ARMY HISTORY

THE PROFESSIONAL BULLETIN OF ARMY HISTORY

PB-20-90-1 (No.14) Washington, D.C. April 1990

The United States Army Observes the Fiftieth Anniversary of World War II

Robert Arter

The Honorable Michael P. W. Stone, Secretary of the Army, and General Carl E. Vuono, Army Chief of Staff, have formed a commission to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of World War II. This commission has the threefold purpose of acquainting or reacquainting Americans with World War II as the seminal event of the twentieth century, providing our soldiers and the Army community with a clearer understanding and appreciation of the history of World War II, and honoring the veterans of the Second World War.

In support of this purpose, the Army World War II Commemorative Commission has developed four objectives: to develop educational and awareness programs for the soldiers and the Army community; to conduct appropriate commemorative ceremonies and other special events; to provide assistance and support, upon request, to patriotic and veterans organizations; and to help develop civilian awareness, particularly in the nation's schools, of the historical significance of World War II.

There are compelling reasons for the United States Army to develop World War II historical programs. First, the Army has a justifiable public education responsibility--if not a duty--to inform wartime and postwar generations of the military's contributions during the war and of its role in preserving and protecting the nation's cherished liberties and freedoms. Second, by encouraging the study of World War II history, the Army will help America's youth acquire sorely needed geographical and historical knowledge. According to a *Life* poll conducted in 1985, three of five Americans have no memory of World War II. Finally, the commemoration of the fiftieth anniversary of the Second World War offers yet another opportunity to educate our soldiers, their families, and Army civilians about the responsibilities of citizenship and to reaffirm the values upon which our nation and Army were founded.

As the United States faces its third century in a world entering the third millennium, our country must continue to manifest a strong sense of national purpose. This sense of purpose has manifested itself in our past during conflicts, such as the American Revolution and the Civil War, and in peacetime when the country united its efforts to place a man on the moon. The foundation of that sense of unique national purpose is based on the freedoms, individual rights, and system of democratic government guaranteed by the United States Constitution.

The mortar that secures the foundation is an amalgam of the core values demonstrated by our forefathers during the American Revolution: duty, loyalty, honor, selfless service, discipline, integrity, and courage. These values became central to American thought and action for all time--and to an extraordinary degree during World War II. The Department of Defense, as charged by the Constitution, continues to serve proudly as the steward of these core values in

the execution of its mission: to "provide for the common defence."

As the nation charts its course for the future, it is appropriate for the Department of Defense to continue to lead commemorations of the past and present and to encourage the adoption and practice of these core values to "secure the blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our posterity."

Central to the success of the fiftieth anniversary of World War II commemorations will be the role of the Army's military historians. The United States Army Center of Military History has taken the lead in this regard. The Center is planning a significant series of publications, some new and some reissued, that chronicle the official Army history of the war. Included, for example, are a master index to the official Army histories (the "green books"), staff ride guides to major battles, a chronicle of combat divisions, and a master calendar of World War II events. The highlight of the publication effort will be a series of 36 campaign brochures, akin to the highly acclaimed brochures honoring the 23 Soldier-Statesmen of the United States Constitution Bicentennial, covering each of the campaigns for which the United States Color bears a World War II campaign streamer. These brochures will set each campaign in its strategic context; touch on combat, combat support, and combat service support; consider joint and combined dimensions; and include maps, photographs, and order of battle information. The Center will also sponsor conferences, symposia, fellowships, and other research activities.

Although the United States did not enter the war until the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, the Army was nonetheless deeply involved in increased preparedness through training and reorganization long before that fateful day. In the upcoming year, efforts related to the World War II observances include the fiftieth anniversaries of the Army Airborne and Armored Forces and federalization of several states' National Guard units. In particular, the Florida National Guard is planning an extensive observance in November 1990, centered on the history of Camp Blanding.

Preeminent among related activities in 1990 is the Dwight D. Eisenhower Centennial. Other agencies, at all levels, will participate in this important commemoration. The National Archives is already under way with a substantial Eisenhower Centennial Program and with plans for significant activities



Lt. Gen. Robert Arter (U. S. Army, Retired) is Special Consultant to the Secretary of the Army for the fiftieth anniversary of World War II. Most recently, General Arter served as Special Assistant to the Secretary for the Bicentennial of the United States Constitution.

ranging throughout the period. For example, arrangements are being made to schedule the Archives "Home Front" exhibits at military installations in support of the Army museum program.

The world has changed exponentially in the last fifty years. Events in eastern Europe offer great potential for renewing old friendships, while lessening long-standing tensions. At the same time, we have a unique opportunity to examine objectively and thoroughly the period with our wartime adversaries, building on the close ties we have enjoyed with some in the postwar years.

As we undertake these reflections, it would be well to remember that many veterans will participate in our country's World War II commemorative observances. Accordingly, the fiftieth anniversary of World War II should receive our best efforts, so that we can remember and honor those patriots who participated in that great crusade for freedom as we capture the war's enduring lessons and significance for our Army and our nation.

Editor's Journal

With this issue of *Army History*, I assume the responsibility of Managing Editor from my good friend, Billy Arthur. As Mr. Arthur noted in the Fall 1989 issue, we are attempting to broaden the scope of this bulletin to include all those who recognize the importance of military history to their professional development, whether they be in uniform or in civilian status.

I am committed to producing a truly professional publication. First and foremost, this means one that appears on a predictable basis--a bulletin that you can count on to be a regular part of your professional reading. As we expand, we will introduce a number of standard features that will enable you to keep abreast of field and international activities, professional events, and new publications. I also plan to begin a series of book reviews, both original reviews and reprints from various sources. In addition, as part of the Army's commemoration of World War II, we will run a chronology of the Army's role in that conflict for the next several issues.

I know what follows is a cliche, but this publication really is your professional bulletin and yours alone. I welcome your suggestions and comments, and especially your contributions. These contributions need not be full-length articles or book reviews; I encourage you to share with the Army community news about any new research, or newly available source material. Only you, the more than six thousand subscribers, can keep *Army History* vital.

Arnold G. Fisch, Jr.

ARMY HISTORY

Army History (PB-20-90-1) is published by the Department of the Army, the Center of Military History, for the professional development of Army historians. Opinions expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the official policy of the Department of Defense, the Department of the Army, or the Center of Military History. The reproduction of articles for educational purposes is encouraged.

Secretary of the Army
Michael P.W. Stone

Chief of Staff, U.S. Army
General Carl E. Vuono

Chief of Military History
Colonel (P) Harold W. Nelson

Chief Historian (Acting)
Morris J. MacGregor

Managing Editor
Arnold G. Fisch, Jr., Ph.D.

Associate Editor
Edward N. Bedessem

Assistant Editors
Rae T. Panella
LaJuan R. Watson

Correspondence should be addressed to Managing Editor, *Army History*, U.S. Army Center of Military History, 20 Massachusetts Ave., NW, Washington, DC 20314-0200. Telephone AUTOVON 285-1279 or commercial (202) 272-1278/9. This bulletin is approved for official dissemination of material designed to keep individuals within the Army knowledgeable of developments within Army history for the purpose of enhancing their professional development. Use of funds for printing this publication was approved by the Department of the Army on 17 September 1983, in accordance with the provisions of AR 310-1. Third-class postage paid at Washington, DC.

The Chief's Corner

Harold W. Nelson

My first months in this job have been educational. I still have much to learn. The Museum Conference at Wright-Patterson in October 1989 offered wonderful opportunities to meet key people and hear of new developments. The Historians Conference in Washington, taking place as this issue of *Army History* appears, promises similar potential. The planned agendas for that conference and for the American Military Institute meeting that follows indicate that all of us who are able to attend will benefit greatly, and we shall endeavor to make the widest possible distribution of the products of the conferences to those who could not attend.

Travel budgets may have been the culprit keeping many from attending. Worries over limited resources will be with us for the foreseeable future. My predecessors managed a growing Center with ever-larger budgets. I will be trying to hold the line against excessive cuts. Some consolidation is inevitable, but new missions such as the commemoration of the fiftieth anniversary of World War II will help us hold our share of resources. We must strive for high efficiency and increased productivity with no lowering of qualitative standards--a challenge we share with all government historians.

The Army's Chief of Staff has made it clear that we have a wonderful opportunity to shape the smaller Army that will ultimately appear as these times of rapid change stabilize. General Carl E. Vuono lists six imperatives that all leaders must keep in mind during the period of change. To illustrate his point within the Army's history community, I will focus on only one of these imperatives:

Leader Development

History does many things for our Army, but virtually everything we do can be understood in terms of leader development. Museums, monographs, art exhibits, annual histories, history lessons, lineage documents, commemorative activities, and staff rides are all aimed at leaders of every rank. The payoff for most of our hard work lies in our ability to strengthen and broaden leaders' knowledge of their peacetime environment and the wartime demands they might face. Army leaders must understand war, and providing that understanding is the province of historians in a nation blessed with peace.

All of us who have stewardship responsibility, who must be sure that tomorrow's leaders are not crippled by a lack of historical insight, must fight for the resources to carry out this vital mission. Nothing we do is above scrutiny, but everything we do should be easily explainable to a higher authority trying to save resources. Our programs are relatively inexpensive, our products are excellent, and we offer something that is unique. If our briefings reflect these facts, we should thrive. If we are not able to make these claims, we are not meeting our basic stewardship responsibility.

My wanderings through Army history programs during the last twenty years and my more focused study of the last few months encourage me in the knowledge that the Army's ranks include bright, dedicated, productive historians who can meet today's challenge, and I look forward to learning more about the ways I can help you.

Colonel Nelson, Chief of Military History, leads CMH staff on Chancellorsville staff ride training session.

The 1941 Maneuvers
What Did They Really Accomplish?

Christopher R. Gabel

The battle of the Red River began on 15 September when Lt. Gen. Ben Lear, a crusty old cavalryman, ordered his two armored divisions to lead Second Army into enemy territory. While aerial dogfights laced the sky overhead, Lear's tanks rumbled westward over the Red River between Shreveport and Natchitoches and established a bridgehead on the far shore. Infantry divisions followed, their progress impeded by heavy traffic and enemy air activity. It was essential that infantry formations relieve the armored divisions in the vanguard so that the armor could be gathered up for a decisive blow against the enemy Third Army, which was even then approaching from the south.

Lt. Gen. Walter Krueger, commander of Third Army, was himself an innovator in mobile warfare, having commanded an experimental motorized division just a year earlier. Krueger had no armored divisions in his order of battle, but he knew how to move troops by truck. Using a technique known as "shuttling," his numerically superior Third Army swarmed northward with surprising speed.

Lear was taken off guard by the rapidity with which Krueger's forces appeared in his front. Long before he was able to regroup his armor for a decisive blow, enemy reconnaissance elements, quickly supported by infantry, probed Lear's positions and forced his armored divisions into a premature battle. By nightfall of 16 September, Lear's forces were locked in place, smothered by a superior enemy, forced to defend an overextended line. Unable to concentrate his armor, Lear lashed out with piecemeal tank attacks that foundered in the pine forests around Camp Polk, suffering heavy losses.

Krueger was relentless. Having pinned down his foe and deflected Lear's premature armored jabs, he committed his reserves in a general offensive. Lear's left flank collapsed under Krueger's pounding attacks. On 19 September, Lear's efforts to establish a new defensive position to the rear were interrupted by the announcement that hostilities had been terminated. Peace returned to the countryside of northwestern Louisiana.

It was magnificent, but was it all worthwhile? The 1941 maneuvers, which started in June and ran to November, began with division-versus-division and corps-versus-corps exercises and culminated in the great army-versus-army maneuvers held in Louisiana and the Carolinas. They cost the nation at least $20 million in direct expenses, a figure that does not include maneuver damages. Sixty-one soldiers lost their lives in the army-versus-army maneuvers alone. Perhaps most significant was the expenditure of precious time--virtually every Army field unit, excepting those in overseas garrisons, spent its last summer at peace "playing war."

Did the 1941 maneuvers in fact help or hurt the Army as it entered World War II? When viewed as an element of unit training, the maneuvers cannot be said to have done the wartime Army much good. In his post-maneuvers critique, Lt. Gen. Lesley J. McNair, maneuvers director, stated that the U.S. Army could go to war at once, if necessary, but that readiness among different units was uneven. Most disturbing were widespread inadequacies in small unit training that had emerged during the great maneuvers, deficiencies that should have been addressed much earlier in the training process. McNair prepared a remedial training program which, however, was cut short by Pearl Harbor and the onset of hostilities. In any event, whatever benefits in unit training that the Army gained from the maneuvers were erased in the course of a sevenfold wartime expansion of forces that involved the dismemberment of most maneuvers-trained units.

Although the maneuvers did little to prepare specific units for the campaigns they eventually fought, in a more general sense the forces and individuals involved in the maneuvers bridged a critical gap between theoretical training and practical application of military skills. General George C. Marshall, Army Chief of Staff, believed firmly that training should avoid the elaborations of theory and should stress the practical, essential skills that an Army of citizen-soldiers needs to master before going to war, skills such as the competent movement and supply of troops. The 1941 maneuvers provided such practical training, particularly at the large unit level. Staffs that had never seen a unit larger than a regiment found themselves moving corps and field

armies across a continent. Army logisticians transported and supplied some 400,000 soldiers during the Louisiana maneuvers alone, and did it well. According to McNair's deputy, Brig. Gen. Mark W. Clark, this newfound ability to move units came into play immediately with the declaration of war.

Similarly, the maneuvers taught commanders and staffs of the smaller units how to move, deploy, and maneuver their forces in real terrain against an uncooperative enemy. The process was not, however, always taken seriously by the troops themselves. Umpires reported that troops habitually ignored enemy "fire," responded to air attacks by rushing into the open to watch the show, and generally could not be bothered to practice camouflage and light discipline. Col. J. Lawton Collins, VII Corps chief of staff in Louisiana, believed that the troops acquired more bad habits than good during the maneuvers.

If the 1941 maneuvers were a mixed success in terms of training, as a device for refining tactical doctrine the maneuvers made a vital contribution to the wartime Army. All of the combat arms had new doctrines to try out, and thanks to the maneuvers the Army could test and adjust them without wasting lives and losing battles in the process. Infantry, for example, had recently made the transition from an all-rifle branch into one that incorporated support weapons down to the battalion and company. The maneuvers showed that tactical commanders needed more training in the employment of these weapons and in the coordination of artillery support, which had attained new heights of responsiveness and flexibility.

Armor benefited more than any other branch from the trial run that the maneuvers afforded. Coming into the maneuvers, armor doctrine overstressed mobility and failed to provide for an adequate level of combined arms. This more than any factor explained armor's repeated embarrassments in the maneuvers. But the lesson was taken to heart, and before the first American armored division entered combat, doctrine and force structuring were completely reworked. Ironically, armor's failings in the maneuvers also provided impetus for the creation of an antitank quasi-arm, the Tank Destroyer force, which, while not exactly a failure in combat, never lived up to the successes it had attained on maneuvers.

Too much has been made of Marshall's using the maneuvers as a testing ground for future commanders. While it is true that a number of officers who attained fame in World War II did well in the 1941 maneuvers, it should be noted that of the forty-two commanders at the division and higher levels who participated in the army-versus-army maneuvers, only eleven went on to hold significant combat commands during the war. In all probability, Marshall already knew who his future commanders would be, and he used the maneuvers period to educate and groom them in lower level command and staff positions. Most of the senior commanders, on the other hand, were openly regarded as caretakers whose age largely precluded them from commanding in combat. As a criterion for selection to higher command, one's showing in the maneuvers had relatively little significance.

Nor is it likely that Marshall and McNair viewed the maneuvers as a device to train the senior commanders in "operational art." Teaching operational art would have conflicted with Marshall's commitment to teaching simple things first--in this context, the maneuvers promoted the competent handling of troops, not operational brilliance. Curiously, the most "successful" army commander of the 1941 maneuvers, Lt. Gen. Hugh A. Drum, was also the least progressive. His "operational art" was indistinguishable from that which he had practiced in 1918 as First Army's chief of staff.

It could be argued that the presence of two armored divisions in the maneuvers represented an attempt at operational art, in that armor doctrine called for maneuvering deep behind enemy lines. In practice, armor never succeeded in executing its doctrine during the army-versus-army exercises. Maj. Gen. George S. Patton, commanding the 2d Armored Division, did lead a spectacular raid against the rear of the opposing army during phase two of the Louisiana maneuvers, but little significance should be attached to this operation. Patton's raiding force was only a reinforced reconnaissance battalion, and it reached the enemy's rear only by playing fast and loose with the maneuver rules. There was more J.E.B. Stuart than Erich von Manstein in Patton's "operational art."

The absence of operational art should, however, be viewed in historical context. The forces engaged in the 1941 maneuvers may have failed to practice AirLand Battle, but they did at times provide remarkably prescient glimpses of the operational style that would emerge during World War II. The best of these foreshadowings emanated from Krueger's

"blue-collar" Third Army, which dominated the Louisiana maneuvers. During those exercises Krueger demonstrated a relentless, pounding style that was powerful yet not ponderous. Third Army showed considerable proficiency at motor movements and proved that motorization made it possible to advance on a broad front without sacrificing the ability to mass at decisive points. All this enabled Krueger to make substantial and decisive gains at minimal risk. It should be noted that Krueger's chief of staff in Louisiana was a colonel named Dwight D. Eisenhower.

Although difficult to substantiate, it seems plausible to suggest that the 1941 maneuvers made a contribution to the Army's and the nation's psychological preparation for war. Extensively and favorably covered in the media, the maneuvers helped dispel any lingering illusions of neutrality by making manifest that the nation was earnestly preparing for war. Unlike the 1940 maneuvers, which were also highly publicized, those held in 1941 involved full-up units, real weapons (for the most part), and real competition. The 1940 maneuvers had been playacting; 1941 was serious business. As for the Army itself, the senior leaders must have been enormously reassured to see that the newly mobilized Army, fabricated from scratch after two decades of skeletonization, actually functioned capably in the field. Evidence suggests that the morale of the troops improved as well. Nothing reinforces the resolve of the citizen-soldier more powerfully than the perception that his efforts are producing results.

The 1941 maneuvers were indeed worth the cost and effort that they entailed. Under most conditions, the tangible benefits derived from the maneuvers--general competence in handling troops, doctrinal reform, and psychological uplift--can be attained in a less expensive, more controlled manner. The circumstances in the fall of 1941 were, however, unique. War was at hand. Every facet of the Army's doctrine, organization, and training had to be brought together *at once*. Thus the great maneuvers provided the medium in which an embryonic Army completed an important formative process, setting the stage for its metamorphosis into an Army that could fight and win the greatest battles in American history.

Dr. Gabel is a historian with the Combat Studies Institute at the Army's Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

1941 Maneuvers: Lt. Col. George R. Barker, Lt. Gen. Walter Krueger (CG, Third Army), and Col. Dwight D. Eisenhower

The Army Center of Military History's Senior Research Professorship Boon or Boondoggle?

Theodore A. Wilson

In a wonderfully manic novel of the early 1980s, *Small World*, British writer David Lodge described a never-ending, globe-girdling academic conference peopled by scholars who critiqued each other's papers and reviewed each other's applications for travel grants. While no such boondoggle exists (at least not for historians), it is certainly true that over the past two decades opportunities have increased markedly to participate in exchanges or to take up "visiting professorships" with agencies and institutions in the United States and, literally, around the world.

Among the most attractive of these opportunities are the visiting appointments for military/international historians at the various service schools--the United States Military Academy, the Air, Army, and Naval War Colleges--and now at the U.S. Army Center of Military History. Under the terms of the "Intergovernmental Personnel Assignment (IPA) Act," an agency employee from one branch or level of government may be assigned to duties at another level (e.g., a member of a state university's history faculty going for a year to the U.S. Department of Energy). In theory, the flow is reversible, with individuals going from DOE or CMH to a temporary position in a university or local governmental agency; however, proverbial academic stinginess, inflexibility regarding temporary staff assignments, and the homesteading instincts of federal historians, especially those working in Washington, D.C., have served to limit drastically exchanges in the other direction. That is to be regretted, for, as one who has repeatedly ridden the exchange circuit, these have been among the most rewarding experiences, both professionally and personally, of my career.

I myself went to University College, Dublin, for a year in the mid-1970s, served as the John F. Morrison Visiting Professor of Military History at the Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, in 1983-84, and spent a semester at Leicester University two years ago. Though no one as yet has punched all the IPA military history visiting professorship tickets, unless budgetary severities intervene, that distinction surely soon will be awarded.

The Senior Research Professorship at the Center of Military History is, as noted, the most junior of these appointments, having been established in 1984. It is also the only one of the military history appointments not to carry teaching duties. As is appropriate for an agency whose *raison d'etre* is historical research, the principal responsibility of the CMH Senior Research Professor is "independent, self-directed research and writing" with the goal of completing a "major work of military history scholarship" within the allotted two years. This would seem a reasonable requirement given the very substantial sum of money (certainly equivalent to three inches of a B-2's epidermis) the Army is investing in my presence here. For the first time in nearly twenty years, I have been liberated from the inexorable rhythms of the academic calendar. A further advantage is the opportunity to work in a research institute devoted solely to military history and one which, in comparison with most university history departments, possesses lavish resources to support research.

Happily, too, the project I am investigating takes me along a road I had previously explored in only cursory fashion. When my coming to CMH changed from attractive prospect to serious possibility, Brig. Gen. Bill Stofft and I discussed various research topics of interest to me and of potential value to the Army. From the list I submitted, Bill Stofft chose the "training of United States ground combat forces in World War II." He did so, I presume, because 1988 was designated as the Army's Year of Training, and because, sensitive to the rapidly approaching commemoration of World War II, he was aware that a volume on training originally had been planned for the Army Ground Forces subseries of the *United States Army in World War II*. Whether General Stofft's perspicacity extended to predicting that the Army very likely will be adjusting in the early 1990s to circumstances which, at least superficially, appear to be similar to those of the 1930s, is unknown to me. But I am persuaded, some six months into the

project, that the lessons from the Army's experience in World War II are relevant in today's rapidly evolving geopolitical environment.

From one perspective, my study (tentatively titled "Building Warriors: The Selection and Training of United States Ground Combat Forces in World War II") plows well-tilled ground. Among the first of the "green books" published were Kent Roberts Greenfield, Robert R. Palmer, and Bell I. Wiley, *The Organization of Ground Combat Troops* (1947) and Palmer, Wiley, and William R. Keast, *The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops* (1948). These compilations of selected monographs described the effort of Army Ground Forces to organize and train combat forces to overcome the diverse challenges the U.S. Army confronted in World War II. When linked with such unpublished studies as Boyd Shafer's 1,290-page history of ground and air force training in World War II, their portrayal of the successes and limitations of the wartime system for selection, training, and assignment of soldiers to combat roles deservedly achieved general acceptance within the community of scholars and professionals especially interested in World War II. While numerous battle, campaign, and unit histories, memoirs by veterans, and biographies of important military leaders subsequently appeared, little effort was given to extend or challenge the interpretive framework espoused in the AGF histories. Only in recent years have monographic studies of such topics as prewar Army manpower policies, the 1940-41 maneuvers, passage of the Selective Service Act, and comparisons of division-level training and combat performance provided fresh insights.

Today, the story of how the enormous force that fought World War II was raised and trained is a mystery to much of the American public and even to many historians. As well, the assumptions as to the aims and results of manpower utilization in World War II imbedded in the green books would appear to deserve reexamination from the distance of nearly fifty years and the perspective of nearly five decades of continuous training for a general war. The existing portrayal is grounded in the records of the War Department General Staff and unavoidably scants the views of other participants in the often fierce debate over the composition and preparation for combat of America's ground forces. For example, what concerns motivated the Adjutant General's Office, representatives of the combat arms and of other services, Somervell and the SOS/ASF, leaders of congressional committees, the War Manpower Commission and other wartime agencies, and the White House?

Also important is an effort to place this story within the context of social, political, and intellectual developments that shaped American society during this period. Is Richard Kohn correct in arguing, "If our military forces at any given time have reflected American values and practices, it has only been in comparison to the forces of other nations or if measured against some sociological model of an ideal military organization"? Whence came the ideas which defined the Army's thinking about "efficient" allocation of human resources, methods to modify the behavior of raw recruits, and standards of individual and group performance under extreme stress? For example, what explains the seemingly total victory of assumptions derived from scientific/industrial management theory in the mobilization process? The metaphor of the factory, with individual soldiers perceived as specialized cogs and/or interchangeable parts, constructed on an assembly line and plugged into the war machine as required, pervades both the literature and the historical records of World War II. Were the implications of this approach fully understood? At an even more basic level, what assumptions about the character of those Americans who were selected for combat guided the architects of the wartime system of training?

These are only a few of the questions that have arisen, raising difficult problems of definition and scope. As well, any exploration of the training afforded U.S. ground combat forces in World War II has to confront the issue of "combat motivation and effectiveness." Understandably, the CMH green books dealt only anecdotally with questions of how and why soldiers dealt with the psychological and physical stresses of battle. However, based on data generated during the war, an enormous literature on the experience of combat has been produced by social scientists (especially military sociologists and social psychologists) and by participant observers such as S.L.A. Marshall. In wrestling with this interior world of motivation and perception, the historian's task is to differentiate between insights grounded in evidence and speculation derived from inferential extrapolation.

By now it must be apparent that the work I have

undertaken threatens to become a social history of the American soldier in World War II if not of the total U.S. war effort. Striking a balance between narrative and analysis, between attention to the details of that process by which the United States created these ground combat forces and the external forces and those assumptions which determined the Army's character and the American approach to waging war, poses an especially difficult tightrope act.

The IPA agreement points to the value of "attaching the Army's name" to an "important" work of historical scholarship. Whether the book I have just sketched will add measurably to the reputation of the Army's historical program may be questioned; in any case, the historical research done at CMH and throughout the Army needs neither defense nor justification. That it may be timely, helping to enhance understanding of the significance of the U.S. Army's experience in World War II during the upcoming period of commemoration, is another matter.

Beyond any tangible benefit to derive from the product, I would point to the utility of having someone like me--a survivor of the academic wars--around for an extended period. Indeed, the IPA gives particular emphasis to such cultural interaction. After some six months spent in the Pulaski Building, I still find myself occasionally bemused by the lack of knowledge among CMH colleagues about the realities which confront university practitioners of history--and, still more surprising, by the insularity and sense of isolation that exists here. Of course, their presence within CMH (and, presumably, elsewhere in the Washington historical community) pales in comparison with the truly astonishing ignorance about official history programs betrayed by the great majority of academic historians. There have been numerous calls in recent years for reopening communication and forging cooperative linkages across the gulf that has separated "academic" and "official" historians. I can think of no better way of achieving that laudable end than to do what is called for by the spirit and language of the Intergovernmental Personnel Assignment Act.

Dr. Ted Wilson is Professor of History at the University of Kansas. He is the Center of Military History's Senior Research Professor for 1989-91.

German Prisoners of War in American Hands

Albert E. Cowdrey

Most Americans believe that their country's record in handling enemy prisoners during World War II was good and that compassionate treatment of POWs was a testimony to the moral superiority of the Allied cause.

Recently, however, Canadian author James Bacque published a book called *Other Losses* that offered a sensational challenge to American complacency. He charged that up to 1 million German POWs died in American and French camps after World War II, mostly of starvation and disease, and that General Dwight D. Eisenhower deliberately engineered their deaths out of a hatred of all things German.

The "CBS Evening News" uncritically endorsed his allegations. *Time* reported the charges, but also the skepticism of many historians who naturally wondered how a million bodies could be hidden and how the slaughter happened to escape notice for forty-four years. What happened to the German POWs--and how did Bacque reach his conclusions?

Fortunately for humanity, there have not been many times in history like the spring and summer of 1945. As Allied armies broke into Germany from west and east, the German armed forces not only yielded, they disintegrated. About 7.5 million Germans surrendered in the West, including many in flight from the Red Army advancing from the East. Over 4 million of these Germans became American prisoners.

Facilities were overwhelmed. Hundreds of thousands of men were jammed into transient enclosures along the Rhine, shelterless, without sanitation or adequate water supplies. Disease rates climbed to about what American troops suffered in the worst malarial pestholes of New Guinea. POW hospital admissions ran 7.8 times the rate for American soldiers, and the death rate from disease was 20.5 times higher.

Then the ration was cut. World food production

was down because of the diversion of workers and the devastation of once productive lands by warfare. Transport was endangered or tied up by the demands for shipping to transfer American soldiers out of Europe and replace them with other soldiers. Food was short and the continent was jammed with hungry people. First in the international chow line stood Allied soldiers; then Allied civilians; then displaced persons from Allied countries; then Germans who worked for the conquering Americans. The POWs stood last, and by midsummer the results were grim.

Both the Americans and the British reclassified many POWs as disarmed enemy forces to evade the Geneva Convention requirement that POWs must be fed full rations. Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF), ordered nonworking prisoners to get 1,500 calories a day and workers 2,900. In August a team of nutritionists sent out by the theater surgeon found symptoms suggesting the onset of beriberi and pellagra among the nonworking prisoners, and even working POWs were not always in good shape.

The chief surgeon, therefore, issued a letter ordering surgeons of all major commands to provide multivitamin capsules to prisoners of war with signs of malnutrition. General Eisenhower addressed a letter to commanding generals of the command, prescribing full rations for workers and for all prisoners under twenty-one years of age and all prisoners declared by the medics to be malnourished. As far as the Americans were concerned, that ended the threat of mass starvation--though prisoners working for the French, who had little themselves, continued to suffer severely.

How did Bacque manage to get from a story of genuine misery and want to an Allied Auschwitz with Eisenhower in the unlikely role of Heinrich Himmler? He claimed that no food shortage existed, an idea that would have astonished Allied governments, civilians, and DPs who were hungry themselves. And he misinterpreted a column called Other Losses that appeared on some POW tallies. Bacque treated it as a list of deaths--a "body count," in his words. Actually, the tallies themselves show that Other Losses included hundreds of thousands of POWs transferred from one command to another--a very common practice as the Americans tried to alleviate crowding. The Other Losses columns do not show that they included any deaths at all--though they may.

Anyone interested in the true story can consult a number of worthwhile sources. In German, Kurt W. Boehme of the German Red Cross has authored *Zur Geschichte der Kriegsgefangenen im Westen* and other useful works. In English, the essay "Prisoners of War," in volume 6 of the Surgeon General's history *Preventive Medicine in World War II* provides a scathing commentary on American blunders in providing for the health of its POWs in mid-1945.

Dr. Albert E. Cowdrey is Chief, Conventional Warfare Branch, at the Center of Military History. He is the author of The Medics' War, *a history of the Army Medical Service during the Korean War.*

Capturing the Year of the NCO in a New CMH Volume

Arnold G. Fisch, Jr.

The Center of Military History recently published *The Story of the Noncommissioned Officer Corps: The Backbone of the Army.* This multi-authored, popular history caps CMH's efforts for the 1989 Army theme, the Year of the NCO.

At 252 pages, including front matter, the book is divided into three main parts: an introductory historical essay describing the evolution and development of the Army's NCO corps since 1775; a series of eighteen essays and color plates based on the Center's popular NCO print set, capturing traditional NCO functions in different periods of history; and a selection of documents. In addition, the volume has three appendixes, illustrating the evolution of NCO sleeve insignia, presenting a gallery of noncommissioned officer heroes, and suggesting further readings.

Army account holders should requisition the book from the Army Publications Distribution Center, 2800 Eastern Boulevard, Baltimore, MD 21220-2896, using DA Form 4569 and citing CMH Pub 70-38-1.

The book is also available for public sale from the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402-9371. (Hardcover, GPO Stock No. 008-029-00192-2; paperback, GPO Stock No. 008-029-00191-8). Call 202-783-3238 to verify prices.

Dr. Fisch coedited the new NCO book and was a major contributor to the text.

1939

9 Aug--17,000 National Guardsmen and 5,000 Army regulars open maneuvers at Manassas, Virginia.

10 Aug--The War Department awards contracts for $85,000,000 worth of planes and engines, setting a peacetime record.

29 Aug--Military guards are placed on all ships utilizing the Panama Canal. The Army augments its defense force in the Canal Zone by 1,085 men.

1 Sep--Germany invades Poland.

--In the largest increase of officer personnel in the history of the Army Air Corps 542 men are assigned to flight training duty.

3 Sep--Great Britain and France declare war on Germany.

--The Navy begins evacuation of Americans in Europe to neutral ports.

5 Sep--President Roosevelt makes a pair of announcements proclaiming the neutrality of the United States. The first denies belligerents the use of territory and territorial waters of the United States for warlike purposes. The second, under terms of the Neutrality Act of 1937, places an immediate embargo on shipments of arms, munitions, airplanes, and airplane parts to those nations at war, specifically Germany, Poland, France, the United Kingdom, India, Australia, and New Zealand.

--President Roosevelt places the Panama Canal Zone under full military rule, reserving the right of the United States to inspect and take possession and control of any vessel, other than a warship, passing through the Canal.

7 Sep --The Army and Navy accelerate recruiting campaigns to meet emergencies under neutrality laws.

8 Sep--President Roosevelt declares a national emergency "to the extent necessary for the proper observance, safeguarding, and enforcing of the neutrality of the United States and the strengthening of our national defense within the limits of peacetime authorizations."

21 Sep--President Roosevelt urges repeal of those provisions of the Neutrality Act which place an embargo on the sale of arms, munitions, and airplanes to the warring nations in Europe. He expresses regret at ever having signed the Act.

--Roosevelt discloses two foreign submarine sightings: one off the coast of Alaska and one off New England.

29 Sep -- As a precaution against espionage, secrecy is ordered concerning the movement of U.S. naval vessels.

3 Oct--The War Department orders the purchase of 329 tanks at a cost of $6,000,000.

4 Oct--American merchant ships are advised by the Department of State to avoid waters of the Atlantic and Baltic which are adjacent to the nations involved in the European war.

10 Oct--The War Department places orders for munitions, supplies, and construction totaling $24,062,696.

11 Oct--The Navy's FY 1941 budget request is submitted. At more than $900,000,000 it is the largest in the peacetime history of the United States.

13 Oct--President Roosevelt announces that there have been no official requests from any of the belligerents for the intervention of the United States on behalf of peace.

18 Oct--President Roosevelt proclaims it unlawful for any submarine belonging to a nation involved in the war to enter the ports or territorial waters of the United States.

3 Nov--The Joint Neutrality Resolution is passed (55 to 24, Senate; 243 to 172, House), repealing the arms embargo, opening trade to belligerents by U.S. munitions manufacturers, and barring American

merchant ships from belligerent areas. Arms purchases by belligerents are required to be shipped under a foreign flag.

4 Nov--President Roosevelt delineates a combat area, extending from Norway to Spain and including the United Kingdom and the English Channel, into which U.S. ships may not go.

15 Nov--The Navy Department reveals that plans for two cruisers, the *Columbia* and *Cleveland*, will be altered due to developments connected with Germany's 10,000-ton "pocket battleships."

21 Nov--Congress acts to assist war plants expansion by providing tax concessions to American manufacturers who must expand their facilities to meet national defense equipment needs.

15 Dec--Maj. Gen. William P. Upshur is placed in command of the Department of the Pacific.

17 Dec--The first contingent of Canadian troops, including some Americans, disembarks in England.

1940

3 Jan--In his annual budget request to Congress, President Roosevelt asks for $1.8 billion for national defense.

20 Jan--Sweden accepts $10,000,000 credit from the United States Reconstruction Finance Corporation for purchase of U.S. agricultural products.

9 Feb-- President Roosevelt assigns Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles to travel to Italy, France, Germany, and Great Britain "for the purpose of advising the President and the Secretary of State as to present conditions in Europe."

9 Apr--Germany invades Norway and Denmark, claiming a need to protect these nations from Allied aggression.

13 Apr--In a White House statement, President Roosevelt characterizes the invasion of Norway and Denmark as an "unlawful exercise of force."

10 May--Germany invades the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg.

17 May--The Navy is ordered to recommission 35 destroyers.

1 Jun--The first battleship to be added to the U.S. fleet since 1921, the USS *Washington*, is launched at Philadelphia.

10 Jun--Italy declares war on France and Great Britain.

11 Jun-- President Roosevelt declares the Mediterranean Sea a combat zone, barring U.S. ships, planes, and citizens from the area.

19 Jun--The United States warns Germany and Italy against any aggression toward British, French, and Dutch possessions in the Western Hemisphere.

22 Jun--France agrees to terms of the German armistice.

24 Jun--France agrees to terms of the Italian armistice.

1 Jul--President Roosevelt signs the Act to Expedite National Defense, banning shipments of existing Army and Navy munitions stocks to Great Britain. The president also signs a bill authorizing the Navy to award contracts for the construction of 45 vessels costing $550,000,000.

--Germany advises the United States to end all diplomatic missions in Norway, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands by 15 July.

This chronology, compiled by Associate Editor Edward N. Bedessem, is the first of a series that will appear in Army History *during the Army's commemoration of World War II.*

Alan H. Archambault

As the fiftieth anniversary of American participation in World War II nears, public interest in the history of that momentous conflict is certain to increase dramatically. Those who are concerned with interpreting history for the military and civilian communities are likely to find the next few years both challenging and rewarding.

Many U.S. Army museums are planning special exhibits and programs that will focus public and media attention on particular aspects of World War II. Museum curators within the Army system have a special responsibility to present military history in an intelligent, meaningful manner. For many visitors, the museums' commemoration will be a nostalgic experience; for others, a patriotic one. Hopefully, it will be an educational event for all concerned.

Recently, with the support of a highly interested I Corps Command Group, the Fort Lewis Military Museum launched a major upgrade of its exhibit galleries. During the planning of this upgrade considerable thought was given to the presentation and interpretation of the Second World War period. The museum has several major story lines that all converge during World War II, so it was imperative that serious attention and adequate space be devoted to that crucial period of Army history.

During the initial stages of exhibit planning, the museum staff collected data on the history of the major story lines that the Fort Lewis Museum mission encompasses. The content and layout of the galleries were approached as if the staff were writing a history book. First, historical data were gathered and sifted to select the most significant events. Then, the story line was organized into a meaningful format. The exhibits must help interpret events for the visitor, that is, communicate a part of history through a physical display of artifacts.

During the recent renovations the museum was divided into four galleries. Three of these feature significant World War II themes. Each gallery was designed as an independent area, yet the galleries were also intended to complement each other in exploring several areas of the World War II experience. In these galleries the visitor can experience the actual memorabilia of the war set in a story line appropriate to the museum's mission.

The *Fort Lewis Gallery* surveys the history of the post from 1917 to the present. Here, the focus is on the training of soldiers and the experience of living on Fort Lewis in wartime. The post played a

9th Division World War II Memorabilia

A Portion of a Diorama in the Ninth Division Gallery

major role in World War II, beginning with the mobilization of the National Guard in 1940. The museum exhibits incorporate many interesting artifacts associated with the post and dating from the early 1940s. They range from weapons and uniforms to souvenir pillows and "sweetheart" pins. Collectively, the memorabilia form a fascinating tapestry against which the story of wartime Fort Lewis is told.

In the *America's Corps Gallery* the story of I Corps is told in a series of colorful exhibits. I Corps saw active service in the Pacific during World War II, and the exhibits focus on the campaigns of the corps, most notably New Guinea and Luzon. Through displays of uniforms, weapons, and memorabilia from the Pacific theater, I Corps' wartime service is showcased. The museum staff took special pains to include pertinent Japanese artifacts as well as American material in this gallery.

The *Ninth Infantry Division Gallery* completes the museum's World War II trilogy with a series of displays chronicling the campaigns of the "Old Reliables," from their trial by fire in North Africa to the fall of Germany. Originally organized during World War I, the 9th Division was still in training when that war ended. It was during the Second World War that the division, designated by its octofoil insignia, first saw active frontline service and earned a reputation as a first-rate combat outfit. This gallery is rich in material from the European Theater of Operations. In addition, the gallery traces the campaigns of the division using maps and photographs as well as text. Historic news wire releases, reports, and speeches also provide insight into the division's service.

The Fort Lewis Museum staff hopes that the three galleries form a narrative that illustrates a portion of the American experience in World War II. Since each soldier assigned to Fort Lewis receives an orientation and tour of the museum during his in-processing, the staff has been able to stress the importance of America's military heritage to the young soldiers. Judging from the questions and interest shown during the museum tours, it is a message that is not lost on these uniformed visitors. In recent years the interest in military history has increased noticeably, and it is reasonable to predict that the fiftieth anniversary commemorations will give the Fort Lewis and other museums an opportunity to become a focal point for interpreting and appreciating the lessons of World War II.

Mr. Archambault is the curator of the Fort Lewis Military Museum. He frequently does his own sketches and graphics for displays and publications, such as the newsletter of the Friends of the Fort Lewis Military Museum.

The Press and the Vietnam War
Reflections and Reactions to the Media's Role

Arnold G. Fisch, Jr.

Every so often the Center of Military History produces a volume that so clearly transcends the normal, narrow bounds of Army history that it causes a stir outside the circle of military scholars. *The Modern Volunteer Army Program: The Benning Experiment, 1970-1972*, by Willard Latham, *The Integration of the Armed Forces, 1940-1965*, by Morris J. MacGregor, and the forthcoming *The Women's Army Corps, 1945-1978*, by Bettie J. Morden are three examples that come to mind of books that are not only legitimate military history, but make a contribution to American social history as well.

William M. Hammond's book, *Public Affairs: The Military and the Media, 1962-1968*, is a more recent example of a Center publication that, because it impacts upon other sectors of American society, has drawn considerable attention beyond the military community. Specifically, since Dr. Hammond focuses on the tensions among administration spokesmen, the military, and the press in Vietnam, the media have taken a lively interest in his book. Dr. Hammond has appeared on both commercial and public television to discuss his volume, and his work has been reviewed or commented on by the *Washington Post*, the *New York Times*, the *Boston Globe*, the *Washington Times*, *Choice*, *Newsweek*, and several other papers and periodicals.

Hammond rejects the notion held by certain Vietnam veterans that negative news reporting by the media undermined the military effort and turned the American public against the war. Instead, Hammond focuses on the rising casualty rate as it contrasted with the administration's rosy assurances that the war was going well.

He states: "When the contradictions engendered by President Johnson's strategy of limited war led . . . to a more critical attitude, the military tended increasingly to blame the press for the credibility problems they experienced, accusing television news in particular of turning the American public against the war. In so doing, critics of the press within the military paid great attention to the mistakes of the news media but little to the work of the majority of reporters, who attempted conscientiously to tell all sides of the story."

Not that the press coverage in Vietnam was entirely without fault. He notes that: "Competing with one another for every scrap of news, under the compulsion of deadlines at home, sacrificing depth and analysis to color, they created news where none existed . . . while failing to make the most of what legitimate news did exist."

Hammond backs up this assertion with three specific examples of how the media created "news" in Vietnam. The errors, omissions, and excesses of the press notwithstanding, he concludes: "What alienated the American public . . . was not news coverage, but casualties. Public support . . . dropped inexorably by 15 percentage points whenever total casualties increased by a factor of ten."

Not surprisingly, Dr. Hammond's work, which will be followed by a sequel covering the years 1969-73, drew wide acclaim from the print medium. *Choice* declares it an "outstanding monograph" (October 1989), while Nicholas Lenmann, writing in the *New York Times* book review section (2 July 1989) concludes that Hammond has been a "meticulous historian." *Newsweek* (11 September 1989), under the headline "The Press Didn't Lose the Vietnam War," practically breathes a sigh of relief that "the American military itself" has challenged the "fervently held view of many" that the "media were more of a fifth column than a fourth estate."

Although Dr. Hammond's study has been widely hailed, there are those who persist in seeing the press in Vietnam as the dark force. Wesley Pruden, writing in the *Washington Times* (30 August 1989) dismisses the book as "the bureaucratic view of war." Pruden notes that casualties in Vietnam hardly begin to compare with those in earlier American wars, where the populace continued to support a perceived just cause despite the cost. Pruden believes that: "What made Vietnam unique . . . is that this was the first time an irresponsible media had a louder voice than the government." He argues that, of course, the American failure in Vietnam sprang from a lack of determination at the highest levels of government, "but it was the grinding down of the public's will that made it impossible for Lyndon Johnson and his men to do the things they knew in

their hearts they ought to do."

Pruden's piece is a conspicuous exception to the positive reception that *Public Affairs: The Military and the Media* has received. The book observes events from the perspective of the Military Assistance Command's (MACV) Office of Information in Saigon, and those public affairs officers and reporters who were there in Saigon during the years Hammond covers are unanimous in their praise. A forthcoming *USIA World* review characterizes the book as "a unique work of scholarship. The book is a case study text of the bungling of media relations on a grand scale with enormous consequences."

There seems to be little doubt that Dr. Hammond's second volume, which will cover the truly difficult years for the United States in Southeast Asia, will spark even more interest, perhaps more controversy, while making a further contribution to our understanding of who we were during America's war in Vietnam.

Public Affairs: The Military and the Media, 1962-1968, by William M. Hammond (U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1988) is available to account holders from the Baltimore Army Publications Center (CMH Pub 91-13, hardcover; 91-13-1, softbound), and can be purchased from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office: $23.00 hardcover (GPO S/N 008-020-01122-3); $20.00 paperback (GPO S/N 008-020-01123-1).

International Military History Exchanges: The Hungarian Peoples' Army Visits Washington, D.C.

Burton Wright III

The U.S. armed forces have begun, through the initiative of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a series of reciprocal visits between their historical organizations and those of the Hungarian Peoples' Army (HPA) and the Ministry of Defense of the Soviet Union. In times past, history has been one of the opening interests of nations who have not had much contact for a period of time. An agreement was concluded more than a year ago between the HPA and the Joint Chiefs of Staff that mandated a series of exchanges in a number of diverse areas. One of those areas was military history.

In June 1988, Brig. Gen. William A. Stofft led a five-member delegation of U.S. Army military historians and one representative of the Office of Air Force History to visit Hungary to hold discussions with the HPA's historical organization, the War Historical Institute and Museum.

General Stofft and his delegation were given first-class treatment while in Hungary. They toured the various museums of the ancient and historic city of Budapest and were taken to the castle which dates from the twelfth century and which houses the War Historical Institute. There, they were welcomed by its director, Maj. Gen. Ervin Liptai and began a tour of the facilities which ended with a series of friendly discussions on possible cooperation between both military history organizations.

The American delegation was treated to lunch on Margit Island, located in the middle of the Danube River, and toured many of the old areas of Budapest. Delegation members also visited the Zrinyi Miklos Military Academy, the HPA's version of the U.S. Military Academy and the Command and General Staff College rolled into one. General Stofft and his party also visited Hungarian Army units and were given opportunities to converse with unit members.

During the discussions with General Liptai and his staff, the HPA briefed the American delegation on the military history programs of the U.S. Army

Center of Military History, the Army War College, the U.S. Military Academy, Fort Leavenworth's Combat Studies Institute, and the U.S. Air Force.

On 1 September 1989, General Liptai came to the United States to continue the dialogue begun in Budapest. Accompanying General Liptai was Col. Imre Fuzi, the chief of the history faculty of the Zrinyi Miklos Military Academy. The next day, the two Hungarian historians toured the U.S. Army Center of Military History and were given detailed briefings on all its branches and how they operate. After lunch, the delegation returned to the Center for a long discussion with the new Chief of Military History, Col. Harold W. Nelson. That evening, the Hungarians were the guests of honor at a banquet hosted by the Acting Director of the Army Staff, Brig. Gen. William A. Stofft, where they met all the heads of the U.S. armed forces history organizations they would later visit.

On day two of their visit, General Liptai and Colonel Fuzi were taken to the Pentagon where they were briefed on the historical office of the Secretary of Defense by Dr. Alfred Goldberg, its head. Mr. Will Webb and his staff from the historical office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff briefed the Hungarian visitors on their multifaceted program and presented them with some of their publications.

In the afternoon, the delegation was treated to a series of briefings on the U.S. Naval Historical Center conducted by the director, Dr. Dean Allard, and then toured its nearby museum. The U.S. Marine Corps History Office and Museum provided the next port of call for the delegation and the tour was conducted by Brig. Gen. (Retired) Edwin Simmons, the director of Marine Corps History and Museums. They viewed the history of the U.S. Marine Corps through various exhibits and memorabilia used by some of the Corps' most celebrated leaders.

Day three belonged to the U.S. Air Force. Dr. Richard Kohn, the director of the Office of Air Force History, welcomed General Liptai and Colonel Fuzi to his office at Bolling Air Force Base. After briefing the Hungarians on operations, Dr. Kohn escorted the delegation to the National Air and Space Museum for a three-hour tour of the busiest museum in the world — 10 million visitors in just one year. That evening, General Liptai and Colonel Fuzi were the guests of the Center of Military History at a performance of the National Symphony Orchestra at the Kennedy Center.

The next morning, the delegation was driven to the U.S. Army War College. Maj. Gen. Paul G. Cerjan, the AWC commandant, welcomed them to Carlisle Barracks and treated the Hungarians to a detailed briefing of what the War College does. In the afternoon, General Liptai was taken by Lt. Col. Marty Andresen, the acting director of the Military History Institute, on a tour of his organization's extensive document collections. Ambassador John Scanlan of the Department of State hosted the Hungarians at dinner and discussed current events in central Europe with them.

The highlight of the visit to Pennsylvania occurred the next day when Col. Harold W. Nelson, one of the two authors of the staff ride book on Gettysburg, took the Hungarians on a extensive tour of the battlefield, visiting Little Round Top and the "High Water Mark." The Hungarian Peoples' Army delegation departed the next day for Budapest.

These two visits were important first steps which will lead to a closer relationship between the HPA and the U.S. armed services. General Lipati expressed the hope a number of times that these contacts could both continue and deepen.

With the HPA delegation safely returned to Budapest, the Center of Military History is now in the process of planning for the arrival of an eleven-member military history delegation headed by Col. Gen. Dmitryi Volkogonov, the director of the Institute of Military History of the Soviet Ministry of Defense, who will be returning a visit by General Stofft and his delegation to Moscow in April 1988. This visit is also expected to provide a vehicle for developing more friendly relations with the USSR's military history organization. It is not out of the realm of possibility for the history organizations of the U.S. armed services to begin exchanging scholars, historical materials, museum artifacts, manuscripts, and the like with those of the Soviet Union.

Dr. Wright is a historian with the Center's Field and International Division.

Focus on the Field

Office of History
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
Paul K. Walker, Chief Historian

Professional historians have been documenting the history of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers since 1942. That history is rich with stories of soldiers and civilians engaged in nation building, combat engineering, military construction at home and abroad in support of the Army and Air Force, overseas assistance, and development of our nation's capital. The thread runs back more than two centuries to the battle of Bunker Hill.

First located in Baltimore, Maryland, the Corps' Office of History makes its home today at the Humphreys Engineer Center near Fort Belvoir, Virginia. The headquarters staff consists of ten historians, two museum curators, an editor, and an administrative officer. Although most of the Corps' field offices do not employ historians, seven currently serve in divisions located in Honolulu, Omaha, Portland, and Vicksburg, and in districts in St. Paul, Louisville, and Los Angeles.

Missions and functions of the headquarters history office include research and writing, staff support and reference, oral history, research collection management, support to engineer units and the Engineer School and regiment, and acquisition and management of museum collections.

For years the Corps' publication efforts focused on completion of four volumes in the U.S. Army in World War II series. These appeared over a long period of time, starting with *The Corps of Engineers: Troops and Equipment* in 1958 and ending with *The Corps of Engineers: The War Against Germany* in 1985.

In the mid-1970s as the bicentennial of American independence approached, the Corps embarked on an ambitious program to publish histories of all of its divisions, districts, and laboratories. This effort is still under way. To date, it has yielded over fifty volumes on Corps field activities. These have proved valuable as sources for other books and as the basis for answering reference questions, while serving the needs of the activities that produced them.

In the last ten years the Office of History's publications program has evolved in several directions. The ten volumes of the General History series cover topics from military engineering in the American Revolution to the construction of the St. Lawrence Seaway. The Engineer Historical Studies series reprints important engineer reports or publishes manuscript materials, such as the letters of Thomas Owen, a Civil War volunteer in an engineer regiment. There are three volumes in the Environmental History series and five special Studies in Military Engineering. Books in the latter series, among them combat interviews done after the Battle of the Bulge and a documentary history of the bridging of the Imjin River during the Korean War, have been popular with student officers at the Engineer School. Other publications include bibliographies, lithographs, and proceedings of meetings, as well as a long series of navigation histories done for inclusion in the National Waterways Study, which was prepared for Congress by the Institute for Water Resources of the Corps of Engineers.

The oral history program has also yielded several publications. Five of these are career interviews included in the Engineer Memoirs series. One in the Engineer Profiles series looks at the work of the district engineer, and two have been published in the Water Resources People and Issues series. All of these publication series are active and will grow in the near future.

Currently, the members of the Office of History are emphasizing and expanding their involvement in the active programs of the Corps of Engineers. Historians attend the weekly staff meetings of the major operating elements of the headquarters to keep abreast of projects and policy issues. In addition, a member of the Office of History staff has made major contributions to the Strategic Planning Group of the headquarters, providing information and background papers that give perspective to long-range planning. Another historian is working alongside emergency management personnel as they carry out recovery operations in the wake of the Alaska oil spill, Hurricane Hugo, and the California earthquake. With a major commemorative program marking the fiftieth anniversary of World War II also under way, the Office of History's program continues to thrive and branch out in a variety of directions.

Conferences With a World War II Focus

Judith A. Bellafaire

During the last week of March in Crystal City, the Center of Military History will hold the eighth Army Historians Conference and sponsor the American Military Institute annual meeting. Both conferences will focus on World War II-related anniversaries and on international perspectives of the war.

Army Historians Conference (26-29 March)

During the first two days of the conference, workshops will emphasize the professional skills Army historians will need to deal with the anticipated special research and commemoration-related demands of their respective organizations and communities throughout the World War II anniversary years. Formal scholarly papers on World War II-related themes are scheduled for the last day of the conference.

Tuesday afternoon, 27 March, representatives from the National Archives and Records Administration, the Center of Military History, and the Military History Institute will describe the various types of World War II-related records available at their respective institutions as well as how to retrieve and use them. Mr. Timothy Mulligan of the Archival Publications Staff, National Archives, is currently working on updating the Archives' World War II-related research indexes. He will talk about common problems researchers often encounter with current bibliographies and indexes and how to avoid them. Mr. William Cunliffe, chief of the Special Archives Division, National Archives, will describe the World War II-related audio, visual, and cartographic collections currently available to researchers. Ms. Hannah Zeidlik, chief of the Historical Resources Branch of the Historical Services Division, CMH, plans to speak about the Center's World War II-related holdings. A representative from the Military History Institute is scheduled to describe the World War II Survey, personal papers, unit history collections, and rough working bibliographies available for researchers at the Institute's archives.

On Wednesday morning, 28 March, Lt. Gen. Robert Arter, Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Army, will participate in a panel presentation on "Commemorating the U.S. Army in the Second World War" to be chaired by Dr. John T. Greenwood, chief of Field and International Programs at CMH. General Arter will discuss the Army's commemorative plans from a national perspective. An example of what Army historians can expect from their respective divisions will be provided by Dr. Paul K. Walker, whose presentation is entitled "Corps of Engineers Planning For Second World War Commemorations."

Later that morning Col. Harold W. Nelson, Chief of Military History, is scheduled to chair a panel of international military historians, who will discuss the history programs and World War II-related commemorative planning being undertaken in their respective countries. Those invited include Dr. W. A. B. Douglas, the director of the Directorate of History, National Defence Headquarters, Ottawa, Canada; Col. Roland Foerster, chief of the Department of Education, Information, and Technical Studies, MGFA; Brig. Gen. Jean Delmas, former chief of the French Army's Historical Service; Mr. Alex Ward, head of the Army Historical Branch of the Ministry of Defence in London; and General Pierluigi Bertinaria, chief of the Italian Army Historical Office.

Wednesday afternoon is devoted to small, concurrently running workshops of technical professional interest. Participants will be able to attend a workshop on writing Command Histories and Annual Historical Reviews; or they may choose to learn the techniques involved in planning and conducting battle analysis conferences and organizing and conducting staff rides. Later that afternoon, Dr. Richard Hunt will lead a workshop on developing an oral history program, and Dr. H. O. Malone will conduct a session on how Army historians can aid the Army in preparing for war.

Formal research papers relating to World War II topics will be presented on Thursday, 29 March. This is the first time that scholarly papers focusing on a specific theme have been included in the Army Historians Conference. Presentations will focus on the most current historiographical questions within World War II scholarship. For example, a panel entitled "Strategic Planning and the U.S. Home Front" includes papers on "Bombers, Battleships, and Bullets: Did Women Win World War II?" by

Professor D'Ann Campbell and "Wedemeyer and the Victory Plan of 1941" by Maj. Charles Kirkpatrick. "Perceptions of the Other Side of the Hill: Enemies and Allies," to be chaired by Col. Richard Swain, the director of the Combat Studies Institute, will include papers on "Watching the U.S. Army Prepare for War: Observations of von Boettiger, German Military Attache in the United States, 1933-1940" by Dr. Alfred Beck, Office of Air Force History; "Through the Looking Glass: U.S. Army Observers in Great Britain, 1939-1940" by Dr. Theodore Wilson, Senior Research Professor at CMH; and "Observing The Soviets: Army Attaches in Eastern Europe During the 1930s" by Col. David Glantz, Director of Research, Soviet Army Studies Office, at the Combined Arms Center. Mr. Morris MacGregor, Director of Special Projects and Contracts and Acting Chief Historian of CMH, will host a panel on Military Leadership. Panelists include emeritus CMH historians and World War II scholars Drs. Hugh M. Cole, Forrest C. Pogue, and Richard M. Leighton. The conference will close Thursday evening with a banquet and speech by General Carl E. Vuono, Chief of Staff of the Army. General Vuono will focus on the importance of commemorating the Army's activities in World War II, and on how Army historians can best prepare to meet the special commemoration-related demands soon to be placed on them.

American Military Institute Annual Meeting (30-31 March)

The Center of Military History is sponsoring the American Military Institute annual meeting, 30-31 March, directly following the Army Historians Conference. Army historians are strongly encouraged to attend the AMI meeting, which will focus on international perspectives of the approach of and first few months of World War II. The AMI conference theme is "The Coming of the Second World War: The Last Years of Peace, the First Months of War." Panel sessions are organized so that scholars from Canada, Great Britain, France, Austria, West Germany, and Italy can compare the war preparations and political and economic strategies of their respective governments, as well as the military strategies, efforts, and accomplishments of their respective armies, navies, and air forces. Among those topics which will be dealt with in great detail are the annexation of Austria (the *Anschluss*), the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, the Polish campaign, the invasion of Norway, and the fall of France in 1940.

Dr. Alexander Cochran will chair a highly topical session on "ENIGMA and Intelligence." Panelists include Dr. Richard Woytak, who will give an overview of the activities of the Polish intelligence network, its successful breaking of the German code, and the transferal of this knowledge to French and British intelligence; and Dr. David Kahn of *Newsday*, who will present a detailed analysis of the significance of ENIGMA to the Allied forces.

Professor Lee Kennett of the University of Georgia is scheduled to chair a panel on "The Air War: The Opening Rounds, September 1939-July 1940." Col. (Retired) Feris Kirkland will present a paper on the French Air Force; Dr. Richard Hallion of the Office of Air Force History will discuss the activities of the Royal Air Force, and Dr. Horst Boog, Director of Research, Military History Research Office, FRG, has been invited to present a paper on the *Luftwaffe*.

Another particularly exciting session is "Strategy and Direction" to be chaired by Col. Harold Nelson, Chief of Military History. Professor Alan Wilt of Iowa State University; Col. Roland Foerster, chief of the Department of Education, Information, and Technical Studies, MGFA; Maj. Gen. Robert Bassac, chief of the French Army Historical Service; and General Pierluigi Bertinaria, chief of the Italian Army Historical Office, will discuss the planning and strategies of the leadership of their respective countries during the 1930s through the fall of France in the spring of 1940.

On Friday evening, Military Classics will hold its annual dinner and colloquium. The guest speaker will be Professor Robin Higham of Kansas State University, who will speak on "The Official History of the Norwegian Campaign: 1940."

Saturday afternoon a panel of distinguished American historians will comment on "Past, Present, and Future: The Changing Face of World War II Scholarship." Participants include Professors Ronald Spector of the University of Alabama, Stephen Ambrose of the University of New Orleans, Gerhard Weinberg of the University of North Carolina, and Michael Howard of Yale University.

The conference will close Saturday evening with a banquet at which Professor Howard will speak.

Dr. Bellafaire is with the Center's Field and International Division. She is responsible for coordinating both the Army Historians Conference and the AMI meeting.

Professional Events

CMH Publications

Not all Center publications receive a standard initial distribution, and, therefore, readers may not always be aware of "new" publications. The Editors would like to call your attention to the following now available:

The Presidents (CMH Pub 71-27), a pamphlet in the U.S. Army Bicentennial Series, describing the thirty (out of forty-one) American presidents who served their country under arms.

American Military History (CMH Pub 30-1), a revision of the standard ROTC text, with a wholly new treatment of the Vietnam War and with new bibliographies.

United States Army in the World War, 1917-1919, vols. 1-3 (CMH Pubs 23-6 through 8). The Center will publish all seventeen volumes, reformatted in modern typeface. Volumes 4-7 should be available in 1990. Distribution of vols. 1-3 was limited to libraries and schools.

The Center produced three titles in support of the Army theme for 1989, Year of the NCO, including:

The Noncommissioned Officer: Images of an Army in Action (CMH Pub 70-36), a set of eighteen prints with accompanying booklet, featuring NCOs doing NCO duties throughout American history;

Time-Honored Professionals: The NCO Corps Since 1775 (CMH Pub 70-37), a pamphlet stressing the NCO's role as small unit leader, trainer, guardian of standards, and proponent for professional development; and

The Story of the Noncommissioned Officer Corps: The Backbone of the Army (CMH Pub 70-38), a 252-page volume featuring an introductory history of the American NCO, eighteen color plates and essays portraying traditional NCO functions in different branches and in different eras, selected documents, and three appendixes: a graphic rendering of the evolution of NCO insignia, a gallery of noncommissioned officer heroes, and suggestions for further reading.

Publications of the U.S. Army Center of Military History (CMH Pub 105-2), the updated catalog of CMH offerings, is now available from the depot in Baltimore.

Within the last three years nineteen DA PAMs, formerly available from the Center only on microfilm, have been reprinted and are now available from the depot with new CMH Pub numbers. First CMH editions delivered during fiscal year 1989 are as follows:

German Armored Traffic Control During the Russian Campaign (CMH Pub 104-17), formerly DA PAM 20-242

Airborne Operations: A German Appraisal (CMH Pub 104-13), formerly DA PAM 20-232

Rear Area Security in Russia--The Soviet Second Front Behind the German Lines (CMH Pub 104-16), formerly DA PAM 20-240

The German Campaign in Poland (CMH Pub 104-20), formerly DA PAM 20-255

The German Campaign in Russia--Planning and Operations (CMH Pub 104-21), formerly DA PAM 20-261a

The Personnel Replacement System in the U.S. Army (CMH Pub 104-9), formerly DA PAM 20-211

Air Force Military History Symposium

The Department of History, U.S. Air Force Academy, will sponsor the Fourteenth Military History Symposium, 17-19 October 1990, on "Vietnam, 1964-1973: An American Dilemma." The symposium will examine the disparate nature of America's combat involvement in Vietnam, focusing on the "dilemmas" caused by American participation in the war during the Johnson and Nixon presidencies. The symposium will begin with an assessment of the war's scholarship on the afternoon of 17 October. That evening, the Thirty-third Harmon Memorial Lecture will probe the ambiguities of American involvement. On the second day, the morning session will examine the war during the Johnson era, while the afternoon session will analyze the Vietnamese perspectives of the conflict. On the evening of 18 October, a formal banquet will assess cinematic and literary views of the war. The final day's sessions will evaluate the war during the Nixon administration, and the symposium will conclude with a panel discussion of Vietnam's impact on the United States.

For more information concerning the symposium, contact: Capt. Scott Elder, Department of History, USAF Academy, CO 80840-5701. Telephone: (719) 472-3232.

Battlefield Computers and the Absence of Records

Christopher L. Manos

Raymond A. Mentzer

During the last two weeks of March 1989, the 50th Military History Detachment, Bozeman, Montana, deployed to the Republic of Korea. The unit participated in Exercise TEAM SPIRIT 89 and reestablished liaison with the Eighth U.S. Army command historian, the detachment's Capstone affiliate. The 50th MHD is one of many Army Reserve units in the Capstone program, which aligns reserve units for planning and training purposes with the active units with which they will serve in the event of mobilization.

Participation in field exercises can be a mixed experience, particularly for the reserve historian, who often possesses too little precise information concerning preexercise planning and postexercise evaluation. At the same time, the 50th MHD's experience in TEAM SPIRIT 89 suggests that with careful preparation and proper focus, reserve military history detachments can gather some useful insights from the field, quite apart from the value of living and working in a tactical environment.

The detachment spent its first week in Korea working with the 2d Infantry Division, a key element in TEAM SPIRIT 89. The Division Public Affairs Office, located with the Division Support Command (DISCOM) at Division Rear, south of the city of Wonju, provided billeting and work space. The division exercise area was fairly extensive, covering several hundred square miles. Accordingly, the commander divided responsibilities between himself and the unit NCOIC. The commander visited and interviewed selected action officers at Division Main, Division Rear, and Division Tactical (DTAC). They included the chief of staff, division automation management officer (DAMO), inspector general, G-1, and G-2. The NCOIC was able to find transportation with one of the division IG teams and, as a result, visited units down to battalion level throughout the maneuver area. In both cases, the focus was on orientation as well as fulfillment of a specific Eighth U.S. Army command historian requirement: to assess the impact of electronic data processing on battlefield record keeping.

The 2d Infantry Division uses laptop computers and the somewhat bulkier personal computers (PCs) at several levels in the tactical environment. Officially, the laptop computers were being used down to battalion level, although laptops could frequently be found at the company level. The PCs were at division and brigade level. The laptops were used for unclassified data only, while the PCs handled both classified and unclassified materials. Information was sometimes stored as hard copy; in other instances, it remained on hard drives or floppy disks. There was no division-wide standard operating procedure establishing guidelines for retention of computer-generated information. The question of which data ought to be stored and the manner of their storage--hard drive, floppy disk, or hard copy--remained largely unanswered.

Military historians operating in the field have traditionally worked to preserve operational documents (OPLANs, OPORDs, etc.), photographs, maps and map overlays, recorded interviews, and miscellaneous materials such as diaries and field notes. In addition, the Modern Army Record Keeping System (MARKS) identifies for retirement to the National Archives a wide range of historical documents. Yet no overall policy or standard operating procedure currently exists for the preservation of computer-generated materials. In the case of the 2d Infantry Division, the division information management officer has been asked to study the problem and, in working towards a solution, to coordinate with division G-1 as well as the Eighth U.S. Army historian. The need to standardize information and data retention with regard to computers is apparent to all who have examined the issue.

Army units typically invoke the criteria established by MARKS to identify "historically significant" data. The system tells the unit which documents are to be retained and which are to be destroyed. Some other data such as photographs and maps, if filed within MARKS, are occasionally retained in accord with the system guidelines. Whether MARKS guidelines for document retirement will successfully adapt to the computer age remains an unanswered question.

At the same time, the modern AirLand Battle concept has led to a highly mobile and rapidly developing battlefield environment. Are military historians capable of "capturing" the fast-changing

tactical situation through traditional means such as hard copy documents, maps, photographs, and interviews? The days of hand-typed reports and grease pencil map overlays appear to be numbered. The 2d Infantry Division, for instance, has plans for maneuver control systems (MCS) which consist primarily of networked computers. These systems will, to take a single example, possess the capability to develop situation reports on the computer screen. While these sitreps will be updated on a regular schedule, the computer will retain the earlier ones and they can, in turn, be "played back" as necessary. The information will be retained primarily on floppy disks and simply projected onto the computer screen. What is the likelihood that hard copy--either printed maps or photocopies--will be made? Certainly the preservation of the floppy disks or even computer-generated hard copy presents a new and unique challenge for the military historian in the field.

The proper identification and preservation of computer tapes, computer disks, and other computer materials containing historically relevant electronic data will require some standardization in the employment of these machines for record keeping. The 2d Infantry Division tailors its computer disk usage according to specific and individual guidance from the various staff areas. Thus, G-1 issues its own customized guidance to subordinate units for compiling certain manning table and unit personnel data on a series of computer disks. Maintenance and finance, on the other hand, offer different specific guidance directing the use of computer disks in a wholly different fashion. The guidelines are, at best, task specific according to staff function and by no means standardized, not even within this single division.

Clearly these new forms of data require new standard operating procedures for retention and preservation. The 2d Infantry Division has already recognized the problem and charged its Division Information Management Office with an ongoing project to find a solution. It is unlikely that the perceptions and concerns of the 2d Infantry Division are unique. Comments and suggestions on an Army-wide basis, the views of the Center of Military History, even input from the joint services would go a long way towards resolving an ever more pressing issue: What are "historically significant" computer data? How are they to be retained? And where are they to be retained? Until these matters are decided, the individual computer operators will remain as collectively bewildered as those future historians attempting to sort out, locate, and read their data.

Major Manos is commander of the 50th MHD, in which SSG Mentzer also serves.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
THE CHIEF OF MILITARY HISTORY AND
THE CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20314

OFFICIAL BUSINESS
PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE $300