ARMY HISTORY

THE PROFESSIONAL BULLETIN OF ARMY HISTORY

PB-20-99-1 (No. 46) Washington, D.C. Fall 1998–Winter 1999

The Girl I Left Behind Me?
United States Army Laundresses and the Mexican War

Robert P. Wettemann, Jr.

The hour was sad I left the maid,
A lingering farewell taking,
Her sighs and tears my steps delay'd—
I thought her heart was breaking;
In hurried words her name I bless'd,
I breathed the vows that bind me,
And to my heart, in anguish press'd
The girl I left behind me.
Samuel Lover

During the Mexican War, the Irish poet and songwriter Samuel Lover toured the United States popularizing "The Girl I Left Behind Me," a tune that would remain a favorite of American soldiers for many decades.[1] Throughout the summer of 1846, balladeers played this song for the wives and sweethearts left behind by American citizen-soldiers marching towards the "halls of the Montezumas." But, this patriotic image of heart-rending separation did not reflect the significant role of the soldiers' wives and other women who accompanied the United States Regular Army in this period. Throughout the war, laundresses and camp women performed domestic duties within the recognized structure of the U.S. Army, cooking, cleaning, and caring for both Regular Army officers and enlisted men campaigning in Mexico.[2] Forgotten by most, these women exercised a noteworthy humanizing influence on the Army units to which they were attached.

A number of historians have viewed Army laundresses and camp followers as little more than prostitutes for the rank and file of the antebellum Army. In a study of prostitution in the American West, Anne Butler alleged that:

The multiplicity of terms [used in military regulations between 1802 and 1869] was not a minor point. Overlapping terminology—"matrons," "nurses,' "female attendants," "campwomen," "followers of the army," and "laundresses"—has served to keep identification of female roles confused, and permitted officials to avoid any direct acknowledgement of prostitution on military grounds.[3]

In short, Butler contended that "the [United States] military created a de facto policy in support of prostitution." This assertion has been contested in studies of Army laundresses serving after the Civil War.[4] Whatever the case later in the nineteenth century, Butler's statements do not reflect the experiences of women retained by regular forces during the Mexican War.[5]

In the absence of written records produced by actual Army laundresses, scholars have been forced to rely upon government documents, officers' diaries, and letters to understand these women. These accounts are difficult to interpret. Grady McWhiney noted that Army officers expressed "diverse attitudes and actions" with respect to sex.[6] According to Edward Coffman, women mentioned by officers were usually "troublesome" or victims of "unusual difficulties."[7] While prostitutes were known to live near some military camps, my reading of these documents leads to the clear conclusion that American army camp women in the antebellum period were not ladies of ill repute, nor did they "just fade away" as suggested in one study of laundresses in the frontier Army.[8] Like their counterparts in the eighteenth century, these women fulfilled an important function for the Army throughout much of the Mexican War.[9]

The March 1802 "Act Fixing the Military Peace Establishment of the United States" officially recognized the U.S. Army's women retainers.[10] That act provided that rations were to be issued "to the women

who may be allowed to any particular corps not exceeding the proportion of four to a company" and to nurses and matrons employed in military hospitals. Article 40 of the *General Regulations of 1841* specified the function of the women attached to these peace establishment companies: "Four women will be allowed to each company as washerwomen, and will receive one ration per day each." These regulations further provided that "The price of washing soldiers' clothing, by the month, or by the piece, will be determined by the Council of Administration. . . . Debts due the Laundress by soldiers, for washing, will be paid or collected in the same way as is prescribed for those due the Sutler, the Laundress having the preference."[11] In consequence, rates for laundry were determined by regimental officers, with payment taken from the soldiers' monthly wage. It was under these guidelines that the army of Brevet Brig. Gen. Zachary Taylor assembled in Texas in the summer of 1845.

It is difficult to determine how many laundresses worked for the U.S. Army. As the Regular Army at the start of the Mexican War contained fourteen regiments with ten companies in each, as many as 560 women may have served in this capacity.[12] While few peacetime records exist that mention laundresses or camp women, numerous references to them may be found in soldiers' writings in the Mexican War era. These accounts, in conjunction with wartime military orders and reports, form a body of evidence supporting both the presence and positive influence of American women with the U.S. Army in Mexico.

The letters of Pvt. Barna Upton of the Third Infantry Regiment offer one of the first recorded references to camp women in this period. In 1845, Upton wrote from Fort Jesup, Louisiana, "In my next letter . . . I shall also write how many women there is in our company (there is five) and how many in the other companies (about the same number), and I shall write how many children if I can find out."[13] While Upton's next letter is not known to exist, it appears that these women were a part of the recognized organizational structure of the nineteenth century American military.

This assumption is supported by the reminiscences of Pvt. George Ballentine of the First Artillery. While traveling by transport prior to the war, Ballentine noted that while women were not present in "great number," private quarters were nonetheless arranged for "the married people." The Scotsman noted that "in time of peace, three married men of each company are allowed (their wives being laundresses, and washing for the soldiers), to bring their families along with them when moving." Ballentine explained that potential laun-

Contents

dresses applied to the captain, and he rewarded the soldiers' wife who was "best deserving." According to Ballentine, these women were not permitted to accompany their husbands in the field.[14] Although Ballentine understated the number of laundresses allowed by the Army, he offered one of the earliest statements recognizing that laundresses were soldiers' wives. Contrary to his suggestion that these women served only in peacetime, there is considerable evidence that the Army employed laundresses through much of the war with Mexico.

In July 1845 President James K. Polk ordered General Taylor to assemble a 3,000-man "Army of Observation" at Corpus Christi, Texas, in anticipation of hostilities with Mexico. Based on the diaries and letters written by many of the Army officers who joined Taylor, it appears that a significant number of camp women accompanied this force. While the terminology used in these accounts may not be consistent, there is little evidence that suggests that these women were prostitutes. Instead, they appear to have lived, worked, and suffered alongside their soldier-husbands as the United States and Mexico moved toward war.

Transportation orders issued in July 1845 authorized 55 women to accompany the 942 officers and enlisted men of the Third and Fourth Infantry Regiments to Texas.[15] First Lt. William Henry of the Third Infantry observed these women from the very moment he landed at Corpus Christi. In July 1845 Henry wrote, "Seventy-five yards distant from the shore the men had to jump overboard into the roaring surf. . . . Some old veteran camp-women took to the element as if they were born in it; while others, more delicately-nerved, preferred a *man's back, and rode on shore.*"[16] Almost immediately, these camp women began to experience the same difficulties which befell their soldier-husbands. Capt. Ephraim Kirby Smith of the Fifth Infantry wrote, "[Capt. James] Thompson lost his tents . . . a most serious loss, depriving his company of the only shelter his men and women have, compelling the rest to divide with him and crowding all."[17]

In late July, Lt. Col. Ethan Allen Hitchcock of the Third Infantry arrived at Corpus Christi. The next morning, he inspected his regiment's camp. In addition to his troops, he observed "two or three families living on shore."[18] While Hitchcock does not state that these families were attached to his regiment, in light of the

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

DENNIS J. REIMER
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

Official:



JOEL B. HUDSON
Administrative Assistant to the
Secretary of the Army

Chief of Military History
Brig. Gen. John S. Brown

Managing Editor
Charles Hendricks, Ph.D.

Army History (PB-20-99-1) is published by the U.S. Army Center of Military History for the professional development of Army historians. The reproduction of articles for educational purposes is encouraged. Correspondence should be addressed to Managing Editor, *Army History*, U.S. Army Center of Military History, 103 Third Ave., Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, D.C. 20005-3402, or by e-mail to hendrcd@hqda.army.mil. Opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors, not the Department of Defense or its constituent elements. *Army History*'s contents do not necessarily reflect an official Army position and do not supersede information in other official Army publications or Army Regulations. This bulletin is approved for official dissemination of material designed to keep individuals within the Army knowledgeable of developments within Army history for the purpose of enhancing their professional development. Use of funds for printing this publication was approved by the Department of the Army on 7 September 1983. Postage paid at Washington, D.C.

observations made by Lieutenant Henry and Captain Smith, the inference is obvious.

Second Lt. Napoleon Dana of the Seventh Infantry mentioned camp women to his wife on a number of occasions. Dana hired Mrs. Lindsay, the wife of one of his soldiers, to work for him. In early September Dana wrote that "I at last . . . persuaded [the captain] to get Mrs. Lindsay to cook and wash for both for us." Dana added that "we agreed to give Mrs. L. each six dollars for doing both [cooking and washing]." Later, Dana and the captain invited another officer to join the group, and they gave "Mrs. L. three dollars more for him."[19] If nothing else, Dana's comments suggest the economic benefits of working for the Army. Considering that a private only made $7 per month, Mrs. Lindsay's $15 monthly wage was a significant sum by contemporary standards. Nor was Dana the only officer to hire a woman to work for him. Captain Kirby Smith wrote that by having Mrs. Kelly, a soldier's wife, "cooking and washing" for him and First Lt. Nathan Rossell, he expected "to get on with great economy."[20]

Kirby Smith also related his concern for one of his company's camp women who was pregnant. In mid-September he wrote, "Mrs. Roth (a camp woman of my company) was sick. Poor thing! I gave her my stateroom, and by morning she was delivered of a son. This was the second birth on the route [from Cincinnati to Corpus Christi]. The mothers are now both well, and doing their regular washing for the men."[21]

Lieutenant Dana reacted differently to a similar experience in October 1845. After explaining that Mrs. Lindsay's pregnancy required medical attention, Dana mentioned a second camp woman in the service of his regiment. He observed that "Our other woman, Mrs. Dorrance, is sick, too, with an ulcer in the throat." Dana critically judged these women as "worthless hags, not fit for anything," despite the fact that their husbands had each served with his regiment for over five years.[22]

Children were also present with the American Army. After the war, Dr. John Potter, an Army surgeon, published reports indicating the difficult circumstances that many of these military families faced. He wrote, "In a common tent there were three of my patients, a poor woman of the Third Infantry and her twin children, the latter in their second or third teething summer, with cholera infantum, and the mother with chronic dysentery." While Dr. Potter noted that all

An engraving depicting "The Great Western," printed in Mexican Treacheries and Cruelties: Incidents and Sufferings in the Mexican War *(Boston, 1847)*

survived and were well again in 1849, references to the loss of permanent quarters, pregnancy, and children suggest that Regular Army camp women were more than just laundresses. They imply that these women were not only supplementing their husband's meager income by cooking and cleaning for the soldiers but were struggling to maintain some sort of a domestic environment within the structure of the U.S. Army.[23]

In March 1846 President Polk ordered General Taylor and his army south to the Rio Grande. While most women made the journey by steamer, some American laundresses joined the march south.[24] It was on this march that the most famous of the American camp women made her first appearance. By the end of the Mexican War, Sarah Borginnis, a laundress married to a soldier of the Seventh Infantry, was nationally renowned as "The Great Western," recognized for both her exploits and her size, as she was reported to stand six feet tall and weigh some two hundred pounds. Borginnis' greatest claim to fame came during the siege of Fort Texas. Over the course of seven days' bombardment, most camp women "found perfect security" in earthen bombproofs. Undaunted by the Mexican shellfire, Borginnis performed her duties as cook and laundress "as if nothing but a morning drill with

blank cartridges" had occurred.[25] Although "a bullet passed through her bonnet, and another through her bread tray," she continued tending to the soldiers, delivering coffee and meals to "her" men.[26] At one point, she even "applied . . . for a musket and ammunition," anticipating an assault on Fort Texas by Mexican troops.[27] She was later honored with the following Fourth of July toast: "The Great Western — One of the bravest and most patriotic soldiers at the siege of Fort Brown."[28] Despite the "Great Western's" good fortune, not all camp women could celebrate after the initial victories along the border. A week after the battle of Resaca de la Palma in May 1846, Lieutenant Dana observed the widow of an infantry sergeant who had just been killed, "sitting with a child in her arms, her face buried in its sleeping form, sitting beside a group of dead."[29]

After occupying Matamoros, Mexico, near the mouth of the Rio Grande, Taylor's army made preparations to march on Monterrey. A general order issued by his command in May 1846 directed that all baggage and laundresses be sent back to Matamoros.[30] In August Lieutenant Dana wrote from Camargo, about 100 miles upriver from Matamoros, that "All our women go back from here as we cannot provide for them any longer." He expected that most would return to New Orleans. Although he had earlier joined in employing a soldier's wife, Dana expressed the "hope we will not see any of them back again so long as we are campaigning."[31]

Nevertheless, some laundresses apparently accompanied the American Army further into northern Mexico. While marching towards Monterrey in early September, the brigade of now-Captain Henry was accompanied by four camp women. "One of them," the captain wrote, "had gone to the expense of a Mexican lady's side saddle, certainly one of the most curious specimens of saddlery I have ever seen."[32] From these comments it is possible to infer the *American* nationality of these women, for if they had been Mexican—a distinct possibility during the latter stages of the war—why would Henry describe a unique *Mexican* saddle?

After Taylor captured Monterrey in September 1846, he ordered that "all horses, mules, or donkeys, in possession of non-commissioned officers, musicians, privates or laundresses of the various regiments, shall be sold, or otherwise disposed of."[33] Based solely upon this order, one cannot determine how many laundresses remained with the U.S. Army. But the question must be asked: If no laundresses were present, why did Taylor include them in the order?

Women appear to have remained with Taylor's army in the early months of 1847. Capt. Franklin Smith of the First Mississippi Volunteers noted that some women were present behind the lines. In January 1847 he wrote from Camargo that two camp women en route to join their husbands further south had pitched their tents in the immediate vicinity of his.[34] Although most of the regular forces were assembling in and near Tampico, Mexico, in preparation for amphibious landings at Veracruz, Captain Kirby Smith and elements of a number of regular regiments were encamped near the Palo Alto battlefield north of the Rio Grande. Women were present with at least one of these regiments, for in early February 1847 Kirby Smith wrote, "Corporal Riley of my company lost his youngest child this morning, about a year old. I went to his tent before noon and found the mother, an excellent little woman he married at Dearborn Arsenal, sitting with her dead baby in her lap, the tears quietly dropping on its face."[35] These observations suggest that despite Taylor's orders, some laundresses remained in the American camps and endured day-to-day life with the Army throughout a large portion of the Mexican War.

When the campaigns in northern Mexico and California failed to end the war, the United States determined to "conquer the peace" by launching an offensive towards Mexico City. Commanding General Winfield Scott's strategy called for an amphibious landing at Veracruz, which he led in March 1847, followed by an overland march to the national capital. In preparation for this march, Scott ordered limitations on the extraneous baggage of the American forces and is thought to have prohibited camp women from accompanying the American Army into the Mexican interior. References to laundresses, however, do not appear in written orders issued by Scott.[36]

Captain Robert Anderson of the Third Artillery expressed the difficulties women faced when traveling with the Army in Mexico. Anticipating the arrival of a number of soldiers' wives and their children, he wrote, "Women are, as I anticipated, a great pain to their captains in the field. So little transportation is allowed, that if permitted to accompany their troops, they must

purchase or steal some poor horse or ass to carry their baggage." Anderson also observed that if more than one child was present, travel was often impossible.[37]

Nonetheless, a few laundresses are known to have accompanied Scott's army. In mid-March Engineer Sgt. Samuel Starr wrote from Veracruz, "I saw a little girl here . . . yesterday on the sea beach, a soldier's daughter. . . . Singular place for such a child—Women here too."[38] At least one laundress made it as far as Perote, on the eastern edge of the central Mexican plateau. According to Lt. Henry Judah of the Fourth Infantry, Mrs. Clancy refused to abandon her husband and was prepared to follow her spouse. When ordered to return to Veracruz, "Mrs. Clancy . . . would not go. Three men were ordered to accompany her to the wagon. One of them impudently laid his hand on her arm, when in an instant her huge fist sent him sprawling to the ground with a very red eye."[39] This did not deter Mrs. Clancy, for Lieutenant Judah later noted in his journal, "I forgot to state that Mrs. Clancy made her appearance at Perote."[40]

During the spring and summer of 1847, the American army advanced toward Mexico City. Following a series of pitched battles in August and early September, the Americans captured the capital. They occupied it until the ratification of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo the following year. There is little evidence regarding the whereabouts of U.S. Army laundresses during this occupation. However, Mississippi's *Natchez Courier* reported in January 1848—while a large part of the U.S. Army was still in Mexico—that "Official documents state that there are at least 2300 women attached to the American Army, cooking, washing, tending the sick, and loving the survivors."[41] Unfortunately, no supporting documentation is available, making it hard to assess the meaning of this newspaper article.

It is difficult to extend to U.S. Army laundresses the idealization of female piety, purity, and submissiveness, termed "the cult of True Womanhood," that pervaded women's magazines in antebellum America, for lower class women had limited access to this literature.[42] That is not to say that these sturdy military women could not find a "women's sphere" within the Army. Isolated from American society due to the nature of military service, these women struggled to create their own domestic realm within the confines of the U.S. military. Provided for in military regulations and generally well-received by the officers and men of the regular regiments, Army laundresses formed part of the extended family of the regular soldier. They (and their children) were in many ways a part of the Army just as were their husbands in uniform.

Elizabeth Jameson has argued that frontier women have traditionally been stereotyped into categories of "good" and "bad."[43] Considering that many Americans viewed the Regular Army as filled with "ne'er-do-wells," the "scum of society," and "candidates for the states prison," it should not surprise us that the prejudices directed toward the professional military establishment would be extended also to soldiers' wives.[44] However, characterizing Army laundresses in this way does these women a disservice.

If nothing else, the laundresses' humanizing influence was positively reflected in the discipline, morality, and health of the U.S. Regular Army. Although units raised for the duration of the war served under the same regulations which applied to the "old establishment," few laundresses accompanied these new units. A volunteer in a Tennessee unit wrote, "there were none of these women [laundresses] as far as our observations extended, among the volunteer regiments."[45] Many volunteers made specific note of the first time they performed such camp chores as cooking and washing. William H. Richardson, one of Colonel Alexander W. Doniphan's Missouri volunteers wrote:

> I never boiled [clothes] before, and I felt pretty much as I did when I began to cook breakfast [I was perfectly green at the business, but it had to be done.] I went to work awkwardly enough, as my scalded hands bore witness. But a man can wash his clothes when he is obliged to do it, the opinions of the ladies notwithstanding.[46]

When women were present in volunteer regiments, they frequently disguised their femininity and served under questionable circumstances.[47] *Niles' National Register* reported that a woman enlisted in Capt. William Walker's Company of the Second Regiment of Indiana Volunteers in an effort to join her father, who had emigrated to Texas some years earlier. When her identity was revealed, the soldiers of her company raised funds for her journey.[48] Zo S. Cook recalled the

enlistment of one volunteer's "younger brother," who when discovered to be a demimonde from the city of Mobile was promptly discharged.[49] A similar arrangement existed between Lt. Amandus Schnabel and Elizabeth C. Smith, alias Pvt. Bill Newcome of Company D, Gilpin's Battalion of Missouri Volunteers. After a brief period of service, Smith became pregnant, and Schnabel encouraged her to desert. However, she was discovered and sent back to Missouri by wagon train. A military court martial tried Schnabel for "tenting, sleeping, and cohabitating *[sic]* with a female, thereby, *defrauding the United States of the service of a good and competent soldier.*" Schnabel was discharged following the trial. Smith, alias Newcome, later sued the United States government for a land bounty and in March 1854 received 160 acres of land.[50]

Many volunteer camps lacked basic sanitation and quickly became breeding grounds for dysentery and other illnesses. Most citizen-soldiers were, according to one observer, "young and inexperienced, never having been away from the counsels of a kind father, or affectionate mother."[51] Their lack of domestic skills undoubtedly contributed to the volunteers' high non-violent casualty rates. According to official War Department statistics, 31.2 percent (4,917 out of 15,736) of the regulars of the "old establishment" died as a result of "disease and the exposures and hardships of an active campaign, independent of losses in conflicts with the enemy." In contrast, 21.3 percent of the volunteers (15,671 out of 73,260) died from similar circumstances. While non-violent casualties appear higher among the regulars, when the monthly casualty ratio is considered—"the true comparison," according to Assistant Surgeon Richard Coolidge—the volunteers' monthly casualty rate was 2.13 percent per month, nearly twice the 1.20 percent suffered by the regulars of the old establishment.[52] Granted, there were significant differences between regulars and volunteers, a direct consequence of their military experience and discipline. However, the aforementioned disparity nonetheless reinforces the significant domestic role played by laundresses in the regular regiments.

It would appear that the nineteenth-century woman's "cult of domesticity" found expression within the U.S. Army during the Mexican War. Regular Army laundresses and camp women developed a distinct realm within the organizational structure of the ante-bellum U.S. military. Making a military setting their home, they extended their influence to the soldiers in their care. Although there were other inherent differences between regulars and volunteers, the influence of these women was certainly prominent among them. Far from being either prostitutes or "the girls left behind," laundresses and camp women were an important part of the U.S. Army during the Mexican War. Cooking, washing, and living alongside their soldier-husbands, Army laundresses provided an important humanizing influence for the U.S. regular soldiers who fought in America's first largely foreign war.

Robert P. Wettemann, Jr., is a Ph.D. candidate in history at Texas A&M University.

NOTES

1. Samuel Lover, "The Girl I Left Behind Me," in *The Poetical Works of Samuel Lover*, rev. ed. (New York, 1884), pp. 175–76. When Santa Anna's artificial leg was captured by American troops in April 1847 following the battle of Cerro Gordo, new words were written for the same tune. "The Leg I Left Behind Me" lampooned the Mexican commander. See Robert W. Johannsen, *To the Halls of the Montezumas: The Mexican War in the American Imagination* (New York, 1985), pp. 239–40.

2. Richard Bruce Winders, *Mr. Polk's Army: The American Military Experience in the Mexican War* (College Station, Tex., 1997), p. 22, suggested that women accompanying the U.S. Army during the Mexican War played a more significant role than had been previously recognized.

3. Anne M. Butler, *Daughters of Joy, Sisters of Misery: Prostitutes in the American West, 1865–1890* (Urbana, Ill., 1985), p. 140.

4. Ibid., p. 146; opposing views are expressed in Darlis A. Miller, "Foragers, Army Women and Prostitutes," chap. in Joan M. Jensen and Darlis A. Miller, eds. *New Mexico Women: Intercultural Perspectives* (Albuquerque, 1986), p. 158; Patricia Y. Stallard, *Glittering Misery: Dependents of the Indian Fighting Army* (San Rafael, Calif., 1978), p. 61.

5. See also Anne M. Butler and Ona Siporin, *Uncommon Common Women: Ordinary Lives of the West* (Logan, Utah, 1996), pp. 106–07; Peggy M. Cashion,

"Women and the Mexican War, 1846–1848," Master's Thesis, University of Texas at Arlington, 1990, pp. 108–09, 112–13.

6. Grady McWhiney, *Southerners and Other Americans* (New York, 1973), pp. 39–60.

7. Edward M. Coffman, *The Old Army: A Portrait of the American Army in Peacetime, 1784–1898* (New York, 1986), pp. 113, 181.

8. Miller J. Stewart, "Army Laundresses: Ladies of 'Soap Suds Row'," *Nebraska History* 51 (Winter 1980): 434.

9. For an example of women present in the armies of the French and Indian War, see Ian K. Steele, *Betrayals: Fort William Henry and the Massacre* (New York, 1990), pp. 38, 112, 116, 120. Linda Kerber observed that throughout the American Revolution, General George Washington viewed washerwomen and cooks in the service of the Continental Army as a little more than a nuisance. Nonetheless, he felt compelled to recognize them as "belonging" to the army, which Kerber viewed as a tacit recognition of the domestic skills they could provide it. She did not consider these women to be prostitutes. See Linda Kerber, *Women of the Republic: Intellect and Ideology in Revolutionary America* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1980), pp. 55–58.

10. John F. Callan, *Military Laws of the United States*, 3d ed. (Washington, 1846), pp. 100–01.

11. *General Regulations for the Army of the United States, 1841* (Washington, 1841), p. 37. With respect to the payments demanded of soldiers by the sutlers, the regulations dictated that "Every facility will be afforded to the Sutler in the collection of the just debts contracted with him. The Sutler will take his place at the pay-table, with his books and accounts. If the amount charged against a soldier be disputed, the Sutler shall be required to produce a written acknowledgment of the soldier, which shall be sufficient for the then settlement." Ibid., p. 36.

12. Francis B. Heitman, *Historical Register and Dictionary of the Untied States Army* (2 vols., Washington, 1903), 2: 588–91. Women also worked in the Medical Department. As matrons, they cooked and washed for the patients. Once in Mexico, local women sometimes filled the various positions allotted to women. See Winders, *Mr. Polk's Army*, p. 19.

13. William F. Goetzmann, ed., "Our First Foreign War," *American Heritage* 17 (June 1966): 86.

14. George Ballentine, *Autobiography of an English Soldier in the United States' Army* (2 vols., London, 1853), 1: 79, 94–95.

15. Cpt Osborne Cross to Lt Col Thomas F. Hunt, 2 Jul 1845, Letters Received, Office of the Quartermaster General, Record Group 92, National Archives. I am indebted to Aaron Mahr Yáñez, chief historian, Palo Alto Battlefield National Historic Site, for providing me a photocopy of this order. By extending the ratio of 942 officers and men to 55 laundresses (roughly 17:1) in the Third and Fourth Infantry to Taylor's entire force of 3,593 men at Corpus Christi, one could surmise that some 210 washerwomen were present with the Army of Observation. However, lacking additional evidence to support these figures, such estimates are purely speculative.

16. William S. Henry, *Campaign Sketches of the War with Mexico* (1847; reprint ed., New York, 1973), pp. 14–15.

17. Emma J. Blackwood, ed., *To Mexico with Scott: Letters of Captain E. Kirby Smith to his Wife* (Cambridge, Mass., 1917), p. 17.

18. W. A. Croffut, ed., *Fifty Years in Camp and Field: Diary of Major-General Ethan Allen Hitchcock* (New York, 1909), p. 194.

19. Robert H. Ferrell, ed., *Monterrey is Ours!: The Mexican War letters of Lieutenant Dana, 1845-1847* (Lexington, Ky., 1990), p. 8.

20. Blackwood, *To Mexico with Scott*, p. 16.

21. Ibid., p. 17.

22. Ferrell, *Monterrey is Ours*, p. 27. In the cases of both Mrs. Lindsay and Mrs. Dorrance, men with corresponding names have been located in the Registers of Enlistments in the U.S. Army. Both John Lindsay, a soldier who reenlisted at Fort Pike, Louisiana, on 1 September 1844, and William Dorrance, who reenlisted in the Seventh Infantry at New Orleans on 14 January 1845 after a brief period away from the Army, had service records consistent with that of Lieutenant Dana. Captain Kirby Smith's earlier reference to Mrs. Roth can also be paired with Pvt. Sebastian Roth, a reenlistee from Fort Crawford, Wisconsin, who signed on again on 30 January 1845. In all three cases, the soldiers were veterans of military service who had served at least one five-year enlistment. See Register of Enlistments in the United States Army, 1798–1914, National Archives Microcopy M233, rolls 20–21.

23. John B. Porter, "Medical and Surgical Notes of Campaigns in the War with Mexico, during the Years 1845, 1846, 1847 and 1848," *American Journal of the Medical Sciences* 23 (January 1852): 17–18.

24. *Niles' National Register*, Fifth Series, 20, no. 24 (15 Aug 1846): 373; Henry, *Campaign Sketches*, p. 53.

25. The first chronicles of Borginnis' exploits are found in *Niles' National Register*, Fifth Series, 20, no. 24 (15 Aug 1846): 373, and Lewis L. Allen, *Pencillings of Scenes Along the Rio Grande* (New York, 1848), p. 22–24. The former source contains the quoted words. More detailed studies include J.F. Elliott, "The Great Western: Sarah Bowman, Mother and Mistress to the U.S. Army," *Journal of Arizona History* 30 (Spring 1989): 1–26, and Brian Sandwich, *The Great Western: Legendary Lady of the Southwest* (El Paso, Tex., 1991), pp. 1–13. See also Jeanne Holm, *Women in the Military: An Unfinished Revolution* (Novato, Calif., 1982), p. 5, and Betty Sowers Alt and Bonnie Domrose Stone, *Campfollowing: A History of the Military Wife* (New York, 1991), p. 31.

26. Allen, *Pencillings Along the Rio Grande*, p. 24.

27. *Niles' National Register*, Fifth Series, 20, no. 24 (15 Aug 1846): 373.

28. Allen, *Pencillings Along the Rio Grande*, p. 24.

29. Ferrell, *Monterrey is Ours*, p. 75.

30. Paragraph 2, Orders No. 63, Headquarters, Army of Occupation, Matamoros, 21 May 1846, synopsis printed in *Mexican War Correspondence: Messages of the President of the United States, and the Correspondence, Therewith Communicated, between the Secretary of War and Other Officers of the Government upon the Subject of the Mexican War*, House Exec. Doc. 60, 30th Cong., 1st sess., 1848, p. 516.

31. Ferrell, *Monterrey is Ours*, p. 107.

32. Henry, *Campaign Sketches*, p. 164.

33. Orders No. 146, Headquarters, Army of Occupation, Camp near Monterrey, 27 Nov 1846, printed in House Exec. Doc. 60, 30th Cong., 1st sess., p. 512.

34. Joseph E. Chance, ed., *The Mexican War Journal of Captain Franklin Smith* (Jackson, Miss., 1991), pp. 172–73.

35. Blackwood, *To Mexico with Scott*, p. 99.

36. In George Winston Smith and Charles Judah, eds., *Chronicles of the Gringos: The U.S. Army in the Mexican War, 1846–1848—Accounts of Eyewitnesses and Combatants* (Albuquerque, 1968), p. 304, the editors note that "After the capture of Vera Cruz, when Scott eliminated all surplus baggage for the march inland to the City of Mexico, orders barred camp women from the march." While the author has identified orders eliminating excess baggage, he has been unable to locate any orders issued by Scott that refer to laundresses or camp women either in General Orders and Circulars of the War Department and Headquarters of the Army, 1809–1860, National Archives Microcopy M1094, or House Exec. Doc. 60, 30th Cong., 1st sess.

37. Robert Anderson, *An Artillery Officer in the Mexican War* (New York, 1911), p. 129.

38. Samuel H. Starr to his wife, 14 Mar 1847, W. K. Bixby Collection, Missouri Historical Society, quoted in John Porter Bloom, "With the American Army into Mexico, 1846–1848," Ph.D. dissertation, Emory University, 1956, p. 123

39. Smith and Judah, *Chronicles of the Gringos*, p. 304.

40. Bloom, "With the American Army," p. 124.

41. *Semi-Weekly Natchez Courier*, 21 Jan 1848, p. 2.

42. Barbara Welter, "The Cult of True Womanhood: 1820–1860," *American Quarterly* 18 (Summer 1966): 151–74.

43. Elizabeth Jameson, "Women as Workers, Women as Civilizers: True Womanhood in the American West," in Susan Armitage and Elizabeth Jameson, eds., *The Women's West* (Norman, Okla., 1987), p. 145.

44. Ballentine, *Autobiography of an English Soldier*, 1: 31, 32, 115–20.

45. George C. Furber, *The Twelve Months Volunteer; or, Journal of a Private, in the Tennessee Regiment of Cavalry* (1848, 3d ed., Cincinnati, 1857), p. 57.

46. *Journal of William H. Richardson, A Private Soldier in the Campaigns of Old and New Mexico* (New York, 1849), pp. 6–7; for similar examples see Allen, *Pencillings Along the Rio Grande*, 22; Ann Brown James, *Gathering Laurels in Mexico: The Diary of an American Soldier in the Mexican American War* (Lincoln, Mass., 1990), p. 3; Allan Peskin, ed., *Volunteers: The Mexican War Journals of Private Richard Coulter and Sergeant Thomas Barclay, Company E, Second Pennsylvania Infantry* (Kent, Ohio, 1991), pp. 67, 94.

47. Winders, *Mr. Polk's Army*, p. 22.

48. *Niles' National Register*, Fifth Series, 20, no. 18

(4 Jul 1846): 288.

49. Zo Cook, "Mexican War Reminiscences," *Alabama Historical Quarterly* 19 (1957): 438–39.

50. See Thomas L. Karnes, "Gilpin's Volunteers on the Santa Fe Trail," *Kansas Historical Quarterly* 30 (Spring 1964): 5–6; Leo P. Oliva, "Missouri Volunteers on the Santa Fe Trail, 1847–1848," *The Trail Guide* 15 (June 1970): 3–4.

51. Allen, *Pencillings Along the Rio Grande*, p. 22.

52. Richard H. Coolidge, *Statistical Report on the Sickness and Mortality in the Army of the United States Compiled from the Records of the Surgeon General's Office; Embracing a Period of Sixteen Years, from January, 1839, to January, 1855*, Senate Exec. Doc. 96, 34th Cong., 1st sess., 1856, p. 606.

In Memoriam

Dr. Michael C. Robinson

Michael C. Robinson, former historian with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers' Lower Mississippi Valley Division, died on 29 November 1998 in Vicksburg, Mississippi. He was 55. A native of Kingman, Kansas, he earned his doctorate from the University of Wyoming in 1973. He worked for the American Public Works Association in Washington, D.C., and Chicago, Illinois, from 1974 to 1982, first as associate editor of the association's bicentennial history of public works in the United States and then as research coordinator for the Public Works Historical Society.

In 1982 Dr. Robinson became the first historian of the Mississippi River Commission and the Corps of Engineers' Lower Mississippi Valley Division. In 1994 he was appointed the division's chief of public affairs. Dr. Robinson wrote extensively on military, civil engineering, and environmental history. In addition to his contribution to *History of Public Works in the United States, 1776–1976* (Chicago, 1976), he authored *Water for the West: The Bureau of Reclamation, 1902–1977* (Chicago, 1979), and *Gunboats, Low Water, and Yankee Ingenuity: A History of Bailey's Dam* (Baton Rouge, 1991).

Dr. Robinson was an innovative and creative public historian who excelled in promoting the use of historical analysis among managers and policy makers. For over twenty years, he promoted the utility of historical studies in decision-making. He was among the founders of the Public Works Historical Society in Chicago, and he used his position as research coordinator of that organization to show senior managers in the public and private sectors the importance of oral history interviews and historical studies. His many contributions to the Army were recognized by his selection to attend in 1997–98 the U.S. Army War College, in Carlisle, Pennsylvania, an opportunity offered to only a very select group of civilian employees of the Department of the Army.

Michael Robinson

CMH Issues a CD-ROM on the United States Army in World War I

By John Elsberg

The entry of the United States into World War I marked this nation's emergence as a major military power in world affairs. The American Expeditionary Forces (AEF), sent to France in 1917, clearly tipped the balance in favor of the Allies. Over two million troops were transported to France, of whom 1.39 million served at the front. To mark the eightieth anniversary of the Allies' military victory in 1918, the U.S. Army Center of Military History has now issued a three-disc CD-ROM, *The United States Army in World War I*, that brings together all of the Center's published work on that war.

The heart of the CD is a huge, searchable collection of records, the 18-volume *United States Army in the World War, 1917–1919*, which the Army published in 1948. This work quickly became a standard primary source for anyone studying the Army's challenges and experiences in World War I. The CD-ROM also expands this documentary collection by including the five-volume *Order of Battle of the United States Land Forces in the World War*, first published by the Army from 1931 to 1949.

Other works on the CD include *Learning Lessons in the American Expeditionary Forces*, an introductory essay by Kenneth E. Hamburger that provides an analytical overview of the war; *American Armies and Battlefields in Europe*, a classic, authoritative, and well-illustrated study published by the American Battle Monuments Commission in 1938 that is still a useful guide to the battlefields where the AEF fought; and *Army Art in World War I*, a distinctive and revealing set of prints by the Army's first uniformed artists.

As Kenneth Hamburger makes clear in his essay, the history of the "Great War" can still teach very relevant lessons to today's military leaders and planners. Although the age of trench warfare is long over, the dynamics of effective planning and decision-making have not changed. The CD's sweeping array of day-by-day detail in effect provides a laboratory in which much of the reality of one of America's major wars reemerges, not through hindsight but as it was experienced and described at the time.

Within the Army, the CD-ROM (CMH EM 0023) can be requisitioned by a command's or staff section's publication account holder from the U.S. Army Publications Distribution Center–St. Louis. The CD-ROM is available for public sale from the Government Printing Office under GPO Stock Number 008-029-00342-2 for $20.00 Orders may be directed by mail to the Superintendent of Documents, P.O. Box 371954, Pittsburgh, PA 15250-7954, or by phone to 202-512-1800.

John Elsberg is chief of the Center's Office of Production Services.

A Call for Papers on the Civil War in the Border States

The Department of History at Fairmont State College has issued a call for papers for a conference on "Stonewall Jackson and the Border States during the Civil War" to be held at the college's Clarksburg, West Virginia, campus on 22–23 October 1999. Clarksburg is the birthplace of Thomas J. Jackson. Papers prepared for the conference may address any portion of Jackson's life and career or any aspect of the military, political, or social history of the Civil War in the border states, including West Virginia. Proposals for papers should be sent by 7 May to Prof. Ken Millen-Penn, Department of History, Fairmont State College, 1201 Locust Avenue, Fairmont, West Virginia 26554. Inquiries may be directed to Prof. Millen-Penn at 304-367-4500.

A New Chief Arrives at the Center of Military History

Brig. Gen. John Sloan Brown became chief of military history in December 1998, succeeding Brig. Gen. John W. (Jack) Mountcastle who retired at the end of October. General Brown came to the Center from Mons, Belgium, where he had served since July 1997 as chief of the Requirements and Programs Branch of the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe. He became a general officer in September 1997.

Brown was born in August 1949 near Nuremberg, Germany, where his father, now retired Col. Horace M. Brown, was a young artillery officer with the 1st Infantry Division. General Brown attended the U.S. Military Academy and graduated eighth in the class of 1971. An armor officer, his first military assignment was with the 1st Armored Division in Germany, where he served as a platoon leader, company executive officer, and brigade equal opportunity staff officer. He attended the armor officer advance course at Fort Knox, Kentucky, after which he served there as the S-1 (personnel officer) of the 4th Battalion, 37th Armor, an element of the 194th Armored Brigade, and as the commander of the battalion's Company B.

General Brown

General Brown spent two years in Bloomington, Indiana, as a graduate student in history at Indiana University, which awarded him master's and doctoral degrees. He later published the product of his doctoral research under the title *Draftee Division: The 88th Infantry Division in World War II* (University of Kentucky Press, 1986). Brown's maternal grandfather, Maj. Gen. John E. Sloan, had commanded the 88th Division in 1942–44, and his father had served in the division as a forward artillery observer and as the S-1 and the S-4 (supply officer) on the division's wartime artillery staff. General Brown taught history at the U.S. Military Academy from 1981 to 1984.

After spending a year at the Army's Command and General Staff College, General Brown received a series of assignments with divisional units in Germany. He served as the S-3 (operations officer) and the executive officer of the 4th Battalion, 66th Armor, an element of the 3d Infantry Division; as the executive officer of the 3d Brigade of that division; and as commander of the 2d Battalion, 66th Armor, an element of the 3d Brigade (Forward), 2d Armored Division. The brigade moved to Saudi Arabia in January 1991 and served in Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM as the third brigade of VII Corps' 1st Infantry Division. Brown's battalion and the two other line battalions of that brigade joined the battle for the Wadi al-Batin, in Iraq just west of the Kuwaiti border, late on 26 February 1991. They moved through the well-prepared obstacles of the Iraqi Army's 12th Armored Division, destroying the tanks that had been entrenched across their route, and entered Kuwait. Brown was awarded the Legion of Merit and the Bronze Star Medal. The battalion returned to Germany in May 1991, and Brown left it the following month.

After attending the U.S. Naval War College at Newport, Rhode Island, General Brown served for a year as the G-3 (operations officer) of the 24th Infantry Division at Fort Stewart, Georgia. He then went to Fort Hood, Texas, where he served for five months as the deputy G-3 of III Corps and for two years as commander of the 2d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division. He deployed with the brigade to Kuwait in 1995. He served in the Pentagon from November 1995 to July 1997 as the executive officer to the Army's deputy chief of staff for operations and plans.

The staff of the Center is delighted to have this skilled and experienced officer at its helm.

THE CHIEF'S CORNER

John Sloan Brown

As the newly assigned Chief of Military History, I wanted to tell you how pleased I am to be joining this dynamic organization and how appreciative I am of all the hard work that has been going on in it during the last several months. I am particularly grateful to those who have had to stretch themselves even further than usual to cover the interval between Brigadier General Jack Mountcastle's departure and my arrival. The truest test of an organization's resilience is its ability to compensate for the absence of key players. The U.S. Army Center of Military History has certainly shown well in facing this particular test!

I am very pleased and impressed with what I have seen of the Strategic Plan 2010 for the Army Historical Program and the Strategic Plan 2010 for the Center of Military History. These initiatives are thoughtful, thorough, balanced, and dynamic. I totally support them, and we all recognize that the success of a plan depends on the skill and energy of its execution. The conceptual effort to define a strategy for fulfilling our responsibilities into the twenty-first century is behind us and agreed. Now the equally difficult task of making plans actually work out in practice is upon us. I know that we will all continue to pull together in harness through the extraordinary efforts required by our two Strategic Plans 2010.

Throughout my career I have found supervision works best when supervisors interact. My door is open, and I am accessible. What is more, I will make every effort to get out and visit subordinates, subordinate headquarters, and parallel staff agencies in their own places of business. Please do not misinterpret such a "ministry of presence" as circumvention of routine procedure or customary chains of command. It is merely my effort to figure out what is going on by "walking around" amongst those whom I supervise or serve.

Again, let me reiterate how pleased I am to be coming aboard as Chief of Military History during these dynamic, challenging—and therefore rewarding—times.

Editor's Journal

This issue presents two interesting and thought-provoking articles on the nineteenth-century U.S. Army. Robert P. Wettemann, Jr., a graduate student at Texas A&M University, opens with an article that explores the role and impact during the Mexican War of women who were attached in an official capacity to U.S. Regular Army units. Rebecca Raines, a CMH historian, examines the Army Signal Corps' struggle during the Spanish-American War to provide American military and governmental leaders with the ability to communicate nearly instantaneously with American troops that had landed in enemy-ruled insular territories. Raines also examines the Signal Corps' role in intelligence gathering.

Retired Army Lt. Col. Thomas D. Morgan presents another viewpoint on French Army's rebuff of the 1916 German attack on Verdun, which Robert B. Bruce judged "a logistical feat of monumental proportions" in an article in the Summer 1998 issue of *Army History*. Morgan argues that the bloodbath the French endured at Verdun left their nation so war-weary as to be unprepared to meet a renewed German military threat some two dozen years later. This issue closes with reviews of eight recently published books, all but one of which focus on various campaigns and participants in World War II.

The Center of Military History is now securely ensconced in its new building at Fort Lesley J. McNair. The managing editor welcomes all comments and written submissions, which may be addressed to him at the mailing and e-mail addresses given in the box on page 3.

Manifesting Its Destiny
The U.S. Army Signal Corps in the Spanish-American War

By Rebecca Raines

The following article is an expanded version of the paper the author read at the Conference of Army Historians held in June 1998 at Bethesda, Maryland.

Between its creation in 1860 and the outbreak of the War with Spain, the Signal Corps searched for a niche within the Army. When the Civil War opened in 1861, the Army still communicated much as it always had, using mounted couriers and musical signals such as drum beats and bugle calls. The field of communications was not yet recognized as a military specialty. While the electric telegraph had been used commercially for nearly twenty years, it had not been perfected for military purposes. The wigwag flags invented by Maj. Albert J. Myer, the Army's first chief signal officer, fell into a kind of technological time warp. They were simple to manipulate and could relay messages over relatively long distances. Employed by both sides during the Civil War, the "talking flags" helped fill the communications gap until tactical telegraphy became commonplace. By the time the United States went to war in 1898, communications technology had developed so extensively that the War with Spain became the first conflict fought by our Army in which electrical communications played a predominant role.

After the Civil War the Signal Corps had struggled for survival, finding salvation in the operation of a national weather service. The telegraph had made a system of nationwide weather reporting possible, and the Signal Corps built over 8,000 miles of lines between military posts and in areas where commercial routes were not yet feasible. Signal soldiers thus wore two hats—as military telegraphers and as weather observers. In practice, the branch's military communication duties took a back seat to its weather functions. Although the United States Army had been the first in the world to have a separate and distinct Signal Corps, it soon fell behind its European counterparts in the communications sphere. Not until Congress transferred the weather service to the Agriculture Department in 1891 did the Signal Corps once again focus its full attention on military communications.

The last half of the nineteenth century was a time of fundamental change for both the United States and its Army. The Industrial Revolution had transformed the nation from a land of farms to one of factories. In the field of communications alone, momentous innovations had occurred since the Civil War: the telephone, electric light, and phonograph had all been invented, and telegraph lines now spanned the continent. Industrial giants like AT&T, Westinghouse, and General Electric were becoming household names. Despite the restrictions imposed by stringent budgets and shortages of personnel, the Signal Corps endeavored to keep abreast of the latest technological developments.

Fortunately, the Corps was guided during this period by one of its most dynamic leaders, Brig. Gen. Adolphus W. Greely. Greely is perhaps best known as the commander of an ill-fated expedition to the Arctic during the early 1880s in which most of his men perished. The unfortunate outcome of this enterprise overshadowed its significant accomplishments—the gathering of scientific data and a journey to the farthest point north reached by man to that time. Promoted to brigadier general and chief signal officer in 1887, Greely devoted his considerable energy to returning the branch to its military signaling functions in the post–weather bureau years.

To this end, Greely initiated efforts to modernize the Corps' signaling equipment, especially its field telegraph trains. These so-called trains were actually animal-drawn wagons designed to carry telegraph instruments, telephones, and batteries, plus the necessary auxiliary items for laying lines, such as poles and wires.[1] The trains had originally been designed during the Civil War but had received little attention since.

Greely also championed efforts to reintroduce aeronautics into the Army. During the Civil War, the Army of the Potomac had briefly used balloons, but they had been operated by civilians under military supervision. After the Civil War, civilians employed by the Signal Corps had operated balloons for making weather observations. By the 1890s European nations,

particularly France, had taken the lead in military aeronautics. Greely proposed that captive balloons accompany telegraph trains to serve as portable observation platforms. Signal officers could transmit reports to the ground through wires in the balloon's anchor cable. Initially the Signal Corps could afford to purchase just one balloon, which it obtained from a French company. After exhibiting its newest acquisition at the World's Columbian Exposition in Chicago in 1893, the Signal Corps sent the balloon first to Fort Riley, Kansas, and then to Fort Logan, Colorado, where the weather conditions were more favorable. Due to the branch's chronic scarcity of funds, however, only a minimal amount of practical experimentation was possible. Isolated from the rest of the Army, the Signal Corps had no opportunity to develop a clear-cut doctrine for the use of the balloon in battle.

When the United States declared war on Spain on 25 April 1898, the Signal Corps had a meager $800 in its war chest. Moreover, the branch consisted of just ten officers and fifty enlisted men scattered at posts across the country. No doubt Chief Signal Officer Greely wondered how he would manage to fight a war with such limited resources. Although Congress had already authorized the creation of a Volunteer Army of 125,000 men, it had not provided for signal soldiers to accompany this force. On 26 April Congress approved an addition of 150 men to the wartime strength of the Signal Corps, but this number would not be adequate for the demands that would be placed on the branch. Therefore, Greely lobbied Congress for a further increase in personnel.[2]

Nearly a month passed before Congress established a Volunteer Signal Corps, which ultimately comprised 115 officers and about 1,000 men. A key provision of the legislation stipulated that two-thirds of the officers and men would be skilled electricians or telegraphers. The Army recruited many of these individuals from private industry. Signal units in the National Guard also proved a significant source of personnel. After training the volunteers in signal techniques and military drill at Washington Barracks (now Fort Lesley J. McNair), D.C., the Signal Corps organized the men into a total of nineteen companies of approximately four officers and fifty-five men each. Greely used his Regular Army officers as the leadership cadre for these new units.[3]

Upon the declaration of war, President William McKinley had ordered the chief signal officer to take control of the nation's telegraph system. Under this authority, the Signal Corps monitored international cable traffic entering the country, concentrating on those lines with termini in New York City, Key West, and Tampa. The commercial companies censored themselves under the supervision of a signal officer. The censors prohibited the transmission of information regarding military movements and of any messages between Spain and its colonies, except for personal and commercial correspondence in plain text that did not contain sensitive material. The Corps also prohibited the dispatch of coded messages to foreign nations except for those sent to or from the diplomatic and consular representatives of neutral governments.[4]

The Signal Corps obtained a great deal of valuable intelligence from its monitoring of telegraph traffic. It was also aided by a Cuban agent in the Havana telegraph office who regularly transmitted details regarding Spanish activities. Through him the Corps learned of the arrival of Admiral Pascual Cervera's Spanish fleet at the harbor of Santiago de Cuba on 19 May 1898. The location of this fleet had been a matter of serious concern to Americans who thought it might attack the east coast of the United States. When Signal Corps Capt. James Allen received the news while monitoring the lines at Key West, he relayed it immediately to Greely. The chief signal officer then sent the information on to President McKinley who notified the Navy Department.[5] The Navy, however, did not act immediately, because it could not independently confirm the fleet's whereabouts. Another ten days passed before the senior American naval officer in the area, Commodore Winfield S. Schley, became convinced of the accuracy of the Signal Corps' information and imposed a naval blockade of Santiago harbor to bottle up the Spanish vessels. The Army, meanwhile, dropped its original plan to attack Havana and hastily prepared to mount an expedition against Santiago.

The War with Spain was the nation's first major overseas conflict since the Mexican War, and communications posed a significant challenge. Among the Signal Corps' initial undertakings was an expedition to cut the underwater telegraph cables that connected Cuba with Spain. Because the Army had no cable ships in its inventory, one had to be found. With the help of

Western Union and the Mexican Telegraph Company, Greely chartered a Norwegian steamship, the *Adria*, and outfitted it for the operation. The captain and crew of the private vessel balked at the hazardous nature of the mission but eventually agreed to sail. A further crisis arose when the experienced cable cutters hired for the job backed out at the last minute, forcing Greely to use soldiers with no such training. The safety concerns turned out to be warranted, as it was a dangerous assignment. The men worked within the range of Spanish shore batteries at the entrance to Santiago harbor, to which the unarmed *Adria* could not reply. Moreover, the cable proved difficult to grapple due to the deep water off Cuba and the coral-covered sea bottom. Despite the difficulties, American soldiers eventually severed one cable in two places. After the *Adria* was repeatedly exposed to shelling, however, its captain and crew refused to continue working, forcing the abandonment of the project. Consequently, a second cable from Cuba to Spain remained in operation throughout the Santiago campaign.[6]

The next task was the establishment of communications between Cuba and Washington. The Signal Corps repaired a French underwater cable, previously cut by the U.S. Navy, that provided connections with the United States via Haiti. When Maj. Gen. William R. Shafter and his Fifth Army Corps arrived off Santiago on 20 June, the Signal Corps was ready to open a cable office near Guantanamo. From this point, Shafter could communicate with the War Department within five minutes. After the troops landed, signal soldiers constructed land lines to complete the circuit between the front and Washington. Throughout the contest, General Shafter was never more than twenty minutes away from the War Department by telegraph.[7]

Meanwhile, back in Washington, President McKinley set up a war room next to his office in the White House from where he could communicate by telegraph to the front in Cuba. In addition, telephone lines linked the president with the War and Navy Departments, other key offices in Washington, and the port of embarkation at Tampa. The White House telegrapher, Benjamin F. Montgomery, operated this communications center, known as the Telegraph and Cipher Bureau, for which service he was commissioned first as a captain and later as a lieutenant colonel in the Volunteer Signal Corps.[8]

Although he would later praise the work of the Signal Corps in Cuba, General Shafter initially made decisions that could have severely limited the Corps' effectiveness. Of the need for signal soldiers he is reported to have exclaimed, "I don't want men with flags! Give me men with guns!" And his actions seemed to speak as loudly as his words. Against the advice of Maj. Frank Greene, his signal officer, and General Greely, Shafter did not allow the Corps to take all of its electrical equipment to Cuba. Left behind in the confusion at Tampa were the telegraph trains and their valuable contents. Despite Shafter's disdain for flags, signal officers used them during the voyage to Cuba to maintain communication between the ships of the convoy. Once ashore, however, the flags proved useless for communicating in the island's dense jungle growth. Since the Spanish had the benefit of both telegraphic and telephonic communications, the Americans would have been at a great disadvantage had not General Greely taken matters into his own hands. Before the *Adria* had sailed on its cable-cutting mission, Greely had made sure that it also carried electrical equipment, especially insulated wire. Greely's foresight allowed Shafter and his forces to employ modern communications during the Cuban campaign.[9]

For tactical purposes, the Signal Corps established telephone lines. For long-distance communication, it used the telegraph. Thanks to the insulated wire provided by the chief signal officer, these lines could be run along the ground or atop bushes. This was fortunate because the island's vegetation yielded few poles on which to string wire. The insulation also protected the wire from the rains that fell daily. Without the tools and equipment left behind in Tampa, however, the signalmen "had but their hands and one pair of pliers" to install the lines. Ever resourceful, they improvised as necessary. A machete borrowed from the Cubans, for example, proved especially useful for hacking through underbrush.[10]

General Shafter *had* allowed the Signal Corps to bring a balloon to Cuba, and it would play a spectacular, but controversial, role in the ensuing combat. Due to the hurried nature of the war preparations, the new balloons, two of them from France, that the Signal Corps had ordered with its wartime funds were not ready in time to accompany the Fifth Corps to Cuba. Instead, the Signal Corps took a homemade silk sphere

that had been completed in the winter of 1896–97 by Signal Corps Sgt. Ivy Baldwin and his wife, aided by two other signal sergeants. A balloon detachment of twenty-three men, commanded by Maj. Joseph E. Maxfield, a Regular Army Signal Corps officer, accompanied Shafter's expeditionary force.[11]

Once ashore, the balloon would be ideal for performing reconnaissance because it could rise above the island's dense foliage. However, it was nearly a week before General Shafter called for the balloon to be unloaded from its transport on 27 June. Unfortunately, the prolonged stay in the sweltering hold had damaged the envelope. Its varnished sides had stuck together and had begun to rot. The detachment performed makeshift repairs to render it useable. In addition to the balloon's poor condition, Shafter had denied Maxfield's request to unload the gas generator. Consequently, the detachment had to depend on its limited supply of bottled hydrogen, enough for just one complete inflation.[12]

Maxfield and two other signalmen made several ascents on 30 June, during which they noted terrain features and observed the Spanish fleet in Santiago harbor. In order to lighten the balloon's load, the telegraph cable was not taken aboard. The occupants communicated with the ground by shouting or dropping messages tied to pebbles. When the battle opened the next morning, Shafter's engineer officer, Lt. Col. George McC. Derby, accompanied Maxfield aloft. The balloon was initially raised about a quarter of a mile to the rear of the American command post at El Pozo. Derby, however, wished to move it closer to the front. Although Major Maxfield objected, he obeyed his superior officer.[13]

Maxfield's concerns soon proved justified. The balloon floating overhead marked the position of the American troops and was an excellent target for Spanish artillery and rifles. Many men became casualties as a result, particularly the soldiers of the 1st and 10th Cavalry who were located below the balloon along the congested trail to the front. This location, at the crossing of Las Guamas Creek, became known as Bloody Ford or Hell's Corner.[14] A bad situation became worse when the guide ropes became entangled in the brush, making it impossible to move the balloon at all. Now an even better target, the balloon was rent beyond repair by Spanish bullets and shrapnel. As Major Greene would dryly observe in his report, "It is the first time a balloon has taken up observers on the skirmish line and will probably be the last time."[15]

Stephen Crane, the famous Civil War novelist, covered the war in Cuba for the *New York World* and witnessed the dramatic events of 1 July. He described the balloon as "a fat, wavering, yellow thing," that "was leading the advance like some new conception of war-god." Crane vividly recounted the balloon's demise: "The front had burst out with a roar like a brushfire. The balloon was dying, dying a gigantic and public death before the eyes of two armies. It quivered, sank, faded into the trees amid the flurry of a battle that was suddenly and tremendously like a storm."[16]

First Lt. John J. Pershing, the regimental quartermaster of the 10th Cavalry, recalled that his troops received "a veritable hail of shot and shell." According to him, no one in the line knew the balloon's purpose, and the only intelligence furnished by its occupants was "that the Spaniards were firing upon us—information which at that particular time was entirely superfluous."[17]

Derby and Maxfield escaped unhurt, but one of the signal soldiers in the ground party was shot in the foot. Despite the casualties it caused and Pershing's negative assessment notwithstanding, the aerial reconnaissance was not a total failure. While aloft, Derby and Maxfield observed the Spanish entrenchments on San Juan Hill and found them to be heavily defended. They passed this information to the commanding general with a recommendation to reopen artillery fire upon the position. More significantly, Derby discovered a previously unknown trail through the jungle that helped speed the deployment of troops toward San Juan Hill.[18]

During the battle General Shafter was sidelined by the tropical heat and his ample girth, and he did not direct the action from the front as he had planned. Remaining at the main corps headquarters, he relied on mounted messengers to bring him reports and carry orders. He was in telephone contact, however, with the advance command post at El Pozo.[19]

Both sides fought courageously on 1 July and each took heavy losses, but the day ended with the Americans in possession of the heights around Santiago. Shafter, believing an attack on the fortifications around Santiago would be costly, began a siege of the city and threatened a devastating bombardment if the Spanish forces there did not surrender. When Admiral Cervera's

fleet made a desperate attempt to escape from Santiago harbor on 3 July, it was destroyed by the American blockading squadron in a dramatic running fight. After tedious negotiations, the Spanish garrison finally surrendered on 17 July, and the Americans triumphantly raised the Stars and Stripes over the city.

With the end of the fighting in Cuba, troops under Maj. Gen. Nelson A. Miles, the commanding general of the U.S. Army, invaded Puerto Rico, Spain's other major colony in the Caribbean. To furnish communications, now-Colonel Allen and six signal companies accompanied Miles' forces. Unlike in Cuba, the Spanish did not mount a strenuous defense of this territory. After Miles captured Ponce, then Puerto Rico's largest city, on 28 July, the Signal Corps took charge of the city's telegraph office, which became the Army's communications center on the island. Before abandoning this office, the Spanish had destroyed nearly all its equipment. To make it functional, the Signal Corps, short of spare parts, had to improvise from the materials available. One officer, for example, constructed a telephone switchboard from a brass sugar kettle, which worked surprisingly well.[20] By mid-August the Americans had overrun most of the southern half of the island and stood poised to advance to its capital city, San Juan.

Meanwhile, the Army launched a third expedition halfway around the world to the Philippine Islands, nearly ten thousand miles from Washington. This undertaking presented the Signal Corps with an unprecedented communications challenge. The Philippines had actually been the site of the first fighting of the war when, on 1 May, Commodore George Dewey had decisively defeated the Spanish in a naval battle in Manila Bay. But the official report of this achievement did not reach Washington for six days because Dewey had cut Manila's cable to Hong Kong after the Spanish authorities had refused his request to use it. Therefore, dispatches to the outside world had to travel to Hong Kong by ship before being transmitted by telegraph. Fortunately for the United States, Great Britain did not enforce its policy prohibiting belligerent nations from sending telegrams regarding operations through British ports.[21]

To follow up his naval victory, Dewey requested that ground troops be sent to occupy Manila. Maj. Gen. Wesley Merritt commanded these expeditionary forces,

James Allen, circa 1910
(Signal Corps photograph)

which eventually became known as the Eighth Army Corps. Unlike Shafter, Merritt asked that signal soldiers, especially those who could speak Spanish, accompany his troops. The vanguard of Merritt's force sailed from San Francisco on 25 May and disembarked south of Manila on 30 June, having stopped along the way to occupy Guam. The signal troops arrived at the end of July as did General Merritt himself. The signalmen immediately began working to connect the supply base at Cavite by telegraph with the advance troops entrenched before Manila.

Because of the difficulty of communicating with the Philippines, the Battle of Manila was fought on 13 August, the day after representatives of the United States and Spain had signed in Washington a peace protocol designed to stop the fighting. Word of the agreement did not reach Manila, however, until 16 August. During the battle, signalmen ran telegraph wires along the beach as the American troops advanced. They communicated with the Navy using wigwag flags, which they also used to direct naval gunfire against the Spanish positions. Hopelessly outgunned, Manila's Spanish defenders offered only limited opposition and formally surrendered the following day. With the fall of Manila, the work of signal

units began in earnest as they faced the task of establishing communications within and between the islands of the archipelago. By the end of August they had repaired the cable from Manila to Hong Kong.[22]

The victory in what U.S. Ambassador to Great Britain John Hay called "a splendid little war" came at a relatively small cost for the United States in blood and treasure. Of the approximately 1,500 signal soldiers who participated in the War with Spain, only one officer and none of the enlisted men were killed in action. Like the rest of the Army, the Signal Corps suffered a majority of its casualties from such diseases as malaria, typhoid, and yellow fever. A total of twenty-two members of the Signal Corps succumbed to illness. Chief Signal Officer Greely praised his men for filling "neither the guardhouse nor the hospital." In his words: "Battles may be fought and epidemics spread, but speedy communications must nevertheless be maintained."[23]

Despite the war's successful conclusion, the health and diet of the troops became the subject of considerable scrutiny. The "embalmed beef" scandal is perhaps the best-known example. President McKinley appointed a commission chaired by retired Maj. Gen. Grenville M. Dodge to investigate the conduct of the war. Although the Signal Corps had been criticized in the press for its handling of the balloon, the commission concluded that "the work accomplished by the Signal Corps was of great aid to the army in the field."[24] The unfortunate experience with the balloon did not discourage the Signal Corps from continuing its work in aeronautics. A few years later, the Signal Corps purchased from the Wright brothers the Army's first airplane, which became the forerunner of today's Air Force.

The United States' victory in the War with Spain catapulted the nation into world power status. According to the terms of the peace treaty signed in December 1898, the United States acquired the islands of Puerto Rico and Guam. Spain further agreed to American occupation of Cuba and the annexation of the Philippines by the United States. For the Signal Corps, these new territories meant a greatly expanded realm of responsibility.

Moreover, military communications had finally achieved the status and recognition for which the Signal Corps had long been striving. In the future, commanding officers would not repeat Shafter's mistakes. Communications would henceforth be included as part of the combined arms team. This arrangementbecame institutionalized with the opening of the Signal School at Fort Leavenworth in 1905, one of the so-called Leavenworth Schools where Army officers received advanced training. Looking back over the events of the past one hundred years, the War with Spain can be viewed not only as the dawn of America's century but also as the genesis of the modern information age.

Rebecca Raines is a historian in the Organizational History Branch of the Center of Military History and the author of Getting the Message Through: A Branch History of the U.S. Army Signal Corps *(Center of Military History, 1996).*

NOTES

1. Howard A. Giddings, *Exploits of the Signal Corps in the War with Spain* (Kansas City, Mo., 1900), p. 86, provides a good description of a telegraph train and its contents.

2. General Orders 29, 29 Apr 1898, and 30, 30 Apr 1898, Headquarters of the Army, printed in *General Orders and Circulars, Adjutant General's Office, 1898* (Washington, D.C., 1899); Ltr, Sen George L. Shoup to Brig Gen Adolphus W. Greely, 30 Apr 1898, Box 28, Adolphus W. Greely Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress; *Annual Reports of the War Department, 1898*, 2 vols. (Washington, D.C., 1898), 1 (pt.1): 876. (The annual reports are hereafter cited as ARWD, followed by the year.)

3. ARWD, 1898, 1 (pt. 1): 919–26; ARWD, 1899, 1 (pt. 2): 750–51. Signal units were organized in the National Guard before they were established within the Regular Army. Several states, notably New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut, furnished personnel to the Volunteer Signal Corps.

4. ARWD, 1898, 1 (pt. 1): 891–95, 966–68; Giddings, *Exploits of the Signal Corps*, pp. 114–16.

5. Captain Allen was the fourth most senior officer in the Signal Corps in May 1898. He became a colonel in the Volunteer Signal Corps in July 1898. General Greely's Letterbook, 17 May 1897 to 30 Jan 1899, Box 60, Adolphus W. Greely Papers, Library of Congress,

contains copies of messages the chief signal officer sent to McKinley that contained the information received from Allen. Although Allen never revealed the identity of the agent, G. J. A. O'Toole, *The Spanish War: An American Epic—1898* (New York, 1984), pp. 207–15, identified the Cuban informant as Domingo Villaverde. See also Rpt, Col James Allen to the chief signal officer, 1 Sep 1898, in ARWD, 1898, 1 (pt. 1): 946–49, and Giddings, *Exploits of the Signal Corps*, p. 46.

6. ARWD, 1898, 1 (pt. 1): 946–48; Henry MacFarland, "The Signal Corps of the Army in the War," *American Monthly Review of Reviews* 19 (February 1899): 186, reprinted in Paul J. Scheips, ed., *Military Signal Communications*, 2 vols. (New York, 1980), 1: n.p.

7. *Report of the Commission Appointed by the President to Investigate the Conduct of the War Department in the War with Spain*, Senate Doc. 221, 56th Cong., 1st sess., 1900, 8 vols., 6: 2936; Giddings, *Exploits of the Signal Corps*, pp. 23–36.

8. Robert T. Loomis, "The White House Telephone and Crisis Management," *United States Naval Institute Proceedings* 95 (December 1969): 63–73; Francis B. Heitman, *Historical Register and Dictionary of the United States Army from 1789 to 1903*, 2 vols. (Washington, 1903), 1: 719.

9. David L. Woods, *A History of Tactical Communication Techniques* (Orlando, Fla., 1965), p. 91, containing the quotation; ARWD, 1898, 1 (pt. 1): 884–85; MacFarland, "Signal Corps in the War," p. 187. Shafter later testified that he had been "admirably" served by the Signal Corps. See *Commission to Investigate the War*, 7: 3204.

10. Rpt, Maj G. W. S. Stevens to the chief signal officer, 24 Aug 1898, in ARWD, 1898, 1 (pt. 1): 955–57; Giddings, *Exploits of the Signal Corps*, pp. 72–73.

11. Russell J. Parkinson, "Politics, Patents, and Planes: Military Aeronautics in the United States, 1863–1907," Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1963, pp. 85–88 and 113–25. The Signal Corps received $21,000 for expenses to include "war balloons" in an appropriation bill enacted on 4 May. See General Orders 37, 7 May 1898, Headquarters of the Army, pp. 1–2.

12. John R. Cuneo, "The Balloon at Hell's Corner," *Military Affairs* 7 (Fall 1943): 191.

13. Ibid., pp. 191–94; Parkinson, "Politics, Patents, and Planes," pp. 132–39.

14. Cuneo, "The Balloon at Hell's Corner," pp. 189–95, gives the location as the ford of the San Juan River, but Graham A. Cosmas, "San Juan Hill and El Caney, 1–2 July 1898," in Charles E. Heller and William A. Stofft, eds., *America's First Battles, 1776–1965* (Lawrence, Kans., 1986), p. 133, indicates that it was the nearby crossing of Las Guamas Creek, a tributary of the San Juan.

15. Rpt, Lt Col Frank Greene to the adjutant general, Fifth Army Corps, 15 Aug 1898, in ARWD, 1898, 1 (pt. 1): 954. Greene received the rank of lieutenant colonel in the Volunteer Signal Corps on 21 July 1898.

16. "The Price of the Harness," in Stephen Crane, *Wounds in the Rain: War Stories* (1900, reprint ed., Freeport, N.Y., 1972), pp. 12–13.

17. Donald Smythe, *Guerrilla Warrior: The Early Life of John J. Pershing* (New York, , 1973), p. 51, contains the first quotation; John J. Pershing, "The Campaign of Santiago," in Herschel V. Cashin et al., *Under Fire with the Tenth U.S. Cavalry* (1899, reprint ed., Niwot, Colo., 1993), p. 206, contains the second quotation.

18. On ballooning at Santiago, see ARWD, 1898, 1 (pt. 1): 888–91 and 960–66, and 1 (pt. 2): 342–43; Cuneo, "The Balloon at Hell's Corner," pp. 189–95; Giddings, *Exploits of the Signal Corps*, pp. 47–65.

19. Heller and Stofft, *America's First Battles*, pp. 130–31.

20. ARWD, 1898, 1 (pt. 1): 895–97 and 946–53, and 1899, 1 (pt. 2): 788–97.

21. On Dewey's cutting of the cable, see David F. Trask, *The War with Spain in 1898* (New York, 1981), pp. 105, 369, 590–91; Graham A. Cosmas, *An Army for Empire: The United States Army in the Spanish-American War* (1971, 2d ed., Shippensburg, Pa., 1994), p. 111; Ivan Musicant, *Empire by Default: The Spanish-American War and the Dawn of the American Century* (New York, 1998), p. 556; James A. Field, Jr., "American Imperialism: The 'Worst Chapter' in Almost Any Book," *American Historical Review* 83 (June 1978): 665–66.

22. ARWD, 1898, 1 (pt. 1): 877–78 and 908–09; Cosmas, *Army for Empire*, pp. 237–43; Musicant, *Empire by Default*, p. 582. When the protocol was signed in Washington at 4:30 p.m. on 12 August, it was already 5:30 a.m. on 13 August in Manila.

23. According to U.S. Army, Adjutant General's Office, *Statistical Exhibit of Strength of Volunteer For-*

ces Called into Service During the War with Spain; with Losses from All Causes (Washington, D.C., 1899), pp. 2–3, 128 officers and 1,329 enlisted men served in the Volunteer Signal Corps during 1898–99. These statistics are available via the internet on the War with Spain page of the Books and Documents section of the Center of Military History's web site, http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg. The Regular Army Signal Corps had 60 officers and men, some of whom were also commissioned as Volunteer Signal Corps officers. See Orders no. 13, Signal Office, War Department, 13 Sep 1898, in ARWD, 1898, 1 (pt. 1): 983–85, with the quotations on pp. 985 and 984, respectively. 24. *Commission to Investigate the War*, 1: 202, contains the quotation; Musicant, *Empire by Default*, pp. 631–47. Parkinson, "Politics, Patents, and Planes," pp. 148–53, discusses the negative press accounts about the balloon.

Letters to the Editor

11 December 1998

Editor:

My co-author, Thomas B. Allen, and I appreciate the fine review of *Code-Name Downfall* by Conrad Crane, which appeared in the Summer 1997 issue of *Army History*.

However, we were confused by his statement that we erred in "claiming that the Eighth Air Force would have deployed from Europe with B-29s." In fact, the Eighth Air Force had already begun to deploy from Europe when the Japanese surrendered. To quote General James H. Doolittle's *I Could Never Be So Lucky Again*, "By early May, Hap [Arnold]'s plans for me had changed. I was to stay on as commander of the 8th [Air Force] and the mission of my command was redeployment to the Pacific." (p. 438) "I went to Seattle to talk with employees of the Boeing Company and get a good look at the B-29 Superfortress the 8th would be flying. . . . I then flew on to Kadena Air Base, on Okinawa, where we officially established the presence of the 8th Air Force. . . ." (p. 444)

"Of the 8th's units scheduled to be in place by August 15, two bomb groups had begun to arrive on August 7, the day after the first A-bomb drop. However, according to the plan, we were not scheduled to be at full strength until February 1946." (p. 453) Although he had a small force of B-29s available to strike Japan prior to the capitulation, Doolittle declined to dispatch them in view of the striking power available from the Twentieth Air Force; however, some of Doolittle's P-51 Mustang fighters were in combat over Japan while escorting those B-29s.

With respect to what Crane refers to as an "awkward" footnote style, I would note that the publisher preferred none; it was a compromise and, like most compromises, few are happy with the arrangement. However, the book does have 25 pages of notes and an 8-page bibliography—all in small type.

Norman Polmar
Alexandria, Virginia

Colonel Crane responded as follows:

22 December 1998

Editor:

I am glad Mr. Polmar wrote his letter, because it corrects a misleading impression that could come out of my review. He is right about the Eighth Air Force's deployment of B-29s to Okinawa. My comment was designed to take issue with his wording on page 142 that implied to me that the B-29s were coming from Europe, when in fact units were required to go through a thorough retraining, reorganization, and refitting in the United States to get those planes. However, that is not clear from my wording. In my attempt to be brief I may have sacrificed some clarity, and I apologize for that.

On his footnotes, I appreciate the difficulties he may have had compromising with his publisher. I prefer a more academic style of numbered entries, but the system adopted for the book is adequate and usable.

Lt. Col. Conrad Crane
Department of History
U.S. Military Academy

New CMH Publications

The Center of Military History has issued four new books. It completed the publication of its landmark series, The United States Army in World War II, with the appearance of *The Medical Department: Medical Service in the War Against Japan*, by Mary Ellen Condon-Rall and Albert E. Cowdrey. This book is CMH Pub 10-24 (cloth) and 10-24-1 (paper). The cloth edition may be ordered from the Government Printing Office under stock number 008-029-00335-0 for $37.00.

The Center also published *Combat Operations: Taking the Offensive, October 1966 to October 1967*, by George L. MacGarrigle, a volume in its series on the U.S. Army in Vietnam. This is the first volume to appear of the four in this series that will focus on U.S. Army combat operations. It is listed as CMH Pub 91-4 (cloth) and 91-4-1 (paper). The cloth edition may be ordered from the Government Printing Office under stock number 008-029-00339-2 for $44.00.

Two books have appeared in the Center's Army Lineage Series. *Maneuver and Firepower: The Evolution of Divisions and Separate Brigades* by John B. Wilson discusses the history of these critical maneuver organizations in the U.S. Army. This is CMH Pub 60-14 (cloth) and 60-14-1 (paper). The cloth edition may be purchased for $36.00 from the Government Printing Office under stock number 0008-029-00340-6.

The new Army Lineage Series volume *Military Intelligence* contains a history of the Army's intelligence-gathering efforts by John Patrick Finnegan and a compilation of the lineages and honors of the branch's brigades and battalions prepared by Romana Danysh. Color illustrations of the units' heraldic items are also included. This is CMH Pub 60-13 (cloth) and 60-13-1 (paper). The cloth edition may be ordered from the Government Printing Office under stock number 008-029-00332-5 for $39.00.

The Center is now also offering to Army account holders boxed sets of the pamphlets on the Army's World War II campaigns that it issued in commemoration of the fiftieth anniversary of World War II. The slipcase edition of World War II commemorative pamphlets on the war against Japan is CMH Pub 72-41; the companion edition on the war against Germany is CMH Pub 72-42.

Upcoming Conferences

The Council on America's Military Past (CAMP) will hold its 33d annual military history conference in and around Omaha, Nebraska, on 5–9 May 1999. The conference will emphasize western frontier military history. Further information may be obtained by writing the council at P.O. Box 1151, Fort Myer, Virginia 22211, or by calling its secretary, Col. Herbert M. Hart, USMC (Ret.), at 703-912-6124.

The 14th annual Siena College multi-disciplinary symposium on World War II will be held at the college on 3–4 June 1999. Marking the sixtieth anniversary of the start of that war, the conference will focus on the events of 1939. Inquiries may be addressed to Prof. Thomas O. Kelly, Department of History, Siena College, 515 Loudon Road, Loudonville, New York 12211; telephone: 518-783-2512; e-mail: legendziewic@siena.edu.

The Society for Military History is seeking proposals for papers or complete panels for sessions it will sponsor at the Northern Great Plains History Conference to be held at St. Cloud State University, St. Cloud, Minnesota, on 6–9 October 1999 and at the Ohio Valley History Conference that will be held at Tennessee Technological University at Cookeville, Tennessee, on 21–23 October 1999. Proposals should be sent to Prof. Malcolm Muir, Jr., Department of History and Philosophy, Austin Peay State University, Clarksville, Tennessee 37044, no later than 1 April 1999.

THE LEGACY OF VERDUN

By Thomas D. Morgan

The following article provides a very different perspective on the battle of Verdun from that contained in the article by Robert B. Bruce, which appeared in the last issue of Army History. *The Editor*

On ne passe pas.
(They shall not pass.)

General Henri Pétain, 26 February 1916[1]

The battle for Verdun from 21 February to 20 December 1916 marked one of the longest and bloodiest military campaigns in European history. For ten terrible months, at a cost of over 500,000 French and 400,000 German casualties,[2] France bore the brunt of some of the most severe fighting on the Western Front. Verdun became France's longest and most costly struggle of the war. France defended itself against the might of the German Army and, in the end, Germany fell victim to the war of attrition that it had inflicted upon the French. France eventually won a military victory at Verdun. However, the exhaustion from the effort involved in achieving that victory would leave a bitter legacy for France that would last well beyond the end of the war in 1918 and would sow the seeds of France's defeat in 1940.

The German Chief of Staff, General Erich von Falkenhayn, selected the French sector at Verdun on the Western Front as the site of the great battle. He had convinced the kaiser that Great Britain was the real enemy but that, without France, the British could not go it alone. Since France was almost exhausted by 1916, the object was to "bleed white" the forces of France by making that nation commit every man available to defend sacred French soil in a suicidal battle of attrition that would drive France out of the war. Then the British, lacking a strong ally, would be forced to sue for peace.

Verdun was selected because it was located in a salient protruding into the German lines and had great historic significance for France. After the loss of Alsace-Lorraine in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870, Verdun had become a key bastion for the defense of the heartland of France. It was considered the gateway to Paris. Since 1870, the Meuse River that flowed through Verdun had replaced the Rhine as the strongest natural barrier to direct invasion from Germany. Peacetime German military studies had thoroughly analyzed a military maneuver against Verdun as a way to break through the Meuse River barrier and onto the flat plains leading to Paris. Further, German intelligence knew that after the failure of the Belgian fortresses of Liège and Namur in 1914, the French forts in the Verdun sector had been stripped of artillery for use in other sectors. Now, the once formidable Verdun forts were lightly manned with less than first-rate troops. From a logistics standpoint, Verdun was only twelve miles from a German railroad network that could ease German resupply. Only a secondary road and rail line to Bar-le-Duc to the south linked Verdun precariously to the nearest French resupply base.[3]

The French salient at Verdun suited the Germans because they planned to attack on a small front and suck the French into a meat grinder. The Germans believed that they could do this with an economy of force and effort that would minimize their losses and allow them to control the battle by calling off the attack when it suited their purposes. That way the German positions in the rest of France and Belgium would not be greatly affected, and the German High Command could seek a decision elsewhere in the west after France had been depleted.[4]

Instead of waging a limited offensive, however, the Germans fell victim to their own plan. Their initial success against weak French defenses around Verdun led the German High Command to commit more troops there. They widened the front of the attack and began seeking a decisive victory instead of settling for limited gains. As the French hurriedly reinforced the Verdun sector, French strength became so great that the Germans could not break off the offensive for fear that superior French forces would turn the tables on them and achieve a decisive breakthrough into German-held territory. The battle of attrition that Germany sought ended taking almost as many German lives as French. The Germans finally had to call off the

attacks to pursue the war elsewhere, but not before France bolstered its morale by holding Verdun and recapturing key terrain nearby.

In the years that followed, Verdun became enshrined in the French memory as a miracle. It was France's Battle of Britain, symbolizing the defense of the nation, though perhaps imbued with an even greater emotional force. The great hero of Verdun was General (later Marshal) Henri Phillipe Pétain. Born in 1856, he was a 58-year-old colonel nearing retirement in 1914. The war, his command at Verdun in 1916, and his service as commander-in-chief of the French Army in 1917–18, propelled him into lasting prominence as the great savior of France.[5]

Verdun was solely a French campaign and victory. Pétain's concern for his soldiers resulted in a rotation system for the units committed to combat there. Because of the length of the campaign and the large numbers of units committed, most of the French Army had passed through Verdun by the time it was over. Maj. Albert Lebrun, Pvt. René Coty, and Capt. Charles de Gaulle, all future presidents of France, and most of the professional French officers who would attain high rank by World War II, had personal experience in the "miracle" of Verdun. Because the German Army was in a similar situation, such officers as Heinz Guderian and Erich von Manstein, architects of the successful blitzkrieg offensive against France in 1940, would also remember Verdun and vow never to repeat it.[6]

The bloodbath of Verdun would undermine the enthusiasm for the war effort in France. In 1916 French author Marc Boasson, who would be killed in Flanders in 1918, wrote, "What kind of a nation will they make of us tomorrow, these exhausted creatures emptied of blood, emptied of thought, crushed by superhuman fatigue?"[7]

France and Great Britain had gone to war in 1914 on a surge of patriotic emotion that had few parallels in modern history. In Great Britain, Thomas Hardy appealed to a sense of homeland and Rudyard Kipling defended the righteousness of empire. In France, the people were still moved by the poetry of Victor Hugo:

> *Ce ciel est notre azul*
> (This heaven is our blue sky)
> *Ce champ est notre terre!*
> (This field is our land!)
> *Cette Lorraine et cette Alsace*
> *c'est a Nous!*
> (This Lorraine and this Alsace
> are ours!)[8]

It is no wonder that France adopted a field uniform of *horizon bleu* (sky blue) for its soldiers as opposed to the *feldgrau* (field gray) of the Germans. After all, France's war aims represented those lofty thoughts of Hugo. Ridding French soil of the invader had been the prime motivation since the days of Robespierre. It was not until later in the war that such poets as Charles Vildrac in "Relief" wrote about the realities of trench warfare inspired by battles such as Verdun:

> In our place
> Fresh troops have come
> Sent up the line
> As bait for death
> Met face to face.[9]

Verdun was a great test because it was purely a French affair. By 1916 the happy warriors of 1914, filled with *élan* (spirit) and *cran* (guts), had become the *poilus* (hairy ones) of Verdun. They would be immortalized as the *anciens de la guerre* (war veterans) who, along with Pétain, had saved France. They had experienced something almost mystical, and the war had buried their youth. After General Nivelle replaced Pétain as army commander at Verdun, he adopted Pétain's declaration of *"On ne passe pas"* as *"Ils ne passeront pas,"* but by then the *poilus* had become cynical enough to answer, "And neither shall we."[10]

The best-known American poem of the war, Alan Seeger's "I Have a Rendezvous with Death," is also bluntly realistic. It reflected a fatalism that many soldiers displayed. Seeger wrote:

> I have a rendezvous with Death
> at some disputed barricade,
> . . . .
> I shall not fail that rendezvous.[11]

It is appropriate to compare Seeger with the French poets because he was killed in France in 1916 fighting with the French Foreign Legion. The Harvard-

The ossuary in the French National Cemetery at Verdun (Photo courtesy of the author)

educated product of a prosperous New York family, Seeger was living in Paris when the war began. Like many of the British soldier-poets, he enlisted as soon as the war started. Romantic and rebellious, he longed for glory and found it in death. He was posthumously awarded the French *Croix de Guerre* and the *Médaille Militaire*. His poetry lacked any pretense of satire or irony. It was blunt and reflected the stark reality of trench warfare that Verdun came to symbolize.[12] The irony is that Seeger's title was paraphrased as "I Have a Rendezvous with Destiny" and used as the motto and song of the 101st Airborne Division that won fame and glory at Normandy and Bastogne during World War II. "Destiny" was a more appropriate motivation for American soldiers than "death" the second time around.

By the end of 1916, the French home front was not immune to the horrors of Verdun. Hardly a French household with military-age males was unaffected. By the war's end, 27 percent of French men between the ages of eighteen and twenty-seven had been lost.[13] The deaths of so many inspired a hatred of the enemy that provoked an irrational desire for a total, avenging victory. Summoning up images of Joan of Arc repelling the invader, French propaganda depicted the national symbol Marianne, whose face and figure were on monuments and money, and the *Coq Gaulois* (French rooster) vanquishing the hated German eagle. These patriotic scenes were a far cry from the grim reality of the Verdun trenches. Pétain reflected this by recalling his anguish at the sight of soldiers passing his headquarters at Verdun when he wrote:

My heart lurched as I saw our young men of twenty going into the furnace of Verdun, and reflected that they would pass too quickly, with the lightness of their age, from enthusiasm in their first engagement to the weariness caused by suffering . . . how saddened I was when they came back . . . when I spoke to them, they could scarcely answer.[14]

Despite the cynicism of the *poilus* and the widespread mutinies experienced by the French Army in 1917, Verdun, in the view of the French military, became a great victory. Instead of the antiwar literature, the French military remembered the stirring order Pétain issued on 10 April 1916. With the situation around Verdun at its worst, he recalled Joan of Arc, saying "*Courage—On les aura!*" (Courage—We shall have them!)[15] That phrase and "They shall not pass" became the watchwords for the defenders of France. But it fell to Winston Churchill in his history of World War I, *The World Crisis*, to view Verdun as a battle without winners, when he wrote: "Victory was to be bought so dear as to be indistinguishable from defeat."[16] Later, the Verdun generation would be castigated by novelist Jean Dutourd in *The Taxis of the Marne* as the "Men of Fifty" who in 1940 brutally betrayed France by their lack of vitality against Hitler.[17]

The legacy of Verdun would be a generation that in 1939 and 1940 lacked the same strong fiber of the *poilus* in 1914 and 1916. Included in that legacy were all the young men who did not survive World War I. The "hollow years" of manpower shortage that followed the war deprived Europe of badly needed military men and junior leadership. Those soldiers who did survive were sometimes bitter and disillusioned. They were often unready to cope with the dramatic changes

that France and Europe encountered in the postwar years. The carnage and devastation of the Great War provoked a bitter determination to ensure peace at any cost. France tried to secure itself behind the "Great Wall of France"—the Maginot Line.

While France was the dominant military power on the European continent for several years after the war, its severe suffering during that conflict made France's military policy defensive. The great losses France experienced at Verdun and elsewhere made France passive and fearful and its military leaders too willing to hold onto outmoded doctrines of *couverture* (continuous front) and *bataille conduite* (methodical battle) that had worked well at Verdun.

France lost its self-confidence in World War I. The concept of noble sacrifice that had dominated the literature, speeches, sermons, and journalism of the early years of the war had by its end been eroded by the awful reality of brutality and mass death inflicted by modern weapons. In 1936–38, as Hitler's Germany remilitarized the Rhineland and carved up Czechoslovakia, the leaders of France were not willing to ask their people to make the sacrifice again. Even when war came in 1939, the French people could not endure another war of attrition. France fell and Great Britain tottered on the brink of defeat, before the great military capacity of the Soviet Union and the United States tilted the balance against Hitler. The Frenchman of 1939 was not as he had been in 1914. The reality of war, so graphically depicted and remembered, had caused the generals, politicians, and citizens of France to falter.

Today, Verdun offers the lesson and forecast that even after a war is over, there is no assurance of peace and stability. The legacy of Verdun and the Great War was World War II.

Retired Army Lt. Col. Thomas D. Morgan is a fire support analyst with Logicon RDA, a firm for which he supports the Battle Command Training Program at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. A Military Academy graduate who served with the 5th Special Forces Group and the 101st Airborne Division in Vietnam, Colonel Morgan has a master's degree in history from Pacific Lutheran University and has written a number of articles for Army History.

NOTES

1. Robert Debs Heinl, *Dictionary of Military and Naval Quotations* (Annapolis, 1966), p. 335.
2. Alistair Horne, *The Price of Glory: Verdun 1916* (New York, 1962), p. 327; T. Dodson Stamps and Vincent J. Esposito, eds., *A Short Military History of World War I* (West Point, 1954), p. 170.
3. Stamps and Esposito, *History of World War I*, pp. 161–63.
4. Ibid.
5. Guy Chapman, *Why France Fell* (New York, 1968), p. 17.
6. Quoted in Horne, *The Price of Glory*, pp. 339–40.
7. Ibid., p. 149.
8. Joseph Darracott and Belinda Loftus, *First World War Posters* (London, 1972), p. 32.
9. Jon Silkin, ed., *The Penguin Book of First World War Poetry* (New York, 1979), p. 246.
10. Roy J. Morris, Jr., "Nature Herself Murdered," *Military History*, August 1986, pp. 26–33.
11. Ibid., p. 86.
12. James D. Hart, *The Oxford Companion to American Literature* (New York, 1941), p. 679.
13. Alistair Horne, *To Lose a Battle: France 1940* (Boston, 1969), p. 37.
14. Correlli Barnett, *The Swordbearers: Supreme Command in the First World War* (1964, reprint ed., Bloomington, Ind., 1975), p. 217.
15. Horne, *The Price of Glory*, p. 182.
16. Ibid., p. 319.
17. Jean Dutourd, *The Taxis of the Marne*, trans. H. King (London, 1957), pp. 135–37.

The University of North Carolina Press has issued a paperbound edition of Brian McAllister Linn's book, *Guardians of Empire: The U.S. Army and the Pacific, 1902-1940*. The press published the original cloth edition of that book in 1997, and Charles R. Anderson reviewed it in the Fall 1997/Winter 1998 issue of *Army History*. The new paperbound edition carries a list price of $18.95.

Book Review
by Terrence J. Gough

Warhogs: A History of War Profits in America
by Stuart D. Brandes
University Press of Kentucky, 1997, 371 pp., $34.95.

Warhogs. Can a book with such a title be anything other than an antiwar tract, a diatribe against "merchants of death"? Emphatically, yes. Stuart Brandes' sweeping account of wartime profiteering—the title is a sobriquet for World War I-era speculators—rises high above overheated muckraking. Thoughtfully and with nuance, Brandes explores Americans' centuries-old attempt to balance their cherished economic freedom and their disapproval of wealth acquired through war.

Brandes covers in detail the Revolution, the Civil War, and the two world wars, but provides only a broad-brush treatment of the Cold War era with no discussion of the Korean, Vietnam, or Gulf Wars. He shows how means of profiteering and of curbing it changed over time. While extortionate pricing and degraded quality persisted, plunder, privateering, trading with the enemy, and bounty jumping declined or disappeared in the twentieth century. Advances in technology, meanwhile, brought to the fore issues of patent royalties, stock market speculation, and gains in executive income. Modes of government regulation—federal income and excess profits taxes, renegotiated pricing, and prosecution for fraud in war contracts—grew, and the federal government expanded accordingly.

Businessmen, Brandes reminds us, do not have a monopoly on greed. Other citizens, including military officials, have sometimes taken advantage of wartime opportunities to make unethical and illegal gains. U.S. Navy sailors in the Red River campaign, for instance, routinely stenciled Unionists' cotton bales "C.S.A." and, under existing policy, gained half of the "contraband" for themselves. Yet in his typically measured approach, Brandes persuasively argues that historians have exaggerated Civil War corruption. Large war profits owed less to venality than to tremendous economic dislocation, precipitate mobilization, crude procurement practices, and an unexpectedly long war. Eschewing throughout the book the common academic bias against business, he presents war contractors' risks, problems, and patriotic acts of generosity along with their profits.

Brandes strives to balance the sometimes jaundiced opinions of contemporaries and Progressive historians with a common-sense realization that government, especially military, authorities at war tend to value time over cost-effectiveness. Making fresh use of post-World War I congressional hearings, he counters the argument advanced against cost-plus contracts in 1917 cantonment construction by pointing out that the additional time required to advertise for bids would have harmfully delayed troop mobilization.

In a corrective to sympathetic accounts of the work in the 1930s of the Senate's Special Committee Investigating the Munitions Industry, chaired by Gerald P. Nye, Brandes notes that the committee engaged in demagoguery and sometimes suppressed evidence that did not support the flimsy "merchants of death" theory. Moreover, he debunks the committee-fostered legend that there was a great shift in the distribution of wealth that favored the rich during World War I.

While recognizing the widespread evasion of price, rent, and ration controls during World War II, Brandes assesses the government's comprehensive antiprofiteering program as an imperfect success. Inflation was less than in previous wars, taxes paid a larger part of the bill, and the fundamentally progressive tax structure produced a leveling of shares of wealth.

Consigned in the Cold War to an unfamiliar reliance on a huge, permanent, profit-seeking defense industry, Americans, Brandes declares, "struck out at the expensive shield that provided dubious security while eroding [American] exceptionalism." Yet by the time it confronted the "military-industrial complex," the society had progressed to the point that it could "keep profiteering substantially in check." Although this conclusion will not go unchallenged, it is based on a type of cool-headed, reflective scholarship that is all too rare in the study of business and war.

Brandes does not always successfully synthesize the information in his diverse sources, and his unfamiliarity with the details of specific aspects of his subject occasionally surfaces. For example, the congressman who chaired the Select Committee on Expenditures in the War Department after World War I was William J. Graham, not the nineteenth-century dietary reformer and cracker eponym Sylvester Graham. But such lapses detract little from the soundness of Brandes' well-considered conclusions in a study that is particularly valuable for those whose careers engage them in civil-military relations.

Dr. Terrence J. Gough, chief of the Center's Historical Support Branch, has published several articles on Army-business relations.

Book Review
by Mason Schaefer

Invasion Balkans! The German Campaign in the Balkans, Spring 1941
by George E. Blau
2d ed., Burd Street Press, 1997, 164 pp., $19.95.

First published by the Center of Military History forty-five years ago, George Blau's terse but comprehensive account of the German Balkan campaign remains timely. Since Blau, then an employee in the Center's Foreign Studies Branch, originally compiled his account from German sources, *Invasion Balkans!* examines the campaign largely from the Axis point of view. Nonetheless, its broad picture includes the political background, logistics, and lessons learned in each campaign phase.

Blau sets the scene carefully. In 1941 Hitler backstopped his planned Russian campaign by securing the Balkans. He faced substantial British intervention in Greece. He distrusted Yugoslavia after Serbian air force officers deposed Prince Paul's friendly regime in Belgrade in March 1941. With his Russian invasion imminent, Hitler would leave nothing to chance. In April 1941 German armored forces stormed into both Greece and Yugoslavia. They faced ill-equipped enemy forces dispersed over large areas.

In Yugoslavia the Germans, relying on their superiority in armor and mobility to overcome hasty planning, quickly overpowered strung-out and ill-prepared enemy forces. Within twelve days the Germans crushed the divided Yugoslav Army. In Greece the outnumbered and outmaneuvered British could only fight a delaying action. Though the Greeks fought well, they could not long resist the heavily armored German forces. Helped by air superiority, the Germans repeatedly outpaced their foes. By the end of April they had pushed the British out of Greece.

The Germans then invaded Crete, where they faced intense Allied resistance. There the German airborne attack against tough, dug-in forces almost collapsed. However, the British did not exploit the Germans' initial confusion well enough to prevail. As Blau points out, German control of the air ultimately trumped British control of the sea. Nonetheless, inept German improvisations made the Cretan operation costly and ultimately counter-productive.

Occasional tactical mistakes aside, the German mastery of logistical problems impresses the reader. Facing bad roads and weather, the Germans placed supply dumps near the Greek and Yugoslav borders and used munitions economically. They also speeded movements by classifying all major rail lines according to capacity.

Invasion Balkans! sheds light on the recent breakup of Yugoslavia. According to Blau, Serb-Croat tensions in 1941 reduced the cohesiveness of the Yugoslav Army, which officially numbered one million at full mobilization. When the Germans invaded, the Croats often would not fight and sometimes even attacked Serb units. Unwisely, the Belgrade high command tried to hold every frontier point. The German bombing of Belgrade, meanwhile, dealt the Yugoslavs a "devastating blow [that] virtually destroyed all means of communication between the Yugoslav high command and the forces in the field," and "rendered impossible" coordination and control of field operations, writes Blau.

As Blau's account implies, the Yugoslav and Greek campaigns paralleled the Japanese invasion of Malaya. In both cases the Allies overestimated natural obstacles like mountains and jungles. Despite difficult terrain, the Axis forces persevered and repeatedly surprised their opponents. In Greece and Yugoslavia German mountain divisions moved so quickly they took objec-

tives before their opponents knew what was happening. They used tanks on terrain considered impassable for armor. The Japanese repeated this performance in the Malayan jungles.

Historians have long debated whether the Yugoslav and Greek campaigns delayed Operation BARBAROSSA long enough for the Russian winter to halt the Germans. In Blau's view, the Balkan invasion stalled BARBAROSSA by a possibly decisive three weeks. To Andrew Zapantis, the campaign postponed the Russian invasion five crucial weeks, while German paratrooper and troop carrier losses in Crete weakened the German thrust toward Moscow. John Keegan, however, argues that the Russian weather decided BARBAROSSA's jump-off date—Germany could not move until the end of spring flooding in eastern Europe. The question of the Balkan campaigns' ultimate strategic impact remains open.

To his credit, George Blau covers the 1941 Balkan campaign point by point. At times his account seems overly schematic and mechanical; one longs for more fire in all the orderly prose. One could also use more of the Allied perspective in his book. Nonetheless *Invasion Balkans!* admirably describes the last successful German blitzkrieg—before BARBAROSSA foundered in the snows of Moscow.

Mason Schaefer has been a historian for the Military Traffic Management Command since 1990. He holds a master's degree in history from American University and is currently a Ph.D. candidate there.

Book Review
by Earl F. Ziemke

Stumbling Colossus: The Red Army on the Eve of World War
by David M. Glantz
University Press of Kansas, 1998, 392 pp., $39.95.

Under the pseudonym Victor Suvorov, a Soviet defector, Vladimir Rezun, who appears to have been a junior military intelligence officer, published *ICEBREAKER: Who Started the Second World War?* (London, 1990). In it, he "revealed" that Josef Stalin, to further his own plan for world conquest, had used Adolf Hitler as his "icebreaker" in 1939–40. A sequel, *Den'-M* (Moscow, 1994), gave specifics: on 19 August 1939 Stalin decided to start the world war on 1 September and on the same day began a secret mobilization against Germany that was to be completed by 1 September 1941. Later, according to Suvorov, Stalin set M-Day, the day the Soviet attack was to begin, for 6 July 1941 because by then "the mobilization would have reached such colossal proportions that it could no longer have been concealed. Hitler's last and only chance was to save himself by a preventive strike." (*Den'-M*, p. 248)

Being wholly undocumented and supported solely by Suvorov's claim to having had access to the most secret Soviet archives, *ICEBREAKER* found few readers in England or the United States and *Den'-M*, to date, no publisher for an English translation. In Germany, however, where World War II is not a popular subject, both achieved best-seller status even though their contents were distinctly shopworn. The preventive war thesis had been promoted in German right-wing literature ever since Hitler first formulated it in his address to the nation on 22 June 1941; and Joachim Hoffmann had given it a scholarly—personal not official—endorsement in Volume 4 of the German Bundeswehr's *Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg* (Stuttgart, 1983). Consequently, Suvorov's substantive contribution was minimal; but, by converting what had been a disclaimer of legal responsibility for the attack on the Soviet Union into a blanket release from virtually all war guilt, he established himself as the foremost spokesman of war revisionism in Germany.

Stumbling Colossus and Suvorov's books share a metaphorical "colossus" derived from Soviet statistics released in the 1980s that confirmed the Red Army's prewar buildup to have been far larger than previously admitted. In all other respects, Colonel David Glantz's work is an antidote to "Rezun's contentious and explosive theses." (p. 5) He has undertaken to refute Suvorov and his advocates in Germany and Russia by examining the head and feet of the colossus. The polemics are confined to the Introduction. The text thereafter is a straightforward, documented assessment of Soviet war readiness in the summer of 1941.

Chapter One establishes the human dimension: 5.3 million men mobilized by 22 June 1941, of whom 2.9 million were deployed in the western military

districts. Since the German invasion force had 3.05 million troops, the initially deployed force was not all that colossal, but the Red Army had sufficient reserves to replace 4.3 million losses in the first months of war and still have 8.3 million troops deployed on 31 December 1941. As Colonel Glantz points out, the losses, which amounted to practically the whole 22 June 1941 cadre strength of the army, can be taken as one of the most significant considerations relative to war readiness.

In the second to fourth chapters, Colonel Glantz depicts a high command enmeshed in monumental problems. A political purge, of which the Red Army was the chief target, was in the process of sweeping away nearly all commanders and chiefs of staff above the regimental level. At the same time the armed forces were being more than doubled. In June 1941, in the regiment to military district (army group) range, half of the commanders had less than six months' experience at their assigned level. Hitler's partnership with Japan in the Rome-Berlin-Tokyo Axis raised the prospect of a two-front war. The Red Army's unopposed march into Poland in September 1939 had been a fiasco, its attack on Finland two months later a calamity.

On the basis of Soviet readiness and after-action reports, Chapters Five to Eight assess in depth the combat readiness (and effectiveness) of the "by June 1941, according to every measurement . . . largest and most complex fighting force in the world." (p. 259) In sum, Colonel Glantz finds the Red Army to have possessed more than adequate arms but hardly a clue to their effective employment in the kind of war it faced. It had not assimilated the lessons of the German campaigns in Poland, the Low Countries, and France. It had multiple-digit numerical superiority in tanks, aircraft, and artillery, but the commands at all levels were not schooled in mobile warfare. The air force had more aircraft than pilots; armored units were outfitted with a bewildering variety of tanks; radios were rare items. In the light of the experience in Poland and Finland, the infrastructure's ability to sustain operations on a massive scale was in utter doubt.

Stumbling Colossus is and probably will be for some time the most comprehensive assessment of the Red Army's war readiness in June 1941. It shows Stalin to have been too beset by military deficiencies to have contemplated engineering a world war. If facts can refute Suvorov, it has done that, at least on this side of the ocean; however, his and his disciples' form of revisionism derives its support less from the historical record than from the current circumstances of Germany and Russia. The last Russian troops left Germany in September 1994, and—one thinks not coincidentally—in the subsequent few months, *Den'-M* and three similar works by German historians appeared in Germany. Their sales seem to indicate substantial public sentiment for revision of the more than half-century-old Soviet portrayal of itself as the wholly innocent and unsuspecting victim of aggression. On the other hand, mainstream opinion in Germany and in Russia sees much the same "explosive" potential in their central theses as Colonel Glantz does but has thus far not managed to develop an effective response. Unfortunately, the relevant literature is almost entirely in German or Russian. The reader can find a somewhat dated but still useful sampling of the various positions in Bernd Wegner, ed., *From Peace to War: Germany, Soviet Russia and the World, 1939-1941* (Providence, R.I., 1997), a symposium sponsored jointly by the Bundeswehr's Military History Research Institute and the Soviet Military History Institute.

Dr. Earl F. Ziemke was a historian in the Office of the Chief of Military History from 1955 to 1967 and from then until his retirement in 1993 a professor of history at the University of Georgia. He is the author of Stalingrad To Berlin: The German Defeat In The East *(CMH, 1968) and* The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany, 1944–1946 *(CMH, 1975).*

Book Review
by James W. Williams

Ernie Pyle's War: America's Eyewitness to World War II
by James Tobin
312 pp., cloth, The Free Press, 1997, $24.50
paper, University Press of Kansas, 1998, $16.95.

Read James Tobin, *Ernie Pyle's War*, for entertainment, reflection, and inspiration. Tobin is a rare combination—a successful journalist who holds a Ph.D. in history. Tobin brought these streams together to tell

a compelling personal-interest story that provides insights into the nature of documenting combat, as well as into the political and economic dynamics of the news. Tobin examines the personal qualities that established Pyle's unique approach to covering the world war, made him seek it, and kept him at it until it cost his life. What comes through the account is a sense of a man of small physical stature, great emotional sensitivity, and native shyness who, responding to large personal and professional demands, became and remains a national hero. In telling a compelling personal story, Tobin raises issues that should make this book mandatory reading for any who intend to practice the art of history—particularly capturing and conveying military operations.

Ernie Pyle was a fugitive his whole life. His first flight was from the flatlands of rural central Indiana and the suffocating lifestyle he associated with it. Too young to get into World War I, Pyle's first escape was to Indiana University. There he threw himself into the student newspaper. That work opened avenues that carried him ever further from the places he feared, although his success came largely from being able to speak to people whose lives centered in such places.

Pyle was also a fugitive from a troubled home. His wife suffered chronic depression and drinking. Ernie's visits home were terribly strained, consumed as they were in futile efforts to spring his wife out of despondency and alcoholism. Ernie's return to the road relieved them both of that strain without resolving the fact that they really could not stand living together.

As a journalist, Ernie found that he could with some effort mix well with people. He cultivated a 'poor devil' style that gained him detail and explanation from those he met. That translated into writing that created a sense of intense, personal connection with his readers. Finally Pyle was a fugitive from old age. He saw early how the newspaper business treated those who grew old and lost the energy of youth. Like George Patton, Pyle fled into war and its hazards, preferring them to the natural decay of peaceful life. For Pyle, despite the sickening fear he felt under fire, death in combat was a gift.

Tobin's treatment of Pyle as war correspondent addresses some core issues of the historical profession. One is the balance between capturing what the observer actually sees and conveying what is acceptable to those who will inevitably filter whatever the observer sets down. Ernie avoided graphic descriptions of the carnage and terror he saw. Those who criticize him for not covering the harsher, more graphic aspects of war fail to grasp the basic dynamics of documentation. A historian will never consistently capture what those in charge are unwilling to see about themselves. The homely fare of Pyle's writing was vital to his success. The mundane let him avoid the censor's knife. Pyle's dispatches were generally so innocuous that the one time he wrote something that invited censorship, it flew; probably the censors saw the byline and passed it without reading. More importantly, Pyle's commonplace style gave his writing an allegorical power that transcended graphic detail or strategic treatment.

Pyle's focus on the mundane and individual let readers feel personally connected. He focused on everyday lives caught up in great events that were by themselves too abstract to be articulated in an emotionally satisfying way. This focus assisted his readers to connect with loved ones far away and at risk in these grand events. Americans viewed Ernie as a personal conduit between readers at home and individual service members wherever they were. A sign of his success was the persistent deluge of mail Ernie received from people across America inquiring if he had seen someone or asking that he convey a message. No more graphic or analytical approach could have forged such a bond.

Pyle was a man of and for his times. The style and content of his writing perfectly suited his own nature, the sensibilities of his readership, and the needs of the government to sustain the war effort. Ernie Pyle was a patriot when the nation needed patriots. Pyle didn't deal with death in the horrifying, agonizing instant but in the context of a soothing, noble aftermath. The horrors of war became ennobling, as in his famous account of the handling of Capt. Henry T. Waskow's body in Italy. Throughout Pyle's writing ran the thread of war forging bonds of brotherly love among those condemned to the awful business of killing and dying.

Pyle's writing and the widespread following his writing generated created an invaluable dynamic. He fed the desperate desire of those at home to have both information and assurance. The sense of knowing without real information and assurance despite uncertainty served personal and institutional interests at all

levels. One result was at least a partial triumph of democracy over despotism, in contrast to the results accompanying far more complete coverage later in Vietnam.

In life and even in death Pyle was and remains a national treasure. At the time he helped the nation meet severe challenges. In both retrospect and prospect, the dilemmas he faced confront in varying degrees any historian or journalist. Perhaps the most telling episode was a brief collaboration between Pyle and the playwright Arthur Miller on a Hollywood movie. Miller felt driven to invest events with overarching significance. Pyle resisted imposing elements that the moments utterly lacked. These are eternal horns of the historian's dilemma. Pyle struck a balance that served many well. We could all wish to do as well as he did.

Dr. James W. Williams is the Army aviation branch historian and a captain in the U.S. Naval Reserve. He served in combat roles in Vietnam and Operation DESERT STORM and was a historian with the Implementation Force (IFOR) in Bosnia. He received his Ph.D. in history from Indiana University.

Book Review
by Stanley L. Falk

MacArthur's Jungle War: The 1944 New Guinea Campaign
by Stephen R. Taaffe
University Press of Kansas, 1998, 312 pp., $35.00.

The huge island of New Guinea in 1944 was not the sort of place you or I would choose to go to for a holiday. Hot, humid, insect and disease infested, it contained enough trackless jungles, rugged mountains, deep swamps, and coral-locked beaches to discourage even the toughest military units supposedly trained and hardened to endure such difficulties. The tens of thousands of stubborn, determined, and aggressive Japanese troops defending New Guinea merely compounded the problem for the invading Americans, who might well have preferred facing the enemy to having to deal with the elements.

General Douglas MacArthur's campaign to conquer New Guinea was further punctuated by his fight to gain Washington's recognition of the strategic importance of his operations, his struggles with the Navy over scarce resources, and, above all, his all but fanatical determination to return to the Philippines at the earliest possible moment. To achieve the latter objective he pursued a brilliant, aggressive, and unrelenting campaign in which, however, he often ignored intelligence, took unnecessary risks, sustained needlessly heavy casualties, and lied to his superiors.

Stephen Taaffe's brilliant description and analysis of MacArthur's New Guinea campaign, a volume in the impressive Modern War Studies series edited by Theodore Wilson for the University Press of Kansas, is one of the best books on World War II in the Pacific that I have read in a long time. Thoroughly researched and well organized and written, it is an imaginative, perceptive, and critical, but thoroughly balanced, appraisal of a relatively neglected campaign in the historiography of the war.

Taaffe's coverage is comprehensive: strategy, logistics, tactics, weapons, health, morale, personalities, weather and terrain, the enemy, and a variety of other small but interesting aspects of his subject. His narrative is illustrated with useful operational maps (surprisingly, however, without scales). Taaffe's documentation is thorough, including published sources, personal papers of participants, and important Japanese materials.

Taaffe is especially skillful in portraying the complexities of MacArthur's personality and leadership style. While he pays tribute to the general's manifest abilities, he does not hesitate to criticize his many faults and weaknesses. Taaffe also points out that MacArthur's success in New Guinea was "due to his self-confident ability to recognize and take advantage of the American military's assets," which later on in Korea led him "to behave as if he possessed similar advantages over the communist Chinese, which he did not." MacArthur, in other words, "played the game the same way no matter how strong or weak his hand was." (p. 237) In New Guinea, this worked. In Korea, it proved to be disastrous.

Dr. Stanley L. Falk was chief historian of the U.S. Air Force and chief of the Southeast Asia Branch at the Center of Military History. He is the author of

Bataan: The March of Death *(New York, 1962)* and Seventy Days to Singapore *(New York, 1975)*.

Book Review
By Douglas E. Nash

Hitler's Ardennes Offensive: The German View of the Battle of the Bulge
edited by Danny S. Parker
Stackpole Books, 1997, 264 pp., $ 34.95.

This book will appeal especially to World War II historians interested in the Battle of the Bulge. At a time when works based on secondary sources are becoming increasingly prevalent, it is refreshing to return to primary source material, written shortly after the war, by men who played key roles in what was to be the largest land battle ever fought between the U.S. Army and Hitler's *Wehrmacht*.

In this work, Mr. Parker, author of *Battle of the Bulge* (Philadelphia, 1991) and *To Win the Winter Sky: Air War over the Ardennes, 1944-45* (Conshohocken, Penna., 1994), has conveniently compiled narratives written under the auspices of the Army's European Theater of Operations Historical Section between 1945 and 1949. Under Colonel S. L. A. Marshall, this section was tasked with interviewing scores of captured German officers and compiling their accounts of operations against the Allies.

One of the battles that generated the highest level of interest in this program was the Battle of the Bulge, known by the Germans as Operation *Wacht am Rhein* (Watch on the Rhine). Due to its size, complexity, and ferocity, it stands out as one of the most difficult battles ever fought, and won, by the U.S. Army and worthy of continued study by military professionals and historians. Toward this end, Parker has assembled the narratives of three German army commanders and four staff officers who played key roles in the planning and execution of the offensive.

These accounts, by *SS-Oberstgruppenführer* Sepp Dietrich (Sixth Panzer Army); Dietrich's chief of staff, *Generalmajor* Fritz Krämer; *General der Panzertruppen* Hasso von Manteuffel (Fifth Panzer Army); *General der Panzertruppen* Erich Brandenburger (Seventh Army); *Generalfeldmarschall* Wilhelm Keitel (Chief of Staff, *Oberkommando der Wehrmacht*, or OKW); *Generaloberst* Alfred Jodl (Chief of Operations, OKW); and *General der Infanterie* Günther Blumentritt, have lain in storage at the U.S. National Archives since the end of the war. They were used in early official accounts of the battle, but in little since.

Most of these accounts have not been readily available to the general public before in their entirety, and Parker admirably succeeds in this regard. Much like Stackpole Books' similar efforts covering German operations in Russia—*The Anvil of War* (1994) and *Fighting in Hell* (1995), both edited by Peter G. Tsouras—Parker allows the Germans to speak for themselves, with little editing, thus leaving the original flavor and individual idiosyncrasies of each officer for the reader to discover. Comments by their American interviewers which appeared in the original accounts have also been left intact. Thus, the reader gets an unvarnished view into the thoughts and recollections of these men shortly after the war's end, and, in the case of Jodl and Keitel, shortly before their execution for war crimes.

Each chapter is prefaced by a brief biography of the officer whose interview follows, emphasizing the professional development which led up to his role in *Wacht am Rhein*, followed by his account. To carry out their task, the American interviewers generally followed a standard framework in approaching their subjects, asking whether each army conducted its attack differently and why, how well prepared they felt their formations were, and how each judged the chances for success. Not surprisingly, each army commander responded differently.

For example, Dietrich's attack, which was to be the offensive's main effort, was conducted with a lengthy preparatory barrage, which both Manteuffel and Brandenburger eschewed because they felt it would nullify the advantage of surprise and waste scarce artillery ammunition. While the latter's armies were able to make quick initial gains against unprepared American troops, Dietrich's divisions had to fight hard before they were finally able to break through, losing precious time in the process. Another remarkable feature of the battle commented on repeatedly was the nearly total lack of cooperation between the attacking armies, which could maintain only poor radio commu-

nications under difficult weather and terrain conditions.

Dietrich, who first commanded Hitler's SS bodyguard, comes across as an honest man, yet one who had clearly been promoted beyond his ability. His account illustrates his aversion to detail, since he was often unable to remember specific events. This failing, commented on during the war by other high-ranking German officers, explains why OKW approved sending Krämer, a competent general-staff trained officer, from the Army to the *Waffen-SS* to serve as Dietrich's chief of staff. In comparison to his commander, Krämer focuses clearly on details and specifics and fleshes out Dietrich's account. While one learns little new from Dietrich, the reader does gain amusing insights into his personality, as when he indignantly complains to his interviewer that American fighter bombers, which harassed his staff car, "don't distinguish between generals and anyone else."

While elements of Manteuffel's account of the Fifth Panzer Army's operations have been used elsewhere, that of Brandenburger, whose army protected the offensive's vulnerable left flank, is the most detailed and insightful. A general-staff trained military historian, Brandenburger has written an account that could stand as a model of battle analysis, illustrating his masterful grasp of operational concepts, tactical insight, and, above all, a sense of reality in visualizing what he believed was attainable in contrast to Hitler's grandiose scheme that envisioned marching on Antwerp and splitting the Anglo-American coalition.

Jodl and Keitel's narratives highlight the view of events from OKW's perspective and reflect an almost surreal perception of the conditions at the front and the capabilities possessed by the units involved, which in no way resembled their actual fighting potential. By this point of the war, divisions, even elite SS ones, were being filled with half-trained recruits, sailors, and airmen. Most importantly, they lacked the experienced mid-grade officers and non-commissioned officers so necessary for the efficient operations of any army.

While seemingly large and well equipped, the three armies chosen for Operation *Wacht am Rhein* had little in common with the armies that had stormed through the same forest in May 1940. The fact that Hitler and OKW did not fully grasp the fact that the *Wehrmacht*, by December 1944, no longer functioned effectively at the unit level was to have an adverse impact as the offensive unfolded. This makes it all the more amazing that the Germans advanced as far as they did.

The book is rounded out by Blumentritt's assessment of what he felt would have been actually required to achieve Hitler's goals. Not surprisingly, Blumentritt, another officer of the German General Staff, believed Hitler's offensive stood absolutely no chance of success, unless the plan was simplified and allocated more combat power, particularly in the number of panzer divisions, which he felt were inadequate.

While the book is short on maps and in several instances fails to provide context—a shortcoming compounded by the poor translation of certain terms and phrases used in the original reports—Parker overall has succeeded admirably in making available the thoughts and recollections of the Battle of the Bulge's key German leaders. This is a useful work. By placing primary source material into the hands of historians who can then reach their own conclusions about one of history's greatest battles, Parker has performed a service which will hopefully be imitated by others.

Lt. Col. Douglas E. Nash is the deputy G-5 officer at Headquarters, V Corps, in Heidelberg, Germany. His article "The Forgotten Soldier: *Unmasked" appeared in the Summer 1997 issue of* Army History.

Book Review
by Kathryn Shenkle

The Victors: Eisenhower and His Boys: The Men of World War II
by Stephen E. Ambrose
Simon & Schuster, 1998, 396 pp., $28.00.

Stephen E. Ambrose is the well-known historian and author of many works. In his new book, *The Victors, Eisenhower and His Boys: The Men of World War II*, he covers the last year of the European Theater of Operations from D-Day at Normandy to V-E Day. A self-taught expert on World War II, Ambrose compiled his story drawing from eleven of his previous works to create this account of how the battles were experienced by members of various units which served there.

Much of the material is gleaned from his *Citizen Soldiers* and *Eisenhower*. The latter work is known as one of the greatest works on how General Dwight D. Eisenhower fought the war. Ambrose includes descriptio-ns of individual battles and acts of courage and suffering from his work *Pegasus Bridge*, where he related how a detachment of British aviation troops stormed German defense forces and paved the way for the Allied invasion at Normandy. From *Band of Brothers* Ambrose draws the story of the U.S. rifle company in the 506th Parachute Infantry Regiment which fought from Utah Beach on 6 June 1944, through the Battle of the Bulge, to Hitler's own "Eagle's Nest" in Germany at the end of his war.

Ambrose discusses Eisenhower's preparation and planning for D-Day, Omaha Beach, Pointe-du-Hoc, the British and Canadian Beaches, the hedgerows, breakout and pursuit, the German border, Metz, Aachen, the Hürtgen forest, the Battle of the Bulge, Rhineland, overrunning Germany, and the GIs. Privates speak of their admiration for General Eisenhower and their original non-commissioned officers who were qualified jumpers. They talk about the changing commanders of their units, and how they were trained. Soldiers tell stories about everything from moving barbed wire to "appropriating" supplies.

Ambrose tells a human story that brings the past to the reader's present. One vignette relates to an American soldier who drew a Star of David and "The Bronx, New York" on the back of his field jacket, so "Hitler would know who he was." We learn about nineteen-year-old Pvt. Harold Baumgarten, Company B, 116th Infantry, who was wounded five times at Omaha Beach, but survived to become a physician. Baumgarten was proud to dedicate a monument to the 29th Infantry Division in Vierville, France, on 17 September 1988.

Allied logistics and troops both proved to be superior to those of the German Army in 1945. A captured German officer is quoted saying, "we had never seen how a rich man makes war before." The U.S. Army in Europe focused its resources on winning the battle on the ground in foxholes in all weather, and in the air on the clear days.

Ambrose speaks to us in the voices of many unsung veterans in this work. He refers to interviews and memoirs of over 1400 veterans, using oral histories conserved in both government and private archives. In this book a broad range of soldiers from five-star generals to privates relates the story of the last year of World War II, when Allied troops pushed the German Third Reich out of France and destroyed the Nazi regime in Germany. Ambrose hopes that readers will see in these events the triumph of democracy over totalitarianism.

Kathryn Shenkle is a historian at Headquarters, U.S. Army Materiel Command. She was a historian at Arlington National Cemetery from 1989–1997.

Book Review
by Keir B. Sterling

Sisterhood of Spies: The Women of the OSS
by Elizabeth P. McIntosh
Naval Institute Press, 1998, 284 pp., $29.95.

The Office of the Coordinator of Information (COI), which later evolved into the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), was a legendary and highly controversial intelligence agency which made major contributions to the Allied war effort between 1941 and 1945. A considerable number of books have been published over the years concerning this agency—ancestor of the CIA—and its director, Maj. Gen. William "Wild Bill" Donovan, a charismatic corporate attorney who had earned the Medal of Honor as an infantry battalion commander during World War I. This, however, is the first book to focus on the four thousand women who made up nearly 20 percent of the OSS's 21,642 wartime operatives.

Some of these women served in Army (WAC) uniforms, others with the Navy. A majority were civilians working in four of the seven OSS branches—Research and Analysis (R&A), made up of the old COI; Secret Intelligence (SI); Counter Intelligence (X–2); and Morale Operations (MO). The last of these branches was primarily concerned with disinformation. Very few women were involved in the work of the other three branches—Special Operations (SO), the Operations Group (OG), and the Maritime Unit (MU), each of which undertook various forms of sabotage.

The author, herself a veteran of OSS work in Burma and China who later served with the CIA, has

based her book on interviews with 120 OSS and CIA veterans and with various historians and other scholars. Many of the wartime operatives continue to be relatively anonymous, having, in Donovan's words, "spent their war years behind desks and filing cases in Washington, *invisible apron strings* of an organization which touched every theater of the war." (p. 11)

But there were others who achieved a measure of notoriety, including Czech-born law school graduate Barbara Lauwers, a multilingual WAC private, and later a captain, who won the Bronze Star by arranging the surrender of 600 Czechs who had been forced to serve the Germans. Other well-known women OSS members include Julia McWilliams, who worked for a time on the development of a shark repellent for downed airmen and later became TV cook Julia Child, and Aline Griffith, a young college graduate and fashion model from Pearl River, New York, who married a Spanish nobleman following wartime OSS service in Spain. As the well-known author Aline, Countess of Romanones, she has published several accounts about her sometimes harrowing wartime experiences. Minnesota-born Amy Elizabeth Thorpe, a French-speaking graduate of the Sorbonne, first became the well-known agent "Cynthia" while in the British service. Among her many accomplishments, "Cynthia" managed to purloin much-needed secret codes from a safe in the Vichy French embassy in Washington with the aid of her French lover, whom she later married.

McIntosh makes it clear that these and other women, some of whom had successful prewar careers, gave outstanding service while completing dangerous missions in various parts of the globe. Many had lived and been educated abroad. Not a few made personal sacrifices in order to serve, and their personal lives were often tumultuous. Some women sought a change of pace from their humdrum peacetime pursuits, but many stepped forward out of a strong desire to serve their country. Many of their prewar marriages did not survive the conflict. Other operatives met their future spouses during the war. Many mothers volunteering for service abroad with the OSS were obliged to leave young children behind in the care of others and later had occasion to regret this decision. A number of them earned high military or civilian decorations for their wartime work, and some continued in government service with the CIA or other federal agencies after the war.

McIntosh's fast-paced, well-written book is a readable and worthy contribution to the growing body of OSS literature, and I recommend it highly.

Dr. Keir Sterling served for fifteen years as the U.S. Army ordnance branch historian. He is now the Combined Arms Support Command historian at Fort Lee, Va. His paper on the work of American geographers in the wartime OSS appeared in The U.S. Army and World War II: Selected Papers *(CMH, 1998).*

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

THE CHIEF OF MILITARY HISTORY
AND
THE CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY
103 THIRD AVENUE
FORT LESLEY J. McNAIR
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20319-5058

OFFICIAL BUSINESS