ARMY HISTORY

THE PROFESSIONAL BULLETIN OF ARMY HISTORY

PB-20-91-2 (No. 18) Washington, D.C. Spring 1991

Not by Accident

Gerald P. Stadler

Maj. Gen. Stadler is commandant of the National War College in Washington. His article, "A Shortage of Strategists," appeared in the Fall 1990 Army History. In this sequel, General Stadler uses a fictionalized approach to discuss the very real role of military history in shaping future Army strategists.

A modern short story? Yes, I suppose you could call this a very short one about a great and prominent strategist. He grows to heroic stature in the year 2014 as adviser to the President. On the centennial of the start of the First World War, he is the military strategist who plays a key role in the design of the strategy that allows the nation successfully to avert general war.

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When I offered an article describing a shortage of strategists to *Army History* some months ago, it was accepted with the proviso that a second article follow which filled in the missing parts: how the shortage developed and how to fix it. So how will the premier military strategist of 2014, an up and coming major in the Army of 1991, progress and develop over the intervening two-and-a-half decades to be poised to make that epic contribution to the nation in 2014? Not by accident, I would argue.

Operational Duties. A critical part of the development of our military strategist, Justin Tyme, had little to do with the study of strategy, military history, or staff colleges and war colleges. Yet, it was the part of his experience that distinguishes the uniformed military strategist from his civilian counterpart. Operational duties tempered and balanced the lifelong study of strategy by this professional Army officer—this would-be strategist. Those duties brought understanding by experiencing discipline, muddled intelligence, privations, and responsibility, among other things—experiences that academic efforts could only approximate. Students of the strategist Carl von Clausewitz, for example, frequently have linked his successful articulation of strategy to his own operational experiences of increasing responsibility.

Earlier Study. Justin Tyme was fortunate to have had important operational assignments regularly during his service. Not by chance; he sought those jobs. But he was also fortunate to have started off on the right foot in the precommissioning phase of his education. His hard-charging ROTC (Reserve Officer Training Corps) instructor had challenged all cadets to read military history beyond the requirements of the curriculum. Start with anything, he told them, biographies, autobiographies, unit histories, analyses, whatever. In the process, many of them came to enjoy reading military history. Only a few of them might ultimately grow to be genuine military strategists, he advised, but they would have to start their study early.

He reminded his cadets that in an earlier era, Lt. Omar Bradley met weekly with like-minded lieutenants to discuss the military history they had read. Their ROTC instructor, a West Point graduate, even amazed them by predicting they'd be better prepared in history than their Academy counterparts whose attention to the subject was steadily reduced by other demands and time constraints.

Advanced Military Studies. The eye-opener for Justin was the year he spent in the Advanced Program of the School for Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) after being a student at the staff college. That year's training was the key element in the educational process by which strategists were developed in the 1990s. Almost a decade old, that course challenged his imagination and had earned a respectable reputation across the Army by the excellence of its graduates. It provided him, for the first time, an intersection of the several developmental paths available to a strategist. A wide variety of jobs and a steady diet from various

sources of military history prepared him for SAMS.

Bold and comprehensive, the program focused the study of a handful of officers each year to probe the depths of military strategy and operations that would confront the U.S. armed forces. Historical experiences of the Army were examined as well as those of our most formidable adversaries. To their credit, the developers of the course had not yielded to the temptation to explore the entire history of warfare. Rather, they focused on relevant, modern history—as Clausewitz had urged nearly two centuries earlier. History was explored to share vicariously the experiences of those who themselves made history.

Beyond Land Warfare. What Justin Tyme did not encounter was comparable study and emphasis on maritime operations and the projection of air power. Rarely was he stretched beyond the land battle—AirLand battle, if you prefer—or confronted with those challenges facing a major maritime nation that is also an air power. Fortunately, he began to fill in those blanks himself with study at the War College, but only because an enterprising faculty professor exposed the depths of his ignorance in maritime matters and designed a useful self-study program for him. Many of his contemporaries already had served outside Army organizations by their twentieth year. Justin himself could list peace-keeping duties and arms control negotiations among his previous assignments. Consequently, the War College seemed to him too late to begin to examine these broader issues. Our military strategist of 2014 had concluded by now that the land orientation of Army officers introduced a conservative bias that limited the boldness of the educational curricula as well. He was struck by the fact that the faculty was not populated in significant numbers by those who might be strategists, either.

Tutored by Broadview. But Justin's education as a military strategist really didn't come together until he met Maj. Gen. Ernest Broadview in 2002. At the end of a typically busy week, Broadview, his division commander, was speculating with Justin on the ramifications of the recent dispatch of a carrier battle group to the scene of growing unrest in the settlements in Antarctica. He asked Justin what it would mean for future U.S. policy. "What am I supposed to know about that?" Justin wondered. As a brigade commander, he felt entirely secure in his duties relating to brigade operations and even division operations, but less confident in matters beyond land-power strategy despite sampling the field at the War College. Broad-

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view sensed Justin's unfamiliarity with maritime issues and lent him several volumes from his own library as a starter kit.

Justin's learning process rapidly expanded into a new phase as his study of warfare entered whole new areas. He studied in depth the relationship between the heavy trench warfare losses of World War I and the infantry available to European nations in World War II. He learned about the extent of peninsular causes of the Korean War beyond the East-West superpower confrontation. From the *Tacticus* of Leo the Wise, the tenth-century Byzantine Emperor, he was reminded of strategies tailored to the special characteristics of each enemy. Among the authors he read, Rear Adm. Joseph Caldwell Wylie in his *Military Strategy* attributed to the sailor and the airman a necessity to "think in terms of a total world," but observed in contrast that the "soldier is almost hemmed in by his terrain." Justin had no intention of being hemmed in by terrain. His division commander kept the momentum of his education rolling as they discussed regularly what he was reading and explored new sources that reached well beyond military history. It was probably the most formative stage of his education and one, regrettably, few Army officers encountered.

As in the earlier period between the world wars, the system for developing strategists was still haphazard and dependent upon individual initiative and the fortuitous contact between apt subordinate and interested superior. Senior officers seemed to be either too busy with current matters or ill equipped to guide willing subordinates in the study of strategy. It was, he thought at the time, the weakest link in the Army's attempt to educate strategists and would hardly yield the stable of educated strategists needed in the second decade of the century as the pace of change in world events and military dimensions continued to quicken.

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That's where this very short story ends. The military strategist who advised the president in 2014 retired in 2016 to his small farm in Alabama. The peace continued. Countless television specials celebrated the hundredth anniversary of events from the First World War. The epic seven-part series "Passchendaele" in 2017 featured an aging but mellowed Peter Jennings who left retirement to narrate it for JNN, the new Tokyo-based news conglomerate. Justin enjoyed his role as historical adviser for the series. He had retired from active duty concerned whether budding military strategists would be adequately prepared to meet twenty-first-century demands. But he was optimistic that from among those he had guided in the first decade of the new century there would emerge worthy advisers to future presidents. They had been educated by design, not by accident.

Editor's Journal

With this issue of *Army History* we acknowedge all of our colleagues and friends who have served in DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. Mr. Billy Arthur's feature article details the Army's rather substantial effort to collect and preserve historical material during these complex operations.

For those of you who are looking for Professor Raymond Mentzer's article on military history detachments during the Korean War, please be patient until the next issue, when *Army History* will focus on Korea in a number of items.

The winter 1990/1991 *Army History* offered two contributions by Soviet Col. Igor N. Venkov. In this issue we continue our international feature with Dr. Frank Schubert's introduction to the Hungarian Military History Institute, and with Col. Laszlo Bencze's sobering and informative look at the Hungarian military and society during the early years of Communist rule.

I continue to hear nothing but favorable comments about *Army History*—the variety of articles, the expanded format, the reviews, and so forth—all have been well received, and our standing as a recognized professional publication is secure. As I look ahead for the rest of 1991, however, I see open slots for good material. If you enjoy reading *Army History*, remember that your colleagues who have contributed make your professional reading possible. If you have a contribution, or know of a young military history scholar who would like to be published, please keep us in mind.

Arnold G. Fisch, Jr.

The Chief's Corner

Harold W. Nelson

Everyone in the Army has been touched by DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. Mr. Billy Arthur's feature article in this issue provides insights into our efforts to chronicle this massive venture. I want to comment on the historians' contributions as of this writing (late February) and on the work I see before us.

The structure needed to perform the Army's historical function in the field was in place before the present crisis because of the work of many who came before me. Command historians in all of the major commands and major subordinate commands had a keen appreciation of their respective requirements. Commanders who had let historian positions sit vacant or who relied on contractors to do their work will never know how much better their story might have been told if they had preserved historian slots within their staff structure. These gaps are rare, though, and we should be able to bridge them by applying extra effort. The structure is in place to produce the historical reports and specialized monographs that coverage of this war will require.

The Military History Detachments (MHDs) also have been central to the data collection effort. From the Washington perspective, their availability as TO&E organizations was critical. Many other small, vital functions—analogous to military history—have no formations in the Active Army, Army Reserve, and National Guard. While we were struggling to get our Reserve Component units activated and on their way to Saudi Arabia to augment the fine work of the 44th MHD, proponents in other fields had a far more difficult problem as they assembled ad hoc organizations and tried to interject them into the flow of units. Now we need to build on the strong organizational base of the MHDs, improve the TO&E, and perfect training by incorporating DESERT STORM lessons.

Using Active Army officers to supplement the history structure has worked reasonably well. Sending Col. Rick Swain to be the ARCENT (Army Central) Command historian was the right move, but the temporary duty insertion of officers from the Center of Military History was reactive and lacked clearly defined purpose. I believe there is a place for these officers as augmentees in future deployments, but the Training and Doctrine Command, the Military Academy, and the Center should be talking to the Forces Command historian before the next crisis to develop concepts and identify assets.

Army Art teams have performed well with limited assets. In an Army that recognizes the importance of retaining unit integrity in combat situations, we cannot expect to remove talented volunteers from units as we did in Vietnam. As we build an "expeditionary" Army, we must build an institutional framework for Army artists to make them as deployable as MHDs.

We struggled to build a capability to identify and ship historically significant materiel. Our improvisations were innovative, but only time will tell whether they were productive. Clearly, this is another area where our museum system would benefit from formal recognition of a requirement, and development of the necessary regulations and force structure to do the job. The Center of Military History is already working toward that goal.

As we prepare to write the history of the liberation of Kuwait, we recognize that it is a story with many parts. The trained and ready Army that made the initial moves did not spring up instantly, so we must tell the story of the predeployment years of preparation. The Reserve Components are an important part of that story, and their wide range of functions inevitably introduces complexity to the tale, as we would expect in such a sophisticated operation. The movement of units from home stations to desert camps is a saga in itself, requiring joint dimensions—as will so many other parts of the overall story.

Training and modernizing of forces in theater will also require careful attention because of the diversity of experiences and novelty of some of the tasks. Engineer historians will surely take the lead in capturing the history of infrastructure development, but logisticians and tacticians have a part of that action as well.

The reinforcement from Europe, the strongest evidence that the Cold War has ended, could be a separate history if it were not such an important element in describing the flexibility of general purpose forces. The Army's role in the joint campaign is the traditional "military history," but everyone recognizes that tactical battle action is only a small part of a much larger DESERT STORM picture.

All of us look forward to completing that picture—especially the part that depicts the redeployment of the victorious coalition forces.

"Spearhead Week": An Armored Division Celebrates Its Fiftieth Anniversary

Dan Peterson

Mr. Peterson prepared this article for Army History *as the 3d Armored Division was deploying for Operation DESERT SHIELD. That deployment, scheduled to end in June, forced the rescheduling of certain activities, but all events still are planned.*

As the U.S. Army commemorates the fiftieth anniversary of World War II, several divisions and innumerable smaller units, created by necessity at the advent of that great and terrible conflict, will be observing their own fiftieth anniversaries.

Prominent among these is the 3d Armored Division. Activated at Camp Beauregard, Louisiana, on 15 April 1941, the "Spearhead Division" played a particularly significant role in the western European theater of World War II. First to enter Belgium, first to breech the Siegfried Line, first to capture a German town, its great victory in the battle of Mons—these are just a few of the division's battlefield achievements.

The 3d Armored has long exhibited an above-average interest and pride in its historical past. This is evidenced by the division's close association with its wartime veterans, its extensive museum and archives, its long tradition of commemorative and memorial ceremonies in Europe, and the numerous battlefield tours and staff rides in which its units regularly participate. Not surprisingly, therefore, the Spearhead Division is making a major effort to celebrate its "golden anniversary."

This April and May the 3d Armored Division will complete one of the most ambitious historical commemorative programs yet undertaken by an Army division in the observation of its fiftieth anniversary. These events culminate in "Spearhead Week," 20-24 May 1991, to be held in Germany, or in Southwest Asia if the division is still deployed.

The planning began with some basic concepts proposed by the division historian and approved by the commanding general. A committee, chaired by the assistant division commander-maneuver, Brig. Gen. Paul E. Blackwell, developed these ideas and formulated appropriate activities. The planning committee consisted of the division's principal staff, representatives from the 3d Armored Division brigades and communities, and others who could contribute fresh ideas or support the various projects envisioned. Taskings followed to those units or staff sections best equipped to undertake a specific project.

Perhaps the most unique of the many commemorative events is the "Spearhead Liberation Convoy," scheduled to coincide with the division's redeployment to Europe. Using predominantly privately owned World War II-vintage vehicles, as well as the division's modern combat vehicles of today, the liberation convoy will trace the 3d Armored Division's footsteps from its landing on OMAHA Beach, 23 June 1944, until it was relieved from combat duty on the banks of the Elbe River on 25 April 1945 at Dessau, deep in what was formerly the German Democratic Republic.

At all times along the march the convoy will be headed by one of a team of runners selected from throughout the division. The runner will carry a flaming torch, which will be ignited on OMAHA Beach and remain ablaze until the end of ceremonies at Dessau.

Supported by the Division Support Command, this march of over 1,400 has proved to be a great logistical challenge, as well as a "first ever" historical event. Reconnaissance teams from the division's 4th Squadron, 7th Cavalry, scouted the entire line of march for the dual purpose of finding the best route for the convoy, which includes heavy armored vehicles, while maintaining the historical integrity of the march. The division G-5 also played a prominent role, coordinating with innumerable city governments in four countries, while the division historian worked with the various individuals and historic vehicle clubs that will participate.

The march will culminate at Dessau with ceremonies on the Elbe River in a "peace park" constructed by the 3d Armored Division's "Ready First" Brigade. The convoy will be joined on the outskirts of Dessau by the 3d Armored Division commanding general, key staff, and a number of World War II veterans from the

3d Armored Division's Fiftieth Anniversary Emblem

original 3d Armored Division. On the day before this event, the veterans will conduct a memorial service at the Netherlands American Cemetery at Margarten, Holland.

The Margarten memorial ceremony has been a 3d Armored Division tradition since the division returned to Germany in 1956. Although more 3d Armored Division veterans are buried at other American cemeteries throughout Europe, and division memorial ceremonies have been held at each site, Margarten has held a special significance. It is the final resting place of Maj. Gen. Maurice Rose, the 3d Armored Division commander from the Normandy Campaign until his death in action on 30 March 1945.

In the week preceding the Margarten ceremony, division staff officers will be conducting a battlefield tour tracing the 3d Armored Division's actions from Normandy to the Ardennes. During this unprecedented learning experience, they will be joined by 3d Armored Division World War II veterans, who will share their recollections.

Staff rides and battlefield tours will not be limited to the division staff. Every unit in the division is expected to participate in these activities during the anniversary year. The division historian prepared packets of historical information on key 3d Armored Division battles to assist units in developing their programs. World War II veterans will undoubtedly participate in many of these activities as well. Through a "veteran-unit affiliation program" every unit in the original World War II 3d Armored Division is matched with either the current unit of the same designation or the most similar new unit. Whenever a veteran visits the 3d Armored Division, the unit affiliated with his unit will sponsor him.

Close ties between the present division and its World War II veterans were firmly established long before the fiftieth anniversary. Every year at least one veteran—and often many more—visit the division in Germany, where they are personally welcomed by the division commander, given a tour of the museum, and assigned sponsors from the modern 3d Armored Division organization affiliated with the veteran's original unit. In turn, each year the division commander, command sergeant major, noncommissioned officer of the year, soldier of the year, and division historian attend the 3d Armored Division Veterans' Reunion. The veterans ask many questions of the modern Spearheaders, while the historian takes the opportunity to conduct oral history video interviews with as many veterans as time allows. Not only are these tapes valuable additions to the division archives, but they are often employed in battlefield tours and staff ride presentations.

The fiftieth anniversary activities are not limited to historical programs. In addition to the history-related events, Spearhead Week is also filled with athletic competitions among division units. Interest-

ingly enough, some of these athletic events also can be linked to the division history. A bike rally from Marburg to Paderborn, for example, will commemorate the division's famous one-day, ninety-mile march between these points, the most rapid single day American advance through enemy territory of the war.

Additional competitions will include a photography contest and an art contest in which the subjects are to be related to 3d Armored Division history. These photos and paintings will be judged during the Spearhead Week awards presentation ceremony, with the top selections destined for exhibit in the division museum.

The division staff also has commissioned a professional artist to create a painting that will be reproduced as a commemorative collector's print of the division's DESERT STORM experiences.

Other commemorative products being developed are T-shirts, caps, swords, and so forth, with the 3d Armored Division fiftieth anniversary emblem. Perhaps the most interesting of these items is a reproduction of the original tanker's jacket of the type worn in the 3d Armored Division during World War II.

Several publications are planned for the anniversary year. The 3d Armored Division veterans will release a new division history, and the present division will offer a golden anniversary yearbook to complement its silver anniversary yearbook of 1966. Additionally, there will be a special anniversary edition of the division's command information publication, *Spearhead*, as well as an article in *Armor*, and possibly other Army magazines.

The closing ceremonies of Spearhead Week in May will not end the 3d Armored Division's fiftieth-anniversary activities. On the contrary, they are only the beginning! As the U.S. Army commemorates the various fiftieth anniversary events of World War II during 1991, the 3d Armored Division will continue likewise to commemorate its significant role in that war. Beginning 15 April at Camp Beauregard, ceremonies will dedicate a monument at the site of the division's activation exactly fifty years before. Subsequently, on their fiftieth-anniversary dates, monuments and plaques will be dedicated throughout Europe at wartime locations noteworthy in the history of the 3d Armored Division.

Mr. Dan Peterson is curator of the 3d Armored Division's Spearhead Museum and serves as division historian. Currently he is with the 3d Armored Division in Southwest Asia as part of DESERT STORM.

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The Hungarian People's Army, 1947-1954

Laszlo Bencze

The Paris Peace Treaty became effective in September 1947. In addition to settling issues on borders, war damage compensation, and other questions, this agreement ended the military occupation and the operation of the Soviet-controlled Allied Control Authority in Hungary. The leaders of most respected European Communist parties accepted the claim of Andrei Aleksandrovich Zhdanov, a major figure in the Soviet Communist Party who served as Stalin's emissary, that subordinating their national interests to the aims of the Soviet foreign political strategy was in everyone's mutual interest. According to the peace agreement, those countries where Communist regimes were in power had to compensate the Soviet Union for its huge wartime losses in soldiers and industrial capacity. This effort was to ensure the final victory if a third world war should break out.

Based on the needs of the general staff in Moscow, therefore, Hungary had to build nine modern air bases by the end of 1951. The country was also required to restore roads and the bridges over the Danube and Tisza rivers that were absolutely necessary for any mobilization and deployment. Moreover, the productive capacity of Hungary's military industries had to be restored to the level reached during the war and additional factories for weapons, munitions, and other military stores had to be constructed. In addition to this effort, 264,000 persons had to be under arms in Hungary by the end of 1952, as part of the mobilization of three armies (30 divisions). The ultimate goal was to mobilize 850,000, and later one million, soldiers.

Matyas Rakosi, Erno Gero, and Mihaly Farkas, the three members of the National Defense Committee, executed the instructions in a servile way. The committee increased the strength of the Army more than five times (from 41,500 to 210,400), including a tenfold growth of the officer class (from 3,004 officers to 32,184). The number of persons thought available for mobilization was about 1.5 million, including nearly 100,000 reserve officers. At the same time, the total armed strength of agencies subordinated to the Ministry of Interior reached 66,000. In addition, the People's Army employed about 15,000 persons under permanent or temporary contract, while 64,000 workers labored in forty-eight war factories (twenty-one of them quite new) producing the munitions and weapons for the artillery and infantry.

During the first five-year plan the expenses of the armed forces and defense agencies, related investments, and the so-called "special import" directly amounted to over 44 billion forints, or about $3.74 billion 1947 dollars (the forint then being worth about $0.085 at the official exchange rate). The special import involved the purchase of Soviet arms and armament with Hungarian foodstuffs, uranium ore, and other commodities, on terms that were manifestly unfavorable to Hungary. Among the other principal expenses were the preparation of a war headquarters, assurance that the reserves had mobilization capacity for military engineering, and production of medical facilities for wounded people. They also included construction of civil defense shelters and underground command posts for the government and party. Indirect expenses amounted to another 6.4 billion forints. These defense needs were a burden to the other branches of the national economy.

The increase of manpower, the supply of weapons and arms, the construction of military installations and systems of fortifications all required enormous sums of money and vast quantities of raw materials. The costs of the so-called "special import" from the Soviet Union reached about 200 million rubles from 1950 through 1954. The military budget with its 51 billion forints was huge compared with the total sum invested in the national economy: 67.4 billion forints.

The armed forces and defense agencies consumed 13.9 percent of the national income in 1950, 15.2 percent in 1951, 25.5 percent in 1952, and 24.3 percent in 1953. This proportion declined back to 15.2 percent only in 1954. The development of the Army took 80 percent of these sums, because the Ministry of Defense also paid for the arms and weapons for the Ministry of Interior and the State Security Agency (AVH). As a comparison, defense expenses were 11.9 percent of national income in 1938 and 1939, and they reached 27.9 percent only in 1942, increasing to 44.1 percent in 1944, the year of total mobilization.

The debate over military expenses can be merely theoretical in the context of a tense international situation. But a forced development of the armed forces

and military investments can ensure the success of strategic plans and ideas only temporarily. As time passed, the dislocations created in other fields of the economy caused not only anarchy in production, but the collapse of the nation's defense ability, too. Spectacular anomalies emerged during the period of the first five-year plan. National housing costs were 3.9 billion forints from 1950 through 1954. But the cost of equipping the artillery with out-of-date guns that we were forced to buy from the Soviet Union in 1952 alone was 3.6 billion forints. The textile industry received only some 700 million forints for investments over five years, while the military supply services used 1.7 billion forints in 1952, and 1.9 billion in 1953 for uniforms. The signal corps command received more money in two years than the National Post Office could invest in a five-year period. Overall, given the fact that investments in war industry amounted to 18 percent of industrial investments and 60 percent of the engineering industry, it is safe to say that defense expenses made the economic aims of the first five-year plan completely illusory.

The sums allocated for developing education over five years were less (1.67 billion forints) than the cost of wages and salaries in the Army (1.86 billion) in only one year, 1953. Meanwhile, the yearly income and the additional sums paid for the special and secret expenses of Minister of Defense Mihaly Farkas reached staggering proportions. Farkas, who was born in Czechoslovakia and spoke Magyar, came to the ministry from the Soviet Union, where he had strong ties to the NKVD, the predecessor of the KGB. He was part of the ruling Rakosi clique and filled the NKVD's need for control of a key position in the Hungarian government. In 1952, his total pay reached 2,185,520 forints, an amount equivalent to a lieutenant's salary for 200 years.

The Ministry of Defense's corrupt and incompetent leaders spent these enormous sums lavishly. This situation created huge economic difficulties for the country. An overall revision downward could be made only after the 1953 death of Stalin and the subsequent dismissal of Farkas, who was sacked on 4 April 1954 after the appearance of a report entitled "The Economy of Budget Credits in 1953 for the People's Army and the Realization of Documental Control." Subsequently, he spent several years in prison.

This report on financial operations in the Army pointed out numerous fiscal irregularities. For example, the comptroller's office, an independent agency that resembled a field operating agency on the American Army staff, completely lacked experience in financial planning and usually had very little rationale for its own funding. The health section, which combined the functions of the U.S. Army's Office of the Surgeon General and army-wide medical activities in a single organization that also resembled a field operating agency, demanded nine million forints but spent only six. The Air Force headquarters initiated the construction of its own casino in Folyondar street. Meanwhile, 1,200 trucks and cars belonging to the central stocks of vehicle and material stores were damaged beyond repair while kept in open storage. The office that supervised rifle battle drill spent 2.5 million forints for sports equipment, while a stock of equipment valued at 640,000 forints sat in storage.

Additional examples of financial mismanagement and waste abounded. The office of armament and the Institute for Military Engineering squandered 146 million forints. The military supply services of the People's Army claimed 200,000 tons of potatoes in 1954, five times as much as the Army actually needed to feed its troops for the year. While the meat consumption of the country's inhabitants amounted to 36 kilograms (79.3 lbs.) in 1952 and 28 kilograms in 1953, the Army's allocation was more than 55 kilograms a year per person. Certain high officers had slush funds for entertainment expenses of up to 90,000 forints a month, plus another 52,000 forints monthly for special cigarettes and cigars. The personal sauna bath of Mihaly Farkas cost 229,000 forints in 1949, and the secretariat of the ministry consumed extraordinary quantities of scarce and expensive coffee yearly.

In spite of the immense sums invested, neither the structure nor the armament of the People's Army was able to carry out the assigned military objectives. The proportion of air to land forces was far lower than the average of Western European countries, even without taking their navies into consideration. In addition, the airplanes delivered from the Soviet Union, especially most of the YAK-9s, were unusable because of improper storage after the war. Those put into operation later had problems due to permanent shortages of spare parts and technical shortcomings. The Air Force had 101 "events" and eleven catastrophes during 1953 alone, resulting in seventeen deaths, and the loss of twenty-three planes, with seventy-seven others seriously damaged. Before long, approximately one-third of all the Air Force's available military equipment became inoperable. It was not surprising, therefore, that

when a B-57 Canberra crossed into our airspace the antiaircraft defense could not detect it at first, and then could not intercept it.

The Soviet transports bearing military supplies were unreliable, so that before long the armored forces were unable to fulfill their assigned operational tasks. The supply of tanks was merely one-half of what it should have been, and many were obsolete. As far as mobility is concerned, a single fact illustrates the situation: at that time an American division of 19,000 persons possessed nearly 4,000 vehicles; the whole Hungarian People's Army had a total of 8,000 tractors, trucks, and cars.

The riflemen, the backbone of the whole Army, used the so-called "long rifle" introduced into the Russian Army in 1896. It was compulsory to refer to it as a "victorious weapon," even though this rifle had been bested as early as the Russo-Japanese War. At the same time the Soviet Army used the Khalashnikov submachine gun, introduced in 1946. To make matters worse, 528,000 gun parts were declared defective in 1953 after the first firing test in the People's Army because of the unsatisfactory quality of the metal castings produced by Hungarian metallurgy.

The Hungarian military leadership estimated that if a third world war should break out, Hungary would suffer 200,000 bloody, irreplaceable losses each year. If we take into consideration the opposing Western states' air superiority, supply of nuclear weapons, mobility, and firepower, it can be assumed that in reality actual losses at the front would have been much higher. Sooner or later even the workers of military age, who were not mobilized but remained at home in production, would also have been lost, together with a great number of other inhabitants as well.

Large-scale training of officers began in the Hungarian People's Army as one of the main conditions necessary to prepare for a new war. On the surface, it appeared to be completed successfully by the end of 1952. There were then 32,184 officers, of whom 30,394 were captains and lieutenants. These men, motivated by pure patriotism and a sense of responsibility to their families and country, were volunteers. In the cynical, hysterical political atmosphere of the early 1950s, even the most optimistic or naive youngsters could not believe in the possibility of permanent individual security and prosperity, because it seemed that a new world war was inevitable. At the same time, many people were entering the professional military staff because of directions from the party. They also knew perfectly well what fate they could expect in the event of an all-out war. Most of the candidates, however, were strongly motivated by the fact that they could have a clear path to a higher social position than their parents, quickly and without any effort.

The highest leadership of the party deliberately insisted upon putting an end to the so-called "rights of birth" without checking the validity of this preconception. In a reversal of traditional class relationships, industrial workers and propertyless farm laborers were given employment preference over others. The military specialists especially considered changing the class structure in the officers corps to be a matter of very high priority. They emphasized political reliability and class background and attached only a secondary importance to the special military skills and expertise modern warfare demanded of an individual. Of course, this attitude created a deformed selection system within the society and meant a continuation of "native" rights—but in a new way. It established a new social structure that artificially turned the manual workers against even the layers of employees, clerks, craftsmen, and traders, as well as the intelligentsia.

By the end of 1952, within the Army 38.7 percent of the professional staff were the sons of agricultural workers and 32 percent were of working class origin. The others, the so-called "else," belonged to a secondary category, and this distinction hindered their careers. The party leadership ordered a similar discrimination in recruiting reserve officers as well. About half of these 87,134 persons belonged to a group called "politically absolutely reliable," and 20,130 persons to the second group termed "those being liable to be requisitioned." The last group contained those who were "unreliable politically"; they were mostly reserve officers of the old Army, with wartime experience. The proportion of new officers grew from 5.3 percent in 1949 to 91.3 percent by 1953. The statistics from 1953 reveal that not a single person left in the Army was a graduate of the old General Staff Academy.

Despite being promoted to colonel general, Mihaly Farkas was not an expert on military matters. He could not stand to have any expertise around him, nor could he cope with the smallest sign of threats to his financial and other privileges. Between the summers of 1949 and 1950, using various slanders, he removed twelve generals and 1,100 other high-ranking officers from the Army. He and his ignorant careerist aides—Lt. Gen. Istvan Bata, chief of the general staff; Lt. Gen.

Istvan Szabo, chief of the personnel section; Lt. Gen. Sandor Nogradi, chief of the political section; and Brig. Gen. Pal Ilku, deputy chief of the political section—led this purge with the authorization and sanction of the highest party leadership. The majority of the denounced men met a tragic personal fate. As part of this same process 539 former officers received a chance to be reactivated. Declining reactivation was not recommended.

The minister of defense and the commanders advanced by him (despite their lack of military knowledge expertise) were able to base their success upon the frightened but experienced officers of the old Army. Because of their political unreliability these officers could not threaten the profitable positions of the newcomers. At the same time the "leaders," profiting from the work of their deputies, continued their own advancement through "disclosures," show trials, executions, internments, and dismissals and by forcing the unpunished ones to make compulsory and humiliating self-criticisms. Thus they could pretend to be acting like leaders—firm as a rock in front of the public.

Only half of the members of military prosecutorial staffs had degrees; the rest were uneducated but very alert. These cadres charged a large number of officers, soldiers, and civilians with crimes. The courts-martial officers, possessing similar limited expertise, passed sentences on an assembly line basis. Statistics indicate there were 1,100 officers sentenced in 1950, about 10,000 in 1951, 6,500 in 1952, and 4,600 persons even as late as 1953.

It is legitimate to ask how many innocent people suffered, either through professional ignorance, political pressure from above, or by the passage of time, which hindered unbiased deliberations. Was it possible at all to sort out people being punished legally from this guiltless, suffering crowd? This senseless "toughness" projected by the military leaders also masked the lack of military expertise needed to protect the nation if war should threaten. Although he had no credentials at all, Farkas had pathological ambitions to be a truly great strategist. Istvan Bata, the chief of the general staff, was an inefficient toady, so he was not a rival of the minister of defense.

Farkas excelled at rigidly copying details of the Soviet military system. He changed the Hungarian uniform along the Soviet model. It cost billions—the value of the old, now surplus, material was 21 million forints alone. An even more stupid decision was the establishment of summer camps. These camps required 50 million forints and actually became residences in the woods from April to October. Officers and warrant officers with families could not go home for months even in those cases where the garrison was only six to ten kilometers from their homes. Serious epidemics raged almost everywhere in the camps because of primitive hygienic conditions, the lack of healthy drinking water, and the low level of supply. These conditions were not altered, despite the introduction of serious punishments, imprisonment, and sometimes even execution for commanders or doctors. Between 8,000 and 11,500 soldiers developed dysentery in 1953. The number of victims among women and children, the victims of "family camps" initiated by Istvan Bata, is unknown. It is hardly surprising that on a training inspection held in the fall of 1953, five of the six regiments examined could not be mobilized for battle. Moreover, even this sixth had serious problems that weakened its readiness.

According to personnel statistics in 1953, only 41 percent of the military had the training, education, and degrees necessary for their assignments. These included the chiefs of sections, branch of service commanders and their deputies, division commanders, and Army corps commanders. These high- ranking officers were responsible for leading the Hungarian armed forces at the front and for the lives of their subordinates. Yet the majority of them were promoted based on their past status in the workers' movement or for their connection with leading party functionaries, and for successfully completing a military course lasting only a matter of weeks or months. Only one-third of the commanders of regiments, battalions, and separate battalions, of staff department heads, and commanders of institutes could present a certificate required for their jobs. In addition barely one-fourth of the heads of Ministry of Defense departments, and of the divisional operational, training, and reconnaissance chiefs had the requisite training. Only one-fifth of the chiefs of military supply services received the training necessary to fulfill their duties reliably.

At the same time, however, 98 percent of the platoon commanders finished a one- or two-year officers' academy, so they had a thorough military training. These young, ambitious and energetic lieutenants disturbed their uneducated and hesitating superiors daily. Superior officers solved these conflicts mostly by power, but it was a permanent conflict, one not eased by differences in the civilian education system.

It is a known fact that two-thirds of the subordinate officers completed six to eight years of elementary school, but only one-third of them completed higher elementary school or studied in the lower classes of secondary school. At the same time, one-third of the generals and one-forth of all field officers foundered at the level of mere writing and reading.

The military council meeting of 11 December 1954 had on the agenda a report entitled "The Cadre Position of the People's Army," which stated sadly that only 15 percent of the professionals reached high school graduation; 85 percent completed only the eight classes of elementary school, or even less.

The leadership of the party did not take into consideration the demands that a future war might impose on people and arms. The party leadership strained the loan-bearing capacity of the national economy with wasteful military expenses and with the cost of maintaining a large Army. Yet all of this sacrifice and planning went into preparation for a future conflict in which Hungary would have only the weapons of the last war and out-of-date Soviet doctrine. Moreover, using the bombastic slogan of "changing the class structure of officers," the "leaders" deprived the Army of suitable officers, and troops were given into the hands of mostly uneducated, unsuitable commanders. This tinkering with the defense abilities of the country was potentially suicidal. Hundreds of thousands of Hungarian youngsters could have paid with their lives for their leaders' silly decisions.

Lieutenant Colonel Laszlo Bencze, Ph.D., is deputy director of the Hungarian Military History Institute.

Dr. Frank N. Schubert edited this article. He is Chief, Field Programs Activity in the Center's Field and International Division and has a special interest in Hungarian history, culture, and philately *(see p. 17).*

A Call for Distinctive Insignia

The U.S. Army Military History Institute (MHI), Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, has on display a large collection of Army distinctive insignia (unit crests) and shoulder patches. The initial collection, which was obtained in 1969, has now grown to over 12,000 insignia representing a wide variety of brigades, regiments, battalions, companies, detachments, and ROTC units. With over 9,000 of these insignia on display, the collection is proving to be a very popular exhibit for visitors—especially veterans. Your assistance is requested in helping this display grow.

Newly created insignia are received automatically from the Institute of Heraldry, and donations from Army War College students and visitors help fill some of the shortages. But there remain many older crests still not represented in the collection. Over the years each unit may have several different variations of crests, with slight differences in color and shape caused by changing manufacturer or resulting from modifications directed by the Institute of Heraldry. MHI is also missing numerous "unauthorized" crests that were made and worn overseas during World War II, Korea, and Vietnam, but never approved by the Institute of Heraldry or its predecessors.

You may have that extra insignia or patch that is just the one MHI needs to keep the exhibit growing. Your assistance would be greatly appreciated in making certain that your old unit is represented adequately. To send in your insignia or to obtain more information about the collection, contact Mr. Mike Winey, Curator, U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013-5008 (AV: 242-3434).

Clio in DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM

Billy A. Arthur

"History is the last thing we care about during operations and the first thing we want afterwards. Then it is too little, too late and too untrue."

These words spoken during World War II by Col. William A. Ganoe, the ETOUSA (European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army) chief historian, served as guideposts for planning the historical coverage of the DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM operations. The concept of historical coverage for the deployment and operations in the Persian Gulf was essentially an outgrowth of the military history organizations, after-action reporting, and interview techniques pioneered in World War II by the Army's own military historian predecessors such as Martin Blumenson, Hugh M. Cole, S.L.A. Marshall, and Forrest C. Pogue.

Historians in the Theater of Operations

The first organizations designed to provide historical coverage of wartime operations appeared late in World War II as teams assigned to the Information and Historical Service, established by War Department *T'O & E* 20-12S [*sic*]. The Information and Historical Service consisted of a headquarters detachment, news teams, and historical teams. Designated by the letters A, B, and C, the historical teams differed in composition and were commanded by a lieutenant colonel, major, and captain, respectively.

Similar history organizations served in Korea and Vietnam, undergoing some modifications to meet changed requirements and limitations in personnel. By the 1970s the Army had adopted the standard military history organization currently used in the DESERT operations. It consists of three military personnel--one major-commander, one staff sergeant as public affairs supervisor, and one specialist as clerk/driver. The official terminology for this historical organization is the military history detachment (MHD), and the Total Army force includes twenty-four: three Active Army (two are unmanned), thirteen U.S. Army Reserve, and eight Army National Guard.

Throughout its organizational evolution, the MHD mission has remained unchanged--to ensure the preservation of operational records and to produce material to supplement the history of Army units in the field. This supplementary material includes interviews, documents, photographs, maps, overlays, journals, and audio and video recordings that are used by the Center of Military History to prepare the official histories of the operation. The most familiar and often-consulted of these official works are the World War II "green books," which have been used by a host of scholars as the basis for popular military histories.

Historical coverage in the theater of operations began with the 44th Military History Detachment's arrival in Saudi Arabia on 11 September, some six weeks after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. The 44th, assigned to Headquarters, Forces Command, Fort McPherson, Ga., and the only manned MHD in the Active Army, was attached to Lt. Gen. John Yeosock's U.S. Army Forces Central Command (ARCENT, nee Third U.S. Army), the Army component of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). The MHD commander, Maj. Larry Heystek, served as the theater Army historian until the authorization and manning of an ARCENT history office. In early January 1991 Col. Richard Swain arrived in Riyadh from Combat Studies Institute to head a three-person ARCENT history office. The 44th remained at ARCENT, working under Colonel Swain's direction, but was then able to spend more time in the field conducting interviews, checking records, and performing other doctrinal functions.

As the troop buildup continued, Reserve Component military history detachments were mobilized and deployed—by 27 December seven detachments (four USAR and three ARNG) had arrived in Saudi Arabia. According to current Army doctrine, military history detachments are attached to corps and divisions, and down through separate brigade and equivalent-level support commands. However, since there were not enough to go around in DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM, the detachments were pooled at corps level to be used as the corps historian saw fit. In addition, one detachment was attached to the 22d Support Command (Theater Army Area).

The inprocessing of the MHDs, beginning with selection of units to be mobilized, mobilization, deployment scheduling, processing and assignment in theater--all complex actions in themselves--were handled at Headquarters, Forces Command. The command historian there, Mr. William E. Stacey,



SCUD BUSTER *by SFC Peter Varisano. Saudi Arabia, 1990. U.S. Army Art Collection 1.20.91*

effected the staff coordination necessary to fit the MHDs into a plan for historical coverage of both operations.

Some deploying units took their historians with them to the theater of operations. The XVIII Airborne Corps command historian, Dr. Robert K. Wright, deployed in his regular position as XVIII Airborne Corps command historian and was mobilized in-country as Major Wright. The 101st Airborne Division Historian, Capt. Ida M. McGrath, deployed and served as the division historian during DESERT SHIELD until redeployed as a result of an emergency and replaced by 1st Lt. C. M. Lippard. Captain McGrath is currently assigned to the division emergency operations center at Fort Campbell, where she has the additional duty of preserving the division's records as they are shipped back to Fort Campbell. Mr. Dan Petersen, Spearhead Museum Curator and division historian, deployed from Germany with 3d Armored Division. The VII Corps civilian historian remained in Germany with the corps base, and Lt. Col. Peter Kindsvatter was assigned as the corps staff historian.

In most other cases, those DESERT STORM units that did not have full-time historians sensed that their participation in the operation was momentous and appointed historical officers to perform history functions in addition to their normal duties.

Historical Coverage of Special Topics

Certain other historians deployed to the theater of operations to provide historical coverage of topics of special interest. At the request of the commander of the 22d Support Command, the Center of Military History sent an officer-historian to that organization to cover the monumental logistical story surrounding the desert operations. Maj. Glen R. Hawkins filled this position until mid-March, when he was replaced by Maj. William W. Epley, both are from the Center of Military History. In addition, because of the massive and unprecedented complexity of the logistical effort and the size of the support command itself, the 90th MHD was attached to the 22d Support Command when it arrived in-country.

Dr. Richard W. Stewart, Command Historian, U.S. Army Special Operations Command, and an Army Reserve major, was placed on active duty for forty-five days to cover special operations in the theater. Dr. Stewart conducted historical interviews there, while working out of Special Operations Command Central (SOCCENT). He interviewed special operations planners and operators from A-team to SOCCENT staff levels. When the war ended, Major

Stewart was at the U.S. Embassy in Kuwait City.

Lt. Col. Patricia B. Wise, Army Nurse Corps, and a historian at the Center, and Capt. Donald E. Hall, Academy of Health Sciences, deployed to ARCENT to cover medical operations and activities.

Army Artists Portray Desert Operations

Two teams of Army artists deployed to the Gulf to depict the American soldier in DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM through combat art. The first team to deploy consisted of two Regular Army sergeants first class-illustrators, Sieger Hartgers and Peter G. Varisano, from the 560th Signal Battalion, Lowry AFB, Colorado, who covered the arrivals of DESERT SHIELD units in Saudi Arabia. Armed with cameras and sketch pads, Sergeants Hartgers and Varisano spent some 45 days in the theater, collecting enough raw material to complete numerous drawings and paintings of the desert war upon their return to Lowry AFB.

At the time of this writing, another artist team, of two Reserve Component officers, Lt. Col. Frank M. Thomas (a high school art teacher from Utah) and Capt. Mario H. Acevedo (a California professional artist), just returned from the theater of operations. They are attached to the Center while they turn the raw material they collected into artistic-historical representations of the war. The art works produced by both teams will become a permanent part of the Center's Army Art Collection.

The Historical Network

In summary, the following network provided historical coverage in the theater of operations:

- HQ ARCENT: 1 COL, 1 MAJ, and 1 NCO as staff historians

44th MHD (Active Army from FORSCOM HQ)
Medical: 1 LTC, 1 CPT (TDY)
Two teams of artists (TDY)

- USARSOC: 1 MAJ (TDY)

- VII Corps: 1 LTC as staff historian

50th MHD (USAR, Bozeman, Mont.), 132d MHD (ARNG, Madison, Wis.), 326th MHD (USAR, Columbus, Ohio)

3AD: 1 CIV as curator/historian

- XVIII Abn Corps: 1 MAJ as staff historian

116th MHD (ARNG, Manassas, Va.), 130th MHD (ARNG, Raleigh, N.C.), 317th MHD (USAR, East Pt., Ga.)

101st Abn Div: 1 CPT as historian

- 22d TAACOM: 1 MAJ as staff historian (TDY from CMH)

90th MHD (USAR, San Antonio, Tex.)

Historical Coverage in the United States

Meanwhile, in the United States, it was clear that there was an important story to be told, involving mobilization, readiness, deployment, training, sustainment, and effects on the homefront, just to name a few subjects. Interviews had to be conducted, documents had to be preserved, monographs and histories had to be planned and written. Most of this work could be handled by the history offices located at major commands, their subcommands, and installations; however, in some instances there were no historians assigned or current staffing was not adequate to cover this additional workload. In the following cases, MHDs and individual mobilization augmentees (IMAs) were mobilized to cover specific aspects of the mobilization and deployment of units.

To write the history of Second Army's participation in DESERT SHIELD, one lieutenant colonel IMA (individual mobilization augmentee) was activated and assigned as the staff historian, and the 322d MHD (USAR, Tuscaloosa, Ala.) was called up in September 1990--making it the first Reserve Component history detachment to be activated. The detachment has remained on active duty at Second Army Headquarters, Fort Gillem, Ga., spending more than five of its first eight weeks on active duty in the field conducting interviews and gathering data on the mobilization, training, and deployment of Reserve Component units to Saudi Arabia. Members of the unit have traveled to mobilization stations in eight southeastern states and Puerto Rico, gathering information from the following sources: individuals in units deploying, mobilization assistance teams, mobilization and emergency operations centers, installation support commands, various state adjutants general, the Directorate of Reserve Components, commanders of Army Reserve Commands, and the Second Army staff. (As a matter of interest, in the last three years the 322d MHD has particiapted in Operation BRIGHT STAR and has had four tours in Panama--three to work on the history of Joint Task Force BRAVO and one to report on the nation building following Operation JUST CAUSE.)

In Fifth Army the 101st MHD (NG, Omaha, Neb.) was mobilized in February 1991 to undertake a mission similar to what the 322d MHD was doing in

sion similar to what the 322d MHD was doing in Second Army, that is, to record the mobilization of Reserve Component units there. In doing so, the 101st paid particular attention to mobilization activities in support of DESERT SHIELD at Fort Sam Houston, Tex., Fort Polk, La., and at the service schools in the Fifth Army area.

At the Department of the Army level, historians augmented the Army Staff and the Center of Military History to meet those additional responsibilities brought on by DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. Lt. Col. Richard D. Adamczyk, a Center IMA, was attached to the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel to record the personnel actions relating to the Gulf war and to provide "lessons learned" observations from the perspective of the personnel. Lieutenant Colonel Adamczyk attended Army Operations Center and director-level meetings and collected from action officers historically significant documents and working papers that might otherwise have been destroyed. He interviewed 40 staff officers concerning DESERT operations personnel issues before hostilities began, and again afterwards to provide a picture of decision making during the planning process and how plans were altered to meet contingencies.

At the Center, one MHD and three IMAs came on board to perform DESERT SHIELD- and DESERT STORM-related functions. Two colonels, Charles A. Endress and Arthur Samuel, formed a cell to record the Reserve Component mobilization process from the Department of the Army perspective. Both traveled extensively to collect documents and to interview personnel at mobilization and training centers and units returning from the Gulf. The Center's third IMA, Lt. Col. Carolyn M. Feller, backfilled the Army Nurse Corps historian position vacated when Lieutenant Colonel Wise departed for temporary duty in Southwest Asia.

Maj. John H. King and SSgt. Christopher N. Choppelas constitute the 51st MHD, a USAR unit from the Presidio of San Francisco. The 51st MHD was mobilized in February 1991 and reported for a year of active service at the Center on 6 March. The detachment's primary duty is to provide direct support to the MHDs in Southwest Asia and to support the writing of the official histories of the DESERT operations. In addition, the 51st will study MHD operations during all phases of the operations and evaluate their performance in terms of personnel administration, equipment doctrine, and training.

Center Support to CENTCOM

Two historians from the Center of Military History augmented the historical office of U.S. Central Command Headquarters at MacDill Air Force Base (AFB), Fla., during part of Operation DESERT SHIELD, 21 August-14 September 1990. The augmentation came at the request of USCENTCOM, because its command historian had been called to active duty with the U.S. Army Reserve, leaving the command without a historian during the critical initial deployment of Operation DESERT SHIELD.

Maj. William W. Epley, Military Studies Branch and Dr. Richard Hunt, Oral History Branch, deployed from CMH to MacDill, each spending about two weeks there. The two CMH historians were joined by augmentee historians from the other services. During the first half of August, there were four historians, representing each service augmenting the USCENTCOM history office. Directed by the deputy chief of staff to develop a plan for historical coverage of CENTCOM during the DESERT operations, the augmentees implemented the following actions necessary to provide for coverage of the joint headquarters: interviews of key players, document and electronic message preservation, attendance at daily command briefings, and the issuance of a memorandum directing that the staff support the history effort in the headquarters.

Writing the Official History

As of this writing, the ground war has come to an end, and troop redeployments are under way—for the historian this means his work is just beginning. Command reports must be written, interviews must be completed before the individuals are departed, tapes must be transcribed, unit records must be screened, sorted, and preserved, journals, maps, and overlays must be retained—in short all of the materials needed to write the official histories must be collected and preserved.

If this is done successfully, perhaps we can overcome Colonel Ganoe's prediction, and the history of the DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM will not be "too little, too late and too untrue."

Mr. Billy A. Arthur is Chief, Leader Development Activity, Field and International Division. He wishes to thank the following, who contributed to this article: Maj. William W. Epley, CMH; Maj. Larry Heystek, 44th MHD; Maj. Lewis D. Turberville, 322d MHD; and Dr. Richard Stewart, USASOC.

The Exchange Program With the Hungarian Military Institute and Museum

Frank N. Schubert

As part of the ongoing exchange program with the Hungarian Military History Institute and Museum, the Center of Military History recently acquired over thirty books on Hungarian military history. This exchange of historical information began in 1988, when a delegation of U.S. Army historians visited the institute's headquarters in Budapest. During the following year the Center shipped a number of volumes to the Institute, and a Hungarian group, led by the then director general of the institute—Maj. Gen. Ervin Liptai—came to Washington. With the arrival of the Hungarian books the exchange took another major stride toward fulfilling the exchange program's potential for illuminating mutual concerns and sharing the fruits of official scholarship.

The shipment shows the wide-ranging interests of Hungarian military historians--from the ninth century battles in which the Magyars took over the Danube basin to the world wars of the twentieth century. There is even a biography of Mihaly Kovats, a Hungarian-born cavalryman who fought for American independence during the RevolutionaryWar. Studies of Hungarian participation in World War II, in which the Hungarian government fought on the side of the Axis, tend to emphasize the Hungarian resistance to the Nazis, exceptional though this opposition was.

Very little in these books concerns post-World War II subjects. Nevertheless, there are indications, among them Laszlo Bencze's essay (see p. 8) of this issue) that official historians in Hungary are beginning to turn their attention to the period of Communist rule.

The books also come in a variety of formats. General Liptai's two-volume *Military History of Hungary* is a massive and attractive publication with many color illustrations and maps, but no footnotes. Laszlo Bencze's monograph on the 1878 occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina is a more fully documented traditional study, with three sections of black and white plates and five maps. Another, a profusely illustrated history by Jozsef Lugosi and Ference Temesvary of European and American pistols is oriented more toward collectors than historians.

Members of the Military History Institute staff are prominent among the authors represented. There are three books by Dr. Lorand Domrady on the Hungarian Army during the late regency and World War II. Other titles are by Dr. Marton Farkas, an expert on the World War I period; Dr. Bencze, who has written extensively on the Austro-Turkish War of 1878; and Dr. Gabor Bona, who specializes in the revolution of 1848. There are also books by Dr. Laszlo Nagy, an authority on the expulsion of the Turks from Europe; Dr. Sandor Szakaly, on the Hungarian elites of World War II; and Dr. Jozsef Zachar, who has written on Hungarians in foreign armies as well as on other subjects.

The institute's overall mission is the study of the entire spectrum of Hungarian military history. The current director general, Dr. Gyula Razso, heads a complex organization that includes the institute, the museum, a library, a map collection, and archives. The publications program includes a scholarly quarterly journal, *Publications on Military History*, edited by Ference Csakvary, as well as narrative histories.

The War History Museum is housed with the institute in a dignified old building near the northwest corner of the Buda castle hill. The museum has its own publications program as well as exhibits. The staff responds to queries regarding flags, uniforms, and orders and decorations. The museum collections contain several hundred thousand artifacts, including uniforms, weapons, flags, medals, and artwork.

The other elements of the institute also have significant holdings. The map collection, which is open to the public, is the largest of its kind in Hungary and contains military surveys dating back to the time of the eighteenth-century Hapsburg emperor, Joseph II, and items pertaining to the military history of other European countries. The library, also open to the public, has over 100,000 volumes, as well as military reports, periodicals, and translations of foreign military literature.

The archives is the primary custodian of official records of the Army. The collections occupy 7,000 meters of shelves. Two scholars from the archives work permanently in the Vienna Military Archives supervising materials concerning the Austro-Hungarian Army of 1856-1915. As the keeper of the army's records as well as its historian, the institute joins missions and operations that are kept separate in the United States. Otherwise its functions are similar to those carried out in the U.S. Army historical program.

1941

APRIL - JUNE

1 Apr - Paul Fehse, a German-born naturalized American citizen charged with failure to register as a foreign agent, pleads guilty, and receives a prison sentence of a year and a day. The former ship's cook from the SS *Manhattan* admitted to sending Germany information about British shipping.

-$154,000,000 worth of defense orders are stalled when 8,000 workers go on strike at the Ford Motor Company.

-Congressman Leland M. Ford (R-Calif.) introduces a bill that would make strikes involving the defense program an illegal act of treason punishable by up to twenty-five years imprisonment.

2 Apr - The House votes to allow its Military and Naval Affairs Committees to examine the effects of strikes on defense program contract fulfillment.

-The British commander in Eastern Asia, Air Chief Marshal Sir Robert Brooke-Popham, meets with U.S. Asiatic Fleet commander Admiral Thomas C. Hart and Maj. Gen. Douglas MacArthur to discuss the defense of the Philippines.

3 Apr - Secretary of State Cordell Hull rejects the protests of Germany and Italy against the 30 March seizure of their ships in American ports.

-The War Department announces that it will soon be training Air Corps pilots at the rate of 30,000 a year.

-President Roosevelt directs the Department of State to request the recall of the Italian naval attache, Admiral Alberto Lais, in connection with the sabotage of the seized Italian ships.

4 Apr - During a presidential press conference Roosevelt states that $500,000,000 of the Lend-Lease fund has been earmarked for Great Britain to construct 212 cargo ships, 56 shipways, and facilities for repairing merchant ships. Another $500,000,000 worth of Army and Navy supplies has been allocated to Great Britain.

-The Army publicly tests a new 25-ton medium tank at the Aberdeen Proving Grounds. The M3 tank is equipped with a 75-mm. main gun and a 37-mm. antiaircraft gun.

6 Apr - Germany invades Yugoslavia and Greece.

-Secretary of State Hull characterizes the German invasion of Yugoslavia as "barbaric."

-The 75-day strike at the Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Company, which has stalled $45,000,000 worth of defense contracts, is settled.

9 Apr - Henrik de Kauffman, Danish minister in Washington, and Secretary of State Hull sign an agreement whereby the United States is granted full military defense rights in Greenland, because of the American fear that Germany will establish a base there from which to attack North America. The German-controlled Danish government declares the agreement void.

-Italy requests of the U.S. Embassy the recall of assistant military attache Maj. William C. Bentley.

10 Apr - In the first American military action against Germany, the USS *Niblack*, a U.S. destroyer picking up survivors of a torpedoed Dutch freighter, detects a U-boat nearby and drops three depth charges on it. The submarine escapes undamaged.

12 Apr - The governor of South Greenland denies the validity of the agreement giving defense rights in Greenland to the United States. He states that U.S. forces will not have any military base rights on Greenland until he is "faced with a fait accompli." The fait accompli arrives in the form of three Coast Guard cutters and a contingent of U.S. Marines.

-Total U.S. armed forces strength reaches 1,479,359, including a 1,185,600-man Army.

18 Apr - The commander of the U.S. Atlantic Fleet, Admiral Ernest J. King, orders American ships to attack any Axis ship encountered within twenty-five miles of the Western Hemisphere.

-The U.S. Maritime Commission awards contracts for the construction of 112 10,000-ton freighters, all of which will be transferred to Great Britain.

22 Apr-Two thousand U.S. soldiers arrive in Manila to reinforce the Philippine defense forces.

-Chief of Staff George C. Marshall states before the Senate Defense Investigating Committee that the German technique of *Blitzkrieg* has prompted drastic revisions in Army tactics.

23 Apr - In continuing testimony before the Senate Defense Investigating Committee, Lt. Col. A. R. Wilson

Chronology

of the Army General Staff testifies that *Blitzkrieg*-type tactics have been taught at the army staff schools since 1932, but the lack of fast tanks and planes has restricted the use of those tactics in maneuvers.

25 Apr - A Gallup poll reveals that eighty-two percent of the respondents believe that America will enter the war, compared to fifty-nine percent in November 1940. Sixty-eight percent of those questioned would favor U.S. entry into the war if it was the only way to defeat the Axis.

30 Apr - The Douglas Aircraft Company is awarded a $43,521,300 contract to build B-19 bombers.

8 May - The chairman of the American Eagle Club, a London-based organization for Americans serving in the British and Canadian armed forces, says that there are 10,000 Americans fighting with Britain and her allies.

13 May - The War Department says that firms filling Army contracts have lost 1.7 million man-days since the beginning of the year through labor strikes.

21 May - After the passengers and crew are ordered into four lifeboats, the American freighter SS *Robin Moor* is torpedoed and sunk by a German submarine. The lifeboats drift for thirteen days before being picked up.

27 May - President Roosevelt declares an unlimited national emergency.

29 May - The United States agrees to train British pilots to fly the American planes sent to Britain through the Lend-Lease program.

31 May - Since the Lend-Lease program began, $75,202,425 in materials have been shipped to the Allies.

4 Jun-The War Department creates the Plant Production Inspections Service to provide for the "uninterrupted production of materials for defense."

5 Jun - Workers at the North American Aviation, Inc. plant at Inglewood, California, go on strike, stopping work on $200,000,000 worth of defense orders.

6 Jun - President Roosevelt signs a bill authorizing the requisition of foreign ships idle in U.S. ports.

9 Jun - 2,500 Regular Army troops under the command of Lt. Col. Charles E. Branshaw commandeer the North American Aviation, Inc., plant. Roosevelt says the plant was taken over because the strike endangered national defense. The plant's employees are invited to return to work.

-The Selective Service Administration determines that striking defense plant workers are eligible for the draft because they are no longer performing the defense work for which they were deferred.

12 Jun - The U.S. Naval Reserve is called to active duty.

16 Jun - The Department of State orders all German and Italian consular personnel out of the United States because of "improper" activities.

19 Jun - Germany and Italy order all U.S. consular personnel out of their respective countries and all Axis-controlled countries by 15 July.

-The Department of State institutes a policy of denying visas to aliens with a close relative living in German-controlled areas.

20 Jun - President Roosevelt calls the German sinking of the ship *Robin Moore* "the act of an international outlaw."

-Assuming that the American battleship *Texas* was a British Lend-Lease ship, the submarine U-203 attempts to attack it between Newfoundland and Greenland, but the *Texas* outruns the U-boat.

22 Jun - Germany invades the Soviet Union along a 2,000-mile front from the Arctic to the Black Sea.

24 Jun - President Roosevelt promises aid to the Soviet Union.

26 Jun-Army strength reaches 1,441,500 officers and men, including 594,000 draftees.

28 Jun - In the largest single appropriation action to date, the House and Senate pass a bill appropriating $10,384,821,624 for the Army.

State of the (Soviet) Union

James F. Gebhardt

From 26 September to 23 November 1990 I traveled in the Soviet Union as a guide for a United States Information Agency (USIA) book exhibit, entitled "Fighting for Freedom." The exhibit consisted of 650 recently published books about World War II, obtained from commercial publishers, and about 40 reproductions of World War II art and photographs provided by the Center of Military History. USIA prepositioned three complete sets of exhibit materials in three Soviet cities: Brest in the Byelorussian Republic, Odessa in the Ukrainian Republic, and Volgograd in the Russian Republic.

USIA's request for my participation on the exhibit staff went through Dr. John Greenwood of the Center's Field and International Division and received full cooperation from my chain of command at the Soviet Army Studies Offices and Fort Leavenworth. Our exhibit staff traveled within the Soviet Union on diplomatic passports under the sponsorship of the Soviet government's state printing agency, GOSKOMPECHAT. I was virtually unhampered by the normal restrictions that apply to foreign military personnel and was able at all times to mingle freely with Soviet citizens, both at the exhibit site and in their apartments after duty hours. Because so few U.S. Army officers ever have such an opportunity, I recorded my experiences and impressions in a diary, which became the basis for this article.

Our first few days in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) were spent in Moscow, where I had the opportunity to meet with two special people. GOSKOMPECHAT arranged an interview for me with Twice Hero of the Soviet Union Viktor Leonov, a 74-year-old World War II naval special operations veteran of the Northern Fleet (1941-44) and Pacific Fleet (1945). The following day I met with Colonel-General Dmitri Volkogonov, Director of the Institute for Military History of the Ministry of Defense.

While in Moscow I also witnessed a bit of free enterprise at the open air flea market in Ismailovskiy Stadium, and soapbox political speechmaking on the Arbat. Both were more than symbolic examples of the sharp visible changes that have occurred in the USSR in the last five years under Mikhail S. Gorbachev.

The Soviets provided our transportation between Moscow and all the exhibit sites, beginning with an overnight train ride to Brest. The windows would not open, and our compartment was only sixteen meters from a restroom that emanated strong odors of urine and ammonia. By midnight the temperature in the top of the compartment was nearly 85 degrees, and the air barely breathable. During the long night ride I thought of the Soviet partisan struggle in this region to deny the Germans full use of the rail net. At dawn I saw the birch forests in sandy soil, at times close against the track bed, often interspersed with pastures and fields.

Brest was a much cleaner city than Moscow, with broad tree-lined streets and better-maintained public buildings and houses. Our exhibit site was an art exhibition hall located in a heavily traveled pedestrian zone. To the surprise of our hosts, we began to unpack and set up the exhibit immediately upon our arrival. While hanging the reproductions I noticed a marked difference in the standards of work quality between my "supervisor," a spry grandmother, and the other helper, a man in his early forties—a difference that favored the former.

Attendance at our exhibit was brisk throughout the two-week stay in Brest. We had many walk-ins, people who saw our flag in the window and were curious, classes of school children, veterans of the Great Patriotic War, and the occasional soldier from the local garrison. They all made us feel welcome in their city and were especially appreciative that Brest had been chosen as an exhibit site. Veterans were delighted to find some photographs of the meeting on the Elbe and eagerly recounted their impressions of American soldiers. Here, as well as in the other exhibition sites, Soviet World War II veterans were eager to renew acquaintances with American units they had encountered in Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Austria. They all expressed the sentiment that forty-five years of the Cold War had not dampened their memories of the friendly encounters of April and May 1945.

In Brest I had my first meeting with veterans of the war in Afghanistan. As a Vietnam veteran I felt a special empathy with these men, who are now struggling for recognition in a society that has not yet come to terms with their war. During our stay in Brest they took me around to all the graves of the men killed in Afghanistan (nineteen officers and two soldiers) and

invited me to a dinner with two officers' widows and their families. The conversation was not about the war, but about the many aspects of military life that are shared by army families everywhere—moving, separation, schools, housing, and children. We had much in common, and I was deeply impressed by their hospitality.

On another day I was invited to supper by a 40-year-old man, Sergei, married, with two children. He was a secondary school history teacher, but refused to join the Communist Party and consequently lost his job. He now drives a truck, and his wife works as an engineer in a textile factory. They live in a comfortable apartment by Soviet standards—two rooms plus kitchen and bathroom. But the apartment belongs to Sergei's father, a retired colonel of tank troops, who now lives is Sevastopol with his second wife.

Walking to the apartment, my host pointed out many things I would not have learned in any other way. We saw prewar structures of Polish construction, a former church now used as a theater, the KGB headquarters, and the VIP quarters that Eduard Shevardnadze used recently. We stopped at the Russian Orthodox church now being reconstructed. The beauty of this church in the midst of pervasive Soviet dullness was visually and emotionally stunning. We walked past communal apartments, some constructed as recently as a year ago, where families share kitchen and bathroom facilities with other families.

His wife prepared a light meal, and we spent the evening talking. They wanted most of all to know how we live in America, especially how our economic and market systems work. I was embarrassed to tell them that my family of four has two cars and two motorcycles, when the majority of Soviets do not own a single car. My family spent about one-sixth of my income on food, while my new Soviet friends spend about half. We live in a house with about 600 square meters of usable space—they live like cattle in vertical feed lots.

My host said that an honest person could not survive in the Soviet system. Even people who hate the Communist system have to find ways to accommodate it just to survive. He is convinced that Gorbachev is dancing to Western music only to receive assistance through the current crisis, and will revert to form whenever convenient or necessary [author's note: these words, spoken in September 1990, now ring true in light of events in the Baltic republics].

We rode the train to our second exhibit site in Odessa, with a three-hour stop in Kiev. Here I witnessed a student hunger strike that later forced the resignation of the Ukrainian Republic's premier. The site of the protest was the Square of the October Revolution, virtually under the nose of a Lenin statue. The demonstration was peaceful, with few police and no troops in sight.

Although in the Ukrainian Republic, Odessa is more a cosmopolitan Russian city, where the Ukrainian language sometimes is mistaken for Polish. We found the size of our attendance to be smaller here, but people stayed longer to read our books and came back more often. As in Brest, veterans came in to talk about their meetings with Americans. The most poignant story was from an old man who was liberated from German captivity by a unit of the 11th Armored Division in late April 1945. He recalled how a German soldier was setting up a machine gun on a tripod in a clearing to execute the entire group of prisoners, when an American tank burst through the woods. Their lives were saved.

I met with two serving Soviet Army officers in Odessa, both veterans of the war in Afghanistan. They spoke guardedly at first, but later freely about their experiences. Both showed me photographs they had brought home from their two-year tours. We did not talk about the politics of war, but rather how the war looked from the perspective of the soldier and the junior officer. One officer assured me that Soviet casualties were three to four times the number admitted in the Soviet press. The other affirmed his willingness to serve alongside American troops in Saudi Arabia to stop Saddam Hussein's aggression.

In Odessa I met with one college-level class of history students to discuss Lend-Lease aid to the Soviet Union during World War II. Their questions suggested that they know very little about the type and scope of aid, but that they have been taught that American equipment was obsolete, delivered without ancillary items such as guns and radios, and made an insignificant contribution to the war effort. This official view of Lend-Lease contrasted sharply with stories told me by veterans, who flew the A-20 attack bombers, ate American food, or rescued Allied seamen from the frozen Barents Sea near Murmansk. Throughout this trip we encountered Soviet citizens who through their own experience or that of parents, grandparents, or other relatives could attest to the importance of Lend-Lease to their survival, both as individuals and as a community at large.

In Odessa I also had my first confrontation with Soviet anti-Semitism. A woman asked me, "What will

you do in America when the Jewish nation comes to power?" This led to a long conversation about what is the Jewish state (I maintained that Israel was the only Jewish state), and how ethnic groups express their political and cultural identity in the United States. The question itself, however, reveals an underlying prejudice toward Jews that is deeply held in the Soviet Union.

In a similar vein, we had an interesting discussion with a Ukranian gentleman about nationalities. He had difficulty with the fact that I would not admit to being some brand of hyphenated American. He did not realize that Americans do not carry internal passports, so we used this opening to discuss individual freedom in our country. It was after discussions like this that I began to understand the real significance of our Constitution and Bill of Rights.

We traveled from Odessa to Volgograd by air. Aeroflot flights are risky affairs, with no doors on the overhead storage compartments, and hand luggage piled on the floor in every available space. The crew members were the last to board the aircraft, and the engines were not started until right after they entered the cockpit. The flight itself was uneventful, but upon exiting the aircraft, the woman seated across the aisle pressed a plaintive note into my hand. She and her husband, both electrical engineers, have been married fifteen years. They live with one child in a room twelve meters square, and share cooking and bathing facilities with other families. She asked me for assistance in emigrating to the United States. The note left me distraught and feeling helpless.

Throughout the Soviet Union the Great Patriotic War is remembered as if it ended yesterday, yet in Volgograd it was as if the war had ended this very morning. This notion is manifested in the street names, the omnipresent plaques on the corners of the buildings, the postwar architecture of the city, the statuary, and in the conversation of the city's inhabitants. We set up the exhibit and opened it in a few days, then took three days off for the official celebration of the seventy-third anniversary of the October Revolution.

During this break we visited the tallest free-standing statue in the world, the woman with upraised sword—"Mother Russia"—162 feet tall. I thought I would be moved by this memorial, but after five weeks in the USSR, I viewed it as an empty symbol for wasted lives. It represents great sacrifices, but not great achievements. I was reminded of this when I saw ration coupons for sugar, long lines for gasoline, and young and old veterans without prostheses to replace their limbs lost in war.

The unofficial but tolerated counter demonstration by democratic parties on the Volga River was far larger than the official October Revolution celebration just a few blocks away in the city square. Demonstrators displayed many signs condemning the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and speakers showed no reluctance to point out the failings of seventy-three years of Communist rule. Here, freedom of assembly was being exercised to a degree I never thought possible in the Soviet Union in my lifetime.

In Volgograd I met a Soviet officer who participated in the cleanup at Chernobyl and was now ill with an undiagnosed blood ailment. A former young officer and I had a long discussion about my oath as a commissioned officer in the armed forces of the United States and about how seriously we take our responsibility for the safety and lives of our soldiers. Another Soviet officer, a lieutenant colonel, came into the exhibit and talked about the possibility of civil war in the Soviet Union.

From these and many other conversations with military personnel and ordinary people, I gained several impressions of the current situation in the Soviet Union. The country is coming apart. Civil war has already begun in the Caucasus and Central Asia, spreading to Moldavia during my visit, and—since my return—to the Baltic States. The central authorities have a weak grip on the political and economic infrastructure, and as the events of January 1991 clearly demonstrated, perhaps on the military apparatus as well. Questions about "who is in charge?" were the focus of daily attention among the public at large.

The Soviet Army is only as cohesive as the central authority that governs it. Republican governments within the USSR already are chipping away at the legal and demographic base of the Army, passing laws that challenge compulsory military service and troop movements and stationing. The death of thousands of draftees each year at the hands of other soldiers is a problem the military hierarchy appears both unwilling and unable to rectify. The standing of the Army in society is extremely low and will remain so as the Army is used to suppress democratic reforms, as it is now doing in some regions.

The veneer of civilization in Soviet society is wearing thin. People have always been rude to each other in the Soviet Union, but worsening economic conditions are exacerbating this problem. Soviet society is becoming a late-twentieth century "hunting and gathering" culture, as people spend two to four hours

daily in search of food.

In two months of conversations with ordinary people, I never met an optimist. Grandparents and middle-aged couples no longer think of themselves, but only of their grandchildren and children. They are without hope, realizing that what took several generations to create cannot be torn down and replaced overnight. They worry about where the next meal is coming from and they worry about where the next government is coming from.

The Soviet people I met on this trip still remember the food aid provided them through the American Relief Agency during the famine in 1921, as well as Lend-Lease material supplied during World War II. They also look to America as the embodiment of a free market economy and the world's most visible, functional democratic society. So they see us not only as a source of material support for their crippled economy, but also as intellectual inspiration for their crippled political system.

Even though I have studied the Soviet Union for almost twenty years, only now have I begun to understand how the Soviet people live. Not only did this trip change the way I think about them, it changed the way I think about my own country. I met many Soviet citizens of my generation who have worked as hard or harder than I for their entire lives. The difference between us is that the American political and economic system has allowed me, and Americans at large, to reap far greater rewards for our labors. Just as I now have a far greater sense of what it means to be a Soviet citizen, I also more fully understand what it means to be an American. Long after the mental pictures of Soviet life fade, this greater understanding will remain.

Maj. James F. Gebhardt, formerly a military analyst with the Soviet Army Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, is now an escort officer with the On Site Inspection Agency.

Exemplary Service: The U.S. Army in Vera Cruz, 1914

Mark Edmond Clark

On 22 February 1913 Mexican President Francisco Madero was assassinated. His main opponent, a revolutionary and a military officer named Victoriano Huerta, seized the presidency. Many who were concerned with the situation in Mexico erroneously connected Madero's murder with Huerta's seizure of power and held him responsible. Nevertheless, most nations—especially European nations with interests in Mexico—recognized his government.

At the same time that Huerta seized power, Woodrow Wilson was elected president of the United States. Wilson refused to recognize the Huerta government on the grounds that its leader had not taken office in a constitutional manner. Consistent with that position, Wilson strongly supported efforts by the Mexican people to bring about a new constitutional government. He aided many anti-Huerta factions, but threw his strongest support to Venustiano Carranza and his *Constitutionalista*.

Wilson permitted Carranza to buy arms from American arms suppliers, nullifying an embargo set by President William Howard Taft in 1912. In more direct action against Huerta, on 22 April 1914 Wilson responded to an incident between a few U.S. sailors and Huertistan soldiers at Tampico by blockading and occupying the port of Vera Cruz (later, Veracruz) with a force of almost eight thousand U.S. military personnel. That intervention, as well as the constant pressure applied by well-supplied *Constitutionalista*, caused Huerta to step down. Carranza became the new president in Mexico.

This paper will examine the U.S. Army's role during the occupation of Vera Cruz in 1914: how the Army managed to operate successfully overseas within poorly considered foreign policy guidelines set by the administration; and how, historically, the Army handled occupation duties. This story is a testament to the fine service and superior capabilities of U.S. Army officers

on the scene.

After word of Madero's assassination reached Washington, the Army staff considered the possibility of fighting a full-scale war with Mexico. As time passed, that possibility became more likely, because by aiding the *Constitutionalista* and other factions, Wilson was directly involving the United States in a hostile environment. (1) The Army's chief of staff, General Leonard Wood, became committed to an interventionist stand on the issue of Mexico. Secretary of War Lindley Garrison supported General Wood's position.

Ironically, when the United States finally intervened with force, U.S. marines and sailors were used primarily. It seemed for a time as if the Army would have a comparatively small role in the involvement. (2) After Vera Cruz was secured, however, Wilson—influenced by the strong advice of Secretary Garrison—dispatched the U.S. 5th Brigade, commanded by Maj. Gen. Frederick Funston, to Vera Cruz to replace most of the marines and sailors holding positions there. While that force sailed, the Army General Staff considered the possibility of dispatching additional troops to put an end to the instability in that region once and for all. But that opportunity never materialized. Wilson's limited order for the Army to occupy the city remained unchanged.

When the Army arrived in Vera Cruz on 30 April 1914, it quickly took command of the situation in the city. The U.S. military commanders on the scene conferred and then appointed an American civilian official, Robert Kerr, to the position of governor of the occupied area. Unfortunately, Kerr was a Republican and very anti-Wilson. (3) The two military men were unconcerned with the politics involved and only sought to establish a qualified administrator to handle the variety of problems involved with an occupation operation. Nevertheless, the appointment caused great consternation among Democrats in the United States, and Wilson felt compelled to remove Kerr. (4) In his place as governor, the president appointed General Funston. Shortly thereafter, General Funston was given complete command of all U.S. forces in the area.

Like many senior Army officers of that period, General Funston was not a graduate of the Military Academy at West Point. He was thirty years of age when he joined the Army as a lieutenant, winning fame during the Philippine Insurrection for single-handedly capturing Emilio Aguinaldo, the famous Filipino nationalist. General Funston emerged from the campaign as a brigadier general in the Regular Army. During the thirteen years that followed, he fell into obscurity and gained a reputation within the Army for being "wonderfully expert in unfolding and refolding red tape and signing requisitions for hams and shoes." (5) But his administrative skills were respected, especially after his tenure as commandant of the Command and General Staff College. In many ways General Funston was well prepared for addressing the situation in Vera Cruz.

When Wilson decided on the occupation, he planned to allow local Mexican authorities to continue exercising their functions as they had before the arrival of the sailors and marines. (6) Only the customs and port activities were to operate under military control. (7) Wilson saw the occupation as an opportunity to prove a deeply held notion of his that "when properly directed, there is no people not fitted for self-government." (8) Most Mexican civilian employees, however, refused to return to their government jobs because of threats from Mexico City to punish collaborators. Their absence created a major problem for General Funston.

In order to comply with Wilson's order, General Funston had to develop a method of working around the Mexicans' boycott. After reviewing his options, General Funston decided to reestablish the government in Vera Cruz by using U.S. Army officers in lieu of civilian officials. The officers were to formulate and implement any reforms they deemed necessary, and then gradually to bring about a transition from a military to a civilian government. Army officers, therefore, turned their hands from warfare to governing and operating the civic departments of public works, public safety, education, finance, and law.

The government of Vera Cruz had been weak and inefficient for years. Most of its departments were rife with graft and corruption. The city's financial records were in a shambles. Sanitation was very poor. The city's schools were closed more often than they were open. Court cases were solved with bribes and bargains. With the installation of the Army officers, however, all of these conditions began to change.

The first problem the new government had to cope with was sanitation. Vera Cruz was a city cluttered with filth and refuse. Vultures, dogs flies, and vermin were everywhere. With the rainy season approaching, it would be impossible for the U.S. soldiers to occupy the city without a massive cleanup. Thus, during the first days of May 1914 the new government put over three thousand soldiers to work night and day cleaning up the city to meet military standards.

After the cleanup, the Department of Public Works began reconstructing the city. The Army's soldiers replaced windows, doors, roofs, and walls. The department paved streets and crafted concrete sidewalks for the entire city. General Funston issued many decrees implementing sanitation and health measures. Sanitation laws were rigidly enforced, and offenders were subject to jail sentences. Health laws, such as mandatory vaccinations for the entire population of the city, proved to be successful. Because of these requirements, the death rate because of disease dropped 25 percent from previous months. (9)

At the same time the Department of Education made great reforms of the public school system. The Army officers assigned there would accept only those teachers who were qualified and motivated to work in the schools. To improve the quality of instruction in the schools, a teachers' institute was established. The system the Army created was so efficient and effective that it continued to function in the same manner long after the U.S. forces left in November 1914.

The Department of Finance managed to put the city's bookkeeping in order. A schedule for collecting taxes was set up and vigorously implemented by the Army officers. Those who failed to pay were subject to legal penalties.

In legal matters, the Army's officers in the Department of Law initially confined their attention to supervising the occupation troops. (10) Half the men garrisoned in the city were court-martialed by the end of the occupation. (11) Of the more than two thousand-four hundred cases brought before the court, all but eighty-three ended in conviction. Fifty-three of the soldiers convicted received dishonorable discharges. (12)

As time passed, however, the officers in the Department of Law were given the task of controlling the civil population. Since the members of the civilian police force and other law enforcement agencies—like their counterparts in other departments—refused to serve under or with the U.S. servicemen, the Army officers had to establish a new police force. They placed it under the control of a Cuban who had been chief of police in Havana during the U.S. occupation there following the Spanish-American War.

As for the judicial system, the new government was prepared to handle a variety of civilian cases. A military commissar was created with the power of life and death in cases of persons charged with infractions of the Laws of Hostile Occupation and the Laws of War. (13) Further, four inferior provost courts and one superior provost court were established to hear criminal cases.

Initially, the Mexican attitude toward the improvements made by the Army officers in the new government was one of disinterest. Soon, however, the improvement in their quality of life brought about through the U.S. changes began to reshape their views. (14)

President Wilson planned to keep the U.S. force in Vera Cruz until he was positive Mexico had set up a provisional government that satisfied him. (15) But the new leader in Mexico, Carranza, had a different timetable. Once Huerta was forced from power, Carranza no longer saw the need for U.S. troops to control the city. On 16 September 1914 he sent a communique to Washington demanding the evacuation of the U.S. force.

Wilson agreed to Carranza's demand and ordered the army out of the city immediately, as a sign of his desire to bring about the speedy establishment of a "truly just and representative government in Mexico." (16) To Wilson, it was obvious that as long as the U.S. force remained in Vera Cruz, Carranza would not have full control of his country. For his part, however, General Funston was quite chagrined by the president's order.

Funston wanted to complete his mission of providing the machinery for self-government in Vera Cruz. He recognized the need to provide for a smooth transition from the Army's officers to Mexican civilians. If the Americans left the city immediately, most of the reforms made during the occupation could be undone if the government positions were filled with individuals who did not know how to work within the new system. Funston wanted time to train competent Mexican employees who would ensure the survival of the work already accomplished. Clearly, something had to be done to convince the president to delay his order.

In a desperate effort, General Funston sent a request to Secretary of War Garrison. He asked Garrison to have the president suggest to Carranza that the Mexican leader send some personnel to Vera Cruz to observe the Army's methods of operation and to maintain stability once the U.S. forces departed. Funston also requested that the Mexican government provide protection for the civilians who eventually came forward to aid the U.S. Army in governing the city.

Garrison discussed the situation with Wilson, and on 21 September 1914 the president demanded that Carranza guarantee that "no new duties be collected,"

and that "no punishment would be inflicted upon the population...." (17) Carranza, however, refused to provide an answer and remained noncommittal to Wilson's demand. He wanted only to see the U.S. troops out of his country, and he saw Wilson's request merely as a stalling tactic. As words between the two leaders became increasingly hostile, a diplomatic stalemate developed that lasted for two months. In the end, it was Carranza who backed down. Under pressure from a new revolutionary faction, he could not confront that problem and Wilson simultaneously.

On 9 November 1914 the Carranza government granted a general amnesty to all Mexicans who had aided the Army officers in Vera Cruz. Two weeks later, U.S. forces evacuated the city.

Clearly, the U.S. Army served as an instrument of Woodrow Wilson's policy for Mexico. Not only by its presence, but also by its operations, the Army served as a demonstration of Wilson's determination and his concern for the right of the Mexican people to have a constitutional form of government. Yet, fulfilling that mission was not easy. The Army officers directing the occupation of Vera Cruz had far less than ideal conditions with which to work.

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As part of their professional technique, Army officers lead, teach, guide, build, counsel, and learn. They work with ideas and with people. They meet the challenge of motivating individuals to do their best. It is no small responsibility to perform these tasks while leading soldiers in peace or during an emergency. Moreover, it is much more difficult to perform these tasks with individuals who speak a different language, are untrained and undisciplined by military standards, or are unreceptive and uncooperative.

Despite the handicaps, through the resourcefulness and ingenuity of General Funston and the other Army officers who held positions in the various departments of the Vera Cruz government, the United States government was able to provide the people of the city with a demonstration of its good intentions toward Mexico. Seventy-five years later, the Army's achievements in Vera Cruz remain exemplary of the service that Army officers can provide and a credit to Army training and the school system that helped to develop those officers.

Mark Edmond Clark has a master's degree in American history from Columbia and a law degree from Georgetown University. Currently, he is head of his own academic and management consulting firm in New York City.

Notes

1. In a letter to his wife, young Lieutenant George S. Patton, Jr., while on assignment with General Leonard Wood's staff noted: "We all think here that intervention will be necessary as soon as Mr. Wilson gets in." Martin Blumenson, *The Patton Papers* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, Co., 1972), 1: 243.
2. The *New York Times*, 22 April 1914.
3. Robert Quirk, *An Affair of Honor* (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1962), p. 107.
4. "Personal Glimpses: Fighting Fred Funston," *Literary Digest* 48 (1914), p. 1269.
5. Ibid.
6. Quirk, *Affair of Honor*, p. 128.
7. Ibid.
8. Samuel Blythe, "Mexico: The Record of a Conversation with President Wilson," *Saturday Evening Post* 47 (1914), p. 15.
9. Jack London, "Lawgivers," *Collier's* 53 (1914), p. 15.
10. Quirk, *Affair of Honor*, p. 139.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid.
13. London, "Lawgivers," p. 14.
14. Quirk, *Affair of Honor*, pp. 154-55.
15. Mark Gilderhaus, *Diplomacy and Revolution, U.S.-Mexican Relations Under Wilson and Carranza* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1977), p. 16.
16. Ibid.
17. U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States 1913 (Mexico)* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1922), p. 603.

Focus on the Field

Historical Services Branch
Directorate of Public, Legislative,
Intergovernmental Affairs and Policy
National Guard Bureau
Lt. Col. Leonid Kondratiuk, Chief

The Historical Services Branch, National Guard Bureau (NGB), was created in October 1981. Before that time historical tasks were performed by the Office of Public Affairs and the Administrative Services Office. Lt. Gen. La Vern Weber, then chief of the NGB, realized that the bureau needed a professional historical office to support the renewed interest by members of the Guard in their own history.

The National Guard Bureau originally was established in 1908 as the Division of Militia Affairs. In 1916 it became the Militia Bureau, and in 1933, the National Guard Bureau.

The mission of the NGB has not changed since 1908 when it was chartered to serve as the channel of communications between the War Department and the several states on all matters pertaining to the National Guard. With the creation of the Air National Guard in 1947, the National Guard Bureau became a joint bureau of the Departments of the Army and the Air Force. The NGB is organized into a Joint Staff, which is concerned with policies common to both the Army and Air Guard; the Army Directorate, which sets policy for the training, funding, and logistical support of the Army Guard; and the Air Directorate, which similarly sets policies for the Air Guard. By law, 60 percent of the officers assigned to the NGB are active Army and Air Force—the balance are National Guard officers on active duty. While the NGB is an integral part of the Army and Air Staffs, it also has the same functions as a major command.

One of the original tasks of the NGB was to maintain data concerning the history and operations of the National Guard, and today that task serves as the mission of the Historical Services Branch. Before 1981 NGB basically collected documents and passed through letters and policies from the Chiefs of Military and Air Force History to the adjutants general of the states. As the office grew from one historian and two technicians to its current staff of six historians—two civilian and four military—the branch launched a National Guard Historical Program, which established policies for the recording of National Guard unit and state history, lineage and honors, museums, publications and heraldry.

The office provides historical support to NGB, adjutants general of the states, and to individual Army and Air Guard units. The staff works closely with the commanders of the 7 military history detachments (3 of which are serving in Saudi Arabia), 30 state command historians, 33 museum and historical holdings curators, 113 Air Guard group/wing historians, and several hundred regimental and battalion historians.

The NGB is the office of record for federal recognition and historical documents for 5,000 National Guard units and all orders affecting the reorganization of National Guard units. Much of our work concerns writing the annual histories for both the Chiefs of Military and Air Force History. These reports are different in content and reflect the joint Army-Air Force historical mission and organization—unique within the Department of Defense. Other NGB programs and missions include the museum program, lineages, heraldry, ceremonies, the U.S. Army Regimental System, force structure issues, and publications.

The museums and historical holdings receive no federal funds. These museums rely on a combination of state support, foundation funding, and other sources. Most of the historical holdings were established in the 1980s as the Guard renewed its interest in its history and became concerned with preserving the material culture of the National Guard.

An important part of the mission involves preserving unit lineages. Unlike active Army units, Army National Guard units are either active or disbanded. Units cannot be inactivated and then reactivated. Therefore, the Historical Services Branch works closely with the states, the National Guard Bureau force structure office, and the Center of Military History's Organizational History Branch to ensure that the Guard's oldest and most distinguished units remain in the force structure. Generally speaking, the Guard has been successful in preserving its oldest units. The four oldest, the 101st Field Artillery, 101st Engineers, 181st Infantry, and 182d Infantry, Massachusetts Army

The First Muster *by Don Troiani portrays the East Regiment, Massachusetts Militia, in 1637.*

President John F. Kennedy is presented with the first National Guard Heritage painting, The Whites of Their Eyes, *in September 1962.*

National Guard (all organized 13 December 1636), and others in New England and Virginia are the oldest units in the Total Army and are among the world's oldest military units. However, these regiments and others are threatened by future force reductions. With this fact in mind, the NGB will be very busy during the next two years.

The office works closely with the Institute of Heraldry and individual units in authorizing distinctive shoulder sleeve insignia for the Army Guard and organizational emblems for the Air Guard. The Historical Services Branch produced two posters depicting these sleeve insignia and organizational emblems.

The NGB staff works closely with Lt. Gen. Robert Arter's office in coordinating the participation of National Guard units in the World War II commemoration and other ceremonies. The office sponsored a Pentagon ceremony last September that recognized the entry into federal service of the Guard's eighteen divisions in 1940. The staff also works with Army attaches in sending bands to take part in activities outside the continental United States that recognize the Guard's combat role in World Wars I and II. Generally, the NGB deploys a division band or a separate band that took part in a particular campaign. In the last three years we have deployed bands several times to France and Italy, as well as to Australia and Papua-New Guinea.

Since the office works with force structure, history, and lineage, the branch operates the U.S. Army Regimental System for the Army National Guard. The Guard consists of 259 regiments. The office sets the policy for regimental affiliation for the Army National Guard's 457,000 soldiers, works with the honorary colonels in assisting them with their duties, and with the headquarters offices within the several states.

The NGB publishes its annual history, *Annual Review of the Chief, National Guard Bureau*, and Renee Greene's *A Brief History of the Militia and National Guard* is always kept in print. The branch staff is now preparing for publication a history of the National Guard Bureau as well as biographies of past chiefs.

The office's best known publication is the National Guard Heritage Series poster series, which currently consists of forty posters depicting the history of the National Guard from 1636 to the present. The series is known for its artistic quality, its historical accuracy, and its depiction of important incidents in American military history. Well-known artists such as Don Troiani, Mort Kunstler, and Keith Rocco have participated in the series. The branch's goal is to produce at least one poster for each state. The staff also publishes the Presidential Series, an eighteen-poster set depicting the Militia/National Guard service of eighteen U.S. presidents.

In addition to posters and publications in print, the branch recently produced a twenty-three minute video history of the National Guard entitled "Always Ready, Always There."

The NGB intends to expand the publication effort in the near future. The staff works closely with the Center of Military History in its production of the Army Lineage Series, looks forward to the forthcoming *Infantry Part II: Army National Guard and Army Reserve*, and hopes to publish a book on the lineage and honors of the Air Guard's squadrons.

Branch historians work with the authors of prospective state National Guard histories. These books are sponsored and sometimes funded by the individual states. Over a dozen of these state histories have been published during the last several years.

Official requestors, Guard units, and the general public have all demonstrated a considerable interest in the National Guard's history. The Historical Services Branch anticipates that this interest will continue as the National Guard enters its fifth century of service to the states and the nation.

Translators Wanted

Through the Center's international programs, we receive our share of articles for *Army History* in languages other than English. We also exchange a number of books with military history offices overseas. Readers with foreign language skills who would like to volunteer as translators for articles that could then be published in *Army History*, or for books we could excerpt, are encouraged to contact us at the Center. We have a need for translations from Korean to Magyar. The financial renumeration is nil, but we can offer you publication and a chance to serve the Army's military history community.

A.G. Fisch

Professional Development in the Army Museum System

R. Cody Phillips

Although Army museums have been around since the nineteenth century, few people paid very much attention to the professional development of museum personnel until the first Army museum conference in 1972. That gathering lasted two days and was attended by about eighty people. Using an annual conference as a medium to share information and experiences among colleagues at least ensured that some curators and historians learned something about a variety of museological and historical topics. But with a few exceptions, the conference format provided little depth and was too broad in scope to benefit everyone who attended.

Nevertheless, the emerging interest in professionalism encouraged the Center of Military History to host the first basic curatorial methods course at Harpers Ferry, West Virginia, in 1982. This five-day training class focused exclusively on providing individuals with an introduction to the museum profession and the Army Museum System. Unlike the conference format, this class (and successive basic courses in 1983, 1984, and every two years thereafter) was a smaller group, with a specialized curriculum that was tailored to meet the participants' needs.

Currently, the basic course addresses four principal subject areas that museum technicians and specialists could expect to encounter early in their career at an Army museum: collections management, conservation practices, education programs, and exhibits development. Students learn about the procedures to use in the accountability, identification, and care of historical property. This technical information is followed by an overview of different kinds of museum education programs, to include a sample staff ride that ends at a museum where the participants can observe the exhibits in preparation for their block of instruction about developing exhibitions.

In the past eight years, 152 individuals have been through the basic course, with 21 of those persons representing institutions in the National Guard, Army Reserve, U.S. Air Force, U.S. Marine Corps, and even one nonfederal military museum.

One year after the first basic curatorial methods course, the Center of Military History sponsored a senior curatorial seminar in Arlington, Virginia. The program was designed to discuss various policies affecting the Army Museum System. Subsequent seminars in 1987 and 1989 followed a similar format and resulted in producing papers that were shared with all Army museums. These included a sample museum standing operating procedure that could be adapted for any Army museum, a "Handbook for Commanders and Supervisors of Army Museums," and a collection of sample position descriptions for GS-1015 curators in different grade levels and technical fields of study.

In both of these later training opportunities, Center staff members were able to address the two extreme ends of the personnel spectrum in the Army Museum System: those at the entry level, and those who had considerable experience. However, these training opportunities were not applicable to or available for most of the personnel in Army museums—particularly those individuals who were deputies in their institutions or who aspired to become the directors of their own Army museums. This was one of the most serious problems affecting the Army Museum System.

The Center was able to provide adequate introductory information and instruction at the entry level through its basic course, and other museum organizations and schools offered superlative technical instruction in exhibitry, educational programs, conservation, and collections management. But there was no museum-specific training for Army personnel who might eventually become directors of their own museums. As a result, many individuals were thrust into management positions with little prior knowledge or instruction, and they were expected to perform at the same level of competence as their predecessors. Many of these people lost valuable time learning the subtleties of their new position, and some of them failed.

The Center developed a training course to overcome this situation. Initiated in 1988 and named the intermediate curatorial workshop, this four-day course was designed to prepare museum professionals for higher levels of responsibility in their own institutions, and ultimately for service as directors of their own Army museums. This workshop is not intended to replace the standard supervisory and personnel management classes that are available at the installation level. Instead, this course places these managerial subjects in a museum setting to facilitate the transition from performing specific technical duties to being responsible for managing an entire museum program.

Using an interdisciplinary approach and team

building concepts, participants in the intermediate curatorial workshop are introduced to various managerial tasks associated with the operation of an Army museum. These include sessions that deal with interpersonal relations, financial management, and personnel management. About 20 percent of the classroom instruction is set aside for professional development subjects that address mission statements, collections policies, story lines, exhibit plans, and briefing techniques. The workshop concludes with the participants designing a museum program of their own, which incorporates most of the material that the instructors presented during the week.

These three training courses are offered on a biennial schedule, with the basic and intermediate courses held every even-numbered year and the senior seminars conducted during the odd-numbered years. Thus, while the annual Army museum conferences continue to address topical subjects for a wider audience, the basic, intermediate, and senior courses are able to focus on a more structured curriculum to provide for the individual professional development of the participants.

From 1982 through 1990, one hundred eighty-nine people have attended at least one of the Center's three training courses. Approximately three out of every five individuals have accepted new positions since attending one of these courses, and one out of every three still employed in Army museums has been promoted within two years of each course that he or she attended.

Although it would be incorrect to conclude that a new position or a promotion could be expected of a participant who completes one of these training courses, the statistics at least suggest that this is the trend. Either the training strengthens the individual's ability to secure a new job or to be promoted, or the individual's supervisor recognizes the person's potential and is preparing him or her for opportunities to advance. Either way, the training is having an impact—not only on the individual, but on their institution as well. Many of the museums that have a large cadre of personnel from these training courses are also those certified by the Chief of Military History and are regarded as the stronger institutions in the Army Museum System.

The basic, intermediate, and senior courses probably will continue in their present format through this decade. But even now, the Center's Museum Division is exploring other topics and media for the professional development of museum curators, specialists, and technicians. Computerized instruction programs may be developed as introductory courses in exhibitry, collections management, and educational programs. Video tapes about these subjects already are available for loan to requesting institutions. The computerized instruction may be supplemented with three-day colloquiums held in different parts of the country every three years or concurrent with the Army museum conferences.

Even the Army museum conferences have begun to adapt to the changing professional needs in the museum community. Beginning in 1985, the Center of Military History held its first concurrent sessions to accommodate the different interests of those who attended. This has evolved into essentially a dual-tracked program, with one series of concurrent sessions focusing on technical and specialized museological subjects and the other series of sessions dealing with managerial and historical topics. The plenary sessions have been limited to issues of interest to all conference participants.

The keynote speaker at the first Army museum conference touched upon the value of this meeting by calling it "an opportunity to come together so that you may learn from the experience of others." The professional development of museum personnel was a recurring topic at each successive conference. Panel presentations discussed training and educational opportunities at some of these conferences, and keynote speakers selected topics that focused exclusively on this subject—underscoring that the entire conference was for the participants' professional development.

Thus, over the years, the museum conferences have become the base for museological education in the Army, and the three courses—basic, intermediate, and senior—have become the pillars from which more specialized training may be developed. The overriding goal for this continuing education of museum personnel is to enable their institutions to improve their operations and to be more responsive in the service and support that they give to their constituencies. Better accountability and care for the Army's historical property, improved exhibitions, implementation of educational programs, and sound resource management practices are some of the legacies of the professional development opportunities within the Army Museum System.

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Book Review: Brooks E. Kleber Reviews Charles Brown MacDonald's *Company Commander*

On 25 September 1990 Dr. Brooks Kleber, formerly the Assistant Chief of Military History, offered his reflections on Charles MacDonald's military history classic, Company Commander*—and much more—for the benefit of the Military Classics Seminar at the Fort Meyer Officers Club. That paper is presented here as given.*

Charles MacDonald's *Company Commander* is truly a classic. It has withstood the test of time—it was first published forty-three years ago—because it continues to be an honest and realistic account of what it was like to command an infantry company in Europe during World War II. In fact, MacDonald commanded two companies—Company I, 23d Infantry, 2d Infantry Division, and then, returning after convalescing from a wound, Company G of the same regiment. Amazingly, he entered combat as a 21-year-old replacement officer. *Company Commander* originally appeared in 1947. MacDonald says the appearance of his book led to his invitation to join the Army's Center of Military History.

What about the memoir genre in our recent wars? The American experiences in World War I produced several general officer memoirs, but with books by Siegfried Sassoon, Philip Graves, and Edmund Blunden, the British did the best at this sort of thing. The American memoirs of World War II are dominated by the writings of general officers, which are suspect in purpose, inasmuch as self-aggrandizement could be listed as a principal motive for most of these works. My friend Roger Spiller of the Combat Studies Institute, arguably one of the Army's finest historians, thinks that William Slim's *Defeat into Victory* is the only general officer memoir that is worth its salt—in any war. My favorite is Lucian Truscott's *Command Missions*; and if Roger is correct and there is self-aggrandizement there, after spending the war in the shadow of that supreme egoist, Mark Clark, Truscott deserves some self-aggrandizement. The Korean War was unique in many ways, among them the dearth of memoirs at any level. Vietnam books have been written by the younger participants; another of that special category--prisoner of war memoirs--appeared just last month.

Let's get back to *Company Commander*. In the foreword of the 1984 hardback edition, MacDonald tells us that there have been ten paperback editions of the book as well as two editions in Italian, two in Spanish, and one each in Danish and Hebrew. One can only speculate why there hasn't been a German edition.

Before beginning, I must explain that this critique has been a labor of love. I met Charles MacDonald, along with Martin Blumenson, about thirty-five years ago when, as a reserve captain, I spent two weeks of annual training with the Office, Chief of Military History. We have been friends ever since. So you must understand my positive prejudices about the author.

My plan of attack is as follows: Why did "Mac" write this book? What do we learn about the motivation of soldiers, about cruelty and compassion on the front line? How were prisoners of war treated? Despite my own short period of combat, what were the common reactions and experiences I recognized in Mac's narrative? What about his writing style? And, finally, some thoughts about the reasons for the prolonged pertinence of *Company Commander*.

Why did Mac write this book? Certainly it was not to extol or exploit war, nor was it to excoriate war. There are no poppies on his battlefields, and he doesn't reach out for butterflies.

Nor does he exploit himself. The "I's" in the narrative are necessary to provide a concise active voice. They are not self-serving. Even such chapter headings as "Nice Work, Mac" really explain how the view of things from the perspective of a company officer so often varies from the overall situation.

So why did he write this book? It seems to me that he wrote it as a reporter. He was attempting to portray the role of an infantry company commander—the trials and tribulations, the successes and failures—and he also wrote to portray the role of the infantryman. Why else would Pfc. Johnny Jones be identified as a native of Easton, Pennsylvania? Ernie Pyle could not have done better in identifying the men of Companies I and G. In fact, in some place the Pyle technique tends to intrude. We're in the midst of a dramatic action, and suddenly "hordes of attacking Germans" are held off by a machine gun just five feet from Mac's foxhole—

a machine gun manned by Pfc. Richard Cowan of Wichita, Kansas.

This motivation—the reporter revealing just what an infantry company commander's role was like—comes across early in the narrative. In preparation for an attack, the men of Company I were to travel light. Unnecessary and heavy equipment were to be left with the kitchen trucks to come up later. Mac also left his typewriter with the kitchen trucks, along with an article he had written entitled "Nine Days in a Pillbox." Mind you, here is our 21-year-old replacement captain with a typewriter and a manuscript. Well, the trucks were overrun by the Germans, but it seems that Mac remembered. Early chapters in *Company Commander* include "Eleven Men in a Pillbox" and "Nine Long Days."

To me, Mac's reasons for writing this book were simple and uncomplicated—no ulterior motive and no hidden agenda. He simply wanted his readers to know what life in an infantry company was like. Who did he think his readers would be? I'm not sure. I like to think that he felt his story would be instructive to those who followed at the company level. The fact that it was first published by the *Infantry Journal* Press supports this view, and probably he wanted the general public to know what it was like to fight in the front lines. I never asked him.

One of the most important subjects I look for in historical narratives, be they memoirs or otherwise, is any indication of what motivates a soldier—what makes him fight.

Some of you will recall that in *The Face of Battle*, John Keegan's best book, the author devotes considerable space outlining the motivation of the soldiers in the widely dispersed battles of Agincourt, Waterloo, and the Somme. Widely dispersed in time, that is; geographically the battles were fought within one hundred miles of one another. Motivators, or the "will to combat," as Keegan expresses it, at Agincourt were headed by alcohol; the spoils of war; and, to a degree, by religion. At Waterloo, men again were impelled by alcohol (gin had been added to the battlefield). Weariness enured fear. Officers, by coercion or positive leadership, provided motivation. And if religion was less a factor, unit pride provided a larger one.

On the Somme, coercion continued to be a motivator, although plunder was no longer a factor. Morals had not changed; soldiers now left their valuables behind. Individual leadership, much of it emanating from the amateur officers of the new Army, played a part. And in the age of massive artillery bombardment, it was often better to advance than to stay where one was. Thus spoke John Keegan.

One looks almost in vain in *Company Commander* for the author to address motivation. What we find about the subject comes from interpreting MacDonald's narrative. Doubtless, he had great fondness, even love, for the men in his two companies. His description of his men and fellow officers, for the most part, is positive, although I must say that I didn't really get to know many of these people.

I am reminded of a general I knew in CONARC—the Continental Army Command—who insisted, when the subject of motivation arose, that men fought for Company B. They weren't particularly concerned with making the world safe for democracy. And from my World War II experience, we sure as hell weren't fighting for the flag. The flag was never an issue. Then, as now, it was a very respected symbol, but we were fighting for more than just symbols. Which also reminds me: how many of you have seen officers and men on military installations running for cover at retreat time in order to avoid the formalities of that occasion, which, of course, featured lowering the flag—a ceremony entailing two minutes at the most?

Not only will you not find the flag as a motivator in *Company Commander*, you also will not find religion as a motivator—quite naturally, I guess, but not even as a sustainer.

Throughout this review, by way of comparison, I looked again at Harold Leinbaugh and John Campbell's *The Men of Company K*. The flag isn't there either, and the most prominent religious anecdote is a negative one. A hero of the Leinbaugh book is Company K's first captain, a man named George Gieszl, who was wounded and evacuated. "I talked with a chaplain," Gieszl says, "tried to tell him how I wanted to get back. It was this loyalty thing, *esprit de corps*. I thought they needed me. He didn't understand. He was trying to give me a dose of that bullshit. I was telling him, 'I got more important things to do. I got to get back.'"

"I lost a lot of respect for the religious types in those situations," Gieszl asserts. "They didn't understand the [inanity] of attempting to sell that to somebody who wasn't interested. I even used to wonder why those damn guys were there."

So Gieszl says "I thought they needed me," which prompts me to reaffirm my CONARC general; and John Keegan, to a degree; and John Baynes in his excellent book on the Great War called *Morale*; and,

indeed, MacDonald, in reading between the lines of *Company Commander*. For me, at least, Mac reaffirms that the primary combat motivator is a soldier's respect for the men in his unit, be it Company K, or a troop, or a battery. And Mac does this, not by preaching, but by properly reporting the facts.

We don't get to know many people outside those in Mac's companies. Some officers from other companies are mentioned. Battalion commanders, Paul Tuttle and William Smith, appear frequently, but we never get to know them. The regimental commander is mentioned once, and I don't recall reading about any division general. This is no reflection on Mac; he was writing about his role as a company commander under the circumstances he had experienced. One doesn't know very much beyond the boundaries of the unit. Both he and his colleague, Martin Blumenson, have made this fact abundantly clear in their many writings. This is not merely the fog of war settling in: in combat one doesn't see much beyond the company boundaries even on the clearest day—meteorologically or metaphorically speaking.

Now I'd like to leave my broad coverage of *Company Commander* and talk about a number of reactions to both the style and substance of the book. Take, for example, raunchy language. I can't quite explain this tendency, but in the years after the war, when as a reserve officer I attended two-week tours of active duty, I amazed myself how easily—once in uniform—I reverted to my World War II vocabulary. At my latest reading of *Company Commander* I particularly noted just how Mac handled this delicate subject. As a matter of fact, he was quite moderate. A rough count of the adjectival form of the "f" word revealed five instances when one of his men—never MacDonald—uttered that vulgarism. The printed form was the letter "f" followed by a dash. There was one case of s_tless and an honest to goodness rendering of "cold as a witch's tit." An interesting but probably irrelevant observation about the "f" word—in every case it was used in the first half of the book by the men of Company I. Presumably, the men of Company G were less inclined to obscenity.

I compared Mac's language with that used in *The Men of Company K*, where I found the "f" word spelled out several times and used almost always by taunting Germans and sometimes with reference to Mrs. Roosevelt. We must remember that Leinbaugh and Campbell's book appeared almost forty years after *Company Commander*. As Eddie Murphy fans surely realize, we have become more tolerant in recent years.

Having entered Normandy as a replacement officer in an infantry company that had landed on D-Day, I was interested in parallel situations and reactions with those related by MacDonald. There were many. Common experiences included the large number of dead cattle, lying on their backs, bloated, their legs extended in awkward positions. They reminded me of great obscene goatskin water bags. The first dead Germans were a sobering sight.

Flinching at incoming artillery, only to be soothed by one's sergeant, turned out to be an exclusive experience. Then there was the second battle, this one private, to be fought by a replacement officer—winning the confidence of your men. Mac is explicit as to how he faced this challenge. It was reassuring to learn that Mac urinated a lot, but not excessively, mind you....

And then there is the matter of sex. Having been a prisoner of war (P.O.W.), I have reviewed many P.O.W. memoirs and histories. One thing one learns from the P.O.W. experience is that you don't think about sex on an empty stomach. First things first. And, in most cases, prisoner of war stomachs were empty. My point here is that even the absence of sex, and the reasons why, is important to document in describing the overall P.O.W. experience. Mac's case was different, of course. But, in a tactful way, as the war terminated he introduces situations that cause the reader to realize that nature's course was being taken.

The last pages of the book provide a beautiful and poignant description of a celebration in Czechoslovakia when Mac dances with Leibe as the band plays in his honor. There is a touching aftermath when Mac, contemplating with quiet relief the end of the war, envisions the weary faces of the men of his two companies as they trudge past in his mind's eye. Leibe, aware of his preoccupation, squeezes his hand. The end.

No, not sex, but an emotion and a situation which transcend a more sensual involvement. That is not to say that one doesn't imagine that the latter—the sexual involvement—had taken place beyond the final sentences of Mac's book.

I was particularly interested in Mac's examples of American treatment of German P.O.W.s. Over the years I have given numerous talks about the P.O.W. in American wars, interspersed with my own experience. That way I felt the result would be neither too pedantic nor too much old-war story. There is one passage from *Company Commander* I always quoted to back my point that Americans captured by the Germans were

treated as well or better than Germans captured by Americans. Mac's company takes a prisoner who is badly wounded. The German asks for a cigarette, only to be turned down in a fit of profanity. The two men assigned to take the prisoner to the rear return in a very short time. When questioned, one of them says "The sonofabitch tried to make a run for it. Know what I mean?" "Oh, I see," MacDonald replies, slowly nodding his head, "I see." At another time, a group of Mac's men turned up without the expected prisoners of war. Mac writes in italics: "Company G today committed a war crime. They are going to win the war, however, so I don't suppose it really matters."

I guess I was more taken by indications of Mac's lack of sensitivity in dealing with German civilians. We knew Charles MacDonald as a kind and gentle man. So to me, at least, the following example provided some surprise. Company G and some tanks attack the town of Ellerhausen in a short, intense, victorious fire fight. As the company moves through the town, it encounters a burning house. Mac writes: "The house was a mass of flame. Two cows stood nearby, chewing their cuds and staring without expression at the scene of destruction. A grey-haired German farmer stood with his arm around his aged wife and stared at the burning house, tears streaming down both their faces."

"'*Alles ist kaput! Alles ist kaput!*' they sobbed hysterically as we passed."

"I was not impressed; instead, I was suddenly angry at them and surprised at my own anger. What right had they to stand there sobbing and blaming us for this terror? What right did they and their kind have to any emotions at all?"

"'Thank Adolf!' I shouted. 'Thank Hitler!' I pointed to the burning house and said, '*Der Fuehrer*!' and laughed."

What a beautifully written, terrible passage. What right did they have to sob? What right did they have to blame us for their terror? What right did they and their kind have to have emotions? If Mac had not written so eloquently, these sentences would be less hard to take. In any event, he thought so much of this incident that he placed it in a chapter called "Thank Adolph."

There are other similar incidents. I bring them up—and those involving the P.O.W.s—not to be critical of Mac, but to call attention to the intensity and emotion of combat as well as to the honesty of the author in his attempt to depict his experiences. One hears a lot about the camaraderie of front-line soldiers vis-a-vis one another, inasmuch as the common ordeal of combat makes them brothers in arms—or one hears about the humanity of the American GI when encountering aged and blameless civilians. Mac's account shows that this is not always so, and I thank him for his honesty.

So far I have not said anything specific about narrative style. As is to be expected, there are several passages that strike me as weak. In one, Mac is on a tank near Grofendorf when his column is attacked by German artillery. The tank comes to a sudden halt by a stone fence, and Mac jumps quickly to the ground. "The impact with the hard earth jarred my feet and made them burn." Here we are in the midst of an artillery attack, which his tank failed to outrun, and he jars his feet and makes them burn. It just doesn't ring true.

It was in this passage, when Mac twice identifies German artillery as 88s, that I thought of one of my favorite Army historians, John Miller, Jr., who, as deputy chief historian, monitored my *Chemicals in Combat*. He chided me by saying that troops tended to identify any German artillery as 88-mm., whether it was or not. There is a passage in Leinbaugh's book in which he parenthetically tells us: "Throughout the war we referred to all incoming flat trajectory rounds as 88s—the best ear in the company couldn't tell the difference in the size of an explosion from a 75 or an 88 round."

And then there was the time when MacDonald advises a battalion commander to place artillery on some German flak guns that would cause the enemy to disperse and save the expense of an American attack. His plan is adopted, the Germans flee, and Mac is filled "with a sort of smug satisfaction." Justifiably so, but I wonder about the thinking ability of the battalion commander who had to receive this basic advice from a young company commander.

One of my favorites, negatively speaking, was Mac's reaction to his colonel's order for a platoon attack, accompanied by the statement: "I told regiment I thought you could do it." Mac's response was "Roger, I said thoughtfully." In all my years of having heard "Roger," I never heard it said "thoughtfully."

And the brief epilogue is a bit schmaltzy with the "loading on a big boat at Le Havre" and its "tall lady with a torch."

But such passages are few and far between. For the most part the narrative is straightforward and simple. Every now and then we are treated with such gems as the following: "The artillery bombardment continued. Through the maze of explosions I could discern the

crushing sound of the big railroad gun which had bombarded us two days before. The center of the shelling passed from the cp (command post) pillbox to the pillbox which housed the two mortar squads and on to the L Company pillboxes and back again like a pianist running a scale, with a few rounds exploding directly above us always, like accompanying chords. The barrage was deafening."

And later: "I slipped and fell face down in the snow. I cursed my slick overshoes. I rose and fell again. I found myself not caring if the Germans did fire. Snow had gotten inside my shoes, and my feet were soaked. My clothes were drenched. Perspiration covered my body, and my mouth was dry. I wanted a cigarette."

"I felt like we were helpless little bugs scurrying blindly about now that some mad monster had lifted the log under which we had been hiding. I wondered if it would not be better to be killed, and perhaps that would be an end to everything."

And *Company Commander* has its light moments; its share of humor. As the war draws to a close Mac is contacted by a German officer who says his general would like to surrender Leipzig to Captain MacDonald. The regimental commander can't be reached, so the executive officer gives Mac the authority to negotiate. Unfortunately, the surrendering general is not from the *Wehrmacht*, but commander of the 2,500-man Leipzig police force. Negotiations fail, but not before a hilarious chapter in which, among other things, sex raises it seductive head.

Over the years I've reviewed many books. For me, there are three categories of books: great, lousy, and in-between. I like the last category the best. I can point out all the good things, but always have an opportunity to feed my ego and hopefully, inform the reader by pointing out mistakes or omissions that were apparent because of my long years of experience.

Paul Fussell's latest book, *Wartime*, falls in the last category. It is a remarkable collection of all sorts of observations about World War II, including screw-ups and euphemisms at the front, and songs, slogans, and sex at the rear and back at home. He sociologically and psychologically dissects the war. Last December I gave the dinner speech at the annual meeting of the Virginia-North Carolina chapter of the Survivors of Corregidor and Bataan. I chose to review *Wartime* as my talk, because much of the details marshaled by Fussell obviously had passed by these prisoners of war. So I reviewed many of the categories that make up the book, along with his analysis and interpretation.

I had to criticize his major point. It seems that he needed a central theme upon which to hang his fascinating data, so he disputed all the talk about the last good war, the justified war, the necessary war. Not so, says Fussell, quoting one of his heroes, British literary figure Cyril Connolly, to the effect that World War II was stupid and sadistic, a war "of which we are all ashamed...a war...which lowers the standard of thinking and feeling...." Further, it was a war opposed to "every reasonable conception of what life is for, every ambition of the mind or delight of the senses."

As one reviewer asked, in connection with Fussell's comments on World War II and the lowering of the standard of thinking and feeling, "What would have been that standard in a Nazi Europe or a Japanese Asia?" May I add that I was sure my audience, after four years of the cruelest treatment of World War II, would take my side. I wasn't ashamed of World War II, and I know my audience wasn't either.

Company Commander, unlike *Wartime*, has no major weakness. If I were sitting out there with you, I think I'd like a bit more controversy in these remarks. So while I gladly reviewed the book in positive terms, something inside me clamored to reveal and dissect some major flaw. This was not to be.

Roger Spiller confirmed this for me. He says that he has never seen anyone do a critical analysis of the book: "All mention of the book, whether by historian or by casual reader, is laudatory."

A great deal of my career has been involved with the Army's educational programs and the role of military history in enhancing the education of our officers and men. One of the most common applications of history to education is the use of reading lists. (I might add that in many ways reading lists are cop-outs. They give the appearance of a positive reaction to a situation, a solution to a problem, without ensuring that books are read, let alone understood.) Nonetheless, there are several important Army reading lists. I guess the most noteworthy is the contemporary military reading list which comes out as a numbered Army circular, compiled by the Army War College. This list is geared to high-level publications covering various disciplines. So, there is good reason not to find *Company Commander* on the list. But if one day the powers that be might want to include some guidance on basic leadership for the benefit of those colonels who hope to be generals, *Company Commander* just might appear on the list for contemporary reading.

Another important series of lists is the MQS—Military Qualification Standards. Numbers II and III

deal with lieutenants and captains and consist of nineteen military histories, of which each branch school selects ten. *Company Commander* is among the nineteen, and also, happily, on some of the lists of ten.

Bruce Siemon, the U.S. Army, Europe, historian, and one of the Army's most dedicated, persuaded his general to include *Company Commander* on the four-star reading list. His argument: the book shows the problems that the combat leader must deal with, subjects of infinitely greater importance to the young officer than, say, the thoughts of Frederick the Great or Napoleon. With no wars going on most of the time, we can't get the experience directly, so vicarious experience is the only answer.

Well, that does it. These comments have not been a review of *Company Commander* in the conventional sense, but a nostalgic revisit of an unpretentious but tremendously important book whose author also has written some of the major histories of the European phase of World War II.

John Keegan is renowned for his considerable research and splendid narrative on what it was like at Agincourt, Waterloo, and on the Somme. Charles MacDonald has done the same for the GI in Europe in World War II, simply by honestly recording his experiences as a company commander.

Book Review
by Frank Schubert

Key to the Sinai: The Battles for Abu Ageila in the 1956 and 1967 Arab-Israeli Wars
by George W. Gawrych
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Combat Studies Institute Research Survey No. 7. 147 pp.

The harsh terrain of the sparsely populated Sinai peninsula offers little to fight about except avenues of approach. In his study of Abu Ageila, a key crossroads on the central route across the desert, George Gawrych considers two battles—roughly eleven years apart—for access routes between Egypt and Israel. The narrative looks at the first battle, then discusses what each side learned from it, and looks at the application of those lessons in the second confrontation. Overall, the Israelis turned out to be the better students.

In 1956 the Egyptians surprised Israel with their tenacious defense at Abu Ageila. The Israeli Army, operating as part of a coalition with Britain and France, ultimately prevailed in its largely extemporized assault. But it learned not to depend on the Egyptians to run in the face of Israeli arms.

In the decade that followed, both sides studied Abu Ageila. For Egypt, the heroic defense took on almost mythological dimensions. Convinced that a future war would involve another major struggle there, the Egyptian Army studied the battle in detail. Abu Ageila became a showpiece fortification, and the Egyptian Command and General Staff College took its annual staff ride to the site. With the aid of their Soviet advisers, the Egyptians strengthened the position, added new mines, trenches, strongpoints, and observation posts, and dug supply facilities into the ground.

The Israelis learned too. Perhaps the primary lesson was that the Egyptians would not collapse when confronted. But Abu Ageila taught much more, about the need for early mobilization of reserves, more extensive training, and careful planning.

When the Israelis hit the crossroads again in 1967, they used a plan so complex that Chaim Herzog later called the fight "probably the most complicated battle in the history of the Arab-Israeli Wars" (*The Arab-Israeli Wars*. New York: Random House, 1982, p. 159). Brig. Gen. Ariel Sharon, the archimprovisor who had disobeyed orders and gone his own way in 1956, orchestrated simultaneous attacks by infantry, armor, artillery, and paratroopers. The Israeli success "surprised, shocked, and demoralized" the Egyptian leadership, according to Gawrych (p. 117) and led directly to the abandonment of the Sinai by Egyptian forces. Israel held the Sinai until 1982 and enjoyed unprecedented strategic depth and maneuver space until Prime Minister Menachim Begin's government returned it as part of the Camp David peace agreement with Egypt.

Gawrych has written a fascinating study of battle at a crossroads that had a major role in shaping the region's political future. Using Israeli and Egyptian sources and interviews, he has looked at both sides; how they planned and operated, interpreted their experience, and used what they had learned. There is much for Army historians to ponder here.

Dr. Frank N. Schubert is Chief, Field Programs Activity, in the Center's Field and International Division. Currently he is working on an official volume: Building Air Bases in the Negev: The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers in Israel, 1979-1982.

Book Review
by Teresa Kraus

Operation JUST CAUSE, Panama December 1989: A Soldier's Eyewitness Account
by 1st Lt. Clarence E. Briggs III
Stackpole Books. 176 pp., $10.95.

1st Lt. Clarence E. Briggs III offers a bird's-eye view of the 1989 invasion of Panama in *Operation JUST CAUSE, Panama December 1989: A Soldier's Eyewitness Account.* Briggs, a rifle company executive officer assigned to Bravo Company, 3d Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment, 82d Airborne Division—which operated as part of Task Force Atlantic during JUST CAUSE—provides an account of one company in the thick of battle. He enables the reader to view the operation from the ground level and gives personal insights into this complex military operation. He admits that this is his story and in the introduction forewarns readers that it "is a personal account" and "not meant to be an all-inclusive history of Operation JUST CAUSE."

Through the author's discussion it is clear how solid training and the dedication and professionalism of the soldiers overcame problems such as inadequate intelligence on the enemy and terrain, sporadic engagements by friendly fire, and the fog of war in general. He aptly describes the changing rules of engagement during the operation and the adjustments his company made to accommodate those changes. As the operation proceeded, the political goals, strategic considerations, and mission changed. "By the time we left Panama, we as soldiers had operated under five separate sets of rules of engagement and had assumed five distinct roles." Before Bravo Company deployed to Panama, the men considered themselves "gamesters," planning for future contingencies. Upon arrival in Panama they became "agents"—to train and to reaffirm U.S. treaty rights. At H-Hour the men became "warriors"; as the fighting wound down they became "constables"; and lastly they served as "guardians," entrusted with providing assistance to the Panamanians.

Briggs discusses problems inherent in jungle and urban warfare as seen through the eyes of the men of his company and gives the reader examples of the combat techniques practiced in the numerous training exercises before the operation, explaining what worked well and what needed improvement. He does not shy away from telling the darker side of U.S. participation in the operation. Although he generally commends the men in his company, he also discusses problems with battlefield mistakes, soldier looting, drunkenness, and lapses in discipline.

Since Lieutenant Briggs introduces the men of his company to the reader, it would be interesting to learn more about those with whom Briggs served. Briggs tells us how they reacted to the battlefield situation, how they dealt with wartime stress, and how they succeeded in their mission. But, how did the war change their view of soldiering? What was their view of the operation? What became of the men of Bravo Company—how many casualties, how many wounded, and how many received commendations? Perhaps most importantly, where are these warriors now? We are left to wonder.

Although readers can find more balanced historical summaries of the operation, Briggs' contribution is that, to date, his is one of the first published battlefield accounts of JUST CAUSE. Perhaps it will be of little use to the serious military and diplomatic historian, since the book lacks a broad perspective and a coherent chronology, but it does provide a thrilling account of one company's battle and the fatigue, fear, excitement, and passion exhibited by some of the soldiers who fought in Panama.

Overall, this first-person account is well written in a style that is both easy and fun to read. Briggs gives his readers the opportunity to participate in his experiences, sharing the anxieties, hopes, and successes of Bravo Company. Although the book is neither a comprehensive battlefield account nor a well-rounded and detailed historical narrative, its value for any audience lies in its personal discussion of military training, the continually changing battlefield situation, and the warrior mentality.

Dr. Theresa L. Kraus is a historian assigned to the Center's Research and Analysis Division. She is currently preparing a monograph on the Army staff and Operation JUST CAUSE.

Professional Events

1991 Military History Writing Contest Rules Announced

Eligibility: All students attending officer advanced courses or the Sergeants Major Academy during calendar year 1991 are eligible to enter the competition.

Entries: Submit two copies of previously unpublished manuscripts, 2,000-3,000 words (7-10 pages), typed, double-spaced. Documentation is required, but footnotes or endnotes do not count in determining the length. Submit graphics, illustrations, or photographs as if the article were to be published. Include Sergeants Major Academy or advanced course title, course number, the dates the writer attended the course, and a forwarding address.

Topics: Essays should develop a limited historical theme related to the U.S. Army. Suggested topics include:

-Desert operations, battles, campaigns
-World War II battles and campaigns (50th anniversary period)
-Korean War battles and campaigns (40th anniversary period)
-The Black experience during the Civil War, Spanish-American War, World Wars I or II, Korea, or Vietnam
-Leadership
-Training
-Light infantry forces
-Mexican border operations or Indian campaigns
-Unit cohesion and stress in combat
-Fighting outnumbered and winning, e.g., Ardennes, Vietnam
-Logistics

Deadline: Entries must be postmarked by midnight 31 December 1991.

Submission: Send two copies of the manuscript, along with any accompanying photographs, maps, or other graphics to: U.S. Army Center of Military History, ATTN: Writing Contest (DAMH-FI), Southeast Federal Center/WNY Bldg. 159, Washington, D.C. 20374-5088. Point of contact is Mr. Billy Arthur, AV 335-2905, or commercial (202) 475-2905.

Judging and Prizes: A panel of military historians will judge each entry based on the following criteria: relevance of the essay to today's Army leader, originality, historical accuracy, style, and rhetoric. First place: $500 and publication in *Army History*; second, $300; third, $100, or as the judges direct.

***American Military History* Extract Available**

Organizations interested in obtaining copies of Chapter 28 extracted from the 1989 edition of *American Military History* may request copies from HQDA (DAMH-ZBP-E), Washington, D.C. 20374-5088. The extract also contains a new Suggested Readings section and updated chapter bibliographies.

Announcement of U.S. Air Force Historical Researach Center Grants

The United States Air Force Historical Research Center (USAFHRC) announces research grants to encourage scholars to study the history of air power through the use of the Air Force historical document collection at the USAFHRC. The Research Center will make several awards up to $2,500 each to individuals who meet the criteria in this annoucement and are willing to visit the USAFHRC during fiscal year 1992 (ending 30 September 1992). Recipients will be designated "Research Associates of the USAF Historical Research Center."

Criteria

Applicants must have a graduate degree in history or related fields, or equivalent scholarly accomplishments. Their specialty or professional experience must be in aeronautics, astronautics, or military-related subjects. They must not be in residence at Maxwell Air Force Base (AFB), Alabama, and must be willing to visit the USAFHRC for a sufficient time to use the research materials for their proposed projects. Active duty military personnel are also eligible.

Topics of Research

Proposed topics of research may include, but are not restricted to, Air Force history, military operations, education, training, administration, strategy, tactics, logistics, weaponry, technology, organization, policy, activities, and institutions. Broader subjects suitable for a grant include military history, civil-military relations, history of aeronautics or astronautics, relations among U.S. branches of service, military biographies, and international military relations. Preference will be given to proposals that involve the use of primary sources held at the Research Center. Proposals for research of classified subjects cannot be considered for research grants. As a general rule, records before 1955 are largely unclassified, while many later records remain classified. Examples of classified subjects include nuclear weapons and war planning, weapons systems currently in the Air Force inventory, and Air Force operations during the Vietnam War.

Application Deadline

Applicants can request an application from the Commander, USAF Historical Research Center, Maxwell AFB, Alabama 36112-6678. The completed application must be returned by 31 October 1991.

In the next issue of *Army History*...

Raymond A. Mentzer's article (delayed one issue) on military history detachments in wartime Korea.

Duane Denfeld's account of a new program at the 2d Infantry Division Museum and Historical Center at Camp Casey, Korea.

SFC David T. Bristow's description of the 44th Military History Detachment's training exercises in the Mojave Desert in preparation for deployment for DESERT STORM.

Ted Ballard's staff ride suggestions and bibliography for those planning a staff ride to Gettysburg.

Book review of Ed Cray's *General of the Army: George C. Marshall, Soldier and Statesman*, reprinted with permission from the *Washington Post*.

And much more....

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