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General Carl E. Vuono, Chief of Staff, U. S. Army Remarks to the Conference of Army Historians 29 March 1990

The Eighth Conference of Army Historians, 26-29 March 1990, was capped by a thought-provoking address by General Vuono, reproduced here as given. Over two hundred Army historians from across the United States and overseas attended the conference.

I am pleased to be here as you conclude this Conference of Army Historians at a time in our history when so many exciting, important, and new things are happening to our Army. You know that better than most because you are the stewards of our past. You have always been vital to our profession, but today as we confront an era of dramatic change and shape the Army of the future your work becomes of paramount importance.

For if we are to create the kind of Army this country will require in the 1990s and beyond, we must understand very well the lessons of our history, and we must properly apply those lessons to the challenges we confront. I believe that what we as a nation do over the next year will largely determine whether historians fifty years from now will look back on the '90s as the dawning of a new era of peace and freedom or as yet another violent chapter in the story of humanity. The decisions of 1990 are going to carry us far into the next century, and the United States Army will be a crucial element in determining which path the community of nations follows. So tonight I'd like to discuss with you my plan for the evolution of the Army in this uncertain time--with special emphasis on the role of history.

The study of history, in my view, is of profound importance in shaping the Army. The three great former Chiefs of Military History here tonight know very well that everyone in this room is a critical player in this process. Historians, more than anyone, understand the context within which the events of today are taking place and the lessons that we must glean from the thousands of years of human experience. Alongside the other members of the Army team, you share a vital responsibility in the evolution of the Army into the force our nation will need in the twenty-first century.

As we shape the future Army, the single most important aspect of the decade of the '90s will continue to be the international environment in which we operate. I think it is not an understatement to say that we are witnessing changes of historic proportions--changes that were undreamed of just a few short months ago. Our country is alive with a sense of optimism and hope unmatched since the early days of the 1920s. But I submit to you who understand history that we cannot hope to give substance to this optimism, and we cannot exploit the opportunities that are within our grasp, without a firm grounding in history. For history teaches that change by itself does not necessarily bring about peace and security.

Indeed, the past has many examples in which the collapse of mighty empires ripped apart the established order, resulting in uncontrolled instability and untold human suffering. Recent events affirm that there is no reason to believe the shattering of the Soviet empire will be any different.

As we all know too well, the United States has witnessed dramatic changes in Europe twice before in this century--changes different in origin but similar in magnitude to those we face today. The first time was in 1918 when, in the aftermath of what Woodrow Wilson described as the war to end all wars, the United States chose to abandon a chaotic and bleeding Europe to fend for itself. Twenty-five years later the world had paid the price for short-

sighted political expediency with a second global war and fifty million dead.

The second redesign of Europe's security occurred after World War II. This time we resisted the siren's call of isolationism and established a powerful military alliance called NATO that has undergirded the longest period of unbroken peace in Europe in ten centuries. So those who call for a movement away from NATO should read the lessons of history.

Today we face the third major restructuring in this century. Again the United States confronts a choice between withdrawing from Europe or continuing a strong leadership role in NATO that has been the foundation for two generations of stability. History tells us what we must do. NATO must remain strong, under the mantle of firm American leadership.

Our challenge as a nation is patiently to apply the lessons of our history so that we can participate in an orderly redesign of European security that will sustain a stable, peaceful, and democratic continent. In the nuclear age, we can ill afford to risk the alternative.

Even as our attentions and our emotions are drawn to events in Europe, we must retain a broader perspective of the United States as a global power, with an interlocking web of vital interests that must be protected in an increasingly complex environment. Nations in the Third World now possess mounting arsenals of tanks, artillery, fighting vehicles, ballistic missiles, and chemical weapons that can threaten our interests as never before. We also face an enduring challenge from insurgencies, terrorism, and the scourge of drugs which, together, are sometimes called low intensity conflict. These pose threats to our nation as significant as any we have yet encountered.

So, in the midst of our national euphoria over events inside the Soviet bloc, I believe we must maintain a pragmatic perspective of a world based on the lessons of history, because in this world, as in the past, there is one simple truth. The United States is a global power and must have a powerful Army--a strategic force with both functional and geographical mandates. You see, I believe that this remains the price of admission for a superpower in the decade of the '90s. And, if our Army is to meet the challenges of tomorrow, it must fulfill a very simple, overarching vision--a vision that embraces a demanding future and is firmly anchored in historical experience. It is a vision of a trained and ready Army today and tomorrow, capable of meeting its strategic obligations anywhere, any time.

Army Chief of Staff, General Carl E. Vuono

As we build the Army of the future and we seek to realize this vision, we begin from a very solid foundation. The Army of the '90s is, quite simply, the finest peacetime force this nation has ever fielded. Most recently, of course, the entire world witnessed what our trained and ready Army can do in Operation JUST CAUSE. JUST CAUSE kicked off on 20 December at one o'clock in the morning with a combination of ground and airborne assaults to rescue a people that had lost democracy and freedom. It was a highly successful operation that I believe will be studied by military historians for years to come.

The Army that performed so well in Panama is a product of a comprehensive program built on six enduring imperatives--imperatives that have forged the Army of the '90s and that serve as a beacon to guide us into the next century. These imperatives are neither revolutionary nor radical; they have been consistently validated by the lessons of history. Indeed, I would suggest to you that armies of the past, when built on imperatives such as these, have been victorious on battlefields beyond number.

The first imperative is an expanding, effective warfighting doctrine--the principles that guide our actions on the battlefield. Put simply, the Army must know how to fight.

Second, we must maintain the right mix of forces. We are an Army that has to be prepared to fight globally, so we need a mix of light forces, heavy forces, and special operations forces--forces like

those that fought together in Panama and that are defending freedom around the globe today.

Next, we must conduct tough, realistic training: the kind of training that is at the heart of readiness and is the ultimate guarantor of success in battle.

Fourth, we must continually modernize the force so that our soldiers maintain their qualitative edge against any potential enemy.

Fifth, we must continue to develop confident, competent leaders--the most enduring legacy we can contribute to the future of the nation. You, in this room, have a responsibility to help us teach the generation of noncommissioned officers and officers in our ranks today who will lead the Army of tomorrow.

When I am asked by audiences where are the MacArthurs, Eisenhowers, and Bradleys of the future, I say they are students at the Command and General Staff College; they are sergeants leading squads at Grafenwoehr; they are lieutenants who are now at the Basic Course at Fort Benning. If we are successful, no one will ever know their names, because we will have assured a continual peace as we move into the next century. But, if called upon, these leaders will rise up and lead our great Army to victory anywhere our nation needs us.

The final imperative--last in discussion but first in priority--is that of a quality force. Today we have in the Army the finest young men and women in our history. They are absolutely essential to the kind of trained and ready Army this nation needs. Quality is the dominant imperative in any Army, and it has made a difference in battle throughout time. It is the quality of our armed forces that will determine the fate of this nation in the future, and that is why we are so dedicated to keeping quality in the ranks.

So the Army of the '90s is a force built on these six imperatives, and they reflect the timeless experience of the great captains and the mighty armies of the past. It is an Army that is poised to provide a protective mantle for the evolution of freedom in the years ahead.

But as good as we are today we must move forward aggressively to shape the Army to respond to the challenges of the changing environment and our increasingly constrained resources. All of you in this room know very well that this is not the first time our Army has faced budget reductions, and it is not going to be the last. We must now draw from history in order to take command of our future, and that is exactly what the Army is doing. For if we don't take command of our future, someone else will, and the results will not be satisfactory.

As we shape the Army to fulfill our vision, we will not compromise on the six imperatives. Taken together, they will ensure that we never return to an Army that is undermanned, poorly trained, or ill equipped; an Army that has been fractured by the budget; and an Army that is neither credible for deterrence nor capable of defense.

Over the next five years we will carefully, deliberately, and gradually shape a smaller Army with fewer divisions and fewer soldiers. We must make those reductions if we are to preserve the quality, training, and readiness of the force--the characteristics that undergird our security worldwide. But we must evolve, not demobilize, into a smaller Army. This presents us with a unique challenge.

We have never built down a professional, successful, quality, volunteer force before. As the checkered history of the century demonstrates, every time we have demobilized we have found ourselves tragically unprepared when next we were called upon to defend the nation in battle. As leaders charged with the responsibility for the men and women of this nation, we can never forget the examples of the past.

The lessons of Task Force Smith in the early days of the Korean War, when we could not form even one TO&E battalion in Japan to send to Korea, provide us a grim reminder of the consequences of unpreparedness. We sent Task Force Smith--brave Americans who were ill trained, ill equipped, and ill prepared--to Korea; and the results were disastrous. Ladies and gentlemen, the tragic example of Task Force Smith must be a lesson of history that we never repeat.

The Army of tomorrow, like the Army of today, must be trained to go anywhere, defeat any foe, meet any challenge, and defend any interests whenever it is called upon to do so. It must be an Army that is versatile, with our soldiers, units, and leaders able to accomplish a wide range of missions. It must be an Army that's deployable. If we have fewer forces deployed overseas--which we will--then we must have the capability to move the Army to wherever the crisis arises. Then, we must be an Army that is lethal, that is able to accomplish the mission when it gets to the fight. It must be an Army made up of quality young soldiers, trained to a razor's edge, with the finest equipment we can provide them and the most outstanding leaders we can put on the battlefield.

It must be an Army that is expandable, so that, should the need arise, we can grow into a larger force. It must be an Army that's relevant--relevant to the challenges of today and tomorrow. Finally, it must be an Army that is unique: an Army possessed of a unique forced-entry capability; an Army that can operate across the spectrum of conflict from peacetime competition to full global war; an Army that can move, as we did in Panama, from fighting today to stability op-

erations tomorrow to retraining a force next week. Those, ladies and gentlemen, are the characteristics that your Army must have. It is an Army that history shows us we need, and it is an Army that the American people expect.

As we shape that Army, there is a prominent role for the Army historian. I have used Army historians time and again to validate and refine our overarching plans for shaping the force. And the role of the Army historian will become of even greater significance in the years ahead.

So, as you finish this Eighth Conference of Army Historians and prepare to return to your commands, I want to leave you with several missions that I believe are of vital importance to the Army and to you.

First, I want you to understand the Army's vision--a vision that looks ahead to the future, but is firmly anchored on our past. I ask that you explain the Army's vision in historical context to the soldiers and civilians within your various commands and organizations. I want you to help our soldiers and leaders keep current issues in perspective and demonstrate throughout our ranks that the Army has successfully endured the ebb and flow of budgets in the past, and that we will do so again in the future.

Second, you must help build on the growing momentum behind the study of military history and fuel the enthusiasm for history that is gathering steam throughout the Army. Regardless of our educational backgrounds and specialties, I believe that you must be the very best American military historians in the country--true masters in the study of the profession of arms and of our great Army.

Third, I want you to contribute to the professionalism of our leaders through the study of history. Professionalism, with its three qualities of competence, responsibility, and commitment, will be the cement that binds together our smaller, compact, professional Army into a cohesive fighting force; and history conveys a sense of our professional worth far more effectively than any other single discipline. History will help us teach the great captains of tomorrow. I intend to continue the emphasis that we now have on professionalism and on leader development, and I need your help to do so.

I am reminded again of what Douglas MacArthur said when he was Chief of Staff of the Army in the early '30s. He was up on Capitol Hill testifying before one of the committees and was asked, in the dark days of the '30s when his budget was very low, what his priority was. He answered without hesitation, "The education of my officers." That translates today into the development of the Army's leaders. So, I need your help in binding together that vital imperative and assisting me in assuring the development of professionalism in every officer and noncommissioned officer within our ranks. And that leads to my final charge.

I expect you to be active and involved and to play the central role in the development and improvement of our historical programs. I ask you--I urge you--to take as your mandate the understanding of our history and the integration of historical study into our leader development programs for both officers and noncommissioned officers. You must help to make this an Army with a sense of its own history and a vision of what it must be in the future.

I know that's not an easy charge, and that you have to work with commanders and with other members of the force--military and civilian--to accomplish this mission. It is not an easy challenge, nor is it one at which you will succeed without commitment, selfless work, and dedication. But the stakes are too high for you to do otherwise.

As we enter a new decade, we find ourselves in the midst of a fundamental readjustment in the international order, and although it is premature to agree with Frank Fukuyama who said that we have reached the end of history, it is obvious that freedom and democracy are on the rise. We have been successful. We are winning, and we ought to be enormously proud of that. As members of the Army team, we all share in that emerging triumph of our ideals.

It was the American soldier, supported by the other services and standing shoulder to shoulder with our NATO allies, who broke the back of Soviet aggression and bought time for the historical contradictions inherent in communism to bring the oppressive regimes of Eastern Europe to their knees.

We in the Army have a major role to play in helping to capture the potential that the '90s offer the community of nations. We have a clear vision of the Army for the future. We have a firm foundation upon which to build. We have a comprehensive road map rooted firmly in the six imperatives by which we're guiding ourselves in the next century. We must now follow that road map, making adjustments for resource constraints, with our eyes firmly fixed on our ultimate objective--a trained and ready Army for the next generation.

We in the profession of arms, who have studied history and are a part of history, understand more than most the importance of freedom. We who wear the uniform understand also that freedom isn't free: that its price is often paid with the blood of America's youth.

About a month ago I was privileged to go to Fort Polk, Louisiana, to participate in a welcome-home ceremony for the battalion of the 5th Mechanized Division that had participated in Operation JUST CAUSE. The commander had arrayed the entire division on the parade field as a show of thanks for that returning battalion. The battalion was lined up on the field in a place of honor and the weather was terrible--rainy, windy, and cold. After the colors were brought forward, those soldiers who were to be decorated took their place in front of the reviewing stand.

As they marched forward, I noticed a murmur from the crowd to my right, where a number of the families were sitting. I turned, and there were about twelve soldiers from the battalion walking out from the right rear. These were soldiers who had been wounded and three were in wheelchairs with serious leg and back wounds. As they neared the formation, these soldiers left their wheelchairs and stood in ranks with their comrades. The wheelchairs were placed behind the soldiers, so that as soon as I finished decorating the soldiers they could sit in their wheelchairs. As I went up to the first soldier and pinned an award on him, I shook his hand. I said, "Trooper, why don't you sit down now?" He said, "Sir, I appreciate that, but I want to stand with my comrades until the formation ends."

When I went to Fort Polk, I took two Silver Stars with me. One I awarded to a combat medic, a young specialist, a magnificent soldier who did some heroic deeds during the first night of the operation. I presented the second Silver Star posthumously. It went to Specialist Ivan Perez who gave his life so that we could restore freedom to the oppressed country of Panama. Ivan Perez had never been to Panama, but when his nation called, he was there.

Ivan Perez and all the soldiers in that formation understood, more than most, the fact that freedom isn't free. Whether it's in Panama or East Germany, people around the world understand the importance of the United States Army and of this great nation as a symbol of freedom.

Each of you here tonight--men and women who share with me a commitment to our nation and to our Army--will play a vital role in shaping our Army of the future. I am confident that we will rise to the challenges of the future and that we will continue to illuminate our efforts with the shining light of our honored past.

Thank you very much for having me, and God bless the United States.

ARMY HISTORY

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The Chief's Corner

Harold W. Nelson

The biggest news at the Center of Military History since March may be the fire in the Pulaski Building, as reported further in the Editor's Journal. From my perspective, the more important story is the accomplishments of people at the Center who managed to run conferences, support staff rides, answer queries, conduct research, coordinate field activities, evaluate manuscripts, edit works in progress, and deliver finished products in spite of the difficulties. While nothing has been normal since the fire, the usual high performance of dedicated people made a disastrous situation tolerable.

During this tumultuous period I had the opportunity to brief the Chief of Staff of the Army on my concepts for implementing the Letter of Instruction he had given me. That briefing is the source of what follows--an effort to describe the future of military history in the Army using the Chief's six imperatives. As we historians help shape the Army's future, we must remember that some of our actions are aimed at our community of specialists, while others are directed at the entire Army. This dual approach is reflected in what follows.

Attract and Retain High Quality Soldiers and Civilians

Within our community of historians this imperative challenges us to expand and perpetuate the central core of dedicated professionals, both civilian and military, who have nurtured existing programs. All of us who have risen through a succession of history jobs need to work to attract a quality "successor generation," even though promotions are scarce and the future is uncertain. As the 5X proponent for uniformed historians, I need to be more involved in career development, and as the proponent for civilian career field 61 I need to create training programs that will allow our best professionals to truly grow in Army service.

When we look at the things historians can do to help the entire Army attract and retain quality people, we recognize that we contribute to esprit and identification with the profession of arms in unique, important ways. We must manage lineage and honors carefully, and we must monitor memorialization actively as the Army realigns, recognizing that these functions give many soldiers one of their strongest ties with the Army's proud past. Our work on World War II commemoration is also linked to this imperative because it will be used to remind us that our peacetime sacrifices are small compared to those we might face if our readiness flags, and because it will demonstrate that well-trained units with inspired professional leaders make a difference in modern war.

Part of the commemoration work will be in our museums--the concrete, widely available, and popular aspect of Army history programs that has been helping quality soldiers know more about their service for many years. Building the National Museum of the United States Army, while strengthening existing museums, will help the Army meet the challenge of this imperative.

Develop Competent, Confident Leaders

Within the history community we will be addressing this imperative if we make progress in the career development programs outlined above. But we must also be aware that Army historians must practice leadership while studying it. We must mentor junior colleagues and help them define goals, and we should reward historians who display leadership qualities alongside the technical requisites of the field.

As we work to support Army-wide leader development programs, we must recognize that the education of officers and noncommissioned officers is at the top of our priority list. Military history is virtually unique in that it can contribute directly to leader development in classrooms, units, or at home. We should be producing materials that answer needs in all of these settings, and we should press for widespread dissemination of quality products that will improve leader abilities to understand the complexity of modern military affairs and the challenges leaders face in wartime.

Conduct Tough, Realistic Training

For historians in Military History Detachments, this imperative calls for a properly tailored ARTEP

as well as a professionally rewarding training cycle. Those who teach history in the classrooms should expect a faculty development program that helps them develop the tools they need for classroom effectiveness. Those who preserve and teach history in the museums should expect similar programs. The Center will continue to support these efforts.

Historians support tough, realistic training by becoming aware of training objectives within their commands and developing appropriate support materials. These might take the form of historical studies that link training activities more directly to wartime challenges, historical data to support simulations, or staff rides to reinforce key points in leader development. In every instance, the main challenge is to get the historian involved in training.

Maintain Forward-Looking Doctrine

Within the historical community we must gain approval of the new version of AR 870-5. This document contains most of the doctrinal statements that will govern our activities, and it is reasonably forward-looking. To maintain adequate focus on the future we must pay attention to initiatives taken by colleagues in other services, in the civilian academic world, and in foreign armies. This will give us the broad baseline necessary for carrying our programs forward in a changing world.

As the Army modifies its forward-looking doctrine, historians will help by assisting doctrine writers address issues in combined warfare, transition to war, the role of the Army in American society and in other areas, as well as operational histories. At the same time historians will teach and mentor those who interact with doctrine writers at our various schools, using history to illustrate and evaluate characteristics of current doctrine while providing new doctrine as well.

Continuously Modernize

Historians will modernize their own operations by automating historical storage and retrieval, modernizing publishing methods, and exploring alternative media. Print and artifacts have been our mainstay, and they will surely retain a central position in our traditional media while we explore applications in computer and video publishing.

As we modernize our support of the Army we will surely be looking for more responsive product distribution and more perfect audience feedback. More people in the Army have an appetite for the historian's product now. We can stimulate and satisfy that appetite if we interact more effectively with our customers in the Army community.

Maintain the Proper Force Mix

Within the historical community, this imperative requires us to find good historians for new headquarters as the Army adjusts. It also implies that all historians must understand the Heavy/Light/Special Operating Forces concept and offer relevant historical examples to illustrate its utility. They must also interpret "force mix" to include Total Army concepts, developing materials that demonstrate the ways in which Army Reserve and National Guard capabilities have contributed to our nation's strength.

As we support the Army in this area we recognize that we must expand and deepen our coverage of special operating forces. We must also address questions of global mobility and sustainment in addition to the traditional tactical and operational inquiries if we are to tell the full story of force mix options facing decision makers in a nation that must be prepared to use military force to defend its interests many miles away from its shores. We must also develop materials that show the advantages of mixed forces in the complex environment that characterizes the modern theater of active operations.

Conclusion

Clearly, there is much to be done as we help reshape the Army. We will be challenged in a scarce resource environment, and we must build on past successes if we are to make adequate contributions. We have tremendous credibility, a fine cadre of professionals, and much to offer.

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On 1 August 1990 Harold W. ("Hal") Nelson, the Chief of Military History, was promoted to the rank of brigadier general. Previously, on 10 July, Dr. Jeffrey Clarke was appointed to the Senior Executive Service as the Center of Military History's new Chief Historian. Ed.

Editor's Journal

Fire!

On the morning of 23 March there was a fire at the Pulaski Building in Washington, which housed both the Office of the Chief of Engineers and the Center of Military History (including *Army History*). The fire was confined to the floor above the Center, but we suffered considerable smoke, soot, and water damage. Since the fire, the Center has been trying to get back to business-as-usual as quickly as possible, but it has not been easy. Some of you have experienced a delay in receiving your April issue, and if we have been at all slow in acknowledging your correspondence and your contributions, please bear with us.

Because of damage to the Pulaski Building, the Center has moved from Massachusetts Avenue to the Southeast Federal Center in Washington. For those of our friends and colleagues who missed the changes in the masthead, we can now be reached at the following address:

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Phone numbers for *Army History*: (202) 475-2905 or AUTOVON 335-2955.

With this issue of *Army History* we introduce a number of changes that I hope will make this publication more valuable to our growing audience. First of all, we are offering longer articles, some footnoted. This format will make it easier to incorporate scholarly articles in military history into our publication. Of course, we will continue to seek shorter pieces as well--the type of articles you have always seen in *Army History*. Second, we are introducing book reviews, both reprints and original reviews written for *Army History*. Third, I am starting a Letters to the Editor section where our readers who feel inspired to comment concerning an issue or material that has appeared in *Army History* can express their thoughts. Finally, with the "In the Next Issue..." column, our readers are given a "heads up" on what to expect in the forthcoming issue.

I anticipate further innovations as this publication matures. For example, whenever possible we would like to include historical videos among our reviews. But *Army History* will not engage in "change for change sake"--our goal will always be to produce a periodical that is more useful and enjoyable for the Army history community.

Arnold G. Fisch, Jr.

Reflections of a Historian in Uniform

Richard O. Perry

Today the study of history is alive and well in the U.S. Army. But it has not always been, as my experience as a historian in uniform over a twenty-four year period indicates. The reflections that follow deal primarily with the teaching of history in the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) program, with brief commentary on other experiences involving history and historians. They are restricted to those matters of which I have direct personal knowledge.

My introduction to the community of Army historians was with the ROTC program at the University of Georgia in 1964. The Vietnam War was in its early stages. The Army there was still in an advisory and support role, but the pace of combat was accelerating. ROTC was as much a part of the academic scene as in my own undergraduate days. Mandatory two-year enrollment for male students kept freshman and sophomore classrooms filled, and draft deferments brought in all the recruits needed for the junior and senior years.

My preparation for teaching American military history was woefully inadequate. Though a history major, I lacked a coherent grasp of the outlines of our

nation's past. Graduate studies at Georgia would remedy this, but that would not help in those first critical months. As to the military side, in my undergraduate days no courses in military history were offered. The exception was in ROTC, but that instruction was by an officer with no particular interest in the subject, who lectured on his views of current events.

For the ROTC military history instructor in the early 1960s, the Army provided little support. There was an Army Subject Schedule, but it was of little use to the novice. There was a textbook, but its shortcomings were even then widely recognized. It had been written at the Office of the Chief of Military History by the staff assembled to write the World War II "green books," and it reflected their interests. For the instructor who needed a broad introduction to our military heritage, its concentration on the recent war was overwhelming and disappointing. In short, military history in the ROTC curriculum reflected the malaise into which the subject had fallen within the Army.

The Army has a long tradition of the study of military history as an essential element in officer development, as the memoirs and biographies of the great leaders of World War II attest. But after the Korean War, something happened. Military history remained in the ROTC curriculum and on official reading lists. But nobody really seemed to believe it important. It was given lip service and it languished. The cause of the malaise is subject to conjecture. Its existence in this period is not.

But even by the mid-1960s, the atmosphere was beginning to change. In retrospect that is surprising, for in 1965 we committed ground troops to the fighting in Vietnam, and that became the focus of all attention. Nevertheless, the outlook was improving. Third Army, which had responsibility for the ROTC program in the Southeastern states, held a training conference each summer for all officers newly assigned to ROTC duty. In 1966 it inserted into the agenda a block of instruction on how to teach military history, presented by two "veteran" instructors, of whom I was one. Significantly, although I brought the subject schedule, textbook, and other ROTC support materials to the attention of the participants, I did not recommend them for use. In addition to helpful hints to new instructors, the Army turned its attention to the textbook. In 1967 Continental Army Command convened a conference to consider its revision. Maurice Matloff represented the Office of the Chief of Military History. His purpose was to learn firsthand from the classroom instructors what our requirements were. Since the instructors, coming from all over the United States, had never met before that conference, I am not sure that we spoke with a very clear voice. OCMH produced a new text in 1969, of which Matloff was editor. Well received, it was revised in 1973 and is still in use, though admittedly dated.

Two tours in Vietnam intervened between the ROTC assignment and my next encounter with history education in the Army. Vietnam brought me into a very different contact with history in the Army, and to a very different responsibility with respect to it. Heretofore, my experience had been with its study and teaching. But in a war, we are "creating" history rather than studying it, and it is incumbent on us to preserve the record for the study and use of those who come after us. My own experience in Vietnam, which was limited to the advisory effort, is that we failed to do so. Sometime after Tet 1968 I was the G-3 Plans adviser at IV Corps headquarters in the Mekong Delta. Visited by an officer from the field history program, I had to tell him that we did not have a system for retaining documents. On the contrary, we destroyed those we no longer needed for current purposes. True, the documents were so overclassified and overcontrolled in those days that a retention system would have imposed significant burdens on records managers. And we were extremely busy as it was. But the fact is that our historical mindedness had a blind spot when it came to preserving the record as opposed to studying it.

Following my first Vietnam tour, I returned to the University of Georgia at the end of 1968. The Tet Offensive having occurred in the interim, the attitude on campuses toward the Army and the ROTC had changed significantly. The ROTC detachments provided a convenient focus for antiwar protests. That did not affect me because I was then a civilian, a graduate student in the History Department. It was most instructive to be able to watch the planning of "spontaneous" demonstrations without being part of the target. The effect of the antiwar sentiment of this period on the ROTC program and on its military history course was profound.

In January 1973 I returned to history in the Army when I reported for duty in the Department of History at the Military Academy. The Department had been formed during the later years of the Vietnam War, and as such was a manifestation of the increasingly favorable change in the Army's attitude toward history. It quickly became the most influential single institution in the Army historical community, both through the cadets who passed through its

classrooms and through the officers brought in from the Army to serve on the faculty. For most of the instructors, the graduate schooling and the follow-on teaching assignment are the only formal association that they will have with the discipline of history in the Army. But it is an experience to which they devote five years, and as they return to command and staff assignments their cumulative influence on the development of historical mindedness is enormous.

Some former faculty members remain more closely associated with the Army's history program and seek subsequent assignments at the Command and General Staff College (CGSC), the war colleges, and the Center of Military History. My own career after the Academy brought me to CGSC as a student. On the faculty were several History Department colleagues. While they did teach military history, their principal objective was to convince the remainder of the faculty to integrate military history into the general curriculum as a teaching aid, by the use of historical examples. Even by the mid-1970s they had succeeded beyond all expectation. The only historical example that I can recall in the Infantry School of the '50s and early '60s was the use of Hannibal at Trasimeno to illustrate an ambush. The CGSC course began in 1976 with each student reading the green book account of the battle of Schmidt, and spending an afternoon discussing it. The same influence made itself felt at the Army War College, where a few years later the historical approach permeated the curriculum.

For the officer whose studies have been tied to a particular geographical region, and who wishes to continue to pursue those studies, a Foreign Area Officer (FAO) assignment is a logical progression. If the officer can pass the Army language test, little additional training is necessary. Following CGSC, I reported to the U.S. Southern Command in Panama as an FAO. I arrived there just as negotiations for the Panama Canal Treaties of 1977 were being completed, amidst bitter national debate. I found myself a member of the small staff charged with implementing the status of forces agreement that was part of the treaty package. That was the most exciting FAO assignment in Latin America at that time, and easily the most challenging assignment of my career. My principal credential in getting it was a graduate degree in history.

Leaving Panama in 1981, I returned to military history education as the Professor of Military Science (PMS) at the University of North Alabama. The ROTC program had changed significantly since my previous experience with it at Georgia. The profound effects of the antiwar movement were evident throughout the country. Gone was the mandatory program for male students; gone also was the draft. The focus of the PMS was no longer on education and training, but on recruiting.

Changed as greatly as the ROTC program itself was American military history. The Army had been wrestling with how to improve the quality of instruction since the mid-1960s. Initial experiments centered on the training of officers assigned to teach it. The most successful effort was an immensely popular summer program offered by the Military Academy's Department of History to prepare officers for the task.

Academicians had been grumbling at least since 1964 about academic credentials of ROTC instructors, and military history was the course in which their comments were most telling. Absent the mandatory program and the draft, and given the demands of the recruiting mission, the decision was made to turn military history over to the history departments. As I was arriving on campus in 1981, a professor was returning from the summer session at the Academy's Department of History prepared to teach the course. Under the civilian professors, military history has become fully accredited. While there is much to praise in this development, the absence of an officer as historian is sorely felt. It denies to the officer corps an entry point into the community of Army historians, and it denies to the cadet the role model of a historian in uniform.

In 1984, twenty years after I began to prepare my first lesson in military history, I was assigned to the U.S. Army Center of Military History as Chief of the Histories Division. Here the mission was not study and teaching, but researching and writing, our priority being the Vietnam War. I thought often of my conversation with the officer from the field history program in the Mekong Delta. Next time, we must do a better job of preserving the record.

Today the historian, like everyone else in Washington, carefully watches the Budget. In these times of unforeseeable changes in Eastern Europe, the prognosis for continued funding at recent levels is not promising. That might affect the great institutions that are the bastions of history in the Army. But let us hope that with the significant changes of the last quarter-century, the study of history in the Army has taken root as deeply as it did in the era that produced the great leaders of World War II.

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The Role of the Department of the Army Historical Advisory Committee (DAHAC)

Edward M. Coffman

As he assumes leadership for the Department of the Army Historical Advisory Committee, "Mac" Coffman shares with us his thoughts on the history and role of the DAHAC for Army history. He wishes to thank two former official historians who later served on the DAHAC, Forrest Pogue and Charles Roland, for their input.

Soon after the birth of what is now the Center of Military History following World War II, the Army historical community recognized the necessity for a body of advisers drawn from outside the ranks of public historians. In the four decades that followed its inception, the DAHAC has continued to perform its basic function of supporting the Army's history program through its oversight and counsel.

As Chief of Staff during the postwar period from 1945 to early 1948, General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower recognized the need for a thorough chronicle of the Army's experience during the war. Fortunately, he had both the necessary funding and an available pool of veteran, wartime historians to start the program. He also had the services of Dr. Kent R. Greenfield, who had left a distinguished career at Johns Hopkins University to serve as Chief of the Historical Section, Army Ground Forces, during the war. Professor Greenfield was an outstanding professional historian, who wanted to lead the proposed project.

As he embarked on this monumental work, Greenfield had to be pleased with a situation that provided him with the strong support of the top Army leadership and a group of skilled, trained historians who had already done much of the necessary research. Some had even already completed specialized studies on various aspects of the Army's role in World War II. A few years later, he would recall: "The most challenging task that faced the professionals in 1946 was to make official history honest." (*The Historian and the Army*, New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1954, p. 7.) The new Chief Historian, whose background was in European history, was acutely aware of the criticism leveled against various European official history programs as being "court histories," with the purpose of putting the best face on events and going to the extent, in some instances, of stretching the truth rather broadly indeed. On the one hand, he was confident that his mandate from General Eisenhower that Army historians must tell the Army's story "with no reservations as to whether or not the evidence of history places the Army in a favorable light" (ibid., p. 9) gave him and his colleagues the freedom to write an honest history. On the other hand, he was concerned about the image and the very legitimacy of the program in the eyes of the historical community--in particular, the academic historians.

When the first volume in THE UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II--The Army Ground Forces: *The Organization of Ground Combat Troops*--appeared in 1947, there was no advisory committee listed in the volume. In reality, this was a collection of studies prepared during the war by Greenfield himself and two historians, Robert R. Palmer and Bell I. Wiley, who had held academic positions at Princeton and the University of Mississippi before the war. These men would quickly return to their academic endeavors upon their discharge from active service. Three years later, however, when The War Department: *Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations*--by the well-known veteran military correspondent of the *Baltimore Sun*, Mark Watson--came out, the names of an advisory committee were prominently displayed in the front matter. Similar names have appeared in successive volumes.

It has been an interesting group. Among the ten who appear in Watson's book are six academics: James P. Baxter of Williams, Henry S. Commager of Columbia, William T. Hutchinson of Chicago, E. Dwight Salmon of Amherst, Charles H. Taylor of Harvard, and John D. Hicks of Berkeley; two famed military historians--Douglas Southall Freeman and S.L.A. Marshall; a representative of the great granting agencies--Pendleton Herring of the Social Science Research Council; and the Head of the Military Art and Engineering Department at West Point--Col. Thomas D. Stamps.

Over the years as rotation brought in different individuals, the committee always contained a significant number of academic historians; however, a larger representation was added from the Army, with the War College, the Command and General Staff College, Industrial War College, Army Field Forces, Training and Doctrine Command, and the Surgeon General's Office all represented at one time or another. The increased participation of officers served to indicate the full role of the history program, which went beyond the writing of the official histories of World War II and, subsequently, the Korean and Vietnam Wars, to serve the Army in various new ways. Although the duties of the Center of Military History have expanded over the years, the presence of so many academics on the committee implies the continuing importance of producing the official history volumes.

By 1990 the impressive publications of the Army's official history program have laid to rest any suspicion of distorted history, which worried Greenfield at the onset. At the same time, the field of military history is more established in academe now than it was forty years ago. What remains, therefore, as the function of the DAHAC?

Today the advisory committee serves as a liaison agency to bring the Center of Military History into contact with its two basic constituencies--soldiers and historians. During its periodic meetings--which of late have been too few and far between--members of the committee listen to reports of the various activities of the Center and learn of problems as well as achievements. They can also serve as a sounding board, as it were, for ideas. At the same time, in their own comments at the annual meeting, as well as in the formal report that goes to the Secretary of the Army, they can observe whether they believe that the Center is carrying out properly what they hold to be its mission and make appropriate recommendations. Finally, there is the traditional social function in which they can meet and talk with Center historians. This can also serve the members of the DAHAC as an informal means of gathering information about accomplishments and problems.

In sum, the purpose of the Advisory Committee is to advise and support the Army's official history program in a variety of ways. I look forward to its continued active involvement.

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Operation MARKET-GARDEN: Historical Perspective for Future Combined Arms Deep Battle

Stewart W. Bentley, Jr.

September 1944: To the Allied High Command, it seemed that the Wehrmacht had completely collapsed all along the Western Front. Everywhere, all through France and Belgium, the Germans and their collaborators were in retreat.

The Allied troops were in full pursuit of the fleeing Germans. Lt. Gen. George Patton, commanding the U.S. Third Army, was racing through southern France, toward the Saar River. Field Marshal Bernard Law Montgomery, commanding the 21st Army Group, pursued the enemy across northern France into Belgium, and captured Antwerp on 4 September.

Allied intelligence officers told their commanders exactly what they wanted to hear: the Wehrmacht was broken; the Germans would continue to retreat at least as far as Germany. They could be expected to fight their last battle behind the West Wall, or at the historic moat of the Rhine River. (1)

Allied commanders, becoming overconfident, predicted the end of the war within a couple of months, or even weeks. Montgomery himself said the war would be over "reasonably quickly." (2)

Indeed, the Germans were on the verge of complete collapse. Their forces, bled white by the

Russian front and by Hitler's orders not to withdraw anywhere, had only one hundred tanks on the Western Front at this critical time. (3)

After Field Marshal Erwin Rommel had been wounded by a strafing Allied plane on 17 July, the command of Oberkommando West passed to Field Marshal Walter Model, and then to the most respected general officer in the Wehrmacht, Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt.

When von Rundstedt took command on 4 September, his first actions, already set in motion by Model, were to slow down and halt the retreat, organize his disrupted forces, and attempt to establish a defensive line. In Belgium, the defensive line that Model had designated was the Albert Canal, just south of the Dutch-Belgian border.

On Model's final day in command of Oberkommando West, he ordered his battered armored units to rear areas for refitting and rearming. The most important of these units, especially for the MARKET-GARDEN participants, was the II SS Panzer Corps, under Lt. Gen. Wilhelm ("Willi") Bittrich. The area they were sent to was near a quiet city in Holland. (4) The city, Arnhem, is located on the north bank of the Rhine River.

General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces, had been, until September, successfully executing his "fight on a broad front" strategy against the Wehrmacht. But the breakout and pursuit from Normandy across France had upset the preinvasion logistical plans. The result was that Allied pursuit began to slow. Indeed, the Germans were retreating faster than the Allies could pursue them. As the Allies began to slow down the pursuit, the command and logistical battle for who would get the precious fuel, ammunition, personnel, and maintenance parts began.

Montgomery, determined to be the man who would ultimately defeat the Germans, began pleading, cajoling, and even demanding that Eisenhower give him the impetus to continue the pursuit. Montgomery advocated a single, knife-like thrust through Holland and into the Ruhr, Germany's industrial heartland. (5)

General Omar Bradley, commanding the U.S. 12th Army Group, also favored a spearhead thrust, but wanted to let Patton continue his drive to the Saar and Frankfurt. For various reasons, political, military, and personal, Eisenhower gave the nod to Montgomery.

Montgomery's plan was simple, yet audacious. Operation MARKET-GARDEN was a two-part plan. MARKET was the airborne operation, employing three divisions: the American 82d and 101st and the British 1st Airborne, with the 1st Polish Parachute Brigade attached. These units were collectively grouped under the newly formed First Allied Airborne Army.

The airborne forces, dormant since the D-Day operations, were technically Eisenhower's reserves. By September the airborne commanders and troops began to become concerned that they would be left out of the war, that the war would soon be over, and the airborne would have no further part to play. (6)

The First Allied Airborne Army was scheduled to drop into three separate drop zones in Holland. They were to secure an airborne corridor along a narrow, two-lane highway, stretching from the Belgian-Dutch border north to Arnhem. The distance between the two is sixty-four miles.

Most of Holland is right at, or just above, sea level. The result is a country crisscrossed by everything from intermittent streams to mile-wide rivers. The most major of the latter are the lower Rhine, the Waal, and the Maas. There are also canals running through the Dutch countryside wide enough and deep enough to pose serious military obstacles. The ones that affected MARKET-GARDEN were the Willems Canal and the Wilhelmina Canal. The bridges over the above bodies of water were the objectives of the MARKET forces. Additionally, there were other lesser, but equally vital, bridges across numerous small streams that had to be taken intact by the airborne troops.

The Dutch terrain is flat, with small towns and forests dotting the fertile countryside. The soil is well irrigated, and even today is not the best ground for maneuvering mechanized forces. Over this difficult Dutch terrain the largest airborne operation in history would take place.

Today, there are many good roads and even an autobahn running through the center of Holland. However, in 1944 there was only one two-lane highway running north from the Belgian-Dutch border through Eindhoven, Nijmegen, and on to Arnhem. This single road and the soft Dutch soil would have a telling effect on the ground drive through the airborne corridor.

MARKET's objectives were as follows: Beginning in the south, the 101st Airborne, commanded by Maj. Gen. Maxwell Taylor, was to land some thirty miles beyond the British front lines and secure the bridges over the Wilhelmina Canal at the towns of Son and Best. Additionally, the division was to seize the bridge over the Willems Canal at Veghel. Approximately ten miles beyond Veghel the 82d

View of the Nijmegen bridge, looking north from the German command post.

Airborne, commanded by Brig. Gen. James Gavin, was assigned the task of securing the bridge over the Maas River at Grave, and the bridge over the mile-wide Waal River at Nijmegen. At Arnhem, the northernmost point of the operation, the British were tasked to capture the crucial bridge over the lower Rhine. With this bridge, the Allies would have an open door through which they could drive into Germany.

The deputy commander of the First Allied Airborne Army and the field commander for MARKET-GARDEN, Lt. Gen. Frederick Browning, and his headquarters were to land by glider with the 82d. Browning would direct the airborne battle from Nijmegen.

The commander of the 1st British Airborne Division was 42-year-old Maj. Gen. Robert Urquhart. This would be the first time he had ever commanded an airborne division in combat. Further, he had never jumped from an airplane, and was even, as he confessed afterward, "prone to airsickness." (7) However, this man's command presence and force of personality would eventually earn him the respect of the German commanders opposing him and save his division from complete annihilation.

It is important to bear in mind the Allied drop zones in relation to the operation's objectives. Both the 101st and 82d divisions' drop zones were fairly close to the bridges assigned to them. The exception was the Waal River bridge assigned to the 82d. General Gavin determined that the securing of the dominant terrain feature in his area of operations, the Groesbeek Heights, was more important than the Waal bridge. It has been argued that Gavin should have secured this bridge immediately because of its immense importance. However, with the forces Gavin had at his disposal, he could only carry out one mission at a time. (8)

The division artillery was dropped on the commanding Groesbeek Heights to protect the division from possible counterattacks out of the Reichswald to the east. With the heights secured, the All-Americans could get on with the business of seizing the Waal bridge.

In contrast to the American, the British drop zones were located far to the west of Arnhem, on the Renkum Heath. The distance between the drop zone and the bridge was six to eight miles. Urquhart planned to make up for this weakness by sending a motorized reconnaissance squadron of Jeeps under the command of Maj. C. P. H. "Freddie" Gough to take the bridge.

The division was scheduled to drop over a period of two days. On the third day of the operation, General Stanislaw Sosabowski's 1st Polish Parachute Brigade was to be dropped on the southern bank of the Rhine, only a mile away from the Arnhem bridge, near the town of Driel.

The choice of the British drop zones was primarily influenced by the terrain around the bridge and the Dutch countryside itself. The area around the Arnhem bridge, then as now, is heavily urbanized on the north side. On the south side, the ground was determined to be too soft for glider operations. Even so, there was already a historical precedent for the use of British airborne and glider-borne troops in assaulting a bridge. Early on the morning of 6 June

1944, a company of glider-borne troops under the command of Maj. John Howard (Company D, 7th Battalion, 5th Parachute Brigade, 6th Airborne) had successfully taken the bridges over the Orne River and the adjacent canal. The former was later known as the Pegasus Bridge. These bridges were vital in D-Day operations because they not only secured an exit from the beaches for the invasion forces, but they also denied the Germans a counterattack route.

The lead glider of the three Horsas used in the assault came to a halt barely seventy-five yards from the bridge. (9) The British were able to overpower the German defenders and hold the bridges until relieved by Lord Lovett's commandos.

The appropriate lesson, which the British command seems to have forgotten after only three months, is that to be successful, airborne/glider-borne troops must be dropped extremely close to, if not right on top of, their objectives. In fact, during the planning of MARKET-GARDEN, Col. George Chatterton, commander of the Glider Pilot Regiment, suggested a Pegasus Bridge type of coup de main. His plan was for "a force of five or six gliders to land near the [Arnhem] bridge and take it. I saw no reason why we could not do it, but apparently no one else saw the need for it, and I distinctly remember being called a bloody murderer for suggesting it." (10)

The GARDEN portion of the operation was to be an armored drive by the British XXX Armored Corps, commanded by Lt. Gen. Brian Horrocks. This powerful mechanized force was scheduled essentially to attack on a one-tank front down a single highway and relieve the airborne troops holding the corridor open.

Montgomery had expected the armored drive to take two days. Once XXX Corps was over the Rhine at Arnhem, the thrust would turn east for Germany and the Ruhr. The plan was a bold one, especially for the perennially cautious, methodical Montgomery. It captured Eisenhower's imagination and gained his approval.

D-Day for the operation was 17 September. At 0945 on that bright Sunday morning, the first airlifts took off from airfields all over southern England. In all, some 4,700 aircraft: bombers, fighters, troop transports, and gliders participated in the largest airborne mission in history. (11)

XXX Corps, with the Irish Guards under Lt. Col. J.O.E. Vandeleur spearheading the drive, crossed the line of departure (LD) south of Valkenswaard at 1435, accompanied by a rolling artillery barrage and close air support provided by fighter-bombers. (12)

As the British drive continued to Eindhoven, thirteen miles away, it became apparent that the Allied intelligence picture was completely inaccurate. Captured German prisoners of war revealed that the defense was not made up of demoralized, second-rate troops. Veterans of the 9th and 10th SS Panzer Divisions, II SS Panzer Corps; General Kurt Student's First Parachute Army; and General Gustav von Zangen's Fifteenth Army resolutely opposed and vigorously counterattacked not only the paratroopers, but also the British tanks and infantrymen. The German defenders were combat-tested, tough veterans.

The resulting hard fighting all along the narrow corridor caused the GARDEN forces to slow down considerably. XXX Corps finally linked up with the 101st in Eindhoven at noon on 18 September, already eighteen hours behind schedule. (13)

As soon as linkup was effected, engineer equipment was brought forward to build a Bailey bridge over the Wilhelmina Canal at Son to replace the bridge blown by the defenders. The Germans had already blown the bridge at Best, and until the canal at Son was bridged, the XXX Corps was stopped in its tracks.

At 0645 on 19 September, thirty-six hours behind schedule, the Guards Armored Division began rolling across the newly constructed Bailey bridge at Son, forty-six miles south of Arnhem. At 0830 the spearhead linked up with Gavin's troopers at Grave. By midday the British tanks were in the suburbs of Nijmegen.

In the face of stiffening resistance, the 82d had not taken the Waal River bridge. The Germans were occupying a defensive perimeter at the southern edge of the bridge in the city park. They were also forming a defensive line on the north bank of the Waal. The bridge would have to be secured for the drive to continue. General Gavin determined there was only one way to seize the bridge: "We've got to get it simultaneously, from both ends."(14) His plan called for an assault river crossing of the Waal.

Gavin assigned the task to Col. Reuben Tucker's 504th Parachute Regiment. Maj. Julian Cook, commanding the 3d Battalion, was to lead the assault, originally scheduled for 1300, 20 September. The battalion waited on the southern bank of the Waal River near the PGEM electrical power plant all through the previous night as the British labored to bring up the collapsible nineteen-foot canvas boats. Because of the delays down the two-lane highway, the assault was postponed until 1500.

At 1430 the fighter-bomber air strike of the far

Memorial to the 82d Airborne on the north bank of the Waal River.

shore began. At 1440, Vandeleur's tanks began barraging the Germans and laying down a protective smoke screen. Now, twenty minutes before assault time, the boats arrived. (15) It is a credit to the training, morale, and leadership of the paratroopers that they were able to assemble the boats, assign personnel to them, and ready themselves to begin the assault at 1500.

At H-hour, the Americans scrambled up over the steep embankment and down to the river's edge. The daylight crossing of the 400-yard-wide river began. Because of a breeze, the British smoke screen began to lift. Almost immediately, German guns opened up on the exposed Americans; 20-mm. guns erected at Fort Hof van Holland added to the machine guns and rifle fire coming from the north bank. Despite tremendous losses, the paratroopers gained the far shore, raced across some six hundred yards of open, flat terrain and stormed the German defensive line on a dike road.

As the rest of the battalion began running down the dike road headed for the north end of the Nijmegen bridge, Company H detached itself and assaulted Fort Hof van Holland. The fort, which dates from 1865, is surrounded by a ten-foot-wide moat, and a fifteen-foot-high earthen wall. In the interior is a stone blockhouse and a residential home. The paratroopers swam the moat and climbed the wall, surrounding the remaining defenders in the blockhouse. The Germans finally surrendered when they realized they were trapped. Twelve of the enemy died defending the fort. (16)

The remainder of Major Cook's paratroopers had their hands full mopping up the remaining German defenders, but seized the northern end of the bridge as the first British tanks rolled across.

The capture of the Nijmegen bridge would have seemed to be the catalyst for the successful completion of MARKET-GARDEN. But the British could not follow up this tactical success and push on to Arnhem. All along the corridor, from Nijmegen back to Valkenswaard, American paratroopers and British infantry were fighting off German counterattacks seeking to cut the narrow lifeline of the operation. Horrocks' tanks could not move up the exposed dike road from Nijmegen to Arnhem without infantry support. The operation stalled.

Meanwhile, at the Arnhem bridge Maj. John Frost's battalion was slowly facing annihilation in the bitter, house-to-house fighting on the north side of the bridge. Only Frost's battalion and a small number of troopers from the rest of the division managed to gain the bridge. A few miles to the west, in the once-quiet suburb of Oosterbeek, the remainder of the 1st Airborne was slowly being compressed into a defensive perimeter around division headquarters at the Hartenstein Hotel.

The British, armed only with a few antitank guns, PIATs (projector, individual antitank), rifles, machine guns, and Molotov cocktails, were no match for the Tiger tanks of the 9th and 10th SS Panzer divisions. On the morning of 21 September the remaining defenders on the Arnhem bridge, out of ammunition, food, water, and medical supplies, surrendered or tried to get out on their own. Major Frost, for whom the Arnhem bridge is now named,

was wounded and taken prisoner.

The 1st Polish Parachute Brigade, delayed for more than forty-eight hours by weather over England, dropped near Driel, south of the Rhine, on 21 September around 1700 hours. Ironically, their drop zones (DZs) were the very ones deemed too soft for the British forces. The DZs had been overrun by German reinforcements attempting to block the Allies driving north out of Nijmegen. The Poles had a hot drop zone and had to fight their way to the bridge rendezvous at Driel. The Poles attempted to reinforce Urquhart, but were unable to cross the Rhine in force.

XXX Corps finally pushed as far as the southern bank of the Rhine and linked up with Sosabowski's Poles at Driel. But the Germans, rushing reinforcements to Arnhem, thoroughly controlled the bridge and the city. Surprise had been lost, and the British now did not have the mass or firepower required to achieve the bridgehead over the Rhine.

By 25 September it had become painfully obvious to all participants that the 1st Airborne's position on the north bank was untenable. Permission to withdraw, should it become necessary, had arrived two days earlier. The evacuation was begun at 2200 hours on the twenty-fifth. A little more than 2,000 soldiers made it safely back across the Rhine. Some 6,400 of the paratroopers who had gone into Arnhem were dead or missing. (17) Operation MARKET-GARDEN was over.

The MARKET portion of the operation was a success. The paratroopers had captured and held all their objectives with the consequences already noted. The 1st Airborne had captured the north end of the Arnhem bridge initially and held it far beyond Montgomery's time line.

GARDEN had failed to achieve its ultimate goal of driving across the Arnhem bridge and then east into the Ruhr. The British Second Army had succeeded extending their front lines some fifty miles northeast beyond their position of 15 September. They had also been able to silence the German rocket sites in southern Holland firing on London. But in the face of stiffening resistance and the inevitable German counterattack, the British could get no farther.

There are several reasons why MARKET-GARDEN failed, despite Montgomery's egotistical assertion that the operation was "ninety percent successful." (18) The first reason was not the fault of the Allied command. The weather over northern Europe and especially England hampered efforts to parachute in the Polish brigade on schedule and attempts to air drop supplies to the airborne. Weather also grounded much of the close air support so desperately needed against German Panzers.

Next, there were several command and planning errors made on the part of the Allies that are important historical lessons. Field Marshal Montgomery's and General Browning's most important mistakes include:

1. Failure to heed and disseminate intelligence from ULTRA indicating the presence of German armored divisions in the MARKET-GARDEN area of operations. On 15 September ULTRA stated that Field Marshal Model's headquarters was located at Oosterbeek, west of Arnhem, yet Headquarters, Second Army, failed to heed the warning; (19)

2. Failure to accept Dutch underground reports confirming ULTRA. The British considered the underground unreliable. This predisposition was compounded tactically by the 1st Airborne at Arnhem, when they politely refused the help of the local underground; (20)

3. Refusal to accept the photographic proof of German armor at Arnhem that reconnaissance planes provided before the attack. General Urquhart, Browning's intelligence chief, provided proof less than forty-eight hours prior to the operation, but Browning told him not to worry about the "unserviceable" tanks. (21) Even Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF)'s intelligence summary on 16 September was discounted. It declared: "9 SS Panzer Division and presumably the 10th, has been reported withdrawing to the Arnhem area in Holland." (22) Still, Headquarters, Second Army regarded these reports as highly unlikely; (23)

4. Failure to drop the British closer to the Arnhem bridge. Though the terrain on the south side of the river was not conducive to a large-scale glider landing, a coup de main such as the one suggested by Chatterton could have been accomplished. Further, an airborne unit could have been dropped just as easily close to the bridge; and

5. Failure to employ all available manpower resources. After SHAEF intelligence chief Maj. Gen. Kenneth Strong warned Eisenhower's Chief of Staff, Lt. Gen. W. Bedell Smith, of the presence of German armor in MARKET-GARDEN's target area, Smith became extremely concerned. After briefing Eisenhower on developments and receiving permission, Smith flew to Montgomery's headquarters in Brussels. Smith suggested to the 21st Army Group commander that a second airborne division should be dropped at Arnhem along with 1st Airborne. Possibly he meant using the veteran 6th

Area of the 82d Airborne's daylight crossing of the Waal River, looking south from the German position.

Interior of Fort Hof van Holland.



The John Frost Bridge, looking south from Arnhem.

Airborne, inactive since D-Day--Major Howard and his unit would indeed have been perfect for an Arnhem bridge coup de main, but Montgomery "ridiculed the idea." (24)

The Germans apparently agreed with General Smith. In a captured after action report on the battle, the Germans concluded the Allies' "chief mistake was not to have landed the entire First British Airborne Division at once rather than over a period of three days and that a second airborne division was not dropped in the area west of Arnhem." (25)

It is also interesting to note that the Table of Organization and Equipment (TO&E) of the First Allied Airborne Army included the American 17th Airborne Division and the British 6th Airborne Division. (26) For some reason, neither of these units was included in the planning phase.

Another oversight by the Second Army was the failure to secure the Schelde Estuary following the capture of Antwerp. In what Charles MacDonald called "the greatest tactical error of the war," (27) the entrance and exit of the great port were overlooked by commanders in the British Second Army. As General Horrocks admitted, the focus was on the Rhine River; everything else was of "subsidiary importance." (28)

Further, von Zangen's Fifteenth Army was allowed to escape right under the noses of the British at Antwerp and fell into the defensive lines that XXX Corps had to fight their way through. By all rights, the Fifteenth Army should have been bottled up on the Dutch coast by the British.

MARKET-GARDEN planners also overlooked the critical importance of the Westerbouwing Heights and the Driel ferry. The Westerbouwing Heights are located on the north side of Arnhem. This commanding piece of ground was the key terrain in Arnhem, and from here artillery could fire on Oosterbeek, the river, and the bridge. The Driel ferry, which linked Heveadorp with Driel, spanning the Rhine, was ignored. (29) Jan ter Horst, a leader of the Oosterbeek resistance and former Dutch artillery captain, pointed out these facts to the British, but the Red Devils were politely disinterested. By the time they realized the importance of both, they did not have the combat power to occupy the heights and the ferry had disappeared.

The communications problems of the 1st Airborne at Arnhem are well documented. Suffice it to say that General Urquhart's command and control problems were only intensified by his inability to contact Major Frost at the bridge and to inform General Browning of the division's dire straits until it was too late. The problem was compounded when General Urquhart set off for the Arnhem bridge to get a grip on the situation there. Lack of communications forced this decision upon him. The result was that the commanding general was trapped behind enemy lines for almost thirty-nine hours during a crucial time in the battle. (30)

As history has borne out, several of the principles of war were violated during the conduct of MARKET-GARDEN. Surprise, however, was not one of them. The Germans were genuinely caught off guard by the operation. Not only were they surprised that Montgomery was in charge, (31) but they simply could not believe what the operation's objectives were. Even when a copy of the operations order fell into Model's hands on the evening of 17 September, he initially refused to believe its authenticity. (32) His staff did, though, and alerted German air defense artillery assets for subsequent Allied drops.

In summation, Operation MARKET-GARDEN failed for the following reasons:

1. Overconfidence and arrogance on the part of Allied commanders on what they could accomplish against what they supposed was a weak, beaten, and demoralized enemy;

2. Underestimation of the ability of the Wehrmacht to recover their fighting capability; and

3. Failure to change a rigid plan when intelligence indicated that it needed to be altered to fit the situation.

It is interesting to note the manner in which the Germans would have carried out the operation. General Siegfried Westphal, von Rundstedt's chief of staff, has suggested that if Horrocks' ground drive had started first and drawn the attention of the mass of German troops, notably the 9th and 10th SS Panzer Divisions, then the airborne could have dropped behind the lines in the Germans' undefended rear area. (33)

The operation called for the premature use of the airborne troops before, rather than coinciding with or following, the main thrust's actions in forcing the enemy to withdraw. Simply put, it was wasteful, unwise, and impracticable to exploit a success in advance of its achievement.

Capt. Stewart Bentley, Jr., is an Army military intelligence officer. A former platoon leader with the 3d Infantry Division, he currently is assigned to the Intelligence School at Fort Huachuca, Arizona.

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Focus on the Field

Office of the Command Historian U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command

Henry O. Malone, Jr.

"When we prepare the Army for war, our efforts must be guided by historical perspective. You must ensure that decision makers learn to think in a historical context."

-- General Carl E. Vuono, 25 February 1987

Military history has been an important component of the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) since its inception in 1973, when General William E. DePuy put the TRADOC historian close to the decision-making process by placing his office directly under the command element. In 1976 he appointed future TRADOC Commander Lt. Col. John W. Foss as Director of the Division Restructuring Study. Working closely with the TRADOC historian, the study director built on a solid foundation of historical data relating to the design of Army divisions and laid the groundwork for the force design initiatives carried out in the 1980s.

In 1977 the second TRADOC Commander, General Donn A. Starry, reminded all his service school commandants that "a knowledge of military history is a necessary component of an officer's technical competence." To further that philosophy, a military history teaching department--the Combat Studies Institute (CSI)--was established within the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth during his tenure as commander. To keep the momentum alive, his successor, General Glenn K. Otis, told his subordinate commanders that he had four areas of emphasis internal to TRADOC: "military history, mobilization planning, maintaining the force, and modernizing the force."

In keeping with his view that TRADOC had a special responsibility that made it unacceptable merely to meet the minimum Army requirements for the preparation and use of military history, the fourth commander, General William R. Richardson, directed the expansion of the command history program to include full-time, professionally

trained historians on the staffs of all TRADOC Commandants of officer professional development schools. His vision was recognized in 1985 when the Society for History in the Federal Government awarded him the prestigious Franklin Delano Roosevelt Prize, given every third year to the person who has made the most outstanding contribution to the advancement of history in the federal sector.

Because he believed that "a knowledge of history is central to the profession of arms," General Carl E. Vuono, when he led TRADOC, emphasized that commanders at all levels had to be a part of the military history team and that planning for the future had to be grounded in sound historical perspective. He took the position that "historians are critical to TRADOC's ability to accomplish the mission." Later, General Maxwell R. Thurman stressed the importance of command histories that reported once a year to him and the Army on each organization's accomplishment of its mission. At the same time, he highlighted the importance of continued alignment of historians on the commander's special staff as an essential ingredient of producing "command history." More recently, the present TRADOC Commander, General John W. Foss, who once taught military history at Sandhurst, has stressed the importance of history in leader development and planning for the future.

Today, military history activity in TRADOC is carried out in two separate but complementary programs: the Command History Program and the Military History Education Program (MHEP). The Command History Program is designed to bring the historical dimension to bear at all levels of the mission: development of leaders, doctrine, force design, equipment requirements, and training appropriate to the demands of modern war. This program consists of the MACOM Command History office at Fort Monroe and parallel offices at the three integrating centers (Combined Arms, Logistics, and Soldier Support), at two principal subordinate commands (ROTC Cadet Command and the Test and Experimental Command), and at sixteen functional centers (i.e., branch schools), as well as at the School of the Americas and the Defense Language Institute/Foreign Language Center. Also included in this program are twenty-three Army museums, fourteen of which are branch museums. Command historians at all levels in TRADOC conduct research to publish military history in written formats, preserve a selected collection of historical documents as the institutional memory of their command, and advise commanders on the use of military history in the professional development of leaders. Most branch historians also serve as adjunct instructors of military history, and at all levels historians lead staff rides on historic battlefields. Thus, a major responsibility of the command history program is to lend support to the Military History Education Program. This support comes from both the command historian and from the museums.

The Military History Education Program is guided by the Combat Studies Institute at Fort Leavenworth, which provides military history instruction in the Command and General Staff College, publishes historical studies on selected topics, and coordinates the implementation of military history instructional programs in the branch schools, ROTC units, and other arenas. This program is guided for the Combined Arms Center (CAC) Commander by the Director, CSI, and by a senior-level TRADOC Commander's Military History Education Council, which includes representation by Headquarters, Department of the Army, the Military Academy at West Point, the Army War College, the Military History Institute, and the Headquarters, TRADOC, staff and schools. There is also an annual Military History Education Conference and an annual military history instructor course. A dedicated element in CSI supports CGSC staff rides and provides assistance to serve schools and even organizations outside TRADOC with expertise on this form of military history instruction.

Representative publications include the TRADOC Historical Monograph, *SLAM: The Influence of S.L.A. Marshall on the United States Army* by Maj. F.D.G. Williams, released in April of this year, and Leavenworth Paper No. 17, *The Petsamo-Kirkenes Operation: Soviet Breakthrough and Pursuit in the Arctic, October 1944* by Maj. James F. Gebhardt, appearing this year. Still in print, with some 33,000 copies distributed to date is John L. Romjue's monograph, *From Active Defense to AirLand Battle: The Development of Army Doctrine, 1973-1982*. Currently under way are several branch histories by command historians at the branch schools. The first of these, King of Battle: A Branch History of the U.S. Army's Field Artillery, by Boyd L. Dastrup, is in the editorial and printing process.

Because TRADOC has been led by a series of commanders who believe that military history is an important ingredient in the successful accomplishment of Army objectives, the preparation and use of military history in TRADOC has been a matter of high priority, tied directly to the success of the command's mission.

1940

1 Jul--President Roosevelt signs the Act to Expedite National Defense, banning shipments of existing Army and Navy munitions stocks to Great Britain. The president also signs a bill authorizing the Navy to award contracts for the construction of forty-five vessels costing $550,000,000.

--Germany advises the United States to end all diplomatic missions in Norway, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands by 15 July.

2 Jul--President Roosevelt receives congressional authority to prohibit export of any war material if he deems its export contrary to the interest of national defense.

5 Jul--Following an interview by German Consul General von Spiegel of New Orleans, in which he stated that Germany would not forget America's assistance to the Allies, the U.S. Department of State warns the German Embassy against permitting its country's representatives in America to comment publicly concerning U.S. policies and attitudes.

10 Jul--U.S. Army Armored Force created by War Department order.

--In a message to Congress requesting an additional $4,848,171,957 in defense funds, President Roosevelt makes the statement: "That we are opposed to war is known not only to every American, but to every government in the world. We will not use our arms in a war of aggression; we will not send our men to take part in European wars."

19 Jul--President Roosevelt signs the Naval Expansion Act, authorizing a 70 percent increase in Navy tonnage to 1,425,000 tons; 15,000 airplanes are also authorized to be added to the Navy's inventory.

25 Jul--The export of petroleum, petroleum products, and scrap metal from the United States is prohibited except by special license from the administrator of export control.

31 Jul--The export of aviation fuel from the United States to countries outside the Western Hemisphere is banned.

--Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson calls for a reinstatement of the draft.

3 Aug--The U.S. ban on exports of aviation fuel is protested by Japan.

4 Aug--General John J. Pershing urges the sale of fifty World War I destroyers to Great Britain.

--Col. Charles A. Lindbergh, addressing an audience at Soldier Field, Chicago, calls for an American peace plan to be offered to whichever side wins the European war. "Nothing is to be gained by shouting names and pointing the finger of blame across the ocean. Our grandstand advice to England and our criticism of her campaigns has been neither wanted nor helpful. Our accusations of aggression and barbarism on the part of Germany simply bring back echoes of hypocrisy and Versailles. Our hasty condemnation of a French government, struggling desperately to save a defeated nation from complete collapse, can do nothing but add to famine, hatred and chaos. If we desire to keep America out of war we must take a lead in offering a plan for peace."

5 Aug--The Burke-Wadsworth Selective Service Bill is approved by the Senate's Military Affairs Committee. The bill provides for the registration of approximately 12,000,000 male citizens between the ages of 21 and 31.

6 Aug--Secretary of State Cordell Hull warns that in order to avoid war the United States must "continue to arm, and to arm to such an extent that the forces of conquest and ruin will not dare make an attack on us or any part of this hemisphere."

8 Aug--Aircraft production lines in the United States achieve an output of 500 planes each month.

Chronology

18 Aug--Canadian Prime Minister Mackenzie King and President Roosevelt agree to create a permanent Joint Board on Defense to study issues concerning the defense of the northern half of the Western Hemisphere.

20 Aug--British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and the House of Commons agree to a 99-year lease of defense facilities in Newfoundland and the West Indies to the United States.

24 Aug--Bermuda and Great Britain agree to lease the Great Sound of Bermuda to the United States for development as an air base.

26 Aug--The first session of the United States-Canadian Joint Board on Defense is held in Ottawa, with Mayor Fiorello H. La Guardia of New York as the American chairman and Colonel O.M. Biggar as the Canadian chairman.

27 Aug--Having received official assurances from the Attorney General that he does not need the consent of Congress to proceed, President Roosevelt concludes a deal whereby the United States will trade fifty aged destroyers to Britain in return for 99-year leases on air and naval bases in Jamaica, British Guiana, the Bahamas, Antigua, St. Lucia, and Trinidad. Congress is not given prior notification of the pact because it requires no appropriations.

28 Aug--President Roosevelt signs a congressional bill authorizing the mobilization of the National Guard and Army Reserve. He also signs a bill authorizing American vessels to remove children from European combat zones.

3 Sep--The British government announces a pledge to the United States not to scuttle or surrender the British fleet.

--President Roosevelt informs Congress of the destroyers for bases deal he has made with Great Britain.

4 Sep--Secretary of State Cordell Hull warns Japan against aggression toward French Indochina.

16 Sep--Congress passes the Burke-Wadsworth Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, the first peacetime conscription plan in U.S. history. The total number of draftees to be trained in any one year is limited to 900,000.

--60,500 National Guardsmen across the country report for induction into federal service for a year's training.

19 Sep--The Secretary of State, the British Ambassador, and the Australian Minister meet in Washington to discuss joint use of air and naval bases for mutual defense.

--American destroyers commence operations alongside the Royal Navy in the North Atlantic.

24 Sep--Through executive order, President Roosevelt creates the Defense Communications Board, designed as a coordinating body between all national communications systems and the national defense establishment in order to ensure operation of communications during a national emergency.

25 Sep--A U.S. Army intelligence officer, Col. William Friedman, breaks Japan's top secret Purple code, enabling officials in Washington to read Tokyo's most sensitive messages.

28 Sep--England takes delivery of the first of fifty destroyers transferred from the United States.

The Patton Museum of Cavalry and Armor Fort Knox, Kentucky

John W. Cranston

The words "location, location, location" apply to siting a museum as well as to buying a house. The Patton Museum of Cavalry and Armor certainly meets the requirements of high visibility and easy accessibility. The entrance to the museum is at the main gate of Fort Knox. An adjacent park area provides facilities for family and group outings.

The museum seeks to furnish an understanding of the evolution of mechanized cavalry and armor within the context of our nation's military history. In recent months it has also served as a source for testing improvements to tanks and other military equipment.

The present permanent structure was constructed in four installments from private donations collected through the Patton Development Fund of the Cavalry-Armor Foundation. Many items in the initial collection came from Third Army, commanded by General George S. Patton in World War II. The Patton family has continued to make personal donations. Their example has influenced others to make gifts to the museum.

Because of the heavy weight of Armor Force equipment, the museum is housed in a one-story building, enclosing some 40,000 square feet of exhibition space. The rectangular configuration enables the visitor to tour the exhibits in clockwise and broadly chronological order. Every effort has been made to associate items on display with contemporary problems. Displays trace the development of cavalry and armor from the Revolutionary War through the Grenada conflict. The Patton Gallery, which includes General Patton's legendary ivory-grip pistols, concludes the exhibits.

Larger exhibits are arranged to enhance smaller items on display. The two cavalry soldiers from 1780 and 1884, as uniformed mannequins in four-way display cases, carry sabers both sheathed and unsheathed. Paintings in the same gallery depict cavalry horsemen using their sabers in the Mexican War (1846). The sabers on display span the entire nineteenth century, as part of a collection from the cavalryman's blade to small arms. Among the small arms on view are the .45 Colt pistol and the .45 Springfield carbine rifle.

Cavalry and armor uniforms in the collection are in widespread demand. Armor School instructors borrow them for classroom use when they focus on particular battlefield presentation.

Battlefield dioramas are also an important part of Armor School instruction. The diorama for the Battle of Brandy Station, Virginia, which took place on 9 June 1863, depicting the largest cavalry engagement of the Civil War, probably has received as much attention as any other museum attraction.

The Armor School staff ride at the Civil War battlefield in Perryville, Kentucky, has won widespread recognition. Brig. Gen. William A. Stofft, former Chief of Military History, presented the Armor School with a diorama of the battle. Union troops on that fateful, sweltering day in October 1862 were desperately searching for water. Therefore, the diorama emphasizes Doctors Creek and the Chapin River, plus the major military roads and the streets of Perryville, laid out on a 1-inch to 400-foot scale. Six overlay maps posted above show Union and Confederate troop dispositions from early morning to late afternoon.

Several techniques make World War I come alive for younger museum visitors. A three-ton Ford tank of 1918, driven by two Model "T" engines, dramatizes the involvement of private industry in war production. A diorama of the Saint Mihiel salient of 12 September 1918 illustrates one of the war's first major tank battles.

Armor School officer instruction at the museum since 1988 has included a Lorraine Campaign terrain board, equipped with hills, roads, villages, and miniature Allied and enemy tanks. Veterans of this late 1944 campaign use the terrain board in personal analyses of wartime battlefield combat situations. Videotapes of these presentations keep the interest level high during Armor School seminars.

Wherever possible, World War II tanks and other vehicles on display are operable. One nonfunctioning M2A1 tank is placed in a realistic combat setting with its crew removing the engine for fuel line repairs. As with the cavalry exhibits, larger weapons in the World War II displays call attention to smaller items. For example, the amphibious *Schwimmwagen*, designed by Dr. Ferdinand Porsche, is displayed in a forest setting, with its crew taking a break, while the small *Panzerfaust* (similar to the American bazooka) is located off to one side,

ready for action.

Armor Force World War II artifacts are arranged near displays capturing their major battlefield achievements. The sign declaring that soldiers could "cross the Rhine with dry feet, courtesy 9th Armored Division," for example, adjoins a photo panorama of the American seizure of the Remagen bridge over Germany's Rhine River (March 1945). Sherman and Pershing tanks, similar to those that captured the bridge itself, are placed nearby, with hatches open and accessible to public view.

A captured German 88-mm. antitank gun is placed in an appropriate battlefield context by means of a diorama of gun and crew on duty in 1943 in the Russian Ukraine. Nearby, a Soviet T34 tank takes aim at a German Panzer IV tank, its adversary during the German invasion of Russia. The highly capable 88-mm. gun and T34 tank were two of the military "surprises" of World War II.

Air cavalry played a major role in the Vietnamese conflict. A UH-1B helicopter in the museum is suspended above ground level, with doors open, guns loaded, and rockets in place, ready for action. Close by are wall displays of hand-carried weapons used by North and South Vietnamese forces. Explanatory placards, outlining each weapon's origin, date of manufacture, and general importance during the conflict, are at each display. The indoor display is supplemented by an outdoor exhibit of helicopters, armored personnel carriers, tanks, and other assault vehicles employed in aerial and ground warfare in Vietnam.

Current Soviet fighting equipment on display serves as training aids in threat instruction at the Armor School. Exhibits of the Soviet T55 tank and the BTR60 armored personnel carrier, now in the inventory of Warsaw Pact nations, permit "hands-on" access for Armor School students.

Although the Patton Museum's mission primarily is to show cavalry and armor contributions to American military history, it has also assisted military equipment manufacturers. For example, the Cadillac Gage Company of Warren, Michigan, used operational M41 and M48 tanks at the museum to prepare turret improvement and modification packages. A Texas optics manufacturer brought wooden mockups of new equipment to the museum, fitting the mockups into place in operational tanks and noting modifications to be made. The company's engineering department then prepared the final equipment. Manufacturers bidding for Army contracts are frequent visitors to the museum, where they can have direct access to operational equipment. In recognition of the help received, a number of private corporations manufacturing military equipment have generously contributed to support the museum's work.

In addition to furnishing reproductions of period uniforms and Soviet equipment for classroom instruction, the museum also provides the source for answers to a questionnaire, prepared by the Armor School for Advanced NCO and Armor Officer Basic Course students. The questions require self-paced tours of the museum's exhibits for answers based on factual and interpretive comprehension of material on display. The "Red" Davis Memorial Library at the Patton Museum is also open to Armor School students. Its collection is especially rich in photographs, training manuals, data on foreign and domestic armor vehicles, and recently donated personal memoirs and visual materials.

In sum, the Patton Museum is a "must" for visitors to the Fort Knox area. Brochures advertising its attractions can be found at Kentucky state welcome centers as well as at local travel information booths. Hopefully, visitors to the museum leave with clearer impressions and increased knowledge about America's military forces, as well as with a sense of pride in the Army and its heritage.

Dr. John W. Cranston is the Armor Branch Historian at Fort Knox, Kentucky.

Correction

Brig. Gen. John S. D. Eisenhower (USA, Retired), among others, was kind enough to write us concerning an incorrect photograph caption on page 7 of the April *Army History* (No. 14). The photograph depicts a briefing during the Louisiana maneuvers, but the lieutenant general in the middle is not Walter Krueger, the Third Army commander, but rather, Lesley McNair, the exercise director.

While we are on the subject of that photograph, at least one faithful reader called to wonder why we identified Dwight D. Eisenhower as a colonel, since he seems to be wearing a brigadier's star. Not so: he is shown wearing the General Staff insignia with the coat of arms of the United States (in gold) superimposed on a silver five-pointed star.

Ed.



The Patton Museum exhibits include (clockwise from right) *the Patton statue, carved from a single block of 3 ft. x 7 ft. basswood; a 1918 Ford tank; a Soviet T-34 tank that fought at the battles of Leningrad, Moscow, and Stalingrad; and a captured German 88-mm. gun.*

International Military History Exchanges: Soviet Military Historians Visit Washington, D.C.

Burton Wright III

Colonel General Dmitriy Volkogonov, Director, Institute of Military History of the Ministry of Defense, and four other Soviet military historians visited Washington during the week 31 March-7 April 1990. General Volkogonov was accompanied by Col. Robert A. Savushkin, head of the editorial board of the *History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet People*, Col. Richard M. Portugal'skiy, head of the Department of History of the Frunze Academy, Col. Igor Venkov, chief of the Archives of the Soviet General Staff, and Lt. Col. Vitaly N. Bogdanov, head of the Institute of Military History's Foreign Military History Department.

During their visit to Washington, the Soviet delegation visited the offices of all the U.S. armed forces military history organizations, except the Army Center of Military History, which was in disarray because of a fire the previous week.

Chief of Military History Col. Harold W. Nelson conducted a staff ride for the Soviet delegation at the Antietam Civil War battlefield. Later, former Chief of Military History Brig. Gen. William A. Stofft hosted the delegation in his quarters at Fort Belvoir and at a banquet at the officers' club.

The delegation participated in an exchange of historical papers with American military history scholars during a symposium at the National Defense University. The papers presented dealt with various aspects of World War II, and copies can be obtained from the Center of Military History.

One of the highlights of the visit was a discussion between the Soviets and the U.S. armed forces Chiefs of Military History on the shape of future historical relations. As a result of these discussions, and if the international climate does not radically change, armed forces military historians will travel to the Soviet Union next year, possibly to Kiev or Volgograd, for exchanges of scholarly papers.

General Volkogonov and his delegation departed Washington on 7 April, having successfully completed fruitful talks on future historical exchanges. Barring any dramatic shift in the international climate, the future of U.S.-Soviet military history exchanges appears brighter than ever.

Dr. Wright is a historian with the Center's Field and International Division.

Colonel General Dmitriy Volkogonov with Colonel Nelson at the Antietam battlefield.

World's Best Tankers
Fifty Years of "Forging the Thunderbolt"

Phillip A. Dyer

July 1990 marked the fiftieth anniversary of the Armored Force. The following article was prepared at Fort Knox by the 50th Anniversary of the Armored Force Committee and submitted by Captain Dyer.

"Organize a Mechanized Force." This terse mission directive, scribbled on a pink slip of paper by Army Chief of Staff Charles P. Summerall, landed on the desk of Lt. Col. (later Maj. Gen.) Adna R. Chaffee, Jr., in the G-3 Section of the War Department General Staff. The year was 1929. Colonel Chaffee undertook the task of developing the armor concept and conducting initial maneuvers. He created a plan that led to the modern Armored Force. For his many contributions to the development of that force, he is known as the "Father of Armor."

The War Department allocated funds in 1929 to create a Mechanized Force with the Cavalry Branch receiving the specific mission of developing the force. The Mechanized Force was first assembled at Fort Eustis, Virginia, in the autumn of 1930. Col. (later Lt. Gen.) Daniel Van Voorhis developed the basic principles of the new Mechanized Force and was selected to be its first commander. The initial tank company assigned was Company A, 1st Tank Regiment. This prototype company consisted of armored cars, antiaircraft artillery, truck-drawn artillery, engineers, and "infantry tanks."

During the first few years of operation at Fort Eustis, Chaffee and Van Voorhis determined that the area lacked necessary maneuver terrain. They both felt that Camp Knox, Kentucky, which was larger in size and had a better variety of terrain, was more appropriate for the development of the Mechanized Force. Congress designated Camp Knox as a permanent garrison on 1 January 1932, and a year later the camp became Fort Knox. In the meantime, a select cadre was chosen to move into its new home by November of 1932.

These pioneers envisioned the first Mechanized Force in the U.S. Army as one having the capability of performing missions based on speed, firepower, shock effect, and a wide operating radius. They began to think of armor as a potential shock weapon that could paralyze the minds of the enemy with fear. They conceived of armor as a strategic threat--a weapon that commanders could use decisively to affect the outcome of any war.

At an impromptu meeting under Third Army auspices on 25 May 1940, in the basement of an Alexandria, Louisiana, high school during the maneuvers that year, General Chaffee, Col. Alvan C. Gillem, Jr., Col. George S. Patton, Jr., and General Frank Andrews (a member of the War Department General Staff) drafted a proposal to authorize and create an Armored Force. These officers, who declined to invite the chiefs of Cavalry and Infantry, were motivated in part by the startling German Panzer successes against the French and British forces. The "Alexandria Recommendation" they adopted, coupled with events in Europe, gave added impetus to the establishment of an Armored Force.

On 10 July 1940 the War Department reacted to events with an order creating the U.S. Army Armored Force. The Armored Force School and Replacement Training Center, now the Armor School, was established on 25 October of the same year. Here, the officers and enlisted men trained for duty with the sixteen armored divisions and more than one hundred separate tank battalions the Army fielded during World War II. At the school's peak of operation, two shifts a day were required to meet the demand for qualified armor personnel. The training reflected the rapid evolution of armored doctrine, which was constantly modified as both force structure and equipment changed. For example, with the organization of armored divisions, the training had to adapt as the long-envisioned combined arms team came into existence.

According to the doctrine that emerged, the tank was to be used in two basic roles: (1) separate tank battalions, organized and trained to support the infantry, and (2) armored divisions, organized for missions requiring independent action, combining great mobility and firepower. The combat actions fought between armies of tanks during World War II proved that mobility, surprise, and shock action were the deciding factors in combat. Armor offered the greatest opportunity for an army to create these conditions. Armored formations possessed the capability to do the unexpected, to cover great distances relatively quickly, and to arrive at the decisive

point on the battlefield instantly ready to fight.

Over the years, armor has proved to be an imposing force ready to fight and overcome the ongoing challenges of modern warfare. Today, those challenges are being met at Fort Knox, Kentucky. Known as the "Home of Armor," Fort Knox for five decades has had the primary mission of training soldiers for the Armored Force. From the M1A1 Abrams Main Battle Tank, to the most advanced computer simulation available, the Armored Force soldiers of Fort Knox combine high technology with hands-on training to fill the ranks of the Army with the best tankers in the world. They continue to "Forge the Thunderbolt" with the same sense of duty, patriotism, and dedication to freedom demonstrated by their predecessors.

Capt. Phillip A. Dyer is stationed at the Army's Armor Center at Fort Knox. He is a special project officer for the fiftieth anniversary of the Armored Force and a member of the Anniversary Committee, whose members prepared this article.

World War II brought with it a number of innovations and new weapons. It is interesting to note that on the eve of the war, the debate on the role of tanks and armor tactics was very much alive.

German

"Its peculiarity means that it must not be tied to Cavalry or Infantry. Countries which do this nevertheless consciously or unconsciously discard progress which has already been achieved by setting the speed and mobility of this new weapon to coincide with the tactical and 'operative' speedometers of the old-line armies. In a free-moving form, without rear-echelons, an armored unit is the big, decisive club in the hands of the warlord and commander which the latter can bring to bear with lightning speed and in an inexorable fashion."

Source: Heigl's *Taschenbuch der Tanks* [Heigl's *Tank Pocketbook*], 1938. (HRC GEOG M Germany 350.06 Armor Tactics, pp. 4-5.)

Great Britain

"The situation as regards the tank is far less clear. Here again its marked increase in speed in the postwar era has led to its divorce from its original task as an auxiliary of the infantry, and its development as an independent arm. In part, it has been transformed into a kind of armored cavalry, useful for many purposes but incapable of overcoming the resistance of a strong enemy.... Tank development must continue decisively to meet two great functions which particularly fall upon such a weapon: (1) for close-in fighting in densely populated areas and; (2) in open battle for quick decisive surprise flank movement while artillery holds the front--very much as a champion fighter guards with his right and slips around a powerful body blow with his left. And for the breakthrough? The chances are slim!"

Source: *The Round Table* (British Quarterly). (*Army Ordnance*, September-October 1938, p. 103.)

American

"It has not yet reached a position in which it can be relied upon to displace horse cavalry. For a considerable period of time it is bound to play an important but minor role while the horse cavalry plays the major role so far as our country is concerned.... I feel that the psychology of the public as well as that of important key men in our legislative branches and men in the army itself has mistakenly become unfavorable to the horse.... We must not be misled to our detriment to assume that the untried machine can displace the proved and tried horse."

Source: Chief of Cavalry, Memo for the Chief of Staff, 17 Oct 1938. (History of the Armored Force, Command and Center, 6-1 BA 27, p. 5.)

American Press

"Is it a valuable army unit or a pretty toy? It is agreed by the entire Army that the mechanized cavalry puts on a dashing and impressive show with its hundreds of motor units, but agreement ends there. ... Mounted cavalry would as soon discuss the devil as its rivals on wheels, and the infantry has a low opinion of the mechanized brigade, which it terms 'the men from Mars'."

Source: International News Service, Louisville *Courier Journal*, 18 August 1939. (*Forging the Thunderbolt*, p. 130.)

These reflections were compiled by Larry A. Ballard of the Center's Field and International Division.



Military training on "The Quad," Utah State University, circa 1912. This photograph is shown courtesy of the University Archives, Utah State University, Logan, Utah, and was submitted by Lt. Col. John S. Westerlund, former ROTC assistant professor of military science. Military drill at this land grant university can be documented in photographs dating back to 1888. Following World War II, the ROTC student body at Utah State grew to 2,000 cadets, and the school commissioned more lieutenants than any school other than the United States Military Academy. Consequently, for a period of time in the late 1940s and early 1950s, Utah State was known as the "West Point of the West."

Drums and Bugles Corner

This issue presents an example of catchy Army training during World War II.

Your Nose Knows
How to Tell the Gases

M-1
Grandma smelled geranium,
Started feeling kind of bum.
Sure, you guessed the trouble right--
Grandma whiffed some Lewisite.

PS
Don't you find my odor sweetish?
Said flypaper to the fly.
I smell just like chlorpicrin,
And you'll think you'd like to die.

CG
Maud Muller on a summer day,
Smelled the odor of new-mown hay.
She said to the Judge who was turning green,
"Put on your mask! That there's phosgene!"

CN
Apple blossoms, fresh and dewy?
Normandy and romance? Hooey!
For the charming fragrance then known,
Now is chloracetaphenone.

HS
Never take some chances if
Garlic you should strongly sniff.
Don't think Mussolini's passed,
Man, you're being mustard-gassed!

--Fairfax Downey
Major, Field Artillery

Reprinted from Infantry Journal, *July 1942*

Letters to the Editor

More on the Operations Orders

Editor:

The "Drums and Bugles" corner of the fall 1989 *Army History* (No. 13) was a fascinating presentation; the content of the operations order captures the moment and the division commander's perspective wonderfully.

However, the history of the operations order, as presented in the article, deserves further discussion.

In the spring of 1989 General Curtis LeMay remarked that the most important thing he learned in the Air Corps Tactical School (in a short course at the start of World War II) was the operations order format. My recollection is that General LeMay found, in England in World War II, that orders were issued in diverse forms until he established the five-paragraph format as standard in 1943. At the time I heard this, I was researching General Kenney's campaigns in the Southwest Pacific and had noted that Kenney used the operations order soon after his assumption of command in September 1942. A survey of the materials available here at Maxwell convinced me that the five-paragraph order is hoary indeed.

The oldest text located in this brief survey, *Combat Orders* (Fort Leavenworth: The General Service Schools Press, 1925), anticipated General LeMay's complaint by speculating "If each commander who issues a field order should follow a form of his own, and if no two of these should be the same, confusion would result. . . ." This text calls five-paragraph orders "Formal, Written Field Orders."

By 1929, the Air Corps Tactical School had published its own Combat Orders (no publication data) which presented an elegant sequence of orders, from an Attack Group commander's written field order through the oral orders of a Pursuit Squadron and its subordinate Pursuit Flight.

Like the example in your article, these texts simply explain the meaning of the paragraphs and number the paragraphs in the orders. The first example of titled paragraphs I have found is in Army Field Manual 101-52, *War Planning*, December 1951, page 35.

It is not surprising that General Marshall reinvigorated the five-paragraph field order after early problems in World War II, nor that he told the commander in chief that this measure offered hope for more coherent operations. Whether General Marshall's letter claims undue credit for the prove-

nance of the operations order, distracts from other issues, offers false hope, or covers up inexcusable lapses of institutional memory, are questions best left to those interested in such things.

In perspective, this footnote to the history of military theory is interesting in illustrating continuity, rather than provenance. It is fascinating to see the Services rediscovering these concepts that were voiced in the 1920s and proved in World War II. The Army is currently reviving the oral order, while the Air Force is stressing "Mission Orders," that tell a commander what to do, rather than how to do it (in other words, field orders). While it is tempting to criticize the Services for neglecting lessons paid for in blood, rediscovery of the basics is not only hopeful, but necessary.

Every generation apparently needs to rediscover the fundamentals, to realize the basics anew, rather than just to appreciate them at a rational level. In the Air Force, for example, we have "invented" the airborne forward air controller, forward firing ordnance, and useful flying instruments repeatedly. Similarly, infantrymen have relearned the lessons of fire and maneuver in every war to date. It is especially hopeful that "Mission Orders" and oral orders are being promoted now, without the imperative of combat and the goad of costly error. One hopes this is the first bud of a revival of military theory with its roots in military history. There's much more to rediscover and apply to the defense of our nation.

Just the same, the history of the operations order is fascinating, as it illustrates the unchanging conditions of warfare that justify study of military history. I am sure your readers could shed further light on this subject. In fact, it would not surprise me if Joshua, prior to Jericho, said "okay, this is the situation. . . ."

Maj. Charles M. Westenhoff,
USAF
Airpower Research Institute
Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

Computers and Battlefield Recordkeeping

Editor:

Undoubtedly a coincidence, the subject issue has arisen in two Army publications which recently crossed my desk. The *Army History*'s April 1990 issue included an article on this subject, and the *Army Communicator*, Vol. 14, No. 4, included a Commander's Comment on Battlefield Records Management.

Not a coincidence is the fact that Records Management is a critical issue in the Army. It is, as so stated in Major General Child's comments, one of the five "disciplines" of the information mission area (IMA) of the U.S. Army Information Systems Command (USAISC), and it has received much attention at this command as well as at the DA Director of Information Systems for Command, Control, Communications, and Computers (DISC4).

Computer generated records management has been an extremely difficult concept to manage and develop guidance for. Electronic recordkeeping has been the subject of seminars and workshops for the past four years. It is a subject that should be a concern to all Army historians as well as we move towards a "paperless" Army.

I recommend Major Manos and SSG Mentzer contact USAISC's DCSOPS Policy and Management Division for further guidance regarding their problems with battlefield records management. They have valid concerns which are shared at this command. The address: Commander, USAISC, ATTN: AS-OPS-M, Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613-5000.

Nancy A. Howard
Historian Assistant

Managing Editor:

I received the April 1990 edition of *Army History* and appreciate being on the mailing list.

The last article in the edition "Battlefield Computers and the Absence of Records" by Manos and Mentzer raised some red flags to me. I'd like to provide some comments.

The authors note, with some alarm, that the increasing presence of computers in the Army and on the battlefield poses a problem, if not a threat, to historians because of "these forms of data." They lament the lack of formal standardization within the 2d Infantry Division and cite a need to standardize information and data retention with regard to computers.

My concern is that the authors have focused on the medium when their concern should be addressed to information. The Army should decide which "information" should be retained for historical purposes and publish this guidance. It seems a little narrow and self-defeating to focus on "computer data"--as if these data were different and unique from "paper data."

First of all, information is the key--not data. Secondly, the form, format, method of generating, or method of storage would seem of little historical significance--one would hope that we are preserving something for its content, not its carrying case. Thirdly, paper files and "computers" with the associated magnetic media are not the only two means of storing information--a typical day in USAREUR [U.S. Army, Europe] sees information being generated, used, and stored as microfilm, photographs, motion pictures, posters, etc. Fourthly, "reading" information stored on magnetic surfaces is a whole new game; the procedures to render this information "readable" by the historical community are numerous, sometimes unique and often not simple.

Given the above, it would seem that the required instructions to the field--if they are indeed insufficient today--should focus on the information to be retained, independent of the medium.

Perhaps the problem is really that the collection and retention of historical information has continued to rely on the identification and retention of selected paper documents (relatively easy to specify in systems such as MARKS [Modern Army Recordkeeping System]), and the world, not just the Army or the battlefield, has put more and more of its information in forms other than paper. The authors talk of "document retirement" while the real issue would appear to be information preservation.

I've gone through the above not to downplay the value of historical information or dismiss the problems raised by "paperless" environments, but to caution against "solutions" that might be prompted by the article's tone. Computers, on and off the battlefield, allow rapid generation, revision and display of information--free form and available for viewing and/or change by multiple individuals in dispersed locations. Procedures akin to those prescribed in MARKS to identify, tag, number, label, etc. the pages, disks, frames, tracks and segments of magnetic media represent a step backward and would create legions of clerks and checkers to implement--an inspector's delight and a commander's nightmare.

I not only speak from the perspective of a Commander, 5th Signal Command, but as the Deputy Chief of Staff for Information Management, Headquarters, USAREUR--responsible for both automation and records management. I also operate the USAREUR Records Holding Facility at Bremerhaven and see the boxes of documents/files that routinely flow through that point on their way to some holding area in CONUS [continental United States].

I recognize the problems and their impacts as well as the value of historical information, but I caution against a MARKS-type solution of slapping labels on disks and boxing up the accumulation at appropriate intervals. I would recommend that we study some existing systems--neither computer information nor the historical process is in its infancy. Check to see how NASA preserves information on space missions--the FAA on aircraft control--the banking system with its electronic transactions--ditto, the credit card system--and on and on.

The problem is real, but I caution against a "quick" solution that would be operationally inefficient--reducing everything to paper is not the answer nor is the indiscriminate labelling and saving of disks. The key is to first determine the information worthy of preservation, then bring in some visual information and automated data processing individuals to help with a solution.

Sincerely,

Alfred J. Mallette
Brig. Gen., U.S. Army
Commanding

Editor:

I read with great interest Major Manos' article, "Battlefield Computers and the Absence of Records," in *Army History*, April 1990. Clearly we have entered the computerized age when Military History Detachments (MHDs) are aware of the consequences of poor disposition of electronic records created on the battlefield. I commend Major Manos for seeing the connection between the orderly retirement and preservation of permanently valuable data by records management authority and the historical concerns of all MHDs, the Center of Military History, and the National Archives.

I can understand this concern. I served as Command Historian for United States Army Vietnam from 1965 to 1966. I saw firsthand the need for the MHDs in Vietnam to monitor unit operational records to speed their retirement and eventual accession by the National Archives which would ensure their utility for historical research in the Center of Military History and other places. Equally pertinent has been my over fifteen years experience with the appraisal

and disposition of Army electronic records at the National Archives' Center for Electronic Records. It is in this latter vein that I wish to respond to Major Manos' article.

He is correct that the emergence of the microcomputer has altered both the process of creating and the methods of saving information for historical purposes. Though the Modern Army Recordkeeping System (MARKS), the Army Functional Files System (TAFFS) and all their predecessors have consistently scheduled the operational records of any unit engaged in combat operations as permanent and worthy of archival maintenance, clearly corresponding changes in the methods of recordkeeping must be as dramatic as the invention that caused the problem.

I would start with Major Manos' first question, "What are historically significant computer data?" The theory is that MARKS identifies the permanent or disposable qualities of battlefield information, regardless of media. The reality is that MARKS (and TAFFS before it) identifies paper records. Therefore, it was necessary to say in Chapter 7: (page 12, par 7-5, sub b2), "... the basic principles used in appraising the value of hard copy records apply equally to the appraisal of MRR (machine-readable records). Thus, ... [operational records maintained in electronic form]...will be assigned equivalent MARKS numbers." What can be explained out of all this is that information recorded in electronic form that can be assigned to the 525 series, "Military Operations," should be dealt with according to the instructions for disposition in the appropriate paragraph describing paper records. This explains why Major Manos found that the guidelines in the 2d Infantry Division were "task specific according to staff function."

Which begs Major Manos' second question, "How and where are [electronic records and the media they are written on] to be retained?" It doesn't take much to imagine how anyone in their right mind would want to protect a floppy disk in a cold/hot, wet/dry, confused, dangerous battlefield situation. Certainly when the Army added the electronic chapters to TAFFS and later to MARKS, the writers failed to envision the ultimate effect of laptop computers and the electronic records they create in brigades, battalions, and even in environments at the unit level.

A crucial first question to be asked is in what media should the information be maintained: in electronic form or printout to hard copy for file? If we are discussing correspondence/memoranda or even brigade operational or intelligence logs, it would seem logical to printout the information to hardcopy. But in the case of more comprehensive data such as those found in database management systems, cartographic information systems, and the networks of maneuver control systems Major Manos mentioned, I agree it is very important to maintain the data in electronic form.

One proven method of accomplishing this is to periodically preserve a "snapshot,"--a "dump" of the entire database. Military history detachments have used this procedure in the past. In the last three wars it was standing operating procedure to photograph the overlay on the unit's operational map each morning. But though that was another day and another medium, the concept hasn't changed. A periodical snapshot can provide frequent evidence of changes in the database. Today the electronic snapshot is popularly used in cases where the system calls for superseded data to be immediately erased. Most systems are dumped frequently as security backup procedures. The trick is to save these dumps as records for "historically significant" data.

Can the data be read many years later by researchers? Transportability has been a consistent problem in archiving permanent data to the National Archives. This is a major long term consideration exacerbated by using the mix of personal computers and laptops Major Manos described. Probably the software packages will not be compatible. Battlefield data can be standardized. I suggest that the common control and graphic characters found in ASCII (American National Standard Code for Information Interchange) are easily translated by most microcomputer software packages. This is a good way to send back this information.

The issues raised together with the variety of computer hardware and software used by a unit, invariably lead to the problem of caring for the media in a battlefield environment. Someone needs to make decisions about labeling, temperature, and humidity control, and speedy evacuation to a records holding area. Floppies present a notoriously poor medium for storing electronic records. But they have the advantage of being transportable (mailable) while enroute. Eventually the Army would have to copy the data onto mainframe tapes or whatever the prevailing medium might be, before depositing them with the National Archives.

Finally, where should the responsibility rest? It seems to me that Major Manos was on the right track with the action falling to the division Information

Management Officer. Records management used to be an Adjutant General function, but the advent of computers and the concept of "electronic recordkeeping" altered the way we do things. As a result the Army needs to deal with this new problem, and in as expeditious a manner as possible.

I have enclosed a step-by-step procedure that reflects what I have discussed. It could be used by a division information management officer for the orderly disposition of all electronic records in the division.

Good luck to Major Manos in his historical endeavors.

Donald F. Harrison, Ph.D.
Archivist
Center for Electronic Records

SUGGESTED STEPS TO APPRAISE ELECTRONIC DATA ON THE BATTLEFIELD

STEP ONE: Determine to what MARKS paragraph these division files in electronic form apply. The 2d Infantry Division is on the right track when it assigns out to "proponents" the task of deciding if the *information* is permanent or disposable.

STEP TWO: IF PERMANENT, determine whether the information should be kept on electronic media or printed out to hardcopy.

a. If it is to be stored on electronic media (tapes, floppies), then follow MARKS Chapter 7, Section IV. Evacuation to a records holding area should be speedy.

b. If it is not to be stored on electronic media, printout the records to paper or microform and file as hardcopy.

STEP THREE: IF TEMPORARY, erase the data within the following guidelines.

a. If the electronic records have no paper equivalent, then the division (or the records holding area) must maintain the records in electronic form as long as MARKS and the division proponents prescribe for the equivalent hardcopy.

b. If the electronic records do not take the place of paper records (and the proper authorities decide that the paper and not the floppy will be the record medium), then the 2d Division can destroy (erase) the electronic records as soon as the proponents would like.

The 1941 Maneuvers

Editor:

Christopher R. Gabel's piece on the 1941 Maneuvers prompts this letter. It is a very stimulating piece, and what I am about to say should in no way imply my denigration of it. But some years ago I investigated distinct portions of that year's maneuver activity. The results emerged as two articles ["The Tennesee Maneuvers, June 1941," *Tennessee Historical Quarterly*, XXIV (Fall 1965), No. 3; "The Arkansas Maneuvers, 1941," *The Arkansas Historical Quarterly*, XXVI (Summer 1967), No. 2]. I continue to quibble with the focus lavished primarily upon the Louisiana phase of the 1941 maneuvers. It seems to me that both of my articles and a TRADOC study (the author and title escape me) suggest the attraction of broadening our focus in some ways. Other maneuvers took place in Tennessee, Arkansas, the Carolinas, and out west, I believe. Together, they provided the armed forces with useful lessons (some not learned). The interface between war (or military affairs) and society, organizational politics, military sociology, military technology, and civil-military relations (from Washington down to the local scene) are more fascinating, in some ways, than the war games aspects of these maneuvers.

If we are to truly profit from enhanced understanding of the Second World War this fiftieth anniversary revisitation, then I wonder if we should not broaden our focus as military historians. Research in state and local affairs (and sources) will prove quite useful in this manner. . . . The future transcendence of military history beyond purely traditional parameters seems obvious. Studying the prewar (and even wartime) maneuver exercises, like the study of the Army and civil defense or the Army and the Manhattan Project, for example, can be very useful to everyone concerned.

Benjamin Franklin Cooling
Chief Historian
Department of Energy

Book Review: Brig. Gen. Edwin H. Simmons Reviews Paul Fussell's *Wartime*

Paul Fussell, *Wartime: Understanding and Behavior in the Second World War.* Illustrated. 330 pp. New York: Oxford University Press, 1987. $19.95.

Paul Fussell's *The Great War and Modern Memory* was a blockbuster. Ostensibly a book of literary criticism, it brought into focus a whole new perspective of the First World War, wittily, gracefully, and trenchantly presented.

Paul Fussell's *Wartime*, a kind of sequel addressed to the experience of the Second World War, is less successful. The mordant wit has soured; the judgments are more crabbed.

In the preface he tells us, "This book is about the psychological and emotional culture of Americans and Britons during the Second World War. It is about the rationalizations and euphemisms people needed to deal with an unacceptable actuality from 1939 to 1945."

He goes on to say, "For the past fifty years the Allied war has been sanitized and romanticized almost beyond recognition by the sentimental, the loony patriotic, the ignorant, and the bloodthirsty. I have tried to balance the scales."

Has the history and recollection of the Second World War really been in the hands of "the sentimental, the loony patriotic, the ignorant, and the bloodthirsty"? This reviewer thinks not entirely. But let us submit to the flagellation that Fussell has prepared for those who fought in, wrote about, remembered, or in other ways experienced the Second World War.

For those who don't know, Paul Fussell currently holds a chair in English Literature at the University of Pennsylvania. When he wrote *The Great War and Modern Memory* he was a professor at Rutgers. He is a prolific writer; *Wartime* is his ninth book. During the Second World War, which he now regards as such an abomination, he was severely wounded in France as a 20-year-old lieutenant leading a platoon in the 103d Infantry Division. From time to time the 20-year-old lieutenant enters the pages of the book so it is at least a bit of a memoir.

As he did with *The Great War and Modern Memory,* Professor Fussell uses a filing cabinet approach to assemble his anecdotal data. Each of his eighteen chapters is a kind of file drawer. So let's dump out each of these drawers, one by one, onto the floor, and sort through the contents.

Chapter 1 is "From Light to Heavy Duty." He uses the newsreel or picture magazine shot of "the newly invented jeep, an elegant, slim-barrelled 37-mm. gun in tow, leaping over a hillock" as the image that "suggests the general Allied understanding of the war at its outset." He tells us that the U.S. Army in 1941 had just supplied itself with 20,000 horses. He describes British armor at the outset of the war "as dainty as American, depending on little light tanks dating in design from the 1920s. . . ." Sabers and Sam Browne belts are paraded as romantic anachronisms. But "cynicism, efficiency, brutality, and bloody-mindedness" will be required to win the war and there is "inexorable progress from light to heavy duty." As for example: In 1940 Roosevelt had called for 50,000 planes. By the war's end the United States had produced almost 300,000 aircraft and had put 11,000 into the air over France on D-Day alone.

Chapter 2 has an underlying sneer in its title "Precision Bombing Will Win the War." Fussell speaks of the early optimism that took stock in Giulio Douhet's prophecy in *The Command of the Air* that bombing alone would win future wars. On the American side the B-17 bomber and Norden bombsight promised miracles of accuracy. But then as the war went on and there were great smashing and indiscriminate air attacks, "'precision bombing' became a comical oxymoron relished by bomber crews with a sense of black humor."

Fussell quotes Speer as quoting Hitler as saying, "The loser of this war will be the side that makes the greatest blunders." Chapter 3 is "Someone Had Blundered" and in it Fussell says, "Coming somewhat dazed into the armed services from individualistic and sometimes anarchic personal backgrounds, the Americans and the British committed many more blunders than the Germans or the Japanese." Most of the anecdotes have to do with recognition failures but, in addition, he says "military Bright Ideas [such as canvas skirts for D-Day tanks so they could swim ashore] have a way of ending disastrously." To make his points he sometimes stretches his facts as when he says the sinking of the cruiser USS *Indianapolis* in the last days of the war caused "the greatest loss of life at sea ever suffered by the United States Navy." He cheerfully avers that "the most intelligent contemporary writers have perceived in blunders, errors, and accidents something very close to the essence of the Second World War." The writers he cites are such as Evelyn Waugh

(*Sword of Honor*), Joseph Heller (*Catch-22*), and Kurt Vonnegut (*Slaughterhouse-Five*).

From blunders Fussell moves to "Rumors of War." He speaks of such things as "demotic social narrative and prophesy" and "folk-narrative" (in its extreme form the "officially generated pseudo-folk narrative") and then explains that he is really talking about dirty jokes, myths of military heroism, and compensatory rumors. The anecdotes include Capt. Colin P. Kelly's supposedly putting a bomb from his B-17 down the stack of the Japanese battleship *Haruna* and that great favorite myth of saltpeter (he inevitably gives it the British spelling, "saltpetre") in the troops' chow to dampen down their sex drives. One of the most outlandish rumors was that Tokyo Rose was really Amelia Earhart.

In Chapter 5 he goes into the "School of the Soldier," starting off by saying, "War must rely on the young, for only they have the two things fighting requires: physical stamina and innocence about their own mortality." To young men coming so soon from school, military training could not fail "to arouse ironic echoes." And in the service, one was graded and marked constantly as in school.

In Chapter 6, "Unread Books on a Shelf," Fussell goes on to say, "Uniform and anonymous . . . these boys [were] turned by training into quasi-mechanical interchangeable parts. . . ."

"Chickenshit, An Anatomy" comes next, and in a book that is full of Fussell-coined aphorisms perhaps the best is: "Chickenshit can be recognized instantly because it never has anything to do with winning the war." Full treatment is given haircuts, "chewing ass," roll calls, and snap inspections. General Patton is cited as a master of chickenshit, but Hitler is declared the champion with a quotation of his "Surrender is forbidden" response to von Paulus' desperate plea from Stalingrad.

From chickenshit, it is a short step to Chapter 8, "Drinking Far Too Much, Copulating Too Little." Fussell tells us that the soldier suffers so deeply from contempt and chickenshit that some anodyne is necessary: in Vietnam it was drugs, in World War II it was drunkenness. (At this point, this reviewer had a flashback to a pier in Panama in December 1943 and the memory of a cargo net filled with drunken sailors being lifted to the deck of a troop transport. The Marines had not been allowed to go ashore or else they might have gotten drunk too.) Moreover, he tells us that, "If drink was indulged in freely, the other traditional comfort, sex, seemed often in short supply."

Chapter 9 is "Type-casting" and the reader learns that in the soldier's world "classifications are clearly indicated by insignia of rank and branch of service." But then Fussell jumps quickly into wartime racism. Yellow-skinned "Japs" or "Nips" were "bestial apes," "jackals," "monkey-men," or "subhumans." Germans ("Krauts") were more human but particularly perverse and sinister. Italians could be dismissed as comical "Wops." In a book that is largely Europe-oriented, Fussell mentions only in passing that most useful term "Gook."

The topic sentence of Chapter 10, "The Ideological Vacuum," is "The puzzlement of the participants about what was going on contrasts notably with the clarity of purpose felt, at least in the early stages, by those who fought the Great War." This is likely, in turn, to cause some puzzlement to the reader, particularly since Fussell bolsters his statement with selective extracts from largely left-of-center poetry and other writing, some of it contemporary to the war and some of it a generation later.

"The Ideological Vacuum" segues into Chapter 11, "Accentuate the Positive," a title taken from Bing Crosby's 1945 hit song and meaning the artificial boosts given to morale as the war went on "months (or even years) longer than expected." He spends a lot of space defining the term morale which he says replaced the nineteenth-century term esprit de corps. He lists a great number of euphemisms, as in battle fatigue for insane. But were the combat fatigued insane? Not for the most part, as this reviewer remembers it. And to whom, except Fussell, would mopping up suggest "household cleansing"?

He has even more to say about what he calls "The publicity competition among the various services." With dubious documentation, he says, for example, "The marines who took Saipan in June, 1944, were angry that the Normandy invasion had occurred nine days earlier, grabbing all the publicity." This reviewer, who was afloat off Saipan at the time, certainly does not remember it that way. One statement with which this reviewer will agree, however, is that "Perhaps the most energetic and far-reaching public-relations performance during the war was what must now be labeled The Great China Hoax, worked largely by the Luce magazines." His dour conclusion to the chapter is that "The postwar power of the 'media' to determine what shall be embraced as reality is in large part due to the success of the morale culture in wartime."

In Chapter 12, "High-Mindedness," he says that the China Hoax required "a unique context of public credulity and idealism." He adds to the China Hoax the Wonderful British People Hoax. The logic of the

war required the enemy to be totally evil and the Allies--all of them--totally good; ergo, "That the world was divided rigorously between 'slave' and 'free' was axiomatic. . . ." This was all for the folks at home. As for the troops in the field, "They were neither high-minded nor particularly low-minded. They were not -minded at all."

Which brings us to Chapter 13, "With One Voice." Quite correctly, he says that "For those at home the sound of the war was the sound of the radio." He goes on to say that the star radio reporters, such as Edward R. Murrow and Eric Sevareid, did their best to euphemize the war. There is a good deal in the chapter about war films such as *Desert Victory, Bataan,* and *Guadalcanal Diary.* All of these, according to Fussell, were fundamentally deceptive.

Chapter 14, "Deprivation," tackles home-front "shortages." Half-forgotten by most is America's wartime rationing of tires, gasoline, clothing (particularly shoes), sugar, butter, cheese, meat, canned goods, et al. The other side of it, as he reports, was the black market in which these things were always available at a price. Although Fussell doesn't say so directly, shortages in this country were merely inconveniences. In Britain and elsewhere they were truly deprivations.

Chapter 15 is "Compensation," supposedly the balancing for "Deprivation." It doesn't come through. A good deal of the chapter is given over to Cyril Connolly's obscure British literary review *Horizon*. Then there is more from Evelyn Waugh and *Brideshead Revisited*. No one but the most chichi Anglophile will get much out of this chapter.

Chapter 16, not surprisingly, is "Reading in Wartime." The British, Fussell tells us, spent their time reading Henry James, Anthony Trollope, Charles Dickens, Jane Austen, E. M. Forster, Leo Tolstoy, Arnold Toynbee, T. S. Eliot, and, of course, Will Shakespeare. (Now who is contributing to the Wonderful British People Hoax?) Their less cultured American cousins were reading Lloyd C. Douglas' *The Robe* and whatever was served up to them by the Book-of-the-Month Club. He does, quite correctly, get into the paperback book phenomenon, specifically the 1,322 titles published in the immense total of 22,000,000 copies in the Armed Service Editions. Every American veteran of the Second World War remembers those floppy books that fit into a uniform pocket. Fussell gives the effort high marks but points out peevishly that there was some censorship. Books that were too blatantly erotic or of "pacifistic tendency" were not to be found in the list of titles.

Chapter 17, "Fresh Idiom," leads off with "Disappointment threatens anyone searching in published wartime writing for a use of language that could be called literary--that is, pointed, illuminating, witty, ironic, clever, or interesting." He goes into the spoken argot of the war, much of it obscene, and suggests that some of it had a "poetic quality." He cites, for example, chow hound, shit list, walkie-talkie, repple-depple, and some other terms probably too prurient for *Army History*. He has a great time with the acronyms of the war. Some, such as RADAR, are now part of the English language and some such as SHAEF and CINCPAC are still intelligible, but who now knows the meaning of PLUTO or even ETOUSA?

Then finally we have Chapter 18, "The Real War Will Never Get in the Books." He asks the question, "What was it about the war that moved the troops to constant verbal subversion and contempt?" He says that "It was not just the danger and fear, the boredom and uncertainty and loneliness and deprivation." It was, he concludes, "rather the conviction that optimistic publicity and euphemism had rendered their experience so falsely that it would never be readily communicable."

As he does in *The Great War and Modern Memory*, Fussell in *Wartime* uses literary criticism, with copious extracts from novels, poems, and other writings, as his method for exploring experience and effects of the Second World War. It comes off much more convincingly for the First World War, perhaps because the literature was so much better. The works of Randall Jarrell, Norman Mailer, James Jones, and Lewis Simpson are just not as pungent, telling, or heart-breaking as the works of Rupert Brooke, Wilfred Owen, Siegfried Sassoon, and Robert Graves. And in both wars, American literature comes out second best to British.

I am pleased, though, that he singles out Eugene B. Sledge's memoir *With the Old Breed at Peleliu and Okinawa* as "one of the finest memoirs to emerge from any war, and no Briton could have written it." This reviewer agrees, although he reads Sledge somewhat differently than does Fussell.

If I were teaching a course in the First World War, *The Great War and Modern Memory* would be on my required reading list. If I were teaching the Second World War, *Wartime* would be on my optional reading list--with reservations.

Brig. Gen. Edwin H. Simmons, U.S. Marine Corps (retired), is the Director of Marine Corps History and Museums. A veteran of World War II, Korea, and Vietnam, he has published profusely.

Book Review
by Ronald H. Spector

How War Came
The Immediate Origins of the Second World War, 1938-1939
by Donald Cameron Watt
Pantheon. 736 pp. $29.95

Total War
The Causes and Courses of the Second World War
Revised Second Edition
by Peter Calvocoressi, Guy Wint and John Pritchard
Pantheon. 1,315 pp. $39.95

The Second World War
A Complete History
by Martin Gilbert
Holt. 846 pp. $29.95

"In May 1945," writes Donald Cameron Watt at the end of his masterly survey of the immediate origins of World War II, "Britain was the only power whose people could say that they had entered the war by choice to fight for a principle and not because their country was attacked." World War II has always had special meaning for the British and it is probably no accident that these three new books published on the 50th anniversary of that conflict's outbreak are all by British authors. Together they total over 2,800 pages, enough reading to dampen the determination of all but the most hard-core World War II junkie. Yet surprisingly enough these three massive tomes only rarely repeat each other, and each represents a distinctive approach and a solid contribution to our understanding of the Second World War. Early works on that war have tended to take a heroic view of the conflict, presenting it as a great adventure in which the world was saved from evil by the courage and daring of the Allies. These three books take a far more somber view, as if, as the war recedes in time, its pain and loss stand out all the more clearly.

Donald Cameron Watt's *How War Came* is the product of more than 20 years of research by one of Britain's leading historians of international affairs. It is "diplomatic history" in the grand tradition, drawing on the archives of half a dozen countries. It is more than that, however, for Watt has thoroughly integrated and explained the influence of military considerations and intelligence on the conduct of the European powers. He shows, for example, how intelligence received from German opponents of Hitler within the Third Reich in January 1939 (information which turned out to be false) led the British to initiate staff talks with the French, Dutch and Belgians, and to step up preparations for war even before Hitler entered Prague in March 1939.

Above all, Watt provides a superb portrait of the characters, personalities and mind sets of the politicians, generals and diplomats who figure in the catastrophe of 1939. His portraits are vivid and uncompromising. Molotov's "ingratiating smile and straggly mustache hid one of the most extraordinarily stupid men to hold the foreign ministry of a major power in this century. Beside him, Ciano, Beck, even Ribbentrop seemed masters of intelligence . . . He was ignorant, stupid, greedy, grasping, incurably suspicious and immovably obstinate. Like many stupid men he was cranky, sardonic even, and a bit of a bully in a coarse peasant way." It was these men, Watt argues, with their errors of commission and omission, their fears, prejudices, ambitions and lust for power, who brought on the great disasters of 1939-1945. "Contrary to what some historians are now beginning to argue . . . the Second World War was willed to happen."

Watt's *How War Came* is an exhaustive look at a single aspect of World War II; the books by Martin Gilbert and Peter Calvocoressi are general surveys purporting to cover all aspects of the war. Gilbert's book is almost a day-by-day chronicle of the war, with as much space devoted to the victims of war as to the combatants, to partisans and resistance fighters as to major battles and campaigns. The reader who comes to Gilbert's book with little background on World War II may be somewhat confused by the constant juxtaposition of great and small events, often in the same paragraph. Yet Gilbert's odd method is surprisingly effective in reminding us that World War II was more than a series of battles and feats of arms; that for most of the peoples of Europe and Asia it meant anxiety, sacrifice, deprivation, dislocation and death. During the same week, for example, that the Allies met at Casablanca to plot grand strategy, Heinrich Himmler complained of a shortage of trains to haul the Jews and his other victims to the gas chambers, Yugoslav partisans battled German forces on the slopes of Mount Durmitor in Montenegro, the Gestapo executed hundreds of members of an underground network in Belgium and France, and 700 patients at a Jewish mental hospital at Apeldoorn in the Netherlands were taken by train to Auschwitz and murdered in the gas chambers

along with their nurses.

Total War is a revision of the book first published in 1972 by Calvocoressi and Guy Wint. The present edition has been revised to take account of the opening of new records on code breaking; and John Pritchard, an expert on British-East Asian relations has revised the chapters on the war in Asia, originally written by Wint, who died in 1969. Yet the strengths and weaknesses of the original edition remain. The strengths are a clear and lucid presentation, a thorough discussion of the origins of the war in both Europe and Asia and a useful emphasis on the political as well as the military impact of the war. The weakness is a kind of Anglo-myopia, a tendency that the authors share with Gilbert and Watt, to neglect or downplay political and military developments in which the British were not already involved. Ironically, it is usually British authors who complain that their American cousins lack the breadth of vision and balanced perspective necessary properly to understand World War II. Watt suggests that only "the work of younger British and German scholars" has enabled us to reevaluate American policy in 1938-1939.

Yet any parochialism on the part of American historians pales in comparison to the lack of balance, the naivete and breezy confusion with which Gilbert, Calvocoressi, and Pritchard treat the American side of the war, particularly the war against Japan.

To take only one example, the important campaigns in the Marshall Islands, which resulted in a speedup of the tempo of the entire Pacific War, get only a single paragraph in Gilbert's book, a single sentence in Calvocoressi's. (By contrast, the wholly British victory at El Alamein gets four pages in *Total War*.) Yet American readers probably have little cause for concern. With the 50th anniversary of World War II just beginning and publishers gearing up for the long haul, plenty of American authors are sure to jump in to redress the balance.

Dr. Ronald H. Spector, professor of history at the University of Alabama, is the author of Eagle Against the Sun: America's War with Japan. *Reprinted with permission from the* Washington Post, *10 December 1989.*

Book Review
by Russell F. Weigley

The Second World War
by John Keegan
Viking. 607 pp. $29.95

In spite of the profusion of books about the Second World War, the most written-about war in history, it was not until the 50th anniversary of its outbreak in Europe supplied the impetus that we received a truly satisfactory, comprehensive one-volume survey more recent than Sir Basil H. Liddell Hart's *History of the Second World War* and Martha Byrd Hoyle's *A World in Flames: A History of World War II*, both dating from 1970. Now historians in the United Kingdom have given us three such works: Martin Gilbert's *The Second World War: A Complete History* . . . , somewhat surprisingly the most narrowly military of the three; Hedley Paul Willmott's *The Great Crusade: A New Complete History of the Second World War*, noteworthy especially for its rethinking of the conventional wisdom about the assured qualitative military superiority of Germany over the Soviet Union; and the present volume, the most comprehensive of the three in its coverage of the diplomatic, political, economic and cultural context of the military events.

John Keegan's contribution features the eloquence we have come to expect of him, affording his book the sense of dignity appropriate to a chronicle of tragedies. The book offers no startling new revelations or interpretations; perhaps indeed Keegan might have tried harder to find fresh perspectives, for there is a certain conventionality and predictability about his judgments. But *The Second World War* merits the acceptance as the standard work of its size that it will surely receive.

The nearest approach toward innovative interpretation comes early, when Keegan is dealing with the causes of the war. He rightly emphasizes that the two world wars, especially in Europe, were essentially one, a contest about finding a place for the recently unified Germany that would not unduly threaten the other European powers. For both world wars, however, Keegan argues that the causes have been dissected too minutely and made to seem more complex than they were. The world wars were distinctive not because of special characteristics in their causation, but because of the unprecedented amounts

of manpower and other resources that modern states were able to commit to waging them. Keegan explores not so much why the world wars happened as how it was possible for wars of such a scale and intensity to happen, through an introductory exploration of the 19th-century creation not only of the physical power of the modern state but also of its emotional resources in nationalism and in its ability to command and manipulate the loyalties of its citizens.

The immensity of the power of the modern states was displayed most dramatically in the Second World War in the campaigns of massive armies on the Eastern Front. Here the Soviet Union could endure the losses of over a million prisoners, thousands of tanks and guns and untold numbers of killed and wounded, in the first few months of the 1941 campaign alone, yet its resiliency seemed never to be impaired. The bitter struggles in the East, where there was so much courage and endurance displayed on both sides--the Soviets bearing up under those horrendous early losses, the German soldiers pushing steadfastly on toward Moscow though their army's logistics had nearly broken down, the cold weather and snows were overtaking them, their boots were worn away and their rations seemed far too deficient to fuel their long marches and battles --these scenes bring out the best in Keegan's literary skills and present the most moving passages in the book.

On the Pacific Ocean war, where the geographic scale compared with and even exceeded that of the Soviet-German war, but where the numbers of the fighting men were much smaller, the shadow cast by the knowledge that the war would end with the atomic bomb leads Keegan to shift his focus. He moves increasingly from struggles of human endurance to battles shaped by the recognition, which had already grown out of the First World War, that while the human capacity to absorb punishment is far greater than we might have expected before 1914, the structures built by men to shield themselves in battle, such as armored warships and tanks, are paradoxically less resilient. As machines became the major targets of war, they had to be produced at a more and more rapid pace, which in turn stimulated the doctrine of strategic air power as a means of slowing or halting production, which led again in turn to the atomic bomb. On the significance of these latter issues, Keegan seems ambivalent. He denies that strategic bombing in general fulfilled its advocates' promises; but while not exploring in detail the debates over the motives for and the effects of using the atomic bomb, he appears to accept that the bomb hastened the end and thus limited the casualties of the war.

It may signify much about the attitudes with which we are observing the 50th anniversary of the war that a similar ambivalence shapes Keegan's reflections on its whole meaning and legacy. Considering that he is writing about a conflict that most of us are presumed still to regard as a good war, his mood is scarcely celebratory. Had he wanted to find positive legacies to enumerate, he might have said much more than he does about the war's discrediting the myth of racial superiority, or perhaps, though he is an Englishman, about the breakup of the colonial empires. But his book implies that the horrors and the assaults upon civilized values were too appalling to permit claiming much in the way of proportionate benefits. The best Keegan can offer as a positive outcome is that while the Second World War did not at the time foster promises that it would be the last war, perhaps the revulsion from it will prove after all to have made it at least the last of its kind.

Russell F. Weigley, Distinguished University Professor at Temple University, is writing a history of modern war. Reprinted with permission from the Washington Post, *10 December 1989.*

Professional Events

CMH Publications Recognized by the American Library Association

The Government Documents Round Table of the American Library Association has selected two Center publications for recognition. William M. Hammond's *Public Affairs: The Military and the Media, 1962-1968*, and Jeffrey J. Clarke's *Advice and Support: The Final Years, 1965-1973*, have been selected by the Association's Notable Documents Panel for its "Notable Documents 1989" listing. This honor was announced in the Association's 15 May 1990 issue of the *Library Journal*.

Previously, the May 1989 issue of *Library Journal* recognized Earl F. Ziemke and Magna E. Bauer's *Moscow to Stalingrad: Decision in the East* in the "Notable Documents 1988" list.

Search for Photographs

The Army Medical Department is now undertaking the publication of the first history of the Medical Service Corps. The manuscript is nearing completion and the search for photographs to support the text has now begun.

Of particular interest are photos of Medical Service Corps (MSC) officers or their predecessors and members of the Pharmacy Corps, Medical Administrative Corps, or Sanitary Corps performing duties assigned in support of the Army in peace and war. Most valued would be pictures in which the people can be identified and activity easily recognized. We realize that pictures are valuable to their owners and have made arrangements to have them carefully handled, cataloged, reproduced, and returned.

If readers have photos that they are willing to submit for consideration to be included in the MSC history, they should please forward them to Chief, Medical Service Corps, ATTN: DASG-MS/Colonel Jackman, 5109 Leesburg Pike, Falls Church, VA 22041-3258.

U.S. Army Military History Institute "Excess" Source Materials

As the Army's repository for unofficial source materials on American military history, the U.S. Army Military History Institute (MHI) receives a tremendous quantity of published materials from other libraries and private donors. These materials are screened against the Institute's holdings and, if needed, are added to the collection. The remaining materials are considered excess to MHI's needs, yet may be of value to others in the Army historical community.

Lists of excess materials are prepared and mailed to a number of federal libraries and command historians. Librarians or historians who receive the list review them for any materials of interest, then call or return the list to the MHI, indicating which materials they need. Transfer paper work is prepared, and the excess items are shipped to the requestor on a first come, first served basis. Upon receipt of the shipped items, the requestor signs the transfer paper work, returning a copy to the Institute, where accountability records are maintained. Once the suspense date for a particular list has passed, the items that remain are transferred to the Library of Congress Gift and Exchange.

Army historians who are interested in participating in this program are encouraged to contact their local Army library. The librarian can contact the MHI about being added to the mailing list for excess materials, determine how the materials will be transferred, and decide how the materials can be made available to the historian. As an example, branch reference collections have been established at the Institute so that materials are readily available in the branches for use by staff and researchers. Control of these collections is maintained through the on-line catalog, although it could easily be maintained on a manual checkout system.

For further information about excess lists, contact Kathryn E. Davis, AV242-3600 or commercial (717) 245-3600.

Call for Papers

Professor William Woodward, chairman of the "War and Peace" section of the American Culture Association (a sister organization of the Popular Culture Association) invites official Army historians to propose individual papers--or entire sessions --for the next joint meeting of the ACA/PCA, to be

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held March 1991 in San Antonio, Texas.

Topics may range widely, but should be targeted to an academic audience that spans a broad spectrum of disciplines and addresses aspects of the American experience. Specialized sections on World War II and Vietnam are in preparation; Professor Woodward (who, incidentally, commands the 141st Military History Detachment) will forward proposals in these areas to the respective chairpersons.

Send queries and proposals by 31 August 1990 to Dr. William Woodward, Department of History, Seattle Pacific University, Seattle, WA 98119.

Armored Force Anniversary at Fort Knox

In recognition of the fiftieth anniversary of the Armored Force (10 July 1990), Fort Knox conducted a number of activities. These included: (1) open house at Fort Knox, (2) a static exhibit at the NCO Club parking lot, (3) a Living History demonstration, (4) a live fire exercise, and (5) a parade of historical and current armor vehicles.

The highlighted event of the day was a dedication of the Armor Memorial Park and a wreath-laying for Armor veterans. The anniversary concluded with a concert by the 113th Army Band and a fireworks display.

POCs for the Fort Knox anniversary activities were Dr. Charles H. Cureton, Office of the Command Historian, TRADOC and Dr. John Cranston, U.S. Army Armor Center Historian.

In the Next Issue of *Army History* . . .

A lead article by Maj. Gen. Gerald P. Stadler, commandant of the National War College in Washington, on the value of military history to leader development among Army officers.

Dr. John Schlight, former chief of the Low Intensity Conflict & Contingency Operations Branch at the Center, shares his thoughts on researching special operations/low intensity conflict.

Maj. Charles E. Kirkpatrick analyzes the role of the Victory Plan of 1941 in strategic planning for World War II.

As the Army begins to realign and restructure, Lt. Col. Clayton R. Newell, chief of the Historical Services Division, looks at the historic role of lineages and honors within the senior service.

Book reviews of two recent collections of documents pertaining to military intelligence: *The Final Memoranda* and *Listening to the Enemy*, both from Scholarly Resources, Inc., and of a memoir of a military professional and his lady, *A Long March: The Lives of Frank and Alice Baldwin* from the University of Texas Press.

And much more . . .

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