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The "Red Bull" Division: The Training and Initial Engagements of the 34th Infantry Division, 1941-43

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Although the story of the 34th Infantry Division in North Africa and one of the division's regiments, the 168th Infantry, in the disaster at Kasserine Pass is well known, few writers have offered a satisfactory explanation of the reasons behind the 34th's performance. This essay will focus on the composition, mobilization, training, and deployment of the 34th Infantry Division, National Guard, one of many divisions of the United States Army called to active duty in the months before Pearl Harbor. Only by examining the history of the division prior to its landing in North Africa can historians gain a clear understanding of the character and abilities of the 34th Division which explain its actions at Kasserine Pass.

The 34th Infantry Division—the "Red Bull"—was in many ways a typical National Guard division of the late 1930s and early 1940s. It was a division in name only; most drill and maneuvers were conducted at the company and battalion level. The division was scattered throughout Iowa, Minnesota, and North and South Dakota and truly came together as a division only in the summer of 1940 at Camp Ripley, Wisconsin. The 34th was still a "square" division, as were most divisions in the Army in 1940. Its structure was based on two brigades of two regiments each, totaling on paper around 27,313 men. (1) The 34th's major units were the 67th and 68th Infantry Brigades, consisting of the 133d, 135th, 164th, and 168th Infantry Regiments. It also had the 59th Field Artillery Brigade (consisting of three regiments), the 109th Medical Battalion, the 109th Engineer Battalion, and the usual number of smaller divisional units of Military Police, Quartermaster, Signal Corps, and so forth. (2)

Although sources generally are silent about the Camp Ripley encampment which brought the whole division together, it is likely that its training was similar to that of any other National Guard division: small unit

tactics, marksmanship, and close-order drill. The only difference in this encampment was the existence of the divisional headquarters and the fact that the camp lasted from 4-24 August: three weeks rather than the traditional two weeks. (3)

Upon their return from Camp Ripley, the scattered units of the 34th quickly discovered that world tensions were beginning to affect their training programs. Training time in their armories was to be doubled. (4) Armory training was normally severely limited however; units were too widely scattered to assemble for more complex instruction. By official Iowa Guard policy, so-called Armory Training consisted mainly of "discipline, use and care of arms, material and equipment, leadership, responsibility of commanders, protection measures against chemical warfare, and target practice." In their constricted environment, little more could be done. (5)

As early as October 1940, units of the 34th began receiving alerts for imminent activation and induction into federal service. The units were alerted nine times, throwing personal lives into chaos and uncertainty. (6) Components of the division finally were federalized in January and February 1941. The division headquarters and most of the major units were activated on 10 February 1941. (7)

The units initially moved into their armories. Many of these had been built for occasional use only and lacked training facilities and sleeping quarters. In addition, the sub-zero weather of Iowa and Minnesota in January and February made it impractical to train outside for extended periods. Frostbite was a constant concern because the men lacked overshoes, and many men were forced to buy their own gloves since the Army did not have enough woolen inserts for the issue leather gloves. (8) This was just the first of many supply problems that would plague the division over

the next two years.

Finally, in late February, the division was loaded on rail cars and trucks and moved to Camp Claiborne, Louisiana, just outside of Alexandria. Here, in a hurriedly constructed camp typical of those just beginning to spring up around the country, the 34th Division received its first taste of large-scale maneuvers and its first introductions to life in the "real" Army at Camp Claiborne. By 5 March the entire division was assembled at Camp Claiborne. Shortly thereafter, the division staff drew up plans for a comprehensive training program which was to last for thirteen weeks, i.e., 10 March-7 June. This mobilization training was for all personnel, regardless of prior service. In essence, all enlisted men were to receive basic training all over again. Most Guardsmen had not had any standardized military training other than the rudiments of close-order drill and range firing. The goal was to train, or retrain, individuals in their own small unit (company level) for the first nine weeks before graduating them to battalion and regimental training for the last four weeks.

Training areas were set aside, classes assigned, and training schedules published. The program looked good on paper. (9) Much of the plan, however, proved impossible to implement. Many of the division's regimental officers charged with implementing these plans had to be sent to Fort Benning Infantry School to

receive their own training. In addition, if the experience of the 135th Regiment is at all typical, any movement from individual training to collective training was rendered impossible by the arrival of floods of new personnel. The 135th's strength was supposed to be almost 2,500 enlisted men and 86 officers. However, the initial physicals disqualified several hundred. On 17 April the regiment received 650 new personnel who had no military training whatsoever. Three days later it received 500 more replacements. (10) Thus, of the authorized regimental strength, almost one-half of the men were brand new soldiers needing the most rudimentary instruction. At this point the division was five weeks into the company-level training phase and just a few weeks away from the beginning of collective training. The planned training progression was impossible under such circumstances.

Interviews with several participants in the Louisiana training, including one officer who was a company commander at the time, confirmed that training was marginal. No equipment, including machine guns and mortars, was available, and there was no live fire training except for an occasional visit to the range. The majority of the training time was devoted to close-order drill in the Louisiana mud. (11) One participant summed up the training as follows:

There was no combined arms training integrated into



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daily training schedules. Artillery and mortar live fire exercises were yet to be introduced into training schedules. Training criteria issued to the National Guard did not provide for training in the installation and removal of land mines by the Rifle Companies, probably because it was anticipated Engineers would do this work. Even training in methods of evacuating the dead and wounded was antiquated and did not contemplate fast moving situations and was geared primarily to trench warfare or a more static situation. (12)

The collective training experience of the 34th Division should have changed dramatically in August 1941 with the start of the Louisiana maneuvers. (13) After all, this was a massive military maneuver which was to test staffs and logistical systems to the maximum extent possible. Doubtless something like this happened at the higher levels. The training experience of the 34th, however, was less than salutary. The 34th was assigned to the V Corps of the Third Army, the Blue Forces of Lt. Gen. Walter E. Krueger. (14) The division was in V Corps reserve almost the entire time of the maneuvers. The officers and men remember little more than constant road marches and tactical foot marches with the constant changing of orders: march and countermarch. During Phase 2 of the maneuvers from 24-29 September, the 34th was ordered to cross over the Red River at Alexandria. It spent virtually the entire maneuver far behind friendly lines, isolated on the east side of that river. (15) Whatever the division staff may have learned, the troops at the regimental level and below seem only to have gained additional calluses on their feet.


There was another indicator that training in combined arms continued to be a problem. Two soldiers of the 34th when interviewed stated that they did not remember even seeing a tank up close during these maneuvers. Indeed, one stated that the first tank he ever saw up close was a German tank after he was captured in North Africa—this despite the fact that the Louisiana maneuvers marked the largest concentration of armored vehicles in U. S. history up to that time. (16) The infantrymen who would have to fight in coordination with tanks in North Africa did not even have a chance to see tanks nearby, let alone maneuver with them in close support. Valuable though these maneuvers may have been to some, this critical lack of combined arms training shows that few understood the changed nature of warfare.

The Louisiana maneuvers did have one specific impact on the state of training, readiness, and morale of

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all the National Guard divisions involved. This was the famous "October Purge" of National Guard officers. Lt. Gen. Lesley J. McNair, Chief of Staff, General Headquarters (GHQ), had carefully stated during the critique of Phase 2 of the Louisiana maneuvers that "So far as I know, no drastic purge of weak leaders is contemplated, although the issue undoubtedly has been clarified in many cases by performance during these maneuvers." (17)

Clarified indeed. Within a few months of the end of the maneuvers, at least six division commanders who had participated in the maneuvers (all National Guard major generals) were relieved, retired, or reassigned. In terms of junior officer losses, General McNair stated clearly after the fact that, "It was found necessary to make almost 100 percent replacement of the commissioned officers with troops from the grade of major general down through the grade of colonel and to replace an extremely high percentage of officers of lower rank." (18) The 37th Division alone suffered the loss of 119 of its officers. While the purge directly affected only 1 percent of the overall officer corps, the indirect results were felt politically throughout the entire National Guard community. (19)

The direct impact on the 34th Division was far from minimal. Just before the Louisiana maneuvers began, its commanding general, Maj. Gen. Russell Hartle, had taken command from Maj. Gen. E. A. Walsh, the National Guard commander, on the grounds of poor health. In addition, a significant number of Army Reserve officers arrived to fill slots created by the more gradual attrition of older officers. (It was estimated that over 22 percent of National Guard first lieutenants were past age forty in June 1941.) (20) This rapid changeover in the officer corps was disturbing to both enlisted men and officers. When added to the arrival of floods of replacements, the resulting personnel turmoil had a negative impact on the division's training posture. As one study of National Guard mobilization stated, "For divisions in training, personnel turbulence was, unquestionably, the leading obstacle to the development of proficient combat organizations." (21)

This turmoil did not stop even after war broke out and the 34th Division found itself alerted for overseas movement. The 34th Division was nearly the last National Guard division federalized. (It was the fourteenth mobilized out of eighteen National Guard divisions.) (22) In terms of strength, the 34th mobilized with 12,279 personnel which, for a square division, meant it was at roughly 60 percent strength. This was

actually a fairly high percentage; it was fourth in mobilized strength of all the divisions at the time of federalization (the strongest division was the 31st Division with 12,484 personnel). The 34th played no particularly distinguished part in the Louisiana maneuvers that can be determined. However, it was chosen to be the first division to go overseas almost immediately once war was declared. The 34th Division was deployed in January 1942, after only eleven months of active training and a short stint guarding the port facilities in New Orleans, Texas, and Florida. (23)

Given the above history of the 34th Division through 1941, one might well wonder why the 34th was chosen for deployment above several other divisions, which appear to have been better qualified. Both the 41st Division and the 2d Armored Division were praised for their operations in the Louisiana maneuvers in official reports, whereas almost no mention is found of the 34th Division. The division history, not an entirely objective source, states that it was chosen to be the first to deploy "because of its outstanding performance in the maneuvers and, because of its advanced state of training." (24) This seems to be wishful thinking.

The 34th had less time to train than virtually all of the National Guard divisions and most of the regular divisions. Yet it was selected even before regular units to deploy overseas to show the flag in Northern Ireland, Scotland, and England and to prepare for operations, perhaps even an invasion of Europe which was being contemplated for 1942 or 1943. (25) At the time, junior officers speculated that the division was to be some kind of sacrificial lamb in case of German invasion of the British Isles. (26) It is hard to image any rationale for the movement of a partially trained and poorly equipped National Guard division into a theater of war.

On the other hand, with all of the cross-leveling of personnel, transference of cadres to and from regular and Guard divisions and the influx of Army Reserve officers, it was probably no longer useful to categorize units as "Regular" or "National Guard". By this point in the mobilization process, it was probably true that the 34th was no worse off than most other units despite its short period of time in federal service.

This judgment is confirmed, to a certain degree, by a later study of reserve component mobilization in which it was determined that training time was not the critical factor in readiness. The quality of equipment and training facilities and the availability of rail and sea transport all played a greater part in the decision to deploy a trained unit than did the length of time the division had trained. (27) Considering all of the above

criteria, the 34th Division was probably neither better nor worse than other units available for deployment.

Immediately after Pearl Harbor, the regiments of the 34th Division were scattered about the southern United States from Texas to Florida, guarding ports, oil refineries, communications centers, and rail junctions. Finally, after Christmas, the units were brought back to Camp Claiborne and began to prepare for movement to a port of embarkation. The 168th Regiment, which had been designated as the first unit to move out, packed its equipment into boxes and loaded vehicles—well braced and tied down—onto railcars. Suddenly, however, the 133d Regiment was ordered to move out first. The 133d hurriedly threw its equipment in disorder on railcars and moved out. Eventually the reason for the confusion came to light. When General Hartle, the division commander, was asked by Army Ground Forces which of his units was ready to depart first, he mistakenly answered that it was the 133d. Rather than admit his mistake, Hartle changed the division plans to match his misstatement, with much confusion as a result. (28)

Just after the new year, the division moved in series by rail to Fort Dix, New Jersey. It arrived at Dix to find that the unit which had been at work constructing its new barracks had been shipped to Camp Claiborne. Many of the men had to move into tents: a drastic change from the warm climate and comfortable barracks in Louisiana. The tents had inadequate stoves and poor lighting. There were insufficient quantities of both coal and winter clothing.

To add to the confusion, the division had moved in the middle of its reorganization into a triangular division. It lost its infantry brigades, dropped one regiment (the 164th, which went out to the Pacific to join the Americal Division), and exchanged its artillery brigade for four separate artillery battalions. (29) This shift had a major impact on the division, as equipment was turned in, reissued, lost, and scattered. Worse, what little division-level training had been accomplished by the division had focused on square division tactics with two brigades of two regiments each on line. Now, an entirely new fighting arrangement of two regiments up and one back or three regiments on line, shifting combat commands, mobile reserves, and shifting task organizations had to be internalized by the already overtaxed division staff. New tactics often result from new organizations, and staffs need time to plan, wargame, and think through their actions in exercises before gaining the necessary level of competence under any new organization.

The 34th Infantry Division was forced to make a confusing move during a major reorganization while preparing for an overseas deployment in the unsettled days of January 1942. The experience did not instill confidence in the officers or men of the division.

The first elements of the 34th Division to move overseas were the 1st Battalion, 133d Infantry; the 151st Artillery Battalion; and the forward division headquarters. These units departed Brooklyn Navy Yard on 14 January and landed at Belfast, Northern Ireland, on 26 January. The division headquarters and headquarters units, the remainder of the 133d Regiment, and the 168th Regiment of the division began moving from Fort Dix on 18 February, first to the Brooklyn Navy Yard, then reaching Belfast a few weeks later. The final increment of the division, the 135th Infantry and the 125th and 185th Artillery Battalions, sailed from New York on 30 April and arrived on 10 May. (30) It thus took almost four months to complete the movement of the division overseas.

Deployment and Training in Northern Ireland and Scotland

In Northern Ireland the units of the 34th were scattered over the countryside in small battalion-size encampments. They occupied tents and later Nissen huts recently vacated by British units. Their collective training doubtless suffered because of this scattering. The training areas in Northern Ireland were not well suited for large unit maneuvering. Even when brought together in regimental size elements, it was extremely difficult to perform large unit maneuvers. All of the terrain was under cultivation and the fields were divided up into small picturesque plots surrounded by hedges and stone walls. (Actually, this was excellent training ground for what other units would face two years later in Normandy.)

Much of the training consisted of physical toughening drills such as obstacle courses and speed march competitions between units. Training with tanks was still not a priority although the British managed to scrape up a few lightly armored Bren gun carriers. A few units managed to train with some obsolete tanks upon the arrival of elements of the 1st Armored Division. (31) However, several infantrymen contacted later indicated that they never saw a tank during training in Ireland or Scotland. What little combined arms training there was, was probably episodic in nature.

As for equipment, many of the men were still armed with Springfield rifles and wore the old World War I "dishpan" helmets. There were few antitank

guns and precious little ammunition of any kind.

The lack of equipment had a definite impact on training. Live fire exercises were rare. (32) One of the antitank companies of the 168th Regiment, the first to fight at Kasserine Pass, had only a few 37-mm. towed antitank pieces. Because of the ammunition shortage, one of the units rigged up a .30-caliber rifle with a wire attached to the trigger and built a wooden carriage to mount it on to simulate antitank firing. The men used chewing gum to make the crosshairs for bore sighting the piece. The unit finally was issued six rounds of 37-mm. ammunition per gun to fire so the men could get used to the noise before using it in combat. They fired these rounds into the water in Scotland since there were no targets or ranges of sufficient length available. (33) The rest of the time the men were on rifle ranges firing antitank grenades from their rifles, a totally useless weapon against any tank on the battlefield except for a few obsolete models. The men even lacked the blank rounds needed to shoot these primitive grenades from their rifles. They were forced to pull the lead out of their own rounds, stuff GI soap into them to hold in the powder, and fire the grenades with these homemade blanks. (34)

Artillery units were in better shape, although they had their own problems with the training areas. Many of the artillery rounds they fired into the uninhabited moors (which had been designated as impact areas) failed to detonate. The moors were so soggy and springy that the soil did not always set off the detonator. This made it very challenging to adjust fire. On the positive side, artillery observers experienced rounds being fired over their heads for the first time. (35)

While in Northern Ireland all the units drew up alert plans for a possible enemy seaborne invasion. This fact would tend to confirm the idea that the 34th was moved to Ulster as an insurance policy against German raids. However, after the units settled in there is no evidence that any of these alerts were actually tested. No units occupied their paper positions, which implies that whatever threat may have existed in January or February was nonexistent by May. (36)

Early in June 1942 General Hartle, the commanding general of the 34th Division, appointed his aide, Capt. William Darby, to organize the first Rangers. Naturally, most of the personnel came from the 34th Division, which added to the drain of trained manpower. Those men selected as Rangers received excellent training and evolved into a formidable combat force; however hundreds of the division's best men were siphoned off. The Rangers trained separately

with the British commandos. While many of the men eventually returned to the division in North Africa and Italy, they were for all intents and purposes lost to the division for the remainder of the training in the British Isles.

British commando training, however, was not reserved just for the Rangers. Most of the 168th Regiment, after its move to Scotland in July, had some instruction led by the commandos. The regiment was concentrated on the Duke of Argyle's estate near Inverary and practiced amphibious assaults at the nearby Loch Fyne and Strachen Beach.

While at Inverary the regiment changed commanders twice. Col. Folsom Everest was replaced, and within just a few weeks, his replacement yielded in turn to Col. (later Lt. Gen.) John O'Daniel. Two of three battalion commanders were replaced, as was the regimental executive officer. These men had been with the regiment throughout its training and now, on the eve of combat operations, they were replaced by regulars. A great deal of resentment, focused within division headquarters, surfaced against these new commanders. (37) Strangely enough, most of the replacement officers stayed with the regiment only long enough to land in North Africa before they too were replaced. Some later wondered if the 34th was being used as a "training aid" for the Army officer corps. (38)

The 34th Division, now under the command of Maj. Gen. Charles S. Ryder, did not deploy to North Africa as a division. Each regiment, and sometimes battalions within regiments, traveled a separate path. The majority of the 168th Infantry Regiment, formed into a combat team with the addition of the 175th Artillery Battalion, landed near BEER Beach WHITE west of Algiers on 8 November 1942. The first units became lost and actually landed between Beach WHITE and Beach GREEN. The regiment was scattered over fifteen miles of coast, logistic supply was a nightmare, and communications were almost nonexistent. Nevertheless, the team advanced overland, dominated the road network and captured the critical airport at Blide. It accomplished its mission despite some initial confusion and surprisingly heavy French resistance. (39)

One battalion of the 135th Infantry Regiment landed as part of the TERMINAL force. Loaded on two British destroyers, it crashed directly through the defenses of the port of Algiers and landed the battalion in the teeth of heavy French opposition. The firing was so heavy that the destroyers took a number of hits and had to go back out to sea. The abandoned force soon ran low of ammunition and had to surrender. The men remained

prisoners of the French for only a few days before the 168th Combat Team occupied Algiers under the terms of the cease-fire arranged with the French.

The remainder of the 34th Division did not participate in the invasion. It stayed in the United Kingdom until late in December and then sailed from Liverpool, landing at Oran in early January despite a torpedo attack which almost sank its transport. One of the battalions of the 133d Infantry Regiment was then assigned to honor guard duties in Algiers, and the rest of the division, minus the 168th Regimental Combat Team (RCT), moved to western Algeria and conducted another round of training exercises and maneuvers in the hills surrounding the city of Tlemcen. The 168th RCT moved to Constantine where it remained until 29 January when it was placed under the command of the 1st Armored Division in the Gafsa-Sbeitla area of Tunisia. It was this unit that first faced the Germans at Sened Station and Faid Pass, near Kasserine Pass.

The 168th RCT, having already had three regimental commanders in the past six months, received a new commander on 31 January 1943. Col. Thomas Drake, a dynamic if somewhat rash individual, almost immediately launched a reckless attack on Sened Station. Taking this objective on 2 February, the regiment stayed for two days under heavy German air attack. However, it was isolated too far forward and withdrew to the Gafsa vicinity under orders. The regiment had accomplished little except to give the troops a baptism of fire, a baptism which cost the regiment's first battalion some 20 percent casualties, including its battalion commander, killed in action. (40) On 7 February the regiment was ordered to Sidi Bou Zid to guard the Faid Pass and arrived there two days later.

The action around Faid Pass can be summarized briefly. The 168th Regiment set up two battalion strongpoints on the high ground north and south of Faid Pass. One battalion was kept in reserve, but none of the units was in mutually supporting positions. Visitors from General Eisenhower on down came to the position and all seemingly approved the disposition. The II Corps, the 1st Armored Division headquarters, and its Combat Command A, which was to direct the operations of the 168th Regiment in the upcoming battle, failed to notice a problem with the above positions.

While at Sidi Bou Zid the regiment received 450 new replacements, some of whom had never been through basic training. On the night of 12 February the units also received their first shipments of the new bazooka, a 2.75-inch rocket launcher antitank weapon.

The Germans attacked in force through the pass on

14 and 15 February, and the battalions of the 168th were quickly cut off. U.S. tanks from the 1st Armored Division charged bravely but foolishly into German gunsights on the plain, and the obsolete Grant and Stuart tanks crumbled before the German armor. On the hills the men of the 168th watched helplessly as the armored battle settled their fate. With communications cut off, water growing short, and ammunition running low, Colonel Drake ordered his men to break out as best they could on the night of 16-17 February. Virtually the entire 3d Battalion was captured along with almost half of the 2d Battalion. The regimental headquarters, including Colonel Drake, was also captured. The 168th Regiment lost about 2,200 men during this initial engagement, including at least 1,400 prisoners. (41) Only the 1st Battalion escaped relatively intact.

It took the remnants of the 168th Regiment a month to rebuild, refit, and process replacements. In essence, it became a new unit; the 168th Regiment of the Iowa National Guard was destroyed. The regiment and the rest of the division spent the intervening month training harder in patrolling, controlling artillery fires, and defending against air attack. None of their previous training had prepared them for the fact that the enemy would control the skies or that he would attack with a coordinated, all-arms team.

Finally, at the end of March, the entire division was united under its own command. It was placed under II Corps and directed by Maj. Gen. George S. Patton, Jr., the new corps commander, to capture Fondouk Pass. In this first action by the entire division, many of the same weaknesses noted in the 168th Infantry Regiment's actions at Faid Pass were repeated. Poor coordination with armor, inadequate air support, and lack of experience in the battalion and regimental staffs in coordinating attacks resulted in some units losing contact with the units on their flanks and faltering under the German guns. The bravery and personal toughness of the individual American soldier was not enough to put together a coordinated attack.

The division tried again to capture the pass, this time under the command of the British IX Corps, commanded by Lt. Gen. Sir John Crocker. Attacking frontally, as ordered, over the open ground southwest of the pass, the men of the "Red Bull" were easy targets for the dug-in Germans. The German rear guard held the 34th long enough for the main German and Italian forces to slip away.

Despite having been mishandled by the British, the division came under severe criticism from General Crocker. He recommended that the division be with-

drawn from combat and sent for retraining in the rear under British guidance. (42) This suggestion naturally did not set well with the division officers or the American high command. They felt that Crocker had misused the 34th Division in a series of frontal assaults and assigned it impossible objectives. Both Lt. Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower and British General Harold R.L.A. Alexander did their best to crush the mutual recriminations that resulted from this battle. Partly as a result, however, the 34th underwent another series of retraining exercises which included emphasis on night attacks, infantry-tank operations, attacks behind rolling artillery barrages, and mountain operations. (43)

The training and the combat experience combined to create a more effective division. The transition from peacetime training to wartime operations, despite two years of exercises, invasions, and tactical movements, had been very difficult and painful for the 34th.

Conclusions

The story of the first two years of the activated 34th Infantry Division is not a particularly happy one. It is a story of shortages of equipment, training, and personnel that ends in initial failure on the battlefield. However, in defense of the 34th, it should be remembered that the poor state of the mobilization base of the United States in the early days of the war was more to blame for the division's shortcomings than were the officers and men of the division. The men trained as hard as they could under the severe limitations of poor equipment, a shortage of training areas, and inexperienced officers. They became physically tough and confident in their individual abilities to fight and win.

The mobilization and training system disrupted the division's cohesion and growth too frequently. Personnel turbulence, the relief and reshuffling of officers, and a major reorganization during deployment overseas all contributed to the division's initial difficulties. While stationed in the British Isles the division suffered significant personnel losses with the creation of the Rangers, was starved of training ammunition, and was prevented by circumstances inherent in the terrain from any large-scale combined arms training. The officers tried their best to remedy these shortcomings, but were unsuccessful. The division trained as hard as it could under the circumstances, but it faced the reality of a different battlefield than the one for which it had trained. The 34th did not fight as a division, but as a collection of smaller units under other divisional commands. It learned its lessons the hard way, in combat, outgunned and out-generated by the battle-hardened German *Afrika Korps*. If blame must be placed, it should fall upon the U.S. Army's inexperienced higher ranking officers who placed the 34th Division, piecemeal, in a series of untenable positions. There was no shortage of courage or even physical and mental toughness on the part of most of the men of the "Red Bull" division: they were as ready as individuals could be. But trained individuals are never enough. Trained teams—well versed in the means to synchronize all their weapons and systems on the battlefield and trained in realistic combat conditions—are necessary to win on the battlefield.

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Notes

1. John C. Binkley, "A History of U.S. Army Force Structuring," in *20th Century War: The American Experience Book of Readings* (Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: Command and General Staff College, 1986), pp. 139-55; see also John Ney, *Evolution of the U.S. Army Division: 1939-1968* (Fort Belvoir, Va.: Combat Operations Research Group M-194, U.S. Army Combat Developments Command, 1969).

2. Taken from "A Year in Federal Service," a typewritten synopsis of the division's history, lent to the author by Dr. John Westover, a former member of the 151st and 175th Artillery Battalions of the 34th Division. Dr. Westover also lent copies of the 175th Field Artillery

Battalion journal, his own memoirs of his service during this period, and two video tapes of the 34th Division history. His assistance was invaluable in adding a personal touch to a study otherwise dominated by official—read "dull"—documents.

3. *Biennial Report of the Adjutant General of the State of Iowa, 1942.*

4. Martin Blumenson, "Kasserine Pass, 30 January-22 February 1943," in *America's First Battles, 1776-1965*, Charles E. Heller and William A. Stofft, eds. (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1986), p. 239.

5. *Biennial Report of the Adjutant General of the State of Iowa, 1940*, p. 5. Even field training at Fort Dodge

(the usual summer camp location until 1940) consisted of little more than range firing, marching, and small unit drill. There was no artillery range at Camp Dodge and precious little maneuver space. In addition, units had their training interrupted during earlier years by strikebreaking activity (e.g., Maytag Washing Machine Plant strike, July 1938) and other civil disturbance/emergency relief duties.

6. John H. Hougen, *The Story of the Famous 34th Infantry Division* (Nashville: The Battery Press, 1949, 1979), chapter 7.

7. *Biennial Report of the Adjutant General of the State of Iowa, Supplement to the 1941 Report*, Archives and Records Department of Iowa, Camp Dodge, Johnston, Iowa.

8. Homer R. Ankrum, *Dogfaces Who Smiled Through Tears in World War II* (Lake Mills, Iowa: Graphic Publishing Co., 1987), p. 27.

9. Training Orders, 34th Division, located in the Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth, Kans., folder N-19734. This folder includes a copy of the division master training schedule, the plan for setting up the intelligence classes as part of the overall schedule of classes, and a map of the training areas and ranges at Camp Claiborne. Areas are still set aside for the 67th and 68th Brigade headquarters. The division did not triangularize until it was on its way overseas.

10. "The Background of the 135th Infantry," on deposit in the 34th Infantry Division Gold Star Museum, Camp Dodge, Iowa.

11. Interview, author with Dewey Wood, medic in 3d Battalion, 168th Infantry, 34th Division, at Camp Dodge, 7 Mar 90; interview, author with Edward Bird, then second lieutenant and captain, commander first of the antitank company, then an infantry company, 1st Battalion, 168th Infantry, 34th Division, at Camp Dodge, 8 Mar 90.

12. Ankrum, *Dogfaces*, pp. 47-48.

13. Apparently there was one maneuver in July pitting the inexperienced 34th Division against the equally inexperienced 32d Division. I have been unable to discover any account of these maneuvers between the two units that were the first American divisions to launch offensives in Europe and Asia, respectively. In any event, collective training events between these equally untrained divisions were the equivalent of the blind leading the blind.

14. Other V Corps units that appear to have had more mock combat exposure were the 32d and 37th Divisions.

15. Christopher R. Gabel, "The U.S. Army GHQ

Maneuvers of 1941," Ph.D. dissertation, Ohio State University, 1981, pp. 167-95.

16. Idem, Edward Bird and Dewey Wood interviews.

17. Lt Gen L.J. McNair, 2d Phase, GHQ-Directed Maneuvers, quoted in Gabel, "The U.S. Army GHQ Maneuvers of 1941," p. 197. General McNair later became Commander, Army Ground Forces, which grew out of the GHQ structure and which was activated on 9 March 1942 to oversee creation and training of the Army's ground units.

18. I. Heymont and E.W. McGregor, *Review and Analysis of Recent Mobilizations and Deployments of U.S. Army Reserve Components* (McLean, Va.: Research Analysis Corp., 1972), pp. 2-8.

19. Gabel, "The U.S. Army GHQ Maneuvers of 1941," pp. 198-200.

20. *Ibid.*, p. 198.

21. John S. Brown, "Winning Teams: Mobilization-Related Correlates of Success in American World War II Infantry Divisions," MMAS thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1985, p. 40.

22. Only four other National Guard divisions mobilized later (the 28th, 43d, 40th, and 33d Divisions).

23. The next divisions to deploy were in March 1942 to the Pacific, but these had been mobilized for an additional seven months: the 41st, followed within days by the 27th. The 32d followed in April, after eighteen months of training.

24. Hougen, *Story of the Famous 34th*.

25. See the discussions on ROUNDUP, SLEDGEHAMMER, and BOLERO in Chapter 1, "The Roots of Strategy," in Gordon Harrison, *Cross-Channel Attack* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1951), pp. 1-45.

26. Interview, author with Dr. John Westover, former second lieutenant, Artillery, in the 175th Artillery Battalion, at the TRADOC Historians Conference, Fort Monroe, Va., 17 Jan 90.

27. Heymont and McGregor, *Review and Analysis*, pp. 2-9.

28. Ankrum, *Dogfaces*, pp. 61-62.

29. John Westover, unpublished manuscript, loaned to the author, chapter 5, pp. 30-31. The author sincerely appreciates the loan of Dr. Westover's memoirs and other material relating to the 34th Division.

30. Hougen, *Story of the Famous 34th*.

31. Ankrum, *Dogfaces*, pp. 82-83.

32. *Ibid.*, p. 104.

33. Edward Bird interview. They did this firing on 1,000-inch ranges, which were not of great value to antitank practice. See also Ankrum, *Dogfaces*, p. 91.

Miniature tanks were fabricated by one of the men, as well as a conveyor belt for moving them across the range.

34. Dewey Wood interview.

35. Westover manuscript, chapter 6, p. 9. The firing occurred in the Antrim Mountains in Northern Ireland.

36. Edward Bird interview.

37. One of the former company commanders of the 168th (Lt. Edward Bird) indicated that shifts in command at the regimental or even battalion level did not have much impact on the company's operations.

38. Hougen, *Story of the Famous 34th*, chapter 9.

39. George F. Howe, *Northwest Africa: Seizing the Initiative in the West* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army

Center of Military History, 1957), pp. 229-40.

40. This individual was Lt. Col. John C. Petty, a long-standing member of the Iowa National Guard. He enlisted in 1921, made first sergeant, and was reduced in grade before being discharged in 1926. He enlisted again and became a second lieutenant in 1931 and a lieutenant colonel in January 1943. *Biennial Report of the Adjutant General of the State of Iowa, 1944*, p. 61, General Order no. 5, State Adjutant General.

41. Blumenson's figures, in *America's First Battles*, p. 252; Howe, *Seizing the Initiative*, pp. 410-24.

42. Howe, *Seizing the Initiative*, p. 590.

43. *Ibid.*, p. 591.

Editor's Journal

This issue highlights the U.S. Army in North Africa, beginning with Dr. Richard W. Stewart's lead article. The *Archaic Archivist* focuses on the Military History Institute's holdings on North Africa, and Dr. Boyd L. Dastrup's article examines field artillery as it was brought to bear in that theater.

This issue contains the cumulative index for 1992, as well as certain papers from the 1990 Conference of Army Historians. Brig. Gen. Harold Nelson intends to incorporate selected papers from the 1990 and 1992 conferences into future issues. Readers should note that publication in *Army History* in no way precludes the Center from later publishing these, and other, conference papers in another format.

I want to thank Lt. Col. Martin Andresen, Deputy Director at the Military History Institute, for an *Archaic Archivist* column in support of our North Africa theme. This is the seventh contribution from the "Archaic Archivist" himself, Dr. Richard Sommers.

Finally, a word of apology to Col. Stephen Bowman concerning his article on Wilson's cavalry campaign of 1865 in the Summer 1992 (No. 23) issue. We sometimes have to "compress" endnotes for printing purposes. Unfortunately, Colonel Bowman's submission, as published, included the compressed notes (fifty-five in number), but endnote numbers in the body of the article that still referred to the original notes (seventy-two in all); certainly this was not Colonel Bowman's fault. Any of our readers who were confused by the error and who wish to have a copy of the full, original notes, can write to the Managing Editor.

A.G. Fisch, Jr.

The Chief's Corner

Harold W. Nelson

As Chief of Military History I have spent many hours—some might say too many—leading staff rides over various U.S. Army battlefields. I think the rediscovery of the historical staff ride has been an important factor in strengthening the Army's use of military history in recent years. Staff rides certainly have helped many officers focus on warfighting challenges, and some Army leaders credit staff rides as the inspiration to study the art of war more seriously. Since there is no narrowly defined "staff ride program," I am devoting this column to a few reflections on what we are accomplishing with the program and some predictions for its future.

Army officers began systematic study on Civil War battle sites early in this century. They continued the practice until the eve of World War II, adding materials for similar studies on American Expeditionary Forces battlefields in France while maintaining the focus on Civil War sites. Accessibility of sources and sites made the Civil War battles most practical for an officer corps and a school system centered in the continental United States, but those battles seemed remote from the demands of "modern" warfare when the Army turned its full attention to the challenges of World War II. The victorious postwar Army, eager to project a progressive image in the nuclear era, was slow to rediscover the educational value of studying war on an actual battlefield. Command historians in Germany and Korea led a few trips to important nearby battlefields, and the Army War College conducted an annual tour of Gettysburg, but most officers of the late 1970s never experienced a staff ride.

The rediscovery began about ten years ago when both the Combat Studies Institute at Fort Leavenworth and the Army War College at Carlisle Barracks began to instruct selected officers in staff ride methods, to lead staff rides for a wide range of military groups, and to collect historical materials specially tailored for use on battlefields. Now everyone from ROTC cadets to four-star generals has the opportunity to participate in substantive educational experiences on old battlefields.

The most important staff rides are being conducted for young officers and precommissioning groups. Army battlefields can help them see how leaders' decisions influence tactical outcomes, how terrain shapes en-

agements, and how technology, tactics, and organization interact in a battlefield setting. Those observations, when combined with curiosity and diligence, lay the groundwork for a lifetime of professional reading and will produce officers within each year group who are mentally prepared for a warfighting role.

Senior officers reinforce their knowledge of those combat basics when they study a battlefield or campaign, but their staff rides justifiably focus on warfighting generalship: How does the operational plan evolve? How are major decisions communicated? What is the role of senior commanders in executing and modifying the plan? How do theater-level logistics influence outcomes? What is the relationship between the strategic rear and the battlefield?

In the past few years an increasing number of commanders and staff principals have been taking their officers on staff rides. These groups combine officers having varied backgrounds but common current interests, resulting in stimulating discussions of both historical factors and current concerns. These groups now include people who have participated in other staff rides and have high expectations for the return on time invested.

While Civil War battlefields are still most frequently visited, excellent staff rides are available in Korea and Europe. Groups in Europe can choose battlefields from many wars, and improved access to Eastern Europe has expanded their geographic range. The focus on commemorating World War II led 1st Armored Division members to expand the range in a different direction when they visited Kasserine Pass and associated sites in Tunisia last fall.

Many staff ride leaders and advocates around the Army are products of Dr. Glenn Robertson's excellent course at Fort Leavenworth or Dr. Jay Luvaas' extensive program at Carlisle Barracks. Others have been groomed by Mr. Billy Arthur and Mr. Ted Ballard here at CMH. During fiscal year 1992, we at CMH conducted forty-six staff rides to Civil War battlefields around Washington. As you can see, the demand for staff ride support has been increasing, and capable leaders have accepted larger workloads while bringing new recruits into their midst.

Some of the finest recruits have been in the U.S.

Army Reserve and National Guard. While it is often difficult for Reserve Component units to find opportunities to conduct staff rides, there have been many innovative solutions to problems of time, distance, and competing priorities. National Guard staff rides can be especially evocative, because there are often direct lineal connections between today's units and those encountered on the historic battlefield.

I believe the future volume and quality of staff rides in the Army will exceed present levels. The command climate for staff rides as a tool in officer professional development is improving as advocates rise to higher rank. The use of specialized staff rides in areas such as logistics, signals, or medical services is expanding, broadening the professional appeal of the effort. Specialized support materials are proliferating, and civilian historians continue to produce monographs for the large commercial audience that can be applied on staff rides.

Creating a clearinghouse for that literature is still a challenge. Ted Ballard's columns in *Army History* are a step toward that goal, and the long-term effort to build an accessible digitalized data base for Army historians will eventually solve that problem. Main-

taining high standards of scholarship and relevance is another important challenge. Officers who participate in a staff ride expect the historian who leads them to have a firm grasp of the historical details, so scholarship cannot be neglected. But historical detail without perspective on current Army concerns reduces the effectiveness of the staff ride experience. Finding the right balance is an art, and holding that balance at a high standard is extremely demanding.

The Army has not initiated a "train the trainer" program for staff ride leaders because each battlefield poses unique challenges and each group has special needs. An informal apprentice system produces new leaders and Glenn Robertson's pamphlet *The Staff Ride* (CMH Pub 70-21) still provides the general framework necessary to plan and conduct a successful staff ride. Those of us who have spent many years in history education in the Army recognize a familiar pattern in the continuing success of the staff ride program: dedicated, knowledgeable teachers; compelling subject matter; sensitivity to student needs; and tremendous enthusiasm in the execution of the program. As long as these characteristics endure, the program will flourish.

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War Planning at the U.S. Army War College, 1934-40

The Road to RAINBOW

Henry G. Gole

This article is derived from a paper Colonel Gole presented to the 1990 Conference of Army Historians in Washington. Dr. Judith Bellafaire edited the article for Army History. This article is copy protected. All rights reserved by the author.

Conventional Wisdom and Revision

The case presented here revises an interpretation of United States war planning between the world wars that has been the conventional wisdom on the subject since 1953. This conventional wisdom holds that the color plans of the 1920s and 1930s were not in touch with contemporary international events; that they were abstract, unreal, and not useful to the planners of 1939-41 who devised the RAINBOW Plans that provided strategic options to political authority and strategic direction for those who would fight World War II.

Examples of what has been found in previously unexploited archives illustrate three major points contradicting common belief: 1) Planning at the U.S. Army War College (USAWC) from 1934 to 1940 was realistic and in touch with contemporary international developments; 2) the same planning was strikingly prescient in anticipating both friendly and enemy actions and the course of the conflict as the United States with allies fought a two-ocean war; and 3) the War Department General Staff was fully aware of the planning for coalition warfare at the Army War College and often used the students to augment its own undermanned divisions.

Writing in 1953, Maurice Matloff gave high marks to the harried American military planners of 1939-41 who designed the RAINBOW Plans that realistically addressed the most likely threats to the security of their country, and he dismissed earlier war planning as simplistic and irrelevant. Referring to the color plans of the 1920s and 1930s, he wrote:

A characteristic of all these plans was their limited scope. Nothing in the way of a global or total war was envisaged. With the exception of ORANGE (signifying Japan), they bore little relation to contemporary developments in international affairs. ⁽¹⁾

Describing the activities of American military planners on the eve of war, he asserted that it was not until 1939-41 that planning underwent a change from the "abstract exercises" of the color plan period "to reestablish contact with reality" by recognizing Germany and Japan as the likely foes. ⁽²⁾

It is Matloff's observations that have become the conventional wisdom on American war planning between the two world wars. ⁽³⁾ There has been no challenge to Matloff's interpretation to date, nor has he changed his mind. ⁽⁴⁾ A fresh look at war planning in the United States in the 1930s is needed, because the mainstream interpretation missed evidence that links work done at the U.S. Army War College to the RAINBOW Plans.

A memorandum dated 14 March 1957 from Louis Morton (as Deputy Chief Historian) through Kent Roberts Greenfield (Chief Historian) to the Chief of Military History refers to "25 foot-lockers of Course Material in the AWC basement and attic." Morton wrote:

The collection at Carlisle, housed partly in the attic of the library of the present AWC is... probably only second in value to the General Staff [collection] of the period 1919-1941...at the [National] Archives. The College during these years was primarily an educational institution, *but its students for part of this period based their studies on the actual war plans developed by the joint and general staffs... and did important spade work [for the joint and general staffs].* (Emphasis added)

That "spade work" is the antecedent of the RAINBOW Plans and connects War College planning to General Staff work. ⁽⁵⁾

Morton scanned the contents of the footlockers, recognized their value, and wanted them for the Center of Military History. There is no record that the materials ever got to Washington. It appears that the curricular materials in the archives of the U.S. Army Military History Institute (MHI), Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, include the former contents of those footlockers. In any event, the course materials for the

period 1919-40 were not available to the authors of the relevant volumes in the series called the United States Army in World War II. (6) Had Matloff and co-author Edwin M. Snell been aware of the war planning at the college, particularly that portion of the war plans period from 1934 to 1940 called Participation with Allies, they would have known that there was a transition stage leading from the color plans to the RAINBOW Plans. Planning Participation with Allies was strategic planning for coalition warfare; it anticipated that the United States would fight as a part of an allied coalition against an enemy two-ocean coalition.

Matloff knew that significant modifications to his interpretation of prewar plans and preparations would be made by future historians as new sources were inevitably uncovered. In 1953 he said, "The full story must be sought in the archives of the Service, Inter-Service, and British-American staff agencies, which are still in the very early stages of being mined by professional scholars." (7)

We now have access to the Army War College course materials that apparently are those identified by Louis Morton in 1957. No one has gone through the 1919-40 course materials specifically with war plans in mind, nor has anyone asked if what was done at the college mattered to the General Staff. The present study does both and reports findings that modify the way we should understand United States war planning between the world wars. The RAINBOW Plans were neither a spontaneous combustion nor *deus ex machina*. War planning at AWC from 1934 to 1940 fed directly into the RAINBOW Plans.

War planning at AWC had always been taken very seriously. Assistant Commandant George S. Simonds said of the 1922-23 curriculum: "The actual preparation of war plans had been given more prominence than any other feature of the course." (8) The class of 1925 was told:

It is essential that you keep in mind all during the year that all work done is preliminary to and preparatory for the preparation of actual war plans. Almost without exception everything undertaken during the year has its application, either direct or indirect, to the preparation of war plans. (9)

Emphasis on war planning in the AWC course continued right up to 1940. (10)

War plans based on GREEN (Mexico) and CRIMSON (Canada) were played routinely because it was

prudent to have plans on file to cover war with contiguous foreign powers. ORANGE (Japan) was also played each year after 1906 when war planners—after the Russo-Japanese War—recognized that conflict between the United States and Japan was one of the more likely wars of the future. Indeed, the U.S. Navy was inclined to regard a future war with Japan as inevitable. (11) RED (Great Britain) was played frequently because it filled a pedagogical need of the school: RED provided the only enemy whose power could be projected to America's Atlantic backyard and, with the cooperation of Canada, to the American Northeast. (12)

Until Germany, Italy, and Japan showed a willingness to use military force in the 1930s, one had to stretch one's imagination to find a direct military threat to the United States in the years between the two world wars. Nevertheless, war planning at the Army War College from 1934 began to show a good deal of imagination as students carefully monitored contemporary developments in international affairs and considered coalition warfare on a global scale. (13)

Review of the plans from 1934 to 1940 demonstrates that planners kept one eye on the region assigned for study by the faculty and one eye on the other side of the world where events raised doubts in the minds of planners as to the location of the greater threat to the United States. There was an awareness that one might easily fall into the trap of committing forces or other resources to the wrong theater or to the wrong war. Students at the Army War College were conditioned to think of simultaneous wars in the Pacific and in Europe.

As American involvement in war moved from the realm of possibility in the early 1930s to that of high probability in the late 1930s, planners turned their attention to the Western Hemisphere from 1938 through 1940. The modest resources immediately available to the nation, and especially to the nation's third-rate Army, suggested that only modest short-term strategies were possible initially. Defense of the so-called Alaska-Hawaii-Panama strategic triangle was about all the United States could manage until American potential was more fully realized.

1934 AWC Planning for Coalition Warfare: Japan

The introduction of Participation with Allies to the war plans portion of the course at the AWC in 1934 brought a new realism to war planning. (14) A U.S.-led coalition consisting of BLUE (the United States), PINK (the Soviet Union), RED (Britain), and YELLOW (China) confronted ORANGE (Japan) and CARNATION

(Manchukuo). The backdrop to the scenario was the actual international situation in 1933-34, except that in the war game PINK and ORANGE are actually fighting, and ORANGE has violated BLUE neutrality. The situation presented to the students can be summarized as follows. PINK and ORANGE come to blows without declaration of war. BLUE attempts to get the disputing parties to an international body for arbitration, but: "Orange would probably refuse to take part in, or would withdraw from this conference.... This action would be similar to the manner in which Orange withdrew from the League of Nations as a result of the Manchurian affair." (15) The prospective allies agree to a conference "...to settle the terms on which they would deter the war and to decide on the contribution each would promise for its prosecution." This conference evolves into a "permanent Inter-Allied War Council." Ultimately, BLUE, RED, PINK, and YELLOW declare war on ORANGE and CARNATION.

One reality struck the committee immediately: the distances involved. From San Francisco to Manila via Hawaii is about 7,000 miles. ORANGE is a mere 400 to 600 miles from any port between Vladivostok and Shanghai. The distance to the U.S. naval base in the Philippines is significant, but there was even worse news about it: the United States had failed in all the years since 1898 to fortify a base in the Philippines. That meant that the United States would almost certainly be denied a base in the region shortly after the initiation of hostilities with Japan. It was assumed that Japan would enjoy local superiority and seize the Philippines at the war's outset.

The strategic choices became: 1) a risky bold stroke requiring the U.S. Navy to cover great distances to confront the Japanese fleet in a decisive Trafalgar-like battle close to Japan, or 2) seizure of air and sea bases en route to the Far East as the fleet conducted a much slower and more deliberate strategy.

In the context of this scenario the British fleet would take much of the pressure off the Americans. However, even with the overwhelmingly superior naval power of the two fleets available to them, in developing the scenario the allies were careful--too careful in the opinion of those uninitiated to naval combat. Capt. William F. Halsey, USN—a student in the class of 1934—was asked during the question and answer session why the naval operation took so long when the friendly coalition enjoyed such clear naval superiority. He responded with an analysis that was made the previous year at the Naval War College when he attended that course. In brief, the U.S. Navy

response to a Japanese defensive strategy was the slower and more deliberate offensive. Since the United States would prevail in a long war of materiel, it would be foolish to risk all on the roll of the dice. (16)

Even before deciding on a specific course of action, it was clear that the United States would need a big troop buildup including mobilization and conscription. (17) The planners showed a realistic appreciation of public opinion and an understanding of American traditions and institutions. Their ruminations foreshadowed the contentious peacetime conscription of 1940 and the cautious course the president had to follow in dealing with the public, the press, and the Congress as the country edged toward war. The connection between foreign and domestic policy was also appreciated, and the psychological predisposition of the American people was understood, i.e., war would lead to economic recovery but:

American public opinion and sentiments are, in general, opposed to the conduct of war, and it would require flagrant enemy acts and properly handled propaganda to arouse the nation to the point of prosecuting a war effectively. (18)

The students displayed confidence in the potential of the United States to overwhelm any foe, but they expressed their concern for the short term. By 240M (240 days after mobilization) the BLUE coalition would be superior to ORANGE, but until then the situation was dangerous. The United States had to depend upon others and good luck while it built its armed forces for war. Speculation about what the Japanese would do concluded that they would go on the strategic defensive.

Orange will consider, but not adopt, a surprise submarine attack against the Blue Fleet, assembling in Hawaiian waters....Orange Fleet will assume the strategic defensive and conduct a war of attrition with submarines. (19)

The American planners believed that the Imperial Japanese Navy would form an outer line of light forces to harass approaching enemy naval forces and subject them to attrition. The inner line of Japanese battleships, land-based aircraft, mines, and coastal defense guns would then engage the depleted enemy force in a decisive battle that would determine the outcome of the war. The planners were convinced that control of the

sea would lead to ultimate victory, because control of the sea was required to maintain land forces in the Pacific region. One suspects that the Army students were attentive to Halsey on naval matters and that he applied the 1933 Naval War College solution to the Army War College problem of 1934.

The committee concluded its presentation by saying that the degree of cooperation attained by the allies in the Great War was about as much as one could expect. And then they added a remark that immediately brings Franklin D. Roosevelt and Winston Churchill to mind: "The most important factors in determining the degree of cooperation and unity of effort that an alliance can obtain are the personalities of its civil and military leaders." They unknowingly described Dwight D. Eisenhower when they said, "Tact and diplomatic skill are essential qualifications for an allied Commander-in-Chief." (20)

1935, 1936, and 1937 AWC Planning for Coalition Warfare: Germany and Japan

The Participation with Allies portion of the 1935 course demonstrates as well that the faculty was in touch with contemporary international affairs and that the students were sophisticated in their analyses of all instruments of state power as they wrestled with complex political-military issues handed to them by their faculty. The scenario presented the students with a problem in Europe, but Japan's readiness to exploit the European situation to its advantage in the Far East raised the real possibility of American involvement in a two-ocean war. The student briefer of the committee report was not engaging in hyperbole or buttering up the faculty on 17 April 1935 when he said:

This situation was conceived by the Faculty some months ago and events of today outside the walls of this institution, are in a fair way to substantiate the Faculty's flight of fancy to a degree most flattering to the perspicacity of that august body. Indeed the members of War Plans Group #4 have experienced some difficulty in keeping separate the developments of the problem from the news in the daily press. (21)

As the situation develops, a Nazi coup in Austria results in Italian occupation of Alpine passes with the approval of Britain and France. War follows as Italy confronts Germany and Austria; France occupies the Saar and sends troops to the Rhine but—significantly—not beyond. The Nazi Confederation consists of Germany, Austria, Hungary, and Yugoslavia. A Ger-

man-financed revolt breaks out in the Ukraine; Czechoslovakia is overrun as France holds the Rhine, but French public opinion, "while insisting on defense, was opposed at the outset of war to undertaking more than was essential for security—and the advance to the Rhine satisfied that." (22)

Russia closes its western frontier, suppresses the revolt in the Ukraine, and reinforces its Far East army. Japan, as a result of a secret understanding with Germany, mobilizes and concentrates a large force in northwest Manchukuo and demands a free hand in China and cessation of further fortification of Singapore and Hong Kong. It notifies the United States that any movement of the U.S. fleet west of the 180th meridian (roughly halfway between Hawaii and Wake Island) would be considered a hostile act; it asserts the right of sovereignty over mandated islands which it has been fortifying. "...Great Britain, urged on by Australia and New Zealand, sought cooperation of the United States in enforcement of a mutual policy in the Pacific and Far East....In the fighting on the western front during February and March, German operations were characterized by unrestricted aerial warfare...." (23)

In the United States:

The American people loudly demanded that the United States not enter the conflict no matter what the cost. Laws were passed withdrawing protection to nationals or property in the war zone and mindful of our World War debts forbidding the making of loans to belligerents...then came the Japanese ultimatum denying to our fleet movement west of the 180th meridian, which hurt the pride of Americans and opened their eyes to the real threat to our commercial future. (24)

Japan closes the Sea of Japan and the China Sea to all foreign ships not licensed by the Japanese government, and the United States and Britain declare a state of armed neutrality in the Pacific, an action warmly received by the American public. Shortly thereafter, several American and British ships are destroyed in the ports of Le Havre and Cherbourg by Nazi aircraft. The United States and Britain declare war on the Nazi Confederation.

Proceeding from this scenario, the main decisions of the planning group were:

- (1)...the United States is committed to the war in Europe but sooner or later will have to deal with Japan.
- (2) Our war aims are to prevent the Nazis or any other Confederation becoming supreme in Europe, and Ja-

pan becoming all powerful in the Far East. It will not suffice that our assistance be limited to money and supplies and it has been decided to send an expeditionary force to Europe...all we need to send to France is a respectable force—and we can save our main effort for Japan....(3) it is essential that a strong naval force be stationed in the Pacific. (25)

Linking Germany and Japan in a military axis as early as 1935 correctly anticipated what happened in November 1936—a year and a half later. Close cooperation between these disturbers of the peace, once allied, was expected, but Germany and Japan went their willful and independent ways before and during World War II—to their disadvantage. It was important to Japanese planning that the United States and Britain commit to Europe so that the Japanese would have a free hand in the Pacific—as they had during World War I. Hence, the German-Japanese connection in the 1935 scenario presented the problem of the two-ocean war to Britain and the United States. The committee decided to defeat the Germans before turning to the defeat of Japan. The defeat of Germany by the forces of Britain, France, Italy, and the United States did not appear to be a very difficult task, considering German unpreparedness for a major war in 1935.

The students clearly understood the contemporary international scene and the background to issues; their analysis also included an examination of cultural dictates and domestic constraints to policy in the United States and among possible belligerents on both sides. (26) One of the themes to emerge was suspicion of the Japanese among the American people and how this attitude might be used to enlist “wholehearted assistance to the prosecution of the war,” particularly in the western states where there was a sense of a “yellow peril.” (27)

There was also an economic argument that might win support for an American war in the Pacific and the expectation that war would stimulate “idealism”:

It is believed that the cynical attitude of the depression era would quickly disappear once the country was committed to war and that pre-World War idealism would reassert itself as a marked national characteristic. (28)

The subcommittee was confident that the administration would be able to manage the support of the public:

Ever since the Civil War, the trend of our political system has been to increase the power of the Executive. Within recent years, and especially since 1932, this trend has been intensified. In event of war, this trend will enhance the power of the administration to control events and, probably to influence the public to support its policies. (29)

And the students looked to the other side of the Atlantic to assess the potential of propaganda:

The Nazi government of Germany has used all means of propaganda and advertising with telling effect. There is every reason to believe that these same means would be quite as effective in influencing American public opinion, especially in the emotional stress of impending or actual international conflict. (30)

In another flash of insight, the students anticipated a propaganda ploy by the Soviet Union. When the Japanese concentrate troops in Manchuria, the Soviets reinforce on the border. As it looks like war between Japan and the Soviet Union, “Communist agitation in the U.S. was greatly reduced at once.... Several of the strongest peace organizations changed their peace-at-any-price attitude. Propaganda against Japan became more common. The pacific attitude of Russia was emphasized....” (31) This scenario fairly describes the new line of Communist propaganda taken when the Germans turned on the Soviet Union in 1941.

The students believed that there was a willingness on the part of France to take some symbolic action when the Nazi coalition invaded Czechoslovakia in the scenario, but there was no desire to engage in decisive combat with Germany. French aversion to war was so pronounced that it would convince itself that it would be enough to put French troops on the Rhine. This action by the French in the make-believe world of 1935 is strikingly like that actually taken in 1939 after the German invasion of Poland, when the so-called *Sitzkrieg* lasted from September 1939 to the spring of 1940. (32)

The committee also got right not only the prospective close cooperation between the Americans and the British but also the nuances of the relationship before and after the United States entry into World War II. Movement toward intimate cooperation with Britain had to be paced with the perception by the American public of a threat to the United States. The development of the alliance with Britain in the 1935 scenario comes very close to the way that the president played

his cards from 1939 until the American declaration of war in December 1941.

It was clear that if Britain were engaged in a European war while also fighting a war in the Pacific, priority would go to the European theater. Therefore, Australia and New Zealand would press the British to cooperate with the Americans. This estimate by the planners of 1935 proved sound when the United States dominated the Pacific in World War II and by degrees accepted former British responsibilities around the world.

After a thorough analysis of friendly and enemy ways, means, and ends, the committee decided: 1) to transport U.S. troops and supplies to Europe in order to assist in the defeat of the Nazi forces; and 2) to concentrate the U.S. fleet in Hawaii in order to prepare for war with Japan. It was assumed that Britain, France, and Italy would be capable of defeating the Nazi Confederation, thus allowing the United States to withhold forces for possible use against Japan. Nowhere was anything like the *Blitzkrieg* of 1940 even suggested. The United States promises to send at least 250,000 troops to Europe but not more than 500,000. American troops will be en route to France by 30M (30 days after U.S. mobilization) to complete training and to be ready to take over a section of the front by about 270M. The memory of the slow-moving Great War is evident here, as it is expected that there will be time for a deliberate American buildup. And why not? The French Army was estimated to number some 4.5 million men, and it was allied to Britain and Italy. The German Army had been unilaterally increased from the Treaty Army of 100,000, but professional soldiers believed that it was not fully trained for protracted war against a first-class foe. (33) Surely, the European allies were sufficiently superior to the enemy coalition that there would be no urgent need for United States troops, but the United States needed to take part in the war if it was to have a voice in peacemaking.

Strong American naval forces stationed in Hawaii would cooperate with the great British Navy operating out of its impregnable base in Singapore. There was no sense of great urgency:

[The Japanese] generally begin their wars by surprise attacks before there is any declaration of war. This must be guarded against, but with the strong forces allied against them it does not seem probable that they will detach any important force for distant operations away from their homeland. (34)

After all, the U.S. Navy was superior to the Japanese fleet in battleships by a margin of 15 to 9. The Japanese advantage was in other types: cruisers, destroyers, and submarines and in land-based aviation in the mandated islands. But the U.S. fleet combined with the British Mediterranean Fleet (the Italians and French would take up the slack in the Mediterranean) was estimated to enjoy a 2 to 1 advantage over the Japanese in the Pacific. The Japanese would be tough, but sheer allied weight would defeat them.

The 1936 alignment of contesting coalitions in Participation with Allies was like that of 1935, with one significant difference: Italy, an ally of the United States in the 1935 scheme, was moved to the German-led Central Coalition. This change indicated that Italian aggression in Abyssinia and Benito Mussolini's bombast had removed Italy from the side of the angels. It also shows that the planners at the AWC were in touch with contemporary international developments. (35) The scenario of 1936 presented the student committee with a European threat to American security greater than the threat in the Pacific. The 1936 response to the question of where American interests are to be found anticipated the "Germany first" strategy. The students came very close to predicting how World War II would break out, how the contending coalitions would evolve, the course of the war, and its outcome.

Again in 1937 one of the war planning groups addressed the big war in Europe and a simultaneous threat from Japan. (36) This was the war that would become World War II—whose outcome would be determined by "economic and material factors." (37) The French Army was highly regarded for its morale, training, combat efficiency, supply, command, and staff, but there were doubts regarding the will of the people and the stability of the government. France, it was thought, was in danger should a defeat occur. The committee warned: "...its future stability may falter in the face of a military defeat." (38)

The committee saw two courses of action available to the enemy coalition. The first was to go on the defensive in the west, to contain the French, while crushing Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Rumania and continuing east against Russia. Japan would strike Russia from the east. The rationale for this course was the early possession of the natural resources of the Soviet Union, Czech industry, and Rumanian oil. The second course was the one that the Student Committee #6 expected the enemy to select: the Germans would make their first main effort in France and then turn east.

Two friendly courses of action were considered. The first was to conduct offensive operations against Japan while on the strategic defensive in Europe. The object was to knock Japan out of the war while keeping Russia in. A variation of this plan called for an offensive via Italy to the Balkans, the Mediterranean offensive to be conducted simultaneously with the Pacific offensive. The object was to isolate Turkey, menace the Coalition from the south, and ensure free passage of allied shipping in the Mediterranean. Course two called for containing the Japanese by reinforcing the British fleet in the Pacific and conducting the main offensive operations against Germany from France. This was the course chosen.

The determining reason for the student choice would prove to be a later source of friction between the Americans and their British allies when actual hostilities began: "The heart of the Coalition is Germany...." The students would send the American expeditionary force "with the armies of France and Britain directly against the heart of the Coalition...." (39) The Americans were always ready to go for the jugular; the British preferred a strategy of nibbling at the edges to weaken Germany before risking the decisive battle. (40) In precisely this connection it is interesting to note the consideration and rejection of proposals to conduct landings in Africa, the Baltic, the North Sea, and Italy. The plans for landings are discarded because it is estimated they would be too expensive in men and material and too peripheral. It is also thought that once ashore in Italy our forces would face formidable mountain barriers favorable to the defender. (41)

The 1937 version of *Participation with Allies* is the fourth consecutive consideration of the problems of coalition warfare at the Army War College and is addressed from the perspective of the American concern with a two-ocean war as events heat up in Europe and Asia. It anticipates the basic considerations that would perplex leaders in their deliberations before the United States entry into World War II and after. They had to decide where to put their main effort—Atlantic or Pacific. Once they decided to defeat Germany first, they had to agree on whether the offensive would be direct or indirect. That is what the fifteen student officers of Committee #6 did in 1937.

The Army War College and the General Staff

However prescient the studies and war plans done at the Army War College between the wars, they would be no more than a historical curiosity had they remained unknown to the war planners on the General

Staff. Such was not the case. The Army's leadership knew about the planning and just about everything else that went on at the college and annually requested projects and plans to be prepared by the college for a General Staff that was always short of officers. Normally the War Plans Division (WPD) consisted of twelve officers, including the assistant chief of staff, WPD, a brigadier general. In the entire period from 21 September 1921 to 31 December 1940, only ninety-two officers served in WPD. (42) The AWC record of the connection between the college and the War Department in 1939-40 says: "Close cooperation with the War Department was continued by the study of issues of special interest to the War Department." (43) This observation is supported by the contents of so-called Zero files and Flat files in the Military History Institute (MHI) curricular archives. (44) These files contain correspondence between the college and the various sections of the General Staff—G-1, G-2, G-3, G-4, and WPD—regarding both general and specific projects that students might do, and did, for the staff sections. The relationship was characterized by a polite professionalism. The college was prepared to assist the General Staff, but the commandant and faculty never forgot that the AWC mission was to educate. The General Staff, on the other hand, made it clear in the requests sent to the college that the commandant would have the final word regarding student efforts.

Further evidence of a close and continuous relationship between the college and the General Staff can be found in assignment patterns as well as in direct written communication in which the staff requested assistance from the college. The annual assignment of several AWC graduates to the War Plans Division of the General Staff was routine. For the AWC classes from 1934 to 1940, the following numbers of graduates, by year group, were assigned to the influential WPD: 1934, four; 1935, four; 1936, nine; 1937, three; 1938, six; 1939, four; and 1940, four. The six officers of the AWC class of 1938 were serving in WPD when the bombs fell on Pearl Harbor. (45) Other General Staff sections also received recent graduates on a regular basis. (46)

Further, 436 general officers spread around the Army had some influence on the institution. About two-thirds of the AWC classes that experienced *Participation with Allies* in the war plans period of the course from 1934 to 1940 served as generals in World War II. Many of them were famous commanders: Omar N. Bradley, Courtney H. Hodges, Jonathan M. Wainwright, and William F. Halsey, USN, 1934; Mark

W. Clark and Matthew B. Ridgway, 1937; J. Lawton Collins, 1938; George E. Stratemeyer and Hoyt A. Vandenberg, 1939; and Maxwell D. Taylor and Lyman Lemnitzer, 1940. Far more served in faceless staff jobs where policy was made for the conduct of the war and the peace to follow.

Despite attaining high rank, staff officers remain relatively unknown to the public. (47) A few examples of relatively unknown officers who were at AWC in the 1930s and later in key planning positions make the point.

Thomas T. Handy (AWC 1935) provided unprecedented continuity in WPD (later OPD) from August 1936 until October 1944, except for one year with troops (June 1940-June 1941). He joined WPD for his first tour as a major after completing the Naval War College, and he left WPD as a lieutenant general in 1944. He succeeded Dwight D. Eisenhower as chief of the Operations Division when Eisenhower was sent to command troops in Europe, and he worked with George C. Marshall on an almost daily basis as the chief of Marshall's wartime command post. (48)

Thompson Lawrence (AWC 1933) was selected to teach at the War College in 1938. He previously had taught at both the United States Military Academy, West Point, New York, and at Leavenworth, Kansas, and would retire a major general. In 1940 he was one of that group of students and faculty directed to temporary duty with the War Plans Division. His specific assignment was to work on War Plan RAINBOW. (49) While a student at the AWC, Lawrence served on committees studying War Reserves and General Mobilization; Joint Operations Overseas; Expedition to Seize and Hold Halifax; War Plans-RED Coalition; and Southern Theater (GREEN). (50) It is just this kind of academic work that has been called unrealistic and out of touch with contemporary international affairs, but it is hard to imagine a better preparation for what Lawrence had to do in 1940 as he worked on RAINBOW 4. (51) The plan was concerned with command and control exercised by the General Headquarters (GHQ) established at AWC as of July 1940 and possible deployment of U.S. troops to Brazil (PURPLE). Lawrence's students had worked out Plan PURPLE in both 1938 and 1939. The work on RAINBOW 4 in 1940-41 refined previous planning and took him to terra cognita as he wrestled with the problems of hemispheric defense from 1938 into 1941 at the AWC for WPD. Further, WPD's 1938 request that the college "specify by name and location...the critical points...which if occupied by U.S. naval or land forces would...delay the advance of

enemy forces" had rehearsed both the college and WPD for a very similar planning exercise in 1940, this one "for real." (52)

Charles L. Bolte (AWC 1937) (53) clarifies the rationale for planning for the unlikely war with Britain and Canada, but Bolte says that Japan concerned his colleagues most:

Orange was the premier problem plan. We have to have a plan for the contiguous theater, in which you could have a war with Mexico or a war with Canada or Britain or something, just to get a scenario to set it up. But the Orange Plan was the one that got the most attention from the students and from the faculty who were guiding the course. (54)

Bolte said that even "after the basic decision was made by the political heads, Mr. Churchill and Mr. Roosevelt, that we would win in Europe first and then turn to the Pacific...our Navy was always reluctant as to Europe..." (55) He joined the AWC faculty after he completed the course in 1937. He said that General Marshall closed the college in 1940 because "there were presumably good officers being students at the War College, and on the faculty, so he...scattered us around." (56) Bolte at first assisted the chief of Air Corps and then joined the War College Group before going to London as a member of the "special observer group" for the ABC conversations. He was close to the centers of power in the critical period before the United States entered the war and would end his career with four stars.

Bolte's recollections are confirmed by those of his friend, John E. Hull (AWC 1938), who recalled that before the war everyone was looking to Japan when war was considered. (57) It is not clear from the interviews if it was September 1939 or if it took the German successes in the spring of 1940 to place Europe ahead of Japan as the chief concern of American war planners. Hull said that it was generally assumed that in a war with Germany, Italy, and Japan, the United States would go on the strategic defensive in the Pacific and put the main effort in Europe to defeat Germany and Italy. (58) Hull succeeded Handy as ACS, OPD, when Handy became Deputy Chief of Staff, U.S. Army.

Russell Maxwell (AWC 1934), credited with coining the term Hemisphere Defense, is another who found himself in the midst of planning for the defense of the Western Hemisphere at the end of the decade. He served as the special assistant to the Secretary of War

in 1938 as an expert logistician. (59) Among the subjects attracting his professional interest in this period were American logistical support to Britain and the nations of the hemisphere; bases in Newfoundland and Bermuda; congressional authorization to the Secretaries of War and Navy "to assist the governments of American republics to increase their military and naval establishments"; and aviation capabilities in Latin America. (60) Clearly, he was well prepared for his responsibilities in war and in the transition to war.

His work from 1939 onward brought him into close contact with George Marshall, George Strong of WPD, and Assistant Secretary of War Louis A. Johnson. When the shooting war in Europe broke out, he was named Administrator of Export Control. Later he would ply his trade as a logistical planner by heading up the U.S. Military Mission to the Middle East. Two weeks before Pearl Harbor he was in Cairo, and he remained in the region until 1943.

In addition to the close and constant contact AWC had with the General Staff via correspondence and assignments, the assistant chief of staff, War Plans Division, and his colleagues, the G-1, G-2, G-3, and G-4, addressed the students each year, informing the classes of staff missions and functions and indicating current problems of professional interest to the General Staff. (61) Key officers went from the college to General Staff assignments and back to teach there or to command the college. In the period under discussion, a former commandant and a deputy commandant went on to serve as the chief of staff of the Army and as the deputy chief of staff, respectively.

The relatively unrestrained creativity of students was exploited by the more cautious General Staff. The clearest evidence of this exploitation is the tasking of the college by the staff found in the so-called MHI-AWC-"O" and "Flat" files in the curricular archives. (62) Much of the student work was of interest to the staff because it was done in response to the staff. Student work, including the Individual Staff Memorandum (ISM), a written project required of each member of the class, was often assigned after consultation with the various sections of the War Department General Staff. The ISM done by students was "exactly like the form used in the War Department in preparing a Memorandum for the Chief of Staff." (63)

In 1932, among the ISMs sent to the War Department were one by George S. Patton, Jr., and another by Capt. Edward J. Foy, USN, who would later teach at AWC. (64) Students had the opportunity to deal with current issues of concern to those at the top of the

military hierarchy and an opportunity to be "discovered" as bright fellows with a future. The small sections of the General Staff had the benefit of the thinking of those bright fellows and could take what was useful and toss out what was not.

But it was not just the students who came up with fascinating ideas. In 1931, while still ACS, WPD, Brig. Gen. George S. Simonds wrote a note proposing that one of the students examine a notion that would reappear almost a decade later in quite different circumstances. "An interesting study for Ind. Memo. next year.-Would it be worthwhile for England to cede her possessions in the Western Hemisphere to the U.S. in consideration of the cancellation of all debts?" (65) Someone added in pencil: "If so what disposition should we make of them?"

Staff response to the studies done by students varied from simple acknowledgment of receipt to rather expansive commentary. One of the students failed to cover himself with glory in his ISM, but without apparent damage to a promising career. Future Admiral of the Fleet William Halsey addressed "Japan's Attitude at the Forthcoming Naval Conference." The comment on his paper is: "The study is not sufficiently extensive nor exhaustive to be of great value." His grade: satisfactory. (66)

A sense of the issues that were important to the General Staff is found in the list of topics staff sections asked the classes to study, and not only on the eve of World War II. For the class of 1932, WPD listed, among others: What war plans should be prepared by our war planning agencies? Was there a conflict between political and military strategy among the Allied Governments in the Great War? How should air forces be allotted to GHQ, Armies, Corps, Divisions? Is the policy of "Paramount Interest" the best that can be used to insure coordination and cooperation between the Army and the Navy in joint operations? G-3 was interested in motorization, mechanization, whether the tank was an infantry or cavalry weapon, antitank systems, air force issues, civil defense against bombs and gas, anti-air capabilities in the division, mobilization, the reserve components and volunteers, organization of the War Department, and the need for a Department of National Defense. G-2 wanted the students to study the international objectives of the "Russian" government, if Alaska was an asset or a liability to national defense, subversion in the military and how to combat it, and the Nicaraguan Canal issue. The staff's proposed list of topics to be studied by War College students is a kind of barometer of security

concerns by year throughout the 1930s. (67)

In 1935 Malin Craig, AWC commandant (and soon to be Army chief of staff), asked the War Department's G-2 for a "list of subjects on intelligence matters which in your opinion, would make worthwhile topics for a two weeks' individual study by students of this college." Within two days he had a promise to provide the list requested. (68)

The topics sent from WPD to the AWC in 1938 reflected an increasing sense of urgency as they became more specific than they had been earlier in the decade. For example, the staff shopping list for the college that year included requests for a study of hemispheric strategy and recommended troop deployments; it asked: "Are the economic and political advantages of sufficient importance for the U.S. Government to subsidize 30 percent of the U.S. Merchant Marine?" WPD also asked for analysis of the "Relative value of defensive war along the line Alaska-Hawaii-Panama [the so-called strategic triangle], or along the line Aleutians-Guam-Samoa, versus offensive war in the Western Pacific." (69) All of these WPD requests were honored. The center of gravity for planners shifted from Europe to the Western Hemisphere and to the "strategic triangle" in 1938 as war planners trimmed their sails to match modest plans to modest means. The reason for the shift in War College planning is these requests to the college from the General Staff's War Plans Division. (70)

In addition to the regular exchange of correspondence and student work in support of the staff, an officer working on a special project could call for help from the AWC. For example, John D. Reardon, Air Corps, was a member of a board at the War Department doing studies on a number of air force issues in 1934 when he asked that the college assist by assigning students to study the issues. George Simonds, commandant, was keenly aware of current issues being studied by the General Staff and he assigned students to the air force issues. (71)

It is not surprising that Commandant Simonds was so responsive. He was in his person a strong link between the college and WPD for much of the interwar period. He was a member of the first postwar class, graduated in 1920, and upon graduation he was assigned to the faculty. During 1922-24 he was assistant commandant and from 1932-35 commandant. (72) His previous assignment on the General Staff enabled Simonds to keep the college in the mainstream of national security thinking. He had served as ACS, WPD, under General Douglas MacArthur, so he under-

stood the thinking and desires of the chief of staff. As one of MacArthur's principal staff officers, Simonds produced plans to comply with MacArthur's insistence that mobilization plans be geared to war plans and that mobilization plans be flexible enough to support the color plans.

Simonds added two weeks to address mobilization as a part of the war plans course in his first year as commandant (1932-33). In his second year he reestablished the college War Plans Division and ensured that the Navy and Air Corps faculty members were part of it. Just as joint operations meant coordination of the U.S. services, alliances meant that there was a need for a better understanding of the dynamics of coalition warfare. Therefore, it was on his watch as commandant that Participation with Allies was added to the usual color plans worked out by students each year. Simonds left the AWC in January 1935 to become deputy chief of staff to MacArthur. Under Simonds the college was not an academic backwater out of touch with Army concerns; Simonds was an influential man in the Army, and his successor as commandant was no less influential.

Malin Craig served as commandant for less than a year (from February to October 1935) before he succeeded MacArthur as chief of staff. Being the commandant of the AWC in the decade before World War II was obviously one of the most prestigious assignments in the Army and a stepping stone to higher perches in the military hierarchy. One can be sure that officers notice patterns of advancement and pay attention to men of achievement like Simonds and Craig. Staffs respond quickly and students take careful notes when the boss is a rising star. Craig, while Chief of Staff, turned to the bright men he left at the AWC to do special projects of interest to him. With Craig and Simonds running the Army, the college was well connected. (73)

Conclusions

The college had done its work well. The *data* produced in considering the strengths and weaknesses of potential friend and foe across the full spectrum of national power—political economic, psychosociological and military—were voluminous and useful in real-world planning. The *process* was also useful. Continuous reconsideration of the color plans between the world wars (and of coalition warfare in a two-theater war from 1934) and of the rationale for the plans was important in forming a habit of mind critical to a strategist. More important than the me-

chanics of planning was the habit formed by the elite of the U.S. Army of thinking about war from the level of national strategy. That habit partially explains why American officers, whose command experience was at and below regimental level, were capable of stepping into key staff positions near the apex of political power and into high command with confidence and competence. They were a self-conscious elite, well schooled. As General Handy put it, the Army War College experience made graduates the PhDs of the Army. (74)

A careful comparison of RAINBOW Plans 1 to 5 with the war planning done by at least one committee each year at the AWC from 1934 to 1940 under the title Participation with Allies reveals that all of the elements of RAINBOW are to be found in the college planning. Further, some combinations of elements are also visible.

All of the RAINBOW Plans included defense of the hemisphere as the *sine qua non* of American war planning. (75) Defense of the Western Hemisphere south to the bulge of Brazil, 10 degrees south latitude, was RAINBOW 1. RAINBOW 2, 3, and 5 were also—among other things—to prevent violation of the Monroe Doctrine to 10 degrees south latitude. The AWC PURPLE plan exercised in 1938 and 1939 was just what later Army and Navy RAINBOW planners needed. It finds its way into all RAINBOW Plans. RAINBOW 4 was more ambitious. It was to protect all the territory and the governments of the Western Hemisphere against external aggression. In fact, RAINBOW 4 simply restated the Monroe Doctrine. PURPLE was useful in taking the entire hemisphere into account, and so were color plans GREEN, RED, and CRIMSON. Data compiled by War College planners from Newfoundland to and including Brazil were current, comprehensive, and available to RAINBOW planners, some of whom had been key Army War College planners.

The differences between RAINBOW 2 and RAINBOW 3 recall considerations made by students again and again from 1934 to 1937 in Participation with Allies and in the ORANGE Plans. RAINBOW 3 called for getting to the United States possessions in the Western Pacific as rapidly as possible, as in the 1938 ORANGE Plan at AWC. RAINBOW 2 was a more cautious and deliberate plan for war in the Pacific, like the ORANGE solution at AWC in 1939. (76)

RAINBOW 2 assumed a United States alliance with Britain and France. It further assumed America's allies could manage quite well in Europe, requiring minimal American participation there. No one imagined that Germany would crush France and chase Britain from

the Continent mere weeks after the Joint Planning Committee delivered the RAINBOW Plan courses of action to the Joint Board in April 1940. In any event, RAINBOW 2 looked much like the AWC Participation with Allies of 1935. (77)

Similarly, RAINBOW 5 was much like the plans of the AWC in the 1936 version of Participation with Allies. Both saw a need to project American forces "to the Eastern Atlantic and to either or both the African and European Continents as rapidly as possible" in order decisively to defeat Germany or Italy or both, in concert with France and Britain. (78) The AWC student plan of 1936 reacted to a scenario portraying a situation much more serious in Europe than that of 1935. (79) The 1936 plan required 750,000 American troops in six months, and over 2 million within a year. (In 1935 it was believed that 250,000 to 500,000 United States troops in Europe in nine to twelve months would be sufficient.) In the 1936 plan it was still assumed that the British and French fleets in European waters would permit the United States fleet to keep its major combatants in the Pacific.

RAINBOW 5 also resembled the AWC work of 1937. That year the scenario in Participation with Allies found the United States at war with Germany and Italy, but not with Japan. One of the early decisions was that the U.S. fleet would assume responsibilities in the Mediterranean, thus releasing British ships to counter Japanese naval strength in the Pacific. This was a variation on a familiar theme: since the Army needed to mobilize and the Navy was a force in being, the swiftest response the president could make was the naval response. Further, the students of 1937 anticipated the *Sitzkrieg* and the German decisive victory over the weak nations of Eastern Europe. They also decided for offensive operations against Germany from France, going for the jugular in the exercise just as the United States Army would in the course of World War II. Landings in Africa and Italy were also considered by the students in 1937. (80)

Planning at the Army War College from 1934 to 1940 was realistic and prescient. AWC work was known to the General Staff whose officers had experienced the planning for coalition warfare while students at AWC. The steady stream of visits and correspondence between the college and the staff, officer assignment patterns, and the fact that the students and faculty of the 1930s were among the key planners before and during World War II connect the AWC and the General Staff. It is incorrect to suggest that planners proceeded from a zero base to the RAINBOW Plans of 1940.

Knowledge of the war planning done at AWC from 1934 to 1940 reveals that planning was neither simplistic nor irrelevant. Conventional wisdom on American war planning between the two world wars needs to be modified. The AWC coalition plans rehearsed planners by providing them with the "spade work" mentioned by Louis Morton in 1957. The spade work was preparation for the RAINBOW Plans and the strategy for World War II.

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Notes

¹ Maurice Matloff, "Prewar Military Plans and Preparations, 1939-41," *United States Naval Institute Proceedings* 79 (July 1953):741.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 743-44.

³ This interpretation appears also in the first pages of Matloff and Edwin H. Snell's *Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1941-1942* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1953). The authors say their book "is a product of cooperative effort" (p. ix) and an outgrowth of Ray S. Cline's *Washington Command Post: The Operations Division* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1951). They also express their great obligation to colleagues at the Office of the Chief of Military History by name: Kent Roberts Greenfield, Stetson Conn, Louis Morton, Richard M. Leighton, and Robert W. Coakley, all writers of books in the United States Army in World War II series. Louis Morton, *Strategy and Command: The First Two Years* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1962), p. 22, uses almost the same language as Matloff and Snell in describing the pre-RAINBOW Plans. "...the early war plans were little more than abstract exercises and bore little relation to actual events." Morton's book is in *The War in the Pacific* subseries of United States Army in World War II; Cline's book and the Matloff and Snell book are in *The War Department* subseries.

⁴ See Matloff's 1965 essay, "The American Approach to War, 1919-1945," in Michael Howard, ed., *The Theory and Practice of War* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1965), pp. 229-35. He expands on some of the points he raised in 1953, but his position on pre-1939 war planning by the United States is unchanged.

⁵ File HRC 313.2, U.S. Army Center for Military History. Hereafter CMH.

⁶ Ray S. Cline's *Washington Command Post: The Operations Division* was published in 1951; Mark S.

Watson's *Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations* was published in 1950; Maurice Matloff and Edwin M. Snell published their *Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1941-1942*, in 1953.

⁷ Matloff, "Prewar Military Plans," pp. 741-48; see also Maurice Matloff, "The American Approach to War, 1919-1945," in Michael Howard, ed., *The Theory and Practice of War* (London: Cassell, 1965), pp. 213-43. Matloff had not changed his interpretation in 1965 (see especially p. 218; "Limited in scope, the plans envisaged neither global nor total war.")

⁸ Archives, Military History Institute, United States Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pa., hereafter MHI. MHI, USAWC, File 1-105, Summary of the Courses at the AWC Since the World War, 1919-1940. See p. 7 of the 1922-23 course summary.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 1924-25 course summary, p. 10.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 1939-40 course summary, p. 31.

¹¹ Michael Vlahos, *The Blue Sword: The Naval War College and the American Mission, 1919-1941* (Newport, R. I.: Naval War College Press, 1980). The author says that from about 1919, war with Japan was an obsession of the U.S. Navy. The "mission" of the subtitle is ORANGE, war with Japan. Before the Russo-Japanese War, the Japanese were praised at the Naval War College (p. 122). By 1906 they were called "Japs" and were seen as the "inevitable" enemy (p. 123).

¹² Unlikely, but most dangerous to the United States, would be war with a British-Japanese alliance. See MHI, USAWC, File 1-105, p. 2, for RED-ORANGE planning.

¹³ Examination of the thinking that went into the plans year by year is possible because data, analyses, the plans, and the question and answer sessions that followed student presentations are well documented and readily available. See the MHI, USAWC files for records of the curriculum at the Army War College. The war plans period files, especially Participation

with Allies from 1934 to 1940, provide the detailed plans.

¹⁴ MHI, Course at the Army War College, 1933-34, Preparation for War Course, 2d Part, War Plans Period, War Plans Group No. 4, Participation with Allies. See also Participation with Allies from 1935 to 1940.

¹⁵ Ibid. See Tab 3.

¹⁶ Ibid. See question and answer period following the presentation by the committee. This is a fair summary of what Halsey's classmates at the Naval War College concluded in the 1933 Plan ORANGE. Earlier it was thought that BLUE was sufficiently superior to ORANGE to permit the fleet to go to the Philippines without delay en route. (See Naval Historical Collection, RG 4, 2261-BB, Joint Problem I, 1926, p. 12.) In 1933 both students and faculty are very pessimistic. Reaching from Hawaii to Manila is just too risky. (See NHC RG 4, 2261-1, Enclosure "T" for Summarized Data regarding losses and damage and Enclosure "P" for how damage was inflicted. See RG 4, 2261-AA for a faculty critique of Ops. Prob. IV-33.) Without a forward fortified base—Manila was assumed to be lost in the opening days of the war—Japanese damage to the U.S. fleet so far from Pearl Harbor made a bold offensive unacceptable. Bases had to be established. That would require a more deliberate strategy in the Pacific. At the Naval War College in 1933 were also Ernest J. King, student commander of BLUE, and Raymond A. Spruance. See also Vlahos, *The Blue Sword*, p. 93.

¹⁷ MHI, Course at the AWC, 1933-34, War Plans Period, Group No. 5, Participation with Allies, Tab 4, p. 2.

¹⁸ Ibid., Tab 5, p. 17.

¹⁹ Ibid., Tab 5, Appendix 2, p. 38.

²⁰ Ibid., Tab 7.

²¹ MHI, USAWC, 5-1935-20, Course at the AWC, 1934-1935, War Plans Course, Report of Group #4, Participation with Allies, Oral Presentation, p. 1. Except where otherwise noted, this report is the source of the scenario presented to the committee and the committee's reaction to the situation.

²² Ibid., p. 1.

²³ Ibid., p. 2.

²⁴ Ibid., pp. 2-3.

²⁵ Appendix 1 to Tab 4, 5-1935-20.

²⁶ See the Tabs attached to 5-1935-20, especially Tab 7 for thorough summaries of U.S. treaty obligations, declarations, and policies.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Ibid.

³² Tab 4, 5-1935-20.

³³ Ironies abound! General Thomas T. Handy, who succeeded Eisenhower as chief of the Operations Division when Eisenhower was sent to command troops in Europe, said of the reports of the U.S. Military Attache in Berlin, Truman Smith: "...he kind of missed the biggest picture of all...After every one of these moves [by the Germans], like into Austria and so on, Truman indicated that was about the last thing they'd do because it would take them 4 or 5 years to digest what they had." (MHI, The Thomas T. Handy Papers, debriefing by Edward H. Knoff, Jr., Section 3, 1-3.) Smith's sources were excellent. The problem was that German military professionals, his sources, were advising their *Fuehrer* that the *Wehrmacht* needed time to consolidate and to train and absorb masses of new soldiers into an army that had expanded too rapidly. This was neither the first nor the last time that Hitler would confound military professionals, German or others.

³⁴ Appendix 2, An Estimate of the Naval Situation, in 5-1935-20.

³⁵ MHI, USAWC, 5-1936-21, Course at the AWC, 1935-1936, Preparation for War Course, 2d Part, War Plans Period, Report of War Plans Group #4, Participation with Allies.

³⁶ MHI, USAWC File 1-105, Summary of the Courses at the AWC Since the World War, 1919-1940, 1936-1937, pp. 1-5.

³⁷ MHI, USAWC, 5-1937-24B, Course at the AWC, 1936-1937, Preparation for War Course, 2d Part, War Plans Period, Supplement #3 to the Report of Committee #6, Subject: War Plan-Participation with Allies, Joint Plan with Appendices, Date of Conference, 8 May 1937, pp. 2-3. See also: MHI, USAWC, 5-1937-24A, Course at the AWC, 1936-1937, Oral Presentation, 10 April 1937, with Supplements #1 and 2, Report of Committee #6, Subject: War Plan, Participation with Allies-European. Note that File 5-1937-24B contains a Supplement #3 from the same Committee #6. Supplement #3 contains the Joint Plan with Appendices and is dated 8 May 1937. It appears that a clean copy of the report including all supporting documents was submitted a month after the oral presentation. Unless specified otherwise, the page references that follow are to 5-1937-24A.

³⁸ Ibid., p. 45.

³⁹ Ibid., pp. 78-80.

⁴⁰ For the theory and practice of American strategy,

see Russell F. Weigley, *The American Way of War* (New York: Macmillan Co., Inc.; London: Collier Macmillan Publishers, 1973), pp. 312-59. "...an army strong enough to choose the strategy of annihilation should always choose it, because the most certain and probably the most rapid route to victory lay through the destruction of the enemy's armed forces," p. 313. The Army Air Forces also sought battle with the main enemy force in order to destroy it (see pp. 334-43, especially p. 342).

⁴¹ See the Oral Presentation and 80-82 in 5-1937-24A.

⁴² In the period 1 January-6 December 1941, 66 officers were assigned to WPD. Late in the war as many as 310 officers served in WPD/OPD. HRC 321, War Plans Division, Appendix D, "Master Personnel List, Arrivals and Departures." For the heavy responsibilities carried by WPD between the world wars, see Mark Skinner Watson, *Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1950), pp. 74-75.

⁴³ MHI, USAWC 1-105, Summary of the Courses at the AWC Since the World War, 1919-1940 (1939-1940), p. 4.

⁴⁴ MHI, 7-1935-0, 7-1936-0, 7-1938-0, 7-1939-0, 407 Flat, 387 Flat and 397 Flat.

⁴⁵ CMH, HRC 321, War Plans Division, Appendix D, "Master Personnel List, Arrivals and Departures" and the *Directory, Present and Former Staff and Faculty. Graduates and Students By Class. 1905-1984*, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pa., 1984, are the documents cross-referenced by name to determine when graduates of AWC, by year group, served in WPD. For a good example of WPD seeking and getting help from AWC, see 7-1938-0, "Correspondence re: ISMs." WPD requested a "strategy of a BLUE-South American combine against a German-Italian challenge to the Monroe Doctrine." Plan PURPLE was done at AWC in direct and specific response to the WPD request. In a longer study the author of the current work illustrates the evolution of PURPLE to an approved RAINBOW Plan. Also See MHI 111-41/20, TAG 6-21-40 and 6-22-40 assigning Thompson Lawrence (AWC 1933) to work on RAINBOW. As senior man and the instructor who had directed PURPLE at AWC in 1938 and 1939, Lawrence headed up the War College Group (WCG) under the direction of WPD in 1940. His signature appears on the RAINBOW documents found in MHI 111-41/16; 111-41/15; 111-41/13 and /14. See also MHI, 5-1939-8/1 to note that PURPLE evolves into RAINBOW 4.

⁴⁶ Among the AWC graduates of 1934-39 who held

key non-WPD jobs in the transition from peace to war were Orlando Ward (1936), Walter B. Smith (1937), and John R. Deane (1939)—Secretaries of the General Staff in that order from 3 July 1939 to 3 September 1942; from the class of 1934 James A. Ulio was Adjutant General from 3 March 1942 to 31 January 1946, Dawson Olmstead was Chief Signal Officer from 1 October 1941 to 30 June 1943, and Courtney H. Hodges was Chief of Infantry from 31 May 1941 to 9 March 1942. Harry J. Malony (1936) was ACS, G-3, in the spring of 1941. Edmund B. Gregory (1937) was the Quartermaster General from 1 April 1940 to 31 January 1946, and William N. Porter (1938) was Chief of the Chemical Corps from 31 May 1941 to 28 November 1945. See James E. Hewes, Jr., *From Root to McNamara: Army Organization and Administration, 1900-1963*, Special Studies Series (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1975), Appendix B.

⁴⁷ AWC Total

<u>Year Group</u>	<u>Graduates</u>	<u>Generals</u>
1934	84	49
1935	92	60
1936	95	61
1937	96	61
1938	96	64
1939	92	69
1940	102	72

Directory, Present & Former Staff & Faculty. Graduates & Students By Class, 1905-1982, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pa., pp. 31-38. One "staff officer" whose name became a household word was Lewis B. Hershey (1934). He directed the U.S. conscription system through three wars. Ten World War II corps commanders came from AWC classes 1934-38; 29 of 34 came from AWC classes 1926-38. See Robert H. Berlin, "United States Army World War II Corps Commanders: A Composite Biography," *The Journal of Military History* 53 (April 1989):152, 158. None of the officers in Eisenhower's OPD on 3 April 1942 would qualify as household names, but they were the brain of the Army. Five of the 6 brigadier generals are AWC 1935-40 graduates; 13 of the 19 colonels are AWC 1935-39 graduates; 9 of the 13 AWC 1935-39 graduates listed as colonels were later generals. By any definition, these were key men. Their rather recent experience at AWC was fresh as they performed important duties. See "Officers, War Department General Staff, Operations Division," Biog.

Rm., DOD Telephone Directories, Basement, MHI.

⁴⁸ MHI, The Thomas T. Handy Papers including "Transcripts of the Debriefing of General Handy," by Lt Col Edward M. Knoff, Jr., 1973-74; See also *Oral History: Gen. Thomas T. Handy. USA. Ret.*, Maj. Floyd J. Davis, Summer 1981. He believed that the school system saved the Army (Knoff, p. 8) and was impressed by the breadth of knowledge found among the faculty and students at AWC. (Knoff, Section 2, pp. 30, 51-52). He also said that Japan was seen as the Navy's problem, but Hitler's "acting up in Europe" was recognized by the American people as a reason to pay for an Army (Knoff, Section 5, p. 16).

⁴⁹ MHI 111-41/20, TAG 6-21-40 and 6-22-40, "Secretary of War dirs. folwg. off. rpt. to ACofS, WPD at AWC folg. temp. duty.(i/c/w/War Plan Rainbow)"; See also in MHI 111-41/20, Memo for ACS G-1, G-2, G-3, G-4, sub: Color Plans, RAINBOW, 17 June 1940 with Inclosure 1, same subject, 14 June 40, signed by George V. Strong, ACS, WPD, WDGS, a detailed directive to the staff.

⁵⁰ MHI, Lawrence Family Papers, Maj Gen Thompson Lawrence: 201 File.

⁵¹ MHI 111-41/17. Lawrence's signature is on the "Covering Memorandum for the Draft of the War Department Operations and Concentration Plans-Rainbow 4," 23 Oct 40.

⁵² MHI, File 7-1938-0. In the same file, under "Correspondence re: ISMs," WPD requests that the college examine "Strategy of a Blue-South American combine against a German-Italian challenge to the Monroe Doctrine." See also MHI, AWC 111-41/16, Comments and Corrections re: WPD, WDOP-R-4-40 (RAINBOW 4), 17 Sep 40, s/Lawrence; MHI, AWC 111-41/15, "Reproduction of Strategic Studies," 23 Sep 40, s/Lawrence; MHI, AWC 111-41/13 and /14, Troop Strengths, Deployments in W. Hemisphere, s/Lawrence; 111-41/15, Priorities of Photos in Caribbean, 14 Sep 40, s/Lawrence.

⁵³ MHI, Bolte Interview with Dr. Maclyn Burg, 17 Oct 73, p. 24.

⁵⁴ MHI, Bolte Interview with Arthur J. Zoebelin, AWC 1971-72, pp. 7-8.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 8.

⁵⁶ 25, Burg interview. This "scattering" resulted in 23 percent (127 of 555) of AWC graduates 1934-39 being assigned in WDGS as of March 1940 and 33 percent (215 of 652) of AWC graduates 1934-40 being assigned in WDGS as of November 1941. Cross-reference, *AWC Directory 1990* and *War Department Telephone Directories*, 1 Mar 40 and 15 Nov 41.

⁵⁷ MHI, Hull Interviews with Lt. Col. James W. Wurman, Oct-Apr 73.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, Section 3, pp. 37, 45.

⁵⁹ The *Philadelphia Inquirer* gave him credit for coining the expression "Hemisphere Defense" in a February 1939 report. MHI, The Russell Maxwell Papers (see The *Inquirer*, 12 Aug 45). His papers include correspondence, official papers, and newspaper clippings showing his interest in German, Japanese, and Italian penetration of Latin America, 1938-41.

⁶⁰ His papers include a copy of President Roosevelt's 14 April 1939 speech on Pan-America Day before the Governing Board of the Pan-American Union. The president woos Latin America and warns that the nations of the hemisphere should stay out of European affairs. One suspects that Maxwell played some role in contributing to the speech, but that suspicion is circumstantial and based on a reading of the papers in his file.

⁶¹ See, for example, MHI, WP #5, 1937 and MHI, WP #5, 1938 for the visits of Brig Gen Walter Krueger, ACS, WPD, to the college. The texts of his presentations are available in the AWC curricular archives, as are those of the other assistant chiefs of staff for the entire interwar period. In his 1938 lecture to the class, Krueger said: "Additional officers that may be needed [in WPD] will be drawn from the student body of the Army War College...." He made the same statement in 1937. In fact, in 1940 WPD was augmented by officers of AWC in an organization called "the War College Group" (WCG). See note 49.

⁶² See MHI, 7-1935-0, 7-1936-0, 7-1938-0, 7-1939-0 and 407 Flat, and 397 Flat for correspondence between AWC and the General Staff regarding student work done for the staff. See MHI, USAWC File 1-105, Summary of the Courses at AWC Since the World War, for an outline and summary of what AWC considered significant by year from 1919 to 1940.

⁶³ MHI, Orientation, 1936, ISM #1 in 407 Flat.

⁶⁴ MHI, 387 Flat.

⁶⁵ Red pencil note attached to 1931 Files in 387 Flat.

⁶⁶ MHI, 407 Flat, Correspondence re: Individual Staff Memoranda, 1933-34. See Memo, 20 Oct 34, AWC Studies from MID to AWC. Of course, the conference itself was unsatisfactory.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, Ltr, 1 Oct 31, List of Subjects for Individual Studies Requested by WDGS to AWC. Similar shopping lists will be found in the correspondence in the "zero" and "Flat" files in note 44 for the various years.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, Ltrs, Craig to Lincoln, 5 Mar 35, and response,

7 Mar 35. This, and many similar examples of quick responses, suggests that cooperation was excellent and that probably there was a daily courier service linking the college and the War Department. Person-to-person correspondence frequently resulted in a response within forty-eight hours. There are advantages to locating senior service colleges in the national capital. There are also advantages to faculty and students in having a commandant whose star is rising.

⁶⁹ MHI, File 7-1938-0, Correspondence re: ISMs.

⁷⁰ MHI, File marked Misc. # 3, 1938.

⁷¹ MHI, 7-1935-0, Ltrs, Reardon to Simonds, 8 Dec 34, and Simonds to Reardon, 10 Dec 34.

⁷² *Directory*, AWC, 1905-84, USAWC, Carlisle Barracks, Pa., 1984, pp. 1, 2, 43. See also Harry P. Ball, *Of Responsible Command* (Carlisle, Pa.: The Alumni Association of the United States Army War College, 1983), p. 228. "...Simonds was not averse to having his students take on studies that the War Department General Staff needed."

⁷³ Craig's successors were Walter S. Grant (1924), who retired as a major general; John L. DeWitt (AWC 1920), who had served in WPD (1921-24) and been deputy commandant at AWC (1928-30). DeWitt supervised the internment of Japanese and Japanese-Americans after war broke out (Obituary, *New York Times*, 22 Jun 62) and was commandant of the Army & Navy Staff College for its entire wartime existence (1943-45). He retired with four stars. Philip B. Peyton (AWC 1931), the last of the prewar commandants,

retired a major general. Simonds, Craig, Grant, and DeWitt had also served on the faculty, as did Stanley D. Embick, Walter Krueger, William H. Simpson, Joseph T. McNamey, Charles L. Bolte, and J. Lawton Collins (Ball, p. 252); the following officers served in the War Plans Division: Embick (twice), Krueger (twice), DeWitt, Simonds, and McNamey (HRC 321, WPD Master Personnel List).

⁷⁴ The Thomas T. Handy Papers, "Transcripts of the Debriefing of General Handy," by Lt Col Edward M. Knoff, Jr., 1973-74, SI-S2. He also said "...anything that came up, there was some guy who just knew a hell of a lot about it... [The Army War College] was the one place where you could sit down and think."

⁷⁵ For a summary of RAINBOWs 1-5, see Matloff and Snell, *Strategic Planning*, pp. 5-9.

⁷⁶ For student development of ORANGE in 1938 and 1939, see MHI, 7-1938-0 for correspondence between WPD and AWC, turning AWC attention to the Western Hemisphere and the strategic triangle. See MHI 1-105, 1937-1938 for rationale for AWC's doing RED, GREEN, ORANGE, and PURPLE. See MHI, 5-1938-21 and MHI, 5-1939-6 for two variations of ORANGE: 1938 was a roll of the dice; 1939 was deliberate.

⁷⁷ MHI, 5-1935-20, especially the Oral Report of Group # 4.

⁷⁸ Matloff and Snell, *Strategic Planning*, p. 8.

⁷⁹ MHI, 5-1936-21, Report of the War Plans Group # 4.

⁸⁰ MHI, 5-1937-24A.

Call for Papers

The Society for Military History will sponsor a session at the Missouri Valley Historical Conference, hosted by the University of Nebraska-Omaha, early to mid-March 1994. Proposals for papers or complete panels are welcome, as are the names of those willing to serve as chairs or commentators. Address your submissions to Prof. Jerry M. Cooper, Department of History, University of Missouri-St. Louis, St. Louis, MO 63121. The deadline for proposals is 1 September 1993.

1992-93 Military History Writing Contest Rules

Eligibility: All students attending officer advanced courses or the Sergeants Major Academy during calendar years 1992 and 1993 are eligible to enter the competition. We have extended eligibility back to 1992 because no contest was held last year due to funding problems. **Be sure to include your advanced or Sergeants Major Academy course title, number, and dates attended, your current (and if possible, forwarding) address, and telephone number.**

Entries: Submit two copies of previously unpublished manuscripts, typed, double-space. **Maximum length of papers is 3,500 words (approximately fourteen double-space pages).** Papers that exceed this length will not be accepted. Documentation is required, but footnotes or endnotes do not count in computing length. Submit graphics, illustrations, or photographs as if the article were to be published.

Topics: Essays should develop a limited historical theme related to the U.S. Army. Some suggested topic areas:

- Desert operations
- World War II campaigns/battles (50th anniversary period)
- Korean War (40th anniversary period)
- The black soldier's experience during the Civil War, Spanish-American War, World Wars I or II, Korea, or Vietnam
- Leadership
- Training
- Light infantry forces
- Unit cohesion and stress in combat
- Fighting outnumbered and winning, e.g., Ardennes, Vietnam

Deadline: Entries must be postmarked by midnight 31 December 1993.

Submission: Send two copies of the manuscript, along with any accompanying photographs, maps, or other graphics to: U.S. Army Center of Military History, ATTN: Writing Contest (Mr. Arthur), 1099 14th Street, NW, Washington, D.C. 20005-3402.

Judging and Prizes: A panel of military historians will judge each entry based on the following criteria: **historical accuracy, originality, relevance of the essay to today's Army leader, style, and rhetoric.** First place, \$500 and publication in *Army History*; second, \$250; third, \$100 or as the judges direct. Winners should be announced by 30 April 1994.

Point of Contact is Mr. Billy Arthur, DSN 285-5368, or (202) 504-5368.

World War II

1943

January - March

2 Jan - Buna Mission, a Japanese stronghold on New Guinea, is overrun by three battalions of the 32d Infantry Division, task organized as the Urbana Force.

4 Jan - U.S. forces gain ground southwest of Henderson Field on Guadalcanal.

5 Jan - The Fifth Army is activated in French Morocco, under the command of Lt. Gen. Mark W. Clark. General Clark had been Eisenhower's deputy during the planning for Operation TORCH.

9 Jan - The Japanese-controlled Chinese government in Nanking declares war on the United States and Britain. Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, leader of the U.S.-recognized Chinese government at Chungking, calls the declaration "ludicrous."

10 Jan - The 25th Infantry Division opens the XIV Corps offensive, the last and most extensive on Guadalcanal.

12 Jan - U.S. Army troops land unopposed on the Aleutian island of Amchitka.

14 Jan - President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill open what Roosevelt calls the "Unconditional Surrender Conference" in Casablanca, French Morocco. During the ten-day conference it is agreed that rather than attacking Germany through France in 1943, the Allies will first take Sicily while continuing the buildup for a cross-Channel attack later. The president also announces the policy of unconditional surrender in which the Allies will seek to deny the Axis nations ability to wage war.

15 Jan - 152 Japanese are killed on New Guinea as American and Australian troops overrun enemy positions on Sanananda Point.

16 Jan - Iraq declares war on Germany, Italy, and Japan.

22 Jan - The Papua Campaign ends on New Guinea in the first ground defeat of the Japanese. The Australians

suffer 5,000 casualties, while American losses are 2,788. The Allies bury 7,000 of the estimated 16,000 enemy engaged in the campaign.

23 Jan - The U.S. XIV Corps advances seven miles west of Henderson Field to capture Kokumbona.

25 Jan - The Sixth Army is activated at Fort Sam Houston, Texas, and immediately prepares to move to the Pacific theater. Within a month the army is operational in Australia under the command of Lt. Gen. Walter Krueger.

28 Jan - Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson announces that the U.S. has suffered 1,258 casualties in Tunisia, including 211 killed, 532 wounded, and 515 missing. Total U.S. casualties in North Africa are 2,168, including 571 killed, 582 wounded, and 1,015 missing according to the United Press.

1 Feb - The 442d Infantry is activated at Camp Shelby, Mississippi. The regiment is made up of personnel of Japanese ancestry who are American citizens having resided in the United States since birth.

- Under cover of darkness the Japanese begin a seaborne withdrawal from Cape Esperance, Guadalcanal.

- Combat Command D, 1st Armored Division, assaults and occupies Sened Station in Tunisia.

- Third Army begins maneuvers in Louisiana which run through 28 March. Participating units include the VIII Corps, 77th and 90th Infantry Divisions, and 8th Armored Division.

2 Feb - The Russian siege of Stalingrad ends in total defeat of Germans.

3 Feb - In an attempt to consolidate Allied positions, Combat Command D, 1st Armored Division, is ordered to withdraw to Gafsa, abandoning Sened Station.

9 Feb - Organized resistance on Guadalcanal ends.

14 Feb - U.S. troops are forced to abandon Sidi Bou Zid and forward positions near Faid Pass as the Germans open a major attack in Tunisia, breaking through the American lines.

Chronology

17 Feb - U.S. troops are forced from Sbeitla as the Axis advance in Tunisia continues.

19 Feb - After several days of advances, German forces attack Sbiba and Kasserine Passes in Tunisia.

20 Feb - The Germans are repulsed at Sbiba Pass by French and British troops but break through U.S. positions at Kasserine Pass.

- According to a report released by the Office of War Information, total Army casualties in the war are 3,533 killed, 6,509 wounded, 25,684 missing, 6,132 prisoners of war, and 90 internees.

21 Feb - Elements of the 43d Infantry Division mount an invasion of the Russell Islands, thirty-five miles northwest of Guadalcanal. Landings are made on the islands of Banika and Pavuvu with no opposition. By the end of the month there are 9,000 soldiers on the islands.

- The German drive from Kasserine Pass is stopped just short of Thala by American (II Corps) and British units. Other Axis thrusts toward Tebessa and Robaa are also checked by the Allies.

22 Feb - Under heavy air attack Axis forces in the II Corps area begin retreating toward Kasserine Pass, completing withdrawal into the pass by the next morning. British armor and U.S. artillery are credited with turning the tide on the Axis offensive.

25 Feb - Elements of the II Corps retake Kasserine Pass virtually unopposed.

- The 11th Airborne Division is activated at Camp Mackall, North Carolina, and the 97th Infantry Division of the Organized Reserves is ordered into active military service at Camp Swift, Texas.

1 Mar - U.S. troops recapture Sbeitla.

2-4 Mar - The Japanese are soundly defeated in the Battle of the Bismarck Sea by Allied land-based planes. This is the last enemy attempt to use large vessels to reinforce positions on Huon Gulf, New Guinea.

3 Mar - Americans reenter Sidi Bou Zid and drive to a point less than three miles from Faid Pass.

6 Mar - General Eisenhower relieves Maj. Gen. Lloyd R. Fredendall as commander of the II Corps, appointing Maj. Gen. George S. Patton, Jr., to the post.

11 Mar - Secretary of War Stimson announces that U.S. forces suffered 2,242 casualties during the week of the German offensive, 14-20 February: 59 were killed, 176 wounded, and 2,007 are listed as missing.

15 Mar - The 20th Armored Division is activated at Camp Campbell, Kentucky, and the 106th Infantry Division is activated at Fort Jackson, South Carolina.

17 Mar - The 1st Infantry Division opens a major II Corps offensive in Tunisia, recapturing the initial objective of Gafsa. This is the first time the division has attacked as a division.

18 Mar - The 1st Infantry Division, with the 1st Ranger Battalion attached, enters El Guettar unopposed.

20 Mar - The 1st Armored Division, on the II Corps left flank, advances and takes Sened Station, which has been abandoned by the enemy.

22 Mar - The 1st Armored Division occupies Maknassy and continues its drive, occupying Djebel Dribica and Djebel Bou Douaou after dark. The 18th Infantry, 1st Infantry Division, occupies Djebel el Mcheltat.

23 Mar - The 1st Infantry Division holds off strong enemy counterattacks toward El Guettar. The 1st Armored Division advance is held up by a strong enemy defense of Djebel Naemia. Over the next several days the II Corps offensive grinds to a halt as German forces check every attempt at significant gains.

28 Mar - The 1st and 9th Infantry Divisions attempt unsuccessfully to open a gap in the enemy lines for the 1st Armored Division to attack through.

This chronology was prepared by Edward N. Bedessem of the Center's Historical Services Division.

The Archaic Archivist

From TORCH to Tunisia, American military operations in North Africa, 1942-43, are well represented in the U.S. Army Military History Institute. This article highlights only certain archival holdings. Readers should keep in mind that the Archives Branch possesses many other pertinent papers and that the Institute's Library and Special Collections Branches, respectively, contain extensive published and pictorial material on those campaigns.

Preliminary planning for the initial landings is covered in the memoirs of Lt. Gen. John C. H. Lee, while the voluminous wartime papers of Office of Strategic Services Director William J. Donovan touch on the gathering of intelligence in French North Africa. Both planning and military intelligence, including the famous trip by submarine, receive extensive treatment in the oral history transcript of Mark W. Clark. Detailed accounts of the November landings themselves can be found in the reports of Col. Esher Burkhart with the Atlantic Fleet, in the official documents of Col. William O. Darby's forces in the Ranger Collection, and in the oral history memoirs of Lt. Col. Ben Harrell of the 3d Infantry Division headquarters.

General Clark is among numerous commanders and staff at the senior headquarters level whose papers are in the Institute's archives. Also, from Headquarters, Fifth Army, may be mentioned the papers of Col. Arthur Nevins and the oral history transcript of Lt. Col. William P. Yarborough. The memoirs of Col. Oscar W. Koch and Col. Garrison H. Davidson cover their respective service as intelligence (G-2) officer and chief engineer on Lt. Gen. George S. Patton's staff; the clippings of Lt. Gen. Geoffrey Keyes also relate to that headquarters; and the letters and reminiscences of Maj. William P. Jones shed light on the operations (G-3) section of the Western Task Force. The recollections of Col. A. E. Schanze include Lt. Gen. Lloyd R. Fredendall's account of his relief, while the narrative by Col. Robert A. Hewitt covers the II Corps throughout the North African operations.

Another excellent source on that headquarters during the final fighting in Tunisia is the diary of Capt. Chester B. Hansen, aide-de-camp to Lt. Gen. Omar N. Bradley. General Bradley's own papers and the documentation on him in the Clay Blair Collection are also useful for the spring of 1943. Sources on General Dwight D. Eisenhower's own headquarters include the observer dispatches of Lt. Gen. Harold R. Bull and the

oral history transcript of General Lyman L. Lemnitzer. Then, too, many senior commanders themselves, both American and British, were interviewed by George Howe and Sidney Mathews in the course of writing *Northwest Africa: Seizing the Initiative in the West* for the official history series, United States Army in World War II. The resulting research notes are contained in two boxes at the Military History Institute in the Office of the Chief of Military History Collection.

At the divisional level may be mentioned the papers of Maj. Gen. Orlando Ward, Brig. Gen. Paul Robinett, Maj. Gen. Ernest N. Harmon, General Hamilton H. Howze, and Brig. Gen. Robert I. Stack of the 1st Armored Division, and of Maj. Gen. Terry Allen of the 1st Infantry Division. The Big Red One headquarters is also reflected in the papers of Col. Stanhope B. Mason and the oral history memoirs of Lt. Col. Robert W. Porter.

Further strong coverage for the 1st Infantry Division and the 1st Armored Division comes through the World War II Survey, with nine and eleven boxes, respectively. The 3d, 9th, and 34th Infantry Divisions and the 2d Armored Division already have a box apiece within the Survey, and a number of nondivisional units that served in North Africa also are represented. Hundreds more donations from veterans of all those units are anticipated in the upcoming months and years. Most of the Survey papers come from junior officers and GIs; those ranks are also well represented in the World War II Miscellaneous Collection. Two significant holdings of medical manuscripts on the North Africa operations are the diaries and wartime papers of Col. John G. Knauer, commanding the 23d General Hospital, and the personal letters of Dr. George H. Olds of the 845th Engineer Aviation Battalion.

Even as American and Allied forces were advancing from Algeria and Morocco into Tunisia, other British troops battled westward toward Bizerte. Important American logistical support for Bernard Montgomery's army is reflected in the papers of Maj. Gen. Russell L. Maxwell and the reminiscences of Col. George B. Jarrett.

Logistics, tactics, and strategy; enlisted men, junior officers, key staff officers, and senior commanders; wartime documents, personal letters and diaries, and postwar accounts—all these dimensions of World War II in North Africa are well represented in the Archives Branch of the U.S. Army Military History Institute.

Travails of Peace and War Field Artillery in the 1930s and Early 1940s

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This article is derived from a paper Doctor Dastrup presented to the 1990 Conference of Army Historians in Washington. Dr. Judith Bellafaire edited the article for Army History.

During the 1930s and early 1940s, the U.S. Army's field artillery experienced a profound change. Throughout these years limited budgets compounded by conservative thinking within the field artillery, especially after 1933, influenced the pace of modernization. Nevertheless, the field artillery motorized its field pieces, revamped fire direction, reorganized, and rearmed to improve close support for the other combat arms.

After a decade of limited progress in the 1920s with modernizing the field artillery, Maj. Gen. Harry G. Bishop, Chief of Field Artillery (1930-34), took aggressive action to rearm and reequip. At the general's urging the War Department directed the Field Artillery Board in 1931 to test four M1897 75-mm. guns with carriages that had been adapted for high-speed movement, their wooden wheels replaced with steel wheels with pneumatic tires. After conducting trials between May 1932 and March 1933, the board recommended employing trucks as prime movers for light artillery and testing a battalion of towed 75-mm. guns. Although the lack of funds caused by the Great Depression prevented the battalion trial, General Bishop accepted the results of the battery test as evidence that light trucks were acceptable for towing light artillery for the division. Even though the specific type of vehicle to be used was still undetermined in 1933, General Bishop concluded that the War Department could not continue to avoid adopting towed artillery as it had done since the late 1920s with the rationale that suitable motor vehicles did not exist. (1)

General Bishop's prompting, a declining horse population in the United States, a grant from the Public Works Administration to increase motorized equipment in the National Guard and Regular Army, and a modernization program initiated in 1933 by Chief of Staff General Douglas MacArthur (1930-35), combined to encourage the War Department to motorize its light artillery. Still reluctant to depend totally on motor vehicles as prime movers, the War Department established the goal of motorizing 50 percent of its light batteries to complement its medium and heavy batter-

ies, which had been motorized in the 1920s. As an expedient, the War Department adapted old M1897 carriages for towing behind a truck until a new carriage could be developed. Supported by funds from the Public Works Administration, the War Department in 1936 standardized a new carriage with pneumatic tires, antifriction bearings, and springs to give the 75-mm. gun two types of carriages—a modified M1897 carriage and a modern one. Even though lingering resistance from conservative field artillery officers slowed down progress, the War Department motorized fifty-eight of its eighty-one M2 75-mm. (modernized French M1897) gun batteries by 1939 and even produced an experimental towed M2 105-mm. howitzer. (2)

In comparison, leadership within the field artillery continued to oppose introducing self-propelled artillery. As they had done during the 1920s, many field artillery officers contended throughout the 1930s that towed artillery was more maneuverable, less conspicuous, and less likely to be deadlined for repairs than self-propelled artillery and could be pulled by horses if necessary. Simply put, adopting self-propelled artillery represented an even more radical step than acquiring towed artillery, and it was resisted. (3)

Just as World War II was beginning, Maj. Gen. Robert M. Danford, Chief of Field Artillery (1938-42), expressed the feelings and fears of many field artillery officers about motorization. In a lecture in September 1939 to Army War College students, he explained that the motor surpassed the horse in some situations, while the horse was better in others:

For light division artillery, the horse still remains superior as the prime mover off roads, through the mud, the darkness and the rain. . . . To discard him during peace in favor of the motor, 100 percent, is simply putting all our eggs in one basket, and is, in my judgement, an unsound policy. (4)

Although Danford hesitatingly accepted motorization, he hoped to preserve some horse-drawn light artillery. For the general, motorizing all was too risky because motor vehicles were still unproven in combat and because motorizing the field artillery meant abandoning tradition for the unknown. This was difficult to do. (5)

Caught in the middle of a technological revolution, many field artillery officers reluctantly converted most of their light artillery to towed by 1939 but did not want self-propelled artillery. Yet, as early as the mid-1930s, most field artillery officers conceded that the appearance of reliable motor vehicles made horse-drawn artillery obsolete and that they had to adopt motorized artillery. Even so, swayed by their apprehensions and faced with the possibility of restructuring tactics, doctrine, and organization, they kept their horses even though the availability of suitable motor vehicles and money dedicated to motorization removed two of the three obstacles that had stood in the way of progress in the 1920s and first years of the 1930s. After 1933 only conservatism—the third obstacle—hindered motorization. (6)

Meanwhile, improvements in motor transportation, the development of a 155-mm. howitzer carriage suitable for towing behind a motor vehicle, pressure from eager reformers, and the desire to stay abreast of developments in foreign armies caused attitudes to change about the division's field artillery armament. Ever since the War Department's decision of the early 1920s to equip the division with new 75-mm. guns and 105-mm. howitzers, which meant dropping the 155-mm. howitzer, many field artillery officers pushed to replace the 75-mm. gun with the 105-mm. howitzer. They wanted to keep the 155-mm. howitzer because a 105-mm. and 155-mm. howitzer combination would give the division superior firepower and mobility. Besides being too light, the 75-mm. gun's flat trajectory limited its utility by preventing it from hitting targets on the reverse side of the slope, which discouraged employing the gun. (7)

In June 1938 General Danford directed the Field Artillery School at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, to determine the best weapons for the division to end the controversy that had been raging for almost two decades. The school emphatically rejected using 75-mm. guns and 105-mm. howitzers because they lacked sufficient firepower and offered only mobility. Rather, the school wanted to equip the division with 105-mm. and 155-mm. howitzers because of their mobility and firepower. Yet the school realized that a surplus of 75-mm. guns and ammunition from the Great War would delay or even prevent scrapping the 75-mm. gun for the 105-mm. howitzer. (8)

Even though tests of the triangular division in 1937-39 supported employing 105-mm. and 155-mm. howitzers, the War Department still resisted changing the division's artillery. In 1939-40 the War Depart-

ment noted that the M2 105-mm. howitzer's range of 12,500 yards was shorter than the M2 75-mm. gun's range of 13,600 yards, that it took longer for the howitzer to go into action, that the howitzer had not been proven in battle, that there was a surplus of 75-mm. guns and ammunition, and that replacing the 75-mm. gun with the 105-mm. howitzer would be expensive and difficult to justify in peacetime. (9) In fact, Chief of Staff George C. Marshall (1939-45) pointed out in February 1940 that abandoning the 75-mm. gun and ammunition and spending vast sums of money to arm the division with 105-mm. howitzers were awkward to defend and that he was unwilling to convert to the 105-mm. and 155-mm. howitzer combination. Like many of his predecessors, General Marshall hesitated to spend money on new weapons in peacetime when a surplus from World War I existed. (10)

Nevertheless, events of 1940 finally prodded the War Department to reshape the division's artillery. Reports by field artillery officers during maneuvers of April and May 1940 further validated the need for 105-mm. and 155-mm. howitzers. Moreover, the Germans' success with 105-mm. howitzers in their divisions encouraged the War Department to change its position. Influenced by overwhelming evidence in favor of abandoning the 75-mm. gun for the 105-mm. howitzer, in June 1940 the Organization and Training Division (G-3) of the General Staff announced its decision to arm the division with three battalions of 105-mm. howitzers (thirty-six) and one battalion of 155-mm. howitzers (twelve). (11)

Adopting new field pieces in the 1930s generally faced stiff challenges. The Field Artillery School commented in 1937, "It cannot be expected that this reserve [M1897, M1916, and M1917 75-mm. guns, M1918 155-mm. howitzers, M1918 155-mm. guns, and M1918 240-mm. howitzers] will be replaced, in peace, with more modern materiel, because of the great cost involved." Although the school acknowledged that new light, medium, and heavy field pieces were being developed, it lamented, "However so long a time is required for production, issue, and training with new types that it is safe to assume that any war fought by the United States during this generation will be begun and continued during a considerable period with modified World War materiel." (12)

Because of a war surplus, Congress', the War Department's, and the field artillery's hesitancy to purchase new weapons during peacetime, and the lengthy time required to introduce new weapons, the Field Artillery School viewed the future pessimisti-

cally in 1937. Replacing old field pieces with new ones simply was not likely because Congress and the War Department would not provide money to produce new pieces that were in varying stages of development. As such, the field artillery was destined to continue equipping its batteries with old, worn out guns or modernized old models until a war broke out to force Congress to allocate the funds for manufacturing new weapons in the needed quantities. (13)

Motorization also caused reforms in fire direction to be made. Since the inception of indirect fire at the beginning of the twentieth century, the battery had been the firing unit. (14) Because of this practice, the field artillery had two methods of massing fire from two or more batteries on a target. First, if all of the battery forward observers could see the target, adjusting fire was easy. If the target was obscure, the other batteries would watch for the bursts of the adjusting battery and then try to engage the target. Second, when the target could be located on a map, the observers would pass its grid coordinates to the batteries to compute firing data. When a map was not available or when only one observer could see the target, massing fire was difficult and slow even for static warfare. (15)

Without a method of massing fire quickly on a battlefield that was becoming more mobile with the advent of motor vehicles, Maj. (later Maj. Gen.) Carlos Brewer, director of the Gunnery Department at the Field Artillery School, and his instructors overhauled fire direction procedures in 1931. Inspired by British Lt. Col. Neil Fraser-Tyler's book, *Field Guns in France*, that detailed the colonel's wartime experiences of shifting fire around the battlefield, they revised air and ground observation methods, created a firing chart, located the battery position through survey, and designated targets with reference to the base point on the firing chart. Yet they did not centralize the computing of firing data at the battalion because they could not find a way that was not slow and laborious. (16)

Brewer's successor, Maj. (later Maj. Gen.) Orlando Ward and his instructors developed a means for massing fire rapidly. In 1932-34 they created the fire-direction center in the battalion. The battalion commander would dispatch forward observers, while the center would compute firing data and synchronize fire on the most dangerous target. With accurate maps a battalion could mass fire within ten minutes after a call for fire, while a battery could provide fire within five minutes. Without maps massing fire was slower. Although the system could handle only observed fire, the fire-direction center surpassed anything in Europe

and made the battalion the firing unit. (17)

Even though the fire-direction center improved the ability to mass fire, many senior field artillery officers of the late 1930s opposed placing the battalion commander in charge of directing fire. In emotionally charged articles they insisted that the battery commander was "king in his own right" and that no one but the battery commander could give orders to fire. Influenced by such officers and by the Chief of Field Artillery, Maj. Gen. Upton Birnie (1934-38), the War Department refused to adopt the fire-direction center and left the battery as the firing unit. (18)

During the latter years of the 1930s, Lt. Col. (later Maj. Gen.) H. L. C. Jones, who became the director of the Gunnery Department in 1939, and his staff made the fire-direction center acceptable. They centralized all computation for observed and unobserved fire at the fire-direction center and made the battery commander responsible for observed fire and the battalion commander for unobserved. Only in 1941 after Colonel Jones demonstrated the ability of the fire-direction center to mass fire rapidly and effectively did the Field Artillery School commandant, the chief of Field Artillery, and the War Department accept the center and break with the past. (19)

Unlike the fire-direction center that improved the field artillery's capacity to perform its traditional role of supporting the other combat arms, using field pieces to fight tanks had the potential of forging a new and controversial mission. Even though field artillery officers of the 1920s and 1930s devised antitank tactics, they still clung tightly to those missions that predated tanks. Addressing student officers at the Army War College in September 1938, General Danford said, "The artillery should not be diverted from its primary role solely for antitank defense except in real emergencies." (20) Danford and most field artillery officers opposed antitank warfare as a primary mission because it would give the field artillery a defensive role and divert it from supporting the other combat arms. Therefore, they favored acquiring extremely mobile antitank weapons and attaching them to the division or corps. (21)

Literature at the Field Artillery School confirmed that field artillery officers knew about the tank's ability to alter tactics and organization dramatically. Nevertheless, they did not envision employing tanks, infantry, and artillery in formations as the Germans were developing with *Blitzkrieg* warfare or as B. H. Liddell Hart or J. F. C. Fuller were promoting in Great Britain. As far as the field artillery was concerned, the tank was

still an infantry support weapon. (22)

Consequently, on the eve of World War II, a mix of the old and new uneasily coexisted in the field artillery. Antiquated weapons and conservative thinking certainly dominated. Progressive people at the Field Artillery School and General Bishop tried to move the field artillery forward, but conservative thinking by most field artillery officers, to include chiefs of Field Artillery after 1934, and limited funds hampered modernization.

The German offensives of 1939 and 1940 dispelled any lingering American doubts about modernizing the field artillery. (23) Impressed with the mobility of German self-propelled 105-mm. howitzers, the War Department initiated action to acquire its own. Pressed by expediency, the Ordnance Department mounted an M2 105-mm. howitzer on a medium tank chassis, designated the weapon the M7 self-propelled 105-mm. howitzer, also known as the "Priest" because of its pulpit-like machine gun turret, and rushed it to the British in North Africa late in 1942. The adoption of self-propelled and towed artillery opened a new era. After depending on horses for years, field artillery officers finally came to terms with motor vehicles as prime movers for their field guns. (24)

Simultaneously, the war in Europe caused Congress to increase funding for defense. Contracts were let, and by late 1942 towed M2 105-mm. howitzers, self-propelled M7 105-mm. howitzers, towed M1 4.5-inch guns, towed M1 155-mm. guns, self-propelled M12 155-mm. guns, towed M1 8-inch howitzers, and towed M2 8-inch guns were beginning to replace World War I pieces and their modernized versions. Besides having more mobility and firepower than their predecessors, these new weapons fired high-explosive shell, chemical shell, steel shrapnel, and shot for piercing armor. (25)

The introduction of more powerful artillery, the growing use of camouflage, and deeply defiladed battery positions made ground observation more difficult. In some cases only air observation could detect targets. Because of these changes, field artillery officers set out to make aerial observation more responsive to their needs. As early as 1935, General Bishop openly opposed using air service personnel as observers in aircraft because they were not trained artillerymen and did not know the requirements of the field artillery. By doing this, Bishop challenged the decision made in 1926 to place aerial observation under the control of the Air Corps. (26)

Several years later, field artillery officers led by

General Danford also agitated for better air observation. Influenced by this dissatisfaction, Aeronca, Piper, and Taylorcraft aircraft manufacturers offered their light aircraft complete with pilots to senior commanders participating in the Army maneuvers in Tennessee, Texas, Louisiana, and the Carolinas in 1941 for testing in artillery observation and liaison roles. Chief of the Air Corps, Maj. Gen. Henry "Hap" Arnold, accepted using the light planes and assigned them to squadrons of O-49 observation aircraft for employment in the maneuvers. Named "Grasshoppers" by Maj. Gen. Innis P. Swift, Commanding General, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Bliss, Texas, the light aircraft flew over 400,000 miles during the maneuvers, completed more than 3,000 missions without losing an aircraft, and demonstrated their utility in air observation, courier, and reconnaissance missions. (27)

Notwithstanding the Grasshoppers' success, field artillery officers participating in the Louisiana maneuvers complained about the quality of the Air Corps' air observation. They wrote that they never knew when air observation would be available, that the diversion of aircraft to other missions was disruptive, that coordination between the field artillery and the Air Corps was difficult, and that there were never enough aircraft for artillery missions. Unable to depend on the Air Corps, in 1941 the War Department saw the possibility of making air observation organic to field artillery units. After all, the Germans were employing this type of air observation successfully in the war, while the British were introducing it. (28)

In light of the requirement for better air observation and the precedent being established in Europe, the War Department tasked the field artillery to test organic air observation. Using various models of light aircraft, experiments conducted at Camp Blanding, Florida, and Fort Sam Houston, Texas, in February and March 1942 demonstrated the timeliness of organic air observation. After studying the after-action reports, the War Department approved adopting organic air observation for the field artillery. Subsequently, a directive of 6 June 1942 allotted two small aircraft, two pilots, and one mechanic to each field artillery battalion and the same to each group, division, and corps artillery headquarters. (29)

The war years of 1939-42 generated significant changes in the field artillery. The acceptance of motorized artillery as the prime mover (even though vestiges of horse-drawn artillery were still hanging on), determined efforts to introduce new weapons, the adoption of organic air observation, and the decision to accept

the fire-direction center revolutionized the field artillery. Even so, field artillery officers could only speculate about how effectively they could mass fire and provide close support under combat conditions.

Early in 1943 in North Africa, American field artillery met one of its first combat tests. As Maj. Gen. Lloyd R. Fredendall's dispersed U.S. II Corps with a decentralized artillery command was struggling to hold the passes around Kasserine Pass, Lt. Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Commander in Chief, Allied Forces, dispatched reinforcements from Algeria to Tunisia. After several days of forced marches, Brig. Gen. S. LeRoy Irwin, Commander, 9th Infantry Division Artillery, moved his artillery of three battalions and two cannon companies into position at Thala to bolster sorely tested British defenses. During the night of 21-22 February, Irwin sited forty-eight American howitzers and thirty-six British pieces to enfilade the road from Kasserine Pass and massed fire on the Germans as they approached. Unable to continue forward under such destructive fire, the Germans finally retreated to Kasserine Pass. Meanwhile, Brig. Gen. Clift Andrus, Commander, 1st Infantry Division Artillery, massed barrages on the Germans and Italians as they drove towards Tebessa to cover the German advance on Thala and forced the Axis to retire back toward Kasserine Pass. (30)

Although American field artillery played an important role at Kasserine Pass by massing fire on the enemy, American participants expressed mixed observations about its effectiveness. Joseph B. Mittelman, a soldier in the 9th Division, complimented the field artillery's gallant stand. Yet artillery commanders knew that they had to master the fire-direction center and centralize command. After all, effective fire support in North Africa came only after Irwin and Andrus had organized their command properly to mass fire. (31)

After pushing the Germans back, the Allies then drove the Axis out of North Africa. Taking advantage of the fire-direction center, radio-equipped observers attached to infantry or armor units or sent aloft in organic spotter aircraft, and centralized command, field artillerymen repeatedly massed fire on German positions. During the Battle of El Guettar on 23 March 1943, for example, American field artillery with help from tank destroyers knocked out nearly thirty enemy tanks and helped contain the attack early in the day. Later that same day, massed fire from American field artillery shattered another German attack led by thirty-eight tanks. Following El Guettar, an enthusiastic

report recorded that American artillery had crucified the Germans with high explosive shell. Based on El Guettar and other battles, field artillerymen concluded that artillery, when employed in mass, was one of the dominating factors on the battlefield. As a result, corps and division commanders used as much field artillery as possible to support operations and often massed up to twelve battalions (144 guns) to attack enemy positions. This led the Field Artillery School to conclude in 1943 that massed fire was a necessity for successful operations. (32)

Besides this demonstration of firepower at El Guettar, other intense and accurate American artillery bombardments during the Allied push in Tunisia destroyed the Axis. Commenting on his field artillery's effectiveness, Maj. Gen. Manton Eddy, Commander, 9th Division, noted, "One Nazi who had served on almost every German front said that the American artillery fire was the most deadly that he had experienced." (33) After driving the Axis out of North Africa, Lt. Gen. Omar Bradley, Commanding General, II Corps, during the latter days of the North African campaign, explained that massed fire was a major factor in the Allied success at Gafsa and El Guettar. (34)

The fire-direction center, organic air and ground observers, motorized light artillery, and the newly created field artillery group that had been organized for corps artillery made effective close support possible. With few exceptions, the field artillery depended on observed fire because the hills and ridges of Tunisia provided excellent positions for observation. The commander of the 1st Armored Division's artillery indicated that any one of his observers could adjust fire for any of the division's batteries because of the fire-direction center. Explaining the impact of the center further, the commander wrote, "On any important target I usually mass all the artillery of the division [forty-eight guns]." (35) At the conclusion of the fighting, General Bradley reaffirmed the artillery commander's position. He pointed out that the fire-direction center was so flexible that any air or ground observer could adjust fire for any battery in his corps and bring fire from all the artillery in the corps (324 guns) onto a single target if it required such firepower. (36) As such, the fire-direction center and radio-equipped observers tied observers and battalions into an effective fire support network to crush enemy resistance and simultaneously united the field artillery, armor, and infantry into a potent combined arms team. (37)

Despite being new, organic air observation also

played a key role in North Africa. In a brief 1944 article in *Field Artillery Journal*, Maj. Edward A. Raymond, a field artillery officer, explained that air observation had "come into its own."⁽³⁸⁾ In fact, the Battles of El Guettar, Mateur, and Bizerte silenced detractors. Although the enemy was a master of camouflage, air observers repeatedly identified gun flashes from almost perfectly concealed positions for corps artillery to engage. Hostile antiaircraft fire might have prevented air observers from flying behind enemy lines on occasion, but they could still pick out enemy batteries to be neutralized or adjust fire on targets over ten thousand yards away. In light of this ability, flying behind the enemy lines was not critical for effective fire support. During action near Hill 609 near Sidi Nsir in late April and early May 1943, for example, organic air observers located so many targets that the 34th Infantry Division's artillery "could hardly haul in ammo fast enough to respond to the calls for fire."⁽³⁹⁾

Aerial observation also had a side benefit. During the Battles of El Guettar, Mateur, and Bizerte, observation aircraft flying over enemy lines often caused hostile batteries to cease firing to prevent them from disclosing their positions, which allowed the Americans to mass fire with impunity.⁽⁴⁰⁾

At the same time, towed and self-propelled pieces proved themselves. In 1943 the War Department noted that towed pieces were highly mobile and maneuverable but that self-propelled guns were even more so. Although self-propelled artillery was not any faster than towed artillery on the road, it had the ability to move into position faster to deliver fire, to displace quickly to avoid counterbattery fire, and to follow armor over terrain that was impassable for towed artillery. As a result, self-propelled artillery could be used aggressively on the offense and support fast-moving armor forces in North Africa.⁽⁴¹⁾ An article in *Field Artillery Journal* in March 1944 reported that the M7 was not only mobile, but also offered the crew protection from small arms fire and shell fragments so that the weapon could be sited forward to support closely any action. Although the M7 performed effectively, many field artillery officers still thought that it was too slow and heavy to support fast-moving armor. Even so, towed and self-propelled artillery silenced critics and had become an acknowledged asset by mid-1943.⁽⁴²⁾

Nevertheless, the inability of the M7 105-mm. self-propelled howitzer to shift its direction of fire by traversing only the tube created problems. With the

towed M2 105-mm. howitzer, the gun crew could change direction of fire easily and quickly by moving the trails when the target was beyond the tube's range of traverse. This was impossible with the M7. Because of the short traverse of the M7's tube, the crew had to reposition the gun mount when calls for fire were outside of the tube's range of traverse. This was slow and required a high degree of skill and teamwork on the part of the driver, the gunner, and section chief. As such, early action in North Africa in 1943 reinforced the wisdom of 360-degree on-board traverse recommended by the Westervelt Board of 1919.⁽⁴³⁾

Even though most Army officers agreed that American field artillery had performed effectively in North Africa, some saw the need for changes. General Irwin and Col. George B. Barth, Chief of Staff, 9th Division, wanted to expand the light battery from four to six pieces for more firepower. In a confidential review of combat action, the Field Artillery School pointed out that the U.S. II Corps' 324 field guns fired over 23,000 rounds a day in North Africa. Although this number of guns may appear impressive, it really is not. Because of the failure of the Germans to mass their artillery and their lack of guns and ammunition, II Corps had sufficient artillery. In light of this fact, the school warned that the Army should not draw any false conclusions from the North African campaign concerning field artillery support. The school thought that the division's organic artillery of forty-eight guns was the bare minimum and that a corps required more than II Corps had in North Africa when the United States invaded Europe to overcome the vast concentrations of enemy artillery on the Continent.⁽⁴⁴⁾

Even so, combat action in North Africa in 1943 vindicated the progressive reforms of the 1930s and dispelled the apprehensions of conservative field artillery officers. Towed and self-propelled artillery supplied unprecedented mobility without sacrificing firepower, while the fire-direction center and organic air observation dramatically facilitated massing fires for close support. By improving firepower, mobility, and responsiveness, the new weapons and techniques introduced during the 1930s and early 1940s revolutionized the field artillery, while combat strengthened the requirement for firepower.

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Notes

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- ⁸ Study of the 105-mm. Howitzer, pp. 1-2, 19, 42.
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1993 Chemical Corps Annual Writing Competition Announced

The theme for the 1993 Chemical Corps Writing Competition will be "The Chemical Corps: Protecting the Future Force." This competition is open to military of all branches and services, including allied nations, and to civilians of any nationality. Entries should be 500 to 2,500 words in length, supported by appropriate footnotes, bibliography, and graphics. Manuscripts should be double spaced and accompanied by a cover sheet with the author's name, title, organization, and by a short biography. Competitors need to submit their entries to the Office of the Command Historian, U.S. Army Chemical School, ATTN: ATZN-CM-MH, Fort McClellan, Alabama 36205-5020, no later than 15 August 1993. Judging will be on a 100-point scale, with up to 40 points for writing clarity, 30 for relevance to the Chemical soldier of the 1990s, 20 for general accuracy, and 20 for originality. A panel of judges appointed by the Assistant Commander, Chemical School, will review the entries and recommend the top three articles to the Chief of Chemical. The decision of the Chief of Chemical will be final. The Chemical Corps Regimental Association will present monetary awards to the top three entries. First place will receive \$300, second will get \$150, and \$50 will go to the third-place entry. The winning article will be published in the Chemical Corps Regimental Association "Yellow Book" and in the January 1994 issue of *CML, Army Chemical Review*. Other articles submitted to the competition will be considered for publication as appropriate.

For further information contact Dr. Daniel E. Spector, Command Historian, U.S. Army Chemical School: DSN 865-5722, or commercial (205) 848-5722.

A. G. Fisch

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Book Reviews

Book Review
by Judith L. Bellafaire

Dearest Isabel: Letters From an Enlisted Man in World War II

by Sidney Bowen
Sunflower University Press. 232pp., \$18.95

"At the outset of my induction," writes former enlisted man Sidney Bowen of his World War II

service, "I considered my draft status and commitment as a kind of feudal serfdom. Through a layer-cake of jumbled experiences, my tour of duty became a matter of survival. I changed from a person with acceptable behavior to one with the unacceptable behavior of compulsive gambling and dabbling in the prevailing black market."

Bowen, a 33-year-old railway mail clerk living in a Chicago suburb, was drafted in 1943. He and Isabel, 36, had been married for three years and had no

children. Bowen's frequent letters to his wife comprise the text of *Dearest Isabel*.

Upon induction, Bowen was sent to an antiaircraft artillery gun battalion at Camp Edwards, Massachusetts, where he was selected to receive training as a radar operator. After his radar training was completed, Bowen and twelve other men with experience in postal work were reclassified as postal clerks and sent to Camp Reynolds, Pennsylvania. This Camp Edwards contingent learned that they, along with other newly minted postal clerks, were to be sent overseas immediately to help alleviate an Army-wide shortage of postal workers. Bowen was upset at the thought of going overseas without a furlough, and he complained to the post chaplain. The chaplain interceded with post authorities, and Bowen and the rest of the Camp Edwards transferees were granted one week's furlough. The other postal clerks left while Bowen was on leave. Bowen, who had graduated at the head of his radar class, was disappointed with his new classification and lobbied intensively to have it changed. An innovative smooth talker, he eventually succeeded and was shipped overseas as an antiaircraft artillery replacement. Bowen was sent to a replacement depot in Litchfield, England, and eventually assigned to a battery of the 494th Antiaircraft Artillery Gun Battalion.

Bowen's unit landed on UTAH Beach, Normandy, France, on 16 July 1944, relocating in August to the area around Cherbourg. Until April 1945 the battalion was engaged in the operational defense of OMAHA Beach, the port of Antwerp, and Liege, Belgium, and in guarding German prisoners.

Because letters home were censored, soldiers knew they could not discuss many of the particulars of their assignments. Bowen's letters to his wife focus on the nonbattle-related experiences that were a large part of his life: the supplemental food he managed to obtain by trading cigarettes, which functioned as a common medium of exchange; the books he read; the movies he saw in camp; the contents of letters and packages he received from other family members; and the customs of local people, including the type of houses they lived in and the food they ate.

Individuals who find themselves arbitrarily placed in a dangerous, confusing situation over which they have little control often react to stress by engaging in behavior that would have been inconceivable in their early lives. Examples of altered behavior patterns range from harmless eccentricities such as the increased use of profanity through more self-destructive compulsions such as substance abuse, sexual promis-

cuity, gambling, stealing, and participation in the black market.

Bowen dealt with his stress by becoming a major player in nightly poker and crap games. When he was lucky at the table, he often loaned money to those of his cohorts who had been less fortunate. Bowen also enjoyed "bargain hunting," wheeling and dealing with his fellow soldiers, local people, and refugees by buying, selling, and trading cameras, watches, jewelry, "artwork," and perfume.

Bowen's letters home detail his increasing interest in card games. The first letter that mentions cards was written on 22 August 1943, during Bowen's first week at Camp Edwards: "I played poker for the first time and dropped seven bucks. I'll try to hang on to the rest of my dough." On 5 September he wrote "And now the bad news—I lost my roll playing poker. Please send me a couple of bucks, but no more." In his 12 September letter, Bowen confessed to witnessing a "spirited crap game," watching "to get the hang of it." He noted that "the game is fascinating, and I am afraid I will be tempted to learn." On 8 November he reiterated that "It is fascinating to watch the action. However, I have a certain mistrust of the game and consider myself fortunate never having taken up the 'sport.'"

Bowen participated in his first crap game as an unhappy future postal clerk at Camp Reynolds. During this time Bowen was trying to regain his radar classification. The stress Bowen felt at Camp Reynolds manifested itself at the card table. When he had bad luck, he was forced to borrow money from the Red Cross.

Bowen's gambling became chronic by August 1944. He wrote Isabel: "The dice D... sent me are true, and everyone wants to gamble with my new dice. However, I don't loan them out, as I want to be present and have a piece of the action when I am off duty. This evening I ran my \$34.00 up to over \$200.00."

On 7 September Bowen wrote about being "practically drafted into a poker game...a no-limit, check and raise bloodthirsty session of five card draw." In a letter of 8 January 1945, Bowen told his wife:

The nightly games start out modestly enough at 20 francs a lick to create a center of interest. It isn't long before the game progresses to 100 francs and more, and it is not unusual to see several thousand francs in the center of the table. I have had my ups and downs in the five nights I have played in this new year. Payday, I lost 2,000 of my 3,000 francs. The second night, I lost the

remaining 1,000 and borrowed until I was 7,500 in debt. But my luck turned the next evening and I not only paid back the 7,500 but came home with 5,700 francs to the good. The next night, I came home with an augmented purse and had in the neighborhood of 13,000 francs. The following evening, I did things up right by winning 20,000 more francs, or \$300.00 American.

Bowen's descriptions of nightly card games agree with the reminiscences of other veterans. In *The Good War: An Oral History of World War II* by Studs Terkel, veteran Johnny DeGrazio describes gambling each payday, and sometimes winning as much as \$1,400.00 in a single all-night session.

Bowen also spent a great deal of time while on leave scouting around France for perfumes, jewelry, and other little luxuries. Initially, Bowen was simply looking for gifts for his beloved wife, but in his travels he located watches, cameras, and other commodities for bargain prices. He purchased these items, had small repairs made, and resold them to his fellow soldiers for a profit. Bowen also purchased things from troops in need of cash and frequently resold these items. In January 1945 Bowen wrote to his wife:

Our neighboring Canadian trucking outfit is in deep trouble. It seems that the whole outfit has been selling supplies to the black market. They would not only black market supplies for soldiers on the front lines, but also sell the vehicle too. At first they got away with it by declaring a loss in transit due to enemy action. But it occurred once too often. The Canadian Royal Mounted Police infiltrated the outfit and caught up with them. No wonder the Cannucks had so much money to throw around the crap tables and for the purchase of luxury articles to send back home.

Dearest Isabel is a valuable book for historians interested in the psychological impact of stress and regimentation on the individual soldier. Bowen describes both the laughable minor eccentricities developed by some of the men in his and neighboring units and the potentially damaging extracurricular activities indulged in by many others: the kid from Kentucky who habitually got drunk on apple brandy and kept going AWOL; the soldier who stole a stack of blank passes from the orderly room; the men who frequented the bawdy houses at every locale; those who drank away their money every payday; and those who could not stay away from violent roadhouse brawls. The

innate value of this collection of letters stems from the frankness and honesty of Bowen's letters to his wife. Their mature, loving relationship allows the reader a clear look at the exigencies soldiers respond to while at war.

Dr. Judith L. Bellafaire is a historian in the Center's Field and International Division. She currently is assigned to the cadre working on the commemoration of the U.S. Army in World War II.

Book Review by Roger Cirillo

The American Military Ethic: A Meditation
by James H. Toner
Praeger Publishers. 288 pp., \$49.95

James Toner's *American Military Ethic* is a tale of two armies: a gladly forgotten Army of the recent past, and a second, theoretical, Army that embodies what the author believes the American military ethic should be.

Toner graduated from officer candidate school following college in the late 1960s and, like many created by that "Green Machine," was commissioned a second lieutenant of infantry. Toner served in the other Army of the Vietnam era, not the one fighting in Southeast Asia, but the U.S. Army, Europe, and not in an infantry unit, but in a nuclear holding unit as part of an ordnance battalion. Toner's training, shaping, and experiences in the grade of lieutenant and captain form a tale familiar to this reviewer, but not one the Army likes to remember. The Army of the late 1960s and early 1970s was rent by racial tensions, problems hidden by ticket-punching commanders, the underlying social clash between the unwilling conscript and the career noncommissioned officer longing for his former status, and the constant stigma of being part of an organization fighting an unpopular war. Societies get the armies they deserve; that Army was both a tragedy and a disgrace.

The triumph of chicken—over reason, of function over purpose, of unquestioned obedience to any martinet or careerist in the chain; these are the facts underlying Toner's troop stories. And they are true. Historians who believe that social scientists like Charles Moskos have got it right need to read Toner—and his story hits only the iceberg's tip.

Toner finished his tour, earned a doctorate, and

eventually taught at the Air War College, where he began a course called "Conscience and Command." From this rapid story jump, he begins tale two—his beliefs, based on his experience and studies, in what the military ethic should be. Essentially, he says that ethic should return to the World War II-era belief captured by the expression "in the service." Service to country, its belief systems, and its past underlies the code, one designed not to produce parade ground manikins, service chiefs without professional opinions, or the lack of discipline of his time—but a true professional force.

That force has existed for some time, and if the book has a failing, it is the missing story of how the Army rebuilt itself. Toner's work is valuable for its frankness about a subject ignored by Americans—their Army and what happened when America turned its back on its own Army. It is also valuable in reminding us all that the foundation for a military's service to the nation is its readiness to serve in time of military need.

Lt. Col. Roger Cirillo is assigned to the Field and International Division, U.S. Army Center of Military History. Colonel Cirillo is involved with the Center's commemoration of World War II and recently returned from the battlefields of Tunisia.

Forthcoming in *Army History*...

Col. Claudio Moreira Bento's paper on the fiftieth anniversary of Brazil's entry into World War II as an ally of the United States.

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