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"A BOLD EXPERIMENT" THE U.S. ZONE CONSTABULARY IN OCCUPIED GERMANY, 1946–1952

BY M. ASHLEY VANCE

A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE GENERAL SURVEY ACT

BY MATTHEW T. PEARCY



ARMY HISTORY

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RANDY A. GEORGE
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

Official:


MARK F. AVERILL
Administrative Assistant
to the Secretary of the Army
2425707

GARY A. BRITO
General, United States Army
Training and Doctrine Command

Chief of Military History
Charles R. Bowery Jr.

Managing Editor
Bryan J. Hockensmith

Editors
Shannon L. Granville
Deborah A. Stultz

Layout and Design
Michael R. Gill

Cartographer
Matthew T. Boan

Book Review Editor
Pilar A. Lightfoot

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Front cover: Constabulary School students in an armored vehicle in Sonthofen, Germany
National Archives

EDITOR'S JOURNAL

In the Fall 2024 issue of *Army History*, I am excited to offer two engaging articles, a look at some interesting Army artwork, a visit to a new and unique exhibit at the U.S. Army Airborne and Special Operations Museum, and an excellent selection of book reviews.

The first article, by Ashley Vance, looks at a little-studied aspect of the U.S. Army's occupation of Germany after World War II, the U.S. Zone Constabulary. Her examination of this important, but short-lived, unit and its postwar role highlights the Army's improvisation in creating a force that would maintain law and order, secure zonal borders, and support local German police, all while remaining highly mobile. Although the Constabulary existed for only about six years, its impact cannot be understated as it stood at the forefront of a changing Army during the early years of the Cold War.

The second article, by Matthew Pearcy, examines the history of the General Survey Act of 1824, which authorized Army engineers to conduct road and canal surveys. The act, along with another piece of legislation, the Rivers and Harbors Act, would have long-lasting ramifications for the internal infrastructure of the country. These laws would give birth to a new era of civil works and would reshape the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, which still performs many of the duties and activities laid out 200 years ago.

The Art Spotlight in this issue is unique in that it does not focus on finished artwork, but instead looks at a few works in progress and the artist's process. Army artist Sfc. Jason M. Spencer recently traveled to Normandy, France, for the eightieth anniversary of the D-Day landings. While there, he documented many of the ongoing activities in rough sketch form and watercolors, which he uses as reference works for later pieces. This is an interesting look into the creation of official Army art.

This issue's Museum Feature takes readers on a visit to a new exhibit at the U.S. Army Airborne and Special Operations Museum (ASOM) in Fayetteville, North Carolina. Titled *Opening the Vaults*, this exhibit is a collaboration between the three Fort Liberty museums and an Army historical holding: ASOM, the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Museum, the 82d Airborne Division War Memorial Museum, and the History Office of the U.S. Army Reserve Command. It displays seventy rare and never-before-seen artifacts, each piece with its own unique history.

I continue to encourage potential contributors to submit articles on the Revolutionary War period. With the 250th anniversary of the war quickly approaching, I am very interested in publishing articles dealing with various aspects of this conflict. Please see the Call for Submissions box that appears in the pages of each issue for instructions. I strongly suggest that contributors download and familiarize themselves with the Center of Military History Style Guide, which can be found here: https://history.army.mil/Portals/143/Images/AboutCMH/CMH_Style_Guide_2023.pdf.

I always like to close by thanking the small staff here for their hard work and our readers for their continued support. We are always excited about continuing to provide you with high-quality content.

BRYAN J. HOCKENSMITH
MANAGING EDITOR

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THE CHIEF'S CORNER

CHARLES R. BOWERY JR.

HISTORICAL HONESTY AND TRANSPARENCY

As a familiar saying goes, “There is never a wrong time to do the right thing.” In addition to being trained professionals who are educated in the standards of their craft, U.S. Army official historians, archivists, and museum professionals are first and foremost staff officers. They respond to the needs of military and civilian officials for historical information and perspective to support ongoing Army and federal government business. The work that this small community of approximately 500 professionals does is critical to maintaining government transparency and public trust, because it informs leader decisions and government programs daily.

The rigorous historical research, publishing, decision support, and material culture this community provides have been essential to ongoing efforts to engage with the most challenging moments in our past. From the work of the Naming Commission to the Army’s correction of the record to restore honorable service to African American soldiers wrongly accused of mutiny in the World War I era, and continuing in the hundreds of Freedom of Information Act requests that our community supports each year, the Army Historical Program is a key component of our nation’s ability to face its past with honesty.

This does not mean that we have all the answers, however, or that we are able to define an “objective” past. Rather, the constant pursuit of complexity, and of difficult questions, is what matters. This work takes place in a sharply polarized society with access to tremendous amounts of information of dubious reliability, making our jobs more difficult but, if anything, more critical. I am especially proud of the diversity of content and subject matter in *Army History*, because it serves as a great example of the scholarly accomplishments of our community, and of our commitment to honesty and transparency in mobilizing the past for a better future. I am also proud of our hundreds of museum professionals and archivists, who use objects and documents to inform both official inquiries and public engagement with our military. A visit to any one of our thirty museums affirms our commitment to illuminating all aspects of our Army’s 250 years of service to the nation. The sum total of this great work is the ability of our most senior leaders and officials to confront the past with confidence and integrity, to the benefit of our society.



NEWSNOTES

Walter H. Bradford (1945–2024)

Walter H. Bradford, 78, died on 29 May 2024 at his home in Fredericksburg, Virginia. The son of a long-serving Army warrant officer, he was born at Fort Knox, Kentucky. He completed high school in Lawton, Oklahoma, when his father was stationed at Fort Sill. Walter then attended Texas A&M University, receiving his bachelor's degree and being commissioned as an Armor Branch second lieutenant. He soon saw service in Vietnam, received two Purple Hearts, and was honorably discharged from Army active duty as a first lieutenant.

He then began his civilian government service with the National Park Service in Harpers Ferry, West Virginia, where he was involved in exhibit design. While employed there, he somehow managed to find time to earn a certificate in fashion and costume design and an additional degree from the Maryland School of Art and Design. Subsequently, he entered his principal employment for many years, serving as a museum curator in the Collections Branch, Museums Division, U.S. Army Center of Military History. Many of these years were spent at the branch location near Franklin Square in downtown Washington, D.C. He also provided significant design input for the Army's Museum Support Center at Fort Belvoir, then in the planning phase, as well as supporting the campaign for the building of the National Museum of the U.S. Army. Most importantly, with his knowledge of Army material culture, he was an often-used and invaluable resource and mentor to his fellow curators in the branch, and to personnel at the various Army field museums. His knowledge of Army history was encyclopedic, and he was the resident expert on uniforms.

He also was consulted frequently by the film and television industries, providing detailed and historically accurate information on uniforms and equipment for such movies as *The Thin Red Line* (1998) and *Saving Private Ryan* (1998).

Walter was a Fellow of the Company of Military Historians and continued his research in Army material culture in retirement, and was working on four books. He also devoted considerable time to his lifelong passion for music, playing with several Fredericksburg groups. Walter was tremendously proud of his alma mater, Texas A&M, where he had played in the band of the Corps of Cadets. He will be sorely missed.

Arnold G. Fisch Jr. (1943–2024)

Arnold G. Fisch Jr., age 80, passed away peacefully at his home in Ocean View, Delaware, on 11 April 2024. He was born in Albany, New York, on 2 June 1943 to Arnold G. Fisch Sr. and Elvira Smith Fisch. He is survived by his loving wife Dorothy, with whom he shared over fifty-six years of marriage; their

daughter Jennifer Rollins; her husband Jonathan; his grandson Carter; his sister Carol Watts of Payson, Arizona; and his cousin Carol Aufdemberge of Frisco, Texas.

While attending the State University of New York at Albany, he enlisted in the Navy and spent the summers at Officer Candidate School in Newport, Rhode Island. After graduating he went to the Navy Communication/Crypto-Security School before being assigned to the USS *Annapolis*, a communication/relay ship, stationed in the Gulf of Tonkin off the Vietnam coast. He served on that ship for thirteen months during the Vietnam War.

After his active military service, he received his master's degree from the University of Rhode Island and his PhD in history from Penn State. He became the chief of the Field and International Branch for the U.S. Army Center of Military History (CMH). During his time at the Center, he edited its journal *Army History*, authored *Military Government in the Ryukyu Islands 1945–1950* (1988), and coedited *The Story of the Non-Commissioned Officer Corps: The Backbone of the Army* (1989).

With a talent for teaching and a keen sense of humor, he became a popular professor at Strayer University in the D.C. area after he retired. After moving to the beach, he continued to teach for the University of Delaware at the Owens Campus in Georgetown. He will be missed greatly by his family and former CMH colleagues.

New Publication from AUSA


On 6 August 2024, the Association of the United States Army (AUSA) released its latest entry in the Medal of Honor graphic novel series: *Medal of Honor: Hiroshi Miyamura*.

Hiroshi Miyamura received the only Medal of Honor classified as top secret. While fighting in Korea as a machine-gun squad leader, Miyamura faced wave after wave of Chinese soldiers during a night assault. He ordered his troops to fall back while he covered their withdrawal. The enemy captured Miyamura and held him for over two years, only finding out upon his release that he had been awarded the nation's highest military honor.

To read *Medal of Honor: Hiroshi Miyamura* online or download a free copy, please visit www.ausa.org/miyamura.



A BOLD EXPERIMENT



THE U.S. ZONE CONSTABULARY IN OCCUPIED GERMANY, 1946–1952

By M. Ashley Vance

As the world paused to celebrate V-E Day in May 1945, Army commanders in Europe were implementing the postwar occupation of Germany, Operation ECLIPSE, to govern millions of Germans within a predesignated U.S. Zone of Occupation.¹ Despite extensive planning in Washington, leaders in Germany faced a situation that required flexibility. General Lucius D. Clay, military governor of the Army's occupation zone, later remarked that during the early occupation period, "Nobody had had any experience in this kind of job. . . . We had nothing. We had to improvise. We had to make decisions on the spot."² Immediate issues included setting up a military government, managing an unpopular demobilization program, and securing rural areas while maintaining unit integrity. The first major initiative to solve the many problems was born out of the spirit of improvisation later voiced by General Clay. In fact, the solution fundamentally altered the nature of the postwar occupation.

The answer to the complications developing in occupied Germany was the creation of a highly mobile police force, the U.S. Zone Constabulary. The "troopers," as Constabulary soldiers came to be known, maintained law and order, secured U.S. zonal

Constabulary forces demonstration, Memorial Day, May 1947

National Archives

A U.S. Zone Constabulary shoulder sleeve insignia

Fort Riley Museums

borders, and supported the development of local German police forces. Upon its formation, *Stars and Stripes* described the police unit as "a bold experiment" and a "departure into a new military field of operations."³ Instead of a massive occupation force to secure all areas at once, small groups of Constabulary troopers spread out to conduct patrols. If a disturbance developed, the mobile force would quickly coalesce to resolve the issue. Later dubbed "the Army's most unusual organization," the Constabulary was "born on foreign soil" and "never set foot in its homeland."⁴

At its height, the Constabulary never fielded more than 30,000 soldiers and existed only from July 1946 to December 1952.⁵ It would be easy, therefore, to discount the impact the police force had on the postwar occupation. The few publications that touch on the Constabulary examine its organizational narrative but do little to address the unit's participation in the Army's mission or its transformation from a punitive occupation force to a defensive shield for the Cold War.⁶ This is understandable, especially considering contemporary and historical narratives of the occupation during the late 1940s. For example, in 1952, *Combat Forces Journal* referred to forces in Germany as "immersed in the pleasant round

of garrison life.⁷ As the story goes, occupation soldiers in Germany lived a relaxed, unimportant life that revolved around recreation and romantic relationships with German women. By the end of the decade, the occupation was no longer a serious affair because the Germans had taken the reins of local governance. More recent scholarship, such as Elaine Tyler May's *Homeward Bound* and Susan Carruthers's *The Good Occupation*, use the growing partnership with the Germans and the arrival of American dependents as a way to demonstrate the increased domesticity of Army forces in Germany during this period.⁸ However, these portrayals oversimplify the complex military and political situation in Europe and inflate the German capacity for self-government and security under a military occupation.

Beginning in early 1947, Army leaders in Germany responded to the deteriorating relationship with the Soviets. They reorganized occupation units for combat and developed a strict training regimen to prepare for a possible East-West confrontation. The stakes were all too real. In 1948, the Berlin blockade provided a glimpse into the Soviets' commitment to secure their territory. By 1950, many worried that the outbreak of the Korean War was a Soviet feint to invade West Germany. For Constabulary troopers, the training was imperative, particularly for those posted at remote crossings along the East German and Czech borders. A historian at the time remarked that the threat of Soviet forces at the border "was not publicly appreciated until 1948, but . . . gave rise to trouble from the very beginning."⁹ To be sure, soldiers in postwar Germany had a relaxed tour compared to those in combat, but they spent most of their time preparing for a war that, thankfully, never came. By the time the Korean War broke out in June 1950, troopers spent almost all their work week either in a training camp or out on a field maneuver. Few soldiers would have described their life in the field as pleasant, or as an equivalent to the supposedly easy, uncomplicated garrison life.

Although the shrunken force did not have the capability to stop the Soviets if they chose to invade, the intent to prepare for a possible invasion was ever present. That effort was just as important for the soldiers as it was for the Army's public commitment to stand and defend the rebuilding nation. Yet, for all their accomplishments, the Constabulary as

a unit is barely known today. As one writer aptly summarized, "It succeeded, but with virtually no recognition in the annals of U.S. military history."¹⁰ Nevertheless, this small, short-lived police force helped secure a fragile peace and aided the creation of a training framework that Seventh Army later expanded and relied on for decades.

Redefining the Occupation

During the opening months of the postwar occupation, Army commanders in Germany wrestled with a massive campaign to demobilize and redeploy approximately 3 million soldiers out of Europe. Complicating matters, the War Department's point-based approach to demobilization was highly problematic. The program assigned points for various attributes like time overseas, participation in battles, and number of dependents. Soldiers had to meet a point threshold before earning the right to go home.¹¹ It was widely unpopular among soldiers because many saw the point system as an inaccurate reflection of who deserved to go home first. The result was low morale, bad behavior, and the decimation of unit efficiency.¹² As one soldier awaiting his orders remarked, "Never was so little credit given to those to whom so much was due."¹³ Frustration with the point system prevailed throughout the European Theater of Operations. A report later argued that something needed to be done to resolve the issues with demobilization because "the Army was literally falling apart at the seams."¹⁴

War Department planners initially called for a postwar "Army Type Occupation" that deployed tens of thousands of soldiers across the U.S. Zone to establish a military government, enforce law and order, and maintain zonal security.¹⁵ However, a variety of evolving factors led commanders to reassess the utility of maintaining a large troop presence in occupied Germany.¹⁶ First, redeployment simplified into demobilization after Japan surrendered in August 1945. Second, the point-based system wreaked havoc on troop morale and unit efficiency. Third, the Germans did not resist the occupation, as the military planners had feared they would. Finally, the Army sought to separate the military's tactical forces from the more administrative Office of Military Government, United States (OMGUS), once it became operational.

Throughout summer and fall 1945, leaders at the War Department and within the newly formed U.S. Forces, European

Theater (USFET), discussed alternatives to the large-scale deployment. Commanders reviewed reports from the field to identify problem areas and discover solutions. After-action reports from 12th Army Group and Fifteenth Army were particularly relevant, as these forces led early occupation operations during the final six months of the war before ECLIPSE officially launched on V-E Day. Of note, Fifteenth Army G-5 (Civil-Military Operations) units experienced acute manpower shortages during their wartime occupation. As combat divisions invaded and defeated more territory in Germany, existing G-5 staff stretched thin to cover the expanding front without additional personnel. In response, Army leaders created "Frontier Commands" that deployed their limited troops in mobile, patrolling units to police and secure areas simultaneously.¹⁷ The success of the Frontier Commands inspired a new postwar organization. Planners embraced a concept that would use similarly mobile, dispersed units to control the U.S. occupation zone. Rather than an "Army-type" occupation, a new "police-type" occupation developed.

No one individual or organization can be credited with the idea to create the new, mobile police force. Instead, leaders agreed to establish a "super military force" to secure the zone with much fewer soldiers.¹⁸ But initial ideas varied. General George C. Marshall proposed to General Dwight D. Eisenhower a replication of the police occupation model being used in Japan, which used local Japanese police forces alongside the U.S. military to maintain law and order. General Eisenhower agreed, but refused to employ local police forces in Germany, as was happening in Japan. Considering Germany's position as a former aggressor, public opinion in both the United States and Europe would have opposed the possibility of employing Germans to police anyone, let alone the hundreds of thousands of refugees and survivors of war and state violence.¹⁹ The Army, General Eisenhower argued, should fulfill the police role. General Clay explained the concept: "The idea was that if we were going to have any problems internally in Germany, we needed light, fast, armed, highly mobile troops that could be moved to where they were needed very rapidly. Since this did not fit in with any of our existing organizations, the logical development was . . . the constabulary."²⁰ After many conversations and compromises, Army commanders formed the U.S. Zone



tactical troops would detach from military government operations. The force had a triangular formation of three brigades, each responsible for one German *Land* (state) within the U.S. Zone. Across nine regiments, the twenty-seven squadrons had 144 troops, with twenty to thirty soldiers per troop. Initial estimates projected one Constabulary police officer for every 450 Germans, or 38,000 troopers to police about 17 million Germans living in the zone.²³ Underlying this structure, a strategic reserve would remain in place in case of emergency. The reserve would activate and provide tactical support for issues like a widespread rebellion against occupying forces or an enemy invasion. However, just as leaders improvised and adapted to bring the Constabulary into existence, they learned that the evolving international landscape would wash away these early plans. General Joseph T. McNarney, who took over as USFET commanding general when General Eisenhower became Army chief of staff, appointed Maj. Gen. Ernest N. Harmon as the Constabulary's first commanding general. From his appointment in early January 1946, General Harmon had six months to enlist, train, and deploy the new police unit.²⁴

Transforming Warriors into "Soldier Policemen"

The idea to fill the new police force with carefully selected, highly trained soldiers proved more aspirational than practical. General Harmon used the existing personnel and units within Germany to create the new Constabulary, as replacements were in short supply. Because the demobilization point system prioritized soldiers with longer terms of service, most experienced soldiers already had left Germany. In spring 1946, the occupation soldiers were either fresh draftees inducted after V-E Day or those who had too few points to meet the point threshold. Making matters worse, in January 1946, the War Department reduced the length of basic training from seventeen to eight weeks to get personnel to Germany as quickly as possible, thus creating a situation where the Army was "using soldiers with approximately two months training to support [U.S.] foreign policy."²⁵ These young, inexperienced soldiers were, by necessity, the foundation of the new U.S. Zone Constabulary. Like the average wartime GI, the Army continued to meet personnel quotas with 18- and 19-year-old draftees.

Constabulary as the bedrock of a newly envisioned police-type occupation in Germany.

For the Constabulary to manage the occupation zone with fewer soldiers, the unit needed to be highly mobile and effective in policing and security. Broadly construed, the police unit would maintain law and order within the U.S. Zone and would secure interzonal and international borders. Regular activities included daily patrols, lightning raids to stop illegal activity, support for Counter Intelligence Corps investigations, roadblocks throughout the zone and along its borders, and supervision over reestablishing local German police units.²¹ To accomplish these goals, the police force needed carefully selected, highly trained soldiers capable of operating independently. These soldiers had to be ready to handle a

wide range of issues from petty crimes to black-market trading, illegal border crossings, and even physical violence, if it arose. The police officers would have authority over German civilians, displaced persons (DPs), any foreign national entering the zone, and fellow Allied soldiers, civilian employees, and dependents. General Eisenhower told the War Department the "police-type method of occupation offers the most logical, long-range solution to the problem of security coverage," especially given that "combat troops are becoming stretched so thin as to be incapable of adequately assuring law and order."²²

In October 1945, General Eisenhower announced the formation of the U.S. Zone Constabulary. Its activation would occur on the same day, 1 July 1946, that wartime

Two groups of soldiers transferred into the Constabulary. First, in October 1945, Third and Seventh Army provided the 2d, 6th, and 15th Cavalry Groups, Mechanized, to form District Constabularies, the test bed for the zonal unit.²⁶ Then, in spring 1946, troops of the 1st and 4th Armored Divisions, Third Army, transferred to the new police force in bulk. Third Army was an appropriate choice. The unit initially formed in 1918 for the post-World War I occupation of Germany's Rhineland and later won acclaim for its contribution in the 1941 Louisiana Maneuvers.²⁷ During the war, while under the leadership of the famed General George S. Patton, the Army was recognized for its march across France and action in the Battle of the Bulge.²⁸ Armored divisions especially were prepared for the new police mission, as the units had both the equipment and training to move swiftly, in a wide range of vehicle types, through unknown territory.

One Third Army battalion commander, Lt. Col. Albin F. Irzyk, summarized the soldier response to the news of the unit's transformation. He remarked, "at the outset, the mission seemed impossible, the challenges more than daunting." The battalion had to divest equipment quickly, such as the tanks, half-tracks, and armored artillery that brought it glory during the war. Newly appointed commander of 1st Constabulary Brigade, Colonel Irzyk's larger issue was the psychological change. "There had to be a different mindset," he said. "No longer were the tactical troops warriors, fighters. Yes, they were still soldiers, but now they would have to learn to be soldier policemen."²⁹

Part of the mindset shift included the development a new esprit de corps to set the occupation police force apart from its wartime predecessors. Constabulary leaders created a distinct motto, uniform, and colors to differentiate the troopers from other units. The motto "Mobility, Vigilance, and Justice" appropriately summed up the Constabulary's goals and values. The uniform, once coined "the flashiest dressed . . . in Army history," featured a striped helmet, yellow scarf, paratrooper boots, and a Sam Browne belt with leather pouches and side pistol.³⁰ General Harmon later remarked, "the Constabulary uniform we came up with was a real eye-catcher." The insignia, the letter "C" crossed with a lightning bolt, reflected the unit's high speed and mobility. The colors, yellow, blue, and red, represented the amalgamation of the cavalry, infantry,



A motorcycle patrol near Moringen, Germany
National Archives



General Harmon inspects troops from the 1st Constabulary Brigade, Wiesbaden, Germany, July 1946.
National Archives

and artillery, respectively. General Harmon recalled, “I saw to it that [the colors and insignia] were applied lavishly to every piece of our rolling equipment from my personal railroad train to our ubiquitous jeeps and motorcycles.”³¹ The distinctive insignia became “the symbol of law and order,” a “personification of American military strength,” and a “guarantee of justice and fair dealing.”³²

However, not all aspects of the new unit were postwar creations. At its core, the Constabulary was a reimagined cavalry unit and, as such, adopted both the organizational structure and terminology of its predecessor. Historically, cavalry forces organized into troops and referred to the soldiers as “troopers,” both of which the Constabulary adopted. Cavalry forces also had a history of border security and police functions going back to at least the 1913 Mexican Expedition.³³ Although the Army generally had abandoned the use of horses, the U.S. Zone Constabulary relied on horses for remote and off-road patrols. During the planning stage, an Army commander casually described the equestrian police unit as akin to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police or the Texas Rangers.³⁴ Troopers quickly were dubbed the “Circle ‘C’ Cowboys.” The final cavalry connection came from the top. Through its seven-year history, each of the Constabulary’s four commanding generals

previously led armored divisions before taking charge of the police force.

For the Constabulary concept to work, troopers needed to maintain high standards because they were “empowered with unusual authority in matters of arrest, search, and seizure.”³⁵ To be successful, German civilians, DPs, other Army units, and Allied forces all needed to trust and rely on the troopers’ ability to act appropriately and fairly in a wide array of situations. To fulfill their mission to “maintain general security,” troopers had to be reliable, adaptable, and successful in building positive relations with local populations.³⁶ As one *Information Bulletin* explained, “the nature of assignments makes it necessary that each trooper can function both individually and in a team in the dual role of soldier and special policeman.”³⁷

To prepare the Constabulary, USFET opened a special training school in Sonthofen, a small, remote town near the Austrian border in the southwest corner of the U.S. Zone. The Constabulary School opened in January 1946 to train officers and troopers on policies and procedures of the new organization. Soldiers referred to the school as the “West Point with the Dehydrated Curriculum” because courses, although wide-ranging, focused only on subjects pertinent to the police force.³⁸ Classes covered topics like “the history of Germany, occupational policy, courts and laws, the relationship of the Constabulary to military government and the German police . . . the mission of the Constabulary, police policy and procedures, tactics, general

instruction, and communications.”³⁹ Army leaders did not create a separate replacement training center because they hoped the Sonthofen school “could operate as a combination replacement and school center.”⁴⁰ A plethora of training materials, including a hundred-page “Trooper’s Handbook,” were distributed to all Constabulary soldiers to quickly instill the values and high standards of the new police unit. The message to the troopers was simple: “There is no profession on earth which requires more strength of character than the police profession. . . . He represents the law and the dignity of the government he serves. . . . No class of officials can less afford to make mistakes than policemen.”⁴¹

Deploying the Police Force

The Constabulary’s activation on 1 July 1946 “marked a fundamental change in the concept of the occupation,” as a “police-type occupation force was considered more practical” than a large-scale deployment.⁴² The unit activated with 29,437 soldiers who were responsible for securing an area more than 43,000 square miles (about the size of Pennsylvania) with almost 1,400 miles of international and interzonal boundaries.⁴³ To do so, the Constabulary conducted a variety of patrols. Tanks, jeeps, and motorcycles deployed to larger cities, horse and foot patrols traversed remote or mountainous areas, and air surveys covered unpopulated areas. The patrols had two key purposes. First, troopers traveled throughout their respective



An illustration of the U.S. Zone Constabulary uniform
Courtesy of usconstabulary.com



The training grounds at the U.S. Zone Constabulary School, Sonthofen, Germany, August 1946
National Archives

areas to monitor populations for subversive or illegal activities, conducting investigations and making arrests when needed. Second, patrols were intended to impress upon the German population “the military bearing and business-like manner” of the Army occupation.⁴⁴ Patrolling quickly became the hallmark of the new police force. In the first six months of operations, troopers made 168,000 patrols (in vehicles, on horseback, and by foot) traveling more than 5 million miles. In the same period, Constabulary pilots flew more than 14,000 hours on 11,000 missions throughout the zone.⁴⁵

Patrol teams often consisted of three troopers and at least one local police officer. The partnership helped build the relationship with occupied populations, provided necessary German language translation, and trained local police forces. Generally, if the person under investigation was a DP or a German, the German officer conducted the interview or made the arrest. If the individual was an Allied soldier, civilian, or dependent, the Constabulary trooper took the lead.⁴⁶ For example, in one investigation a patrol team from the 25th Constabulary Squadron and three German police officers searched the home of a German civilian suspected of illegally owning weapons. The inspection uncovered a single empty pistol holster and an Army-issued undershirt. Upon questioning, the civilian explained that the gun that had been in the holster already had been surrendered to Military Government officials. The German police officers arrested the suspect for possession of the holster and the stolen clothing and turned him over to the Army detachment at Vohenstrauß.⁴⁷ The Constabulary’s long-term goal was eventually to function only in a supportive role to trained German police forces.

The Constabulary’s second major focus was border security. Troopers acted as “customs inspection, passport control, and general law enforcement” along the internal and international zonal borders.⁴⁸ Early in the occupation, the borders between the zones were rather fluid. However, as the Cold War developed, militaries on both sides increased efforts to restrict interzonal movement. A 1947 report explained, “Dealings with Russians in matters concerning border control . . . have long been a problem owing to the apparent administrative friction in Soviet channels.” As a result, “Control of the Russian boundary is still unsatisfactory . . . because of the volume of illegal border



Members of the 16th Constabulary Squadron show an armored vehicle to local German children near Berlin, March 1949.

National Archives

crossing arrests.” The deteriorating situation along the border occasionally became deadly. The same report noted that in one incident, “an illegal border crosser, as an alternative to repatriation, murdered his U.S. Constabulary guard and then committed suicide.”⁴⁹ As Soviet policies became more restrictive, more people attempted to illegally cross into the western zones. In one week in early January 1948, 79 people were arrested and another 335 were turned back. All but five came from the eastern zone.⁵⁰ That figure was lower than summer months, as winter weather conditions tended to slow crossing attempts.

Like the patrols, German police officers often accompanied Constabulary troopers at the border.⁵¹ But, as an occupied nation, German officers had no legal right to detain or arrest certain groups. Over time, Constabulary units slowly turned border duties over to German police, but the troopers had to provide administrative and tactical support at all crossing points. By 1948, the local officers were empowered to conduct “baggage and credential checking” for all crossers except military and Allied civilian personnel.⁵² When possible, the illegal crossers were turned away at the border, which German police forces could do. However, if the individual was a member of the Soviet or Czech militaries, troopers arrested them and informed European Command (EUCOM) headquarters of their presence.⁵³

A third feature was unannounced raids, often called “swoop raids” or “lightning raids,” to discover illegal activities and

contraband. Germans often referred to the Constabulary as the *Blitzpolizei* (lightning police) because of these raids. The surprise inspections took place in private homes, businesses, and DP camps. Raids occurred frequently to great effect. In the Constabulary’s first six months, seventy-one operations resulted in the arrest of 793 Germans and 502 DPs.⁵⁴ A classic DP raid was Operation CAMEL, which took place on 25 November 1946 and involved 676 troopers. Army commanders ordered the raid because they suspected black-market activity was occurring in a DP camp. Just after 0430, members of the 27th Constabulary Squadron surrounded the Ulana Kaserne, a barracks for Polish DPs. Troopers quietly moved in while everyone slept and blocked all exits of the multifloor building to prevent inhabitants from moving between floors or escaping. Then, troopers from the 10th and 13th Constabulary Squadrons began to clear the building, room by room, waking everyone in the process. The raid was very successful. In addition to a stash of ammunition, knives, black powder, and military uniforms, troopers seized more than \$52,000 (roughly \$710,000 in 2023 dollars) worth of codeine, morphine, and penicillin. In the end, troopers apprehended and interrogated more than a hundred people and arrested eighty-four of them.⁵⁵

Given the youth and inexperience of some troopers, raids sometimes became a source of friction between locals and their occupiers. For example, at 0630 on 2 March 1948, troopers conducted a raid at the Eschwege DP Camp near Frankfurt,

where 2,100 Jewish DPs lived and worked.⁵⁶ The inspection revealed unregistered livestock, agricultural goods, and other items. Troopers arrested 103 residents and caused immense damage throughout the camp. International Refugee Organization area director U. P. Jonckheere sent a formal complaint to Constabulary commander Maj. Gen. Withers A. Burrell and EUCOM Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Clarence R. Huebner. Jonckheere argued that troopers and accompanying German police officers intentionally inflicted widespread damage in every building. In just in the administrative office, “doors, desks, cupboards had been deliberately forced open and damaged; chairs broken; all the records . . . were thrown all over the place.” He concluded, “There is no question that the Army had the right to pull a raid on a camp at any time, but . . . if a little patience had been shown, and time given for the keys to be produced, damage to doors etc. could have been avoided, and probably the troops would not have acted like maniacs.”⁵⁷ The complaint prompted a series of investigations and increased troop inspections to curb unruly soldier behavior.

Frequent troop inspections were often the best way of keeping discipline and order among Constabulary units, particularly because many troopers were stationed so far apart from one another. General Harmon explained, “the Constabulary was peculiarly dependent upon the good judgment, sensitivity, and honesty of the individual trooper” because the troopers operated in remote areas away from their headquarters.⁵⁸ To maintain strict standards, the general later remarked, “I set myself the task of visiting each of the twenty-seven squadrons at least once a month.”⁵⁹ General Harmon also told soldiers that they were forbidden from airing grievances in the *Stars and Stripes* “B Bag,” a column dedicated to soldier gripes. Instead, he told troopers, “If you have a problem with a superior, you can write me personally and I will investigate.” After a soldier in Karlsruhe disobeyed that order, “I rearranged my schedule and went down to Karlsruhe in person.” General Harmon ordered a parade formation of the unit and “in the presence of his comrades, I took off the man’s insignia and dismissed him from the Constabulary.”⁶⁰ Regular inspections ranged from the squadron commander to the military governor. General Clay frequently visited troops and inspected barracks to monitor behavior and morale.⁶¹



Three members of the Constabulary arrest a black marketeer at his home in Bad Homburg, Germany, August 1946.
National Archives

In addition to the patrols, border security, and raids, Constabulary troopers participated in a range of activities throughout the occupation zone. The police unit actively supported German Youth Activities program, holding events and fundraising throughout the year. During the 1947 holiday season, for example, one troop

pooled funds and distributed candy to 1,400 schoolchildren.⁶² Other troopers, like Sgt. William Luddy, used their German language skills to give afternoon lectures to German children “on American ideology and history” to “teach the Germans the principles of self-government and democracy.”⁶³ Constabulary troopers also offered suggestions to EUCOM leaders on how to modify existing policies. One 1947 report explained, “as a result of operational experience by Constabulary units in the field, a more effective method of controlling Displaced Persons was evolved.” The report went on to note that, rather than managing the civilians solely through raids, a new system of security controls at entrances to the camps, “proved successful as the number of serious incidents involving Displaced Persons dropped.”⁶⁴

EUCOM also relied on the Constabulary to conduct covert operations. In spring 1948, troopers carried out Operation FINITE, a five-day, top secret mission to transport an immense cache of American-printed deutsche marks from Hamburg to Frankfurt for the trizonal currency conversion, Operation BIRD DOG.⁶⁵ On 20 June 1948, without prior public notice, the military governments in the U.S., British, and French zones replaced the devalued reichsmark with the new deutsche mark.⁶⁶ The currency conversion in the recently merged western zones stabilized the German economy and quickly eliminated the high demand for black-market trading. It was made possible because the Constabulary successfully, and



German children play with an American football during an event sponsored by the Constabulary forces.
National Archives

secretly, distributed the new funds to local finance offices throughout the occupation zone.

Operational Lessons and Early Adjustments

Within weeks of activation, commanders adapted daily operations and broader strategic goals based on early lessons learned. One of the first lessons was that small-scale operations testing could not be scaled up easily. Before the Constabulary activated, commanders experimented with two District Constabularies to test the possibility of deploying all units to patrol the entire zone simultaneously. Importantly, this testing did not include border security—it focused on policing.⁶⁷ On the district level, a blanket-coverage approach worked. However, to cover the entire U.S. Zone, patrols and border security could not be conducted concurrently because there was not enough personnel and equipment. Leaders modified the original plan to use smaller, more mobile detachments on a rotating patrol schedule, both along the border and in towns. Instead of providing simultaneous coverage across the entire zone, units deployed in sizes that were commensurate with the population totals in their respective areas. Along the borders, checkpoints and roadblocks changed from static to mobile posts to remain unpredictable for potential border crossers and to use personnel more efficiently. The units “would establish a roadblock in a seemingly random location; inspect personnel and vehicles for a period of time, then move to a new location.”⁶⁸

Throughout fall 1946, USFET leaders and General Harmon made more adjustments to the Constabulary. In September, the Army reduced or cut small detachments that they could not justify. In planning for winter, General Harmon ordered a pause to most secondary-road patrolling to regain control of some disorderly units and reduce gasoline consumption. In November, the Constabularies “show of force” tank parades reduced to only critical cities with higher crime rates and border patrols focused on areas where illegal crossings occurred most often.⁶⁹ Population size no longer figured as a primary factor dictating patrol schedules.

Additionally, War Department changes to USFET personnel levels drove many of the early adjustments. When the Constabulary activated, the Army assigned approximately 330,000 soldiers to Germany. By mid-1947, the approved total dropped to 117,000

soldiers, and by mid-1948 that figure reduced again to a mere 80,000 soldiers.⁷⁰ Although these figures appear large for a zonal area about the size of Pennsylvania, they encompassed all staff within OMGUS headquarters and support services. Of the total personnel, less than half were tactical units charged with policing or securing the zone. The Constabulary never had more than 29,000 officers, despite the initial authorization for 9,000 more.⁷¹ Interestingly, by fall 1948, the 1st Infantry Division, the sole remaining tactical unit, maintained more soldiers than it had during the war, with 18,751 soldiers in three regiments.⁷² Despite the division’s overstrength, only around 40,000 soldiers were responsible to secure and police a densely populated occupation zone that contained about 230,000 DPs and 17 million Germans.⁷³ Those numbers became more disproportionate over time as the German population in western zones increased.⁷⁴ In practice, many units were staffed with a skeleton crew or only existed on paper at a time when relations with the Soviet Union worsened weekly.

Planning for the Constabulary was based on the expectation that a strategic or tactical reserve would support the police force in case of an emergency.⁷⁵ Ideally, a strategic reserve could deploy across the entire zone if hostilities arose with an enemy nation and a tactical reserve could support local crises like a widespread rebellion or a dramatic increase in violence. However, those goals were abandoned almost immediately. When the Constabulary activated in summer 1946, Third Army was the sole remaining

army in the occupation zone, as the others already had inactivated. Months later, Third Army inactivated and “there was no strategic or tactical reserve other than that maintained within the organization of U.S. Constabulary.”⁷⁶ For its part, the 1st Infantry Division either was so widely dispersed as to be incapable of serving as a reserve or was dedicated to training the “grossly untrained replacements,” which “rendered the [Division] ineffective as a fighting unit.”⁷⁷ Within a year of the Constabulary’s activation, only the then-undermanned 1st Infantry Division remained as the sole tactical support if an emergency broke out.⁷⁸

USFET Commander General McNarney reported to General Eisenhower that forces in Europe were unable to defend the U.S. Zone from outside aggression, nor could they evacuate without British assistance.⁷⁹ Rating estimates in fall 1946 concluded that the Constabulary held a 65 percent combat efficiency and the 1st Infantry Division maintained only a 20 percent capability.⁸⁰ In the face of increasing tensions with the Soviet Union, Army commanders were alarmed at the lack of fighting capability in Germany and spent the second half of 1946 preparing to solve the readiness issue.

The Mission Evolves for the Cold War

By the end of 1946, it was clear that a Nazi resurgence was not going to materialize. The goal of demilitarizing Germany was almost complete. Local governments and police forces worked with their occupiers to secure the zones and maintain law and order. Yet



A 37th Constabulary Squadron tank parade in Limburg, Germany, July 1946
National Archives

the Soviet threat on the other side of the Iron Curtain was growing. Although the Soviet Army technically demobilized after World War II, it maintained a massive contingent of at least twenty-four divisions in the eastern zone, to the concern of the western Allies.⁸¹ One report noted, “the realization served to justify, in the minds of planners, a more equitable distribution of manpower between occupational duties and a combat reserve.”⁸² This new approach to balance the occupation mission with combat readiness was both a proactive effort to be prepared for a conflict with the Soviets and a reaction to the disintegration of unit effectiveness and continued shrinkage of the forces stationed in Germany. A year into the occupation, the Army of World War II no longer existed. No real combat training occurred after the war ended, and it showed in the inspection assessments of remaining forces. A major initiative, therefore, would have to take place to reorient the occupation units for combat.

After months of planning, USFET began a theater-wide reorganization in February 1947. It had two major components: consolidate units and equipment to increase efficiency and shift the operational focus from occupation management to combat readiness. On 15 March, USFET reorganized as EUCOM; administrative reorganizations took place, which included an array of promotions and transfers among commanders; and a large personnel cut from unnecessary Military Government operations occurred.⁸³ The date marked “the real start toward reconstituting the United States Army in Europe as an effective tactical force.”⁸⁴ Instead of focusing on OMGUS operations and Constabulary policing, Army planners adapted the mission to combat readiness to prepare for a potential clash with Soviet forces. Of note, this shift began more than a year before the Soviets blocked Western access to Berlin in June 1948, prompting the yearlong Berlin Airlift that flew in millions of tons of supplies to Allied forces and Germans isolated in West Berlin.⁸⁵ Given the increasing conflicts with the Soviet Union, including President Harry S. Truman’s adoption of a containment strategy in 1947, the Army was preparing for a potential standoff in Germany.⁸⁶

To begin, EUCOM issued a directive to reduce Constabulary personnel to 18,000 soldiers by 1948, down from its previously authorized 31,000 in 1946, as a first step to shift daily operations away from policing. To do so, Constabulary headquarters

eliminated two brigades, five regiments, and eleven of the thirty-two squadrons.⁸⁷ In tandem with this consolidation, EUCOM planners ordered the Constabulary to reduce unnecessary equipment such as tanks and other armored vehicles.⁸⁸ Publicly, this shift served a broader narrative that control of policing was being turned over to the Germans. General Harmon told the *New York Times* that the equipment removal, which accompanied a 20 percent personnel loss, “served to emphasize the nonmilitary aspect of the United States occupation of Germany had assumed.”⁸⁹ Ultimately, the equipment removal was only a temporary measure.

The theater-wide reorganization also brought a change in Constabulary leadership. On 1 May 1947, Maj. Gen. Withers A. Burress became the new commanding general. At his farewell speech, General Harmon recognized the Constabulary’s mission shift, remarking, “at no time has it been clearer that we ha[ve] an opportunity to contribute so much and so vitally to reconstruction and peace.” He told the crowd he was leaving at a time when the Constabulary had “outgrown its growing pains.”⁹⁰ Shortly after assuming command, General Burress expanded on General Harmon’s springtime reduction by eliminating patrols in areas that had little to no criminal incidents reported in the previous quarter.⁹¹ Throughout the summer, the German police became more independent and, by fall 1947, Constabulary units served primarily in a supervisory capacity. Checkpoint patrols became more important “as a means of affording contact with the general public,” and rural patrols, or those in areas with no criminal incidents, reduced.⁹²

Although the consolidations served to streamline operations, they also exacerbated personnel shortage issues. For example, when Third Army inactivated, Constabulary headquarters offices dramatically expanded their scope of responsibility without additional staff. The police force moved its headquarters from Heidelberg to Bamberg to take over Third Army offices. Before the move, Constabulary offices managed a tactical headquarters for Bavaria. However, the move to the new facility meant that the same staff took on the duties to manage Württemberg-Baden and Greater Hesse, in addition to Bavaria. To compensate, EUCOM leaders requested the remaining Third Army staff of about 1,400 soldiers assist in the transition. However, almost all rotated out within a



General Burress
U.S. Army

month, leaving the shrunken Constabulary staff to manage three states with the staff for one.⁹³ Personnel problems such as these were apparent throughout the zone. The quarterly report after the merger explained, “Many positions which were formally considered to be full time jobs in the Military Posts are now being performed [i]n addition to other duties.”⁹⁴

On top of the administrative consolidations, troopers in the field turned over many of their duties to local German police units to focus on the second aspect of the reorganization: combat readiness training. In April 1947, the *Lightning Bolt*, the unit’s newspaper, explained, “As the German police become more efficient and mobile in assuming responsibility for their own people, and as thousands of DPs leave the zone for Belgium and South America . . . the Constabulary [will be] a static organization, with all units in *kasernes* [barracks] except for a few border check-points.”⁹⁵ Rather than being a mobile force out in the field, the troopers consolidated into stationary formations to focus on training. Combined, the consolidations and hand-off “brought troops under better control and made more man hours available for training purposes.”⁹⁶

As noted earlier, Germany’s lack of sovereignty meant that local police forces had no legal jurisdiction to detain or

arrest Allied forces, dependents, or foreign nationals, which necessitated continued U.S. involvement in police and border security functions. In spring 1947, the Constabulary handed most policing authority over to OMGUS offices to free troopers from local patrols. However, as the Constabulary newspaper informed readers that, despite the transfer, troopers “will still be charged with border security control until the ability of the German police is definitely established.”⁹⁷ In practice, this meant German officers were unattended at border posts and Constabulary troopers arrived when called for support. For example, on the evening of 20 January 1949, German border officers fired on a truck attempting to crash through a U.S.-Czech crossing. The truck hit a tree and the German officers called for Constabulary support. A patrol from the 53d Constabulary Squadron arrived fifteen minutes later and a firefight ensued. A full platoon arrived hours later. The next day, the Czech driver, who had been attempting to smuggle hidden individuals into the U.S. Zone, surrendered and Constabulary troopers arrested him and turned away those hiding in the truck.⁹⁸

Alongside the 1st Infantry Division, Constabulary troopers began combat training at the former German training facility near Grafenwöhr. The Grafenwöhr camp, which the Army still uses today, opened in May 1947 and marked the beginning of EUCOM’s public commitment to establish a combat reserve in Germany, as it shifted the occupation’s focus from local security to tactical proficiency. Before 1947, training took place on the lower unit level and focused on border security, lightning raids, and individual readiness to compensate for poor soldier quality in the replacement system. After 1947, training focused on theater-level combat readiness. This shift meant that “Constabulary training began to shift away from the individual and toward the platoon . . . to serve as theater assets.”⁹⁹ In place of Constabulary School classes to learn interpersonal skills and policing strategy, troopers joined elements of the 1st Infantry Division in combat exercises and field maneuvers in areas across the zone.

As Constabulary training shifted from police duties to combat readiness, leaders predicted the “Constabulary unit would be deactivated [i.e., inactivated] over the next three years as the German government assumed responsibility for internal security.”¹⁰⁰ If the transition was completed as planned, the Constabulary would no



Cpl. Robert Ryan conducts radio operator training at Sonthofen, Germany.

National Archives

longer be directly responsible for policing. Many considered this slow elimination of the police force as a reflection of the unit working itself out of a job. If fully successful, German police would be capable of handling all internal security. The visible marker of that success was the movement of troopers from local patrols to Grafenwöhr.

On 15 November 1947, another key reorganization took place that cemented the occupation’s transformation to combat readiness and defense. USFET successor U.S. Ground and Service Forces, Europe, organized in February 1947 alongside the formation of EUCOM, became U.S. Army, Europe (USAREUR). General Clay and General Huebner continued to lead the forces in Germany, but the new designation indicated a further shift to combat training. As a later report summarized, EUCOM was “established to control a potentially powerful enemy nation.” As such, occupation forces “came to be viewed more and more . . . as a bulwark against communism.”¹⁰¹

A week after the redesignation, General Clay sent a request to the Department of the Army to organize some elements of the Constabulary into field artillery battalions. Eight months after the Constabulary lost

its armored equipment to save resources, General Clay argued that artillery units would be vital in case of an emergency. He later explained:

I changed them to heavily armored regiments with support artillery and infantry when I took over because it was obvious to me that we weren’t going to fight the Germans. If we were going to do any fighting over there it was going to be a major enemy and we weren’t going to do it with lightly armed troops.¹⁰²

The Army approved the request in December. However, because the Constabulary’s Table of Organization had no authorization for this type of equipment, the envisioned combat battalion would have to be organized outside the unit. General Huebner accomplished this by eliminating more squadrons and troops from the Constabulary.¹⁰³ This year-end reduction and formation of an artillery battalion in occupied Germany set the stage for another major reorganization months later.

In 1948, the Constabulary further streamlined and reorganized to reflect EUCOM’s tactical emphasis. Shortly before the Berlin Airlift began in June, the Department of the Army unofficially authorized EUCOM’s request to reorganize the 1st Infantry Division and the Constabulary into armored cavalry forces. Maj. Gen. Isaac D. White, the Constabulary’s fourth commander in two years, met with Generals Clay and Huebner to discuss the reorganization. The three agreed to change the Constabulary’s organizational structure into an armored division.¹⁰⁴ However, yet again, the ongoing police mission prevented it becoming a division, which would have helped with broader, theater-wide training goals. To compensate, the generals agreed to reorganize the Constabulary into a modified corps with three armored cavalry regiments.¹⁰⁵

A series of transformations dramatically altered the nature of the once-mobile police force. First, the Army approved the generals’ proposal to reorganize three Constabulary regiments into armored cavalry regiments. Then, EUCOM received approval to reduce the Constabulary’s operational commitments. To do so, OMGUS took over even more responsibility to put down local disturbances and manage some police functions.¹⁰⁶ General White pulled the troopers from some Czech and Soviet zonal crossings. In summer 1948, *Stars and Stripes* noted

that tight military control of the crossing points is “no longer necessary due to the high discipline of the military forces and effective cooperation with German police.”¹⁰⁷ Constabulary units also increased training at Grafenwöhr.

Throughout the year, the Grafenwöhr training camp underwent a series of building projects to expand its capabilities. To accommodate more soldiers, Army engineers and local contractors constructed housing across eight new camps.¹⁰⁸ Units from the Constabulary and the 1st Infantry Division rotated through the camp, conducting a variety of training and maneuvers. The police force also took over a combat training site at Vilseck to develop the armored cavalry regiments.¹⁰⁹ During the first half of the year, the Constabulary’s ongoing security mission meant it could not be consolidated or completely pulled from daily operations as the 1st Infantry Division had. Therefore, smaller police units rotated in and out of Vilseck for eight-week programs.¹¹⁰

On 23 June 1948, the day before the Soviets blockaded Berlin, EUCOM instructed Constabulary commanders to completely stop training for the police mission and to instead focus exclusively on the tactical mission.¹¹¹ Days later, the Berlin Airlift (Operation VITLES) began and units at Grafenwöhr, including the 2d Constabulary Regiment and the newly formed 91st and 94th Field Artillery Battalions, switched

from small-unit to full division training.¹¹² The decision to end police training meant that the U.S. Army in Germany unofficially stopped focusing on the occupation mission; all efforts strove to achieve full combat readiness in case the Cold War turned hot.¹¹³ The Constabulary, initially created to compensate for manpower shortages, would no longer be a mobile police force, but the unit retained its headquarters and insignia. The *Military Review* reflected, “During the first year and a half of its existence, the Constabulary was primarily a police force. Now the emphasis was shifting to a purely military mission which required changes in training, planning, and organization.”¹¹⁴ As such, General Huebner balanced Constabulary strength levels, both in personnel and equipment, with the 1st Infantry Division to bring the combined units to normal division strength.¹¹⁵

Just one month after police training ended, division-level exercises got underway. The 1948 maneuvers, including exercises BLACK, GREEN, PRIME, and NORMAL, employed the entire 1st Infantry Division and at least one Constabulary regiment.¹¹⁶ The field exercises aimed “to test mobility, communications, and logistics support, to develop liaison with French and British elements . . . and to develop tactical procedures.”¹¹⁷ After these initial maneuvers, training in occupied Germany continued to expand. For 1949, EUCOM planners sought

to fully integrate all U.S. military services and units in Germany into the training program. The season-ending maneuver, Exercise HARVEST, deployed around 112,000 troops (almost every soldier in EUCOM), covered the whole of the U.S. Zone, and incorporated the Army, Air Force, and Navy in a full-scale joint maneuver. The annual report that year noted that the exercise “demonstrated for the first time the striking force and defense capabilities of U.S. forces in Germany.”¹¹⁸

The disorderly and ineffective units of the early occupation were gone. In their place was a burgeoning army for the Cold War. Following Exercise NORMAL, General Huebner told soldiers at Grafenwöhr, “You are today, in my opinion, the best trained . . . in the United States Army. You don’t need to take a back seat. You have the ‘know how.’ You can now step upfront and lead the way for others.”¹¹⁹ The poorly trained, badly behaved GIs that had arrived in Germany at the end of the war had given way to a contingent prepared for a possible conflict. The training program successfully transformed the occupation forces from inefficient, disorganized teams into a cohesive defense force preparing to defend the zone and train incoming replacements. To be sure, the forces in Germany in the late 1940s did not have a combat readiness comparable to their World War II predecessors. However, the initiative to develop a force that could respond to a Soviet invasion was underway.

The Cold War Mission and Constabulary Inactivation

From spring 1949 to summer 1950, a series of events codified the Army’s mission transformation in Germany from policing to defense, all of which contributed to the eventual inactivation of the Constabulary. First, in April 1949, while the Berlin Airlift was ongoing, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) formed. The international coalition’s basic charter stated that an attack on one member was an attack on all members. Even though West Germany did not become a NATO member until 5 May 1955, the original charter included a member nation’s occupied territory as part of the defense clause. As such, America’s membership in NATO committed the Army to stand and defend West Germany.¹²⁰

Second, in May 1949, the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) formed, and the State Department announced that its newly formed High Commission for



General White inspects troops of the Constabulary’s 70th Field Artillery Battalion, Giessen, Germany, July 1949.

National Archives

Occupied Germany (HICOG) would take over management of the military government.¹²¹ The transfer was a sigh of relief for Army leaders, as they had been asking for it since fall 1945. The formation of HICOG dissolved OMGUS and freed the Army to formalize the mission change from occupation to defense. It is important to note that although the Army's management of the occupation ended, its legal structure did not. The continued military occupation, codified in a new Occupation Statute (passed May 1949), secured the legal framework that allowed the Army to station troops inside West Germany—without requiring preapproval from the Bonn government to conduct training maneuvers or a troop buildup.¹²² The new statute also confirmed that Germans still could not detain or arrest non-German personnel, thus necessitating the Army's continued involvement in border operations.

Third, in August 1949, the Soviets successfully tested a nuclear bomb. Historians Marc Trachtenberg and Ingo Trauschweizer rightly point out that military leaders in the late 1940s relied on America's nuclear monopoly to justify keeping personnel levels low in Europe, instead relying on a trip wire strategy that would deploy atomic weapons if attacked.¹²³ Once the Soviets possessed their own atomic bomb, the trip wire strategy became irrelevant and the low number of personnel in Germany became a liability instead of an asset. Fourth, in December 1949, China converted to communism. On its own, this event was more of a political issue for officials in Washington than it was for commanders in Germany. However, coupled with the Soviets attaining the bomb, commanders in Germany worried about the growing power of communism and its potential impact for Western Europe.

Finally, in June 1950, forces in North Korea invaded their southern neighbor and "everything changed practically overnight."¹²⁴ When the Korean War began, EUCOM personnel, including all tactical and service units, numbered a mere 80,000 soldiers compared to the estimated 360,000 Soviet ground troops in six armies on the other side of the East German border.¹²⁵ As professor Gregory F. Treverton explained, "It did not take paranoids, or conspirators, to see the [Korean] invasion as, at worst, a feint in preparation for an attack in Europe, at best as an indication that weakness invited adventure."¹²⁶

Given the international landscape and conflicts with the Soviet Union, Army planners understood the necessity of a strong defense in Western Europe. General Matthew B. Ridgway later remarked, "It's just a utopian dream to think that [an invasion] could not happen because you are dealing with a ruthless, coldly calculated government in the case of the Soviet Union, and if at any time they judged it to be in their interest to do so, they wouldn't hesitate . . . regardless of the cost to themselves."¹²⁷ Army commanders in Germany also paid close attention to public opinion and appreciated that America's military presence provided a sense of security. A 1950 report noted, "To most Germans, the news that the Americans had gone into action in Korea was a morale booster. Previously, the Germans believed that the U.S. would quit Germany when the Soviets advanced."¹²⁸ The Army's response to all these events and sentiments was a massive troop buildup to secure the peace in Western Europe.

To provide EUCOM with much-needed tactical support, Seventh Army activated in November 1950. Simultaneously, EUCOM planners inactivated the U.S. Zone Constabulary headquarters. By the time the police force inactivated, "The unit had provided a wide range of police services to a continent in need of stability and order. The men who served in the unit eventually managed to win the hearts and minds of the civil population and set the stage for German admission into the NATO framework."¹²⁹ From 1946 to 1950, the Constabulary had fully transformed itself from a mobile police unit that took over for a shrinking, inefficient World War II force to a unit focused on combat training for the Cold War. The *Lightning Bolt* noted in July 1950 that "the primary mission, that of security, has never changed. The Constabulary today, a compact, fast-moving arm, built principally around armor . . . stands ready, day or night, to move into any part of the zone."¹³⁰ General White added, "To the Germans, the trooper is a symbol of help and progress, a signpost on the road to democracy. To the American in Germany, the trooper is an assurance that the job now being done will not have to be done again."¹³¹ In four years, the Constabulary successfully contributed to the security and stabilization of the zone and did so while transforming from a mobile police unit to a static combat force.

By the time Lt. Gen. Manton S. Eddy took command of Seventh Army, the soldiers

in Germany had spent almost three years conducting field maneuvers or attending training courses in one of the newly opened technical schools. Although it is true that forces in Germany in 1950 did not serve as a true deterrent to the Soviets, adding four divisions in 1951 did not provide that either. Instead, the buildup "was largely a political signal, as even five American divisions had little hope of containing a determined Soviet offensive."¹³² One report even argued, "the soldier serving in the European Command in 1950 was probably one of the best-trained in the U.S. Army."¹³³ From the original reorganization in February 1947, Army leaders in Germany spent four years working toward that goal before Seventh Army activated. *Stars and Stripes* confirmed this by noting, "The transformation of U.S. Armed Forces in Europe from occupation to tactical security units can be traced from September 1948 when the first large-scale troop maneuvers . . . were held at Grafenwöhr."¹³⁴ Personnel from the Constabulary and the 1st Infantry Division formed the bedrock of the developing Cold War Army, creating both the physical and administrative structures of a training framework that Seventh Army would employ for years to come.

After three years of combat training, the two units transferred into Seventh Army upon its reactivation and established a security shield for their arrival in May 1951. At the beginning of the year, the 1st Infantry Division scattered across the northern portion of the zone to provide a screen for the incoming 4th Infantry Division. Upon arrival, the 4th Infantry Division traveled south from Bremerhaven and moved into areas north and northeast of Frankfurt where the Rhine and Main rivers met. Doing so offered protection for the incoming 2d Armored Division, which moved into areas west of the Rhine. The Constabulary deployed in the same staggered pattern in the southern portion, providing protection for the recently activated National Guard 28th and 43d Infantry Divisions.¹³⁵

These shields were strategically important. During the period of Seventh Army's arrival, Army leaders continued to suspect that the outbreak of the Korean War was a Soviet ruse for an invasion into West Germany. The arriving divisions came ashore with little equipment and virtually no capability to defend themselves as separate units, and therefore relied on the existing proficiency of 1st Infantry Division and Constabulary forces to protect them. By fall 1951, Seventh



General Eddy inspects troops of the 2d Constabulary Brigade in Augsburg, Germany, September 1950.

National Archives

Army's five divisions, divided between V and VII Corps, had spread out to cover the southern half of West Germany.


Upon their arrival, EUCOM leaders discovered that the new divisions did not have the same level of combat proficiency as their existing counterparts in Germany. Early assessments showed that the 4th Infantry Division was only 45 percent combat ready when it shipped to Europe and the 2d Armored Division carried a 65 percent readiness rating.¹³⁶ This problem persisted for the National Guard's 28th and 43d Infantry Divisions, as they had received even less training than their Regular Army counterparts. EUCOM commanders acknowledged the deficiency, which "had to be weighed against their progressively increasing capabilities . . . and against the possibility of hostility in Europe." Because the units could be trained while in Germany, "it was considered reasonable to move them in."¹³⁷ To fulfill manpower quotas as quickly as possible, EUCOM accepted the units with their lower states of readiness. Leaders thought they could bring the new soldiers up to desired levels through a combination of field maneuvers and attendance at the training centers and technical schools already in place throughout southern West Germany.

The new soldiers also relied on the existing forces for their practical experience and skills. Because the Army still had to maintain authority over border control issues, Constabulary troopers were able to advise new soldiers on those procedures. This process was made slightly easier because the 15th and 24th Constabulary Squadrons continued to provide security and law enforcement into two outposts until December 1952, a rare example of subordinate units remaining active after their headquarters was eliminated.¹³⁸ Troopers also provided practical advice to incoming soldiers on issues from German language skills and cultural norms to procedures about maneuver damage claims and training schedules. Their incorporation into Seventh Army was an incredible asset for the new divisions, especially because most young soldiers were recent draftees and did not have previous experience in Germany during the war.

Seventh Army soldiers soon joined the already-developed training schedule at the various camps and technical centers throughout southern West Germany. Their first real test, Exercise COMBINE, took place in October 1951 in front of an international audience of military leaders, journalists, and foreign dignitaries. The maneuver was typical of what the Army had been doing in

Germany for three years: a massive contingent of soldiers traveled across a huge swath of land to conduct a multistage exercise to test combat proficiency, communications, and support services. Exercise COMBINE involved more than 100,000 soldiers, spanned 150 square miles through myriad towns and villages, and took place over a ten-day period.¹³⁹ According to General Thomas T. Handy, the maneuver had the dual benefit of providing vital tactical training and "show[ing] any potential aggressor that we stand as a united and integrated force in the defense of Western Europe."¹⁴⁰ Maneuvers such as these became the hallmark of the Cold War Army throughout the rest of the 1950s. Combat proficiency was the benchmark of assessing mission success because Seventh Army's primary objective was to serve as a Cold War deterrent.

The soldiers that carried out these maneuvers became the face of the Army's Cold War mission, for domestic and foreign audiences alike. In 1955, the Army television show *The Big Picture* summarized, "Never before in American history has a peacetime army been so strenuously trained."¹⁴¹ Historian Donald A. Carter once argued that just as the doughboy and GI Joe represented the soldier of earlier wars, "the men guarding the inter-German border dominated the public image of the





Members of the 16th Constabulary Squadron show a mortar to local German children near Berlin, March 1949.

National Archives

modern American soldier.”¹⁴² Indeed, during the 1950s, the Army’s “One Army On Alert” campaign promoted these soldiers as the “ultra-modern, relevant Army.”¹⁴³

In November 1950, Constabulary troopers of the 2d, 6th, and 14th Armored Cavalry Regiments transferred into USAREUR and exchanged the Circle “C” patch for Seventh Army’s “Seven Steps to Hell” insignia.¹⁴⁴ Yet, the Constabulary logo continued until December 1952 with the remaining 15th and 24th Squadrons. In the announcement of the squadron’s inactivation, *Stars and Stripes* remarked, “The year 1953 will be born without a single Constabulary patch in Germany or anywhere else except the memory of the thousands of men who held the standards of America aloft in a troubled Europe.”¹⁴⁵

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Dr. M. Ashley Vance is a Colonel Charles Young postdoctoral fellow at the U.S. Army Center of Military History. She holds a PhD in history from Texas A&M University and specializes in the post-World War II Army occupation of Germany and the early Cold War. Dr. Vance is currently transforming her dissertation, “On the Edge of Battle: Building a Cold War Army in Germany, 1945–1960,” into a monograph.

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139. Final Rpt, Joint Field Training Exercises (Exercise COMBINE), 3–10 October 1951, 7, 37, ca. 1951, USAHEC, Carlisle Barracks, PA; “‘Foe’ Launches Assault as EC Maneuver Opens: 160,000 Take to Field in ‘Combine,’” *Stars and Stripes*, 3 Oct 1951; “Allies Attack in ‘Combine,’” *Stars and Stripes*, 9 Oct 1951.
140. Thomas T. Handy, quoted in “EUCOM Maneuvers in Pictures,” *Stars and Stripes*, 21 Oct 1951.
141. *The Big Picture*, episode 326, “Division in Europe,” Army Pictorial Service, 1955.
142. Donald A. Carter, *The U.S. Army Before Vietnam, 1953–1965*, The U.S. Army Campaigns of the Vietnam War (Washington DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2015), 22.
143. See the recruitment poster in A. J. Bacevich, *The Pentomic Era: The U.S. Army Between Korea and Vietnam* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1986), 149.
144. For an explanation of Seventh Army’s unofficial slogan, see “100 Years of History,” 7th Army Training Command, accessed 27 Jun 2024, <https://www.7atc.army.mil/History/>.
145. “Army Orders ‘Taps’ for Constab,” *Stars and Stripes*, 7 Dec 1952.

U.S. ARMY ART SPOTLIGHT

ARMY ARTIST COVERAGE OF THE EIGHTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF

D-DAY



By Sarah G. Forgey

Beginning in World War I, the Army has assigned official artists to document its activities through the artistic medium of their choice. Although the program has looked different at various points in history, the Army established the current Artist in Residence position in 1992. The Army Museum Enterprise continues to host the program.

Since 2001, Army artists largely have documented the Global War on Terrorism. With the withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021, the artist program needed to develop a new direction. As the incoming artist in 2023, Sfc. Jason M. Spencer became primarily responsible for outlining a future vision for the program in alignment with TRADOC's enduring priorities. With previous artists heavily focused on troops deployed in the Middle East for twenty years, the Army Art collection lacked comprehensive coverage of daily soldier life outside of an operational environment. It also needed documentation of

training efforts and content on the important role that Army families play in supporting soldiers.

With these priorities in mind and with further intent to include groups of soldiers that traditionally have been underrepresented in Army artwork, Sergeant Spencer traveled to Normandy in June 2024 in support of the Army's commemoration of the eightieth anniversary of the D-Day landings. In addition to documenting ceremonial events, he intended to record the daily lives of soldiers from the units participating in the anniversary and their interactions with Normandy invasion veterans and their families, local residents, and foreign soldiers. Sergeant Spencer went to Normandy with the 82d Airborne Division and was quartered in Carentan with the 101st Airborne Division. These travel arrangements offered numerous spontaneous opportunities to document daily events as they occurred. His field sketches include soldiers sleeping while waiting for a ride, checking in with loved ones on their

ME D+1

The Stop Bar



phones, and even lining up for a opportunity to use a latrine. At the living quarters in Carentan, he walked into the dining tent one day to find various Army bands practicing for the upcoming ceremonies, playing the *Band of Brothers* theme.

Although Army artists always carry a camera to take reference photos during fast-paced events that they can use later to develop artwork in the studio, many also carry a sketchbook in case they have slower moments to draw. During the D-Day mission, creating artwork in the field was particularly important to Sergeant Spencer. It would be a link to the Army

artists who documented the Normandy invasion during World War II. He could distinguish the difference between his mission and that of public affairs, which was documenting the anniversary as well. While in France, he completed seventeen graphite sketches and watercolors, which he used as examples of the artist program's capabilities when interacting with major commands. They are finished artworks on their own, but some will also serve as reference material for oil paintings or watercolors produced later in the studio. Field sketches

(Continued on page 31)


Chow Hall

100th ARMY BAND
JOINS USAFWR-AF BAND
FOR NORMANDY 80th ANN

PLAYING "BAND OF BROTHERS"
IN THE MESS TENT...

TRUMPET

Spence



Cabbage Patch



SPENCER
24

No Movement/Movement

NORMANDY 80TH D-1 / 82ND CHALK THREE-13H



MIDNIGHT
MOVEMENTS

Spencer



Spencer



Ever Vigilant



Medic at Church Memorial

Spencer 24



like these are important to future curators and historians as primary source material. They capture the details of a scene and the artist's emotional impression of an event, and can include notes about the event or humorous observations by the artist that make a scene feel more relatable to the viewer.

Since his return from Normandy, Sergeant Spencer also has completed five larger watercolors with Normandy subjects and has six oil paintings in progress in the studio. One of the in-progress pieces has the working title of *Chiefs and Chaplains*. It depicts a ceremony at the Charles Shay Memorial on OMAHA Beach, which is dedicated to Native American medic Charles Norman Shay and other Native Americans who served on D-Day. Of many commemorations scheduled during the D-Day anniversary,

documenting this moving ceremony was particularly important to Sergeant Spencer, as there is little representation of Native American soldiers in the Army Art collection.

In addition to documenting the eightieth anniversary of the D-Day landings, Sergeant Spencer also has been working recently on a series of artwork documenting Army families and a series on training. When completed, his work will be accessioned into the Army Art collection and preserved at the Army Museum Support Center at Fort Belvoir, Virginia.

Sarah G. Forgey is the chief art curator for the Army Museum Enterprise.

MUSEUM FEATURE

OPENING THE VAULT

TREASURES of the FORT LIBERTY MUSEUMS



By Jimmie Hallis

The closing scene of the first Indiana Jones movie, *Raiders of the Lost Ark* (1981), shows the Ark of the Covenant crated up and being delivered to the back of a long, dark warehouse full of other wooden crates, never to be seen again. Sometimes, people think this is what happens to artifacts in museums. However, if you are at Fort Liberty, North Carolina, the opposite of this scene recently occurred, and it is bringing in museum lovers from all around.

A new exhibit called “Opening the Vaults” recently debuted at the U.S. Army Airborne and Special Operations Museum (ASOM) in Fayetteville, North Carolina. It is a collaborative effort by three museums and one historical holding. ASOM, the John F. Kennedy



Lucasfilm LTD/Disney



The entrance to the "Opening the Vaults" exhibit

A World War I-era 77th Division shoulder sleeve insignia



Special Warfare Museum, the 82d Airborne Division War Memorial Museum, and the History Office of the U.S. Army Reserve Command all worked together to create the exhibit, which will run through December 2024.

Exhibits in military museums often revolve around a battle, special mission, or historical period to tell a story. "Opening the Vaults" is more like finding the Ark of the Covenant on display. Each organization participating in the exhibit contributed rare and never-before-seen artifacts for the public to view in one place. Each piece has its own unique history or story to tell. The temporary exhibit gallery has seventy select artifacts on display, along with sixteen informational panels highlighting historical information from each museum's mission. From the Civil War to the current combat raging in Ukraine, there is something for everyone to discover. The exhibit even has an educational Seek and Learn activity for kids to do, as they go from case to case reading artifact labels and learning about U.S. Army history. In this educational activity, visitors can spoil the intentions of an expert artifact thief, Overlord.

Without giving too much away, some of the artifacts include an Office of Strategic Services Welrod pistol, a special forces extraction suit from Vietnam, World War I-era musical instruments, and a message carried by a pigeon during World War I. Perhaps one of the most unique artifacts, from the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Museum, has the apt name of the "Unknown Artifact." Museum director Roxanne M. Merritt says she and her staff have never been able to figure out what this artifact it is or what it does. They created a QR code for visitors to scan and submit their guesses as to what they think the Unknown Artifact is. Hopefully, before the exhibit comes down, the museum will have an answer.

(Continued on page 37)

A Fort Bragg garrison patch, ca. 1942





A view of the *Opening the Vaults* exhibit room



An Italian parachute container, ca. 1916



An M-209A Mechanical Cipher Machine



A candelabra made from Civil War bayonets



A .32-caliber Welrod pistol



A World War I-era M1917 helmet from the 307th Engineer Battalion, 82d Division

Of course, you cannot have a vault filled with rare artifacts and a thief on the loose without the presence of Military Police (MP) officers. The ASOM staff approached the 503d Military Police Battalion (Airborne) on Fort Liberty for help. As visitors enter the exhibit, figures of two MPs from the only airborne MP battalion in the U.S. Army stand guard over the vault's entrance. The battalion's command team was excited for the unit to help dress their representative mannequins with the appropriate gear.

The idea for this exhibit came from an ASOM staff member, but it could not have happened without all the museums coming on board with the project. Planning began in late 2023, and final installation occurred just before the exhibit's opening night. For the Fort Liberty museums, this is a chance to showcase parts of their collections, and it should not be missed. The museums' goal is to host another version of the exhibition at a future date. Those

who miss seeing this one can follow the museums on social media to learn more about when they will launch the next one. For more information, including location and hours of operation, visit the ASOM website at <https://www.asomf.org>.

Jimmie Hallis is a museum curator at the U.S. Army Airborne and Special Operations Museum.



A Legislative History of THE GENERAL SURVEY ACT




A painting of a nineteenth-century survey party in northern New Mexico by J. J. Young. The General Survey Act authorized the use of Army engineers to survey road and canal routes throughout the growing United States. National Archives

BY MATTHEW T. PEARCY

On a blustery winter night in February 1823, the steamer *Tennessee* ploughed her way upstream through the twisting currents of the Mississippi River. It was snowing, and visibility on the river was poor. The steamship carried more than 180 men, women, and children, with many already asleep for the night and tucked away in their rooms. Some gathered in the spacious cabin, eating and drinking and enjoying the evening together. While still under a full press of steam, the *Tennessee* struck a large snag near Natchez, Mississippi, tearing a 6-foot gash in the hull. The ship rapidly took on water, and panic and confusion spread among the passengers. The captain acted quickly to lower the longboat, which filled to near-sinking before shoving off to shore. Dozens who were left behind jumped into the river. The strongest swam ashore, but many others drowned in the frigid and turbulent waters. Fully a third of the passengers died that night, most in the first five minutes of the disaster. The ship was completely wrecked, with lost cargo estimated at \$80,000. The dead, more than a dozen of whom were never identified, came from all over the country and as far away as Kentucky, Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Massachusetts.


Two hundred years later, this incident mostly has been forgotten, but the sinking of the *Tennessee* was one of the first great river disasters in U.S. history. Newspapers throughout the country reported on the tragedy. It was a topic of conversation for many months and ultimately worked in commune with a variety of other factors to drive the passage of two vital pieces of congressional legislation in 1824: a General Survey Act authorizing Army engineers to conduct road and canal surveys, and a Rivers and Harbors Act to fund navigational improvements on the Mississippi and Ohio Rivers.¹¹ Together, these laws ushered in a new era of civil works legislation that reshaped the Army Corps of Engineers and, in the late 1830s, birthed its sister organization, the Army Corps of Topographical Engineers.

The *Tennessee* disaster drew public attention and provided a powerful emotional catalyst for government action on internal improvements on American rivers and waterways, but much of the groundwork was already in place. The War of 1812 brought about a significant expansion of the Corps of Engineers, including the addition of eight topographical engineers (or “topogs”) and an equal number of assistants. Much of the organization was dismantled



A sketch showing the sinking of the steamboat *Tennessee*.

Library of Congress



A sketch of John C. Calhoun, ca. 1840

Library of Congress

after the war, but legislation in April 1816 restored six topogs to the peacetime Army, a vital recognition of their significance to the service and of an emerging appreciation for the importance of both military *and* civil engineering works, especially surveying and roadbuilding. In the early part of the nineteenth century, the peacetime Army engineers focused primarily on the construction of Third System coastal fortifications first authorized in 1816, whereas the topogs assumed responsibility for a limited array of civil works improvements such as roads and canals. These delineations were drawn tightly, and the pecking order within the Army clearly favored the engineer officers over the topogs, though the latter enjoyed a “rising reputation” throughout these decades.²

The South Carolinian John C. Calhoun (1782–1850), then a member of Congress, promoted the cause of civil engineering with his Bonus Bill of 1817, which earmarked surplus monies from the lucrative Second Bank of the United States for an internal improvements fund. President James Madison favored the bill but vetoed it as unconstitutional because he felt that the Commerce Clause of Article I, Section 8, of the U.S. Constitution did not expressly give Congress the power to fund the building of roads and canals. This interpretation and the absence of any relevant Supreme Court rulings had the effect of restricting civil works funding, but advocates for internal

improvements continued to make their case, pointing to the “necessary and proper” clause under that same Section 8. It contends that Congress has the legislative power “to make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution” the other powers explicitly granted by the Constitution.³ The Supreme Court affirmed that interpretation of the “elastic clause” in its *McCulloch v. Maryland* ruling in 1819.⁴

As secretary of war under President James Monroe, Calhoun continued to press his views in his “Report on Roads and Canals” (1819), which advocated for extensive use of Army engineer and topographical support for surveys of public works. Three years later, in 1822, Maj. Isaac Roberdeau of the Topographical Engineers underscored the value of the topogs in public improvements and argued for a more active role for them in assisting transportation and communications, in addition to their vital work on national defense. In December of that same year, two leading Army engineers submitted the landmark “Report on the Board of Engineers on the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers.” Written by Maj. Simon Bernard and Maj. Joseph G. Totten, and signed by Alexander Macomb, the “Colonel Commandant of the U.S. Engineers,” the report constituted the first official U.S. survey of those two mighty American waterways. It called for extensive improvements, including the removal of obstacles, sandbars, and other obstructions in the Ohio River; the construction of a

canal on the Indiana side to circumvent the falls above Louisville, Kentucky; and the removal, particularly on the Mississippi River, of dangerous snags including floating or underwater tree stumps or large branches hazardous to navigation. The timing of this report proved fortuitous, as Congress turned its attention once again to the issue of internal improvements.⁵

Debate in the House of Representatives began in February 1824, a time of relative political upheaval in the United States. As the sun set on the period of relative domestic political harmony known as the “Era of Good Feelings” (1817–1824), the Democratic-Republican Party established by Thomas Jefferson was losing its hold on national politics. Old fissures in the party deepened, leading it to split into four factions, with the more conservative (strict constructionist) elements falling behind William Harris Crawford (1772–1834) of Georgia. This faction, known contemporarily as Crawford Republicans, had the support of the “Virginia dynasty”—Presidents Jefferson, Madison, and James Monroe—but ongoing concerns about Crawford’s health undermined efforts to consolidate the party under his aegis. A second wing came from a rising star, Andrew Jackson (1767–1845), the great military hero of the War of 1812 who at that time was senator from Tennessee. Into Jackson’s fold fell especially rural and




A. Major Totten
Library of Congress

B. A bust of Simon Bernard
*U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
Office of History*

C. Portrait of Alexander Macomb by Thomas Sully, showing Macomb as a major general when he was the commanding general of the U.S. Army.
U.S. Army Art Collection

Western elements that were growing in size and influence. These were the Jackson Republicans, who later would become the Democrats. The third group was the John Quincy Adams (1767–1848) wing, based heavily in the old Federalist area of New England and composed of elements that generally favored a more activist government and federal spending on internal improvements. Henry Clay (1777–1852) of Kentucky led a fourth Western faction that embraced the “American System,” an economic plan rooted in the “American School” ideas of Alexander Hamilton. The powerful Kentuckian, then Speaker of the House, favored the preservation of the Bank of the United States and the development of a system of internal improvements that would bind the nation together.⁶



A painting of Henry Clay by J. W. Dodge, 1843
Library of Congress

Amid the ebb and flow of these competing and realigning interests, Joseph Hemphill (1770–1842), a former lawyer and judge serving as a representative from Pennsylvania, first introduced a bill in 1822 to authorize general surveys of proposed transportation improvements. With President Monroe still fully ascendent and the Democratic-Republican Party sufficiently united, the General Survey bill went nowhere in either 1822 or 1823. However, by 1824, the ground had shifted considerably. Hemphill, reelected to the Eighteenth Congress (March 1823–March 1825) as a Jackson Federalist, had new friends and allies. Chief among these were a powerful cabal of Jackson Republicans and a significant number of well-placed Adams-Clay Federalists including of course House Speaker Henry Clay. Standing in opposition was a vocal and steadfast group of Crawford Republicans, most of whom later migrated to the Jacksonian wing of the party but who retained, out of loyalty or long habit, the small government predilections of the old Jeffersonian party.

Each of the five who rose in opposition to the bill hailed from Virginia, but so did the first and most eloquent advocate: James Barbour (1775–1842), a former governor of that state who allied himself with Adams and would later serve as his secretary of war (1825–1828). After referencing the usual “necessary and proper” arguments related to post roads (the roads built and maintained for mail delivery between major cities), Barbour expressed a more novel opinion that road construction was justified by the congressional power “to provide and maintain armies and navies,” as these “must be filled with troops, cannon, small arms, and all the munitions of war” and that “the means of transporting these are just as necessary as the forts themselves.”⁷ This

argument especially may have resonated with the several veterans of the War of 1812 who later spoke on the topic, all of whom—including Barbour’s cousin John Strode Barbour (1790–1855), also of Virginia—favored the legislation.⁸ Taking up a banner for his Western allies, James Barbour called back to the recent war and the actions of a selection of New England states at the infamous Hartford Convention (1814–1815) which, acting in the name of states’ rights, had embraced secessionism and moved “to abandon the service of the United States, at the very moment a powerful foe was endeavoring to devastate our northern frontier, and to overwhelm it in the horrors of war.” He then contrasted those actions with the “people of the West,” who threw aside thoughts of constitutional restrictions and state’s rights and rallied together under Andrew Jackson



A lithograph of Andrew Jackson
Library of Congress

to victory at the Battle of New Orleans. “They sought the foe, they fought and conquered him; triumph sat upon their brow, and the joy of victory gladdened a nation’s heart. A practical illustration is here presented of these two systems of Constitutional Construction.”⁹

Yet another Virginian, George Tucker (1775–1861), a Crawford Republican elected to the Eighteenth Congress, spoke for those in opposition and threw out a host of arguments. He pointed to Article I, Section 9 of the Constitution, which “prohibits Congress from making any discrimination in favor of the ports of a state, over those of another.” This was the states’ rights position that underpinned most opposition arguments—that major internal improvement projects would provide outsized benefits for some states at the expense of others and thus would represent an unjust transfer of wealth. He then brusquely tossed aside Barbour’s military justification: “we have raised and supported armies in two wars, without making roads and canals.”¹⁰ Tucker also feared the inevitable graft that would result from the millions of dollars required for internal improvement, as “the city [of Washington, D.C.] will swarm with hundreds of projectors, and their maps and plans, beautifully illuminated, electioneering for business; and as they would succeed according to their address, and means of conciliating favor, the result would be that we should have roads without travelers, and canals without navigation, and perhaps without water.”¹¹ Lastly, Tucker, with a flair for humor, dismissed another proffered argument that constitutional authority to “establish post offices and post roads” (Article I, Section 8, Clause 7) could provide a basis for broader authority to build roads or bridges. “Our whole territory is intersected with roads, and there is not, perhaps, a square of three miles in the United States, having a population of ten persons on it, in which there is not a road sufficient for the transportation of the mail. Nothing,” he continued, “can be more unnecessary than such a power to Congress.”¹²

A Kentuckian joined Barbour in supporting the bill and defending Western interests. An Adams-Clay Republican with a keen wit, Richard Aylett Buckner (1763–1847) went after the states’ rights argument and picked it apart at its core. “If this government shall ever so far lose sight of its true principles, as to aim at the downfall of state’s rights, it will not commence the

perpetration of so wicked and nefarious a design, by exhausting its funds in improving, beautifying, and strengthening the states.”¹³ Buckner then assumed a more serious tone and spoke of the need for “forming additional ligaments by which to unite us.” Internal improvements including roads and river work were justified, as he argued in a moment of prescience, because “a separation of the states [secession] is an evil not only more probable, but even more to be deprecated than a consolidation of power; and if ever the predictions of our downfall by the enemies of Republics shall be realized, it is to be the result of a separation produced by sectional feelings and jealousies.”¹⁴ Buckner noted in closing that “I am aware that less has been done for the West than for any other portion of the Union, yet,” he offered, “we shall not complain.”¹⁵

John Randolph (1773–1833) of Virginia closed out the debate on February 10. He was a founding member of the “Old Republicans,” a conservative wing of the Democratic-Republican Party that sought to restrict the role of the federal government. By 1824, he stood with the Crawford Republicans in opposition to the General Survey bill based on constitutional scruples. It was his stated conviction “that Congress did not possess the power, by the Constitution, to engage in a system of internal improvements, as contemplated in this bill.”¹⁶ For him, it was enough that its advocates had failed to consolidate their “necessary and proper” arguments. “One gentleman is fully persuaded that it is contained in the power to establish post offices and post roads. Another disclaims this ground entirely; but sees it clearly in the power to regulate commerce. Another rejects this as altogether untenable; but discovers it, as clear as the noon day’s sun, in the power to declare war. . . . If that power is given,” he concluded, “why do not gentlemen agree in what part of the Constitution it is to be found?”¹⁷ The House considered and rejected a series of amendments before ending debate with a procedural vote that saw advocates secure a third reading of the bill with 115 “yeas” to 86 “nays.” That result shed light on the size and shape of an emerging majority support in Congress for a robust internal improvement program.¹⁸

Analysis of that vote *by state* provides early evidence to the growing heft and weight of the Western vote. The new Midwestern states of Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Missouri, and Ohio favored the measure 28–0; and the



An engraving of John Randolph by John Sartain

Library of Congress

Deep Southern states of Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi voted 7–0 for the measure. The much more populous seaboard states in both North and South opposed the bill with 79 “yeas” and 86 “nays.” Breaking in opposite directions, the two most populous states in the country decided the vote. New York alone provided more than a quarter of all opposition votes at 24 but lost 7 to the other side; it was Pennsylvania that pushed the procedural vote over the top, generating 23 votes in favor and losing only 2 to the opposition. The State of New York was just completing the Erie Canal—an entirely state-funded endeavor—which would create access to the Great Lakes and to the rich farmland and mineral and timber resources west of the Appalachians and make New York the preeminent commercial city in the United States. It understandably loathed to risk its hard-earned advantage in transportation by subsidizing its competition. Pennsylvania was otherwise motivated. With Philadelphia and its busy ocean port at one end of the state, Pittsburgh at the mouth of the Ohio River on the other, and 300 miles and a stretch of the Appalachians separating the two, the state had a rich stake in developing its roads and rivers and would need federal largesse to compete with the Erie Canal.

Analysis of that same procedural vote *by party* points to the final splintering of

the Democratic-Republicans and to the birthing of a Jacksonian party with Western roots. Jacksonians alone, counting both the Republican and Federalist factions, provided sixty votes in favor of the bill, which amounted to more than half of the total. They were joined in an alliance of convenience by a splintered Adams-Clay faction that divided almost evenly between “yea” and “nay” votes. Those from Kentucky and Ohio supported the bill in large numbers, whereas all thirty-one opposition votes generated by Adams-Clay Republicans came from Eastern Seaboard states (Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, and Vermont). The Crawford Republicans provided nearly half of the opposition number. This vote, coming as it did on February 10, evidenced sufficient support for passage of the bill through the House of Representatives, though obstacles remained in the Senate. There also were indications that President Monroe, like his predecessor James Madison, harbored concerns about the constitutionality of these internal improvement bills. Speaker Clay held off for several weeks on a final vote, and by the time he returned to it in late April, much had changed in his favor.

During that interregnum, the U.S. Supreme Court took up the issue of internal improvements and promised a resolution as to its constitutionality, one way or the other. The case before the court was a New York law dating to 1798 granting Robert Fulton and Robert Livingston—two titans in the development of the steamboat—a state monopoly on “navigating all boats that might be propelled by steam, on all waters within the territory, or jurisdiction of the state [of New York], for a term of twenty years.”¹⁹ The two men subsequently sold an operating license to Aaron Ogden, a former New Jersey governor, who proceeded to run a steamboat between Elizabethtown, New Jersey, and New York City. Several years later, in 1818, he was joined on that route by Thomas Gibbons, who had been licensed separately by the U.S. Congress under a 1793 law regulating coastal trade. Ogden filed a complaint with the Court Chancery of New York and won an injunction to stymie any competition from Gibbons. The latter secured legal counsel and appealed the decision. His lawyer, Daniel Webster (1782–1852), had been the winning attorney on the *McCulloch v. Maryland* (1819) case and was an increasingly prominent repre-



An engraving of Aaron Ogden by A. B. Durand, ca. 1834

Library of Congress

sentative from Massachusetts then serving on the House Judiciary Committee.²⁰ The case was litigated all the way to the Supreme Court, where Chief Justice John Marshall (1755–1835) ultimately ruled on behalf of Gibbons in carrying out the clear intent of the Constitution to have Congress, rather than individual states, regulate interstate commerce as well as *intrastate* commerce that substantially impacts *interstate* commerce. The landmark ruling in *Gibbons v. Ogden* empowered the federal government, through the Commerce Clause only, to conduct internal improvements of a national character. Advocates for the legislation pending in Congress took the win and moved quickly and successfully to pass legislation in late April.²¹


The *Annals of Congress* (1789–1824), a precursor to the modern *Congressional Record*, references the General Survey Act one last time in its Appendix under “Public Acts of Congress,” which presents the text of the act in its entirety.²² Dated 30 April 1824, the new law authorized the president “to cause the necessary surveys, plans, and estimates, to be made of the routes of such roads and canals as he may deem of national importance, in a commercial or military point of view, or necessary for the transportation of public mail.” The second section approved funding of \$30,000 and authorized

the employ of “two or more skilful [*sic*] civil engineers, and such officers of the Corps of Engineers.”²³ Though the approved funding was a relative pittance, the Army engineers ultimately proved their worth through the planning and coordination of transportation projects, and the act heralded the beginning of a great national program of internal improvements.²⁴

Fresh from victory on both legal and legislative fronts, Clay and his Western allies returned to Congress with a bill to fund navigation improvements on the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers. They carried it to the floor of the House of Representatives on 7 May and opened the discussion the following morning, a Saturday. Speaker Clay tasked fellow Kentuckian, Robert Pryor Henry (1788–1826), with making the case for improving “Western Rivers.” Henry had been born in Scott County, Kentucky (then part of Virginia), and took a degree in classical studies from Transylvania University in Lexington, Kentucky, before studying law and gaining admittance to the bar in 1809. He served in the War of 1812 and was elected to the Eighteenth Congress as a Jackson Republican. After establishing himself as “a friend of State sovereignty,” he indirectly referenced both the *Gibbons v. Ogden* ruling and the General Survey Act in assuming it “to be the settled rule of the government that Congress have the power to do what is proposed to be done by the bill under consideration.” The question at hand, then, “shall be directed throughout, to the naked questions of expediency, necessity, practicality, and propriety.” Henry called out first for fairness and equity. “Whilst so much has been done, and is still doing, for the benefit of the seaboard, may we not insist that it is high time to do something for us?” Then, in a direct emotional appeal, he put it to “the magnanimity and justice of our Atlantic brethren to say whether they will not protect our agriculture and our internal commerce against the bars, the sawyers, the planters, the snags, those stationary pirates of the Ohio and Mississippi?” He finally recalled the “loss of the steamboat *Tennessee*, a disaster which is hardly surpassed in the annals of shipwreck!” That disaster, he hoped, “will beget a lively attention to this great concern.”²⁵

Representative Andrew Stewart (1791–1872) of western Pennsylvania, reelected as a Jackson Republican, rose in favor of the bill and promptly referenced the 1822 Bernard and Totten report. He drew particular

9 Maps



A map of the United States by A. T. Perkins, ca. 1824
Library of Congress

1824

attention to the section detailing the “losses sustained at present by those who navigate the rivers Ohio and Mississippi, [which] were estimated as high as from five to ten percent.” These losses, “when it was recollected that the commerce with Pittsburgh alone amounted to a million and a half of dollars,” were enormously costly and would “justify a much larger expenditure than is now proposed.”²⁶ The House passed the bill four days later on 11 May, and it went to the Senate. There it was introduced to the floor on 19 May by Kentucky Senator Richard Mentor Johnson (1780–1850), another Jackson Republican and a future vice president under Martin van Buren. Johnson also referenced the Army report, “which is now before us. . . . It is the opinions of the most scientific and experienced engineers” that the “causes which render our navigation dangerous” may be “removed at an expense quite inconsiderable, compared with the advantages that would ensue.”²⁷ Senator Thomas Hart Benton (1782–1858), the famed champion of westward expansion and, later, Manifest Destiny, failed in a last-minute bid to incorporate the Missouri River into the legislation.²⁸ The Senate subsequently approved what would be the first rivers and harbors bill, and it became law on 24 May 1824.²⁹ The act authorized the relatively paltry sum of \$75,000 for work on the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers, but John Quincy Adams’s election later that year put a strong advocate of internal improvements in the White House. His inaugural address in March 1825 welcomed “progress [that] has been made in the defense of the country by fortifications and . . . by scientific researches and surveys for the further application of our national resources to the internal improvement of our country.”³⁰

The significance of these two bills, each of which celebrates a bicentennial in 2024, scarcely can be overstated. The General Survey Act empowered the Army to chart transportation improvements vital to the nation’s military security and commercial growth while authorizing Army engineers to design canals, railroads, and both state and private roads. The initial appropriation of \$30,000 grew to a total of \$425,000 by 1837 and saw the Corps, with few restrictions, undertake surveys and plan internal improvements in virtually every corner of the growing nation.³¹ The first rivers and harbors act was an obvious concession to Western interests and an overdue recognition of the vital importance of maintaining



A lithograph of Maiden Rock on the Mississippi River, published by Currier & Ives, ca. 1850

Library of Congress



An engraving of President John Quincy Adams by A. B. Durand, ca. 1826

Library of Congress

navigable waterways for commerce and transportation. Congress followed it up two years later with a second rivers and harbors act that combined authorizations for both surveys and projects and established a pattern that pushed spending over the next 100 years to more than \$1 billion on

thousands of rivers and harbors projects in every state.³² In the early application of those laws, a major portion of the field work fell to the topographers who set out to develop a working system of internal improvements and, a decade or so later, to foster the establishment of an independent Corps of Topographical Engineers in 1838. Twenty-five years later, during the U.S. Civil War, Congress merged the two engineer corps, and they thereafter worked in unison to develop the modern civil works program.

Dr. Matthew T. Percy has been a historian with the Army Corps of Engineers since 2001 and currently works in its Office of History in Alexandria, Virginia. He has published articles in *Louisiana History*, *Journal of the Illinois State Historical Society*, *Florida Historical Quarterly*, *Military History of the West*, and several long articles in *Army History* related to Maj. Gen. Andrew A. Humphreys (1810–1883) and his Civil War exploits. He holds a PhD in history from the University of North Texas and is currently completing a Civil War biography of Humphreys.

Notes

1. “Melancholy Catastrophe,” *Poughkeepsie Journal*, 19 Mar 1823, 3; James T. Lloyd, “Sinking of the Steamer Tennessee,” in *Lloyd’s Steamboat*

Directory and Disasters on the Western Waters (Cincinnati, OH: James T. Lloyd, 1856), 61–63; House of Representatives, “Ohio and Mississippi Rivers,” 28 Feb 1824, vol. 41, 18th Cong., 1st sess., *Annals of the Congress of the United States* (Washington, DC: Gales and Seaton, 1824) (hereinafter *Annals of Congress*), 1704; House of Representatives, “Navigation of Western Rivers,” 8 May 1824, vol. 42, 18th Cong., 1st sess., *Annals of Congress*, 2582.

2. Third System coastal fortifications were authorized in response to lessons learned in the War of 1812. The Army Corps of Engineers ultimately built dozens of such forts between 1816–1867. These include Fort Pulaski in Savannah, Georgia; Fort Sumter in Charleston, South Carolina; and Fort Warren in Boston, Massachusetts. First System coastal defenses were built at the end of the Revolutionary War, and Second System defenses were built just before the War of 1812. Frank N. Schubert, *The Nation Builders: A Sesquicentennial History of the Corps of Topographical Engineers, 1838–1863* (Fort Belvoir, VA: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Office of History, 1988), 5; Todd Shallat, “Building Waterways, 1802–1861: Science and the United States Army in Early Public Works,” *Technology and Culture* 31, no. 1 (Jan 1990): 18–50.

3. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8.

4. *McCulloch v. Maryland*, 17 U.S. 4 (1819). <https://www.archives.gov/milestone-documents/mcculloch-v-maryland>.

5. Matthew T. Percy, “The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and the Evolution of Navigation Practice and Policy, 1800–1865,” in *Two Centuries of Experience in Water Resources Management: A Dutch-U.S. Retrospective*, eds. John C. Lonquest et al. (Alexandria, VA: IWR and Rijkswaterstaat, 2014), 51, 56–60.

6. Calvin Colton, ed., *The Private Correspondence of Henry Clay* (New York: A.S. Barnes, 1855), 253.

7. House of Representatives, “Surveys for Roads and Canals,” 3 Feb 1824, vol. 41, 18th Cong., 1st sess., *Annals of Congress*, 1328.

8. The War of 1812 veterans were Robert Pryor Henry (1788–1826), Charles Anderson Wickliffe (1788–1869), and John Strode Barbour (1790–1855). All three were Jackson Republicans.

9. James Barbour failed, however, to win over his brother, Philip Pendleton Barbour, a Crawford Republican and former Speaker of the House (17th Congress). Philip Barbour would later serve as an associate justice of the Supreme Court. House of Representatives, “Surveys for

Roads and Canals,” 3 Feb 1824, vol. 41, 18th Cong., 1st sess., *Annals of Congress*, 1331.

10. House of Representatives, “Surveys for Roads and Canals,” 3 Feb 1824, vol. 41, 18th Cong., 1st sess., *Annals of Congress*, 1337.

11. House of Representatives, “Surveys for Roads and Canals,” 3 Feb 1824, vol. 41, 18th Cong., 1st sess., *Annals of Congress*, 1341.

12. House of Representatives, “Surveys for Roads and Canals,” 3 Feb 1824, vol. 41, 18th Cong., 1st sess., *Annals of Congress*, 1335.

13. House of Representatives, “Surveys for Roads and Canals,” 4 Feb 1824, vol. 41, 18th Cong., 1st sess., *Annals of Congress*, 1362.

14. House of Representatives, “Surveys for Roads and Canals,” 4 Feb 1824, vol. 41, 18th Cong., 1st sess., *Annals of Congress*, 1364.

15. House of Representatives, “Surveys for Roads and Canals,” 4 Feb 1824, vol. 41, 18th Cong., 1st sess., *Annals of Congress*, 1394.

16. House of Representatives, “Surveys for Roads and Canals,” 10 Feb 1824, vol. 41, 18th Cong., 1st sess., *Annals of Congress*, 1463.

17. House of Representatives, “Surveys for Roads and Canals,” 10 Feb 1824, vol. 41, 18th Cong., 1st sess., *Annals of Congress*, 1465.

18. The “third reading” is a pro forma question that routinely is put and approved by voice vote just before the measure itself is put to a vote. If the question is put to a vote and decided in the negative, the bill is considered rejected. See “Reading, Passage, and Enactment,” *House Practice: A Guide to the Rules, Precedents and Procedures of the House*, 104th Cong., 2nd sess. (1 Jan 1996), <https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-HPRACTICE-104/pdf/GPO-HPRACTICE-104-45.pdf>.

19. *Gibbons v. Ogden*, 22 U.S. 1 (1824). <https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/22/1>.

20. The 1819 Supreme Court case *McCulloch v. Maryland* helped to define the relationship between the federal government and the states, and the scope of Congressional powers. Chief Justice John Marshall ruled that Congress has implied powers, or “unenumerated” powers, under Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution, also known as the “necessary and proper” clause. This clause gives Congress the power to establish a national bank, and to pass laws that are “necessary and proper” to carry out its duties.

21. *Gibbons v. Ogden*, 22 U.S. 1 (1824).

22. *United States Congress. The Debates and Proceedings in the Congress of the United States; with an Appendix, Containing Important State*

Papers and Public Documents, and All the Laws of a Public Nature; with a Copious Index. [First To] Eighteenth Congress.—First Session: Comprising the Period from March 3, 1789 to May 27, 1824 (Washington, DC: Gales and Seaton, 1849).

23. House of Representatives, “Public Acts of Congress,” 30 Apr 1824, vol. 42, 18th Cong., 1st sess., *Annals of Congress*, 3217.

24. Schubert, *Nation Builders*, 10–11; Todd Shallat, “Building Waterways, 1802–1861: Science and the United States Army in the Early Public Works,” *Technology and Culture* 31, no. 1 (Jan 1990): 28–29.

25. House of Representatives, “Navigation of Western Rivers,” 8 May 1824, vol. 42, 18th Cong., 1st sess., *Annals of Congress*, 2579–80, 2582. See also the House report of the Committee on Roads and Canals, which pulls heavily from the Bernard and Totten Report and references the *Tennessee*: H. Rept. 18-75, *Report of the Committee on Roads and Canals, upon the subject of the navigation of the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers, accompanied with a bill to improve the navigation of the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers*, 18th Cong., 1st sess. (28 Feb 1824), 3, https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/SERIALSET-00105_00_00-076-0075-0000.

26. House of Representatives, “Navigation of Western Rivers,” 8 May 1824, vol. 42, 18th Cong., 1st sess., *Annals of Congress*, 2581.

27. Senate, “Mississippi and Ohio Rivers,” 7 May 1824, vol. 41, 18th Cong., 1st sess., *Annals of Congress*, 762–65.

28. Senate, “Mississippi and Ohio Rivers,” 7 May 1824, vol. 41, 18th Cong., 1st sess., *Annals of Congress*, 764.


29. House of Representatives, “Public Acts of Congress,” 25 May 1824, vol. 42, 18th Cong., 1st sess., *Annals of Congress*, 3228.

30. John Quincy Adams, “Inaugural Address,” 4 Mar 1825, The American Presidency Project, UC Santa Barbara, <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/inaugural-address-25>.

31. Forest G. Hill, *Roads, Rails, and Waterways: Army Engineers and Early Transportation* (Norman: Oklahoma University Press, 1957).

32. Christopher M. Klyza, “The United States, Natural Resources, and Political Development in the Nineteenth Century,” *Polity* 35, no. 1 (Autumn 2002): 8–9. See the valuable chart on page 9 of Klyza’s article for expenditures on rivers and harbors projects between 1821 and 1921.

BOOKREVIEWS



ON CONTESTED SHORES: THE EVOLVING ROLE OF AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS IN THE HISTORY OF WARFARE

EDITED BY TIMOTHY HECK
AND B. A. FRIEDMAN

Marine Corps University Press, 2020
Pp. xix, 430. Free Download

REVIEW BY JAMIE L. H. GOODALL

It is no secret that the United States faces an ever-evolving threat landscape that appears to be accelerating at an unprecedented pace. Secretary of Homeland Security Alejandro N. Mayorkas identified the emerging threats to be “revolutionizing technological innovations, growing political and economic instability, widening wealth inequality, a rapidly changing climate, increasingly aggressive nation states, emerging infectious diseases, and other forces.”²¹ Every branch of the U.S. armed forces is working to define their place in and strategize for this complex and diverse threat landscape. The U.S.

Army has its “The Army of 2030” vision, and the U.S. Navy has “Force Design 2045.” Even the U.S. Coast Guard has its “Ready Workforce 2030.” However, the U.S. Marine Corps (USMC), serving on both land and sea, has one of the most challenging futures.

Marines traditionally have been responsible for conducting expeditionary and amphibious operations. However, the terrorist attack against the United States on 11 September 2001 shifted the focus of many military forces—the Marines among them—from traditional force models to counterinsurgency. With the apparent conclusion of the Global War on Terrorism, the USMC has begun to return to its amphibious roots, sparking a lively debate on the relevance of amphibious operations. Some argue that these operations are “obsolete” or “dinosaur[s] which had outlived [their] usefulness” (7). Some have declared the age of amphibious assault over, arguing that an “atavistic insistence on building capabilities geared towards the now infeasible amphibious landing operations . . . will feed the very premise that animates political skepticism regarding the Marines’ utility by presenting the corps as a force built for battlefields that no longer exist.”²²

It is within this context that Timothy A. Heck and B. A. Friedman conceptualized *On Contested Shores*. Self-described as “career Marine officers, who spent very little time at sea,” Heck and Friedman had “long been concerned that the Marine Corps was becoming too land-centric, heavily reflecting the characteristics of a second land army” (5). It was an anxiety that the then-Commandant of the Marine Corps General David H. Berger shared, tasking the Marines “with a return to the sea” (4). Reflecting on Lt. Col. Merrill L. Barlett’s *Assault from the Sea: Essays on the History of Amphibious Warfare*, the editors realized that it had been nearly thirty years since anyone had taken on the broader history of amphibious

operations. An update to the scholarship was overdue.

In their research, Heck and Friedman identified a gap in our understanding of amphibious operations born of three interrelated issues: confusing amphibious assaults with amphibious operations; a narrow focus “on the drama and significance of” famous assault operations (such as Operation NEPTUNE in Normandy); and a failure to address both historical perspectives and future conceptualization (5). *On Contested Shores* is designed to tackle these problems and fill the knowledge gap. The editors sought to develop a diverse collection of essays (in terms of author and subject). They were particularly successful in the breadth of topics, covering the five types of amphibious operations: assault, withdrawal, raid, demonstration, and support of other operations.

The collection comprises twenty-three essays that work in concert to provide lessons from the past, evaluations of the present, and considerations for the future of amphibious operations. The first seventeen chapters cover amphibious operations spanning five centuries from a historical perspective. From Jacopo Pessina’s essay on the sixteenth-century nighttime assault and twenty-four-day siege of Porto Ercoletto during the Italian Wars (1494–1559) to Serhat Güvenç and Mesut Uyar’s study of Turkey’s amphibious operation YILDIZ-70 ATMA 4 (Star-70 Drop 4) in Cyprus in 1974, the majority of chapters examine the most studied type of amphibious operation (assault). However, several essays share lessons learned from the other four. For example, Samuel de Korte investigates the Pyrrhic victory resulting from the Dutch amphibious withdrawal at Leiden in 1574, and Gregory Liedtke evaluates how German naval evacuations on the Eastern Front between 1943 and 1945 prolonged German resistance despite its declining military fortunes. Edward J. Hagerty provides a look into Confederate Brig. Gen. Richard H. Anderson’s near-disastrous raid against U.S. troops at

Fort Pickens on Santa Rosa Island, Florida, in 1861; Benjamin Armstrong offers insight into how the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps used peacetime amphibious operations to facilitate diplomatic negotiations with Korea in 1871; and Eric A. Sibul considers how the Estonian military used not only amphibious raids and assaults during the Estonian War of Independence (1918–1920), but also demonstrations to “throw the Bolsheviks off balance and disrupt their communications” (133).

The remaining six chapters use such historical lessons to evaluate present-day amphibious operations and offer ruminations on the future of these operations. For example, Kevin Rowlands uses the evolution of the United Kingdom’s approach to amphibious operations over the last seventy-plus years to demonstrate that different does not mean less specialization or abandonment of doctrine but an opportunity to become a more effective fighting force. Sulakshana Komeranth argues that to gain strategic advantage in the great power competition, Naval Special Warfare must reevaluate its mission and capabilities from the last twenty years and refocus on enhancing its “amphibious, more unconventional capabilities” (339).

Ellen A. Ahlness’s essay, which uses Russia’s historical and current engagement in amphibious operations to ponder the future, is a prime example of how the editors envisioned this book as creating a conversation between the past and the future. As climate change is one of the critical elements shaping the threat landscape, Ahlness seeks to move beyond a focus on Pacific littorals and equatorials when the Arctic region, which may be open for commercial shipping as early as 2050, is a “bellwether . . . for changing geophysical realities” (340). Given the possibility of future exploitation of the Arctic’s natural resources as a source of contention and Russia’s propensity for deceptive amphibious military strategies, Arctic states with accessible coastlines may find themselves vulnerable to an assault (351–52).

In total, the editors masterfully selected essays that not only demonstrate how the “history of amphibious warfare is one of both continuity and change,” but also the sheer “diversity of forms the subject assumes” (393). The result truly speaks to the collective labor involved in creating an edited collection. Although the editors were successful in the diversity of the sub-

ject matter, they were less so in terms of authors. Out of twenty-three essays, only two are by women. The editors note that the “community of interest around amphibious operations . . . remains quite homogenous in English-speaking militaries” (xiv). Although this may be true, databases such as Women Also Know History or Jacqueline Whitt’s (U.S. Army War College) crowdsourced list of women military historians might yield a more gender-diverse lineup. For example, Kunika Kakuta’s research on the Imperial Japanese Navy or Classical Athenian Navy, Anna Brinkman’s scholarship on eighteenth-century Anglo-Spanish maritime history, or Jennifer L. Speelman’s work on the military and maritime strategic importance of the Panama Canal could lead to fruitful discussions about the history and future of amphibious operations.

On Contested Shores is an essential update to the broader history of amphibious operations that expands our collective understanding of the subject and provides ample space to continue the conversation.

The book is available for free download at: https://www.usmcu.edu/Portals/218/OnContestedShores_web.pdf.


Dr. Jamie L. H. Goodall is a historian in the Field Programs and Historical Services directorate at the U.S. Army Center of Military History (CMH). She holds a PhD in history from the Ohio State University, specializing in early American, Atlantic World, and military histories. Her publications include a National Geographic bookazine on global piracy, three regional histories of piracy in North America with The History Press, and a history of the Office of the Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army with CMH.

NOTES

1. Alejandro Mayorkas, “Tackling an Evolving Threat Landscape—Homeland Security in 2023,” remarks to the Council on Foreign Relations, Washington DC, 21 Apr 2023, <https://www.dhs.gov/news/2023/04/21/2023-state-homeland-security-remarks-tackling-evolving-threat-landscape-homeland>.

2. Jack Watling and Sidhartha Kaushal, “Amphibious Assault is Over,” RUSI Defence Systems, vol. 21, 21 Jan 2019, <https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/>

[publications/rusi-defence-systems/amphibious-assault-over](https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/rusi-defence-systems/amphibious-assault-over).



THE BATTLE OF HARLEM HEIGHTS, 1776

BY DAVID PRICE

Westholme Publishing, 2022

Pp. xvi, 164. \$28

REVIEW BY ANN M. BECKER

The Battle of Harlem Heights, 1776, by David Price, offers a comprehensive and thought-provoking overview of this pivotal but little-known Revolutionary War battle. Well-written and engaging, this meticulously documented book provides insight into the challenges faced by General George Washington as he engaged the British in battle for the first time. Price details the significance of this battle and its implications for the future success of the Revolution and brings to light the importance of Lt. Col. Thomas W. Knowlton’s efforts to provide badly needed intelligence for the commander in chief.

As the first successful battlefield outcome for Washington’s troops and closely following the devastating loss at the Battle of Brooklyn, Harlem Heights provided American soldiers with crucial combat experience for the ill-trained, novice army and, perhaps more importantly, a desperately needed win against

the professional British army they opposed. Price effectively argues that the Americans, invigorated by the small victory, were more confident and cohesive at this crucial battle. This success also demonstrated to the British that their disdain for the rebellious American Army was perhaps misplaced, as the resistance they encountered was much stiffer than anticipated (xvi). The loss in Brooklyn, retreat, and debacle at Kip's Bay crushed the morale of the rebel troops. Their successful stand against the British at Harlem Heights proved they could resist effectively and demonstrated that Washington's Army, though untrained, could hold their own against their foe.

Price provides a solid overview of the New York campaign and emphasizes the initial confusion among the Americans. Washington changed commanders three times just before the Brooklyn battle, split his forces, and sorely lacked the intelligence he needed to plan effectively (7). Confronting an overwhelming British flotilla armed with thousands of professional British and German troops, the general faced an almost insurmountable task as he prepared to defend New York (4). The book describes the American attempts to fortify the city and anticipate the invasion. It credits British General Henry Clinton's intelligence about the geography of Long Island with his ability to crush Washington's forces there. After Washington's escape, the Continental Army, retreating north, withdrew to Harlem Heights and attempted to secure that location while planning defensive actions. Price provides maps and careful descriptions of modern locations throughout *The Battle of Harlem Heights*, allowing his readers to picture the events and battle movements he describes with ease.

An important aspect of the book focuses on Colonel Knowlton of Connecticut, who is revered as the father of military intelligence and led Knowlton's Rangers, an intelligence and reconnaissance unit. Knowlton was present at the Harlem battle, where he and his Rangers encountered the British while attempting a flanking movement, which initiated the battle. Price argues that Knowlton, who was killed during his early engagement at Harlem Heights, deserves recognition for his courage and valor as a soldier. He seeks to raise Knowlton's profile by

detailing his military career during the French and Indian War and the Revolutionary War. Knowlton first enlisted in the Connecticut militia in 1756 and served until 1763. He became known for his leadership abilities during his time in the militia. Price highlights Knowlton's experiences alongside Robert Rogers's Rangers as providing Knowlton with knowledge about the specific tactics and equipment useful in scouting, reconnaissance, and special operations. All were used during the New York campaign and at Harlem Heights (45–46).


Knowlton returned to active service at Cambridge, Massachusetts, after Lexington and Concord and before his deployment to New York. He fought at the Battle of Bunker Hill, serving as a rear guard for the retreating Americans, earning him high praise and a promotion to major (60). In January 1776, Knowlton led a successful raid on Charleston and destroyed several homes there, preventing the British from using them, with no loss of American lives. Soon promoted again, Colonel Knowlton formed a new contingent of 130 New England soldiers as Knowlton's Rangers. Essentially a light infantry and skirmishing force, the Rangers provided desperately needed intelligence about British troop movements for the commander in chief and often engaged in hazardous duty and missions that required individual initiative for success (64). Throughout the book, Price emphasizes that the lack of military intelligence proved disastrous for Washington and his Continental Army. He argues that Knowlton had a pivotal role in reversing that trend through his scouting expeditions and other harrowing duties.

Price's analysis of Knowlton's untimely death in the battle focuses on its significance as a pivotal win, and importance to the ultimate success of the Revolution. He argues that by ordering Knowlton to move on the British at Harlem Heights and, in effect, poke "a stick in a hornet's nest" (109), Washington perhaps risked the loss of his Army to compensate for the embarrassing losses in Brooklyn and Kip's Bay. Citing his inexperience as a commander and his combative temperament with this decision, the author argues that Washington made mistakes during this engagement. However, Price believes that the victory at Harlem Heights,

though it did not change the outcome of the campaign and caused the loss of Knowlton and other valued military leaders, gave the Americans a boost to morale and an important psychological advantage they had not had before. The cause of rebellion was rejuvenated as the Continental Army successfully stood up to the British army, which was no longer seen as invincible, and the American soldiers gained valuable combat experience, which served them well for the remainder of the Revolutionary War (110–11).

Dr. Ann M. Becker is a professor of historical studies at (SUNY) Empire State University and received her PhD from Stony Brook University. Her areas of interest include the American Revolution, with a focus on the impact of smallpox, as well as Revolutionary War pensions and prisons. Her book, *Smallpox in Washington's Army: Disease, War, and Society during the Revolutionary War*, was published in 2023 by Lexington Press. A chapter entitled "Inoculation in Washington's Army: The Battle Against Smallpox," appeared in Margaret Vining and Barton C. Hacker, eds., *Science in Uniform, Uniforms in Science: Historical Studies of American Military and Scientific Interactions* (Rowman and Littlefield, 2007). Dr. Becker has presented at numerous academic conferences, including the American Historical Association, and has published several articles in scholarly journals and three photo history books.





NAPOLEON ABSENT, COALITION ASCENDANT: THE 1799 CAMPAIGN IN ITALY AND SWITZERLAND, VOLUME 1

BY CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ
TRANSLATED AND EDITED
BY NICHOLAS MURRAY
AND CHRISTOPHER PRINGLE

University Press of Kansas, 2021
Pp xvi, 435. \$39.95

REVIEW BY TOM VANCE

This is a translation of volume one of the two-volume *The 1799 Campaign in Italy and Switzerland* by Prussian General Carl von Clausewitz (1780–1831). It is more than just a translation, however. Once you begin reading, it becomes clear why it has its own title (aside from the obvious marketing advantages of Napoleon’s name). During this campaign, General Bonaparte commanded the French expedition of 45,000 troops in Egypt (1798–1799). However, his shadow is present as France faces off against Austria and Russia of the Second Coalition (1799–1802). With 509 footnotes accompanying Clausewitz’s original 39 notes, Murray and Pringle have created an engaging book within this translation.

Clausewitz’s fame comes from his magnum opus *On War*, published posthumously by his wife Marie and longtime friend Maj. Franz August O’Etelz, but he also had a distinguished active-duty career.¹ Clausewitz

received his commission at age 12 and his baptism of fire a year later during the war of the First Coalition (1791–1797) against revolutionary France. After graduating at the top of his class from the Prussian War College, he served in staff assignments during the Napoleonic Wars at Jena-Auerstedt (becoming a prisoner of war, 1806–1808); Borodino (1812), Leipzig (1813), and finally in the Waterloo campaign (1815), serving as a corps chief of staff. Clausewitz directed the War College and served as chief of staff to Prussia’s commanding general. He died of cholera at age 51 while organizing army resources to control an outbreak in Germany.²

Clausewitz’s text and Murray and Pringle’s commentary and analysis are so seamless that it is easy to forget whose voice you are reading (especially as Clausewitz wrote with the editorial *we*). Nicholas Murray teaches strategy and policy at the U.S. Naval War College, whereas Christopher Pringle, formerly with the British Territorial Army, is an academic publishing executive. They are also the translators and editors of volume two of the series, *The Coalition Crumbles, Napoleon Returns: The 1799 Campaign in Italy and Switzerland* (2021) and *Napoleon’s 1796 Italian Campaign* (2018), also published by the University Press of Kansas.

Murray and Pringle’s motivation for translating Clausewitz is simple. They want to share Clausewitz’s campaign histories with “a broader audience so that they too might benefit from his historical analysis and the testing of his theoretical models against the campaigns themselves” (2). They believe this would increase understanding of Clausewitz’s *On War* (3). This work serves as a primer (or refresher) for *On War*, with our translator’s footnotes cross-referencing Clausewitz’s principles of war.³ Murray and Pringle also compare nuances of the campaign accounts by two of Clausewitz’s contemporaries: the formidable general Charles Louis, Archduke of Austria, and Clausewitz’s rival as a military theorist, General Baron Antoine-Henri de Jomini.⁴

Bonaparte appears nineteen times in Clausewitz’s text, and Murray and Pringle refer to the absent general in nine footnotes. Most references are to Bonaparte’s successful 1796 Italian campaign—Clausewitz calls it “glorious” (394)—and Bonaparte’s abilities as a commander.⁵ In one instance, while describing the options of the commanding generals, Clausewitz wrote, “Bonaparte’s method in 1796 was disregarded” (341), along with related phrases scattered throughout like “A Bonaparte might have . . .” or “If one side

had had a Bonaparte in charge. . .” Bonaparte’s absence did indeed contribute to French reverses during the campaign, as did political instability in France.⁶ There are several ironies to note: the Egyptian campaign was a trigger for the Second Coalition against France (14); the early French defeats eliminated the gains from Bonaparte’s 1796 campaign and hastened Bonaparte’s return from Egypt, creating the opportunity for his seizing control of the nation and then turning the tide of the war in France’s favor—hence the title of volume two, *The Coalition Crumbles, Napoleon Returns*.

In his introduction, Clausewitz describes the campaigns in Italy and Switzerland as “among the most significant and richest in lessons of any campaigns in the history of warfare” (7). He classifies the four key leaders of the campaign as commanders of “great repute” (7): Aleksandr Suvorov and Archduke Charles leading the Allies; Jean Victor Marie Moreau and André Masséna for the French. Clausewitz’s text, written in the present tense, is arranged into five chapters: (1) General Situation; Opening the Campaign in Germany; (2) Opening the Campaign in Italy; (3) Continuation of the Campaign in Switzerland; (4) Continuation of the Campaign in Italy; and (5) The Allies Take Mantua and Alessandria. The five chapters have fifty-six sections in total, each with subheads, which provides easier reading (especially as there is no chronology). He describes seven major battles and twenty-nine actions or encounters. The final battle is at Novi, where Russian general Suvorov defeated General Barthélemy-Catherine Joubert (who was killed in action). Of Suvorov, Clausewitz says, “Something out of the ordinary could always be expected” (25). We learn about the fog of war, the interference of government instructions to field commanders, local uprisings in Italy against French forces, and alliance issues between the Austrians and Russians.

Murray and Pringle include translators’ and editors’ notes, and a note on the utility of war-gaming in understanding Clausewitz (Murray conducts these at the Naval Academy and Pringle wrote a book on war-gaming). Eleven maps, a bibliography, and an index complete the book. Their footnotes are conversational and include fifty-five mini-bios of Austrian, Russian, and French leaders, including many of Napoleon’s future marshals. We learn that Clausewitz and Jomini “exhibited a severe enmity for each other’s works” (29n45) and of Clausewitz’s

“hatred of the French Republic” (66n91). General Suvorov was “an intellectual and dynamic soldier right up to his death in 1800, in contrast to many of his contemporaries from Russia and Austria, who seem to have been almost universally slow moving and slow witted” (15n13). They also point out the French advantage of having younger generals than the allies (75n109).

Although I do not have the credentials to criticize Clausewitz, his chapter on the general situation, filling one-third of the book, is a bit long. I smiled when he admitted that he wrote some of it “at the risk [of being] too vague to see the wood for the trees” (127). I hope Murray and Pringle will not mind my saying that their book requires studying, not just reading. However, the effort is worth it. Their commentary is easy to follow, and the cross-referencing creates an engaging and interactive experience (especially if you were to follow along with a copy of *On War*, which I did not). When you are finished, however, you feel like you have earned several professional military education credits.

Tom Vance is a retired Army Reserve lieutenant colonel with bachelor’s and master’s degrees in history from Western Michigan University, where he received his Army ROTC commission branched Adjutant General Corps. After ten years of active duty, he served as a part-time ROTC instructor at his alma mater and in public affairs assignments in Washington, D.C. His article “Napoleon’s Son: Commissioning and Professional Development” was a *Military Review* Online Exclusive in December 2022.

NOTES

1. Clausewitz’s works, published between 1832–1834, include three campaign histories (1796, 1799, and 1812) and his *On War*. Also see Vanya Eftimova Bellinger, *Marie von Clausewitz: The Woman Behind the Making of On War* (Oxford University Press, 2016).

2. Michael Howard, *Clausewitz: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford University Press, 2002), 5–11.


3. Murray and Pringle use Michael Howard and Peter Paret’s translation of *On War* (Princeton University Press, 1989).

4. Jomini (1779–1869) was a Swiss army officer and historian before joining Marshal Michel Ney’s staff. In addition to being theorists, Jomini and Clausewitz have two things in common.

Their wartime experience came from staff, not command, assignments, and each of them served in Russian uniform: Clausewitz during 1812–1813 and Jomini beginning with the armistice in 1813. Theodore Ayrauld Dodge says Jomini “left the French army and took service with the Russians” (*Napoleon*, vol. 4, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1907, 113–14), whereas Albert Sidney Britt III calls it “desertion” (*The Wars of Napoleon*, West Point Military History Series, Garden City, NY: Square One Publishers, 2003, 132).

5. For accounts of the 1796 campaign by U.S. Army officers, see 1st Lt. Herbert H. Sargent, *Napoleon Bonaparte’s First Campaign, With Comments* (Chicago: A. C. McClurg, 1895) and Col. G. J. Fiebeger, *The Campaigns of Napoleon Bonaparte of 1796–1797* (West Point, NY: United States Military Academy Printing Office, 1911).

6. According to Murray and Pringle, France’s “three most distinguished commanders” were absent. In addition to Bonaparte: General Jean-Charles Pichegru was in exile and General Jean Victor Moreau was in exile at the start of the campaign but was then reinstated (20).



GETTYSBURG’S SOUTHERN FRONT: OPPORTUNITY AND FAILURE AT RICHMOND

BY HAMPTON NEWSOME

University Press of Kansas, 2022
Pp. vii, 411. \$29.95

REVIEW BY JOHN R. MAASS

The title of this book is oddly misleading. The term *front* was not used during the

American Civil War, as author Hampton Newsome intends. Moreover, although the U.S. Army’s operations around Richmond in 1863 were related tangentially to the Gettysburg campaign, their limited success, distance from the great battle in Pennsylvania, and relative insignificance in the minds of the U.S. Army high command make a weak connection to the Confederate invasion of the North.

This initial observation aside, Newsome’s work is a well-researched, clear account of the little-known U.S. Army operations around Richmond during the summer of 1863, supported by several helpful maps. These movements were intended to interrupt Confederate logistics and threaten the Confederate capital when General Robert E. Lee moved north into Pennsylvania and subsequently fought the battle of Gettysburg. The rail lines running north and west from the Richmond area were the chief targets of Army commanders, who also knew that the Confederate capital would be guarded lightly. The author holds that the failure of these operations was a lost opportunity to capture Richmond and seriously damage Confederate supply efforts that summer. It was a “small, oft-overlooked component of the massive operations, taking place during the Gettysburg campaign,” Newsome contends (2).

The author begins his study with Lee’s invasion of Pennsylvania and the efforts of General Chief Henry W. Halleck to counter this danger. Part of his plan was to task Maj. Gen. John A. Dix, commander of the Department of Virginia headquartered at Fort Monroe in Hampton (in the coastal Tidewater region), with threatening Richmond and destroying the railroad bridges over the North and South Anna Rivers in Hanover County, north of the city. Supplies moved from Richmond along the Virginia Central Railroad west to Staunton, then by wagons in the wake of Lee’s army. Trains on this rail line had to cross the South Anna River, and thus, the bridge there became the target. Another objective was the Richmond, Fredericksburg, and Potomac railroad bridges that crossed over both the North and South Anna Rivers.

General Dix was a curious choice to lead the expedition from Fort Monroe, as he was not known as an aggressive, fast-moving leader. Almost 65 years old when the raid began, he was a War of 1812 veteran and had resigned from the U.S. Army in 1828. He moved 20,000 largely inexperienced

troops west to White House Landing on the Pamunkey River, soldiers of the IV and VII Corps commanded by Maj. Gen. Erasmus D. Keyes and Brig. Gen. George W. Getty, respectively. From here, the troops launched their raid on 23 June in what Newsome aptly calls “a story of might-have-beens, confusion, and failure” (5).

Dix developed a two-part plan of attack. The IV Corps under Keyes would advance toward Richmond by way of Bottoms Bridge on the Chickahominy River in a feint to hold the defenders of the capital in their trenches, while the VII Corps under Getty would move rapidly to destroy the railroad bridges in Hanover County. Getty’s “entire purpose was to generate a vigorous demonstration and prevent the Confederates from sending troops north to repel Gettys column at the railroad bridges in Hanover” (179).


Newsome gives a highly detailed account of both columns’ movements and attacks and is adept at describing the marches and skirmishes. Col. Samuel P. Spear led the expedition to destroy Virginia Central’s South Anna River bridge with his 11th Pennsylvania Cavalry. Along the way near Ashland, this column captured rebel cavalry commander Brig. Gen. William Henry Fitzhugh “Rooney” Lee, who was recuperating from a wound in Hanover. The bluecoats attacked the bridge and burned it after pushing off rebel defenders. However, Spear did not destroy the wooden Richmond, Fredericksburg, and Potomac trestle just a few miles away, which significantly limited the effectiveness of the expedition.

To the south, Keyes’ troops made little impression on Richmond’s Confederates under the overall command of Lt. Gen. D. H. Hill. Newsome provides details on an action at Crump’s Crossroads, between Bottoms Bridge and White House on 2 July, which stopped the Army forces in their tracks due to Keyes’s ineptitude. The rebels’ successful defense of the city is surprising, given that their command structure was overlapping and ineffective, the troops were spread out in too many locations, and several of their top generals were not up to the job.

Newsome concludes his study by noting that the Lincoln Administration was disappointed with the insignificant results achieved by Dix. Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton likewise thought the operation was a “waste of force” (277), and there was even disagreement afterward about

whether capturing Richmond was the main objective of the expedition or not. “In the end, it was clear that the federal effort to cut Lee’s communications had failed to generate decisive results” (286).

Dr. John R. Maass is a historian at the National Museum of the United States Army at Fort Belvoir, Virginia.



SOLDIER OF DESTINY: SLAVERY, SECESSION, AND THE REDEMPTION OF ULYSSES S. GRANT

BY JOHN REEVES

Pegasus Books, 2023
Pp. iv, 289. \$29.95

REVIEW BY MATTHEW J. MARGIS

Ulysses S. Grant has experienced a resurgence in the popular American imagination over the past decade. Initially considered a larger-than-life hero in the years following the Civil War, Grant’s reputation ebbed and flowed over the following century. Lost Cause supporters often portrayed Grant as little more than a drunkard who only achieved victory by brute force and sheer numbers. However, the diligent work of historians has corrected this inaccurate and unfair portrayal in recent years. Works such as Ronald C. White’s 2016 biography *American Ulysses*,

Ron Chernow’s 2017 *Grant*, and a 2020 History Channel miniseries have reshaped Grant in the popular imagination. This renewed affinity for the once-marginalized Grant culminated in a clause within the 2023 National Defense Authorization Act that promoted Ulysses S. Grant posthumously to General of the Armies, a rank held only by George Washington and John. J. Pershing. John Reeves’s *Soldier of Destiny: Slavery, Secession, and the Redemption of Ulysses S. Grant* fits this environment. Reeves set out to examine Ulysses S. Grant as a human being rather than as a mythical figure. What emerges is a character study that sheds new light on a figure who has been the focus of countless studies and historical debates.

Unlike most other works that cover Grant’s life, Reeves dedicates little time to the general’s military exploits, political pursuits, or childhood. All of this has been covered elsewhere. Instead, Reeves focuses on the ten years between 1854, when then-Captain Grant resigned his commission from the United States Army, and 1864, when Grant became the first person since George Washington to earn the permanent rank of lieutenant general in the Army. During this period, Grant’s life took many different turns. He left the Army, returned to his family living in Missouri, became a slave owner, struggled financially, faced internal demons, moved to Illinois to work in a leather goods store, reentered the Army, rose through the ranks, continued to struggle with alcoholism, possibly shifted his views on slavery, overcame numerous obstacles, and achieved the highest military honor one could. This amounted to a theoretical fall from grace capped by both personal and professional redemption.

Although this book is not without its flaws, its focus on this period in Grant’s life offers a unique, though often blurry, glimpse into his personal relationships, views on slavery, and struggles with alcohol. Reeves pays particular attention to Grant’s relationships with his wife, Julia Dent; his father, Jesse Root Grant; his father-in-law, Frederick Dent; the Dent slaves; his children; and various other friends and acquaintances. Reeves notes that Grant came from a northern antislavery family. Yet he married into a slave-owning family and owned slaves himself. Grant lived and worked on his father-in-law’s plantation and personally benefited from slavery. His wife, whom he

adored, continued owning slaves and even traveled with her enslaved nurse until late 1863. Although Grant offered freedom to one of his slaves (perhaps the only one he owned personally) in 1859, Reeves shows this was probably a move drawn less from moral convictions than from a pragmatic decision as he prepared to move to Galena, Illinois.


Throughout this book, Reeves digs into the often contradictory and complex nature of Grant the person. As noted above, he benefited from slavery. Eventually, he served as one of the key figures in emancipation as his armies broke the yoke of bondage in its wake. Reeves demonstrates that Grant was undoubtedly not an abolitionist like his father—at least not early in the war—and Grant even held some extremely prejudiced views, as evidenced by his antisemitic General Orders 11. Grant, however, evolved throughout his life and remained fiercely pro-Union and antisecession. This unyielding attitude drove him back into the Army in 1861. It served as the foundation of his wartime attitudes toward political issues, which were weighty and impactful. Grant was more than happy to see slavery end in exchange for preserving the country. Grant's philosophical redemption, then, was borne out of the violence of the Civil War.

In addition to Grant's relationships and views on slavery, Reeves dedicates significant time to discussing Grant's complicated struggles with alcohol. As with other aspects of Grant's life, his supposed alcohol abuse has been the subject of much scrutiny over the past century. Although Reeves does not go so far as to call Grant an alcoholic, he does discuss this issue with poise. He represents Grant as a man who struggled with sobriety and often had moments of weakness when faced with loneliness or prolonged stress. Grant found support from Julia and a trusted advisor, John A. Rawlins. They helped keep Grant on the straight and narrow. Others, though, could tempt Grant with drink, and many of his enemies were quick to spread rumors and gossip. Reeves does a masterful job of discounting unreliable stories while acknowledging the potential truth in others. As with the other aspects of Grant's life, his alcohol use was complicated and nuanced. Reeves's treatment of this subject is fair.

Although this book is wonderfully written and offers an in-depth look at Grant as a person, it is not without its

shortcomings. One is the author's lack of voice and interpretation. This reviewer waited for Reeves to provide context for Grant's internal contradictions. Reeves acknowledges that finding the real Grant is almost impossible, but Grant's theoretical redemption is somewhat ambiguous. Reeves hints at Grant's eventual move toward abolition. Those familiar with Grant will know how he treated freed persons as commanding general and president. Those with less familiarity, though, may tend to read this book and conclude that Grant was a typical slaveholder with an occasional drinking problem who hated secession. This is certainly not Reeves's intention, but a more extensive concluding chapter could have provided additional context for a character as complicated as Grant. Nonetheless, this book has the potential to change readers' understanding of Grant, offering a deeper look than most biographies offer into a flawed human who achieved greatness. Readers will have difficulty putting this book down. It is a fine addition to any Grant scholar's collection.

Dr. Matthew J. Margis is a historian in the Historical Studies Directorate at the U.S. Army Center of Military History (CMH). He earned his PhD from Iowa State University in 2016 and has worked with CMH since 2017. He is currently serving as the senior historian in the Office of the Chief of Staff of the Army.



THE AMERICAN ARMY IN GERMANY, 1918–1923: SUCCESS AGAINST THE ODDS

BY DEAN A. NOWOWIEJSKI

University Press of Kansas, 2021

Pp. viii, 376. \$54.95

REVIEW BY JANINE M. HUBAI

In *The American Army in Germany, 1918–1923: Success Against the Odds*, Dean A. Nowowiejski tells the story of the American occupation of the Rhineland in Germany after World War I. Attempting to fill in gaps of scholarship in military governance, Nowowiejski moves away from a diplomatic history and focuses on the institutional history of post-World War I governance of the American zone in the German Rhineland by the U.S. Army. He breaks the occupation of the American Zone of the Rhineland into two major phases: (1) The Third Army's occupation in Germany from December 1918 to July 1919, and (2) the American Forces in Germany's (AFG) occupation from 8 July 1919 until its departure in 1923—although he dedicates the bulk of his book to the latter. Celebrating the ability of the commander of the AFG, Nowowiejski argues that Maj. Gen. Henry T. Allen's successful navigation of the complex relationships of the Inter-Allied Rhineland High Commission (IARHC) and his skill in turning the recruits of the

AFG into a highly trained and respected force makes it a surprising and worthy story about “leadership, diplomacy, international relations, soldier training and education . . . and the performance of the United States Army in military government” (8).

During the first phase of the occupation, the Third Army followed the retreating German Army through difficult, war-torn terrain to Coblenz, Germany. Leaving France’s friendly and celebratory atmosphere for the uncertain environment of a defeated Germany, the American soldiers found a trepid civilian populace who expected a barbarian American Army. Yet, over time, civilians found the Americans to be disciplined soldiers whose job entailed enforcing order and international laws. Although there were antifraternalization laws, American soldiers were billeted in local German hotels and homes, which made avoiding social intimacy difficult. Brig. Gen. H. A. Smith and Col. Irvin L. Hunt oversaw the initial months of the occupation by writing the ordinances of the military government, supervising their implementation, and administering them to the city of Trier. Despite flaws such as confusing lines of authority and uneven policy creation, Nowowiejski details the efforts of the Third Army to grant some authority to local German leaders to give a sense of partnership between the occupier and the occupied, setting the stage for the second phase.

The second phase occurred when the Third Army changed to the AFG, and Allen took command on 8 July 1919. Here, the author strongly celebrates Allen’s leadership in the Rhineland. Nowowiejski calls Allen a “model commander and accomplished soldier-diplomat,” whose internationalism was unusual when Americans favored isolationism (10). Nowowiejski claims that Allen managed the occupation largely on his own with limited direction from the U.S. State Department or the War Department. As an officer with international experience as an attaché to Russia and Germany before World War I, as the military governor of Leyte in the Philippines, and as the founder of the Philippine Constabulary, Allen understood the workings of military governance. He was a man of wealth who felt most comfortable in the upper echelons of society, making it easy for

him to blend into the diplomatic and political circles of the IARHC, using his influence to protect American interests in the region. Nowowiejski successfully frames Allen’s position in the political context of America’s refusal to ratify the Treaty of Versailles and the League of Nations, which prompted America to sign a separate peace agreement with Germany. This state of affairs gave Allen an “unofficial observer” role in the workings of the IARHC, rather than being an official member. Allen used his diplomatic skills and networks to keep the French and Belgians from infringing on German soil and interfering in the economic redevelopment of the American zone. As Warren G. Harding entered the White House in 1921 and the Senate refused to continue funding the AFG efforts, Allen lost his influence in the region as the number of American soldiers dwindled. The occupation ended in 1923.

Nowowiejski’s work is strongest in detailing the history of the training and education program that Allen implemented to turn the AFG recruits into disciplined, well-respected soldiers. When many World War I veterans returned home, recruits replaced the combat-tested veterans. Given the delicate political and diplomatic situation in postwar Europe, the American soldiers needed to be ready for any resurgence of violence. Nowowiejski’s meticulous description of the development of Allen’s training program is a testament to the thoroughness of his historical account. He also details the responsibilities of the occupying force, including maintenance of roads, bridges, railroads, public utilities, public health, and food supplies. The soldiers also were tasked with destroying German war materiel and selling American vehicles, animals, and other items to German citizens. The AFG offered the local community protection and helped the Rhineland regional economy in several ways: industries and public utilities were profitable, Army excess livestock was sold to local farmers to restock their farms, and the money spent by the AFG soldiers in the community boosted the local economy. The American soldiers lived a privileged life in Coblenz, as they tended to have better financial conditions than most of the German population and enjoyed the city’s recreational offerings. Allen ensured that the Salvation Army


and YMCA huts provided the soldiers with plenty of entertainment (especially to ward off visits to the local red-light district). Allen also organized horsemanship events and competitions with other occupied armies to show the strength and abilities of the American forces.

Nowowiejski offers an extensive, even exhaustive, number of examples of Allen’s leadership skills. He paints Allen as almost too perfect, skirts over potential areas of flaws, and overextends some of Allen’s perceived legacies. In one instance, Nowowiejski suggests that “Allen’s interaction with diplomats across Europe . . . in many ways foreshadowed . . . American relations that happen today in the United States’ Mission” to NATO (41). However, he offers little evidence of how or why he makes this assertion. Part of Nowowiejski’s issue is the lack of varied sources. He often relies on one or two sources written by either the person of the subject themselves or the Army in general, offering only one perspective. This same problem also indicates an unbalanced view when discussing how the Germans viewed the Americans. Although it may be true that Americans and Germans found a way to coexist and that Americans helped increase the region’s economy, Nowowiejski offers too perfect of a picture. He suggests that Germans escalated violence shortly before the official signing of the Treaty of Versailles and that some American soldiers committed infractions. However, he does not go into further details. Looking into records that give the Germans’ point of view could have offered a more balanced reality of American occupation, and issues of soldier-civilian relations. Nowowiejski too often refers to the “benevolence” of the AFG but explains Allen as a “successful host while using his authority over billeting . . . to cultivate friends and to resist pressure” (86). Would the inhabitants whose living circumstances were leveraged by the occupying power speak of their benevolence in the same way Nowowiejski suggests? This critique underscores the need for a more realistic and balanced view of history, highlighting the dangers of an overly idealistic portrayal of historical events.

These criticisms aside, this book provides a wealth of useful information about the workings of leadership and

the Army during its occupation of the Rhineland. Despite the complex and changing nature of the postwar landscape, the narrative is easy to read. It is of value to anyone interested in American military governance, U.S. Army life, or European history during the first half of the twentieth century.

Janine M. Hubai is a multimedia historian at the U.S. Army Center of Military History and a PhD candidate at George Mason University, specializing in military, public, and digital history. She has produced video projects for the Roy Rosenzweig Center for History and New Media and created digital exhibits for the Center of Mason Legacies and Dr. Gabrielle A. Tayac. Her areas of interest include war and society, the Cold War, and racial segregation and integration in the U.S. Army.



BRAIDED IN FIRE: BLACK GIS AND TUSCAN VILLAGERS ON THE GOTHIC LINE

BY SOLACE WALES

Knox Press, 2020
Pp. xxxii, 447. \$20

REVIEW BY BRADLEY J. SOMMER

The Second World War often is framed as a conflict to protect democracy and

freedom. The fascism and militarism of the Axis Powers represented serious threats to liberal democracies and constitutional monarchies. They provided an ideological rallying point for the world. The narrative of the war being a conflict over political ideologies became the dominant one and is the most commonly cited explanation for the war today. This perspective certainly is accurate and does provide a viable means of understanding the Second World War. A critical aspect of the political ideology of the Axis Powers was race on both sides. In every major theatre of the war, the conflict was framed in racial terms. The Nazis' political worldview was linked irrevocably with race. In the Pacific, the Japanese and the United States both used heavily racialized language and imagery. Within the United States, civil rights leaders developed the "Double V" or "Double Victory" campaign to promote the defeat of racism abroad and at home. The Second World War was undoubtedly a racial conflict; however, the larger understanding of that conflict is not understood wholly. In her book *Braided in Fire: Black GIs and Tuscan Villagers on the Gothic Line*, Solace Wales details the experiences of Black soldiers fighting Germans in Italy, revealing the complexities of race on the battlefield and exposing a dramatic and complicated history.

Braided in Fire is a winding series of vignettes and oral histories connected by a shared location and experience. Wales focuses on the relationship between the American 92d Infantry Division and the people of Sommocolonia, a small town with great strategic importance on the Gothic Line. Part of the U.S. Fifth Army fighting its way up north through the soft underbelly of Italy, the 92d was the only African American unit to see combat in the European Theater. Wales takes great care in describing the settings and the actors, creating a richness and texture that makes her book a stylistic standout from contemporary professional history. She writes a deeply affecting and personal narrative, with dialogue and internal monologue befitting a fine novel or dramatic play. Wales balances a large historical cast, weaving elegantly between the rather mundane aspects of life in Sommocolonia and the harsh realities of the slogging and brutal fighting that characterized the Italian Campaign. Individual backstories on each of the central figures allows us a better understanding of their motivations,


even if Wales takes some liberties with her inferences and presents a much more human picture of war and race relations in the Italian countryside. This approach is not without drawbacks. Wales's attention to detail sacrifices much in the way of scope, claiming to place the story of the 92d and the people of Sommocolonia into a larger discussion of the Second World War despite ultimately failing to do so.

Recounting the experience of such a distinguished and historic unit is certainly a worthwhile endeavor. Wales provides keen insights and rich descriptions of the fighting and the complex relationship between Italians—many of whom had embraced Benito Mussolini's rhetoric and ideologies heartily, if not his leadership—and soldiers who had more pressure on them beyond the mission and their lives. The book is not without its faults, though. Despite its claims to a larger experience of Black soldiers across the Gothic Line, Wales focuses much of the narrative on the Biondi family, as well as the life and experience of Lt. John R. Fox, particularly the events leading up to his heroic sacrifice for which he eventually would receive a posthumous Medal of Honor fifty-two years after his death. The struggle for Fox's recognition is a story in itself. Putting the story at the end of the book is a missed opportunity to explore the most interesting part of the narrative. One cannot help but feel that Wales buries the lede a bit here.

Sometimes, historians take too large of a scope, letting the details and the human experience get lost amid historiographical scuffles and exercises in semantics. Wales, herself not a professional historian, then indirectly demonstrates a style of writing that is available to us, even if we rarely use it. Her book's most significant contribution is not to the historiography, perhaps the weakest part of the book, but how we write history with fluid, engaging prose and articulate thoughts of the lives of historical actors that delve into personal motivations. This can be as compelling as critical historical interventions and major historiographical revelations. Wales lived in Italy and is fluent in Italian, so her proximity to the source and polyglot nature certainly put her level of immersion out of reach for some people, toeing the line between history and anthropology. However, if history is storytelling, even just in part, the discipline would be wise to take note of how to tell a good story

while staying true and faithful to the facts. Wales has opened the door on an important topic. Now, someone needs to walk through.

Dr. Bradley J. Sommer is a research fellow at the U.S. Army Center of Military History at Fort McNair in Washington, D.C. He received his PhD in U.S. history from Carnegie Mellon University. Specializing in labor, urban, and African American history in the twentieth century, he currently is working on a book titled "Tomorrow Never Came: Toledo, Ohio, and the Making of the Postindustrial Midwest."



RED ARMY INTO THE REICH

BY SIMON FORTY, PATRICK HOOK,
AND NIK CORNISH

Casemate, 2021
Pp. 256. \$37.95

REVIEW BY DEVIN L. DAVIS

World War II saw mass destruction and the introduction of mass logistics and warfare on a scale that had not been seen yet in military history. Although historians have researched and discussed the demarcation of the Axis and Allied powers many times, the historical prevalence of the so-called Western Allies and Eastern Allies is often overlooked.

In this case, the Western Allies refer to the Soviet Union and the Red Army specifically. The numerous campaigns and battles fought from the Red Army's perspective are often overlooked and not discussed compared to the D-Day landings at Normandy or the Eastern Allies' push across the Rhine. Simon Forty, Patrick Hook, and Nik Cornish set out to research, examine, and present the everyday armchair historian with an accurate, precise, and well-illustrated look into the operations on the Eastern Front.

Their collective work, titled *Red Army into the Reich*, was published in 2021 by Casemate. It is an excellently researched and illustrated timeline of the Soviet Union's advance toward Berlin in 1944 and 1945 and the birth of early Cold War tensions. Although this work does not encompass all campaigns and countries of German occupation, it provides a masterful overview of each in references and text, as well as vivid color illustrations and maps.

The introductory narrative sets the stage for not only Adolf Hitler's initial failures during the initial invasion of the Soviet Union but also discusses the efforts made by the Soviet Union to change the tides of war on the Eastern Front. The German Wehrmacht and Luftwaffe's use of the Blitzkrieg, or Lightning War, against Poland was not unknown to the Soviet Union. Although Hitler had planned for a march toward Moscow, the Red Army eventually would surround the eastern side of Berlin utilizing their version of the Lightning War.

The introduction also contains an in-depth and well-constructed overview of many facets of the Allied war effort that not only affected the Western advance into Germany but also the Eastern advance by the Red Army; for instance: the importance of partisan warfare and the introduction of Lend-Lease in June 1941. The final pages of the introduction also play a vital role in the readability of the narrative by providing numerous pages on key military and political figures. An overview of the German and Soviet leaders helps the reader understand the greater context of each operation that follows in the subsequent chapters. The book also contains an overview of weaponry, a key element not only in setting the narrative but also

in emphasizing the sheer scale and size of each campaign that was orchestrated to bring down the Third Reich.

After the introductory narrative flows a sequence of campaigns that each could encompass an entire standalone published work. The Red Army advanced through many countries on their drive toward Berlin—for example, Poland, Hungary, the Balkans, and eventually Austria. Although each of these countries have a vast history in World War II, the authors meticulously included the historical foundation needed to understand each nation's impact on the Red Army. The authors did a superb job at keeping the narrative clear and concise to provide the greatest overview of each campaign or country and its impact on the conclusion of World War II.

The principal value in this work is in the illustrations that are provided throughout, both within the narrative as well as outside of the narrative. Campaign maps, such as the map of coastal batteries along Norway as part of the Atlantic Wall, are paramount to understanding the Red Army's quest toward gaining the northern advantage. Campaign and fortification maps are included throughout, as well as an abundance of images of key military leaders, military weaponry, and location images during the war and postwar. These images do a great job of projecting not only the brutality of war on the Eastern Front but also the scale at which the war was fought.

Overall, *Red Army into the Reich* is a well-written, well-illustrated, and pleasing read that I could recommend to almost anyone. The illustrations help the ease of reading, and the clear timelines help the reader follow the war easily, without any confusion of dates or Army group positions. This book could be viewed as inadequate or controversial by some because of its lack of historical references, and its abundance of illustrations. However, both are an added benefit and help paint a more vivid picture of the war for the reader.

WO1 Devin L. Davis is an active-duty army officer serving as an AH-64E Apache aviator. He earned his bachelor's degree in American military history in 2019 and his master's degree in military history with a concentration in World War II in 2022, both from


American Military University. His thesis, "An Indoctrinated Generation: The Impacts of Allied Re-education and De-Nazification on The Hitler Youth," was published in 2022 by the university. He also has published, "The Hitler Youth & Communism: The Impacts of a Brainwashed Generation in Post-War Politics in Eastern Germany," in the Spring 2020 issue of the *Saber and Scroll* historical journal. His interests include World War II, Nazi Germany, and the Hitler Youth.



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INTRODUCTION



James A. Malachowski

Traditionally, each new chief historian at the Center of Military History (CMH) introduces themselves in their first Footnote, and I will follow their example. My predecessor, Jon Hoffman, aptly described the emotion of stepping into the role in his first Footnote. He said, and I agree, it is a humbling experience joining the CMH team, knowing its reputation for high professional standards and remarkable work. At the same time, I am thrilled to be coming home to the U.S. Army. I grew up as an Army brat, with a family history of service tracing back to the Revolutionary War. That family tradition is why I enlisted soon after high school. Somewhere between Airborne School and Ranger School, I decided I wanted to be a career historian. This was partly the influence of a military history detachment conducting oral history interviews during a BALIKATAN exercise, where they took the time to explain the importance of history and describe the Army history program.

It was also the result of seeing a connection in regimental history. Way back in the sixth grade, working on a history project, I had run across a photo showing two soldiers guarding a train boxcar. Despite their parkas, they were freezing in the cold, but each of them had a determined look in their eyes. My paper on the American intervention in Siberia at the close of World War I won an honorable mention, and the image stuck with me. Years later, arriving at 1-27 Infantry "Wolfhounds," that very picture was on the wall in the orderly room. I was walking in the footsteps of the soldiers in that Siberian photo. That visceral connection between a history book and the living regimental heritage led me to volunteer at the Army Museum at Fort DeRussy and help build exhibits for the Wolfhound Regimental Room. I am thankful for the mentorship of Ms. Linda Hee at the Tropic Lightning Museum, Col. Lewis Millett, and the incomparable Honorary Regimental Sergeant Major Hugh O'Reilly. They helped me understand the connection between today's soldiers and our storied history. That connection is the reason I became a history major.

My wife, Kristen, is the reason I became a historian. We met while assigned to the same Military Intelligence battalion

at Fort Carson. Her support through years of late night and weekend homework finishing an undergraduate degree and then the public history program was, and still is, invaluable. I would not be here without it. I admit, she may not have known what she was getting into, since the homework continued as I went on to earn a doctorate in education and complete graduate programs in half a dozen fields. Somewhere, I should have a lifelong learner coffee mug.

In nearly two decades as an airpower historian, I have written history at every level of the Air Force, mentored a generation of historians, archivists, and museum professionals, and led several award-winning programs. Along the way, I have had the privilege of being a policy analyst for the Congressional Research Service and a defense fellow in the U.S. Senate, deploying multiple times as a civilian historian, and serving as the historian-in-residence at the Executive Office of the President for two administrations. As a member of the Defense Senior Leadership Development Program, I graduated from the U.S. Navy War College where, as part of an advanced research team, I had the chance to explore the relationship between the rapid fielding of disruptive technology and organizational learning on mission performance (spoiler: historians are a transformational force multiplier, but we all knew that!).

My experience has given me a unique view of the importance that history and heritage bring to the fight. We know that the problems and challenges of today cannot be solved without understanding the past from which they derive. The Center's 2030 Strategic Vision of maintaining the Army's institutional memory, helping shape a historically minded culture, integrating material heritage and archives, and putting people first all lay out a plan to win that fight, even as the character of warfare evolves. I am honored to join the team and help realize the vision.



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