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In This Issue

The Professional Bulletin of Army History

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The Professional Bulletin of Army History

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Cover Image:
Sgt. Michael Lawrence, Company C, 1st Battalion, 4th Infantry Regiment, at an observation point at Forward Operating Base Baylough, Zābol Province, Afghanistan, July 2008/Spec. Alex Godinez, Department of Defense

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Top: S. Sgt. Albert Galvan in Afghanistan/Dirk D. Ringgenberg Collection
Middle: An AH–64 attack helicopter/Dirk D. Ringgenberg Collection
Bottom, center: Illinois militia cavalrymen disperse striking railroad workers and their supporters in Chicago, 26 July 1877, as portrayed in *Frank Leslie's Illustrated Newspaper*. (See book review on page 52)/Library of Congress

EDITOR'S JOURNAL

This issue of *Army History* presents three pieces that explore the topic of counterinsurgency warfare from a variety of perspectives. It begins with a company commander's account of a May 2005 encounter between elements of an American airborne infantry battalion and Taliban fighters at the remote village of Balūch Kalay in southeastern Afghanistan. The engagement began with an attack on the battalion's scout platoon and the small Afghan National Police contingent that was accompanying it. The line company that was immediately dispatched by helicopter to support the embattled scouts was attacked in the air and forced to alter the location of its insertion. The account of the ensuing battle demonstrates the critical role played by the company's Afghan translator and the impact of good luck in determining the outcome of this fight between two determined combatants.

The issue then presents an analysis of the British Army's efforts during the American Revolution to reconcile or subdue independence-oriented American insurgents in the colonies of South Carolina and Georgia in the five months after the capitulation in May 1780 of the American garrison at the port of Charleston and the surrender of nearly six thousand Continental Army troops there. Army historian Steven Rauch shows that British measures aimed at bolstering Loyalist militia forces so threatened potentially neutral colonials that many, including societal leaders with substantial popular followings, rallied to the insurgent cause. The renewed attacks they launched stymied British efforts to pacify these southern states, where Continental regular forces could no longer contest British power.

While attitudes toward counterinsurgency largely divided Americans and Britons during the American Revolution, the military forces of Great Britain and the United States have cooperated closely in addressing the matter in the past decade. Recently retired British Lt. Gen. Sir John Kiszely, who was deputy commander of the Multinational Force in Iraq and later director of the Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, is among those who have given serious thought to the challenges that insurgency movements pose in today's world. *Army History* is pleased to present in this issue General Kiszely's reflections on how modern militaries can best prepare their officers to meet the challenges of the emerging threats that confront the world's democratic governments. Kiszely recommends that officers develop a wider range of competencies in skills needed to strengthen challenged states. Army officers, Kiszely argues, increasingly require a broad education, and he judges the study of history to be particularly valuable.

Charles Hendricks
Managing Editor

The Chief's Corner

Dr. Jeff Clarke

A ceremony held on Monday, 15 December 2008, marked the opening of the History of the Army museum exhibit in the section of the newly renovated corridors of the Pentagon's outer, or E, ring into which the offices of the Army's senior leaders open. Sponsored by Secretary of the Army Pete Geren, the event saw the culmination of a nine-month project directed by Dr. John Shortal (Brigadier General, U.S. Army, Retired), the assistant chief of military history here at the Center. At Secretary Geren's request, Dr. Shortal worked closely last spring and summer with former Secretary of the Army John O. Marsh and former Army Chief of Staff General Edward C. "Shy" Meyer to develop approved project concepts and story lines, followed by a detailed exhibit plan that steadily grew in scope and size.

A series of complicated but critical exhibit fabrication contracts ensued at the end of September, producing some forty large museum-quality display cases that were complemented by a significant amount of additional free-standing art and artifacts and many basic corridor refurbishments. Completing all of the different components by Secretary Geren's December deadline, however, posed a major challenge. Nearly one hundred curators, historians, and other associated professionals ultimately became involved in the project as preparation activities intensified after the beginning of November. Here great credit must be given to Col. Robert J. Dalessandro, director of the Army Heritage and Education Center at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, and his expert staff, who provided much of the detailed technical expertise

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Gregory Jones, U.S. Army Photographic Branch

Colonel Dalessandro speaks about the new History of the Army exhibit to a distinguished audience that includes Secretary Geren, fifth from left, two former secretaries of the Army, and five former Army chiefs of staff, four of whom are clearly visible, 15 December 2008.

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ARMY HISTORY
Spring 2009


Dirk D. Ringgenberg Collection

Features


Dirk D. Ringgenberg Collection

Articles

NEWSNOTES

Center of Military History Issues New Publications

The Center of Military History is pleased to announce two new historical publications—an anthology of oral history interviews relating to the U.S. Army's counterinsurgency efforts in Afghanistan in the years 2003 through 2005 and a monograph on the battles of Quang Tri City and Hue during the Communists' 1968 Tet offensive in Vietnam.



Enduring Voices: Oral Histories of the U.S. Army Experience in Afghanistan, 2003–2005, edited by Christopher N. Koontz, is an anthology of sixteen oral history interviews that discuss the establishment and early counterinsurgency operations of the multinational Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan. The book features a lengthy interview with U.S. Army Lt. Gen. David W. Barno, the first commander of the new headquarters, who discusses his organization's strategic challenges, its development and implementation of a counterinsurgency strategy adapted to the complexity of the armed opposition to the Afghan government, and his efforts to coordinate military and political initiatives. Other interviews record how General Barno's international staff operated, how subordinate field commanders conducted counterinsurgency operations, and how members of provincial reconstruction teams tackled the arduous work of developing a nation shattered by three decades of almost continuous conflict. Koontz is a historian in the Center's Histories Division; he and two other historians from the Center conducted the interviews. The Center of Military History published this volume in paperback as CMH Pub 70–112–1.

Army publication account holders may obtain *Enduring Voices* from the Directorate of Logistics–Washington, Media Distribution Division, ATTN: JDHQSVPAS, 1655 Woodson Road, St. Louis, Missouri 63114-6128. Account holders may also place their orders at http://www.apd.army.mil. Individuals may order the book from the U.S. Government Printing Office Web site at http://bookstore.gpo.gov, where it carries stock number 008-029-00493-3.

The 1968 Tet Offensive Battles of Quang Tri City and Hue by Erik Villard is an 82-page annotated monograph that focuses on the battles for the two northernmost provincial capitals in South Vietnam at the beginning of 1968. These were important Communist objectives in the enemy's Tet campaign. The battles provide valuable lessons on the potential and limitations of airmobile warfare and on the challenges of urban combat in a counterinsurgency environment. The fighting involved South Vietnamese troops as well as soldiers of the U.S. Army and Marine Corps. This monograph is part of a larger study that is still in progress. Villard too is a historian in the Center's Histories Division. Military users may request copies of this monograph by writing to Bryan Hockensmith, the Center of Military History's distribution editor, at bryan.hockensmith@conus.army.mil.

2009 Conference of Army Historians

The U.S. Army Center of Military History will hold its biennial conference of Army historians in Arlington, Virginia, from 28 July to 30 July 2009. The theme of the conference is "Exiting War: Phase IV Operations." Conference organizers expect presentations to address a wide range of topics involving postconflict military operations, including peace-keeping, nation-building, reconstruction, counterinsurgency, occupation, and withdrawal. Further information on the conference will be posted at the Center's Web site, http://www.history.army.mil.

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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Maj. Dirk D. Ringgenberg commanded Company C, 2d Battalion, 503d Infantry, an element of the 173d Airborne Brigade, from May 2004 to July 2005. He was awarded a Bronze Star and a Silver Star for heroism in Afghanistan with this unit, receiving the former decoration for his service at Balūch Kalay. He had served in the same battalion in Iraq in 2003–2004. Ringgenberg was commissioned in 1997 after nearly ten years as an enlisted man. He holds a bachelor's degree in history from Columbus State University in Georgia and a master's degree in military science from the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He is currently serving at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, as the operations officer of the 2d Battalion, 504th Infantry Regiment, an element of the 1st Brigade Combat Team, 82d Airborne Division.

A CH–47 cargo helicopter in flight

Department of Defense

Department of Defense

The Battle of Balūch Kalay

By Dirk D. Ringgenberg

During the early morning hours of 3 May 2005, paratroopers of the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 503d Infantry, 173d Airborne Brigade, fought a large Taliban force in the remote Arghandab Valley in southern Afghanistan. In the ensuing twelve-hour battle, the "Sky Soldiers" killed or captured over sixty Taliban fighters. This action was the first of many throughout the year for the battalion, which was newly arrived from Vicenza, Italy.

The battalion had deployed to Afghanistan between February and early April 2005. It replaced elements of the 25th Infantry Division primarily in Zābol Province, Afghanistan, serving under Regional Command South. The battalion moved quickly to establish its presence in the province by deploying patrols into remote areas that had not been previously visited. The total absence from the area of Afghan National Army troops and the minimal Afghan National Police presence there quickly forced the battalion to develop plans to train and reinforce the few existing Afghan police contingents.

During the first few days of May, the battalion's scout platoon joined with a small Afghan National Police contingent to conduct a patrol into the remote Arghandab Valley. Just after first light on 3 May, the scout platoon engaged a large Taliban force on the east side of the Arghandab River, across from the village of Balūch Kalay. During the initial fight, Taliban forces maneuvered rapidly against the scouts' few high-mobility multipurpose-wheeled vehicles (Humvees) and destroyed one with a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG). The scouts established a hasty defensive position on a small hill near the Arghandab River and radioed the battalion tactical operations center (TOC) at Forward Operating Base (FOB) Lagman, calling for immediate reinforcement. FOB Lagman was situated just outside Qalat, a town about fifty miles from Balūch Kalay.

The operations center immediately alerted Company C, an outfit known as "The Chosen Few," based at FOB Lagman. The company had returned the night before from a four-day combat patrol. It was conducting its post-operations refit when the call came to prepare to assault by air into the valley to reinforce the scouts.

The Alert

At approximately 0700, Company C's commander, Capt. Dirk Ringgenberg, received an urgent message to report to the TOC. Before hurrying there, he instructed the company's first sergeant, Scott Brzak, to assemble the company's leadership at the company command post as soon as possible in anticipation of a forthcoming mission. At the TOC, the battalion staff informed Ringgenberg that the current situation in the Arghandab Valley was extremely tenuous and required his company to immediately reinforce the scouts. Lt. Col. Mark Stammer, the battalion commander, and Maj. Doug Vincent, its operations officer (S–3), huddled around a map with Captain Ringgenberg and devised a plan of attack. Stammer ordered Ringgenberg to prepare his forces for a helicopter assault into the valley to reinforce the scouts. Capt. Troy Gammon, the battalion's air coordination officer, hurried over to the group and informed them that the helicopters would arrive within forty-five minutes. Ringgenberg then raced back to brief the leaders of Company C, who were now assembled at its command post.

Company C's leadership consisted of the three rifle platoon leaders and three platoon sergeants, along with the following company headquarters personnel: Capt. Ernesto Perez, the com-

Dirk D. Ringgenberg Collection

Colonel Stammer, standing, places a call during the Balūch Kalay operation.

pany's executive officer; 1st Sgt. Scott Brzak; 2d Lt. Ari Martyn, the fire support officer (FSO); Sfc. Edward Hinojosa, the fire support noncommissioned officer (FSNCO); S. Sgt. Faustino Martinez, the Air Force Joint Terminal Attack Controller (JTAC); senior medic Sgt. Austin Storms; and 60-mm. mortar section leader S. Sgt. Zach Workman. The rifle platoon leadership consisted of 2d Lt. Les Craig and Sfc. David Cavataio of the 1st Platoon, 2d Lt. Tim O'Neal and Sfc. Stephen Zaleski of the 2d Platoon, and 1st Lt. Ken Wainwright and Sfc. Danny Boivin of the 3d Platoon. A quick examination of the map in the command post, augmented by a few black-and-white aerial photos, revealed the objective area to be a narrow valley with steep mountains on each side.

The leaders quickly planned an air assault in which the company's headquarters, its 3d Platoon, and the 60-mm. mortar section would insert first, using two CH–47 cargo helicopters each having carrying space for twenty-eight personnel. This first lift would be accompanied by two AH–64 attack helicopters for security. The 1st Platoon, along with the battalion commander; S–3; Cmd. Sgt. Maj. Jeffery Hartless; the battalion intelligence officer, Capt. Mike Adamski; and a security squad, would follow in the second lift. The 2d Platoon would remain and secure FOB Lagman. The insertion would use two separate helicopter landing zones (HLZ 1 and HLZ 2), both located on the west side of the Arghandab River near the village of Balūch Kalay. The flight time from FOB Lagman to each HLZ was forty-five minutes.

The most current situation report from the scouts indicated that the Taliban was concentrating reinforcements on the west side of the river and preparing to attack south toward the scout positions. Under Company C's plan, the riflemen of the 3d Platoon would land to the north of Balūch Kalay at HLZ 1 and attack south as the main effort. The company's headquarters and the machine guns of the 3d Platoon would land south of Balūch Kalay at HLZ 2 and establish the support by fire (SBF) for the riflemen's attack. Once the SBF was established, the 3d Platoon would attack to capture Balūch Kalay. When the 1st Platoon arrived on the second lift, approximately ninety-five minutes later, it was to follow and support the 3d Platoon attack.

The CH–47 helicopters were loaded evenly with most of the 3d Platoon in the lead aircraft and the company headquarters and the 3d Platoon's machine gunners and a squad of its riflemen in the trail aircraft. In total, Company C had sixty personnel on the first lift with an additional twenty-eight coming on the second lift. The paratroopers were told to pack ample water and ammunition for a mission of up to seventy-two hours. At approximately 0745, the company assembled in the blazing sun on the FOB Lagman HLZ amid a flurry of repacking, calling of manifests, and the issuing of orders.

At the Lagman HLZ, Company C's leaders gathered around Captain Ringgenberg to receive a final update and a quick back-brief of the plan, which had been primarily verbal to this point. The available overhead photos clearly showed the Arghandab River but underscored the mountains and orchards along both its sides. Within minutes the helicopters arrived, blasting the waiting paratroopers with a fine coat of dust and sand. The soldiers immediately loaded. Once onboard, Captain Ringgenberg and Lieutenant Wainwright briefed the plan to the pilots, who had come from Task Force Storm based in Kandahar. Each pilot was given a copy of the overhead photo with instructions on the specific HLZ at which he would land. The helicopter assault force then lifted off on the forty-five minute flight, rising sharply toward the northwest to traverse the mountainous terrain between FOB Lagman and the Arghandab Valley.

Into the Arghandab

The plan directed the lead CH–47 with the 3d Platoon to land approximately 1,500 meters north of Balūch Kalay at HLZ 1 and the second CH–47 with the SBF and company headquarters to

land approximately 1,000 meters south of Balūch Kalay at HLZ 2. Follow-on elements in subsequent lifts were tentatively set to insert into HLZ 1. Both CH–47s would be landing on the western side of the Arghandab River. The river at Balūch Kalay was some fifty to seventy-five meters wide, its cold and swift south-flowing currents fed by the melting snow of the Hindu Kush to the north. Balūch Kalay sat at the western edge of a thick orchard that paralleled the river on both sides for approximately two kilometers. The town's residents used the terraced ground inside the orchard to grow pomegranates and other harvestable items. By early May the grass in the orchard was already extremely thick, and its crops stood one meter high. Up to this point, no member of the battalion thought of Afghanistan in terms of lush vegetation and raging rivers, but this would soon change.

Balūch Kalay itself was a cluster of twenty mud compounds with walls ranging from three to five meters high arranged in a confusing pattern. It spread across the river into three distinct settlements. The main village of

Balūch Kalay, the target of the 3d Platoon attack, was on the west side of the river, but two smaller settlements were on the opposite shore. The eastern settlements each ran along the river, but they were separated from one another by a large hill. The scouts were holding a defensive position on the hill separating the small settlements on the eastern side of the Arghandab River, close to their destroyed Humvee. As the helicopters descended into the valley, smoke was visible from the still-burning Humvee. Identifying the location of the earlier firefight, the pilots asked Captain Ringgenberg if there would be any last-minute changes. He told them to stick to the original landing zones and to avoid overflying the area near the burning Humvee. While descending, the CH–47s separated, and each began heading to its predetermined HLZ.

Approximately thirty meters above HLZ 2, the CH–47 carrying the company headquarters and the machine guns of 3d Platoon began receiving small-arms fire. The crew members manning the helicopter's machine guns initially strained to identify targets, but as the fire intensified the pilots began to scream at them, "Start firing in all directions!" Immediately, the machine-gun crews on both sides of the craft began firing, and they were soon joined by paratroopers firing their rifles from the rear of the helicopter. Within seconds of the opening bursts, a loud thud jolted the aircraft. An RPG had hit the tail of the CH–47 but exploded under the rear ramp, sending the aircraft into a spin only twenty meters above the ground. Looking quickly to the rear, Captain Ringgenberg saw S. Sgt. Clint Mack, who was firing over the rear ramp, barely able to stay inside the aircraft as it spun around. The pilots immediately began pulling the violently spinning aircraft skyward, while shouting into the intercom for continued suppressive fire. During the spin, Captain Ringgenberg crashed to the floor and dropped the headset on which he was talking to the pilots. Regaining the headset moments later, he screamed to the pilots, "Land the bird anywhere!"

Once the pilots gained enough altitude to evade all of the fire, they informed Captain Ringgenberg that they were aborting the landing at HLZ 2 and heading back to FOB Lagman; they also told him that the first CH–47 carrying the 3d Platoon had landed at HLZ 1. Captain Ringgenberg responded that the 3d Platoon was already on the ground and would be in a firefight with the *clearly present* Taliban within a short time. He pressed the pilots once again to "Land the aircraft anywhere, no matter what." After a quick consultation among themselves, the pilots agreed, headed back to the valley, and landed. Everyone scrambled out the back of the CH–47. However, within seconds they realized that they were in a small side valley on the *eastern side* of the river, opposite to where they had originally intended to land. The perceived misfortune of landing on the opposite side of the river was to become the key factor in the ensuing battle.

and ordered him to begin the assault toward Balūch Kalay.

East of the Arghandab River

While the members of the company's headquarters element tried to determine their exact position, which they designated as HLZ 3, everyone quickly gathered his equipment. Then, as the headquarters and the 3d Platoon's SBF element began to descend toward the river, they soon came under fire. Two Taliban riflemen were quickly spotted on a small rise in the direction of the river. Everyone returned fire and began to move quickly to the river. One of the enemy was killed, but the other ran behind the hill and disappeared from sight. The company's headquarters stopped at a position overlooking the river with good visibility of the surrounding valley, but minimal cover. Captain Ringgenberg ordered S. Sgt. Matthew Blaskowski's machine-gun squad to establish the SBF on a hill to the north of their current location that overlooked Balūch Kalay on the other side of the river. No one realized the full significance of this position at the time.

The few paratroopers under Sergeant Boivin who had remained at HLZ 3 spread out facing west in an effort to find good firing positions. The company's headquarters set up its tactical satellite radio and established communication with the battalion headquarters and the 3d Platoon. Lieutenant Wainwright confirmed that the 3d Platoon had landed at HLZ 1 and was waiting for word that the SBF had been established. Captain Ringgenberg informed Wainwright of his detachment's encounters with the Taliban, both at HLZ 2 and near HLZ 3, and told him to prepare for his assault. Simultaneously, Sergeant Hinojosa radioed the scout element and the battalion TOC. He reported that Company C was now split by the river due to heavy enemy fire at HLZ 2 but was continuing to execute the planned mission. He relayed the location of HLZ 3 and that Captain Ringgenberg was moving out toward the scouts with a portion of the company's headquarters and Sergeant Mack's squad.

At the SBF, Sergeant Blaskowski placed his machine guns in a position looking across the river toward HLZ 2, the location at which they had originally intended to land. Simultaneously, Captain Ringgenberg advanced toward the scout element with Sergeant Mack and his squad, accompanied by the JTAC, FSO, translator, and senior medic. Sergeant Brzak, the company's

first sergeant, and the FSNCO remained with Sergeant Boivin and a few paratroopers near HLZ 3, forming an unofficial rear headquarters. Unknown at the time, they now were covering the Taliban's only withdrawal route. The valley remained quiet as the company's headquarters with Sergeant Mack moved up almost to the edge of the river, before being able to parallel it north toward the location of the scouts. As the group started moving north, Captain Ringgenberg radioed Lieutenant Wainwright that the SBF had been established and ordered him to begin the assault toward Balūch Kalay. Company C had been on the ground thirty minutes.

Toward the Scouts

As the company's headquarters group moved north along the river, its members heard shots coming from the vicinity of HLZ 3 to the south. Captain Ringgenberg radioed Sergeant Brzak, who explained that the firing was coming from Taliban fighters on the western side of the river; as they talked the firing intensified. Brzak said his element had observed the enemy moving up the southern slope of the mountain on the western side of the river; the fighters were now looking down on HLZ 3. Ringgenberg directed Sergeant Martinez to radio for an airstrike against the Taliban on the mountain. After several minutes of radio coordination, Martinez announced, "The first run of A–10s will be in twenty minutes."

Captain Ringgenberg radioed the information on the incoming airstrike to Sergeant Brzak and then started moving north again, but he stopped as the firing to the south intensified once more. Brzak told Ringgenberg that he could direct the airstrike anywhere on the mountainside facing HLZ 3. "That mountain across the river is literally crawling with enemy!" he said. Moments later, Brzak, as first sergeant, directed Sergeant Blaskowski, now at the SBF, to begin suppressing the Taliban on the mountainside facing HLZ 3.

As Sergeant Blaskowski's machine guns riddled Taliban locations on the mountain, the translator accompanying Captain Ringgenberg used a captured Motorola-style Taliban radio he was carrying to intercept several enemy radio transmissions. The radio carried by the translator was set to pick up unsecured radio transmissions in close proximity. The reception was loud and clear, indicating that they emanated from a position very close to the company's headquarters. The translator stated that the Taliban were attempting to flee from somewhere on the western side of the river, but were trapped by American fire. Captain Ringgenberg determined this to be a clear reference to Sergeant Blaskowski and the SBF location.

The translator reiterated that the enemy was desperately trying to flee but was unable to move due to heavy firing along its withdrawal route. At this point Captain Ringgenberg decided to move the company's headquarters to the SBF location, believing that from there he could better enable Sergeant Martinez to direct airstrikes onto the Taliban positions. Sergeant Mack conducted a security halt with his squad while the company's headquarters moved south, up a hill toward the SBF location. After moving about seventy-five meters up the hill, the group began receiving heavy fire from Taliban positions on the mountain overlooking HLZ 3.

Everyone quickly dived behind a large rock mass just as Lieutenant Martyn was hit in the foot. As they huddled behind the rock, Martyn bandaged his foot and Sergeant Martinez contacted the arriving flight of two A–10 attack aircraft. Martinez directed the A-10s to make several passes firing their 40-mm. cannon onto the mountainside facing HLZ 3. As the aircraft struck Taliban positions on the mountain, everyone in the company's headquarters noticed that the translator was not present. He had remained at the base of the hill and yelled to them, "Come back down, you are not in a safe position." Huddled together behind a rock with most of the rest of the company's headquarters personnel, Captain Ringgenberg felt as though this, their first battle together, was demonstrating his Afghan translator's superiority in tactical judgment.

After several strikes were conducted by the A–10s against the Taliban positions on the mountain, the company's headquarters sprinted back down the hillside and linked up with Sergeant

Lieutenant Wainwright and his 3d Platoon preparing to assault Balūch Kalay

Dirk D. Ringgenberg Collection

Mack's squad and the translator, who laughed just a bit. The translator continued to receive radio transmissions that other Taliban fighters were trapped somewhere in the valley. The trapped men begged their comrades on the mountain to silence Sergeant Blaskowski's machine guns. The desperation in the voice of the Taliban leader on the radio clearly indicated that the SBF was in the right position. The SBF was pinning a group of Taliban somewhere in the valley, but no one knew exactly where at this point.

Captain Ringgenberg radioed Sergeant Blaskowski and informed him that his firing was having a drastic effect on the enemy and to continue to engage. At the same time the company's headquarters received a radio transmission from the battalion TOC that Colonel Stammer and the part of the company's 1st Platoon riding with him had landed at a new landing zone (HLZ 4) north of the scout location and that the CH–47 carrying the remainder of that platoon was now arriving in the area. Captain Ringgenberg directed the battalion TOC to have a second CH–47 also land at HLZ 4, where he would link up with the entire platoon. He then radioed Colonel Stammer directly and informed him of the current situation and of his plan to join him.

Sergeant Mack's squad now led the company's headquarters along a narrow trail paralleling the river and a hill to the north. As they moved, the translator received information on the captured radio that the Taliban were talking about destroying an unidentified bridge across the river. The movement stopped. Captain Ringgenberg pulled out the map and tried to determine what bridge might be near any of Company C's positions. The translator said he thought he remembered from years ago a small bridge located north of their current location. Captain Ringgenberg radioed Major Vincent, who quickly confirmed that aerial photos indicated a very small bridge about 400 meters north of Ringgenberg's current location. It now appeared that the Taliban wanted to prevent U.S. forces from crossing the river. Destroying the bridge would isolate the 3d Platoon on the west side of the river. Everyone realized the gravity of the situation.

Captain Ringgenberg yelled to Sergeant Mack to "Move like hell to the north. We need to get to a bridge fast!" As they hurried down the trail, they observed several Taliban fighters on the opposite side of the river, approximately 100 meters away, also moving quickly north. Instantly both sides engaged each other in a hail of gunfire in which Lieutenant Martyn's radio antenna was shot in half. Each side was racing the other to the only bridge across the Arghandab River for many kilometers. Captain Ringgenberg radioed Lieutenant Wainwright, now nearing the north of Balūch Kalay on the western side of the river, and told him what the Taliban was attempting to do. He pressed Wainwright to quickly secure the bridge or the 3d Platoon would be isolated. As the 3d Platoon entered the northern edge of Balūch Kalay, an RPG or booby trap exploded under Sgt. Tim Brumley, the lead team's leader, seriously wounding him. Without pausing, several elements from the 3d Platoon continued to advance, killing two enemy fighters only fifty meters from the bridge. After securing the bridge, the 3d Platoon evacuated Sergeant Brumley back to HLZ 1.

With the bridge secured, the SBF in position, and airstrikes continuing to engage Taliban positions, Captain Ringgenberg met face to face with Colonel Stammer near HLZ 4. Observing that the scouts were now secure and reinforcements were arriving, Colonel Stammer pressed Captain Ringgenberg to quickly destroy the Taliban force still thought to be in Balūch Kalay. Captain Ringgenberg then linked up with Lieutenant Craig and the 1st Platoon, which had arrived at HLZ 4 on the second lift minutes earlier. Much to Sergeant Brzak's surprise, a nine-man Special Forces team landed at HLZ 3, also on the second lift. Sergeant Brzak radioed Captain Ringgenberg that, after the Special Forces team landed, they scattered around the area. The first sergeant relayed that he had gained control of a few of the team members, most importantly the team medic. Company C now had the majority of two full platoons prepared to assault Balūch Kalay, but they were spread across the valley and separated by a river. Two and a half hours had now passed since the initial insertion.

Taliban positions on mountainside south of Balūch Kalay drawing American fire, 3 May 2005

Dirk D. Ringgenberg Collection

Across the River

Taking account of developments on the ground, Captain Ringgenberg now changed the plan of attack on Balūch Kalay and disseminated the revised plan over the radio to all Company C elements. The 1st Platoon would now conduct the assault with the 3d Platoon securing the flanks. As the company's headquarters element coordinated with the 1st Platoon's leaders relative to crossing the river and attacking Balūch Kalay, Sergeant Brumley was evacuated by helicopter back to FOB Lagman. The 3d Platoon, which had stopped north of Balūch Kalay and consolidated its position there during the evacuation mission, stood reorganized and ready. Captain Ringgenberg instructed Sergeant Mack to take the lead position and proceed down to the bridge with the 1st Platoon following. Sergeant Mack's squad would move back under Lieutenant Wainwright's control once they met across the river. As the element moved toward the bridge, it passed several dead enemy fighters, who had been killed during the earlier engagement with the scouts. The bodies were a graphic reminder of the ferocity with which this enemy was prepared to fight for Balūch Kalay.

Arriving at the bridge, the company's headquarters and 1st Platoon discovered that it consisted of nothing more than several logs with sticks and boards jammed together for footing; there appeared to be nothing holding the structure together but some twine and mud. Everyone held his breath while crossing. Firing had resumed after a fifteen-minute lull, with the SBF position catching the brunt of the fire as the Taliban again relentlessly tried to destroy the position. Every paratrooper in Company C now fully understood that the SBF position was preventing the Taliban fighters in the valley from escaping. As Captain Ringgenberg reached the far side of the river, he received a radio transmission saying that one of the machine-gun squad members in the SBF position had been wounded. Pfc. Tyler Wilson had been hit in the spine and was now in critical condition.

Sergeant Brzak immediately radioed Captain Ringgenberg from HLZ 3 that he would organize a force to bring Private Wilson back to that landing zone. Brzak then took several men and the Special Forces medic up the hill to the SBF and evacuated Private Wilson under increasing fire. The medic was able to stabilize Wilson, even though he was almost paralyzed. By this time the rest of the company's headquarters had crossed the bridge and was receiving fire. Captain Ringgenberg continued forward and quickly linked up with

U.S. soldier crosses the Arghandab River on the footbridge near Balūch Kalay, 3 May 2005.

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Sergeant Sanchez

Dirk D. Ringgenberg Collection

stunned by his brazen act of deception; the translator grabbed the enemy and


Private Wilson

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Lieutenant Craig

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Lieutenant Wainwright, who had two squads positioned to secure the flanks of Balūch Kalay. As the company's headquarters joined with elements of the 3d Platoon, the Taliban fighters on the mountain increased their firing, focusing more on this assault element near Balūch Kalay.

Ringgenberg ordered Lieutenant Wainwright to bring up his attached 60-mm. mortar and attempt to suppress the fire from the mountain face. Suddenly aware that a mistake had been made, Wainwright sheepishly replied that the mortar crew had been assigned to maintain security back at HLZ 1. Extremely upset with the misallocation of a major weapon system, Ringgenberg sought to use speed to compensate for the lack of firepower, ordering, "We need to start sprinting to Balūch Kalay."

The 1st Platoon, meanwhile, was close to completing the bridge crossing when one paratrooper fell into the river. The soldier was quickly recovered minus his rucksack, which floated downstream never to be found. Lieutenant Craig quickly informed Ringgenberg of this incident, but he was told, "Disregard the rucksack and immediately bring the platoon forward to assault Balūch Kalay." Craig's platoon, now on the west side of the river, quickly formed for the assault and rushed toward Balūch Kalay. Ringgenberg, meanwhile, directed Lieutenant Wainwright to position S. Sgt. Christopher Sanchez further east of Balūch Kalay with a squad from his platoon, enabling it to secure the bridge site. At this time Ringgenberg still thought the majority of the enemy was somewhere inside the village with only a few stragglers elsewhere.

As the company's headquarters adjusted the forces near Balūch Kalay, it received numerous requests from the crews of recently arrived AH–64 attack helicopters eager to engage targets in the orchard. As Sergeant Martinez deconflicted all the air support assets, it became apparent to him and Captain Ringgenberg that the orchard was too dense and friendly forces were moving too close to each other to safely bring the AH–64s into the fight. The frustrated pilots could not clearly indicate specific targets and were forced to maintain a holding pattern while the ground elements continued to assault forward. As elements of Company C approached Balūch Kalay, the deafening level of fire continued to indicate they were very close to a large Taliban force.

As the 1st Platoon closed to within thirty meters of the first compound in Balūch Kalay, Captain Ringgenberg and Sergeant Storms observed a Taliban fighter, situated approximately 150

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American troops advance through the orchard near Balūch Kalay, 3 May 2005.

meters to the west, fire an RPG at one of the squads of the 1st Platoon. The man then immediately dropped the RPG launcher and ran south into Balūch Kalay. The company's headquarters personnel quickly pursued him, catching him on the opposite side of a small compound, where they found him now holding a garden rake and pretending to be raking dirt. The Americans were stunned by his brazen act of deception; the translator grabbed the enemy and smelled his hand proclaiming, "He fired the rocket, and smells of gunpowder!" Sergeant Storms restrained the man as the translator asked him, "Where are your friends?" The shocked enemy looked at the ever-growing numbers of paratroopers from the 1st Platoon rushing into Balūch Kalay, and then casually gestured toward the orchard. No one in the company's headquarters quite grasped what the man was indicating, so Captain Ringgenberg told the translator to ask him once more about the village. Pressed again, the Taliban fighter replied that there was no one in the village and stated, "All the friends are leaving through the thick brush." The translator looked at Captain Ringgenberg and said, "I believe he is telling the truth, they are *all* in the orchard."

Into the Orchard

Captain Ringgenberg immediately radioed Lieutenant Craig, who had begun to clear the village, and asked him if his platoon had made any contact with the enemy there. Craig radioed back that so far the village appeared empty. Ringgenberg then radioed Lieutenant Wainwright and told him to shift one squad into Balūch Kalay, because the 1st Platoon would assault into the orchard to the south. Confused by the sudden change, Craig asked for clarification. Ringgenberg then relayed to him the information he had received from the enemy prisoner and explained the new direction for the assault. Next, he ordered Sergeant Sanchez's squad, now detached from the 3d Platoon, to remain close to the river, but to move south on line with the 1st Platoon. Within the 1st Platoon, S. Sgt. Christopher Choay's squad assumed the lead as it moved into the orchard.

As the 1st Platoon, the company's headquarters, and Sergeant Sanchez's squad moved south into the orchard, Lieutenant Wainwright's platoon, with Sergeant Mack's squad now reintegrated, secured the bulk of Balūch Kalay, while S. Sgt. Albert Galvan's squad on the extreme right, secured the west side of the village. As Galvan's squad maneuvered into position, it almost immediately began taking heavy fire from the mountain to the south and was forced to assume a precarious position on rocky open ground, where it provided vital protection for the company's entire right flank. As the assault gained momentum, Captain Ringgenberg received a radio transmission from the SBF element. Sergeant Blaskowski had been wounded.

Ringgenberg immediately radioed Sergeant Blaskowski and asked his condition. Sergeant Blaskowski replied, "I'm great, but I won't be able to hold this position much longer." He relayed that the Taliban had bracketed in his position with intense fire and that only rapid survivability moves by his men around the SBF location was keeping everyone from being wounded. Captain Ringgenberg told him that the 1st Platoon needed thirty or forty more minutes from his machine guns. Blaskowski readily agreed and replied, "We will remain in position, *no matter what*." Within minutes, Sergeant Brzak, the company's first sergeant, radioed Captain Ringgenberg and informed him that his detachment at HLZ 3 was running out of ammunition and had no more mortar rounds. Captain Ringgenberg replied that he was in the final assault in the orchard and instructed him to "Hold on a little longer!" With withering fire coming into the assault force position, Captain Ringgenberg gave his M4 rifle to his translator, who had been unarmed, and instructed him to protect himself in the event the final assault became vicious. Three and a half hours had now elapsed since the insertion.

At this crucial point, Captain Ringgenberg radioed Colonel Stammer and informed him that the assault was under way against what was thought to be a large enemy force concentrated in the orchard rather than in Balūch Kalay. Stammer asked, "Is there anything I can do to assist?" Ringgenberg replied, "No, we must end this quickly." As the 1st Platoon pressed forward, the volume of enemy fire rose again to a deafening level, accompanied by branches falling all around the paratroopers. Immediately, Lieutenant Craig raced up to Ringgenberg and said he thought they were under friendly fire from the 3d Platoon positions to the west. The

assault halted. Both officers rushed to the western edge of the orchard and attempted to signal Sergeant Galvan's squad on the Americans' extreme right flank, which was thought to be firing down onto their location. Simultaneously, Captain Ringgenberg radioed to all Company C units to verify their targets and confirm locations. As Craig and Ringgenberg reached the edge of the orchard, they moved into an exposed position and immediately drew a heavy volume of fire from the south. The fire was clearly coming from the Taliban on the mountain to the south, ending the confusion once and for all. The assault continued forward at a quickened pace, albeit now at a very low crouch.

As the men in Sergeant Choay's lead squad reached a position about 100 meters from the end of the orchard, they encountered several stone walls running east to west across the orchard, and the ground became terraced, rising from the river into three different levels. Sergeant Sanchez's squad was on the first terrace next to the river, the 1st Platoon and company headquarters were on the second terrace, and one fire team from the 1st Platoon was on the third and highest terrace. This area was the last covered position of any type before the end of the orchard and the main Taliban position. At this point, several hours having elapsed since insertion, most of the company's radio batteries began to fail. Sergeant Sanchez on the left flank was first to lose contact. Realizing that no one could contact Sergeant Sanchez, Captain Ringgenberg informed Lieutenant Craig that he would contact Sanchez personally, but told him not to slow the assault.

As Captain Ringgenberg broke away from Lieutenant Craig, Pfc. Matthew King's M4 rifle was struck by an RPG. The explosion destroyed the rifle and severely wounded King in both legs. Under intense fire, the platoon's medic, Pfc. Charles Coker, rushed forward and began treating King. Simultaneously, Pfc. Darren Byrd was wounded in the hand, but he continued fighting. Within seconds Sgt. Christopher Holbrook, a team leader, was struck in the mouth by a ricocheting bullet just to the right of where Private King had been wounded. The shot knocked out one front tooth and fractured several others, but Holbrook was able to move to the rear on his own. Amazingly, King also moved to the rear under his own power, but he passed out soon afterwards.

Almost instantly, the assault halted, as the number of men being wounded began to mount. Over the deafening fire, Ringgenberg screamed to Craig to get the assault moving again. Craig rallied his platoon, but he soon realized that the Taliban was outgunning his men. Sprinting to the rear of his formation, he brought up his machine guns to gain fire superiority. As the 1st Platoon's machine guns lurched forward, Ringgenberg ordered Craig to "Get the guns rocking and flank everyone from the right!" He said he would get the information to Sergeant Sanchez, who was still out of radio contact. As a party led by Sergeant Cavataio guided the last of the wounded toward the rear, Lieutenant Craig zeroed Spec. Steven Lewis's machine gun into the heart of the Taliban defense.

He immediately fired from the left to the right into the group, killing all eight.

The Assault

Captain Ringgenberg moved back to rejoin Sergeants Storms and Martinez. He told them to prepare to make the final assault with the 1st Platoon, but to wait until he briefed Sergeant Sanchez on the plan. He then raced to his left flank, jumped over a small stone wall, and upon reaching Sanchez's position, told him where to provide suppressive fire and specified a right limit for his fires. Before returning, Ringgenberg told Sanchez that the 1st Platoon would signal him from the far right, and then he hurried back to Sergeants Storms and Martinez, just as an enemy zeroed in on his movement. Rounds started smacking all around him as he attempted to jump back over the small stone wall, assisted at the last minute by a strong tug from Sergeant Storms. After gathering their composure, they rushed to the extreme right of the 1st Platoon just as Specialist Lewis, who had crawled forward to a good firing position, opened up with a 200-round burst from his machine gun. The massive fire stunned the enemy into silence. Lieutenant Craig grabbed Sergeant Choay, the lead squad leader, and told him to move quickly to the highest terrace to begin the flanking assault.

By this time Captain Ringgenberg had positioned the company's headquarters on the far right flank where Sgt. Tim Smith, a team leader, asked permission to jettison his team's AT4 antitank rockets. Ringgenberg readily agreed, enabling the team to hastily drop the large rockets and quickly move away. As Ringgenberg moved forward to direct the assembling squads, an enemy combatant no more than fifty meters away fired an RPG at him. The round landed at his feet, burying into the soft muddy ground, which absorbed the brunt of the impact. A stunned Captain Ringgenberg, now covered with mud, fired his 9-mm. pistol at the assailant, hitting him several times. Moments

later, Sergeant Choay rushed past him with his squad close behind. The sheer momentum of the assault carried everyone unscathed across the seventy-five meters of thick grass into the Taliban's exposed flank.

Sergeant Choay moved around what appeared to be a mud bunker and found himself strategically placed on the left flank of eight Taliban fighters crouching behind a stone wall, facing the opposite direction. He immediately fired from the left to the right into the group, killing all eight. His squad followed close behind and fired on additional enemy fighters, killing several more. Following right behind the assault, Captain Ringgenberg, with Sergeant Storms close behind, inadvertently moved in front of the bunker behind which Sergeant Choay's squad was firing. Ringgenberg then crested a corner of the higher terrace from which the two had just descended. Here a Taliban fighter hiding between a tree and the stone wall at the edge of the terrace fired on him from about one meter away. The enemy shot the pistol out of Ringgenberg's hand but missed him. Now weaponless, Ringgenberg quickly grabbed an AK47 assault rifle from a dead enemy fighter and yelled for Spec. Jessie Husketh, a squad automatic weapon gunner, to assist him. Choay yelled to Ringgenberg, "The bunker is not clear, *get back*!" Sergeant Smith jumped down near the bunker entrance and threw a grenade inside. After the explosion, he peered inside and was fired on, so he fired several times into the opening, ensuring that the Taliban fighters inside were dead.

At the same time, Ringgenberg motioned to Craig to look over the edge of the wall from where he had been fired on. Craig was on the upper part of the terrace facing the Taliban positions. As Craig crept forward to the edge, he was fired on and hit in the helmet by another Taliban fighter farther down the wall. The impact knocked Craig to the ground. Immediately Specialist Husketh and Captain Ringgenberg moved around the stone wall and fired on both Taliban fighters, killing them. Sergeant Choay eliminated the remaining enemy from the immediate area just as Sergeant Sanchez, having received a visual signal to move forward, cleared the remaining Taliban fighters that had been close to the river. As Sanchez and his squad began to emerge from the thick grass and wooded area at the end of the orchard, his squad fired on and killed several more of the enemy. Sergeant Sanchez's squad reached the end of the orchard just as the firing from the Taliban on the mountain to the south ceased. This culminated the assault and secured the final Company C objective.

By this time approximately seventeen Taliban militants lay dead at the end of the orchard, and another dozen enemy dead were scattered elsewhere throughout the orchard, along with numerous belt-fed heavy machine guns, RPGs, and AK47s, and several enemy radios. To everyone present in the orchard, it appeared the remaining enemy fighters realized that their comrades in the orchard were now dead or captured. The 1st Platoon began consolidating its position, preparing for an enemy counterattack, and searching for remaining enemy fighters. Captain Ringgenberg radioed Colonel Stammer with a situation report. Stammer told him to attack around the base of the mountain south of the orchard to a small village located approximately 1,500 meters beyond. He ordered Ringgenberg to destroy the remaining Taliban elements in the area, as he put it, "while we have them on the run." As it was now getting late in the day, Ringgenberg verified the objectives and issued an order to the platoons. The 3d Platoon would lead the attack and Ringgenberg instructed it "to be in position prior to night."

The impact knocked Craig to the ground. Immediately

Around the Mountain

As the 3d Platoon moved forward to the edge of the orchard to link up with the company's headquarters, its men redistributed ammunition and water, both of which were now in short supply. Ringgenberg radioed Sergeant Brzak and told him to bring everyone forward from HLZ 3 to the orchard position. The company's first sergeant informed Ringgenberg that Sergeant Blaskowski and the other casualties had been evacuated back to FOB Lagman and that he would comply. After twenty minutes of preparation, the 3d Platoon began moving south along a narrow trail around the mountain, the same trail the Taliban had been prevented from using by Sergeant Blaskowski's machine guns. The trail, a steep narrow path, followed the river south to the new village. As the Americans walked cautiously along the trail, they heard only sporadic gunfire in the distance to the south. With the last fading rays of light, the 3d Platoon and the company's headquarters reached good controlling positions overlooking the new village south of the mountain. They waited for requested air support to arrive before moving further.

Meanwhile, Sergeant Brzak and the SBF, having crossed the river and linked up with the 1st Platoon at its final position in the orchard, now joined it in securing Balūch Kalay and the orchard. Just after nightfall, an AC–130 gunship came on station and immediately began reporting possible Taliban positions in a wooded area to the east of the small village over which the 3d Platoon was standing watch. Sergeant Sanchez's squad once again was on the far left flank near the river, Sergeant Galvan's squad

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Taliban weapons captured at Balūch Kalay, 3 May 2005

held the center, and Sergeant Mack's squad was on the right flank. With Mack's squad providing security, Sanchez began to move south into a wooded area near the new village. Just inside the wooded area, he was fired on. With his forces spread thin as darkness engulfed the area, Captain Ringgenberg pulled Sanchez's squad back from these woods and directed the AC–130 to fire on the Taliban. For the next several hours, the precision firepower of the AC–130 decimated the remaining Taliban positions inside the wooded area.

At 0300, with the AC–130 having finished its engagement with the Taliban positions, Captain Ringgenberg moved the company's headquarters back to the final position in the orchard but left the 3d Platoon in its positions overlooking the new village. The entire company headquarters reunited at the orchard position, and as dawn approached the entire valley became silent. At first light, Company C continued to clear the orchard area, capturing several Taliban fighters hiding in holes or in the thick grass.

The Aftermath

The company spent the following day consolidating its position, collecting Taliban weapons, and processing captured Taliban fighters, almost all of whom were wounded. Other companies from the battalion conducted air assaults into several villages close to Balūch Kalay and began searching for enemy combatants who had escaped the fight. Over the next several days, reports of individuals being caught with up to five bullet wounds were not uncommon. Company C secured Balūch Kalay and the surrounding area until the destroyed Humvee could be recovered and transported by air back to FOB Lagman. During this time the company's leaders held several meetings with the local village leaders to assist them in dealing with the Taliban. Company C, augmented by scouts and Colonel Stammer's element, had killed or captured over sixty Taliban fighters during two days of fighting. At 0800 on 5 May, the last Company C elements lifted off from HLZ 4 en route to FOB Lagman, leaving behind Balūch Kalay and a definitive victory against the Taliban.

Postscript

Sergeants Choay and Blaskowski received the Silver Star for their gallantry at Balūch Kalay. Blaskowski, however, was killed in action in 2007 during his second tour in Afghanistan with the 2d Battalion, 503d Infantry Regiment. He was then a platoon sergeant. S. Sgt. Patrick Brannan, who led a squad of the scout platoon that had first engaged with the Taliban near Balūch Kalay on 3 May 2005 and called for reinforcements after one of its Humvees had been destroyed, also received the Silver Star for his gallantry that day.

With the help of Captain Ringgenberg, the translator for Company C, 2d Battalion, 503d Infantry, came to the United States in 2006. He expects to become an U.S. citizen in 2009. He had maintained his distinguished level of service to the company throughout 2005.

AH

This essay received the first prize in the U.S. Army Center of Military History's 2008 James Lawton Collins Jr. Special Topics Writing Competition.

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From left, Afghan translator, Captain Ringgenberg, and Sergeant Brzak

COMMENTARY

Postmodern Challenges for Modern Warriors


Department of Defense

A 2d Infantry Division soldier stands on guard during a security operation near Sadr City in Baghdad, Iraq, 26 December 2006.

By John Kiszely

Introduction

As warfare—the practice of war—changes through the ages, so it can be expected to change the demands it places on its practitioners. Where these changes in practice are dramatic—for example, the advent of mechanized warfare—the changing demands will be easy to spot. But where the changes are more evolutionary or gradual, over a period of time, it is less easy to identify the impact on military professionals. It is also possible to be living through a period of such change without being aware of it: from one month to the next—even from one year to the next—change can take place so gradually as to be almost imperceptible.

It is certainly possible, looking back, to perceive changes in features of warfare over the almost-two decades since the end of the Cold War—for example, the increased incidence of civil wars and instability in failed or failing states, and the rise of terrorism and insurgency, national and transnational—and to identify some of the different demands placed on our armed forces as a result; but some of the demands, particularly those that might be taking place in current operations, may be less obvious. It is timely to examine these challenges and their impact on armed forces, and to assess how well placed they are to cope with the operational challenges of the future.

This paper examines the challenges presented to modern warriors by changes in contemporary warfare, and argues that while some of these challenges have been or are being overcome, there are others, particularly those associated with military education and culture, which have yet to be fully recognized, let alone met, and which will require to be so if modern warriors are to be a match for tomorrow's warfare.

Enduring and Changing Challenges

In terms of the challenges facing warriors—"person[s] whose occupation is warfare"[1]—the period of the Cold War was characterized by the quest to keep up with the modernization of the battlefield: for example, the increasing sophistication of weapon systems; the impact of information technology; and the increased complexity of command and control, staff work, and tactics. One of the major challenges was that of providing warriors with sufficient training, and this despite—or, cynics might argue, as a result of—the increasing number and sophistication (not to mention cost) of training aids, simulators, and operational analysis tools. New command and staff courses, for example in the United States and in several European

U.S. Army soldiers provide protection to a reconstruction team in Tagab, Kapisa Province, Afghanistan, 20 December 2006.

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armed forces, were created to help meet this demand, and many militaries found that training to achieve the necessary skills was a full-time occupation. But as a result of responding to this challenge, many became better trained and more professional—in the sense of being more focused on achieving expertise in their jobs—arguably, than ever before.

With a few exceptions, the battlefield for which they prepared (and by which they judged their professionalism) was the arena of large-scale, interstate combat or, as some came to call it—warfighting. Indeed, for many military professionals, warfare—the practice of war, and warfighting, or combat, were synonymous, thereby misleading themselves that there was no more to the practice of war than combat.[2] True, some armed forces found themselves involved in other types of operations, for example, postcolonial disengagement, anti-Communist interventions, United Nations peacekeeping missions, or even internal security roles in their own countries. But these missions were largely considered by many military establishments to be aberrations—Operations Other Than War, as they came to be known in British and American doctrine—distractions from the "real thing": large-scale, high-tech, interstate conflict, which was perceived axiomatically (and not without hubris) to be "modern warfare" in the sense of being a culmination in evolutionary development. The essence of this type of warfare was a contest, relatively simple in conceptual terms, between two regular armed forces, where war and peace, and victory and defeat, were clearly identifiable states, where the mission was to destroy the enemy's forces, and the method was the application of overwhelming firepower, facilitated by physical maneuver.

With the exception of some nations that chose to specialize in peacekeeping and humanitarian operations, the requirement for armed forces to be prepared for "the real thing" did not, of course, end with the Cold War. Encouraged by the zeitgeist of the so-called Revolution in Military Affairs, with its extravagant claims that it "challenges the hoary dictums about the fog and friction of war,"[3] and thus the nature of war itself, and amid assertions that this view was vindicated by the one-sided nature and result of the 1991 Gulf War,[4] the development of modern warfare continued, and continues, in linear fashion,[5] driven largely by a technological dynamic: the quest for greater firepower, greater lethality, greater speed, better stealth, better digitization, more efficient logistics, network-centric warfare, and the ability to deliver high-tech "shock and awe." Such warfare presents mind-boggling challenges to practitioners—notably those of the coordination and synchronization of what amounts to a huge and perplexingly complex machine—albeit that their solution is, in character, Newtonian—more formulaic and mechanistic than conceptual. The overall challenge for warriors here was and is to keep pace with (and, where possible, to keep ahead of) the development of warfare.[6] It remains a considerable challenge, but by no means the only one, and for some, not even the most testing.

The asymmetric challenges posed to modern armed forces, particularly those of liberal democracies, by opponents who refuse to engage them in modern, conventional warfare, but instead choose a different style of warfare, for example insurgency, are not new,[7] but they are largely of a different sort: postmodern challenges—challenges that are not primarily overcome with the tools of modernity: more advanced technology, firepower, lethality, speed, stealth, digitization, logistics, network-centric warfare, or high-tech "shock and awe."[8] Postmodern warfare does not develop in linear fashion; and unlike modern warfare, many of the major challenges it poses are not so much technological, formulaic, or mechanistic as conceptual. For example, war and peace are not easily delineated; "defeat" and "victory" require definition. The enemy is not obvious, nor easily identifiable, literally or figuratively, and may change on an almost-daily basis; success depends not on destruction of the enemy, but on outmaneuvering opponents—in particular, depriving them of popular support, and winning it oneself. The contest takes place not on a field of battle, but in a complex civilian

environment: "among the people."[9] Nor is it a primarily military contest; in the case of counterrevolutionary warfare, according to David Galula, "twenty per cent military, eighty per cent political is a formula that reflects the truth."[10] The war is, in large part, a war of ideas, the battle largely one for perception, and the key battleground is in the mind—the minds of the indigenous population, and the minds of regional and world opinion.[11] Much of this ideological struggle is carried out in the virtual domain of cyberspace.[12] Time is a key—sometimes the key—resource, and one that our opponents are likely to hold in far greater quantity than do we. How the war is fought becomes crucially important to the quality and sustainability of the resulting peace. Operations that could previously be clearly and conveniently labelled—for example, combat, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, counterrevolutionary warfare, humanitarian operations—can no longer be so. Now, "these reassuringly neat delineations sit uneasily with the reality that campaigns involving counterinsurgency are inherently messy—a kaleidoscope of different types of operation, remarkably resistant to neatness in delineation,"[13] confusing doctrine writers and warriors alike. Generalizing about these operations is not easy, not least because every one is *sui generis*—of its own kind; but many practitioners who have experienced them might agree that they are characterized by four things in particular: complexity, ambiguity, uncertainty, and volatility, and by the fact that they all tend to be "wicked problems"—problems that are intractable and circular with complex interdependencies, and where solving one part of the problem can create further problems, or make the whole problem greater.[14]

The nature and characteristics of these operations point toward the roles in which military professionals may expect to find themselves, and the competencies they require. Particularly striking is the far greater diversity of roles than is demanded by combat operations alone: for example, state-building, security-sector reform, mentoring and training indigenous security forces, humanitarian assistance, civil administration, law enforcement, exercising political muscle, even social work—roles that might be expected to be the proper responsibility of other organizations, agencies, or government departments. These roles point, in turn, toward the far greater breadth and variety of competencies required—for example, the ability to apply soft power as well as hard, and choose the right one for the right circumstances; work in partnership with multinational, multiagency organizations, civilian as well as military, within a comprehensive approach; master information operations and engage successfully with the media; conduct persuasive dialogue with local leaders and opinion-formers; mentally outmaneuver a wily and ruthless enemy; and, perhaps most often overlooked, measure progress appropriately. These competencies require practitioners to have a high level of understanding across a wide range of subjects, including the political context; the legal, moral, and ethical complexities; culture and religion; how societies work; what constitutes good governance; the relationship between one's own armed forces and society; the notion of human security; the concept of legitimacy; the limitations on the utility of force; and the psychology of one's opponents and of the rest of the population. Compared with large-scale, interstate combat, therefore, the challenges facing military professionals conducting postmodern warfare such as counterinsurgency may or may not be tougher, but they are certainly very different—not least, considerably broader and more cerebral, requiring far greater contextual understanding; and successful decision-making at all levels (not just senior ones) is likely to depend less on purely military expertise than on the application of wisdom.

The Cultural Challenge

In addition to a diverse and broad range of competencies and understanding, operations such as counterinsurgency require military professionals to have a different mind-set—a different culture—from that required for modern warfare. The practitioner of modern warfare is schooled to see challenges in a certain way: the end state that matters is the military one; operational success is achieved by the application of lethal fire-

U.S. Army Pfc. Daniel Williams surveys the interior of the M2A2 Bradley fighting vehicle in which he is travelling to Buhriz, Diyala Province, Iraq, 27 January 2007.

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power which, in turn, is largely a question of targeting and physical maneuver; the effects to be achieved are physical ones; the means to the end are largely attritional: destroying targets until there are none left; technology will disperse or at least penetrate "the impenetrable fog of war"; given sufficient resources, all campaigns are winnable—and quickly; the world is divided into "enemy forces" and "friendly forces"; and the operational picture can be seen in distinct colors: black and white.

The culture and mind-set required for practitioners of postmodern warfare such as counterinsurgency are very different, requiring recognition that: the end state that matters most is not the military end state, but the political one; indeed, "the insurgency problem is military only in a secondary sense, and political, ideological and administrative in a primary sense";[15] operational success is not achieved primarily by the application of lethal firepower and targeting; that outmaneuvering opponents physically is less important than outmaneuvering them mentally; that, in the words of Lawrence Freedman: "In irregular warfare, superiority in the physical environment is of little value unless it can be translated into an advantage in the information environment";[16] that claims that technology will disperse the fog of war are to be expected from technophiles with little understanding of war (and, indeed, from those paid large sums of money to make such claims); that sufficient resources do not lead inexorably to campaign success; that "the image of a quick and decisive victory is almost always an illusion":[17] counterinsurgency campaigns are rarely won quickly—and, indeed, some are quite simply unwinnable and should never be attempted in the first place; that the dramatis personae cannot be divided in Manichaean fashion into "enemy forces" and "friendly forces"; and that very little of the picture is actually painted in black and white—mostly in shades of grey.[18]

Even the approach to problem-solving is different. In conventional warfare the doctrinal approach is essentially Cartesian or reductionist—

A sergeant in an ordnance disposal unit places enemy munitions found in Afghanistan into a pit for destruction, 26 February 2007.

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the first step in problem-solving is to reduce the problem to its essentials and identify a workable solution as quickly as possible. A number of quasi-scientific tools—formulas, templates, "norms"[19]—have been developed to assist in the process; the preferred means to the end is the delivery of rapid and decisive effect; a well-known dictum is "don't just sit there, do something!" Counterinsurgency, by contrast, characterized by "wicked problems," does not lend itself to the reductionist, PowerPoint mind: the first essential step is spending time understanding the nature of the problem and all its many facets; to try to develop formulas, templates, and "norms" is to misunderstand the nature of the problem; the delivery of rapid and decisive effect is but one means—in many circumstances it may be not only singularly inappropriate, but also actively counterproductive; and the wiser counsel is sometimes "don't do something, just sit there!"

The degree of cultural challenge is easy to underestimate. Unless educated otherwise, those schooled in conventional warfare are liable to conduct counterinsurgency as conventional warfare. When the enlightened General Creighton W. Abrams Jr. assumed command in Vietnam in 1968, he was briefed on the campaign plan:

> The briefer stated that the mission was to "seek out and destroy the enemy"—the mission of MACV [Military Assistance Command, Vietnam] under General Westmoreland for the previous four years. Abrams stopped the briefing and wrote out on an easel "The mission is not to seek out and destroy the enemy. The mission is to provide

> protection for the people of Vietnam." [20]

And Frank Kitson drew attention in 1971 to British Army commanders in counterinsurgency who "present the situation to subordinates in terms of conventional warfare."[21] Such commanders are, of course, transgressing, among other things, Carl von Clausewitz's "first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make [which] is to establish . . . the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature."[22]

Since all these cultural challenges require the conventional combat warrior to jettison some old, and often deeply held, tenets, it is perhaps worth recalling Basil Liddell Hart's view that "the only thing harder than getting a new idea into the military mind is to get an old one out."[23] Moreover, rather like modernists and postmodernists in twentieth-century art, some protagonists of modern warfare have an inherent disdain for those who espouse a postmodern style, have a desire (conscious or subconscious) to prove that their style is superior, and are therefore reluctant to change.[24]

An important aspect of this different mind-set or culture required by military professionals concerns their warrior ethos—a term that immediately introduces a secondary meaning of the word "warrior": "a person . . . distinguished in fighting . . . fig[uratively] a hardy, courageous or aggressive person," or as one contemporary historian suggests of warriors, "people with a penchant ["a strong or habitual liking"[25]] for fighting.[26] To be effective in combat, an army needs its members to have a self-perception of warriors as fighters; and the army as a whole needs to be imbued with the characteristic spirit, or ethos, of the fighting warrior: the desire to close with the enemy and kill him. A strong warrior ethos is, thus, a precious commodity. But to be effective at counterinsurgency and stabilization operations, an army needs its members to perceive themselves as something other than, or more than, just warriors. Unless they do, they are liable to apply a warrior ethos, approach, and methods, for example exercising hard power (in particular, "kinetic solutions") when they should be exercising soft power—in Max Boot's words, "fighting small wars with big war methods."[27] As the old saying goes, "if the only tool you have in your toolbox is a hammer, all problems begin to resemble nails."[28] To be effective at both combat and counterinsurgency, the army needs to have sufficient warrior ethos, but not so much that it cannot adapt, otherwise warrior ethos becomes an obstacle to versatility and success. Combining these two cultures is highly problematic.

> It is . . . remarkably difficult for an army to be really good at both combat and counterinsurgency. Notable examples of this dichotomy are the Russian and Israeli armies, highly adept warfighting machines with a warrior ethos so strong that they have found it almost impossible to adapt to the requirements of counterinsurgency. On the other side of this coin are those armed forces which have largely foregone warfighting as their core activity, instead choosing to become specialist peacekeeping forces, and who have found it less easy than they might have wished to regain the warrior ethos needed to meet the challenges of combat operations.[29]

Moreover, counterinsurgency possesses features with which the pure warrior ethos is highly uneasy: complexity, ambiguity, and uncertainty; the whole concept of soft power; political "interference"; media scrutiny; the "unfair" constraints of rules of engagement that can negate the use of the trump card—firepower. And it requires these warriors to acquire some decidedly unwarrior-like attributes,[30] such as emotional intelligence, empathy with one's opponents, tolerance, patience, subtlety, sophistication, nuance, and political adroitness—attributes which, to some warriors, appear to undermine the warrior ethos on which success in combat depends. Warriors can thus be highly uncomfortable with a role as counterinsurgents, and highly resistant to any change of culture. Such warriors might agree with Ralph Peters writing in the U.S. Army journal *Parameters*: "A soldier's job is to kill the enemy. All else, however important it may appear at the moment, is secondary. . . . Theories don't win wars. Well-trained, well-led soldiers in well-equipped armies do. And they do so by killing effectively . . . . There is no substitute for shedding the enemy's blood."[31]

A lieutenant uses a sand table to brief his platoon on plans for a mission near Nani, Ghazni Province, Afghanistan, 2 June 2007.

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Proponents of such an approach sometimes enlist Clausewitz in support:

> Kind-hearted people might of course think that there was some ingenious way to disarm or defeat an enemy without too much bloodshed, and might imagine this is the true goal of the art of war. Pleasant as it sounds, it is a fallacy that must be exposed. If one side uses force without compunction, undeterred by the bloodshed it involves, while the other side refrains, the first will gain the upper hand,[32]

That may have been true of warfare in Clausewitz's day, but in counterinsurgency conducted by armed forces of liberal democracies in the twenty-first century it is simply not true that "if one side uses force without compunction, undeterred by the bloodshed it involves, while the other refrains, the first will gain the upper hand." In these circumstances, disarming or defeating an enemy without too much bloodshed is not so much kind-hearted as clever.

There is, nevertheless, a dichotomy here. In an era when armed forces can expect to be deployed on counterinsurgency and stabilization operations, there is a difficult balance to be achieved in the strength of their warrior ethos. So is a warrior just a military professional? Or is a warrior essentially a person with a strong habitual liking for fighting, an aggressive person whose job is to "destroy the enemy,"[33] "to kill the enemy—all else . . . is secondary"?[34] As Christopher Coker points out, killing is one of the traditional marks of the warrior, and he observes that while Achilles is the archetypal warrior in the Western tradition, today "for many soldiers the archetypal hero is Rambo . . . a one dimensional action figure engaged in a compellingly reductive vision of war as pure violence."[35] And there is a further complicating factor. Some counterinsurgency campaigns, such as those in Iraq and Afghanistan today, contain significant elements of combat, as depicted in the notion of the Three Block War ("the entire spectrum of tactical challenges in the span of a few hours within the space of three contiguous city blocks"[36]). Combat and counterinsurgency are not mutually exclusive.

but training time is finite and, for many armed forces, is under pressure

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Spec. Jonathan Castillo on duty in Al Khalis, Diyala Province, Iraq, 25 January 2007

Training and Doctrine

A key requirement for an armed force reorienting from one type of warfare to another is having agile and responsive training and doctrine organizations. For many militaries involved in contemporary operations, it is probably true to say that training has adapted faster than doctrine. The amount of predeployment training in, for example, the U.K. and U.S. armed forces is now significantly increased, including not only the specialist tactics and techniques required, but also special-to-country briefings, cultural awareness, and language training. There is also increasing recognition that such training needs to widen still further to include, among other things, knowledge and understanding of the part that the military line of operation plays in a multidisciplinary, comprehensive approach, and a more holistic approach to the study of insurgency. This has involved some redefinition of the training requirement. It was often claimed that it was relatively simple for armed forces trained in combat to adjust to what were perceived to be the lesser demands of operations other than combat, such as stability operations and counterinsurgency, but much harder, if not impossible (in a short space of time), for troops trained only for operations other than combat to become combat-capable.[37] True though this is, it was interpreted by some to imply that counterinsurgency required little extra training for well-trained combat troops. This was an error. Frank Kitson commented adversely on this attitude toward operations other than combat, or what he called Low Intensity Operations, in the early 1970s: "a considerable number of officers . . . still consider that it is unnecessary to make any great effort to understand what is involved in Low Intensity Operations, and the cry that a fit soldier with a rifle can do all that is required is often heard."[38] This cry is occasionally still to be heard, albeit infrequently, and rarely from anyone with any understanding of the subject.

The underlying challenge, though, is that armed forces also need to retain their capability to conduct large-scale, conventional warfare, training for which, particularly for land forces, is (as has been pointed out) a poten-

tially full-time occupation in itself; but training time is finite and, for many armed forces, is under pressure from a high rate of operational deployments. Achieving the necessary amount of training time for both combat and for other operations, and for both war and *the* war, is highly problematic.

Turning to doctrine, new doctrine on both sides of the Atlantic recognizes the need for a different approach to counterinsurgency. In June 2006, the U.S. Marine Corps produced a "tentative manual," *Countering Irregular Threats: A Comprehensive Approach*, in which its sponsor, Lt. Gen. Jim Mattis, argued that

> Marines will be asked to do many things other than combat operations to beat our adversaries. . . . Marines need to learn when to fight with weapons and when to fight with information, humanitarian aid, economic advice, and a boost toward good governance for the local people. . . . Winning and preserving the goodwill of the people is the key to victory. [39]

This approach is continued in the latest U.S. Army and Marine Corps counterinsurgency doctrine, published remarkably quickly in December 2006. In their introduction to the publication—significantly, jointly signed—Lt. Gens. David H. Petraeus, U.S. Army, and James F. Amos, U.S. Marine Corps, stress that "this manual takes a general approach to counterinsurgency operations. . . . It strives to provide those conducting counterinsurgency campaigns with a solid foundation for understanding and addressing specific insurgencies."[40]

And contrary to precepts previously espoused by neocons in the Department of Defense, the generals also stress that "soldiers and Marines are expected to be nation builders as well as warriors. They must be prepared to help reestablish institutions and local security forces and assist in rebuilding infrastructure and basic services. They must be able to facilitate establishing local governance and the rule of law."[41]

This is also the British Armed Forces' approach in their emerging joint doctrine[42] on what is termed "countering irregular activity" which, like its U.S. counterpart, seeks to instruct military personnel about counterinsurgency as a whole and about associated threats, and emphasizes the need for military activity to be part of a comprehensive approach involving all instruments of power. Many other militaries are also updating their doctrine with a similar approach. But there are further challenges for armed forces here. The first arises from the fact that, as pointed out earlier, every insurgency is *sui generis*, making generalizations problematic. Doctrine that does not take this sufficiently into account can be dangerous; but equally, doctrine that is too wary of this pitfall can become so general and anodyne as to be of very limited assistance. Second, insurgency is becoming increasingly complex, with the advent, for example, of transnational, and hybrid insurgencies[43] for which the counterinsurgency doctrine suitable for national insurgencies may be either of limited utility or counterproductive. And third, the nature of complex insurgencies is that they are amoeba-like (mutating in shape and form to take advantages of the circumstances in which they find themselves), dynamic (proactively changing their tactics to suit their purpose), and agile (able to make these changes quickly). And insurgents, being thinking enemies, study our doctrine[44] and adjust their methods and tactics accordingly. In consequence of these factors, the likelihood is that some aspects of our doctrine are liable to be out of date almost from the day of publication. Military doctrine and training organizations need, therefore, to be flexible enough to make the necessary and appropriate changes, and agile enough to be able to do so quickly.[45] And armed forces need to be learning organizations, which can learn and adapt—a key tenet of the new U.S. doctrine—and do so even faster than their agile opponents. Particularly in counterinsurgency, it is "who learns wins."

A CH–47D Chinook helicopter in flight east of Bayji, Salah ad Din Province, Iraq, 6 June 2006

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aspects of our doctrine are liable to be out of date almost from the day of publication.

Education

Here there is a further challenge. In conventional warfare, the tools necessary for any conceptual change in a military's approach to warfare are essentially twofold—doctrine and training. It comes naturally, therefore, to militaries to place their faith in these tools as the means of reorientating

from one type of warfare to another. Such faith is, however, misplaced and misleading. A further essential instrument in this process is education.

It is necessary here to distinguish between training and education. Training is preparing people, individually or collectively, for given tasks in given circumstances; education is developing their mental powers and understanding. Training is thus appropriate preparation for the predictable; but for the unpredictable and for conceptual challenges, education is required. And, as noted earlier, current and likely future operations, particularly those such as counterinsurgency, are characterized by complexity, ambiguity, uncertainty, and volatility—all of which add up to unpredictability—and by challenges that are not so much formulaic and mechanistic as conceptual and "wicked." This calls for minds that can not only cope with, but excel in, these circumstances—thus, minds that are agile, flexible, inquiring, imaginative, capable of rigorous analysis and objective critical thinking; minds that can conceptualize and innovate; minds at home with sophistication and nuance ("interpreting shades of grey"); and minds that have developed understanding, intuition, wisdom, and good judgment.[46] Moreover, postmodern operations are also characterized by devolved decision-making where relatively junior commanders are making very senior decisions. The requirement for this education is not, therefore, just a requirement for senior officers.

The relationship between training and doctrine, on the one hand, and education, on the other is important. All training and doctrine need to be founded on education. If they are not, the practitioner is liable to lack the versatility and flexibility needed to adapt them to changing circumstances or to extemporize. Indeed, doctrine alone "may constrain the ability to "think outside the box" and "limit the ability to understand novel situations."[47] This is particularly applicable in the fluid, unpredictable, "messy" operations that characterize postmodern warfare. Here doctrine and training are liable to be only rough guides, requiring the practitioner to possess the ability to spot when and where they are no longer appropriate, and to adapt accordingly. Moreover, adaptability by itself is inadequate; we must also possess the understanding (resulting from education) that will enable us to anticipate change. As Giulio Douhet noted, "Victory smiles on those who anticipate changes in the character of war, not those who wait to adapt themselves after they occur."[48] Furthermore, without a considerable degree of education, learning is liable to be experiential, often based on the last campaign, with a tendency to transpose inappropriate lessons from one *sui generis* campaign to another; and overfocus on training as opposed to education often results in too much learning time being spent on counterinsurgency—not enough on insurgency: "Whoever would understand modern counterinsurgency must first understand modern insurgency."[49] Finally, success in postmodern operations requires military leaders at all levels to possess political sophistication and savvy—from the junior commander engaging with a local mayor, to more senior ones dealing with regional governors, right up to the most senior commanders interacting with and advising political leaders at the national level. Education has a key role to play in developing the necessary political acumen.

whether they succeed or fail, is likely to depend much more than in the past on their intellect.

It is important to recognize the purpose of this education. Its purpose is not the purist one of the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake, but of developing capacity for good judgment. Such education, therefore, has a training dimension in that it is preparing practitioners to exercise good judgment in their profession, but not just in their next job or deployment, but throughout their career. Thus, its payback should not be judged by the improvement to an individual's immediate performance, but by the value it adds to performance over the course of a career, and in the value added to the organization as a whole over a similar time-span. Judged in this way, professional military education is a direct and essential contributor to operational capability. The nature of future operations will almost certainly place a greater premium than in the past on this contribution, with the increased intellectual demands it is likely to place on military leaders at all levels. Whether these leaders match up to the operational challenges they will face, whether they succeed or fail, is likely to depend much more than in the past on their intellect. If so, then recruiting officers of the necessary intellect and educating them to a high standard throughout their careers will be even more important in the future. To be well prepared, officers will thus need to be both well trained and well educated (that is to say, having well-developed minds and understanding the nature of the subject). In combat operations it matters less that officers are well trained but poorly educated; it seldom determines the outcome. In operations such as counterinsurgency, it is liable to be the difference between success and failure. The educational requirement is, thus, far more about teaching officers "how to think," than "what to think"—the antithesis of what Masland and Radway warned against, fifty years ago, as "the stockpile approach" to learning: thinking in terms of "counting, piling and storing."[50] Developing minds is most decidedly not something that can be achieved as part of predeployment training.

M. Sgt. John Paxton provides security to a girls' school in Mahmudiyah, Iraq, just south of Badhdad.

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Education is important even—perhaps, particularly—for armed forces, such as the British, who have perceived experience of counterinsurgency. The temptation for these armed forces is to believe that their experience relieves them of the requirement for education. This belief is ill-founded. For example, at the outset of the 2003 deployment to Iraq, the British Army had considerable and almost universal experience of counterinsurgency, but apart from a small number of people who had briefly served in Afghanistan or Sierra Leone, and a very few individuals seconded to other armies, this experience was confined to one theatre alone, and a very *sui generis* one at that: Northern Ireland[51] (campaigns in the Balkans were not counterinsurgency, but peacekeeping/peace enforcement). As a result, and with very limited education (as opposed to training) in counterinsurgency, there was a tendency among some to overdraw on the lessons of the Northern Ireland campaign.

Some aspects of the educational requirement for military professionals are more obvious than others, with some subjects being more obvious candidates for study, for example, history. Indeed, a lack of understanding of history, and of the importance of its study, is a sure sign of a military leader destined to fail in operations such as counterinsurgency. But focus on one subject can obscure visibility of the wider educational requirement, a requirement well articulated by Samuel P. Huntington, also fifty years ago:

> Just as law at its borders merges into history, politics, economics, sociology, and psychology, so also does the military skill. Even more, military knowledge also has frontiers on the natural sciences of chemistry, physics, and biology. To understand his trade properly, the officer must have some idea of its relation to these other fields and the ways in which those other areas of knowledge may contribute to his own purposes. In addition, he cannot really develop his analytical skill, insight, imagination, and judgment if he is trained simply in vocational duties. The abilities and habits of mind which he requires within his professional field can in large part be acquired only through the broader avenues of learning outside his profession. The fact that, like the lawyer and the physician, he is continuously dealing with human beings requires him to have the deeper understanding of human attitudes, motivations, and behavior which a liberal education stimulates. Just as a general education has become the prerequisite for entry into the professions of law and medicine, it is now also almost universally recognized as a desirable qualification for the professional officer. [52]

This certainly resonates today, and the nature of current operations suggests that what may have been a desirable qualification fifty years ago is now essential. These complex operations depend for success on a multidisciplinary, comprehensive approach, combining a number of lines of operation—for example, political, diplomatic, security, economic, social—and the military professional requires an understanding across the breadth of these disciplines. There is also a corollary to this for the method and approach to the delivery of professional military education in-service. Such education and training are customarily delivered in most countries in staff colleges or war colleges—military establishments largely restricted to members of the armed services. This may meet the requirement of preparation for an operating environment that is itself restricted to the armed services, although this has not been without some disadvantages. Huntington referred to these colleges as "professional monasteries."[53] A purely military learning environment, whether or not a "professional monastery," no longer meets the requirement. There is a strong argument for military professionals to undertake at least some of their education and training alongside representatives of those other organizations with which they will be operating in the future, not least for better mutual understanding of the very different institutional cultures involved.

This is already happening to some extent in colleges where outsiders are invited for short modules, but there is scope for increasing this practice still further. Indeed, some countries host multidisciplinary establishments such as Ghana's International Peacekeeping Training Centre, and Paddy Ashdown has proposed a similar establishment—"a school for conflict prevention, armed intervention and post-conflict resolution"[54]—in the United Kingdom. A further way of avoiding the effect of the "professional monastery" is for some postgraduate officer education to take place away from the essentially military culture of military academies. However good these academies may be, there is likely to be an institutional culture with the attendant risk of stereotypical thinking, which may inhibit thinking "outside the box." An officer corps needs some of its members, indeed its brightest and best, to receive the intellectual stimulation that protracted immersion in the very different free-thinking culture that a good civilian university can provide—for example, through master's and doctoral programs—and to bring that stimulation and fresh approach back into the armed forces. Most armed forces recognize this, but there is wide divergence in the extent to which they create such opportunities and incentivize participants. The British Armed Forces are not currently in the lead in this respect.[55]

There is one aspect of developing minds and understanding to cope with the challenges of counterinsurgency that deserves special mention and that is the need to develop cultural understanding—a key element of the contest both in the physical domain and the "severely understudied" ideological one.[56] There is a tendency, particularly in busy armed forces (and not excluding those who believe that cultural understanding is part of their inheritance), to shortcut the cultural understanding process by focusing on the training challenge: how to behave in dealing with those of another culture, what basic errors to avoid, and a smattering of a few handy phrases. Important though this is, we delude ourselves if we believe that a behavioral checklist does any more than scratch the surface of cultural understanding. If, as has been argued, success in operations such as counterinsurgency depends on mentally outmaneuvering opponents, there is a requirement to get inside their minds; this cannot be done without a proper understanding of their culture. And if the psychological impact of our actions is all important, we cannot hope to succeed without understanding the psychology and culture of those whose behavior we are trying to influence. Consistently underestimated is the requirement for greater linguistic skills than that provided by the equivalent of a tourist phrase book. Equally important is the requirement for cultural self-awareness: understanding our own culture, in particular our cultural inheritance—what we have inherited in the way of subconscious assumptions, perceptions, and prejudices that may affect how we relate to people of other cultures. Moreover, Masland and Radway drew attention to the connection between cultural awareness and the development of the political sophistication required by counterinsurgents: "for any executive the beginning of political sophistication is the realization that there are men who may not feel as he feels, who may not dream as he dreams, or who may not pray as he prays."[57] In addition to developing minds, therefore, is the need, where necessary, to broaden them—to make them more open and sensitive to the views of others, and less certain of their own omniscience and rectitude. An important attitude is that advocated by the Scots poet, Robert Burns: "O wad some Pow'r the giftie gie us/To see oursels as others see us."[58] Understanding both the opponents' culture and one's own are essential elements of success. If we do not recognize this, we must expect to lose. In the words of Sun Tzu:

> Thus it is said that one who knows the enemy and knows himself will not be endangered in a hundred engagements. One who does not know the enemy but knows himself will sometimes be victorious, sometimes meet with defeat. One who knows neither the enemy nor himself will invariably be defeated in every engagement.[59]

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A Special Forces medic treats shrapnel wounds that Taliban fighters inflicted on a U.S. Army soldier in Helmand Province, Afghanistan.


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Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Michael G. Mullen answers questions from students at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kans., 23 October 2007.

Finding the necessary time for intellectual development in an officer's career, and in the overheated syllabi of many military colleges and schools, will be a considerable practical challenge, particularly at the same time as preparing for large-scale combat operations (which, as has been pointed out, is itself a full-time occupation), and particularly at a time when many armed forces find themselves very heavily committed to current operations. The scale of the educational requirement is easy to underestimate. Viewed as subject areas, there may be no more than half a dozen which, to use Huntington's phrase, "frontier on military knowledge"—although politics, economics, anthropology, sociology, psychology and—perhaps above all—history spring quickly to mind. But these are not subjects that lend themselves to a reductionist approach to learning, to be covered in a few periods of instruction, nor are they optional for military leaders in counterinsurgency. Taking military history as an example, it should be studied, as Michael Howard famously advised, "in width," "in depth," and "in context,"[60] (fast becoming the most quoted and least observed advice on the subject). Nor does the solution lie in overprogramming existing courses at the expense of time for reflection, let alone the easy option of cosmetic change—a tick-in-the-box approach that allows those who wish to do so to claim that the necessary change has been made.

There is, of course, an important place in the learning process for self-education, particularly in the study of history. But the temptation for the unwise, or at least the unforewarned, will be to postpone such self-education until it is too late. In many of today's armed forces (including the British and the American), most senior officers, and a number of middle-ranking ones as well, are in jobs, whether operational or non-operational, which are so demanding that little time is left for any reading that is not job related, and, indeed, very little time for creative thinking of any sort. A cautionary tale is that of General William C. Westmoreland, who throughout his time as commander in Vietnam had beside his bed the works of a number of authors, including Mao Zedong and the insightful Bernard Fall, which could have been key to helping him solve the problems that confronted him. But "I was usually too tired in late evening to give the books more than occasional attention."[61]

Finally, on the subject of education, is the requirement for it to be research-led. To keep at the cutting edge of the subject, particularly in competition with a learning and adaptive enemy, requires a corpus, or body, of academic research experts alongside, and able to interact with, practitioners and students. The risk here is that since research output is difficult, if not impossible, to measure, research departments become highly vulnerable to financial cuts.

Cultural Change

Appropriate doctrine, training, and education are, however, only part of the solution. Even more important is acceptance of the required cultural change alluded to earlier. This will be a particular challenge for those military professionals who see themselves purely as combat soldiers. It will also be a particular challenge for those returning from operations in places such as Iraq and Afghanistan whose experience of, or acquaintance with, counterinsurgency has been largely of combat and who, as a result, may have little time for the niceties of "hearts and minds" in comparison to the more obviously heroic, and more obviously rewarded, activity of combat. Those who are unable to make this cultural transition are unlikely to prove adept counterinsurgents. Selection of those capable of transitioning from modern to postmodern warfare is also problematic. In David Galula's opinion,

> there are no easy criteria enabling one to determine in advance whether a man who has not been previously involved in a counterinsurgency will be a good leader. A workable solution is to identify those who readily accept the new concept of counterinsurgency warfare and give them responsibility. Those who prove themselves in action should be pushed upward.[62]

In achieving the necessary cultural change, the single most important fac-

tor will be the lead given from the top of the hierarchy. Taking, for example, the United States, the then Chief of Staff of the Army, General Peter J. Schoomaker, made his position, and his clarity of vision, clear in his introduction to the 2006 *Counterinsurgency* doctrine publication:

> Western militaries too often neglect the study of insurgency. They falsely believe that armies trained to win large conventional wars are automatically prepared to win small, unconventional ones. In fact, some capabilities required for conventional success—for example, the ability to execute operational maneuver and employ massive firepower—may be of limited utility or even counterproductive in COIN [counterinsurgency] operations.[63]

And in many other nations, military leaders have given similar support for their own armed forces' new approaches to counterinsurgency. Important though it is, a lead from the top, by itself, is not enough. Any change-management program requires buy-in throughout the hierarchy. Addressing the subject generically, and not specifically related to the armed forces of any nation in particular, subordinate leaders are likely to fall into three main groups. At either end of the spectrum are, on the one end, those who agree wholeheartedly with the change and do all in their power to effect it; and, on the other, those who disagree with it wholeheartedly and do all they can to oppose it. The latter are unlikely to prosper if those at the top are unified in their support for the change. But among those in the middle of the spectrum—the third group—will be people who, at heart, oppose the change, but understand that overt opposition is not career-enhancing. Some of them will, therefore, keep their opposition muted, or maybe allow themselves over time to be persuaded to support the change; others, however, will treat the proposed change as yet another piece of political correctness: something that must be espoused in public, but opposed in private. This latter group is probably the greatest threat to achievement of change. It will be tempting indeed for them to wait for the reformers to move on to other jobs or leave the service, to be replaced by those with less reformist zeal.

Achieving the right balance in the cultural orientation of an armed force is not easy, nor is it an exact science. At the heart of opposition to moderating the warrior ethos and to orientating a force more toward operations such as counterinsurgency and stability operations is the concern, often unspoken, that such operations are indeed the sideshow, that "the real thing," the ultimate test, may be large-scale, interstate warfighting, possibly against a military superpower—for example, China—and that armed forces need to be fully trained and psychologically prepared for it, and not undermined by what may be a passing phase of a threat which, while serious, is not existential. Nor can this argument be dismissed out of hand, not least because, contrary to the views of those who hold that "war no longer exists . . . war as cognitively known to most non-combatants, war as a battle in a field between men and machinery, war as a massive deciding event in a dispute in international affairs: such war no longer exists,"[64] such warfare is not extinct, just hibernating. Less respectable but equally passionate arguments can be expected from the military-industrial lobby for which a diversion of the focus and budget away from large-scale, modern warfare represents a most unwelcome threat which for some may, indeed, be existential.

It may be that the cultural challenge of preparing some armed forces to be both adept combat soldiers and adept counterinsurgents is simply unachievable. Where this is judged to be the case, there appear to be three options. The first is the creation of two specialist forces, with the noncombat role confined to a paramilitary force, similar

U.S. Army soldiers escort suspected insurgents to interrogation site in Mosul, Iraq, 5 June 2007.

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to those in a number of states, such as the Italian Carabinieri, which acquitted itself commendably in the NATO Sustainment Force in Bosnia, or given to a specific part of the armed forces, such as reserve forces. This, though, has major disadvantages, foremost of which is the constraint of numbers and lack of flexibility. Even without such specialization, a number of armed forces, such as those of the United Kingdom and the United States, are highly stretched on current operations. Furthermore, as these current operations demonstrate, troops deployed on counterinsurgency or stabilization operations can quickly find themselves in combat, and vice versa. The second option for a state is role specialization for its armed forces as a whole, either as combat or noncombat forces. But, by the same token, the blurring of neat delineations in modern operations risks troops of one specialization finding themselves in situations for which they are unprepared and unsuited. The third option is to accept that the desirable level of versatility is unachievable, but pretend otherwise, accepting that troops will be less good at one role than the other (or mediocre at both), and attempt to manage the risk. This is perhaps the easiest option, but it is probably also the most dangerous, with its potential for misunderstandings with serious consequences. None of these three options, therefore, is attractive.

Conclusions

Although many of the challenges facing military professionals in postmodern warfare are similar to those facing them in modern warfare, some of them—in particular the intellectual and cultural challenges—are very different, requiring a different approach and mind-set. Armed forces, especially those whose primary focus is modern warfare, need not only to recognize this and adapt accordingly, but to institutionalize adaptability. Among other things, they will need to ensure a balance in their warrior ethos throughout their organization; warrior ethos needs to be sufficient for combat operations, but not so great that it inhibits effective performance in counterinsurgency. The term *warrior* has a number of meanings and is potentially misleading. Controlling warrior ethos and achieving the right balance in the right circumstances are among the most important responsibilities and duties of any military commander at any level.

Armed forces should note that it is easy to underestimate the amount of training required in order to perform effectively in postmodern warfare, in particular counterinsurgency—even for those who are highly trained in modern warfare. Indeed, the more focused armed forces are on modern warfare, the harder the transition is likely to be. Finding the necessary training time in competition with that required to keep armed forces well prepared for modern warfare is not easy. Achieving the right balance requires fine judgment from senior military officers and defense planners.

Many militaries need to take more active steps to ensure that their doctrine remains up to date with, and relevant to, an operational environment that changes faster than does that of modern warfare. But accepting that, in practice, this will not always be achievable, they also need to allow commanders in the field sufficient latitude to adjust doctrine in line with evolving circumstances. Furthermore, they need to devote considerable attention to being "learning organizations," and ones that learn, adapt, and anticipate faster than the opposition.

All armed forces need to recognize that reliance on training and doctrine alone as tools for achieving success in postmodern warfare is misplaced, and that an important factor in the process—more important than in modern warfare—is education. Such education needs to focus on the development of minds, and in particular the development of breadth of vision, understanding, wisdom, and good judgment. Education is required not just for those new to postmodern operations, but also to ensure that those with some experience in these operations do not overrely on their experience, for example, by translating inappropriate lessons from one *sui generis* campaign to another. Militaries should undertake more of their education and training alongside representatives of those organizations with which they will find themselves operating in the future, not least to gain an understanding of the different organizational cultures. And to avoid institutional culture and stereotypical thinking, and to inject fresh ideas into the officer corps, armed forces should ensure that they send a sufficient number of their brightest and best for postgraduate programs in civilian universities. In general, militaries will need to find more time for professional military education.

All of this is likely to call for a change of institutional culture for some militaries, or within areas of militaries, particularly for those institutions or individuals who see themselves purely as combat warriors. The essence of the change of culture is for these combat warriors to come to judge their professionalism (in which most take such pride) by their performance not just in combat, but in all roles they are required to undertake. For some, this requires a redefinition of professionalism. Any cultural change within any military is problematic, and overcoming resistance to change may be challenging. And there is a paradox here: where change is required, senior military leaders will need to press it home if it is to sustain, but in some organizations it may be that some of the senior leaders are among those most resistant to change. There is also a need to ensure that those with an understanding of, and an acumen for, postmodern warfare are not sidelined within military hierarchies. There is a potential comparison here with the art world where, in some institutions, postmodernists found their way barred by an establishment dominated by modernists.

Finally, we should recognize that overfocus on a single type of warfare—large-scale, conventional warfare—inhibited understanding of other types of warfare, and of warfare as a whole. We should, therefore, beware the potential danger of overfocus on postmodern warfare having the same result.

Lt. Gen. Sir John Kiszely KCB, MC, was commissioned into the British Army's Scots Guards from the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst in 1969. He served with the regiment in Northern Ireland, Germany, Cyprus, and the Falkland Islands and was awarded the Military Cross for actions at Mount Tumbledown during the Falklands War. He subsequently commanded the 7th Armoured Brigade and the 1st Armoured Division. He served in Bosnia first as commander of Multinational Division Southwest and then as deputy commander of the NATO force. He served in Iraq for six months in 2004–2005 as deputy commander of the Multinational Force and senior British military representative. He became director of the Defence Academy in 2005 and retired from the Army in 2008. He is now a visiting professor of war studies at King's College, London, and a defense and security consultant.

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Notes

1. *Shorter Oxford English Dictionary*, 5th ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002). Webster's Dictionary has a similar definition: "Someone engaged in or experienced in warfare." See *Webster's Online Dictionary*, 2007, http://www.websters-online-dictionary.org.

2. See Colin S. Gray, *Another Bloody Century: Future Warfare* (London: Phoenix, 2006), p. 37.

3. Bill Owens, *Lifting the Fog of War* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000), p. 15. As a former vice chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Owens' views were particularly influential in military and political circles in the United States. Much of the hype surrounding the Revolution in Military Affairs is written in language that Edward Luttwak described, several decades earlier, as " 'brochuremanship' . . . where extravagant claims are camouflaged under the pseudo-technical language fashionable in military circles." Edward Luttwak, *A Dictionary of Modern War* (London: Allen Lane Penguin Press, 1971), p. 4. Nor were these extravagant claims confined to civilians. General Ronald Fogelman, Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air Force, testifying before Congress in 1997, asserted, "In the first quarter of the 21st century you will be able to find, fix or track, and target—in near real time—anything of consequence that moves upon or is located on the face of the Earth." Michael E. O'Hanlon, *Technological Change and the Future of Warfare* (Washington D.C., Brookings Institution, 2000), p. 13. Apart from anything else, it would have been interesting to hear General Fogelman's definition of what constituted "anything of consequence."

4. Some writers drew conclusions of even more far-reaching consequences, for example: "The potential ability of the United States to help consolidate a revolution in geostrategic affairs—in which most of the world's major industrial powers are democratic, prosperous, allied with each other, lacking a major strategic foe, and gradually extending their club of membership to other countries—is even more historic, and more important, than its purported ability to again revolutionize warfare." O'Hanlon, *Technological Change*, p. 197.

5. See Rod Thornton, *Asymmetric Warfare: Threat and Response in the Twenty-first Century* (Malden, Mass.: Polity Press, 2007), pp. 178–79.

6. This is not just a matter of keeping up with technology, but of keeping up with technics: all aspects of the relationship between equipment and its operators. "Weapons development is only one corner of a triangle, of which the other two are a tactical 'doctrine' for using the weapon, and the training of the combatants, individually and collectively, to use it." Christopher Bellamy, *The Evolution of Modern Land Warfare: Theory and Practice* (New York: Routledge, 1990), p. 30.

7. They are, of course, as old as war itself, and with plenty of relatively recent experience on which to draw: "If we look at the 20th Century alone we are now in Viet-Nam faced with the forty-eighth 'small war.' " Bernard Fall, "The Theory and Practice of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency," *Naval War College Review*, April 1965, reproduced in Vol. 51 (Winter 1998): 46.

8. We should not be surprised that a particularly successful style in warfare evokes a response that rejects it in favor of a different one that exploits strengths and weaknesses exposed by changing circumstances. This process has been a constant throughout history with modern (for their time) styles of warfare constantly being challenged or usurped by postmodern styles. Nor does the use of the term *postmodern* imply that those who adopt this style refrain from employing highly advanced technology—as contemporary insurgents are doing so effectively.

9. Rupert Smith, *The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World* (New York: Allen Lane, 2005), p. 3.

10. David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice* (1964, repr. Westport, Conn.: Praeger Security International, 2006), p. 63.

11. Magnus Ranstrop and Graeme P. Herd, "Approaches to Countering Terrorism and CIST," in Anne Aldis and Graeme P. Herd, eds., *The Ideological War on Terror: Worldwide Strategies for Counter-Terrorism* (New York: Routledge, 2007), p. 3.

12. Ibid.

13. John Kiszely, "Learning about Counter-Insurgency," *RUSI Journal* 151 (December 2006): 19.

14. Horst Rittel and Melvin Webber, "Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning," in Nigel Cross, ed., *Developments in Design Methodology* (New York: Wiley, 1984), pp. 135–44. The authors contrast "wicked" problems with the relatively benign or "tame" problems of mathematics, chess, or puzzle-solving.

15. Fall, "Theory and Practice of Insurgency," p. 47.

16. Lawrence Freedman, *The Transformation of Strategic Affairs*, IISS Adelphi Paper No. 379 (New York: Routledge, 2006), p. 20.

17. Anthony H. Cordesman, *The War after the War: Strategic Lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan*, Significant Issues Series, Vol. 26, No. 4, Center for Strategic and International Studies (Washington, D.C.: CSIS Press, 2006), p. 71.

18. David M. Glantz, *Soviet Military Operational Art: In Pursuit of Deep Battle* (London: Frank Cass, 1991), p. 44; Bellamy, *Evolution of Modern Land Warfare,* pp. 173–76.

19. The Russian "norme," mathematically and scientifically derived prescribed rates and scales. See Glantz, *Soviet Military Operational Art*.

20. John A. Nagl, *Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam: Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger Publishers, 2002), p. 175.

21. Frank Kitson, *Low Intensity Operations* (London: Faber and Faber, 1971), p. 200.

22. Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, Michael Howard and Peter Paret, trans. and eds. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984), p. 88.

23. Basil Liddell Hart, *Thoughts on War* (London: Faber and Faber, 1944), p. 115.

24. There are obvious parallels with Thomas Kuhn's paradigm theories.

25. *Shorter Oxford English Dictionary*.

26. Max Hastings, *Warriors: Portraits from the Battlefield* (New York: Knopf, 2005), p. xi.

27. Max Boot, *The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power* (New York: Basic Books, 2002), p. 285.

28. Quoted in Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup*, p. 203.

29. Kiszely, "Learning about Counter-Insurgency," p. 19.

30. Or as Kitson puts it, "the qualities required for fighting conventional war are different from those required for dealing with subversion or insurgency." Kitson, *Low Intensity Operations*, p. 200.

31. Ralph Peters, "In Praise of Attrition," *Parameters* 34 (Summer 2004): 24, 26. Condoleeza Rice also observed, "carrying out civil administration and police functions is simply going to degrade the American capability to do the things America has to do. We don't need to have the 82nd Airborne escorting kids to kindergarten." See *New York Times*, 21 Oct 2000.

32. Clausewitz, *On War*, p. 75.

33. This phrase is part of the U.S. Army's Soldier's Creed but excluded from the Warrior Ethos, which is part of the creed. The Warrior Ethos itself is remarkably bereft of any mention of fighting or killing: "I will always place the mission first. I will never accept defeat. I will never quit. I will never leave a fallen comrade." It is posted at http://www. army.mil/warriorethos/.

34. Peters, "In Praise of Attrition," pp. 24–26.

35. Christopher Coker, *The Warrior Ethos: Military Culture and the War on Terror* (Abingdon, England: Routledge, 2007), pp. 7, 41–42, 61.

36. Charles Krulak, "The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War," *Marine Gazette*, January 1999, p. 3.

37. See, for example, House of Commons Select Committee on Defence, 1997–98, Eighth Report, paragraph 203, posted at http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/cm199798/cmselect/cmdfence/138/13814.htm#a39.

38. Kitson, *Low Intensity Operations*, p. 199.

39. *Countering Irregular Threats: A Comprehensive Approach* (Quantico, Va.: U.S. Marine Corps, June 2006), pp. 3, 5, 14, posted at http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/usmc/irreg.pdf.

40. U.S. Army Field Manual 3–24 and U.S. Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3–33.5, *Counterinsurgency*, December 2006, posted at http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-24.pdf.

41. Ibid., Foreword.

42. United Kingdom Ministry of Defence Joint Doctrine Note 2/07, *Countering Irregular Activity within a Comprehensive Approach*, March 2007.

43. For "complex" insurgencies, see John Mackinlay, *Defeating Complex Insurgency: Beyond Iraq and Afghanistan*, RUSI Whitehall Paper 64 (London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, 2005), pp. vi–vii.

44. "The field manual was widely reviewed, including by several Jihadi websites; copies have been found in Taliban training camps in Pakistan. It was downloaded 1.5 million times in the first month after its posting to the Fort Leavenworth and Marine Corps website." Sarah Sewall, in the foreword to the Chicago University Press edition of the manual, quoted in John A. Nagl, "An American View of Twenty-First Century Counterinsurgency," *RUSI Journal* 152 (August 2007): 15.

45. This requirement goes some way beyond Michael Howard's advice about military doctrine that "What does matter is to get it right when the moment arrives." See "Military Science in an Age of Peace," *Journal of the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies* 119 (March 1974)—advice better suited to an age of peace.

46. This paragraph largely taken from Kiszely, "Learning about Counter-Insurgency," p. 24.

47. Colin McInnes, "The British Army's New Way in Warfare: A Doctrinal Misstep?" *Defense & Security Analysis* 23 (June 2007): 127–41, available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14751790701424697.

48. Giulio Douhet, *The Command of the Air*, trans. Dino Ferrari (1942, repr. Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1984), p. 30.

49. David Kilcullen, "Counterinsurgency *Redux*," *Survival* 48 (December 2006): 116.

50. John W. Masland and Laurence I. Radway, *Soldiers and Scholars: Military Education and National Policy* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1957), pp. 382–85.

51. The United Kingdom referred to the armed forces' activity in this campaign as "Military Aid to the Civil Power."

52. Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1957), p. 14.

53. Ibid., p. 266.

54. "There is . . . a powerful case for the establishment of a school for conflict prevention, armed intervention and post-conflict reconstruction which could act as a kind of high-level staff college to learn lessons, propose changes to government and develop and pass on expertise to senior service-officers, civil servants and politicians. . . . This teaching should have an international dimension too, given that one of the tasks is to spread best practice and raise capacity, not just in the developed world, but in other armed forces and government practitioners worldwide." Paddy Ashdown, *Swords and Ploughshares. Bringing Peace to the 21st Century* (London, Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 2007), p. 192.

55. In contrast to the U.S. armed forces and in contrast with the British Army in, for example, the 1970s, when, among those officers who elected to undertake mid-career postgraduate programs to Oxford and Cambridge, subsequently achieved four-star rank, and made significant contributions to military thought, were Frank Kitson, Anthony Farrar-Hockley, and Nigel Bagnall.

56. Ranstrop and Herd, "Approaches to Countering Terrorism," p. 3.

57. Masland and Radway, *Soldiers and Scholars*, p. 71.

58. Robert Burns, "To a Louse," *The Canongate Burns: The Complete Poems and Songs of Robert Burns*, ed. Andrew Noble and Patrick Scott Hogg (rev ed., Edinburgh: Canongate, 2003), p. 132.

59. Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, trans. Ralph D Sawyer (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1994), p. 179.

60. Michael Howard, "The Use and Abuse of Military History," in Michael Howard, ed., *The Causes of War and Other Essays*, 2d ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1983), pp. 195–96.

61. William C. Westmoreland, *A Soldier Reports* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1976), p. 364. See also Williamson Murray, "Thoughts on Military History and the Profession of Arms," in Williamson Murray and Richard Hart Sinnreich, eds., *The Past as Prologue: The Importance of History to the Military Profession* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 89.

62. Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*, p. 67.

63. U.S. Army Field Manual 3–24, *Counterinsurgency,* p. ix.

64. Smith, *Utility of Force*, p. 1.

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Sir Henry Clinton by Thomas Day, 1787

R. W. Norton Art Gallery, Shreveport, La

Southern (Dis)Comfort

British Phase IV Operations in South Carolina and Georgia, May–September 1780

By Steven J. Rauch



Francis Marion/New York Public Library
A North Carolina militiaman by Don Troiani, 1997/ Don Troiani's Military and Historical Image Bank

On 8 June 1780, Lt. Col. Thomas Brown, commander of the Loyalist provincial King's Carolina Rangers, led his regiment into the frontier town of Augusta, Georgia, the place where his Whig neighbors had once tormented, tortured, and disfigured him.[1] In August 1775, Brown had obstinately supported the British Crown against the Whigs and their traitorous actions. For holding those convictions, he was confronted by a large mob; hit in the head with a rifle, which fractured his skull; tied to a tree; and had burning pieces of wood stuck under his feet. Next, his enemies scalped the hair from his head in three or four places. He lost two toes due to the burning he suffered when he was tarred and feathered. Brown was then paraded through Augusta in a cart while ridicule and insults were heaped upon him by Whig "Patriots."[2] "Burnt Foot" Brown, as he came to be derisively called, spent the next several years leading a regiment of Loyalist rangers in Florida and Georgia, keeping alive the hope that Britain would overthrow the radical regimes of the Whigs and restore peaceful government to the region.

The successful British capture of Charleston on 12 May 1780 had made Brown's triumphal return to Augusta possible. American Maj. Gen. Benjamin Lincoln then surrendered almost six thousand Continental and militia troops to a powerful British joint land and naval force commanded by Lt. Gen. Sir Henry Clinton.[3] From the British perspective, it was "mission accomplished," as the most important city in the southern colonies fell into their hands. It seemed all that remained were minor postcombat operations to destroy an inconsequential number of fanatical Whig "dead-enders." By the end of June 1780, columns of British and Loyalist troops, such as Brown's, had overrun South Carolina and Georgia; garrisoned major population centers; established forward operating bases from the coastal towns deep into the backcountry piedmont; and begun a comprehensive program to organize, train, and equip units of native Loyalists to help restore order and stability to the region. However, subsequent events demonstrated that British forces operated in a complex social, economic, and military environment, one in which commanders soon found themselves struggling to hold fixed bases against attack, protecting supply convoys from ambush, searching for and fighting bands of insurgents inspired by regional leaders, and trying to coexist with a populace where friend was often indistinguishable from foe.

This paper explores some of the challenges faced by the British army of liberation—or occupation, depending on your view—during the immediate months that followed what appeared to be a conflict-ending, decisive victory at Charleston. The British faced a new phase of the southern campaign, one which we identify today as Phase IV operations or postconflict operations. Phase IV operations include those tasks designed to build a secure and stable environment so that political, economic, and social reconstruction can occur.[4] One of the greatest challenges during this phase is effective management of the transition through policies designed to promote a unified effort and mitigate any attempts at disruption by determined and often fanatical opposition. Recently, historian Joseph J. Ellis framed this challenge in the form of a historically enduring question: "Can a powerful army sustain control over a widely dispersed population that contains a militant minority prepared to resist subjugation at any cost?"[5] By using the example and experiences of Loyalist commander Brown, I hope to illustrate some of the challenges of occupation

Lord George Germain

that he and other British commanders faced as they sought to restore peace, stability, and security to Georgia and South Carolina during the summer of 1780.

Operation Southern Campaign I (1775–1778)

During 1775–1776, southern Whig leaders and their supporters overthrew the royal governments of the southern colonies of Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia in relatively bloodless coups d'état. The southern Whigs were indirectly aided in their efforts when the British chose to focus most of their military power on containing and suppressing the Whig rebellion in the northern colonies. However, the British did undertake a short and inconclusive raid on Charleston in June 1776 by land forces commanded by Clinton and naval units directed by Admiral Peter Parker. The defense of Charleston, enabled by a fort of palmetto logs on Sullivan's Island, provided the Whigs a physical and moral victory over British conventional military forces.[6] The 1776 raid on Charleston was to have been timed with an uprising of North Carolina Scotch-Irish Loyalists, who had expected earlier assistance and were prematurely defeated by the Whigs at the battle of Moore's Creek Bridge in February 1776.[7] Coincidently with the Charleston raid, open warfare broke out between Cherokee Indians and backcountry settlers in Georgia, South Carolina, and North Carolina, which appeared to validate claims of an alliance of the British and Indians against the backcountry people.[8]

After the victories over the British, Loyalists, and Indians in 1775–1776, the southern Whigs enjoyed almost two and a half years of relative peace. They used this breathing space to organize their governments to include absorbing the existing militia organizations, tax structures, legal systems, and legislative assemblies. Between 1776 and 1778, the Whig governments conducted several limited military campaigns against pockets of Loyalists, the Creek and Cherokee Indians, and the loyal British colony of East Florida. These campaigns exercised the militia systems and provided valuable experience for a small cadre of Whig leaders. Also during this time, the southern Loyalists were subjected to varying degrees of repression, including murder, and many Americans, like Thomas Brown, found themselves facing the choices of compromising their values so they could retain their property, fleeing their homes to more stable parts of the empire, or taking up arms and fighting against the rebellion.[9] By the end of 1778, an uneasy détente came to exist between the Whigs and those Loyalists who chose to remain in their homeland.[10]

Change of Course — Operation Southern Campaign II (Georgia)

By 1778, Lord George Germain, Britain's secretary of state for the American department, was frustrated by the lack of progress in the war, particularly the defeat at Saratoga and the inconclusive campaigns near Philadelphia in 1777. He recognized that British military power was limited and that, when France openly became an American ally, the war had changed from a regional conflict into a world war.[11] This development stretched British naval and land resources as the empire tried to operate in several theaters of operations, particularly the valuable sugar-producing West Indies.[12] A shortage of manpower had already led the British to contract with various German princes for military forces, commonly known as Hessians, to augment the small regular British Army conducting operations in America.

Thus, by 1778 the British government sought to change its strategy, and it appeared that operations in the southern colonies could achieve success. This "soft underbelly" held sparsely settled territory, a large slave population that might be exploited, and valuable export economies based on rice, indigo, beef, hides, and naval stores.[13] On 8 March 1778, Germain ordered an expedition be sent to recover Georgia and the Carolinas. In general, the British adopted a two-phased approach to recover the South. They based the first phase on a swift military invasion to destroy or capture Whig combat units and on the targeting of Whig leaders for capture and removal from power and influence. In the second and more complex phase, they would restore peace through reconstituted royal civil governments.[14] Human intelligence analysts classified the southern populace as generally Loyalists who would enthusiastically embrace the opportunity to overthrow their tyrannical Whig governments when British military power appeared.[15]

The constrained force structure drove British planners to use the minimum number of "boots on the ground" and to rely on Loyalists to

assume a significant role in their own liberation, to include overthrowing, capturing, and detaining former Whig leaders. As John Shy has described this effort, "No longer would British troops try to occupy and hold directly every square foot of territory; instead, the war was to be 'Americanized'—territory once liberated would be turned over as quickly as possible to loyal Americans for police and defense, freeing redcoats to move on to the liberation of other areas."[16] These Loyalist security forces would then assist in the reestablishment of loyal civil governments, the economy, judicial functions, and public safety.

The successful two-pronged invasion of Georgia in December 1778 by forces led by Lt. Col. Archibald Campbell and Maj. Gen. Augustine Prevost seemed to validate all the expectations of the new strategy. The defeat of the Georgia Whig regime was hailed as a success, and many exiled Georgia Loyalists returned to the homes they had fled earlier. However, there were indications that Whig resistance would be offered from South and North Carolina. In February 1779, a combined force of Georgia and South Carolina Whigs destroyed a South Carolina Loyalist force at Kettle Creek, Georgia. That incident was perhaps overshadowed by the stinging defeat in March 1779 of Georgia, North Carolina, and South Carolina Whig militia and Continental troops at Briar Creek, Georgia, by British forces.[17] The British determined that the backcountry region near Augusta and beyond was too difficult to control and instead appeared satisfied with a foothold at Savannah and along a thin corridor of the Georgia coast. Occupation was not stagnant; General Prevost, who assumed command at Savannah in January 1779, mounted another inconclusive raid on Charleston during the spring and, more dramatically, defended Savannah against a joint American and French expedition in October 1779. To anyone paying attention, the operations in Georgia revealed an early indication of the complex problems facing an occupying military force attempting to pacify a colony rent by the stresses of civil war and rebellion against authority.[18]

General Prevost

Operation Southern Campaign III (South Carolina)

In March 1779 Germain advised Clinton, who in 1778 had become commander in chief of British ground forces in America, that he should follow up success in Georgia with a more decisive operation to recover South Carolina.[19] To help obtain intelligence about the inhabitants' attitudes toward such an operation, Germain ordered James Simpson, former royal attorney general for South Carolina, to Georgia and South Carolina to report on conditions. On 28 August 1779, Simpson reported to Germain that the Loyalists of the Carolinas had been relentlessly persecuted since 1776 and anxiously sought assistance to overthrow their Whig oppressors. Simpson had warned the Loyalists with whom he had spoken that "unless Government was to be so firmly established as to give security to them without the protection of the Army . . . the success would be far from complete. And if upon a future emergency, the Troops were withdrawn . . . their situation would probably be very deplorable. But to this they replied, 'they had no apprehensions on that score.' " Thus Simpson concluded that "whenever the King's Troops move to Carolina they will be assisted by very considerable numbers of the inhabitants."[20] All information seemed to indicate that a significant number of Loyalists were ready to assist the British military with manpower and political support.

Clinton departed New York City on 26 December 1779 with 8,708 soldiers aboard a fleet of 88 transports accompanied by 30 warships.[21] V. Adm. Marriot Arbuthnot commanded the naval component of the expedition. Despite their conflicting personalities, Clinton and Arbuthnot managed to execute a superb example of a joint operation, with Arbuthnot's ships landing Clinton's army on the Sea Islands south of Charleston and then supporting the land forces as they advanced toward the city. Joined by



almost two thousand men from the Savannah garrison, Clinton bottled up General Lincoln's force of almost six thousand men in Charleston, which included the regular regiments from South Carolina, North Carolina, and Virginia—almost a third of the Continental Army. During a siege that lasted from 30 March until 12 May, few casualties were suffered by either side, and Clinton implored Lincoln to surrender.[22] After being rebuffed several times, Clinton was prepared to lay waste to the city, but Lincoln, persuaded by Charleston's political leaders, agreed to surrender. A frustrated Clinton refused to allow Lincoln's soldiers the customary honors of war upon their surrender.[23] Though Lincoln and many of his senior officers were paroled and eventually exchanged, many of the rank and file of the Continentals were forced to endure the filthy prison ships in Charleston harbor for almost a year.[24] The largest city in the South, its center

General Lincoln

of political power and commercial activity, had fallen to a completely successful conventional military campaign.

Phase IV: Postcombat Operations

The British victory on 12 May sent a shock wave through the southern states that stunned supporters of the Whig cause and electrified those Loyalists who had suppressed their beliefs since 1776. Clinton and his commanders were almost euphoric in their descriptions of future operations in South Carolina and Georgia. During this phase of operations, they had to accomplish several tasks. First, they had to extend the presence of British troops from the coast into the interior as far as the backcountry to physically demonstrate that Crown authority had returned. Next, as determined by their assumptions and limited force structure, they would recruit and organize Loyalist militia units so that Georgians and South Carolinians could assist with maintaining order in the region. Perhaps the most critical task was to determine how to deal with the former Whigs—an issue that raised questions about how many would return their allegiance to Britain, in what capacity they could serve, and how many would continue to resist, either passively or violently, the British attempt at reconstruction.[25]

To accomplish the first task, Clinton, assisted by his deputy, Lt. Gen. Charles, Earl Cornwallis, sent regular and provincial forces into the interior regions of South Carolina, fanning out from the coast and along the Savannah River into Georgia. While moving forward, the commanders of the British units had orders to destroy any remnants of Rebel forces and encourage the Loyalists to take control of local regions. During these early deployments, the inhabitants and the British military forces had their first personal interaction with each other. In some cases, the regular troops, who generally lived at poverty level, pillaged and looted farms without concern for the owner's status as a Whig or Loyalist. When Whigs were victims, it was deemed a fortune of war, but acts against Loyalists could result in the making of new enemies. Loyalist columns also used this opportunity to seek retribution to settle old scores. The temporary void of power between the collapse of the Whig regime and the restoration of Crown rule also contributed to a general lawlessness and rise of criminal activity.[26]

One incident made a lasting impression on all inhabitants. On 29 May 1780, a British column led by Lt. Col. Banastre Tarleton fought a small Continental force led by Col. Abraham Buford in a region known as the Waxhaws near the North Carolina border. After the fight ended, 113 of Buford's men lay dead, with 150 wounded and 53 captured. The British had only 17 casualties. The Whigs alleged that Tarleton had ordered surrendering American prisoners killed and promoted a perception that the British did not adhere to the laws of war. Tarleton soon became known as "Bloody Ban" as Whig sympathizers sought to use incidents such as Waxhaws to sway opinion away from supporting the Crown.[27]

As Colonel Brown led his veteran King's Carolina Rangers north from Savannah to occupy Augusta, he did not meet any resistance.[28] On 18 June, Brown reported to Cornwallis that he had taken Augusta and had initiated efforts to restore royal authority to the backcountry. On the same day, Lt. Col. Nisbet Balfour moved to possess the post at Ninety-Six, while another force under the command of Cornwallis moved to occupy Camden. The Whigs offered no resistance to these operations, and the British believed that they had defeated all organized opposition in South Carolina and Georgia.[29]

The British secured their gains in the interior by establishing a series of interconnected posts—what we would call forward operating bases, or FOBs, today—along key lines of communication, such as rivers and roads. These posts began at the coast and included Savannah, Charleston, and Georgetown; extended through Camden, Rocky Mount, and Hanging Rock; and along the Savannah River from Ebenezer to Augusta and on to Ninety-Six. Brown's base at Augusta was critical because it secured the British left flank along the Savannah River, and it served as the gateway to trade and communication with the Cherokee and Creek nations. Additional smaller fortified posts such as Fort Granby, Fort Motte, and Fort Watson linked these bases into a network for logistics and communication throughout South Carolina and Georgia.[30]

These forward operating bases served several purposes. They could garrison troops sent out to patrol the immediate area and demonstrate the presence of royal authority; they allowed each base to support others, as they were usually within a day or two march or travel by water; and they provided a safe haven where wounded could convalesce, food could be gathered from the countryside and stored, jails could hold fugitive Whigs, and courts could try them. The forward operating bases served as centers for communication of policy and a place of refuge for those harassed where British power was absent.

Collapse of Whig Resistance in the Backcountry

Many Whig militia leaders were convinced that the rebellion was over, and on 28 June various Whig units surrendered to Brown and other Loyalist officers. Loyalist William Manson accepted the surrender of Georgia militia Col. John Dooly's command of about 400 men, along with over 210 stands of arms.[31] Brown received the surrender of Cols. Benjamin Garden's, Samuel Hammond's, and Robert Middleton's South Carolina regiments and ordered them to return to their homes as prisoners on parole, seizing their arms but imposing no additional penalties.[32] Andrew Pickens from the Ninety-Six district and other prominent regional leaders, who had openly resisted British and Loyalist activity in the preceding years, accepted parole and returned to their plantations with their wills broken. However, a few others, including Dooly's subordinate, militia Lt. Col. Elijah Clarke of Wilkes County, Georgia, and Maj. James McCall of South Carolina, determined to remain in the field and resist all British efforts to restore royal order throughout the region.[33]

Clinton's Proclamation — You Are with Us or against Us

Clinton sought to shift the burden of reconstruction to the inhabitants as quickly as possible, stating, "The helping hand of every man is wanted to re-establish peace and good government."[34] However, before the British could put a "southern face" on the situation, they had to implement safeguards to ensure that former Whig regime members were eligible to resume important civic responsibilities. This process of "de-Whigification" proved critical to subsequent events. The British insisted that all subjects take public oaths of loyalty before they could be employed in any official political or military capacity.[35] They arrested those Whigs identified as unredeemable either ideologically or due to specific acts they had committed and held them in Charleston or, in some cases, removed them from the region and sent them to prison in St. Augustine, Florida.[36]

Though thousands of South Carolinians and Georgians agreed to take the oath, open demonstration of loyalty often depended on the assured presence of regular British troops.[37] Many Loyalists chose to withhold their full support until they were sure the army had eliminated armed remnants of the Whig regime.[38] Clinton, however, was convinced that calm would be quickly restored and stated, "From every Information I receive, & the Numbers of the most violent Rebels hourly coming in to offer their Services, I have the strongest Reason to believe the general Disposition of the People to be not only friendly to Government, but forward to take up Arms in its Support."[39]

On 1 June 1780, Clinton issued what amounted to a full pardon for most treasonable offenses, except for murder, committed by any Whigs who were "firmly resolved to return to and support" the crown.[40] Even this limited act of leniency, however, aggravated the Loyalists, who had suffered years of abuse and now found some of their former oppressors restored to full citizenship, with no clear obligation to demonstrate loyalty through military service.

So on 3 June 1780, Clinton elaborated on his policy, issuing a new proclamation that stated, "It is . . . proper that all persons should take an active part in settling and securing His Majesty's government, and delivering the Country from that anarchy which [has] prevailed. . . . All persons . . . who shall afterwards neglect to return to their allegiance, and to His Majesty's government, will be considered as Enemies and Rebels to the same, and treated accordingly."[41] This proclamation released former Whig civilians from their paroles on 20 June and, after that date imposed on them as citizens a duty to actively fight against the "dead-enders" like Clarke and McCall who did not accept the parole. The proclamation meant that former Whigs could not be neutral, no matter how much they wanted to be. They had to be either for or against the British Crown. After backing the former Whigs into a corner where they now had to make a choice, Clinton threw that policy grenade into the lap of Cornwallis and departed Charleston for New York two days later on 5 June. Cornwallis would have to deal with the consequences of this policy.[42]

Cornwallis Assumes Control of Operation Southern Campaign III

Upon Clinton's departure, the responsibility for the campaign and the reconstruction of the liberated colonies rested upon Cornwallis, who had about 6,369 regular and provincial

Massacre of Buford's Command by Felix O. C. Darley, engraved by Albert Bobbett, 1877

New York Public Library



Colonel Sumter

troops.[43] He indicated his view of occupation by modifying Clinton's proclamations to ensure greater protection for those who had remained loyal to the Crown and to provide more severe punishment to those who had chosen rebellion. During June, Cornwallis issued an order to the commanders of British forward operating bases to ensure that they understood in no uncertain terms his policy toward those who had second thoughts about their allegiance. Cornwallis wrote:

> I have ordered in the most positive manner, that every militia man who has borne arms with us and afterward joined the enemy, shall be immediately hanged. I desire you will take the most rigorous measures to punish the rebels in the district in which you command, and that you obey in the strictest manner, the directions I have given in this letter.[44]

The organization of Loyalist internal security forces was most significant in the Ninety-Six district, one of the most populous and contested in the region. Colonel Balfour, assisted by Maj. Patrick Ferguson, whom Clinton had appointed inspector general of militia on 22 May, formed seven battalions of Loyalist militia with about four thousand men.[45] Ferguson served as the main adviser or training instructor, charged with taking undisciplined backcountry Loyalists and turning them into a fighting force capable of opposing their Whig counterparts. His major complaint about his new recruits was their ill-discipline—many of them got homesick and simply left the training camps. Also, in the cliquish circles of the British Army, Ferguson was considered a protégé of Clinton, which made for an awkward relationship with Cornwallis and his supporters. Balfour, a Cornwallis man, said of Ferguson, "His ideas are so wild and sanguine . . . it would be dangerous to trust him with the conduct of any plan." Despite these challenges, Ferguson approached his mission with diligence.[46]

The British formed other battalions of Loyalist militia in the extensive region between the Broad River basin and Cheraw, but many of them proved weak or not fully committed to taking on the responsibility for security. In some cases, they simply could not be trusted. One incident involved the defection to the Whig insurgency of all but sixty members of a regiment of Loyalists. The militia from the districts between the Enoree and Tyger Rivers had previously served under Whig commander Col. Andrew Neel, who fled South Carolina when Charleston surrendered. A new Loyalist regiment was organized by Col. Mathew Floyd, who accepted former Whig Lt. Col. John Lisle as second in command after he swore the oath of allegiance. However, as soon as the British completed issuing arms and ammunition to the regiment, Lisle led a battalion of the unit to join Whig Col. Thomas Sumter's command near the Catawba. When Floyd later captured two of the deserters, he had them hung in accordance with Cornwallis' order, which then prompted most of the remainder of the regiment to desert and join Sumter as well.[47]

Those closer to the populace did not share the optimism of the senior commanders regarding the expected nature of Phase IV operations. Balfour reflected his frustration with the occupation when he wrote:

> Things are by no means, in any sort of settled state, nor are our friends, so numerous as I expected, from Saluda to Savannah river, almost the whole district . . . are disaffected and allthow at present overawed by the presence of the troops, yet are ready to rise on the smallest change—as to their disarming it is a joke they have given in only useless arms and keep their good ones.[48]

A Plea for Fortifications at Augusta

Colonel Brown probably held a more realistic view than Cornwallis of the challenges facing the British occupation during the summer of 1780. Fortifications were foremost in Brown's mind as he sought to ensure Augusta's defense and to protect supplies from any potential Whig raid, which he believed was almost certain given the volatility of the region.[49] Brown requested funding and materials from Cornwallis in order to build a suitable fortification. He obtained support from Balfour at Ninety-Six, who wrote to Cornwallis, emphasizing Augusta's strategic importance.

> As to the post at Augusta . . . it has been and will continue to be the depot for the Indian business, and . . . is a support to this post, and here, I am clear, a force ought to be kept. . . . I conceive a small work will be necessary, as it is so straggling a village and as there are guns and necessarys on the spot. I should think a work for two hundred men perfectly sufficient with Barracks, and they have six four-pounders on the spot.[50]

Despite these appeals by commanders intimately familiar with the military, political, and social concerns of their areas of occupation, Cornwallis

rebuffed their request. In a 3 July reply to Balfour, he specifically forbade the construction of any permanent wood or brick fortification structures at either Ninety-Six or Augusta and instead authorized only earthen fieldworks as a measure of economy.[51] Cornwallis' response reflected his growing irritation at many similar requests he had received from Georgia's royal governor Sir James Wright, who had pleaded throughout the summer for more troops, supplies, funding, and permanent fortifications to secure Georgia. Cornwallis told Wright, "So long as we are in Possession of the whole Power and Force of South Carolina, the Province of Georgia has the most ample and Satisfactory Protection by maintaining a Post at Savannah and another at Augusta, nor can I think myself justified in incurring any further expence on the Army Accounts for the Protection of Georgia."[52] Cornwallis' assessment perhaps reflected his desire to focus resources on his next objective, North Carolina. He saw what he wanted to see rather than accept a realistic understanding of just what his forces faced in the backcountry. As a result, Brown's garrison at Augusta made do without adequate fortification to protect itself should it be attacked by unreconciled Whig forces.

To men like Brown, hope was not a method, as he knew the paroled Whigs held uncertain levels of commitment to the oath of allegiance to which they had submitted to in June. In Wilkes County alone, he knew of more than five hundred Whigs who had grudgingly accepted that their cause was lost. Brown was concerned that these men could be influenced by those firmly unreconciled to losing power and might work to destabilize British efforts to restore order and control in South Carolina and Georgia.

On 1 July, the "de-Whigification" of Georgia began when Governor Wright signed the Disqualifying Act, which named 151 leaders of the rebellion who had held office under the Whig government and barred them from any position in the restored royal government. This act also prohibited former officials from owning firearms, and they could be arrested and brought before a magistrate to swear allegiance to Great Britain. Anyone not complying with this act could be fined, imprisoned, or impressed into the Royal Navy.[53] Wilkes County, Georgia, became a tinderbox waiting to ignite at the slightest hint of Whig strength or British weakness.

Emergence of Insurgent Leaders

The policies of Clinton, Cornwallis, and Wright angered many Whigs,

who believed they had no incentive to remain neutral. Without any organized Continental force to oppose the British, several Whigs emerged who sought to continue the fight as partisans or insurgents. These partisan leaders exhibited an influence grounded in local social affiliations, genealogical relationships, and strong personalities, which gave them an almost tribal leadership role that inspired men to follow them. One observer commented on the willingness of the backcountry people to follow either Whig or Loyalist regional leaders in this way, "But remove the personal influence of the few and they are a lifeless, inanimate mass, without direction or spirit to employ the means they possess for their own security."[54] The measure of success for these men was their ability to attract others to the ranks and retain them for operations; they did this primarily through their ability to persuade their neighbors, appealing variously to their patriotism, greed, vanity, or need for survival.[55]

One of these men, Francis Marion, had served as a lieutenant colonel in the South Carolina Continental line but had been absent at the capture of Charleston. He gathered as many men as he could into a small detachment that lived in the swamps north of Charleston and operated east of the Catawba-Wateree-Santee river line. Marion assumed the role as the "swamp fox," attacking the British supply lines from Charleston to the backcountry and using his proximity to the main British base to gather intelligence and pass it to the other leaders.

Although Colonel Sumter had resigned from the Continental Army in 1778 and retired to his plantation near Statesburg (today Stateburg), he returned to the fray after a raiding force from Tarleton's command plundered his estate. Known as the Gamecock, Sumter assumed the most prominent role during the summer of 1780, effectively raising large numbers of Whigs to fight in the insurgency against the British. Often supporting Sumter was one of the most aggressive of these tribal leaders, Colonel Clarke of Georgia, who had never accepted parole and energetically continued resistance in the backcountry of Georgia, South Carolina, and North Carolina, often joining forces with Major McCall of South Carolina.

Absent from the fighting during the summer of 1780 was Andrew Pickens, the South Carolina militia colonel who had accepted the British parole in good faith. However, he would emerge as the most influential backcountry Whig leader after the British burned his plantation in November 1780. Pickens already enjoyed a reputation as a successful partisan because of campaigns against the Cherokee Indians in 1776 and his victory over the Loyalists at Kettle Creek, Georgia, in 1779.

Don Troiani's Military and Historical Image Bank

A British dragoon in 1780 by Don Troiani, 2003

These Whig partisan leaders, either working alone or in loose collaboration with one another, provided stubborn and violent resistance in a region that had been paralyzed by the British victory. They continually fanned the spirit of revolt in the occupied areas and fought a relentless and savage war against their Loyalist neighbors. War in the backcountry was conducted without quarter, and the intensity of the violence stunned outsiders such as Continental Maj. Gen. Nathanael Greene, who later said, "The whole country is in danger of being laid waste by the Whigs and Torrys, who pursue each other with as much relentless fury as beasts of prey."[56]

Insurgents Versus Occupiers — Summer 1780

During July–September 1780, the tinderbox produced by British policies and actions could no longer contain the tension among the Whigs, Loyalists, Indians, and British. A civil war erupted that crossed religious, social, economic, and family boundaries and signaled a new phase for British military operations. Each side watched closely for reaction to events, for every success or defeat would affect the psychology of participants and either encourage or depress support for either faction. Hearts and minds were the goals of each side during that time. Space and time do not allow for a detailed study of important battles; the following is an abbreviated description of those events.[57]

On 12 July at Williamson's Plantation, five hundred Whigs from Sumter's command surrounded and surprised New York Loyalist Capt. Christian Huck, leading a detachment of 115 men from Tarleton's British Legion. The Loyalists were routed and Huck was killed, as were thirty-five of his men. Fifty others were wounded. The same day, fifty miles west at Cedar Springs, South Carolina, near modern Spartanburg, Whig Col. John Thomas, commanding the Spartan regiment,

received warning of an impending attack from a woman who had learned of it while visiting Ninety-Six. When a detachment of Ferguson's men attacked Thomas, they ran into a prepared ambush and lost about thirty killed. The fighting continued the next day near Gowen's Old Fort, South Carolina, where Col. John Jones, leading Georgia Whigs to join a Whig force in North Carolina, attacked the remaining Loyalists retreating from Cedar Springs. Without central direction, three different Whig columns, each acting independently, engaged and defeated two separate Loyalist forces. In three days of fighting in the region just south of the North Carolina border, the Whigs had killed or wounded over 175 Loyalists while suffering about 60 casualties.[58]

On 25 July 1780, Maj. Gen. Horatio Gates assumed command of the Southern Department in North Carolina and began to organize Continental and militia forces to prove that the Continental Congress had not yet written off the South. Knowing that help was on the way, on 30 July Sumter maintained pressure on British bases by attacking Rocky Mount, held by Loyalist Lt. Col. George Turnbull. When Turnbull refused to surrender, Sumter attacked his fortified position three times but was repulsed with a loss of about fifteen men. That same day, Maj. William Davie and his North Carolina Whigs ambushed several companies of North Carolina Loyalists on their movement to the British base near Hanging Rock. They killed or wounded most of the Loyalists, and Davie captured the weapons and horses of the enemy. A week later, on 6 August, Sumter joined Davie with over 800 men to attack almost 1,400 men of the British garrison at Hanging Rock. The battle of Hanging Rock lasted over four hours, with heavy casualties suffered on both sides. When many of his men stopped to loot one of the British camps and he found he was running low on ammunition, Sumter withdrew, leaving the base in British hands.[59] By the first week in August, Cornwallis' occupying army had been attacked more than a dozen times by insurgents who had killed or wounded nearly five hundred of his men.[60] Though the British had much presence, with detachments in dozens of forward bases throughout the region, that presence did not translate into control. In fact, they had moved into areas where Whig support was the strongest.

On 7 August, Lt. Col. John Harris Cruger, a New York Loyalist who was Balfour's replacement at Ninety-Six, reported intelligence to Cornwallis that Elijah Clarke was raising a force of several hundred men in Wilkes County, Georgia. Cruger requested that Cornwallis send additional troops to Augusta to augment Brown's command.[61] However, Cornwallis had other matters to contend with, as Gates made his appearance in South Carolina with a Continental force of men from Delaware and Maryland. On 16 August, Cornwallis encountered Gates and his army just north of Camden on the old Waxhaws road. There, in a decisive battle, Cornwallis defeated Gates' army, which suffered a loss of about 1,800 to 2,000 men killed, wounded, and captured. To many British, Loyalists, and Whigs, the British victory at Camden appeared to have destroyed another American army and the last gasp of the insurgency in the South.[62]

Following the disaster at Camden, Sumter pulled back his command to regroup near Fishing Creek. Tarleton had picked up Sumter's trail and drove his dragoons forward. On 18 August, Tarleton caught Sumter and eight hundred of his men by complete surprise as they either rested or bathed in the river. Sumter escaped, but he lost about 150 men killed and 300 captured.[63] That same day, Musgrove's Mill on the Enoree River witnessed one of the most violent skirmishes of the summer. There, Col. Isaac Shelby, with a detachment of frontier riflemen, teamed with Elijah Clarke of Georgia and James Williams of South Carolina to attack a Loyalist unit commanded by Col. Alexander Innes. After the Whigs employed a ruse to bait the Loyalists into pursuit, Innes' force left the post at Musgrove's Mill and crossed the Enoree River, right into a trap. Innes fell wounded, and his men were badly defeated, with about 150 killed and wounded and 70 captured.[64]

Francis Marion also kept the British busy near the swamps close to Charleston. On 25 August at Nelson's Ferry, Marion attacked a British column escorting several hundred Whig prisoners from Camden to Charleston. Marion captured or killed about two dozen British troops and freed 150 Maryland Continentals, many of whom joined him to continue the war against the enemy. A few weeks later, on 4 September, Marion struck again and ambushed a detachment of British near a swamp island called Blue Savannah.

The intensity of the warfare surprised Cornwallis, while the combat performance of the Loyalist militia disappointed him. Within about six weeks there had been over fifteen skirmishes and battles between Loyalists and Whigs in South Carolina, often including fighters from Georgia and North Carolina. The Whig attacks convinced Cornwallis that the backcountry presented a single operational problem and that the occupation of South Carolina depended upon subduing the North Carolina piedmont as well as stopping the further incursion by insurgents from the north. However, the British effort to support the Loyalists to take control had stretched forces so thin that the Whigs could strike at will anywhere along the chain of forward operating bases and their lines of communication to Charleston. Cornwallis was convinced that the best defense of South Carolina was to carry offensive operations into North Carolina.

Clarke Prepares to Attack Forward Operating Base Augusta

Colonel Clarke had spent July and August moving through the upper backcountry of Georgia, South Carolina, and North Carolina to participate in any opportunity to fight the British forces. The action at Musgrove's Mill on 18 August 1780 cemented his reputation as a hard, courageous fighter, and

Clarke hoped to raise a force of over one thousand men to strike at Augusta and Ninety-Six. He asked his companion in these efforts, Major McCall, to recruit among the South Carolina men and bring them to a rendezvous forty miles northwest of Augusta in early September. Recruiting insurgents proved a problem for both Clarke and McCall, as Gates' defeat at Camden once again turned events in British favor. McCall appealed to Pickens to support the continued resistance effort of Clarke; however, Pickens rebuffed him with the argument that the paroles they had accepted were binding unless a violation occurred to justify breaking those bonds of honor. As a result, McCall could persuade only about eighty men to join in operations with Clarke.[65]

Clarke, however, was more successful, mainly because his pleas for men were accompanied by threats. Joshua Burnett, one of those who "volunteered" to join Clarke recalled that Clarke "sent word to those who had so surrendered, that if they did not meet him at a certain noted Spring in a wilderness, . . . he would put every one of them to death."[66] These recruiting incentives resulted in about 350 men joining Clarke along with the 80 that McCall was bringing for a total of about 430 men.

Clarke decided to attack Augusta to demonstrate that the rebellion in Georgia was not defeated. He also hoped to seize presents and supplies for the Indians stored at Augusta. Finally, many of his men would welcome an opportunity to attack many of the Cherokee and Creek Indians moving along the trails to Augusta.[67]

While Clarke gathered his partisans, about 250 Creek Indians, led by Little Prince of the Tuckabatchees, answered Brown's call to join forces with the British at Augusta.[68] There, Brown's provincial troops consisted of five companies of the King's Carolina Rangers, which numbered about 250 men.[69] He stationed one company of rangers at the Mackay trading post, a white stone structure known locally as the White House, where they guarded the Indian presents and supplies. He placed his command post and his other four ranger companies about a mile and a half east at Loyalist James Grierson's fortified house and St. Paul's church. In addition, Brown had a small detachment of about twenty-seven men from Lt. Col. Isaac Allen's 3d Battalion, New Jersey Volunteers, who were recovering from wounds received at Musgrove's Mill.[70] Brown also had at least two brass artillery pieces, probably three-pounders. Along with the Indians, Brown commanded about five hundred effective soldiers scattered about the Augusta area.

Brown Versus Clarke — Siege of FOB Augusta (14–18 September 1780)

On 14 September 1780, Clarke approached the unsuspecting Loyalists and Indians, dividing his command into three elements to attack from different directions.[71] By using this tactic, Clarke hoped to surprise the superior force, seize key supplies, and kill or capture as many Indians and Loyalists as possible. Early in the morning, Maj. Samuel Taylor began the attack and surprised the Creeks in their camp just outside of the town. It did not take long for Brown to be alerted, and he immediately dispatched his rangers, along with two small pieces of artillery, toward the direction of the fighting. While Brown moved to support the Indians, Clarke and McCall entered Augusta and released more than seventy Whigs who had been in jail; seized Indian presents valued at £4,000; and liberated much of the arms and ammunition that had been turned over previously by surrendering Whig forces.[72] Clarke then moved toward the Mackay house, where his men engaged Capt. Andrew Johnston's company and gained possession of the house and all of the supplies.[73]

Meanwhile, Brown had joined the battle with his rangers and soon found himself caught fighting Taylor's forces bearing down the Creek path from the west and Clarke's forces behind him to the east.[74] The Loyalist attack inflicted several casualties on the Whigs, who were beaten back and driven from the Mackay house and surrounding outbuildings. In the confusion of the fight, however, some of Clarke's men had used the cover of brush to move around a flank and capture one of the Loyalists' cannons.[75] Clarke managed to direct fire on Brown's position at the Mackay house until early afternoon, when many of his men quietly departed the battle to seek plunder from Augusta.

Brown used this pause in the action to improve his defensive position. Since the house was too small to hold the rangers and the Creeks, he directed the Indians to dig earthworks around the perimeter to improve their position. Brown ordered Loyalist Sir Patrick Houstoun (brother of former member of the Continental Congress and former Whig governor of Georgia John Houstoun) to Ninety-Six with a message for Cruger to send assistance to help drive off the insurgents.[76] By nightfall, Brown and his men were well established in a good defensive position and were prepared to meet a renewed Whig attack. Early the next morning, about fifty Cherokees crossed the Savannah River and joined Brown's forces at the trading post. Brown continued to send written updates to Cruger while his men improved their defensive positions. In his message to Cruger, Brown stated, "I shall defend my post to the last extremity."[77]

About noon, the Whigs opened fire with artillery, which did some damage to the Mackay house. Clarke also directed rifle and small-arms fire during a fusillade in which Brown was hit in both thighs by a rifle bullet. Though he was knocked down and in great pain, Brown continued to direct the defense. By early evening on 15 September, dead and wounded men covered the area surrounding the British position.[78] At Ninety-Six, Cruger received the message about the attack and sent a report to Cornwallis about the emergency.[79] At Augusta, Clarke sent Brown a message under a white flag demanding that he surrender, but Brown rejected the demand, promising that Clarke's actions would bring retribution to him, his followers, and their families. With that final rejection, the Whigs opened up with

a burst of fire upon the Loyalist position and continued firing throughout the night.

The siege of Augusta continued through 17 September. Brown conducted his defense under extremely aggravating conditions due to the heat and lack of food and water. Though only a few hundred yards from the Savannah River, the British were cut off by the insurgents from all sources of water. In a decision that reflected imagination, resolve, and desperation, Brown ordered his men to preserve their urine in some stoneware. When the urine became cold it was issued out to the men, with Brown himself taking the first drink. For food, all the Loyalists had to eat were raw pumpkins. Added to these discomforts were the stench of dead men and horses and the wailing cries of the wounded calling for water and aid.[80] During all this time, Brown, whose wounds grew more aggravating, continued, in the words of a historian who had served in the Continental Army, "at the head of his small gallant band, directing his defence, and animating his troops by presence and example."[81]

Meanwhile, at Ninety-Six, Cruger had departed with a relief force during the morning of 16 September. Marching with him toward Augusta was the first battalion of Delancy's New York provincials; a detachment from Colonel Allen's 3d Battalion, New Jersey Volunteers; and Colonel Innes' South Carolina Royalists, a force of about three hundred men.[82] It would take Cruger almost forty-eight hours to reach Augusta and assist Brown. During this time, the portion of Clarke's already small force that still focused on the mission may have been reduced to about two hundred men, as many others sought plunder in the town.

At about 0800 on 18 September, Cruger's column appeared within sight of Augusta. The arrival of three hundred fresh Loyalists was enough to induce many Whigs to flee from the battlefield. Brown ordered his troops to sally out from their works to capture any stragglers. By that time, Clarke decided he had accomplished all he could and ordered his men to break off the engagement and rendezvous at Dennis Mill on Little River.[83] Clarke and his men had to run for their lives and, as Brown had promised, the consequence of his insurrection would affect the homes and families of those who had chosen to participate in the attack upon the British base.


Augusta Museum of History, Augusta, Ga.

Elijah Clarke by Rembrandt Peale, c. 1805

Due to their exhausted physical condition after four days of siege, Brown's rangers were unable to pursue the attackers far, but the Loyalists did manage to recover their artillery piece and to capture several wounded insurgents. The Creeks and Cherokees moved quickly to capture and kill as many of the Whig stragglers as they could, while seizing horses and weapons. In the end, Brown and Cruger's combined forces had killed or wounded about sixty of Clarke's men.[84] The Loyalists lost an unknown number killed and the Indians lost about seventy killed in the action.[85] Cruger reported to Cornwallis on 19 September, "I got here yesterday morning. . . . I am now sending out patrols of horse to pick up the traitorous rebels of the neighborhood, who I purpose to send to Charles Town."[86]

Hangings at the "White House"

Perhaps the most well-known incident related to this battle concerned the fate of the Whig prisoners. In accordance with Cornwallis' policy about those who broke their parole and took up arms, the Loyalist commanders were compelled to take action toward thirteen of the captured men. They hanged a Captain Ashby from McCall's South Carolina militia and twelve others from a staircase of the Mackay house for having participated in the recent battle.[87]

Whig histories have turned this event into a "Waxhaws" of sorts for Brown, and it has tainted his reputation, deservedly or not. South Carolina Governor John Rutledge even used the "Thomas Brown defense" to justify executing Loyalist prisoners following the Battle of Kings Mountain.[88] Nineteenth-century historians such as Charles Jones described how Brown's injuries dictated that the condemned attackers be "hung upon the staircase of the White House, where Brown was lying wounded, that he might enjoy the demoniacal pleasure of gloating over their expiring agonies."[89] Hugh McCall, son of James McCall, described Brown as having "the satisfaction of seeing the victims of his vengeance expire."[90] However, these descriptions appear contradictory to Brown's character and career. In fact, a strong case can be made that Cruger ordered the enforcement of the law and supervised the hangings, as Brown would have been incapacitated, having suffered from the stress of command during four days of siege, painful wounds in both legs, and having subsisted on a diet of pumpkins and urine.[91] If it was in fact Brown, gleeful or not, he ensured the enforcement of Cornwallis' policy.

Loyalist Retribution against Georgia Whigs

Governor Wright's concern about the state of military security in Georgia was confirmed by the Whig attack upon Augusta, which demonstrated that the "the Spirit and Flame of Rebellion was not over." The royal governor again urged construction of proper defensive fortifications at Augusta. In addition, he advised British military leaders that "the most Effectual and Best Method of Crushing the Rebellion in the Back Parts of this Country, is for an Army to march without Loss of time into the Ceded Lands—and to lay Waste and Destroy the whole Territory."[92]

Cruger took command of subsequent operations to hunt down the remnants of Clarke's force and discourage another such insurrection. On 20 September, he received intelligence that Clarke had retreated as far north as the Little River, where he was regrouping for another attack on Augusta after the British moved back to Ninety-Six. Cruger decided to take the fight directly into the backcountry and sent detachments in all directions to mete out frontier justice to the insurgents, their families, and any others who demonstrated sympathy for the Whig cause.

Cruger's force reached John Dooly's farm about forty-five miles north of Augusta by 23 September and the Broad River five days later, but by then Clarke had already crossed into South Carolina. Following Wright's advice, the Loyalists under Cruger inflicted a terrible retribution for Clarke's attack. In Wilkes County, the courthouse was burned, frontier forts were destroyed, and the homes of the leading Whigs were burned, their property plundered, and livestock driven off. The families of the men who had joined Clarke were given a choice of leaving the colony within twenty-four hours or taking an oath and submitting to the royal government.[93] As he pursued the insurgents, Cruger ordered many arrests. Whigs who had been on parole were arrested and sent to Charleston for confinement.[94] By the time Cruger reached the Broad River, he could find no trace of the enemy, who had fled toward the mountains of North Carolina.

After leaving Augusta, Clarke and the remnants of his followers scattered to their homes to gather their families and prepare to leave Georgia for refuge in North Carolina. At an appointed rendezvous, over three hundred men and four hundred women and children met for the arduous journey, carrying only five days of supplies. One historian characterized this event, "Like Moses from Egypt . . . Colonel Clarke commenced a march of near two hundred miles, through a mountainous wilderness," to reach the Watauga Valley.[95] Cruger reported Clarke's flight toward North Carolina to Cornwallis, who directed Major Ferguson, with his 1,100-man Loyalist force operating in western South Carolina, to intercept Clarke. Ferguson eventually established a position at Kings Mountain to block Clarke and to discourage further rebellion in that region.

Clarke, however, escaped, and Ferguson was surprised by a force of five regiments of "over the mountain" men, who attacked his position on 7 October in one of the most decisive battles of the war.[96] Later, Cornwallis wrote Clinton about Ferguson's defeat at Kings Mountain, stating, "Majr Ferguson was tempted to stay

Death of Major Ferguson at Kings Mountain, engraved 1877

near the mountains longer than he intended, in hopes of cutting off Col. Clarke on his return from Georgia. He was not aware that the enemy was so near him, and in endeavoring to execute my orders of . . . joining me at Charlottetown, he was attacked by a very superior force & totally defeated at Kings Mountain."[97] For Cornwallis and the men of the British forces, the war had entered a new phase that replaced the optimism that had characterized their operations only a few months earlier. Kings Mountain signified a turning point in the war in the South and reflected that the assumptions of operating in the southern theater needed to be reassessed by the British leadership.

Significance of May–September 1780

The British experience in attempting to conduct Phase IV operations during the summer of 1780 reflected complexities and challenges they failed to understand, perhaps on account of a hubris that could not conceive of such events. At its heart, the occupation plan may have been sound militarily, but it did not adequately consider how the events of 1776–1780 had fractured beyond repair the relationships between the Loyalists and the Whigs. To mend that rift would have required occupation policies designed to address the grievances of each side so that resentment did not boil into civil war. Clinton's policies did not accomplish that objective and instead may be identified as one of the fundamental causes of the internecine war that began in July 1780. Instead of policies to mitigate resentment, larger numbers of British troops were needed simply to protect the Loyalists and to convince the Whigs of the futility of further resistance. Instead, the stability of local areas was determined by the presence or absence of British troops. Because the limited British forces were spread out into small detachments occupying a vast network of forward operating bases, the Loyalists and their Indian allies were open to insurgent attack, such as occurred at Augusta. Though the British had much presence throughout the region, they did not have a level of control that would encourage widespread support by those who were at best lukewarm in their attitudes toward the Crown. Without the assurance of security, declaring loyalty exposed one to a potential death sentence at the hands of Whigs.

The battles that summer by Whig insurgents reflected the tribal nature of the region, as leaders like Marion, Sumter, and Clarke rallied men to their cause to disrupt and discredit British reconstruction efforts. The British, meanwhile, failed to develop an adequate system for recruiting and training Loyalist militia, whose performance may have reflected the lack of adequate British forces to help train them and bolster their self-confidence. Men like Brown, Wright, Balfour, and Cruger, who understood the volatility of the region, were refused resources they needed because their concerns did not fit into preconceived notions for the overall campaign.

The example of Augusta may not seem all that significant in the greater scope of the American Revolution; however, one result was a changed outlook in the backcountry on the part of both Loyalists and Whigs. In one sense, Clarke's attack was a ringing endorsement of the arguments made by Wright, Brown, Balfour, and Cruger. Clarke opened Cornwallis' eyes regarding the need for fortifications at Augusta, something Brown could never accomplish, no matter how rational his argument. After Clarke's attack, the gloves came off, and Cruger directed a punitive expedition into the backcountry against persons and property identified with the insurgent cause. The Loyalists intended not to allow an attack like that against a key British operating base to happen again. The action at Augusta also exercised the working relationships of the Loyalist commanders, who saw their roles as mutually supporting reaction forces who would come to each other's aid in checking any Whig operations.

On the other hand, the Whig cause may have gained momentum in some respects due to the post-battle events. The execution of captured insurgents, regardless of the legality of the sentence, served the Whig cause far beyond the vicinity of Augusta. The Whig press and information network spread news of this event, painting Brown as the devil incarnate, an example of the barbaric British occupation, and justification for retaliation in kind for Loyalist prisoners. Such an event, while demoralizing in one sense, served to harden the resolution of many Whigs, certainly those related to the men who suffered retaliation for the attack upon Augusta. When Clarke and hundreds of displaced men, women, and children made their way through Georgia and South Carolina and into North Carolina, their status as refugees served as a further example of the cruelty inflicted by Loyalist punitive actions. All of these events may have contributed to creating more insurgents in the backcountry rather

A Loyalist private by Don Troiani, 1996

Don Troiani's Military and Historical Image Bank

than convincing people to declare loyalty to the Crown.

Finally, because Clarke and his Georgians fled to North Carolina, Patrick Ferguson was ordered to intercept them as they retreated to the mountains. However, instead of Clarke, he found an assembly of militia from western Virginia and North Carolina, who turned their sights on him at a place called Kings Mountain. Kings Mountain was the culmination of events of the summer of 1780 that reflected the British failure to understand the complex cultural, political, social, and psychological nature of the enemy they were fighting. The Whigs successfully disrupted British Phase IV efforts to build a secure and stable environment by striking at their weak points, intimidating their neighbors through threats and violence, and portraying the British and Loyalist forces as killers of the innocent. The reasons for their ultimate success are reflected in the words of British Lt. Col. T. E. Lawrence, who, after fomenting Arab insurgencies against the Ottoman Empire during World War I, wrote:

> Rebellion must have an unassailable base, . . . in the minds of the men we converted to our creed. It must have a sophisticated alien enemy, in the form of a disciplined army of occupation too small to fulfill the doctrine of acreage. . . . It must have a friendly population, not actively friendly, but sympathetic to the point of not betraying rebel movements to the enemy. Rebellions can be made by 2 per cent. active in a striking force, and 98 per cent. passively sympathetic. . . . Granted mobility, security (in the form of denying targets to the enemy), time, and doctrine (the idea to convert every subject to friendliness), victory will rest with the insurgents.[98]

Notes

This article is an expanded version of a paper read at the conference of Army historians held in Arlington, Virginia, in August 2007.

1. For this paper, I will use the terms Whigs and Loyalists to describe Americans who held different political views. I avoid the use of the words "Patriot" or "American," as they can apply to either side; both were native, both were patriotic, and both were American. Political ideology served as the mechanism for division.

2. The definitive book on Brown is Edward J. Cashin, *The King's Ranger: Thomas Brown and the American Revolution on the Southern Frontier* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1989). For this episode, see p. 28.

3. The most recent account of the campaign for Charleston is found in Carl P. Borick, *A Gallant Defense: The Siege of Charleston, 1780* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2003). For the number of prisoners and casualties of the siege of Charleston, see p. 222.

4. The phases of an operation include Phase I (preparation), Phase II (initial operations), Phase III (combat operations), and Phase IV (postcombat operations). The topic of Phase IV operations related to the war in Iraq has generated several discussions in recent literature. See Thomas E. Ricks, "Army Historian Cites Lack of Postwar Plan," *Washington Post*, 25 Dec 04, p. A01; Kevin C. M. Benson, "OIF Phase IV: A Planner's Reply to Brigadier Aylwin-Foster," *Military Review* 86 (March–April 2006): 61–68; Conrad C. Crane, "Phase IV Operations: Where Wars Are Really Won," *Military Review* 85 (May–June 2005): 27–36; and Andrew Garfield, *Succeeding in Phase IV: British Perspectives on the U.S. Effort to Stabilize and Reconstruct Iraq* (Philadelphia: Foreign Policy Research Institute, 2006), posted at http://www.fpri.org/books/Garfield.SucceedinginPhaseIV.pdf.

5. Joseph J. Ellis, "Washington: The Crying Game," *Los Angeles Times*, 29 Dec 2006.

6. The palmetto tree on the South Carolina state flag commemorates this event.

7. For a good overview, see David K. Wilson, *The Southern Strategy: Britain's Conquest of South Carolina and Georgia, 1775–1780* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press: 2005), pp. 5–58.

8. For information on the early campaigns, see John W. Gordon, *South Carolina and the American Revolution: A Battlefield History* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2003), pp. 34–57. See also Jeff Dennis, "Southern Campaigns against the Cherokees: A Brief Compilation," *Southern Campaigns of the American Revolution* 2 (October 2005): 17–19, and idem, "Native Americans and the Southern Revolution, Part II," *Southern Campaigns of the American Revolution* 4 (July–September 2007): 21–27, both available at www.southerncampaign.org.

9. On 16 September 1777, the Georgia Whig legislature or General Assembly passed *An Act for the Expulsion of the Internal Enemies of this State* to set up twelve-man committees in each county with authority to judge the political allegiance of any male over the age of twenty-one. Two witnesses were required to verify that a man was a "Friend of Freedom," and he had to swear an oath of allegiance to the state of Georgia. If he was not a Friend of Freedom, he was to be banished from the state under penalty of death, never to return, and the loss of one-half of his property. Heard Robertson, ed., "Georgia's Banishment and Expulsion Act of September 16, 1777," *Georgia Historical Quarterly* 55 (Summer 1971): 274–82.

10. For events of this period, see Kenneth Coleman, *The American Revolution in Georgia, 1763–1789* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1958), and Cashin, *King's Ranger*, pp. 40–82.

11. The best account of the British perspective of the war remains Piers Mackesy, *The War for America, 1775–1783* (1964, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1993).

12. Mackesy, *War for America*, p. xv.

13. Ibid., p. 159.

14. Alan S. Brown, ed., "James Simpson's Reports on the Carolina Loyalists, 1779–1780," *Journal of Southern History* 21 (November 1955): 513; Mackesy, *War for America*, p. 233; Wilson, *Southern Strategy*, pp. 59–64; Gordon, *South Carolina*, pp. 58–62; and John S. Pancake, *This Destructive War: The British Campaign in the Carolinas, 1780–1782* (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press: 2003), pp. 9–33.

15. The question of how many Loyalists there were among the American population has been addressed in several sources. The most useful is Paul H. Smith, "The American Loyalists: Notes on Their Organization and Numerical Strength," *William and Mary Quarterly*, 3d ser., 25 (April 1968): 259–77. Smith concludes that about 19,000 men served in Loyalist provincial or militia units in America throughout the war. From that figure, he concludes that there were about 128,000 adult male Loyalists and a total Loyalist population of 513,000 men, women, and children, or 19.8 percent of white Americans.

16. John Shy, "British Strategy for Pacifying the Southern Colonies, 1778–1781," in Jeffrey J. Crow and Larry E. Tise, eds., *The Southern Experience in the American Revolution* (Cha-

pel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1978), p. 159.

17. For good recent summaries of these battles, see Wilson, *Southern Strategy*, pp. 65–100.

18. Martha Condray Searcy, "1779: The First Year of the British Occupation of Georgia," *Georgia Historical Quarterly* 67 (Summer 1983): 168–88; Kenneth Coleman, "Restored Colonial Georgia, 1779–1782," *Georgia Historical Quarterly* 40 (March 1956): 1–20; and Patrick J. Furlong, "Civilian-Military Conflict and the Restoration of the Royal Province of Georgia, 1778–1782," *Journal of Southern History* 38 (August 1972): 415–42.

19. Brown, "James Simpson's Reports," p. 513; Borick, *Gallant Defense*, pp. 16–24.

20. Brown, "James Simpson's Reports," pp. 514–18, quotes, p. 517.

21. Wilson, *Southern Strategy*, p. 198; Borick, *Gallant Defense*, pp. 23–25.

22. Total casualties were 99 killed and 217 wounded among the British Army and naval forces. The Americans lost 89 killed and 138 wounded, mostly from the Continental forces. Borick, *Gallant Defense*, p. 222.

23. This action was viewed as a personal insult to Benjamin Lincoln, but it would be repaid at Yorktown on 19 October 1781, when Cornwallis' army surrendered under similar terms to Washington's deputy commander, Benjamin Lincoln.

24. Borick, *Gallant Defense*, p. 223.

25. A good overview of these problems is described in Louis D. F. Frasché, "Problems of Command: Cornwallis, Partisans and Militia, 1780," *Military Review* 57 (April 1977): 60–74.

26. Pancake, *Destructive War*, pp. 94–95.

27. Rpt, Tarleton to Cornwallis, 30 May 1780, in Lt. Col. Banastre Tarleton, *A History of the Campaigns of 1780 and 1781 in the Southern Provinces of North America* (1787; repr., North Stratford, N.H.: Ayer Company Publishers, 2001), p. 84. On the Waxhaws battle, see Thomas A. Rider, "Massacre or Myth: No Quarter at the Waxhaws, 29 May 1780" (master's thesis, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2002); James Piecuch, "Massacre or Myth? Banastre Tarleton at the Waxhaws, May 29, 1780," *Southern Campaigns of the American Revolution* 1 (October 2004): 4–10, available at www.southerncampaign.org; Wilson, *Southern Strategy*, pp. 242–61.

28. Brown to Cornwallis, 18 Jun 1780, 30/11/2, Cornwallis Papers, British Public Records Office (BPRO), London.

29. Henry Lee, *The American Revolution in the South [Memoirs of the War in the Southern Department of the United States]* (1812, 1869, repr., New York: Arno Press, 1969), pp. 163–64.

30. Tarleton provides a detailed description of the bases and units assigned to garrison and patrol the region. Tarleton, *History of the Campaigns*, pp. 86–88.

31. Robert S. Davis Jr., "The Last Colonial Enthusiast: Captain William Manson and Revolutionary War Georgia," *Atlanta Historical Journal* 28 (Spring 1984): 23–38. For John Dooly, see idem, "Colonel Dooly's Campaign of 1779," *Huntington Library Quarterly* 47 (Winter 1984): 65–71; idem, "A Frontier for Pioneer Revolutionaries: John Dooly and the Beginnings of Popular Democracy in Original Wilkes County," *Georgia Historical Quarterly* 90 (Fall 2006): 315–49.

32. Edward J. Cashin and Heard Robertson. *Augusta and the American Revolution: Events in the Georgia Back Country, 1773–1783* (Augusta, Ga.: Richmond County Historical Society, 1975), p. 42.

33. There is no recent biography of Elijah Clarke or James McCall. Although it is thoroughly annotated, the work by Louise Frederick Hays, *Hero of Hornet's Nest: A Biography of Elijah Clarke, 1733 to 1799* (New York: Stratford House, Inc., 1946), reads more like historical fiction than modern scholarly research. For a reliable summary of Clarke's life, see Robert Scott Davis, "Elijah Clarke: Georgia's Partisan Titan," *Southern Campaigns of the American Revolution* 4 (January–March 2007): 38–40, available at www.southerncampaign.org. Even less is available on James McCall, though much may be found in his son's account of Georgia history. See Hugh McCall, *The History of Georgia* (2 vols., 1811–1816, repr. ed., 1 vol., Atlanta: Cherokee Publishing Co., 1909), as well as recent studies by Sam Fore, "Presentation on Lieutenant Colonel James McCall, Given at Musgrove's Mill State Historic Site, Clinton, South Carolina, on December 17, 2005," *Southern Campaigns of the American Revolution* 3 (January 2006): 11–13, and Daniel Murphy and Ron Crawley, "The Real Life Exploits of an Unknown Patriot: Lt. Col. James McCall," *Southern Campaigns of the American Revolution* 3 (December 2006): 19–23, available at www.southerncampaign.org.

34. Handbill issued after the surrender of Charleston, printed in Tarleton, *History of the Campaigns*, pp. 68–70, quote, p. 69.

35. Prominent South Carolina Whigs such as Henry Middleton, president of the First Continental Congress, and Col. Daniel Horry, one of General Lincoln's cavalry commanders, took the oath of allegiance. See Borick, *Gallant Defense*, p. 232.

36. A list of thirty-three of the most wanted inhabitants of Charleston can be found in Tarleton, *History of the Campaigns*, p. 156, and Note B, pp. 185–86.

37. Colin Campbell, ed., *Journal of an Expedition against the Rebels of Georgia in North America under the Orders of Archibald Campbell Esquire, Lieut. Colol. of His Majesty's 71st Regimt., 1778* (Augusta, Ga.: Richmond County Historical Society, 1981), p. viii.

38. Coleman, *American Revolution in Georgia*, p. 122.

39. Clinton to Cornwallis, 29 May 1780, cited in Borick, *Gallant Defense*, p. 234.

40. Proclamation, issued by Clinton and Arbuthnot, 1 Jun 1780, in Tarleton, *History of the Campaigns*, pp. 75–76.

41. Proclamation, issued by Clinton, 3 Jun 1780, in Tarleton, *History of the Campaigns*, pp. 73–74.

42. Borick, *Gallant Defense*, pp. 237–38.

43. Borick, *Gallant Defense*, p. 236. Cornwallis had six British regiments, three Hessian regiments, and six provincial regiments of Loyalists. Mackesy states that in July, the disposition of British forces in South Carolina and Georgia was 6,129 fit for duty out of 8,439 total effectives. See Mackesy, *War for America*, p. 346.

44. Quoted in McCall, *History of Georgia*, p. 481.

45. H. L. Landers, *The Battle of Camden, South Carolina, August 16, 1780* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1929), pp. 31–33.

46. Ferguson appeared to face many of the same issues that U.S. military advisers confronted in Iraq in 2007, including halfhearted recruits who often did not show up for training or simply went home. A very good analysis of Ferguson's challenges as an adviser can be found in John Buchanan, *The Road to Guilford Courthouse: The American Revolution in the Carolinas* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1997), pp. 202–04, quoted words, p. 202.

47. Pancake, *Destructive War*, p. 82; Tarleton, *History of the Campaigns*, pp. 93, 126–27.

48. Quoted in Pancake, *Destructive War*, p. 81.

49. Many histories of the Revolution wrongly identify Fort Cornwallis as existing in the summer of 1780. In reality, there were then no forts in Augusta, just fortified houses, such as Grierson's. Fort Cornwallis did not yet exist, and Fort Augusta was more a memory

than a physical structure. Augusta in summer 1780 had no physical defenses. Fort Cornwallis would be built during the fall of 1780, after Colonel Clarke's attack.

50. Balfour to Cornwallis, 24 Jun 1780, 30/11/2, Cornwallis Papers, BPRO.

51. Cornwallis to Balfour, 3 Jul 1780, 30/11/78, Cornwallis Papers, BPRO.

52. Cornwallis to Wright, 18 Jul 1780, in Manuscript, Colonial Records of Georgia, vol. 38, pt. 2, pp. 413–14, Georgia Department of Archives and History, Atlanta, Ga.

53. Cashin and Robertson, *Augusta and the American Revolution*, p. 43.

54. Continental Army Maj Gen Nathanael Greene quoted in Pancake, *Destructive War*, p. 92.

55. Pancake, *Destructive* War, p. 93.

56. Greene to Samuel Huntington, President of the Continental Congress, 28 Dec 1780, *The Papers of General Nathanael Greene*, ed. Richard K. Showman et al., 13 vols. (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1976–2005), 7: 9.

57. More detailed descriptions can be found in secondary accounts such as Pancake, *Destructive War*, pp. 70–107; Gordon, *South Carolina*, pp. 89–111; Henry Lumpkin, *From Savannah to Yorktown: The American Revolution in the South* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1981), pp. 264–68; Buchanan, *Road to Guilford Courthouse*, pp. 104–207.

58. Pancake, *Destructive War*, pp. 96–97.

59. Lumpkin, *Savannah to Yorktown*, pp. 265; Rpt, Cornwallis to Clinton, 6 Aug 1780, in Tarleton, *History of the Campaigns*, pp. 126–28.

60. Pancake, *Destructive War*, p. 98; Terry W. Lipscomb, *Battles, Skirmishes, and Actions of the American Revolution in South Carolina* (Columbia: South Carolina Department of Archives and History, 1991), pp. 7–8.

61. Cruger to Cornwallis, 7 Aug 1780, 30/11/63, Cornwallis Papers, BPRO.

62. Tarleton, *History of the Campaigns*, pp. 104–10; Pancake, *Destructive War*, pp. 104–07.

63. Gordon, *South Carolina*, pp. 94–95.

64. Pancake, *Destructive War*, pp. 84, 111.

65. McCall, *History of Georgia*, p. 482.

66. Edward J. Cashin, ed., "The Pension Claim of Joshua Burnett," *Richmond County History* 10 (Winter 1978): 16.

67. McCall, *History of Georgia*, p. 483.

68. Cashin, *King's Ranger*, p. 114.

69. Colonel Cruger, relying on a return that has subsequently been lost, reported to Cornwallis on 15 September 1780 that Brown's force of provincial troops numbered about two hundred fit for duty. See Cashin and Robertson, *Augusta and the American Revolution*, pp. 46–47, 95–96. Muster rolls for five companies of the King's Carolina Rangers dated 29 November 1779 at Savannah, transcribed in Cashin, *King's Ranger*, pp. 251–52, 264–65, 276–77, 281–82, 288–89, give a total strength of 270. The rolls from Savannah in late 1779 provide the closest extant strength figures for the assigned companies of Thomas Brown (64); Capt. Andrew Johnston (62); Capt. Joseph Smith (61); Capt. Alexander Wylly (42); and Capt. Samuel Rowarth (41). Both Tarleton and Henry Lee state in their memoirs that Brown had about 150 provincials in the fight. See Tarleton, *History of the Campaigns*, p. 161, and Lee, *American Revolution in the South*, p. 199.

70. New Jersey Volunteer Return, 30/11/103, Cornwallis Papers, folio 4, BPRO, posted by the On-Line Institute for Advanced Loyalist Studies at www.royalprovincial.com/military/rhist/njv/njvretn3.htm; Nan Cole and Todd Braisted, "A History of the 3d Battalion, New Jersey Volunteers," posted by the same group at http://www.royalprovincial.com/military/rhist/njv/3njvhist.htm.

71. McCall, *History of Georgia*, p. 483; Cashin, *King's Ranger*, p. 115; Hays, *Hero of Hornet's Nest*, p. 99.

72. Hays, *Hero of Hornet's Nest*, p. 100. The purchasing power of £4,000 in 1780 is roughly equivalent to that of $600,000 in U.S. currency today.

73. Cashin, *King's Ranger*, p. 115.

74. This location today is approximately where Eve and Broad Streets meet. The Ezekiel Harris house sits on the northeast slope of what remains of Garden Hill.

75. Cashin, *King's Ranger*, p. 116.

76. Lt Col Thomas Brown to Lt Col John Harris Cruger, 15 Sep 1780, 30/11/64, Cornwallis Papers, BPRO.

77. Brown to Cruger, 15 Sep 1780.

78. Cashin, *King's Ranger*, pp. 116–17.

79. Cruger to Cornwallis, 15–16 Sep 1780, 30/11/64, Cornwallis Papers, BPRO.

80. Charles C. Jones, *The History of Georgia*, 2 vols. (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and Company, 1883), 2: 457.

81. Lt. Col. Henry "Lighthorse Harry" Lee, who often wrote in glowing terms of his enemy's tenacity, courage, and determination, was an unusual admirer of Brown. See Lee, *War in the Southern Department*, pp. 199–200.

82. Cruger to Cornwallis, 16 Sep 1780, 30/11/64, Cornwallis Papers, BPRO.

83. Cashin, *King's Ranger*, pp. 117–18; Hays, *Hero of Hornet's Nest*, p. 101.

84. Known Whig dead included Capt. Charles Jourdine, Capt. William Martin, Absalom Horn, William Luckie, and a Major Carter. See Hays, *Hero of Hornet's Nest*, p. 101.

85. Among the known dead of the Loyalists were Capt. Andrew Johnston and Ensign Silcox of the rangers. See McCall, *History of Georgia*, p. 487.

86. Cruger to Cornwallis, 19 Sep 1780, 30/11/64, Cornwallis Papers, BPRO.

87. Cashin, *King's Ranger*, p. 118; McCall, *History of Georgia*, p. 486–87. McCall cites as his sources British officers who witnessed this event and had "exultingly communicated it to their friends in Savannah, Charleston, and London." See ibid., p. 487.

88. Rutledge said, "It is said (and I believe it) that of the Prisoners whom Brown took at Augusta, he gave up four to the Indians who killed em, cut off their Heads and kicked their bodies about the Streets and that he (Brown) hung upwards of 30 prisoners." See Cashin, *King's Ranger*, p. 120.

89. Jones, *History of Georgia*, 2: 458.

90. McCall, *History of Georgia*, p. 486.

91. Cashin makes an important point that officers, such as Henry Lee, expressed admiration for Brown in their memoirs, which perhaps reflects a contemporary view of reality rather than postwar myth (Cashin, *King's Ranger*, p. 120).

92. Cited in Heard Robertson, "The Second British Occupation of Augusta, 1780–1781," *Georgia Historical Quarterly* 58 (Winter 1974): 435.

93. Cashin and Robertson, *Augusta and the American Revolution*, p. 50.

94. McCall, *History of Georgia*, pp. 488–89.

95. Ibid., pp. 490–91, quote, p. 491.

96. Cashin and Robertson, *Augusta and the American Revolution*, p. 50.

97. Ibid., p. 51; Cornwallis to Clinton, 3 Dec 1780, 30/11/72, Cornwallis Papers, BPRO.

98. T. E. Lawrence, "The Evolution of a Revolt," *The Army Quarterly* 1 (October 1920): 69, as reprinted at Leavenworth, Kans., by the Combat Studies Institute in 1999, p. 22.

Gregory Jones, U.S. Army Photographic Branch

Guests at exhibit dedication ceremony examine display on wars fought at the turn of the twentieth century.

Gregory Jones, U.S. Army Photographic Branch

Women's Army Corps exhibit

Continued from page 3

and plain hard work that contributed to the final planning and made possible the installation of the artifacts and supporting graphics. The results include thirty-nine displays illustrating the Army's major wars; many others highlighting the service's important economic, social, and scientific contributions to the nation's development; over eighty pieces of mostly original artwork; some twenty-six life-size figures depicting period uniforms and equipment; and such iconic items as the Girandoni air rifle carried on the Lewis and Clark expedition, a siege mortar from the Battle of Saratoga, and a prototype M1 Garand rifle.

The opening ceremony was a project itself, involving several hundred dignitaries who included former Army secretaries and chiefs of staff, a host of general officers and high-ranking officials, and many other luminaries. Speeches by Secretary Geren and Army Chief of Staff General George W. Casey Jr. highlighted the event, while scores of Army historians and curators acted as guides, escorting a constant flow of visitors through the exposition. All told, the exhibit constitutes a great showpiece for the Army Historical Program and the Army Museum System that will underline for years to come the educational and inspirational value of our historical professionals to the larger Army. I sincerely hope that all of our team members will have an opportunity to enjoy this magnificent exhibit if and when they visit the Washington, D.C., area in the months ahead.

BOOK REVIEWS

Manhood, Citizenship, and the National Guard: Illinois, 1870–1917



By Eleanor L. Hannah
Ohio State University Press, 2007,
304 pp., $42.95

Review by Roger D. Cunningham

After four long and bloody years of civil war, few Americans were interested in serving as citizen-soldiers. During the 1870s, however, there was a national resurgence of interest in the organized militia, which most states began to refer to as the National Guard. By 1888 there were more than 100,000 militiamen in the United States, while the Regular Army totaled less than 27,000 officers and men. One of the largest state militias during the Gilded Age—the eighth largest in 1888—was in Illinois. Eleanor L. Hannah, an assistant professor of history at the University of Minnesota, Duluth, analyzes the first half-century of its post–Civil War development in *Manhood, Citizenship, and the National Guard*. Her research was supported by a U.S. Army Center of Military History doctoral fellowship.

In 1870 Illinois reported to the federal government that it had no active militia, but by 1880 it had more than eight thousand active militiamen; thousands of other men had passed through scores of militia companies during the intervening decade. These citizen-soldiers organized units across the state and actively participated in local community social functions, emphasizing their manhood and sense of civic responsibility by proudly marching in holiday parades and participating in other martial events. They also conducted frequent fund-raising activities, since the state initially covered none of their expenses.

The militia units were activated in response to strikes. In fact, because of the many labor struggles in the coal-mining region in the central part of the Prairie State, Illinois Guardsmen had more experience with strike duty than did any other state militia during the two decades before the Spanish-American War. The citizen-soldiers did not enjoy strike duty, which they viewed as an unpleasant but necessary function, and beginning in 1894, National Guard officers began to actively question their role in handling strike-related events.

The change in the officers' attitude was provoked by the large number of strikes in 1894, beginning with the walkout of all but about 600 of the state's 26,000 coal miners in the spring of that year. The Illinois National Guard spent more than $360,000 responding to labor disputes that year. National Guard officers did not question their deployment in May, but by the end of June "they were beginning to resent being called into situations that they claimed should have been quelled by local authorities" (p. 164). They also criticized the Guard's involvement in that summer's Pullman strike affecting railroads both in Illinois and around the nation. The Guard's leaders realized that when strikers or bystanders died, they were always blamed, no matter whose fault it was, and they decided that the militia would benefit by staying as far away from such situations as possible. Their stance hardened after bitter coal strikes in 1898–1899 and 1904–1905, and they thereafter managed to evade further strike duty through 1917.

When the United States declared war on Spain in April 1898, the nation hurriedly raised a volunteer force to augment the small Regular Army. The War Department asked Illinois for one cavalry and seven infantry regiments, which matched what the state's National Guard had to offer. By 21 May all of these regiments and an artillery battery had been mustered into federal service at Springfield, the state capital, and the units soon departed for camps in the South, where the myriad elements of the Volunteer Army were being assembled. Illinois mustered two more infantry regiments into service in July. Because the "splendid little war" was quite short, only two companies from the 6th Illinois Infantry were able to participate in the Puerto Rico campaign before hostilities ended. But seven Illinois infantry regiments and its artillery battery deployed overseas, five to Cuba and two (plus the battery) to Puerto Rico, where they performed occupation duties. The 8th Illinois Infantry was one of only three African American volunteer regiments to deploy to Cuba, and, despite a shooting incident involving soldiers from another black regiment that generated adverse press coverage in the United States, the unit provided effective service on the island. National Guardsmen, black and white, emerged from the war believing that "they had demonstrated to the world that they could perform, more or less, as advertised—and certainly as well as the regular army itself." (p. 156)

The author says little about the Illinois National Guard during the early twentieth century. She notes that it

was mobilized for service along the troubled Mexican border in 1916, but she does not provide details of where the units went, nor does she report the fact that the 1st Illinois was the first National Guard unit to reach Texas. There are a few errors in the text. The 23d Kansas, another African American unit that served alongside the 8th Illinois in Cuba, was also a regiment (albeit one with only two battalions) and had a full complement of black officers (p. 150). These are minor flaws, however, in a well-researched volume that should be of great use to those interested in the evolution of the nation's organized militia after the Civil War.

Roger D. Cunningham is a retired Army officer who has contributed many articles and book reviews to Army History over the past decade. From 1977 to 1980 he was a branch adviser to Army Reserve and National Guard military police units in Texas and Louisiana. His book, *The Black Citizen-Soldiers of Kansas, 1864–1901*, was published by the University of Missouri Press in 2008.

Fighting the Great War: A Global History



By Michael S. Neiberg
Harvard University Press, 395 pp.,
hardcover, 2005, $27.95; paper, 2006, $18

Review by Michael A. Boden

Perhaps one of the most challenging efforts a historian can undertake is the attempt to provide one-volume coverage of any of the great wars in human history. Of particular difficulty are those conflicts that are global in nature, like the First and Second World Wars. The author must find the delicate balance between the need to condense information so as not to overwhelm the reader, while at the same time providing enough analysis to make the study worthwhile and relevant. Michael S. Neiberg's treatment of the First World War, *Fighting the Great War: A Global History*, succeeds in attaining this balance.

For the majority of this book's target reading audience the general outline of the First World War is common knowledge, and Neiberg does not waste effort in unnecessary commentary. His focus and intent remain directed at tying all the events of the conflict into a coherent whole, with a continuous and seamless trajectory. He also does not devote the preponderance of his attention toward the Western Front, which is perfectly acceptable in light of the importance of the other arenas of the war. His coverage of the Eastern and, more impressively, the Italian Fronts is commendable, depicting these campaigns with enough continuity and context to accent effectively their significance to the larger conflict. By this all-encompassing treatment, he succeeds in presenting a true global history, as his title promises—an achievement that is far too uncommon.

The Germans in Neiberg's book are definitely the antagonists of the war, and the author does not hesitate to point out occasions where the leaders of the Reich, both civilian and military, were brutal and overbearing. This behavior involved not only the soldiers of the German Army and their treatment of their foes on all fronts but also the leaders of Germany in their treatment of their allies, who are seen, for the most part, as well-meaning but wanting subsidiaries of the German Empire. An undercurrent to Neiberg's thesis is how this German treatment of Eastern and Southern European nations, friend and foe alike, fed into the perceptions and attitudes of the postwar years that culminated in the horrors of the Second World War's Eastern Front. Through this theme, Neiberg solidifies his global conception of the war by bringing it forward into the next decades.

Neiberg's treatment of the Western Allies is equally candid. While he does spend a notable amount of time addressing the relatively common Great War themes of technological and tactical advances, and how leaders adapted or failed to adapt to them, his analysis of the Allied efforts primarily focuses on the theme of civil-military relations. Indeed, one of the primary advantages enjoyed by these Western states, in Neiberg's mind, was the ability of the civilian authorities to assert direction of the war over the military leadership of their countries, unlike their German foes. Although the effort was difficult and led to a number of new problems, the overall effect enhanced the ability of the Allies to continue the war in the face of personnel and materiel shortages.

Neiberg also finds the leadership of the various armies wanting, and he makes a case that the commander of the Italian forces at the beginning of the war, Luigi Cadorna, was "one of the worst senior commanders of the twentieth century" (p. 151). Other armies had the typical mix of talented and atrocious leaders, although Neiberg's criteria for calculating effectiveness include a high degree of political savvy along with innovative tactical style. Using these criteria, the author finds the great German command team of Paul von Hindenburg and Erich Ludendorff less stellar than do most critical examinations of the conflict, although he certainly does not consider them to be failures.

This is not a tactical history of the First World War, and it makes no pretensions of being such. Campaigns occasionally earn discussion down to the division level, but only with the purpose of elaborating operational and strategic themes. *Fighting the Great War* addresses advances in military technology within the context of the broader scope of the war without forcing the overall course of the book to veer off its path. By combining all of these elements, Neiberg has succeeded admirably in the difficult task he sought to achieve—providing a succinct analysis of the war that is balanced chronologically,

geographically, and topically, without ever bogging down in too much detail. Neiberg's ability to portray the global nature of the conflict, as well as his deft inclusion of civil-military relations throughout the war, enhance the book's current relevance. *Fighting the Great War: A Global History* is the best single-volume treatment of World War I since the publication of Martin Gilbert's *The First World War: A Complete History* over a decade ago, and it will appeal to both historians and the wider public.

Lt. Col. Michael A. Boden served in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait with the 1st ("Tiger") Brigade, 2d Armored Division, during the Persian Gulf War; in Kosovo in 2002 as executive officer of the 1st Battalion, 77th Armor; and at Mosul, Iraq, in 2007 as the deputy commander of the 4th Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division. He has also been an assistant professor of history at the U.S. Military Academy. He is a graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College and a doctoral candidate in history at Vanderbilt University.

The Korean War



By Paul M. Edwards
Greenwood Press, American Soldiers' Lives Series, 2006, 210 pp., $65

Review by Kenneth R. Foulks Jr.

This book is a volume in Greenwood's American Soldier's Lives series. The series editors write that the books are intended to describe the "daily routines" of soldiers (p. ix). Dr. Paul M. Edwards, the author of this volume, is a veteran of the Korean War and senior fellow at the Center for the Study of the Korean War at Graceland University in Missouri. Edwards has written several other books on the war. The fourteen chapters in this book deal with such topics as "Learning to Be a Soldier," "Learning to Fight with World War II Weapons," and the "Division Rear and the Train."

Edwards claims that despite the increasing number of narrative accounts, the historiography of the Korean War remains deficient due to the paucity of information available regarding the daily existence of individual service members. The real strength of this book is in the details it provides at the micro-level of the Korean War—the experience of the individual American soldier. Edwards makes extensive use of oral histories, memoirs, and personal recollections of ordinary soldiers who served in the war. The book also provides a general overview of the war and a highly detailed historical timeline of the events that took place on the Korean peninsula from 1950 to 1953, which can benefit both the newcomer and the expert.

In the section "Transportation to War," Edwards writes that although the soldiers who rushed to Korea from Japan in 1950 traveled by air, most soldiers who served in Korea traveled by ship from the West Coast on a monotonous two-week voyage that trapped most enlisted members in cramped compartments below decks. Boredom was a constant. However, "for those who felt up to it, the primary attraction of the day was chow and it could well take up most of the day. The lines ran throughout the ship as men stood for hours trying to get the next meal. . . . The line moved slowly, and most were aware that once done with their meal, they would simply move into the chow line waiting for the next one" (p. 68). Most soldiers' first impression of the Korean mainland was the initial smell of human waste used for agricultural fertilizer. In fact, this smell is often cited by Korean War veterans when asked what they recall about their initial impression of the "Hermit Kingdom."

In "Combat Routine," Edwards details the daily life of the ordinary soldier and describes the austere and often horrible living conditions on the battlefield. He traces the changes in the soldier's daily living environment as American tactics evolved from an urgent defensive retreat to initially a fast-moving offensive operation and later to a static defense that ultimately wound up being similar to the style of trench warfare experienced by American soldiers during the First World War. The blistering heat of summer was replaced by the bitter cold of winter, as winds swept across the Korean peninsula from the Siberian tundra. Edwards comments that "the U.S. military was ill-prepared for the cold winters in North Korea. As a result, many soldiers and marines fought in frigid conditions with inadequate equipment and supplies" (p. 92). Everything from weapons to plasma froze; shock was a constant companion to the soldier and marine alike. Using statistics and personal stories, Edwards tells a tragic story of horror, death, severe cold, bewilderment, courage, and ultimately survival.

One of the best sections of the book focuses on medical care. Edwards is critical of Army medical care at the beginning of the war. He describes how unprepared the Medical Service Corps was for the outbreak of hostilities, even though World War II had ended less than five years earlier; his comments follow the developing historiography of medical care during the war, such as Frank Reister's official statistical history of Army battle casualties and medical care. During the early phases of the Korean War, medical care was inconsistent. For example, wounds were often infected with dirt and human waste. Treatment processes improved as the war progressed, in part because of the development of a four-stage chain of care that extended from the frontline to the evacuation hospital in Pusan. Triage was not a new concept, but the four-tiered triage system (based upon minor, moderate, urgent, and emergency care) was new. The use of helicopters greatly accelerated the movement of severely wounded patients to mobile Army surgical hospital (MASH) units, enabling doctors to treat severely wounded soldiers quickly. The fact that the Bell H–13

helicopter was mechanically unreliable and at best could carry only two patients at a time limited the use of air evacuation, but it was nonetheless important to the combat soldier in Korea.

Edwards falls short in describing soldier attitudes during the war. In his *History of the United States Army*, Russell Weigley wrote that the Army tried to support soldier morale in Korea by creating a lavish support structure that attempted to approximate the American standard of living at home. Edwards' description of the soldier's experience, which focuses on hardship, does not reflect Weigley's interpretation, and his failure at least to address this inconsistency is troubling. Edwards describes the American soldier enduring unremitting hardship, but the experience of U.S. troops in different parts of the country probably varied greatly.

Edwards successfully shows the process by which U.S. soldiers were trained and how they fought during the austere and psychologically ambiguous conditions in Korea. He quotes S. L. A. Marshall, who described American troops in Korea as "perhaps the best of all fighting men who served the country" (p. 146). Edwards' book does credit to the American soldiers sent to Korea, and it successfully explains how the soldiers' experience of hardship in the Korean War, which is often said to have been fought by men and equipment of the Second World War with tactics resembling those of the First World War, was unique.

Maj. Kenneth R. Foulks Jr. is an Army Reserve officer assigned to the U.S. Army Center of Military History. He holds bachelor's and master's degrees in history from Monmouth University in New Jersey. He served on active duty with the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment during the Persian Gulf War and as a military historian in Kuwait in 2008. A resident of Middletown, New Jersey, he has worked in the commercial airfreight transportation field for over fifteen years.

The Role of Federal Military Forces in Domestic Disorders 1945–1992



By Paul J. Scheips
U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2005, 512 pp., $66

Review by William B. Taylor

In *Federalist 41*, James Madison proclaimed:

> A standing force therefore is dangerous, at the same time that it may be a necessary provision. On the smallest scale it has inconveniences. On an extensive scale, its consequences may be fatal. On any scale it is an object of laudable circumspection and precaution. A wise nation will combine all these considerations; and whilst it does not rashly preclude itself from any resource which may become essential to its safety, will exert its prudence in diminishing both the necessity and the danger of resorting to one which may be inauspicious to its liberties.

In writing this passage, Madison addressed the enduring problem facing the new American nation of the proper function and organization of a military establishment within a republic. Madison's words express the incessant British Whig fear of standing armies that was bequeathed to American citizens and the Constitution. Too much military power results in an army subverting liberty, while too little military power results in an inability to meet internal or external threats. Madison believed that the solution lay in allowing for the creation of an Army, while making sure that proper constitutional safeguards were in place to hedge against individuals or factions turning the Army into an instrument of tyranny. Paul Scheips illustrates the resulting dilemma and its corresponding tension in post–World War II America in *The Role of Federal Military Forces in Domestic Disorders, 1945–1992.*

Scheips' book examines how American federal troops functioned in post–World War II domestic civil disturbances: predominately forced desegregation, race riots, and antiwar protests. Time and time again Scheips' research demonstrates Americans' paradoxical uneasiness with both domestic disorder and the use of federal troops to help quell it (pp. 165, 254). Indeed, General Ralph E. Haines Jr. during the April 1968 Washington riot instructed his command to "avoid appearing as an invading, alien force rather than [as] a force whose purpose is to restore order with a minimum loss of life and property and [with] due respect for the great number of citizens whose involvement is purely accidental" (p. 286). By and large the story that Scheips chronicles is one of success, with the obvious exception being the Kent State Tragedy in 1970. However, when one puts the Kent State killings into the context of the massive domestic unrest that occurred in the 1950s and 1960s, it is actually quite remarkable that more federal interventions did not go awry. For example, during the height of rioting in the United States in April 1968—in which there were 31 deaths, 3,219 injuries, and over 2,000 fires—it is absolutely astounding that federal troops only expended 16 rounds of ammunition against American citizens (p. 337). Diverse individuals and groups from President Lyndon B. Johnson (p. 264) to the American Civil Liberties Union (p. 298) praised the troops for their professionalism and restraint.

Scheips focuses most of his research on the dynamics of federal involvement in these domestic disturbances. Perhaps one of the greatest strengths of his book is to showcase the apprehension many key political figures from President

Dwight D. Eisenhower to President Johnson exuded when opting for federal intervention (pp. 47, 284). Due to the potentially disastrous consequences of federal intervention, high-ranking officials and generals would often abbreviate the chain of command in order to micromanage the use of federal troops (pp. 77, 274). Another strength of the book is to demonstrate the inadequacies of the National Guard in discipline and training (p. 90). In the 1950s many criticized the Guard for its members' support for segregation. How could even a federalized National Guard with sympathy towards segregation be expected to preside over the downfall of segregation (p. 59)? Later on, after-action reviews on the performance of the National Guard consistently pointed to weaknesses in the realm of riot-control training and command and control (pp. 216–17). Many Army leaders identified this lack of discipline and training as a primary cause of the Kent State shootings (p. 412).

Scheips has mixed success dealing with a very contentious contemporary issue when he analyzes how federal forces became entangled with domestic intelligence and surveillance (p. 144). Much of the Army's domestic surveillance program became focused on a "hypothesis that revolutionary groups might be behind the civil rights and anti-war movements" (p. 396). Through a rapidly expanding and unchecked domestic surveillance program that eventually became public, the Army awakened a latent American fear of standing armies subverting liberty (p. 397). Since Scheips completed his work in April 2002, it may be unreasonable to criticize him for not contextualizing his research, since these issues have since had tremendous implications for the George W. Bush administration's highly divisive Patriot Act and domestic surveillance programs.

Perhaps the greatest weakness of this work lies in Scheips' inadequate links to the larger mood in American society and culture. This is not Scheips' primary goal, but allowing the American people a greater voice in terms of what they thought about federal intervention in these many domestic disturbances would have resulted in a more comprehensive account. We do hear from the citizens of Detroit in a few paragraphs (p. 203), but overall Scheips does not include enough of this type of analysis. A three-page conclusion seems inadequate for a work with so much potential significance for modern American society. Scheips argues that "the Army was often viewed with considerable hostility by organized labor and the working classes," yet provides no evidence to base this claim (p. 450). Overall, the author misses an opportunity to connect with larger narratives within American society during this era. How, for example, did the use of Federal troops in the Vietnam era fit into the commonly held view that the United States was distorting and perverting its values based on malfeasant power? Perhaps in the future another author can build on *The Role of Federal Military Forces in Domestic Disorders, 1945–1992*, to elucidate their deeper repercussions for American society.

Maj. William B. Taylor is an instructor in the Department of History at the United States Military Academy, where he teaches a senior course on American foreign relations since 1898 and a survey course in American history. He earned a master's degree in history from Stanford University in 2006.



Soldiers of the 2d Infantry Division detain students following disturbances at the University of Mississippi over the enrollment of a black student under a desegregation order, 1962.

National Archives

NEWSNOTES

Continued from page 5

Walter Reed Symposium

The Walter Reed Army Medical Center will hold a symposium on 29 April 2009 on the Army doctor for whom the facility is named and on the medical care it has provided since its opening in May 1909. More detail about this event is available from Sherman Fleek, the medical center's historian. He may be reached by phone at 202-782-3329 or by email at sherman.fleek@amedd.army.mil.

Biography of Thomas Neibaur

Utah State University Press has issued a biography of a World War I soldier authored by Walter Reed Army Medical Center historian Sherman Fleek. *Place the Headstones Where They Belong: Thomas Neibaur, WWI Soldier*, recounts the life and wartime heroism of an Idaho native who was awarded the Medal of Honor for his actions in the fighting on 16 October 1918 at the Côte de Châtillon, a hill dominating the village of Landres-et-St. Georges in the Meuse-Argonne region of France. Neibaur served with Company M, 167th Infantry, an element of the 42d Division, and he was the first Mormon to receive America's highest decoration for valor. The difficulties Neibaur encountered after the war led him to return the medal to Congress. Fleek is also the author of *History May Be Searched in Vain: A Military History of the Mormon Battalion* (Spokane, Wash.: Arthur H. Clark Co., 2006).

In Memoriam: Henry O. Malone (1934–2008)

Dr. Henry O. Malone, who served as chief historian of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command from 1981 to 1994, died in October 2008. He was 74.

A native of Shreveport, Louisiana, Malone earned a bachelor of arts from Baylor University, a bachelor of divinity from Baptist Theological Seminary in Zurich, and a doctorate in history from the University of Texas at Austin. He also served as a fighter pilot in the U.S. Air Force and was stationed in France. Prior to his work at the Training and Doctrine Command, Malone taught history at Texas Christian University and served as a historian with the 9th Air Force; Headquarters, U.S. Air Force, Europe; and the Office of Air Force History in Washington. His doctoral dissertation focused on the development of opposition to National Socialism in Hitler's Germany.

Malone worked closely with the commander of the Training and Doctrine Command, General William Richardson, in the early 1980s to create a robust field history program that placed well-credentialed historians into each of the Army's branch schools, where they offered courses and wrote about the history of the military specialties. At its peak, the program had historians at nineteen Army schools and the command's three integrating centers. After Malone retired, he became president and historical adviser of Citizens for a Fort Monroe National Park, an advocacy group with which retired Generals Glenn K. Otis and Donn A. Starry have been involved. The group has worked vigorously to preserve Fort Monroe as a park that would focus both on the military significance of the installation at Old Point Comfort and on the role of the contraband policy of Maj. Gen. Benjamin Butler, who commanded at Fort Monroe in 1861, in liberating African Americans during the Civil War. The Army is scheduled to depart the site in 2011 under its base realignment plans.

The Chief Historian's Footnote

Dr. Richard W. Stewart

The Relevance of Military History

There is an ongoing debate between those who see history, especially military history, as critical to our understanding of the world and those who attack history on a regular basis as "not relevant" and thus not worth spending time, money, or effort to create it, read it, or try to learn from it. The question of the "relevancy" of history is hard to address because historians by their very nature are predisposed to love their craft. In addition, those who question history's relevance have often made up their minds long ago that history is useless and nothing but old, dry facts and dates and are immune to argument. Nonetheless, I intend to take a stab at the issue.

Any effort to demonstrate the relevance of history has to begin by defining history. At its essence, history is little more than an attempt to write down and convey past events in as much detail as credible sources and carefully weighed speculation permit, with the historian making it very clear to the reader the vital difference between the two. History begins immediately after an event, when a participant or observer seeks to make some initial sense out of it. Thus when a squad or platoon finishes a patrol, and its members sit down for a few minutes and rehash what happened and what they need to do better next time, "history" for the first time begins to replace the "now." The troops try to make sense of what happened so that it does not happen again. Likewise at any of the Combat Training Centers, when members of a unit assemble after a rotation for a "hot-wash" or an after-action review (AAR), they are attempting to learn from their own experiences that are now in the recent past—their own history. Going one step further, writing down observations or lessons learned and forwarding them to other units and up the chain of command into the schoolhouse makes possible the first systematic cut at creating a "usable past": a quick historical account filled with practical tips and new tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs). This is true current history—very quick and dirty with almost no time to analyze or place events in their fullest context. This process makes it easy to pass along the one-time event or trivial technique that is not as useful as other observations, but no one can say that such current history is not relevant.

However, history cannot stop there. The weakness of current history is that while everyone can see its relevance to the current struggle, the narrowness of focus on a specific time, unit, or place causes others to see such insights as less than useful to their own specific time and place. Because such hastily produced recent history provides little context or refinement of detail, critics can easily dismiss much of its applicability as the battlefield shifts in time and space. But more extended initial attempts at capturing history—often called "instant histories"—prepared by journalists, observers, and contemporary historians, can fill a vital interim gap between the poorly digested but important insights and tips of the quick after-action review and lessons-learned report and the more detailed and nuanced histories to come. These pamphlets and books, often generated using oral testimony and interviews conducted by military or civilian writers and journal contributors, are epitomized by Fort Leavenworth's *On Point I* and *On Point II*, Michael Gordon and Bernard Trainer's book *Cobra II*, and journalist Linda Robinson's *Tell Me How This Ends.* These are somewhat more fully analyzed treatments of the subject at hand that attempt to establish a clear chronology, present a compelling narrative, and rely upon multiple sources. These studies are far from comprehensive, but they have a powerful and important impact on our understanding of recent events and on the development of doctrine. And it is doctrine—carefully weighed attempts at discerning the shapes of future battlefields and how we should fight on those battlefields—that turns practical experience into training and new practices. Even harsh critics of instant histories should realize that these studies often provide the initial basis of the efforts of the Army to learn from, and incorporate into writing and practice, recent battlefield experiences. However, this form of history can be dangerous if not used with care. It is often based on a less than complete story of what happened on the battlefield and generally lacks the details only garnered through thousands (and not just hundreds) of interviews and tens of thousands of documents. Worse, the speed of its preparation can make it completely wrong in its analysis of what happened and what was most important.

An example of this phenomenon is a detailed report prepared quickly by U.S. Army doctrine writers after the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. That report got almost as much wrong as right. It jumped to conclusions about

the vulnerability of the tank and the airplane to ground- and air-guided missiles, virtually consigning both to the ash heap of history. Over time, as more details emerged, a fuller analysis of tactics and outcomes demonstrated how effective both weapons systems could still be in many circumstances when used correctly. In short, the detailed study epitomized the value of historical research that, over time, can correct hastily reached conclusions. Yet quick studies, when prepared with care and due consideration of the paucity of the evidence on hand at the time, have value and can provide important insights on current battlefields. Is this relevant history? Again, yes.

Finally, what about history as the fully researched—as fully as sources permit—major study, often a decade or more in the making? Here is where critics of history and non-historians often focus their ire. These histories are long, detailed, thorough analyses of a subject. Indeed I submit that it is in their thoroughness that their true value lies. They are admittedly not quick. The products of the first category of history described above are much quicker in generation and use. They scratch that very human itch that seeks to make sense of experience and learn from it. Those in the second category of history try to place events in context, but time and incomplete sources are often an enemy of true thoroughness. To really understand what happened and why, one simply has to wait for the fully researched history. To some critics, therefore, such studies are not considered "relevant." However, I submit that they are perhaps the *most* relevant to the Army in the long run.

Fully researched and detailed history provides the richly woven perspective and depth that only a complete mastery of the events in question can provide. While observations, AARs, lessons-learned reports, and the "instant" histories can provide some cause and effect that can lead to useful tactical or even quick-turnaround doctrinal insight, they can just as often lead to hasty and wrong conclusions through faulty analysis based on inaccurate facts or insufficient context. If you do not fully understand an event, battle, or war—do not *really know* what happened—then any conclusions or lessons you try to draw from the episode stand a good chance of being flawed. Writing doctrine that changes the structure of an Army and may shape its training environment and even what weapons systems it will try to procure a decade or more in the future should not be undertaken lightly or embarked upon when you are not absolutely sure you know what is driving that doctrine. Military history—the distilled experience of an Army with all of its detail, nuance, depth, and subtlety—is essentially the long-term basis of all doctrine, and it pays to get it really right. All attempts at capturing and learning from experience—from patrol debriefings to lessons-learned reports to AARs to quick studies to full-blown historical studies—work toward that end, and all are valuable pieces of a puzzle; a puzzle that when fully assembled and understood can lead to a more fully trained Army. They can be the foundation of an Army that is ready not just for the current conflict but also for future engagements, regardless of time, place, or foe. I frankly do not see how you can be more "relevant" than that.

AH

Call for Submissions

Army History welcomes articles, essays, and commentaries of between 2,000 and 12,000 words on any topic relating to the history of the U.S. Army or to wars and conflicts in which the U.S. Army participated or by which it was substantially influenced. The Army's history extends to the present day, and *Army History* seeks accounts of the Army's actions in ongoing conflicts as well as those of earlier years. The bulletin particularly seeks writing that presents new approaches to historical issues. It encourages readers to submit responses to essays or commentaries that have appeared in its pages and to present cogent arguments on any question (controversial or otherwise) relating to the history of the Army. Such contributions need not be lengthy. Essays and commentaries should be annotated with endnotes, preferably embedded, to indicate the sources relied on to support factual assertions. Preferably, a manuscript should be submitted as an attachment to an e-mail sent to the managing editor at charles.hendricks1@conus.army.mil.

Army History encourages authors to recommend or provide illustrations to accompany submissions. If authors wish to supply photographs, they may provide them in a digital format with a minimum resolution of 300 dots per inch or as photo prints sent by mail. Authors should provide captions and credits with all images. When furnishing photographs that they did not take or any photos of art, authors must identify the owners of the photographs and artworks to enable *Army History* to obtain permission to reproduce the images.

Although contributions by e-mail are preferred, authors may submit articles, essays, commentaries, and images by mail to Charles Hendricks; Managing Editor, Army History; U.S. Army Center of Military History; 103 Third Avenue; Fort McNair, D.C. 20319-5058.

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