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RIVERS, RAILS, AND WOODEN BATEAUX

CIVIL WAR PONTONIERING IN THE EASTERN THEATER

BY MARK A. SMITH

"IT WAS MIGHTY LITTLE FOR ANYONE TO DO"

ROY E. APPLEMAN AND *SOUTH TO THE NAKTONG, NORTH TO THE YALU*

BY WILLIAM M. DONNELLY

ARMY HISTORY

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Front cover: A pontoon bridge across the James River at Deep Bottom, Virginian ca. 1864
Library of Congress

EDITOR'S JOURNAL

In this Summer 2024 issue of *Army History*, I am pleased to offer two excellent articles, a look at an extremely rare Army artifact, a visit to the Okinawa Prefectural Archives, and our usual crop of quality book reviews.

The first article, by Mark Smith, examines military bridging in the Eastern Theater during the American Civil War. The many contributions of regular engineer officers in building these bridges kept the U.S. Army on the march. These soldiers employed an array of different equipment and methods to keep troops and materiel moving across the many rivers that often stood in the way of their advance. The author provides a brief history of military bridging and then examines a number of these operations and puts them into the context of the larger plans and battles they supported.

The second article, by William Donnelly, looks at the writing of *South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu*, by Roy E. Appleman, and the controversy surrounding the book. Published by the Office of the Chief of Military History in 1961 in the Army's official Korean War series, it was, for many years, considered the definitive account of the first five months of that conflict. Only later, after a concerted effort by a number of veterans from that period—many from the 24th Infantry Regiment, the only African American regiment in Korea—would Appleman's work be reexamined. Donnelly has mined numerous primary sources, official Army documents, and Appleman's own papers to compile the story behind the writing of this book. In doing so, he exposed the many biases that existed at all levels of Army leadership at the time.

The Artifact Spotlight in this issue highlights one of only three surviving examples of the Mark VIII tank. A joint British and American venture to produce a heavy tank in great numbers near the end of World War I ran into numerous issues and delays, with the first prototype not being delivered until 11 November 1918. The Mark VIII pictured in this issue was produced in 1920 and is currently housed at the Armor and Cavalry Training Support Facility at Fort Moore, Georgia.

For something a little different in this issue, we take a visit to the Okinawa Prefectural Archives on the main island of Okinawa, Japan. Our senior editor Shannon Granville recently visited this archive during a yearlong stay in Japan on a fellowship program. While there, she was able to examine the wealth of U.S. Army records held by Okinawa Prefecture, with most dating from the years after World War II while the island was under U.S. military and civil governance.

Army History is still seeking submissions for content related to the American Revolution, as next year will start the 250th commemorations. Any questions or submissions should be sent to the journal's email address at usarmy.mcnair.cmh.mbx.army-history@army.mil. Those wishing to submit articles should review the instructions located in the Call for Submissions box located in most every issue of this journal and should adhere to our style guide: https://history.army.mil/about/docs/CMH_Style_Guide_2023.pdf.

Once again, I take this opportunity to thank our readers for their continued support and encouragement as we strive to provide you with quality issues.

BRYAN J. HOCKENSMITH
MANAGING EDITOR

AH SUMMER 2024 ARMY HISTORY

CONTENTS

Features

Articles

THE CHIEF'S CORNER

CHARLES R. BOWERY JR.

ARMY MUSEUMS:
Tradition, Innovation, and Education

In 2017, the secretary of the Army centralized the funding and management of the United States Army's museums. This included the National Army Museum and twenty-eight museum activities and support centers in three countries. Since then, the Army Museum Enterprise (AME) has been one of the world's largest and most diverse communities of historical collections and museum activities focused on military history. Three recent AME programs, ranging from traditional to cutting-edge, demonstrate how the U.S. Army remains at the forefront of the practice of material culture education.

At Fort Gregg-Adams, Virginia, the U.S. Army Women's Museum recently opened a new exhibition, "Courage to Deliver: The Women of the 6888th Central Postal Directory Battalion." This exhibition uses personal objects, never before seen, to tell some of the stories of the only segregated, all-woman Army unit

(*Continued on page 63*)

NEWS NOTES

New Exhibit at the History Colorado Center

This past Veterans Day, the exhibit *Winter Warriors: The 10th Mountain Division in World War II* opened at the History Colorado Center in Denver. Drawn from the substantial holdings of the 10th Mountain Division Resource Center, this exhibition tells the story of America's first mountain and ski division: from its origins during the Winter War in the early months of World War II, to arduous wartime training in the Colorado Rocky Mountains, and finally to its fateful deployment in the Italian Apennine Mountains. It features hundreds of photographs and artifacts in the largest gallery in the museum. This evocative story of service and sacrifice rests on profoundly personal objects and stories donated by veterans and their families since the end of World War II. More than 700 guests, including representatives from Fort Drum, New York, the 10th Mountain Division Foundation, and the 10th Mountain Division Descendants Organization, attended the opening reception. The exhibit will be open through October 2024. For further details and questions, contact the History Colorado Center at 303-447-8679.

New Publication from CMH

The Center of Military History (CMH) recently released its new publication *Unit History 101: Understanding Your Lineage and Honors*. It is a reference book that will introduce soldiers to the basics of unit lineage and honors, the ways unit history affects their everyday service, and the relevant Army regulations that govern key elements of unit history.

The historians of the Force Structure and Organizational History Division at CMH have the primary mission to research and prepare Lineage and Honors Certificates, Special Designation Certificates, and Unit Day Certificates; maintain the Rolls of the Army; research and select appropriate designations for all new units; and select historic units for activation in the Regular Army and Army Reserve. Maintaining this organizational history is a complex task. Yet through these historians' efforts, Army units have access to records of their past accomplishments, including campaigns in which particular units served and the U.S. and foreign awards received for distinguished service. *Unit History 101* provides a useful overview of these and other topics for soldiers in the Regular Army, Army National Guard, and U.S. Army Reserve. This book has been issued as CMH Pub 60–17–1.

RIVERS, RAILS, AND WOODEN BATEAUX

Civil War Pontoniering in the Eastern Theater



Pontoon bridges across James River at Richmond, Virginia, ca. April, 1865
Library of Congress

By Mark A. Smith

During the American Civil War, the small number of regular officers and enlisted soldiers in the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers fulfilled several important roles. They gathered tactical and operational intelligence through field reconnaissance and mapped the local countryside to enable movements through a hostile environment. They provided expertise and guidance in the construction of field fortifications and siege works and built semipermanent defenses for important places behind the lines. Engineers also often directed the fatigue details that made the abysmal Southern roads passable for large armies and their supply trains. In all these areas, volunteer officers and soldiers also provided significant support, with and without the assistance of regular engineers. However, the regular engineer officers provided critical leadership in the management of military bridging. The development, organization, and army-level oversight of portable bridging equipment fell almost entirely within their purview, though volunteer units often managed the bridge trains themselves in the field. These operations literally kept the United States' armies on the march toward victory.

The engineers employed a variety of equipment and approaches, but these operations also followed larger patterns. Historian Philip Shiman has illuminated some of these in the West, where Maj. Gen. William S. Rosecrans designed a new canvas pontoon boat that was easier to maneuver across the poorer roads in that theater. This so-called Cumberland pontoon, as later refined by engineer Capt. William E. Merrill, had a wooden frame that could be folded in half and transported on a standard Army wagon.[1] Pontoniering in Virginia, however, has been understudied, a curious oversight given the many rivers and their impact on operations. An examination of wartime military bridging in the East shows how Corps of Engineers officers crafted a system of portable bridging that was best suited to the region's geography and infrastructure and that enabled Lt. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant's 1864 Overland Campaign and subsequent American successes.

Spanning History

Military bridging, also called pontoniering for its reliance on specialized floating craft called pontoons or pontoon boats, was not new to Americans during the Civil War.

Largely because of the persistent efforts of Army Chief Engineer Col. Joseph G. Totten, Congress authorized a single company of engineer soldiers in the spring of 1846, just after it declared war on Mexico.[2] While the new unit organized and deployed, Totten's officers developed its first bridge train. It relied on boats made of three inflatable natural rubber cylinders, but these proved less than ideal over the long term. The rubber decayed over time in storage, and the boats were vulnerable to punctures in the field, though pontoniers could make minor repairs with small rubber patches. Worse, the floating cylinders could become unstable in the water; sometimes bridges made with them moved so much that they were unsafe for animals. Despite their problems, when the Civil War started in 1861, the Army's only portable bridging equipment consisted of a half-rotted rubber train first made for the war against Mexico.[3]



General Totten
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

James C. Duane, shown here as a colonel
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers

The engineers had carried out trials with other types of pontoons. In 1858, the commander of the antebellum Engineer Company, Lt. James C. Duane, tested a variety of portable bridging materials. These included corrugated iron pontoons; boats made of a canvas cover stretched over a wooden frame that were based on a Russian design; a type of wooden bateaux used by the French army; the Austrian-designed Birago trestles for use in water too shallow for pontoons; and a new rubber bridge train. In reviewing this equipment, Duane had to balance two main considerations: the boats had to have sufficient structural integrity and buoyancy to support the heaviest field guns and wagons while remaining light and portable enough to keep up with an army's movements. The wooden boats in Duane's trials were 31 feet long and weighed nearly 1,300 pounds, but with considerable effort sixteen pontoniers could carry them on their shoulders when required. Their sturdy design made them preferable where the water was rougher, or the bridges needed to last longer. The canvas pontoons in the trials weighed about half what the wooden ones did, so they were more portable, and the additional step of attaching the covers to the frames hardly slowed trained pontoniers. However, the covers degraded over time in the water. The iron boats weighed the most, making them the hardest to transport. Moreover, they were no stronger than the wooden pontoons because their corrugations ran from bow to stern and so did not provide any additional support for the decking, which rested on the boat's gunwales. After his tests, Duane recommended the wooden boat for a field army's main pontoon train (sometimes called the reserve train) and the more mobile canvas boats for advance-guard trains, with Birago trestles a part of both. He also considered transportation for the bridge train. The pontoon wagon the French

A wooden bateaux loaded on its transport wagon at the camp of the 50th New York Engineers near Rappahannock Station, Virginia, during the winter of 1863–1864.
Library of Congress

designed for their wooden bateaux had small wheels that would be likely to break down and more difficult to maneuver on American roads, which were rougher and narrower than those throughout Europe. To adapt to American conditions, Duane designed a wagon with larger wheels and a geared front axle that could turn in narrower spaces. Although certainly an improvement over the French wagon, the new design remained larger and less maneuverable than the army's standard quartermaster wagon, and its geared axle mechanisms were susceptible to breakdowns.[4]

Civil War Beginnings

Despite Duane's trials, the Engineer Department still relied on rubber boat trains at the start of the Civil War. In May 1861, Chief Engineer Totten ordered the New York Engineer Agency, which often supplied equipment and materials to the army's engineers, to obtain a new rubber pontoon train. In late July, Lt. Quincy A. Gillmore, who ran the agency, shipped the new equipment to Washington where a small detachment of the Engineer Company drilled with it. A few months later, Totten ordered another rubber train for future use, but as part of the reorganization of the Army of the Potomac that fall, Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan instructed the engineer captain Barton S. Alexander to prepare several new bridge trains for the army. With Duane's help, Alexander repeated some of the earlier trials with Birago trestles and wooden, canvas, iron, and even the rubber pontoons, after which the two engineers built McClellan's army five wooden trains and several canvas ones, both supplemented with the Austrian trestles.[5]

Captain Alexander
Library of Congress

Early the next year, a recently established but informal battalion of regular engineer soldiers built the country's first wooden pontoon bridge at Harpers Ferry, West Virginia, to clear rebel forces from the upper Potomac River and begin restoring the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. The battalion's Company A (the original Engineer Company) threw the bridge on 26 February, amid high winds and flood conditions, with the Potomac full of ice and driftwood. Conditions were so difficult that the pontoniers had to add a hawser when heavy winds almost pulled up the boat anchors. By day's end, Maj. Gen. Nathaniel P. Banks's division marched across an 840-foot bridge made from forty-one wooden bateaux, demonstrating the stability and sturdiness of the pontoons.[6]

The Peninsula Campaign

In the spring of 1862, the Army of the Potomac brought six portable bridge trains on the Peninsula Campaign. Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan intended to land the army at Fort Monroe at the tip of the Virginia Peninsula between the James and York Rivers and then move against the Confederate capital of Richmond by marching up the peninsula and crossing the Chickahominy River with his bridge trains if necessary. Each train contained thirty-four pontoon wagons designed to carry a boat and related equipment, like the balks that connected pontoons in a bridge as well as spring lines, oars, and anchors. Another twenty-two wagons

A canvas boat with its cover stretched over the frame and ready for deployment
Library of Congress



This drawing, by Gilbert Thompson of the U.S. Engineer Battalion, shows the first military bridge thrown using wooden bateaux in February 1862.
Library of Congress

bore the long wooden planks, known as chess, which served as bridge decking. Four carried abutment materials, and four more carried tools. Two traveling forges and eight of the Austrian trestles completed a train. The boats themselves were a mixture of the wooden bateaux and canvas types, with the more durable but heavier wooden pontoons predominating. Fully deployed, each train could span a river up to 700 feet wide, and multiple trains could be combined for longer crossings.[7]

Specially trained units of engineer soldiers managed the bridge trains, a duty responsible for a third of their popular designations as sappers, miners, and pontoniers. The Volunteer Engineer Brigade included two Empire State regiments, the 15th and the 50th Regiments, New York State Volunteer Engineer Corps. Daniel P. Woodbury, a major in the Regular Army Corps of Engineers who also held a volunteer brigadier general's commission, commanded this brigade. The officers and soldiers of the army's one antebellum company of engineer soldiers had helped train the New York engineer regiments during the winter of 1861–1862, even while raising and organizing two more companies of regulars. James. C. Duane, now promoted to captain, led the three regular units (increased to four following the Seven Days' Battles in late June and early July). For ease of management, Duane combined the regular companies into an ad hoc organization known as the Engineer Battalion, though it lacked both formal authorization as a battalion and the regular complement of a battalion's support personnel. Both Duane's battalion and Woodbury's brigade were attached directly to McClellan's headquarters once on the peninsula, and this organization persisted in the East for the next two years, with the engineer troops who served as pontoniers attached to Army of the Potomac headquarters.[8]

McClellan's operations in Virginia provided a preview of some of the pontoniering challenges and their potential solutions in the Eastern Theater. The first problem was organizational, and it may explain why the pontoniers spent two years attached to army headquarters. Before leaving the area around Washington D.C., McClellan originally assigned the Volunteer Engineer Brigade to Maj. Gen. Irvin McDowell's I Corps. When President Abraham Lincoln retained that corps to shield the capital, it threatened to deprive the Army of the Potomac of most of its engineer troops. Although McDowell's

One of the wooden boat trains of the 50th New York Engineers at their camp near Rappahannock Station, Virginia, shortly before the beginning of the Overland Campaign
Library of Congress

corps never joined McClellan on the peninsula, Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton returned the volunteer engineers to McClellan's command before operations reached the rebel defenses at Yorktown, 20 miles beyond Fort Monroe.

The brigade's movement to join McClellan's army illustrated one of the advantages of pontoniering in the East, with the theater's more developed rail system and its numerous navigable waterways. The volunteer engineers traveled by train from Bristol, Virginia, to Alexandria, where they boarded a steamboat that took them and their pontoons to Fort Monroe. This arrangement made a long, tedious march overland while encumbered by heavy pontoons on oversized wagons unnecessary.[9] Overland transport, however, could not be avoided entirely. The regular engineers had also moved from the capital to the peninsula by steamboat, but once both units reached Fort Monroe, they had to unload their bridge trains and advance toward Yorktown on what was a slow and difficult march "on account of the terrible condition of the roads."[10]

Just getting American forces arrayed before Yorktown required a significant amount of bridging because of McClellan's decision to employ siege-like operations to batter the town's Confederate defenses. Getting the heavy artillery in position across the many ravines and branches of Wormley Creek kept the engineers busy for much of the siege. Indeed, while Captain Duane's small command of regulars supervised the construction of most of the siege batteries and trenches, Woodbury's volunteers eventually took charge of most of the road and bridge work required to get the guns into position. Almost immediately, the formal organization of the army's six bridge trains disintegrated as boats and equipment were parceled out in small groups as needed. The engineers built three pontoon bridges, numerous crib bridges and at least one improvised floating crossing. This variety became essential in late April when McClellan set aside some seventy pontoon boats to support a planned amphibious landing. Brig. Gen. William B. Franklin's division was to land on the opposite shore of the York River to silence a rebel battery at Gloucester Point that was harassing the American siege works. Although the original plan became unnecessary when the Confederates abandoned Yorktown, Franklin used the boats to land his newly established and still provisional VI Corps at West Point, Virginia, about 30 miles upriver.[11]

Once Yorktown fell to American forces, the Chickahominy River became the Army of the Potomac's next major obstacle as it continued its advance on Richmond. This stream flowed southeast through a wide, swampy bottomland from a point north of the rebel capital until it turned south and emptied into the James River a few miles above Williamsburg. After the volunteer engineers repaired and reorganized the army's pontoon trains at White House Landing, they and the regular pontoniers undertook an enormous amount of bridge work along the Chickahominy, both before and after the Battle of Fair Oaks in late May and early June. When McClellan retreated to a new base at Harrison's Landing on the James during the Seven Days' Battles, though, his engineers dismantled all their crossings, abandoning or destroying many of the pontoon boats because they lacked



sufficient transportation to bring them off quickly overland in the presence of a pursuing enemy. Their loss highlights the difficulty of moving the pontoons rapidly by wagon.[12]

Underscoring the limits of overland transport, when newly appointed General in Chief Henry W. Halleck ordered McClellan to return to the Washington area and abandon the peninsula approach to Richmond, the American engineers and their boats left Virginia the same way they had arrived—by water. Although the engineer troops themselves were capable of building replacements for the pontoons lost during the retreat to the James and may have done so at Harrison's Landing, the Engineer Department in Washington also forwarded some replacements. All those boats had been stored at Fort Monroe while the army remained along the James. On August 10, the pontoniers left the camp at Harrison's Landing for the fort near the river's mouth. There, they lashed the boats together into rafts that steamships then towed back upriver to Barrett's Ferry where the Chickahominy empties into the James. There, the engineer troops threw a pontoon bridge more than a third of a mile long across the Chickahominy to expedite the army's evacuation. Once the bridge served its purpose, the steamboats towed away rafts of pontoons and carried the engineers back to the vicinity of Washington where they rejoined the army.[13]

The subsequent Maryland campaign that reached its climax with the Battle of Antietam involved little pontoniering and few engineer soldiers. By early September, the pontoniers were back at their old encampments in the capital city, having repaired and reorganized their boat trains while at Aquia Creek south of Washington. The Volunteer Engineer Brigade remained on duty in the capital until after Antietam, with its soldiers continuing to build and repair pontoons while simultaneously improving the city's defenses. The regular battalion joined McClellan's army and marched out of Washington on 7 September 1862. Their primary service before the campaign's major engagement was improving two fords across Antietam Creek in front of Maj. Gen. Edwin V. Sumner's II Corps the day before the battle. They played no role in the fighting, other than guarding the two improved crossings. Most of the campaign's bridge building came after the battle.

On 12 September, four companies of the 50th New York Engineers left Washington with a pontoon train to rejoin the army in the field, and eventually they were ordered to Harpers Ferry to reestablish river crossings that the rebels had destroyed after capturing the garrison. On the twentieth, they threw the first of five bridges in the area, this one over the Potomac at Harpers Ferry itself. The Engineer Battalion joined them the next day, and together they raised and repaired the wooden bateaux that had been scuttled earlier in the campaign. Another detachment of the 50th New York arrived by rail two days later with more boats brought up from Washington. Thereafter, the engineers added a second bridge over the Potomac and another nearby over the Shenandoah River. In late October, they threw two more bridges across the Potomac 15 miles downriver at Berlin (present-day Brunswick), Maryland. As the engineers commenced these final two crossings almost six weeks after the battle of Antietam, McClellan finally began returning his army to Virginia, but in part because of these delays, McClellan's command tenure was nearly over.[14]

The Fredericksburg Campaign

The Fredericksburg Campaign initiated by the army's new commander, Maj. Gen. Ambrose E. Burnside, brought the limits of eastern pontoniering into sharp relief. Shortly before his removal, McClellan had considered a movement that might take the army through Fredericksburg to bring General Robert E. Lee's *Army of Northern Virginia* to battle by threatening to cut it off from its base at Richmond. Although these plans were far from concrete, if implemented, McClellan would need the boat trains that were at Harpers Ferry and Berlin to cross the Rappahannock River just north of Fredericksburg. Consequently, on 6 November he had his chief engineer, Captain Duane, order General Woodbury of the Engineer Brigade to move the pontoons to Washington, closer to Fredericksburg. The request, however, was not urgent, so Duane sent it by regular mail rather than via telegraph. Woodbury did not receive it until 12 November, and Maj. Ira Spaulding of the 50th New York did not get the first thirty-six boats to the capital for two more days.[15]

Between the order directing the pontoons to Washington on 6 November and Spaulding's arrival on the fourteenth, the situation changed. On 8 November, Burnside replaced



General Burnside
Library of Congress



General Woodbury
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers

McClellan and definitively decided to move overland against the Confederate capital, which required him to cross the Rappahannock at Fredericksburg. He planned to reach Falmouth by the seventeenth, when he would need the bridging materials. After a 12 November meeting with Quartermaster General Brig. Gen. Montgomery C. Meigs, General Halleck, and General Herman Haupt of the U.S. Military Railroads, Burnside incorrectly assumed that all the pontoon equipment was already on the way to the capital and that Halleck would be able to forward it to Falmouth in time

for the planned crossing. Halleck did order Woodbury to send the pontoons to Aquia Creek, a tributary of the Potomac just a dozen miles from Falmouth. At this stage, though, with only one train on the road from Berlin to Washington, Woodbury informed Halleck that the best he could do was to get that one train to Falmouth by the sixteenth or seventeenth while also sending a second one directly to Falmouth by water. However, the engineer general was still not informed about the critical need for the boats. It was another two days before Burnside's chief engineer, Lt. Cyrus B. Comstock, finally told Woodbury of the urgency. The engineer general later claimed that when he finally knew how important the movement of the boats was to the upcoming operation, he asked Halleck to delay it for five days to give him time to move all the pontoons. When Halleck refused to interfere with field operations and postpone Burnside's schedule, Woodbury promised to dispatch the boats from Washington immediately, if the quartermaster provided the necessary horses. The local quartermaster, however, did not deliver the animals until the nineteenth, two days after the army's advanced elements reached Falmouth. Once Major Spaulding acquired the horses, he led the trains out of Washington, but Woodbury failed to tell Spaulding how urgently the army needed its bridging equipment.[16]

Burnside first learned about all the delays on the fourteenth when Comstock spoke to Woodbury, but at that stage the army commander remained optimistic about maintaining his original schedule and crossing the river on 17 November.



Lieutenant Comstock
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers



General Halleck
Library of Congress



The Army of the Potomac departed for the Rappahannock on the fifteenth, but because of his inability to procure horses to haul the pontoons, Spaulding did not leave Washington for another four days. By that time, heavy rains had turned the roads to mud, slowing progress to a mere 5 miles per day once he finally had the boats on the road. Two days out of Alexandria, Spaulding sent fifty-eight pontoons down the Potomac to Belle Plain just 10 miles from Fredericksburg while he continued with most of the equipment wagons and a few boats overland. Maj. James Magruder of the 15th New York moved another train via the Potomac from Washington to Belle Plain on the twenty-second. Again, no one had communicated the urgency of the movement, and the quartermaster at the landing delayed providing Magruder with the horses he needed to pull his train overland to Falmouth. Because of all the delays, the first boats did not arrive opposite Fredericksburg until 24 November, a week later than the original schedule, and it was another three days before the Army of the Potomac had all its bridging equipment on hand. The extra ten days allowed Lee to concentrate his army on the heights south Fredericksburg, a move that eventually undermined Burnside's operations.[17]

Almost everyone involved with the American movement shared some culpability. Managing all the army's supporting components was the new field commander's job, but Halleck could have aided Burnside's operations by just informing the engineers how urgently Burnside needed the pontoons. This was Burnside's responsibility as army commander, but the general in chief should have supported him during his transition to army command. Once he was finally aware of the urgency, General Woodbury compounded the problems by failing to inform his own subordinates about the importance of getting the bridge equipment to Falmouth. So when quartermaster officers, who were also unaware of the movement's urgency, did not immediately supply the draft animals needed to haul the boats, neither Spaulding nor Magruder demanded prompt action. Overall, poor communication compounded the delays caused by the logistical problem of moving the large and bulky boats over inadequate roads in bad weather.

Nevertheless, by 27 November, the bridge trains were at Falmouth where Burnside now confronted Lee's army positioned on the ridge south of Fredericksburg. In the changed situation, Burnside contemplated crossing downriver from the town beyond Lee's right, but poor roads and alert rebel pickets convinced him to retain his initial operational concept. The delays created by the miscommunications and the commander's indecision meant that by early December, throwing a bridge in front of Fredericksburg required the American engineers to make the first contested river crossing of the Civil War. In doing so, the pontoniers established a procedure used for the remainder of the conflict whenever the rebels opposed a crossing. Burnside planned to send the Left Grand Division of William B. Franklin, now a major general, to make the main attack against the rebel right just downriver from the town proper. Maj. Gen. Edwin V. Sumner's Right Grand Division probed the Confederate left, and Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker's Center Grand Division stood ready to assist either advance. To support these plans, the engineers laid six bridges: two upriver near the northwestern corner of Fredericksburg for Sumner's Grand Division, one "middle bridge" near the old railroad crossing at the town's southwestern corner for Hooker's troops, and three bridges at Deep Run 2 miles downriver for Franklin's soldiers.[18]

The Rappahannock was clogged with ice when the engineers began bridging operations in the wee hours of 11 December. At Deep Run, later called Franklin's Crossing, the pontoniers of the regular battalion and the 15th New York volunteers unloaded their boats near the 400-foot-wide river. Lt. Henry V. Slosson led a detachment of volunteers into the water to start the first bridge in this area about 0500. Covered by dark and fog, they met no opposition until they were placing the final balks. Just as the bridge was almost finished, two rebel regiments opened fire and wounded six pontoniers. Slightly downstream, the regulars started later and faced stiffer resistance. A steep embankment required Lt. Charles E. Cross's detachment to haul the heavy boats by hand for the last

Lieutenant Cross
Library of Congress

This postwar chromolithograph, produced by Thure de Thulstrup for L. Prang & Co., depicts the laying of the two upper bridges opposite Fredericksburg before the December 1862 battle. It also shows, out of sequence, the ferrying of infantrymen across the river to secure the far bank.
Boston Public Library

George Ford, shown here as a major in 1865. Three years previously, Ford helped to supervise the throwing of the upper bridges at Fredericksburg as a captain in the 50th New York Engineers.
Library of Congres

hundred yards. By the time they started the second crossing at Deep Run around 0700, southern troops had noticed the bridging operations. By 0900, Cross had ten boats in the water and had led a small group to the far shore to prepare the abutment, when enemy pickets opened fire. They captured two of Cross's pontoniers, wounded another, and briefly drove the rest off the unfinished bridge until fire from the engineers' supporting infantry overcame the rebel pickets. Two hours later, the regulars' bridge was open. Later that day, Chief Engineer Comstock ordered the pontoniers to open a third bridge at Deep Run, which Slosson's New Yorkers threw with no opposition. By that afternoon, some of Franklin's infantry had crossed the three spans and secured the bridgehead.[19]

Farther upriver immediately across from the town, resistance was much fiercer. The 50th New York began three bridges directly opposite Fredericksburg around 0300. Capt. James H. McDonald supervised the troops building the middle bridge, while Capts. George Ford and Wesley Brainerd directed the pontoniers throwing the two upper bridges. After three hours' work, the middle bridge and one of the two upper ones were between half and two-thirds finished and the second upper bridge was about a quarter complete. That was when William E. Barksdale's Mississippians opened fire, driving the engineers from their work, wounding Captain McDonald at the middle bridge and killing Capt. Augustus Perkins at one of the upper crossings. Repeatedly, the officers of the 50th New York led their pontoniers back to work, only to be driven off again. Even the heavy bombardment that Burnside ordered from U.S. Army artillery on Stafford Heights about noon failed to dislodge the enemy, even though it devastated the town's buildings.[20]

Around 1500, Burnside approved a suggestion from his artillery chief, Brig. Gen. Henry J. Hunt, that the pontoniers ferry infantrymen over the river in their boats to establish a beachhead before continuing the three bridges directly before



Fredericksburg. At the uppermost site, a detachment from the 50th New York led by Lt. James Robbins carried about 400 soldiers from one Michigan and two Massachusetts regiments over the Rappahannock in several trips. While Barksdale's rebels now tangled with the Americans on their side of the river, the pontoniers returned to their bridge work. Major Spaulding, then in command of the 50th New York, took charge of the two upper bridges. Half an hour after the infantry crossed, his troops completed the first upper bridge, and the second was not far behind. A similar chain of events played out at the middle bridge. There, Maj. James Magruder and his 15th New York pontoniers ferried a hundred soldiers from the 89th Regiment, New York State Volunteers, over the river. While the infantrymen cleared the rebels from the southern part of town, Magruder's troops were able to finish their span by dusk. In addition to three officer casualties, the Volunteer Engineer Brigade lost six enlisted men killed and forty-one wounded during the day's operations. The engineers, however, learned from Hunt's suggestion and disseminated his idea. For the rest of the war, when pontoniers in any theater anticipated a contested crossing, they first ferried infantrymen across in their boats to secure a beachhead. Unfortunately, at Fredericksburg their work earned few dividends. After Burnside's failed assault on the fortified enemy position above the town, he retreated across the Rappahannock and had his engineers dismantle their bridges.[21]

Six weeks later, the army's engineers facilitated another attempt to dislodge the rebel army at Fredericksburg. Burnside hoped to turn the rebel left by crossing a pontoon bridge at Banks Ford a few miles upriver. The plan began well enough. In mid-January, additional pontoon boats arrived from the Washington Engineer Depot, brought to Belle Plain via the Potomac. Over the next few days, the pontoniers of the Engineer Battalion transported them overland to the camps at Falmouth. On the twentieth, the turning movement commenced and almost immediately went awry. As Gilbert Thompson of the regular battalion remembered, "At first the ground was frozen and good progress was made, but at about dark it began to rain and the ground thawed and broke up. As the darkness increased, the boat train became separated, a wagon occasionally becoming mired, and delays occurring." The heavy rain itself became the enemy, making it virtually impossible to move the pontoon boats to the crossing site in an episode eventually dubbed the Mud March. The 15th New York fared little better than their regular comrades as the rain continued for two days. The pontoniers' heavy wooden boats stuck fast, even when the engineers removed them from their special wagons and tried to drag them through the mud early on the twenty-first. A few boats reached Banks Ford but not enough for a bridge, and at midday on 23 January, Burnside canceled the movement. The engineers spent five days returning the pontoon boats to camp over the abysmal roads. After this latest failure, Hooker replaced Burnside as commander of the Army of the Potomac because Burnside



Gilbert Thompson, shown here a month after he mustered out in late 1864 and before returning to Army of the Potomac headquarters as a civilian topographer.
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

General Benham
Library of Congress

This sketch by artist Alfred R. Waud depicts the Army of the Potomac on the move toward the Rappahannock crossings during General Burnside's infamous Mud March. Notice the pontoon boat being manhandled along in the center foreground.
Library of Congress

had been unable to produce a success twice because of the inability to get across the Rappahannock when needed.[22]

Learning As They Go

Hooker first reorganized his army, including his engineering arm. He added the regular battalion to the Volunteer Engineer Brigade, a change that only lasted for his own brief command tenure. He also replaced Woodbury in brigade command with Henry W. Benham, another regular engineer with a volunteer brigadier's commission. Benham had earned a reputation as a less than competent commander in 1862 when he launched an unwise and unsuccessful assault at the Battle of Secessionville below Charleston, South Carolina. He performed so poorly that the War Department revoked his volunteer commission that August and did not restore it until February 1863. Rumors about insobriety also plagued Benham, and his service in charge of Hooker's engineers only added to them. When the pontoniers threw the first bridge of the Chancellorsville Campaign in late April, one of the regular engineers recorded a few days afterward that "To his dishonor, General Benham was tumbling *drunk*." Even though he formally retained brigade command after this episode, his drinking may explain why Benham spent most of the war after Chancellorsville superintending the Washington Engineer Depot, while the senior volunteer engineer led the brigade in the field.[23]

Despite his poor choice for Engineer Brigade leadership, Hooker's campaign plans had great potential. He intended for the V, XI, and XII Corps, led by George G. Meade, Oliver O. Howard, and Henry W. Slocum, respectively, to turn Lee's left flank via Kelly's Ford on the Rappahannock, 25 miles northwest of Fredericksburg, while John F. Reynolds's and John Sedgwick's I and VI Corps feinted directly against the town itself. Hooker's opening movements succeeded in part because of his pontoniers. Over the last three days of April, they had laid eight pontoon bridges over the river. Five supported the feint at Fredericksburg: three at Franklin's Crossing and two about a mile and a half further downstream. The main flanking force marched over a pontoon crossing at Kelly's Ford, and two more spans at United States Ford, about halfway between Falmouth and Kelly's Ford. After Hooker lost the battle at Chancellorsville, the engineers threw six more spans for the American withdrawal: one at United States Ford, two at Banks' Ford, and three at Fredericksburg. Some of these bridging operations are instructive.

A detachment of volunteer engineers from the 15th New York threw a canvas pontoon bridge at Kelly's Ford for the main flanking force on 28 April. Two factors contributed to their rapid success. A nearby railroad ensured their timely arrival. The detachment traveled from the Engineer Depot in Washington to Bealeton Station, just 5 miles from the ford, on the Orange and Alexandria line, leaving only a short overland trip for the bulky pontoons. In addition, an infantry brigade from the XI Corps secured the bridgehead just before the pontoniers went to work. The infantrymen had been in place for a couple of weeks and previously had established a soldier's truce with rebel pickets across the Rappahannock. When the engineers ferried the soldiers over the river late on the twenty-eighth, it caught the rebels off guard, and they quickly withdrew. By 2230 that night, the bridge was open.[24]

South of town at Franklin's Crossing, the regular and volunteer pontoniers laid five spans, having also learned from their Fredericksburg experiences to secure the opposite shore in advance. The Engineer Battalion threw the bridge at Franklin's Crossing under Benham's alleged supervision. The general, as one pontonier put it, became "*mulfathomed* with drink" as the soldiers conducted the operation over the night of 28–29 April. The engineers first took soldiers across the river in their pontoon boats while under fire from rebel pickets who may have been alerted by Benham's drunken shouting. Nevertheless, after four trips the pontoniers had landed enough infantrymen to end enemy resistance. By 0800 that morning, they had a bridge in place for Sedgwick's feint against Fredericksburg. Later, after Hooker had snatched defeat from the jaws of victory, the battalion's soldiers relocated this bridge using the river itself as a conveyance. Although the volunteer detachment nearby removed their crossing from the Rappahannock entirely and hauled the pontoons overland to a new position, the regular pontoniers only partially dismantled their bridge at Franklin's Crossing. They broke it down into rafts that consisted of four pontoon boats each, rowed the rafts upstream, and reassembled them into a bridge near the southeastern corner of Fredericksburg.[25]

Despite the regular pontoniers' efforts at Franklin's Crossing and the town proper, the volunteer engineers' work at United States Ford saved Hooker's army after the defeat at Chancellorsville. Inside a fortified bridgehead laid out by the army's chief engineer, both New York engineer regiments struggled to prepare three crossings for the army's withdrawal. Just as they finished the approach roads, it started raining in sheets. Within hours, the river rose 6 feet, and the current accelerated enough to threaten the bridges. The uppermost span took most of the damage, so the pontoniers dismantled it and used its pontoons to strengthen the other two. By midnight, they had completed the two remaining bridges, allowing the army to return to the safety of its camp at Falmouth, but it did not remain for long.[26]



This pontoon bridge supported General Hooker's Chancellorsville Campaign as part of the feint mounted against Lee at Fredericksburg. During its construction, Brig. Gen. Henry W. Benham also demonstrated his insobriety.
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

When Lee marched north on the Gettysburg campaign, the American engineers continued their work to enable the Army of the Potomac's pursuit. They threw nine bridges over three different rivers in this campaign, but the rebels only contested the first. When Hooker first learned that Lee's army had begun moving in early June, he ordered Maj. Gen. John Sedgwick to conduct a reconnaissance toward the rebel forces still at Fredericksburg. To enable Sedgwick's advance, the regular engineer battalion and a detachment of volunteers from the 50th New York, working together on the same span for the first time, bridged Franklin's Crossing yet again on the afternoon of 5 June. Based on recent experience, they had planned to send troops over first to secure the bridgehead, but a small, fortified Confederate position on the opposite shore made the ferrying operation extremely hazardous. The rebels opened fire when the pontoniers moved their wagons to the riverbank that afternoon, inflicting several casualties before the engineers even reached the Rappahannock. The much beloved commander of the regular battalion's Company B, the recently promoted Capt. Charles E. Cross, fell among his soldiers, shot through the head just as he stepped into one of the first pontoons intended to cross the river. Once the engineers managed to get the infantrymen across, the soldiers secured the bridgehead, allowing the engineers to build the bridge. Sedgwick led part of his corps across, but found his path blocked by A. P. Hill's troops. Sedgwick returned a few days later, and the pontoniers dismantled the span.[27]

The construction of these bridges at the start of the Gettysburg Campaign exacted several casualties from the engineers, including Capt. Charles E. Cross, the commander of Company B, U.S. Engineer Battalion.
Library of Congress



The rest of the campaign's crossings were uncontested, but the means of transportation that the engineers employed for their boats is instructive. On 12 June, the regular engineers took their pontoons to Aquia Creek. There, the pontoniers boarded the *Sylvan Shore*, a steamship that took a raft of sixteen pontoon boats in tow before heading north to the mouth of the Occoquan River. There the pontoniers disembarked and rowed their boats further up the Occoquan to throw a bridge of fourteen boats. The next morning, after the army had crossed the small span, the regular engineers dismantled it and rowed the pontoons downriver to Colchester Ferry where a detachment from the 50th New York met them with more boats brought up by water from Aquia Creek. Together, the two groups spanned the Occoquan again with a bridge for the army's artillery and its cattle train. The volunteers left after helping to open the bridge, and after the trains had crossed, the battalion pontoniers dismantled the span late on 16 June, tied the boats into rafts, and took them to Edwards Ferry on the Potomac through the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal. At the ferry, they met another detachment of the 50th New York bringing up more boats on the Potomac from the Washington Engineer Depot. Using sixty-four pontoons as well as three crib trestles, the engineers built a bridge more than 1,300 feet long to get the army over the Potomac just below Frederick, Maryland. After the volunteers floated more boats up through the Chesapeake and Ohio, the regulars threw another, smaller span over the nearby Goose Creek to provide easier access to the main bridge, and a few days later the volunteers added another crossing over the Potomac to speed the army's march north. By 27 June, the entire Army of the Potomac was in Maryland, and the pontoniers dismantled all the Edwards Ferry crossings. The volunteer engineers took most of the boats back to the Washington Depot via the canal while the regulars rushed after the army with their own bridge train, though they did not participate in the climactic fight at Gettysburg or conduct any more bridging beforehand. Indeed, when the Engineer Battalion reached army headquarters at Taneytown, Maryland, on 1 July, its pontoon train returned to the Washington Engineer Depot by wagon.[28]

The engineers' ability to use the rivers and canals of northeastern Virginia may explain the eastern pontoniers' preference for the heavier wooden pontoons. With water or rail transport more easily available, the heavier, more durable boats that could remain in the water longer made a sensible choice. In Virginia, the engineers continued to use rivers and rail lines whenever possible. For instance, as the Army of the Potomac prepared to return to Virginia after Gettysburg, the regular pontoniers raised and repaired some scuttled boats at Harpers Ferry and carried them down the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal to Berlin, Maryland, where they met another boat train coming up the waterway. With the help of the volunteer engineers who brought these additional boats, they put three bridges over the Potomac to carry the army back to Virginia.[29]

Shortly thereafter, bridging operations resumed along the Rappahannock and



Rapidan Rivers. Lee withdrew south beyond the Rapidan after the Gettysburg campaign, and Meade followed to Culpeper. During Lee's thwarted Bristoe Station offensive, when he moved around the Federal right, Meade pulled back from Culpeper and marched north in October. The American engineers pulled up their bridges and followed the army, using the Orange and Alexandria Railroad to move their pontoons whenever possible. Once the II Corps of Meade's army defeated the rebels at Bristoe Station, the Army of the Potomac returned to its position north of the Rapidan. In the Mine Run Campaign of late November, when Meade tried unsuccessfully to turn Lee's left by crossing the Rapidan at Jacob's and Kelly's Fords, wagons were the pontoniers' only option for hauling their bulky equipment to the crossing points. After the year's final movement, some of the pontoon bridges over the Rappahannock behind the army's camp at Brandy Station remained in place all winter, an option made possible by the more durable wooden bateaux.[30]

A New System for the Overland Campaign

The Army had not neglected canvas boats in the Eastern Theater, but in the war's early years, the lighter-weight pontoons had drawbacks and had failed to perform well. In September 1863, Maj. Israel Woodruff at the Engineer Department sent William P. Trowbridge orders for the New York Engineer Agency to construct a canvas train for Maj. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant's western army, adding that the canvas pontoons Trowbridge's agency had earlier provided for the Army of the Potomac were defective. Cyrus B. Comstock, who had been promoted to captain and was now General Grant's chief engineer, had complained that the earlier pontoons' transoms, which were supposed to strengthen the wooden boat frames, tended to split when carrying heavy loads. Comstock's complaint led the Engineer Department in Washington to seek the opinions of field engineers about boat design. In December 1863 and again in January and March of the next year, Maj. John D. Kurtz at department headquarters asked engineers in the field for input on pontoon design. At the same time, James. C. Duane, now a major serving as the Army of the Potomac's chief engineer, designed a new canvas frame. His model was 5 feet shorter than the older one, making it more maneuverable in tight spaces, even without the geared wagons. Duane's design was still as wide as previous models, so it could support the same length of bridge with the same number of boats. He even achieved a buoyancy equal to the wooden bateaux, allowing his new canvas boats to bear heavy loads. Although Duane improved the canvas pontoons, Col. William H. Pettes of the 50th New York developed improved pontoon and chess wagons for all the trains, and both Duane and Pettes finished their new bridging equipment by the time Grant opened the Overland Campaign in early May.[31]

Major Duane also overhauled the Army of the Potomac's entire engineering organization for that campaign. Under his directions, the regular battalion focused on field fortifications, roadwork, and small temporary bridges, whereas the 50th New York, commanded in the field by Ira Spaulding who had risen in rank to lieutenant colonel, managed all the bridge trains, both wooden and canvas. Duane,



This diagram shows the standard canvas pontoon frame, which measured 25 feet by 5 feet, 4 inches wide.

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

This diagram shows the shorter canvas pontoon developed by James C. Duane just before the Overland Campaign. The new design was still 64 inches wide, but it was only 21 feet long, making it more maneuverable on narrows.

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Soldiers from the 50th New York Engineers construct a road on the south bank of North Anna River near Jericho Mills, Virginia.
Library of Congress

however, retained ultimate control of the trains to provide unified direction. He split the New York engineer regiment into four battalions. Duane detailed three of these, each with a wooden train, to specific corps. The first battalion under Maj. Wesley Brainerd served with the II Corps. Maj. Edmund O. Beers's second battalion joined the VI Corps, and Capt. James H. McDonald commanded the third battalion in support of the V Corps. The fourth battalion, led by Colonel Spaulding, carried a canvas train and served as the reserve. At Duane's direction, the reserve train with its lighter and more maneuverable boats moved in front of the army's leading column and built its initial crossings to keep the army moving. When the first of the more durable wooden trains arrived at any given stream, the heavier bridge replaced the less durable canvas boats, and the reserve battalion pulled up their span and rushed to the head of the column to be ready for the next crossing. Duane's new procedures, combined with the numerous rivers in Virginia, led to an astonishing number of bridges over the six weeks of the Overland

This is the crossing that Captain Van Brocklin threw over the North Anna River with his reserve battalion canvas train on 23 May 1864.
Library of Congress

campaign. From 29 April, when the Empire State pontoniers laid the campaign's first span, through 23 June, they built thirty-eight separate crossings, ranging from 40 to 400 feet in length.[32]

Duane tested his new pontoniering equipment and organization near the campaign's start. As Grant positioned his forces to commence operations, on 29 April, Lt. Mahlon B. Folwell supervised a detachment of the 50th New York's fourth battalion as it laid a bridge at Kelly's Ford using the new canvas pontoons to cross Brig. Gen. David M. Gregg's cavalry division over the river. After their success laying this early span with the new boats, the engineers tested Duane's new procedures as the campaign began in earnest when the Army of the Potomac crossed the Rapidan. Lieutenant Folwell's canvas train reached Ely's Ford with Gregg's cavalry at daylight on 4 May. This was one of three crossing sites for Grant's forces as they made their first attempt to outflank the *Army of Northern Virginia* that spring in a maneuver that culminated in the Battle of the Wilderness the next day. On the fourth, Folwell's pontoniers threw their canvas bridge while the troopers forded the river. As soon as the engineers finished, the II Corps appeared and began its crossing. Shortly thereafter, Major Brainerd's battalion, marching with the II Corps, arrived on site and laid its wooden bridge. By 0915, the wooden pontoon crossing opened, and the II Corps shifted to it, allowing Folwell's pontoniers to pull up their canvas boats and return to the front of the column. The II Corps never paused.

Similar operations were repeated throughout the campaign as Grant continued crossing the region's rivers in his attempts to maneuver the Army of the Potomac around Lee's right or bring it to battle on open terrain. Duane's procedures continued to work well as the army maneuvered, and he also employed a similar approach whenever the lighter-weight pontoons were needed for more mobile operations elsewhere, as was the case at Jericho Mills along the North Anna River in late May. On the twenty-third, Capt. Martin Van Brocklin's detachment of the reserve battalion built a canvas bridge there that allowed Maj. Gen. Gouverneur K. Warren's V Corps to establish a lodgment on the south side of the river during the first day of the Battle of North Anna. Three days later, after the inconclusive engagement ended and the turning movement resumed, Major Beers's volunteer battalion replaced this canvas bridge with a wooden one so Van Brocklin's more mobile train could support Maj. Gen. Philip H. Sheridan's cavalry corps as it moved against the Virginia Central Railroad to cut Richmond's western supply lines.[33]

This July 1864 sketch by Alfred R. Waud shows the 1st New York Engineers' pontoon bridge at Point of Rocks on the Appomattox. They later disassembled the bridge and sent the boats downriver to aid in the effort to get the Army of the Potomac across the James River.
Library of Congress

As the Overland Campaign devolved into a stalemate after the Battle of Cold Harbor, Grant adopted a course that both redefined the war in the Eastern Theater and relied on his pontoniers for its success. He abandoned his efforts to isolate and defeat Lee's army north of Richmond, operating from a direction that allowed his army to also shield Washington. Instead, Grant opted to throw his army over the James River and seize Petersburg. Located about 20 miles south of Richmond, this city contained several rail lines critical to Confederate logistics; if Grant severed these lines, it would isolate the rebel capital and make it vulnerable to capture, which could deprive Lee of his army's base. To move against Petersburg,

With boats in the water (*center right*) not attached to the main structure and soldiers clearly working atop the span, this photograph may show engineers constructing the pontoon crossing over the James River for Grant's move against Petersburg in June 1864.
Library of Congress



The completed bridge over the James in the late summer of 1864. This photograph also shows the heavy vessels used to stabilize it against the river's strong current and tidal changes.
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though, the American engineers had to lay the longest pontoon bridge of the entire war, despite difficulties marshalling their equipment. Grant intended for Meade's army to cross the James at Weyanoke Point. There the river narrowed to about 2,000 feet, which was still a considerable distance for a temporary floating bridge. Moreover, as the channel narrowed, the current accelerated, creating additional complications for the engineers who already had to deal with the river's regular 4-foot tidal change in depth. Creating more difficulties, the Army of the Potomac's entire pontoon train was required to get its troops over the Chickahominy and to Weyanoke Point on the James's north bank. Therefore, Grant needed the assistance of Maj. Gen. Benjamin F. Butler's Army of the James, but the required cooperation between the two armies was hampered by an unfortunate decision. On 6 June, Grant's aide-de-camp, the engineer Cyrus B. Comstock, had told Butler that the commanding general intended to cross the James soon. Just four days later, one of Butler's staff officers sent all of his army's pontoon equipment 35 miles downriver to Fort Monroe for storage.[34]

Fortunately, the ease of moving pontoons over the rivers themselves prevented this from becoming a fatal blunder. On 12 and 13 June, Grant ordered Butler to send all his available boats to Weyanoke Point for the James River bridge. The pontoniers of Butler's 1st Regiment, New York State Volunteer Engineer Corps, immediately dispatched some of their equipment, dismantling a bridge at Point of Rocks on the Appomattox River and towing them 25 miles down the Appomattox and James to Weyanoke Point. At Fort Monroe, Brig. Gen. Henry W. Benham of the Volunteer Engineer Brigade received Grant's orders and put two volunteer captains, Timothy Lubey of the 15th New York and James Robbins of the 50th, in charge of getting the pontoons stored at the fort back upriver. In an eerie similarity to the Fredericksburg crossings two years earlier, Benham failed to communicate the urgency of the operation to Lubey and Robbins. So when a detachment of the 1st New York Engineers finished the northern approach road for the James River bridge as the Army of the Potomac approached the crossing site on the morning of 14 June, the pontoons had not yet arrived. Butler's chief engineer, Godfrey Weitzel was on site supervising the work, and he sent a boat downriver to find the pontoons. The two volunteer captains, being unaware of the importance of their assignment, had decided to wait for the tide to come in to ease their trip up the James. Informed of the urgency, they immediately set out and arrived at Weyanoke Point by noon. When Major Duane subsequently arrived with two companies of the Army of the Potomac's regular engineer battalion, he took charge of the operation.[35]

Work on the bridge accelerated after Duane and his pontoniers appeared. Even after receiving the pontoons, the 1st New York had not accomplished much, but around 1600, Capt. George H. Mendell's regulars built a trestle out to deeper water, then crossed to the southern shore, and began laying pontoons on the far side. Three companies of the 15th and 50th New York arrived about the same time and started placing boats from the new northern abutment. Benham himself arrived from Fort Monroe and assumed command of the operation around 1700, and by 2300 only 100 feet in the middle of the river remained unbridged. Around midnight the engineers filled this final gap with a removable draw to allow river traffic to pass. To stabilize the bridge in the face of the tides and rapid current, the pontoniers anchored it with heavy boats both up- and downriver. Ultimately, the engineers used 101 pontoons to build a

This illustration by artist Edwin Forbes shows components of the army as they crossed the James on the engineers' pontoon bridge on their way to Petersburg.
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

1,980-foot bridge over the James that also included about 200 feet of trestlework. It was, and still is, the longest pontoon bridge ever thrown by the American Army. The sturdy wooden bateaux allowed the engineers to build a crossing used by one infantry corps, a division of another corps, and the Army of the Potomac's entire supply train, including 5,000 wagons and 3,000 head of cattle. On 18 June, with the army safely south of the James, the engineers dismantled the bridge. Without the crucial logistical support it enabled, however, the Army of the Potomac would have been incapable of threatening Petersburg and, after nearly a year of siege-like operations, cutting this vital rebel supply line. Strikingly, the delays imposed on the James River bridging operation by poor judgment and miscommunications were quickly rectified by the engineers, and had minimal operational impact because at the James the engineers enjoyed the benefit of water transport to the crossing point.[36]

Conclusion

The engineers continued their pontoniering efforts in the East until the final surrender of Lee's army, but by the time they dismantled the James River bridge, the final pontoniering patterns were set. The war's first contested crossing at Fredericksburg had taught them to secure the opposite shore before attempting to deploy a bridge, a lesson almost uniformly applied in every theater for the rest of the war. They had also learned how to best organize their trains for operations in the East, with heavier but sturdier wooden pontoons for bridges of greater length and duration, while using the lighter and more maneuverable canvas boats in the advance to maintain forward movement and prevent delays. The many rivers and railroads in the Eastern Theater allowed the engineers to continue their primary reliance on the heavier wooden

A pontoon bridge under construction at Belle Plain Landing, Virgina
Library of Congress

craft by providing reliable alternatives to overland transport much of the time. Of course, they continued to use wagons when lacking other options, but Fredericksburg and the subsequent Mud March had made clear that even the relatively better roads in the East were not sufficient for the heavy wooden boats under extreme weather conditions. A similar process of experience and pontoon experimentation in the Western Theater led to an almost universal preference for lighter-weight and more mobile options because of the sparser infrastructure, but in the East the prevalence of rivers and rails allowed the wooden bateaux to bear the heaviest burdens of military bridging.[37]

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ARCHIVES FEATURE

U.S. ARMY HISTORY IN THE OKINAWA PREFECTURAL ARCHIVES



By Shannon Granville

All images are by the author.

The U.S. Army has a relatively small physical presence in Japan today, but it has an extensive historical record spanning more than half a century of transition from wartime enmity to peacetime alliance and cooperation. The relevant documentary evidence for the Army's activities in the Pacific are available through various U.S. repositories such as the National Archives and the Army Heritage and Education Center. However, researchers interested in the history of the Army in the Pacific have another resource for a number of unique historical materials: the Okinawa Prefectural Archives.

The U.S. Army in Okinawa

The closing months of World War II in the Pacific Theater saw brutal fighting in the islands nearest to Japan, primarily in the Ryukyu Islands southwest of the Japanese mainland. Operation Iceberg, the invasion of the main Ryukyu island of Okinawa, involved nearly three months of fierce, bloody combat against deeply entrenched Japanese defenses. Contemporary estimates state that almost 250,000 people, including close to 100,000 Okinawan civilians, lost their lives during the invasion.[1] Following the Japanese surrender in September 1945, the Army remained on Okinawa in several different capacities. During the postwar occupation period, the U.S. Military Government of the Ryukyu Islands administered Okinawa from 1945 until 1950. Yet even after the Treaty of San Francisco restored sovereignty to Japan in April 1952, the Ryukyu Islands remained under de facto U.S. military control and administration for two decades through the U.S. Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands (USCAR).

In the ensuing years, Okinawa was a key strategic location for the U.S. Army. It provided a vital logistical and staging platform for U.S. engagement in the conflicts in Korea and Vietnam, as well as an overall base of operations for Army forces in the Pacific, first through Ryukyus Command and then U.S. Army, Ryukyu Islands. A succession of Army general officers served as the most

senior governing officials in the Ryukyus for both military and civilian authorities. The Okinawan people had a parallel governing body known as the Government of the Ryukyu Islands (GRI), but USCAR effectively had veto over all government decisions in Okinawa. Even after Okinawa reverted to Japan in 1972, the legacy of the Army's presence in the islands has continued to shape the U.S.-Japan relationship, as well as the political and cultural dynamics between Okinawa and the rest of Japan.

U.S. Army Records in the Okinawa Prefectural Archives

The Okinawa Prefectural Archives is a critical source for materials on the history of Okinawa and the Ryukyu Islands as a whole. In the final months of World War II, intensive shelling and the wholesale devastation of the war destroyed many of Okinawa's prewar records. For this reason, the archives staff has a strong sense of the importance of conservation and preservation in safeguarding local history and Ryukyuan cultural identity. Okinawans often visit the prefectural archives to research local and family

Located in the town of Haebaru, the Okinawa Prefectural Archives incorporates traditional Ryukyuan architectural features in a concrete-based structure designed to withstand the island's frequent typhoons, as well as other natural disasters.

The main researcher entrance. The exhibit hall is located on the first floor, and the main reading room is on the second floor.

Open shelves in the main reading room allow researchers to access information on the archives' microfilm holdings and personal document collections.



Several relevant volumes of CMH's United States Army in World War II series, as seen on the archives' open shelves.

history, particularly as the perspectives of those with firsthand knowledge of the war years have faded from living memory.

A glance through the Okinawa archives' searchable online database reveals the depth of the Army-related collections. Wartime and postwar documents can be viewed on microfilm copies of U.S. records also available through the National Archives at College Park, Maryland, including Record Groups 331 (Records of Allied Operational and Occupation Headquarters, World War II) and 260.12 (Records of the U.S. Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands (USCAR), 1945–1972). Digitized photographic and film records from the military government and USCAR periods provide a wealth of insight into day-to-day life in Okinawa, particularly regarding civil-military relations. Okinawan government records, from the GRI to the postreversion prefectural assembly and local government bodies, also offer glimpses into the islands' relationships with both Washington and Tokyo.

Beyond official government materials, the archives hold several personal papers collections from individuals with strong ties to Okinawa's history. One of the major personal holdings is the papers of George H. Kerr (1911–1992), a U.S. diplomat and academic who received a commission from USCAR to write a scholarly history of the Ryukyu Islands. Other notable collections related to U.S. Army history include those of Edward O. Freimuth (1919–2001), a key USCAR staff member whose papers contain useful materials on postwar Okinawan history and culture; and Raymond Yoshihiro



Document volumes available for reference in the archives' open stacks include the records of the U.S. occupation government and related diplomatic materials. The collected papers of James T. Watkins IV, seen in blue at the far right, are a notable archival source for information on the U.S. Navy's civil affairs program in occupied Okinawa in 1945–1946.



Available Army-related materials seen here include U.S. Army and USCAR photograph reference files.

Among the documents on display in the archives' main exhibit hall is a bilingual safety procedures manual used in Operation RED HAT, the removal of U.S. chemical weapons from Okinawa in 1971.

56 レッド・ハット作戦特別安全対策要綱

琉球政府毒ガス撤去対策本部

アメリカ陸軍が作成した毒ガス移送の手順書。1969年（昭和44）7月、知花弾薬庫区域で発生した神経ガス漏洩事故をアメリカの雑誌がスクープしたことにより、沖縄の米軍基地に大量の毒ガス兵器が保管されている事実が明らかになりました。それから毒ガス兵器の撤去が終了する1971年（昭和46）9月までの間、生命を守り平和を求める住民のたたかいが続けられました。

The text of the information placard, introducing the exhibit as "A procedure manual prepared by the U.S. Army on the transportation of poison gas."

Aka (1915–2006), a Japanese American soldier from Hawai'i who was a member of the Military Intelligence Service during World War II and a Department of the Army civilian in the postwar period.

Even though the U.S. Army is no longer a driving force in Okinawa's political and cultural life, the people of Okinawa have dedicated significant public resources to preserving its historical records. The Okinawa Prefectural Archives has much to offer to those who are looking for a broader understanding of the Army's experiences in the Pacific.

Access Information

The Okinawa Prefectural Archives is in the town of Haebaru on the main island of Okinawa, southeast of the prefectural capital of Naha. From central Naha, it can be reached by car in about 25 minutes, or by local bus and a short walk in about 45 minutes. The main reading room and exhibit hall are open Tuesday through Sunday from 0900 to 1700 and closed on Mondays and on Japanese public holidays. Researchers interested in requesting materials should contact the archives in advance of their visit through the main website at https://www.archives.pref.okinawa.jp. English-speaking staff are available for assistance, but researchers will benefit from having some knowledge of Japanese to aid in their review of materials.

Shannon Granville is the senior editor in the Multimedia and Publications Division at the U.S. Army Center of Military History. As a member of the twenty-sixth class of Mansfield Fellows (2022–2023), she spent a year working with Japanese government counterparts to study the use and teaching of military history in Japan. She thanks the Okinawa Prefectural Archives for their work to preserve the history of the U.S. Army in Okinawa.

Note

1. "The Cornerstone of Peace: Number of Names Inscribed (as of June 23, 2023)," Okinawa Prefectural Peace Memorial Museum, 28 Feb 2024, https://www.pref.okinawa.jp/heiwakichi/jinken/1008269/1008287/1008296/1008299.html.

Tall glass windows in the main reading room offer a view over the hills of Haebaru.

THE MARK VIII TANK

THE FIRST JOINT ARMOR PROGRAM

By Robert L. Cogan

In April 1917, the United States entered World War I on the side of the Allies. Only seven months earlier, the British had introduced the tank to warfare during the Battle of the Somme. When the commanding general of the American Expeditionary Forces, General John J. Pershing, arrived in France that June, one of his first directives was to form several committees researching the British and French use of tanks and their production.

The Army dispatched two mechanical engineers from the Ordnance Corps, Majs. James A. Drain and Herbert W. Alden, to France to study Allied tank design and the potential for the manufacture of American tanks. Drain and Alden concluded that the British heavy tanks and French Renault FT light tank were the most capable vehicles of the time, and that American production could be established quickly by licensing American firms to build these already established designs. In mid-November 1917, Drain was assigned to the newly created Inter-Allied Tank Committee to coordinate tank design and production efforts between the Allies. Major Drain worked closely with his British counterparts on a new heavy tank design that could be fielded in time for the planned Grand Offensive of 1919. This was the first time two nations cooperated in a shared design for an armored fighting vehicle.

To produce large numbers of the new tank, construction would be divided between two nations based on their strengths in manufacturing. Great Britain would produce the armor plate and provide cannons from its robust naval industry. The United States, already home to several continuous track firms, would provide the track and power train systems. The Ordnance Corps selected The Liberty L–12 aircraft engine, already mass-produced in the States, for propulsion. The manufacturers would ship the components from the United States and Britain to a centralized assembly plant in France. The Allies made plans to build 1,500 of the new heavy tanks, designated the Mark VIII, by the end of 1918.

Developmental issues, bureaucracy, and competition for vital resources, like engines, delayed the Mark VIII program. The first operational prototype finally was ready on 11 November 1918, as the guns fell silent on the Western Front. With the fighting over,



2

U.S. Army Armor & Cavalry Training Support Facility



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R. P. Hunnicutt Reference Collection, U.S. Army Armor & Cavalry Training Support Facility

1. Original 1920 manufacturing plate from Rock Island Arsenal

2. The Mark VIII was 34 feet long to cross the widest of German trenches on the Western Front.

3. Demonstration at Camp Meade, ca. 1920, showing the size difference between the heavy Mark VIII and the light M1917 used by the Tank Corps after World War I.

4. The wide tracks made the Mark VIII difficult to turn and often resulted in breakages.

4

U.S. Army Armor & Cavalry Training Support Facility



U.S. Army Armor & Cavalry Training Support Facility

R. P. Hunnicutt Reference Collection, U.S. Army Armor & Cavalry Training Support Facility

U.S. Army Armor & Cavalry Training Support Facility

5. Brig. Gen. Samuel D. Rockenbach, chief of the Tank Corps, watches maneuvers at Camp Meade, ca. 1920. Two M1917 6-ton special tractors follow the Mark VIII heavy tank.

6. The American Mark VIII had a secondary armament of five M1919 .30-caliber machine guns, shrouded in armored sleeves.

7. The interior of the Mark VIII, showing driver's position (*center*), 6-pounder gun mounts, and ammunition storage.

8. The front hull of the Mark VIII featured a triangular splash guard to redirect incoming fire from the driver's visor.

9. The triangular plate on the back of the Mark VIII allowed the rear machine gun to ricochet fire into trenches that the tank crossed over.



U.S. Army Armor & Cavalry Training Support Facility



U.S. Army Armor & Cavalry Training Support Facility

the Allies canceled the joint production program. Great Britain would build twenty-five Mark VIIIs using all-British components and engines. They quickly scrapped most of them.

In the United States, the Army completed one hundred Mark VIII tanks using British-made parts at Rock Island Arsenal, Illinois, in 1919 and 1920. The American-built Mark VIIIs, often called "Liberty Tanks" after their engine, weighed 38 tons with a maximum armor thickness of .63 inches. The L–12 engine provided 300 horsepower, giving the Mark VIII a top speed of 6.25 miles per hour. Two British-produced QF 6-pounder guns and five 1917 Browning .30 caliber machine guns provided firepower. Ten crewmembers operated the tank: a commander, driver, mechanic, two gunners, two loaders, and three machine gunners.

Starting in 1919, the Army assigned the Mark VIIIs to the returning Tank Corps units at then Camp Meade, Maryland, where future Generals Dwight D. Eisenhower and George S. Patton Jr. commanded them. When the Army disestablished the Tank Corps in 1921 and placed tanks under the Infantry Branch, it sent several to Fort Benning, Georgia (present-day Fort Moore). There the service housed them on the ground that later became Eubanks Field, currently the home of the U.S. Army Airborne School. The Mark VIIIs continued to serve through the 1920s at both Fort Meade and Fort Benning before finally being retired in 1932.

The Mark VIII shown here was built at Rock Island Arsenal in 1920 and served under Maj. Dwight D. Eisenhower. The now-closed Fort Meade Museum displayed it for many years. In 2022, it was transferred from Fort Meade to the Armor & Cavalry Training Support Facility at Fort Moore, Georgia. Only two other Mark VIII tanks exist in the world: another American example displayed at Rock Island Arsenal, and a single British-produced example at The Tank Museum in Bovington, England.

Robert L. Cogan is a retired armor officer and the curator at the U.S. Army Armor & Cavalry Training Support Facility at Fort Moore, Georgia.

U.S. Army Armor & Cavalry Training Support Facility

"It Was Mighty Little for Anyone to Do"

ROY E. APPLEMAN AND *SOUTH TO THE NAKTONG NORTH TO THE YALU*



Major Appleman, shown here in Korea, ca. 1951
U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center

By William M. Donnelly

Introduction

In 1961, the Office of the Chief of Military History (OCMH) published Roy E. Appleman's *South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu*, the first volume in its United States Army in the Korean War series, covering combat operations from June to November 1950. Twenty-four years later, Appleman wrote a friend:

> I have received many letters from students of the war that have told me that South to the Naktong is the only reliable book on the subject thus far in print. Because of the nature of the material available and the manner in which the vol. was written, I myself, believe that it will never be superseded.[1]

Appleman's reasons for this certainty, even though it contradicted OCMH's position that its publications were not "the final and definitive version of events," lay in a combination of personality and circumstances that produced a most unusual volume of official history.[2]

Roy E. Appleman

Born on 10 April 1904, Roy E. Appleman lived in Columbus, Ohio, until he was 10, and later on a farm in southeastern Ohio. After high school, he did not have enough money for college; instead, he went to a normal school and qualified as a teacher. After a year teaching in a one-room school, he entered Ohio State University. After graduating in 1928, he wanted to attend Yale Law School, but could not afford the fees. He taught at high schools for four years to earn the necessary money. During his first semester at Yale, Appleman became disillusioned, concluding "that it was an intellectual game of chess in which the pursuit of justice was a subordinate part." He left after a year for the history PhD program at Columbia University.[3]

By 1935, Appleman had begun his dissertation. At this time, Columbia required publication of a dissertation before it would grant the doctorate. To pay for that, Appleman took a job with the National Park Service as a site survey historian based in New York City. The next year, he transferred to the service's Region I headquarters in Richmond, Virginia. There he completed his dissertation and one article, but he never published the dissertation and so Columbia never awarded him a doctoral degree.[4]

In October 1942, Appleman was drafted. Commissioned into the infantry from officer candidate school, in 1944 he joined the 1st Information and Historical Service in Hawai'i. There he wrote his first military history, a study of Army tank battalions in the Saipan campaign. During the battle for Okinawa, he transferred to the XXIV Corps to serve as its historian. After Japan surrendered, XXIV Corps deployed to southern Korea, where Appleman remained until late 1945, working on a history of the corps in the Okinawa campaign. He then moved to Hawai'i, where he completed the history by March 1946. Now eligible for release,

he instead volunteered to remain on active duty as part of the team completing the Army's history of the Okinawa campaign. They finished their draft in June 1946 and Appleman left active duty as a major, returning to his position with the National Park Service.[5]

Appleman's experiences during the war created a strong identity as a "combat historian," which he defined as a historian who "was assigned to and lived with combat forces." A combat historian, he believed, must study closely the relevant terrain to understand its effects on a unit's actions; on Okinawa, he went to the front "to see enough of it to get the feel." Enemy fire once killed the man next to him. Soldiers who had fought in an engagement were the best sources because "it's impossible to write accurate combat history from the records because the records never have the story." Appleman "always felt so sorry for the infantrymen. . . . It was a hell of a life, I'll tell you, not even counting the fighting. You can't get close to these infantrymen without having the greatest of sympathy for them and also admiration."[6]

As a writer, Appleman did not strive for a "style." Rather, he sought "to be clear so that the reader may be said to be looking through a clear glass—free of frostings, bubbles, and grit."[7] For historians, "it is not a good idea to make judgments right and left." Instead, "nearly always one can let the facts reflect and bring out an obvious judgment from the reader." Nevertheless, "on occasion I do have some passions about a situation and do not hesitate to make a clear judgment that reflects my personal feeling."[8] This approach to his writing reflected how Appleman lived his life; in the National Park Service he was known for his "outspoken honesty."[9]

Starting the Book

In December 1950 Maj. Gen. Orlando Ward, the Chief of Military History, recommended the Army prepare a five-volume series titled *The U S. Army in the Korean Conflict*. After receiving approval for the project from General J. Lawton Collins, chief of staff of the Army, in February 1951, Ward decided that to continue work on the *United States Army in World War II* series, OCMH would use mobilized reserve officers, many with experience in the Army's World War II history program, to prepare the Korean War series. In early 1951, the office requested Major Appleman's recall to active duty to research and write the combat operations volume.[10]

Appleman's active duty began on 30 April 1951, but he did not start on the book. Instead, he assisted in preparing the secretary of defense's report for the president on the conduct of the Korean War.[11] For the next six weeks, Appleman worked twelve-hour days, producing a draft of about 35,000 words that covered the war up to the Inch'on landing in September 1950. Although frustrating, the delay did familiarize him with the course of the war's first months and he developed a relationship with General Ward, one that deepened after Appleman returned from Korea. He especially appreciated the charge Ward gave him in October 1951 to "pull no punches but to write the truth as supported by the facts."[12]

In June 1951, Appleman received his project directive. Supporting instruction at the Command and General Staff College was the book's primary purpose, but it also should "have subject matter of interest to the Army as a whole." Because the war had not ended, OCMH could not set an end date

General Ward
U.S. Army

Arthur S. Champeny, shown here as a colonel
National Archives

for the time span he was to cover, but he was told to plan for a book of no more than 350 pages. Appleman would travel to Korea as soon as possible to collect records, examine where possible the terrain of combat actions, and interview soldiers. Once he returned to Washington, Appleman would prepare an outline "at the earliest practicable date." The Chief of Military History added a postscript to the memo: "Don't get lost in an isolated fight. Beg, borrow, and steal from others. Get others to work for you. Don't start the critical battle of the war just so you can be there."[13]

Appleman traveled by train to Washington state and from there flew to Japan. During his trip across the continent, he met soldiers returning from Korea. Among those he spoke with were a young enlisted soldier who had survived Task Force MacLean/Faith's destruction at the Changjin (Chosin) Reservoir and a sergeant who had been with 2d Infantry Division at the Kunu-ri gauntlet. A master sergeant from the 24th Infantry Division told him that on the Pusan Perimeter, North Korean troops murdered any prisoners they took from the division because they blamed it for denying them a quick victory.[14] Appleman arrived in Japan on 11 July, where he remained for seven days, interviewing officers as he waited for a flight to Korea.[15]

Appleman spent his first days in Korea with Eighth Army in Taegu and Pusan, interviewing officers about both the current situation and their earlier experiences in the war. One of these was Brig. Gen. Arthur S. Champeny, who in 1950 had commanded the 24th Infantry Regiment, the only Black regiment in Korea. Its performance under Champeny became a matter of controversy both in Eighth Army and back home, with stories of poor performance and cowardice in the regiment. Appleman described their conversation as a "very fruitful interview."[16]

On 23 July, he arrived at Eighth Army's advance command post in Seoul. Once forward, he met with military history detachments, interviewed soldiers, reviewed records, and walked the terrain of several battles. On 1 August, he spoke with three 21st Infantry Regiment soldiers who had been with Task Force Smith in July 1950. Driving back to Taegu on 16 September, Appleman stopped at the Task Force Smith battlefield. There he found several fighting positions which contained the bones of American soldiers, a discovery that left him "quite indignant." Two days later, he spent four hours flying over battle sites from August and September 1950. Two days after that, he left Korea for Japan.[17]

Back in Japan, he interviewed officers, arranged for aerial photographs of terrain in Korea, had a long lunch with a war correspondent who had accompanied American troops the previous year, and spent several days as a tourist. On 11 October, he left Japan. After another train trip across the United States and leave in Richmond, Appleman returned to OCMH on 22 October.[18]

Writing the First Draft

While in Korea, Appleman had received a letter from General Ward, who wrote "the more I see of our current endeavor, the more important I think it is to write contemporary history and publish it before it becomes ancient."[19] The day after his return to OCMH, Appleman estimated it would take two years to produce a first draft.[20] As he wrote, he continued researching, and in accordance with the lessons he had drawn from Okinawa, he initiated a wide-ranging correspondence with soldiers who had served in Korea during the war's first six months.[21] Appleman also interviewed Korean veterans now stationed in the Washington area, and several times he traveled further afield for interviews.[22]

After nearly a year of work and with the first nine chapters drafted, Appleman in September 1952 recommended splitting the combat history into two books. When it seemed an armistice might be signed in November 1951, he had submitted a revised outline ending with the battle for Heartbreak Ridge in October 1951. Ten months later, there was no armistice and Appleman argued that compressing the 1950–1951 period into one book would require "treating the various actions in such a generalized manner that the history would have little value." He thought the best break point was late September 1950, with South Korea liberated and Eighth Army ready to cross the 38th Parallel. Appleman volunteered to extend his active duty and complete the first draft of both books. Lt. Col. Joseph Rockis, the chief of OCMH's Current Branch, concurred, but he thought 24 November 1950, the day before Eighth Army launched its attack toward the Yalu River, made a better break point. On 20 October 1952, Ward approved the proposal to divide the combat history and accepted Rockis's suggestion on the end date for the first book.[23] By June 1953, Appleman—now promoted to lieutenant colonel—had drafted sixteen of the twenty-three chapters for the first book, covering the start of the war to just before the Inch'on landing. The manuscript totaled 1,503 triple-spaced typewritten legal-sized pages.[24]

At this point, Appleman's writing had its first review. Stetson Conn, the Deputy Chief Historian, identified strengths and weaknesses that would appear in later revisions and in the published version. The research gave the work a "general ring of authenticity." The narrative was "readable and generally clear." Appleman's sympathy for infantrymen had left little room for the other arms and services. The viewpoint rarely lifted above that of infantry regimental commanders, which sometimes left unclear the course of actions and movements.[25]

Conn detected "a high correlation" in the detail accorded to units based on the number of interviews and correspondence with officers in a unit. He acknowledged that in cases where insufficient written records survived, such as the 24th Infantry Division's operations in July 1950, Appleman had to rely mostly on participants' accounts. Conn, though, saw two problems with this method. One was that "rather frequently the author relies on a single uncorroborated source." The other was that Appleman "tends to deal more tolerantly with the conduct of officers whom he has interviewed than with many others."[26]

Stetson Conn
National Archives

Regarding the 24th Infantry Regiment, Conn warned that Appleman "may be open to some charge of prejudice on this subject." Appleman used "colored" instead of the Army's then standard term "Negro," and when discussing the unit's poor performance, he used comments from White officers on the supposed characteristics of Black soldiers that made them inferior soldiers. Conn noted these comments "are duplicated in most instances by WWII commanders," but at the same time the forthcoming OCMH book on Black soldiers in that war "shows that there are many other qualifying factors that are needed for an understanding of the problem of employing Negro troops in combat."[27]

The "really serious difficulty" was length. Conn predicted a completed manuscript of 1,800 double-spaced letter-sized pages which, after the addition of maps and photographs, would be "a bulging volume that few will read." Conversely, he did not see any way to reduce it to a manageable size "without radically changing its viewpoint and level of treatment—which I do not think he should do." To get a final draft ready before the author's release from active duty, Conn recommended that the first book's endpoint be changed to the liberation of South Korea. He estimated Appleman could complete the remaining chapters to that point by 1 November, which would allow sufficient time for a revision reduced by 15 percent, leaving a manuscript of about 1,200 pages.[28]

Like other World War II veterans recalled for the Korean War, Appleman wanted to remain on active duty in the career category reservist program, but his wife, Irene Appleman, reminded him they had three children just coming into school age. Furthermore, if he remained on active duty, he would be transferred from OCMH and quite possibly to an overseas posting. Appleman reluctantly agreed with her and extended his active duty only to 31 July 1954, with the expectation that by 31 January 1954 he would complete the remaining chapters in the first volume, giving him six months to revise the manuscript.[29] OCMH did not accept Conn's suggested change in the book's endpoint and assigned the second volume to another historian.[30]

Appleman missed his completion date by three and a half months, in part because he continued interviewing and corresponding with officers who had served in Korea.[31] On 14 May 1954, he noted in his journal that at 1530 he completed the draft for what was now titled *From the Naktong to the Yalu*.[32] The manuscript had 2,550 triple-spaced letter-sized pages—equal to about 730 printed pages before adding photos and maps.[33] Appleman considered the manuscript, and especially its early chapters, "seriously defective, not only for fact, in many instances, but also in organization, emphasis, and clear writing."[34]

His supervisors agreed with OCMH's chief editor that "Long books are not read and are too expensive for most readers to buy." Lt. Col. Eugene J. White, the chief of OCMH's Current Branch, directed a 30 percent cut in the text. During June and July, Appleman revised ten chapters. He and OCMH agreed he would complete the revision after returning to the National Park Service, working nights, weekends, and during his annual two weeks of active duty. OCMH would provide him a desk, file space, and a typist. Just before leaving active duty, Appleman estimated he could finish by the spring of 1955, but he expected this version would not meet the targeted length and that further trimming would come after OCMH reviewed the manuscript.[35]

"It Was Mighty Little for Anyone to Do"

The revised manuscript arrived at OCMH in November 1956. Appleman had a heavy workload at the Park Service; it had transferred him to its headquarters where he covered all matters related to post-Civil War history.[36] Believing that "there were many unanswered questions, many puzzles that I had not been able to unravel," especially concerning the 24th Infantry Division in July 1950, he "continued to work and write, correspond and interview."[37] The project consumed his life outside the Park Service, so much so that he "did not give my small children the family attention I should have."[38] Nevertheless, "it was mighty little for anyone to do who has enjoyed good health and is still living when one reflects on the many fine young men who dropped in death on the Korean hills and paddies. In a sense I have tried to write a tribute to them."[39]

OCMH asked officers who served in Korea during 1950 to comment on the manuscript and almost all responded favorably. In 1954, Appleman had sent the 24th Infantry Division's commander in the July 1950 battles, Maj. Gen. William F. Dean, the relevant draft chapters. The North Koreans captured Dean after the fall of Taejong and he later received the Medal of Honor for his leadership during that battle. In 1954, Dean thought the manuscript "so far misses the pulse of the operation that mere correction of its many errors of fact would not suffice."[40]



General Dean
U.S. Army

Maj. Gen. Richard W. Stephens, the Chief of Military History in 1957, had commanded a regiment in the 24th Infantry Division during July 1950 and he sent the revised manuscript to Dean. In a cover letter to his former subordinate, Dean wrote that as he prepared his

General Stephens
U.S. Army

comments he realized "that I was writing a defense of my own actions." As "it is very easy to be a Monday morning quarterback," in his formal response to Stephens he limited himself to few minor points because the manuscript "is a good account" of the battles he fought in Korea.[41]

General of the Army Douglas MacArthur had abundant criticisms of the manuscript. Appleman, although praising the general's amphibious assault at Inch'on, concluded that the former head of Far East Command made grave mistakes after the arrival of Chinese troops on the battlefield in October 1950. MacArthur responded in kind: the manuscript had "errors of fact," "doubtful strategic analysis," and was "unduly weighted by innumerable alleged incidents of individual and organizational cowardice." As written, "the volume constitutes a damming [*sic*] indictment of the courage and reliability of our national security forces." He advised General Stephens that if the manuscript was "published in its present form it will do an irreparable disservice to the American Army and to the nation it is created to defend." Appleman recalled that MacArthur's critique "was all self-justification, but he didn't succeed in getting a single word changed in the text."[42]

A more important and perceptive critic was OCMH historian Dr. Louis Morton, who reported his assessment in December 1957. He began by recognizing the sacrifices the author had made to complete this "labor of love." Although the manuscript "is a remarkable achievement" that was "painstakingly researched," it "has a formlessness, a lack of discipline that denies the greatness of the theme." Appleman had "just missed writing a great book, but it is not too late."[43]

The revision left intact the strengths and weaknesses Stetson Conn identified in 1953. "Appleman understands the front-line soldier as few historians do, and he is keenly concerned with their leadership as well. He writes about them with understanding and sympathy, but he is critical also and honest to the point of bluntness." This bluntness, though, was "tempered too often with impatience and indignation." He had "a sort of moralistic and didactic tone in some of his judgements that is inappropriate in historical writing." Along with this tone, the "author's style could hardly be described as felicitous, or polished, or lean."[44]

Morton had three major criticisms of this draft's coverage. First, it slighted the actions of headquarters above the regimental level. Second, "in essence, this manuscript is a series of separate stories, many of them superbly told, most of them interesting and important, but not always adding to an integrated cohesive story whose parts are fully related to the whole." Third, there was unequal coverage of units and individuals. Like Conn, Morton called out Appleman's treatment of the 24th Infantry Regiment: "The facts as given are probably correct; the author's judgement of these facts is open to question, for he does not, it seems to me, consider other factors that may affect this judgment."[45]

As the author of OCMH's volume on the fall of the Philippines in 1942, Morton was familiar with the problem of reconstructing events when records were scanty, and the historian had to rely on participants' accounts. This reliance risked a loss of objectivity from subjective reactions to participants formed during research. Morton believed Appleman "had fallen into this trap" on a few occasions.[46]

The "major problem" was length. This draft in published form would be about 700 pages, to which front and back matter, maps, and photos would add at least another 100 pages. Morton recommended cutting the manuscript by 25 percent. Although "a difficult assignment," he thought it possible if the author condensed and generalized much of the small unit actions described in detail.[47]

Morton concluded that, even with its flaws, Appleman had "written one of the finest combat narratives" produced by the Army. Therefore, "every effort should be made to facilitate its revision and to speed it through the editorial and publication process." Additionally, the Army should give him an "appropriate award or commendation" in recognition of the author "giving so much of his own time during the last three years to the work of this Office."[48]

In January 1958, OCMH convened its review panel for the manuscript. These panels brought together participants in the subject covered by a book's topic, outside historians, and OCMH staff for a final assessment. On this panel were retired Maj. Gen. Leven C. Allen, Eighth Army's chief of staff in 1950–1951; Professor William R. Emerson of Yale University; Col. S. W. Foote, chief of OCMH's Histories Division; and Louis Morton. Kent Roberts Greenfield, OCMH's chief historian, chaired the panel.

Greenfield's memo to Appleman on the panel's findings began by praising his "herculean work of reconstruction" that was "written with candor, admiration, pity, and indignation, from a knowledge acquired by observation and by research that seem all but exhaustive." The book, however, departed from the principle used in the Army's World War II combat narratives of

Louis Morton
National Archives



Kent Roberts Greenfield
Courtesy of Johns Hopkins University

selecting one echelon as the point of view for the volume, dipping into lower ones only when an action there had "a decisive effect on the outcome." Instead, Appleman moved frequently among the company, battalion, and regimental levels, with some visits to higher headquarters, leaving the impression his guiding principle was "to relate everything that you could extract from your admirably resourceful search for information."[49]

Professor Emerson had highlighted the key to the manuscript's organization: 67 percent of it concerned the period before the Inch'on landing. The author's intense interest in the summer 1950 engagements produced so many accounts of small unit actions that at times it overwhelmed any narrative storyline and impaired the work's value as a basis for analytical study. Greenfield shared Appleman's belief that these actions were important but believed his presentation had created a "formlessness" in the manuscript that made it unclear why the reader "is asked to absorb so much detail." Nevertheless, the panel did not advise heavily cutting these accounts to give more attention to higher headquarters because during that summer "so much turned on what small units did."[50]

The panel decided against a "maximum prescription" for revising the draft like the World War II combat histories because it "would take more time than we can expect you to put into this revision of your manuscript and impose a delay in getting it published that the OCMH is unwilling to accept." Instead, the panel prescribed a "minimum" approach for producing a book of manageable size and more effective presentation, along with improving "your reader's confidence in your use of evidence and statements of the fact, even when his emotional bias is different from yours."[51]

The panel thought that a reduction to 1,200 pages would preserve the book's "value as an epic story of the American soldier (and his leaders) under the ordeal of battle." The biggest cut suggested was to end with the liberation of Seoul, but "this is your book, and the Panel wished to have the final decision left to you." In the sections on the Pusan Perimeter, much of the detail was repetitive; concentrating on illustrative actions would yield considerable savings. Greater reliance on maps would permit briefer descriptions in the text.[52]

A more effective presentation would require a better balance between small units and higher headquarters. General Allen clearly influenced the panel's recommendation here, especially with regard to illustrating the difficult tactical problems confronting Eighth Army's commander, Lt. Gen. Walton H. Walker, during the war's first three months. The South Korean army's performance, especially on the Pusan Perimeter, also would require more balanced coverage. A third suggestion concerned chapter length; some were too long and should be divided into two.

General Walker
U.S. Army

There were two major suggestions for improving the reader's confidence. The first concerned Appleman's "preoccupation with the behavior of the 24th Infantry." Greenfield thought that in "the special, all but massive attention, you give to the behavior of this outfit, I guess that you were moved by soldierly indignation, by your interest in military 'integration,' and by the abundance of testimony about Negro troops." The panel advised limiting the discussion to what the regiment did and how that affected battles' outcomes. "The rest, and it is a great deal, belong in a special study of Negro troops." The second suggestion was removing the partiality shown toward those who had contributed significantly to the research, especially when writing about the battle for Taejon. Also, the panel highlighted Appleman's tendency to refight contemporary controversies, particularly in his footnotes, leading him into "dogfights in which you as a historian do not need to become involved."[53]

In his response to the panel report, Appleman set the endpoint for the book after the first intervention of Chinese troops on the battlefield but before the final drive toward the Yalu River. This would make it difficult to reach the 1,200-page limit, but he agreed to try, even though it would "result in the loss of much valuable combat and military information." Appleman thanked Greenfield for "the latitude you and others on panel [*sic*] have given me in bringing the manuscript to acceptable form" and promised to "give all the time I can possibly find" to finish the revision by early 1959.[54]

Colonel Foote thought Appleman unduly optimistic in setting that date and he was proved correct: Appleman delivered the final revision in October 1959.[55] He did not make major cuts to the manuscript; when published in 1961, the book had 813 pages, about what Morton had estimated. OCMH's recommendation that Appleman receive the Department of the Army Distinguished Civilian Service Medal was not approved; instead, he received the Secretary of the Army's Certificate of Appreciation for Patriotic Civilian Service.[56]

Initial Reception

S. L. A. Marshall, a key figure in the Army's World War II historical program and an influential postwar analyst, reviewed the book for the *New York Times*. He had visited Korea twice during the war and published two books about battles that occurred after the period covered by *South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu*.[57] Appleman had given Marshall's first book, *The River and the Gauntlet* (William Morrow, 1953), a negative review: it "must not be considered as a well reasoned and well studied military history of the episode with which it deals."[58]

Marshall found that "for length, for diligence of research by its tireless author, for beauty of illustrations and for controversial content," *South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu* "sets itself apart." Appleman "is not a command apologist or yet a strictly objective chronicler. He loves to draw lessons." Unlike OCMH reviewers, Marshall complained that Appleman did not have enough "analysis of the blow-by-blow ordeal of men on the fire line." Given the difficulties Appleman faced in reconstructing much of what happened during the summer of 1950 from just participants' accounts, the author's "noteworthy achievement" in using

S. L. A. Marshall, shown here as a brigadier general
National Archives

these sources produced a narrative with "as even balance as his manifest handicaps permitted." Marshall did not agree with the book's end point: "A less ambitious author" would have stopped earlier because including the decision-making for an advance to the Yalu, but not "the lost battles" that followed, left the reader in suspense. His overall appraisal was "Appleman's strength is his diligence in research," but the "writing is not spellbinding, and the pace is often tedious. His editors might have done better by him."[59]

Although Professor Theodore Ropp, one of America's leading military historians, praised the book's "fine combat narrative," his interest was in questions "more important to civilian scholars": the Chinese intervention into the war and MacArthur's relationship with President Harry S. Truman. Ropp concluded Appleman had added "depth and detail" in two areas: that misconceptions about the Chinese usually attributed just to MacArthur's headquarters "were shared by all other intelligence agencies," and "the extent to which the United Nations forces were tactically surprised by the Chinese armies."[60]

The historian Richard D. Challener wrote that *South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu* "is fully up to the standards established by" the *United States Army in World War II* series. Although he criticized the book's "sheer bulk" and the decision to end it just before the Chinese offensive, he found "there is much to reward the persistent reader." Challener, awarded the Combat Infantryman Badge in World War II, found the book's depictions of infantry actions "outstanding." At the same time, he appreciated that it did pay "careful attention to logistical problems" and did not ignore strategic and political issues. He also appreciated that it was not "an uncritical narrative." Among the examples he cited were that Appleman "observes, with fairness but without apologies" the 24th Infantry Regiment's performance and that "criticism of the high command is less direct but no less present."[61]

Michael E. Howard, historian and a British veteran of infantry combat in World War II, appreciated "a brutal frankness and a vividness which are highly welcome and most unusual in official histories." The "poor performance of certain U.S. units is described with an explicitness which makes the complimentary accounts of heroism and success entirely credible." The book was "a work which is not only—as inevitably it must be—the main authority on the military aspects of the Korean campaign, but one of the most readable and convincing works of military history that the present writer has ever encouraged."[62]

Two veterans of the summer 1950 battles reviewed the book. Col. John T. Corley had commanded a battalion in the 24th Infantry Regiment and later the whole regiment. Appleman interviewed him twice and sent him draft chapters concerning his regiment. Corley was one of the officers asked to review the manuscript in 1957: he "was impressed with the excellent job that has been done. It is the first time that I have seen battle on battalion level brought alive." Appleman described him in the book as "energetic" and "highly regarded."[63] He also wrote about Corley's appointment as a battalion commander in August 1950 that "although Eighth Army sent some of the very best unit commanders in the United States Army to the 24th Regiment to give it superior leadership, the regiment remained unreliable and performed poorly."[64]

In his review, Corley again praised Appleman's skill in illuminating the battalion level of combat. The book provided "an unbiased picture of the defeats and successes of UN [United Nations] forces during the first five months." He spent two paragraphs on the author's "thorough job of research," and the attention Appleman paid to the difficult tactical problems General Walker had faced. As for his superior, the reviewer only noted the "over-all conduct of the war by Gen. MacArthur is not neglected." The 24th Infantry Regiment's former commander did not address the book's depiction of the regiment.[65]

ARMOR magazine published the longest review of *South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu*, written by Forrest K. Kleinman, a retired Army lieutenant colonel. He had been the 24th Infantry Division's public information officer at the start of the war and later served as an infantry battalion operations officer. After the war, he published several articles based on his experiences in Korea.[66] In 1954, Kleinman, at General Dean's request, reviewed the chapters in the first draft concerning the 24th Infantry Division's actions during July 1950. He provided Dean a detailed critique, which the general forwarded to Appleman; the chapters had "Undue Assumption of Editorial Omniscience," "Unsound military deductions," and a "lack of objectivity."[67]

Now, Kleinman "was favorably impressed by the painstaking reconstruction" of the division's battles. After mentioning that he had read Appleman's first draft, he could "appreciate how much effort he has devoted since then to further research and rewrite." Kleinman acknowledged that gaps in written records required the author to rely heavily on "the memories of eye witnesses," but "some passages read as if written by the individual cited as the source."[68]



Colonel Corley
National Archives

In addition, he did not like Appleman's "disproportionate treatment" of the 24th Infantry Regiment. Kleinman felt that the volume's criticism of the regiment was warranted because Corley had been a major source of information on its conduct, but he was troubled by Appleman's failure to mention Black infantrymen's commendable performance in integrated units. If the regiment's misconduct merited the space given it, Appleman should have given equal attention to "the praiseworthy performance of the same race in integrated units." Otherwise, the book could be "cited by bigots" as proof of Black soldiers' "poor fighting qualities." Kleinman argued that what the 24th Infantry Regiment's record actually showed was "discriminatory segregation of any American minority in combat is as psychologically unsound as it is un-American."[69]

Veterans Versus the Historian

Two veterans took issue with the way Appleman portrayed their regiment's performance. Both demanded the Army either revise the book or publish a new one exonerating their unit. One had his demand rejected. The other's led to an unprecedented reexamination that did not produce the result he desired.

Lacy C. Barnett, a medic, deployed with the 34th Infantry Regiment to Korea. He survived the regiment's costly defeats in July 1950 and its subsequent battles along the Pusan Perimeter. After he retired, Barnett began researching the regiment's actions during that summer, visiting the National Archives and contacting veterans of the regiment for their accounts of what happened.[70]

He also wrote Appleman. In a 1984 letter, he implied that Col. Charles E. Beauchamp, the 34th's commander, was a coward who left his soldiers to die at Taejon, and he criticized Dean's decisions. Appleman did not agree: "I think you have let your imagination engage in too much speculation," and ended his reply with "I am always aware that I myself have not been able to find out all the facts of importance. Truth is never wholly complete in any inquiry."[71]

By 1987, Barnett had concluded *South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu*, "contains many errors in interpretations of events and actions" regarding the 34th Infantry. In a draft article about the Battle of Taejon he sent Appleman, Barnett faulted him for contacting "only a few of the survivors" of the regiment despite having eight years and "unlimited resources." Additionally, some of those he did contact "**could** have had reasons to make self-serving statements." Nevertheless, he was not making "an attack on the professional abilities of Roy E. Appleman." Rather, it was "an example of how an official U.S. Army version of actions can be wrong and can stand for such a long period of time without challenge." Barnett had read the correspondence between Appleman and Stephens from 1952 in which the latter stated the cause of the 34th Infantry's defeats was ineffective officer leadership, not the quality of its enlisted troops. Because Stephens at Taejon had commanded the 21st Infantry Regiment, Barnett believed he had been "in no position to make such statements."[72] Appleman rejected this critique. He had had "no animosity against the 34th Infantry," Barnett made "too many accusations against me without proof that I erred in what I wrote," and had not proved the statements by those at Taejon used by Appleman "were untrustworthy and wrong."[73]

In 1989, Barnett wrote the Chief of Military History requesting the Army revise the portions of *South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu*, regarding the 34th Infantry. Based on his experience at Taejon in 1950 and his research since 1985, Barnett believed Appleman's portrayal of the regiment was "not to be in accordance with the facts." To support this conclusion, he sent copies of his research to the Center of Military History (CMH).[74] Barnett thought he had been "stonewalled" when the Center did not agree with this request, so he asked two members of Congress and a retired lieutenant general who had been a 34th Infantry platoon leader at Taejon to intervene on his behalf.[75]

Soldiers aid a wounded comrade of the 24th Infantry Regiment after a battle 10 miles south of Chorwon, Korea, 22 April 1951.
National Archives

Lacy C. Barnett
Courtesy of Christopher Russell

Barnett also reached out one more time to Appleman. In a November 1992 letter, he alleged that Colonel Stephens had been drinking at Taejon, leaving him unable "to act in a rational and competent manner." He was a coward who had "wanted to avoid any and all contact with enemy forces on 20 July." Then Barnett showed he did not know Appleman. After noting that Stephens had been the Chief of Military History when the OCMH panel reviewed the manuscript, "I can understand why there would have been certain things that you would not have written in your manuscript. If this was the case, I would hope that you will be willing to disclose those things now."[76]

Appleman, now 88 years old, replied he could "neither affirm nor deny" Barnett's statements about what happened at Taejon because of the "lapse of time" and because he did not have copies of his research. Regarding Barnett's accusation about omitting negative material on Stephens, Appleman wrote "there is no basis in fact for this suspicion as I neither then nor latter did so." To make this clear to Barnett, he closed his letter with "Col. Stephens in no way influenced what I wrote about the battle of Taejon."[77]

Four days after Barnett sent his letter to Appleman, Brig. Gen. Harold W. Nelson, the Chief of Military History, wrote Representative Les Aspin, chair of the House Committee on Armed Services, about revising the portrayal of the 34th Infantry in *South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu*: "The policy of the Center of Military History is to not revise its published works." Factual errors would be corrected in subsequent reprints of a book. "We will not, however, make changes based on different interpretations of essentially the same facts or new facts which are not germane. It is the work of succeeding scholars to undertake revisions and new interpretations by writing new books and perhaps commenting in the new books on the deficiencies of the old ones."[78]

Nelson's predecessor, Brig. Gen. William A. Stofft, made a similar stand in regard to the 24th Infantry Regiment, but David K. Carlisle brought enough pressure to bear that CMH was ordered to write a new book with a new interpretation of the regiment's performance. Carlisle graduated from West Point in 1950. Like many in his class, he shipped to Korea as a replacement that summer, but as a Black officer in a segregated Army, his assignment options were limited. In August 1950 he joined the 77th Engineer Combat Company, a Black unit that supported the 24th Infantry Regiment, where Carlisle served successively as a platoon leader, the executive officer, and the commander. He contracted bronchial asthma while in Korea, a condition that eventually forced him to leave the Army in 1958.[79] In the 1970s, Carlisle and his first commander in Korea, Charles M. Bussey, prepared a history of their company in the war. Their research included reading *South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu*, for the first time. Carlisle found its portrayal of the 24th Infantry "seriously-flawed and grossly misleading."[80] He soon began a campaign for revisions to the book that would portray the 24th Infantry's performance as having been at least equal to that of any White regiment in Korea.[81]

David Carlisle had two advantages over Lacy Barnett. The first was his military credentials: as a West Point graduate who had commanded in combat, his criticisms had a creditability that Barnett could not match. Carlisle referred to them often in mobilizing support for his campaign and in his extensive correspondence with Army offices.[82] The second advantage was the Army's continued reckoning with the racism in its history during an era when keeping the all-volunteer force viable relied on recruiting Black people.[83]

Carlisle, like Barnett, examined unit records and reached out to veterans. Also like Barnett, he shared his research with Uzal W. Ent and Clay D. Blair, who were working on books about the Pusan Perimeter and the war's first year, respectively. These books would portray the 24th and 34th Infantry Regiments in

General Stofft
U.S. Army

General Nelson
U.S. Army

David K. Carlisle, shown here as a West Point cadet in 1950
U.S. Military Academy Library

a more favorable light than Appleman's did, and they criticized his depiction of the units' performance.[84]

Carlisle's first success concerned the regiment's first battle, the fight to take Yechon in July 1950. In response to a 1984 congressional inquiry, CMH reviewed the relevant records and contacted Appleman, who saw no reason to change what he had written. Although the review found Appleman's scholarship to be "sound," it recommended changes in future reprints "in the interest of clarity and sound scholarship."[85]

Appleman doubted anything of note happened at Yechon, beginning his book's section on the action with the aside "if indeed it was an action at all," and concluding with "whether there were North Koreans in the town on 20 July is something of a question." A key source for Appleman was Col. Henry G. Fisher, commander of the 35th Infantry Regiment, who had gone to the town on 21 July after receiving a message that the North Koreans "had driven the 3d Battalion, 24th Infantry, from Yech'on." Appleman used Fisher's 1957 comments on the manuscript to dismiss in a footnote a reporter who had written a story praising the 24th Infantry at Yechon. The revised text in reprints deleted the aside, the conclusion about what happened on 20 July, and Appleman's comment in the footnote. It described the message Fisher received as "erroneous" and added a sentence on soldiers from the 77th Engineer Combat Company entering the town on 21 July to fight fires started by American shelling.[86]

Secretary Marsh
U.S. Army

In 1988, Secretary of the Army John O. Marsh Jr. directed a review of the regiment's performance from its deployment in 1950 to its inactivation in 1951.[87] Appleman declined interview requests about this decision, but he wrote a friend that the book "is well documented, so I have to be contended with letting it stand on its own merits." He believed that Clay Blair, "savvy about Washington publicity channels, is behind Carlisle's efforts this time."[88] In 1989, Appleman published *Disaster in Korea* (Texas A&M University Press), which examined the Chinese defeat of Eighth Army in North Korea. He again stressed that the 24th Infantry functioned poorly despite receiving White officers who "were handpicked from among the top performers in the U.S. Army." Appleman emphasized the regiment's "ineptness" and that it was "a cause of concern to friendly units on its flanks."[89] That same year, Irene Appleman told a reporter that his portrayal of the regiment was not racially motivated and that his research supported these conclusions. As to revising the book, she said that Appleman "would hate to see it done. You don't rewrite history 30 years later."[90]

In 1996, almost three years after Appleman's death, CMH published *Black Soldier, White Army*.[91] The book did not critique the 24th Infantry Regiment's portrayal in *South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu*, and made no mention of the criticisms within OCMH about how Appleman treated the unit. It did describe the book as "the most thorough and authoritative source for combat operations during the early period of the war."[92]

Instead, *Black Soldier, White Army* analyzed the regiment's performance using the lens Stetson Conn had recommended in 1953: the "many other qualifying factors that are needed for an understanding of the problem of employing Negro troops in combat." It concluded that the regiment's "record in Korea reveals an undue number of military failures, particularly during the early months of the war." The cause of these failures was mainly "a lack of unit cohesion brought on by racial prejudice and the poor leadership it engendered at all levels."[93] One of those prejudiced poor leaders was the 24th Infantry's second commander in Korea, Colonel Champeny, who had been the first person Appleman interviewed about the unit.[94] Another important source for Appleman, Colonel Corley, may have been prejudiced, but *Black Soldier, White Army* made it clear that if so, it did not prevent him from providing effective leadership.[95]



Secretary West
Department of Defense

Although Carlisle had succeeded in getting the Army to produce a new book, he rejected its new interpretation. After reading the final draft, he told a reporter that "even in 1996, Army historians continue misleadingly and insultingly to characterize the regiment's combat performance."[96] In response, the Army convened a review panel with Clay Blair among its members, and acting on the panel's recommendation, Secretary of the Army Togo D. West Jr. approved publication of *Black Soldier, White Army*.[97] Its interpretation of essentially the same facts did not lead to any further revisions of *South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu*.

Conclusion

Although both OCMH and Appleman believed that "historians who were thorough in their research had no need to interpret the events they were describing,"[98] the latter's experiences and personality created a "moralistic and didactic tone" extraordinary for an Army official history volume. His intense admiration of American soldiers who risked their life in battle predisposed him to praise those who did their duty and condemn those who did not.[99] The charge by General Ward "to pull no punches," which

Soldiers of the 24th Infantry Regiment move up to the firing line in Korea, ca. 1950–1951.
National Archives

aligned with Appleman's commitment to outspoken honesty, only reenforced this tendency in his writing. OCMH had identified this tone as a significant problem in 1953 and it remained one six years later. The office could have responded in one of three ways: continue the unorthodox process of the author revising on his own time, start over with another historian, or accept the manuscript Appleman delivered in October 1959. Because the office decided against the significant delays the first two options would produce, much of Appleman's interpretation made it into the published volume.

This decision also meant that Appleman's belief that *South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu* would never be superseded was in one sense correct. The book retained most of his detail on small unit actions, which exceeded that found in OCMH's World War II combat volumes. This detail, and the material Appleman collected to produce it, created the historiographical foundation about the battles covered by his book, especially for the events of July 1950. All who write about this subject, even those who decades later solicited other veterans' accounts, rely on this foundation and are in dialogue with Appleman's interpretation.

The book was superseded in one important area. *Black Soldier, White Army* confirmed Appleman's conclusion that the 24th Infantry Regiment had an undue number of military failures, but it showed he was wrong about the reason for them. In both *South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu* and *Disaster in Korea*, he offers no explicit explanation for the regiment's performance.[100] The available sources do not reveal to what extent racism influenced Appleman's conclusion and how much it was based on his contempt for shirkers who endangered others. Racism, though, clearly did have some effect on his portrayal of the regiment. The first draft of *South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu* included comments from White officers on the supposed nature of Black troops that made them poor soldiers. Although OCMH removed these, it did retain Appleman's insistence that the Army had supplied the regiment with some of its "very best unit commanders," thereby implying the unit's failures resulted from inherent characteristics of Black soldiers. *Black Soldier, White Army*, however, showed that it was racial prejudice that undermined the cohesion essential to effective combat units, and that, with the exception of Colonel Corley, the 24th Infantry Regiment did not receive the "very best" either before or after deploying to Korea.[101]



Major Appleman in Korea, ca. 1951
U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center

South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu accomplished an official history's mission of providing the Army's account of what it did in battle and giving others a base from which to develop their own narratives and interpretations. But because of its path to publication, the book is unusual in that Appleman's voice and his quest to honor his fellow soldiers can be heard clearly. The result is a hybrid unique in the U.S. Army's official history program.

AUTHOR'S NOTE

This article is a revision of a presentation made to the Military Classics Seminar in 2019. My thanks go to the seminar members for their valuable comments and suggestions.

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Notes

1. Ltr, Roy E. Appleman to William J. McCaffrey, 16 Mar 1985, Folder 3, Box 21, Roy E. Appleman Collection, U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center, Carlisle Barracks, PA (hereinafter AHEC), underline in original.

2. The quote is from Edward J. Drea, "Change Becomes Continuity: The Start of the U.S. Army's 'Green Book' Series," in *The Last Word? Essays on Official History in the United States and British Commonwealth*, ed. Jeffrey Grey (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003), 95.

3. Interv, Herbert Evison with Roy E. Appleman, 10 Feb 1971, 1–3, Herbert Evison's National Park Service Oral History Project, 1952–1999, National Park Service Oral History Collection, HFCA 1817, Harpers Ferry Center, Harpers Ferry, WV, https://npgallery.nps.gov/AssetDetail/b297ad5f-d525-4aae-b90f-b75952bc2684. The quote is from page 3.

4. Interv, Evison with Appleman, 10 Feb 1971, 3–4, 7; Ltr, Roy E. Appleman to Richard F. Kramb, 14 May 1988, Folder 7, Box 21, Appleman Collection, AHEC; "List of Doctoral Dissertations in History in Progress December 1939," *American Historical Review* 45, no. 3 (Apr 1940); Roy E. Appleman, "Timber Empire from the Public Domain," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review* 26, no. 2 (Sep 1939): 193–208; Roy E. Appleman, *South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu*, United States Army in the Korean War (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1961 [1992 reprint]), viii (hereinafter *SNNY*). None of the available sources mention why he never published the dissertation.

5. Enlistment rcd, Roy E. Appleman, 13 Oct 1942, Electronic Army Serial Number Merged File, ca. 1938–1946, World War II Army Enlistment Rcds, Record Group (RG) 64, National Archives at College Park (NACP), College Park, MD, https://aad.archives.gov/aad/record-detail.?dt=893&mtch=1&cat=WR26&tf=F&sc=24994,24995,24996,24998,24997,24993,24981,24983&q=Appleman+Roy&bc=,sl,fd&rpp=10&pg=1&rid=3709988; Interv, Evison with Appleman, 25 Feb 1971, 1–5, Herbert Evison's National Park Service Oral History Project, 1952–1999, National Park Service Oral History Collection, HFCA 1817, Harpers Ferry Center, Harpers Ferry, WV, https://npgallery.nps.gov/AssetDetail/de4bb1b2-d222-45fc-b78b-cf0c6c70d622; Roy E. Appleman, James M. Burns, Russell A. Gugeler, and John Stevens, *Okinawa: The Last Battle*, United States Army in World War II: The War in the Pacific (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1948), xi–xii; Capt. Roy E. Appleman, "Army Tanks in the Battle for Saipan," 1st Information and Historical Service, 8 Feb 1945, Library and Archives, U.S. Army Center of Military History, Washington, DC; Ltr, Appleman to Kramb, 14 May 1988.

6. Interv, Evison with Appleman, 25 Feb 1971, 2–5.

7. Ltr, Appleman to William J. McCaffrey, 20 Mar 1981, Folder 4, Box 6A, Appleman Collection, AHEC.

8. Ltr, Appleman to William J. McCaffrey, 23 Mar 1980, Folder 7, Box 6A, Appleman Collection, AHEC.

9. Interv, Evison with Appleman, 25 Feb 1971, 8–9, 18; Interv, Herbert Evison with Robert Utley, 17 May 1973, 19, 51–52, Herbert Evison's National Park Service Oral History Project, 1952–1999, National Park Service Oral History Collection, HFCA 1817, Harpers Ferry Center, Harpers Ferry, WV. The quote is from Robert M. Utley, *Custer and Me: A Historian's Memoir* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2021), 69.

10. Edgar F. Raines, Jr., "Beyond the Green Books: a Prehistory of the U.S. Army in the Cold War," in *International Cold War Military Records and History: Proceedings of the International Conference*, ed. William W. Epley (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1996), 411–12; Stetson Conn, *Historical Work in the United States Army, 1862–1954* (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1980), 185–86.

11. Jnl entry, 30 Apr 1951, Roy E Appleman Korean War Journal 30 Apr 1951–12 Jan 1956, Folder 1, Box 36, Appleman Collection AHEC.

12. Jnl entries, 4 May and 22 Oct 1951, Appleman Korean War Journal; *SNNY*, xiii–xiv; Ltr, Appleman to William J. McCaffrey, 2 Dec 1984, Folder 3, Box 21, Appleman Collection, AHEC. Work on the report continued after Appleman left for Korea, but eventually the Office of the Secretary of Defense decided not to publish it. Telecon, D. Finke with R. Winnacker, Ofc of the Sec of Def, 22 Oct 1971, sub: Report on Korean Operations, Folder 319.1/Report from the Secretary of Defense—Winnacker Draft, Historical Resources Collection Geog V Korea, Library and Archives, U.S. Army Center of Military History, Washington, DC.

13. Memo, Col. T. J. Sands for Maj. Roy E. Appleman, 28 Jun 1951, sub: Narrative History of the Korean Campaign, Folder Notes Chapter 20, Box 12, Entry P-185, RG 319, NACP.

14. Jnl entries, 4 Jul, 11 Jul, and 12 Jul 1951, Appleman Korean War Journal. After retiring from the National Park Service, Appleman would research and write the definitive account of Task Force MacLean/Faith, *East of Chosin: Entrapment and Breakout in Korea, 1950* (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1987). He would write about the 2d Infantry Division's ordeal at Kunu-ri in *Disaster in Korea: The Chinese Confront MacArthur* (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1989).

15. Jnl, Appleman Korean War Journal, 12–25.

16. Ibid., 26–35. The quote is from the entry for 22 July.

17. Ibid., 36–90. The quote is from Memo, Appleman for Col. George G. O'Connor, 17 Apr 1953, Folder Memoranda, Box 12, Entry P-185, RG 319 NACP. On the difficulties in recovering American dead early in the war, see Bradley Lynn Coleman, "Recovering the Korean War Dead, 1950–1958: Graves Registration, Forensic Anthropology, and Wartime Memorialization," *Journal of Military History* 72, no. 1 (Jan 2008): 187–93.

18. Jnl, Appleman Korean War Journal, 90–109.

19. Ltr, Maj. Gen. Orlando Ward to Maj. Appleman, 29 Aug 1951, Folder 314.7/FAR EAST-KOREA, Box 1, Entry A1-144D, RG 319, NACP.

20. Jnl entry, 23 Oct 1951, Appleman Korean War Journal.

21. For examples of this correspondence, see Boxes 10 and 12 in Entry P-185, RG 319, NACP.

22. Jnl entry, 13 Dec 1951, Appleman Korean War Journal.

23. Memo, Appleman for Col. George G. O'Connor, 27 Nov 1951, sub: Outline of Volume on Korean Campaign; Memo, Appleman to Lt. Col. J. Rockis, 25 Sep 1952, sub: Combat History of the Korean War: Recommended Expansion to Two Volumes; Memo, Lt. Col. Joseph Rockis for Ch, War Histories Div, 10 Oct 1952, sub: Two Volumes for the Combat History of the Korean Conflict; Memo, Col. George G. O'Connor to Ch, Ops Div, Executive, OCMH, and Ch, Current Br, 21 Oct 1952, sub: Combat Operations in Korea, all in Folder Outline-Korea, Box 10, Entry P-185, RG 319, NACP.

24. Memo, Appleman for Col. McFerren, 1 Jun 1953, Folder Outline-Korea, Box 10, Entry P-185, RG 319, NACP.

25. Memo, Stetson Conn for Dr. K. R. Greenfield, 12 Aug 1953, sub: Review of Lt. Col. Roy E. Appleman's Manuscript, Chapters I–XVI, Folder Reviews, Box 13, Entry P-185, RG 319, NACP.

26. Ibid.

27. This study would be published as Ulysses Lee, *The Employment of Negro Troops* (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1966).

28. Memo, Stetson Conn for Dr. K. R. Greenfield, 12 Aug 1953.

29. Ltr, Appleman to William J. McCaffrey, 8 Apr 1980, Folder 7, Box 6A, Appleman Collection, AHEC; Ltr, Appleman to Kramb, 14 May 1988; DF, OCMH to CMD, AG, 24 Sep 1953, sub: Retention of Officer Beyond

Normal Category Expiration, Folder Reviews, Box 13, Entry P-185, RG 319, NACP; Memo, Louis Morton for Ch, Branch II, 14 Nov 57, sub: Study of Schnabel and Mossman Manuscripts, app. 1, Box 729, Entry A1-1816, RG 319, NACP. On the career category reservist program, see William M. Donnelly, "Bilko's Army: A Crisis in Command?," *Journal of Military History* 75, no. 4 (Oct 2011): 1185, 1190.

30. Poor management and shifting priorities delayed publication of this volume until 1990. Billy C. Mossman, *Ebb and Flow: November 1950–July 1951*, United States Army in the Korean War (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1990), ix; Ltr, Appleman to Brig. Gen. James L. Collins Jr., 5 Mar 1980, Folder 7, Box 6A, Appleman Collection, AHEC; Memo, David F. Trask for Ch, Histories Div, 21 Jun 1985, sub: Instruction for Revision of CMH 25-P, "Ebb and Flow," by Billy C. Mossman, Folder 20, Box 38, Matthew B. Ridgway Papers, AHEC; Ltr, William J. McCaffrey to Appleman, 12 Jul 1985, Folder 10, Box 29, Appleman Collection, AHEC; Memo, Morton for Ch, Branch II, 14 Nov 1957.

31. Jnl, Appleman Korean War Journal, 125–29.

32. Jnl entry, 14 May 1954, Appleman Korean War Journal.

33. MFR, Lt. Col. Eugene J. White, 2 Aug 1954, sub: Korean Combat Operations-Volume I, Folder Review of Manuscript (1), Box 14, Entry P-185, RG 319, NACP.

34. Ltr, Appleman to Maj. Gen. William F. Dean, 10 Jun 1954, Folder Notes Chapter 20, Box 12, Entry P-185, RG 319, NACP.

35. MFR, Lt. Col. Eugene J. White, 2 Aug 1954.

36. Interv, Evison with Appleman, 25 Feb 1971, 12–13; Roy E. Appleman, "A History of the National Park Service Mission 66 Program," 7 Jan 1958, National Park Service History eLibrary, http://www.npshistory.com/centennial/0516/index.htm.

37. Interv, Evison with Appleman, 25 Feb 1971, 7. For examples of this correspondence, see Ltr, Appleman to Lt. Col. John J. Dunn, 30 Aug 1955, Ltr, Appleman to Brig. Gen. Edgar Thomas Conley Jr., 14 Mar 1956, and Ltr, Appleman to Capt. James H. Bell, 26 Mar 1956, all in Folder Outline Volume 2 The KW, Box 10, Entry P-185, RG 319, NACP.

38. Interv, Evison with Appleman, 25 Feb 1971, 7.

39. Ltr, Appleman to Maj. Gen. Richard W. Stephens, 21 Nov 1956, Folder Reviews, Box 13, Entry P-185, RG 319, NACP.

40. Ltr, Maj. Gen. William F. Dean to Appleman, 18 Dec 1954, Folder General Dean July 1950, Box 12, Entry P-185, RG 319, NACP.

41. Ltr, William F. Dean to Dick, 20 Jan 1958, and Ltr, Maj. Gen. William F. Dean to Maj. Gen. R. W. Stephens, 20 Jan 1958, both in Folder General Dean July 1950, Box 12, Entry P-185, RG 319, NACP. Comments from other officers are in Boxes 8, 9, and 13, Entry P-185, RG 319, NACP.

42. Ltr. General of the Army Douglas MacArthur to Maj. Gen. R. W. Stephens, 15 Nov 1957, Folder MacArthur's Comments, Box 12, Entry P-185, RG 319, NACP; Interv, Evison with Appleman, 25 Feb 1971, 6–7.

43. Memo, Louis Morton for Ch Historian, 3 Dec 1957, sub: Review of "The Korean Conflict, 25 June–24 November 1950" by Roy E. Appleman, Folder The Korean Conflict, 25 Jun–24 Nov 50 Review by Louis Morton, Box 13, Entry P-185, RG 319, NACP.

44. Ibid.

45. Ibid.

46. Ibid.

47. Ibid.

48. Ibid.

49. Memo, Kent Roberts Greenfield to Lt. Col. Roy E. Appleman, n.d., sub: Manuscript Entitled: Combat in Korea, Volume I, Submitted for Publication in THE U.S. ARMY IN THE CONFLICT WITH THE COMMUNIST POWERS, Folder Editor's File [Critique], Box 13, Entry P-185, RG 319, NACP.

50. Ibid.

51. Ibid.

52. Ibid.

53. Ibid.

54. Ltr, Appleman to Dr. K. R. Greenfield, 23 Feb 1958, Folder Editor's File [Critique], Box 13, Entry P-185, RG 319, NACP. Appleman did not say why he retained this organization when in 1952 he had suggested an earlier endpoint.

55. Ltr, Greenfield to Appleman, 25 Feb 1958, Folder Review of Manuscript (1), Box 14, Entry P-185, RG 319, NACP; Ltr, Appleman to Brig. Gen. James A Norell, 13 Oct 1959, Folder October 1950, Box 13, Entry P-1825 Feb 595, RG 319, NACP. During the first decade of the *United States Army in World War II* series, combat volumes averaged seventy months from project directive to publication. Drea, "Change Becomes Continuity," 96.

56. DF, OCMH to DCS OPS [Dep Ch Staff, Ops] and DCS PER [Dep Ch Staff, Personnel], 4 Mar 1958, sub: Recommendation for Distinguished Civilian Service Medal, Folder 1, Box 1, Appleman Collection, AHEC; *SNNY*, viii. Available sources do not mention why the recommendations were downgraded.

57. Kelly C. Jordan, "Right for the Wrong Reasons: S. L. A. Marshall and the Ratio of Fire in Korea," *Journal of Military History* 66, no. 1 (Jan 2002): 135–62.

58. Lt. Col. Roy E. Appleman, "The River and the Gauntlet," *Military Affairs* 17, no 2 (Apr 1953): 95–97.

59. S. L. A. Marshall, "Arms and The Man: Korea: SOUTH TO THE NAKTONG, NORTH TO THE YALU," *New York Times*, 10 Sep 1961, BR3.

60. Theodore Ropp, "South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review* 48, no. 4 (Mar 1962): 740–41; Michael P. M. Finch, "Theodore Ropp's Makers of Modern Strategy Revisited and the Course of Military History, 1945–1981," *Journal of Military History* 82, no. 4 (Oct 2018): 1231–57.

61. Richard D. Challener, "South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu," *Journal of Modern History* 34, no. 2 (Jun 1962): 234–36; "Richard Challener '44, Scholar of American History, Dies at 79," Princeton University, 25 Sep 2002, https://www.princeton.edu/news/2002/09/25/richard-challener-44-scholar-american-history-dies-79.

62. Michael Howard, "South to Naktong, North to the Yalu," *Pacific Affairs* 35, no. 1 (Spring 1962): 67–68; Michael Howard, *Captain Professor: A Life in War and Peace* (New York: Continuum, 2006). In addition to the 24th Infantry Regiment, units Appleman described as panicking at some point included Far East Command's Advance Command and Liaison Group in Korea, the composite battalion of the 21st Infantry Regiment at Chonui, and the 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment. *SNNY*, 56–57, 93–94, 203.

63. Dates for Appleman's interviews and correspondence with Corley are from footnotes in *SNNY*, 285, 369, 371, 440. Appleman's description of Corley is from *SNNY*, 483. Corley's comments are from Ltr, Col. John T. Corley to Maj. Gen. Richard W. Stephens, 14 Nov 57, Folder 1, Box 1, Appleman Collection, AHEC. For Corley's service with the 24th Infantry Regiment, see William T. Bowers, William M. Hammond, and George L. MacGarrigle, *Black Soldier, White Army: The 24th Infantry Regiment in Korea* (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1996), 141–43, 151–52, 171–78, 180, 183–85, 190–92, 196–97, 202, 205n, 206, 208, 210–13, 215–18, 224, 226–30, 235–36, 268.

64. *SNNY*, 285.

65. Col. John T. Corley, "Buying Time in Korea," *ARMY* 12, no. 4 (Nov 1961): 85. *ARMY* identified Corley as having commanded a battalion and a regiment in the 25th Infantry Division but did not specify which regiment.

66. Lt. Col. Forrest K. Kleinman (USAR-Ret), "South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu," *ARMOR* LXX (May–Jun 1961): 61–64 (At this time, *ARMOR* was not published by the Army's Armor School. Rather, it was an unofficial publication of

the United States Armor Association.); M. Sgt. Forrest K. Kleinman, "The Tactician of Danger Forward," *ARMY* 9, no. 4 (Nov 1958): 26–29; "Truth of Taejon," *ARMY* 10, no. 11 (Jun 1960): 28–37; "Haman Notch," *ARMY* 11, no. 6 (Jan 1961): 34–39. Kleinman's byline identified him as a master sergeant because he was a career category reservist released from active duty after the war. He then enlisted in the Regular Army because after reaching twenty years of active duty service he could retire as a lieutenant colonel. Donnelly, "Bilko's Army," 1190.

67. MFR, Sfc. Forrest K. Kleinman, 1 Jun 1954, sub: Korean Manuscript of Lt. Colonel Appleman, encl. to Ltr, Maj. Gen. William F. Dean to Appleman, 4 Jun 1954, Folder Outline Volume 2 The KW, Box 10, Entry P-185, RG 319, NACP.

68. Kleinman, "South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu," 61–64.

69. Ibid.

70. "Lacy Clayton Barnett Obituary," Legacy, 5 Oct 2021, https://www.legacy.com/us/obituaries/name/lacy-clayton-barnett-obituary?id=20364161; "VITA–LACY C. BARNETT," encl. to Ltr, Lacy C. Barnett to Appleman, 29 Jan 1987, Folder 5, Box 21, Appleman Collection, AHEC.

71. Ltr, Appleman to Lacy C. Barnett, 16 Dec 1984, Folder 3, Box 21, Appleman Collection, AHEC.

72. Lacy C. Barnett, "Korea: Postmortem Examination of the 34th Infantry Regiment," 7–8, encl. to Ltr, Barnett to Appleman, 29 Jan 1987; emphasis in original.

73. Ltr, Appleman to Lacy C. Barnett, 3 Feb 1987, Folder 5, Box 21, Appleman Collection, AHEC.

74. Ltr, Barnett to the Ch of Military History, 4 Nov 1989, Folder 8, Box 16, Uzal W. Ent Collection, AHEC. In June 1973, as part of the Abrams reorganization of the Army Staff, OCMH became the Center of Military History, a field operating agency under the general staff supervision of the deputy chief of staff for military operations. Terence J. Gough, "The U.S. Army Center of Military History: A Brief History," *Army History* 37 (Spring 1996): 1–5.

75. Ltr, Lt. Gen. William B. Caldwell III to Col. Harold W. Nelson, 20 Nov 1989, Folder 6, Box 16, Ent Collection, AHEC; Ltr, Col. Harold W. Nelson to Lt. Gen. William B. Caldwell III, 12 Mar 1990, Folder 6, Box 16, Ent Collection, AHEC; Ltr, Barnett to Rep. Phil Sharp, 2 Jan 1992, Folder 9, Box 16, Ent Collection, AHEC; Ltr, Brig. Gen. Harold W. Nelson to Rep. Les Aspin, 16 Nov 1992, Folder 8, Box 16, Ent Collection, AHEC. The "stonewalled" quote is from Ltr, Barnett to Seileen Mullen, 11 Nov 1992, Folder 8, Box 16, Ent Collection, AHEC.

76. Ltr, Barnett to Appleman, 12 Nov 1992, Folder 1, Box 37, Appleman Collection, AHEC.

77. Ltr, Appleman to Barnett, 29 Nov 1992, Folder 1, Box 37, Appleman Collection, AHEC.

78. Ltr, Nelson to Aspin, 16 Nov 1992.

79. "David K. Carlisle," USMA Class of 1950, n.d., https://www.usma1950.com/memorial/david-k-carlisle; Ltr, Carlisle to Gen. John A. Wickham Jr., 11 Jun 1983, Folder 2, Box 2A, John A. Wickham Jr. Papers, AHEC.

80. Ltr, David K. Carlisle to Lt. Gen. Arthur E. Brown Jr., 29 Mar 1987, Folder 5, Box 10, Arthur E. Brown Jr. Papers, AHEC.

81. Memo, Lt. Col. Richard O. Perry for the Ch of Military History, 12 Jan 1987, sub: David K. Carlisle and the 24th U.S. Infantry Regiment, Folder 2, Box 17A, William A. Stofft Papers, AHEC.

82. For a sample of Carlisle's correspondence see Ltr, David K. Carlisle to Brig. Gen. William A Stofft, 13 Aug 1986, encl. to Ltr, David K. Carlisle to Lt. Gen. Arthur E. Brown Jr., 2 Jun 1987; Ltr, David K. Carlisle to Brig. Gen. William A Stofft, 26 Mar 1987, encl. to Ltr, David K. Carlisle to Lt. Gen. Arthur E. Brown Jr., 27 Mar 1987, both in Folder 5, Box 10, Brown Papers, AHEC; Ltr, David K. Carlisle to Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway, 5 Aug 1987, Folder 1A, Box 35, Matthew B. Ridgway Papers, AHEC; Ltr, David K. Carlisle to Gen. Arthur E. Brown Jr., 1 Jan 1988, Folder 1, Box 1, Brown Papers, AHEC; Ltr, David K. Carlisle to Sec Def Frank C. Carlucci, 7 Nov 1988, Folder 3C, Box 3B, Brown Papers, AHEC.

83. Beth Bailey, *America's Army: Making the All-Volunteer Force* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009), 211–15.

84. Clay Blair, *The Forgotten War: America in Korea, 1950–1953* (New York: Times Books, 1987), 983, 1002; Uzal W. Ent, *Fighting on the Brink: Defense of the Pusan Perimeter* (Paducah, KY: Turner Publishing, 1996), 98, 247, 320, 340, 398.

85. Memo, Perry for the Ch of Military History, 12 Jan 1987; Ltr, Appleman to Robert E. Drake, 7 Aug 1988, Folder 6, Box 21, Appleman Collection, AHEC. Another reason for Carlisle's emphasis on revising the discussion of Yechon was to support his efforts to have Bussey's award for his actions there upgraded from a Silver Star to the Medal of Honor.

86. *South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu*, 190–91, in both 1961 publication and 1992 reprint. Blair, citing Carlisle and Bussey's work, described Appleman's account of Yechon as "sneering." Blair, *Forgotten War*, 1004.

87. Bryan Brumley, "Army Orders Review of Blacks' Role in Korean War," *Washington Post*, 2 Aug 1988.

88. Ltr, Appleman to Herb Kahler, 6 Aug 1988, Folder 6, Box 21, Appleman Collection, AHEC.

89. Roy E. Appleman, *Disaster in Korea: The Chinese Confront MacArthur* (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1989), 51, 142.

90. J. Paul Scicchitano, "Fight for Honor," *Army Times*, 21 Aug 1989.

91. For information on the book's production, see Bowers, Hammond, and MacGarrigle, *Black Soldier, White Army*, v–ix; Memo, Ch of Military History for Director of the Army Staff, 22 Oct 1987, sub: Proposal for 24th Infantry Study—ACTION MEMORANDUM, Folder 2, Box 18, William A. Stofft Papers, AHEC; John M. Broder, "War and Black GIs' Memories," *Los Angeles Times*, 15 Nov 1989; Michael Ollove, "A Soldier's Disgrace," *Baltimore Sun*, 28 Apr 1996; Memo, Lt. Col. Rowland for Sec West, 28 May 1996, sub: Cincinnati Media Feedback, Folder 3, Box 3D, Togo D. West Jr. Collection, AHEC; Ltr, David K. Carlisle to Uzal W. Ent, 6 Jul 1996, Folder 9, Box 8A, Ent Collection, AHEC.

92. Bowers, Hammond, and MacGarrigle, *Black Soldier, White Army*, 279.

93. Ibid., 263.

94. Ibid., 132–71, 268.

95. Ibid., 141, 171–74, 229–30, 235–36.

96. Philip Shenon, "Veterans of Black Unit Threaten Suit Over Army's Account of Their Service," *New York Times*, 7 May 1996.

97. Philip Shenon, "Army Panel to Review Accuracy of Book on All-Black Regiment," *New York Times*, 23 May 1996; Ltr, Carlisle to Brig. Gen. John K. Mountcastle, 22 Apr 1996, Ltr, Carlisle to Maj. Gen. Fred A. Gordon, 5 Jul 1996, Ltr, Carlisle to Uzal W. Ent, 6 Jul 1996, all in Folder 9, Box 8A, Ent Collection, AHEC.

98. Drea, "Change Becomes Continuity," 84.

99. Appleman's condemnation of those who did not do their duty extended to the next war. See his letter to the editor concerning Lt. William Calley and American tactics in Vietnam, "Letters To The Editor: More on the Calley Case and the Reaction," *Washington Post*, 13 Apr 1971.

100. A reviewer of the latter book complained that it "offers no explanation for the poor performance of the soldiers, forcing the reader to reach his own conclusion." Robert A. Doughty, review of *Disaster in Korea*, *Journal of American History* 77, no. 3 (Dec 1990): 1093–94.

101. On the quality of leadership in the regiment, see Bowers, Hammond, and MacGarrigle, *Black Soldier, White Army*, 73–74, 94, 100, 113, 120, 130, 133–34, 143, 169, 185, 267, 268.

BOOK REVIEWS



GUNBOATS, MUSKETS, AND TORPEDOES: COASTAL SOUTH CAROLINA, 1861–1865

By Michael G. Laramie

Westholme Publishing, 2022
Pp. xii, 383. $35

Review by Luke Carpenter

A valuable contribution to Civil War military operations, Michael G. Laramie's *Gunboats, Muskets, and Torpedoes: Coastal South Carolina, 1861–1865*, offers a comprehensive look at military and naval operations studies in the South Carolina littoral. Although it is a companion volume to Laramie's earlier work *Gunboats, Muskets, and Torpedoes: Coastal North Carolina, 1861–1865*, readers can profit from reading either book independently of the other.

Laramie begins with a geographic overview, describing the features of South Carolina's coastal region and its initial Confederate fortification efforts. The first major military operation described is the successful Union expedition against Port Royal in November 1861, in which Port Royal Sound's fortifications fell to U.S. Navy Adm. Samuel F. DuPont's skilled tactics and naval ordnance. This expedition demonstrated the Navy's ability to defeat isolated coastal fortifications and land troops at will along the coast.

Confederate leaders reexamined their defensive plans in the wake of Port Royal's fall, while Federal forces busied themselves with fashioning their prize into a forward operating base. However, Confederate forces repulsed an ill-conceived attack at Secessionville, just south of Charleston, in June 1862 with heavy losses for Federal troops. This defeat, combined with the failure of U.S. military expeditions against the Savannah-Charleston Railroad, demonstrated that Confederate forces could muster sufficient strength rapidly at threatened points to counter and defeat Federal incursions.

Confederate forces developed more effective systems of coastal fortification with the return of General P. G. T. Beauregard, a military engineer famous for leading the bombardment of Fort Sumter in April 1861. Beauregard embraced a strategy of abandoning exposed fortifications guarding coastal inlets, like the ones defeated at Port Royal, in favor of withdrawing defense forces into the interior along a line protecting the Savannah-Charleston Railroad. This conceded the initiative to Federal forces in choosing the time and place to make landings but also facilitated Confederate use of the railroad to concentrate troops quickly in response to those landings. The soundness of this flexible operational approach was demonstrated repeatedly, particularly at the November 1864 Battle of Honey Hill. Confused and dilatory Federal troop movements after the landings, combined with alert Confederate defense pickets and prompt communications, enabled the rebels to concentrate their troops and repel with U.S. incursion, albeit with substantial losses. This book's central focus is the U.S. Navy's efforts against Charleston. The "Cradle of Secession" invoked strong desires for revenge among Federal leaders and the public. After U.S. forces failed to capture Charleston via the back door at Secessionville, U.S. naval planning shifted focus to the use of a new type of weapon: ironclad warships. Ironclads combined modern naval ordnance with steam power and armor plating in a combination that, to naval leaders, appeared unstoppable. Despite Admiral DuPont's ambivalence regarding the effectiveness of ironclads against coastal fortifications, President Abraham Lincoln and his cabinet ordered DuPont to attack Charleston with an ironclad fleet in a bid to destroy the harbor fortifications, principally Fort Sumter, thereby gaining access to the inner harbor. This would enable the Navy to bombard Charleston directly and end the port's usefulness as a destination for blockade runners.

DuPont's assault failed against Beauregard's well-designed harbor defense. Naval power alone was insufficient. Subsequent Federal operations around Charleston under two new commanders, General Quincy A. Gillmore and Admial John A. Dahlgren, followed a different method. Gillmore, an exceptional military engineer credited with the reduction of Fort Pulaski outside Savannah, Georgia, in 1862, favored a siege approach to the Charleston problem. Dahlgren, an ambitious naval ordnance expert, was willing to provide whatever assistance the Army needed.

Federal efforts in South Carolina's littoral reached their peak in 1863. The target was Fort Wagner, a sand fortification on one of the barrier islands near Charleston's entrance. Taking Fort Wagner was, in Gillmore's view, the first step in reducing Fort Sumter and then gaining passage to the inner harbor. Two direct assaults by U.S. Army infantry on Fort Wagner failed in spectacular fashion, in spite of the valor of regiments such as the 54th Massachusetts Infantry Regiment, one of the first African American units in the Army. After settling into a siege, Gillmore's persistence and

Dahlgren's outstanding naval gunfire support resulted in the fall of Fort Wagner in September 1863. Another failed Federal landing followed, this time by a boat attack against Fort Sumter made by sailors and marines. Dahlgren's blockading fleet suffered heavy personnel losses, reducing its effectiveness. Despite the reduction of Fort Sumter's artillery capabilities by Gillmore's siege artillery in a series of bombardments, it remained useful as an outpost and anchor for protecting underwater obstacles that barred Dahlgren's fleet from the inner harbor for the remainder of the war. Charleston defiantly resisted Federal forces until Sherman's overland invasion of the Carolinas in 1865, which prompted the city's abandonment by Confederate authorities.

Laramie does not ignore the varied naval aspects of the struggle for South Carolina's coast. He argues that concentrated Federal naval strength near Charleston did lead to a substantial drop in the level of blockade-running into and out of the port. However, this traffic reduction was due as much to vessels diverting to ports like Wilmington, North Carolina, as to Federal captures of blockade runners. Laramie also sheds light on torpedo warfare at sea, in terms of mines and spar torpedoes. In combination with underwater obstacles, mines proved a simple yet effective barrier in denying Dahlgren's fleet access to Charleston's inner harbor. The success of Confederate torpedo rams and submersibles against U.S. Navy warships yielded mixed results, with a single vessel sunk and an ironclad heavily damaged, but both pointed to future possibilities.

Laramie excels at placing naval and military operations in a historical context. Comparing combat during the siege of Fort Wagner to trench warfare in the First World War is an overreach. However, the detailed background Laramie provides on siege theory and methods before the Civil War, especially in the book's extensive glossary, builds a scaffold for the reader to understand how troops conducted siege operations. His analysis of the U.S. Navy blockade's effectiveness is well-argued and backed by solid sources, as is his criticism of promising Confederate naval torpedo operations being undercut and under-resourced in favor of harbor ironclads. Laramie also highlights the role human foibles played in military operations, most notably in the failed boat attack on Fort Sumter, a demonstration of Admiral Dahlgren's ego and desire to reap naval glory trumping sound military planning. The book is not without faults. Inconsistent editing makes for a confusing read at times, with multiple ship or place names spelled differently or changed in the same paragraph. Despite his prominence in the narrative, no picture of Admiral Dahlgren is provided, although other personalities mentioned less frequently are featured in photographs.

Laramie delivers a comprehensive synthesis of Federal and Confederate operations on the South Carolina coast. Efficient use of modified nineteenth-century coastal survey maps enables the reader to follow military operations with ease. Laramie's analysis is judicious in using sources, logic, and a wry understanding of human nature to explain why events unfolded as they did. This book will appeal to readers seeking to deepen or expand their knowledge of Civil War military operations, to military professionals contemplating the complexities of littoral and expeditionary warfare against a far-flung hostile coast, and to theorists and scholars examining interactions between military theory and weapons development.

Luke Carpenter is a middle and high school social studies teacher in St. Cloud, Minnesota.



SOLDIERS OF SIAM: A FIRST WORLD WAR CHRONICLE

By Khwan Phusrisom

Lemongrass Books, 2020
Pp. vi, 192. $25

Review by Barry M. Stentiford

Siam, modern Thailand, is the only country in Southeast Asia that was never colonized. It achieved that feat by resisting when possible and yielding when necessary during the years of imperialist expansion. It simultaneously instituted reforms that made the kingdom more legitimate to the Europeans. World War I presented Siam an opportunity to solidify its independence by allying with France and Britain against Germany. Other factors were also at work. King Vajiravudh (Rama VI, reigned 1910–1925), an honorary general of the British Army, studied law and history at Christ Church, Oxford, and maintained personal connections with members of the British aristocracy. Further, Vajiravudh was aware of German espionage within Siam and feared that his country would become a target of German colonialism should Germany win.

Siam declared war on Germany and Austria-Hungary on 22 July 1917. The kingdom raised an expeditionary force of four battalions, which left Bangkok in June 1918. The Siamese soldiers were grouped as Transportation, Medical, or Air Service, although apparently, none

of the soldiers had any prior training in these specialties. Upon their arrival in France, the medical soldiers were assigned as hospital orderlies, the airmen began training under French instructors, and the transportation soldiers were taught to drive and maintain their vehicles. Afterward, the transportation soldiers were assigned to the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF).

Soldiers of Siam is a short volume that is mainly a translation of a chronicle kept by Sgt. Kleuap Kaysorn of the transportation corps. His manuscript was translated by Khwan Phusrisom, who added an introduction that placed the war in the context of Siam's internal and external relations and an epilogue examining the results of the war. She holds a PhD in Anglo-Thai relations and spent two years in the Rhineland while working on the book, making her uniquely qualified to translate the work.

Phusrisom uses the terms Siamese and Thai interchangeably throughout the book, as Sergeant Kaysorn apparently did in his original chronicle. She makes clear throughout the work that she sees German conduct during the war and in its African colonies before the war as inhumane, and she ties Imperial Germany's conduct directly to the later rise and acceptance of Nazi practices and ideology. She includes two short chapters that give a brief overview of the service of the medical and aviation soldiers, as well as a short account from another soldier in the transportation corps of his experience in the Rhineland, rounding out Kaysorn's account.

Sergeant Kaysorn was a veterinarian, not a professional soldier, when he volunteered for the expeditionary force. He lied about his age, claiming to be younger than his 36 years. His patriotism and devout Buddhism come through clearly throughout the work. He has a keen eye and a subtle sense of humor. His observations of the wealth of Singapore; the degradation of the people of Columbo, Ceylon; and the difficulties of dealing with the people of Port Sa'id, Egypt, offer intriguing glimpses into the world at the height of the imperialist age. His impressions of the French, the Americans, and the Vietnamese are also valuable for understanding the era. At first, he was taken aback by the lack of Asian brotherhood shown by the Vietnamese. However, after seeing the abuse heaped on them by the French, in sharp contrast to the generally amiable attitude of the French to the Siamese, he understood the role colonialism played in the degradation of a people.

The transportation and medical troops supported the AEF in the Meuse-Argonne Offensive in the later summer and fall of 1918. Sergeant Kaysorn described the hardships, dangers, and frustrations of the Siamese in the campaign. Many of the Siamese became ill during the first wave of the Spanish flu, which fortunately left those who recovered immune to the later, more deadly wave. As a result, the Siamese, although they lost troops to the disease, apparently had a lower death rate, which the Siamese soldiers attributed to the natural immunity of Asians. After the Armistice, the Siamese transportation soldiers supported the French army in the occupation of the Rhineland to pressure Germany into signing the Treaty of Versailles.

The Siamese soldiers spent several months in the Rhineland, serving first in Mussbach and later in Hochspeyer. The European winter left a strong impression on the sergeant. Coming from a tropical country, a typical winter in the Rhineland was a miserable ordeal for the Siamese. Equally chilly was the initial reception from the Germans, and Kaysorn had to grapple with his feelings about living among people he recently had seen as the enemy. Eventually, warmer relations grew, but he became disappointed by some of his colleagues who took German girlfriends, which he believed brought shame to the Siamese army.

In all, the Siamese Expeditionary Force lost nineteen soldiers during the war, fourteen of whom died from the Spanish flu. Sergeant Kaysorn commented much less on the return voyage to Bangkok, but he did describe the tumultuous welcome the soldiers received. Upon their return to Siam, the pilots and aircraft mechanics formed the nucleus of what became the Royal Thai Air Force. Phusrisom added information on Kaysorn's life after his return, and sadly it was not a happy tale. On his way to his home after his discharge, carrying his military service pay and the money the king gave him for his chronicle, Kaysorn was robbed and left penniless. He eventually married and had a family, but his wife died and he fell into alcoholism and homelessness, possibly from what today would be called post-traumatic stress disorder. He eventually would be rescued by one of his daughters but later died in a road accident when he was 76.

Soldiers of Siam joins Stefan Hell's *Siam and World War I: An International History* (River Books) from 2017 as the only currently available works in English about Siam in the Great War. Whereas Hell placed events in Siam at the center while also exploring the larger context of Siam's participation, *Soldiers of Siam* is mostly the story of a single observant Siamese soldier, providing a less academic but more personal account. Kaysorn's observations of the various people he encountered during his journey and in France offer vivid images of a world that no longer exists. In a larger context, *Soldiers of Siam* provides an understanding of why small countries sometimes join alliances or participate in wars seemingly outside of their immediate interests. As such, *Soldiers of Siam* offers a case study of how smaller countries can successfully navigate the treacherous waters of a major war to their advantage.

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

NO SACRIFICE TOO GREAT: THE 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION IN WORLD WAR II

By Gregory Fontenot

University of Missouri Press, 2023
Pp. xxi, 571. $37

Review by Timothy A. Willging

The 1st Infantry Division is the oldest continuously serving division in the U.S. Army and is among its most heralded. Although the unit has amassed an impressive combat record stretching from World War I through the Global War on Terrorism, it is perhaps best known for its achievements in World War II. The division features prominently in the works of such eminent authors and historians as Stephen Ambrose, Rick Atkinson, and John C. McManus. However, it is surprising that it has taken more than eighty years for a serious academic study of the unit to appear on the market. Retired Col. Gregory Fontenot's timely study thus fills a significant void in the historiography of the American Army in World War II. Fontenot makes a compelling argument in this exceptional unit history that the 1st Infantry Division succeeded by absorbing lessons learned and proving itself adept at adapting to rapidly changing battlefield circumstances and situations.

The author is eminently qualified to write this history of the 1st Infantry Division during the largest conflict in the Army's history. Fontenot commanded a tank battalion within the division during Operation Desert Storm. He is also a gifted author and historian whose previous works include *On Point: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom* (Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004), *The 1st Infantry Division and the U.S. Army Transformed: Road to Victory in Desert Storm, 1970–1991* (University of Missouri Press, 2017), and the exceptional unit history *Loss and Redemption at St. Vith: The 7th Armored Division in the Battle of the Bulge* (University of Missouri Press, 2019).

Fontenot's narrative comprises fifteen chapters. The first chapter explains the context of the interwar period, including the development of doctrine, the enhancement of professional military education, and the organization and sustainment of units. Chapter 2 focuses on how the 1st Infantry Division trained for war and deployed to Europe. The subsequent twelve chapters contain the meat of the author's narrative, chronicling the division's actions in the Mediterranean Theater of Operations. Finally, Chapter 15 details the division's transition into occupation duty and the outcomes of various individuals highlighted in the narrative, and offers the author's conclusions.

The 1st Infantry Division served more than fourteen months in combat during World War II, fighting in nine separate campaigns and suffering more than 20,000 casualties. In each campaign, the division learned and grew as an effective combat force. Fontenot writes that "for those in the 1st Infantry Division, learning, training, and adaptation were continuous processes because they had to be" (3). After the division's first successful assault landing in Operation Torch, the unit suffered reverses at the beginning of the Tunisian Campaign. Despite these setbacks, the 1st Infantry Division persevered, learning the importance of digging in and conducting effective reconnaissance, with the unit's performance consequently improving by the Battle of El Guettar and the final drive on Tunis.

The 1st Infantry Division built on its experiences in North Africa during Operation Husky, the Allied invasion of Sicily. Fontenot observes that in this campaign, the division first functioned as the "combined arms team the army had intended it to be" (175). The Big Red One also had to adapt to wildly changing terrain, from coastal plains to rugged mountains, while simultaneously confronting a determined enemy. Although the unit was praised for its performance in Sicily, most notably in repulsing a German counterattack on the beachhead, there remained room for improvement, such as the need to employ suppressing fire effectively rather than only engaging observed targets.

Fontenot efficiently describes the transition in division command between Maj. Gen. Terry de la Mesa Allen and Maj. Gen. Clarence R. Huebner. The division's soldiers loved and respected Allen so much that they were not particularly warm toward their new commander. Huebner is perhaps underrated but proved an exceptional division commander. Fontenot describes how Huebner strove to enhance discipline within the 1st Infantry Division and to improve marksmanship and physical fitness, while also encouraging lower-level leaders to demonstrate initiative. These efforts paid dividends when the division next saw combat.

In the weeks and months after its famous assault landing at Omaha Beach, the division constantly transitioned between confronting an entrenched enemy—first in the Normandy hedgerows and later in the streets of Aachen and the forbidding Hürtgen Forest—and the fast-paced open warfare during the race across France and the drive into Germany in 1945. Amid these varied operations, the division faced high turnover because of casualties and the consequent need to incorporate a steady stream of replacements. Fontenot notes that Huebner instituted a school for replacements that instilled esprit de corps and taught marksmanship, and that NCOs imparted "tribal wisdom" and supervised on-the-job training at the company level and below (519). Fontenot convincingly assesses that the 1st Infantry Division achieved the status of an expert division because it effectively used learning to change its behavior to succeed on the dynamic modern battlefield.

The book is well-written, superbly organized, and impeccably researched. Authors and historians will find value in mining Fontenot's notes and bibliography when conducting their research. The author also includes an exceptional photo essay that will help both casual readers and more experienced scholars visualize the division's wartime experience. Additionally, the author includes many maps throughout the work, which aid in understanding complex

military operations. These maps depict operations at various echelons, from battalion through army group, and experienced military professionals and historians will find them invaluable. However, more general readers may struggle with the complexity of maps depicting higher-echelon operations.

Although *No Sacrifice Too Great* certainly sets a new standard for divisional histories, it also reveals opportunities for further research. Limitations on size and scope limit Fontenot's ability to examine closely the extent to which the 1st Infantry Division may or may not have been unique in its ability to absorb lessons learned and adapt to changing battlefield circumstances. Some readers may emerge curious as to whether other units with similarly extensive combat records, such as the 3d and 9th Infantry Divisions, possessed an ability to adapt to dynamic combat conditions in a manner comparable to that of the Big Red One. In 2010, Mark E. Grotelueschen released *The AEF Way of War: The American Army and Combat in World War I*, a groundbreaking study examining how four American divisions in World War I adapted to combat on the Western Front. Although historians such as Michael D. Doubler and Peter R. Mansoor have examined how the Army learned during World War II, a study covering American divisions in the European Theater of Operations during World War II, like that of Grotelueschen's book, certainly would find an avid readership.

Fontenot's first-rate history of the 1st Infantry Division will prove invaluable for scholars and general readers interested in understanding the U.S. Army's experience in the Mediterranean and European Theaters of World War II. Moreover, this work should be required reading for Army leaders at all levels, as it compellingly depicts how an excellent unit trains for combat and continually adapts to the ever-changing battlefield.

Timothy A. Willging served for seven years in the Regular Army as a field artillery and military intelligence officer, including two deployments in support of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. He currently serves in the District of Columbia Army National Guard and is a Department of Defense civilian. He earned his bachelor's degree in history from Radford University, a master's degree in military history from Norwich University, and a master's degree in diplomacy, also from Norwich University.



IMPLACABLE FOES: THE WAR IN THE PACIFIC, 1944–1945

BY WALDO HEINRICHS AND MARC GALLICCHIO

Oxford University Press, 2017
Pp. xvi, 714. $24.95

REVIEW BY SHANNON GRANVILLE

Implacable Foes: The War in the Pacific, 1944–1945, was one of three recipients of the 2018 Bancroft Prize for American history writing from Columbia University. Its authors, Waldo Heinrichs and Marc Gallicchio, took on the daunting task of writing a single-volume history of the final eighteen months of World War II in the Pacific Ocean. Even more ambitious, their history covers not only the actual fighting but also the higher-level decision-making and underlying economic and social factors that shaped the course of the conflict.

Although the United States entered the war in December 1941 with a "Europe First" grand strategy, the Japanese threat in the Pacific meant that a nearly equal proportion of U.S. military resources soon flowed to both fronts. The narrative of *Implacable Foes* begins in late 1943 when the United States and its Pacific Ocean allies had managed to halt the Japanese expansion and were preparing to drive Japanese forces out of their island fortifications and entrenchments. The authors give detailed accounts of the major combat engagements in the Pacific during this period, from New Guinea and the Solomon Islands to the landings at Okinawa. Central to this push was the American war economy, as assembly lines ran around the clock to produce the ships, munitions, and related supplies needed to retake occupied islands and control the surrounding seas. At the same time, the authors make it clear that the fighting in the Pacific took place on many different levels, and highlight various instances in which interservice rivalries and personality conflicts among key political and military leaders exacerbated disagreements over strategy and policy. Even as Allied forces advanced across the ocean, the U.S. political leadership had to contend with a public that was tiring of war and anxious to know how much more hard work and difficulty would be needed to secure Japan's surrender. *Implacable Foes* suggests that this sense that U.S. public opinion would not support a lengthy war of attrition on the Japanese mainland, at the cost of many thousands of lives on both sides, was a contributing factor to President Harry S. Truman's authorization of the atomic bombings of the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945. This is by no means a novel argument about the climatic decision-making of the war. However, it does emphasize the idea that purely logistical calculations of troop strength and material resources are but one element of many in military history.

Implacable Foes is at its best when it looks at the unique aspects of the war in the Pacific. The vastness of open water between the U.S. West Coast and the Pacific Ocean island chains forced Allied logisticians to figure out new ways to keep the fighting forces supplied over long distances. Tropical diseases like malaria felled soldiers, sailors, and marines as readily as a burst of Japanese bullets. The enemy's approach to combat, in general, was unlike that of any other foe: imperial Japanese forces almost always chose death over surrender, often in the form of suicide attacks. As the authors point out in the introduction, "no organized unit of the Japanese Imperial Army surrendered during the entire Pacific war until they were ordered to do so by the emperor" at the end of the war (7). Allied troops therefore had to spend considerable time in mopping-up operations, using grenades and flamethrowers to eliminate scattered pockets of Japanese soldiers hidden in

countless bunkers, caves, and trenches. The crude, brutal nature of the ground war in the Pacific often took a heavy mental toll on those who fought—though by this point in the conflict, doctors were more likely to regard service members affected by "combat fatigue" as casualties rather than cowards and offer them treatment and care. The Allied armed forces did their best to counter the myriad tactical, logistical, and medical problems posed by wartime, and the authors present a compelling account of the various innovations in warfare that came about because of the military's experiences in the Pacific.

Even for a book of this length, *Implacable Foes* is not a comprehensive account of the war. Heinrichs and Gallicchio are writing primarily about the conflict in the Pacific Ocean, not the broader Asia-Pacific Theatre. Those who are interested in, for example, the later years of the China-Burma-India campaigns or the final struggle between France and Japan over Indochina will need to consult other sources. However, the title of the book itself is also a little misleading. As another reviewer noted, "The Japanese story is told only enough to make sense of the American story."[1] U.S. signals intelligence had been able to intercept Japanese diplomatic communications (code-named Magic) even before the attack on Pearl Harbor, and the book does include information from these and other wartime sources to provide a window into high-level strategic discussions among the Japanese leadership. Nevertheless, for a volume titled *Implacable Foes*—in the plural—the fact that it is so overwhelmingly devoted to the U.S. perspective does diminish the strength of the historical narrative.

One other note of caution for potential readers: in the paperback review copy received by this magazine, at least five of the twelve maps are printed in ways that cut off text or other information. An online preview of the book's electronic format, however, does not show any such formatting issues with the maps. It is difficult to know whether this problem is unique to the specific review copy received or to a more general issue with the printing of the paperback edition. Readers should check their copies for map quality.

For those interested in gaining a broad general sense of the scope of U.S. activity and decision-making during the later years of the conflict in the Pacific Theater, *Implacable Foes* is a solid work. Waldo Heinrichs (who passed away in 2019) served as an infantry soldier in World War II in the European Theatre, and the combat-oriented sections show an attention to detail that hints at an author's personal understanding of the experiences of frontline troops. The sections dealing with the home front and the war economy are also strengths of the book. Even without a more complete picture of the Japanese side of the war, it tells the story it sets out to tell.

Shannon Granville is the senior editor with the U.S. Army Center of Military History. Previously, she was editor and deputy publications director with the Woodrow Wilson Center Press, where her responsibilities included editing manuscripts for the Cold War International History Project series copublished with Stanford University Press. She has a master's degree in international history from the London School of Economics and a bachelor's degree in history from the College of William and Mary. From July 2022 to June 2023, she was a member of the 26th class of Mansfield Fellows, working with counterparts in the Japanese government to study Japanese approaches to military history.

NOTE

1. Michael Sherry, review of *Implacable Foes: The War in the Pacific, 1944–1945*, by Waldo Heinrichs and Marc Gallicchio, *Journal of American History* 106, no. 3 (Dec 2019): 806, https://doi.org/10.1093/jahist/jaz621.



ISLAND INFERNOS: THE U.S. ARMY'S PACIFIC WAR ODYSSEY, 1944

By John C. McManus

Dutton Caliber, 2021
Pp. xiv, 637. $34

Review by Christian A. Garner

As tensions continue to rise and competition activities increase in the United States Indo-Pacific Command Area of Responsibility, American military leaders continue to grapple with the implications and necessities of how to project and sustain a combat-credible force capable of operating in the unforgiving region. Having to contend with the vast Pacific Ocean and the disparate, archipelagic nature of the various land masses, modern military practitioners have realized that the lessons learned in combat in Europe and the Middle East over the past four decades do not translate cleanly there, if at all. Instead, operating in the region requires a joint force capable of conducting distributed command and control while embracing the tenets of mission command to synchronize multiple operations in time and space. Arguably, World War II offers the last large-scale example of sustained combat operations in the theater and offers lessons aplenty to those interested.

The importance of the sea and air domains within the region remains readily apparent,

but one cannot discount the ground domain and the scores of soldiers required to campaign and fight in the challenging terrain. Although the Marines immediately come to mind when considering Pacific operations, John C. McManus's *Island Infernos* rightly identifies the U.S. Army as the primary executor of ground operations in the region and captures the essence of the Army's role in the crucible of ground combat in the Pacific during World War II. The second work in his three-part series on the Army in the Pacific during World War II, the author devotes this book to Army operations in 1944 and the actions that ultimately led to the Allied advances across the theater. At the core of *Island Infernos* and its narrative, McManus details the transition of the Army from a force previously put on its heels at the onset of hostilities to one battle-hardened by tough fighting against a tenacious enemy in demanding terrain.

McManus takes the reader through each operation in that year, offering a blow-by-blow perspective of the tactical and operational actions that achieved overarching strategic objectives. With an overall structure to the work that is both chronologic and thematic, the reader quickly becomes familiar with Army operational names like Flintlock, Galahad, and Forager and how these operations fit within the greater strategic vision of theater-level commanders General Douglas MacArthur and Admiral Chester W. Nimitz. Likewise, the author examines the motives, decision-making, rivalries, and interpersonal relationships between the various commanders at echelons within the theater. Although their actions often were dwarfed by those of outsized personalities like MacArthur or General Joseph W. "Vinegar Joe" Stilwell, McManus introduces the reader to corps, division, and battalion commanders who executed the orders on the ground and how their interactions with each other and their joint service counterparts enabled or hindered operational execution.

While covering the commanders and decisions to launch each operation, the author also provides the tactical perspectives of the soldiers who patrolled and fought throughout the Pacific. Having to grapple daily with an environment as hostile as the enemy it faced, U.S. soldiers incurred a tremendous psychological and physical cost to defeat their adversary. McManus admirably conveys the stress, fear, and trauma experienced by the soldiers who stormed the beaches, patrolled the jungles, and created the necessary infrastructure to campaign in the region, all while being under the constant threat of contact from opposing Japanese forces. The result is a rich narrative that seamlessly weaves individual perspectives from soldiers of all ranks and experiences across the theater. It is a comprehensive account that humanizes the war by portraying the experiences of those who lived through the Pacific ground campaigns of 1944. Although not purposefully discounting the importance of any individual operation or the associated cost in human casualties, the length and treatment of each chapter and its associated operation starkly depict the time and human capital invested during each operation of 1944.

With an invaluable understanding of the ground war in the Pacific and the commanders who led in the theater, McManus's work will serve as the authoritative, modern account of the Army's contributions during World War II. Accessible to both the casual reader and the academic environment, *Island Infernos* is the definitive account of the soldiers who, in 1944, tenaciously fought through the mountains, jungles, and sand to bring the war to the doorstep of the Home Islands and set the conditions to bring Japan to its knees. Although on the verge of ultimate victory, combat operations by nearly 700,000 Army soldiers in the Pacific Theater offered "troubling portents of the American postwar future . . . rapidly modernizing, ever deadlier weapons, flawed alliances, and the labyrinthine struggle for influence in Asia and the Pacific, a crucial enterprise that the United States has never yet mastered nor relinquished" (2). For these reasons, modern American military leaders would be served well by studying the struggles and successes that McManus highlights. The Pacific Ocean remains vast, and any future conflict or campaign will require the Joint Force's full capabilities to project, support, and sustain combat power. The U.S. Army will once again be the choice to execute sustained ground combat in the disparate geography and inhospitable terrain within the region.

Lt. Col. Christian A. Garner is an active-duty Army officer currently serving as the deputy commanding officer of the 201st Expeditionary Military Intelligence Brigade at Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Washington. A former assistant professor of history at the United States Military Academy, he has spent all his operational field grade time serving in the INDOPACOM Area of Responsibility.



RITCHIE BOY SECRETS: HOW A FORCE OF IMMIGRANTS AND REFUGEES HELPED WIN WORLD WAR II

By Beverley Driver Eddy

Stackpole Books, 2021
Pp. viii, 428. $28.95

Review by Jack M. Crossman

Ritchie Boy Secrets: How a Force of Immigrants and Refugees Helped Win World War II, by Beverley Driver Eddy, should be considered a continuation and expansion of the ground-breaking, Academy Award–winning documentary *The Ritchie Boys* (2004) directed by Christian Bauer and Bruce Henderson's 2018 book *Sons and Soldiers* (William Morrow, 2018). All try to explain or relate the wonderful story of the European nationals who, in World War II, volunteered to use their intelligence, language, and culture as specialists trained at the secret Military Intelligence Training Center at Camp Ritchie, Maryland. From

1942 to the end of the war, the soldiers proved immeasurably important to the war effort. Their talents led to the successful Allied victory and to peace.

Eddy has compiled an exhaustive record of not only of Ritchie Boys' training, but also of their employment in different theaters of war and their engagement in the war crimes trials in Germany and Japan. Such specialists! What a treasure of talent to aid us in our endeavors against the Axis, and immense kudos to the folks who thought to bring their unique assets to bear.

The soldiers, with their language and cultural experiences, leveraged both to help wage psychological warfare against our enemies, interrogate prisoners of war, and compile vital references about the Axis military to aid the fighting forces in their fight to victory. Without them, who knows how long or how different the war would have been?

Interestingly, when I was in the Army, after intelligence analyst training at Fort Huachuca, Arizona, I was assigned to the U.S. Army Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center–General Intelligence Production Division at Fort Bragg, North Carolina (now Fort Liberty), part of the Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM). When I reported to the fort, no one knew what our unit was or where it was located. I accidentally encountered someone from my unit in a large parking lot during lunchtime and found out where it was. It was diagonally across the parking lot from where we were speaking.

We conducted unclassified and classified research on countries' commanders to learn more about the world in the Middle East, Caribbean, and African areas. I researched, wrote, copied, and typed reports and requests for information on some of the same topics as the Ritchie Boys did (order of battle, infrastructure, attitudes, personnel analysis, and more), just not on the same geographic areas or enemies. So, from that perspective, I am aware and familiar with the type of work these fine soldiers accomplished through their work in World War II.

Eddy traces the founding of Camp Ritchie up through World War II and beyond, illustrating it with a great amount of period photographs and diagrams. The narrative moves from the first class to be trained at Camp Ritchie, to what kind of troops trained there, through the various sections, interrogations of prisoners of war, order of battle (the military intelligence research section), the mobile radio broadcasting company, to the counterintelligence corps of the Army, and the Office of Strategic Services.

The author does not ignore the Pacific Theater, outlining the unique talents and experiences of the Nisei soldiers, and including the Ritchie Boys' contributions to war crimes trials there and beyond. Their contribution to dealing with the end of the war and the war crimes trials is detailed and balanced.

The twenty appendices and voluminous bibliography are especially helpful and noteworthy in a book whose subject occurred over fifty years ago. Eddy's exhaustive research is present on every page. Being the third book dedicated to these overlooked heroes, it serves to bridge numerous gaps and essentially acts as a textbook, aiding researchers and readers in understanding these discreet professionals.

Jack M. Crossman is a retired Army master sergeant with more than thirty years of active and reserve service, including senior assignments in intelligence, operations, and personnel. He served in the continental United States, Germany, and Bosnia, and also served during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM with a Military Transition Team reporting to the 1st Infantry Division. After retirement, he taught at the Joint Intelligence Combat Training Center at Fort Huachuca, Arizona, for three years.



ARMING EAST ASIA: DETERRING CHINA IN THE EARLY COLD WAR

By Eric Setzekorn

Naval Institute Press, 2023
Pp. xi, 307. $31.95

Review by Katherine (Hyun-Joo) Mooney

Arming East Asia: Deterring China in the Early Cold War explores President Dwight D. Eisenhower's Mutual Security Program (MSP) in East and Southeast Asia, shedding light on the administration's efforts to contain China during the early Cold War. The author, Eric Setzekorn, contends that, in contrast to his predecessor Harry S. Truman and successors John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson, Eisenhower gradually shifted focus to mutual security efforts in East Asia during his presidency. Furthermore, Setzekorn argues that the MSP, along with military aid in the Far East more generally, has not been taken seriously as an integral component of a surprisingly comprehensive strategy employed by the Eisenhower administration. Overall, Eisenhower's focus on reinforcing local military forces instead of deploying U.S. troops in the region was cost-effective and efficient in Taiwan (formerly Formosa) and (South) Korea and somewhat successful in South Vietnam, Thailand, and Japan.

The Eisenhower administration advocated for mutual security in the Far East using five key points: (1) provide military aid to establish a vital East Asian alliance against Communist military threats; (2) target the aid to reduce allies' defense spending and allow them to recover economically from World War II; (3) support cost-effective development and maintenance of military strength compared to deploying U.S. forces directly; (4) position East Asian partners' forces to deter and respond to hostile actions; and (5) gradually enhance the economy and governance of East Asian partner nations, offering a long-term advantage in the Cold War and an alternative to Communist development models. In doing so, the United States invested significant time and billions of dollars in developing strong local military forces, first in Taiwan and South Korea and then, from 1956 onward, in Southeast Asia and Japan—despite domestic pushback due to "donor fatigue" (96). By the end of Eisenhower's two terms, more than 1.4 million soldiers in East Asia had been trained and supported through American military assistance. These mutual security policies also contributed significantly to positive economic growth in the ensuing decades.

The book's structure follows a broad chronological approach, moving smoothly from the Truman administration to the Eisenhower years from 1952 to 1960, and concluding with a brief assessment of the legacies of Eisenhower's MSP and the enduring challenges in these regions from the Kennedy administration to the present day. Chapter 1 reviews the historical backdrop of mutual security policies inherited from the Truman administration and the lingering distrust between the United States and Far East nations. Chapter 2 analyzes the strategy and policies of the Eisenhower administration during its initial term and its aim of expanding and reshaping military and economic aid for sustained deterrence in East Asia. Chapters 3 and 4 illustrate successes in Taiwan and South Korea despite hurdles. Chapter 3 delves into the development of South Korean military and economic sectors with U.S. assistance. Chapter 4 focuses on Taiwan, serving as the initial test case for Eisenhower's approach, exploring the impact of American military aid and advice on this regional partner. Chapter 5 examines revisions and reforms to mutual security efforts prompted by public and congressional criticisms, which intensified from 1953 and peaked in 1957 to 1958.

Chapters 6 and 7 differ from the previous chapters by focusing on the Eisenhower administration's challenges in Southeast Asia and Japan from 1956 to 1960. In Eisenhower's second term, a commitment to continuity, limited political support in Congress, and a relatively unchanging strategic posture in East Asia hindered these policies. Dealing with South Vietnam, Thailand, and Japan required flexible, ad hoc responses, which were generally unfavorable in Washington, particularly as these nations presented challenges as security partners. Chapter 6 scrutinizes security assistance policies in Southeast Asia, with emphasis on South Vietnam and Thailand, highlighting their distinct developmental challenges. Ultimately, internal security issues in South Vietnam and Thailand fell between the military and civilian realms. Chapter 7 centers on Japan and the tensions between the U.S. and Japanese governments throughout Eisenhower's presidency. Japan was not fully integrated into an American military program until the mid-1950s. Japan lacked a strong local political leader who could advocate for military partnership, unlike the "strongman" relationships with leaders in Taiwan and South Korea (108). Finally, Chapter 8 assesses the handover to the incoming Kennedy administration and evaluates the successes and failures of nearly a decade of mutual security assistance.

Setzekorn is clear from the beginning that his study aligns with the revisionist perspective, affirming that Eisenhower pursued a well-structured, efficiently executed, and ultimately successful East Asian policy centered on mutual security. Revisionism can be traced back to the 1970s, when a shift in critiques emerged as a new generation of historians, influenced by the Vietnam War and Watergate, began recognizing Eisenhower's adept and subtle exercise of power. Historian Fred I. Greenstein characterized it as the "hidden-hand presidency" (6). Released government documents and Eisenhower's personal materials provided more insight into the formulation of crucial decisions and policies made during the 1950s, which Eisenhower had preferred to shape and discuss confidentially. Setzekorn proves through archival evidence that Eisenhower was efficient, focused, and often relentless in pursuing his defense policies abroad.

In addressing the contemporary challenges posed by China's assertive influence in East Asia, Setzekorn argues that Eisenhower's policies from 1953 to 1961 offer valuable insights. The book underscores the importance of strategically building allies and military capabilities through military education and advocating for cost-efficient and sustainable deterrence strategies. Setzekorn's meticulous study fills a significant gap in Cold War military history and provides lessons for today's policymakers in dealing with the complexities of China in the twenty-first century. For instance, Eisenhower believed that land power, encompassing both U.S. ground forces and allied armies, was crucial for deterring China and shaping broader regional security. In the 1950s, like today, land power demonstrated resilience and interconnectedness and provided a credible deterrent without posing a threat to potential adversaries. Overall, Setzekorn is correct in his overarching argument: exploring the MSP provides insights into U.S. national security strategies and the rivalry with China and offers a new perspective on the Eisenhower administration and its approach to foreign affairs during the Cold War era.

Katherine (Hyun-Joo) Mooney is a Colonel Charles Young Fellow at the U.S. Army Center of Military History and a PhD candidate in African diplomatic history at the Ohio State University. Her research evaluates Zambian state-building in the immediate postindependence era (1964–1980), and Zambia's role in the competition for diplomatic recognition between Taiwan and China.



IN STRANGE COMPANY: AN AMERICAN SOLDIER WITH MULTINATIONAL FORCES IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND IRAQ

BY ROLAND J. TISO JR.

Casemate Publishers, 2023
Pp. xi, 401. $37.95

REVIEW BY JOHN P. RINGQUIST

Winston Churchill is credited with saying, "There is only one thing worse than fighting with allies, and that is fighting without them."[1] The U.S. Army has frequently worked with allies during United Nations (UN) operations such as the Korean War and the interventions in Haiti, and in NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) operations like the peacekeeping missions in Bosnia and Kosovo. An airborne infantryman with experience in Korea and Panama, Col. Roland Tiso Jr. performed multiple successive UN observer duties in Kuwait with the UN Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission, then as chief of staff of the Multinational Force and Observers in the United States Task Force Sinai. Eventually, Colonel Tiso became the commander of Task Force Sinai, part of the Multinational Force and Observers peacekeeping organization in Egypt. Tiso's final assignment with the international forces as chief of staff and deputy chief of staff of operations (C–3) for the Coalition Military Assistance Training Team assigned to build the new Iraqi army, serving as the hallmark for his multinational service.

In his book *In Strange Company*, Colonel Tiso sheds light on the underreported role that United States military personnel and their foreign partners performed in peacekeeping and stabilization operations in the Middle East, notably in the Sinai Peninsula, Kuwait, and Iraq. Uncovering the complex relationship between the U.S. military and its allies with a deft and precise hand, Tiso leaves few stones unturned in citing the sometimes-ugly sources of friction and competition in these relationships. The author recognizes his succession of assignments with allies and is quick to ascribe his success in these environments as stemming from his youth in racially and culturally diverse settings. It gave him an appreciation for distinct cultures and languages and for people of different races. Throughout his book, he reiterates how these early experiences translated into the skills required for him to be successful in multinational operations.

Colonel Tiso cites the keys to his success as arising from an ability to adapt to new surroundings quickly and the mental awareness to appreciate the nuances of new situations. The numerous stories and anecdotes that form the substance in much of *In Strange Company*'s chapters add a personal dimension to his descriptions of the plans and processes that went into multinational operations—especially the 2003 invasion and postwar stabilization operations in Iraq. The author's recollections within *In Strange Company* are equally professional memoir and personal revelations of the pressures, political considerations, and internal staff processes that shaped successful alliances.

Colonel Tiso's leadership lessons start early in his story. His statement on page fifteen that "change is not something with which multinational organizations are comfortable" still rings true today—through the years of multinational efforts to combat terrorism, to the control of violent extremism across the Sahel, and even to the reaction to Russia's invasion of Ukraine. It quickly becomes apparent in *In Strange Company* that Tiso is a systems person with a meticulous leadership philosophy and focus on real-world mission readiness. First, in the Sinai narrative and then in the Iraq stories, Tiso demonstrates through anecdotes how care for soldiers and their welfare transcends nationality, race, culture, and language. Readers cannot help but be impressed with how the author encourages actively interacting with foreign troop contingents, a theme that he repeats throughout *In Strange Company*.

The author does valuable service with his explanation of how world politics drove the need for closer cooperation with allies and alliances worldwide in the post–Cold War period as the United States planned to reduce its military through a force drawdown. Reducing U.S. forces also affected the forces available to confront regional threats in the Middle East, Korea, and elsewhere. U.S. war plans for Iraq therefore focused on how to destroy potential threats, despite advice to retain sufficient types and numbers of U.S. forces to reconstruct and secure postwar Iraq. The lack of available U.S. forces and two subsequent major political decisions made postwar security difficult to attain: the choice to disband the Iraqi Regular Army and the decision to bar former Ba'ath Party members from serving in the new Iraqi government. Ultimately, these decisions, in tandem with the ongoing U.S. campaign in Afghanistan, created the need to reconstitute the Iraqi army and work with international allies to secure Iraq in the aftermath of the invasion.

Colonel Tiso has captured masterfully the triumph and frustration of working in a paradigm parallel to the U.S. military but with foreign forces. When his story expands to cover the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the behind-the-scenes explanation of the challenges that he faced while rebuilding the New Iraqi Army is a sobering reminder of the effort required for any disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration effort. These detailed and engaging chapters offer gripping accounts of the unanticipated consequences of disbanding the Iraqi government and army. The author's efforts to build the New Iraqi Army and his service with the Polish-led Multinational Division (MND) offer thrilling accounts of Poland's performance as the lead NATO ally amid a twenty-three-member international contingent. The unfiltered assessment of the MND's command and organizational mix of languages, cultures, and ways of conducting military operations would have challenged any command. On top of it, the author reminds us of the national

contingents' need to inform their own Ministers of Defense before following MND orders. The author navigated those demands and imparts some lasting words of wisdom for future advisers and staff members in the same position, one of which resounds through the last part of *In Strange Company*: the need to rely less on aggressive or kinetic behavior and more on a passive approach in potentially tense situations involving civilians. His service with the MND and its polyglot members is a brisk reminder that allies do not have an obligation to think the same way about how to resolve problems and the need for all leaders to have a common operating picture informed by consensus and not unilateral action. Chapter 24's recounting of operations in the aftermath of the death of two American personnel is a powerful argument for understanding planning, commander's intent, and civil-military considerations before any military response, especially in an urban insurgency.

Throughout *In Strange Company*, there is a tone of humble appreciation of the author's opportunity to serve with international partners. Colonel Tiso has written a fascinating memoir with all the elements of a military travelogue while embedding plenty of professional guidance for readers. His book serves as an excellent primer for any U.S. military personnel considering being an adviser, staff in a multinational unit, or a foreign area officer. The nature of any duty as an observer or multinational staff member demands a baseline of personal discipline, acuity, and diligence. Tiso amplifies this obligation with examples from his service while remembering to honor the troops with whom he served.

Lt. Col. John P. Ringquist, PhD, is an instructor at the Command and General Staff School in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. His research focuses on contemporary military affairs, technology, and African security affairs. He is the author of articles on counterinsurgency, the intersection of climate, technology, and security, and the African American soldiers of the Kansas-raised 79th United States Colored Infantry Regiment in the Civil War West. His duty assignments frequently have involved working with NATO allies, foreign military partners, and the delicate civil-military relations that Colonel Tiso referenced so well.

NOTE

1. "D-Day: FDR and Churchill's "Mighty Endeavor," n.d., Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library and Museum, https://www.fdrlibrary.org/mighty-endeavor.

(*Continued from page 4*)

to serve overseas during World War II. It is at once a very traditional, artifact-based exhibition, but displays the touch and educational focus of the best public history programs. It illustrates for soldiers and public audiences that service to the nation comes in many forms, and that the U.S. Army has always fostered diversity in its ranks, and that through their service they challenged the Army to rethink its attitude toward the prevailing racial and gender stereotypes of the day. Most critically, it illustrates the "Double V" campaign that African American soldiers waged in World War II to secure their rights as citizens while defeating fascism abroad.

Fort Novosel, Alabama, the home of the U.S. Army Aviation Center of Excellence, has opened the fourth Army Training Support Facility. The William A. Howell Training Support Facility is named for the first curator of the Army Aviation Collection, who was himself an army aviator in World War II and Korea. It houses a series of collections of aircraft and systems that curators arranged for the education of aviation soldiers attending training at Fort Novosel. The facility also displays some one-of-a-kind experimental and prototype systems that have never been seen before. It will be a locus of soldier training and community engagement for years to come. The Howell facility demonstrates the Center of Military History's commitment to using the Army's past to train current and future generations of soldiers.

The National Museum of the U.S. Army, located adjacent to Fort Belvoir, Virginia, is home to a new cutting-edge educational experience, "D-Day: Freedom from Above," which tells the story of the American airborne assault on Normandy in June 1944. The exhibit is based on an augmented-reality system that employs tablets to transport visitors into the fields and hedgerows of Normandy, eighty years after the events it chronicles. The exhibition also displays, for the first time in one place, the four Medals of Honor awarded to Army soldiers for their actions during the D-Day landings. In its innovative use of technology, "Freedom from Above" can engage visitors of all backgrounds and interests in the U.S. Army's battle history.

You can learn more about these and many more museum programs at history.army.mil and www.thenmusa.org, as well as by following our museums on Facebook, X, and Instagram.



Coming Soon



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Army History welcomes articles, essays, and commentaries of between 4,000 and 12,000 words on any topic relating to the history of the U.S. Army or to wars and conflicts in which the U.S. Army participated or by which it was substantially influenced. The Army's history extends to the present day, and *Army History* seeks accounts of the Army's actions in ongoing conflicts as well as those of earlier years. The bulletin particularly seeks writing that presents new approaches to historical issues. It encourages readers to submit responses to essays or commentaries that have appeared in its pages and to present cogent arguments on any question (controversial or otherwise) relating to the history of the Army. Such contributions need not be lengthy. Essays and commentaries should be annotated with endnotes, which should be embedded, to indicate the sources relied on to support factual assertions. A manuscript, preferably in Microsoft Word format, should be submitted as an attachment to an email sent to the managing editor at usarmy.mcnair.cmh.mbx.army-history@army.mil.

Army History encourages authors to recommend or provide illustrations to accompany submissions. If authors wish to supply photographs, they may provide them in a digital format with a minimum resolution of 300 dots per inch or as photo prints sent by mail. Authors should provide captions and credits with all images. When furnishing photographs that they did not take, or any photos of art, authors must identify the owners of the photographs and artworks to enable *Army History* to obtain permission to reproduce the images, if necessary.

chief historian's FOOTNOTE

FAREWELL NOTE

Jon T. Hoffman

By the time this issue appears in print, I will have retired after thirty years of service in the U.S. Marine Corps (seventeen active and thirteen reserve) and twenty-two years as a civil servant (including five at the Center of Military History in an earlier incarnation as a division chief). One of the primary tasks of the chief historian is overseeing the publications produced by the Center. During my nearly eight-year stint in this billet, with the able assistance of the editorial board and a stable of high-quality authors, fellows, and graduate research assistants, the Center has produced a significant number of books and monographs.

Among my proudest accomplishments is bringing the United States Army in Vietnam series to the doorstep of completion. Although the Center initiated work on the conflict in 1966, its first volume did not appear until 1983 and only eleven were in print by 2016 when I returned to the Center. One of my early tasks was putting the final touches on Erik Villard's *Combat Operations: Staying the Course, October 1967 to September 1968* (2017), largely completed under my predecessor's watch. After several years of focused effort, other books are soon to arrive. Andy Birtle's *Advice and Support: From Combat Support to Intervention, January 1964 to June 1965* is in page proofs and ready to get printed, and his companion volume covering 1961 to 1963 recently has gone into editing. The editors have completed work on Joel Meyerson and Mark Bradley's *Logistics: The Buildup, 1962 to 1967* and it is undergoing security review by Army Public Affairs for printing approval. Erik is wrapping up post–external panel revisions on *Combat Operations: Year of Transition, October 1968 to December 1969* and it will be in editing this summer. Kevin Boylan's *Combat Operations: Drawdown, January to December 1970* underwent external panel review in late May, and he has completed four of the proposed sixteen chapters of the final combat volume covering January 1971 to March 1973. The sole remaining entry in the series, the second logistics volume, at present has no author assigned, though Kevin would be a natural choice to research and write it.

The Center has made great strides on the U.S. Army After 11 September 2001 series, colloquially known as the Tan Books. Travis Moger's short monograph *Between Desert Storm and Iraqi Freedom: U.S. Army Operations in the Middle East, 1991–2001* (2021) is in print. We have published four of six campaign monographs on Afghanistan with another well underway, and three of six for Iraq with a fourth in progress. Among the major volumes, Nick Schlosser's *U.S. Army Operations in Iraq: The Surge, 2007–2008* is complete and will go into editing when it is declassified. Mark Reardon's *Reforging Babylon's Sword: The U.S. Army's Role in Building the Iraqi Army, 2003–2011* went into editing in April and will be the first big book in the series to make it into print. Six more volumes are in progress. Mason Watson has completed seven of seventeen chapters of *U.S. Army Operations in Iraq: The Campaign Against ISIS, 2012–2021*. Kate Tietzen-Wisdom is completing the first chapter of *U.S. Army Operations in Iraq: Freedom and New Dawn, 2009–2011*. John Mortimer has produced two chapters of *The U.S. Army in Afghanistan: The Surge, 2009–2011*. Mark Folse has written the initial chapter of *The U.S. Army in Afghanistan: The War on Terror Begins, September 2001–March 2002*. Laurence Nelson is working on the prospectus for *The U.S. Army's Role in Building the Afghan Army, 2001–2021*. Paul Cook has drafted four chapters of *The Evolution of U.S. Army Doctrine, 2001–2018*.

The U.S. Army in the Cold War series continues, albeit at a reduced rate as we devote more authors to the Tan Books. The paucity of primary sources after Army recordkeeping began to falter in the 1970s has contributed to the difficulties of completing the series. William Stiver and Don Carter's *The City Becomes a Symbol: The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Berlin, 1945–1949* came out in 2017. In 2022, we printed Thomas Boghardt's *Covert Legions: U.S. Army Intelligence in Germany, 1944–1949*. Thomas has completed six of nineteen chapters of his follow-on volume, *The Invisible Front: U.S. Army Intelligence in Germany, 1949–1961*. Don's *From New Look to Flexible Response: The U.S. Army in National Security, 1953–1963* appeared in 2023. Julie Prieto's *The U.S. Army in Latin America, 1945–1960* underwent external panel review in late May.

The Vietnam fiftieth anniversary campaign monograph series was half complete when I took the reins as chief historian, but the last entry in that commemorative effort will soon be in print. Another one of my early tasks was shepherding production of the ten campaign monographs of the World War I centennial series. We have made considerable progress on the Revolutionary War campaign monographs in preparation for the 250th anniversary of that conflict. The first one will be ready to print this summer, three others are in the editing and production phase, and the remaining nine manuscripts are in varying stages of completion.

In addition, the Center has published a number of special studies and commemorative volumes: Steve Lofgren's *The Highest Level of Skill and Knowledge: A Brief History of U.S. Army Civilians, 1775–2015* (2016), Kathy Nawyn's *The Army G–4* (2018), Bill Donnelly's *Army Readiness Reporting Systems, 1945–2003* (2018), Sarah Forgey's *The Great War: U.S. Army Art* (2018) and *The Great War: U.S. Army Artifacts* (2018), Joe Beard and Shane Makowicki's *The Lincoln Assassination* staff ride guide (2020), Pete Knight's revision of William Robertson's *The Staff Ride: Fundamentals, Experiences, and Techniques* (2020), Eric Setzekorn's *The Office of the Chief of Legislative Liaison: A Brief History* (2021), Bill Donnelly and Jamie Goodall's *The U.S. Army and the COVID–19 Pandemic, January 2020–July 2021* (2021), Joel Herbert and Eric Setzekorn's *The Army Science Board* (2022), Mark Bradley's *Army History and Heritage* (2022), and Jamie Goodall's *A Brief History of the Office of the Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army* (2024), as well as the *Department of the Army Historical Summaries* for fiscal years 2015 through 2022.

It has been a good run of doing what the Center is known for—producing quality, objective histories that tell the Army's story, that will stand the test of time, and that provide the basis for future research and writing by other historians. I have had the pleasure of working with a great group of historians, editors, and visual information specialists that will continue that tradition. It is fitting that my last publication as chief historian will be this Footnote, which marks my transformation into a footnote to the Center's long and storied history.

ARMY HISTORY
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