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The Staff Ride: Training for Warfighting

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History sharpens the vision of the skilled commander. By taking in the events and lessons of the past, he can assess his present readiness for war and prepare himself and his subordinates for the challenges of future battles.

History puts today's decisions in perspective against those of past commanders. Equally important, it contributes to leader development by narrowing the gap between peacetime training and war. That gap is of special concern in today's Army when few below the rank of lieutenant colonel or master sergeant have ever experienced combat. History infuses with living immediacy the matrix of tactics, logistics, command, terrain, and technology. The student quickly realizes that battles are not merely matters of theory or doctrine—they really happened.

Nowhere is this close connection between history and training more apparent than in the staff ride. In the Army Year of Training, it is especially appropriate to emphasize the staff ride. It is the one training technique that uses military history with the actual battlefield to bring together the realities of war. This issue of *The Army Historian* has much of interest to say about the staff ride and the proper techniques for conducting this unique and important training exercise.

I should emphasize at the outset that the staff ride is more than a mere historical tour that only relates what happened. The staff ride is primarily an analytical experience, one that allows the student to understand how and why events occurred as they did and to gain insights into what these observations mean in today's military environment. At its best, therefore, the staff ride assists participants not only to understand the realities of war, but also to improve their professional expertise and the readiness of their units.

As it has evolved over the years, the staff ride begins with a comprehensive study of the campaign. The actual visit to the battlefield includes a recounting of the battle, relating it to the current Army situation and



Gen. Vuono conducts staff ride after-action review at Chancellorsville.

doctrine. It's an opportunity to discuss maneuver, command and control, fire support, mobility, countermobility, survivability, and sustainment as they are described in AirLand Battle Doctrine. The commander can use it to cover leadership lessons for his current organization. A properly conducted staff ride is a powerful teaching tool that can contribute to leader training at any level.

All this was brought forcefully home to me when I recently participated with other members of the Army Staff in a staff ride at Chancellorsville, Virginia, where a battle, called by some military historians "the tactical masterpiece of the 19th century," raged for three days in the spring of 1863. That violent contest is an outstanding example of fighting outnumbered and winning—a subject of keen interest to us today.

Looking back on our staff ride, I remember standing in a little hilltop clearing called Hazel Grove. With a little imagination I could see the Union Army

under General Joseph Hooker and the Confederates led by Robert E. Lee clash with a fury seldom seen in the history of war. On the second, fateful day of battle, General "Stonewall" Jackson executed the famous and highly successful flank march that swept around the Union right by several miles, pushed the Northern forces from their positions, and gave the Confederates the initiative. But Hooker's defeat was sealed only when he ordered a withdrawal from the little hilltop, allowing Lee's forces to place artillery there and drive the Union Army from the land.

By conducting this staff ride to Chancellorsville, walking the battlefield and analyzing the terrain, I could readily see how Hazel Grove became the scene for the decisive phase of the battle. I was also struck by a number of thoughts.

First, I was able to note the similarities between the clash at Chancellorsville and events in my own military experience. Fundamentals of leadership and decision making at all levels, principles of war, and many other factors are virtually timeless. So around the world, battlefields of many wars teach lessons that are still relevant today.

I was also struck by the difference that being on the ground made to an understanding of what and why things happen. Too often our mental picture of the battlefield, based solely on maps, does not give a true feeling for the impact of terrain on tactics and decision making.

Finally, I noticed that there always seems to be "something special" about every battlefield. Just being in a place where soldiers fought and died, the ground they saw, exploring their thoughts, and analyzing their mistakes and successes, adds new meaning to professional development and the study of warfighting.

The staff ride concept is not new. Interestingly enough, even Lee and Jackson, while students at West Point, participated in that part of the Academy's curriculum involving the study of ancient battles from the viewpoints of opposing commanders. Although they rarely got to see the battlefields firsthand, both learned from these case studies to develop an eye for terrain and troop placement that stood them in good stead throughout the Civil War.

The staff ride as we know it today was first used in this century in 1906 by students at what is now the Command and General Staff College as well as at West Point and the Army War College. Interrupted by World War II and its aftermath, staff riding was revived in the late 1960s primarily through the

efforts of the military history instructors at the War College and the Command and General Staff College.

Now, staff rides are being employed throughout the Army—both in our formal school system and in units, not only in the United States but also in Europe and Korea. Officers from the highest echelons of command down to those at the battalion level participate. Without exception, commanders confirm their value in developing leaders; supplementing current doctrinal, operational, and technical knowledge; and improving unit morale and cohesiveness. All agree that staff rides enhance combat readiness.

Training should make use of history to add realism to the peacetime study of war. Short of experiencing war, history is the best way to understand the effects of battle on soldiers, units, and leaders. I am convinced that the staff ride is one of the most effective techniques to train leaders for our Army.

This issue of *The Army Historian* has much to say of interest about the staff ride and the proper techniques for conducting this important and even unique training exercise. I commend it to your attention.

The ARMY HISTORIAN

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Studying the Operational Level of War: A Staff Ride to Sedan (1940)

Robert A. Doughty

Of the many battlefields available to the historian or professional officer to study, few offer the opportunity to analyze as many facets of modern warfare as does that of Sedan, France, where German ground and aerial forces clashed with those of France and her allies in May 1940. Since the terrain around Sedan and in the Ardennes has changed only slightly in the last five decades, a staff ride is a particularly useful method for studying the battle. Whether focusing on the offense or the defense, a great deal can be learned about the maneuver of divisions and corps and about the employment of aerial forces in support of large ground units. In addition to offering an example of mechanized and aerial forces working (or not working) closely together, one can examine the battle at the operational level, that is, with the German XIX Corps fighting against the French X Corps.

In October 1986 American, British, Canadian, and German officers from NATO's Central Army Group (CENTAG) and 4th Allied Tactical Air Force (4 ATAF), accompanied by a group of French officers, conducted a two-day staff ride of this important battle. Leading the tour were Maj. Gen. Wolfgang Odendahl, German Army (Chief of Staff of CENTAG) and then Brig. Gen. (P) Gordon Sullivan, U.S. Army. (Both have been promoted and reassigned since the staff ride.) Because of language differences, a variety of French, German, and English sources had been read by the participants, of whom several had previously completed detailed studies of the campaign in various military schools. All in all, it was different from the usual staff ride, with different nationalities being represented, different materials being read, and different viewpoints being offered.

To provide a clear overview of the battle, the staff ride was broken into four major phases: (1) the early fighting in the Ardennes, (2) the crossing of the Meuse River and the fighting in the main battle area, (3) the French attempt to seal the breach and the German breakout, and (4) aerial operations. Each of these major phases had several subordinate parts, with aerial operations being an integral part of the entire campaign. Throughout the staff ride, the doctrine, organization, and equipment of both sides were covered thoroughly, and an even-handed



Col. Bob Doughty, staff ride leader, briefs staff riders near Sedan.

approach was taken to explain why each side took the actions it did.

Fighting in the Ardennes

The two-day staff ride began with the staff ride leader-historian presenting an overview of the campaign outside the town of Wallendorf, Germany. In the early morning of 10 May 1940, elements of the *1st Panzer Division* in the German *XIX Corps* (commanded by General Heinz Guderian) had crossed the border and moved quickly and deeply into Luxembourg. To their north was the *2d Panzer Division* and farther to the south, the *10th Panzer Division*. Luxembourg offered only symbolic resistance, and about an hour after departing Germany, initial elements of the German advance guard crossed the border into Belgium.

The Germans crossed the border quickly and used aerially transported troops to leapfrog behind and to disrupt the Belgian defenders. Though the Belgians had not intended on strongly opposing the Germans on the border near Luxembourg, preferring instead to concentrate their forces to the west, two companies of light infantry were cut off by German troops landing to their rear and chose to fight rather than surrender or infiltrate to friendly lines. Never giving an inch while inflicting heavy casualties, their spirited defense in Martelange and Bodange delayed General Heinz Guderian's *XIX Corps* for more than nine hours and is a classic example of how light infantry can be used against heavily mechanized forces.

After fighting through the Belgians, the Germans pushed forward and encountered the French covering forces fifteen kilometers to the west near Neufchateau. The French cavalry force had the mission of determining the location of the principal enemy effort and gaining sufficient time for the occupation and possibly the reinforcement of the main line of resistance. Unfortunately, they were spread very thinly across a wide front, and the Germans kept moving forward by rushing through lightly defended or unprotected points. The French resistance quickly collapsed, and after a series of engagements, the main covering forces pulled back along the Semois River, which had steep and heavily wooded banks and was about fifteen kilometers from the main line of resistance along the Meuse River.

The rapid German crossing of the Semois River was one of the most remarkable achievements of the entire campaign. Because of communication problems and liaison lapses, one of the defending French units pulled back from the river, leaving a gap for the Germans to use as a crossing. Another German unit found a ford farther south, and resistance along the Semois soon became impossible. Still being pushed by the Germans, the last elements of the French covering crossed the Meuse River about 2000 hours on 12 May. French higher headquarters had assumed the Germans would take nine days to cross the Ardennes; instead, they had taken three days, with their strongest opposition coming from two outnumbered and encircled Belgian light infantry companies.

For those on the staff ride, special attention was paid to the *1st Panzer Division* as it fought its way through the Belgian defenders at Martelange and Bodange and the French covering forces at Neufchateau and along the Semois River. Participants carefully analyzed the German road march through the Ardennes and the French use of intelligence reports. They particularly focused on the information available to the French Second Army concerning the attacking German forces.

The Meuse River and the Main Battle Area

Along the Meuse River, the French X Corps initially had two divisions (the 55th and 3d North African) defending a front of about forty kilometers. The Corps was reinforced by two fortress regiments that occupied large concrete bunkers along the river line. As the German forces ap-



Overlooking Mouzaive, where the Germans crossed the Semois River

proached the Sedan area and the Meuse River, the Second French Army reinforced the X Corps with the 71st Division. The Corps commander attempted to move the 71st Division forward along the Meuse River between the 55th and 3d Divisions. On the night of 12-13 May, the 71st attempted to conduct a night relief in place of elements of the other two divisions, but by the next morning had only partially occupied its new positions.

Beginning around 1500 hours on the 13th, the Germans began their effort to cross the Meuse River. Luckily for them, their attacks concentrated primarily on only one French regiment that was defending east and west of Sedan. By 2300 hours, a few German forces had pushed forward ten kilometers into the French position. By midnight a battalion of artillery was able to cross the river using a bridge erected by the engineers, and by 0600 hours on the 14th, an armored brigade followed.

The French recognized the extreme danger to their position, having reinforced the X Corps with two regiments of infantry and two tank battalions on the evening of the 13th. Tragically for the entire defensive effort, elements of the 55th Division, primarily from forward artillery units, began panicking and fleeing to the rear around 1800 hours on the 13th. Amidst this disorder, the French attempted to hold the Germans and to organize for a counter-attack.

For the staff ride, many of these actions could be followed easily on the terrain. Though the city of Sedan has grown in size, most of the area has changed little since 1940. Many of the roads are intact, the hills remain open and sparsely settled, and the bunkers are untouched. By checking the bullet and shell marks on the bunkers, one can locate the areas which came under the most intense

attack. Members of the staff ride concentrated on the scheme of defense by the French and followed the route of the main German attack.

Sealing the Breach and the German Breakout

Although the Germans had penetrated about ten kilometers to Chehery by midnight on the 13th, the French had not yet lost the battle. During the night the X Corps and the 55th Division attempted to move the two regiments and two tank battalions into position for a counterattack and for the establishment of a second line of resistance. On the night of the 12th, the Second French Army had ordered the 3d Armored Division, the 3d Light Mechanized Division, and two cavalry regiments to move toward Sedan. These units arrived in the rear of the X Corps during the night of 13 May.

By the morning of the 14th, the French had moved two infantry regiments, two tank battalions, one armored division, one light mechanized division, and two cavalry regiments into the vicinity of the German forces which had crossed the Meuse. Even though they were in position and refueled by 1600 hours on the 14th, no effective counterattack was delivered against the Germans. A fainthearted attack came early on the morning of the 14th from an infantry regiment and tank battalion under the control of the 55th Division, but they met fierce resistance from the German armored brigade that had just crossed over the Meuse.

Throughout the 14th, the Germans poured three divisions across the Meuse. Then, in one of the most brilliant maneuvers in the history of warfare, they left the *10th Panzer Division* in contact with the French 3d Armored and 3d Light Mechanized Divisions, and turned the *1st* and *2d Panzer Divisions* toward the west. By attacking the soft flanks of the nearby French units, they soon opened a vast hole in the French defensive lines. As the battle of Sedan ended, and as the Germans hurled themselves toward the English Channel, France could do little to avoid humiliating defeat.

Aerial Operations

For both the Allies and the Germans, aerial operations were a vital part of the entire campaign. The French and British had more fighters, and the Germans had the upper hand in the number of bombers. The Germans, however, gained a key edge in their better organization and use of their planes. They had a better concept of dividing the

planes into aerial corps and then massing them rapidly where they were needed. Additionally, the German planes were technically superior to those of the French. With greater speeds and higher ceilings, the German planes could outmaneuver and outfight the French planes. The Germans also had more effective communications between their ground units and their air forces and consequently were able to coordinate air support more rapidly and more effectively.

The flexible use of air power by the Germans is best illustrated in the employment of the *VIII Air Corps* under Lt. Gen. Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen. After first being engaged in Belgium against deep targets and against the fortified areas on either side of Liege, this corps later moved quickly to support the Sedan breakthrough and the advance to Dunkirk. The close air support provided by this air corps to the armored forces enabled them to continue moving when artillery could not maintain the pace.

The Allies did not abandon the air to the Germans. On the 14th, as the panzer divisions were being rushed across the Meuse, the entire strength of the Allied bombers in France was thrown in waves against the Sedan bridgehead, but German fighters and antiaircraft guns extracted a high toll. For the period 10-14 May, the Royal Air Force experienced the highest rate of loss it has ever experienced in an operation of comparable size.

Though many aspects of the aerial operations were difficult to see on the staff ride, emphasis was placed on the important role played by aircraft in the movement through the Ardennes and in the crossing of the Meuse. The contrasting doctrines for employment and the different approaches to organization provided many opportunities for analysis and discussion. No one missed the key point about the important effect aerial operations had on ground operations.

After-Action Review

Because of the great geographical area over which the battle was spread and because of the clearly separate phases of the battle, an after-action review was conducted at each of the main halts and at the end of the phases. This permitted the participants to focus on issues that pertained to their normal duties and to follow these issues with questions and discussions throughout the staff ride. It also ensured that aerial operations were never for-

merged beneath the complexity of the battle.

In the final analysis, the staff ride proved to be a remarkable success. Participants gained an appreciation of the effect doctrine, organization, and equipment have on the conduct of battles. Also, most left the staff ride with a better understanding of the "friction" of war and the requirement for well-trained, well-led troops. More importantly, they left confident that study of the past had provided them numerous insights into the current challenges facing them.

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Drums and Bugles Corner

This issue offers an example of gentlemanly leadership from the Battle of Chickamauga:

During the heat of this battle General Benning, of Georgia, one of the bravest men that ever lived, came charging up to General Longstreet in great agitation. He was riding an artillery horse and was using a rope trace for a whip. His hat was gone, and he was much disordered. "General," he said, "my brigade is utterly destroyed and scattered." General Longstreet approached him and said quietly, "Don't you think you could find one man, General?"—"One man?" he said, with astonishment. "I suppose I could. What do you want with him?"—"Go and get him," Longstreet said very quietly, laying his hand upon his arm, "and bring him here; then you and I and he will charge together. This is the sacred soil of Georgia, General, and we may as well die here as anywhere." He looked at General Longstreet curiously a moment, then laughed, and, with an oath, lashed his horse with his rope trace and was off like a flash.

In a few moments he swept by at the head of a command that he had gathered together somehow or other, and he was in the fight again.

General Longstreet does not think it necessary to swear at the men, to whoop 'em up as it were; he always adopts the demeanor of quiet assurance and confidence, which is always better than strong oaths.

First Lieutenant William Miller Owen, C.S.A., "Chickamauga-Indian, A 'Steam of Death,'" in In Camp and Battle with the Washington Artillery of New Orleans (Boston: Ticknor and Company, 1885), p. 288.

Editor's Journal

Professional Bulletin Status for *TAH*. As a result of recent DOD and Army directives, *TAH* has been designated a professional bulletin, which means that it must conform to stricter publishing guidelines, including the publishing of only those articles that are directly related to activities for which the Center of Military History has proponentcy. This should not present any real problems. However, I would ask that authors take a closer look at their articles and try to address, as clearly and practically as possible, how military history contributes to professionalism among officers, Army historians, and soldiers.

The need for a bulletin for Army historians has been established previously. Our publishing goal continues to be a quarterly issue, printed in 5,000 copies. I am acutely aware that this schedule has not been met in the past, but, even in the present situation of limited funds, I believe that goal can be attained. However, it must have your continued support with well-researched, carefully thought-out, provocative articles on historical issues, uses, and work in progress.

The theme for the next issue of *TAH* is training, the same as that for the Army in 1988. We need a lead article (approximately 2,000 words) and two or three shorter ones on the historical aspects of training. Some interesting possibilities for topics are historical perspective of a current training issue; historical case studies of training and its results in combat; and use of military history in training and OPD programs. These are only examples and not intended to limit your submissions.

Some rules that we must follow are: no nonfunctional photographs or illustrations, no lists of routine items, such as awards or promotions, no letters to the editor which only comment on the quality of the bulletin or other matters which do not contribute to the mission of the Army historical program, and no articles or photos which promote self-aggrandizement. Official free distribution is now more limited as we are authorized to mail to only US Army audiences.

This issue is changed in another way, too; this is our first try at desk-top publishing. As our knowledge of this new technology increases we should be able to serve you better and, I sincerely hope, on a more timely basis.

Thank you for your support. B.A.A.

Battle of the Bulge Staff Ride: Integrating Leader Development Into Exercises

Billy A. Arthur

One difficulty in organizing staff rides is finding time for them in a unit's normally full training schedule. Some organizations schedule the rides during off-duty hours, but this may detract from their effectiveness. U.S. Army, Europe (USAREUR), and Seventh Army solved this problem by integrating staff rides to Battle of the Bulge sites during EXERCISE CREATED EAGLE 86. This unique opportunity for leader development occurred when USAREUR main headquarters was located at Camp Elsenborn, Belgium, itself an important American position during the famous 1944 winter battle. Elsenborn Ridge, so named by its American defenders, was just out the gate to the camp. The ridge was a key terrain feature in blocking the northern prong of the German surprise attack through the Ardennes. Nowadays, Camp Elsenborn is occupied by Belgian Army units, and the ridge is part of an artillery firing range.

The USAREUR History Office conducted staff rides to battle sites in this sector of the Bulge known as the North Shoulder. Evening orientations on the battle, along with World War II films, were presented in the headquarters briefing room, and the staff rides were conducted on the following afternoons.

The three historian positions at USAREUR headquarters are designated as emergency essential, so one of the historians accompanied the headquarters staff to Camp Elsenborn and participated in the exercise, wearing battle dress uniform with non-combatant insignia. There he presented the classes and coordinated final details of the staff rides.

Most staff riders were night shift soldiers whose sleep was voluntarily cut to three or four hours so they could participate in the tours. That sacrifice attested to a high degree of interest in military history.

William C. C. Cavanaugh, an English-speaking resident of Belgium and an authoritative historian of the battle, was the group's local guide. Cavanaugh had just completed his own book on the battle, *Krinkelt-Rocherath: The Battle for the Twin Villages*, which details operations on the North Shoulder of the Bulge and portrays those actions as decisive in the entire battle. His vivid presentations during the staff ride made the 42-year-old action

come alive for those USAREUR soldiers who participated.

Ardennes Today

The terrain of the Ardennes is not greatly changed from 1944, the benefit of which is obvious to military visitors. Foxholes and trenches have been partially filled by erosion, but are clearly visible, and timbers lie rotting in bunker depressions. The group discovered some cartridges, tops of ammunition boxes, barbed wire, and pieces of blankets.

Part of the North Shoulder is a nature preserve, and forests remain as they were during the battle except for replanting. Villages are about the same size, and roads remain in their same locations, although most have now been covered by asphalt. In 1944 they were mud. "Dragon's teeth" (tank obstructions) of the Siegfried Line stretch for miles along the German border, being too costly to remove. Some Germans say they should be left in place as historical reminders against war.

Each staff ride took over five hours, beginning at



the U.S. 99th Infantry Division's front-line positions facing the Siegfried Line, and following the withdrawals of the 99th and 2d Divisions through the twin cities of Krinkelt-Rocherath to Elsenborn Ridge and safety.

The first stop for the staff riders was near the big bend in Route 265, called the "International Highway" because it paralleled the Belgian-German border. The bend was nicknamed "Purple Heart Corner" for appropriate reasons. There, in the woods, they inspected the overgrown trenches and foxholes of Company K, 393d Infantry Regiment, 99th Division, a greenhorn outfit that had arrived on the Continent 6 November 1944.

After inspecting the limited observation and fields of fire from the positions, the staff riders could visualize the German attackers being almost among the defenders before the Americans could react when the artillery preparation lifted. Company K was overwhelmed by Panzergrenadiers, and a forest trail, a primary avenue of approach into the American positions, was opened for the *12th SS Panzer Division* (Hitler Youth Division). However, the greenhorns held a bit longer than the German leaders had expected.

The group moved south on the International Highway and viewed other company positions, with large gaps between them. It was obvious that this was no continuous line, but separate strongpoints, with dangerous, concealed approaches between



Staff riders inspect dragon's teeth of Siegfried Line near Purple Heart corner.

them. It seemed to invite the Germans to employ one of their favorite tactics, infiltration—which they did.

The railway leading to Buchholz Station looked the same as it did in 1944, a deep cut with sheer banks and screened by thick trees, a perfect entrance to the American rear areas. At 7:45 a.m. on 16 December, during a lull in the shelling, men of Company L, 394th Infantry Regiment, lined up near the station for breakfast. A large number of soldiers, marching along the track through the fog, were almost at the station before they were recognized as Germans and taken under fire. A shootout with bazookas and small arms ensued, around boxcars and into the roundhouse. By noon, the attackers were driven off, leaving behind seventy-five dead. This stubborn stand did not fit into the German timetable for crossing the Meuse and reaching Antwerp, the attack's final objective.

Bouck's Platoon

The last stop in the 99th Division's sector was at its southernmost position, just northwest of Lanzerath. The 394th Infantry's Intelligence and Reconnaissance Platoon, commanded by Lt. Joseph Bouck, Jr., occupied positions atop a high hill, which linked the regiment's 6,500-yard front to VIII Corps. Bouck and his thirty men held up a battalion of the 3d Parachute Division for the better part of 16 December, literally decimating the German unit, which attacked frontally, uphill over an open, snow-covered field. Finally, under cover of darkness, the paratroopers were able to infiltrate the American position and force the remaining defenders to surrender.

The importance of the I&R Platoon's incredibly heroic defense is best described by the following incident: Bouck, wounded and captured, was lying on the floor of the Cafe Scholzen during the early hours of 17 December when the infamous SS Lt. Col. Joachim Peiper entered. Bouck learned that Peiper, commander of the *1st SS Panzer Division* Task Force, which was to lead the breakthrough, had waited all day for his column to be sprung loose, burning irreplaceable gasoline in the process. Peiper was furious. He had pushed his vehicles forward, running over horse-drawn artillery along the way, and now demanded that the paratrooper colonel, a senior officer, provide reinforcements for him to go through. It was done, Peiper barreled through, and some ten hours later massacred American sol-

diers at the Baugnez road junction near Malmedy.

For the staff riders, Cavanaugh's relating of these incidents was heightened by his having met Joseph Bouck and Malmedy survivors during their return visits to the battlefield with veterans groups.

Leaving Lanzerath, the bus followed Peiper's route past Buchholz Station, then veered north toward the twin villages. Lively discussion took place among the group as to what was happening to the American forces on the North Shoulder and why. A clear picture emerged that the 99th Division was giving way, but more slowly than the Germans had hoped for or expected. The veteran 2d Division, at Wahlerscheid, attacking north toward the Roer dams, was in a precarious position. Both divisions were in grave danger of being cut off, leaving the route over Elsenborn Ridge to open country uncovered for Peiper and *Sixth SS Panzer Army*. Two trails and the road to Wahlerscheid had to be held until both divisions were withdrawn.

The staff riders learned how a few outstanding leaders at the right place and time can turn the tide of the battle. On 17 December 1944, one of those outstanding leaders stood at the crossroads near Rocherath Barracks, the next stop on the tour. Here Maj. Gen. Walter Robertson, 2d Division commander, took charge of directing the withdrawal and fighting the battle for Krinkelt-Rocherath. Robertson moved up and down the Wahlerscheid road under heavy fire, encouraging the troops along, taking strength reports from commanders and evaluating morale. He peeled off units and directed them into defensive positions to protect those following and sent others on to defend sectors in the twin villages. Robertson also called his reserve battalion (3d Battalion, 23d Infantry Regiment) forward from Camp Elsenborn and sent two companies into the woods to block the two trails from the east.

Turning Point

The USAREUR staff rides halted at the positions established by Company I, 23d Infantry Regiment, commanded by Capt. Charles B. MacDonald. The group reviewed the action there, using MacDonald's books, *Company Commander* and *A Time for Trumpets*, as guides. For many, this was the highlight of the trip.

The 3d Battalion slowed the Panzer thrust just long enough for Robertson to appropriate ten trucks from the 395th Infantry and move 1st Battalion, 9th Infantry, into position along the trail complex just in



Col. Richard W. Wall stands in foxhole position occupied by MacDonald's I Company, 23d Infantry.

front of Krinkelt-Rocherath. The commander, Lt. Col. William D. McKinley, was told to defend until ordered out. He did just that, until noon on 18 December, when all units had withdrawn into the twin villages. But by this time, McKinley saw little chance of extricating his unit without heavy close-in fire support.

Fortunately, four Sherman tanks appeared on the scene and, with artillery firing almost on top of their foxholes, the American infantrymen slipped to the rear. Some consider this action as the turning point of the entire battle. It surely saved two divisions from destruction.

An unusual experience came to the staff riders as they stood in the gathering darkness on McKinley's positions. Belgian artillery at Elsenborn range chose that moment to rumble across the ridge. The sound rolled eastward, and all eyes turned in that direction, searching the dim woodline as if expecting to find SS troops there. For a moment, each member of the group was with Bill McKinley, defending the twin villages "until ordered otherwise" by Robertson. The staff riders stood silently. Then, the moment passed, and jokes began about the sound effects courtesy of the Belgian Army.

The staff ride had come to an unexpected but fitting end.

Mr. Arthur, a historian formerly with the USAREUR and 7A Military History Office, is assigned to the U.S. Army Center of Military History.

Army Staff Rides Worldwide

"Army organizations reported 305 staff rides in 1987, an average of one per working day, making this teaching technique a vital tool in leader development during the Year of Training."

BG William A. Stofft
Chief of Military History



Eighth U.S. Army Inspector General's staff ride to Inchon. Maj. Dennis Ng briefs on a hill overlooking Blue Beach. Submitted by Tom Ryan, EUSA historian.



Staff riders walk down Kall trail during V Corps ride to study 28th Infantry Division attack on Schmidt. Submitted by Russ Parkinson, VII Corps historian.

Military History and Officer Professional Development in an Infantry Battalion

Stephen D. Westbrook

Three recent developments in the U.S. Army have combined to increase the role of military history in maneuver battalions, especially as it applies to the professional development of officers. First, the regimental system gives soldiers and officers the chance to serve repetitively with each other in the same geographic locations and facilitates the inculcation of unit history and tradition. Second, the Army-wide resurgence of interest in military history has increased the likelihood that a battalion will include a fair number of historians or buffs and has made resources available for historically based study of the military art. Third is the rediscovery of the staff ride, a unique technique for conveying the lessons of the past to present-day leaders. (See William Glenn Robertson, "Staff Ride Returns to Leavenworth," *The Army Historian*, Winter, 1984).

When the three aforementioned developments come together, there can occur dramatic improvements in military-intellectual skills and professional commitment. Simply put, when soldiers who are familiar with each other and their unit's history participate in staff rides on the actual terrain over which their unit fought in previous campaigns, there are remarkable results. Leader development and unit cohesiveness are two areas which benefit greatly from the staff ride that brings together these circumstances.

This has been possible for the 16th Infantry, and especially for those battalions stationed in Europe. With two battalions (1st and 4th) in Germany with the 1st Infantry Division (Forward) and two battalions (2d and 5th) at Fort Riley, soldiers retain not only their regimental tradition but also their divisional history as they move between assignments.

The regiment itself has been present at most of the turning points in American history since Gettysburg, and much of the regiment's fighting was done on European battlefields. Its soldiers were the first to die in France in World War I, and these losses became a symbol of American commitment. During World War II it fought from North Africa to

Czechoslovakia, leading the assault to liberate Europe when it landed first on Omaha Beach.

Each European-based battalion has a half dozen officers who are seriously studying military history, with a majority of officers being well read.

The Honorary Regimental Colonel, Maj. Gen. Albert Smith (Ret.) served with the regiment during all of the campaigns of World War II and served as the assistant division commander of the "Big Red One" during the Vietnam War. His annual visits to talk to soldiers and lead officer professional development events, monthly distribution of packets of historical materials, and development of regimental Christmas cards and other symbols have served to bind the soldiers to their past. The division (forward) commander encourages historical study and, because of the belief that the battlefields where the division's soldiers have fought provide the best training ground possible, commits annually to each battalion funds necessary to do a week-long historically based regimental staff ride.

Officer Professional Development

Army training regulations require that units establish formal Officer Professional Development (OPD) programs. The structure and content of these programs is largely left up to unit commanders. Although officer development goes on continuously, most units define more narrowly a formal program of instruction taught two or three times a month. In the 1st Battalion, 16th Infantry, the OPD program was structured into five areas:

- Leadership and professionalism, taught by the battalion commander.
- Technical and tactical expertise, supervised by the operations officer.
- Military history, taught by the battalion executive officer.
- Individual study, with assigned readings and quarterly seminars conducted by the battalion commander for the company

commanders, and by company commanders for their subordinates.

- Annual historical TEWT (Training Exercise Without Troops), modeled on the staff ride concept.

Military history was the core element in the last three. The majority of the individual study selections were military history or closely related works, such as John Keagan's *Face of Battle*, Charles B. MacDonald's *Company Commander*, J. Glen Gray's *The Warriors*, S. L. A. Marshall's *Men Against Fire*, or Ernie Pyle's *Brave Men*. The technique of analysis would be familiar to a graduate student in a history seminar, with greater operational orientation and concern with lessons applicable to our battalion and its wartime mission.

The military history instruction was structured around campaigns relevant to 16th Infantry and 1st Infantry Division history. For example, we established our OPD theme for the year from July 1984 to June 1985 as "The Road to Victory: Breakout to Central Europe." In each quarter the historical seminars focused on the campaigns fought forty years earlier during that time of year.

The historical TEWT was the most important event of our OPD program, both in terms of man hours and long-term retention. It served as the capstone event of the annual military history study program, provided an opportunity for half a dozen junior officers to do historical research, and emotionally tied the participants to their regiment in a way nothing else could. It also brought together all aspects of the OPD program because it focused on examining the ultimate determinant of technical and tactical proficiency, the cauldron where the precepts of leadership and professionalism have developed—the battlefield.

The Staff Ride 1985

In 1983 the battalion took its first staff ride to the Huertgen Forest to study the battle of Schmidt. Although only three days long and lacking the regimental association, its success sparked an expanded program.

In June of 1984 we were at Normandy, where the battalion was privileged to serve as the honor guard for the 40th Anniversary Celebration of D-Day, attended by President Reagan, at the Omaha Beach Cemetery. We used that opportunity to examine the

assault on the beaches. In 1985 our historical TEWT took us to the 16th Infantry battlefields of Northwest Europe in the fall of 1944; in 1986 it was to those of Eastern France, 1918.

For the 1985 TEWT, we selected three regimental battles based on historical significance, geographic proximity, and tactical diversity—Mons, Aachen, and Hamich. Mons was a classic pursuit, where in September the 1st Division got behind five retreating German divisions, killing or capturing 25,000 enemy and destroying 2,000 vehicles. Near Aachen in October, the 1st Division led by the 16th Infantry first penetrated Germany. After intense fighting around outlying fortifications and in the city itself, the 1st Division captured the first major German city of the war. At Hamich in November, the 16th Infantry led the VII Corps assault to turn the northern shoulder of the Huertgen Forest. Executing a relief in place in an area where the Germans had been entrenched for two months, the 16th fought through World War I-style fortifications in a thick forest. It achieved its objectives and won a Presidential Unit Citation, but it paid a terrible price.

Because our route would take us near Waterloo, we also added a day to study that battlefield, focusing on principles of war and use of terrain.

The division approved the funds and General Smith, who had been the regimental operations officer (S-3) during the fall of 1944, agreed to come. The event was organized and run completely by the battalion's lieutenants. (See Derek A. Miller, "Historical TEWT," *Infantry*, March-April, 1987.) The most capable lieutenant in the battalion was given broad guidance to select interested lieutenants from each company, who were assigned to study specific battles. Their preparation involved three tasks:

Historical Research—By examining published sources, the regimental history, 1st Division operations logs (provided by General Smith), and other documents, the responsible officers constructed battalion and regimental orders to include detailed graphics. For Mons we had an original regimental order preserved and provided by members of the Belgian resistance who had fought with the 16th Infantry. The lieutenant-instructors also determined the enemy situation, both as it was known to 16th at the time and as it actually was.

Reconnaissance—The lieutenants visited each piece of terrain well in advance to develop fully their understanding of events and plan their instruction.

At Mons, Belgian veterans who had served both with the Resistance and as part of the 1st Infantry Division Counterintelligence Corps, as well as the Belgian Reserve Officers Association, were extremely helpful. But in both Belgium and Germany, local residents who had lived through the fighting frequently volunteered information and shared photographs.

Instruction—The lieutenants assembled study materials into read-aheads for all participants before departure. In addition to developing complete training plans for them on the ground portion, the responsible officers prepared a two- to three-hour block of instruction, which they presented the evening before the terrain exercise. During the terrain exercise, the battalion's lieutenants assumed the role of company commanders and the captains that of battalion commanders to emphasize leader development, and it was not historically unrealistic. In 1944 the regimental S-3 was only twenty-six years old and the regimental commander only thirty-two.

The basic pedagogy had the following main points:

- The battalion officers received an operations order similar or identical to that issued in 1944.
- Battalion commanders issued their orders to company commanders, who in turn prepared theirs. Opportunities for reconnaissance paralleled the 1944 situations exactly.
- One battalion group presented their solutions followed by a general critique.
- The instructor, supplemented by General Smith, briefed the actual solution arrived at in 1944.
- The group then executed the plan, receiving at the appropriate locations a number of tactical situations encountered in 1944. They determined and briefed their collective solutions.
- The instructor or local expert (at Mons the regional head of the Belgian Reserve Officers Association) then briefed on the actual actions of the regiment and the enemy at the

particular spot in 1944, along with the outcome.

The specific application of this pedagogy varied based on circumstance. At Mons, which was a mobile battle, the plans and actions were based on current battalion organization. At Hamich, where in 1944 the regiment attacked on only a two-kilometer front, we used World War II organization and simulated the dismounted attack against aggressors manning the precise German trenches and fighting positions, which are still quite evident. In one location, where the terrain, mission, and force ratios of the defending Germans paralleled what we would face if sent to our own general deployment positions, we reversed roles and assumed the 1944 German mission. Our resulting solutions helped us better understand our own wartime mission. By analyzing the historical outcome of a German defense to the west in 1944 against the numerically superior Americans, we strengthened our understanding of how Americans could defend to the east against numerically superior Russians.

We felt it was not only important to study the history of the regiment and learn from it, but also to remember those who made it. Accordingly, we conducted three memorial services or ceremonies: at the 1st Division monuments at Mons and Henri Chapelle, as well as at the Henri Chapelle Military Cemetery, where so many "Big Red One" soldiers who died in the fall of 1944 are buried.

Results

As with any tactical terrain walk, the historical TEWT helped sharpen our officers' analytical skills, troop leading procedures, use of terrain, and tactical decision making. But battalions can do TEWTs in their own backyards with substantially reduced resource requirements. The payoff of the historical aspect came in the areas of professionalism, patriotism, and esprit de corps. The face of battle and fog of war could have been no more dramatically illustrated to new officers than for the officers of Companies A, B, and C to be caught at Hamich in the same killing zone as their counterparts in 1944. Our commanders had tried to find a way to accomplish the mission with fewer casualties, but could not. A price had to be paid. When in 1944 the Regimental S-3 reported to the division commander initial casu-

alties, General Huebner responded that the objective had to be taken at any cost, that "This might be the day the 16th Infantry ceases to exist." Harsh words for a new lieutenant in peacetime to otherwise understand, but of course the reality of war.

Our officers came away with increased pride in being American soldiers. Their heightened patriotism sprang from two sources. The first was the tremendous enthusiasm of the Belgian veterans and population. Forty years after the fact, they repeatedly thanked us as American soldiers for the sacrifices of forty years earlier. Unforgettable was an emotional description of liberation by one woman who as a small daughter of a Resistance leader had been hidden for two years to protect her from the Gestapo. For her, the appearance of 16th Infantry soldiers had meant not only the liberation of her country but a reunion with her family as well. The second source was the realization of the courage and willingness of soldiers to sacrifice for their comrades, their unit, and their country. This was most

intense during our memorial service at Henri Chapelle Cemetery, which contained the remains of soldiers such as Capt. Victor Briggs, Commander of Company C, whose names were almost as familiar to us by then as those on our current officers roster.

The week-long trip also strengthened our bonds with each other and with our past as members of a regiment. The presence of General Smith, with his battle and career experience, personal accounts of the battles, and stories of the happy as well as sad times, brought the whole experience to life.

The total dollar cost to gain these benefits was less than the cost to replace one set of tracks on one side of one armored personnel carrier. It was a good investment in combat readiness.

Lieutenant Colonel Wesbrook, currently assigned to the Office of the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, was Commander, 1st Battalion, 16th Infantry, when this article was submitted to The Army Historian.



During Huertgen staff ride, 1st Battalion, 16th Infantry officers prepare battalion and company operations orders based on 1944 regimental order.

What the Staff Ride Can Depict: Face of Battle, Clash of Wills and Arms, Generalship, and Cause and Effect

Harold Nelson

When a staff ride leader takes a military group onto a battlefield, he will structure the time on the ground to fill that group's needs. Unless the group is very senior, one of the common needs will be to experience battle vicariously, getting as close as possible to combatants having responsibilities similar to those of the staff ride participants. Most military officers have not personally experienced battle, so the staff ride is one of the primary tools being used within the Army to give leaders insight into the physical, emotional, and intellectual challenges typical of combat situations. Every staff ride must therefore depict battle in the broadest generic sense, not just "the battle" that was fought over a specific piece of ground.

This fundamental requirement of depicting the "face of battle" helps to explain why staff rides do not require battles of a specific era or of a specific size, decisiveness, or type in order to succeed. It also helps to explain why the most successful staff ride leaders are generally those who take a real interest in general military history and the problems of future battle rather than those who specialize in the details of a single war, campaign, or battle.

As he uses a particular battlefield to depict battles in general, the staff ride leader must always strive to let the events on that battlefield illustrate the gap between a plan and its execution. Often, the combination of smoothly run peacetime training exercises and the military's positive attitude causes the uninitiated officer to believe that perfection is always attained in warfare. To correct this misconception, the perfect staff ride will show that battles put two wills in opposition, causing deviation from plan not only because of the familiar "fog and friction," but also because counteractions by an opponent reshape the situation. This dynamic, interactive environment must be reconstructed for staff ride participants through preparatory study for the staff ride and during the ride on the terrain.

Depicting the Clash of Wills

In every instance, battle is a clash of wills. The first expression of will is leadership, and this quality

should be depicted at every possible level for both sides in the contest. It is not enough merely to outline the leadership qualities of the senior leader on each side. Qualities and actions of key subordinate leaders should be used to show how their actions contributed to the reputations of their superiors and built the reputations of their units. At the small-unit level, Chamberlain's actions on Little Round Top at Gettysburg illustrate the point and have justifiably been selected by doctrine writers to introduce the Army's leadership manual. Participants in staff rides should be encouraged to ask what leaders said and did in a specific situation (What were his actions and orders?) and how they contributed to the outcome of the battle.

Will is formally expressed in a plan, and whenever a plan was developed in a form that can be known to the historian—beyond that reconstructed after the fact by the responsible individual, such as McClellan's famous "plan" at Antietam—the staff ride should depict the events associated with the execution of the plan to illustrate its strengths and weaknesses. For example, Hooker's plans for moving his army across the Rappahannock before the battle of Chancellorsville are easy to trace and critique, and this process should be an integral part of that staff ride, along with the plan developed by Lee and Jackson to flank Hooker's army in its new position. Throughout the staff ride, participants should be asking how each commander attacks the other's plan, for this is one of the enduring keys to victory.

In this same vein, all staff rides should depict the use of initiative. Many beginning students of military affairs confuse this important battlefield imperative with offensive operations. The staff ride can help overcome this basic misconception and go far to help officers understand how difficult it can be to control initiative and how central it can be to achieving a favorable outcome on the battlefield. Sickles' initiative in moving his corps forward into the Peach Orchard at Gettysburg is a prime example: Staff ride participants should discuss the advantages and disadvantages that accrue to both sides as a result of this initiative.

Courage is another key to the outcome of the clash of wills. In virtually every battle, staff ride participants have the opportunity to analyze individual acts and the actions of units that far exceed the normal call of duty. The fruits of their courage may be more difficult to measure, but wider consequences can usually be discerned.

An army's ability to collect and act on intelligence is another essential aspect of battle that a staff ride should depict. How did commanders gain information on the enemy's capabilities and activities? How was this information transformed into an intelligence estimate? How was this estimate used to help select a course of action? How was the estimate modified as the situation changed? This topic will seldom be in the forefront of discussion in the preparatory phase or on the battlefield, but it should always be explicit in the after-action review.

Communication of intent and action is the last factor I would include in the clash of wills. Participants in a staff ride should be attuned to the error and confusion introduced when a superior commander fails to communicate intent clearly and completely, and they should be equally sensitive to the consequences of incomplete or misleading reports from subordinates. All modern battlefields expose us to situations requiring that the commander exercise his will through distant elements, and the difficulties associated with fulfilling this fundamental communication need are easy to depict.

Depicting the Clash of Arms

The leap from the specifics of a selected battlefield to the broader principles governing battle is straightforward where the clash of wills is concerned. The historical challenge is more complex in the analysis of the physical aspects of battle. Here the application of technology and method (both doctrinal and managerial) have had profound effects, and the staff ride leader must familiarize his charges with the state of the art associated with the battlefield under review while keeping modern capabilities and future challenges always in mind.

The arms themselves must be accurately depicted so that experts in today's weapons can make the necessary comparisons. The range, accuracy, and rate of fire of principal weapons must be clearly stated in every instance, and certain other characteristics such as weight, reliability, and basic loads may be required if full, meaningful comparisons are

to be made. Most of this information can be distributed in the preparatory phase to avoid long-winded dissertations on the battlefield, but careful presentation of these characteristics is essential if participants are to have a clear understanding of the material realities that shape this aspect of battle.

Once weapons characteristics have been laid out, organization and tactics can be depicted. Staff ride participants need to know the internal organization of the combatant elements (e.g., infantry regiment, artillery battery, cavalry squadron), and they need to know the organizational relationship among these elements in the formation of combined arms capabilities. In addition, they must know the tactical concepts designed to bring the strength of these arms to bear while shielding their weaknesses. When they understand these weaknesses, strengths, and tactical concepts, they will be ready to understand the consequences of a surprise assault on a flank in linear warfare or any other interactive battlefield event.

The role of training and discipline in determining the outcome of the clash of arms should also be depicted in the staff ride. The ability of units to withstand the challenges of combat will vary in any battlefield situation, and the staff ride leader should correlate performance to experience for a few units. This feature of the staff ride is especially important when the participants are unit leaders actively engaged in a training mission. All of us know that the real payoff for effective training will come on the battlefield, but we are exposed to few reminders of that fact.

The importance of logistics in the physical struggle on the battlefield should always be depicted. While details of staff responsibility and organizational structure for logistical support may be covered cursorily in some instances, every staff ride should expose participants to the limitation on maneuver and sustained combat action imposed by logistical capabilities. Often this can be the critical factor limiting the success of exploitation, and it can reduce unit effectiveness as dramatically as enemy firepower. Since peacetime exercises can gloss over this fundamental reality, it is especially important that staff rides do not reinforce this tendency. If logistics is the subject of primary concern for a group, the leader is justified in organizing and conducting the staff ride with logistics rather than fire and maneuver as the principal learning objective.

Depicting Generalship

Groups composed of senior officers will want to use the staff ride to investigate problems in generalship—decision making at the operational level of war. In this as in all other areas of inquiry, the staff ride leader needs a framework for analysis that transcends the battlefield under review. To achieve this, he can structure the preparatory phase and the terrain coverage so that participants can ask how each army's leader compensated for his force's weaknesses while capitalizing on its strengths. Obviously, the general who can do this with the greatest assurance is the better general in any contest, no matter what the outcome. Explicit discussion of this subject will develop spontaneously throughout a staff ride with senior officers and can become an important feature of the after-action review. Discussions on this topic will seldom be definitive, but they can be an extremely valuable adjunct to all other means of addressing this difficult subject.

Depicting Cause and Effect

In everything we have discussed thus far, the relationship between cause and effect has been very near the surface but seldom the center of attention. The same will be true on a staff ride unless the leader makes a special effort to depict that relationship. At the lower tactical levels, this is a fairly easy process. Success or failure of a regiment or similar unit can generally be attributed to a combination of a few of the factors already considered, and participants should be encouraged to dissect a few units' experiences on the battlefield to work out this relation-

ship. Compounding this process on the grand tactical level introduces more variables and greater uncertainty, but participants in a successful staff ride should be able to argue the relationship between cause and effect in the performance of a corps. How does success at the minor tactical level contribute to engagements won? Since most staff rides focus on a single battle rather than a full campaign, participants will only have a vague insight into the relationship between engagements won and campaigns victorious until they have done more thinking and reading. But there are few activities better suited than staff rides to opening this inquiry, and once it has begun the staff ride participant is ready to be his own teacher in his further investigations into the nature of the military art.

Conclusions

This short discussion of aspects of the military art that can be depicted on a staff ride is far from complete, for the limits on what a good staff ride leader can depict are set by his imagination, time available, and the needs of the group. Before detailed planning for a staff ride begins, the leader should always check the profile of the group, making sure he understands its primary learning objectives, and design all aspects of the staff ride accordingly.

Colonel Harold Nelson, Military History Program Coordinator, U.S. Army War College, was one of the staff ride leaders for the secretary of the Army's staff ride to Chancellorsville in the fall of 1987.

The Staff Ride - Goals and Definitions

The goals of staff rides have varied from the specific testing of operational concepts to the general enhancement of professional and analytical skills. All staff rides, however, have one idea in common—to place students on an actual piece of terrain, confront them with an operational situation, and stimulate them to reach conclusions or derive lessons from the experience. A staff ride consists of systematic preliminary study of a selected campaign, an extensive visit to the actual sites associated

with that campaign, and an opportunity to integrate the lessons derived from each. It envisions maximum student involvement before arrival at the site to guarantee thought, analysis, and discussion. A staff ride thus links a historical event, systematic preliminary study, and actual terrain to produce battle analysis in three dimensions. It consists of three distinct phases: preliminary study, field study, and integration. Extracted from "The Staff Ride" by William G. Robertson, Combat Studies Institute.

Additional Skill Identifier 5X

Kenneth R. Pierce

According to AR 611-101, Additional Skill Identifier (ASI) 5X is entitled "Historian." The ASI actually identifies Army officers with an advanced degree (M.A. or higher) in the discipline of history. There are two ways to obtain this ASI. The first is to obtain an M.A. in history at an accredited college or university. The second way is restricted to CGSC resident students who participate in the Master of Military Arts and Science (MMAS) Program, with a concentration in history.

The officer designated 5X is often generally viewed as a history instructor. This has resulted in a perception in the field that an ASI 5X could lock an officer into a very restrictive and not very upwardly mobile career track. The purpose of the 5X program is not to identify officers with historical skills. However, if one views those Army billets that have been coded with 5X in the TDA, almost all are associated with schools or "history organizations." For example, there will soon be approximately 100 ASI 5X billets within ROTC Cadet Command, at 100 different ROTC battalions. Each service school has at least 1 ASI 5X billet. The U.S. Military Academy has about 20 TDA billets for ASI 5X. Command and General Staff College has over 20 ASI 5X billets. Other coded billets are at the Military History Institute, the U.S. Army War College, and the Center of Military History. The rank authorization of these positions ranges from captain to brigadier general.

At USMA and ROTC the ASI 5X billets are primarily instructors. At the service schools the assignments range from platform instructors to division chief of small group instruction teams. At CGSC the billets range from curriculum supervisors at CAS³ and Combat Studies Institute, to tactics instructors, researchers, doctrine writers, as well as military history instructors. At the War College they generally teach, and at MHI and CMH they generally perform research.

The point is that within the Army there is a broad range of duties and positions for officers holding ASI 5X. However, in my view there remains a major problem—it may be perception and it may be real. The problem is that branches tend not to recognize a need to allow officers the time to go to

school for advanced degrees in history unless they have been selected for an instructor position at USMA.

The largest population of officers holding a 5X are those who got their advanced degree on their own time, with their own funds. The majority of these officers tend to be combat arms officers with an OPMS Specialty Code 54 (Operations). In fact, Maj. Gen. Gordon R. Sullivan, the Army's Chief of Specialty Code 54, has recently stated that a degree in history is ideally suited for OPMS Specialty 54.

Actually, the skills of the historian are exactly the type skills needed for commanders and staff officers at every level. Clearly, the ability of an officer to research, write, and analyze serves the Army well in almost any staff billet. The unfortunate part of this is that there are very few 5X-coded billets outside USMA, TRADOC, the War College, and the Center of Military History. Even on the Army Staff in DCSOPS there are no 5X-coded billets. At corps and theater Army TOE headquarters, evidence shows that officers applying for advanced civil schooling in the discipline of history are being turned away, if not openly rebuffed, by MILPERCEN. There are over 900 Army officers with the additional skill 5X. General Palmer, General Wagner, and General Saint are all students of history. General Vuono as CAC Commander and TRADOC Commander put great emphasis on military history. The Concept Based Requirements Systems is totally inculcated with history. Even casual study illustrates that Frederick the Great, Napoleon Bonaparte, and George S. Patton, Jr., studied and read history. Yet today it is evidently more career rewarding to be skilled in computer science, operations research, journalism, or hotel management than history. It is time that we stop giving lip service to the continued study of history.

If we wish to encourage young officers who specialize in Operations and Training (OPMS Specialty 54) to get an advanced degree in history, then the Army must code TOE and TDA billets with the ASI 5X and submit Army Education Requirements Board (AERB) validations for those positions. Within TRADOC we must convince officers that they will be serving as service school instructors or

division chiefs—not just as instructors in military history. What the Army is looking for is soldiers schooled in the discipline of the historian. They are not going to convince people of that until there is at least one 5X-coded and validated billet in every division and corps G-3 TOE. We are not going to be convincing unless there are more than five O-6 billets in the entire Army coded with ASI5X. We are not going to be convincing until there are ASI 5X billets at HQ FORSCOM, HQ USAREUR, and on the DA Staff, and Army billets on the Joint Staffs. Again, it cannot be overemphasized that those coded billets should not be for “historians” but for operations officers, plans officers, training officers, and combat developments officers who are schooled in the discipline of history.

The Army has come a long way in recognizing the need for more study, education, and training in military history. This is particularly true in TRADOC where there are literally hundreds of billets

coded with the ASI 5X, from ROTC through the Command and General Staff College. It is time that the chief of staff and the MACOM commanders take a hard look at the balance between officers schooled as technicians in the hard sciences and those schooled in the arts, particularly history. After all, FM 100-5, Operations, states that one of the imperatives of land combat is “to know the effects of battle on units, soldiers, and leaders.” Particularly in peacetime we must learn that the lessons of the past can save lives in the future. Warfighting is both a science and an art. It is time we recognize that balance and take action to ensure there are enough officers educated with the skills that will cause them to think and act in terms of the “art of war.”

Lieutenant Colonel Pierce is chairman of the Military History Education Committee, Combat Studies Institute.



Maj. Michael D. Maples (left) and Lt. Col. Karl J. Leatham, Commander, 1-94 FA at the pill box marking the link-up of 4th AD with the defenders of Bastogne, 26 Dec 44, on the road from Assenois. A late season snowstorm helped create a sense of winter conditions confronting the original defenders 0830 hours, 10 Apr 86. Submitted by Russ Parkinson, VII Corps historian.

History Net Completes Second Year

David R. Campbell

The U.S. Army History Network was officially recognized as a subnetwork of the Army FORUM-NET on 18 February 1986. FORUM is the Army's teleconferencing network designed to facilitate communications among the Army's action officers and thinkers for the solution of difficult problems. FORUM has authorized a total of thirty-six subordinate networks to focus on specific areas of concern to the Army.

The Army FORUM originated in 1976 as 'Delta Task Force'. Army teleconferencing in its current mode, however, began in 1980 with the purchase of CONFER II, a program written by Dr. Robert Parnes of the University of Michigan. CONFER II allows network participants to present items for discussion, comment, or vote, and welcomes an almost unlimited number of responses. The key word here is 'participant'. Many of you know how difficult it is to conduct an orderly and meaningful conference in which each attendee feels that he (or she) must have extensive floor time to express his or her view. Conferees rarely seem to come away feeling completely satisfied with the opportunities afforded them for participation. That is why we often see pre-conference ice breakers, smokers, and post-conference gatherings. Conferences are always costly and very often convene at inopportune times.

Teleconferencing has the advantage of giving all participants an equal opportunity to express themselves and adequate time to prepare their responses. Normally shy participants are not faced with the problem of confronting their fellow discussants. Although every item of discussion and every response is clearly identified with the author's name, normal barriers to personal communications are removed. Titles and ranks are not used; informal discussion is encouraged. Dispensing with formalities and getting to the heart of the discussion saves time.

The History Net is designed to link all Army historians with the Center of Military History for the purpose of sharing knowledge through thoughtful discussion and frequent contact. Although the goal of the network is to encourage interaction among history professionals, the net has not limited participation to Army historians. Currently, there are ninety-nine participants entered in the net. They include command historians in West Germany

(USAREUR), Korea, Japan, Hawaii (PACOM), and AMC. Others are from organizations such as the Army War College, Fort Leavenworth's Combat Studies Institute, the Military History Institute, West Point's History Department, and the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations.

Net participants have recently expressed great enthusiasm for this concept because it affords them greater communication among themselves and with the Center. In the past two years the history net has assisted historians at the Center and around the world to accomplish their mission. The net has been used for simple communications, the discussion of new concepts, as a research tool, the passage of historical trivia, advertisement of new publications, and historian jobs available all over the world. The net works to the extent that historians participate, but as yet all historians are not with the program. Teleconferencing is a tool that works for historians, it is the future, and it is available now. Anyone interested in joining the History Net needs only a computer (any brand), a modem, and an identification number. Contact the net organizer: Mr. Billy Arthur, AV 285-1279, for further information.

Lieutenant Colonel Campbell was assigned to the Center of Military History from 31 October 1984 to 30 June 1988.

War Poetry

The poem on the next page appeared as part of the *Heeresamt's* (German Army Office) after-action report on the 1985 German-American staff ride to Remagen Bridge. (See *TAH*, Number 8, "The Bridge at Remagen: A German-American Staff Ride to Study Its Capture.") According to Bruce Siemon, (Chief, USAREUR Military History Office), the poet is assigned to the *Heeresamt* and speaks excellent English, as do most personnel there. He chose to write in Gerglish, a term coined by Bruce, to liven up the text and reach a wider audience. Bruce generously provided explanatory footnotes for those of us who have trouble with any deviations from our native tongue.

Die Brücke von Remagen!
Dieter Schleinkofer

Let's praise today, so gut we can,
The First Lieutenant Timmerman,
Who was a hero, yes indeed,
Wenn man it like the Ami's sieht.¹
Here is, sehr nüchtern und auch² short,
The very thrilling war-report.
Es war in March of Forty-Five,
Da took der Timmerman a drive
From Meckenheim down to the Rhine
To buy in Remagen some wine,
Because a General named Bradley,
Wanted the Rhinewine ziemlich³ badly.
In Remagen he got a Schreck,⁴
Die Rhine-Bridge there was gar nicht weg,⁵
Because the German's so to say
Had not genügend⁶ TNTay,
And ausserdem⁷ a Major Scheller,
Who was not a besonders schneller.⁸
This has den Timmerman gefreut,⁹
He schrie: "The bridge is not destroyed,
I take it jetzt, sonst ist s zu spat¹⁰
And then I build a Brücken-Head."
He crossed the bridge at half past drei,¹¹
Climbed dann noch¹² up the Erp'ler Ley
And called in Meckenheim his boss:
"We crossed the Rhine without a loss,
Send me Verstärkung,¹³ if you can,
I see you later, Timmerman!"
This was the end of World War Two,
In Remagen herrscht wieder Ruh,¹⁴
Only the Burgermeister Kurten,
Who is schon lang in Amt und Würden,¹⁵
Sells bridge-stones wenn he immer can,
In memory of Timmerman.

¹ If one views it as the Americans do.

² Very prosaic and also.

³ Rather.

⁴ Shock, fright.

⁵ Was not gone.

⁶ Enough.

⁷ Besides.

⁸ Especially.

⁹ Pleased.

¹⁰ Now, or 'twill be too late.

¹¹ Three.

¹² Then also.

¹³ Reinforcements.

¹⁴ Peace reigns once again.

¹⁵ Long in office and full of dignity (dignified).

PROFESSIONAL EVENTS

DAHAC Meeting

On 22-23 October 1987, the Department of the Army Historical Advisory Committee (DAHAC) held its forty-second annual meeting at the National Guard Association Building, 1 Massachusetts Avenue, NW, Washington, D.C.

Recently, there have been a number of important changes to the DAHAC membership. On the military side due to reassignments, Maj. Gen. Raymond E. Haddock, Chief of Staff, TRADOC, and Brig. Gen. Stephen Silvasy, Jr., Deputy Commandant, U.S. Army War College, were added. Brig. Gen. Roy K. Flint, Dean of the Academic Board, U.S. Military Academy, replaced the head of the History Department, and Maj. Gen. Gordon R. Sullivan, Deputy Commandant, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, replaced the director of the Combat Studies Institute in a move to have all general officers as members of the Committee.

Three eminent civilian historians joined the Committee: Dr. Edward M. Coffman, University of Wisconsin; Dr. Ernest R. May, Harvard University; and Dr. Russell F. Weigley, Temple University. Lastly, Dr. Frank G. Burke, Acting Archivist of the United States, and Mr. David Miller, Solicitor of the City of Scranton, were added as members.

On the first day the chief of military history, Brig. Gen. William A. Stofft, and his staff presented updated briefings to review the preceding year's activities at the Center of Military History. This was followed by briefings by Col. Robert A. Doughty, U.S. Military Academy; Col. Harold Nelson, U.S. Army War College; and Col. Jim R. Paschall, Military History Institute.

The second day was devoted to an open discussion of current issues by the Committee and Center staff, emphasizing practical measures by which the Committee could support the Center in its initiatives and enhance the Army Historical Program in general. A committee report will be furnished through the chief of staff to the secretary of the Army.

Staff Ride Video

A new Department of the Army videotape entitled *The Staff Ride* has been completed and forwarded to Tobyhanna Depot for reproduction and distribution. Identified as TVT 20-762, *The Staff*

Ride will be available in 3/4-inch format at TASCs worldwide by the end of January 1988. A copy of the Center of Military History's staff ride pamphlet will be packaged with each cassette.

Produced by the Combat Studies Institute, the 36-minute tape is designed to supplement the pamphlet and provide additional "how-to" tips in building your own staff ride. Footage from several rides, both CONUS and overseas, reinforce specific principles. The target audience includes TRADOC branch schools, ROTC Cadet Command, and line units all over the world. Contact your local TASC around the end of January 1988 to get your copy. For more information on the film, contact the Combat Studies Institute, AV 552-3904/4110.

TRADOC Board Meeting

The seventh annual TRADOC Commander's Advisory Board on Military History Education was held at Fort Leavenworth on 4 November 1987. Chaired by Lt. Gen. Gerald T. Bartlett, the Board reviewed the state of the MHEP within TRADOC and discussed several concerns and issues focusing on program improvement and refinement. Topics discussed included: integration of history into core curriculum; staff ride participation; ASI 5X management; history education in NCOES; Warrant Officer Training System MHEP; and future MHEP initiatives. See MHEP notes #4-87, published by the Combat Studies Institute, for details.

New CMH Function

The Center of Military History has recently assumed responsibility for the U.S. Army portion of the federal declassification program. The Center has the authority to declassify certain Army-authored documents for historical research purposes, and it has the knowledge to route to the appropriate authority those documents that it does not have the authority to unilaterally declassify. Details will be covered in the revised AR 380-5 scheduled for publication in March 1988. Command historians are encouraged to use this service in order to produce studies and monographs that can be circulated widely. Requests should be addressed to DAMH-HSR.

Military History Writing Contest Results

In the 1987 Military History Writing Contest, Capt. David Francavilla, IOAC 5-87, was awarded the first place prize of \$500. The following persons received honorable mention awards of \$100 each: 1st Lt. Mark T. Kennedy, OOACC-22-3-87; M. Sgt. Norman J. Oliver, USASMA Class 30; Capt. Rick Waddell, EOAC 4-87; and Capt. Marcus B. Zinger, AOAC 7-87.

Scholars

Dr. Carl Boyd, professor in the History Department at Old Dominion University, is visiting research scholar at the Center for 1988-89. He is available for consultation and speaking engagements on MAGIC intelligence and Japanese-German communications in WWII.

Dr. Ray Skates, visiting research scholar from the University of Southern Mississippi, departed the Center the end of May 1988. He is completing his manuscript on Operation DOWNFALL: The Proposed WWII Invasion of Japan.

Normandy Seminar

On 16 and 18 February, a team of CMH historians presented a six-hour historical analysis of the Normandy invasion to the Director of Operational Plans and Interoperability (J-7) of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and his principal staff officers as a background for the development of joint doctrine. Also in attendance were General William DePuy, the former Commanding General of TRADOC, and representatives from the Navy, Air Force, and Marine history offices. The CMH team consisted of Mr. Billy Arthur, Dr. Carl Boyd, Col. Reid Franks, Dr. Jack Schlicht, and Dr. Burton Wright III.

MHD Seminar

Twenty-two active and reserve component military history detachments assembled at Ft. Hood, Texas, 17-30 July 1988 to participate in training. The seminar was co-hosted by the Center of Military History and the United States Forces Command and was supported by III Corps. MHDs received instruction in such diverse areas as oral history interview

techniques, photo journalism, and map reading. III Corps personnel provided MHDs with the opportunity to engage in a simulated computer war game to develop knowledge of Army AirLand Battle operational concepts and tactics and also demonstrated the latest in equipment and battle drill.

CMH Publications

The following publications have been recently distributed:

Armies, Corps, Divisions, and Separate Brigades
The Army Medical Department, 1818-1865
Dissertation Year, Fellowship brochure
Hukbalahap Study
The Medics' War (Korean War series)
Moscow to Stalingrad
Reprints of *Soldier-Statesmen* brochures #1-23
The Staff Ride
WWII Close Air Support Joint Operations: North Africa

The following publications will be distributed in the near future:

Advice and Support: The Final Years
CMH Publications Catalog
Commanding Generals and Chiefs of Staff, 2d ed.
FY 81 DAHSUM
Historical Analysis of Normandy
Military Government in the Ryukyu Islands, 1945-1950
Public Affairs: The Military and the Media
Quarters One, 2d ed.
Report of The Surgeon General, 1976-1980
The Role of Federal Military Forces in Civil Disturbances
Soldier-Statesmen of the Constitution (book version of Bicentennial brochures)
Urology in WWII
U.S. Army Mobilization and Logistics in the Korean War: A Research Approach
WWI Order of Battle (facsimile reprint; first CMH ed.); 5 vols.

Readers are invited to express their opinions with letters to the editor on the content of this publication as it contributes to the mission of CMH, as well as to share their experiences on topics related to the study, use, and teaching of military history. Correspondence should be addressed to *The Army Historian*, 20 Massachusetts Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20314-0200.

Engineers Analyze Antietam

Donald D. Jacobovitz

On 5 June 1986, members of the staff and faculty of the Engineer School visited the Antietam National Battlefield at Sharpsburg, Maryland, on a staff ride. Fifty-seven staff ride participants spent the day walking the site of the bloodiest single day of fighting during the Civil War.

The trip was preceded by extensive preparation on the part of the participants. Everyone was given a package of information concerning the Civil War, the Antietam Campaign, men, equipment, tactics, and events which played a part in the September 1862 battle. Most participants read *Landscape Turned Red* by Stephen W. Sears prior to the trip, and a prebriefing was given by Dale Floyd, a historian from the Office of the Chief of Engineers.

Some participants were assigned to study the careers of prominent leaders of the North and South who fought in the battle of Antietam Creek. These individuals researched their assigned characters to discover what they did and why they acted the way they did. This information was shared with the group during the visit to the battlefield.

In addition to the Fort Belvoir personnel, Col. Brian Moore from the Army War College at Carlisle Barracks and Mr. Paul Chiles, Interpretive Specialist, from the National Park Service took part and assisted in the discussions. The battlefield discus-

sions usually began with the tactics employed in the battle and then digressed to idiosyncrasies of the Civil War leaders, engineer aspects of the battle, and to modern day techniques that could be applied if the battle were fought now. Maximum group interaction was encouraged from all participants to foster the exchange of ideas.

The staff and faculty of the Engineer School conduct quarterly staff rides to Revolutionary War, War of 1812, and Civil War battlefields. These staff rides consist of three parts: a systematic preliminary study of a selected campaign, an extensive visit to the actual sites associated with that campaign, and an after-action review to integrate the lessons derived from each. Maximum participant interest is generated before arrival at the sites to guarantee stimulated analyses and discussions. Battle analysis in the three phases mentioned above is thereby achieved. Overall, the Fort Belvoir staff rides result in increased historical mindedness for all participants and a much better understanding of the reactions of leaders and soldiers in the crucible of combat.

Captain Jacobovitz is the staff ride coordinator for the staff and faculty of the Engineer School.

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