

# The ARMY HISTORIAN

A PUBLICATION OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY

Number 10

Washington, D.C.

Winter 1986

## Army Historians and Historic Preservation:

### The Alaska Example

D. Colt Denfeld

The fortieth anniversary of the end of World War II has meant—in addition to commemorative events and considerable media coverage—an increased sensitivity to the preservation of historical military sites. Although public awareness on this issue is a very recent development, the preservation of military sites has been going on for some time. Army historians have an important role to play in this activity. In addition to their traditional functions of conducting archival and other documentary research, Army historians are called upon to survey and evaluate physical remains of old installations. In the preservation process, they make field surveys to identify and evaluate such military objects and sites as fortifications, buildings, battlefields, and the flotsam of war.

This expanded role for Army historians in historic preservation is perhaps nowhere as evident as in the US Army Corps of Engineers clean-up program in its Alaska District. The program, funded out of the Defense Environmental Restoration Account (DERA), has responsibility for the removal of debris from former Department of Defense properties. The Alaska District probably leads the nation in the number of abandoned military bases. During World War II an entire region of the Aleutians was built up and within five years abandoned, leaving behind the enormous amount of debris that today litters these beautiful islands. Forty years of neglect and extreme northern weather have decayed but not obliterated some 20,000 structures at about thirty separate installations.

Were it not for historical concerns, ridding these islands and other Alaskan regions of the military debris littering them would have been a relatively straightforward task for the Engineers. There were two principal historical issues: the

importance of the Alaskan aspects of World War II and the potential the abandoned sites provided for rare examples of military architecture.

As an American territory in World War II, Alaska underwent both Japanese carrier-based air attacks and land invasions. Clean-up activities threatened the destruction of relics that could provide physical dimensions to the Alaskan wartime experience. The DERA program therefore included a historian position to provide preservation expertise.

Many of the abandoned bases are on remote and uninhabited islands, and some of the structures found—relatively untouched—are among the last examples of their kind. Field surveys have located a variety of Civilian Conservation Corps designs, as well as untouched Quonset huts, Pacific huts (plywood twins of Quonsets, developed later in the war to avoid the use of critical materials), Stout houses (twelve-by-sixteen-foot prefabricated huts), and many other buildings either rare or found only in Alaska. A few of the rare buildings were structurally sound, permitting their retention; others were



Dutch Harbor. Photo by Jim Stuhler

sufficiently intact to allow their documentation through Historic American Building Survey projects.

The program provided for systematic surveys at every DERA project site to ensure the protection of historic relics at Attu, Kiska, Dutch Harbor, and other Alaskan restoration areas. The DERA historian, in coordination with the Alaska State Historic Preservation Office and the US National Park Service, was to conduct archival research and then field surveys to identify and evaluate the military remains. Those elements central to the Aleutian campaign or which could effectively recount the war in Alaska were to be located and when possible retained. Some of these features were to be actively sought out; others located during the survey

phase. Located to date have been rare buildings, Japanese and American weapons, Japanese submarines, fortifications, such as downed aircraft as P-38s, P-40s, and B-24s, and many small items recalling the war.

The majority of the buildings at the abandoned military sites were beyond saving; years of neglect and the Aleutians' strong winds had collapsed them. Among the thousand of decayed structures, however, there were a few standing examples of each type. These were to be searched for, located, excluded from the clean-up operation, and left as historical documents. On Amchitka Island, for example, over 1,800 Pacific and Quonset huts were located. The island was one large pile of scattered iron sheets and wood debris, and few of the huts were

## Editor's Journal

In a December 1985 memorandum, the Secretary of Defense asked each of the military department secretaries to find ways to reduce by fifty-five percent the expense of producing periodicals. The Department of the Army intends to exceed this goal by a variety of means, among them reduction of printing costs for individual periodicals, elimination of unnecessary duplication, cancellation of some periodicals, and reduction of free subscriptions. *TAH* is a small operation. We do a printing of 6,000 copies of a sixteen-page issue quarterly (or as close to quarterly as we can manage). The Center of Military History made a pretty good case for the periodical's cost effectiveness in a recent Annual Periodicals and Pamphlets Review. The need for a periodical of this sort has already been established.

One cause of concern, however, is whether the issues are reaching the people on our distribution list. About half of *TAH* distribution is for individuals. When we began compiling our original distribution list two years ago, we included, for example, all Army officers who had been awarded the 5X Additional Skill Indicator for having earned an advanced degree in history. The periodically updated MILPERCEN list of 5Xs provides something less than ideal mailing addresses, and although we try to keep our 5X mailing list up-to-date some addresses are falling through the cracks. Many 5Xs have notified us of their changes of address. We urge all our individual subscribers—especially military—to do so, either by using the form included in each *TAH* issue, the standard Postal Service card, or

the Army change-of-address card. Since there is little likelihood *TAH* will be able to increase its printing run of each issue, we have to make the best use of all the copies we have. We'd appreciate whatever help our subscribers can provide.

### *The ARMY HISTORIAN*

*The Army Historian* (ISSN 0748-2299) is published by the Department of the Army, U.S. Army Center of Military History. Opinions expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the official policy of the Department of Defense, the Department of the Army, or the Center of Military History. The reproduction of articles for educational purposes is encouraged.

*Secretary of the Army*  
John O. Marsh, Jr.

*Chief of Staff, US Army*  
General John A. Wickham, Jr.

*Chief of Military History*  
Brig. Gen. William A. Stofft

*Chief Historian*  
Dr. David F. Trask

*Editor*  
Dr. Brooks E. Kleber

Correspondence and subscription requests should be addressed to Managing Editor, *The Army Historian*, U.S. Army Center of Military History, 20 Massachusetts Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20314-0200. Telephone AUTOVON 285-1278 or commercial (202) 272-1278. Use of funds for printing this publication has been approved by the Department of the Army on September 17, 1983, in accordance with the provisions of AR 310-1. Third-class postage paid at Washington, DC.

standing. Two groups of Amchitka Pacific huts and a few other structures—including two Birchwood hangers—were found relatively intact and were excluded from clean-up.

At Dutch Harbor, scene of Japanese carrier-based attacks in June 1942, field surveys emphasized the physical evidence of raids. Surrounding this Aleutian community were thousands of dangerous buildings that had been part of the Dutch Harbor Naval Operating Base and Fort Mears. They had to be removed, but historic features—especially those recalling the raids—had to be identified for preservation. There were particular problems associated with this effort. At Fort Mears, for example, the raids had destroyed two barracks and killed twenty-five soldiers. Since a large part of the post was in place at the time of the 1985 clean-up it was possible that the foundations or debris of the destroyed mobilization-type barracks might be located. Although the barracks sites were pinpointed from as-built maps and aerial photographs of Fort Mears, the on-site field survey revealed that a new road had obliterated all evidence of them in 1981. The field survey did produce more positive results. A number of reminders of World War II soldiers' and sailors' daily lives in the Aleutians were discovered and preserved. The survey identified for preservation artwork, living areas, and the quarters in which Japanese POWs were held. A few buildings were structurally sound enough to be saved. A team of Historic American Building Survey architects compiled architectural documentation for those removed.

For the project's Army historian, the final phase of the clean-up program is the preparation of historical reports on each site and of a historic monograph for the more important areas. At this writing, the monograph on Dutch Harbor is under way. In its final form, it will include a history of the Unalaska/Dutch Harbor region, a description of the construction of Fort Mears and the Dutch Harbor Naval Operating Base, an account of the Japanese raids, descriptions of life at the bases following the raids, and accounts of the base closings and the clean-up project.

The DERA environmental restoration efforts in Alaska provide a good example of the compromise possible between historic preservation and other needs. An Army historian was able to perform a critical task in the program, identifying and evaluating surviving features so that evidence of the historical past can be retained while at the same time the Aleutian Islands can

be returned almost to their former, uncluttered state.

*Dr. Denfeld is the DERA project historian, Anchorage, Alaska.*

## A Lesson Learned

The Rangers' defeat [at Cisterna, Italy, where in January 1944 all but six of 767-man Ranger force were killed or captured by the Germans] was due to several causes, but one of the factors that contributed to the battle's outcome preceded it by several months and is worth examining in detail at this point. This was the decline in the unit's combat skills resulting from the dilution of a well-trained, extremely cohesive unit by less well-trained replacements for those original members who had become casualties. Ironically, the Rangers suffered most of these casualties when the force was used as conventional infantry rather than as the special strike force that it was. These casualties began to mount immediately after Salerno.

Michael J. King, *Rangers: Selected Combat Operations in World War II*, Leavenworth Paper No. 11 (Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, US Army Command and General Staff College, 1985), p. 29.

## Call for Articles

*The Army Historian* is seeking articles of from 300 to 2,500 words for publication in future issues. Articles on such topics as Army historical activities, current research, the uses of military history and its position in the Army, past commanders' use of history, military historiography, programs promoting historical mindedness, and professional reading are being considered. Accepted submissions are edited for clarity and suitability, but every effort is made to preserve the authors' individual styles. Where possible, photographic prints related to the articles would be very helpful, and will be returned to authors of accepted manuscripts upon request. Manuscripts should be double-spaced, in two copies, accompanied by a daytime telephone number and a brief description of the writer's current position, and sent to Managing Editor, *The Army Historian*, U.S. Army Center of Military History, 20 Massachusetts Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20314-0200.



# Military History, Command Support, and the Mission: The TRADOC Experience

Henry O. Malone, Jr.

The commander's support is essential to the success of any command historical program. While there are various ways to gauge the degree of this support, one indicator is the staff historian's alignment in the command group itself or as a member of the special staff, reporting directly to the command group. When the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) was established in 1973, its headquarters historical function at Fort Monroe, Virginia, was aligned as a separate office in the command group. This development recognized that command history needs to be written from the commander's perspective, presenting a view of events as seen from the command element rather than from a staff agency viewpoint, and that this could best be accomplished by giving the staff historian access to the commander and the staff principals, as well as to the decision-making process.

The new alignment changed the way the staff historical function operated, and its effectiveness increased as a result of the new visibility and access to information. Despite having a small historical office staff and few resources for the command historical program, the TRADOC program was recognized as one of the best in the Army. As important as proper organizational alignment is for the most effective execution of the staff historical function, however, it must be connected with substantive command support in other ways if the program is to realize its full potential.

There is probably no clearer indicator of command support for military history than the reactions of commanders when resources and training time are constrained. A 1975 mandated reduction in the length of officer advanced courses at branch schools led to the elimination of military history instruction from almost all their curricula. Only one branch school—Armor—retained a required military history course. The school's commandant was Maj. Gen. Donn A. Starry; some two years later, he had advanced to four-star rank and command of TRADOC. It was not long before the impact of his attitude toward military history was felt.

In August 1978, upon the recommendation of his Chief Historian, Dr. Brooks E. Kleber, General Starry sent a personal message to TRADOC school commandants emphasizing that "a knowledge of military history—the acquisition of a sense of historical mindedness—is a necessary component of an officer's technical competence." Concurrently, General Starry approved a Combined Arms Center proposal for the establishment of an academic department-level activity within the Command and General Staff College to take the lead in developing an integrated, progressive program of military history instruction in the TRADOC service school system, as well as to teach military history in the college and conduct historical research. The new activity, designated the "Combat Studies Institute," was formed on a provisional basis in January 1979 under the direction of Lt. Col. Charles R. Shrader, and was officially activated in June of that year under the leadership of then Lt. Col. William A. Stofft. By the spring of 1981, a nascent Military History Education Program had been developed in TRADOC, with prescribed military history courses in basic and advanced officer courses, in the Command and General Staff Officer Course, and in the Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC).

In March 1981 General Starry described the important role of military history in TRADOC to a visiting group of historians at Fort Monroe. At the conclusion of his talk, he was asked how long the current emphasis on military history would last. In an answer cogently illustrating the necessity of command support, he replied, "At least as long as I remain in command." Four months later General Starry was reassigned. Named to succeed him, however, was Lt. Gen. Glenn K. Otis, then Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans in the Army General Staff and formerly Deputy Commanding General of the Armor Center under General Starry. Soon after putting on his fourth star, General Otis outlined three areas of emphasis for TRADOC, his "three M's": *Mobilization Planning*, *Maintaining the Force*, and *Modernizing the Force*. Shortly afterward, he was called upon to make

clear his attitude toward military history. Some elements in the command had already taken steps to retrench in the military history area, having assumed that the new commander would be unwilling to pay the price necessary to perpetuate "this Starry initiative." General Otis, however, quickly showed how wrong that perception was. In a talk to his subordinate commanders, he explained that in reality he had "four M's": *Military History*, *Mobilization Planning*, *Maintaining the Force*, and *Modernization of the Force*. The impact of his emphasis on the historical dimension was not lost on the listeners, who included some forty-five general officers. The fate of military history in TRADOC seemed secure for the near term.

Following General Otis' reassignment in March 1983, General William R. Richardson, well known as a strong supporter of military history, became TRADOC Commander. He came, like his predecessor, from the post of Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans in Washington, and had served as Commander of the Combined Arms Center, Commandant of the Command and General Staff College, and Deputy Commander of TRADOC under General Starry. In those posts General Richardson had played a key role in the revival of military history instruction in the Army, including supporting and guiding the development of the Combat Studies Institute at Fort Leavenworth. Very soon after taking over at TRADOC, he confirmed the historical community's expectations of him, demonstrating in a dramatic way his determination to strengthen and improve both the Military History Education Program and the Command History Program. To appreciate the significance of what General Richardson did, it is necessary to look back at some changes in the Army's organization over the previous four decades.

When General George C. Marshall reorganized the War Department in March 1942, the combat arms lost their branch chiefs. Twenty years later the Department of the Army abolished most of the technical service chief positions and, along with them, the technical service historical offices. Another twenty years later, the Army returned to the concept of branch chiefs, but not as part of the DA Staff. In 1982, Army Chief of Staff General Edward C. Meyer approved designation of the commandants of most of TRADOC's branch schools as chiefs of their respective arms or technical services. The Commandant of the Infantry School, for example,

became the Army's Chief of Infantry; that of the Quartermaster School became Quartermaster General of the Army. Even in cases where there were branch chiefs on the Army Staff, the respective branch school commandants were delegated Army-wide proponentcy for specific functions. The Commandant of the Engineer School, for example, became the Army-wide proponent for combat engineering.

In conjunction with this revival of the branch chief posts, the TRADOC Historical Office developed a concept for placing a civilian Army historian at each TRADOC functional center in order to provide each branch chief or functional proponent a professional history program that could meet the needs of the Army for accurate and documented branch history. Furthermore, professional historians in the centers could make important contributions in support of the emerging TRADOC Military History Education Program, assisting with course development and instruction and serving as the focal points of "history cells" in the branch schools. In December 1982, the TRADOC Commander's Advisory Board on Military History Education, under the chairmanship of Maj. Gen. John B. Blount, TRADOC Chief of Staff, evaluated the concept and recommended that branch school commandants adopt it. The problem was that establishment of the positions had to be done by realignment of an existing manpower authorization, a price many commandants were not willing to pay unless they saw it as the TRADOC Commander's clearly defined policy.

It is against this background that, in March 1983, the new TRADOC Commander directed the implementation of the plan the Advisory Board had endorsed. General Richardson tasked sixteen service school commandants with the creation of a civilian Army historian position on each of their personal staffs. His action was based on the firm belief that an understanding of history undergirds the development of a professional cadre of officers sensitive to the demands of peace and war, and that the role of history as one of the pillars of TRADOC's doctrinal and combat developments processes must be strengthened. Because of the strong command support for military history, the climate in the Headquarters staff was sympathetic to yet another subordinate command's request to be allowed to establish a staff historian position. The approval of this request—from a command with no TRADOC school assigned to it and for which significant manpower cuts were projected—testified convincingly to the TRADOC

Commander's belief that proper use of history can be a tool for the more efficient use of resources. Training, doctrine, combat developments, resource management—in reality it is a question of mission accomplishment. Early in 1985, General Richardson made clear his idea of the connection between military history and the TRADOC mission:

We have a special responsibility in TRADOC—with our mission to prepare the Army for war, together with our functional proponentcy for the arms and services of the Army—to prepare and use military history in the development of doctrine, organizations, equipment, and training appropriate to the demands of modern war. Given that responsibility, it is not satisfactory that we meet only the minimum standards for historical activity which the Army Historical Program requires. On the contrary, TRADOC must set the standard of excellence within the Army for . . . achieving Army historical objectives.

In recognition of General Richardson's important role in laying the groundwork for the use of military history to help accomplish the Army's mission, the Society for History in the Federal Government awarded him its prestigious Franklin Delano Roosevelt Prize in April 1985. This award, given by the Society only once every three years to the individual who has made the most outstanding contribution to the advancement of history in the Federal government, testifies to the high level of command support military history receives in TRADOC. But the emphasis on history goes beyond the service schools, ROTC, and other subordinate TRADOC commands. At TRADOC head-

quarters, the command group supports a Military History Lecture Program; two recent speakers, David Chandler and Richard Holmes of Sandhurst, were bought in at the commander's personal initiative. The headquarters is also conducting staff rides, newly mandated as part of officer professional development courses in TRADOC, with participation by the TRADOC Commander, its Chief of Staff, and other general officers. Recent staff rides have been to the battlefields at Fredericksburg and Gettysburg.

These developments out of the TRADOC experience validate the view that military history is an important ingredient in the successful accomplishment of Army objectives. Fifteen years ago high-level concern about the post-World War II decline in the Army's use of military history led to the creation of a "Department of the Army Ad Hoc committee on the Army Need for the Study of Military History." The committee concluded that, if the Army wanted to be led by leaders with broad perspective, sharpened judgment, increased perceptivity, and professional expertise, it was indeed necessary for officers to study and use military history. TRADOC has been led by a series of commanders who strongly endorse this appraisal. The preparation and use of military history has consequently become an undertaking of high priority in TRADOC, tied directly to successful accomplishment of the command's mission.

*Dr. Malone is Chief Historian, US Army Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe, Virginia.*

## History in CGSC's School of Advanced Military Studies

Douglas V. Johnson II and Harold R. Winton

To meet the challenges of preparing for and conducting war, commanders and principal staff officers of tactical and operational formations need sound military judgment, competence in planning and leadership, and professional ethics. It is the mission of the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS), founded in the Command and General Staff College in June 1983, to foster the development of these crucial traits in selected field grade officers. Extensive use of military history is an important part of the School's program to meet these goals.

The premise of the School's historical program is that in order to prepare for the future, as its mission requires, and to comprehend the at-

tendant nature of change, it is essential to understand that the future, the present, and the past are all part of a continuum. Projections of the future's possibilities must be based upon an understanding of what lies behind the present, and that means understanding the historical processes at work behind events.

Before beginning the School's Advanced Military Studies Course, the selected officer is required to take two preparatory courses taught as electives in the Command and General Staff Officer Course. The first is the History of Modern Military Thought, taught by members of the Command and General Staff College's Combat Studies Institute. The second is a series



of Military Classics Colloquia, taught by the SAMS Historian. These colloquia examine the evolution of the art of war from antiquity to the present, focusing on the causes and consequences of adapting or failure to adapt to changing environments.

The School's curriculum then opens with an intensive examination of the historical roots of the theory of war. This translates into a sometimes painfully thorough examination of the works of such military thinkers as Clausewitz, J.F.C. Fuller, and B.H. Liddel Hart, to name a few. (Air and sea power theorists are studied later in the Joint Theory and Doctrine block.) The study of these works is intended to create in the students a firm grounding in the foundations of art and science of war (apologies to J.F.C. Fuller), upon which the remainder of the course rests. Otherwise, we would, like the "foolish man," end up building an elaborate edifice upon shifting sand.

War games, all based upon historical data, form a major component of the next subcourse. As the students examine the roles of the Army's branches within the contexts of the war games, they must invariably uncover and trace historical roots.

The following subcourse is a series of campaign studies ranging from the Napoleonic era to the Falklands war and including four pre-World War II campaigns, five World War II campaigns, and three post-World War II campaigns. Here the focus is on the practice of operational art—the linkage of tactical events with strategic results in a theater of operations or theater of war.

In the next subcourse, Planning and Conduct of Major Operations and Campaigns, students read portions of works by Alfred Thayer Mahan, Julian Corbett, Billy Mitchell, Arthur Trenchard, and others to understand why the Air Force and Navy think the ways they do—a clearly historical undertaking that drives home the basic theoretical foundations upon which those service doctrines rest. Also founded upon a deep historical base, the final subcourse, Low Intensity Conflict, includes analyses of both the French and American experiences with revolutionary and conventional warfare in Indochina.

There is a great deal more to the course than outlined here, but the point is that history is one of its primary vehicles. The intent is not to study the historical examples for their sakes, alone. In close cooperation with the Combat Studies Institute, the School uses living history to put flesh on the dry bones of theory and doctrine. Having

repeatedly confronted, in a wide variety of contexts, Santayana's oft-quoted assertion that "those who do not know their past are condemned to repeat it," the School's students complete their studies well-equipped to use their analyses of the past to ask the correct questions of the present and future. They will then be in better positions to confront, in a comprehensive and balanced manner, the tough issues facing today's military professional.

---

*Lieutenant Colonels Johnson and Winton were two of the original seminar leaders/course authors in the School of Advanced Military Studies, US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Lieutenant Colonel Winton is currently Deputy Director of SAMS; Lieutenant Colonel Johnson is currently assigned to the Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.*

---

### Drums and Trumpets Corner

This issue's offering of powder-burned prose is on the Battle of Fredericksburg:

How beautifully they came on! Their bright bayonets glistening in the sunlight made the line look like a huge serpent of blue and steel. The very force of their onset leveled the broad fences bounding the small fields and gardens that interspersed the plain. We could see our shells bursting in the ranks, making great gaps; but on they came, as though they would go straight through and over us. Now we gave them canister, and that staggered them. A few more paces onward and the Georgians in the road below us rose up, and, glancing an instant along their rifle barrels, let loose a storm of lead into the faces of the advance brigade. This was too much; the column hesitated, and then, turning, took refuge behind the bank. But another line appeared from behind the crest and advanced gallantly. . . . But this advance, like the preceding one, although passing the point reached by the first column, and doing and daring all that brave men could do, recoiled under our canister and the bullets of the infantry in the road, and fell back in confusion . . . . Among other missiles a 3-inch rifle-ball came crashing through the works and fell at our feet. Kursheedt picked it up and said, "Boys, let's send this back to them again"; and into the gun it went, and was sped back into the dense ranks of the enemy.

First Lieutenant William Miller Owen, C.S.A., "A Hot Day on Marye's Heights," in *Battles and Leaders of the Civil War; Being for the Most Part Contributions by Union and Confederate Officers* . . . . (New York: Century, 1884), III: 98.

## PERSPECTIVE

# Civilian Historians in the Army ROTC Classroom: A View from the Trenches

Thomas J. Adriance

*The Army Historian* continues here its series of guest contributions on the state of military history. The following essay is adapted from a talk delivered at the Center in December 1985. Professor Adriance is Associate Chairman of the Department of History, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Blacksburg, Virginia.

My opportunity to speak at the Center of Military History on my experience organizing and teaching a course in military history for senior Army ROTC cadets afforded the Army historians there a chance to learn, from a classroom instructor's perspective, what happens when military history is turned over to a civilian history professor. For me, it was an opportunity to review the process by which I shifted into military history, and to assess the results.

This prompted several questions in my mind. Why had the Army decided to have civilians teach the required ROTC history course, especially since neither the Navy nor the Air Force had? What, moreover, had my participation in the ROTC Military History Workshop at West Point done for me? Had it prepared me to teach the history course the Army seemed to want? And consequently what was the history course I did teach? Has that course evolved? How and why? Has this satisfied the ROTC unit at my university? What kind of relationship have I had with them anyway?

A memorandum issued in October 1980 by Brig. Gen. Daniel W. French, US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Deputy Chief of Staff for ROTC, answered my first question. Beginning in the 1981-1982 academic year, it said, ROTC units were to implement an upgraded history course, modeled "somewhat" after an elective offered at the United States Military Academy. The prototype course was outlined in the TRADOC syllabus, copies of which all the addressees soon received. The "somewhat," however, implied flexibility. Instructors, General French wrote, could offer a course in European or Western military history. But the key phrase that opened the door to me was the following: "It is strongly urged that such a course be taught by civilian academics from either the history or political science departments."

Clearly, Army policy was to obtain civilian instructors to teach one of their courses. Why? Cost effectiveness, I inferred, was a strong motive, and in my mind this made good sense. The Army would send civilian historians to a workshop to prepare, retool, or bone up to teach the course. In return, the Army would get several years of service from these people, thus obviating the need constantly to train new officers for brief tours of duty with ROTC units. Universities too would benefit. History departments, as General French pointedly noted, would get increased enrollments, while administrators would be pleased to see an upper-level course in a declining liberal arts discipline prosper. (Furthermore, universities, not the Army, would be paying the salaries of these instructors, something the memorandum tactfully did not mention.)

Cost effectiveness, however, was neither the only nor the principal concern. When General French wrote that the new policy "ensures the long-term stability of instructors . . .," he had more than economy in mind. He hoped that instructors would shape, revise, and improve their classes in the light of their teaching experiences, resulting, one would hope, in a better quality history course.

The TRADOC memorandum also shows that the Army never intended to remove ROTC faculty entirely from a history-teaching role. ROTC staff, it noted, were to engage in team teaching with the civilians and "to take the lead in organizing field trips to local battlefields, museums and military installations." Was I not to infer that my ROTC unit was expected—or at least encouraged—to cooperate with me in developing and offering the course?

A summer workshop at West Point, guaranteed enrollments, ROTC support for starting a new course—all these made the TRADOC proposal attractive. Although I was a civilian with no military experience, I had an in-



terest in the subject. I had written a dissertation on the French army, had sometimes introduced military topics into my courses, and had even taught military history on an experimental basis. Because of teaching assignments, administrative duties, and departmental skepticism, I had never proposed a regular course in the topic. Now I had reason to do so. Departmental opposition dissipated, a formal course was adopted, and in June 1981 I set out for West Point.

That year's ROTC Military History Workshop was considered a transitional one. The characterization was apt: our "class" was new wine being poured into old bottles. For the first time the majority was civilian. No doubt the tone differed. The civilians were experienced history teachers, most with Ph.D.s. They wore not military insignia but the badge of practicing professional historians, and many were engaged in ongoing research and publication. No doubt too the attitude differed; there was an air of respectful, healthy skepticism, a tendency to look askance at military practices and traditions. Yet if the members were a different breed, the program was not. In content it was the same as the year before. Therein lay the problem. It was a workshop designed to turn officers into history instructors being presented to history professors who were not officers.

But what a program it was! It consisted of a compact, intensive six-week course including sixty-five one-hour seminar sessions, usually three per day, and sixteen guest lectures, some delivered by the most recognized authorities in military history in the US today. In addition, there were one or two films each afternoon and a whirlwind three-day field trip to Antietam and Gettysburg. For each "seminar" there was a respectable reading assignment plus an extensive bibliography for further reference. On top of this, each participant was expected to be the lecturer or discussion leader in three seminar sessions.

Although the schedule was exhausting, it afforded me immeasurable benefits, and for that reason I have never regretted participating. The seminars provided me with a host of materials I could incorporate into my courses. The extensive syllabi supplied me with leading questions; the bibliographies, with sources for answers. The battlefield tours taught me what one might (and might not) try to accomplish with such exercises; my turns as discussion leader gave me similar experiences.

The greatest benefits, however, were in-

tangible. They consisted of the ideas I obtained from the guest lecturers and fellow participants. These people repeatedly astonished me. Well do I remember my surprise at Russell Weigley's upward revision of the reputations of Douglas Haig and Erich Falkenhayn who, he implied, correctly understood the nature of the war in 1915-1916 and what needed to be done. What a delight was David Schoenbaum's playful suggestion that the West Point faculty, representatives of a military that had twice defeated the Germans in the twentieth century, ought not for that reason to place the Great German General Staff on so high a pedestal.

An equally important benefit—perhaps the most valuable—was the opportunity I had to make contact with other military historians. Before I got to the workshop I knew neither the other participants, the West Point faculty, nor the guest lecturers, except for a few by name. Through the workshop I became acquainted with several fellow military historians and what was "going on" in the field.

Even so I came away disappointed. I had gone there with hopes of doing work in areas of military history where I felt weakest. As a trained Europeanist, I believed I needed to familiarize myself with the main currents of the military history of the United States: its military policy and institutions, its military thought, campaigns, and leadership, and its military historiography. I strongly believed that in the "modern military history" I proposed to teach, American and European developments should be viewed as a part of a continuous whole. Yet I knew little about the American side of the story and counted on the workshop to fill in the gap. At West Point, however, I was offered an intensive version of a familiar subject: a survey of the military history of Western civilization. So I never had my most pressing needs fulfilled.

Prepared or not, I returned to my university to teach the course I entitled "Modern Military History." I chose that title deliberately for its ambiguity. It gave me the flexibility to expand or contract the chronological and geographical dimensions as circumstances dictated. I could experiment with topics and add and subtract lectures from year to year. In my first try, I assigned my class selected readings from Ropp's *War in the Modern World*, Matloff's *American Military History*, and Keegan's *The Face of Battle*. I set out to show my students that the American military experience has been shaped not solely or necessarily most significantly by

forces unique to US society, but also by experiences and cultural and social influences of a broader Western or Atlantic civilization of which the US is a part. In practical terms, this meant that I intended to highlight both American and European military history.

Did I succeed? Those three books do not, after all, quite fit together, nor did any of the outside book report assignments, which I had the students select from an approved list, help tie ends together. Worse yet, my university operates on a quarter system in which each course meets only twenty-nine class hours per quarter. Since the local ROTC program allowed me only one quarter for the course, students got only two-thirds of the semester that the Army wanted them to have. Under these circumstances what surprises me is not that I failed to reach my goal, but that I covered as much as I did. The course was supposed to begin with the American and French revolutionary wars and to trace key American and European military developments in parallel fashion to the present. My objective was a dream; we barely got into World War II.

The next year I retained the same theme, but charged the chronological coverage to start at the mid-nineteenth century. The transformations of warfare brought on by industrialization, democracy, and nationalism—symbolized by the railroad, mass armies, and rifled weapons—now became the beginning from which I could move, as I did, past World War II and into the 1960's. This time I felt more satisfied by the coverage I offered; so did the students. The focus was more heavily twentieth-century, and that better fit their notion of what was "modern." Convinced that I had now found the formula for a meaningful one-quarter military history course, I prepared to cover essentially the same material for an indefinite time in the future. Once again I had guessed wrong.

In fact, I had gotten by for two years teaching a course not adequately adapted to the quarter system. In retrospect I think I did so without causing much discontent because of a sort of unwritten, unspoken collusion between me and the students. There were about thirty of them each year, and most were ROTC cadets. They wanted some military history, preferably of the drum and trumpet kind, but would take whatever came their way. They were also a clubby little bunch who knew each other, studied together, and prepared for tests together. They conned me endlessly about their selection of outside readings. We liked each other, and between us

there developed a conspiracy of silence. If the course lacked a focus and seemed headed in too many directions, that was OK by them. They learned lots anyway, and it mattered not to most of them that little of it made much overall sense.

Beyond two years no such arrangements could be maintained. In my third year General French's predictions proved correct. Enrollment quadrupled, and I had to make adjustments to cope with the new numbers. The changes I made, however, were mechanical: I increased the amount of mark-sense, machine-gradable testing and reduced the writing assignments. I did not alter the syllabus. As a result, the course's faults emerged in sharp detail. The new students had far less patience with a class that seemed to lack cohesion and less tolerance for an expensive textbook of which they were required to read only portions. Many of them expressed their dissatisfaction with pointed but justifiable remarks on their class evaluations. So I had to rethink the whole structure of the class.

What emerged is a course designed to fit into the quarter system, be presented to large classes, serve both civilians and cadets, and trace a few themes clearly from beginning to the present. My aim is still the same: to explain the American military experience in the broader context of Western military history. The course is now structured around two different books, Larry Addington's *The Patterns of War Since the Eighteenth Century* and Russell Weigley's *The American Way of War*. The selection of these texts entails many sacrifices, some of which TRADOC will regret. The Weigley volume does not stress policy, institutions, technology, or the interrelation of society and the military. My students will not get a history of the US Army, how it has developed and functioned, what its role has been at home and abroad. Weigley's is an examination of the conduct of war and the definition of strategy at the highest levels. Neither this volume nor the Addington one provides the student with an analysis of combat of a quality such as Keegan's *The Face of Battle*, a volume I reluctantly dropped from the syllabus when I learned the publisher could not guarantee delivery of adequate copies in time for the course.

The tradeoffs have been worth the cost. Weigley's is a well-written, elegant, erudite volume. It provides my classes with a coherent set of themes and fits well within the ten-week constraints imposed on my course. I have time too for discussion, even in a large classroom.



And discussion there is likely to be, for although Weigley argues his points well he does not avoid controversy. Many of his remarks provoke good students into taking a stand and arguing their points of view. As a volume which both stimulates debate among students and teaches them about military history, it strikes me as a most satisfactory introduction to the subject.

The Weigley book also defines my place in the classroom. In a way, Weigley does fit the American way of war into a Western context, although he assumes his readers have a broader base of knowledge than most ROTC cadets in fact possess. My lectures provide information these students need, a lot of which is drawn from European military history. The legacy of Frederick the Great, elements of Napoleonic strategy, the influence of Jomini and Clausewitz, the significance of the Franco-Prussian War, the rise of the Great German General Staff, the shortcomings of the Schlieffen Plan—all these topics the students need to understand. Part of every class period is devoted to material not adequately covered in the readings.

Thus the course has become a broad overview of the military history of the Western World in the past two centuries. The focus is upon the experience of one of these Western nations—our own—but I try to make comparisons when they seem appropriate. For each class session there is a theme or question announced in the previous class. Classes usually begin with a discussion of the points covered in the assignment. This is followed by a brief lecture introducing material inadequately covered in the reading, or illustrating themes from both reading and discussion.

If I am now satisfied that I have found a formula I can work with given the constraints placed upon me, I nonetheless regret the shortcomings remaining. "Modern" is a flexible term which, when crammed into a ten-week mold, invites superficiality. Topics sometimes get a cursory treatment; there is little time to pause for a detailed examination of a subject. It is hard to provide treatment of events in recent military history, when issues are most complex and controversial. Furthermore, a stated TRADOC goal reiterated in a lecture by Theodore Ropp at the 1981 workshop has been missed: students get far less of an opportunity to express their knowledge and organize their thoughts in writing. The sheer numbers General French's memorandum promised us have forced a reduction of the course's writing component.

All of this suggests that my experience has produced something different from what the Army originally intended. Does this seem to affect the Army's ROTC unit at my university? I have an obligation to teach a part of its program. Is its faculty satisfied that the cadets' professional training is being enhanced through my course? An answer is difficult to reach, but my tentative answer is "yes." "Yes," because relations between us are excellent; the spirit of cooperation and cordiality is exemplary. "Yes," because they regularly send me information I may need. "Yes," because the head of the ROTC program told me they were pleased with the job I was doing and that the students were, too. Yet "tentative," because the course has not been formally evaluated, neither by an official in the ROTC program nor by any professional historian.

There is, I suspect, a good reason. I think that wherever military history has been turned over to civilian history departments, ROTC faculty are delighted to have the course off their hands. This should be no surprise. Most Army officers are not trained to be professional historians, nor do they ever expect to function as such. Few combine those qualifications so aptly described by Roger Cirillo in the Spring 1985 *Army Historian*. Most officers probably do not want to teach history, and unlike high school football coaches they are honest enough not to try. Wherever there is mutual respect between the ROTC faculty and civilian historians, wherever each can appreciate the capacities of the other and accept their liabilities—and this situation obtains, I believe, at my university—I think ROTC departments are likely to leave the historians alone. Each can cultivate his own garden; the students can benefit from the variety.

Still, the lack of a more vigorous interchange between ROTC faculty and civilian historians is to be regretted. Perhaps my course should be evaluated. I believe I can respond positively to informed and helpful criticism. I am also willing to consider requests from ROTC that I cover topics they deem essential. Furthermore, nothing has come of General French's recommendation that the course be team-taught. At my university—and elsewhere too, I suspect—no such thing has occurred. I know why. I forgot the recommendation and so too did the Army ROTC unit. When I recently reminded the head of the local program that there was such a policy, his response was clear, straightforward, and practical. It was a good idea, he said, but his staff had too many other duties to perform.



They lacked the time. I have no doubt he was correct.

Do I think that my experience demonstrates that the goals General French's memorandum set forth five years ago have been reached? What I see is a kind of compromise between the ideal and no history at all. In my case, the Army has gotten a civilian instructor with no record of military service; a classroom swamped with students from outside ROTC, thus reducing the amount of attention paid to the specific needs of the cadets; an ROTC department so burdened

with duties it cannot participate in the history course; and a peculiar university calendar that shortchanges everybody. On the other hand, the ROTC has obtained the services of a trained professional historian with both enthusiasm for and experience with subject, the cooperation and good will of a very busy history department, and the assurance that the course will evolve to meet the needs of all involved and to avoid mistakes made in the past. All in all, I think the Army has gotten a good deal.

## The First Army Library

George W. Aux

The rapid growth in the use of the US Army Military History Institute has not been accompanied by a commensurate rise in the size of its staff. The efforts of volunteers have partially compensated for this situation. We benefited significantly this past year from the volunteer efforts of two military retirees who reside in the Carlisle community. Col. Wally Aux graciously accepted the challenge to trace the lineages of several thousand books in the Army's rare book collection and was capably assisted by retired Warrant Officer Aime Caron. While both men continue to render faithful and much appreciated service on other projects, their completed inventory of our rare books has helped clarify the extent of a remarkable holding, the first library of the Army.

—Col. Rod Paschall, Director, MHI

The rare book collection of the US Army Military History Institute (MHI) at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, comprises over 5,000 volumes, the great majority of which were printed before 1850. This collection had its origin in the office library of the first Secretary of War, Henry Knox, established in the mid-1790s. President George Washington still held office then, and it might be reasonably inferred that some of the aged tomes are actually the same books the military officials of his administration—or perhaps the President himself—consulted in the 1790s. Some of these books, such as von Steuben's *Blue Book* or Turpin's *Essay on the Art of War*, may have been used to decide matters of the early Republic's military affairs. MHI's rare books are therefore something more than printed sources of information; they are authentic American artifacts, tangible connections with the nation's past.

The MHI staff had done some previous research on the origins, content and development of this, the first of the Army libraries. By 1984, however, it was clear that the Institute's growing workload would preclude further

research. MHI began at that time an aggressive volunteer recruiting campaign to pit labor against those tasks its permanent staff had to abandon.

My assignment was in the rare book room, continuing previous efforts to determine the origins, content, and evolution of a priceless national treasure. The objective was to verify the existence of the actual books that had made up the original collection, with the intention of eventually reassembling the first Army library. In order to verify those connections, a careful examination of the collection had to be made. This project is far from finished, but the effort thus far has produced a revelation or two.

The present rare book collection probably has more symbolic than actual connection to the original library the first Secretary of War established. Within a few years of its inception, that library was destroyed by fire on Saturday evening, 8 November 1800. At the time, the offices of Secretary of War Samuel Dexter and his few clerks—the entire War Department—occupied the second floor of a rented private dwelling on Washington City's Pennsylvania Avenue. The War Department had recently

moved to the new capital from Philadelphia. The fire that ravaged the War Office Building on that fateful evening was fueled by books shelved ceiling-to-floor against the east wall of Secretary Dexter's office. The Secretary reported that "the library, which was entirely destroyed, was extensive and contained many military works of celebrity."

Restocking the Secretary of War's Library began soon after the 1800 fire, and as a useful library should, the collection grew in size. It comprised probably about one thousand books at the outbreak of the War of 1812. The collection suffered no significant loss or damage during the brief but destructive occupation of the national capital by British troops in 1814. Perhaps the War Department had made an accurate appraisal of the state of Washington's defense, for there is clear indication that the books were transported to temporary safety. By the 1830s the library had grown too large to continue sharing the same office space with the Secretary of War, and a separate room was designated for it. The library contained approximately 7,000 to 8,000 volumes by the 1850s, 15,000 volumes by the late 1870s, and had grown so large by the 1890s that the Chief Signal Officer of the Army was placed in charge. That officer, Brig. Gen. A. W. Greely, called the collection "The Library of the Army and the War Department." With the assistance of the Library of Congress, he organized its holdings and doubled the number of volumes to more than 49,000 by 1904, when his stewardship ended.

In 1904 the War Department Library was placed under the supervision of the new General Staff, specifically its Second Division charged with the duties of military intelligence and information. Almost a decade and 10,000 volumes later, the library was transferred to the Army War College and incorporated into the sizable collection that institution had already gathered. As a result of the merger, the integrity of the former War Department Library was lost. Its history became entwined with that of the Army War College Library, a collection exceeding 100,000 volumes in 1919, a number that tripled over the next half century. The Army War College, dormant during the 1940s, transferred most of its library to the National War College, established in 1946. Only a remnant of the old library accompanied the Army War College to its reopening at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, in 1949-50, and eventually to its Carlisle Barracks home in 1951.

In 1967, when the Military History Research Collection (later renamed the Military History Institute) was established, the "older" holdings of the Army War College were transferred to the new history establishment. MHI's holdings were soon augmented by sizable transfers of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century imprints from the National War College and the US Army Command and General Staff College. Private donations and other acquisitions further enlarged the Institute's holdings of rare books. With its core swollen by increments from a number of different repositories, the MHI rare book collection became a maze that seemed to preclude identification of the pedigrees of individual volumes. What began as a seemingly hopeless task has, however, begun to show results by dint of hard work, a considerable amount of detective-like investigation, and an occasional reasonable deduction.

The "Rosetta Stone" of our investigation turned out to be part of the collection itself, a manuscript ledger listing the holding of the War Department Library in the 1840s. This 13-by-16-inch bound ledger contains ninety-seven pages of handwritten entries representing just over 4,000 individual volumes. Each titled work was entered into one or occasionally two of the ledger's subject sections. Because there is no alphabetical or other recognizable arrangement of the entries in each section, our conclusion is that new books were simply added to the list as they were acquired, leaving a cumulative inventory. The hands of at least four different scribes are clearly evident. The ledger was most probably begun in 1820 when the War Department moved into the Northwest Executive Building, offices it occupied until 1879. The inventory ends at about 1844, a terminal point suggested by the fact that only one entry was found to bear a date of publication in that year, and that no entry date later than 1844 appears. The ledger therefore reveals what books were shelved in the War Department Library during the period 1820-1844, and is our window to the published knowledge available to the military leadership serving the Republic in the National Period and Jacksonian Era.

The ledger's subject sections represent a then-current classification scheme of knowledge, about fifty categories and sub-categories covering subjects as diverse as skirmishes and moral philosophy. Our analysis revealed that seventy percent of the entries fall into only four of the listed subjects: history (31%), military art

(26%), politics (7%), and law (6%). Fortunately, the ledger has provided the means to identify which of the original War Department Library's books are now in the Institute's rare book collection. Each line entry in the ledger indicates a numbered "division" and "shelf" where the item was located in the old library, and corresponding notations can be found inside the covers or on the flyleaves of books in the current collection. By this clue, 540 entries in the ledger—one-third of the total—have been identified in the MHI collection.

Our work has just begun, and we believe continued efforts to reassemble this, the first of our Army's collections of published knowledge, will

yield a wealth of information on the origins and development of the nation's ground combat arm. Our hope is to locate as many more of the ledger-identified volumes as possible and perhaps fill in the gaps in the holdings. Of many yet-to-be-undertaken projects, an interesting and possibly rewarding one would be to investigate the early American exploitation of this body of knowledge. MHI exists to serve both public and official researchers who seek knowledge of our Army's past. In many respects, the basis of that knowledge can be found in the Army's first library, a collection of rare books being reassembled at Carlisle Barracks.

## The New History Net

David R. Campbell

The US Army History Network was officially recognized as a subnet of the Army FORUM on 18 February 1986. The FORUM is the Army's teleconferencing network designed to facilitate communications among action officers and thinkers for the solution of difficult problems. The FORUM has authorized a total of thirty subordinate networks to focus on specific areas of concern to the Army, including the Lite Division Net, Low Intensity Conflict Net, Ammunition Net, and now the History Net.

The Army FORUM originated in 1976 as "Delta Task Force." Army teleconferencing in its current mode, however, began in 1980 with the purchase of CONFER II, a program written by Dr. Robert Parnes of the University of Michigan. CONFER II allows network participants to present items for discussion, comment or vote, and welcomes a magnitude of responses from all. The key word here is *participant*. Many of us know from experience how difficult it is to conduct an orderly and productive conference in which all attendees feel that they have had sufficient floor time to express their views. Conferees seem rarely to come away feeling completely satisfied with the opportunities afforded them for participation. That is why we often see preconference "ice breakers" and "smokers" and postconference gatherings. Conferences are always costly and very often convene at inopportune times.

Teleconferencing has the advantage of giving all participants an equal opportunity to express themselves and adequate time to prepare their

responses. Normally shy participants are not faced with the problem of confronting their fellow discussants. Although every item of discussion and every response is clearly identified with the author's name, normal barriers to personal communications are removed. Titles and ranks are not used; informal discussion is encouraged. Dispensing with formalities and getting to the heart of the discussion saves time.

The History Net is designed to link all CONUS-based historians with the Center of Military History for the purpose of sharing knowledge through thoughtful discussion and frequent contact. Although the goal of the network is to encourage interaction among history professionals, the subnet will not limit participation to the Army historians. Currently, only a few stations outside the Center are actually entered in the net, but soon the Army War College, the Combat Studies Institute, the Military Academy's History Department, and the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations will join.

The majority of field historians recently contacted have expressed enthusiasm for the History Net, a concept that will afford them greater communications between themselves and with the Center. Anyone interested in joining the History Net needs only a computer (any brand), a modem, and an identification number. Interested parties should contact me at AUTOVON 285-1521/0302 or (202)272-1521/0302 for further information.

*Major Campbell is a member of the Analysis Branch, US Army Center of Military History.*



## AT THE CENTER

### 1985 History Writing Awards

The US Army Military History Writing Awards are made annually for the three best military history essays by students in the branch school officer advanced courses and at the Sergeants Major Academy. The schools provide entries which the Command and General Staff College's Combat Studies then rank according to merit. The Center of Military History selected the following three winners of the third annual competition from the finalists:

- First Place: Capt. Paul F. Hunt, Infantry School, "An Analysis of the Cause of the Defeat of Nathaneal Greene's Army at Guilford Courthouse (15 March 1781)."
- Second Place: Capt. Anne Robertson, Signal School, "The Bright and Splendid Shroud: War Poetry and the Military Professional."

Third Place: Capt. John M. Peppers, Infantry School, "Vicksburg—AirLand Battle Campaign or Not?"

In addition to certificates and letters of congratulations from the Chief of Military History, the winners received monetary awards.

### 1986-87 Fellowships

The Center has awarded two Dissertation Year Fellowships annually since 1971. The 1986-87 fellows are John Morgan Dederer of the University of Alabama and David J. Coles of Florida State University. Mr. Dederer's dissertation is entitled "Washington's Lieutenants: American Command and Strategy in the War for Independence." Mr. Coles' is entitled "Duel for the Bluegrass: The 1862 Campaign for Kentucky." Ph.D. candidates interested in applying for the 1987-88 Dissertation Year Fellowships should write to Dr. Lowell K. Dyson, US Army Center of Military History, 20 Massachusetts Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20314-0200, for information.

## COMMENTARY AND EXCHANGE

### To the editors:

I would like to let you know that we find your publication *TAH* to be most useful in the Department of History at the United States Air Force Academy. We regularly circulate it among our supervisory staff and all our military history instructors. Many of the articles, such as "Military History and Officer Education: Some Personal Reflections" by Jay Luvaas (Winter 1985), relate directly to our mission at the Academy. We also find the bibliographies published in the "Professional Reading" section quite helpful, and the reports on recent developments in the field of military history are a great aid for us in maintaining our currency. We look forward to each issue of *TAH* and I would like to take this opportuni-

ty to thank the Center of Military History for putting out such a valuable periodical.

COL. CARL W. REDDEL, USAF  
Professor and Head  
Department of History  
US Air Force Academy  
Colorado Springs, Colorado

### To the editors:

I enjoyed as usual the latest issue of *TAH* (Summer 1985) and was pleased to note that you are continuing your very useful pieces on professional reading. Here are a few more citations for possible inclusion in your military history bibliography, not all of which (in-

### Subscriptions--Changes of Address

To be added to our distribution list or change an existing subscription, please supply complete mailing information in the space provided and mail to Managing Editor, *The Army Historian*, U.S. Army Center of Military History, Pulaski Building, 20 Massachusetts Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20314-0200.

Name \_\_\_\_\_  
Address \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_ Zip \_\_\_\_\_  
Number of Copies \_\_\_\_\_  
Circle one: New Subscription  
Change of Address

cluding my own article) may necessarily be appropriate:

Adams, Charles Francis. "Plea for Military History," American Historical Association, *Annual Report for 1900* (Presidential address, 28 Dec. 1899).

Allen, Louis. "Notes on Japanese Historiography: World War II," *Military Affairs*, December 1971.

Falk, Stanley L. "Gaps in the Published History of the Air Force: Challenge for Historians," *The Historian*, August 1982.

Forstmeier, Friedrich. "Official Military History in the Federal Republic of Germany," *Aerospace Historian*, September 1976.

Hyatt, A. M. J. "Official History in Canada," *Military Affairs*, Summer 1966.

Morton, Louis. "The Writing of Official History," *Army*, May 1961.

Nishiura, Susumu. "Japanese War History," *Air University Review*, March-April 1965.

Record, Jeffrey. "The Fortunes of War," *Harpers*, April 1980 (on teaching military history at the Service academies).

STANLEY L. FALK  
Alexandria, Virginia

*To the editors:*

As a civilian who teaches Military History I find myself somewhat at odds with David G. Gruenbaum, "Military History and Officer Education: Who Should Teach, and What?" (*TAH*, Fall 1985). Mr. Gruenbaum has confused courses on military history with courses on leadership. I teach the former, as a history professor should, in the same manner as I teach other history courses. It is an intellectual and analytical inquiry into a body of information concerning man's behavior in the past and the consequences of that behavior. Mr. Gruenbaum would

have me relegate that mission to one of teaching leadership and because I do not he then criticizes me for being "antimilitary."

Military history is too important to leave to the military. Future officers must be exposed to the most critical thinking possible. Mr. Gruenbaum's position reminds me of the arguments in the 1960s and 1970s as to whether whites should teach black history.

I must also note that—horror of horrors—in my course on American military history I require my students (about half are ROTC cadets) to watch the Gwynne Dyer series and then write essays on each program. The Dyer series is provocative and thought provoking and thus a wonderful teaching device. Should professors only assign materials to students that they know they will agree with?

Military History needs to be brought into the regular curriculum. This can only be done effectively by involving civilian faculty. ROTC and non-ROTC students ought to participate in the course together providing an arena for discussion and debate. Let officers teach leadership. Historians should teach history.

WILLIAM M. FOWLER, JR.  
Managing Editor  
*The New England Quarterly*  
Boston, Massachusetts

*Readers are invited to express their opinions on this publication and its featured articles, as well as to share their experiences and views on topics relating to the study, use, and teaching of military history. Correspondence should be addressed to the Editors, The Army Historian, U.S. Army Center of Military History, 20 Massachusetts Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20314-0200.*

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
THE CHIEF OF MILITARY HISTORY AND  
THE CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20314-0200

OFFICIAL BUSINESS  
PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE \$300

BULK RATE  
POSTAGE & FEES PAID  
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
PERMIT No. G-5