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Morale Problems in Combat American Soldiers in Europe in World War II

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Conventional wisdom suggests that it is hard to argue with success, but the U.S. Army Ground Forces in World War II were an exception to this principle. American ground troops (especially, although not exclusively, the infantry) have been criticized for deficient combat skills and a lack of aggressiveness and initiative, despite their role in defeating the Axis armed forces. In *Men Against Fire*, S.L.A. Marshall cites the low percentage of American soldiers who admitted to firing their weapons at the enemy as evidence of a lack of aggressive spirit in the ground forces. (1) Although the research and quantification methods of Marshall's rate-of-fire arguments have been challenged (2), other indications of the lack of initiative in American ground troops include deficiencies in aggressive patrolling and scouting, overdependence on artillery and air support, and a greater aversion to night fighting and hand-to-hand combat than their German and British counterparts had. (3)

Several factors contributed to such motivational problems in combat. Lewis B. Hershey, commander of the Selective Service System, believed the excessive Army regimentation created soldiers who would not act on their own and who needed both direct orders and close supervision. More recently, Martin van Crefeld in his work, *Fighting Power*, argues that, in contrast to the flexible mission-oriented German command system, the more rigid American command system failed to train soldiers to think and act for themselves. (4) Other considerations include the disruption of unit cohesion by breaking up units during training and the training itself, which—at least early in the war—lacked realism and failed to prepare men for what they could expect on the battlefield. (5) Also, manpower policies diverted hundreds of thousands of high-quality personnel to the Army Air Forces, Army Service Forces, and Specialized Training Program, thus depriving the Army Ground Forces (and again especially the infantry) of its share of men who showed the most promise for individual initiative and achievement. (6) Although an article of this scope cannot deal with all these issues in detail, it will focus on explaining how two particular results of the Army's manpower policies contributed to morale problems associated with the lack of initiative among American ground troops in Europe. The two factors are the replacement system and the lack of rotation from frontline duty.

The individual replacement, feeling isolated at being sent to join a group of strangers and lacking a sense of unit pride and cohesion, had a far more difficult time adjusting to frontline conditions than did soldiers who entered combat with the same men they had known through weeks, months, or even years of training and other precombat service. Replacements, often poorly received until they proved themselves to the veterans of their new unit, felt alone during their baptism of fire and typically suffered higher casualty rates in their first engagements than did units composed entirely of untried soldiers. Concerns about the replacement system mounted as more and more men went through the European theater replacement system, which had a capacity of 100,000 men and handled a total of 2.1 million soldiers, or about half the personnel who served in the theater. (7)

Replacements reporting to a unit behind the front lines had more time to adjust before entering combat, but newly arriving men still had often missed key aspects of unit training. In the 1st Infantry Division, selected commissioned and noncommissioned officers used brief rest periods in the North African campaign to conduct accelerated courses for incoming replace-

ments. Such measures reduced casualties and improved performance among the new men, who entered combat with greater confidence. Yet there was seldom time for thorough training in scouting, patrolling, night combat operations, first aid, and all the other skills in which the replacements were typically deficient. (8)

Many soldiers endured the horrors of combat through the sustaining bonds of loyalty, feelings of security, and sense of unit pride instilled by long service as part of a cohesive group, and even units of entirely green troops had at least developed some interpersonal bonds during precombat service. (9)

The Replacement Depots or "Repple Depples," often poorly managed and lacking in training and recreational facilities, proved ineffective in providing transition for soldiers waiting for individual assignment. Replacements endured the hardships of overseas service close to the front but had little sense of purpose. Most duties consisted of meaningless, busy assignments soldiers invariably called "chicken____," although even such tasks failed to alleviate the boredom. The average stay in the depot was one to three weeks, but some men waited weeks before assignment. Combat skills deteriorated from idleness. The lack of training, recreation, or purpose combined to reduce the replacement's morale and effectiveness just before he was sent to the front. (10)

Poor manpower planning led to a shortage of trained combat replacements that became critical after D-Day in Europe, when 70 to 80 percent of all replacements had to be sent to the infantry. The Army took soldiers trained as clerks, cooks, and other noncombat personnel, reclassified them as infantrymen, and sent them forward to join rifle companies. Soldiers sometimes received a short retraining course for their new specialty, but some replacements, despite Army regulations about basic training requirements, had never even fired the M1 rifle or qualified with any weapon. Even noncommissioned and commissioned officers received combat assignments without adequate training. Such men often lacked combat knowledge, skills, and conditioning. Reclassified and retrained soldiers, referred to derogatorily as "retreads," resented their assignment to combat duty, felt betrayed by the Army, and lost faith in a system that seemed to waste their abilities and preparation for other tasks. Even elite Ranger and airborne units received replacements who, despite having the zeal and confidence to volunteer for such duty, lacked basic skills. During the Battle of the Bulge, one replacement sent to the 517th Parachute

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Regimental Combat Team did not have (and had never fired) any infantry weapon. (11)

Many wounded soldiers, lacking confidence in the replacement system and motivated by unit pride and cohesion, tried desperately to return to their former units rather than go through the replacement depot. Army policy initially required units to file personnel requisitions for casualties expected to return to duty after treatment. But if the paperwork was mishandled, a veteran might be reassigned to any unit. Also, Army policy in Europe in the latter half of 1944 prohibited assigning personnel whose presence would place the unit above its authorized strength. When replacements filled the vacancies of casualties, therefore, a wounded soldier returning to duty could go back to his former unit only if it had taken subsequent losses that had not been replaced. Such policies proved disastrous because the desire of casualties to return to combat stemmed largely from a sense of loyalty to one's comrades and pride in one's unit. Some soldiers who knew about this problem went absent without leave from hospitals or replacement depots in order to get back to their old units; field commanders usually reported such men returned to duty and passed the paperwork to someone else. The problem of reassigning rehabilitated casualties finally caused the Army to revise its policies in 1945; subsequent veteran replacements were returned to their former units, regardless of strength authorization or formal requisitions. (12)

Adjustment was even more difficult for inexperienced troops than for returning veterans. New replacements, still needing orientation and experience when sent to a quiet sector of the front, suffered conspicuously high casualty rates when ordered into an attack or defense against an enemy assault. Often, more than half the replacements sent directly into combat became casualties in the first few days of fighting. The odds were against a replacement's surviving long enough to gain recognition and experience. Occasionally a soldier arrived and died before anybody learned his name. Some units tried to shelter new men for a day or two, but rifle companies in the line had few (if any) such opportunities. While even veteran infantrymen felt isolated because of the dispersed battlefields typical of World War II, the untried replacement was both physically and psychologically alone when he faced his baptism of fire. (13)

Surviving replacements could expect to be accepted by the veterans of the group, but the process was neither automatic nor easy. Some veterans felt guilty for accepting a replacement who took the place of an

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

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old friend or resented a replacement who came with a higher grade and thus blocked or slowed the path of promotion. Also, many veterans had little or no respect for untried noncommissioned or commissioned officers. Replacement leaders who failed to adjust quickly could destroy the morale of the entire unit. Most veterans avoided replacements because they were dangerous: they attracted fire, revealed their positions by being trigger-happy or otherwise conspicuous, bunched up, panicked under fire, picked up booby-trapped souvenirs, or lit cigarettes at night. Experienced soldiers, having already seen how frequently new men became casualties, stayed away for their own safety. Finally, many veterans had already lost enough friends and did not want to lose any more. Since so many of the replacements would be killed, wounded, or psychologically broken in their first few days with the unit, it was easier to accept the losses if the new men remained strangers. (14)

Yet veterans who helped replacements survive had more comrades to share the burdens ahead. With no standard policy for integrating replacements, individual commanders proceeded at their own discretion. Maj. Gen. John W. O'Daniel, commander of the 3d Infantry Division, had a replacement indoctrination system that included a welcome by the divisional band, briefings for officers, and speeches for groups of enlisted men. The arrangements were impossible to maintain during combat operations, however, when the men moved forward immediately. Incoming infantrymen were dispersed among the various platoons and usually paired up with experienced soldiers who could help them adjust. Sometimes a replacement performed a support role, such as an ammunition bearer, until he became accustomed to the sights and sounds of the battlefield. Veterans avoided taking an untried man on a night patrol or giving him a bazooka, flamethrower, or other specialized weapon. Armored commanders disliked breaking up their tank crews, but assigning two or three replacements created problems. Yet sometimes a unit suffered such severe losses that there were more replacements than veterans, therefore requiring inexperienced men to be assigned together and forcing them into the front lines without delay. (15)

Sgt. Raymond P. Janus of the 1st Armored Division, for example, had an especially difficult problem breaking in a new crew for his light tank: all three of the crewmen were newly arrived, eighteen-year-old replacements. For tank driver, Janus chose the only replacement with any driving experience, which amounted to having taken the family car to church on Sundays. Neither of the other two had any experience firing a machine gun or 37-mm. tank gun, but by default they assumed their new duties and learned what they could in the mere two hours of training time they had before moving out on a mission. The tank did not get far, however, as the driver panicked, rolled the vehicle down a hill, and threw Sergeant Janus out of the turret and on his head, whereupon he received a severe concussion that resulted in permanent hearing loss. With such events unfortunately all too common, it is no wonder that veterans shunned new replacements whenever possible. (16)

The Army reevaluated its replacement policies, although improvements during the war were few. Replacement depots added recreational facilities and Special Services activities, and wounded soldiers returning to duty went back to their former units automatically. Some reform efforts were merely cosmetic, as when the Army officially changed the word "replacement" to "reinforcement" for its perceived psychological benefit. Reform proposals under study included reworking the replacement system in connection with rotating combat-weary units out of the front lines and using replacement teams of two to six men so that soldiers could both approach combat with a group of comrades and still be integrated on the squad and platoon level. Yet these options had not advanced past the planning stages. At the end of the war in Europe, men were still assigned as individuals to combat units fighting on the front lines. Manpower shortages led to a constant demand for combat units and individual replacements alike, thus preventing any significant reworking of the system. (17)

With little unit rotation, men faced prolonged periods of danger, physical exertion, emotional anxiety, and mental stress without rest and relaxation. British soldiers in the war, who often (although not always) had a brief rest period after about a fortnight of combat, lasted for about 400 aggregate days of combat. On the other hand, American troops, who often endured 30 or 40 days (or more) of continuous fighting, tended to last no more than 200 aggregate days in battle. The price of such extended combat service was the loss of memory, perception, and judgment abilities and a lowering of morale. Casualty rates rose as soldiers became increasingly fatigued. For many troops the level of fear began to increase with each engagement, a condition that psychologists referred to as the lowering of the anxiety threshold. Even men who refused to break under the strain suffered from deteriorating combat skills, fatalistic attitudes about surviving

the war, and a demoralization that adversely affected incoming replacements. (18)

Food and sleep deprivation, although tolerable for brief periods, could with sustained loss undermine combat effectiveness and morale. U.S. Army field rations had more calories, variety, and nutrition than British or German rations, but Americans also expected a better diet—even in combat. Although the field rations had sufficient nutrition, men often discarded items such as cabbage flakes, lemon crystals, ersatz butter, apricot spread, and canned luncheon meat. Many troops considered canned C rations barely palatable when unheated. During the Ardennes offensive, Leroy N. Stewart of the 26th Infantry Regiment used his bayonet to chip away at ice-cold C rations that other men in his unit had stopped carrying because the cans could burst upon freezing. Of course, C and K rations were superior to the field rations of other armies, and problems such as malnutrition or severe weight loss seldom developed except in units operating behind enemy lines or otherwise out of supply. The Army made great efforts to keep the troops well fed, even setting up laboratories to develop better rations and attempting to provide hot turkey dinners for all frontline soldiers on Thanksgiving and Christmas in 1943 and 1944. Such efforts could boost morale, but combat troops still knew that rear-echelon personnel enjoyed most of the added material comfort while having far fewer risks and sacrifices. (19)

Stress and fatigue increased as soldiers endured difficult nights at the front and lost sleep because of real or anticipated enemy activity, guard duty, patrols that meant an entire evening with no sleep, and exposure to the elements. An Army study in Italy found American soldiers averaged only four hours of sleep per night even in quiet sectors of the front. Sleep loss had a cumulative effect that, combined with psychological imbalances from interruption of the body's 24-hour internal clock, could seriously impair physical, mental, and emotional stability. Moreover, the stress of sleep deprivation added to the fatiguing effects of physical exertion, emotional anxiety, and nutritional deficiency. Combat veterans were able eventually to sleep in almost any circumstances, but men received insufficient rest as long as they remained in the front lines. With no chance to recuperate, troops continued to operate with increasingly impaired efficiency. (20)

Soldiers had various ways of coping with the stress and fatigue of combat duty. While some deluded themselves or engaged in magical thinking, such as believing that performing a certain ritual would protect them, others sought diversions by searching recently liberated areas for alcoholic beverages, turning to humor as a way of coping with the horrors of battle, making minor challenges to authority, or improving their rations through improvised field cooking, foraging, or bartering with local civilians. Most diversions helped men escape the logical, rational reality that the odds were against surviving combat unharmed. Such thoughts, however, became increasingly difficult to dismiss the longer the soldier remained in the front lines without rest. (21)

Soldiers could find relief if their units were pulled out of the most forward positions, even if the location was still within range of enemy artillery. A brief lull in the fighting, accompanied by temporary withdrawal from foxholes, trenches, or other frontline positions, allowed men to rest and sleep more comfortably. Field messes could more easily provide hot meals, and troops had a chance to shave and bathe from their helmets. The soldiers often had to clean their weapons, repair or maintain their vehicles and equipment, care for their feet to prevent trench foot, and wash their socks and underwear. Most men were too tired for active recreation beyond drinking, gambling, or smoking cigarettes; besides, the rest was usually too brief to allow for much entertainment. Yet such a break provided the opportunity to reflect on recent battle experiences, get a hot meal and perhaps a delivery of mail, and simply rest. In practice, however, many combat units went weeks or even months without such a break. There were too few units to keep many of them out of the front lines for even this short period of time. (22)

Instead of unit withdrawal, individual soldiers could be rotated from the front for a few days of rest. Some commanders rejected this practice as one that coddled men and encouraged malingerers, but many units arranged for rest centers in the rear area immediately behind the range of enemy artillery. Quotas gave priority to soldiers with long combat service or symptoms of a physical or nervous breakdown. Men went to the rest center on duty status for an average stay of about seventy-two hours and, at the discretion of the commanding officer, attended a training or indoctrination lecture or performed minor duties. The center's Special Services officer provided reading material, writing paper or V-Mail forms, and passive entertainment such as shows or movies (when available). The soldiers, who received a complete change of clothes and could take a conventional shower or bath, had two or three days of rest to alleviate the cumulative stress

and fatigue of prolonged combat duty. (23)

The leave centers in Europe expanded with the opening of the 10,000-bed Paris facility in October 1944, followed by centers in Brussels, Rome, the Riviera, and many smaller towns and villages. With priority going to men with the most combat service, individual soldiers could get a two- or three-day pass or a seven-day leave or furlough. The Army Air Forces reduced travel time to and from the front by providing ninety-six round-trip flights per week to the Riviera and the United Kingdom. The centers arranged sightseeing tours, provided recreation, and offered men the chance to escape from Army life and live among civilians again for a short period. Purchases of food and other scarce commodities were limited, but men willingly paid black market prices or traded war souvenirs. Continued disruption of transportation in places like Rome commonly led to the unofficial appropriation of jeeps. Another problem was the spread of venereal disease among soldiers who sought female companionship; there were twenty-nine prophylactic stations in Paris alone. Overall, leave centers boosted morale for men who visited them or who were motivated to persevere until it was their turn for a pass or a furlough. The chance to escape from combat without being killed, wounded, or captured was a godsend to many soldiers. (24)

The impact of the centers on the frontline troops' morale, however, was limited by several factors. The opening of the facilities in late 1944 and 1945 came too late for many men who had already succumbed to combat exhaustion. Unit quotas were small, and personnel classified as "critical" were ineligible. Rotation to the United States, although available, was limited to an extremely small minority of long-service men who had been wounded twice or decorated for bravery twice or who had suffered a serious family hardship. Sometimes soldiers heard so many plans and rumors about rotation that they became disillusioned at what they perceived to be the Army's unfulfilled promises. Finally, the shortage of combat units made it difficult to take entire units out of the front lines or to coordinate rotation with the integration of replacements. (25)

In conclusion, in spite of improvements made during the course of the war, the poor utilization of the nation's manpower resources adversely affected the morale of frontline ground forces in Europe. This paper, while alluding to such problems as the diversion of high-quality manpower away from the Army Ground Forces or the breaking of unit cohesion by stripping away personnel from units in the midst of training, has focused on two particular issues. First, the replacement system rushed men into combat without adequate preparation and created an unnecessarily arduous challenge of adjustment on the field of battle. Second, the small number of divisions required units to remain in the front lines without rest and beyond the limits of individual human endurance, thus causing an earlier than necessary breakdown of veterans whose invaluable combat experience and skills were lost prematurely. That American troops lacked initiative and aggressiveness is not surprising when battles were fought all too frequently by inexperienced replacements (who were unprepared and did not know what to do) and by war-weary veterans (whose fatalistic attitudes suggested that it did not matter what they did). The American soldier admirably attempted to adjust and deal with wartime challenges; however, his ultimate success in each campaign was usually in spite of the Army's manpower policies rather than because of them.

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The Chief's Corner

Harold W. Nelson

This column will appear after my departure. Five years in office is an appropriate tenure for the Army's Chief of Military History, and there are many colonels who deserve the opportunity to carry on the work. One of them will be "promotable" in time to write the next Chief's Corner.

As I reflect on the past five years, I see a number of areas of gratifying improvement. *Army History* has been sustained as a useful periodical, giving us a chance to share professional views and reaching an ever-larger audience. That audience is helping us to broaden and deepen the use of military history throughout the Army and to improve the use of U.S. Army history in other programs. The interest in military history continues to grow, and the field itself is expanding to encompass new topics and fresh approaches. It has been exciting to be part of that growth.

Yet, traditional military history remains central to our work. Army historians still devote their efforts to producing operational and institutional histories, and our fine museums continue to evoke familiar branch, post, and unit histories. We can be proud of the high standards we set in these traditional endeavors, and we should take credit for having found ways—through automation, lateral communication, use of volunteers, and many other approaches—to do more with less in these key areas while maintaining those standards.

The "new" approach to military history that grew fastest during my tenure was the staff ride. Of course the staff ride is not new, but far more commanders, staff principals, and schools are now taking their people onto old battlefields to study the art of war. Those who study in this way are reading more military history and using history more systematically in their decision processes. This is a powerful development that has strengthened the Army and made the historian a more central figure in day-to-day operations at every level.

The historian has been central to war and reshaping in recent years. The historians who covered DESERT STORM taught us a great deal about readiness, and we have made significant progress toward having more capable teams ready to deploy when needed. Most of our Somalia coverage was done after units returned to home station, and that model has many advantages for future operations. As a result of these experiences, I believe we have built a CONUS-based, contingency history capability to match our changing Army. At the same time, curators, historians, and commanders have worked together to ensure that the Army's material heritage and lineage are preserved during reshaping. It has been tough. We have made some mistakes and missed some opportunities, but we can be proud of "breaking the mold" when we compare our performance with the Army's efforts during other demobilizations.

We linked lineage to World War II commemoration with our campaign brochures. Our marketing of such products is still spotty, but units that used the pamphlets became enthusiastic consumers, and veterans were equally supportive. Short operational histories appeal to a broad audience, but they must be supplemented. The paperback reprints of the operational "green books," the reprint of general officer after-action reports by Brehon Somervell, Douglas MacArthur, Dwight D. Eisenhower, and George C. Marshall, and the updated *Reader's Guide* all help to establish the necessary framework of supplemental literature. Obviously, the extant materials are so extensive that we must consider publishing on CD-ROM—a logical step that still lies in the future.

There are plenty of tasks remaining for my successor in addition to new publishing media. We still need a building for the National Museum of the U.S. Army, since its capable staff cannot demonstrate the full range of its skills in the Smithsonian and Pentagon displays that have earned such widespread praise. Such a museum will provide appropriate galleries for Army Art as well as artifacts, and the next Chief of Military History can carry Army Art to new plateaus now that the Army Artist program has been institutionalized. He can also build on our efforts to coimprint with field history programs. As resources become more scarce, this is an obvious way to make good use of research talent, editorial skills, and publishing money. The Army Knowledge Network, providing digitized storage, retrieval, and data links among key Army history sites, is another initiative that will mature in the coming years. Sustaining excellence while fostering innova-

tion will continue to consume the energy of the Chief of Military History.

I was extremely fortunate to be chosen for this position. I spent nearly twenty-two of the last twenty-six years in various history jobs, so I was lucky to be promoted to lieutenant colonel, let alone progress as I did. Young officers continue to risk their careers to study and teach history in the Army. Dedicated civilians continue to put in long hours, often unappreciated, isolated, and underpaid. Whether civilian or in uniform, these dedicated individuals are the essence of our program, preserving and interpreting the Army's past. It has been an honor to serve with such fine people, and I look forward to hearing of your continued success.

1994 Military History Writing Contest Rules

Eligibility: All students attending officer advanced courses or the Sergeants Major Academy during calendar year 1994 are eligible to enter the competition (contest may be entered only once). **Be sure to include your advanced or Sergeants Major Academy course title, number, dates attended, and your current and forwarding address and telephone number.**

Entries: Submit two copies of previously unpublished manuscripts, typed, double-space. **Maximum length of papers is 2,500 words (approximately ten double-space pages). Papers that exceed this length will not be accepted.** Documentation is required, but footnotes or endnotes do not count in computing length. Submit graphics, illustrations, or photographs as if the article were to be published.

Topics: Essays should develop **a limited theme** related to the history of the U.S. Army. Some suggested topic areas:

-Civil War, World War I, Korean War, etc.
-World War II (this is the fiftieth anniversary period)
-Minority soldiers and their experiences
-Leadership
-Training
-Unit cohesion and stress in combat
-Fighting outnumbered and winning
-Logistics

Deadline: Entires must be postmarked by midnight 31 December 1994.

Submission: Send two copies of the manuscript, along with any accompanying photographs, maps, or other graphics to: U.S. Army Center of Military History, ATTN: Writing Contest (Mr. Arthur), 1099 14th Street, NW, Washington, D.C. 20005-3402.

Judging and Prizes: A panel of military historians will judge each entry based on the following criteria: **historical accuracy, originality, and style and rhetoric.** First place, $500 and publication in *Army History*; second, $250; third, $100 or as the judges direct. Winners should be announced by 30 April 1995.

Point of contact is Mr. Billy Arthur, DSN 285-5368, or (202) 504-5368.

Editor's Journal

Printing and distribution of the spring issue were delayed for more than three months by funding problems. Five hundred copies of the spring issue were prepared by Defense Printing specifically for the Conference of Army Historians in Washington, D.C. (13-16 June), but the normal print run followed several weeks later. Consequently, this issue of *Army History* appears relatively soon after the last one. Funding shortfalls are becoming common within the Army community and are not limited to *Army History*. Unfortunately, there is no guarantee that there will not be others in the future. I regret that sometimes your notices of meetings, deadlines for papers, etc. may be dated by the time they appear, and I hope that our contributors and our readers alike will be patient as we try to maintain our quarterly schedule, while retaining as many features of our professional bulletin as we can.

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Prospective contributors to *Army History* who are uniformed or civilian members of the Department of Defense are reminded that all articles must be cleared by the author's security office and public affairs office before submission. The accompanying cover letter should then state that all requisite clearances have been obtained and that the article has command approval for open publication.

Arnold G. Fisch, Jr.

Applying for Civilian Historian Positions at Unified Commands Located on U.S. Air Force Bases

Civilian historians who wish to apply for historian positions at joint organizations serviced by Air Force civilian personnel offices must now enroll in the Air Force's automated personnel referral system. These organizations include USCENTCOM and USSOCOM (both at MacDill AFB, Florida), USSPACECOM (Peterson AFB, Colorado), USSTRATCOM (Offutt AFB, Nebraska), and USTRANSCOM (Scott AFB, Illinois).

The Air Force has named this referral system the Career Program External Applicant System (CPEAS). Current and reinstatement-eligible federal employees may register in CPEAS by sending Standard Form 171 (06/88 edition) with a copy of their most recent SF 50 showing career status, veterans preference, and service computation date. Mail in a non-government-franked envelope to the Air Force Civilian Personnel Management Center (AFCPMC) at the following address:

AFCPMC/DPCX
ATTN: CPEAS
555 E. Street West, Suite 1
Randolph AFB, Texas 78150-4530

After confirming eligibility, AFCPMC will send additional forms to use in entering data into the Air Force's central personnel computer. For further information concerning the Air Force Historian Career Program, contact Mr. Ed Canivan at DSN 487-4508 or (210) 652-4508. For procedural questions regarding CPEAS, call DSN 487-6192 or (210) 652-6192.

A German Officer and Historian's Sojourn at Washington

Wolfgang Rink

The following is a personal memoir by Wolfgang Rink, a German student of military history and a member of the German Army Reserves, who spent a month conducting research at the Center in the fall of 1993.

As a second lieutenant in the German Army Reserves and a history student at the Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms University in Bonn, I often contemplated the possibility of conducting historical research overseas. In the summer of 1993 the opportunity presented itself, and in late October I began my journey to the U.S. Army Center of Military History (CMH) in Washington, D.C. What follows is a memoir of the steps that led to my stay at CMH and my unique experiences doing research there.

I first learned of CMH in the summer of 1992 as a volunteer during a reserve training exercise at the *Militaergeschichtliches Forschungsamt*, or MGFA, (Military History Research Office) in Freiburg, Germany. During my month-long assignment, I served as a history officer. I believe that my work at the MGFA synthesized my role as a history student (concentrating mainly on modern military history) with my status as a member of the German Army Reserves. The possibility of working at a similar institution of military history in the United States seemed very attractive, so I began to devote my energies to making this happen. Initially, I explored channels within the German Army, to see if I could go in an official capacity as a representative. Severe budget constraints, however, made this impossible, so the only alternative left was a quasi-official visit, paying all expenses myself.

I sent a letter of application to the Center of Military History, while asking Col. Roland G. Foerster at the MGFA—who has a good professional relationship with CMH—for a letter of recommendation. A short time later I received a letter from Mr. Billy Arthur of the Center's Field and International Division; he would soon become my "point of contact." Mr. Arthur's letter indicated that I would be welcome, but that I had to take certain steps to satisfy the bureaucracy. I had to contact the German military attache, who processed my visit request through the Foreign Liaison Office at the Pentagon. After my proposed visit was cleared, CMH and the German embassy in Washington were informed. The whole process took about a month.

I was prepared to face the fact that on my own I would have to arrange for my flight, find a place to stay, and organize all other aspects of my visit. But fortunately when I arrived in Washington, D.C., I received considerable assistance from the historians at CMH.

I confess that when I arrived at CMH, I had no clear impression of what I should study. In one sense, I thought this might be a good thing, since I would be more flexible in the face of whatever demands the Center made on me. Following a long talk with Mr. Arthur on my first day in Washington, we agreed on my agenda. Essentially, I would serve my month-long assignment as a history officer-researcher in the Field and International Division, fully integrated into the organization's functions and activities. During my first week, I would visit the Pentagon and be briefed at the Center, becoming familiar with the different offices in CMH and their respective tasks. Following this orientation period, I would concentrate on preparing an article for *Army History* about the relationship of the *Wehrmacht* with the *Waffen-SS* during the period from 1942 or '43 to 1945.

This particular topic was selected partly at my own suggestion, since I hope to write a thesis for my bachelor of arts requirement dealing with this controversial military organization—the*Waffen-SS*—as a topic of interest to the fiftieth anniversary commemoration of World War II. It soon became clear, however, once I assembled a bibliography and began reviewing the literature, that I could not finish such a project in the two and one-half weeks effectively left for my work. Moreover, despite the helpful assistance and best efforts of CMH's librarian, Mr. Jim Knight, and others at the Center, notably Lt. Col. Roger Cirillo, I could not immediately obtain all the books, articles, and essays that appeared relevant to my research.

After about a week of studying the available printed materials, I decided to visit the National Archives to study additional sources on microfilm on my subject. The Archives has on microfilm the records of the*Reich* Leader of the *SS*, the chief of the German police, and the records of the German Army High Command. The originals of these records are in the German archives in Koblenz and in Freiburg.

I was able to obtain a researcher's card, and Dr. Clayton Laurie of CMH was very helpful with my

research, giving me good advice on using the Archives' records. After reviewing the Archives' finding aids, I was able to define what areas were important for research. At the same time, I realized that I needed much more time than I had to write a comprehensive historical essay before I left the United States. I suppose that really wasn't expected of me, but I had hoped to do so anyway. In any event, I profited greatly from my research, even if the results are not quite ready for publication.

What follows are some impressions I developed in comparing the military history organizations of CMH and the MGFA, as well as some general thoughts about the ways in which military history is studied in the United States and in Germany.

It seems to me that German historians are preserving an identity for their army based on history and tradition. At CMH, generally speaking, the historians appear more interested in promoting an appreciation of history and its value to today's soldiers. This attitude can be seen, for example, in the emphasis placed on staff rides to local battlefields. Army historians carefully plan for these trips, and their purpose is to make military personnel aware of military history's lessons. As noted in the foreword to Joseph W.A. Whitehorne's *The Battle of Second Manassas*, staff rides should help soldiers to use the past to enhance their knowledge of the Army's future. These words surely reflect an ideal, and I think it remains to be seen how practical studies of historic battlefields really are. But perhaps the U.S. Army's staff ride program does demonstrate that military history plays a more powerful role than in Germany. In this respect, it is interesting to note that currently the U.S. Army and the German Army face many of the same problems. Both have to reduce their overall strengths and their number of units. This presents a challenge to CMH historians, who must carefully identify those units with a long and important history. It seems, therefore, that in this area CMH historians have a more pronounced input to their Army than German historians do in theirs.

In reality, it is much more difficult in Germany to stress the value of tradition and military history. The founders of the current German Army, the *Bundeswehr*, of necessity turned away from many military traditions of the past that had been part of the *Reichswehr* and the *Wehrmacht*. Certainly, anything that reminded one of the Third Reich or of Nazi ideology had to be avoided. In their search for the "good tradition" in German military history, our historians focused on the Prussian reformers. After the Prussian Army was defeated by Napoleon Bonaparte, these men created a new army based on new ideas—new thinking. But rooting the military tradition in the Prussian reformers did not entirely solve the problem, so a struggle over military tradition has persisted since the establishment of the *Bundeswehr*. Most military commanders reflect an ongoing uncertainty about tradition. The result is that commanders often tend to ignore the history of the German Army before 1945 because they fear unpleasant questions and possible political consequences. This is not the forum for discussing these matters in detail, but in my opinion, there is too much embarrassment within the *Bundeswehr* in dealing with historical tradition.

In addition to staff rides, unit histories, and military traditions, I have the impression that the historians from CMH are more involved in the Army's present activities than are their German counterparts. This involvement is amply demonstrated by the Center's Oral History Branch, under the direction of Dr. Richard Hunt. As early as 1945, U.S. soldiers from the Historical Division conducted interviews with German officers of the *Wehrmacht* and the *Waffen-SS* who were then prisoners of war. Many years later these interviews were given to the MGFA in Germany, where they were highly regarded for their historical value. Nevertheless, as far as I know, there have never been—then or since—similar interviews conducted by German historians. In this age of technology—this era of modems, facsimiles, and conferences calls—written documents (especially written drafts—the historian's raw materials) have become less prevalent. When one considers how important oral sources could be in the future for historians, it should be a challenge for German military historians to conduct interviews and to collect and protect them for future research. The German soldiers performing a mission in Somalia provide a good opportunity for these types of interviews. German historians could profit from the long experience and the example of U.S. Army historians.

Finally, on a more personal note, a sincere "thank you" to many members of CMH, including all those I cannot name here. Special thanks to Billy Arthur, Ted Ballard, Arnold Fisch, Terry Offer, Bob Wright, Judy Bellafaire, Lt. Col Deane Williams, John Greenwood, and last, but not least, Joanna Brignolo. You all made my visit pleasant and successful, giving me the freedom to research and the support I needed, and you reinforced my ambition to continue my research as a historian.

Civil Affairs Operations in Kuwait
A Case of Disparate Command Priorities

Patrick W. Carlton

This article is derived for Army History *from Prof. Patrick Carlton's more extensive article, "The Kuwait Task Force: A Unique Solution to Kuwait's Reconstruction Problems." That article included seventy footnotes, many of them extensive. Interested readers can contact the managing editor of* Army History *to obtain a copy of these notes.*

"The role that was played by civil affairs...needs to be explained and better understood by the American people. This includes the manner in which planning was accomplished for Kuwait reconstitution." [Hon. John O. Marsh, Jr., to the U.S. Army JFK Special Warfare Center and School, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, Civil Affairs Symposium, 25 October 1991].

Civil affairs (CA) forces have been part of the Army inventory since World War II, where they served well and faithfully, usually performing the doctrinal mission of civil administration in occupied Europe and in Japan. Since that time, however, utilization of the CA capability has languished, those forces in existence being relegated primarily to the U.S. Army Reserve and seldom allowed to participate in military pre- or post-conflict planning.

During the 1970s, under the auspices of the CAPSTONE program, relationships were established between reserve component CA units and a variety of active component organizations, but these relationships, intended to foster training, mutual understanding, and increased opportunity for CA utilization, were in some cases only incompletely implemented by the time Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM was initiated in August 1990.

Most important to the Kuwait scenario was the status of the CAPSTONE relationship between the 352d Civil Affairs Command, Riverdale, Maryland, and Headquarters, Central Command (USCENTCOM). Speaking plainly, the relationship was incompletely developed and less than totally satisfactory, both from the perspective of the CENTCOM staff officers, who had reservations about the capabilities of the 352d, and from the point of view of the members of the 352d, who felt that CENTCOM was not using their resources and talent in an altogether appropriate manner. When DESERT SHIELD commenced, no plans had been developed for the restoration of Kuwait or for utilization of the 352d in the effort.

The attack on Kuwait by Saddam Hussein's Iraqi forces stunned the world. Most analysts at the Department of State and within the international diplomatic community had rejected the idea that one Arab nation would attack another, despite the festering Kuwaiti-Iraqi dispute over the Rumaila oil field production and Saddam's claims that Kuwait was conspiring with the United States and with Israel to "sabotage" Iraq. At the May 1990 Arab League summit in Baghdad, Saddam sought payment of $27 billion from Kuwait, claiming that the Kuwaitis had been stealing Iraqi oil. In June he demanded that Kuwait and other Arab states bordering the Persian Gulf cut production in an attempt to drive up the price per barrel of crude oil. Saddam's increasingly belligerent attitude toward Kuwait was emphasized by ever-larger troop movements of an unusual kind beginning on 17 July 1990. By the end of the month he had stationed 100,000 soldiers along the Kuwaiti border.

On 1 August the CENTCOM commander, General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, briefed Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney on the likelihood of an Iraqi attack on Kuwait. Shortly after General Schwarzkopf returned to Tampa, Florida, he received word that the invasion had begun.

On 8 August 1990, President George Bush stated in a White House speech to the nation that the United States sought "immediate, unconditional, and complete withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait...[and that]...Kuwait's legitimate government must be restored to replace the puppet regime." This speech triggered immediate civil affairs planning efforts on the part of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (OASD SO/LIC), OSD's civil affairs proponent. By 14 August 1990, Jim Locher III, the assistant secretary, had been presented an information paper dealing with various CA issues. Among these were the Department of Defense's potential role in the reconsti-

tution of the government of Kuwait and the need to explore with the Department of State plans for support of the Kuwaiti government; the need to provide cultural orientation for U.S. forces being inserted into that region and to minimize contact between Americans and the local populace of Saudi Arabia (an exceptionally conservative society); and the requirement that U.S. forces be prepared to help multinational force commanders lacking CA capabilities in meeting their legal and moral obligations under international law. This paper recommended that the assistant secretary of defense send a memo to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) recommending activation of the Joint Civil Affairs Committee (JCAC). The draft of this memorandum, staffed informally with the Joint Staff, ultimately was responded to by the director of the Joint Staff.

The JCAC, chartered to serve the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the formulation of civil affairs policy, had never been activated. The absence of such an instrumentality left the Joint Staff with inadequate CA policy development. Activation, therefore, appeared to be in the best interests of the Department of Defense. After several days, however, the director of the Joint Staff indicated in a handwritten note to the assistant secretary of defense that he did not consider activation of the JCAC appropriate at that time. This left the assistant secretary for special operations and low intensity conflict to his own devices in surfacing CA policy issues with the Department of Defense. Fortunately, both he, individually, and his staff members were highly resourceful, assertive, and dedicated to the proper use of CA operations during this emergency. They continued to "percolate up" issues and suggestions relating to CA policy through Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Paul Wolfowitz during the next several months, attempting to influence civil affairs involvement to the greatest extent possible. An outside observer watching the ebb and flow of these events undoubtedly would have been perplexed at the spectacle of the home service (the U.S. Army), as well as the Joint Staff, exhibiting little apparent interest in the enormously complex CA missions associated with this crisis. Eventually, external forces generated sufficient pressure to ensure appropriate action.

In September 1990 the exiled Kuwaiti government dispatched a team of twenty specialists to Washington to establish a reconstruction planning structure. They planned to use funds on deposit in foreign banks to restore the rightful government as soon as the Iraqis could be ejected from Kuwait. Mr. Fawzi Al Sultan, assigned to lead the team, hoped to involve the United States heavily in the restoration and reconstruction effort. He and his colleagues were soon apprised of the U.S. Army Reserve civil affairs capability.

As it happened, Col. Randall Elliott, a reserve officer assigned to the 352d CA Command, also held a middle management position within the Department of State and was acquainted with Ambassador-designate Edward (Skip) Gnehm, who was in Washington awaiting confirmation and deployment to Kuwait. Elliott foresaw the appropriateness of civil affairs involvement in Kuwaiti reconstruction and, apparently not trusting normal bureaucratic processes within the military establishment, called the matter to the attention of various officials in the Department of State, including Ambassador Gnehm. Gnehm saw the potential for such an arrangement and discussed the matter with Ambassador Saud Nasir Al-Sabah and the Kuwaiti delegation, who were immediately receptive to the idea of involving CA personnel. State passed the request to Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Henry S. Rowan, who made arrangements through the director of the Joint Staff for a briefing on civil affairs capabilities.

OASD SO/LIC had not been idle during this period. Staff officers had been awaiting the results of a preliminary on-ground CA assessment being conducted by an early deploying team from the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion, the only active component CA unit. The message, received on 3 September, convinced SO/LIC that the battalion was "operating beyond its capability and was not able to conduct an adequate assessment of this magnitude." The message also "confirmed our suspicions that CENTCOM was ill-prepared to conduct CA operations." SO/LIC also feared that U.S. Army, Central (ARCENT), the Army component of CENTCOM, was heading toward the creation of "another 'ad hoc' CA organization" similar to the one that had been deployed in Operation JUST CAUSE with less than optimal results.

This development generated a flurry of activity between SO/LIC and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs on the topic of potential civil affairs missions in the CENTCOM area of operations. Shortly thereafter, a briefing was arranged for the Kuwait Emergency Recovery Program representatives in Washington. The stage was being set for the temporary removal of command and control of the CA assistance program from regular military channels.

On 4 October 1990, the senior CA officer on the Joint Staff, Lt. Col. Dennis Barlow, from the Psychological Operations/Civil Affairs Branch of the Directorate for Current Operations (J-33), conducted a briefing. Colonel Barlow addressed an audience which included Ambassador Gnehm; Lt. Gen. Tom Kelly (the J-3); Mr. Fawzi Al Sultan, coordinator of the Kuwaiti team; Mr. Sulayman Abd al-Razaq Mutawa, the Kuwaiti minister of planning; and Shaykh 'Ali Khalifa al-Sabah, the Kuwaiti minister of finance. Colonel Barlow's briefing was well received by the Kuwaiti representatives, who inquired as to how a request for civil affairs assistance could be initiated. The response by U.S. representatives suggested the appropriateness of having the Kuwaiti ambassador address a letter to President Bush, requesting such aid. This letter was forthcoming on 9 October 1990. It stated, in part:

In violation of international law and norms of conduct between sovereign nations, you are aware of the aggression carried out by Iraq against...Kuwait.... We call upon the friendship and assistance of...the United States...in putting together an emergency and recovery program. More specifically, we have...need for certain specialties and expertise resident, among other U.S. agencies, in the United States Department of Defense.

On 19 October 1990, Mr. Locher, the assistant secretary of defense SO/LIC, attended the National Security Council (NSC) Deputies Committee meeting, during which the decision was made to provide advice and assistance to Kuwait in its restoration planning efforts. In the interest of time and efficiency, the NSC recommended that the Department of State, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff establish a steering committee to make the necessary arrangements, with International Security Affairs taking the lead for the Department of Defense. Mr. Rowan quickly issued a set of draft terms of reference and circulated them for comment to the JCS. In addition, Rowan asked that a military service be designated executive agent for the project and that appropriately qualified personnel be assigned to the various working committees specified in the terms of reference.

The terms specified that the U.S. objective would be to provide assistance to the legitimate government of Kuwait in planning governmental restoration efforts to be implemented upon the withdrawal of Iraqi forces. The Department of State and the Office of theSecretary of Defense were to have joint primary responsibility for developing a civic restoration program, with other departments and agencies being called upon as appropriate. An American Interagency Steering Group Committee, chaired by State, with representatives from State and Defense, was to oversee the planning effort. A U.S.-Kuwaiti Committee on Emergency and Recovery Programs was to be formed, consisting of the U.S. Interagency Steering Group Committee and representatives of the Kuwaiti government in exile. Planning was to be undertaken in the twenty civil affairs functional areas, with working committees for each area established as appropriate. The government of Kuwait was to execute all contracts for services and equipment with civilian firms. The U.S. government was to be allowed to request reimbursement for the cost of various services rendered. Twice-monthly reports were to be submitted to representatives of the Department of State, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the National Security Council, and Headquarters, U.S. Army Central Command. The terms of reference were approved on 5 November 1990 and working level groups established to oversee implementation of the project.

During the period 5-15 November 1990, intense debate occurred within the Army and the Joint Staff over whether it was appropriate for the Department of Defense to provide such advice and assistance to the Kuwaitis and whether the Army was the right organization to lead the effort. The Army, not wishing to deprive military operations of resources, was not interested in a long-term nonmilitary effort and believed that the Department of State should be responsible for reconstructing Kuwait. In the event that the Office of the Secretary of Defense were to get involved, both the Army and the Emergency Planning Office of the under secretary of defense for policy felt that the mission should be performed by an "ad hoc" group created for that purpose. The Army favored creation of a composite task force composed of representatives from various elements of the force structure (medical, military police, communications, engineers, and quartermaster) with augmentation from civil affairs, the overall structure to be commanded by an active component general officer. The generally negative tone in Army communications issued throughout the process suggests a lack of confidence in the capability of the reserve component CA units to provide the needed services. Emergency Planning submitted a matrix involving the distribution of responsibilities among twenty-seven departments within the U.S. govern-

ment. The paper also suggested the assignment to Ambassador Gnehm's staff of an officer from the Corps of Engineers.

The Department of the Army staff members were supported in their concerns by operatives within the Joint Staff, who felt that the Department of State was the proper agency to lead the effort, since the reconstruction would be primarily civilian in nature. A good deal of residual sensitivity existed within these organizations, the legacy of the Panama operation, JUST CAUSE. During that activity the Department of Defense found itself serving as "lead" agency long after the shooting had stopped, inadequately supported by the Department of State and other agencies of the U.S. government which, many felt, should have taken political and fiscal responsibility for the restoration of services in that troubled nation. The director of the Joint Staff wanted to be certain that State and other government agencies would participate this time.

Because of the Army's hesitance to commit to CA utilization, the Office of the Secretary of Defense decided that the Army should not be designated as executive agent for the operation, as normally would have been the case. Some felt that the operation would not be prosecuted vigorously if matters were left to the Army. As can be imagined, this conclusion caused considerable embarrassment within Army circles. On 19 November three assistant secretaries—International Security Affairs, SO/LIC, and Reserve Affairs, made a concerted effort to prompt action and on 21 November, after another exasperating last-minute holdup (this one generated by the director of the Joint Staff), the JCS reluctantly approved the formation of the Kuwait Task Force, using civil affairs soldiers. The following day the chairman of the JCS sent a message to the Army chief of staff and the commander in chief, Special Operations Command, requesting activation of elements of the 352d Civil Affairs Command. The Kuwait Task Force (KTF) had been created.

It should be noted that from 7 August 1990, when Operation DESERT SHIELD commenced (designated C-day in military parlance), until 2 October 1990, General Schwarzkopf and his planners had been operating on the assumption that their mission was to prevent the invasion of Saudi Arabia, protecting those allies from further incursions by the Iraqis. During that time the world political situation evolved rapidly, as did President Bush's views on appropriate military options. Further, the mood of the American people underwent a steady shift toward a more aggressive posture vis-a-vis Iraq. American and coalition forces in Saudi Arabia had been augmented to such an extent that great confidence existed in the coalition's ability to repel any attempt at invasion by Saddam Hussein. By 2 October 1990, General Colin Powell, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was able to state that "Washington was impatiently awaiting an 'offensive option' from Central Command." On 6 October General Schwarzkopf directed his planners to assume the availability of an additional armored corps and to begin planning for a massive flanking attack to the west.

General Schwarzkopf and his planners have come under heavy criticism in the civil affairs community and in some circles within the Office of the Secretary of Defense for failing to plan early and adequately for proper employment of CA assets in the reestablishment of vital services in Kuwait. While it is true that commanders are expected to plan for all contingencies, the commander in chief, Central Command (CINCCENT), was laboring under serious informational and directional constraints as well as carrying a massive burden for decisions and operations. He presents himself in his writings as struggling to understand the rapidly changing political environment and to respond appropriately in a reactive—rather than active—mode, at least during the early months of DESERT SHIELD. As part of his response, CINCCENT worked himself hard. He reportedly kept a strenuous schedule and was exceptionally demanding with his staff.

Because of his extensive exposure to the Middle East, Schwarzkopf viewed himself as something of an expert on the area. Indeed, he was quite effective in his dealings with his Saudi counterparts. One is struck, however, by his testimony to the effect that he routinely was drawn into making decisions that clearly were within the purview of civil affairs. General Schwarzkopf speaks, for example, of multiple direct dealings with the Saudis in the areas of religion, sensitivity to local customs and traditions, commercial relations, and others areas of CA concern. Had adequate CA assets been available to him during the early months of DESERT SHIELD, better plans could have been made for operations in Kuwait and better CA-related execution orchestrated for activities in Saudi Arabia. Arguably, such foresight would have reduced the burden on the general himself. Unfortunately, there is no indication that he was aware of or concerned about the employment of civil affairs assets, perhaps because of his lack of knowledge of their capabilities, perhaps because of earlier negative experiences involving CA forces in particular and reserve components in general.

A former member of the CENTCOM J-5 (Plans

and Policy) staff states that the decision not to activate the reserve component Theater Army Area Command supporting Third Army (ARCENT) "has been attributed to the Active Component leadership's evaluation of Reserve Component units' ability...combined with the experience of Active Component leaders in training and evaluating...the (Reserve Component) leadership." He later references "the apparent distrust of the Reserve Component leadership and command and control organizations...by the Active Component leadership." One can readily imagine the effect of such widely held views upon those decisions affecting the activation and deployment of reserve component civil affairs units during the early months of DESERT SHIELD.

CENTCOM's lack of attention to CA-related issues put the Kuwait Task Force in a peculiar position. Having been placed under the command and control of the Interagency Steering Group Committee, composed of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Department of State, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with nominal support being supplied by the Department of the Army, the task force had no formal relationship with CENTCOM. Consequently, it received almost no information concerning CENTCOM plans. CENTCOM, in turn, knew relatively little about the KTF's activities and intentions. This peculiar situation can be explained, at least in part, by the fact that the task force, working closely with the Kuwaitis, was not authorized access to mission-related classified information, so far as CENTCOM was concerned. Indeed, CENTCOM worked hard to exclude the coalition members from access to the OPLANs (operations plans) being developed, for fear that the Arabs would compromise the operation prior to execution. Whether justified or not, there was a healthy degree of cynicism concerning the trustworthiness of these allies in classified matters. In addition, at the time the KTF was created, Colonel Elliott had been informed that the task force would serve as a stateside planning group only—there were no plans to deploy the group to the area of operations. Consequently, the task force initially was structured as a planning cell only. Upon receiving the deployment request from Mr. Robert Kimmitt of the Department of State and the crown prince of Kuwait, it became necessary for the KTF to reconfigure itself sufficiently to conduct operational missions.

Following a series of on-again, off-again alert orders, the KTF was called to active duty on 1 December 1990. Initially, the group mustered fifty-seven civil affairs functional specialists and eventually reached a strength of sixty-three officers and enlisted personnel covering a majority of the twenty CA specialties. Most of these personnel had been identified through the use of a newly established and computerized civil affairs skills data base and were drawn from throughout the 352d CA Command's CAPSTONE trace.

When the KTF was called to active duty, Brig. Gen. Howard T. Mooney was listed as commander. New to civil affairs, he was an experienced logistician and transportation officer, skills that ultimately were to stand him in good stead in the Persian Gulf. Activated on 1 December 1990, he was released from active duty two days later, having been informed that the Department of the Army would not validate his call-up. He had no further official connection with the KTF until his arrival in Saudi Arabia in January 1991. His task force deputy, Colonel Elliott, became director of the KTF and served in that capacity for the duration. Reporting to Washington, D.C., after a brief period of administrative in-processing at Ft. Meade, Maryland, the task force quickly found office space and furnishings with the assistance of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and the General Services Administration. The Department of the Army furnished office equipment. The task force moved into leased space three blocks from the offices of the Kuwait Emergency Recovery Program, a convenient arrangement, and commenced assisting the Kuwaiti team with the business of planning for the eventual restoration of that unfortunate nation.

Elliott structured the work to be completed in four phases: (1) task organizing; (2) initial estimate and scope of work; (3) first draft of plans; and (4) OPLAN (Annex G) completion and preparations for deployment. Organizational planning presented the KTF with special challenges, since no one could predict with certainty what conditions would exist within Kuwait after the Iraqis withdrew. Consequently, the group initially attempted to develop restoration matrices predicated upon varying degrees of destruction. This proved to be an unworkable approach, so it soon shifted to a "worst case" scenario, operating on the assumption that lesser degrees of destruction could be managed readily under such a planning approach. The Kuwaitis, having been in the United States for several months, had already initiated the contracting process on a limited basis. The KTF immediately joined the process, providing advice and assistance, doing research on potential contractors and providing lists of such organizations to the Kuwaiti team, and serving as a support structure for the Kuwait Emergency Recovery Program. It was clear from the outset that the

Kuwaitis would negotiate and sign all contracts; KTF members served as "honest brokers" throughout the process. Ultimately, the Kuwaitis concluded 271 contracts worth approximately $685 million during the life of the KTF. Most of these were for such things as food, water, medicine, power generation, emergency communications, uniforms, and vehicles. In line with U.S. desires that the Kuwaitis "buy American" wherever feasible, over 80 percent of the total dollar value of all contracts concluded was with U.S. firms. It was during this stage of operations that the KTF, sensing that the Kuwaitis had almost no experience in planning a recovery of this magnitude, arranged for representatives of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and of other federal agencies to brief the Kuwaiti government representatives. From these briefings sprang the ultimate agreement that the Corps of Engineers should play a major role in the restoration process.

In addition to contractual services, the KTF became involved in protecting the human rights of Palestinians and other third-party nationals. In the case of the Palestinians, stories of collusion with the Iraqis were filtering out of Kuwait, along with horrifying stories of atrocities against Kuwaiti citizens. In keeping with time-honored cultural traditions, the Kuwaitis planned to exact retribution from these malefactors. The task force, upon becoming aware of these intentions, began an organized campaign of written and oral communications designed to dissuade the Kuwaitis from their intent, arguing that such behavior was unacceptable to the U.S. government and would be embarrassing in the extreme. American human rights policies were included in all agreements concluded with the Kuwaitis. Ambassador Gnehm joined the discussion, repeatedly making these same arguments with the Kuwaiti government. This persuasion had a positive impact upon the situation that developed in Kuwait City after the coalition forces reoccupied it. Elliott states that "the KTF made a difference.... The physical presence of KTF personnel in Hawally (the major Palestinian neighborhood) and physical intervention by KTF personnel had a calming effect. We remain convinced that there were no officially sponsored or sanctioned acts of violence."

Another function performed by the Kuwait Task Force was the preparation of a civil affairs annex to Third U.S. Army's (ARCENT) OPLAN. Work was undertaken beginning on 25 December 1990, and a draft was completed by early January 1991. Unfortunately, aforementioned operational security (OPSEC) considerations, coupled with the fact that the KTF was not at that time subordinate to CENTCOM or ARCENT, prevented the degree of interorganizational coordination necessary for preparing high-quality strategic plans for CA employment. The planning cell for CENTCOM (CCJ5) apparently made no effort to keep the task force abreast of plans for civil-military operations that were being developed in theater. These focused on five areas of concern: (1) minimizing interference by and hazard to the civil population in Saudi Arabia; (2) developing contingency plans for temporary civil authority in occupied areas of southern Iraq; (3) contingency planning for handling dislocated civilians in Kuwait, in support of the Kuwaiti government; (4) restoring emergency services in Kuwait City and Kuwait; and (5) repatriating enemy prisoners of war.

At the same time, the KTF was preparing its own Annex G to the ARCENT OPLAN on a parallel and often nonintersecting course. The task force's focus was on long-term restoration of the nation's infrastructure in cooperation with the government of Kuwait and the U.S. Country Team, while the ARCENT/CENTCOM plans focused upon short-term emergency services. These plans would not be compared until the KTF arrived in Kuwait, with the unsurprising result that ARCENT and CENTCOM found the KTF's early planning efforts to be inappropriate and less than optimally useful.

In January 1991 the Kuwait Task Force ceased operations in Washington, D.C., and deployed to Saudi Arabia, arriving on 31 January. The move had been requested by the Emir of Kuwait, with the concurrence of the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Robert Kimmitt, and the Steering Group Committee. Upon arrival in Saudi Arabia, the KTF was reunited with its parent unit, the 352d Civil Affairs Command, and took up its duties in support of the Kuwaiti ministerial representatives with whom they had been working. There were some initial problems concerning the future role of the task force, which was operating on the assumption that it would continue to support the government of Kuwait in its long-term restoration and reconstruction mission. CENTCOM, ARCENT, and the 352d CA Command, on the other hand, planned to reintegrate the KTF into the regular chain of command and to employ its members in emergency restoration missions. The crux of the matter was whether the KTF as then constituted would continue to exist and, if so, to whom that structure would report. It should be noted that message traffic received prior to its deployment had suggested new organizational arrangements which would have, in effect, dismantled the task force. The

Marine Corps Historical Pamphlets of World War II Battles Available

In conjunction with the Department of Defense commemoration of the fiftieth anniversary of World War II, the Marine Corps History and Museums Division is publishing a series of thirty-five historical pamphlets. Mr. Benis M. Frank, chief historian of the Marine Corps, notes that the theme of each pamphlet in the Marines in World War II Commemorative Series is to honor the veterans of that conflict.

The first pamphlet, *Opening Moves: Marines Gear Up for War*, appeared in February 1992. Published at intervals over the five-year period of the commemoration, the series will cover the major Marine Corps campaigns and innovations of World War II. Each pamphlet is thoroughly illustrated, with a brief sketch of the author, and a note on sources for each campaign.

The Marines in World War II Commemorative Series can be obtained from the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, P.O. Box 371954, Pittsburgh, PA 15250-7954. Veterans and veterans' organizations may obtain these pamphlets by writing to the Director of Marine Corps History and Museums, Marine Corps Historical Center, Building 58, Washington Navy Yard, 900 M Street, SE, Washington, D.C. 20374. Phone (202) 433-3840 or DSN 288-3840, or FAX (202) 433-7265.

situation was rectified by Ambassador Gnehm, who spoke directly with General Schwarzkopf, seeking continued use of the Kuwait Task Force for the recovery and reconstruction mission. The result was a compromise arrangement, in which a handful of KTF officers were assigned to the performance of liaison duties at ARCENT and CENTCOM, while the main body continued to plan with the Kuwaitis. Their emphasis shifted at this point from long-term reconstruction to the emergency restoration of services, in line with CENTOM's immediate requirements. They focused their attention on the provision of food, water, medical care, sanitation, transportation, telecommunications, and electric power.

Upon deployment to Saudi Arabia, the activities of the KTF became intertwined with those of the larger structure established for the execution of the CA mission. General Mooney, having arrived in theater on 1 February 1991, was named commander of the newly created Combined Civil Affairs Task Force (CCATF). This organization included the Kuwait Task Force, now redesignated the Deputy Chief of Staff for Reconstruction, although the name KTF continued to be used by those familiar with its operations. This move probably was designed, at least in part, to ameliorate some of the hard feelings and concerns within ARCENT and CENTCOM over the unusual circumstances surrounding the creation and operations of the KTF up to that time. The CCATF was, in turn, assigned on 13 February 1991 to Task Force Freedom, a composite service support unit composed of the Combined Civil Affairs Task Force and a Support Command Task Force, commanded by the deputy commanding general of the 22d Support Command, Brig. Gen. Kenneth Guest. Brig. Gen. (P) Robert Frix, the deputy commanding general of ARCENT, was named commander of Task Force Freedom. This arrangement worked very well, with General Frix providing the high-level coordination necessary to get resources, General Guest providing logistical support, and General Mooney providing the civil affairs expertise.

The ground war commenced on 24 February 1991, and the Combined Civil Affairs Task Force was ordered to Kuwait City. Two KTF assessment teams reached the city on 26 February, with the main body arriving on 1 March. Teams were sent out early that day to perform damage assessments and initiate humanitarian assistance. It was soon determined that the city was in much better condition than U.S. forces had been led to believe. There was a good deal of water stored in rooftop tanks, food had been stockpiled by the inhabitants, and even the hospitals were operating at minimal levels. The major shortages were electric power and an ongoing water supply. The Iraqis had destroyed the power-generation facilities as part of their hasty withdrawal from the city. Without power, it was not possible to pump water for business or home use. The CCATF pitched in, coordinating with the engineers on restoration of these vital services, with good results. As discussed earlier, civil affairs person-

nel also participated in the prevention of human rights abuses involving Palestinians and other third-country nationals.

KTF members, along with other civil affairs personnel in the area, assisted in a variety of other areas: providing emergency care at a hospital for mentally and physically impaired children; assisting dislocated civilians; restoring the educational infrastructure; assisting in the restoration of garbage services and sewage operations; restoring public archives and monuments; supporting the American ambassador and the embassy staff in a variety of tasks; providing advice and assistance on financial and currency issues; clearing unexploded demolitions; assisting in fighting the 729 oil fires set by the departing Iraqis; and working with the media to provide accurate and current information to all interested parties. The variety of tasks in which the CA community engaged and the professionalism with which the soldiers performed their tasks were immensely impressive.

Over a period of several weeks, the seven functions deemed critical by the Kuwait Task Force and Task Force Freedom changed in status from "red" to "green" with the restoration of essential services and the availability of additional supplies. It soon became possible to release the tactical CA companies to ARCENT for redeployment to the United States, beginning on 25 March and terminating with the release of the 432d CA Company on 6 April 1991. The KTF was able to revert to its earlier mission, assisting in long-term reconstruction efforts. Task Force Freedom's operations terminated on 30 April 1991, at which time General Mooney, who had been named commander on 15 April, turned over the continued work of reconstruction to Maj. Gen. Patrick J. Kelly, head of the Defense Reconstruction Assistance Office, an ad hoc body created from Army assets. Most of the KTF, along with its parent organization, the 352d CA Command, redeployed to the continental United States, arriving on 10 May.

The Kuwait Task Force, along with the 352d Civil Affairs Command, turned in an excellent performance during the Gulf War. Their prior planning and subsequent execution bore fruit in that coalition forces were relieved of having to devote large portions of their resources to the support of the civilian population. The Kuwaiti government, upon the advice of the KTF, contracted for most services and paid the bills promptly. Supplies delivered during the emergency included 2.8 million liters of diesel fuel, 1,250 tons of medicine, 12.9 million liters of water, 12,500 metric tons of food, 250 electrical generators, and over 750 vehicles. Thirty-five major convoys were operated, involving 1,700 vehicles. By the time the KTF and Task Force Freedom departed, the Ministry of Health had become operational and the Kuwaiti medical community was carrying 98 percent of its prewar workload. The international airport reopened, and the Kuwaitis resumed operational control in April 1991. Police forces were operational within the first thirty days following liberation. A major Kuwaiti port was opened during the first two weeks after liberation, and two others were being swept for mines. All major roads had been restored to service, with most able to sustain convoy traffic.

The work that the KTF accomplished contributed to an unprecedented civil affairs mission. The initiative taken to remove the team from the command and control of the Army "plowed new ground" in utilization of this branch for the purposes of national defense. That the experiment had to be carried out with only grudging cooperation from Headquarters, Department of the Army, added to the difficulty of reaching ultimate success but in no way detracts from the usefulness of the mission.

The work performed by the KTF and the 352d CA Company received high praise from Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict James Locher and from Mr. Fred Smith, Director for Near East/South Asia, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, among others. Secretary of the Army Michael P.W. Stone noted that it "is not an exaggeration to say that bringing Kuwait back to life in the early days following the Iraqi departure would not have been possible without the 352d." Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, in a message to the Civil Affairs Symposium, noted: "Your role in U.S. Government assistance to the Government of Kuwait in its reconstruction of that country was exceptional, both for its swiftness and the depth of expertise which you provided. The extraordinary skills resident only in the Reserve Component were absolutely essential to these successes."

Clearly the Kuwait Task Force constituted a success story, one of which the civil affairs community can be proud in the years to come. The work that it performed helped to establish a pattern for future utilization of military forces in disaster and humanitarian relief efforts. At the beginning of DESERT SHIELD, General Schwarzkopf indicated to Maj. Gen. W.G. Pagonis that he did not want "to win the war and lose the peace." The KTF worked to ensure that this did not happen. In great measure, as stated in the motto of the Civil Affairs Branch, it helped to "secure the victory."

Afterword

An operation of this magnitude draws on the competence and dedication of many persons. As described in the preceding account, any number of senior or junior persons, starting with the president of the United States and ending with sergeants and privates in the various civil affairs units, contributed to the achievement that was the Kuwait Task Force. A number of talented civilians within the Department of Defense and the Office of the Secretary of Defense lent their talents to the success of the operation. Within the uniformed community, however, several key participants demonstrated unusual vision, political acumen, tenacity, and willingness to place themselves at risk. First among these is Col. Randall T. Elliott, the director of the KTF. Elliott was the man who, seeing the developing need for assistance of the type ultimately provided and sensing that the Departments of Defense and Army were unlikely to call upon the CA community to provide it, "took his career in his hands" and contacted Ambassador-designate Gnehm to initiate the process that created the KTF. Elliott's rare combination of intellect, assertiveness and drive, commitment, and salesmanship captured the attention of those who could make things happen, and for this the nation, the Department of Defense, and the civil affairs community are in his debt.

Within the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict, Lt. Col. Paul Mikesh, the CA action officer, served as a key player throughout the war. Mikesh, an experienced civil affairs reservist presently serving on an active Guard and reserve tour, monitored the day-to-day activities in CA for his office, acting as an intelligence gatherer and "sleeve tugger" for Brig. Gen. Charles Wilhelm, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Mission Activities. Mikesh sat through endless meetings, deciphered the voluminous message traffic, prepared dozens of memorandums and information papers for General Wilhelm and Mr. Locher, and interacted constantly with personnel within the Pentagon. Colonel Mikesh is largely responsible for making the policy makers aware of the need for the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff aggressively to assume their roles and for alerting these same decision makers to the fact that CA assessments being conducted in Saudi Arabia during the autumn of 1990 by the 96th CA Battalion were insufficient and that planning for civil affairs within ARCENT and CENTCOM was inadequate, at best. Colonel Mikesh provided the ammunition used by Mr. Locher and General Wilhelm in many of the successful battles they fought on behalf of CA and its appropriate use during the Gulf War. He is a gifted writer, a man of strong opinions and commitment, intellect, excellent political understanding, and substantial drive. As in the case of Colonel Elliott, the nation and the civil affairs community are greatly in his debt.

Lt. Col. Dennis Barlow, then the CA action officer with the PSYOP/Civil Affairs Branch, Office of the Deputy Director for Current Operations (J-33) of the Joint Staff, was extraordinarily influential in the promotion of CA interests during the Gulf War. As the only trained civil affairs person on the Joint Staff, he was the officer chosen to give the initial briefing to the Kuwaitis and, like Colonel Mikesh, served on the U.S.-Kuwait Civil Affairs Working Group, a subset of the U.S. Steering Group Committee, established to implement the assistance program to the government of Kuwait. A brilliant thinker and organizational strategist, Barlow is a powerful speaker and debater, as well as a man of strong conviction and integrity. His management of CA deployment orders within JCS, service on numerous committees responsible for CA-related decisions, and constant promotion of the interests of civil affairs as it supported national priorities were flawless, helping to ensure the smooth flow of activities in this important area.

These three men, working closely with their superiors, were largely responsible for the success of the Kuwait Task Force mission. Many others, of course, contributed to the process, but it was their dedication and hard work that provided the chemistry necessary to carry out this difficult, unprecedented mission. They demonstrated the "power of the lowerarchy," the influence that mid-level operatives can have in achieving organizational goals.

Patrick W. Carlton holds a master's degree in history and a doctorate in educational administration. Currently a professor at the School of Education, Youngstown State University, Dr . Carlton served as a colonel during DESERT STORM and PROVIDE COMFORT in the PSYOP/CA Branch, Special Operations Division, Operations Directorate, The Joint Staff, and later as senior research fellow with the Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University.

The 1994 Conference of Army Historians

Judith Bellafaire

Dr. Judith Bellafaire served as the Center's conference coordinator for both this year's Conference of Army Historians and the earlier, initial Cold War Military Records and History Conference.

The 1994 Conference of Army Historians was held 13-16 June in Arlington, Virginia. This meeting was the last of a series of World War II-related conferences which were part of the U.S. Army's efforts to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of the war. The 1994 theme was "The U.S. Army in the War Against Japan, 1943-1945." Thirty topical sessions took place over a three-day period. Speakers included veterans, authors, international scholars, historians from academe and from Army agencies, and representatives from the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force History Offices.

The most talked about sessions were "The Media and the Pacific War," which included presentations on "The Censored War" by Dr. George H. Roeder, Jr., of the Art Institute of Chicago and "Hunters and the Hunted: Images of the U.S. Military and the Japanese Foe in Hollywood Film" by Dr. David Wilt and Mr. Michael Shull of the University of Maryland Libraries; and "U.S. Military Women in the Pacific." The latter session included presentations by two veterans of the Women's Army Corps, Lt. Col. Annie Lancer and Mrs. Mary Johnston; an Army Nurse, Mrs. Prudence Burns Burrell; and Professors Judy Litoff and David Smith. Litoff and Smith shared parts of their collection of letters written by servicewomen in the Pacific theater.

Once again, presentations by international scholars were highlights of the conference. Col. Syohgo Hattori (Ret.) of the National Institute for Defense Studies in Tokyo presented a paper on "Kamikazes," which was extremely well received. Col. Olmedo Aisar Vasquez, Director of Civil Affairs for the Guatemalan Army, discussed "Guatemala's Contributions to the War in the Pacific," and Dr. Petra Groen, Historical Section, Royal Netherlands Army, the Hague, presented a thought-provoking paper on "The Recovery of Dutch POWs in Asia, 1945-1946." Miss Alex Ward, Chief of the Army Historical Branch of the Ministry of Defense in London, contributed substantially to the session on "The Impact of the Environment on Military Operations" by reading her paper on "Preparing Britain's Army for Jungle Warfare, 1943-1945."

The most popular, enjoyable, and unique presentations at Army historians' conferences are often made by military veterans who participated in events under discussion. Among those veterans who shared their memories of the war in the Pacific were Comdr. Philip F. Eckert, U.S. Navy (Ret.), who spoke about his assignments on three Pacific submarines; Mrs. Hazel Jenkins, who described her experiences as a Women Ordnance Worker at Aberdeen Proving Ground during the war; former POW and Army Nurse Madeline Ullom, who discussed her experiences in the Philippines during the war, and Col. Trevor Dupuy, U.S. Army (Ret.), who spoke on his experiences in the China-Burma-India theater during the war.

We were honored to be able to listen to the wartime experiences of three retired Army general officers. Lt. Gen. Elmer Almquist spoke on "Amphibious Landings and Artillery Support in a Jungle Environment and Security Measures in a Hostile Environment." Lt. Gen. Frederick J. Clarke described his experiences while assigned to the Pacific Theater Planning Division of the Army Service Forces in Washington, D.C., from 1942 to 1945. Lt. Gen. Lawrence J. Lincoln spoke about his tours of duty in the Operations Division of the Southeast Asia Command and the China theater.

Historians and authors Harry Gailey, Donald M. Goldstein, Anthony Arthur, Robert Maddox, Ray Skates, and Theodore Cook gave excellent presentations describing their latest works to large, enthusiastic audiences.

U.S. Army Chief of Staff General Gordon Sullivan spoke at the closing banquet on Thursday evening. The conference ended that evening with the unveiling of the work of two U.S. Army artists on the experiences of the U.S. Army in Somalia.

The U.S. Army Center of Military History will publish selected papers from the 1990, 1992, and 1994 Conferences of Army Historians as a commemorative volume in honor of the fiftieth anniversary of the end of the war.

1944

October-December

2 Oct - Canadian elements of the British 21 Army Group launch an offensive to clear the Schelde estuary and provide Allied ships access to the port of Antwerp, Belgium.

- The 30th Infantry Division begins an attack to cross the Wurm River and breach the West Wall (or Siegfried Line).

4 Oct - The War Department announces that as of 1 October there were 300,382 prisoners of war in the United States: 248,205 Germans, 51,034 Italians, and 1,143 Japanese.

7 Oct - The 30th Infantry and 2d Armored Divisions establish a bridgehead beyond the West Wall six miles wide and nearly five miles deep.

16 Oct - Elements of the 30th Division link up with 1st Infantry Division elements northeast of Aachen, encircling the city. The 1st Division had broken through the West Wall south of Aachen in September.

20 Oct - U.S. troops return to the Philippines as four divisions make assault landings on the east coast of Leyte. The X Corps, consisting of the 1st Cavalry and 24th Infantry Divisions, lands in the north near Tacloban. About fourteen miles to the south the XXIV Corps' 7th and 96th Infantry Divisions land in the vicinity of Dulag. Both beachheads are well established by the end of the day.

21 Oct - The German defenders of Aachen surrender.

23 Oct - The United States officially recognizes the de facto government of General Charles de Gaulle as the French Provisional Government.

23-26 Oct - The U.S. Navy scores an overwhelming victory in the Battle of Leyte Gulf. As the Japanese Combined Fleet steams toward Leyte in an attempt to counter the U.S. threat to the island, it is intercepted by the American Seventh and Third Fleets. The Japanese lose 3 battleships, 1 large carrier, 3 light carriers, 6 heavy cruisers, 4 light cruisers, and 9 destroyers compared to American losses of 1 light carrier, 2 escort carriers, 2 destroyers, and 1 destroyer escort. Despite their losses the Japanese continue to reinforce their garrison on Leyte, landing over 45,000 troops at the west coast port of Ormoc during the seven weeks beginning 23 October.

25 Oct - The United States and Great Britain resume diplomatic relations with Italy.

26 Oct - The War Department announces that as of 14 October the Army had suffered 403,074 casualties, including 78,522 killed.

27 Oct - As a result of personnel and ammunition shortages and the onset of poor weather, the Allied offensive in Italy is halted for the winter, except for limited-objective operations.

7 Nov - President Franklin D. Roosevelt is elected to a fourth term.

8 Nov - Following a month spent in defensive positions, rectifying the strained logistical situation and conducting much-needed equipment maintenance, the XII Corps, Third Army, launches an Allied offensive aimed at driving to (and across) the Rhine.

16 Nov - The First and Ninth Armies join the offensive to reach the Rhine, with the Roer River as an intermediate objective. Elements of the First Army, particularly the 4th Infantry Division, begin a period of very difficult fighting in the Huertgen Forest.

19 Nov - Elements of the 90th and 5th Infantry Divisions meet east of Metz, completing the envelopment of the town.

22 Nov - Metz capitulates, although several forts in the area continue to hold out. With no way to receive supplies, the last of these forts surrenders on 13 December.

Chronology

24 Nov - Tokyo is bombed for the first time since the Doolittle raid of 18 April 1942.

28 Nov - The first convoy of Allied ships arrives at Antwerp.

- The XIX Corps, Ninth Army, reaches the Roer.

1 Dec - The 1st Battalion, 379th Infantry, of the 95th Infantry Division crosses the Saar River at Saarlautern.

3 Dec - The XIII Corps, Ninth Army, reaches the Roer.

7 Dec - The 77th Infantry Division makes an assault landing on Leyte's west coast south of Ormoc.

- The V Corps, First Army, reaches the Roer.

9 Dec - The entire west bank of the Roer is cleared in the Ninth Army sector.

10 Dec - The 77th Infantry Division captures Ormoc.

15 Dec - The 19th Infantry and 503d Parachute Infantry land virtually unopposed on the island of Mindoro in the Philippines. The landings are made to secure airfield sites to provide ground-based air support for the upcoming invasion of Luzon.

16 Dec - The Battle of the Bulge begins as the Germans launch a major counteroffensive in the Ardennes ultimately intended to cross the Meuse and capture Antwerp. The counteroffensive takes the Allies by surprise, and the ensuing battles are generally confused small unit actions with little overall coordination. Many small groups of U.S. troops are surrounded.

- The VII Corps reaches the Roer, completing the First Army's 31-day drive to what had been an intermediate objective of the November offensive.

17 Dec - The 422d and 423d Infantry, along with several supporting units, are isolated behind a ridge known as the Schnee Eifel as the German counteroffensive flows around them.

- At least eighty-six unarmed prisoners from Battery B, 285th Field Artillery Observation Battalion, are killed by German troops at Malmedy.

18-19 Dec - The 101st Airborne Division moves into Bastogne to assist in the defense of the town, an important road junction.

19 Dec - With wounded mounting and ammunition running low, the units trapped in the Schnee Eifel surrender to the Germans. At least 7,000 and possibly as many as 9,000 American troops are taken prisoner.

20 Dec - Bastogne is surrounded.

21 Dec - The Germans capture St. Vith, key to the road net around the Schnee Eifel.

22 Dec - The III Corps, Third Army, counterattacks toward Bastogne.

- Brig. Gen. Anthony C. McAuliffe, in command of the troops trapped in the Bastogne sector, responds to a German surrender ultimatum with one word: "Nuts!"

25 Dec - With the capture of Palompon, the last major port on Leyte, General Douglas MacArthur declares the end of organized resistance on the island. Mopping-up operations continue for several months.

26 Dec - The 4th Armored Division fights through the Bastogne perimeter and reaches the town, opening a corridor for relief supplies.

28 Dec - The Army seizes the executive offices of Montgomery Ward & Company in Chicago and several other company properties around the nation. President Roosevelt has directed the action following the company's refusal to abide by rulings of the National War Labor Board concerning disputes between the firm and its employees' union.

This chronology was prepared by Mr. Edward N. Bedessem of the Center's Field Programs and Historical Services Division, recently created by the merger of the Field and International Division with the Historical Services Division.

Heinz Guderian As the Agent of Change
His Significant Impact on the Development of German Armored Forces Between the World Wars

David P. Harding

Much has been written about lightning war, or *Blitzkrieg*, as the German armed forces practiced it in World War II. It is a subject which has fascinated two generations of historians, yet there are many facets of its development that have yet to be scrutinized. Even more than fifty years later there remains much controversy over who did what and who played the main role in its development.

Generaloberst Heinz Guderian was one of the most influential of the German officers who are credited with developing and bringing into operation this method of warfare. It is generally accepted that Guderian took the teachings of interwar British tank theorists and put them into practice. Yet Guderian was only a captain when he joined the staff of the Motorized Troops Department and began his career as the leading proponent of what later became the terror of two continents. How was a relatively junior officer in a brand new branch of the army able to overcome many officers who were senior to him and who opposed his views and to shape the direction of modern warfare? What began with Guderian's appointment to the staff of the Inspectorate of Motorized Troops in 1923 and culminated with the German Army's standing triumphantly on the shores of the English Channel was a combination of brilliance, perseverance, and good fortune rarely seen in the annals of military history. (1)

Heinz Guderian was born in 1888 in Kulm, on the Vistula River in what is now Poland. His father commanded a *Jaeger* (light infantry) regiment, and young Guderian began military school as an officer cadet at the age of eight. He joined his father's regiment in 1906, and this experience gave him his first sense of the need for mobility in military operations. It was the job of the light infantry in those days to clear built-up and wooded areas for the cavalry, to bolster "green" units, and to act as a reserve for regular infantry divisions. Of necessity these troops were lightly equipped in order to be able to move swiftly from one sector of the battlefield to another. Thus, a link to later developments was already established in the formative years of Guderian's career. (2)

In 1912, Guderian decided to broaden his professional knowledge by electing assignment to one of two emerging technological branches that would have major impacts on future warfare. These were machine guns or wireless communications. When he turned to his father for advice, he was told not to go into machine guns, for "they have little future." (3)

As a defensive weapon, the machine gun was largely responsible for the stalemate of trench warfare. Wireless communications rendered practical the control of the tank, the weapon that was going to restore mobility to the battlefield. Heinz Guderian fortuitously wound up using the technology that in the future would enable commanders efficiently to control large mobile formations. Wireless communications would one day contribute decisively to the defeat of Germany's opponents in the early years of World War II. (4)

After several months of intense preparation, Guderian entered the *Kriegsakademie* in 1913. The *Kriegsakademie* was a very select school for training General Staff officers, and only officers with particularly high potential and intellectual abilities attended. At this early point in his military career, Guderian had already been identified as one of the top junior officers among his peers. The outbreak of the world war in August 1914 cut short Guderian's time at the *Kriegsakademie*, but he returned to it in 1920 as an instructor of military history and tactics.

When World War I erupted, young Guderian was posted to a signal battalion in the Fifth Cavalry Division, then fighting in France. The experience of providing signals support to a highly mobile formation such as a cavalry division built upon the basic principles of mobility Guderian absorbed as a young *Jaeger* officer. His technical training as a signals officer and the opportunity to put it to practice in a wartime situation brought home to him the potential of wireless communications. The experience of the Great War also impressed upon him the chaos that can ensue from inefficient communications. He remembered these things and later, when he was working on the design

imperatives for the new armored forces, he insisted that radio sets be included in each tank to facilitate command and control of armored formations. (5)

It did not take long for the war in France to settle into the stalemate of trench warfare. Trench warfare was notable for the horrendous losses suffered by the belligerents on both sides, and a solution was sought to break the stalemate. Four years of trench warfare should have been enough to convince anyone that different tactics were needed. As early as 1915, the German Army attempted mobile operations and met with some success. A breach of French lines was effected by specially trained assault groups in what was the precursor of the *Stosstrupp*, or storm troop, tactics of 1917-18. These later offensives were conducted by modified *Jaeger* units who were selected for the mission as a result of their inherent independent-mindedness and their predilection for mobile operations. (6)

In 1917 General Erich Ludendorff became chief of the German General Staff. Ludendorff's experience to this point had been in the battles against the Russian Army in Galicia and western Poland, where the great distances covered dictated a high degree of mobility on the part of the combatants. The result was that combat operations in this theater bore little resemblance to the stalemate of the trenches that characterized the war in the West. Ludendorff directed the General Staff to study these operations with the result that they developed the *Stosstrupp* tactics. So in a sense it was General Ludendorff who opened the door for the return to mobility that characterized storm trooper tactics. Although Ludendorff recognized the value of infantry troops' practicing such tactics, he apparently did not appreciate the potential of the tank. This accounts in large measure for the lack of production of German tanks in sizable numbers. (7)

The *Stosstrupp* tactics involved small units infiltrating through enemy lines under cover of darkness, bypassing points of resistance, and setting upon the enemy's command and communications facilities so that his forces would be paralyzed when the main attack came. These tactics were extremely successful during the offensives of 1917-18, and had they been able to sustain the attack, the Germans might have turned the tide in the West or at least concluded a more favorable peace. The key to the success of these operations was to identify the weak point in the enemy's lines against which to launch the main point of effort of the assault and to exploit this breach by feeding in reserve formations to sustain the attack. This was later one of the basic principles of armored warfare as practiced by the *Panzerwaffe* (armored force). (8)

Many of the key elements of the later developments in armored warfare were already in place at war's end in 1918. The German Army systematically studied tactical developments during the war and successfully evolved new methods of both offensive and defensive warfare. The defensive tactics emphasized defense in depth, especially reacting to enemy penetrations of the front line by a swift counterattack aimed at the enemy's flanks. The offensive tactics also required leaders who could react swiftly to changing conditions. To accomplish this, the army implemented a rigorous training program at all levels which emphasized training under realistic conditions and maximum stress. This required a great deal of flexibility and initiative on the part of junior leaders, qualities that traditionally had been stressed in the German Army since the time of Frederick the Great. (9)

Another characteristic of the storm troop tactics which bore resemblance to the tactics of the *Panzerwaffe* twenty years later was the integration of all arms, that is, of infantry, artillery, and cavalry at the lowest possible unit level. Where the *Strosstrupp* tactics fell short was in the inability of the storm troopers to sustain offensive operations for several days. Because of sheer exhaustion they often failed to maintain the momentum of the attack or to hold newly gained territory. In one instance a successful counterattack fell apart completely because the victorious Germans stopped to plunder British stores and were themselves counterattacked and routed. (10)

After the war, it became apparent that the solution to these problems lay in mechanization. Foot infantry and horse-drawn transport had proven slow, inefficient, and vulnerable to artillery and small arms fire. Until then, motorized transport had been used primarily to shift troops from one part of the battlefield to another. These movements were usually conducted behind the front lines because the trucks of the day lacked the armored protection and the cross-country mobility necessary in combat zones that armored vehicles would later provide. The tank would provide the ability to move about and survive on the battlefield, as well as provide covering fire for the infantry conducting the assault. Heinz Guderian later became involved in developing both in the German Army. (11)

Although they recognized the need, the Germans could not motorize their forces easily. At the end of the Great War, Germany had been limited by the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles to an army of 100,000 men. In addition, there were clauses which proscribed

the production of combat aircraft and tanks, and there were even sections of the treaty which described what the tables of organization and equipment for German Army units would look like. The Germans eventually circumvented these strictures by building combat vehicles and aircraft in other countries such as Sweden and the Soviet Union. In 1929 Guderian even spent four weeks in Sweden observing the latest German tanks deployed on exercises in Swedish Army units. (12)

Ironically, it proved advantageous that the German military was dismantled. The lack of huge inventories of obsolescent equipment compelled the Germans to rebuild from scratch. And it was in this political and military atmosphere of disgrace, anger, and frustration that new ideas took root and eventually flourished. While the victors at Versailles made plans to disengage and draw down their military organizations, the Germans began almost immediately to rebuild theirs. (13)

There can be little doubt that the post-World War I German Army was ripe for new ideas. There were enough reformers in key positions, starting at the very top, to ensure that the new ideas were put into practice and that the necessary steps were taken to equip the new formations accordingly. In addition, the reform movement received added impetus from the hardship imposed by the Versailles Treaty and all the negative feelings it engendered.

The German Army was not complacent, as were the armies of the victorious Allies, nor had the General Staff accepted the outcome of the war as final. There had never been a surrender of German armies in the field; indeed the troops were allowed to march back into Germany with their weapons. The General Staff never admitted that they had lost the war; according to their version of things, it was the politicians' fault. Chief among the culpable politicians was the Kaiser—and he was no longer around to defend himself. The German Army had a tradition dating back to 1806 of learning from the lessons of defeat and building upon them for the next war. This, and the fact that much of the hard work was already done, made the task ahead somewhat easier. (14)

At the end of the war, however, Germany was in disarray. The revolution of 1919 created a situation that internal enemies strove to exploit, while the new states on the eastern borders posed a potential danger. Generaloberst Hans von Seeckt was the man who would see the army through these dark days and set it on the path to becoming once again a formidable fighting force. In spite of the conditions of Versailles and the chaos and turmoil that was Germany, the army somehow managed "to maintain its defiant old battle- and offensive-spirit" and this was due largely to the "contributions of its leadership, especially Colonel General von Seeckt." (15)

Hans von Seeckt was appointed chief of the commission to restructure the army under the terms of Versailles in June 1919. In November he dissolved the General Staff and became the chief of its successor organization, the *Truppenamt*. Seeckt would remain in this capacity until his forced resignation in 1926. He successfully laid the foundation for what later became the German *Wehrmacht* of World War II.

One of Seeckt's guiding principles was that Germany needed a small and highly professional force to protect its borders. Gone were the earlier days of mass armies of conscripts. Seeckt wrote that "Perhaps the principle of the levy in mass...has outlived its usefulness," that "mass becomes immobile." He concluded that mass armies were incapable of maneuver and therefore must rely on crushing the enemy by sheer weight, as had been the case in World War I. In keeping with his thoughts as a disciple of the school of mobility, Seeckt recognized the importance of air power as well. (16)

Seeckt also understood that the army must attract only the best recruits and train them to the highest possible standards. Otherwise, the army would not realize his goals. He envisioned a *Fuehrerheer*, or army of leaders. Integral to the success of the *Fuehrerheer* was the extensive training and education of high-quality personnel. These principles were crucial to the success of armored warfare as the German Army practiced it in the next two decades. The tempo of combat operations and the technologies involved in the new style of warfare would require specially trained troops of the highest quality. (17)

In this environment, Guderian was posted to the Central Office for Eastern Frontier Defense in Berlin and later served on the general staff of the "Iron Division" in Riga, Latvia, on the Baltic coast. During this time, against the backdrop of the revolution of 1919, Guderian formed some of the opinions that would prove momentous later in life. Chief among these was the decision to remain in the 100,000-man army. In Riga Guderian also had the opportunity to view firsthand the employment of armored cars, one of the nascent capabilities from which the armored force would one day evolve. (18)

Guderian's assignment to the *Kriegsakademie* in 1920 as an instructor of military history and tactics

opened a new door and allowed him to exercise his theories in the classroom. It provided the opportunity to cultivate disciples among the new crop of young, impressionable officers just coming into the army. He also began his career as a writer on military affairs, and this gave him further opportunity to "spread the word." (19)

German Army officers in the 1920s were prohibited from involvement in politics. As a result, they devoted a great deal of their time to writing about small unit tactical developments, rather than about broader strategic issues. Among the standard publications of the day were tactical textbooks written to help others prepare for their military district exams and articles for professional journals. Guderian became an acknowledged technical expert of sorts and was soon appearing in military publications in Britain and the United States. Guderian's ability to communicate well was responsible for the spread of his ideas and fame. (20)

Between the wars Guderian spent considerable time studying and writing about the tank battles of World War I. He studied the operations of his opponents and drew the appropriate lessons from them. In his book *Achtung! Panzer!*, Guderian attributed the German decision to seek an armistice in 1918 at least in part to the success of Allied tank operations and described the air force as a "weapon of the first class." He analyzed and described specific tank battles and presented lessons from them. The story of the development of the *Panzerwaffe* between the wars was also set forth, as well as Guderian's ideas on armored warfare. (21)

In a sense, the story of interwar German tank development is the study of the development of Guderian's ideas on armored warfare. As Guderian explained it, in 1927 the German Army adopted the British manual for the employment of armored forces because it had none of its own. The Germans chose the British manual instead of the French because British tactical doctrine seemed a more adaptable starting point. They also studied the British experience with tanks in the Great War because they had limited practical experience of their own. The Germans studied the British, practiced their methods, and evolved their own unique tactical doctrine. (22)

For Heinz Guderian, speed was the essence of armored warfare. Victory was possible only through the surprise and shock that resulted from the maximum utilization of the tank's inherent speed, and all else turned on this point. In order fully to exploit the tank's potential, it would be necessary to bring all the rest of the supporting arms up to its speed. His central principle was the need to employ tanks in mass at the point of main effort on the battlefield, or *Schwerpunkt*, where a decisive breakthrough could be effected. Additionally, the attack had to be conducted over suitable terrain. And in order to control large, unwieldy tank formations moving at high rates of speed over great distances, the commander had to have at his disposal sufficient wireless communications to enable him to control his subordinate units. (23)

Guderian also wrote of the need to integrate all the arms into combined arms units at the lowest levels in order to maximize the speed and shock effect of the tanks. He claimed this was distinctly different from the ideas of British theorists such as John F. C. Fuller or French theorists such as Giffard Le Q. Martel. The British believed in creating pure tank units operating independently of the other arms who would strike deeply into the enemy's rear; the French believed in splitting up armored units and parceling them out to support the infantry divisions. Guderian warned that the British method would be unable to seize and occupy enemy territory for lack of infantry support, while the French method would fail to optimize the tank's inherent combat power for lack of mass. (24)

Recognizing the technological limitations of his day, he advocated a compromise by which the armored forces would take some artillery and infantry with them to provide the necessary fire support and the ability to occupy ground and clear resistance. To achieve this, the supporting arms would need the same mobility and cross-country characteristics that the tanks possessed. The operational potential of such combined arms formations was realized in 1935 with the creation of the first three *Panzer* (armored) divisions. The fact that Guderian was selected to be one of the first commanders of these divisions speaks volumes about the *Panzertruppe* leadership's opinion of his abilities. These armored divisions represented the realization of Heinz Guderian's teachings. In later years his fame was tied even more closely with them as he had the opportunity to test his theories by leading *Panzer* formations into battle in Poland, France, and finally in Russia. (25)

The bulk of the army, however, remained foot mobile and horse drawn. Aside from the technological limitations imposed by mechanization, Guderian also recognized the expense involved in fully motorizing an army, and he understood that traditional forces would still comprise the bulk of a modern army. Even so, he maintained that "modern mobile units can be of deci-

sive value only if their strength is in due proportion to that of the whole army," that they should have a unified command "even in time of peace," and that they should be "formed in large units." (26)

In addition, Guderian's interwar writings repeatedly emphasized the coordination and integration of air and ground combat assets whenever possible. He especially recommended that those reconnaissance missions which lay beyond the capabilities of armored reconnaissance units be conducted by the air force. Additionally, he stressed that both armored and air reconnaissance personnel should receive special training. As the speed of the attack increased due to motorization, so too did the commander's need for timely information on the locations and activities of his enemies. Since aerial reconnaissance can cover more ground in less time than ground-based reconnaissance, it extends the horizons to which the commander can see, and provides him with crucial information sooner. Guderian noted that "information is valueless unless it be delivered in time for a commander to act on it." (27)

The air force can also serve as highly mobile, long-range artillery to interdict enemy reinforcements and to disrupt lines of communications and command posts. The inability of the artillery to keep pace with the tempo of armored formations in the attack could therefore be offset in two ways: by motorizing those artillery batteries that support armored formations, and by creating special air units to attack targets in the enemy's rear beyond the range of the artillery's guns. In addition, he foresaw that parachute units could be dropped into enemy rear areas to disrupt supply services. This was precisely the combination that made *Blitzkrieg* as practiced by the German armed forces so successful in the years of 1939-41. (28)

Guderian placed high value on the training of the *Panzer* specialists. He was fully aware that he was advocating a departure from warfare of the past and that its sophisticated nature required a high level of technical as well as tactical proficiency. In Seeckt's *Reichsheer*, education and training were emphasized not only as ways of building one's professional competence, but also were seen as necessary to allow the army to fight the kind of mobile battle that he envisioned in future wars. Guderian also believed that a high level of training could compensate somewhat for inferiority in numbers and equipment. He saw the *Panzertruppe* as an elite force, and for most of his career he sought to create a combined arms force of special capabilities that would be the decisive arm on the battlefield. Special black uniforms with distinctive insignia were even developed for the armored troops to set them apart from the field gray uniforms of the army and *Waffen SS*. The conceptualization of the *Panzer* arm as an elite fit right in with the idea of the 100,000-man army as a very select *Fuehrerheer*. And although some of the basic principles of lightning war were already being tried, having begun to take shape during World War I, the tempo of this new type of warfare dictated the need for new degrees of cooperation at all levels.

Guderian's writings reflect a concern for training at all levels. For instance, in the 1930s he wrote that "fire control and a high standard of [tank] gunnery training are the factors that will contribute most toward

victory." He even discussed the need for driver-gunner cooperation at the individual tank level. In 1943, when he returned to active duty as Inspector of *Panzer* Troops, one of his first official acts was to reorganize the training establishment of the *Panzertruppe* to facilitate input to the training program based on wartime experience in the East. This fundamental emphasis on training and individual preparedness was a traditional German military virtue emphasized throughout the Seeckt years and persisting to this day. (29)

Not surprisingly, the tank pioneers in Germany met with considerable resistance from the "old guard" of conservative elements in the army. This resistance stemmed most notably from elements in the Cavalry Branch, who saw in the armored troops the danger that they would lose their horses and their role as the army's primary reconnaissance assets. Guderian remarked on this in his memoirs, and General Wilhelm Ritter von Thoma, another *Panzer* commander, corroborated the charge. Aside from the Cavalry, Guderian named General Ludwig Beck, an artilleryman and Chief of the General Staff in 1933, as one who resisted his efforts and those of his colleagues. The fact that Guderian was laying claim to the decisive role for his *Panzers* that traditionally belonged to the Infantry also suggests that he likely encountered resistance from that quarter. The degree to which resistance occurred continues to be debated. That there was at least some resistance to Guderian's ideas is certain. Guderian and his fellow *Panzer* officers worked hard at overcoming this opposition. (30)

Throughout his career, Guderian developed a network of allies who helped him implement his programs in the early years of the *Panzerwaffe*. Beginning with his attendance at the *Kriegsakademie* in 1913, Guderian repeatedly came in contact with others who played significant roles in the development of these forces. Among those of high station who displayed an interest in the activities of the young armored troops and whose aid Guderian was able to enlist were Generals Werner von Blomberg and Werner Freiherr von Fritsch, who were the Minister of War and the Commander in Chief of the Army, respectively, in the mid-1930s. His early days in the Inspectorate of Motorized Troops gained him a useful ally in General Oswald Lutz, who later became Commanding General of the Armored Troops Command with Guderian as his chief of staff. Major Lutz had been one of Guderian's superiors in 1922 when he was posted to the Motorized Troops Department, and the major had helped Captain Guderian to become an "expert" on mobile operations. There can be little doubt that General Lutz's interest helped Guderian realize his plans for armored units. (31)

General Lutz commanded the Armored Troops Command in 1935 when Guderian "built" the first *Panzer* divisions. He was also at least partly responsible for Guderian's relatively rapid promotions during this period. Under General Lutz, he was promoted twice in six years, reaching full colonel. This occurred in a peacetime army with only 4,000 officers on active duty, when it was not unusual for a soldier to retire after twenty years as a captain. General Lutz was also the one who directed Guderian to write his influential book *Achtung! Panzer!* in 1937. (32)

Adolf Hitler became Chancellor of Germany in January 1933, and with his help the German Army soon embarked on a path of rearmament. Although the rearming had actually begun in 1919, it was after 1933 under the National Socialist regime that it proceeded with far greater urgency. When in March 1935 Hitler renounced the terms of the Versailles Treaty and, by extension, the limitations placed on the *Reichswehr*, the ground was fertile for new ideas from those who had been working on mobile warfare. (33)

The most influential patron Guderian had was Adolf Hitler himself. Guderian was profoundly affected by the revolution and the turmoil of his homeland and longed, like most Germans, for the restoration of order and for Germany once again to regain her rightful place as a great power. During his service in the Baltics in 1919, Guderian, like many of his colleagues and countrymen, began to voice the opinion that a savior must be found for Germany who would lead her out of the chaos of the postwar years. These feelings were reinforced by what he saw in Munich upon his return to Germany in the fall of 1919. Hitler promised this deliverance and more. Guderian and Hitler had found each other. Guderian often attended social functions at Hitler's invitation and soon became one of Hitler's favorite *Panzer* generals. This point is illustrated by the fact that in addition to holding high positions in the army, Guderian usually played a major role in important military operations. In March 1938 his corps led the forces that entered Austria following its incorporation into the *Reich*, and his corps was selected as the occupation force when Germany annexed the Czech Sudetenland in October of the same year. (34)

As early as 1926, Adolf Hitler had written of the disgrace of Versailles and how it was imperative that the shackles of the treaty be thrown off so that France could be defeated and Germany could pursue her need

for *Lebensraum* or living space in the East. To do this, it would be necessary to fight a succession of short, rapid battles to defeat those who stood in Hitler's way, since he recognized that Germany's economic potential could not sustain a lengthy war. He had been a decorated soldier in the West during World War I, and after four long years of trench warfare in occupied France and having been twice wounded, he was aware of the need to avoid stalemate again. (35)

Hitler's fascination for mechanical things and especially for weapons and weapons systems is well documented. In *Mein Kampf* he wrote of the importance of motorization and in 1936, while viewing a field training exercise conducted by Guderian's *Panzers*, he exclaimed, "That's what I need, that's what I have to have!" In the early years of the Third Reich, Guderian and the others who were preaching the mobility doctrine were the beneficiaries of the most important sponsor of all. In addition to recognizing the combat potential of tanks, the propaganda effect of columns of tanks with fleets of bombers overhead on parade must have excited a propagandist like Hitler. Guderian related in *Achtung! Panzer!* that the big push for the buildup of the *Panzerwaffe* came at this time and that its units were finally able to rid themselves of their dummy tanks and replace them with real ones. (36)

Another element at work in this relationship was that both Hitler and Guderian saw themselves as men of vision struggling to overcome conservative forces attempting to keep them from achieving their goals. A certain amount of mutual empathy strengthened their bonds. In one instance the politician was trying to build a revolutionary political system and he needed the other's military machine to do so. The soldier needed the politician's sponsorship to lend support to his ideas and help him overcome conservative elements in the General Staff. In the short term, each would benefit the other. In the long term, both fell short of their ultimate objective, that is, winning World War II. (37)

The key to understanding Guderian's contribution is to recognize a man who was able to blend technical knowledge and expertise with practical experience and a strong will. The result was a new military doctrine unlike anything else in its day. Guderian was not afraid to push convention to its limits, daring to try something new. This was one of the main reasons for his success. He was fond of the saying, "In the land of the blind, the one-eyed man is king." In 1937 he wrote that even though he could not go beyond the limits of the technical possibilities of his day, he could not deny himself "the right to study new methods of employment for new weapons." And although there would always be those who would gladly oppose him, "only he who dares reach into the unknown will be successful." He was a man who had the inclination to do something new and better, and he was not afraid to pursue it. (38)

On a personal level, Guderian was a fortunate man. Almost every post he held in the early years during and after World War I gave him something he was able to apply to his later efforts at creating armored forces. In the years following World War I, Guderian's tours of duty rotated between schools, staff assignments, and tactical commands. This allowed him to research the newest material on the subject of mechanization and to teach it to junior officers, while developing new training and doctrine. His command assignments afforded him the opportunity to put his ideas into practice; then he could test, evaluate, and refine them. In short, Guderian had benefited from extensive technical training and experience in an army that stressed technology.

Guderian was not necessarily a particularly original thinker or an organizational genius, but he was a very practical man who was astute and hardheaded enough to push his ideas through. He had the insight to discern the useful from the unnecessary and to combine only those useful ideas for armored warfare that others had already developed with his own. Guderian had the technical acumen to recognize the value of a new technological development and the imagination to determine how it could best be put to use in a practical sense. He also had the ability to look at examples from past experience and draw lessons from them. (39)

That he was stubborn is well illustrated by the fact that he was twice dismissed by Hitler for insubordination, once in December 1941 as commander of *Second Panzer Army*, and again in March 1945 when he was Chief of the Army General Staff and Inspector of *Panzer* Troops. In both instances, Guderian's behavior was characteristic. Over the years he had developed the tactic of ignoring superiors or bypassing their resistance to his plans when it suited him. This method of "cutting his losses" served him well to a point in his later dealings with Hitler. Often this occurred when he was looking out for the interests of his troops. He could be an insufferable subordinate, as illustrated by his nickname of *Brausewetter* [hothead], but there were numerous instances where his subordinates praised him for being a firm but fair leader. (40)

His first dismissal occurred as the German offensive ground to a halt outside Moscow. Fearing a repeat of the ignominy of the French retreat from Moscow in 1812, Hitler gave the order to hold every bit of con-

quered territory at all costs. Always sensitive to the condition of his soldiers, Guderian flew to Hitler's headquarters in East Prussia to intervene with Hitler. Guderian wanted to pull back to winter defensive positions to let his men regroup and reequip before resuming the offensive in the spring. Weather conditions at the front were appalling, and Guderian was concerned that his troops might get caught out in the open and suffer a setback from which they might not recover. Hitler would have none of it, and the order to stand fast held. Guderian maintained that he returned to the front and proceeded to carry out his orders. When one of his subordinates was forced to retreat by a Russian counterattack, Hitler accused Guderian of ordering a retreat against his orders and placed him in the pool of reserve officers along with about thirty other generals and field marshals who also were dismissed at this time.

His identification as one of the best "*Panzer* minds" in Germany largely accounted for his being called back to active duty after his first dismissal. He was recalled to "repair" an armored force broken from two years of constant fighting in unimaginable conditions. The situation must have been dire for a megalomaniac like Hitler to recall Guderian after dismissing him less than a year and a half before. Guderian's final dismissal in the last weeks of the war was a result of one too many arguments with Hitler over the conduct of the war. (41)

Heinz Guderian was not the only soldier involved in the development of armored forces in Germany between the world wars. A little luck and some key supporters in high places along the way helped him to realize what he had envisioned between the world wars for the *Panzerwaffe*. His sponsors recognized the means to achieve their political and military goals in his ideas for the *Panzer* force. He made the most of the opportunities that came his way, and he had the courage to do what he thought was right in spite of what it may have cost him personally. But it was mostly by virtue of hard work, practical experience, diligent study, and the application of the new techniques and technologies available that he was able to make a significant contribution to the evolution of modern combined arms warfare.

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Notes

1. Generaloberst, the last rank Heinz Guderian held, translates literally as colonel general, but perhaps more accurately as senior general. It is equivalent to full general in the U.S. Army. F.W. von Mellenthin, *Panzer Battles: A Study of the Employment of Armor in the Second World War*, trans. H. Betzler, ed. L.C.F. Turner (Tulsa: University of Oklahoma Press, 1956), p. xiv; Heinz Guderian, *Panzer Marsch! Aus dem Nachlass des Scöpfers der deutschen Panzerwaffe*, ed. Oskar Munzel (Munich: Schild-Verlag GmbH., 1955), p. 9; Heinz Guderian, *Panzer Leader*, trans. Constantine Fitzgibbon (New York: E. P. Dutton, & Co., Inc., 1952), p. 20; Erwin Rommel, *The Rommel Papers*, trans. Paul Findlay, ed. B.H. Liddell Hart, et al. (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Inc., 1953), p. 520.

2. Guderian, *Panzer Leader*, p. 16; Bruce Gudmunson, *Stormtroop Tactics: Innovation in the German Army, 1914-1918* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1989), pp. 78, 88.

3. Kenneth Macksey, *Guderian: Creator of the Blitzkrieg* (New York: Stein and Day Publishers, 1975), p. 25.

4. Ibid., p. 73; Charles Messenger, *The Blitzkrieg Story* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1976), pp. 148-49.

5. Macksey, *Creator of the Blitzkrieg*, pp. 26, 28-29, 73; Guderian, *Panzer Marsch!*, p. 41.

6. Gudmunsson, *Stormtroop Tactics*, pp. 77-78.

7. James S. Corum, *The Roots of Blitzkrieg: Hans von Seeckt and German Military Reform* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1992), pp. 3-4, 21.

8. Heinz Guderian, *Die Panzerwaffe: ihre Entwicklung, ihre Kampftakktik, und ihre Operativen Möglichkeiten bis zum Beginn des grossdeutschen Freiheitskampfes* (Stuttgart: Union Deutsche Velagsgesellschaft, 1943), pp. 222-23. Guderian's original (1937) title was *Achtung! Panzer!*

9. Gudmunsson, *Stormtroop Tactics*, pp. 22-23, 87;

Corum, *Roots of Blitzkrieg*, p. 10.
10. Gudmunsson, *Stormtroop Tactics*, pp. 91, 168.
11. Guderian, *Panzer Leader*, p. 20.
12. Corum, *Roots of Blitzkrieg*, p. 43; Guderian, *Panzer Leader*, p. 23.
13. B.H. Liddell Hart, *The German Generals Talk* (New York: W. Morrow, 1948), p. 24; Rommel, *Rommel Papers*, pp. 516-17; Corum, *Roots of Blitzkrieg*, p. 1.
14. Corum, *Roots of Blitzkrieg*, pp. 10, 29-34, 48-49.
15. Guderian, *Die Panzerwaffe*, p. 138.
16. Corum, *Roots of Blitzkrieg*, pp. 29-31.
17. Ibid., pp. 33, 69-70; Jehuda L. Wallach, *The Dogma of the Battle of Annihilation: The Theories of Clausewitz and Schlieffen and Their Impact on the German Conduct of Two World Wars* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1986), pp. 231-32.
18. Guderian, *Panzer Leader*, p. 468; Corum, *Roots of Blitzkrieg*, p. 124.
19. Guderian, *Panzer Leader*, p. 21.
20. Corum, *Roots of Blitzkrieg*, pp. 86-87; Guderian, *Panzer Leader*, p. 20.
21. Guderian, *Die Panzerwaffe*, pp. 52-55, 61-62, 80, 85, 94, 133. Guderian describes (pp. 52-55) British and French methods in the battles of Cambrai, Arras, and Berry-au-Bac and the lessons learned from them.
22. Ibid., p. 176.
23. Heinz Guderian, "Cooperation Between Armored Forces and Other Arms," in *Selected Readings in Military History: Evolution of Combined Arms Warfare* (Fort Leavenworth, Kan.: Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army C&GSC, 1983), pp. 63, 70; Guderian, *Die Panzerwaffe*, pp. 177-78; 202-03; Guderian, *Panzer Marsch!*
24. Guderian, *Die Panzerwaffe*, p. 178.
25. Ibid., pp. 177-78. Given his rank at the time (colonel), Guderian might have expected to be no more than a brigade commander. The two other early *Panzer* division commanders were two full ranks above Guderian, so not only did he have the honor of leading one of the very first armored divisions, but he also did so ahead of many who were senior to him. Guderian, *Panzer Leader*, pp. 468-69.
26. Guderian, "Cooperation Between Armored Forces and Other Arms," pp. 73-74.
27. Ibid., pp. 59-60; Guderian, *Die Panzerwaffe*, pp. 171, 204-05, 211.
28. Guderian, *Die Panzerwaffe*, pp. 160, 204, 211-12. Guderian discusses Russian experiments with parachute troops, concluding that judgment was still out on them. He also discussed the possible role of airborne troops in the context of German offensive operations.
29. Guderian, "Cooperation Between Armored Forces and Other Arms," pp. 62, 64; Guderian, *Panzer Leader*, pp. 292-93.
30. Ibid., pp. 25-26; Liddell Hart, *The German Generals Talk*, pp. 91-92; Rommel, *The Rommel Papers*, p. 517.
31. Macksey, *Creator of the Blitzkrieg*, p. 26; Guderian, *Panzer Leader*, pp. 19, 25, 35-36. Guderian admits he became an "expert" largely because no one else really cared about the role of motorization at the time. F.W. von Mellenthin, *Panzer Battles*, p. xvi.
32. Guderian, *Panzer Leader*, pp. 38, 468-69.
33. Guderian, *Die Panzerwaffe*, p. 170; Guderian, *Panzer Leader*, p. 35; Macksey, *Creator of the Blitzkrieg*, p. 76.
34. F.W. von Mellenthin, *Panzer Battles*, pp. 49-50, 432-33; Macksey, *Creator of the Blitzkrieg*, pp. 43-44, 55, 97.
35. Adolf Hitler, *Mein Kampf*, trans. Ralph Mannheim (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1971), pp. 644-46, 674-75.
36. Ibid., p. 659. Although Hitler appeared at this time (1926) to recognize the potential for motorization, there is little to indicate he saw it as anything more than a means to get his brown shirts from one rally to the next. Hitler is quoted in Guderian, *Panzer Leader*, pp. 30, 431. There are numerous reports of Hitler's fascination, as well as his ability to recall minutiae weeks, even months, after the fact. Guderian, *Die Panzerwaffe*, p. 170.
37. Macksey, *Creator of the Blitzkrieg*, p. 55.
38. Guderian, *Panzer Leader*, p. 20; Guderian, "Cooperation Between Armored Forces and Other Arms," p. 74.
39. One need look no further than his experience as an instructor of military history at the *Kriegsakademie* in 1920, or the fact that *Achtung! Panzer!* is replete with examples of armored combat from World War I. In each instance, Guderian tried to draw lessons that were applicable to the mobile operations of his time.
40. Guderian, *Panzer Leader*, p. 469; Macksey, *Creator of the Blitzkrieg*, pp. 56-57; Oskar Muzel in *Panzer Marsch!*, p. 11.
41. Macksey, *Creator of the Blitzkrieg*, pp. 189-90; Guderian, *Panzer Leader*, pp. 264, 428-29.

Call for Papers

The 1995 annual meeting for the Society of Military History (formerly the American Military Institute) will be held 11-14 May 1995, in Gettysburg, Pennsylvania. The U.S. Army War College will serve as the host institution. The theme of the meeting will be "War Termination and Transitions to New Eras," reflecting the fiftieth anniversary of the end of World War II.

Proposals for individual papers or complete sessions are solicited. Prospective presentations could include such topics as concluding campaigns, political-military efforts to end hostilities, efforts to glean doctrinal lessons, wars of succession, military occupation and interim governments, the status of veterans, and the reorientation and reconfiguration of military establishments. Apart from the focal period 1944-50, panels that compare similar phenomena among different eras also are welcome, as are other stimulating papers on military affairs.

Submit abstracts of proposals (no more than one page in length) to the meeting coordinator no later than 1 November 1994: Mr. David A. Keough, Society for Military History 1995 Meeting, U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pa., 17013-5008. For additional information, contact Mr. Keough by phone (717) 245-3189 at the Institute, or at home (717) 249-2397, or by electronic mail: keoughd@carlisle-emh2.army.mil.

1993 Military History Writing Contest Winners

On 15 April 1994, Brig. Gen. Harold W. Nelson, Chief of Military History, declared three captains winners of the Army's 1993 Military History Writing Contest and stated that the contest will be held again in 1994.

Capt. Nathan K. Wantanabe won first prize in the annual competition and a cash award of $500 for an essay he wrote while attending the Aviation Officer Advanced Course at Fort Rucker, Alabama. Captain Wantanabe's winning essay was entitled "A Fight for Freedom, A Fight for Justice: An Overview of the 442d Regimental Combat Team." His article will be adapted for publication in a forthcoming issue of *Army History*.

Capt. Robert P. Whalen, Jr., captured second place and $250 for his essay entitled "Bimble in the Dark: Tactical Intelligence in the Falklands War." Captain Whalen attended the Military Intelligence Officer Advanced Course in 1993 and currently is assigned to the 519th Military Intelligence Battalion, Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

Third place and $100 went to Capt. Thomas E. Stackpole for his essay entitled "What It Takes To Win: The Son Tay Raid Revisited." Captain Stackpole attended the Quartermaster Officer Advanced Course and is now assigned to 2d Support Center (CMMC), Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

Four judges evaluated twenty-five entrants' essays on the basis of historical accuracy, originality, style, and relevance to today's leaders.

The annual writing contest is open to all officers attending advanced courses and all noncommissioned officers in sergeants major academy courses. Entries for the 1994 contest must be postmarked no later than midnight, 31 December 1994. Each essay submitted should be written as an article for publication, typed, and strictly limited to 2,500 words (approximately ten typed, double-spaced pages). Submit entries to the U.S. Army Center of Military History, ATTN: DAMH-FI (Writing Contest), Franklin Court, 1099 14th St., NW, Washington, D.C. 20005-3402.

For further information, contact Mr. Billy Arthur at the preceding address. Phone: (202) 504-5368, or DSN 285-5368.

The Cold War Military Records and History Conference

Judith Bellafaire

Dr. Judith Bellafaire served as the Center's conference coordinator for both the Cold War Military Records and History Conference in March and this year's Conference of Army Historians in June.

The Conference on Cold War Military Records and History was held 21-26 March 1994, in Arlington, Virginia. The first of its kind, the conference was sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the U.S. Army Center of Military History. The gathering brought together archivists and historians from the Russian Federation and former Warsaw Pact countries with their counterparts from the United States and many other NATO countries. Participants discussed the increased opportunities for communication, access to records, and historical research created by the end of the Cold War.

This initial meeting essentially was an exchange of information and an effort to become better acquainted. Archivists and military historians from the Russian Federation, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and the Czech and Slovak Republics presented papers describing the document collections in their military archives pertaining to Cold War military activities and analyzed various aspects of the history of the Cold War. They discussed the accessibility and scholarly value of their varied document collections and described current and future plans for declassification. Archivists and historians from the U.S. military services, Canada, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and the Netherlands described their collections and historical programs for their colleagues from Eastern Europe.

Participants visited the National Archives and Records Administration, the National Security Archives, and the Military History Institute at Carlisle Barracks to gain an understanding of the way in which military archives function in the United States.

The conference was a significant first step in a continuing process that will attempt to improve understanding and begin cooperative efforts to research the history of the Cold War. The Center of Military History plans to publish the proceedings in fiscal year 1995. Conference attendees agreed to establish a permanent coordinating committee and launch a Cold War newsletter to enhance communications and encourage exchanges among the countries involved.

Maj. Winfried Heinemann (l) of the German Military History Research Office, discusses a point with Mrs. Heather Yasamee (r), Chief, Historical Branch, Library and Records Department of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London, England.

Launching "THE UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II"

Stetson Conn

(Part one of three parts)

In 1980 Dr. Stetson Conn, the coauthor of The War of the American Revolution *and* The Framework of Hemisphere Defense, *produced* Historical Work in the United States Army, 1862-1954, *also published by the Center of Military History, but far less known than Conn's other works. Chapter 4 was serialized in* Army History, *issues 28-30. What follows is the first of three excerpts (less footnotes) from Chapter 5, Launching "THE UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II."*

The establishment by the War Department of the Historical Division, Special Staff, in November 1945, and the assignment of a general officer to head it, were essential foundations for launching the largest undertaking in narrative historical work that the American nation had ever known. The basic objective behind establishing a new Army historical office in 1943 had been the ultimate production of an official history of the United States Army's participation in World War II. By "official," Army planners of this period meant a history as nearly comprehensive and factually correct as possible, not one that would present an official point of view. In contrast to the large history projected and begun by the Army during and after World War I, the scope of the new undertaking was to be confined to military matters of direct concern to the Army and largely based upon the Army's own records. The first known plan for an official history of World War II, labeled "Military History of the War: American Phase," was dated 21 February 1944, or about three months after Chief Historian Livy Wright's arrival in the Historical Branch. Whether or not Wright was the author of it is uncertain. In any case, this plan called for a multi-volume history under six general headings, including an opening section on the background of American participation in the war and a closing one on demobilization, areas left largely or wholly uncovered when the official history was actually undertaken. A month later Dr. Wright drafted a very different plan which emphasized coverage of major commands at home and overseas. Ten or so volumes would be devoted to each of the major commands in the United States, with a large but unspecified number of volumes on operations in the various overseas theaters. Of course, Dr. Wright and his colleagues realized that no very specific planning could be done before the fighting ended. Until then they concentrated on stimulating as much historical activity as they could within the Army at home and overseas in order to lay the groundwork for the comprehensive history to be prepared as soon as possible after the war was over.

In the spring and summer of 1945, as the fighting neared its end, Col. [Allen F.] Clark spent many hours with his senior colleagues, Dr. Wright and Col. [Charles H.] Taylor, drafting and discussing plans for the official history. At first they favored a work of relatively modest length that might be published in ten or fifteen volumes and become widely known and read. But such a work, however comprehensive it might appear to the public, would have to leave out a great deal of detail that the Army itself needed for educational purposes. Material for those purposes would have to be printed if it was to survive and not be forgotten. Thus a more detailed series would have to be prepared and published also, probably before the more condensed series. There was no argument with Dr. Wright's projection for the scope of the work:

Military history as conceived by the modern historian is not merely an account of battles and campaigns, but of a whole national society organized for war, using all of its resources both human and material. Within the larger picture of American society at war, the mission of the Historical Branch is to record that part of the war effort which is under the direct or effective influence of the War Department.

Wright recognized that the scope thus defined was "enormous," and held that the product "must be well done or another generation may be left to repeat the same mistakes." For his part Colonel Clark felt very strongly that after the war the Army must depend on professional civilian historians to write the official history, not on Regular Army officers. He thought the peacetime experience of the War College Historical Section had proved conclusively that the historical office could well become a refuge for officers who were not adequately qualified to undertake historical

research and writing and, perhaps of equal importance, who were liable to be ordered to duty elsewhere before they could finish a major writing assignment.

In August 1945 at least two plans were drafted that were designed to be a compromise between the "condensed" ten- to fifteen-volume plan and the very detailed monographic writing that had characterized most of the Army's historical work until then. One plan contemplated about forty volumes, half of them on operations. The presumption was that the majority of these volumes would be prepared by the existing major command and overseas historical organizations rather than in the central historical office, and that about ten years would be needed to prepare the official history in this way. A second plan, drafted by Dr. Wright, also projected forty volumes in a main series, with greater emphasis on administration and logistics than proposed in the first plan. There were also to be additional publications to include the two-volume popular history, two volumes on Army training and education, an indefinite number dealing with the activities of the seven technical services, and an indefinite number of documentary volumes, the last to be prepared in compliance with the original directive to the branch in 1943.

Colonel Clark was probably working on the second of these plans when in early September he confided somewhat prophetically to his diary that "this particular project gives me a sense of cobwebs and old millstones turning over....it will grind on and on for years." A month later the branch's records specialist, Lt. Col. Jesse S. Douglas, advanced a more immediately pertinent criticism of a revision of Dr. Wright's plan. He objected to the publication by the branch of a core of forty to forty-five volumes of official history and separate publication of other series of Army histories by the major commands, the technical services, and so forth. He thought the official history ought to contain all the volumes, including the detailed accounts that the ground, air, and service forces were planning to publish. The only Army histories Douglas thought the branch should exclude from the big series were highly specialized technical monographs and studies on classified subjects. Despite these objections, the Wright plan was still the accepted one only five days before the Advisory Committee met in October 1945. Then, on the very eve of that meeting, the Historical Branch changed its course and presented instead to the committee a much broader plan for the official history—essentially the same as that which would be submitted for formal War Department approval in December.

This change resulted from several factors, apparently beginning with the criticisms of Colonel Douglas. About this time Dr. Wright told Colonel Clark that he intended to return to teaching in the fall of 1946, and after mid-October he took little part in the planning for the official history. It is also evident that before the end of the month Colonel Clark and others were looking toward the Ground Forces historian, Dr. [Kent Roberts] Greenfield, as Wright's most eligible successor. Among programs outside the branch, the historical work of the Army Ground Forces was considered the highest in quality and its monographs most nearly ready for publication. Possibly a decisive factor in the change of course for the official history plan was the discovery that Greenfield, with his commander's blessing, had begun to make arrangements with the *Infantry Journal*'s press to publish an eight-volume Army Ground Forces history. Getting Greenfield as Chief Historian seemed also to require putting the Ground Forces volumes into the official history.

During the three days preceding the Advisory Committee meeting, Colonel Clark rewrote the plan for the official history in a manner which gave it a much broader coverage and a goal of about 125 volumes. In refining the revised plan, Clark was aided by suggestions from Dr. Wright and Colonels Taylor and Douglas. When the Advisory Committee met on 24 October it approved the new plan. Within a fortnight all of the major command and technical service historical chiefs had added their enthusiastic endorsements. The War Department Printing Board gave its approval on 13 November, and in doing so recommended that the publication of the official history be financed by an initial "no year" appropriation large enough to cover the whole cost of printing. By 24 November this plan for "The History of the Army in World War II" had assumed its final form, but it was not sent through channels to the Chief of Staff and Secretary of War for formal approval until mid-December.

In the plan formally submitted on 18 December 1945, General [Edwin F.] Harding estimated that the full series would contain about 120 volumes, although only 101 of them were specified in an accompanying list. The stated objective of the series was to present to the Army and to the American people a comprehensive account of the administration and operations of the War Department and the Army during World War II. The history was to be basically a reference work and not a popular summarization. It was not the aim to make it a final and definitive history, but rather a "broad and factual foundation for further specialized research and study." Since the sheer bulk of the records

involved made it impossible to publish them in a series similar to the Civil War *Official Records*, the decision for such a detailed history had been made especially so that the Army's schools could use the finished products as basic texts for study. The plan contemplated that the Historical Division would prepare the volumes on the War Department's general direction of the Army's war effort and those treating overseas operations. The major commands and technical services were to prepare their own volumes. The plan called for the use of professional civilian historians to write the history. They would either be employed as full-time workers in government service or obtained by contract to prepare volumes on subjects about which they were especially well qualified to write. The Historical Division hoped such contracts could be paid for from the guaranteed appropriation that it planned to request. All volumes were to be published by the Government Printing Office, at an estimated cost of $8,000 per volume for 5,000 copies, and were to be as nearly uniform as possible in size, binding, and format. The plan admitted that "some of the work will take years to complete," but it did not try to estimate how many.

After two minor revisions to satisfy objections raised by the Operations and Intelligence Divisions, the proposal reached the Secretary of War and was approved by him on 7 February 1946. An Army circular published five days later described the plan and assigned responsibility to the Historical Division and to other Army agencies for the parts that they were to play in producing the volumes. General Harding informed Dr. [James Phinney] Baxter that the plan which the Advisory Committee had approved had won the support of the Secretary of War and Chief of Staff, clearing the way "for the preparation of a detailed and comprehensive history such as the Army has never before attempted." In a personal letter written about the same time, Colonel Clark explained why nearly two-thirds of the volumes were to deal with the major commands and technical services. These, he said, were works "which the respective CGs thereof would have published anyway whether we liked it or not." "This way," he added, "we have control of them and can review and edit them carefully to insure a high standard."

Included in the plan as submitted was a recommendation that the Historical Division be authorized to initiate action to establish a continuing fund to finance preparation and publication of the official history. The War Department's budget authorities, in commenting on the plan as it passed through the Chief of Staff's office, stated that the establishment of such a continuing fund would require a special act of Congress and that it had been the long-standing policy of Congress to oppose such appropriations except for large construction projects. It would therefore in all probability be necessary to procure the funds required through appropriations on a year to year basis. This verdict made it very unlikely that the Historical Division could contract with outside scholars for very much of the work, if indeed it could contract for any of it.

Not everyone either within or outside of the Army was happy over the decision to undertake under official auspices a massive narrative history of the Army's part in the war. In December 1945 the chief of the War College Historical Section, Colonel [Clarence C.] Benson, minced no words in writing to his new technical supervisor, General Harding. He voiced his opposition to the official history proposal and expressed his strong preference for collecting and publishing the source materials in order to make them available to historians generally. The following April Douglas S. Freeman, the dean of American military historians, wrote editorials and a letter to the Secretary of War that were even more adamant in their opposition. He held that "no adequate unrestricted history of America's participation in the Second World War can be written during the lifetime of the principal leaders in that struggle," and that "historians will not be grateful for our attempt to write an official history before we publish the basic documents." A conciliatory reply drafted by the Chief Historian-elect, Dr. Greenfield, does not seem to have changed Freeman's mind.

Except for the appointment of General Harding as Director (Chief after June 1946), the new Historical Division changed very little in organization or size in the first few months after its establishment. Physically it remained in the same fifth floor location in the Pentagon that it had occupied as the Historical Branch. In November 1945 Colonel Clark, in consultation with his senior colleagues, drafted an organizational directive for the division, which would be issued, with two significant changes, as an Army Staff circular on 7 January 1946. It provided for an organization under the Director consisting of five elements: (1) an Advisory Committee appointed by the Secretary of War and representing the professional historical scholarship of the nation, with the duty of advising the Secretary, the Director, and the Chief Historian on all matters relating to Army historical activities; (2) a civilian Chief Historian to be the principal full-time historical adviser to the military Director, and who would be primarily responsible for supervising the production and quality of the division's historical work and for establishing

and maintaining professional relationships (Colonel Clark in his November draft had proposed that the Chief Historian be appointed by the Secretary of War, on the advice of the Advisory Committee, but this provision was dropped); (3) a Planning Branch, to handle planning and to supervise other Army historical organizations (but not to control them, as Clark's November draft had proposed), with a Records Analysis Section to be responsible for securing, handling, and analyzing documentary materials, including establishment "of standards for the retention and processing of War Department and Army records of value in the preparation of military histories"; (4) a Research and Writing Branch to prepare historical studies "not within the province of other...Army organizations"; and (5) an Editorial Branch to establish standards for and review Army historical manuscripts and publications, and to edit and prepare for publication works to be published by the division. In two areas the new organization was assigned responsibilities that encroached upon functions normally exercised by the Adjutant General: supervision of the process of retention and processing of Army records to be used in military history, and editing of Army publications for printing. In both of these areas there would be problems to resolve in the years ahead.

In the new organization Colonel Clark became the Deputy Director and Colonel [John M.] Kemper, who had returned in November 1945, the Chief of the Planning Branch. General Harding, whose residual duties with the Joint Chiefs of Staff occupied much of his time, left the routine administration of the division very largely to Clark, Kemper, and Chief Historian Livy Wright. It was they who fought off a proposal in January 1946 to annex the Army Library to the Historical Division. They were less successful in fending off the amalgamation of the War College Historical Section and the division, when the former had to find a new home following the decision to establish a national war college at Fort McNair. On paper this consolidation occurred on 1 May 1946, although the possible embarrassments of physical integration were postponed until the following year.

At the beginning of February 1946 the strength of the Historical Division was twenty-nine officers and forty civilians, but a proposal for a much larger staff (thirty-four officers and eighty-three civilians) to handle the big history project was in the mill. This enlargement was made all the more necessary by two developments: the disintegration of overseas historical organizations during the rapid postwar demobilization, which made it impossible for them to prepare volumes for the World War II history as originally contemplated, and the discouraging prospect for contracting with outside scholars to prepare volumes.

During a month's visit to the European Theater in December, Colonel Clark had confirmed a growing realization in Washington "that no historical program covering operations during the war could be accomplished [overseas] under the confused conditions caused by the redeployment schedule." It would therefore be necessary, if at all possible, to persuade the best of the overseas historians to return to Washington to do the work. The ablest of the Army's professional historians in Europe was Dr. Hugh M. Cole, then the deputy theater historian. Cole expressed willingness to consider civilian employment with the Historical Division only when he learned that Dr. Wright was leaving and would probably be succeeded by Dr. Greenfield, whom Cole admired. Cole's apparent willingness promised to win over several of his more able colleagues, if satisfactory salaries could be offered to them. After his return to Washington, and somewhat to his surprise, Colonel Clark managed to persuade the Civil Service Commission to approve salaries high enough to attract top-notch people, salaries substantially higher than America's colleges and universities were then paying scholars of comparable ability and experience. To complete the Army's best historical work then under way in the Pacific, on the battle for Okinawa, the team of five men in uniform then working on it in Hawaii were brought to Washington and made a temporary part of the Historical Division's staff. Because only one of them would remain as a civilian historian and he for only a short while, writers for the other Pacific volumes had to be recruited from outside this highly qualified group.

In recruiting competent people, the enlistment of Dr. Greenfield as the future Chief Historian was of almost equal importance to an attractive salary schedule. Greenfield was widely known and highly regarded in academic circles. Fortunately for the Army, a feud with the president of Johns Hopkins made him reluctant to return there and resume the chairmanship of its history department. But he was also reluctant to commit himself to peacetime government service unless he could be assured that the work he would supervise would be well supported and conducted in accordance with the principles of sound historical scholarship. As a practical matter, it was also necessary to resolve the inconsistency between the approved World War II history plan that contemplated publishing all the volumes through the Government Printing Office and the Army Ground Forces' arrangement to

Admiral Nimitz Museum Sets Pacific War Symposium

The Admiral Nimitz Museum and Historical Center, Fredericksburg, Texas, will hold a retrospective symposium on the theme "The Die Is Cast...the Final Campaigns of the Pacific War, 1944-45." The symposium, to be held 8-9 October 1995, will bring together leading authors and historians to review the events of Saipan, Tinian, Guam, the Battle of Leyte Gulf, the "Marianas Turkey Shoot," Iwo Jima, and Okinawa, with veterans who were there. For further information contact the Admiral Nimitz Museum and Historical Center, Fredericksburg, Texas 78624 or call (210) 997-4379, FAX (210) 997-8092.

have its volume published by the *Infantry Journal*'s press.

In mid-February 1946 after conferences between Harding, Clark, Greenfield, and the editor of the *Infantry Journal*, the editor agreed to government publication of the Ground Forces' volumes. Two weeks later the first volume, Greenfield's own work on the history of General Headquarters, was delivered to the Historical Division for preparation for the press. A conference at the end of February also reached preliminary agreement on more or less uniform characteristics for all series volumes. Still, Greenfield did not commit himself until after two more significant meetings the following month. The first, on 13 March, was a session of the Advisory Committee, at which its members were briefed on the development of the official history program since the last meeting five months before. Presumably they expressed approval of the selection of Dr. Greenfield as Dr. Wright's successor. The second, two days later, was a forty-minute interview between Dr. Greenfield and General [Dwight D.] Eisenhower. The Chief of Staff expressed keen interest in the official history project, promised that those working on it would be given access as necessary to Army records, and agreed to allow Colonels Clark and Kemper to remain with the project until it was on a firm footing. A month later, with some difficulty, the Historical Division obtained Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson's signature to a letter to Dr. Greenfield (still in uniform as a lieutenant colonel) assuring him support from the secretariat for the World War II history project and expressing appreciation for Greenfield's willingness to leave university life and devote himself to it.

The Eisenhower interview convinced Greenfield and his prospective senior colleagues of the Historical Division that the auspices for official history work were good. They were assured that as government historians working on the history they would have access to all relevant Army records, individual authorship credit, and the freedom "to call the shots as they saw them." These assurances were all the more necessary because among academic historians in the United States, military history after World War I had become a neglected and disparaged field, and among them and the American public generally official publications had never acquired a reputation for scholarly objectivity. If the volumes of the official history of the Army in World War II were to be accepted and used both within and outside the service, they would have to be as good and trustworthy as their authors could possibly make them.

The day after the War Department publicly announced the appointment of Dr. Greenfield as Chief Historian, Colonel Clark learned that General Harding felt he must soon retire, because in the postwar reduction of temporary grades he was to revert to the Regular Army rank of colonel. Within a week Clark and Greenfield had lined up Maj. Gen. Harry J. Malony as Harding's successor. Malony took over as Chief of Military History on 12 July 1946, about three weeks before Greenfield himself reported for duty. The new Chief, described as a "natural" for the job by one of his most knowledgeable military colleagues, had been a Deputy Chief of Staff at General Headquarters before Pearl Harbor and afterwards the leader of the 94th Division in training and battle. Shortly before he became Chief, he reverted to the rank of brigadier general, which was the grade formally allotted to the Chief's position effective 1 July 1946. Malony's rank of major general was restored in 1948 and he and his successors during the decade following all held that rank, a step higher than the position actually required. During Malony's tour, Chief and Chief Historian worked closely together. Greenfield carried the major responsibility for molding the World War II series into shape and Malony exercised aggressive leadership in other matters, particularly in directing the division's broadening range of historical activities.

The exchange of military and civilian chiefs in the summer of 1946 was but a part of the larger turnover in the division staff. Thanks to General Eisenhower's

intervention, Colonels Clark and Kemper were allowed to complete their normal tours, but Colonel Taylor, Major [Roy] Lamson, and several other officer-historians decided to return to teaching, and an entirely new staff for the Editorial Branch had to be found. With some reluctance, Dr. Winnacker agreed to suspend work on his history of Secretary Stimson's activities and take temporary charge of editing. Under him newly recruited senior editors including historians Dr. Stetson Conn from Amherst College and Dr. Albert K. Weinberg from the United Nations' relief organization. Fortunately, the largest writing sections, the European under Dr. Hugh Cole and the Pacific under Dr. Louis Morton, acquired not only strong leadership but also a core of authors who, like their chiefs, had served overseas during the war. New people had to be found for Mediterranean coverage and for many administrative and logistical topics. Getting them in the summer of 1946 was not easy in competition with colleges and universities emerging from their wartime doldrums. Both newly recruited historians and those already aboard met with Chief of Staff Eisenhower for half an hour on 30 July to receive his greetings and assurance of enthusiastic support.

A most important ingredient in the success of the Army's Historical Division was what Dr. Pendleton Herring called the "honest cooperation between two professional groups, the professional officers of the Army and the professional historians of the nation, each recognizing and respecting the needs and interests of the Army." Dr. Greenfield described it more simply as "a happy marriage of the military and historical professions." There were, of course, occasional instances of misunderstanding and friction, but they were generally overshadowed by a spirit of harmony. In part this harmony reflected the care taken in selecting officers and civilians for the Historical Division. It also flowed, as Colonel Clark emphasized, from the administration of the division's work as a "consultative operation," no major step being taken without careful preliminary discussion and substantial agreement among military and civilian leaders.

The Historical Advisory Committee provided another pillar of strength as the Army's World War II series took shape, especially after it was enlarged in the winter of 1946-47. Planned since the spring of 1946, this expansion retained the four original "outside" members chosen in 1943, and added seven civilian historians appointed by the Secretary of War to increase total membership to eleven. Dr. Baxter continued as chairman, and all civilian appointments were for an indefinite term. Four of the newcomers were alumni: Dr. Wright, Colonel Taylor, and the ex-chiefs of the overseas European and Mediterranean theater historical offices. Two were professors at the Universities of Chicago and California, added to give the committee nation-wide geographical representation. The seventh was Douglas Freeman, who agreed to serve but never really became a convert to the World War II program. Before the expansion, the remnant of the original committee held an all-day meeting on 7 November 1946 devoted to reports on the development of the World War II series; and in April 1947 the enlarged committee, during a two-day meeting, heard addresses from both Chief of Staff Eisenhower and Secretary of War Patterson attesting to their interest in the historical program. After 1946 individual members kept in touch between meetings by receiving copies of the Chief Historian's progress reports. From time to time they helped in the review of volumes nearing readiness for publication. Naturally, the distinguished members of the expanded committee gave the World War II program a strong tie with the historical profession across the nation.—*To be continued.*

Book Reviews

Book Review
by Cole C. Kingseed

Thunderbolt: General Creighton Abrams and the Army of His Times
by Lewis Sorley
Simon & Schuster. 429 pp., $25.00

Few officers have made such a dramatic impact on the Army as did Creighton Abrams. In what surely is the definitive biography of this remarkable soldier, *Thunderbolt* follows Abrams' career from his graduation from West Point (U.S. Military Academy, 1936) to his untimely death in 1974, while serving as Army Chief of Staff. In the interim, Abrams' career reflected the transformation of the Army from the interwar force of the 1930s to the creation of the modern force that later triumphed superbly in the Gulf War. Whether leading the advance column that relieved the besieged garrison of Bastogne or supervising the Army forces at the time of the civil rights demonstrations during

President John F. Kennedy's administration, Abrams demonstrated a no-nonsense approach to mission accomplishment and to the welfare of the individual soldier.

Using a plethora of primary and secondary sources, Sorley follows Abrams through three wars and countless domestic crises. Since the author relies so heavily on the recollections, anecdotes, and personal reminiscences of a number of Abrams' proteges, this biography is so laudatory that one wonders if the hard-driving combat commander had any personal quirks or foibles. The reader will certainly not find any in this book, which borders on idolatry.

Abrams achieved legendary status in World War II as commander of the 37th Tank Battalion, one of three tank battalions in the 4th Armored Division. Beginning on 11 July 1944 (D+35) in Europe, Abrams played a critical role in the Normandy breakout and the subsequent race across France. Categorized by the author as "an enlisted man's officer," Abrams also earned the respect of his superiors for his tactical acumen, culminating in the relief of Bastogne in December 1944. Small wonder that George Patton considered Abrams the best tank commander in the Army.

Whether or not Abrams was the most famous small unit leader of the war, as Sorley attests, Abrams' contemporaries obviously agreed with Patton's assessment. When asked why the 4th Armored Division had a much greater reputation than any other armored division in the theater, one commander's unequivocal answer was, "Abrams. Abrams when he got into combat knew everything that was going on....He was able to command and move his outfit and always defeated the enemy in front of him. It was just that simple."

What makes *Thunderbolt* such interesting reading, however, is Sorley's analysis of Abrams' contribution to the Army during the period between World War II and the Vietnam conflict. Not resting on his combat laurels, Abrams provided yeoman service as head of the Department of Tactics at the Armor School at Fort Knox, Kentucky, and as commander of the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment in occupied Germany. Following his mentor, Bruce Clarke, to Korea in 1953, Abrams arrived too late to participate in any combat. Abrams served as Clarke's chief of staff at I Corps and later at X Corps (Group). Subsequent tours at Fort Knox and the Pentagon only enhanced Abrams reputation, and he quickly received command of the 3d Armored Division (1959-60) and V Corps in Germany (1963-64).

The narrative of Abrams' Vietnam experience and his subsequent tour as chief of staff alone makes Sorley's *Thunderbolt* mandatory reading for military officers. Vietnam dominated Abrams' efforts from mid-1964, when he served as vice chief of staff, until 1972 when he returned to the United States as chief of staff. Indeed, the author devotes nearly half this biography to the Vietnam experience. Succeeding General William Westmoreland as commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, Abrams inherited a nearly impossible situation. Quickly restoring order after the disastrous Tet offensive, Abrams implemented the Vietnamization strategy and presided over the gradual withdrawal of American forces from the conflict. It was a thankless job, but one at which he customarily excelled. Sorley wisely leaves to the reader the larger question of how effective the Vietnamization strategy was.

After succeeding Westmoreland, this time as chief of staff, Abrams made perhaps his greatest contribution by setting the Army on its way back to respectability. Imperative in this reconstruction was restoration of the trust and confidence of the American people in the officer corps and the Army as a whole. Determined that the nation would never again commit the Army to a war without the full support of the American people, Abrams became the leading proponent of the Total Army concept that incorporated the careful integration of the active Army, the Army National Guard, and Army Reserve units. The Army of the 1990s is a product of Abrams' foresight.

In short, this work is a major contribution to military historiography. For those officers interested in learning the profession of arms and the art of command, here is a biography of one of the Army's genuine heroes.

Col. Cole C. Kingseed is an infantry officer and historian. He currently is a permanent associate professor in the Department of History, U.S. Military Academy, West Point, New York.

Book Review
by Ted Ballard

U.S. Uniforms of the Korean War
by Shelby Stanton
Stackpole Books. 243 pp., $29.95

After World War II the U.S. Army demobilized rapidly. Army clothing stocks were depleted until, at

the outbreak of the Korean War, supplies were extremely short. After the North Korean invasion of the south in June 1950, there followed a three-year "police action" in which American soldiers served in an environment made hostile not only by the war but also by the weather. Although the Army had been designing and adopting specialized clothing in the post-World War II years, during the early stages of mobilization for Korea most American troops sent there were still uniformed in World War II-era clothing. However, this garb was not suited for the generally long and cold winters and hot, humid summers of the Korean peninsula. A crash program was begun, therefore, to develop clothing and equipment better suited to the Korean climate.

U.S. Army Uniforms of the Korean War, the third book in Shelby Stanton's uniform reference series, more than adequately fills the gaps between his previously published volumes on World War II and Vietnam. Soldiers' uniforms are well documented by photographs and text, from World War II-vintage clothing to the design and distribution of attire specifically targeted for Korea. Various types of summer and winter duty uniforms for men and women are illustrated and discussed. The volume also includes information on uniforms worn by aviators, military police, medics, and other specialized personnel. Body armor is also included, from "flak jackets" to the "armadillo suit," used for mine-clearing operations.

Considerable information is presented on both issue and commercial headgear and winter field clothing, from parkas, overcoats, and sweaters to underwear, shoes, boots, and socks. A multitude of photographs depict the wear of unit and rank insignia on uniforms and individual equipment, although in most cases the equipment is of World War II vintage. An appendix provides a chart on uniform distribution in Korea, from the base depot at Pusan to various divisions in the field, including the type of transportation used for each leg of the line. Tables of field clothing and allowances and body armor distribution during the war are also provided.

This book, with copious photographs of actual uniforms in the field, is educational for an insight into military clothing development and distribution during the Korean War.

Larry A. ("Ted") Ballard is a historian in the Center's Field and International Branch. A collector of historic American uniforms and equipment, he is a frequent participant in military reenactments.

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