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Recognizing the Liberators
U.S. Army Divisions Enter the Concentration Camps

Edward J. Drea

Since 1985 the U.S. Army Center of Military History and the United States Holocaust Memorial Council, an independent U.S. Government establishment responsible for the creation and operation of the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, have cooperated to recognize U.S. Army divisions that liberated Nazi concentration camps during World War II. The purpose of recognition is twofold: first, to honor the officers and men of the liberating divisions and, second, to remember the victims of Nazi tyranny. As with any cooperative venture, the passage of time has led to a gradual evolution of policies and procedures for the recognition of liberating units. Since the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum will open adjacent to the National Mall in April 1993, it is appropriate to review the work of the seven previous years.

On 9 February 1985, Messrs. Sigmund Strochlitz and Benjamin Meed, cochairmen of the United States Holocaust Memorial Council Days of Remembrance Committee, wrote to Secretary of the Army John O. Marsh, Jr., requesting that the U.S. Army "present its colors and those of the units that participated in liberation for permanent display in the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum" then being planned in Washington, D.C. The occasion for the presentation was to be the 18 April 1985 national civil ceremony in the Capitol Rotunda, at which the Council wished to honor the U.S. Army on the fortieth anniversary of its role in the liberation of the World War II concentration camps.

On 25 February, the Acting Chief of Public Affairs, Brig. Gen. Richard B. Griffitts, submitted a memorandum to the secretary of the Army recommending how the Army might participate in the April event. Mr. Marsh's approval of General Griffitts' memorandum established the policy that the U.S. Army would present "the Army Flag with streamers and the flags of appropriate Army divisions" involved in the liberation of Nazi concentration camps.

Meanwhile, Public Affairs had already contacted the Center of Military History for research support. After meetings with Public Affairs and the Holocaust Memorial Council, Public Affairs devised a list of U.S. Army liberating units and asked Center historians to verify the accuracy of the selections. On 21 February however, the U.S. Army Institute of Heraldry notified the Center that it needed forty-five days' lead time to have ten division flags manufactured at the Defense Personnel Support Center in Philadelphia. This meant, in turn, that the Center had to verify the Public Affairs list by 28 February or else the Institute of Heraldry could not guarantee that the division flags would be available for the April ceremony.

With this short suspense, Center historians had to rely on secondary sources to verify the unit list. The units certified as liberating divisions were the 3d, 4th, 6th, 10th, and 11th Armored Divisions and the 42d, 45th, 80th, 90th, and 103d Infantry Divisions. It was obvious at this time that because of the magnitude of the concentration camp network, more U.S. Army divisions deserved recognition as liberating units.

Because the names Dachau, Buchenwald, Mauthausen, Ravensbrueck, and Auschwitz forever will be linked with man's chilling inhumanity to his fellow human beings, many believe that these were the only concentration camps under the Nazi regime. In fact, as the war dragged on, wherever German industry needed labor other camps were set up and grew into an extensive system that included the occupied countries as well. (1)

The notorious major camps were surrounded by dozens and even hundreds of subcamps (see accompanying map). Auschwitz, for example, boasted 38 *Aussenkommando* (subcamps), Buchenwald had 134 subcamps—120 *Aussenkommando* and 14 *Unterkommando* (smaller camps under a subcamp's administration), Ravensbruck 42 *Aussenkommando*,

and Dachau 160 *Aussenkommando* and 9 *Unterkommando*, or 169 subordinate slave labor camps. As documented by the International Red Cross, there were in Germany 15 major camps or *Konzentrationslager*, what we generally refer to as concentration camps. More overpowering were the numbers of subcamps—863 *Aussenkommando* and 83 *Unterkommando* in Germany alone. (2) In addition, there were many other facilities of various kinds that were not subordinate to the major camps, such as transit, security, and special function camps. Altogether Red Cross officials counted approximately 5,000 camps of varied sizes and functions. The very number of camps makes it likely that as they drove across the Third Reich, more U.S. Army divisions than originally recognized liberated concentration camps of one type or another.

Indeed, as American veterans' organizations learned of the proposed display of division flags in the Holocaust Museum, the Council received requests from veterans to acknowledge additional divisions as camp liberators. In December 1987, as chief of the Staff Support Branch, I met with Dr. Brewster S. Chamberlin III, the Council's Director of Archives and Library, to discuss guidelines to govern future recognition of liberating units. Our agreement on several points, also coordinated with the Institute of Heraldry, led to an informal understanding of how our respective offices would handle requests for liberation credit.

The Center and the Council agreed that eligibility for liberation credit would not be limited only to the first division to reach a camp but would include follow-on divisions that arrived at the same camp or camp complex within forty-eight hours of the initial division. This agreement accords with established Center policy on answering requests concerning the "first" soldier to accomplish certain feats during wartime. The 16 May 1947 precedent reads, in part:

Regardless of the motives prompting such requests, the W[ar] D[epartment] may not with propriety or generally with any degree of official accuracy resolve such questions. Eye-witness accounts vary, and verification is ordinarily impracticable either from IBM punch-cards, organization or personnel records. When all records are received and evaluated, contrary information oftentimes develops.

Given the great number of U.S. Army units involved in the advance across Germany and the great number of camps, many were freed by small units

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subordinate to a division. Two factors account for this phenomenon. As the map shows, outlying or subcamps were scattered across the German landscape, making it likely that one or more U.S. Army units would discover the same or neighboring camps of the same larger complex. Moreover at this stage of the war, the U.S. Army task-organized its units for specific missions. Thus an infantry regiment of division X might find itself temporarily attached to an armored battalion of division Y as they pushed across the Third Reich. For these reasons, and to ensure proper credit to all American GIs involved in liberations, the Center, with the Council's concurrence, determined that it would recognize the parent division of the respective lower-echelon unit—regiment, battalion, company, or platoon. As a consequence, two or more divisions might be eligible for recognition as liberators of the same camp. In the case of independent regimental combat teams (RCT), such as the 442d RCT, they would also receive recognition according to which division they were attached to during the action.

Using these criteria, since December 1987 the Center has certified ten additional divisions: 12th, 14th, and 20th Armored; 4th, 8th, 71st, 89th, 99th, and 104th Infantry; and 82d Airborne. The Center verified these units following requests, from the respective unit associations or individual veterans of a division, to the Holocaust Memorial Council for recognition as a camp liberator. The Council and the Center adopted this approach to facilitate methodology. A divisional association seeking recognition usually provides the name of the camp that it liberated, the approximate dates of the liberation, the unit's geographical location at the time, and a brief account of the events, sometimes including information on the division's subunits that entered the camp. This background information narrows the historians' research tasks and enables them to identify quickly the pertinent divisional records held at the National Archives' Washington National Records Center (WNRC) at Suitland, Maryland. The Center of Military History insists that verification of any claims be based on research in these official records.

In the certifications made after December 1987, two significant facts emerged. First, the Center's initial identification of ten liberating divisions, done under time constraints, focused on the liberators of main camps or *Konzentrationslager* like Dachau, Buchenwald, Nordhausen, and so on. Additional research made plain that each main camp controlled scores of subcamps each holding from dozens to thousands of prisoners. Second, because hundreds of

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

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Chief of Staff

Official:



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

Network of concentration camps, Germany, 1945

camps existed, verification had to be based upon primary sources, that is, unit records available only at the Washington National Records Center. This step was necessary to resolve insofar as possible conflicting claims by divisions that may have liberated subcamps within the same *Konzentrationslager*'s administrative area. Once Center historians had gone to WNRC, reviewed the relevant unit records, and documented the presence of a particular division or one of its organic or attached units at a camp, the chief, Research and Analysis Division, sent a memorandum to the Institute of Heraldry to request that a division flag be ordered for display at the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum scheduled to open this April.

With the date for the museum opening drawing near, representatives from the Council and Center met again to formalize policy for the identification of liberating units. On 18 June 1992, we agreed to continue existing procedures with appropriate modifications. One change occurred in 1988 when Dr. Robert Kesting became an archivist for the Council. Working at the WNRC, he reviews and catalogs copies of archival materials relating to the concentration camps and other Holocaust-related subjects. Among his other duties, Dr. Kesting confirms documentary evidence of a unit's participation in camp liberation. His efforts made sending a historian from the Center to WNRC to search the records unnecessary. Instead, Dr. Kesting sends photocopies of the appropriate supporting documents to Ms. Mary Haynes of the Staff Support Branch who, in turn, prepares a memorandum for the Research and Analysis Division chief requesting that the Institute of Heraldry order a replica of a division flag to honor the liberating unit.

The Center and the Council formally agreed to recognize at the division level because unit records below that echelon are comparatively fragmentary. Furthermore the very number of flags for units below division echelon would be overwhelming. Both agencies concurred with the present policy of responding to requests for recognition from veterans or their associations as opposed to independently initiating certifica-

tion processes. Our reasoning was that unilaterally selecting and identifying a division as a liberating unit might imply favoritism on our part and unintentionally offend other divisions not yet selected for recognition.

As for the evidentiary basis for a liberating unit, we concurred that primary source evidence found in unit and other contemporary records is essential for liberation credit. Oral history or testimony by itself, for instance, would not suffice for liberation credit; nor would secondary accounts or unit histories unless their details conformed to the documentary context established in the official records. Our procedure, we agreed, underscores both the Council's and the Center's concern that extreme caution must accompany the certification of a division as a liberating unit. Those who deny the Holocaust occurred would use any errors, no matter how minor and unintentional, as "proof" that government historians fabricated the scope of the destruction of European Jewry and others deemed undesirable by Adolf Hitler's Germany. Our mutual concern for accuracy further highlights the need for primary source documentation when certifying liberating units.

The Center and the Council regard the U.S. Army's role in the liberation of the Nazi concentration camps as one of the Army's brightest achievements during World War II. Amidst suffering, captivity, and degradation, officers and men of U.S. Army divisions brought hope, freedom, and dignity to the victims of the Holocaust. It is fitting that their divisional flags will be on display in the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum foyer because the accomplishments of those American soldiers deserve to be honored and remembered by all.

Dr. Edward J. Drea is chief of the Research and Analysis Division, U.S. Army Center of Military History.

Notes

1. Christian Zenter and Friedemann Bedurftig, eds. *The Encyclopedia of the Third Reich* (English translation edited by Amy Hackett) (New York: MacMillan Publishing Co., 1991), vol. 1, p. 160.
2. Comite International Geneve, International Tracing Service, comp., "Verzeichnis der Haftstatten unter dem Reichsführer-SS (1933-1945): Konzenstrationslager und deren Aussenkommandos sowie andere Haftstatten unter dem Reichsführer-SS in Deutschland und deutsch besetzen Gebieten" [Catalogue of Camps and Prisons in Germany and German-Occupied Territories], photocopy of revised 1949 report with foreword, 1979.

Editor's Journal

This issue--long delayed by budget constraints placed upon the Center--begins with a focus on prisoners. Dr. Edward Drea's lead article deals with the often difficult subject of recognizing American Army units that liberated the German concentration camps during World War II.

I want to thank Mr. Derek Beyss for his efforts on behalf of Army History. Mr. Beyss, with a new B.S. degree in foreign service from Georgetown University, served for much of this summer as an intern in our Field and International Division. He typed and edited several articles for *Army History* and designed the Reader's Survey that appears in the back of this issue. Mr. Beyss did an excellent job, and we wish him success in Washington's competitive job market.

Please take a moment to fill out the Reader's Survey and return it. Go ahead—invest that 29-cent stamp—we really can use your input for our future planning.

The "Focus on the Field" column will not appear in this issue or the next; it will resume in the Spring 1993 *Army History*.

Finally, my apologies to our readers for inadvertently deleting the very last line of the Archaic Archivist in the summer issue.

A. G. Fisch, Jr.

The Chief's Corner

Harold W. Nelson

Fifty years ago our Army found itself fully engaged in global war. Defense of the Western Hemisphere consumed enormous resources. Forces were training in Australia, fighting in New Guinea, and reinforcing marines at Guadalcanal. Units, supplies, and equipment were still flowing toward the United Kingdom, but a major effort in North Africa drew upon that base, as well as the base in the United States. Lend-Lease for the Soviets, the British, and other Allies continued to divert a significant portion of American industrial production from U.S. Army use.

None of this had been predicted by a generation of Army planners. Drawing on the 1917-18 model, they had posited a single theater of active operations. A straightforward priority system to allocate scarcity among the Army, Navy, and domestic market would support the needs of the expeditionary force. Reality proved to be far more complex. Our allies were the first to fight, and they made powerful claims on U.S. equipment sought by American commanders trying to train the growing U.S. Army. After Pearl Harbor, units were needed everywhere, as a global strategy called Americans to serve in unlikely places thousands of miles from home. From Northern Ireland to India, soldiers built camps, depots, and training facilities that would be the staging areas for eventual victory.

The U.S. Army demonstrated enormous innovative skill in coping with such unprecedented global commitments. Key leaders understood that warfighting was much bigger than fighting battles. Wars are won by transforming advantages into accomplishments. The U.S. Army, as it existed in 1942, could not be counted as an advantage. Our nation's advantage lay rather in its ability to solve simultaneously multitudes of organizational and industrial problems in ways that focused potential production capacity on distant battlefields. No one else had to move forces thousands of miles to face the enemy. The ocean barriers that had given a sense of security before the war now had to be transformed into lifelines to support expeditionary forces requiring planes, tanks, guns, and radios that had existed only on drawing boards a few months before. As 1942 ended, the results of three years of buildup and a year of frantic effort began to be felt on battlefields worldwide. Nearly three years of sacrifice and hard fighting remained.

When Communist recalcitrance soured the fruits of victory, the Army was able to salvage some of the hard-won gains of World War II. At home, new camps with relatively large training areas had been established, and the arsenal system had been expanded. Overseas, soldiers improvised adequate living and training facilities as occupation duty transitioned into forward basing. The U.S. Army retained a global mission.

Now the forces available to perform that global mission are changing. Historians throughout the Army are working hard to chronicle the changes. Unit inactivations and base closures have kept museum personnel working at a rapid pace. The emerging force will be smaller and largely CONUS based, but it will still be globally engaged.

The U.S. Army of World War II attacked to liberate, not to conquer. Its successes during the war and since that time have built a framework of cooperation and respect with foreign armies that we must continue to cultivate during this period of transition. While Army historians capture the history of the Army in the Cold War, they must also capitalize on every opportunity to use history to strengthen ties with other armies. Whether working with a former foe, a long-time ally, or a newly emerging sovereign state, we have much to share as representatives of an army in a democracy. Even though resources are scarce, this effort to stay globally engaged is one of the strengths of our Army history programs.

General Nelson recently returned from Tunisia and Australia, where he discussed World War II commemorative activities and fostered army-to-army contacts with both nations.

Rock Island Arsenal, An Arsenal of Democracy

Thomas J. Slattery

Wars are not won solely by the courage of soldiers in battle. The bravery of American and Allied troops alone could not have defeated the Axis Powers of totalitarian Germany, Italy, and Japan during World War II.

On the American home front, dedicated and skilled "soldiers of production" labored around the clock to produce and supply quality weapons and equipment, not only for American servicemen, but also for soldiers of any nation threatened or under attack by the Axis Powers. Army arsenals, such as Rock Island Arsenal (RIA), spearheaded production of arms and equipment for the defense of their allies several years before the United States entered the war against the Axis Powers.

Rock Island Arsenal is situated on a 946-acre island in the upper Mississippi River between the cities of Rock Island and Moline, Illinois, and Davenport and Bettendorf, Iowa. Today the island is commonly known as Arsenal Island, and the surrounding bi-state communities form the "Quad Cities" with a population of approximately 375,000.

The Quad Cities have been a defense production community since the initial construction of the Rock Island Arsenal in 1862. The arsenal's employment and production are traditionally cyclical in nature, the work force and workload historically increasing during national emergencies and declining during peacetime.

After RIA employment reached a World War I peak of 13,263 in November 1918, the arsenal's work force plunged to the installation's lowest ebb of 618 in 1924. (1) Rock Island Arsenal scaled down its operations during peacetime, closed shop buildings, and consolidated manufacturing operations in building 220 (Shop M).

Stimulated by the world events and the presidential election that brought Franklin D. Roosevelt to office, RIA work force and production orders slowly began to rise again in 1932. In that same year Japan invaded Manchuria, and in the Quad Cities a small RIA work force performed research and development work on Army tanks as well as other armored vehicles. During the 1930s RIA remained active by equipping World War I-era gun carriages with modern, high-speed rubber tires and air brakes and manufacturing prototype gun carriages and various items for the U.S. Army Air Corps and U.S. Navy.

Beginning in 1936, the arsenal received increased orders for automotive and artillery vehicles, .30-caliber machine guns, gun mounts, recoil mechanisms, and gun carriages. (2) During that same year fighting erupted in Europe. General Francisco Franco began the revolt which ignited the Spanish Civil War and provided Hitler with a proving ground to test his new weapons and troops.

In 1937 Japan and China began their undeclared war, and Japanese planes bombed an American gunboat, the *Panay*, sinking the vessel and killing two sailors and wounding thirty others. During the same period RIA manufacturing activity increased in building 220 (Shop M).

Building 350 (Shop L) reopened in 1938 to provide additional manufacturing facilities for artillery, tank parts, and work projects for the U.S. Navy. Also in 1938 Building 66 (Shop H) reopened for the manufacture of .30-caliber Browning machine guns. The initial production rate of 25 per day later climbed to 100. (3) In 1938 Germany annexed Austria and brought an end to Czechoslovakia's sovereignty.

In 1939 RIA purchased and installed new machines and equipment for the manufacturing and assembly of heavy artillery, gun carriages, and Navy gun mounts. (4) In 1939 Nazi Germany crushed Poland, and in response, Great Britain and France declared war against Germany.

Rock Island Arsenal played a major role in the mobilization of American industry. In 1939 the War Department developed a plan whereby certain responsible private manufacturers with qualified engineering staff and plant facilities were selected to produce limited quantities of Army ordnance.

RIA was given the responsibility for providing the technical supervision of such items as tanks, artillery, and machine guns. Private manufacturers visited the facility to study its manufacturing operation. Rock Island Arsenal did everything short of setting up these contractors in business. The arsenal provided descriptions of manufacture route sheets; copies of tool, die, jig, gauge, and fixture drawings; machine-tool requirements; and updated component and assembly drawings.

When available, the arsenal loaned inspection gauges, surplus machines, and tool equipment to the private manufacturers. RIA's role as educator and technical adviser to Midwest plants converting to war production sharply increased following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, 7 December 1941. (5)

Rock Island Arsenal provided supervision for the overhaul of 133 Medium M3 Tanks at the Quad Cities Tank Arsenal in Bettendorf, Iowa, later in the war. RIA provided technical advice and drawings for the tank assembly plant. (6)

In 1940 the German *Blitzkrieg* rolled across western Europe and the *Luftwaffe* began an air attack on Great Britain, while in the United States President Roosevelt was reelected. Roosevelt made it clear during his reelection campaign that Great Britain needed drastically increased aid from the United States.

In response to British Prime Minister Winston Churchill's call for aid, Roosevelt released to Britain more than $43 million worth of surplus stocks of arms, munitions, and planes in June 1940. (7) He established the Office of Production Management on 20 December 1940 to coordinate defense production and speed all material aid short of war to Great Britain and other anti-Axis nations.

On 29 December 1940, during a fireside chat on national security, President Roosevelt stressed the Axis threat to the United States and called for an immense effort that would make the nation "the great arsenal of democracy." Roosevelt in his famous Four Freedoms speech stated that the United States must help make secure a world where "four essential freedoms" of speech, of worship, from want, and from fear would prevail. (8)

In 1940 RIA reopened Buildings 109 and 110 (Shops G and I), repaired old machines, and installed new ones for the production of 105-mm. recoil mechanisms and gun carriages. Rock Island Artillery Vehicle Department began the largest manufacturing program ever assigned to the arsenal during that same period.

Months prior to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, RIA reorganized and rearranged its manufacturing departments and installed 230 new machine tools in those departments. Experimental programs designed by RIA's manufacturing departments were placed in quantity production. Just two months prior to the bombing of Pearl Harbor, RIA began manufacturing the Army's new air-cooled .30-caliber M1919A4 Browning machine gun. (9)

The American commitment to aid nations at war with the Axis Powers and the need to replace and build up its own ordnance stores resulted in an explosion of war production activities in the United States. Of course, government munitions plants like the Rock Island Arsenal experienced the boom in production before most private industries.

On 11 March 1941, President Roosevelt signed into law the Lend-Lease Act, which opened mutual aid to all nations struggling against the Axis Powers of Germany, Italy, and Japan. Lend-lease authorized the president to sell, lease, or lend arms, munitions, food, or other defense articles to any country whose defense was vital to that of the United States. The lend-lease announcement clearly committed America to unlimited aid to Great Britain.

Depot activities steadily increased at RIA during the period 1940-41. Approximately 1,500 orders were handled weekly, with shipments directed to all corners of the world. (10) The World War I-era storehouse W1 (Building 350) was no longer adequate.

In April 1941, eight months before the attack on Pearl Harbor, construction began at RIA on what would become the world's largest storehouse, Building 299--eighteen acres under one roof with room for seventeen football fields inside. (11) This structure was equipped with rail tracks and could unload an entire train at its interior docks. Building 299 was built to accommodate the business generated by America's new role as an arsenal of democracy for those nations under attack by the Axis Powers.

President Roosevelt's outpouring of American munitions to foreign allies hindered the Army's own development. Before American industry organized for war, the strain of arms production for Britain and France encroached on the production of items needed for the U.S. Army's own training operations. Rock Island Arsenal increased production both to keep pace with growing demands for U.S. Army training equipment and to fill lend-lease orders.

Pleas for armaments and munitions continued to mount from nations struggling against Axis aggression. Their requests were draining American forces' own supply of weapons and ammunition. Great Britain's request for 9 million rounds of American-made ammunition in early 1941 reduced U.S. ammunition for training by approximately 40 percent. (12)

In 1946 William Baumbeck, RIA Superintendent of Manufacturing, recorded a chronological World War II history of the RIA Artillery Vehicle Department. He stated that "it seemed [on the eve of the Pearl Harbor attack] very probable the U.S. would become involved in World War II." (13) In the eleven months



Two of the many women employed during World War II at the arsenal mill top plates for the .30-caliber Browning machine gun, April 1943.

prior to December 1941 the United States had boosted its tank production to many hundreds a month and at the same time manufactured 3.7 million refrigerators, 1.5 million typewriters, and millions of other small appliances and office equipment. In the same year plane production rose to 2,000 a month while the American automobile industry produced an all-time high of 5 million motor vehicles. (14)

Details of the bombing of Pearl Harbor were censored, but the gravity of the situation was understood by most Americans. The adjustment to converting to wartime production was probably less severe in defense production communities such as the Quad Cities.

While many Americans were alarmed by the news of the attack, Rock Island Arsenal commander Brig. Gen. Norman F. Ramsey was not one of them. A veteran of the Spanish-American War, Philippines Insurrection, and World War I, the arsenal's commander provided calm leadership during the crisis. As RIA commander, General Ramsey had taken steps months earlier to secure the arsenal in case of a national emergency. The first detachment of the 225th Military Police Company arrived at RIA to guard the water power plant and other key arsenal sites in July 1941.

On 8 December 1941, a local newspaper's headlines read "Quad Cities Take War in Stride Without Hysteria; Arsenal, Plants Guarded." General Ramsey said that all possible precautions had been taken. "We can't do anything to guard the arsenal we are not already doing. A large force of soldiers and civilian police are guarding the arsenal and for many months no one but employees have been permitted within the seven fenced areas of the reservation." (15)

Ramsey announced on 9 December that members of the 225th MP Company would assist the civilian guards recently placed on the government bridge. The guarding of Illinois approaches to the Mississippi River bridges was assumed by Rock Island and Moline units of the Illinois Reserve Militia. Twenty-five men from Company A, Rock Island, and eight from Company B, Moline, formed the guard unit. (16)

On 10 December 1941, military police from the RIA, headed by the commanding officer of the 225th MP Company and the Arsenal chief of police, raided the "hobo jungles" on Sylvan Island. The MPs rounded up the vagrants and burned their shacks. A second raid was made on a group of shacks at the Illinois end of the Rock Island Railroad Bridge. The raid was conducted at the request of Henry Arp, mayor of Moline, who considered the "jungle" dwellers a menace to the arsenal and to the community in general. (17)

On 19 December 1941, RIA sent out a call for classified laborers to update and build up the arsenal's civil service register. Applicants were required to

show that they had completed at least six months' experience above common laborer. Another requirement stipulated that applicants be between eighteen and fifty years of age and capable of performing physical labor. (18)

Early in the war the RIA work force worked ten-hour, two-shift days, some operations around the clock with three eight-hour shifts six and seven days a week. Arsenal machines never stopped running during these initial periods of emergency production. Arsenal employees worked without a normal lunch break. They often ate a sandwich at their machines when the pace slowed.

American industries' production of war materials was an immense factor in the ultimate victory over the Axis Powers. "Remember Pearl Harbor" became the rallying cry for the American people as they prepared for war. Only a united home front could produce the all-out effort required to convert the United States into an arsenal for democracy.

The task of converting American private industry to war production was given top priority. Rock Island Arsenal and other government ordnance depots rushed to assist the retooling of private plants. In early February 1942 the War Production Board announced the halt of all auto and truck production in the United States, which freed the automobile industry's manpower and facilities to retool for war production.

The United States Government restricted the production of other commercial goods to reserve materials such as steel, copper, and aluminum for war production. Rock Island Arsenal auctioned off obsolete artillery relics to scrap-metal dealers. Victory or defeat appeared to hang in the balance. American soldiers were fighting, dying, and falling back at Wake Island, Bataan, and Corregidor. Manufacturers of railroad locomotives, office equipment, home appliances, women's and men's garments, recreational goods, and children's toys converted their facilities to the manufacturing of armaments and munitions.

On 30 September 1942, RIA received the coveted Army-Navy "E" pennant for excellence of war production. During the ceremony Illinois Governor Dwight Green summed up the situation in his address to RIA employees. He said, "Today, the only business in America is the business of winning the war." (19)

During World War II the RIA Artillery Vehicle Department consisted of twenty-seven divisions which in turn were divided into ninety-eight sections for the manufacture, overhaul, and modification of all types of ordnance equipment. By 1942 the Artillery Vehicle Department alone had 10,200 employees. (20)

Employment at RIA showed a steady rise until peak employment was reached at 18,675 on 7 July 1943. (21) From that date until the end of the war employment gradually declined. Just as in World War I, women replaced men in the arsenal shops, offices, and storehouses. In 1944 the RIA work force was composed of 32.2 percent women. The warehouse staff in Building 299 employed 650 workers, 65 percent of which were female employees. (22) Italian prisoners of war formed another source of labor for the Rock Island Arsenal.

On 16 July 1944, the 39th and 40th Italian Quartermaster Service Companies arrived at RIA by train from Pine Camp, New York. (23) Technically they were no longer prisoners of war since Italy had earlier surrendered and joined the Allied forces against Nazi Germany. The Italians were permitted to volunteer for noncombat duty in special service units of the U.S. Army. Each volunteer signed a pledge to perform any duty except combat on behalf of the United States against the common enemy.

Upon their arrival the Italian Service Companies were assigned to the stone barracks, Building 90, and two other quarters. The 225th Military Police Detachment was previously housed in the old barracks. The 426 Italian signers performed general depot and warehouse work and grounds and equipment maintenance. Italians with special talents were assigned duty as mechanics, chemists, or carpenters.

The RIA commander restricted the Italians to the immediate area surrounding the barracks and a small field directly across from the barracks. Eventually their designated area was expanded to include the southeast quadrant of the island. The arsenal commander allowed the two Service Companies to form soccer teams and set up a playing field. Other off-duty recreational activities for the Italians included showing films and playing cards. They were permitted to receive visitors on Sunday and attend mass at Catholic churches in Davenport and Rock Island.

In September 1944 the arsenal commander established a limited pass policy for Italian signers. The Italians had to stay in groups of five and under escort of an American cadre soldier while off the island. Two groups of five each were granted passes each Sunday to visit the Quad Cities.

Of the 426 Italian signers assigned to Rock Island Arsenal only 15 were returned to prisoner-of-war status for disciplinary reasons. Several Quad City veterans associations protested against Italians being as-

signed to Rock Island Arsenal. They expressed concern for the safety of the community and what they considered the excessive liberties permitted the Italians. (24)

The arsenal commander explained to the public through the local news media the War Department's regulations and cited the good work record of the two Italian Service Units. The local criticism against the Italians diminished with time. On 22 September 1945, the Italian signers departed Rock Island on a special troop train to begin their journey back to Italy. (25)

One problem RIA had to cope with during the war was the scarcity of skilled labor. With men being called into uniform and private industry converting to war production, skilled craftsmen were difficult to find. Rock Island Arsenal sent announcements to 100 Midwest radio stations to broadcast its appeal for workers.

The RIA Apprenticeship School provided the answer to some of the arsenal's manpower needs. Unable to hire experienced skilled craftsmen, RIA expanded its program to train new ones. On 5 January 1942, the Apprenticeship School enrolled twenty-five additional students, bringing school membership to eighty-four. (26) In addition, hundreds of workers undertook in-service training which would lead to machine operator jobs and other positions in the factory.

In 1942 construction continued on Building 299, the construction of Buildings 208 and 390 began, and the forge shop, Building 222, was completed. Building 208 was designed as a new assembly and repair shop for heavy artillery, tanks, and combat vehicles. Building 390 was built as the post headquarters.

In 1922 the old headquarters was moved from Building 360 to the manufacturing area as part of the peacetime consolidation of operations and facilities. During the 1930s Building 360 was converted to officers' family quarters.

The war brought great quantities of new machine tools which replaced old, worn out, and obsolete machines in shops. A total of 946 new machines was installed in the various shops during 1942. (27) All the RIA departments were geared up for high production. Many representatives of private industry visited RIA in 1942 to receive instructions on how to manufacture machine guns, recoil mechanisms, gun carriages, and tanks.

American industry made an all-out effort to provide the troops on the front line with high quality weapons and equipment. The U.S. Army's search for new technology included joint ventures with the British, soliciting cooperative efforts from U.S. Army arsenals, such as Rock Island, and American private industry. Cloaked in secrecy, these special projects explored a wide gamut of possibilities, some practical and some not.

The Canal Defense Lights project was one such venture that was developed and produced in large quantities in the United States but barely used overseas. However, the project is an example of America's "shotgun" approach to providing every possible weapon for defense against the Axis Powers.

The Rock Island Arsenal performed final assembly on hundreds of Canal Defense Lights (CDLs), a high-intensity searchlight for night use on the battlefield. The United States produced nearly 500 CDL tanks, initially developed by the British, in 1943-44. The searchlight turret fit best on the U.S. M3 medium tank. To maintain secrecy about the project, the tanks were designated as "Leaflets" and the training program was referred to by the code name CASSOCK. (28)

The light was exposed through a vertical slot and could be opened and closed by an electric motor which produced a dazzling flicker. Color filters were inserted into the 13 million-candlepower beam which, when flickered, caused confusion among the enemy during night assaults.

American Locomotive Company received the contract to remanufacture the M3 tank chassis to the CDL configuration. For security reasons they were labeled Shop Tractor T10. Press Steel Car Company built the turrets, and the Army Corps of Engineers procured the arc lamps from Mole-Richardson Company. Rock Island Arsenal conducted the final assembly under tight security in 1943-44. (29)

RIA manufactured both the water- and air-cooled .30-caliber Browning machine guns and metallic belt links and parts for .30-caliber machine guns, and overhauled and modified .50-caliber machine guns, machine gun tripods, mounts, and parts. The RIA Manufacturing Department's Small Arms Division produced 84,945 machine guns and manufactured 715,000 machine gun barrels of various models during World War II. (30)

The Small Arms Division produced nearly 2 million metallic belt links for .30- and .50-caliber machine guns during the war. The belt links replaced the cloth webbed belt used to feed ammunition into machine guns during World War I. Rock Island manufactured approximately 5 million metallic link belts since 1932. (31)

Rock Island Arsenal began development work on the .60-caliber machine gun, T117E3, in 1944. Also,

M2 tank production in the Shop M craneway, 1940

in February 1944 the overhaul of various types of tank transmissions was transferred from Building 60 to Building 208. In April 1944 preparations began in Building 250 for the manufacture of breech mechanisms for the 155-mm. M2 gun. The project required the complete remodeling of the machine court in Building 250 and the installation of approximately 116 new machine tools.

On 1 October 1944, Col. Carl A. Waldeman succeeded Brig. Gen. Norman F. Ramsey as RIA commander. General Ramsey assumed command of Springfield Armory following his tour of duty at Rock Island Arsenal.

Other major items of RIA production during World War II included 6,889 artillery carriages of various types, 24,539 recoil mechanisms for various artillery pieces, and 22,520 gun mounts for different models. In addition, the arsenal manufactured thousands of paracrates, parachests, paracaissions used for air transport of weapons and equipment.

Furthermore, RIA overhauled or modified approximately 1,000 artillery carriages, 109,073 machine guns, 133,435 .30-caliber rifles of various kinds, 9,281 .30-caliber carbines, 29,210 .45-caliber automatic pistols, 32,741 bayonets, 5,441 recoil mechanisms, 1,146 tanks and other motor vehicles, 5,297 tank engines, nearly 3,000 transmissions and differentials, 170,000 sighting and fire control instruments, and 60,000 miscellaneous leather items. Howitzers, mortars, ammunition trailers, equilibrators, tripod mounts, telescope mounts, rocket launchers, rifles, pistols, and trench tools were among the items overhauled, repaired, or modified at RIA during the war.

Additionally, RIA conducted research and development projects on artillery carriages, self-propelled carriages, 105-mm. recoilless gun carriages, half-tracks, transport wagons, light, medium, and flame-throwing tanks, armored car turrets, hydro-pneumatic recoil mechanisms, gun mounts for airplane armaments, mortar mounts, rocket launchers, .60-caliber machine guns, and paracrates. Also, RIA made discoveries and improvements on lubricants, greases, and rubberized products during the war that aided the shipment, preservation, and storage of ordnance weapons and equipment. (32)

One of RIA's contributions to the war effort was a new method of broaching (rifling) barrels for machine guns. The term rifling pertains to the machining of groves in a gun barrel which enhanced the rotation and stability of the fired round. During World War II Mr. William Baumbeck wrote an account of the RIA broaching operation for machine gun barrels. (33) In 1936 RIA Superintendent of Manufacturing Baumbeck started experimenting with a broaching method for rifling barrels. His trial tests showed that the process could be developed. In 1938 RIA sought funds to develop a broaching machine. Colonel Waldman, officer in charge of RIA shops, eventually obtained the sought-after funds.

Under the old method, the best production rate was approximately three barrels an hour per machine. Using the broaching method, RIA broached thirty-five barrels an hour per machine, each of which passed inspection. Rock Island Arsenal test fired 8,000 rounds through the broached barrels and Springfield Armory conducted the same test on 20 September 1940. Rock Island manufactured 1,000 barrels and conducted additional testing on the barrels which resulted in favorable comments.

In November 1940 the Ordnance Department accepted and authorized the broaching method to accelerate the machine gun production of private contractors and government arsenals. In April 1941 RIA received twelve sets of broaches and a broaching machine from Illinois Tool Works. The production was initially thirty-five per hour, with virtually no

rejects. The new broaching method enabled RIA to increase its machine gun production, and by 1 February 1943 the arsenal had 172,000 broach barrels.

The broaching method was not only successful but also economical to use. Only women operators were used on the broaching machine. The accuracy of the broach rifle barrel proved superior to the old hook tool method practiced by other manufacturers. The arsenal shared this expertise with private manufacturers, who soon adopted the Rock Island Arsenal broaching method. (34)

William Baumbeck, RIA's top civilian employee, was placed in charge of all RIA manufacturing activities on 6 May 1926. On 8 December 1943, Mr. Baumbeck received the War Department's "Emblem of Excellence of Service" from Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson in Washington, D.C. (35) He was one of only two recipients to receive the highest civilian award, presented annually for extraordinary service to the War Department. He served as Chief Superintendent of Production at RIA until 1948 and retired with forty-four years of government service. Lt. Gen. L. H. Campbell, Jr., Chief of Army Ordnance during World War II, paid tribute to Baumbeck in the book *The Industry-Ordnance Team.* He commented that:

Every Regular Ordnance officer has a deep personal affection for our six old line arsenals (only two remain today: Rock Island Arsenal and Watervliet Arsenal, NY) and their civilian personnel. Those of us who have known and served with such fine men as William Baumbeck, superintendent of RIA, cannot help feeling admiration and respect for these great craftsmen. We have studied in these arsenals, worked in their shops, and learned from master craftsmen the secrets of one of our most highly specialized professions in the world. (36)

William Baumbeck exemplified the "We Can Do It!" spirit of the Rock Island work force during World War II. This positive attitude was also displayed by arsenal employees during their off-duty hours. Arsenal workers formed a seventy-piece RIA band that performed at RIA functions and other events supporting the war effort. Volunteers also formed a fifty-member RIA Ladies Chorus and a thirty-member Mens Chorus. In addition, Rock Island employees organized a variety stage show for a benefit performance at the Capital Theater in Davenport, Iowa. Later, they performed the same show before wounded veterans in hospitals in Clinton, Iowa, and Galensburg, Illinois. The spirit of Rock Island Arsenal employees during World War II set a standard for future generations of arsenal personnel.

Before his retirement in 1948 William Baumbeck supervised the return of RIA to peacetime status. By January 1946 RIA employment had declined to 4,458 and by July 1947 still further to 2,469. Rock Island Arsenal along with the rest of American industry recorded war production unsurpassed in the history of the arsenal and the nation. Private industry converted back to producing automobiles, small appliances, office equipment, men's and women's garments, recreational equipment, and toys. But Rock Island Arsenal's smokestack continued to burn, only not as brightly as before. A "hot smokestack" ready to answer the call for emergency production, Rock Island Arsenal continued its role in peace as in war—as the arsenal of democracy. *Thomas J. Slattery is a historian at the U.S. Army Armament, Munitions, and Chemical Command in Rock Island and is the historian of the Rock Island Arsenal.*

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American Military University
A "Distance Learning" Enterprise

In August of this year the *Washington Post* prominently carried an article describing the growth in the number and variety of distance learning institutions in the United States. Correspondence courses by mail have long been a feature of continuing education, but the proliferation of personal computer modems and FAX machines has brought an expansion in the capabilities and course offerings of what is now known as distance learning.

In January 1993 American Military University, located in Virginia, will begin its first semester. This privately owned university offers a master of arts degree in military studies, using distance learning to connect students one-on-one with the military professionals, historians, and authors on the faculty. More than twenty-five courses are planned for the January semester, grouped into four areas of study: land warfare, naval warfare, aviation warfare, and combat support.

Interested readers can obtain further information, a catalog, and an application for admission by sending $5.00 to the American Military University, Office of Admissions, P.O. Box 587, Quantico, Virginia 22134-0587.

A.G. Fisch

A Pandemonium of Torture and Despair
The Capture of St. Charles & Explosion of the *Mound City*

Mark E. Hubbs

The Civil War moved quickly in the western theater during the spring of 1862. Maj. Gen. Earl Van Dorn and his Confederate army met defeat at Elkhorn Tavern, and the Confederacy lost Missouri. Van Dorn's adversary, Maj. Gen. Samuel R. Curtis, was marching triumphantly across northern Arkansas. A month after the defeat at Elkhorn, Confederate General Albert S. Johnston was killed and his army driven from the field of Shiloh. By early June Federal troops occupied Corinth, Mississippi, a vital supply depot and rail junction.

Events on the vital Mississippi River were also worsening for the Confederate cause. Admiral David Farragut's naval force captured New Orleans in late April. After a pitched gunboat battle early in June, Memphis fell into Union hands. Of the major defensive positions on the Mississippi, Confederate forces controlled only Helena, Vicksburg, and Port Hudson. The little gunboat battle at Memphis not only netted that city for the North, but also destroyed the Confederate Western Flotilla. Of the eight-ship fleet, only the *General Van Dorn* escaped destruction or capture. (1) After this battle on 6 June, only a few rebel gunboats were left to defend the Mississippi and its tributaries between Memphis and Baton Rouge.

The Army of the Southwest, which had routed the Southerners at Elkhorn Tavern, was moving east across northern Arkansas by early May. This army, under the command of General Curtis, began to slow down by the time it reached Batesville. Curtis had stretched his supply line too thin and now had to rely on a new "cracker line." He began to send urgent requests for equipment and supplies, while his army came to a halt in the Batesville and Jacksonport area.

Maj. Gen. Thomas C. Hindman, Confederate commander of the Trans-Mississippi Department, anticipated the fall of Memphis three days before it occurred. (2) He began a crash program to defend the White River. It was obvious to him that an effort to resupply Curtis must use this waterway. The point Hindman chose to defend the White River was St. Charles, eighty-eight miles north of the river's mouth. St. Charles was chosen because of its easily defended high bluffs, the first bluffs to appear above the point where the White River flows into the Arkansas River. The village itself was small, consisting of only a few small homes and businesses. (3) On 8 June, the Confederate gunboat *Ponchartrain* arrived at St. Charles, bringing with it two 32-pounder cannons for the defenses of the town. (4)

By order of General Hindman, Lt. J. W. Dunnington of the *Ponchartrain* began building fortifications. The crew placed the huge weapons two hundred feet from the shore and seventy-five feet above the water. (5) The guns were not only on high ground, but also on a strategic bend in the river. This afforded a sweeping angle of fire both up and down the river. The guns themselves were hidden from view by dense undergrowth and trees.

Many of the local citizens began to leave the village when the sailors told them that a fight was expected. Lieutenant Dunnington was boarded with one of the citizens who did not plan to leave, Mrs. Mary S. Patrick. She wrote in her diary, "Many families have moved some miles from town.... I conclude to wait and face the foe, if they come." (6)

Mrs. Patrick and her family evidently became close friends with Lieutenant Dunnington. She recalls:

> Capt. [*sic*] D. took daughter and I to see the battery-while Capt. Smith was drilling the gunners. The big guns were tried and Capt. D. explained the manners of shooting etc....The Capt. is intelligent, interesting, and gallant. We enjoyed his explanations. Truly these are formidable weapons. I hope that we may not have to use them. (7)

As the fortifications were nearing completion, Dunnington left a small force at St. Charles and departed for Little Rock for additional men and equipment.

While Lieutenant Dunnington was busy at St. Charles, preparations of a different kind were made at Memphis. Flag Officer C. H. Davis, the commander of the Western Flotilla, informed Washington on 10 June of plans for an expedition up the White River. He planned this expedition for two purposes: first, and most important, to open communications with General Curtis; and second, to clear the White River of any remaining rebel gunboats. This expedition was delayed until 13 June, while repairs were being made and provisions put on board. Three ironclads set sail that

Monument to both sides during the engagement at St. Charles, listing all the casualties

morning: the *Mound City*, the *St. Louis*, and the *Lexington*.

The next morning the remainder of the small fleet, delayed even longer, left Memphis. These were the gunboat *Conestoga*, the transport *New National*, which carried the 46th Indiana Infantry, and the transport *White Cloud*, containing provisions for Curtis' army. Two tugs towing coal barges brought up the rear. Col. Graham N. Fitch of the 46th Indiana Infantry was in overall command of the expedition.

The *Conestoga* and transports caught up with the first half of the fleet at a place called the Arkansas cutoff, where the Arkansas and the White Rivers converge before emptying into the Mississippi. It was there that the Federals met their first opposition. Apparently with little effort, the *Mound City* captured the rebel steamer *Clara Dolsen*. The commander of the *Mound City*, Capt. A. H. Kilty, sent the ship back to Memphis as a prize of war. The Confederates had also attempted to block the river by sinking wet timber in the channel. With the protection of the Indiana infantry, the sailors quickly removed the obstacles.

The fleet left the Arkansas cutoff the morning of 16 June and moved cautiously up the river. By dusk it had reached a point five miles below St. Charles. The fleet laid anchor for the night. At daylight the following morning the big guns would be tested at St. Charles. (8)

The Union fleet was not aware that there was so little to resist it on the White River. When the Confederate gunboat *Ponchartrain* left for Little Rock with Lieutenant Dunnington, only one Southern ship of war was left on the White River. This boat, the *Maurepas*, as well as the *Ponchartrain*, was part of a six-boat fleet purchased in New Orleans at the beginning of the war. These wooden steamers had little protection except for their iron plating around the bow and engine. (9) The *Maurepas* had proven quite formidable in its short career. The commander of this vessel was Capt. Joseph Fry, formerly of the United States Navy. He proved to be an able leader on the White River. In late May the *Maurepas* was operating on the river as far as Jacksonport, Arkansas. In fact, at one point the steamer and its crew of less than forty actually captured this little river port. The 9th Illinois Cavalry, which was protecting Jacksonport, fled after only ten shots were fired from the *Maurepas*—apparently believing that a larger land force had accompanied the gunboat. The crew, with the help of some citizens, destroyed large amounts of cotton and sugar. Much more could have been destroyed, but Fry set sail when it was feared his vessel would be stranded because of falling water levels in the river. (10)

On 15 June the *Maurepas* reached St. Charles. As the senior officer present, Captain Fry immediately took command and began unloading his stores in the fortifications. (11) Soon after the *Maurepas*, another group of Southerners arrived, thirty-five infantrymen commanded by Capt. A. M. Williams of the Confederate Engineers. These men were detailed from five companies of the 37th Arkansas Infantry. (12) The remainder of the 37th Arkansas had also been sent by General Hindman, but it was waiting in Devalls Bluff a few miles upstream, while its powder was being processed into cartridges. On the day of the ensuing battle, this regiment advanced within ten miles of St. Charles before the battle was decided. (13)

Lieutenant Dunnington finally returned to St. Charles from Little Rock. Dunnington made the trip overland, leaving the *Ponchartrain* to be repaired. He brought with him two ten-pound Parrot rifles he had found in the arsenal at Little Rock. These two weapons would help, but it would take much more to stop the Union forces. By the afternoon of the 16th, smoke from the Federal fleet could be seen rising from the river five miles below. It was obvious to Fry that the wooden gunboat *Maurepas* would be useless against the ironclads he had to face. Fry decided to scuttle the *Maurepas* in an effort to block the river channel. Fry ordered the gunboat along with two small steamers, the *Eliza G.* and the *Mary Thompson*, sunk in line across

the river. This was a difficult process, for there was no ballast to ensure the ships would not shift position while sinking in the current. It took the entire night to scuttle the three vessels. On the night of 16 June, Captain Fry organized his defenses. Lieutenant Dunnington commanded the 35-man crew of the *Ponchartrain* in the upper battery, which consisted of the two 32-pounder rifles. Midshipman F. M. Roby took command of the crew of the *Maurepas*, about forty men, and four field guns in the lower battery. This battery was 400 yards downriver from the upper one. It included two Parrot rifles from Little Rock, a 10-pound Parrot rifle from the *Ponchartrain*, and a 12-pound howitzer from the *Maurepas*. Captain Williams' men were detailed as sharpshooters below the lower battery. The Confederate troops bedded down as close as possible to their guns on the evening of the 16th for the expected attack the following morning. (14)

By daylight the next morning, people were already active in St. Charles, and the Union fleet had gotten up steam and started upriver. It proceeded in the following order: *Mound City*, *St. Louis*, *Lexington*, *Conestoga*, and transports. (15) The lead boat, the *Mound City*, seemed prone to misfortune. The *Mound City* and the *St. Louis* were two of seven boats constructed on contract by the James B. Eads Company of St. Louis, Missouri. All of these vessels were basically the same, each with a long, low profile and medium armor. Two weeks earlier the *Mound City* had received heavy damage at Ft. Pillow. The crew had no way of knowing that their ship was destined for more bad luck. (16)

The Federals moved slowly up the river. Shortly after 0900, the *Mound City* encountered a squad of Williams' infantry two miles below the main fortifications. The giant guns on board the vessel began belching grape shot and shell onto the riverbank, opening the battle of St. Charles. (17)

At 0800, before the Federal fleet had arrived, Mrs. Mary Patrick invited the Confederate officers for breakfast. Most of the officers declined so they could stay near their guns, but several, including Midshipman Roby and Captain Smith, found the offer too tempting. Mrs. Patrick recalled the interrupted breakfast in her diary:

> We had just been seated a few moments when the loud booming of cannon startled Leut. Roby and others.... Another loud boom and the ball came whizzing over my house and fell in the stable yard. Another and another. Close enough to be distinctly heard as they passed through the air. (18)

The officers left the Patrick dining room and ran the 300 yards back to the lower battery. Mrs. Patrick, who had been so determined to stay, used her better judgment and made hasty preparations to leave.

> Poor Nellie; so frightened. I went to the buggy with her... she looked whiter than I thought her Mullater face could be made. We drove rapidly out of town. Had to stop once or twice to avoid branches cut by the fierce cannon balls. (19)

It did not take long for the giant shells to drive the tiny squad of infantry away from the riverbank. As the Confederate sharpshooters pulled back, the steamer *New National* hove to shore two and one-half miles below the main battery and began unloading the 46th Indiana Infantry. The Union regiment was soon advancing cautiously, driving the rebel skirmishers back towards the village. (20)

As the *New National* was unloading its cargo of infantrymen, the ironclad came abreast of the lower battery. A brisk but ineffective artillery duel began between the lead boats and Midshipman Roby's battery. The firing had been going on for thirty minutes when skirmishers of the 46th reached the home of Mrs. Patrick. Here Williams and his men were attempting to make a stand. (21)

Colonel Fitch knew his men were but a few hundred yards from their destination and had received only slight casualties, but he paused. He had an unreasonable fear for the safety of his troops as they faced the heavy guns. The 32-pounders actually posed little threat to his scattered troops. Fitch notified Captain Kilty of the *Mound City* that he had the option of

One of the two 32-pounders recovered from the White River

allowing the infantry to charge the batteries or of steaming ahead, locating the main battery, and silencing it with the gunboats. Unfortunately for the men of the *Mound City*, Kilty chose the latter. (22)

The fleet disengaged itself from the lower battery and steamed ahead. The gunners were ignorant of the location of the rebel guns until the first one opened an accurate fire on the *Mound City*. Now Kilty made a deadly mistake. He sailed on, and by doing so placed his boat between and below the rifled guns. This put him in point-blank range of both weapons. (23)

On the third shot of the number two gun, Lieutenant Dunnington stepped up and personally sighted and fired the weapon. The solid iron projectile penetrated the forward casemate of the *Mound City*. Three seamen were killed in its flight before it passed through a bulkhead and punctured the boiler and steam chest. Instantly the entire vessel was filled with scalding steam. All those who were not immediately killed or seriously injured began pouring out of the gun ports into the river. A correspondent for *Harper's Weekly* reported:

The gundeck was covered with miserable, perishing wretches: Some of the officers who were in their cabins rushed out frantic with pain, to fall beside some poor though fortunate fellow who had just breathed his last. The close burning atmosphere of the vessel was rent with cries, and prayers, and groans, and curses--a pandemonium of torture and despair.

They suffered, writhed, and twisted like coils of serpents over burning fagots; but many who were less injured than others, felt even in that hour the instinct of self-preservation, and, running to the ports, leaped into the river. The water, for a while, relieved them of their pain, and they struck out bravely for the shore opposite the fortifications, or for the *Conestoga* or the *Lexington*, perhaps a half mile in the river. (24)

All those capable of controlling the ironclad had jumped overboard, and the ship drifted helplessly to shore between the upper and the lower battery. The river was filled with struggling men. Boats from all the vessels were in the water in a matter of minutes, picking up the wounded as the *St. Louis* and *Lexington* engaged the battery.

The *Conestoga* came to the aid of the *Mound City*. Mr. Dominy of the disabled vessel was standing on the stern crying out, "Come and tow me down; we are all lost, we are all lost!" The *Conestoga* hooked on and towed her out of the engagement. (25)

Captain Williams saw the sailors jump off the disabled *Mound City* and ordered the remaining sharpshooters to the riverbank to fire on the struggling men. It was reported that many were shot and killed in the water. This is doubtful, however, since most of the sharpshooters were armed with smooth-bore muskets—a weapon accurate only at short range. Through the years Captain Fry has been accused by both Northern and Southern sources of giving the order to fire on these men, but Williams alone was guilty of what was then considered a great atrocity. (26)

The men of the 46th Indiana were anxious to make their assault on the rebel works. When learning of the catastrophe on the *Mound City*, Colonel Fitch directed all the other vessels to fall back, fearing that they might suffer the same fate. Fitch then gave the order and his men began to do what the Navy could not. In five minutes the infantry overran the lower battery and started to climb the bluff to the main battery. (27)

Captain Williams and his remaining troops, along with the crew of the *Maurepas*, fell back to the main battery only a few seconds ahead of the Federals. Captain Fry realized that the situation was hopeless. The enemy outnumbered them ten to one and was advancing on two sides. Just as he gave the order to retreat, Federal troops broke over the hill fifty yards distant and poured a galling volley of musketry into the fleeing rebels. Captain Fry himself was severely wounded in the shoulder. The rest of the men scattered, the officers bringing up the rear. A half-mile gauntlet of fire had to be run before the retreating Southerners could disperse into the forest. (28) An officer in Colonel Fitch's command hailed Lieutenant Shirk of the *Lexington* and said, "We have the Battery!" (29)

Mrs. Patrick received the news of the battle's end around 1100. She and her family started back to town in hopes of helping the wounded, both friends and foe.

First was a Federal—a sailor—lying under the gin shed--we hurried Charlie off for water for him—poor fellow so thirsty—another and another claimed our care and sympathy—most of them Feds. Only three Confederate army... One man or rather a youth lay dead close to the front door of the spacious hall with musket in hand.

Mary Patrick returned to her home to find it completely looted and vandalized by the Union soldiers.

It had been broken open—everything of value had been taken away...books lay around the gallery with holes through them made by the bayonet. A large mirror bore the marks of the same weapon. Feather

beds were emptied on the upper hall floor and suppose they needed large sacks to a carry off their plunders and needed the bed ticks for that purpose. (30)

The 46th Indiana Infantry was lucky. It received no serious casualties when it stormed the works at St. Charles. Confederate casualties were also light. Reports are incomplete, but it appears that 8 were killed and 24 wounded and captured, among them Captain Joseph Fry. It was a completely different situation aboard the *Mound City*. Of a crew of 175 officers and men, 82 were killed in the casemate, 43 were killed or drowned in the river, and 25 were severely wounded, among them Captain Kilty. Only 3 officers and 22 men escaped uninjured or with only slight scalding.

The wounded and prisoners, along with four small captured guns, were loaded aboard the *Conestoga* and taken to Memphis. The other ships remained in St. Charles, their crews destroying fortifications and burying the dead. The two large 32-pounders were spiked and rolled into the river.

The *Conestoga* returned to St. Charles on 20 June. With it came additional troops and boilermakers to repair the *Mound City*. Soon the fleet was moving north, easily passing through the wreck of the *Maurepas*. (31) Because of the low water level, Des Arc was as far as the Federal expedition would travel. This was still seventy miles short of the intended destination of Jacksonport. Communications with General Curtis were opened overland from Des Arc.

The battle of St. Charles was a limited Union success. After opening communications with his superiors in Memphis, Curtis was able to progress through eastern Arkansas and eventually to Helena on 13 July 1862. The real value of the White River was not realized until higher water levels permitted more efficient navigation. Occupied ports on the river, such as Des Arc and Devalls Bluff, were essential in later stages of the war as supply bases for the Union Army. With east Arkansas in Union hands and the White River undefended, Maj. Gen. Frederick Steele and his army of 20,000 easily captured Little Rock on 10 September 1863.

Capt. Mark E. Hubbs is an Infantry officer. Assigned to Readiness Group Redstone in Huntsville, Alabama, he currently is attending the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare School.

Notes

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13. Glenn, "The Battle of St. Charles," p. 1.
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18. Patrick Diary, 17 Jun 1862.
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23. *Official Records/Armies*, 13:929.
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The NCO and the Military History Detachment

Michael R. Fischer and Raymond A. Mentzer

The noncommissioned officer (NCO) clearly plays a vital role in the accomplishment of the unit mission. NCO leadership has traditionally been crucial to the proper operation of company-size combat and combat support units. Infantry or engineer companies, for example, simply could not function without squad/section leaders, platoon sergeants, and a first sergeant. By the same token, the substantial contribution which the NCO makes to smaller, highly specialized units, such as the military history detachment (MHD), can sometimes be underestimated or overlooked altogether. The issue is surely worth reviewing, and the experiences of the 50th Military History Detachment, Bozeman, Montana, while on active duty for training, overseas deployment for training, and most recently in the Persian Gulf provide a convenient backdrop for the discussion.

The reserve MHD, currently staffed with a major, staff sergeant, and a specialist, depends upon its NCOs in a more immediate and continuing fashion than many larger units. The major/commander naturally sets out the mission and provides ongoing guidance toward its successful performance and completion. He or she works closely with the NCOs, primarily with the staff sergeant, in the actual conduct of the mission. Given its size and configuration, the MHD invites and requires a cooperative relationship among its members. Indeed, the structural and operational nature of the MHD serves to reinforce the role of the NCO.

The NCO often provides the essential continuity within the MHD. The demands of the reserve system create a constant turnover among the commanders and generally discourage them from anything more than a three-year tenure. Under these circumstances, the sergeant is likely to have the greatest experience with the particular unit. Coupled with this is the fact that in reserve MHDs, over the past fifteen years or so, the NCOs have been as likely as the commanding officer to have some background in history. From a practical standpoint, the most successful units are those with experienced trained personnel and low rates of turnover. When the NCO brings a measure of expertise to the position and then reinforces it by acquiring, over time, a thorough familiarity with the specific unit and its mission, the Army's military history program as well as the individual commander cannot help but benefit.

A seasoned NCO, familiar with the requirements of military history and knowledgeable in general military organization and procedure, plays a substantial role in structuring as well as executing an individual mission. During August 1986 and again in August 1987, the 50th MHD deployed to the Republic of Panama and there assisted the U.S. Southern Command in developing a command historical program. The deputy chief of staff, the unit's host and liaison, provided general guidance, detailing command problems with the proper retention of historically significant data and outlining its needs for ready access to such documents and materials.

The mission was far more than a training exercise; it centered on a very real "information management" problem and called for something more that the "school solution." Moreover, Southern Command, while fully cognizant of the inadequacies in its existing historical program, was reluctant to establish overly specific mission guidelines, lest they misdirect or distort the effort. The 50th MHD appreciated the latitude which it was given in formulating and carrying out the task. The commander was new to his position, but the NCOs had long been members of the unit. They had a strong sense of military history's role and were well versed in the specifics of historical research and writing. Together, under the commander's leadership, the unit members formulated a plan to survey the various elements in the command, assess the information, and formulate recommendations. The NCOs helped to design the unit's approach to the problem and proved especially adept in resolving certain practical aspects of the task. Who in command should be contacted? What questions might be asked of them? What type of documents and records ought to be identified and where in the command would they likely be located? What are the salient features of a command historical program? How should it be organized?

Another aspect of the NCO's contribution, one more closely related to rank than those already touched upon, is his or her ready rapport with other NCOs. Sergeants at every level are often uncomfortable speaking with field grade officers or, at the very least, feel

obligated to respond "officially" to the various queries put their way. NCOs tend to be less formal—hence more informative and helpful—when working among themselves. The 50th MHD's participation in Operation DESERT STORM confirmed this assessment.

The detachment deployed to the Persian Gulf in January 1991 and remained there until mid-May. It worked with the U.S. VII Corps, operating in northeastern Saudi Arabia and southern Iraq. The unit NCO in charge (NCOIC) established contact, almost fortuitously, with several other senior noncommissioned officers in the VII Corps inspector general's office. The latter, sympathizing with the plight of a fellow NCO, were able to provide essential practical help. They worked together toward the resolution of logistical problems, suggested points of contact, and offered background information on corps activities.

Coupled to this handy and well-received assistance was the NCO's perspective on operation planning and execution. The MHD risks viewing a military operation exclusively from the command and staff level. Either the detachment commander or the NCOIC, for instance, normally attended the daily briefings given to the VII Corps commanding general. The experience proved invaluable. Still, the perceptions of veteran NCOs were useful in balancing the overarching generalities that occasionally emanate from staff briefings. Senior noncommissioned officers can frequently place matters in closer perspective.

This rapport within the ranks also can affect other aspects of the mission. Most record keeping, to use an obvious example, is done by NCOs. During Operation DESERT STORM, the 50th MHD visited the various staff sections at VII Corps to advise and assist in the retention and disposition of documents having historical value. The commander generally made the initial introductions; afterwards the particulars became "NCO business." The design was simple. NCOs, as previously noted, are sometimes ill at ease with officers and, not surprisingly, more inclined to lend support to another NCO. This familiar and beneficial NCO association extends to simple material support. When the unit in the middle of the Saudi desert needed electricity for its tent, it was the NCOIC who had the necessary contacts. Later, after the preliminary ceasefire, the detachment decided to move to hardened quarters. The decision resulted in part from the need to find a dust-free environment to prepare computer transcriptions of the many oral interviews the commander and the NCO had conducted in the field. Again, it was the NCOIC who took the lead in successfully "negotiating" the move.

These observations may not exhaust the list of possibilities for the NCO's role in the reserve MHD. They do, however, point up the obvious principal contributions. Experienced, trained, and resourceful NCOs must be retained. Serious consideration should be given to upgrading the NCO position in the reserve detachments to E-7 and E-5. Not only would it encourage capable NCOs to remain with the military history detachments, but would provide them with the rank necessary to coordinate with senior NCOs and officers. Members of the MHD, whether officers or NCOs, routinely must work with field grade rather than company grade officers. Additional rank would make it easier to establish credibility and would allow for a freer flow of information. Improving the NCO position would both be an incentive to retention and a pragmatic boost toward the completion of the detachment's mission. At the same time, the creation of Individual Mobilization Augmentee (IMA) positions for senior NCOs at the Center of Military History as well as at the various corps, army, and theater headquarters would place proficient and trained persons in a position to assist immediately in the event of future contingencies. Qualified, experienced NCOs are especially valued, and they ought to be kept. NCOs and the leadership they provide are critical to the ongoing success of the MHDs and the overall historical effort within the U.S. Army.

S. Sgt. Michael R. Fischer and S. Sgt. Raymond A. Mentzer between them have thirty-five years of service as MHD NCOs. During their tenure with the 50th MHD, the unit has received numerous Department of the Army Superior Unit Awards and four Sixth Army Excellence in Training Awards. Raymond Mentzer is professor of history at the Montana State University, and Michael Fischer teaches in the Montana secondary school system.

Dr. Brooks Kleber's excellent review of John Colby's *War From the Ground Up: The 90th Division in World War II* (*Army History*, No. 23) did not include specific ordering information. Interested readers should contact Eakin Press in Austin, Texas. Phone (800) 880-8642. The book costs $29.95, plus $1.91 for shipping and handling.

A. G. Fisch

1942

October - December

3 Oct - The Navy Department announces that U.S. Army forces have been convoyed to the Aleutians to occupy positions in the Andreanof Islands.

10 Oct - The Justice Department announces that the country's 600,000 Italian-Americans will no longer be regarded as enemy aliens.

12 Oct - In a radio address to the nation, President Franklin D. Roosevelt says that the draft will have to be expanded to include 18- and 19-year-old men.

13 Oct - The first U.S. Army ground forces on Guadalcanal—the 164th Infantry of the Americal Division—arrive on the island and go into action. This was the first U.S. Army unit to conduct an offensive operation against the enemy in any theater.

14 Oct - Advocating the lowering of the draft age to eighteen, Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson testifies before the House Military Affairs Committee that the Army intends to expand to 7.5 million men (including Air Forces personnel) by the end of 1943.

15 Oct - The 13th Armored Division is activated at Camp Beale, California. The 84th Infantry Division (Organized Reserves) is ordered into active military service at Camp Howze, Texas. The 92d Infantry Division is activated at Fort McClellan, Alabama.

19 Oct - In response to a request by Lt. Gen. Joseph W. Stilwell, chief of the U.S. Task Force in China, the War Department agrees to provide the necessary equipment to expand the Chinese Army by an additional thirty divisions, for a total of sixty American-equipped Chinese divisions.

22 Oct - A convoy of cargo vessels for the North African invasion sails from Great Britain.

23 Oct - Elements of the North African invasion force sail from Hampton Roads, Virginia.

- The 43d Infantry Division arrives in New Zealand.

24-26 Oct - Elements of the 164th Infantry help repulse determined nighttime attacks by Japanese infantry on Guadalcanal.

25 Oct - Carriers loaded with aircraft for the invasion of North Africa sail from Bermuda.

- The 1,523-mile pioneer road from Dawson Creek, British Columbia, to Fairbanks, Alaska, is completed and enters service as a supply route. Over the next year this primitive road is developed into the permanent, all-weather Alaska Highway.

26 Oct - A troop convoy for the North African invasion sails from Britain.

- 172d Infantry, 43d Division, arrives at Espiritu Santo, New Hebrides.

30 Oct - General George C. Marshall announces that 800,000 Americans are serving overseas.

31 Oct - Approximately 7,000 U.S. troops, including 175 Army nurses, arrive in Egypt.

2 Nov - *Stars and Stripes* expands to daily publication. It is the Army's first daily paper.

5 Nov - Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson announces the creation of the Legion of Merit, to be awarded to individuals for exceptionally meritorious conduct in the performance of outstanding services.

7 Nov - The War Department announces that Lt. Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower is commander in chief of the Allied forces invading North Africa.

8 Nov - Elements of six U.S. divisions and numerous attached units participate in Operation TORCH, the Allied invasion of Algeria and Morocco. Algiers is captured despite French resistance.

- Vichy France breaks off diplomatic relations with the United States.

9 Nov - Maj. Gen. George S. Patton, Jr., assumes command of the ground forces in Morocco.

Chronology

10 Nov - The Algerian port of Oran falls to American troops after moderate resistance by the French defenders.

11 Nov - In response to an order given the previous day by Vichy French Admiral Francois Darlan, French forces end all resistance in North Africa by 0700.

- The 3d Infantry Division enters Casablanca at 0730.

- Germany invades unoccupied France, citing the Vichy government's inability to defend itself against the United States and Britain as cause for the nullification of the Franco-German armistice.

12 Nov - The 182d Regimental Combat Team arrives on Guadalcanal.

13 Nov - General Eisenhower arrives in Algiers to confer with Admiral Darlan, who commits French forces in North Africa to the Allied cause.

- President Roosevelt signs a bill lowering the draft age from twenty to eighteen years of age.

15 Nov - The 14th Armored Division is activated at Camp Chaffee, Arkansas. Three divisions in the Organized Reserves are ordered into active military service: the 99th Infantry Division at Camp Van Dorn, Mississippi; the 100th Infantry Division at Fort Jackson, South Carolina; and the 103d Infantry Division at Camp Claiborne, Louisiana.

23 Nov - The War Department announces that the Army has lost 350 killed, 900 wounded, and 350 missing in the fighting in North Africa.

30 Nov - IX Corps maneuvers open in Louisiana for the 86th and 87th Infantry Divisions.

1 Dec - IV Armored Corps maneuvers commence at the Desert Training Center in California. The 4th and 6th Armored Divisions and the 6th Infantry Division take part in the maneuvers, which run through 22 February 1943.

3 Dec - Faid Pass in Tunisia is captured by U.S. and French troops.

9 Dec - Lt. Gen. Alexander M. Patch, commander of the Americal Division, takes over responsibility for Guadalcanal from Lt. Gen. Alexander A. Vandegrift, 1st Marine Division commander.

11 Dec - U.S. troops arrive in Iraq and Iran.

15 Dec - Two divisions in the Organized Reserves are ordered into active military service: the 86th Infantry Division at Camp Howze, Texas, and the 87th Infantry Division at Camp McCain, Mississippi.

17 Dec - Lead elements of the 25th Infantry Division arrive on Guadalcanal.

19 Dec - Secretary of War Stimson announces that an infantry battalion consisting of Austrian aliens will be raised in the U.S. Army. The unit, the 101st Infantry Battalion, is activated on 15 December 1942. (Unfortunately, the War Department accepted an offer by Archduke Otto of Hapsburg-Lorraine, a proponent of the monarchist faction of Austrian politics and aspirant to the Austrian throne, to assist in the recruiting drive. Although the War Department repeatedly explained that Archduke Otto was not officially connected with the Austrian battalion, the democratically oriented majority of Austrian aliens in the United States refused to volunteer for service in a "monarchist" unit. To bring the unit up to strength, it was decided to assign all Austrian aliens volunteering for service in the U.S. Army to the 101st Infantry Battalion. The result was a unit of men who were resentful and of low morale. Eventually these men were allowed to choose the Army unit to which they wished to be assigned; on 7 June 1943, the 101st Infantry Battalion was quietly disbanded.)

This chronology is the latest in our series of World War II chronologies compiled by Mr. Edward N. Bedessem of the Center's Historical Services Division.

Using the Staff Ride To Train Junior Leaders at West Point

Timothy R. Reese

"Good military leaders understand history. Leadership without a sense of history can only be instinctive, and thereby limited in its scope." (1) "History shapes the vision of the skilled commander. Nowhere is this close connection between history and training more apparent than in the staff ride." (2) These comments by Generals John R. Galvin and Carl E. Vuono were perceptive several years ago and are even more appropriate for today's Army.

The study of military history found its modern emphasis in the German military historian and theorist Carl von Clausewitz. The Prussian General Helmut von Moltke made the staff ride his primary teaching tool for the German General Staff in the mid-nineteenth century. An appreciation of the staff ride's value was reborn in our own Army during the 1980s. Today, the Department of History at the United States Military Academy is using history and the staff ride to train future generations of Army officers.

As part of the Academy's Individual Advanced Development (IAD) program, the European Division of the Department of History sponsors a battlefield staff ride to Europe in June of each year. The staff ride, called "Germany Attacks," gives cadets majoring in history an opportunity to study in depth the 1940 German attack on France and the German winter attack of December 1944 in the Ardennes—the Battle of the Bulge. The cadets strengthen their historical research, writing, and briefing skills; gain an appreciation for the military use of terrain; deepen their understanding of military and European history; and experience at least three different cultures during the staff ride. Instructors from the department who have studied the campaigns extensively and have visited the areas numerous times lead eighteen cadets on the two-week-long staff ride. The staff ride is one of the many enrichment programs that go beyond the Academy's baseline requirements; cadets must forgo some summer leave to participate, but cadet interest and motivation are high nonetheless.

The first four days are devoted to classroom study, map preparation, battle analysis, and briefings. The next ten days are spent in Germany, France, and Belgium, walking and riding over the actual ground on which the campaigns were fought. Cadets are divided into three- or four-person groups, each group responsible for a particular phase of each campaign. Each group must study the campaign, prepare a staff ride manual, and brief the entire group on its study during the classroom phase of the program. The same groups then lead the discussion and terrain walk during the staff ride itself for the phase of the campaign on which they focused. The officers provide in-depth historical knowledge of the campaign and terrain, quality control, and technical and tactical expertise in staff ride techniques. By virtue of their Army experience the officers also bring the historical record into present-day focus for the cadets who will soon enter the Army. (3)

During the classroom phase of the staff ride cadets use Charles McDonald's *A Time for Trumpets* and Col. Robert Doughty's *The Breaking Point: Sedan and the Fall of France, 1940*, for their research. Other short historical books, articles, and after-action reports are used to supplement these books. Each cadet also assembles four sets of 1:50,000 and 1:250,000 military maps. These maps are used to follow the campaigns as research is done, to annotate specific aspects of the battles, to brief the entire staff ride group on the selected phase of the campaign, and to navigate to and around the battlefields in Europe. Cadets study the campaigns primarily from the German Army's perspective, although the Belgian, French, and American Armies' plans, preparations, and reactions are considered as well.

The officers provide the strategic and operational overview of each campaign during the preparation phase; cadets also examine the operational level of the campaign, but their focus is primarily upon the tactical level. Broad sweeping arrows of advance and division-size unit markers on a map are useful and necessary for the staff ride. These are not, however, the heart of this staff ride: the heart of this program is the historical study of leadership at the lowest tactical level. Particular emphasis is placed on understanding how and why small unit leaders and soldiers reacted the way they did. The study of the German invasion of France and the Battle of the Bulge is replete with examples of good and bad leadership at this level. Studying the tactically sound and courageous—as well as the sometimes

Cadets at the French battle monument on the south shoulder of the German breakout at Sedan

stupid and cowardly—actions of the sergeants, lieutenants, and captains who made those map symbols possible is a learning experience that simply cannot be provided in a classroom.

Upon their arrival in Europe, the cadets assume responsibility for conducting the staff ride. Three eight-passenger vans are used for the ride, with one officer leading each van. Route selection and navigation to and around the battlefield are done by cadets. Cadets are divided among the vans so that for each part of the campaign being studied, one subject matter expert from the classroom phase is in each van to lead a discussion en route and on the ground. The officers select stops that allow the group to dismount and walk the ground.

The daily schedule is intensive and begins with physical training. (Running along medieval castle roads at 0600 on a fog-shrouded morning is an experience that should not be missed!) The staff ride portion of the day usually runs from 0800 to 1700, with short briefings and/or planning sessions conducted each night.

The first portion of the staff ride focuses on the 10-15 May 1940 attack of the *XIX Panzer Corps*, consisting of the *1st, 2d,* and *10th Panzer Divisions*, and commanded by General Heinz Guderian. The offensive is divided into four phases, each the focus of a cadet staff group: the *XIX Corps*' attack through Luxembourg into Belgium and the defense of the Belgian and French screening forces; the drive across the Semois River and the rugged terrain between it and the Meuse River; the assault crossing and securing of a bridgehead across the Meuse against stiff French resistance; and finally the abortive French counterattacks upon the bridgehead and the breakout and exploitation of the *XIX Corps*.

The second portion of the staff ride focuses on the initial attack of the German Army on 16 December 1944 up to the high water mark of its advance into the "Bulge." The cadets break down into five groups, each again focusing on one phase of the battle: the attack of the *5th Panzer Army* and the American defense of the "Northern Shoulder"; the attack by and defeat of *Kampfgruppe Peiper*; the *6th Panzer Army*'s attack on the "Southern Shoulder" and the American defense of Bastogne; the combined attack into the Losheim Gap and the defense of St. Vith; and the exploitation of the German attacks beyond St. Vith, Bastogne, and nearly to the Meuse. Since the group provides its own expertise, there is no need for expensive tour guides. Transportation, meals, and lodging are the principal expenses of the trip. To help limit the costs, the Department of History has arranged for the use of a German Army *Kaserne* at Koblenz and a French officers club at Trier during the staff ride. Two inexpensive inns have supported the trip over the years and offer the department low group rates for meals and lodging—one in Boullion and one in Bullingen, Belgium, for the 1940 and 1944 campaigns respectively. The cadets "go native" for the entire trip, as no American facilities or guides are used. Besides the officers, the group usually contains a number of cadets who speak limited German or French.

The staff ride traverses sections of Europe that were fought over long before the battles of World War II, and several short stops are made along the way to study the Roman ruins in Trier, various ancient castles, a medieval monastery, and the capital of Charlemagne's ninth-century empire—Aachen. The officers provide historical expertise, giving cadets a better understanding of the complex and fascinating history of Europe.

Cadets benefit from the staff ride in both the short and the long term. Improved historical research, writing, and briefing skills, a deeper understanding of military and European history, and a knowledge of at least three different European cultures are all of tremendous value while they complete their education and training at the Military Academy. Cadets also learn the value of a staff ride, as well as how one is conducted—a skill in great demand out in the "real Army" they are longing to enter. They gain an appreciation for the military use of terrain, learn mounted

land navigation, and study military history and combat leadership under stress at many levels of command, all of which will be invaluable upon graduation and commissioning in the Army. As one of the cadets stated in a recent after-action review, "This trip really forced me to think about leadership in a way I hadn't done before. We were constantly asked, 'Now what would you do in this situation?' by the officers who led the trip."

The staff ride is frequently used by senior commanders and staffs, but as the Department of History at the United States Military Academy is proving, it is also well suited for future leaders while they are still developing the skills that will serve them and our Army for a lifetime.

Capt. Timothy R. Reese is an Armor officer who has served in units in the United States and overseas in Germany. Currently, he is an assistant professor of European history at the United States Military Academy, West Point, New York.

Notes

1. General John R. Galvin, "Army Leaders and Military History," *Army History* 13 (Fall 1989): 1.
2. General Carl E. Vuono, "The Staff Ride: Training for Warfighting," *The Army Historian* 12 (October 1988): 1.

Pentagon World War II Exhibit

The Turning Point: July-December 1942

As part of the commemoration of World War II, the Department of Defense is sponsoring a series of exhibits in the Pentagon. Each exhibit, prepared by one of the armed services, will have a six-month duration and highlight the role of the American war effort and all the military services during the time. The staff of the Museum Division, U.S. Army Center of Military History, prepared the current exhibit, "The Turning Point: July-December 1992," as well as the following background to the display.

The period July to December 1942 was the turning point in World War II. After initial defeat in the Pacific and on the European continent, the Allies rallied, began to stop Axis aggression, and started their own offensive actions in the Pacific, Europe, and North Africa.

The U.S. Navy, following the attack on Pearl Harbor and the loss of the Philippine Islands, began to turn the tide in the Allied favor at the Battles of the Coral Sea and Midway. As part of a larger effort to stop Japanese aggression, joint U.S. Army/Australian operations in New Guinea and Marine operations in Guadalcanal—supported by the Navy and Army Air Forces—began a counterthrust in 1942.

In western Europe, still recovering from the loss of the Continent, Allied operations were largely confined to organizing, training, and beginning the strategic bombing campaign against Europe. The Battle of Britain had been fought, and Adolf Hitler had turned his attention to the Russian front, while British and Canadian units launched commando raids in the prelude of a cross-Channel attack.

The American attack on northern Africa late in the year was our first major counterthrust against the Nazi and Fascist regimes. It provided relief for the Soviet Union, which was desperately fighting for survival, brought the French Army back into the war after its 1940 defeat, and began the destruction of Axis forces in North Africa. With the successful transporting and supplying of troops for the invasions, some directly from the United States, it was a striking example of interservice cooperation between the Army and the Navy.

This exhibit depicts the main themes of strategy and operations. The introductory section shows how World War II was fought as an Allied effort and as the result of an overall grand strategy, including the American home front as a supporting element. Preparing for the European invasion demonstrates this planning and balances the corresponding operational sections of fighting back in the Pacific and the invasion of Algeria and Morocco—Operation TORCH.

The Archaic Archivist

This installment of the Archaic Archivist *details the holdings of the U.S. Army Military History Institute that cover Army operations in the South Pacific and Southwest Pacific during 1942.*

The spring, summer, and fall of 1942 witnessed major operations in the Central, South, and Southwest Pacific. At the Battles of the Coral Sea and Midway, the U.S. Navy played the decisive role. As operations moved ashore into the islands of the Pacific and the East Indies, however, not only the sea service but also its Marine Corps and the U.S. Army became heavily involved for the rest of 1942 and into the next year.

The Army's participation is reflected in the holdings of the U.S. Army Military History Institute at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Researchers are reminded to check with the Institute's Reference and Special Collections Branches for printed and pictorial holdings, respectively. This column concentrates on manuscript holdings, which are in the Archives Branch.

Some of these papers cover early operations in New Guinea. Although the Allied victory at the Battle of the Coral Sea stopped the Japanese short of Australia, their continuing efforts to overrun all of Papua required the use of Army forces on that island. Papers gathered by several historians cover those operations. The Army Office of the Chief of Military History (OCMH) Collection includes a box on World War II in the Pacific; within that box are interviews with the following generals: Robert L. Eichelberger, Edwin F. Harding, and Albert W. Waldron. Also included are interviews with other senior commanders and staff officers elicited for the official Army history *Victory in Papua* by Samuel Milner. More papers on Harding appear in the collection of Prof. Leslie Anders, who wrote *Gentle Knight: The Life and Times of Major General Edwin Forrest Harding*. The Institute also holds two boxes of General Eichelberger's own papers, contributed by Dr. Jay Luvaas, who edited the general's correspondence with Mrs. Eichelberger. In addition to excerpts from the letters and diaries, these papers primarily consist of dictated recollections of the general's service in the Pacific.

A scholar who is not only a historian, but also a veteran of the 41st Infantry Division, Dr. Hargis Westerfield, has donated two boxes of his writings on that division's service in World War II, including the New Guinea campaigns. These writings draw upon his own experiences and those of his comrades and even upon accounts by opposing Japanese officers. The Westerfield Collection now forms part of the Military History Institute's ongoing World War II Survey initiative. That survey contains another box on the 41st (currently holding papers of five other soldiers) and also a box on the 32d Infantry Division (including material from sixteen soldiers).

Within the OCMH box previously mentioned is an interview with Maj. Bernd G. Baetcke, executive officer at 32d Division headquarters. In addition, the Baetcke Family Papers contain a box of his field notes, letters, and papers. Then, too, the oral history transcript of Lt. Gen. Jack C. Fuson covers his service as a lieutenant in the 532d Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment of the 2d Engineer Special Brigade, operating along the island coast in 1943.

After the 32d Division went back to Australia from New Guinea in February 1943, its new commander, Maj. Gen. William H. Gill, helped prepare it to return to the front. His oral history transcript covers the division's training in Queensland as well as its subsequent service. Training and critical logistical support in Australia also are reflected in two boxes in the Quartermaster Collection. One contains the historical reports of the chief quartermaster, Army Services of Supply, Southwest Pacific Theater, July 1942-June 1945; the other box holds a history of "Food Production in Australia and American Co-operation in Wartime (1941-1945)" by Kenneth R. Cramp, the historian of Base 7 of the Army Services of Supply.

Overseeing logistics in Australia at senior staff level was Brig. Gen. Richard Marshall. The three boxes of his papers focus on logistics and include historical reports on the Transportation Corps, Quartermaster, General Purchasing Agent, and Signal Section staff members—Guadalcanal is well represented in these papers. Particularly substantive for that campaign are two boxes of family letters and papers of Brig. Gen. (then Maj.) Ralph T. Noonan as a field officer of the 101st Quartermaster Regiment. A dozen more donations from veterans of that division have come in through the Institute's World War II Survey.

The survey also has elicited seven contributions from men of the 25th Infantry Division, which landed on Guadalcanal in December 1942 and January 1943.

Also from that division: a brief memoir of Lt. Col. Stewart Yeo of the 8th Field Artillery Battalion and the fuller oral history transcript of Lt. Gen. (then Maj.) Stanley Larsen of the 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry Regiment. An informative oral history transcript is also available on the division commander himself, Maj. Gen. J. Lawton Collins.

Yet another oral history transcript comes from Maj. Gen. William H. Arnold, who would later command the Americal Division, but who on Guadalcanal served on the XIV Corps staff. An even more senior officer, Lt. Gen. Millard F. Harmon, commanding U.S. Army Forces in the South Pacific, is represented by a box of letters and historical reports. The Harmon Papers are in the Pacific portion of the OCMH Collection. That collection also contains a box of draft writings and interviews with American and even Japanese officers assembled for the official Army history *Guadalcanal: The First Offensive*, by John Miller. In the OCMH Pacific box, moreover, is Admiral William F. Halsey's historical report of operations in the South Pacific Area, April 1942-June 1944, including Guadalcanal.

Key logistical support for these operations is documented in the papers of Col. Harold P. Henry, who served in the Western Pacific Base Command postwar. Although he was not on Guadalcanal during the fighting, his box of papers contains historical reports on that campaign submitted by the 525th Quartermaster Group and eight smaller quartermaster units.

Through logistics, command, and combat—as recorded in official documents, personal letters, diaries, memoirs, oral histories, and survey questionnaires—American Army service in the South Pacific and the Southwest Pacific in 1942 (and into 1943) is well covered in the manuscript holdings of the U.S. Army Military History Institute.

World War II Exhibitions and Collections

Beth F. MacKenzie

All Army museums address some aspect of the history of World War II. For instance, the Patton Museum of Cavalry and Armor at Fort Knox, Kentucky, illustrates the career of General George S. Patton and displays numerous armored vehicles, including several vintage tanks from the early 1940s. At the Fort Huachuca, Arizona, Museum, one exhibit emphasizes the fort's use as a World War II training base, while a special exhibition at the III Corps and Fort Hood, Texas, Museum commemorates the contributions of the unit and the post.

The facilities that comprise the Army Museum System represent very important sources for the study of military history, and it is likely that they will become increasingly important during the commemoration of the fiftieth anniversary of World War II. It is at these institutions that visitors can see the parachute of the first paratrooper to land in occupied France during the Normandy invasion, or find a completely restored CG-4A cargo glider (Pratt Museum, Fort Campbell, Kentucky), or learn about the elaborate coastal defenses that protected the entrance to the Chesapeake Bay (Casemate Museum, Fort Monroe, Virginia), or see memorabilia from Generals Omar Bradley, Douglas MacArthur, and Dwight D. Eisenhower (National Infantry Museum, Fort Benning, Georgia).

Many other military museums in the United States that are not part of the Army Museum System also have major exhibitions or large collections related to the history of World War II. These facilities range from small private museums to large state-operated institutions. Some are offering special exhibitions to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of the war, while others are permanently centered around a Second World War theme. The list below identifies some of the museums and how to get in touch with them.

National Park Service

USS *Arizona* Memorial
1 Arizona Memorial Drive
Honolulu, HI 96818
Telephone: (808) 422-2772
Hours of Operation: 0800-1600 daily, shuttle boat 0800-1500, closed Thanksgiving, Christmas, New Year's Day

War in the Pacific National Historical Park
Post Office Box FA
Agana, Guam 96910
Telephone: (671) 477-9362
Hours of Operation: 0730-1530 Mon-Fri, 0830-

1400 Sat-Sun, closed Thanksgiving, Christmas, New Year's Day

Non-Federal Military Museums and Collections

USS *Alabama* Battleship Memorial Park
Post Office Box 65
Mobile, Alabama 36601
Telephone: (205) 433-2703
Hours of Operation: 0800-1800 daily, closed Christmas

General Patton Memorial Museum
1 Chiriaco Road
Chiriaco Summit, California 92201
Telephone: (714) 877-5077
Hours of Operation: 0900-1700 daily, closed Thanksgiving, Christmas

American Society of Military History
American Heritage Park
1918 N. Rosemead Blvd.
El Monte, California 91733
Telephone: (818) 442-1776
Hours of Operation: 1000-1600 Mon-Fri, 1200-1630 Sat-Sun

Military Medal Museum and Research Center
448 North San Pedro Street
San Jose, California 95110
Telephone: (408) 298-1100
Hours of Operation: 1200-1700 Mon-Fri, 1000-1700 Sat, closed Sunday and all federal holidays

Military Museum of Southern New England
Post Office Box 2342
Danbury, Connecticut 06813
Telephone: (203) 790-9277
Hours of Operation: 1100-1600 Thu-Sun (summer), by appointment only (winter), closed 4 July

The Company of Military Historians HQ and Museum
North Main Street
Westbrook, Connecticut 06498
Telephone: (203) 399-9460
Hours of Operation: 0830-1600 Tue-Fri, Sat by appointment

Museum of the Militia National Guard
1 Massachusetts Ave, NW
Washington, DC 20001
Telephone: (202) 543-5692
Hours of Operation: not open to public, office manned--must call

The 1st Division Museum at Cantigny
1 South 151 Winfield Road
Wheaton, Illinois 60187
Telephone: (708) 668-5185
Hours of Operation: 1000-1700 Tue-Sun (summer), 1000-1600 (winter), Fri-Sun only (Feb), closed Thanksgiving, Christmas, New Year's Day

Tri-State University,
General Lewis B. Hershey Museum
Post Office Box 307
Angola, Indiana 46703
Telephone: (219) 665-4114
Hours of Operation: 0800-1700 Mon-Fri, 1300-1600 Sat-Sun, other times by appointment, closed national holidays

The PT Boat Museum
Battleship Cove
Fall River, Massachusetts 02720
Telephone: (901) 755-8440
Hours of Operation: 0900-1700 daily, closed Thanksgiving and Christmas

Mississippi Military Museum
Post Office Box 627
Jackson, Mississippi 39205
Telephone: (601) 354-7555
Hours of Operation: 0830-1630 Mon-Fri, closed all federal holidays

Soldiers' Memorial Military Museum
1315 Chestnut Street
St. Louis, Missouri 63103
Telephone: (314) 622-4550
Hours of Operation: 0900-1630 daily, closed Thanksgiving, Christmas, New Year's Day

Strategic Air Command Museum
2510 Clay Street
Bellevue, Nebraska 68005
Telephone: (402) 292-2001
Hours of Operation: 0800-2000 daily (summer), 0800-1700 daily (winter), closed Thanksgiving, Christmas, New Year's Day

Intrepid Sea-Air-Space Museum
46th Street and 12th Avenue
New York, New York 10036
Telephone: (212) 245-2533
Hours of Operation: 1000-1700 Wed-Sun, closed all holidays

USS *North Carolina* Battleship Memorial
Post Office Box 417
Wilmington, North Carolina 28402
Telephone: (919) 762-1829
Hours of Operation: 0800-1700 daily (winter), 0800-2000 daily (summer)

Pennsylvania Military Museum
Post Office Box 148
Boalsburg, Pennsylvania 16827
Telephone: (814) 466-6263
Hours of Operation: 0900-1700 Tue-Sat, 1200-1700 Sun, closed holidays

Citadel Museum and Archives
The Citadel
Charleston, South Carolina 29409
Telephone: (803) 792-6846
Hours of Operation: temporarily closed for reno vation, call for appointment, closed Christmas and New Year's Day

Battleship *South Dakota* Museum
600 East 7th Street
Sioux Falls, South Dakota 57103
Telephone: (605) 339-7060
Hours of Operation: 1000-1700 daily (Memorial Day-Labor Day)

Admiral Nimitz State Historical Park
Post Office Box 777
Fredricksburg, Texas 78624
Telephone: (512) 997-4379
Hours of Operation: 0800-1700 daily

Battleship *Texas* State Historical Park
3527 Battleground Road
La Porte, Texas 77571
Telephone: (713) 479-2411
Hours of Operation: 1000-1700 daily (winter), 1000-1800 daily (summer)

George C. Marshall Research Foundation
Post Office Box 1600
Lexington, Virginia 24450
Telephone: (703) 463-7103
Hours of Operation: 0900-1700 Mon-Sat, 1400-1700 Sun (Mar-Nov), 0900-1600 Mon-Sat, 1400-1600 Sun (Dec-Feb)

Virginia Military Institute Museum
Jackson Memorial Hall
Lexington, Virginia 24450
Telephone: (703) 464-7232
Hours of Operation: 0900-1700 Mon-Sat, 1400-1700 Sun, closed Thanksgiving, Christmas week, and New Year's Day

War Memorial Museum of Virginia
Huntington Park
9285 Warwick Blvd.
Newport News, Virginia 23607
Telephone: (804) 247-8523
Hours of Operation: 0900-1700 Mon-Sat, 1300-1700 Sun, closed Christmas and New Year's Day

General Douglas MacArthur Memorial
MacArthur Square
Norfolk, Virginia 23510
Telephone: (804) 441-2965
Hours of Operation: 1000-1700 Mon-Sat, 1100-1700 Sun, closed Thanksgiving, Christmas, New Year's Day

Portsmouth Naval Shipyard Museum
Post Office Box 248
Portsmouth, Virginia 23705
Telephone: (804) 393-8591
Hours of Operation: 1000-1700 Tue-Sat, 1400-1700 Sun, closed Thanksgiving, Christmas, New Year's Day

Museum of Military and Naval History
Post Office Box 4184
San Juan, Puerto Rico 00905
Telephone: (809) 723-6246
Hours of Operation: 0800-1200, 1300-1630 Tue-Sun

Ms. Beth F. MacKenzie is a museum specialist in the Programs and Policies Branch of the Museum Division, U.S. Army Center of Military History.

The Revised AR 5-3, *Installation Management and Organization*, is Published

Billy A. Arthur

The good news for Army historians is that the revised version of AR 5-3, *Installation Management and Organization*, was published on 9 October 1992. This long-awaited regulation implements the Army's revised concept of managing and organizing installations. It prescribes an organizational framework and describes management principles and responsibilities for installations.

The best news is shown in the following extracts from the regulation, which institutionalize the military history office and its functions at the installation level. First, note that Paragraph 2-11, "Office of the Command Historian," extracted below, lists the functions of the model installation history office and becomes the base from which the staffing of the office is derived. On the next page, note that in the Installation Model wiring diagram (Figure 1-1 of the AR), the military history office is positioned on the installation commander's special staff. This should assist the historian in gaining and maintaining access to the commander so that he may record the command's significant events and activities from the commander's viewpoint.

Billy A. Arthur is chief of the Leader Development Activity, Field and International Division, U.S. Army Center of Military History.

2-11. Office of the Command Historian

a. Overview. The Command Historian develops, publishes and directs the mission element's and the installation's historical program and activities.

b. Functions. The Command Historian has overall functional responsibility for the following:

(1) Military history policy, operations and developments.

(2) Historical support to leader development activities, including staff rides.

(3) Preparation of annual command history.

(4) Historical research collection.

(5) Application of historical perspective to planning and decision-making process.

(6) Historical monographs and studies, as directed by the commander and higher headquarters.

(7) Liaison with other historical offices and organizations.

(8) Advice and recommendations on the development and preservation of historical monuments and sites on the installation.

(9) Administrative functions and planning, programming and budgeting input in support of Command Historian office operations.

c. Because of the significant role of history and the magnitude and diverse nature of historical activities at the United States Military Academy (USMA), selected portions of the historical responsibilities listed in paragraph *b*, above, may be delegated to the History Department, USMA, and the West Point Museum.



AR5-3, Figure 1-1. Installation Model

The Ring—A Historical Vignette

Thomas D. Morgan

Many human interest stories of heroism and sacrifice came out of the great Ardennes campaign of 1944-45. One of the most unusual concerns that of Maj. Mathew Legler and his U.S. Military Academy 1939 class ring. He lost it during the hectic days of combat at the start of what Americans call the Battle of the Bulge. The ring was returned to him forty years later by a young Belgian garbage collector whose hobby was military archaeology.

The Quiet Ardennes

On 16 December 1944, Legler was a 28-year-old major commanding the 1st Battalion, 393d Infantry Regiment, of the 99th Infantry Division, located near the twin villages of Rocherath-Krinkelt, just west of the German border in the Belgian Ardennes. Newly arrived from the United States, the 99th Division was untested in battle. Since arriving on the European continent in November 1944, the 99th Division had been placed in a defensive sector to gain combat experience. The lines of the 99th Division ran for nineteen miles through belts of timber in the forests of the Ardennes, which contain rocky gorges, small streams, and steep hills.

At the start of the German offensive, the 99th Division held the right wing of the V Corps looking at the German "West Wall" defenses. The Ardennes sector had been quiet for weeks, and the 2d Infantry Division was attacking through the 99th to capture the Roer Valley system of dams. If this attack succeeded, the 99th Division was scheduled to follow the 2d Division and cover its southern flank. It was to be the 99th Division's first large-scale operation—little did anyone know how large scale it would be.

The Ardennes sector appeared to offer no special risk, because the V Corps and the 99th Division had identified only three understrength German divisions to their front. When Hitler unleashed his Ardennes offensive on 16 December, V Corps did not know that twelve of approximately thirty German divisions were assembled in front of it to launch the breakthrough attack. The 99th Division was in the path of the *Sixth SS Panzer Army*, in particular the *I SS Panzer Corps*, consisting of two armored and three infantry divisions.

In late November Major Legler had moved his battalion from regimental reserve to be the right flank battalion of the regiment. The 393d Regiment had only two battalions on line, the 3d and Legler's 1st, because 2d Battalion had been attached to the 395th Regiment to the north. The 394th Regiment was to the south. The 393d Regiment had made a demonstration in front of the German West Wall defenses during the V Corps attack against the Roer on 13 December. The regiment was deployed along the Belgian-German frontier in the eastern edge of a long forest belt and the International Highway, which marked the border. The 393d's regimental headquarters was in Krinkelt, and the 1st Battalion held a front of about 500 yards approximately four miles to the east of the twin villages of Rocherath-Krinkelt. The Belgian-German border cut diagonally through Legler's battalion position, and the battalion had a view of the defenses of the Siegfried Line.

All Hell Broke Loose

On the night of 15 December, Legler's right flank units reported tank tracks clanking. Just before dawn on the 16th, Legler said, "all hell broke loose" as artillery, mortars, and *Nebelwerfer* (multiple rocket launchers) fired into his command post and tanks with searchlights ablaze came rumbling through the anti-tank obstacles of the Siegfried Line 300-400 yards to his front. The German gun and *Nebelwerfer* barrage lasted from about 0525 until 0600, when the German grenadiers of the *277th Volksgrenadier* (people's infantry) *Division* advanced out of the artificial moonlight created by the tank searchlights. Other on-line battalions of the 99th Division underwent the same kind of overwhelming assault. The entire *277th Volksgrenadier Division* was destined to hit only three battalions (the 1st and 3d of the 393d and the 2d of the 394th). These battalions suffered greatly, but by absorbing and delaying the *277th Volksgrenadier*, they held up the entire *I SS Panzer Corps*.

Most of Legler's fighting positions were at the edge of the forest belt overlooking the International Highway and generally open ground. That gave them better fields of fire than their neighboring battalions on either side. Legler's battalion held on and inflicted a heavy toll on the Germans with its mortar and machine gun fire. None of the advancing Germans got inside

Legler's position, and the German assault in his sector ground to a halt. Legler credits his initial success to two factors: the battalion had fighting foxholes for every one to two men in addition to their sleeping foxholes, and daily leadership checks of the soldiers' feet had kept them free of the debilitating trench foot which was well known to soldiers in the cold, damp Ardennes. Nevertheless, their stand was a heroic action on the part of all the men involved.

A Pyrrhic Victory

As the German attack stalled, the commander of the *277th Volksgrenadier* committed his reserve regiment and drove back the American lines—three hundred yards in places. Some of the platoons of Legler's line companies fell back, and he had to commit his reserve to prevent a breakthrough. By the end of the day, Legler's battalion still maintained a cohesive defense, but more than one-half of the battalion's strength had been lost, and the 3d Battalion to its left had its right flank pushed back several hundred yards, losing almost as many men as Legler.

At 1030 on 17 December the 393d's commander ordered the 1st and 3d Battalions to move to a new position closer to Rocherath-Krinkelt. The move was completed that afternoon. Just after dark, Legler's not yet fully established command post was overrun by the Germans. Legler and some of his men evacuated the area and spent the night hiding in the forest. The next morning, the 18th, Legler and his staff returned to their former command post area, where he assembled the remaining troops of the battalion. Here Legler joined Capt. Bob McGee, the S-3 of the 2d Battalion of the 394th Regiment on his right flank, along with his remaining troops. Together they proceeded west cross-country on the morning of the 18th, taking a few vehicles and those wounded who could be transported. While moving back towards Mürringen and the American lines, the remnants of the two battalions met a hail of enemy small arms fire from a village. Communications were sporadic, but an artillery liaison officer with the group called in enough fire from a corps artillery unit to enable the group to escape back into the woods. The main body followed a creek bed and, under cover of darkness, entered American lines in the vicinity of Wirtzfeld. On the morning of 19 December, the 1st Battalion, 393d Infantry, dug in along the Elsenborn ridge with less that 300 of its officers and men left.

The Northern Shoulder Holds

Legler and his battalion remained on the Elsenborn ridge until the end of January 1945. They formed part of the shoulder of V Corps units consisting of the 99th, 9th, and 1st Infantry Divisions. The *6th SS Panzer Army* could not shake this hard shoulder free and, therefore, the major German role in the Ardennes offensive passed to the *5th Panzer Army* to the south.

Legler has no recall of when he lost his ring, nor of when he first realized that he no longer had it. The heavy gold ring with an onyx stone was found in an overgrown foxhole in a forested area called the Rocherathwald not far from the village of Mürringen. From the location of the foxhole, it would seem that the ring was lost on the 17th or 18th of December when Legler and his unit were trying to avoid the Germans and set up a defense. The man who found it, Alain Jacquemain, was a 26-year-old garbage collector from Charleroi, Belgium, who spent his free time going over battlefields with a metal detector looking for military souvenirs. Jacquemain had found many objects in this manner, and he had accumulated an extensive private collection of World War II relics. He even drove a restored WWII jeep as his personal vehicle. In spite of his previous successes in ten years of hunting on the battlefields, he admitted that the ring was the nicest thing that he had ever found. Naturally, he was excited by his souvenir and anxious to find its owner.

Finder Gives Up the Ring

Finding the owner of the ring is almost a story in itself. Jacquemain found the ring in 1982. While visiting the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), near Mons, Belgium, Jacquemain asked a British colonel if he could identify the owner. The colonel immediately recognized the ring as a West Point class ring and saw the name Mathew L. Legler engraved on the inside. American authorities at SHAPE researched the U.S. Military Academy (USMA) Register of Graduates and determined that Legler was retired and living in Hilton Head, South Carolina. That got the ball rolling. The author and his commander, Col. David E. Schorr, both USMA graduates, became involved in notifying Legler and negotiating with the Belgian Gendarmerie and Jacquemain for the return of the ring. It took almost two years to convince Jacquemain to part with the ring. He delayed the return of the ring not because he wanted a reward or to keep it, but because he wanted to be sure that Legler was really alive and that he would receive it (Jacquemain had mistakenly heard that Legler had died). Also, it was Jacquemain's fondest wish to be able to return the ring to Legler in person. That was not possible, and

New Publication on World War II Material Culture

The Company of Military Historians announces the publication of a special World War II commemorative issue of its journal, *Military Collector & Historian*. Mr. Walter H. Bradford, chief planner of the National Museum of the United States Army, served as an assistant editor to assemble unique offerings of material culture. Articles from the history of the M-1 helmet liner to the development of the Eisenhower jacket and early Marine Corps utilities. Interested military historians and curators can obtain copies of the issue from The Company of Military Historians, North Main Street, Westbrook, Conn. 06498. Telephone: (203) 399-9460. The cost is $5.00 for member, or $6.00 for non-members, plus $ .75 for postage.

finally Jacquemain agreed to turn over the ring to the author in a semiofficial ceremony at SHAPE. The ring was promptly mailed to Legler, and he put it back on his hand nearly forty years from the time he had lost it.

The return of the ring was a fitting end to a story that began in 1938 when First Classman Legler bought his 1939 class ring from Tiffany's. Legler wore his ring during his final year at West Point and as a young officer for five years of peacetime and wartime training assignments before ending up in Belgium in 1944. After surviving the initial stages of the Battle of the Bulge, Legler tripped a land mine on 1 February 1945, which resulted in his medical retirement in 1946 as a lieutenant colonel. Legler has since retired a second time from Mobil Oil in 1980 and moved to Hilton Head.

When first approached about his ring, Legler did not seem anxious to return to the scene of the "Bulge." No doubt the memories of fallen comrades and the end of his promising military career had something to do with his reluctance. While researching this article, the author was pleased to learn that Mathew Legler finally did make arrangements to return to the Ardennes on a historical tour with noted World War II historian Charles B. MacDonald, now deceased, thereby completing his pilgrimage to the battlefield that had given up his ring after forty years.

Lt. Col. Thomas D. Morgan, USA (Ret.), is employed by a defense contractor at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, supporting the Training and Doctrine Command's Battle Command Training Program. He visited the Ardennes several times while stationed at SHAPE in the early 1980s. This article is based on Charles B. MacDonald's A Time for Trumpets, *Hugh Cole's* The Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge, *and correspondence with Lt. Col. Mathew L. Legler, USA (Ret.).*

Letters to the Editor

The following letter to Maj. Edwin L. Kennedy, Jr., was also forwarded to Army History.

Dear Sir:

I read with great interest your commentary about *The Forgotten Soldier* ("The Forgotten Soldier: Fact or Fiction?" *Army History* no. 22, Spring 1992). Like many others I found that book a "good read" when I came across it in our library several years ago. Your assessment that "...the book is accurate but not to a tee," followed by evidence of a series of technical and circumstantial inaccuracies must bring into question its validity as an autobiographical war memoir, but you fail to come to grips with the central problem that troubled me from the beginning: who is/was "Guy Sajer"? In the first English edition the publisher noted the book had been widely read in Europe and that the author had made television appearances.

Whatever the inaccuracies in the text, the central credibility lies with the circumstances of its publication, namely the person or persons who presented the manuscript to the publisher. Having this information we can conclusively judge the nature of the errors you noted, as well as the others that might well turn up upon further scrutiny. Although your review states unequivocally that *The Forgotten Soldier* is a "carefully written novel," you do not provide the one essential piece of evidence that would absolutely confirm this assertion or that would establish the basis for judging the broader credibility of the book.

It would be greatly appreciated if you could address this issue in a further issue of *Army History*. You would be doing a real service to those of us who teach military history and who might wish to recommend this

book to our students, but only if its substantive bona fides are established, e.g., a critical analysis of its origins and content that your commentary promises and your undoubted expertise could obtain.

Dr. Frank Edwards is a professor in the Department of History and Urban Studies at the California University of Pennsylvania.

Movie Review
by Louis E. Keefer

A Midnight Clear

The current movie *A Midnight Clear* is about six teen-aged GIs *all with IQs higher than 150*, who, in December 1944, are assigned to scout German positions in the Ardennes. After a bizarre couple of days in which Germans and Americans throw snowballs rather than grenades at one another, one of the GIs is killed, along with most of the Germans.

None of the reviewers seems to think it odd that six men with IQs in the genius range should be found in one place at one time, all carrying M1s or carbines. Yet the odds for that occurring on any random basis are at least ten thousand to one, and probably higher.

Could something that improbable really have happened? Yes. William Wharton, the author of the book on which the movie is based, says that in forming his I&R (intelligence and reconnaissance) platoon—more than half of whom have been lost when the story begins—an eager major scoured his whole regiment to find men with AGCT (Army General Classification Test) scores over 150. This is understandable, since I&R patrols are more effectively accomplished by smart soldiers, generally speaking.

Wharton's book, also titled *A Midnight Clear* from the Christmas carol, "It Came Upon A Midnight Clear," terms the I&R squad Whiz Kids. They are all from the Army Specialized Training Program (ASTP), ex-ASTPers like Wharton himself. To those who know of the ASTP (and that will unfortunately exclude most of today's moviegoers), this makes the movie story line more plausible.

The ASTP story is familiar to veterans of World War II. Starting in 1943, the Army selected and assigned men to take accelerated college courses in engineering, languages, and certain other disciplines. A minimum AGCT score of 110 was required for eligibility. While the minimum wasn't so high, many ASTPers scored well into the 150s and 160s, just as in the movie.

In April 1944, after a maximum of nine months in college, and more often only three to six months, about 110,000 of the ASTPers were taken out of the program and sent to the infantry and other combat and service branches. Thanks to the unexpected "manpower crisis of 1943," the Army needed soldiers, not scholars.

Although the young men then received several months' more training, the 55,000 or so who went to the infantry, armored, and airborne divisions arrived overseas in plenty of time for the heavy fighting.

Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson tried desperately to save the ASTP, but the program was caught up in the numbers game. With selective service running behind schedule, the Congress arguing interminably about drafting fathers, and the Italian campaign's casualty rates higher than anticipated, there was deep concern about finding enlisted replacements.

As Robert Palmer et al. explain in their *Procurement and Training of Ground Troops*, the unalerted divisions in January 1944 were, because approximately 26,000 men had been taken from them for overseas replacements, on average, short some 2,000 men each. By the end of January, only four months before the cross-Channel invasion, the total net shortage of enlisted men in Army Ground Forces units was 52,625. (p. 201)

General George C. Marshall on 10 February formally asked Secretary Stimson to liquidate ASTP. The only alternative means of obtaining a pool of replacements, he said, was to disband 10 infantry divisions, 3 tank battalions, and some 26 antiaircraft battalions. Stimson had little choice but to agree to curtail the college training program.

In his postwar autobiography, Stimson put the ultimate blame squarely on the shoulders of Congress:

The true question for the Specialized training Program was whether it should be continued at the expense of further drafts of fathers, deferred workers, and other civilians. Here the choice lay not with the War Department but with Congress, and the verdict of the people's representatives on this matter was not a matter of doubt. The Army of early 1944 was forced to cannibalize itself, and the soldiers of the ASTP were among the first victims.

What the presence of the ASTPers in the divisions did, among other things, was to raise the average level of intelligence significantly. Palmer et al. note (p. 78)

that despite coming into a type of service different from what they had been led to expect, they "nevertheless proved with few exceptions to be excellent soldiers...they could absorb infantry training more rapidly [than other men]."

When they first came into the divisions, the green ASTPers were given a hard time by the men already there, who feared that the college kids were out to steal their stripes. The ASTP men often made it worse for themselves by sticking together like glue. As one surprised company commander put it, "what kind of soldiers deal out bridge hands during breaks?"

Most ex-ASTPers went overseas as buck privates, and got ratings only when casualties created vacancies. Although they had some catching up to do, the Whiz Kids ultimately proved they could be tough, dependable soldiers. And in time they earned their fair share of Purple Hearts and other awards.

Though the ASTP story ended sadly for many, the final result of the program can be seen as upbeat: while many died in the war, most survived and the vast majority returned to college after the war.

Some of the survivors, it has been said, might never have seen a college classroom except for their introduction to higher education as ASTPers. Today there are many who see the program as setting a precedent for young men to attend college based on intellectual merit rather than on family status and economic class.

Many of the surviving Whiz Kids became rather famous, among them Henry Kissinger, Gore Vidal, Mel Brooks, Heywood Hale Broun, Roger Mudd, and Ed Koch, as well as four-star General James Hartinger, a retired NORAD commander in chief.

Too bad that the future cannot be anticipated in the movie, but its unlikely squad of six men all with IQs higher than 150 isn't as weird as it might at first seem.

Mr. Louis E. Keefer is the author of Scholars in Foxholes: The Story of the Army Specialized Training Program in World War II.

Book Review
by John H. King

Company Command: The Bottom Line
by John G. Meyer, Jr.
National Defense University Press. 235 pp., $6.50

Historians studying small units in Operations JUST CAUSE or DESERT SHIELD/STORM will find this book a useful background reference for reviewing the role the company, battery, or troop commander plays in preparing his or her soldiers for war. Meyer has written a handbook that details what he calls "the essential tasks a company commander must complete ... to command successfully." The author, John G. Meyer, Jr., is a colonel in the U.S. Army Military Police Corps whose assignments have included several company commands, a battalion command, and selection for brigade command. He has the experience and he writes authoritatively. This effort was produced when he was a senior fellow at the National Defense University.

Colonel Meyer spells out those essentials such as what to do before the command is assumed and how to establish a working relationship with the first sergeant. He also provides easy to understand comments and suggestions on performance through "Tips" such as inviting the battalion commander to take part in relevant training to seize the upper hand in the relationship and prevent subsequent unannounced inspection visits. If you issue the invitation you can make certain things are going well, whereas a surprise visit tends to have less pleasant outcomes. Although the work is not a replacement for leadership and doctrine manuals, it is an excellent guide to bringing all of the formal concepts to bear on practical situations.

For example, although the book is definitely useful for today's soldiers, it is also useful for historians. Tomorrow's historian trying to understand what is special and unique about today's commander of United States soldiers would learn from Chapter 2 material on "To Be or Not To Be a Company Commander" and "What It Takes To Be a Successful Company Commander." Meyer poses eleven questions to use in determining a desire to command and then expounds on twenty-one "You Gottas" for success, such as "You Gotta Have The Basics," "You Gotta Lead By Example," "You Gotta Establish Standards," "You Gotta Check, Check, and Recheck," and "You Gotta Have Fun." Chapter 6 provides information on "training to fight to win," while Chapter 8 gives an overview of unit maintenance management and operations. Finally, Chapter 9 covers "the kitchen sink," a mixed bag of details on things such as unit readiness and readiness reporting, inspections, weight control, and integrity. The book culminates in eight specifics called "The Bottom Line for Company Command." The publisher promises this book will show the reader many things, including how to start off running when taking command, how to find help and avoid mistakes, and how to command with confidence and authority. The book fulfills those promises superbly, and therein is its

great value. The author's extensive use of practical tips on how to do things, the numerous realistic and relevant war stories, and the mostly pithy quotations from "The Brass" tell what needs to be told in an immediately useful and easy to apply fashion. Meyer's book is the best handbook for a commander I have seen, and is the book I wish I had prior to taking my first battery command. It is certainly one book the Army should consider issuing to each company grade officer before allowing him or her the privilege of assuming command.

The book, however, is not without one flaw. Meyer's examples and tips deal with a world where the battalion commander, and the senior noncommissioned officers are all the embodiment of what each should be. Unfortunately, many of these soldiers need a similar book on their role and responsibilities so they will perform as expected. So Colonel Meyer, when will you write volume two for field grade commanders?

Maj. John H. King, a Field Artilleryman, commanded the 51st Military History Detachment at the Center of Military History during Operation DESERT STORM.

Book Review
by Albert H. Smith, Jr.

Heroes of World War II
by Edward F. Murphy
Presidio Press. 365 pp., $24.95

This is great reading for combat veterans of the United States Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard. While providing a concise and enjoyable summary of what happened in all the theaters of World War II, the author describes how individual warriors influenced the action or saved the day, battle after battle—Pearl Harbor to V-J Day.

Unlike official military compilations, there is a page or two of biographical information on each Medal of Honor recipient whose story is highlighted. For example, before any discussion of his Medal of Honor battle, the reader learns that Capt. Bobbie Brown is age thirty-seven; that he has already served twenty-two years in the Army; that he is an expert marksman; and that he was a star boxer and football player during early enlistments.

Military professionals are introduced to heroes over the years from their chosen armed service. Now, in this fine compilation of courageous deeds, one discovers how other servicemen earned the medal. The story of Chief Watertender Peter Tomich is especially compelling. Through his mastery of steam lines and complex boilers, Tomich prevented a deadly explosion on the battleship USS *Utah* at Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941. Ordering his fellow crewmen to safety topside, this brave sailor was last seen bravely turning valves, setting gauges, and opening petcocks. For his deliberate self-sacrifice he was awarded the Medal of Honor.

Several months after the Pearl Harbor attack, a 28-year-old Navy pilot saved the carrier USS *Lexington*. In just four brief, hectic minutes Lt. Butch O'Hare shot down five Japanese bombers, becoming the Navy's first ace of World War II. Chicago's O'Hare airport is named in his honor.

Of the 433 Medals of Honor awarded in World War II, only one was earned by a member of the Coast Guard. Signalman 1st Class Douglas A. Monroe, in charge of nine small landing craft, somehow managed to evacuate 500 wounded marines from a fire-swept Pacific invasion beach. Tragically, he was killed by bullets from a Japanese machine gun during the final minutes of that valiant effort. On the other side of the globe, in the European theater, two of my Big Red One comrades earned the medal during the campaigns of mid-1944. Brig. Gen. Theodore Roosevelt, Jr.—then assistant division commander of the 4th Infantry Division—led the successful D-day amphibious assault on UTAH Beach, Normandy, France. Three months later in Belgium, Pfc. Gino Merli, an 18th Infantry machine gunner, held a key defense position against repeated enemy night attacks. Next morning, reinforcing American infantrymen found Merli still alive, surrounded by fifty-two dead Germans.

Ed Murphy, a master storyteller, makes these and many other battle accounts come alive for history buffs of all ages.

Heroes of World War II offers additional coverage that makes it a fine reference volume. Chapter 1 summarizes the history of the Medal of Honor from its birth during the Civil War through World War II. A comprehensive appendix lists each Medal recipient: 294 Army and Army Air Corps, 57 Navy, 81 Marine Corps, and 1 Coast Guard. Twenty-four pages of photographs and a well-organized index also are definite pluses.

Edward F. Murphy's latest work enhances our understanding of land, sea, and air combat during World War II. It is, therefore, a recommended addition

to your professional library.

Maj. Gen. Albert H. Smith, Jr., USA (Ret.) had an Army career spanning more than thirty-three years, beginning in 1940. He spent ten years in infantry divisions, including service with the 1st Infantry Division—the Big Red One. A dedicated history buff, General Smith has served as honorary colonel of the 16th Infantry Regiment.

Book Review
by James R. Arnold

The Certain Trumpet: Maxwell Taylor and the American Experience in Vietnam
by Douglas Kinnard
Brassey's (US), Inc. 252 pp., $22.95

In 1954, with French-held Dien Bien Phu under siege, Maxwell Taylor hosted one of his famous bi-weekly after-dinner debates. The topic he chose was "Resolved: That the United States Should Intervene Militarily in Indochina." The debate was so ably conducted that when the issue was put to a vote, the result was a tie. Taylor himself voted only to break ties, and, accordingly, all eyes turned towards the head of the table. After thinking for a moment, Taylor voted with the negative. Although his vote had no bearing on the ongoing debate within Dwight D. Eisenhower's administration regarding intervention in Vietnam, it did begin an association with a far-off land that would lead Taylor to the pinnacle of influence within the administration of two presidents who committed the nation to war. During the years 1960-65, Maxwell Taylor was arguably the most influential military man in America. How he arrived at that point and what he made of this role are the subjects of Douglas Kinnard's *The Certain Trumpet: Maxwell Taylor and the American Experience in Vietnam.*

There was less to Taylor's qualifications for such a high position than meets the eye. Lionized as the first American general to enter France on D-day—Taylor jumped with the paratroopers of his 101st Airborne Division—he in fact had a relatively brief exposure to combat during the war.

His initiation came during the invasion of Sicily, where he commanded the 82d Airborne's artillery. In battery alongside was a 155-mm. howitzer battalion led by an officer who greatly impressed Taylor, Lt. Col. William C. Westmoreland. Detailed on a diplomatic mission, Taylor missed further fighting in the Italian campaign. Transferred to command the 101st Airborne in March 1944, Taylor received his second command mission in Normandy where his division engaged in stiff combat for about a month. It returned to England to train for further airborne operations and participated in the Arnhem drop. Slightly wounded by an artillery fragment, Taylor was in the United States convalescing on a staff assignment when the German counteroffensive exploded through the Ardennes. Thus, he missed the division's epic stand at Bastogne, although he managed to rejoin his unit on 27 December.

In sum, his World War II combat experience amounted to about ten weeks. Taylor possessed unquestioned courage. Because of both fortune and the episodic nature of airborne operations, however, he did not lead units in combat for nearly as long as most generals who commanded in the European theater.

Taylor's next appearance on the world stage was as the fourth, and last, commander of the Eighth Army in Korea. During the six months leading up to the final cease-fire he "was almost invisible, even during the last big battle of the Kumsong salient. Perhaps this absence would have been true of any commander at that stage, but what comes through is that Taylor did not project as effectively as an Army commander in combat should" (p. 209).

From 1955 to 1959, he served on the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), a position he hoped to parlay into Chairman. He failed because he ran afoul of the Commander in Chief. During the strategic debates of the mid-1950s, Taylor argued against Eisenhower's "New Look" doctrine. The New Look sought to rationalize military expenditures with likely threats given finite economic resources. Its solution was deterrence based on massive nuclear retaliation. The New Look was an enormously divisive issue within the military and only with difficulty did JCS Chairman Arthur Radford manage to forge a consensus supporting Eisenhower's program. Taylor remained a formidable dissenter. He did so in part because he was trying to preserve the Army's share of the budget during a time of budget austerity. The enthusiasm with which he took his case outside of regular channels—to the press and to Congress—convinced Eisenhower that Taylor was undermining him. Over his four-year term as Chief of Staff, Taylor failed to reorient national strategy and thus failed to achieve his goals for the Army.

Taylor's criticism of Eisenhower's strategy attracted the attention of presidential hopeful John F. Kennedy. Upon his election, Kennedy summoned

Taylor from retirement back to the center of national affairs where he served as Kennedy's personal military adviser. The suave and urbane Taylor fit well into "Camelot," the ideologically driven Kennedy administration. As military adviser, Taylor participated in what the author identifies as three of the five great turning points in the Vietnam War.

For a 21-month period beginning in October 1962, Taylor served as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In the summer of 1964, he began a one-year tour as ambassador to the Republic of Vietnam. He drafted his own letter of instruction, which, the author observes, "was the most powerful charter given an American ambassador to Vietnam" (p. 135). In sum, Taylor had overall responsibility for the U.S. effort in Vietnam, including the "the whole military effort." Following his ambassadorship, until 1968, Johnson retained Taylor as a special consultant on Vietnam. In this position Taylor consistently recommended further military escalation and remained convinced of the efficacy of aerial bombardment of North Vietnam.

These then are the principal facts bearing on Taylor's career, and it is apparent that the author is not entirely comfortable with them. Still, he unflinchingly relates the salient events while refraining from passing judgment. The reader learns what happened but is left wondering why.

The author is at his best distilling and describing salient presidential decisions. One of these occurred in 1961, when Taylor accompanied Walt Rostow on a tour of Vietnam. This visit produced a 25-page report which is best remembered for the prophecy, "The risks of backing in to a major Asian war by way of SVN are present but are not impressive. NVN is extremely vulnerable to conventional bombing"(p. 98). Kennedy rejected Taylor's proposal for a small troop commitment, but "All this time the debate on troop commitments was distracting the decision makers from what was really happening—a significant American escalation of men, supplies, and money" to the South Vietnamese leader Ngo Dinh Diem (p. 104). This escalation created an ongoing bureaucratic demand for more resources. Moreover, henceforth decision makers believed that American prestige was on the line in Vietnam.

Another pivotal event came in August and September of 1963, when the issue was whether the Kennedy administration should continue to support the now badly faltering Diem. Taylor participated in a series of long conferences that forged U.S. strategy during this period. On page 124, we learn that Taylor commented at one of the meetings "that he would not be associated with any program which included commitment of U.S. Armed Forces." Six months, and seven pages, later Taylor recommends "an intensified counterinsurgency campaign in the South and selected air and naval attacks against targets in North Vietnam" (p. 131). There is no explanation of Taylor's change of attitude.

Shortly after the Korean armistice, Taylor reflected on his experience. He argued that despite possessing overwhelming air and naval superiority and nuclear weapons, it had been American infantry deployed along Korea's rugged hilltops who had determined the issue of victory or defeat. Taylor elaborated upon this theme in 1959 with the publication of *The Uncertain Trumpet:*

An outstanding impression from the operations in Korea has been the ineffectiveness or inapplicability of many of our modern weapons to the requirements of the Korean type of limited war.... The enemy, terrain, and weather combined to nullify in a large measure much of the costly equipment assembled during and after World War II in preparation for a possible World War III. (*The Uncertain Trumpet.* [New York: Harper & Bros., 1959], p.15.)

Taylor was also well acquainted with "Operation STRANGLE," the methodical aerial interdiction campaign waged by the United Nations' air forces in Korea. However much Operation STRANGLE impeded Communist operations—something unknowable then and now since there is no reliable information from enemy sources--it manifestly did not markedly alter operations on the ground.

Given Taylor's clear-sighted assessment of the limitations of the American war machine in Korea, and in particular the limitations of strategic air power, why did he promote a massive conventional buildup in Vietnam; and why did he believe aerial bombardment of North Vietnam would be successful? These are issues only lightly touched upon in Kinnard's book.

When the author emerges from his self-imposed restraint, he offers cogent analysis, but such sorties are all too rare. This is, of course, a problem in the telling of history. An author performs meticulous research and then relates the facts in chronological fashion. For fear of interrupting the narrative flow or perhaps undermining his credibility by offering a provocative opinion, the author waits until the last chapter to analyze and critique. So it is with *Trumpet.* After 204 pages of text, the author asks a series of searching, important questions, including how did Taylor's World War II

and Korean experience shape his strategic outlook; what was his influence on presidential decision making concerning Vietnam; and how much is he to blame for the eventual defeat?

These are good questions all. But waiting until the last chapter to ask them puts a considerable burden on the reader. The reader must recall events and descriptions that took place somewhere well back in the text in order to follow and appreciate the author's interpretation. So it is that in the final chapter, on page 214, we learn that as ambassador "Taylor never made full use" of the powers conferred upon him by the charter he wrote and Johnson approved. We first learned about this charter on page 135. Over the passage of 79 pages it is a bit hard to remember the pertinent details surrounding his appointment as ambassador. It is not an easy task to weave seamless narrative and analysis. But to refrain from trying is to surrender the field to dry-as-dust history that merely records the facts without engaging the reader. *The Certain Trumpet* provides a well-researched, clearly written description of the major decisions related to the U.S. involvement in Vietnam between 1960 and 1968. It is a valuable stepping stone for future historians who wish to probe more deeply into America's worst foreign policy and military debacle.

James R. Arnold is a free-lance writer and historian. His latest book is The First Domino: Eisenhower, the Military, and America's Intervention in Vietnam. *He currently is working on a book about the commanders in chief from George Washington to George Bush.*

Book Review
by Jimmy D. Ross

Recurring Logistics Problems As I Have Observed Them
by General Carter B. Magruder, USA (Ret.)
U.S. Army Center of Military History. 136 pp.

We are fortunate to have General Magruder's observations to enrich the history of Army logistics. This history is important for ensuring the continuing education of the Army's leaders and should be required reading for all logisticians. Additionally, I recommend the concluding chapter, "Lessons Learned in Logistics," as an executive summary for review by Army senior leaders. The "lamp of experience" that guided General Magruder through his distinguished career is sure to help us prepare for war today and in the future.

As I look at our recent experiences from Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM, General Magruder's "hard and fast rules for logisticians" apply well. The uncertainty of today's international balances of power is not unlike those our nation faced after World War II and Korea; therefore, I believe it is important that we not lose sight of his concept of "unconstrained requirements for...war." He observed that not much really new is learned, but that we relearn old lessons forgotten or disregarded over time. As we reshape today's Army, we must maintain its essential capabilities. From that viewpoint, I would like to examine General Magruder's observations.

Effective resupply from the United States still relies on adequate war reserves to meet initial requirements until production rates catch up. At the end of Vietnam, the Army's war reserves were dangerously depleted. In the 1980s we fought to rebuild those stocks. Pre-positioned materiel and war reserves were essential to our success in the Persian Gulf and must be restored. A continuous flow of reports from the theater is as important as ever. Reports must be based on timely and relevant information, but an abundance of data does not automatically ensure such information. We must continue to improve our logistics automation and communications capabilities. Ultimately, new production must flow to meet these requirements. The American defense industrial base must be capable of meeting our essential requirements.

Advance planning of initial equipment and supply requirements in contingency plans based on war gaming is essential. This provides us with planning factors to compute time lag before the resupply pipeline is in operation. Requirements for equipment beyond normally authorized items were also essential to our success. Water purification equipment and chemical defensive equipment are two prime examples. Predicting the expected intensity of operations provides us challenges similar to those our predecessors faced. Finally, advance planning of allied requirements and resources available in theater was essential to our success in DESERT SHIELD just as it was in World War II and Korea. In fact, our reliance on host-nation support for transportation and services was critical to our effort. Local procurement makes sense. It saves time and transportation, conserves resources, and helps the local economy while ensuring that the supported or conquered nation contributes to our efforts.

General Magruder proposed that every operational concept must be validated by a transportation study.

Today that requirement is just as valid as it was forty years ago. The requirements we placed on our sea and airlift assets stressed their operational capabilities; they could not meet desired time lines for closure because we have not made the necessary investments in strategic airlift and fast sealift. Our continued commitment to the C-17 transport and to improved fast sealift is essential to meeting the future power projection requirements of this country.

At the opening of a theater of operations, well-trained logistics troops are critical to success. Once again, this was proven in DESERT STORM. The lead forces of active and reserve logistics units made the buildup of combat forces possible. General Magruder cautioned about ensuring that peacetime reductions in logistics troops do not fall below three months of operational capability. Generally, we are moving towards one month of active capability with sufficient follow-on reserve units to meet planning requirements. Again, I believe that we and General Magruder are in agreement. He highlighted the necessary continuous efforts to reduce logistics troop requirements. The initiatives which he identified are neither new nor out of date: containerization, simplified distribution, improved reliability, reduced fuel consumption, and use of local labor and common-sense maintenance. These are continuing initiatives resourced through programs like the Logistics Unit Productivity Systems, single fuel initiatives, host nation support, and maintenance redesign efforts. All of these efforts will be enhanced through the improved automation management tools we are developing to provide greater asset visibility and in-transit visibility of materiel. As we continue to modernize our Army, modernization of logistics capabilities must continue. Data base technologies, communication interfaces, palletizing loading systems, embedded diagnostics, and literally hundreds of ideas must continue to be integrated into our daily capabilities.

Logistics personnel management continues to be critical. Today's logistician is challenged as never before. Modern technology, combined with our multifunctional approach to field logistics, requires soldiers and leaders grounded in tactical experience and with a vision to the future. We must continue to balance our functional technical skills against our multifunctional organizations. This is especially critical as we reduce the size of the Army. Branch technical channels are required. Our system is pretty well balanced right now, and we must be careful not to allow essential elements to be cut in the future without fully realizing the inherent risk. General Magruder pointed out that the proper reward for competence is increased responsibility for important work. We must keep promotions and command/project management opportunities open.

The remainder of his observations fall into what I will generally call management observations. Most of them are common-sense points the we have heard since early in our career but are worthy of periodic review. Decisions should be made at the lowest possible level; maintenance requirements must be kept to a minimum; logistics planning and action must begin early; planes for airlift must be light on equipment; plans for sealift must be long on time; and waste can be limited by good planning. Some are worthy of special consideration as we face the changes ongoing today. Headquarters, Department of the Army, is not the proper manager of daily logistics operations. An operating agency is necessary. The Army Materiel Command will continue to meet this need, but it is more difficult with the expanded role of the Defense Logistics Agency. Reports, cost-effectiveness decisions, management, and redistribution of excess all become more complex to manage. The old adage "fix forward" is more accurate when used in General Magruder's style--"repair forward when it is smart." The push concept of supply is something that "loggies" can do; but ultimately, the user must go and find critical items. Finally, he reminds us that logisticians must not only have integrity, but also the complete freedom from any suspicion of conflict of interest.

General Magruder's book is a valuable addition to our logistical history.

General Jimmy D. Ross is Commanding General, U.S. Army Materiel Command.

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—professional reading	A B C
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—Book Reviews	A B C
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