THE PROFESSIONAL BULLETIN OF ARMY HISTORY

# ARMY HISTORY

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## THE LIGHT FIGHTERS

THE 7TH INFANTRY DIVISION (LIGHT) AND THE LATE COLD WAR, 1983–1989

**BY DONALD P. WRIGHT**

## NOT WITHOUT BLEMISH

THE CAREER OF BRIG. GEN. FRED A. SAFAY, FLORIDA NATIONAL GUARD

**BY RYAN P. HOVATTER**

# ARMY HISTORY

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Front cover: A soldier of the 7th Infantry Division, shown here in full battle gear, 12 May 1989
*National Archives*

# EDITOR'S JOURNAL

In this Winter 2025 issue of *Army History*, I am excited to share with our readers two outstanding articles, a look at an interesting Army artifact, a special feature that highlights both the art and artifacts of a famous artist, and a selection of quality book reviews.

The first article, by Donald Wright, details the transformation of the 7th Infantry Division into a light division, a concept that was developed toward the end of the Cold War. The reconfigured division was able to deploy as a highly mobile force anywhere in the world within a matter of days. Although the division was limited in firepower, its speed and ability to maneuver—primarily on foot over rough terrain—were significant advantages in various contingency operations and low- and medium-intensity conflicts.

The second article, by Ryan Hovatter, examines the career of Florida National Guard soldier Fred A. Safay. Safay, perhaps the first Arab-American general, enlisted in 1915, was commissioned as a second lieutenant in August 1918, and served in France and as part of the occupation force in Germany, before returning to the United States in July 1919. He remained active in the Florida National Guard and worked for the state Board of Health. In late 1940, he took command of the 124th Infantry Regiment, which he led as the demonstration unit at Fort Benning, Georgia. Safay eventually deployed to the Mediterranean Theater in March 1944 and commanded the 338th Infantry Regiment of the 85th Infantry Division during the Italian Campaign. Hovatter expertly tells the story of this relatively unknown soldier, highlighting his service, warts and all.

The Artifact Spotlight for the issue shows us the High Standard Model HDMS pistol. This silenced .22-caliber pistol entered service in early 1944 and was used primarily for clandestine missions by members of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). Later, it also was used by the OSS's successor, the Central Intelligence Agency. This pistol is currently housed at the Army's Museum Support Center at Fort Belvoir, Virginia.

This issue contains a slightly different feature, in lieu of our usual museum spotlight, which gives us the rare opportunity to look at not only some Army artwork but also some artifacts that belonged to the artist. Many readers will be familiar with the World War II artwork of Tom Lea. What some may not know is that several uniform items belonging to Lea are housed at the Fort Bliss Museum in Fort Bliss, Texas, and that his wartime *Life* artwork, of which the Army is the custodian, is stored at the Museum Support Center at Fort Belvoir. Lea traveled the globe during the conflict as a war correspondent for *Life* magazine, documenting the combat and activities of U.S service members. This feature allows readers to view his artwork and the personal items that he wore during his travels.

As this is the first issue of 2025, and the 250th anniversary of the Revolutionary War is upon us, I strongly urge folks to submit articles on this pivotal conflict. Please see the Call for Submissions box that appears in the pages of each issue for instructions.

**BRYAN J. HOCKENSMITH**
MANAGING EDITOR

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CHARLES R. BOWERY JR.

## THE ARMY AT 250

As you read this issue of *Army History,* excitement and interest continue to build toward the June 2025 semiquincentennial (250th anniversary) of the establishment of the United States Army. Across the Army, work is underway to plan for and execute this milestone event. This commemoration offers us the opportunity to reconsider the Army's foundational role in the creation of our republic. The Army was our first transnational institution, established by the Continental Congress in 1775, and it has maintained an unbroken lineage of service that bridges from the revolution to the present day.

To headline the Army's 250th birthday, the National Museum of the United States Army will open its blockbuster temporary exhibition, *Call to Arms: The Soldier and the Revolutionary War,* in early June 2025. This 5,000-square-foot landmark exhibit, much of which has come together thanks to ongoing partnerships with Great Britain, France, and Canada, will be on display until 2027 and will feature more than 285 objects, many of which never have been seen by the public. The artifacts will enrich multimedia experiences and firsthand accounts of strategy, campaigns, battles, social and political change, and public memory of the revolution. By using personal artifacts and compelling stories, the *Call to Arms* exhibit will uncover the revolutionary soldier's daily experiences, leading to a deeper understanding of why soldiers served and for what they believed they were fighting. The exhibit also will incorporate the experiences of the British and French armies, Native Americans, and noncombatants into a uniquely comprehensive and compelling storyline. The National Museum remains free and open to the public 364 days every year, so stop by or check out our full schedule of virtual programs at www.thenmusa.org.

The Center of Military History will be publishing a revised edition of *Centuries of Service*, which originally was written by David J. Hogan in 2000 in celebration of the Army's 225th birthday. In this revision, Hogan provides a retrospective look at the Army's history and legacies, incorporating more recent conflicts, to come to grips with what the Army has meant to the nation over time and to show how the Army has seen itself and its missions.

Meanwhile, Headquarters, Department of the Army, continues to develop plans for major national commemorations around the key date of 14 June 2025. Stay tuned to our website, https://history.army.mil, as well as to our social media feeds for further information on these events, and let's get ready to celebrate the Army at 250 in style.

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


**This standard belonged to Samuel B. Webb's Additional Continental Regiment, which was formed on 11 January 1777. Raised in Connecticut, Webb's unit was one of the sixteen newly authorized additional regiments.**

**This highly attractive horn stands out because of its striking carvings of the soldier's name and its unique pattern of vines and leaves. Made in Brimfield, Massachusetts, where many horns were produced, it is inscribed with "JOHN BOND" and the date "MAY/1779." On 4 July 1775, John Bond enlisted in Capt. Gideon Foster's Company of Col. John Mansfield's Regiment at Cambridge. Bond remained in the war, serving at Bennington in 1777, and finally was discharged from the Continental Army on 23 January 1780.**

# NEWSNOTES

## Adrian G. Traas (1934–2024)

Lt. Col. (Ret.) Adrian G. Traas, 90, of Alexandria, Virginia, passed away on Saturday, 14 September 2024. Born in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, Traas received his education at schools in Milwaukee and Delafield, Wisconsin, completing high school at St. John's Military Academy in Delafield. He received his Army commission and bachelor's degree in history from Marquette University and a master's degree in history from Texas A&M University. His military education included the engineer basic and advanced courses, the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, and the Air War College. Colonel Traas served in a variety of command and staff positions as an officer in the Corps of Engineers from 1957 to 1989. He was a company commander of engineer units in Korea and at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, as well as a post commander of engineers in Verona, Italy. Additionally, he served as an executive officer and commanding officer of the 64th Engineer Battalion, headquartered in Leghorn, Italy. He also worked on mapping projects in Ethiopia, Liberia, and Iran. Traas served as an assistant professor of military science at both Texas A&M and Marquette and as the chief of the Combat Support Branch and a staff officer in the Concepts and Studies Division at the U.S. Army Engineer School at Fort Belvoir. He served two tours in Vietnam and, before his retirement, was a historian at the U.S. Army Center of Military History. While at the Center, he authored several books and monographs, including *Engineers at War* in the U.S. Army in Vietnam series; two monographs in the U.S. Army Campaigns of the Vietnam War series, *Turning Point* and *Transition*; and *From the Golden Gate to Mexico City: The U.S. Army Topographical Engineers in the Mexican War, 1846–1848*. His burial, with full military honors, took place at Arlington National Cemetery on 15 January 2025.

## New Publication From AUSA

On 25 September, the Association of the United States Army (AUSA) released the latest entry in its Medal of Honor graphic novel series, *Medal of Honor: Charles Whittlesey*. Maj. Charles W. Whittlesey commanded the famed "Lost Battalion" during World War I. On 2 October 1918, he led more than 500 soldiers in an advance against the German line during the Meuse-Argonne Offensive. In the face of superior numbers, the American troops were surrounded by the enemy and cut off from their division. Whittlesey overcame the lack of supplies and mounting casualties to hold out for five days before reinforcements finally arrived. Those interested can view or download the graphic novel for free at www.ausa.org/whittlesey.

## The Society for Military History 2025 Annual Meeting

The Society for Military History (SMH) will hold its annual meeting from 27 to 30 March 2025 in Mobile, Alabama, at the Renaissance Mobile Riverview Plaza Hotel. More information can be found on the SMH website, https://www.smh-hq.org/annualmeeting/index.html.


# The 7th Infantry Division (Light) and the Late Cold War, 1983–1989

**Soldiers of the 7th Infantry Division offload from a C–130 *Hercules* aircraft in Honduras during Operation Golden Pheasant, 1 March 1988**
*National Archives*

By Donald P. Wright

Early on the morning of 16 March 1988, 1st Lt. Brian M. DeToy was fast asleep in his bedroom when the phone rang. He picked up the receiver and heard a staff duty officer on the other end say, "Blue Bayonet." DeToy was the executive officer of a light infantry company in the 7th Infantry Division at Fort Ord, California. He knew that the phrase "Blue Bayonet" meant his unit, the 3d Battalion, 27th Infantry, had eighteen hours to assemble, move to Travis Air Force Base near Sacramento, load into transport aircraft, and depart the airfield. Although the division routinely used these alerts to test its units' ability to meet rigorous deployment timelines, DeToy quickly discovered that his battalion was headed to Honduras. The Marxist Sandinista government in Nicaragua had ordered its army to cross the border with Honduras in pursuit of anti-Sandinista insurgents. In response to the Nicaraguan incursion, the U.S. government decided to send DeToy's battalion to Honduras as of part of a larger operation called Golden Pheasant. The 3d Battalion, 27th Infantry, would join another battalion from the 7th Infantry Division along with two battalions from the 82d Airborne Division in what the U.S. government officially termed a "show of force" designed to both convince Nicaraguan forces to retreat from Honduran territory and to demonstrate U.S. resolve to defend its allies in Latin America. However, once DeToy's battalion arrived at Travis Air Force Base and saw troops loading live ammunition on their aircraft, he knew immediately that the show of force might turn into a far more dangerous mis-

sion. The smoldering conflict in Honduras threatened to become a major Cold War conflagration, and the U.S. Army's light infantry was heading straight into the blaze.[1]

Army Chief of Staff General John A. Wickham Jr. had announced the need for light infantry divisions in a 1984 White Paper, and he designated the 7th Infantry Division, stationed at Fort Ord, California, as the first unit to convert to the new structure.[2] Within four years, the Army formed three more of these divisions within its active component: the 25th Infantry Division in Hawai'i, the 6th Infantry Division in Alaska, and the 10th Mountain Division in upstate New York. In 1985, the 29th Infantry Division, composed of units from the Virginia and Maryland Army National Guard, reactivated and become the fifth light infantry division. With relatively few vehicles, a very austere logistical footprint, and a troop strength of only 10,000 soldiers, the Army designed these divisions for rapid deployment across the globe.

Wickham's decision to build the new light infantry formations signaled a dramatic change in thinking about future conflicts and the forces required to fight them. Since the end of the Vietnam War, and especially after the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, the Army had prioritized the defense of NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) allies in Central Europe. That focus had led to the introduction of new doctrine, new equipment such as the M1 Abrams tank and the M2 Bradley fighting vehicle, and new training approaches focused on enabling U.S. forces to defeat a Warsaw Pact offensive. The two versions of Field Manual (FM) 100–5, *Operations*, the Army's capstone doctrine published in this period, concentrated on how armor, mechanized infantry, and other units would leverage the firepower from the new weapon systems to fight and win in Europe. As late as 1979, the Army planned to convert most of its remaining standard ("straight") infantry divisions to heavier mechanized formations that could contribute directly to the NATO mission.[3]

The 1984 decision to establish light infantry divisions formally halted the drive toward an Army dominated almost entirely by heavy units. By 1989, when the four new light infantry divisions had been established fully, the Army was a relatively balanced force with six light divisions in its active duty force, including the 82d Airborne Division and the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault). This meant that out of the eighteen active combat divisions, one-third was light infantry of one type or another. In putting the Army on a new course, General Wickham was reacting to changes in Cold War dynamics that suggested the next contingency requiring U.S. forces was more likely to be a low-intensity conflict in Central America than a general war in Central Europe.[4] Wickham's response to this perceived shift was to create small, agile, and swiftly deployable units that would depend less on firepower than on what he called "Soldier Power"—a combination of physical and mental toughness, tactical excellence, offensive mindedness, and decisive leadership. The Army began building a new division of "light fighters," soldiers wholly dependent on these attributes to win the battles of the late Cold War.[5]

## New Forces for a New Era of Conflict

In 1979, three events disrupted how U.S. military and political leaders understood the Cold War. The first, in January, was the fall of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the Iranian monarch who had been a key Cold War ally of the United States in the Middle East and had protected U.S. interests in the critical oil-producing region for decades. The revolution that overthrew the shah brought to power a new Islamic republic that quickly became antagonistic to any continued ties with the United States. The second, in July, was the toppling of the Somoza family dictatorship in Nicaragua by Marxist insurgents known as the Sandinista National Liberation Front, or Sandinistas. The Nicaraguan revolution encouraged armed Communist groups in El Salvador and Guatemala to increase their pressure on the ruling regime in each country, generating serious concern inside the U.S. government that Soviet- and Cuban-sponsored movements like the Sandinistas might take control across Central America. Most worrying, however, was the third event: the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979. That action not only placed Soviet Army units significantly closer to the oil fields of the Middle East, but also served as evidence of the Soviet Union's renewed willingness to use its own military forces for territorial expansion. Soon after the Soviet invasion, President James E. "Jimmy" Carter called



**General Meyer**
*U.S. Army*

the invasion "a radical and aggressive new step" that posed a "grave threat" to vital U.S. interests in the Middle East.[6] In response he issued what became known as the Carter Doctrine, which promised that the United States would use all measures, including its military forces, to defend its interests in the region.

From the early days of the Cold War, the United States generally had followed a policy of deterrence, which attempted to use various ways and means to prevent the expansion of the Soviet power. The forward positioning of substantial U.S. military forces in Europe and Northeast Asia was perhaps the clearest expression of this policy.[7] After the 1979 invasion of Afghanistan signaled that the Soviets were willing to make aggressive moves that threatened U.S. interests outside these two theaters, U.S. Army leaders began reassessing what type of forces they needed to deter this new danger. Practically and politically, the Army's heavy units in West Germany and South Korea were difficult to deploy to deal with contingencies in the Middle East, Africa, or Latin America. In mid-1979, Army Chief of Staff General Edward C. "Shy" Meyer began advocating for medium-weight divisions that the Army could deploy on contingency missions more quickly than heavy units but were armed with significant firepower.

In the wake of the Soviet entry into Afghanistan, he halted the Army's plan to convert the 9th Infantry Division to a mechanized force, directing it instead to transform into a high-technology light division (HTLD), capable of relatively quick deployment but equipped with new systems that gave it some of the mobility and firepower of a mechanized division.[8]

Developing the HTLD proved difficult. As it slowly evolved through experimentation and exercises, the division became a medium-weight unit dependent on highly mobile vehicles mounting antitank weapons like the TOW (tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided) missile system. As a result, the HTLD was less able to serve as a force that could deploy quickly in a crisis. General Wickham, who took over as the Army's chief of staff in 1982, reviewed the progress made on the HTLD and by 1983 had determined that the division had "turned out to be too heavy." With its 18,000 soldiers and large inventory of vehicles and complex weaponry, the HTLD would require three weeks to deploy on a contingency mission.[9]

Although he allowed the HTLD experiment to continue, Wickham looked in a new direction to create a force that could respond to crises quickly before they became larger conflicts. In addition, Wickham wanted that force to have the ability to conduct combat operations with minimal support if the crisis developed into a larger conflict. The Army had long relied on the 82d Airborne Division as its main rapid deployment force. That division could within days send its lead elements anywhere on the globe and forcibly enter a theater using its parachute assault capability. However, in 1983 the 82d had 16,000 soldiers, a light armor battalion, and other heavy equipment. Deploying the entire division would require more than a thousand aircraft and a time line measured in weeks instead of days.[10] The 82d had deployed to the Caribbean island of Grenada in 1983 as part of Operation Urgent Fury, but the Army viewed the 82d primarily as a strategic unit, designed specifically for mid- to high-intensity conflicts rather than smaller-scale contingencies like the invasion of Grenada.[11] The 101st Airborne also had some of the characteristics of a contingency force, but like the 82d, it was equipped and manned for medium- to large-scale combat operations. With 18,900 soldiers and a large inventory of helicopters, any deployment of the 101st would also require weeks.[12]

**General Wickham**
*National Archives*

The Army chief of staff hoped to create a new type of infantry division that could deploy almost anywhere on the globe within a few days. In 1983, Wickham directed the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center (CAC) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, to draw up the design for such a unit. In the fall of that year, the center presented blueprints for a force with 10,000 soldiers and few vehicles of any kind. Although this light infantry division could not conduct the forcible entry mission like the 82nd Airborne Division, CAC designed it to deploy in its entirety in 500 sorties of C–141 aircraft over a 96-hour period. That level of strategic mobility, however, meant making concessions in other aspects of the division's capabilities. Perhaps the most important of these was the limited tactical mobility of the division once it deployed. The Combined Arms Center designed the new unit to be "essentially foot mobile."[13] However, Wickham, a lifelong infantry officer who had commanded both an airmobile battalion in the 1st Cavalry Division in Vietnam and the 101st Airborne Division in the 1970s, knew how helicopters could enable maneuver. He ensured that the design for the new division included aviation units that could enhance the division's tactical mobility to some degree.[14]

Other concessions included the relatively limited firepower the unit could wield, especially against an adversary equipped with armored vehicles, and a reduced logistical infrastructure that could only support the division for the first forty-eight hours of a deployment. For the division's designers at Fort Leavenworth, the lack of heavy weapons was a reasonable risk, given the guidance that the division would be "optimized" for defeating lightly armed enemy forces such as insurgents or other light infantry units if contingencies evolved into low- or medium-intensity conflicts.[15] Wickham and others in the Army's leadership did accept that the light infantry division would need to have a role in high-intensity conflicts like the defense of NATO, but planned for it to be augmented with additional weapons and vehicles in those scenarios.[16]

For the new division to meet its missions and overcome some of its key limitations—especially if it became involved in sustained campaigns—General Wickham and the Fort Leavenworth force designers believed that it had to instill a unique ethos in its soldiers. Because the Army required light infantry to maneuver primarily on foot and in a wide variety of difficult terrain, they had to be mentally tough and more physically fit than other soldiers. They also would have to operate independently in small units, each a well-led and highly cohesive formation of disciplined soldiers. Using initiative and audacity, these units would take advantage of every opportunity to attack the enemy. They would train to fight at night and in the most adverse weather conditions. In their operations, shock rather than firepower would be decisive. Leadership would be critical to their success, especially at the squad and platoon levels.[17] Quickly, the force designers adopted the term *elite* to describe light infantry units, a word that the U.S. Army usually reserved for its Ranger battalions and Special Forces. One organization at Fort Leavenworth, for example, defined light infantry divisions as "iron willed elite fighting forces."[18] At the time, use of the term *elite* was aspirational at best, especially because these divisions still existed only on paper. Still, its prevalence in the planning documents was evidence of the high expectations the Army's leadership had for the new light infantry units.[19]

## The Transformation of the 7th Infantry Division

In the summer of 1984, the 7th Infantry Division began the transition to the new light infantry organization. The 7th was a standard infantry division with approximately 18,000 soldiers and equipped with a substantial number of vehicles and heavy weapons.[20] One of its three brigades was the 41st Infantry Brigade, a "round out" unit from the Oregon Army National Guard. The transition timeline began with the turn-in of equipment and vehicles in July 1984 and would end in the summer of 1985 when the new division in its entirety conducted a field training exercise. In those twelve months, the division planned to reduce its overall strength by almost half while also standing up a new active duty brigade to replace the round out brigade. This was an exceedingly ambitious schedule made more difficult by the fact that by mid-1985, the Army expected the restructured division to have at least some of the capabilities of an elite force. To make this goal possible, Army leadership made critical decisions about how the 7th would staff its units and train its soldiers. In the process, the division created a new "Light Fighter" ethos that established the high standards necessary in a formation expected to be elite.

In 1981, the U.S. Army had introduced a new personnel management system called Project Cohesion, Operational Readiness, and Training, known by the acronym COHORT. This new program was an attempt to create greater unit cohesion by moving away from the individual replacement manning system that the Army had relied on for decades. Under the individual manning system, cohesion—the product of the bonds created between soldiers—was difficult to sustain because units constantly lost and gained personnel as they left the service or moved on to new positions. The COHORT program sought to foster cohesion in select company-sized combat arms units (Infantry, Armor, Field Artillery, and Combat Engineers) by keeping groups of junior soldiers together for an entire three-year term.

Soldiers brought in through COHORT went through basic training together. Commissioned and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) traveled to basic training sites, took command of their new soldiers, and brought them back to their home station where they would start training as a unit. Ideally, that group of officers, NCOs, and enlisted soldiers would stay together for two to three years, becoming a highly cohesive and combat effective organization as a result.[21] The COHORT program gathered momentum in the early 1980s and by 1984, the Army had fielded dozens of COHORT companies and decided to use the system to begin manning entire battalions.

Aware of this success, those involved in designing the new light infantry division saw the program as the ideal means to establish the type of bonding required by an elite unit that was likely to face tough combat conditions in austere settings. General Wickham decided that the three Infantry brigades, three Field Artillery battalions, and single Combat Engineer battalion in the 7th Infantry Division would be manned through the COHORT system.[22] This was an unprecedented use of COHORT and would take twelve months to complete. At the end of that year, the foundation of the new division would form around a core of small units that were tightly bonded and, arguably, better prepared for the decentralized and demanding light infantry missions they would have to conduct.

Creating cohesion among junior enlisted soldiers was just the first step. Next, those soldiers and their new NCO and officer leadership had to gel as teams as they learned the skills required for light infantry operations. To do that, the Army created a wholly new training program for the division. General Wickham's 1984 white paper had contended that the training regimen for the new light infantry divisions had to be "tough, physical, realistic, and mentally demanding." Wickham asserted that these divisions had to have the best small units in the U.S. Army and that training was the "crucial catalyst" in the preparation of those forces.[23] For those charged with creating small units of that caliber, the U.S. Army Ranger School loomed large. The sixty-five-day school had the deserved reputation of offering the most rigorous leadership and small-unit tactics training in the Army. Those soldiers able to complete the course arguably were the Army's best light infantry leaders. Not surprisingly, Ranger School—and the soldiers authorized to wear the Ranger Tab upon graduation—became ideals that shaped the Army's vision for the light infantry divisions. In 1984, the Combined Arms Center described the new light infantry units as "ranger oriented" and asserted that "Ranger Training remains the single most important leader training required to instill confidence and toughness for the building of elite Light Infantry Units."[24]

With this guidance, the Infantry School at Fort Benning, Georgia (now Fort Moore), began working with the leadership of the 7th Infantry Division to develop an integrated training cycle that was substantially more complex than similar programs in other types of divisions. That cycle began with an expanded version of advanced individual training (AIT) for junior enlisted Infantry soldiers in COHORT companies assigned to the 7th Infantry Division. While these young troops sharpened their basic light infantry skills, the officers and NCOs who would lead them reported to Fort Benning and attended a thirty-day Light Leaders Course. Conducted by Ranger School instructors, this course focused on how to train soldiers upon return to Fort Ord. Brian DeToy, who served as a company-grade officer in the 7th Infantry Division, attended the Light Leaders Course in 1986 and recalled that it was "essentially Ranger School again, but with more time for us as a cadre to sit and talk about how we were going to do things back at home station."[25] After completion of the Light Leaders Course, the COHORT company leadership would meet the new AIT graduates who made up the junior enlisted ranks of their unit and then travel back as a group to their new home station.

At Fort Ord, the soldiers were welcomed into a new division that was establishing a unique identity and culture. By late 1984, the leaders of the 7th Infantry Division had adopted the term "light fighter" to describe all who served in the division and used that term to highlight how the division was different from other units in the Army. To ingrain the light fighter identity, all newly arrived enlisted soldiers, regardless of their military occupational specialty (MOS), attended a weeklong Rites of Passage course at Fort Ord. During this course, they learned fieldcraft, combat survival, basic light infantry skills, and the "spirit" of the light infantry. Completion of the Rites of Passage meant officially becoming a light fighter, regardless of whether they were an infantryman, an artilleryman, a medic, or a mechanic. The "light fighter"

moniker quickly began to appear in the division's official correspondence and on unofficial division symbols, including patches.[26]

After graduating from the Rites of Passage, soldiers transitioned to training in small units—first as squads and platoons, and eventually in companies and battalions. By design, Ranger School served as the inspiration for much of the training at Fort Ord. The Army had decided to seed the light divisions with a high percentage of Ranger School graduates, especially company commanders, platoon leaders, and squad leaders. This approach would help ensure that the divisions had proven leaders in key positions who would know how to train their own units using techniques they themselves had learned at the school. Of course, most of the positions requiring the Ranger Tab were in the division's infantry units, where even staff officers from other branches were expected to have completed Ranger School. Brian DeToy noted that that in 1986, Ranger school graduates in his infantry battalion included the signal officer, the military intelligence officer, and the chemical officer.[27] The division's intelligence, military police, medical, and logistics battalions also planned for their key leaders to attend Ranger School.[28]

To accommodate this increased require-ment for Ranger-qualified soldiers, the Army expanded the school's capacity, a decision that allowed the 7th Infantry Division to send many of its noncommissioned leaders to the course. This policy was unprecedented, as the Army generally offered relatively few enlisted soldiers the opportunity to attend the school, especially after a soldier had reported to a division. Robert J. Avalle, a company commander in the 7th Infantry Division in 1986, recalled, "we started to get . . . course slots in the Army's Ranger school and started to send platoon sergeants, squad leaders, and in some cases, even [fire]team leaders would go and come back with their Ranger tab."[29] Between March 1984 and 1986, 544 of the soldiers sent by the division to the course successfully completed it, leading to a significant presence of Ranger-qualified soldiers at the squad and platoon level.[30] Given the centrality of "Ranger-oriented" skills and training in the emerging light fighter culture, this was no small achievement. Avalle remembered that "people were calling us a ranger division."[31] The division's senior leaders certainly focused on the numbers of Ranger Tabs in their units, boasting in 1986 that the 7th Infantry Division had the highest concentration of Ranger-qualified soldiers of any division in the U.S. Army.[32] This was probably an accurate assessment.

The high standards for the new light infantry soldiers led to a rigorous training program. Although they often trained to conduct air assaults or move by truck, the division's light infantry battalions expected to maneuver primarily on foot. Not surprisingly, infantry leaders at all levels stressed physical conditioning. Small units conducted regular long-distance foot marches with full combat load including rucksacks weighing 40 to 60 pounds. Brian DeToy recalled his company doing 12-mile road marches in full gear twice a month and one 25-mile march per quarter. When units went to train at nearby Fort Hunter Liggett, they often marched on foot, often over extreme distances. In 1984 and 1985, for example, the division's 2d Battalion, 9th Infantry, conducted a five-day 65-mile march from the Pacific coast near Big Sur to Fort Hunter Liggett, traversing the rugged Santa Lucia mountain range. The march was so demanding that after finishing, a young soldier in the battalion quipped "we should all become Ranger-qualified for completing this training."[33] By 1987, the event had become bigger and even more grueling. That year, all three infantry battalions in the 7th Infantry Division's 1st Brigade, known unofficially as the 9th "Manchu" Regiment, participated in a five-day 100-mile march called the Manchu 100. For the Manchu 100, the battalions walked 20 miles per day in full combat gear, including a 40-pound rucksack.[34] In the late 1980s, foot marches of this length and duration were essentially unknown in other U.S. Army infantry units, including the Ranger Battalions.

While the Army expected the units of the 7th Infantry Division to train for basic offensive and defensive missions, it also charged light infantry units to prepare for specific operations that took advantage of their unique skills and attributes. To leverage their stealth—and mitigate their vulnerability to heavy artillery and air attacks—light infantry units at all echelons would train to conduct all operations at night. This capability was considered a key characteristic of elite units and the Army's light infantry doctrine stated that night operations were the "forte" of the new divisions.[35] The Army planned to equip the 7th Infantry Division with the newest night-vision technology and broadly distribute the devices, especially across the division's infantry battalions. Early on, operating at night became an important norm within light fighter culture. Richard J. Dixon, a company com-

**7th Infantry Division soldiers training at Fort Hunter Liggett, 5 December 1986**
*National Archives*

mander in the division in 1988, recalled that his light fighters were very aware of the limited concealment and protection they would have in combat. For that reason, he insisted during field exercises that his rifle company move only in darkness, a practice that led to his soldiers believing they "owned" the night.[36]

With the ability to maneuver at night and operate in small independent units, light infantry units became ideal for what the Army's doctrine writers described as "special tactics." Defining these missions became critical to showing the Army at large how light infantry division operations were unique.[37] The doctrine for light infantry battalions published in 1985 used new terminology to identify special tactics such as search and attack, urban storm, urban web (archipelago), and expanding torrent. The last of these was a version of an infiltration operation that featured small groups of light fighters slipping through enemy lines undetected to attack critical sites deep in the rear area. Expanding torrent missions and infiltrations of the more general variety quickly became favored tactics within the 7th Infantry Division. Brian DeToy recalled that infiltrations were "heavily, heavily emphasized" and that his battalion often practiced multiday infiltration missions.

A March 1986 exercise at Fort Hunter Liggett showcased the types of special tactics and missions the Army expected the light infantry to perform. The three battalions of the division's 1st Brigade began operations in a low-intensity scenario, conducting platoon-level search-and-attack operations against small guerrilla units. While pursuing these groups, the battalion commanders suddenly received orders to infiltrate through territory defended by a conventional light infantry adversary allied with the guerrillas. The battalions then spent two days stealthily moving on foot deep into the enemy's rear area before reassembling and mounting a large-scale attack on an armored column.[38]

During these exercises in 1984 and early 1985, the soldiers of the division developed the most visible emblem of light fighter culture: the ragtop helmet. Designed to enhance a light infantry soldier's ability to hide and stalk the enemy, the strips of burlap and old battle dress uniforms (BDUs) attached to the Kevlar helmet cover broke up the distinctive outline of the helmet. Alternatively called "light fighter hair"—and "Manchu Hair" by soldiers in the 9th Regiment—the ragtop, along with the wearing of camouflage face paint, became mandatory for all soldiers in the division in 1985. The division's leadership even expected helicopter crews to wear ragtop helmets and camouflage face paint in the field when not in their aircraft. Although worn primarily during field training, soldiers wore the ragtops and face paint for ceremonies and parades as well. Although initially a minor addition to the uniform, the ragtop emerged first as the most important emblem of the division. Other light infantry divisions adopted it in the late 1980s as a symbol of the broader light fighter culture.[39]

**A 7th Infantry Division soldier during training at Fort Hunter Liggett, 5 December 1986**
*National Archives*

That culture, however, relied on more than prowess in the field. In the original vision for the light infantry divisions, the Army had made it clear that they had to have the ability to deploy almost anywhere within several days. That requirement became formal in 1985 when the 7th Infantry Division became part of the Army's Rapid Deployment Force (RDF).[40] As a part of this force, the division maintained a rotational-ready brigade, prepared to serve as its lead element upon receiving deployment orders. That brigade would designate one of its infantry battalions as the Division Ready Force (DRF), which had to be in the air and en route to its destination eighteen hours after alert. The remainder of the division would follow over the next six days.

To ensure its units were ready to meet these deployment standards, the 7th initiated an Emergency Deployment Readiness Exercise (EDRE) program that closely resembled that conducted by the 82d and 101st Airborne divisions, both of which belonged to the RDF. The EDRE program periodically tested the division's ability to deploy by conducting approximately six alerts per year, usually at the battalion and company levels.[41] So critical were these exercises that DRF units kept all their equipment palletized and ready for air-loading at Travis Air Force Base, the division's airport of embarkation. Meanwhile, soldiers in the DRF battalion were on two-hour recall status, required to stay near enough to Fort Ord so that they could report to their units within two hours after notification of the EDRE. After assembling, the alerted unit would travel 180 miles to Travis Air Force Base and load their equipment onto aircraft. In many cases, the exercise went further in simulating an actual contingency by deploying the DRF by air on "fly away" operations to training sites inside the United States or abroad.

Short-term training deployments also became a common experience for the soldiers of the 7th Infantry Division. Given its requirement to operate in difficult climates and tough terrain, the division used these deployments to give their units experience with a variety of missions in diverse

**Leaders from the 7th Infantry Division coordinate attack positions during training at Fort Hunter Liggett, 1 December 1986.**
*National Archives*

conditions. Between 1985 and 1989, the division sent units to the Caribbean to take part in counterinsurgency training in a tropical environment as well as to southern California to participate in amphibious operations. One company deployed to Iceland in 1988 to practice defending critical NATO radar installations in the extremely austere environment of that country.[42] Training for combat operations in arid conditions took the division's soldiers to Utah, Arizona, and Texas, as well as to the Army's National Training Center in the Mojave Desert at Fort Irwin, California. In 1987, heavily forested Fort Chaffee in western Arkansas became a common destination for fly away deployments after the Army opened the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) at that site. The JRTC would become the Army's main facility for training light infantry units on a range of missions they could conduct in low- and medium-intensity conflicts.

## Honduras and Panama: Light Fighters in Central America

In 1988 and 1989, the 7th Infantry Division graduated from training exercises to contingencies that rigorously tested the light infantry division concept. To the surprise of few in the division at the time, these tests occurred in Central America. The first, Operation Golden Pheasant, was a show of force mounted in 1988 to support the Honduran government and called on the division to move its units quickly into a situation that had the potential to escalate into armed conflict. Operation Just Cause in 1989 gave the 7th Infantry Division a pivotal role in a low-intensity conflict in Panama, which demanded that the division conduct a broad set of missions—including its first combat operations. Panama is where the Army's first modern light infantry division would display its full potential as well as suffer its first combat casualties. Although the scope of this article does not allow for complete narratives of each operation, the summarized accounts below illustrate how the U.S. Army chose to employ the division in these two distinct crises and the capabilities the light infantry force brought to bear once they were on the ground in Honduras and Panama.

Army leaders had not designed the new light infantry divisions to focus on specific countries or geographic areas. In 1985, however, General Wickham identified Latin America as a region likely to require a military intervention of the type the light infantry divisions had been designed to conduct.[43] As the 1980s progressed, the 7th Infantry Division began to narrow its attention on Central America. Since the 1979 revolution that brought the Marxist Sandinista government to power in Nicaragua, the U.S. government had sought ways to prevent the expansion of communism to other states in the region. To do that, the U.S. military increased its involvement in the area, expanding its presence in Panama, establishing a military assistance and advisory mission in El Salvador, and gradually ramping up exercises with regional security forces.[44] In 1983, the United States military established a joint task force (JTF) at an air base in Palmerola, Honduras, just north of the capital Tegucigalpa. That task force, eventually called JTF-Bravo, served as the headquarters for annual joint exercises called Big Pine in which thousands of U.S. military personnel deployed to train Honduran Army units and build airfields, roads, and other infrastructure in remote areas, especially those near the country's border with Nicaragua.[45] The Big Pine exercises and the permanent presence of JTF-Bravo served as ways to assure Honduras and other allies in the region that the U.S. pledge to stand up to the Sandinistas was tangible.

Although leaders in the 7th Infantry Division did not formally identify Nicaragua as a key adversary and Honduras as a likely theater of conflict, many of the division's soldiers were certain that they were training to defend Honduras from Sandinista attack. As a company commander in this period, Robert Avalle recalled thinking that Central America was by far the most likely place where he and his troops would have to fight. Avalle asserted "the enemy was definitely, I think, in Central America." In his estimation, however, it was not only the Marxist threat in the region that made it a likely destination for the 7th Infantry Division, but the terrain as well. He noted that much of Central America was "either very mountainous or very wet, and they are environments [the division] could actually thrive in."[46]

The division's attributes made it well-suited for operations in the region. It could deploy quickly to Central America and was prepared to operate in the austere conditions. Not surprisingly, by 1988 the most prominent destination for the division's deployments was Honduras. The 7th Infantry Division's first EDRE outside the United States involved sending the 2d Battalion, 8th Field Artillery, to Honduras


in July 1985 to train a Honduran artillery unit.[47] In early 1986, Maj. Gen. William H. Harrison, the 7th Infantry Division's commanding general, traveled to Honduras with the division's staff, an infantry company, and an artillery battery to participate in Operation Big Pine '86. The next year, the 7th Infantry Division dramatically expanded its role in Big Pine '87 by deploying its division staff as part of an XVIII Airborne Corps command post exercise. At the same time, the division sent a task force that included the 3d Battalion, 27th Infantry, a field artillery battery, an engineer platoon, and the division's long-range surveillance detachment to participate in another part of Big Pine.[48] While the 7th Infantry Division staff—along with the staffs of the 82d and 101st Airborne Divisions—simulated how U.S. troops would reinforce the Honduran Army in combat against an invading force, the 7th Infantry Division Infantry task force rehearsed air assault missions into rugged terrain with Honduran units.

Less than a year later, the United States found itself facing a situation resembling the scenario its forces had trained for in Big Pine '87. On 4 March 1988, the Nicaraguan Army launched Operation Danto, an incursion into the Bocay Salient in southeast Honduras. For years that area had served as a sanctuary for the Contras, the anti-Sandinista insurgent forces that received financial and material support from the U.S. government. The Sandinistas had mounted small cross-border strikes against the Contras in 1985 and 1986, actions that JTF-Bravo helped counter by using U.S. helicopters to move the Honduran military quickly to the border region.[49] Operation Danto was another matter entirely. Planned for months by the Nicaraguan Army General Staff, the operation featured seven infantry battalions supported by artillery batteries, riverine craft, and aviation units that provided both transport and close air attack.[50] The Sandinista force of approximately 4,500 troops overwhelmed the Contras, forcing them to flee further north into Honduras. In mid-March, after the Nicaraguan government refused Honduran calls to withdraw its forces, the Honduran president formally requested military assistance from the United States.[51]

In response, President Ronald W. Reagan ordered the U.S. military to conduct a show of force mission in Honduras. The operation, dubbed Golden Pheasant, was

designed to persuade the Nicaraguan Army to retreat to its own territory. However, if that failed, senior U.S. military leaders understood that the mission might shift to combat operations.[52] For that reason, Army leadership chose to deploy a combined arms task force that had the combat power to pose a convincing threat to the Sandinistas, but also the ability to deploy quickly to demonstrate the capability to intervene rapidly and deliberately in Latin America. The Army had designed the XVIII Airborne Corps for this type of contingency and normally would have chosen the 82d Airborne Division to conduct the show of force. However, General Carl E. Vuono, the Army chief of staff, insisted that the 7th Infantry Division participate in the mission alongside units from the 82d Airborne.[53]

The U.S. Army quickly formed a brigade-sized task force that included two infantry battalions and a field artillery battalion from the 82d Airborne Division and two infantry battalions from the 7th Infantry Division. To this already formidable task force, the XVIII Airborne Corps commander added several AH–1 Cobra attack helicopters and a section of two M551A1 Sheridan light tanks. He also planned to insert one of the 82nd Airborne battalions into Honduras by parachute.[54] Numbering around 3,300 soldiers, the force was the largest deployment of U.S. combat units to Honduras during the Cold War.[55]


The opening phase of Golden Pheasant went smoothly. The two battalions from the 7th Infantry Division—2d Battalion, 27th Infantry, and 3d Battalion, 27th Infantry—traveled to Travis Air Force Base, loaded onto transport aircraft, and took off for Honduras eighteen hours after they had received the alert. They began arriving at Palmerola Air Base later that day, joining the units from the 82d at the U.S. base. The three airborne battalions from the 82d then moved to areas in central Honduras near the capital. The task force commander directed the two light infantry battalions south toward the Nicaraguan border to take up positions closer to the areas threatened by the Sandinistas. The 2d Battalion, 27th Infantry, conducted an air assault to the town of San Lorenzo near the Choluteca Gap, an area that could serve as a corridor for Sandinista forces intent on invading Honduras. A day later, the 3d Battalion, 27th Infantry, flew into Jamastran, a town approximately 70 miles from the Bocay Salient where the Nicaraguan Army was still conducting operations against the Contras. The site was even closer to the Las Vegas Valley, which had harbored Contra camps for years and where the Nicaraguan Army had invaded in 1985 and 1986. Because of the 3d Battalion, 27th Infantry's prox-

**A Sheridan light tank at Jamastran, Honduras, 1 March 1988**
*National Archives*

imity to the Sandinista incursion, the brigade task force commander reinforced the battalion by sending a battery of 105-mm. howitzers and the two Sheridan light tanks to Jamastran.[56]

Once the light infantry battalions moved to their areas near the Nicaraguan border, concerns about hostilities grew. Ater arriving in San Lorenzo, the soldiers of the 2d Battalion, 27th Infantry, set up defensive positions and began digging in as ammunition was distributed down to platoon level.[57] Closer to the actual Sandinista incursion, the 3d Battalion, 27th Infantry, marched up into the hills surrounding the Jamastran airstrip where they had landed. Each company quickly established a battle position and issued ammunition to all its soldiers.[58] Brian DeToy, a company executive officer in the 3d Battalion, 27th Infantry, during Golden Pheasant, was impressed by his battalion's proximity to Nicaraguan border. Years later, he remembered that as they arrived in Jamastran, his company was convinced they might have to fight. DeToy recalled, "We were in a defense ready to go . . . we all thought, man, we got to be ready for something tonight."[59]

No attack came that night. Instead, the next day saw tensions begin to cool as the Sandinistas began removing their forces from Honduran territory. Negotiations between the governments of Nicaragua and Honduras began soon after. The five U.S. battalions shifted to training Honduran Army units, and ten days later they flew back to their home stations. As a show of force, Golden Pheasant appeared to have been a success. Elliott Abrams, the assistant secretary of state for inter-American affairs in 1988, claimed that the Nicaraguan Army "turned on a dime" and retreated when the U.S. Army task force arrived in Honduras.[60] Military officials tended to focus less on the Sandinista reaction than on the rapidity with which the U.S. responded to the Nicaraguan incursion. During Golden Pheasant, Lt. Col. Richard J. Rinaldo, a spokesperson for U.S. Southern Command, stated, "The message here is that we can deploy quickly with no notice and demonstrate our support to the Honduran government."[61]

Within the 7th Infantry Division, Golden Pheasant validated the division's ability to deliver combat power quickly, one of the key tenets of the light infantry concept. Maj. Gen. Edwin H. Burba Jr., the 7th Infantry Division commanding general during the operation, remarked that the show of force had demonstrated the division's strategic mobility and that sent "an important message for the entire nation—indeed the entire world." Burba proclaimed that "the Soviet Union, and the Eastern Bloc, and the rest of the dictators" would now have to account for this new capability before attacking U.S. allies.[62] Looking back, Brian DeToy echoed his division commander's thoughts, stating that Golden Pheasant was "an exactly 100% successful light infantry mission. We were deployed so fast to a combat zone—a brigade task force, within 18 hours we're on the ground." DeToy maintained that it was the speed with which he and his soldiers arrived near the Nicaraguan border that

**Members of the 7th Infantry Division confer with Honduran Army soldiers.**
*U.S. Army*

**7th Infantry Division troops on a foot march during Operation Golden Pheasant**
*National Archives*

proved decisive in Honduras in March 1988.[63]

In the eighteen months that followed Golden Pheasant, the 7th Infantry Division found itself focusing almost entirely on Latin America. Because the security of Honduras remained a concern, the division deployed its headquarters and one of its infantry battalions to participate in a large joint counterinsurgency exercise with the Honduran military in the summer of 1988. However, the growing political instability in Panama overshadowed this deployment. Security of the Panama Canal remained a vital component in U.S. Cold War strategy, and by 1988 the increasingly erratic behavior of Panamanian president Manuel Noriega suggested that Panama might not remain a staunch ally. In 1988, after Noriega began courting the Cubans and the Nicaraguans for military assistance and ramped up tension between his security forces and U.S. military units stationed in Panama, the U.S. government began planning to remove him from power.[64] As those plans developed over the course of that year, the role of the 7th Infantry Division in a military intervention against Noriega grew. From April 1988 through early 1989, the division deployed elements of its aviation brigade to Panama on ninety-day rotations to augment U.S. forces stationed there with mobility and firepower.[65]

In the spring of 1989, when threats of violence against Americans in Panama spiked, the light fighter commitment to the Panama mission increased dramatically. On 11 May, the 9th Infantry Regiment, the division ready brigade at the time, deployed its headquarters along with one of its infantry battalions to Panama to reinforce security along the Panama Canal. After arriving, the task force moved to the Atlantic side of the canal and began operations to secure U.S. installations and protect U.S. civilians living on that side of the Canal Zone.[66] As the summer began and the instability in Panama continued to grow, the 7th Infantry Division started rotating brigade headquarters every 120 days and infantry battalions every 90 days to ensure that if an armed conflict began, U.S. forces had enough combat power to act immediately. By late November, two brigade headquarters and three infantry battalions had performed this mission while the rest the division remained at Fort Ord, fully prepared to deploy to Panama if the long-simmering tensions boiled over into armed conflict.[67]

**Soldiers of the 7th Infantry Division wait with their gear on the flight line for airlift to Panama, 12 May 1989.**
*National Archives*

When the Panamanian Defense Forces (PDF) shot and killed a U.S. Marine Corps officer at a roadblock in Panama City on the night of 16 December, President George H. W. Bush ordered the U.S. military to conduct offensive operations to protect U.S. citizens and facilities, neutralize the PDF, and ultimately remove the Noriega regime from power. That decision formally initiated the process to deploy U.S. Army units inside the United States to Panama while forces already in the country prepared for combat operations. On 20 December 1989, the U.S. military operation now known as Just Cause began with the U.S. Army Rangers and paratroopers seizing airfields and other key infrastructure on the Pacific side of the country near the capital of Panama City. Other U.S. Army units secured key government buildings and PDF facilities in the capital, along the canal, and in the city of Colón on the Atlantic side of the isthmus. Although the force focused against the Noriega regime and the PDF was overwhelming in size and combat power, U.S. forces met armed resistance and suffered casualties in many of these actions.

The headquarters of the 3d Brigade, 7th Infantry Division, commanded JTF-Atlantic, composed of one of the brigade's units, the 4th Battalion, 17th Infantry, and an infantry battalion from the 82d Airborne Division. The 4th Battalion, 17th Infantry, had deployed in late November and each of the unit's three line companies had trained in the weeks since to secure three objectives: the PDF naval base at Coco Solo, the PDF garrison at Fort Espinar, and the main highway leading into Colón.[68] When the U.S. offensive began at 0100 on 20 December, each of these companies ran headlong into PDF units willing to stand and fight. The battalion's attack on the naval bases was exceptionally difficult, requiring 4th Battalion's C Company to clear a large building using hand grenades and other small arms. The battalion eventually gained the initiative in these actions and by dawn had taken control of its three objectives. That success came at a price, however. PDF Fire killed Spc. William D. Gibbs outside Colón and wounded several of the battalion's soldiers at Coco Solo and Fort Espinar.[69]

In the first 24 hours of Operation Just Cause, the U.S. military forces neutralized most of the PDF's units in the major cities and the Canal Zone. However, they had not yet apprehended Noriega and they controlled only small portions of Panama City and Colón. PDF units outside the Canal Zone in Panama's interior




also posed a possible threat. To expand the U.S. military presence in Panama and address these concerns, the 7th Infantry Division deployed its 1st and 2d Brigades to Panama on 21 and 22 December 1989, respectively, airlanding both at Tocumen International Airport near the capital. The 1st Brigade took up positions inside Panama City, where they established traffic control points, conducted searches and security patrols, arrested suspected PDF members, and engaged in several firefights with unidentified attackers, all amid rampant looting by the local population in the days just following their arrival.[70] As the city became more peaceful after the first week, the brigade's mission largely shifted to stability operations for which they had little formal preparation. While this transition challenged the light fighters, they gradually adapted and by early January 1990 began training a new Panamanian police force to replace them in the city.[71]

The 2d Brigade received the mission to move into the open areas west of the Canal Zone to neutralize PDF units, secure key infrastructure, and begin stability operations. Over the next two weeks, the brigade conducted multiple battalion- and company-level missions across this region. These missions combined nighttime air assaults, dismounted marches through jungle, and cordon-and-search operations to induce the surrender of PDF garrisons. This approach was remarkably successful as the light fighters' appearance outside these towns, along with negotiations led by U.S. Special Forces, led to the quick and peaceful capitulation of these PDF forces in almost all cases.[72] For Richard Dixon, a company commander in the 2d Brigade, it was his unit's ability to operate independently and move quickly from site to site in western Panama that was critical to this success. He noted, "we showed pretty good flexibility


**Three members of the 7th Infantry Division walk past a restaurant during Operation JUST CAUSE, 1 January 1990.**
*National Archives*

**A 7th Infantry Division soldier stands guard outside the residence of the Peruvian ambassador in Panama City, 9 January 1990.**
*U.S. Army*

and adaptability by responding to the missions . . . it was very decentralized, focused on company level missions and initiative and developing the situation."[73]

On 3 January 1990, fifteen days after JUST CAUSE began, Manuel Noriega surrendered to U.S. authorities. That same day, the Army Ranger battalions began redeploying to the United States and a week later, units from the 82d did likewise. The 7th Infantry Division remained to conduct postconflict operations. While the division's 1st Brigade left Panama City to redeploy to Fort Ord on 17 January 1990, the 2d and 3d Brigades would remain until the first week of February to maintain security in Panama City and conduct stability operations in Eastern Panama.

## The Legacy of the First Modern Light Infantry Division

When the light fighters returned to Fort Ord, they were feted as heroes. Their commander, Maj. Gen. Carmen J. Cavezza, declared that they had performed brilliantly and that JUST CAUSE had "validated our training program" and highlighted the division's strategic capabilities.[74] There was much to this statement. The 7th Infantry Division's performance in JUST CAUSE—and GOLDEN PHEASANT—confirmed the division's ability to rapidly deploy its combat power into crisis situations. JUST CAUSE further appeared to confirm the light fighters' ability to operate effectively in a low-intensity conflict against an irregular adversary. Over the course of little more than a month, 7th Infantry Division units conducted a variety of actions, from close combat to stability operations. In adjusting to this environment, they benefited greatly from the light fighter culture that had emerged in the division, which emphasized highly trained small units operating in a decentralized manner. Although they may not have all been elite soldiers of the kind originally envisioned by General Wickham, the troops of the division proved in Panama that they were disciplined, prepared for combat, and adaptive in the rapidly changing conditions of a low-intensity conflict.

Despite its success in Panama, the 7th Infantry Division faced new challenges almost as soon as its forces returned to California. In February 1990, the Army announced that Fort Ord would be close as part of the Base Realignment and Closure process—part of the federal government's effort to reap a "peace dividend" as the Cold War ended. Army leaders then directed the 7th Infantry Division to begin planning to move to Fort Lewis, Washington.[75] Six months later, after Iraqi forces invaded Kuwait, the Army chose not to include any of the light infantry divisions in the large expeditionary force deployed to the Persian Gulf to defend Saudi Arabia and force the Iraqi Army out of Kuwait (Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM). Most observers understood this decision as driven by the nature of the open desert terrain and the need for highly mobile mechanized units.[76] Moreover, the place of the light forces within the post–Cold War Army seemed secure, given the consensus at the time was that the new global security landscape would more likely be characterized by low-intensity conflict than conventional wars like the one fought against Iraq. In 1992, the growing conflict in Somalia, which involved U.S. forces including elements of the 10th Mountain Division, seemed to validate this assumption. The lack of a clear threat to U.S. military dominance, however, encouraged the U.S. government to look for deeper reductions in the Department of Defense's budget. Senior Army leaders reacted to this push for fiscal savings by cutting the overall active force by a third, a reduction that included two of the light infantry divisions established in the 1980s. In 1994, both the 6th and the

**Members of the 7th Infantry Division move to set up a defensive perimeter during Exercise CABANAS '88, 8 August 1988.**
*National Archives*

7th Infantry Divisions inactivated, leaving the 10th Mountain and 25th Infantry Divisions on active status.

The legacy of the original light fighters, however, remained intact. Within the span of a decade, the 7th Infantry Division had established the organization, doctrine, and culture of the U.S. Army's new light infantry units. The soldiers of that division had tested the effectiveness of the light infantry concept in rigorous training as well as in combat. The experiences and ethos of the first light fighters passed to the other light divisions as the United States confronted a series of low-intensity conflicts in the 1990s. The two remaining light divisions would become workhorses as a result. In addition to the mission in Somalia in 1992, the Army sent the 10th Mountain Division to Haiti in 1994 to conduct stability operations. The 25th Infantry Division relieved the 10th from that mission in 1995. Large elements of both divisions also served as peacekeepers in the Balkans. The 10th Mountain Division was the Army's first conventional force in Afghanistan after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks. The light infantry divisions may not have had many opportunities to play main roles in the last decade of the Cold War. However, the crises of the post–Cold War world required a force of disciplined and well-trained soldiers that could deploy quickly and conduct a broad set of operations in austere conditions. With little fanfare, the Army's light fighters had moved from the peripheries of the Cold War to the foreground of a new uncertain era.

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## Notes

1. I thank Bob Avalle, Joe Bongiovi, Brian DeToy, Rich Dixon, and Barry Maxwell for the interviews they graciously provided to me. Their recollections of the 7th Infantry Division in its first decade as a light division greatly informed this work. Thanks also to Rick Herrera, Tom Hanson, Eric Burke, Rob Williams, and the readers at *Army History* for their careful review and comments on an earlier version of this article.

2. White Paper, "Light Infantry Divisions," John A. Wickham Jr., 1984, 1. General Military History Files, Ike Skelton Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library. https://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/p4013coll11/id/1446/.

3. John L. Romjue, an Army historian who worked for many years in the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) History Office, authored two key works on the Army's transition in this period: *From Active Defense to AirLand Battle: The Development of Army Doctrine, 1973–1982* (Fort Monroe, VA: Historical Office, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1984); and *The Army of Excellence: The Development of the 1980s Army* (Fort Monroe, VA: Office of the Command Historian, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1993).

4. The changing dynamics of the Cold War after 1979 generated great concern within the U.S. military about Low-Intensity Conflicts (LICs). That interest led to the U.S. Army publishing two field manuals on operations in LICs between 1981 and 1986. For a contemporaneous summary of thought within the U.S. military about LICs in this period, see John S. Fulton, "The Debate About Low-Intensity Conflict," *Military Review* 66, no. 2 (Feb 1986): 60–67.

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6. Jimmy Carter, "State of the Union Address 1980," Jimmy Carter Presidential Library and Museum, 23 Jan 1980, https://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/assets/documents/speeches/su80jec.phtml.

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Center of Military History, 2015) provides a more detailed account of the establishment of the U.S. Army's conventional deterrent in Europe in the early Cold War.

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76. The 10th Mountain Division did deploy its 548th Support Battalion for Operation Desert Shield, but that unit was not involved in combat operations.

# U.S. Army Artifact Spotlight



# SILENT BUT DEADLY

## THE HIGH STANDARD MODEL HDMS

By Brian M. Briones

The failure of the United States to anticipate the attack on Pearl Harbor, Hawai'i, led President Franklin D. Roosevelt to approve the creation of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) on 3 June 1942. Maj. Gen. William J. Donovan, a highly decorated World War I Army officer, was appointed as its director. Under Donovan, the OSS utilized research, analysis, covert operations, counterintelligence, espionage, and technical development to gather and use intelligence to give the United States an edge over its enemies.[1] A silenced weapon—one equipped with a noise reducer or suppressor to muffle the telltale sound of a firearm—was needed to help agents complete their often clandestine missions.

On 22 November 1943, a contract was awarded to the High Standard Manufacturing Company of New Haven, Connecticut, for 1,500 silenced U.S.A. Model HD pistols in .22 long-rifle caliber. High Standard already had produced thousands of the .22-caliber semiautomatic pistols for the U.S. military to use for basic pistol instruction. The Model HD used a ten-round detachable box magazine, was accurate, and had a relatively small report and minimal muzzle flash when fired, making it a great platform with which to work. The design was modified by drilling forty-four one-eighth-inch holes one-quarter inch apart from each other in the barrel. During testing, this modification was found to be the magic number that allowed for enough propellant gas to be collected to provide sufficient noise reduction while still allowing the weapon to cycle and chamber the next round. The silencer itself consists of a roll made from twenty tin-plated bronze screens soldered together, a brass washer, and a stack of 110 tin-plated bronze screen disks. The screen roll, disks, and brass washer are contained in a 7.75-inch steel tube .98 inches in diameter. It screws onto the frame where it meets the base of the barrel. The silenced pistol was designated the Model HDMS. It was 13.815 inches long and weighed 2 pounds, 15 ounces. To reduce the risk of corrosion and increase the weapon's resistance to wear over time, the earliest production pieces had blued frames and Parkerized silencers. Later examples were entirely Parkerized. The silencer reduced the sound of firing the weapon by 90 percent. General Donovan was so pleased with it that he demonstrated the pistol to President Roosevelt in the Oval Office.[2]

Regular deliveries of the HDMS began 20 January 1944, and, just a week later, it was demonstrated in Algiers. On 1 February 1944, General Douglas MacArthur received twenty of them, six of which went to the 6th Army Special Reconnaissance Unit, the Alamo Scouts. By summer 1944, the HDMS was regularly available to OSS field stations.[3] The OSS weapons catalog listed the HDMS as being quieter than traffic noises and closing doors. Additionally, the pistol was advertised as having no muzzle flash, making it perfect for working indoors and in the dark. All this without any reduction in performance.[4] The suppression of sound and muzzle flash would degrade, however, the more the weapon was fired. Regular cleaning of the weapon was suggested after every twenty rounds.[5] The screen roll in the silencer also would foul after repeated use. The pistol was shipped with a replacement screen roll to be used after 250 rounds were fired.

**Composite image above: William J. Donovan, shown here as a major general, the director of the Office of Strategic Services**
*National Archives*

.22-caliber High Standard Model HDMS, right side


HDMSs that were delivered to the OSS were stamped with "PROPERTY OF U.S." and the Ordnance Department stamp. Central Intelligence Agency models did not have these stamps.



**.22-caliber High Standard Model HDMS, left side**

As the war progressed, so did the HDMS's reputation. It became one of the most common weapons used by the OSS. The Alamo Scouts even used it to hunt for food while working in enemy territory. By war's end, the U.S. government had purchased 2,620 Model HDMS pistols.[6] After the end of the war and the dissolution of the OSS, a production run was completed for the Central Intelligence Agency.[7] Despite its small caliber, the HDMS proved to be an excellent weapon for close-range sniping and sentry elimination, particularly when silence was key.

**Brian M. Briones** is the curator of arms and ordnance for the Museum Support Center at Fort Belvoir, Virginia (MSC-B). He studied history at the University of Texas at Austin and obtained a master's degree in military history from American Military University. He interned at the National Museum of the United States Marine Corps, was a museum technician at the National Museum of the United States Navy, and then served as assistant director and curator of the Fort Ward Museum and Historic Site for the City of Alexandria, Virginia. As a curator at the MSC-B, he interprets and cares for the Army Museum Enterprise's arms and ordnance collection. He serves as a subject-matter expert on small arms and light weapons and ensures inventory accountability and security of the small arms and light weapons collection at the MSC-B.

## Notes

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2. John W. Brunner, *OSS Weapons* (Williamstown, NJ: Phillips Publications, 1994), 27.
3. Brunner, *OSS Weapons*, 25–26.
4. Charles W. Pate, *U.S. Handguns of World War II: The Secondary Pistols and Revolvers* (Lincoln, RI: Andrew Mowbray Publishers, 1998), 250–51.
5. Brunner, *OSS Weapons*, 27.
6. Pate, *U.S. Handguns of World War II*, 253.
7. Brunner, *OSS Weapons*, 28.

The silencer on the HDMS could be removed for cleaning.

The silencer consisted of a metal cylinder containing a mesh tube, mesh washers, and a brass washer. The endcap has been removed in this photograph.

The Model HDMS was shipped with a replacement mesh tube.

# Art and Artifact Feature

# The Art and Artifacts of Combat Artist and War Correspondent



## Tom Lea

By Leigh E. Smith Jr. and Naomi Absalon

As World War II raged across the globe, news agencies scrambled to send correspondents into harm's way to get the latest information about the conflict. Reporters, journalists, photographers, and artists all sought to capture the war and bring the news to the home front. One of those who answered the call was civilian artist Tom Lea.

Thomas Calloway Lea III was born 11 July 1907 at Hotel Dieu Hospital in El Paso, Texas. Tom Lea's father, Thomas C. Lea Jr., was the mayor of El Paso from 1915 to 1917. After Mexican revolutionary Pancho Villa raided Columbus, New Mexico, in March 1916, killing several soldiers and civilians, Tom's father, as mayor, publicly declared he would arrest Villa if the rebel leader came to El Paso. Villa responded by placing a bounty of 1,000 pesos on Mayor Lea's head. During this tumultuous time and for six months after, Tom and his brother Joe were escorted to and from school by police officers, and a twenty-four-hour guard monitored the Lea residence. Tom graduated from El Paso High School in 1924, after which he studied at the Art Institute of Chicago. He then apprenticed under John W. Norton, a Chicago muralist. While in Chicago, Lea met and married a fellow student of art, Nancy Jane Taylor, and they traveled to Europe to see works of art in Paris and Italy. When Lea and Nancy returned to the United States, they moved to New Mexico.

Lea made a reputation for himself painting murals in Missouri, Texas, and Washington, D.C., for the Works Progress Administration, an American New Deal agency that employed millions of jobseekers. One of Lea's early murals, "The Nesters," painted in the Post Office Department Building in Washington, D.C., won a national competition in 1935.

In 1936, the Leas moved back to El Paso, where Nancy died from surgical complications from an appendectomy. Lea continued to paint murals as well as illustrations for *Life* and *Saturday Evening Post* magazines. He later was commissioned to paint the mural

**"Pass of the North"** *Courtesy of the Tom Lea Institute*

"Pass of the North" in the United States District Court House in El Paso, and the artwork was completed on 6 July 1938. Also in 1938, Lea met and married Sara Dighton from Monticello, Illinois, who became Tom's lifelong partner. During this time in El Paso, Tom met book designer and typographer Carl Herzog and noted Texas writer J. Frank Dobie, both of whom became frequent collaborators. Lea illustrated two of Dobie's books, *The Longhorns* and *Apache Gold and Yaqui Silver*. In 1940, Lea also won a Rosenwald Fellowship, but after receiving an invitation from *Life* magazine to be a featured contributor, he declined the fellowship.

In 1941, *Life* magazine hired Lea as an accredited war correspondent, illustrator, and combat artist. Lea traveled over 100,000 miles to the various combat theaters in the South Pacific, North Atlantic, China Burma India Theater, North Africa, Europe, and the Artic. He recorded the events of U.S. and Allied soldiers, sailors, and marines, and brought *Life* readers the graphic horrors and heroisms of the war with a stark human perspective. Reflecting on his wartime experience, Lea said, "I became, for deeply felt reasons, an eye-witness reporter, in drawings and paintings, of men and their machines waging a war worldwide. I want to make it clear that I did not report hearsay; I did not imagine, or fake, or improvise; I did not cuddle up with personal emotion, moral notion, or political opinion about War with a capital W. I reported in pictures what I saw with my own two eyes, wide open."[1]

Lea witnessed some of the most iconic battles of World War II. In 1941, he went to sea in the North Atlantic on a destroyer that was escorting supply convoys to Iceland. During this sea voyage, he went aboard other ships and the patrol bombers of the air arm of the convoy, capturing in his art the jobs of those protecting the convoy of ships and the vital war supplies bound for England. After returning to the states, he finished his drawings and illustrations in Texas. From August through October 1942, Lea was on board the aircraft carrier USS *Hornet*, leaving the carrier just days before it was sunk during the Battle of Santa Cruz (25–27 October 1942). In 1943, Lea traveled across the globe to cover the war from England, North Africa, Greenland, and other countries in the European and American Theaters of Operations. In 1944, he went to the Pacific Theater of Operations and landed on the island of Peleliu just after the first assault wave of marines from the 1st Marine Division. Some of his most famous paintings were inspired from this landing, such as *Going In* (1944) and *The Two-Thousand Yard Stare* (1944). Lea's wartime drawings and paintings, some of which became the most recognized and graphic images of the war, were printed in numerous issues of *Life*. Notably, Lea's images and accompanying notes from the invasion of Peleliu Island were featured in the 11 June 1945 issue of *Life*.

As a war correspondent and artist, Lea wore many uniforms during his travels. Because

many of the correspondents were embedded with the armed forces, they often wore fatigue uniforms, M1 helmets, field jackets, flight jackets, and officer dress uniforms. These articles of clothing were adorned with cloth and metal insignia identifying the wearer as a war correspondent. The Fort Bliss Museum in Fort Bliss, Texas, is home to several of Tom Lea's uniform items from his time as a war correspondent. Such items include his dress uniform coat, a flight jacket, and his identification bracelet and card.

Lea's dress uniform coat is a commercially-made version of the U.S. Army four-pocket officers' service coat made of elastique in olive drab or chocolate brown, a dark shade color that later became known as shade 51. The coat includes two brass belt hooks (by the waist near the elbows) to support a leather Sam Browne belt. However, in November 1942, the brass hooks became optional, and the Sam Browne belt was replaced by a cloth belt. The coat also has a half-inch wide drab cloth braid around each cuff. Lea wore the U.S. officer's collar brass and three campaign ribbons: from left to right, the European-African-Middle Eastern Theater campaign ribbon with one campaign star, the Asiatic-Pacific Theater campaign ribbon with three campaign stars, and the American Theater campaign ribbon. On the left upper arm is one of many versions of the U.S. war correspondent shoulder sleeve insignia, which those who reported from the battlefield wore to help themselves stand out from frontline troops. On the shoulder epaulettes of Lea's uniform are British-made war correspondent metal insignia.

In lieu of the standard military issue identification tags (known as dog tags) worn by soldiers, sailors, and marines for identification purposes, Lea wore a stainless-steel bracelet on his wrist. The text of the bracelet reads: TOM LEA, LIFE MAGAZINE WAR CORRESPONDENT, BLOOD TYPE-A, TET [tetanus shot] 6 1942.

While embedded with the U.S. Navy, Lea was issued a temporary photographer's identification card, which included a 1-inch by 1-inch photograph of Lea and listed his hair color (brown), eye color (brown), weight (150 pounds), and his date of birth (7–11–07). On the reverse side of the card were Lea's right and left index fingerprints. This card authorized him to carry cameras and to take pictures within the Pacific Ocean Areas, while being subject to existing security instructions. All negatives exposed by Lea were subject to submission to the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet or other specifically authorized personnel for processing and review. Lea's identification card was valid until 31 December 1944.

The last article of clothing shown here is a post–World War II–era U.S. Navy nylon jacket worn by Tom Lea. The uniform tag identifies this jacket as a "Jacket, Winter Flying Suit, Specification MIL–S–18342A" and indicates the color (light olive green and partial khaki green). On the left pocket flap is a leather name tag with gold-printed naval aviator wings and the name "TOM LEA." Over the right pocket is another metal example of the war correspondent insignia.

Following the war, Lea returned to El Paso and continued to paint murals and illustrations, but he also expressed in words what he had experienced during the war. He also wrote fiction that drew from his Texas roots: two of his novels, *The Brave Bulls* (Little, Brown, 1949) and *The Wonderful Country* (Little, Brown, 1952), became best sellers. Lea illustrated both books, and both stories were turned into motion pictures, in 1951 and 1959, respectively. In the later part of the 1960s, Lea wrote his autobiography, entitled *A Picture Gallery: Paintings and Drawings* (Little, Brown, 1968).

Tom Lea passed away in El Paso on 29 January 2001. He was 93 years old. His wife, Sarah Catherine Dighton Lea, donated many of his uniforms and mementos from his time covering World War II to the Fort Bliss Museum in 2002.

Tom Lea's World War II artworks are part of the Army Art Collection. Although he was embedded with the Navy and Marines for most of his assignments for *Life*, his collected pieces were donated to the Department of Defense in 1960 with a condition that the works remain together as one collection rather than be split up among the military services. The Army was appointed custodian of the *Life* collection and received eighty-two paintings and drawings by Lea. Along with the rest of the Army Art Collection, these works are preserved at the Museum Support Center at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, and are available for loans to both military and civilian museums.



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**Naomi Absalon** is a museum technician at the 1st Armored Division, Fort Bliss, and Noncommissioned Officer Museums, Fort Bliss, Texas.

## Note

1. "Tom Lea Biography," Tom Lea Institute, n.d. https://www.tomlea.com/biography (accessed 21 Oct 2024).




**Tom Lea, pictured here in China**
*U.S. Army*




***Portrait of Sgt R.H. Hulse, Crew Chief***


Art and Artifacts

*Portrait of Flying Cadet Bill Kelly*




**Sgt Bruce Bieber**




*Portrait of Pvt Wylie Potter*



# NOT WITHOUT BLEMISH

## The Career of Brig. Gen. Fred A. Safay, Florida National Guard

**BY RYAN P. HOVATTER**

When Arab-American community organizations highlight the contributions of Arab Americans in the United States, they frequently point out the military service of General John P. Abizaid, who once commanded U.S. Central Command, and General George A. Joulwan, who commanded U.S. Southern Command before serving as the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe.[1] However, long before these four-star generals of the late twentieth century, there was Fred Abraham Safay. Promoted to brigadier general in September 1942, Safay likely was the first Arab-American general officer in the U.S. Army.

Safay served in the Florida National Guard for more than three decades, and he also had a distinguished and long-lasting career in public sanitation. Safay's military service was not without its blemishes. After nearly one year as an assistant division commander, he was reduced to his permanent rank of colonel. He then commanded an infantry regiment in combat in Italy before his relief and retirement. Safay's story offers examples of both perseverance and caution. It also shows the political maneuvering of federal and state promotions during his era and, in particular, highlights the contention between Regular Army and National Guard advancements during World War II. Lastly, it shows the influence of community in the National Guard and highlights the experiences of an Arab-American general in the U.S. Army.

### Background

Safay was born in Jacksonville, Florida, on 16 June 1897 to Syrian immigrant parents, Abraham and Jesimine Safay. Since 1890, the economically booming city of Jacksonville had been a popular destination for Syrians, most of whom were Catholics from the rural area around the Anti-Lebanon mountain range, during the last decades of Ottoman rule. By 1920, one out of every ten immigrants in Jacksonville were Syrian, and the majority went into business as grocers and merchants. They integrated quickly,

**Above: Col. Fred A. Safay and the staff of the 124th Infantry Regiment at Fort Benning, Georgia, 1942** *Florida National Guard Archives*

living throughout the city, rather than in ethnic enclaves. Outwardly, they conformed to and were accepted by the predominantly White southern culture. In private, however, they maintained many of their unique traditions.[2] The Arab community established its own churches and the Salaam Club, a local social club founded in 1912. Safay probably grew up in a household filled with both Arabic and English chatter, and his meals likely were a mix of Syrian and Southern-American cuisine.

Just after graduating high school at the age of 17, Safay enrolled in Jacksonville's Florida Military Academy in 1914. He studied military science and graduated the next year, after which he joined the band of the 1st Regiment of Infantry, Florida National Guard, enlisting on 10 March 1915.[3] Not long after Safay joined his unit, President T. Woodrow Wilson called upon the National Guard to secure the Texas border while Brig. Gen. John J. Pershing led the Mexican Punitive Expedition to bring Pancho Villa to justice for raiding Columbus, New Mexico. Safay and his comrades in the 1st Florida were disappointed when Florida's adjutant general, Maj. Gen. J. Clifford R. Foster, chose the 2d Regiment of Infantry, Florida National Guard, to fill the state's quota. As the 2d Florida made its way to Laredo, Foster prepared the 1st Florida for a potential second round of call-ups. He expanded recruiting to fill the infantry companies to war strength in June 1916. Foster noted that the Militia Bureau thought that "all of the National Guard will probably be mobilized" for use along the border.[4] It was during this build-up that Safay reenlisted. This time, he joined an infantry unit from the same regiment—Company F, commonly known as the Jacksonville Rifles. He advanced through the ranks, from private to corporal to sergeant, in just a few months.[5]

Foster correctly predicted that the entire National Guard would be mobilized. What he did not anticipate was that Congress would declare war on Germany. Immediately after the declaration on 6 April 1917, the president mobilized the entire National Guard—not to the Texas border as Foster had predicted, but to various efforts in support of the new war. Florida's two infantry regiments entered active federal service, reporting to the base (now Naval Air Station Jackson) on Black Point, an Army training camp on the St. John's River for what Safay recalled as "intensive training."[6] In addition to training, the regiment was tasked with defending key infrastructure near the Florida coast from German maritime attack. In this capacity, Safay commanded a detachment to guard Atlantic Coast Line Railroad bridges between Jacksonville and Sanford, Florida, from July to September 1917.[7]



**General Foster**
*State Archives of Florida*

In mid-September, the 1st and 2d Florida entrained to Camp Wheeler, near Macon, Georgia, where they joined National Guard regiments from Georgia and Alabama to form the 31st Division, also known as the Dixie Division. Once in camp, the understrength state units consolidated to make full-strength divisions with four infantry regiments and support units. Soldiers transferred from their old state regiments to the new federally designated units irrespective of their state of origin. The 2d Florida formed the building block for the 124th Infantry Regiment, and the 1st Florida was disbanded to fill the 124th Infantry and other units in the 31st Division. Safay initially transferred from the 1st Florida to the 122d Infantry Regiment (formerly the 5th Infantry Regiment, Georgia National Guard), but like so many soldiers in the 31st Division, Safay changed units several times before entering combat.

Like many prewar National Guard noncommissioned officers, Safay was selected to attend officer training. He commissioned as an infantry second lieutenant in August 1918. Of the 125 newly commissioned officers from the 31st Division only 65 stayed in the division. The rest spread across the Army. Safay transferred to the 121st Infantry Regiment from Georgia. Then, after arriving in France, he transferred twice more. First, he reported to the 49th Infantry Regiment near Le Mans, and finally he reported to Company M, 18th Infantry Regiment, 1st Division, which already was engaged in the Meuse-Argonne Offensive.[8] Safay seems to have learned one important lesson after moving from regiment to regiment: impersonal replacement systems breed discontent between the old soldiers and the new ones. Later, he would work hard to smooth over that divide while commanding the 124th Infantry Regiment.

After the cessation of hostilities on 11 November 1918, Safay remained in active service. He attended the Army's School of Scouting and Patrolling at Châtillon-sur-Seine, France, and served on occupation duty in Germany until his discharge in July 1919.[9]

Upon returning to Florida, Safay joined a few influential veterans in reorganizing the Florida National Guard. In September 1920, he assisted in reorganizing the Jacksonville Rifles, then more commonly known by their federal designation, Company F, 124th Infantry Regiment. Two years later, he organized the regiment's Headquarters Company while serving as the company's commander, just before its summer encampment.

Safay married Iva I. McKendree sometime in early 1921 and had a daughter, Dorothy T. Safay, the following spring.[10] Safay also started his civil career with the Florida Board of Health shortly after the war.[11] He joined fellow Florida guardsman, Capt. Charles N. Hobbs, as one of the six district sanitation engineers. Col. Raymond C. Turck, who commanded the 124th Infantry when Safay commanded its headquarters company, likely introduced Safay to the public health field. Like Safay, Turck lived in Jacksonville's upscale Riverside neighborhood, and he, too, was a World War I veteran and prewar Florida guardsman. He was also a medical doctor who served as the state health officer and oversaw the Board of Health from 1921 to 1925. During this

**Captain Hobbs**
*State Archives of Florida*

**Governor Carlton, ca. 1928**
*State Archives of Florida*

**Major Davis**
*State Archives of Florida*

time, Safay got a job as a district sanitation engineer for northeast Florida.[12] In Turck's 1924 annual report, *Florida Health Notes*, he noted that "Capt. Safay is setting a pace which will keep him steadily moving."[13] Safay improved public sanitation by building more privies, wells, and drainage ditches throughout Florida.

While Safay was still a young (32-year-old) Florida National Guard captain and a state employee with the Board of Health, he found himself at the center of an important case for the Florida National Guard involving dual pay for state employees in service with the National Guard. Governor Doyle E. Carlton ordered the Florida National Guard into state service in 1929 to quarantine the better half of the Florida peninsula to curb the spread of the Mediterranean fruit fly, whose larvae turned citrus fruits into inedible pulp. The Florida National Guard soldiers established checkpoints and inspected vehicles leaving the quarantine area, ensuring they did not have infected fruit.

Safay commanded his company in active state service for a period of nine days, from 8 to 16 May, to enforce the quarantine. These nine days would matter not only to Safay but to all members of the Florida National Guard, who also were employed by the State of Florida and entitled to a leave of absence without loss of pay. When the state comptroller's office received the bill from the Florida National Guard to pay its soldiers for their duty, the office halted Safay's payment of $80. This was a significant amount of money. For comparison, his Board of Health salary amounted to $200 per month. The comptroller claimed that his office could not pay both Safay's Board of Health salary and his National Guard earnings for the same dates. Safay asked Florida's adjutant general, Maj. Gen. Vivian B. Collins, for assistance, and Collins referred the case to the state attorney general, Fred H. Davis.[14]

Davis was also a war veteran and a major in the Florida National Guard, but his true genius was in his ability to navigate the halls of the state capitol and understand the law. Davis had served as speaker of the Florida House of Representatives before his appointment as attorney general, and he later would serve as the chief justice of the Supreme Court of Florida. Davis opined that Safay was due both payments, because, by Florida law, all members of the Florida National Guard were "entitled to leave of absence from their respective duties without loss of pay, time, or efficiency rating . . . providing that leave of absence should not exceed 17 days at any one time."[15] Davis continued, "In other words, military compensation to state employees is treated as being entirely separate and distinct from other compensation, because the Constitution of the State expressly provides that military officers may hold any other legislative, executive, or judicial office."[16] Safay may have been a passive activist in this case, but it laid the foundation for Florida National Guard soldiers to receive state pay for both their civil service and their state-funded National Guard work at the same time. As the law stands today, Florida state employees who are also members of the Florida National Guard are allowed up to thirty days of paid military leave for each governor-declared emergency or disaster.[17]

Safay continued to advance in his civil career, becoming a senior sanitary engineer involved in controlling rabies, enforcing quarantines, coordinating vaccinations, and testing water, among other things.[18] His civilian career frequently intersected with his military role—especially regarding disaster response. Both the Board of Health and the National Guard were important in the wake of hurricanes, a frequent hazard in Florida. As a guardsman, Safay would be responsible for evacuating people and assisting in recovery. As a sanitary engineer, he found himself educating communities on the dangers of contaminated waters. In 1939, the state promoted Safay to be the director of the newly formed sanitation section at the Board of Health, which oversaw statewide sanitation projects, inspected canning plants, water bottling plants, Works Progress Administration sites, and tourist camps. Safay also sat on the State Milk Control Commission, known as the Milk Board, which controlled the production and pricing of milk.[19]

Meanwhile, Safay had continued to rise in the National Guard as well. He was promoted to major and took command of the 2d Battalion, 124th Infantry Regiment, in October 1930. In 1934, he transferred to the regimental headquarters to serve as the plans and training officer. It seems that he was far more focused on his civil service career, earning some terse remarks from his commander for his "lack of interest in staff functions" and for not completing an army extension course, as the adjutant general had directed all of his officers to do.[20] Even so, Safay's superiors reassigned him to command 2d Battalion again in 1937 and promoted him to lieutenant colonel on 30 July 1940.[21]

Safay's second time in battalion command was short-lived. In August 1940, Congress authorized President Franklin D. Roosevelt to call up the entire National Guard in the nation's first prewar mobilization. The United States was preparing to expand the Army and it needed its National Guard to be prepared should the nation join World War II. The activation provided many Florida National Guard soldiers with promotions. The 124th Infantry's commander, Col. Joseph C. Hutchinson, advanced to brigadier general to command a brigade of the 31st Division. Safay took Hutchinson's place as commander of the 124th Infantry. He was promoted to colonel on 10 November 1940 and inducted his troops into service three days later. Their civilian employers released them for their active service, as was the case with all mobilized members of the guard. The state gave Safay a one-year leave of absence.[22]

## Shaping the 124th Infantry Regiment

The 124th Infantry Regiment, nicknamed the "Gators," reported to Camp Blanding, Florida, on 18 December 1940. They were among the 18,000 troops of the 31st Division who poured into the new cantonment area by Kingsley Lake that month. The guard members unloaded from trains during the cold, rainy season and were shocked to see barren, sandy fields that were "little more than a morass."[23] Acres upon acres had been cleared of trees, but few buildings were finished when they arrived. Construction by hired contractors had not progressed as quickly as necessary to house an entire division. Safay's first task was to assist the contractors with constructing the camp facilities. He ordered his companies to finish clearing land of trees and to set up tents for temporary living. The soldiers were especially motivated because there was a shortage of tents, and the incessant rain caused the freshly cleared cantonment area to flood.[24]

**General Hutchinson**
*National Archives*

That winter, the cleared areas transformed into something resembling a wood and tent city. The land was low and sandy, except for the grassy regimental parade fields. There were wooden structures for kitchens and offices and cleared areas for hutments. Regiments were kept together, with each company having its own kitchen, latrine, and about thirty-five hutments connected by raised wooden sidewalks. The company areas were bordered by hardpacked dirt roads and small, three-sided cement structures to store the wood and coal used to heat the buildings and hutments. Each hutment was made with a wooden floor and wood slat walls up to the waist. A tent, held up over the wooden floor with a tall center pole in the middle, constituted the top half of the walls and the roof. The tent walls could be rolled up in the summer, and when it was cold, the troops used a central wood stove to keep warm at night. From this simple beginning, Camp Blanding would grow to be the fifth most populous place in Florida by the end of the year, exceeded only by Jacksonville, Miami, Tampa, and St. Petersburg.[25]

In addition to the barracks, kitchens, headquarters offices, and motor pool buildings, Safay had an officers' clubhouse, dubbed the "Gator Club," constructed. The one-story wooden structure was placed right next to the regiment's officers' mess



**Aerial view of Camp Blanding, Florida, ca. 1942**
*State Archives of Florida*

hall.[26] Despite having a board of officers to run the club, Safay oversaw every detail of the operation. He arranged for the installation of slot machines and personally arranged to purchase the liquor, wine, and beer from a wholesale distributor, which the club sold to officers at a 10 percent markup to fund club improvements. He entrusted Lt. William H. Bridges, with the aid of some enlisted soldiers, to run the Gator Club, make purchases, and keep records. When the regiment went to the field in the army maneuvers of 1941, the 124th brought along a mobile Gator Club, complete with booze and slot machines.[27] Unfortunately, Safay's direct supervision of the Gator Club would haunt him after the war as some Florida National Guard officers decried an improper accounting of funds.

Safay's most important task was to build his National Guard regiment up to the full wartime strength of 2,660 soldiers. During its first few months in active service, the 124th Infantry doubled in strength, incorporating 1,318 new inductees.[28] Among the new troops was Safay's own nephew, Pvt. William J. Khoury, who, the divisional newspaper *Dixie* joked, worked for both "Uncle Sam" and "Uncle Fred."[29] It was (and still is) common for the National Guard to have family members in the same outfit.

Safay welcomed the new troops, fully incorporating them into the regiment. Remembering the bitter distinctions between the new inductees and the "old soldiers" in World War I, he informed his regiment that no distinction would be made between the new and premobilization soldiers. Speaking directly to the newcomers, Safay said, "You are accepted not as 'selectees' but as a component part of this regiment and an equal sharer in the glorious traditions and honor of the 124th Infantry."[30]

In the first week of April, Safay led the 124th Infantry Regimental Combat Team (which included attached artillery, engineer, and medical units) on its first major exercise: a 60-mile motorized road march with 200 vehicles from Camp Blanding to Sanford.[31] Thus began a rigorous training program to prepare the regiment—as individual soldiers and as a unit—for its participation in both the Louisiana and Carolina maneuvers in the summer and fall of 1941. Safay and several staff officers attended the Battalion Commanders' and Staff Officers' Course taught by the Infantry School during this time.[32]

While the 31st Division, which officially became the 31st Infantry Division in 1941, was in the Carolinas, President Roosevelt extended the national emergency for another year. The War Department also informed the 31st Infantry Division commander, Maj. Gen. John C. Persons, that he had to send his best regiment to Fort Benning (now Fort Moore), Georgia, to be a demonstration unit for the new Officer Candidate School. General Persons chose the 124th Infantry in large part because of its proficiency and its performance in the recent maneuvers. Persons noted that it was "of course, a compliment, but it was a severe blow to the Division for it took away from it at one time two thousand of its best trained men and officers."[33] As the soldiers of the 124th Infantry took leave and prepared to transfer to Fort Benning, the country was shaken by news that the Japanese had attacked the Navy fleet at Pearl Harbor, Hawai'i, on 7 December 1941. Within days, the United States was officially at war with Japan, Germany, and Italy.

## Training America's Infantry Officers

The Infantry School at Fort Benning rapidly expanded from a peacetime training school, focused primarily on advanced infantry officer education, to one of basic officer training. Once war was declared, the Infantry School needed to produce officers at a drastically increased rate. The Army required the Fort Benning Officer Candidate School to expand from training several hundred officer candidates at a time (and graduating a total of 800 officers a year) to training 14,400 officer candidates in the month of December 1942 alone.[34] This required an expansion of training and housing areas east of the main post in an area called Harmony Church and necessitated more instructors and demonstration troops.

The 29th Infantry Regiment had been the sole demonstration unit on Fort Benning at the start of World War II. The idea behind the demonstration unit was that officer candidates would learn tactics by observing highly drilled infantry units perform maneuvers. In response to wartime demand, the Infantry School expanded from its one student regiment to create the 1st and 2d Student Training Regiments. The 29th Infantry remained the demonstration unit for the 1st Student Training Regiment on the main post, and the 124th Infantry became the demonstration unit for the 2d Student Training Regiment, located at Harmony Church, just south of Hourglass Road (now home to the U.S. Army Ranger School).[35]

The 124th Infantry arrived at its new housing in Harmony Church on 18 December 1941, ready to demonstrate infantry tactics. By the end of its first year, the 124th Infantry had demonstrated infantry tactics for thirty Officer Candidate School classes.[36] The most complex maneuver was B–188, the Battalion Attack, or, as the soldiers called it, "the Battle of Benning."[37] This demonstration required the most coordination of heavy weapons and was performed as hundreds of candidates sat on a hill overlooking the action. Pvt. Aubrey P. Tillery recalled the memorable B–188 combined arms demonstration:

> The battalion was capturing a hill with supporting units and all using live ammunition. It began with the bombing of the hill from the air. Then as the officers and

**Troops from the 124th Infantry training at Fort Benning, ca. 1943**
*State Archives of Florida*

> OCS [Officer Candidate School] groups sat in the viewing stands, live artillery was fired over their heads and into the hill. Very few if any had ever heard artillery screaming over their heads before. I feel quite certain that later on in combat they came to appreciate this sound. Next came the tanks moving on each side and infantry ground troops in the middle moving on the hill, with all firing live ammunition. Tracer bullets were used which made it easier to follow the action from the viewing stands. It was quite an impressive sight which the viewers would probably remember for a long time.[38]

Safay had trained a first-rate unit. The 124th Infantry later would provide cadre officers and noncommissioned officers to stand up the 300th Infantry Regiment. A high proportion of the 124th Infantry's soldiers commissioned as officers and joined paratroop and air force units. Safay was rewarded with a promotion to brigadier general in September 1942. Among the sixty-two colonels that President Roosevelt appointed to brigadier general that September, only five were from the National Guard.[39] Safay's promotion came at the same time that two Regular Army colonels at the Infantry School were promoted to the general officer ranks and the commander of the Infantry School was promoted to major general. The *Fort Benning Bayonet* stated that the four generals were "probably more than any other group of officers . . . responsible for the achievements of Fort Benning during the last year."[40] General Collins wrote to Safay, "I was more than delighted to read in the press, notice of your nomination for promotion. You have built an outstanding regiment and deserve this recognition. I am very proud of the distinction which you are bringing to our state and especially to my old regiment. Hearty congratulations."[41]

Shortly after his promotion, Safay transferred to Camp Wheeler, where he briefly served as the assistant to the commanding general of the Infantry Replacement Training Center. The local papers hailed the transfer as Safay's return to his "old home" because he had received his commission there in 1918.[42] Safay's job was not so different from his time in the 124th. Instead of preparing infantry officers, he now oversaw the training of enlisted infantry soldiers for combat. However, Safay's time at Camp Wheeler was short and, in November, he joined the 78th Infantry Division as its assistant division commander at Camp Butner, North Carolina.[43] The War Department only had reactivated the division in August, but just before Safay reported to it, the Army designated the division as a replacement training unit. Safay once again found himself training fresh troops to send to combat as replacements. In his first six months, the 78th Infantry Division trained between 40,000 and 50,000 soldiers, who were sent to war as replacements in both theaters.[44]

Sadly, General Collins's elation over Safay's promotion turned to disappointment and bewilderment when Safay was reduced back to his permanent rank of colonel and relieved of his assignment as assistant division commander of the 78th Infantry Division eleven months later, on 11 August 1943. The circumstances that led to Safay's demotion during his time in the 78th Infantry Division are unclear. The chief of the National Guard Bureau, Maj. Gen. John F. Williams, later told Collins that Maj. Gen. Edwin P. Parker Jr., the 78th Infantry Division commander, had recommended Safay's relief. Lt. Gen. Lesley J. McNair, the commanding general of Army Ground Forces and an architect of the Army's mass mobilization, had agreed with the reduction and reassignment. According to Williams, Parker found that Safay had "insufficient professional training" for assignment as a general officer. Williams, however, noted that Safay had demonstrated an ability to command an infantry regiment, and his service had been "entirely satisfactory."[45] Therefore, Safay was given another regimental command.

Williams's explanation, which relied on secondhand information, did not satisfy Collins, who became suspicious of the Army leaders' true intentions.[46] Safay was a war veteran who had graduated from Army schools in France and Fort Benning and had commanded an infantry regiment so well that it had been selected to be the Officer Candidate School demonstration unit. Furthermore, Safay's assignment with the 78th Infantry Division required him to do what he already had excelled at doing: train infantry soldiers.

Safay may have been a casualty of the anti–National Guard sentiment that was prevalent among Regular Army officers at the time. General McNair himself told



**General Safay**
*U.S. Army*

General George C. Marshall, the Chief of Staff of the Army, in July 1944 that the National Guard "provided general officers who were not professional soldiers and who, almost without exception, were not competent to exercise the command appropriate to that rank."[47] McNair's sentiment represented a viewpoint, propagated by military theorist Emory Upton, that favored placing Regular Army officers in command of National Guard units.[48] Although that practice was adopted as a policy, McNair at least saw to it that few National Guard generals continued

**General Parker**
*National Archives*

to command after their divisions were brought into active federal service.

The relationship between Florida National Guard and Regular Army leaders further soured after the Army disbanded the 124th Infantry Regiment in March 1944. Florida governor Spessard Holland questioned the Army's motives in doing so. In a letter to Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, Holland stated, "Why such a regiment," which had a long history, had been selected above others as a demonstration unit, and had produced four general officers—including the former chief of the National Guard Bureau, Maj. Gen. Albert H. Blanding—"should be selected for oblivion when there are scores of others recently formed which have no record nor traditions is difficult to understand." The governor implored the secretary of war to reinstate the old regiment, lest its disbandment "arouse bitterness in the hearts of many of our citizens who have served in it in the past."[49] Collins blamed the "jealous and hostile attitude of individual officers of the Regular establishment who by the Grace of God and their class rings, [had] promulgated orders directing the disbandment of this fine regiment."[50] Stimson responded to these complaints by reactivating the 124th Infantry less than one month later.

Although simple carelessness, rather than jealousy, most likely led to the inactivation of the 124th Infantry Regiment, Collins's assertion highlights the mistrust between some leaders of the National Guard and the Regular Army. But this mistrust does not explain why Safay, who was promoted to the general officer ranks *after* the Pearl Harbor attacks, was reduced. If the Army was trying to remove or sideline National Guard senior leaders, then why promote Safay to brigadier general at all? Perhaps Safay took the reduction, as the Florida newspapers later reported, so that he could get into combat.[51] This is plausible. Another officer, Henry Carlton Newton, who was on the same promotion list as Safay, voluntarily accepted a reduction from brigadier general to colonel so that he could lead an element of the Monuments, Fine Arts, and Archives program (often referred to as the Monuments Men), which operated primarily in war-torn Europe. Perhaps Safay felt that he would be forced to sit out the war entirely unless he took a reduction to colonel and found a unit scheduled to move overseas. Safay already had been in active service for nearly three years, and although he had trained thousands of soldiers to go off to war, he himself had not yet seen combat. The 85th Infantry Division, where Safay took his next assignment, would depart the United States for the Italian theater of war within four months.

## Italian Combat

The 85th Infantry Division, a draftee division, only had been activated in May 1942. Safay arrived in the fall of 1943 just as the division ended nearly three months of intensive combat training—during which at least four soldiers had died of heat exposure and one from a lightning strike—in the Sonoran and Mojave Deserts of

**General Williams**
*U.S. Army*

**General Newton** *(right)* **speaks with a private at Fort Knox, Kentucky, ca. 1943.**
*Library of Congress*

Southern California.[52] Safay soon took command of the 338th Infantry Regiment from Col. Lee S. Gerow, the brother of Maj. Gen. Leonard T. Gerow, who later would gain fame as the V Corps commander at Normandy.[53]

Safay and the division departed the United States in December 1943 and arrived at Oran, Algeria, by mid-January. They encamped in the desert 60 miles south of the city, where they trained for nearly six weeks on mountain warfare to prepare to fight in Italy's Apennine Mountains. They then had three weeks of amphibious assault training along the Algerian coast.[54] The 85th Infantry sailed to Naples, which was already under Allied control, arriving throughout March 1944. The 85th joined the line to the left of the 88th Infantry Division.[55]

Safay's sister regiment, the 339th Infantry Regiment, had arrived in Naples in mid-March, ahead of the rest of the division. Col. James E. Matthews had led the 339th into combat only one day after it arrived. After fourteen days of brutal fighting in blizzard conditions, a quiet returned to the front. Colonel Matthews, described in the 85th Infantry Division's history as "greatly loved by his men," voluntarily relinquished his command on 28 March 1944. He had commanded the 339th for only five months. In a farewell to his troops, Matthews wrote, "A man of my age cannot take the terrific punishment similar to that which you have just experienced, and which I also experienced, although in a different position for fourteen days. It means that in the crucial period when one more ounce of energy can give us victory, a younger leader can produce where a man of my age cannot." He spoke of visiting the dead, who had been placed in a "little stone building," and looking upon the face of one dead soldier "until tears blinded [his] vision." He continued, "If that be weakness, then I am weak. If that be indicative of poor command, then I am a poor commander." Matthews was then released from the division and hospitalized for an infected bladder.[56] Matthews's story shows just how difficult combat was on regimental commanders.

As Matthews and his regiment had been fighting alongside the 88th Infantry Division, Safay's 338th Infantry staged near Qualiano, a suburb of Naples. Taking advantage of the extra time, his soldiers practiced fighting in mountains and villages and crossing streams before taking over a sector along the American line to await the late spring offensive.[57] The offensive, known as Operation Diadem, was a major attack by the U.S. Fifth and British Eighth Armies designed to break the Gustav Line—the primary German defensive position running across the Italian peninsula—and open the road to Rome and the rest of Italy. In an analysis of the opening battle of Operation Diadem, the authors of *Small Unit Actions* note that the battle held particular importance because it was the first battle of World War II that involved American drafted divisions in combat.[58]

The plan of attack for Operation Diadem employed the highly trained mountain soldiers of the French Expeditionary Corps on the Fifth Army's right, in the most rugged terrain, with the II Corps to its left. The II Corps consisted of the 85th and 88th Infantry Divisions, which, aside from the 339th Infantry, had not yet seen combat. Safay's 338th supported II Corps' main effort, the 351st Infantry Regiment of the 88th Infantry Division, whose objective was to seize the village of Santa Maria Infante. To Safay's left was the 339th Infantry. Safay's objective was to seize Solacciano Ridge, or S-Ridge, which consisted of several 100-meter-high hills. The Germans had occupied this ridge for several months and built an excellent network of defenses. Machine-gun pillboxes, protected by earthen overhead cover, swept the gentle slopes below. Antipersonnel mines and concertina wire blocked the approach to the fortified positions. The *267th Grenadier Regiment*, *94th Infantry Division*, supported by mortar and artillery fire, defended this section of the German main line of resistance with 300 to 400 soldiers.[59]



The offensive began at 2300 on 11 May 1944 with a massive artillery barrage. Safay had the 1st and 3d Battalions of his 338th on line, with the 2d Battalion in reserve. Safay's troops advanced toward the fortified German positions along S-Ridge. Soldiers from the antitank company's mine platoon removed mines to allow tanks to support the attack. The American troops faced fierce resistance. The 1st Battalion was pinned down by machine-gun fire in a steep draw until small teams crept up to German positions and silenced the machine gunners with grenades.[60] Elements of the 338th had advanced beyond the ridge and into the village of Solacciano, but a German counterattack pushed them back across the ridge.[61] After nine hours of fighting through the night and into the early morning, the 1st and 3d Battalions did not hold their objectives and had taken significant casualties. With the growing numbers of killed, wounded, and missing, every company had been reduced to less than 65 percent of its strength.[62]

The regiments to Safay's left and right fared no better in their attacks. To Safay's right, the 351st Infantry lost a battalion commander in its attempt to seize Santa Maria Infante.[63] The 339th Infantry, to Safay's left, also faced tough opposition; a German counterattack on 12 May completely destroyed its Company F.[64] All along the American line, fighting had devolved into squad-level attacks because cloud and smoke had obscured the moonlight and units became separated.[65]

Safay regrouped his units on 12 May and attacked again at 0800, then 1300, then again at 1500, until the 3d Battalion finally broke through the German defenses and reached Solacciano to the far left of its zone. Although the regiment made gains, they had not seized the crucial strongpoint of Hill 131.[66]

At 1100 on 13 May, the commanding generals of the 85th and 88th Infantry Divisions met with Colonel Safay and Col. Arthur S. Champney of the 351st Infantry at the 88th's headquarters in Minturno to plan another synchronized attack against the S-Ridge and into Santa Maria Infante. Because the 351st needed more space to flank the village and because Safay's half-strength 338th needed to focus on the heights of seizing Hill 131, the commanders shifted the unit boundaries to give more space to the 351st. The 351st moved its fresh 1st Battalion in between the regiments, giving it Hill 109 along the S-Ridge as its objective. At this moment, success for the entire II Corps depended on Safay's regiment securing Hill 131.[67]

The attack started at 1225 on 13 May when a few P–40 fighter bombers

**Colonel Champney, ca. 1950**
*National Archives*



attacked Santa Maria Infante by strafing enemy positions and dropping half a dozen bombs. The Germans returned the favor by sending a few Focke-Wulf–190s to bomb the American troops. Then, American tank destroyers opened up on the fortified German positions. The two-regiment attack was anything but coordinated, however. Originally scheduled to begin his attack at 1600, Colonel Champney requested two delays from his division commander, with the final approval to attack given at 1830. Safay did not receive the order for the second delay and attacked at 1630, along with some of Champney's companies, which likewise only had received word of a thirty-minute delay.[68]

By the time the 351st launched its attack, it was six and a half hours behind the 338th's attack. This caused considerable confusion, because the two regiments were supposed to fight side by side. In the dark of night, elements of the 338th veered too far to the right and mistook Hill 109 for Hill 131, and, after taking a part of Hill 109, dug in for the night. When the 351st Infantry started its belated attack with an artillery barrage at 2200, the rounds landed amid Safay's troops on Hill 109.[69] In spite of these difficulties, Safay's troops took Hill 131 that evening. By then, the German *XIV Panzer Corps* defending the Gustav Line realized that its situation was untenable and ordered a withdrawal, to begin in the early morning hours of 14 May, to another line of defense to the north.[70]

By the afternoon of 15 May, II Corps had smashed through the Gustav Line. Safay's 338th had taken three commanding positions: Hills 131, 85, and 60.[71] The 85th Infantry Division commander, Maj. Gen. John B. Coulter, continued the attack on the afternoon of 15 May, pressing Germany's retreating *94th Infantry Division*. Safay's 338th fought along the coast, seizing Mount Penitro, then advanced up coastal Highway 7 and took the town of Formia.[72] Highway 7 was the only major road in II Corps' zone, and it led directly to Anzio, where the VI Corps had been encircled since making their assault landings in January 1944.

While the rest of the 85th Infantry Division attacked from the coastal town of Gaeta toward Terracina, Safay's 338th prepared for an amphibious assault on Terracina. The 1st Battalion loaded into six-wheeled amphibious trucks known as DUKWs and attempted to assault land at Terracina on 21 May. The defenses proved to be too much, and after the 1st Battalion landed successfully at Sperlonga, just south of Terracina, the rest of the regiment's amphibious assault was called off.[73] Safay's 338th then reassembled at Gaeta where his soldiers had a short day of rest, even enjoying a swim in the sea, before moving inland to join the division in outflanking the Germans at Terracina.[74] The 338th seized Monte Leano, which overlooked Terracina, and the 339th pushed on to the town and opened the road to Anzio.

**American troops fire a mortar at German positions around Santa Maria Infante.**
*National Archives*

The opening freed VI Corps to attack out of Anzio. The attacks of the two American corps squeezed the 85th Infantry Division out of the line, and, on 28 May, after forty-nine days of near continuous fighting, the division was moved into a rest area near the coastal village of Sabaudia, just under 60 miles from Rome.[75] According to the division's history, "'sheer exhaustion' and 'complete weariness' are wholly inadequate" in describing how the soldiers felt.[76] After only a day's rest, U.S. Fifth Army commander General Mark W. Clark ordered the 85th back into the offensive toward Rome, an important symbol of power for whomever held it. Safay's 338th, fighting against the *Herman Goering Division*, seized Lariano and then San Cesareo before going into division reserve again on 2 June.[77] The 85th Infantry Division entered Rome unopposed on 4 June 1944.[78] Unfortunately, the Allied success in Italy would be overshadowed by the invasion of Normandy, which began two days later. Nevertheless, the 85th pursued the fleeing German troops for 46 miles beyond Rome before entering another short rest and refit period, during which it integrated replacement troops and trained for the next offensive.

In the middle of August, the 85th Infantry Division occupied defenses along the Arno River opposite Florence before again being pulled back to prepare for the attack on the Gothic Line, the German's last main line of resistance across the Italian peninsula. It was during this period, on 31 August 1944, that Safay was unexpectedly relieved of command, after nearly four months of combat, and immediately sent to the United States. While their former commander made his voyage back to the United States, the 338th Infantry Regiment, now commanded by Col. William H. Mikkelsen, attacked the Gothic Line. The regiment performed




so bravely that the Army awarded it the Presidential Unit Citation for its actions at Monte Altuzzo in mid-September. Meanwhile, Safay arrived at the separation center in Fort Dix, New Jersey, where he was released from active duty and returned to the Florida National Guard on 26 October 1944.

Florida's adjutant general, Vivian Collins, once again wrote to Maj. Gen. John F. Williams, the chief of the National Guard Bureau, in March 1945 asking for clarification about Safay's relief from combat duty and his previous reduction to the permanent rank of colonel. Williams simply noted that Safay's record was "without blemish" and that there was no way to uncover the full record of his combat service.[79] Still, Collins demanded to know why Safay had been relieved. He wrote, "With the experience of this officer at Fort Benning in command of a demonstration regiment it would appear that he was especially qualified for combat command."[80] Collins even asked Williams to inquire from the Fifth Army or the 85th Infantry Division commanders, but Williams told him it was impossible.

Although dissatisfied with Williams's lack of reasoning, Collins believed Safay's service was good enough to merit the state's highest military honor, for which Collins nominated him. Governor Holland awarded Safay the Florida Cross on 28 August 1945. The citation even notes the difficulties that National Guard officers faced, stating, "Colonel Safay served with distinction in the Italian War Theater under the adverse and discouraging conditions too often imposed on senior officers of the National Guard."[81]

It may never be clear why Safay was relieved of command, but many of his peers in the 85th also were relieved. Colonel Matthews relinquished command of the 339th Infantry after only fourteen days of combat. Col. Brookner W. Brady, who succeeded Matthews, himself served as commander for just six months when he was relieved of command in October 1944, only one month after Safay's relief.[82] Col. William T. Fitts Jr. from the division headquarters replaced Brady for a short time before the 339th's executive officer, Lt. Col. John T. English, succeeded him on 31 December 1944.[83] Thus, Safay's sister regiment, the 339th Infantry went through four commanders in combat. It is plausible that some of these commanders were simply worn out. There was no respite for a regimental commander in combat, and both Safay's 338th and Matthews's 339th had been ground down to the core.

## Return to Civil Life

Safay returned to Jacksonville and settled back into his civil life. In addition to becoming active in his local American Legion, he immediately started back to work on important state issues. Safay mired himself in the details of a Florida state employee retirement plan, serving on the nine-member board that pushed for legislation to enact it.[84] Less than six months after Safay's release from active service, the Florida Senate introduced Senate Bill 169, An Act to Provide for a Retirement System for State Officers and Employees of the State of Florida, on 16 April 1945.[85] Safay also resumed his employment with the Board of Health as a sanitation consultant in October 1945.[86]

Safay remained on the Florida National Guard rolls, and Collins considered appointing him to reactivate and command the 124th Infantry Regiment. However, accusations of embezzlement, based on discrepancies in the Gator Club funds, and rumors of Safay womanizing while in active service, gave Collins pause.

When Safay left command of the 124th Infantry, the Gator Club funds were reportedly short between $5,000 and $6,000. Collins directed Brig. Gen. Joseph C. Hutchinson, whom Safay had succeeded in command of the 124th in November 1940, to investigate the rumors. Although there was no proof of embezzlement, Hutchinson found that many of the regiment's former officers, including many prewar Florida National Guard soldiers, had lost confidence in their former commander's integrity. Hutchinson brought to light a different side to Safay, whom he described

**Medics tend to a wounded soldier near Santa Maria Infante.**
*National Archives*

as having a "mania for slot machines." Hutchinson, a firm and professional prewar officer, who had accepted the Japanese surrender on Mindanao while commanding the 31st Infantry Division in September 1945, found Safay's behavior inappropriate. Rumors were that "he played [the slot machines] for hours at a time and often invited officers (many of whom were junior to him) to form a pool with him for playing the machines, splitting profits or losses."[87] Hutchinson concluded that, although rumors could not be verified, Safay should not be given command of the 124th Infantry nor have any part in standing up the Florida National Guard.

Hutchinson could not confirm accusations that Safay took on a girlfriend while away from his wife, Iva. Nevertheless, Hutchinson rightfully concluded that, "having lost the respect and confidence of those who served under him while he commanded the 124th Infantry, and the irregularities and misconduct he is charged with being common knowledge of the rank and file of the Florida National Guard, Col. Safay has lost his usefulness to the Florida National Guard."[88] Collins followed Hutchinson's sound advice and decided not to give Safay a role in the renewed regiment. Instead, Collins asked Safay to retire.

Safay retired from the Florida National Guard on 15 June 1946, after nearly thirty-four years of service to his state and nation. The state recognized him as a brigadier general, although his federally recognized rank remained as colonel. Collins invited Safay to the 124th Infantry's reactivation ceremony, but the former commander, whose rising star long since had burned out, politely declined. "As war time Commander of the 124th Infantry, I should very much like to attend this ceremony, because I am proud of the record made by the 124th Infantry during this last war," Safay wrote to Collins. However, he noted that he had accepted another invitation to speak at an Armistice Day celebration at the American Legion Post No. 9 in Jacksonville.[89] The 124th Infantry held their reactivation ceremony in Orlando, Florida, on 11 November 1946, without one of their most influential commanders.

Safay continued to work for the state and became influential in the National Association of Sanitarians (now the National Environmental Health Association). He was elected vice president of the association in 1949 and then president in 1950. Safay described his elation: "I have had many honors in the past, but my election as president of our organization was the greatest honor ever bestowed upon me."[90] Although the history and importance of sanitation stretches back for many thousands of years of human existence—as is evident, for example, by the aqueducts and sewers used to keep water safe in the era of ancient Rome—the professionalization of the field was not developed and codified (at least in the United States) until Safay's time with the sanitarians' association.[91] Under his leadership, the association adopted its first code of ethics and developed new national

**A machine gun crew of the 338th Infantry fires at German troops, 19 September 1944.**
*National Archives*

**Governor Holland**
*State Archives of Florida*

standards and courses for certifying registered sanitarians.[92] Safay had entered the sanitation field when it was still a burgeoning profession. Although a state-level association of sanitarians had existed earlier in California, it was not until 1937 that the National Association of Sanitarians was incorporated as a national entity. Safay wrote in his president's message in the summer of 1951, "We older sanitarians had to gain our knowledge the 'hard way,' and we certainly see the progress made in the field of sanitation."[93]

Just five years after retiring from the Florida National Guard, while attending an American Legion meeting, Safay was "stricken" (perhaps by a stroke or heart attack) and brought to the hospital, where he soon died on 4 January 1952.[94] His wife applied for his veteran's headstone. Although 124th Infantry was listed as his regiment on the application, it appears that someone at the Quartermaster General's Office adjusted his regiment to the 338th. Like so many veterans' headstones, Safay's is limited to a few lines about his lifetime of service: "Florida, Colonel, 338 Infantry, World War I & II."[95] The headstone misidentifies Safay's birth year, and, even more conspicuously, neither his wartime rank of brigadier general nor his beloved 124th Infantry Regiment are mentioned at all.

Safay's reputation did not remain tarnished after his death. At the 50th Annual Conference of the Florida National Guard Officers' Association, held in 1952, members of the association adopted a resolution to honor the deceased Safay, whom they described as "an outstanding citizen soldier whose untiring efforts contributed materially in developing well trained citizen soldiers for the defense of State and Nation."[96] The National Association of Sanitarians also published a memorial in their journal and established the General Fred A. Safay Memorial Scholarship for advanced study of environmental sanitation.[97]

**The staff of the Florida State Board of Health in 1945. Safay is in the back row on the far left.**
*State Archives of Florida*

## Reflection on Safay's Impact

Fred Safay was indeed integral to readying the Florida National Guard's largest unit, the 124th Infantry. He incorporated thousands of soldiers into the regiment over the course of his nearly two years in command. He was among the most influential officers at the Infantry School as head of the Officer Candidate School demonstration unit. Through this unique position, in which he trained thousands of soldiers and officers, Safay extended his influence beyond what most colonels could. In addition to preparing the Army's infantry officers for combat, Safay's 124th Infantry Regiment also offered up a large number of its own to the officer corps and air services.

Safay's most lasting impact may have been on Florida National Guard soldiers and Florida State employees. His activism assured soldiers in the Florida National Guard their right to receive their state civil service pay while ordered to active state service with the National Guard. He was also instrumental in the development of the state employee retirement system, a system which also benefited many Florida National Guard troops who concurrently served the state in civil service. He further affected Floridians, and Americans as a whole, in his efforts to maintain a clean and safe living environment and in his professionalization of public sanitarians.

These accomplishments highlight the dual nature of National Guard troops who traditionally occupy two careers, and whose worth goes beyond just their time in uniform. Soldiers like Safay volunteered their free time to serve their nation, while facing prejudices from the most senior Regular Army officers. Although important nuances of Safay's story—such as how being the son of Syrian immigrants may have affected his time in the Army or whether mistrust or prejudice factored into his career setbacks—remain largely unknown, Safay's experiences as likely the first Arab-American general officer in the United States Army illuminate the complexities of National Guard service in times of both war and peace.

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## Notes

1. For example, see Linda S. Heard, "Influential Arab Americans," *Al Shindagah* 84 (Oct-Nov 2008), https://www.alshindagah.com/shindagah84/people.htm.

2. Bill Delaney, "A Look at Jacksonville's Arab American Community," *The Jaxson,* 5 Apr 2023, https://www.thejaxsonmag.com/article/a-look-at-jacksonvilles-arab-american-community/; Andrew Pantazi, "Syrian Refugees Enjoy Century-Old Roots in Jacksonville," *Florida Times-Union*, 24 Nov 2015, https://eu.jacksonville.com/story/news/2015/11/24/syrian-refugees-enjoy-century-old-roots-jacksonville/15689697007/.

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5. Memo, Safay for Foster, 9 Apr 1927, sub: Military Record and History of Capt. Fred A. Safay.

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid.

8. *Historical and Pictural Review of the 31st Infantry Division* (Baton Rouge, LA: Army & Navy Publishing Co., 1941), 25; Memo, Safay for Foster, 9 Apr 1927, sub: Military Record and History of Capt. Fred A. Safay. Fred A. Safay wrote that he fought in the "Boise de Foilies Woods." The location of the 49th Infantry Regiment is found in *Order of Battle of the United States Land Forces in the World War, American Exeditionary Forces: Divisions*, vol. 2 (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1931, repr. 1988), 361–63.

9. Memo, Safay for Foster, 9 Apr 1927, sub: Military Record and History of Capt. Fred A. Safay.

10. Department of Commerce—Bureau of the Census Form 15–6, Fifteenth Census of the United States: 1930, Population Schedule, Jacksonville, Duval County, Florida, n.d., sheet 12A, Record Group 29: Records of the Bureau of the Census, National Archives Building, Washington, DC; Family Tree, Fred A. Safay, https://www.ancestry.com (accessed 13 Nov 2024).

11. The Florida Legislature established the Board of Health in 1888 to protect citizens by controlling disease and pollution.

12. Safay started his job in February 1924, when the State Health Board was still a relatively small organization. "Fred Safay, 53, State Health Consultant, Dies," *Miami Herald*, 5 Jan 1952, 2.

13. Stewart G. Thompson, ed., *Florida Health Notes* 16, no. 8 (Aug 1924): 122.

14. Ltr, Fred H. Davis to Vivian Collins, 20 Jul 1929; Ltr, Vivian Collins to Preston Ayers, 22 Jul 1929; both in Safay Record, FLNG Archives.

15. Ltr, Davis to Collins, 20 Jul 1929.

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20. Memo, Preston Ayers for Fred Safay, 31 Dec 1935, sub: Deficiencies, January 1st to December 31st, 1935, Safay Record, FLNG Archives.

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22. Annual Rpt, Florida State Board of Health, 1940, 96, https://archive.org/details/annualreportstat1940flor (accessed 15 Nov 2024).

23. *History of the 31st Infantry Division in Training and Combat, 1940–1945* (Baton Rouge, LA: Army & Navy Publishing Co., 1946), 13.

24. Ibid.

25. "All-Florida Roundup of War and Defenses," *St. Petersburg Times*, 11 Dec 1941, 9.

26. "Officer's Club-House Being Erected, 124th," *Dixie* (31st Infantry Division newspaper), 7 Mar 1941, 1.

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28. "Florida Infantry Welcomes Men," *Dixie*, 14 Mar 1941, 4.

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30. "Florida Infantry Welcomes Men," 4.

31. "Motor Maneuver and Bivouac to Sanford Well Executed," *Dixie*, 4 Apr 1941, 1.

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33. Cited in Christopher M. Rhein, *Mobilizing the South: The Thirty-First Infantry Division, Race, and World War II* (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2022), 81.

34. Leroy W. Yarbrough and Truman Smith, *A History of the Infantry School*, vol. 2 (unpublished manuscript, 1945), 210–11, 215–16, Donovan Research Library, Fort Moore, GA.

35. Ibid., 208–9.

36. Ibid., 212–13.

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38. Aubrey Paul Tillery, "124th Infantry Regiment World War II," 1998, http://www.kilroywashere.org/003-Pages/Tillery-Paul/03-Harm-Tillery.html#PaulTilleryDrafted.

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*Benning Bayonet*, 12 Nov 1942; "Around Florida," *Miami Herald*, 27 Nov 1942, 14A; J. Johnston, "Engineer Troops at Camp Butner Blaze Trails through the Woods," *Durham Herald-Sun*, 10 Jan 1943, 11, https://www.newspapers.com/image/789043915/?terms=Fred%20Safay&match=1.

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63. Lt. Col. Raymond E. Kendall was killed while leading a group of soldiers to destroy a German bunker.

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67. Historical Div, War Dept., *Small Unit Actions*, 155, 158.

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70. Ibid., *Small Unit Actions*, 172–73.

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72. Ibid., 89, 91.

73. Ibid., 94.

74. Ibid., 94, 98.

75. Ibid., 100.

76. Ibid., 101.

77. Ibid., 104.

78. Ibid., 154.

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80. Ltr, Vivian Collins to John F. Williams, 21 Mar 1945.

81. GO 12, State of Florida Mil Dept., 28 Aug 1945, Award of Florida Cross, Safay Record, FLNG Archives.

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# BOOKREVIEWS




## BIPOLAR GENERAL: MY FOREVER WAR WITH MENTAL ILLNESS

By Gregg F. Martin

Naval Institute Press, 2023
Pp. xi, 245. $27

Review by John P. Ringquist

Military forces demand soldiers and leaders that have inner fire and drive, the ability to generate enthusiasm, and an unquenchable desire to complete the mission. These same forces historically have viewed mental illness as a form of weakness or imperfection. This viewpoint has affected enlistment policies, security clearance checks, medical treatment access, and retention and has led to the ostracization of soldiers and their ultimate removal from military service. When soldiers—especially leaders—mask mental illness and the impact of trauma on their mental health, the outward appearance of vigor and energy may conceal the sort of "cycling" that persons with bipolar disorder experience. Those affected with bipolar disorder experience the manic highs and depressive lows that derive from their body's brain chemistry and potential trauma-induced changes to it. The resulting behaviors can be mitigated through coping strategies, and as Maj. Gen. (Ret.) Gregg F. Martin has written in his book, *Bipolar General: My Forever War with Mental Illness*, when soldiers and leaders with bipolar disorder are able to mask their condition, they frequently are perceived as model soldiers and leaders. However, when the bipolar disorder overwhelms coping strategies or medications, those with bipolar disorder can be dangerous to themselves and their subordinates and can damage their careers.

General Martin served thirty-five years as an engineer in a career that included multiple overseas tours and appointments as the commander of the Corps of Engineers Northwest Division, commandant of the Engineer School, commander of Fort Leonard Wood, deputy commander of the Third U.S. Army, commandant of the Army War College, and president of the National Defense University. He is a highly educated professional with a doctorate and multiple master's degrees. Despite these impressive achievements, Martin admits that his bipolar disorder, though diagnosed officially only at the end of his long and distinguished career, always has existed.

In *Bipolar General*, Martin provides an unflinching account of how combat trauma triggered the disorder, which then reordered his life. He chronicles a series of gradually intensifying incidents that typify Bipolar Disorder Type I, with manic highs and paranoia accompanied by crushing lows. The incidents that Martin cites are shocking in retrospect, and readers can take note of the signs that Martin gives of his bipolar disorder and the effects on his leadership, philosophy, and mental processes. Each stomach-churning incident illustrates Martin's inability to recognize the potential impact of his actions and choices while under mania and the pernicious mental distortion of paranoia. His actions built upon themselves until the level of Martin's mania, exceeding the ability of others to excuse his behaviors as eccentric or aggressive, moved into the realm of dangerous and transgressive. The culminating crash of his career—his actions and reactions to external events while serving as the president of National Defense University—and the subsequent official diagnosis of his bipolar disorder can give readers insight into how a senior leader's mental illness can affect everyone around them to the significant detriment of their command.

Leaders of all ranks will be able to draw valuable lessons from *Bipolar General*'s Chapters 13 and 14, which focus on how treatment for mental illness is conducted and the general structure of mental health treatment regimens. One significant take-away should be an appreciation of how mental illness treatment requires more than medication. Martin's major lifestyle changes and restructuring of coping mechanisms reflect a painful recognition that what worked while he was a soldier and leader, subjected to an untreated bipolar disorder, are no longer appropriate. He offers a valuable selection of resources and material for readers to explore for their own education and to help understand bipolar disorder's effects. He advocates for the adoption of a 360-degree leader evaluation system and for a senior mentor system that can help

determine if senior leaders have been impacted by detrimental behaviors or masking (219).

Bipolar disorder is not a voluntary condition; it is a biochemical one that combat or a similar trauma can trigger. Unlike visible wounds that immediately manifest, the biochemical imbalance can develop after the triggering event and manifest decades after. Martin recognizes this and cautions the reader that bipolar disorder never lets up; once diagnosed, treatment can never cease. Military members, their families, and those who have been diagnosed, as well as those that wish to help persons with mental illness will find much to consider in *Bipolar General*.

**Dr. John P. Ringquist** is a retired Army lieutenant colonel, an engineer, a foreign area officer, and an instructor at the Command and General Staff School in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. His research focuses on contemporary military affairs, technology, and African security affairs. He is the author of articles on counterinsurgency; the intersection of climate, technology, and security; and the African American soldiers of the Kansas-raised 79th United States Colored Infantry Regiment in the Civil War West. He has bipolar disorder.




## VICTORY THROUGH INFLUENCE: ORIGINS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS IN THE US ARMY

### By Jared M. Tracy

Texas A&M University Press, 2022
Pp. xix, 263. $47

**Review by Travis M. Prendergast**

Every military capability was once new and untested. In most cases, a single war was enough to prove the value of any given emerging capability. However, the psychological operations (PSYOP) capability was an exception. Despite the long history of psychological warfare, it took three wars to firmly establish PSYOP as a capability worthy of the U.S. Army's investment. In the periods between World War I, World War II, and the Korean War, hard-earned lessons and best practices were lost. It was only through repeated experiences that psychological operations became a capability that the U.S. Army would learn to value.

In *Victory Through Influence: Origins of Psychological Operations in the US Army,* Jared M. Tracy, deputy command historian for U.S. Army Special Operations Command, masterfully describes PSYOP's journey. In the introduction, Tracy clarifies that this is not a history of PSYOP organizations in the U.S. Army, but rather the history of the capability itself. To tell this story, Tracy performed an impressive act of archival research. By doing so, he was able to tell the story of PSYOP using the words of those who brought PSYOP into the fold of the U.S. Army.

Tracy focuses on several themes that reappear throughout the book. Perhaps the most prominent is proving the return on investment for PSYOP. In this regard, the gold standard was the surrendering enemy combatant holding aloft a leaflet describing the U.S. Army's fair treatment for enemy prisoners of war. However, Tracy also presents primary source accounts that demonstrate the problems with assessing PSYOP's effects. For instance, at one point, the focus was on the total number of leaflets dropped, a shoddy metric at best and a harmful one at worst.

A strength of Tracy's research is that he is not afraid to point out instances in which PSYOP was deemed to be ineffective. For example, he refers to surveys of enemy prisoners of war. Many of these prove that PSYOP affected the enemy's decision to surrender. However, Tracy is open about the fact that not all enemy soldiers were swayed by psychological operations. During the Korean War, one captured Chinese soldier remarked that "most of his comrades remained skeptical of propaganda and avoided surrender due to fears of UN [United Nations] forces killing them in captivity" (158).

Another theme of Tracy's book is the importance of winning over advocates for PSYOP. This proved difficult, as some high-ranking officials considered psychological operations as "pansy" operations (34). Others considered anything that detracted from the pool of combat soldiers to be a detriment to the war effort. However, the acquisition of high-ranking advocates of PSYOP enabled the capability's survival in the U.S. Army. At times, Tracy goes a bit far in trying to prove that high-ranking officials valued PSYOP, as when he recounts how Maj. Gen. William Bergin liked a picture that a PSYOP soldier had taken of him so much that he used it as his official photo. Although Tracy admits that the general's appreciation for the photo is not necessarily an endorsement of PSYOP, he does call it an "indirect validation of PSYOP" (177). Examples like this one are few and far between, but they detract, albeit only slightly, from the argument that Tracy is making.

Tracy also demonstrates that talent management, a problem that the military grapples with today, was just as much of a problem for PSYOP during the wars. He presents numerous accounts of PSYOP soldiers complaining about incoming soldiers having no training in psychological operations. Even when schools were established for psychological operations training, PSYOP units did not receive trained personnel to fill their rosters. A report from the 1st Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company stated that "an attempt to obtain trained and available personnel from the pool of Psywar School enlisted graduates, not one of whom has ever been assigned, failed" (162). Furthermore, there was a lack of knowledge about PSYOP within other training units. This may have contributed to issues with moving PSYOP school graduates to PSYOP units. As one soldier recounted about basic training, "The cadre [had] never hear[d] of the [1st Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group], and [did]n't understand the functions of bon-bon troopers from high-level outfits" (174).

The last major recurring theme in *Victory Through Influence* is how the U.S. Army organized PSYOP units from war to war. The organization varied from theater to theater within wars, and Tracy somewhat tediously lays out the mishmash of radio broadcasting and leaflet groups, mobile radio broadcasting companies, loudspeaker and leaflet companies, and reproduction companies. Keeping track of the various PSYOP organizations was an unenjoyable aspect of the book, and a few organizational charts would have been helpful in making things clearer.

Another minor difficulty the reader will encounter is the presentation of different theaters within each war. Each chapter focuses on a specific theater from the beginning of the particular war being discussed to its end, which means that when switching to another theater within the same war, the reader is taken back to the start of that war. This can make for tedious reading, especially in the Korean War chapters. Nevertheless, the overall presentation makes sense, even if it could have benefited from better transitions.

Overall, Tracy does an excellent job of using primary sources to demonstrate how PSYOP developed as a capability across three wars. By showing both how the capability developed and how it was or was not retained, Tracy provides a history of the PSYOP capability that gives readers a chance to apply the lessons of history to today's circumstances. A careful reader could draw parallels between the development and adoption of PSYOP and the development and adoption of emerging technologies in recent decades. Should it take three wars before the military understands that a capability is worthy of retention?

**Maj. Travis M. Prendergast** is an FA59 (Army Strategist) currently serving in the office of the Joint Staff J–7 (Joint Force Development). He received a bachelor's degree from the United States Military Academy at West Point and a master's in strategic intelligence from the National Intelligence University (NIU). At NIU, his graduate thesis was about Taiwanese influence operations and their effect on Chinese perceptions of deterrence.




## THE FRONTIERSMEN WHO COULDN'T SHOOT STRAIGHT: THE ARMY VS. THE PIONEERS, 1815–1845

### By Gregory Michno

Caxton Press, 2020
Pp. iv, 368. $18.95

**Review by Alexander M. Humes**

In his work on American pioneers between 1815 and 1845, Gregory Michno examines myths, particularly those related to White settlers and the Army. A scholar on the American West and warfare in that region, Michno presents an Army led by officers who increasingly were devotees of the Enlightenment and its principles, as opposed to the frontiersmen, who existed to obtain as much personal wealth as possible.

Michno's central focus is to change the popular perception of frontiersmen as self-sufficient, virtuous citizens who cleared a wilderness for civilization. He writes that "while historians may have seen behind Oz's curtain, the majority of Americans still cherish the smoke and mirrors" when it comes to their memory of settlers (4). Michno acknowledges that it appears he "only focused on the negative" but argues that "to swing the pendulum back toward the middle, the unflattering and scandalous need exposure" (6). Rather than structure his argument chronologically, Michno arranges

it by theme. He dedicates each chapter to an area of pioneers' actions, often where they did whatever was necessary to obtain land and wealth, including lying, stealing, and resorting to violence. Michno uses examples from the South and the North to show that these actions were not limited to a particular region.

Fraud is one of the major tools Michno claims frontiersmen used. They lied to gain lands or money. They also used force to achieve their goals. A militia force's massacre in 1818 of a Chehaw village (an event Michno compares to the 1864 Sand Creek Massacre) is one of many instances of violence chronicled in support of his argument that White civilians were responsible for most of the violence on the American frontier.

Michno also targets the myth of self-sufficiency, arguing that pioneers received federal financial support. Among his examples, Michno points to postearthquake relief in the 1810s, militia members being reimbursed for expenses while in the service, and relief for those affected by the War of 1812 and the Seminole Wars as proof of a long history of the federal government providing aid.

When Michno examines the U.S. Army, it is often in the role of those who sought to keep the peace but ultimately were powerless against the pioneers' political power. Rather than judging the regulars as "a legion of Indian-killers," he presents them as more professional and better soldiers than militia and volunteer units (6). He also shows a philosophical difference between the two groups. Although the Army of the 1810s initially followed local passions, including espousing a hatred of American Indians and sympathy "toward the frontiersmen," the Whig-influenced regular officer corps became "more tolerant of the Indians' dilemma and less patient with the aggressive frontier whites" by the mid-1820s (86). Popularly elected militia and volunteer officers represented the Romantic era and populism, two of the movements Michno believes ended the progress of the Enlightenment.

Michno portrays the Army as a force attempting to restrain White settlers and enforce federal laws and regulations regarding land use and American Indians. For most of the book's first half, the Army interacted with the pioneers while trying to enforce federal laws, escorting American Indians during Indian removal, or during conflicts such as the Seminole Wars. As he writes about officer professionalization after the War of 1812, Michno touches on the same subject area as Samuel Watson, referencing his two-volume work on professionalization. Michno traces the change in Army policy toward American Indians, but his focus remains on frontiersmen during this study.

Direct confrontation between the settlers and the Army occurs during the book's second half. Officers and soldiers attempted to stop frontiersmen physically in some instances, often facing civil charges and lawsuits for their efforts. The largest example is late in the book when Michno chronicles filibustering (unauthorized military expeditions to seize territory) efforts in Canada and the Army's efforts to stop cross-border movements.

Ultimately, as other works on Indian Removal and local-federal relations during Westward expansion argue, White settlers won because of their political power. In Michno's argument, Army officers recognized they would receive no support from their superiors against criminal charges and lawsuits when they attempted to remove trespassers or forcibly stop pioneers who preyed on all persons in the area. Facing this lack of support, these officers made a conscious decision to stop enforcing federal rules. The influx of volunteer officers during the Mexican War and after led the Army to embody a racialized view of American Indians during the post–Civil War Indian Wars.

Michno concludes with an examination of how frontiersmen are remembered today. He points to Frederick Jackson Turner's frontier thesis and instances within popular culture and the historical field in which such a point of view remained through the twentieth century to today. He examines whether the settlers' violent nature continues to shape American society.

Michno joins other historians in tracing the development and changes to a professional regular Army, though he focuses more on the pioneers' actions, with the Army as a secondary character. *The Frontiersmen Who Couldn't Shoot Straight* is best read alongside Samuel Watson, Robert Utley, Durwood Ball, Sherry Smith, and Robert Wooster, whose research on the military and the frontier analyzes military-settler relations in addition to military-Indian relations. The works of these historians address the Army's attempts to control frontiersmen to varying degrees, with Wooster's *The American Military Frontiers* and *The United States Army and the Making of America* having the greatest combination of timespan covered and focus on the Army as agents of federal power. Scholars have an opportunity to build on the work of Michno and these other historians with a monograph focused on the Army's efforts to enforce federal laws on the White settler population between the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

Suggested readers for *The Frontiersmen Who Couldn't Shoot Straight* include students of the development of the Army during westward expansion (especially between the War of 1812 and the Mexican War), officer interactions with and opinions of White pioneers and American Indians, Indian Removal, and the comparison between regular forces and militia and volunteers. As Michno's primary focus in this work is addressing popular memory, *The Frontiersmen Who Couldn't Shoot Straight* also would benefit those studying historical memory, why historical memories are formed collectively, and how they change over time.

**Maj. Alexander M. Humes** is an active duty Army officer and a former assistant professor of history at the United States Military Academy. He received his PhD in history from the University of Virginia in 2021.




## FORGING THE ANGLO-AMERICAN ALLIANCE: THE BRITISH AND AMERICAN ARMIES, 1917–1941

BY TYLER R. BAMFORD

University Press of Kansas, 2022
Pp. xi, 284. $49.95

REVIEW BY ZACH WRISTON

Tyler Bamford's *Forging the Anglo-American Alliance* is well-timed, as the United States maneuvers political and military alliances around the globe, seeking to increase stability and security while challenging strategic competitors. Navigating the relational aspects of Ukraine-Russia, Hamas (Iran)-Israel, or Taiwan-China conflicts presents significant challenges to both diplomacy and defense. While Bamford's volume is limited to the Anglo-American alliance, its application remains relevant today as American leaders strive to build relationships, formal and informal, to protect the country and to promote freedom in the modern era.

In Bamford's inaugural work, he analyzes the bonds and personal relationships of U.S. and British army officers during the interwar period between World War I and World War II. Bamford asserts these informal relationships are directly responsible for the quick integration of forces contributing to one of the most effective alliances of World War II. He frames the discussion with a concise analysis of the contributions of earlier historians to the study of Anglo-American relations between World Wars I and II. However, he narrows the focus of his research to the armies' activities, citing an established study of naval tensions and relations between the two countries.

Bamford leads the reader through seven foundational themes, applied chronologically, to illustrate how the deepening bonds between the United States and Great Britain led to intelligence sharing, cultural exchanges, and the identification of common adversaries. He introduces this concept with General John J. Pershing's World War I relationship with Lt. Gen. Sir George Fowke, which originated in 1905 when the two were observers for their respective countries during the Russo-Japanese War in Manchuria (13). He builds on this idea of shared service and personal interactions as the World War I veterans sustain a relationship through two challenging decades. He further articulates the idea that post–World War I memoirs formed the institutional memory that supported interpersonal relationships over the next two and a half decades. Bamford discusses the similarities between the officer ranks and their willingness to share ideas and experiences. He then transitions to the postwar occupation of Germany.

Postwar occupation duty following the conclusion of World War I is typically overlooked by historians and researchers. Occupation duty was shared by the French, British, and American forces divided into sections along the Rhine River. Bamford capitalizes on many wartime diaries and postwar memoirs to create a narrative of shared activities and goodwill between U.S. and British soldiers while on occupation duty. Equestrian activities, in particular, bonded the officers of the two nations. Throughout the text, Bamford weaves elements of common interests such as polo, hunting, and sports. These interests complement the study of war, military structure and organization, and military education. Occupation duty is also the only extended passage within the book that addresses the enlisted force.

Another fascinating aspect of *Forging the Anglo-American Alliance* is the contrasting perceptions of officers and enlisted soldiers, which is revealed broadly by Bamford's research. American enlisted personnel did not share the fraternal warmth toward the British that their officer counterparts did. Bamford extracts primary sources revealing the enlisted soldiers' distrust of British training methods and strategic approaches: "Training under British guidance embittered many American soldiers" (10). The enlisted force also resented the British policies toward fighting Bolsheviks on the Eastern Front even after the armistice in November 1918. Bamford shows how "soldiers bemoaned the lack of a clear objective, the increasing strength of Bolshevik forces, and the tenuous supply lines" (42). The American enlisted opinion of the French also was strained because of price gouging, and "French soldiers showed little fondness for the Americans crowding their towns" (50).

By describing the dramatic shift in the two countries' national policies following World War I, Bamford further bolsters his argument that informal personal relationships fostered the future alliance. The United States' pull toward isolationism often is credited with creating most of the problems with defense preparation before World War II. Bamford skillfully demonstrates that isolationism was only one concern among several as the U.S. and British governments distanced themselves after the war.

He illustrates the significance of interpersonal and informal relationships as he explores the elements of national power: diplomacy, information, military, and economics. As the Allied powers negotiated the terms to end World War I, Americans yearned to return to an internal focus, demobilization, and the economy. Persistent disagreements about the direction of the League of Nations and the Treaty of Versailles increased the distance between the Allies after the war. There was also a growing political movement in the United States and Great Britain based on the idea that World War I was the war to end all wars, emphasizing disarmament to achieve peace and stability. Bamford examines the influence of the world economy on U.S. decision making during two important periods: first, as rapid growth led U.S. leadership to reprioritize the country's economic efforts in the 1920s, and later, as the Great Depression curtailed these ambitions. Bamford's analysis of the National Defense Act of 1920, with its promise of

a permanent army numbering 300,000, and which Hunter Liggett hailed as "one of the finest and best thought out pieces of legislation ever enacted" concludes that a well-intentioned bill, with significant potential toward achieving lasting national defense objectives, was never realized or implemented. This reflects both American and British economic priorities following the war (58). Despite passing the bill, Congress never funded, filled, or equipped the Army to its authorized strength. Within three years of the legislation, the Army had shrunk by more than half, down to a mere "112,108 by December 1923," and it remained minimal until 1936 (59).

Bamford's overall objective is to demonstrate "that the Anglo-American alliance rested on hundreds of interpersonal connections stretching back to World War I" (5). In addition to distinguishing the unique relationship that developed between the two countries, he analyzes the other great powers—Germany, France, and Japan—to determine why they did not develop similarly close relations with the United States. The British and Japanese were allies throughout the early twentieth century and through World War I until 1923. The British and French were the dominant allied forces during World War I. Yet, Bamford argues, the bond between the British and the Americans is clearly unique. He probes Anglo-American similarities in race, class, religion, and politics, which can establish and explain connections, the lack of which might explain why personal relationships were not shared between the other nations.

The most significant contribution of Bamford's scholarship is his thorough case study of military attachés and liaison officers, and his insight feels relevant not only to historians but also to those currently serving in these roles. Army doctrine stresses the importance of these roles, but Bamford brings them to life by distinguishing the tangible and intangible attributes necessary to succeed as an attaché.

He describes the successful approaches of some officers as well as the inflexible officers who quickly were removed from their positions. By addressing both the triumphs and the pitfalls, Bamford equips his readers with practical insights that will be invaluable for those assuming these positions and for the commanders who will select them. Bamford's volume properly fuses readability with expert research and analysis to benefit general readers, veterans, professionals, and experts.

**Sgt. Maj. Zach Wriston** is a 2022–2023 Sergeants Major Academy–Penn State Fellow. He is an instructor at the U.S. Army Sergeants Major Academy in the Department of Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational Operations. He holds a master's degree in public policy from Liberty University and another in education from Pennsylvania State University. He resides in El Paso, Texas, with his wife, Rebekah.




## THE WEEKLY WAR: HOW THE SATURDAY EVENING POST REPORTED WORLD WAR I

### By Chris Dubbs and Carolyn Edy

University of North Texas Press, 2023
Pp. viii, 279. 34.95

Review by Adam T. Steveley

In *The Weekly War: How the Saturday Evening Post Reported World War I*, authors Chris Dubbs and Carolyn Edy provide an expert retelling of the United States' most comprehensive international expedition and how it was depicted through the pages of the nation's most popular circulation magazine. Having previously written comprehensive works covering the broad topics of journalism in the American Expeditionary Force and the importance of female war correspondents during America's coming of age, the authors narrow their scope to recount how the era's most well-known magazine, the *Saturday Evening Post*, told the stories of World War I, from the war's outbreak to its armistice. The authors' ability to transport their readers back to the age of the American Expeditionary Force, trench warfare, and news by print journalism is remarkable. In today's world of twenty-four-hour news cycles and sound-bite reporting, literary journalism may seem as antiquated as war on which it reported; however, Dubbs and Edy provide an expertly curated selection of readings that transport their audience back to America's entry into global affairs.

Through presenting a collection of the magazine's most well-written, comprehensive, and representative articles, Dubbs and Edy introduce today's readers to the era's most luminary writers; many of whom, in a time before television and radio, were once household names (6). At the same time, they tell the story of how a floundering newspaper was transformed into the nation's most widely circulated magazine by its visionary editor, George Horrace Lorimer, and how this magazine delivered the feelings and emotions of war to those on the home front. The most notable strength of this work is the opening pages of each chapter, in which the authors briefly set the stage concerning the war's timeline and contextualize the primary sources that follow. This gives an excellent overview to those not intimately familiar with the details of the Great War and makes the text that follows more accessible. Like the journalists they represent, Dubbs and Edy have no pretention about their tactical expertise. Rather, like the journalists whose stories they tell, the authors are expert story tellers who consistently use the power of narrative to bring to life the human elements of war.

Interestingly, in an era that often is critiqued as an age of unquestioned, boisterous Americanism, Dubbs and Edy show how the *Post*'s writers covered the unfolding of the war from the perspective of all its belligerents. Additionally, the authors take special care to highlight how

it was often the women of journalism who, because of prevailing stereotypes of the era, were able to get the best access to frontline troops and other restricted areas by posing as nurses and noncombatant morale workers (189). In another break from what is now assumed to be the pervasive pessimism of the age, Dubbs and Edy recall the exuberance and gallantry of the nation's youth as they marched off to war (108). Unlike many books written about how humanity experiences war, this work succeeds in retelling how the true feelings of war—patriotism, valor, excitement, fear, and boredom—often are experienced in immediate proximity to one another. Overall, the authors succeed in their efforts not because of their own expertise but because they set the stage for the era's own premier journalists to tell their own stories.

If the book has any noticeable flaw, it is its brevity. At just under 250 pages, *The Weekly War* leaves plenty of primary source material unused. Certainly, this was done intentionally to improve the readability of the book and decrease a reader's likelihood of being bogged down by historical detail. However, the overall story is so riveting and the book is so well-written that it leaves the audience wanting more. Dubbs and Edy do an excellent job in challenging preconceived notions of how the story of world war reached an American audience without falling into the trap of becoming revisionists. The book easily could be extended to include an afterward on how the *Post* continued to inform and influence American's perspective in the interwar years or on what we have lost without trusted authors writing for such a widely circulated magazine today.

Those who want to know more about what it was like to experience World War I from the home front would do well to add this book to their reading list. Rather than focusing only on the fighting troops or those they left behind, this book, like war itself, intertwines these stories. Dubbs and Edy's work adds significantly to a field of history that, although deeply researched, is rarely covered from a novel perspective. Through this book, those new to the field will be able to gain a sense of the breadth and complexity of the Great War while those with a thorough knowledge of the conflict will gain a greater understanding of what it felt like to live in an age of unprecedented uncertainty and change.

**Maj. Adam T. Steveley** most recently served as the Commander's Action Group chief and the Army strategist for the Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command. Previously, he was the strategic plans officer in the V Corps Commander's Action Group. Steveley holds a master's in public administration from the Ohio State University.




## AWAITING MACARTHUR'S RETURN: WORLD WAR II GUERRILLA RESISTANCE AGAINST THE JAPANESE IN THE PHILIPPINES

BY JAMES A. VILLANUEVA

University Press of Kansas, 2022
Pp. xiv, 234. $34.95

REVIEW BY IVAN A. ZASIMCZUK

On 8 May 1942, Lt. Gen. Jonathan M. Wainwright surrendered all American forces across the Philippines to the Japanese, leaving the defense of the Philippines, its people, and resistance against the Japanese occupiers largely to the Filipino people and a few American mavericks. The guerrillas that formed and operated during those perilous and chaotic years maintained a connection between the Filipino people and their exiled government through the allied forces, giving all four participants in the fight a sense of hope that they could resist the Japanese. In six tidy chapters, James A. Villanueva tells the story of these disparate and resilient guerrillas in *Awaiting MacArthur's Return: World War II Guerrilla Resistance Against the Japanese in the Philippines*. Villanueva's singular focus is on the experience and actions of the men—and a few women—who, in the absence of American forces, formed insurgent organizations, continued the struggle against the Japanese, and eventually fought alongside U.S. troops to liberate the Philippines.

Villanueva introduces this history with a helpful historiographic review of the Filipino guerrilla movement and notes the dearth of coverage in American scholarship (3). To fill in this gap, Villanueva seeks to provide "a fuller picture of the nature of the war in the . . . Pacific" by using greater sources and records, and an examination of the friction not only between the groups but between the groups and General Douglas MacArthur's headquarters (5). Villanueva outlines the reasons for Filipino guerrilla success and then compares this movement to Josip Broz Tito's Yugoslav Communist partisans in the Balkans. Finally, he makes a conceptual claim that the experience of the Filipino insurgents resembled more the counterinsurgency theories employed during colonial wars, designed to retain colonial possessions, rather than the ways developed to fight Marxist insurgents in the Cold War (5).

The first two chapters cover the early formation and individual circumstances of each group as well as early guerrilla-supported operations launched by MacArthur's headquarters. Perhaps the most interesting chapter is on the internecine struggle and rivalry that developed between the groups as each vied for power and legitimacy. Open warfare was often the result. There is another fascinating chapter about guerrilla organization, administration, and logistics. Readers learn that "paper and office supplies were also essential for guerrilla operations" (116). On either side of this chapter are two on guerrilla operations.

One of the central facts of the narrative is that it is impossible and impractical

to regard the resistance movement as a monolithic whole. Villanueva recounts the birth of each major guerrilla group across the largest islands: Luzon, Mindanao, Negros, Panay, Cebu, Leyte, and Samar. He explains that the exclusive nature and experience of each group was driven by several defining factors, such as their unique leaders and geographic isolation. However, essential to each was the struggle for legitimacy, which derived from the mutual support of the local population, and official recognition by MacArthur's headquarters. Here, the guerrillas often encountered a conflict of interests. MacArthur's staff generally preferred that the groups conduct intelligence-gathering activities; alternately, the local populations preferred direct action against the Japanese. The guerrillas had to balance this friction because they needed material support from both to survive and operate.

Villanueva excels at delivering penetrating facts and analysis as well as developing the nuances and complexities of this movement. No issue reflects these aspects better than the fratricidal rivalry between the groups. Anti-Japanese sentiment usually united the guerrillas, but not all of them wanted to restore the prewar Filipino government. The Huks, for example, wanted to usher in a Communist regime, which put them squarely at odds with most of the guerrillas and the allies who sustained the exiled president (60). On Panay, Col. Macario Peralta quarreled with Governor Tomás Confesor over the issues of who would print money and pay civil officials. Both knew that control of these civil functions conferred power and legitimacy. These and other arguments culminated with Confesor accusing Peralta of sedition (65–66). On Cebu, Lt. Col. Ricardo Estrella, the executive officer of one group, captured and executed a wayward leader from the same group while their commander, Lt. Col. James M. Cushing, was away in conference on another island. Upon returning, a displeased Cushing had Estrella tried and executed. The greatest fratricide was on Luzon where, in early 1944, the Hunters Reserve Officers' Training Corps executed members of the Marking Regiment who were threatening Hunters' supporters. The "Markings" retaliated by attacking a Hunters' headquarters with 300 fighters and were in turn routed by an even larger Hunters force. In May, these two groups and the Japanese had a three-way firefight (73–74). Meanwhile, the unsupported Communist Huks were in open combat with other groups to steal resources—even faking parlay—and were ambushing rival forces on multiple occasions (76). Despite it all, these groups were able to cooperate very well with each other once the American landings began.

The real core of the work is the chapters on the military operations of the guerrilla groups. A general pattern emerges from the numerous engagements that sees some initial success against the Japanese followed up by brutal and punitive reprisals against the guerrillas and the Filipino people by the Japanese. A disappointed MacArthur feared this exact outcome when he ordered the groups not to take direct action against the Japanese (80). However, recruiting new members, retaining legitimacy, and remaining popular among the people required violent action against the occupiers (81). Japanese brutality served to drive new members into the guerrillas, rather than suppressing them, and made the people even more willing to support them. The net effect was that by the time the Americans returned, the guerrillas had grown strong and resilient.

The most important contributions of the guerrillas undoubtedly were made just before and during the campaigns to the retake the islands. Lt. Gen. Walter Krueger, commander of the U.S. Sixth Army, said that the guerrillas who fought with his command "proved to be an important source of information" (125). The guerrillas were involved in selecting targets for bombardment, rescuing downed pilots, and conducting invaluable security patrols (125–26). On Mindanao, one guerrilla regiment of 350 executed a flawless amphibious operation, assisted by the U.S. Army and Navy, and destroyed a Japanese garrison (143). Chinese Nationalist and Communist guerrillas fought with the American 25th Infantry Division and 1st Cavalry Division, respectively (129). The raid on Cabanatuan freed 513 prisoners of war and was executed flawlessly with precise and timely intelligence provided by the guerrillas, who added their own mass and combat power to the effort (135). Other groups assisted with the liberation of military and civilian prisoners at Santo Tomas in Manila and at Los Baños (135–36). One stalwart unit fighting with U.S. units, the Anderson Battalion, was responsible for killing about 3,000 Japanese troops and capturing another 1,000 (137). The evidence is clear that "the guerrillas made the Allied liberation of the islands easier" (16).

This valuable contribution is well written and sustained by very good sources. Readers will appreciate the simultaneous complexity of the material and the facility with which it is delivered. At only 157 pages, it might have benefited from a little more content to embed the struggle in the Philippines more firmly within the wider Pacific War. Academics and enthusiasts alike would find great value in this work, as would modern-day practitioners of war, especially those in the special warfare communities and high-level staff officers who might work with these groups in future conflicts.

**Ivan A. Zasimczuk** has been the military history instructor in the Signal History Office, Office Chief of Signal, at Fort Eisenhower (formerly Fort Gordon), Georgia, since June 2019. He graduated from the University of California at Davis (UCD) with a BA in history and political science and a minor in English. He joined the Army through UCD's reserve officer training corps and entered the active duty Army in 1997 as an adjutant general officer. He has served in Germany, Bosnia, Kosovo, Kuwait, Iraq, and Jordan. He attended Kansas State University, earning an MA in history with a follow-on teaching assignment at the United States Military Academy at West Point, where he taught military history and leadership. He ended his military career in 2017 after managing a marketing portfolio in the Army Marketing and Research Group. He then worked at the British Embassy in Washington, D.C., for one year before assuming his current role.




## AMERICA AND VIETNAM, 1954–1963: THE ROAD TO WAR

BY MICHAEL M. WALKER

McFarland & Company, 2022
Pp. ix, 391. $49.95

REVIEW BY LEROY L. CISNEROS

One of the impressive aspects of this book, which grabs the reader's attention from the onset, is Michael M. Walker's clear identification of the key players and their prominent roles within the Vietnamese hierarchy. This allows the reader to know how these certain individuals from both North and South Vietnam were involved in shaping one of America's longest wars and helps the reader reflect on who played what part during the crucial few years between the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu in 1954 and the Gulf of Tonkin Incident in 1964. The breakdown identifies political, military, and influential people who helped set the stage for future events.

As U.S. intelligence estimates began to analyze Vietnamese capabilities at this time, Washington also was observing the internal power struggles that took place in Saigon between governmental factions. Walker describes, with great intricacy, the demographic, religious, and political landscape across Vietnam between 1954 and 1963. These topics set the stage for the U.S. military advisers who were on the ground before the United States' escalation in 1965. Walker also conducts a deeper study into the capabilities of the South Vietnamese military and its will to fight as the United States drew nearer to total war.

False assumptions, unrealistic expectations, and inaccurate assessments are just some of the major issues that plagued the United States and South Vietnam during this time frame. With no strategic goals identified or end state provided, the United States would pay greatly in the years to come. Another portion of this book articulates enemy capabilities after the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu, gauging how the North Vietnamese military planned to engage not only the South Vietnamese forces but also American combat units once they arrived in theater.

The North Vietnamese forces were poised to utilize irregular warfare, combined arms maneuver, and the development of a strong insurgency to remain dominant on the battlefield. Their financial support also was substantial during this period, as both North and South Vietnam looked toward superpowers—such as the United States and the Soviet Union—to help fund their collective efforts. With limited key personnel to lead the South Vietnamese forces and political infighting continuing to hamper unified efforts, it is no wonder that this conflict was doomed to fail from the start.

The final portion of the book examines where the United States stood with South Vietnam and which key leaders from both nations would support as John F. Kennedy's administration took over in 1961. Focus shifted from Dwight D. Eisenhower's administration as Washington had to determine, quickly, who its most credible ally was. U.S. intelligence assets increased the scope of their work as they continued to push their influence in both Washington and Saigon. The topic of Laos is also detailed in this book because of its logistical proximity to both North and South Vietnam and because it served as key terrain for the duration of the Second Indochina War, with the Ho Chi Minh Trail providing enormous resupply capabilities to the North Vietnamese forces. Walker expresses that the Vietnam Conflict did not just simply happen overnight or because of one incident. The stage was set long before the approval of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution during Lyndon B. Johnson's administration in 1964.

This comprehensive analysis provides a true assessment of what decisions were made and why. It further reviews time constraints and policy inaccuracies, which hampered efforts in South Vietnam. As the rest of the world focused on Europe and the threat of Soviet expansionism in a post–Korean Conflict environment, initial efforts were being placed in Southeast Asia, between 1954 and 1963.

This book flows smoothly while creating a detailed timeline between the years 1954 and 1963. It does not jump across time periods, and it helps the reader comprehend how certain unknown individuals helped develop the Vietnam Conflict. The illustrations, maps, and photographs are placed exactly where they need to be to validate the influential nature of their chosen subjects. Whether the person was a seasoned diplomat assigned to Washington or a North Vietnamese field commander, the author defines these individuals so well that the reader appears to have known them all along. No guesswork or uncertainty is present, and this author addresses many of the misconceptions about this war.

**Lt. Col. Leroy L. Cisneros** is a joint qualified officer who has served in the U.S. Army Infantry since 1989. He graduated from the United States Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island, in November 2024. He will soon deploy to the Middle East as a deputy brigade commander with the California Army National Guard.




## RAIN IN OUR HEARTS: ALPHA COMPANY IN THE VIETNAM WAR

### By James Allen Logue and Gary D. Ford

Texas Tech University Press, 2020
Pp. xix, 176. $45

Review by Fielding S. Freed

The idea of the warrior's homecoming as a transformative experience is an old one. The ancient Greeks called it *nostos*, and it figured heavily in their culture and literature. In Homer's *Odyssey*, Odysseus's nostos is the central plot line. In *Rain in Our Hearts: Alpha Company in the Vietnam War*, author Gary D. Ford aptly uses the word odyssey several times to describe the journey he took across the United States with photographer and Vietnam War veteran James (Jim) Allen Logue.

The framework of the book is an impressive collection of more than 150 photographs taken by Logue during his tour in Vietnam. Drafted away from his civilian job as a professional photographer in May 1969, Logue found himself jumping off the skid of a hovering Huey into the Quang Tin Province as a replacement infantryman that October. He reported to Company A [Alpha Company], 4th Battalion, 31st Infantry Regiment, 196th Light Infantry Brigade, Americal (23d Infantry) Division, the unit with which he would serve his twelve-month tour.

When Logue was not aiming his rifle, he was aiming his Nikonos camera. The caliber of Logue's photography throughout the book reveals a photographer in his prime. There is a noticeable intimacy in the images that only comes when the subjects are comfortable and trust the photographer. During that long year in Vietnam, Logue found mental respite in documenting the daily life of his fellow grunts. "To take my mind off the war, I took pictures," he later said (3).

Through Logue's camera lens we view the placid smile of Sp4c. Daniel Simmons, surrounded by village children after handing out candy; images of the strain and stress of combat on the taut faces of young men aging quickly; and moments of joy mixed with the relief of surviving another day. Logue's stamina and dedication to his photography is impressive. Even after he was made a radio operator and had to hump an extra twenty-five-plus pounds, he still summoned the energy to make photographs. Ford emphasizes that unlike well-known news photographers from the war, Logue "was building an archive as someone rare: a combat soldier and professional photographer who both fought and documented the last major American conflict shot in black-and-white and color film" (7).

After the war, Logue boxed up his black-and-white negatives and, like so many others, did his best to keep moving forward and forget the war. But years later, after a particularly difficult period of familial losses, Logue began losing his struggle with post-traumatic stress disorder. Ford writes that "the war found him [Logue] in the green, tangled Florida countryside, slithering like a sapper through Jim's mental claymores and the tangles of concertina wire he raised against the assault of memory" (11).

At the urging of his therapist, Logue revisited his Vietnam photographs in an effort to quell his recurring nightmares. "Steadily, Jim broke from the cell that incarcerates so many veterans: their own silence," writes Ford (11). Logue reconnected with his best friend from the war, Ben Perry, who encouraged him to share his images online, which had a cascading effect, leading to connections with other Alpha Company soldiers as well as members of his regiment, including Ford.

The pair met at a 31st Infantry reunion in 2011. Ford, a Vietnam-era National Guard veteran, is an author seasoned from thirty years of working as a travel editor and senior writer at *Southern Living* magazine. Logue's photographs captivated Ford, but they left him with a powerful question that would take the pair multiple years and trips across the United States to answer. What happened to the men of Alpha Company?

What sets *Rain in Our Hearts* apart from many other Vietnam photography books is the partnership Logue and Ford formed to answer that central question. The pair traveled 54,000 miles across the United States over four years to interview seventy-one Alpha Company veterans or their survivors. For each interview, Logue took prints of his photographs, which evoked both laughter and tears. Ford put his compassionate storytelling to work by fleshing out the backstory of each image and, in turn, the post-Vietnam life of each of the men pictured.

Logue dedicated the book to the nine Alpha Company soldiers who were killed in action during his tour. Of the nine, Logue and Ford located and met with family members of eight. It was the first time that some had met with a veteran who had known their loved one during the war. For the family of Sfc. Everette Caldwell, Logue's recounting of his death differed from the account they had been told. Logue left the family with a photograph which they had never seen before of Caldwell taken the day before his death. "Now I know the truth," his widow Loretta said (128).

Because the journey from warrior to civilian after combat is one of the main topics of *Rain in Our Hearts*, the book helps dispel the lingering and unfortunate trope of the maladjusted Vietnam veteran. Through Ford and Logue's frank conversations with the remaining men of Alpha Company, it becomes clear that each man found something to keep himself going both through the war and afterward. For this reason, all combat veterans are likely to find something in common with their stories.

*Rain in Our Hearts* concludes with an epilogue titled "The Last Sweep". It recounts Logue and Ford's bittersweet return to Vietnam to retrace the path of Alpha Company's red, mud-caked boots across the former Quang Tin Province. In a powerful twist befitting the conclusion of an epic odyssey, Logue's photographs lead him to come full circle in a chance encounter that leads to a reunion with one of his camera's subjects.

*Rain in Our Hearts: Alpha Company in the Vietnam War* is the second book in the *Peace and Conflict* series published by the Texas Tech University Press with Ron Milam as the general editor.

**Fielding S. Freed** is the archivist for the Army Training Center at Fort Jackson, South Carolina. He worked for five years as a staff photographer for the *Chattanooga News Free Press* before pursuing an advanced degree. He holds a master's degree in anthropology from the University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee and a museum studies certificate from the Milwaukee Public Museum. During his twenty-seven-year career as a museum professional, his work has focused primarily on the curation of historic house museums and sites.


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# *chief historian's* FOOTNOTE

Jim Malachowski

The idea that trust is the coin of our realm has never been more important. Social media and generative artificial intelligence applications, which can create the illusion of facts and false realities, have influenced thinking and behavior and, ultimately, have eroded trust. In *Truth Decay*, the RAND Corporation describes how advancements in technology, combined with societal polarization, negatively impact democracy.[1] Today, the public has less faith in traditional sources of information, and only 22 percent of Americans say they trust their government.[2]

In a world where information—and deliberate disinformation—is readily available, historians provide stability by adding context and giving meaning to data. The Center of Military History (CMH) and the Army Historical Program (AHP) aim to cultivate a culture of trust within the U.S. Army by documenting its history, even when that history does not portray the Army in a favorable light. With the rapid advancement of technology and the shift toward information-centric and multidomain warfare, the need for honest and accessible history is more important than ever to the warfighter and the nation.

Let's consider three opportunities for historians to build trust. First, official history must be authoritative and authentic. The primary responsibility of an official historian is to provide accurate and reliable reports, essentially serving as a public trustee of truth. The American Historical Association's standards of conduct emphasize that professional integrity, grounded in trust and respect, is fundamental to scholarship.[3] Similarly, Kent Roberts Greenfield, the Army's first chief historian, noted in *The Historian and the Army* that honesty is essential for official history.[4] Therefore, the authenticity of source documents and material must be ensured in every step of our process—from the tactical edge to the archive. Because data preservation is often overlooked in the field due to the high operational tempo of contingency and wartime operations, we deploy Military History Detachments to document operations and support both local commanders and Army service component command history offices.

Second, every member of the AHP must build credibility and expertise and foster a spirit of ownership. We gain credibility by integrating into the mission and by providing actionable information with historical context to address today's problems. We build expertise by completing Functional Community 61 courses and professional military education, which help us understand how the Army operates as an institution, as part of the joint force team, and at all levels of warfare. We present at conferences, soldier events, and community talks, sharing the Army's history. We systematically document the Army's operations, activities, and investments, building the archive that will support future commanders. Regardless of the operational tempo, we adhere strictly to historical methods of source criticism when collecting, evaluating, and interpreting documents. Additionally, we become experts in derivative classification processes and ensure these items are properly marked and safeguarded.

Lastly, we build trust by producing history that meets our customers' needs. In a memo written shortly after World War II, General Dwight D. Eisenhower stated that "the historical record of the Army's operations as well as the manner in which these were accomplished are public property, and . . . the right of the citizens to the full story is unquestioned."[5] Our writing must reflect the understanding that the history of the Army is the history of our nation, and we must pay attention to the needs of our audiences as an unread work carries little value. Senior leaders and commanders may need a concise two-page summary that puts the bottom line up front. Some may want short pamphlets, historical studies, or monographs. Others may gravitate toward multimedia products. The AHP, a leader in digital history, offers podcasts, digital storytelling, and interactive experiences like Army Trails and the projects at West Point's digital history center.[6] Recently, CMH added a series of in-progress reviews through which a cross-functional team identifies digital media and technology extensions that will roll out with and support each new publication. This framework will grow to encompass every product the center produces as we work to expand the accessibility of Army history within the digital sphere.

While these practices help nurture trust in CMH and the U.S. Army, they are not a panacea. They rely on hard work by everyone involved. Writing authoritative, authentic, and trusted official history will only make a difference when people read and interact with our publications, whether in print or online.

AH

## Notes

1. Jennifer Kavanagh and Michael D. Rich, *Truth Decay: An Initial Exploration of the Diminishing Role of Facts and Analysis in American Public Life* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2018).

2. "Americans' Views of Government's Role: Persistent Divisions and Areas of Agreement," Pew Research Center, 24 Jun 2024, 25, https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2024/06/24/americans-views-of-governments-role-persistent-divisions-and-areas-of-agreement/.

3. "Statement on Standards of Professional Conduct," American Historical Association, Jan 2023, https://www.historians.org/resource/statement-on-standards-of-professional-conduct/.

4. Kent Roberts Greenfield, *The Historian and the Army* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1954), 7.

5. Memo, Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Ch Staff Army, for Directors Army Gen Staff Divs and Chs Army Special Staff Divs, 20 Nov 1947, sub: Policy Concerning Release of Information from Historical Documents of the Army–With Special Reference to the Events of World War II, https://www.history.army.mil/reference/History/ikmemo.htm.

6. See https://history.army.mil/Revwar250/Army-Trails/ and https://www.westpoint.edu/research/centers-and-institutes/digital-history-center.


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