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News Notes

New Deputy Commander Reports to the Center of Military History

Col. Donald W. Warner has assumed the position of deputy commander of the U.S. Army Center of Military History, replacing Col. Daniel R. Edgerton, who retired in August 2002. Colonel Warner was commissioned as an armor officer upon his graduation from Stephen F. Austin State University in Texas in 1975. He served in 1986–1987 as a joint politico-military planner in the NATO Policy Branch, Office of the Director for Strategic Plans and Policy, J–5; in the Gulf War as executive officer of the 3d Battalion, 66th Armor, which served with the 1st Infantry Division in Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Kuwait; as an aide-de-camp to the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; as commander of the 2d Battalion, 8th Cavalry, an element of the 1st Cavalry Division; and as director for Army international plans, policy and programs integration in the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of the Army for International Affairs. For the past three years Colonel Warner was assigned as the director of the American, British, Canadian, and Australian Armies' Program, an international armies' standardization organization in Rosslyn, Virginia.

Army Museum Expansions

The 1st Infantry Division Museum in Würzburg, Germany, has reopened in its newly expanded building (*above*). The division's commander, Maj. Gen. Bantz Craddock, led a ribbon-cutting ceremony marking the event that was attended by over 150 guests, including the director of Army Museums, Judson E. Bennett, Jr.

Construction began on an addition to the Army Transportation Museum at Fort Eustis, Virginia, after a groundbreaking ceremony held on 21 May. The addition will increase the exhibit space of the museum building by 50 percent and provide new storage space for artifacts and archives. The Army Transportation Museum Foundation is funding the addition.

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The Chief's Corner

John S. Brown

The Conference of Army Historians held this August in Arlington, Virginia, was the high point of the summer's activities at the Center of Military History. This biennial gathering is of great importance both for the Center and for the Army Historical Program as a whole. It affords an opportunity for all Army historians to engage one another intellectually and personally, sharing experiences, ideas, information, and research endeavors. This year's focus, "The Cold War Army, 1947–1989," proved especially stimulating. It encompassed the great events and changes since World War II that have shaped the institution we serve today. The challenges of that period and the adaptations undertaken in response to them provide much grist for thought during this period of transformation within our Army and the world around us.

The Field Programs and Historical Services Division, under the leadership of Dr. Richard Gorell, was responsible for the overall organization and execution of the conference. Bill Epley saw to the day-to-day management of the events, with Dr. Rob Rush in charge of overseeing and organizing the two "content" days. The program consisted of superb panels and eighty paper presentations from Army historians, nationally prominent and international experts, and academic scholars. Ted Ballard ensured the administrative aspects of the four days of the conference ran smoothly. The FPHS Website Activity, with Donna Everett and Joe Frechette working many extra hours, lent its great expertise, making it possible for all participants to carry home a single CD containing forty-five papers presented at the conference. The members of the 305th Military History Detachment helped out in many tasks, large and small, as did other members of the division.

The entire CMH community was actively engaged in making the overall endeavor a great success. Panel chairs came from throughout our Army history community, and many were field historians. Our CMH Histories Division, under Dr. Richard Stewart, provided six panel chairs and secured appropriate scholars to provide intellectually stimulating papers. This conference in particular offered our historians working on Vietnam a venue in which to share some of the important research they are currently pursuing.

John Elsberg and his Production Services Division provided a superb display of written products and publications, demonstrating a selection of the 500 catalog items produced by the Center. As always, the published material establishes the basis for all further work. Members of the Museum Division, led by Jeb Bennett, readily responded to a number of very significant questions that arose during the MACOM council meeting and the extremely valuable workshop day that preceded the two days of paper presentations. The workshop day focused on the needs of Army historians in the field. It provided insights into a broad range of issues that challenge us and hopefully helped move us toward positive conclusions with respect to them.

Any discussion of the conference must feature praise for the 200 participants and attendees: those who gave papers, provided insights at the workshops, and responded to the challenging questions discussed throughout. The conference is a gathering of people with a mutual interest in the history of our great institution. It offers us the opportunity to demonstrate the results of research in a challenging way to stimulate thought, discussion, and further inquiry. It is also an opportunity to meet and greet those who share our profession. I truly thank all who came to the conference. You contributed to its great success, and we look forward to seeing you again at the next one.

Army Nurses aboard the Hospital Ship *Relief*
(Courtesy of the National Museum of Health and Medicine, Armed Forces Institute of Pathology)

"You and your party descended upon that hill suddenly and without warning, like angels from Heaven. . . . My admiration for you and your abilities is boundless."

Army Surgeon General Brig. Gen. William H. Forwood,
writing about Dr. Laura Hughes
and her Red Cross nurses

Women Physicians in the Spanish-American War

By Mercedes Graf

The history of female physicians in the military can be traced back to the Civil War, when at least seven women doctors volunteered their services at a time when the government hospital system was in confusion. Since the barriers erected against female doctors made it difficult for them to secure official posts as surgeons, the majority chose to serve as nurses instead. Two of these women—Drs. Sarah Chadwick Clapp and Mary Edwards Walker—did manage to volunteer as contract surgeons and work directly with specific regiments. Only Walker received a formal contract, but Clapp received a lump sum many years after the war in payment for her services.[1]

At the outbreak of the Spanish-American War, more than thirty years later, the War Department was still unwilling to have women on the battlefield and unenthusiastic about seeing women nurses in military camps, even in the United States. The number of medical men in the Army in April 1898, however, was barely adequate for a standing force of 28,000 men, and with the outbreak of typhoid fever in Army cantonments, the need for additional doctors and nurses became urgent. The War Department thus authorized the surgeon general to employ nurses, both male and female, under contract, and some 1,700 contract nurses, most of them women, would serve with the Army during and immediately after the Spanish-American War. Although men were again able to volunteer as military surgeons as they had during the Civil War and some 650 men served the Army as contract surgeons in 1898–1900, the War Department did not engage women to serve as doctors.[2]

The number of women physicians in the United States had grown substantially in the last decades of the nineteenth century, as a considerable number of medical schools began to accept female students and more women attempted to join the profession. While most of the nation's oldest and most prestigious medical schools still refused to accept women students, many of their newer competitors became coeducational. By 1893 women accounted for 15 to 20 percent of the medical students at the College of Physicians and Surgeons in Boston, at Johns Hopkins University, and at the Universities of Michigan, Colorado, Oregon, and Southern California. Female students comprised 25 to 30 percent of enrollment at Denver Medical College and Tufts College Medical School and more than 30 percent of the medical students at Kansas Medical College and at the homeopathic medical school at Boston University. By 1895 there were also ten all-women's medical colleges, the oldest of which, the Woman's Medical College of Pennsylvania in Philadelphia, had been founded in 1850. Overall, the 1900 census showed that 5.6 percent of the nation's physicians were women, but the percentages were much higher in urban centers, ranging from 13 to 15 percent in Chicago, San Francisco, and Los Angeles, and from 18 to 20 percent in Boston and Minneapolis. While the percentages of women physicians declined in the first decades of the twentieth century, the national average of women doctors remained at or above 5 percent until 1920.[3]

The widespread use of female doctors in the American military, however, began only in the First World War, when fifty-five were appointed as contract surgeons. As one interested party observed, "Most of them were hired at First Lieutenant's pay, without rank, pension, bonus, or regulation uniform." Even in 1942, a year after Pearl Harbor, the military still offered women physicians positions only as contract surgeons or as officers in the Women's Army Auxiliary Corps. Not until 16 April 1943, when President Franklin Roosevelt signed a bill enabling the commissioning of licensed women physicians and surgeons in the Medical Departments of the Army and the Navy, were they eligible for service on an equal basis with men. While this act awarded women doctors a status they had not pre-

viously held, they were still not allowed to go to the front, and the authorization for women physicians in the military expired six months after the conclusion of World War II. In 1950 the surgeon general reestablished the authorization, and two women physicians were accepted into service, the first since the end of the Second World War. It was not until June 1952 that Congress authorized the appointment of women physicians in the Regular Army, Regular Navy, and the Air Force, and only in March 1953 was the first woman physician commissioned in the medical service of the Regular Army.[4]

A number of female physicians, however, served in the U.S. Army as nurses prior to World War I. It is difficult to locate information regarding their service, as their records are included among those of numerous nurses and further information about them is scattered across various other files that do not necessarily identify them as physicians. The purpose of this article is to trace the history of these women physicians in the Spanish-American War.

Early History of Women Medical Personnel in the Spanish-American War

The United States declared war on Spain in late April 1898, and the two nations engaged in combat for almost four months. Secretary of War Russell Alger reported late in 1898 that 280 U.S. Army soldiers and officers had been killed in battle or died of wounds and that by 1 October the Army had suffered more than 2,500 additional deaths from disease. Yellow fever, dysentery, malaria, and typhoid fever were rampant among the troops, especially in the Army camps in Virginia, Tennessee, Georgia, and Florida. Almost 21,000 of the Army's 275,000 men contracted typhoid fever, and some 1,500 of them died of the disease. Yellow fever struck the victorious troops of Maj. Gen. William R. Shafter's Fifth Army Corps outside Santiago in July, and by early August well over four thousand of them were on sick report. Once the War Department learned the extent of the health crisis, it ordered the return of these troops to a camp it would build at Montauk Point at the eastern tip of Long Island, New York. The camp was named for Col. Charles Wikoff, a brigade commander who had died in the battle of San Juan Heights.[5]

The number of women physicians in the United States had grown substantially in the last decades of the nineteenth century, as a considerable number of medical schools began to accept female students and more women attempted to join the profession.

However bleak, this situation provided a special opportunity for women, who had not been allowed to serve as nurses in the U.S. military since the end of the Civil War. Responding positively to the opportunity to assist in the war effort, hundreds of patriotic women, trained and untrained, flooded government offices with offers to tend to sick and dying soldiers. Maj. Gen. George M. Sternberg, the Army's surgeon general, recognized the need for female nurses at Army hospitals, although he was unwilling to have them accompany troops "engaged in active operations." At the end of April 1898 he sought approval from Congress to employ men and women as contract nurses and promptly received it. On 10 May 1898, he provided an initial detachment of four women nurses to the general hospital at Key West, Florida.[6]

Dr. Anita Newcomb McGee, an officer of the Daughters of the American Revolution (D.A.R.), learned of the need to recruit nurses and offered to help in selecting qualified applicants from around the country. She suggested that the D.A.R. act as an examining board for women who wished to volunteer their services. The surgeon generals of both the Army and the Navy promptly accepted this offer, and the "Daughters of the American Revolution Hospital Corps" was organized with McGee as director. As the work of the volunteers expanded, Sternberg created an Army Nurse Corps Division in the Surgeon General's Office and on 29 August 1898 arranged for McGee to be appointed an acting assistant surgeon in the Army. Sternberg then released the Daughters from their responsibilities for examining applications for nursing positions in the Army.[7]

Ever mindful of how this important work had started, McGee stated "it was with the desire to accomplish the double purpose of being useful to the government as Daughters of the American Revolution and as being useful to our sex that the National Board proposed undertaking the selection of women nurses." The standard that Dr. McGee and her D.A.R. associates adopted for Army service included graduation from a training school combined with suitable endorsements, with primary reliance placed on the recommendation of the superintendent of nurses under whom the applicant had graduated. In judging a nurse, three areas were considered: professional ability, character, and health. Dr. McGee observed, "women physicians were also considered eligible." Military records verify McGee's subsequent assertion that "a few women physicians in good standing were also accepted as nurses."[8]

Entering the Service: Women Physicians as Nurses

Unfortunately, there does not seem to be a separate list containing the names of these female physicians. Although McGee's correspondence contains occasional references to these women, their names can be ascertained only by reviewing the Personal Data

(PD) cards for Army nurses. Each card contains the information provided by an applicant for a nursing position regarding his or her name and address, name of nursing school, hospital experience, age, birthplace, marital status, and physical characteristics (height, weight, health, and skin color; race, however, is not specifically listed). The cards also state where the candidate later served and contain evaluations of his or her performance on the job. One may distinguish a graduate physician by checking the answers given to two questions: Are you a graduate of a training school for nurses? What has been your occupation?

In completing the information requested, a few women either inserted in place of a nursing institution the name of the medical school they had attended or entered physician as their current occupation. If they had not given this information, the number or identity of these women physicians might never have been known. For example, Isabel Eliot Cowan, M.D., noted only that she had graduated in 1895 from the Woman's Medical College of Pennsylvania while Laura Hughes listed attendance at both nursing and medical schools. Mary Eloise Walker gave a decisive answer to the first question: "No. Physician. Univ. of Michigan '96." Irene S. Toland, M.D., also answered "No" to the first question and to the second responded succinctly: "Have practiced medicine continuously." Dr. Ellen Lawson Dabbs gave answers to both questions and indicated that she had gone to a medical college in Keokuk, Iowa, and that her occupation was physician. At least two other women indicated on their PD cards that they were then enrolled as medical students. Eliza Josephine Dadmun noted that she had "nursed 3 years" and was now in medical school at Tufts College. Caroline L. Danford wrote that she had done "12 months hospital work" and was a student at Ohio Medical University. Danford would serve in the Philippines as a contract nurse and join the Nurse Corps (female) in February 1901. Dadmun would obtain her medical degree in 1901 and would serve as the examining physician for the public schools of Boston from 1911 to 1915, the first woman appointed to that position.[9]

In terms of attracting women from various locations, the surgeon general gave "strict injunctions" that all parts of the country were to be represented and that those who had been exposed to yellow fever would be preferred for southern hospitals.[10] Contract nurses indeed represented more than just the United States. The Personal Data cards indicate that they came from as far away as Ireland, Scotland, England, and the West Indies. (Later eligibility for joining the Nurse Corps was restricted to United States citizens.) The seven women physicians discussed here constitute a narrow sample of Spanish-American War Army nurses, and they were not very geographically diverse since four of them were born on the East Coast.

The Army particularly wanted Dr. Mary Elizabeth Green's services in the sphere of proper nutrition, since she was reputed to be "the most noted medical authority in the nation on food products and their relationship to the physical, chemical, and medical needs of the human body."

The women physicians hired as contract nurses all received the same basic pay, namely $30 a month plus a daily ration, although there was a pay differential for chief nurses. The basic salary was later increased to $40 a month for service in the continental United States and $50 a month for service elsewhere.[11] At the outset of the war, only nurses over thirty years old were accepted, but as soon as demand increased this restriction was removed. Nurse Clara Louise Maass was only twenty-two years old when she volunteered. After her contract was annulled in May 1900, she became a participant in experiments with mosquitoes. She died in Havana of yellow fever in August 1901. The ages of the Army's seven women physicians ranged from twenty-six to fifty-four. Dr. Cowan was the youngest and Dr. Mary Elizabeth Green the oldest. Drs. Toland and Dabbs were in their forties, Drs. Hughes and McGee were in their thirties, and Dr. Walker was twenty-nine. In terms of marital status, Cowan, Walker, Toland, and Hughes listed themselves as single on the PD cards and Dabbs referred to herself as a widow.[12]

Only Drs. McGee and Green were married. Both were well off financially and, as they were able to carry on full-time professional roles outside the home in addition to being wives and mothers, they seem to have had exceptional husbands for the times. Writing about her family in postwar years, Dr. Green's daughter recalled that she had rushed home one day to have her father, Alonzo, tell her that her mother was upstairs packing. "It seems," he explained, "the government needs her more than we. They think she is a very remarkable woman," he continued. "But of course, you know I could have told them that!" The Army particularly wanted Dr. Green's services in the sphere of proper nutrition, since she was reputed to be "the most noted medical authority in the nation on food products and their relationship to the physical, chemical, and medical needs of the human body."[13]

William John McGee was also supportive of his wife's decisions. Eleven years older than Anita, he had no objections when his young wife continued her intellectual pursuits by studying medicine. In considering her husband's views on her career, Dr. McGee observed matter-of-factly that he expected his wife to have an identity of her own.[14]

Dr. Anita Newcomb McGee

A discussion of these women physicians must begin with Anita Newcomb McGee, who was the only woman given the title of acting assistant surgeon during the Spanish-American War. Born in Washington, D.C., on 4 November 1864, she was the eldest of three daughters of Professor Simon Newcomb and Mary Caroline (Hassler) Newcomb. Anita's father was a professor of mathematics at the Naval Observatory in Washington whose work in the fields of astronomy, mathematics, and economics made him the most celebrated American scientist of the late nineteenth century. Anita was educated in the private schools of her native city and at the University of Geneva in Switzerland and Cambridge University in England. In 1888 she married William John McGee, a scientist with the U.S. Geological Survey; he would later head the Bureau of American Ethnology at the Smithsonian Institution. The couple had three children: a daughter born in 1889, a son who died in infancy in 1895, and a second son born in 1902.[15]

As a young wife, McGee decided to study medicine. She received her medical degree in 1892 from Columbian (now George Washington) University and took postgraduate courses in gynecology at Johns Hopkins University. She established a successful medical practice in the city but closed it after the death of her son and joined the attending staff of the Women's Dispensary, a Washington institution that provided free medical services to women and children. She was also very active in the Daughters of the American Revolution, which had been founded in 1890.[16]

Still, the years from 1898 to 1901 were the busiest of her career. In the period from 10 May 1898 to 1 July 1899 a total of 1,563 women served as Army nurses, and Dr. McGee personally oversaw the selection of most of them from among the nearly 6,000 applications that she and her committee reviewed. In addition, she devoted herself to the arduous task of perfecting the organization of the Army's contract nurse corps and to drafting regulations governing the appointment, duties, pay, and privileges of its members.[17]

Dr. Anita Newcomb McGee
(Courtesy of the Army Nurse Corps Collection, Office of Medical History, Office of the Surgeon General, U.S. Army)

A review of her work with the Army's contract nurses reports that "Dr. McGee had to overcome prejudice, to convince and demonstrate to medical officers of the Army who were accustomed to the trained hospital corpsmen, the necessity for the establishment of a permanent corps of trained women nurses as a component part of the Army. . . . In the fall of 1900 when the War Department prepared the draft of a law to reorganize the army, at the Surgeon General's request, Dr. McGee wrote a section which made the Army Nurse Corps, as it had been organized, into a permanent part of the Army."[18]

McGee is thus best remembered for being instrumental in forming the Spanish-American War Nurse Corps that under the Army Reorganization Act of 2 February 1901 became the permanent Nurse Corps (female). As a result of a Senate amendment to McGee's draft provision, the act provided that the superintendent of the Nurse Corps "shall be a graduate of a hospital training school having a course of instruction of not less than two years." McGee commented, "I am only a physician, and not a nurse, and therefore should be prevented from performing that part of the administrative work in the Surgeon General's Office which relates to nurses and the credit for which ought to be given to a nurse."[19]

Confident that Congress would approve the Army reorganization bill to which she had contributed, McGee tendered her resignation effective on the last day of 1900 and recommended as her successor one of her own nurses, Dita H. Kinney. Kinney wrote of her predecessor, "It takes genius to break new roads, to show the work-a day-world new paths in which its feet may tread; and it is little less than the same God-given attribute that sees an opportunity and seizes it at exactly the right moment. It was this which Dr. McGee did . . . often maligned, misrepresented, and misunderstood, weary, far from well and longing to be relieved."[20]

Many nurses outside the Army criticized the female acting assistant surgeon for the way she conducted her job. Her explanation to this was that "I proposed to stay right in Washington all summer and as long as needed, and work directly under the Surgeon General and in reach of him. No nurse or anyone else offered to do this. Now, had all applications been thrown away, and any one organization (as the Associated Alumnae for example) been authorized to send nurses, one after the other, all the other organizations would have forced the same recognition for themselves and there would have been no general standard, and no Corps at the end—in short, the Civil War conditions would have been repeated."[21]

McGee also believed that if she had tried to go about her work the way Dorothea Dix did in the Civil War, she would have failed. For this reason, she chose not to supervise the actual nurs-

ing herself but selected the best women for the work in the field and remained in a central office to organize and coordinate their efforts. "I never found a nurse outside the Army who understood this," she confessed. "They all had the point of view of the superintendent who is immediately on the job—a totally different character of work. When I said I had nothing to do with the actual nursing, they thought it a confession of weakness; in fact it was an essential part of my success."[22]

McGee went on to defend herself by pointing out that the fact that she had not been a trained nurse herself was initially a great advantage in forming the Nurse Corps. Since there was great prejudice against granting nurses a status equal to that of commissioned officers, even General Sternberg would not consider the possibility. "In fact," McGee went on, "when I was writing the original law of the nurse corps, I talked to him of the rank question and he absolutely refused to admit that nurses were as useful or should rank as high as the trained Hospital Sergeants, who could nurse and also do many other things which the women could not. A position as an officer was therefore not open to a nurse at all in those days, and many a time (which no one outside knew about) I gained some point for the nurses thru [*sic*] the recognition I had as medical officer, and in that sense, an equal."[23]

McGee never lost interest in "her" nurses, however, and she used her considerable influence in Washington to arrange service-connected benefits for those women who served in the Spanish-American War, including authority for burial in Arlington National Cemetery. McGee served as the first president of the Spanish-American War Nurses, an association organized in 1900. During the Russo-Japanese War, she went to Japan with a group of nine nurses, four of whom had served in the Spanish-American War. For six months they trained women there for military nursing service and observed battlefields in Korea and Manchuria. Upon the group's return to the United States in November 1904, McGee was named a military attaché to Japan. She returned there the following month and spent the final seven months of the war in Manchuria, visiting Japanese Army units and military hospitals. Japan awarded her the Japanese Order of the Sacred Crown, a special Japanese Red Cross decoration, and two Russo-Japanese War medals. Dr. McGee died in 1940 and was buried with full military honors in Arlington National Cemetery.[24]

Dr. Ellen Lawson Dabbs

Ellen Lawson Dabbs was not only a physician but also a writer and a campaigner for women's suffrage rights. The daughter of militia Col. Henry M. Lawson, Ellen was born on 25 April 1853 in Rusk County in eastern Texas, where she later attended school. She graduated first in her class at Furlow Masonic Female College in Americus, Georgia, and taught school for five years. She met and married J. W. Dabbs, a merchant from Sulphur Springs, Texas, who was a widower with four youngsters. During their marriage Ellen had children of her own and then entered the College of Physicians and Surgeons in Keokuk, Iowa, an element of the Iowa state university system. She graduated after two years of study and then took a course in midwifery in St. Louis. Around 1890 she returned to Sulphur Springs where she practiced medicine, owned a stake in a newspaper, and wrote for the *National Economist*, a newspaper of the National Farmers' Alliance in the nation's capital. She subsequently moved to Fort Worth and by 1898 had practiced medicine there for seven years.

The years from 1892–1895 were absorbing times for her as she worked with the Woman's Christian Temperance Union and organized Texas's first suffrage society, the Texas Equal Rights Association. She traveled around the state addressing women on their need to involve themselves in politics and legislation, and she found time to write articles advocating women's rights. Her husband must have died before she became an Army nurse in 1898, as Dr. Dabbs listed herself as a widow on her PD card. She also indicated that she had had a case of varioloid, so she could feel secure in her immunity to smallpox. In answer to the question, how soon after receiving an appointment can you leave home, she replied: "Whenever needed." This suggested that she had no pressing family responsibilities that would stop her from moving quickly. She supported her application for service as an Army nurse with a letter from the governor of Texas.[25]

Dr. Ellen Lawson Dabbs
(Courtesy of the Elizabeth Bass Collection on Women in Medicine, Rudolph Matas Medical Library, Tulane University Medical Center)

On 25 August 1898, at age forty-five, Dabbs signed a contract to work at $30 a month as a nurse at Camp Cuba Libre near Jacksonville, Florida. Unfortunately, Dabbs's performance at this camp was not highly regarded. She was graded as "fair" in regard to both health and ability in September, and her evaluator observed a "lack of professional skill." The next month, Dabbs was graded "poor" in ability but "fair" in health. The comment about her lack of professional skill was repeated and an

additional note was appended stating, "Not a graduate nurse."[26]

Her contract was annulled on 18 October 1898. Dr. Dabbs subsequently returned to Fort Worth, from where she attempted unsuccessfully in 1899 to return to Army service as a nurse or assistant surgeon. The 1900 census listed her living in Tarrant County, Texas, with four of her daughters. It is not clear what happened to Dr. Dabbs after this. She may have left Texas since the index to Texas death certificates from 1903 until 1955 did not mention her.[27]

Since her PD card listed no reason for the termination of her Army service, it is impossible to determine whether Dabbs resigned or was terminated. One may conclude, however, that women physicians were not automatically deemed to make better nurses because they possessed a higher level of skills and training. Since nurses had reached a level of professionalism not possible during the Civil War, when there were almost no nursing schools in existence, it is likely that ratings given by chief nurses were influenced by a strict interpretation of what constituted *a good nurse*. A physician who had not graduated from an approved training school was thus immediately suspect as a nurse.

Dr. Isabel Eliot Cowan

Unlike Dr. Dabbs, Dr. Isabel Eliot Cowan very much impressed her Army supervisors. When the question of her skills was brought up, Maj. Edgar Mearns, a brigade surgeon who had served in the Army since 1883, commented that aside from Sister Lydia Clifford "no better selection could be made for chief nurse."[28] The fact that Cowan remained in the Army for three years suggests that this young physician found her service rewarding, albeit in the guise of a nurse rather than as a doctor.

Isabel Eliot Cowan was born on 12 October 1871 at Andes, New York, in the Catskill Mountains to Andrew Cowan and Sarah Campbell. From her mother she inherited her Scots, Welsh, and Dutch "blood," which, she believed, "was [the] cause of my restlessness and wanderings." In 1873 she moved with her parents to Iowa, where she attended public school, the Coe Academy, and Coe College. Cowan entered the Woman's Medical College of Pennsylvania in September 1891. She dropped out of school for a year on account of her mother's illness but returned to graduate in May 1895. Following graduation, she interned for a year at the Woman's Hospital in Detroit, Michigan.[29]

In the fall of 1896 Cowan began practicing in Dubuque, Iowa. Perhaps her restlessness took hold of her at this point, as she entered Army service as a contract nurse in September 1898. She explained: "Women doctors not allowed in Army then, only as Nurses." She did not view this as a professional loss, as she explained: "I found this service as attractive, and so worthwhile, I remained until August 1901."[30]

Cowan served first at the hospital of the Third Division, First Army Corps, at Camp Hamilton near Lexington, Kentucky, before moving on 27 November to the hospital of the First Brigade, Second Division, of that corps in Columbus, Georgia. In early January 1899 she was sent to Matanzas, Cuba, site of a 120-bed military hospital, where she served briefly. Within two weeks of her arrival there, General Sternberg ordered the contracts of all lay nurses there annulled, with Catholic nuns taking over their nursing duties. Cowan's personal plea to Senator William Allison to help her to remain in Cuba apparently would have borne fruit, however, had not Army authorities so quickly arranged for her to return to New York, where on 25 January she was granted a brief leave before her first contract was annulled. She then returned to Dubuque. On 3 April 1899 she was given a new contract at $60 a month as chief nurse at the newly expanded general hospital at the Presidio of San Francisco, California. Her salary was increased to $65 a month in July 1899.[31]

Cowan relished Army life and the opportunities it offered her. "Due to the many courtesies shown me by the Commanding Officer and the Staff Doctors," she wrote, "I always felt I had a most helpful post-graduate course in both medicine and surgery. I can never give praise enough to the fine and outstanding [physicians] in their work—medical men I knew in the Army service. God may have made finer men; if so I have never met them." Her comments suggest that, on account of her training as a physician, male surgeons accorded her some privileges that they might not have given to ordinary nurses.[32]

Dr. McGee, however, found fault with the leniency apparent in her grading of the nurses under her supervision. In a personal letter to Cowan, McGee observed: "As a matter of fact the habit of placing every nurse in the 1st class practically destroys the value of efficiency reports. It is perfectly evident that many nurses will be appointed who are 'suitable for retention in the army, though not as thoroughly satisfactory as Class I.'" McGee concluded, "It is not only unfair to the service but it is quite unjust to the best nurses to put all in the first class. . . . I have done my best to explain to everyone the importance of efficiency reports, but have never yet received from you the same kind that come from other hospitals."[33]

Cowan was inducted into the Nurse Corps in February 1901 and retained her position as chief nurse at the Presidio of San Francisco. She was discharged from the Army in August of that year at her request. She returned to Iowa, but family affairs kept her from practicing for the remainder of the year. In 1902 she received a three-year appointment as the resident physician at Converse College in Spartanburg, South Carolina. When her mother died, her elderly father needed her and she moved to Rodney, Iowa, where she resumed a country practice until 1914. She remained her father's housekeeper until his death in 1922. Dr. Cowan died in Sioux City, Iowa, on 26 May 1961 at the age of 89.[34]

Dr. Irene S. Toland

Irene Toland may be considered a hero as she died in the service of her country. Like Dr. Cowan, Dr. Toland served as a chief nurse. She was born on 27 April 1857 in Artesia, Mississippi, to a wealthy slave-owning planter, and she grew up in Washington County, Texas, where her family moved in 1860. She was 41 years old when she volunteered to go to Cuba. Friends had tried to dissuade her from going, but she insisted. "My country needs me," she had replied, "and I have made up my mind to answer the call." She considered herself immune to yellow fever because she had had the disease when a child, and she spoke Spanish, which would be a definite asset in Cuba.[35]

After assisting her physician brother Albert as a nurse and caring for her invalid mother until her death, Irene Toland had left Texas to teach in one of the mission schools in San Luis Potosí, Mexico. But recognizing that she wanted to be nurse or a doctor, she decided to quit teaching after one year. It appears that she entered a nursing school but soon left to study medicine at the American Medical College in St. Louis, Missouri. She graduated in 1894. The American Medical College followed the nineteenth-century American school of medical thought known as eclecticism, which attempted to treat diseases with a limited pharmacopoeia of simple remedies, especially herbal preparations. Dr. Toland established what by 1898 she would call "a large practice" in St. Louis, and at the same time became an adjunct professor of microscopy at her alma mater. She also joined the Daughters of the American Revolution.[36]

Willing to abandon her successful civilian career to tend to sick and wounded soldiers, Dr. Toland contracted on 25 July 1898 to serve as an Army nurse for $30 a month. She sailed from New York on the SS *Olivette* that same day and arrived in Santiago, Cuba, on 4 August. Dr. Toland was soon appointed acting chief nurse on the hospital ship *Reina de Los Angeles*, a Spanish merchant vessel that the United States had commandeered in Santiago harbor when the Spanish there surrendered. This ship's facilities were "specially intended for officers and noncommissioned officers," and the vessel featured "very nice accommodations for 75 patients." By the end of August 1898 Dr. Toland was herself taken ill with typhoid fever. She died on 25 September 1898. Dr. Louis B. Childs, an Army contract surgeon who worked with her, recalled: "She worked hard, early and late, always ready and willing to administer to the wants of others. . . . I became her physician. . . . She played her part in life well and nobly, and sacrificed it that others might live, and I might add, that through her noble efforts many did live. She died loved by all who knew her, for her zeal and true moral worth, as well as her skill."[37]

Back in St. Louis, Missouri, Dr. Toland's friends had not forgotten her. Impressed by the life she had led, they decided to establish a school in honor of her memory, and they turned to the Woman's Council of the Methodist Episcopal Church for help. The council approved the creation of a school in Cuba that would bear her name. On 13 November 1899, the Irene Toland School was inaugurated in the provincial capital of Matanzas, Cuba.[38]

Dr. Mary Elizabeth Green

Mary Elizabeth Green was born on a farm near Machias, New York, south of Buffalo, on 6 August 1844. When she was a young girl, her family moved to Michigan, where it endured all the hardships of pioneer life. Since the family had limited means, Mary was allowed to live at a neighbor's home several miles away where she could work for her board and attend school. At age fourteen she passed the required examination and began to teach, "her salary being two dollars a week, with the privilege of boarding around."[39]

Dr. Mary Elizabeth Green
(National Archives photo)

Green entered Olivet College in southern Michigan in 1861 and then transferred to Oberlin College in Ohio, but she interrupted her coursework to serve as an apprentice for a male physician in Michigan. In 1865 she entered the New York Woman's Medical College, where she was chosen to serve as assistant in the chemical laboratory. Undaunted by the criticism of her friends, she entered Bellevue Hospital and remained there in spite of the "hisses and insults which [the students] felt duty bound to hurl at a member of the 'weaker sex' who dared to cross their paths and tread their sacred territory." The next year she entered the Woman's Medical College of Pennsylvania where she studied for two more years. In 1868 she submitted a thesis entitled "Medical Jurisprudence" and graduated with honors. Before she graduated, she became the wife of her cousin, Alonzo Green, who was a practicing lawyer in New York. She joined him there in 1868 and started a successful medical practice.[40]

Outside of her office hours, Dr. Green engaged in charitable work. She served as visiting physician to the Midnight Mission, the Five Points

Mission, the New York Infirmary for Women and Children, and the Prison Home for Women. Despite the excellent reputation Dr. Green developed, her granddaughter reported that, when she wished to become a member of the New York Medical Society, "that body shouted with indignation at the thot [*sic*] of admitting a woman to this conclave. Her determination won, tho [*sic*] it took many stormy discussions to achieve her object and she finally was honored by membership, being one of the first women in America to be admitted to the Society." She and Alonzo moved to Charlotte, Michigan, southwest of Lansing, in 1873. There Dr. Green engaged in part-time medical practice and authored a number of medical and scientific articles, many relating to nutrition, as she raised four children. She also became president of the National Household Economic Association, an organization that promoted the teaching of home economics.[41]

Dr. Green's expertise on food products made her particularly attractive to the War Department when it wished to establish diet kitchens for ailing soldiers. The epidemic of typhoid fever that swept through the Army's domestic camps left the affected soldiers terribly wasted due to loss of fluids and lack of nutrition. As those afflicted lost the ability to assimilate food, special diets needed to be prescribed to coax the survivors back to health. At the outbreak of the war, Dr. McGee solicited Dr. Green's help in this most urgent task, and the doctor agreed to volunteer as a contract nurse. She pursued this work at two of the Army's general hospitals, the 416-bed facility at Fort Thomas, Kentucky, and the 544-bed hospital at Fort Myer, Virginia. Dr. Green established a diet kitchen for typhoid patients at Fort Thomas and enhanced the diet kitchen that had been established by the Red Cross Society at Fort Myer. She subsequently served as president of the Tulsa, Oklahoma, Board of Health. She died in Seattle in February 1910.[42]

Dr. Mary Eloise Walker

Mary Eloise Walker was the daughter of Samuel and Mary M. Walker, who had been members of pioneer families on Michigan's Old Mission Peninsula, which divides the two arms of Grand Traverse Bay on Lake Michigan. Mary Eloise Walker, however, was born in St. Johns, Michigan, north of Lansing, on 13 August 1869. When she became an Army nurse in 1898, she was a single woman. She had received a bachelor's degree from the University of Michigan in 1893 and a medical degree from the same institution three years later. She practiced medicine briefly at the Women's Hospital in Detroit and then took over the practice of another woman doctor in Buffalo, New York.[43]

Dr. Mary Eloise Walker
(Courtesy of the Bentley Historical Library, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor)

Walker volunteered in September 1898 and began work at the hospital of the First Division, Seventh Army Corps, at Camp Cuba Libre, Florida, on 12 October. She remained in the Nurse Corps until January 1900. During her service she was assigned to hospitals in Florida, Georgia, Ohio, and New Mexico. In May 1899 she became acting chief nurse at Columbus Barracks, Ohio; in December of that year she became chief nurse at Fort Bayard, New Mexico, where the Army had a hospital for pneumonia patients. Without exception, all her ratings were ones, the best available on a scale of 1–4. Her services were described as "efficient" and "very satisfactory."[44]

On 20 October 1898 a presidential investigative commission headed by railroad executive Grenville Dodge called upon Dr. Walker to testify about the conditions in the division hospital where she was first assigned. Walker stated that she had "not had so much experience with typhoid outside of here. That is why I came." She had no negative comments to make about the medical care that the soldiers received. When asked what suggestions she could make to improve general conditions, Dr. Walker pointed out that the wards could use stoves for hot water: "There has been a great inconvenience to patients, and nurses particularly, but of course the patients suffer indirectly thereby. We need hot water," she declared "as the dishes have to be washed out well and we have to have hot water for hot-water bags." In conclusion, she said that proper courses of treatment had been followed in the hospital.[45]

Dr. Walker's contract was annulled at her own request on 6 January 1900 so that she could accept a civil position. From 1900 to 1906 Walker served on the staff of the State Training School for Girls in Hudson, New York. Following this she was employed until 1923 at Binghamton State Hospital for the insane at Binghamton, New York. She then returned to Ann Arbor to become an associate physician in the University Health Service. She retired in 1937 to her family's large fruit farm at Old Mission in Grand Traverse County, Michigan. She died on 16 July 1954 at the age of 84.[46]

Dr. Laura Ann Cleophas Hughes

Relatively little is known about the last of the physicians to be discussed. Born in Boston, Massachusetts, on 9 April 1860, Laura Ann Hughes decid-

ed to study nursing at the Boston City Hospital Training School not long after the school was founded in 1878. She completed a course of studies there in June 1882 and engaged in hospital work. She attended Tufts College Medical School in Boston about a decade later, soon after the school opened in 1893. After graduating in 1895, she practiced as a "regular" physician" in Boston. At the time she volunteered for the Army, she listed as additional training her completion of a "full invalid course at the Boston Cooking School."[47]

Hughes organized the first group of Red Cross nurses employed by the Army and was herself enrolled as a contract nurse on 28 August 1898. The Army sent her and the group she had organized to the General Hospital, Camp Wikoff, at Montauk Point, New York, the camp to which the illness-wracked Fifth Army Corps was being returned after its victory before Santiago, Cuba. Dr. Hughes was assigned in September as the superintendent of nurses at the Detention Hospital at Montauk Point, and she immediately set about establishing the diet kitchen. Her contract was annulled under honorable conditions on 8 October 1898.

Brig. Gen. William H. Forwood, General Sternberg's successor as surgeon general of the Army and chief surgeon at Camp Wikoff during Dr. Hughes's service there, remembered her work in very favorable terms four years later. He then observed that

> no personal description is needed to recall the distinguished chief nurse of the Detention Hospital at Montauk Point to my mind. Your commanding figure, splendid abilities, and the efficient work you did under many difficulties and disadvantages at Montauk Point will ever be remembered by me with gratitude and pleasure. I was in need of additional nurses there and telegraphed to Boston for them. You and your party descended upon that hill suddenly and without warning, like angels from Heaven. . . . My admiration for you and your abilities is boundless.[48]

Dr. Hughes traveled to France and England in 1899, and in 1900 she was chosen as vice president of the Spanish-American War Nurses at the organizational meeting of that association. She was appointed Boston's first woman medical inspector in October 1918. She died in Boston on 30 July 1920.[49]

Conclusion

In 1942 Dr. Emily Dunning Barringer, chairperson of the American Medical Women's Association committee working to make women physicians eligible for military commissions, remarked that the woman physician "in the eyes of the law of every state in the Union [is] held as an equally responsible physician with her brother practitioner. The minute this woman physician receives her license to practice, that moment she becomes a responsible physician in the eyes of the law, subject to the same rules, regulation, fines and penalties as the male physicians. You notice I did not include privileges in this list, for the Government, while exacting all the same faithful accomplishment from its women physicians, has seen fit not to grant equal privileges to them so that they may have equal opportunity to become as skilled and efficient as the men of the profession."[50] Barringer's statement well summarizes the dilemma of the female physician in the Spanish-American War. Lacking the privilege to serve officially as physicians, they were not able to hone their skills in the same manner and to the same degree as were their male colleagues. Although all these women physicians challenged the stereotype that "a woman's place is in the home" at a time when there was a need for trained medical workers in the military, they did not, except for Dr. McGee, advance their professional status by volunteering as nurses.

The careers and goals of these seven women physicians seem to have little in common except for their medical degrees and their desire to serve their country. Each woman had followed her own path. We should recognize that these female physicians wanted to be judged as persons in their own right who had real contributions to make in terms of skills and services in a military setting. The variety of tasks these women undertook during the Spanish-American War demonstrates the kinds of abilities nineteenth-century women physicians possessed. Anita Newcomb McGee applied her exceptional administrative talents in the service of others. Both Mary Elizabeth Green and Laura Hughes demonstrated how their knowledge of nutrition and cooking could be utilized on a large scale in military diet kitchens. Irene S. Toland showed the world that women physicians were willing to serve in dangerous conditions and, if necessary, to die for a cause in which they believed. Isabel Eliot Cowan and Ellen Lawson Dabbs made it clear that women physicians were drawn to work that they found both interesting and challenging. Mary Eloise Walker proved that women doctors wanted to learn more about diagnosis and treatment, a desire she exhibited as she began to care for typhoid patients and would maintain in postwar years as she worked with the insane.

Yet Dr. Walker and possibly Dr. Hughes appear to be the only woman physicians that served in the U.S. Army during the Spanish-American War who would practice medicine for an extended period in the postwar years. The other women physicians who served in this war seemed content to devote themselves to a variety of tasks other than purely medical ones. This disparity between what these women did and what they had been trained to do was rooted in the fact that society continued to have defined sex-role expectations which impacted on the roles and choices these female physicians made. Toland, for example, was thirty-seven before she graduated from medical school, and it must be remembered that she could not indulge in her own career choices much earlier because she had an invalid mother to tend. Her death in Cuba at the age of 41 thus denied her the opportunity to practice medicine for more than a few years. Cowan admitted that even after

acquiring her degree, she quit practicing medicine twice to care for one parent and then the other, even serving as her father's housekeeper until his death in 1922. The much older Dr. Green, in contrast, seems to have practiced medicine at least part time for three decades in the nineteenth century, and she took a major step toward integrating the medical establishment of the nation's largest city by winning admission to the New York Medical Society.

Another potential problem for these early Army physicians can be located in the male-female nexus. As Dr. Barringer wrote in 1942, "the modern woman labors under the handicap of not having a wife."[51] In assuming professional duties, these women had to combine the roles of wife and mother or competing family demands with their medical practices, which entailed long and irregular hours. While Drs. McGee and Green managed to do this for short periods (and with understanding spouses), they eventually scaled back or abandoned their private practices to engage in public service and humanitarian pursuits. While the work of Dabbs cannot be traced after the war, at least early on she had devoted herself to women's rights issues. This is not surprising as feminism among nineteenth-century women doctors played an important role in their careers. Thus, 96 percent of the women doctors included in *Notable American Women* were either at one time affiliated with women's institutions or leaders in the nineteenth-century women's movement.[52]

It is also clear that from 1861 to 1903 the Army paid no attention to the role of the woman physician in wartime. The Army's limitation on the service of female doctors to the role of nurses remained unchanged from the Civil War to the Spanish-American War. Even by the start of the World War I, when women physicians thought their chances of serving in the military had improved over the course of two decades, they learned that equal opportunity was more a promise than a reality. When numerous women doctors applied to the military, most were rejected because of their sex. Even at this late date, stereotypes continued to impact on women physicians, perpetuating a division of responsibilities between the sexes. Men would cure the patients through surgery and medicine while women would provide care and maintenance—the traditional female nurturing role.[53] Thus, the potential medical power of American women was largely ignored until 1943.

Spanish-American War nurses may not necessarily have had an easier time proving their value in the hospitals, but any objections to them were usually overruled in the general appreciation of their value as *trained* female nurses—as opposed to the thousands of untrained women who had volunteered in the Civil War hospitals. Women nurses seem to have achieved earlier recognition than women physicians who served in the same two conflicts. As further evidence of this, nurses were commissioned in the Army in 1920, but women physicians were unable to enter the Army and Navy Medical Corps until 16 April 1943, when President Franklin Roosevelt signed the Sparkman-Johnson bill into law.

One of the most striking features regarding the history of women physicians in the military is that they have been virtually ignored in the historical literature, with almost no attention being paid to their presence in the Civil and Spanish-American Wars. Clearly, women physicians were present in the Spanish-American War. No matter in what capacity they served, their record was a proud one and their stories should be told.

The Author

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NOTES

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1. See Mercedes Graf, "Women Physicians in the Civil War," *Prologue* 32 (Summer 2000): 86–98.

2. Mary C. Gillett, *The Army Medical Department, 1865–1917*, Army Historical Series (Washington, D.C., 1995), pp. 18, 123–24. The number of contract nurses in the Army peaked at roughly 1,160 in mid-September 1898. See Dallas Bache, "The Place of the Female Nurse in the Army," *Journal of the Military Service Institution of the United States* 25 (November 1899): 316–17.

3. Mary Roth Walsh, *"Doctors Wanted: No Women Need Apply": Sexual Barriers in the Medical Profession, 1835–1975* (New Haven, 1977), pp. 176–86, 193.

4. "Contract Surgeons: The Record of Agnes Scholl Ruddock, M.D.," *Medical Woman's Journal* 49 (February 1942): 34, containing the quotation; Editorial, *Medical Woman's Journal* 49 (August 1942): 252; *U.S. Statutes at Large*, 57: 65; 66: 155; "First Women Physicians Report for Active Duty in the Army," *Journal of the American Medical Women's Association* 6 (May 1951): 195; Bettie J. Morden, *The Women's Army Corps, 1945–1978*, Army Historical Series (Washington, D.C., 1990), p. 111.

5. *Annual Reports of the War Department for the Fiscal year Ended June 30, 1898: Report of the Secretary of War, Miscellaneous Reports* (Washington, D.C., 1898), pp. 5–8; Graham A. Cosmas, *An Army for Empire: The United States Army in the Spanish-American War* (Columbia, Mo., 1971), pp. 252–63, 275; Davis F. Trask, *The War with Spain in 1898*, The Macmillan Wars of the United States (New York, 1981), pp. 241, 324–34.

6. *Report of the Surgeon-General of the Army to the Secretary of War for the Fiscal Year Ending June*

30, 1898 (Washington, D.C., 1898), p. 102; Maj Gen George M. Sternberg to Grenville M. Dodge, Commission President, 17 Oct 1898, printed in *Report of the Commission Appointed by the President to Investigate the Conduct of the War Department in the War with Spain*, Senate Doc. 221, 56th Cong., 1st sess., 1900, 8 vols., 1: 723, containing the quoted words; Bache, "The Place of the Female Nurse," p. 316.

7. Gillett, *The Army Medical Department, 1865–1917*, p. 123.

8. Anita Newcomb McGee, "Address before the Pennsylvania State Conference of Chapter Regents, Congress Hall, Philadelphia, June 8, 1898," in "Dorothy Sutherland's Excerpts from Papers of Dr. Anita Newcomb McGee," file, Box 3, Entry 230, Correspondence/Office Files of Dr. Anita Newcomb McGee, Record Group (hereafter RG) 112, Records of the Office of the Surgeon General, National Archives (hereafter NA), containing the first quotation; Anita Newcomb McGee, "Women Nurses in the American Army," *Proceedings of the Eighth Annual Meeting of the Association of Military Surgeons of the United States Held at Kansas City, Missouri, Sept. 27, 28 and 29, 1899* (Columbus, Ohio, 1900), p. 242, containing the second quotation; *Conduct of the War Department*, Senate Doc. 221, 56th Cong., 1st sess., 1: 725, containing the final quotation.

9. Personal Data (PD) Cards, Isabel Eliot Cowan, Box 1; Ellen Lawson Dabbs, Box 2; Eliza Josephine Dadmun, Box 2; Caroline L. Danford, Box 2; Laura Hughes, Box 3; Irene S. Toland, Box 6; Mary Eloise Walker, Box 6, in Entry 149, Personal Data Cards of Spanish-American War Contract Nurses, 1898–1939, RG 112, NA; *American Journal of Nursing* 25 (April 1925): 343.

10. Dita H. Kinney, "Dr. Anita Newcomb McGee and What She Has Done for the Nursing Profession," *Trained Nurse and Hospital Review* 26 (March 1901): 131.

11. *Report of the Surgeon-General for Fiscal Year 1898*, p. 102; *Report of the Surgeon-General of the Army to the Secretary of War for the Fiscal Year ending June 30, 1899* (Washington, D.C., 1899), p. 26.

12. "Nursing in the Spanish-American War," *Trained Nurse and Hospital Review*, September 1919, copy on U.S. Army Medical Museum negative 71382; PD Card for Clara Louise Maass, Box 4, Entry 149, RG 112, NA; Mary T. Sarnecky, *A History of the U.S. Army Nurse Corps* (Philadelphia, 1999), pp. 45–46.

13. Mary Elizabeth Korstad, *One to Follow: A Tale of Two Women* (New York, 1990), p. 135–36, containing the quotations. Mary Elizabeth Green, *Food Products of the World* (Chicago, 1895), and the magazine articles on which this book was based gained its author wide recognition in the field of nutrition.

14. Louise C. Wade, "Anita Newcomb McGee," *Notable American Women, 1607–1950: A Biographical Dictionary*, 3 vols. (Cambridge, Mass., 1971), 2: 465.

15. See Albert E. Moyer, "Simon Newcomb," *American National Biography*, 24 vols. (New York, 1999), 16: 330–31; Elizabeth Noble Shor, "William John McGee," *American National Biography*, 15: 47–48; Sarnecky, *History of the Army Nurse Corps*, p. 31. McGee was apparently the third woman physician in the Army to hold the title of acting assistant surgeon; Drs. Mary Edwards Walker and Sarah A. Chadwick, who served in the Civil War, had held the title then. See Pension File SC 142715, RG 94, Records of the Adjutant General's Office, NA, on Walker and Certificate #601330, RG 15, Records of the Veterans Administration, NA, on Chadwick.

16. Connie L. Reeves, "Anita Newcomb McGee," *American National Biography* 15: 43–45; Cindy Gurney and Dolores J. Haritos, "Anita Newcomb McGee," in Vern L. Bullough, Olga Maranjian Church, and Alice P. Stein, *American Nursing: A Biographical Dictionary* (New York, 1988), pp. 217–18; Gloria Moldow, *Women Doctors in Gilded-Age Washington: Race, Gender, and Professionalization* (Urbana, 1987), pp. 80–87, 90, 145–46.

17. Journal of Anita Newcomb McGee, 1898–1936, 2 vols., Entry 229, RG 112, NA; *Report of the Surgeon-General for Fiscal Year 1899*, pp. 24–25.

18. Ms, untitled, unsigned, and undated (but not completed before McGee's death in 1940), evidently prepared as a comprehensive history of McGee's work with the Army Nurse Corps, pp. 31–32, file "Historical Notes of interest in re the beginning of the A.N.C.," Box 1, Entry 230, RG 112, NA.

19. *U.S. Statutes at Large*, 31: 753, containing the first quotation; *Congressional Record*, 34: 549; Sarnecky, *History of the Army Nurse Corps*, pp. 50–51; Florence E. Oblensky, "Anita Newcomb McGee, M.D." *Military Medicine* 133 (May 1968): 398, containing the second quotation. The Nurse Corps (female) would be redesignated as the Army Nurse Corps by an act of 9 July 1918; see *U.S. Statutes at Large*, 40: 879.

20. Ltr, McGee to Surgeon General, 20 Nov 1900; Ltr, Sternberg to McGee, 21 Nov 1900, both in file 42563, Entry 26, General Correspondence of the Office of the Surgeon General, RG 112, NA; Sarnecky, *History of the Nurse Corps*, p. 51; PD Card, Dita Hopkins Kinney, Box 3, Entry 149, RG 112, NA; Kinney, "Dr. Anita Newcomb McGee," p. 133.

21. McGee, Historical perspective given to Nellie Birdsong for a history of Red Cross nursing service, c. 1920, quoted in Ms, Comprehensive history of McGee's work with the Army Nurse Corps, p. 21. The Associated Alumnae of Trained Nurses of the United States and Canada, the forerunner of the American Nurses Association, represented the graduates of twenty-four training schools located primarily in the Northeast. See Sarnecky, *History of the Nurse Corps*, p. 34.

22. Ms, Comprehensive history of McGee's work with the Army Nurse Corps, pp. 21–22, with the quoted words on p. 22.

23. Ibid., p. 22.

24. "Second Annual Meeting of the Spanish-American War Nurses," pp. 1–2, copy in "JAPAN—Dr. Anita Newcomb McGee—Various articles written by Dr. McGee" file, Box 3, Entry 230; Journal of Anita Newcomb McGee, vol. 2, Entry 229, both in RG 112, NA; Oblensky, "Anita Newcomb McGee," p. 399; Frederic A. Sharf, *"American Angels of Mercy," 1904: Dr. Anita Newcomb McGee's Pictorial Record of the Russo-Japanese War* (Washington, D.C., 2001), pp. 4–17.

25. Frances E. Willard and Mary A. Livermore, eds., *American Women*, 2 vols. (New York, 1897); Ms, biographical sketch of Ellen Lawson Dabbs in the Elizabeth Bass Collection on Women in Medicine, Rudolph Matas Medical Library, Tulane University Medical Center, New Orleans, La.; The "Texas Equal Suffrage Association Scrapbook," Austin History Center, Austin Public Library, Austin, Tex., which contains, for example, her first annual address to the Women's Congress (later the State Council of Women of Texas), printed in an undated and untitled newspaper clipping, and her "Reply to Mrs. Craig" in which she "holds that man has no rights over woman," that appeared in the *Dallas News* in April 1894. See also Melissa Gilbert Wiedenfeld, "Women in the Texas Farmers' Alliance," M.A. Thesis, Texas Tech University, 1983, and Melissa G. Wiedenfeld, "Dabbs, Ellen Lawson," *The Handbook of Texas Online* (http:www.tsha.utexas.edu/handbook/online/view/DD/fda66.html); Comments on PD card of Ellen Lawson Dabbs; Ltr, Dabbs to the secy of war, 18 Jul 1898; Ltr, Dabbs to McGee, 2 Aug 1898; Charles A. Culberson, Governor of Texas, to McGee, 1 Aug 1898, all in file 58143, Entry 26, RG 112, NA.

26. PD card, Ellen Lawson Dabbs.

27. Ltr, Dabbs to J. H. Strong, 7 May 1899; Congressman Robert B. Hawley to Sternberg, 11 May 1899; Sternberg to Hawley, 18 May 1899; Dabbs to Sternberg, 10 Sep 1899; McGee to Dabbs, 15 Sep 1899; Sternberg to Hawley, 2 Nov 1899, all in file 58143, Entry 26, RG 112, NA. Information on 1900–55 provided by the Genealogy and Local History Department, Fort Worth Library, Texas.

28. See Mearns's comment on PD Card, Isabel Eliot Cowan; Francis B. Heitman, *Historical Register and Dictionary of the United States Army from Its Organization, September 29, 1789, to March 2, 1903*, 2 vols. (Washington, D.C., 1903), 1: 700.

29. Ms, autobiographical memoir of Isabel Eliot Cowan, Bass Collection, Tulane University Medical Center, containing the quotation; PD card of Isabel Eliot Cowan; Cowan, Response to "Questionnaire to Alumnae," Woman's Medical College of Pennsylvania, 17 September 1944, and "Forty-Sixth Annual Announcement of the Woman's Medical College of Pennsylvania, Session of 1895–96," (now merged into MCP Hahnemann University, an element of Drexel University) which lists Cowan as a graduate, both in MCP Hahnemann University Archives and Art Program, Philadelphia, Pa.

30. Ms, autobiographical memoir of Isabel Eliot Cowan, containing the quotations; PD card of Isabel Eliot Cowan.

31. Ms, autobiographical memoir of Isabel Eliot Cowan; *Report of the Surgeon-General for Fiscal Year 1899*, pp. 11, 115–16; PD card of Isabel Eliot Cowan; and Ltr, Cowan to Allison, 13 Jan 1899; Telg, Sternberg to Lt Col Wilcox, Chief Surgeon, Matanzas, 24 Jan 1899; Telg, Allison to Sternberg, 28 Jan 1899; Ltr Cowan to McGee, 29 Jan 1899, all in file 52014, Entry 26, RG 112, NA.

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

BY HIS EXCELLENCY
GEORGE WASHINGTON, Esq;
General and Commander in Chief of the Forces of the United States of America.

THESE are to CERTIFY that the Bearer hereof Oliver Cromwell Private in the Jersey Battalion ~~Regiment~~, having faithfully served the United States for Six Years and being inlisted for the War only, is hereby DISCHARGED from the American Army.

GIVEN at HEAD-QUARTERS the fifth day June 1783

By HIS EXCELLENCY'S Command,

REGISTERED in the Books of the Regiment, Adjutant.

Discharge certificate of Pvt. Oliver Cromwell, an African American who served for six years in the 2d New Jersey Regiment *(National Archives photo)*; *below*, portrait of James Armistead Lafayette by John B. Martin, circa 1824 *(Courtesy of the Valentine Richmond History Center)*

. . . No regiment is to be seen in which there are not negroes in abundance: and among them there are able-bodied, strong, and brave fellows.

Journal of a Captured German Officer
23 October 1777[1]

A Legacy of Integration

The African American Citizen-Soldier and the Continental Army

By Noel B. Poirier

The casual student of the War of American Independence, when considering the composition of the Continental Army, might assume that African Americans played no significant role in the war. The layperson will likely take for granted that any African American patriots who may have assisted that army must have fought in segregated, all-black units or served simply as laborers in the construction of fortifications and camps or as servants to wealthy officers. One may suppose that the attitudes of all Euro-American officers and enlisted men toward African American soldiers would have been categorically negative. However, a careful reading of contemporary accounts and strength reports will show that to the contrary the Continental Army was the first *integrated* army in American history. Although an attempt was made during the course of the war to form a segregated unit in the Continental Army, this was an isolated effort that was eventually reversed. Only in subsequent wars did the philosophy of racial segregation become dominant in the organization of American land forces. During this nation's struggle for independence, Continental Army officers and most American political leaders alike came to recognize the necessity of tapping into the manpower available in the contemporary African American population and embraced, if at times hesitantly, the inclusion of the African American citizen-soldier alongside Americans of European origin in the struggle for the nation's independence.

African Americans and the Colonial Militia

Prior to the Revolutionary War, the American colonies had relied heavily on a militia system for their defense. This British inheritance, based on the idea of a citizen's obligation to defend his homeland, dated back to the very founding of the English monarchy. King Alfred the Great (871–99), in his effort to reform the Anglo-Saxon system of defense, divided the various counties within his realm into military districts called "fyrds." Within these fyrds each landholder who owned more than six hundred acres of land was required to provide an armed man for the king. Occasionally, if the landholder held sufficiently large grants of property, even the landholder himself was required to provide service to the monarch. King Alfred's reforms were to become the foundation upon which later English militia systems were built. Parliamentary acts and royal decrees like the Assize of Arms (1181), the Statute of Westminster (1285), and the Instructions for General Musters (1572) later codified this obligation for the male citizens of Great Britain.[2]

In spite of this common foundation, there existed no pan-colonial militia system. Rather, each colony formulated its own militia statutes in light of its individual needs and concerns. One would imagine that, as the colonies possessed very different social structures, there would be a corresponding diversity in their militia laws regarding the employment of enslaved and free men of African descent. This was not the case. If there was one point on which all American colonial militia laws agreed, it was on the exclusion of the majority of those of African descent from service in the colonial militias. The reasons given for this exclusion varied from colony to colony, but colonial officials cited two principal motivations for not permitting African Americans to join the ranks of their militias. First, since the majority of the Africans in America were enslaved and therefore held as property, colonists believed that the service owed by African Americans to their masters should be preeminent over any service that slaves could provide to their colony as militiamen. In the unlikely event that a colony desired to enlist slaves into the militia, this viewpoint of a slave's duty to his master required the

colony to obtain the master's permission before doing so. Second, colonists feared arming an element of the population of whom many were enslaved and the rest treated as second-class citizens. Many European colonial leaders feared that upon the onset of hostilities armed slaves and discontented free African Americans might flock to the enemy's standard or rise in insurrection against their Euro-American masters.[3] This viewpoint dominated colonial thinking on the issue in the period immediately preceding the American Revolution, and it affected the deliberations of the Continental Congress over the use of African Americans in the Continental Army. Nevertheless, a number of African Americans did serve in the Massachusetts militia before the Revolutionary War.

The American Revolution Begins

In spite of the prevailing colonial militia policies, African Americans began to take part in the hostilities in and around the city of Boston even before the creation of the Continental Army. The most famous African American participant in the pre-Revolutionary turmoil was Crispus Attucks, who was killed in 1770 during the riot that came to be known as the Boston Massacre. Attucks was not alone, however, in his active role in the period before June 1775. When the British marched a detachment from Boston to Lexington and Concord, Massachusetts, in April of that year in an effort to capture American munitions and militia leaders, they found the African Americans Peter Salem and Prince Estabrook present in militia ranks to greet them. Salem, a recently freed slave, fought again two months later at the Battle of Bunker Hill and, as legend has it, fired the round that fatally wounded Maj. John Pitcairn, who led the British assault force. Another African American, Salem Poore, was honored by the officers of his regiment for his bravery during the battle. They wrote that Poore "behaved like an experienced officer, as well as an excellent soldier. . . . In the person of this said negro centres a brave and gallant soldier." Cuff Whitmore, another African American veteran of Bunker Hill, left the field with a British officer's sword, which he later sold.[4] The African American men who served at Lexington, Concord, and Bunker Hill did so in integrated militia units, not as part of a segregated force.

The African American soldier who, whatever his motivations, served in the Continental Army did so as part of America's first integrated force, an integration that would not again prevail until the Cold War Army of the twentieth century.

The Continental Congress, meanwhile, determined in June 1775 that the time had come to create an American army to challenge the British force in Boston. In arranging how to fund the coming conflict, Congress chose to bill each state in proportion to its inhabitants. In doing so, the delegates resolved that the amount be "determined according to the number of Inhabitants, of all ages, including negroes and mulattoes in each colony."[5] However, deciding to count African Americans as part of the population and allowing them to bear arms in the new army were two entirely different matters.

In the spring of 1775, a ragtag American army made up primarily of militia and short-term volunteers from New England gathered at Cambridge, Massachusetts, across the Charles River from the British garrison in Boston. Congress used this force to form the nucleus of the Continental Army and chose Virginia delegate George Washington to command it. Among the many New England militiamen in service around Boston were men of African descent. Speaking of his Massachusetts brigade, Brig. Gen. John Thomas stated "we have some Negros [*sic*] but I look upon them as equally serviceable with other men, for fatigue and in action." He also observed "many of them have proved themselves brave."[6] While General Thomas may have sung the praises of his integrated brigade, others were not so supportive. One soldier from Philadelphia, Alexander Graydon, wrote that the presence of African American soldiers had a "disagreeable, degrading effect [on] . . . persons unaccustomed to such association."[7]

Despite the commendable service already rendered by men like Salem, Poore, and Whitmore, the leaders of Congress and the colonies remained resistant to the idea of enlisting African Americans into the newly created army. Massachusetts determined that it would not permit the enlistment of slaves into its ranks but would allow the continued enlistment of free men, whether European or African in origin. The Continental Army's adjutant general, Horatio Gates, acted to prohibit the recruitment of any "stroller negro." The inclusion of *any* African American in the American army infuriated some of the southern delegates to the Continental Congress. In September 1775, Edward Rutledge of South Carolina attempted to purge the Continental Army of all African Americans, free or slave. Congress defeated Rutledge's motion after vigorous debate, but it did not object when the army acted on its own to prohibit the enlistment or reenlistment of African Americans as the colonials' 1775 enlistments neared their expiration.[8]

The prohibition of the further enlistment of African Americans into the Continental Army took effect in November 1775. General Washington had consulted with his Council of War on the issue of Negro enlistments in October and found that all nine of his

general-officer advisers opposed enlisting slaves and that a great majority disapproved the enlisting of free blacks. A three-member congressional committee charged with conferring with Washington at Cambridge on 23 October approved a ban on new Negro enlistments, and on 12 November Washington issued general orders that "Neither Negroes, Boys unable to bare [*sic*] Arms, nor old men unfit to endure the fatigues of the campaign, are to be enlisted."[9] However on 2 December 1775, when Congress considered in order its committee's recommendations of 23 October, it took no action on the proposed ban on Negro enlistments, although it then formally approved most of the committee's other suggestions.[10]

Shortly after he issued his 12 November order, Washington learned that rejecting African American reenlistments might lead black Continental veterans to enter into the service of the British. For while this issue was being discussed in American circles, the royal governor of Virginia issued a proclamation freeing all male slaves of rebel masters who could, and would, bear arms for King George III.[11] The Proclamation of the Earl of Dunmore, as it came to be known, may have been a factor in Washington's concern over African American defections to the British. Washington's anxiety led him to inform Congress that "the free negroes who have Served in this Army are very much disatisfied [*sic*] at being discarded—as it is to be apprehended, that they may Seek employ in the ministerial [British] Army—I . . . have given Licence [*sic*] for their being enlisted, if this is disapproved of by Congress, I will put a Stop to it."[12] Congress responded in January 1776 by allowing the reenlistment of free African Americans who had served in the army in Massachusetts but continued its moratorium on the enlistment of others of their race.[13]

During 1776 patriot leaders came to the conclusion that their army would need to enlist men for longer than the one-year enlistment period that then prevailed. Congress eventually decided to enlist new army recruits for three years or for the duration of the war. It was in this form of long-term enlistment that African American men like Salem Poore often found themselves. Following the decision to increase the term of enlistment for recruits in the Continental Army, Congress devoted very little further attention to determining whether African Americans could enlist in the Continental Army. Many of the individual colonies continued to address the issue, following in Congress's footsteps by effectively banning the recruitment of African Americans into their state units. However, when the city of New York prepared for an impending British attack in 1776, American Brig. Gen. William Alexander, also known as Lord Stirling, ordered all able-bodied African Americans to work alongside Continental Army troops who were preparing the city's defenses.[14]

Congress continued to set recruiting quotas for the individual states, and the states found these increasingly difficult to meet with Euro-American recruits alone. Military authorities in some states simply disregarded the mandates of Congress or their state legislatures and allowed anyone who volunteered for service to enlist. In order to meet the Continental quotas, a few



By His Excellency the Right Honorable JOHN Earl of DUNMORE, His Majesty's Lieutenant and Governor General of the Colony and Dominion of Virginia, and Vice Admiral of the same, &c.

A PROCLAMATION.

AS I have ever entertained Hopes, that an Accommodation might have taken Place between Great-Britain and this Colony, without being compelled by my Duty to this moſt diſagreeable but now abſolutely neceſſary Step, rendered ſo by a Body of armed Men unlawfully aſſembled, firing on His Majesty's Tenders, and the formation of an Army, and that Army now on their March to attack His Majesty's Troops and deſtroy the well diſpoſed Subjects of this Colony. To defeat ſuch treaſonable Purpoſes, and that all ſuch Traitors, and their Abettors, may be brought to Juſtice, and that the Peace, and good Order of this Colony may be again reſtored, which the ordinary Courſe of the Civil Law is unable to effect; I have thought fit to iſſue this my Proclamation, hereby declaring, that until the aforeſaid good Purpoſes can be obtained, I do in Virtue of the Power and Authority to ME given, by His Majesty, determine to execute Martial Law, and cauſe the ſame to be executed throughout this Colony: and to the End that Peace, and good Order may the ſooner be reſtored, I do require every Perſon capable of bearing Arms, to reſort to His Majesty's STANDARD, or be looked upon as Traitors to His Majesty's Crown and Government, and thereby become liable to the Penalty the Law inflicts upon ſuch Offences; ſuch as forfeiture of Life, confiſcation of Lands, &c. &c. And I do hereby further declare all indented Servants, Negroes, or others, (appertaining to Rebels,) free that are able and willing to bear Arms, they joining His Majesty's Troops as ſoon as may be, for the more ſpeedily reducing this Colony to a proper Senſe of their Duty, to His Majesty's Crown and Dignity. I do further order, and require, all His Majesty's Leige Subjects, to retain their Quitrents, or any other Taxes due or that may become due, in their own Cuſtody, till ſuch Time as Peace may be again reſtored to this at preſent moſt unhappy Country, or demanded of them for their former ſalutary Purpoſes, by Officers properly authoriſed to receive the ſame.

GIVEN under my Hand on board the Ship WILLIAM, at NORFOLK, the 7th Day of November, in the SIXTEENTH Year of His Majeſty's Reign.

DUNMORE.

(GOD ſave the KING.)

Proclamation of the Earl of Dunmore, 7 November 1775
(Courtesy of the Tracy W. McGregor Library, The Albert and Shirley Small Special Collections Library, University of Virginia Library)

states, including Connecticut, allowed masters to free their slaves to permit their enlistment in the Continental Army. Massachusetts announced in 1777 that all African Americans, whether free or slave, were eligible to be drafted for service in the Continental Army. The demand for enlistees induced Rhode Island to begin offering outright freedom as a reward for service to enslaved African Americans who would enlist, with the state providing compensation to their masters. These actions followed the recommendation of Princeton attorney Jonathan Dickinson Sergeant, who had represented New Jersey in the Continental Congress. Sergeant advised John Adams in 1776 that African Americans would join the Continental Army if the new nation would "set Liberty before their eyes as the Reward of their Valour and . . . we should find them sufficiently brave."[15] At least in the northern states, the challenges involved in filling troop quotas produced broad support for the enlistment of African Americans, regardless of their status.

The enlistment of African Americans was not, however, limited solely to the North. In 1775 the colony of Virginia, while unwilling to allow the enlistment of slaves, permitted the enlistment of all freemen between the ages of sixteen and sixty. This policy encouraged a number of enslaved African Americans to illegally profess to be freemen in order to enlist. The problem became severe enough that Virginia amended its law two years later to require all African Americans who wished to enlist to provide proof of their freedom. Maryland, under continuing pressure to meet its state's quota for troops, did nothing to prevent slaves from enlisting for either state or Continental Army service. Other southern states were not as willing to forgo their cultural traditions; the governments of South Carolina and Georgia continued their steadfast resistance to arming African Americans throughout the war.[16]

As the number of African Americans in the Continental Army began to increase due to more open enlistment policies, so too did the commentary on their presence. In July 1776 a Pennsylvania officer stationed at Fort Ticonderoga, New York, Capt. Persifor Frazer, observed that the men constituting the army there were composed of "the strangest mixture of Negroes, Indians, and whites." Maj. Gen. Philip Schuyler complained from Saratoga, New York, in July 1777 that one-third of his force were men who were either too young or too old to serve, or African Americans. When asked to describe the Massachusetts men serving with the Northern Army in 1777, Maj. Gen. William Heath reported that his force contained "a number of negroes" and provided insight into how the army was employing these African Americans. Heath observed, however, that, while the African American soldiers were capable, he did not relish seeing them serve alongside his Euro-American soldiers. It was about this American army operating in the northern theater that one captured German officer observed, "no regiment is to be seen in which there are not negroes in abundance." Thus while the Continental Army may have initially discouraged the enlistment of African Americans, it had by 1778 nevertheless become a racially integrated force.[17]

Alexander Scammell's Report

As the Continental Army's new adjutant general, Col. Alexander Scammell had among his tasks in the summer of 1778 the duty of compiling figures on the number of African Americans then serving with the Continental Army at White Plains, New York. The product of this count was a report dated 24 August 1778, which recorded how many African Americans were serving in each of the Army's brigades. All but one of the fifteen brigades in this Main Army had at least one African American, and most had a substantial number. A comparison of the number of rank-and-file soldiers recorded as being present, whether fit for duty or sick, in the Army's general return for that month with the number of Negroes listed as present by Scammell illustrates the distribution of the African Americans then bearing arms in the Continental Army.

The North Carolina brigade, composed of the First and Second North Carolina Regiments, counted 42 African American soldiers out of a total of 678 men present (6.2 percent). Brig. Gen. William Woodford's Brigade, composed of six Virginia regiments, included 36 African Americans among 809 soldiers present (4.4 percent). Another Virginia brigade, under Brig. Gen. Peter Muhlenberg, had 818 men in ranks, of whom 64 were African American (7.8 percent). Including both state and Continental Virginia regiments, this was the Continental Army's second most racially diverse brigade. Brig. Gen. Charles Scott's Brigade, composed of regiments from Virginia and Delaware, included 20 African American soldiers among its 953 men (2.1 percent). Brig. Gen. William Smallwood's Maryland brigade with 835 men claimed 43 African American enlistees (5.1 percent). The Second Maryland Brigade, which contained a regiment made up of German-speaking soldiers, amounted to 1,334 men. Among the troops of this rather large brigade there were only 33 African Americans (2.5 percent). All together, a total of 4.4 percent of the rank-and-file Continental soldiers in the six brigades from states south of the Mason-Dixon Line were African American.[18]

The brigades with the smallest number of African American troops were those from Pennsylvania. Among the 848 rank-and-file soldiers in Brig. Gen. Anthony Wayne's Pennsylvania brigade, only 2 were African American (0.2 percent). There was no accounting of any African Americans as members of the relatively small, four-regiment, Second Pennsylvania Brigade. The brigade of Brig. Gen. James Clinton, composed of four New York regiments, totaled 901 men of whom 33 were African American (3.7 percent). African American soldiers in the three brigades from the middle states of Pennsylvania

American Foot Soldiers, Yorktown Campaign, 1781, a watercolor drawn by French Army Sublieutenant (later Bavarian Army Lt. Gen.) Jean-Baptiste-Antoine de Verger. The soldier at the left is a light infantryman of the First Rhode Island Regiment. *(Courtesy of the Anne S. K. Brown Military Collection, Brown University Library)*

and New York amounted to 1.5 percent of their rank-and-file strength.

Black soldiers were better represented in the army's New England elements. The Connecticut brigade commanded by Brig. Gen. Samuel Parsons boasted 117 African Americans out of a total of 1,258 rank and file (9.3 percent), making it the Continental Army's most integrated brigade. Another Connecticut brigade, commanded by Brig. Gen. Jedediah Huntington, numbered 877 men including 56 African Americans (6.4 percent). Brig. Gen. John Nixon's large Massachusetts brigade, comprising 1,446 men, contained a mere 26 African American soldiers (1.8 percent), but another big Massachusetts brigade, commanded by Brig. Gen. John Paterson, included 64 African Americans among its 1,211 men (5.3 percent). The smaller, 916-man Massachusetts brigade that had been commanded by Brig. Gen. Ebenezer Learned prior to his resignation in March 1778 included 34 African American troops (3.7 percent). The last brigade mentioned in Scammell's report was Brig. Gen. Enoch Poor's brigade of Canadians and New Hampshire men. Poor commanded 995 men, of whom only 16 were African Americans (1.6 percent). Overall, African American soldiers comprised 4.7 percent of the strength of these New England brigades, a marginally higher percentage than the brigades representing the southern states.[19]

According to monthly strength reports for the month of August 1778, the brigades listed by Scammell contained a total of 14,509 men present with the Main Army. Of that total 586 were African American soldiers, representing an even 4.0 percent of the total. In the summer of 1778, the First Rhode Island Regiment contained an additional 125 African American soldiers. This regiment was not counted in Scammell's report as it was assigned to the Eastern Department, but had it been the proportion of African American soldiers would have risen to 4.9 percent. These 711 African American soldiers were not consolidated into a single brigade, which could have been done. Rather, they were scattered throughout the army in a largely integrated fashion.[20]

Scammell's report, taken with the monthly strength reports, also shows that African American soldiers were less likely to be absent from camp than their Euro-American comrades. In the brigades mentioned in Scammell's report, 32.3 percent of the white troops were listed as "sick absent," "on command and extra service," or "on furlough," while 22.4 percent of African American soldiers were placed in any of these categories. African American soldiers, in general, were thus more likely to be with the army in the field. They were less likely to find excuses for leaving the army in its time of need. They were also more willing to accept longer terms of service.[21]

Colonel Scammell's report confirms what observers of the Continental Army had affirmed about its integration of African Americans into the ranks. They were a noticeable presence in practically every Continental Army brigade. Perhaps the most interesting aspect of Scammell's report was that one of the two brigades with the highest proportion of African Americans was a Virginia brigade.

Although absent from Scammell's report, the First Rhode Island Regiment is deserving of closer inspection. Desperate for recruits, the state of Rhode Island determined in 1778 to create a regiment composed primarily of African Americans, both enslaved and free, and it offered to purchase the freedom of all slaves who enlisted. Rhode Island had organized four regiments in 1775 and a fifth in 1776, but three of these survived less than thirteen months, and in January 1778 the state concentrated its white privates in the Second Rhode Island Regiment. Recruitment of African Americans to refill the First Rhode Island Regiment went so well that the state was required to halt any further active enlistment after only four months. The regimental recruiters managed to enroll some 250 privates in the short time in which they were actively recruiting. While the regiment began as a strictly segregated unit, it did not remain so. At the beginning of 1781, the two existing Rhode Island regiments were combined into one. The Chevalier de Chastellux encountered the Rhode Islanders soon after their regiments had been fused and observed, "The greatest part of them are negroes or mulattoes." Baron Ludwig von Closen, after sighting the regiment, recalled that "three-quarters of the Rhode Island regiment consists of negroes." Chastellux's use of the qualifying statement "greatest part," combined with the observations of his German

comrade, would seem to indicate that by 1781 a substantial degree of integration had occurred within the ranks of even this once all-black regiment. A light infantry company from this regiment, which presumably included a number of African Americans, served as part of the Light Infantry Corps commanded by the Marquis de Lafayette, a Continental Army major general, in the Virginia campaign of 1781. It was this integrated Rhode Island Regiment, not the segregated one of 1777, which in October 1781 witnessed the surrender at Yorktown, Virginia, of British Lt. Gen. Charles, Earl of Cornwallis.[22]

The War Turns South

As the war dragged on, the need for manpower to fill the ranks of the Continental Army remained an ongoing challenge. In response, Congress and the states continued to turn to the African American soldier to meet some of that need. While the state of Virginia maintained its policy of forbidding the open enlistment of enslaved African Americans, recruiters allowed each slaveholder to send one of his bondsmen as a substitute for himself. In some cases an enslaved soldier, having been sent to fight in his master's stead, did so unaware that he might be returned to slavery when his enlistment expired. While continuing to accept the enlistment of African Americans, including slaves enlisting with their masters' permission, the state of Maryland in 1781 subjected free blacks and mulattoes to the draft and considered raising a regiment of 750 slaves *a la* Rhode Island. The latter proposal was not approved by the Maryland legislature, however.[23]

The British had attempted to lure enslaved African Americans away from their masters in the South since the beginning of the war. The response from African Americans to the offer of the royal governor of Virginia, the Earl of Dunmore, to free any slave of a rebel master who was willing and able to bear arms against the American insurgents, proved so considerable that the governor created a segregated African American unit. Lord Dunmore's Ethiopian Regiment battled alongside the governor during his attempts to reassert control of Virginia in 1775 and 1776. In June 1779 Maj. Gen. Sir Henry Clinton, the commander of British forces in America, issued his own proclamation stating that any enslaved African American who deserted his rebel master would find protection with the British. He also warned that any African American soldier serving with the rebels who was captured would be purchased for the public service, with the proceeds going to the men who seized him, but that those who deserted the rebel forces could follow any occupation of their choice behind British lines. Lord Cornwallis, on his march from the Carolinas to Virginia in 1780 and 1781, attracted many enslaved African Americans who believed that his army offered them freedom from servitude. Cornwallis refused to allow them to bear arms, however, and put them to work as laborers. Many of them died from various camp diseases.[24] While the British commanders searched for ways to disrupt the slaveholding South's rhythm, American leaders were considering the enlistment of thousands of enslaved African Americans there as well.

As the focus of the conflict moved to the southern states, states that had avoided using African American troops reassessed their positions. In 1779 the governor of South Carolina, John Rutledge, considered raising a regiment of reliable slaves to assist in the state's defense, observing that he could not enlist enough white men to challenge the British invasion of his colony. Going one step farther, Congress recommended that the state raise as many as 3,000 African American troops with the promise of freedom as payment for their service.[25] In March 1779 Delegate Henry Laurens of South Carolina, whose term as president of the Continental Congress had ended three months earlier, wrote General Washington that "Had we arms for three thousand such black men as I could select in Carolina, I should have

Posthumous miniature portrait of Colonel Laurens by Charles Willson Peale, 1784 *(Courtesy of Independence Hall National Historic Park)*

no doubt of success in driving the British out of Georgia, and subduing East Florida." Washington was not nearly as enthusiastic, believing that the arming and freeing of some slaves would further irritate those remaining in servitude. As the preference for segregated units was strong in the South, the plans for enlisting slaves in South Carolina all involved the creation of units composed entirely of African American soldiers.[26]

Among the most unequivocal champions of the plan to raise a corps of enslaved African Americans was one of Washington's aides-de-camp, Lt. Col. John Laurens, Henry Laurens's son. Returning home to South Carolina to raise two to four battalions of African Americans, he faced a daunting task. While Lt. Col. Alexander Hamilton, another of Washington's aides-de-camp, expressed the belief that "the negroes will make very excellent soldiers," South Carolinians were less convinced. Members of South Carolina's elected government reacted with horror at the prospect of arming and emancipating so many members of their enslaved population and raised the specter of slave insurrection to buttress

their opposition. In spite of the staunch resistance, Colonel Laurens persisted. The Marquis de Lafayette wrote an acquaintance that Laurens was "sacrificing his own fortune" in the effort.[27]

Maj. Gen. Benjamin Lincoln, commander of the Southern Department, aided Colonel Laurens's efforts. A month before the British Army began its siege of Charleston in April 1780, Lincoln wrote Governor Rutledge, "I think the measure of raising a black corps a necessary one. I have repeatedly urged this matter, not only because Congress have recommended it . . . but because my own mind suggests the utility and importance of the measure." Colonel Laurens and General Lincoln became prisoners of war in May 1780 when royal forces captured Charleston, and the task of attempting to raise the African American troops in the South fell to Maj. Gen. Nathanael Greene, Lincoln's successor as commander of the Southern Department.[28]

Laurens and Lincoln were not alone in their call for the increased involvement of the African American population in the cause of independence. Delegate James Madison of Virginia, whose ideas would have infuriated the South Carolinians and Georgians, called for the emancipation of slaves and their enlistment in the Continental Army. Madison argued in 1780 that it would "certainly be more consonant to the principles of liberty" to liberate slaves and employ them in the fight against Great Britain than to provide white enlistees a bounty of a Negro slave paid for by the public, as a bill under consideration by the Virginia legislature proposed.[29] In spite of the support of Congress, Colonel Laurens, Generals Lincoln and Greene, and intellectuals like James Madison, the Deep South remained unwilling to initiate any large-scale use of African American soldiers. Colonel Laurens attributed the failure to raise an African American force in the South to "a triple-headed monster, in which prejudice, avarice, and pusillanimity were united."[30] General Washington, who had never expressed a great deal of support for the plan, blamed "selfish passion" and "private interest" for the disappointment.[31]

Portrait of General Lincoln by Charles Willson Peale, circa 1782 *(Courtesy of Independence Hall National Historic Park)*

Following the capture of General Cornwallis's army at Yorktown in October 1781, there was considerably less military conflict in the North American theater of the war. However, the Continental Army continued to be concerned with maintaining a force large enough to counter any possible British offensives there. General Greene, still operating in the Southern Department, continued to press for the greater enlistment of African Americans. Greene had witnessed the use of African Americans in the North, and he encouraged Governor Rutledge to have African Americans "incorporated, and employed" for the defense of his state. Greene informed the governor that he had "not the least doubt" that African Americans "would make good soldiers" and that, due to the shortage of Euro-Americans, they were essential.[32] However, the British ministry soon began to make peace overtures to the Americans, and it appeared that the need for further enlistment of African Americans was coming to an end.

The Postwar Years

As the war drew to a close and Continental Army veterans returned to their homes, the African Americans in that group faced many of the same challenges as did other veterans. One Euro-American veteran, desperate for any sort of income, sold his war stories in the city of New York after the war.[33] However, the war had held out the hope that the revolutionary ideals espoused in the Declaration of Independence, for which the African American soldier had fought, would alter the manner in which people of their race would be treated in the new American republic. These ideals, however, were not immediately fulfilled. Soon after the war's end, the African American soldier returned to his status of second- or third-class citizen.

Given the substantial numbers of enslaved African Americans who had enlisted in the Army when offered their personal freedom in return, it is not surprising that after the war some masters attempted to restore their veteran former slaves to a state of servitude. In Virginia some masters who had illegally enlisted slaves as substitutes for their own service without giving them more than an unenforceable, private promise of freedom attempted to reassert their ownership over their old property. Virginia Governor Benjamin Harrison was outraged, and he lobbied the General Assembly to provide protection for the returning African American veterans. The assembly in 1783 determined that slaves who had enlisted had played a part in the liberation of America and ordered that any slave who had served honorably as a substitute be released from any further involuntary servitude. Virginia's slave-holding class was not alone in the attempt to return former slaves, who had become war veterans, to bondage. There were also cases in the states of North Carolina and Connecticut where the legislature or a court had to step in to protect African American veterans from their former masters. As late as 1786 the state of Virginia purchased the freedom of

James (later identified as James Armistead Lafayette), a New Kent County slave owned by William Armistead, in response to a testimonial that General Lafayette had given him for his services, with his master's approval, as a spy in 1781. Lafayette wrote, "His intelligence from the enemy's camp were industriously collected and more faithfully delivered. He perfectly acquitted himself with some important commissions I gave him."[34]

The American Revolution and the liberal ideals it embraced did have an effect on many of the states' attitudes toward the institution of slavery itself. Pennsylvania and Massachusetts did not wait until the end of the war to eliminate slavery but did so during the heat of conflict. In 1784 Connecticut and Rhode Island passed legislation that began the gradual emancipation of their slave populations. Four years later, the state of New York eased its restrictions on the emancipation of slaves. The North was not alone in taking a more liberal view of the institution of slavery. John Dickinson attempted to pass a gradual emancipation bill in Delaware, but even his support was not enough to win its passage. Virginia passed an act that permitted the private manumission of slaves and secured the rights of free African Americans in the state. The legislators even went so far as to declare that any person who knowingly sold a free man as a slave would receive a punishment of "death without clergy." When Maryland's legislature voted on a measure to emancipate the state's slaves, twenty-two of fifty-four members voting supported the measure. Needless to say, the states that had resisted the use of African Americans as soldiers continued to resist changes in the status of African Americans within their jurisdictions.[35]

Such was the climate to which the African American soldier of the Continental Army returned. While many states made strides toward emancipation during and immediately after the war, these black veterans were, by and large, undoubtedly disappointed in the nation they had helped fight to create. A nation that had been founded with the words "all men are created equal" failed to abolish the institution that ran most directly counter to that assertion. Nevertheless, African American veterans, many of whom had been held as property prior to their service in the Continental Army, were now freer than they ever had been before. The African American soldier may not have been a citizen before his service, but he became a citizen-soldier, albeit one with limited civil rights.

Conclusion

If one merely examines the number of African Americans who served in the Continental Army during the War of American Independence, their contribution may appear to have been small. Approximately 5,000 African American soldiers and sailors, out of about 200,000 Continentals under arms, served the American cause during the Revolution.[36] While this figure was proportionately small, it is not the number of African Americans who served, but *why* they served, that truly matters.

The African American citizen-soldier who served in the Continental Army did so for many of the same reasons as his Euro-American counterparts. There was the draw of enlistment bounties, adventure, and the escape from the day-to-day existence of being an outsider in colonial American society.[37] However, the African American also volunteered for something the Euro-American already possessed, personal freedom. Euro-Americans were fighting for their society's freedom to determine its own government, economic policies, and geographic expansion. African Americans of eighteenth-century America undoubtedly thought of freedom in its more fundamental and individual terms. They sought the same opportunities as their Euro-American neighbors to raise their families, to acquire personal property, and to travel freely. Undoubtedly, many African Americans willingly enlisted in the Continental Army to obtain their personal freedom and the future freedom of their progeny. These personal goals made it possible for them to justify their active defense of a new nation that was not yet prepared to abolish the institution that continued to enslave their fellow African Americans.[38]

The racially integrated units in which African American soldiers served in the Continental Army would rarely be replicated in the United States before the second half of the twentieth century. That is not to say that the War of American Independence did not set a precedent for the use of African Americans in the United States military. In fact, the nation's approach to the employment of African American soldiers during the American Revolution initiated a pattern that predominated for the next 175 years. That pattern consisted of discouraging the involvement of African Americans until the necessity for manpower dictated that they must be used.[39] The United States, for political and cultural reasons, generally sought to leave the African American citizen-soldier out of the fight. Even in the first half of the twentieth century, the military often preferred to use African American soldiers in labor- and service-oriented roles. This bias against using the African American in combat roles derived from a mythology regarding his inability as a soldier, a mythology that many Revolutionary War veterans could have debunked. The African American soldier who, whatever his motivations, served in the Continental Army did so as part of America's first integrated force, an integration that would not again prevail until the Cold War Army of the twentieth century.

The Author

Noel B. Poirier leads the carpentry and joinery historic trades program at Colonial Williamsburg, Virginia. A freelance writer and military historian, he lectures on American and Virginia history in the College of William and Mary's elder hostel program. He has written articles on the Marquis de Lafayette that appeared in *MHQ: The Quarterly Journal of Military History* and *Virginia Cavalcade*.

NOTES

1. Ltr from a captured junior German officer, 15 Nov 1777 to 10 Oct 1778, printed initially in August Ludwig von Schlözer, *Briefwechsel, meist historischen und politischen Inhalts*, 10 vols. (Göttingen, 1777–82), 4: 365–66, as translated in George Livermore, *An Historical Research Respecting the Opinions of the Founders of the Republic on Negroes as Slaves, as Citizens, and as Soldiers* (1863; reprint ed., New York, 1969), p. 111. A less literal translation of the entire letter is printed in William L. Stone, trans., *Letters of Brunswick and Hessian Officers during the American Revolution* (1891, reprint ed., New York, 1970), pp. 106–70, with the quoted section, rendered into English somewhat differently, on p. 142.

2. Frederick Stokes Aldridge, "Organization and Administration of the Militia System of Colonial Virginia," Ph.D. dissertation, American University, 1964, pp. 13–14; Louis Morton, "The Origins of American Military Policy," *Military Affairs* 22 (1958): 76.

3. Benjamin Quarles, "The Colonial Militia and Negro Manpower," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review* 45 (1945): 643–44.

4. Bernard Nalty, *Strength for the Fight: A History of Black Americans in the Military* (New York, 1986), p. 10; Petition, Col Jonathan Brewer et al. to the Honorable General Court of the Massachusetts Bay, 5 Dec 1775, printed in Livermore, *Historical Research on Negroes*, p. 95, containing the quotation.

5. Worthington Chauncy Ford, ed., *Journals of the Continental Congress, 1774–1789*, 34 vols. (Washington, D.C., 1904–37), 2: 221–22, with the quoted words on p. 221.

6. Ltr, Thomas to John Adams, 24 Oct 1775, quoted in Nalty, *Strength for the Fight*, p. 10.

7. Graydon is quoted in David O. White, *Connecticut's Black Soldiers, 1775–1783* (Chester, Conn., 1973), p. 18.

8. Nalty, *Strength for the Fight*, p. 11.

9. Philander D. Chase, W. W. Abbot, and Dorothy Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington, Revolutionary War Series*, 10 vols. to date (Charlottesville, Va., 1985–), 2: 354; Livermore, *Historical Research on Negroes*, pp. 101–02.

10. Chase, Abbot, and Twohig, eds., *Papers of George Washington, Revolutionary War Series*, 2: 198–202; Ford, *Journals of the Continental Congress*, 3: 399–401.

11. Cary Carson, ed., *Becoming Americans: Our Struggle To Be Both Free and Equal* (Williamsburg, Va., 1998), p. 152; Benjamin Quarles, *The Negro in the American Revolution* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1961), pp. 19, 71.

12. Ltr, Washington to President of Congress, 31 Dec 1775, printed in *Papers of George Washington, Revolutionary War Series*, 2: 623.

13. Ford, *Journals of the Continental Congress*, 4:60; Livermore, *Historical Research on Negroes*, p. 103; Nalty, *Strength for the Fight*, pp. 12–13.

14. Robert K. Wright, *The Continental Army*, Army Lineage Series (Washington, D.C., 1983), pp. 91–92; H. James Henderson, *Party Politics in the Continental Congress* (New York, 1974), pp. 102–05; Nalty, *Strength for the Fight*, p. 13.

15. Nalty, *Strength for the Fight*, p. 13–15; White, *Connecticut's Black Soldiers*, p. 19; James Martin and Mark Lender, *A Respectable Army: The Military Origins of the Republic, 1763–1789* (Arlington Heights, Ill., 1982), p. 91; Ltr, Sergeant to Adams, 13 Aug 1776, printed in Robert J. Talyor, ed. *Papers of John Adams*, 8 vols. (Cambridge, Mass., 1977–89), 4: 455, containing the quotation.

16. Quarles, *The Negro in the American Revolution*, pp. 56–58.

17. Ibid., p. 72, containing the first two quotations; Livermore, *Historical Research on Negroes*, pp. 111, 127, containing the fourth and third quotations, respectively.

18. Figures for this paragraph and the next two are drawn from Charles H. Lesser, ed., *The Sinews of Independence: Monthly Strength Reports of the Continental Army* (Chicago, 1976), pp. 80–81, and Alexander Scammel, "Report on Negroes in the Continental Army," 24 Aug 1778, Papers of George Washington, Library of Congress. A photo of Scammel's report is posted on the web at *http://memory.loc.gov*, search for "Report on Negroes in the Continental Army."

19. Lesser, *Sinews of Independence*, pp. 80–81; Scammell, "Negroes in the Continental Army." The figures given in the three paragraphs are for rank-and-file men at White Plains, New York, only. They do not include officers.

20. Lesser, *Sinews of Independence*, pp. 80–81; Scammell, "Negroes in the Continental Army"; Quarles, *The Negro in the American Revolution*, p. 81; Wright, *The Continental Army*, p. 227.

21. Lesser, *Sinews of Independence*, pp. 80–81; Scammell, "Negroes in the Continental Army"; Quarles, *The Negro in the American Revolution*, pp. 78–81.

22. Wright, *The Continental Army*, pp. 149, 227–30; Nalty, *Strength for the Fight*, pp. 15; Livermore, *Historical Research on Negroes*, pp. 123–24, with the first quotation on p. 124; White, *Connecticut's Black Soldiers*, p. 35, containing the second quotation.

23. Nalty, *Strength for the Fight*, p. 16; Quarles, *The Negro in the American Revolution*, pp. 56–58.

24. Quarles, *The Negro in the American Revolution*, 19–32, 140–42; Livermore, *Historical Research on Negroes*, p. 136.

25. Nalty, *Strength for the Fight*, p. 16

26. Ltr, Henry Laurens to Washington, 16 Mar 1779, containing the quotation; Ltr, Washington to Henry Laurens, 20 Mar 1779, both quoted in Livermore, *Historical Research on Negroes*, p. 131.

27. Ltr, Hamilton to John Jay, 14 Mar 1779, printed in Harold C. Syrett, ed., *The Papers of Alexander Hamilton*, 26 vols. (New York, 1961–79), 2: 17, containing the first quotation; Quarles, *The Negro in the American Revolution*, pp. 63–64; Ltr, Lafayette to the Prince de Poix, 30 Jan 1781, printed in Stanley J. Idzerda, *Lafayette in the Age of the American Revolution, Selected Letters and Papers, 1776–1790*, 5 vols. (Ithaca, N.Y., 1977–83), 3: 302, containing the second quotation.

28. Ltr, Lincoln to John Rutledge, 13 Mar 1780, printed in Livermore, *Historical Research on Negroes*, p. 138, containing the quotation; Quarles, *The Negro in the American Revolution*, p. 64; Francis B. Heitman, *Historical Register of Officers of the Continental Army during the War of the Revolution*, rev. ed. (Washington, D.C., 1914), pp. 341–42, 351.

29. Ltr, Madison to Joseph Jones, 28 Nov 1780, quoted in Livermore, *Historical Research on Negroes*, pp. 138–39. See also William T. Hutchinson, William M. E. Rachal, et al., eds., *The Papers of James Madison*, 17 vols. (Chicago and Charlottesville, 1962–91), 2: 182–85, 208–09.

30. Ltr, John Laurens to Washington, 19 May 1782, printed in Livermore, *Historical Research on Negroes*, p. 139

31. Ltr, Washington to John Laurens, 10 Jul 1782, quoted in Livermore, *Historical Research on Negroes*, pp. 140–41. See also John C. Fitzpatrick, ed., *The Writings of George Washington from the Original Manuscript Sources, 1745–1799*, 39 vols. (Washington, D.C., 1931–44), 24: 421.

32. Livermore, *Historical Research on Negroes*, pp. 148–49, with the quoted words on p. 148.

33. White, *Connecticut's Black Soldiers*, p. 39.

34. Quarles, *The Negro in the American Revolution*, pp. 183–84; Sidney Kaplan, *The Black Presence in the Era of the American Revolution, 1770–1800* (Washington, D.C., 1973), p. 36, containing the quotation. The 1783 act of the Virginia legislature is printed in full in Joseph T. Wilson, *The Black Phalanx: African American Soldiers in the War of Independence, the War of 1812, and the Civil War* (1887, reprint ed., New York, 1994), pp. 68–69.

35. Ibid., pp. 193–95.

36. Nalty, *Strength for the Fight*, p. 18.

37. White, *Connecticut's Black Soldiers*, p. 27.

38. Nalty, *Strength for the Fight*, p. 18.

39. Ibid.

Center Publishes New Book on Persian Gulf War

The Center of Military History has published a new book by Stephen A. Bourque on the war with Iraq in 1991, *JAYHAWK! The VII Corps in the Persian Gulf War*. Authored by a retired Army officer who served in the 1st Infantry Division in that war, this 528-page paperbound volume may be purchased from the Government Printing Office for $52 under stock number 008-029-00378-3.

STEREOSCOPIC VIEWS
of
West Point and the Corps of Cadets

By Roger D. Cunningham

The United States Military Academy at West Point, New York, marked its bicentennial earlier this year. During the past two centuries, legions of painters and photographers have flocked to the Academy's strategic location overlooking the Hudson River to record both its great natural beauty and the martial trappings of the Corps of Cadets. Much of their handiwork has been marketed to the public, whose interest in West Point steadily increased as Academy graduates, members of the "Long Gray Line," made names for themselves.

During the Gilded Age, stereoscopic views of West Point were very popular. To create the illusion of depth, the stereoscope used printed slides with dual images photographed using two lenses separated by 2.5 inches—exactly as the eyes would see them. The viewer's brain then fused these slightly different images into three-dimensional relief, much to his or her delight.

The stereoscopic views shown here depict members of the Corps of Cadets during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Gustavius W. Pach (1845–1904), a New York City photographer, produced the four views at West Point. The International Stereograph Company of Decatur, Illinois, produced the scene at the Capitol. The title of this last slide was printed next to it, while the titles of the Pach slides were penned on the back of each.

Cavalry Drill on [the] Plain. Cadets wearing stable jackets carry a stars and stripes swallow-tailed guidon, adopted by the cavalry after the outbreak of the Civil War. During West Point's first century, graduates joined several mounted arms, including the dragoons, mounted riflemen, and cavalry. The dragoons and mounted riflemen were consolidated with the cavalry in 1861. Between 1855 and 1902, more than 25 percent of Military Academy graduates were commissioned in the cavalry, including 40 of the 58 men who graduated in 1870.

Area of Barracks: Walking 'Extras' Saturday Afternoon. When cadets accumulated too many demerits, they were required to march punishment tours, or "extras," during their sparse free weekend time—one hour for each demerit over their monthly limit. These forlorn "area birds" are marching beside the old Central Barracks.

The Author

Roger D. Cunningham is a retired Army lieutenant colonel who graduated from the U.S. Military Academy in 1972. He served as an infantry and military police officer in the United States and Korea and as a foreign area officer in Pakistan, Egypt, and Nepal. He was the U.S. Defense Attaché in Kathmandu in 1991–92. His article "Shaking the Iron Fist: The Mexican Punitive Expedition of 1919" appeared in the Winter 2002 issue of *Army History* (No. 54).



Camp, Color Line and Guard Mounting. This view of summer training shows cadets in "50–50" (gray coats and white trousers) full-dress uniform under arms. Their 1869-model dress caps were worn until 1899. The stacked weapons are undoubtedly 1868-model, single-shot, breech-loading cadet rifles, which were used until Krag-Jorgensen–style rifles were introduced in 1895. The cadets' summer encampment on the northeastern edge of "The Plain" endured until 1942.



Signaling in Front of Barracks. These cadets have gathered to practice the transmission of messages using signal flags. Their blue chasseur-style forage caps were worn from 1861 to 1903. The first class (senior) cadet in the center is wearing the chevrons of a quartermaster sergeant. Graduating cadets were not commissioned directly into the Signal Corps until after World War I.



The Pride of the Nation: West Point Cadets in Martial Array before U.S. Capitol, Washington, D.C. The Corps of Cadets occasionally marched in special ceremonies beyond the confines of their rockbound, highland home. This scene depicts them standing at attention during an official function at the U.S. Capitol, probably the inauguration of President Theodore Roosevelt in March 1905 at the start of his second term. The cadets' full dress uniform, adopted in 1899, remains virtually unchanged today.

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32. Ms, autobiographical memoir of Isabel Eliot Cowan.

33. McGee to Cowan, 31 Jul 1900, Cowan file, Box 493, Entry 104, Case Files of Candidates Seeking Appointments as Army Nurses, 1898–1917, RG 112, NA.

34. Order, Surgeon General's Office, 25 Feb 1901; Cowan to the Surgeon General, 15 Mar 1901, both in file 79142, Entry 26, RG 112, NA; PD card of Isabel Eliot Cowan; Ms, autobiographical memoir of Isabel Eliot Cowan; Ltr, Elsie Campbell to Woman's Medical College of Pennsylvania, 15 July 1961, Cowan file, MCP Hahnemann University Archives and Art Program.

35. PD card, Irene S. Toland; Nize Fernandez, "Fifty Years of Irene Toland School," *Methodist Woman* 9 (November 1949):12, containing the quotation; Sheet of notes on Toland's qualifications, Irene S. Toland Candidate Case File, Box 509, Entry 104, RG 112, NA.

36. Sheet of notes on Toland's qualifications; personal communication relating to American Medical College from Paul Anderson, archivist, Washington University, St. Louis, Mo.; PD card, Irene S. Toland, containing her quoted words; *Polk's Medical and Surgical Register*, 5th ed. (Detroit, 1898), p. 977.

37. Charles Dana Gibson with E. Kay Gibson, *Over Seas: U.S. Army Maritime Operations, 1898 through the Fall of the Philippines* (Camden, Me., 2002), p. 41; *Correspondence Relating to the War with Spain, Including the Insurrection in the Philippine Islands and the China Relief Expedition, April 15, 1898, to July 30, 1902*, 2 vols. (reprint ed., Washington, D.C., 1993) 1: 156, 175, 180–81; *Report of the Surgeon-General for Fiscal Year 1899*, pp. 170–71, with the description of the hospital ship on p. 170; Ltr, Childs to J. E. Willis (Toland's uncle), 20 Oct 1898, in file 44831, Entry 26, RG 112, NA.

38. Fernandez, "Fifty Years of Toland School," pp. 12–13.

39. Ltr, Mary Green Korstad to Dr. Fay, Woman's Medical College, Dec 1956, in MCP Hahnemann University Archives and Art Program; Korstad, *One to Follow*, pp. 43–55; B. L. Selmon, "A Woman of the Century," *Medical Woman's Journal* 54 (December 1947): 42–43, containing the quotation.

40. Korstad, *One to Follow*, pp. 56–57, 62–68, 72–86, with the quotation on p. 72; Ltr, Korstad to Dr. Fay, Dec 1956; PD Card, Mary Elizabeth Green, Box 2, Entry 149, RG 112, NA; Mary Elizabeth Green, Thesis on "Medical Jurisprudence" submitted for the degree of Doctor of Medicine, Session 1867–68, and Commencement Program, Woman's Medical College of Pennsylvania, 14 March 1868, both in MCP Hahnemann University Archives and Art Program.

41. Ltr, Korstad to Dr. Fay, Dec 1956, containing the quotation; Korstad, *One to Follow*, pp. 65, 86–89, 93, 132–35; Manifesto of the National Household Economic Association, undated, in Mary E. Green file, Box 497, Entry 104, RG 112, NA.

42. Clipping, "Dr. Mary E. Green," *Hotel World*, September 1895; Clipping of a newspaper obituary, datelined 9 Feb [1910]; Ltrs, McGee to Green, 27 Jul 1898, and Green to McGee, 6 Sep 1898, all in Mary E. Green file, Box 493, Entry 104, RG 112, NA; Korstad, *One to Follow*, pp. 135–37; *Report of the Surgeon-General for Fiscal Year 1898*, p. 130.

43. PD Card, Mary Eloise Walker; "Alumni Catalog of the University of Michigan 1891–1921," Bentley Historical Library, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor; *Conduct of the War Department*, Senate Doc. 221, 56th Cong., 1st sess., 3: 451, 453; Ltr, Mary H. Williams, Buffalo Chapter, DAR, to Mc Gee, 3 Sep 1898, in file 55850, Entry 26, RG 112, NA.

44. Ltr, Williams to McGee, 3 Sep 1898; Ltr, Walker to McGee, 16 Sep 1898, file 55850, Entry 26, RG 112, NA; PD Card, Mary Eloise Walker; *Conduct of the War Department*, Senate Doc. 221, 56th Cong., 1st sess., 3: 451.

45. *Conduct of the War Department*, Senate Doc. 221, 56th Cong., 1st sess., 3: 451–53, with the quotations on pp. 452–53.

46. Untitled newspaper clipping, 16 Jul 1954; Ltr, Carroll W. Collins to the Alumni Association of University of Michigan, 16 Mar 1955, both in Mary Eloise Walker file, Bentley Historical Library, University of Michigan; "Old Peninsula Resident Dies," *Michigan Press Clipping Bureau*, 17 July 1954; Obituary File No. 23804, Alumni Catalogue Office, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor.

47. PD Card, Laura Hughes; Hughes to Brig Gen William H. Forwood, 28 Aug 1902, file 61611, Box 372, Entry 26, Record Group 112, NA; *Polk's Medical and Surgical Register*, p. 779; Jane Hodson, ed., *How To Become a Trained Nurse* (New York, 1898), p. 133.

48. Ltr, Forwood to Hughes, 30 Aug 1902, File 61611, Box 372, Entry 26, RG 112, NA.

49. Hughes to McGee, 10 Sep 1899, file 61611, Box 372, Entry 26, RG 112, NA; 1st Ind, Cpt Sayres L. Milliken to the Quartermaster General, 31 Jul 1928, to Ltr, Maj J. McClintock to the Surgeon General, 30 Jul 1928, in Lizzie L. Hudson, Laura Anne C. Hughes, et al. file, Box 554, Entry 150, Correspondence relating to Spanish-American War contract nurses, RG 112, NA; *American Journal of Nursing* 20 (September 1920): 1006; "Second Annual Meeting of the Spanish-American War Nurses," pp. 1–2.

50. Quoted in William Chafe, *The American Woman: Her Changing Social, Economic, and Political Roles, 1920–1970* (New York, 1972), p. 280.

51. Emily Dunning Barringer, "The American Woman Physician and War Time Rating," *Medical Woman's Journal* 49 (December 1942): 361.

52. Walsh, *"Doctors Wanted: No Women Need Apply,"* p. 261.

53. Odin Anderson, *The Uneasy Equilibrium: Private and Public Financing of Health Services in the United States, 1875–1965* (New Haven 1968), p. 38.

Center of Military History Issues New CD-ROM Set

The Center of Military History has issued a new CD-ROM set entitled *United States Army and World War II: Set 2: Asiatic-Pacific Theater*. This four-disk set reproduces in digital form *Strategy and Command: The First Two Years*; the ten volumes pertaining to U.S. Army combat in Pacific from *The Fall of the Philippines* to *Okinawa: The Last Battle*; and the three volumes describing Army operations in the China-Burma-India theater. Army publication account holders may order this CD-ROM set from the Army Publications Distribution Center–St. Louis. The Government Printing Office is offering this product for sale for $23 under order number 008–029–00380–5.

Continued from page 2

New Books by Center Historians

The University Press of Kansas has issued books by two historians at the Center of Military History. Dale Andrade is the author of *America's Last Vietnam Battle: Halting Hanoi's 1972 Easter Offensive*. Robert S. Rush is the author of *Hell in Hürtgen Forest: The Ordeal and Triumph of an American Infantry Regiment*. A review of the latter book appears in this issue.

Brassey's, Inc., has published *Eisenhower: Soldier-Statesman of the American Century* by retired Brig. Gen. Douglas Kinnard, Ph.D., in its series of concise biographies of historic military figures, Military Profiles. General Kinnard served as chief of military history in 1983–1984.

In Memoriam

Three long-time members of the U.S. Army's historical community have died. Howell C. Brewer, Jr., a cartographic technician at the Center for more than three decades, passed away on 25 August at the age of 69. Hal's maps graced many CMH publications. His career in the federal civil service spanned four decades. He also served in the military, rising to the rank of command sergeant major in the Army Reserve.

Dr. John P. Finnegan, who worked as a historian at the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) from 1982 until his retirement in May 2002, died on 2 September at the age of 65. He received his doctorate from the University of Wisconsin and taught history at Ohio University, Texas Tech University, and the University of Ibadan, Nigeria, prior to joining the federal civil service. He worked as a historian in the Organizational History Branch of CMH from 1980 to 1982. Dr. Finnegan was the author of *Against the Specter of a Dragon: The Campaign for American Military Preparedness, 1914–1917* (Westport, Conn, 1974); *Military Intelligence: A Picture History* (INSCOM, 1985); *The Military Intelligence Story: A Photo History* (INSCOM, 1994); *Military Intelligence* (CMH, 1997), a volume in the Army Lineage Series; and *The U.S. Army in the Korean War, 1950–1953: Operations and Intelligence Support* (INSCOM, 2001). He also coedited *U.S. Army Signals Intelligence in World War II: A Documentary History* (CMH, 1993).

Dr. Paul J. Scheips died on 29 September at the age of 87. He worked as a historian for the Signal Corps historical office in 1952–1962 and at the Center of Military History from 1962 until his retirement in 1986. He ended his federal career as chief of the Center's Staff Support Branch. He received his doctorate in history from American University in 1966, after completing a dissertation on the life of Albert James Myer, founder of the Army Signal Corps. Dr. Scheips served on the Editorial Advisory Board for *Military Affairs*. He wrote articles on signal communications that appeared in *Civil War History* and was the editor of *The Panama Canal: Readings on Its History* (Wilmington, Del., 1979), and *Military Signal Communications*, 2 vols. (New York, 1980). The Center of Military History is preparing for publication his manuscript volume on "The Role of Federal Military Forces in Domestic Disorders, 1945–1992."

New Commemorative Publications on the Korean War

The Marine Corps Historical Center has issued a 56-page booklet by John P. Condon, *Corsairs to Panthers: U.S. Marine Aviation in Korea*. The Air Force History and Museums Program has issued a 50-page booklet by William T. Y'Blood, *Down in the Weeds: Close Air Support in Korea*. The Marine aviation booklet may be purchased from the Government Printing Office for $8 under order number 008–055–00227–3. That office is offering the close air support booklet for sale for $4.25 under order number 008–070–00776–2.

Series on Kansas Forts Awarded Commendation

The American Association for State and Local History has awarded a Certificate of Commendation to the Kansas State Historical Society for its series of publications on the frontier forts of Kansas. Two men associated with the Army historical program contributed to this series. Dr. J. Patrick Hughes, command historian for the 99th Regional Support Command in Pennsylvania, is the author of *Fort Leavenworth: Gateway to the West*. William McKale, museum specialist at the Fort Riley Regimental Museum, is coauthor of *Fort Riley: Citadel of the Frontier West*.

Photo History of Fort Lewis

Arcadia Publishing has issued a new photo history, *Fort Lewis*, in its Images of America Series. Authored by Fort Lewis Military Museum director Alan Archambault, this 128-page paperback is being offered at a list price of $19.99.

Book Reviews

Mr. Lincoln's Bridge Builders The Right Hand of American Genius

By Phillip M. Thienel

White Mane Books, 2001, 278 pp., $40

Review by Michael E. Lynch

The military historiography of the Civil War is dominated primarily by discussions of battles, tactics, strategy, unit histories, and biography. Phillip Thienel expands the field by exploring an aspect of military engineering, one of the critical areas of military history. In this narrative history, Thienel, a retired Corps of Engineers writer, tells the story of the U.S. Army engineers in the Civil War by focusing on their bridge-building efforts. Military engineers played a critical role in facilitating both armies' mobility.

Thienel examines the engineers of the Army of the Potomac, relying primarily on the records of the 15th and 50th New York Volunteer Engineer Regiments. He chronicles the development of the engineer corps, which began the war with only one company but expanded to meet requirements. As the army's force structure grew and engineer units began performing missions, their equipment and techniques improved and the engineers quickly became adept at field-expedient construction methods. Thienel captures many of the engineers' remarkable feats in bridging rivers, creeks, and streams under fire or duress. Footbridges, pontoon bridges, trestle bridges, and corduroy roads were among the most visible and dramatic projects the engineers completed. As the war progressed, the engineers learned from their experiences and were able to build bridges faster and to make better use of local timber.

The book's chief problems are organization, editing, and analysis. Thienel has researched the topic thoroughly using both primary and secondary sources, but unfortunately his book reads like a list of facts and events. Though his discussion of engineer tactics is interesting, he offers no analysis of the operations in which they occurred. Simply replaying events which are intimately familiar to most readers as a prelude to a bridging operation, with no analysis of the engineers' impact on the operations they were supporting, seriously limits the value of the work. Thienel's book often reads as if the war was only a backdrop for a series of bridging operations.

Thienel occasionally attempts to use the Confederate engineers to illustrate certain points. For instance, he observes that the Confederate engineers discovered the importance of a bridge crossing at Drewry's Bluff on the outskirts of Richmond, while the Union forces failed to notice the same thing. Presented well, this could have been a good illustration, but the passage is garbled and the engineers from both sides are intertwined so badly that the reader is left confused.

The author also has difficulty limiting the scope of the work. Most of the book focuses on the Eastern Theater, but Thienel includes brief paragraphs describing bridge-building activities in Missouri and at Vicksburg, and his abrupt switches from East to West and back again do little more than confuse the reader. The book's illustrations are interesting, but they often have no association with the adjacent narrative. They are neither numbered nor directly referenced in the text, so instead of truly illustrating the work they merely decorate it.

Thienel's prose is wordy and awkward, and his syntax frequently impedes the narrative. One short example will suffice: "Captain Pike confronted an engineer officer's expectancy. He responded to the challenge. He conceptualized quickly in his creative mind an image of the required bridge, hurried to the task to collect materials, and to start building the bridge." (p. 23)

This and many similar passages, together with one-sentence paragraphs and other stylistic anomalies, bog down an otherwise interesting work. Section headings within chapters are good stylistic devices when used sparingly to divide clear sections of a larger theme, but Thienel uses them to avoid the need for thoughtful transitions. One chapter had twenty-nine of these section headings, some of which were followed by only two or three sentences.

Thienel certainly shows the engineer in the best possible light, as a dedicated, intelligent, hard-working professional determined to get the job done whatever the cost. It becomes clear that engineers were crucial to many operations, as Thienel lays out a chronological account of engineer activities throughout the war. Many of their accomplishments were indeed exceptional, but Thienel's frequent attempts to "heroify" specific engineers are clumsy and distracting.

This book explores an important aspect of Civil War military operations, adds a bit of breadth to an already large historiography, and makes a laudable attempt to "sing of unsung heroes," but the serious researcher will have to look elsewhere to find in-depth analysis of engineer operations in the Civil War.

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A Grateful Heart: The History of a World War I Field Hospital
By Michael E. Shay
Greenwood Press, 2002, 237 pp., $64.95

Review by Richard J. Shuster

The First World War ushered in the tremendous military power of the twentieth century. Its destructive legacy added over eight million fresh graves to European soil, transformed a tranquil French and Belgian countryside into a tortured landscape, and erased whole towns from the map of Europe. The United States Army lost about 50,000 soldiers in the war, while about 200,000 were wounded by the machine guns, poisonous gas, and artillery barrages that inflicted a constant rain of death and disfigurement along the Western Front. Fighting a war of a different nature were the U.S. Army's doctors and medics, whose scientific advances and personal care helped stem the terrible losses of battle. Historians have examined many facets of the war, but one area that has not received sufficient attention is the role of medical personnel. In his book *A Grateful Heart: The History of a World War I Field Hospital*, Michael Shay begins to narrow this gap in the historiography of the war. His history is a testament to the 103d Field Hospital of the 26th Division, a small group of American soldiers that, instead of adding to the horrendous death toll, fought to save soldiers from the fate suffered by so many.

A superior court judge in Connecticut, Shay bases *A Grateful Heart* on his research in a mixture of primary and secondary materials. His sources include the records of the American Expeditionary Forces in the National Archives, the annual reports of the Surgeon General, and the fifteen-volume study issued by the Surgeon General's Office, *The Medical Department of the United States Army in the World War* (Washington, D.C., 1921–29). In providing a broader context to his discussion of the field hospital in the war, Shay draws heavily upon Edward Coffman's seminal work, *The War To End All Wars: The American Experience in World War I* (New York, 1968), and Martin Gilbert's *The First World War: A Complete History* (New York, 1994), but he uses scholarly articles sparingly.

The author divides each chapter into short accounts of the strategic situation and the actions of the 26th Division (nicknamed the Yankee Division), the division's field hospitals, and the 103d Field Hospital itself. Shay examines the Yankee Division from its formation from New England National Guard units in August 1917 to its dispersal in April 1919. He argues that the U.S. Army, from General John J. Pershing downward, generally viewed the quality of the Guard units with skepticism, but he is quick to point out that the division performed heroically throughout the war and contributed to the success of the Allied victory.

When Shay focuses his attention on the operations of the Yankee Division's 103d Field Hospital, his detailed examination adds new insight into the role of the Army's medical branch in World War I. He explains that the field hospital generally consisted of only about five officers and eighty enlisted men but confronted a daunting number of difficulties and tasks. Doctors and medical personnel faced harsh conditions as they worked in filthy hospitals and tents without sanitation facilities, where sickness and disease thrived on the conditions of war. Aside from the possibility of contracting the illnesses and diseases they treated, medics were also subject to the constant dangers of the battlefield, and medical personnel behind the front were sometimes wounded or killed by artillery fire. Shay does not explore the amount of medical training the hospital's personnel received, but he does explain that medical supplies, as well as medical specialists, were abundant in the U.S. Army. Overall, he finds that the level of the Army's medical care in the war was excellent.

Shay often details the constant movement of the field hospitals and indicates that their mobility was critical to successful medical operations. The speed with which wounded and sick soldiers received preliminary treatment before being transported to base hospitals was crucial to their survival. Flexibility in medical operations was also important. In its initial placement near the front lines, the duty of the 103d was simply to care for the slightly wounded and sick. As the U.S. Army began offensive action against the Germans in the summer of 1918, the duties and responsibilities of the 103d increased dramatically along with the number of the division's critical casualties, which it handled. Doctors and specialists treated severe wounds and illnesses, while noncommissioned officers and other enlisted attendants carried out nursing duties, such as bathing patients and changing their dressings. By the end of the war, the ambulance train and four field hospitals of the

Yankee Division had provided care to over 60,000 patients, of whom 6,500 were treated by the 103d Field Hospital. According to Shay, these medical units themselves together suffered 155 casualties in the war.

A Grateful Heart has some weaknesses that limit its contributions. In the preface to the book, Shay argues that the First World War "has been largely ignored by modern writers" and as a historical topic has been pushed toward "oblivion." (p. xiii) But Shay provides evidence to the contrary in his own bibliography, which lists over two dozen scholarly studies on the war that have been written in the last decade. Although World War I may be considered a "forgotten war" by the American public, which can discuss D-Day much more easily than the St.-Mihiel offensive, the war has by no means been neglected by historians. Shay would have been more correct to argue that compared to the examination of the operational level of the war, the study of the medical activities of the U.S. Army has been neglected and thus deserves a more thorough historical review.

Despite the title of the book, the author focuses too much of his attention summarizing the general course of events in the American sector of the Western Front and examining the overall history of the Yankee Division. At times, this abundance of context overwhelms his examination of the operations of the field hospital. Similarly, his accounts of the precise movements of the hospital from one location to another often overshadow the contributions its medical personnel provided to the thousands of wounded, gassed, or diseased soldiers of the U.S. Army.

Shay's descriptions of the operations of the Yankee Division's 103d Field Hospital, together with some photographs of its medical facilities and personnel, provide a fresh view of a relatively obscure aspect of the history of the First World War. The author has included excellent appendixes in his book; those containing information regarding the types and treatment of diseases and wounds are especially valuable. These appendixes are essential to understanding the nature of and response to various medical conditions that the U.S. Army faced in the war, and it is unfortunate that Shay did not discuss the information they contain in the text of the book. A description and analysis of these data woven into the narrative would have strengthened his examination of the field hospital's ordeal in attempting to treat the ghastly wounds, sicknesses, and diseases that were bred on the field of battle.

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Minuteman: The Military Career of General Robert S. Beightler

By John Kennedy Ohl

Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001, 290 pp., $59.95

Review by James C. McNaughton

Between 1898 and 1975 the United States Army fought four wars in the Asia-Pacific region. In each, the Army fought with a mixed force of regulars and guardsmen. The Army's institutional history in the same period was also marked by a sometimes stormy relationship between these two components. This fine new book illuminates these linked aspects of the Army's history using a biographical perspective.

John Kennedy Ohl is the author of a previous book on Army logistics in World War II, *Supplying the Troops: General Somervell and American Logistics in World War II* (DeKalb, Ill., 1994). His new work, *Minuteman: The Military Career of General Robert S. Beightler*, tells the story of the National Guard officer who commanded the 37th Infantry Division (Ohio National Guard) through World War II. Beightler led the division in some of the war's toughest battles, from the jungles of New Georgia and Bougainville to the streets of Manila. Perhaps the longest-serving division commander of the war, he commanded the 37th Division from its activation in October 1940 through Japan's surrender in September 1945. By all accounts he was an unusually able commander.

Beightler enlisted in his hometown National Guard company in 1911, attracted by its marksmanship program. He took a commission in 1914, just as America was entering a turbulent time when guardsmen saw extensive active duty. From 1916 to 1919 Beightler served thirty-two months on active duty, first on the Mexican border and then in France, where he fought as a regimental adjutant in the 42d "Rainbow" Division.

Beightler discovered that he enjoyed the Guard and showed considerable capacity for leadership and staff work. When the war ended, he returned to Ohio to pursue his dual careers. In civilian life he became a successful civil engineer specializing in highway construction, a booming business in the 1920s. He showed impressive managerial talent as he moved back and forth between positions in private industry and state government. Meanwhile in the National Guard he rose through the ranks, becoming a colonel in 1939. (However, his military and civilian commitments took a toll on his personal life; his first marriage ended in divorce in 1933.) During the Great Depression he left Ohio to spend

four years in Washington as the War Plans Division's highway expert. By the time he took command of the 37th Division, he was a well-rounded officer with a record of combat service and general staff work and civilian experience as manager of large-scale engineering projects. He was an extraordinarily competent and caring officer.

In October 1940 the War Department mobilized all eighteen National Guard divisions. Ohl describes how Beightler prepared the 37th Division for combat. The division was deployed to the South Pacific in May 1942 and committed to combat in July 1943. Although it gradually lost its original character as a Guard outfit, the division retained throughout the war a core of Guard officers in command and staff positions.

Ohl's book is an academic study of an individual infantry division in World War II, and the first for a division in the Pacific. Few recent books of any sort address this level of command in the Pacific. Most focus on General Douglas MacArthur and his senior field commanders, as does William M. Leary, ed., *We Shall Return!* (Lexington, Ky., 1988). More recently, Eric Bergerud, *Touched with Fire* (New York, 1996), features the frontline soldier's experience. Ohl follows Beightler, his staff, and his regimental commanders as they learned the difficult trade of command in combat.

The division faced an extraordinary diversity of operating environments. Initially slated for Northern Ireland, the division was diverted to the South Pacific. It began its combat experience with small unit operations on New Georgia and then engaged in positional defense on Bougainville, open maneuver warfare on Luzon, and finally four weeks of combat in Manila. Ohl shows us how Beightler gradually built a powerful and adaptable combat organization. On the same day that General MacArthur accepted the Japanese surrender in Tokyo Bay, Beightler accepted the surrender of General Tomoyuki Yamashita, the Japanese commander in the Philippines. After the war Beightler accepted a Regular Army commission and received a succession of assignments, including commands in the Marianas and Ryukyus, until his retirement in 1953.

Underneath Ohl's competent combat narrative is an inside look at the relations of the Regular Army and National Guard. Beightler first experienced what Ohl cautiously calls the gap between the Regular Army and the National Guard during the 1916 mobilization for Mexican border duty. Rivalries in Pershing's American Expeditionary Forces in 1917–1918 led to bad blood between regulars and guardsmen in the interwar years. During World War II Beightler became obsessed with what he perceived as Regular Army prejudice against National Guard officers. He constantly felt that his superiors were just waiting for him to fail. As he watched other division commanders promoted to corps command, he became convinced that senior Regular Army officers would never allow a National Guardsman to command a corps. Beightler's private letters, like those of Lt. Gen. Robert L. Eichelberger brought to light by Jay Luvaas, reveal his suspicions and private frustrations.

Minuteman is a solid study of division command in the Pacific in World War II and a well-crafted biography. The text is supplemented with well-chosen photographs. In contrast, the simple maps are barely adequate for a study in battle command. What makes Ohl's work especially valuable for today's Army leaders is the documented tensions between regulars and guardsmen that persisted through Beightler's forty-two years of military service. Ohl presents these tensions to the reader not in the form of a dry study in bureaucratic politics but as heartfelt personal experiences.

Ohl concludes with a postwar comment from General Walter Krueger, under whom Beightler served in the Philippines: "Beightler's trouble was that he was a damn National Guardsman." Thanks to Ohl, we can see that the trouble was not only Beightler's. Rather, it was an unfortunate and enduring aspect of the Army's experience in the twentieth century.

Dr. James C. McNaughton is the command historian for U.S. Army, Pacific. He holds a Ph.D. in history from Johns Hopkins University and is completing a book on the Nisei (Japanese-American) linguists who served in the Military Intelligence Service in World War II. He served as an officer in the active Army, National Guard, and Army Reserve, prior to his military retirement in June 2002 as an Army Reserve lieutenant colonel.

Hell in Hürtgen Forest
The Ordeal and Triumph of an American Infantry Regiment
By Robert Sterling Rush
University Press of Kansas, 2001, 403 pp., $34.95

Review by Martin Blumenson

Robert Rush here presents a case study to compare, he says in his Preface, "the effectiveness of one American infantry regiment against its German opposition in the Hürtgen Forest." He is interested in the factors that produce long-term combat effectiveness or staying power.

The 22d Infantry of the 4th Division fought against several units of the LXXIV Corps for eighteen days, from 16 November to 3 December 1944. At the end of this "sustained bloodletting," both sides were exhausted. Causalities had reduced the adversaries to cadre strength. Yet the Americans were in better condition than their opponents. Why?

To find the answers, Dr. Rush has studied both combatants. Although

data for the 22d Infantry are much more abundant and detailed than for the LXXIV Corps, sufficient research materials support Rush's inquiry. He examines the units' organizational histories, inductions into service, training, leadership, and combat experiences before Hürtgen. He then conducts his readers through a heartbreaking, day-by-day account—beautifully written—of the small unit action in the forest. Finally, he analyzes what has happened and states his conclusions.

What kept both sides fighting were the usual motivators—organizational coherence, unit cohesion, junior leadership, the buddy system or band-of-brothers syndrome, sometimes labeled camaraderie, and coercion. The latter was far more pronounced for the Germans, and the major reason for the difference, Rush says, was the replacement systems in effect. Specifically, the Americans had been able to regenerate their combat effectiveness through the infusion of newcomers into their units. The Germans, lacking systematic individual reinforcements, became incapable of further battle effort.

Rush's theory, which makes a great deal of sense, challenges the work of such predecessors as Edward Shils and Morris Janowitz, S. L. A. Marshall, Martin Van Creveld, and Omer Bartov. Rush's book, therefore, deserves careful reading and thoughtful consideration by those who seek the advantages of sustained combat power in our forces.

Martin Blumenson served as a historical officer with the Third and Seventh Armies in Europe during World War II and commanded a historical detachment in Korea during the Korean War. He was a historian with the Office of the Chief of Military History both as an officer and, from 1957 to 1967, as a civilian. He is the author of many books including Breakout and Pursuit *(CMH, 1961),* Salerno to Cassino *(CMH, 1969),* The Patton Papers *(2 vols., Boston, 1972–74), and* The Battle of the Generals: The Untold Story of the Falaise Pocket *(New York, 1993). Dr. Robert Sterling Rush is a historian in the Center's Field and International Branch. He received his Ph.D. in history from Ohio State University in 2000.*

The Panzer Legions: A Guide to the German Army Tank Divisions of World War II and Their Commanders

By Samuel B. Mitcham

Greenwood Press, 2001, 340 pp., $80

Review by Douglas E. Nash

Interest in the German armored forces of World War II, the *Panzertruppen*, has been on the increase in recent years, due in part to the release of the memoirs of well-placed German tank officers such as Col. Hans von Luck, as well as the reemergence of wartime documents and oral interviews of key personnel conducted shortly after the war's end. The publication of Samuel Mitcham's *The Panzer Legions* is therefore timely indeed. The German *Panzertruppen* were long considered in post–World War II military circles as the force that most closely reached the pinnacle of success in armored warfare, but their reputation began to decline in the 1970s due in large part to their replacement in the pantheon of armor by the Israeli Army after its magnificent performance during the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. This trend continued throughout the 1980s and 90s, as the Israeli Armored Corps was in turn replaced by the U.S. Army's heavy divisions operating under the AirLand Battle doctrine. The American equipment, doctrine, and tactics proved highly effective in the desert sands of Iraq and Kuwait during the 1991 Gulf War, when U.S. and coalition forces defeated a larger Iraqi force in only 100 hours.

Nowadays, with military historians displaying renewed interest in the World War II generation and with the popularity of such movies as *Saving Private Ryan*, public interest in World War II has enjoyed a resurgence. Thus it was only natural that the German armed forces of that war would eventually be rediscovered. Much of that interest, in turn, has concentrated on the *Panzertruppen*, whose divisions, corps, and armies stormed across Poland, France, the Balkans, North Africa, and the Soviet Union in 1939–42. Those readers seeking the definitive history of the *Panzertruppen* with their attendant political battles and personalities, as well as detailed descriptions of their operations, should look elsewhere, for Mitcham has not written that kind of book. Rather, the value of this new book lies in Mitcham's description and detailed histories of all major Panzer formations, including Panzer armies, Panzer corps, and all forty-eight individual tank divisions.

Those who stand to profit most from this book are wargamers or anyone interested in encapsulated unit histories, tables of organization, and short biographies of commanders. The book treats the rise, maturation, and downfall of the *Panzertruppen* in cursory fashion and provides little new information for anyone who has studied the German armored force. For those new to the topic, however, Mitcham's historical outline is very handy indeed, since it adequately covers all of the major events concerning the *Panzertruppen* from their inception to their final defeat in May 1945. Every major Panzer division, from the well-known and highly respected 11th to the ill-fated Panzer Division Clausewitz receives equal treatment. Mitcham offers organizational data as well as descriptions of obscure engagements at the war's end that have remained unknown until now. A few

photos are thrown in for good measure, though the addition of more detailed maps would have provided the reader a handy guide to follow the actions of the various Panzer units as they fought their way through Europe and North Africa. Though not a scholarly study per se, *The Panzer Legions* remains a worthy addition to anyone's military history reference library. Hopefully, it will stimulate readers to engage in further research on the subject.

Lt. Col. Douglas E. Nash serves at Fort Drum, New York, as the G5 of the 10th Mountain Division. He enlisted in the Army in 1974 and graduated from the U.S. Military Academy in 1980, receiving a commission as an armor officer. He served as a special operations officer in Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM, participated in humanitarian operations in Northern Iraq; Guantánamo Bay, Cuba; and Kosovo, and served with Coalition Joint Task Force MOUNTAIN in Afghanistan until April 2002. A graduate of the Army's Command and General Staff College, he is the author of Hell's Gate: The Battle of Cherkassy Pocket, January to February 1944 *(Southbury, Conn., 2002). His article* "The Forgotten Soldier*: Unmasked," appeared in the Summer 1997 issue of* Army History *(No. 42).*

The Will To Win: The Life of General James A. Van Fleet

By Paul F. Braim

Naval Institute Press, 2001, 419 pp., $42.50

Review by Roger Cunningham

James Alward Van Fleet was a member of the West Point Class of 1915. This group of 164 talented men became known as "the class the stars fell on" because it produced fifty-nine general officers, including two of the nation's five five-star generals—Eisenhower and Bradley. In spite of Van Fleet's own stellar military career (1915–1953) and his rise to four-star rank, his record was somewhat dimmed by the aura of his classmates. As a contemporary retired general said, "Van Fleet too often stood in the shadow of more flamboyant commanders until he came into his own in post–World War II Greece and post-MacArthur Korea." Paul Braim, an Army colonel who served in three wars and died shortly after this book was published, finally gave Van Fleet his due in this very readable biography.

Born in New Jersey in 1892, Van Fleet reported to West Point in 1911, after growing up in modest circumstances in central Florida. While a cadet he played fullback on the undefeated 1914 Army football team (with Eisenhower and Bradley) and grew to love the game. Army's memorable 20–0 victory over Navy convinced him that winning was the direct result of developing a proper mental attitude—the will to win.

After graduation, Van Fleet was assigned to the 3d Infantry and soon deployed to the Mexican border. During World War I, he commanded one of the 6th Division's machine-gun battalions in France and engaged in combat during the Meuse-Argonne offensive. He spent much of the interwar period on ROTC duty at several universities, including the University of Florida. In Gainesville he also coached the Gators to an 8–2–1 record in the 1924 football season, an experience that helped him to further develop his will-to-win philosophy. After commanding an infantry battalion in Panama, Van Fleet briefly coached the Army's enlisted football team and attended the Infantry Officers' Advanced Course, where his performance earned him the bleak assessment that he was not to be considered for further schooling. He then received another assignment to the University of Florida, where this time he assisted in coaching the football team. Duty with the Civilian Conservation Corps and as an instructor with the Organized Reserves preceded his taking command of a third battalion at Fort Benning, Georgia, as war broke out in Europe.

In 1941 Colonel Van Fleet, still at Fort Benning, took command of the 8th Infantry, the regiment that he would lead ashore at Utah Beach on D-Day, three years later. As his regiment pushed out of the Normandy beachhead toward Cherbourg, "Van ranged across the battlefield, standing up in his jeep or walking erect in all his six-foot-one-inch visibility. He commanded confidently and exuded a certitude of success, which he attributed as much to his football background as to his tactical experience." (p. 88) His combat leadership earned him his first Distinguished Service Cross, pinned on by his classmate, Lt. Gen. Omar Bradley.

One of the reasons why Van Fleet was still a colonel, while classmates Bradley and Eisenhower were senior general officers, was that General George C. Marshall, the Army chief of staff, had apparently confused him with another officer who had a drinking problem. Once Marshall realized his error, Van Fleet quickly began to receive the promotions he so richly deserved.[1] In August 1944 he was promoted to brigadier general and named assistant commander of the 2d Infantry Division. In the next two months, he assumed command of the 4th and 90th Infantry Divisions and led the former outfit across the Moselle River south of Metz. Van Fleet was then promoted to major general, and in March 1945 he assumed command of III Corps, leading it as it spearheaded the First Army advance across Germany in the final months of the war in Europe.

In 1948 Van Fleet, now a lieutenant general, was assigned to command the Joint U.S. Military Advisory and Planning Group that was organized under the Truman Doctrine to assist the government of Greece in its fight against a Communist insurgency.

When Secretary of State Marshall asked Van Fleet what he could do to help the Greeks beat the Communists, he replied that if the Greeks had the will to win, he could train them to be victorious. True to his word, Van Fleet was instrumental in reversing a previously deteriorating situation in Greece, and by 1950 the Greek National Army had defeated the "Democratic Army of Greece" and saved the country from communism.

Shortly after the Korean War began, Van Fleet returned to the United States and took command of Second Army. When in April 1951 President Harry S. Truman relieved General Douglas MacArthur as the supreme commander of UN Forces in Korea, General Matthew Ridgway replaced him, and the president, impressed with what Van Fleet had accomplished in Greece, insisted that he succeed Ridgway as Eighth Army commander. Although Van Fleet was greatly saddened by the death of his only son, a bomber pilot, and exasperated with the political restraints that America's first "limited war" placed on his desire for offensive action, he capably commanded Eighth Army until he turned it over to General Maxwell Taylor in February 1953. As an army commander, Van Fleet was also instrumental in establishing the Republic of Korea's military academy, which was modeled on West Point. He retired a month after leaving Korea. During the interim he was given an office in the Pentagon—the first time that he had ever been assigned there. Van Fleet survived another thirty-nine years, dying in 1992 at the age of 100.

My only criticism of the author is that he spends fifty pages covering Van Fleet's post-retirement life. His final chapter, "The Long, Long Trail," which includes five pages on the general's 100th birthday party alone, is too, too long. Other than that, I very much enjoyed reading about the man that Harry Truman called the nation's greatest combat general. One can only hope that other senior leaders can instill Van Fleet's will to win in future generations of American fighting men and women, whenever the nation finds itself in peril.

NOTE

1. The author credits Omar Bradley's autobiography, *A General's Life* (New York, 1983), for this explanation of Marshall's hesitation to promote Van Fleet. However, the fact that he had had repeated football-coaching assignments and had not attended the Command and General Staff College would also undoubtedly have left Marshall unimpressed.

Korean Atrocity! Forgotten War Crimes, 1950–1953

By Philip D. Chinnery

Naval Institute Press, 2000, 286 pp., $36.95

Review by Richard J. Shuster

Almost fifty years after the end of hostilities in the Korean War, the treatment of American prisoners in that conflict remains a bitter memory. Today, the tense relationship between the United States and North Korea has once again captured the world's attention. Historians have published numerous studies on the Korean War, but few have focused on the treatment that U.S. prisoners of war received at the hands of their North Korean and Chinese captors. Philip D. Chinnery's recent book, *Korean Atrocity! Forgotten War Crimes, 1950–1953*, examines the terrible ordeal suffered by thousands of captured American soldiers and, to a lesser extent, by other United Nations troops and South Korean civilians who were also taken into custody by the Communists. The historian for the National Ex–Prisoner of War Association, a British organization dedicated to the welfare of British and Allied servicemen who became prisoners of war, Chinnery uses recently declassified Korean War files in the British Public Record Office at Kew Gardens to illustrate the horrors of life in enemy captivity. The author points out the ironic legacy of a war in which no war crimes trials were held for North Korean and Chinese soldiers responsible for the murder, torture, and negligent treatment of thousands of prisoners, while the United States held court-martial trials for American soldiers accused of collaborating with the enemy while in captivity. Most importantly, the newly released materials offer shocking insight into the treatment of prisoners and the brutal nature of the war. Therefore, anyone interested in the Korean conflict will find Chinnery's book valuable.

The opening stages of the Korean War were especially harsh for those unfortunate soldiers taken prisoner. As North Korean forces advanced swiftly in the summer of 1950, thousands of inadequately trained and equipped American and South Korean soldiers were captured. Although historians and veterans of the Pacific theater in World War II may well disagree, Chinnery argues that "the war was only a few days old when it became obvious that the treatment of US prisoners of war was going to be different to previous wars." (p. 8) The author uses firsthand accounts of American soldiers to show that prisoners of the North Koreans, especially those taken in the early battles, generally suffered the most inhumane treatment of the war. Death marches were common. Prisoners were forced to walk hundreds of miles northward to prison camps without medical attention, adequate food, or proper clothing and boots. Stragglers and wounded were often shot or bayoneted. In some instances, dozens of American prisoners were shot *en masse*. When one reads that U.S. soldiers had their tongues cut out, were castrated, or were used for bayonet practice, the savage nature of the war takes on a new meaning.

Chinnery does not ignore the plight of civilians taken in the North Korean advance toward Pusan. In the first months of the war North Korean forces murdered foreign teachers and missionaries, along with thousands of South Koreans who were considered political enemies, and dumped their remains in caves or hastily dug trenches. When American and U.N. forces later pushed the North Koreans north of the 38th Parallel, they discovered widespread evidence of mass murder. American interrogations of captured North Koreans produced startlingly frank and detailed confessions of specific executions. Chinnery explains that in the absence of a clear victor in the war, the Americans never brought these perpetrators of atrocities before any war crimes tribunal but instead simply released them when the war ended.

The author also looks at the impact of China's intervention in the war on American prisoners. The massive Chinese attack in the fall of 1950 pushed American and South Korean troops back from the Yalu River to south of the 38th Parallel, and this offensive added a new influx of prisoners. Consequently, numerous prisoner of war camps sprang up south of the Yalu River. Over the course of two years, no fewer than 3,000 American soldiers either died of malnutrition or disease or were beaten and murdered, sometimes brutally. Chinnery observes, "the Geneva Convention meant nothing to the North Koreans or the Chinese." (p. 112) Once peace negotiations began after the first year of the war, however, the Chinese came to the realization that prisoners of war could be used as bargaining chips, and, the author contends, the treatment of prisoners improved.

The Chinese attempted to indoctrinate American and U.N. prisoners in Communist ideology. A novelty for American prisoners of war, this program forced many prisoners to attend lectures and write false confessions of war guilt. Chinnery rightly points out that most of these efforts failed and that many prisoners ridiculed the attempts and openly mocked their captors. The author also explains that prisoners often attempted to escape but were impeded by the distance from friendly lines, rugged terrain, lack of food, and hostile populace. In the spring and summer of 1953, as the war dragged to a close, the opposing sides exchanged thousands of prisoners. Chinnery reveals that a staggering 38 percent of the 7,190 American soldiers held in captivity died, while an additional 8,000 U.S. troops were listed as missing in action. Many of the missing are assumed to be victims of atrocities.

A major shortcoming of *Korean Atrocity* is the unorthodox and inadequate use of citations. Chinnery explains in the preface that he discovered recently declassified files on the Korean War, and he uses these records liberally, quoting them at length throughout the study. He cites his material, however, in ambiguous parenthetical citations and does not provide the reader with accurate references; classification or file numbers, dates, and descriptions of the records are absent. Some of the survivors' accounts have no citations at all. Moreover, the occasional parenthetical or textual citations often impair the flow of the narrative. Similarly, it is a shame that the photographs in *Korean Atrocity*, some depicting horrifying scenes of burned civilians and tortured soldiers, appear without credit. The book's rather meager bibliography fails to satisfy the reader's interest in the author's sources.

The accounts of the American and British survivors are shocking to read, and one can only marvel at the determination of the prisoners and the behavior of the captors. The strength of *Korean Atrocity* therefore lies in the evidence that Chinnery has discovered, some 1,615 Eighth Army War Crimes Division investigations of atrocities committed by the North Koreans and Chinese during the war. Yet the author's research has covered little else. As a result, he is short on analysis and fails to address a number of important issues. For instance, who sanctioned the mass killings of American and U.N. prisoners and the many civilians that fell under Communist control? How much did the United States know about the treatment of its men in captivity? What was the fate of South Korean prisoners of war? Instead of providing a synthesis of the material at the conclusion of the book, Chinnery chooses instead to sketch miscellaneous accounts of prisoners missing in action.

The topic of war crimes is an important aspect of the Korean War that still needs a thorough examination. The disturbingly frank personal accounts found in *Korean Atrocity*, however, add to a more complete understanding of the brutal nature of that war and bring to light the terrible ordeal that thousands of American troops were forced to endure. The heroism of the prisoners and the actions of the captors portray the indomitable spirit of the individual confronting a regime of brutal cruelty.

Why A Soldier? A Signal Corpsman's Tour from Vietnam to the Moscow Hot Line

By David G. Fitz-Enz

Ballantine Books, 2000, 397 pp., paper, $6.99

Review by Rebecca Robbins Raines

This book offers something rare—a portrait of Army life as seen from a Signal Corpsman's perspective. To answer one obvious question right away, the author's unusual surname is of Alsatian derivation and proved a problem throughout his career. Because his name was mangled so often, he answered simply to "Fitz." Fitz-Enz received a commission as a

lieutenant in the Army Reserve after graduating from Marquette University in 1963.

Fitz-Enz begins his account in November 1965 with his arrival in Vietnam with the 69th Signal Battalion, as the U.S. troop buildup began. Although Fitz-Enz had not received any formal photographic training and "had never even owned a camera," he was assigned to lead the battalion's combat photographic platoon. The platoon was soon split up, and Fitz-Enz was assigned to the 173d Airborne Brigade, which had no photographic support of its own. Because he was airborne-qualified, he was perfect for this job. Fitz-Enz spent nine months with the 173d, during which he and his cameras saw plenty of action as they accompanied the paratroopers into battle. A number of his photos illustrate the volume.

In addition to vivid descriptions of the combat he experienced, Fitz-Enz provides interesting technical details about his job. For example, he substituted a skin-diver's camera for his issued Leica and Speed Graphflex models. The underwater camera was not bothered by the moisture and dust of Vietnam and had a wide-angle lens that proved ideal for work in the jungle, where vision was limited. The motion-picture photographers, meanwhile, were using World War II–era equipment that could only shoot one hundred feet of film at a time.

The book's major flaw is the author's tendency to move back and forth in time rather than to tell his story in chronological order. This proves extremely distracting and makes the narrative hard to follow. Fitz-Enz also makes some fairly serious historical errors, such as his statement that the 69th Signal Battalion had not missed a conflict since the Civil War. The Signal Corps in fact had no permanent units until the War with Spain, and the 69th can only trace its lineage to 1942. The battalion served in the European Theater during World War II, but it did not go to Korea. The Signal Corps itself, however, dates from 1860, so in that sense Fitz-Enz is correct. Those signal soldiers who landed under fire at such places as Normandy, Sicily, and Leyte will certainly take issue with his statement that the 69th Signal Battalion made "the only amphibious assault by a Signal Corps battalion" in the Corps' history. Fitz-Enz also states that he was the first to establish communication between Vietnam and the Oval Office using tactical systems. He relates that in 1970, during his second tour in Vietnam, he operated the radio connecting his corps commander with President Richard Nixon. Five years earlier, however, President Lyndon Johnson had spoken directly with a marine regimental commander in the midst of a battle.

While Fitz-Enz may not be a historian, he writes well and effectively evokes Army life—from the horrors of battle to the humor that can be found even in the most difficult of circumstances. He also provides insight into an often unheralded aspect of military service: the life and work of the non–combat arms soldier. His book provides a firsthand look at the communicator's war in Vietnam that complements the overview provided by John D. Bergen in *Military Communications: A Test for Technology* (CMH, 1986). If only more signal soldiers and other combat support personnel would follow his example, we might better remember that not all war stories are about killing and that it takes all kinds of soldiers to make an Army.

Fitz-Enz is surprisingly frank in his observations about the Army and his fellow soldiers. That assessment must be tempered somewhat, however, by the fact that he changed the names of some individuals to "protect their privacy." He is obviously very proud of his military service, especially the two tours in Vietnam for which he volunteered and to which he devotes a considerable portion of the text. He served his second tour with the 124th Signal Battalion of the 4th Infantry Division. This time he at first commanded the communications platoon of the divisional cavalry squadron and then, upon promotion to major, became the battalion S–3.

As for the other portions of the book, one of the best is his description of jump school. It conveys the combination of skill, determination, and courage required to earn the silver wings. But Fitz-Enz is much less passionate and informative about his signal training and many of his signal assignments. The section covering his tour in Japan during the early 1960s is very interesting, but chiefly because of his observations about the social and cultural aspects of life there. He hardly mentions his involvement with the tropospheric scatter-communications system he was helping to install. Regrettably, he says nothing about his work with the Moscow Hot Line, despite the fact that it is featured in the title. Perhaps there are national security issues involved, but the book's title should not trumpet something that the book does not discuss.

To this reader, the author's choice of emphasis reflects his underlying desire to be a combat arms soldier. Fitz-Enz had originally chosen the Signal Corps because his eyesight was too poor for the cavalry. Yet, when given a chance to transfer to armor during his second tour in Vietnam, he declined. He had made a good start in the Signal Corps, and he went on to enjoy a successful career as a signaleer. Fitz-Enz retired as a colonel in 1993 after serving as the Training and Doctrine Command's deputy chief of staff for information management. Today he is vice president of a film company. In response to the question posed by the title, the answer is clear: Being a soldier was exactly what David Fitz-Enz wanted to be. *Why a Soldier?* tells us part of his story. Perhaps someday he will tell us the rest.

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Stronger than Custom: West Point and the Admission of Women

By Lance Janda

Praeger Press, 2000, 226pp., $65.00

Review by Jennie Kiesling

Lance Janda's *Stronger than Custom* is an intelligent and highly readable study of the admission of women to the United States Military Academy at West Point and of the experiences of the women of the Class of 1980.

For many women of that class, the West Point experience was one of cruelty exacerbated by bafflement. Few women applied to West Point in 1976 to proselytize for women's liberation or out of an informed desire for a military career. As ignorant as many male applicants about the Academy and Army, the women were attracted by the same things—free education, physical challenges, love of country, and the Academy's mystique and traditions. Whatever they expected, it was not hatred and rejection. Janda recounts the experiences over the next four years of the young women who entered unprepared into a world that did not want them. He also tells the parallel stories of the male cadets who (generally) resented the female intrusion into *their* Academy and of the Academy leadership, which executed with reasonable grace a profoundly uncomfortable mission.

The book is based almost entirely on interviews with members of the USMA Class of 1980 and of the Academy staff and faculty. Janda conducted some recently; the class of 1980 exit interviews come from the Academy archives. Janda uses this material skillfully, allowing his subjects to tell the stories of their own experiences from Reception Day in 1976 to Graduation Day in 1980.

Although this is not a happy story, Janda's tone is notably mild, sometimes shockingly so in view of the enormity of some of the misbehavior described. The book is a gripping and emotionally affecting narrative, not a diatribe. If anything, some of the nastier experiences of the first women at West Point are so understated that a careless reader might miss them. While Janda is to be praised for avoiding rumormongering and histrionics, the desire to avoid sensationalism leads to understating the importance in the Academy's history of eating disorders and (probably) sexual assault.

Those who blame feminist machinations for the expanding role of women in the armed forces of the United States ought to read Janda's account of the integration of the military academies. The change happened, over the vehement objections of most military leaders and in spite of the disinterest of most feminists, because Congress determined that all-male academies restricted the pool of talent available to the armed forces and discriminated against the women whose taxes supported such institutions.

In the opening discussion of the political debate, Janda explains male opposition to integrating the service academies entirely in terms of West Point's self-image as a school for combat leaders. To admit women to West Point was to undermine the myth that all West Point graduates were warriors—or lead to the opening of combat arms to women. Those familiar with the issues surrounding the admission of women to the academies may be uncomfortable with Janda's willingness in the opening chapters to allow the opponents of integration to define the debate in terms of the connection between West Point and combat arms. This is a rational argument, vulnerable to rational rebuttal and inadequate to explain the visceral hostility to gender integration. Over the course of the narrative, Janda leads the reader to see that arguments about opening combat arms to women were rhetorical cover for real issues about men's self-image and their need to preserve a monopoly on the traditional soldierly virtues. If women could succeed at West Point, then were courage, loyalty, honor, and toughness no longer distinctly male? The overall structure of Janda's argument is an effective one, but those who read only the first two chapters may be misled.

Janda argues that the admission of women to West Point was a good thing for which the women (and some of the men) of the Class of 1980 paid an unnecessarily high price. He offers over the course of the narrative thoughtful suggestions as to how the process could have been more efficient and less emotionally destructive. Historians are not objective chroniclers of undigested fact, and one of the strengths of *Stronger Than Custom* is the demonstration that a historian's personal engagement with the subject can draw the reader into the story and into the controversies that arise from it in an intellectually satisfying way.

This is an admirable book and valuable reading for anyone seeking a clearer understanding either of the overall process of gender integration of the armed forces or of one of the most important, and ultimately successful, episodes in the story.

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