

# ARMY HISTORY

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## Army Leaders and Military History

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Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Good military leaders understand history. Leadership without a sense of history can only be instinctive, and thereby limited, in its scope. The study of history contributes to our knowledge of the human experience so that in the end we are better able to render judgment, and what is leadership but the ability to judge what must be done and how to accomplish it?

The late World War II historian and combat journalist Cornelius Ryan told of watching a group of green American lieutenant replacements in Italy moving up to take over platoons that were already in heavy action. A fellow war correspondent at his side commented simply, "I hope they are well read." Ryan found much wisdom in that observation. How else could men so young and new to war hope to lead others? They had little chance to train; they had no experience of war; they were too young to know much of life firsthand. Those with an early acquired sense of history, with a knowledge of human endeavor, would be relatively well off indeed at that moment.

As military leaders we are charged to prepare our soldiers and ourselves for war. We go about this in a variety of ways, not least of which is to bring about some understanding of the nature of war. With this in mind we can look back over the Army's recent training programs and activities with some satisfaction that we have been able to emphasize history as a part of them. Our military schools are encouraging more and more historical readings and analyses. Units are visiting battlefields, making terrain walks, taking staff rides, and investigating the decisions and circumstances of the men who fought there. We are requiring our junior officers, and encouraging our more senior ones, to select from recommended lists, to read, and to reflect. More and more of our people are writing, and more and more of their works are being published.

Hopefully, we are seeing the development of a trend



*General Galvin during NATO exercise*

here. Perhaps we can take some pride in the indicators that history is a more vital part of training than it has been in the recent past. But there are still those who would question whether we really need all this effort. After all, the military is a busy place, the days are long, the work demanding, and the pace exhausting. Can we really devote much time and effort to reading history?

Clausewitz answered that question some time ago. In his effort to understand the nature of war, he praised the use of historical example. He approached the use of history from four perspectives: as an explanation, as a demonstration of the application of an idea, as a support for a statement, and as a detailed presentation from which one might deduce doctrine. Each use requires greater degrees of rigor. The first and simplest demand is for accuracy. If we read widely enough, we can develop an ability to discern and a base for comparison that will develop a feel for

accuracy. The second and far greater demand is to project ourselves into the moment in time under study, not to force fit it into our own world. Only by understanding the conditions of the era and the perspectives of the people under study can we understand the rationale of their decisions--and make judgments for our own time. The third and fourth are matters of logic and discipline.

In sum, the reading of history is a way to gain experience. The reader swelters with Lawrence in the burning Arabian sands and learns the brutality and fluidity of guerrilla warfare. He gasps at Chandler's description of the genius Napoleon arising at midnight to dictate his orders through the night to set the stage for the battle. He hammers at Lee's Army of Northern Virginia with Grant's memoirs; overcomes the terror of the Burmese jungle and turns defeat into victory with Slim; unravels the conceptual threads of battle and maneuver with Delbruck; relates war to nuclear weapons to politics with Brodie; freezes in Korea with Marshall at the river and the gauntlet; and cries out with MacDonald at the inanities of the Kall trail before Schmidt.

In the end he emerges as a veteran--more inured to the shock of the unexpected, better prepared to weigh the consequences of critical decisions, and imbued with the human drama breaking upon leaders and led in their march to destiny. He knows the fine line between foolhardiness and courage, between obstinance and conviction, between disgrace and glory. He has had a conversation with the soldiers of all time and has shared their lives and thoughts. His judgment is sharpened, and he is better prepared to lead.

As we read history we enter into a conversation together, where a reference to Douhet, an analogy that cites Verdun, or an illustration that notes Trafalgar evokes a much greater understanding of what is meant. Professional exchanges are richer, transmission of ideas more efficient, and misunderstandings fewer. A common historical understanding carries a wealth of meaning for us as leaders.

We have done much in our Army recently to heighten our professionalism and our readiness to defend our nation. Not least among our accomplishments has been a restatement of the importance of history in general and military history in particular. No one should become so busy with the course of events that he does not pause and consider how others have dealt with similar circumstances in their

own time and place. To immerse oneself in history is to spend time well.

## ***ARMY HISTORY***

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## New Chief of Military History



Colonel Harold W. ("Hal") Nelson has been appointed Chief of Military History, effective 21 August 1989. A native of Nebraska, Colonel Nelson has held appointments across the spectrum of Total Army functions in several countries, including positions with troops and in combat, at various staff levels and Army schools, and has integrated advanced academic study into his military duties. A 1963 graduate of the United States Military Academy at West Point, Colonel Nelson joined the field artillery and served as a battery officer with the 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized) at Fort Carson, Colorado, from November 1963 to May 1965. Sent next to Vietnam, the colonel served on Advisory Team 2, for which he was awarded the Bronze Star Medal and the Combat Infantryman's Badge, among other awards. Shortly after his return from the war zone, he began graduate studies at the University of Michigan and received the M.A. in history in 1970. His second overseas posting took him to Korea, where he served one year as Assistant Chief of Staff (S-3) of the 4th Missile Command from January 1974.

Colonel Nelson is an experienced instructor, having taught European and Russian history at the Military Academy during May 1970-June 1973, as well as Soviet military history and American military history and defense policy in the Department of Unified and Combined Operations at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, during February 1975-June 1978. While instructing there, the colonel completed his dissertation and was awarded a Ph.D. in history by the University of Michigan in 1978. Sent to Europe the same year, Colonel Nelson served as a defense planner in the Office of the Defense Advisor at the U.S. Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in Brussels, Belgium, for two years. He then commanded 2d Battalion, 377th Artillery (Lance), at Herzo Artillery Base, Federal Republic of Germany, for two years from June 1980.

Colonel Nelson's publications include U.S. Army War College guides to the battles of Gettysburg, Antietam, Chancellorsville, and Fredericksburg; articles on strategy and intelligence; and a political-military study: *Leon Trotsky and the Art of Insurrection, 1905-1917* (London: F. Cass, 1986), the last based on his dissertation.

Colonel Nelson comes to Washington from Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, where he served in the Department of War Gaming at the U.S. Army War College, prior to which he completed his own USAWC course in 1984. He then served as Director of the Theory of War, USAWC, and most recently as Director of the U.S. Army Military History Institute.

Colonel Nelson is married to the former Janet Wachter, and they have two daughters, Karen and Catherine.

The former Chief of Military History, Brig. Gen. William A. Stofft, has assumed duties as Army Director of Management at the Pentagon. General Stofft served as Chief of Military History from 6 April 1985 through 20 July 1989.

## The Chief's Corner

When I received a call on 2 August informing me that I was to become the Chief of Military History on 21 August, I expressed the same sincere surprise that many have since voiced. Brig. Gen. Bill Stofft's move to become Director of Management for the Army Staff had been billed as temporary, and many of us in the field had not stayed abreast of the changing situation on the Potomac. With General Stofft in his new position I have an advantage never before enjoyed by a new Chief of Military History: My predecessor is still actively involved in the Army's efforts to make the best possible use of its history.

I also have the advantage of assuming a leadership role at a time when history has earned widespread support in our Army. General Stofft built a strong team at the Center, and MACOM historians have made great strides in their own and subordinate headquarters. History education has been strengthened from precommissioning through the War College, and programs such as the staff ride and the end-of-tour interviews for senior leaders have given historians increased visibility. General Stofft filled key vacancies and restored the Senior Executive Service position of Chief Historian. The resulting momentum makes my job much easier than it must have been for many of my predecessors when they assumed office.

While maintaining that momentum, I hope to produce tangible progress in several areas. The National Museum of the U. S. Army needs a site. We aim to have the site selected by year's end so that we can begin the important task of forming the Commission and raising the private funds that will be needed to transform that vision into reality. While that project moves forward, we must develop programs and materials that will support our Army's fifty-year commemoration of World War II. At the same time I plan to improve the career management programs for officers (ASI-5X) and civilians (GS170, 1015, 1016) who are the lifeblood of our successes.

At my first staff meeting I drew upon my field artillery background to tell everyone that becoming Chief of Military History and Commander of the Center of Military History appeared to be similar to becoming a division artillery commander. Com-

manding some key assets is an important part of the job, but coordinating the vast array of capabilities that can be brought into play to help my supported headquarters is equally important. Learning about those capabilities and attempting to coordinate their employment will absorb much of my attention throughout my tenure and will be especially important in these early months.

I shall endeavor to attend key meetings where members of our Army history community gather, and I hope to call on many members of our team at their work sites. I may have been surprised by the opportunity to become Chief of Military History, but I was not unprepared. I hope that I can draw upon my many years of studying, teaching, writing, and staffing military history to accelerate the progress initiated by my predecessors. *H.W.N.*

### Editor's Journal

The big news in this issue is twofold: note on the masthead that the bulletin's name is changed from *The Army Historian* to *Army History*, and I have been replaced as managing editor.

The name change to *Army History* is more than cosmetic. It reflects an attempt to broaden the publication both in audience appeal and content. That is to say, all Army personnel, green-suiters and civilians, have a vested interest in the history of their profession, and the previous title implied that the publication pertained only to those of us assigned to full-time professional history positions.

Further, we are taking a broader view of the value of military history in professional development and will include, in the future, pieces on the history of the Army, as well as those that describe ongoing historical activities in the field.

As for the change in management, Dr. Arnold Fisch will become managing editor after this issue in addition to assuming those duties relating to leader development and the military history education program. For your information, a new organization chart of the Center of Military History is presented elsewhere in this first issue of *Army History*. Thank you for your support. *B.A.A.*

# Battle Command Training: Putting History in War Games

Thomas D. Morgan

## Computer System Trains Commanders

As we all know, the only true test for peacetime training is to fight a war, but then it is too late. Consider this familiar scenario. An enemy tank regiment makes a surprise river crossing near the border that divides East and West Germany. The tanks drive to link up with an airborne regiment that has taken a critical NATO airbase in the rear. The enemy tank columns are spotted by friendly air reconnaissance and their locations reported to a forward-deployed U.S. armored division. After a quick consultation with his command group, the U.S. division commander orders a series of counteractions. The advancing enemy is lured into a pre-planned engagement area. The trap is sprung. Coordinated air strikes and massed artillery hit the column with the latest air and ground munitions. As the enemy columns are detained in the killing zone, the U.S. armored division counterattacks an exposed enemy flank and drives for critical crossing points over the river to trap the follow-on forces, setting them up for later destruction. Simultaneously, the U.S. armored division's aviation brigade neutralizes the enemy airborne force in the rear, which is now isolated because the enemy armored link-up force is in the process of being destroyed.

## War of Nerves, Not Blood

This is not the start of World War III, but it is the opening phase of a realistic, history-based, computer-simulated wargame recently conducted by the U.S. Army's Battle Command Training Program (BCTP). Fortunately, the battle just described and the rest of the campaign were simulated using computer graphics. No one was hurt, but high-ranking commanders and their battle staffs lost plenty of sleep.

Europe is no stranger to warfare, real or simulated. Over the centuries armies have fought and plundered their way from the Meuse to Elbe rivers and back. In recent years, the Central Region of NATO has been a favorite battleground for wargamers. One can safely assume that the Warsaw Pact forces have also picked this historically significant terrain for the



*Lt. Gen. (Ret.) David Grange (L), a past 2d Inf Div Commander and a veteran of many Korean War campaigns, and Maj. Gen. Jack Woodall, 2d Inf Div Commander, discuss leadership during a BCTP WARFIGHTER seminar at Camp Casey.*

wargames that drive their training and war plans.

Nowhere in the Central Region is a potential East-West conflict more dramatic than in the historic Fulda Gap region of Germany. The Hessian Corridor, Meiningen Gap, Vogelsberg, and Spessart Mountains shape an area that has seen its share of exercises, both command post and field training exercises, as well as staff rides and terrain walks that train for warfighting. Whether it is the Fulda Gap or the North German Plain, Korea's Chorwon Valley or Imjin River at the DMZ, key terrain and an appreciation of its historical military significance play a large part in successful training. Being able to tie the terrain with current training plans, however, is not always easy. CONUS-based and even some overseas units, for a variety of economic and political reasons, cannot always conduct exercises in contingency areas of their choosing.

## Battle Command Training Program

The U.S. Army now has a form of command post training that combines the historical perspective of the staff ride with the present-day reality of a field training exercise. It allows a commander to train himself, his staff, and his subordinate commanders

and staffs on terrain that best satisfies his training objectives without the costly expense of deploying entire corps/divisions in a field tactical exercise with troops. It is called the Battle Command Training Program (BCTP), and it is today's computer-driven wargame successor to yesterday's sand table/map exercises. The success of TRADOC's Combat Training Concept, the National Training Center (NTC) and the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), and USAREUR's Combat Maneuver Training Complex (CMTC) caused BCTP to be organized at Ft. Leavenworth in 1987. While the NTC, JRTC, and CMTC primarily train leaders and staffs up to battalion and brigade level, BCTP trains division and corps commanders, major subordinate commanders, and associated battle staff, normally at their home stations, in the tenets and principles of AirLand Battle doctrine at multiple echelons of command using a variety of exercise terrain "playboxes."

Realistic training is expensive. Future budget constraints may well limit large-scale military training opportunities. General Galvin, NATO's Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, noted in the September 1988 issue of *Army*, "Greater use will have to be made of tactical exercises without troops, of terrain walks, simulations, and command post exercises." BCTP combines the latest "schoolhouse" concepts from the U.S. Army's Command and General Staff College (USACGSC) with state-of-the-art battle simulation techniques to make realistic and professional command and staff training efficiently available to the Total Army.

BCTP uses a corps battle simulation system that consists of a VAX 8600/8750 computer linked to 13 MICROVAXs and the Joint Exercise Support System (JESS) software, to provide a free-play, computer-simulated wargame against a realistic, world-class opposing force. The BCTP exercises come in the form of a WARFIGHTER seminar to train the unit's command group, followed in two to six months by a full-fledged WARFIGHTER that exercises realistic operation plans based upon historical research. A historically relevant road-to-war scenario and a master events list are also part of this seminar. Most of the areas of the world where U.S. Forces can be expected to be deployed exist for BCTP in the form of digitized terrain in the JESS simulation model.



*Lt. Col. Johnson (L), 3d Armored Division Artillery executive officer, and DIVARTY fire support team during WARFIGHTER at Fulda.*

#### **Military Historians as Wargamers**

The ability to study and analyze military history is essential for the planners to prepare BCTP WARFIGHTER training. Officers with OPMS Specialty Code 54 (Operations) usually plan the WARFIGHTERS, and many are recent USACGSC School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) graduates who are well versed in military history and schooled in the discipline of the historian. Old campaigns are researched to provide the right historical perspective for a WARFIGHTER seminar or exercise. For example, the Korean War provides an excellent historical precedent for the 2d Infantry Division, which is currently stationed on terrain near the DMZ that was fought over by UN Forces thirty-five to thirty-seven years ago. Also, some of the successful deception plans of WWII's European Theater can be used to develop realistic scenarios and plans for today's training of USAREUR forces. In addition, the study of German blitzkrieg tactics and the Russian ripostes add historical perspective to any current European AirLand Battle scenario.

BCTP engages the services of distinguished, retired senior officers to be senior leadership consultants for seminars and senior observers for WARFIGHTER exercises. Lt Gen. (Ret.) David Grange and General (Ret.) Richard Cavazos have

ably filled those roles. They can interject pertinent historical lessons during the planning and conduct of a WARFIGHTER because, in a real sense, they have been there. Grange's accounts of being a company commander during the Korean War on the hills that now overlook Camp Casey brought a startling reality to a BCTP WARFIGHTER seminar held last year at Camp Casey, Korea.

BCTP has run JESS WARFIGHTER exercises from Corps Battle Simulation Centers in CONUS and in Europe, as well as a remoted seminar in Korea. The WARFIGHTER program starts with a three- to five-day battle seminar for commanders and their staff members, followed a few months later by a week-long command post exercise that is the main WARFIGHTER exercise. In 1988, BCTP trained active and reserve component divisions using the JESS simulation at Ft. Lewis, Washinton; Ft. McCoy, Wisconsin; Ft. Hood, Texas; Ft. Bragg, North Carolina; Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas; and in Korea and Germany. In 1989, corps-level WARFIGHTER exercises will start with Ft. Hood's III Corps's being the first. The intent is to conduct WARFIGHTER exercises for all twenty-eight divisions and five corps of the Total Army on a periodic basis through 1990.

### Training Leaders to Win

The most recent WARFIGHTER exercise was for the 3d Armored Division in Germany's Fulda Gap. As befitting "America's first choice for the Fulda Gap," the 3rd Armored Division WARFIGHTER was the largest BCTP/JESS exercise run to date in Europe. It was also the first completely deployed exercise because all of the computers and JESS suite workstations were deployed and installed in a gymnasium in Fulda's Downs Kaserne, which became the Battle Simulation Center (BSC) for the exercise. Over 2,000 command, staff, and communications personnel were trained in field TOCS from that BSC.

Napoleon would have been well served by BCTP. At Waterloo he relied upon an untried scratch staff, hastily assembled during the 100 days of his second reign. He was rusty after a lethargic year's exile on Elba. It was not Victor Hugo's famous "sunken road," or the soggy ground restricting his artillery movements, that caused Napoleon's final defeat. It was his failure to practice the principles of war that he, himself, had developed over twenty years of warfare and his failure to teach those principles to his

subordinates. He had not taken the time to practice synchronizing those essential tactical and operational military skills without which his new staff and subordinate commanders could not execute his brilliant strategic plan. He did not have a well-trained team to win the first battle as he had at Austerlitz, Jena, and a host of other successful battles. Bravery and courage were no longer enough to face Wellington's well-defended positions at his front and to beat off Blucher's overwhelming flank attack. Napoleon's enemies had learned his tactics and beat him to the punch.

Marshal Foch is reported to have said: "It takes 15,000 casualties to train a major general." If we are to win the first battle, the U.S. Army cannot afford that type of doctrine. Historically, the U.S. Army has not fared well in its first battles. To win the first battle, commanders and staffs must be well trained and experienced. They must have their "15,000 casualties" behind them. BCTP and JESS give a commander an opportunity to practice that first battle on a digitized, simulated battlefield of his choosing that satisfies his training objectives. In that way, the commander can make mistakes, experiment, and learn without sacrificing his command. BCTP gives the commander a historical second chance to fall back on so that the first real battle will be a success. Commanders who have graduated from a series of BCTP WARFIGHTER exercises will, as Napoleon's enemies, be able to beat theirs to the punch.

*Lt. Col (Ret.) Thomas D. Morgan is a civilian contractor supporting BCTP at Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas. A graduate of the Military Academy and an artillery officer, Colonel Morgan has a masters degree in history.*



*The peacefulness of the Chorwon Valley belies its significance as a historical invasion route to the south. It was studied extensively during WARFIGHTER exercises in Korea.*

# Using the Staff Ride for Battalion Training

Jerry D. Morelock

The young captain had tears in his eyes as he listened to the voice of Mr. Gene Garrett, a 62-year-old veteran of the Battle of the Bulge, describing the events of 17 December 1944. On that day, Mr. Garrett and about one hundred other members of Battery B, 285th Field Artillery Observation Battalion, were captured by a German SS panzer unit at Baugnez Crossroads near the Belgian town of Malmedy. In a matter-of-fact, emotionless tone the voice on the tape continued as Garrett described how he and his buddies were marched into a nearby field, carefully aligned into ranks, and then systematically mowed down by SS machine gun and small-arms fire. Incredibly, Garrett and several others survived the horror of the Malmedy Massacre, and now his tape-recorded story was being used to educate and train a later generation of American soldiers.

Such is the power of military history that a World War II event can have a noticeable emotional impact on the soldiers of today's Army. Clearly, there are few, if any, current warfighting training techniques that have as great a potential and that, when applied as in a staff ride, can yield such gratifying results.

Listening to former artilleryman Garrett's story was part of the preliminary study phase of the 570th Artillery Group's staff ride to study artillery operations during the Battle of the Bulge. The purpose of this article is to describe the organization and conduct of this staff ride, as well as to share some lessons learned from it. Primarily, I want to emphasize that a staff ride, when conducted properly, is excellent and meaningful training at the battalion level, and it can be accomplished with limited training resources.

The idea for our battalion's staff ride began when I took Dr. William G. Robertson's excellent staff ride elective as a student at the Command and General Staff College. Extremely impressed with the potential of this use of history as a means of training soldiers, I decided that if I was selected for battalion command, staff rides would be integrated into our unit's training plan. Within days after I assumed command of an artillery battalion in Germany, the operations officer was instructed to include a battalion staff ride in our training plan, using these principles as general guidelines for the training: First, it must be meaningful and relevant training; second, it must be conducted within the available resources;

and third, it must include all the elements of the staff ride as taught at CGSC.

Due to the unit's location in northwest Germany, several battlefields were considered as possible staff ride sites. Arnhem, the location of the ill-fated Allied airborne Operation MARKET GARDEN is just across the border in Holland. Even closer is the German town of Wesel, scene of Field Marshal Montgomery's 21 Army Group Rhine River crossings in March 1945. Directly south of us is Lippstadt, meeting place on 1 April 1945 of the leading armored elements of General Simpson's Ninth U.S. Army and General Hodges' First U.S. Army, which closed the Ruhr Pocket and trapped the last major German combat forces in the rubble of Germany's major industrial area. All of these were tempting, but the final decision went to the greatest pitched battle fought in World War II by U.S. soldiers--the Ardennes Offensive, known as the Battle of the Bulge.

The battle met all the general guidelines and included other extremely important factors that made it the logical choice. The 570th is a NATO unit that provides support to the Belgian I Corps in Germany, and this Belgian connection was vital in easing the logistical support burden and obtaining adequate accommodations during the staff ride. An extensive library of critical resource material was available on the Ardennes and, finally, the situation of outnumbered U.S. troops facing a surprise assault by a highly mobile, determined enemy is directly relevant to the situation existing in Germany today. As General Bruce Clarke, the hero of the fight at St. Vith, described the Bulge:

NATO troops (now) along the Iron Curtain in Europe face a Russian force that could launch another such surprise attack like the Ardennes Offensive without buildup. If such should occur, the pattern of the battle could well follow this one . . . surprise, cut-off units, bad weather, short supply . . . cut communications, loss of contact to right . . . left and . . . rear, and the other confusion of a modern, fluid battle. For these reasons the study of this battle is of value.



The staff ride was organized into three prescribed phases: preliminary classroom study; field study; and integration phase or after-action review. Reference materials in the form of a battle book were made available to participants to provide background information. These books contained articles and excerpts from historical works covering a variety of subjects related to the battle. These included some written by American and German participants, individual unit histories, and portions of Hugh M. Cole's volume of the official U.S. Army history.

The preliminary classroom study phase consisted of a series of classes combining instructor lectures with presentations by participants. I acted as the staff ride leader and instructor. The initial class consisted of a multihour presentation covering the following areas:

- a. Overview and historical setting (U.S. Army, 1944)
- b. Strategic and tactical situation
- c. Ardennes region topography and history
- d. German plan of attack
- e. Initial attack and Allied reaction

Subsequent to this class, additional subjects were presented by the staff ride participants, much in the same manner as Dr. Robertson's CGSC staff ride. The assignment of these presentations was key to getting the participants more involved in the exercise and placing leader development at multiple levels in the learning process. As in the CGSC staff ride, the majority of these preliminary phase presentations were on commanders who took part in the battle, including Generals Hodges (First U.S. Army), Patton (Third U.S. Army), Simpson (Ninth U.S. Army), Middleton (U.S. VIII Corps), Hasbrouck (7th Armored Division), Clarke (CCB, 7th Armored), and Alan Jones (106th Infantry Division). Presentations were made from the other side of the hill on the German commanders along with a limited battle analysis from the German perspective. Last but not most relevant to the participants, U.S. artillery operations were analyzed.

Two Battle of the Bulge veterans provided the emotional highlights of the staff ride. Mr. Garrett, as described earlier, was kind enough to provide an audio tape of his experiences at the infamous "Malmedy Massacre," prompted by questions we prepared. In addition to providing thirteen articles on the battle that he authored, General Bruce Clarke

also prepared an audio tape describing his actions as commander of Combat Command B, 7th Armored Division, during the crucial fighting around the vital crossroads of St. Vith. Both of these distinguished veterans very kindly kept contact with us, providing a means for follow-up questions and comment. Copies of the tapes, as well as transcriptions of our questions, have also been provided to other units here in Germany who are planning staff rides to the Ardennes.

Actual coordination and completion of the detailed tasks necessary to conduct the battlefield phase of the staff ride were accomplished by one of the battalion's assistant operations officers, designated as project officer for the exercise. His duties included arranging for transportation and billeting, both of which were achieved at a minimum cost. Transportation was obtained through our supporting military community and our Belgian allies arranged for billets with the 1st Belgian Artillery Regiment, headquartered in Bastogne. This Kaserne, coincidentally, is the same one used by General McAuliffe as his headquarters during the battle. Additionally, the 1st Belgian Artillery kindly arranged for our breakfast and dinner meals each day of the field study phase for an incredibly low cost. Lunch meals were purchased at restaurants along the field study route. Prior to the field work, the instructor conducted a reconnaissance of proposed routes and battle sites.

The field study phase lasted three days, including two full days visiting battle sites. The first day concentrated on the 106th, 28th, and 101st Divisions' sectors, concluding with the airborne division's defense of Bastogne and Third Army's breakthrough to the surrounded soldiers.

The second day's route also began in the 106th Division's sector, then followed the flow of fighting around St. Vith and along the Northern Shoulder, concluding with the route of SS-Lt. Col. Joachim Peiper's Panzer column. As much as possible, the routes attempted to follow the flow of action chronologically. However, given time constraints and to avoid backtracking, some minor compromises had to be made. The actual conduct of the visit to each battle site during the field study phase incorporated one or more orientations on the action that occurred at the location. These short (10-15 minute) orientations were presented by the participants and included excerpts from the official history. Approximately twenty of these presentations were made at battle

sites along the two routes. At the end of each day, a wrap-up meeting was held to review the day's activities, answer any additional questions that may have arisen, and briefly orient the participants on the next day's events.

The final phase, the after-action review (integration phase), was conducted in the classroom after returning from the battlefield. The purpose the review was to integrate all of the experiences of the previous two phases and to discuss lessons learned. The format for this phase consisted of selected participants briefing the rest of the class on an assigned topic in one of the following areas: infantry, armor, engineers, artillery, supply and transport, air operations, and command and control. The last topic in the review was an overall summary and discussion of the Ardennes by the staff ride leader.

Now turning to those who want to use military history for leader development at battalion level, there are several significant lessons to be learned from this staff ride. First, it is obvious but should be stated for emphasis that the unit must be willing to allocate considerable time and resources to the project. Without this commitment it becomes merely a battlefield tour, not a staff ride. Battlefield tours and visits are, of course, of value as supplements to other training and study but cannot, by their very nature, achieve the results of a staff ride and probably cannot be classified as training for funding purposes. Second, the availability of research material and a primary instructor, (staff ride leader) is a key resource issue that must be resolved before any planning can proceed. Although many units, especially those in Germany, do not have access to research libraries, sufficient resource material can be obtained by carefully reviewing some of the excellent bibliographies currently available and acquiring the identified resources through formal or informal channels. The key is to plan well in advance of the staff ride. Similarly, even though not all battalion commanders are qualified historians, Army-wide there are military officers who hold advanced degrees in history and are designated ASI-5X. They should be located and contacted either to assist as subject matter experts, or to help in locating others who could. Once again, starting early is the key. Third, it is possible to stay within a limited budget by taking advantage of every opportunity to save on administrative costs, including reducing the cost of travel and accommodations. If possible, select a battle or campaign that

accomplishes your training objectives but is not too far from your unit, even though there may be a perfect battlefield farther away, requiring more travel time and resources.

There is no doubt that this battalion staff ride was, in all its aspects, good, solid, leader-development training. Not only were the young officers who participated able to sharpen their communication and research skills but, more importantly, they were able to prepare themselves better to lead their soldiers in combat. By using a systematic, comprehensive framework of military history to study the military failures and successes of a previous generation, they have become better leaders and commanders of their own generation. When their first battle comes, if it comes, they will be better prepared for it because of their study of military history--and the Ardennes staff ride.

*Lt. Col. Jerry D. Morelock was commander, 570th Artillery Group, when this article was submitted to Army History. He has studied the Battle of the Bulge extensively and is classified ASI-5X, Historian.*

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### NCO Training in the Prussian Army

"The German soldier had a very solid background of training . . . . The Prussian commanders kept the peacetime (garrison) tasks of barracks maintenance, guard and fatigue duty to the absolute minimum to permit the allocation of most of the men's time to purely military duties; thus, the soldier was diverted as little as possible from the final objective: To learn his profession. By intelligent decentralization, responsibility for the soldier's training was confined to his direct superiors, noncommissioned officers, lieutenants and captains . . . . In this respect the Prussian Army was incontestably the best in Europe, and its system of training, facilitated by the German respect for the principle of authority, contributed as much as its remarkable organization to its surprising triumphs." From Lt. Col. Leonce Rousset's "Histoire Generale de la Guerre Franco-Allemande," published at Paris in 1886 and quoted in T.N. Dupuy's *A Genius for War*. (Submitted by Bruce Siemon, Command Historian, U.S. Army, Europe, and Seventh Army.)

## St. Bonaventure Cadets Visit Gettysburg

Edward K. Eckert

Educators have used staff rides for years, them field trips. Last fall the St. Bonaventure University ROTC cadre requested me to lead a field trip for third- and fourth- year cadets to the Gettysburg National Military Park. As a specialist on the Civil War and American military history, I had long dreamed of taking a class to a battlefield to use it as a setting for students to study the Civil War.

A week before the trip I lectured to the cadets on the Civil War, focusing on the military events leading to the Battle of Gettysburg. I tried to show that the eastern campaign could best be understood in combination with General Ulysses S. Grant's attack on Vicksburg, Mississippi. When Vicksburg fell to Grant a day after General Robert E. Lee's loss at Gettysburg, the Confederacy could never again initiate a major strategic offensive. In addition to the lecture, cadets were assigned Michael Shaara's Pulitzer Prize, winning novel, *The Killer Angels*, which focuses on Confederate strategy at Gettysburg.

Arrangements were made for the cadets, two of the cadre, and me to stay at Fort Ritchie, Maryland (about twenty-five miles west of Gettysburg). We left on a Friday afternoon on a commercial bus and arrived at the post seven hours later. The cadets camped indoors in the recreation hall; the cadre and I had rooms at the club.

On Saturday morning the bus traveled along part of the Confederate Army's route to the field. Although I had worked as a Ranger-Historian on the battlefield for three summers, I was impressed once again with the difficulty of the mountainous terrain west of town. On the way I pointed out the difficulties the terrain presented, as well as the fine protection the mountains gave Lee's army.

When we got to the field I used Jay Luvaas and Harold W. Nelson's *U.S. Army War College Guide to the Battle of Gettysburg* (1986). Standing on McPherson's Ridge, near where the battle began, we soon found ourselves awash in a sea of buses, each led by a person carrying the same book. I soon spotted Professor Luvaas and asked him if he could help me, because I told him, "I've just bought this silly book and now am totally lost." Luvaas laughed and responded that he was guiding a group of War College students and families around the battlefield.

My students' appreciation of our trip rose considerably during this exchange between one of the authors of the Guide and me.

The site of the start of the battle, just west of Gettysburg, is easy to interpret. The trick is how to make the second day understandable to students. Since all the cadets had read Shaara's novel, it was possible to skip Culp's Hill on the northern edge of the field and focus on the strategic discussions between Lee and General James Longstreet. We followed Longstreet's route to the Southern move between Washington, D.C., and General George G. Meade's Army of the Potomac.

Little Round Top is the ideal place to stress the importance of terrain and initiative. The highest peak is not always the best to defend. Too steep a rise may fatigue troops and isolate a unit from the rest of the army. I gave the cadets time to explore the area before we walked to the monument commemorating the 20th Maine, a regiment composed mostly of teachers and students. There I stressed the value of the citizen-soldier in America's wars and reminded cadets that extraordinary bravery and determination at the right moment can be decisive. Col. Joshua Chamberlain, commander of the 20th Maine, is a major character in *The Killer Angels*. I read portions of Chamberlain's report of the battle, reprinted in the Guide. Then I asked the cadets to imagine themselves at this point on 2 July 1863, tired and out of ammunition, when Colonel Chamberlain ordered his men to "fix bayonets" and charge the enemy at the foot of the hill. This desperate charge was a success and helped ensure a Union victory on the second day of the battle.

We hiked down Little Round Top to Devil's Den where I lectured on Civil War weapons. I passed around a few minie balls to illustrate how a simple change in ballistics (effective rifling) could have a tremendous effect on tactics and casualties. We then drove to the "Electric Map" and Museum where we ate a picnic lunch and viewed the exhibits. After lunch we rode to Seminary Ridge, left the bus, and walked across Pickett's Field. Once again I asked the cadets to imagine themselves on the field, 125 years before, marching with 12,000 other men toward the mouths of Union cannon and rifles on

Cemetery Ridge. The mile-long hike gave plenty of opportunities to point out hollows in which an individual soldier might find some security, and to discuss a diversity of Civil War topics, including medicine, food, and logistics.

After we reached the "Angle" we walked to the National Cemetery. There I showed the students the spot where Lincoln gave his immortal address, and discussed the larger implications of the war. I left the cadets among the unmarked graves, alone with their personal thoughts on the meaning of the battle.

The day had passed too quickly and, like any campaign, there were lessons to be learned. First, I would spend more time with the students before traveling to Gettysburg. A couple of hours was not enough time to cover the entire Civil War and to prepare them for the trip. In the future I will try to get students more involved, possibly dividing them into teams to discuss the strategic options available to the generals.

Second, I would go to the electric map before touring the field. That would prepare the students better for what they are going to see that day and

refresh their knowledge of the battle. At the end of the day I would take them to the top of the national tower--the ugly steel structure that is the nemesis of so many Civil War buffs--to get an aerial view of the terrain. The tower may not be attractive, but it is an effective teaching tool. From there students can see the entire field at one time, and the instructor can summarize the battle.

The Army has long recognized that important lessons can be learned by studying historic battles. Decisiveness, courage, creativity, leadership, as well as terrain and technology, were some of the deciding factors at Gettysburg. Hopefully, a history lesson built around this one battle can inspire future officers to imitate past successes.

*Edward K. Eckert is a professor of history at St. Bonaventure University and the author of two books on the Civil War. His latest, Fiction Distorting Fact (Mercer University Press, 1987), deals with Jefferson Davis' imprisonment after the war. Currently he is completing a military history anthology, which Wadsworth Press will publish.*

## Reserve MP Brigade Studies Antietam

Raymond E. Bell, Jr.

Recently, the staff of a reserve component (RC) military police brigade and members from some of its subordinate units conducted a historical terrain ride in the environs of the Antietam Creek battlefield in Maryland. Although the exercise was not a staff ride under its strictest definition, most aspects of the staff ride system were included, and the end result was the same--enhanced professional expertise based on appreciation and analysis of a historical event.

The two primary purposes of this article are to describe how the Army's standard staff ride concept was adapted to meet the special conditions under which RC units operate and to encourage units to use this interesting, realistic, and effective training technique.

First, the unit was in the U.S. Army Reserve, which means restricted training time since these types units average approximately thirty-eight days of productive training per year at the most. Therefore this particular ride was limited to a total of one and a half days for the entire operation, which meant a

relatively simple, project easily well-defined within the capability of the unit. Participation was limited by a number of factors including difficulty in obtaining, reproducing, and distributing study material; dispersion of participants, who, by the nature of RC units, live over a wide area; and, most important, time. As often happens, the detailed preparation of the exercise then fell to a few individuals who had the time and expertise to pull everything together. Thus there was a primary deviation from the normal staff ride in which all participants are expected or required to be well prepared and each individual has a specific assignment in the program. In active Army units, for example, personnel normally work together on a daily basis and live in closer proximity, making more resources readily available and planning much simpler.

Second, the unit conducting the staff ride was a military police brigade staff with military intelligence and confinement facility subordinate organizations. This is hardly as homogeneous a formation as one would find in most active duty units. The

approach to the historical terrain ride had to be altered somewhat as a result. Again, basically it meant that the ride objectives had to be relatively simple and broad in scope. Thus the emphasis was on the fundamentals of terrain appreciation in the context of a historical event.

Third, the organization's being a military police brigade staff represented a particular challenge. Combat maneuver units can easily employ staff rides as TEWTs (Training Exercise Without Troops) and analyze historical examples of tactics, terrain, leadership, and a multitude of other battlefield dynamics appropriate to their current missions. Combat support and service support units have a somewhat narrower range of topics to choose from in adapting staff rides to their training objectives, and this was a problem for the unit at first. But, because the military police are the primary combat force on today's rear area battlefield, it was possible to perceive this as an exercise in light cavalry operations, which, as it turned out, was in tune with the battles fought prior to the one on Antietam Creek.

Fourth, many units, both Reserve and active, can conduct staff rides in areas where they may actually fight. Certainly units in Europe and Korea have this option. Active component units stationed overseas may even be located near battlefields fought over by ancestral units. However, this RC MP brigade's wartime mission is of a nature and in a location which is extremely difficult to train for, making the relevance of a Civil War staff ride even harder to establish. This required a degree of extrapolation that placed a premium on connecting the historical aspects of the environs with the type of unit and the area of projected actual operations. As we shall see, it was a challenge that met with rather unexpected success.

Finally, the objective of the exercise was to give the staff practical work in making estimates of the situation and producing an overlay type of operations order. Information necessary to complete these requirements had to be deduced from what the participants saw on the ground at Antietam, the historical framework of the campaign, FM 101-5, and their past experience, especially from Command and General Staff College course instruction.

The historical terrain ride began with little preparatory work by the participants but with a general familiarity about the Battle of Antietam, since many had lived in the Washington, D.C., area for some time and several had previously visited and studied the battle on their own. Staff members were enjoined to

do two things well: draw a good strip/sketch map of the area to be traveled and closely observe how the terrain looked and was utilized, particularly by the Confederate forces. The group then set out, accompanied by a running commentary of the situation by the terrain ride leader. Lively discussion on the bus quickly ensued with the subject matter quite varied, to include the height of the corn (and the concealment it provided) in the fields at the Battle of Antietam.

The immediate goal of the terrain ride group, however, was not the actual battlefield before Sharpsburg. Instead, moving over back roads, the bus drove through the battlefields of Crampton's Gap and South Mountain. These two terrain features are part of the extension of the Blue Ridge Mountains north of the Potomac River, running north to south. South Mountain, through which Turner's Gap runs, is about eight miles northeast of Sharpsburg. Crampton's Gap is about six miles due east of the same town. Here the principal part of the historical terrain ride was to be conducted, not at the site of the terrible battle fought just north of the Potomac River.

Briefly, on 14 September 1862, two days before McClellan and Lee faced each other across Antietam Creek outside Sharpsburg, McClellan's grand army marching out of Washington met what amounted to Lee's flank guard at Crampton's Gap and Turner's Gap in South Mountain. It turned into a critical Confederate delaying action with a modest force of infantry and cavalry under McLaws, D. H. Hill, and Stuart gaining time for Lee to gather his forces.

Longstreet, with three divisions, was several miles to the northwest of Sharpsburg at Hagerstown. Jackson was investing Harpers Ferry with three divisions, and Lee's trains were around Boonsboro, six miles northeast of Sharpsburg and near the crossing of South Mountain at Turner's Gap.

Opposing Lee was an army of five-plus corps under McClellan who also had Lee's famous Special Order No. 191 in hand. But for the caution and lethargy of Franklin's Corps in front of Crampton's Gap and two corps under Burnside at South Mountain, McClellan could have gone crashing into the midst of Lee's strung-out army which he was trying to assemble and move south of the Potomac River. The logistical trains in the vicinity of Boonsboro would have been uncovered if D.H. Hill had not held with Longstreet's support as long as he did in the face of Burnside's double envelopment. McLaws, at

Crampton's Gap, was driven off, but Franklin was spooked by McLaws' posturing after leaving the gap.

Now, for a military police brigade charged with protecting logistical and command elements in the rear areas, the relevance of the brigade's wartime mission to the preliminary battles of the Antietam campaign is brought into better perspective.

As the terrain ride group made its way through the countryside, the participants discussed the nature of the terrain as well as the actions taken by the various commanders. The intent, however, was not so much to concentrate on the Confederate or Union commanders' actions as to examine their thinking in accomplishing their missions. This was then translated into how an MP brigade might effectively employ relatively small mobile formations to accomplish those tasks derived from situations in which the Civil War commanders found themselves. Thus, at several stops discussion revolved around how a modern, well-equipped military police unit might perform the same mission that a Confederate infantry regiment might have been given in the same instance.

The group, all the while sketching their maps, went from place to place reviewing the historical events with the terrain and relating them to current doctrinal concepts. The culmination of the day's activities was conducted in front of Sharpsburg, where a professional historian described in detail the events of the bloodiest day in American military history. The evening found the brigade staff and subordinate units back at the starting point with each participant in possession of a completed strip/sketch map of the entire area. The exercise, however, did not end here.

The next day the participants assembled with their maps for an after-action review. They were divided into four groups, and each group was given a situation and mission that related to its unit's wartime responsibilities.

The simulated situation was that a Soviet airborne regiment equipped with light armored fighting vehicles had been dropped in the vicinity of the nation's capital. It was advancing west, as the Union Army had done in 1862, toward Sharpsburg, with the objective of securing the large airfield and logistical complex (both simulated) in the area where Lee had located his trains and unassigned reserves. The terrain ride participants had to determine the size and

composition of a military police brigade (based on current MP doctrine for area coverage) that should be assigned to defend the logistical complex from the advancing force.

Specifically, each group was required to use its previously prepared sketch maps and make an assessment of the situation given limited information, determine resources required, and prepare an overlay operations order within an hour. The group would then present its solutions for comments by the others and the brigade commander.

This after-action review/map exercise accomplished several objectives. First, it brought the past and present together in a relevant manner. The staff and unit participants had actually been on ground previously fought over and could draw appropriate conclusions as to placement of forces and maneuvers. Most importantly they gained an appreciation for the vagaries of the type of terrain that had features akin to terrain over which they would have to operate in wartime. Second, it required them to focus their energies on translating, in writing, a historical event into a present-day situation they might have to deal with, that is, to protect rear area installations against a large enemy force's attack. Third, it required utilization of limited resources, both in terms of information, i.e., troops available or required, and knowledge—crude sketch maps, to plan an operation. Fourth, it helped approximate, in a small way, the frustrations and uncertainties that a battle staff might encounter on today's fast-moving battlefield.

To reiterate, the staff ride is an effective teaching vehicle, but to realize its full benefit to specialized units, detailed preparation and participation are required. This is especially true of those units in the reserve components whose missions do not fall neatly into the staff ride category. Instead, the best approach may be a historical terrain ride, a close cousin of the staff ride. It is recommended to those who cannot meet the prerequisites of the more comprehensive staff ride.

*Brig. Gen. Raymond E. Bell, now retired, was the former commander of the 220th Military Police Brigade (USAR), which has its headquarters at Gaithersburg, Maryland.*

# The Joint Chiefs of Staff Historical Division

Willard Webb

The Historical Division of the Joint Chiefs of Staff dates back to the end of World War II. In October 1945, the Joint Chiefs established a Historical Section to write their history. The plan at that time called for a balanced narrative, in classified form, of the "organization, problems, undertakings, and accomplishments" of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the just completed year. Projected volumes would cover the evolution of global strategy, the war against Germany and her satellites, the war against Japan, the organizational development of both the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Combined Chiefs of Staff, and posthostilities planning and problems. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believed that such histories would be useful in future planning and for the education of staff officers. By the end of October 1945 the JCS Historical Section was functioning and, at the end of 1945, consisted of six military officers, soon to be augmented with several civilian historians, engaged in the research and writing of the history of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The work proceeded apace. By the early 1950s five classified volumes were finished. These included two on the war in the Pacific, two devoted to the organizational development of the JCS structure and the Combined Chiefs of Staff, and one covering the immediate postwar problems. Several volumes were in progress.

Then in August 1954, Admiral Arthur W. Radford, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, called upon the Historical Section to give its entire effort to studies of current crises and problems for his use and that of the Joint Staff. Shortly thereafter the Historical Section was redesignated the Historical Division and incorporated into the Joint Staff. At this point, the division consisted of eight military officers and seven civilian historians. In a realignment following the Defense Reorganization of 1958, the Historical Division moved under the secretary of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, where it has remained ever since. At about that same time, the military officer billets in the division were converted to civilian historian spaces, although a military officer served as the division chief until 1964.

From 1954 until 1961 the JCS Historical Division devoted its entire effort to special studies and historical research and writing in support of the current

work of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff. In 1961 work resumed on basic narrative volumes of JCS history. At that time the division was reorganized into two branches--the Histories Branch to write narrative volumes and the Special Projects Branch for special studies, current research, and other historical staff support.

With the resumption of work on the basic histories in 1961, the division, with the approval of the secretary of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, decided to give priority where there appeared to be the greatest need, the post-World War II period and the Cold War. The uncompleted World War II histories were set aside and a new series, *The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy*, begun. The fortunes of the JCS Historical Division since 1961 have generally followed the vicissitudes of the JCS organization. During the late 1960s and the Vietnam War, the division expanded; then, with the tight defense budgets and personnel cuts of the late 1970s, it contracted. The separate branches were abolished in 1983 and, currently, the division consists of five historians and one administrative person. All the while, however, the division has maintained the dual missions of preparing a narrative history of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as well as special studies and research to assist the current work of the Joint Chiefs and their staff.

The narrative history, *The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy*, takes up in 1945 with the close of World War II and carries the history of the Joint Chiefs of Staff forward. Volumes that usually cover presidential administrations are completed through 1968, and drafts for the period 1969 through 1984 are in various stages of preparation. The division has also completed a separate, five-volume series on *The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the War in Vietnam*. All of these histories were originally classified top secret and finished volumes have been distributed to the services, the Joint Schools, and the senior service schools on a classified basis.

The initial volumes of *The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy* and the first Vietnam volume were reviewed and declassified during the late 1970s and early 1980s. Since the Joint Chiefs of Staff lacked funds for publication, the Historical

Division could only distribute the declassified volumes in typescript copy within the Department of Defense and to the National Archives. To date, unclassified Volumes I through IV of The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, covering the years 1945-1952 and the Korean War, and The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the War in Vietnam: History of the Indochina Incident, 1940-1954, have been circulated in this fashion. Subsequently, they have been reproduced and published by a private concern. Last year, Volume V of The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, covering 1953-1954, was declassified. For the first time, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are publishing this volume through the Government Printing Office.

Special historical studies prepared by the JCS

Historical Division are, in large part, not only classified but prepared for the internal use of the JCS organization. For this reason, they are normally distributed only within the organization. The division does circulate periodically a list of these studies, and the studies are available to the services on a classified basis upon request. Unclassified studies of a general interest, such as A Concise History of the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, The Evolving Role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the National Security Structure, and Chronology of JCS Organization, have been widely distributed.

*Mr. Willard Webb is Chief, Historical Division, Joint Chiefs of Staff.*

## Drums and Bugles Corner

In 1943 General Marshall sent a memorandum to President Roosevelt informing him of the development of a new Army operational technique, namely the five-paragraph operations order. The Chief of Staff carefully explained how, in World War I, a division attack order was sometimes twenty pages long and how at Fort Benning in 1927 battalion orders were still three and four pages in length. Marshall continued that he learned from the German Army in 1930 that their division attack orders were not only brief but often entirely oral, and he tried similar systems in the Louisiana maneuvers of 1940. This led to the Five-Paragraph Field Order, in which each paragraph is dedicated to a specific purpose. The first contains information about enemy and friendly forces; the second, the mission and general plan; the third, the details of the execution of the operation; the fourth, administrative details and logistics; and the fifth, communications and locations of command posts. He concluded by attaching an example of this technique--the 1st Infantry Division's attack order on Oran. This order follows, exactly as written:

Hq 1st Inf Div  
Renan 2210, Nov 9, 1942  
FO #3

1. Omitted.
2. Div atks at 0715 Nov 1942 (See operations map scheme maneuvers and time of atk). CC B atks from S at 0730 in conjunction with 1st Div.
3. a. CT 18 see operation map.  
1st bn CT 18 follows CT 18 after mopping up around ST CLOUD
- b. CT 16 less 1st Bn, see operation map.  
1st Bn CT 16 (brought forward in trucks follows in Div res).
- x. Civilian snipers caught red-handed will be summarily shot.  
Nothing in Hell must delay or stop this atk.
4. Attached.
5. Div CP initially follows 16th Inf.

ALLEN  
Maj Gen



## Professional Activities and Notices

### Year of the NCO

In support of the Army theme for 1989--the Year of the NCO--the Center of Military History has undertaken a number of initiatives. These efforts have resulted in an eighteen-plate print set, "The Noncommissioned Officer: Images of an Army in Action" (CMH Pub 70-36), depicting NCO duties and functions over two hundred years of Army history. The Center also published a pamphlet, "Time-Honored Professionals: The NCO Corps Since 1775" (CMH Pub 70-37), featuring the NCO's role as a small unit leader, small unit trainer, and guardian of standards, as well as the NCO Corps' increasing opportunities for professional development. Both of these publications are available through normal distribution channels from the Army Publications Center, 2800 Eastern Boulevard, Baltimore, Maryland, 21220-2896.

The Center will close out the Year of the NCO with the publication in December of the volume, *The Story of the Noncommissioned Officer Corps: Backbone of the Army*, which will include an overview of American NCO history, eighteen plates based on the print set with accompanying essays, and selected documents.

### Senior Curatorial Seminar

The Army Senior Curatorial Seminar was held at Airlie, Virginia, on 20-26 August 1989. This biennial seminar assembled twenty of the senior curators in the Army Museum System to discuss various policies and programs affecting Army museums.

Seminar participants reviewed the revised curriculum for the Army's Intermediate Curatorial Workshop and formed three committees to work throughout the coming year on subjects of special interest within the museum program. Reports will be furnished at the end of the year. One committee developed a draft volunteer program manual to assist museums in establishing their own volunteer programs. Another committee prepared a sample professional development plan for various museum positions, and the third committee evaluated the ad hoc committee process itself and charted a course for committee projects in the 1990s.

Participants in this year's seminar included Emma-Jo Davis (Chief Curator, CMH), R. Cody Phillips (Deputy Chief Curator, CMH), Mike Vice (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Museum), Terry van Meter (U.S. Cavalry Museum), Jim Finley (Fort Huachuca Museum), Towana Spivey (U.S. Army Field Artillery and Fort Sill Museum), Sam Hoyle (Fort Bliss Museums Division), John Purdy (Patton Museum of Cavalry and Armor), Clif Chappell (1st Cavalry Division Museum), Kim Combs (U.S. Army Engineer Museum), Jack Atwater (U.S. Army Ordnance Museum), Barbara Bower (U.S. Army Transportation Museum), Mark Megehee (Frontier Army Museum), John Duvall (82d Airborne Division War Memorial Museum), Alan Archambault (Fort Lewis Military Museum), Dennis Mroczkowski (The Casemate Museum), Dan Whiteman (Rock Island Arsenal Museum), Les Jensen (Old Guard Museum), Tom Fairfull (U.S. Army Museum of Hawaii), and Mary Lou Gjernes (Chief, Army Art Activity, CMH).

### 18th Annual Army Museum Conference

The 18th Annual Museum Conference was held at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, 23-27 October 1989. Hosted by the U.S. Air Force Museum, this year's theme was "World War II--A Look at the Past: Planning the 50th Anniversary." This is the largest annual military museum conference in the country.

Program sessions focused on the commemoration of the fiftieth anniversary of the Second World War. Some of the scheduled presentations included: "Looking at Observances in the Past," "Uniforms in World War II," "Numismatics of World War II," and the oral history of the war. There were special presentations about military museums in other nations, exhibitry, volunteer programs, and historical preservation.

For additional information, contact:

Chief Curator  
U.S. Army Center of Military History,  
ATTN:DAMH-HSM  
20 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C.  
20314-0200  
AV 285-0310 or commercial (202) 272-0310.

## History Department, USMA

Col. Robert A. Doughty has returned to the department after a year's sabbatical in Carlisle Barracks where he completed a manuscript on the pivotal encounter between Guderian's XIX Corps and elements of the French Second and Ninth Armies, titled "Almost a Miracle: The Battle of Sedan, May 10-16, 1940."

Col. Paul L. Miles, Jr., acting head of the department last year, will spend his last year at USMA working on a manuscript on Lyndon Johnson as Commander in Chief.

Throughout the academic year, book reviews and articles prepared by members of the department were published in various scholarly and professional journals to include *Army*, *Civil War History*, *Journal of Military History*, *Military Review*, *Parameters*, *Signal*, and the *Valley Forge Journal*. Maj. Daniel P. Bolger's book, *Americans at War, 1975-86*, was published in late 1988 by Presidio Press.

In June 1989 the Department of History conducted the 21st Annual Reserve Officers Corps (ROTC) Workshop in Military History. This demanding four-week program included staff rides to Saratoga, Antietam, and Gettysburg and presentations by twenty officers and several distinguished guest lecturers to thirty-four college professors and DOD historians. The guest lecturers included Russell F. Weigley, Jeffrey J. Clarke, Holger H. Herwig, I. B. Holley, Donald Howard, Col. Michael D. Krause, Malcolm Muir, John W. Shy, and Arthur Alphin.

The West Point Fellowship in Leader Development is a new two-year postgraduate program to prepare Army officers to serve as company tactical officers. In support of this program the Department of History teaches a graduate-level colloquium, HI 600: "The American Military Experience and the United States Military Academy." Course objectives include developing the major themes of the American military experience as they concern the relationship of American military institutions to society, civilian control of the military, manpower and industrial mobilization, professionalism, and a distinctive American way of war.

For the first time, the department will have two visiting professors of military history. Professor Malcolm Muir will remain a second year. In the fall he will teach the advanced course in the History of

the Military Art and a colloquium on the Great Pacific War, 1941-45. Professor D'Ann Campbell comes to the department from the University of Indiana. In the fall she will teach an elective on the U.S. Army in the American West. Both will serve as advisers to cadets and to members of the faculty working on advanced degrees.

The Department and the Capital District (New York) Civil War Round Table will cosponsor a seminar on Leadership in the Civil War at the Hotel Thayer on 5-8 April 1990. The program will include the following Civil War scholars: Edward Hagerman, Scott Hartwig, Herman Hattaway, David Jordan, Robert Krick, Richard McMurry, Col. James Morrison, Jr., and Maj. Mark Snell of the department.

## Combat Studies Institute

Combat Studies Institute inaugurated a new military history offering for the Command and General Staff Officers Course during academic year 1989-90. Titled "The Evolution of Modern Warfare," it will replace the old core history curriculum with a single course, presented to each staff group (fifteen students), two hours a week for the duration of the one-year CGSC resident course, a total of seventy-six contact hours. The course is designed to present the evolution of modern warfare in terms of the theory, art, and practice of battle from the seventeenth century to the present day. "The Evolution of Modern Warfare" will employ historical analysis to demonstrate and test the efficiency of historical trends in military thought and practice and to illuminate operational issues of importance to the U.S. Army. The overarching objective of the course is to provide the professional military officer with the knowledge, skills, and techniques common to the employment of historical data and insights as an additional mode of analysis upon which he or she may draw in future command and staff duties. All professional faculty in CSI will teach at least one staff group of the core course.

The Staff Ride Committee of Combat Studies Institute continues to serve both an internal CGSC audience and an external clientele. The committee provides assistance to external Army agencies wishing to conduct historical staff rides to Vicksburg, Shiloh, and Chickamauga battlefields, provides instruction in staff ride methodology at the summer

Military History Instructor's Course at CGSC, conducts a staff ride to Vicksburg for the Advanced Operational Studies Course at the School of Advanced Military Studies, and continues to offer the Staff Ride elective in the Command and General Staff Officer Course. The Staff Ride Committee has undertaken the publication of a series of battlefield guidebooks, designed specifically for Army audiences, to be produced in conjunction with the CMH program of staff ride guides. The first two books, covering Chickamauga and Shiloh, are scheduled to go to the printer in January 1990.

Although CSI abolished its separate research faculty consequent to TDA cuts and ODP shortfalls, its publication program continues to be viable, at least for the short term. CSI's most recent publications include two special studies: *Soviet Operation Deception: The Red Cloak* by Lt. Col. Richard Armstrong and *Pastel: Deception in the Invasion of Japan* by Dr. Thomas M. Huber. These and other CSI publications are available to Army historians by written or phone request. Recent publications include a special study, *United States Army World War II Corps Commanders: A Collective Biography* by Dr. Robert H. Berlin, and Professor Gerald F. Linderman's Morrison Professor Lecture to the CGSC Class of 1989 titled, "Military Leadership and the American Experience." Two lengthier studies, one on the World War II Soviet Petsamo-Kirkenes Operation in Northern Norway, and the other, the 1956 and 1967 battles of Abu Agelia in the Sinai, by Lt. Col. Jim Gebhardt and Dr. George Gawrych, will be printed in 1990.

CSI's third mission, to act as executive agent for the TRADOC Military History Education Program, continues to be a demanding task for the members of the Military History Education Committee, now headed by Lt. Col. Bob Gillespie. This year the committee plans assistance visits to each of the TRADOC schools, ROTC Region Headquarters, fifteen to twenty ROTC battalions, and nine National Guard State Military Academies. In addition to being the principal TRADOC advocate for the officers' history education program, this year military history programs will focus on Warrant and Non-commissioned Officer education systems. The committee will continue to conduct the annual Military History Instructor's Course (three weeks in July) and host a Military History Education Conference, as well as the TRADOC Commander's Council on

Military History Education. Updates on Committee activities will continue to be printed quarterly in "MHEP Notes."

Professor Gerald F. Linderman, the 1988-89 John F. Morrison Professor, has returned to his duties with the Department of History at the University of Michigan. The 1989-90 Morrison Professor is Dr. Jerry M. Cooper of the University of Missouri-St. Louis. Professor Cooper earned his Ph.D. at Wisconsin. His most recent book is *Citizens as Soldiers: A History of the North Dakota National Guard*.

### History at Carlisle Barracks

Military history education at the U.S. Army War College is evolving along established lines. Several commandants have come and gone since General Merritt sanctioned the renaissance of history studies in 1981, but the broad outline of the program would be familiar to anyone who encountered it at some time during the intervening years. Military history is integrated into the core curriculum to strengthen discussion of senior leadership in war, planning and conduct of theater operations, formulation and execution of military strategy, and similar topics traditionally addressed in War College curricula. Seminar discussions are led by qualified historians from the entire Carlisle Barracks community--the Military History Institute, the Strategic Studies Institute, and War College students, as well as faculty. Professor Jay Luvaas continues to coordinate this effort, but Lt. Col. Tom Dombrowsky has replaced Col. Harold Nelson as his faculty teammate.

The new team will continue to run monthly staff rides for War College students. It also will find staff ride leaders for various military groups going to nearby battlefields, supporting about one or two trips a week throughout the year. Supporting these external demands becomes more difficult as they and their colleagues teach a growing number of advanced military history courses in a War College curriculum that continues to place greater emphasis on courses tailored to student needs and interests. History faculty will continue to advise increasing numbers of students who write their major research papers on historical topics. Numbers grow in their activity because more of today's War College students received a solid grounding in military history at Fort Leavenworth, and interest in military history seems to be more widespread.

Increased War College usage of MHI is just one dimension of growing public patronage, since an even larger segment of the public will become aware of its holdings when the World War II questionnaire is sent to more veterans and the Korean War Survey begins.

Automation has been an important dimension of the institute's response to increased use. Electronic cataloging of published works and manuscripts is moving forward rapidly, using contract cataloging to supplement in-house capabilities. "Ref Bibs"--automated bibliographies that speed and deepen responses to queries on specific topics--are in the process of being produced. At the same time, the first automated inventory of key military documents--"The Inventory of War Department and Department of the Army Field Manuals"--is virtually complete and will be distributed to all branch schools and the doctrinal community. Before beginning the automated "Ref Bibs" effort, historians in the field were queried for their anticipated research needs. The response was overwhelming, so progress in this activity should improve MHI's ability to support the work of Army historians.

During the summer two Military History Detachments completed their two-week active duty training sessions at the institute. Both the 49th and 326th MHDs achieved their research training objectives in the collections of primary sources available at MHI.

Carlisle Barracks, the Military History Institute, and the Army War College recently copublished an anthology, *The Constitution and the U.S. Army*, based on the "Perspectives" series of lectures at the college during academic year 1987. While the lecture series continues, it will seldom, if ever, have a single theme, so such a publication initiative will not soon be repeated.

#### **Staff Rides at Gettysburg National Military Park**

Gettysburg may be the best-known of American Civil War battles. Its park is certainly the most frequently visited, the volume of traffic making it

unique among the battlefields that U.S. Army groups are likely to visit. While the battlefield seldom seems crowded to military groups that are intent on reconstructing the battle action, our intensity can detract from the pleasure others might experience in their visits.

On a recent busy day visitors to Little Round Top had their contemplation of the matchless view from that site marred by a Army unit that had set up loudspeakers, easels, and a lecturer next to General Warren's statue, just above the sign imploring, "Do not climb this rock." On another day, drivers attempting to see the battlefield from Confederate Avenue were frustrated by a formation of Army officers on their daily run who left little room for oncoming traffic and soon produced a long (and angry) column of tourists who could not pass.

The Park Service will go out of its way to help us shorten the ever-growing list of such horror stories. Commanders and action officers having a full basic load of common sense and courtesy can prevent most of the incidents that are causing friction between occasional Army groups and Park Service authorities. The list of "Do's and Don'ts" that follows should help everyone plan and conduct a Gettysburg staff ride that meets all training objectives, while avoiding interference with other programs at the Gettysburg National Historical Park.

#### **DO:**

-- Call the Park Service (717-334-1124) to coordinate your visit. Many groups can use help with scheduling and advice on logistics. The Park Service is the best source of answers. Groups that are totally self-sufficient still must make this call so that the Park Service is aware of your plans.

-- If you want advice on the staff ride itself, call Professor Jay Luvaas or Lt. Col. Tom Dombrowsky at the U.S. Army War College, commercial (717) 245-3207 or Autovon 242-3207. If you need a staff ride leader, they can often provide one from their cadre of military history instructors. They also can help you develop read-aheads and discuss options for organizing your group and the material you want to present.

-- Conduct a reconnaissance. Unless you are meeting a staff ride leader provided by the War College or are using a Park Service Licensed Guide, you cannot expect to move through the park smoothly by simply repeating actions that may have worked in the past. Traffic patterns change continually; your group will lose valuable time and momentum if you arrive at one of the change points and are forced to improvise.

-- Obey traffic signs. Bulling your way through because your Army bus is the biggest thing in sight is not a good practice anywhere, and it simply will not work at Gettysburg. Limit parking to areas that have been prepared to handle buses and avoid the "prolonged pause" used to point out something of interest while traffic piles up behind you.

-- Use common sense safety rules while walking. Groups should go single file along the edge of roads when those roads are open to cars. Often one-way traffic rules result in pedestrians, moving in the same direction as the vehicles. Leaders must be especially alert in this situation to keep their people out of the roadway.

-- Be aware of the needs of other groups. Many guides are working at Gettysburg every day. These licensed guides always go out of their way to avoid interfering with one another. On busy sites such as Little Round Top, this may require shortening the presentation one might give there or choosing a spot that will not interfere with someone else's work.

#### DON'T:

- Use bullhorns.
- Interfere with other groups.

#### Conference of Army Historians-AMI Meeting

The Center of Military History will sponsor the Conference of Army Historians and the American Military Institute Annual Meeting throughout the week of 26-31 March 1990 at the Holiday Inn Crowne Plaza, Arlington, Virginia. The theme of both conferences will be "The Coming of the Second World War: The Last Years of Peace, The First Months of War." Subjects on the Army program include plans for the commemoration of World War II and a discussion of repositories of World War II records and documents. A panel of international military historians will discuss the most recent trends in World War II historiography.

AMI will hold sessions on 30-31 March that also

have an international emphasis. Participants are expected from Canada, Great Britain, Germany, Austria, France, and Italy. Panel sessions will be organized so that scholars can compare the war preparations and the political and economic strategies of their respective governments throughout the 1930s, and the military strategies, efforts, and accomplishments of their respective armies, navies, and air forces between September 1939 and the Fall of France in the summer of 1940.

Detailed schedules and registration forms will be sent to Army historians and AMI members in early December.

#### Military History Writing Contest Winners


Capt. Donald E. Hall, Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences, won first prize and a cash award of \$500 in the 1988 Military History Writing Contest. Captain Hall's winning essay was titled "The First Medical Regiment at the Gettysburg Reunion-1938."

Second place resulted in a tie between Capt. John M. Dougherty, U.S. Army Armor Center and School, and John M. Hutchins, 96th Reserve Command, Fort Douglas, Utah. Each received a cash award of \$350. Dougherty's essay was titled "Officer Training and Education," and Hutchins' was "Battle of the Severn: A Seventeenth Century Lesson in Military Training and Effectiveness." Due to the limited number of entries, three prizes were awarded in the 1988 contest instead of the usual five.



*Cpt. Donald E. Hall, winner of 1988 Military History Writing Contest.*

# US ARMY CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY ORGANIZATIONAL CHART



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## Army Staff Rides

"Training should make use of history to add realism to the peacetime study of war. Short of experiencing war, history is the best way to understand the effects of battle on soldiers, units, and leaders. I am convinced that the staff ride is one of the most effective techniques to train leaders for our Army."

*General Carl E. Vuono  
Chief of Staff, U.S. Army*



*New Market Staff Ride: Cpl. Jack Thompson, a member of the re-created 5th New York Zouaves, briefs the Secretary of the Army, Chief of Staff, and staff on the Zouave uniform and bayonet drill at New Market Battlefield Park.*



*Perryville Staff Ride: Dr. Stephen E. Bower, Command Historian, Soldier Support Center and Ft. Benjamin Harrison, shows the Confederate line of attack to advanced course students at the Adjutant General and Finance Schools during the schools' staff ride to the Battle of Perryville. Students analyze the Kentucky campaign by covering the terrain over which the Union and Confederate Armies fought this important Civil War battle.*

## Soviet Officers Visit Chancellorsville



*A group of Soviet officers from the Voroshilov General Staff Academy accompanied by American counterparts toured the Chancellorsville National Battlefield Park as a part of a military-to-military exchange program with the National Defense University. Led by General Grigory I. Salmanov (center, behind cannon) the group is shown being briefed at Hazel Grove, where the decisive action of the battle was fought.*

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