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In This Issue



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News Notes

Army History Adopts New Color Format

With this issue *Army History* inaugurates a new format that is designed to present its contents in a more appealing manner and to enable the reader to benefit from available color illustrations.

Army History Article Wins History Writing Award

An article by Col. Robert A. Doughty published in the Spring 2001 issue of *Army History* (No. 52) was one of three articles selected as winners of the Army Historical Foundation's 2001 Distinguished Writing Awards. Colonel Doughty's article, "More Than Numbers: Americans and the Revival of French Morale in the Great War," was one of two awardees in the Professional Army Journals category. Retired General William W. Hartzog, president of the foundation, announced the awards at the group's annual members' meeting on 19 June 2002. Colonel Doughty, who is professor in and head of the Department of History at the U.S. Military Academy, received a plaque and a $250 cash award. The awards honor articles that, in the foundation's judgment, have made a distinctive contribution to U.S. Army history. The foundation is also the principal fundraiser for the National Museum of the U.S. Army.

New Air Force History Publication

The Air Force History and Museums Program has issued a new book by David N. Spires, *Air Power for Patton's Army: The XIX Tactical Air Command in the Second World War*. The book is available from the Government Printing Office for $39 under stock number 008–070–00777–1.

National Guard Bureau Announces Recent Publications

The Historical Services Division of the National Guard Bureau has announced three publications that it has issued in the last two years. Maj. Les Melnyk, the division's chief, authored *Mobilizing for the Storm: The Army National Guard in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm* (2001). Division historian Renee Hylton wrote *When Are We Going? The Army National Guard and the Korean War, 1950–1953* (2000). Their colleague Charles Gross authored *Turning Point: The Air National Guard and the Korean War* (2000).

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The Chief's Corner

John S. Brown

As we have come to expect, we at the Center of Military History have had yet another busy quarter in each of our four divisions. In its ongoing support of the Secretariat and the Army Staff in the War on Terrorism, the Histories Division prepared seven papers on potentially relevant aspects of the Army's Vietnam War experience, six on historical examples of regime change, four on past U.S. involvement in building foreign ground forces, and one on the history of the policy of unconditional surrender. The division also continued to coordinate the Army's effort to collect oral history testimony concerning the 11 September 2001 attack on the Pentagon and its aftermath. Other support provided to HQDA decision-makers and staff relevant to contemporary issues included papers on the evolving organization of the Department of Defense, the origins of the Total Force policy, German artillery and close air support in World War II, Korean War events in May 1952, the Battle of Milk Creek in 1879, historical aid to the HQDA Realignment Task Force, assistance for Women's History Month presentations in the Pentagon, and historical information for the Army Birthday Ball. The oral historians conducted end-of-tour interviews with senior Army leaders and prepared to teach the oral history portion of the annual military history detachment training course.

While meeting these immediate needs, the Center of Military History continued to pursue its longer-range mission of recording and interpreting the Army's history in books and monographs. Dr. Andrew J. Birtle completed a draft of the second volume of his well-received history of counterinsurgency and contingency operations, this one covering 1942–75. Dr. Graham A. Cosmas, now with the Joint History Office, began post-panel revisions of his history of MACV, the joint command. Retired Center historian Dr. Mary C. Gillett also began post-panel revisions of the draft fourth volume of her history of the Army Medical Department, which will carry the story from 1917 to 1941. In a work that has already generated high interest, Dr. Mark Sherry finished a draft of a history of the Army command post—HQDA—and defense reshaping, 1987–97.

These works in progress will hopefully soon join those already far enough along to be within the orbit of the Production Services Division. Production Services is particularly proud of its comprehensive new United States Army and World War II CD-ROM series. Seven multidisk CDs, numbered as Sets 1–7, together will include all the Green Books and all forty commemorative pamphlets written to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of the war. Set 1 and the forthcoming Set 2 will include all the European, Mediterranean, and Pacific combat volumes.

CMH titles recently published include:

- *The U.S. Army and the Lewis and Clark Expedition*, by David W. Hogan, Jr.
- *The U.S. Army Chief of Staff's Professional Reading List*
- *The United States Army and World War II, Set 1: European–Mediterranean–Middle East Theaters of Operations* (a 4-disc CD-ROM)
- *Today's Soldier* (a print set)
- *U.S. Army Historical Directory, 2002*

Forthcoming titles include:

- *FY 1996 Department of the Army Historical Summary*
- *JAYHAWK! The VII Corps in the Persian Gulf War*, by Stephen A. Bourque
- *The United States Army and World War II, Set 2: Asiatic-Pacific Theater*
- *The Fletcher Conference Compendium, 2001*
- *Publications of the United States Army Center of Military History, 2003*

With respect to field programs, Dr. Richard Gorell and Dr. Robert Rush attended the fifth annual conference of the Partnership for Peace Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes in Paris on 17–19 June. The conference, which was attended by representatives of forty-seven countries on four continents, focused on "Building a Strategic Community through Education and Research."

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TS Anthony Contillo, 235th Engineer Combat Battalion, San Vittore, Italy, by Edward Reep

Any subject is in order, if as artists you feel that it is part of War; battle scenes and the front line; battle landscapes; the wounded, the dying and the dead; prisoners of war; field hospitals and base hospitals; wrecked habitations and bombing scenes; character sketches of our own troops, of prisoners, of the natives of the country you visit;—never official portraits; the tactical implements of war; embarkation and debarkation scenes; the nobility, courage, cowardice, cruelty, boredom of war; all this should form part of a well-rounded picture. Try to omit nothing; duplicate to your heart's content. Express if you can—realistically or symbolically—the essence and spirit of War.

Instructions for Army artists from the
War Department Art Advisory Committee
1 March 1943

The 1943 War Art Program

By Peter Harrington

In an editorial entitled "What of Art in Wartime?" published a few days after Pearl Harbor, the *American Artist* posed the question "What is the use of art *now*?" The writer argued that the role of the artist, the actor, and the musician should be to act as "a stabilizer for the national spirit in our expected trial by fire."[1]

Two months later the same journal observed that several agencies, including the armed forces, were beginning to employ artists to create posters, drawings, paintings, and cartoons for recruiting purposes. The Office of Civilian Defense, with help of future war artist Olin Dows, had, it reported, commissioned several well-known artists at $10 a day plus expenses to make paintings at defense plants.[2] In its Art Bulletin no. 1, entitled "A Call to Artists," the agency asked artists to submit on or before 15 January 1942 pictures of subjects relating to the war and defense. A total of 1,189 artists sent in 2,582 watercolors, drawings, and prints, of which the agency purchased 109. These works were exhibited at the National Gallery of Art in Washington, D.C., beginning in February 1942, before traveling to Chicago, Milwaukee, and Denver.[3]

While each service and various federal agencies created art programs to serve their wartime needs, the government established no central body to coordinate artistic efforts. The Office of War Information made a move in this direction in the late summer of 1942 when it organized a Bureau of Publications and Graphics, whose Division of Graphics under *Fortune* magazine art editor Francis Brennan was geared in part "to assist American artists who wish to take part in the war effort."[4] While acknowledging that local soldier art competitions were already being held in camps, Brennan pushed for a central organization for this effort. "It must be admitted that, thus far, the Government has fumbled the ball—first, because it had no central organization for the purpose; and second, because there was a split point of view on how the war graphics job was to be done." While he would not succeed in centralizing the administration of wartime art operations, Brennan did issue an impassioned call for wartime art:

> Certainly now, in this greatest of all wars, is the time to find out if another Goya is fuming in Iowa, or another Daumier sketches acidly in Vermont. The American people need their artists now—to charge them with the grave responsibility of spelling out their anger, their grief, their greatness and their justice. The artist will respond, as he has countless times before in the history of the world, to fight it out on the field where no others can.[5]

The U.S. Army did not develop any formal art unit until late 1942. As Brennan noted, however, artists who had been inducted were by then participating in various uncoordinated camp art programs around the country. Many of these were sponsored by the Army Special Services Branch, the new name for the Morale Division which had been established in 1918 "to study, devise and put into effect psychological measures among the troops to produce and maintain good morale."[6]

Enhanced Army art efforts had begun in the year before the attack on Pearl Harbor. In the late spring of 1941 Maj. Harry Cooper, the post morale officer at Fort Custer, Michigan, put together a group of soldier-artists who began turning out paintings, posters, and prints. The artists depicted barrack scenes, soldiers on the march, armored cars in action, bayonet practice, and other Army activities. The Fort Custer Army Illustrators, as they called themselves, later held annual shows of their work, several of which received national exposure.[7]

The American Federation of Arts and the College Art Association created an experimental art program in August 1941 at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, "to explore the possibilities, advantages, and limitations of a recreational program employing the arts for the enjoyment and participation of soldiers at the camp." At Camp Barkeley, Texas, Cpl. Samuel D. Smith painted military scenes as murals with the hearty endorsement of his commander, Col. Henry A. Finch. T. Sgt. John B. Lear, Jr., who was assigned to the Reproduction Department at the Cavalry School Detachment, Fort Riley, Kansas, was so successful sketch-

View of Shanghai from Hamilton Home, by Barse Miller, 19 November 1945

ing the men in his unit that he was selected to do portraits of the officers. Artists, sculptors, and photographers at Keesler Field, Mississippi, grouped together to improve the cultural atmosphere and physical surroundings for their fellow draftees. There and at numerous other camps, groups of soldier-artists produced murals that brightened up the stark surroundings of barracks, service clubs, recreation halls, and dayrooms in an effort to make them "interesting and comfortable places of assembly instead of mere shelters from weather."[8]

In many cases, artists came together in camps purely by chance, but at Fort Meade, Maryland, artists were actively recruited. This post was home to the 603d Camouflage Battalion, and the unit's adjutant sent letters to various publications inviting artists to apply to the battalion.[9] Meanwhile, a team of six soldier-artists with the Engineer Replacement Training Center at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, led by Pvt. Willard Cummings, had worked since December 1941 creating murals depicting aspects of military life and training to decorate recreation halls and service clubs at the camp. At first, these artists used money from a special emergency fund for extracurricular activities and donations from Washington civilians, including $100 from the National Gallery of Art, to purchase necessary supplies for this project, but these funds were soon expended. In the spring of 1942 the Museum of Modern Art in New York came to the rescue by donating proceeds from a huge art sale for the armed forces. Over 500 works by many fine artists realized $15,000, which helped equip studios at eleven air and ground installations. In its publicity, the museum highlighted the Fort Belvoir soldier art program.[10]

Artists spent time at Fort Belvoir throughout 1942. One of them, Andre Kormendi, realized the importance of the project and similar ones elsewhere and composed a letter to the *American Magazine of Art* outlining the need for a consolidated war art program:

> Those who endorse the objectives of the project full heartedly feel that this task is a valuable one. . . . They feel that this relatively small investment pays large dividends in morale building, in creating respect for the Army in people who are justly concerned with the welfare of the men in service, and in providing valuable material for a history of this war. Some among them even feel that this program should be enlarged and extended, that men trained in this and other similar tasks should be sent to follow our units to other camps, foreign bases, theaters of operations, to absorb and record the historic mission of our forces in all its important phases. They also believe that this task can only be accomplished by soldier artists; by men trained in the art of warfare.[11]

Kormendi's idea eventually caught on and many of the Fort Belvoir artists would work in the 1943 war art program and succeeding projects.

Soldier art competitions were held around the country. In April 1942 *Life* magazine announced an art competition for drawings, watercolors, and paintings by uniformed personnel which "must relate to scenes connected with the artist's experience while on active duty with the armed forces." A total of $1,000 in prize money was promised.[12] This was the first time that a major national magazine had taken the lead in promoting soldier art, and it was the precursor of a much more extensive war art program sponsored by *Life* that started in late 1943 and continued through the remainder of the war. In fact, as early as 1941 *Life* had commissioned artists to represent how the United States prepared for war and fought it. The artists involved in this effort included Floyd Davis, Tom Lea, Fletcher Martin, Barse Miller, Paul Sample, and Byron Thomas.[13]

These early artistic endeavors demonstrate the willingness of many senior Army officers not only to tolerate but in several cases to wholeheartedly embrace and encourage art programs. Yet no attempt was made to coordinate these efforts into a single scheme until the Office of the Chief of Engineers announced an initiative at the end of 1942. While the impetus came no doubt from the many Army art projects then under way, the announcement by the Navy in October 1942 that it was establishing a naval art program undoubtedly helped push the Army to develop a similar art operation. The Navy Department's Office of Public Relations commissioned several

leading artists to produce paintings, drawings, and etchings "to bring home to the American people a vivid picture of battles and other naval actions."[14]

In its turn, the Office of the Chief of Engineers' Operations and Training Branch, Troops Division, set about to create a war art unit to depict scenes in the daily life of the soldier, combat actions and other events of military importance, and views of combat support operations. The creation of this war art unit responded to a memorandum of 13 November 1942 approved by Lt. Gen. Brehon B. Somervell, commander of the Services of Supply, directing the Chief of Engineers, Maj. Gen. Eugene B. Reybold, "to form a select group of artists and dispatch them to active theaters to paint war scenes." The directive also authorized "local commanders at posts, camps, and stations . . . to employ such talent as they have in uniform" to decorate buildings with murals.[15] Somervell reported both to General George C. Marshall, the Army's chief of staff, and to Robert Patterson, the under secretary of war, and he may have been acting at the suggestion of one of his superiors when he mandated this war art program. Somervell himself had had dealings with artists before the war in his capacity as director of the Works Progress Administration (WPA) relief project in New York.[16]

One of the engineer artists working on the Fort Belvoir mural program, 2d Lt. Sidney Simon, had painted a large formal portrait of Fort Belvoir's commander, Brig. Gen. Edwin H. Marks, a career engineer officer. Sometime in this period, Simon received a call from Marks to go to Washington at the request of the chief of engineers.[17] Simon was given a small office and asked to compile a list of artists already serving in the Army whom he considered suitable for the art project. He located more than fifty artists in various camps on the East Coast alone.[18] Some of these soldiers were already involved with art programs while others had received direct commissions based on their artistic talents, so for many it was a logical move into the new program. Simon managed to have several soldier-artists transferred to the engineers from other branches, but he could not approach the Navy or the Marine Corps as they were developing their own art programs.

By mid-December, Simon and his office had prepared a draft directive for the soon-to-be official war artists of the Corps of Engineers. The order would authorize its recipients "to make sketches and paintings anywhere within the zone of the American Army" in their assigned theater of operations, subject to such verbal instructions as they might receive. The goal would be to produce "a pictorial record depicting the innermost significance of the war and to stress just those aspects which need to be stressed. Your duties," the directive explained, "will be more that of a war correspondent gathering pictorial information in forward battle areas and developing and finishing these sketches and paintings in rear zones. Each artist will be equipped with a camera for use in conjunction with gathering material."

The directive also provided that "all finished sketches and paintings will be sent to the home office" periodically, where, after review and release by censors, they "will be placed at the disposal of the War Department, public relations, historians, educational institutions, museums and the public at large. . . . It is hoped that they will finally be placed in complete form as a permanent exhibit." The directive also observed that it was "definitely not the aim or purpose of this undertaking to gather a series of portraits or landscapes."[19]

The program took a significant turn in January 1943 when Brig. Gen. Frederick H. Osborn, director of the Special Service Division, Services of Supply, received a visit from George Biddle, a New York mural artist who was the brother of U.S. Attorney General Francis Biddle, inquiring whether his services could be used in the war effort.[20] General Osborn showed the artist Somervell's November directive, and with Osborn's permission George Biddle proceeded to show it to John J. McCloy, the assistant secretary of war. Seemingly unaware of the Corps of Engineers' fledgling effort, McCloy asked Biddle to prepare a memorandum on the subject.[21] Biddle responded with a paper entitled "Organization and Selection of War Artists and Writers," which listed seventeen artists who Biddle thought might be suitable for the job. McCloy forwarded Biddle's paper to General Reybold. Evidently concluding that Biddle had contacts in high places that merited respect, the engineer chief then invited Biddle to organize and chair a War Department Art Advisory Committee (WDAAC). Reybold apparently thought the project would better be handled by a committee than by the

5000 Miles from Brooklyn, by Sidney Simon, Southwest Pacific

existing one-man office in Washington. Lieutenant Simon, meanwhile, was on Cape Cod scouting for additional artists when he received a call from Col. Robert H. Burrage of the Office of the Chief of Engineers ordering him to return to the capital. He was later informed of the new advisory committee.[22]

Biddle had already played a seminal role in promoting federal support for art as part of the New Deal. Biddle, who had accompanied noted Mexican muralist Diego Rivera on a sketching tour of Rivera's homeland in 1928, had written in May 1933 to President Franklin D. Roosevelt and observed how Mexican artists had been able "to express on the walls of the government buildings the social ideals of the Mexican revolution." Biddle urged Roosevelt to employ American artists to express "in living monuments the social ideals that you are struggling to achieve." The president invited Biddle to talk with the appropriate Treasury Department official, and before the year was out that department made funds available to inaugurate the Public Works of Art project, which in two years would employ 3,600 artists in every state in the Union. This project was succeeded in 1935 by the Federal Art Project, which provided employment for many jobless artists. Biddle himself worked on a series of murals on the theme "society freed through justice" at the headquarters of the Department of Justice in Washington, D.C.[23]

Biddle had contemplated the role artists should play in the war as early as June 1942, when he wrote from Brazil to Henry Varnum Poor, New York City's fine arts commissioner, "that we should do what we can to help the country or our own profession during the crisis."[24] Poor was thinking along the same lines and had presented to various officials an outline of a "proposal to form an Artists Corps to record characteristic and significant military and civilian events, activities and persons. (a) For current information through reproduction in the Press and by exhibitions; (b) for future historians. The record," he suggested, "will go to a National War Museum or the Library of Congress." In Poor's conception, such a corps would be administered by the Section of Fine Arts of the Public Buildings Administration and would comprise three different groups: a salaried corps of about 40 artists paid $300 a month with the status of war correspondents assigned "to record activities in distant and dangerous places"; about 50 to 75 volunteer artists who would receive passes to record production and other activities in restricted areas in the United States; and volunteer artists to record local activities in unrestricted areas. The government could purchase the work of the latter two groups.[25] Apparently Poor's ideas did not reach the War Department, although they were shared with the Office of War Information in the Office for Emergency Management.

Major Marston Arms the Eskimos, by Henry Varnum Poor

Biddle was certainly aware of Poor's ideas, and he may have drawn on some of them in forming his own concepts of how to structure a war art program. By late January 1943, Biddle began taking steps to make the program a reality with the assistance of the Associated American Artists, a New York–based organization that arranged jobs for artists in the commercial field. In his capacity as chairman of the WDAAC, Biddle sought the help of various leading arts administrators, including Poor. He sent copies of the paper he had prepared for McCloy to Francis Henry Taylor, director of the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York, and David Finley, director of the National Gallery of Art in Washington, both of whom expressed support for the program.[26] The author John Steinbeck, another recipient of the paper, also endorsed the proposed war art program, remarking that "a total war would require the use not only of all the material resources of the nation but also the spiritual and psychological participation of the whole people. And the only psychic communication we have is through the arts." Steinbeck also observed that "written or photographic military history has always been objective history in spite of the fact that a great part of wars [*sic*] impact is subjective."[27]

While Steinbeck was supportive of an art program, his primary interest was the parallel creation of a corps of writers to create a written record

of the war, and he penned some "Notes appended to the memorandum of George Biddle on the advisability of sending artists to combat areas" in which he set forth his reasons for having writers accompany the artists. In this he was heavily critical of previous war "recording": "Of some wars we have no record whatever except that written by the best writers of their times. . . . Of other wars the best and most living accounts are the work not of military analysts nor news gatherers, but of literateurs (Tolstoy, Dandet, Hemingway). These were not specialists but artists and yet they have left the only comprehensible accounts of their times." Biddle sent a memo to McCloy on 3 February backing Steinbeck's proposals. Whatever the merits of such a program, Steinbeck's ideas failed to win approval. Steinbeck obtained a position as a war correspondent and left for England in late May 1943. Although he was a member of the War Department Art Advisory Committee for three months, he was not an active participant.[28]

As Biddle put the necessary pieces together in early February 1943, he undertook a hectic exchange of correspondence and memorandums covering such issues as the method of selection and payment of war artists and the establishment of the advisory committee. On 15 February Reybold announced the appointment to the committee of Reeves Lewenthal, president of the Associated Artists of America; Edward B. Rowan, director of the Public Buildings Administration's Section of Fine Arts; Finley; Poor; and Steinbeck. Of this group, Lewenthal had already arranged for several artists to be employed by Abbott Laboratories of Chicago to travel to various theaters of operations and paint scenes of the military's medical services. Each committee appointee had at the start of the month received a letter from Col. Walter Lorence, chief of the Civilian Personnel Branch, Office of the Chief of Engineers, engaging him as an "expert consultant" at $25 per day plus travel expenses for a period not to exceed three months. Two weeks later they received a second letter, this one from General Reybold, informing them that General Somervell had instructed him to form a group of selected artists to proceed overseas to paint battle scenes as a historical record of the war and that he had appointed them to serve on an advisory committee that would report to the Troops Division of his office.[29]

On 3 February Biddle submitted to Reybold a list of thirty-two artist candidates and named thirteen more artists as substitutes. These would be dispersed to the North African and European theaters, Alaska, the Pacific, and around the home front. Six days later, Biddle informed the future committee members that eleven artists had already "stated their willingness to work with us at one of the three war fronts."[30] On the same day Services of Supply sent confidential messages to the various theater commanders notifying them of the plans to create an artistic record of the war. The messages expressed Secretary of War Henry Stimson's support for the project, but they had a tentative aspect as each ended with a question: "The Secretary of War desires that action be initiated to obtain an historical and pictorial record of the war in the form of oil paintings, water colors, drawings and other graphic media. To assist in carrying out this project it is proposed to send . . . in near future a small art unit composed of approximately three artists probably civilian. Have you any objection?"[31]

The next step was to work out procedures and personnel. On 10 February Biddle submitted a lengthy memo to McCloy outlining the objectives and operational approaches of the art program. Biddle explained that the Army artists were to be sent to the various theaters of operations and to military sites in the United States. In addition, the press, industry, and other private institutions would be encouraged to commission artists to record certain phases of military activity. Soldier artists would be invited to submit their work to the WDAAC "for examination and possible acceptance as part of the pictorial war record." Finally, Biddle proposed that a headquarters with an office staff be established in New York City. Upon receipt of this

Hill 609, Tunisia, by George Biddle

agenda, the War Department asked Biddle to submit estimates for the costs involved in the execution of these ambitious plans.[32]

Biddle also wrote on 13 February to President Franklin Roosevelt, whom he had known as a student at Groton and Harvard, providing him an outline of the program. Biddle expressed concern about the program's future and suggested that the president support him. He observed that "we still have some five-bar fences to hurdle. I have no right to ask to see you just now, for I know what pressure you are under. But I can promise you that if you can find a moment to see me and to give our idea just a little shove, that no nation in history will ever have gotten as complete a graphic picture of War for the historian of future generations."[33]

There were funding problems to be ironed out, and Biddle and Lewenthal held a number of meetings with Reybold. After much discussion, Biddle and Reybold agreed how to expand the engineers' original project, which had used only military personnel, into a larger program involving civilians as well. They approved a projected war art program half of whose personnel would come from the ranks and half from a list of civilian artists proposed by Biddle and Lewenthal. The civilian artists would be paid at the salaries of Army captains. Biddle himself was to be commissioned a colonel. Had the program involved only military personnel, it could have been funded without altering the Army's budget, but including the civilian artists required adding a new budget item of $250,000.

In mid-February Reybold asked Biddle and his nascent committee to name three artists for immediate dispatch to Australia and Borneo and to suggest others to go to Guadalcanal, Alaska, England, and elsewhere. The chief of engineers acted despite the fact that General Douglas MacArthur, who had written that it would be satisfactory to send artists to his theater, was thus far the only theater commander who had responded to the message from Services of Supply. Following their selection by the committee, Poor and Joe Jones were instructed to report to the commanding general, Alaska Defense Command, at Fort Richardson, just outside Anchorage, Alaska; David Fredenthal and George Schreiber were assigned to General MacArthur's Southwest Pacific Area at Brisbane, Australia; and John Carroll, Aaron Bohrod, and Howard Cook were asked to report to the commander at Nouméa, New Caledonia. A group consisting of Biddle himself, along with Edward Laning, Philip Evergood, and William Cropper were scheduled to be dispatched at a later date either to North Africa, Great Britain, or Iceland.[34]

Transport Conversation, 1943, by Aaron Bohrod

As things turned out, not all of these civilians joined the program, and several of the artists were reassigned. The art advisory committee also added to the groups of deploying artists men already serving in the ranks. Lieutenant Simon, Capt. Barse Miller, and 1st Lt. Frede Vidar were assigned to the Southwest Pacific contingent. In early March 1943, the committee came up with a slate of additional artists for other theaters.[35]

Biddle wrote to the selected civilian artists on stationery of the Office of the Chief of Engineers, inviting them to participate and informing them of the goals of the project. Typically, the artist was advised, "You have been recommended by the War Department Art Advisory Board as one of a small group of outstanding American artists to go to an active war theater, and there to obtain a graphic record of the war." But Biddle was also looking for something more than a journalistic record, as he expressed the hope that the American artists would produce works comparable to Goya's *Horrors of War*, Orozco's drawings of the Mexican Revolution, the lithographs of Steinlen, Forain, and Naudin, and the battle scenes of Gericault, Gros, and Delacroix, powerful works that commented on as well as recorded military experience.[36]

A few days later the Corps of Engineers sent the selected civilian artists contracts offering each a salary of $3,800 per annum plus "lawful" travel expenses from point of engagement to post of duty, with the caveat that "all notes, drafts, sketches, paintings, and all other artistic creations conceived and produced by you during the life of this agreement shall be the property of the Government." The engineers also

sent the artists information about Signal Corps special equipment, including cameras, and supplies for the artists, together with a sheet entitled "Information for Artists who may be sent to Theaters of Operation by the Chief of Engineers" that dealt with travel arrangements, inoculations, art supplies, clothing, and equipment, including uniform details.[37]

In order for civilians to be employed in the program, they first had to be cleared for security purposes, and the Corps of Engineers called on the FBI to conduct background checks. Recognizing that some of the artists selected by his committee had unconventional political histories, Biddle sought to assure his brother, the attorney general, of the good intentions of the artists in his program. He observed that "our committee is, of course, convinced of the loyalty and efficiency of all the men we have selected, but it is just possible that two or three of them may have some difficulty in clearing." One of those selected, Joe Jones, had been a member of the Communist Party, but, Biddle asserted, "He is, of course willing to swear that he never had any intention or obligation to disrupt the American Government and as far as he knows, was in no way implicated with an organization that had such an intention."[38] Jones was approved and went to Alaska.

At the beginning of March, the committee, through the Office of the Chief of Engineers, provided important further guidance on both operational and artistic matters to the selected artists:

> Artists of each War Art Unit will be sent to the active theaters of war in small groups under the command of a Unit Leader. In all matters of group integration, selection of assignments and administration detail within the group they will be responsible to him. The entire group, however, as a unit and individually will at all times be under the command of the Commanding General of the area to which it is assigned.
>
> In this war there will be a greater amount than ever before of factual reporting, of photographs and moving pictures. You are not sent out merely as news-gatherers. You have been selected as outstanding American artists, who will record the war in all its phases; and its impact on you as artists and as human beings. The War Department Art Advisory Committee is giving you as much latitude as possible in your method of work, whether by sketches done on the spot, sketches made from memory, or from notes taken on the spot, for it is recognized that an artist does his best work when he is not tied down by narrow technical limitations. What we insist on is the best work you are individually capable of; and the *most integrated picture of war in all its phases* that your group is capable of. This will require team play on your part as well as individual effort. It is suggested that you will freely discuss each other's work and assignments, always in the hope of new suggestions and new enthusiasm. Any subject is in order, if as artists you feel that it is part of War; battle scenes and the front line; battle landscapes; the wounded, the dying and the dead; prisoners of war; field hospitals and base hospitals; wrecked habitations and bombing scenes; character sketches of our own troops, of prisoners, of the natives of the country you visit;—never official portraits; the tactical implements of war; embarkation and debarkation scenes; the nobility, courage, cowardice, cruelty, boredom of war; all this should form part of a well-rounded picture. Try to omit nothing; duplicate to your heart's content. Express if you can—realistically or symbolically—the essence and spirit of War. You may be guided by Blake's mysticism, by Goya's cynicism and savagery, by Delacroix's romanticism, by Daumier's humanity and tenderness; or better still follow your own inevitable star. We believe that our Army Command is giving you an opportunity to bring back a record of great value to our country. Our Committee wants to assist you to that end.
>
> Circumstance, your Unit Leader and the Commanding General of your area will determine the method in which you work. It can be roughly divided into two phases: the rapid accumulation of data, notes, photographs, sketches and impressions at the scene of the action; and secondly, the rendering or working up of this material into a more permanent form. This will best be accomplished at the rear, where you will be provided with working facilities, or in the United States upon your return.[39]

Member of the Alaska Territorial Guard, by Joe Jones

Once these instructions had been issued, the tasks of creating the units, making travel arrangements, and procuring the necessary equipment presented substantial challenges to the committee and tested Biddle's organizational skills. Biddle and his committee selected a leader of each War Art Unit. His task was to act as liaison officer between the unit and the commanding general of the theater. He was also responsible for integrating the work of the unit and for making periodic and emergency reports on its work and on that of its individual members.[40] Thirteen units were created, but there were numerous problems to resolve before they could depart to their appointed theaters. Equipment had to be gathered at the embarkation centers. Various departments, including the Signal Corps, needed to be informed that cameras and other equipment had to be shipped to these points. Simon had already obtained some equipment for the earlier engineer project before the art advisory committee had been created, and the engineers made sure

that the artists received what they needed. As a result, what Henry Varnum Poor and his colleagues found when they arrived at the Presidio of San Francisco in early April 1943 en route to Alaska surprised them. "We were all in a state of excitement over the quality and the abundance of the stores of artists' supplies laid in for our use."[41] Nevertheless Poor was somewhat disconcerted:

> It all made me uneasy and seemed very amateurish, this dragging along of so much equipment. I didn't have the heart to say so, nor the strength of character to resist getting my share of the enticingly fine brushes and paints and papers, but I knew that a few bottles of ink, a tiny water-color set, and a box of colored crayons, with a sketchbook to fit into my pocket, would be about all I would ever use.[42]

Gun Crews Cover Landing Craft, Arawe, New Britain, by David Fredenthal

Civilian artists were given a certificate attesting to their having an "accredited status" similar to that of war correspondents, which was designed to provide them protection in case of capture. They also received a photo-identification card. They wore officers' uniforms bearing no insignia of rank. Instead, a noncombatant patch was sewn on the left sleeve below the shoulder. The fact that some of the artists had civilian status while others were already serving in the Army, either as commissioned officers or enlisted men, resulted in inequalities in pay and status. The differences in status sometimes caused problems. The first three-artist team sent to the South Pacific included the civilians Cook and Bohrod and T. Sgt. Charles Shannon. Cook and Bohrod were allowed to use the officers' mess, but Shannon was forbidden to set foot in the place. Even before the teams had left the States, Bohrod complained to the WDAAC about the inequality of status accorded their enlisted teammember, but the committee could do nothing about it.[43]

Each artist assigned to the Pacific was told to proceed to San Francisco for processing and embarkation. The first group to arrive there consisted of Miller, Vidar, Fredenthal, and Simon, who were en route to MacArthur's headquarters in the Southwest Pacific. While waiting to board ship, they were eager to sketch military scenes in the San Francisco area, but they needed to obtain special permission to sketch and photograph port installations, shipping, and other sensitive subjects. The artists felt hampered by the fact that, as Simon put it, "outside of the few copies of Chief of Engineer's [*sic*] correspondence that I have in my possession, we have no official authorization of our mission." On 12 March the artists were permitted to draw cameras and film for photographing places they deemed of value to their work, but questions remained as to when they could commence sketching. Miller then raised the question as to whether the artists could sketch while aboard transports, as their directive stated that the artists were to paint overseas. General Reybold came to the group's assistance on 17 March by sending a telegram to the commanding officer of the San Francisco port stating: "It is desired that group of artists headed by Captain Barse Miller destined for Southwest Pacific be allowed freedom to paint scenes on board ship while en route."[44]

Once the teams were assigned to the Pacific theaters, the committee had to consider teams for other areas of operations. In mid-March letters went out to additional artists announcing that these theaters would include the Caribbean and South America, West Africa (Dakar and Accra), England and Iceland, Northwest Africa, the Near East, India, Burma, and China.[45] On 22 March, authority was requested to expand the art project to these other theaters, which Marshall granted, and at the end of March, Colonel Burrage listed the units as follows:

Theater	Headquarters	# Artists
Alaskan	Ft. Richardson	4
S.W. Pacific	Melbourne	4
So. Pacific	Noumea	3
No. African	Algiers	3
Great Britain	London	3
Iceland	London	2
Caribbean	Quarry Heights	2
Panama	Quarry Heights	2
So. Atlantic	Recife, Brazil Ascension Island	2–3
Central African	Accra, Gold Coast Liberia	2–3
Middle Eastern	Cairo, Egypt Iraq Iran	4
Asiatic	New Delhi, India Burma China	5
Total		36–38 artists[46]

As for the home front, Biddle expressed the following views to a committee colleague: "I wish to keep distinct the possibility of short dramatic assignments on the Home Front—such as embarkation, debarkation scenes, training schools of air-fighters, bombers, ski and parachute battalions, negro divisions, etc.,—all of which could be done either by civilians or enlisted men in a few weeks."[47]

Biddle, who had served as a captain in World War I and had marked his fifty-eighth birthday in January 1943, applied for a new commission but was notified in late February that he had failed the qualifying physical due to evidence of coronary artery disease. A second test at Walter Reed General Hospital confirmed the findings. According to Biddle, after all the arrangements had been made and the units established, he was approached by General Reybold to take charge of the North African unit. In mid-April Biddle notified many of the artists of his pending departure for North Africa. He also announced the appointment of six additional persons to the War Department Art Advisory Committee, which Lewenthal would henceforth chair.[48]

Biddle had made a second effort to win direct White House endorsement of the war art program in mid-March, but in early April he learned that this attempt had also failed. Writing to Maj. Gen. Edwin Watson, President Roosevelt's military secretary, Biddle had stated, "I believe that when these artists are at the front a word from the President would be an inspiration in reaffirming the high importance of their work for posterity; and also in securing for them the sympathy and facilities of the commands to which they are attached." Attached to the letter was a statement Biddle had prepared for the president's use. On 10 April another of Roosevelt's secretaries responded that it was not customary for the president to write letters of endorsement in connection with any undertakings of the War Department. Biddle also received letters from other groups and individuals about the project including a letter from the artist Marion Greenwood on behalf of seventeen women artists proposing the involvement of outstanding women artists in the program both at home and abroad. From Peter Blume, another artist, came an offer to depict the work of the Army Medical Corps. Biddle did not respond positively to these offers.[49]

Once the frustration of delays and red tape was behind them, the artists chosen for the project could enjoy the exhilaration of proceeding to their specified destinations. The artists' letters of acceptance to Biddle clearly showed the excitement they felt in being able to do their part in the war effort. There were in all 42 artists, of whom 19 were civilians, 16 enlisted men, and 7 commissioned officers.[50] By early May a number of them were already in theater. The Southwest Pacific team had reached Australia in late April, and the unit leader, Captain Miller, wrote to the committee:

> We are most happy to reach our permanent stations and to advise that every facility is being extended to get us established. . . . We have enjoyed an opportunity of seeing Suva and environs on Fiji. . . . During the trips at sea and while waiting unloading cargo for 8 days at Suva, permission was obtained to make watercolors and drawings and in some places photographs. Consequently we have on hand a quantity of unfinished material to work up, which we propose to do while getting a base established here.[51]

Howard Cook of the South Pacific unit announced on 15 May that "we have arrived safely [at Noumea] after a very pleasant trip with very interesting work accomplished on board ship, a few things which we hope to send back to you soon to show the beginning of our part of the project. . . . It looks like we can get going very soon and with keenest enthusiasm. We are on our toes with the excitement of being here at last and about to get down to real work."[52]

Most of the Alaskan group had arrived, evidently at Fort Richardson, on 5 May, the same day that Biddle reached Algiers. Two other members of the North African unit arrived a few weeks later, and transfers were approved for three more. By the end of May, the units for the United Kingdom, Iceland, the Caribbean, Panama, and Brazil were in standby status at various ports; other artists were awaiting transfer or had already been cleared to go to Ascension Island in the South Atlantic, Central Africa, the Middle East, and Asia. Letters to the commander of each theater preceded the artists.[53]

Back home, the program had been announced by the War Department's Bureau of Public Relations in late April 1943, and many of the nation's newspapers devoted attention to the program. On 27 April the *New York Herald Tribune* and the *New York Times* printed small announcements, while the *Washington Post* two days later introduced its readers to the program by describing the arrival of the Southwest Pacific Army artist group and of Navy artist McClelland Barclay in Australia. The *Art Digest* ran a picture of several of the artists awaiting embarkation in San Francisco in its issue of 1 May. *Yank* on 28 May reproduced two sketches by Pfc. Albert Gold of Richmond Army Air Base, Virginia, along with a caption that stated that he was one of twelve enlisted men who had been selected to make a pictorial record of the war at overseas bases.[54]

Less than a week after Biddle arrived in North Africa, he was interviewed by war correspondents. He recorded the event in his published memoirs: "May 11 . . . Messed with the correspondents and to bed exhausted."[55] This is the only interview to which Biddle alludes, but it provoked serious repercussions back home. On 1 June both the *New York Times* and the *Washington Evening Star* quoted from the interview, the latter appending a photograph of a rather smug-looking Biddle. Members of Congress would shortly use part of the *Star*'s story as evidence that the war art program should be terminated. "The project, Mr. Biddle said, is one of the most liberal ever devised. The

artist works entirely *without supervision or direction* [emphasis added]. He paints only what he is inspired to paint by the environment. This will result, he believes, in a type of war record never before achieved." The article went on to quote Biddle as saying that "it would be entirely proper for a surrealist painter to paint a surrealist battle scene. That would be his own reaction and it probably also would be the reaction of many others who saw the same thing."[56]

Some felt that Biddle was bragging that he had the right to go anywhere, see anything, and paint whatever he wanted. As correspondents were normally restricted in their movements, Biddle's comments did not sit very well with the press corps. Rumblings were heard in Washington about the waste of government funds for such an art project. What could artists do that state-of-the-art movie and still cameras could not?[57]

Ironically, on the same day that the interview was published, the engineer office in New York that was supporting the art advisory committee issued a four-page newsletter describing the successes of the war art program. Titled "Newsletter No. 1," although a second issue was apparently never published, it listed all the artists and their current stations, quoted from various members' descriptions of the optimism of their units, added a note about publicity and museum interest, and announced that over 1,200 artists had applied for assignments. It ended: "*A HOPE*—Naturally, all of us—here in New York as well as in Washington—are anxiously awaiting pictorial evidence of our projects [*sic*] operation. Please bear this in mind and use your own good judgment, but at the very first opportunity ship to us whatever creative products you feel you can release."[58]

The news reports of Biddle's provocative interview appeared in the press while the House Appropriations subcommittee on the War Department was in the midst of its hearings on the military establishment appropriation bill for fiscal year 1944. Congressman Joe Starnes of the Tennessee River town of Guntersville, Alabama, was particularly disturbed by what he had read. A reserve lieutenant colonel in the Alabama National Guard who had commanded a National Guard infantry battalion headquartered in his hometown, Starnes questioned General Reybold about the program on 7 June. After Reybold answered that he had, in fact, been consulted about organizing a group of artists to provide a pictorial record of the war, Starnes asked: "Did you request that this particular group be assigned to the engineers?" to which Reybold replied, "No, sir."

"Was it your idea that this group would contribute materially to winning the war by preserving for us an art record of World War No. 2?" Starnes asked.

"I just carried out orders," Reybold replied.

Starnes concluded, "The truth of the matter is that you did not ask for this piece of foolishness, but you received instructions dated November 13, 1942, to include the item in your budget." Reybold did not demur. Somervell, who had testified before the committee in May, was never questioned about the program by the House subcommittee.[59]

When the $71.5 billion appropriation bill came to the House floor on 19 June, it included a provision prohibiting the Army from spending any of that money for "any military or civilian personnel employed outside continental United States to paint or otherwise reproduce war scenes except by means of photography, or to paint portraits." Similarly no funds could be spent within the continental United States on any "decorative art projects or painting portraits" by military personnel. The chairman of the appropriations subcommittee, Congressman J. Buell Snyder of Pennsylvania, explained this proviso to the House as follows: "The next proposition sounds a bit like W.P.A. The Army has an art project. It has civilian and military artists in this country and abroad. I shall let my colleague the gentleman from Alabama [Mr. Starnes] tell you about it later. We just felt that General Somervell was right when he said this bill is for the support of a fighting army, *and that picture painting might well be dispensed with* [emphasis added]." Somervell had told the House subcommittee on 26 May 1943, "In fiscal year 1944, a fighting army must be financed," but he did not discuss the war art program with the committee.[60]

War Orphans, by George Biddle

While no amendment to strike this proviso was offered on the House floor, Congressman A. Willis Robertson of Lexington, Virginia, the site of General Marshall's alma mater, spoke critically of the provision withholding funds from the war art project: "We can take photographs of what happens in Europe, but my point was it takes the vision and artistic skill of the artist to bring us the inspiration which only an artist can put on canvas." Noting that Washington, Lincoln, and McKinley had all used artists, he informed his colleagues that the present Army project, which so far had cost around $30,000, had the "wholehearted endorsement of General MacArthur, General Eisenhower, and of the War Department."[61]

The Senate dropped the House proviso against the war art project before it passed its version of the appropriation bill, but its conferees subsequently accepted an amended version of it which postponed its implementation until 1 September 1943, two

months after the start of the fiscal year. The president signed the bill containing this language on 1 July 1943, as the new fiscal year began.[62]

Out in the theaters, the various artists were finally getting into the swing of things and producing some quality work, completely unaware of the deliberations of Congress in Washington. It was not until mid-July that the news of their program's termination finally began to filter through. Biddle himself got word of it in a letter from Lewenthal on 16 July:

> Dear George,
> My letter to you of two days ago telling you that we had come out whole in the Congressional action was premature. . . . In conference between the House and Senate, our project was killed!
> Not only were we eliminated, but the Section of Fine Arts was liquidated, Special Services in the Army involving painting was stopped and the Graphic Division of the OWI was eliminated.
> This indeed is a blackout of Art in America. There is little more that I can tell you except that the liquidating process is a heart-rending affair. Upon instructions from Washington, I've had to speak to each of the nineteen men we have here who are awaiting transportation.
> There is little more, George, that I feel that I am capable of writing. I know you will understand.
> Blessings,
> Reeves[63]

This came as devastating news to the artists, many of whom did not hear it until the end of July. Even in Biddle's own North African theater the other artists did not get the news until 27 July, when they were also informed that Biddle had left for Sicily. M. Sgt. Mitchell Siporin wrote in his diary:

> This morning we went to Eng. Section and Major Shirk told us he had bad news for us. We were completely unprepared for the order he read us saying that "Life" Magazine had taken over the art program—were continuing the contracts of the civilians—and that the soldier-artists—meaning us—would be transferred to other units. This was so damn sudden and absolutely "incredible," to use Rip's expression. Rip [Lt. Rudolph von Ripper, another artist] is going back this afternoon to see the Major about getting out (38 yrs.) or getting transferred to Intelligence work. As for myself—I'm in a pickle—and I don't know what's up until Biddle returns from Sicily.[64]

Siporin did not see Biddle again until 27 August, by which time their war art unit had been dissolved, Biddle was settling into his new role as a *Life* artist, and Siporin was about to start work with the Engineer Section of Allied Forces Headquarters in Algiers. Some artists like 2d Lt. Edward Reep had no sooner arrived at their appointed destination to start work than they were rerouted. Reep had been sent to the North African unit to join Biddle, Siporin, von Ripper, and others, but on his arrival at Algiers he was informed that he would be reassigned, as he had been a "military artist under war art project, which has terminated."[65] Reep was then assigned to work as a commercial artist for the Psychological Warfare Branch, Allied Forces Headquarters, in Algiers, illustrating propaganda leaflets and posters. However, in December 1943 General Eisenhower personally assigned him to lead a five-artist team that would accompany and record the service of Fifth Army in Italy. Attached to that army's historical section, Reep made frequent forays to the front to observe combat scenes, which he later rendered artistically in sketches and paintings. Mixing combat and art, Reep received two battlefield promotions and a bronze star.[66]

In the Southwest Pacific unit, Captain Miller was assigned to public relations with the air forces; Lieutenant Vidar became an aide to Maj. Gen. Hugh Casey, MacArthur's senior engineer officer; and Lieutenant Simon, the only artist who had received basic engineer training at Fort Belvoir, became part of a small unit engaged in engineer reconnaisance.[67] Aaron Bohrod, a member of the South Pacific unit who went to work for *Life* magazine upon the termination of the war art project, commented on the news in his diary on 21 August:

> The Government has withdrawn from the War Art Project. . . . Even though I am just as well off working for *Life*, and the prestige is perhaps greater, I would rather this had happened after I had returned to the States rather than while we were here. The action had taken place while we were up in Rendova [Island, in the Solomons]—I mean Congressional action—One of us might, conceivably, have had his head shot off; and at this same time Congress was giving us this kick in the pants. They might have waited to judge the results of the venture before they moved to wipe out the thing.[68]

Army Trucks on Road, by Mitchell Siporin

Henry Varnum Poor received word of the project's demise on 23 July. He reacted sharply: "To save $100,000 at the expense of a free, liberal, and constructive art program and at the same time rap the Administration was too good a combination to be missed by a body which had so shamefully and consistently functioned in a purely obstructionist capacity since the first outbreak of war in Europe."[69]

The editor of *Life* magazine, Daniel Longwell, visited Secretary Stimson shortly after learning of Congress's action and offered to employ some of the civilian artists. *Life* had, in fact, been sending artists to cover the war since before the attack on Pearl Harbor. The magazine hired seventeen of the nineteen civilian members of the war art program, while the Army continued to provide transportation and billeting. Another artist joined *Collier's*. *Life*'s action in effect saved the program, for the magazine's artists went on to produce an extensive visual record of the war. However, one of the *Life* artists, Joe Jones, was drafted, and another, Lucien Labaudt, was killed on assignment when his plane went down en route from India to China on 12 December 1943. The uniformed artists were simply reassigned. The talented Jack Levine spent twenty months on Ascension Island as a special services sergeant responsible for movies and books.[70]

The cancellation of the project triggered several editorials in the national art journals condemning the action. Under the heading "Congress Fumbles the Ball," Peyton Boswell, Jr., editor of the *Art Digest*, observed: "It is true no Jap is going to be killed by an artist's brush. On the other hand, it is also true that the country was in line to receive a lot of good art reporting for its comparatively small outlay—paintings that would have constituted an irreplaceable pictorial history of the war." The *Magazine of Art* published a lengthy editorial by Peppino Mangravite entitled "Congress Vetoes Culture" in its issue of November 1943. Mangravite saw the government's action as part of a long-term pattern against art and its producers and observed that while Congress might not understand the value of art, Hitler's "systematic looting of art museums and the obliteration of national cultures" illustrated that America's archenemy did.[71]

In Broken Caen, by Aaron Bohrod

Although the war art program came to an end in August 1943, along with similar art projects in domestic camps, Congress did not and could not stifle American artistic creativity. War-inspired art exhibitions continued to attract large crowds in galleries across the nation. Some 125 eyewitness war paintings commissioned by *Life* began a nationwide tour in July 1943, after being exhibited at the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York. A few weeks earlier, a wartime organization of art groups, Artists for Victory, Inc., had announced a competition on the theme of "America in the War," promising prizes totaling $800 in war bonds.[72] The competition closed on 2 August, and its fruits were shown in twenty-four cities beginning in October. *Life* was not the only private organization to employ a sizable group of artists to cover the war. By war's end, Abbott Laboratories had commissioned twelve artists to travel around the world, recording the work of the Army Medical Department, and the product of their work was published in the 1945 book *Men without Guns*. The 144 pictures produced by these artists toured the country, and their work, like the *Life* war art collection, was eventually donated to the Army.[73]

While the military appropriation act for fiscal year 1945 extended the prohibition on using civilian artists overseas, Congress dropped the ban on using military personnel for producing artwork. Secretary of War Stimson wrote to Senator Elmer Thomas of Oklahoma on 20 June 1944 requesting this change, and the secretary pledged that he would not bring civilians into the Army "solely for these [artistic] purposes." After the Senate agreed with the amendment suggested by Stimson, House conferees, including Starnes, acquiesced.[74] As a result, a number of uniformed artists who had not been taken on by *Life* obtained a new opportunity to create images of war while they were serving in units.[75] They became the nucleus in mid-1944 of an Army Combat Art Program under the War Department Historical Branch, an office which reported to the Army's Assistant Chief of Staff, G–2.[76] Some of the earlier war art units were reconstituted. The Southwest Pacific unit comprising Miller, Vidar, and Simon was reinstated around the time the Americans retook Manila. An exhibition of its earlier work had been held in Australia and received much attention.[77] Based on this record, the

trio was sent to the United States around the spring of 1945 to set up shows of war art at the National Gallery in Washington and the Metropolitan Museum in New York. Then they returned to the Pacific to prepare for the anticipated invasion of Japan. Three new artists from the Army were added to the group in expectation of a lengthy campaign. Following the employment of atomic weapons, Miller, Vidar, and Simon drew straws to see who would cover the Japanese surrender ceremonies on the USS *Missouri*. Only one artist from each of the services was allowed, and Simon represented the Army. Simon then required a further eight months to finish his painting. This art unit was finally disbanded in 1946.[78]

The works of art produced after the cessation of the original project in August 1943 are quite impressive, and today they constitute the largest part of the Army's World War II art collection. Many of these pictures were created by original members of the war art teams, and a number of them depict the campaign in Europe following D-Day.

It has been estimated that approximately 2,000 works of art were created by the Army art program between February and August 1943, of which 1,500 were considered of high artistic merit and suitable for retention by the Army.[79] The value of the short-lived program cannot be estimated, but some felt it had boosted morale. One comment that appeared in the *Washington Evening Star* on 17 September 1943 about the decision of Congress to terminate the program stated that it "has caused disappointment among American soldiers in North Africa who have had an opportunity to see the three official war artists at work at the front and behind the lines." The paper went on to state that news of the cancellation came after a visit of five U.S. senators and caused some bitterness: "The American soldier has time to calculate many things, among them relative costs. Several have written letters asking whether the senatorial visit, with its special planes, fleet of cars and entertainment did not cost the United States taxpayer as much, if not more, than the $100,000 art appropriation that Representative Starnes of Alabama carved out of a $71,000,000 [actually $71 billion] War Department budget." As Biddle commented in the foreword to his 1944 memoir, "Twenty-five thousand American artists will remember this action."[80]

In its conception the war art project was sound, and the quality and quantity of the work produced during the few months that the program existed indicate that it was a qualified success. It enjoyed enthusiastic support within the artistic community, and the War Department Art Advisory Committee had made preparations to display its artistic product around the country. Some of the blame for the project's demise, however, must be assigned to this committee. Biddle and some of the artists his committee selected were controversial figures, and Biddle's comments to reporters in North Africa were by no means politically astute. Had the project stayed under the direction of the Office of the Chief of Engineers without the involvement of civilian advisers, as originally planned in November 1942, it might have had a greater chance of uninterrupted survival. However, the contributions of the talented civilian artists that Biddle brought into the program and who were retained by *Life* magazine when the war art program collapsed cannot be overemphasized. The collection of 1,050 paintings that *Life* presented to the Army in 1960 represents one of the finest visual archives of World War II. These, along with the countless numbers of paintings produced by both official and unofficial artists serving in all branches of the armed forces during the war, make it the most artistically depicted war in U. S. history.

The Author

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Notes

1. *American Artist* 6 (January 1942): 28.
2. "Art in the War," *American Artist* 6 (March 1942): 31. The artists were Howard Cook, David Fredenthal, George Harding, Mitchell Jamison, Richard Jansen, Carlos Lopez, Reginald Marsh, and Ogden Pleissner. With the exception of Harding and Jamison, these men all served in the 1943 war art program.
3. *Magazine of Art* 35 (January 1942): 32–33. See also *Life* 12 (6 Apr 1942): 58–60, which reproduced ten of the pieces submitted in response to the call.
4. *American Artist* 6 (Sep 1942): 28.
5. Ibid., p. 29.
6. Typescript, Lincoln Kirstein, "Ft. Belvoir, Virginia, History of Art Project," p. 9, Anne S. K. Brown Military Collection, Brown University Library, Providence, R.I.
7. *As Soldiers See It, by the Fort Custer Army Illustrators* (New York, 1943).
8. "Experiment at Fort Bragg," *Magazine of Art* 35 (January 1942): 41–42, containing the first quotation; Memo, Col Henry A. Finch for Chief of Staff, 90th Infantry Division, 29 Jun 1943, Anne S. K. Brown Military Collection; "Soldier-Artists," *Art Digest* 17 (15 Jan 1943): 10; Florence S. Berryman, "Guns and Brushes," *Magazine of Art* 35 (October 1942): 214–17; Paul Magriel, ed., *Art and the Soldier* (Biloxi, Miss., 1943), containing the second quotation.
9. One such letter appeared in the *New York Times*, 19 Jul 1942, sec. VIII, p. 6.
10. The art project at Fort Belvoir was profiled in several newspapers and magazines including the *Washington Post*, 5 Feb 1942 and 24 Oct 1943, and the *Christian Science Monitor*, 21 Nov 1942. For information on the Museum of Modern Art's Armed Services Program, see *Bulletin of the Museum of Modern Art* 10 (October–November 1942): 15.

11. Quoted in Kirstein, "Ft. Belvoir Art Project," p. 26. The letter was apparently not published in the *Magazine of Art*.

12. *American Artist* 6 (April 1942): 2.

13. *Time* magazine, 5 Jul 1943, p. 43; *Army Information Digest* 20 (June 1965): 29.

14. *Art Digest* 17 (15 Oct 1942): 15. See also *American Artist* 6 (November 1942): 26.

15. Memo, Maj Gen W. D. Styer, Chief of Staff, Services of Supply, by command of General Somervell, for the Chief of Engineers, 13 Nov 1942, printed in *Military Establishment Appropriation Bill for 1944: Hearings before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, Seventy-Eighth Congress, First Session* (Washington, D.C., 1943), p. 326. See also George Biddle, *Artist at War* (New York, 1944), p. 1, and "The Victory and Defeat of Modernism," *Harper's Magazine* 187 (June–November 1943): 37.

16. Whether or not the war art program was Marshall's idea, he clearly supported it. A written statement that General Reybold provided to the House Appropriations subcommittee in June 1943 observed that "at the beginning of this project, before any artists were appointed, the Chief of Staff communicated with the commanding generals of every one of our theaters of operations, outlining the nature and scope of the proposed project; every one of the theater commanders, Eisenhower, MacArthur, and the others without exception, replied giving full approval." See *Military Appropriation for 1944: Hearings*, p. 323.

17. Interv, author with Sidney Simon, 20 Jan 1994.

18. Ltr, Simon to author, 15 Jul 1994, Anne S. K. Brown Military Collection.

19. Unsigned draft, "Directive–Official War Artists, C. E.," marked 15 Dec 1942, Sidney Simon Papers in family possession, copy in the Anne S. K. Brown Military Collection.

20. Described in Biddle, *Artist at War*, p. 1.

21. Memo, Biddle for John J. McCloy, n.d. (marked "approximately January 1, 1943"), George Biddle Papers, Philadelphia Archives of American Art, Philadelphia Museum of Art, Philadelphia, Pa., microfilm copy in the Archives of American Art, Smithsonian Institution, Washington, D.C., reels P17–18 (hereafter Biddle Papers).

22. Interv, author with Simon, 20 Jan 1994.

23. William F. McDonald, *Federal Relief Administration and the Arts* (Columbus, Ohio, 1969), pp. 354–482, with the quoted words on pp. 357–58; Martin R. Kalfatovic, " George Biddle," *American National Biography*, 2: 730–31.

24. Ltr, Biddle to Poor, 3 Jun 1942, file 1, Henry Varnum Poor Papers in family possession, microfilm copy in the Archives of American Art, reel 633.

25. "Outline for a Proposed Artists Corps," file 1, Poor Papers, reel 633. Other artists had developed similar plans. See, for example, Emanuel Bromberg, "Plan to make use of the artist in the national emergency," November 1941, copy in Anne S. K. Brown Military Collection.

26. Telg, Taylor to Biddle, 16 Jan 1943; Telg, Finley to Biddle, 15 Jan 1943; Biddle Papers.

27. Ltr, Steinbeck to Biddle, 28 Jan 1943, Biddle Papers. For a further discussion of Steinbeck's role, see Peter Harrington, "Steinbeck and the War Department Art Advisory Committee," *Steinbeck Studies* 13 (Fall 2001): 23–26.

28. Handwritten memorandum by Steinbeck, n.d., Biddle Papers, containing the quoted words; Ltr, Biddle to Steinbeck, 20 Feb 1943, Biddle Papers.

29. Ltr, Lorence to Poor, 1 Feb 1943; Ltr, Reybold to Poor, 15 Feb 1943, Poor Papers.

30. Ltrs, Biddle to Lewenthal, Finley, Poor, and Rowan, 9 Feb 1943, Biddle Papers.

31. Msg, Col A. V. Winton, Executive for Operations, Services of Supply, and Col F. A. Heileman, Deputy for Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations, Services of Supply, 8 Feb 1943, Biddle Papers.

32. Memo, 10 Feb 1943, sub: Objectives and Organizational Structure of War Department Art Advisory Committee, Biddle Papers.

33. Ltr, Biddle to Franklin D. Roosevelt, 13 Feb 1943, Biddle Papers.

34. Ltr, Lewenthal to Biddle, 13 Feb 1943; List, Office of the Chief of Engineers, Civilian Artists for Art Project, 18 Feb 1943; and Ltr, Marshall to MacArthur, 25 Feb 1943, all in Biddle Papers.

35. Ltr, Biddle to Rowan, 8 Mar 1943; Ltr, Reybold to Commander, Army Service Forces, 22 Mar 1943, both in Biddle Papers.

36. Ltr, Biddle to Bohrod, 16 Feb 1943, Aaron Bohrod Papers, Syracuse University Library; Ltrs, Biddle to Simon, Vidar, Fredenthal, et al., 19 Feb 1943, Biddle Papers.

37. Ltr, Lorence to Bohrod, 18 Feb 1943, Bohrod Papers, containing the quoted words; Memo, Burrage for artists, 18 Feb 1943, Biddle Papers; Memo, n.d., sub: Information for Artists who may be sent to Theaters of Operations by the Chief of Engineers, Biddle Papers. A salary of $3,800 per year was $100 less than that of an Army captain or major with 18–20 years of military service. See *Official Army Register, January 1, 1943* (Washington, D.C., 1943), pp. 1402–03.

38. Ltr, George Biddle to Francis Biddle, 19 Feb 1943, Biddle Papers.

39. Memo, War Department Art Advisory Committee for War Art Units To Be Sent Overseas, 1 Mar 1943, copies in Simon Papers and Biddle Papers.

40. Memo, Office of the Chief of Engineers for Miller, 25 Feb 1943, Simon Papers.

41. Henry Varnum Poor, *An Artist Sees Alaska* (New York, 1945), p. 14.

42. Ibid.

43. Memo, sub: Information for Artists who may be sent to Theaters of Operations by the Chief of Engineers; Ltr, Lewenthal to Bohrod, 12 Apr 1943, Bohrod Papers.

44. Ltr, Simon to Burrage, 3 Mar 1943, containing the first quotation; typed transcription of telephone conversation, 12 Mar 1943; Telg, Reybold to CG, San Francisco Port of Embarkation, 17 Mar 1943, containing the second quotation, all in Simon Papers.

45. See, for example, WDAAC to Pvt Emanuel Bromberg, 17 Mar 1943, Anne S. K. Brown Military Collection.

46. Memo, Burrage for WDAAC, 29 Mar 1943, sub: Expansion of Art Project to Other Theaters, Biddle Papers.

47. Ltr, Biddle to Rowan, 23 Mar 1943, Biddle Papers.

48. Memo for Record, Lt Gen Hunter Liggett, 16 May 1919; Memo, Lt Col William B. Foster, Office of the Surgeon General, for Officer Procurement Service, 24 Feb 1943; Ltr, Reybold to Biddle, 9 Apr 1943; Ltr, Biddle to unlisted addressees, 16 Apr 1943, all in Biddle Papers; Biddle, *Artist at War*, p. 2.

49. Ltr, Biddle to Roosevelt, 12 Mar 1943, containing the quotation; Ltr, Stephen Early, Secretary to the President, to Biddle, 10 Apr 1943; Ltr, Greenwood to Biddle, 10 Apr 1943; Ltr, Blume to Biddle, 9 Apr 1943, all in Biddle Papers.

50. For a complete list of the artists showing their civilian or military status, see Memo, Burrage for Col Joseph S. Gorlinski, Chief, Operations and Training Branch, Office of the Chief of Engineers; Brig Gen Clarence L. Sturdevant, Assistant Chief of Engineers, Troops Division; and Reybold, 29 May 1943, sub: Status of Art Units, Biddle Papers.

51. Quoted in a WDAAC Newsletter no. 1, 1 Jun 1943, Simon Papers.

52. Ibid., p. 3.

53. Memo, Burrage to Gorlinski, Sturdevant, and Reybold, 29 May 1943; Ltr, Marshall to Eisenhower, 11 Apr 43, both in Biddle Papers. The Marshall letter is printed with slight variations in Biddle, *Artist at War*, before p. 1, and Edward Reep, *A Combat Artist in World War II* (Lexington, Ky., 1987), p. 24.

54. *Yank* 1 (28 May 1943): 19.

55. Biddle, *Artist at War*, pp. 8–13, with the quoted words on p. 13.

56. Thomas R. Henry, "Biddle's Brother Paints Scenes of Devastation on Front Line," *Washington Evening Star*, 1 June 1943, p. A–2; reprinted in *Military Appropriation for 1944: Hearings*, p. 324–25.

57. Frederick Voss, *Reporting the War: The Journalistic Coverage of World War II* (Washington, D. C., 1994), p. 136.

58. WDAAC Newsletter no. 1.

59. *Military Appropriation for 1944: Hearings*, pp. 11–12, 325, with the quoted passages on p. 325; *Biographical Directory of the United States Congress, 1774–1989* (Washington, D.C., 1989), pp. 383, 1863; *Official National Guard Register for 1931*, p. 53; *for 1939*, p. 132; *for 1943*, p. 1115.

60. *Military Establishment Appropriation Bill, Fiscal Year 1944*, H. Rpt. 566, 78th Cong., 1st sess., p. 14, containing the first quotation; *Congressional Record* 89 (78th Cong., 1st sess.): 6153, containing the second quotation; *Military Appropriation for 1944: Hearings*, p. 11, containing the third quotation.

61. *Congressional Record* 89: 6174.

62. *Military Establishment Appropriation Bill, 1944*, S. Rpt. 357, 78th Cong., 1st sess., p. 8; *Congressional Record*, 89 (78th Cong., 1st sess.): 6588; *Military Establishment Appropriation Bill, 1944*, H. Rpt. 620, 78th Cong., 1st sess., p. 2; *U.S. Statutes at Large*, 57: 352–53.

63. Biddle, *Artist at War*, pp. 57–58.

64. Mitchell Siporin diary, 27 Jul 1943 entry, file 2, Mitchell Siporin Papers in family possession, microfilm copy in the Archives of American Art, reel 1332.

65. Ibid., 27–28 Aug 1943; Reep, *A Combat Artist*, pp. 26–27, with the quoted words on p. 27.

66. Reep, *A Combat Artist*, Edward Reep file, Army Art Collection, U.S. Army Center of Military History, Washington, D.C.

67. Interv, author with Simon, 20 Jan 1994.

68. Aaron Bohrod, Pacific War diary in his family's possession, copy in Anne S. K. Brown Military Collection.

69. Poor, *Artist Sees Alaska*, p. 238.

70. Marian R. McNaughton, "The Army Art Program," in John E. Jessup, Jr., and Robert W. Coakley, eds., *A Guide to the Study and Use of Military History* (Washington, D. C., 1988), p. 321; *Life* 16 (3 Jan 1944): 3.

71. *Art Digest* 17 (1 Aug 1943): 3; *Magazine of Art* 36 (November 1943): 264–65, with the quoted words on p. 264.

72. *American Artist* 7 (June 1943): 4.

73. DeWitt Mackenzie, *Men without Guns* (Philadelphia, 1945).

74. *Congressional Record* 90 (78th Cong., 2d sess.): 6359; *Military Establishment Appropriation Bill, 1945: Conference Report*, H. Rpt. 1720, 78th Cong., 2d sess.; *U.S. Statutes at Large*, 58: 578–79.

75. For instance, T. Sgts. Emanuel Bromberg and Albert Gold, who were with a war art unit in England when the program was cancelled, joined the staff of the Historical Section, European Theater of Operations, in London. See ltr, Bromberg to author, 9 Aug 1994, in author's possession. A photograph of the members of this section is in the Anne S. K. Brown Military Collection, gift of Emanuel Bromberg.

76. McNaughton, "The Army Art Program," p. 321.

77. *Exhibition of U. S. War Paintings from MacArthur's New Guinea Campaign. Catalogue* (Melbourne, 1944), copy in Anne S. K. Brown Military Collection.

78. Interv, author with Simon, 20 Jan 1994; *American Artist* (November 1979): 83.

79. McNaughton, "The Army Art Program," p. 321. Many of the paintings created during the war are reproduced in James Jones, *WW II* (New York, 1975); Ken McCormick and Hamilton Darby Perry, *Images of War. The Artist's Vision of World War II* (New York, 1990); and *Portrait of an Army* (Washington, D. C., 1991).

80. The *Evening Star* article was quoted in the *Magazine of Art* 36 (November 1943): 264; Biddle, *Artist at War*, p. 2, contains the final quotation.

Brig. Gen. James Lawton Collins, Jr. (1917–2002)

Brig. Gen. James Lawton Collins, Jr., who served as chief of military history from 1970 to 1982, longer than any other officer, died on 5 May 2002 at his home in Middleburg, Virginia. A member of a distinguished military family, General Collins was born in 1917 in El Paso, Texas, the son of a cavalry officer who had served as an aide to General John J. Pershing during the Punitive Expedition into Mexico and would serve in World War II as a major general. General Pershing became the boy's godfather. General Collins's uncle, General Joseph Lawton Collins, commanded the VII Corps in Normandy and the remaining campaigns in Western Europe in World War II and served as chief of staff of the Army in 1949–53. His brother, Air Force Col. Michael Collins, an astronaut who participated in the Gemini X and Apollo XI space missions, survives him.

General Collins spent four years in his youth at the Lycée Chateaubriand, a French school in Rome, and graduated from the U.S. Military Academy in 1939. During World War II he commanded the 957th Field Artillery Battalion, a North Dakota National Guard unit that fought with the VII Corps in Europe, and he received a Silver Star. He served in 1952–54 as representative of the American military commander in Europe to the North Atlantic Council and in 1955–58 as military secretary of the Army's General Staff Council in the Pentagon. In 1959–62 he led the U.S. Army Language School at the Presidio of Monterey, California, and he became the first director of the Defense Language Institute. He served from August 1964 to May 1966 as a senior adviser and special assistant to the commander of the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, and in 1966–67 as an Army deputy assistant chief of staff for intelligence. He was commander of V Corps Artillery in Germany in 1967–69.

During his twelve years as chief of military history, General Collins oversaw the production of a series of monographs on the Vietnam War authored by men holding senior positions during that conflict as well as research on that war by Center historians that would later be reflected in the Center's series of Vietnam War histories. General Collins himself authored a monograph on *The Development and Training of the South Vietnamese Army, 1950–72*, and co-authored another on *Allied Participation in Vietnam*. Among the noteworthy volumes shepherded to publication during General Collins's tenure at the Center were a history of *The Integration of the Armed Forces*; a history of Army administration in the first two-thirds of the twentieth century, *From Root to McNamara*; two combat volumes in the Center's series on the U.S. Army in World War II, *The Last Offensive* and *Cassino to the Alps*; and a *Guide to the Study and Use of Military History*, to which more than two dozen military historians contributed.

General Collins

General Collins devoted special interest to efforts to return the study of military history to the Army education system, which with the assistance of senior commanders made noteworthy progress during his tenure. He also encouraged the Center to sponsor and participate in international historical programs and personally led the Army's first scholarly exchanges with the official military history offices of the Soviet Union.

In his retirement, General Collins became a grower of vinifera grapes and a member of a Virginia wine cooperative, producing as many two tons of grapes a year on his two-acre vineyard. After a memorial service at the Old Post Chapel, Fort Myer, General Collins was laid to rest with full military honors in Arlington Cemetery on 20 June. His many friends at the Center mourn his passing.

Department of Defense photo

A cartload of very young refugees

The episode's notoriety began in September 1999 with the publication of an explosive Associated Press article entitled "The Bridge at No Gun Ri," and it did not quite end with the release of the Department of the Army inspector general's investigation of the subject sixteen months later. In my view the several examinations of this episode, collectively considered, have led to a more thorough understanding not only of the Korean War but also of military responsibilities toward noncombatants. They have also demonstrated that the best remedy for the damage inflicted by a free press is, in fact, a free press.

John S. Brown

No Gun Ri Revisited

Historical Lessons for Today's Army

By John S. Brown

A number of colleagues have asked for my "take" on two recent but contrary accounts of an alleged American massacre of Korean War refugees: *No Gun Ri: A Military History of the Korean War Incident* by Robert L. Bateman (Mechanicsburg, Pa.: Stackpole Books, 2002) and *The Bridge at No Gun Ri* by Charles J. Hanley, Sang-Hun Choe, and Martha Mendoza (New York: Henry Holt, 2001). These queries have come to me and my associates not only because of the Center of Military History's responsibility for preserving and interpreting the history of the United States Army, but also because of our early and continuing involvement in research relevant to the incident, which ultimately became a cause célèbre pitting Pulitzer Prize–winning journalists against outraged Korean War veterans and their supporters. The episode's notoriety began in September 1999 with the publication of an explosive Associated Press article entitled "The Bridge at No Gun Ri," and it did not quite end with the release of the Department of the Army inspector general's investigation of the subject sixteen months later. In my view the several examinations of this episode, collectively considered, have led to a more thorough understanding not only of the Korean War but also of military responsibilities toward noncombatants. They have also demonstrated that the best remedy for the damage inflicted by a free press is, in fact, a free press.

The Center of Military History's direct involvement with No Gun Ri predates the publication of the Pulitzer Prize–winning article. We write the Army's official history, so we were, of course, no strangers to accounts of confusion and tumult during the desperate fighting in Korea during the summer of 1950. In December 1998 we were given several weeks to determine whether anything in our official records supported an allegation forwarded by the Reverend Dong-Wan Kim of the National Council of Churches in Korea that American soldiers had perpetrated a deliberate massacre of Korean civilians near the village of No Gun Ri. In our research we benefited from a sizable packet of translated Korean accounts and had at our disposal unofficial American accounts and eyewitness testimony as well. We found little in the American materials that could be linked with confidence to actions at No Gun Ri itself, and certainly nothing to suggest a deliberate massacre. However, the testimony of Koreans who alleged that they had been fired upon by American troops seemed plausible enough, and it corresponded in nature to accounts we did have of Korean civilians becoming the unintended victims of American firepower. In the early months of the Korean War, desperate and outnumbered American defenders experienced the customary problems of green troops in distinguishing friend from foe when coordinating fire and movement. Their challenges were greatly aggravated by their woefully deficient state of training and by their conviction, often supported by fact, that Communist infiltrators were mingling with refugees in order to penetrate American lines. The Center's report of 18 February 1999 concluded that "doubtless unintended civilian casualties were caused by . . . U.S. . . . units in the confusion of battle" at No Gun Ri.

Seven months later the article "The Bridge at No Gun Ri" made headlines around the world. It alleged that American troops had perpetrated a massacre under orders and then had sustained the secret for fifty years. Indignant, the Center of Military History promptly drafted a rebuttal for possible use by the Army's Public Affairs Office. In it we complimented the article's au-

thors for the breadth and depth of their research, the extent to which they captured the horrors and confusion of the war's opening months, and the vividness of their reconstruction. We took issue, however, with the way they had extrapolated from rather slender data to characterize the killings as a deliberate massacre, the numbers they had cited, and the suggestion that the Army had engaged in a fifty-year cover-up to hide its involvement. The case for a deliberate American massacre seemed to boil down to the testimony of three veterans—Edward Daily, Delos Flint, and Eugene Hesselman—supported by severe interpretations of battlefield documents that could be otherwise explained. Four hundred or so victims seemed high for the incident as we had tentatively reconstructed it and implausible for an event that had attracted so little notice. The Army had not denied possible involvement in such an incident but had simply asserted it was not liable for damages. In our twentieth century wars we have in the course of combat operations inadvertently killed thousands of French, Belgian, Italian, Filipino, Korean, and Vietnamese civilians, as well as those from other countries. As dreadful as these unintended casualties were and as extensive as was the physical devastation of war, it was not practical to assume financial liability for property destroyed or civilians inadvertently maimed or killed by soldiers who were conducting operations in accordance with the laws of war. That is probably why the letter from the Reverend Kim had been careful to allege that "the U.S. Army soldiers did kill innocent civilians deliberately, under non-combat circumstances," actions not countenanced by the laws of war. We also noted that the article's authors ignored the humanitarian instincts that the Eighth Army did display. Its refugee evacuation plan represented a major effort to integrate compassion into the maneuver scheme, and its medical regimen for the refugees remains a case study in assuming responsibility for an endangered civilian population. The fact that these efforts fell short does not denigrate the good intentions involved.

Our proposed rebuttal never left the Department of the Army. The Associated Press article had created a firestorm, and within days top officials in the governments of both South Korea and the United States, including our secretary of defense, the secretary of the Army, and the Department of the Army inspector general, committed themselves to an exhaustive review at considerable cost to determine "the full scope of the facts surrounding these press reports."

American soldiers probably inflicted the casualties, no orders to kill refugees had been given, aerial imagery and forensic evidence did not support a claim of hundreds of deaths, and no war crime had been covered up.

Because such an investigation was under way, external Army correspondence with respect to No Gun Ri, including ours, ceased. The Center of Military History fully supported the inspector general's review, from early in-briefings to participation in the drafting of the final report. There was a bit of political theater in the choreography of the inspector general's review, but its essence was painstaking research of a very high caliber. The review team examined over a million official documents; interviewed 200 American and 75 Korean witnesses; reviewed press reports, aerial imagery, and forensic evidence; and visited the incident site several times. In the end the researchers developed extraordinary detail, but their conclusions had about the same thrust as CMH's earlier report: American soldiers probably inflicted the casualties, no orders to kill refugees had been given, aerial imagery and forensic evidence did not support a claim of hundreds of deaths, and no war crime had been covered up. Aerial imagery supported the possibility that the refugees had been strafed but not that they had been bombed, and prohibitions against refugees crossing "battle lines" (i.e., positions in or imminently expecting contact with the enemy) did not preclude safely evacuating refugees through "friendly lines." This last point seems to have accounted for some of the confusion regarding the Associated Press article's assertion that the Army had issued standing orders to kill refugees.

During the Army's sixteen months of self-imposed official silence while it investigated No Gun Ri, the Associated Press and other news media were not similarly uncommunicative. One purported exposé after another appeared in print, expanding on the original No Gun Ri article by "discovering" further incidents in which American troops had killed Korean civilians. Television inevitably became involved, culminating in an extraordinary bit of soap opera when Tom Brokaw showcased a tearful episode of reunion, remembrance, and forgiveness involving alleged assailant Edward Daily and a handful of his purported erstwhile victims. Korean War veterans reacted to this cascade of calumny with indignation, first at the Associated Press and others for perpetrating it and then at the Department of the Army

Department of Defense photo

Refugees flee the combat area near Taegu.

for allowing it to roll along uncontested. Ultimately recognizing that the Army was for a period incommunicado, these veterans and their friends took up their own defense. Many contributed, but Joseph Galloway of *We Were Soldiers Once and Young* fame[1] and Edward Offley of Stripes.com led the charge. They were greatly assisted in this counterattack by the insights of Maj. Robert L. Bateman, an associate professor of history at the U.S. Military Academy who had known Daily for some years and now began to research this high-profile incident.

No Gun Ri: A Military History of the Korean War Incident should be appreciated in part as an effort by Bateman to make for the Army the case that he perceived the Army was failing to make for itself. It is fine work. Its first half is classic military history as historians should hope to write it. In lucid prose Bateman recounts the experiences of the 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry, a unit of which he was a recent veteran, from constabulary duty in Japan through the incident at No Gun Ri and beyond. His account is thoughtful, superbly documented, and well supported by maps. He does benefit from the product of the Army inspector general's investigative team, but his research is independent of theirs. He concludes that the number of slain refugees was about twenty-five and persuasively argues that the words the Associated Press construed as instructions to massacre take on a less malignant tone when fully understood and placed in context. Perhaps most significant, he makes the case that among the slain refugees there were Communist guerrillas who had fired on the Americans and that the U.S. soldiers had killed these guerrillas and seized their weapons. Moreover, he asserted that forensic evidence, eyewitness testimony, and extant records documented the use of these weapons and their evacuation through American logistical channels. If he is right about all this, the civilians slain at No Gun Ri represent neither a massacre nor a case of mistaken identity, but rather a group of noncombatants unfortunate enough to have remained in the vicinity of a legitimate military target.

For the most authoritative single account of the incident at No Gun Ri, I would recommend the first 130 pages of Major Bateman's book. In the second half of *No Gun Ri*, Bateman shifts his attention from the historical incident itself to the circumstances and the journalistic processes that led to the publication of the Associated Press article. His analysis is thoughtful, insightful, and entertaining, but ultimately overdrawn. He firmly establishes that Edward Daily was

never present at No Gun Ri and makes a persuasive case that Delos Flint and Eugene Hesselman were not present at the time of the incident either. These stunning revelations virtually gut the allegations of massacre from American sources; only these men had unequivocally asserted that they had received orders to kill refugees.

Bateman follows up on his advantage to give us a brief history of American journalism and its methods, which helps explain the media's fervor for a story that he believes misconstrued the events at No Gun Ri. In this effort he borrows heavily from insights presented by B. G. Burkett and Glenna Whitley in *Stolen Valor: How the Vietnam Generation Was Robbed of Its Heroes and History* (Dallas, 1998). Burkett and Whitley exposed dozens of fraudulent Vietnam veterans, outlining the techniques they used to paint themselves into the memory of actual veterans while participating in reunions and the like. Oral history is always risky, and is particularly so when contaminated by the passage of time, fading or jumbled memories, the published accounts of others, or a species of "group think" in which participants—or alleged participants—collectively work themselves into a consensus over time. Truth can become even more imperiled if those taking the oral testimony already have a version of the facts in mind that they are trying to induce their witnesses to support. Reading Bateman, however, one might go so far as to believe that the Associated Press journalists nefariously manipulated confused old men into disgraceful confessions, that the dozen or so American witnesses corroborating aspects of the Associated Press story were delusional, and that the testimony of the Korean witnesses was altogether dominated by the $400 million they hoped to collect in damages. As satisfying as it is to see the Fourth Estate take its just lumps, we should consider the possibility that the journalists may have been biased but nevertheless attempted to get the story straight, that the American veterans still have most of their mental faculties intact, and that the Koreans who pursued redress when even their own government was hostile to such efforts were probably sincere in doing so.

The book *The Bridge at No Gun Ri*, much improved in coverage and tone over the article for which the book's authors had won a Pulitzer Prize, inclines one toward this more favorable view. The authors clearly benefited from the criticism their article had provoked. Daily disappears from the narrative, the Army inspector general's investigation is addressed, and far more is done to establish a context. It is true that the authors do not simply confess their previous sins and try, with endearing persistence, to salvage their conspiracy theory from the discrediting of Daily and the others; that they emphasize the ugly-American aspects of the GIs over their more benevolent side; and that they manage the incredible feat of working an account of Wounded Knee into a book on the Korean War, but one can nevertheless look through this bias to see that they are attempting to balance their account. In their discussion of the incident itself, for example, we find them crediting the 7th Cavalrymen for providing succor and safe passage to some refugees even as they are shooting others. We also find the Korean victims knowledgeable enough about the possibility of mistaken identity to attempt to convince the Americans that they were not Communist infiltrators, and we learn of refugees and soldiers in another battalion working together to extricate American vehicles over a narrow mountain trail. The book produces enough evidence of the soldiers' confusion and inconsistency to be broadly compatible with the inspector general's findings of tragic mistake rather than calculated massacre.

We didn't fault the Associated Press reporters for merely bringing up an unpleasant subject, of course. Rather we faulted them for inflating the casualties, inaccurately alleging deliberateness, and accusing the Army of engaging in a cover-up.

As a historical account per se, I would recommend *No Gun Ri: A Military History of the Korean War Incident* over *The Bridge at No Gun Ri*. With thirty-five pages of endnotes, numerous maps, and direct attention to discrepancies among accounts, Bateman's history is clearly more in line with contemporary expectations of scholarship. The Associated Press journalists make a different contribution. Their flyleaf advertises the book's presentation of "the untold human story behind the killing of Korean civilians by American soldiers in the early days of the Korean War." This characterization is accurate. In their pages we get to know many of the individuals whose lives came together so tragically during July 1950. We meet the Koreans and their families and learn of their prewar lives. We follow their prolonged efforts to reconstruct those lives and achieve closure with respect to lives cut short. We also get to know a number of the American soldiers involved. For the most part they were militarily ill-prepared young men who proved courageous and capable at

later times and in different places, but who had to live with the fact that in their first great wartime paroxysm of firepower they had killed women and children for the most part. It is not necessarily a bad thing for historical tragedy to have a human face.

A number of my military colleagues have opined that the Associated Press reporters have done us a disservice. I respond that intellectual discourse puts at a disadvantage only those who do not participate in it. The journalists' original article was far more flawed and inaccurate than an article on the same subject written today would be. This is as it should be. The Army knew of numerous incidents in which Korean civilians became the victims of American firepower, yet we had never quite forced ourselves to do a detailed case study of any of them. Indeed, the Army did a far better immediate postmortem of the incident at Wounded Knee in the 1890s than we did of any comparable tragedy in Korea in the 1950s. Now we have several detailed analyses of a single Korean War incident supported by dozens of maps and photos, scores of documents, and hundreds of eyewitness accounts. It would not be hard to use this knowledge of No Gun Ri to improve our efforts to avoid similar tragedies. This is a useful aspect of history. The first step in such a reevaluation would be to reflect upon the horrible consequences of sending ill-prepared units into battle. All accounts of No Gun Ri agree that the poor state of soldier training, the hasty integration of individual replacements, and the uncertain leadership of American soldiers contributed significantly to the ultimate results. These conclusions accord with the views of Roy E. Appleman, T. R. Fehrenbach, Gordon R. Sullivan, and a host of others who have elevated the Korean War intervention into the premier example of the price paid for military unpreparedness. They also expand the circle of the victims of our unpreparedness to encompass our intended beneficiaries as well as ourselves.

We didn't fault the Associated Press reporters for merely bringing up an unpleasant subject, of course. Rather we faulted them for inflating the casualties, inaccurately alleging deliberateness, and accusing the Army of engaging in a coverup. It does seem that those killed numbered in the dozens rather than in the hundreds, but that does not much alter the horrific character of the event for those involved. Both Bateman and the inspector general's review argue persuasively that there were no deliberate orders to kill refugees, but all accounts admit to considerable confusion in that regard in the foxhole. The inspector general, for example, found a number of soldiers who considered themselves authorized to use deadly force on civilians who did not comply with instructions. Today we attempt to avoid such confusion by thinking through the possibilities in advance and issuing comprehensive rules of engagement to all echelons. Military lawyers have progressed from awaiting reports of transgressions to becoming active participants in decisions on engagement policies and prospective targets. We have learned through hard experience that it takes thoughtful preparation to minimize unintended casualties. The accounts of No Gun Ri underscore the importance of such efforts. Over the years the Army may have neglected the events that unfolded at No Gun Ri, but it does not seem to have consciously suppressed information about them.

The Associated Press reporters do not have to apologize much for seizing on an unpleasant topic, researching it in some haste, and delivering it in a manner calculated to emphasize drama and excite controversy. They are, after all, journalists. We should not be surprised that historians and investigators following up on their lead found much to improve upon in their account, and we should be gratified that the same free press that aired the Associated Press version of events was receptive to contrary views as well. The consequent give-and-take has enriched our understanding of the No Gun Ri incident, the Korean War, military responsibilities toward noncombatants, and the interplay between journalistic and historical processes.

I would recommend both *No Gun Ri: A Military History of the Korean War* and *The Bridge at No Gun Ri* to all officers and noncommissioned officers responsible for preparing soldiers to cope with the confusion of the battlefield. Read collectively and in tandem with the inspector general's review, available at *http://www.army.mil/nogunri*, they provide a gripping case study from which to draw lessons learned. Indeed, they should be required reading for all military lawyers, and the case study should become an important feature of judge advocate education. I can think of no better testimony to the value that sensible rules of engagement and adequate discipline can bring to the fight.

The Author

Brig. Gen. John S. Brown has been chief of military history since December 1998. He commanded the 2d Battalion, 66th Armor, in Iraq and Kuwait during the Gulf War. He holds a doctorate in history from Indiana University and is the author of *Draftee Division: The 88th Infantry Division in World War II* (Lexington, Ky., 1986).

Note

1. Galloway was co-author with Harold G. Moore of *We Were Soldiers Once and Young: Ia Drang, The Battle That Changed the War in Vietnam* (New York, 1992).

Forrest Pogue

In the field most of the time, Pogue slept in foxholes and huddled in them during artillery barrages and air raids, suffered cold and wetness, went for weeks without a change of uniform, and ate what and when he could, putting up stoically with whatever discomfort he experienced.

Stanley L. Falk

Pogue's War and the Making of a Military Historian

A Review Essay

By Stanley L. Falk

Anyone who knew Forrest Pogue will be delighted by the University Press of Kentucky's recent publication of *Pogue's War: Diaries of a World War II Combat Historian*, a posthumous personal account of his experiences as a combat historian in the final year of World War II in Europe.[1] Originating in a careful diary he kept during those tumultuous months, which he later expanded into a fuller, more thoughtful narrative, *Pogue's War* is both a primer for would-be wartime field historians and a revealing description of the activities and observations of the then-32-year-old historian. Franklin D. Anderson, Pogue's cousin by marriage, readied the book for publication; Stephen Ambrose contributed an enthusiastic foreword; and Forrest's widow, Christine, added a restrained but touching epilogue.

Forrest Pogue was born in Kentucky in 1912 and showed early promise as a student and scholar. After earning a master's degree at the University of Kentucky and teaching at Murray State Teachers College, he studied international relations and diplomatic history at Clark University and as an American exchange fellow at the University of Paris. He received his Ph.D. from Clark in 1939,[2] not three years earlier as both Anderson and Ambrose indicate. (pp. ix, xv) Pogue was teaching European history at Murray State in 1942 when he was drafted into the Army. He was assigned as a clerk at the Fort Harrison, Indiana, Reception Center, where his duties included typing locator cards and, as he reported, "searching recruits for whiskey, pornographic literature, and concealed weapons." (p. 4) A year later he was digging a trench in the hard, red clay of Fort McClellan, Alabama, when he was ordered to Second Army headquarters in Memphis, Tennessee, to assist its historian, Lt. Bell Wiley, in writing a history of Second Army.

In March 1944, at Wiley's recommendation, Pogue was transferred to Washington to join the Historical Branch, G–2, where some twenty soldier-historians, ranking from private to lieutenant colonel, had begun preparing a series of booklets on selected World War II battles fought by the Army—the American Forces in Action series. After a month spent studying after-action reports and other official records, he and several others were given inoculations and special training, issued field equipment, and sent to London. There Pogue, now a sergeant, was assigned to the First Army as a combat historian for the coming invasion of France.

D-Day, 6 June 1944, found him aboard an LST approaching the coast of Normandy. By the following evening, the ship was receiving and treating wounded men from OMAHA Beach, and Pogue was beginning to interview these first casualties of the invasion. Late on 8 June he was able to go ashore, where he dug a foxhole, pitched his tent, and tried to sleep despite the roar of antiaircraft guns only a short distance away. This was the beginning of Pogue's year as a First Army combat historian. From OMAHA Beach to Pilzen, Czechoslovakia, he participated in five campaigns, during which he was awarded a Bronze Star and the French Croix de Guerre. Living in the field, he covered the fighting in Normandy and at St. Lô, reached Paris just after its liberation, and followed the bloody struggles in the Hürtgen Forest and the Ardennes.

He continued on through the fight for the Roer dams and the capture of Leipzig, saw the horrors of the Buchenwald concentration camp soon after its liberation, and witnessed the dramatic meeting of American forces with the Russian army at Torgau on the Elbe.

In the field most of the time, Pogue slept in foxholes and huddled in them during artillery barrages and air raids, suffered cold and wetness, went for weeks without a change of uniform, and ate what and when he could, putting up stoically with whatever discomfort he experienced. Enemy fire was not the only danger he faced. During the Battle of the Bulge, sentries were on the alert for infiltrating German soldiers dressed in American uniforms. Pogue was arrested several times for using passwords that had been changed without his knowledge. When asked to name the capital of his state, Kentucky, he learned to reply cautiously, "Frankfort, but you may think it is Louisville." (p. 303)

Yet there were pleasant times as well. The two months he spent in Paris, working long hours with others on the history of the invasion, also afforded him time to revisit old haunts and professors from his student days and to learn much about contemporary French politics and public opinion. Both in Paris and, surprisingly, in the field as well, he had ample opportunity to renew his acquaintanceship with the language, wine, and cognac of France.

Pogue's time was spent primarily interviewing and writing campaign history. But he was also frequently pressed into service as an interpreter, since he spoke French fluently, and he could make occasional sightseeing trips. It was during this year in Europe that he developed and refined the interviewing techniques that he would continue to use with such success during the remainder of his life. A pioneer in the field of oral history, Pogue established standards and methodologies that stood as examples to all who followed. His careful use of interview material in much of his later work was an important factor in establishing oral history as a legitimate form of scholarship.

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During his year in Europe, Pogue jotted down his experiences and impressions, diary-fashion, in little pocket notebooks that he carried with him everywhere. He hoped that someday he could combine these notes with his more general memories and expand the material into a publishable account. Sometime after the war, he began to apply to this project whatever time he could find in his otherwise very busy professional life. He had made considerable progress when he discovered that it was becoming increasingly difficult for him to continue. His eyesight was failing rapidly. As Christine Pogue recounts: "He was told that he had degeneration of the retinal macula in both eyes. There was no cure. He would never run into furniture, but he never again would be able to read or write, or see anything in detail." (p. 381)

Pogue tried to find an assistant to help him complete his narrative but could locate no one who could read his nearly illegible handwriting, some of it almost a form of shorthand. As anyone who has seen Pogue's writing knows, his all but incomprehensible scribbling can challenge, and defeat, even the most astute reader. So the work remained unfinished until after his death, when Pogue's cousin and her husband, Jeannine Stallins and Franklin Anderson, decided to attempt the task of deciphering Pogue's material. Jeannine's long correspondence with Pogue had given her considerable familiarity with his writing, while Franklin's own Army experience helped him to understand many otherwise obscure military references. With some assistance from a few others and a great deal of hard work, they finished the task in about two years. The result is a narrative by Pogue that covers the period up until the beginning of 1945, including extracts from his diary notebooks themselves, a few verbatim interviews, and some material he apparently wrote at the time as part of an official account. From mid-January 1945 until the end of the war, the diary is presented alone, without further narrative.

Pogue's War is not only an account of the American drive through France and Germany as witnessed by its author—primarily with units of V Corps, First Army—but also a fascinating report of his perceptions, thoughts, and education in the school of war as he followed the advancing edge of combat. His account is insightful and analytical, at times even introspective, and is sprinkled with occasional touches of dry humor. It includes revealing details from some of his interviews, colorful descriptions of courageous battlefield actions, and frank reporting on some of the less than praiseworthy behavior of American soldiers. Pogue also provides a thoughtful discussion of the scene in newly liberated Paris, with some interesting observations about French politics and public opinion. His writing is clear, at times even dramatic, and it offers a view of the war seldom found in other sources.

It is also frequently highly personal, as exemplified by Pogue's re-

action to his first closehand view of OMAHA Beach. After interviewing wounded soldiers aboard his LST, he went ashore on D+2 and moved through the carnage of the American assault: torn and wrecked landing craft, hastily dug foxholes, barbed wire and antitank ditches, corpses piled in front of hospital tents lying grotesquely in the minefields, the torn shells of buildings, and the remains of German pillboxes and gun positions. Climbing up from the beach along a carefully marked path through the mines, Pogue's jeep joined the traffic heading inland. "As we moved up the bluff," he wrote, "we noticed at the side of the road, almost crushed by the dirt, several poppies in full bloom. I picked one and pressed it in my notebook." (p. 63)

Operating directly under Headquarters, V Corps—which directed subordinate commanders to fully support and cooperate with combat historians—Pogue and his colleagues had a broad mission. They were to ensure the preservation of source materials, prepare specific monographs and then an overall corps campaign study, advise unit historians (who usually took on this assignment as an additional duty), and support unit commanders preparing operational reports.

Getting the job done required individual or group interviews with key participants or witnesses, from privates to full colonels, and the techniques Pogue employed will be of special interest to oral historians. Within a few days of going ashore, he established a methodology which he followed fairly closely throughout the European campaign. He would first show his credentials to the local commander and then request a general description of his unit's experience on a particular day or days. He would ask about its mission, the weather and terrain, the condition of the men and the performance of their weapons, their artillery and tank support, and the major problems they encountered and how they overcame them. Then he would seek out key individuals who in turn might call on other unit members to check or corroborate their stories, until as many as twenty men might be gathered around. Before finally leaving a unit, Pogue would ask for casualty figures, usually from the first sergeants, who frequently kept track of losses. Overall casualty figures for major units, however, were best left for later study, after the confusion and fog of battle had dissipated.

Pogue's experience as a combat historian was surely the basis for much of his later professional work.

Pogue learned several lessons fairly quickly. As pinning down the exact time and location of an action could be difficult, he found it best to ask the soldier being interviewed to try to relate such specifics to other, more generally known events or places, i.e., did this event occur before or after something else happened, or before or after you had passed a certain easily recognized landmark? Furthermore, only careful questioning could determine the true nature of a particular firefight or the type of weapons encountered: was a "sharp" action more intense than a "heavy" one, wasn't the enemy really firing mortars rather than the 88s that everyone always claimed they faced? And although Pogue gives no indication, it is hard to imagine that his warm, understanding personality, his complete lack of pretentiousness, and his gentle touch with difficult people did not stand him in good stead in these interviews, as indeed it would throughout his career in oral history.

Although this is not discussed in *Pogue's War*, Pogue's experience as a combat historian was surely the basis for much of his later professional work. With the conclusion of hostilities in the spring of 1945, he was ordered back to Paris to begin writing a history of General Dwight D. Eisenhower's Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF). He continued this task as a civilian historian in Paris and subsequently with the Army's official historical program in Washington. Operating under a directive from Eisenhower, then Army chief of staff, to write the definitive history of SHAEF, he embarked on a program of interviews, research, and writing that would culminate in the completion in January 1952 of a manuscript that the Office of the Chief of Military History would publish two years later as *The Supreme Command*, a volume in the portion of the official series United States Army in World War II that dealt with the European Theater of Operations. The volume would be widely praised not only as an outstanding work of history but also as an excellent demonstration of the use and value of oral history.

Pogue worked in 1952–54 at the headquarters of U.S. Army, Europe, in Heidelberg as a member of the Johns Hopkins University Operations Research Office and then returned to Kentucky to teach history at Murray State. At the same time, he continued to write articles, reviews, and essays, including three of the six chapters in *The Meaning of Yalta*.[3] He was also in wide demand as a speaker, coloring his talks with stories and anecdotes about people he had known and interviewed and places he had visited. In 1956 he became director of the George C. Marshall Research Foundation in Lexington, Virginia, and began collecting and organizing Marshall's papers and prepar-

ing a full-length biography of the general, a responsibility he had insisted on having as a condition for taking the position and on which he would spend the next thirty years of his life.

Pogue was an ideal man for this undertaking. Not only was he an established and widely regarded scholar, but he also shared with Marshall the highest standards of integrity, character, and devotion to truth and duty. He also had the warm and ingratiating manner and gentle persistence necessary to persuade Marshall to participate in a series of interviews. Three years earlier, in fact, Pogue had written Marshall suggesting that since the general had decided not to write his memoirs, he should agree to be interviewed by professional historians, including Pogue himself. Marshall had graciously declined, but the contact had been made and the seed planted.

Pogue's first meeting with Marshall took place in the autumn of 1956 in the general's Leesburg home. Marshall remembered their earlier correspondence and, while he ruled out talking into a tape recorder, allowed Pogue to take notes on their conversation. In this and their next few meetings, the general was a little stiff and seldom volunteered information. But Pogue slowly but surely began to draw him out and, once he had persuaded Marshall to accept the tape recorder, the general talked more and more freely. In more than forty hours of taped interviews, Marshall discussed in detail major policy decisions he had made and the experiences of his youth and early years in the Army. The perspectives Pogue thus obtained would have been unavailable in documents or other sources and proved invaluable in preparing the Marshall biography. Pogue supplemented the Marshall interviews with research in archives and libraries and with interviews with hundreds of other wartime and postwar leaders and with friends and associates of the general. The result was his magnificent four-volume Marshall biography published between 1963 and 1987, a monumental achievement that drew widespread acclaim.[4]

In 1974 Pogue became director of the Eisenhower Institute for Historical Research at the Smithsonian Institution, a position he held for ten years before retiring. While continuing to work on the Marshall biography, he also wrote occasional short essays and reviews, applying his fine, critical mind to a variety of subjects. He also continued to speak and lecture widely, to serve on numerous advisory boards, and to hold leadership positions in professional scholarly organizations, including the presidency of the Oral History Association. In many ways, perhaps his most influential role was in serving as a generous adviser to hundreds if not thousands of scholars and others who sought his guidance on a wide range of subjects. He was never too busy to talk with a researcher, student, member of the press, professional historian, popular writer, or anyone else who sought his guidance on any subject on which he was knowledgeable—and there were few on which he was not. He was a wonderful conversationalist and could go on at great length, spicing his remarks with a delightful string of anecdotes or fascinating historical tidbits. His phone would be busy for hours at a time, simply because he rarely limited himself to less than half an hour per call, and he frequently spent most of the day on the phone as one call followed another.

A few years after Pogue left the Smithsonian, his eyes rapidly failing, he and Christine returned to Murray, Kentucky, their final home together. He died in 1996, at the age of 84, after a sudden stroke. *Pogue's War*, his final contribution to history, reminds all of us who knew him of the fine scholar and true gentleman he was. It reminds us also of how much we miss his presence.

The Author

Stanley L. Falk first joined the Historical Division, Department of the Army, in 1949 and soon became acquainted with Forrest Pogue. They remained lifelong friends. Dr. Falk taught international relations at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, served as chief historian of the U.S. Air Force, and was deputy chief historian for Southeast Asia at the Center of Military History. He is the author of five books and numerous articles on World War II. Most recently, his essay "The Army in the Southwest Pacific" appeared in William M. Leary, ed., *MacArthur and the American Century* (Lincoln, Nebr., 2001).

Notes

1. Published in October 2001, *Pogue's War: Diaries of a World War II Combat Historian* is offered at a list price of $29.95.

2. See Forrest C. Pogue, *The Supreme Command*, United States Army in World War II (Washington, D.C., 1954), p. x; the foreword to Pogue's published 1968 Harmon Memorial Lecture at the Air Force Academy, *George C. Marshall: Global Commander* (Colorado Springs, 1968), reprinted in Harry Borowski, ed., *The Harmon Memorial Lectures in Military History, 1959–1987* (Washington, D.C., 1988), p. 194; his entry in the *Directory of American Scholars, Eighth Edition* (New York, 1982), 1: 598; the program for the dedication of the Pogue Center in Lexington, Va. (1994); and the memorial note in *Army History*, No. 40 (Winter 1997): 10.

3. Pogue contributed "The Struggle for a New Order," "The Big Three and the United Nations," and "Yalta in Retrospect" to John L. Snell, ed., *The Meaning of Yalta: Big Three Diplomacy and the New Balance of Power* (Baton Rouge, 1956).

4. The four volumes, all bearing the title *George C. Marshall*, were subtitled *Education of a General, 1880–1939* (New York, 1963), *Ordeal and Hope, 1939–1942* (New York, 1966), *Organizer of Victory, 1943–1945* (New York, 1973), and *Statesman, 1945–1959* (New York, 1987).

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Dr. Rush has also been coordinating plans for the 2003 symposium of the Military History Working Group of that consortium with the symposium cochairs, Germany and the Czech Republic. The Field and International Branch has also continued to make preparations for the August 2002 Conference of Army Historians, which, we anticipate, will contribute substantially to Army historians' understanding of the history of the U.S. Army in the Cold War.

Military History Detachment Task Force Noble Eagle, comprising the 46th and 305th Military History Detachments, conducted more than 500 interviews and collected over 200 documents and four dozen artifacts in its effort to document the impact of the 11 September attack on the Pentagon. After eight months of service at the Center, the 46th returned in late June to its home station in Arkansas, where it returned to a reserve status. Congratulations are in order for a job well done.

I encourage everyone to visit the newly created "Army History Knowledge Community" available through the Army Knowledge Online (AKO) portal, *www.us.army.mil.* Although the Center is still developing and adding to this site, I envision this online community's becoming a remote forum for the business of the Army Historical Program. Our ultimate, albeit long-term, goal is to elicit participation from all of the major command historical offices in the community. We will keep you all informed as the site is developed and expanded. On a related subject, our website recently achieved a new record of 5.3 million hits in a single month! Wow!

The Museum Division continues to focus heavily on the National Museum of the United States Army (NMUSA). It recently supported the first meeting of the Executive Steering Committee for that project, chaired by General John Keane, the vice chief of staff of the Army. The results of this meeting were very favorable, as the committee approved for further staffing the Center of Military History's bids for manpower and funding as well as the project concepts, command relations, and museum design the Center proposed. We have a long way to go with respect to NMUSA, but we do seem to be making important progress. We are also making significant progress with respect to both the U.S. Military Academy Bicentennial exhibit being developed for the Smithsonian and the ongoing effort to catalogue all artifacts in the Army Museum System. The latter is a long-term project measured by quiet, but ever-increasing, success.

In summary, this has been a busy quarter and it gives us great pleasure to update you about our activities. We of course look forward to hearing from you all in the field as well. We do appreciate all that you do each day to preserve and promulgate the history and heritage of the United States Army.

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Readers of *Army History* may request copies of these publications from Major Melnyk. He may be reached by e-mail at *melnykl@ngb.ang.af.mil.* They may also find an online version of *Mobilizing for the Storm* at *http://www.ngb.dtic.mil/downloads/pdf/desertstorm.pdf.*

Military Academy Publishes Bicentennial Pictorial History

The U.S. Military Academy has issued *The West Point Bicentennial, 1802–2002: A Pictorial History of the First Two-Hundred Years of the United States Military Academy.* Readers may request copies of this 76-page, magazine-format publication from the Public Affairs Office of the academy at 845-938-3808.

Upcoming Military History Conferences

The Army History Unit of the Australian Department of Defence will sponsor a conference on "The Australian Army and the Vietnam War, 1962–1972," on 3–4 October 2002 at the National Convention Centre in Canberra, Australia. Among the scheduled presenters at this conference will be Center historian Dale Andradé, former Center historian Dr. Ed Drea, and Prof. Roger Spiller of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. A limited number of conference brochures are available at the desk of the editor of this bulletin.

The Society for Military History will hold its 70th annual conference on 1–4 May 2003 at the University of Tennessee, Knoxville. The theme for the conference will be "The Military and Society during Domestic Crisis." The program committee is currently soliciting proposals for papers, particularly on the role of professional military forces, citizen-soldiers, and civilians during domestic disturbances, insurrections, civil wars, revolutions, terrorist acts, natural disasters, epidemics, and other national emergencies that involve questions of civil-military relations. The committee will, as always, also welcome proposals involving all aspects of military history. Each potential participant should send by 1 October 2002 a one-page abstract outlining the paper's topic, thesis, and sources, along with a brief *curriculum vitae,* to Dr. Kurt Piehler at 220 Hoskins Library, Knoxville, Tennessee 37996-0411 or by email to *gpiehler@utk.edu.* The committee plans to post the abstracts on the society's web site in advance of the conference.

Book Reviews

West Point Warriors
Profiles of Duty, Honor, and Country in Battle
By Tom Carhart
Warner Books, 2002, 426 pp., paper, $6.99

Review by Roger Cunningham

As the United States Military Academy celebrates its bicentennial, many publishers have produced new books examining both the institution and the experiences of its more than 59,000 graduates—the "Long Gray Line." In *West Point Warriors*, Tom Carhart tells the stories of more than a score of Academy graduates who chose the warrior's path. Carhart is a lawyer with a doctorate in history whose experiences as a cadet and as an infantry officer in Vietnam were among those highlighted in Rick Atkinson's superb chronicle of the Class of 1966, simply titled *The Long Gray Line* (Boston, 1989). Carhart's military experience and educational background make him well qualified to write such a book, and he relates the warriors' tales with feeling, beginning with the death of Bvt. Lt. Col. Eleazer Derby Wood (USMA 1806) in Canada during the War of 1812 and ending with the operations of Capt. Jason L. Amerine (USMA 1993) in Afghanistan in 2001. Perhaps because the author's combat experience was in Vietnam, he devotes about half of his book to the tales of graduates who fought and died there.

One of Carhart's best chapters deals with Russell P. "Red" Reeder, Jr. (1902–1998), a West Point legend. An Army "brat," Reeder took six years to get through the Academy, but his academic shortcomings were more than offset by his excellence as a baseball player. When he finally graduated in 1926, Red passed up an opportunity to play ball with the New York Giants and became an infantry lieutenant. During World War II, his useful study, "Fighting on Guadalcanal," impressed Army Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall, a VMI graduate, enough to help him secure the command of the 12th Infantry, an element of the 4th Infantry Division, for the assault on Normandy. Reeder's heroic actions on 7 June 1944 won him a Distinguished Service Cross, but he also lost a leg and had to retire on medical grounds in 1945. Reeder returned to West Point, where he was recalled to active duty for two years and then worked as a civilian for twenty, teaching leadership, coaching the cadet baseball team, and becoming a prolific author.

Through the years, Red Reeder mentored many cadet baseball players, including Frederick M. Franks, Jr., Class of 1959, who later led VII Corps into Kuwait during the Gulf War and who retired as the commander of the Training and Doctrine Command in 1994. When Major Franks sustained such terrible wounds in Vietnam that his lower leg had to be amputated, Reeder was a key player in his rehabilitation, visiting him in the hospital and using his connections to convince General of the Army Omar Bradley (USMA 1915) to send Franks a get-well letter. The strong bonds of kinship among Bradley, who had also played baseball at West Point; Reeder; and Franks exemplify the ethos that will forever link the many generations of the Long Gray Line: "Grip hands with us, strengthen our hearts."

The author could have ended his book with his chapter on Captain Amerine's very recent experiences leading a Special Forces A Team against Taliban foes in Afghanistan, but instead he chose to close with some thoughts on "The Heart of West Point." Lamenting the fact that the percentage of West Point–trained general officers in the Army has been steadily decreasing, Carhart observes that the Academy's image is "slowly sliding from widely acknowledged prominence in the middle of the last century to what is often and increasingly seen by the American public that pays the bills as marginal relevance." (p. 403) To solve this problem, Carhart proposes that the Army follow the lead of the other services and create at West Point a new Army graduate school where senior captains and field officers could earn advanced degrees in military history and leadership. West Point would continue to produce second lieutenants, but those officers would not be allowed to enroll in this graduate school, whose student body would be, at least initially, ROTC and officer candidate school graduates. In this way, the number of Army officers exposed to training at West Point would be greatly expanded. Carhart observes that large unused or underutilized buildings already exist at West Point, which would make locating graduate school facilities there cost effective. His concept is innovative and very interesting, but change has never come easily at West Point, and many of its "old grads" as well as its opponents will probably find flaws in such a venture. If the academy hopes to silence those who criticize its more costly commissioning path, however, Carhart's proposal may be just what the doctor ordered.

Roger Cunningham is a retired Army lieutenant colonel who graduated from West Point in 1972. He served as an infantry and military police officer in the United States and Korea and as a foreign area officer in Pakistan, Egypt, and Nepal. He was the U.S. Defense Attaché in Kathmandu in 1991–92. His article "Shaking the Iron Fist: The Mexican Punitive Expedition of 1919" appeared in the Winter 2002 issue of Army History *(No. 54).*

Company "A" Corps of Engineers, U.S.A., 1846–1848, in the Mexican War
By Gustavus Woodson Smith
Edited by Leonne M. Hudson
Kent State University Press, 2001, 96 pp., paper, $14.50

Review by James W. Dunn

Kent State University Press has issued a new edition of Gustavus Smith's book about Company A, Corps of Engineers, in the Mexican War. The engineers' Battalion Press at Willets Point, New York, published the original in 1896. Writing nearly fifty years after the event, Smith produced an interesting and accurate account of engineer activities during the Mexican War. He had to be accurate since he was writing for many readers who had been alive at the time of the events. The Kent State press and editor Leonne Hudson, an associate professor of history at the university and biographer of Gustavus Smith, have improved the first edition by adding maps, photographs, an index, and endnotes that highlight personalities, many of whom went on to fame in the Civil War.

In his introduction Hudson presents an overview of the war and documents the creation of Company A. He provides brief biographies of the original company officers, Capt. Alexander J. Swift and 2d Lts. George B. McClellan and Smith. He then follows the company through the war, noting its participation in each battle of Maj. Gen. Winfield Scott's campaign in central Mexico. Hudson states that he strove to maintain the integrity of Smith's work. He succeeds admirably.

In the first half of the nineteenth century, the Army's chief engineer repeatedly asked Congress for an engineer company, albeit with little success. At the start of the war with Mexico, the Corps of Engineers consisted of about forty officers scattered around the country and a few enlisted men stationed at West Point. Not until after the declaration of war did Congress authorize a 100-man engineer company in the Regular Army. Smith notes that this company's strength peaked at 72 enlisted men, but he does not give the reasons for the shortfall. One evident problem was the high standard for enlistment. Each man had to be able to read and write and to have some mechanical knowledge. Another problem was the difficulty of recruiting in the Northeast, a stronghold of abolitionists and Irish Catholics, many of whom opposed the war.

Col. Joseph Totten, the chief engineer, assigned Captain Swift, who had returned in 1841 from the school for French engineer and artillery officers at Metz, as the company commander. Swift chose Smith from the West Point faculty, where he was instructor of practical engineering, and Smith suggested McClellan, a recent graduate in the class of 1846. Second Lt. John G. Foster, another 1846 graduate, joined the company in Mexico.

The company reached Maj. Gen. Zachary Taylor's army in northern Mexico after the Battle of Monterey and spent the fall drilling and earning the epithet "the pick and shovel brigade." (p. 5) Smith's tale of the cook who would not drill until threatened with a rapier illustrates the problem of too much time and not enough to do in a combat zone. Ordered to join Scott's army for the campaign to Mexico City, Smith led the company on a 354-mile road-building march to Tampico in December 1846 and January 1847, while Swift and twenty-two enlisted men remained behind in a hospital, victims of tropical maladies. Swift rejoined the company in time for the Vera Cruz amphibious operation but had a relapse the first day ashore, and Smith led the company for the rest of the campaign.

Smith notes that the Vera Cruz siege was a classic engineer operation and that his company played an important role. It is here that the reader begins to meet other engineer officers, including Capt. Robert E. Lee and 1st Lt. Pierre Beauregard, members of Scott's unofficial General Staff who would become prominent in the future. Scott surrounded himself with engineer graduates of the Military Academy as he felt that he and his senior officers lacked the knowledge that these proficient young officers could contribute. Smith and the engineer staff officers used the company before Vera Cruz to locate and prepare artillery positions and to outline and supervise the construction of the siege lines. Smith complains, however, that after playing such an important role in the siege, his company was not allowed to participate in the surrender ceremonies.

That lack of respect continued, according to Smith, when Company A was not placed in the lead when the army moved inland toward Mexico City. Consequently the engineers did not arrive at Cerro Gordo, the scene of the first major battle along Scott's route to Mexico City, until late on 17 April, after the battle had begun. Smith provided detachments to clear approach routes and help position artillery batteries, and then he led the remainder of his company as infantry in the main attack.

After Cerro Gordo the engineer company led the advance to Mexico City, and Smith hints that Scott followed the advice of his staff engineers in revamping the order of march. In the Valley of Mexico, Scott's army participated in five major battles: Contreras, Churubusco, Molino del Rey, Chapultepec, and Mexico City. Smith takes his readers through each one.

At Contreras, Company A personnel cleared a road through difficult terrain that allowed Scott to attack the Mexican position from the rear early on 20 August. Once again, the company participated as infantry in the action. A Mexican defensive position at Churubusco blocked the American pursuit later that afternoon. Engineer officers, with Company A as an escort, made a reconnaissance, but Smith comments that the frontal attack was haphazard and did not take advantage of the engineers' report.

Before he could get into Mexico City, Scott had to clear Molino del Rey and take the Chapultepec castle. Smith tells his readers that a ten-man detachment from his company under Lieu-

tenant Foster supported the 8 September attack at Molino del Rey. At Chapultepec, the company built artillery positions and provided scaling ladders for the storming party's early morning assault on the castle. That afternoon the company supported Bvt. Maj. Gen. William Worth's attack on San Cosme Gate, Mexico City. Smith's account provides a good example of how Scott and his senior commanders used the engineer company in combat operations. Reporting to Worth about 4 P.M., Smith found that he was the senior engineer in the division and thus had to function as a staff officer as well as a unit commander, a dual role that would be taken by many future engineer officers. Ordered to make a reconnaissance and recommend the best method to assault the gate, Smith suggested an indirect approach and recommended using Company A in an infantry role. With Worth's approval, Smith then led the company to a flanking position and forced the Mexicans from their defensive position.

By the end of the campaign Company A was at half strength, but Smith claims that as a veteran unit of more than half a dozen major battles it was no longer "the pick and shovel brigade." With the end of hostilities Smith once again faced the problem of too much time and not enough to do. His company clerk, Artificer Frederick W. Gerber, a respected veteran soldier with a tendency "when off duty, [to] indulge too freely in strong drink," (p. 67) came up with an elaborate story when accused of going on a drinking spree. What to do? Smith let it be known that Gerber would be considered for promotion to corporal or sergeant if he gave up drinking. Gerber stayed in the Army through the Civil War and was sergeant major of the Battalion of Engineers from 1867 until his death ten years later.

While Smith stayed at Vera Cruz to settle supply records, McClellan brought the company back to West Point in June 1848. Here Smith ends his account, but the unit's story continued. Company A remained in Regular Army service, and its Mexican War honors are today proudly carried by Company A, 1st Engineer Battalion, the oldest engineer unit in the U.S. Army.

Smith's work is a unit history. It is not a diary such as McClellan wrote, nor a Beauregard-style memoir. It is about Company A in the war rather than the personalities involved. It details the events, places, and dates, and relates what life and combat were like in a mid–nineteenth century U.S. Army engineer unit. As such it deserves a place on the bookshelves of those interested in wars of the nineteenth century as well as of those interested in the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.

Retired Col. James W. Dunn was a historian with the Army Corps of Engineers from 1985 until June 2002. He holds a doctorate in history from the University of Hawaii. As an artillery officer, he served two tours in Vietnam, focusing on pacification work. He was chief of the Histories Division of the Center of Military History in 1978–84.

Retreat to Victory? Confederate Strategy Reconsidered

By Robert G. Tanner

SR Books, 2001, 162 pp., cloth $65, paper $17.95

Review by Thomas Goss

"The Confederate States of America was not destined to retreat its way into existence." So concludes Robert Tanner in his *Retreat to Victory? Confederate Strategy Reconsidered*. Tanner, a longtime Civil War author and lecturer who focused on the Shenandoah Valley Campaign of 1862, has produced an insightful study of one of the great "what ifs" of Confederate strategy in this recent addition to SR Books' American Crisis Series on the Civil War era. In his most recent work, Tanner challenges those historians who with 20–20 hindsight criticize the leading Confederate strategists, President Jefferson Davis and General Robert E. Lee, for any and all Southern offensive moves and for their efforts to defend the entire Confederacy; these historians and authors also generally suggest that one or more viable (and apparently more promising) strategic options existed for the Confederacy. The outcome of Tanner's joining the argument is a must-read for students of Civil War strategy. *Retreat to Victory?* is a comprehensive strategic analysis of any potential Confederate "Fabian strategy" and a strong argument on how politically, socially, and geographically unrealistic this choice would have been in a war fought by the South for political independence and the protection of the institution of slavery.

Tanner begins with a simple question: "Why were there great battles in Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, and Tennessee rather than well-laid ambushes in Alabama's sandhills or skillful retreats through the pine forests of the Carolinas?" The remainder of the book is a very comprehensive argument assailing the idea that a Fabian strategy was a viable option for the South. In a very methodical (and very convincing) fashion, Tanner proceeds to address the cultural and political context for Southern strategic decisions to show the impact of states' rights, slavery, social order, and military geography on Confederate options for waging the war. As a result, Tanner makes a strong case that all these powerful underlying forces suppressed any contemporary consideration of conducting either guerrilla warfare or a Fabian strategy against the advancing Federal armies. Tanner also boldly challenges many assertions on military operations during the Civil War that have far too often been accepted as true without any supporting evidence. For example, Tanner goes a long way toward disproving the common hypothesis that Confederate armies lost many more soldiers in "costly" battles than they would have by a "maneuver" or raid-

ing strategy like that Stonewall Jackson conducted in the Shenandoah Valley.

The main strength of this book is the power of its analysis and the depth of its argument. After reading so many recent lengthy tomes on the Confederate High Command, this reader actually was pleasantly surprised at how much solid historical analysis and enjoyable prose fit in a compact 148 pages of text. The in-depth analysis of military geography and its impact on Southern strategic decision-making was an especially welcome addition to the ongoing debate on why the war was conducted as it was. Tanner also has the courage to go beyond casual mention of Clausewitzian axioms as he presents an entire chapter on viewing the Civil War through the lens of the famous Prussian military theorist. The resulting "On Clausewitz" makes a strong argument that Clausewitz is a highly improper tool with which to bash Confederate decision-makers. The only major weakness in the book (other than the all-too-common flaw of not enough maps) is the author's tendency to border at times on asserting "it is so because Clausewitz says so." However, the chapter on Clausewitz and the interesting use of John Keegan as a foil for the nineteenth-century theorist more than make up for this fault.

As designed, this book is a great counterweight to Charles P. Roland, Gary Gallagher, James McPherson, and others who argue that Confederate armies attacked too often for their own good. Tanner's concise book has not by any means ended the arguments on the issue of Confederate war strategy, but he has certainly advanced the historical debate. This makes the book a great read for all interested in either the military aspects of the Civil War or the choices faced by the Confederate High Command. However, *Retreat to Victory?* also offers budding strategists, graduate students, and military historians of any period a tutorial on the dangers of historical decision-making by Monday morning quarterbacks. By presenting the complex context for Confederate strategic planning, Tanner reminds us all both of the danger in simplifying historical choices and of the value in placing all historical decisions in the political, social, and strategic conditions that created them. This reminder alone is well worth the price of the book.

Maj. Thomas Goss is an Army officer currently assigned as a strategic planner at the North American Aerospace Defense Command at Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado. He has a doctorate in history from the Ohio State University and has taught the subject at the U.S. Military Academy. He served with the 82d Airborne Division in Operation JUST CAUSE in Panama and Operation DESERT STORM in Iraq and commanded an infantry company in Operation ABLE SENTRY in Macedonia.

Racial Borders
Black Soldiers along the Rio Grande
By James N. Leiker
Texas A&M University Press, 2002, 241 pp., $34.95

Review by Roger Cunningham

After the Civil War, Congress decided to allow African Americans to enlist in the Regular Army for the first time. Six regiments composed of black enlisted men were organized in 1866, and most of them were soon stationed in Texas, primarily at the forts on or near the Rio Grande. This river delineated the border with Mexico, but, as author James N. Leiker, an assistant professor at Saint Cloud State University in Minnesota, relates, few residents took it "seriously as a boundary of national authority and identity." (p. 39) Controlling the border by distinguishing Mexicans from Americans was a daunting task, since 90 percent of the residents on the American side of the lower valley had Mexican ancestry. In *Racial Borders* Leiker studies the interactions of black soldiers with members of other racial and ethnic groups in the Rio Grande valley and "conveys the limitations of race as an analytical tool for understanding conflict and cooperation." (p. 180)

In 1869 Congress consolidated the Regular Army's four black infantry regiments to form two—the 24th and 25th Infantry—and these, along with the 9th and 10th Cavalry, the other two black units created in 1866, spent much of the 1870s and 1880s stationed in the Lone Star State. Their service there prepared the region and its people "for a strengthening of national identities" and enabled the Rio Grande to evolve "from a 'frontier' to a 'border.'" (p. 95) The extent of the black military presence in Texas is illustrated by the fact that the Army in 1873 had a total of 2,700 black regulars in 44 companies—10 in each infantry regiment and 12 in each cavalry regiment—and all but 7 of these companies were stationed in that state. African American soldiers could be found at twelve different posts in Texas, with the largest group, eight companies with about 480 men, stationed at Ringgold Barracks in Rio Grande City. As the need for troops grew in other parts of the West, however, the black units were gradually transferred, and after the last one left Texas in 1885, black regulars did not return to the state until 1899.

Although black soldiers in Texas had certainly been willing to assert their rights during the earlier period, they returned there after the Spanish-American War with their pride bolstered by their brave performance under fire in Cuba and with even less inclination than before to passively accept segregation and abuse from civilian authorities. American race relations, however, were then at or near their nadir, and over the next few years "blood feuds" (p. 119) between black troops and Hispanic civilians erupted on at least five occasions. One of the best-known inci-

dents occurred at Brownsville, where Fort Brown watched over the lower Rio Grande. Three companies of the 25th Infantry moved there from Nebraska in the summer of 1906, and their relations with the local community quickly deteriorated. In August a midnight shooting spree by unidentified gunmen killed a civilian, and local citizens laid the blame solely on the unwelcome black regulars. The soldiers' guilt could not be established, but an Army investigation concluded that the infantrymen would never cooperate in determining who was guilty. President Theodore Roosevelt took their silence as proof of conspiracy, and without filing formal charges he ordered all 167 black soldiers in the companies discharged without honor,[1] shocking and dismaying the many African Americans who had supported the president. The author contributes to the historiography of this tragic incident by challenging the standard interpretation focusing on racial tensions between black soldiers and white Southerners, while questioning the "unequivocal assertion of the soldiers' innocence" (p. 144) made in John D. Weaver's book *The Brownsville Raid* (New York, 1970). Leiker points out that "historical understanding of the Brownsville affair lacks a proper consideration both of its complexity and its many antecedents on the Mexican border." (p. 143) He also stresses that Brownsville's dominant culture was that of a Mexican border town with a frontier mentality and that scholars should not be blinded to "the multiracial context in which the shooting transpired." (p. 144)

One surprising omission in this otherwise thorough study is the author's failure to discuss the participation of black Texans—some of them discharged soldiers—in their state militia, the Texas Volunteer Guard. Between 1875 and 1905 at least a score of black militia units served for varying periods of time, and during the early 1880s nine of the companies formed the First Regiment of Colored Infantry, commanded by a black colonel, A. M. Gregory. The author briefly mentions the uproar in eastern Texas that resulted from the colonel's attempt to raise another company for his regiment in 1883, but he says nothing else about the black militiamen, omitting the fact that a company based in Seguin was activated to prevent the lynching of a Hispanic prisoner in 1889—one of the few instances of black militiamen being used to enforce the law during the nineteenth century. At least one former black regular, Cpl. Lewis Taylor of the 9th Cavalry, was elected to command Galveston's Lincoln Guard in 1892, and a man who claimed to have served in the 24th Infantry commanded San Antonio's Excelsior Guard as well as the Colored Infantry Battalion that replaced the regiment in the mid-1880s. Other veterans probably also sought out the martial camaraderie of the black Texas militia units after their enlistments expired, and conversely, some of the militiamen opted to serve in the black volunteer units that the nation raised for the Spanish-American and Philippine Wars.[2]

Hero vs. Hero

Adam Paine was a Seminole Negro whose bravery as an Indian Scout with the 4th Cavalry in the Red River War in September 1874 gained him a Medal of Honor. After leaving the Army, Paine was suspected of running stolen cattle from the vicinity of Brackettville, Texas, site of Fort Clark, into Mexico. At a dance on New Year's Day 1877, Deputy Sheriff Claron Windus tried to apprehend Paine for killing a soldier in Brownsville. Windus killed Paine with a shotgun, shooting him at such close range that his clothes reportedly caught fire. Such violent deaths were fairly commonplace in frontier Texas, except for one notable coincidence—Windus was also a Medal of Honor recipient, having earned the award for his "gallantry in action" as a bugler with the 6th Cavalry in northern Texas in July 1870. We may only speculate about whether Paine's color exacerbated the itch in the lawman's trigger finger, but contemporaries believed that Windus could work effectively with African Americans. During the Spanish-American War President William McKinley commissioned Windus to command black troops. As a captain, he led a company of black soldiers raised in Houston in 1898 that was an element of the 9th U.S. Volunteer Infantry.

The Nineteenth-Century Medal of Honor

Notes

1. In 1910 the Army allowed 14 of the 167 men to reenlist, and in 1972 it reclassified the discharges of all of them as honorable, but only Dorsey Willis was still alive to receive special compensation approved by Congress a year later.

2. For details on Texas's black militiamen, see Alwyn Barr, "The Black Militia of the New South: Texas as a Case Study," *Journal of Negro History* 63 (July 1978): 209–19.

On the German Art of War Truppenführung
Edited by Bruce Condell and David T. Zabecki
Lynne Rienner, 2001, 303 pp., $55

Review by Stephen A. Bourque

Few American soldiers racing across the southern Iraqi desert in 1991 would have been able to explain the theoretical roots of their success. Most knew something about AirLand Battle doctrine and its emphasis on initiative, agility, depth, and synchronization. They were also aware, especially after the initial attack, that they were operating under mission orders, led by officers who had no difficulty in making decisions on the spot. Few, however, would be able to identify the obscure German manual that contributed to the doctrinal debate that resulted in a revitalization of American military art after the Vietnam War.

Following Germany's defeat in the First World War, a period of reappraisal and rebuilding took place within the German Army Command. The doctrinal product of that evolution was the manual *Truppenführung* (1933–34), or *Unit Command*, a book which served as the basis of German training and tactics until the end of World War II. Written under the direction of then–Lt. Gen. Ludwig Beck (1880–1944), head of the German Army's Troop Office, it drew on the approaches to military theory found in the writings of Carl von Clausewitz and Helmuth von Moltke. American exchange officers, including Capts. Harlan N. Hartness and Albert C. Wedemeyer, were exposed to this document while attending the *Kriegsakademie* (German War College) in the late 1930s.

Soldiers from U.S. Army intelligence translated this document and by 1936 an English version of Part I was in the hands of American officers at Fort Leavenworth's Command and General Staff School. Within two months of the German invasion of Poland in September 1939, the War Department replaced its archaic 1923 *Field Service Regulations* with a more dynamic document. Following further German success in France the following year, the War Department made additional revisions to these regulations and issued the result as FM 100–5, *Field Service Regulations, Operations* (1941). General Beck, now retired, must have been amazed if he discovered that his work had been put to use by a nation that had gone to war with his. Perhaps even more stunning is the fact that, thirty-five years later, when American doctrinal writers again struggled to define the secrets of successful battle command in the aftermath of the Vietnam War, they turned once more to Beck's manual. As with the 1941 field service regulations, extracts from *Truppenführung* permeate the 1986 edition of FM 100–5, *Operations*, which the U.S. Army used for tactical and operational guidance during the 1991 Persian Gulf War.

The German manual's most notable feature is the section on command with its emphasis on mission orders. Based on the lessons of World War I, German officers learned that battlefield success required subordinate leaders to display initiative in confusing circumstances and to adapt their actions to the situations they confronted. To show this kind of flexibility, they must understand the mission, the situation, and the commander's intent. Once the operation was under way, German doctrine charged subordinate leaders to succeed, even if it required changing both the scheme of maneuver and the initial objective. "In the changing situations of combat," General Beck admonished, "inflexibly clinging to a course of action can lead to failure. The art of leadership consists of the timely recognition of circumstances and of the moment when a new decision is required." (p. 23) Simply following orders from above was no longer acceptable. American doctrinal writers, emerging from the confusion of the Vietnam era, saw this concept, which permeates the German manual, as essential to operating on the "chaos of the next battlefield," and incorporated it throughout the 1982 and 1986 editions of Field Manual 100–5, *Operations*.[1] Army jargon of the late 1980s is replete with terms such as initiative, flexibility, commander's intent, and *Auftragstaktik*—all terms which attest to the influence of German military art and *Truppenführung* on American military thinking.

Truppenführung has been difficult to obtain for those wishing to study the development of military doctrine. Those translations that do exist are incomplete and uneven, as is the case of the copy I obtained at Fort Leavenworth in the 1980s. Most do not contain translations of Part II, which remained classified by the U.S. government until 2000. Bruce Condell and David T. Zabecki have solved this problem in their excellent edition. They begin with an essay that places this document within its historical context. Explaining its origins, they analyze how the German Army used and modified it during the war. After examining its strengths and weaknesses, the editors provide us a short overview of its value in the postwar years. Of special interest is their analysis of how this document was, and was not, incorporated into U.S. Army doctrinal publications.

The editors have done a masterful job of rendering *Truppenführung*'s German text into readable English prose. The choppy and awkward phrases in previous official translations have now been rendered so that they clearly convey the essence of General Beck's message. The manual's introduction is, by itself, a masterpiece of managerial wisdom, as it describes the basic elements of successful leadership for any place, any time, and any profession: "Simple actions, logically carried out, will lead most surely to the objective." (p. 17) Or, "Willingness to accept responsibility is the most important quality of a leader," and "The decisive factor, despite technology and weaponry, is the value of the individual soldier." (p. 18) Finally, Beck ends his introduction with an admonition that has stood the test of time and reads as true today as it did in 1933: "The first criterion in war remains decisive action. Everyone, from the highest commander down to

the youngest soldier, must constantly be aware that inaction and neglect incriminate him more severely than any error in the choice of means." (p. 19)[2]

The editors and their publisher have done the military history community a great service in issuing such a fine edition of this very important manual. It should become a standard reference for those interested in German performance during World War II, as well as American doctrinal debates before that war and after the Vietnam War.

Stephen A. Bourque teaches history at California State University, Northridge. A retired Army major, he served in the 1st Infantry Division in the Persian Gulf War and in 1992 commanded the Army's only Regular Army military history detachment. He authored the chapter on Operation DESERT STORM *in George Hofmann and Donn Starry, eds.,* Camp Colt to Desert Storm: The History of U.S. Armored Forces *(Lexington, Ky., 1999).*

NOTES

1. John L. Romjue, *From Active Defense to AirLand Battle: The Development of Army Doctrine 1973–1982* (Fort Monroe, Va., 1984), pp. 58–61, with the quoted words on p. 59.

2. Beck's participation in the coup plot that attempted but failed to kill Adolf Hitler and seize power in Germany on 20 July 1944 showed that he could follow his own advice and change course when military circumstances appeared to dictate. However, his and his coconspirators' lethargic efforts to seize control of Berlin that day marked a severe failure to meet Beck's demand for decisive action, a failure for which they paid with their lives. On Beck's role in this coup attempt, see William Shirer, *The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich: A History of Nazi Germany* (New York, 1960), pp. 1028–68.

From the Normandy Beaches to the Baltic Sea: The Northwest Europe Campaign, 1944–1945

By Alan J. Levine

Praeger, 2000, 223 pp., $67.50

Review by Michael A. Boden

Countless books examine specific aspects of the Second World War. The prevalence of such acute specialization makes the task of writing an overarching history of large sections of the war much more complicated. Alan Levine attempts to produce precisely that sort of work in *From the Normandy Beaches to the Baltic Sea: The Northwest Europe Campaign, 1944–1945*. In this relatively brief study, Levine strives to relate the story of the war in western Europe. He does so, however, with particular attention to two issues that he believes are greatly ignored by other historians. First, Levine attempts to emphasize elements of the campaign other than ground combat, specifically the logistical, air, and maritime aspects of operations. Second, the author specifically addresses the relationship among the Western Allies. This second theme is particularly important to Levine, who believes that historians repeatedly slight the Canadians' role in the campaign. In his effort to address and analyze the former set of issues, Levine presents some admirable narration and offers some intriguing observations. His endeavor to explore Allied relationships, however, is less successful.

The greatest strength of this book is Levine's ability to maintain an effective balance between his discussion of the operational and logistical activities not only of the Americans, but of all the Allied combatant forces in Western Europe during the final twelve months of World War II in Europe. His first chapter, comprising nearly one-quarter of the book's length, relates almost exclusively to the preparations for the cross-channel invasion, including not only the Allied debates concerning grand strategy but also the air activities, supply concerns, and deception operations that went into conducting the invasion of Normandy. Levine makes a real effort to maintain his focus on these key issues over the course of the campaign. Supply concerns figure most notably during the fall of 1944, when competition for limited resources and materiel became paramount for army-level commanders, particularly American Lt. Gen. George S. Patton and British Field Marshal Sir Bernard L. Montgomery. To Levine's credit, he keeps these considerations in focus, while never allowing them to obscure the combat operations of the theater.

Levine does not, however, achieve the same degree of success in reaching his second goal, to provide a nationally balanced portrayal of Allied operations across Western Europe. The multinational debates Levine considers and cites are presented very routinely, with little new or insightful analysis. Indeed, while he makes a particular point of singling out the Canadians as deserving greater consideration for their role in the European fighting, Levine seldom includes them directly in his discussion. Only when he explains the Allied order of battle and operational situation in June 1944 does Levine integrate his discussion of Canada's military forces with the other Allies. In the remainder of the book, the Canadians appear for the most part simply as junior partners to the British. While this interpretation could lead to some refreshing evaluation, Levine rarely goes beyond brief descriptions of roles and command relationships. His failure to address the incorporation of the Free French forces into his discussion is also remiss. For example, Levine mentions Generals Charles de Gaulle and Jean de Lattre de Tassigny a mere four times in the book, and he does not discuss Maj. Gen. Jacques Leclerc even once. While Levine's use of the British designation for the Northwest Europe campaign, a phrase that even appears in the subtitle of the book, evidences his pro-British orientation, Levine does not allow such partiality to influence his analytical perspective significantly.

Levine does advise the reader in his introduction that he will offer some conclusions that "are a bit different from those that have been prevalent, at least among American historians." (p. x) Unfortunately, it is difficult to discern to what degree Levine succeeds in this regard because of the book's almost complete failure to place his comments in their historiographical context. Levine does provide a useful, though not all-inclusive, anno-

tated bibliography of World War II scholarship that balances American, British, and Canadian perspectives of the theater. It is not apparent, however, that he used many of these sources when preparing the book, as he includes a mere seventeen footnotes in his work. While many of the comments the author makes are pointed and thought provoking, they often appear to be based on mere emotional judgment, as Levine rarely supports them by drawing on historical facts or arguments.

In total, Levine's work deserves mixed marks. For those who want a general overview of the entire theater without the encumbrance of minute details of operations and arguments, Levine's work can prove beneficial. Levine should be applauded for undertaking this examination of the European Theater from a difficult perspective. He does manage to present the progression of events in a reasonable form, and he integrates noncombat activities to a commendable degree. The severe problems with documentation and historical analysis, however, limit this book's usefulness to the serious scholar of World War II. These problems not only frustrate the reader, they also seriously detract from the important points the author wishes to emphasize; it is difficult to give full credit to Levine's interpretation when he seldom supports his assertions with tangible facts. Nevertheless, the importance of the questions Levine raises and the perspective from which he attempts to analyze the campaign lead the reader to hope for more thorough analyses in the future.

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The Battle of Ap Bac They Did Everything but Learn from It

By David M. Toczek
Greenwood Press, 185 pp., 2001, $64.95

Review by Charles R. Anderson

Among the few battles of the Vietnam War to be remembered beyond a community of specialists is the two-day clash that began on 2 January 1963 at the hamlet of Ap Bac, forty miles southwest of Saigon. Although no American combat units were on the scene—the United States was supporting the South Vietnamese at the time with equipment transfers and the guidance of some 2,500 advisers—the battle shook the assumptions of military commanders and policy makers in Saigon and Washington and attracted more attention in the United States than had any single action in the war to that time.

David M. Toczek, a serving U.S. Army major, has produced the most detailed account of the battle of Ap Bac, and its presumed antecedents, that we are likely to get for a good long time. In a seemingly limitless search for causation, the author reaches back more than a decade before the battle to sketch the origins of and foreign influences on the two forces that met in early 1963. The result is an overburdened account that keeps the reader wondering just what is and what is not relevant.

The operation that culminated in the battle began in an ordinary enough way for the time as a routine South Vietnamese Army sweep to capture a Viet Cong radio broadcast team in the Ap Bac area. However, as advisers and unit commanders struggled to maintain a halting advance over canal-crossed terrain, events departed from the script. Within a two-hour period the Viet Cong shot down five helicopters, killing three Americans. Even more demoralizing to the South Vietnamese, the guerrillas stayed in their positions and fought rather than firing briefly and then melting into the jungles or their tunnel complexes.

Despite clear advantages in firepower, equipment, and manpower, government commanders used every terrain obstacle, burst of enemy fire, and transparent excuse to avoid combat. Exasperated advisers pleaded with the Army commanders to put together a coordinated assault before daylight ran out, but the delays and halts continued. That night the enemy escaped, and the next day the finger pointing began. Furious American advisers charged Vietnamese commanders with incompetence and judged the operation a defeat. But General Paul D. Harkins, U.S. commander in Vietnam, congratulated the Vietnamese on a victory. The loss of five helicopters, the deaths of three Americans, and the open disagreement between Harkins and advisers on the scene pulled the attention of the American public toward Vietnam as had no previous incident.

There is much to question in Toczek's presentation and interpretation of the fiasco at Ap Bac. His account is not simply detailed; it is exhaustive to the point of distraction. The author lays out the development of institutions and practices that date from the late 1940s and early 1950s without clarifying their relevance to a lone battle in 1963. The subjects of such treatment include the four armies represented in some way at Ap Bac—those of North and South Vietnam, the Viet Cong, and the United States—as well as the agencies furnishing U.S. military aid, the Military Assistance Advisory Group and the Military Assistance Command. Similarly, Toczek makes much of the Vietnamese Communist watchword *dau tranh*, or "struggle," which he describes as a "mythical concept" that gave purpose to the Viet Cong soldier's existence. (p. 55) But we are never told just how *dau tranh* related to Viet Cong tactics in general or to the performance of enemy units at Ap Bac in particular. Nor are we told if

the same concept also motivated the South Vietnamese soldier, or if he relied on some other idea to counter it. In his zeal to gather everything even remotely related to his subject, Toczek slides into the realm of the trite, even repeating the old Rudyard Kipling warning against hustling the East.

Toczek did most of his research in secondary works that have been available for two decades or more. He interviewed several veterans, but only one, a former Viet Cong, seems to have added anything useful to the account. A single Viet Cong document, in translation, is used. The author's style is clumsy and repetitious, occasionally ungrammatical, and in places as somnolent as a field manual. The text is choked with military jargon and acronyms. Generous padding appears in a foreword by a retired general, marginally relevant photos, inflated discursive notes, and six appendixes that add very little. Toczek doesn't get to the battle that is his subject until page 74, and his narrative of the combat then occupies only 35 pages of the 158-page text. For the author, no detail is too small to explore, no definition too widely understood to revisit. In one footnote he even discusses what it means to shoot down a helicopter. In another, he tries to determine how many UH-1B helicopters, as distinct from UH-1As, were used at Ap Bac. Toczek does not explain why the reader should be concerned with this level of detail.

Toczek sees much to learn in the missed opportunities at Ap Bac and, despite its flaws, his book has value in a specialized venue. The problems that plagued the South Vietnamese during the battle—competing chains of command, a striking lack of initiative, and no coordination of arms—offer useful teaching points for cadets at the Military Academy, where Toczek served on the history faculty while researching the book, and for officers in the Army school system. His conclusions, however, are all borrowed, all known for decades. The reader looking for a good overview of a key battle before American combat troops went to Vietnam would do better to search elsewhere. The military specialist, however, will find a few points to ponder in Toczek's account.

Charles R. Anderson has been since 1987 a historian at the Center of Military History, where he is now in the General History Branch. He is currently working on a volume in the series United States Army in Vietnam entitled "Advice and Support, The Middle Years: 1961–1965." He is the author of two books on the Vietnam War, The Grunts *(San Rafael, Calif., 1976) and* Vietnam: The Other War *(Novato, Calif., 1982), and seven campaign studies prepared for the U.S. Army's commemoration of World War II.*

New Center of Military History Publications

The Center of Military History has published a new set of three 16-by-20-inch posters reproducing original works of art executed in the past year by M. Sgt. Henrietta M. Snowden, the Center's staff artist. The set is entitled *Today's Soldier*. The three prints reproduce the following illustrations: *Basic Training*, a watercolor and oil pastel painting showing a young recruit maneuvering through a low-crawl obstacle course; *Waiting To Go to War, 2001*, a watercolor and color pencil painting, which portrays the uncertainty faced when deploying to war; and *Medic*, a watercolor, pencil, and oil pastel that attempts to capture the frenzy of the battlefield under enemy fire. The poster set may be purchased from the Government Printing Office for $8.00 under stock number 008-029-00377-5.

The Center has also issued a new CD-ROM set entitled *United States Army and World War II: Set 1: European, Mediterranean, Middle East Theaters of Operations*. This four-disk set reproduces in electronic form *The Supreme Command*, the two volumes of *Logistical Support of the Armies*, the seven volumes pertaining to U.S. Army combat in France and Germany, the three volumes describing Army combat in Italy, and the volumes on *Northwest Africa* and *The Persian Corridor and Aid to Russia*. This CD-ROM set my be purchased from the Government Printing Office for $23 under GPO stock number 008-029-00376-7.

In preparation for the 200th anniversary of the Lewis and Clark expedition, the Center has issued a sixteen-page, color-illustrated pamphlet by David W. Hogan, Jr., entitled *The U.S. Army and the Lewis and Clark Expedition*. It may be ordered from the Government Printing Office for $2.25 under stock number 008-029-00379-1.

Orders for any of these items may be placed with the Government Printing Office online at *http://bookstore.gpo.gov*. Army publication account holders may order them from the Army Publications Distribution Center–St. Louis.