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Army History: A Call for Action in the Information Age

Steve E. Dietrich

To be effective in the future, historians can no longer live only in the past. Army historians who do not understand phrases such as *digitized battlefield, Force XXI,* or *information operations* will be left in the commuter lot as the Army speeds down the information highway into the twenty-first century. Military historians who do not enter, or drop out of, this race will likely be left by the wayside.

Likewise, as America's Army modernizes, it must do so with its history intact. As the Army evolves its procedures, so too must the historians, archivists, curators, photographers, and unit records managers who comprise the Army's historical community. (1) The cost of failure is high—an Army unable to capture or retrieve its history and or to maintain its legacy—and a historical community severely handicapped by its inability to support Army schools, leaders and planners with pertinent historical analysis.

In spring 1994, then Chief of Military History Brig. Gen. Harold W. Nelson called a small group into his office. Nelson was getting ready to meet with then Army Chief of Staff General Gordon R. Sullivan to discuss how to prepare the Army for a future where we do not even know what the lexicography will be. Sullivan had quipped, "Imagine what a secretary's reaction would have been ten years ago if you told her there was a mouse on her desk." We poured over dozens of briefing slides and scores of scribbled notes Nelson had made during earlier meetings with Sullivan.

We listened as Nelson described the chief of staff's passion for technology, digitization, and Alvin and Heidi Toffler's theories of a future in which intelligent societies will dominate those which depend on brawn. (2)

A precedent exists for what Sullivan had in mind. Perhaps the armed forces' most successful glimpse into the future was *Toward New Horizons,* a study written by Dr. Theodore von Karman's U.S. Air Force Scientific Advisory Group in 1945. The commanding general of the Army Air Forces, General Henry H. "Hap" Arnold, had directed Karman to project "the shape of the air war, of air power, in five years, or ten, or sixty-five." Arnold urged the scientist to "forget the past: regard the equipment now available only as the basis for [the] boldest predictions." Much of what Karman's group foresaw has been realized: transonic flight, flying wings (similar to the B-2 bomber), target-seeking antiaircraft missiles and unmanned precision munitions with ranges of several thousand miles. (3)

Like Arnold, Sullivan proposed using emerging technologies and forward-looking theories to mold the Army of the future—*Force XXI.* Sullivan's claim that the Army will get better as it gets smaller is based on the greatly enhanced potential that information age technologies promise. Future capabilities will stem not from brute force and mass production, but from knowledge and the ability to generate, access, use, and control information. Operation DESERT STORM offered a peek at how digitization, smart weapons, superior communications, satellite-based navigational systems, nonlethal weapons, and computers might be used to control future battlefields. Mastery of knowledge and information has become more of a force multiplier than ever before. Because of this phenomenon, infor-

mation systems such as satellites, electric grids, and computers have also become principal targets. (4)

Future battlefield victories will belong to the smartest forces. In his recent book, *Armored Cav*, Tom Clancy describes, in layman's terms, the Army's current and emerging combat and combat support systems. He vividly depicts an M1A2 tank platoon equipped with the intra-vehicular information system (IVIS). IVIS is capable of receiving, processing, and disseminating orders; navigating and reporting its location; coordinating maneuvers; locating and destroying enemy forces; calling for fire support; automatically and flawlessly identifying vehicles as friend or foe; reporting operational progress as well as logistic status; and arranging for resupply—all without using paper or uttering one word over a radio. Tests at the National Training Center and elsewhere show that digitized platoons are three to five times more lethal than the M1A1 platoons that smashed Iraq's best forces during the Gulf War. Clancy and others have also produced hypothetical (but insightful) vignettes of how tank units equipped with IVIS might outsmart and crush future foes. (5)

To be compatible with Sullivan's *Force XXI* vision, the leaders of the Army's historical community must act aggressively now to catch up and keep pace with technology. To date, historians have not done this well. The Tofflers report that over 3,000 military computers in the Gulf War were directly linked to computers in the Continental United States (CONUS), but not one belonged to a historian. (6) CD ROMs and modems are proliferating in the American home and office, yet few official military historians have more than limited access to these devices. Meanwhile, even high school students are conducting historical research on the *Internet*. (7)

One small group of Army historians has made a noble start. The Combined Arms Center history office at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, with the encouragement and strong support of then commander, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), General Frederick M. Franks, Jr., has been operating its automated historical archives system (AHAS) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, since 1994. With over 500,000 pages of digitized documents accessible to authorized *Internet* travelers via the Army Knowledge Network (AKN), AHAS may be the nation's most advanced archiving system.

Presently AHAS is focused on records from the Gulf War and later. Plans are emerging to expand the

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collection to include records of earlier operations as well as other aspects of the Army's history. (8) Perhaps a Korean War collection will be on-line before that war's fiftieth anniversary. To be of maximum value, AHAS could be expanded into an easy-to-use network containing collections at other sites—such as the holdings of the U.S. Army Center of Military History (CMH) in Washington, D.C., and the Military History Institute at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Eventually, other service history offices, the joint history office, and collections at unified commands, such as U.S. Central Command's Gulf War Collection in Florida, could be merged into an Armed Forces automated archives. (9)

AHAS is an invaluable resource with vast potential. Unfortunately, not all Army history offices have the proper computer and communications hardware or software to access this archives. For the have-nots, entering AHAS demands planning now, including budgeting for hardware and software needs. In the long run, according to one estimate, AHAS could reduce operating costs and save $4.5 million in time and travel expenses by 1998. (10)

Army historians in Haiti during Operation UP-HOLD DEMOCRACY shunned paper, instead collecting everything they could in digitized format—about 100 computer disks in the first month—for easy and accurate transfer into AHAS. Properly equipped historians today can use portable computers to store this much information on one compact disk for easy handling. In future contingency operations, deployed historians with the proper automation hardware, software, and training will be able to transmit electronically the historical documents they have collected to Fort Leavenworth for instant archiving. This ability to transfer data electronically exists today, and it is widespread throughout the Army. (11)

Imagine how valuable the electronic information generated on tomorrow's digitized battlefields would be if recorded and archived. Historians, investigators, the Center for Army Lessons Learned, and other researchers could re-create at least the American perspective of events precisely, to within fractions of seconds and meters, much like air crash investigators using an aircraft's "black box" have done for years. Unfortunately, there is no procedure or mechanism to record or archive information passed on the IVIS or

several other new digitized operational and logistical decision-support systems. During World War II, stenographers monitored the telephone switches and recorded important phone calls, enabling historians to reconstruct key decisions and actions. (12) Today, despite available technology, important telephone calls, video teleconferences, and electronic mail are lost to history. A lack of education and discipline in our current records retirement procedures aggravates these shortcomings. (13)

The entire Army historical community must modernize in partnership with the rest of the service. The Concepts Based Requirements System (CBRS)—the Army's process for changing doctrine, organizations and acquiring new capabilities, including materiel—is a good place for historians to exert their influence to ensure the Army modernizes in a way that will enable it to capture its history. (14) Working within CBRS, historians and archivists should help the Army develop the physical means and the necessary doctrine for recording and preserving historically important information. With slight modification, CBRS could offer TRADOC historians an opportunity to contribute to the development of each new military capability, while their U.S. Army Materiel Command counterparts work with program managers and program executive officers.

While the Chief of Military History and the Army Staff work in concert, their collaboration with their sister services, the Joint Staff, and their history offices is needed to ensure that joint developmental program activities also provide historians appropriate access and the means to record and archive significant historical information. (15)

The possibilities for technological advances in the military are boundless. For now, the Army's historical community needs a road map with short-, intermediate-, and long-range goals to advance technologically in tandem with the rest of the Army. Short-term goals might focus on mending current deficiencies by purchasing the minimum essential quantities of the best available computers and software and by establishing interface with AHAS. (16) In the intermediate term, historians should seek their own specialized software programs and plan to acquire a capability to digitize and automatically transcribe audio voice recordings,

thus eliminating the costly, labor intensive and time consuming requirement to transcribe interviews manually. In the long term, developing and procuring a portable, battery-operated device that automatically records voices in digitized format that can translate into text may be possible. Commanders and their historians alike would benefit from the ability to take automatically digitized photographs, simultaneously dictate digitized captions, and instantaneously to send the product via satellite directly to AHAS, its replacement, or some other repository. Although such technology is within reach, without proper planning *now*, it may never become available to Army historians.

The paper records from the Vietnam War are still being laboriously organized and catalogued at the National Archives Records Administration (NARA). Over 1,000 interviews from Vietnam to the present still await transcription. (17) Although over 160,000 pages of documents from DESERT STORM and DESERT SHIELD are in AHAS, millions of paper, film, and computerized documents remain scattered throughout the Army and in various archives. (18) Despite the digitized collection effort in Haiti—the product of which is already organized and easily searched in AHAS—many documents from that operation remain unorganized, uncatalogued, and uncollected. Meanwhile, much of the information historians need to collect, analyze, and provide to Army leaders to help them make informed decisions resides in remote or obscure collections which are difficult, time-consuming and costly to access. Technology and properly enforced records retirement procedures hold the solution tomorrow to these and other challenges, but only if Army leaders work intelligently today to achieve those ends.

Like other segments of the Army, the historical community must be forward looking or be left behind. Only ten years ago many Army historians thought they would never need a computer. Today, most of those same historians do not know how they ever managed without one. I hope that ten years from now we cannot imagine how we ever functioned before joining the information age. The Army and its historical community must team together to act now or risk losing the Army's heritage and a key part of its ability to improve on past performance.

Lt. Col. Steve E. Dietrich is the director, U.S. Army GulfWar Declassification Project and chief, Declassification Branch, U.S. Army Center of Military History. Both offices are to transfer to the Adjutant General's Office in January 1997. Colonel Dietrich received a B.S. degree from the U.S. Military Academy and an M.A. from Eastern Kentucky University. A graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, he has served in a number of assignments, including as senior Army historian with Joint Task Force 180 in Haiti during Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY. His articles have appeared in Military Review *magazine.*

Notes

1. Other activities usually are associated with this broadly defined historical community. For example, the Center for Army Lessons Learned, serves an entirely different purpose from the historical community, yet works in close cooperation with it.

2. Alvin and Heidi Toffler, *The Third Wave* (NY: William Morrow, 1980) and *War and Anti-War: Survival at the Dawn of the 21st Century* (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, and Co., 1993). The Tofflers theorize that civilization has undergone two "waves" of revolutionary change; the first carried nomadic man into an agricultural age, and the second brought the industrial age. The Third Wave, then, is carrying portions of the world into the information age.

3. Michael H. Gorn, *Harnessing the Genie: Science and Technology Forecasting for the Air Force, 1944-1986* (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1988). Gorn describes and analyzes the Air Force's five main science and technology forecasts, beginning with Theodore von Karman's *Toward New Horizons*.

4. Much has been written about DESERT STORM as the "first information war." See the Toffler's *War and Anti-War* and Alan D. Campen, contributing ed., *The First Information War* (Fairfax, VA: AFCEA International Press, 1992). Rick Atkinson's *Crusade: The Untold Story of the Persian GulfWar* (NY: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1993) outlines how coalition forces used new technology to "blind" the Iraqi leaders, isolating them from their forces.

5. Tom Clancy, *Armored Cav: A Guided Tour of an Armored Cavalry Regiment* (NY: Berkeley Books, 1994). See also LTC Mark P. Hertling, "The Battle of Oom Chalouba, 17 June 2008," *Armor* (Jan-Feb 95):34-37; David C. Nilsen, "What if?...How an IVIS-equipped M1A2 force Might have made a difference in twelve DESERT STORM incidents," *Armor* (May-Jun 94):26-35.

6. Toffler, *War and Anti-War*, pp. 69-70.

7. SFC Douglas Ide, "Internet Basics: The Army Cruises the Information Superhighway," *Soldiers* (Feb 95):32-33.

8. In addition to wartime records, candidates for addition to AHAS include station lists, Army—as well as command and installation—annual historical summaries and reports, summaries of the careers of retired general officers, information papers produced by Army historians on a wide range of topics, reports of Army boards, and unpublished studies.

9. Additionally, the Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC) has on microfilm a monumental collection which, if digitized, would greatly enrich the automated on-line archives, while saving reproduction and mailing costs. DTIC is creating on the Internet a "Gulf Net" digitized data base, which will contain declassified and public releasable documents from the Gulf War to assist veterans and others with research on possible Gulf War-related illnesses, as well as other aspects of the war.

10. Rodler F. Morris, Fact Sheet, ATZL-MH, 5 Jul 94, sub: Automated Historical Archives System. The estimated savings figure is from Morris' memorandum. While the actual figure is debatable, the suggestion that AHAS will lead to savings eventually is plausible. Morris' estimate does not include the intangible value of increased efficiency of historians utilizing AHAS. Jeff Rothenberg's "Ensuring the Longevity of Digital Documents," *Scientific American* (Jan 95):42-47, concludes that archives such as AHAS may be the solution to preventing important electronic information from becoming irretrievable, as it fades from readability on its storage media, and as hardware and software continue to change. For example, AHAS should continue to grow and evolve with computer hardware and software technology, so that information

in AHAS today will still be universally accessible to authorized researchers fifty years from now.

11. As the Army's senior historian in Haiti, the author could have transmitted unclassified information to the CAC history office for AHAS from his desk on the U.S.S. *Mount Whitney*. To be truly useable, the technique of electronically "bursting" documents from the field to AHAS requires a secure communications means.

12. The World War II transcripts could be digitized and added to the AHAS collection. By contrast, one CMH historian was interviewing a general officer recently, when they were interrupted by a telephone call. The general made an important decision and passed his orders over the phone, with no record being made.

13. The author made these observations while serving as the senior Army historian in UPHOLD DEMOCRACY with the joint task force headquarters on the U.S.S. *Mount Whitney*, a superb, high-technology platform, off the coast of Haiti. The opinion is widespread that the Modern Army Recordkeeping System (MARKS) is an abject failure.

14. CBRS is set forth in Training and Doctrine Command Regulation 11-15, *Concepts Based Requirements System*, and implemented by TRADOC as the principal Army combat developer. The Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, the Army Materiel Command, and the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Research, Development, and Acquisition are the other key players in this process. The Army's 25-series regulations outline the means of acquiring information management capabilities under the auspices of the Director of Information Systems for Command, Control, Communications, and Computers (DISC4).

15. Other key participants not previously mentioned are the Army's Digitization Office and the U.S. Army Information Systems Command. The Archivist of the Army—working for the DISC4—also has a major role in this effort.

16. Kara Swisher, "Intel Unveils Chip Doubling Speed of its Pentium," The *Washington Post*, 17 Feb 95, section B. The Intel Corporation has announced plans to begin selling by the end of 1995, new P6 computer chips (two-and-one-half times the speed and nearly double the power of its latest Pentium chips).

17. Contracts to transcribe these interviews—the standard method—could cost about $150,000. With an annual transcription budget of only $10,000-15,000, CMH's collection is growing faster than it can be transcribed. Certainly, the digital technology to transcribe this collection would provide a quick and cost-effective means to make the contents of these interviews available to researchers at AHAS.

18. The U.S. Army Gulf War Declassification Project became operational in September 1995, under the U.S. Army Center of Military History. The project is responsible for locating, gathering, scanning, digitizing, and declassifying the Army's operational records from the Gulf War and its aftermath, to support research into Gulf War-related illnesses. The resultant digitized documents will be provided to AHAS and DTIC.

U.S. Air Force Pre-1954 Still Photo Collection Recalled

The U.S. Air Force has recalled its pre-1954 Still Photo Collection, which has been on loan to the National Air and Space Museum, for the purpose of placing it permanently at the National Archives. The National Air and Space Museum is no longer processing orders for photos from this collection and is performing only limited residual reference support. This collection will be closed until the National Archives completes its acquisition process. A date for transferring the collection to the National Archives is expected by 1 January 1997.

Please address inquiries concerning this collection to: Still Pictures Branch, National Archives at College Park, 8601 Adelphi Road, College Park, MD 20740-6001. Phone (301) 713-6660.

The National Air and Space Museum sincerely regrets any inconvenience this unanticipated move may cause.

The Chief's Corner

John W. (Jack) Mountcastle

I hope you had an enjoyable holiday season and that you found time to catch up on your reading and correspondence. Have you checked out the CMH Homepage on the Internet? (Remember—we're at www.Army.mil/cmh-pg). We've put a lot of work into this dynamic link with the Army, the history community at large, and the public.

If you have not yet seen one of our newest publications, please look for it. Entitled *Biennial Report of the Chief of Staff of the United States Army—1 July 1939-30 June 1945*, it is the result of a great idea by BG Hal Nelson and some superb work by John Elsberg's Production Services Division staff. There is a statement in General George C. Marshall's 1943-45 Report to the Secretary of War that deserves to be framed and hung in classrooms at every Army school. Marshall said:

> *We have tried since the birth of our nation to promote our love of peace by a display of weakness. This course has failed us utterly, cost us millions of lives and billions in treasure. The results are quite understandable. The world does not seriously regard the desires of the weak. Weakness presents too great a temptation to the strong, particularly to the bully who schemes for wealth and power.*

The compilation of General Marshall's wartime reports effectively concludes the Center's commemoration efforts of World War II. Two other recent publications deal with wars in Korea and Vietnam. Bill Hammond, Tom Bowers, and George MacGarrigle continued the research begun eight years ago by COL John Cash to produce *Black Soldier, White Army*, the story of the Army's last segregated infantry regiment, the 24th Infantry, in Korea.

Bill Hammond's new book, entitled *Public Affairs: The Military and the Media, 1968-1973*, has received quite a bit of attention, to include some very laudatory reviews. Public affairs officers and commanders throughout the Army are finding very useful this second volume in Bill's study of the media in Vietnam.

We have made initial distribution of General Gordon R. Sullivan's *Gordon R. Sullivan: The Collected Works, 1991-1995*. You will find it a great resource for your library. This extraordinary collection of speeches, papers, and discussions by our former Army Chief of Staff is a gold mine of information and insights on how we have changed our Army since DESERT STORM.

Let me close this with a word or two for each of you who believes what our Army has done is worth remembering. Since May 1995, the Center of Military History has served as the Office of Primary Responsibility for the review and declassification of nearly six million pages of operational records from Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM. Starting from scratch, CMH built a team of dedicated professionals, equipped with state-of-the-art automation and a heartfelt desire to do the best job we could to review critical documents from the Army units that participated in the Gulf War. We were also charged with coordinating similar efforts by the Joint Staff, U.S. Central Command, the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps. Our mission was to pass on to an investigation team in the Department of Defense all documents that might shed some light on a possible cause for Gulf War illness. We also were charged with putting as many applicable documents as we could

on the Internet Homepage entitled GULFLINK. We did this. I'm very proud of the work done by our superb team of soldiers, DA civilian employees, and contractors, led by LTC Steve Dietrich.

I'm also bound to tell you that we could have done a better job—if only the Army field commanders had followed up on repetitive instructions sent to them from the Department of the Army during and immediately after the Gulf War. One of the criticisms leveled at the Army by those groups genuinely concerned about the federal government's response to veterans' concerns over Persian Gulf illnesses has been that the Army did not maintain complete files of operational records. The most glaring shortage occurred in the operations logs of battalions throughout the forces deployed to the Gulf. We know that CMH is not the Army's records manager. That mission is fulfilled by the Army records managers serving the Director of Information Systems for Command, Control, Communications, and Computers (DISC4). We know that we have problems with the Modern Army Recordkeeping System (MARKS). But in the end, it is the historian who is left to say what happened, when it happened, and why. Without a record, that gets harder and harder to do. That reason was paramount in my campaign to ensure that we maintain the record of our Army's efforts in support of Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR in Bosnia. We learn from experience. I sincerely hope that commanders Army-wide will support this basic mission. Don't let our history die!

Please accept my personal best wishes for every good thing in this New Year.

Editor's Journal

The winter issue is the first one of the calendar year and always features the cumulative index for the previous year. This winter offering of *Army History* is no exception. This issue also includes Lt. Col. Steve Dietrich's thoughtful article on Army historians in the computer age, and Lt. Col. Winfried Heinemann's look at Yugoslavia's early Cold War relations with the West. This latter article derives from Dr. Heinemann's contribution to the 1996 Conference of Army Historians, which focused on the Cold War.

It is my sad duty, in this space, to say "Good-bye" to Dr. Judith Bellafaire, who, for the last seven years, has been a valued member of the Center's Field and International Branch, and who has contributed some excellent articles and book reviews to this publication. Dr. Bellafaire is going to northern Virginia to serve as the curator/historian for the Women in Military Service for America Memorial Foundation, Inc., and I know I speak for everyone at the Center in wishing her the very best.

Arnold G. Fisch, Jr.

CAMP Student Grants Available

Applications are invited for Robert E. Yount/Merril C. Windsor Memorial Awards, to assist students in attending the thirty-first Annual Military Conference 7-11 May 1997 in and around Buffalo, New York. Student applications must be postmarked no later than 20 February 1997. The award memorializes two later presidents of the Council on America's Military Past (CAMP) and is made possible by interest drawn on the Yount/Windsor Memorial Fund, supported by member contributions. Tax-deductible contributions to the fund are welcome, and can be sent to CAMP's Virginia address below.

Any full-time student is eligible to apply, from grade school through post graduate school. There are no restrictions, and membership in CAMP is not required. The awards will defray all official conference costs, such as meals and conference-chartered transportation. Winners will be expected to provide their own lodging, transportation, and nonconference meals. A $300 stipend per winner will be available to help defray actual expenses.

There is no application form. Students should write a short (one typewritten page, or two in longhand) statement on why they want to attend the conference, and should forward it to CAMP, P.O. Box 1151, Ft. Myer, VA 22211. No postmarks after 20 February 1997, please. The judges will be given the applications in early March and award by 15 March.

Judges include Col. Lloyd Clark, AUS (Ret.), CAMP founder and retired journalist; Dr. Edward M. Coffman, professor of history at the University of Wisconsin and author of *The Old Army: A Portrait of the American Army in Peacetime, 1748-1898*; Dr. Elaine Everly, National Archives and Records Administration; Dr. Warren W. Hassler, Jr., professor *emeritus* of history at the Pennsylvania State University and author of several books on the Civil War, as well as a study of the president as commander in chief during World War II; General William A. Knowlton, USA (Ret.), former superintendent of the U.S. Military Academy; Dr. Darlis Miller, professor of history, New Mexico State University, Las Cruces, author of several books on the logistics of the frontier Army; Lt. Gen. E.G. "Buck" Schuler, USAF (Ret.), formerly CAMP's senior active-duty military member; and Dr. Robert M. Utley, former Associate Director for Cultural Resources, National Park Service, where he was once chief historian.

Dr. William Dudley, Director, Naval Historical Center, will be the opening speaker at the conference. Dudley is considered a leading expert on War of 1812 history. As has been the tradition since 1978, the session will be co-hosted by the Society for Military History.

Although the conference will emphasize the War of 1812 on the Great Lakes and the military in the Northwest Territory, it also will include all aspects of American and Canadian military history from the seventeenth century to the recent Cold War.

The conference headquarters will be at the Radisson Airport Hotel, Buffalo. In addition to military history discussions each morning, 8-10 May, the conference will feature visits to historic sites such as Forts Niagara, NY; Presque Isle, Erie, PA; York, Erie, PA; and George and Mississauga, Canada. Visits also will be made to the former cruiser U.S.S. *Little Rock*, the destroyer U.S.S. *The Sullivans* in Buffalo, and the War of 1812 brig *Niagara* in Erie.

Preliminary optional tours on Wednesday, 7 May, will be to Niagara Falls and to the tour boat *Maid of the Mist*. A second optional tour will be on Sunday, 11 May, to several forts in New York: Ontario in Oswego; Stanwix in Rome, and Madison Barracks in Sacketts Harbor.

Requests for additional information should be addressed to CAMP '97 Conference, ATTN: H.M. Hart, P.O. Box 1151, Fort Myer, VA 22211-1151, or phone (703) 912-6124, FAX (703) 912-5666.

In Memoriam

Army History noted with sadness the loss last October of one of the giants in the field of Army history when Forrest C. Pogue passed away. Dr. Pogue, who was perhaps best known for his four-volume biography of General George C. Marshall, will also be remembered at the Center of Military History for his innovative work in the field of oral history and for his "green book," *The Supreme Command*.

After graduating from Murray State College in Kentucky, Forrest Pogue studied diplomatic history and international relations at Clark University and at the University of Paris, receiving a Ph.D. degree from Clark in 1939. He taught European history at Murray State before entering military service in 1942. Dr. Pogue served in the five campaigns of the First U.S. Army as a combat historian, collecting information from OMAHA Beach to Pilzen, and earning a Bronze Star and a *Croix de Guerre*. In interviews with wounded servicemen following D-day, he developed and crafted the oral interview techniques so essential to gathering and writing military history.

Following the war, Dr. Pogue served as a historian with the Office of the Chief of Military History (1947-1952). In addition to *The Supreme Command*, the Center also published his "The Decision to Halt at the Elbe" as part of *Command Decisions*, edited by Kent Roberts Greenfield, and later as a separate essay. He also taught part time at the George Washington University.

After a brief return to teaching at Murray State, Dr. Pogue was named the first executive director of the George C. Marshall Research Foundation in Lexington, Virginia, in 1953 and was a member of their board of trustees until his death. In 1956 he began work on Marshall's biography, a project that occupied him for the next thirty years.

In 1964 he became director of the Marshall Library in Lexington, and in 1972 served as Eminent Scholar Professor of history at Virginia Military Institute (VMI). He became director of the Eisenhower Institute for Historical Research in 1974, retiring in 1984.

Forrest Pogue and his family remained fond of Murray, Kentucky, and he always was proud of the time he spent at Murray State. The Special Collections Library there is named in his honor. Two years ago he and his wife Christine moved from Arlington, Virginia, back to Murray for the last time.

Dr. Pogue had a long and distinguished career in military history and his accomplishments will live on for generations of Army historians.

A.G. Fisch, Jr.

The West and Yugoslavia in the 1950s

Winfried Heinemann

Lt. Col. Winfried Heinemann, Ph.D., serves with the Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt *(Military History Research Office) in Potsdam, Germany. This article derives from a paper he presented at the June 1996 Conference of Army Historians in Washington, D.C.*

Yugoslavia's Defection

"From Stettin on the Baltic to Trieste on the Adriatic, an iron curtain has come down," is how Winston Churchill articulated the new political geography in 1946. Stettin—that referred to Poland; oddly enough, the Soviet zone of occupation in Germany was not conceived as being behind the Iron Curtain. Trieste—that denoted Yugoslavia, a staunch ally of the Soviet Union, and as Stalinist as any other country in its internal structure. Yugoslavia was then busily supporting Greek Communist units in their civil war, with Great Britain and later the United States giving aid to the democratic government. Five years later, World War II-vintage American military equipment was being delivered to Yugoslavia. What had happened?

Yugoslavia was the only country within the Soviet orbit that could claim to have liberated itself. It certainly had not been liberated by the Red Army, yet when Josip Broz (Marshal Tito) sought a measure of independence, he soon found himself ostracized by Joseph Stalin. In June 1948 Stalin cut his ties with Belgrade. Of course, he expected to see Tito's government overthrown within a matter of weeks, replaced by a more servile administration.

Much to everyone's surprise, Tito remained. Still, for a long time to come, he necessarily felt insecure, threatened by military aggression from outside, and by uprisings of malcontent Stalinists from within. Those circumstances meant that Tito had to maintain a large army, while at the same time sustain an acceptable standard of living that would keep his population content. It was the classic balance between military and social security, and Tito was standing alone. Would he turn to the West, and would the West support him?

For Western leaders, there was a certain rationale to do so. After all, if suitably encouraged by Tito's example, other Eastern states might well want to follow suit, making Yugoslavia the first of a series of splits within the Eastern bloc. Was this the beginning of a "roll-back?"

The Strategic Importance of Yugoslavia

In addition to the political considerations, Yugoslavia could be a valuable military asset. Not only did Tito command the largest army of any Balkan state, Yugoslavia also was in an important geostrategic position. In the event of war in Europe, the Soviets were expected to resume their traditional drive toward the Mediterranean. There were two major weak spots where this push was most likely: across the Yugoslav-Italian border, or along the Greek-Turkish border.

In the northern option, a push through what was known as the Ljubljana Gap would evoke memories of 1916-18. Once the Soviets reached the North Italian plains, there would be no stopping their forces. Italy's only hope lay in defending in the mountains, along the lines of World War I fighting, that is, along the Isonzo. That river, however, already was in Yugoslav territory, which meant that a successful denial of this attack route could be attempted in a well-prepared, concerted Italo-Yugoslav defense effort.

In the south, things were slightly different. Both Turkey and Greece originally had planned to leave Thrace to the Soviets in the event of attack. Both considered the narrow coastal strip indefensible. Both Greeks and Turks, therefore, were quite surprised when, upon joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1952, they were visited by a deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR), who urged them to hold on to Thrace by all means and even seemed to promise additional NATO troops for that. Little did they realize that this was Field Marshal Bernard L. Montgomery's own, on-the-spot idea, by no means an agreed Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) policy. If Yugoslavia could be made to join in the defense of the area, however, the

whole plan might become feasible, since any thrust south from Bulgaria along the Vardar Valley would have sizable Yugoslav forces in its deep right flank.

Military Aid for Yugoslavia?

Much as military cooperation might seem advisable, however, it was not easy to achieve. The major obstacle was Trieste. At the end of World War II, the port and its hinterland had become a "free territory," nominally under United Nations (UN) control. Since the Soviets had sabotaged the nomination of a UN high commissioner, however, Trieste was divided into two zones: Zone A, including the port and town, held by British and American troops of about 10,000 men each; and Zone B, controlled by the Yugoslavs. Both zones had been Italian territory before the war, and to boost the Christian Democrats' election prospects, the Americans, British, and French declared in March 1948 that they would support the Italian claim to the entire territory.

Italo-Yugoslav relations thus were tense. When Tito did ask for military aid in 1952, it was obvious that such help could not be coordinated by NATO. A delegation of British, French, and American officers was assembled, but since the British and French contributions to the envisaged aid program would be no more than nominal, the bulk of the delegation, too, was American. It was headed by Deputy Commander in Chief, Europe, General Thomas T. Handy, selected because he was the highest ranking American officer who did not wear a second, NATO "hat."

The Handy mission in November 1952 ended in failure. American officials demanded to know about Yugoslav defense planning, notably whether Tito meant to defend the Ljubljana Gap, or whether he would withdraw into the mountains again—as he had done during World War II. Not without justification, Handy argued that if the Americans were supposed to provide military equipment, at least they should know the sort of warfare for which it was to be used. The Yugoslavs, however, would not reveal anything unless the West was prepared to reciprocate. Western defense planning for the region, however, included Italian planning against a Yugoslav attack, and it was not possible that the Italians would consent to handing this planning over to the Yugoslavs.

This failure prompted Tito to look elsewhere for extra security, and that meant looking south. Early in 1953, Tito initiated talks with officials in Ankara, Turkey, and Athens, Greece, about a joint defense plan for the Balkans.

The Trieste Crisis

Before a proper pact could emerge, the Trieste situation flared up. In September 1953, a classic misunderstanding led Italian politicians to believe that Tito was going to annex "his" Zone B (under Yugoslav administration) formally. They began moving *Alpini* formations and warships into the region. The Yugoslavs responded in kind. At this juncture, NATO entered the equation. Tito at once charged that the units being deployed were "NATO troops." Was there alliance connivance in Italy's threatening posture? The British explained to their wartime ally that, in peacetime, there was no such thing as "NATO troops" and that, technically, the Italians were free to move their troops as they wanted. Privately, however, American officials told the Italian government quite bluntly what they thought of this provocative act.

In October 1953, events began to move swiftly. Anthony Eden, after a prolonged illness, had just resumed office. Of course, everyone expected the three Western signatories of the Italian peace treaty, the United States, Great Britain, and France, to act together as they had always done. But this was not to be the case. American and British officials decided that the French were too supportive of the Italian position, and acted alone. On 7 October, the American and British ambassadors in Paris informed French Foreign Minister Georges Bidault that their governments were withdrawing their troops from Trieste, and that control of Zone A (under joint U.S.-British administration) was to be handed to the Italians. As the American ambassador recalls, Bidault was "hurt, upset, and displeased" at this cavalier abandonment of what had been a tripartite policy.

Even less had NATO been made a party to this decision. The U.S. permanent representative was told that, surely, none of his colleagues on the North Atlantic Council could challenge this step, and, should they still question the wisdom of it all, he was to give them copies of the joint U.S.-British communique. Would he care to pick up a few copies at the embassy? This, certainly, was not the sort of political consultation the

smaller partners had expected.

The matter soon was to become a NATO problem. Yugoslavia announced that it could not accept a solution that one-sidedly favored Italy. Should Italian troops enter Zone A, they would be attacked. Soon, smaller NATO countries were wondering if Italy would then be entitled to invoke the North Atlantic Treaty (NAT). Certainly not—was the joint U.S. and British knee-jerk reaction. After all, Trieste was not and would not become Italian territory. But when they consulted their respective legal authorities, the outcome was quite a surprise: a Yugoslav attack against Italian troops in Zone A would indeed constitute an aggression as defined by Articles 5 and 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty, and would entitle Italy to call for Allied support. (1) American and British action had brought NATO to the brink of war with a prospective security partner, without consulting anybody beforehand. All those Allied nations who had always stressed the political dimension of NATO, above all Canada, were severely critical.

Founding the Balkan Pact

The resolution of the Trieste crisis opened the way to a true Balkan Pact. (2) Throughout 1954, Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey had been negotiating. Again, there was close scrutiny by NATO partners of what was transpiring. Italy's claim that, under the NAT, Greece and Turkey were obliged to obtain NATO agreement before they could engage in security arrangements with a third party, was soon dismissed by the other Allies. (3) After all, such an interpretation of the NAT would have given every NATO partner the right to veto, for example, future American security arrangements. However, there was concern in NATO over what would happen should Greece and Turkey have to go to war in support of Yugoslavia. Would NATO have to follow suit, thus giving Yugoslavia an indirect security guarantee without reciprocal Yugoslav undertakings? One thing was certain: Tito did not want to join NATO, either directly or indirectly. When the Balkan Pact was signed at Bled, Yugoslavia, on 9 August 1954, the North Atlantic Council had taken

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Call for Papers

Siena College, Loudonville, New York, is continuing its sponsorship of an annual, international, multidisciplinary conference commemorating the anniversary of World War II. The 4-5 June 1998 session will feature a dual perspective: the sixtieth anniversary (1938-1998) of the beginnings of World War II, and the fiftieth anniversary (1948-1998) of the aftermath of that conflict. Conference organizers invite papers suitable to either focus. World War II—Beginnings, 1938, could include papers on Fascism, National Socialism, Spain, Austria, Munich, the Sino-Japanese War, literature, art, film, women's studies, and Jewish studies dealing with that era. World War II—The Aftermath, 1948, might include papers dealing with the Holocaust, displaced persons, war crimes trials, literary or cinematic studies of the war, veterans affairs, the G.I. Bill, and economic reconversion. Of course, other relevant topics within these broad foci also are welcome.

Potential contributors should submit a one-to-three-page outline or abstract of the proposal, with an indication of sources, archival materials consulted, etc., along with a recent vita or biographical sketch. The deadline for these submissions is 1 December 1997, with final papers due 15 March 1998. Inquiries from those who wish to chair sessions or to comment also are invited.

For more information, contact Professor Thomas O. Kelly II, Department of History, Siena College, 515 Loudon Road, Loudonville, NY 122211-1462, or call (518) 783-2512, FAX (518) 786-5052.

note of it in a private meeting. On this occasion, the very useful invention of "private meetings" proved its worth. No official notes were taken, so that Italian acquiescence did not go on the record, which would have implied express approval. Instead, NATO's role was reasserted and, at the same time, the Italians saved face.

Still, at the insistence of the United States and other NATO partners, the actual assistance clause in the Balkan Pact had been toned down to parallel the rather noncommittal text of Article 5 of the NAT, which left up to the discretion of each contracting party the type and the degree of assistance provided (including military force) in the event of an attack. For Yugoslavia, this was disappointing. Even though this measure of Balkan cooperation had opened the way for limited American military aid in November 1952 (expanded after another round of negotiations in 1953), Yugoslavia could not rely decisively upon any nation to come to its aid in the event of attack.

For the Turks, the objective of the entire enterprise had always been to tie Yugoslavia closer to the West, maybe even to make it the next member of NATO. There would be no lofty objections from Ankara (or from Lisbon, Portugal) that NATO was conceived to be a community of democratic nations.

For the Greeks, the principal aim of the Balkan Pact was to reinforce their military defenses, nothing more. Greek authorities always accepted the fact that the Yugoslavs did not want to join NATO, and that most NATO members would object should Tito ever change his mind. The Greeks, however, were also hoping that relations between the Yugoslavs and the West might be conducted principally through the Balkan Pact nations, thus enhancing their own position.

The treaty eventually agreed upon did not meet any of these expectations. In a sense, it bore the seeds of failure even as it was signed. And fail it did. In the spring of 1955, Tito's new allies were as surprised as everyone else when Nikita Khrushchev's forthcoming visit to Belgrade was announced. The Turkish Prime Minister, Adnan Menderes, had been in Belgrade while the visit was being planned, and nobody had informed him. Khrushchev's visit itself seemed to indicate a rapprochement between Yugoslavia and post-Stalinist Russia, even if Tito did nothing to make things easy for his guest. Mercilessly, he kept asking about comrades from his Moscow days, and an embarrassed Khrushchev had to admit that every one of them had been shot.

Still, the Soviet threat had receded, and Tito was hoping to become one of the leading figures in the nascent movement of nonaligned states, initiated by the Bandung Conference. Tito saw himself as closer to Jawaharlal Nehru and Gamal Abd-al-Nasser than to Dwight D. Eisenhower and John Foster Dulles.

Almost at the same time, conflict erupted between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus. After the anti-Greek riots in Izmir and Istanbul in September 1955, Yugoslavia openly sided with Greece, bringing Yugoslav-Turkish cooperation to a virtual halt. In fact, NATO became the forum for attempts at Greek-Turkish reconciliation, and the Balkan Pact—the making of which exercised diplomats for two years—lapsed into insignificance in just over twelve months.

Simultaneously, Tito decisively stabilized his internal position. The arrest of Archbishop Cardinal Alojzije Stepinac, a Croatian nationalist and, therefore, a potentially divisive factor in Tito's multiethnic Yugoslavia, indicated a crackdown on the forces of disintegration. (However successful the ruthless repression of such forces may have been during Tito's lifetime, events soon after his death were to show that the demons had been dormant, not dead.) Jailing Western-minded Milovan Djilas signaled a continuing adherence to Marxist principles.

Tito's dependence on foreign aid waned, and he let the West feel this change. The hoped-for military cooperation on the Yugoslav-Italian border never prospered, and the United States phased out military aid in 1955. The withdrawal of American and British troops from Trieste in 1954, and from Austria in 1955, together with the end of all plans for a coordinated defense along the Isonzo, created a potentially dangerous situation in northern Italy. The United States responded by deploying to Verona their first tactical nuclear weapons in Europe.

Military versus Political Aspects of the North Atlantic Alliance

It has been argued that the West should have reacted earlier to Yugoslavia's defection from the Stalinist camp—should have given more—and that by not doing so, wasted an opportunity to tie Yugoslavia continuously to the Western camp. This seems doubt-

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ful. In view of Italy's position, and the need for the Allies to support a democratic government on the brink of electoral defeat, it was not possible for the West to be more forthcoming to Yugoslavia. When all was said and done, Tito's state was a repressive Marxist dictatorship. If NATO really was to be anything more than an old-fashioned military alliance, there was no room for Yugoslavia. Tito never wanted to commit himself more than he actually did, and it would be hard to imagine him pledging himself to uphold the principle of "democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law," as laid down in the preamble of the North Atlantic Treaty. There never was a real opportunity which the West might have missed.

Still, there were lessons to be learned. Lack of timely political consultation on the part of the Americans and British had gravely offended NATO partners, and overlooking the NATO dimension of their ill-conceived snapshot solution to the Trieste crisis had landed both the Department of State and the Foreign Office in hot water. The major NATO powers were only beginning to learn that the alliance was, in fact, putting more restrictions on their policies than they had imagined back in 1949.

Continuous calls for political consultation had come from Canada's minister of external affairs, Lester Pearson, and from Italy. In the end, it had been the appointment of a relatively unknown schoolteacher, Gaetano Martino, as foreign minister in Rome, that broke the deadlock over Trieste. Martino went on to serve the longest term in office of any Italian foreign minister in the 1950s. Perhaps it is no coincidence then, that Pearson and Martino, together with their Norwegian colleague, Halvard Lange, became known as the "Three Wise Men of NATO," and in 1956 codified the basic rules of political consultation within the alliance. These rules—which still apply today— were developed by NATO's members through the successful management of complex problems such as the alliance's relations with Tito's Yugoslavia in the 1950s.

Notes

1. Article 6 had been amended by the Protocol on the accession of Greece and Turkey. It now stated that "an armed attack...is deemed to include an attack...on the forces, vessels, or aircraft of any of the parties, when in or over...any other area in Europe in which occupation forces of any of the forces were stationed on the date when the Treaty entered into force...." Of course, this provision had been meant to protect Germany and Austria, but technically, it would apply even if the forces attacked (Italian) were not identical to those stationed in the territory in question (Trieste) in April 1949 (i.e., American and British).

2. Incidentally, the solution of the Trieste crisis also cleared the path for a U.S.-Italian base agreement which opened Naples to the U.S. Sixth Fleet.

3. Article 8: "Each party...undertakes not to enter into any international agreement in conflict with this Treaty."

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Recollections of Those Who were There
D-Day Stories by Veterans

Thomas D. Morgan

Regular readers of Army History *will be familiar with Lt. Col. (Ret.) Thomas Morgan's articles about D-day. In the Winter 1996 (no. 36) issue he suggested a tour of Normandy sites for returning veterans, while the Summer 1996 (no. 38)* Army History *offered nine of his photographs in a D-day pictorial. In this issue, he shares the reminiscences of veterans he has met, either at a May 1994 symposium at the Eisenhower Library on D-day, or on visits to Normandy itself.*

Chester Hansen: Major Chester "Chet" Hansen was Lt. Gen. Omar Bradley's aide on D-day. Trained as a journalist, Hansen kept a detailed diary for Bradley that was later used to write Bradley's World War II memoir, *A Soldier's Story.* The landing in the OMAHA Beach sector made little progress during the morning of 6 June 1944. Ship-to-shore communications were not good, because so many radios had been lost in the surf or destroyed by enemy fire. Bradley sent Hansen in a torpedo boat to the beachhead to determine the situation. Hansen does not recall exactly what he reported to Bradley, but the situation on the beach was confused and his report was not very optimistic. What Hansen remembers better was General Dwight D. Eisenhower's first meeting with Bradley the day after D-day.

On 7 June 1944, General Eisenhower, accompanied by Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsay, the overall naval commander, and members of the SHAEF (Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force) staff, made a complete tour of the landing beaches in a fast minelayer, H.M.S. *Apollo.* (It was later damaged when it hit a sand bar and Ike returned to England on a destroyer, the H.M.S. *Undaunted).* Bradley met Eisenhower aboard the ship in the English Channel. The first comment an indignant Ike made to Bradley was, "Why didn't you tell me what was going on?" Bradley stated that he was reporting almost hourly to his higher headquarter's, Field Marshal Bernard L. Montgomery's 21st Army Group, but that Monty's headquarters either lost or filtered the reports so that Eisenhower's Su-

preme Headquarters received very little information. Nevertheless, by noon on 7 June Bradley felt that conditions were improving on OMAHA Beach and he visited UTAH Beach. On 10 June, Bradley closed his floating command post on the cruiser *Augusta* and moved permanently into his First Army Headquarters, set up in an orchard behind Point du Hoc.

Piper Bill Millin: William Millin, from Glasgow, Scotland, has played the bagpipes since he was twelve. Telling him, "You have volunteered for commando duty," Brigadier Lord Lovat selected Millin to be the bagpiper of his 1st Special Service (Commando) Brigade. He participated in the ill-fated Dieppe Raid in August 1942 and in 1943 he attended a three-month bagpiping course in Edinburgh Castle.

Millin's charming Scottish accent and underplayed sense of highland's humor make him a popular speaker about D-day. On D-day, Millin "piped" Lovat's brigade ashore at SWORD Beach. The British War Department had forbidden bagpipes in battle, but Lovat felt that for that occasion the pipes must be played. Millin played walking through the surf and got his kilts wet. He played walking up and down the beach and led the column of Lovat's commandos to relieve the airborne force under Major John Howard at the Orne River and Canal (Pegasus) Bridges. Lovat ordered him to play as loud as possible so that Howard's troops on the bridges would know that relief was on the way. One of the first things that Millin will tell you with a twinkle in his eye is that, "I do not give bagpipe lessons." Unless, he says, it is "...to earn a few 'bobbies'." Part of his commando training consisted of jumping into the sea every morning at the commando training center in the Scottish Highlands. That compared to getting his kilt wet while coming ashore at SWORD Beach.

Lovat directed him to play tunes on the march inland from SWORD Beach to the Orne bridges. Millin was worried about snipers, but none shot at him. Millin thought Lovat was a bit "eccentric" because of his casual manner at the head of the column of comman-

dos. Contrary to Peter Lawford's portrayal of Lovat in the film, *The Longest Day*, Lovat did not carry his hunting rifle for long. He gave it to a soldier on the beach who had lost his, and then Lovat was armed only with a holstered pistol and Scottish walking stick. At one point Millin played the "March of the Clan Cameron" not remembering that Lovat was the 25th chief of the Clan Fraser, archrivals of the Cameron's. Lovat stopped him with a curt, "not that tune." There were German snipers, but either they liked the bagpipe tunes, or—as a captured sniper said—he thought the piper was insane, and, therefore, it was bad luck to shoot him.

John Howard: Thirty-one-year-old Maj. John Howard, commander, D Company, 2d Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire ("Ox and Bucks") Light Infantry, was a former regimental sergeant major and policeman. He and his company had been selected by his brigadier to capture the two key bridges over the Orne Canal and River north east of Caen. It was to be a gliderborne *coup de main* attack. Howard trained his men to his exacting standards and personally led the attack on the Orne Canal Bridge that was later immortalized as the Pegasus Bridge after the symbol of the British Airborne. Howard's action at Pegasus Bridge is considered one of the outstanding feats of arms on D-day and was made famous in the film, *The Longest Day*.

Speaking to an audience at the Eisenhower Center in Abilene, Kansas, just before the fiftieth anniversary of D-day, Howard admitted to being so scared as his Horsa glider approached the French coast that he forgot about the air-sickness that had plagued all of his training flights. His glider made two bumps as it touched ground near the bridge. The third bump was the crash landing. He thought the sparks generated by the glider skids during the first two bumps were enemy tracer bullets being fired at him. Suddenly, as the glider came to a violent stop, Howard could not see anything and he thought that the jolt had made him blind. He was wondering how he would accomplish his mission in that condition when he realized that his helmet had come down over his eyes. The time was 0016 on 6 June 1944. He knows the exact time because the force of the crash landing stopped his watch at that time.

Every year at 0016 on 6 June, he and a few of his veterans toast their fallen comrades with champagne

on the Pegasus Bridge. He remembers the "Ham" signal (for the capture of the Pegasus Bridge) and the "Jam" signal (for the capture of the Orne River Bridge) that he directed be sent by Morse code to announce mission accomplishment. At 0300 hours, Howard was reinforced by members of the 7th Parachute Battalion. Howard blew a V-for-victory in Morse code with his company commander's whistle into his radio to signal Lt. Col. Pine Coffin, who was coming up with his 7th Battalion. At the conclusion of his remarks at the Eisenhower Center, Howard produced his old whistle and blew V-for-victory into the auditorium's public address system, with attention-getting results.

Wallace C. Strobel: 1st Lt. Wally Strobel was celebrating his twenty-second birthday on 5 June 1944. He was a platoon leader in E Company, 502d Parachute Infantry regiment of the 101st Airborne Division, preparing to lead his platoon in the airborne assault that began the D-day landings in Normandy.

General Eisenhower visited the 101st Division at Greenham Common airfield in England about 1900 on 5 June 1944 as the division was rigging up for the D-day jump. Eisenhower's air commander, Air Vice Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory, an experienced fighter commander from the Battle of Britain, had officially warned Eisenhower that the OVERLORD airborne assault would suffer at least 50 percent losses, even before hitting the ground. Ike took the risk, but he went to see the 101st Airborne before and during their takeoff to make sure they were ready (and probably to reassure himself). Ike mingled with the airborne troopers and selected Strobel, among several, to question. He asked Strobel his name and where he was from. The answer was, "Strobel, sir, Michigan." Ike commented on the fishing he had done in Michigan. Then he asked if Strobel and his men were well briefed and ready. Strobel answered in the affirmative.

Strobel's plane number was 23, and that was the reason he is seen in a well-publicized photograph with a "23" card around his neck. His uniform and number placard are now on display in the Eisenhower Museum in Abilene, Kansas. Strobel recalls landing in a tree, some seven-to-eight kilometers from his designated drop zone. He remembers seeing his battalion commander, Lt. Col. Steve Chappuis, sitting on the ruins of a German gun emplacement and asking where he had

been. Chappuis told him to repair a communication line. Then Strobel assembled his platoon and led them into action in Normandy. It had been a most exciting birthday!

Colonel Hans von Luck: Luck represents the "other side of the hill" at D-day. A professional German army officer with all of the career-enhancing assignments required of the German officer corps in the post-World War I 1920s and 1930s. He studied under the legendary Erwin Rommel at the Infantry School, and Rommel considered him as a second son.

A veteran of the North African Campaign with Rommel's *Afrika Korps*, Luck was assigned to the *21st Panzer Division* in North Africa. With the collapse of German resistance in Tunisia, he was sent as a young colonel to Adolph Hitler's headquarters at Berchtesgaden with a special plan to save what was left of Rommel's desert army from extinction or capture in a Dunkirk-type operation. He was sent because of the perception that "Hitler doesn't like generals." He got no further than the chief of operations' (*Generaloberst* Alfred Jodl) office, but it got him out of Tunisia before the final capitulation. Luck was then sent to Paris for a six-month military course before being assigned to help rebuild the *21st Panzer Division* in France. At the end of April 1944, the *21st Panzer Division* was reconstituted near Caen, with Luck commanding its *125th Panzer Regiment.*

He was conducting night training exercises with his command at the time of the airborne D-day landings. Rommel had told him that the British would come to Normandy. Two weeks before the Normandy landings, his corps commander, General Eric Marcks, had told him that the British would go to church on Sunday and invade on Monday. Eisenhower's famous twenty-four-hour postponement of D-day made the Allied invasion on Tuesday (6 June 1944). On the night of 5 June and early morning of 6 June 1944, British paratroopers landed on Luck's *5th Company*, which was training without ammunition. Nevertheless, the first prisoner captured was a doctor from the 6th British Airborne Division. Luck spoke excellent English so he engaged the doctor in "small talk" to illicit information from him. He gathered enough information to know that what was afoot was serious. The problem was that Luck's division commander was away in Paris with his girlfriend on what the British called a "dirty weekend," and Rommel was at home in Germany, visiting his wife on her birthday. In the absence of these commanders, therefore, there was inactivity at the front.

In 1979, Rommel's chief of staff, *Generalleutnant* Hans Speidel, told Luck that there was a secret order for an immediate counterattack by the *21st Panzer Division* in case of an Allied airborne assault. No one except the higher commanders knew about this—and they were absent. If this order had been transmitted promptly, Luck's command would have counterattacked the British paratroopers at 0130, 6 June 1944, just after they had landed and were still vulnerable. The *Panzers* could have gotten into the bridgehead and pinned down the British before they had a chance to get started. As it was, Luck did not get the order to attack until the afternoon of 6 June, and then it was too late for decisive results.

One thing Luck remembers clearly is that fairness on the battlefield was the highest priority. It had been his trademark since the days in North Africa when they had captured many British prisoners and treated them fairly. He said that he and the British were just doing their jobs.

In 1951, Luck had the opportunity to meet General Eisenhower when he was the new Supreme Commander Allied Force Europe. The past was past by then, and new problems beset the former victorious Allies. Germany was being courted as a full-fledged member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to counteract the Soviet menace during the Cold War.

Stanley Winter: Stan Winter commanded C Company, 16th Infantry Regiment, 1st Infantry Division ("Big Red One") on D-day. In his own words, he was a "handcuffed" draftee in 1941. He was sent to Officers Candidate School (OCS) and then to Great Britain in August 1942. From there, he went to North Africa and participated in that campaign after landing at Oran later in 1942.

In November 1943, he trained with his unit in England for the D-day landings. His company was in the regimental reserve battalion and he landed at OMAHA Beach at H+30 minutes. He remembers the regimental commander, Col. George A. Taylor, exhorting the men to get off the beach and up the bluffs. Winter crawled

through the mined, sandy beach and up the Colleville Draw after the first wave had neutralized *Widerstandnest 62*, the German strongpoint that defended the EASY RED and FOX GREEN sectors of OMAHA Beach. His unit was in the *bocage* (hedgerow) beyond the beachhead by late afternoon on D-day.

Winter remembers how the battlefield smelled. He said that it stank of gunpowder, smoke, stale body sweat, fecal matter, and decaying bodies (both human and Norman farm animals). He helped capture St. Lo, and he left the unit just before it captured Cologne, Germany. He closed his remarks by stating, "The 1st Infantry Division is a part of my life."

Peter Martin: Maj. Gen. (Ret), then Major, Peter Martin landed on GOLD Beach with the 8th Armored Brigade of the 50th (British) Division. He already was a veteran of Dunkirk, North Africa, and Sicily. He went to Sicily on a luxury liner that served the troops an excellent breakfast before the landings. However, the liner anchored far offshore and everyone "lost their kit" on the long, rough ride in to the beach in shallow-bottomed landing craft.

His division commander and the commander of the 51st Highland Division tossed a coin to see who would go in first at GOLD Beach. His commander "won" the toss and thus the 50th Division went in first. It was all very sporting for the general officers.

Alfred Rubin: Lt. Al Rubin landed at H-2 hour with the 24th Cavalry Squadron on the Iles St. Marcouf, just a few miles off UTAH Beach. Their mission was to secure these two, barren piles of rock so that the Germans could not attack the landing craft and landing beaches from the rear. The Germans had abandoned the islands before D-day, but they had left them heavily booby-trapped. Especially dangerous against personnel were the S-mines, which bounded into the air when stepped on, spraying bullet-like ball bearings at waist level.

Rubin remembers the battleship U.S.S. *Nevada* shelling UTAH Beach from behind the islands and how big the 14-inch shells looked going over the islands on their way to the beach area. Twenty-four hours after the landings, his unit went ashore at UTAH and provided security for the 4th infantry Division headquarters in the vicinity of Ste. Mere-Eglise. Rubin, who now runs a catering firm in Chicago, is proud of being mentioned in Cornelius Ryan's book, *The Longest Day.*

Lt. Col. Thomas D. Morgan, USA (Ret.), works for Logicon RDA in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and is a frequent visitor to Normandy, France. A graduate of the U.S. Military Academy, he holds a M.A. degree in history from Pacific Lutheran University and an M.P.A. degree from the University of Missouri.

Fifty Years of Army Computing Celebrated

The Army Research Laboratory (ARL) and the Ordnance Center and School sponsored a celebration (13-14 November 1996) at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, of the Army's role in the ongoing computer revolution. The Aberdeen festivities highlighted the efforts of the original pioneers in this endeavor, and included recognition of Dr. Herman H. Goldstine, the ENIAC project officer, as well as the presentation of plaques to the families of two other key figures—Col. Paul N. Gillon, Ordnance Department staff officer, and Prof. John L. von Neumann, Institute for Advanced Study. The two-day event culminated in the ribbon cutting for ARL's Major Shared Resource Center, one of the cornerstones of the modernized Department of Defense research and development computational capability.

During a series of panels, Goldstine, Harry Huskey, Betty Holberton, John Gregory, Barkley Fritz, Mike Muuss, and others discussed the development of ENIAC and successor machines, software, and applications, focusing on activities at the Ballistic Research Laboratory. In one of the most interesting sessions, several of the original programmers—the "women pioneers"—described some of their experiences.

The ARL is planning to produce printed proceedings, as well as videos of certain sessions. For more information, contact Dr. William T. Moye, Historian, U.S. Army Research Laboratory, Adelphi, MD 20783, or at wmoye@arl.mil, or visit the ARL home page on the internet at http://www.arl.mil.

Call for Papers
National Security Agency
Seventh Symposium on Cryptologic History
29-31 October 1997

The National Security Agency (NSA) will sponsor and host the seventh Symposium on Cryptologic History, 29-31 October 1997, at NSA, Fort George G. Meade, Maryland. The conference will focus on cryptologic history based on recently declassified materials from World War II and the VENONA releases.

Additional information regarding registration, accommodations, and the program will be available in June 1997.

The Center for Cryptologic History welcomes papers and panels relating to any aspect of cryptologic history based on research into declassified materials. The deadline for submissions is 1 April 1997.

To propose either a complete session or an individual paper, submit a one page abstract for each paper, a one-page statement of session purpose for a panel, and a brief vita for each presenter to Dr. David A. Hatch, Chief, Center for Cryptologic History (S542), National Security Agency, 9800 Savage Road, STE 6886, Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755. Phone (301) 688-2336, or FAX (301) 688-2342 for additional information.

Letters to the Editor

Editor:

I enjoyed the article in the recent issue of *Army History* (no. 38, Summer 1996) which recommended the 1870 Franco-Prussian War battlefields for a "staff ride." In the spring of 1945 when my battalion was in division reserve for the 70th Infantry Division, I made a reconnaissance with my S-2 and S-3 of the Spicheren Heights battlefield to prepare a counterattack to support our forward units, which were under heavy German attack. We came under artillery fire and ducked into a building in which we found displays of maps and material illustrating the 1870 German attack on Spicheren. I was surprised to discover that the current German attacks were using the same route of attack in 1945 that they had used in 1870. The dominant terrain still dictated tactical operations on the ground seventy-five years later.

In May 1995 it was a sense of *deja vu* that I and members of the 70th Division Association attended the commemoration of a monument which the French dedicated to the 70th Division's capture of Spicheren Heights. It was a touching ceremony, in sight of the 1870 French and German memorials.

After the ceremony the French mayor asked if we could obtain a World War II tank which could be placed with the monument. General George Blanchard and I visited USAREUR headquarters in Heidelberg and were assured that they would furnish a tank from one of their relinquished Kasernes. A year later, after personal assistance from the Chief of Military History, the M-24 tank was finally received and placed near our monument. I'm sure that the presence of this World War II monument and M-24 tank with the 1870 monuments will emphasize to future visitors to the battlefield the validity of the old French saying, *"Plus ca change, plus c'est la meme chose!"*

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As a postscript, at the...reunion of the 70th Infantry Association the members voted to raise funds to place a duplicate of the French monument at the National Infantry Museum at Fort Benning, Georgia.

Ted Mataxis
Brig. Gen., USA (Ret.)
World War II Commander,
2d Bn, 276th Infantry
70th Division

Editor:

Your Summer 1996 issue provided me with some reminders and interesting information.

First, your [14th Street]...address brought back many memories of the 1960s when I visited Main Navy on radar business with the Navy and Marine Corps, located at 14th Street and Constitution Avenue. It always amazes me to think of those days, knowing that the many offices in Main Navy and adjacent Munitions Building were scattered about, requiring Crystal City, Crystal Mall, and other buildings.

I enjoyed reading "A Staff Ride to the Franco-Prussian War Battlefields" for a number of reasons. My grandfather, born in Martin Luther's home town of Eisleben, lost an eye somewhere in that battle, northeast of Metz. In World War II I served in the 26th Infantry Division (Yankee Division), which entered the Lorraine arena (October 1944) and fought in the area east of your descriptive area, as well as after the Battle of the Bulge in the Saarbruecken-Kaiserslautern path. Over the years, I found it possible to cover the tracks of the Yankee Division in World War I...also in roughly the same locations, and throughout most of Lorraine.

Since I'm a collector of maps, I followed the [article] using my German...atlas and No. 57 Michelin map, both of which I refer to when I provide data to veterans from the 26th, 28th, 42d, 44th, 65th, and 103d Infantry Divisions, all of which had some activity in these areas, October 1944-April 1945.

The article on the Army Remount Program also was of interest, because I have a cousin who served in the German *291st Infantry Regiment*, and who was one of the caretakers of the regiment's horses.

William Leesemann, Jr., veteran
101st Eng Combat Bn, 26th Div

Editor:

In a book review (Fall 1996) of Michael Lemish's *War Dogs: Canines in Combat*, Judith A. Bellafaire writes that "Vietnamese culture did not value dogs." On the contrary, in rural areas of Vietnam especially, when other animal protein is in short supply, dog is highly valued as food. This no doubt offends the sensibilities of many American dog-lovers, but [it] is true.

Ms. Bellafaire is correct when she writes that "scout dogs saved lives in the Vietnam jungles." During my tour in the 25th Infantry Division (1967-68), I saw German shepherds alert near tunnel entrances and booby traps in Hau Nghia Province north of Cu Chi.

I regret that many working dogs were mistreated in Vietnam as the American presence diminished. I thank [Dr.] Judith Bellafaire for her book review.

Col. Robert Fairchild
Army National Guard (Ret.)

Book Reviews

Book Review
by Stanley L. Falk

SHOBUN: A Forgotten War Crime in the Pacific
by Michael J. Goodwin
Stackpole Books. 147 pp., $19.95

Of the nearly 26,000 Americans taken prisoner by the Japanese in World War II, more than 10,000 failed

to survive their cruel captivity. This small book is the detailed story of how one of these unfortunate victims, Lt. (jg) William F. Goodwin, USNR, met his tragic death.

In early October 1944, Goodwin was a pilot aboard a Morotai-based Navy PBY (Consolidated patrol bomber) making a solitary night attack on Japanese shipping when it was shot down off the Celebes Island town of Kendari. He and eight other survivors were

captured by the Japanese, and, seven weeks later, were summarily executed in a bizarre series of elaborate ceremonial beheadings. Their executions reflected the Japanese policy of killing most enemy flyers who fell into their hands, ostensibly for war crimes, but in reality as a matter of revenge and as a sop for shattered Japanese morale. For Goodwin and his fellow captives, the immediate cause of their deaths was a brief order from the local Japanese base commander concerning the fate of the prisoners. His order used the word *shobun*, which means to '"dispose of" or, in some instances, "to punish." In this case, Goodwin's captors took it to mean "to execute."

SHOBUN: A Forgotten War Crime in the Pacific was written by Goodwin's son, who was born shortly after his father's execution. Finding nothing about this episode in published accounts of the war, he set out to research the circumstances of William Goodwin's death. He got in touch with members of his father's squadron or their families, and with other individuals and organizations both here and abroad who might have had relevant information. He also studied the records of the war crimes trials of those involved in his father's execution and did further archival research. The result is a full, credible, and well-written account. It is also a restrained and unemotional one, with none of the bitterness that might be expected in such a personal work.

The author does, however, point out that many Japanese war criminals were never punished and that, of those who were, most were released within several years or even months of their convictions. And unlike the continued scarch for German war criminals several decades after the end of hostilities, investigations into Japanese war crimes ended in the late 1940s. Nor, observes Goodwin sadly, have many Japanese been willing to "face the fact that they and their leadership were the source of a great deal of suffering during the first half of this century" (p. 140).

Dr. Stanley L. Falk formerly was chief historian of the U.S. Air Force. He is the author of a number of books about World War II in the Pacific, including Bataan: The March of Death *and, as editor,* Foo, A Japanese-American Prisoner of the Rising Sun: The Secret Prison Diary of Frank "Foo" Fujita.

Forthcoming in *Army History...*

Brig. Gen. Roger Hand's (USAR) use of decision analysis techniques to examine General Dwight D. Eisenhower's critical decisions just before the Normandy landings.

Rev. Paul F. Liston's review of *Battlefield Chaplains: Catholic Priests in World War II.*

And much more....