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The U.S. Army Center of Military History: A Brief History

Terrence J. Gough

The Center of Military History traces its functional lineage to the Civil War era. An 1864 congressional authorization for the War Department to collect and publish the military records of the Civil War resulted in the appearance of 131 volumes of documents and maps between 1880 and 1901—a collection that remains an essential source for the study of that great national conflict. In a separate project, the War Department between 1870 and 1888 published a study (two volumes in six books) of the Union Army's medical experience, the first official histories of the U.S. Army.

Although Army regulations based on the General Staff Act of 1903 recognized historical study as a proper staff function, and there was some historical activity over the next fifteen years, not until March 1918 was a Historical Branch organized in the War Plans Division (ever since this slow start, the Army has maintained a central historical office). The branch's projected comprehensive, 65-volume history of U.S. Army participation in World War I never came to fruition because of postwar personnel reductions and Secretary of War Newton D. Baker's apprehension about controversy over economic, political, and diplomatic issues. He thought that the branch's work should be restricted to "the collection, indexing, and preservation of records and the preparation of such monographs as are purely military in character."

Notwithstanding a fifteen-volume history of the Medical Department's clinical and administrative experience in World War I, published by that branch in the 1920s, Baker's opinion exercised a limiting influence over the Army's historical work for a quarter of a century. The central historical office collected records in the United States and Europe for eventual publication, prepared about a dozen specialized studies of military operations in World War I, and began compiling and publishing a multivolume Army order of battle for the war. Nominally attached to the War College in Washington and redesignated the Historical Section in 1921, the historical staff actually continued its central role for Army headquarters and supervised all historical work in the War Department. In 1922 the section became responsible for determining the official lineages and battle honors of Army units. The section's staff, with a professional component composed mostly of military officers, spent an increasing portion of its time answering queries from the Army and the public about the recent war and earlier Army history.

America's entry into World War II brought the Historical Section important and varied duties. To deal with the war's exigencies, the Army's leaders needed to know how their predecessors of twenty-five years before had dealt with similar challenges. The Historical Section began responding to requests for studies, producing the first one, "Deficiencies in Transportation, 1917-1918," on 6 March 1942 and sixty-one more by the end of the war. Reference inquiries from War Department agencies rose from a stream of about a thousand in 1942 to a torrent of well over ten thousand in 1943. Units peppered the historians with questions—eighteen thousand in 1944 alone—about their organizations' history. Initially, the Historical Section also had supervisory responsibility for historical offices that the Army's major commands established in 1942. Three-quarters of the section's enlarged staff nonethe-

less continued work on the World War I documents (collection of which in French and German archives had not ended until 1940) and order of battle, so that the seventeen volumes of documents and last volume of the order of battle appeared in 1947 and 1949, respectively.

With the wartime Historical Section thus engaged, the Army in 1943 organized in the G-2 (Intelligence) division of the General Staff an additional historical office with responsibility for the history of World War II. All of the senior officers in the Historical Section during the war were retired men recalled to active duty, and some of them were over seventy. A separate office was necessary to provide the vigorous leadership required for a large new effort. The second entity's placement in G-2 was a matter not of any particular functional affinity, but rather of administrative convenience.

President Franklin D. Roosevelt catalyzed the creation of the second office through the Committee on Records of War Administration, his instrument for ensuring that executive agencies would preserve "for those who come after us an accurate and objective account of our present experience." Both civilian and military War Department leaders supported the eventual publication of a comprehensive narrative history of the Army's experience in the war—precisely what had not been done for World War I. Building the groundwork to realize that vision, the new Historical Branch, G-2, recruited, trained, and deployed historians—primarily civilians who had brought academic history credentials to their military service—to supervise the gathering and preservation of the necessary documents.

To ensure that a definitive and comprehensive history of World War II would come to fruition, the Historical Branch needed a stronger and more secure position in War Department headquarters. In November 1945 the branch achieved that goal with its departure from G-2 and establishment as the Historical Division, headed by a general officer, in the Special Staff. The division absorbed the staff and functions of the Army War College Historical Section in 1947.

Employing mostly civilian professional historians who had practiced their craft, as soldiers, in overseas theaters during the war, the Historical Division embarked on the most ambitious U.S.



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official history project ever, the United States Army in World War II series. Since 1947 the division and its successors have published seventy-seven volumes in the series, and the final volume is being edited for publication. These books describe in detail the organization, plans, and operations of the War Department and the Army in the zone of interior and in all of the Army's five theaters of operations from 1939 to 1945. A massive accumulation of source material, mainly official records of the Army's activities but also captured enemy documents and statements and writings of enemy officers, undergirds this vast work.

The Historical Division produced additional studies on World War II and on other aspects of the Army's history, while also performing related historical functions. Published as Department of the Army pamphlets (many of them book-length), the studies included many German Army subjects, such as operations in the Balkans, and chronologically broader treatments of the U.S. Army's experience in such areas as mobilization, demobilization, and personnel replacement. The division gave expanded attention to unit lineages and honors, the determination of which would become increasingly complex with successive reorganizations of the field forces in the post-World War II era. Eight volumes in an Army Lineage Series have since appeared. Staff support and general reference services continued, with a reference collection significantly augmented by World War II historical manuscripts and other unpublished material. In 1946 the division acquired from the Military District of Washington policy-making and staff duties for, and in 1949 full responsibility for, historical properties, including a large collection of Army and captured enemy war art. The redesignation of the division as the Office of the Chief of Military History (OCMH) in March 1950 reflected the expansion of the agency's mission.

Work on the World War II books was proceeding intensively when the United States unexpectedly entered the sudden conflict in Korea in June 1950. A quickly established field history program, manned largely by reserve officers called to active duty from academe, produced valuable

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unpublished monographs. Most of the reserve officers returned to civilian life after the war. OCMH began a series of major narrative volumes, of which five ultimately would be published in the U.S. Army in the Korean War. The office's major efforts remained focused on World War II.

As OCMH steadily completed the bulk of the World War II work in the 1950s and early 1960s, the size of the history staff decreased, even as Army and public calls for historical support and information increased. It was a time of generally static budgets. Organizational streamlining terminated OCMH's status as a Special Staff agency and brought it under the direct supervision and control of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations in 1956, as part of an effort to reduce the number of agencies reporting to the Chief of Staff.

In conjunction with a general reorganization of the Army's headquarters and major continental commands in 1962, the Chief of Staff directed the Chief of Military History to take steps to ensure effective coordination and supervision of all of the Army's history efforts. OCMH absorbed some of the functions of the historical offices of the Army's abolished technical services, while various commands established new historical offices. The result was an improved balance in historical coverage of the Army. In October 1962, Army Regulation 870-5, the first consolidated governance of all of the service's historical activities, was issued. Fiscal year 1963 saw the first issuance of the annual Army Historical Program, which encompassed the historical activities of OCMH and major commands and agencies.

During this period, the demands of the Army Staff for special studies began to increase as the United States became more involved in Vietnam. With President Lyndon B. Johnson's announcement in July 1965 of plans for Army expansion and for large deployments to Vietnam, OCMH stepped up its attention to the conflict. By the end of 1966, the office had developed a tentative plan for a multivolume history of the Army's role in Vietnam, and work on the series began in earnest in the 1970s. The number of volumes fluctuated with the course of the war and with changing perspectives afterwards. Five volumes have been published, and nine others are in progress. Unlike World War II and the Korean War, during and after which field historians wrote many detailed monographs, the Vietnam War did not result in the production of a rich lode of studies upon which to base a multivolume history. Two-man military history detachments in Vietnam concentrated more strictly on collecting information and helping units prepare operations reports that stressed lessons learned. OCMH assisted the detachments and in turn benefited from them by giving some of their commanders (most of whom were reserve officers) orientations before deployment and by assigning points of contact in OCMH for those deployed. The office also sponsored the deployment of military and civilian artists to record images of the war.

OCMH added a significant historical resource to its organization during the Vietnam War. The U.S. Army Military History Research Collection, which was established at the Army War College in June 1967, became a Class II activity of OCMH in January 1970. Creation of the collection provided a repository for extensive library materials of great historical value that otherwise would have been dispersed as installations closed and as Army libraries necessarily made room for recent accessions. In addition, the collection served as a needed center for the acquisition and preservation of the personal papers of leading military figures. All of these materials are of great value to military and civilian scholars writing Army history. In October 1985, control of the Military History Institute (as the collection had been renamed in 1977) shifted from the Chief of Military History to the Commandant of the Army War College in order to facilitate command and control as well as resource management. The realignment into two separate agencies underlined the unique mission of each and improved service to the field, since each entity could now respond directly to requests for its specialized types of historical assistance.

Meanwhile, OCMH in June 1973 became the Center of Military History (CMH), a field operating agency under the general staff supervision of

the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations (later the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans). CMH retained that status until March 1989, when it was redesignated a field operating agency under the proponency of the Office of the Chief of Staff, Army.

Organizationally, the 1970s saw one major addition to CMH. In 1978 the Center absorbed the Army Medical Department's Historical Unit, which had published dozens of volumes of clinical and administrative history of World War II. CMH continued to publish volumes in the two series. A total of forty-five of these books has appeared to date.

Several major trends emerged in CMH in the 1980s. Early in the decade, the Center began to give the Army museum system more direct staff supervision, including museum assistance, management and acquisition of historical artifacts, improvement of conservation standards, and professional training. Along with that new emphasis, the start of planning for a National Museum of the United States Army and the need to ensure the Army's compliance with laws governing the nation's material culture caused CMH to devote significantly more personnel to material culture functions. In 1983 the staff support and reference functions were consolidated in a new division, as CMH placed greater stress on providing the Army Staff and the Secretariat with historical perspective designed to aid in decision-making. Finally, field and international programs grew. The Center increased its guidance and support to major and subordinate command historical offices and to Army-wide military history education and leader development activities; conducted staff rides; and maintained liaison and exchange programs with counterpart military history offices abroad.

Beginning with the invasion of Panama in 1989, the Center has deployed uniformed historians in contingency operations. CMH historians collected documents and did oral history interviewing there and in Saudi Arabia, Somalia, and Haiti. A historian is now deployed to Bosnia. In addition, the Center sent Army artists to record contingency operations, including the service's role in disaster relief in the wake of Hurricane Andrew in Florida in 1992.

All of these operations, but most especially the Persian Gulf War in 1991, brought the staff support function to the fore as CMH historians turned out short-suspense information papers on demand. CMH provided well over a hundred papers to the Pentagon and to the Army in the field during the buildup and the operations of DESERT STORM.

On 22 March 1995, the Deputy Secretary of Defense appointed the Army as the executive agent for the declassification of all Persian Gulf War operational records. In May 1995, CMH became the office of primary responsibility for this project within the Army and is proceeding with the mission. The Center is also involved in planning for the implementation of Executive Order 12958, regarding declassification more generally.

In 1995 CMH passed the fiftieth anniversary of the establishment of the Historical Division—a milestone in the central historical office's history—virtually without remark. Yet there was an observance in spirit. For the people of the Center of Military History expended considerable effort during the year helping to commemorate the Army's role in the climactic events of World War II. They celebrated their own anniversary by doing what they have always always done: serving the United States Army.

Terrence J. Gough, Chief, Staff Support Branch, Research and Analysis Division, has been a historian with the Center since 1979.

The Chief's Corner

John W. (Jack) Mountcastle

Change is constant. Since our last issue of *Army History*, we have seen the conclusion of one major contingency mission (Haiti) and the maturation of another in Bosnia. The continuing reduction in the number of active divisions has led to the retirement of the proud standards of the 2d Armored Division ("Hell on Wheels") and the 24th Mechanized Infantry—the "Victory Division." Accompanying redesignations in Wuerzburg, Fort Stewart, and Fort Hood, also meant changes that went far beyond repainting bumper numbers and sewing on new shoulder patches. The Center of Military History (CMH) has been, and continues to be, deeply involved in facilitating the decision making that has gone into the execution of all of these major actions. Whether it's sending field commanders the implementing directives they require to carry out mandated changes, locating missing flags and guidons needed for reflagging ceremonies, or assisting field units with the transportation of museum artifacts from one installation to another, the staff at CMH is fully engaged.

Change has been clearly evident at the Center itself. I hope that you've had a chance to visit the CMH homepage on the worldwide web. We are very excited about the possibilities offered by our entry to the net. The Center is reaching a greater audience than ever before. We are actively seeking ideas from other members of the Army history family throughout the Army, but especially at Fort Leavenworth, West Point, and Carlisle Barracks, on ways to improve our outreach to our cybernet audience.

I discussed in a previous issue the work that the Army is doing for the entire Department of Defense as the coordinating agency for the review and declassification of operational records from Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. Our efforts in this new mission have truly begun to pay off as the Navy and Marine Corps have collocated their declassification task force with ours in the Skyline 5 Building at Baileys Crossroads. The pioneering work being done there by Lt. Col. Steve Dietrich and his great team of officers, NCOs, DA civilians, and contractors has been the subject of intense interest by a wide variety of government agencies anxious to find ways to digitize paper records for enhanced record keeping and data retrieval. We are responsible through the Army Secretariat to the Deputy Secretary of Defense for the review/declassification by 31 December 1996 of nearly four million pages of records. These records (generated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the U.S. Central Command, and all the services) are critical to the Defense Department's in-depth review of documents which may shed some light on medical conditions being reported by veterans of the Persian Gulf War.

Even as the Army in the field is changing its shape and size, so too is Headquarters, Department of the Army. At the direction of General Dennis Reimer, the Chief of Staff, the Army Staff has been engaged for the past six months in a detailed review of its own organization, giving special attention to reducing the number of field operating agencies (FOAs) currently reporting directly to a principal staff office in the Pentagon. The Center of Military History, formerly a FOA of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (DCSOPS), became a FOA reporting directly to the Chief of Staff through the Director of the Army Staff in the late 1980s. We have been involved in this Army Staff review from the first, and continue to be a part of the ongoing assessment of "fit, form, and function"

so critical to the future Army, Force XXI. We also are assisting the Army's office space managers in their search for a different (less expensive) site for our offices. The current 14th Street location is simply too expensive to maintain for much longer. So, for the fourth time in ten years, the Center of Military History is planning to march order to a new location. We've done it before—we ought to be getting good at it!

As I write this (March 1996), we have not been informed of just what the future holds in store for the Center of Military History and for the Army's history program. Needless to say, we all are most anxious to retain as much as possible of our capacity to serve the Army in all the areas in which we currently are making a contribution. We feel that our program has a great deal to offer in leader development, in staff support for informed decision making, and in the maintenance of the Army's heritage. As I noted in the first paragraph, CMH is a key element in the effective and efficient management of organizational change currently being carried out in the field. We are convinced that our value is evident to the Army. Whatever decisions are made, I want you to know that we will execute them to the best of our ability. So, until my next letter to you, let me extend my best wishes for success in all you do for the Army and for the nation.

Editor's Journal

A quick glance at this issue will reveal that we now are publishing Army History in a more open format, which we hope will be easier on our readers' eyes.

In his Chief's Corner, above, General Mountcastle addressess the impact realignment in the Army may have on the Center and its future. He also introduces the CMH Homepage, which the webmaster describes more fully in the following item.

Arnold G. Fisch, Jr.

U.S. Army Center of Military (CMH) Homepage Established

The Center's homepage will attempt to provide the U.S. Armed Forces and members of the general public with rapid access to the institutional memory of the U.S. Army. Initially, the site will be more of a finding aide to resources than an actual library, archive, or museum. For example, it will provide access to our publications catalog, and information about the primary and secondary historical resources held at the Center. As the site develops and grows, however, it will begin to display actual CMH publications, documents, and museum artifacts. It is conceivable that one day, every book published by the Center and every artifact in the Army art collection will be accessible online through the Internet, so please logon to the site and return often.

Our uniform resource locator (URL): http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg

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The Personal Part of History

Susan Canedy

In days long gone, it was common for people of significance to keep, often in the literal sense, a historian at court. These recorders, or scribes, were part of the inner circle and were responsible for writing and—dare we admit it—rewriting the history of the Significant Ones.

In the United States, perhaps the closest we come to that type of arrangement is the personal—or official—biographer, an individual historian designated, frequently by the significant personage, to write his or her "official" or "authorized" life. Those of us in the field of history often turn to these biographers as we would turn to the significant figure himself for the first-person account of the "truth"; the "real" story. Official biographers, then, perform invaluable service to recorded history. They take the pen for those who can't, or won't, or shouldn't, and fill in the holes to form the story from which the past will be remembered.

Now, to be sure, there is another aspect to any "official" history. While historians may turn to it for answers close to the source and unavailable elsewhere, there is the distinct possibility of taint, the very real consideration that the official historian has gotten close enough to the Significant to become as-the-Significant, and to lose his or her objectivity. With that danger in mind, back to my court scenario.

In February 1994 I was selected to become personal historian to General Frederick M. Franks, Jr., then commanding general of the U.S. Army's Training and Doctrine Command. General Franks had been in command of TRADOC almost two and a half years. During those years, he had been well served by the entire history contingent at the headquarters, headed by Dr. H.O. Malone and staffed by four historians and one curator. Each one of us was fully occupied doing our jobs: collecting and archiving documents, supporting the staff, running the field and military history education programs, and researching and writing history to a variety of depths.

By the fall of 1993, General Franks and his immediate staff had determined the need for closer coverage. Comfortable in command and with two years of preparatory vision laid down, General Franks launched the TRADOC arm of the Army's Force XXI, termed Joint Venture. Ever mindful of history in its entirety—from the proper recording of events on the spot, careful reading and analysis of the past, and prudent application or questioning of that past to the future— General Franks felt that the times, and his personal link with them, were special enough to warrant closer, more personal attention.

Rather than distract the chief historian from the management of the broad TRADOC history program, he designated one more likely to be able to focus on the types of duties the position of personal historian would entail. And that's a point of this small article. When I became General Franks' historian, I thought I would be doing different things. Perhaps I thought I would receive a long flowing robe and a quill pen! What I found is that I did my regular job(s)—plus. I found that, in fact, many of us are personal historians to a greater or lesser degree.

I served as personal historian for about a year, all things considered, with the job split up into about three phases: from February 1994 until General Franks changed command and left TRADOC in October; the transition month before his retirement; and the clean-up. It may be worth noting that none of this was considered "beyond my job." Throughout the entire process I maintained my office and my duties in the history office. When it was time to process the official and personal files, I put on my archivist hat and my assistant, Mrs. Pat Mark, and I moved into the top floor of the command building to be better surrounded by the work. But for the most part, all of my duties were considered staff support.

In the beginning, my duties revolved around General Franks' schedule. I sat in on a lot of meetings, and I took a lot of notes. In fact, I am sure that I have sat, and for long periods of time, in almost every uncomfortable chair in this headquarters! I traveled with him when either of us felt his trip was worth special atten-

tion. I listened, I observed, I noted—all to be able to capture not only the chain of events but also to understand those who actively participated and deliberated and made the decisions. I was allowed access to virtually everything, and I will always be grateful for the consideration and respect that was afforded not only to me, but to the process of capturing history.

In between the seemingly endless succession of meetings and briefings, I was able to conduct some oral history interviews and write some small articles. Document collection was a major focus from the outset. From the vantage point of the commanding general's office, I was able to watch with greater clarity the origination and flow of documents. Following them and making sure that they ended up in a historical collection became easier. Fortunately (or unfortunately), that generated and is still generating, more work for the archivist, but will provide a richer document base from which to work in the future.

Perhaps the most specific contribution was made merely by my presence. While the placement of my chair was often unobtrusive, my being in that chair was not. My presence indicated General Franks', and the Army's, support for historians and for the history function. The addition of my name on calendar cards, attendance lists, and seating plans resulted in an awareness of historians and their jobs which extended beyond that previously accorded to the history function and which is still in evidence in TRADOC today.

General Franks relinquished command at the end of October 1994. The month that followed he spent at the Pentagon in Washington, D.C., in transition to retirement. It was a busy month as the general finished his ongoing business and we hustled to support him. Pat Mark and I concentrated on the files, official and personal, and prepared them for final disposition. In accord with General Franks' wishes, we prepared the official files for digitization into the Automated Historical Archives (AHAS) at Fort Leavenworth and then for retirement to the National Archives. The files are extensive, and working through them, page by page, document by document, was an incredible job. As I write one year later, the unclassified official files, some thirteen boxes, have been loaded into the AHAS database and the originals are on their way to the National Archives. A paper copy will be added to the Franks Collection in the TRADOC Military History Office. The personal files were handled a little differently. We inventoried them only to the file-folder level, organized them chronologically, and then provided them to General Franks to work with until he desired to "retire" them, most probably to the Military History Institute. During this transition time we processed not only the archival material but artifactual and materiel aspects of his tenure as well. General Franks donated a great deal of historically significant material to the Army museum system. Additionally, General Franks' final interview was taken during this month. This one we did a little differently than others we had done in years past—we videotaped it. Later we transcribed the audio from the video so we have both records.

With General Franks' retirement in December, the transition team came home and cleaned up remaining tasks at Fort Monroe. That involved finishing the files and shipping them, beginning the assembly of the Franks Collection with the TRADOC archives, writing a small perspective piece for the annual history, and tying up a variety of loose ends from associated projects including the final details of a BBC (British Broadcasting Company) production on General Franks and the VII Corps in DESERT STORM to the VII Corps history.

With the turn of the year, my stint as personal historian was over, at least in the direct sense. I came back into the TRADOC Military History Office, at least for a time, much enriched from my experience. I learned a lot about the process of contemporary history. I learned a lot about history beyond TRADOC, and I learned a lot more about TRADOC. I learned a lot about General Franks and the job of commanding general. I learned a lot about the staff and the interactions that make up staff work. And I learned a lot about my fellow Army historians. As I wrote earlier, I found out that most Army historians, particularly those who work alone in organizations, are personal historians to some extent. We all attempt to capture the tenor and pulse of the command at the commander's level and with his breadth of vision and experience. Happily for tomorrow's history, most of us are successful.

Dr. Susan Canedy is Chief, Historical Programs, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, and also serves as the archivist at TRADOC's history office.

Air Force Historical Research Agency Grants Announced

The Air Force Historical Research Agency is offering research grants to encourage students to study the history of air power, through the use of the U.S. Air Force historical document collection at the agency, Maxwell AFB, Alabama. Awards range from $250 to $2,500. Selectees must meet the criteria stated in this announcement and be willing to visit the agency for research during fiscal year 1997 (ending 30 September 1997). Recipients will be designated "Research Associates of the Air Force Historical Research Agency."

Criteria

Applicants must have a graduate degree in history or related fields, or equivalent scholarly accomplishments. Their specialty or professional experience must be in aeronautics, astronautics, or military-related subjects. They must not be in residence at Maxwell AFB, Alabama, and must be willing to visit the agency for a sufficient time to use the research materials for their proposed projects. Active duty military personnel are eligible to receive a grant.

Topics of Research

Topics of research may include, but are not restricted to, Air Force history, military operations, education, training, administration, strategy, tactics, logistics, weaponry, technology, organization, policy, activities, and institutions. Broader subjects suitable for a grant include military history, civil-military relations, history of aeronautics or astronautics, relations among U.S. branches of service, military biographies, and international military relations. Preference will be given to those proposals that involve the use of primary sources held at the agency. Proposals for research of classified subjects include nuclear weapons and war planning, weapons systems presently in the Air Force inventory, and Air Force operations since the Vietnam War.

Application Deadline

Applicants can request an application from the Commander, Air Force Historical Research Agency, 600 Chennault Circle, Maxwell AFB, AL 36112-6424. The completed applications must be returned by 1 October 1996.

Lt. Gen. Edward L. Rowny Memoirs Available

Engineer Memoirs: Lieutenant General Edward L. Rowny, Former Ambassador, the ninth publication Engineer Memoirs series of career interviews, is now available from the Office of History, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. Dr. Barry W. Fowle conducted the interview, based on a series of recorded conversations between July 1986 and September 1990. The original tapes and unedited transcript are in the Research Collections, Office of History, Headquarters, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Alexandria, Virginia. Ms. Marilyn Hunter of the Office of History provided editorial and technical support for the publication.

The Army Civilian Training, Education, and Development System (ACTEDS) Plan for Historians

R. Cody Phillips

Late last year, every historical office and activity within the Army Historical Program received a copy of the recently approved Army Civilian Training, Education, and Development System (ACTEDS) plan for GS-170 historians. Copies of this ACTEDS plan also were provided to all major Army command civilian personnel offices and to every personnel office that services an Army activity. This ACTEDS plan, only the fifth to be developed and approved in the Army, represents a significant step toward developing a systemic approach to providing comprehensive training and education for the professional development of historians at all grade levels.

The origins of the Army Civilian Training, Education, and Development System date from 1985, when the Department of the Army Inspector General (DAIG) reported major deficiencies in personnel management and training for Army civilians. The DAIG's report prompted a series of initiatives that were designed to improve the management and leadership of the civilian workforce and make the personnel system more responsive to the needs of all civilian employees. Career development and training were among the primary components of this modernization project, and implementation of ACTEDS plans for all career fields became one of the essential elements of the overall program.

Army Regulation 600-3, *The Army Personnel Proponent System*, dated 25 June 1993, designated the Chief of Military History as the personnel proponent for all uniformed military historians with the 5X skill identifier. He also is the personnel proponent for Career Field 61, which includes all civilians in these classification series: GS-170 historian, GS-1010 exhibits specialist, GS-1015 museum curator, and GS-1016 museum aide/technician/specialist. A separate ACTEDS plan for museum personnel, which was begun in 1992, was approved last year. The ACTEDS plan for historians was prepared under the supervision of the Army's Chief Historian.

The overall objective of any ACTEDS plan is to provide sequential and progressive professional development for all civilians in a specified career field from the entry level through the most senior grades. Essentially, it is designed to parallel the professional development that military personnel receive during their careers. To achieve this objective, ACTEDS plans blend an assortment of training and educational opportunities with developmental assignments and individual initiatives. Its functional design is intended to provide civilian personnel with a map to guide them in their careers and in their preparation for higher levels of responsibility.

There are two basic kinds of training and education in every ACTEDS plan: universal and competitive. Universal training is available to all employees who have similar duties and responsibilities. This type of training is divided into three categories: mandatory priority one training, which must be completed as a condition of further employment; mandatory priority two training, which is less urgent and meant to improve an employee's performance; and recommended training, which usually includes courses that would be helpful to an employee, but are not critical to his or her professional development. As the phrase implies, competitive training is restricted to individuals who are selected for professional development in preparation for higher levels of responsibilities within an organization or a program.

In most ACTEDS plans, there is a clear division between "specialist tracks" and "leader (or leader development) tracks." The former deals with individuals who stay in nonsupervisory positions, but still are able to achieve promotions and career advancement by remaining in a specialized occupational field. The "leader track," however, identifies individuals who assume supervisory positions and advance to higher grades as managers or leaders. Generally, prescribed training is tailored appropriately between these two career paths, with the principal difference being the

inclusion of mandatory training for supervisory personnel. In the historians' ACTEDS plan, however, we modified this structure.

Historians have different specialties and responsibilities, which the current Office of Personnel Management qualification and classification standards do not clearly distinguish. In the Army Historical Program, we have teaching historians, writing historians, research historians, and oral historians. Some of these personnel may be supervisors; many others have duties which combine two or more of these responsibilities—sometimes permanently, and occasionally temporarily. While most deal with military history, their duties may be limited to specific subject areas, such as the history of a branch or a period of time. Occasionally, some Army historians may labor in other fields, such as political, social, economic, or diplomatic history. While some pride themselves on their particular specialization (e.g., a teaching historian covering modern warfare), others proclaim their flexibility as generalists (e.g., a historian who writes monographs, does research for the command, teaches an occasional class, and covers the history of the U.S. Army from 1775 to the present). Mixed in with all this are the number of supervisors, which varies regularly and is never dependent upon who is a specialist and who is a leader.

We took this tangled heap of cargo netting and found a common strand that accommodated the present situation, while still meeting the basic objectives of an ACTEDS plan. Usually, Army historians could be identified as either generalists or specialists. The generalists tend to come from smaller historical offices, where it is necessary for the historian to perform a variety of tasks. Specialists usually work in larger historical offices, where the scope of their duties and even the focus of their studies can be more narrowly defined. Supervisors can be found in either category—usually, but not always, at the higher grade levels.

We found that historical offices at divisions, installations, corps, or schools typically were staffed with one or two personnel—neither of whom would necessarily have supervisory responsibilities. Yet, in a fiscally enriched environment or following an organizational realignment, some of these personnel might assume supervisory responsibilities, particularly with the addition of support personnel or new missions (e.g., combining a historical office with an Army museum). These events could not be predicted. And when they did occur, it was immaterial whether a historian wanted to be identified as a "specialist" or a "leader." If he or she was the senior-graded civilian in the organization, he or she became the supervisor.

Another variation from the typical ACTEDS plan for other career fields is that the one for GS-170 historians may be applied to civilian employees who are temporarily detailed to serve as historians. Although there are few individuals in this category Army-wide, the reasoning was that a plan such as ours could improve the effectiveness of "historical officers" and perhaps even help qualify them for permanent positions as Army historians. No other ACTEDS plan in the Army has consciously tried to be as inclusive. The Civilian Personnel Management Directorate, which is the Army's proponent office under the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, formally approved the ACTEDS plan for GS-170 historians in October 1995.

The Army Civilian Training, Education, and Development System has a number of strengths. First and foremost, it formally establishes the minimum training and education that civilian employees in various career fields should receive at different grade levels during their time of service in a given position. This does not mean that every course that an ACTEDS plan lists must be completed within a specific period of time and for every individual in a comparable grade. Neither does it mean that employees can bludgeon supervisors with demands for immediate compliance—especially if funds are not available, or mission requirements do not permit releasing personnel for training. However, the plan at least establishes parameters for training that employees should receive and that supervisors should consider when planning professional development for themselves and their staffs.

Second, an approved ACTEDS plan can serve as the guide in preparing individual development plans (IDP). In fact, it virtually replaces the old IDP requirement from earlier personnel management practices, and it facilitates planning professional development activities for both the individual and the organization by providing a centralized reference for everyone involved in planning future training needs.

A recurring problem for many historians has been the frustrating cycle of always justifying attendance at

or participation in professional colloquia. Some supervisors, unfamiliar with the historical profession, have dismissed annual conferences and meetings as unimportant and costly events of dubious educational merit. The ACTEDS plan for historians legitimizes such annual sessions as justifiable professional development opportunities because the personnel proponent for Career Field 61 has officially identified specific colloquia in which individuals should participate.

Realistically, funds may not always be available for attendance at the most desired training courses. The Army Civilian Training, Education, and Development System establishes the policies for career development, but it does not provide the funds to implement the policies. Although there is an initiative from the Civilian Personnel Management Directorate to provide some funds for personnel proponents in support of approved ACTEDS plans, for now individuals and supervisors must see to their own resources to finance many of the courses cited in the historians' ACTEDS plan.

Generic knowledge, skills, and abilities (KSAs) that are typical for historians at different grade levels are included in the ACTEDS plan to show how specific courses can meet a prescribed KSA. These same KSAs also might be used as a guide for supervisors when it becomes necessary to initiate recruitment for vacancies—but that is not why they were included in the historians' ACTEDS plan. The generic KSAs in this plan are intended to be a "universal fit" for a typical position. They do not represent specific KSAs for specific recruitment actions.

Neither should the historians' ACTEDS plan be construed as a lever to determine grade levels, position classifications, or scope of duties and responsibilities. The ACTEDS plan is a training document that is designed to provide guidance and direction for the professional development activities of personnel employed in the Army Historical Program. What may stand out in this new plan are the many courses which are not related exclusively to the historical profession. Most of these courses deal with supervisory and managerial training.

Supervisors must complete specific training courses prior to assuming supervisory responsibilities or soon after accepting a supervisory position. Specific supervisory training is a regulatory requirement—what Department of the Army calls "core leader development courses," such as the Leadership Education and Development (LEAD) course and the Organizational Leadership for Executives (OLE) course. Although most required supervisory training is not actively enforced now (largely because of limitations in class size and availability), it is likely that personnel and proponent offices will be monitoring compliance in the future. An individual who fails to have the minimum requisite supervisory training at a lower grade could be disqualified for promotions to higher graded supervisory positions.

The plan is written for three audiences: the historian, who is planning his or her career and professional development; the historian's supervisor, who should be considering what training and education would be helpful for the employee and the organization; and the personnel staffing specialist, who may be called upon to advise others concerning developmental training opportunities. Although a number of courses are listed in the ACTEDS plan for each grade, it does not mean that an individual must enroll in every course that is listed. Neither does it mean that an annual conference must be attended every year. While the historians' ACTEDS plan was being developed, every effort was made to include typical training courses that any historian in a particular grade level should have or be eligible to receive. Yet, even in this small career field, there are some specialized courses that are unique for only selected individuals. We tried to make allowances for this by including a generic listing called "Specialized Training/Education." Also, there may be times when a course comparable to one already listed in the ACTEDS plan would be more appropriate for an individual. The plan provides for the substitution of equivalent training for courses that are already listed.

It is important to remember that we are dealing only with one aspect of personnel proponency. We are not establishing a career management program for historians. That is an entirely different issue, and given the low number of personnel employed as GS-170 historians in the Army, it is not likely that an active career management program would work. Nevertheless, personnel proponency does provide some of the benefits that customarily are associated with career management programs.

Individuals who apply for competitive training

under the historians' ACTEDS plan will be referred to the personnel proponent to ensure that only the best qualified individuals in a career field receive one of the limited billets for a course. And with an approved ACTEDS plan in place, it should be much easier for historians in subordinate commands to justify and secure training and education courses for their professional and career development. And finally, by establishing the prescribed training and typical career path for Army historians, the personnel proponent will be able to influence the direction of individual careers and further solidify the Army Historical Program.

The ACTEDS plan is an essential element of personnel proponency, but it is only the beginning of a number of initiatives that will revolutionize the Army's personnel management system. Even now, there are discussions of possibly introducing pay-banding and classification grouping within the next four or five years. Such initiatives could be facilitated by the possibility of further force reductions in the TDA side of the Army, which may necessitate the consolidation of multiple historical activities within commands or installations. By the next decade, all personnel management functions may be processed through the automated Core Document Project (COREDOC), an experimental menu-driven program that can process personnel actions in minutes. (The day may come when an employee could retire on one day, and within 24 hours, the position could be restructured, reclassified, recruited, and filled without the supervisor ever leaving his or her desk.)

As the civilian workforce continues to decline in numbers, the professional abilities of all employees will become even more important in maintaining the effectiveness of organizations and programs. This is especially true for the Army Historical Program, which employs one of the smallest career fields in the Army. Being among one of the very first to respond to these personnel management initiatives gives us a unique vantage from which we can benefit from our early participation and also be prepared for other initiatives still to come.

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Evolution of Major-Caliber U.S. Coastal Defense Guns, 1888-1945

William H. Dorrance

Echoing in part the report of the Gun Foundry Board of 1883, the 1886 report of the Board on Fortifications or Other Defenses (the Endicott Board, named for Secretary of War William C. Endicott) ushered the United States into a new era of coast defense. From the time of this board until the end of World War II, the nation's coastal defenses would include high-power, steel, breech-loading, rifled cannon. While the tie to the ancient muzzle-loading, cast-iron cannon was severed, transition to the new cannon was painfully slow, as the Army struggled to obtain funding, manufacture cannon, develop and fabricate carriages, perfect tactics, and train personnel. What follows is the story of that struggle and subsequent progress.

Strategy Without Tactics, 1886-1893

The Endicott Board captured the attention of Congress with a 391-page report filled with details on strategy and weaponry relating to the coastal defense of the United States. The report could not fail to impress the most jaded reader, and Congress took two years to digest its implications. Finally, in 1888, Congress began appropriating funds for projects consistent with the grand plan the board had outlined.

The Ordnance Department established a Seacoast Cannon Shop within the Army Gun Factory at Watervliet, New York; settled on the Watertown Arsenal, Massachusetts, as the fabricator of cannon carriages; and awarded contracts to domestic producers

for steel billets and iron castings, as a major overhaul of the nation's defenses got under way.

The production of major-caliber guns, that is, 8-inch, 10-inch, and 12-inch caliber steel, breech-loading, rifled guns and 12-inch breech-loading rifled mortars, dominated the post-Endicott Board years, along with a concerted effort to install submarine mining facilities at numerous harbors to the exclusion of numerous other weapons recommended by the Endicott Board. Congress failed, however, to fund the 14-inch guns, more than one 16-inch gun, 6- and 10-inch mortars, turrets, more than 2 gun lifts, armor plate, 5 floating batteries, 150 torpedo boats, and 12 lake boats—all of which also had been recommended by the board. Using the board's own cost estimates, Congress did not fund fully 65 percent of the total cost of the weapons recommended. The reasons for this shortfall can be inferred by using data included in the board's report. Through design or just luck, Congress allocated just enough funding to accomplish the objectives, and no more.

In 1886 the objectives of coast defense were defined to include protecting commercially important coastal cities from offshore bombardment, providing a safe haven for the nation's merchant fleet, and protecting coastal shipping.

Numerous countries in 1886 had or were building respectable navies. The Endicott Board catalogued the number of naval vessels as heavily armored major warships armed with large-caliber guns, lightly armored and longer range cruisers armed with medium- to large-caliber guns, and lesser special purpose vessels.

Consider, for example, characteristics of Italy's warship *Italia* and Chile's light cruiser *Esmeralda*, representative, respectively, of major warships and cruisers:

Italia, launched in 1880, displacing 14,400 tons, 30.5-foot draft, with four 17-inch guns, and 18-inch armor.

Esmeralda, launched in 1883, displacing 2,920 tons, 18.5-foot draft with two 10-inch guns, and protection limited to gun shields and to coal bunkers positioned around the ship's vitals.

The Endicott Board considered recent tests of various caliber rifled guns when used against steel and face-hardened armor and took note of recent experiments with mortars used against deck armor. For example, using turn-of-the-century data, the board calculated the maximum effective ranges (in yards) for various cannon against the protective armor of the *Italia* and the *Esmeralda* as follows:

	8-inch gun	10-inch	12-inch	12-inch mortar
Italia	700	3,200	8,750	15,200
Esmeralda	12,900	14,000	13,500	15,200

Note: Mortars penetrate 3-inch deck armor at ranges less than shown, depending upon emplacement locations. Gun ranges are limited by disappearing carriage, first emplaced in 1896.

In 1886, large-caliber shipboard guns, like the 17-inch guns of the *Italia*, were pointed by gunners using an open sight. The accuracy of the guns pointed in such a way was limited to 2,000 yards at best, and high elevations of the guns were unnecessary. If the defenses could keep such vessels beyond 2,000 yards, precise ship-to-shore bombardment was not possible. Further, if the defense could keep the enemy beyond the 8,000-10,000 yard range, the enemy could not reach land with his low-elevation guns, regardless of accuracy.

As noted in the statistics above, mortars could prevent all naval vessels attempting shore bombardment from anchoring within 15,200 yards. The 10-inch and 12-inch guns of the day threatened vessels such as *Italia* at ranges beyond the 2,000-yard accurate range of her guns, and all of the cannon threatened cruisers beyond the effective range of their guns. Coast defense strategy, therefore, consisted of determining the combination of cannon with their locations to be distributed among important harbors along the nation's shores.

The board studied each commercially or strategically important harbor to determine the deepest draft vessel that could pass over the shallowest barrier at the harbor entrance. San Francisco harbor, for example, would admit naval vessels of the deepest draft (such as *Italia*), whereas New Bedford's shallows would limit harbor entry to cruisers (like *Esmeralda*). New Bedford, by the board's calculations, needed no 10-inch or 12-inch guns (it was not until 1924 that the city's Fort Rodman got its 12-inch guns at Battery Milliken).

According to this line of reasoning, 14-inch and 16-inch guns were unnecessary, and the eventual obso-

lescence of the fixed emplacements of 8-inch guns when used in deep-draft harbor defenses against capital ships was foretold. Indeed, the only 16-inch gun (mounted on a disappearing carriage) inspired by the Endicott Board was emplaced in 1917 at Fort Grant and named Battery Newton, as part of the harbor defenses of Balboa, Panama.

At the time, the artillery arm lacked a chief, and no representatives served on the Endicott Board. As a consequence, the board failed to allow for the vast changes in tactics and training required for using the new weapons. Until the first of the new cannons were emplaced in 1896, the heavy artillery practiced firing at stationary targets positioned 1,000 to 3,000 yards from muzzle-loading cannons. Position finding and fire direction were left to the initiatives of the battery commanders, and no protocol existed to ensure Army-wide uniformity. One might expect, therefore, that the artillerymen would continue these procedures even after the new cannons were issued. Indeed, many of them did.

Period of Consolidation, 1894-1903

Shortly before the new guns with their barbettes and disappearing carriages began to be emplaced, artillery officers awakened to the need for improved methods of generating firing data. A system of fire control began to emerge, incorporating the ingenious inventions of several officers. Special instruments were invented, including the vertical base line depression position finder. Telescopic sights were introduced, and thereby the accurate range of the cannon was increased.

In recognition of these scattered contributions, the War Department in 1894 established the Board of Regulation of Seacoast Artillery Fire. A haphazard collection of contributions to position finding and fire control gained an official patron, and position finding by triangularization was perfected. This procedure was based on plots on a scale map, using angles determined by simultaneous optical sighting from both ends of a horizontal base line.

In 1901 the effort to perfect tactics and to train personnel was focused further when the Artillery was organized as a corps under a Chief of Artillery. In the same year, tests at Fort Preble, Maine, demonstrated that mortars could be employed effectively against moving targets. Other tests, conducted in 1903 at Fort Barrancas in Pensacola harbor, resulted in refinements in direct pointing and the indirect laying of the guns.

In 1903 Brig. Gen. Wallace Randolph, Chief of Artillery, reviewed the results of the recent tests and summed them up in a report to the powerful Board of Ordnance and Fortifications, which endorsed it and sent it on to the Secretary of War for dissemination throughout the corps. This report signaled the adoption of a standard system of fire control for all the nation's coastal defense forts. The principal recommendations included:

(2). Case II (traverse determined by a sight at the gun and elevation by a quadrant using plotting room data), though not necessarily to be used to the exclusion of Case III (both traverse and elevation angles determined by plotting room firing data), is always to be preferred thereto....

(3). Horizontal base lines, with depression position finders (DPFs) at the base ends...are necessary for all batteries and fire commands...(it being understood that using DPFs at the base ends was redundant).

The scientific method of generating firing data was officially sanctioned and used until the end of the Coast Artillery. This official endorsement came none too soon. By the end of 1903, 79 8-inch guns, 110 10-inch guns, 87 12-inch guns, and 192 12-inch mortars had been emplaced in 70 forts within 28 localities and turned over to the Coast Artillery.

Period of Refinement, 1904-1915

In January 1905, President Theodore Roosevelt directed his Secretary of War to convene a board of review to revise the Endicott Board's report and to incorporate developments since 1886. The National Defense Board (Taft Board) made its report to the President in February 1906, and Roosevelt submitted the report to Congress with his blessing. The board recommended technical improvements to the Endicott Board-inspired defenses and added harbors in Hawaii, the Philippine Islands, Alaska, and the Panama Canal Zone to the list of localities to be defended. The method of position finding and fire direction based on triangulation was strongly endorsed.

The principal recommendation that affected ma-

jor- caliber guns was that a 14-inch gun under development by the Army should be used in future emplacements instead of the 12-inch gun previously used. Smokeless powder recently had been abandoned, and the higher chamber pressures and temperatures that resulted increased the erosion rate and reduced the lives of the 12-inch guns. A heavier 14-inch projectile fired at 2,150 feet per second muzzle velocity had the same or greater impact energy as did a lighter 12-inch projectile fired at 2,500 feet per second, with an increase in the life of the barrel from 60 to 240 rounds. For the next fifteen years, the 14-inch guns mounted on a disappearing carriage became the heaviest coast defense gun manufactured in quantity.

The Taft Board considered and rejected the 16-inch gun because of the elaborate mechanism required to move the heavy projectiles and powder cartridges forward from magazines to gun, whereas ammunition handling for the 14-inch gun would be similar to that used for years with the 12-inch gun.

While the board concluded that engagements would probably be at ranges upward of 12,000 yards (6.82 miles), whereas 3,500 yards (2 miles) was previously considered the effective limit, the Artillery clung to the use of a sight at the gun. Range (elevation angles) and deflection (at the sight) would come from the plotting rooms, but the traverse of the guns would be determined at the gun by the gun pointer. Further, by sticking with the disappearing carriage with its elevation angle limitations (the carriage of the new 14-inch gun at least increased the elevation angle limit from 12 or 15 degrees to 20 degrees) the ranges of the guns so mounted were restricted to less than their maximum. Except for mortars, the Artillery was slow to embrace the concept of indirect gun laying (i.e, Case III), a concept at the time in the process of being perfected for battleship guns (i.e., director gun laying).

By 1913 the Coast Artillery had refined its skills to the point that 100 percent hits could be registered with a 12-inch gun firing at a moving target at 7,000-9,000 yards, with a firing rate of one shot every thirty-five seconds. Further, the accuracy of a salvo of 12-inch mortars had reached not less than 50 percent hits on a battleship at any range up to 15,000 yards. The nation felt secure.

Shortly after Great Britain declared war on Germany, the Coast Artillery was shaken from its complacency. On 8 December 1914, the British 12-inch cruisers *Invincible* and *Inflexible* engaged the German 8.3-inch cruisers *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau* off the Falkland Islands. The British began the engagement at 16,500 yards and kept the German cruisers beyond the range of their own guns. The German ships were sunk without any significant damage to the British vessels.

The war soon provided another object lesson. On 24 January 1915, the British 13.5-inch battle cruisers *Lion* and *Tiger* sank the German 8.3-inch cruiser *Blucher* and severely damaged the 11-inch cruiser *Seydlitz* at ranges between 17,000 and 20,000 yards, well beyond the reach of the German guns. The British ships used indirect, director-controlled fire.

From these engagements, it was evident that gunfire afloat was accurate at ranges of 20,000 yards, that indirect fire was effective, and that 8-inch guns were useless at such ranges when opposed by larger caliber guns. It was time to overhaul the nation's coast defense.

Years of Turmoil

The Secretary of War met the challenge by appointing boards of review. The 26 November 1915 report of the Board of Review on the Coast Defenses of the United States, the Panama Canal, and the Insular Possessions (or Scott Board, for the chairman, Chief of Staff Maj. Gen. Hugh L. Scott) summed up the situation. The board took a strong stand on the need to upgrade coastal defense cannon, seconded an earlier 1915 board recommendation that future installations of direct-fire guns be 16-inch caliber, and introduced a new recommendation that future installations of mortars also be 16-inch caliber.

Further, in recognition that only one 16-inch gun and no 16-inch mortars were available immediately, the Scott Board (1) recommended that numerous spare 12-inch guns on hand be mounted on a new barbette carriage that, in combination with a lighter projectile, would make possible a range of 30,000 yards, and (2) specified where such guns should be located.

While the board recommended inactivation of several old emplacements, some before the new guns were emplaced, it did not abandon entirely the guns mounted on disappearing carriages. "The board is of the opinion that the disappearing principle should be retained and that it should be the type of mount for

direct fire guns, except for those instances where special conditions may render advisable the installation of the turret or the barbette mount." The first of the Scott Board-inspired 16-inch guns produced was mounted on a disappearing carriage and emplaced in 1923 (as Battery J.M.K. Davis) at Fort Michie on Gull Island, with the harbor defenses of Long Island Sound.

Of course, with shipboard cannon firing from ranges of 16,500 yards and beyond, the board's "special conditions" existed—and the long-range barbette carriage was the preferred mount. With the emplacement of the 12-inch gun on a barbette carriage permitting high elevations, indirect gun laying (Case III) would become the usual practice, and the day of pointing a major-caliber seacoast cannon at a capital warship using a sight at the gun was passing into history.

The United States entered World War I in April 1917, well before the Scott Board's recommendations could be implemented. It would be 1921 before the first of the barbette-mounted 12-inch guns was emplaced (as Battery Frank G. Smith, later divided into Batteries Hearn and Smith) on Corregidor in the Philippine Islands. As for 16-inch guns, wartime events overtook plans before production in quantity began.

The combatants had been fighting for almost three years when the United States entered the war. The German surface fleet was bottled up in port, and ground warfare was reduced to deadly artillery exchanges. The United States was ill prepared for such a conflict, having neglected the production of field pieces while tooling up its coastal defenses.

The dire need for mobile cannon was met by withdrawing cannon from the coastal defense forts. Significant numbers of 8-inch, 10-inch, and 12-inch guns were removed (as well as some 5- and 6-inch guns) to be emplaced on railway cars. Few of these guns were returned to the forts after the war's end. One hundred 12-inch mortars also were withdrawn and ninety-one were emplaced on railway mounts. None of the mortars was returned to the forts.

Few of the withdrawn cannon reached Europe before the armistice. The 5-inch and 6-inch mobile guns that did were useless and were displaced by the French-designed, tractor-drawn, 155-mm. GPF gun. A large number of the GPFs, railway-mounted 12-inch mortars, and railway-mounted 8-inch guns survived to be kept in inventory.

Following the end of the war, the emplacement of the barbette-mounted 12-inch guns began, and by the end of 1924 thirty guns had been emplaced within sixteen forts at twelve localities. The serial production of the 16-inch guns and 16-inch howitzers recommended by the Scott Board was begun in 1920. All of these weapons favored using indirect gun laying (Case III), and the number of long horizontal base lines with elevated base and stations was increased throughout the system.

It took over a year to cast, forge, machine, and assemble a 16-inch gun or howitzer, and after the war ended the personnel in the Army's gun factory were reduced almost every year. It would be years before the supply of 16-inch cannon produced by the Army would be sufficient. Although six barbette-mounted 16-inch guns and four 16-inch howitzers would be emplaced by 1927, something more was needed.

That "something" came from the Washington Naval Conference of 1921-22. As a result of that conference, the United States scrapped several capital ships and ceased construction on others. Numerous Navy 16-inch guns became available, and the Army was pleased to get them.

The Army emplacements of the 16-inch naval guns on barbette carriages could hurl a 2,240-pound projectile to a nominal maximum range of 45,100 yards (25.6 miles). While the stock of 16-inch guns had increased, budget constraints between the wars slowed the construction of emplacements until the war clouds gathered over Europe again.

Adjusting the Defenses, 1924-45

The fixed harbor defense forts were of little value if the rest of the coastline was vulnerable to invasion. On the other hand, fortifying every mile of coastline was an impossible task. The Army saw the solution in the field army and the stock of mobile weapons left over after the war. For example, some 933 tractor-drawn 155-mm. GPF guns were available. These weapons could hurl a 95-pound projectile some fifteen miles and could be useful in beach defense and as emergency batteries.

Railroad guns and mortars also were available. These weapons were capable of being moved on the nation's regular railroads, supplemented by spur tracks

put down by the Corps of Engineers, to any position in need of defense.

In 1924 the War Department notified each Coast Artillery District that the cost of the additional armament requested the previous year was prohibitive and that a reduction must be made in the numbers requested.

The report prepared in response by the Ninth Coast Artillery District (Pacific Coast) exemplifies the results of the 1924 review. The district recommended that the following weapons be distributed within its command, in addition to the existing harbor defenses: eight fixed 16-inch guns, eight fixed 12-inch mortars, twenty-eight railway 12-inch mortars, twenty-eight railway 8-inch guns, and six railway M1920 14-inch guns (to be held in strategic reserve)—all less than was requested the previous year.

Little of this was supplied during the Depression years. Some 155-mm. GPFs, 8-inch and 12-inch railway cannon, and two M1920 14-inch railway guns were available. Four 14-inch railway guns were fabricated, two for the harbor defenses of Los Angeles, California, and two for Panama. The all-important 16-inch guns were slow to come.

During the 1920s and 1930s, the nation allowed its coast defenses to decay to the point that Chief of Coast Artillery, Maj. Gen. Joseph A. Green, stated in May 1940

With but few exceptions our seacoast batteries are outmoded and today are woefully inadequate. Nearly every battery is outranged by guns aboard ship that are of the same caliber. More alarming than this is the fact that every battery on the Atlantic Coast, and all but two (Batteries Richmond P. Davis and Townsley) on the Pacific Coast, have no overhead cover so are open to attack from the air.

The Harbor Defense Board, constituted by the War Department in 1931, reacted to General Green's criticisms and, in July 1940, recommended the adoption of the 16-inch gun as the primary seacoast gun, with a shielded, barbette-mounted 6-inch gun as the secondary gun. All 16-inch guns were to be casemated, as were a number of yet to be emplaced barbette-mounted 8-inch guns, along with the previously emplaced barbette-mounted 12- and 16-inch guns. As the new casemated emplacements were completed, older seacoast fortifications—128 in all—were to be abandoned. This program was approved by the General Staff in September 1940, and Congress made subsequent appropriations available.

The United States entered World War II before most of the construction was started. It took over a year to complete a casemated emplacement. Each two-gun battery was supported by optical base end stations and a 700-mc SCR 296A radar—accurate enough to be used for position finding. Between the guns, the concourse, containing the magazines, plotting room, and auxiliaries, was protected by several feet of concrete and earthen cover. The new 16-inch gun batteries were the most modern major-caliber emplacements to be constructed before the Coast Artillery was disbanded in 1950. However, only fifteen of thirty-nine batteries contemplated were completed and armed before construction was suspended.

Conclusion

The U.S. Army led the world in the tactics of using coastal defense cannon after 1896. Because of budgetary limitations, however, the weapons and/or their emplacements intermittently lagged behind developments in naval gunnery until the onset of World War II. Events during that conflict, including the Normandy and Pacific islands invasions, demonstrated the folly of depending upon fixed artillery emplacements to defend coastal positions in the face of modern explosives, aircraft, and amphibious landing craft and tactics employed by a determined adversary. Following that war, the Board of Officers on the Organization of the War Department (the Simpson Board, composed of battle-experienced general officers) recommended that the offices of the Chiefs of Field and Coast Artillery be eliminated (requiring an act of Congress, because Congress had created these offices) and that the combined artillery forces be folded into the Army Ground Forces. This was done, and by mid-1950 almost every coast defense cannon had been scrapped and the Coast Artillery had disappeared into the dustbin of history, unremembered save but for a dwindling number of veterans and a select few military historians.

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How to Write an Annual Command History

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The Annual Command History (ACH) or Annual Historical Summary (AHS) is a written account of the activities and accomplishments of your command during the year. Future historians and researchers will use these accounts to place the activities of your command into an overall Army context as they write the history of the Army. For this reason, the ACH/AHS should be a very important document to your commander and to the Army.

The current version (July 1993) of Army Regulation (AR) 870-5, *Military History: Responsibilities, Policies, and Procedures*, chapter four, paragraph six, holds the following organizations responsible for preparing ACHs and AHSs: MACOMs and their next subordinate commands, agencies, schools and installations, and MTOE organizations of the Regular Army, Army Reserve and Army National Guard when in federal service, to include armies, commands at corps level and above, corps, combat divisions, nondivisional armored and infantry brigades, ranger and armored cavalry regiments, and Special Forces groups (See AR 870-5, p. 5).

The individual assigned to prepare the ACH/AHS may be—but is not always—a professional historian. If you are a civilian historian working for the Army or an Army officer who has been trained as a historian, you should prepare the traditional Annual Command History, which is a narrative account of the historically significant developments and events that took place in the command during the year. The narrative should function as a historical study; that is, it should include analyses of why things happen and why they were important to the command and to the Army as a whole. If you are an officer or a civil servant in another job series and are assigned to prepare this report as an extra duty, you will write an Annual Historical Summary, which is a descriptive record of historically significant developments and events which took place within the command during the year but does not include analyses or explanations of events or seek to place these events into historical context.

Ideally, the individual responsible for preparing the ACH/AHS should spend the year to be covered documenting the activities of the command. He should attend staff meetings, take notes, collect documents, and conduct formal and informal interviews, all with an eye to compiling material which will be of use when it comes time to sit down and begin organizing and writing the ACH/AHS. Unfortunately, many preparers will not be afforded a year's notice; these individuals must do the best they can to collect the necessary records by canvassing the various offices on post.

What types of documents should the preparer collect? The following list, derived from Dr. Susan Canedy's "Archives 101 for Army Historians," is by no means comprehensive, but should serve to give you an idea of the type of documents to look for: communications, letters, messages, and memorandums from higher headquarters (DA or your MACOM) directing your command to take certain actions; communications and directives from your command headquarters to subordinate elements within your command; planning and program documents; final or after-action reports on programs or projects undertaken by your command; significant decision papers; fact sheets and memorandums; decision briefing narratives and slides; memorandums for record (MFRs); minutes of meetings and conferences and after-action reports on conferences; trip reports; memorandums of understanding and agreement; significant ad hoc study group documents; after-action reports on mobilization and logistics exercises; test and evaluation documents; liaison activity reports; significant activity reports; monthly and quarterly activity reports; published bulletins and newsletters; copies of significant pamphlets, circulars, and regulations; operational concept statements; and news summaries and significant newspaper reports featuring the activities and accomplishments of the

command.

Another type of document which may be used to write an ACH/AHS is a memorandum for the record written by the command historian. The historian may write memorandums of conversations he or she has had during the year with various individuals within the command. These MFRs preserve details of the conversation, such as the time and date, and authenticate the source of information.

Sometimes people have difficulty in determining if a document is "significant" enough to collect. How do you know whether a particular project, development, or event will be important to your command over the course of the coming year? Remember, you are looking for documents which describe developments and events which will have a significant impact on your command. For example, you may decide to save an after-action report on a brigade training exercise during which new equipment was fielded, but decide not to save newspaper articles which describe social events and award ceremonies. But should you save a proposal to reorganize the Public Affairs Office? When in doubt, save the document in question. If you make a wrong decision, it is much easier to dispose of a document than it is to recall one.

Before beginning a draft outline of your ACH/AHS, look over your collection. Organize it by subject, and determine which topics have had the most impact on your command during the past year. Once you have an idea of what events were important and which ones were superfluous, you can carefully cull your collection. But the operative word is *carefully*. You still may not have enough perspective to be able to judge the significance of every document. For example, you may not know whether the proposal to reorganize the Public Affairs Office will be acted on or simply shelved. Remember, you do not have to use every document in the collection as a source for your ACH/AHS. However, every document cited in your report should be in your collection, and those not used should be preserved in the historical files.

In addition to your document collection, you will want to use several other sources to write your ACH/AHS:

Oral History Interviews. If you are the command historian, one of your duties is to conduct oral history interview with your commander, the commanders of subordinate elements, and staff agency chiefs. These interviews should provide you with a better understanding of the mission and accomplishments of the subordinate elements within your command. You will also learn which factors had the most significant impact on various organizations on post. This will give you a better perspective on the overall operations of the entire command. Although the end-of-tour interview is the standard medium and should be done whenever possible, it is also a good idea to set up quarterly or semiannual interviews with key personnel. These interviews eventually will cover the whole tour, but each will include more detailed information, because events will still be fresh in the individual's mind. In the event the individual is rotated so quickly that he/she departs before being interviewed, there will be some record, however incomplete, of their tenure. For information on oral history techniques, refer to Stephen E. Everett's *Oral History: Techniques and Procedures*, published by the U.S. Army Center of Military History.

Submission Reports. Submission reports are feeder-type reports which summarize the activities and accomplishments of individual offices within the command. What exactly should you ask for in a submission report? Think in terms of mission—what is the mission of the individual element or organization submitting the report? Has the mission changed during the year? If so, how was it changed and why was it changed? How was the mission accomplished? Standard submission reports begin with a mission statement and continue with an executive summary. The executive summary, written by the supervisor, describes the most important accomplishments of the organization and the most significant problems it faced that year. Encourage contributors to include an organizational chart, a key personnel roster, and other key documents. The key personnel roster should include a list of officers or branch chiefs with the full dates of their incumbency. The report should also include the number of personnel authorized and assigned, both civilian and military by grade, with beginning and end strengths. Included here should be an assessment of the impact of any changes on the accomplishment of the mission. Each organization should submit a section on budget (frequently entitled "Fiscal Management")

which includes the amount of money authorized and the amount spent on items such as salaries, operations, and training as well as appropriations and expenditures by major program. There should also be a section on training, which should cover how many personnel were trained and the types of training they received. One of the most important sections will describe the major accomplishments of the organization. Other items to consider including in the report are the impact of important new equipment and technological change and any planning, policy, and operational difficulties and problems which may have occurred during the year, as well as the proposed solutions to these problems.

There is an art to soliciting and receiving good submission reports. Consider asking each major staff section to appoint a historical POC (point of contact) responsible for collecting data and reports. Organize a group meeting with these people before the fiscal year starts and tell them what you want and why. It will help your contributors if you can provide them with an example. Give them a sample list of questions and answers or a survey form which has been filled out. If you have a particularly good submission from last year, use that, or borrow one from another Army historian.

The most common problem encountered when attempting to devise a good sample submission form is the fact that different subordinate elements will have differing missions, be of varying sizes, and face varying requirements on a day-to-day basis. That is, the G-2 section of a division will be structured and operate very differently from the Public Affairs Office. This means that these offices and agencies will submit varying types of responses to your standard questions. Not all your standard questions will even apply to all of your contributors. The natural reaction of some contributors will be to brush off the report by filling in a minimum of information.

Anyone who uses submission reports will have to deal with the uneven quality of what is submitted. You might assume that all organizations and agencies on post are equally busy; however, the reports of some organizations will reflect very little activity. Ask yourself why this has happened. Are the standardized questions on your form unrelated to the type of work this element is doing? Does this organization assume that its activities will be of no future interest to researchers and thus do not qualify for inclusion in a historical report? This is not the organization's decision to make—it is your call.

If a substandard report comes in, don't complain up the chain of command, but don't quietly accept it either. Instead, work with your POC or the supervisor to elicit more information. Usually, a report is substandard because the contributing office simply did not understand what it is you are looking for as it applies to that office. Talk to the supervisor, and work with him to devise a submission report tailored to the work his organization does.

Discussing the submission report format with the organization chief is a good way for you the historian to learn exactly what gets done in each of these various organizations on post. Ask each chief to list the functions/missions of his section and estimate the percent of time spent on each. Then ask him to discuss in detail exactly what each of the three top functions entails.

Once you develop a good "sample" report format and response for each staff element and agency on post, they can keep these on file and use them as examples of what to do year after year. By taking the time to do it right the first time, you've already won more than half the battle for later years.

Numbers form an integral part of many submission reports—the amount of dollars allocated and spent, the number of personnel authorized and assigned, the number of missions flown per month, the number of incidents investigated, etc. If the numbers reported indicate a significant variation, the reason for the variance should be explained in the narrative of the report. If the submission report does not provide an explanation for the unusual numbers, you as the historian must determine the reason so that you can include it along with the numbers in the ACH/AHS. Otherwise, the numbers will raise more questions than they answer and will be of little help to future researchers.

Some organizations have a list of "projects" they work on throughout the year. These organizations are used to thinking of accomplishing their mission in terms of the progress they have made with their ongoing projects. In their submission reports, ask these organizations to describe each project in terms of its background (when and why it was started), the status of the project as of the end of the year, and the overall

significance of the project to the command and—if appropriate—to the Army.

How To Organize Your ACH/AHS

Remember that form follows function. The structure of your ACH/AHS should follow the structure of your command. Define the mission of your command. How does your command function to accomplish that mission? What activities, assignments, training missions, projects, and other accomplishments were successfully carried out by your command during the fiscal year? Do not try to fit the story of your command into the chapter format successfully used by another organization.

Regardless of the specific way you decide to organize your ACH/AHS you should start with three essential documents: the mission statement, an organizational chart, and a key personnel roster. These are not difficult documents to obtain, but if for any reason you cannot locate them you will have to prepare them yourself for inclusion in the ACH/AHS.

1) Every command in the Army has a mission. The mission statement should define the mission clearly and succinctly in one to two paragraphs.

2) The organizational chart defines exactly how your command is structured. Most important, it illustrates the chain of command—who reports to whom. Include a narrative explanation of any organizational changes that have occurred in the command's structure during the past year. If an element or agency reports to a new boss or disappears, you must explain how and why this occurred, as well as the overall impact on the command. Be sure to include the exact date of the change. Were new elements added? Again, explain how and why this took place, including the impact on the command.

3) The key personnel roster should include the name, title, and exact dates of incumbency for the chief or commander of each staff element, subordinate element, agency, and organization within the command. This should include the G-1, -2, -3, etc., within the headquarters of the corps or division as well as the S-1, S-2, S-3 of each brigade and battalion, and the civilian or military chief of every separate office or agency.

While not mandatory, the following documents are often included in ACHs and AHSs because they contain information which helps to clarify the way the command works and its priorities: 1) A **mission essential task list** is often defined by a new commander and circulated throughout the command. This is a valuable document because it illustrates how the commander sees the mission in terms of priorities; 2) The **commander's summary**, or **executive summary**, describes the major undertakings and accomplishments of the command from the commander's perspective. A good executive summary will do more than list the year's accomplishments in glowing terms. It will also define problem areas and discuss plans to address these in the future; 3) **Chronologies** are helpful because they provide exact dates and brief descriptions of significant events or highlights which occurred during the year. These can include changes of command, training exercises, deployments and returns, activations and inactivations, and other events of overall interest. You might also want to consider putting a **brief history** of your command, unit, or post in the appendix of the ACH/AHS.

Chapter Titles

Now that you have obtained your essential documents and selected your supporting documents, you must decide how to organize your chapters within the text. Remember, you are seeking the most logical way to tell the story of your command over the past year. There are basically two ways of doing this: you can pattern your chapter organization after the way your command is organized, unit by unit and office by office; or you can develop a thematic organization which reflects the way your command functions.

Submission reports often tempt the historian to organize the ACH/AHS office by office. It may seem like less work initially, and working on the development of submission forms and reading and analyzing submissions often encourage the historian to think in this fashion. The problem with this format is that it tends to be very repetitive. Such an organization can also hide the common overriding themes, accomplishments, and concerns of the command as a whole. Finally, unless the historian is very careful, this format can discourage thoughtful analysis and the development of "the big picture," in essence, exactly what the historian writing an ACH is supposed to be doing. While those of you writing AHSs need not concern

yourself with analysis, you should still attempt to organize your AHS in a fashion which helps the reader to understand as quickly as possible what your command is all about.

Thematic organization might include such topics as training, resource management, operations, intelligence, force modernization, logistics, and special projects. Look at your collection of documents. What has your command spent the preponderance of its time doing? Is your command involved in training for contingency operations, or does it teach intelligence skills to officers? Have elements of your command deployed overseas to engage in nation building? Has the command participated in disaster relief programs, or is it involved in developing battle simulation techniques? Organize your chapters around the major efforts or accomplishments of your command.

Whatever you do, do not simply break up the submission reports of various offices and agencies and reconfigure them under thematic chapter titles. For example, avoid lumping everyone's budget and personnel reports together in a chapter entitled "Resource Management," or stringing all reports on the acquisition of new communications equipment together in a chapter entitled "Information Management." Without analysis or a comprehensive narrative, this technique leads to a choppy, confusing sequence of facts and renders even the best data meaningless.

The best way to implement a thematic organization is to write a comprehensive narrative for each chapter, using statistics supplied in submission reports only as examples to illustrate points of discussion. Select the most important programs, projects, exercises, and deployments; then, discuss and describe their background, development, and significance as if you were telling a story. At the end of each chapter, provide charts with statistics derived from submission reports.

However you decide to organize your chapters, remember that you are attempting to answer one overall question, i.e., "How did the command go about accomplishing the mission?" To answer that question, be sure to include the following discussions somewhere within the body of your ACH/AHS: Emphasize those events which have had a substantial impact on the policy, organizations, and functions of the command. Routine matters should be discussed only when necessary to provide background, explanation, or context or to show patterns and changes. Describe the impact of decisions by higher authorities, including executive and congressional directives, particularly those affecting policies and missions. Discuss major policy and management decisions by providing the background and reasons for these decisions, the various courses of action considered, the final action taken, and an analysis of results wherever possible. Be sure to discuss changes in missions, operations, procedures, and organizational structure and the reasons for these changes (See John T. Greenwood, Scope of Work for an Annual Historical Review, Operational Test and Evaluation Command, Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991).

Remember to include a discussion of financial management. How did the command elect to spend its money? Did the command experience budget shortfalls? If so, what impact did these have on the accomplishment of mission and on readiness? Was the manner, pattern, and expenditure of funds as expected? Were there changes or innovations in the way money was spent, and what impact did these have on the command?

You cannot afford to neglect one of the most important topics today, force modernization—the development and fielding of new equipment, doctrine, and methods of training for combat, conduct of operations, and provision of combat support and combat service support. Publications involving the development of doctrine should be listed by author, title, and date, with a brief description included. Pay special attention to the impact of all new developments on soldier performance. This includes changes in methodology and in training as well as changes in weapons and equipment. Do not just describe the changes, explain why they were made and what impact they will have on your command's ability to accomplish its mission.

Subjects which should be discussed on both a collective and an individual unit basis include training exercises; equipment readiness (including the arrival and dispersement of new equipment, the ways in which soldiers were trained to operate new equipment, and the timely replacement of parts); budget; personnel strength (key MOS shortages); test performance; deployments; drawdowns; reorganizations (assuming these are already covered in a chapter relating to

mission and organization, they need to be covered again here if they are related to a change of mission or the accomplishment of mission); and inactivations (including the process of and preparations for). The number of enlisted soldiers and officers taking courses such as basic and advanced noncommissioned officer training courses, the combat lifesaver course, technical training and leader development, and language programs should be included in a section on professional development.

When discussing training, remember to include the training philosophy. Has this shifted in emphasis over the past year? Describe the major training exercises in which the command participated, the purpose of each exercise, the extent of participation, and the experience gained.

Remember to discuss the significant problems encountered by your command and how these were handled. Problem areas might include budget and personnel shortfalls; an increase in the number of training accidents; problems in fielding new equipment; a rise in positive results from alcohol/drug testing; mechanical problems with equipment; equipment or ammunition shortages; backlogs on vehicle or weapons repairs; and problems obtaining spare parts. In addition to identifying the problem, the narrative should discuss its significance in terms of mission and describe what is being done to rectify the situation. Do not hesitate to include a discussion of problems in your report. Those anxious to avoid a negative tone might emphasize potential solutions.

Avoid giving award ceremonies and special events such as fairs, ground-breaking ceremonies, visiting dignitaries, marathons, Christmas balls, etc. too much emphasis. While boosting unit morale, these events are not significant historically. That is, they do not tell you anything new or important about the unit, its soldiers, or its mission.

As you know, "significance" changes over time. Programs and events which do not seem important to us now may be of exceptional interest to researchers in the future. The problem is, we can't give equal weight to every event. The best we can do is save as many documents as possible which relate in any way to the performance of mission. At the end of the ACH/AHS, provide a bibliography of documents used to write the report which are now in the historian's office. If the command does not have a historian, designate the office where the documents used to write the report will be stored.

Remember, you are not writing a history of your command; you are writing only about what happened within your command over a one-year period. Sometimes historians are concerned about "placing the year in context," and this leads them to spend an inordinate amount of time recounting the prior history of the command. There are several ways to avoid making this mistake. You can place the year in context in a short preface or introduction or in the executive summary, or you can include a brief overall history of the command in an appendix.

What Else To Include in Your ACH/AHS

The standard ACH/AHS often includes the following components, enabling the reader/researcher to locate the specific information he/she needs within the document as quickly as possible (those items which must be included in all ACHs and AHSs are noted by an asterisk):

***Table of Contents** - The table of contents should be fairly detailed, including not only chapter titles but also the subtitles, sections, and headings within each chapter. In cases where an index is not included (see discussion of index below) it is especially important that the table of contents include subject headings within chapters.

Charts, Graphs, Maps, Briefing Slides - These should be listed by page number in the table of contents, even if they are part of an appendix. Otherwise, they represent "lost" information. When specific charts, graphs, etc. are referred to within the narrative of the text, be sure to include a page number in parentheses so that the reader can find the information quickly. Also, it is important to include a narrative explanation of what each chart, graph, briefing slide, etc. represents, even if the chart is not specifically referred to in the narrative and is simply placed in an appendix. A chart or document devoid of context or explanation loses much of its meaning and significance.

Biographies - Biographies of commanders, deputy commanders, and command sergeants major are often

placed in the front of the ACH/AHS directly after the table of contents. Although biographies are not mandatory, they are easy for the historian to supply and extremely helpful to many researchers.

Introductions and Conclusions - These summaries of information encourage the writer to analyze the information a whole. The most significant aspects, events, decisions, and trends should be identified and discussed in introductions and conclusions by chapter and volume.

Appendix - The appendix includes the most significant documents cited in footnotes or endnotes throughout the narrative in support of information presented in the chapters as well as other documents which the preparer believes to be significant. Examples of documents often included in the appendix are memorandums, test results, after-action reports, maps, charts, and graphs. Remember never to include documents without some sort of narrative explanation of what the document represents and what it shows.

***Footnotes/endnotes** - All documents used to write the ACH/AHS should be cited in footnotes or endnotes. In theory, the cited documents should reside in a file in the historian's office. Documents in historian's file should be given an ID number. If at some misty date in the future the command disappears, these files should revert to the National Archives. Documents should carry the identification tag 870-5d.FY (MARKS - Historian's Background Material Files). If the command does not have a historian, it must designate an office to be a repository of the files used to write historical summaries. These documents should be identified and filed by MARKS, just as are the historian's files described above. These files should also revert to the National Archives in the event the command disappears.

Photographs - Groups of photographs are often placed in the appendix. They can also be scattered throughout the narrative as illustrations. Each photograph should have a caption which identifies all individuals in the picture by name and rank and all weapons, equipment, and vehicles by type. Also include the date and geographical location of the event in the caption. If possible, briefly state what the individuals are doing.

Newspaper articles - Newspaper articles referring to the command can be extremely informative. Select those which reflect major or significant accomplishments such as deployments, returns, and training exercises rather than change of commands, awards, contests, and fairs. Group these in the appendix, and be sure to list each by title in the table of contents.

Chronology - Many preparers like to include chronologies of significant events. These are nice to have and can give researchers a quick understanding of the activities of the command. The chronology can be placed in the front of theACH/AHS or in the appendix.

***Glossary** - By a glossary, we mean a list of military acronyms and abbreviations. All acronyms and abbreviations used throughout the narrative and in all documents in the appendix should be included. Define or explain all abbreviated terms or initials. Merely spelling out the long form of an abbreviated concept or organizational title is unacceptable.

Index - Although many preparers do provide an index to their ACH/AHS, an index is not necessary. A detailed table of contents will provide a reasonable substitute. The important thing to remember is that future researchers should be able to locate the topics they are looking for quickly and efficiently. Information which is not listed in a table of contents or an index is not readily accessible and represents lost information. If the table of contents includes topical/subject headings under the chapter titles and lists each document within the appendix, an index is not necessary.

Bibliography - A bibliography should list all documents used directly or indirectly to prepare the ACH/AHS, all of which can be found in the preparer's file. The bibliography can be arranged alphabetically or topically. By the term "direct reference," we mean those documents which are cited as footnotes in the ACH/AHS. Documents used indirectly are often those which contain information mentioned or referredto in the ACH, but which are not directly quoted. Sometimes these documents contain more information than

is provided in the ACH/AHS. Researchers interested in this information will be able to find it in the preparer's file.

Summary

The most important thing to remember as you assemble all of these components into an Annual Command History or Historical Summary is the reason why this effort is being required of you. Understand that this ACH/AHS will not vanish into limbo at the Center of Military History,the National Archives, or the Military History Institute. You can expect that it will be referred to in the future by several different types of users, including yourself. The commander and his staff may use the ACH/AHS to add historical perspective to the decision-making process. Members of your command will refer to this ACH/AHS as they prepare reports in support of your command, plan for future operations, write newspaper articles, and plan ceremonies. New members of the command may use it to orient themselves. Outside researchers and scholars writing on a specific aspect of military history will use the ACH/AHS as a secondary resource or as an aid in identyfing primary resources.

The ACH/AHS of your command is part of the year-by-year history of the United States Army on a command-by-command basis. You want future researchers to be able to find the information (topic) they are looking for in your report quickly. You want to help them understand what your command accomplished during the year in question, the forces which impacted on your command, and the significance of your command to the United States Army.

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