ARMY HISTORY

The Professional Bulletin of Army History

Summer–Fall 2003
PB 20-03-3 (No. 59)
Washington, D.C.

In This Issue

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

PETER J. SCHOOMAKER
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

Official:

JOEL B. HUDSON
Administrative Assistant to the
Secretary of the Army

Chief of Military History
Brig. Gen. John S. Brown

Managing Editor
Charles Hendricks, Ph.D.

The U.S. Army Center of Military History publishes *Army History* (ISSN 1546–5330) for the professional development of Army historians. Correspondence should be addressed to Managing Editor, *Army History*, U.S. Army Center of Military History, 103 Third Ave., Fort Lesley J. McNair, D.C. 20319–5058, or sent by e-mail to *charles.hendricks@ hqda.army.mil*. The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors, not the Department of Defense or its constituent elements. *Army History*'s contents do not necessarily reflect official Army positions and do not supersede information in other official Army publications or Army regulations. This bulletin is approved for official dissemination of material designed to keep individuals within the Army knowledgeable of developments in Army history and thereby enhance their professional development. The reproduction of illustrations that were not obtained from federal sources is prohibited. The Department of the Army approved the use of funds for printing this publication on 7 September 1983. Postage has been paid at Washington, D.C.

News Notes

Call for Papers
July 2004 Conference of Army Historians

The Center of Military History is soliciting papers for the 2004 biennial Conference of Army Historians, which will be held on 12–14 July 2004 in the Washington, D.C., area. The theme of the conference will be "Military Professionalization: The Quest for Excellence." Papers may address different military institutions. Possible subjects include officer education and training, noncommissioned officer training, the shift from conscription to an all-volunteer force, the development of doctrine, the role of professional journals, and changes in the relationship between military and civilian institutions.

Individuals interested in participating should send a proposed paper topic, a one-page prospectus on the paper, and some information about his or her background to Dr. Robert S. Rush, preferably by email to *rushrs@hqda.army.mil* or alternately by U.S. Postal Service to U.S. Army Center of Military History, ATTN: DAMH-FPF (Dr. Rush), 103 Third Avenue, Fort Lesley J. McNair, D.C. 20319-5058. This material must be received no later than 15 February 2004. Further information may be obtained by calling Dr. Rush at 202-685-2727.

Uniformed Historians Continue to Cover Army's Asian Operations

Five Army Reserve and three National Guard military history detachments remained deployed in the Iraq Theater of Operations in early August 2003, conducting interviews and collecting documents and artifacts for use by military historians and museums. Five other military history detachments returned from this theater in July, and others were preparing to return home. A National Guard military history detachment that had served in Afghanistan in 2002 returned there in July 2003, replacing an Army Reserve military history detachment had had served in Afghanistan for six months.

Lt. Col. Steven Holcomb, an Army Reserve officer and former military history detachment commander, supplanted Col. Neil Rogers as commander of the military history group at Headquarters, Combined Forces Land Component Command, at Camp Doha, Kuwait. Cmd. Sgt. Maj. Scott Garrett, an Army reservist who teaches history at Paducah Community College in Kentucky in civilian life, joined the military history group as its senior enlisted man. The military history detachments in the Iraq theater report to Colonel Holcomb.

News Notes continued on page 30

The Chief's Corner

John S. Brown

An issue that has preoccupied a great many of us recently has been the so-called "Third Wave" associated with A-76, outsourcing, divestiture, and privatization. As many of you know, these initiatives have been the subject of lengthy deliberations and negotiations within the Pentagon and without, with the staff lead undertaken by Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs Reginald Brown. A high-level Executive Steering Committee assisted Mr. Brown, and I was invited, as Chief of Military History, to make the case for the Army Historical Program before that committee.

The disposition of all of matters relevant to this review is not yet complete, but after several months of give and take I believe you would be interested in the current state of play. The Executive Steering Committee has strongly recommended that the Army Historical Program be exempt from A-76, outsourcing, and divestiture. This would mean no contracting out of historians and curators and would also mean no further cuts. This is wonderful news. The Executive Steering Committee has also asked us to explore such alternatives to A-76 as partnering with a major university such as Johns Hopkins or the University of Maryland, with the missions and constitutions of our organizations maintained intact.

Exploration will be just that, exploration, and it would undoubtedly be some time before such a relationship could be worked out. Such an initiative might very well require enabling legislation, and we do not yet know if a university is interested in taking on a project of the immense scope and breadth of the Army Historical Program. Nevertheless, partnerships with academe hold some promise for historians and curators, and we are happy enough to explore the possibilities while rigorously sustaining our standards. In the meantime, all positions within the Army Historical Program have been coded "Y," pending privatization. This device serves to protect each of our positions from outsourcing or divestiture until we work out the details of a feasible partnership or determine such a partnership to be unworkable. This interim protection is also, we believe, very good news.

An additional factor weighing heavily in these discussions has been the accelerating momentum towards the National Museum of the United States Army (NMUSA). In June the NMUSA Executive Steering Committee approved the mission and vision of the museum and accepted for further staffing proposed manning and budget figures and site specifications. Preparatory expenditures of $2.5 million have already been made this year, and a further $6.3 million will be spent before the year is over. Beyond Fiscal Year 2003, the necessary appropriated funds are in the Program Objective Memorandum (POM). These funds should be sufficient to complete the site selection, building concept, and gallery design and to get on with the museum itself. All of this growth will become yet another prominent feature of the Army Historical Program.

In sum, I believe we historians and curators are positioned to be well served during the course of the Third Wave. Divestiture and outsourcing have been rejected, and alternatives to A-76, should they progress, have been carefully designed to preserve intact the integrity of our programs. As always, the strongest single argument in preserving our programs has been the reputation for invaluable service that you, the curators and historians of the Army, have so deservedly earned. Please keep up the great work!

Courtesy of the Smithsonian Institution

Thinking of Loved One, *an oil painting by Henry Sugimoto, depicts a mother with child in a camp waiting for her husband in the Army. The artist was interned at the Jerome and Rohwer camps in Arkansas.*

"The complex history of Japanese Americans and the U.S. Army shows that there is still plenty of room for fresh interpretations. This history can teach us important lessons about the obligations of citizenship and the varieties of valor, topics that will never go out of style."

James C. McNaughton

Japanese Americans and the U.S. Army
A Historical Reconsideration

By James C. McNaughton

A dramatic painting hangs in many Army offices, one of a well-known series of historical lithographs. *Go For Broke* depicts a platoon of Japanese-American soldiers in the Vosges Mountains battling a German tank at close range with rifles and bazookas in October 1944. (See page 9.) The phrase "Go For Broke" was the motto of the famous 442d Regimental Combat Team.[1]

This unit and its predecessor, the 100th Infantry Battalion (Separate), hold a special place in the Army's memory. The battalion's lineage and that of the 442d Infantry are preserved by today's 100th Battalion, 442d Infantry, a unit in the U.S. Army Reserve. Both the battalion and the regiment, of which the battalion became a part in 1944, were composed of Japanese Americans from Hawaii and the West Coast who called themselves *Nisei*, the Japanese word for "second-generation." About 22,000 Nisei served in the U.S. Army during World War II. Their valor in Italy and France was unsurpassed as they battled the Germans and simultaneously fought for acceptance as loyal Americans.

The proud history of these units has been celebrated in countless books, ceremonies, films, and public monuments.[2] Two Nisei veterans, Spark Matsunaga and Daniel K. Inouye, went on to represent Hawaii in both houses of Congress. In 1999 a Japanese-American officer, General Eric K. Shinseki, became chief of staff of the Army. Finally, after Congress in the mid-1990s directed the secretary of the Army to review the award records of Asian Americans in World War II for possible upgrade to the Medal of Honor, President Bill Clinton in June 2000 awarded new Medals of Honor to 22 Asian Americans, 20 Nisei and 2 from other Asian-American groups.[3]

Taken as a whole, these powerful memories evoke a compelling storyline that has changed little since the war: how the Nisei overcame prejudice through heroic military service to achieve national recognition. More than fifty years later, new interpretations are moving beyond this basic storyline. Today multiple viewpoints coexist, sometimes in uneasy balance, reflecting evolving perspectives on World War II. Patriotic narratives and memoirs have now been followed by academic works from the emerging field of Asian-American studies. As the Nisei have begun passing from the scene, scholars and community activists are focusing more on the Japanese-American internment camps than on battlefield valor, stimulated in large measure by the successful redress movement of the 1980s.[4] Yet these new approaches have done little to displace the continual outpouring of publications and commemorations that honor Nisei veterans. The new studies seem reluctant to address military service, as if the continued need to honor surviving veterans might preclude more critical treatment. Hence two storylines now coexist side by side: military service and the internment camps.

Several recent books indicate that scholars may now be more willing to move beyond the celebratory to address issues of Nisei military service in a critical fashion. One result has been to put the U.S. Army in the spotlight once again. The Army played two apparently contradictory roles in the history of Japanese Americans during this period. First, in 1942 the Western Defense Command removed some 110,000 persons of Japanese birth or ancestry from the West Coast, citing "military necessity." Second, in 1943 the War Department called for Nisei volunteers for a segregated regimental combat team, and this was followed in early 1944 by the renewed application of selective service laws to the Nisei. The new books shed light on both episodes and show there is more to the heroic story in the painting than is commonly realized.

Relocation: A Military Necessity?

The Army's removal of all persons of Japanese descent from the West Coast to so-called "war relocation centers"

was a watershed in the history of Japanese Americans. On 19 February 1942 President Franklin Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066 giving military commanders the authority to designate "military areas" from which "any or all persons may be excluded." The commander of the Western Defense Command proceeded over the next six months to remove from the entire West Coast all Japanese immigrants and their American-born children to ten internment camps. Once established, the camps were administered by the War Relocation Authority, but the Army continued to provide security forces.[5]

The decision to evacuate has been studied in great detail. Morton Grodzins of the University of Chicago completed a thorough scholarly examination of the decision-making process and its political context just seven years after the evacuation began. In 1959 Stetson Conn of the Office of the Chief of Military History completed the first study of the decision that was based on War Department records. Grodzins's essay and Conn's careful account have remained the foundation of all subsequent scholarship on the topic.[6] Since 11 September 2001 renewed attention has been given to the evacuation as a potentially dangerous precedent for the detention of suspect groups without due process in time of war.[7] Because the government cited "military necessity" for its rationale, Conn and more recent scholars have focused on the actions of several of the Army's senior leaders—particularly Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy; Provost Marshal General Maj. Gen. Allen W. Gullion, who was responsible for internal security; and the commanding general of the Western Defense Command, Lt. Gen. John L. DeWitt. The staff judge advocate who oversaw the evacuation, Col. Karl R. Bendetsen, is often singled out for special opprobrium.[8]

A new book usefully supplements Conn's essay and for the first time places the commander in chief under the microscope: Greg Robinson, *By Order of the President: FDR and the Internment of Japanese Americans* (Cambridge, Mass., 2001). Robinson begins not on 7 December 1941 but decades earlier in Roosevelt's long public career. He carefully documents Roosevelt's attitudes towards Japan and the Japanese, beginning with the Russo-Japanese War in 1904–05 and his years as assistant secretary of the Navy (1913–20), when American naval strategists became concerned about Japanese naval power. Robinson concludes that Roosevelt and the military "seem to have perceived Japanese Americans not only as aliens but as appendages of Japan." (p. 61) This was not so much wrong as simply outdated. In 1920 the census found that only 27 percent of persons of Japanese descent on the West Coast were native born, most of them still minors. With relatively few exceptions their parents had not been permitted to become naturalized citizens because they were not considered "free white person(s)" or "aliens of African nativity or persons of African descent" as required under U.S. law. They were thus deemed "aliens ineligible for citizenship." California and a dozen other states prohibited such aliens from owning land.[9] By 1940, however, the citizen Nisei had grown to 64 percent of the West Coast Japanese American community and about 75 percent in Hawaii.[10]

The Japanese attack in December 1941 on American forward-deployed forces in Hawaii and the Philippines plunged America into global war. Long-standing suspicion by white Americans of the Japanese community in Hawaii made it an easy target of blame for the disaster. In California public officials urged the War Department to take action to prevent a similar disaster on the West Coast. Solid intelligence about any real threat was difficult to come by in an atmosphere rife with rumor and exaggeration. Military intelligence and the Federal Bureau of Investigation downplayed any threat. However, as Robinson points out, "the President was willingly misled. . . . He was prepared to believe the worst, and expected the worst, from them." (pp. 114–15) After several weeks of pubic pressure and intense discussions among high-ranking officials from the War Department, Justice Department, and state of California, Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson asked the president to decide whether to remove from the West Coast all Japanese Americans, citizens as well as aliens, as he recommended. In a telephone conversation on 11 February 1942, the president "was very vigorous about it" and told Stimson to "go ahead on the line that I [Stimson] had myself thought the best."[11]

Armed with an executive order and a subsequent act of Congress, the Western Defense Command in 1942 removed, by its own count, 109,427

Photo by Dorothea Lange. National Archives photo

Japanese Americans in San Francisco report for processing under the Army's civilian relocation order, 25 April 1942.

Photo by Dorothea Lange. National Archives photo

The San Francisco Examiner announces plan to remove Japanese Americans living in California, 27 February 1942.

persons of Japanese ancestry from the West Coast. The initial plan was to disperse them throughout the rest of the country, but this was blocked by several Rocky Mountain governors who refused to accept any unless they were kept under tight control.[12]

Over the next few months the tide turned in the Pacific with naval victories in the Coral Sea and at Midway. But the die was cast for evacuation. No one had cause to reassess the decision, either in Washington or the Western Defense Command, which was also responsible for the defense of Alaska, now an active theater of war. Robinson laments that "Roosevelt displayed a shocking unconcern for the negative effects and ramifications of the policy as it developed," (p. 134) while conceding "the enormous demands made on him by the war." (p. 133)

The Supreme Court initially upheld the constitutionality of the evacuation. Most Japanese immigrants were subjects of the emperor, it is true, as technically were many of their American-born children who held dual citizenship. But most of the immigrants had lived in the United States for more than twenty years, owing to the fact that immigration from Japan had been severely restricted in 1907–08 and completely halted in 1924. As Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist emphasizes in his popular study, *All the Laws But One: Civil Liberties in Wartime* (New York, 1998), the U.S. Constitution afforded the government the right to intern enemy aliens in time of war.[13] Rehnquist generally applauds the Supreme Court's reluctance to overturn government actions in time of war. In this case he only expresses doubts about the right of the government to evacuate and incarcerate American citizens based on race alone. He suggests that the Army should have required "far more substantial findings to justify this sort of discrimination, even in wartime." (p. 209)

Beyond the issue of its constitutionality, was the evacuation truly necessary, or even good policy? Scholars have long questioned the "military necessity" justification, pointing out the glaring discrepancy between the handling of Japanese-Americans on the West Coast and in Hawaii, where persons of Japanese ancestry approached 40 percent of the population. In Hawaii, which was certainly at greater risk, shipping was simply not available to remove Japanese Americans, who in any event made up a large proportion of the territory's work force. Instead Army officials opted for cooperation and strict surveillance, which worked well throughout the war.

Robinson documents Roosevelt's lack of interest in Japanese Americans once the evacuation had been set in motion. Not until late 1944, after the strategic situation had markedly improved, the president had won

Photo by John Bigelow. National Archives photo

Four brothers in the Sakura family, each of whom had volunteered to serve in the 442d Regimental Combat Team, gather at the Minidoka camp, Idaho, with their mother and the wives and children of the two men at left, March 1943.

Signal Corps photo. Courtesy of the Hawaii State Archives

Volunteers for the 442d Regimental Combat Team assemble before the Iolani Palace in Honolulu, 28 March 1943.

reelection to a fourth term, and the Supreme Court was poised to begin releasing detainees, did Roosevelt agree to close the camps and permit Japanese Americans to return to the West Coast.

Robinson's perspective as a presidential scholar helps us see this tragic episode in a new light and to understand the various patterns in national decision making it exemplifies. First, the decision was fundamentally political in nature, not military. Conn concluded that the Army carried out the evacuation "because the Secretary of War and his principal civilian assistant [McCloy] in this matter themselves thought it necessary to carry it out."[14] The evidence suggests that Roosevelt and his civilian assistants were more concerned about public morale on the West Coast and the need to appear decisive than they were about any threat posed by the Japanese-American community. The Army was called upon to provide the justification of "military necessity" for a political decision that had already been made on other grounds.

Second, the decision was a product of a specific moment in the war. If the decision had been delayed by even a few months, as it was for Hawaii, the result might have been very different. Finally, once Stimson had obtained Roosevelt's blessing, it was next to impossible to reopen the question. Policy drifted for the next two years, as lower-level officials wrestled with the complications of its implementation. Top-level decisions develop a momentum that make them difficult to alter or reverse unless something dramatic elevates the underlying issue to senior policy levels again. Robinson, in *By Order of the President*, laments Roosevelt's subsequent disengagement, saying his "decision to maintain public silence on the internment policy was perhaps his most crucial and damaging act of injustice toward Japanese Americans during 1942." (p. 159) Indeed, "the President's direct involvement in internment policy after 1942 was restricted in large part to its political defense." (p. 247)

Robinson's craftsmanlike study puts the evacuation in the context of the messy way the Roosevelt Administration made policy during the darkest hours of the war. "Roosevelt failed to transcend the prejudice around him in his direction of public policy," Robinson concludes. "He also deserves censure for not providing moral and constitutional leadership." (p. 257) That is not the same thing as to say his actions had no basis, only that Robinson wishes he had decided differently.

The claim of "military necessity" has remained a lightning rod for those determined to prove that no such necessity existed and that the claim was not even supported at the time by competent intelligence or law enforcement officials. It has likewise been a rallying point for those who insist that the Roosevelt Administration was fully justified, or at least had reasonable cause to suspect the Japanese community.

David D. Lowman's book, *MAGIC: The Untold Story of U.S. Intelligence and the Evacuation of Japanese Residents from the West Coast during WW II* (Athena Press, 2001) has reasserted the latter view. Lowman, who died in 1999, was a career intelligence officer with the National Security Agency. He spent his retirement years battling the redress movement for Japanese Americans,

Shoulder patch of the 442d Regimental Combat Team approved in December 1943

Go for Broke, *H. Charles McBarron's depiction of the 442d Regimental Combat Team's successful attack of 30 October 1944 on German lines in the Vosges Mountains, France*

writing newspaper opinion pieces, and testifying before congressional committees to defend "our wartime leaders, . . . some of the finest men to have ever served our nation," who, he asserted, "were all branded by the Commission [on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians] and now by the U.S. Congress and the country they served as racists and political opportunists." (p. 81) His book, completed in 1989 but only published a dozen years later, argues forcefully that scholars who dismiss the military necessity of the evacuation have ignored the MAGIC evidence that pointed to extensive Japanese plans for espionage before Pearl Harbor.[15]

Lowman's book reproduces and summarizes selected MAGIC messages, intercepted cables between Tokyo and its embassies and consulates in the United States in 1940–41, together with other non-MAGIC intelligence reports about Japanese Americans. (The Department of Defense first published the MAGIC intercepts in a five-volume set of decoded and translated messages, *The "MAGIC" Background of Pearl Harbor* [Washington, D.C., 1978].) Lowman provides an overview of American signals intelligence before and during the war and describes the work of the U.S. Army Signal Intelligence Service and the Navy cryptographers working for OP-20-G within the Office of Naval Communications.

Japanese diplomatic messages gave indications that Japan was trying to build an espionage network in Hawaii and on the West Coast. On 30 January 1941 Japanese Foreign Minister Yosuke Matsuoka directed his nation's diplomatic assets in the United States to engage in stepped-up espionage using labor unions, anti-Semitic groups, Communists, African Americans, and individuals of foreign extraction other than Japanese. He also called for the use of Japanese nationals and the American-born Nisei but warned that "if there is any slip in this phase, our people in the U.S. will be subjected to considerable persecution, and the utmost caution must be exercised." (p. 129) A few months later the Japanese consulate in Los Angeles boasted, "We shall maintain connection with our second generations who are at present in the (U.S.) Army, to keep us informed of various developments in the Army. We also have connections with our second generations working in airplane plants for intelligence purposes." (p. 147) Subsequent messages from the consulates in Los Angeles, San Francisco, Seattle, and Honolulu

National Archives photo

Soldiers of the 442d Regimental Combat Team listen to citations near Bruyeres, France, in November 1944 after sustaining heavy casualties in the Vosges Mountains.

reported defense contracts for aircraft, ship movements, and the like.

Lowman claims these messages prove that military necessity indeed existed and that it provided sufficient justification for the mass evacuation of all persons of Japanese descent from the West Coast. MAGIC and other intelligence, he asserts, revealed "the specter of subversive nets up and down the West Coast, controlled by the Japanese government, utilizing large numbers of local Japanese residents, and designed to operate in a wartime environment." (p. 1) He admits that the claim of military necessity may have been vulnerable to criticism during the war, but he explains that "the most important reason for the evacuation, MAGIC, couldn't be put into the [Western Defense Command's] report." (pp. 88, 93) However, his reading of the evidence is too simplistic.

Lowman fervently believes that the raw intercepts speak for themselves and trump other sources of intelligence on the Japanese American community.[16] However, the messages speak more of intentions than results. One critic, retired Army Lt. Col. John A. Herzig, pointed out that "newspaper articles which appeared a few days before the date of the intercepts show a remarkable resemblance to the cables sent to Tokyo."[17] The U.S. government was fully aware of the legitimate connections between Japan and some of its emigrants in the United States, and immediately after 7 December 1941 authorities arrested thousands of Japanese aliens who had been too close to the Japanese government. But Lowman has no interest in such nuances. He dismisses his critics as lacking expertise in the arcana of signals intelligence and being highly biased. Herzig, he tells his readers, "was married to a Japanese-American." (p. 107)

Few historians have paid much attention to Lowman's charges since he first raised them in the 1980s. Joseph E. Persico in *Roosevelt's Secret War: FDR and World War II Espionage* (New York, 2001) describes MAGIC in connection with the Pearl Harbor attack, but not with internment. Rather, he states that "FDR had convincing information from [William J.] Donovan's COI [Office of Coordinator of Information], John Franklin Carter's ring, the FBI, and Army intelligence that Japanese Americans and Japanese aliens posed no threat to American security." (p. 439) He ascribes Roosevelt's decision instead to "the President's sincere and ingrained fear of internal subversion, however unfounded." (p. 169)

Roosevelt's most thorough biographer, Kenneth S. Davis, describes a similar cold-blooded calculus. The decision, he asserts, "was further eased by the fact that it involved no political risk, whereas a contrary decision would loose a storm of criticism of the administration."[18] Greg Robinson relegates the impact of MAGIC on the evacuation decision to a footnote and there concludes that "the MAGIC excerpts do not reveal conclusive evidence of any espionage activities by Japanese Americans." (p. 277, note 43) William Rehnquist, however, argues that the MAGIC intercepts do give some support to the view that "first generation American citizens of Japanese descent were more likely than the citizenry as a whole to include potential spies or saboteurs."[19]

Lowman claims that traditional historians have found no traces of MAGIC in documents that were not the direct product of this intelligence source because the secret was so closely

Courtesy of the Office of Senator Daniel Inouye

First Lt. Daniel Inouye serving in southern France with Company E, 442d Infantry, March 1945

Courtesy of the Clinton Presidential Materials Project, National Archives and Records Administration

President Clinton awards the Medal of Honor to Senator Inouye and twenty-one other Asian Americans at a White House ceremony, 21 June 2000.

guarded. While I do not find this persuasive, historians may be too quick to dismiss MAGIC out of hand. A more useful approach would be to examine these messages in light of how national decision-makers actually use intelligence during crises. The evidence for any threat from Japanese Americans was mixed and indirect. The hints contained in MAGIC, if decision-makers paid them any heed at all, were not by themselves sufficient to justify the mass evacuation and incarceration of over 100,000 civilians. However, the trickle of ambiguous messages may have contributed to Roosevelt and Stimson's fears.

Lowman extols the evacuation as "a legitimate wartime measure" (p. 17) that had minimal impact on the evacuees, and he includes wartime propaganda pictures to demonstrate how well the internees were treated. He sees no need to delve into the well-documented history of anti-Japanese prejudice, as he is convinced that "the motivating force behind the evacuation was the intelligence being fed on an almost daily basis to the President and his key advisers." (p. 15) The explanation seems clear to him: "It was because of MAGIC that the U.S. government decided in early 1942 to evacuate all persons of Japanese ancestry from the West Coast of the United States." (p. 49)

Lowman's book swings from history to politics as he pours out more than fifty pages of polemical interpretation of the movement for Japanese-American redress in the 1980s. He focuses his attack on the work of the Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians, created by a 1980 statute, which held hearings and issued a report, *Personal Justice Denied*.[20] Lowman accuses the commissioners and their staff of first being ignorant of MAGIC and then denying its influence. Five years after the commission issued its final report, Congress passed the Civil Liberties Act of 1988, which President Ronald Reagan signed into law. This act called for an official government apology and a $20,000 payment to each surviving internee. Lowman is critical of what he considers the commission's creation of a politicized official history containing a "hodgepodge of dishonest research and shocking disinformation." (p. 83)

Lowman's book rehashes old arguments and gives a tortured reading of the available intelligence sources. He errs in giving absolute primacy to communications intelligence, no matter how ambiguous. His polemics should be viewed as symptomatic of the lingering bitterness stemming from Pearl Harbor and the emotions raised by apologies and compensation.

Military Service or Resistance

The internment story must be balanced by an account of the Nisei's outstanding military service, which led to ultimate acceptance of this group by mainstream America as the nation's "model minority." The inspiring story of the 100th Battalion and the 442d Regimental Combat Team has been retold many times. One historian recently commented that rather than being the "forgotten heroes" of World War II, the Nisei soldiers "are probably the most remembered, almost forgotten heroes of the war."[21]

In recent years, however, another story has emerged that runs counter to the familiar version, that of the small but significant number of Nisei from the internment camps who resisted the draft. Their story reminds us that the issue of Nisei military service is more complex than is usually presented.

The history of the Nisei soldiers did not begin on 7 December 1941. A few Japanese immigrants had served in the Spanish-American War and more than a thousand Japanese Americans entered the Army during World War I. Between the wars, however, few, if any, Nisei served on active duty until the Selective Service Act of 1940 mandated that American men be subject to induction in such a way that "there shall be no discrimination against any person on account of race or color." From the fall of 1940 until December 1941 about 5,000 Nisei were inducted into the U.S. Army. Most Nisei draftees in Hawaii were assigned to two Hawaii National Guard regiments, the 298th and 299th Infantry. West Coast Nisei were scattered throughout various units and training centers in California and Washington. After the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, most Nisei soldiers on the mainland were discharged or transferred to inland posts. Selective Service stopped accepting Nisei in early 1942 and subsequently reclassified them IV–C on the ground that they were "not acceptable to the armed forces because of nationality or ancestry." When the 27th Infantry Division arrived to help secure the Hawaiian Islands in the

spring of 1942, all Hawaiian Nisei draftees who had been assigned to the 298th and 299th Infantry were sent to the mainland, organized into the 100th Infantry Battalion, and shipped to Camp McCoy, Wisconsin. Of the several hundred left behind on Hawaii, most went into 1399th Engineer Construction Battalion. The Military Intelligence Service took others as translators and interpreters.[22]

In the fall of 1942 Assistant Secretary McCloy persuaded the General Staff to form an all-Nisei combat unit. The call for volunteers, announced in January 1943, was greeted with great enthusiasm in Hawaii, where 10,000 Nisei volunteered, a key moment in the historical memory of Nisei military service. Less remembered is the low turnout in the internment camps on the mainland, where the call for volunteers was complicated by the War Relocation Authority's decision to administer a loyalty questionnaire to all individuals for a "leave clearance" program designed to release selected individuals from the camps for military service, schooling, or civilian employment.[23]

In late September 1943 the 100th Infantry Battalion was committed to battle with the 34th Infantry Division near Avellino, Italy, north of Salerno. Meanwhile the 442d Regimental Combat Team, formed from the new volunteers, trained at Camp Shelby, Mississippi, for fifteen months before deploying to Italy in May 1944, where it joined Fifth Army for the Rome-Arno campaign. But this is not the whole story of Nisei manpower. In the winter of 1943–44 the 100th Infantry Battalion suffered an individual replacement crisis when it took heavy casualties at Monte Cassino and Anzio. Because it was a segregated unit, the battalion required a separate-stovepipe replacement stream. For this the Army drew hundreds of replacements from the 442d, which was still training at Camp Shelby.[24]

By January 1944 the War Department decided it had to resume applying Selective Service laws to the Nisei to keep these units at full strength.[25] Conscription brought to the surface the contradictions inherent in compelling young men to serve at a time when many of their families remained behind barbed wire. The Japanese American Citizens League wholeheartedly supported the resumption of Selective Service, but in the camps the move was met with scattered protests and bitterness. More than 300 Nisei resisted induction and landed in jail. They were sometimes called the "No-No Boys," for answering "no" to two questions on the loyalty questionnaire: "Are you willing to serve in the armed forces of the United States on combat duty, wherever ordered?" (Some responded yes, but only if their civil rights were restored) and "Will you . . . foreswear any form of allegiance or obedience to the Japanese emperor?" (Some thought this was a trick question, because they had never offered any allegiance to the emperor.)[26]

The "No-No Boys" were controversial within their communities, much as Vietnam-era "draft dodgers" were to a later generation. They have remained so to this day, for they contradict the public perception of Nisei willingness to prove their loyalty by volunteering for military service. Their story has finally been told in detail by Eric L. Muller, a law professor at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. Muller's book, *Free to Die for Their Country: The Story of the Japanese American Draft Resisters in World War II* (Chicago, 2001), is the first full treatment of this sensitive story.[27] Muller's tightly focused work is based on careful legal research, supplemented by oral histories with eleven of the resisters.

Muller briefly covers the familiar story of the evacuation and internment, followed by the formation of the 442d. His story really begins when the War Department announced the resumption of Selective Service for the Nisei on 20 January 1944. Soon afterward came the orders to individual Nisei to report for their induction physicals. Responses were divided. Most young men chose to comply without incident, although many did so with mixed feelings.

The strongest organized resistance sprang up at Heart Mountain, Wyoming, where a few activists organized the Fair Play Committee and issued a manifesto declaring, "We would gladly sacrifice our lives to protect and uphold the principles and ideals of our country as set forth in the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. . . . But have we been given such freedom, such liberty, such justice, such protection? NO!!" (p. 83) Camp administrators, Japanese-American community leaders,

Photo by Hikaru Iwasaki. National Archives photo

Nisei selectees travel from Heart Mountain to a preinduction physical examination at Fort Warren, Wyoming, March 1944.

Courtesy of Frank Emi

Defendants in the federal district court in Cheyenne, Wyoming, at the trial of 63 men from Heart Mountain camp charged with draft resistance, June 1944

and the Justice Department came down on them hard.

In May 1944 a federal grand jury in Cheyenne, Wyoming, indicted seven Fair Play Committee leaders and a sympathetic Nisei newspaper editor for conspiring to counsel, aid, and abet young men to evade the draft. Soon 63 Nisei resisters from Heart Mountain were in jail. Others were arrested from the other camps, and their number eventually grew to 315 from all camps and Hawaii. Muller details the various cases as they progressed through the court system. In all 263 Nisei were convicted and most were sentenced to three years in federal prison. Only one federal judge demurred, Louis B. Goodman of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. Goodman dismissed the indictments of 27 Nisei, declaring, "It is *shocking to the conscience* that an American citizen be confined on the ground of disloyalty, and then, while so under duress and restraint, be compelled to serve in the armed forces, or be prosecuted for not yielding to such compulsion." (p. 143)

With this lone exception, hundreds of Nisei draft resisters were sent to federal penitentiaries. President Harry Truman pardoned these Nisei in December 1947, along with several thousand other Americans convicted of violating the Selective Service Act. In a country and an ethnic community that honored their returning war heroes, the Nisei draft resisters were a scorned minority within a minority and were ostracized by the Japanese-American community. Muller unfortunately does not explore their postwar experiences, which have been portrayed by the novelist John Okada, himself a Nisei veteran, in his novel, *No-No Boy* (which Muller curiously does not cite).[28]

Muller instead follows the legal twists and turns as the cases moved through the courts. He reluctantly draws the conclusion that the law and the constitution supported Selective Service. His reluctance marks the views of a generation now three decades removed from any form of military conscription. "I struggled to match my sense of moral outrage with a corresponding conviction that the law was on their side." (p. 195) He regrets that "America would not extend the option of loyal protest" to the Nisei. "Through the force of criminal sanction, it demanded that these young Japanese Americans prove their patriotism through unquestioning obedience to authority, ironically a trait more Japanese than American." (p. 6)

Muller does not place the Nisei in the broader context of the 50,000 conscientious objectors during World War II, many of whom served in noncombat assignments. Another 5,000 men were jailed for resisting the draft. But he gives readers an opportunity to see in a new light the choice of those Nisei who did serve. They did so not blindly or automatically, but in full knowledge that their country had not given their parents a fair shake.

On balance the Japanese American Citizens League had the better side of the argument. Rather than insist on full restoration of civil rights before they would serve, most Nisei looked to the future. Their pragmatic strategy was to use military service to effect positive changes, rather than holding back and demanding their rights as a precondition for service. As President Truman told returning 442d veterans in 1946, "You fought not only the enemy, you fought prejudice — and you won."[29] The story of the Nisei draft resisters in no way diminishes the valor of the Nisei who served. On the contrary, it places their choice in stark relief. No less a figure than Senator Inouye declares in the Foreword to Muller's book: "In this climate of hate, I believe that it took just as much courage and valor and patriotism to stand up to our government and say 'you are wrong.' I am glad that there were some who had the courage to express some of the feelings that we who volunteered harbored deep in our souls." (p. xi)[30]

Honors and History

Nisei valor is often measured by the thousands of military awards they received. In 2001 Lee and Sam Allen of Athena Press, David Lowman's publishers, attacked an exhibit in the

Smithsonian Institution's National Museum of American History on the ground that these statistics were inflated.[31] The exhibit, *A More Perfect Union: Japanese Americans and the U.S. Constitution*, opened in 1987 to mark the bicentennial of the U.S. Constitution. The Smithsonian had developed the exhibit in cooperation with Asian-American scholars and the Japanese-American community to tell the story of the wartime Japanese-American evacuation, internment, and military service. It has long been controversial, although it has not drawn as much criticism as the Smithsonian's 1995 exhibit on the *Enola Gay*.[32]

The exhibit's section on Nisei military service presents commonly cited statistics about the casualties suffered by and the medals awarded to Japanese American soldiers. The Allens do not dispute the bravery or valor of the Nisei but challenge what they call "the gratuitous embellishment of military achievements."[33] Beyond the statistics, they consider the exhibit yet one more example of official history giving a revisionist view of the American past in favor of a privileged minority group. In an August 2002 press release Lee Allen, a retired Army lieutenant colonel, comments that "the politically correct notion that race was the main motivation [for the evacuation], which the Smithsonian with its poor scholarship buys into, results from denying, ignoring, exaggerating and fabricating important facts."[34]

When the museum's staff reviewed the statistics, they discovered that reliable sources from the immediate postwar period reported substantially lower numbers. For example, the exhibit claimed 9,486 Purple Hearts, but a regimental history published in 1946 estimated the total to be less than half that amount. In consequence the museum promised to correct the numbers.[35]

The Allens' attack on the Smithsonian exhibit and Lowman's polemical book in the end shed little new light on the evacuation and Nisei military service. Instead they exploit weaknesses in others' scholarship for their own questionable ends. They do remind us, however, that although the Army often differentiates between "history" and "heritage" activities, heritage must be based on sound history.

The subject of Japanese Americans and the U.S. Army is still an area of controversy and on-going scholarship. Old controversies die hard or get recycled endlessly on the internet. These questions burn brightest in the thoughts of those who were most affected as well as those who still fervently insist that the evacuation was based on military necessity and deny that racial prejudice had anything to do with it. However, Greg Robinson's policy-oriented study of presidential decisionmaking shows that sound scholarship can still contribute new insights. Eric Muller's legal study of the Nisei draft resisters takes nothing away from the valor of those who chose differently and fought for their country. If anything, it helps us appreciate all the more the civic courage of those who volunteered when others refused. The complex history of Japanese Americans and the U.S. Army shows that there is still plenty of room for fresh interpretations. This history can teach us important lessons about the obligations of citizenship and the varieties of valor, topics that will never go out of style.

The Author

Dr. James C. McNaughton is the command historian of U. S. Army, Pacific. He holds a doctorate in history from the Johns Hopkins University and is a retired U. S. Army Reserve lieutenant colonel. He directed the research team for the Asian-American Medal of Honor review. The Center of Military History hopes to publish his book-length manuscript, "Loyal Linguists: Japanese Americans in the Military Intelligence Service."

Notes

1. H. Charles McBarron, *Go For Broke*, lithograph, 1978, U.S. Army Center of Military History.

2. For some works since the 1980s see Thelma Chang, *"I Can Never Forget": Men of the 100th/442nd* (Honolulu, 1991); Lyn Crost, *Honor by Fire: Japanese Americans at War in Europe and the Pacific* (Novato, Calif., 1994); Masayo Umezawa Duus, *Unlikely Liberators: The Men of the 100th and 442nd*, trans. Peter Duus (Honolulu, 1987); and Chester Tanaka, *Go for Broke: A Pictorial History of the Japanese American 100th Infantry Battalion and the 442d Regimental Combat Team* (Richmond, Calif., 1982). Recent documentary films include *Beyond Barbed Wire* (Mac and Ava, 1997); *Forgotten Valor* (Lane Nishikawa, 2001); *Uncommon Courage: Patriotism and Civil Liberties* (Bridge Media, 2001); and *A Tradition of Honor* (Go For Broke Educational Foundation, 2002).

3. "A Last Battle Won for 22 Asian Americans Given Medal of Honor," *Washington Post*, 22 Jun 2000; James C. McNaughton, Kristen E. Edwards, and Jay M. Price, "'Incontestable Proof Will Be Exacted': Historians, Asian Americans, and the Medal of Honor," *The Public Historian* 24 (Fall 2002): 11–33.

4. Recent surveys include Sucheng Chan, *Asian Americans: An Interpretive History* (Boston, 1991); Harry H. L. Kitano and Roger Daniels, *Asian Americans: Emerging Minorities*, 3d ed. (Upper Saddle River, N.J., 2001); and Ronald T. Takaki, *Strangers from a Different Shore: A History of Asian Americans*, rev. ed. (Boston, 1998). For useful bibliographic essays, see Paul R. Spickard, *Japanese Americans: The Formation and Transformations of an Ethnic Group* (New York, 1996), 177–85; and Gary Y. Okihiro, *Teaching Asian American History* (Washington, D.C., 1997).

5. The government labeled the camps "war relocation centers" and referred to them publicly as concentration camps. However, since 1945 "concentration camp" has carried the connotation of the Nazi death camps. "Internment camp" usually refers to the separate camps established by the Department of Justice for enemy aliens, not citizens, but for convenience I have used the term to include the ten camps operated by the War Relocation Authority.

6. Morton Grodzins, *Americans Betrayed: Politics and the Japanese Evacuation* (Chicago, 1949); Stetson Conn, "The Decision to Evacuate the Japanese from the Pacific Coast," in Kent Roberts Greenfield, ed., *Command Decisions* (New York, 1959), pp. 88–109. A later version appeared as a chapter entitled "Japanese Evacuation from the West Coast" in Stetson Conn, Rose C. Engelman, and Byron Fairchild, *Guarding the United States and Its Outposts* (Washington, D.C., 1964), 115–49. For a convenient summary see Roger Daniels, *Prisoners Without Trial: Japanese Americans in World War II* (New York, 1993). Grodzins made substantial use of the Western

Defense Command's published report on the evacuation and on congressional and Justice Department sources.

7. For example, Sam Tanenhaus, "Outside In," *New Republic* 225 (8 Oct 2001): 22.

8. For example, Michi Weglyn labeled Colonel Bendetsen "the Army architect-to-be of the racial uprooting." See Michi Weglyn, *Years of Infamy: The Untold Story of America's Concentration Camps* (New York, 1976), p. 43. Bendetsen would serve as assistant secretary of the Army in 1950–1952. Recent studies of the camps include Daniels, *Prisoners Without Trial*, and Lawson Fusao Inada, ed., *Only What We Could Carry: The Japanese American Internment Experience* (Berkeley, Calif., 2000). David Guterson's award-winning novel, *Snow Falling on Cedars* (New York, 1994), and its 1999 film adaptation brought the story to a new generation.

9. Takaki, *Strangers from a Different Shore*, pp. 203–09; Bradford Smith, *Americans from Japan*, reprint ed. (1948, Westport, Conn., 1974), pp. 148–49; "Alien Land Laws," in Brian Niiya, ed., *Encyclopedia of Japanese American History: An A-to-Z Reference from 1868 to the Present*, updated ed. (New York, 2001), pp. 111–12. Congress had initially limited eligibility for naturalization in 1790 to any "free white person" meeting certain qualifications and extended to "aliens of African nativity and persons of African descent" in 1870. See *U.S. Statutes at Large*, 1: 103, 16: 256. However, the undisputed right to citizenship of permanent resident alien veterans of World War I without regard to race was granted by the Lea-Nye Act of 1935. See Frank F. Chuman, *The Bamboo People: The Law and Japanese-Americans* (Del Mar, Calif., 1976); *U.S. Statutes*, 49: 397–98. The McCarran-Walter Act of 1952 lifted the bars to naturalization of immigrants from Japan and to further immigration from that country.

10. West Coast Nisei population: Western Defense Command, *Final Report: Japanese Evacuation from the West Coast, 1942* (Washington, D.C., 1943), pp. 84, 402. The narrative portions of this report should be used with caution. Hawaii Nisei population: Thomas D. Murphy, *Ambassadors in Arms: The Story of Hawaii's 100th Battalion* (Honolulu, 1954), p. 1.

11. Conn, Engelman, and Fairchild, *Guarding the United States*, pp. 131–32, quoting Stimson's diary.

12. Executive Order 9066, 19 Feb 1942, printed in War Department Bulletin 10, 28 Feb 1942; Public Law 503, 77th Congress, approved 21 Mar 1942, printed in *U.S. Statutes*, 56: 173. The evacuation figures are in Western Defense Command, *Final Report*, p. 362. The evacuees included 259 persons from Arizona.

13. See also William H. Rehnquist, "When the Laws Were Silent," *American Heritage* 49 (October 1998): 76–89.

14. Conn, Engelman, and Fairchild, *Guarding the United States*, p. 147.

15. David D. Lowman, *MAGIC: The Untold Story of U.S. Intelligence and the Evacuation of Japanese Residents from the West Coast During WW II* (n.p., 2001); David D. Lowman, "MAGIC and the Japanese Internments," *Baltimore Sun*, 24 Jun 1983; Testimony of David D. Lowman, 27 Jun 1984, in *Japanese-American and Aleutian Wartime Relocation: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, Ninety-Eighth Congress, Second Session, on H.R. 3387, H.R. 4110, and H.R. 4322* (Washington, D.C., 1985), pp. 430–548; testimony of David D. Lowman, 16 Aug 1984, in *Recommendations of the Commission on Wartime Internment and Relocation of Citizens: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Civil Service, Post Office, and General Services of the Committee on Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, Ninety-Eighth Congress, Second Session, on S. 2116* (Washington, D.C., 1986), pp. 310–50.

16. Another possible problem which Lowman does not consider is mistranslation. See Keiichiro Komatsu, *Origins of the Pacific War and the Importance of 'MAGIC'* (New York, 1999), pp. 247–88.

17. John A. Herzig, "Japanese Americans and MAGIC," *Amerasia Journal* 11 (Fall/Winter 1984): 56.

18. Kenneth S. Davis, *FDR: The War President, 1940–1943* (New York, 2000), p. 425. Davis follows James MacGregor Burns, *Roosevelt: The Soldier of Freedom* (New York, 1970), 213–17.

19. William H. Rehnquist, *All the Laws But One: Civil Liberties in Wartime* (New York, 1998), pp. 208–09, with quoted words on p. 208.

20. The commission's findings were given in *Personal Justice Denied: Report of the Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians*, 2 vols. (Washington, D.C., 1982–83).

21. T. Fujitani, "*Go For Broke*, the Movie: Japanese American Soldiers in U.S. National, Military, and Racial Discourses," in T. Fujitani, Geoffrey M. White, and Lisa Yoneyama, eds., *Perilous Memories: The Asia-Pacific War(s)* (Durham, N.C., 2001), p. 239. See also T. Fujitani, "The Reischauer Memo: Mr. Moto, Hirohito, and Japanese American Soldiers," *Critical Asian Studies* 33 (September 2001): 379–402.

22. "World War I Veterans," *Encyclopedia of Japanese American History*, p. 413; Brian McAllister Linn, *Guardians of Empire: The U.S. Army and the Pacific, 1902–1940* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1997), pp. 149–57; Ted T. Tsukiyama, "Gero Iwai," *Secret Valor: M.I.S. Personnel, World War II, Pacific Theater, pre Pearl Harbor to Sept. 8, 1951: 50th Anniversary Reunion, July 8–10, 1993* (Honolulu, 1993); Murphy, *Ambassadors in Arms*, pp. 39–74; Tamotsu Shibutani, *The Derelicts of Company K: A Sociological Study of Demoralization* (Berkeley, Calif., 1978), p. 49; U.S. Selective Service System, *Special Groups*, Special Monograph No. 10, 2 vols. (Washington, D.C., 1953), 1: 113–42, quotations on pp. 74, 117–18.

23. Duus, *Unlikely Liberators*, pp. 50–71. The best study of the Army's decision to organize a Japanese-American combat unit is in Murphy, *Ambassadors in Arms*, pp. 104–12. Only 1,256 Nisei in the internment camps, or roughly 5 percent of the 23,606 interned Nisei of draft age, volunteered by 23 March 1943. See Duus, *Unlikely Liberators*, p. 70.

24. Murphy, *Ambassadors in Arms*, pp. 123–84; Martin Blumenson, *Salerno to Cassino*, U.S. Army in World War II (Washington, D.C., 1969), pp. 161–62; Crost, *Honor by Fire*, pp. 115, 137.

25. Selective Service rules were later amended to allow the enlistment of selected aliens, mostly those who had been born in Japan but brought to America at an early age and were otherwise indistinguishable from Nisei. About forty Japanese aliens served in the U.S. military during the war. See Duus, *Unlikely Liberators*, p. 231.

26. *Personal Justice Denied*, 1; 191–92; Daniels, *Prisoners Without Trial*, p. 69.

27. The story of Nisei draft resistance is also described in the documentary film *Conscience and the Constitution* that was written, directed, and produced by Frank Abe in 2000. The most widely read book on Japanese-American history, Bill Hosokawa, *Nisei: The Quiet Americans* (New York, 1969), significantly makes no mention of the draft resisters.

28. John Okada, *No-No Boy* (Rutland, Vt., 1957).

29. Quoted in Ronald Takaki, *Double Victory: A Multicultural History of America in World War II* (Boston, 2000), p. 165. The Japanese American Citizens League's approach was similar to the "Double V" campaign by African Americans during the war.

30. Few works treat the Asian American military experience after World War II. Two exceptions are Toshio Whelchel, *From Pearl Harbor to Saigon: Japanese American Soldiers and the Vietnam War* (New York, 1999), and Carina A. del Rosario, ed., *A Different Battle: Stories of Asian Pacific American Veterans* (Seattle, 1999). See also "Asian Americans in the U. S. Military," in the *Asian American Almanac: A Reference Work on Asians in the United States* (Detroit, 1995), pp. 371–402.

31. Typescript, Lee Allen and Sam Allen, "Critique of the Smithsonian Institution's Exhibition, 'A More Perfect Union: Japanese Americans and the U.S. Constitution,'" 9 May 2001, copy in *Army History* files, CMH. An unpaginated copy of the document is posted on web at *http://www.athenapressinc.com/smithsonian/critique.html*. An online version of the Smithsonian exhibit can be found at *http://americanhistory.si.edu/perfectunion/experience/index.html*.

32. I. Michael Heyman, "Smithsonian Perspectives," *Smithsonian* 26 (September 1995): 6.

33. Typescript, Allen and Allen, "Critique of the Smithsonian Exhibition," p. 4.

34. Press release, Athena Press, 16 August 2002, copy in *Army History* files, CMH. The press release is posted at *http://www.athenapressinc.com/smithsonian/press_release.html*.

35. Information and Education Section, Mediterranean Theater of Operations, United States Army, *The Story of the 442nd Combat Team*, p. 44 (n.p., 1945); Orville C. Shirey, *Americans: The Story of the 442d Combat Team* (Washington, D.C., 1946), p. 101; Marc Pachter, Acting Director, National Museum of American History, letter to Rep. Chris Cannon, 12 Jul 2002, copy in *Army History* files, CMH. The letter is posted at *http://www.athenapressinc.com/smithsonian/response.html*. The author assisted museum staff with obtaining more accurate numbers.

By Franklin Boggs

Jungle Trail. *The members and porters of a medical unit transport the components of a portable surgical hospital over the Owen Stanley Range in Papua.*

"Health conditions were among the worst in the world. The incidence of malaria could only be reduced by the most rigid and irksome discipline and even then the dreaded disease took a heavy toll. Dengue fever was common while deadly blackwater fever, though not so prevalent, was no less an adversary. Bacillary and amoebic dysentery were both forbidding possibilities, and tropical ulcers, easily formed from the slightest scratch, were difficult to cure. Scrub typhus, ringworm, hookworm, and yaws all awaited the careless soldier. Millions of insects abounded everywhere. Clouds of mosquitoes, flies, leeches, chiggers, ants, fleas, and other parasites pestered man night and day. Disease was an unrelenting foe.

General Headquarters, U.S. Army Forces, Far East,
Reports of General MacArthur[1]

The Fight against Malaria in the Papua and New Guinea Campaigns

By John T. Greenwood

Disease has been an unrelenting foe of military leaders since the beginning of recorded history. It was not until the Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905) that the Imperial Japanese Army became the first army in modern history to suffer fewer deaths from disease than it did in battle. By that time modern military medicine had finally gained an advantage over some of its deadliest foes, such as smallpox, typhoid, cholera, and dysentery. That is not to say that it had "defeated" those foes. History has also shown quite clearly that even with the weapons of modern medicine, we will never completely defeat these diseases and their endless permutations. Military medicine must always be prepared to defend the health of the fighting force against their ravages.

After the attack on Pearl Harbor and the loss of the Philippines, which had been the U.S. Army's operational base in the Far East, continuing Japanese offensives in the southwest Pacific shifted the focus of Allied operations in that area to Australia in early 1942. The establishment in March 1942 of the Southwest Pacific Area as an Allied theater command under General Douglas A. MacArthur meant that one of the most primitive, remote, and disease-infested tropical areas in entire world would become the scene of major military operations. MacArthur, who assumed command of both the theater's Allied and U.S. Army Forces, faced enormous challenges in building the foundations for a viable strategic theater of operations some 7,000 miles from his main supply base in the continental United States. While securing his base of operations in Australia, MacArthur had to establish a medical system that would protect the well-being of his forces in one of the world's most unhealthy areas and keep them fit enough to conduct military operations. In addition, that medical system had to assure the swift delivery of quality medical care for those soldiers who became wounded, injured, or sick. To accomplish these critical tasks, the U.S. Army Medical Department in the theater had to be built from the ground up.The period of roughly two years from the establishment of the American presence in Australia early in 1942 through the end of Operation CARTWHEEL in the Admiralty Islands in the Bismarck Archipelago in early 1944 was a very challenging time for the forces in the Southwest Pacific Area, especially for the Medical Department. With trained medical personnel, medical units, and Army hospitals just beginning to arrive in the theater; a threatened line of communications; and few established sources of much-needed medical supplies, the Medical Department faced challenges in early 1942 that appeared almost insurmountable.[2] Two years later, many of these challenges had been conquered through trial and error and sheer hard work, allowing the Army to provide a high level of medical support to the combat and service forces in Australia, Papua, and northern New Guinea. Other problems, some of them self-inflicted, remained to bedevil the leaders and forces of the Medical Department. As it is impossible for this essay to address the full range of the Army Medical Department's experience and operations in the Southwest Pacific Area during these early years of the war, I will focus on just the critical area of preventive medicine and the impact of disease, specifically malaria, on the troops.

Preventive Medicine and Malaria

Among the many challenges that initially faced the Army Medical Department in the Southwest Pacific Area, disease may well have been the most difficult to combat effectively. Some of the diseases were familiar and common, such as syphilis and influenza, but others were more exotic tropical diseases that were often unfamiliar even to those Army tropical medicine specialists who had worked in Panama and the Philippines. Dysentery and diarrheas were the results of

---

This is a revised version of a paper delivered by the author at the U.S. Army–Japanese Ground Self-Defense Force Military History Exchange held in Tokyo in February 2001.

National Archives photo



Construction nears completion on an extension to the 42d General Hospital in Brisbane, Australia, May 1943.

unhealthful water supplies, poor sanitation, and inadequate waste-disposal practices, but they could be controlled through better water treatment, field sanitation, and hygienic procedures. However, insect-borne tropical diseases, such as malaria, dengue fever, and scrub typhus (Tsutsugamushi fever), were endemic and hyperendemic in the tropical areas of northern Australia, Papua, and North-East New Guinea. Of these diseases, a variety of malarias, all spread by mosquitoes, posed the greatest threat to the health of the military forces. In the 1930 edition of his *Military Preventive Medicine*, a classic text that was used by every Army Medical Department officer, Col. George C. Dunham listed malaria as "an important disease from a military standpoint because of the non-effectiveness produced by the disease and by the long course of treatment required to prevent relapse and effect a cure." In its campaign against disease in the Southwest Pacific Area, the Army Medical Department drew heavily on its long tradition of preventive medicine, implementing a strategy aimed at doing everything possible to prevent or control the spread of disease among the troops and to maintain their health and fitness for military operations.[3]

The Army's basic manual on tropical medicine during World War II stated directly that "Malaria is an acute and chronic infection characterized by fever, anemia, splenomegaly [enlargement of the spleen] and often serious or fatal complications." The cause is a protozoal parasite of the genus *Plasmodium* that is ingested by an anopheline mosquito with the blood of an infected person, breeds and matures within the mosquito, and is then spread to other persons when the mosquito feeds on them. The four types of malaria that affect man are *Plasmodium vivax, falciparum, malariae*, and *ovale*. Of these, the *P. falciparum* (malignant tertian malaria) is both the most virulent and dangerous and also the most prevalent form in Papua and North-East New Guinea. *P. vivax* (benign tertian malaria) and *P. malariae* (quartan malaria) also were present, but to a lesser extent, and they are much less dangerous to man. Malaria in all of its forms was by far the most significant and widespread health problem in Papua and the rest of New Guinea owing to the heavily infected native population and the generally favorable breeding conditions for anopheline mosquitoes. Infected troops could be incapacitated for days or weeks and rendered thoroughly unfit for duty. Moreover, they become human reservoirs of the parasites and targets for attack by anopheline mosquitoes, which then spread the disease to uninfected persons.[4]

The Medical Department's experience with tropical diseases in the Spanish-American War in 1898, combined with the huge amount of damage that malaria had inflicted on American forces on Bataan, should have alerted American military and medical leaders to the impending danger. Even if this specifically American experience were ignored, the knowledge that most of the planned operations in the Southwest Pacific Area would have to be conducted in highly malarious areas, combined with the information that

National Archives photo

Brig. Gen. Percy Carroll, center, introduces Brig. Gen. William C. Chase, on crutches, to Under Secretary of War Robert Patterson, left, as he tours the 42d General Hospital, August 1943.

Table 1. **Malaria and All Other Infectious or Parasitic Disease Admissions Southwest Pacific Area, September 1942–January 1943[9]**

	Malaria		*All Diseases*		*Malaria*
Month	*Total Cases*	*Rate/1000/Annum*	*Total Cases*	*Rate/1000/Annum*	*Percentage*
Sep 1942	63	7.6	859	104	7.3
Oct 1942	493	53	1,588	171	31
Nov 1942	807	93	1,866	214	43
Dec 1942	2,773	295	4,472	476	62
Jan 1943	3,517	382	5,287	574	66

Australian troops in Papua were suffering heavily from malaria, should have immediately made the disease a major concern. Malaria, however, only surfaced as a significant health threat and problem for American commanders after U.S. Army forces moved to bases in Papua in the summer of 1942 and launched major ground operations against the Japanese strongholds in and around Buna on the north shore of Papua.[5]

On 15 December 1942, Col. Percy J. Carroll, the chief surgeon of U.S. Army Services of Supply (USASOS), Southwest Pacific Area, in Australia, submitted to the surgeon general in Washington an extensive report on the medical services in the Southwest Pacific Area that warned of a significant malaria problem. In an attached report on sanitation and vital statistics, Lt. Col. James W. Bass not only clearly identified malaria as one of the most important public health problems throughout New Guinea but also warned that returning troops could possibly spread it to previously uninfected areas of Australia. Bass noted that malaria was already very prevalent among U.S. and Australian troops in New Guinea, reaching rates of 1,000 per 1,000 per annum for American forces at Milne Bay, Papua, and 4,000 per 1,000 per annum for Australian troops. In his next report on 1 January 1943, Carroll warned that "The high incidence of malaria, especially prevalent among the troops in New Guinea, has presented additional problems in malaria control. With the contemplated increase in the number of our forces occupying areas where malaria is very prevalent, it will be necessary to increase our malaria control measures."[6]

Theater officers devoted little attention to developing an antimalaria program during 1942, however, because of their focus on more immediate operational requirements. As a result medical officers could not obtain the level of priority required for the shipment of antimalarial supplies into or even within the theater. Even when such supplies did reach Australia, they were often not moved forward to Papua. Shipment priorities simply reflected the continuing preoccupation of line commanders and theater planners with operational matters and their of lack of interest in the malaria threat. Effective control of malaria in base and combat areas required commanders to educate their troops and strictly enforce personal protection measures. In most areas, line commanders were not sufficiently concerned to do this. Moreover, the theater lacked clear, centralized theater medical leadership that could push an effective theater-wide preventive medicine and antimalaria program in cooperation with the Australians.[7]

MacArthur himself seems to have fully understood the threat posed by malaria. In September 1942 he told Lt. Col. George W. Rice, who had just become the surgeon in the G–4 Section at MacArthur's small General Headquarters (GHQ), that malaria had played such an important part in his defeat in the Philippines that he wanted to keep the disease under control in New Guinea.[8] However, Colonel Rice did not translate his words into any significant theater-wide malaria program.

MacArthur assigned the task of taking Buna to the three regimental combat teams of the 32d Infantry Division in coordination with the Australians, and these forces launched operations in October 1942. The initiation of these operations produced almost immediately a huge jump in hospital admissions in the theater resulting from malaria, and these increases continued well into early 1943. (See Table 1.) Such sick rates meant that large numbers of men had to be hospitalized for longer periods of care than previously anticipated. The large patient load strained not only the Army's limited medical services and facilities in the advanced areas but also the entire system of evacuation back to hospitals in the base sections in Australia. From October 1942 to April 1943, 30 percent of all hospital admissions in the Southwest Pacific Area were for malaria.[10]

Malaria rates for the American combat and service units assigned to the

Table 2. **Malaria Rates in the Advanced Base, New Guinea[11]**

Dates	*Rate Per 1,000 Per Annum*
6 March–17 October 1942	95
12–26 December 1942	1,600
9–22 January 1943	1,374
6–20 February 1943	1,672
20 February–6 March 1943	1,560
6–20 March 1943	1,288

National Archives photo

Main ward of the 18th Station Hospital at Iron Range, Australia, March 1943

Advanced Base in New Guinea were much higher than the overall Southwest Pacific Area rates. (See Table 2.) From mid-October to mid-December 1942, malaria rates for U.S. troops in Papua skyrocketed from an average of 95 per 1,000 per annum for the March–October period to 1,600 for the period 12–26 December. American troops at Base A at Milne Bay on the eastern end of the island, a highly malarious area, had a crippling malaria rate of 3,308 per 1,000 per annum in January 1943.[12] The overall malaria rate in New Guinea peaked at 1,672 per 1,000 per annum in mid-February 1943 and did not fall below 1,000 until April 1943.[13] A closer look at the major ground combat units involved in the drive on Buna provides an even more revealing perspective on the ravages of malaria and other diseases. The 163d Infantry, an element of the 41st Infantry Division, which augmented the 32d Infantry Division late in the Buna fighting, reported in February 1943 suffering 2 men killed, 13 wounded, and 925 sick—661 with fevers of undetermined origin (FUO), mostly malaria of one sort or another, and 264 definitely diagnosed with malaria. From January through March 1943, the regiment evacuated 220 wounded in action and 1,945 for FUO and malaria. These sicknesses did not disable the soldier for just one or two days; the soldier with malaria in 1943 lost an average of 15–26 effective days per admission to a medical facility. It is not hard to imagine the potentially devastating impact that such losses could have on a fighting unit, as 1,945 men represented 58 percent of the regiment's nominal strength of 3,333.[14]

The Papua campaign ended in late January 1943 with the capture of the area around Sanananda, and the 32d Infantry Division, which had borne the brunt of the fighting, reported that it had suffered a total of 10,960 troops killed, wounded, injured, or sick during the period from 26 September 1942 to 28 February 1943. Of this total, 2,387 were classified as battle casualties (707 killed and 1,680 wounded), and 8,286 were listed as sick on account of disease. Of those sick from disease, 5,358 suffered from one of various forms of malaria or FUO, with 70–80 percent of the latter usually representing undiagnosed malarias. These figures corresponded to rates of 1,674 per 1,000 per annum for fevers and malaria and 2,589 per 1,000 per annum for all diseases. Fully 65 percent of all diseases were ascribed to malarias or FUO. In contrast, the division's average combat strength during the drive on Buna was 7,679.[15]

In his report on the 32d Infantry Division's medical service from January to June 1943, Lt. Col. Francis L. DePasquale, the division surgeon, commented extensively on the continuing effects of malaria on the division even after its return to Australia for rest and rehabilitation. Despite prophylactic and cure programs for malaria, the division's units began suffering enormously from new and recurrent attacks (relapses) of malaria originally acquired in New Guinea. Malaria cases remained so numerous among division troops that from late March to early May 1943 the division's 107th Medical Battalion had to operate its casualty clearing station at Camp Cable, Australia, to relieve pressure on the 155th Station Hospital that was supporting the division. The clearing station alone compiled combined average patient censuses of 200–600 daily in this period, mainly due to malaria and FUO. DePasquale lamented, "Malaria, its treatment and control, furnishes the greatest problem the Division Medical Service has ever had to face, and as of 30 June 1943 is still the greatest problem. There has been no want of help, no dearth of suggestions, no lack of complete cooperation, both from higher

National Archives photo

Two thatched-rooved native structures and an Army tent house the 1st Portable Surgical Hospital near Oro Bay, Papua, February 1943.

National Archives photo



Soldiers taking quinine tablets in Papua, December 1942

headquarters and by commanding officers within the division."[16] The 32d Infantry Division was basically noneffective on account of malaria for four to six months after its return from Papua, and 67 percent of its personnel showed clinical symptoms of malaria during the ten months after its withdrawal from New Guinea.[17]

Fortunately, the means to combat the malaria threat were actually already at hand. Col. (later Brig. Gen.) James S. Simmons, chief of the Preventive Medicine Division of the Office of the Surgeon General, had realized before the United States entered the war that American forces might be called upon to fight in areas where tropical diseases presented serious threats to the health of the force. Even before malaria and other tropical diseases began to account for growing sick rolls in the Caribbean, South America, Africa, the Middle East, and the China-Burma-India Theater, Simmons and the Preventive Medicine Division launched a massive effort to build a worldwide antimalaria program. They emphasized training and deploying malaria survey and control units that could identify and plan the eradication of the mosquito populations that transmitted the disease. Simmons's division oversaw the development of new residual insecticides, larvicides, and insect repellants, along with synthetic antimalaria drugs, protective clothing and shelters, spraying equipment, and other items. To these new weapons in the war on malaria, the division added a massive, worldwide troop education program aimed at informing soldiers about the dangers of malaria and how to protect themselves against the disease and the mosquitoes that carried it. In October 1942 the surgeon general offered theater army commanders the assistance of his malaria specialists, new malaria control and malaria survey units, and the antimalarial supplies and equipment. On 1 December 1942, Colonel Carroll in Sydney formally requested the immediate shipment of seven malariologists, three survey units, and twelve control units to the Southwest Pacific Area to help combat the emerging malaria menace.[18]

With assistance on the way and the malaria caseload clearly on the rise in early 1943, initiating antimalarial measures assumed the utmost importance for the preventive medicine program in the Southwest Pacific Area. Sick rates due to malaria were threatening to incapacitate a large part of the fighting and service forces in Papua, and, as Colonel Bass had predicted, the soldiers returning to Australia were bringing the disease back with them. However, the theater's malaria control program was not developing at a pace sufficient to meet the growing threat. One factor contributing to the weakness of the program was an ongoing struggle over who would control the theater medical program: Colonel Rice at GHQ, MacArthur's small planning and operational headquarters, or Rice's senior Colonel Carroll, who served first at USASOS, MacArthur's service command, and then after February 1943 at U.S. Army Forces in the Far East. This struggle prevented the emergence of any strong medical leadership at the theater level and meant that antimalarial efforts were often implemented in piecemeal fashion, frustrated by uncooperative line officers, and hindered by inadequate command emphasis. Carroll nonetheless instituted a strong antimalaria training program for units headed into combat and on 5 February 1943 issued a detailed theater directive on preventive measures. His success, however, was mixed at best.[19]

Strong command emphasis and support down to the smallest units were always the critical elements in the antimalaria campaign and other preventive medicine and health programs. In many combat commands the needed emphasis and support was often lacking. Shortly after Lt. Gen. Walter E. Krueger moved part of his Sixth Army headquarters from Brisbane to Milne Bay to serve as Headquarters, Alamo Force, Col. William Hagins, the Sixth Army surgeon, began reporting to Carroll increasing noncompliance with

theater antimalaria directives. MacArthur then sent Carroll to New Guinea to speak with Krueger about his responsibility as the commander to implement these measures. Krueger was unenthusiastic about shouldering this burden until Carroll asked, "Now, do you want me to go back and tell General MacArthur that you told me that you didn't want to do it?" That got Krueger's attention. After an ensuing detailed discussion with Carroll and Hagins on noncompliance in Sixth Army units, Krueger turned to Carroll and said "Carroll, you tell General MacArthur that we'll take all steps possible and [conform] as much as possible to the instructions . . . to enforce the malaria orders." Krueger's final answer was then and remains today the correct one—the health of the force was ultimately the commander's responsibility—and he kept that promise to Carroll throughout the rest of the war.[20]

Through the early months of 1943 it was sadly clear that the Southwest Pacific Area lacked a comprehensive, theater-wide preventive medicine program and organization that could attack and solve the threats presented by malaria and other tropical diseases. Major changes, expert assistance, and close cooperation with the Australians were mandatory, but so too was strong and definite support from MacArthur and the GHQ. Buna and its aftermath finally brought MacArthur and GHQ to realize the danger that diseases such as malaria posed to the entire Allied campaign. In February 1943 Carroll's major initiatives were just beginning to produce results—the initial theater directive was issued; the first three malaria survey units arrived; and Col. Howard F. Smith, a malaria expert from the U.S. Public Health Service, was appointed theater malariologist. In March 1943 MacArthur set up the United States–Australian Combined Advisory Committee on Tropical Medicine, Hygiene, and Sanitation to establish overall policies for the Allied Forces and report directly to MacArthur's headquarters. As more information and resources became available for the antimalaria campaign, Carroll distributed to all Army commands in the Southwest Pacific Area the revised and more specific "Sanitary and Prevention Measures for the Control of Malaria" that U.S. Army Forces in the Far East issued on 18 April 1943. This directive encapsulated all of the individual and organizational malaria control policies and practices that became the standard operating procedures for the Southwest Pacific Area's combat and service forces for the remainder of the war. Once MacArthur's attention was gained, he responded quickly, forcefully, and effectively, and the attack on malaria advanced steadily thereafter.[21]

In late April 1943, Carroll emphasized the problems and activities of the theater's antimalaria program in one of his periodic letters to the surgeon general of the Army. He reported that one of his most difficult problems was convincing the forces in the forward areas in New Guinea "that the main fight is against contracting malaria and not against the treatment." The antimalaria program was multifaceted, Carroll stressed, but the troops focused their concerns on the taking quinine or atabrine (quinacrine hydrochloride). Atabrine, a synthetic quinine substitute developed by the Germans in the early 1930s, was an effective malaria suppressant that slowed the progress of the infection and prevented the onset of the disease's clinical symptoms. However, it did not prevent malaria and debilitating symptoms would frequently arise, even after troops returned to nonmalarious areas, if the administration of atabrine was suspended. Moreover, atabrine caused a yellowing of the skin and,

National Archives photo

Australian soldier directs local residents in spraying mosquito breeding ground in Papua, January 1943.

Anopheles Home Front. *A Sanitary Corps officer directs an attack on mosquito breeding grounds in New Guinea.*

particularly at high dosages, frequent gastrointestinal upsets during early administration and some instances of psychoses. Perhaps most important to the GIs, it was also widely rumored to cause impotency. While personal measures were always important, Carroll noted that they were of secondary importance compared to eliminating the mosquitoes that transmitted the disease and their breeding places. Carroll enclosed a copy of his newly issued theater directive and a six-page summary entitled "Malaria in the Southwest Pacific Area" that outlined the extensive malaria control program that was already partially underway. Carroll observed that "The Commanding General is greatly interested in our fight on malaria and has been convinced that malaria is just as great an enemy of our forces as are the Japanese troops themselves."[22] During May and June 1943 Col. Paul F. Russell, chief of the Tropical Disease and Malaria Control Branch of the Preventive Medicine Division at the Office of the Surgeon General and an Army expert on malaria, visited the Southwest Pacific Area and met with General MacArthur to discuss the malaria threat. After the meeting MacArthur said, "Doctor, this will be a long war if for every division I have facing the enemy I must count on a second division in hospital with malaria and a third division convalescing from this debilitating disease!" Russell concluded that "The general was not at all worried about defeating the Japanese, but he was greatly concerned about the failure up to that time to defeat the *Anopheles* mosquito."[23]

Russell's visit served more than just to brief MacArthur. He came to review the entire antimalaria program in the Southwest Pacific Area to determine its effectiveness. He did not like what he saw. The Surgeon General's Office had designed the malaria control program to function under a theater surgeon who would operate under the authority of the theater commander and oversee the medical needs of all of the Army's ground, air, and service forces within that theater. A unified Army medical structure of this sort that could impose a strict malaria control program simply did not then exist in the Southwest Pacific Area. Candidly criticizing the medical command structure, Russell noted that "the anopheles did not respect command channels and that it infected men within specific areas regardless of the command to which they were assigned." He recommended changes that were accepted and resulted in better coordination of the entire malaria control program. However, the continuing lack of an effective theater-wide Army medical command structure repeatedly frustrated these efforts.[24] From April to June 1943 Brig. Gen. Charles C. Hillman, the chief of professional services

By Francis Criss. Courtesy of the U.S. Army Medical Department Museum

The surgeon general, Maj. Gen. Norman T. Kirk, pen in hand, with his staff at the Washington office. The officers include, at far left, Brig. Gens. Charles C. Hillman and Hugh J. Morgan and, at far right, Brig. Gen. James S. Simmons, all standing.

at the Office of the Surgeon General in Washington, visited the South Pacific and Southwest Pacific theaters to examine their full range of medical activities. He focused particular attention on the problems presented by malaria. Before he left Australia, Hillman gave Carroll a copy of his preliminary observations in which he noted:

> It appears that your headquarters is cognizant of the seriousness of the malaria situation. However, it is my opinion that most junior officers, and even some general officers and others in responsible positions, are not fully aware of the disastrous results that are invited by anything less than the maximum effort to control this disease, by far the greatest cause of ineffectiveness of the military forces in this area. . . . It should be realized that there is much greater danger of defeat of the American Forces in this theater by this disease alone tha[n] as a result of casualties inflicted by the [Japanese].[25]

In his more detailed report submitted to the surgeon general in July, General Hillman wrote "This disease has proved to be by far the greatest cause of noneffectiveness of military personnel in both theatres. Its importance as an adverse factor in the success of military operations in New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, and the islands to the north cannot be overemphasized." He noted that the 32d Infantry Division in late May was "still unfit for combat service and, without extensive replacements, will be for some time to come." He concluded: "In view of these experiences it becomes evident that no measure which will contribute to the solution of this serious menace to the success of military operations should be neglected." He emphasized that an aggressive educational program was needed among the junior officers and enlisted personnel so that they would recognize their personal responsibilities in fighting malaria. In addition, Hillman stressed that more malaria survey and control units, insecticides, repellants, and equipment were needed and that they were being requisitioned for the theater.[26]

Despite the progress, malaria was still a virulent threat to the combat forces in New Guinea. In May 1943 Col. William J. Miehe, surgeon of Maj. Gen. Robert Eichelberger's I Corps, reported that "Malaria is becoming the most serious problem in New Guinea in spite of the intensive prophylactic medical measures and suppressive medication."[27] Two months later

Miehe reiterated his view that "Malaria continues to be of paramount importance in all operations to be accomplished in this theater. The strength of any unit, which is composed of personnel who have had recurrent attacks of malaria or fever of undetermined origin, will, without question, be severely reduced when the unit is called upon to function under adverse conditions of any sort."[28]

Another high-level visitor from Washington, Brig. Gen. Hugh J. Morgan, chief of medical services at the Office of the Surgeon General, strongly echoed Miehe on the threat that malaria posed to American forces in comments

Table 3. **Malaria Control Personnel, Southwest Pacific Area (In Theater and En Route)**[31]

	13 Feb 43	*15 Jul 43*	*15 Feb 44*	*30 Sep 44*
Malariologists	7	13	NA	21
Malaria Survey Units	3	3	17	32
Malaria Control Units	12	12	27	66

he directed to Carroll following his visit to the theater in late July and early August 1943: "The greatest threat to successful military operations in this theater is malaria. The strength of units in the forward areas is affected adversely first by malaria. The Japanese are responsible for only 10 to 15% of the evacuation from the front. Malaria is responsible for over 50%. Thus, the enemy's influence upon our non effective rate is negligible as compared to the effect of malaria."[29]

Morgan believed that greater effort had to be expended on antimalaria efforts in the forward areas where combat troops operated because that was where the highest infection rates were. "Here," Morgan said, "malaria will produce non-effectiveness 5 to 10 times as often as will the enemy's guns." He urged increased initial doses of atabrine, along with quinine, as the preferred prophylactic for malaria and a review of the previous requisitions for malaria control and malaria survey units to make sure that they were being sent to the theater.[30]

With new units, drugs, equipment, priorities, and strong command support, American and Australian field and medical forces now focused their primary attention on the greatest threat—malaria. In February 1943 Medical Department malariologists, malaria control and malaria survey units, and smaller malaria control and survey detachments, all trained in the United States, began arriving in the theater to attack the malaria threat head on. (See Table 3.) These carefully trained teams effectively identified malaria problem areas, tracked infections and types of malaria, and began a widespread program of eradicating the mosquitoes' breeding grounds by oiling, filling, and draining standing water and by ground and aerial spraying of insecticides, including DDT (dichlorodiphenyltrichloroethane). So effective were the malaria control and malaria survey units that by the end of 1943 each division had been permanently assigned one of each of these units. All operational task forces also had one or more units of each type attached as part of the basic force so that antimalarial measures could be initiated as soon as the force landed on a hostile shore. In addition, new policies on personal protection were promulgated to prevent transmission of the disease, including the mandatory wearing of clothing with minimal skin exposure (long-sleeve sheets and long pants), the use of mosquito bars and netting while sleeping, the screening of all buildings, the plentiful application of mosquito repellants, and the use of aerosol insecticides in quarters and buildings. Above all else, these active measures were combined with an increasingly stringent prophylactic policy that involved administering increased dosages of atabrine, which soldiers in all units that were located in the malarial areas of New Guinea now took daily in strictly enforced quantities.[32]

As the antimalaria measures became increasingly effective during 1943, the malaria rate per 1,000 per annum in the Southwest Pacific Area dropped from 382 in January to 105 in December 1943. That rate would continue to decline rather steadily until it reached a low of 29 in November 1944.[33] The immediate aftermath of the Papua campaign marked the low point in the Medical Department's war against malaria. The programs and measures introduced as a result of this malaria crisis of early 1943 eventually proved successful against this tenacious foe.

When he left the Southwest Pacific Area in December 1943 for reassignment to the United States, then–Brigidier General Carroll sent a lengthy memorandum to the commander of the Services of Supply about the medical situation in the theater. In it he made several observations and recommendations. As to malaria, he reemphasized some of the key points that had highlighted his antimalaria campaign:

> Malaria is the most potent enemy we have so far had to contend with in the SWPA [Southwest Pacific Area]. It causes far more losses and non-effectives than all other causes combined. Not only does it cause the actual loss of personnel for prolonged periods of time, but it also causes a great loss of efficiency of troops remaining with their organizations. . . . I firmly believe that *malaria can be reduced to the point where it would almost cease to be a menace in any way. How?* By strict enforcement of all malaria control measures as propagated by our Chief Malariologist. . . . I am leaving the SWPA, but naturally will be greatly interested in the work here. I cannot possibly ask for anything now with the hope of personal gain. Therefore, I ask that the malaria control problem be given more consideration by all commanders from the top down.[34]

The Outcome

Writing about malaria in the Southwest Pacific Area in the Army Medical Department's preventive medicine volume on malaria in World War II, Dr. Thomas Hart and retired Col. William Hardenbergh concluded:

> As a result of the control program in the Southwest Pacific, military operations after the middle of 1943 were not seriously handicapped by malaria. The campaign in this area was the first one in which so many U.S. Army troops had fought under such highly malarious conditions. The lack of experience in controlling malaria under combat conditions, the absence of any organization suitable for control, and the mental unreadiness of both combat and medical officers represented very serious problems which had to be, and were, overcome.[35]

Colonel Russell, the leading Army malariologist who had paid an

important visit to the theater in mid-1943, observed that experience in the Southwest Pacific and other areas taught

> that it is impossible to control malaria effectively in military forces in highly malarious areas unless commanding officers from highest to lowest echelons are malaria conscious. Training and education of both medical and line officers in regard to malaria and its control are essential. Malaria control in the army is a military problem. A malaria policy must not only be formulated; it must be enforced. Malaria discipline is absolutely necessary to an army's success in fighting the *Plasmodium*-mosquito axis.[36]

Once these critical obstacles were overcome, special malaria control organizations and the supplies and personnel they required had to be given the proper priorities, mobilized, and deployed to fight the war against malaria. "The military experience," Russell continued, "taught once again that the prevention of malaria is neither automatic nor simple but is compounded of law and persuasion, organization and training, supplies and technical application. Once the fundamental lessons were learned, the military malaria problem was solved."[37]

The importance of winning the fight against malaria and other tropical diseases is made evident by the figures in Tables 4–6. Although only 771 American soldiers in the Southwest Pacific Area died from all infectious and parasitic diseases from 1942 through 1945 (126 of them from malaria),[38] even a cursory review of these figures indicates the potential that these debilitating diseases had for incapacitating large numbers of troops for long periods of time.

The Army Medical Department's struggle against malaria in the Southwest Pacific Area from 1942 to 1944 confronted numerous obstacles, natural as well as man-made. After a slow and shaky start, the Medical Department successfully waged and won the arduous battle to protect the health of the troops so that military operations could be prosecuted. Throughout the war in the Southwest Pacific Area, disease indeed remained an unrelenting foe. Success against these microscopic enemies and their insect allies was difficult to achieve, even on a temporary basis, and could be maintained only through constant vigilance. The unrelenting nature of the attack of the anopheles mosquito and the *plasmodium* parasite required the Army Medical Department to plan and wage an equally unrelenting campaign against them.

In analyzing the military contest in New Guinea, the *Reports of General MacArthur* place the importance of the Medical Department's achievement in the fight against malaria in its proper context:

> One of the important victories won by General MacArthur's forces was their triumph over the anopheles mosquito. It was a battle involving science and discipline, waged by the troops, both officers and men, under the guidance of the Medical Corps. During the first stages of the New Guinea fighting, malaria had been as bitter and deadly a foe as the enemy. On the Papuan front, it had been responsible for more non-effectives than any other single factor. By the time General MacArthur was ready to go into the Philippines, however, it was reduced to secondary importance as a cause of disablement and no longer deserved serious consideration in planning tactical operations.[41]

Table 4. **Admissions for Infectious and Parasitic Diseases, Southwest Pacific Area, 1942–44[39]**

Disease	*1942*	*1943*	*1944*
Malaria	4,432	39,797	25,980
Dengue	4,224	6,436	27,670
Scrub typhus	26	677	3,340
Dysentery	959	2,802	5,330
Total All Diseases	16,085	57,617	81,770
Malaria Rate/1000/Annum	62.2	209.5	48.2
Malaria as Percentage of Total	27.6	69.1	31.8

Table 5. **Average Number of Days Lost Per Admission, Southwest Pacific Area, 1942–44[40]**

Disease	*1942–45*	*1942*	*1943*	*1944*
Malaria	19	26	25	14
Dysentery, amebic	45	66	44	65
Dengue	8	7	8	8
Scrub typhus	93	69	43	99

Table 6. **Estimated Total of Noneffective Man-Days Due to Specific Diseases, 1942–44 (Total admissions times average days lost per admission)**

Disease	*1942*	*1943*	*1944*
Malaria	115,232	994,925	363,720
Dengue	29,568	51,488	221,360
Scrub typhus	1,794	29,111	330,660

The Author

Dr. John T. Greenwood has been chief of the Office of Medical History in the Office of The Surgeon General, U.S. Army, since 1998. He earlier served as chief of the Office of History, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and chief of the Field Programs and Historical Services Division at the Center of Military History.

Notes

1. General Headquarters, U.S. Army Forces, Far East, *Reports of General MacArthur*, 2 vols. (Washington, D.C., 1966), 1: 42–43.

2. The 153d Station Hospital, which arrived in Brisbane on 9 March 1942 and admitted its first patient ten days later, was apparently the first U.S. Army hospital to operate in Australia. See Mary Ellen Condon-Rall and Albert E. Cowdrey, *The Medical Department: Medical Service in the War against Japan*, United States Army in World War II (Washington, D.C., 1998), pp. 68–69.

3. Thomas A. Hart and William H. Hardenbergh, "The Southwest Pacific Area," in Ebbe Curtis Hoff, ed., *Preventive Medicine in World War II*, Medical Department, United States Army, 8 vols. (Washington, D.C., 1955–76), 6: 513–26; Thomas T. Mackie, George W. Hunter III, and C. Brooke Worth, *A Manual of Tropical Medicine* (Philadelphia, 1945), pp. 213–31; Fred H. Mowrey, "Statistics of Malaria," in W. Paul Havens, Jr., ed., *Internal Medicine in World War II*, Medical Department, United States Army, 3 vols. (Washington, D.C., 1961–68), 2: 449–63; Michael Worboys, "Tropical Diseases," in. W. F. Bynum and Roy Porter, eds., *Companion Encyclopedia of the History of Medicine*, 2 vols. (London, 1993), 1: 512–32; Allan S. Walker, *Clinical Problems of War*, Australia in the War of 1939–1945 (Canberra, 1952), pp. 75–79; Stanhope Bayne-Jones, *The Evolution of Preventive Medicine in the United States Army, 1607–1939* (Washington, D.C., 1968), pp. 174–75; George C. Dunham, *Military Preventive Medicine* (Carlisle Barracks, Pa., 1930), pp. 783–84.

4. Mackie, Hunter, and Worth, *A Manual of Tropical Medicine*, pp. 213–15; James S. Simmons et al., *Global Epidemiology: A Geography of Disease and Sanitation*, 3 vols. (Philadelphia, 1944–54), 1: 402; Walker, *Clinical Problems of War*, pp. 81–83.

5. James O. Gillespie, "Malaria and the Defense of Bataan," and Hart and Hardenbergh, "The Southwest Pacific Area," in Hoff, *Preventive Medicine*, 6: 497–511, 513–26, respectively; Walker, *Clinical Problems of War*, pp. 77–95; Bayne-Jones, *Evolution of Preventive Medicine*, pp. 123–46, 174–75.

6. James W. Bass, "Sanitation and Vital Statistics," pp. 4–5, in Rpt, Col Percy J. Carroll, CSurg, USASOS, SWPA, to Office of the Surgeon General (OTSG), "Medical Service in Australia," 15 Dec 1942; and Rpt, Carroll to OTSG, "Medical Service in Australia," 1 Jan 1943, with the quotation on p. 1, both in Folder 4, "Annual Rpts, U.S. Army Services of Supply, SWPA, 1942–43," Box 12, The Medical Department: The Medical Service in the War Against Japan, U.S. Army Center of Military History (CMH) Refiles, Accession NN3-319-00-038, Record Group 319, National Archives (hereafter CMH Refiles, RG 319, NA).

7. Blanche B. Armfield et al., *Organization and Administration in World War II*, Medical Department, United States Army (Washington, D.C., 1963), pp. 442–43; Condon-Rall and Cowdrey, *Medical Service*, pp. 44–47, 56, 59; Paul F. Russell, "Introduction," in Hoff, *Preventive Medicine*, 6: 6; Interv with Lt Col G. L. Orth, 12 Jun 47, in "Interview–LTC Orth, 12 Jun 1947, Medical Activities SWPA," Folder 21, Box 4, CMH Refiles, RG 319, NA.

8. Armfield, *Organization and Administration*, p. 443.

9. Frank A. Reister, ed., *Medical Statistics in World War II*, Medical Department, United States Army (Washington, D.C., 1975), pp. 768–69, 790, 878–79, 900.

10. Rpts, Carroll to OTSG, "Medical Service in Australia," 15 Jan 1943, 1 Feb 1943, in Folder 4, Box 12, CMH Refiles, RG 319, NA; Rpt, OTSG, "Monthly Progress Report, Section 7: Health, Data as of 30 June 1943," Office of Medical History files, Falls Church, Va.; Condon-Rall and Cowdrey, *Medical Service*, pp. 68–77, 137–47.

11. Rpts, Carroll to OTSG, "Medical Service in Australia," 15 Dec 1942 and 1 Feb 1943; Rpts, Col F. H. Petters, Surg, USASOS, SWPA, "Medical Service in Australia," 1 Mar and 1 May 1943, in Folder 4, Box 12, CMH Refiles, RG 319, NA.

12. Bass, "Sanitation and Vital Statistics"; Hart and Hardenbergh, "The Southwest Pacific Area," 6: 578.

13. Rpt, Lt Col Delbert E. Stanard, Surg, 41st Inf Div, "Medical History of the 41st Infantry Division from 1 January 1943 to 31 March 1943," n.d.; and "Monthly Activity Report (March 1943)," 9 Apr 1943, with encl, "Laboratory Report: Diagnosis of Patients of the 163rd Infantry Combat Team for month of February 1943," n.d., in Folder 58, "Surgeon, 41st Inf. Div. Jan–Dec 1943," Box 9, CMH Refiles, RG 319, NA.

14. Rpt, Carroll to OTSG, "Medical Service in Australia," 15 Apr 1943, p. 2, in Folder 4, Box 12, CMH Refiles, RG 319, NA; Mowrey, "Statistics of Malaria," 2: 459–60.

15. Rpt, Lt Col Simon Warmenhoven, Surg, 32d Inf Div, Table No. 1, "Total Casualties–32d Division–Buna Campaign 26 September 1942–28 February 1943," n.d., p. 10, in "Warmenhoven, Papua Campaign, 1942–43," Folder 14, Box 2, CMH Refiles, RG 319, NA; Rpt, "Total Casualties–32d Division–Buna Campaign, 26 September 1942–28 February 1943," n.d., in Folder 53, "Annual Activity Reports, 32d Infantry Division, 1943–44," Box 9, CMH Refiles, RG 319, NA.

16. Rpt, Lt Col Francis L. DePasquale, Surg., 32d Inf Div, "Medical History 32d Infantry Division, 1 January–30 June 1943," n.d., with the quoted words on p. 7, in Folder 53, Box 9, CMH Refiles, RG 319, NA.

17. Hart and Hardenbergh, "The Southwest Pacific Area," 6: 568.

18. Oliver R. McCoy, "War Department Provisions for Malaria Control," in Hoff, *Preventive Medicine*, 6: 11–59; William A. Hardenbergh, "Control of Insects," in Hoff, *Preventive Medicine*, 2: 179–232, especially pp. 205–18; Harry Most, "Clinical Trials of Antimalarial Drugs," in Havens, *Internal Medicine*, 2: 525–98. For the development of antimalarial drugs, see E. C. Andrus et al., eds., *Advances in Military Medicine*, 2 vols. (Boston, 1948), 2: 665–716.

19. Condon-Rall and Cowdrey, *Medical Service*, pp. 48–54, 137–41; Armfield, *Organization and Administration*, pp. 442–47; Hart and Hardenbergh, "The Southwest Pacific Area," 6: 536–51.

20. Condon-Rall and Cowdrey, *Medical Service*, pp. 137–39; U.S. Army Forces in the Far East (USAFFE), "Directive on Malaria Control," in Hoff, *Preventive Medicine*, 6: 585–87; Interv, Mary Ellen Condon with Brig Gen Percy J. Carroll, U.S. Army, Retired, 26 Sep 1980, p. 45, containing the quotation, in folder 8, box 4, CMH Refiles, RG 319, NA; Walter Krueger, *From Down Under to Nippon: The Story of Sixth Army in World War II* (Washington, D.C., 1953), pp. 6–7, 24–25, 40, 134–35. The interview transcript used the word inform, where conform was evidently intended. Carroll recalled that General Krueger addressed him as General Carroll, but the medical officer had not become a brigadier general until 23 June 1943.

21. Hart and Hardenbergh, "The Southwest Pacific Area," 6: 537–41; Armfield, *Organization and Administration*, pp. 443–45; Condon-Rall and Cowdrey, *Medical Service*, pp. 59–60; D. Clayton James, *The Years of MacArthur*, 3 vols. (Boston, 1970–85), 2: 475–76; USAFFE, "Directive on Malaria Control."

22. Rpt, Carroll to the Surgeon General, "Medical Department Activities, S.W.P.A.," 27 Apr 1943, with the quoted words on p. 1, in Folder 4, Box 12, CMH Refiles, RG 319, NA; Benjamin M. Baker, "The Suppression of Malaria," in Havens, *Internal Medicine*, 2: 465–77; McCoy, "Provisions for Malaria Control," 6: 30–32; Most, "Clinical Trials," 2: 538–40; Condon-Rall and Cowdrey, *Medical Service*, p. 123.

23. Russell, "Introduction," 6: 2, containing the quotations; Robert J. T. Joy, "Malaria in American Troops in the South and Southwest Pacific in World War II," *Medical History* 43 (1999): 200.

24. Armfield, *Organization and Administration*, pp. 446–49, quote, p. 446; Memo, Col William L. Wilson, C Hospitalization and Evacuation Br, Plans Div, Army Service Forces, for the Surgeon General, 20 Oct 1943, encl to Brig Gen Raymond W. Bliss, C Operations Service, OTSG, to BG Charles C. Hillman, C of Professional Services, OTSG; BG James S. Simmons, C Preventive Medicine Div, OTSG; et al., 25 Oct 1943, in Folder 25, "Visit of Col. Wilson, et al., to SWPA, 20 Oct 1943," Box 2, CMH Refiles, RG 319, NA.

25. Memo, Hillman for Deputy Chief of Staff, USAFFE, "Observations and Recommendations, Medical Service, in U.S.A.F.F.E.," 23 May 1943, p. 4, Folder 18, "Report of Observations of Medical Services in SWPA & SPA–1943–Hillman," Box 2, CMH Refiles, RG 319, NA.

26. Rpt, Hillman to Surgeon General, "Report of Observations of Medical Service in Southwest Pacific and South Pacific Areas," 12 Jul 1943, with the quotations on p. 2, Folder 18, Box 2, CMH Refiles, RG 319, NA.

27. Rpt, Col William J. Miehe, Surgeon, I Corps, "Medical History [1942], I Corps, U.S.

Army," submitted 14 May 1943, p. 23, Folder 2, "Annual Rpt, I Corps, 1942," Box 10, CMH Refiles, RG 319, NA.

28. Rpt, Miehe, "Quarterly Reports of Medical Activities of Headquarters I Corps, U.S. Army for the period 1 April 1943 to 30 June 1943," 16 Jul 1943, p. 5, in Folder 1, "Quarterly Reports, HQ, I Corps, 1 Jan 1943–31 Dec 1943," Box 10, CMH Refiles, RG 319, NA.

29. Ltr, Brig Gen Hugh J. Morgan, C of Medical Services, OTSG, to Brig Gen Percy J. Carroll, CSurg, USAFFE, 12 Aug 1943, and encl Rpt, "Comments and Recommendations, Medical Department, USAFFE," n.d., with the quotation on p. 4, in Folder 23, "Comments and Recommendations – Med. Dept. by Hugh J. Morgan," Box 2, CMH Refiles, RG 319, NA.

30. Rpt, "Comments and Recommendations, Medical Department, USAFFE," pp. 4, 5.

31. McCoy, "Provisions for Malaria Control," 6: 17, 19, 20. The 30 September 1944 figures include 10 malariologists, 9 survey units, and 13 control units that were transferred from the South Pacific to the Southwest Pacific Area when their boundaries were adjusted on 1 July 1944.

32. Condon-Rall and Cowdrey, *Medical Service*, pp. 59–60; Hart and Hardenbergh, "The Southwest Pacific Area," 6: 536–83; N. Hamilton Fairley, "Tropical Diseases with Special Reference to Malaria in the Eastern Theatres of War," in Henry Letheby Tidy and J. M. Browne Kutschbach, eds., *Inter-Allied Conferences on War Medicine, 1942–1945, Convened by the Royal Society of Medicine* (London, 1947), pp. 94–97; Baker, "The Suppression of Malaria"; Hardenbergh, "Control of Insects," 2: 179–232.

33. Reister, *Medical Statistics*, pp. 900–01, 924–25.

34. Memo, Carroll to CG, USASOS, "Medical Service in the Southwest Pacific Area," 8 Dec 1943, in Folder 21, "Carroll Departure," Box 3, CMH Refiles, RG 319, NA.

35. Hart and Hardenbergh, "The Southwest Pacific Area," 6: 578.

36. Russell, "Introduction," 6: 5–6.

37. Ibid., pp. 6–7, quote, p. 7.

38. Reister, *Medical Statistics*, p. 966.

39. Ibid., pp. 768, 790, 812, 878, 900, 924.

40. Ibid., pp. 554–55.

41. General Headquarters, U.S. Army Forces, Far East, *Reports of General MacArthur*, 1: 161.

Army History Offices and an Army Museum Send Civilians to the Middle East

Randy Talbot, a historian with the U.S. Army Tank-automotive and Armaments Command in Warren, Michigan, traveled to Kuwait at the end of April 2003 to document Army Materiel Command activities in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. He replaced Dr. Robert Darius, the Army Materiel Command's senior historian who had worked in Kuwait for two-and-a-half months beginning in mid-February. Mr. Talbot is slated to remain in the Iraq Theater until early October. George Eaton, historian for the Army Field Support Command and the Joint Munitions Command, is scheduled to take over from Mr. Talbot at that time and to remain in the Iraq Theater until mid-December. The three historians have and will be conducting oral history interviews, collecting documents and photographs, and answering inquiries about the work of the Army Materiel Command in Kuwait and Iraq.

The two staff members of the Fort Stewart Museum at Fort Stewart, Georgia, Jeff Reed and museum director Walter Meeks, traveled to Baghdad in May. During their four-week stay in Iraq the two men collected and documented artifacts pertaining to recent American combat activities there and prepared these artifacts and others collected by units serving in Iraq for transmission to Army museums in the United States. The men returned to the United States on 10 June.

Dr. John Lonnquest, a historian, and Eric Reinert, a curator, from the Office of History of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers in Alexandria, Virginia, traveled to Kuwait, Iraq, and Afghanistan for four weeks in July and August. The two conducted oral history interviews, took photographs, and collected documents, photos, and artifacts to document the Corps of Engineers' support for Operations ENDURING FREEDOM in Afghanistan and IRAQI FREEDOM in Iraq. The information they collected is designed to support after-action reports and to serve as the basis for publications and displays to be prepared by their office.

Oscar Patton Inducted into the Quartermaster Hall of Fame

Retired Cmd. Sgt. Maj. Oscar R. Patton, who has served as the Supra Corporation's On-Site Project Manager with the Museum Division of the Center of Military History since 1997, was inducted into the Quartermaster Hall of Fame on 16 May 2003. A Texas native, Patton enlisted in the Army in November 1965 and served on active duty for more than thirty years, first as an infantryman and then as a quartermaster. He served in Vietnam for two years and three months, including a tour with the 173d Airborne Brigade. He later served as noncommissioned officer in charge of logistics support for the 800th Materiel Management Center and as command sergeant major for the 142d Supply and Service Battalion and the 23d Quartermaster Brigade. His decorations include the Legion of Merit with one leaf cluster, the Meritorious Service Medal with three oak leaf clusters, the Combat Infantryman Badge, and the Parachustist Badge. He was selected in 1996, following his military retirement, to serve as honorary sergeant major of the Quartermaster Regiment.

Cmd. Sgt. Maj. Oscar R. Patton

New Publications from the Center of Military History

The Center of Military History has published revised and updated editions of two books relating to noncommissioned officers, a compendium of the proceedings at a high-level national security conference held in 2002, and an after action report on operations in Somalia.

Dr. David W. Hogan, Jr., of the Center's Histories Division served as general editor of the new edition of *The Story of the Noncommissioned Officer Corps: The Backbone of the Army*, which revises a book first published in 1989. Dr. Hogan expanded the section on the evolution and development of the NCO Corps, adding material on "DESERT STORM, Peacekeeping, and Beyond," and Center historians Robert Rush and Charles White and the chief of military history, Brig. Gen. John S. Brown, added portraits of the noncommissioned officer in the Lewis and Clark expedition, the Army of the 1990s, and the Army in Afghanistan. The new edition also includes many new illustrations. This book may be ordered from the Government Printing Office, either in hard cover for $48 under stock number 008-029-00384-8 or in paperback for $41 under stock number 008-029-00385-6.

The new edition of *The Sergeants Major of the Army* updates the first edition of that book published in 1995. Cmd. Sgt. Maj. Daniel K. Elder undertook the revisions, which include an expanded essay on the Office of the Sergeant Major of the Army and new biographies of Sgts. Maj. of the Army Gene C. McKinney, Robert E. Hall, and Jack L. Tilley. This book may be ordered from the Government Printing Office, either in hard cover for $40 under stock number 008-029-00382-1 or in paperback for $33 under stock number 008-029-00383-0.

Orders for either of these items may be placed with the Government Printing Office online at *http://bookstore.gpo.gov*. Army publication account holders may order them from the Army Publications Distribution Center–St. Louis.

Dwight D. Eisenhower National Security Conference, 2002, is a compendium of the addresses delivered and the discussion entertained at a conference held in the Ronald Reagan Building and International Trade Center in Washington, D.C., on 26–27 September 2002. Secretary of Transportation Norman Mineta delivered the conference's keynote address on the topic of "Homeland Security—The Challenge of Securing America's Transportation." Four panels discussed the new global security environment, security cooperation in a globalized world, achieving military transformation, and building capabilities for international efforts. General Richard B. Myers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, delivered the closing address on "Transformation of the Military Instrument of National Power." Among the other participants at the conference were academics, including several from the National Defense University, journalists, officials with non-profit organizations, Congressman Jerry Lewis, General Montgomery C. Meigs, and Maj. Gen. James M. Dubik. This book is also available to Army publication account holders from the Army Publications Distribution Center–St. Louis, but it has not been offered for public sale.

The Center has published a limited edition of the after action report of United States Forces, Somalia, prepared in 1994 by a working group headed by Lt. Gen. Thomas Montgomery, who had commanded United States Forces, Somalia. The after action report focuses on Operation CONTINUE HOPE, which began in May 1993, and United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II), an international effort to continue humanitarian relief and promote political reconciliation in Somalia of which the American operation formed a part. These operations followed the efforts of the American-led Unified Task Force in Operation RESTORE HOPE, which began in December 1992. Turkish Lt. Gen. Cevik Bir led UNOSOM II forces, and General Montgomery served as his deputy. The Center has included with the U.S. Forces, Somalia, after action report a historical overview by Richard W. Stewart of the U.S. Army's work in Somalia in 1992–94, which places in context the events after May 1993, including the 2–3 October 1993 Task Force RANGER firefight in Mogadishu. The Center will provide copies of this new publication to Department of the Army staff elements, Army major command history offices, and Army libraries. Other official military historians and other agencies needing a copy of the report should contact Dr. Stewart, who is chief of the Center's Histories Division, by email at *Richard.Stewart@hqda.army.mil*.

Training and Doctrine Command Publishes Thirty Year History

The Military History Office of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command has published *Transforming the Army: TRADOC's First Thirty Years, 1973–2003*. The book examines the command's important role in the evolution of Army weapons, force structure, and doctrine during that period. The new book is an updated and somewhat condensed version of *Prepare the Army for War: A Historical Overview of the Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1973–1998*, which the Military History Office published five years ago. While the command printed only a very limited number of copies of the thirty-year history, it may be found at the main TRADOC homepage on the web, *http://tradoc.monroe.army.mil*, by clicking on the TRADOC 30th Anniversary logo on that page's upper right-hand corner.

Continued from page 2

Army Command Publishes History of Army Signals Intelligence in Vietnam

The Military History Office of the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command has published a generously illustrated, 131-page paperback book by Army historian James L. Gilbert, *The Most Secret War: Army Signals Intelligence in Vietnam*. The book examines the work of Army Security Agency personnel in Vietnam from 1961 to 1973. The Government Printing Office is offering the book for sale for $35 under stock number 008-020-01520-2.

Call for Papers: May 2004 Conference of the Council on America's Military Past

The Council on America's Military Past (CAMP) will hold its 38th annual military history conference on 5–9 May 2004 at the Eastland Park Hotel in Portland, Maine. The conference will emphasize the early military history of New England and eastern Canada, but papers at the conference may address any aspect of the military history of the United States from the colonial period to the present day. Those interested in delivering a 20-minute illustrated talk should send their paper topics to CAMP '04, Conference Papers, P.O. Box 1151, Fort Myer, Virginia 22211-1151. Further information is available from retired Col. Herbert M. Hart, U.S. Marine Corps, Retired, who may be reached by phone at 703-912-6124 or by email at *camphart1@aol.com*.

Minerva Publishes Article by *Army History* Author

Minerva: Quarterly Report on Women and the Military has published an article by Mercedes Graf, who wrote "Women Physicians in the Spanish-American War," an article that appeared in the Fall 2002 issue of *Army History* (No. 56). Professor Graf's article "With High Hopes: Women Contract Surgeons in World War I" appeared in the Summer 2002 issue of *Minerva*.

Center of Military History Supports Prague Conference on NATO and the Warsaw Pact

The Military History Working Group of the Partnership for Peace Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes held its third annual international seminar in Prague, Czech Republic, on 7–11 April 2003. The seminar focused on "NATO and the Warsaw Pact: The Formative Years, 1948–1968." Forty-nine individuals from national official military history organizations in thirteen nations in Europe, Asia, and North America participated. Drs. Bianka Adams and Robert Rush of the Center of Military History presented papers on the American soldier in Germany. At the conclusion of the seminar the Ministry of Defense of the Czech Republic awarded its Cross of Merit (Third Class) to Brig. Gen. John S. Brown for the contributions that he and the Center of Military History had made to the organization of this seminar.

Continued on page 30

Agencies Issue New Publications on Military and National Security History

The Command and General Staff College Press has issued a 329-page volume edited by Thomas M. Huber entitled *Compound Warfare: That Fatal Knot*. Compound warfare is defined as the simultaneous use of regular and guerrilla forces against an enemy. The book contains chapters on eight examples of this type of warfare from the wars of colonial North America and the American Revolution to the Vietnam War and the Soviet War in Afghanistan. Other chapters deal with the Napoleonic Wars in Spain and Naples, the Indian Wars on the Great Plains, the Irish "Troubles" of 1919–21, and Mao Zedong's military thought and his army's Huai Hai campaign. The authors of the eight chapters have all taught or practiced history at Fort Leavenworth or, in one case, nearby. The book may be ordered from the Government Printing Office under stock number 008-000-00904-0 for $26.

The Naval Historical Center has issued a 48-page illustrated booklet by Bernard C. Nalty entitled *Long Passage to Korea: Black Sailors and the Integration of the U.S. Navy*. The publication examines the service of African Americans in the Navy from the American Revolution to the Korean War. It may be ordered from the Government Printing Office under stock number 008-046-00201-1 for $8.50.

The Office of the Historian, National Reconnaissance Office, has issued a two-volume set edited by R. Cargill Hall and Clayton D. Laurie entitled *Early Cold War Overflights, 1950–1956: Symposium Proceedings Held at the Tighe Auditorium, Defense Intelligence Agency, Washington, D.C., 22–23 February 2001*. The first volume contains a historical introduction by Hall and recollections of overflight participants. The second volume contains contributor biographies and photocopies of documents related to the overflights. The two-volume set may be purchased from the Government Printing Office under stock number 041-015-00227-9 for $74.

Continued from page 29

Publishers Issue Paperback Editions of Books Reviewed in *Army History*

Texas A&M University Press has issued a paperback edition of *A Dark and Bloody Ground: The Hürtgen Forest and the Roer River Dams, 1944–1945*, a book by Edward G. Miller that was reviewed in the Summer 1997 issue of *Army History* (No. 42). The press is offering the paperback edition for $18.95.

The University Press of Kansas has published *Civilian in Peace, Soldier in War: The Army National Guard, 1636–2000*, by Michael D. Doubler, and is selling the book for $17.95. The new book is a paperback edition of Doubler's book *I Am the Guard: A History of the Army National Guard, 1636–2000*, which was published in hard cover by the Office of the Director, Army National Guard in 2001. The book was reviewed in the Winter 2003 issue of *Army History* (No. 57).

Illinois National Guard Dedicates New Museum Facility

The Illinois National Guard on 2 April dedicated a new museum facility in the renovated Camp Lincoln Commissary in Springfield, the state capital. The commissary, a 1903 stone building with castle-like features, is listed on the National Register of Historic Places. The structure was built by the Culver Stone Company, an enterprise founded by an Illinois militia general. The new facility houses displays of uniforms, weapons, equipment, vehicles, documents, and photographs depicting Illinois National Guard history in 9,000 feet of exhibit space and contains a library, gift shop, and exhibit construction area.

2004 West Point Summer Seminar in Military History

The Department of History at U.S. Military Academy announces the 2004 West Point Summer Seminar in Military History. Held annually in June, this month-long experience is open to faculty and advanced graduate students in the field of history who wish to enhance their ability to study and teach military history. The Summer Seminar focuses primarily on the Western European and American military experience in the modern era. The program consists of a series of seminars led by Military Academy faculty, presentations by a variety of guest lecturers, and staff rides to American Revolution and Civil War battlefields. Participants receive food, lodging, reimbursement for travel, and a $1,500 stipend. Applications must be received by 1 February 2004. Further details are posted on the web at *http://www.dean.usma.edu/history/USMA/fellowship.htm*.

In Memoriam: Vincent C. Jones

Vincent C. Jones, who served as a historian at the Center of Military History from 1955 to 1986, died on 22 July 2003 at the age of 88. Born in Nebraska in 1915, Jones earned a bachelor's degree from Park College in Missouri, a master's degree from the University of Nebraska, and a doctorate in history from the University of Wisconsin. During World War II he was a noncommissioned officer in a heavy weapons company, serving with the 81st Infantry Division in the Western Pacific and Leyte campaigns. Before joining the Center of Military History, he taught history for a year at Central State College of Connecticut.

Dr. Jones authored sections on minor wars and campaigns of the U.S. Army and the U.S. Army in World War I in the *Army Almanac* (Harrisburg, Pa., 1959); chapters on this nation's "Emergence to World Power, 1898–1902" and the Army's "Transition and Change, 1902–1917" in *American Military History* (CMH, 1969), an ROTC textbook; and *Manhattan: The Army and the Atomic Bomb* (CMH, 1985), a volume in the United States Army in World War II series. The Center mourns the passing of this dedicated public servant.

Photo by Oscar Porter, U.S. Army Photographic Agency

Vincent Jones, September 1964

Book Reviews

Early Carolingian Warfare Prelude to Empire
By Bernard S. Bachrach
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2001, 430 pp., $ 55

Review by John S. Brown

Too many historians are content to perpetuate the popular mythology that military technique worth studying died with the Romans and that a long, ignorant, Dark Age interval separated classical martial capabilities from their resurrection during the Renaissance. This simplistic assessment does considerable injustice to the facts of medieval European civilization and also foregoes fascinating case studies of institutional continuity through time. Bernard S. Bachrach's *Early Carolingian Warfare: Prelude to Empire* provides a wonderful antidote. In it we read of strategic, operational, and tactical finesse that demonstrate a retained expertise in the warfare of the West. Bachrach's subject is the military machine Charlemagne (768–814) inherited from his ancestors, and its earlier evolution under Mayors of the Palace Pippin II (d. 714) and Charles Martel (d. 741) and under the latter's sons, Carloman and King Pippin I, king of the Franks from 751 to 768. This army restored much of the Roman Empire in the West.

Bachrach approaches his subject systematically in separate chapters on long-term strategy, military organization, training and equipment, morale, battlefield tactics, and campaign strategy and military operations. With respect to long-term strategy, we find the Carolingians employing methodical statecraft to build up the *regnum Francorum* a digestible bite at a time rather than engaging in a frivolous pursuit of glory and loot. Force was subordinate to diplomacy and economic calculation. Military organization was not merely a feudal levy, but a hierarchy of capabilities capped by considerable professionalism in the *expiditi milites* and considerable flexibility in the *scarae*, or battle groups. Training and equipment produced capable performance on the battlefield as well as effective siegecraft. Reliable means to invest, seize, and secure an enemy's fortified strong points generally distinguished civilized armies from those of barbarians during these troubled times. With respect to morale, the Carolingian soldier responded to principles of leadership, attention to troops' welfare, and remuneration that the ancients would have recognized, as well as to spiritual inspirations with which they would have been less familiar. Carolingian battlefield tactics featured respectable demonstrations of training, discipline, and drill as phalangial heavy infantry, light and medium cavalry, heavy assault cavalry, and missile infantry combined their efforts to best one adversary after another. Campaign strategy and military operations were as sophisticated as battlefield tactics, with the long view and larger purposes kept in mind even as one clash of arms followed another. In short, Carolingian soldiers demonstrated themselves to be worthy heirs of their classical predecessors in each of the venues Bachrach examined.

It would be simplistic to overstate the military continuity of the Romans as the sole theme of this book, however. This is a robust military history of the early Carolingians in its own right, and it ably describes how they prepared for, participated in, and made use of war. In it we follow the course of their major campaigns at the tactical, operational, and strategic level, and we witness important underpinnings of medieval civilization being set in place. Bachrach's account of Charles Martel's decisive defeat of the Muslim invasion in 732 or King Pippin I's siege of Bourges in 762, for examples, are fine accounts, and an appendix on naval assets provides a useful summary of an underappreciated capability.

Early Carolingian Warfare is exceptionally well documented and features a robust bibliography. Indeed, of its 430 pages, 124 are given over to endnotes and 34 to a comprehensive yet taut bibliography. The sources reflect an appropriate mix of original or nearly contemporary materials with modern scholarship. If there is a criticism, it is the lack of maps and Bachrach's decision not to use illustrations. The book features a single map on a one-inch to one hundred mile scale. This is hardly sufficient to do justice to the otherwise splendid campaign and tactical portrayals. Similarly, Bachrach elected not to use illustrations in order to avoid the explanatory digressions that inevitably accompany them. This makes more sense for readers familiar with the era than it does for those who have little idea what the dress, equipment, accoutrements, and formations looked like.

In conclusion, *Early Carolingian Warfare: Prelude to Empire* is a valuable work that will make a worthy addition to any historian's library. It will be particularly useful in bridging the gap between classical and medieval holdings. It is comprehensive,

well written, thoroughly documented, and authoritative. It brings a little known era to light and establishes its importance while doing so. I strongly recommend it to specialists and laymen alike.

Brig. Gen. John S. Brown has been chief of military history since December 1998. He commanded the 2d Battalion, 66th Armor, in Iraq and Kuwait during the Gulf War and returned to Kuwait as commander of the 2d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, in 1995. He holds a doctorate in history from Indiana University and is the author of Draftee Division: The 88th Infantry Division in World War II *(Lexington, Ky., 1986).*

The Emperor's Friend: Marshal Jean Lannes
By Margaret Scott Chrisawn
Greenwood Press, 2001, 259 pp., $57.95

Review by Michael A. Boden

Many times biographies are difficult to write because of enigmatic elements of the subject's personality. The author of such a study may, however, be faced with the alternate scenario. What if the person about whom you are writing is too one-dimensional, and the individual exhibits a consistent and relatively simple pattern of conduct throughout life? In such a study, establishing the relevancy of the individual is more difficult in many ways. On one level, that is the dilemma faced by Margaret Scott Chrisawn in her study of, arguably, Napoleon's best subordinate tactical commander in *The Emperor's Friend: Marshal Jean Lannes*. That she succeeds so admirably in her endeavor is a tribute not only to her research skills, but also to her ability to portray her findings to the reader in a lucid and captivating manner.

The picture of Lannes that emerges from Chrisawn's study is that of an imaginative and phenomenally brave leader of men who is endowed with a headstrong demeanor that makes compromise unknown in either his personal or professional life. Chrisawn recounts the story of Lannes's life from his early years as a young man in Gascony and his period of initial military service to the republic in the Pyrenees to the end of his military career, which concludes with his death outside Vienna in 1809. This is a balanced account of Lannes's military career. One of its strengths is the manner in which the author lays the foundation for Lannes's service as a marshal early, when she examines his experiences as a junior leader fighting in the Pyrenees and in Italy. It was in the latter of these locations that he first earned the attention and respect of the future emperor, Napoleon Bonaparte.

Chrisawn's ability to handle the particular nature of Lannes's personality is to be commended. For the vast majority of his life, the French marshal behaved with single-minded intensity. The author, however, does an excellent job of demonstrating how his personal and professional behavior, on and off the battlefield, earned him many friends and admirers and, of course, a number of enemies. Such a personality, however, produced exactly the type of advance-guard commander that Napoleon required for his audacious maneuvers in the field. Nowhere was Lannes's value to his emperor in this capacity more aptly demonstrated than in the pursuit after the battles of Jena and Auerstädt, alongside his frequent rival Marshal Joachim Murat.

Two particularly fascinating episodes stand out in the book as noteworthy in the career of Lannes. In each of these situations, Chrisawn devotes the proper amount of attention to events in the life of this man that could easily be overlooked. She writes a substantial chapter on Lannes's service as the French ambassador to Portugal from 1802 to 1804. During his duty in Lisbon, which he despised, Lannes proved, surprisingly, very successful in pursuing French interests in spite of British and Spanish intrigues. His diplomatic style, "blunt, single-minded, and totally unvarnished," (p. 96) was completely in keeping with his approach to military leadership, and the author does an excellent job of displaying the parallels.

The second experience occurs near the close of Lannes's career and involves the siege of Saragossa and the profound impression that civilian suffering during the Peninsular Campaign made on the French marshal. The local population's misery deeply affected Lannes, and one can see in his subsequent actions a different type of man, although not necessarily a different type of leader. Always impetuous, stern, and unforgiving, following his service in Spain Lannes seemed more morose and susceptible to mental anguish. Lannes left Spain with scarcely six months yet to live, and he never deviated from his impulsive and inspiring leadership style in the Danubian Campaign of 1809. He did, however, exhibit a more insightful and introspective demeanor off the battlefield. It should not go unnoticed that he received his mortal wound at Essling after the fighting was practically over, while he sought a moment of privacy in which he could mourn the death of his friend General Charles Pouzet, which had left the marshal visibly shaken.

Even though there is evidence of a change in Lannes's mental perspective on battle after Saragossa, his talent as an advance-guard commander remained exceptional during the 1809 campaign. Chrisawn's ability to intertwine this new outlook with his military skills is insightful, and it provides numerous opportunities to ask ever-popular "what if" questions about the years ahead for Napoleon. Following Lannes's death, Napoleon never had anyone as astute in the Army's van as the Gascon marshal, and the emperor clearly lost more than just a corps commander at Essling.

This study does not delve deeply into Lannes's personal life, and that is not a shortcoming. Of course, Chrisawn discusses his relationships with his wives, and integrates these ladies into the story enough to make the reader remember their presence. But they seldom appear to have an impact on the marshal's actions or attitudes and figure in his life as merely supporting characters. Of more interest is Lannes's relationship with Napoleon. As the title indicates, Chrisawn emphasizes the surprisingly close bond. Lannes, the author emphasizes, was one of the few individuals who retained the ability to have an intimate conversation with Napoleon, even after the latter became emperor. Lannes's relationship with other marshals is also covered solidly, most prominently his love/hate relationship with Murat.

In the final analysis this is a study of Jean Lannes, French marshal and advance-guard commander *extraordinaire.* The focus remains throughout on his personality and leadership style and how Lannes applied himself to and executed his duties as a soldier of France. Chrisawn's research is excellent, her writing crisp, and her conclusions solid. The text is augmented by a better set of maps than most historical works possess, which only adds to the project. This is an excellent book and should serve as the foundation for any secondary research on Jean Lannes for the foreseeable future.

Maj. Michael A. Boden is an operations observer/controller at the Combat Maneuver and Training Center at Hohenfels Training Area in Germany. A former assistant professor of history at the U.S. Military Academy, he is a graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College and a Ph.D. candidate in history at Vanderbilt University. He served during the Gulf War in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait with the 1st (Tiger) Brigade, 2d Armored Division, and in Kosovo during 2002 as executive officer of the 1st Battalion, 77th Armor.

A Single Grand Victory: The First Campaign and Battle of Manassas

By Ethan S. Rafuse

Scholarly Resources Inc., 2002, 226 pp., cloth $65, paper $17.95

Review by Thomas J. Goss

"A single grand victory, Northerners and Southerners were equally sanguine, would be sufficient to convince the other side of the hopelessness of its cause and persuade its adherents to abandon their war aims." So begins Ethan S. Rafuse's study of the first great battle of the American Civil War in his new book *A Single Grand Victory: The First Campaign and Battle of Manassas*, the seventh book in the American Crisis Series from Scholarly Resources. Rafuse is currently an assistant professor of history at the United States Military Academy, and he has put his experience from previous essays and articles to good use in producing a readable and enjoyable monograph on the first major battle of the Civil War. Rafuse believes that this battle is deserving of more historical attention because of its influence on the remainder of the war. Unlike such later clashes as Antietam, Gettysburg, and Second Bull Run, the First Battle of Bull Run, or First Manassas, lacks an extensive literature and analysis, possibly due to its small scale and somewhat "comic quality." Rafuse's new book fills this void nicely.

A Single Grand Victory covers the events in the Eastern Theater between the start of the war and the end of the Union retreat from Manassas, focusing on the period from when President Abraham Lincoln ordered the attack on Manassas Junction until the end of the campaign and battle to achieve that objective. Rafuse has two goals for his study of the campaign. First, he seeks to narrate this important military operation and present a clear understanding of the events that transpired. This is clearly accomplished as the book provides a very detailed look at the campaign preliminaries and a thorough description of the events on the Manassas battlefield on 21 July 1861. However, Rafuse attempts to provide far more than a campaign narrative. His second goal is to examine the cultural and political factors that lay behind the events on the First Bull Run battlefield. Thus, the author seeks to provide traditional "drums and trumpets" military history overlaid with a "new military history" approach to the campaign's broader cultural context. Though more successful with the first goal than the second, Rafuse's book does analyze the political causes of the offensive, the military cultures that clashed on Henry Hill, and the sectional tensions that ensured that First Bull Run would be the first, but not the last, battle of the war.

This is a book of many strengths and few weaknesses, and the weaknesses are shared with many newer campaign narratives. As this book lacks an order of battle for the two sides, many readers may get lost in the narrative of brigade and regimental designations and commanders. Also, while the book provides an ample number of maps, the text at numerous points refers to locations in northern Virginia that do not appear on any of them, leading this reader, who has been to Manassas many times, occasionally to get confused about the spatial relationships of units. These distractions, however, are minor compared to the enjoyment of so readable an introduction to the military struggle of the Civil War, one which avoids the temptation of just focusing on the one-day battle and presents as well a lengthy description of the days leading up to the contest of arms and a fine assessment of the campaign. The book's first two chapters also provide a valuable synopsis of the concept of a "decisive battle" in 1861 America and of the two opposing societies and military cultures that clashed during the war. Throughout his narrative and analysis, Rafuse also overlays

the insights on key aspects of the campaign of such prominent historians as James McPherson and Herman Hattaway. The result is a valuable synthesis of primary and secondary sources concerning First Battle of Bull Run.

What stands out in the book is Rafuse's thoughtful treatment of the operational and tactical decisions of the Union commander, Maj. Gen. Irvin McDowell. Challenging the traditional interpretation of First Bull Run, Rafuse does not lay the blame for Union failure entirely on this leader, and he takes numerous opportunities to assess the choices available to the Union command at key decision points during the campaign. From this a far more balanced appraisal of McDowell emerges, as the Union commander is shown to have at times selected the least bad option among those available. Appropriately, Rafuse judges Maj. Gen. Robert Patterson's conduct in the Shenandoah Valley to be closer to the cause of the Union defeat. Rafuse has in this effort brought to the study of the 1861 Bull Run campaign what was desperately needed: a new interpretation that no longer focuses on any of the individual reasons to which the outcome has been ascribed. *A Single Grand Victory* instead presents a Bull Run campaign where a multitude of cultural factors, geographic constraints, and decisions at all levels of command led to the Union offensive failure and Confederate defensive success that opened the way to a long and bloody war. This makes it a book worth reading.

Maj. Thomas Goss is an Army infantry officer currently assigned as a strategic planner for United States Northern Command at Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado. He holds a doctorate in history from Ohio State University and taught history at the U.S. Military Academy. He served with the 82d Airborne Division in Operation JUST CAUSE in Panama and Operation DESERT STORM in Iraq.

Elmira: Death Camp of the North
By Michael Horigan
Stackpole Books, 2002, 246 pp., $26.95

Review by Roger D. Cunningham

William Marvel, a contemporary historian who has written several excellent books on the Civil War, once described the war's prisons as a "tragedy-within-a-tragedy." [1] During the conflict, about 410,000 soldiers from both sides became prisoners of war, and more than 56,000 of them perished outright, while thousands more suffered for the rest of their lives from the ill effects of their incarceration. Because of the adverse publicity accorded the largest Confederate prison camp at Andersonville, Georgia—where more than one-fifth of these fatalities occurred—its name has come to symbolize all prisoner suffering. Indeed, the superb National Prisoner of War Museum is located at Andersonville National Historic Site today. Many would be surprised to learn, however, that Civil War prisoner fatalities were almost equally divided between the North and the South and that a federal prison camp in Elmira, New York, inflicted upon its Confederate inmates a death rate that was only slightly lower than Andersonville's. Michael Horigan, an Elmiran and first time author, chronicles the sad story of this Union Army facility in his meticulously researched *Elmira: Death Camp of the North.*

In July 1864 federal authorities established a prison camp at Elmira, a city with excellent railroad connections and vacant barracks that had been used to house Union Army recruits earlier in the war. After the first Confederate prisoners were transferred there from Point Lookout, Maryland, problems quickly arose. The barracks could hold less than half of the prisoners, and a stagnant pond in the middle of the camp contaminated the well water. Cutbacks in beef procurement and the lack of fruits and vegetables in the prisoners' rations caused malnutrition and the onset of scurvy. Sutlers were eventually banned from selling food to the starving prisoners, forcing them to supplement their meager fare with meat from stray dogs (which allegedly tasted like mutton), cats, and the far more plentiful rats, which entrepreneurs sold for five cents apiece. The advent of winter weather exacerbated the terrible conditions under which the prisoners eked out their grim existence, especially for those clothed in rags and still living in tents. The sick who were admitted to the camp's hospital received second-rate medical care, and the camp's death rate climbed. It peaked at 426 during February 1865, and by July of that year, when the final prisoners were released, almost 3,000 of 12,122 inmates had died. "Helmira's" death rate of 24.3 percent made it the most deadly camp in the North, well ahead of runner-up Rock Island, Illinois, where 15.8 percent of the prisoners perished. Meanwhile, almost 13,000 Union prisoners had died at Andersonville, but because it was a much larger facility, its death rate was 29 percent, only slightly higher than Elmira's.

Horigan makes a convincing case that Elmira's high death rate was no accident. Unlike Andersonville, the camp "was located in a region where food, medicine, clothing, building materials, and fuel were in abundant supply." (p. 193) While most prison camps deteriorated over time, conditions at Elmira were bad from the start. The author lays the primary blame for the camp's many fatalities on Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton, accusing him of wanting to retaliate for the suffering that Union prisoners were enduring in Southern prison camps. Horigan uses some caution in expressing that conclusion, however, observing, "There is no definitive paper trail of evidence that specifically cites Elmira as a place of retaliation. Yet it can be said that the men who made decisions that determined Elmira's fate were enthusiastic supporters of retaliation." (p. 191)

My only criticism of this well-written book is that the author does

not adequately place the Elmira facility into the general context of Civil War prison camps. A brief discussion of that system, especially the other camps' death rates, would have been especially useful in determining how federal negligence in caring for Elmira's prisoners compared with what was going on elsewhere, both North and South. Readers interested in an overview of Civil War prison camps should turn to Lonnie R. Speer, *Portals to Hell: Military Prisons of the Civil War* (Mechanicsburg, Pa., 1997).

Roger D. Cunningham is a retired Army lieutenant colonel. He served as a military police officer in the United States and Korea and as a foreign area officer in Pakistan, Egypt, and Nepal. He was the U.S. Defense Attaché in Kathmandu in 1991-1992. His article "Black Artillerymen from the Civil War through World War I" appeared in the Spring 2003 issue of Army History *(No. 58).*

NOTE

1. William Marvel, *Andersonville: The Last Depot* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1994), p. 326.

"Galvanized Yankees"

In early 1864 the federal government began offering some Confederate prisoners of war a unique opportunity to escape their captivity. They could enlist in one of six regiments—the 1st through the 6th U.S. Volunteer Infantry (USVI)—that would serve in the West and not have to fight their former comrades in the South. Between January 1864 and May 1865 about 6,000 "galvanized Yankees" (or "white-washed rebs") were recruited from prison camps in Maryland, Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio. The 1st and 4th USVI were organized at Point Lookout, Maryland; the 2d and 3d USVI at Rock Island, Illinois; the 5th USVI at Alton and Camp Douglas, Illinois; and the 6th USVI at Camp Douglas, Illinois; Camp Morton, Indiana; and Camp Chase, Ohio.[1]

The regiments generally were stationed in the upper Great Plains—the 1st USVI in Minnesota and the Dakotas, the 2d in Kansas, the 3d in Nebraska and Colorado, the 4th in the Dakotas, and the 5th and 6th in Nebraska, Kansas, and Colorado—fighting Indians, escorting supply trains, and guarding surveying parties for the Union Pacific Railroad. One battalion of the 6th deployed as far west as Camp Douglas, Utah, which was ironic, because many of its men had been imprisoned and then recruited at Camp Douglas, Illinois. In spite of the terrible conditions under which all the units served, their desertion rates were only slightly higher—about 14 percent—than those of the Union Army's state volunteer regiments. The last units, the 5th and 6th USVI, were mustered out in November 1866.[2]

Although the former rebels swore allegiance to the United States, their sentiments were not always politically correct. In April 1865 the 5th USVI was passing through Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, when its men learned that President Abraham Lincoln had been assassinated. One soldier earned a trip to the guardhouse for publicly exclaiming, "G_d d__n Abe Lincoln, he has gone to H__l straight."[3]

NOTES

1. For details on the units, see Dee Brown, *The Galvanized Yankees* (1963; reprint ed., Lincoln, Nebr., 1986). The story of the 1st USVI is told in Michèle Tucker Butts, *Galvanized Yankees on the Upper Missouri: The Face of Loyalty* (Boulder, Colo., 2002).

2. Frederick H. Dyer, *A Compendium of the War of the Rebellion* (Des Moines, 1908), p. 1717; Brown, *The Galvanized Yankees*, pp. 2, 146-47.

3. *Leavenworth Daily Conservative*, 19 April 1865.

Courtesy of the Chicago Historical Society. Photograph ICHi-01800

Confederate prisoners at Camp Douglas, Illinois, circa 1863, a group from which federal authorities recruited elements of U.S. volunteer infantry

Perilous Pursuit
The U.S. Cavalry and the Northern Cheyennes
By Stan Hoig
University Press of Colorado, 2002, 292 pp., $ 34.95

Review by Samuel Watson

Though not a historian by training, Stan Hoig has written several thoroughly researched accounts of United States–Native American relations during the nineteenth century, including six previous books on the Cheyennes and their battles. *Perilous Pursuit* addresses the flight and pursuit of the Northern Cheyennes from the reservation where they had been placed in western Oklahoma to their traditional lands in western Nebraska in the fall of 1878, an episode that is also the subject of Mari Sandoz's famed work *Cheyenne Autumn* (New York, 1953). Hoig's account, which balances attention to the Cheyennes and their pursuers, is now the most scholarly available, and it will interest modern officers because of its attention to Army efforts and problems.

While Hoig makes clear the error of the policy of uniting disparate Northern and Southern Cheyennes in Oklahoma and describes the inhospitable climate, broken promises, and starvation that caused the Cheyennes to flee the Indian Territory, *Perilous Pursuit* is primarily about military operations across the spectrum from war to peace. Although it describes Cheyenne suffering and perseverance in detail, most of the book is devoted to discussions of the dozen or so engagements fought during the pursuit, which featured experienced, tactically skilled Cheyennes against poorly trained U.S. cavalry, composed largely of recent recruits. The Army was aided by railroads and telegraph, but it repeatedly underestimated the Cheyennes' fighting ability and was unable to concentrate sufficient force to defeat the Indians in a single battle. Instead, units from posts across the northern plains took nearly a month to wear down the Cheyennes sufficiently by their pursuit to forced them to surrender. In the interim, dismounted Cheyennes frequently ambushed company and battalion-sized task forces using rifle pits (foxholes) cleverly sited on dominant terrain to pin the cavalry at both long and short range before launching assaults that often forced the less disciplined and frequently confused cavalry to retreat. Hoig's narrative, which is prefaced by accounts of the Fetterman fight and other battles between Cheyennes and cavalry during the 1860s, provides ample demonstration of the value of tactical discipline and patience and of the dangers of underestimating a "savage" enemy. Pungent chapter titles, well-chosen photographs of significant terrain, and frequent maps accompany the account, although unfortunately the maps lack scales and are not listed in the book's front matter.

Hoig's second major theme is the mistreatment of the Cheyennes after their recapture. Officers deliberately withheld water, food, and fuel in the dead of winter in hopes of pressuring the Cheyennes to return to Oklahoma. This led the Cheyennes to attempt a final breakout, which ended when cavalry surprised the refugees and fired at them indiscriminately, producing a massacre much like that at Wounded Knee twelve years later. Civil authorities in Kansas attempted to prosecute the surviving Cheyenne men for the murder of white civilians during the Indians' initial flight, but they were frustrated because they could not identify individual culprits.

Hoig also focuses his attention on the constant dissension among officers and the conflicts between officers and both local and federal civilian officials. The Army was poorly served by its elaborate chain of command, as the Cheyennes crossed departmental boundaries without regard for the problems this caused the Army bureaucracy. The officers in the field repeatedly quarreled over tactics and battlefield performance, and the charges of dereliction and cowardice they directed at each other resulted in a series of courts-martial that lasted for a year after the pursuit. One of the principal sources of tension was the antagonism felt by young West Point graduates toward older officers who had immigrated from Germany or risen from the ranks. Although the older men were probably more often right than wrong, they were often discredited and shunted aside.

Hoig begins *Perilous Pursuit* by stating his intent to revise previous accounts through a more thorough use of Army and Indian Bureau records, especially those from small units, individual posts, and courts-martial. He has succeeded in providing an exhaustively researched account, but the revisions in historical interpretation it yields are never explicitly stated. In the concluding chapters, which are devoted to the Army rather than the Cheyennes, it appears that Hoig wants to distinguish between the sacrifices of the U.S. troops and the rapaciousnous of the local civil authorities and the societies they represented as they demanded the Cheyennes' return to Indian Territory. Hoig is right that the pursuit led to tragedy on all sides, but the evidence at the courts-martial, regardless of the outcomes for specific officers, confirms that the greatest tragedy was that of the Cheyennes. The officer who ordered food and fuel withheld from the freezing, starving Cheyennes ended his military career as a brigadier general.

Dr. Samuel Watson is an assistant professor at the U.S. Military Academy, where he teaches U.S. history and the Civil War. His book on the Army officer corps in the borderlands of the early republic (1783-1846) will be published by University Press of Kansas in 2004; he is also working on a book on Winfield Scott and another on the Seminole Wars.

Turbulence in the Pacific Japanese–U.S. Relations during World War I
By Noriko Kawamura
International History Series, Praeger Publishers, 2000, 173 pp., $69.95

Review by Kevin Clark

In the grand scheme of World War I, Japan played a minor role compared to the major Western powers. Nonetheless, the war has been widely recognized as a pivotal event in Japanese–U.S. relations. Tensions between the two nations had heightened steadily from 1905 to 1914. The outbreak of war and the inability of the European powers, especially Britain, to divert effort to Asia meant that only the United States had the political will or military might to challenge Japanese ambitions in the Far East. Though Japan and the United States had each viewed the other as a potential foe prior to 1914, wartime diplomacy badly damaged their long-term relations. While historians such as Ian Nish, Walter LaFeber, and Akira Iriye have produced many wide-ranging surveys and a number of narrower works on U.S.–Japanese relations, no recent English-language monograph has solely addressed the wartime diplomacy between the two nations. Noriko Kawamura, an associate professor of history at Washington State University, fills this niche with a compact chronological narrative.

Kawamura argues that the Woodrow Wilson administration failed to check Japanese aggression because the two nations had diametrically opposed world views and flawed understandings of the other side's internal political dynamics. Wilson's idealism and tacit approval of anti-Japanese racism undermined the best efforts of the realists in his cabinet to produce a meaningful compromise. Wilson lobbied for the creation of a league of nations that he anticipated would usher in a new world order of international cooperation to achieve common interests. He ignored Japanese rhetoric as nothing more than a smoke screen to justify imperialism. By contrast, Japan came to view itself as downtrodden Asia's champion against exploitive (white) Europeans. Japan believed that its unique position entitled it to the same leeway in Asia that the United States claimed for South America and that U.S. pronouncements about the league represented hypocritical attempts to maintain Western power in Asia at Japanese expense. With each diplomatic encounter, both sides grew increasingly stubborn and angry.

China emerged as the main battleground in this diplomatic joust. Japan's unhesitating support of the Entente and rapid military action at the start of the war stymied U.S. efforts to prevent it from gaining Germany's Asian holdings. Japan sought to secure these gains by issuing the Twenty-one Demands to China in 1915. Astute Chinese maneuvering drew the United States into what Japan viewed as a local issue beyond the purview of the West. Wilson refused to abandon China to the Japanese, but the ambiguous resolution of the incident left both sides suspicious about the other's intentions.

Wilson undermined Chinese support for the United States as he led the nation into war. After first encouraging the Chinese to move against Germany, he backed away from promises of support. Pro-Japanese factions in China exploited this opening to gain power and cement China's growing economic dependency on Japan. The U.S.–Japanese effort to resolve their differences led to the Lansing-Ishii pact of November 1917, which only served to worsen matters. The final straw for Wilson came with the combined U.S.–Japanese intervention in Siberia. The excessive Japanese military contribution to what the United States considered a very minor effort ensconced the United States in the Chinese corner. Domestic politics on both sides hardened attitudes, as the pro-Chinese lobby in the United States and the maneuvering of the Imperial Japanese Army discouraged compromise.

Kawamura's command of both languages and cultures provides numerous insights. She observes, for instance, that deception in Japanese politics was an accepted norm that most did not recognize would cause problems in dealing with Wilson. (pp. 16–17) The book's clear organization enhances the argument, although I found the prose a bit dense at times, as when the author explains that "the ultimate reason for Japanese-American disagreements was the dichotomy between Wilsonian universalism and unilateralism and on the other hand an incipient particularistic regionalism and pluralism which arose from Japanese leaders' perception of the unique position of their own country in East Asia." (p. 133) It suffers from the obvious problems of narrowly defined monographs and therefore can best be used by specialists in Japanese–U.S. relations. The cast of characters has been necessarily pared to a minimum. Aritomo Yamagata largely speaks as the one voice of the otherwise faceless Imperial Japanese Army, General Masatake Terauchi having become premier. Agents of European powers, aside from Britain, fade from view. Thus the central figures in the Wilson and multiple Japanese administrations are framed with picturesque detail, but the cast of characters blurs into impressionism beyond this hub. On the whole, however, *Turbulence in the Pacific* is a marvelously well-researched and compellingly argued book that demonstrates the intricacies of intercultural diplomacy.

Maj. Kevin Clark has just completed three years on the history faculty of the U.S. Military Academy and is set to begin an assignment with the Third Army staff in Kuwait. He is an ordnance officer whose previous service has included tours in Panama and at Fort Bliss, Texas. He is pursuing a Ph.D. in history from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.

The Australian Centenary History of Defence, Vol. 1: The Australian Army
By Jeffrey Grey
Oxford University Press, 2001, 300 pp., $35

Review by Edward Drea

The Australian Army is the first of a seven-volume series designed to commemorate 100 years of Australian military history dating from the establishment of the Commonwealth of Australia in 1901. Companion volumes deal with the navy, air force, the Australian Defence Force, Department of Defence, sources and statistics, and an atlas of Australia's wars. Although conceived by the faculty at the Australian Defence Force Academy to celebrate the centenary of the Australian Army and generously funded by the Department of Defence, the series is neither official nor commissioned.

Commemorative histories are normally set-piece narratives extolling the virtues and triumphs of the institution under review. Jeffrey Grey breaks from that pattern to write an excellent institutional history of the Australian army that critically analyzes the army's strengths and weaknesses, virtues and faults, and myths and realities. In skillful fashion Grey guides his reader through the development of an "amateur" army of 1901 into the professional defense establishment of 2001. As an institutional history, the volume tackles difficult questions of what armies do in peacetime; how they formulate doctrine; why they structure themselves as they do; how they select senior leaders; and a host of other significant issues that are too often overshadowed by the more glamorous, and frankly easier to write, campaign histories.

The official Australian operational histories of World Wars I and II stressed the deeds of ordinary soldiers in battle and consequently told only part of the army's story. Armies, after all, exist to fight wars. Their usual state, however, is not perpetual war but instead preparation for what the institution anticipates will be the future conflict. Grey deals incisively with these peacetime periods to describe how a first-class army of a democratic nation not only adapted itself to the transformations of warfare in the twentieth century but also to the impact of the changing social imperatives of that period, which included women in the ranks, the development of reserves, ethnic diversity in previously homogeneous units, generational change, and the recruitment and retention of talented officers and noncommissioned officers. Indeed by the close of the century this nation found itself grappling with the very raison d'être of an army.

In the Australian case warfare defined the nation, at least for the first half of the twentieth century, perhaps because combat losses were so heavy in proportion to the nation's small population. From these sacrifices, and perhaps to justify them, arose various myths about the Australian "digger" as a natural, if insubordinate, warrior drawn from citizen soldiers across the continent. Grey demolishes these myths by weaving a rich tapestry of documentary evidence to the contrary. In fact, the vision of idealized citizen-soldiers forming the root of democratic Australia was nothing more than the acknowledgment of a pragmatic reality—Australia was too large, too poor, and too sparsely populated to afford a large standing army. These conditions in turn set the "debate over Australian strategic policy and force structure for the whole of the twentieth century." (p. 12) Planners opted for a tiny, and thus affordable, standing force augmented in wartime by militia and volunteers. These decisions bedeviled military planners. Could militia serve overseas? No. Could volunteers be made into effective soldiers? Yes. What was the army's role, continental defense of the nation or overseas service as a minor ally in a greater imperial force? Both. The outcome was the peculiar creation of a second army—the Australian Imperial Force (AIF)—composed of volunteers to fight overseas, while territorials, the citizen reserves who had military training, remained stationed on Australian territory in a separate army. The tradition of "two armies" persisted through World War II.

Grey narrates the evolution of this amateur AIF of 1914 into the formidable and highly professional military organization of 1918, describing its evolutions in doctrine, training, force structure, and leadership. Along the way he marshals impressive statistical data providing, among other things, enlistment and promotion patterns, replacement policies, and the outcomes of courts-martial. The last group of figures is revealing for they undermine the cherished notion of ill-disciplined Australian soldiers. Instead these soldiers' behavior away from the trenches was no better and certainly no worse than that of servicemen of other armies.

Paralleling their impact on the U.S. Army, the interwar years left the Australian Army's force structure and budget diminished and its potential ignored as the island nation's strategic policy emphasized naval deterrence centered at Singapore. Economic policy determined military strategy and resulted in a steady reduction of both regular and militia forces. Army leaders in turn, much like their counterparts in the United States, determined to maintain a core of professional officers and noncommissioned officers as a cadre for mobilization, but it was the unhappy relationships between army chiefs of staff and defence ministers that shaped strategic planning. Fiscal retrenchment left the Australian army less able than the armies of other developed countries to adapt to the changing requirements of land warfare and technology. Tight budgets, slow promotions, and political indifference left the army ill equipped and undertrained for the confrontation of 1939. But regular officers continued to think about and study their profession of arms and how they might adapt to the revolution of military affairs occurring during the 1920s and 1930s. The results of their efforts appeared during World War II when the 2d Australian Imperial Force fought in Europe, the

Middle East, and the southwest Pacific. Grey describes recruiting and raising the force, adapting it to mechanized warfare, employing women in the military services, and utilizing native peoples in Papua and the rest of New Guinea. Fighting to defend the approaches to its homeland, the army developed an organizational self-reliance not seen previously in Europe or the Middle East. The army adapted its weaponry, doctrine, and force structure to meet the challenge of fighting two distinctly different types of warfare: against the Nazi blitzkrieg and the island war against Imperial Japan.

The 2d AIF was officially dissolved in June 1947, and the Citizen Military Forces (CMF) were reconstituted in 1948. The post-World War II retrenchment naturally reduced the army's establishment, but the creation of a brigade for occupation duty in Japan marked the beginning of a small, standing, regular force that would ultimately be redesignated the Australian Regular Army. Recruitment, training, officer development, and education remained problems, as did parsimonious budgets. However, the government saw conscription as a social benefit that provided training and discipline to the younger generation and introduced compulsory national service in 1950. Conscripts served in the CMF and were exempted from overseas service during the Korean War, because only enlistees were eligible for duty outside of Australia. Much like the U.S. Army, the Australian Army found itself slighted by the 1950s' emphasis on strategic nuclear warfare but regained favor as it fought a nasty little war in Malaya, subsequently faced a belligerent Indonesia, and then fought in South Vietnam. The institution was changed to meet these regional contingencies, and some men were conscripted into the regular army for service in Vietnam. The CMF gradually lost any meaningful role in national defense, and the Vietnam experience tainted the army. The government reassessed the nation's strategic priorities and reduced army budgets.

By the 1980s the army found itself organized simply to defend Australia, the least likely military challenge the nation then faced. The 1980s and 1990s witnessed enormous social change, and the army and the nation responded by improving benefits in an effort to attract and retain talented officers and support their spouses, bettering conditions for the enlisted ranks, recruiting women for the first time on an equal basis with men, and adapting to the changing ethnic composition of Australia. Military professionals grappled with questions about the role of the army as public interest and participation in the armed forces precipitously declined. The consequences were demonstrated by the East Timor intervention of 1999, the largest single Australian Army deployment since World War II but one that stretched the force to its breaking point and exposed what Grey terms a "hollow army."

This brief summary hardly does justice to the texture and substance of the book. Jeffrey Grey has fashioned his account by combining primary sources with an extraordinary command of secondary literature and told it with verve, originality, and clarity. This is a first-rate piece of historical writing and a product that should command a wide audience among military professionals, historians, and general readers.

Dr. Edward J. Drea is a contract historian with the Historical Office of the Office of the Secretary of Defense. He earlier did historical work for the Combat Studies Institute of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, the U.S. Army Military History Institute, and the Center of Military History. He was chief of the Center's Research and Analysis Division when he retired from the federal civil service in 1997. He also served as an officer in the U.S. Air Force in Japan and Vietnam. He is the author of MacArthur's ULTRA: Codebreaking and the War against Japan, 1942–1945 *(Lawrence, Kans., 1991), and* In the Service of the Emperor: Essays on the Imperial Japanese Army *(Lincoln, Nebr., 1998).*

Eyes of Artillery: The Origins of Modern U.S. Army Aviation in World War II

By Edgar F. Raines, Jr.
Center of Military History, 2000, 372 pp., $43

Review by Perry D. Jamieson

Eyes of Artillery relates in impressive detail how Army aviation originated in the air-observation flights conducted by light aircraft for the field artillery before and during World War II. Dr. Ed Raines based this book firmly on primary source documents and on oral history interviews with many of the major figures who appear in his narrative. The result is a valuable history of an important subject.

One benefit of Raines's extensive research is that it allows him to cover a complicated story from several perspectives. *Eyes of Artillery* thoroughly explains, for example, the "nuts and bolts" of the Air-Observation-Post Program. One of the book's many excellent illustrations shows the instrument panel of a Piper Cub. The military version of this light aircraft, the L-4 Grasshopper, became the mainstay of the World War II air-observation effort. Raines also describes individual missions flown in support of the field artillery in every major theater of World War II. At the other end of the spectrum from these operational details, the book relates the debates over Army aviation that took place in the offices and corridors of the War Department. This is a comprehensive history of the Air-Observation-Post Program, covering the appearance of a Grasshopper pilot's instrument panel, the policy positions taken by senior officers and civilians, and many perspectives between these two.

Another dividend of Raines's exhaustive research is that it allowed him to identify many civilians, noncommissioned officers, and junior officers who contributed enormously to the early development of Army aviation. William T. Piper and John E. P. Morgan hold a prominent place in business and military history as light-aircraft manu-

facturers, but *Eyes of Artillery* reveals their less well-known success in lobbying for the air-observation effort. A number of noncommissioned officers, lieutenants, captains, majors, and other unsung contributors put the program in place and showed that it could succeed. Their names would have been lost to history, if not for Raines's work.

Eyes of Artillery highlights the institutional tensions provoked by the debate over how the Army could best perform the aerial observation mission. Originally the field artillery and Air Corps disagreed about this; later the Army Ground Forces and Army Air Forces debated it, and senior officers in the various theaters of World War II held differing opinions. Not surprisingly, the chief protagonists were air and ground officers. After three-and-a-half years of War Department jockeying, the field artillery acquired its own aircraft in June 1942, but the mission-and-organization debates continued during and after World War II. The aerial observation operations conducted during the war, Raines concludes, "foreshadowed the future of relations between the Army and the Air Force over the existence of Army Aviation. . . . In this dispute each of two large, complex organizations claimed that the aerial observation mission fell under its own jurisdiction." (p. 325)

While *Eyes of Artillery* highlights the disagreements between air and ground officers, it also develops several other themes. Raines shows that early Army aviation encountered many problems in addition to the questions raised by some Army Air Force officers. Once the new air-observation units deployed overseas during World War II, they faced tough challenges in getting administrative support, keeping themselves in supply, training their pilots and mechanics, and developing a viable doctrine. In the case of African-Americans, Raines notes, the racial prejudice raised against them created further difficulties.

Eyes of Artillery argues that the members of the air-observation units surmounted most of their problems by determined persistence and creative innovations. Like the rest of the U.S. Army they overcame a rocky start in the North African theater and eventually built a record of success everywhere they served. "In a very real sense," Raines sums up, "the subsequent history of Army Aviation rests upon the record established by the men who served in the field artillery air sections during World War II—some 3,000 air-observation-post pilots, a similar number of aviation mechanics and mechanics' assistants, 1,500 radio operators, and over 1,000 aerial observers who, although not formally a part of the program, were essential to its success. They made what followed possible." (p. 326) *Eyes of Artillery* tells their story in splendid detail and with sharp clarity.

In the foreword to this book Brig. Gen. John S. Brown contends that "*Eyes of Artillery* is the first archive-based, in-depth study of the origins of modern Army Aviation in the United States. It makes a genuine and unique contribution to the literature of World War II and to the institutional history of the Army." (p. vii) Raines's work lives up to this billing. Soldiers, airmen, and students of World War II and of American military history will benefit from this deeply researched and finely crafted volume.

Dr. Perry D. Jamieson is a staff historian with the Air Force History Support Office in Washington, D.C., and has worked for the Air Force history program since 1980. He is the author of Crossing the Deadly Ground: United States Army Tactics, 1865-1899 *(Tuscaloosa, Ala., 1994) and* Lucrative Targets: The U.S. Air Force in the Kuwaiti Theater of Operations *(Air Force History and Museums Program, 2001).*

The Last Kilometer: Marching to Victory in Europe with the Big Red One, 1944–1945

By A. Preston Price
Naval Institute Press, 2002, 201 pp., $24.95

Review by Michael E. Lynch

The Last Kilometer is a first-person narrative account of A. Preston Price's combat experiences with the 1st Infantry Division during World War II. Price's story begins as he sails on a troop ship to England in November 1944 and closes at the war's end. After short stays in England and France, Price is assigned, as an individual replacement officer, to serve as a mortar forward observer with the 26th Infantry Regiment of the 1st Infantry Division, then in Belgium. Shortly after Price's arrival the division is thrust into the Battle of the Bulge, counterattacking to restore the line. From this first look at combat, Price details his experiences fighting with the Big Red One as it crosses first the Roer, then the Rhine; helps close the Ruhr pocket; and then crosses Germany before stopping in

Army History Article Wins History Writing Award

"Shaking the Iron Fist: The Mexican Punitive Expedition of 1919," an article by retired Lt. Col. Roger D. Cunningham that appeared in the Winter 2002 issue of *Army History* (No. 54), received the Army Historical Foundation's 2002 Distinguished Writing Award in the Professional Army Journals category. Retired General William W. Hartzog, president of the Army Historical Foundation, announced five writing awards for books and articles on military history at the group's annual members meeting on 18 June 2003. The awards honor authors who, in the foundation's judgment, made "a significant contribution to the preservation and promotion of the history of the American soldier." Colonel Cunningham, who has now contributed three articles to *Army History*, received a plaque and a $250 cash prize. The foundation is also the principal fundraiser for the planned National Museum of the U.S. Army.

Czechoslovakia at the end of the war. The work is a soldier's view of the war, rendered candidly and personally without excess emotion.

Price's work is noteworthy as much for what it does not contain as for what it does. The book reads like a diary in which Price simply reports the war as he sees it. Staying in the present tense throughout, Price keeps the reader "in the moment." He does not attempt to retell the division's history prior to his arrival or second-guess and editorialize about actions and decisions made by senior commanders, as other memoirs sometimes do. He also does not attempt to secure his place in history by self-aggrandizement. Though clearly proud to be a member of a famous division, he also does not overstate the organization's role. Free of such distraction, the reader is treated to a gritty, realistic account of an infantryman's daily life in combat. Of course, even in combat, not every day is exciting. Some days are dangerous, others are boring; the weather ranges from excellent to terrible; some days there is mail, some days there is none.

Price has perfectly captured the life of the combat soldier, making the best of the situation. Through it all Price details his daily attempts to cope by writing letters and injecting humor to break the routine. A military family and military school background might induce another writer to trumpet his own heroism, but not Price. He does not hesitate to demonstrate his pragmatism under fire. When a new company commander comes forward to the line during a lull and fires meaninglessly at an unseen enemy to demonstrate his courage, Price and his compatriots are not impressed. Price reports, "A look of satisfaction seems to come across his [the captain's] face as he demonstrates his defiance of the Germans and he turns and walks back to his command post. In all the nearby foxholes we pull our heads down as far as we can. We do not like anyone disturbing the status quo." (p. 31)

The one thing missing from the narrative is a description of Price's background. He alludes to his military family in personal references throughout the book, but the reader can only use the dust jacket notes to fill in the details. Some introductory background items could have helped explain the story better. For instance Price is frequently called upon to interrogate German prisoners, but he does not mention that he had been born in an Army hospital in Germany after the First World War, and the reader does not learn whether he had a German mother. Price makes no mention of how this interrogation affects him, if at all. He also ends the story abruptly on V-E Day, with no further explanation or exposition, so the reader is left to wonder about the rest of his story.

Price pulls no punches in describing the action, so when mistakes are made, he faithfully records them, even if he made the mistake. Friendly fire incidents are among the mistakes he records. The result is a well written and highly readable account that opens a window into the life of the combat infantryman. It is an excellent addition to the historiography of the common soldier during wartime, and I would recommend it to anyone who wants to better understand that soldier.

Maj. Michael E. Lynch is a U.S. Army quartermaster officer. He is currently the director of operations at the Army Heritage and Education Center, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. He holds a master's degree in history from Virginia Commonwealth University.

The Cat From Hué: A Vietnam War Story
By John Laurence
Public Affairs, 2002, 848 pp., cloth $30; paperback $18

Review by Thomas D. Morgan

The Cat from Hué is John "Jack" Laurence's memoir of how a CBS TV newsman saw the Vietnam War from 1965 to 1970. Laurence started out as a rookie television newsman and ended up creating a renowned documentary, "The World of Charlie Company." The book covers his life as a television reporter during the period of direct U.S. troop involvement in the Vietnam War, highlighted by his three tours in Vietnam in 1965–66, 1967–68, and 1970. Laurence's focus was on the "grunts," the fighting infantrymen in the bush, and his assignment was difficult. Jack came out with post-traumatic stress syndrome, but many of his reporter friends died or vanished in the war zones.

The first section of this thick book begins with Jack in Hue in the aftermath of the 1968 Tet offensive and covers his second tour in Vietnam. Jack rescues a cat he names Meo, the Vietnamese word for cat, who becomes a central character in the book. The cat becomes as difficult to understand as the Vietnam War itself. It seems to possess nine lives, as does Laurence himself, as he covers many of the key battles of the American war in Vietnam. The second part of the book takes place in 1965–66 in Vietnam's Central Highlands during Jack's first tour as a 25-year-old fledgling TV war correspondent with a background in radio news journalism. Jack is optimistic and idealistic about the war. He covers the 1st Cavalry Division as it becomes the first American combat unit of its size to take on the North Vietnamese Army in the Ia Drang and nearby valleys of the Highlands and in fighting around the Plei Me Special Forces Camp. Part three relates the critical battles in the I Corps Tactical Zone during 1967–68 in and around Da Nang, Con Thien, Khe Sanh, the Rockpile, and Hue. This is where we found him at the beginning of the book. Jack builds a solid rapport with the Marines and is allowed to cover critical battles at the fighting troop level. The fourth section takes place in 1970 and focuses on the 1st Cavalry Division's operations along the Cambodian border north of Saigon and the invasion of Cambodia ordered by President Richard Nixon in an effort to destroy the Communist command structure there. Here we see Jack as an experienced but

Courtesy of Jack Laurence

TV correspondent Jack Laurence in Vietnam, 1965

jaded reporter who relies on alcohol and drugs to get himself through his assignments. His disillusionment and cynicism mirror those of the American fighting men and the mood of their country. The final section of the book explains what happened to Jack and his newsmen colleagues after the war and describes a return visit to Vietnam in 1982 and a visit to the Vietnam Veterans Memorial in Washington, D.C., that complete Jack's long journey back to some type of normalcy.

In the course of Jack's journey, the reader sees the Vietnam War from the point of view of the grunts in the bush and from that of the higher echelons of the military hierarchy in their rear headquarters. Jack and his news team bounce back and forth between harrowing adventures in the field with the combat troops to the political infighting of the high command in Saigon and Da Nang, from where he files his reports. This all makes for an interesting and entertaining story because the war correspondents lived a hedonistic life in comfortable hotels when not in the bush with the troops. Most Vietnam veterans will be able to relate to the story. For those that were not in Vietnam during the war years, the book provides a good introduction to the war at various times and levels. At first we were beginning to win, it appeared; then we realized that we might not win; and finally we concluded that the war was not winnable in the conventional sense. By 1970 the use of drugs and alcohol in the Army had reached alarming levels and a serious rift between career officers and drafted soldiers had become apparent.

Laurence does not hog the limelight in the book, allowing instead generous credit to his news team for his successes, but make no mistake, this is his story. He gives just enough personal information to let the reader know that his fate mirrors those of the grunts that he so loved to cover. In 1965, hoping to launch his career, Jack starts out somewhat naïve and trusting, as did the newly arrived U.S. troops. Later, he comes to depend on alcohol and marijuana to get through his tour. Finally, he succumbs to the available vices, including opium, in a manner similar to the troops that he covers. During his odyssey, Jack meets famous and near-famous war correspondents and military officers. His stories and vignettes about them add interest to the book.

There is an element of suspense at the end of the story. After two Vietnam tours, Jack decides that he wants to do a TV documentary about an infantry unit in the style of Pierre Schoendoerffer's award winning TV film "The Anderson Platoon." Since Schoendoerffer was French, and despite the fact that he been a combat photographer at Dien Bien Phu, Jack wants to make a better documentary for his beloved grunts by telling their story of fighting a war they cannot win as it winds down. He gets a good start on making "The World of Charlie Company," until he runs afoul of the military brass for filming a rebellion, or "combat refusal," of the troops. The men of Charlie Company do not trust their new commanding officer, and they refuse his order to walk down a well-used trail rather than taking advantage of the off-trail safety of the jungle. The tension between the military and the media boils over. Jack is forbidden to go to the field with the unit again, and he sees all of his hard work going for naught. Will Jack get his story told? How will his soldier friends in the unit fare? The suspense builds to a final denouement when the U.S. incursion into Cambodia throws Jack back together with Charlie Company. He is allowed to finish his project, "The World of Charlie Company." After its initial segments are featured on the CBS Evening News with Walter Cronkite, the documentary receives critical acclaim and Jack is vindicated.

Laurence prepared this long book by reviewing his old TV reports and combat journals. The book does not follow a strict chronological sequence and at times it reads like a string of anecdotes and seems excessively long, but Laurence tells a compelling and realistic story. It is too bad that he did not put any photographs in the book considering he worked in an audiovisual medium while reporting in Vietnam, and the book has only one map. *The Cat from Hué* is nevertheless an entertaining read, and it conveys an extraordinary view of the grunts' war. For the Vietnam veteran, it also brings back many memories. I recommend it to anyone interested in the Vietnam War but caution readers to recognize that not everyone needed alcohol and drugs to get along. The book exposes war for what it is, a terrible waste for combatants and noncombatants alike. The book is also a story about love. How could a war story be about love? I will let the reader find out.

Retired Lt. Col. Thomas D. Morgan, an artillery officer, served tours in Vietnam with the 5th Special Forces Group and the 101st Airborne Division. A U.S. Military Academy graduate, he holds a master's degree in history from Pacific Lutheran University. He has written several articles for Army History.





Just Published

. . . see page 29