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In This Issue

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News Notes

Army Chief of Staff Issues His Professional Reading List

General Peter J. Schoomaker, the Army's chief of staff, has issued his professional reading list. The list includes one publication of the Center, three others written by individuals who have been employed in the Army Historical Program, and a fifth book that was coedited by two officers at the Combat Studies Institute, one of whom became chief of military history. These works are Roy E. Appleman, *East of Chosin: Entrapment and Breakout in Korea, 1950* (College Station, Tex., 1987); Charles E. Heller and William A. Stofft, editors, *America's First Battles, 1776–1965* (Lawrence, Kans., 1986); David W. Hogan Jr., *Centuries of Service: The U.S. Army 1775–2004* (CMH, 2004); Peter Kindsvatter, *American Soldiers: Ground Combat in the World Wars, Korea, and Vietnam* (Lawrence, Kans., 2003); and Charles MacDonald, *Company Commander* (Washington, D.C., 1947).

Another five books on this list were authored, edited, or coedited by officers who served on the History Department faculty at the U.S. Military Academy. These books are Michael D. Doubler, *Closing with the Enemy: How GIs Fought the War in Europe, 1944–1945* (Lawrence, Kans., 1994); Christopher Kolenda, ed., *Leadership: The Warrior's Art* (2d ed., Carlisle, Pa., 2001); H. R. McMaster, *Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies That Led to Vietnam* (New York, 1997); Roger Nye, *The Challenge of Command: Reading for Military Excellence* (Wayne, N.J., 1986); and Harold R. Winton and David R. Mets, eds., *The Challenge of Change: Military Institutions and New Realities, 1918–1941* (Lincoln, Nebr., 2000).

The Army's historians appear well represented on the Army chief of staff's professional reading list.

Army Field Historians Win History Writing Awards

Two Army field historians were among the winners of the Army Historical Foundation's 2003 Distinguished Writing Awards. Dr. Peter Kindsvatter, the historian of the U.S. Army Ordnance Center and School, received recognition for his *American Soldiers: Ground Combat in the World Wars, Korea, and Vietnam* (University Press of Kansas), selected as the year's best book on U.S. Army history, 1899–2003. Dr. John T. Greenwood, chief of the Office of Medical History in the Office of the Surgeon General, U.S. Army, won the award in the Army Professional Journals category for the article "The Fight against Malaria in the Papua and New

News Notes continued on page 48

The Chief's Corner

John S. Brown

As always, it has been a busy several months here at the Center of Military History. One particularly noteworthy recent event has been our reorganization from four to five divisions. The National Museum of the United States Army Division, headed by Jeb Bennett, is now altogether distinct from the Museum Division, headed by Terry Van Meter. Jeb has moved his division to a newly built headquarters at Fort Belvoir, Virginia. This new facility is close to where the Museum Center of the National Museum of the United States Army is to be built, and it has ample space for Jeb's steadily growing staff.

Terry Van Meter's Museum Division will continue to pursue all its old missions—less NMUSA—with particular focus on support and services to our museums and holdings in the field. In that regard, Terry and his staff are working with deployed units to facilitate the return of historical property from Afghanistan and Iraq. Dave Cole, the acting chief of the Collections Branch, is traveling to Kuwait to assist in that effort. The Museum Division has also been called upon to support the Inauguration festivities with paintings, displays, and a vehicle exhibit honoring the history and heritage of the American soldier. We do want to recognize the retirement of several of our stalwarts. Jean Zink retired on 4 January as a museum specialist in the Center's Historical Clearinghouse, and Barbara Bower will retire on 28 January as the director of the U.S. Army Transportation Museum. Well done, Jean and Barbara!

The Histories Division continues to produce historical studies of immediate relevance to the Army. Several elements of the military are working on studies and publications relating to the handling of enemy detainees at Guantanamo Bay in Cuba and Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq, and the Histories Division is working on short studies of past episodes of prisoner abuse and an analysis of what the current investigations are finding. In addition, the division prepared papers on a comparison of Iraq and Vietnam; the 60th anniversary of the Battle of the Bulge; the Army's use of interpreters; disproportionate responses to enemy surrender attempts; the history of the Army's Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS); and the actions of the 442nd Regimental Combat Team along the River Arno in World War II.

The Histories Division has made major progress on several volumes that treat the Vietnam War. Three volumes, one of which covers a broader period as well, are being edited by Production Services: both volumes of Dr. Graham Cosmas's *History of MACV, the Joint Command*, and Dr. Andrew Birtle's *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine, 1942–1976*. Both volumes of the new edition of *American Military History* have also been in Production Services. Volume I has now gone to the Government Printing Office and Volume II will be published by the summer. Cadet Command is planning a "publication party" in August, since a prime audience for this new text will be Army cadets in ROTC and at the U.S. Military Academy.

The Oral History Activity conducted several significant interviews with senior Army Staff officers as they departed their staff positions, including General Benjamin Griffin, Lt. Gens. Paul Mikolashek and David Melcher, and Maj. Gens. James Grazioplene and Hubert Hartsell. In addition, the oral history team has been assisting the National Museum of the U.S. Army to conduct an extensive series of oral history interviews for a museum interpretive program, including interviews with veterans of the Normandy invasion of World War II, the Battle the Ia Drang Valley in Vietnam in 1965, Operation DESERT STORM, and operations in Iraq since 2003.

The Lewis and Clark commemoration effort continued in high gear, with numerous conferences, articles, and presentations to the American public on this key event in the

continued on page 50



Courtesy of the Library of Congress

General Early

National Archives photo

General Wallace

"If Early had been but one day earlier he might have entered the capital before the arrival of the reinforcements I had sent. Whether the delay caused by the battle amounted to a day or not, General Wallace contributed on this occasion, by the defeat of the troops under him a greater benefit to the cause than often falls to the lot of a commander of an equal force to render by means of a victory."

Ulysses S. Grant

Crossroads of Destiny:

Lew Wallace, the Battle of Monocacy, and the Outcome of Jubal Early's Drive on Washington, D.C.

By Peter L. Platteborze

Introduction

If judged by its impact rather than its size, the Battle of Monocacy ranks among the most significant battles of the American Civil War. The battle took place on 9 July 1864 on a checkerboard of fields of wheat and corn near the Monocacy River south of Frederick, Maryland, where the rail spur from that city joined the through line from Baltimore to Wheeling. A large Confederate force under Lt. Gen. Jubal A. Early expended that entire day in a hard-fought effort to defeat a substantially smaller body of Union troops led by Maj. Gen. Lew Wallace that blocked their advance toward Washington, D.C. The time and energy lost in this engagement prevented Early from attacking Washington before the arrival there of Union reinforcements detached from the army of Lt. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant that was besieging Petersburg and Richmond. The delay Wallace imposed on Early at the Monocacy thus denied the Confederate commander what might have been the most stunning Confederate triumph of the war, the capture of the Federal capital. Thwarted, Early returned to Virginia, ending the South's final combined-arms attack north of the Potomac.

Strategic Background

What were the factors that led the Confederate commander, General Robert E. Lee, to order another invasion of the North in 1864? After three bloody years of war, the cause of the Confederacy was in desperate straits. The South's economy was in a shambles, contact with the Confederacy's three western states had been severed, most of Tennessee had fallen into Union hands, and adequate numbers of fresh recruits to reinforce Lee's ever-dwindling army were unavailable. General Grant, who had recently been appointed general in chief of Union forces, was initiating a simple yet highly effective strategy that involved unrelenting offensive campaigns on all fronts to prevent the Confederates from shuttling troops from one sector to another.

National Archives photo

General Hunter

In the spring of 1864 Grant ordered Maj. Gen. David Hunter to move south up the Shenandoah Valley with his 15,000-man army in an effort to destroy the railroads and supply depots in this fertile region, which had become the indispensable breadbasket of Lee's Army of Northern Virginia. Grant meanwhile moved the Army of the Potomac southward and began to pin down Lee's army around Richmond and Petersburg. Grant's successes, however, were exacting a heavy cost in manpower, leading him to remove most of the forces that guarded Washington, D.C., to serve as replacements in his besieging army. Lee realized that although he could force Grant to mount a long and difficult siege, Federal forces would eventually erode his rebel army and compel it to yield Richmond. The loss of its capital could destroy the will of the Confederacy to fight. Assessing this situation in toto, Lee recognized that to be passive would spell ultimate defeat.[1]

Lee thus devised a daring counterstroke, the execution of which he entrusted to his boldest and most independent field commander, recently promoted Lt. Gen. Jubal Early, a fellow West Point graduate and seasoned veteran of three wars. On 12 June 1864 Lee ordered Early to take the Second Corps of the Army of Northern Virginia, which had earlier been commanded by Lt. Gen. Thomas "Stonewall" Jackson, and combine it with the Confederate forces under Maj. Gen. John C. Breckinridge that had been opposing Hunter. This consolidated force was to strike Hunter's army and, if possible, destroy it. Then Early was to lead this force down the Shenandoah Valley with limited provisions, cross the Potomac River where practicable, and threaten Washington. According to Lee's report on this campaign, written ten days after the Battle of Monocacy, "it was hoped that by threatening Washington and Baltimore Gen[era]l Grant would be compelled either to weaken himself so much for their protection as to afford us an opportunity to attack him, or that he might be induced to attack us."[2]

When Early assumed command, the corps Lee provided him consisted of three understrength infantry divisions with a total of roughly 8,000 men and two artillery battalions. Early quietly disengaged this corps from the Richmond defenses in the early morning of 13 June and raced west in an effort to beat Hunter to Lynchburg (*Map 1*). With a population of 7,000, Lynchburg was a vital transportation and logistics hub for the Army of Northern Virginia near the center of the state. Early beat Hunter to the city, arriving by rail on the seventeenth with approximately 3,600 of his men to augment the roughly 5,500 veteran soldiers commanded by General Breckinridge and nearly 2,000 militia, cadets, and walking wounded that had already established a haphazard defensive perimeter. The forces already in Lynchburg included General Breckinridge's small infantry division; the cavalry brigades of Brig. Gens. John McCausland and John Imboden; makeshift militia under Brig. Gen. Francis Nicholls, a double amputee; and some 250 Virginia Military Institute cadets.[3]

Early immediately reinforced the defensive perimeter beyond the western outskirts of Lynchburg and later that day forced Hunter to halt just west of the city. Correctly judging he was still outnumbered, Early pretended to acquire a substantial number of additional troops by repeatedly running an empty train into the city all night and receiving it with great fanfare. This ruse convinced Hunter that a

much larger force than his own Army of the Shenandoah would be defending Lynchburg the next morning. On the eighteenth, Union forces conducted an unsuccessful forced reconnaissance and threw back a forceful Confederate attack on the center of Hunter's lines. But having limited ammunition and believing he was greatly outnumbered, Hunter decided to leave the field, issuing orders for a quiet night withdrawal.[4]

Hunter hastily retreated westward through the mountains into central West Virginia, instead of retracing his original axis of advance through the Shenandoah Valley. This escape route effectively prevented the Army of the Shenandoah from interfering with the remainder of Early's campaign and for a time even denied Hunter the ability to communicate with higher headquarters. Not until he received Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton's direct inquiry as to his whereabouts on 5 July did Hunter inform the War Department that he was sending his forces to Martinsburg via Parkersburg on the Ohio River.[5] Thus, Hunter had inadvertently provided Early with a golden opportunity to continue unopposed with his next mission.

The rebels actively pursued Hunter's retreating army only as far as Salem, Virginia, pressing it closely enough to deny it time to cause any substantial damage to Roanoke. Early rested his expeditionary force in this vicinity on 22 June, and because nearly half his infantry was barefoot, he requested that they be supplied with shoes. At dawn on the twenty-third, Early began his famous northward trek along the macadamized Valley Turnpike. By the twenty-seventh his headquarters were located in Staunton, Virginia, where he reorganized his collective force and renamed it the Army of the Valley District, from which it has come to be known as the Valley Army.[6]

Having absorbed into his command the Confederate infantry division and cavalry brigades at Lynchburg, Early chose General Breckinridge, a Kentuckian who had been James Buchanan's vice president, as his second in command and provided him a corps containing the divisions of Maj. Gen. John B. Gordon of Georgia and Brig. Gen. John Echols of Virginia. Two other divisions, commanded by Maj. Gens. Robert Rodes, another Virginian, and Stephen Ramseur of North Carolina, reported directly to Early. Gordon's division contained Brig. Gen. Clement Evans's seven Georgia regiments, Brig. Gen. Zebulon York's remnants of ten Louisiana regiments (once "Lee's Tigers"), and Brig. Gen. William Terry's fragments of fourteen Virginia regiments. General Echols's division included four Virginia regiments of Brig. Gen. Gabriel Wharton's brigade, a regiment and two battalions of Virginians led by Col. George Patton, and Col. Thomas Smith's brigade containing Virginia infantry alongside units from Tennessee and North Carolina. General Ramseur's division consisted of five Virginia regiments commanded by Brig. Gen. Robert Lilley, four North



Courtesy of the Monocacy National Battlefield, National Park Service

Map 1: Route of General Early's Campaign to Washington, 1864

National Archives photo

General Breckinridge

Civil War Hagerstown, Maryland

Carolina regiments led by Brig. Gen. Robert Johnston, and another five North Carolina regiments under Brig. Gen. William Lewis. The fourth and final division, commanded by General Rodes, contained five Alabama regiments under Brig. Gen. Cullen Battle, five North Carolina regiments led by Brig. Gen. Bryan Grimes, and four fractured Georgian regiments under Brig. Gen. Philip Cook. At the start of the campaign, the Army of the Valley District had a total strength of roughly 18,000 men.[7]

These Confederate infantry forces were supported by artillery and cavalry units. Brig. Gen. Armistead Long commanded approximately forty guns fielded in three artillery battalions. All of the batteries originated in Virginia with the exception of one from Georgia. The rebel cavalry was commanded by ex-infantryman Maj. Gen. Robert Ransom. It was composed of three brigades under the leadership of Brig. Gens. John McCausland, John Imboden, and Bradley Johnson, and each of these brigades also included artillery elements.[8]

By 2 July this expeditionary force had quietly entered Winchester, Virginia, still unthreatened by Federal forces. Early halted there briefly upon receiving a telegram from Lee requesting that he remain in the valley "until everything was in readiness to cross the Potomac and to destroy the Baltimore and Ohio [B&O] Railroad and the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal." Early responded by dispatching McCausland's cavalrymen west of Martinsburg to destroy B&O tracks and trestles and thereby prevent Hunter from making what for Early would be an untimely reentry into his theater of operations.[9]

Acutely aware of the Valley Army's shortage of provisions and ever the opportunist, Early also decided to capture the Union Army's depot at Martinsburg, West Virginia. Some 6,500 troops commanded by Maj. Gen. Franz Sigel guarded this facility, and its envelopment fit within the parameters of Lee's directive not to cross the Potomac until Early was fully prepared. Sigel, however, became aware of his forces' inferiority and quickly began to withdraw, successfully holding off the advancing Confederate cavalry long enough to permit the evacuation to Maryland of a majority of the provisions under his care. From the formidable defensive positions the Union had established on Maryland Heights overlooking Harpers Ferry from across the Potomac, Sigel then sought to protect the forward troops of Brig. Gen. Max Weber, commander of Federal forces in that arsenal town where abolitionist John Brown had sought to start a slave rebellion five years earlier. Sigel and Weber were fellow graduates of the military academy in Karlsruhe in the German Duchy of Baden, but neither had established much of a reputation for military leadership in America. The majority of the soldiers under Sigel's command at Maryland Heights were inexperienced, having enlisted for only 100 days, and the force posed little direct threat to the Valley Army. Nevertheless, their presence on the heights blocked the Confederates from using the most direct route to Washington.[10]

After capturing Martinsburg and driving Weber out of Harpers Ferry and across the Potomac, Early on 5 July began to funnel his forces across that river at Shepherdstown, and they soon reached the deserted battlefield at Antietam. Because shoes still hadn't arrived and rations were scarce, Early allowed the majority of his tired army to rest and plunder Federal stores. He sent General McCausland's cavalry to Hagerstown with instructions to levy from it a contribution of $200,000. McCausland misunderstood Early's directive, however, and acquired a mere $20,000, together with substantial quantities of clothing. While the Valley Army accumulated supplies and

awaited truant shoes, Gordon's division occupied Yankee attention by probing the defensive perimeter of the heights. This permitted Confederate wrecking parties to begin destroying the aqueduct of the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal across Antietam Creek, along with nearby locks and boats.[11]

On the afternoon of the sixth, Early sat in the shade near Sharpsburg evaluating the best course of action to take. Every option revolved around the Union troops defending Maryland Heights. Early could attempt to sneak past the southern tip of the heights, using the sheer cliffs to shield his men from the Union's heavy artillery above; he could attack the enemy on the heights in an action that would probably result in substantial casualties on both sides; or he could send his forces further north through South Mountain Pass toward Frederick, thereby bypassing the heights altogether. Early's pugilistic nature might have inclined him to attack rather than ignore the smaller Federal force. But as he pondered his next move, a courier dashed into the camp with a dispatch from Lee. The messenger was none other than Capt. Robert E. Lee Jr., son of the Confederate general. He informed Early of an amorphous plan to orchestrate a breakout of the approximately 17,000 Confederate prisoners held at Point Lookout, Maryland, and transmitted an order to Early to assist in returning them to the Confederacy. Because these plans reemphasized the importance of invading Maryland, Early felt compelled to avoid directly assaulting Sigel's troops ensconced on Maryland Heights. Instead, he determined to proceed through South Mountain Pass. He promised Lee that once through the pass he would detach a cavalry brigade to threaten Baltimore and support any prisoners who might escape from Point Lookout.[12]

Early had Ramseur and Rodes demonstrate strongly against the Federal lines to hold them in place while the rest of the Valley Army slipped northeast through the passes, with Ramseur and Rodes then following.

Guarded Entrance to Prisoner of War Camp at Point Lookout, Maryland
by John Jacob Omenhausser

Troop morale was the highest it had been since Jackson's Valley campaign of 1862. North Carolinians like Sgt. Maj. John G. Young later boasted that while in Maryland they had enjoyed cherries, apple butter, milk, and the "fat of the country." Rebel quartermasters meanwhile acquired some 1,000 horses and cattle in just one day's foraging. No one seemed concerned about the burden these war prizes might pose for the march to Washington. By the time that Early's army reached Frederick on the ninth, Young estimated that the army's wagon train alone stretched for nine miles.[13]

Meanwhile, the Union's reaction to this offensive was confused at best. Both Grant and the Union Army's chief of staff, Maj. Gen. Henry W. Halleck, initially failed to believe that a sizeable Confederate force had moved north. Despite rumors, there had been no confirmed reports of a rebel corps departing the Richmond-Petersburg front, nor had any news arrived from Hunter or his Army of the Shenandoah. Halleck forwarded to Grant the reports he received from Sigel of significant rebel activity along the Potomac River, but Grant thought that Hunter could contain the threat. Fortunately for the Union, John W. Garrett, the politically influential president of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, had received similar reports from his employees, and he began to worry that his expensive iron trestle spanning the Monocacy River might be endangered. On 2 July, while the Confederates were still south of the Potomac, Garrett personally delivered this news to General Wallace, the commander since March 1864 of the Union Army's Middle Department and Eighth Corps, at the latter's Baltimore headquarters. The Monocacy

River was the western boundary of Wallace's department.[14]

Wallace vowed to protect the railroad bridge and dispatched to Monocacy Junction Brig. Gen. Erastus B. Tyler and the 3d Maryland Potomac Home Brigade Infantry. This regiment was one of four Potomac Home Brigade regiments that the War Department had authorized in 1861 to protect the property and persons of loyal citizens on both sides of the upper Potomac. Although this regiment had to be reconstituted after surrendering at Harper's Ferry in September 1862 during the Antietam campaign, Wallace had confidence in it. Wallace also realized that the capital's defenses were severely undermanned, and he was dubious about the troops responsible for the city's protection. Commenting later upon the forces guarding Washington, Wallace observed sarcastically that "eight or nine thousand inefficients were in the works proper, ready upon alarm to take to the guns and do the duty of forty thousand trained specialists, supported by a medley so half-pledged and shadowy as to be a delusion and snare to everybody not an enemy." Wallace was amazed to learn from an aide that newspapers reported Hunter to be far away in the Kanawha Valley in western West Virginia.[15]

Wallace subsequently ordered to the Monocacy four companies of the 1st Maryland Potomac Home Brigade Infantry, the 11th Maryland Infantry (a 100-day regiment organized the previous month), three companies of the 144th Ohio Infantry, seven companies of the 149th Ohio Infantry, and roughly 100 mounted troops of the 159th Ohio Infantry, along with the six-gun Baltimore Battery of Light Artillery. The Ohio regiments had just been organized in May, also for 100 days. All together Wallace sent approximately 2,300 men to guard the Monocacy, a substantial portion of his small command.[16]

Wallace's role in the approaching contest with Early represented a surprising opportunity for this Indiana lawyer and politician, who had been one of the darlings of the Western army early in the war and had become the Union's youngest major general in March 1862. However, his inability the following month to engage his division at Grant's behest on the brutal first day of the Battle of Shiloh led Federal military authorities subsequently to post Wallace to assignments well removed from active theaters of operations—or so they thought.[17]

"With no direction from his confused superiors, Wallace quietly began to move his ragtag army to the junction."

Tactical Situation

Uncertain whether the Confederate objective was Baltimore or Washington, Wallace concluded that Monocacy Junction provided the most logical point of defense. Near there the principal roads from Frederick to Washington and Baltimore crossed this broad river just two miles apart. To the north, the National Road from Frederick to Baltimore crossed a stone bridge, referred to by locals as the Jug or Long Bridge. Further south were the iron B&O railroad bridge and another 300 yards beyond this a wooden, covered bridge on the Georgetown Pike connecting Frederick to Washington. Southwest of the pike and fronting the river were two farms, one belonging to the family of C. Keefer Thomas situated adjacent to the road and the other, that of John T. Worthington, located further south and west along the river. Wallace thought that by stretching his meager forces along the riverfront near the junction of the rail spur to Frederick he could force the Confederates to disclose their strength and primary objective, while delaying them sufficiently to buy time for Grant's veterans to arrive in Washington.[18]

With no direction from his confused superiors, Wallace quietly began to move his ragtag army to the junction. On 5 July he informed Halleck of his troop movements and then took a night locomotive to Frederick. The following day he positioned his second-line neophyte infantry, augmented with limited light field artillery, at the rail junction west of the Monocacy. Unknown to Wallace, Grant on 6 July dispatched Brig. Gen. James B. Ricketts's Third Division, Sixth Corps, to bolster the defenses of Washington and nearby Maryland. These veterans, elated to leave the desolate, sandy killing fields of Southside Virginia, arrived by boat in Baltimore two to three days later. The first two brigades of this division would ultimately form the core of Wallace's defenses on the Monocacy.[19]

On 7 July Wallace acquired the 230 veteran troopers who comprised five companies of Lt. Col. Daniel Clendenin's 8th Illinois Cavalry. One of the more experienced and better mounted units in the Army of the Potomac, the regiment had been dispatched by Maj. Gen. Christopher Augur, commander of the Department of Washington, to investigate the loss of communication between Washington and Harper's Ferry. The forward elements of Ricketts's division began arriving aboard B&O Railroad cars the following day, and by the evening of 8 July the bulk

Camp of the Seventh Regiment, near Frederick, Maryland, in July 1863, by Sanford Gifford

of the First and Second Brigades of the division had either reached the Monocacy or advanced into Frederick, bolstering Wallace's army with nearly 3,400 battle-tested veterans.[20]

The opposing cavalry forces, meanwhile, had clashed on 7 July near Middletown west of Frederick. After a day of skirmishing with superior Confederate forces, Clendenin, supported by the Baltimore light artillery battery, slowly withdrew to Frederick. Clendenin's cavalry harassed the Confederates in flying skirmishes the next day as well. Late in the afternoon of 8 July, however, an observer in the cupola of the Frederick County courthouse spotted three long gray lines of dust moving down from the mountain passes toward Frederick. Approaching the point of contention was the entire Army of the Valley District. Wallace retreated from Frederick that evening, resolved to forcefully confront his more powerful opponent along the east bank of the Monocacy River. After occupying Frederick, Early detached General Johnson's cavalry brigade to harass Baltimore and collaborate in the anticipated Point Lookout Prison breakout.[21]

Having abandoned Frederick to the advancing Confederates, Wallace positioned his forces in strong defensive positions etched out along the banks of the Monocacy River. He ordered the militia under General Tyler to guard the Long Bridge and several nearby fords along his right flank from an easily defensible ridge line. To protect the covered bridge and iron trestle, he placed 350 skirmishers west of the river in a forward position at the railroad junction. This force consisted of soldiers from the 10th Vermont Infantry, two companies of the 9th New York Heavy Artillery, and a smattering of men from the 1st Maryland Potomac Home Brigade. The railroad tracks ran atop an earthen embankment that served as an excellent defensive position. The river trestle was already fortified with wooden blockhouses at either end and with rifle pits flanking the eastern side. At a bluff just east of the trestle, Wallace stood surveying the scene from a position adjacent to the Federals' only 24-pound howitzer.[22]

Anticipating that the main Confederate thrust would come from the south, Wallace positioned Ricketts's seasoned troops along his left flank. These men formed along a fence that divided the Thomas and Worthington farms and was south of and roughly parallel to the Georgetown Pike. Summarizing his approach in his autobiography, Wallace explained that he assigned "the raw men to Tyler; the veterans to Ricketts." The Baltimore battery, consisting of six 3-inch Parrott rifled cannon under the command of Capt. Frederick Alexander, was split to cover the bridges and Ricketts's division, where the main Confederate attack was anticipated. The terrain on the western bank of the river was almost entirely flat, open farmland.[23]

Thus it was here at Monocacy Junction, on nearly optimal ground that Wallace had selected, that he and



Courtesy of the Monocacy National Battlefield, National Park Service

Map 2: The Battle of Monocacy

his Federal forces, now totaling some 6,200 men, would make their stand. Opposing them were approximately 17,000 highly motivated and combat-hardened Confederates spearheaded by some of the best leadership remaining in the South. These troops, supported by superior field artillery and cavalry, were much better armed and equipped than Wallace's. In the face of these disparities, the outcome for Wallace was inevitable. He would lose the battle.

Fighting along the Monocacy

Saturday, 9 July, dawned with Wallace's army prepared for battle at the three bridges across the Monocacy River. Ramseur's rebels began probing around 0600 toward the covered bridge on the Georgetown Pike, while Rodes's division demonstrated at the Long Bridge on the National Road (*Map 2*). Over the course of the next three hours the Confederate artillery arrived and began lobbing shells into the Union positions. Believing that a frontal attack across the Monocacy River would be too costly, the Confederates sought instead to outflank the Union line. They were aided in this endeavor by the timely arrival from the southwest of McCausland's cavalry, which had spent the previous night west of Frederick. Obliging a local farmer to point out a shallow stretch of the river south of the Georgetown Pike, McCausland's troopers, roughly 1,000 strong, promptly splashed across the Worthington-McKinney Ford, before dismounting at about 1030 hours at the Worthington farm on the eastern bank.[24]

Leaving behind about a quarter of his men to watch the horses, McCausland assembled his dismounted troops in a battle line and headed east toward a field of waist-high corn. The field sloped gradually upward toward the fence at its eastern end that marked the line between the Worthington and Thomas farms. There McCausland observed several Union officers, but he failed to see Ricketts's troops concealed in a prone position behind the fence. Anticipating at best a contingent of unseasoned Union militia, McCausland chose not to send skirmishers ahead and instead simply had his forces charge the fence on foot. As the cavalrymen approached within 125 yards of the fence line, the hidden Union soldiers stood up, leveled their rifles on the rail fence, and fired. The entire rebel line collapsed; those not instantly killed or incapacitated retreated by crawling back to the Worthington farmhouse and then running back to the riverbank.[25]

Early that afternoon, the frustrated McCausland regrouped his horse-handlers and launched another attack. This time, the rebel cavalrymen shifted about 200 yards to their right in an effort to overlap the Union line. Because of a small hill that blocked the defenders' view, Ricketts's infantry did not observe their movement until it had almost reached the Thomas property boundary. Only then did they shift to their left in an attempt to extend their line. Firing as they advanced, the

Confederates drove back the Union flank as far as the Thomas farmhouse. Observing this from the bluff, Wallace rapidly shifted his limited artillery fire and snipers to cover the flank while directing two regiments held in reserve to charge with fixed bayonets. This started a hand-to-hand melee that lasted about twenty minutes before the Federal forces again pushed the rebels back to the Worthington farm. Stunned by another setback, McCausland withdrew to the ford and retired for the day.[26]

Around this time the fog of war shifted from gray to blue, and Wallace was beset with problems. An inexperienced member of the 24-pound howitzer gun crew rammed a shell without first inserting a charge, rendering the weapon inoperable. This howitzer had a much longer killing range, from 1,300 to 1,400 yards, than did the 3-inch guns, so its loss was significant. In addition, as the rebels massed on the Georgetown Pike threatening to break through, Wallace ordered the covered bridge set on fire, leaving his valiant skirmishers stranded on the west bank. Upriver, General Tyler's men remained engaged in a spirited fight for the Long Bridge. Wallace was still hoping for reinforcement from an additional three regiments of the Second Brigade, Sixth Corps, that he had been told would arrive by rail from Baltimore early in the afternoon.[27]

After McCausland's mistake at Hagerstown, Early developed a keen interest in seeing Frederick ransomed for a full $200,000. This effort apparently diverted Early from the developing battle in the morning. Not surprisingly, Frederick's mayor stalled for time, creating an impasse that would not be resolved until Early's adjutant, Alexander Pendleton, a former Frederick resident, could inform Frederick representatives of the rebel victory on the Monocacy late in the day. Five local banks then advanced the money the Confederates demanded, imposing a financial burden the city would not completely repay until 1951.[28]

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General Ricketts

To ascertain why his forces were being delayed, Early rode out to the rail junction late in the morning. There he witnessed McCausland's second retreat from the Worthington farm and ordered Breckinridge to send Gordon's crack infantry division to the front to deliver a hammer blow to Wallace's flank. About 1430 Gordon began consolidating his forces on the east side of the river, again using the Worthington property as a staging area. Thereafter he deployed skirmishers and began implementing a plan to hit the Federals on their left and overlap them. Assaults would occur simultaneously at other positions to prevent the Federals from sending reinforcements to the left. Specifically, Gordon directed General Evans's brigade to move by the Union left flank and overlap it and ordered General York's brigade to support Evans. The *en echelon* attack stepped off.[29] (*Map 2*)

Wallace, anticipating this massive blow, ordered Ricketts to withdraw from the fence line to higher ground farther east. His right flank was now near the burning bridge and his left near the Thomas farmhouse. Wallace then shifted the bridge's defenders as well as his light artillery to cover the left flank and committed the last of his reserve to the exposed southern flank.



National Archives photo

General Gordon

These forces were arrayed into three defensible but separate ranks. Just as this was accomplished, the opposing forces converged. Evans's Confederates met fierce resistance, and their leader was severely wounded while leading the charge. York's soldiers, meanwhile, drove Ricketts's first line back upon his second. Observing this, Gordon regrouped his forces and ordered another charge. This drove back Ricketts's second line to his third and final line of battle, a line that overlapped his flanks and took advantage of deep cuts along the Georgetown Pike. Tapping what he would later describe as "an enthusiasm which amounted almost to a martial delirium," Gordon ordered General Terry's brigade to attack the portion of Ricketts's line anchored along the river. This assault pierced the Union line and drove the Federal forces back across the fields of the Thomas farm.[30]

Meanwhile, the rest of Gordon's attack continued to meet sharp resistance, and Gordon's favorite battle horse was killed under him in the fierce combat. Hence, Gordon had Terry shift his line of attack. Terry's second assault, combined with a renewed attack on the center of Ricketts's line, resulted, Gordon later reported, in "the complete rout of the enemy's forces." Ricketts's troops retreated along farm lanes to the National Road, followed by the Union skirmishers who had held out at the railroad junction west of the river. By 1700 hours the main battlefield was clear of Union troops. Perhaps an hour later, General Tyler's forces, now facing renewed attack from Rodes's division at the Long Bridge and threatened by the Confederate advance east of the river, likewise retreated, having first successfully protected Wallace's withdrawal. Early now had an open road to Washington, for the Confederates had won the field.[31]

That evening as the Federals hastened in retreat toward Baltimore, few knew the magnitude of their losses. Eventually calculated at 123 killed in battle; 603 wounded, including some who would die of their wounds; and 568 missing or captured, Union casualties totaled 1,294. Of these all but 222 were among the Vermont, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Ohio regiments that formed the First and Second Brigades of Ricketts's Third Division, Sixth Corps. Those regiments had thus sustained an astounding 32 percent casualty rate. One of the wounded was Col. William H. Seward Jr., commander of the 9th New York Heavy Artillery and son of President Abraham Lincoln's secretary of state.[32]

Early estimated his losses at 600 to 700, including 400 wounded who would fall into Federal hands when Union troops recaptured Frederick, but Confederate losses were undoubtedly higher than that as Gordon's division alone counted 698 casualties. A more realistic estimate places Confederate casualties around 1,300 to 1,500. Among the Confederates killed at the Monocacy were the colonel and lieutenant colonel of the 61st Georgia Infantry. Reporting to General Lee five days after the fight at the Monocacy, Early glossed over the battle, observing that "the enemy in a very short time was completely routed by Gordon, and left the field in great disorder and retreated in haste to Baltimore." He did not realize that the day's delay at

the Monocacy had vitiated his threat to the capital. After this prolonged and bloody battle in the intense summer heat, the exhausted rebel army bivouacked that night among the dead and dying.[33]

That same evening Grant finally realized the seriousness of the threat to the capital and directed north the remainder of the Sixth Corps. Four brigades from the First and Second Divisions of this corps led by the corps commander, Maj. Gen. Horatio Wright, departed City Point, Virginia, around 1100 hours the next day. In addition, Grant ordered a brigade of the Nineteenth Corps, which had been traveling to Virginia by ship from New Orleans, diverted to the capital as it passed Fort Monroe. By noon on 11 July boats carrying the Sixth Corps were landing in Washington.[34]

Late in the morning of the tenth, the fatigued Confederates began their forty-mile march to the capital as temperatures began to rise into the nineties. After bivouacking outside Rockville that night, they advanced under similar conditions the following day to the forts guarding the northernmost portion of the District of Columbia, with Early's main force directed toward Fort Stevens just east of Rock Creek. Some 200 men from an Ohio infantry regiment and a Michigan artillery battery manned this Union position. After calling up the District's militia, General Augur sent a mixed group of veterans, convalescents, and War Department clerks north of Fort Stevens, where they skirmished with troops from Rodes's division and kept the Confederates from approaching within 100 yards of the fort. Meanwhile the heavy guns from several forts on Washington's northern defense lines bombarded Confederate troop concentrations. As the clashes took place north of Fort Stevens, the troops of the Second Division, Sixth Corps, that Grant had sent to defend the city began to mass south of the line of forts, preparing to repel any possible breakthrough. The rebels, apparently intimidated by the artillery of the forts that ringed the city, mounted no serious attack on any of them. Late in the day the Sixth Corps troops pushed forward the Union lines north of Fort Stevens, when they began to sag.[35]

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General Augur

Early deliberated with his senior subordinate commanders that evening at "Silver Spring," the commandeered mansion of absent Francis Preston Blair Sr., father of Lincoln's postmaster general. The Confederate leaders had found the forts "to be very strong and constructed very scientifically." Recognizing the arrival of the Sixth Corps troops dispatched by Grant, Early concluded that an effort to capture one of the forts, even if successful, would deplete his strength so severely that it "would insure [*sic*] the destruction of my whole force." He thus decided to forego a determined assault on the capital's defenses and chose instead to continue the desultory attacks at the edge of the District during the day in preparation for a withdrawal when darkness fell the following night.[36]

President Lincoln provided much of the drama that the fighting on 12 July retained. Coming to Fort Stevens to observe the action, the president exposed himself to the fire of enemy sharpshooters. A Sixth Corps aide, Capt. Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., later reported that he had shouted at Lincoln, whom he had failed to recognize, "Get down, you damn fool, before you get shot!" Concerned about their commander in chief's safety, senior Union officers dispatched a brigade of the Second Division, Sixth Corps, to clear the rebels from small-arms range of the fort. This engagement resulted in some

200 to 400 casualties on each side, with the Union forces succeeding in pushing back the Confederates. Elements of the First Division, Sixth Corps, the Second Brigade of which was commanded by Brig. Gen. Emory Upton, a prominent postwar Army theoretician, also arrived in Washington from Grant's army that day. Early withdrew his forces that evening, marching west through Poolesville to White's Ferry, where he recrossed the Potomac River into Virginia, and returned to the Shenandoah Valley.[37]

Significance

The significance to the Confederates of their tactical victory at the Monocacy on 9 July evaporated quickly as their leaders began the following day to march the winded Army of the Valley District through the summer heat and dust southeast toward the Federal capital. When the exhausted rebel force arrived before the defenses of Washington on 11 July, it had failed by scant hours to reach the city ahead of the first of Grant's reinforcements. The lost hours which Wallace had forced Early to expend on the banks of the Monocacy had made a successful assault on the capital's defenses completely unachievable, making the Battle of Monocacy a strategic victory for the Union.

Despite being denied his ultimate objective, Early did relieve some of the pressure that Grant had been applying on Lee's army, and this may have gained some additional time for the Southern cause. Early's army marched home with an impressive train of plunder-laden wagons, a renewed spirit of audacity among its men, and well-shod infantry that had started north barefoot. With General Hunter removed from the area, the Confederates could again hope to harvest the produce of the fertile Shenandoah Valley and to provide its sustenance to Lee's beleaguered Army.

General Johnson's cavalry raid also achieved a degree of success. By 7 July, however, Federal authorities had learned of the Point Lookout mission.

National Archives photo

General Johnson

In response, they began to shuttle many prisoners north to a new prisoner-of-war facility in Elmira, New York, and stepped up naval patrols on the Potomac. As Johnson came to realize that he did not realistically have enough time or manpower to accomplish all of his missions, he chose to focus the efforts of his 1,500 cavalrymen in the environs of Baltimore, where he created tremendous mischief, destroying sections of several railroad and telegraph lines as well as critical bridges. As Early skirmished with the defenders of Washington on 12 July, the capital lacked direct rail or telegraph connections to the North owing to these cavalry actions. When Johnson's marauders clattered southward toward Washington that day, a courier from Early informed Johnson that Confederate President Jefferson Davis had cancelled the Point Lookout operation and instructed the cavalry leader to rejoin Early's main army north of Fort Stevens. Johnson's men continued destroying railroad ties and telegraph lines as they rode cross country, before rejoining Early's forces that evening.[38]

But what if Early had taken Washington, D.C.? In the short term, the occupation of the Union capital would have put the Confederacy in a stronger position for negotiating peace or achieving recognition from the nations of Europe than it had ever previously enjoyed. Militarily, the city was home to a large naval yard and an extensive supply depot that contained substantial stores of ordnance, commissary, quartermaster, and medical materiel. In the civil sphere, the city housed all the departments and records of the Federal government, including the Treasury Department with its millions in currency and signed bonds ready for issuance. One may assume that whatever of military value the Army of the Valley District would be unable to carry back to Virginia would have been put to the torch, much as the Virginia Military Institute had been burned by General Hunter the month before. In the long term, this embarrassment to the Federal government would probably have forced President Lincoln to relieve Grant of command, denying the Union its best military leader. Further, the blow to national morale might well have swayed the 1864 presidential election toward Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan and led to a compromise peace. Indeed, even without the loss of his capital, Lincoln's political prospects in July 1864 were uncertain. As the president issued a call for 500,000 more conscripts less than a week after Early's departure from the defenses of Washington, an opposition newspaper editor in Ohio wrote that "Lincoln is *deader* than dead."[39]

Washington's relief, which had been facilitated by the stubborn defense of the Monocacy bridges undertaken by the much maligned Lew Wallace and his ragtag army, served as an abrupt wake-up call that revived the Union Army's efforts to safeguard the most threatening invasion route to the North. In the aftermath of Early's march on Washington, the Union began a new offensive in the Shenandoah Valley, which for years had been a critical battleground area. Maj. Gen. Philip

H. Sheridan, who was appointed to replace Hunter, thoroughly defeated Early's army there in a series of battles in September and October, destroying in the process much of the region's farm produce and denying Lee's army an essential source of its sustenance. Union arms also captured Atlanta, Georgia, and pressed forward against the defenses of Richmond and Petersburg, Virginia, in the late summer and early autumn of 1864, laying the groundwork for the reelection of President Lincoln and ensuring the defeat of the Confederacy.[40]

Battle Analysis

The strategic delaying action achieved by the Union at the Battle of Monocacy can largely be attributed to the superb leadership of General Wallace. Despite a lack of military intelligence, he skillfully employed the principles of war and correctly assessed his opponent's strength and potential objectives. Wallace pursued a clear and simple plan: stall the enemy to buy time for Grant to send reinforcements. Wallace displayed uncanny wisdom in choosing Monocacy Junction to make his stand. In hindsight there was no better location. Putting aside his history of differences with the Union's senior commanders and heedless of the danger of losing his command for suffering an almost certain defeat, Wallace quietly seized the initiative. Without permission from superiors he transported his forces beyond his departmental jurisdiction, thereby violating Halleck's standing orders. Once positioned in Frederick, he established a line of communication with Washington, enabling him to provide his superiors an estimate of the situation and a desperate request for reinforcements.

Wallace accomplished his objectives at the Monocacy by maximizing his limited resources and employing the units under his command to their fullest tactical potential. Despite being significantly outnumbered, he took the offensive on 7 July by sending Clendenin's cavalry forward to conduct reconnaissance and harass the enemy. This movement significantly slowed Early's advance and masked the strength and disposition of Union forces. The Confederates' lack of intelligence about the Union forces that faced them along the Monocacy proved disastrous to McCausland at the onset of the battle, when he blindly attacked Ricketts's front expecting to encounter only untested militia. Wallace, anticipating Early's movements toward Washington, skillfully deployed Ricketts's battle-hardened veterans on the terrain that would form the Confederate axis of advance, while placing the militiamen upriver at positions the Confederates would not seriously contest. This alignment was a masterful application of the principle of economy of force and was strongly enhanced by Generals Tyler and Ricketts being provided independent commands with a simple mission—not to retreat until directed.[41] In retaining ultimate control of the battlefield and providing clear instructions to his subordinates, Wallace adhered to the principles of unity of command, simplicity, and objective. Wallace wisely positioned himself on the high ground adjacent to the main battle area, where he could monitor the battle and shift his troops to most effectively delay the inevitable defeat. He positioned his limited artillery nearby, providing them optimal fields of fire to support his defenses.

> **"an apparition of President Lincoln, cloaked and hooded, stealing like a malfactor from the back door of the White House just as some gray-garbed Confederate brigadier burst in the front door."**
>
> **Lew Wallace**

Neglecting other nearby fords where Confederate divisions not fully engaged in the fight might have crossed the Monocacy, Early restricted his attacks to Wallace's left flank at the Worthington and Thomas farms. This uni-dimensional approach permitted Wallace to retain his freedom of action and to react to the developing situation at pivotal moments. Orchestrating quick shifts in his artillery and infantry reserves, Wallace managed to halt successive Confederate attacks despite his forces' decidedly inferior numbers. These were skillful applications of the principles of mass and maneuver. Observing McCausland's second attack, Wallace recognized that Ricketts's position was in jeopardy and quickly responded by committing reserves to extend Ricketts's flank and there meet the main attack. Soon thereafter, seeing Confederates massing before the covered bridge, Wallace sensibly chose to destroy it, denying the enemy that avenue of approach. Knowing the final blow from an overwhelming force would soon follow, Wallace wisely committed his reserves and shifted his field artillery to support the left flank.

While accomplishing his objectives, Wallace exhibited high moral courage by continuing to contest the ground rather than retreat. As Wallace later recalled, one thought in particular hardened his resolve, "an apparition of President Lincoln, cloaked and hooded, stealing like a malefactor from the back door of the White House just as some gray-garbed Confederate brigadier burst in the front door."[42] Wallace arrayed all available forces into three

supporting lines directly in front of the Confederate attack; because of this, the fighting there was brutal and Gordon's division suffered heavy losses. Not until all three brigades of Gordon's division were committed was Wallace finally forced to concede the ground. Both he and Ricketts maintained a strong presence in the Federal forces' retrograde action, thereby preventing the army from being completely routed. The high casualty rates on both sides were indicative of the superior morale and courage of both sets of combatants.

No battle analyzed in hindsight ever meets tactical perfection. Because of poor communication, three regiments of Ricketts's Second Brigade remained eight miles from the front and never engaged in the fight. Wallace also had the covered bridge burned without ensuring that the forward skirmishers were notified. Despite losing their preferred avenue of retreat, the skirmishers continued to fight valiantly, and only after they observed the main Federal force being dislodged did they re-cross the river on the iron trestle. This steadfast effort won the Medal of Honor for 1st Lt. George E. Davis of Company D, 10th Vermont Infantry, who commanded the skirmishers during most of the fight. Another Vermonter, Cpl. Alexander Scott, similarly received the Medal of Honor for his services as color bearer during the battle. General Tyler, who held his position at the Long Bridge until 1800 hours, only escaped because the tired Confederate forces chose not to pursue him.[43] Arguably, Wallace could have more effectively contested the Worthington-McKinney Ford and have destroyed all the bridges across the Monocacy River. Regardless of these shortcomings, Lew Wallace proved himself a capable match for the formidable Jubal Early and a boon to the military bureaucrats in the capital who held him in low regard.

Early, on the other hand, can be rebuked for ineffective leadership both before and during the battle. After invading Maryland, his army spent critical time foraging rather than focusing on reaching Washington. The costly battle at the Monocacy might have been completely avoided and Wallace's forces outflanked or routed had General Johnson's cavalry brigade not been detached that day to threaten Baltimore and Point Lookout. Johnson, a Frederick native, and his cavalrymen could have led the Valley Army unopposed around Wallace's troops via the Buckeystown Road and fords nearer the mouth of the Monocacy.[44] Failing this, Early still might have defeated Wallace much earlier had he taken a more active role in the battle. During the initial phase of the battle Early's insistence on ransoming Frederick for $200,000 seemed to take priority over his role as field commander. The result was a poor Confederate analysis of the terrain and a slow development of the attack from a vastly inferior tactical position. By sending their forces across the Monocacy piecemeal at a single ford, the Confederates allowed the Federal defenders to concentrate their efforts in a single direction and substantially reduced the ratio of attackers to defenders at the critical point of engagement. Early's inadequate intelligence-gathering operation significantly hurt General McCausland in the first engagement. Then, by not augmenting McCausland with veteran infantry, Early allowed the dismounted cavalrymen to conduct a second unsuccessful attack that wasted precious time and resources. Only in the early afternoon did Early finally take an active role and employ the principle of mass to eventually win the field. Even then, General Gordon's division bore the brunt of the attack, while the divisions of Generals Echols, Rodes, and Ramseur made little direct contribution to the outcome of the battle.

The superior quantity and range of Early's field artillery proved significant in this victory, but it is noteworthy that not a single piece of Union artillery was damaged by Confederate fire.[45] The silencing of the exposed Union artillery should indeed have been a high priority for General Early. The old warrior had earlier caused Lee great concern over some of the same problems that arose in his contest with Wallace—poor employment of his cavalry, lack of timely action, failure to seek the opinions of his subordinates, and placing personal goals over military gains. However Lee found these faults more than offset by Early's independent thinking and his willingness to engage the enemy to the death.[46]

The impact of the battle at the Monocacy was succinctly summarized by General Grant in his memoirs. "If Early had been but one day earlier he might have entered the capital before the arrival of the reinforcements I had sent. Whether the delay caused by the battle amounted to a day or not, General Wallace contributed on this occasion, by the defeat of the troops under him a greater benefit to the cause than often falls to the lot of a commander of an equal force to render by means of a victory."[47] The annals of American history should record Lew Wallace not only as the eloquent author of *Ben-Hur* but also as the savior of Washington.[48]

The Author

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Notes

1. William B. Feis, "A Union Military Intelligence Failure: Jubal Early's Raid, June 12–July 14, 1864," *Civil War History* 36 (1990): 213; Benjamin Franklin Cooling, *Symbol, Sword, and Shield: Defending Washington during the Civil War* (2d ed., Shippensburg, Pa., 1991), pp. 182–83; Joseph Judge, *Season of Fire: The Confederate Strike on Washington* (Berryville, Va. 1994), p. 14; James M. McPherson, *Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era* (New York, 1988), pp. 737–43.

2. Jubal Anderson Early, *War Memoirs: Autobiographical Sketch and Narrative of the War between the States* (1912, New York, 1989), p. 371; General R. E. Lee to James A. Seddon,

Confederate Secretary of War, 19 Jul 1864, printed in Clifford Dowdey, ed., *The Wartime Papers of R. E. Lee* (Boston, 1961), p. 822 (quotation).

3. Millard Kessler Bushong, *Old Jube: A Biography of General Jubal A. Early* (1955, Shippensburg, Pa., 1985), pp. 186–88; U.S. War Department, *War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies*, 128 vols. (Washington, D.C., 1880–1901), ser.1, vol. 37, pt. 1, p. 99–100 (hereafter cited as *OR* with series and volume numbers); L. VanLoan Naisawald, "Old Jubilee Saves Lynchburg," *America's Civil War* 16 (May 2003): 30–38, 72. Nicholls would later serve as governor of Louisiana and chief justice of the Louisiana Supreme Court.

4. *OR*, ser.1, vol. 37, pt. 1, pp. 100, 103–06; Naisawald, "Old Jubilee Saves Lynchburg," pp. 30–38, 72. The Union casualty figures covered the period 10–23 June 1864.

5. B. Franklin Cooling, *Monocacy: The Battle That Saved Washington* (Shippensburg, Pa., 1997), pp. 48–49; Judge, *Season of Fire*, p. 111.

6. *OR*, ser.1, vol. 37, pt. 1, p. 160; Judge, *Season of Fire*, pp. 115–16; Bushong, *Old Jube*, p. 194; Frank E. Vandiver, *Jubal's Raid: General Early's Famous Attack on Washington in 1864* (New York, 1960), p. 61.

7. Judge, *Season of Fire*, p. 122; B. Franklin Cooling, *Jubal Early's Raid on Washington* (Baltimore, 1989), pp. 17–23. Gordon would later serve as governor of Georgia and for thirteen years as United States senator from that state. Colonel Patton was the grandfather of World War II Lt. Gen. George S. Patton, Jr.

8. Judge, *Season of Fire*, p. 122.

9. Cooling, *Monocacy*, pp. 12–13 (quote, p. 13); Bushong, *Old Jube*, p. 195; Vandiver, *Jubal's Raid*, p. 76–77.

10. *OR*, ser.1, vol. 37, pt. 1, pp. 175–76, 179; Bushong, *Old Jube*, p. 195–96; Ezra J. Warner, *Generals in Blue: Lives of the Union Commanders* (Baton Rouge, 1964), pp. 447–48, 545–46. Sigel claimed that over two-thirds of his troops were 100-days men.

11. Vandiver, *Jubal's Raid*, p. 77–92; Cooling, *Monocacy*, p. 13; Early, *War Memoirs*, pp. 384–85; Bushong, *Old Jube*, p. 197.

12. Early, *War Memoirs*, pp. 385–86; Vandiver, *Jubal's Raid*, pp. 92–93; *OR*, ser.1, vol. 37, pt. 1, p. 767; Cooling, *Monocacy*, p. 86; Charles C. Osborne, *Jubal: The Life and Times of General Jubal A. Early, CSA, Defender of the Lost Cause* (Chapel Hill, 1992), p. 267.

13. Judge, *Season of Fire*, p. 141–42; Cooling, *Monocacy*, pp. 79–80 (quote, p. 80).

14. Feis, "A Union Military Intelligence Failure" pp. 211, 220–21; Cooling, *Monocacy*, pp. 31, 38, 40; Cooling, *Jubal Early's Raid*, pp. 34–36.

15. Cooling, *Monocacy*, pp. 38–39; J. Thomas Scharf, *History of Western Maryland*, 2 vols. (1882, reprint ed., Baltimore, 1968), 1: 316–18; *OR*, ser.1, vol. 19, pt. 1, pp. 548–49; Lew Wallace, *Smoke, Sound & Fury: The Civil War Memoirs of Major-General Lew Wallace, U.S. Volunteers*, ed. Jim Leeke (Portland, Oreg., 1998), pp. 212–13 (quote). The Potomac Home Brigade regiments were organized by Congressman Francis Thomas of Frederick, Maryland, but their field-grade officers were appointed by the president,

16. Cooling, *Monocacy*, p. 39; *OR*, ser.1, vol. 37, pt. 1, pp. 573–74.

17. Gloria Baker Swift and Gail Stephens, "Honor Redeemed: Lew Wallace's Military Career and the Battle of Monocacy," *North and South* 4 (January 2001): 34–41.

18. Glenn H. Worthington, *Fighting for Time: The Battle That Saved Washington* (1932, rev. ed., Shippensburg, Pa., 1985), pp. 55–62; Wallace, *Smoke, Sound & Fury*, pp. 218–19; Cooling, *Monocacy*, pp. 41–42, 109.

19. Judge, *Season of Fire*, p. 146; Cooling, *Monocacy*, pp. 23, 56–57, 74, 76; Cooling, *Jubal Early's Raid*, p. 38; Alfred S. Roe, *Monocacy, Co. A, 9th New York Heavy Artillery* (1894, reprint ed., Baltimore, 1996).

20. Cooling, *Monocacy*, pp. 43, 64, 76–81; *OR*, ser.1, vol. 37, pt. 1, pp. 194–96.

21. *OR*, ser.1, vol. 37, pt. 1, pp. 213–14, 219–220, 223; Cooling, *Monocacy*, pp. 67–82, 86.

22. *OR*, ser.1, vol. 37, pt. 1, pp. 191–92, 215; Cooling, *Monocacy*, pp. 112–14; Worthington, *Fighting for Time*, pp. 108–10.

23. Wallace, *Smoke, Sound & Fury*, p. 248 (quote), 252; *OR*, ser.1, vol. 37, pt. 1, pp. 196, 223–24; Osborne, *Jubal*, p. 271.

24. *OR*, ser.1, vol. 37, pt. 1, pp. 191, 215, 217; Cooling, *Monocacy*, pp. 112, 116–17; Worthington, *Fighting for Time*, p. 107.

25. Cooling, *Monocacy*, pp. 118–19; Judge, *Season of Fire*, pp. 181–85.

26. Cooling, *Monocacy*, pp. 140–42; *OR*, ser.1, vol. 37, pt. 1, p. 205.

27. Cooling, *Monocacy*, pp. 111, 114, 120, 140; Judge, *Season of Fire*, pp. 178–81.

28. Cooling, *Monocacy*, pp. 97–99; Edward S. Delaplaine, "General Early's Levy on Frederick," in Frederick County Civil War Centennial, Inc., *To Commemorate the 100th Anniversary of the Battle of Monocacy, "The Battle That Saved Washington"* (n.p., 1964), pp. 42–55; Mary Fitzhugh Hitselberger and John Philip Dern, *Bridge in Time: The Complete 1850 Census of Frederick County, Maryland* (Redwood City, Calif., 1978), p. 31.

29. Cooling, *Monocacy*, pp. 115, 139, 143; Judge, *Season of Fire*, pp. 179–80, 187; *OR*, ser.1, vol. 37, pt. 1, pp. 350–51.

30. Cooling, *Monocacy*, pp. 144, 146; *OR*, ser.1, vol. 37, pt. 1, pp. 351–52; John B. Gordon, *Reminiscences of the Civil War* (New York, 1903), pp. 312–13 (quote, p. 312).

31. *OR*, ser.1, vol. 37, pt. 1, pp. 351–52 (quote, p. 352); Cooling, *Monocacy*, pp. 157–58; Cooling, *Jubal Early's Raid*, pp. 74–76; Judge, *Season of Fire*, p. 202.

32. *OR*, ser.1, vol. 37, pt. 1, pp. 198, 201–02; pt. 2, p. 145.

33. Ibid., ser.1, vol. 37, pt. 1, p. 348 (quote), 352; Cooling, *Monocacy*, pp. 180–81; Eric J. Wittenberg, "Roadblock En Route to Washington," *America's Civil War*, November 1993, p. 56.

34. Cooling, *Jubal Early's Raid*, pp. 87, 89, 122; Cooling, *Monocacy*, pp. 190–91.

35. Cooling, *Monocacy*, pp. 181–89; Cooling, *Jubal Early's Raid*, pp. 109–25.

36. Cooling, *Jubal Early's Raid*, pp. 136–37; *OR*, ser.1, vol. 37, pt. 1, p. 348 (quotations).

37. Cooling, *Jubal Early's Raid*, pp. 138–50, 178–88; Margaret Leech, *Reveille in Washington* (New York, 1941), p. 343; Cooling, *Monocacy*, pp. 194, 196–98; McPherson, *Battle Cry of Freedom*, p. 757 (quote).

38. Cooling, *Monocacy*, pp. 50, 55, 177–78, 195.

39. *OR*, ser.1, vol. 37, pt. 1, p. 97; McPherson, *Battle Cry of Freedom*, pp. 757–58, 771; Frank L. Klement, *The Copperheads in the Middle West* (Chicago, 1960), p. 233 (quote).

40. McPherson, *Battle Cry of Freedom*, pp. 758, 774, 777–80.

41. *OR*, ser.1, vol. 37, pt. 1, p. 217.

42. Wallace, *Smoke, Sound & Fury*, p. 230.

43. Cooling, *Monocacy*, pp. 155–58; U.S. Senate, Committee on Veterans' Affairs, *Medal of Honor Recipients, 1863–1978* (Washington, D.C, 1979), pp. 69, 212. While Davis and Scott had become residents of Vermont by the time of the Civil War, Davis had been born in Massachusetts and Scott in Canada.

44. Cooling, *Monocacy*, pp. 115–116; Early, *War Memoirs*, pp. 386–87.

45. *OR*, ser.1, vol. 37, pt. 1, p. 224.

46. Vandiver, *Jubal's Raid*, p. 23.

47. Ulysses S. Grant, *Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant*, 2 vols. (New York, 1885–86), 2: 306.

48. Wallace's book *Ben-Hur: A Tale of the Christ* was published in New York in 1880.

U. S. Army Art Collection

General Pershing, by Richard L. Seyffert

"He [Pershing] is looking for results. He intends to have them. He will sacrifice any man who does not bring them."

Robert L. Bullard

"If a unit failed, the man failed. For some the ruthlessness Pershing practiced could scarcely be grasped, but as the list of removals grew, a dawning understanding permeated the army—nobody had tenure of command."

Frank Vandiver

John J. Pershing
and Relief for Cause in the American Expeditionary Forces, 1917–1918

By Timothy K. Nenninger

For a military officer, particularly a "regular," relief from command for real or perceived failures of duty has frequently led to the professional graveyard. Among contemporaries, as well as subsequently among historians, General John J. Pershing had the reputation of being particularly ruthless with American commanders in the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) who did not measure up to his high standards. One of his subordinate commanders, Maj. Gen. Robert L. Bullard, said of Pershing in his diary: "He is looking for results. He intends to have them. He will sacrifice any man who does not bring them."[1] Bullard's biographer put it more succinctly: "'The Chief' [Pershing] wanted no failures."[2] The implications of Pershing's attitude were conveyed by Frank Vandiver, one of his recent biographers: "If a unit failed, the man failed. For some the ruthlessness Pershing practiced could scarcely be grasped, but as the list of removals grew, a dawning understanding permeated the army—nobody had tenure of command."[3] Yet despite the inherent interest in the topic, few historians have examined in depth how and why AEF combat commanders were relieved and the role Pershing played in the process.[4]

In 1918 Pershing was an active, hard, disciplined, fifty-eight-year-old general officer. His demeanor exuded the manifestations of a soldier's life. His outer shell had only been made harder in 1915 by the death of his wife and three of his four children, who perished in a fire that destroyed their residence at the Presidio of San Francisco. After that tragedy Pershing seemed to become even more withdrawn personally and to concentrate his every effort on fulfilling his soldierly duty and ensuring that his subordinates did the same. He was a hard taskmaster and a difficult man for whom to work.

Pershing was not a student of war, at least to the extent that were Maj. Gen. John F. Morrison and Lt. Gen. Hunter Liggett of his generation or even General Douglas MacArthur and Lt. Gen. George Patton of the next. But he was a battle-tried commander. When in 1917 President Woodrow Wilson

appointed him commander in chief of the AEF, Pershing had already served for eleven years as a general officer. (He reached flag rank at about the same time as Douglas Haig and Ferdinand Foch.) As a general, Pershing had commanded a geographical department in the continental United States, the Department of Mindanao in the Philippines during active operations against Moro insurrectionists, and the politically sensitive Mexican Punitive Expedition that responded to Francisco (Pancho) Villa's 1916 raid into New Mexico. By 1917 Pershing's experience as a commander was unrivaled among American general officers.[5]

As AEF commander in chief during World War I, Pershing was an activist leader. He frequently visited subordinate commanders and units, from the base ports of the Services of Supply to frontline combat divisions. He expected all of his commanders to be as active as he was and to have as firm a grasp of the details of their commands as he had of his.[6] If they did not measure up to his high standards, Pershing relieved them. Over the course of the war, he had a direct hand in relieving at least half-a-dozen division commanders, three during the hard fighting of October 1918, and two corps commanders. But as much as anything, Pershing set the tone, creating a command climate in the AEF that was intolerant of lackadaisical commanders who failed to maintain a firm grasp on their organizations or, worse in his view, did not achieve their assigned objectives.[7]

Pershing tried hard to shape the character of the senior officer corps sent to the AEF, in effect to mold it in his own image. Shortly after arriving in France in July 1917, he began communicating with the War Department in Washington about the personal characteristics needed in commanders. Because even generals commanding divisions would be subjected to considerable physical strain, Pershing wanted only officers with previous command experience who also were young and vigorous. He claimed that few French or British division commanders were over forty-five years of age and that there were few brigade commanders over forty.[8]

Despite initially asking for youth and vigor, Pershing in the end opted for experience and contemporaries. Twenty-nine U.S. Army divisions saw combat in France; forty-three officers commanded them in combat. Of these forty-three officers, forty-one came from the Regular Army, one was a Marine, and one a National Guardsman; thirty-four were West Point graduates, of whom ten had graduated with Pershing in 1886, while seven others had graduated with the preceding or succeeding classes. These commanders ranged in age from forty-four to sixty-one, but most were in their late fifties; their average age was fifty-six, considerably older than Pershing originally desired.[9]

If at the senior level the AEF officer corps was older, experienced, and familiar to its commander in chief, the junior officers were remarkable for their youth and inexperience. About 200,000 officers served in the U.S. Army during World War I. Fewer than 9,000 had been in federal service on 7 April 1917, when Congress declared war, and only 5,800 of them were Regular Army officers. Of all wartime officers, only one in six had previously served in the Regular Army or National Guard, even as an enlisted man. It was a very inexperienced officer corps.[10]

About half of the wartime officers received their commissions from one of the officer training camps established by the Army in the wake of the prewar Plattsburg Movement. The first series of these camps opened in mid-May 1917 with 38,000 candidates; three additional series followed. About 60 percent of the candidates admitted to the officer training camps ultimately received commissions. Significantly, most of the newly commissioned infantry, field artillery, and cavalry officers came from these camps. The officer training camp graduates represented a high-quality manpower pool, as most were college upperclassmen or recent college graduates, but the training they had received was brief and rudimentary. The three-month course included both basic training and leadership evaluation. The training entailed basic soldier skills, close-order drill, physical conditioning, weapon handling, and marksmanship, but little elementary tactics. As a result, the courses at the officer training camps too often resembled recruit training, with little attention devoted to tactical skills and leadership instruction. Many of the failures in AEF small-unit tactics during the hard fighting of the summer and fall of 1918 can be attributed to these shortcomings in junior officer preparation.[11]

Clearly some of the senior Regular Army and National Guard officers were older and more infirm than Pershing had wanted, and most of the temporary officers commissioned from the officer training camps were inexperienced and undertrained. It should also have been clear that some in both groups would likely not meet the demands of command on the Western Front. Yet a system, a process, to deal with such potential problems developed quite slowly and was not fully operational until more than a year after the AEF arrived in France.

A series of AEF general orders, the first issued in November 1917 and the last in August 1918, spelled out the authority and procedures for relieving officers found wanting. Initially the procedures applied only to temporary, wartime officers, and the only disposition in the case of an officer relieved was dismissal from the service. Subsequent orders broadened the authority to cover regulars and National Guard officers as well. The orders also authorized the creation of officer efficiency boards to review the circumstances surrounding officers' relief, aimed at ensuring that no injustice was done. Finally, subsequent orders and instructions from the AEF personnel officer established a system that attempted to "salvage" most of the officers relieved. Although an officer might not be a suitable combat commander, he might, for example, be a satisfactory commander of a warehouse complex in the Services

Signal Corps photo

Casual Officers' Depot at Blois, January 1919

of Supply. With these procedures in place, officers could be reclassified and reassigned to other duty and not be lost to the service by discharge.[12]

In early January 1918 AEF General Headquarters (GHQ) established the Casual Officers' Depot at Blois in the Loire Valley to be administered by the Services of Supply. This depot originally served as a central distribution point for assigning throughout the AEF the large number of officers arriving from the United States unattached to a particular unit. But by March 1918 the depot at Blois had become the most important cog in the AEF's relief, reclassification, and reassignment system, because it is where reassignments were made. Those officers whom the Casual Officers' Depot could not reassign in their current grade were sent before efficiency boards that also met at Blois. These boards could discharge temporary officers and deprive Regular Army officers of their temporary commissions. Thus Blois, or "Blooey" in the vernacular of the AEF, became synonymous with failure and relief for cause.[13]

This reclassification and reassignment system was in place during the summer and fall of 1918 when the AEF engaged in its most active and largest operations and when the largest number of reliefs occurred. Nearly 1,400 officers eventually reported to Blois for reassignment with roughly 1,300 of them coming from combat units. They ranged in rank from second lieutenant to brigadier general and included 180 officers holding commissions in the Regular Army (about 100 held permanent commissions, mostly in the senior field grades, and roughly 80 were lower-ranking regulars with provisional commissions), almost 500 National Guard officers (mostly company grade), over 700 temporary wartime officers with commissions in the National Army (nearly all company grade), and 7 Marine Corps officers.[14]

About 12 percent of the 1,300 combat officers sent to Blois for reassignment returned to a combat unit, but not to the one from which they had been relieved, usually in a position of command. These were cases in which the officers responsible for the Casual Officers' Depot either deemed the original relief unjustified or believed simply "that better material was not available to replace them." A somewhat larger group, about 21 percent of the total, were returned to the United States or ordered discharged from the service in France. These were the "unsalvagables." By far the majority, about 67 percent, of officers relieved from their assigned duty and sent to Blois were reclassified and reassigned to other duties in the AEF, mostly in the Services of Supply. Thus many competent officers, some of them quite experienced and many technically trained, were not lost to the AEF, despite their shortcomings as combat commanders. While fewer than 5 percent of the officers retained in the AEF after being sent back to Blois were demoted, that was the fate of nine of the ten general officers who remained in France after reclassification.[15]

One negative sidelight to the reclassification and reassignment effort, however, was that some came to see the Services of Supply as a "dumping

Signal Corps photo

General Boardman and his staff in Alsace in early June 1918

ground." Indeed, Maj. Gen. James G. Harbord, the commanding general of the Services of Supply, complained to a friend: "All kinds of misfits from the grade of Brigadier General down come here. . . . Of course, each one of those men comes with more or less of a past to live down, and arrives in a very grouchy frame of mind and generally with a strong belief that he has been wronged." Harbord personally handled the cases of each of the general officers sent to his command for reclassification, and his deputy chief of staff, Col. John P. McAdams, interviewed senior field-grade officers prior to the reassignment. A lieutenant colonel interviewed more junior officers sent for reclassification.[16]

A close examination of several specific cases of officers relieved for cause will provide a clearer indication of how the process actually worked, what sort of circumstances led to officers being relieved, and a determination as to how "wronged" some of the relieved officers might have been.[17]

In 1918 Brig. Gen. Charles R. Boardman was the fifty-eight year old commander of the 64th Infantry Brigade, 32d Division. The division consisted largely of National Guardsmen from Michigan and Wisconsin. Boardman himself was a longtime militia officer, and prior to the war he had served as the adjutant general of Wisconsin.

The 32d arrived overseas in February 1918 and during that spring served with the French occupying a quiet sector of the line in Alsace. This was not especially rigorous duty, but it did serve as a testing ground for commanders and troops alike. On the basis of the division's service in Alsace, the division commander, Maj. Gen. William G. Haan, acting with the advice of Brig. Gen. Harold B. Fiske and Maj. Gen. André W. Brewster, the head of the GHQ Training Section (G-5) and the inspector general of the AEF, respectively, determined that Boardman was not capable of leading his brigade in active operations, principally on account of

physical debilities. In late June 1918 Haan asked Boardman to relinquish command of the unit voluntarily. Boardman agreed, acknowledging his physical limitations, and tendered his resignation, effective upon his return to the United States. Few cases of relief were resolved so easily and with such mutually agreeable results.[18]

Brig. Gen. Henry Root Hill, another longtime militia officer, was a forty-two year old brigade commander in 1918. He commanded the 65th Infantry Brigade, 33d Division, which consisted mostly of Illinois guardsmen. Hill, a furniture dealer from Quincy, Illinois, had been in the militia since 1894 and had risen to the rank of brigadier general by 1914. In 1916 and early 1917, when most units in the Illinois National Guard provided support to the Mexican Punitive Expedition, Hill commanded a brigade for nine months along the Mexican border. Following the declaration of war, Hill returned to federal service in July 1917, again as a brigade commander. The 33d Division initially trained at Camp Logan, Texas; went overseas in May 1918; and during the early summer of that year trained with the British and Australians in the Amiens Sector.[19]

Although his battalions and companies spent time in the line, Hill only served as an observer at an Australian brigade headquarters. He never exercised command as a general officer in active operations overseas during 1918. Despite his previous experience commanding a brigade for six months under strenuous conditions along the Mexican border, his division commander, Maj. Gen. George Bell Jr., reported that Hill was "not considered qualified to command an infantry brigade of a combat division on active service." Bell stated that Hill lacked sufficient military education and experience. He also admitted his concern that Hill, as the senior brigadier, was in line to assume command of the division should anything happen to Bell. Some accounts also attribute the relief to Bell's anger over some of Hill's troops not wearing their steel helmets during a training exercise.[20]

Signal Corps photo

Battlefield cemetery near Epionville, containing cross at left marking the grave of Major Hill, January 1919

After Hill was ordered to Blois in July 1918, General Harbord reported to Pershing that he had no need for his services as a general officer in the Services of Supply. Pershing evidently felt the same way, and Hill was recommended for discharge as a general officer and offered a commission as a major. Hill, nevertheless, remained determined to serve in the war. On 29 August 1918 he wrote to Maj. Gen. Charles H. Muir, then commanding the 28th Division, whom Hill had known from previous service before the war. Hill asked to serve in a combat unit in Muir's division: "I wish service at the front and will take anything to get it." Muir informed the adjutant general of General Headquarters, AEF, that "he would be very glad to have" Hill as an infantry replacement officer. When a vacancy occurred, Hill became a battalion commander in the 128th Infantry Regiment in General Haan's 32d Division.[21] On 16 October 1918, while leading his battalion in the Meuse-Argonne campaign north of Romagne-sous-Montfaucon, Hill was killed in action. He was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross for the action in which he died. Suitably, in 1921 when Hill's body was returned to Illinois for burial, he received all honors due a brigadier general.[22]

National Guard officers were not the only ones facing relief and reclassification in the AEF. In 1918 Col. Cromwell Stacey was a forty-two-year-old Regular Army officer. He had entered the Marine Corps as a drummer when he was sixteen, served three years as an Army enlisted man, became an Army lieutenant in the Spanish-American War, and graduated from the Infantry and Cavalry School at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, in 1903.[23] In early August 1918 Stacey received command of the 30th Infantry Regiment, 3d Division, a solid regiment that had recently performed quite well on the defensive at Chateau

Thierry. Stacey had commanded the regiment for less than two months when the division commander, Maj. Gen. Beaumont B. Buck, learned that Stacey "did not have the cooperation of his officers." In fact, he had alienated most of his subordinate commanders, perhaps because Stacey had wanted to replace ten of them for incompetence. But the division chief of staff and inspector general assured Buck that at least seven of the ten had excellent records, were thoroughly competent, and well-suited for their positions. Buck assigned another officer from division headquarters, Lt. Col. Jesse Gaston, to the regiment in an effort to strengthen the command structure and sooth the personal relations among the regimental officers. Not surprisingly, within days Stacey wanted to relieve Gaston, whom he declared to be pig-headed, obstinate, and pessimistic. This was entirely contrary to Gaston's reputation as an officer of quiet dignity and demeanor who was well liked by his fellow officers. It became clear to Buck that Stacey alone was the problem. Buck asked that Stacey be relieved from command of the 30th Infantry as "temperamentally unfit for the command of a regiment."[24]

On 21 September 1918 the Personnel Bureau at GHQ issued the orders which relieved Stacey from the 3d Division. But amazingly, given Buck's characterization, the same orders reassigned Stacey to command a regiment in the 77th Division. This was particularly unfortunate because the 77th would be one of the nine assault divisions in the Meuse-Argonne offensive that was slated to begin two days after Stacey reported to his new regiment. During the initial phase of the offensive, the 77th Division occupied the extreme left flank of the First Army front. The division sector consisted largely of the heavily wooded denseness of the Argonne Forest.

Stacey's regiment, the 308th Infantry, was in brigade reserve during the first phase of the operation, which began on 26 September. But in the series of attacks commencing on 2 October,

Signal Corps photo

Colonel Stacey in France in 1918

the 308th was in the vanguard of the division. On that day six companies of Stacey's regiment, plus one company of the 307th Infantry and parts of two companies of the 306th Machine Gun Battalion, advanced nearly to the division's objective for that day. But this force far outstripped the advance of units on both of its flanks. It became pinned in a ravine and surrounded as German units refilled the gaps through which the American troops had earlier advanced. This, of course, was the episode of the "Lost Battalion." The units were by no means lost, but they remained surrounded for five days.[25]

Colonel Stacey was not principally at fault for the original plight of the surrounded companies. The failure was that of the adjacent units to advance as far and to protect their flanks. But on 4 October, after his brigade commander, Brig. Gen. Evan Johnson, pressed him to use his remaining companies and the division reserve to relieve the surrounded companies, which Stacey attempted to do without success, Stacey lost his nerve, said that he would rather be in the Services of Supply, and asked Johnson to relieve him. Evidently believing that Stacey's morale might rebound, Johnson declined. The next morning, when the division commander, Maj. Gen. Robert Alexander, learned of Stacey's request, he ordered Johnson to relieve Stacey immediately. Stacey was sent to a hospital in the rear and on 21 October sailed back to the United States. Following General Alexander's recommendation, Stacey was returned to his permanent Regular Army rank of major four days later.[26]

Just as he had managed to obtain a second regimental command in France, Stacey successfully salvaged his Army career. In 1920 Stacey had to appear before the so-called Class-B board of general officers established to eliminate inefficient officers from the service by National Defense Act approved in June of that year. But Stacey's counsel during the proceedings, Maj. John C. H. Lee, argued his case well, presented evidence of mitigating circumstances, solicited support from high officials, and convinced the board to retain Stacey in the Army. On 1 October 1920, after the Regular Army had been expanded, Stacey was again promoted to colonel based on his longevity of service. Although the permanent establishment was subsequently reduced in size, Stacey remained a colonel for another ten years until he retired from the Army in 1930.[27]

Another Regular Army officer who seemingly got two chances to prove his mettle at command in the AEF was fifty-six-year-old Brig. Gen. Robert. H. Noble. A graduate of both West Point and the Army War College and the holder of a law degree from the University of Maryland, Noble had served as an aide to Maj. Gen. William R. Shafter and been cited for heroism in 1898 before Santiago, Cuba. In 1902–08 he had served as aide-de-camp to four successive governors general of the Philippines, including future president William Howard Taft. He also commanded an infantry regiment in Mexico during the last three months of the Punitive Expedition led by General Pershing and in the summer of 1917 commanded federal troops in Chattanooga, Tennessee, during labor unrest there. He went to France in the spring of 1918 unassigned to a particular unit.[28]

From May through July 1918 GHQ temporarily attached Noble to the 77th Division and more briefly to several other divisions "for instructional purposes," so that he could observe and learn how to administer and lead an infantry brigade in combat. The 77th Division was the first National Army division, composed of draftees, to reach France, and its commander, Maj. Gen. George B. Duncan, was among the AEF's most experienced troop commanders. Duncan had sailed to Europe in June 1917 at the head of a regiment in the first U.S. division to go to France; had served individually with French forces before Verdun in August 1917, receiving a Croix de Guerre for this combat action; and had commanded the 1st Brigade, 1st Division, for eight months before assuming command of the 77th Division in May 1918.[29]

At the conclusion of both of Noble's training tours General Duncan submitted very negative reports on his potential as a brigade commander. Duncan concluded that Noble lacked a "background of military knowledge and ability in directing the work of others" and that he remained "undeveloped in capacity for command." Duncan concluded, "I would not be satisfied with General Noble in command of a brigade in this division." Both infantry brigade commanders in the 77th also expressed skepticism of, or at best limited confidence in, Noble's qualifications for command at this level.[30]

On 11 August 1918 Noble received orders relieving him from the 77th Division and directing him to report to Blois for reclassification. But before any reclassification could be made, the AEF Personnel Bureau assigned Noble to report to the 79th Division to command the 158th Infantry Brigade. The assignment was unfortunate because the 79th was then one of the least experienced divisions in the AEF. It had completed but a small part of its training cycle in the United States and had spent most of its time in France enroute to the front. Yet the division received one of the most important

Signal Corps photo

Generals Duncan and Noble in France in 1918

and difficult tasks in the initial Meuse-Argonne assault.

Early on 26 September, the first day of the attack, the division was to take Montfaucon, a village situated on the highest ground in the area. These heights dominated the center of the First Army's zone of operations. Moreover, Montfaucon was only an intermediate objective for the 79th, which was supposed to advance to near Nantillois, some three kilometers beyond Montfaucon, by nightfall. The 37th Division was on the 79th Division's left, and the battle-tested 4th Division was on its right. The 79th attacked with the 157th Infantry Brigade leading the assault, two regiments abreast—the 313th Infantry on the left and the 314th Infantry on the right. General Noble's 158th Infantry Brigade was in support, initially about 1,000 meters behind the assault brigade with its regiments also abreast—the 316th on the left and the 315th on the right.[31]

The attack of the 79th Division began at 0530 hours on 26 September. Initial progress was good, with the division encountering little enemy resistance. As the attack progressed during the morning, however, enemy fire increased, progress slowed, and gradually the attacking companies and battalions became intermixed. Liaison between adjacent units and communications between command echelons broke down. By midday it was clear the division would not take Montfaucon by nightfall, much less get to its first day's final objective on the Kriemhilde Stellung beyond. But there was much pressure on the division from corps and army headquarters to do so because both of the adjacent divisions, the 37th and 4th, had made considerably more progress than the 79th. Those divisions had, in fact, advanced twice as far as the 79th and reached positions beyond Montfaucon.

During the evening of 26 September the 79th Division received orders from Fifth Corps to take Montfaucon that night and move abreast of the divisions on its flanks. About midnight Maj. Gen. Joseph Kuhn, a career engineer officer who had served as military attaché in Berlin in 1915–16 and had commanded the 79th Division since August 1917, received a message from General Pershing himself ordering the 79th to advance with all possible energy. At that time, division headquarters was not even in contact with the headquarters of the assault brigade. Consequently, at 0115 hours on 27 September Kuhn ordered Noble, commanding the support brigade with which Kuhn could communicate, to advance at once with his 315th Infantry, the support regiment on the right of the division sector. Kuhn also realigned the brigade structure in his division, assigning to Noble's brigade the 314th Infantry, the right hand assault regiment previously assigned to the 157th Brigade.

Before ordering an advance, Noble sent out runners and his aides in an effort to determine the location and situation of his troops. He thought it was particularly important to learn the disposition of the 314th Infantry, his newly acquired regiment, so that the

Signal Corps photo

General Kuhn, at right, with General Claudet, commander of the French 17th Army Corps

314th and 315th would not mistakenly fire on each other, and to clear out the German machine-gun nests that remained between the two regiments. When General Kuhn arrived at Noble's command post about 0600 hours on 27 September, he discovered that the 315th Infantry had not yet begun to move as he had ordered nearly five hours earlier. As a result, he relieved Noble on the spot.[32]

Noble thought the relief entirely unjustified. "I was relieved at dawn after a day and night of the strain and excitement of battle—the first experience of our division in action—under the condition of expressed disappointment of Corps and Army commanders at the progress made; after a failure of liaison in the division causing the elements to get out of hand. . . . These are factors for which I can not justly be held accountable." When the AEF inspector general, General Brewster, who was a Medal of Honor recipient, investigated the matter two weeks after the events, he reached a different conclusion: "That General Noble failed to take the proper steps to carry out his orders; that he was unable to come to a decision, and lacked initiative and command. . . . I do not believe that General Noble has the leadership and initiative to command a brigade of infantry."[33] That, of course, is the identical conclusion reached by the division and brigade commanders of the 77th Division with whom Noble had served during the spring and summer of 1918.

There is probably some question as to how justified Kuhn was in relieving Noble. Was Noble simply a victim of the tactical circumstances, or was he insufficiently aggressive in trying to shape those circumstances? In light of his unhappy experience with the 77th Division, perhaps the more perplexing question is why Noble had command of the 158th Infantry Brigade in the first place. Regardless, Noble was sent to Blois and on 12 November 1918 reverted to his permanent rank of colonel. He served in the Services of Supply until March 1919, including seven weeks in command of the Monaco Leave Area, and then returned to the United States. From then until his retirement in 1922, Noble was in charge of militia affairs at Western Department headquarters in San Francisco.[34] His career, however, had effectively ended with his relief on the second day of the Meuse-Argonne offensive.

One of the worst tactical breakdowns in the AEF occurred in the 5th Division during the second phase of the Meuse-Argonne offensive. The division commander at the time was Maj. Gen. John E. McMahon, a fifty-seven-year-old Regular Army officer who was a West Point classmate of Pershing. Since January 1918 McMahon had commanded the division as it trained in the United States, moved overseas, and served in quiet sectors at the front. From 12 to 16 September the 5th Division took part in the St. Mihiel attack, and it was thus unavailable for the initial stages of the Meuse-Argonne operation.[35]

McMahon evidently had some opportunity to learn and develop as a combat commander. Unfortunately, he seems not to have taken advantage

of the situation. The division chief of staff later remarked that McMahon had slept through most of the St. Mihiel fight and on occasion took as long as forty-five seconds to sign his name.[36] His weaknesses had not gone unnoticed at GHQ. In July 1918 Brig. Gen. Harold B. Fiske, head of the AEF's Training Section, reported that McMahon "lacks decision, aggressiveness, tactical knowledge, and physical strength."[37] Those with doubts about McMahon's effectiveness included the AEF commander in chief. Before the 5th Division joined the Meuse-Argonne offensive, Pershing told visiting Secretary of War Newton Baker that he wished to remove him and two other major generals from their commands and have them transferred to the United States without loss of rank, possibly to command training camps or newly raised divisions. Although Pershing had full authority to relieve these commanders, on 11 October he cabled the Army chief of staff formally requesting permission to send these officers back home. But he let McMahon lead his division into the Meuse-Argonne battle as he awaited a response from Washington.[38]

Also on 11 October the 5th Division began to relieve the 80th Division, one of the original Meuse-Argonne assault divisions, in the vicinity of Cunel. For the next week both brigades of the 5th Division were on the attack. The principal assault began on 14 October when the 10th Infantry Brigade attacked toward the northwest across generally open ground in an effort to converge with a northeasterly push by the 42d Division designed to outflank the heart of the German defenses in the Bois de Romagne and the Bois de Bantheville. The 32d Division was ordered to advance north between the 5th and 42d toward the center of those defenses. McMahon ordered the 5th Division's 9th Infantry Brigade, commanded by Brig. Gen. Joseph C. Castner, to protect the right flank of the 10th by attacking northward through the thickly wooded terrain of the Bois de la Pultière and into the Bois des Rappes. Castner later stated that the fighting of his brigade in this area was the most difficult faced by the division during the war. He reported that Lt. Col. Philip Peyton of the 60th Infantry, which initiated his brigade's attack, declared the wooded terrain of the Bois de la Pultière "worse than any Philippine Jungle he ever saw."[39]

Signal Corps photo

General McMahon, third from right, and members of his staff near Montfaucon on 15 October 1918

Into this dense forest and the Bois des Rappes, just to the north, McMahon eventually pushed the entire 9th Brigade, irrespective of any means by which he could keep in touch with its elements or their ability to maneuver in the forest. McMahon's corps commander, Maj. Gen. John L. Hines, later stated he would not have put more than two battalions into such a congested area. Aided by elements of the 3d Division, which attacked to the right of the 5th, the 60th Infantry took the Bois de la Pultière on 14 October, but not before four companies of the regiment became intermixed with the 3d Battalion, 11th Infantry, of the 10th Infantry Brigade on its left.[40]

Across a narrow clearing from the Bois de la Pultière was the larger, more heavily defended Bois des Rappes. At 0800 hours on 15 October both the 60th and 61st Infantry Regiments, constituting Castner's entire brigade, attacked into the Bois des Rappes, and by late afternoon elements of these units held the northern edge of that woods. This success, unfortunately, was soon squandered. That afternoon Col. Hugh D. Wise of the 61st Infantry, whom the French had awarded a Croix de Guerre for his active leadership while under French command in the Vosges in June but whose subsequent effectiveness Castner had questioned, reported that all his officers had been killed and that the U.S. troops in the northern part of the Bois des Rappes were in retreat under heavy German counterattack. Although the brigade had suffered extremely heavy casualties,

Author's photo

Western edge of the Bois de la Pultière, June 1983

Author's photo

Northern section of the Bois des Rappes, looking east, June 1983

Wise's report was not true. The brigade commander, General Castner, realized this once he went forward to investigate, and he thus ordered that the positions taken on the north edge of the woods be held and reinforced.[41]

General Hines, who had assumed command of the Third Corps just three days earlier, gave more credence to the disturbing reports from the front, which only strengthened doubts he already harbored about McMahon. Hines concluded that McMahon had contravened a decision Pershing had made on 30 September "not to allow divisions to attack with their four regiments on the line" but instead to have each brigade attack "with one regiment behind another." General Pershing, who was touring the division command posts that day and who had already decided it would be best to reassign McMahon to duties in the Zone of the Interior, agreed with Hines that McMahon had not properly deployed his division. Hines sent McMahon forward "to reorganize and re-establish his division in depth." Despite receiving a detailed and upbeat report of the tactical situation from Castner, who observed that his brigade was then farther forward than any other troops under Pershing's command, McMahon, whom Castner reported "was feeling very badly and depressed," ordered a withdrawal from the northern reaches of the Bois des Rappes. The rattled division commander told Castner that this withdrawal had been ordered by Pershing and Hines, believing his troops were overextended.[42]

Hines considered McMahon's handling of the 5th Division from 12 to 15 October completely unsatisfactory and judged McMahon "entirely unfitted to command the division." He later stated that McMahon's worst error was the withdrawal of the units of the 9th Brigade from the Bois des Rappes, which, Hines said, he and Pershing had never sought, and Hines observed that "it cost the lives of many men and took six days to again gain the ground thus voluntarily given up at General McMahon's orders." But Hines learned of the withdrawal of the 9th Brigade elements from the Bois des Rappes after he had relieved McMahon. What actually cost McMahon his job was what his superiors saw as the poor tactics he employed and the weak leadership he demonstrated in handling the division. He had put most of his infantry into the line, leaving no reserve for support, maneuver, or exploitation. He had lost contact with and control over many of the components of the division and he could not account for many of his troops. Although the division suffered casualties during the period in question, straggling seemed to have sapped much of the division's combat power. In short, Hines concluded, the division lacked discipline, and McMahon lacked tactical skill.[43]

By the end of October 1918 McMahon was back in the United States commanding Camp Zachary Taylor, Kentucky. He retired as a colonel in October 1919 and died three months later in January 1920. Wise retired as a lieutenant colonel in the latter month. Hines succeeded General Pershing as chief of staff of the Army in September 1924 and remained a major general until his retirement in 1932.[44]

What generalizations can be drawn from these examples about the process of "relief for cause" in the AEF? Despite the obvious need and the seriousness of the problem, it took some time for a process, as system, to be put in place. Even in the last weeks of the war, particularly when it involved division and corps commanders, the prerogatives of the corps and army commanders took precedence over published orders, regulations, and any systematized effort at relief and reclassification. General Pershing's influence was evident throughout the process, as he had created a climate where all involved recognized that if commanders did not produce they would be relieved. For a number of reasons Pershing and the AEF could not afford weak commanders, particularly at the levels of division and above. Simple operational effectiveness and troop morale demanded it. But for reasons of interallied politics Pershing needed to demonstrate that U.S. officers were equal to the demands of modern warfare. The French and especially the British frequently criticized perceived weaknesses of U.S. combat leadership.[45] To deflect this criticism, Pershing had to demand high standards of his commanders and to act ruthlessly with those who fell short of the standards. In every instance where Pershing had a direct role, either relieving a commander

himself or confirming the decision of a subordinate to relieve someone, Pershing had first hand knowledge of the situation. For example, a case against General McMahon had been building at GHQ since July 1918, and Pershing actually visited 5th Division headquarters just before General Hines made the decision to sack him.

Commanders were relieved in the AEF for a variety of sometimes ambiguous reasons. But the specific circumstances leading to the relief in many instances was open to differing interpretations. Boardman's age and physical incapacity and Stacey's physical and emotional breakdown were reasonably perceptible, clear-cut situations. But General Bell's belief that Henry Hill lacked professional experience and education is somewhat more difficult to reconcile, especially because Hill had commanded a brigade for six months along the Mexican border. General Kuhn relieved Noble because he thought Noble had not complied quickly enough with orders to attack. But in his own mind, Noble felt he was being tactically prudent, not committing his forces before ascertaining the tactical situation of his own troops. Similarly Hines's relief of McMahon was not entirely clear-cut. It was not only McMahon's leadership, but also the terrain, fierce enemy resistance, and the mission assigned by Third Corps and First Army, that significantly affected the performance of the 5th Division. But in most instances of relief, there probably was at least a plausible case against the officer relieved; Stacey, Noble, and McMahon certainly left something to be desired as combat commanders.

In many cases where a commander was relieved at corps, division, and brigade level, the replacement officer by most objective standards was an improvement if not an outstanding commander. For instance, of the case studies described above, Boardman was replaced with Marine Brig. Gen. John A. Lejeune, who later commanded the 2d Division and who after the war served as commandant of the Marine Corps for nine years. Henry Hill was replaced by Brig. Gen. Edward L. King, who received the Distinguished Service Medal for his command of the 65th Brigade and his earlier service as a division chief of staff; after the war King became commandant of the Command and General Staff School and an assistant chief of staff of the Army. In a brief couple of weeks John McMahon's replacement, Maj. Gen. Hanson Ely, breathed fire into the 5th Division and led it in what was, at least by World War I standards, a spectacular crossing of the Meuse River and a breakthrough of the German line farther east. Two other examples, not described above, suffice to reiterate the point. In December 1917 Pershing replaced Maj. Gen. William L. Sibert as the 1st Division commander with Maj. Gen. Robert L. Bullard, who served with distinction in that command before rising to corps and army command later in the war. At corps level Pershing in October 1918 replaced the plodding Fifth Corps commander, Maj. Gen. George Cameron, with Maj. Gen. Charles P. Summerall, one of the most aggressive AEF commanders, its most skilled field artilleryman, and a future chief of staff of the Army. Pershing did have a marked ability to select able subordinates.[46]

The problem was that too few U.S. officers were as skilled in their profession as Lejeune, King, Ely, Bullard, or Summerall. To that extent the criticism of the Allies was correct. There simply were not enough professionally competent, experienced, senior American officers to fill all the combat commands in the AEF. That officers such as Stacey and Noble, who even before entering combat had been determined to have shortcomings as commanders, were given a second chance at command only reinforces this point. The dilemma was to ensure that the best qualified officers held the most important commands at crucial times. It also meant that unqualified commanders had to be relieved when circumstances required, and Pershing ensured that that would happen.

U. S. Army Art Collection

General Hines
by Joyce Ballantyne Brand

The Author

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NOTES

1. Robert Lee Bullard, *Personalities and Reminiscences of the War* (Garden City, N.Y., 1925), p. 115, 28 Dec 1917, based on conference with General John J. Pershing on previous day.

2. Allan R. Millett, *The General: Robert L. Bullard and Officership in the United States Army, 1881–1925* (Westport, Conn., 1975), p. 332.

3. Frank E. Vandivier, *Black Jack: The Life and Times of John J. Pershing* (College Station, Tex., 1977), p. 972.

4. Edward M. Coffman, *The War To End All Wars: The American Military Experience in World War I* (New York, 1968), pp. 141–42, 329–31, provides some detail on several of the more important instances of relief.

5. For good discussion of Pershing's personality, previous experience, selection as AEF commander in chief, and qualities as a commander, see Millett, *The General*, pp. 303–08; Coffman, *War To End All Wars*, pp. 43–46; Vandiver, *Black Jack*, pp. 593–99, 768–91; and Donald Smythe, *Pershing: General of the Armies* (Bloomington, Ind., 1986), pp. 238–45.

6. Pershing's personal diary, box 4, Papers of John J. Pershing, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress [LC], provides ample evidence of his travels as AEF commander in chief. During the period of the most active AEF operations, May–November 1918, Pershing spent at least 25 percent of his time visiting tactical unit commanders, whose units were frequently in contact with the enemy. His orders to other AEF commanders to visit their subordinate units and move their headquarters close to the front are discussed in Millett, *The General*, pp. 407, 410–11.

7. Coffman, *War To End All Wars*, pp. 329–31; Smythe, *Pershing: General of the Armies*, pp. 214–16.

7. Pershing to Adjutant General, War Department, Cable P-65-S, 28 July 1917; Cable P-208-S, 10 November 1917; and Cable P-1380-S, 27 June 1918, printed in Historical Division, Department of the Army, *United States Army in the World War, 1917–1919*, 17 vols. (Washington, 1948), 2: 22, 76, 486.

8. The commanders who led U.S. Army divisions in combat can be determined from Historical Division, Department of the Army, *Order of Battle of the United States Land Forces in the World War : American Expeditionary Forces: Divisions* (Washington, D.C., 1931). For data on the commanders' background, see *Official Army Register, 1916* (Washington, D.C., 1916), John A. Garraty and Mark C. Carnes, *American National Biography*, 24 vols. (New York, 1999), 13: 461; *Annual Report of the Adjutant General of the State of New York for the Year 1915* (Albany, N.Y., 1916), p. 69.

9. Leonard P. Ayres, *The War with Germany: A Statistical Summary* (Washington, D.C., 1919), p. 21.

10. Coffman, *War To End All Wars*, pp. 54–58; Historical Division, Department of the Army, *Order of Battle of the United Sates Land Forces in the World War: Zone of the Interior* (Washington, D.C., 1949), pp. 79–88; and John Gary Clifford, *The Citizen Soldiers: The Plattsburg Training Camp Movement, 1913–1920* (Lexington, Ky., 1972), pp. 229–55.

11. Ltr, Brig Gen Wilson B. Burtt to Commander in Chief, AEF, 23 Jun 1919, "Reclassification and Reassignment of Officers," and Rpt, Col John P. McAdams, Deputy Chief of Staff, Services of Supply (henceforth SOS), AEF, to CG, SOS, 15 May 1919, "The Reclassification System of the AEF (Blois)," both in folder 1, series 21, box 7, Papers of John J. Pershing, Record Group (henceforth RG) 200, National Archives Gift Collection, National Archives (henceforth NA). The report is extensive and includes numerous statistical tables and exhibits that reproduce the implementing orders, instructions, and memoranda relating to the reclassification system.

12. McAdams to CG, SOS, 15 May 1919, "The Reclassification System of the AEF (Blois)," pp. 1–8.

13. Ibid., Table 1.

14. Ibid., p. 18 (quote); Table 4.

15. Ibid., pp. 8, 12–13; Maj Gen James G. Harbord to Brig Gen Charles McK. Saltzman, Executive Officer, Office of the Chief Signal Officer, War Department General Staff, 18 Sep 1918, Vol. 8, Papers of James G. Harbord, LC (quote).

16. After the Armistice Pershing had the AEF Personnel Bureau prepare dossiers on a number of the officers relieved during the war. Fearing political consequences for the relief of National Guard officers, believed by some to be the target of Regular Army prejudice, Pershing wanted documentation to demonstrate that regulars, guardsmen, and wartime temporary officers were all treated fairly. The case studies compiled on 162 officers as a result of this effort provide a wealth of information on AEF leadership and tactics and were the single most useful source for this study. The initiating memorandum is Pershing to Chief of Staff, AEF, 27 March 1919, in Memos from the Commander in Chief, RG 120, Records of the American Expeditionary Forces, NA.

17. "Brief History in the Case of Brigadier General Charles R. Boardman," binder 6-a22, box 10, Papers of John J. Pershing, RG 200, NA.

18. Russell K. Brown, ed., *Fallen In Battle: American General Officer Combat Fatalities from 1775* (Westport, Conn., 1988), p. 62; Ltr, Brig Gen Henry Root Hill to Maj. Gen. Charles H. Muir, 29 Aug 1918, in "Brief History in the Case of Brigadier General Henry R. Hill," binder 6-a24, box 10, Papers of John J. Pershing, RG 200, NA; Historical Division, Department of the Army, *Order of Battle: Divisions*, pp. 195–97.

19. Maj Gen George Bell Jr. to Maj Gen G. W. Read, Cdr, Second Corps, 26 Jun 1918, p. 1, and Statement of Service, Qualifications, Etc. of Brig. Gen. Henry R. Hill, 6 Aug 1918, pp. 3–4 (quote, p. 4), in "Case of Henry R. Hill"; Coffman, *War To End All Wars*, pp. 290–91.

20. Harbord to Pershing, 16 Aug 1918; Hill to Chief of Staff, SOS, 29 Aug 1918; Hill to Muir, 29 Aug 1918 (first quote); Muir to AG, GHQ, AEF, 16 Sep 1918 (second quote), all in "Case of Henry R. Hill."

21. Brown, *Fallen In Battle*, p. 62.

22. *Official Army Register, December 1, 1918* (Washington, D.C., 1919), p. 591; *Official Army Register, January 1, 1930* (Washington, D.C., 1930), p. 606.

23. Maj Gen B. B. Buck to Pershing, 24 Sep 1918, copy in "The Relief and Reduction of Colonel Cromwell Stacey," binder 4-qq, box 9, Papers of John J. Pershing, RG 200, NA. Buck had assumed command of the division on 27 August 1918.

24. For accounts of the travails of the "Lost Battalion," see L. Wardlaw Miles, *History of the 308th Infantry, 1917–1919* (New York, 1927), Thomas M. Johnson and Fletcher Pratt, *The Lost Battalion* (Indianapolis, 1938), and Irving Werstein, *The Lost Battalion* (New York, 1966).

25. Testimony given by Maj Gen Robert Alexander, 7 Oct 1918, and Brig Gen Evan M. Johnson, 6 Oct 1918, to Capt. Albert T. Rich, Assistant to the Inspector General, First Army, in "Relief of Colonel Stacey"; *Army Register, 1918*, p. 591.

26. Lee to Maj. John G. Quekemeyer (Pershing's aide-de-camp), 21 Jul 1920, folder 14, box 21, Papers of John J. Pershing, RG 200, NA; *Official Army Register, January 1, 1931* (Washington, D.C., 1931), p. 912.

27. *Official Army Register, 1916*, p. 406; George W. Cullum, *Biographical Register of the Officers and Graduates of the U.S. Military Academy*, 9 vols. (3d ed., Boston, 1891–1950), 4: 395–96, 5: 364, 6: 387–88; *The Law School of the University of Maryland, 1892* (Baltimore, n.d.), pp. 7–8.

28. Cullum, *Biographical Register*, 6: 388, 444.

29. 2d Ind, Maj Gen G. B. Duncan to CG, Second Corps, 5 Jun 1918, to Robert H. Noble to Duncan, 19 May 1918; Memo, Brig Gen Evan M. Johnson for Duncan, 18 Jul 1918; Memo, Brig Gen E. Wittenmyer for Duncan, 27 Jul 1918, in "Brief History in the Case of the Relief and Reduction of Brigadier General Robert H. Noble," binder 2-x, box 8, Papers of John J. Pershing, RG 200, NA.

30. The description of the battle for Montfaucon in this paragraph and those that follow is based on Coffman, *War To End All Wars*, pp. 306–11, and Elbridge Colby, "The Taking of Montfaucon," *Infantry Journal* 47 (March–April 1940): 128–40.

31. 2d Ind, Noble to CG, SOS, 25 Oct 1918, to Memo, Maj Gen Joseph E. Kuhn for CG, SOS, 11 Oct 1918, in "Case of Robert H. Noble," p. 12.

32. Memo, Maj Gen A. W. Brewster for Chief of Staff, AEF, 16 Oct 1918, in "Case of Robert H. Noble," p. 25. General Kuhn reported his version of the events leading to the relief of Noble in a memorandum of 16 Jun 1929 to the American Battle Monuments Commission, File 717.9-C/MA, box 242, RG 117, Records of the American Battle Monuments Commission, NA. General Brewster had been awarded a Medal of Honor for heroisim while serving in China during the Boxer Rebellion. See U.S. Senate, Committee on Veterans' Affairs, *Medal of Honor Recipients, 1863–1978*, Sen. Comm. Print 3, 96th Cong., 1st sess. (1979), pp. 386–87.

33. Cullum, *Biographical Register*, 6: 388, 7: 217.

34. Ibid., 6: 415–16, 423; Historical Division, Department of the Army, *Order of Battle: Divisions*, pp. 75, 79–85.

35. Ltr, Col R. B. McBride, Inspector, Third Corps, to Chief of Staff, Third Corps, 5 Nov 1918, in "Brief History in the Case of Major General J. E. McMahon, N.A.," p. 4, binder 1-g, box 8, Papers of John J. Pershing, RG 200, NA. Colonel McBride paraphrased Col. Clemont A. Trott, Chief of Staff, 5th Division.

36. Brig Gen Harold B. Fiske, "Memorandum for the Chief of Staff," 27 Jul 1918, box 8, Fiske Papers, RG 200, NA.

37. Cable No. 1778-S, Pershing to Army Chief of Staff and Secretary of War, 11 Oct 1918, folder 4, box 4, Papers of John J. Pershing, RG 200, NA; Cable No. 2058-R, Maj Gen Peter C. Harris, Adjutant General, War Department, to Pershing, 17 Oct 1918, in "Case of J. E. McMahon," p. 11.

38. American Battle Monuments Commission, *5th Division Summary of Operations in the World War* (Washington, D.C., 1944), pp. 29–30; Castner to Chairman, American Battle Monuments Association (*sic*), 13 May 1930, p. 10, File 710-5-G/MA, box 206, RG 117, NA; Castner to CG, 5th Division, 14 Oct 1918, in "Case of J. E. McMahon," p. 8 (quote).

39. "Statement of Major General John L. Hines re General John E. McMahon," responding to interrogatories from Maj Gen A. W. Brewster, 17 Oct 1918, in "Case of J. E. McMahon," p. 12; American Battle Monuments Commission, *5th Division Summary of Operations*, pp. 29–32.

40. Ibid., p. 33; Ltr, McBride to Chief of Staff, Third Corps, 5 Nov 1918; Castner to Chairman, American Battle Monuments Association, 13 May 1930, pp. 13–14.

41. Pershing's personal diary, 30 September 1918 (first and second quotes), 15 October 1918; Ltr, Hines to CG, 1st Army, 6 Nov 1918, and "Statement of Major General John L. Hines re General John E. McMahon," 17 Oct 1918, in "Case of J. E. McMahon," pp. 10, 12–13, respectively (third quote, p. 13); Castner to Chairman, American Battle Monuments Association, 13 May 1930, pp. 14–17 (fourth and fifths quotes, p. 16).

42. Hines to CG, 1st Army, 6 Nov 1918 (quotes); "Statement of Major General John L. Hines re General John E. McMahon," 17 Oct 1918.

43. Cullum, *Biographical Register*, 6: 416, 601, 712, 7: 329, 8: 86; William Gardner Bell, *Commanding Generals and Chiefs of Staff, 1775–1995: Portraits & Biographical Sketches of the United States Army's Senior Officer* (Washington, D.C., 1999), pp. 110–12.

44. Coffman, *War To End All Wars*, pp. 331, 339: Smythe, *Pershing: General of the Armies*, pp. 203–04, 206, 216–17.

47. Cullum, *Biographical Register*, 6: 359, 403, 627, 769; 7: 341, 422–23; Allan R. Millett, *Semper Fidelis: The History of the United States Marine Corps* (New York, 1980), p. 627; Coffman, *War To End All Wars*, pp. 329–30, 354–55.

In Memoriam: Brooks Kleber

Dr. Brooks E. Kleber, who retired in 1987 as the Center's assistant chief of military history, died on 9 November 2004. He was 85.

Dr. Kleber

Born in Trenton, New Jersey, Kleber grew up in northeastern Pennsylvania and graduated in 1940 from Dickenson College. World War II interrupted his graduate study in history at the University of Pennsylvania. He was inducted into the Army in August 1941; attended officer candidate school at Fort Benning, Georgia; and went ashore in Normandy on 11 June 1944 as a first lieutenant in the 90th Infantry Division. Fifteen days later he was captured by the Germans while leading a reconnaissance mission behind enemy lines in Normandy. His captors shipped him by boxcar to Oflag 64 in Poland and later marched him back to Stalag XIIC in northern Bavaria. He was finally liberated in southern Bavaria as the war in Europe neared its end. He entered the Army Reserve after the war and retired with the rank of colonel.

Kleber returned to his graduate studies after the war, earning a doctorate in history from the University of Pennsylvania in 1957. He worked in the Chemical Corps history office in 1950–63, where he collaborated with Dale Birdsell to write *The Chemical Warfare Service: Chemicals in Combat* (CMH, 1966), a volume in the United States Army in World War II series. He then served successively as chief historian of two major Army commands, heading the U.S. Army Continental Army Command's history office for ten years and the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command history office for seven. He came to the Center of Military History in 1980. Kleber served as chief of the Center's Staff Support Branch and deputy chief historian, before being named assistant chief of military history in 1983. In the latter two positions he focused on the Center's international, field, and military history education programs and on the publication by the Center of manuscripts submitted to it. His book reviews appeared in the *American Historical Review* and other journals. Most recently he contributed an account of his wartime experiences to *The Human Tradition in the World War II Era* (Wilmington, Del., 2001).

By the many in the military history community who came to know and love the man, Brooks Kleber will be sorely missed.

In Memoriam: D. Clayton James

Military historian D. Clayton James, author of an acclaimed biography of General Douglas MacArthur, died on 4 August 2004 at the age of 73. James earned both a doctorate in history from the University of Texas and a bachelor of divinity degree from Louisville Presbyterian Theological Seminary. He served for eight years as a Naval Reserve chaplain. His academic career included 23 years of teaching at Mississippi State University and eight years as holder of the John Biggs Cincinnati Chair in Military History at Virginia Military Institute. He also held the Harold K. Johnson Chair of Military History at the U.S. Army War College at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, and the John F. Morrison Chair of Military History at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and he served on the Department of the Army's Historical Advisory Committee. He was awarded the Civilian Medal for Distinguished Service by the Department of the Army in 1996. In addition to writing the three-volume study *The Years of MacArthur* (Boston, 1970–1985), James authored or coauthored several books on World War I, World War II, and the Korean War, as well as a history of antebellum Natchez, Mississippi.

Book Reviews

Battle: A History of Combat and Culture
By John A. Lynn
Westview Press, 2003, 352 pp., $27.50

Review by Alan C. Cate

Armies fight like they think and how they think about fighting depends preeminently upon culture, which differs widely over time and space, and continually evolves within individual societies as well. In a nutshell, that's the argument of *Battle*, a rich and wide ranging exploration of how ideas, beliefs, and values shape warfare. Perhaps another way to sum up John Lynn's new book is to observe that there are two kinds of historians. Resorting to some highly specialized language, these are lumpers and splitters. The former portray broad similarities and continuities in eras and societies, while the latter emphasize the differences. Lynn is a splitter and *Battle* in part is his extended argument with fellow military historian Victor Davis Hanson, whose work posits a "Western Way of War" that originated with the Greeks 2500 years ago and has persisted in the West (i.e., among Europeans and those subsequently influenced by them) ever since.

While Lynn applauds his principal foil Hanson, along with others such as John Keegan and John Dower, for bringing a cultural approach to the study of war, he faults them for either over generalizing or drawing the wrong conclusions from their analyses. His forensic method consists of teasing out the cultural factors contained in eight case studies spanning from the ancient Greeks to the Egyptian Army's breaching of the Suez Canal during the 1973 October War. Stops along the way include South Asia and China, Medieval Europe, the wars of Frederick the Great and Napoleon, and the World War II Pacific.

Lynn starts by convincingly challenging Hanson's belief in a continuous Western Way of War, predicated upon notions of "civic militarism" and seeking decisive battle, as "more fantasy than fact." (p. 25) While Hanson's construct works for most of the Classical period, Lynn demonstrates that it loses purchase by the time of the Roman Empire and is totally inapt in describing the West again until the Age of Revolution, beginning in the late eighteenth century, and after. As Lynn notes, "Professional Roman legionaries, Germanic tribal levies, mounted medieval aristocrats, and disenfranchised mercenaries of early modern Europe" bore no resemblance to the citizen soldiers of classical Greece or the Roman republic. (p. 26) Likewise, for much of European history, to include the Middle Ages and the Age of Reason, "armies were more likely to avoid than seek a confrontation in the open field." (p. 18) Further, and just as important, Lynn also challenges the corollary to Hanson's thesis, explicitly advanced by Keegan, of the existence of an "Oriental Way of War" based upon those stereotypically inscrutable traits of evasion and indirectness. In examining ancient Chinese and South Asian cases, Lynn, while acknowledging an overall penchant for subtlety in the conduct of war, also discovers great diversity "that belies broad generalizations about a single dominant Asian form of warfare." (p. 70) For example, the Chinese at times actually practiced a style of phalanx warfare akin to the Greek and Roman models emphasizing trained, mass armies engaging in close order infantry combat. Indian potentates on the other hand preferred strategies of battle avoidance. Lynn additionally shows how, over time, Asian military practice further varied as it interacted and fused in complex ways with Western forms that accompanied imperialism. An absorbing chapter on the indigenous sepoys who served the British *raj* in India nicely illustrates this. British weapons, tactics, and organization combined with native concepts of caste, honor, and community to produce a unique and often formidable military culture.

Lynn is interested in how militaries fight, not why societies go to war or what the experience of combat might have felt like to soldiers. It is somewhat paradoxical then, that *Battle* is more intellectual history than anything else. Throughout, the author makes much of the idea of "discourse," an academic term he borrows from cultural theory, by which he means the ways societies think about war. In turn, what Lynn wants to get at is the manner in which those discourses impact how militaries wage war. To this end, he reviews multiple discourses, including, but hardly limited to, those of chivalry, the Enlightenment, nineteenth-century Romanticism, and the Japanese code of *bushido*. When juxtaposed with the historical record, some discourses appear to mirror actual practice. For instance, the hyper-rationalism of Enlightenment Europe's prescriptive literature on warfare seems a good fit for Maurice de Saxe's campaigns and Vauban's siegecraft. On the other hand, chivalry is much less satisfactory in explaining the savagery of medieval combat. Lynn's project, however, is far more sophisticated than merely attempting

to measure the correlation between theory and fact. For Lynn, discourse also influences the ways that societies deal with reality. Medieval Europe, for example, created the tournament, and also the Crusades, as alternatives to the unchivalric practice of Christians slaughtering other—often innocent—Christians. Throughout, Lynn takes pains to acknowledge the tension between discourse, which tends to be prescriptive, and actual practice, which we understand through historical description. A cautionary note may be in order here: We never truly get pure, Rankean history "as it really was." Even the most scientific and "objective" accounts contain cultural bias of one sort or another.

Also running through the volume is a secondary, almost implicit, argument against the belief that material factors provide the best explanation for how militaries fight. While some historians and soldiers undoubtedly still adhere to this sort of technological determinism, Lynn takes it as a given that Keegan's seminal *Face of Battle* (1976) "began modern studies of war and culture" and decisively oriented scholars toward seeking cultural explanations for how militaries choose to fight. (p. xvi) When *Battle* treats technology, it is to observe that the ways militaries employ it is essentially a conceptual or cultural task. The preeminent example Lynn cites concerns the different paths the French and Germans followed prior to World War II in using the same technologies to produce widely differing armored vehicles and doctrine for their employment. Lynn also maintains that, just as culture affects technology, the reverse can also be the case. A fascinating instance concerns what he labels the "battle culture of forbearance" practiced by eighteenth century European armies. The introduction of firearms onto the battlefield required precise individual and collective drill to make them effective in combat. This same drill also served as a control mechanism, and made a premium of discipline and steadfastness. Good commanders and units held their fire until they saw the whites of their enemies' eyes not out of a desire to make some *beau geste*, but because this was how best to ensure that their fire was accurate and effective.

Battle offers enough insights and provocations to fuel dozens of arguments, seminars, and conference panels. Among these is a mini-essay on Clausewitz that seeks "to demonstrate that Clausewitz is culture" by showing how he has been read—almost deconstructed really—to have so many different meanings. (p. 201) Lynn also compellingly debunks the argument, currently fashionable in some academic circles, that American anti-Japanese racism was the principal determinant of how the United States fought World War II in the Pacific and especially motivated the use of the atomic bomb. To be sure, there was virulent racism on both sides, but Lynn concludes that while racism shaped the "experience of war" for Americans, it neither caused the war nor determined its conduct. He declares "The contrast in military cultures is ultimately more important and . . . more interesting than the phenomenon of racism" in explaining the "war without mercy." (p. 279) As examples, he cites the American emphasis on surviving to fight another day, reliance on material factors, and pursuit of rational political goals as opposed to the Japanese preference for seppuku over surrender, exaltation of the spirit, and view of the war as a divine contest. Finally, *Battle* includes a post-9/11 coda on "Terrorism and 'Evil.'" Lynn thinks that the war on terror requires a new American discourse on war. While in favor of a muscular response, Lynn urges Americans to avoid adopting a logic and discourse that ascribe a uniquely evil nature to our opponents, fearing a consequent neglect of the self-preserving restraints that modern Western culture has placed on traditional warfare. Certainly, some might counter, borrowing from Lynn's own case studies that often reveal gaps between theory and reality, that a discourse of simple moral clarity can readily coexist with a strategy that differentiates among threats and ways to meet them.

In sum, for Lynn, war is indeed the continuation of culture by other means, but these cultures are almost infinitely diverse and malleable. One thinks of a crude, simplistic illustration: popular images of the Jewish nation and the Japanese in 1941 and again in, say, 1967. Within a generation, the stereotypes had completely reversed regarding which people were viewed primarily as entrepreneurs and which were seen as a militant, warrior race. Lynn cites Clausewitz to good effect here: "Every age has its own kind of war, its own limiting conditions and its own peculiar preconditions." (p. 197) Agree with Lynn or dispute him, there is no question that *Battle* is an important and uncommonly stimulating book that deserves a wide readership.

Retired Col. Alan Cate was the director of the U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, in 2003 and 2004. He holds a master's degree in history from Stanford University and was an assistant professor in the History Department of the U.S. Military Academy. From 1997 to 1999 he commanded the 1st Battalion, 61st Infantry, at Fort Jackson, South Carolina.

Winfield Scott and the Profession of Arms

By Allan Peskin
Kent State University Press, 2003, 328 pp., $49

Review by Samuel Watson

This is the third Scott biography to appear in a span of a half-dozen years. Each has approached the subject from a different perspective: Scott as agent of Manifest Destiny in John S. D. Eisenhower, *Agent of Destiny: The Life and Times of General Winfield Scott* (New York, 1997); as seeker after military glory in Timothy D. Johnson,

Winfield Scott: The Quest for Military Glory (Lawrence, Kans., 1998); and now as leader in military professionalization in Allan Peskin, *Winfield Scott and the Profession of Arms*. Each perspective is viable, but the degree to which these authors have gone beyond narrative to support their interpretations varies a good deal. Eisenhower, an author of popular histories, largely repeated the structure and judgments of Charles Winslow Elliott's *Winfield Scott: The Soldier and the Man* (New York, 1937), the only really scholarly biography written before 1990. Manifest Destiny, either as idea or as the actual process of expansion, was little more than a gloss on Eisenhower's narration of Scott's career.

Johnson's research, documentation, and interpretive effort were much more complete, and it was unfortunate that *Agent of Destiny* came out just before Johnson's biography and largely absorbed its market. (This is a phenomenon one sees increasingly with the surge in popular history). Johnson hammered his point home in chapter after chapter; his Scott was a rather disagreeable fellow, the vain, irritable, self-aggrandizing Fuss and Feathers of legend. Johnson demonstrated that this image was more than legend. Scott spent much of his career "puffing" himself, and the more Scott condescended to rejoin mortal ranks by following the mannerisms of the gentleman, the more boring he became.

Yet Johnson went too far. While he credited Scott with great military ability and gave a nod in the direction of Scott's work at military professionalization, the quest for military glory seems a rather narrow peg on which to hang a career more than half a century long. Lust for glory cannot explain Scott's patient diplomacy with Britain in boundary crises in 1837–42 and 1859 or in South Carolina during the Nullification Crisis. Nor does it do much to help us understand Scott's concern for the clothing, feeding, washing, and housing of soldiers, or his pressure, contrary to the preferences of most of his subordinate officers, to halt the illegal assaults (usually blows and kicks, but sometimes more) against enlisted men common in the Army of that era. Hunger for glory cannot explain the "Anaconda Plan," Scott's prescient strategy for strangling the Confederacy through blockade. (Although it is fashionable to dismiss this plan as too sluggish to satisfy public opinion, readers should look to William W. Freehling's *The South vs. the South: How Anti-Confederate Southerners Shaped the Course of the Civil War* [New York, 2001], for a sense of how closely the course of the war actually followed Scott's vision.)

Allan Peskin's *Scott* follows the same narrative trajectory as his competitors. Because all three books tell essentially the same story, most readers can skip at least one of them. The one to skip is *Agent of Destiny*. It reads a bit more smoothly but is much longer, without adding much of substance to the story the others tell. Nor does its minimal documentation inspire confidence. Peskin has the advantage over Johnson as well as Eisenhower here, through his extensive use of internal Army correspondence preserved in the National Archives. Although Johnson used some of these sources, his greater reliance on personal papers probably helps to account for his emphasis on Scott's motives and personality. Perhaps because his doctoral dissertation addressed Scott's career before he became commanding general, Johnson did not use the letters sent by the commanding general in Record Group 108 at the National Archives, which are rather useful for examining Scott's tenure in that position. Peskin also provides about twice as much coverage of the 1850s and 1860s as Johnson.

How well does Peskin explore Scott's role in developing military professionalism? In a ten-page chapter devoted to it, he follows William Skelton's *An American Profession of Arms* (Lawrence, Kans., 1992) in recognizing that "in America the military is the oldest profession" (p. 58) and "its first big business." (p. 62) Examples of Scott's professionalism include his persistence in service (hardly a matter of military glory between 1820 and 1840); his impressive understanding of naval power and his cooperation with naval commanders, demonstrated in the War of 1812, the Mexican War, and the Anaconda Plan; and his departure from Mexico without public complaint when recalled by President James K. Polk. Peskin's account of Scott's generalship is notable for suggesting that Scott learned from the failure of his rigid, complex plan in the opening stages of the Second Seminole War in 1836 and thus showed far more flexibility in 1847. Though he still had difficulty in maintaining control over tactical formations in battle, which was perhaps natural in an era of such limited communications, his appreciation of joint operations, logistics, and the need to conciliate local public opinion, combined with his insight into the minds of his Mexican opponents, made him "truly the indispensable man" in the Mexican War. (p. 191)

Peskin is critical of the character and extent of Scott's professional vision, arguing that it "was surprisingly narrow." (p. 120) Perhaps the problem lies rather in Peskin's understanding of professionalism, exemplified by the view that Scott's *General Regulations for the Army* (Philadelphia, 1821) "was his major contribution to the professionalization of the American profession of arms." (p. 68) If so, the two pages he devotes to those regulations are insufficient. But Peskin seems to view military professionalism largely in terms of manpower policy and technology. Was the Army to be composed of long-service regulars or citizen-soldiers, and would its tactics adapt to changes in technology? These were and are two of the great questions in American military policy, but they are not the sum of professionalism. Peskin, like many other historians and political scientists, misinterprets the significance of the prevalence of citizen-soldiers in America's wartime armies. Scott and his fellow "professionals" mistrusted the discipline and capability of citizen-soldiers, but their objective was to maintain a monopoly of command over the militia and volunteers, not to fight major wars with the Regular Army alone. While

Peskin admits that the reduction in force of 1821 produced an officer-heavy Army that could more easily be expanded, he wrongly concludes that "the expansible army would prove inadequate to preserve its professional monopoly." (p. 61) On the contrary, the principal tactical, operational, and strategic commanders of the war with Mexico and the Civil War were Old Army men and West Point graduates. (As retired Lt. Col. David Fitzpatrick has argued in his doctoral dissertation and the *Journal of Military History*, we also need to reassess Emory Upton in this light. Doing so would go a long way toward a more accurate understanding of American military manpower policy and Army professionalism.[1]

The limits of Peskin's vision are further evident in his exaggerated assessment of the impact of the rifle, "which spelled an end to Scott's cherished professionalism." (p. 218) Scott was a practitioner of limited war, but the military profession gradually adapted to the challenges of developing industrial technology and mass armies. Professionalism is not synonymous with limited war. Indeed, only a profession—an occupation pursued by individuals dedicated to the in-depth study of its duties over long careers—could have adapted to the growing complexity of war; this complexity was the root of military professionalism.

Peskin has a far stronger case when he criticizes Scott for maintaining the Regular Army as an institution at the outset of the Civil War rather than dispersing its officers and noncommissioned officers to train the volunteers. But did Scott do so as a "technocrat who places loyalty to his profession above all else," as Peskin argues? (p. 59) Peskin recognizes Scott's fear for the Army as an institution but does not mention his concerns that the officer corps would become politicized and that its constabulary experience would be dissipated and lost. Most important, what would become of the concept of a career dedicated to education and training in the duties of military command? Scott should have distributed the Army's noncommissioned officers among the volunteers as troop trainers, but ultimately, many regular officers entered the volunteers, performing that function (along with essential logistical ones), while maintaining command over the major tactical and operational units of the Civil War armies and their commitment to a profession of arms. (Despite the notoriety of political generals, the great majority of Civil War corps and army commanders were or had been regulars.)

Professionalism is about generosity as well as study. Peskin observes that Scott's vanity was not Andrew Jackson's arrogance and that, despite his reputation for selfishness and ambition, "the soldiers under his care must have seen him in a better, and perhaps even truer, light." (p. 123) Scott's generosity was evident when he dedicated a copy of his self-aggrandizing *Memoirs* "from the oldest to the greatest general," Ulysses Grant. I wish that Peskin had devoted more attention to how Scott's officers and men saw him and to how his example, and his support for professional institutions like the Military Academy, encouraged professionalization. Doing so would have provided a fuller picture of Scott's impact and of the culture of professionalism he did so much to foster. That said, generosity compels me to recommend *Winfield Scott and the Profession of Arms* as the book to read about this key figure in the Army's development.

Dr. Samuel Watson is an assistant professor at the U.S. Military Academy, where he teaches U.S. history, the early republic, and the Civil War. His book on the Army officer corps in the borderlands of the early republic (1783–1846) will be published by University Press of Kansas in 2006; he is also working on a short biography of Winfield Scott.

NOTE

1. David J. Fitzpatrick, "Emory Upton: The Misunderstood Reformer," University of Michigan Ph.D. dissertation, 1996; David J. Fitzpatrick, "Emory Upton and the Citizen Soldier," *Journal of Military History* 65 (April 2001) 355–89.

The Loyal, True, and Brave America's Civil War Soldiers

Edited by Steven E. Woodworth
SR Books, 2002, 222 pp., cloth $65, paper $18.95

Review by Ethan S. Rafuse

In the introduction to *The Loyal, True, and Brave*, editor Steven E. Woodworth states that the book's purpose is "to present to readers—whether formal or informal students of the war—the sum of the research that has already been done" as well as offer "an invitation and a challenge to delve deeper into the literature of the Civil War soldier." (p. xii) No one familiar with Woodworth's many previous works on subjects ranging from the Confederate high command to the religious life of the common soldier will be surprised to find that he has successfully achieved his objective. He has produced an outstanding primer that all students of the Civil War, but especially neophytes (this book will make an excellent supplemental text for college courses), will find of value and interest.

Each of the book's eight chapters focuses on an important aspect of the Civil War soldier's experience, such as camp life, the horror of the hospital, battle, and the meaning of the war. Each chapter consists of an introduction by Woodworth, excerpts from soldiers' writings, and passages from writings by historians. Woodworth has done an excellent job selecting from the many primary and secondary sources available, and his introductions and commentary provide important background information that will help readers make sense of the material. In his analysis of sources, Woodworth's arguments are, on the whole, logical, clear, and balanced. It does not take much effort, however, for a perceptive reader to recognize that Woodworth clearly has his own views on the men who fought the war and the historians who have written about it.

In the past few years, scholarship on the common soldier of the Civil

War has finally moved out of the shadow cast by Bell I. Wiley's classic works *The Life of Johnny Reb* (Indianapolis, 1943) and *The Life of Billy Yank* (Indianapolis, 1952). While revisiting the questions as to what soldiers did and who they were that Wiley addressed so well, recent scholars have also engaged in a vigorous debate regarding why soldiers fought and the broader cultural forces that shaped their experiences. The man who ignited this debate, Gerald Linderman, argued in his 1987 book *Embattled Courage* that a Victorian ethos of courage was central to the soldier's experience and his motivation to fight. Linderman contends that disillusionment set in among the soldiers enduring the harsh realities of camp life and combat, leading to a disconnect between veterans and their society, which still clung to the ethos of courage. Although he provides excerpts from Linderman's book, Woodworth clearly has little sympathy for its argument. In his introduction for the chapter "On the Nature of Courage," Woodworth sets up his discussion by placing Linderman's work in the context of what he scornfully describes as "the post-1960s Zeitgeist" that believes "fixed values *must be* a fiction." (pp. 58–59) Certainly, as Mark Grimsley observed in a 1998 essay in the *Journal of Military History*, it is not unreasonable for readers to see in Linderman's work a skepticism toward war fostered by the Vietnam experience and a reaction against the chest-thumping jingoism of the Reagan years.

In 1997, however, Earl J. Hess in *The Union Soldier in Battle* and James M. McPherson in *For Cause and Comrades*, from which excerpts are also included in Woodworth's book, argued that Civil War soldiers were much more idealistic than Linderman had supposed and that this idealism remained firm throughout the war. Just as Grimsley has seen in Linderman's arguments echoes of a post-Vietnam mindset, one cannot help but wonder if a future historian might see in Hess's and McPherson's well-supported and effectively presented arguments some of the afterglow of the Persian Gulf War, a resounding American victory in a conflict that did not last long enough to give the soldiers who participated in it, or the American public, the sort of experience that fostered disillusionment after more costly wars.

Clearly, Woodworth is more in agreement with Hess's and McPherson's take on the fighting man of the Civil War. The potential danger, of course, is that historians who challenge Linderman's image of soldiers as "victims" of forces over which they have little control might go too far, ignoring or minimizing the true nature of war and resurrecting a romantic and sanitized image of war in general, and the Civil War in particular. Fortunately, Woodworth avoids this pitfall (as have Hess and McPherson in their works) by providing vivid testimony by the soldiers themselves on the realities of life in Civil War armies on and off the battlefield.

A major challenge for those seeking to understand the lives and analyze the motives of Civil War soldiers is overcoming the fact that analysis must be based on what soldiers were actually willing to write down. This fact, combined with the diversity of backgrounds, perspectives, and experiences of Civil War soldiers, makes any general conclusions regarding their motivations and responses to war inherently open to debate. *The Loyal, True, and Brave's* fine survey of sources and scholarship offers readers a wide range of evidence and interpretations that will help them gain a better understanding of the military experience in the mid-nineteenth century. It should also leave them wondering how the wars of the twenty-first century might influence future scholarship on the great American war of the nineteenth century.

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Black Soldiers in Blue
African American Troops in the Civil War Era
Edited by John David Smith
University of North Carolina Press, 451 pp., cloth, 2002, $39.95; paper, 2004, $19.95

Review by William A. Dobak

This is a book of essays about the U.S. Colored Troops, the all-black regiments of the Union Army that served during the second half of the Civil War and the early years of Reconstruction. At one time numbering more than 120,000 men, the U.S. Colored Troops were active in every theater of the war, from Point Lookout, Maryland, to Key West, Florida, and from the bluegrass country of Kentucky to the lower Rio Grande in Texas. The U.S. Colored Troops represented a considerable accession to Northern strength and helped to tip the balance of forces in the Union's favor at a time when draft resistance was widespread and states were offering extravagant bounties to attract recruits.

John David Smith, the North Carolina State University history professor who edited this volume, provides an introductory essay that covers the period from the outbreak of the Civil War, through the Federal government's decision to recruit black soldiers, to the bloody fighting of 1864, when the U.S. Colored Troops, in President Abraham Lincoln's words, "heroically vindicated their manhood." (p. 63) Smith's essay leaves the disturbing impression—as does a good deal of historical writing about the U.S. Colored Troops—that in the twenty-first century black soldiers' "manhood" is still open to question. It is as if historians and reenactors, black and white alike, are stuck in the era of the Second World War, agitating for "The Right to Fight."

The other essays fall into two broad categories: battle and non-battle. In the former category are discussions of U.S. Colored Troops units at Port Hudson (by Lawrence Lee Hewitt), Milliken's Bend (by Richard Lowe), Olustee (by Arthur W. Bergeron Jr.), Fort Pillow (by John Cimprich), the siege of Petersburg (by William Glenn Robertson), Saltville (by Thomas D. Mays), and Nashville (by Anne J. Bailey). The latter group includes treatments of personalities—Bvt. Maj. Gen. Lorenzo Thomas, adjutant general of the Army, by Michael T. Meier; Cols. Thomas Higginson, James Montgomery, and Robert Shaw, by Keith Wilson; and Chaplain Henry Turner, by Edwin S. Redkey; the all-black cavalry regiments, by Noah Andre Trudeau; a postwar riot in Charleston, South Carolina, by Robert J. Zalimas Jr.; and a case study of North Carolina's U.S. Colored Troops pensioners, by Richard Reid.

Students of the Civil War, and of the U.S. Colored Troops in particular, will recognize the names of several of these authors. Indeed, all but two of the essays in this book cite Trudeau's battle chronicle, *Like Men of War: Black Troops in the Civil War, 1862–1865* (Boston, 1998). Redkey's collection of soldiers' letters, *A Grand Army of Black Men* (New York, 1992), is a source for five of the essayists. Cimprich's articles on Fort Pillow appear in the footnotes of four essays. The authors in this collection are familiar with each others' work; many readers will be, too.

An especially interesting essay in the "battle" category is Robertson's "From the Crater to New Market Heights: A Tale of Two Divisions," which compares U.S. Colored Troops in the Army of the Potomac and the Army of the James, formations which fought side by side in the siege of Petersburg in 1864. Robertson contends that the Army of the Potomac's commander, Maj. Gen. George G. Meade, cared little for Colored Troops, while the Army of the James's Maj. Gen. Benjamin F. Butler trained his Colored Troops well and used them carefully. The Army of the Potomac's performance at the Crater in July and the Army of the James's at New Market Heights in September tell the story. (Students of the Medal of Honor will be familiar with the fact that most medals awarded to black soldiers in the Civil War were for valor on a single day in September 1864 at New Market Heights; all the recipients belonged to Butler's Army of the James.)

One of the essays that does not have to do with battle is Zalimas's "A Disturbance in the City: Black and White Soldiers in Postwar Charleston." When Union forces occupied Charleston in February 1865, some of the units assigned to the city were U.S. Colored Troops regiments recruited among former slaves in the Carolinas. The men of these regiments, along with black residents of Charleston, soon encountered the bigotry of white soldiers in the New York volunteer regiments that also patrolled the city. Deteriorating relations among black and white occupiers and black and white residents of the city culminated in a riot that July. The commander of the Department of the South, Maj. Gen. Quincy A. Gillmore, did little to improve the situation. He was the same general whose "timidity," as Robertson's essay points out, caused a Union force under his command that included Colored Troops to pass up a likely opportunity to seize Petersburg, Virginia, on 9 June 1864, when it was lightly defended, which could have eliminated the need for a determined siege lasting some nine months. (p. 173)

All in all, *Black Soldiers in Blue* constitutes an interesting collection of essays. It will be useful to those readers who seek information about individual battles and to those concerned with the U.S. Colored Troops' background—the process of organizing the regiments—and the postwar experiences of the soldiers themselves. Editing such a collection is no light undertaking, and John David Smith is to be congratulated for having done it.

Dr. William A. Dobak is a historian at the U.S. Army Center of Military History. He is the coauthor (with Thomas D. Phillips) of The Black Regulars, 1866–1898 *(Norman, Okla., 2001) and the author of* Fort Riley and Its Neighbors: Military Money and Economic Growth, 1853–1895 *(Norman, Okla., 1998). Essay contributor Dr. William Glenn Robertson is the command historian of the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.*

Reminiscences of a Soldier's Wife
By Ellen McGowan Biddle
Reprint ed., Stackpole Books, 2002, 257 pp., $12.95

Review by Roger D. Cunningham

In 1907 Ellen McGowan Biddle (1841–1922) compiled a memoir for her grandchildren, which was published by J. B. Lippincott. *Reminiscences of a Soldier's Wife* told of her life with James Biddle (1832–1910), a Regular Army officer who had retired as the colonel of the Ninth Cavalry in 1896. Stackpole Books has now made this account available once again, issuing it in an affordable soft cover edition with a new introduction by active Civil War historian Peter Cozzens.[1]

The memoir begins in 1866, as Ellen travels with her two small sons to join her husband in Macon, Georgia, where he is assigned to the federal occupation force. James Biddle had entered the Army as a lieutenant in the Tenth New York Infantry in May 1861 and become a Regular Army infantry captain in August of that year. He served from November 1862 to June 1865 as the colonel of the Sixth Indiana Cavalry and ended the Civil War with the brevet rank of brigadier general of volunteers. In 1865 he reverted to his Regular Army rank of captain. Although he did not again wear "eagles" on his shoulder straps for another twenty-six years, Ellen refers to him as "the Colonel" throughout her book.

As James Biddle and his lady move from post to post across the

country, Ellen's memoir presents ample evidence that Army life during the Gilded Age was hard for the soldiers and even harder for their dependents. The Army did provide for laundresses (four per hundred men), who usually married enlisted men, but as Peter Cozzens stresses in his introduction, officers' wives were "official nonentities." (p. viii) The government allocated no extra funds for their upkeep, and on the frontier the things that today's military wives take for granted—decent family quarters, schools for their children, access to medical care, commissaries, and post exchanges—were generally not available. The primitive nature of military life was underscored by the fact that the Biddles did not enjoy the benefits of indoor plumbing until they occupied the post commander's quarters at Fort Robinson, Nebraska, in the 1890s.

Frontier life included many dangers. As the Biddles crossed through "Indian country" in 1876 on the way to Fort Whipple at Prescott, Arizona Territory, then-Major Biddle handed Ellen a loaded revolver and reminded her never to let an Indian take her alive. There were also dangerous pests, such as the grasshopper plague that descended on Fort Lyon, Colorado. Ellen recalled that one afternoon, it "became perfectly dark. The sky was obscured by grasshoppers. They came in great clouds and ate everything in their passage." (p. 123) After feasting on leaves, gardens, and grass all night and the following day, the insects finally flew away.

Women faced the additional danger of giving birth without access to professional medical care. If their children survived to school age, and two of Ellen's six children did not, parents sometimes opted to send them back East for a better education. The Biddles' two oldest boys were placed in a school in Connecticut, and Ellen did not see them again for six years. In 1886, after seventeen consecutive years of service in Arizona and New Mexico, Major Biddle was assigned to Fort Myer, Virginia, enabling him to see his sons for the first time in nine years. Frontier Army families stoically endured these separations.

Ellen Biddle's reminiscences are not the most insightful of the few nineteenth-century distaff memoirs. For example, she fails to say a word about the life of the African American soldiers that her husband commanded for the last five years of his career. Her account also shows scant regard for dates. It does, however, offer an easy and pleasant read, while providing much useful information for anyone interested in the Indian-fighting Army's garrison life. The female eye saw many things that the "fascinating Sons of Mars" (p. vii) ignored, and as Edward M. Coffman points out in his superb book *The Old Army*, except for Elizabeth Custer, women who left accounts "were not as concerned with maintaining a reputation or of claiming their contribution to the great events of the era as most officers were."[2] One wonders whether similar accounts by military spouses will be available when the next century's historians and sociologists sit down to analyze life in the post-Cold War Army's first decade?

Retired Lt. Col. Roger D. Cunningham served as an infantry and military police officer in the United States and Korea and as a foreign area officer in Pakistan, Egypt, and Nepal. He was the U.S. defense attaché in Kathmandu in 1991–92. His article "'Recreant to His Trust': The Disappointing Career of Major James R. Wasson" appeared in the Winter–Spring 2004 issue of Army History *(No. 60).*

NOTES

1. In his introduction Cozzens maintains (p. xii) that Ellen McGowan was born in 1847, but library catalogs give her birthdate as 1841, and her entry in the manuscript population returns for Union County, New Jersey, in the Eighth U.S. Census (National Archives microfilm publication M653, roll 710, p. 507) gives her age as 18 in July 1860, which is consistent with a late 1841 birth.

2. Edward M. Coffman, *The Old Army: A Portrait of the American Army in Peacetime, 1784–1898* (New York, 1986), p. 496.

Bullets and Bacilli
The Spanish-American War and Military Medicine
By Vincent J. Cirillo
Rutgers University Press, 2004, 241 pp., $ 55

Review by Graham A. Cosmas

The Spanish-American War of 1898 was a small conflict with large consequences. Besides signaling the emergence of the United States as a power on the world stage with an overseas empire, the war led to major institutional changes in the American armed services, including reforms that laid the foundation of the modern United States Army. For the Army Medical Department, the war of 1898 represented a coming of age—clinically, organizationally, and in status and authority within the Army as a whole.

Vincent J. Cirillo, who holds a doctorate in the history of science and medicine from Rutgers University, tells the medical story of the Spanish War in *Bullets and Bacilli*. He bases his work on extensive research in the published primary sources on the conflict, including the annual reports of the War Department and the testimony received and report made by the post-war investigating commission led by Civil War Maj. Gen. Grenville M. Dodge. Cirillo has also consulted manuscript collections, among them the Walter Reed Yellow Fever Collection at the University of Virginia and the Spanish-American War Veterans and Widows Survey at the U.S. Army Military History Institute. His bibliography of published articles and books is exhaustive and covers both writings contemporaneous with the events that he describes and the subsequent medical and historical literature.

The events of Cirillo's story will be familiar to historians of the Spanish-American War and American medicine. After outlining the general course of hostilities, Cirillo describes the wartime expansion of the Medical Department and covers the story of surgery during the conflict. He turns next to the

war's medical disasters—the typhoid epidemic in the troop assembly camps in the United States and the malaria and yellow fever outbreaks that nearly destroyed the Fifth Corps in Cuba as an effective force. After recounting the Army's belated and frequently ill-managed response to the epidemics, Cirillo discusses the resulting public scandal and President William McKinley's formation of the Dodge Commission to investigate the conduct of the War Department during the conflict. The commission's recommendations, Cirillo points out, constituted a blueprint for the subsequent improvement of the Army medical service. Cirillo summarizes the contributions of the Army typhoid and yellow fever investigations, both led by Maj. Walter Reed, M.D., to medicine's knowledge of how those diseases were spread and how they could be prevented. Providing context for the American story, Cirillo concludes with a chapter on typhoid in the British army during the Anglo-Boer War, noting that the British made the same medical mistakes as their cousins across the Atlantic, with the same tragic results.

The U.S. Army Medical Department, like the rest of the service, entered the Spanish-American war woefully short of personnel, equipment, and supplies. As did the rest of the Army, it underwent rapid, often disorderly, expansion and struggled to keep up with fast-moving events. If it was lacking organizationally, however, the Medical Department possessed a powerful new weapon on the clinical side: the germ theory of disease that the medical profession had widely (though not universally) accepted by 1898.

During the war, Army surgeons greatly reduced the number of combat wounded who died of their injuries. They did this in spite of the fact that the high-velocity steel- and copper-jacketed rifle bullets used for the first time in the battles at Santiago de Cuba and elsewhere inflicted different and in some cases more severe tissue and bone damage than the low-velocity large-caliber slugs employed in earlier conflicts. Cirillo attributes this outcome to the surgeons' careful precautions against infection, a consequence of their adoption of the germ theory, and to their use of X-ray machines to locate bullet and bone fragments in wounds.

While the Medical Department recorded successes in surgery, its record in preventing epidemics of disease was dismal, even though Army doctors in this war had identified most of the organisms that caused the various ailments and the means by which they were transmitted. Most scandalous were the losses from typhoid in the large Army assembly camps in the United States. Among nearly 200,000 soldiers in those camps, most in volunteer regiments raised and officered by the states, there were more than 20,000 cases of typhoid and nearly 1,600 deaths. By contrast, combat fatalities in Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines numbered only 281. Yet by 1898, doctors had identified the typhoid bacillus and knew that the disease could be prevented by rigorous sanitary precautions.

Neglect of these precautions, Cirillo points out, led to the epidemics in the Army camps of 1898. The culprits in this negligence were not the medical officers, who could only recommend sanitary measures but not order that they be taken. Instead, regimental and company line officers of the volunteers, untrained in the proper maintenance of camps and ignorant of the military importance of preserving troop health, regularly ignored the remonstrances of their medical officers. Camps became cesspools, both figuratively and literally. At the largest concentration of volunteers, Camp George H. Thomas near Chickamauga, Georgia, Army medical investigators found "the sinks full to the top with fecal matter; soiled paper was scattered about the sinks." In the woods around one particularly noisome camp "fecal matter was deposited around trees, and flies swarmed over these deposits not more than 150 feet from company mess tents; the odor in the woods just outside of the regimental lines was vile." (p. 76) Regular Army units, commanded by men with campaigning experience, kept their camps cleaner and suffered less from the disease. Even Regular Army officers, however, too often viewed their surgeons as not quite real soldiers and treated their recommendations with indifference.

After the war, the Army took its hard-learned medical lessons to heart. The Medical Department expanded its system of sanitary inspections. At West Point, the Military Academy established a Department of Military Hygiene with a curriculum that covered all the requirements for keeping soldiers healthy on posts and in the field and emphasized the command responsibility of line officers for enforcing those standards. All cadets took this course. The General Service and Staff College at Fort Leavenworth (predecessor of today's Command and General Staff College) also instructed its students in military hygiene. Adopting other reforms recommended by the Dodge Commission, the Medical Department established a medical officer reserve, created a permanent female nurse corps, and stockpiled nonperishable supplies to support future mobilizations. Most important, the Spanish-American War taught Army leaders of all branches and at all levels that keeping troops healthy was an essential element in maintaining tactical and operational effectiveness. Hence, the medical officer had to be recognized as a full member of the military team.

Bullets and Bacilli tells the medical story of the Spanish-American War in a lively and authoritative fashion. The author's work is particularly strong on the clinical innovations, notably the Army's pioneering employment of X-ray machines. This volume belongs on the bookshelf of any student of military medicine and the Spanish-American War, alongside Dr. Mary C. Gillett's *The Army Medical Department, 1865–1917* (CMH, 1995).

Dr. Graham Cosmas is chief of the Joint Staff History Branch in the Joint History Office in the Pentagon. He was a historian at the Army Center of Military History from 1979 to 2001. He is the author of An Army for Empire: The U.S. Army in the Spanish-American War, 1898-1899 *(Columbia, Mo., 1971) and coauthor of* The Medical Department: Medical Service in the European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army in World War II *(CMH, 1992). The Center is currently preparing for publication his manuscripts "MACV: The Joint Command, The Years of Escalation" and "MACV: The Joint Command, The Years*

Stepping Stones to Nowhere
The Aleutian Islands, Alaska, and American Military Strategy, 1867–1945
By Galen Roger Perras
UBC Press, 2003, 274 pp., cloth Canadian $85, paperback Canadian $25.95

Review by James C. McNaughton

Galen Roger Perras has written a superb study of a little-understood theater in World War II, the fog-bound North Pacific, where the United States and Canada fought a prolonged air-land-sea campaign against Japan in the pursuit of uncertain goals. The harsh environment was matched only by the mind-numbing complexity of strategic planning. Because the region was such a strategic muddle and because Perras has done his job so well, today's service professionals can learn much from this study of limited war in a secondary theater. Today, as then, not all theaters are equal in the eyes of military planners, national leaders, and the general public.

Armchair strategists, including President Franklin Roosevelt, were quick to point out the potential strategic significance of Alaska and the Aleutian Islands, an archipelago that stretches like stepping stones from North America to Northeast Asia. In 1934 airpower enthusiast and former brigadier general William (Billy) Mitchell declared that "in the future he who holds Alaska will rule the world." (p. 30) But vision and reality were seldom so far apart. *Stepping Stones to Nowhere* begins by sketching American strategic thinking about the region from its 1867 purchase from Russia through the 1930s. During these decades severely constrained American resources and Canadian disinterest made concrete defense planning impractical.

The region burst into the headlines six months after the Pearl Harbor attack when Japan seized Attu and Kiska in the western Aleutians. Closer to Tokyo than San Francisco, these islands were the only North American soil that Japan held during the war. America had to do something. But what? By 1943 the United States had sent 152,000 military personnel to the region, had built the Alaska Highway, and had initiated the Canadian Oil (CANOL) project. The 7th Infantry Division was diverted from North Africa to recapture Attu in May 1943 in a bloody battle. The U.S.–Canadian First Special Service Force landed on Kiska in August 1943, only to discover that the Japanese had withdrawn. Nevertheless, taking Kiska cost 313 American casualties, primarily from friendly fire.

Lt. Gen. Simon Bolivar Buckner Jr., head of the Alaska Defense Command, wanted to push onward to Japan's Kurile Islands with up to nine divisions, a force larger even than the one he would lead in April 1945 to Okinawa, where he would lose his life. But in September 1943 General George C. Marshall and the Joint Chiefs of Staff vetoed any drive west from the Aleutians unless the Soviet Union should enter the war against Japan. The 7th Infantry Division moved to the Central Pacific and the First Special Service Force to Italy.

Perras's book is based on his dissertation at the University of Waterloo in Ontario; portions have previously appeared in the *Journal of Military History* and elsewhere. His account does not replace the stories of courage and endurance found in Brian Garfield, *The Thousand-Mile War: World War II in Alaska and the Aleutians* (Garden City, N.Y., 1969). Instead Perras has employed his considerable skill as a historian and archival sleuth to exploit archives in Canada and the United States to fill in the twists and turns of strategic planning.

Military planners will be interested in the author's description of early U.S.–Canadian joint defense planning, as well as the travails of Army-Navy cooperation on the American side. General Buckner reported to Lt. Gen. John L. DeWitt, commander of the Western Defense Command. The Navy's North Pacific Force commanders, Rear Adm. Robert A. Theobald and, after his relief in January 1943, Rear Adm. Thomas C. Kinkaid, reported to Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, commander in chief, Pacific Ocean Areas. The Joint Chiefs of Staff urged the Army and Navy commanders to work together in a spirit of "mutual cooperation," but this spirit was often lacking.

Also interesting is the story of how the Joint Chiefs of Staff handled local commanders on "minor fronts," men whom Marshall felt were often guilty of "localitis" (p. 54) and who in the view of one Pentagon emissary too often "regard their own action as highly important, when those higher ups do not take it seriously." (p. 91) Marshall fought and eventually won the struggle to ensure that Alaska and the Aleutians did not absorb more of the Army's resources than strictly necessary for the protection and recovery of American territory.

Perras might well have ended his book by describing the final sortie of the Navy's North Pacific Force and elements of the Eighth Army in August and September 1945 to take possession of key points in northern Japan after that nation's acceptance of the Allies' surrender terms. Instead he ends with the Soviet invasion of the Kurile Islands, which was not completed until 4 September 1945, two days after the formal Japanese surrender aboard the USS *Missouri*. He endorses Samuel

Eliot Morison's conclusion "that the Aleutian campaign had no appreciable effect on the wider outcome of the war." (p. 197) But for the student of Allied wartime strategy, the story sheds valuable light on policy-making for a theater burdened with a harsh environment, limited resources, and marginal importance. Planners were forced to make a realistic appraisal of achievable aims.

Dr. James C. McNaughton is the command historian of the U.S. Army, Pacific. He holds a Ph.D. in history from Johns Hopkins University and is a retired Army Reserve lieutenant colonel. His article "Japanese Americans and the U.S. Army: A Historical Reconsideration" appeared in the Summer–Fall 2003 issue of Army History *(No. 59).*

The Last Ridge: The Epic Story of the U.S. Army's 10th Mountain Division and the Assault on Hitler's Europe
By McKay Jenkins
Random House, 2003, 294 pp., cloth $25.95, paper $13.95

Climb to Conquer: The Untold Story of World War II's 10th Mountain Division Ski Troops
By Peter Shelton
Scribner, 2003, 275 pp., $24

Review by David R. Gray

Signal Corps photo

View of Riva Ridge, February 1945

As dusk fell over the Apennine Mountains in northern Italy on 18 February 1945, a small formation of specially trained soldiers set out to scale a steep, enemy-held ridge. Throughout that cold night troops from the 10th Mountain Division's 86th Mountain Infantry Regiment clambered up the heights of Riva Ridge. The ridge occupied a key piece of terrain in the Germans' defenses south of the Po Valley. The combined strength of Riva Ridge and the defense complex on nearby Mount Belvedere had stymied three offensives by the U.S. Fifth Army the preceding year. The mountain troops' assault, including a technical climb up a vertical cliff face by a platoon of experienced climbers, achieved complete surprise. Their seizure of Riva Ridge enabled the 10th Mountain's men to crack the fortifications atop Mount Belvedere, one of the strongest German positions in its Apennine defenses.

Stories of the 10th Mountain's dramatic climbs to glory in northern Italy abound in two recently published books, McKay Jenkins's *The Last Ridge: The Epic Story of the U.S. Army's 10th Mountain Division and the Assault on Hitler's Europe* and Peter Shelton's *Climb to Conquer: The Untold Story of World War II's 10th Mountain Division Ski Troops*. Both books trace the history of the division from the inception of its concept through the training of its elements and their commitment to combat as a division. Concluding chapters in each investigate the enormous postwar impact of 10th Mountain veterans on the skiing and outdoor recreation industries. Similar in focus to Stephen Ambrose's *Band of Brothers* (New York, 1992), these works approach their subject mainly through the eyes of the uniquely skilled soldiers of the U.S. Army's only mountain infantry division.

Jenkins and Shelton are experienced and skillful writers. Jenkins earned a doctorate degree in English at Princeton and is currently Cornelius A. Tilghman Professor of English at the University of Delaware. He is author of several books, including *The White Death: Tragedy and Heroism in an Avalanche Zone* (New York, 2000). Shelton, an avid skier and outdoorsman, is a correspondent for *Outside Magazine*. He previously worked as editor and columnist for *Ski Magazine*, where he authored several articles on the 10th Mountain Division. Both authors' enjoyment of mountain-related outdoor activities, concern for the environment, and knowledge of some of the 10th Mountain's postwar legacies in these areas sparked their interest in the unit's wartime history. Jenkins and Shelton's great respect for the

achievements of the American mountain soldiers resonates throughout their histories.

The 10th Mountain's wartime activation and combat record mirrored the pattern of other specialized formations in the Second World War. The unit's elite character stemmed from its preferred access to personnel and resources, an intensive training program, and the development of a unique set of tactical skills. Charles Minot "Minnie" Dole—an insurance executive, skiing enthusiast, and founder of the National Ski Patrol—originally proposed creating an organization of mountain troops to protect the American homeland modeled after the Finnish ski troops who successfully fought the Russians in 1939–40. In the fall of 1941, Dole convinced General George Marshall to allow the National Ski Patrol to recruit such a force from experienced skiers, climbers, and outdoorsmen. About half of the original mountain regiments filled their ranks with self-selected volunteers who had obtained letters of recommendation certifying their suitability for such an assignment. Dole's recruitment efforts yielded an odd assortment of European expatriates, wealthy ski enthusiasts, and adventure seekers. The mountain regiments underwent three years of extensive mountain and cold weather warfare training, first at Fort Lewis, Washington, and later at Camp Hale, Colorado. The time required to master their specialized skills and a lack of suitable missions delayed the commitment of these regiments to a theater of war. The 87th Mountain Infantry's deployment to Kiska in the Aleutians in August 1942 might have provided an early test of the special troops' expertise, but the Japanese had previously evacuated the island without a fight.

The entire 10th Mountain Division finally deployed to a combat zone in December 1944, making it one of the last American divisions sent overseas during World War II. During the lead-up to the Riva Ridge and Mount Belvedere assaults, only a few mountain troops had opportunities to use their skiing or mountaineering skills, as most of the unit's special equipment had failed to arrive in theater. After the aforementioned battles, the mountain soldiers spearheaded Fifth Army's advance toward the Po River Valley. The troops' superior conditioning and knowledge of mountain warfare greatly facilitated the advance, but the division's progress was not achieved without incurring heavy casualties. After crossing the Po, the 10th Mountain cleared the Germans from the Lake Garda region just as the war wound down. After four months of intense combat, the division returned to the United States and was inactivated.

United not only by years of training and living together, many 10th Mountain veterans had developed uncommon bonds through their shared love of the mountains and outdoor life. In the postwar era former 10th Mountain soldiers helped found many of the ski resorts and ski training programs in the United States. Freidl Pfeiffer, for example, founded the Aspen Skiing Corporation, while others like the Sierra Club's David Brower concentrated on environmental preservation. A co-owner of Nike Corporation, Bill Bowerman became an avid runner and developed the waffled-soled running shoe that became the industry standard. Motivated by their wartime experiences, 10th Mountain veterans like these made invaluable contributions to America's outdoor recreation industry and to the nation's environmental awareness.

In researching *The Last Ridge* and *Climb to Conquer*, the authors relied on both primary and secondary sources. Jenkins and Shelton conducted hours of personal interviews with surviving veterans, who also gave them access to personal papers and correspondence. Official documents and oral histories archived at the 10th Mountain Division Resource Center at the Denver Public Library provided invaluable insights into the unit's major personalities and events. The nature of their primary source material allowed both authors to paint intimate portraits of selected unit members' character and leadership qualities. The National Ski Patrol's "Minnie" Dole; world-renowned skiers Torger Tokle and Friedl Pfeiffer; and the division's commander, World War I Medal of Honor recipient Maj. Gen. George P. Hays, are just a few of the mountain men highlighted in both volumes.

While the two works have many similarities, there are differences in presentation and mechanics. The target audience for both authors is the general public and military history enthusiasts rather than specialists. Shelton's *Climb to Conquer*, therefore, avoids heavy documentation and quotes an occasional source in the text only when necessary. But Jenkins follows his academic training in documenting sources with spare, but meticulous, footnotes. While both authors discuss the general context of the 10th Mountain's combat employment, *The Last Ridge*'s examination of German strategy and tactical countermoves is the more thorough and enlightening. *The Last Ridge* also contains maps to orient the reader to the 10th Mountain's maneuvers during its Italian fighting. *Climb to Conquer's* lack of maps is a key shortcoming. Both works, however, are lively and clearly written, and both accurately portray the struggles of 10th Mountain soldiers during World War II.

These lucid and entertaining books add to the growing literature on the 10th Mountain Division's origins and combat achievements in the Second World War. Jenkins and Shelton's works will best appeal to soldiers—especially the division's past and present veterans—and the general public. Readers will gain a better appreciation of the unit's unique contributions not only to alpine warfare but also to this country's environmental awareness and love of outdoor fitness. Those interested in the wartime organization of elite, specialized units; training and small unit leadership; and soldiers' reactions to battle will also profit from the books' informative narratives. The contributions of these books to military history notwithstanding, I recommend both for their inspirational accounts of dedicated and determined mountain soldiers climbing to glory in war and peace.

Col. David R. Gray commands the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, at Fort Campbell, Kentucky. He served two recent tours in the 10th Mountain Division (Light). He was commander of the 2d Battalion, 87th Infantry, an element of the division, at Fort Drum, New York, and the division's assistant chief of staff for operations, G–3, in Afghanistan. He also served as C–3 of Combined Joint Task Force MOUNTAIN in Afghanistan. He holds a doctorate in military history from Ohio State University and served for three years as assistant professor of history at the U.S. Military Academy.

Waltzing into the Cold War The Struggle for Occupied Austria

By James Jay Carafano
Texas A&M University Press, 2002, 249 pp., $44.95

Review by Bianka J. Adams

At the end of World War II, the Allies divided Austria, just as they did Germany, into four occupation zones and Vienna, like Berlin, into four sectors. Judging by appearances, it would be easy to assume that the effort in Austria was a mirror image of the U.S. Army's role in the occupation of Germany, only smaller. Thus, for the longest time, the history of the occupation of Austria remained a parochial field of study pursued by Austrian historians, and during the twentieth century only three accounts of note were produced on this side of the Atlantic. As a result, Austria's strategic importance in the first and, some might argue, hottest decade of the evolving Cold War was virtually unknown. The competition between the United States and the Soviet Union for the Austrian "prize," as the Soviet Union tried to consolidate its grip on Eastern European countries, was seemingly relegated to history's curios cabinet—until the publication of James Jay Carafano's *Waltzing into the Cold War: The Struggle for Occupied Austria*. Considering that the U.S. Army is currently engaged in the momentous tasks of reconstructing and stabilizing Afghanistan and Iraq, Carafano's book could not be timelier. An unsentimental examination of the strengths and weaknesses of military forces bound by their routines and customs as occupiers, this study should be required reading for anybody, civilian or military, who is now or will be responsible for winning the peace after the official end of hostilities.

Carafano focuses on the U.S. Army's role as shaper and implementer of U.S. government policies in the pressure-filled environment that was Austria at the beginning of the Cold War. His thesis is that "security concerns, as interpreted and expressed by professional military officers, played an inordinately significant role in determining the course of affairs," and that this, in effect, militarized American policy. On the basis of extensive archival research in the United States, Austria, and Great Britain, he supports his argument by tracing the "shift in the role of the occupation force from rehabilitating and reconstructing Austria to enlisting the state as a partner in NATO's defense." (p. 8)

Woefully ill-prepared to occupy a war-ravaged country, the combat troops that comprised United States Forces Austria learned on the job how to reconstruct civil administrations in their zone; to guard, care for, and repatriate masses of displaced persons; to purge Nazi officials from public life; and to disarm and process well over 200,000 enemy troops, while competing for resources with U.S. commands in Germany and Italy. The commanders of U.S. Forces Austria, who were at the same time U.S. high commissioners, were scarcely better prepared for their sensitive mission. Fortunately for the American troops on occupation duty in Austria, they were not confronted with fighting an active insurgency while simultaneously governing a sector of that country as an occupying force and attempting to deter Soviet aggression.

Carafano's skillful characterization of senior military and civilian leadership adds much to our understanding of the dynamics at work at this critical time. In 1947, as the temperature of the Cold War rose and the U.S. Army's role in Austria changed from occupier to protector, Lt. Gen. Geoffrey Keyes succeeded General Mark W. Clark as high commissioner. A successful corps commander in Italy with only minimal training in political-military affairs, Keyes was chosen for the Austrian post, which was considered a "high-profile caretaker job," because his superiors believed he deserved to be rewarded while others were forced into retirement. (p. 99) As it turned out, Keyes made decisions that were pivotal for Austria's future during his three years in office. Convincing his superiors in Washington that Austria "would be the linchpin for holding back communism," he made Austria a strategic listening post for the United States. (p. 101) At a time when the U.S. government formulated its national security policy for the next half-century, intelligence collected in Austria fed an insatiable appetite for relevant insights about the Soviet regime and shaped American decision-makers' perceptions about their Communist counterparts.

The efforts of U.S. Forces Austria to build up Austria as a bulwark against Soviet expansion included covert action to train a *gendarmerie* as Austria's new security force long before the Austrian State Treaty of 1955 released the nation into neutrality. When the Soviets blockaded Berlin in 1948, U.S. Forces Austria began to stockpile food and fuel in the Western sectors of Vienna in order to amass an eighty-two-day supply if the Soviets attempted to interfere with deliveries to the Austrian capital. In addition, U.S. Forces Austria developed secret plans to mobilize Austrians in wartime.

Overall, Carafano concludes that the occupation of Austria was a "flawed triumph" and that the militarization of America's policies hardly represented an optimal approach to foreign affairs. (p. 193) The author reminds his readers that what he terms "peace and stability operations" are not just the continuation of warfare by other means. (p. 198) Quite to the contrary, he demonstrates

in his study that the Army needs to plan and prepare for these types of operations just as it would for any combat mission and that the process includes training combat soldiers to be occupiers.

Dr. Bianka J. Adams has been a historian in the Histories Division of the Army Center of Military History since 2002. She received a doctorate in history in 1998 from the Catholic University of America, where she wrote a dissertation on the administration and denazification of postwar Bremen, Germany. Lt. Col. James Jay Carafano, who retired from the military in 2002, was chief of the Military Studies Branch of the Center in 1996–97. He received a Ph.D. degree from Georgetown University in 2000.

My Story
By Anson Mills
Reprint ed., Stackpole Books, 2003, 412 pp., $19.95

Review by Roger D. Cunningham

In 1918, after a long and distinguished career as an Army officer, government official, and businessman, Brig. Gen. Anson Mills published his autobiography, *My Story*. Stackpole Books recently reissued the book as part of its Frontier Classics Series. The new softcover edition includes an introduction by John D. McDermott, a former National Park Service historian and author of several books on the Indian Wars.

Born in 1834 near Thorntown in central Indiana, Mills was admitted to the U.S. Military Academy in 1855 as a member of the five-year Class of 1860. Although he resigned his cadetship two years later, after being found deficient in mathematics, he "always had the greatest respect for the teachings and discipline of the academy," (p. 47) and the friendships he made there proved useful later during his military career.

In 1858 Mills journeyed to Franklin, Texas, on the Mexican border, where he worked as the district surveyor, laying out an orderly street network for the town and suggesting that it be renamed El Paso. (The community of El Paso del Norte lay across the Rio Grande in Mexico.) When the Civil War broke out, Mills quickly returned to the East and secured a commission as a first lieutenant in the 18th Infantry, one of nine infantry regiments added to the Regular Army in 1861. Although he devotes only one surprisingly short chapter to his Civil War service, Mills saw a great deal of action and was brevetted three times for his gallantry and meritorious service at the Battles of Stones River, Chickamauga, and Nashville.

After the war, Captain Mills returned to the West. While commanding officer at Fort Bridger, Wyoming Territory, he devised a new looped leather cartridge belt, which he patented. (See box at right.) Mills continued to refine his concept, and his subsequent development of a woven cartridge belt eventually made him a wealthy man. He married Hannah, or "Nanny," Cassel in 1868, and the couple traveled to Fort Sedgwick, Colorado Territory, the first of twenty-six posts at which they would reside. Mills includes several of Nanny's letters in his text, and they provide her perspective on frontier life.

After assessing his career prospects and deciding that "the better opening for success would be in the cavalry," (p. 127) Mills transferred to the 3d Cavalry in 1871 and became commander of that regiment in 1892. During his time in the mounted arm, he earned yet another brevet for his courageous actions during the Battle of Slim Buttes in Dakota Territory in 1876. According to McDermott, Mills always believed that his heroism in that battle should have earned him a Medal of Honor.

In 1893 Colonel Mills was appointed to the United States–Mexico boundary commission, and he devotes about one-seventh of his text to a discussion of the Mexican border and the international boundary and water rights problems caused by the ever-shifting course of the Rio Grande. Mills retired from the Army in 1897, less than a week after his promotion to brigadier general, but continued to serve on the boundary commission until 1914. He died in Washington, D.C., in 1924 and was buried with honors in Arlington Cemetery.

Mills was a man of many accomplishments, but *My Story* tends to ramble. The author sometimes digresses to voice his views on political issues, such as women's suffrage and prohibition, which both he and Nanny fervently supported. Mills also overlooks some military history that would be of great interest to modern readers. During the Civil War, his regiment, the 18th Infantry, suffered more casualties than any other regiment in the Regular Army, but Mills says very little about its operations. He was a major in the 10th Cavalry for twelve years, yet he offers no insights into what service in a black regiment was like. *My Story*, however, is a unique primary source with many interesting observations on the settlement of the nineteenth-century West, especially the borderlands region, and is worthy of being made available once again to readers interested in that topic.

Upcoming Military History Conference

The Council on America's Military Past will hold its thirty-ninth annual military history conference on 4–8 May 2005 in San Diego, California. The conference will highlight papers on the Army's role in the settlement of the American West and visits to nearby historic military posts, including the sites of a presidio and a coastal fort built by Spanish military authorities in the eighteenth century. Further information about the conference may be obtained at http://www.campjamp.org/2005%20Conference.htm.

Model 1894 woven Mills cartridge belt holding two rows of cartridges.

The Mills Cartridge Belt

By the end of the Civil War, most soldiers' weapons required metal cartridges, which rattled about in the tin-lined black leather boxes that had originally been designed to carry paper cartridges. In an effort to reduce this noise, frontier soldiers began creating field-expedient, looped cartridge belts. In 1866 Capt. Anson Mills equipped infantrymen at Fort Bridger, Wyoming Territory, with his version—a leather waist belt with fifty sewed-on leather loops to hold each round. The leather's tannic acid, however, produced verdigris on the copper cartridge cases, causing them to stick in both belts and rifle chambers, so Mills continued to refine his creation.

Ten years later, the Army's campaign against the Sioux provided "the turning point for the cartridge belt." Capt. Clarence E. Dutton, an ordnance officer evaluating how military equipment had fared in the field, reported that "officers and soldiers *will not use* the cartridge box & *will use* the belt & if they cannot obtain canvas belts from the Ord. Dept. they will improvise them." Dutton's 1876 report convinced the Ordnance Department to manufacture 30,000 canvas-and-leather "prairie" cartridge belts at Watervliet Arsenal, New York.[1]

Meanwhile, Major Mills had perfected and patented a 50-round woven web belt that an Army equipment board finally recommended for adoption in 1878. The secretary of war approved the Mills cartridge belt for field service, and the leather cartridge box was retained (until 1895) only for garrison wear. Mills then established a company in Worcester, Massachusetts, to manufacture the belts. Several foreign armies, including the British during the Boer War, later adopted versions of Mills's web equipment. The Army continued to use looped cartridge belts until it adopted the model 1903 Springfield rifle. That weapon was designed to accept five clip-joined cartridges at one time, so the Army developed a new woven belt with pockets that could each hold several clips.[2] Nevertheless by the time Mills sold his interest in the business in 1905, he was a wealthy man.

Notes

1. Gordon S. Chappell, *The Search for the Well-Dressed Soldier, 1865–1890: Developments and Innovations in United States Army Uniforms on the Western Frontier* (Tucson, 1972), p. 27.

2. See Stanley J. Olsen, "Development of the Looped Cartridge Belt," *Military Collector & Historian* 6 (March 1954): 9–11.

Army Heritage Center Foundation Releases Virtual Exhibits

The Army Heritage Center Foundation in Carlisle, Pennsylvania, has issued two CD ROMs that provide multimedia depictions of aspects of the Army's history. The first, entitled *The Stories They Could Tell*, presents digitized exhibits on the lives and military service of Luther P. Bradley, Willard F. Dominick, and Hobart K. Bailey. Bradley commanded the 51st Illinois Volunteer Infantry and served as a volunteer brigadier general in the Army of the Cumberland during the Civil War and as an infantry lieutenant colonel and colonel in the Regular Army for twenty years after that war. The CD ROM features typescript editions of General Bradley's "Recollections of Service in the Civil War" and a memoir by his wife, Ione Dewey Bradley. Mrs. Bradley's account discusses the couple's life together at Fort Omaha, Fort D. A. Russell, Fort Laramie, Jackson Barracks, and Fort Wingate. Dominick served as a sergeant in the 25th Infantry Division on Guadalcanal during World War II. The CD ROM features his wartime sketches and some of the pieces he created in his postwar career as an artist. Bailey served as an infantry officer for 39 years in the American West, Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines. The virtual exhibits on this CD ROM feature artifacts and documents held by the Army Heritage and Education Center, and the center assisted in the production of the disk.

The second CD ROM is entitled *Defending the Long Road to Freedom: The Story of Black Soldiers in the American Army* (1770–1953). This disk chronicles the service of African American soldiers in the nation's wars from the American Revolution to the Korean War, illustrating its eight narrative chapters with a plethora of photographs and images of artwork, lithographs, newspaper reports, and manuscript documents. The majority of the images are drawn from the National Archives and the collections of the Army Heritage and Education Center. Brig. Gen. Benjamin O. Davis's scrapbook on the history of African American service in the Army and his own career, along with other items in the Benjamin O. Davis Sr. collection at the Military History Institute, are featured among the exhibits on this disk.

Readers may request a copy of either CD ROM from the foundation by writing via email to *info@armyheritage.org* or by calling the toll-free number 866-276-9484.

News Notes continued from page 2

Guinea Campaigns." That article appeared in the Summer-Fall 2003 issue of *Army History* (No. 59). Retired General William W. Hartzog, the foundation's president, announced a total of five writing awards for books and articles on military history at the group's annual members meeting on 15 June 2004. The awards honor authors who, in the foundation's judgment, made "a significant contribution to the preservation and promotion of the history of the American soldier." The foundation is also the principal fundraiser for the planned National Museum of the U.S. Army.

Army and Joint Commands Publish Studies of Their Responses to the Attacks of 11 September 2001

The Army Reserve Command's Office of Army Reserve History has published *The Role of the Army Reserve in the 11 September Attacks: New York City* and *The Role of the Army Reserve in the 11 September Attacks: The Pentagon.* The first of these books was prepared by the 311th Military History Detachment led by Maj. Robert Bensburg and the second by the 90th Military History Detachment led by Capt. Suzanne Summers. Sgt. William Miller of the 90th contributed to both books. The volumes contain narrative accounts of the Army Reserve response to the attacks, along with photographs and excerpts from interviews with reservists involved. The two books are also available on a compact disk. Requests for copies of the books or the disk should be submitted by mail to the Office of Army Reserve History, U.S. Army Reserve Command, 1401 Deshler Street SW, Fort McPherson, Georgia 30330-2000 or by email to *history@usarc-emh2.army.mil.*

The U.S. Joint Forces Command has published *Response to Terrorism: U.S. Joint Forces Command and the Attacks of 11 September 2001* by Leo P. Hirrel, the command's historian. This volume relates the response of the command to the attack in the United States, its support to Operation ENDURING FREEDOM in Afghanistan, and the impact upon Joint Forces Command of the creation of Northern Command. *Response to Terrorism* also includes a timeline of key events from September 2001 to October 2002. Requests for copies should be submitted by email to *leo.hirrel@jfcom.mil.*

Presses at Fort Leavenworth Issue New Historical Publications

The Combat Studies Institute Press and the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Press, which operate together at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, have issued seven new books on military history. *My Clan against the World: U.S. and Coalition Forces in Somalia, 1992–1994* (CSI Press, 2004), by Robert F. Baumann and Lawrence A. Yates with Versalle F. Washington, is a history of U.S. and U.N. relief and stabilization operations in Somalia. Examining combat operations there, it observes that Mohammed Farah Aideed "proved a credible military adversary." (p. 208) Baumann is a historian at the Command and General Staff College, Yates is a researcher at the Combat Studies Institute, and Washington is a former history instructor at the U.S. Military Academy.

Moving the Enemy: Operational Art in the Chinese PLA's Huai Hai Campaign (CSI Press, 2004), by Gary J. Bjorge, presents a detailed analysis of a crucial military victory in the Chinese Civil War won by Communist forces in the Central Plains region in late 1948 and early January 1949. This book is Leavenworth Paper Number 22. *The Brigade: A History: Its Organization and Employment in the U.S. Army* (CSI Press, 2004), by John J. McGrath, is a study of the evolution of the brigade in the American Army from the Revolutionary War to the invasion of Iraq. Authors Bjorge and McGrath are, respectively, researcher/historian and researcher at the Combat Studies Institute.

The Corps of Discovery: Staff Ride Handbook for the Lewis and Clark Expedition (CSI Press, 2004), by Charles D. Collins Jr. and the other members of the Staff Ride Team at the Combat Studies Institute, presents an account of the expedition along with suggested staff ride routes in western Montana and Idaho. *Judge Advocates in Vietnam: Army Lawyers in Southeast Asia, 1959–1975* (CGSC Press, 2003), by Frederic L. Borch III, provides more detailed information about Army lawyers in Vietnam than does the same author's *Judge Advocates in Combat: Army Lawyers in Military Operations from Vietnam to Haiti* (CMH, 2001). *Combat Multipliers: African-American Soldiers in Four Wars* (CSI Press, 2003), by Krewasky A. Salter, focuses on the role of black soldiers in the American Revolution, Civil War, and two world wars, while discussing relevant developments between those wars. Global War on Terrorism Occasional Paper 3, "Understanding the 'Victory Disease,' from the Little Bighorn to Mogadishu and Beyond," (CSI Press, 2004) by Timothy Karcher, is a 55-page essay that examines how a sense of military superiority can lead to a lack of military success. This paper and the six new books mentioned above are available for public download at the CSI/CSGC Press website, *http://cgsc.leavenworth.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/csi.asp.*

A seventh book, *Weapon of Choice: U.S. Army Special Operations Forces in Afghanistan* (CSI Press, 2003), by Charles H. Briscoe, Richard L. Kiper, James A. Schroder, and Kalev I. Sepp, examines the actions of U.S. Army special operations forces in Afghanistan from September 2001 to mid-May 2002. Lead author Briscoe is command historian of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command. Individuals wishing to obtain a copy of this book may write to the U.S. Army Special Operations Command, ATTN: AOHS, Building E-2929, Fort Bragg, North Carolina 28310, or call the Historical Office of the command at 910-396-5906.

Army History Articles Reprinted in New Anthologies

The article by James C. McNaughton, "Japanese Americans and the U.S. Army: A Historical Reconsideration," which appeared in the Summer-Fall 2003 issue of *Army History* (No. 59), has been reprinted in *Annual Editions: American History*, 18th edition, edited by Robert James Maddox, a textbook issued in two volumes in 2004 by the publisher McGraw-Hill/Duskin. The article appeared in Volume 2, *Reconstruction through the Present*. Dr. McNaughton, command historian of the U.S. Army Pacific, will be assuming the position of command historian of the U.S. European Command in April 2005.

Today's Best Military Writing: The Finest Articles on the Past, Present, and Future of the U.S. Military (New York: Tom Doherty Associates, 2004), edited by Walter J. Boyne, includes two articles that initially appeared in *Army History*: "More Than Numbers: Americans and the Revival of French Morale in the Great War," by Robert A. Doughty, drawn from the Spring 2001 issue of *Army History* (No. 52), and "No Gun Ri Revisited: Historical Lessons for Today's Army," by John S. Brown, taken from the Spring-Summer 2002 issue (No. 55). Colonel Doughty is head of the History Department at the U.S. Military Academy and General Brown is chief of military history.

Army Space and Missile Defense Command Publishes Histories

The U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command has published two histories relating to its sphere of defense activities. *Seize the High Ground: The U.S. Army in Space and Missile Defense*, by James Walker, Lewis Bernstein, and Sharon Lang, is a comprehensive history of the Army's activities in space and missile defense. The authors are all historians in the command. *Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team*, by James Walker and James T. Hooper, is the history of the creation of the Army Space Support Team in 1994 and its activities up to 2003, concentrating on the period before 2000. It updates a history originally published in 1999.

Both of these books were published with the assistance of the Center of Military History. *Seize the High Ground* is CMH Pub 70-88-1, and *Space Warriors* is CMH Pub 70-91-1. *Seize the High Ground* may be purchased from the Government Printing Office for $55 under stock number 008-029-00392-9. *Space Warriors* is available from the same office for $34 under stock number 008-029-00393-7. These books may also be obtained by Army publication account holders from the St. Louis distribution office whose address is given in the announcement of new publications from the Center of Military History.

Commercial Publishers Issue Books by Army Historians and Curators

The Naval Institute Press has published posthumously *Days of Lightning, Years of Scorn: Walter C. Short and the Attack on Pearl Harbor* by Charles R. Anderson. The author was a historian at the Center of Military History from 1987 until his death in August 2003. The book is available at a list price of $34.95.

Publisher ABC-CLIO has issued a new reference work on British military history by Harold E. Raugh Jr., command historian of the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center and the Presidio of Monterey. Entitled *The Victorians at War, 1815–1914: An Encyclopedia of British Military History*, the volume is offered at $95.

Schiffer Books has issued a new book by Charles Lemons, a curator at the Patton Museum of Cavalry and Armor at Fort Knox, Kentucky, on U.S. Army armored units from World War I to the entry of the United States into World War II. The book is entitled *Organization and Markings of United States Army Armored Units, 1918–1941*, and it is being sold at a list price of $59.95.

Arcadia Publishing has issued five new books authored or coauthored by Army curators or historians, all but one appearing in its Images of America series. Harold E. Raugh Jr. contributed books on Fort Ord and the Presidio of Monterey to that series. Tim O'Gorman, Steve Anders, and Steven E. Anders, the first and last of whom are director of the Quartermaster Museum and historian of the Quartermaster Center and School, respectively, authored the Images of America Series book on Fort Lee, Virginia. Daniel W. Zimmerman, director of the Fort Dix Military Historical Holding, prepared the book on Fort Dix in the same series. Dennis Mroczkowski, director of the Casemate Museum at Fort Monroe, Virginia, and coauthor John Quarstein wrote the book on Fort Monroe in Arcadia's Civil War Series. The first four of these books list at $19.99, the last at $18.99.

Army Engineer Historian Writes Account of Army Peacetime Housing

Dr. William C. Baldwin of the Office of History, Headquarters, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, has written a brief, well–illustrated and documented history of the evolution of Army housing from the early nineteenth century to the early 1990s. The account appeared in *Occasional Papers*, No. 4, a serial issued by the Society for History in the Federal Government. The issue's cover features a painting of pre–Civil War Fort Defiance, New Mexico Territory (now in Arizona), executed by retired Bvt. Brig. Gen. Seth Eastman, showing the adobe quarters provided for troops at that frontier installation.

The Chief's Corner continued from page 3

nation's history. Glenn Williams, formerly with the National Park Service, has filled the shoes of Dr. Charles White and is moving ahead with Lt. Col. Mark Reardon to assist the commemorative effort.

Production Services has been truly busy, as always. Since our last report they have published the following: *Humanitarian Intervention: Assisting the Iraqi Kurds in Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, 1991*, by Gordon W. Rudd; *Dwight D. Eisenhower National Security Conference, 2003*, gen. ed. James R. Craig; *Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team*, by James Walker and James T. Hooper; *Centuries of Service: The U.S. Army, 1775–2004*, by David W. Hogan Jr.; *The U.S. Army Chief of Staff's Professional Reading List* (revised edition); *Department of the Army Historical Summary, Fiscal Year 1995*; *Publications of the United States Army Center of Military History, 2005*; *Army Historical Program, Fiscal Year 2005*; *Soldiers' Art from the 91st Infantry Division in Italy, 1944–1945*, by Clifford F. Porter; *Seize the High Ground: The U.S. Army in Space and Missile Defense*, by James Walker, Lewis Bernstein, and Sharon Lang; *The United States Army and the War with Spain*, a CD-ROM; and *The United States Army and World War II*, CD-ROM Set 4: *Technical Services, Part 1* (Chemical, Ordnance, Transportation, and Signal), and Set 5: *The Technical Services, Part 2* (Corps of Engineers, Quartermaster, and Medical).

The Field Programs and Historical Services Division welcomed its new chief, Dr. Richard Davis, and moved Frank Shirer up to take over its Historical Resources Branch as well. Welcome to both! Field Programs continues with its customary full plate, orchestrating Task Force Modularity (the reorganization and in many cases the renaming of Army units set up under tables of organization and equipment); coordinating historical support to operations overseas, notably by military history detachments; helping to arrange and participating in international conferences; and expanding our ever more popular website (*http://www.army.mil/cmh*) and our library collections. With considerable physical effort the division installed new, state-of-the-art, electronically assisted shelving. This will greatly expand both capacity and efficiency.

Well, that's the lion's share of our news here at the Center of Military History. Of course we look forward to hearing from you and catching up on your news. Please keep up all of the great work you are doing to preserve and promulgate the history and heritage of our soldiers.

Army Military History Detachments Continue Covering Operations in the Middle East

Army Reserve military history detachments have continued to chronicle ongoing Army operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The 54th and 101st Military History Detachments, based in Louisiana and Kansas respectively, arrived in Baghdad in February 2004 and completed their tours in Iraq in January 2005. Their work will be carried on by the 46th and 49th Military History Detachments, the former based in Arkansas and the latter in Illinois, which arrived in Iraq in the last quarter of 2004, and the 45th Military History Detachment, based in Georgia, which is scheduled to deploy to Iraq in March 2005. The 317th Military History Detachment, also based in Georgia, served in Afghanistan from March to December 2004. After a brief hiatus, its work will be resumed in March 2005 by the 47th Military History Detachment, based in the state of Washington. The members of these detachments have been or will be conducting interviews and collecting documents and artifacts for use by military historians and museums.

Army History Contributor Writes about Black Volunteers in Cuba

The January 2005 issue of *Southwestern Historical Quarterly*, the journal of the Texas State Historical Association, featured an article by retired Lt. Col. Roger D. Cunningham, a frequent contributor to *Army History*. "'A Lot of Fine, Sturdy Black Warriors': Texas's African American 'Immunes' in the Spanish-American War" tells the story of two companies of black Texans who served in the Ninth U.S. Volunteer Infantry during the Spanish-American War. The regiment was one of ten raised from men allegedly "possessing immunity from diseases incident to tropical climates." Four of the regiments were reserved for black volunteers, but the Ninth "Immunes" was the only one of them to deploy overseas. It served in Cuba from August 1898 until April 1899. The cover of the issue in which the article appeared depicts one of the watercolors by Charles Johnson Post in the U.S. Army Art Collection. Post painted "Field Hospital Back of the Lines" in 1898, while serving in Cuba as a private in the 71st New York Infantry.



Illustrated chronology in exhibit brochure

New Exhibit on American Military History Opens at the Smithsonian

By Rachael Mills

The Smithsonian Institution's National Museum of American History has opened a large new exhibit on the military history of the United States entitled "The Price of Freedom: Americans at War." The exhibit showcases an impressive collection of personal memorabilia and military equipment that recreates the history of the nation's military conflicts from the French and Indian War to Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. The exhibit presents all aspects of war: frontline combat, the daily life of soldiers and civilians, and the political consequences of the engagements. Each segment of the exhibit connects to the next to illustrate the evolution of war and politics in the United States.

A variety of noteworthy objects are on display. The War of Independence section displays a life-size "liberty tree," a diorama of the camp life of Continental Army soldiers, and George Washington's sword, and it emphasizes Washington's decision to relinquish his command at the end of the war. Andrew Jackson's uniform and sword from the Battle of New Orleans are located near Sam Houston's rifle in the Wars of Expansion segment. The Civil War section features a slave collar used for punishment and torture, General McClellan's frock coat, General Sheridan's horse Winchester, the sword and hat General Sherman carried at Shiloh, photographs from Matthew Brady's studio, a tree stump created by the intense rifle fire at the Battle of Spotsylvania, information on Confederate spies, and the furniture used by Generals Grant and Lee at Appomattox. A small World War I exhibit includes posters, military equipment, and a machine gun used in combat.

The World War II section is extensive. It introduces contemporary videos that capture the atmosphere of the war, including propaganda cartoons, and presents displays recreating life in the barracks and information about the internment of Japanese Americans and the work of the USO. Also exhibited are examples of the small arms used by American soldiers in the war. The Korean War and the Cuban Missile Crisis are the focus of the exhibit's section on the Cold War, which precedes a larger display on the Vietnam War. The Vietnam exhibit examines the impact of the war on both soldiers and civilians. It includes a Huey helicopter and explains the importance of helicopters to military strategy and the wounded soldier. In a viewing area that recreates a family living room, exhibit visitors can explore the evolution of the war as seen on television. The Vietnam section also includes information on the experiences of American prisoners of war and on the impact of the Vietnam Veterans Memorial. The "Price of Freedom" exhibit concludes with displays of materials representing the nation's twenty-first century wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and a moving History Channel video on the significance of the Medal of Honor.

The National Museum of American History is open from 10 a.m. to 5:30 p.m. daily. An online version of the exhibit is available at http://americanhistory.si.edu/militaryhistory.

Rachael Mills is a senior at George Washington University and a part-time employee at the Center of Military History.

New Publications from the Center of Military History

The Center of Military History has published a book on a 1991 military operation in northern Iraq, a booklet of art produced by soldiers of an infantry division in Italy in World War II, a Department of the Army historical summary for 1995, a compendium of the proceedings at a high-level national security conference held in 2003, new editions of two Army historical publications, and three CD ROM packages containing digital compilations of books the Center has issued on the Spanish-American War and World War II.

Humanitarian Intervention: Assisting the Iraqi Kurds in Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, 1991, by Gordon W. Rudd, examines the military operation to protect and provide relief to Iraqi Kurds threatened by the government of Saddam Hussein in the aftermath of its defeat in the Gulf War in February 1991. The American operation in northern Iraq was led by Maj. Gen. Jay M. Garner under the supervision of Lt. Gen. John Shalikashvili, the combined task force commander. This book is CMH Pub 70-78-1, and it may be purchased from the Government Printing Office for $34 under stock number 008-029-00395-3.

Soldiers' Art from the 91st Infantry Division in Italy, 1944–1945, by Clifford F. Porter, was published jointly by the Center and the 91st Infantry Division (Training Support). This 94-page booklet reproduces a plethora of sketches and watercolors executed by soldier-artists who captured visually the war they encountered in Italy. The author of the accompanying text was a historian at the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center at the Presidio of Monterey, California. This is CMH Pub 70-86. *Department of the Army Historical Summary, Fiscal Year 1995*, authored by Stephen L. Y. Gammons and William M. Donnelly, two Center historians, joins a series of annual reports on the major issues confronting the Army and how they were handled covering the years 1969 to 1996. This is CMH Pub 101-26-1.

Dwight D. Eisenhower National Security Conference, 2003, edited by James R. Craig, is a compendium of the presentations delivered and the discussion entertained at a conference held in the Ronald Reagan Building and International Trade Center in Washington, D.C., on 25–26 September 2003. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld delivered the conference's keynote address and Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage gave its closing address. Four panels discussed failed states, the power of the United States, predicting nuclear proliferation, and political and military changes in Iraq. This book is CMH Pub 70-90-1.

The new edition of *Secretaries of War and Secretaries of the Army: Portraits and Biographical Sketches*, by William Gardner Bell, expands the coverage of the earlier editions to include information about and portraits of all of the secretaries of the Army who served before 2004. It is CMH Pub 70-12, and it may be ordered from the Government Printing Office for $42 under stock number 008-029-00394-5.

The new pamphlet *Centuries of Service: The U.S. Army, 1775–2004*, by David W. Hogan Jr., updates and expands the pamphlet *225 Years of Service: The U.S. Army, 1775–2000*, issued four years earlier. The current pamphlet contains a new section on the Post–Cold War Army and a more extensive list of suggested readings on Army history. *Centuries of Service* is CMH Pub 70-71-1, and it may be obtained from the Government Printing Office for $5 under stock number 008-029-00390-2.

The United States Army and the War with Spain is a newly issued CD ROM version of *Correspondence Relating to the War with Spain, Including the Insurrection in the Philippine Islands and the China Relief Expedition, April 15, 1898, to July 30, 1902*, which was first published by the War Department in two volumes in 1902. The volumes, which have a total of 1,489 pages, were reissued by the Center of Military History in 1993 with an introduction by Graham A. Cosmas, and the CD ROM includes this introduction.

The Center has also issued CD ROM Sets 4 and 5 of *The United States Army and World War II*. These sets contain the twenty-four volumes on the Technical Services in the printed series United States Army in World War II. Set 4 includes four disks which contain the three volumes each pertaining to the Chemical Warfare Service, Ordnance Department, Signal Corps, and Transportation Corps. Set 5 has three disks which contain the four volumes each pertaining to the Corps of Engineers, Medical Department, and Quartermaster Corps. The Government Printing Office may offer for sale some or all of these sets, but it has not yet done so.

While not all of the aforementioned publications have been made available for public sale, they all may be obtained by Army publication account holders from the Directorate of Logistics–Washington/Media Distribution Division; ATTN: JDHQSV-PAS, St. Louis; 1655 Woodson Road; St. Louis, Missouri 63114-6128. Account holders may also place their orders at *http://www.apd.army.mil*. The facility accepts customer service inquiries by phone at 314-592-0910 and by email at *CustomerService@usapadof.army.mil*.

Some of the recent publications of the Center not currently available for sale may be offered to the public later. The pamphlet by R. Cody Phillips, *Operation JUST CAUSE: The Incursion into Panama*, the publication of which was announced in the Winter-Spring 2004 issue of *Army History* (No. 60), could not be purchased then but can be now. The Government Printing Office is now offering it to the public for $4.50 under stock number 008-029-00391-1.