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Birth and Death of the Army Specialized Training Program

Louis E. Keefer

Many military historians are quite familiar with the story of the Army Specialized Training Program (ASTP): conceived in mid-1942 to meet the Army's avowed need for university-trained officers, with some of the nation's most renowned college educators hovering about as midwives while Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson and his top civilian staff delivered the baby. Some top-level Army officers apparently hoped for a stillbirth.

In early 1944, no sooner than fully operational, the program was curtailed to help meet the manpower crisis. By 1 April, more than 105,000 trainees had been reassigned, over half to infantry, armored, and airborne divisions. These men had expected ASTP to be their open-sesame to officer candidate school (OCS). Instead, they were used as "fillers" in units where even the noncommissioned officer ratings were all taken. For most, their first stripes came only after combat casualties created openings they might fill.

Probably the ASTP discussion best known to Army historians is the one contained in *The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops* by Robert R. Palmer, Bell I. Wiley, and William R. Keast (U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1948). Other aspects of the program are covered in publications by the American Council on Education, in contemporary journals such as *School and Society*, and in newspapers, e.g., the *New York Times*. Tremendous detail about the administration of the program can be found in the National Archives and Records Administration's Record Group 160, titled "Headquarters, Army Service Forces, Office of the Director of Military Training, 1939-1946, Army Specialized Training Division, 1942-1946." The diaries and papers of Secretary of War Stimson offer a politically astute, inside view of the program (the Stimson papers reside in the Yale University Library, but are available on microfilm at the Library of Congress Manuscripts Division).

The author's own book on the ASTP was based on these and other sources, not least of which were interviews and correspondence with several hundred former ASTPers (it helped that the author was one himself). Readers who might like to compare ASTP and the Navy V-12 Program should consult the author's essay "Exceptional Young Americans" in *Prologue* (Winter 1992), the quarterly magazine of the National Archives. This article reviews some of the aspects of ASTP that may be of special interest to the readers of *Army History*. It aims only to inform generally, not to offer any definitive theses.

Confused Objectives at Birth

The Army Specialized Training Program had its origins in the Student Army Training Corps (SATC) of World War I. That plan would have sent trainees to colleges for three years to study military and academic subjects, during which time they would get the foundations to fit them for commissions. The first classes began in September 1918, but the program was canceled shortly after the armistice.

Some of the same people who helped create the SATC in 1918 were still around twenty-some years later. In mid-1942 a few led the prestigious American Council of Education (ACE) to recommend that a "college training corps be set up to function in as many institutions as possible...and that candidates for the corps be selected, inducted, put into uniform, on pay, and be under military discipline while in technical training with the armed forces." (1)

Shortly thereafter, President Franklin D. Roosevelt urged Secretary Stimson and Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox to consider promptly the council's recommendation:

Please have an immediate study made as to the highest utilization of American colleges. This is in view of the undoubted facts that the drafting of boys down to and including eighteen year olds will greatly deplete all undergraduate enrollment....There is an enormous amount of equipment in colleges—buildings, athletic

fields, etc., which the Army and Navy may be able to use without great change. (2)

The commander in chief's orders led to the establishment of a joint Army-Navy study committee which outlined the basics of both the Army Specialized Training Program and the Navy V-12 Program. Asked for his comments on the proposed ASTP, Lt. Gen. Lesley J. McNair, Commander, Army Ground Forces, is said to have exploded, "With 300,000 men short...we are asked to send men to college!" (3) His comments were in vain, however, and the two programs were announced on 17 December 1942, the full text of the announcement carried by the *New York Times* the next day.

Despite allegations that the ASTP was established only to save many colleges from financial ruin—by filling classrooms and fully employing professors—in the author's opinion there was never any mystery about its creation. The basis for ASTP was just as described by General George C. Marshall in the 1 April 1943 War Department booklet, *Fifty Questions and Answers on Army Specialized Training Program*:

The Army has been increasingly handicapped by a shortage of men possessing desirable combinations of intelligence, aptitude, education, and training in fields such as medicine, engineering, languages, science, mathematics, and psychology, who are qualified for service as officers of the Army....The [ASTP] was established to supply the needs of the Army for such men....Successful graduates of the program will be immediately available to attend Officer Candidate Schools and technical schools of all the arms and services....Graduates will be assigned according to need in the same manner newly inducted men entering the Army are classified and assigned, primarily on the basis of pre-induction skills or professions.

Unfortunately, while the Army chief of staff's description of the program's objectives seemed perfectly clear at first glance, a close review of his language reveals ample opportunity for misunderstanding.

In application, "graduate" did not mean college graduate; it simply meant the completion of scheduled courses—without their knowing it, the majority of ASTPers were intended only to have three semesters of "basic engineering" (BE-1, BE-2, and BE-3). In nine months of accelerated study they would acquire the equivalent of freshman and sophomore years in a standard engineering college. Except for ASTPers assigned to medical and dental schools, most of whom did obtain degrees, it was never intended that ASTP "graduates" finish college.

Although a handful of college educators were honest enough to wonder what such a limited amount

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of training might qualify the trainees to do—especially 18-to21-year-old "basic engineers"—most went along without making a fuss.

And, of course, the phraseology "available to attend Officer Candidate Schools," although easily construed by many young trainees as a commitment, was no commitment at all. That was always very clear to Secretary of War Stimson, who took great pains directing that ASTPers *not* be called "cadets" and that they be considered soldiers first, students second.

Finally, one might observe that were ASTP "graduates" to be assigned "primarily on the basis of preinduction skills or professions," there would seem to have been little point to sending them to college at all. What 19-year-old, even with three terms of ASTP instruction, could profess either skill or profession?

If General Marshall's explanation of ASTP's objectives was less than exact, then portions of the *Fifty Questions and Answers* booklet were positively misleading. The answer to the first question read, in part, "It is anticipated that most of the soldiers who receive Army Specialized Training will be recommended for Officer Candidate School." The answer to the twenty-third question read, in part, "At the end of every 12-week term a soldier can be recommended for...assignment to Officer Candidate School."

These answers were paraphrased in camp and post bulletins and newspapers everywhere when promulgated by the Army Camp Newspaper Service. For example, the 8 May 1943 Camp Gordon Johnston *Amphibian,* under the lead "G.I. Authority Explains ASTP; Pre Training for OCS, NCOs," said: "For many soldiers the college courses will open the door to officer candidate schools and lead to commissions. For others the courses will lead to recommendations for technical ratings upon successfully completing the studies."

Qualifications were quickly added. A 1 June 1943 enclosure to the ASTP question-and-answer booklet, while holding that the answers to the first and twenty-third questions were "perfectly true," said:

...it must be realized that the number of soldiers actually appointed to Officer Candidate School will always depend upon the number of openings at any given time. Inasmuch as the number of openings has recently been sharply reduced, this statement has been prepared for enclosure with the booklet in order to avoid any semblance of a misstatement of fact.

Just to be absolutely certain that there could be no

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

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This cartoon first appeared in "Vanguard Section—Blood and Fire," *8 July 1944, HQ 63d Infantry Division, with the caption "That's the New Man from ASTP!"*

mistake, Secretary Stimson directed, through a 9 July 1943 memo signed by Maj. Gen. M.G. White, Assistant Chief of Staff (Personnel Director) for Army Service Forces:

1. That immediate steps be taken to remove from all memoranda, advertising, and other publications on the ASTP, every statement or inference that an enlisted man will go direct[ly] from an Army Specialized Training unit to an officer candidate school [and] 2. That future publications on this subject clearly indicate that an enlisted man who completes Army Specialized Training will be assigned to a unit or other installation at which he must compete for selection to attend officer candidate school along with all other enlisted men. (4)

A memorandum for record by the chief clerk, G-1, at the bottom of General White's memo, notes that in view of "the overstrength of officers expected at the end of 1943" and the relatively few future openings likely to exist in OCS:

It will be impossible to send more than a small fraction of all AST graduates direct to OCS without cutting quotas to the field units out entirely. Although it was never so intended, many have been led to believe that AST graduates would be given preferential treatment...Since academic proficiency is no final test of required leadership qualifications, PD, G-1, believes AST graduates must compete with those who have demonstrated these qualifications with field units.

In any event, extremely few ASTPers ever gained admission to OCS. Moreover, because it was impossible to apply for officer candidate school while in the program, some men may have missed a chance they might otherwise have had. Add to that the fact that many men had to yield corporal's and sergeant's stripes even to enter ASTP (never returned upon the program's curtailment) and the foundations for a significant morale problem were well laid. The author can attest that, even fifty years later, many former ASTPers harbor the feeling that the Army lied to them about their futures.

The Unexpected (and Confused) Demise

The 1 April 1944 utter evisceration of ASTP was anything but a surgically clean-cut operation. In fact, it was a particularly messy one. The confusion stemmed from differences of opinion at high levels.

One of the first reports of the program's possible cutback appeared in the 11 December 1943 *Chicago Tribune* under the heading "Army Abandons Its Specialized Training Course: Liquidation Comes After Bitter War Dept. Row." Reporting some nasty quarrels in the Pentagon, the newswriter said that the "conflict between opponents and supporters of the ASTP a few weeks ago almost passed from the stage of argument into the stage of fisticuffs." No names were revealed.

In the newspaper staff's opinion, the basic problem was that the Army had too many officers, the number

having skyrocketed from 93,000 in 1941 to 650,000 on 1 December 1943. The newspaper commented: "After Pearl Harbor the army worked feverishly to increase its officer personnel. Men were commissioned from civilian life, officer candidate schools were expanded tremendously, and the ASTP was initiated for the purpose of training officer material." Once it was clear that so many officers were not required (the *Tribune* alleged that some were actually returned to civilian life), the ASTP was no longer needed.

Not long after the *Tribune* story broke, Secretary Stimson said that ASTP was *not* being liquidated, but that:

The number of soldiers in the program will depend in the future, as in the past, on the actual needs of the arms and services....It is now being reduced—but later may be either increased or still further reduced as the exigencies of the military situation or military training make advisable. (5)

Privately, in a 30 November 1943 letter to Harold W. Dodds, president of Princeton University, while reminding him that he had "strongly believed in and fathered the ASTP," Stimson admitted that ASTP was in serious trouble, "but I shall try to keep it alive as long as possible." (6)

Suspicions were cast that the ASTP director, Col. Herman Beukema, a highly respected instructor from the United States Military Academy, was deliberately leaking news about ASTP's possible curtailment to forestall the possibility. An "investigation" convinced Secretary Stimson that, while Beukema was not at fault, there were strong feelings between Beukema and Deputy Chief of Staff General Joseph T. McNarney over ASTP's future. (7)

Ultimately, of course, the needs of the arms and services had to prevail. General Marshall on 10 February 1944 asked Secretary Stimson to liquidate ASTP:

I am aware of your strong feeling regarding [ASTP]. However, I wish you to know that in my opinion we are no longer justified in holding 140,000 men in this training when it represents the only source from which we can obtain the required personnel, especially with a certain degree of intelligence and training, *except by disbanding already organized combat units* [emphasis in the original]. (8)

When General Marshall explained that he meant disbanding at least ten infantry divisions to use the men as replacements in other divisions, Stimson reluctantly told Roosevelt that the program had to be scaled back. Convinced there was no other choice, Roosevelt approved. Orders were cut the same day, 18 February 1944, to drop 110,000 ASTPers from college by 1 April. Roughly 35,000 would remain in school, of whom about half later would be dropped as well.

Anticipating this bombshell, Brig. Gen. Walter L. Weible, Director of Training, Army Service Forces, said that the most important thing in any case was to use ASTPers wisely. After recommending that an OCS quota be established for selected ASTPers, General Weible suggested that "a certain proportion of ASTP graduates, for example, the upper 60 percent, be placed in a pool for each of the three major commands...to fill vacancies requiring men of special abilities and mental capacities." Even after his suggestions were ignored, Weible addressed such reassuring words as he could to his ASTP charges. On 28 March 1944, at Washington and Jefferson College, he told 300 departing basic engineers:

All of you graduates are now better prepared to help win this war than you were when you first arrived... [ASTP] has enabled you to improve your greatest weapon, your brain. Display at all times the same qualities in using your new knowledge that you displayed in acquiring it and all of you will rise to your proper places in the service of your country. Good luck to you all. (9)

To have followed General Weible's proposal to give ASTPers preferential assignments would, of course, have missed the point of the program's curtailment. Thanks to the manpower crisis, riflemen were the Army's greatest need, not men of "special abilities." Thus, nearly half the ousted ASTPers were to become rather quickly reacquainted with an M1 and other infantry weapons. Palmer et al. summarized:

Thirty-five divisions, infantry, armored, and airborne, received on the average over 1,500 ASTP students each. Twenty-two divisions received on the average about 1,000 aviation cadets each [their program being cut at about the same time as the ASTP]. All divisions still in the United States, except for those scheduled for earliest shipment overseas...received infusions of the new manpower. Some infantry divisions,those which were most depleted or which had the lowest intelligence ratings, obtained over 3,000 men from the two sources combined. All divisions assigned the ASTP students and aviation cadets mainly to their infantry components. (10)

ASTPers attend a wartime physics class at Georgetown College (now University).

A *Washington Post* editorial (1 March 1944) said the cutback was, at best, poorly timed. Noting that he could not pass judgment on the need for combat replacements, the editorial writer added:

But it would seem that this need might as easily have been anticipated before the specialized training program was launched....All in all, it would appear much better for the Army never to have launched the program in the first place than thus abruptly to abandon it.

Of course the colleges howled, but most trainees took the end of their days in college surprisingly well. They were well aware of the good situation they had been enjoying and felt slightly guilty, knowing that many of their high school classmates were already fighting (and dying) overseas. Some had uneasy feelings about that and were glad finally to be "getting in the action." Pvt. George Hart's poem, *From AST to APO*, which appeared in *Yank* magazine 31 March 1944, typified the sarcastic good humor of many ASTPers:

Say good-bye to the slide rules and textbooks,
Say good-bye to the coeds and classes,
And take one last spree
As you finish term III,
For you're going right out on your—ear!

No particular point is to be gained by dwelling on what happened next: most of the ASTPers joined divisions where all the ratings were taken, were coolly dismissed for being spoiled smart-ass college kids, and were given some of the less glamorous tasks available. In time, however, most ASTPers became excellent soldiers—"the making" of some units, as many of their commanders conceded after the war—and once in combat took more than an equal share of responsibilities and casualties.

Was there ever any consensus about the program's value? At best, the author can recall only opinions. Surveys by the Army Specialized Training Division found that most of the 227 colleges and universities involved were happy to have had their ASTP units, and not just for financial reasons, either. More than one college president may have seen the program as a chance to try new scheduling and new teaching techniques, and all at government expense.

Perhaps it is accurate to say that the Army was much divided in its assessment. Some analysts say that ASTP was a form of diversion that, excepting for those trainees who remained in the program to become Army doctors and dentists, delayed the staffing and training of many combat divisions. But a more positive finding was expressed in *Logistics in World War II*, part of the *Final Report of the Army Service Forces* (1948): there it was postulated that only the war's conclusion kept ASTP from gaining greater recognition. Citing, for example, the 1,600 former ASTPers who helped develop the first atomic bomb—students culled from "advanced engineering" trainees all across the country, just as the program was curtailed—the report modestly advanced the notion that "the immediate contribution of the program to victory was not negligible," and concluded that had the war lasted longer, "the prewar supply of engineers and other technicians would have been exhausted and the importance of the program as a source of replacements would have become increasingly evident."

Without drawing a conclusion about ASTP's value, but clearly regretting its early demise, Secretary of War Stimson in his postwar autobiography laid the blame

for its curtailment on the shoulders of Congress:

The true question for the Specialized Training Program was whether it should be continued at the expense of further drafts of fathers, deferred workers, and other civilians. Here the choice lay not with the War Department, but with Congress, and the verdict of the people's representatives on this point was not a matter of doubt. The Army of early 1944 was forced to cannibalize itself, and the soldiers of the ASTP were among the first victims. (11)

After the war, many surviving ASTPers went on to fame and fortune. Among the better known are former New York Mayor Ed Koch, television newsman Roger Mudd, former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, writer-television commentator Heywood Hale Broun, author Gore Vidal, comedian Mel Brooks, and many more. By contrast to the Navy V-12 Program that produced a large number of flag-rank officers, ASTP produced very few career Army officers.

The program's most lasting contributions may have had little to do with winning the war, but were important nevertheless. First, ASTP opened college doors to a large number of young men on the basis of merit, rather than socioeconomic class. Second, it was the first step toward an integrated Army. (12) Third, it compelled participating colleges to compress their normal academic calendars so that more courses could be taught in less time, thus helping introduce the "quarter" system that accommodated the rush of returning veterans entering college on the GI Bill of Rights.

Few of the young men who were part of the program have forgotten the days when they wore the blue and gold shoulder patch depicting a "sword of valor superimposed upon the lamp of learning." Many say that life was never sweeter. The author is one of those.

Mr. Louis E. Keefer is a free-lance writer and the author of Scholars in Foxholes: The Story of the Army Specialized Training Program in World War II, *and* Italian Prisoners of War, 1942-1946: Captives or Allies? *His review of the movie* A Midnight Clear *appeared in the Fall/Winter 1992/1993 issue of* Army History *(No. 24). The illustrations for this article appeared in* Scholars in Foxholes.

Notes

1. As quoted in Alonzo G. Grace, *Educational Lessons from Wartime Training* (Washington, D.C.: American Council on Education, 1948), pp. 8-9.
2. Ibid.
3. Robert R. Palmer, Bell I. Wiley, and William R. Keast, *The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Historical Division, 1948), p. 29.
4. Memo, White for Military Personnel Div, ASF, 9 Jul 43, NARA, RG 160.
5. Cited in the Society for the Advancement of Education's, *School and Society* (New York) 1 Jan 44, p. 5.
6. Ltr, Stimson to Dodds, 30 Nov 43, NARA, RG 160.
7. Stimson diary, entry of 26 Jan 44 and several subsequent entries. Library of Congress, Manuscripts Division. It is not clear whether Buckema ever was reconciled to cuts in the program, but he returned to his teaching post at West Point in mid-1944.
8. Forrest C. Pogue, *George C. Marshall: Organizer of Victory, 1943-1945* (New York: Viking, 1973), p. 355.
9. Quoted in *The Red and Black*, Washington and Jefferson campus newspaper. Weible Collection scrapbooks, U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pa.
10. Palmer et al., *The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops*, pp. 77-78.
11. Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1948), p. 459. A controversy over drafting those who had become fathers before the Pearl Harbor attack, triggered largely by Senator Burton K. Wheeler (D-Montana), raged during almost all of 1943. Had the Congress acted decisively, ASTP might have survived much longer.
12. There were, throughout the author's thirteen-week basic training at the ASTP Training Center, Harmony Church Area, Fort Benning, Georgia (September-December 1943), a few black trainees in each platoon of my company. They went on to attend certain mixed black and white ASTP colleges in northern and western states. Several hundred others attended all-black colleges such as West Virginia State College, where 170 engineering trainees later served with the 92d Infantry Division fighting in Italy. The author believes this little-known aspect of ASTP deserves closer attention by researchers.

The Chief's Corner

John W. (Jack) Mountcastle

To each of you—Greetings from the Center of Military History! I am convinced that I am the most fortunate general dfficer in the U.S. Army. What a fantastic opportunity I've been given to serve! I've found new surprises and solid achievements in every facet of the Center and, certainly, throughout the Army History Program. There has not been a single day in the four months I've been on board without someone providing a clear demonstration of the commitment to excellence that has characterized the Army History Program in the past and will continue to do so in the future. Bill Stofft and Hal Nelson both told me that this position was a special trust. I'm genuinely humbled by the magnitude of the responsibilities that come with the assignment, and I am determined to do my best to emulate the long-term contributions of my predecessors.

As the Army moves into the twenty-first century (we're already there in many respects!) the Army History Program will serve an ever more important role as a force multiplier. As General Gordon Sullivan has said, "History strenthens us." That's never been more true in my opinion. During my promotion ceremony in November, I made a commitment to the Army leaders who attended, along with key members of the Center. I pledged that I would do everything possible to

—support and enhance the Army History Program so as to honor those who've preceded me in this office and those with whom I work each day,

—link the Center of Military History ever more closely to the Army as it carries out its many diverse and challenging missions around the world,

—build the National Museum of the U.S. Army in the National Capital area, and

—ensure the Center of Military History is on board and fully engaged as we move toward FORCE XXI as a key member of the Joint Service team.

In the past ninety days, we have been moving out at full speed along each of the axes listed above. Members of the Center staff have been in the Far East, Europe, Kuwait, Haiti, and throughout the United States as they strove to attend to the work of the History Program. As one of those travellers, I have had an opportunity to visit Forts Monroe, Leavenworth, and Bliss. In each of these locations, I've discussed the Military History Education Program, the Museum Program, and staff support provided by uniformed and civilian historians. I can honestly say that I have seldom been more impressed by such a group of talented, experienced, and dedicated professionals.

The National Museum of the United States Army took a giant step closer to reality in early December as the National Capital Planning Commission officially lent its support to the Army's plan to purchase the site of the former Twin Bridges Marriott hotel in Arlington, Virginia, on which to build our Army museum. The Army Historical Foundation is now gearing up its epic campaign for raising the funds necessary to build this magnificent tribute to the American soldier.

We took a great step forward when we hired Mr. Skip Satterlund as our new Information Management Officer. He will be of tremendous assistance in linking us through automation with the Combined Arms Center, the Military History Institute, and the Louisiana Maneuvers Task Force. He has already found ways to tap into the Pentagon's automation center and will continue to develop new avenues for advancement in this critical avenue into digitization of our priceless records collection. Matching Skip for energy and initiative is Maj. Connie ("CJ") Moore, our new Nurse Corps historian. Since her arrival from Fort Hood, Texas just before Christmas, she has been totally engaged in top-notch execution of her important program.

Like organizations throughout the Army, the Center of Military History is now facing the tough job of bidding farewell to some of our finest members who have elected to retire in response to the Army's Voluntary Early Retirement program. We will miss them, for they represent the very best of our team. To each of them go our best wishes for every good thing in the future.

In closing this edition of the Comer, I'd like to extend my hopes that 1995 will be a great year for each of you. Also, I'd like to invite any of our readers who have information for me or whom I may assist to contact me via E-mail at the address below:

mountcas@pentagon-hqdadss.army.mil

Let us hear from you!

Chickamauga Staff Ride Guide

Edward P. Shanahan

The battle of Chickamauga, 19-20 September 1863, was the bloodiest two-day battle of the Civil War and the largest battle in the western theater. Fought just south of Chattanooga, Tennessee, in northwestern Georgia, the battle was a culmination of a campaign that began in the summer in middle Tennessee. Maj. Gen. William Stark Rosecrans' Army of the Cumberland, in a masterfully executed campaign of maneuver, forced the Confederate Army of Tennessee, under General Braxton Bragg, to retreat southward behind the Tennessee River and into Chattanooga.

Rosecrans then paused for six weeks to prepare for the next phase of the operation, which was to dislodge General Bragg from Chattanooga. Once again, through the skillful use of deception and maneuver, Rosecrans managed to outflank Bragg's defenses. While the deception operation took place upstream, northwest of Chattanooga, Rosecrans swept downstream to the southwest with the bulk of his army, crossing the Tennessee River at four different locations, virtually unopposed. The Army of the Cumberland then advanced eastward on a broad front in three widely separated columns across cross-compartmented terrain. These movements put the Union forces in a position to threaten the Confederate's line of communication southward with Atlanta and forced Bragg to abandon Chattanooga.

General Bragg, though fooled and forced to evacuate the city, was not beaten and still had a powerful fighting force in being to strike back, if given the opportunity. While General Rosecrans took up the pursuit, Bragg concentrated his troops, looking for the chance to counterattack. On two occasions Bragg attempted to destroy the separated wings of his Union pursuer, but his overcautious subordinates failed each time. However, Rosecrans, realizing the danger to his army and his own line of communication, concentrated his forces and moved northward, back toward Chattanooga. During this phase of the campaign, the two opposing armies collided for two days (19-20 September 1863) along the Chickamauga Creek, struggling in a titanic battle that left 34,000 soldiers killed, wounded, or listed as missing.

Today, the Battle of Chickamauga and Chattanooga National Military Park preserves much of the original battlefield in over 5,000 acres of fields and forests, with an excellent trail system, numerous monuments, markers, and interpretive plaques. The well-preserved battlefield makes an excellent laboratory for the field study phase of a staff ride and for a study of the profession of arms.

The information that follows is provided to assist individuals and organizations interested in designing and conducting a Chickamauga staff ride.

One publication to consider is William Glenn Robertson's *The Staff Ride*, published by the U.S. Army Center of Military History (CMH). This book provides guidance for planning, organizing, and conducting staff rides. Copies are available through the U.S. Army Publications Distribution Center-Baltimore, 2800 Eastern Boulevard, Baltimore, MD 21220-2896. The CMH publications number is CMH Pub 70-21. The Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-6900, has published another valuable publication, the *Staff Ride Handbook for the Battle of Chickamauga, 18-20 September 1863*. It provides a systematic approach to the study of the battle and is designed as a resource for individuals preparing or leading a staff ride to the battle site. The Chickamauga guidebook is available from the Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. A third reference, published by the Office of the Command Historian, U.S. Army Reserve Command, Atlanta GA 30331-5099, is the author's *Chickamauga Staff Ride Briefing Book*, which complements the staff ride handbook and provides numerous maps.

The two best, modern published books that treat the battle in a comprehensive manner are Glenn Tucker's *Chickamauga: Bloody Battle in the West*, published by Morningside Press (1961) and Peter Cozzen's 1992 study, *This Terrible Sound: The Battle of Chickamauga*, from the University of Illinois Press. Both works contain comprehensive bibliographies. In the U.S. Army War College guide series to Civil War battles, see Matt Spruill's *Guide to Chickamauga* (1993), from the University of Kansas Press. All three of these books are available at the park's Visitor Center.

Before the actual field study phase at Chickamauga, a staff ride leaders' reconnaissance is in order to become familiar, not only with the battle and the

principal personalities, but also with the terrain and the routes. The author highly recommends a "dry run" for staff ride leaders to finalize the route, develop a time schedule, and become familiar with the actual sites of important events.

The park and Visitor Center staff can provide information about the battlefield, as well as advice and assistance to groups wishing to visit the park. Prior coordination should occur between the park staff and the ride leaders before the day of the staff ride. The Visitor Center has books, maps, brochures, and other invaluable information concerning the battle for the staff ride leader. For additional information, call (706) 861-6897, or write to Chickamauga-Chattanooga National Military Park, P.O. Box 2128, Fort Oglethorpe, GA 30742.

Mr. Edward Shanahan is Chief of Historical Services, U.S. Army Reserve Command, in Atlanta, Georgia. As manager of the U.S. Army Reserve Military History Education Program, he is responsible for developing and conducting staff rides nationwide for Army Reserve staffs and units.

Editor's Journal

This first issue for 1995 begins with Louis Keefer's article on one of the Army's less well known projects during World War II, the Army Specialized Training Program. This issue also contains the very first Chief's Corner by the Center's new Chief of Military History, Brig. Gen. John W. Mountcastle. In addition, an author and title index of the 1994 issues, the second to the last of Edward Bedessem's excellent World War II chronologies, and the last of our excerpts from Stetson Conn's book, *Historical Work in the United States Army, 1862-1954*, are included.

Working with these features led to a reflective mood and recalled to mind some of our colleagues who passed away during the past year. Frank W. Pew (former Deputy Chief Historian, U.S. Army Forces Command) and Carlin Franklin Cannon, Jr. (former Command Historian, U.S. Army Transportation Center and School, Fort Eustis, Va.) received notice in issue no. 30 (Spring 1994). Since then, the Army history community lost George Thompson (coauthor of *The Signal Corps: The Test)* in April; and two former Center of Military History historians, Moreau Chambers (June), and Detmar H. Finke (July). As I look forward to another year of publication, I cannot help but recall these fellow Army historians and their contributions to our profession.

Arnold G. Fisch, Jr.

The 1995 Symposium of the Admiral Nimitz Museum Set

The 1995 symposium of the Admiral Nimitz Museum, will be held 18-19 March 1995 in San Antonio, Texas. The theme of this year's symposium is 1945—Crucible of Deliverance: Prisoners of War and the A-Bomb. Interested readers should write to the Admiral Nimitz Museum, P.O. Box 777, Fredericksburg, Texas 78624. Phone (210) 997-4379, or FAX (210) 997-8220.

J.F.C. Fuller and Liddell Hart
Contrasting Theories of Armor Development

John Cranston

The theories of J.F.C. (John Frederick Charles) Fuller and B. (Basil) H. Liddell Hart transcended two world wars. By understanding the differences between these two authorities on the use of armor, it is possible to comprehend how the tank came to be, and how it was to be used on the battlefield.

To Fuller (1878-1966), British troops in World War I were being senselessly slaughtered through inept leadership. The newly created tank, therefore, could free soldiers from the perils of trench warfare and end what had become a stalemate in a war of attrition. In a conflict between two highly-mechanized forces, deadlocked in the trenches, the tank could fulfill the objectives of mobility and concentration of firepower, thereby bringing a war to a victorious conclusion. (1)

Fuller was not a great advocate of combined arms, however. In his plan for the armored offensive at Cambrai, (November 1917), he prescribed three attack waves, with heavy tanks in the lead, light tanks following, and a third wave to isolate the cut off mobile enemy forces and attack the enemy command center. Infantry were to take part in the second and third attack waves, but only in protected, armored carriers. Fuller believed that infantry was most useful in the defense, while the tanker operated in a highly mobile offense. Engineers were essential for trench and river crossings. Fuller envisioned the tank, with heavy main guns, eventually displacing some of the artillery. (2)

The airplane was still in its infancy during the Great War, but Fuller believed that the plane could provide "eyes" to see the designated target and to tell the tanker where the target was. Anticipating the V-2 rockets of World War II, Fuller foresaw that the aircraft could someday become an "unmanned flying torpedo." At the same time, Fuller predicted the inability of aircraft to engage in precision bombing of ground targets. (3)

In his analysis of the American Civil War, Fuller projected his war aims. He praised the Union for finally deciding to fight at Chattanooga, for this Tennessee city was a major supply center. To Fuller, "supply is the foundation of strategy," and the conquest of Chattanooga served to cut the Confederacy in two. Fuller liked Lt. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant. In contrast, he blamed Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan for spending too much time trying to take the Confederate capital at Richmond, when he should have been striking at industrial and supply centers like Chattanooga. (4)

Describing the German invasion of France (May-June 1940), Fuller wrote that the odds were always in the Germans' favor. Noting the strength of the German force, he found Heinz Guderian leading a "battering ram" of tank-infantry forces against a "penny packet" French defense. (5)

The son of a Wesleyan minister, Basil H. Liddell Hart (1895-1970) also fought in World War I, where he was gassed in the Battle of the Somme in July 1916. A writer on infantry tactics initially, Liddell Hart was rejected by the Royal Tank Corps in 1923 for physical reasons. However, he continued to reflect more about tanks on the battlefield. (6)

If Fuller preferred a massed tank force striking the enemy head-on, Liddell Hart preferred a mechanized force striking swiftly and directly at the seat of enemy power, preferably at a point of little or no opposition. Liddell Hart, like Fuller, criticized the strategy of General Douglas Haig, British commander in France during World War I. Unlike Fuller, Liddell Hart saw the danger of replacing Haig's existing strategy of attrition with one in which the armor force pursued an equally perilous strategy of attrition. (7)

Perhaps because he already had written extensively about the infantry, Liddell Hart assigned a major role in warfare to this branch. In 1929, he wrote that the infantryman's problems stemmed from a profusion of weapons and, consequently, a lack of mobility. A rifle, and bayonet, and the newer Lewis (later, the Browning) machine gun would suffice, wrote Liddell Hart. A mechanized, tracked tankette would carry the infantry soldier over rough ground and hostile trenches to the scene of battle itself. Infantry required light and efficient transportation to be placed in position to clear enemy battlefield strongpoints. Unlike Fuller, who conceived of infantry functioning separately from armor and aircraft, Liddell Hart placed mechanized infantry in standard platoons, fighting on the front lines

in combined operations with tanks, artillery, and aircraft. Liddell Hart regarded planes as more than "eyes" for the armor. He believed that aircraft could travel fast enough to hit a target in minutes, whereas land forces might take days, although he avoided dealing with the problem noted by Fuller—that of aircraft's limitations when it came to pinpoint bombing. (8)

Liddell Hart's interpretation of the Civil War differed from Fuller's. Whereas Fuller gave Chattanooga priority over Richmond, Liddell Hart argued that tanks should bypass the main enemy force to take the seat of command, which would have meant taking the Confederate capital of Richmond. With the capture of the capital city, the enemy would be doomed. Considering the Franco-German War of 1870, he wrote:

> There are a parallel and a contrast between 1870 and 1914. For in 1870 the German objective was Paris, and while in pursuit of it the French Army [also] fell into their hands. In 1914, the German objective was the French Army, and in pursuit of this objective they missed both it and Paris. (9)

As he studied the Civil War, Liddell Hart preferred Sherman's approach to Grant's. Liddell Hart believed that Sherman struck at multiple objectives, avoiding direct confrontations that cost excessive losses in lives and equipment. Even his famous (or, to the Confederates, infamous) march to the sea demonstrated Sherman's indirect approach, so that no Confederate military leader could rise to oppose him. (10)

Liddell Hart, unlike Fuller, felt that the German invasion of France in 1940 was a "close shave" for the attackers. Guderian, Liddell Hart noted, was detained during the battle because Adolf Hitler thought he was advancing too fast. In Liddell Hart's view, Hitler halted the tanks short of Dunkirk because of the need to conserve tank strength, as well as Hitler's belief that the British would negotiate a peaceful settlement. (11)

In sum, Fuller and Liddell Hart, good friends most (but not all) of the time, often disagreed on the shape of the future fighting force and on the objectives for which this force was to be used. Both authorities, alarmed at the slaughter brought about by the stalemate in trench warfare in 1916, saw the tank as the instrument of salvation. However, whereas Fuller saw the armored force as the means for striking deep at the enemy's supply sources, in tank-versus-tank battles, Liddell Hart favored more of a combined force of armor, infantry, and artillery, striking at the center of command, bypassing strong enemy forces wherever possible. Liddell Hart believed that armor, leading infantry and artillery, could prevent the deadly battles of attrition which characterized the last three years of World War I.

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Notes

1. See J.F.C. Fuller, *Armored Warfare* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1983), pp. 9, 44.
2. Ibid., pp. 17-24, 125-29.
3. On pilotless aircraft, see Ibid., pp. 25-27.
4. See J.F.C. Fuller, *A Military History of the Western World*, vol. 3 *From the Civil War to the End of World War II* (New York: Da Capo, 1956), pp. 48-49, 276-99, passim.
5. Ibid., pp. 390, 404-07. See also J.F.C. Fuller, *The Second World War: 1939-1945* (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pierce, 1949), p. 76.
6. Brian Bond, *Liddell Hart: A Study of His Military Thought* (London: Cassell & Co., Ltd., 1976), especially pp. 23-25.
7. Basil H. Liddell Hart, *The Remaking of Modern Armies* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1928), pp. 120-29, passim.
8. Bond, *Liddell Hart*, pp. 40-41; Liddell Hart, *Paris, or the Future of War* (New York: E.P. Dutton & Co., 1925), pp. 46-48, 56-66; *The Liddell Hart Memoirs: 1895-1938* (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1965), vol. 1, p. 164.
9. Quoted in Liddell Hart, *The Remaking of Modern Armies*, p. 101. On Liddell Hart's objectives, see especially chapter 2, "The Origins of the Paris Objective," in *Paris, or the Future of War*.
10. Bond, *Liddell Hart*, p. 48.
11. Liddell Hart, *History of the Second World War* (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1972), pp. 66, 71-73, 83.

Army History Cumulative Index for 1994 by Author and Title

Index by Author

Index by Title

Kansas City Remembrance of V-E Day Activities Set

The Remembrance and Renewal Commission of Kansas City, Missouri, is planning a number of activities to celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of Victory in Europe Day (V-E Day). Ms. Diana L. Duff of the National Archives-Central Plains Region is chief of operations for the committee, which is working in cooperation with the Department of Defense's 50th Anniversary of World War II Commemoration Committee.

To commemorate 8 May 1945, the Kansas City Remembrance and Renewal Commission will conduct various activities 5-7 May 1995, including a parade on 6 May.

For additional information on Kansas City's V-E Day commemoration, contact Ms. Duff (816) 926-6936, or the Veterans of Foreign Wars of the U.S. at (800) 767-7700 or (800) 840-5750.

Launching "The United States Army in World War II"

Stetson Conn

(Part three of three parts)

Recording the history of the Army Service Forces (ASF), in contrast to that of the Air Forces, became a major problem for the Historical Division and one that was never adequately solved. The abolition of the huge ASF headquarters in the reorganization of June 1946 eliminated the wartime ASF historical organization, and the technical and administrative services that had been under ASF's close supervision recovered most of the autonomy that they had enjoyed before the war. The General Staff's Supply, Services, and Procurement Division inherited many of the ASF's logistical responsibilities, but the single historian it employed could do no more than plan what his agency should do if and when its historical section was enlarged. For ASF's personnel and administrative areas there was no prospect of securing historical volumes from agencies outside the Historical Division suitable for the World War II series. Of the elements that had made up the ASF empire, only the technical services (Chemical, Engineers, Medical, Ordnance, Quartermaster, Signal, and Transportation) had sizeable and generally adequate historical staffs that could produce volumes for the official history.

As soon as the Historical Fund became available, the division detailed Dr. [Stetson] Conn of the Editorial Branch to survey the ASF-technical services historical situation and its relation to the official history as a whole. The survey provided the basis for intensive discussions in late summer 1947 within the Army and with outside experts that produced agreement on the need for employing a top-notch scholar in the Historical Division to head up a ASF-type program, including technical supervision over volumes being undertaken by the technical services. A division of the ground to be covered by the authors that the Historical Division itself would engage for ASF work was also agreed upon. In November, Troyer Anderson tentatively agreed to accept responsibility for a background work on Army procurement and supply before ASF's establishment in March 1942, but shortly thereafter he was struck down by cancer. Professor John D. Millett of Columbia University, who had been ASF's principal historian during the war, agreed to write a one-volume administrative history of the Army Service Forces on a Fund contract. By the spring of 1949 he completed a draft that in due course would become the only volume in the series dealing directly with ASF's organization and activities. Dr. Richard M. Leighton, who had also been an ASF historian during the war, joined the division in January 1948 to work on the story of Army supply from March 1942 onward. This project developed rather differently into a two-volume work entitled *Global Logistics and Strategy* covering the years 1940-45. Dr. Robert W. Coakley, an Army historian in Europe during the war, was coauthor. The division never did find the senior historian it wanted to coordinate the ASF-technical service area. It did get a competent man in 1950, Dr. R. Elberton Smith, a former economics professor at Northwestern University, to provide broad coverage of Army procurement. His work, *The Army and Economic Mobilization*, along with [Irving B.] Holley's volume on air materiel, the volumes on global logistics, and several volumes of the technical services provided a fairly comprehensive coverage of Army logistics in the World War II series.

The areas of ASF responsibility that remained largely uncovered in the World War II series, except for separate treatment in technical service volumes, were the recruitment and training of military and civilian personnel, and the activities of the Army's administrative services (Adjutant General, Chaplains, Finance, Judge Advocate General, Provost Marshall General, Special Services). For years the Historical Division tried diligently but without success to find historians who were both competent and willing to undertake a general work on personnel, and on one or two topical rather than organizational volumes on administrative services that would stress the "segregated community" and "housekeeping" aspects of Army service and employment. When work on a general history of training bogged down in 1949, it too became a topic covered only in scattered accounts in the Ground Forces and technical service volumes.

Until the demise of ASF headquarters, the Historical Division had no direct channel of technical supervision over the historical activities of the technical

services. They had, indeed, received very little supervision from ASF's own historical office. Army directives of February and September 1946 assigned them the task of preparing volumes on both the domestic and overseas activities relating to their service. By 1947 the seven services had developed plans for contributing a total of thirty-eight volumes to the official history, or more than two-fifths of those that were then planned for Army publication through the Government Printing Office. These services had fifty-seven civilian professional workers in the spring of 1947, a considerably larger number than were then in the Historical Division itself. Threats of drastic cuts in this employment were carried out only by the Signal and Transportation Corps.

During the war, all of the technical service historical sections had produced a goodly number of unpublished monographs of varying quality. The Quartermaster Corps in particular had prepared twenty-one studies of sufficient merit to warrant their publication in a monographic series in the years 1943-51. Wartime technical service historians had not worked on the overseas activities associated with their services, since such activities came under theater rather than the service chiefs. Accordingly, overseas coverage became a principal area for new research. To coordinate their work on the World War II series volumes more closely with that of the Historical Division, technical service historians were brought into the seminar system. And, in the continued absence of a senior historian in the logistical field, Dr. Conn was detailed for nine months in 1948-49 to serve as deputy to the Chief Historian for the technical services. A new and more comprehensive survey persuaded the Chief of Military History that the number of volumes they were to contribute must be cut back. On 15 July 1948 the number was reduced from thirty-eight to twenty-four volumes, with each service thereafter allocated either three or four volumes. By the end of 1948 the forty historians employed by the technical services were much more closely allied with their counterparts in the Historical Division than they had been a year earlier. Conn's successor, Lt. Col. Leo J. Meyer (who, as Dr. Meyer, had been a professor of history at New York University), would carry on the work of professional supervision of and liaison with their historical organizations for a number of years thereafter.

Meanwhile, the Historical Division developed other new projects for the series. A reorganization and reorientation of its editorial area, presently to be described, released Dr. [Albert K.] Weinberg to undertake a history of the Army's role in military government. A year later the division temporarily absorbed the historical staff of the Civil Affairs Division, which had been preparing a multi-volume history of wartime and postwar civil affairs and military government in Europe. The only fruit of these efforts in the World War II series would be its sole documentary volume, *Soldiers Become Governors,* compiled by Weinberg and Harry Coles and covering only the war years. In late 1948 the Division assigned former editor Conn to work on two volumes on the Army's role in Western Hemisphere defense that had been proposed in the original series plan. In the summer of 1949, work began on a volume on military intelligence; but it never developed into the type of treatment visualized for a work on this topic in the basic plan, and it wound up in G-2 files as a manuscript for reference use. Other significant gaps in the series that would remain, beyond those noted elsewhere, would be lack of any coverage in the area of top-level civilian control, and a volume on General Staff administration that Colonel [John M.] Kemper had hoped to undertake. The series would also omit the Army's wartime planning for its postwar activities, and most post-August 1945 events and operations, such as demobilization and military government in Germany and Japan.

In preparing the series volumes, it was difficult to prevent undue overlap among related projects. This problem was particularly acute among authors at work in the secretariat, Chief of Staff, strategic planning, and global logistics areas, and between them and theater historians who customarily wanted to begin their volumes with detailed accounts of planning for particular operations. Under the guidance of the Chief Historian, a series of conferences in the years 1947-49 helped to mitigate the problem, at least preventing extensive overlap in basic research.

Some significant personnel changes occurred in 1948 and 1949. In June 1948 Colonel Kemper left the division and the Army to become headmaster of Phillips Andover Academy in Massachusetts. Some weeks later Colonel [Allen F.] Clark [Jr.] returned to his primary field of duty with the Corps of Engineers. As a successor to Kemper, the Division was most fortunate to have Col. Allison R. Hartman, who took over administrative control of the World War II work when Kemper left. He served for four years as the division's principal and very able military critic of its writings. Clark was succeeded as Executive by Lt. Col. Edward M. Harris, like Hartman a man of broad education and experience who fitted very well into the division. In

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mid-summer retired Brig. Gen. Paul M. Robinett served the division as a reviewer. He soon was to head up an applied studies program (described in the following chapter). Shortly thereafter, General [Harry J.] Malony announced his decision to retire. He was succeeded as Chief of Military History on 1 April 1949 by Maj. Gen. Orlando Ward. A division commander during and after World War II, Ward remained with the Historical Division until his retirement nearly four years later. On 8 March 1949 Dr. [Kent Roberts] Greenfield suffered a heart attack and was away from the division for the next six months; because of his rather accidental acquaintance with the duties and business of the position, Dr. Conn was drafted to act as Chief Historian during Greenfield's absence.

One of the least troublesome aspects of preparing World War II series volumes for publication in the later 1940s was the selection and placement of photographs. During this period the division was fortunate to have at least three officers highly skilled in this area, and they helped train a civilian photographic editor who would serve after they left. With General Ward's encouragement in the summer of 1949 the photographic experts began work on three pictorial volumes to be included in the series. One volume was to be devoted to each of the major areas of operations—Northwest Europe, the Mediterranean, and the Pacific.

In contrast to photographic illustration, mapping of the World War II series was a serious problem for many years. It was not a question of quality but of keeping pace with the completion of manuscripts requiring extensive and careful cartographic illustration. The historical office had been peculiarly fortunate in 1944 in acquiring the services of Mr. Wsevolod Aglaimoff, a professional soldier of the Czar who had escaped from Russia after the Revolution. Before and during his employment by the American embassy in Paris he absorbed a massive knowledge of European military terrain. His skill in mapping was matched by a meticulous attention to checking details. This checking extended to an independent review of the sources of an author's work whenever he deemed it necessary. The result was not only maps of the highest quality but both maps and texts of about the highest attainable degree of factual accuracy. But Mr. Aglaimoff's methods took time and no adequate substitute for them could be found. By the end of 1946 mapping had become a serious bottleneck and it remained one for many years thereafter.

As the Chief Historian reported in December 1946, work on the Army Ground Forces volumes had "demonstrated forcibly the need for expert statistical services in the Division." Nothing could be done about this situation until the summer of 1947 when the Historical Fund permitted engaging a senior professional statistical editor. After some early difficulties the statistical advisory role played by George M. Powell proved to be both helpful and highly acceptable to authors. The Fund also provided the means for employing a number of people to work on two volumes of statistics that were part of the original plan for the World War II series. Work on tables for those volumes, some of which had begun much earlier under other auspices, proved to be one of the more costly and futile undertakings under the Fund. Good statisticians were both scarce and expensive, and presently a new war and mobilization would divert most of the Army's best ones to other work. With no more than half the work on them completed, the statistical volumes would eventually be abandoned, not only leaving a serious gap in the World War II series but also in the whole realm of statistics compiled and published on the war.

The most serious contention in preparing the volumes of the World War II series for publication during the immediate postwar years arose in the area of writer-editor relations. The practice of employing senior historians as editors had made sense during the war, when most items processed for publication were rough drafts received from overseas. But writings of the senior historians recruited in 1946 and after were a different matter. They, too, required objective historical as well as literary criticism, but assigning both tasks to an individual editor, especially to one who was himself a historian, almost inevitably led to clashes between editors and writer. Almost as soon as Dr. Hugh Cole arrived, he had urged changing the editorial system, and experiences in 1946 and 1947 in editing the Ground Forces volumes, *Okinawa*, and others confirmed the need for change.

Recognizing that production of the World War II series had, in effect, made the Historical Division into a publishing house, Dr. Greenfield sought the advice of university presses and other publishers of scholarly works. On the basis of experience, as well as this advice, the Historical Division during 1948 instituted a new system of editing and review. This change involved transferring the historians who had been working as editors to other duties, and recruiting a new editorial staff from the publishing world. These new editors would provide literary criticism and perform other editorial tasks required in preparing volumes for the press, but would not indulge in substantive histori-

Air Force Historical Research Agency Grants Announced

The Air Force Historical Research Agency announces research grants to encourage scholars to study the history of air power through the use of the U.S. Air Force historical document collection at the agency. Awards range from $250 to $2,500. Selectees must meet the criteria stated in this announcement and be willing to visit the agency for research during fiscal year 1996 (which ends 30 September 1996). Recipients will be designated "Research Associates of the Air Force Historical Research Agency."

Criteria

Applicants must have a graduate degree in history or related fields, or equivalent scholarly accomplishments. Their specialty or professional experience must be in aeronautics, astronautics, or military-related subjects. They must not be in residence at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, and must be willing to visit the Air Force Historical Research Agency for a sufficient time to use the research materials for their proposed projects. Active duty military personnel are eligible to receive a grant.

Topics of Research

Proposed topics of research may include, but are not restricted to, Air Force history, military operations, education, training, administration, strategy, tactics, logistics, weaponry, technology, organization, policy, activities, and institutions. Broader subjects suitable for a grant include military history, civil-military relations, history of aeronautics or astronautics, relations among U.S. branches of service, military biographies, and international military relations. Preference will be given to those proposals that involve the use of primary sources held at the agency. Proposals for research of classified subjects cannot be considered for research grants. As a general rule, records before 1955 are largely unclassified, while many later records remain classified. Examples of classified subjects include nuclear weapons and war planning, weapons systems currently in the Air Force inventory, and Air Force operations since the Vietnam War.

Application Deadline

Applicants can request an application from the Commander, Air Force Historical Research Agency, 600 Chennault Circle, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 36112-6424. The completed applications must be returned by 1 October 1995.

cal criticism. As senior editor, the division engaged Hugh Corbett, who came from Henry Holt and Company in March 1948. Later in the year Corbett was joined by Joseph R. Friedman, who would succeed him as literary Editor-in-Chief.

To provide a wide spectrum of criticism on broader substantive grounds, the division developed a system of panel and outside review. As refined in 1948 and 1949, this system involved a careful reading and written review of each manuscript by members of a panel. Appointed and chaired by the Chief Historian or his deputy, each panel normally included one or more of the author's own peers, drawn from within the division, a division officer as military critic (a task ably performed by Colonel Hartman during his tenure), an editor, a historian from the outside (frequently, in the late 1940s, a member of the Advisory Committee), and one or more participant critics. After individual reviews, the panel members met without the author present for a frank and thorough discussion of the

manuscript. If they decided that the author could make his draft, with appropriate revision, into an acceptable book for publication, they then discussed what he should do to improve it. During the panel process, the division circulated other copies of the manuscript to knowledgeable participants of the events it described to obtain an even wider range of useful criticism. The Chief Historian then assembled all of the comments and recommendations that appeared to have merit into a composite and more or less anonymous critique for the author's guidance in revising his manuscript. After the revised manuscript was approved by the Chief Historian and formally accepted by the Chief of Military History for final literary editing and publication, it was exempt from further major changes in content. Also, while the Chief Historian was made the arbiter of disputes arising during the final editorial process, he rarely had to exercise this responsibility. The new review system, although time consuming, was well worth the time and effort involved. Not only did it eliminate most of the earlier strain in editor-author relationships, but it also provided the authors of the World War II volumes with a more searching review and criticism of their writing than most scholarly works receive before publication.

The principal safeguard against including in the volume information whose revelation "would in fact endanger the security of the nation" was the knowledge and good judgement of the authors themselves. For this reason the clearance of manuscripts for open publication by Army Intelligence and (from 1949) by the Office of the Secretary of Defense was largely a formality, although sometimes a time-consuming one. The Army also sent completed manuscripts to sister services and to Britain's war history office for comment on sections bearing upon activities of concern to them and customarily it reviewed Marine Corps and British histories in the same manner. The actual printing of Army historical publications by the Government Printing Office had to be handled through the Adjutant General's Office. While that office provided some necessary services, such as retouching and sizing photographs and drafting charts, it was slow in transmitting manuscripts to the printer, and, until 1949, it prevented the historical and printing offices from getting together informally to help resolve printing problems. Fortunately, a very able and interested AGO [Adjutant General's Office] man, Mr. Robert Rose, was most helpful in 1946-48 in improving and expediting his office's work on the first World War II series volumes. After his departure, the Adjutant General's organization was generally willing to accept manuscripts coming from the division's new professional editorial shop as final copy for the printer and otherwise give the division greater leeway in the publishing process. But getting an author's completed manuscript into print continued to take considerably longer than division planners calculated it should. In May 1948 they plotted an ideal span of about 200 days between completion of a draft and its publication; in practice in the ensuing years at best the processing (review, revision, editing, printing) took over two years.

From 1946 onward a number of the division's authors and editors advocated a shift from government to commercial publication. In view of the technical nature of many volumes, it appeared doubtful that any commercial publisher would be willing to print them all without subsidy. The Historical Fund made commercial publication financially practicable, and the Judge Advocate General's office endorsed its legality with nonappropriated funds. In the spring of 1948 the new Editor-in-Chief, Mr. Corbett, reported that several commercial presses had expressed a strong interest in publishing the World War II series as a prestige item. He and others believed commercial publication would bring faster printing, better publicity, and wider distribution. On the other hand, publication by the Government Printing Office carried with it automatic free distribution to several hundred depository libraries across the land and to members of Congress. Most importantly, successive Chiefs of Military History were advocates of using the Government Printing Office, believing that if publication funds were depleted it would be much easier to get more money from Congress for public than for commercial printing. When the Historical Advisory Committee in April 1949 cast its vote in favor of continued reliance on the Government Printing Office, General Ward was greatly relieved.

From the beginning, the World War II volumes cost the Army more, and fewer of them were sold to the public, than Historical Division planners had anticipated. Costs of printing, rising after the war, soon were more than double the estimate of $8,000 a volume in the series plan. The books purchased for official distribution cost the Army substantially more per copy than their selling price to the general public, the latter varying between $3.25 and $6.00 for the first volumes printed. Actually, there is no clear evidence that their selling price significantly restricted sales, and their total distribution exceeded that of most comparable scholarly works. Of the early series volumes printed,

the Historical Division purchased 3,000 copies for the Army's own use and official distribution. The Government Printing Office ran off about 1,000 for depository library and Congressional distribution and as many more as it thought it could sell to the public. Such sales actually totalled between 1,000 and 5,000 copies per volume, with *Okinawa* heading the list. By way of comparison, while the commercial publisher's public sales of the Navy operational volumes by Samuel Eliot Morison were considerably higher, their total distribution about matched that of the most popular volumes in the Army's official history.

To compensate for the meager publicity given to its publications by the Government Printing Office and for the difficulties in purchasing them, the Historical Division did whatever it could to publicize the volumes among scholars and other members of the thoughtful reading public. The Chief Historian, in accordance with his assigned duties, spread news about progress on the series among his academic associates individually and through professional associations. He carried on a wide personal correspondence and arranged sessions at annual professional meetings on the military aspects of World War II in which historians from the division participated. The division also exhibited its wares at professional meetings whenever it could and indirectly encouraged the leading scholarly and literary reviewers, including those of newspapers, to give adequate attention to its publications.

The Advisory Committee continued to be one of the strongest links with the historical profession; and its 1948 meeting became a vehicle for closer coordination of the United States Army's historical work on World War II with that of its British and Commonwealth allies. In February, official military history representatives from Great Britain, Canada, South Africa, Australia, and New Zealand assembled in Washington for a three-day meeting with the Historical Advisory Committee. Members of the United States Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps historical organizations, as well as the senior staff of the Historical Division, were present to discuss matters of common concern. One result was the establishment of particularly close ties between the Historical Division and its counterparts in Canada and Great Britain, including an arrangement with the latter for checking the factual accuracy of works prior to their publication.

While the merits, or even the existence, of the Army's World War II series and of its other historical publications would never become an item of general public knowledge, by late summer 1949 students of military history and scholars generally had come to accept these publications, as well as those of the Army's sister services, as trustworthy and valuable works of scholarship. By this time the Historical Division was nearing its maximum strength, with over 220 individuals on its rolls, most of them at work on World War II projects. While only four of the official history volumes had been published, two more were being printed and work was underway on more than seventy other Army and Air Force volumes, or about three-fourths of the total of 104 projected in a fresh survey of progress on the series compiled in August 1949. Greater progress had been made on operational than on administrative volumes, mainly because of the operational orientation of the Army's new central historical office since its establishment in 1943 and the strong early manning of the principal theater sections. Leaders of the division in mid-1949 still hoped to complete the bulk of its work on the official history by mid-1952, but they no longer expected to complete drafts of all the volumes by that time.

In commenting on the series early in 1948, Dr. Greenfield observed that most of the volumes would present "a young man's history of the war," since most of the authors were in their thirties or even younger. He nevertheless considered them a "first-rate team" for the task at hand. Its youthful authors, he thought, had brought to it not only competence and high spirit but also "an irreplaceable personal interest and direct knowledge of the war and its records which only historians who were themselves in the war fully possess." In a detailed analysis in November 1948 he described his colleagues as a "Department of History" within the Army, and testified that in their work they had met with no infringements upon the principles and rights of historical research. What distinguished them from historians generally was that they were working primarily in response to a pressing need, the Army's own need for "an organized, comprehensive, and objective record" to which it could refer. But there was also the hope that from this effort would come "the thought and study" that would "ultimately produce not only a better understanding of the problem of war among professional and lay students, but also the impetus and basic sources for future interpretive histories of World War II."

This excerpt concludes our series of six extracts from the World War II chapters of Prof. Stetson Conn's book, Historical Work in the United States Army, 1862-1954.

1945
April - June

1 Apr - The Tenth Army invades Okinawa in the last large-scale amphibious assault in the Pacific. With initial Japanese resistance almost nonexistant, over 16,000 soldiers and marines are put ashore in the first hour of the invasion. By the end of the day over 60,000 men, from two Army and two Marine Corps divisions, have landed. Despite the ease of the landing, the battle for Okinawa would ultimately cost more American casualties than any other campaign of the Pacific war.

- The 2d and 3d Armored Divisions meet at Lippstadt, linking the Ninth and First Armies in a vast double envelopment of the Ruhr industrial area.

3 Apr - On Okinawa, the 7th and 96th Infantry Division begin moving south to clear the southern half of the island, as the 6th Marine Division begins its efforts to clear the northern half.

4 Apr - At Ohrdruf, the 4th Armored Division liberates the first concentration camp to be captured by the western Allies.

- The 358th Infantry discovers the German national gold reserve hidden in a salt mine near the village of Merkers. The mine also contains millions of dollars in paper currency, hundreds of priceless artworks, and piles of looted gold and silver jewelry and household objects.

9 Apr - The 383d Infantry begins the Tenth Army's assault against the Shuri Line, the Japanese main line of resistance in southern Okinawa.

11 Apr - Buchenwald, one of the Third Reich's largest concentration camps, is liberated by the 4th and 6th Armored Divisions.

- The Ninth Army's 2d Armored Division dashes seventy- three miles to the Elbe River near Magdeburg.

12 Apr - President Franklin D. Roosevelt dies of a stroke. Harry S. Truman assumes the office of President of the United States.

- General Dwight D. Eisenhower orders the First and Third Armies to halt their eastward drives at the Mulde River, in order to avoid accidental clashes with the Soviet armies advancing westward.

- The Japanese launch a counterattack from the Shuri Line.

13 Apr - The first units of the Third Army reach the Mulde River.

- In the Ruhr, the 8th Infantry Division reaches the Ruhr River, splitting the pocket in two.

14 Apr - In Italy, the Fifth Army launches its spring offensive.

- The Japanese counterattack in southern Okinawa is repulsed.

15 Apr - The First Army's 9th Armored Division reaches the Mulde River.

16 Apr - The 77th Infantry Division makes an assault landing on Ie Shima, a small island off the northwest coast of Okinawa.

17 Apr - The 24th Infantry Division begins the X Corps effort to clear eastern Mindanao by making amphibious landings at Parang and Malabang on the Moro Gulf. The troops meet no resistance.

18 Apr - 325,000 Germans are taken prisoner as resistance ends in the Ruhr pocket.

- Ernie Pyle, one of America's most popular war correspondents, is killed on Ie Shima by a Japanese machinegun hidden behind American lines.

19 Apr - The American forces in southern Okinawa launch a major assault against the Shuri Line. The attack fails to break through the strong Japanese defenses.

20 Apr - Following several days of furious fighting by the First Army at Leipzig and the Ninth Army at Nurnburg, both cities surrender. By turning the cities' antiaircraft defenses against the Allied ground troops, the German defenders had held them at bay until a combination of flanking movements and night attacks forced capitulation.

- Fifth Army troops break out of the northern Apennines into the Lombardy plain in a rush toward the Po River.

- The 6th Marine Division completes the capture of northern Okinawa.

Chronology

21 Apr - Ie Shima is declared secure. Maj. Gen. Andrew D. Bruce, commander of the 77th Infantry Division, later says, "The last three days of this fighting were the worst I ever witnessed."

- Elements of the 34th Infantry Division enter Bologna, Italy.

22 Apr - The Fifth Army reaches the Po River.

23 Apr - The 10th Mountain Division gains a bridgehead across the Po River. Other elements of the Fifth Army and the Eighth British Army flow virtually unimpeded across the river over the next few days.

- Soviet units begin fighting inside Berlin.

25 Apr - Patrols of the 69th Infantry Division and the Soviet 58th Guards Infantry Division meet near Torgau, in the first link between the European eastern and western fronts.

- Soviet forces surround Berlin.

28 Apr - Benito Mussolini is killed by Italian partisans.

29 Apr - In Caserta, representatives of German Army Group South commander, General Heinrich von Vietinghoff, sign documents conceding unconditional surrender of all German forces in Italy. The surrender is to take effect on May 2.

- The concentration camp of Dachau is liberated.

30 Apr - Adolf Hitler commits suicide in Berlin.

- Elements of the Seventh Army occupy Munich.

2 May - The surrender of German forces in Italy takes effect. All fighting in Italy ends.

4 May - Troops of the Seventh and Fifth Armies meet just south of the Austrian-Italian border, linking the European and Mediterranean Theaters.

6 May - The Third Army occupies Pilsen, Czechoslovakia.

7 May - General Alfred Jodl, acting under the authority of Hitler's successor, Admiral Karl Doenitz, signs documents effecting an unconditional surrender of German forces on all fronts.

8 May - V-E Day. The war in Europe is officially ended as the German surrender becomes effective.

22 May - Torrential rains begin on Okinawa, hampering operations.

23 May - The Japanese begin a withdrawal from the Shuri Line.

25 May - The Joint Chiefs of Staff approve Operation OLYMPIC, the invasion of Japan. The invasion is scheduled for 1 November 1945.

31 May - U.S. troops complete the occupation of the Shuri Line and enter the town of Shuri.

- Organized resistance ends on Negros Island of the Central Visayan Islands in the Philippines.

9 Jun - The first assault is launched against the new Japanese defensive line on Okinawa.

17 Jun - The Japanese *32d Army* collapses on Okinawa, although desperate fighting continues in many areas.

18 Jun - The commander of the Tenth Army, Lt. Gen. Simon B. Buckner, Jr., is killed on Okinawa by a Japanese shell.

- Organized resistance ends on Mindanao.

20 Jun - The southern Philippines are declared secure.

21 Jun - With his front lines collapsed and his troops a disorganized mob, Lt. Gen. Mitsura Ushijima, commander of the Japanese *32d Army* on Okinawa, commits *hara-kiri*.

22 Jun - The capture of Okinawa is completed, although mopping-up operations will continue until 30 June. Over 12,000 men of the Tenth Army are killed or missing during the campaign for the Ryukyu Islands. 7,400 enemy prisoners were taken on Okinawa, a very large number by Pacific Theater standards, but 110,000 Japanese were killed defending the island.

30 Jun - The X Corps operations to clear eastern Mindanao are successfully completed.

- The Luzon campaign is officially ended.

The Philippine Scouts Heritage Society

The following article is derived from a Philippine Scouts Heritage Society brochure as well as from other material submitted by Col. John E. Olson, USA (Ret.). A survivor of the Bataan Death March, Colonel Olson is the author of Anytime-Anywhere: The History of the Fifty-Seventh Infantry (PS) *and, most recently, of* The Guerrilla and the Hostage,and serves as historian for the society. *Readers interested in learning more about the Philippine Scouts or the society should write to him at 1 Towers Park Lane, # 510D, San Antonio, Texas 78209.*

The Society and Museum

The Philippine Scouts Heritage Society was established 5 April 1989 at Fort Sam Houston, Texas, to preserve the history, heritage, and legacy of the Philippine Scouts (PS). Membership is open to all former Scouts, their families, and anyone interested in preserving the history of the Philippine Scouts.

Fort Sam Houston's connection with the Scouts dates from 1917, when the 57th Infantry (PS) was organized at the post. The Fort Sam Houston Museum has been designated as a repository for materials related to the history of the Philippine Scouts. The society and the museum actively seek additional materials with which to depict the history of the Scouts.

Origins and Early History

Toward the end of the Philippine Insurrection (1899-1902), the U.S. Army founded the Philippine Scouts. The officers were selected from seasoned American noncommissioned officers, while the enlisted men were Filipinos. Congress authorized a force of 5,000 PS in 1902. The Army, fully aware of the eighty-seven dialects spoken in the Philippines, organized the PS companies by the dialect spoken. By 1908, when PS battalions were organized, language differences were disregarded, except for Moro and Igorote units.

Led by Capt. John J. Pershing, the PS played a major role in pacifying the Moros of Zamboanga and Sulu. During World War I, part of the American garrison was withdrawn, leaving the Scouts as the principal Regular Army element in the Philippines. By the end of the war, the fifty-two Scout companies were organized into thirteen battalions and five provisional regiments. These provisional regiments were permanently organized in 1920 as the 24th Field Artillery (PS), 43d Infantry (PS), 45th Infantry (PS), 57th Infantry (PS), and 91st Coast Artillery (PS).

In 1921 additional units were established as the 25th Field Artillery (PS), 92d Coast Artillery (PS), 14th Engineers (PS), and 12th Signal Company (PS), and the Philippine Division was organized. Led by Regular Army officers, the Scouts were the backbone of the Army's defense forces in the Philippines.

The World War II Years

In the spring of 1941 the looming threat of war with Japan led to an increase in PS strength to 12,000. Japanese planes attacked the Philippines on 8 December, and enemy forces landed at Lingayen Gulf on 22 December. The newly reorganized 26th Cavalry Regiment (PS) delayed the Japanese advance and covered the withdrawal to the Bataan Peninsula. When part of the 43d Infantry and a troops of the 26th Cavalry were cut off by the Japanese advance, these forces withdrew into the mountains and held out as guerrillas until 1945.

By 7 January 1942, the main battle position was fixed on Bataan. The Philippine Division (-) and 26th Cavalry were held in reserve. As the best-trained units available, they were most capable of carrying out counterattacks. The 57th Infantry defended the vital coastal sector on the eastern flank of the defense line.

Despite fierce counterattacks by the 57th Infantry and the Philippine Division, heavy Japanese assaults 10-22 January succeeded, driving the Allied forces south to a new defense line on 25 January. Once again, each of the Scout regiments was assigned a reserve/counterattack mission. The Japanese attack renewed on 26 January, supported by landings on the west coast of Bataan. Counterattacks by the PS restored the defense line and eradicated the Japanese beachheads. The Japanese suspended their offensive on February to build up their forces for a decisive attack. Morale was high on the American side, but short rations and a general supply shortage had begun to weaken the defenders.

The Japanese attack of 3 April, punctuated by a devastating air and artillery bombardment, broke through. On 7 April, three regiments of the Philippine Division counterattacked, but by 9 April the 57th Infantry and 26th Cavalry were surrounded by superior forces and surrendered. The 45th Infantry also was forced to surrender before a move to Corregidor could be executed.

Approximately 1,200 Scouts in the garrison of Corregidor held out until the island was overrun on 6 May 1942. The last combat action by the PS occurred on 7 May on Mindinao by C and E Companies, 43d Infantry, before they too were ordered to surrender. The fall of the Philippines was complete.

The Japanese had expected a quick victory, but the fight for the Philippines proved to be a tough one, lasting five months. The Scouts had fought with tenacity and skill. For their actions during World War II, the Philippine Scouts received one Medal of Honor, approximately forty Distinguished Service Crosses, and over two hundred Silver Stars, many of these awards posthumous.

How to Order the Center's (CMH) Publications Within the Army

Have you ever been stopped from using CMH's many publications on the history of the U.S. Army because of problems in requisitioning them? Have you been concerned about having to pay for them? Have you felt that the Center was too far away to help?

Well, the purpose of this open letter is to tell you that the Center very much wants to help you use its publications, that the requisition process for CMH titles is a little different but not difficult, and that the Center's publications are prepared for official use as training literature.

The rules for requisitioning CMH titles from the U.S. Army Publications Distribution Center—Baltimore (USAPDC-B) are as follows:

1. Send DA Form 4569, listing your publications account number and CMH titles by CMH Publications (CMH Pub) number, to the Commander, USAPDC-B, 2800 Eastern Boulevard, Baltimore, MD 21220-2896. A quicker alternative is to requisition electronically through AUTODIN (contact your DOIM). All CMH titles are listed by CMH Pub number in DA Pam 25-30 and in the Center's *Publications* brochure (CMH Pub 105-2).

2. For more than 10 copies of any one CMH title (we have raised this number from 5 copies), prior coordination with CMH is required; for accountability reasons, we simply need to know the intended educational use. POC is Mrs. Yeldell, DAMH-ZBP, 1099 14th Street, NW, Washington, D.C. 20005-3402, or phone (202) 504-5433; DSN 285-5433; FAX (202) 504-5390. Note that for CMH's World War II campaign brochures and for our historical map posters on Operations DESERT STORM and JUST CAUSE, you can requisition up to 100 copies without prior coordination.

Please don't hesitate to contact Mrs. Yeldell or myself if you have any questions.

John Elsberg, Editor in Chief

Council on America's Military Past to Meet

The Council on America's Military Past (CAMP), a national organization dedicated to the twin objectives of military history and historic preservation, will hold its twenty-ninth annual military history conference 19-22 April 1995 in Savannah, Georgia.

The headquarters for this meeting will be the DeSoto Hilton Hotel in Savannah's historic district. The hotel is the site of the Army's nineteenth century Oglethorpe Barracks.

The council will hear twenty or more papers on historic subjects ranging from pre-Revolution to the Cold War, and will visit a dozen military history sites, forts, and battlefields.

Speakers will include Maj. Gen. Joseph E. DeFrancisco, USA, who formerly taught history at the Military Academy and is now commander of the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized) and Fort Stewart, and the chiefs of history of the Army (Brig. Gen. John W. Mountcastle, USA); Navy (Dr. William Dudley, acting director); and the Marine Corps (Brig. Gen. Edwin H. Simmons, USMC (Ret.). General Simmons also is president of CAMP.

Sites to be visited include active Fort Stewart and Hunter Army Air Field, and historic posts Forts Pulaski, Screven, Jackson, Morris, McAllister, Frederica, and King George. Sites involved in the 1779 siege of Savannah and in the Civil War in Savannah will also be visited. These sites include the Sherman Headquarters (which is two blocks from the hotel), occupied by the General during the winter 1865 federal occupation.

For further information about the council, contact Herbert M. Hart, P.O. Box 1151, Fort Meyer, VA 22211, or phone (703) 379-2006.

Military Research on the Internet

Matthew D. Bird

The Internet—a global network of computers at government sites, libraries, and universities around the world—can be a valuable research tool for the military scholar. Internet users can "visit" museums and military academies remotely, participate in electronic discussions on topics of interest, search the library catalogs of *hundreds* of libraries around the world, and retrieve press releases, photographs, and sound recordings. There are virtual libraries and online reading rooms accessible twenty-four hours a day on the Internet, through which users can read and retrieve portions of dictionaries, encyclopedias, speeches, classic books, and other information. Internet users can also obtain the full text of historical documents such as the Magna Carta, the Mayflower Compact, the colonial Military Instructions of 1636, the U.S. Constitution, the German and Japanese surrender documents of 1945, the Tonkin Gulf Resolution of 1964, and many others.

For those who do not yet have access to the Internet, there are many options for getting connected. Students and faculty at many universities have "free" access privileges, i.e., supported through their student fees or departmental budgets. Some universities also offer Internet accounts to their alumni at student rates—as little as $75 per year. Many government employees also have no-cost Internet access through their offices. Some local governments now offer free, or almost free, Internet access to their citizens through so-called "Freenets"; examples include the city of Cleveland and the state of Maryland. For those who do not fall into any of these categories, there are commercial firms such as America Online and Delphi which offer Internet access for a fee, typically $120 to $200 per year. To locate a commercial Internet access provider, browse the ads in a magazine such as *BYTE*, *Internet World*, or *PC Magazine*, or contact your favorite reference librarian or local academic computing center.

One of the most exciting recent developments in Internet access is the World Wide Web (WWW), which permits users to retrieve audio and video information as well as text. With the proper equipment and connections, WWW users can view graphics files (such as photographs and paintings from museums) and listen to music or speeches, as well as retrieve text files. One major drawback is that because graphics files are so much larger than text files, accessing the WWW efficiently requires a very high-speed telecommunications link, typically 28.8 KB per second or faster. (The modems used with most home personal computers typically handle 2.4, 9.6, or 14.4 KBps.) Some commercial online services, such as Prodigy, are now offering limited World Wide Web features to their customers. Full WWW access is available by purchasing special services known as SLIP and PPP (Serial Line Internet Protocol and Point-to-Point Protocol), but these require a fast modem (14.4 or 28.8 KBps) and the cost of the services—as much as $500 per year—puts these options out of reach for most individuals. Scholars at institutions with access to the World Wide Web will want to explore this new resource, but this article will focus on text-based applications.

For the beginning user, one of the easiest ways to sample the Internet is through the menu-driven Gopher system. A gopher is a set of software menus and telecommunication protocols that lets users "tunnel" or "burrow" through the Internet, hence the name. (It is also the school mascot at the University of Minnesota, where the first gopher software was developed in 1991.) Because the software is standardized, all gopher menus have similar formats, and by making selections from a gopher menu, users can connect to host computers at universities and research centers all over the world. Many university gophers provide access to local information (campus phone directories, course listings, schedules of local events, etc.) as well as to library catalogs and archives containing subject-specific data. Users can connect to a gopher at a university in England or South Africa or Japan and search the library catalog or search one of the many federal government gophers here in the United States and retrieve information such as White House press releases, Supreme Court decisions, and other government documents. There are many approaches to "mining" the Internet for information. This article explores the following options, of interest to students of military subjects:

* "Visit" military sites on the Internet such as NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) or the Military Academy at West Point, New York, and

browse their offerings.

* Find military resources on the Internet by subject.

* Use Internet search tools to find specific information.

* Retrieve historical documents from text archives.

* Identify useful publications by searching library catalogs.

* Read or participate in an electronic discussion group devoted to a relevant topic, such as World War II history.

* Automatically receive news and announcements on a specific subject, such as history and computing.

* Maintain current awareness by reviewing the tables of contents of professional and scholarly journals as they are published.

Military Sites on the Internet

On the Internet there are several gophers whose focus is primarily military; most are located at military academies. These include the Australian Defence Force Academy (Canberra, Australia), the Citadel (Charleston, South Carolina), NATO, the U.S. Military Academy, and Virginia Military Institute (Lexington, Virginia). Internet users can access these gophers in at least three ways: geographically, by subject, or directly by using the TELNET command. The geographical approach is to access a top-level gopher menu, then choose the appropriate continent, then the country, then the state, etc., until the desired gopher choice appears. From a subject tree or gopher jewel menu (explained further, below), one typically selects the subject area "military" and then the appropriate gopher site. Users who know the numeric or domain Internet address of a particular site may connect directly by means of the telnet command. (For example, to access the library at West Point, one could either issue the command "telnet 129.29.198.1" or "telnet LIBRARY.USMA.EDU.")

Using Subject Trees and Gopher Jewels

Among the richest Internet resources for military scholars are gopher jewels and subject trees. These two types of Internet tools are variations on the same theme: collections of Internet resources, grouped by subject. Many gopher site menus include gopher jewels, which are collections of the favorite Internet resources of a gopher site's administrators and/or users. Gopher jewels are often eclectic, but can provide links to previously undiscovered resources.

Subject trees are available at fewer sites than gopher jewels, but they tend to be more extensive. One of the best subject trees for those with military interests is on the BUBL (Bulletin Board for Libraries) Information Service gopher in England. From a top-level gopher menu, the path is Europe/United Kingdom/ BUBL Information Service/ Subject Tree/1.BUBL Subject Tree/20.Military Art & Science. This yields more than a dozen screens of menu choices on military subjects (over 100 separate items), and includes links to most of the military gophers around the world. The gopher at Rice University in Texas also has a subject tree with many military items.

Using Internet Search Tools (VERONICA, Jughead, Archie)

Although subject trees and gopher jewels are often useful, they may not contain the specific terms or subjects of interest to a user. In that case, one can use an Internet tool called VERONICA (Very Easy Rodent-Oriented Net-wide Index to Computerized Archives) to search hundreds of gophers for menu items containing relevant terms, such as "nuclear weapons" or "naval aviation." Veronica literally searches the titles of every menu item on every gopher on the Internet. If the search retrieves any matches, the user can immediately connect to the relevant host by choosing it from the list of VERONICA search results.

Two related tools are Jughead and Archie. Jughead, which is available at some gopher sites, permits users to search all menu items at that single site. For example, a Jughead search for the word "military" at the Oxford University gopher retrieved five files—a five-part list of frequently asked questions and answers about military aviation.

Archie searches files at anonymous ftp (file transfer protocol) sites worldwide. An anonymous ftp site is a host computer which permits remote users to access and retrieve public files anonymously, by sending the computer a request for a particular file, and specifying the address to which the file should be sent. The computer then retrieves the file and sends it to the requester by electronic mail.

Retrieving Historical Documents from Text Archives

There are several collections of historical documents accessible through the Internet. In most cases, users can download the full text of a document to their hard drives, then view the text at leisure or print it locally. To explore three examples of document archives, try connecting to the University of Michigan

Libraries gopher, then select "Humanities Resources" followed by "History." You will then be able to choose from the following:

* Historical Documents and Treaties
* Historical Documents Collection from Queens Public Library
* Historical Texts Archives at Mississippi State University

Currently, the most complete document collection seems to be the one at Mississippi State; among the categories to choose from are 19th century, 20th century, Afro-American, Gulf War, Revolution, Vietnam, World War I, World War II, Colonial, Early Republic, Constitutions, Bibliographies, and Reviews. There are, of course, several different ways to connect to this—or any other—Internet resource. For example, the Mississippi State Historical Texts Archives may also be reached through the military section of the subject tree on the BUBL gopher in the United Kingdom.

Searching Online Library Catalogs

One of the least glamorous uses of the Internet can, nevertheless, be extremely fruitful for the serious researcher: searching library catalogs remotely. Although users as yet cannot retrieve the text of books found on most online library catalogs, a keyword or subject search may turn up a relevant book with which the researcher is not familiar. The book may then be purchased or borrowed locally, or ordered through Inter-Library Loan. Among the best library catalogs for military scholars to search are 1) those at military schools (e.g., the U.S. Military Academy), 2) those at universities with strong military history holdings (e.g., the University of Michigan), and 3) those associated with very large libraries (e.g., Harvard or the Library of Congress).

After accessing the catalog at a likely library, one useful approach is to look up a relevant known title, check the subject descriptors on the library record, and then run a second search using one or more of those descriptors. Another approach is to search by the name of an author known to have written on the subject in question, in case he or she has published (or collaborated on) something else of interest.

Participating in a USENET Group

USENET groups are electronic discussion groups which focus on specific topics. Participants may post questions and answers, engage in debate and discussion, or simply read what others have posted. The Campus-Wide Information Systems (CWIS) at many universities have news reading services that permit users to read the offerings of USENET groups. Alternatively, anyone able to access the gopher network will find that several gopher sites offer USENET access, usually under a menu choice described as NEWS. To sample some of the available USENET discussions, try the Michigan State gopher in the United States or the BUBL gopher in Britain. There is an astonishing range of USENET groups, but beware!—the quality of the offerings varies tremendously. Some of those which military scholars may find worthwhile include the following:

sci.military	sci.crypt
rec.aviation.military	soc.politics
soc.history.war.world-war-ii	soc.veterans
alt.war.civil.usa	sci.crypt.research

Joining a LISTSERV

LISTSERVs are similar to USENET groups; each one focusses on a specific topic of interest. With a LISTSERV, however, users add their e-mail addresses to the list, then they automatically receive a copy of every message posted to that LISTSERV. In some LISTSERVs, that may add up to a dozen or more messages each day, so new users may want to try out a particular LISTSERV for a few days to determine whether they want to continue to participate. Some potentially useful LISTERVs include the following:

AEROSP-L	Aeronautics and Aerospace History
CONSIM-L	Conflict Simulation Games
DISARM-L	Disarmament Discussion List
MARINE-L	Marine Studies/Shipboard Education Discussion
MILHST-L	Military History

Maintaining Current Awareness of Articles in Scholarly Journals

One of the most intriguing uses of the Internet is for electronic dissemination of publications on demand. Many university gophers permit users to browse the tables of contents of scholarly journals; often there are brief annotations describing the articles. To access this type of service, look for a gopher selection such as "Electronic Newsstand" or "Electronic Reading Room." There also are commercial firms which, for a fee, will fax or e-mail subscribers the tables of contents of specific journals as the journals are published. One

such service, Uncover, will also provide full-text copies of specific articles for a charge, currently $9.00 per article. The article is faxed to the user within hours of the request, which makes Uncover faster than many other commercial methods of document retrieval.

Conclusion

This article has touched briefly on just a few of the ways in which military scholars can use the Internet for research and current awareness. One other resource worth mentioning in passing is electronic mail. E-mail enables people around the world to keep in contact with one another faster and more cheaply than via conventional surface mail or air mail. (Those services are collectively known as "snail mail" or "paper mail" by Internauts). And by attaching a text document to an e-mail message, users can exchange documents within minutes. In theory, two or more scholars could collaborate on writing a book or article together via e-mail without ever meeting face-to-face. The only drawback would be maintaining the security of their intellectual property, since the privacy of e-mail is not guaranteed.

Matthew D. Bird, formerly a Regular Army officer, is now a major, USAR. A Research Specialist (Law Librarian) at Kirkland & Ellis in Washington, D.C., Mr. Bird is a doctoral candidate in international politics at the University of Wales. He holds a bachelors degree in history from Princeton University, and masters degrees in strategic studies (Wales) and information and library studies (University of Michigan).

Suggestions for Further Reading

Those interested in learning more about using the Internet will find a wealth of user guides and fact sheets available online. Access your favorite gopher and look for a menu choice such as "Internet Resources," or check a gopher jewels collection or a subject tree for Internet information. There are also several good books on the subject, in particular:

Brendan P. Kehoe, *Zen and the Art of the Internet: A Beginner's Guide to the Internet*. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1993), 112 pages; and

Ed Krol, *The Whole Internet User's Guide and Catalog*. (Sebastopol, Calif.: O'Reilly and Associates, 1992), 376 pages.

The Guns of Bataan: Mobilization of Artillery in the Philippine Campaign

John W. Whitman

Caught partially mobilized by the Japanese attack of 8 December 1941, General Douglas MacArthur's Philippine Army was unprepared for combat. Throughout the island of Luzon, United States Army Forces in the Far East (USAFFE) was still organizing for the campaign to come. MacArthur had begun mobilizing ten reserve divisions in August 1941, calling to active duty one infantry regiment per division every six weeks.

The unexpected Japanese attack had interrupted the hasty reinforcement effort from the United States while it was still in its early stages. One U.S. field artillery brigade and two U.S. antiaircraft artillery brigades had been scheduled to sail to join MacArthur, but as of 8 December, no new artillery had reached Manila. Somehow, using the 75-mm. and 2.95-inch assets on hand, MacArthur had to find enough artillery to support a three-corps, twelve-division army. (1)

On 8 December 1941, artillery for the Philippine Army's infantry divisions was only partially mobilized. The units had been in the process of personnel induction, equipment issue, and basic training when war began. With the exception of some Regular Army Philippine Scout artillery battalions, divisional artillery regiments were understrength in both personnel and equipment. Finding adequate quantities of clothing, helmets, gas masks, mosquito bars, and entrenching tools would prove impossible. (2)

With two four-gun batteries in each battalion (instead of three), and in a few cases with only one or two battalions in a division (rather than three), division artillery fielded a mix of wooden-wheeled British M1917 75-mm. guns and some more modern 75-mm.'s, most towed but some portable on truck beds. Spanish-American War-vintage (1898, 1901, 1903) Vickers 2.95-inch howitzers were all that many artil-

lery battalions received. Division artillery units lacked the most basic fire control equipment, and the new units were often brought up to strength with recently inducted, untrained Filipino infantrymen. Service and ammunition batteries were equipped with whatever cars and trucks they could commandeer from the highways—often with their civilian drivers. (3)

Corps and army artillery had to be created from scratch. The Philippine Army was to have mobilized two 155-mm. regiments, three 105-mm. regiments, one motorized 155-mm. battalion, and three antitank battalions, in addition to division artillery. Washington had scheduled shipment of forty-eight 155-mm. howitzers and twenty-four 155-mm. guns to equip the big-bore units. The only formations that actually existed in the islands, however, were a single battalion of 155-mm. and two small 75-mm. regiments. (4)

USAFFE decided to establish a new organization to handle as yet unissued 155-mm. assets. The big 155-mm. cannon had come to the islands in 1939 and had been stored in warehouses. They were to have been used on the Island Seas Defense Project to protect the straits leading into the inland seas. Because this was a long-term project, the USAFFE staff reviewed its status once war began. Everyone agreed that the first battery could not be functional before mid-February 1942, so Maj. Gen. Richard K. Sutherland, USAFFE chief of staff, ordered the project scrapped and the cannon turned over to the army's field artillerymen. (5)

Excluding Corregidor's seacoast artillery, these wooden-wheeled, slow-speed World War I cannon were the biggest American artillery in the islands (the 105-mm. workhorses never arrived). These guns were durable, simple, and had an efficient recoil system and a wide traverse. Unfortunately, they could not be towed more than five miles an hour. Even then, artillerymen had to stop hourly to grease and cool the wheel bearings. (6)

On 12 December, Col. Alexander S. Quintard reported to Brig. Gen. Edward P. King, USAFFE chief artillery officer. King told Quintard to move the twenty-four 155-mm. pieces from the artillery school at Camp Murphy to Bataan. Quintard was to create a battalion with eight guns, then expand to a regiment. King's oral orders were the only activation orders ever received. Sixteen 155-mm. guns and two 155-mm. howitzers would form the backbone of Colonel Quintard's 301st Artillery. (7)

Cadre for the 301st Artillery were soldiers from the Camp Del Pilar detachment and those men originally selected to lead the 101st Artillery on Mindanao (war prevented these cadre from sailing to Mindanao). Joining them were officers from the field artillery, coast artillery, Philippine Army, antiaircraft, ordnance, chemical warfare service—regulars, reservists, and volunteers. The majority of the gunners consisted of Philippine Scout enlisted men from the 92d Coast Artillery and Philippine Army soldiers. The regiment filled its ranks from two groups of volunteers totalling 700 men, half of whom joined as late as 20 December, twelve days after the onset of hostilities. Under Quintard's leadership, all the men were soon eager and working hard. Morale was high. (8)

Moving these new men with the unfamiliar tractors and cannon proved difficult. The recruits were untrained and lacked any sort of discipline. Only eleven of the regiment's twenty-four trucks could pull the 23,000-pound gun on level ground. Quintard, therefore, purchased two five-ton tractors directly from dealers and drove them away, using the dealers' mechanics as drivers. Other tractors came from Luzon's gold and silver mining firms. Once on Bataan, these guns and tractors would prove outstanding. (9)

USAFFE also formed a Provisional Self-Propelled Artillery Group of three brand new artillery battalions. MacArthur had made an urgent prewar request for 37-mm. antitank guns, a request Washington could not fill. Instead, fifty 75-mm. self-propelled mounts (SPMs) arrived in the Philippines in October 1941. The self-propelled mount was a combination World War I French 75-mm. artillery piece mounted on an American half-track. It was a mid-1941 attempt by the Army to field a mobile antitank gun. The SPMs had a good traverse and a good field of fire. Successful tests of the weapon had been held during the Louisiana Maneuvers. Fifty of the first eighty-six M3 tank destroyers build were shipped to MacArthur. (10)

Because there had been insufficient trained artillerymen to man these guns when they arrived, each Philippine Scout field artillery battalion received several SPMs as training aids. Battalion commanders were told to familiarize their men with the pieces. The Scout artillerymen could not man both their 75-mm. or 155-mm. cannon and the 75-mm. SPMs as well, so completely new units had to be formed. (11)

To bring the three SPM battalions up to strength and to augment their mobility, USAFFE assigned ninety-six truck drivers and technicians from the 200th Artillery (AAA). Battalion and battery commanders were Americans; gun commanders were Philippine Army third lieutenants; gun crews were poorly-trained, six-week service Philippine Army soldiers; gunners

and key cannoneers came from Philippine Scout field artillery battalions, half-track drivers, and Scout engineers; while truck drivers were antiaircraft artillerymen. Fire control equipment consisted of field glasses and compasses. Each of the three battalions ultimately consisted of four, four-gun batteries. The cannon operated with two battalions of American light tanks, giving the tanks uniquely mobile artillery support. (12)

Responding to a crying need for defense against aircraft, USAFFE created a new antiaircraft regiment by splitting the New Mexico National Guard 200th Coast Artillery in half. After dividing the American ranks thus, officers brought in technicians from Corregidor and filled the ranks with muscle from the Philippine Army. By drawing guns and equipment from ordnance warehouses in Manila, a new antiaircraft artillery regiment was created, armed, and engaged in combat within thirty-six hours. Three-inch guns, 37-mm. automatic cannons, and sixty-inch Sperry searchlights were the major pieces of equipment used by the new 515th Coast Artillery. (13)

To relieve a manpower shortage in the regiment, one hundred Philippine Military Academy cadets reported to the 515th. The cadets were too small to handle either the guns or the ammunition in the firing batteries, so they were assigned to the searchlights. Untrained, reckless, and enthusiastic, they knew little English and nothing about equipment maintenance. But, as fate would have it, they trained with Japanese planes as training aids and became real assets. (14)

All these new units performed their duties with amazing effectiveness. Despite the fact that substantial numbers of Filipino artillerymen had not even seen a cannon fired before they sent their first rounds at the enemy, artillery would become the most deadly arm available to the Americans during the three-month siege of Bataan. (15)

Formed and engaged in combat without training of any note, they wrote a glorious chapter in U.S. Army field artillery history.

Lt. Col. John W. Whitman, U.S. Army (Ret.), was raised in a Navy family before earning a bachelor's degree in history from San Jose State College. A career Army infantryman, with tours in Panama, Korea, and Vietnam, he also earned a master of military art and science degree from the Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Colonel Whitman is the author of Bataan: Our Last Ditch *(1990) and several articles in military history. Currently he is preparing a volume for publication later this year on the Japanese invasion of Luzon.*

Notes

1. Memo, Brig Gen L.T. Gerow [?] for CSA, 8 Oct 41, sub: Reinforcements for the Philippine Army; Memo, Brig Gen L.T. Gerow for CSA, 29 Nov 41, Louis Morton Collection, U.S. Army Military History Institute (MHI), box 12.
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Quintard, 301st FA (PA), 30 Dec 42, Louis Morton Collection, MHI, box 15.
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9. Quintard, "Copy of parts of Narrative," p. 1; Tisdelle, "Diary."
10. Morton, *Fall*, pp. 38, 120; David S. Babcock, "The SPM's," p. 1, U.S. Army Administrative Center, St. Louis, ref. no. 500-5; Emory A. Dunham, *The Tank Destroyer History: Study No. 29* (U.S. Army Ground Forces, Historical Section, 1946), pp. 2-9.
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12. Ibid.; Wainright, "Report of Operations of USAFFE and USFIP;" "Annex IX Report of Provisional Coast Artillery Brigade in the Philippine Campaign, "p. 1; Dorothy Cave, *Beyond Courage: One Regiment Against Japan, 1941-1945* (New Mexico: Yucca Tree Press, 1992), p. 74; Ltr, George A. Reed to author, 5 Feb 75; Collier, "Notebooks," 2:19; Ltrs, Ivan W. Weikel to author, 8 Aug and 11 Oct 79; Babcock, "The SPM's," p. 2.
13. "Annex IX," p. 1; Ltr, Robert N. Amy to author, 1 Jul 76; Mellnik, *Philippine Diary*, p. 40.
14. "Annex IX," p. 1; Cave, *Beyond Courage*, p. 80.
15. For a full history of the Bataan campaign, see Whitman, *Bataan: Our Last Ditch*.

Letters to the Editor

Editor:

Readers of Tim O'Gorman's "Kilroy Was Here" (*Army History*, Spring 1994) should not be left with the idea that the "F" word in SNAFU represents some bland, colorless word like "fouled."

Paul Fussell, a severely wounded combat infantry veteran of World War II (European theater), in his *Wartime; Understanding and Behavior in the Second World War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), sets us straight (p. 259) on SNAFU and its brilliant derivatives TARFU, FUBAR, FUBB, FUBID, FUBIS, and others. Fussell's account of Kilroy (and Chad, "favorite graffito of British forces") is at pp. 260-62.

We're all grown-ups out here reading *Army History*. We can handle the authentic wartime idiom without blushing.

Robert Fairchild
LTC, Army National Guard
Hampton, Virginia

Editor:

I would like to register a strong personal protest to Dr. Francis C. Steckel's "Morale Problems in Combat" that appeared in your Summer 1994 issue (pp. 1-8). I understand the article in question was based on a paper Doctor Steckel presented at a CMH conference in June 1992. I also understand he is saying nothing new. In fact, I was quite surprised to note he did not quote Russell Weigley's *Eisenhower's Lieutenants*; in that book, the good Professor Weigley really tore us—the World War II combat infantryman—to pieces.

I say "us" because I commanded a rifle company—Company L, 3d Battalion, 334th Infantry Regiment, 84th Infantry Division—from late November 1944 to late March 1945 in northwest Europe. Prior to taking command of the company, I had served as its executive officer from July 1944. For the past forty or fifty years I have been responding to attacks against us, attacks that have been made by all sorts of people and beginning with "SLAM" Marshall.... Steckel is just another in a long line of U.S. and British military historians who now preach what has seemingly become a party line: the U.S. combat infantryman in northwest Europe during World War II was a lousy soldier, and no one can figure out how he won the war. Certainly, these pundits say, he could not in any way compare with the magnificent British and German soldiers he faced. Lee Kennett did manage to give us a little credit for our showing in the Bulge, and even Nigel Hamilton, certainly no friend of the U.S. military man, devoted a few pages in his second Montgomery volume to recognizing our abilities.

Accordingly, I would like to go back on the attack against those, including Steckel, who have criticized us so severely and have tried their darndest to make us look ridiculous.

His first point—ratio of fire—depends on Marshall's *Men Against Fire*, plus a couple of reports from the Tunisian campaign and a few war-stories thrown in for good measure to supposedly demonstrate our lack of aggressiveness. Marshall's thesis has been discredited; he pulled his figure out of thin air. And I

hardly think one can compare the actions of our units at the Kasserine Pass with the later actions of U.S. troops during the drive on Bizerte, in Italy, and in northwestern Europe.

For the sake of argument, let's assume Marshall's ratio of fire figure is correct (It is not, of course). What about the British and German infantrymen? How many of them fired their weapons? Good statistics, please. For if those infantrymen did not fire any more than we did, then they were not aggressive fighters either. (By the way, do we have any comparable figures from World War I, the era of trench warfare when soldiers were only a few meters apart?).

What kinds of weaknesses did our scouting and patrolling show? All of our units? At all times? Didn't any of our units conduct the proper kinds of scouting and patrolling that were expected of them?...I just cannot believe none of us did the right thing.

We depended too much on artillery and air support? And the British and Germans did not? Ridiculous. Montgomery used more artillery than any other Allied commander, and began the use of strategic air in support of ground operations. Remember his "prepping on the battlefield?" I do, particularly when the 21st Army Group was getting ready to cross the Rhine River in late March 1945 and something like 1,100 guns fired all night long at targets across the river.

The Germans and air support? The *Luftwaffe* was built and structured with one purpose in mind: to support the advance of the ground army. And German commanders used as much artillery as they could get throughout the war. And they were not averse to using their armored vehicles as SP [scouting & patrolling] artillery, as we finally learned to do late in the war, and again in Korea.

Night fighting? Hand-to-hand combat? The British and the Germans did more than we did? Are there any examples of this—of British and German units engaging in hand-to-hand combat in northwestern Europe during World War II? To depend on van Creveld's book for information and statements of this sort is to operate on dangerous ground—he demonstrates in his *Fighting Power* just how little he knows of the U.S. Army during World War II. I would be willing to wager our troops took part in as many hand-to-hand engagements as did British and German units, and did as much night fighting as they did.

Flexibility? I don't know about General Hershey's source of information but in every service school I attended after the war, I was taught that the U.S. Army had been the most flexible of all armies in northwestern Europe, that our people could operate on their own far better than the British and the Germans (and particularly the Russians), and that we did not require the close supervision to accomplish our mission that the British and German soldiers did.

If the Germans were so flexible and their commanders so free to act, why do so many German postwar writings complain about Hitler's control over the actions of the German unit commanders? And remember the German units in Normandy on 6 June 1944? With only one exception, I believe, German units were frozen in place because certain senior commanders were not present to make the necessary decisions. I know all about the German system of using so-called mission orders...but we used the same system, probably a much looser system, down at the front. I don't ever remember seeing a written order at company or battalion level; we operated strictly in the oral mode and with a minimum of instructions.

I agree that an individual replacement system may not be the best man can devise to keep the front-line units filled. But the replacement system used in Europe—except at the time of the Bulge, probably—was not as bad as Steckel makes it. From his article, I get the impression he doesn't know how the system operated and that he read too many war stories from people I can't believe were soldiers in the U.S. Army at the time. For example:

"some replacements...had never even fired the M1 rifle or qualified with any weapon." Every soldier I ever knew during the war, with the exception of our medical personnel, knew how to handle a weapon....

"most veterans avoided replacements because...." Really? In the very next paragraph, Steckel says that the new men were dispersed among the various platoons and usually paired up with experienced soldiers who could help them adjust. That's right, and that's the way most company commanders I knew treated their new men....

As for Sergeant James' story about his inexperienced tank driver—a Stuart, maybe, or an armored car?—I simply do not believe him.... And this was "unfortunately all too common" an occurrence? Steckel can't be serious....

I could go on and on, but I best not....

One last thought—I cannot make out the meaning of Steckel's last sentence. It seems he is saying that we won in spite of ourselves. Or maybe we didn't win and just don't realize it. Thanks for nothing!

Albert N. Garland
LTC, USA (Ret.)

Editor:

I read with interest the lead article by Francis C. Steckel concerning "Morale Problems in Combat" and the training and replacement systems. I trained initially after being drafted March 1943 with the 204th Engineer Combat Battalion (ECB), then...with the Army Specialized Training Program (ASTP), then as a filler to the 101st Infantry, 26th Infantry Division (Yankee Division)...followed by reassignment into the 101st Engineer Combat Battalion a few weeks before going overseas in convoy with the 104th Infantry Division directly...to UTAH Beach.

Although the author cites some valid points concerning problems, I don't believe he covered the drama of a system which started from basically nothing [yet led] to the complex Army fighting in many theaters, all within less than two years after the declaration of war...even now it's hard to comprehend.

I went from the Camp Upton Reception Center...to be in the 204th ECB...by August we were up to platoon training when the battalions were broken up, with people like me going to ASTP and others elsewhere. Now that battalion had to start all over with new draftees sailing in December.... In March, when ASTP folded, all the GIs from schools in New England went to the Yankee Division on maneuvers in Tennessee. Here was a division, like most, federalized from the National Guard three years earlier, yet with so many missing billets on its final training exercise. Many of the personnel were bled off over many months to organize the Americal Division and other units.

The 1st Armored Division went to Northern Ireland in the spring of 1942 without ever firing [heavy] weapons and then they were decimated by hepatitis.... The 34th Infantry Division arrived about the same time and lost many to the formation of the Rangers. They too had little training and yet were turned into invasion troops for the November 1942 Africa campaign.

The 26th landed 7 September 1944 and had the first casualties less than two weeks later.... Formal assignment to the Third Army took effect 4 October, with relief of the 4th Armored on the line, so there was no training for the massive attack that started 8 November. By 12 December the division was shallow, even though replacements came and went....

Some wounded came back to their own units and some went elsewhere. Requisitions for bodies as fillers was the only criteria. The manpower pool was not deep enough to allow for selective replacement. No doubt morale was poor....

Rest periods for a very few did occur. A rest period for a division happened when the division was diluted and incapable of 80 percent operations. The 26th had only a week in Metz for "rest" and had to fight until the end in Czechoslovakia.

Due to the overall lack of manpower, it is incredible that so much was accomplished....

I don't know how the troop replacements came into the division for assignments to the infantry companies or who obtained them, but the soldiers had to have feelings of fright, nervousness, and apprehension. No one can be introduced into a fighting company, particularly when it is in daily combat, without fright, let alone low morale....

Now, with many vets still active in veterans associations, it is obvious how close the bond is among "buddies," even though many had known each other in combat for a short time.... The term "in comradeship" does have a special meaning....

Replacements in the Korean War fared no differently, and the piecemeal MOS system of the Vietnam War certainly had emotional problems.

William B. Leesemann, Jr.
WW II veteran, 101st Eng Combat Bn,
26th Infantry Div (Yankee Division)

Book Reviews

Book Review
by Rodney J. Ross

The Battle of Bataan: A History of the 90 Day Siege and Eventual Surrender of 75,000 Filipino and United States Troops to the Japanese in World War II
by Donald J. Young
McFarland and Co., Inc. 381 pp., $38.95

Donald J. Young professes to write the first comprehensive synthesis of the 1942 Bataan campaign. Declaring that *The Battle of Bataan* offers a fresher and more exhaustive perspective than Louis Morton's official but dated *The Fall of the Philippines* (1953), the author intends to recreate the "atmosphere that existed on Bataan" (p. viii) while giving previously neglected combatants such as Filipinos, among others, their due.

Young retells the now familiar story of the United

States Army Forces Far East (USAFFE) deployment and resistance as Imperial Japan mounted repeated onslaughts against the Bataan peninsula. Despite tactical successes at the outset in countering Japanese ground attacks opposite the Mauban-Abucay battle line and containing the enemy's incursions along the western littoral flank, the Filipino-American II Corps position in the east ultimately collapsed in the face of reinforced enemy assaults supported by concentrated artillery fire and air power.

The author's explication for the U.S. military catastrophe rings resonant. Earlier studies have demonstrated that USAFFE commander General Douglas MacArthur erred when dispersing troops and supplies in an ill-conceived plan to contain the invaders at the beaches. Once Lt. Gen. Masaharu Homma's *Fourteenth Army* splashed ashore and established beachheads at various points north of Lingayen on Luzon's extensive coastline in late 1941, the Japanese quickly broke out and drove southward, chasing Filipino-American forces before them who were compelled to desert their forward-positioned logistics. By the time General MacArthur reinstated War Plan ORANGE-3 (WPO-3), the prewar strategy of withdrawing into Bataan to hold the peninsula and block the entrance to Manila Bay until help arrived, his materiel was diminished, and the consequent privations within the ranks so debilitated the garrison that by March 1942 its capability to withstand General Homma's siege was virtually nil.

Young is mistaken, however, to suggest that implementation of WPO-3 at the outbreak of war would have made an eleventh-hour rescue possible. After all, given a combination of strategic realities, which included a crippled American Pacific fleet, Japan's possession of the Micronesian islands, regional Japanese naval and air superiority, the U.S. Navy's determination to preserve its aircraft carriers, and an Allied Europe-first strategy, his assertion "that prewar planning and priorities, set up by General MacArthur, brought on an irrevocable supply deficit that helped seal the fate of...Bataan" (p. 339) disregards a global situation that produced the irrefragable Filipino-American predicament.

Since the author believes "that every American account of the campaign I came across shortchanged the role of the Filipinos in the battle" (p. xi), *The Battle of Bataan* is written partly to correct this and gives heed to indigenous units. In so doing, he crystallizes the divergent experiences of Philippine and American soldiers. Inasmuch as Filipinos were fighting for and on their native land, Young reveals that they became the primary targets of Japanese propaganda. He also points out that, although the majority of American servicemen were hesitant to try local eatables, it was the Filipino soldier who succumbed faster to sickness than his American comrades. The author believes that the two nationalities held different opinions about General MacArthur. Whereas many American fighting men harbored feelings of "abandonment" (p. 222) because of MacArthur's exit from the archipelago in March 1942, their Filipino mates, according to Young, convinced themselves that the General meant to return soon with aid for the besieged command. Regrettably, the author fails to note any cross-cultural conflict between the two allies.

Somewhat surprisingly, Young makes an effort to rehabilitate the tarnished military reputation of Lt. Ferdinand Marcos, the last president of the Philippines. In 1986, Alfred McCoy, an American researcher, uncovered U.S. Army documents in the National Archives that revealed the deceitful braggadocio behind Marcos' claims of leading a guerrilla band numbering eight thousand and his boast of winning numerous medals. The same research casts a cloud of suspicion over Lieutenant Marcos' recognition for valor in operations on Bataan.

Young's study can serve as a primer for junior officers on the hazards of warfare in an impenetrable thicket. Indeed, the author shows how the "dense, infamous Bataan jungle...contributed decisively to successes and failure on both sides" (p. 51). In addition to bringing home a need to train recruits for night combat, the "irregular, confused, densely vegetated" (p. 77) terrain undermined physical contacts and communications between field units as well as thwarted their cohesion in positions along the front lines. Furthermore, the tangled jungle facilitated enemy stealth and concealment, hindered the effectiveness of tanks, and inspired a savage, no-holds barred style of fighting that set the tone for the Pacific war.

Still, and in spite of numerous attributes, which include a host of maps and many never-before-published photographs, Young's book fails to satisfy in several respects. Writing descriptively rather than analytically, he excerpts lengthy extracts from sources, interrupting the pace and flow of the account that should have been woven into the text. Also, his ubiquitous use of the word "unbeknownst" (pp. 208, 212, 224, 229, 258, 276, and 291) soon becomes annoying as well as distracting and should have been edited. Likewise, the author's attached appendixes are

unnecessary—they merely add pages of redundant information already presented in the narrative.

But this reviewer's major caveat is reserved for Young's methodology, rather than his styling. Relying too much on contemporary publications and ignoring recent studies, the author accepts participant versions on faith and at face value. At the very least, some effort at independent confirmation from the public record of wartime accounts should have been sought to verify the accuracy of the events under discussion.

Moreover, when examining Young's work, the informed reader experiences a sense of déja vu. John W. Whitman already has beaten Young to the punch and covered the subject in his *Bataan: Our Last Ditch* (1990), the magnum opus for the Bataan campaign. Whitman's impressive scholarship, based on a wide range of materials, demonstrates the roles played by both Filipinos and Americans and supplants Morton as the truly definitive study on the topic.

Dr. Rodney J. Ross is professor of history at the Harrisburg Area Community College in Pennsylvania. He has a special interest in the American colonial period in the Philippines.

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