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It's Time to Remember the Doughboys

Edward M. Coffman

For a boy growing up in Kentucky during the 1930s, the World War was a presence. My father was a veteran, as were many of his friends. They were active in the American Legion, which played a prominent role—along with the local National Guardsmen—in parades and other patriotic ceremonies. By the courthouse, there was a captured German field piece which attracted me and other small boys on our way to and from the nearby picture show. On the streets, particularly on Saturdays when the farmers came to town, one would occasionally see men wearing bits and pieces of Army uniforms. Then, there was always the minute of silence on the eleventh hour of the eleventh day of the eleventh month that we school children observed. When I was in the fourth grade (1938), I happened to be working on a problem at the blackboard at the magical moment and had to stand quiet and motionless for minute—quite a strain for a 9-year-old boy.

The coming of World War II pushed aside memories of the earlier war. Instead of a few men in remnants of World War I uniforms, the streets were filled with soldiers from the newly constructed Army camp a few miles outside town. The German gun soon went the way of many of the old helmets to a scrap drive, and school children no longer paused to observe Armistice Day.

My brother and his friends were involved in this longer and harder war than the one their fathers knew. Within five years of V-J Day, there was the Korean War, and, by the fiftieth anniversary of the American entry into the Great War, the nation was mired in Vietnam. By this time my father referred to himself and his fellow veterans as the forgotten men from a forgotten war. Certainly, one found little evidence of that golden anniversary in the media. Americans were too concerned with the Southeast Asia war to give much thought to World War I.

The few who did were struck by the irony of the course of events since 1918, as compared with the high hopes expressed in Woodrow Wilson's phrase—the war to end all wars—and the ideal indicated by the phrase on the Allied and American Victory Medals—the Great War for Civilization. The Germans, incidentally, merely put the dates (1914-18) on their service medal.

Others, who at least were aware that the United States had fought in a war in 1917-18, tended to dismiss its importance. Because of the failure of President Wilson to attain his idealistic goals at the Versailles Peace Conference in 1919, there was a wave of disappointment and frustration and, eventually, cynicism about the American effort to play a leading role on the world scene. This reaction, in turn, led to a downgrading of the American role by scholars and other opinion makers. One can imagine how infuriating this was to those veterans.

An incident at a scholarly meeting some ten years after the war reflected the attitudes of the day. After several scholars had presented papers about various aspects of the American role in the war, the chairman of the panel called upon a general who happened to be in the audience for comment. Somewhat dismayed by what he had heard, the general began with a question: "What do you gentlemen think was the basic contribution of the United States in the war?" After some hemming and hawing, one participant finally volunteered: "We were the straw that broke the camel's back." The general responded: "Straw, hell! We were the sledgehammer that broke that damn camel's back!"

The two million men in the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) were that sledgehammer. No less an authority than Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg made that point emphatically in an interview with four American journalists shortly after the armistice. When asked what had ended the war, he responded: "the

American infantry in the Argonne won the war." At a time when France and Britain were at the limit of their available manpower, the arrival of so many Americans (almost 1.8 million in March-October 1918 to add to those already there) was crucial in countering the German reinforcements from the defunct Eastern Front and, ultimately, was the decisive factor.

Beyond the contribution to Allied victory was the significant fact that Britain, which had so long maintained the balance of power on the Continent, had to turn to the United States to provide the necessary weight to tip the balance. The Permanent Undersecretary at the Foreign Office, Sir Robert Vansittart, even admitted it in 1936: "We only just scraped through the last war with Germany with every assistance we could get from the U.S.A." One could argue that this intervention in European affairs was a more critical debut for the United States as a world power than the seizing of colonies in 1898.

Another aspect of the war that deserves remembering is the logistical effort. The awesome achievement of raising a force of some 4.7 million which had to be fed, clothed, housed, equipped, armed, and trained—all within nineteen months—is still difficult to comprehend. Then, two million were also transported to France. To be sure, the British furnished many of the ships and they and the French provided much of the artillery and other weapons, but Americans organized their economy and demonstrated their ability to manage such a tremendous enterprise to an effective conclusion.

It was an astonishing feat. An American War Department estimate in 1917 helps put it in perspective. Less than a week before President Wilson asked Congress for a declaration of war, a General Staff committee calculated that it would take two years and two months to raise, equip, and transport a force of a half million to France. They grossly underestimated the capability of their nation, as the war ended less than twenty months later with two million Americans in France.

It is a comment on how much the expectations in American life had changed since 1918 that the generally primitive conditions that these men endured in their makeshift tent camps would probably have appalled even their sons who served in World War II, much less later generations. But they had a great deal of enthusiasm and apparently enjoyed the games and singing that were part of their duties. Some of the college athletes who were athletic and recreation offic-

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ers or noncommissioned officers, however, were shocked that many of these men did not know anything about team sports. A boy who grew up on a farm or who worked in mills had little time for play. Nevertheless, all understood boxing, which quickly became very popular.

World War I was the first war in which two powerful combinations of nations brought to bear the full might of the industrial age. Military experts who had considered the possibility presumed that if such a war came about, it would be so awesomely terrible and exhausting that it would be of short duration. In the east, the Central Powers eventually were able to defeat Russia after three years. But on the Western Front, the war descended into a long drawn-out siege where, despite fearful slaughter, neither side could force a decision.

By the time the United States entered the war, the belligerents had already upped the ante of combat with the four weapons that got their first major, sustained use in this war: the submarine, aircraft, the tank, and gas. These, together with the machine gun, changed the scope of the battlefield. As they began to play a role in the conflict, the Americans had to adjust quickly to these weapons. The Navy developed sub chasers and primitive sound detectors. The Army organized new branches—the Air Service, Tank Corps, and Gas Service—and expanded the handful of machine gun platoons (one in each infantry regiment) to formidable battalions. Although the Tank Corps did not survive the postwar organization, the other branches made the transition and certainly no infantryman after World War I was unaware of the capabilities of the machine gun.

Technology and the organizations it brought about during this war thus shaped the American Army of the future, but there was another aspect of the war experience that served the future Army well. Within a couple of years, the great Army that had numbered 3.7 million was down to 200,000 and it remained at a considerably smaller strength throughout the 1920s and 30s. What sustained that small army and prepared its officers for the great demands of World War II was the school system. World War I validated the professionalism of the American Army officer corps, in that it demonstrated the value of the training that Fort Leavenworth and Army War College graduates had received.

There was a poignant illustration of this in the person of Lt. Gen. Hunter Liggett. A few months after the war, Liggett saw a division pass in review and remarked that this was the first time he had ever seen a

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full division. That this officer had commanded with distinction a division, corps, and army during the war years, yet never had actually seen a division, indicates the value of his professional education where he had learned to handle large units in theory. In the prewar Army only a relatively few officers had attended Leavenworth and the War College, but in the AEF those graduates performed yeoman service in the key command and staff positions, where they planned and conducted the successful operations of the AEF. After the war, Army leaders emphasized the schools to the point that General of the Army Omar N. Bradley considered the school system the significant difference between the peacetime Army before 1917 and the one that followed the war.

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In 1992 and 1993, it will be seventy-five years since the doughboys went on what many considered a crusade. Now in their nineties, the veterans who survive have lived through the twentieth century. They have seen the United States rise first to world power and then super power status and lived to see the end of the Cold War. They have experienced the transformation from a rural-village society to an urbanized country; the airplane, radio, movies, television, the great expansion of automotive transportation, and the corresponding decline in dependence on railroads. Men have walked on the moon, and man-made objects have penetrated deep into space; there was a Great Depression and, yes, two World Wars and three others wars—developments and events which have changed the warp and woof of life so much—have all taken place in their lifetimes.

To put their life experience in another context, they were as close to the Civil War as we today are to World War II. Indeed, during World War I there were two Civil War Medal of Honor recipients and a Union brevet brigadier general in Congress.

Some 1.8 million World War I veterans—almost a third—survived to see the nation pointedly not commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of their war. Since then, advancing age has stripped their ranks of the remaining generals, the Medal of Honor recipients, and the aces, but 65,000 (as of October 1991) still survive.

It is now time to remember their war and them—the doughboys of World War I.

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Editor's Journal

April 1992 marks the seventy-fifth anniversary of America's entry into World War I. Our continuing commemoration of World War II reminds us that "the war to end all wars," for all of the sacrifices it demanded, did not quite live up to its billing.

This issue of *Army History* focuses on the American contribution to the First World War. Professor "Mac" Coffman very kindly agreed to provide our lead article this quarter. A number of other items with an emphasis on World War I are included, while still others, e.g., our World War II chronology, keep us mindful of our ongoing commemoration of that conflict.

Charles Anderson, who created the comprehensive index for our last issue and who has helped edit a number of articles for *Army History*, is leaving the Field and International Division for a position in Histories Division. His dedicated efforts on behalf of our professional bulletin will be sorely missed.

This is the last issue of *Army History* before the Center moves to its new address (see The Chief's Corner). Plan as we will, there are bound to be delays in the mail, misplaced submissions, etc. Please bear with us this summer, and thanks for your continued support.

A. G. Fisch, Jr.

The Chief's Corner

Harold W. Nelson

Much of this issue is devoted to World War I, in recognition of the seventy-fifth anniversary of America's entry into the "Great War." Our veterans of that war have always seen their major anniversaries fade into the background. When the twenty-fifth rolled around in 1942-43 the Great War was World War II, and the feverish activity associated with warfighting left little time for commemoration. When the fiftieth passed in 1967-68, the war fever brought on by Vietnam was very different, but the effect was the same—little thought was given to commemorating those who served the republic in World War I.

I knew many World War I veterans and very little history when I was young. The veterans who made it to the front had an awful war. Many bore wounds or gas injuries that were a constant reminder of the rigors they had survived. Until I read some history and learned of the major role U.S. forces were to play in the prospective campaign of 1919, I did not understand why so many veterans had been called, trained, and released without fighting. They never forgot their good fortune, but they were properly proud of their service. The few I knew who had served in Siberia were truly unique, claiming, "We were in on the opening of the Cold War." If so, we can be doubly thankful on this seventy-fifth anniversary that no war—cold or hot—clouds our remembrance of the "war to end all wars."

The Center's contribution to World War I commemoration consists of significant reprints. In 1988 we completed the five-volume set, *Order of Battle of the United States Land Forces in the World War* and turned immediately to *The United States Army in the World War*. David Trask wrote a new introductory essay for that important series, and we have just published the seventeenth and final volume. The original edition is found only in major research libraries, so this reprint will give scholars, soldiers, and veterans better access to important documentary sources on the U.S. Army in World War I. We are also reprinting *American Armies and Battlefields in Europe* as published by the American Battle Monuments Commission in 1938. Its rich historical detail is unsurpassed, and its guidebook dimension is still valid, as any recent user of the original volume will attest.

As this issue of *Army History* indicates, we have not dropped everything else to commemorate World War I. Work on World War II commemoration continues, with the June 1992 Conference of Army Historians now receiving a great deal of attention. The staff ride season opened again in early March, so Civil War battlefields are once again very much on our minds. Force reductions have kept museum specialists and organizational historians especially busy, and General Sullivan's challenge, "No more Task Force Smiths!" has kept our Research and Analysis Division working intensely to answer a broad range of questions about our Army's past.

We are now in the final phase of planning our move in June. A great deal of time and effort by several people at the Center has gone into preparations for that relocation, and we expect to make the move with an absolute minimum of dislocation. Our new address:

U.S. Army Center of Military History
1099 14th Street, NW
Washington, D.C. 20005-3402

We look forward to having Army Art rejoin us after twenty years in Army Materiel Command Headquarters, and everyone who has been working at the Southeast Federal Center is eager to have a better work environment in a more developed part of town. Our lease at the new site will carry us through until the National Museum of the U.S. Army becomes a reality.

Like everyone else in the Department of Defense, we spend a lot of time fighting for resources. We have absorbed significant cuts in personnel in the past two years, while at the same time, missions and taskings have increased. All leaders at the Center are managing backlogs. I hope this has not impeded our ability to meet your needs. We are still pledged to give timely, accurate service across the full range of materials embodying the Army's heritage, and I am proud of the fine civilians and military professionals who fulfill that pledge.

The American 5th Division and Gas Warfare, 1918

Edgar F. Raines, Jr.

Gas warfare during World War I began in the summer and fall of 1914 when the French Army made a few sporadic attempts in the open field to use 26-mm. rifle grenades filled with tear gas. The efforts failed, but they provided the Germans with justification for far more lethal experiments. Attempts to use artillery shells filled with tear gas against the Russians at Bolimov in January 1915 and against the British at Nieuport in March 1915 produced no appreciable results, but at Ypres the Germans succeeded in virtually destroying the French 45th Algerian Division. A total of 20,000 men were gassed; 5,000 died of strangulation. From then until the end of World War I the belligerents vied with one another to produce toxic or incapacitating chemicals, while at the same time developing protective devices to shield their own troops against the effects of the enemy's gases. In this competition the Germans held a decided advantage, because they had monopolized the prewar chemical and dye industries. Not until 1918 did the British and French master the intricacies of gas warfare. The United States never did.

On 17 November 1917 the War Department ordered the creation of the 5th Division, using Regular Army units from Kansas, North Carolina, Georgia, and Texas. Maj. Gen. John E. McMahon commanded the division during most of its training. McMahon, a veteran artilleryman, insisted on sound gas instruction. Gas masks were among the few pieces of standard equipment actually in the hands of the troops. The division had no machine guns or artillery. Tent pegs driven into the ground indicated where the wheels of field pieces would rest, so the artillery recruits might have gun drill. Infantrymen practiced with concrete grenades.

Advance elements of the division sailed for England in late February 1918. The bulk of the division embarked in April, and at the end of the month concentrated at the Bar-sur-Aube training area in France, about one hundred kilometers from the front. A combination of French instructors with recent frontline experience and plentiful materiel gave the division much more realistic training in gas warfare than it had previously obtained. Following standard training procedure in World War I, the division entered a quiet sector in the line on 1 June 1918. The men trained as detachments with French units in rear areas, then in the trenches as regiments and brigades attached to French divisions. Finally, 5th Division Headquarters staff took control of the troops and became responsible for the defense of a sector. During the initial phases of training, the Americans used live grenades for the first time. Gas training concentrated on the hazards of and the protection from mustard gas.

Mustard gas is a powerful liquid vesicant that attacks all parts of the body. It destroys the lungs, blinds the eyes (usually permanently), and produces blisters on the body. Clothing, boots—even rubber—provide no protection against it in liquid form. Even in very dilute vapor it is exceedingly dangerous and will incapacitate if it does not kill. It is also persistent. An area drenched in mustard gas will remain dangerous long afterward. Raw concrete not subject to weathering will retain lethal concentrations of the gas over twenty-five years after the initial exposure. It also has little or no odor, something like mild horseradish according to survivors. This quality makes it particularly dangerous. Troops undergoing heavy physical exertion are all too prone to rip off gas masks with the least excuse. This tendency was all the more pronounced in green American divisions like the 5th.

On the night of 15-16 June 1918, three of the division's infantry regiments entered the line in the Anould sector in the Vosges as attachments to the French 21st Division. About 0200 on 17 June the *39th Bavarian Reserve Division* staged a trench raid on elements of the U.S. 60th Infantry and the French 64th Infantry. The Germans drenched the Allied position with phosgene, an asphyxiating gas. Twenty-three Americans and forty-five Frenchmen became gas casualties. Two of the Americans died.

After a month in the sector, during which little more occurred, the division reunited under General McMahon's control and relieved the French 62d Division in front of the town of St. Die, the sector north of Anould. Aggressive American patrolling provoked a German reaction on the night of 14 August. The Germans shelled American battery positions and the lines of the 6th Infantry at Chapelle St. Clair. Forty rounds of 105-mm. mustard gas caused twenty-two casualties among the American infantrymen. General McMahon had by this date formed some tentative conclusions about gas warfare: "There is nothing more discouraging to our troops," he said, "than to be sub-

jected to a projector attack without any means of reply in kind." He thought that American divisions should be prepared to fire four times the amount of gas shells they received. More than morale concerned him. Gas, he thought, provided the best means of neutralizing hostile artillery batteries. He was about to test his theories at Frapelle.

Frapelle was a small village in a salient in the German lines pointing toward St. Die. The mood of many American officers arriving in France—a burning desire to prove the high quality of the U.S. Army to skeptical allies—apparently infused 5th Division headquarters and led to plans for an attack to forestall the German "threat" to St. Die. In fact, the Germans had only third-rate divisions manned by overage reservists in the area, and the "garrison" of Frapelle consisted of only a four-man outpost.

Backed by thirty-four batteries of field artillery, two companies of the 6th Infantry jumped off at 0400 on 17 August after six minutes of intense artillery preparation using high-explosive shells. As the infantry moved out, the artillery turned to neutralizing supporting German positions. In a ten-minute period, eight batteries of 75-mm. guns fired 1,064 gas shells into the Bois Carre, suppressing German machine guns located there. A German counterbarrage caught the second, third, and fourth waves of American infantry as they advanced out of their trenches. The leading two companies, however, overran the village and Hill 451 that dominated it. They captured or killed all 4 Germans, but at a cost of 104 men killed and wounded, of whom 15 were gas casualties.

The American and German artillery fell silent at 0430. The men of the 6th Infantry, soon reinforced by elements of the 11th Infantry, hurriedly organized the defense of their newly won positions in anticipation of the inevitable counterattack. Well they might, but when the attack came, it came from an unexpected quarter. At 1400 the German artillery opened fire on the village. The Americans soon learned what the Germans had long known: that Frapelle, located at the bottom of a deep valley and nestled beneath a sheer cliff facing the German lines, was a natural gas trap. German yellow cross shells—the designation given mustard gas shells—exploded against the face of the cliff, producing air bursts of mustard gas that rained on the village. The gassing continued through the 17th and the 18th. At 2100 on 18 August, just as the Americans began to evacuate gas casualties from Frapelle, the Germans made a ground assault. One of the surviving field messages vividly conveys the situation: "Enemy artillery too active. Infantry badly handicapped, losing heavily. Infantry demand and need support of our artillery. Just received report that enemy coming in force." A battalion of the U.S. 21st Field Artillery immediately laid down a gas barrage 600 yards in front of the American positions. The shelling and small arms fire broke the attack, but the German shelling continued. By evening, the Americans had suffered a total of 100 gas casualties.

Some 600 Americans held the town, no part of which was free from concentrations of gas. Not until 2030 on 18 August did decontamination begin, which could take place only at night, since the entire area was under German observation. By morning of 19 August, another 45 Americans had been gassed. To keep casualties at a minimum, the 5th Division thinned out the defenders by half, and all men in the area received French Tissot masks and gloves. The Tissot was the finest gas mask developed by any army during the war, but it was extremely bulky. For that reason, while it was standard issue for the French artillery, it was never given to the infantry. The gassing continued, and by the time the 92d Division took over the sector beginning on 21 August, the 5th Division had suffered 300 gas casualties.

The 5th Division surgeon spoke contemptuously of "gas fright" causing the case load to soar, but the closest student of the operation, the historian Rexmond Cochrane, believes that gas mask exhaustion was the real culprit. Many early arrivals at Frapelle had worn their masks—the less efficient British box masks, that were standard issue in the American infantry—more or less continuously during thirty hours of almost constant exertion. But the attitude at division headquarters was that gas served principally as an excuse for malingering.

The division next moved to the Arches training area, receiving new equipment and replacements, and began training for mobile warfare. The schools created by the division included a gas warfare school. The respite was brief. On 29 August, the 5th Division began moving to Lorraine to join the U.S. I Corps, part of the new First Army, which was preparing to attack the St. Mihiel salient. On 10 September the division relieved elements of the U.S. 90th Division on the right flank of the First Army. The 5th Division occupied the center of the corps position, with the 90th and 82d Divisions on its right and the 2d Division on its left.

The arrival of the 5th Division at the front followed a persistent argument at First Army Headquarters about the amount of artillery preparation needed for the

attack. General John J. Pershing initially ordered no preparation. The troops were simply to attack behind a massive rolling barrage. Though members of the First Army staff found this decision unwise, no one would make a final decision on the artillery plan, which, including the gas plan, changed daily. Finally, two staff officers on the First Army G-3 section, Lt. Col. George C. Marshall, Jr., and Lt. Col. W. S. Grant, wrote a memorandum that forced a decision in which they objected to an absence of preparatory fire. Calling an attack without preparation "taking a gambler's chance," they observed that:

> Many areas such as woods, etc., should be drenched with gas before our troops are to pass through them, the gas bombardment on these places ceasing several hours before our troops arrive there. If there is no artillery preparation until H Hour we will be deprived of the use of gas on those locations where the necessity for gas is the greatest.

First Army finally decided on four hours of preparation, which meant that the artillery could use only nonpersistent gases. The divisions learned of the plan at approximately 1600 on 11 September, eight hours before the attack. Brig. Gen. A. L. Flager, commanding the 5th Division artillery, restricted use of gas shells to the attached heavy artillery groupments. These, which included 155-mm., 220-mm., and 8-inch units, would concentrate on woods and trench systems in the German rear. Apparently influenced by the division's recent unhappy experience at Frapelle, Flager restricted the heavies to nonpersistent tear gas. In contrast, the neighboring 90th Division doused the same types of objectives with nonpersistent toxic gases. Corps artillery fired mustard gas shells at long range during the preparatory barrage. The 5th Division Headquarters also directed the chemical warfare platoon attached to the division to install six Stokes mortars to cover German machine gun nests and trenches with smoke, thermite, and skunk gas rounds. Though harmless, skunk gas was foul smelling and would force the German infantry to don their gas masks and thereby reduce their fighting efficiency while the 5th Division advanced unhampered by masks. The infantry in the assault force were equipped with white phosphorus hand and rifle grenades to clear German dugouts and machine gun positions. Infantry assigned to mop up isolated German strongpoints received tear gas grenades. Compared to the elaborate gas plans of the Allies, the 5th Division's preparations were very straightforward, but considering the time allowed to prepare them they were certainly commendable.

The 5th Division was lucky in its choice of opponents. General Fuchs, commanding German forces in the salient, anticipated the American attack and ordered two divisions to withdraw to intermediate positions. The commander of the *77th Reserve Division* on the 5th Division's front misinterpreted his orders, pulling back his guns but leaving most of his infantry in frontline positions. He could have corrected his error the next evening, but the American attack intervened. As the men of the 5th Division advanced, they saw blue flares rise from the German lines—the signal for drumfire to repel the attack—but no German shells came. In the ensuing close combat the *77th Reserve Division* ceased to exist as an organized unit. On the right, the U.S. 90th Division had more problems. The German *255th Division* withdrew in good order behind a dense screen of mustard gas, and in the process slowed the advance of the right flank of the 5th Division. The initial attack and the following five days of pursuit cost the 5th Division 259 gas casualties, most probably attributable to the artillery of the *255th Division*. In contrast, the 90th Division had 508 men gassed during the same period, the most gas casualties suffered by any American division at St. Mihiel.

The 5th Division left its positions in front of the German Hindenberg Line on 17 September and moved to the vicinity of Domevre-en-Haye for rehabilitation and training. Division headquarters gave special attention to the problems identified during the St. Mihiel operation: movement through woods, maintaining liaison between infantry and artillery, and use of gas masks. On 27 September the division began moving north toward Verdun, where the First Army had opened the major American offensive of the war, the Meuse-Argonne Campaign, on 26 September. The division joined the U.S. III Corps and moved into corps reserve in the Foret de Hesse on the night of 5-6 October.

The Meuse-Argonne Campaign consisted of an attack by three corps abreast up a defile north of Verdun, bordered by the Meuse River on the east and the Aire River on the west, leading to Sedan, a rail center and key to German lateral communications along the entire Western Front. High bluffs east of the Meuse and west of the Aire provided ideal artillery positions to bring the entire defile under a brutal crossfire. In the defile, the Argonne Forest presented an almost impenetrable barrier to the American left flank, and at the southern end stood commanding high ground at Montfaucon. Farther north, the heights around the village of Cunel dominated the defile. To

the difficulties posed by geography the Germans added the experience gained from four years of war. They constructed four major defensive belts, the second of which was anchored on Montfaucon. The third and main position, the Hindenberg Line, rested on the heights around Cunel. The First Army planned to outflank Montfaucon on the first day of the offensive and capture the first two defense systems, advancing in all ten miles. It was then to concentrate against Cunel and launch a massive frontal assault and break through the Hindenberg Line on the second day. The timing was important. The Germans had only weak forces in the Meuse-Argonne Sector, but strong reserves could arrive within three days. Many of the U.S. divisions in the initial assault were untested in combat. When he saw the plan, Marshal Petain commented that the Americans would be hung up before Montfaucon all winter. But the result belied both American optimism and French pessimism. The attack captured Montfaucon, but only on the second day. Meanwhile a huge traffic jam behind U.S. lines delayed the movement of American reserves. The First Army seized outlying portions of the Hindenberg Line, but failed to break through, and German reserves arrived in time to stabilize the situation. Continuing American attacks, increasingly uncoordinated, produced high casualties without appreciable benefit, and Pershing finally decided to reorganize before launching another general assault. The movement of the 5th Division to the front was part of this reorganization. On the night of 11-12 October, it replaced the 3d Division opposite Cunel.

The First Army's gas program up to 14 October reflected the divided opinions and lack of experience with gas on the part of most senior American officers. The French and British Armies used persistent gas in the offensive. They drenched suspected machine gun and artillery emplacements with mustard gas and then maneuvered around these locales in the attack. Gassed areas in World War I thus played much the same tactical role in the offensive as minefields did in World War II. But most American officers in September 1918 considered gas strictly a defensive weapon. Mustard gas was suitable for use against German positions east of the Meuse, but only because American troops did not plan to attack into the area. First Army otherwise planned to use nonpersistent toxic gas west of the Meuse and gave corps commanders discretion in using gas within their corps areas. Only the III Corps used phosgene. The I and V Corps relied on smoke and high explosives, their commanders fearing that the use of toxic gases would provoke German retaliation. The Germans suffered no such inhibitions and would use mustard gas freely.

When the American artillery displaced forward after the gains of the first two days, it carried only a minimal gas load. A logistics breakdown behind the American lines meant that sufficient quantities of gas shells could not reach the guns, and as a result of transportation problems, the 5th Division did not bring its organic artillery with it. Instead, the divisional artillery of the 80th Division and two regiments of the 3d Division's divisional artillery plus various French artillery battalions supported the 5th Division before Cunel.

General Pershing set 14 October as the date for the general attack. General McMahon, repeating orders from First Army, directed the artillery to "utilize to the fullest extent possible the advantages of lethal gas in preparing for and assisting the infantry attack and in causing casualties in the rear areas and along the lines of communication." He also attached the Stokes mortars to the two infantry brigades, enjoining them to "make maximum use" of the gas units. But the supply crisis restricted the amount and types of gas used to support the attack. First Army fired only small amounts of gas shells filled with tear gas and chlorpicrin, an asphyxiating gas considerably less lethal than phosgene, producing excessive tearing of the eyes before death—and thus warning intended victims of its presence in ample time for them to don masks. Indeed the gas support on 14 October harassed rather than killed the enemy.

German artillery fire from across the Meuse, primarily high-explosive fire rather than gas, proved particularly deadly to the 5th Division. A heavy concentration landed on the division as it assembled for the assault and caused many casualties, and as the infantry debouched from the trenches, another artillery concentration landed on them. The division pressed on. In some of the bitterest fighting of the war, it seized Cunel and the heights immediately in the rear of the town, the Bois de la Pultiere, although fighting in the wood did not end until the next day. In sum, the division had broken into but not through the Hindenberg Line. General Pershing, dissatisfied with the progress, relieved General McMahon and replaced him with Maj. Gen. Hanson T. Ely. On 20 October the division resumed the offensive, this time in a local action designed to clear the Bois des Rappes, a wood on the division's front approximately 1,000 yards square. General Ely made no particular provision for the use of gas during the attack. It took two days of hard fighting

to capture the place. On the night of 22 October, the 90th Division relieved the 5th Division, which rested and refitted near Montfaucon for the next four days.

The 5th Division returned to the line on the night of 26-27 October and relieved the 3d Division, which held the front from the Bois de la Cote Lemont to a point 1.5 kilometers south of the village of Aincreville. The 5th Division now occupied the extreme right of the III Corps and thus became the American division closest to the Meuse and the German guns on the other side. Maj. Gen. Hunter Liggett, who had succeeded Pershing in command of the First Army on 12 October, planned to open a new general assault on 1 November. This time, gas stocks were entirely adequate. Liggett ordered—and enforced his orders—that the corps commanders use liberal amounts of mustard gas. The use of mustard gas east of the Meuse, discontinued while the French XVII Corps made an unsuccessful attempt to capture the heights, had resumed on 14 October. On 27 October, the artillery preparation began. It included tremendous amounts of gas shells. By 2 November, the *1st Austro Hungarian Division* holding the Meuse line had suffered over 1,000 casualties to gas alone and had virtually ceased to exist.

In a local attack, the 5th Division captured Aincreville on 29 October. Two days later it joined in the general assault. It captured Clery-le-Grand and Brieulles-sur-Meuse and reached the river at the latter point. To the west, the V Corps shattered the German line and made a deep penetration. In the exploitation that followed, Liggett ordered all three corps to pivot on the 5th Division and attack northeast toward the Meuse. By 3 November, the 5th Division closed to the river along almost its entire front. The maneuver was possible only because First Army artillery used mustard gas to neutralize German artillery in the Bois de Sassey, which otherwise would have brought the 5th Division under fire from the flank as it pivoted. A patrol checking the wood a week later found lethal concentrations of gas.

The Meuse constituted a particularly difficult barrier. The Americans had to attack over an open plain, cross an unfordable river, move over another plain, and finally cross a 65-foot-wide canal—all under direct observation of the Germans on the heights. Lt. Col. Courtney H. Hodges, commanding the 2d Battalion, 6th Infantry, succeeded in crossing one company early on 3 November, but dawn brought discovery. German fire defeated attempts to cross the canal. Reinforced by a second company, the Americans finally succeeded in seizing a bridgehead east of the canal on the evening of 4 November, and small unit actions cleared the heights by the evening of 5 November. The division pursued the Germans for the next six days until halted by the Armistice.

Throughout the campaign the 5th Division suffered only 262 gas casualties, small losses compared to those endured by other American divisions. The 33d Division, for example, had 2,198 men gassed. The 5th Division, which ranked ninth among the twenty-five American divisions employed in the Meuse-Argonne in terms of total casualties, ranked nineteenth in terms of gas casualties. Despite confusion in the American high command about the appropriate way to wage gas warfare and the logistical snarl behind the American lines, the opponents of the 5th Division suffered far more heavily than it did. General Liggett may have sometimes lacked the materiel always to obey General McMahon's injunction about returning four gas shells for every one fired by the enemy, but Liggett agreed with the spirit of McMahon's position. The loss of the *1st Austro Hungarian Division* to mustard gas certainly impaired the ability of the Germans to defend the line of the Meuse.

When the United States entered World War I, it found gas warfare part of the standard operating procedure of all the armies on the Western Front. Voluntary abnegation in the hope that the enemy would also refrain proved futile, as demonstrated by the experience of the U.S. I and V Corps in the opening stages of the Meuse-Argonne Campaign. On the battlefield the need to maintain the morale of the assault infantry and the utility of gas in screening attacks, protecting flanks, and neutralizing enemy strongpoints provided much more convincing guidelines for the use of gas than any concept of deterrence. In fact, the entire history of the use of gas during World War I demonstrated the consequences of an absence of deterrence. The Germans embarked on gas warfare because their chemical industry was so superior that they did not fear Allied retaliation. They consistently introduced ever more dangerous chemical weapons before the Allies. Only in the last months of the war did the technical balance shift to the Allies, too late for the new chemical munitions to reach the battlefield. The German collapse spared the combat troops of both sides the necessity of dealing with substances far more lethal than mustard gas.

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Unready for War: the Army and World War I

Stephen J. Lofgren

"We frequently hear it said that the best school for war is war. No idea, however, could be more fallacious...if one cannot understand the how and why of what is happening on the battlefield, he cannot there learn to make successful war. Service in battle hardens officers and men...but it does not school them." (1)

America's entry into World War I demanded the rapid expansion of the United States Army from just over 100,000 men in 1916 to almost four million in 1918. Such a hurried mobilization was fraught with problems, but few were so disruptive or pervasive as the fundamental need for training on all levels to transform the mob of men into an efficient army. The Army's inability to provide the required types of training stemmed from five factors over which the Army had varying degrees of control. First, the unprecedented size of the mobilization overwhelmed the Army's available training resources. Second, a dearth of prewar planning and preparation for such a contingency found the Army lacking basic training essentials of all kinds—from a training program to instructors to materiel (manuals, clothing, and weapons). Third, the Army's experience in previous decades had left it without a force structure or a fighting doctrine suitable for the battlefields of Europe. Fourth, the relatively short time that the United States was involved in the war was insufficient to rectify these deficiencies or to provide opportunity for critical combat analysis and dissemination of "lessons learned." Finally, once the United States declared war, there was great political pressure from France and Britain to dispatch troops to Europe as quickly as possible. This political imperative correspondingly reduced the little time available for training. All of these deficiencies complicated the Army's efforts to create from scratch a multimillion-man fighting force for a new kind of total war.

The transition from peace to war came suddenly for the United States. When America entered the war in April 1917, there were 300,000 men in Federal service; nineteen moths later that number had swelled by more than twelve times. Of the 2,800,000 draftees who served in World War I, 2,300,000 entered the Army in 1918. More than one million men entered the Army during May-July of 1918 alone, inundating the Army's training facilities. (2)

The officer corps grew at a similar rate, from approximately 5,800 in April 1917 to 130,500 by June 1918. (3) The influx of officers and the resultant spate of promotions meant that company commanders and platoon leaders often were new officers lacking any military experience. The same held true for noncommissioned officers. Traditionally responsible for providing basic instruction at the company level, experienced noncommissioned officers soon were spread thin. Others were commissioned as lieutenants, and their replacements generally were as inexperienced as the new recruits they were supposed to train.

Training a mass army of citizen-soldiers obviously was a weighty responsibility. The task was complicated because the War Department General Staff (WDGS)—the brain of the Army—previously had not pondered the problem of intervening in the European war. Limited in manpower by the National Defense Act of 1916, preoccupied during the same year with events along the Mexican border, and physically divided between the War Department building and the Army War College building three miles away, the WDGS, conditioned by American history, focused on continental defense. As if a further restraint to speculative contingency planning were necessary, the WDGS also had to contend with a president who insisted on formally observing a specific policy of neutrality within the broader, traditional American policy of isolationism regarding internal European affairs. The deleterious influence of President Woodrow Wilson is best captured in a well-known 1915 episode, which seemingly showed that he defined neutrality as unpreparedness. The acting secretary of war was called into Wilson's office, where he found the furious president brandishing a copy of the *Baltimore Sun*. Angrily pointing out an article that stating that the WDGS was preparing contingency plans in case of war with Germany, Wilson demanded that the assistant secretary investigate, and, if the story was true, relieve all the officers involved. (4)

Loosed from Wilson's leash by the declaration of war, the nineteen members of the War Department General Staff realized from the start that efficiently organizing, equipping, and training an American army of unprecedented size could not be accomplished overnight. One study concluded that a year of training, at

least, would be necessary to prepare any newly recruited force for offensive action. The War College Division, the planning body of the General Staff, worked from the premise that the Army would not be ready for large-scale offensive actions in Europe until 1919. Throughout the war, the Army, including General John J. Pershing, commander of the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF), believed that the decisive campaigns would take place in that year. (5)

The organizational unit responsible for training troops in 1917 was the division. In August the War Department published its infantry training program. War Department Document No. 656, *Infantry Training*, mandated that divisions carry out a sixteen-week program of intensive military training in the United States before going overseas. Each division would devise and administer its own training program. While the specifics of the program were left to each division commander, certain training missions were emphasized: preparation for trench warfare (*Infantry Training*'s first sentence declared that "training for trench warfare is of paramount importance"); individual training for each soldier in his specialty, from rifleman to horseshoer to clerk; and unit training for squads, platoons, and companies. (6)

On the army level, however, divisional training was a decentralized process without sufficient oversight and guidance. Lacking veteran officers and noncommissioned officers conversant in a coherent doctrine, the Army instead relied on the aptitude of division officers and on Inspector General critiques. The natural result was divisions of different style and quality.

Another factor that complicated divisional training was the Army's decision to organize infantry-heavy "square" divisions—ponderous 28,000-man units with four infantry regiments—at cadre strength, but to fill them to authorized levels prior to embarkation for France. (7) As embarkation dates approached, divisions swept up any available troops, often receiving soldiers stripped in mass from other divisions or levied from recruit depots to bring the departing division up to authorized strength. Such indiscriminate transfer of personnel precluded any semblance of a uniform level of training within a division and wreaked havoc with division integrity.

The 78th Division, for example, experienced such problems. During the fall of 1917 the division cadre at Camp Dix, New Jersey, received recruits and reached an average company strength of 175 men in November. In the last week of November, scores of soldiers were transferred to other units, reducing the division to half-strength. By January 1918 the average strength of infantry companies had shrunk to a mere fifty men. At the beginning of April 1918, the entire division numbered only 10,000; nevertheless, more transfers—this time into the division—and raw draftees ensured that the divisions was at full strength when it sailed for France two months later. (8)

Personnel transfers and inexperience were not the only sources of tribulation for division commanders. Materiel shortages and frictions such as the weather and epidemic illness also hindered training. The harsh winter of 1917-1918 effectively prevented outdoor training. At many camps soldiers lacking winter clothing lived in tents, since there had not been time to build barracks; at other camps outdoor drill continued even though the unfortunate troops had only lightweight uniforms. The influenza epidemic that struck with a fury in the fall of 1918 virtually stopped training in the United States and ravaged AEF units. (9)

Rampant materiel shortages combined with inexperienced instructors to provide particularly stultifying training. The 35th Division's training at Fort Sill, for example, consisted largely of close-order drill and marching. Inspector General reports castigated the division's infantry officers as incompetent, and its artillery officers as inexperienced. The division staff was so mired in administrative work that it took little part in field exercises other than basic drill. Finally, shortages in artillery, observation, topographical, and communications equipment bedeviled training. The division's later poor showing in combat echoed its training. (10)

The 30th Division took two months just to assemble recruits at Camp Sevier, North Carolina, before it began training in mid-September 1917. The newcomers were not issued rifles until February, a mere ninety days before the division sailed for Europe. Until that time the men had to make do with wooden training rifles. Some latecomers to the unit did not fire a rifle in training until after they reached the theater of operations in France. This training deficiency, particularly irritating to Pershing, persisted in the AEF throughout the war. (11)

There were other reasons for the troops' scanty training. At the time of World War I, racial segregation was official policy. Civilian and military authorities worried about arming a large number of blacks and concentrating them in one location. To allay fears, they left black Regular Army units spread out in the southwestern United States and dispersed black draftee

units. One of the latter, the 92d Division, a segregated black unit largely filled with draftees, but commanded by white officers, was spread out between October 1917 and the following June among seven different camps under seven different commanders (none of whom went overseas with the division) with wildly varying training conditions. White officers were often both incompetent and resentful of being assigned to black units—a combination brutal in its results. Because of the initial reluctance to call blacks into service, segregated units were late in organizing. A conspicuous example was the division's 317th Trench Mortar Battery, which was organized in the United States on 20 May 1918 and joined the AEF in France just a month later. Turnover during the month before the 92d Division's embarkation was staggering, as 7,511 enlisted men, including 4,353 brand-new recruits, joined the division. All of the 92d's training for infantry, artillery, motorized, signal, and machine gun units suffered from a lack of equipment. A postwar Army War College study noted that "*only rudimentary training was given in the United States.*" (12)

Perhaps most frustrating for all those involved with training, and indicative of evolving—rather than established—personnel policies, was the transfer of specialists and levy of men trained as infantry to the supply services. This ill-considered policy of expedience ruined unit integrity and wasted months of training. The 82d Division, for example, watched 3,000 specialists leave the division after completing three months of training. Although the War Department eventually recognized its error and established a new depot-based personnel replacement system in mid-1918, it was too late to affect the war. (13)

The final complicating factor was political pressure. In the year following the American declaration of war, the Allied position steadily deteriorated. Enormous manpower losses in failed offensives, withdrawal of Russia from the war, mutinies by dozens of French divisions, and new German offensives in the spring of 1918 led the Allies to beg America for "men, men, and still more men." (14) The desperate circumstances of the Western Front made orderly expansion and training of the Army virtually impossible. Stateside training was subordinated to raising and organizing the Army, which, in turn, meant that American soldiers were shipped overseas hastily—before they were adequately trained.

In the decades before the World War, when he was a cavalry officer serving in the western United States and the Philippines, John J. Pershing had learned the importance of maneuver, the offensive, and rifle marksmanship—all vital components of what he termed "open warfare." When he inspected the four divisions that arrived in France during 1917, General Pershing, now the AEF commander, saw that they needed considerable training. (15) Pershing already was unhappy with the tactical doctrine of the Allies and the War Department. He judged it to be too cautious and bereft of the aggressive spirit he wished to cultivate in the AEF. Pershing was particularly unhappy with the War Department's acceptance of Allied emphasis on trench warfare, as typified in *Infantry Training*. (16) In his view, only open warfare tactics would allow units to exploit breakthroughs and avoid the ritualistic butchery of trench warfare. As he phrased it, "victory...must be won by drawing the enemy out into the open and engaging him a war of movement." (17)

American troops, Pershing believed, must train for maneuver warfare, and the best place for such training was in the United States. The requisite space for open warfare training was not available in France. With French agriculture desperately trying to supply food for millions of troops, maneuver space was at a premium. (18)

Consequently, Pershing insisted on training troops according to his own system before they entered combat, and prescribed his own training plan for his command. A major part of the plan was a three-month regimen for divisions newly arrived in France. This regimen, however, assumed that newly arriving divisions would have completed six months of training in the United States—concentrating on marksmanship and maneuver, and not trench warfare, which could be mastered quickly in practice trenches already established in rear areas in France.

The first month of the AEF program stressed acclimatization and instruction for battalion-size and smaller units. During the second month, individual battalions would serve under French command with French forces in trenches and gain combat experience. For the third month, the troops would be trained in the World War I equivalent of combined arms warfare. (19)

Simultaneously, the AEF established an extensive school system to provide the necessary training infrastructure for an army. The Army school system organized in France had something for virtually everyone: from enlisted men specializing in motor transportation to officer candidates to officers attending the General Staff College at Langres. Originally forced to use British and French instructors, who taught trench war-

fare techniques, the AEF replaced them as quickly as possible to inculcate an aggressive offensive spirit in eager American students.

Pershing had another problem: the Allies coveted American combat troops. This political problem further explained both his adamant stand on training American troops to fight in an American army and his decision to build an entire training and educational infrastructure. When the Allies clamored for men, men, men, they did not mean men (or "wastage" as some British said) in the form of a separate American army. Rather, having squandered virtually an entire generation of young men in failed offensives, the British and French wanted raw Americans to flesh out their own thinned ranks. Allied arguments ran from the logical (the Allied training system was already established) to the imperative (there was no time to train an American army; the Germans would win first) to the unstated (the Americans would have less say in the conduct of the war if they lacked an independent army). The British and French even tried to outmaneuver Pershing politically by going over his head to the secretary of war and President Wilson with their requests for amalgamation of troops. Throughout the war, therefore, Pershing was occupied not only with creating, training, and fighting the AEF, but also with protecting it from numerous Allied attempts to poach his troops. Bolstered by his understanding that American prestige and political power rested on having an independent army and spurred on by his basic disagreement with Allied tactics, the AEF commander forged ahead with his own training program.

The first AEF division to experience this program was, appropriately enough, the lst Division. The initial division deployed to France, the lst Division ostensibly was formed out of four Regular Army regiments. Nevertheless, only half of the company commanders had served on active duty before 1917, and all the platoon commanders were either fresh from officer training camps or were newly commissioned noncommissioned officers. Moreover, two-thirds of the division's enlisted men had volunteered during wartime, and less than half of its noncommissioned officers had prewar service. (20) This was, in the words of one historian, "not a combat division at all, but only the raw material for one." (21)

Arriving in France in late June 1917, the 1st Division began its initial battalion-level training, but encountered a problem that plagued subsequent American divisions. (22) Because of their prodigious size, American divisions in France were billeted by battalion over 500-square-kilometer areas. The great distances made it difficult to assemble battalions for regimental or brigade training. Furthermore, since there were no artillery ranges in the American area, the artillery brigade (which had arrived in late August with the engineers) trained with the French. (23)

The division moved to the front lines by battalions late in October for its second period of training. The first battalion of each regiment deployed within the French lines under French command to learn firsthand the intricacies of trench warfare. Infantry received instructions and practice in patrolling and raiding. Artillerymen, by now familiar with their French-made and French-supplied artillery pieces, and machine gunners practiced adjusting fire and camouflaging their positions. Engineers built the familiar barbed-wire obstructions that dotted no-man's-land. Men were killed. (24)

Only when the 1st Division prepared for the final month of training in the midst of a harsh European winter, hampered by the absence of winter uniforms, were all of its organic elements united. Before beginning the final combined arms field exercises, the 1st Division lost many officers to other less experienced units, to AEF schools (as both instructors and students), to training assignments, and to the services of supply. Nine of the twelve battalion commanders who had commanded in the French sector departed to attend service schools set up by the AEF in France. Enlisted personnel turnover continued unabated as the division had to absorb several thousand fresh replacements direct from the United States. (25) With this conglomeration of combat veterans, new officers, and raw recruits, the 1st Division began the last period of its training. Beginning with battalions and then moving to regiments and the whole division, the combined arms exercises, as mandated by Pershing, emphasized maneuver.

The 1st Division was the only division to complete the entire AEF training cycle. The lst's later performance exhibited flashes of tactical skill and grit, as demonstrated on 28-29 May when it successfully attacked the German-held town of Cantigny, inflicted 1,800 casualties, and held for several days against fierce German counterattacks. Still, the shortcomings of World War I training could not be escaped. For example, despite the most thorough chemical warfare preparation of any AEF division, the men of the 1st Division suffered gas casualties every day that they were on the front in Ansauville. (26) One German gas and artillery attack on 2-4 May wiped out a reserve

battalion of the 18th Infantry billeted near regimental headquarters. (27) Successful countermeasures against gas required self-imposed discipline, fired by the knowledge that the targets of gas attacks were divided into "the quick and the dead." Cursory training in the United States, or no training in the case of six divisions, could not create such a level of proficiency. In the course of the war, gas caused more than one-fourth of all AEF casualties. (28)

The German offensives in 1918 eliminated the AEF's elaborate training programs by creating an immediate need for men at the front. The raw 3d Division's strong showing during the Battle of the Marne in early June, despite no previous combat experience, helped change AEF policy. Coming at a time of great demand for combat troops, the savage success of the men of the "Rock of the Marne" indicated that green troops might be used. New divisions were sent directly into line, often after only a month in France and without the preliminary step of battalion training with the French. By mid-1918 some officers at AEF headquarters, including Pershing, did not consider the latter training a great loss because they believed the French to be too cautious, war-weary, and unattuned to open warfare and its requirements. By June 1918 Pershing had decided that battalion training with the French was "of little value," which helps explain his decision to stop using foreign instructors in AEF training. (29)

As the AEF's role in the fighting increased, constant personnel turnover in AEF divisions consumed hard-won combat experience. The loss of seasoned officers and the infusion of inexperienced infantry were regular occurrences. Promotions and assignments to AEF schools continually drained quality officers from tactical units. (30). One company commander in the 42d Division reported a "typical instance" in which his company received forty-three replacements, of whom "one man had but one week of training; four had two weeks; twenty, three weeks; six, four weeks; and the rest anywhere between one and three months." (31) In late September 1918 more than 4,000 replacements joined the 77th Division in a two-day period—2,100 during a single day. More than half lacked the most basic infantry skills. The next day at dawn the division took part in the initial Meuse-Argonne attack. (32). The 77th Division paid for its lack of training by suffering more than 5,200 casualties in the course of the Meuse-Argonne campaign. (33)

Deficient training in individual and small-unit tactics had fatal consequences. Officer inexperience manifested itself in lack of initiative at the tactical level. (34) Many infantry units learned the hard way that they had to vary nightly patrol routines. In combat, inexperienced American troops often did not take cover when attacking machine gun nests, charged while standing upright, or failed to mop up bypassed machine gun emplacements. Heavy casualties resulted. The 1st Division's chief of staff recorded in early May that "American losses [were] from two to four times as great as those of the French. There is but one conclusion; it is that our men, either from ignorance or carelessness, are not taking cover." (35) British and French officers were dismayed by the American dead lying in regular lines, the work of machine gunners. American doughboys attacked with great courage, an American corps commander noted, but "American troops, doing the same thing [as French troops]...lost twice as many men." (36) In September 1918, two months before the end of the war, General Headquarters, AEF, admonished that troops were attacking "too close together...almost elbow to elbow." (37) "Untutored courage," concluded Maj. George S. Patton after the war "was useless in the face of educated bullets." (38)

Inadequate training in command procedures and staff work resulted in a swarm of other problems. The huge divisions (each roughly the size of a Civil War corps), intended to provide "staying power" in combat and increase the effectiveness of the small number of staff officers trained at the Command and General Staff College, actually did neither. (39) A division in combat quickly needed troop replacements, often numbering in the thousands, while the division's massive size only placed greater demands on its staff officers, who had never controlled units so large except in tabletop exercises.

Always present, the political imperative of deploying American combat troops to counter the German offensives of 1918 affected the growing AEF. Instead of complete divisions, huge numbers of infantry and machine gunners were shipped to France; a corresponding number of combat support and combat service support troops were left behind. The result was an imbalanced AEF force structure, with the most conspicuous deficiency an acute transportation shortage. Logistical problems hurt the AEF during 1918. In late 1918 the problem had become so bad that, in the opinion of one authority, complete operational paralysis was approaching when the Armistice went into effect and "saved the AEF from a logistical disaster." (40)

The AEF's difficulties came to a head in the

offensive, when, after a few days of infantry advances, disorder reigned. (41) The identifying characteristic of an AEF offensive was an immense traffic jam, sometimes lasting for days, as fresh troops, wounded men, wagons, trucks, and animals competed for the same narrow, damaged road nets. Such jams, made worse by the supply and transportation problems, became operational bottlenecks. Command and control disappeared within and between units once they began to advance. Communication between echelons regularly broke down in battle. Units became "lost," and large numbers of stragglers wandered in rear areas. (42) The operational level of war proved a nightmare for the AEF as many officers found that they were simply unready for the increased responsibility of large-unit command.

Fighting in the way they were trained, American soldiers achieved their objectives in World War I, but with the same heavy casualties that the Allies had suffered in the first three years of the war. (43) Without training sufficient in either quantity or quality, exuberance was substituted for education, temerity for training. (44) Efforts to train divisions after leaving the line and to disseminate combat lessons learned were laudable and positive, but the war ended before these practices made a substantial difference. (45) American soldiers who fought in the major AEF offensives of 1918 completed both individual and unit training in the harshest and least forgiving school for the soldier: combat. During the early stages of the American participation in the war, French Premier Georges Clemenceau had remarked that "if the Americans do not permit the French to teach them, the Germans will do so at great cost of life." (46) As if in response, a lieutenant in the 5th Division observed after the war, "the training in small unit tactics and rifle marksmanship was pretty poor.... We learned small unit tactics from the Germans. They were costly teachers." (47) Despite the individual bravery and determination of AEF citizen-soldiers, eminently evidenced by what they endured and achieved, the conditions of the Western Front and the exhaustion of the German Army, and not the performance of AEF divisions, were major reasons that no American military fiascos occurred. (48) In the end, Pershing fought the war of attrition that he hoped to avoid.

Throughout the war, the overwhelming magnitude of the Army's expansion defied attempts to create a coherent training program in the United States. Allied military exigencies required the decentralized training process to speed the procedure of training troops and transporting them to Europe. The absence of established training programs (with trained personnel to run them) to inculcate understood tactical and operational doctrine meant that attempts to create both the programs and the doctrine resulted in only confusion and untrained troops. An exercise in night raids with fixed bayonets, conducted by members of the 30th Division, best symbolized the inexperience of both trainers and trainees. As one veteran recalled, "because of the single file approach, in the darkness, the men were accidentally stabbing the rump of the fellow in front of him [*sic*]." (49)

Meanwhile, in France Pershing and his subordinates were forced to create an educational system for the Army. A monumental task, it was too big for the resources at hand. Further, the AEF proved no better than the Allies at solving the particularly sanguinary dilemma of World War I: how, while relying on infantry and horse-drawn artillery and supplies, to break through miles of prepared defenses without incurring astronomical casualties? Pershing's unmitigated faith in the combat power of the individual rifleman and his emphasis on "open warfare" were not justified by events. Ill-trained draftees, however, were not the ideal test material for Pershing's beliefs. While they were not incapable of breaking into the German lines, they lacked the confidence to exploit what fissures they made. Yet for many AEF commanders and trainers, confronted with the immediate problem of breaching prepared defenses, the prominent discussion of Pershing's subjects in AEF training literature often generated a gap between espoused tactical doctrine and the reality encountered by the doughboys they sent scrambling across a moonscape no-man's-land or through machine-gun-infested thickets. (50)

Although the combat ability, performance, and all-around effectiveness of both the individual soldiers and the large units of the AEF improved, they never reached their full potential. (51) Nevertheless, basic lessons regarding the importance of training and preparation were indelibly impressed upon the future Army leaders. In 1933, as he fought budget cuts that threatened the Army's manpower, Chief of Staff General Douglas MacArthur, a brigade commander during World War I, asserted, "In no other profession are the penalties for employing untrained personnel so appalling or so irrevocable as in the military." (52) Then-Col. George Marshall, in a 1935 speech to Illinois National Guardsmen, stressed the point that "You cannot train without planning. You cannot impart instruction without preparation.....Instruction [in the past] has been a

failure and a waste of time due to lack of forethought and preparation." (53) The crush of draftees that entered the Army, and the speed with which units were shipped overseas in 1918, would have caused difficulties for any training program, but the Army's unpreparedness in virtually all areas—that is, the Army's lack of a training program and its constituent parts—exacerbated the problem.

In World War I, American soldiers often achieved combat success through sheer determination and perseverance, but frequently at high human cost. Today, those who try to learn their profession on the battlefield already may have lost the battle. The tempo, complexity, and advanced technology found on the contemporary battlefield make the cost of victory too exorbitant a price for untrained soldiers to pay. The American experience in World War I provides a stark reminder of the importance of preparation and training for an army.

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Notes

1. Brig Gen Harold B. Fiske, asst. chief of staff, G-5, "Final Report of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, General Headquarters, AEF," *United States Army in the World War, 1917-1919*, 17 vols. (Washington: Historical Division, Dept. of the Army, 1948), 14: 290 (hereafter cited as *USAWW*).
2. John Whiteclay Chambers II, *To Raise an Army: The Draft Comes to Modern America* (New York: Free Press, 1987), p. 186; Dept. of Defense, *Selected Manpower Statistics, Fiscal Year 1986*, p. 64; Russell F. Weigley, *History of the United States Army* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1967), p. 358; Allan R. Millett, "Over Where? The AEF and the American Strategy for Victory, 1917-1918," in *Against All Enemies: Interpretations of American Military History from Colonial Times to the Present*, ed. Kenneth Hagan and William R. Roberts (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1986), p. 242; James R. Rainey, "The Training of the American Expeditionary Forces in World War I" (M.A. thesis, Temple University, 1981), p. 137.
3. Allan R. Millett, "Cantigny, 28-31 May 1918," in *America's First Battles, 1776-1965*, ed. Charles E. Heller and William A. Stofft (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1986), p. 154; *Selected Manpower Statistics*, p. 74.
4. I.B. Holley, Jr., *General John M. Palmer, Citizen Soldiers and the Army of a Democracy* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1982), p. 268; Marvin A. Kreidberg and Merton G. Henry, *History of Military Mobilization in the United States Army, 1775-1945* (Washington: Dept. of the Army, 1955), pp. 192-202, 236; James L. Abrahamson, *American Arms for a New Century* (New York: Free Press, 1981), pp. 158-71; Frederick Palmer, *Newton D. Baker: America at War*, 2 vols. (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1931), 1: 40-41; Weigley, *United States Army*, p. 351-52.
5. Kreidberg and Henry, *Military Mobilization*, p. 239; Millett, "Cantigny," pp. 156, 159; idem, "Over Where?" p. 236; Timothy K. Nenninger, "American Military Effectiveness in the First World War," in *Military Effectiveness*, vol. 1 of *The First World War*, ed. Allan R. Millett and Williamson Murray (Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1988), p. 142; David Trask, *The United States in the Supreme War Council: American War Aims and Inter-Allied Strategy, 1917-1918* (Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1961), p. 181, n. 13; *USAWW*, 2: 579.
6. War Dept., Document No. 656, *Infantry Training* (Washington: War Dept., 1917), p. 5 (quote); Rainey, "Training," pp. 83-84.
7. Historical Section, Army War College, *Order of Battle of the United States Land Forces in the World War: American Expeditionary Forces: Divisions* (Washington: Dept. of the Army, 1931), pp. 446-47. Filling up units prior to deployment has been a recurrent problem for the Army in twentieth-century wars.
8. James Rainey, in the most comprehensive examination available of U.S. Army training in World War I, describes the levies as "personnel rapes." Rainey, "Training," p. 137; Edward Coffman, *The War to End All Wars* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 67; *Order of Battle of the United States Land Forces in the World War: American Expeditionary Forces*, 5 vols. (reprinted) (Washington: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1988), 2: 311.
9. More American soldiers died from influenza than from combat. Kreidberg and Henry, *Military Mobilization*, pp. 318-23; Coffman, *War to End All Wars*, pp. 68, 81-84; Donald Smythe, *Pershing: General of the Armies* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986), p. 65.
10. Coffman, *War to End All Wars*, pp. 311-12; Smythe,

Pershing, pp. 198-200; Army War College, Historical Section, "The Thirty-Fifth Division, 1917-1918" (Army War College, 1921-1922), pp. 7-10.

11. Lt Col Douglas Johnson, "Training the American Army for World War I," Army War College Report, 4 May 87, pp. 16-19; John J. Pershing, *My Experiences in the World War*, 2 vols. (New York: Frederick A. Stokes Co., 1931), 1: 153-54; USAWW, 2: 562.

12. The 92d Division was not the only division that did not assemble before arriving in France, but fear of black troops, exacerbated by the Houston riot of November 1917, encouraged such practice. Bernard C. Nalty, *Strength for the Fight: A History of Black Americans in the Military* (New York: Free Press, 1986), p. 107; Army War College, Historical Section, "The Ninety-Second Division, 1917-1918" (1923), p.15, emphasis in original.

13. Pershing, *Experiences*, 1: 379-81; G. Edward Buxton, *Official History of the 82d Division, American Expeditionary Forces: "All American" Division* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, Co., 1919), p. 3; Coffman, *War to End All Wars*, p. 67; Edward Coffman, *The Hilt of the Sword* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1966), pp. 66-67.

14. Quoted in Coffman, *Hilt of the Sword*, p. 70.

15. Pershing, *Experiences*, 1: 152-55; 265-66.

16. *USAWW*, 14: 316.

17. Pershing, *Experiences*, 1: 152.

18. *USAWW*, 14: 316, 328.

19. Pershing, *Experiences*, 1: 265; Paul F. Braim, *The Test of Battle: The American Expeditionary Forces in Meuse-Argonne Campaign* (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1987), p. 53.

20. Millett, "Cantigny," p. 162; Forrest C. Pogue, *George C. Marshall: Education of a General* (New York: Viking, 1963), pp. 146-47.

21. Pogue, *Marshall*, p. 147.

22. The training of the 1st Division is covered in *USAWW*, 3: 422-90; Millett, "Cantigny;" and idem, *The General: Robert L. Bullard and Officership in the United States Army, 1881-1925* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1975).

23. The artillery brigade and engineer regiment arrived in mid-August. The engineer regiment had to wait a month longer for its tools to arrive. Maj. Thomas F. Farrell, *A History of the 1st U.S. Engineers 1st U.S. Division* (Coblenz: n.p., 1919), p. 7; Capt Ralph T. Heard, ed., *A History of the Sixth Regiment Field Artillery First Division United States Army* (Ransbach: n.p., 1919), p. 21; *History of the Seventh Field Artillery (First Division, A.E.F.), World War 1917-1919* (New York: J. L. Little amd Oves, 1929), p. 15; *USAWW*, 14: 328; Rainey, "Training," pp. 232-33; Shipley Thomas, *The History of the A.E.F.* (New York: George A. Doran Co., 1920), p. 39.

24. Heard, *Sixth Regiment Field Artillery*, pp. 25-29; *Seventh Field Artillery*, pp. 17-20; Farrell, *1st U.S. Engineers*, pp. 12-13; *USAWW*, 3: 441-42; 449; Rainey, "Training," p. 240.

25. *USAWW*, 3: 456; George C. Marshall, *Memoirs of My Service in the World War, 1917-1918* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1976), p. 15.

26. Maj. Charles A. Heller, *Chemical Warfare in World War I: The American Experience, 1917-1918*, Leavenworth Paper No. 10 (Ft. Leavenworth, Kan.: Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1984), p. 61; Millett, *The General*, p. 342. The division occupied the sector from 18 Jan 1918 (not under division control until 5 Feb) to 3 Apr 1918.

27. Coffman, *War to End All Wars*, p. 156; Millett, *The General*, p. 359; Millett, "Cantigny," p. 167; USAWW, 4: 266. This attack took place after the division had moved to the Cantigny sector (Picardy), which the division occupied from 27 Apr 1918 to 8 Jun 1918, in response to the German offensive.

28. Heller, p. 91, puts the figure at 27.3 percent. Heller, *Chemical Warfare in World War I*, pp. 42-43, 78, 91 (statistical figure); George Sylvester Viereck, *As They Saw Us* (Garden City: Doubleday, Doran and Co., Inc., 1929), p. 297.

29. Coffman, *War to End All Wars*, pp. 213-14; Smythe, *Pershing*, pp. 169-70; Pershing, *Experiences*, 2: 113-14 (quote), 189-90, 237-38; *USAWW*, 2: 554.

30. George Marshall complained to Pershing about this subject a decade after the war. Although the AEF was preparing for "one of the greatest battles in history," he wrote, "the staffs of these inexperienced divisions were absolutely scalped a few days before the assault, in several cases I believe the day before—*in order that the next class at Langres might start on scheduled time.* Larry I. Bland, ed., *The Papers of George Catlett Marshall*, vol. 1, *"The Soldierly Spirit" December 1880-June 1939* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), p. 360, emphasis in original.

31. D. Clayton James, *The Years of MacArthur*, vol. 1, *1880-1941* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1970), p. 197.

32. Coffman, *War to End All Wars*, p. 305; Nenninger, "American Military Effectiveness," p. 149.

33. *Battle Casualties*, p. 41.

34. For example, 77th Division commander comments

in Julius O. Adler, *History of the Seventy Seventh Division: August 25th 1917 [-] November 11th 1918* (New York: Wynkoop Hallenback Crawford Co., 1919), p. 155; Pogue, *George C. Marshall*, p. 181.

35. *USAWW*, 4: 266.

36. Robert Lee Bullard, *Personalities and Reminiscences of the War* (New York: Doubleday, Page & Co., 1925), quote, p. 245; Harvey A. DeWeerd, *President Wilson Fights His War* (New York: MacMillan, 1968),quote, p. 323. For more on the well-documented problem of inexperienced troops and enemy machine guns, see Braim, *Test*, p. 98; Coffman, *War to End All Wars*, pp. 136, 246, 251-55; *History of the First Division*, pp. 187, 198; Hunter Liggett, *AEF: Ten Years Ago in France* (New York: Dodd, Mead and Co., 1928), p. 250; Donald Smythe, "St. Mihiel: The Birth of an American Army," *Parameters* 13 (Jun 83): 55.

37. GHQ, AEF, *Combat Instructions*, Doc. No. 1348 (5 Sep 18), p. 3.

38. Maj George S. Patton, Jr., "What the World War Did for the Cavalry," *Cavalry Journal* 31 (Apr 22): 167.

39. Weigley, *United States Army*, p. 386; Smythe, Pershing, pp. 37-38.

40. Smythe, *Pershing*, pp. 107, 200-201, 207-08, 230 (quote).

41. See George Marshall's brief critique of unit actions below brigade in the Meuse-Argonne in Bland, ed., *"The Soldierly Spirit,"* pp. 371-72.

42. Coffman, *War to End All Wars*, pp. 332-33; Symthe, *Pershing*, pp. 206-07, 217-18. The First Army was estimated to have over 100,000 stragglers midway through the Meuse-Argonne campaign, and Smythe, *Pershing*, p. 206, notes that on 3 Oct 18 three divisions were short 80,000 men.

43. Although American units serving with the French suffered even higher casualties. Smythe, *Pershing*, p. 227; Nenninger, "American Military Effectiveness," pp. 144-45; John Kennedy Ohl, "The Keystone Division in the Great War," *Prologue* 10 (Sep 78): 83-100; Weigley, *United States Army*, p. 383.

44. George Marshall remarked that "Our men gave better results when employed in a 'steamroller' operation." Marshall, *Memoirs*, p. 179.

45. *USAWW*, 2: 561-64; Dennis J. Vetock, *Lessons Learned: A History of US Army Lesson Learning* (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army Military History Institute, 1988), pp. 47-50.

46. *The Intimate Papers of Colonel House*, vol. 3, *Into the World War, April 1917-June 1918* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1928), pp. 268-69.

47. Quoted in Rainey, "Training," p. 230. The responses of World War I veterans to questionnaires sent by the U.S. Army Military History Institute consistently note poor training. One sample of the responses revealed that 486 of 514 AEF veterans stated that training had been poor, largely because of lack of time. See Braim, *Test*, p. 184.

48. Maj. George C. Marshall, "Profiting by War Experience," *Infantry Journal* 18 (Jan 21): 34-37; George C. Marshall Lecture at Infantry School (n.d.) in Bland, ed., *"The Soldierly Spirit,"* p. 335.

49. Johnson, "Training the American Army for World War I," pp. 16-19.

50. It can be argued that although Pershing did not fully grasp the import of the machine gun or the difficulty of breaking into German defenses, particularly how the terrain in the Meuse-Argonne facilitated the defense (see Smythe, *Pershing*, pp. 198, 206), he was trying to gain the conceptual initiative in the realm of tactics, rather than passively accepting, as the Allies had, the *status quo* style of combat. For a provocative, insightful, and extremely critical view of Pershing, and one that emphasizes the presence of "mutually conflicting theoretical guidance" in formulating AEF doctrine, see James W. Rainey, "Ambivalent Warfare: The Tactical Doctrine of the AEF in World War I," *Parameters* 13 (Sep 83): 34-46. See also Nenninger, "American Military Effectiveness," pp. 151-52. The experience of the 32d Division is chronicled in Capt Paul J. Jacobsmeyer, "Adjusting Tactical Doctrine in the AEF: William G. Haan and the Experience of the 32d Division in World War I," paper presented at the Northern Great Plains History Conference, Sep 88. David M. Kennedy, *Over Here: The First World War and American Society* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), p. 174, feels that Pershing "overlooked" both the machine gun and artillery in formulating doctrine. Also, Smythe points out the pressure Pershing was under (*Pershing*, p. 208), as well as some concluding thoughts on Pershing and open warfare (pp. 235-37).

51. See the generalized description of AEF troops advancing in Bullard, *Personalities and Reminiscences*, p. 275; Nenninger, *Leavenworth Schools*, p. 140; idem, "American Military Effectiveness," pp. 150-53; Smythe, *Pershing*, p. 225.

52. U.S. War Department, *Report of the Secretary of War to the President, 1933* (Washington: War Dept., 1933), p. 21.

53. George Marshall, Speech on Armory Training (1935), Bland, ed. *"The Soldierly Spirit,"* p. 450.

1942

April - June

1 Apr - The Army begins to remove Americans of Japanese descent from the Pacific coast states.

- The Allied Pacific War Council holds its first meeting in Washington, D.C.

- The 8th Armored Division is constituted and activated at Fort Knox, Kentucky.

3 Apr - Supported by effective air and artillery bombardment, the Japanese open a major offensive against the beleaguered Bataan defenders.

6 Apr - Main body of 41st Infantry Division arrives at Melbourne, Australia. Rear echelon of the division arrives on 13 May.

8 Apr - Equipment of the Luzon Force defending Bataan is ordered destroyed. About 2,000 of the American and Filipino troops escape to Corregidor.

9 Apr - Bataan falls to the Japanese. Luzon Force surrenders and 35,000 men begin the "Death March" from Balanga to San Fernando. Japanese can now concentrate their air and artillery power on Corregidor.

9 Apr - U.S. troops are stationed in Labrador, Newfoundland.

10 Apr - Japanese invade Philippine island of Cebu, defended by an American-Filipino force of about 6,500.

12 Apr - Remnants of the garrison on Cebu retire to the island's interior to organize as a guerrilla force.

13 Apr - The State Department notifies the Vichy government that the U.S. will continue to work with the Free French.

16 Apr - Japanese invade Philippine island of Panay unopposed. American-Filipino Panay Force moves into the mountains to wage guerrilla operations.

18 Apr - The "Doolittle Raid" makes the first air attack of the war on Tokyo.

- General MacArthur formally assumes command of the Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA).

28 Apr - The first U.S. ground troops on New Guinea arrive at Port Moresby. They are members of the all-black 96th Engineer Battalion.

26 Apr - U.S. troops arrive on Fanning Island in the Pacific Ocean.

29 Apr - Japanese open offensive to clear Mindanao.

- After making steady advances in Burma, the Japanese complete the blockade of China by capturing Lashio, terminus of the Burma Road.

5 May - Japanese invade Corregidor.

6 May - Corregidor falls and all U.S. and Filipino forces in the Philippines are surrendered unconditionally to the Japanese. Scattered resistance continues on Mindanao and Luzon until 9 June.

- U.S. troops arrive in Liberia.

8 May - Battle of the Coral Sea.

9 May - U.S. troops land on the Galapagos Islands and at Tongatabu in the Tonga Islands.

11 May - The Military District of Washington is established by the War Department.

12 May - A U.S. cargo ship is sunk by a submarine less than a mile and a half from the Mississippi River Delta.

13 May - Responsibility for the defense of the Fiji Islands is transferred from New Zealand to American troops. In July the 37th Infantry Division arrives to reinforce the garrison there.

14 May - The 32d Infantry Division arrives in Australia.

15 May - President Roosevelt signs an executive order establishing the Women's Army Auxiliary Corps.

- The all-black 93d Infantry Division is activated at Fort Huachuca, Arizona.

- The 85th Division of the Organized Reserves is ordered into active military service.

16 May-The Army assumes control of "dim-out" operations along the East Coast from Maine to Florida.

Chronology

Strict regulations limiting the use of artificial lighting within fifteen miles of the New York, New Jersey, and Delaware coasts are enforced to prevent Allied ships from becoming easy U-boat targets silhouetted against a brightly lit coastline.

19 May - At the White House President Roosevelt awards the Medal of Honor to Brigadier General James H. Doolittle for the 18 April bombing of Japan.

20 May - Japanese establish complete control of Burma.

27 May - The Americal Division is activated in New Caledonia.

30 May - The first U.S. troops arrive in New Zealand.

1 Jun - Mexico declares war on Germany, Japan, and Italy.

- U.S. planes conduct a bombing raid on Rangoon, Burma, sinking a Japanese tanker.

3-4 Jun - Japanese bomb Dutch Harbor, Unalaska Island in the Aleutians.

3-6 Jun - Japanese suffer a decisive defeat in the Battle of Midway.

5 Jun - The United States declares war on Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania.

7 Jun - 1,800 Japanese troops occupy the islands of Attu and Kiska in the Aleutians.

8 Jun - European Theater of Operations, United States Army (ETOUSA), is established.

9 Jun - The Combined Production and Resources Board and the Combined Food Board, joint Anglo-American organizations, are established to aid Allied war efforts by pooling the countries' production and food resources and coordinating their distribution.

11-12 Jun - U.S. Atlantic waters off Boston harbor, the Delaware Bay, and the Chesapeake Bay are mined by German submarines.

11 Jun - A lend-lease agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union is signed in Washington, allowing the Soviets to repay their debts in goods rather than cash.

13 Jun - A U-boat sends four German saboteurs ashore at Amagansett, Long Island.

- The U.S. Army Forces in the Middle East (USAFIME) is established to control operations in that area.

14 Jun - Mexico and the Philippines agree to the United Nations Declaration.

15 Jun - The 76th, 79th, and 81st Divisions of the Organized Reserves are ordered into active military service.

17 Jun - Four more German agents are sent ashore at Ponte Vedra Beach, Florida. By 27 June these agents and those landed in New York are arrested without having committed the acts of sabotage which their mission called for. After being court- martialed, six are executed.

18 Jun - Prime Minister Churchill arrives in Washington to meet with President Roosevelt. In the discussions that follow, the two leaders decide to conduct a campaign in northwest Africa before attempting to open a second front in Europe.

22 Jun - A Japanese submarine shells Fort Stevens, Oregon, in the only foreign attack on a military installation in the contiguous U.S. since the War of 1812. The shelling causes no damage.

24 Jun - Maj. Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower assumes command of ETOUSA.

30 Jun - Headquarters Company of U.S. Army Forces in the South Pacific Area (USAFISPA) is organized at Fort Ord, California, under command of Maj. Gen. Millard F. Harmon.

This chronology was assembled by Mr. Edward Bedessem of the Center's Historical Services Division.

The Command and General Staff College Press

Dr. Lawrence A. Yates, editor in chief of the Command and General Staff College Press, sent this article to help make our readers aware of this new publishing opportunity within the Army community.

In September 1991 the commandant of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, authorized the establishment of the Command and General Staff College Press (CGSC Press).

The CGSC Press serves three purposes: it provides an outlet for professional publication of manuscripts on all subjects of interest to professional officers; it also aids in professional military education at all levels of the U.S. Army and other military services, foreign as well as domestic; and finally, the press promotes and supports advanced study of the theory and practice of the military art by professional officers and other military experts, including the faculties of higher military education in the United States and abroad.

The CGSC Press is in many ways a rejuvenation of the Staff College Press founded at Fort Leavenworth in 1889. During its heyday, the Staff College Press published some of the earliest and most important works of military theory, operations, and history in the United States, and was an integral element in the rise of professionalism in the American Army. Some of the press' classic publications included Arthur Wagner's *The Campaign of Koniggratz* (1889), Leroy Eltinge's *The Psychology of War* (1911), John F. Morrison's *Seventy Problems: Infantry Tactics at Battalion, Brigade, and Division* (1914), a translation of Wilhelm Balck's *Tactics* (1922), and a reprint of Count von Schlieffen's *Cannae* (1931).

In adhering to the standards of excellence set by the Staff College Press, the new CGSC Press promises to enhance the Army's role in the professional discourse so vital to the continued intellectual growth of America's armed forces. As did its predecessor, the CGSC Press will publish original manuscripts and technical studies with broad appeal throughout the military. It will also reprint classic military works and assume responsibility for several serials already in publication at Fort Leavenworth. These serials include monographs from the School of Advanced Military Studies, publications of the Foreign Military Studies Office, and the Leavenworth Papers and other publications of the college's Combat Studies Institute.

The first work published by the press is scheduled for early summer. *Combined Arms in Battle Since 1939*, modeled after the military classic, *Infantry in Battle*, will consist of a series of case studies covering various facets of modern warfare, from airborne operations to weather. A second work currently being prepared will trace, through the pages of *Military Review*, the way in which Army doctrine evolved from the Active Defense to the AirLand Battle. Entitled *To the AirLand Battle*, the insights it offers into the doctrinal process could not be more timely, given current international trends, changing military missions, and the reassessment of Army doctrine these will require.

The short-term production goal of the CGSC Press is to increase its publications to over twenty quality works a year. To meet this goal, the press will consider for publication manuscripts from all qualified sources. The press welcomes submission of any monograph-length research projects or edited works on military topics by professional officers, academic scholars, or other military experts residing in the United States or abroad. Authors or compilers wishing to have their work considered by the CGSC Press should submit their manuscripts to the director of the press, Dr. Roger Spiller, or the editor in chief, Dr. Larry Yates. The mailing address is Combat Studies Institute, ATTN: Dr. Spiller (or Dr.Yates), USACGSC, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027-6900. Telephone inquiries should be placed to Dr. Yates at (913) 684-3414 or DSN 552-3414.

The commandant at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College serves as president of the board of governors of the press. Day-to-day management of the CGSC Press plans, programs, and publications falls to the Combat Studies Institute (CSI). As the history department at the college, CSI, since its inception in 1979, has been publishing works in military history that have attained a nationwide reputation for academic excellence and military acuity. Besides this experience and reputation, CSI has the editorial, production, and distribution assets at hand and in place with which to make the CGSC Press, with its broader emphasis on military subjects, past, current, and future, truly an exceptional press of the U.S. Army.

The Forgotten Soldier: Fiction or Fact?

Edwin L. Kennedy, Jr.

First published in English in 1971, *The Forgotten Soldier* has captured the imagination of soldiers intrigued by the war on the Eastern Front in World War II. The book was transdated from the French, and written by a "Guy Sajer," *nom de plume* for the real author. Recently reprinted, the book has been reviewed and acclaimed by educated military reviewers who cite it as an example of "a powerful firsthand account." (1) Is it or isn't it a "firsthand account" and, if not, what difference does it make?

In reality, the book is a carefully written novel that cleverly disguises as a factual account. It is a fictional work cited by a number of readers as documented fact. It is a piece of literature, the personal ideas of what war is like from an author who is not the character in the book which is taken as reality by others who wish to validate their theories of what combat was like for a German soldier. *The Forgotten Soldier* provides a useful example of how analysis of historical works can prove or disprove, lend credibility, or discredit supposed "history."

The book recounts the trials of a young soldier from Alsace-Lorraine. Enlisting in the German Army in the fall of 1942, Sajer takes the reader through his wartime experiences as a member, first, of a *Luftwaffe* training unit, then a support unit, and finally, as a member of the elite *Panzer Grenadier Division Grossdeutschland.*

The book is accurate, but not to a "tee." Amazingly, the author takes great pains to ensure that his story parallels the actual history of the famed *Grossdeutschland*; however, he fails to perform the necessary work to ensure that the technical details match reality. In short, his book, though interesting and imaginative, is a hoax with no attempt to present it as such. In fact, the book has been cited as a factual source on life in the *German Army* on the Eastern Front. (2)

The first page of the prologue gives some indication of the problems of veracity to follow in the book. Sajer begins his story with an account of selection for training with the *Luftwaffe*. He does not pick a nondescript training unit, but chooses to train with a *Stuka* unit commanded by one of the greatest pilots of the *Luftwaffe*, Hans-Ulrich Rudel. (3)

It is here that the first error is found in Sajer's work. A fast cross-referencing with *Stuka Pilot*, Rudel's autobiography, shows that Rudel was indeed with a training unit in the late summer and early fall of 1942. What it also shows is that the squadron was nowhere near Chemnitz or Dresden as stated by Sajer. In fact, Rudel's unit was located near Graz in southern Austria, a substantial distance to the south. (4)

One error is not enough to disqualify a work as totally incorrect, but Sajer does not stop at this point. The most obvious mistake by the author is the misplacement of the elite unit insignia supposedly worn himself for two years in the *German Army*. On p. 122, Sajer claims the insignia, a cuff title, was worn on the *left* sleeve of his tunic. (5) In reality, the unit insignia was always worn on the right sleeve.

Additionally, other indicators contribute to the evidence that, taken as a whole, leaves no doubt as to the authenticity of the story. For example, his cited battalion--the 17th--never existed in the *Grossdeutschland*. (6) His description of the ammunition, 7.7-mm., would have fit Japanese weapons, but not German, which took 7.92-mm. rounds. Probably most convincing, his company commander, Hauptmann Wesreidau, does not exist on the rolls of the division officers. (7)

Could errors have been made in editing the draft? Possibly, but not likely, at least not in the quantity made in *The Forgotten Soldier*. Could the author have forgotten the details or mixed them up? Again, a possibility, but very unlikely. The book was published a little over twenty years after the war. Soldiers, especially those of elite units, tend at least to recall correctly the major facts, such as locations and elite uniform insignia.

The single most discriminating "fact" is Sajer's assertion that his distinctive unit cuff title was worn on his left sleeve. This appurtenance was not a common item issued to every soldier, and was authorized only for certain units that had distinguished themselves or were considered elite. To wear the band of cloth with the unit's designation was considered an honor. To cite the location on the wrong place is unimaginable, or is it?

The uninformed historian might look at pictures of German soldiers and find cuff bands worn on the left sleeve. A hasty examination would show a number of

such pictures. A major point of fact clears up this apparent problem. The truth is that the *Waffen-SS* wore their cuff titles on the left sleeve, and the majority of the army wore theirs on the right. The *Grossdeutschland*, an army unit, always wore theirs on the right. Hence, a hasty check by the author "Sajer" might have been with pictures of the *Waffen-SS*, not army units, and certainly not the *Grossdeutschland*. (8)

While fictional works perform several functions, presenting conjectured accounts as fact is not one the professional soldier should seek to satisfy. Fictional works may be entertaining, and might give a notional idea of the human dimensions of war, or show how the moral and physical effects "both relate to the physical environment within which engagements and battles are fought." (9) They do not chronicle fact. For this reason, they should be used with care in scholarly works citing"real life" examples. (10)

The use of fiction as fact becomes dangerous, since incorrect lessons can be learned, or improper analyses made regarding cause and effect relationships. After all, why are professional soldiers interested in military history if not to learn from actions which can never be simulated in a peacetime environment?

The Forgotten Soldier is not a completely useless book. It portrays fairly accurately the life of the common soldier in World War II on what was one of the most vicious fronts of the war. The reader gains an appreciation for the harshness of war and the feelings of the individual soldier not usually available in regimental histories. Like *All Quiet on the Western Front*, it has its place in military literature.

The Forgotten Soldier is an interesting example of a fictional work taken at face value by well-read soldiers and even cited for purposes of professional study. The discriminating soldier can read the book and take it for what it is, a novel with the author's own imaginary concepts and ideas of what war is supposed to be like and how soldiers react to war. Care must be exercised not to place too much stock in its lessons without due consideration of the source of these lessons.

Maj. Edwin L. Kennedy, Jr., is an instructor at the Center for Army Tactics, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

Notes

1. Col. Harold W. Nelson, "From My Bookshelf," *Military Review* (March 1990): 90. The School for Advanced Military Studies Bibliography for 1989-90, p. 10, states: "It reads like a novel...." "Varied Fare," *Army* (November 1990): 63 cites Sajer's book as "The classic WWII autobiography...The personal history of a German soldier."
2. Maj. Gen. Michael F. Spigelmire, "From My Bookshelf," *Military Review* (May 1990): 89.
3. Guy Sajer, *The Forgotten Soldier* (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), p. 1.
4. Col. Hans-Ulrich Rudel, *Stuka Pilot* (Costa Mesa, Calif.: The Noontide Press, 1987), p. 45. Colonel Rudel was the ace of tank killers, well known in German military circles for his exploits during World War II.
5. Sajer, *Forgotten Soldier*, p. 122. See also, Brian L. Davis, *German Army Uniforms and Insignia, 1933-1945* (New York: Arco Publishing, Inc., 1971), pp. 76-79. Davis gives a detailed description of cuff titles and their wear.
6. Sajer, *Forgotten Solder*, p. 118: "Henceforth, my identification would be *Gefreiter* Sajer, G., 100/1010 G4. *Siebzehntes Batailion, Leichtinfantrie Gross Deutschland, Sud*, G." In fact, the *17th Battalion* was a nonexistent unit. There were two infantry regiments in the division, the *Fusiliere* and *Grenadiere* regiments, each consisting of only eight infantry companies--1-4 in the *1st Battalion*, and 5-8 in the *2d Battalion*. The term *Leichtinfantrie* is also inappropriate. The *Grossdeutschland*, far from being light, was one of the best equipped units within the *German Army*. Unlike the bulk of *German Army* units, it was completely motorized and armored. Finally, in German military terminology, the designation probably should have read "*Infantrie Division (mot.) Grossdeutschland*" instead of "Gross Deutschland Division"--a curious anglicizing of the name.
7. Interview, author with *Panzer Grenadier Division "Grossdeutschland"* veteran and unit historian, Helmuth Spaeter, 4 Jul 88, at Hessich-Lichtenau, Germany. Spaeter, a Knight's Cross recipient, is author of five books on the *Grossdeutschland*, and served on the division and later the corps staff. Spaeter claimed that "Wesreidau" never commanded a company in the *Grossdeutschland*, nor is he listed on any officer rolls/records. Interestingly, neither Spaeter nor any other veterans I spoke with at the *Grossdeutschland* reunion

at Hessich-Lichtenau had ever heard of *The Forgotten Soldier* or "Guy Sajer."

8. In 1986 the author loaned a friend his copy of *The Forgotten Soldier* to read for a correspondence requirement in the nonresident version of the Command and General Staff College. Subsequently, the author was amused to read the comments of the evaluator. Written in the margins of the requirement were numerous anecdotes that the evaluator probably thought demonstrated his mastry of the history of the *Grossdeutschland*. In reality, they revealed his complete ignorance of the division and his confusion with the history of another unit, named the *Deutschland*, an early-war *Waffen SS* formation. Brassey's has recently republished *The Forgotten Soldier*. The front cover of this edition shows a resonably well-known photograph of a *Waffen SS* soldier. Other publications have, for example, purportedly been about the U.S. Marines, yet show West Point cadets on parade. The point is that inaccuracy is further perpetuated--sometimes by the very publishers--as time passes.

9. Brig. Gen. John C. Bahnsen, "From My Bookshelf," *Military Review*, (November 1989): 89.

10. See Charles W. Sydnor, Jr., *Soldiers of Destruction: The SS Death's Head Division, 1933-1945* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977). Cited under "Diaries and Memoirs" is Guy Sajer and *The Forgotten Soldier*. It is listed with other prominent Germans, colonels and general officers. Curiously among them is one lowly *Grenadiere*. While memoirs are known to exist from lower ranks, they are hardly common--almost rare. How many private soldiers wrote well-known memoirs of their war experiences in the U.S. military during World War II? Sydnor's book is a factual history of the *SS Division Totenkopf*, not a novel, yet he appears to have falledn victim to the same trap others have with regard to *The Forgotten Soldier*.

The Archaic Archivist

In this issue, the Archaic Archivist provides an overview of the Military History Institute's extensive holdings covering World War I.

The First World War is one of the most significant subjects in the Archives Branch of the U.S. Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013-5008. Not only is it one of the best represented areas, with approximately 7,300 donations, but also it is one of the most substantive subjects. No serious study of the American doughboy in the Great War can be written without using the Institute's collected manuscripts.

The heart of these holdings is the World War I Survey. Begun in 1975 and conducted vigorously from 1979 to 1983, the survey asked veterans of that war to donate letters, diaries, memoirs, military newspapers, maps, photographs, and insignia, and to fill out an eleven-page historical questionnaire. The questionnaire proved particularly productive in eliciting their recollections. An estimated 5,400 service personnel completed these forms. Total donations to the survey exceed 7,100, and additional contributions arrive each year. The survey is the largest collection of personal papers of American servicemen in the Great War anywhere.

Most of the donors belong to the veterans organization "Veterans of World War I of the U.S.A., Inc.," which graciously shared its membership list with the Institute. Such a broad base netted contributions from veterans of the U.S. Marine Corps and the Navy, as well as from the U.S. Regular Army, National Guard, and National Army. Army holdings understandably predominated. Every division of the American Army, except for the 98th and 100th, is represented, as are the other combat arms, combat support arms, and support arms. The survey also brought in donations from U.S. civilian contributors to the war effort and even from soldiers of the Entente and Central Powers.

The 6,672 entries for the survey are summarized in the Institute's Special Bibliographic Series, Number 20: *World War I*, Volume I: *Manuscripts, the World War I Survey (Bibliography 20)*, compiled by Mrs. Hermine Scholz in 1985 and published in 1986. Al-

though now out of print, this volume is available in many research institutions, and may be borrowed from the Military History Institute on interlibrary loan.

Also available on loan from the Institute is an abridged microfilm edition of the World War I survey, put out by University Publications of America. It contains thirty-nine reels; a user may borrow up to six reels at a time. Researchers should bear in mind, however, that the reels contain only a fraction of the manuscripts on hand when the filming was performed in the late spring of 1985 and, of course, reflect none of the papers that have come in since then.

Donations do continue to arrive. Papers of over seventy soldiers were received while *Bibliography 20* was awaiting printing. Post-publication acquisitions now exceed 400 servicemen. Even as late as 1991, eighty contributions reached the Institute. Therefore, if users do not see pertinent papers in *Bibliography 20*, they should write to the archives at the Institute to ascertain whether any of the numerous new acquisitions are relevant.

Special Bibliography 20 also summarizes First World War holdings in the main part of the Archives Branch, distinct from the survey. Rather than duplicate all its citations, this article will emphasize its high points and will list significant recent acquisitions.

The main collection, like the survey, includes papers of enlisted men and junior officers, but it also has sizable holdings of papers of general officers. Tasker H. Bliss, the Army chief of staff and principal military member of the American delegation to the Versailles Peace Conference, is represented by some diaries and letters, although his collection is much stronger concerning his career before 1909. Diaries are also available for John L. Hines, who served at American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) Headquarters, and who commanded the 1st Brigade, 4th Division, and the III Corps; and for Johnson Hagood II, who headed the 66th Field Artillery Brigade and then served in the Services of Supply. The foregoing and a score of other general officers are listed in *Bibliography 20*.

That volume also mentions General Dennis E. Nolan; in 1985 his only item here was his report of the 55th Brigade in the Meuse-Argonne offensive. However, the Institute recently acquired his manuscript memoirs of service as G-2 at AEF Headquarters. These accounts focus on General Nolan's response to General John J. Pershing's book, *My Experiences in the World War*. Also from that headquarters come the papers of General Harold B. Fiske, the G-5. The First Army chief of staff, General Hugh A. Drum, is represented by letters, diaries, reports, and historical studies.

The archives also contain the papers of over forty junior officers in World War I who went on to become general officers in or after World War II, including Omar N. Bradley, Lewis B. Hershey, Matthew B. Ridgway, and William H. Simpson. Recent donations in this category include: William H. Abendroth (recollections); Milton O. Boone (papers); Benjamin O. Davis, Sr. (letters); William J. Donovan (diaries); Robert L. Eichelberger (memoirs); Elton F. Hammond (papers); Kenyon A. Joyce (memoirs); John C.H. Lee (memoirs); John W. Leonard (oral history); Sidney P. Spalding (oral history); and Andrew C. Tychsen (memoir).

Besides papers on American involvement in the war, the survey and the main collection contain papers of United States attaches, observers, and medical personnel in Europe before April 1917; of American regulars and National Guardsmen on the Mexican border and in the Mexican Punitive Expedition, 1916-17; of American troops on occupation duty in the Rhineland, 1919-23; of American Expeditionary Forces to north Russia and to Siberia during the Russian civil war; of American officers in the successor states of central and eastern Europe and the Caucasus right after the war; and of American officers in the 1920s gathering historical documents on the Great War. Some of those documents and studies, as well as lectures by participants, appear in the Institute's holdings of the Army War College Curricular Archives for the 1920s and 1930s. With the concurrence of the National Archives and Records Administration, the Army War College archives are maintained by the Military History Institute. Within this collection, comparable documents for the period 1914-17 reflect how the War College studied the war before America's intervention.

Through the curricular archives, through the personal papers of wartime and future generals, and especially through the World War I survey, the Institute can offer splendid archival sources for studying America's service in the Great War. And, as always, researchers are reminded that the Institute also has excellent printed and pictorial holdings on the First World War.

World War II Veteran Survey Project

Martin W. Andresen

The U.S. Army Military History Institute is conducting a major survey project to acquire source material on the Second World War. A follow-on to earlier surveys of Spanish-American War and World War I vets, the project centers on an 18-page questionnaire that is filled out by the veteran and returned to the Institute using an attached franked mailing label. Completed surveys are then made available to the many researchers and scholars who visit the Institute.

Much more than battle accounts, the survey is designed to elicit firsthand responses to questions about a wide range of subject areas. There are no true-false or multiple choice questions; instead, the veteran is encouraged to provide his or her own thoughts on many different aspects of military service. Major topics include general service background, overseas service, combat service, occupation and demobilization, and postwar experiences. Although designed for the Army veteran, surveys also are being completed by Navy, Marine Corps, and Army Air Forces vets. There is also on file one response from a veteran of the German Army.

In addition to the wide range of experiences revealed in the surveys, many veterans also are donating their letters, diaries, photographs, books, patches, insignia, and other items related to their service. Several veterans have sent copies of notebooks that begin with a statement such as "OK, kids, you kept asking what I did in the war...." Many veterans tell us that their wives have been begging them for years to clean out the attic, and the 50th Anniversary of World War II appears to be a great time for them to dig out the trunks and shoe boxes. Thus, the motto for the project has become "From your attic to the Army's attic," where these items will be preserved and shared with researchers and future generations. All paper items are maintained at MHI, while three-dimensional artifacts are turned over to the Army Museum System.

Most surveys are distributed directly to selected veterans' associations and to individuals at reunions. Our experience shows that a much higher return rate is achieved from association reunions than from individual distribution. At the beginning of the project, select units were targeted to gather representative samples from all branches, theaters of operations, and units with unique experiences such as the 10th Mountain Division and the 442d Infantry Regiment. Now that these samples are gathered, we are working with all interested veterans' groups. Associations range from those for divisions to regiments and battalions. Surveys also are mailed to individuals upon request.

Many of the 2,500 veterans who have returned questionnaires thus far commented that the survey is time-consuming, though they frequently attach additional pages of comments and personal war stories. Two of the more interesting group responses prove that almost everyone remembers where he or she was on 7 December 1941, and that the GI Bill played a tremendous role in shaping postwar society. Other answers reveal unique personal experiences in basic training as well as what it was like to be in combat for the first time. One vet, responding to a question about fraternizing with foreign personnel, answered, "I'll never tell!"

All veterans who return a completed survey to the Institute receive a thank-you letter acknowledging their cooperation and interest in preserving the heritage of our Army. The individual's name, unit, donation, and additional information are entered into an electronic data base to facilitate management and retrieval. Surveys and collateral materials are then forwarded to the Archives Branch of MHI, where they are organized, cataloged, cross-referenced, and stored in acid-free folders and boxes. Photographs are sent to the Special Collections Branch of MHI and organized in a separate collection that is cross-referenced with the archival materials collection. Three-dimensional items are forwarded to the Museums Division of the U.S. Army Center of Military History in Washington, DC.

The Military History Institute's goal is to acquire 100,000 completed surveys. We hope the continuing activities of the 50th Anniversary of World War II will help us to reach large numbers of veterans. Anyone who knows of coming veterans' reunions or who can help us identify other interested groups is urged to write:

U.S. Army Military History Institute
ATTN: Assistant Director, Historical Services
Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5008

We urge all interested persons to remember that the materials of the MHI World War II Veteran Survey Project are available to anyone for research or study.

Lt. Col. Martin Andresen is deputy director of the U.S. Army Military History Institue.

Preserving Organizational Historical Property

R. Cody Phillips

In view of the accelerated drawdown of U.S. forces in Europe, base closures, and the inactivation of numerous organizations in the Reserve Components, there is an urgent need to make the many affected agencies and units aware of how to dispose of historical property that may be in their custody. Accordingly, R. Cody Phillips, Acting Chief Curator at the Center, prepared the following announcement on disposition.

Many Army units have objects that are commonly known as organizational historical property—artifacts which have a special and life-long significance to a particular unit. These include unusual pieces, such as "prop-blast" cups and granite rocks, as well as common items that range from obsolete tanks to a souvenir bayonet. Many organizations also have unit fund property, which has only transitory significance to an organization and includes such things as unit awards, plaques, and trophies. For instance, a weapon captured by a unit in Southwest Asia might be cataloged as organizational historical property, while the division's second place baseball trophy would qualify as unit fund property.

But when a unit is inactivated, what happens to these items, and how are they maintained during the unit's inactive status?

AR 740-13 authorizes organizations to store unit fund property. Units that are alerted for inactivation should contact the U.S. Army Center of Military History and request disposition instructions for this material. The Center's Museum Division will respond by providing shipping instructions and a document control number to account for the property.

When the unit receives this information, it should prepare a complete inventory of its material and post packing lists on the inside and outside of every container that is shipped. Unit fund property is stored for ten years, after which time (if the unit does not reactivate before then) it is declared abandoned and screened for further disposition.

Organizational historical property may be retained by a unit indefinitely, regardless of its active status, and the storage of such artifacts is authorized by AR 870-20 and AR 870-13. This type of property is to be accounted for by the owning unit using a DA Form 2609, with a copy of the completed form sent to the Center of Military History. The Center's Museum Division also provides shipping instructions and document control numbers for these objects when a unit begins preparing for inactivation.

Colors, flags, and associated material for inactivating units originally were sent to the New Cumberland Army Depot in accordance with AR 840-10. Effective 1 September 1991, however, the responsibility for the storage, preservation, and management of these items was transferred from the Institute of Heraldry to the Center of Military History. When a unit notifies the Center's Museum Division of its pending inactivation, it will receive shipping instructions and a document control number that authorizes the unit to send its colors and flags to Anniston Army Depot.

It is important that units scheduled to be inactivated submit complete inventories of their organizational historical property to the Center's Museum Division. It is equally important that units comply with the disposition instructions that are issued from the Museum Division. In the past and almost without exception, organizational historical property for inactivating units has been lost or destroyed because previously issued disposition instructions were not followed.

For more information concerning the disposition and accountability of organizational historical property, unit fund property, and colors and flags for inactivating units, write: Commander, U.S. Army Center of Military History, ATTN: DAMH-MDC, 1099 14th Street, NW, Washington, D.C.20005-3402.

Air Force Academy Military Conference Announced

The United States Air Force Academy will hold its fifteenth Military History Symposium 14-16 October 1992. The symposium is titled "A Revolutionary War: Korea and the Transformation of the Postwar World."

For further information, contact Maj. Tim Castle, HQ USAFA/DFH, USAF Academy, CO 80840-5701, or telephone (719) 472-3230.

Focus on the Field

Historical Office
U.S. Army Strategic Defense Command
James R. Cooper, Jr., Command Historian

The U.S. Army Strategic Defense Command (USASDC) is responsible for the Army's portion of the nation's Strategic Defense Initiative. Since the creation of its predecessor, the Redstone Antimissile Missile System Office in 1957, the command has focused primarily upon the development of ballistic missile defense technology. In 1985 then Under Secretary of the Army James R. Ambrose recognized that the "Army's ballistic missile defense activities, centered in Huntsville, Alabama, have kept alive the technology that made possible President [Ronald] Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative."

The USASDC is part of the Army, but does not rely exclusively on Army money. Instead, the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO) funds us with "purple" money. Thus, USASDC does not divert resources from traditional Army programs.

There are 151 military personnel, 1,247 civilians, and a host of contractors who presently work within the unique USASDC organizational structure. The commander, the chief of staff, and several assistant chiefs of staff are located in Arlington, Virginia. The deputy commander and most of the staff, however, including scientists, engineers, and historians, are located in Huntsville, Alabama, near Redstone Arsenal. The command manages the U.S. Army Kwajalein Atoll in the central Pacific and the High Energy Laser Systems Test Facility at White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico. In addition, several field offices are situated at various contractor facilities and other Department of Defense locations around the country. A former USASDC chief of staff once described this unique structure as a "forward command post"-Washington, "SDC-Main"-Huntsville, and a "group of listening posts/liaison offices." The independent nature of the command is also apparent in the use of unusual names for traditional offices. For instance, the procurement office is known as the Contracting and Acquisition Procurement Office, or "Contracts," and the commander's public affairs office is called "External Affairs."

Monitoring a record of the high tech advancements that benefit both the military and civilian industrial communities is the mission of the USASDC Historical Office. Currently we are authorized four personnel spaces. In January 1992, a senior historian was added to our staff, whose mission will include conducting staff rides and writing monographs on the history of the Kwajalein Atoll, Republic of the Marshall Islands, and an overall history of the command. Our current staff is presently concentrating on the Annual Historical Reviews. Lt. Gen. Robert D. Hammond, our present commander, provides strong support for the USASDC history program. Unfortunately, not all employees are as supportive as the commander.

The command's Historical Office, located in Huntsville, faces the challenge of maintaining from one location an up-to-date history of the entire command's technological advancements. A large number of engineers and technicians are reluctant to contribute to the history program or to understand its importance to the command's and the nation's defense efforts. This lack of understanding exacerbates an already difficult collection process. The task is further hampered by the large number and diversity of contractors supporting the command. In short, the engineers appear more comfortable working with contractors than with historians. This situation has resulted in gaps in the command's corporate memory.

The present aggressive document and record collection program is complete and thorough. However, the effort to reconstitute information about the SENTINEL/SAFEGUARD systems is difficult and presents a real concern. SAFEGUARD became operational on 1 October 1975, but was almost immediately phased out. When the project was dissolved, its records were scattered across the nation to various records repositories. The probable deployment of the ground-based ballistic missile defense system to Grand Forks, North Dakota, has renewed interest and doubled the number of questions about the SAFEGUARD system. The questions cover a wide spectrum, ranging from construction costs to operational characteristics of SPRINT and SPARTAN missiles. Fortunately, our sparse records are augmented by a collection of thirty oral history interviews.

Within the command, antimissile projects are supported by wide-ranging scientific research. Separate offices explore optics, laser technology, radar, missile guidance enhancements, and futuristic research projects. In recent years, USASDC has achieved significant scientific successes. For example, the Homing Overlay Experiment (HOE), the Flexible Light-weight Agile Guided Experiment (FLAGE), and the Exoatmospheric Reentry-vehicle Interceptor Subsystem (ERIS)—important components of the strategic defense program, intercepted and destroyed their moving targets through nonnuclear kills. Research devoted to strategic defense also has resulted in scientific achievements with widespread applicability, for instance, the significant advancements in miniaturization. A part of the missile guidance system known as the Resonant Fiber Optic Gyro Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU) has been reduced to one-tenth the size, one-twentieth the weight, and one-twentieth the cost of present commercial IMUs. Similar success has been experienced with the data processing capability of militarized computer modules. Six VAX 11/780 computers have been replaced by a module the size of a bread box.

The USASDC Historical Office staff provides the command a complete history program. A short, popular history of USASDC is updated with each new commander and is given to all new personnel. The historical staff's goal is to sell the idea that history is not just a "nice to have" function, but that historians and the products we provide are vital to the command. They are an integral part of the planning process in maintaining a corporate memory and in providing a straightforward exchange of ideas that are indispensable to the dynamic growth of USASDC. The staff is educating leaders so they can think historically to improve their decision-making process.

New World War II Publication

On 16 May 1992 a ceremony in England dedicated a memorial to the U.S. Army Assault Training Center, where thousands of American soldiers, including men from the 1st, 4th, and 29th Divisions, learned the skills of war on the sands of North Devon in 1943 and 1944.

Coinciding with the dedication, a book by Richard T. Bass, *Spirits of the Sand*, was released describing the training center's activities, as the troops prepared on the beaches of Woolacombe and Saunton for what they would face on the sands of Normandy on D-Day, 6 June 1944.

Spirits of the Sand is available only by direct order. Interested parties can send $30.00 (includes postage) directly to Lee Publishing, PO Box 66, Exeter, Devon EX2 5FE, England.

Drums and Bugles Corner

Sung by Glider Infantry (1942-43) at Fort Bragg
to the tune of
"The Daring Young Man on the Flying Trapeze"

Oh! Once I was happy but now I'm airborne,
Riding in gliders all tattered and torn.
The pilots are daring, all caution they scorn,
and the pay is exactly the same!

Once I was Infantry, now I'm a dope,
Riding in gliders attached to a rope.
Safety in landing is only a hope,
and the pay is exactly the same!

We fight in fatigues, no fancy jump suits,
No bright leather jackets, no polished jump boots.
We crash land by gliders without parachutes,
and the pay is exactly the same!

Source: Archives of the National Soaring Museum, Elmira, N.Y.
Contributed by Dr. Charles E. Kirkpatrick, V Corps Historian.

Maj. Gen. William N. Farmen, chief of the Joint United States Military Mission for the Aid of Turkey (JUSMMAT), recently presented a copy of the Center's Korean War volume Ebb and Flow *by Billy C. Mossman to Turkish veterans of the Korean War.*

The Experiences of a New Field Historian Operation PROVIDE COMFORT—Northern Iraq, 1991

Gordon W. Rudd

The U.S. Army Chief of Military History, Brig. Gen. Harold Nelson, asked me to write this article, probably amused that such a novice historian should have been exposed to so much history in the making this past summer in northern Iraq. Coalition efforts to save and secure a half-million Kurds in the wake of Operation DESERT STORM provided an important historical opportunity, and the fact that more experienced historians were unavailable allowed me to seize that opportunity. Perhaps my experiences during PROVIDE COMFORT may be of interest to other new military historians.

Designated Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, this humanitarian and security mission began with little of the planning and preparation that accompanied DESERT STORM—the provision for military historians being no exception.

Both corps deployed for DESERT STORM had dedicated command historians and three military history detachments (MHDs) apiece. Two other MHDs supported echelons above corps. To provide additional coverage, General Nelson directed Col. Richard Swain, chief of the Combat Studies Institute (CSI), Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, to assume the duties of theater historian in Saudi Arabia and augmented his operation with a handful of officers who could be spared from the Center and CSI.

Brigades were the largest organic Army formation deployed for PROVIDE COMFORT, and brigades do not have positions for historians. Thus, force structure alone did not ensure historical coverage. With the historians committed to DESERT STORM from the Center and CSI still trying to catch up, General Nelson turned to the Department of History at West Point for a historian, and I happily received the task.

My qualifications for this new challenge were mixed. On the one hand, I was only a first-year instructor of military and Middle East history, and I had no prior experience as a field historian. On the other hand, I had spent one tour as a Middle East foreign area officer and had made several trips to the region. A previous stint in the Special Forces and a joint service tour with the United Nations also proved valuable.

In early June 1991, well after PROVIDE COMFORT was under way, I deployed to Europe, making my way to Turkey and finally to northern Iraq. With little more than the most general guidance before leaving the United States, I conducted over ninety interviews in five countries. I traveled on eight different planes, at least twice as many helicopters, and countless jeeps, "Humvees," trucks, taxicabs, and private cars, and slept in hotels, guest houses, barracks, tent cities, and in the field. No one ever told me, once deployed, where to go to conduct my work and, to my surprise, no one prevented me from going anywhere I wanted.

Col. Robert Doughty, head of the Department of History, provided the only guidance I received from West Point. He advised me to focus on my assigned task, to remember that this was an Army project, and to avoid distractions. He suggested that while I might find joint, coalition, and United Nations issues on PROVIDE COMFORT interesting, if I paid excessive attention to them, it could degrade the value of my work for the Army.

To take advantage of his recent experiences in DESERT STORM, I contacted Colonel Swain, then at Fort Leavenworth. Colonel Swain did not know me, and I knew him only by reputation, yet the brief phone call proved quite valuable. While deployed on DESERT STORM, he encountered some difficulty obtaining a vehicle, office space, and administrative support—virtually no one seemed interested in military history until hostilities terminated. He found it difficult to get on the schedule of the key personnel he needed to interview. He found unit briefing slides a valuable primary source. Finally, he advised me that I would have to sell myself and the value of my project, that I should take with me anything essential to conduct my work, and that I should be prepared to operate with little or no support from the field units. All of this proved to be sound advice.

Dr. John Greenwood, my point of contact at the Center of Military History, took care of my orders, advance pay, and travel arrangements, and even obtained some maps of northern Iraq for me. He also sent me to Fort Bragg, where I received a series of briefings

from several Special Operations staffs with an interest in PROVIDE COMFORT. I found that the Army units involved in the operation did not come under any single Army headquarters, but had been integrated with other American and coalition forces. Several of the briefings I attended were classified, but I determined that such material was complicated to handle and not essential to my work. To increase my flexibility, I decided to avoid the use of classified material on my project.

In Washington I received some advice on how to conduct oral interviews from the Center's oral history specialist and found that this was to be my primary means of collecting information. The Center's interview format was valuable, but I found that most of my techniques developed as I operated. The last meeting before my departure was with General Nelson.

His knowledge of PROVIDE COMFORT was general, and so was his guidance. He knew that the Army units had been integrated with other American and coalition forces and that they were involved with the United Nations. Expressing concern that some aspects of PROVIDE COMFORT might establish precedents for the Army of the future, he suggested that the Army's role could not be adequately covered independently of the other units involved and told me to look into the joint, coalition, and United Nations involvement as appropriate. He did not define firm parameters for the project, saying they would be established as my work developed. His final words were that a lot of history was unfolding in northern Iraq and I could not possibly capture it all. He told me to go over there, find the best story I could, and bring it home.

I flew to Germany and checked in with the U.S. European Command, the headquarters responsible for directing PROVIDE COMFORT. To my surprise and disappointment, I found that the 10th Special Forces Group—the first major Army unit deployed on the operation—and several other units were in the process of redeployment. Faced with the dilemma of interviewing those returning or going forward, I chose the latter course. Those I missed on the ground, I intended to interview on my way home. I flew to the U.S. Air Force Base in Incirlik, Turkey, the location of the PROVIDE COMFORT Combined Task Force (CTF) headquarters.

When I arrived at Incirlik, I had no point of contact, transportation, or place to stay. I checked in with the CTF personnel office. They did not know I was coming and they asked nothing of me—not even a copy of my orders. They expressed no interest in my project. Although I was the only Army historian deployed for PROVIDE COMFORT, I found an Air Force historical team had arrived at Incirlik well before me.

Concerned that the three noncommissioned officers constituting this Air Force team would assume that I'd try to direct the overall historical effort, I assured them that my assignment from the Army would not interfere with their work. At the same time, I expressed interest in their material, and in turn provided them copies of anything I developed. This approach led to an exceptional working relationship. They helped me to obtain a room, provided me with local transportation, and shared their office space with me.

The primary task of these Air Force historians was the collection, sorting, and dissemination of documents. The team also conducted oral interviews of key personnel involved in the operation, and they made these interviews available to me. I spent some time listening to several of their tapes, which in essence captured a narrative of events.

I considered the objectives to be accomplished in my interviews and concluded that my contribution should exceed a mere narrative. I reflected upon my graduate school experience with I.B. Holley and Alex Roland. I remembered Professor Holley's guidance to research from the bottom up, to ask quality questions, and to ask hard questions. Professor Roland always urged me to stand back from the issue at hand, to try to see the big picture, and to determine what value its review provided.

The second day at Incirlik I went to see the CTF chief of staff, Brig. Gen. Anthony Zinni, USMC. General Zinni took an active interest in my project, providing me a succinct overview of the operation as conducted in Turkey and northern Iraq. He explained that the CTF had five subordinate elements: the Combined Air Forces (CAF) at Incirlik, responsible for all fixed-wing aircraft; Joint Task Force Alpha (JTFA), responsible for the humanitarian effort in the mountain areas; Joint Task Force Bravo (JTFB), responsible for establishing a security zone below the mountains in northern Iraq; a small Army Civil Affairs brigade, responsible for working with the civilian populations within both the JTFA and JTFB areas; and a Combined Support Command (CSC), responsible for the overall service support of the coalition forward units.

Of these five commands, all but the CAF were commanded by U.S. Army officers and included U.S. Army units. JTFA had redeployed, but the three other formations still operated in northern Iraq and eastern

Turkey. General Zinni asked me how I thought I should conduct my work. I said that I felt I should go as far forward as I could get and work from front to rear. He agreed, and the next morning I flew to northern Iraq.

Just after my arrival, I met Maj. Gen. Jay Garner, JTFB commander. He suggested that I cover his units and key personnel before I interviewed him—an approach that supported Professor Holley's concept of working from the bottom up. I worked for three weeks with virtually all the subordinate units of JTFB and CSC, as well as with the remaining Civil Affairs personnel. I also met and interviewed civilians working for or with the Department of State, the United Nations, and a vast array of nongovernmental assistance organizations. My contact with the Kurds included those in refugee camps and those moving back into their homes. On three occasions General Garner took me to meetings between the senior coalition and Kurdish leaders.

Although I did not interview any JTFA personnel until I went to Germany and Fort Devens, Massachusetts, I quickly learned much about their work. Commanded by Brig. Gen. Richard Potter and his staff from Special Operations Command, Europe, this formation included the 10th Special Forces Group, the 39th Special Operations Wing, a British Marine commando (battalion), and some Civil Affairs personnel. The first of the coalition formations established forward, they had provided the initial assistance to the Kurds, organized the mountain camps, and eventually helped them leave the mountains.

The movement back into Iraq became possible when General Garner put together a coalition security force that coerced the Iraqi Army out of a large area in northern Iraq. Once secured, the Kurds began moving back into this area, where JTFB provided assistance for their resettlement. General Garner's coalition eventually approached an infantry division in size and structure, consisting of Marine and airborne infantry battalions from the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, Spain, and the Netherlands. JTFB also included about five batteries of artillery, a Military Police battalion, and extensive rotary aviation assets, to include an Army aviation brigade and a U.S. Marine composite squadron.

The Army formed an engineer brigade around the 18th Engineer Brigade Headquarters, one of its battalions, a large Navy "Seabee" Construction Engineer Battalion, U.S. Air Force engineers, a Dutch engineer battalion, and several British engineer units. It also included several Explosive Ordnance Demolition (EOD) teams. The medical effort was just as joint and combined. Both military and civilian personnel from several countries supported the medical operation.

General Garner's force emerged on the ground with little planning or preparation. Upon arrival he relied on the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit's staff until he could form his own with Army officers deployed individually from Germany. The JTFB experienced unique transitions throughout its role in Iraq. I spent about half my time with Army units and in interviewing Army officers, and the rest of my time with other American, coalition, United Nations, and NGO (nongovernmental organization) units and personnel. To comprehend the Army's role in the operation, I found it necessary to get the perspectives of those working so closely with the Army.

The Combined Support Command had established its base in Silopi, Turkey, just across the border. In addition to the service support for JTFA and JTFB, it provided a conduit for a massive supply effort by the United Nations and the NGOs for distribution to the Kurds. The CSC approached an Army DISCOM in size, but was made up of non-DISCOM units from all over the Army and, to a lesser degree, from other American services and coalition members.

Like JTFB, the CSC organization and tasks emerged as the operation unfolded. To understand this important and essential service support operation, dominated by Army officers, I visited most of its units and interviewed many of their key leaders. As one might expect, logistics was one of the biggest challenges of the operation, and capturing the problem areas and their resolutions required extensive study and reflection.

Returning to Incirlik, I interviewed key personnel on the CTF staff. All of the staff sections were joint and combined, although American officers held most of the primary positions. Each national group with units serving forward with JTFB had a separate national headquarters at Incirlik. In the case of Britain, France, and Italy, these included a major general as their senior representative. Interviews with each of these general officers provided many additional insights into the operation and some very positive perspectives on the American units and leaders.

On my way back to the United States, I interviewed key American personnel in Germany who participated in PROVIDE COMFORT before my arrival in Iraq. I went to Geneva, Switzerland, and at the headquarters of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, I interviewed personnel who coordinated much of the

relief effort for the Kurds. After returning to the United States, I traveled to Fort Devens, Massachusetts, and spoke with soldiers from the 10th Special Forces Group. At home, I accumulated my notes, documents, and tapes. Over several weeks, I put together a 45-page draft of the operation and turned it and copies of my tapes over to the Center of Military History.

As Colonel Swain had suggested, the participants became interested in the history of the operation as it terminated. I found general officer aides very protective of their bosses' time, but once past them I found all of the coalition senior leaders ready and willing to talk about their roles. Without questions to prompt them, they tended to relate chronological narratives, often flavored with colorful anecdotes. Since I had conducted interviews from the bottom up, I identified many problem areas, conflicts, and irritations. Consequently, I was prepared to ask good questions—and hard questions—when interviewing these leaders. To my pleasant surprise, I found every senior officer more than ready to address the problem areas I raised.

The two months I spent on this project proved to be one of my most fascinating Army experiences. The advice I received before my departure proved most appropriate, and I would pass on the following advice to any other historian encountering such an opportunity. To begin with, a historian must focus on the defined task, remember for whom he works, and avoid distractions. He should not assume that units will anticipate his arrival, or be well prepared to render assistance. Blending in as a soldier in the proper uniform will allow reasonable freedom of movement. Work from the bottom up, research well, and ask good questions. Access to key personnel may be difficult, but once received, usually they will provide the time necessary for a good interview. Do not avoid asking the hard questions. As a rule, your interview subjects are eager to deal with them.

Periodically, one must stand back and try to see the big picture to reflect on the value of the project and to guide one's efforts. Finally, as General Nelson told me, there is a lot of history out there; you cannot capture it all. Go over there, find the best story you can, and bring it home. In the final analysis, that is what historians are all about.

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Book Review
by John T. Greenwood

America's Plans for War Against the Soviet Union, 1945-1950
Steven T. Ross and David Alan Rosenberg (eds.) Garland Publishing. 15 volumes, facsimile editions, $1,792.00

These fifteen volumes contain facsimile copies of declassified documents created by the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff from 1945 to 1950. As such they provide the basic skeletal structure for a better understanding of U.S. strategic planning in the early years of the Cold War. The documents include intelligence estimates of the Soviet threat, strategic war and logistics plans, analyses and plans for atomic warfare, and so on. They are largely drawn from the records of Joint Staff Planners (JPS) and its Joint War Plans Committee (JWPC); the Joint Intelligence and Logistics Committees (JIC and JLC), and their subordinate Joint Intelligence Staff (JIS) and Joint Logistics Plans Committee (JLPC); and the Joint Strategic Survey Committee (JSSC) from 1945 to 1947 and their respective successor organizations thereafter. All of these documents plus many unpublished memoranda and other relevant papers are readily available to all researchers in Record Group 217, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) in Washington, D.C.

The documents chosen for this collection are usually approved JCS "slants," a term drawn from the JCS's system of documentation and filing. When first submitted, each JCS study or paper received a different number, e.g., JCS 1477, and thereafter each revision, separate service submission, or additional information bearing on that original report received a designation of JCS 1477, /, and a sequential number. As a result, the first document submitted in response to JCS 1477 became JCS 1477/1, and so on. Naturally, these slants reflected the respective service's quite parochial position on a given subject, so "slants" came to have another meaning in JCS jargon.

Unfortunately, the editors concentrated on the approved slants, many of them final, agreed versions of studies or war plans that had gestated during long and often bitter fighting among the services within the JCS's various committees. In using this approach, they have missed the very critical, detailed, and often vitriolic position papers of the individual service planners

that were forwarded along with the slants to their respective representatives on the various JCS committees and planning groups. These documents are normally found in the records of the plans and operations staffs of the services. These memoranda outlined the service's position with respect to each JCS slant, gave the reasoning underpinning its particular response slant, and provided arguments and facts to use in attacking the other services' positions in the JCS and its various committees. In many respects, the services' internal planning documents, memoranda, position papers, and comments provide far better insights into the dynamics of U.S. strategic planning than do the agreed JCS slants.

Any historian working on the U.S. Army's role in the early Cold War period would be much wiser to dive into the extensive records of the War Department's Operations Division (OPD) to 1946, the Director of Plans and Operations (1946-48), and then the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Combat Operations (1948-50) in the National Archives. The OPD records are in Record Group 165, Records of the War Department General Staff, while the others are in Record Group 319, Records of the Army Staff. JCS documents, such as the ones in these volumes, only provide a very general framework upon which the history of the Army's planning and actions during these critical years before the Korean War must be built—the rest of the materials for the edifice come from the Army's own records.

While these Garland volumes are available individually at prices ranging from $70 to $160 each, the entire collection costs nearly $1,800 and is really directed toward library purchasers. Each of the individual documents in these volumes can be obtained from the National Archives and Records Administration at far less expense. Many of them have also appeared in various other document collections, such as Thomas H. Etzold and John Lewis Gaddis (eds.), *Containment: Documents on American Policy and Strategy, 1945-1950*. Moreover, the JCS Historical Division's now declassified histories of the JCS during these years are another important source of basic information. They provide the larger context of JCS decision-making, organization, and evolution of U.S. foreign and defense policies in which to place the various documents in this collection.

Dr. John T. Greenwood is Director, Field and International Programs, U.S. Army Center of Military History.

Book Review
by Ted Ballard

U.S. Army Uniforms of World War II
by Shelby Stanton
Stackpole Books. 279 pp., $29.95

Since the organization of the U.S. Army, the soldier's uniform and equipage have gone through a process of evolution. Advances in weapons technology and tactics have changed the uniform from the colorful "regimentals" of the past to the dull camouflage of today. As we continue to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of World War II, there is heightened interest in the uniforms and equipment of that conflict. In our first truly global war, the Army was confronted with the necessity of providing service uniforms that were inconspicuous and comfortable under varied environmental and climatic conditions. The story of the research, development, and adoption of those uniforms is one that parallels the accounts of the various military campaigns.

U.S. Army Uniforms of World War II provides an overview of that story with over 400 captioned photographs. The military historian not only wants to see photographs of how the uniform and equipment were to be worn according to regulations, but also how they actually were worn in the field. This book provides an abundance of both types of illustrations, many never before published.

Although the cover claims the book "...thoroughly documents the clothing and equipment of the American soldier during the war," *U.S. Army Uniforms in World War II* is actually a cursory look at what the soldier wore in garrison and field. The text is meager, but hundreds of photographs depict service and dress uniforms, headgear, combat wet weather and cold weather clothing, armor and airborne attire, and chemical protective clothing. The M1943 experimental combat uniform, tested by the Quartermaster Board during late 1942 through mid-July 1943, is well documented pictorially by almost forty official quartermaster photographs, as well as photographs taken in the field.

Equipment is less documented and usually appears in photographs of soldiers in the open. These photographs include captions which ask the reader to note such items as the M1910 canteen, M1943 service shoe, or the M1938 wire cutter carrier. With a lack of substantive text, or photographs or drawings of the equipment, the general reader will be hard pressed to

tell the differences in, say, a M1910 or M1943 shovel, M1917, M1923, or M1936 cartridge belts, or M1912, M1918, or M1923 pistol ammunition pouches.

Most previously published uniform books failed to include the specialized uniforms of women soldiers. This volume, however, devotes an entire chapter to female uniforms of the war. Again, the text is brief, but formal and field attire, including chemical protective clothing and cold weather items, are amply illustrated.

A valuable reference guide included at the end of the book is a map of the world, showing uniform issue areas according to climate. Also shown is a sample of T/O & E (Tables of Organization and Equipment) 6-125, and T/E (Tables of Equipment) No. 21, and the results of theater tests of the proposed tropical uniform.

Errors in identification are minimal, although the officer identified on p. 180 as a corps commander actually is the commanding general of the 12th Army Group, Omar N. Bradley. As a general pictorial record, *U.S. Army Uniforms of World War II* adds numerous photographs to those previously published. It is a useful reference tool, and will be sought by military historians and others as the interest in World War II increases.

Larry A. ("Ted") Ballard is a historian in the Center's Field and International Division. A former archivist, Mr. Ballard is active in historic reenactments.

Book Review
by David R. Kiernan

Newsmen and National Defense--Is Conflict Inevitable?
Edited by Lloyd J. Mattthews
Brassey's (US). 146 pp., $30.00

Much has been written in the aftermath of Operation DESERT STORM concerning military-media relations. While the natural bent is toward an adversarial relationshp, this fine selection of essays leaves the reader with the possibility that it could be, at best, a symbiotic union. Ranging from the historical anecdotes provided by William Hammond and Joseph Ewing to the contemporary analysis of Richard Halloran and Bernard Trainor, the thread of tension is drawn taut.

To the editor's credit, the reader is given a potpourri of military-media relations, at home and abroad, in terrorist scenarios, as well as in contingency operations in Latin America. The unique literary strength of this book is the credibility provided by the authors selected for this anthology.

Academicians, historians, public affairs officers, and the working press themselves offer both thoughtful and candid appraisals of the relationship that has been tried and tested since the early days of the republic. It is indeed timely to read this book against the backdrop of the recent bicentennial of the First Amendment.

Despite the current technology that gives the American people immediate video images in "real time," the contentious issues of media access and maximum disclosure of information can remain nagging stumbling blocks to a mutually beneficial dialogue. *Newsmen and National Defense--Is Conflict Inevitable?* is a valuable resource for soldiers, scribblers, and media watchers alike. The commentaries are as insightful as the credentials of the essayists are valid.

From the Vietnam jungles to the Joint Information Bureau in Riyadh, the military-media odyssey continues until the next regional contingency alerts the Department of Defense Media Pool and the next chapter is written.

Col. David R. Kiernan is chief, Media Relations Division (SAPA-CID), at the Pentagon. An experienced public affairs officer, his assignments have included serving as editor of Infantry Magazine, *chief of public affairs for the XVIII Airborne Corps and Fort Bragg, and director, Joint Information Bureau, in Saudi Arabia.*

Book Review
by Joseph W.A. Whitehorne

The Regiment: Let the Citizens Bear Arms!
by Harry M. Kemp
Nortex Press. 395 pp., $24.95

Ever since the Civil War, American military literature has been enriched with detailed official and unofficial records of individual and unit participation in the experience of war. A large portion of these works has been regimental histories of varying quality. Each of these has tried to present the record of its favored unit while in some way showing its uniqueness and contribution to larger events.

Col. Harry M. Kemp, USA (Ret.), a former member of the 109th Infantry Regiment, 28th Division, has set out to provide this service for his old unit. His subtitle uses the regiment's motto. The 28th Division and its elements originated in the Pennsylvania National Guard and participated in some of the hardest fighting in northwest Europe. Its experience at Schmidt in the Huertgen Forest in November 1944 was long an object of Command and General Staff College students' study, thanks to Charles MacDonald and Sidney Mathews' work, *Three Battles*. Most of the division's units produced their histories shortly after World War II. For some reason, this was not the case with the 109th, and the author—with the help of several of his comrades—decided to rectify this omission following a reunion discussion in 1982.

Colonel Kemp began his career as an enlisted man in the regiment in 1937, served with it as an officer throughout World War II, and then remained on active duty in the Army until retiring in 1971. His close association with the 109th has not impaired his objectivity.

The book presents a short history of the regiment's pre-World War II history, then provides a narrative of its call to federal service in 1941 and its training at various sites in the United States and the United Kingdom. This portion, although interesting, is the least polished part of the book. It is sometimes repetitive and leaves the reader wanting to know more about training problems, personnel turbulence, the series of great maneuvers, and the evident frictions as the unit members encountered Regular Army policies and standards. More polished are the fully three-quarters of the book that are devoted to the regiment's combat experiences. Beginning in July 1944, it fought in the Normandy hedgerows, marched through Paris in the pursuit to the West Wall, and was among the first units to cross the German border. Its grueling experiences in the Huertgen Forest, Battle of the Bulge, and Colmar Pocket are narrated in clear detail. The author remains considerably detached throughout, even referring to himself in the third person, although his disdain for some higher-level planners and the occasional Regular Army "ticket puncher" sometimes surfaces.

His description of combat actions seems to rely heavily on awards citations and his rhetoric sometimes is influenced by the inflated language associated with them. On the other hand, Colonel Kemp integrates the Pvt. Eddie Slovik episode into his narrative in a straightforward, clear discussion which is very useful to understanding the event and its immediate effects.

The book has not been enhanced by its production standards. It does not have footnotes and the bibliography is not very useful. The frequent redundancies in the predeployment chapters and the typographical errors abounding throughout demonstrate the need for more thorough editing. The scale sketch maps included in the rear of the book are of limited value in following the wealth of terrain detail set forth in the text. On the other hand, the many personal photographs included in the illustrations enhance the narrative and add a touch of humanity otherwise lacking in the prose.

The quibbles aside, this is a good book that could have been even better. All in all, it is a most competent record of one regiment's World War II career. I found it interesting, readable, and a valuable supplement to other works dealing with the same operations. Anyone interested in National Guard history, mobilization and deployment issues, and the recurring effects of attrition and personnel changes in combat units will find this volume well worth the read. For me, as an alumnus of the 28th Division and training at Indiantown Gap, it is a "must have."

Joseph Whitehorne is a professor of history at Lord Fairfax Community College, Middletown, Virginia. Formerly, he was historian for the Army Inspector General. His most recent book, Snake Hill: A War of 1812 Site, *was published in Toronto in September 1991.*

Book Review
by Arnold G. Fisch, Jr.

Nazi Prisoners of War in America
by Arnold Kramer
Scarborough House Publishers. 338 pp., $14.95

In 1979 Stein and Day first published Arnold Kramer's study of Nazi prisoners in the United States. More recently, there has been a surge of interest in the American treatment of German POWs in Europe (see *Army History*, No. 14, page 10). Now, just in time to tap into that interest, Scarborough House has produced a paperback version. The bibliography is somewhat expanded, there is a revised paragraph on page 139 about the last fugitive POW (Georg Gaertner, who surrendered to the author in 1985), and there is a new page of what might be considered introductory hype,

but otherwise the 1991 Scarborough edition is identical. It includes all of the excellent black and white photographs that add much to the story.

Professor Kramer's book is a fascinating study of how American authorities coped with nearly 400,000 German captives at 511 POW camps and other sites across the United States. Readers may be surprised to learn how very well the prisoners were treated (in the hope that the Germans would reciprocate in their camps). Perhaps even more astounding was the degree of conflict (at times fatal) among non-Nazis and true believers in the camps.

A large number of the German prisoners, especially those from the *Afrika Korps*, arrived as loyal Nazis. The War Department, especially the Provost Marshal General's Office, was slow to appreciate the need for a reeducation program. Once such a program was established, most prisoners responded well, although perhaps 10-13 percent remained committed National Socialists after their captivity.

If Dr. Kramer relates the dark side of the German POW experience, he also recounts some humorous moments, such as how some of the Germans who escaped fared outside the camps. He also describes the irony of POW contract workers serving as kosher meatpackers in Farmington, New Jersey. This is history with a human face.

His sections describing the role of POW labor in this country are significant. To an America suffering a manpower shortage because of the war, the contribution of the large German POW workforce was especially important.

Professor Kramer writes history in a style that is clear and readable. This reviewer found his book to be absorbing.

Dr. Arnold G. Fisch, Jr., is the managing editor of Army History *and chief, International Programs Activity, in the Center's Field and International Division.*

Book Review
by Jack A. Oliva

Defense Acquisition Management
by George Sammet, Jr., and David E. Green
Florida Atlantic University Press. 481 pp., $59.95

Defense Acquisition Management by Sammet and Green condenses the vast world of acquisition management into a comprehensible form. The book is particularly noteworthy because of its balanced view of issues. Every issue is presented from the perspectives of both military and civilian contractors.

This balanced view is possible because of the unique qualifications of the authors. Both were accomplished acquisition managers in the Army and have extensive experience as executives in the defense industry. General George Sammet (Ret.) is a former commander of the Army Materiel Command, and is currently a vice president for Martin Marietta Corporation. Col. David E. Green (Ret.), recently retired as director of Procurement Operations for Martin Marietta Aerospace, served as the U.S. Army program manager for the Stinger missile system. Their long careers on both the military and industrial sides of acquisition management enable them to present a balanced view of the process.

The book is an excellent source of information for anyone trying to understand defense acquisition management. It begins with a 28-page introduction that walks even the most uninitiated through the process at basic levels. Subsequent chapters go into greater detail on every aspect, participant, and subsystem that make up the acquisition system. This format allows the reader to see the big picture and then focus on parts of the system in manageable pieces.

Sammet and Green analyze each piece of the process, including the historical development of the present-day system. Of course, acquisition management is a dynamic process and this book (as any) is locked in time. Even though this book will become dated, its thoroughness and readability will make it a milestone work that will be consulted as others chronicle further development of the process.

Several groups will benefit from this book. It is a "must" for anyone working on the government side of acquisition. Those desiring to market their products to the Department of Defense will be interested in the appendix entitled "How to Prepare a Winning Proposal." Additionally, anyone interested in the evolution of complex systems, management, or the interaction of government with the private sector will find this a rewarding study.

The book relies heavily on the aerospace industry for examples, due to the authors' experiences in that area. It is filled with thought-provoking graphs and analyses. Although one could question how different segments of the defense industry would compare with the examples given, the aerospace industry offers a rich source of topics for discussion.

Sammet and Green have provided a comprehensive and readable analysis of one of the most complex systems in our government. This book will contribute to the better understanding of that system by all participants and observers, and will likely be an important source document for future research and analysis of the topic.

Maj. Jack A. Oliva has a degree in history from Fordham University. Currently he is assigned as special projects officer to the Deputy Commanding General for Research, Development, and Acquisition, U.S. Army Materiel Command.

New Chemical Corps Writing Contest

Just as we were going to press, we received word that the Chemical Corps had initiated a new writing contest. The theme for 1992 is "Chemical Trained and Ready." Military of all branches and services, including allied nations, and civilians of any nationality are invited to enter this competition. Competitors need to submit their 500-2,500 word manuscripts no later than 15 August 1992 to the U.S. Army Chemical School at Fort McClellan, Alabama. There will be three cash prizes, beginning at $300.00, and the winning entry will be published in the Chemical Corps Regimental Association "Yellow Book" and in the January 1993 issue of CML, Army Chemical Review. For full information about this new contest, write to:

Dr. Daniel E. Spector
Command Historian
U.S. Army Chemical School
ATTN: ATZN-CM-MH
Fort McClellan, AL 36205-5020

Forthcoming in *Army History...*

Brig. Gen. Guenter Roth, chief of the *Bundeswehr*'s Military History Research Office, shares his perspective on "Field Marshal von Moltke the Elder: His Importance Then and Now."

A look at the historical program at the Army Materiel Command.

Book review by Brooks Kleber of John Colby's *War from the Ground Up: The 90th Division in WW II*.

Book review by Rodney J. Ross of Robert E. Haney's *Caged Dragons: An American P.O.W. in WW II Japan*.

And much more....

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