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The Pentomic Puzzle
The Influence of Personality and Nuclear Weapons on U.S. Army Organization 1952–1958

By Kalev I. Sepp

> Secretary [of Defense Charles E.] Wilson once sent back an Army budget to get us to substitute requests for newfangled items with public appeal instead of the prosaic accoutrements of the foot soldier. . . . It . . . led me to conjure up the Madison Avenue adjective, "pentomic," to describe the new Army division which was designed on a pentagonal rather than triangular pattern with atomic-capable weapons in its standard equipment.[1]
>
> General Maxwell D. Taylor

The following article is a modified version of the paper the author presented at the 1996 Conference of Army Historians in Arlington, Virginia.

The Nature of the Puzzle

In the midst of the storm of military debate in the 1950s about how tactical nuclear weapons might change the way ground forces would fight wars, the United States Army radically reorganized most of its combat divisions into units based on sets of fives to enhance its nuclear warfighting capability. The U.S. Army was alone among the great armies of the world to configure itself in this unorthodox fashion, and no other nation or service chose to emulate its unique adaptation to the imagined nuclear battlefield of the future. Only five years later, this "pentomic" division concept, so labeled for its quintuplicate structure designed for atomic warfare, was abandoned without having endured the test of an actual nuclear or nonnuclear war. This detour in organizational development should not have occurred, but it did, despite significant evidence that railed against the pursuit of "pentomics."

As the U.S. Army returned in the 1960s to a more traditional divisional model formed primarily on elements in sets of threes, various postmortems by senior U.S. military leaders highlighted intrinsic flaws in the divergent pentomic scheme that had been revealed during its relatively brief period of employment. Not the least of these was the absence of battalions and the consequent lack of command positions for lieutenant colonels.[2] Left unanswered was why such a theoretical concept was implemented at a time when the U.S. Army's key allies, the British Army and the new West German Army; its chief opponent, the Soviet Army; and its leading competitor, the U.S. Marine Corps, adhered to battle-proven formations modernized with new equipment and technology. In light of prevailing military thought and doctrine clearly articulated by the U.S. Army's leaders, its choice of the pentomic organization appears puzzling.

American doctrinal histories generally portray the pentomic plan as a predictable stage in a gradually evolving series of organizational modifications that were necessary to adapt to changes in missions, weaponry, tactics, manpower, leadership, and other societal, economic, and technological forces. There was almost universal agreement among different schools of military thought about the likely effects of nuclear weapons on existing tactical and operational doctrine. This consensus was remarkable in its uniformity of expression across ideological divides. U.S. Army Chief of Staff General Matthew B. Ridgway observed in 1956 that in contemporary warfare "men and equipment must move from dispersed positions with great speed

to the focal point of the attack. They must concentrate rapidly, and once the objective is seized, they must disperse with equal speed to avoid a counter-blow." One of his Soviet counterparts, Chief Marshal of Armored Forces Pavel A. Rotmistrov, similarly concluded in 1958: "Troops must now know how to group quickly in order to deliver a powerful assault on the enemy and also to disperse quickly to avoid destruction by his atomic weapons. High mobility of troops on the battlefield is one of the most important features of modern combined-arms warfare."[3]

Despite this consensus, the basis of the U.S. Army's decision to adopt this novel force structure is not plain. During the 1950s, when the pentomic division plan was implemented, there were heated interservice and intra–North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) arguments on the overall role of nuclear weapons in respective national and allied defense strategies. In the United States, a new atomic-era national defense strategy had been articulated in President Dwight D. Eisenhower's October 1953 "New Look," set forth in a National Security Council document known as NSC 162/2. The new strategy emphasized reliance on "massive retaliation" with nuclear weapons to respond to any threat to U.S. security and interests. Although this program drastically reduced the strength and budget of the Army and is often closely tied in military literature to the development of the smaller pentomic division, no evidence supports the popular supposition that a demand for force reductions was the driving force behind the new divisional organization's inception.

Numerous works address the broader questions pertaining to the impact of atomic weaponry on national military strategy and emerging concepts of "limited" war, the larger issues that frame this investigation. The administrative, doctrinal, and operational defects inherent in the pentomic idea are fully exposed in other works that provide details of the demise of the pentomic experiment and the Army's recovery through subsequent tactical reorganizations.[4] A different problem is addressed here. The American Army did not respond to the massive destructive firepower of tactical nuclear weapons as it historically and logically should have—with measured, conservative improvements to the formations that had brought it success in its recent major wars, modifications that might have focused on incorporating technologically advanced equipment. Instead, the Army implemented a completely new and untried organization that relied on a fleet of Air Force transport planes that did not exist. An examination of the ideas and background of the men who led the U.S. Army in this period may help explain why this happened, while a comparison of the reorganization that Army leaders implemented with the evolution of British, West German, Soviet, and U.S. Marine ground forces will illustrate the uniqueness of their response.

The Pentomic Division Arrives

Chief of Staff of the Army General Maxwell D. Taylor publicly revealed the conceptual framework for his Army reorganization plans in a late-

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October 1956 speech in which he declared it essential that the Army have a "built-in capability to use atomic and non-atomic weapons in any combination."[5] At that point, the Army had already begun to implement the new scheme. When General Taylor had presented the pentomic division plan to President Dwight Eisenhower at the White House some two weeks earlier, the president had told Taylor to treat the concept as an experiment and to minimize any associated fanfare, fearing that it would be used for political advantage by those opposed to his scaled-back Army budget. Nevertheless, pentomic publicity was considerable, as Taylor had already ordered the reorganization of all the Army's infantry divisions. Taylor's idea received an even more critical analysis three months later in congressional hearings.[6]

General Taylor and Secretary of the Army Wilber M. Brucker appeared before the House Committee on Armed Services on 29 January 1957 to present the Army portion of the annual military posture briefing. Secretary Brucker began by thanking the committee, chaired by Representative Carl Vinson, for its earlier support for Army requests for "career incentives, housing, Medical Dependents' Care Act, and . . . other legislation."[7] The secretary then referred to a concern voiced by the committee the year before, when it had questioned "whether our country is receiving the maximum return for its tremendous investment in defense."[8]

Nuclear-related programs clearly provided the key evidence that he hoped would prove this was being accomplished. The Army had completed the deployment in West Germany of "units armed with Corporal guided missiles, Honest John rockets, and 280-mm. guns, all capable of delivering atomic warheads"; it had established in Italy the first of several planned "atomic support commands" with like nuclear-capable rocketry; it had placed nuclear-armed Nike Ajax antiaircraft guided missile batteries into operation "for the defense of major cities and industrial areas"; and it was completing the construction of an atomic-reactor power plant at Fort Belvoir, Virginia. The secretary left to General Taylor the highlight of the presentation, the task of describing "the reorganization of our divisions into smaller, extremely mobile 'pentomic' divisions—five element units geared to atomic warfare, but also fully capable of fighting nonatomic battles."[9]

General Taylor set forth the pentomic division con-

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Official:



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Secretary of the Army

Chief of Military History
Brig. Gen. John S. Brown

Managing Editor
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cept as the centerpiece of the "steps we are taking to improve the Army. The first and most important is the major reorganization of the Army's main combat forces—the infantry, airborne, and to a lesser extent, the armored divisions. . . . I visualize that the atomic battlefield of the future will have much greater breadth and depth than battlefields of the past."[10]

This enlarged area of tactical operations required a new military organization, made possible through new technology. General Taylor continued, "Modern signal equipment permits a commander to control a larger number of subordinate units than the three which are standard under the present triangular concept of organization. In the new airborne and infantry divisions, we have taken five subordinate units as a reasonable step forward in extending the span of control."

A description of the old- and new-style units followed:

> The [present] infantry division has a strength of about 17,500. It contains three infantry regiments and four battalions of field artillery. Our current airborne division is organized essentially like the infantry division. . . . [The new airborne] division has a strength of about 11,500, rather than the 17,087 of the present airborne division. The major features are: Five combat groups as opposed to the conventional three. . . . the division artillery . . . now contains an atomic-capable Honest John rocket battery and five batteries of 105-milimeter [*sic*] artillery. The strength of [the new infantry] division is approximately 13,800.

Taylor concluded that one of the advantages of the new infantry and airborne divisions would be "increased frontline fighting strength, on a percentage basis.[11] Of course, any increase in Army fighting strength gained on a "percentage basis" in numerically smaller divisions could manifest itself in the Army as a whole only if there were a corresponding increase in the number of divisions—which was not proposed. On the other hand, General Taylor made it clear that the pentomic reorganization was not designed to permit a reduction in the overall personnel strength of the Army. The chief of staff proffered a "word of warning" regarding this "implication":

> First, by taking out those elements which are not habitually needed at division level, it becomes necessary to pool some of these elements . . . at higher levels. . . . Secondly, [complicated] new weapons . . . are creating a need for new types and quantities of service support. Thirdly, as the logistical system is dispersed to reduce its vulnerability to nuclear fire, more units and more people are required to operate its small, scattered supply installations. Finally, other personnel savings resulting from the divisional reorganizations will be used in the newly designed atomic support commands.[12]



General Taylor

Taylor later restated himself more simply by adding, "we are really redistributing the manpower, not reducing manpower." His point was that overall manpower reductions would endanger the Army's ability to survive on the nuclear battlefield and that in fact more personnel were needed.[13]

The pentomic reorganization briefing did not appear to make a big impression on the committee; the first set of questions from the congressmen following General Taylor's testimony dealt with contracting and the construction of military base housing. Eventually, however, the attention of the committee returned briefly to the pentomic reorganization, and some confusion

was evident. Chairman Carl Vinson asked, "How can we get stronger when we reduce from 17,000 down to 13,800?" After further discussion, the committee came to understand that the advertised "increased combat strength" of the new divisions actually came from the incorporation of tactical atomic weapons. Neither Secretary Brucker nor General Taylor disputed this point, and despite its impact on their implied claim of an enhanced conventional warfare capability in the pentomic units, there was no further questioning.[14]

The British
Lessons from Colonial and Global Wars

As the United States detonated an experimental tactical-yield nuclear device in Nevada in April 1953, British officers in West Germany began to receive instruction on the potential impact of such weapons on their battlefield operations. A British Army exercise in West Germany in February 1953 had already incorporated several concepts concerning tactical nuclear weapons.[15] Notwithstanding their impact on the exercise, the British commander of the Allied Northern Group, General Sir Richard Gale, concluded that "a ground force must still be organized, equipped, and trained to fight a conventional ground battle with as one of its main objects the manœvring of its enemy into a position in which the enemy will become a target for annihilating atomic attack."[16] Writing on "Infantry in Modern Battle" a year later with atomic weapons in mind, General Gale added, "The correct handling of [tanks] should dominate tactical thought."[17]

This reassessment and the resulting subordination of the role and station of the infantry were clearly driven by the considerations of the nuclear battlefield. In the next war in Europe, a British military theorist whose views sparked interest in the United States observed, "A major attack is most likely to be carried out by mechanized forces, advancing through areas neutralized by atomic bursts." To achieve this, "a division in the future will need motorized infantry and more armour than is at present available in an infantry division. . . . All [artillery] guns should be mounted on a self-propelled chassis, with overhead cover." Because of the speed required to alternately mass and disperse forces before they became a target of enemy nuclear attack, "there will be no time to wait for infantry moving on foot, or in unarmoured vehicles."[18]

The ideal of a fully mechanized army was never to be attained. After the Suez Crisis of 1956, the British government moved to full adoption of the American approach toward "massive retaliation" that had been proposed in 1954 and 1955 U.S. policy statements. In 1957 British defense secretary Duncan Sandys announced in the *Defence White Paper* that the national interests of the United Kingdom were best served through economic strength and that reductions in defense spending were required to enhance the economy.[19] Thus, the British defense establishment was faced with a situation that paralleled that of the American armed forces, and the British Army similarly offered strong resistance to the view that deterrence could be based solely on the threat of massive retaliation.

The British military leadership viewed its post–World War II requirements to include being prepared to fight not only another general war in Europe but also limited wars of the Korean type, while continuing to conduct "imperial policing." Confronted with this range of possibilities, they chose to develop a balanced force of all arms, but not to significantly alter the tactical structure of the army. By 1959 brigades and brigade groups were the dominant organizations in the British Army, as they had been since the end of World War II.[20]

The West Germans
Lessons from the *Russlandkrieg* (Russian War)

As the 1950s progressed and the perception of the scope of the Soviet threat in Europe grew, it became clear to the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers–Europe (SHAPE), that a new German army was essential to the defense of Western Europe. When NATO ministers set their Lisbon Force Goals in 1952, they presumed their 96-division objective could be met only with a West German military contribution equal to that of the United States, or at least to that of France.[21] Thus the debate over whether or not the Germans should even have an army quickly gave way to what size and shape that army should assume, given the introduction of *Atomwaffen*—atomic weapons—onto the battlefield.[22]

Since the *Bundeswehr*, the new West German military, was to be employed solely in Europe under NATO command, German Ministry of Defense studies advocated that all twelve of the new army's divisions should be armored.[23] This proposal derived in large measure

from the German experience fighting the Red Army only a decade before; the concern of German military leaders still centered on countering a massive Soviet tank assault.[24] However, NATO's U.S. representatives believed that the "all-armored" plan would be difficult to support logistically, and a compromise "balanced solution" of six armored and six motorized infantry divisions emerged.

The West German Army had borrowed its original divisional structure directly from the U.S. armored division model of World War II, still used by the U.S. Army's armor force in 1956.[25] Each West German tank and infantry division had three combat commands, and each of these had four maneuver battalions, including at least one armored battalion, which were closely tied to divisional control.[26] The Germans' emphasis on armored forces fit nicely with the anticipated requirements of the atomic battlefield.

NATO's formal announcement on 21 March 1957 of its new strategy to equip the West Germans with nuclear weapons under U.S. control gave impetus to the testing of new tactical unit organizations within the German Army. Beginning in the autumn of 1957 and culminating with the Bergen-Höhne maneuvers a year later, the results of exercises that highlighted simulated nuclear detonations showed that the divisional combat command structure had to be modified. As a result, the brigade superseded the division as the West German Army's primary tactical unit. The brigade would include a mix of armored and mechanized infantry battalions and conventional artillery. However, in accord with NATO agreements, nuclear-capable artillery would be retained at division level and above. The brigades included 155-mm. howitzers that technically could fire nuclear munitions, but under the attendant political agreements they were neither trained nor equipped to do so.[27] Significantly, each brigade possessed its own logistical units, which were to be armored and highly mobile. A West German airborne division and a specialized mountain division based in the German Alps were the closest counterparts to the U.S. Army's "un-armored" infantry divisions, and even the German mountain division included one mechanized infantry brigade.

The increased mechanization of the West German brigades permitted the introduction of more powerful, larger caliber, and longer range conventional weapons; this increase in firepower in turn allowed a 35 percent reduction in overall manpower. Each of the *Bundeswehr* divisions, then, required only 12,000–14,000 men, compared to the pre-pentomic U.S. Army divisions that had numbered 15,000–18,000.[28] However, unlike their distant pentomic cousins, the early *Bundeswehr* brigades and divisions had adequate internal logistical capability to support prolonged conventional combat.

The Russians

Lessons from the Great Patriotic War

While the U.S. Army imagined itself becoming a military element ancillary to the U.S. Air Force and its strategic warfighting doctrine, the Soviet Army suffered from no such lack of confidence about its role in wars to come. In 1956 Marshal of the Soviet Union Georgiy K. Zhukov, then Minister of Defense, stated in an address to the Twentieth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party, "Future war, if it is unleashed, will be characterized by the mass use of . . . various means of mass destruction such as atomic, thermonuclear, chemical and bacteriological weapons. However, we proceed from the fact that the latest weapons, including weapons of mass destruction, do not reduce the decisive role of the ground armies, navies and aviation."[29]

Two years before the unveiling of the pentomic division, Marshal Zhukov had begun a sweeping restructuring of the entire Red Army. While retaining the offensive model that had brought him success after success in 1944 and 1945, he adapted his army to the threat of *orudie massovykh porazhenie* (weapons of mass destruction) by giving it mechanized mobility and armored protection. Continuous offensive action—unrelenting day-and-night attack—was Zhukov's formula for operational and tactical victory. Slow, foot-mobile rifle corps and divisions were eliminated, as were the vulnerable cavalry divisions.[30]

The Soviets still saw the infantryman as a critical component. A historical review of the development of Soviet operational art and tactics between 1953 and 1959, written for an audience of Soviet general officers, explained that the Soviet military drew the following conclusions about infantry on the atomic-age battlefield:

To attain high rates of advance it is necessary for motorized infantry to move behind the tanks on APCs

[armored personnel carriers] with increased cross-country ability, and not only before the battle begins, but during it as well. . . . APCs reduce to a considerable degree the destructive effect of nuclear weapons. In particular, they fully protect personnel from light radiation and weaken by several times the effects of radioactive radiation. . . . The above considerations permitted drawing the following conclusion by 1959: the attack must be made primarily on tanks, APCs, and helicopters. An attack on foot will be a rare occurrence. The fire and maneuver operations of troops on machines now rule on fields of battle.[31]

The Soviet mechanized divisions in both 1946 and 1954 comprised five maneuver regiments, not unlike the U.S. pentomic division. However, they were not mirror-image units: the Soviets had included a mix of heavy tank, medium tank, and mechanized regiments. These were replaced in 1958 by a streamlined motorized division model with 13,000 men, reduced to four major maneuver elements—three motorized rifle regiments and one medium tank regiment—along with artillery and other supporting units. Soviet tank divisions were similarly configured.[32]

There is another aspect to the Red Army's tactical organization that reflected its leaders' gloomy perception of the reality of war in the atomic age, described by William P. Baxter:

Soviet tactics does not make a sharp distinction between nuclear and conventional warfare. In part, this is because the Soviet Army believes that the enhanced destructive effects of some modern munitions approach those of tactical nuclear weapons, and in part it reflects Soviet pessimism over the likelihood that a conventional war can long remain such. It is also a reflection of the pragmatic fact that at levels below division, terrain and the physical capabilities of weapons and equipment dictate operations more than considerations of the possible use of nuclear weapons.[33]

Of course, all of the Red Army's projected battlefields were contiguous to the Soviet Union and thus did not call for long-distance over-water transport by aircraft or vessel, as United States ground forces strategy did. This transportation requirement significantly complicated the response not only of the U.S. Army, but also of its major competitor for a portion of the shrinking defense budget in the mid-1950s: the U.S. Marine Corps.

The U.S. Marines
Lessons from Expeditionary Wars

The experimental detonations of two U.S. nuclear devices at Bikini Atoll in the Pacific in July 1946 moved the U.S. Marine Corps to undertake a doctrinal and organizational self-evaluation ten years before the appearance of a pentomic division in the Army. Observing the tests, the commander of Fleet Marine Force–Pacific, Lt. Gen. Roy S. Geiger, wrote, "It is quite evident that a small number of atomic bombs could destroy an expeditionary force as now organized, embarked, and landed."[34] Since the *raison d'etre* of the U.S. Marines was to conduct amphibious assaults, which now appeared to be impossible in the face of nuclear weapons, its continued existence as a combat organization and an instrument of national maritime strategy seemed to be at decided risk. The commandant of the Marine Corps, General A. A. Vandegrift, convened several study groups, including the simply named Special Board, to find a future for the marines in the atomic era.

While the recommendations of the Special Board's central report, USF–63, included such concepts as troop-transport submarines and seaplanes that never came to fruition, the panel determined that the Army's airborne forces were just as vulnerable to atomic attack as Marine amphibious forces and that dispersion was the key to survival. The most important pieces of equipment that would make this dispersion possible, the report concluded, would be troop-transport helicopters and the vessels needed to carry them. No mention was made of any new tactical organization of the marines themselves.[35]

The Marine Corps soon ensured its place in the national defense structure by having its amphibious mission written into U.S. law as part of the National Security Act of 1947.[36] This did not, however, alter the real threat of the destruction of marine landing parties in a nuclear war, a concern that became especially prominent after the 1953 Korean War armistice. Marine Corps officers who looked at the same projected nuclear battlefield as the Army leadership equally saw a requirement for alternating dispersion and concentration, as the enemy and opportunity suggested.

They did not, however, share the view that changes in battlefield tactics required similar sweeping alterations in unit organization, observing that "we are generally agreed that combat groups of appropriate size should be separated by a sufficient distance so that only one will be destroyed by one atomic weapon and such destruction would not result in rendering the Air-Ground Task Force ineffective. . . . The basic tactical grouping will be . . . a task group tailored for mobile, independent action. Although based upon a nucleus composed of T/O [Table of Organization] units, it is reinforced on the 'Task Force' principle."[37]

Decidedly unlike the Army, the Marine Corps saw an atomic battlefield much like the one it currently understood: "The battlefield may easily become linear or at least more concentrated at the point of contact [which would preclude the use of atomic weapons] . . . it means that we must be *able to mass conventional weapons* just as we have always done." (emphasis in original)[38] The marines similarly considered the idea of dispersing combat units a time-tested concept. A. L. Bowser, Jr., then a Marine Corps brigadier general, observed that "Numerous examples of 'unit separation' can be found in accounts of battles and training exercises of the pre-atomic era." But, he stated,

The newness of this tactic lies in the reason for which the Marine Corps is currently practicing it; namely, to reduce the vulnerability of ground formations to weapons of mass destruction. . . . [After World War II] the trial of the "J" Series T/Os stands out. . . . They were aimed in principle at producing a capability for "unit separation" or "unit concentration" as required by the situation. . . . Today our thinking and tentative doctrine reflect the policy of employing the reinforced battalion as the basic unit for "unit separation."[39]

These battalions, most often deployed since the Spanish-American War as floating "battalion landing teams,"[40] were the ground component of the expeditionary unit and the building blocks of the Marine regimental combat team, which was in turn the ground component of the expeditionary brigade. These and the next larger unit, the expeditionary force, which had a division as its ground element, were the air-ground task forces in which the Marine Corps expressed strong faith.[41] Marine Lt. Col. E. B. Wheeler reflected this confidence, when he commented that "the exploitation of atomic fires by vertical envelopment [helicopter assault] and rapidly moving surface forces, will require the utmost in training and skill. . . . This consideration should be of little moment to the Marine air-ground task force where skill, leadership, training and teamwork are basic qualities."[42]

The real answer the Marine Corps found to the problem of agility on a potentially nuclear battlefield was the helicopter, as endorsed in the Special Board's report. In accordance with the primary recommendation of USF–63, the marines established an experimental helicopter squadron at Quantico, Virginia, in 1947. Carrier-based helicopters had been cited by the report as the key means of permitting, and justifying, amphibious operations in a war with nuclear weapons. By 1956, the first assault helicopter transport, the USS *Thetis Bay*, was operational.[43] As far as the Marine Corps was concerned, its traditional force structure design was suited operationally and tactically for any atomic or conventional war. Although the Eisenhower administration's New Look resulted in considerable reductions in the size of the U.S. Marine Corps, its future as a major warfighting service was assured.[44] There is no evidence that "pentomicizing" the Marine Corps was ever seriously considered as part of that future.

The U.S. Army
Lessons from Five Airborne Battles

In the U.S. Army, Ridgway, Taylor, and James M. Gavin, a triumvirate of veteran paratroop generals, dominated the service's strategic and tactical thinking as it emerged from the Korean War. Sometimes derided as the ringleaders of the postwar "Airborne Club," all three had commanded parachute infantry divisions in World War II. Each had jumped into combat at the head of his troops, and each had led them through five major land battles. Ridgway had commanded the 82d Airborne Division and later the XVIII Airborne Corps; Gavin had led one of that division's regiments, became the assistant division commander, and finally took over the 82d from Ridgway; Taylor had been the 82d Division's artillery chief under Ridgway and then commanded the 101st Airborne Division. The three fought side by side in the Sicily, Salerno, Normandy, Arnhem, and Ardennes battles. Undeniably brave, fiercely intelligent, and supremely competent, they had been part

of a new and daring experiment in warfare—the airborne division—which brought them notable battlefield and career success.[45] By 1953 their skills and drive had catapulted them into the highest positions of leadership in the Army. In that year Gavin was commanding VII Corps, one of the two U.S. corps in Germany; Taylor was leading the U.S. Eighth Army in Korea; and Ridgway was chief of staff of the U.S. Army.

When confronted with the challenge of how to deal with a nuclear battlefield, these men predictably incorporated into their response both the general and specific features of their experiences in parachute operations. They adhered less strongly to traditional systems, sought bold and imaginative solutions, and accepted radical new concepts. Thinking about nuclear war was not new to Ridgway in 1956. As Supreme Allied Commander–Europe in 1952, he had been directed by the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff to study the effects that nuclear weapons would have on future NATO force requirements.[46] General Ridgway remarked, "To analyze and predict the role the Army should play on this atomic battlefield, I put to work some of the best military brains we could spare." He told these handpicked study groups that the Army's "old organization would have to be drastically altered; its ancient, tested tactics would have to be revamped."[47]

Ridgway, Taylor, and Gavin had each personally experienced the considerable mobility afforded to light infantry by air transport, and their success in battle with this form of movement reinforced their belief that its model provided the answer to the depth and dispersion that tactical atomic fires made necessary. In a revealing statement, General Taylor explained to the House Armed Services Committee in 1957 that "all Army units must be trained for all-around combat in the same way we trained and fought our airborne divisions in World War II. . . . The [five pentomic] infantry regiments . . . are administratively self-contained, air-transportable units organized essentially like the groups in the airborne division."[48]

The Army's focus on movement by fixed-wing, multiengine aircraft was significant. In describing what would eventually become the pentomic Army, General Ridgway argued in 1956, "As many elements as practicable of these forces, all except their heaviest ones, must be transportable by air, both between continents and within the confines of the battle zone. . . . To a far greater extent than ever before, aircraft must provide the means for troop transport, resupply, evacuation, and communications."[49]

General Gavin had already articulated the idea of large-scale air transportability of military units in considerable detail, and the imagined atomic battlefield was not a new subject to him. Indeed, he had been assigned to the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group in 1949 to study the possible tactical employment of nuclear weapons.[50] Even previous to that experience, however, Gavin had advocated significant divisional reorganization. In his 1947 book, *Airborne Warfare*, he judged both the World War I square division of four infantry regiments, encumbered by two intermediate brigade headquarters, and the World War II triangular division as lacking an all-round defense capability. Gavin's favored solution was a quadrilateral division composed of four infantry regiments, with the division commander in direct control of those elements. Gavin explained:

> The division of the future—and this division must be airborne or adaptable to air transport—must be thoroughly flexible. . . . The infantry regiments should not exceed 2,400 infantrymen. There is a definite need for . . . rockets, recoilless artillery, and weapons of the bazooka and panzerfaust type. . . . It is also imperative that radios be built with greater range and lighter weight. . . . With the dispersion that airborne units are sure to have in the future dependable communications are of the utmost importance.[51]

This quadrilateral organization happened to be the same task-force configuration the 82d Airborne Division possessed during its parachute and glider assaults into Normandy and Holland under Gavin's command.

Gavin, who saw his corps command in southern Germany as "the opportunity that I had been seeking to develop tactical nuclear concepts for our infantry organizations," concluded that transport airplanes that did not require prepared landing fields would enable him to support his forces on a nuclear battlefield.[52] Unlike the U.S. Marine Corps's view, helicopters did not appear to him as an answer to his tactical mobility problem, and he only called for more of these new "rotary-wing" aircraft to bolster divisional reconnaissance assets.[53] The three generals thus conceptually expanded the value of transport aircraft from provid-

ing large ground formations with strategic (intercontinental) and operational (intracontinental) mobility to the sphere of tactical (intrabattlefield) movement. Enamored of fixed-winged craft, they were unwilling to turn to the helicopter—already employed by the marines as a combat troop carrier in Korea in 1951—as the innovative solution that would be required to meet the Army's tactical transport needs. In consequence, as late as 1960 the U.S. Army had only established the objective that "each division [was] to have the capability of moving at least a company of Infantry by its organic airlift," which would by then include a combination of fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft.[54]

But the U.S. Air Force would not sacrifice strategic nuclear bomber production for transports needed by another service, especially when both services were vulnerable to reductions in force. By 1957 the administration's shift in military strategy from the New Look to the "New New Look" had moved the United States from striving for nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union to accepting a "sufficient" nuclear deterrence. This policy change prompted Secretary of Defense Wilson to announce, without having consulted the joint chiefs of staff, the immediate elimination of twenty wings from the U.S. Air Force, along with cuts of 200,000 men and two divisions from the Army and twenty ships from the Navy.[55] Taylor concluded that "the Air Force is not equipped to discharge its responsibilities to the Army in ground combat. . . . [The Army] should have its own organic tactical air support and tactical air lift."[56] In pursuit of the latter objective, the Army in 1959 purchased for evaluation five Canadian-built, twin-engine, fixed-wing Caribou transports, each with a 32-passenger capacity, and it ordered 109 more for delivery in 1961–1963.[57]

The peculiar "sets of fives" organization that was the hallmark of the pentomic division seems to be directly attributable to General Taylor. "I was convinced that our American triangular division, based on three large infantry regiments, was outmoded," Taylor observed. "I set aside one of the last Korean divisions to be organized as an experimental division. During most of 1954, aided by Lieutenant General Bruce Clarke . . . I studied several possible organizations." Employing five different unit models in seventy-two field exercises, Taylor finally determined that "improvement in signal communications . . . now permitted a division commander to control more units than the traditional three regiments. Our Korean tests indicated that the optimum number of subordinate units was about five."[58]

The technological improvement to which Taylor referred was simply the introduction of the frequency-modulated (FM) radio into the 1939-vintage triangular division. The advantage in mobility aside, how the radio extended a division commander's span of control beyond that provided by the field telephone was not clarified. Moreover, Taylor did not explain how he derived the best organization for an American division engaged in nuclear war against the mechanized Soviet Army on the rolling terrain of Europe from tests utilizing a Korean trainee division in the mountains and rice paddies of Northwest Asia. Interestingly, at the conclusion of Taylor's trials, the Republic of Korea Army leadership "politely declined" to adopt Taylor's new organization.[59]

Coincidentally, the military theoretician Carl von Clausewitz had observed nearly a century and a half earlier that "five brigades to a division . . . in the abstract . . . seems preferable. . . . But . . . there are hundreds of local and special conditions to which the abstract rule must yield." There is no indication that Clausewitz's views on this issue were considered by Taylor or any other U.S. general officer, nor had they contributed to the renown Clausewitz's more general thoughts on the nature of war had earned for his work.[60]

All this might only suggest that the pentomic division was one of several plausible responses to the theoretical nuclear battlefield, roughly on a par with the British, West German, and Russian "tanks and APCs" solution and "helicopter" approach of the U.S. Marines. That conclusion, however, would be incorrect. Available evidence strongly suggests that the American paratroop generals were so deeply prejudiced toward irregularly organized air-transportable light infantry divisions reminiscent of their personal wartime experience that they ignored the answers arrived at by the major European armies. The evidence for this lies in their own reports and writings.

In his 1957 congressional testimony, General Taylor spoke at length about the Army's two airborne divisions and twelve infantry divisions. Yet there were four armored divisions as well, a quarter of the Army's total divisional strength, two of which were based in Ger-

many facing the Soviet Army. This powerful element rated only passing mention from General Taylor in his Pentomic Army promotion: "The current [armored] division, by virtue of its armor protected mobility and its favorable firepower-to-manpower ratio, is well suited as it is for the mobile, dispersed type warfare we envision for the future."[61]

General Gavin's conclusions from his corps's BATTLE MACE and BEARTRAP exercises had provided this understanding. During these 1954 field trials, Gavin reported, "we soon learned that the World War II–type organizations, no matter how packaged, would not adapt themselves to nuclear tactics. The one exception was our armored divisions."[62] The Armor Board at Fort Knox ratified these findings by voting to retain the World War II–era combat command organization for the Army's four tank divisions.

Military orthodoxy and doctrinal logic called for armoring and mechanizing most U.S. Army combat divisions in response to the introduction of tactical nuclear weapons. The rejection of this approach, in the face of all the available evidence and examples, can only be attributed to the coincidental positioning of Generals Ridgway, Taylor, and Gavin in the key leadership posts of the U.S. Army at the time the nuclear revolution arrived on the battlefield. All three opposed Eisenhower's massive retaliation doctrine. Their airborne-centered outlook, exacerbated rather than attenuated by their native intelligence and enhanced by their self-confidence, went unchecked by any proponent of a mechanized army. This was not a problem in the British Army, even though General Gale had led the British 6th Airborne Division into combat in Normandy in 1944. The American armor leaders seem to have been content to have their World War II–derived combat command divisions unmolested during the imposition of the New Look, and General Clarke later even rebuked the Army for its precipitous abandonment of the pentomic division.[63] Their turn would come in the early 1960s, when the "Flexible Response" strategy favored by President John F. Kennedy, along with larger budgets and waning "Airborne Club" influence, would bring armor and armor generals to the fore.[64]

Certainly, there were other factors in the pentomic decision. Public, political, and especially professional fascination with the atomic bomb,[65] interservice competition for funds, and conflicts between the Army leadership (the same paratroop generals) and Secretary of Defense Wilson can all be weighed as important elements. It is clear, however, from the memoirs of Ridgway, Gavin, and Taylor and from Taylor's congressional testimony that what came to be known as the pentomic division did not evolve in reaction to the Army's reduction-in-force under the New Look budgetary constraints and was only coincidentally a response to a revolutionary new weapon. Only Taylor's invention of the name itself—pentomic—was influenced by the prevailing political mood.[66]

The central consideration in military organization is in the final analysis warfighting capability. By this measure, there should never have been a pentomic Army. Nonetheless, the influence of an intense but unique personal combat experience on a few key leaders, coupled with their singular belief in a shared vision of future war, overcame historical inertia, the force of logic, and empirical evidence. This is the solution, and the lesson, of the pentomic puzzle.

Retired Army Lt. Col. Kalev I. Sepp is preparing a doctoral dissertation at Harvard University on U.S. military strategy in Central America in 1979–1991. He was an assistant professor of history at the United States Military Academy in 1994–1997.

NOTES

The author would like to thank Michael Hübner; Barney Fischer; Nichol Carlucci, Jr.; P. J. Durrant; and Les Grau for their invaluable assistance and advice.

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Doughty, *The Evolution of US Army Tactical Doctrine, 1946–76*, Leavenworth Papers No. 1 (Fort Leavenworth, Kans., 1979); Matthew B. Ridgway, *Soldier: The Memoirs of Matthew B. Ridgway* (New York, 1956), p. 299, containing the first quotation; Harriet Fast Scott and William F. Scott, eds., *The Soviet Art of War: Doctrine, Strategy, and Tactics* (Boulder, Colo., 1982), p. 145, containing the second quotation.

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8. Ibid., p. 134.

9. Ibid., pp. 134–42, with the quoted words on pp. 134–35, 137, 141–42.

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11. Ibid., p. 144.

12. Ibid., p. 145.

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31. Vasilii Efimovich Savkin, *The Basic Principles of Operational Art and Tactics: (A Soviet View)*, trans. U.S. Air Force (Washington, D.C., 1974), p. 197.

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53. Ibid., p. 137. James M. Gavin, "Cavalry, and I Don't Mean Horses," *Harper's Magazine* 208 (April 1954): 54–60, mentioned helicopters only four times, and on each occasion did so in association with other "air vehicles," including "assault transports, light utility planes, . . . and convertaplanes." (p. 60)

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THE CHIEF'S CORNER

John Sloan Brown

We have had yet another several memorable months at the Center of Military History, and I remain encouraged by the visible signs that the entire Army historical community continues to work to meet the goals of the Army Historical Program. Let's keep up that spirit of teamwork!

A few thoughts occur to me in the interest of sharing news. The Department of the Army Historical Advisory Committee (DAHAC) conducted its annual meeting in October and expressed high praise for the energy and progress demonstrated by the Army Historical Program over the past year. Kudos to all of you who either participated in the deliberations of this esteemed committee or were the subjects of their favorable comments. A full report should be out shortly. Areas of remaining concern to the DAHAC include the understaffing of the Combat Studies Institute with respect to its stated missions and the need to affirm manning for the museum being developed at Carlisle while assuring that there is no degradation in the ability of the Military History Institute (MHI) to fulfill its present functions. The DAHAC also expressed great interest in seeing the Army follow through on its Information Warehouse initiative and great concern with the potential impact on a number of historical activities of A-76 and other privatization proposals. We will, of course, be giving great attention to these DAHAC findings over this next year.

The Military History Coordinating Committee, which I chair, met shortly before the DAHAC and found much to be pleased with regarding military history education and military heritage training. The increasingly visible involvement of branch and unit museums in heritage training received particularly favorably comment, as did the Chief of Staff's newly promulgated Professional Reading List. As new business, we took up the value and utility of commercially produced combat simulations, or war games, in programs of military instruction. We are in a discovery phase with respect to this topic, and are opening up an opportunity to share comments and ideas through our website.

The Army's Korean War commemoration is continuing to roll along, and we have given it significant support. The Center is proud of the interpretive pamphlets and wall posters we have released to coincide with 50th anniversaries. The third of our five planned pamphlets, *The Chinese Intervention*, just came out, and we are reprinting for the Korean War Commemoration Committee the first three wall posters we issued, because they have already proven so popular. I should also mention the striking Korean War display the Center's Museum Division set up in the Pentagon. Our compliments go to all who have assisted in making this commemoration such a success.

This fall has also been an active season for conducting staff rides and providing historical input to the Army's transformation initiative and its participation in the Quadrennial Defense Review. The Center conducted staff rides to Gettysburg, for example, for the Office of Congressional Liaison and congressional staffers, the Washington corps of military attachés, and senior personnel of the Army Materiel Command. During the same period CMH fielded over 8,000 official inquiries, provided a dozen briefings in support of the Quadrennial Review, and devoted over 4,000 man-hours to Army Transformation and the Quadrennial Defense Review—but who is counting?

We do appreciate the gracious reception that folks in the field have offered for several CMH products and activities. Fort Rucker, for example, hosted a coming-out party for Ed Raines's *Eyes of Artillery: The Origins of Modern U.S. Army Aviation in World War II*, and Carlisle's MHI celebrated our issuance of General Dennis Reimer's *Soldiers Are Our Credentials: The Collected Works and Selected Papers of the Thirty-third Chief of Staff, United States Army*. We owe a debt of gratitude to everyone who made these events a success, and we appreciate the similar gracious hosting of my visits this fall to museums and historical programs at Forts Rucker, Jackson, Knox, and Leonard Wood. To all who were involved, thanks so much!

Please keep up all the great work that you do—wherever you are in the Army Historical Program. Thanks!!!

The Wilson's Creek Staff Ride and Hootenanny

By Bill Stacy

One of the required missions for Army military history detachments (MHDs) is to develop the ability to plan, organize, and conduct a staff ride. During the week-long annual MHD Training Course held in July 2000 at Camp Robinson in North Little Rock, Arkansas, the course instructors and detachment personnel conducted a staff ride at Wilson's Creek National Battlefield in Missouri. Maj. Sherman Fleek and Capt. Les Melnyk of the National Guard Bureau Historical Services Office served as staff ride leaders.

The Battle of Wilson's Creek receives relatively little public notice today, although it was one of a series of critical early battles that kept Missouri in the Union during the Civil War. It occurred while the contenders' attention was directed primarily toward other key theaters. Even the Union's Western Department commander, Maj. Gen. John C. Frémont, did not consider the battle very important. He focused his attention and resources instead on the threat to Cairo, Illinois, posed by the Confederate force under Brig. Gen. Gideon Pillow that had taken New Madrid, Missouri, on the Mississippi River.

The Union force at Wilson's Creek consisted of regular and volunteer units gathered mostly from Missouri, Kansas, and Iowa. Brig. Gen. Nathaniel Lyon, a U.S. Military Academy graduate, led the main Union column, while Col. Franz Sigel, a graduate of the military academy at Karlsruhe, Germany, led a subsidiary column. The Confederate force that was attacked at Wilson's Creek comprised elements of the newly formed Missouri State Guard led by militia Maj. Gen. Sterling Price, a former governor of Missouri, and a composite Confederate Army force led by Brig. Gen. Ben McCulloch, a former Texas Ranger and U.S. marshal in that state. After a certain amount of wrangling, McCulloch assumed overall command of the Confederate force.

Missouri had spiraled into violence quickly in the spring of 1861. After Lyon's troops had arrested some 700 state militiamen mustering near St. Louis, an angry and aggressive St. Louis crowd confronted Lyon's forces. The bloody and uneven confrontation that ensued on 10 May left twenty-eight civilians and two of Lyon's troops dead. In reaction, the Missouri legislature created the Missouri State Guard, to which pro-Confederate governor Claiborne Jackson appointed commanders favorably disposed toward secession. Fearing that the state government was preparing to desert the Union, Lyon in June attacked Jefferson City and drove the governor and the nascent Missouri State Guard out of the capital, forcing the latter to retreat to Cowskin Prairie in the southwestern corner of the state. General McCulloch moved his Confederate force from Arkansas into Missouri at the end of July 1861 and with Price began to maneuver to isolate Lyon's force, then headquartered in Springfield. Lyon, however, stole a march on them and attacked them in their camp at Wilson's Creek early on the morning of 10 August 1861. Not only did Lyon achieve complete surprise, but he had also launched a secondary column, led by Colonel Sigel, which had succeeded in interposing itself on the Confederates' best available line of retreat.

Initially it appeared that the Union force would win a complete victory, but the Confederates stood their ground, and the weight of their superior numbers eventually turned the tide. What ensued was a stand-up battle, with both sides often facing each other across short distances without any defensive works whatsoever. This was one of the first major battles of the war, and neither side fully understood the lethality of rifled muskets and the advantages of defensive works. In addition, both combatants benefited from excellent artillery support. The result was that each side suffered very high casualty rates: 1,317 Union casualties in a force of 5,600, compared to 1,230 Confederate casualties in a force of 10,175. The outcome of the battle was inconclusive. The Union troops retreated to Springfield, and the Confederates held the field of battle. After the bruising they had received, however, McCulloch's Confederates were unwilling to push farther into Missouri. Although Lyon

lost his life in the effort, his daring attack kept the bulk of Missouri under Union control.

Staff ride methodology calls for the student participants to study the battle in detail and to come prepared to give presentations during the course of the staff ride. One of the major difficulties in conducting a staff ride at a course to which the students deploy from all over the country for only a week is to arrange adequate preparation and coordination. Major Fleek and Captain Melnyk designed and conducted the staff ride, while Sfc. Bill Roche of the 44th Military History Detachment coordinated administrative support. All three soldiers did a great job of pulling off this major training effort in what would prove to be very adverse conditions.

The first warning that the participants would be in for an unusual staff ride was the weather report from southwestern Missouri for the prior day, which stated that the area around Wilson's Creek had received up to five inches of rain. Staff ride tradition calls for conducting the staff ride no matter how adverse the weather, unless it threatens the safety of the students. Since this is military training, physical discomfort is not allowed to be a factor.

The staff riders were delayed an hour in Little Rock awaiting their naval air transport, but the "can-do" attitude of the reserve component naval air crew more than made up for this inconvenience. The staff riders flew to the National Guard facility at Springfield, Missouri, where they boarded buses rented from Fort Leonard Wood. En route, the Navy airmen became so interested in the staff ride concept that two of them joined the ride. The participants received their first report on ground conditions at Wilson's Creek from an Army National Guard officer at the Springfield airport. He stated that quite a lot of rain had been reported in the area. However, he said that he lived close to the battlefield and had received only about an inch of rain.

The buses drove the staff ride participants to the Visitors' Center at Wilson's Creek National Battlefield, where the staff ride began with an orientation at a diorama of the battlefield accompanied by an excellent narrative recording. Due to the large size of the group, the staff riders split into two platoons, one led by Major Fleek and the other by Captain Melnyk. "Sherman's Death Marchers" went to the first stop, where they

Melynk's Marauders

High Waters on Wilson's Creek

discussed the Union's march to the battle. "Melnyk's Marauders" would follow in thirty minutes. After their preparatory discussions, both groups marched across a large field that had been allowed to return to its natural state. The purpose of this exercise was to illustrate graphically to the students the difficult terrain through which both sides had to march and fight.

"Sherman's march to the creek" unfortunately was cut short by the high waters of Wilson's Creek. As the weather report would confirm, five inches of rain had fallen upstream, and the creek had jumped its banks. As a consequence, both groups had to march upstream to a bridge in order to cross to the other side for the second stop, which was critical for explaining the opening phase of the battle. A little unintended humor awaited the students at the low-water ford: a hazardous water warning sign.

Improvisation is often required on staff rides, and the changes in the terrain conditions at Wilson's Creek because of the rain caused the staff ride leaders to improvise from that point. Not only were the staff riders unable to ford the creek on foot, but in several places even the buses had to go around overflowed bridges. In addition, many of the planned routes of march had to be adjusted due to flooded creek-side paths. Major Fleek and Captain Melnyk both used Wilson's Creek to drive home the importance of weather and terrain in any battle. For example, if Wilson's Creek had been flooded on 10 August 1861, the day's battle might well have had a very different outcome. The majority of the Confederate force was on the opposite side of the creek from where the Union attackers approached. Had Lyon encountered floodwaters, both sides might have prepared and settled down into solid defensive positions. This might have left the Confederates more capable of pushing forward into central Missouri than they would be after the losses they suffered at the hands of Lyon's forces.

Thanks to much improvisation and outstanding teaching by both the staff ride leaders and the MHD participants, the staff ride concluded successfully. Among the many lessons the participants learned was that reconnaissance is absolutely essential to any operation. This staff ride taught that lesson in a way that the participants will not soon forget.

The Wilson's Creek staff ride soon became the

stuff of legend as it entered the collective mythology of MHD history and traditions. Back at Camp Robinson "The Combat Curators" who had participated on the staff ride regaled the participants with a ballad they had written to commemorate the event. Since building unit and soldier esprit is one of the goals of a staff ride, "The Battle of Wilson's Creek," transcribed below, clearly shows that this staff ride was a major success.

The Battle of Wilson's Creek
(Sung to the tune of "The Battle of New Orleans")

Verse 1:

At the Army MHD course, we took a little trip.
We followed Fleek and Melnyk to a swollen Wilson's Crik.
We took some bottled water to overcome the heat,
Some blousing bands and sunscreen, and lots and lots of Deet.

Chorus:

We staggered through the briars, and we staggered through the ivy,
And we staggered through the places where the chigger critters grow.
We staggered back and forth, but we never made a crossing
Along the swollen creek banks where the rangers wouldn't go.

Verse 2:

We left the PE Center to meet some Navy fliers.
They flew us to the staff ride in comfort, class, and style.
We left the Army buses and we trudged up Bloody Hill.
We're good to go, it's 12 o'clock—we started with a will.

Repeat Chorus

Verse 3:

We followed Lyon's footsteps, as best as we could go
To learn about the battle that happened long ago.
The weather it was rainy, and we all commenced to sweat,
But we followed Fleek and Melnyk 'til all were soaking wet.

Repeat Chorus

Verse 4:

Well, we hunted for the batt'ry and we hunted for the road,
But all we found was mud and crud, beside the overflow.
We felt the ticks attackin' like Old McCulloch's rebs,
So we called it quits like Sigel did and from the battle fled.

Repeat Chorus

The combat curators at this particular hootenanny were Rex Boggs, Dave Cole, Steve Draper, Paul Martin, Jim Speraw, and Ceilia Stratton.

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Bill Stacy is the command historian at U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM). CMH and FORSCOM jointly host the annual MHD training course, which has developed into a major training event for soldiers, historians, and curators involved in military history operations in the field.

New Publications

The Military History Office of the U.S. Army Forces Command has published *Army Values: Vignettes of the American Soldier Living and Demonstrating Army Values* by Mason R. Schaefer. The book is available in paperback and CD-ROM. Forces Command historian William Stacy is handling the distribution of these products. Interested offices may request copies by sending an email message to *Stacyb@forscom.army.mil* or by writing to Headquarters, U.S. Army Forces Command, ATTN: AFSG-MH (Military History), 1641 Hardee Avenue SW, Fort McPherson, Georgia 30330.

During 2000 the Center published the first three of five projected commemorative brochures on the actions of the U.S. Army in the Korean War. The first pamphlet, *The Outbreak* by William Joe Webb, covers the period 27 June–15 September 1950. It is CMH Pub 19–6, carries GPO stock number 008–029–00360–1, and may be purchased for $1.75. The second pamphlet, *The UN Offensive* by Stephen Gammons, covers the period 16 September–2 November 1950. It is CMH Pub 19–7, carries GPO stock number 008–029–00361–9, and costs $2. The third pamphlet, *The Chinese Intervention* by Richard W. Stewart, covers the period 3 November 1950–24 January 1951. It is CMH Pub 19–8, carries GPO stock number 008–029–00362–7, and also costs $2.

The Center of Military History has also issued a four-disk CD-ROM entitled "The United States Army and the Korean War." This CD-ROM contains all the materials the Center has published on the Korean War, with the exception of the commemorative brochures described in the previous paragraph. It is CD-ROM EM 0182 and may be purchased for $24 under GPO stock number 008–029–00365–1. Once all five of the commemorative brochures and the fifth and final poster map the Center has been preparing for the commemoration of the fiftieth anniversary of the Korean War have been published, the Center will release a new edition of this CD-ROM to add these additional items.

Each of the Center's new publications is also available to Army publication account holders from the Distribution Operations Facility, U.S. Army Publishing Agency, 1655 Woodson Road, St. Louis, Missouri 63114–6181.

New Articles by *Army History* Authors

Two authors whose articles appeared in the Spring 2000 issue of *Army History* (No. 49) have published related essays elsewhere that may also interest readers of this bulletin. Richard A. Mobley, whose article "North Korea: How Did It Prepare for the 1950 Attack?" opened that issue, has written about the implications of North Korea's attack to American military intelligence. His new article, "North Korea's Surprise Attack: Weak U.S. Analysis?" appeared in the *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence* 13 (Winter 2000): 490–514. Vincent J. Cirillo, author of "'The Patriotic Odor': Sanitation and Typhoid Fever in the National Encampments during the Spanish-American War," in *Army History*, has published another article on the medical history of that war. His article, "The Spanish-American War and Military Radiology," appeared in the *American Journal of Roentgenology* 174 (May 2000): 1233–39.

"His Influence with the Colored People Is Marked"

Christian Fleetwood's Quest for Command in the War with Spain and Its Aftermath

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The rampant discrimination that characterized American race relations during the 1890s caused some black citizens to have serious doubts about supporting America's entry into the War with Spain. They wondered why they should worry about ending Spanish oppression of their dark-skinned Cuban, Puerto Rican, and Filipino brethren when they were facing seemingly similar conditions of injustice in the United States. Many other African Americans, however, were anxious to participate in the conflict, hoping their support would eventually be rewarded with expanded opportunities for racial equality.[1]

One influential African American who was especially eager to join the fight was Christian Abraham Fleetwood, a Civil War Medal of Honor recipient and a prominent member of Washington, D.C.'s black community. Fleetwood's unsuccessful efforts to gain regimental command in the Volunteer Army in 1898 underscored the severe limitations that existed for black men who wished to serve in America's overseas wars at the turn of the century.

Christian A. Fleetwood is largely forgotten today, but during the period between the Civil War and his death in 1914, he was a hero for black Americans. Born to free black parents in Baltimore on 21 July 1840, Fleetwood was taught to read and write by the wife of his father's employer. He attended the Ashmun Institute (today Lincoln University) near Oxford, Pennsylvania, and graduated in 1860, the same year that he helped to found a Baltimore newspaper, the *Lyceum Observer*. Enlisting in the Fourth U.S. Colored Infantry (USCI) in 1863, he earned the Medal of Honor for saving his regimental colors at the battle of Chaffin's Farm, about ten miles southeast of Richmond, in September 1864.[2]

Having risen to the top enlisted rank of sergeant major, Fleetwood was upset to find it virtually impossible to become an officer. In 1865 he wrote to his former employer to reiterate that he had decided to leave the service after his enlistment expired, because "no member of this regiment is considered deserving of a commission or if so cannot receive one." Fleetwood felt that "continuing to act in a subordinate capacity, with no hope of advancement or promotion" was a "telling acknowledgement" that black Americans were "satisfied to remain in a state of . . . subserviency."[3]

After Fleetwood mustered out of the Union Army as a sergeant major in 1866, he settled in the District of Columbia, where he maintained his interest in military affairs, and in 1880 he assumed command of an unofficial militia company called the Washington Cadets. He led this unit until 1884, when it expanded into a battalion, the Washington Cadet Corps, also under his command. When the District of Columbia created its National Guard in 1887, three of its seven battalions were composed of black troops, and the Washington Cadet Corps became the Sixth Battalion. President Grover Cleveland commissioned Fleetwood as its major. Unfortunately for Fleetwood, however, the commander of the District's National Guard, Brig. Gen. Albert Ordway, who had been an enlisted man and officer in a Massachusetts regiment during the Civil War, was not favorably disposed toward these black battalions, and in 1888 he disbanded one of them. He tried to do the same to the two remaining black units in 1891, but the resulting uproar caused him instead to combine them into the First Separate Battalion.[4]

After this consolidation, Fleetwood resigned his commission, and the other black battalion commander, Maj. Frederick C. Revells, took command of the First Separate Battalion. In a letter to the *Washington Bee*, Fleetwood explained that he left the National Guard without regret and gladly welcomed the relief from his "sworn obligation to 'respect' and obey a man [i.e., Ordway] proven so unworthy of respect." For the next seven years, he concentrated on his job as a clerk in the War Department's Record and Pension Office, earning a salary of $1,000 in 1897, and actively participated in community activities. He served as

Major Fleetwood Wearing the Medal of Honor
(Photo courtesy of the Library of Congress)

choirmaster for several churches and acted with an amateur theatrical company that performed Gilbert and Sullivan's popular operetta "H.M.S. Pinafore." He also served as a military science instructor for Washington's black high school cadets, who were formally organized into a company in 1892.[5]

As 1898 began, the United States was gradually edging closer to war with Spain. Cuban guerrillas continued to wage a rebellion against their Spanish overlords that had begun in 1895, and the American public's anguish over the inhumane manner in which Madrid was trying to quell this revolt was becoming increasingly aroused. After the mysterious sinking of the battleship *Maine* in Havana harbor in mid-February, America's martial spirits soared, and patriotic men began to volunteer their services for the anticipated conflict. On 20 April, as President William McKinley signed Congress's joint war resolution, Fleetwood wrote to Secretary of War Russell A. Alger and asked him for authority to "enlist and organize, from the state of Maryland and District of Columbia preferably, a three-battalion regiment, *officers included*, of Colored citizens, as U.S. Vol[unteer]s for the war with Spain." After summarizing his fourteen years of military experience in both the Union Army and the District of Columbia militia, Fleetwood stressed that he had "kept in touch with the subsequent changes in drill tactics. With a knowledge of what is required, born of my experience in camp, field, garrison and provost duties in war and peace, I still feel confident to pledge myself that I can fill with competent men every position in such a regiment, and make of it a model of efficiency if permitted so to do."[6]

The two words that Fleetwood stressed related to what would soon become a controversial issue—the commissioning of black officers. In an era when the enlisted men in state militia companies elected their officers, African Americans naturally expected their volunteer units to be led by black officers. Most white Americans, however, refused to believe that men only one generation away from slavery were worthy or capable of military leadership and offered any number of unsubstantiated arguments to support this conclusion. The *Richmond Dispatch* stated that having black officers in the Army "would be a constant source of embarrassment and weakness" and concluded that "it would be better to do without the aid of colored troops altogether than to send them to the front officered by men of their own race." The *Augusta Chronicle* opined that having black officers creates "especial opportunity for friction between the races, and lends encouragement to such negroes as have not sufficient intelligence to know that no office or rank can bridge the social barrier between the races in the south." Even the *New York Times* objected, observing that "It is pretty well known that the colored race has, as a rule,

much more confidence in white men than in black."[7]

More than 100 black officers had served in the Union Army during the Civil War, but during the 1880s and 1890s the officers in the Regular Army's four segregated black regiments—the Ninth and Tenth Cavalry and Twenty-fourth and Twenty-fifth Infantry—were, with few exceptions, white. When Fleetwood wrote Secretary Alger, there were only five black officers in the U.S. Army—one chaplain in each of the four black regiments and 1st Lt. Charles Young, an officer of the Ninth Cavalry who was assigned as the professor of military science and tactics at Wilberforce University just outside Xenia, Ohio. In contrast, more than 200 black officers, most elected by their men, held leadership positions in the one black regiment, ten battalions, and eleven separate companies that had been formed in the organized militias of fifteen states and the District of Columbia. However, most governors were hesitant to allow these officers to lead their units in any martial activities except drill competitions and public ceremonies. Only rarely were black units activated for domestic peacekeeping in response to strikes or riots.[8]

The War Department planned to include all of the Regular Army's black regiments in its expedition to Cuba, but when Secretary Alger on 25 April informed each governor what his state's share of the initially authorized 125,000-man Volunteer Army would be, only four states—Alabama, Massachusetts, North Carolina, and Ohio—called up black militia units to help fill their quotas. The District of Columbia refused to integrate its four-company black battalion into the regiment that it contributed to the Volunteer Army, and Maryland's black company was used only to guard property at the state mobilization camp, so Fleetwood had five local militia companies available as a nucleus for his projected regiment. He believed he could easily raise seven more companies from the large black populations in the Baltimore and Washington areas. Bvt. Maj. Gen. William Birney, who had commanded black troops during the Civil War, attested to Fleetwood's ability to recruit men from the black community when he argued in a letter to Alger recommending Fleetwood for appointment to "a field position": "His influence with the colored people is marked and he could, doubtless, lead many of them to enlist."[9]

Secretary Alger, who had commanded a Michigan volunteer regiment in the Civil War and had later served as governor of that state, displayed no interest in the proposed black regiment from the District and Maryland. On 11 May, however, Fleetwood was presented with a new opportunity for command when Congress passed a bill adding new federal units to the Volunteer Army. This legislation authorized Alger to raise a force of 10,000 enlisted men "possessing immunity from diseases incident to tropical climates," evidently indicating that the men were to be raised primarily from the South. The resulting ten regiments—the First through the Tenth U.S. Volunteer Infantry (USVI)—became known as the "Immunes," although their members soon demonstrated that they were every bit as susceptible to tropical diseases as any other soldiers. All of their officers—forty-six per regiment—were to be appointed by the president, and McKinley was soon deluged with requests from men seeking commissions.[10]

Fleetwood immediately wrote to John R. Lynch, a prominent black Republican who had served three terms in Congress from Natchez, Mississippi, and had been temporary chairman of the 1884 Republican National Convention. In 1898 Lynch was practicing law in Washington, D.C., and he retained excellent political connections. Fleetwood listed the country's black militia units, and he suggested that the bill was "sufficiently elastic" to allow those "left out" by their state officials to be brought to Washington, organized into two regiments, and brigaded with the Twenty-fourth and Twenty-fifth U.S. Infantry. Undoubtedly hoping to command one of these proposed regiments, Fleetwood said that he felt "qualified to attend to this matter, and to suggest officers competent to fill the vacancies creditably." This would give the country "the advantage of all this trained material now left to waste, and feeling sorely disgusted."[11]

A few days later a delegation of four influential black men, including Register of the U.S. Treasury Judson W. Lyons and one-time Louisiana Governor Pinckney B. S. Pinchback, called on Secretary Alger to request that some of the immune regiments be reserved for African American troops, who were generally presumed to be immune to tropical diseases and thus better suited for service in hot climates. After Alger informed them that the War Department intended to do this for five or possibly six of the units, they presented him with the names of several black

candidates worthy of regimental command: Henry Demas, Charles R. Douglass, Milton M. Holland, Thomas S. Kelly, and Fleetwood.[12]

These five men could claim varying degrees of military experience. Demas, a Louisiana Republican, had served as a corporal in the Eightieth USCI during the Civil War. He had already assured President McKinley that he had enrolled 1,500 black men in New Orleans, ready to be mustered into federal service. Washington lawyer Charles R. Douglass, a son of Frederick Douglass, was also a Civil War veteran and had served for three years as an officer in the District's National Guard. Holland, a notary public in the nation's capital, had like Fleetwood received a Medal of Honor for his service at Chaffin's Farm. A sergeant major in the Fifth USCI during the Civil War, Holland had taken command of his company after all its officers had been killed and led it gallantly through the remainder of the battle. Kelly, a Treasury Department clerk, had served with Fleetwood as a company first sergeant in the Fourth USCI, spent three years in the Regular Army, and later served as an officer in the militias of Louisiana and the District of Columbia.[13]

From a military standpoint, Fleetwood was the most qualified of the five candidates, and he convinced influential men to point this out in letters of endorsement. Daniel Murray, the Assistant Librarian of Congress, wrote Secretary Alger on 26 May—the day after McKinley issued a second call for 75,000 more volunteers—and urged that Fleetwood's application for authority to organize a regiment be granted at once. According to Murray, "It is a simple fact to state, that there is not in the United States a Colored man who has had the experience of Major Fleetwood in the methods of conducting regimental matters and the management and control of men."[14]

Six days later Murray again wrote to Alger, this time stressing the political advantages of commissioning Fleetwood. By this time, the government had announced that only four of the immune regiments—the Seventh through the Tenth USVI—would be reserved for black volunteers and that current or former Regular Army officers would command all of them. Murray still urged that Fleetwood be given command of one of these regiments, pointing out that "the *neglect* or *refusal* of the [War] Dept. to invite competent Colored men to raise regiments is proving very injurious to the [Republican] party[,] if the voice of the leaders with whom I often talk reflects the sentiments of the masses." Murray further opined that it was up to Alger "to over rule any one in your Dept. who persistently discriminates against the faithful allies of the party." He added that there should have been at least five black regiments, "the officers and men to stand the same rigid examination as was accorded to the white men appointed from *civil* life to similar positions."[15]

The next day Murray wrote Alger yet again, saying that Senator Stephen Elkins had told him that his state, West Virginia, had two black companies "anxious to be mustered in." If these units were combined with five companies from Maryland, four of which had evidently been newly organized, more than half of the required twelve companies for a black regiment would already be available. These other companies would not take long to raise, because Major Fleetwood was "known from one end of the Country to the other, thus it would be but a short time before the news spread and its good effect [was] felt."[16]

The government, however, decided that only black lieutenants—two per company—would be commissioned in the black U.S. volunteer regiments. In spite of Fleetwood's age, experience, and former militia rank, he was offered one of these lieutenancies. The offer was conveyed by former Congressman Lynch. On 7 June Fleetwood responded to him that "The matter of going into an immune regiment as a lieutenant . . . cannot be entertained for a moment. Being an applicant for the highest position in a regiment, and accepting the lowest is very much like the case of the man who applied for appointment as a foreign Minister and compromised on a pair of cast off trousers."[17]

Fleetwood's bitterness was obvious as he noted that "the same offer now made me through you" had also been made to "parties with absolutely no military knowledge, and to boys from the schools." He said that it was not even suggested that the captains "be men of any special ability or training. . . . It is simply that they are to be 'white.'" He closed by reiterating that his proposition to organize a regiment of his own was "still feasible, and at comparatively small expense to the Government, if it is desired to entertain it."[18]

Realizing that an immune colonelcy was no longer within his reach, Fleetwood wrote President McKinley on 14 June, because he had heard (again through Lynch) that McKinley had asked whether he would

be interested in a lieutenant colonelcy—the rank of the second-in-command in a regiment and one rank higher than Fleetwood had achieved in the militia. Fleetwood said that he would accept that position in an immune regiment, but pointed out that his endorsements were for colonel, "and the Colored Newspapers of New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore and Washington have already, and without solicitation[,] endorsed me for a still higher place."[19]

McKinley was probably thinking about commissioning Fleetwood as a volunteer general staff officer, perhaps as an inspector general, because a black lieutenant colonel serving on an otherwise white regimental "field and staff" (i.e., headquarters) would not have been socially acceptable. The "color line" in the Army was underscored in July, when Col. Jesse Lee of the Tenth USVI, upon learning that his regimental mess would be integrated by black lieutenants, decided to resign his commission in the Volunteer Army and return to the Ninth Infantry and his Regular Army rank of major. The *New York Times* supported his decision: "His course is simply the course taken by practically the entire white population of the country, consciously or unconsciously, as often as the occasion for it arises. The complete failure of all the laws by which it was attempted to break down the color line proves the existence of a higher law which men obey."[20]

Perhaps McKinley was angered by Fleetwood's lukewarm response to any position less than a colonelcy, because a commission for him never materialized. Hopes for a federally appointed black colonel would not die, however. On 2 July the *Washington Bee* quoted Lyons as saying that McKinley would still appoint one, and it endorsed the two Medal of Honor recipients, Fleetwood and Holland, as well as Douglass, "a man of national reputation equal to any white man appointed by the President." Nine days later several prominent black men, including journalists Christopher J. Perry of the *Philadelphia Tribune*, Edward E. Cooper of Washington's *Colored American*, and John H. Murphy of the *Baltimore Afro-American*, wrote McKinley. After saying how proud they were of America's victories in Cuba and that they were glad that "regiments composed of men of our race have taken part in the hottest of the conflict about Santiago and now share in the glory and honor that belong to our Army," they got to their main point—that they would like to see Fleetwood selected as colonel of one of the regiments "which we understand you will soon call for." They closed their letter by saying: "We believe in your fairness, Mr. President, and we feel that you will do our race complete and full justice in its efforts to assume the full duties and responsibilities of American citizenship."[21]

Unfortunately, these men were misinformed. In response to McKinley's second call for volunteers, issued on 25 May, four more states—Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, and Virginia—organized black units in July, but there was no third call for more troops to be raised in 1898, and Fleetwood's opportunity to serve in Cuba or Puerto Rico was gone. Two black colonels were commissioned in the Volunteer Army—Charles R. Marshall of the Eighth Illinois and James H. Young of the Third North Carolina—but by governors and not by the president. The highest and only field ranks McKinley dispensed to black men were the Volunteer Army paymaster majorities he gave to former Congressman Lynch and Richard R. Wright, the president of Savannah State College for Negroes (today Savannah State College) in Georgia. Perhaps calculating the difficulty he might encounter in any effort to win Senate confirmation of black field-grade line officers, McKinley evidently believed that his political goals would be served best by commissioning a few prominent black public figures to General Staff positions. He selected his preferred candidates without evident concern for their level of prior military experience.[22]

As the transfer of sovereignty over the Philippines from Spain to the United States redirected the antagonism of the armed Philippine independence movement toward the newly arrived American forces, Congress in March 1899 authorized another group of volunteer regiments to bolster the Regular Army units serving there. The last two of the twenty-five new volunteer regiments that were activated for duty in the Philippines—the Forty-eighth and Forty-ninth USVI—were reserved for black enlisted men and company officers, because, as the *Colored American* opined, "the value of the Negro soldier in such a climate is patent to the War Department and every observant citizen."[23]

Although the War Department again reserved the field and staff appointments in these black regiments

for white officers, the black press made another attempt to generate popular support for a regimental command for Fleetwood. This time, the *Colored American* proposed that he organize a third new black regiment, the Fiftieth USVI, which would be composed of militiamen from the District of Columbia, Maryland, Ohio, and Pennsylvania. The paper also suggested Lieutenant Young, who had been loaned to the state of Ohio to command its Ninth Battalion (as a major) during the war, as the Fiftieth's lieutenant colonel. Young had already been offered the senior captaincy in the Forty-eighth USVI but had declined it. Although only a subaltern in the Regular Army, he politely informed the man selected to command that regiment that he had several reasons for doing this, including the fact that he had already successfully commanded a battalion and that his race would expect him to receive "more recognition than that of captain in such an organization." In words that could easily have been written by Fleetwood, Young stressed that "the consideration of seven millions of a race of people is not to be ignored by me." The War Department, however, never seriously considered the organization of the Fiftieth.[24]

It is tempting to view Christian Fleetwood's quest for regimental command as presumptuous, but many far less qualified men were able to use political clout to cajole their way to colonelcies in the Volunteer Army—sometimes with disastrous results. Having graduated from West Point in 1896 but resigned from the Army before he had spent four months on active duty, 25-year-old Duncan Hood secured the colonelcy of the Second USVI largely through the fame of his late father, Confederate General John B. Hood. After Hood's regiment arrived in Cuba, Maj. Gen. William Shafter reported that it and another white immune regiment "are undisciplined, insubordinate, and vicious; . . . terrorize the community by violent acts, and can

Puerto Rico National Guard Opens New and Renovated Museums

Last summer the Puerto Rico National Guard opened the doors of two museums dedicated to telling the story of the commonwealth's military heritage. The larger Puerto Rico National Guard Museum in San Juan, the island's capital, reopened on 18 August 2000 after being closed for major renovations to the historic building in which it is housed. During this closure the museum also enhanced its exhibits. Opening for the first time in June 2000 was a satellite museum at Camp Santiago near Salinas on the island's southern coast. Camp Santiago is the Puerto Rico National Guard's primary training camp, and active forces, including the 82d Airborne Division, train there as well. The exhibits at the Camp Santiago museum focus on military training. The Center of Military History provided assistance with exhibit development at both museums.

Both the San Juan and Camp Santiago museums house collections of weapons, uniforms, military accoutrements, and photographs that document Puerto Rico's long military history under both Spanish and American sovereignty. Examples of Spanish body armor attest to the antiquity of European military activity on the island, while some of the swords and other edged weapons have finely engraved cross guards and decorated fittings that indicate the branches of the Spanish Army in which their owners served. The nineteenth-century firearms on display include single-shot Remington Rolling-Block and multiple-cartridge Mauser rifles used by Spanish regular and militia forces on the island and an M1896 Krag-Jørgensen rifle used by U.S. troops in Puerto Rico in 1898. The museum also features a full panoply of American small arms used by Puerto Rican guardsmen and regulars in the twentieth century. Also displayed are Russian burp guns captured in the Korean War and surrender leaflets and Iraqi weapons that Puerto Rican troops brought back from the Gulf War.

The San Juan museum is housed in a two-story Spanish colonial–style structure originally constructed for the U.S. Weather Bureau in 1930. Located on General Esteves Street just north of Ponce de León Avenue, a few blocks east of the commonwealth's capitol, the museum is open Tuesday through Saturday, 0830–1530. The Camp Santiago museum is open Tuesday, Thursday, Saturday, and Sunday, 0800–1600. Both of the museums have entirely bilingual captions. Admission is free.

not be relied upon for any duty." There is little doubt that Fleetwood could have done better with black troops. His proven bravery, leadership experience as a militia battalion commander, and status as a hero to African Americans would have attracted hundreds of eager recruits to his command and quickly instilled in them an esprit de corps that Volunteer Army regiments like the Second USVI lacked.[25]

It is arguable, however, whether Fleetwood was better qualified than the four Regular Army officers who were originally selected to command the black immune regiments—Charles J. Crane, Edward A. Godwin, Eli L. Huggins, and Lee. Three of these four commanders were, like Fleetwood, Civil War veterans; two were West Point graduates; and two had experience leading black troops. Huggins had received a Medal of Honor for bold action against well-positioned Sioux Indians in Montana in 1880. Lee was the only one to have reached the Regular Army rank of major, but the other three were all talented captains with more than twenty years of commissioned service in the West—Crane's experience entirely with buffalo soldiers. Fleetwood had only fourteen years of combined military service and had spent less than four of those as a National Guard officer.[26]

Given the disciplinary problems that plagued many of the immune regiments, both white and black, Fleetwood's failure to win an immune command was probably a blessing in disguise. The Ninth USVI was involved in a shooting incident while on occupation duty in Cuba in late 1898, and the other black regiments were charged with disorderly conduct as they traveled home from camps in the South, after being mustered out of federal service in 1899. These unfortunate events led the *New York Times* to complain that the units were not immune from anything "but the obligations of law and discipline and decency." Whether Fleetwood would have been able to prevent such problems in the Jim Crow South is a matter of conjecture, but, if they had occurred under his command, there is no doubt that they would have been blamed on the inferiority of black officers and would have cast a pall over the climax of his notable career.[27]

Was Fleetwood wrong to turn down a lieutenancy? Three other men who had served as field officers in black militia battalions were willing to serve as lieutenants in the immune regiments. Atlantans Thomas Grant and Floyd Crumbly, both of whom had commanded a battalion in the Georgia militia as lieutenant colonels, served as first lieutenants in the Tenth USVI and were in 1899 selected to be company commanders in the two black regiments that served in the Philippines. Charles W. Fillmore, who had commanded Ohio's Ninth Battalion as a militia major, obtained with the assistance of Senator Marcus Hanna a federal commission as a first lieutenant in the Ninth USVI. These men were all substantially younger than Fleetwood, had not commanded as long as he had, and lacked Medals of Honor, so it was much easier for them to swallow their pride and accept significant demotions to "wear shoulder straps" in the Volunteer Army. Christian Fleetwood's refusal to become a subaltern was both understandable and predictable. In 1865 he had declined to remain in the Army "in a subordinate capacity, with no hope of advancement or promotion," and thirty-three years later his spirit remained unbowed. As he told John Lynch, in justice to his endorsers and himself, it would be impossible for him "to drop to the bottom of the ladder."[28]

Roger D. Cunningham is a retired Army lieutenant colonel. He served as a military police officer in the United States and Korea and as a foreign area officer in Pakistan, Egypt, and Nepal. He was the U.S. Defense Attaché in Kathmandu in 1991–1992. His article, "Breaking the Color Line: The Virginia Militia at the National Drill, 1887" appeared in the Autumn 2000 issue of Virginia Cavalcade.

NOTES

1. For an excellent discussion of the African-American perspective on American expansion into the Caribbean and the Pacific in the late 1890s, see Willard B. Gatewood, Jr., *Black Americans and the White Man's Burden, 1898–1903* (Urbana, Ill., 1975), chaps. 1, 2.
2. James F. Harrison, Jr., "A Short Biography of Christian Abraham Fleetwood," Fleetwood Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress (hereafter cited as Fleetwood Papers, LC), pp. 1–6; Martin K. Gordon, "The Black Militia in the District of Columbia, 1867–1898," *Records of the Columbia Historical Society of Washington, 1971–1972*, pp. 412–13.
3. Ltr, Christian Fleetwood to Dr. James Hall, 8 Jun 1865, Carter G. Woodson Collection, Manuscript Division, LC.

4. Gordon, "The Black Militia," pp. 414–17. The First Separate Battalion took two companies from each of the previous four-company battalions. The Headquarters and Headquarters Battalion, 372d Military Police Battalion, today perpetuates each of the seven original District of Columbia National Guard battalions.

5. Ltr, Fleetwood to editor, "Thanks His Friends," *Washington Bee*, 25 Apr 1891, containing the quotation; Harrison, "A Biography of Christian Fleetwood," p. 9; *Official Register of the United States, July 1, 1897* (Washington, D.C., 1897), 1: 536; "The History of the Cadet Corps," Fleetwood Papers, LC. The average nonfarm employee had real annual earnings of $529 in 1897. See Ben J. Wattenberg, ed., *The Statistical History of the United States from Colonial Times to the Present* (New York, 1976), p. 165. The War Department's Record and Pension Office was headed by then Col. Fred C. Ainsworth.

6. Ltr, Fleetwood to Russell Alger, 20 Apr 1898, doc. file #170323, Record Group (hereafter RG) 94, Papers of the Office of the Adjutant General, National Archives (hereafter NA), Washington, D.C. The Army had revised its infantry tactics in 1891. See *Infantry Drill Regulations, United States Army, Adopted October 3, 1891* (Washington, D.C., 1891).

7. *Richmond Dispatch*, as quoted in Editorial, *Richmond Planet*, 11 Jun 1898; Editorial, *Augusta Chronicle*, 26 Jul 1898; Editorial, *New York Times*, 13 Jul 1898.

8. Joseph T. Glatthaar, *Forged in Battle: The Civil War Alliance of Black Soldiers and White Officers* (New York, 1990), pp. 279–80; Alan K. Lamm, "Buffalo Soldier Chaplains of the Old West," *The Journal of America's Military Past*, 36 (Spring/Summer 1999): 25–40; *The Organized Militia of the United States, 1897* (Washington, D.C., 1898), pp. 8, 44, 74, 92, 107, 145, 151, 233, 244, 257, 276, 285, 293, 297, 320, 363; *Report of the Adjutant and Inspector-General of the State of South Carolina for the Fiscal Year 1897* (Columbia, S.C., 1898), pp. 41–42; Charles Johnson, Jr., *African American Soldiers in the National Guard* (Westport, Conn., 1992), p. 57. There were at least 108 black officers in the Civil War, almost three-quarters of whom served in the Seventy-third, Seventy-fourth, and Seventy-fifth USCI from Louisiana. Two other black Regular Army officers had been commissioned before 1898, both in the cavalry—Henry O. Flipper in 1877 and John H. Alexander in 1887—but Flipper was dismissed in 1882, and Alexander died in 1894.

9. Johnson, *African American Soldiers*, pp. 61–62; Ltr, Birney to Alger, 14 Jun 1898, doc. file #179190, RG 94, NA, containing the quoted words.

10. Marvin A. Kreidberg and Merton G. Henry, *A History of Military Mobilization in the United States Army, 1775–1945* (Washington, D.C., 1955), pp. 155, 162; General Orders 44, 13 May 1898, and 55, 26 May 1898, in *General Orders and Circulars, Adjutant General's Office, 1898* (Washington, D.C., 1899). The quoted words, taken from the 11 May 1898 enactment, are printed in General Orders 44.

11. Fleetwood to John Lynch, 11 May 1898, doc. file #170323, RG 94, NA; *Biographical Register of the United States Congress, 1774–1989* (Washington, D.C., 1989), pp. 198, 203, 217, 1402.

12. *Washington Bee*, 21 May 1898. The other members of the delegation were Thomas Kelly and James Lewis, a prominent Louisiana Republican.

13. Ltrs, Henry Demas to William McKinley, 11 May 1898, doc. file #76359, and Kelly to Alger, 2 May 1898, doc. file #181762, RG 94, NA; U.S. Senate, Committee on Veterans' Affairs, *Medal of Honor Recipients, 1863–1978* (Washington, D.C., 1979), p. 119. Kelly was endorsed by Confederate Lt. Gen. James Longstreet, who had commanded the Louisiana militia in the early 1870s, probably while Kelly was serving in it. Kelly later commanded Washington's Capital City Guards until it became the Seventh Battalion of the District of Columbia National Guard in 1887.

14. Ltr, Daniel Murray to Alger, 26 May 1898, doc. file #179190, RG 94, NA.

15. Ltr, Murray to Alger, 1 Jun 1898, doc. file #179190, RG 94, NA; Kreidberg and Henry, *History of Military Mobilization*, p. 162. Two civilians (both West Point graduates) and eight Regular Army officers commanded the ten immune regiments.

16. Ltr, Murray to Alger, 2 Jun 1898, doc. file #179190, RG 94, NA. The two West Virginia companies ended up serving in the Eighth USVI.

17. Ltr, Fleetwood to Lynch, 7 Jun 1898, Fleetwood Papers, LC. The black regimental chaplains held a rank equivalent to captain.

18. Ibid.

19. Ltr, Fleetwood to McKinley, 14 Jun 1898, doc. file

#179190, RG 94, NA. The *Baltimore Afro-American* wanted Fleetwood put in command of a black brigade.
20. Editorial, *New York Times*, 13 Jul 1898. Lee's resignation did not hurt his military career. He was promoted to brigadier general in 1902 and named commander of the Department of Texas in 1904.
21. Ltr, Christopher Perry, et al., to McKinley, 11 Jul 1898, doc. file #170323, RG 94, NA.
22. There were three other black state regiments, but two of them—the Third Alabama and the Sixth Virginia—were commanded by white Regular Army officers, while the two-battalion Twenty-third Kansas was commanded by a lieutenant colonel. In 1901 McKinley commissioned Lynch as a Regular Army paymaster captain, and he retired as a major in 1911.
23. *Official Register of Officers of Volunteers in the Service of the United States Organized under the Act of March 2, 1899* (Washington, D.C., 1900); "Who Major Fleetwood Is," *Colored American* (Washington, D.C.), 6 May 1899.
24. "Colored Officers for Colored Soldiers," *Colored American*, 23 Sep 1899; Ltr, Young to Col William P. Duvall, 24 Aug 1899, in National Archives Microcopy M1395, Letters Received by the Appointment Commission and Personal Branch, Adjutant General's Office, containing the quoted words.
25. Ltr, Maj Gen William Shafter to Brig Gen Henry Corbin, 16 Aug 1898, printed in *Correspondence Relating to the War with Spain*, 2 vols. (1902, reprint ed., Washington, D.C., 1993), 1: 230.
26. Francis B. Heitman, *Historical Register and Dictionary of the United States Army*, 2 vols. (Washington, D.C., 1903), 1: 335, 461, 552, 624; U.S. Senate, Committee on Veterans' Affairs, *Medal of Honor Recipients*, p. 292. Lee was replaced by Capt. Thaddeus W. Jones, a West Point graduate who had already fought with the Tenth Cavalry on the heights above Santiago, Cuba.
27. Marvin Fletcher, "The Black Volunteers in the Spanish-American War," *Military Affairs* 38 (April 1974): 51–52; Editorial, *New York Times*, 11 Mar 1899, containing the quoted words.
28. Johnson, *African American Soldiers*, pp. 40, 62, 63; Adjutant General's Office, *Official Register of Officers of Volunteers in the Service of the United States Organized under the Act of March 2, 1899* (Washington, D.C., 1900), pp. 123, 127; Frank N. Schubert, *On the Trail of the Buffalo Soldier: Biographies of African Americans in the U.S. Army, 1866–1917* (Wilmington, Del., 1995), pp. 108, 170; Ltr, Fleetwood to Lynch, 7 Jun 1898, containing the final quotation.

U.S. Army Military History Institute Grant Program

The U.S. Army Military History Institute (MHI) sponsors a grant program to encourage the study of military history by supporting research in its extensive collections at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Two types of grants are currently awarded: the Advanced Research Grant for general researchers and the General and Mrs. Matthew B. Ridgway Military History Research Grant for U.S. Army cadets. The grants defray expenses incurred while conducting research at MHI, including travel, lodging, meals, and copying.

The Advanced Research Grant Program has since 1976 awarded ninety-nine grants. Since 1992 MHI has annually awarded two or three advanced research grants, ranging from $500 to $1,500 each. Applications are due each year by 1 January. Inquiries about this program should be sent to the U.S. Army Military History Institute, ATTN: Research Grant Program, 22 Ashburn Drive, Carlisle, Pennsylvania 17013-5008.

The General and Mrs. Matthew B. Ridgway Military History Research Grant was established in 1998. This program annually supports research at MHI by one U.S. Army Cadet Command cadet and one U.S. Military Academy cadet. Cadet Command cadets should contact their professor of military science, and Military Academy cadets should contact their Department of History for further information. Winners receive reimbursement for their expenses for travel to and from Carlisle, lodging, and meals, usually for up to three weeks of research.

Retired Lt. Col. Tom Hendrix, the Institute's assistant director for historical services, can provide further information. He may be reached by email at *hendrixt@awc.carlisle.army.mil* or by telephone at (717) 245-4134.

Book Review
by Richard W. Stewart

The Wars of Louis XIV: 1667–1714
by John A. Lynn
Addison Wesley Longman, 1999, 421 pp.
cloth $85.95, paper $35.80

John Lynn, as evidenced by his two most recent books on seventeenth century France, is unquestionably one of the great scholars of the era of Louis XIV, the Sun King, and especially of that vital component of Louis's power and glory, his army. Louis fought throughout his realm, first to defend his throne during the great civil strife known as the *Fronde,* then to prove his youthful military prowess by a quick grab of nearby territory. He followed these early attempts at *gloire* with rational (to him, but understandably misunderstood by his European rivals) attempts to seize a few strategic fortresses and territories to "round out" France and establish defensible frontiers. He ended his reign by dragging his nation to the edge of ruin to gain the throne of Spain for the House of Bourbon, as it fought off the nearly unified great powers of Europe for fourteen years. To attempt to understand seventeenth century France, or Louis XIV, or the House of Bourbon without studying war is impossible. The fact that so many historians have tried to do so in the past is little short of incomprehensible. Professor Lynn does much to redress this balance in this clear and thought-provoking study of the wars of Louis XIV.

The role of warfare is, of course, integral to any study of the early modern state and its slow and hesitant steps toward centralized control. Certainly, the role of soldier was one Louis cherished. It was, in fact, little short of central to his self-image. In his mind, he was the chief marshal of France, the constable of France reborn (in all but name), and the "ideal" of a commander in chief. His marshals, of greater (Vauban, Turenne, the Duke of Luxembourg, Villars) and lesser (Villeroi, Tallard) talent were all directed by him—the one central source of authority for the French state. If much of Louis's energy and focus was on making France an absolute monarchy, Professor Lynn establishes clearly that the other central role the Sun King sought was that of supreme general. It is critical to the understanding of Louis XIV and his time to realize that, as Lynn states, "one could not have existed without the other." (p. 5)

The Wars of Louis XIV is a successful attempt to relate in one volume the story of the wars that dominated this reign. It includes year-by-year summaries of the main operations on all the land fronts and discussions of the various French attempts to dispute control of the seas with, or at least grab some of the commerce from, the Dutch and English, those seafaring powerhouses of the time. In addition, and in my mind more importantly, Professor Lynn summarizes what the campaigns *meant* to the overall strategies of the warring states, how the resources to sustain the fight were obtained by Louis's overworked ministers, and how these wars and campaigns slowly changed the very nature of warfare. It is thus an excellent source book for the military operations of the times even if, as is inevitable in trying to tell a complicated set of stories in detail, the endless marching and countermarching, contribution collecting, and fortress besieging begins to blend together somewhat. This was, of course, what war was like in the seventeenth and much of the eighteenth centuries. It was, as Professor Lynn makes clear, "war as process" rather than "war as event." The goal of rival commanders was generally to avoid costly major battles and instead to focus on a series of sieges, skirmishes, maneuvers, and especially foraging and "contribution" operations to force the enemy to bear as much as possible of the cost of war. Maneuvers to get one's forces into position to live off the enemy's countryside were often a central goal, if not the only goal, of a campaign. In a war of attrition for generally limited objectives, finding the resources to "stay the distance" was sometimes enough for victory.

John Lynn's work continues to reinforce the central tenet that the "sinews of war" were money and all the resources—troops, ships, fodder, gunpowder, allies, etc.—that money could buy. It was money that set the agenda, sustained the forces, and often dictated when and under what conditions to sue for peace. It was the shortage of money rather than self-restraint that

ensured that the states in Europe fought for generally limited goals.

Relative to the limited goals he set for himself during his reign, Louis was technically successful, but he achieved that success at a tremendous cost in money and men. France was larger at his death than at his birth. It had taken a few key fortresses and expanded to generally more defensible borders. France had placed and maintained a Bourbon on the throne of Spain, which was no small accomplishment as it had to fight to a stalemate all the other major powers of Europe to achieve this goal. Louis had assembled a tremendous war machine, but, due to the high cost of war for the still underdeveloped state, he almost brought France to ruin in the process. *The Wars of Louis XIV* is a useful and comprehensive book on the campaigns of the time, well worth reading for any student of early modern warfare, with clear analysis and careful scholarship as its hallmarks.

This book is the second of Lynn's planned trilogy on the French Army and France in the seventeenth century. The first volume, *Giant of the Grand Siècle: The French Army, 1610–1715*, which I reviewed in the Spring–Summer 1999 issue of *Army History* (No. 47), focused in great detail on the tremendous logistical, financial, and administrative burden of creating, maintaining, and organizing the greatest army of the age. Now, this second volume focuses on how that army was used in what is always the acid test of a military establishment—the cauldron of battle. The third volume is to be a study of the consequences to France of creating and using this massive standing army. It is an ambitious series but, if the first two books are any indication, the result will be the most comprehensive case study to date of the military and its major role in state formation in the early modern world. This is only appropriate given the dominant role that the army of France played in Europe throughout the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries.

Dr. Richard W. Stewart is chief of the Histories Division at CMH. He received his Ph.D. in Tudor-Stuart English history at Yale University in 1986. His book, The English Ordnance Office, 1585–1625: A Case Study in Bureaucracy, *which was published in 1996 by Boydell and Brewer for the Royal Historical Society, won the Sir Gerald Templar medal for the best book on the British Army in that year. He has also published several articles on the English army in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries.*

Book Review
by Keir B. Sterling

Doniphan's Epic March
The 1st Missouri Volunteers in the Mexican War
by Joseph G. Dawson
University Press of Kansas, 1999, 330 pp., $35

Joseph Dawson's study of Alexander W. Doniphan's career joins Roger Launius's *Alexander William Doniphan: Portrait of a Missouri Moderate* (Columbia, Mo., 1997) as the second recent biography of this noteworthy Mexican War volunteer military leader. The Ohio-born Doniphan (1808–1887) moved to Missouri in the 1830s, where he became an attorney and quondam state legislator with the Whig Party. A long-time militia officer and proslavery expansionist, the 6' 4" Doniphan was elected colonel of the First Regiment of Missouri Mounted Rifles when men from his state signed up for the Mexican War in June 1846. His regiment consisted of ten companies from a string of counties along the Missouri River in the central part of the state.

Doniphan and his command made an epic, year-long march of some 3,600 miles, passing through much difficult terrain. They departed from Fort Leavenworth, moved west across the Great Plains, thence south through mountains and desert in parts of New Mexico, Texas, and Chihuahua to Parras, in southern Coahuila. Their mission accomplished, they were then ordered to Brazos Santiago, at the mouth of the Rio Grande, where they took ship for home. In the course of their 850-mile trek to New Mexico, Doniphan and his command were gradually melded into a effective fighting force under the guidance of then-Col. Stephen W. Kearny, who commanded the Army of the West. Kearny's command, including Doniphan's regiment, initially numbered 3,000 men and 20,000 animals, but Kearny soon departed New Mexico for duty in California

and Doniphan was on his own.

The Missouri colonel and his men compelled several Indian tribes in the Southwest to accept American jurisdiction. This entailed chasing recalcitrant Indians many hundreds of miles through bitterly cold winter weather into Arizona to prevent their depredations against Mexican ranchers. At Kearny's direction, Doniphan served for some weeks as de facto military governor of New Mexico, drafting a constitution, assembling a code of laws, and making necessary civil appointments, while at the same time planning his march toward the Northern Mexican heartland. Doniphan and his men fought major battles against elements of the Mexican Army at Brazito, twenty-five miles north of El Paso del Norte, on Christmas Day 1846 and at Sacramento, just north of

The U.S. Army Military History Institute Reorganizes and Alters Its Hours of Operation

By E. Michael Perry

The U.S. Army Military History Institute (MHI) at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, houses the Army's foremost collection of materials relating to the history of the U.S. Army. From its establishment in 1967 until last summer, MHI had organized its components by the type of medium each collected. Over time, these evolved into numerous subdivisions that included a specialized library, manuscript archives, photo archives, classified archives, an oral history branch, a veteran survey office, a digitization office, and audiovisual archives. However, as the collection grew and diversified, the MHI staff became concerned that the media-based organization was fragmenting the process of developing comprehensive finding aids and complicating researchers' access to the Institute's unique holdings. A review of the Institute's operating procedures conducted at MHI's behest by the National Archives and Records Administration in April 1999 reinforced these concerns.

During the past year, the staff discussed ways to improve the organization. In June and July 2000, the Institute transitioned to an alignment based on function. The Institute's major subdivisions now are a Collection Management Division, a Patron Services Division, a Historical and Educational Services Division, and Classified Archives. The Collection Management Division maintains the vibrancy of the collection. The staff's primary function is to accession materials that meet both the current and future needs of researchers. Moreover, it must establish effective intellectual and physical control of materials coming into MHI. Patron Services assists patrons with checking out books and obtaining manuscripts or other materials they require to conduct research. All unclassified research in Upton Hall, using archival as well as printed material, now takes place in the first-floor reading room, formerly the library reference area, under the supervision of this new division. The Historical and Educational Services Division supports Patron Services with an advanced research consultant, available in the first floor reading room. This division also responds to off-site research inquiries, develops advanced finding aids to facilitate researchers' access to the collection, and assists the Collection Management Division with its accession and advanced cataloging efforts.

Points of Contact are:

General Inquiries: (717) 245-3972
Director: (717) 245-4134
Patron Services Division: (717) 245-3096
Historical Services: (717) 245-4427
Collection Management: (717) 245-4139
Classified Archives: (717) 245-3630

The DSN exchange for all of these phones is 242.

Email inquiries may be addressed to *usamhi@awc.carlisle.army.mil*. Official researchers should note their affiliation in the subject heading.

To facilitate this reorganization and to prepare for the move to a new facility scheduled to open in the summer of 2003, MHI has reduced its hours of operation. Effective 1 January 2001, MHI is now open to patrons from 1015–1615, Monday through Friday. The Institute is closed on all federal holidays, the Friday after Thanksgiving, and two afternoons a year during which the staff attends installation events.

Lt. Col. E. Michael Perry is director of the U.S. Army Military History Institute.

Chihuahua City, at the end of February 1847. The Americans wrested much territory from Mexican control in the process, although they would not retain it all. Doniphan's difficulties maintaining discipline among his volunteer troops in urban Mexican settings repeatedly impelled him to move on.

During much of the time he was in northern Mexico, Doniphan operated in something of a vacuum, having no way of knowing how the overall American war effort was progressing. Some contemporary commentators later likened Doniphan's year-long trek to the accomplishments of the ancient Greek historian and essayist Xenophon, who guided 10,000 Greek mercenaries on their retreat from Persia to the Black Sea in 401 B.C. following a major defeat and the murders of their commanders. Doniphan was an outstanding officer in a volunteer army of 104,000 men, where promotion to higher rank was more often than not awarded to officers sympathetic to President James K. Polk's Democratic Party.

Dawson capably assesses Doniphan's exploits and career before, during, and after the Mexican War, emphasizing that the colonel was in many ways an ideal citizen-soldier. As a militia officer during the Mormon War of 1838, for example, Doniphan refused an order by a superior to summarily execute Joseph Smith and other Mormon leaders, believing that this would constitute murder. This refusal earned him the respect of many Missourians. Although Doniphan strongly opposed the antislavery movement, he refused to help lead Missouri into secession. A delegate to the failed peace convention in Washington in 1860, he subsequently declined to take up arms for or against the Union. While personally popular both before and after the war, Doniphan consistently refused to campaign for higher political office, though at various times he might have won a place in either house of Congress or in the governor's mansion. Beset by personal tragedies, including the loss of both of his sons to accidents and the consequent long-term illness of his wife, Doniphan essentially remained a small-town lawyer and banker for the rest of his life, enjoying the esteem of his fellow Missourians. In late January 1887 Congress enacted legislation awarding pensions to Mexican War veterans, and Doniphan applied at the end of February. His claims for 160 acres of bounty land and a pension were approved in early May, just three months before his death.

Doniphan's Epic March is illustrated with contemporary woodcuts and several portraits of Doniphan and others. Several maps in the book outline the route taken by Doniphan and his men during their year-long expedition in 1846–1847 and provide snapshots of the battles of Brazito and Sacramento. It would have helped the reader to better understand the movements of Doniphan and his men in New Mexico, Arizona, and Chihuahua had additional maps been prepared to cover those actions. Dawson's careful study should be a valuable addition to the literature of the volunteer soldier in the Mexican War.

Dr. Keir B. Sterling is the Combined Arms Support Command historian at Fort Lee, Virginia. His article on the Army's contributions to post–Civil War American natural science appeared in the Summer 1997 issue of Army History *(No. 42).*

Book Review
by Samuel Watson

The Delafield Commission
and the American Military Profession
by Matthew Moten
Texas A&M University Press, 2000, 267 pp. $49.95.

This is an unusually stimulating work of scholarship that holds practical utility and has to be evaluated on a number of levels. Lt. Col. Matthew Moten (USMA, 1982), a legislative adviser to the Army Chief of Staff, is an armor officer who has taught history at West Point. His book provides a concise review of the literature on mid–nineteenth century American military professionalism and a thought-provoking critique of that professionalism. It is an argument for generalism, for the ability to think creatively, and for the liberal education of officers to enable them to perceive connections between disparate phenomena and thus arrive at higher-order conclusions. Moten's critique of the narrowly focused officer education and overspecialized staffs of the mid-1800s provides valuable historical perspective for ongoing discussions of the effect of the Officer Personnel Management System for Force XXI on officer expertise, mission priority, and operational capability.

Most works on the Army of the 1850s concentrate exclusively on frontier operations, but Moten chose the Delafield Commission, for which the Army sent three of its most capable officers to Europe to observe the Crimean War, as a case study in the character of Army expertise and professionalism. His chapters survey the evolution of the Military Academy and the officer corps, the commissioners' tour of Europe and the Crimea, and their final reports to the War Department. The commission included two of the Army's most veteran engineer and ordnance officers, technically minded staff specialists with no line command or combat experience. George McClellan, the only one of the commissioners under fifty, had been an engineer until his recent appointment as a captain in the new 1st Cavalry; he had the only combat experience of the three, as an engineer lieutenant in Mexico. Secretary of War Jefferson Davis, a West Pointer himself, provided the commission with extensive guidance, including questions regarding logistics, ordnance and fortifications, and the effects of rifled weapons. He did not, however, include questions about operational maneuver, strategy, or policy or about the use of railroads or the telegraph, nor did he establish priorities for investigation.

Arguing for the value of different (meaning branch) perspectives, each commissioner prepared a separate report for the War Department. Admirers of French military expertise who had been rebuffed and insulted by the French during their trip, the three substituted an equally uncritical adulation for the Russians. Focusing their attention on the branches to which they belonged, their reports tended to delineate the formal structures of organizations rather than explain how they worked. The commissioners concluded that little had fundamentally or qualitatively changed in the conduct of war. Rather, they argued, it was the greater scale of operations, including a larger supply of artillery made possible by steam-powered transportation and allied control of the seas, that made the siege of Sevastopol so deadly. Impressed by the allies' capability to project power, the commission went beyond Davis's instructions to make professionally responsible but rather generic calls for preparedness, which reaffirmed the status quo by repeating the engineers' traditional argument for the necessity of coastal fortifications. Thus, "while advancing the development of military expertise, the commissioners tended to focus on the particular rather than the general, to promote parochial branch interests rather than armywide or strategic concerns, and to resort to the use of European paradigms rather than developing new American lines of inquiry." (p. 177) Their recommendations for adopting cavalry drill regulations derived from those of the Russian Army and the twelve-pound "Napoleon" gun-howitzer were adopted, but they essentially dismissed the impact of rifles on the battlefield and argued against the introduction of large-caliber artillery on narrow technical grounds. While the Napoleon was effective during the Civil War, the cavalry regulations proved poorly adapted for American service.

Moten's pessimistic assessment of the antebellum Army, stressing the divisions between staff and line and the damaging effects of frontier service on the development of officer expertise, is more akin to Edward Coffman's in *The Old Army* than to William Skelton's in *An American Profession of Arms*. He traces these ills to West Point, presenting a critique of the Military Academy indebted to James L. Morrison's *"The Best School in the World."* In Moten's judgment, "the Thayer system . . . became a pedagogical dogma at West Point. The academy conditioned its graduates through an educational process that was often rigid, unimaginative, and inflexible. This system prized deductive over inductive reasoning: it rewarded correct solutions to problems rather than thinking that expanded understanding." The West Point experience "fostered thought that was more formulaic than creative." Thus, "most professional works in the Jacksonian era were compilations of data," and "antebellum military expertise . . . remained largely dependent upon French sources. It was wedded to a narrow view of military science as military engineering." (p. 71) Officers "absorbed the mental discipline, the exacting precision, the attention to detail, and the facility for deductive reasoning that the system was intended to inculcate." However, their education "stifled creativity, inductive reasoning, and higher-level thinking. Indeed, by 1855, military expertise in the U.S. Army, largely a product of West Point and West Pointers, was moribund." (p. 107)

I agree with the essence of Moten's argument and especially welcome his critical eye, but some caveats are in order. The "deductive" quality of antebellum American military thinking and its inattention to issues of strategic planning that Moten laments were, as I

see it, as much the product of widely shared confident assumptions about the character of American society and the security of its international relations as they were of the thought processes favored in military institutions. The predilection for European models of technical expertise derived in large part from the view that, while general strategic conclusions to questions of civil-military relations, military art, and national security policy could be deduced from the distinctive character of American circumstances, narrower questions of military science, which would guide the creation and employment of institutions, methods, and technologies for conducting war against European powers, required expertise that could only be drawn from European experience.

Moten goes on to blame the evolution of the staff system, which William Skelton sees as an essential part of the Army's growing professionalism, for the intellectual limitations Skelton tends to downplay. Moten's vehement criticism of the bureaus' "incompetence" in the war with Mexico has a long historiographical lineage, but few of these critics compare that performance with the U.S. Army's utter disorganization during the War of 1812. Winfield Scott's genius notwithstanding, his staff chiefs were all "superannuated officers serving for life due to the lack of a retirement system. Moreover, the bureau chiefs . . . had no professional schooling in the skills of army administration." (p. 47) Many of these bureau chiefs had served under Scott's command back in 1814, when the United States could not project a couple of thousand men to Montreal, much less to Monterrey or Mexico City. Indeed, the Army was probably the most highly developed institution in the nation in the years before the Civil War, and the bureau chiefs should be given credit for establishing the basic procedures that sustained the nation's largest full-time employer without logistical disaster as it garrisoned the expanding frontiers during peacetime. That achievement should not be taken for granted, given the Army's performance before 1815. To me, the Army's grand tactical and logistical problems suggest that it suffered as much from a lack of more formal specialized training—for line as well as staff and for field-grade as well as company-grade officers—as it did from the inflexibility and overspecialization engendered by West Point and the staff system.

Moten's most significant conclusion is that the commissioners, and by extension the officer corps as a whole, proved incapable "of thinking of the army as a broad public institution . . . [and] a flexible instrument of policy. Each saw his part, but not the whole." (p. 209) Yet, as I tell my cadets, the issue is balance: was the glass half full or half empty? Moten acknowledges that "American military professionalism had grown prodigiously in the Jacksonian era," (p. 205) with new standards of selection, a sense of corporate purpose and identity, and a sense of responsibility and accountability to civilian control. However, he argues that these specialist reports, made by intellectually

Noted Military Historian Dies

Dr. Theodore Ropp, a professor emeritus of history at Duke University, died on 2 December 2000 in Durham, North Carolina, at the age of eighty-nine. He had suffered a heart attack.

Dr. Ropp arrived at Duke in 1938, a year after earning his doctorate at Harvard University, and rose in academic rank from instructor to full professor. He retired to emeritus status in 1981. Ropp was a proponent of the need to study war in the context of its political and economic causes and to examine the social composition of military forces and the technological capabilities that shaped their weapons and equipment. His most important book, *War in the Modern World*, first published in 1959, is a penetrating, comprehensive account that remains popular in military history classrooms to this day.

Dr. Ropp served on the Department of the Army Historical Advisory Committee from 1964–1967 and successfully encouraged the Army to provide more advanced academic training for the officers who would be assigned to teach military history at the U.S. Military Academy and other institutions. He served in 1962–1963 as Ernest J. King professor of maritime history at the U.S. Naval War College and in 1972–1973 as a professor at the U.S. Army War College.

conservative staff officers who resisted working together or drawing connections between their branches and between levels of war, betray the limitations of that Army professionalism. True enough, but in the nineteenth century the distinction between U.S. officers and their European counterparts was more a matter of degree than of kind. Apart from a few mainly Prussian exceptions, most essentially were either technicians, increasingly wedded to the positivist conception of knowledge emerging during the Victorian era, or aristocratic dilettantes hardly deserving any intellectual title. The Americans, however, were conditioned by a set of strategic and societal circumstances—a higher level of democracy and the relative absence of interstate competition—that differed significantly from those in Europe.

Moten is ultimately arguing that the antebellum Army officer corps failed in its preparation for modern warfighting. Yet this choice of focus effectively dismisses, as all too many contemporary officers did, the Army's many other missions that were both civil and military in character: designing transportation improvements, coercing Native Americans, and policing the borders and frontiers to assert and maintain the sovereignty of the national government. Prior to the then-unanticipated Civil War, these other missions were ultimately more significant to the nation, and the Army undertook them with substantial success. In a sense, the Army doubly overspecialized, first in refusing to accept the real priority of missions other than European-style warfighting, and then in pursuing European expertise from the narrow technical perspective Moten so capably analyzes.

The Delafield Commission and the American Military Profession exudes the critical self-assessment that is central to professionalism, and it should spur dialogue far beyond the boundaries of nineteenth-century military history. Whether overspecialization will create similar problems for Force XXI is a question all officers should ponder; the arrival of Moten's book and the discussions it has provoked in professional journals and West Point hallways suggest that our contemporaries are doing just that. In consequence we may anticipate that they will craft a more effective balance than did their predecessors.

Dr. Samuel Watson is an assistant professor of history at the Military Academy, where he teaches the history of revolutionary warfare. His Rice University dissertation and a number of his articles address professionalism and civil-military relations in the early- and mid-nineteenth-century officer corps. His essay on the Army of that period will appear in the forthcoming Oxford Atlas of American Military History.

Book Review
by Thomas Goss

Cultures in Conflict: The American Civil War
by Steven E. Woodworth
Greenwood Press, 2000, 209 pp., $45

"This is a most beautiful & romantic country," wrote Union soldier Charles B. Haydon as he compared occupied northern Virginia to his native Michigan during the first year of the American Civil War. "Still there seems something decayed. . . . Everything is so unlike Michigan." (p. 21) With primary source evidence like this, historian Steven E. Woodworth begins a compelling examination of society and war in his latest book, *Cultures in Conflict: The American Civil War*. To soldiers like Haydon, the South was a society clearly different from home, and the letters from Haydon's Confederate counterparts show that this surprised observation was mutual. During any conflict, the cultures that produce the combatants and the societies supporting and guiding the war are analogous to tectonic plates: vast, complex, and powerful undercurrents that shape the conduct and resolution of the conflict. By 1860 the societies of the North and the South had been growing apart for decades, and the resultant differences fueled four long years of bloodshed, an unhappy end to the "culture war" of that era.

The study of the intersection of culture and warfare has recently become a very popular facet of military history, and Woodworth here takes this focus in examining the Civil War. Woodworth minces few words in placing a clash of cultures over the issue of slavery at the center of the war. As he provides an opportunity for readers to get to know some Civil War participants through their diaries and correspondence, the author seeks to demonstrate the relationship of civilian and military life during the war. Woodworth concludes that

the culture differed greatly between the North and the South in 1861 and that these differences, based mostly on the issue of slavery, were the root causes of the war.

This book is aimed toward readers who are just starting their study of the Civil War. Woodworth begins by providing a context for the primary source documents that form the heart of this work. *Cultures in Conflict* begins with a chronology of the major events of the war, a chapter narrating the military course of the conflict, and another examining the two opposing cultures in 1861. This introduction is designed to place the documents that follow in perspective. The diary entries, letters, and memoirs are divided into four roughly chronological chapters that focus on the preparation for the conflict, the erosion of early exuberance, the long, bloody years of battle, and the triumph and sadness of the war's end. Woodworth provides an introduction and notes with each of the documents, affording to the reader the background and perspective needed to digest the significance of each entry. The book concludes with ideas for further study in the intersection of war and culture, written to inspire students of the Civil War.

Those who are interested in any aspect of the Civil War will find thought-provoking gems in this book, as participants in the war open their hearts and their thoughts to the reader. Entries filled with emotion from a young soldier before his first taste of combat, an army nurse overwhelmed by caring for the wounded, and a family trapped in the besieged city of Petersburg are only some of the views, perspectives, and biases explored in this effort to reveal the tapestry of conflicting cultures. The strength of Woodworth's book derives from the potential of this approach toward studying the war to permit a deeper exploration of personal reactions to the heroics and hardships of the conflict. However, the inherent complexity of the impact of cultural beliefs and societal pressures on the combatants gives rise to the main weakness of this volume, namely that the brief chronology and narrative chapters may not provide enough context for understanding the diverse individual cultural reactions to the war and their impact on the larger war effort. Thus, while this book will be interesting for readers with any level of knowledge regarding the military struggle, it will be more rewarding for those already familiar with the course of the war.

As designed, this book would be a great reader for undergraduate students. However, *Cultures in Conflict* would also broaden the understanding of graduate students in American history or of military historians of any period. By presenting the attitudes, hopes, and suffering of soldiers and civilians on both sides, Woodworth in this book reveals the war to be a true clash of cultures and brings it to life in the words of those who lived through it. In these words, the Civil War soldiers in the field and their families at home wrote of the costs, hardships, and destructiveness of the war. In the process they revealed the very nature of warfare by describing the impact it had on their two societies. This aspect of the war deserves examination as much as any. Woodworth's book provides a valuable first step on a student's quest to understand the Civil War.

Maj. Thomas Goss is a U.S. Army infantry officer currently attending the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He holds a master's degree in history from Ohio State University and is writing a Ph.D. dissertation on Civil War generalship.

Book Review
by Roger D. Cunningham

Members of the Regiment: Army Officers' Wives on the Western Frontier, 1865–1890
by Michelle J. Nacy
Greenwood Press, 2000, 144 pp., $55

This thin volume in Greenwood Press's Contributions in American History series discusses the distaff side of the Regular Army officer corps that served throughout the West in the decades after the Civil War. The author, also an Army wife, began her work as a doctoral dissertation, examining the lives of eleven women who followed their husbands to scores of isolated military posts that stretched from Montana to Texas.

During the majority of the quarter-century covered by this volume, most of these ladies were married to company-grade officers, because promotions in the severely downsized postwar Army were few and far between. After rising to the brevet rank of major in

the Civil War, Martha Summerhayes's husband, John, spent twenty-two years as a lieutenant, and this was not unusual. He did not again reach the rank of major until 1898, just fourteen months before his mandatory retirement. A few of the ladies were married to more senior officers, notably Elizabeth (Libby) Custer and Alice Grierson, whose husband, Benjamin, commanded the Tenth Cavalry for twenty-four years (1866–1890). This entitled them to enjoy privileges that came with higher grades, not the least of which was avoiding the inconvenience of being "ranked out" of their quarters whenever a more senior officer was assigned to their post.

The eleven ladies generally hailed from eastern middle-class backgrounds and had been reared in "the cult of true womanhood, " which posited that women's domestic activities were the cornerstone of the American social order. Although well educated by nineteenth century standards, they were woefully unprepared for the hardships of contemporary life on the Western Frontier. Their initial naïveté was exemplified by Frances Boyd, who was shocked to discover that her first western post—Camp Halleck, Nevada—was not as beautiful as the military academy at West Point.

The ladies were not perfect. In their writings, they made demeaning comments about black troops, Indians, and Hispanics. They also expressed disdain toward "half-way" ladies—former Army laundresses whose husbands had risen from the ranks to secure commissions—and other "plebian people," a phrase defined by Ada Vogdes to include those with "no money, manners, or position."[1] Nevertheless, the women's resilience was admirable, as they struggled to provide their families with model Victorian homes while suffering personal tragedies. Some lost children to frontier disease, a few became widows, and Alice Grierson died. For most of them, life on the frontier was truly a time of "glittering misery."[2]

Although *Members of the Regiment* is an interesting and useful compilation of Army wives' insights on frontier garrison life, its high price of $55 virtually guarantees that it will not end up in many personal libraries. Until a softcover edition appears, those looking for a cheaper alternative are advised that chapter six of *The Old Army*, Edward M. Coffman's superb and better-priced classic, covers the same subject. Also, those who are interested enough in the topic to read what these eleven remarkable women wrote will be happy to learn that most of their memoirs and letters are currently available in reprinted editions, new biographies, or collections, primarily published by the university presses of Nebraska and Oklahoma. These include two excellent studies by Shirley A. Leckie, *Elizabeth Bacon Custer and the Making of a Myth* (Norman, Okla., 1993) and *The Colonel's Lady on the Western Frontier: The Correspondence of Alice Kirk Grierson* (Lincoln, Nebr., 1989). Only the letters of Ada Vogdes, which reside in the special collections of the U.S. Military Academy library, remain unpublished.

NOTES

1. The quoted words and phrases are on pp. 2 and 49. For more information on Army laundresses, whom the Army officially sanctioned for most of the nineteenth century, see Robert P. Wettemann, Jr., "The Girl I Left Behind Me? United States Army Laundresses and the Mexican War," *Army History*, Fall 1998–Winter 1999 (No. 46).
2. Martha Summerhayes attributed this expression to the wife of a German general, who described Army life as "glaenzendes elend." See pp. 86 and 99.

Book Review
by Edgar F. Raines, Jr.

The Progressive Army: US Army Command and Administration, 1870–1914
by Ronald J. Barr
St. Martin's Press, 1998, 223 pp., $59.95

In *The Progressive Army: US Army Command and Administration, 1870–1914,* Ronald J. Barr, a lecturer at the University of Lincoln in the United Kingdom, argues that turn-of-the-century military reform in the United States was "symptomatic of profound political and economic changes in America." The United States, argues Barr, echoing Robert Wiebe, changed "from a largely demilitarised state" that extolled "the principals of amateur localism" into "an industrial power with a strong central government organized on business management principles served by professionals." Barr identifies the key reformers

as Theodore Roosevelt, Elihu Root, Henry L. Stimson, and Maj. Gen. Leonard Wood and argues that they applied business management techniques to reform the Army. Barr believes "the persistent use of business analogies to attack" the status quo in the War Department and defend change demonstrates "the importance of business management structures as sources for government reform." (p. 196)

Following Samuel P. Huntington, Barr labels the proponents of military reform "neo-Hamiltonian Republicans." They believed that competition over limited world resources would inevitably lead to friction, conflict, and ultimately war between the great powers. Neo-Hamiltonians vigorously supported and promoted empire, believing that colonies strengthened the state by providing locations for military posts and naval bases that would protect the expansion of national commerce. These proponents of military reform expected that future wars would arise from competition over colonies. To them Germany and, after 1905, Japan appeared the most likely opponents to the United States. At the same time these neo-Hamiltonians favored an informal alliance with Great Britain based on a sense of shared cultural (they would have said "racial") superiority and a commitment to free trade. They regarded Army reform as both a key component of the policies they pursued and a logical consequence of their political philosophy. Their task was complicated, however, by the split within the Republican Party between the neo-Hamiltonians, who continued to extol the business model, and the progressives, who regarded business with suspicion and advocated the regulatory state.

Barr brings four strengths to this enterprise. First, he has delved deeply into the Elihu Root and Leonard Wood papers. The author has also given the works of Emory Upton, particularly *The Armies of Asia and Europe*, a close reading. Finally, Barr understands the central importance played by the Philippine Insurrection (1899–1902) and the war scare with Japan (1906–1908) in the institutional development of the Army.

Against these virtues must be set a number of deficiencies that call Barr's conclusions into question. Barr's research is very narrow. He has ignored most of the work of an entire generation of scholars. The most recent article cited in his bibliography was published in 1971. Among the major volumes he failed to consult are Richard Challener's book on naval and military roles in American foreign policy, Allan Millett's monograph on the second Cuban intervention and his biography of Lt. Gen. Robert L. Bullard, and the accounts of the Philippine Insurrection by John Gates and Brian Linn. Barr ignores Paul Hutton on General Philip H. Sheridan and the frontier army, all of Robert Utley's numerous works on the Army and the Indian in the late nineteenth century, and Robert Wooster's study on the same subject, as well as Wooster's biography of Nelson A. Miles. Barr likewise neglects Jerry Cooper on the Army and labor disturbances, Timothy Nenninger on the Leavenworth schools, Jack Lane's biography of Leonard Wood, James Hewes's 1974 *Military Affairs* article on military reform (which supports Barr's thesis), John Finnegan on the preparedness movement, and John Garry Clifford on the Plattsburg movement. Given Barr's penchant for ignoring pertinent published work, it is not surprising that he has neglected a number of significant unpublished dissertations that addressed the same issues and personalities with which he deals.

The author commits a distressing number of factual errors in the text. Brig. Gen. Adolphus W. Greely, not Horace Greely, was the Army's chief signal officer in 1900. (p. 78) The battle of Bladensburg occurred during the War of 1812, not the Revolutionary War. (p. 29) Grant, despite claims in his memoirs, did not exercise military command free of all political control during the Civil War. (p. 84) Brig. Gen. John M. Wilson was the chief of engineers during the War with Spain; he was never an American proconsul in Cuba. (p. 44) Lt. Gen. Arthur MacArthur retired from the Army in 1909, not 1902. (p. 108) Maj. Gen. J. Franklin Bell, the Army's chief of staff from 1906–1910, graduated from West Point in 1878, not 1875 or 1876. (p. 18) Maj. Gen. William W. Wotherspoon received a direct commission as second lieutenant while serving as a mate in the U.S. Navy; he never attended West Point. (p. 18) The list could be extended.

The author also shows a tendency to draw inferences based more on the logical flow of his overall argument than from the narrow evidentiary base he consulted. For example, he asserts that President William Howard Taft took the initiative in replacing Jacob M. Dickinson as secretary of war in an attempt to heal party divisions and enhance his standing with the Army. If Barr had consulted the Taft papers, he

would know that Dickinson, acting on his own initiative, retired from the cabinet because of family financial reverses.

On other occasions, Barr simply misreads his evidence to make a point. In 1912 Wood and Stimson, then the Army chief of staff and secretary of war, respectively, "held a series of conferences on the future organization of the Army. A feature of these meetings," notes Barr, "were large tables, which compared the organisational structure of two principal railroads, the Pennsylvania and New York Central, with the command system operating in the American army." (p. 193) The noted military analyst Frederick L. Huidekoper had indeed recommended that Stimson post charts showing the current organization of the War Department, the organization of foreign armies, and the organization of the two railroads. Although Stimson liked Huidekoper's idea, by the time Stimson received the letter, the conferences had ended. The General Staff never prepared any of these charts. The General Staff did eventually prepare and the War Department published the U.S. Army's first unit tables of organization. However, as John B. Wilson has recently demonstrated, these were based on careful study of the experience of European armies and the 1911 U.S. mobilization on the Mexican border.

Several parts of Barr's overall thesis do not withstand close examination. First, it is hard to see why Barr ended his study of the progressive Army in 1914. A very good case can be made for the National Defense Act of 1916 as the culmination of all the military reform agitation of the prewar era. But if Barr had included the 1916 legislation in his analysis, he would have had to explain why this law very nearly emasculated the War Department General Staff, the institution that Barr sees—rightly, I believe—as central to the efforts for further reform. Specifically, he would have to rethink the clash between Wood and Maj. Gen. Fred C. Ainsworth, the Army's adjutant general, for supremacy in the War Department. Barr presents Ainsworth's forced retirement as an unabashed triumph for military reform, which was certainly Wood's point of view. But Wood seems to have been oblivious to the underlying power realities. Support in Congress for the General Staff remained fragile throughout this period, particularly when the Democrats were in control, and Ainsworth had very close ties to key congressional leaders. Wood's predecessor, Bell, understood this. It was a major reason why he first attempted to work out a modus vivendi with Ainsworth and then contented himself with fending off Ainsworth's power grabs. Barr, like Wood, sees this as evidence of either ignorance, moral cowardice, or both. In fact, it reflected greater political insight.

Barr's analysis of the split between progressive and neo-Hamiltonian Republicans overemphasizes the importance of the Army in American political life. Given Barr's definition of a neo-Hamiltonian, only a handful of men in either party fit the description—Root, Stimson, Secretary of War Lindley M. Garrison, Huidekoper, and a few others. It is questionable whether Roosevelt, who even before the War with Spain worried that the American values were becoming corrupted by an excessive emphasis on commercial success, ever embraced the business model to the extent that Barr believes. Even if Roosevelt did, surely his role in the Anthracite Coal Strike of 1901 represented his first break with the business community rather than his sponsorship of the Hepburn Act in 1905, as Barr argues. Huntington, in developing the concept of neo-Hamiltonians, had commented that they "rejected plutocracy and were bitter in their contempt for prevailing commercialism, materialism, and the values inherent in an economically oriented way of life."[1] Barr simply ignores this discrepancy between his concept and Huntington's.

Indeed, supporting a larger Army and a more closely integrated National Guard did not clash with increasing the regulatory authority of the federal government in the marketplace. Both represented an extension of the power of central government. It is true that most progressives were proponents of a small Army, but then most were primarily concerned with domestic reforms. The same was true of most of those who supported Taft's reelection in 1912. It was the marginality of the Army that gave a well-connected official like Ainsworth so much power. There were no real constituencies for the Army outside the capital—at least none that rose above the level of keeping the local fort open and the pay of the garrison flowing to the local businessmen. If it had been otherwise, Ainsworth would have been an inconvenience rather than a threat.

This is all very unfortunate because buried within

The Progressive Army are the beginnings of a good study of Root's tenure as secretary of war. Barr simply spread himself too thin. By his approach Barr reminds us of the necessity of placing military history in both national and international contexts. He also has a number of valuable insights. He demonstrates, for example, that the detail system had its intellectual roots in Emory Upton's analysis of the British Army rather than the German model, to which many military historians, including this reviewer, have perhaps ascribed too much. While Barr overstates the evidence, he has also uncovered some very interesting material concerning Maj. Gen. Nelson A. Miles's possibly corrupt dealings during the War with Spain, an issue that none of his biographers has addressed.

Even when Barr fails to make his case, as I believe he does with respect to the role of the business model in military reform, he stimulates thought. The relationship between American business experience and American military activities is an important issue, and not just for the years 1870 to 1914. Barr's own evidence suggests that Root possessed at best a shallow understanding of business organization and methods. My own view is that soldiers used business analogies in an effort to convince senior policy makers, Congress, and the educated public of the need for military reform, but that the ideas for change came from foreign armies and the U.S. Army's own experience. Despite Barr's misreading of the evidence, the business model may have had greater salience after 1910. This is a topic that requires more research and careful analysis. Terrence J. Gough's brilliant but as yet unpublished 1997 University of Virginia dissertation, "The Battle of Washington: Soldiers and Businessmen in World War I," currently provides the best treatment of that subject. Barr's book thus inspires considerable regret at its failings, while the questions the author raises provide a measure of intellectual stimulation that one hopes will encourage other historians to undertake the research and analysis they demand.

Dr. Edgar F. Raines, Jr., is a historian in the Histories Division of CMH. He is coauthor with David R. Campbell of The Army and the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Evolution of Army Ideas on the Command, Control, and Coordination of the U.S. Armed Forces, 1942–1985 *(CMH, 1986) and the author of* Eyes of Artillery: The Origins of Modern U.S. Army Aviation in World War II *(CMH, 2000).*

NOTES

1. Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (New York, 1957), p. 272.

Book Review
by Lee T. Wyatt III

P.O.W. in the Pacific: Memoirs of an American Doctor in World War II
by William N. Donovan
edited by Josephine Donovan
SR Books, 1998, 182 pp., $22.95

Josephine Donovan, assisted by her sister Ann, has published a remarkably rich memoir of their father's experience as a prisoner of war in the Pacific. Capt. William N. Donovan's account, recorded in 1995–96, is a rather detailed recollection of his more than three years as a Japanese prisoner of war that provides the reader important insights into the travails that noncombat soldiers endured during the darkest days of America's Pacific conflict.

At the outbreak of the war, Captain Donovan was posted at Fort McKinley near Manila in the Philippines. During December 1941 he ministered to casualties of the enemy's approach on the Philippine capital. By the end of that month, he had been evacuated with the rest of the U.S. forces to Bataan. Between January and April 1942 he treated numerous casualties among the 15, 000 American and 65,000 Filipino soldiers who defended Bataan from the Japanese forces, winning the Silver Star and the Distinguished Service Cross. In early April he fled to Corregidor, barely avoiding the fate of prisoners forced on the infamous Bataan Death March. On 6 May 1942, Captain Donovan was among the nearly 8,700 American troops who surrendered on the five-mile-long by one-and-a-half-mile-wide strip of land called "The Rock."

Within weeks Captain Donovan was sent to Bilibid prison camp in Manila, one of the islands' seventeen internment sites. Although the Japanese did not fully

comply with the 1929 Geneva Convention regarding the treatment of prisoners of war, Captain Donovan as an officer and a doctor fared better than did many prisoners. He performed little hard labor and could apply his medical skills to the treatment of Allied prisoners and, at times, Japanese guards. In a September 1945 letter to his wife, he attributed his good fortune to the fact that he had the knowledge to avoid the ravages of tropical diseases, remained active in body and mind, had occasional access to professional reading material, and practiced his craft.

By February 1943 he was transferred to Prison Camp #8 in the port area, where he had medical responsibility for 150 prisoners who repaired Japanese vehicles. He remained in Manila until September 1944, when the Japanese began evacuating thousands of prisoners of war as the Allied advance to retake the Philippines gained momentum.

In the late summer and fall of 1944, the Japanese sent prison ships from the Philippines to spots closer to their home defensive perimeter. American prisoners of war not only endured horrible conditions on the ships but faced the numbing prospect of being bombed or torpedoed by Allied naval or air vessels because the Japanese, in violation of the accepted practices of warfare, did not identify their prison ships. Captain Donovan sailed from the Philippines in early October 1944 on the *Haro Maru*, a ship given the ignominious nickname of "Horror Maru" by the Allied prisoners. After a 39-day voyage to Hong Kong and a ten-day layover there, the ship proceeded to Formosa and deposited the prisoners at Camp Shirakawa, where Captain Donovan spent the last nine months of the war. At Shirakawa he and the other prisoners enjoyed somewhat better living conditions than in previous camps. However, as the tide of the war shifted decisively in the their favor, the Allies became increasingly concerned as to whether the Japanese would sacrifice the prisoners, use them to negotiate better individual terms, or release them to the control of the victors. Fortunately, the Japanese chose the last option, and Captain Donovan and his comrades received aid from Allied relief forces about a week after V–J Day.

Donovan returned first to the Philippines and then to the West Coast and ultimately celebrated a joyous reunion with his family in Chicago on 9 October 1945. After returning to civilian life, Captain Donovan provided depositions in several Japanese war crimes trials. In 1952 he testified in the trial of an American serviceman accused of treason.

Although the book generally follows Captain Donovan's experiences, in several cases it adds his perspective to larger events that have gained notoriety. For example, Donovan clarifies the decision by General MacArthur to order Col. Thomas Doyle, commander of the 45th Infantry, to withdraw from Bataan to Corregidor. Captain Donovan recalled clearly that, during the defense of Bataan, Colonel Doyle had said that his unit did not seem to take many prisoners. This statement was picked up by Filipino spies and passed to the Japanese, who claimed that Doyle's unit was murdering Japanese soldiers rather than taking them prisoner. The Japanese then announced that upon the fall of Bataan Colonel Doyle would be captured and hanged. According to Donovan, Doyle deeply regretted MacArthur's order to evacuate because he did not want to abandon his troops.

The memoir is also chock-full of personal touches regarding the daily struggles faced by the prisoners. Donovan suffered minor bouts with dysentery and other tropical ailments. Moreover, at a moment's notice his normal day could take a perilous turn. On one occasion, he narrowly escaped execution at Bilibid. In this instance, the Japanese observed that someone had escaped from a detail and lined up the group. They shot friends of the escapee and then began searching the others. If any money was found, they assumed it had been taken from a dead Japanese soldier and executed the prisoner. Only quick wits and luck spared him from harm. In another incident on the *Haro Maru*, he and a fellow doctor avoided certain death for being caught with contraband by quietly moving items up to a row that had been previously inspected. Yet, at other times some Japanese guards seemed inexplicably humane to the prisoners. Captain Donovan remembered episodes when additional food or favors might be granted in return for medical treatment rendered or for no apparent reason at all.

One moving portion of the book is the chapter on the family. Captain Donovan's wife and daughter, both of whom were named Josephine, left the Philippines in May 1941 as the prospect of war heightened. The family lived in New York City for the duration of the war. This portion of the memoir records all or part of some

of the letters written by Captain Donovan in the Philippines in 1941 and his wife's efforts to maintain contact with him after his capture.

Mrs. Donovan expressed displeasure at some of the "inflamed rhetoric" issued in the aftermath of the islands' fall by General MacArthur and U.S. High Commissioner to the Philippines Francis B. Sayre claiming that it endangered those who had been taken prisoner. In May 1942 the War Department informed her that Captain Donovan was missing in action. Thereafter Mrs. Donovan relied on the accounts of several nurses who had served with her husband in the last days before his capture. Indeed, it was not until the end of March 1943 that she received confirmation that her husband was indeed a prisoner of war. This news came as a result of Japanese radio propaganda broadcasts that included messages from prisoners that were picked up by American ham radio operators. In August 1943 Mrs. Donovan received her first direct word from her husband, a POW form card from Bilibid that had likely been mailed some eight or nine months earlier. After the Japanese evacuated the prisoners to Formosa, Captain Donovan's wife did not hear from him until he cabled her from Manila on 13 September 1945.

This memoir is worth reading for several reasons. First, Captain Donovan's perspective as a doctor is one that is rarely recorded. While he did not suffer as much as others, he was responsible not only for his own well-being but for that of many fellow prisoners as well, most certainly a heavy mental and physical burden. Second, in those tense days during the evacuation from Manila to Bataan to Corregidor, Captain Donovan had to practice soldierly skills first and foremost, even as he performed his medical duties in the tumultuous environment. His escape and survival attest to the spirit of the American soldier, particularly in light of his training as a doctor. Finally, the saga of his wife and family brings the ordeal full circle to include all those who felt pain as a result of his incarceration. Their strength and perseverance represent the steadfastness and courage under the burden of uncertainty that the American home front exhibited during nearly four years of war.

Some organizational changes might have improved the work. The appendix was a useful addition, but an index might also have assisted in clarifying and organizing some of the details. Furthermore, the summary of the war provided in the introduction was perhaps unnecessary, even to the general reader. Finally, Captain Donovan's recollections are usurped occasionally by the introductory portions of some chapters. Rather than to introduce redundancy, it would have been better to permit his memory alone to present the story. To be sure, these are minor criticisms that should in no way detract from an informative account that illuminates the experience of a special group of American soldiers who fell victim to Japanese aggression during the Pacific war.

Col. Lee T. Wyatt III is deputy head of the Department of History at the U.S. Military Academy and has taught there for fifteen years. An armor officer, he holds a doctorate in history from Mississippi State University.

Book Review
by Fred L. Borch III

Embracing Defeat
Japan in the Wake of World War II
by John W. Dower
W. W. Norton & Co., 1999, 676 pp.
cloth $29.95, paperback $15.95

What impact did the U.S. occupation of Japan have on the Japanese? Was it a positive experience? Why or why not? Did the Japanese affect their American occupiers in any way? If so, how? *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II* offers answers to these questions, and this makes it a "must read" for those interested in World War II and its aftermath. Additionally, author John W. Dower's balanced perspective and insightful analysis make his award-winning book just as important reading for contemporary military leaders, diplomats, and political decision-makers with an interest in Asia and the Pacific. This is because the nature of today's Japan—and its role on the Pacific Rim—cannot be understood without examining the U.S. occupation of that island nation from 1945 to 1952.

The war between Japan and America lasted three years and eight months; the occupation of the defeated country lasted almost twice as long. Consequently, at least from the Japanese perspective, World War II did

not really end until 1952. During the period of six years and eight months from August 1945 to April 1952, no major Japanese political, administrative, or economic decisions were made without U.S. approval. No public criticism of the American occupation force was allowed. Finally, because Japan had no sovereignty and consequently no diplomatic relations, Japanese were not allowed to travel overseas until the occupation had almost ended. Consequently, a strong argument can be made that the occupation had a greater impact on Japanese life and society than did the war itself.

Unlike postwar Germany and Austria, divided as they were into zones administered by the United States, France, Britain, and the Soviet Union, the "focused intensity that came with America's unilateral control of Japan" (p. 23) permitted the United States to impose a truly remarkable root-and-branch program of demilitarization and democratization. As *Embracing Defeat* explains, this all-encompassing program brought truly revolutionary change to Japanese culture and society.

Future peace and stability required that the imperial Japanese forces be disarmed and demilitarized. Only democratization, however, could prevent the reemergence of militarization. At the same time, instilling democratic thinking in the Japanese people would counteract the rising influence of communism. While the Potsdam Declaration had sketched the overall goals of the occupation, the details of this demilitarization and democratization were left to General Douglas MacArthur as Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. This resulted from both the "Europe-first" focus of policymakers in Washington and MacArthur's imperial personality. In any event, MacArthur was the "indisputable overlord of occupied Japan," (p. 205) and his monopoly on policy and power gave him—and the roughly 1,500 military and civilian bureaucrats who worked for him—virtually unbridled discretion to remake the island nation. They alone decided the form and substance of the remarkable political, economic, and spiritual changes that would be called a "democratic revolution from above." (p. 69) As Dower shows, MacArthur and his underlings determined the shape that the victors' "stern justice" for war criminals would take. Similarly, he and this cadre of reformers determined the extent of "just reparations" for the destruction wrought by the Japanese against their now victorious enemies and the way in which the economy would be demilitarized. Perhaps most importantly, the ideas of MacArthur and his staff shaped a key component of the American occupation agenda: the removal of all obstacles to the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people. This included the establishment of freedom of speech, religion, and thought, as well as respect for fundamental human rights. To a very real extent, the occupation would end when MacArthur decided that a "peacefully inclined and responsible government" existed in accordance with the "freely expressed will of the Japanese people." (p. 75)

Central to molding the Japanese people into good American-style democrats was establishing a democratic form of government. MacArthur and his reformers decided that the existing Meiji Constitution of 1890 was "incompatible with the healthy development of responsible democratic government" (p. 346) and drafted a new document. The resulting constitution, written in six days, was truly a remarkable instrument. Filled with Anglo-American and European democratic ideals, it even included a provision that "affirmed 'the essential equality of the sexes'—a guarantee not explicitly found in the U.S. Constitution." (p. 369) But the truly revolutionary provision was Article 9, in which Japan forever renounced belligerency as a sovereign right of the state. While some modifications would be made before the new constitution came into effect on 3 May 1947, the "renunciation of war" provision remained. It is unique in the history of national constitutions. As *Embracing Defeat* shows, however, the great irony of the way in which democratization, including the constitution, was imposed upon Japan is that the process was so undemocratic. While the victors preached democracy, they ruled by fiat. Their reformist agenda rested on the assumption that Western culture and its values were superior to those of Asia and Japan.

While the United States did impose sweeping change upon Japanese culture and society, not everything changed for the Japanese people. In fact, the occupation reinforced rather than altered some aspects of Japanese life. Unlike the practice of direct military government adopted in Germany, the American occupation of Japan was conducted indirectly through existing organs of government. Lacking the linguistic and technocratic capacity to govern the Japanese

directly, MacArthur and his staff were forced to implement their revolution from above through two of the most undemocratic institutions of imperial Japan: the bureaucracy and the throne. Consequently, whether supervising developments in finance, labor, economics, or science; revising the constitution; or revamping the electoral system, courts, and civil service, the Americans exercised their authority through Japanese agencies and administrators. Not surprisingly, this had the long-term effect of strengthening Japan's civilian bureaucracy and the power of its technocratic elite. As a result, long after the Americans had ceased to rule and the Japanese were regularly electing their leaders, government bureaucrats exercised a level of power unusual in a democracy.

Embracing Defeat is harshly critical of General MacArthur's involvement in the International Military Tribunal for the Far East. While some criminal proceedings involving so-called Class B and C defendants were held outside Japan, the "Tokyo War Crimes Trials" of the Class A defendants—Japanese policymakers charged with "crimes against peace" and "crimes against humanity"—were the most important and best known. Dower convincingly demonstrates that MacArthur's decision that the emperor not be charged with, or even linked to, the war crimes charged against high-ranking Japanese politicians and military leaders irreparably weakened the legitimacy of the proceedings. After all, if Emperor Hirohito was not even *morally* responsible for the repression and violence carried out in his name and with his endorsement, how could the Japanese people be made to accept moral responsibility for the death and destruction wrought by Japanese forces? The War Crimes Trials thus had the unintended effect of strengthening the Japanese people's sense of victimization and retarding their willingness to accept responsibility.

The great strength of *Embracing Defeat* is its extensive use of Japanese-language sources. While other accounts in English of the U.S. occupation of Japan rely almost exclusively on American documentary material, Professor Dower's intimate knowledge of Japanese politics, society, and culture allow him to examine Japan's transformation from an empire to a democracy as no historian has done previously. Some of his sources are unexpected. In one section, for example, Dower examines games played by Japanese children. He explains that in early 1946 the most popular activities among small boys and girls were make-believe games in which children held a mock black market and played prostitute and customer. These games were a barometer of the obsessions of Japanese adults, a reflection of the life faced by their fathers and mothers.

In another section of *Embracing Defeat*, Professor Dower reveals how the postwar Japanese government, through loans and police support, encouraged businessmen to open "Recreation and Amusement Associations" (RAAs). These were houses of prostitution that the Japanese believed to be necessary as a buffer to protect the chastity of the "good" women of Japan from the sexual appetites of the American victors. While the RAAs lasted only a few months before being abolished by occupation authorities as "undemocratic," this experiment in officially sponsored prostitution is fascinating, as is Dower's discussion of the Japanese perspective on the ubiquitous fraternization of the victors with Japanese women. In discussing these and other issues, the author frequently uses Japanese cartoon art to illustrate his points and support his analysis, providing a unique window into the psychology of the Japanese people.

Professor Dower concludes in *Embracing Defeat* that the political and cultural revolution ushered in by the American occupation was, all in all, a positive event. Nearly fifty years later democratization and demilitarization remain firmly rooted in Japan, and the Japanese people are better for it. But not all old ideas and beliefs were swept away, and the value of Professor Dower's book is that it explains just how this could happen. Consequently, those who read *Embracing Defeat* will understand how Emperor Hirohito could claim in a 1975 interview that, looking at Japanese values "from a broad perspective," there had been no change between prewar and postwar Japan. (p. 556) That same reader will also better appreciate why, only a few months ago, Japanese Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori said that "Japan is a divine nation with the emperor at its core, and we want the [Japanese] people to recognize this."

In discussing the comprehensive political, economic, social, and cultural ramifications of the U.S. occupation of Japan, Professor Dower never allows his book to gloss over the effect the occupation had on

the men, women, and children who lived through it. He captures "a sense of what it meant to start over in a ruined world by recovering the voices of people at all levels of society." (p. 25) In doing this, he reveals the Japanese perspective on life under the victors, which in turn tells us something about ourselves as Americans. This is because, in embracing the Japanese and trying to re-create them in our own image and likeness, we Americans necessarily revealed to the Japanese and the world what we thought America and being American were all about.

Col. Fred L. Borch III is a student at the Naval War College. He holds law degrees from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and the University of Brussels in Belgium. The Office of the Judge Advocate General and the Center of Military History plan to jointly publish his book-length manuscript, "Judge Advocates in Combat: Army Lawyers in Military Operations from Vietnam to Haiti."

NOTES

1. *Embracing Defeat* has won the Pulitzer Prize for nonfiction, the National Book Award for nonfiction, the *Los Angeles Times* Book Prize in history, the Bancroft Prize, the John K. Fairbank Prize of the American Historical Association, the PEN/New England L. L. Winship Award, and the Mark Lynton History Prize.
2. Howard W. French, "Japan Ruling Party Wary of Prime Minister's Gaffes," *International Herald Tribune*, 27–28 May 2000, p. 1.

Book Review
by Mason R. Schaefer

The Bradley and How It Got That Way
Technology, Institutions, and the Problem of Mechanized Infantry in the United States Army
by W. Blair Haworth, Jr.
Greenwood Press, 1999, 199 pp., $57.95

Weapons systems have long preoccupied Defense analysts, journalists, and the general public alike. The press often criticizes costly weapons that require decades of development. With that in mind, W. Blair Haworth, Jr., examines the evolution of one such weapon, the Bradley Fighting Vehicle. Along with the Bradley itself, Haworth's book dissects the conceptual underpinnings of mechanized infantry, both mounted and dismounted. Though it fails to hit some of its targets, this book explores a major issue: how can infantry cope with overwhelming firepower on a technologically advanced battlefield? It asks, can soldiers fight "mounted," without leaving their vehicles? Has the U.S. Army developed the right vehicle for such tactics?

A contract historian and defense analyst, Haworth authored this book as an outgrowth of his Duke University doctoral dissertation. Haworth has also worked with Congress's Office of Technology Assessment and the Department of Defense's Cold War Project. The author's vast bibliography reveals his expertise relative to both the Bradley fighting vehicle and mechanized infantry doctrine. He has read or consulted hundreds of articles and books on armored and mechanized warfare and the Bradley itself. This detailed background might have resulted in a sprawling tome. Instead, Haworth succinctly covers both the Bradley and mechanized infantry doctrine in under 200 pages.

The author begins with a general history of mechanized infantry tactics since World War I. During that conflict, massed firepower decimated infantry advances. Would foot soldiers have avoided destruction from machine guns and artillery if they had ridden in armored personnel carriers? Could they have fought without having to dismount? Officials in a number of armies began to raise these questions between the world wars as they started, with limited success, to develop and test armored personnel carriers. Haworth offers an intriguing narrative of the various British, French, American, and Russian efforts in this vein. Employing an often-whimsical, readable style, Haworth's early chapters complement other studies of mechanized infantry tactics nicely.

During World War II, both sides made some incremental advances in the employment of mechanized infantry. The Americans developed the half-track, which could traverse rugged or muddy battlefields. However, these lightly armored vehicles remained vulnerable to enemy fire. Mounted troops could use them to reach the battlefield but would then dismount

to go into action. Even aboard their vehicles these troops lacked substantial protection.

After World War II the U.S. Army's designs for M59 and M75 armored personnel carriers largely fizzled, although the M75 saw very limited Korean War service. Slow, expensive, and clumsy, the new models did not fulfill the Army's expectations. In the early 1960s the Americans developed the M113 armored personnel carrier, and for a time it was the ultimate infantry vehicle. Built mostly of aluminum, this tracked vehicle's strong frontal armor and .50-caliber machine gun looked promising. However, its high silhouette and lack of maneuverability made it less than invincible. During the January 1963 battle of Ap Bac in South Vietnam, the Viet Cong stymied an M113–equipped South Vietnamese force, then withdrew intact. Undaunted, American forces later used the M113 extensively as a troop carrier in Vietnam. It filled the bill.

Haworth praises the M113 and cites its popularity with American troops in the field. A number of generals, including Donn Starry, have shared this view. However, during March 1977 congressional hearings General William E. DePuy, commander of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, called the vehicle "not very good" and "very difficult to move around." (p. 81) According to one cavalry sergeant, the M113 failed badly in four crucial categories: size, firepower, mobility, and simplicity of design and operation. The Israeli Army also found its profile too high and its vulnerability great. Plainly, the vehicle was imperfect. The ultimate mechanized infantry combat vehicle lay in the future.

Haworth's broad approach gradually narrows until he spotlights the Bradley. In his careful examination of the Bradley's technical evolution, the author's discussion sometimes overuses jargon and acronyms, but the reader can follow Haworth's argument nevertheless. With the Bradley, as with earlier armored personnel carriers, the Army wanted a transport vehicle with combat capability, one that could carry troops yet wage armored war. As Haworth points out, the Army wanted the vehicle to serve the often incompatible missions of transportation and combat. As a result the Army slowed the Bradley's development—and that of mechanized infantry—by accepting compromise designs that in the end could not properly fulfill both of these missions. Once committed to combat, however, the Bradley performed not too badly. In the Persian Gulf War in 1991 the maneuverable vehicle kept up with the M1 tank and was only infrequently sidelined. Less positively, the vehicle provided cramped quarters for its infantry contingent. Bradley crewmen, needing the ability to serve as a tank crew, required additional training in gunnery and tactical skills.

As Haworth develops his thesis, he occasionally stumbles. His chapter on armored cavalry tactics proves hurried and discursive, and it is laden with many overly long quotes. The author also handles unevenly the military reform movement of the late 1970s and 1980s. Though he praises such thinkers as John Boyd, whose ideas helped inspire the AirLand Battle doctrine, he dismisses many other reformers as opportunistic journalists and disgruntled, nostalgic military analysts, all shooting from the hip. These reformers criticized the Bradley for its expense and long gestation time. Since Haworth rejects such criticisms, he tries to trivialize their efforts, neglecting the fact that many reformers were, and remain, thoughtful defense commentators who analyzed the military structure in depth. Ill-coordinated operations like the Grenada invasion and the "Desert One" debacle revealed the American military's tactical and organizational shortcomings, as did the security failings that permitted the devastating 1983 truck bombing in Beirut. The military reform movement led to the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act, which remade the American military. Haworth does not mention this landmark legislation.

Despite these and other criticisms, this author finds *The Bradley and How It Got That Way* well worth reading. Haworth's examination of earlier mechanized infantry tactics illuminates the Bradley fighting vehicle's evolution. Haworth concludes convincingly that the U.S. Army still has not fully resolved the mechanized infantry problem. In his view, the Army should not try to "wed" infantry to armored fighting vehicles and thus combine transportation and armored combat doctrine. When it has done so, it has failed.

Mason R. Schaefer is a historian with Headquarters, U.S. Army Forces Command, at Fort McPherson, Georgia. His article "Surge at San Francisco: A Port after Pearl Harbor, 1941–42," appeared in the Fall 1996 issue of Army History *(No. 39).*

Book Review
by Robert P. Cook

Black Hawk Down: A Story of Modern War
by Mark Bowden
Atlantic Monthly Press, 1999, 386 pp., $24

In the now classic essay "How To Tell a True War Story," Tim O'Brien wrote that a true war story is never moral. If at the end you feel uplifted by the story's virtue, then it is not a true war story. If, O'Brien continued, "it's difficult to separate what happened from what seemed to happen," if the story embarrasses you, if the story or parts of it never seem to end, if the point of a story does not hit you until twenty years later, or if at the end you find yourself asking, "Is this really true?" then you know that you have heard a true war story.

Black Hawk Down is a true war story that took place on 3 October 1993, during Operation RESTORE HOPE and United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II). On that Sunday afternoon Task Force RANGER set out in broad daylight to kidnap a couple of key henchman of Mohamed Farah Aideed's Habar-Gedir subclan in the central market of Mogadishu, Somalia, a land in which few seemed to be unarmed. The operation was intended as a routine, snatch-and-grab of some local bad guys—back in time for chow. Well, not exactly.

The U.S. Army Rangers and Special Forces officers and men of Task Force RANGER, supported by helicopter rescue vehicles and gunships, planned to fast-rope in, cordon off the area and buildings in which they expected to find the suspects, capture them, and exit the target area via a thin-skinned, ground convoy timed to arrive like yellow cabs.

Up to a point, the mission went off as planned. The bad guys were indeed captured. But that result was achieved only after eighteen Americans, as well as one Malaysian and one Moroccan from the follow-on force, were killed and dozens of Americans were wounded; only after two Black Hawk helicopters were shot down and three others hit; only after about 500 Somalis, including women and children, were killed and possibly as many as 1,000 were wounded; and only after a hastily assembled armored relief column extracted the remnants of Task Force RANGER the following day.

To tell this true war story Bowden weaves a dramatic, emotional, and fast-paced narrative from hundreds of interviews with American and Somali participants, eyewitnesses, and members of the families of the victims. The result is immensely readable. Unfortunately, it is also unbalanced, short on analysis, and based on selective sources.

The work is unbalanced because the bulk of the interviews are with American soldiers who were on the ground. We see this story from their perspective. By comparison, there are fewer interviews with higher-level military leaders, planners, or analysts. Obviously, it is the soldiers' perspectives that provide the story's heart-pounding excitement, but the presentation denies the reader an equally in-depth treatment of the perspectives of those who planned, conducted, and evaluated the mission.

Thus, when the author turns to analysis, as he does at the end of the book, his observations of means and methods are far less well supported than were his observations of the soldiers' feelings under fire. Why and how did the mission go wrong? What accounted for the failure of command and control? Why was this mission not coordinated with other American and allied units? Why was officer leadership apparently lacking? Why were some members of Task Force RANGER unprepared?

When he turns to these questions, the author accepts uncritically some of the official after-action reports. Bowden asserts that even within professional circles this battle was seemingly ignored, yet he draws on official sources that seem to belie his assertion. Why is that? Bowden had a chance, which his own skill as a good journalist created, to write a truly important book, but the style he selected left us with just a good war story.

The book's source material is also a problem. Bowden relies in his narrative both on his own interviews and on the primary and secondary sources—reports, videos from the helicopters, tapes of the radio traffic, and so on—that he personally obtained from unnamed members of the Department of Defense. Thus, his source material is not available to an ordinary reader or scholar. Moreover, because we don't know what source material Bowden could not obtain, we cannot fully evaluate the material the author does use. It is difficult to believe that the official and possibly classified material that Bowden received, without having to file a Freedom of Information Act request,

came his way simply on account of his affability or good looks. Leakers typically have an axe to grind, which influences their choice of materials to pass along. Unfortunately, Bowden's reticence precludes closer examination.

The publisher is to be congratulated for providing a well-edited text, pleasantly free of major typographical flaws, in a readable font and attractive page design. However, given the list price of $24.00, the purchaser might complain that the weak fiberboard cover and glue binding will not support many readings. The maps and photographs also leave much to be desired. Some of the maps are actually diagrammatic illustrations, not drawn to scale or geographically oriented. Moreover, they largely represent only two dimensions, whereas the battle took place in three. Events that include ground and air activity require maps to scale that clearly depict the spatial relationship of both ground and air movement. The book's photographic inserts are especially disappointing. The photos have been reproduced on regular paper and thus lack sharp definition. Their arrangement is more fitting to a photo album than a book, and the selected photographs illustrate few of the significant points of the narrative.

Black Hawk Down has received, with reason, overwhelming praise from its reviewers that has in part been reinforced by the aggressive marketing effort of the publisher. This work is available in an abridged audiocassette and a CD-ROM. It has its own web site, and press releases have suggested that a movie may be in the works.

The strength of the work is its sympathetic portrayal of the courageous acts of brave men. But in the end, Tim O'Brien is right: A true war story is not uplifting.

Retired Army Reserve Maj. Robert P. Cook commanded the 326th Military History Detachment in Saudi Arabia and Iraq during the Gulf War. A former acquisitions editor for Indiana University Press, he holds a master's degree in history from Indiana University. He is currently preparing a book-length manuscript, "American Military History: A Research Handbook." Cook operates a modest firm that provides research and consulting services in history and education.

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