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"KILLED WHILE RECONNOITERING CAMP OF HOSTILES"

1ST LT. EDWARD W. CASEY, U.S. ARMY INDIAN SCOUTS

ROBERT D. SEALS

THE SOLDIER'S SHIFT FROM ANIMAL TO MOTOR POWER

LISA M. MUNDEY

ARMY HISTORY

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Front cover: Capt. John A. Adams, commanding Troop B, 1st Cavalry, and Casey's Scouts head out from Fort Keogh, Montana, ca. 1890. Lieutenant Casey is just to the left and rear of Captain Adams.

National Archives

EDITOR'S JOURNAL

In the Fall 2025 issue of *Army History*, I am pleased to offer up two interesting articles; a guest Chief's Corner celebrating the anniversary of the actions that led to the creation of the Liscum Bowl, one of the Army's most celebrated treasures; a unique Artifact Spotlight that examines a macro aircraft item; a visit to a new exhibit at the U.S. Army Quartermaster Museum; and an excellent selection of book reviews.

The first article, by Robert Seals, the command historian for the Joint Special Operations Command, examines the life and untimely death of 1st Lt. Edward W. Casey. Casey was the commander of a detachment of U.S. Army Indian Scouts and was killed just nine days after the massacre at Wounded Knee. Casey was well regarded among the Native American tribes and his fellow soldiers. His legacy lives on in the use of the crossed arrows insignia for U.S. Special Forces. This insignia first adorned the hats of those who rode with Casey's Scouts.

The second article, by Lisa Mundey, the academic director at Norwich University, looks at the Army's transition from animal power to motorized transport through the lens of junior officers and enlisted soldiers' views. These views often were expressed through cartoons, songs, and jokes. Making fun, and sometimes praising, command decisions and changes to Army doctrine has been a pastime of the lower ranks since the Army's inception. This unique perspective can provide some levity for what was ultimately a very serious issue and a massive change for an army trying to adapt to the immense technological changes of the early twentieth century.

This issue's Artifact Spotlight shows an interesting concept for delivering firepower from the air during the Vietnam War that turned into a one-of-a-kind artifact once thought lost to time. A single ACH–47A Chinook airframe, discovered at U.S. Army Aviation Logistics School at Fort Eustis, Virginia, in 1997, turned out to be from an aircraft known as "Easy Money." This helicopter's lineage is a fascinating one. Thanks to the efforts of the folks at the U.S. Army Aviation Museum at Fort Rucker, Alabama, this important piece of Army history is undergoing restoration and eventually will be on display.

The Museum Feature in this issue highlights a new exhibit at the U.S. Army Quartermaster Museum titled *A Revolution in Crisis*. As part of the commemoration of the 250th anniversary of the founding of the United States Army, the Quartermaster Museum has put several important artifacts on display that depict Revolutionary War ordnance and operations. The exhibit explains the dire situation the Army faced early in the war concerning the acquisition of ordnance such as gunpowder, muskets, and artillery, among others. Besides captured British weapons, American forces also relied on shipments of French weaponry and materiel. The artifacts on display serve as a link to those that fought for, and those that helped us gain, our independence.

Also in this issue are eight interesting book reviews and some final thoughts from the Army's chief historian in his Footnote.

The last few months have been a trying and bittersweet time for us here at *Army History*. Our two most senior visual information specialists, Gene Snyder and Mike Gill, retired about the same time. If you have enjoyed the layout and graphics in this journal over the last fifteen-plus years, it was largely because of their talents as designers. I would be remiss if I did not recognize them publicly for their contributions to *Army History* and for helping to make it what it is today. They are both missed.

Bryan Hockensmith
Managing Editor

AH FALL 2025 ARMY HISTORY

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GUEST CHIEF'S CORNER

DANIEL W. ROBERTS

THE LISCUM BOWL AND THE 9TH INFANTRY REGIMENT IN THE BOXER REBELLION

In 1900, the 9th Infantry Regiment was operating in the Philippines under the command of Col. Emerson H. Liscum. They were ordered to the aid of the foreign legations in Peking (present-day Beijing), China, who were under siege by the Boxers, a secret society that practiced martial arts and fought foreign influence in China. The transports arrived at the Taku Forts in Tientsin (present-day Tianjin), China, on 6 July. There, they joined with the other troops of the Eight-Nation Alliance: Austria-Hungary, Germany, France, Italy, Japan, Russia, and the British Empire.

Companies A, B, C, D, E, and the Regimental Band arrived in Tientsin the evening of the tenth, spending the next two days consolidating and setting up quarters. On 13 July, while leading the majority of the regiment in support of allied Japanese troops, Colonel Liscum received a fatal wound after retrieving the National Colors from a wounded color-sergeant. The commander of the 1st Battalion, Maj. Jesse M. Lee, then took command of the regiment and sent word to the rear for reinforcements. The regiment held its position, successfully securing the right flank of the Japanese force until nightfall. Losses among the regiment for the day's fighting were Colonel Liscum and seventeen others killed, five officers and seventy-two enlisted wounded, and one missing in action.

On 15 July, after alliance forces had occupied Tientsin, soldiers of the 9th Infantry moved to secure a silver stockpile in the American sector, with an estimated value of $376,300 (today around $14.5 million). Capt. Frank DeWitt Ramsey was ordered to escort the silver to the U.S. Marine camp inside a walled compound for safekeeping. It was then that Captain Ramsey received, on behalf of the 9th Infantry, two melted masses of silver, weighing around 90 pounds, from the Qing government as thanks for protecting the stockpile from pillage.

In the spring of 1901, Captain Ramsey called an informal meeting of officers to discuss what to do with the silver. They decided to create a punch bowl set that would be "symbolic of China," a decision that was later approved by the regimental commander, Col. C. F. Robe. They initially contracted a Chinese silversmith in Peking to make fifty-two cups for the punch bowl. In April 1902, the remaining silver was sent to Yokohama, Japan,

(*continued on page 13*)

NEWSNOTES

Upcoming Revolutionary War Conference

The Shenandoah Valley Battlefields Foundation (SVBF) is hosting a conference on the American Revolution at the DoubleTree hotel in Front Royal, Virginia, from 20–21 February 2026. The theme is "Forging Independence: The Revolutionary War's Early Years." The 250th anniversary of the independence of the United States in 2026 calls for the commemoration and study of the war that brought about the establishment of our country. As part of this eight-year celebration of the important people and events of the American Revolution, the SVBF offers a detailed look at the conflict's early years with historian presentations and a tour of the historic home of General Adam Stephen, one of the Shenandoah Valley's Continental Army generals. Attendees of this conference will explore the war's early campaigns and the lives several of America's key leaders. For more information, please visit the SVBF website at https://www.shenandoahatwar.org/2026-rev-war-conference.

New Publications from AUSA

The Association of the United States Army (AUSA) recently released three new publications: one special edition graphic novel, and two additions to its Medal of Honor graphic novel series.

The first, titled *The Birth of the U.S. Army*, commemorates the 250th anniversary of the founding of the United States Army. On 14 June 1775, the U.S. Army was established under civil authority. Militias from the individual colonies would unite to form a national force to fight for independence. All of this took place more than a full year before the Declaration of Independence was issued, intertwining the Army with the history of America itself. A free download of this book is available at www.ausa.org/the-birth-of-the-us-army.

The next two publications add to AUSA's ever-growing Medal of Honor graphic novel series. The first, *Medal of Honor: Clint Romesha*, was released on 8 July 2025. On 9 October 2009, an estimated 300 Taliban fighters attacked Combat Outpost Keating in eastern Afghanistan from surrounding high ground. S. Sgt. Clinton L. Romesha awoke to the sounds of gunfire and entered the fray. He rallied troops to help assist the wounded, led a counterattack when the perimeter was breached, and called in air support. Through his heroic actions this critical outpost was secured after the intense firefight.

The second, *Medal of Honor: Van T. Barfoot*, was released on 12 August 2025. During World War II, then T. Sgt. Van T. Barfoot fought in Italy with the 45th Infantry Division and participated in the breakout from Anzio. He earned the Medal of Honor for charging through a minefield, attacking enemy machine-gun positions, disabling a tank, and helping two wounded soldiers to safety. Both of these graphic novels are available on AUSA's Medal of Honor graphic novel series website at https://www.ausa.org/medal-honor-graphic-novels.

New Publications from CMH

The U.S. Army Center of Military History (CMH) recently added a number of new titles to its U.S. Army Campaigns of the Revolutionary War monograph series. The four new additions are *The New Jersey Campaign, 1776–1777* (CMH Pub 71-45) and *The War in the North, 1778–1781* (CMH Pub 71-49), both by Steven E. Elliott; *The Saratoga Campaign, 1777* (CMH Pub 71-47) by Seanegan P. Sculley; and *The War in Virginia, 1781* (CMH Pub 71-53) by J. Britt McCarley. Hard copies are available to Army units through the standard ordering process from the Army Printing and Media Distribution Center's ordering portal. All of these publications are also available as free downloads from the CMH website at https://history.army.mil/Revwar250/Publications-and-Videos.





"KILLED WHILE RECONNOITERING CAMP OF HOSTILES"

1st Lt. Edward W. Casey, U.S. Army Indian Scouts



By Robert D. Seals

Lieutenants Casey and Getty lead a formation of Casey's Scouts at Fort Keogh, Montana, in the summer of 1890.
National Archives

In January 1891, only nine days after the Wounded Knee tragedy, 1st Lt. Edward W. Casey was killed leading his detachment of U.S. Army Indian Scouts in an attempt to prevent further bloodshed. The "final Army casualty of the Indian Wars," Lieutenant Casey was a respected advocate of Native Americans and was "one of the most brilliant and beloved officers of the service" according to Maj. Gen. Nelson A. Miles. Today, Casey's legacy lives on in the U.S. Army Special Forces crossed arrows branch insignia, one of his 1890 detailed Indian Scout uniform proposals.[1]

According to military historian Edward M. Coffman, after the American Civil War, "the Indian was an object of curiosity and, depending on the man and the situation, of fear and contempt" to Army officers on the whole. A handpicked elite among them thought otherwise. Possessing "the highest type of leadership," they led U.S. Army Indian Scout detachments and were celebrated during the waning days of the frontier.[2] Largely following the principles advocated by Maj. Gen. George R. Crook, junior Army officers such as Hugh L. Scott, Emmet Crawford, Charles B. Gatewood, and Britton Davis were recognized for "knowledge, understanding, and sympathy" of Native American Scout soldiers. One of the most determined champions of the Indian Scouts was 1st Lt. Edward W. Casey. A visionary 1873 graduate of the U.S. Military Academy (USMA), Casey, of the 22d Infantry Regiment, was an innovative and highly regarded veteran of scout service.[3] This article is an overview of his influential career and the celebrated scout detachment known as "Casey's Scouts."[4]

Edward Wanton Casey was born on 1 December 1850 at the Benicia Barracks near San Francisco, California, the youngest child of Army captain Silas Casey and his wife Abby. Silas was a USMA graduate of the class of 1826, and a career officer who was breveted for gallantry in Mexico and later served during the Civil War. From birth, Edward seemingly was predestined for military service. His father and both older brothers were West Point and Annapolis graduates, and his grandfather served in the Continental Army. Casey's father and brothers all rose to general or flag officer ranks during military careers that spanned decades.[5]

Edward "Ned" Casey attended the Churchill School, a military academy in Ossining, New York, before entering the USMA at the age of 18 in July 1869. He was a popular cadet with his classmates and was nicknamed "The Judge" for his fair and easygoing manner. Described as "a natural born soldier of acknowledged ability," he was a lieutenant as a "Firstie," or senior in the cadet battalion, but graduated in the lower third of his class, 34th of 41 cadets, in June 1873. His highest marks were in mathematics and his lowest in cavalry tactics. Posted to the 22d Infantry Regiment after his graduation, Casey's career was representative of "the

Edward W. Casey was an 1873 graduate of the U.S. Military Academy. Both his father and older brother were also West Point graduates.
U.S. Military Academy Library

Army's Dark Ages" after the Civil War. His service included frontier duty in the Dakota Territory, Michigan, Colorado, Texas, and Montana; Reconstruction activities in New Orleans; an assignment as instructor in infantry and artillery tactics at West Point; and "suppressing Railroad Disturbances in Pennsylvania" and Chicago with his regiment.[6]

Unsurprisingly for a young officer in the "Army of the West," Casey volunteered for duty with Lt. Col. George A. Custer's Black Hills Expedition of 1874, but his request was denied. Two years later, Casey and six companies of the 22d Infantry accompanied then Col. Nelson A. Miles against native Cheyenne, Lakota, Dakota, and Arapaho tribes during what was later designated as the Little Big Horn Campaign. Late in 1876, at Cantonment No. 1, Tongue River, in Montana, Casey caught the attention of Colonel Miles while serving as an adjutant and he gave Casey the command of a provisional "company of civilian and Indian guides" or scouts. Casey fought at Wolf Mountain and later "at the battle of Lame Deer" (also known as Battle of Little Muddy Creek) in May 1877 and was deemed "worthy of special mention" in a report.[7]

Miles cited Casey for "the zeal and skill" displayed for leading his mounted scouts through Lakota chief Lame Deer's band of warriors in a daring dawn raid, "sweeping away the ponies" from the unsuspecting hostile camp. Recommended for a brevet promotion to captain because of his gallantry, the action languished without action in the parsimonious Army for years. Miles later complained that it was "disheartening to officers who have to remain so long in subordinate positions" who often served for decades without advancement until a regimental vacancy occurred.[8]

Promoted to first lieutenant in January 1880, Casey was a student of his profession and not afraid to submit suggestions through military channels when they seemed warranted. In 1887, "convinced of the army's need for better topographical and geographical knowledge," he requested "authority to make a trip to the Grand Canyon of the Colorado River" and visit "Navajo, Moqui, and Pueblo villages" on the journey. The Army approved the request, but accidents plagued the two-month expedition from Fort Lewis, Colorado. One of his soldiers was injured falling down a well, and a wagon was lost and four mules died during the journey. Upon return, Casey faced an unsympathetic post quartermaster "Board of Survey" for the absent government property.[9]

In June 1888, the transfer of the 22d Infantry to Fort Keogh, in southeastern Montana, resulted in an opportunity again for Casey to command scouts. Located near the junction of the Tongue and Yellowstone Rivers, the post was near the Northern Cheyenne Indian Reservation. As "Indian campaigning declined in scale and frequency," many officers had "minimal responsibilities, [and] boredom was a significant challenge." For Casey, who reported studying "history and military works" and who was described in an evaluation as an "efficient, competent, and exceedingly energetic officer," boredom was not an issue.[10]



Lieutenant Casey was recommended for a brevet promotion after an engagement with Lame Deer by Col. Nelson A. Miles during the Little Big Horn Campaign in 1877.
Courtesy of Sam Carr and True West Magazine

On 10 June, regimental commander Col. Peter T. Swaine "placed [Casey] in command of the enlisted Cheyenne scouts." Casey was "imbued with missionary spirit" leading his dozen troops. Giving the "matter of Indians as soldiers a great deal of thought," Casey presented a paper on "the matter of enlisting Indians as soldiers" in the winter of 1889 "before the officers school" at Keogh. Encouraged by Swaine's response, Casey developed a proposal, received approval from the Department of the Dakotas, and traveled to Washington, D.C., to present his plan through channels to Secretary of War Redfield Proctor.[11]

Casey believed his troops, and Native Americans in general, were capable of more organized soldiering than the usual standard for irregular Army Scouts. His intent was to "open a military life to them." As such, they should be armed, fed, trained, paid, quartered, uniformed, schooled, and above all, properly led by capable leaders. From March to April 1890 during a leave of absence, "Big Red Nose," as Casey was known to his Northern Cheyenne Scouts, lobbied senior Army leadership for authorization to raise his scouts to a demonstration troop of 100 soldiers for "inspection during the coming summer encampment."[12]

Casey's concept, approved by the Army's Commanding General Maj. Gen. John M. Schofield and Secretary of War Proctor during the spring visit, drew on earlier proposals by others but with significant modifications, including unique Army Indian Scout uniforms. Scouts were to be issued a "uniform . . . the same as that of white soldiers, but with distinctive facings and modifications" and a unique but practical overcoat for mounted duty. One of the modifications, worn on the fatigue hat, was to be "two arrows crossed . . . made of metal, 3 inches in length, the letters U.S.S. in the upper intersection" for United States Scouts. The scout crossed arrows were also to appear on scout guidons and the

An Indian Scout fatigue hat (*background*) and the insignia of the United States Scouts, ca. 1890
Author's Collection

spiked Prussian-looking pattern 1881 dress helmets. This simple but meaningful design has endured.[13]

Notified of "authority granted" by the secretary of war on 22 April, scout enlistments were for one year, as opposed to the standard Army five-year enlistment. For Casey, improved organization and treatment of the scouts was important, but the selection of the right officers to command the various "troops of 100 scouts" across the western Army was key. Officers had to be "better fitted for special duty." Those picked should be "subalterns from the line" and "younger men, with more ambition" capable of working through interpreters until they "should learn the language and interpreters [are] dispensed with."[14]

Initial recruitment went slow, but Casey persisted. Discovering "a rumor that I would make them cut off their hair and take them from their families," he was able to clarify matters in a meeting with tribal leaders. Soon he had the respected Cheyenne Chief American Horse recommending enlistments. One of the first enlistees, James Tangled Yellow Hair, "heard our old men make such good talk about Bear Shirt [Miles] that [he] wanted to be a scout." With twenty-seven scouts enlisted, Casey organized his troops as light cavalry, armed with the standard Army pistol and carbine on horseback. He felt the scouts were most useful in "open order fighting, patrol, vidette [mounted sentry], and flanking duties." Assisted by his second in command, Lt. Robert N. Getty, the troop also had "William Rowland as interpreter, and Long Forehead as a Sergeant, with Shoulder Blade and Wolf Voice as Corporals."[15]

He drilled and worked his scouts hard but with an eye toward improving their living conditions before the coming harsh Montana winter. His scout troop conducted horse mounted and unmounted drills in the morning followed by afternoon "fatigue duties." Those duties included tending a "12-acre garden" and building log cabins "with [the] help of soldiers."[16] A visiting Churchill classmate that summer observed that "many of the young men were glad to serve as soldiers" because of the monotony of reservation life, and the pay and stoves provided for scout cabins by "the soldier chiefs" were "very welcome." Additionally, the attraction of having a rifle and increased proficiency during "shooting practice" at a "wooden man" on a moving sled was later remembered by scouts with pride.[17]

However, the summer of 1890 was also a tense one. Pressure mounted from surrounding "wealthy stockmen" who wanted to "take possession of [Cheyenne] lands" according to Casey. After the death of a White homesteader, found with a butchered steer nearby, three Cheyenne were arrested. One was an Army scout from Fort Keough. Casey "gathered information" and helped hire a defense lawyer, writing that "this man [Black Medicine] belongs to me; I feel bound to see him have fair play when Cheyenne is versus Cattlemen." Black Medicine was released for lack of evidence, but such actions made Casey "highly unpopular." As the governor sent "arms and ammunition to Miles City" to defend against unrest, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs and its new Cheyenne agent recommended "the removal of the Cheyenne," thereby opening the vacated reservation up for more settlement.[18]

Brig. Gen. Thomas H. Ruger, the Department of Dakota commander, asked Casey for his "assessment of the situation." Strongly supporting the Cheyenne, Casey wrote that they were "a brave and virtuous people" who had been mistreated and he recommended that the tribe remain on their land and receive increased rations, help in



Casey's Scouts' quarters at Fort Keogh, as drawn by Frederic Remington. Casey pressed the Army for logs, stoves, and "earth closets" for his soldiers and their families.
Harper's Weekly

One of Casey's Scouts, as depicted in a sketch by Frederic Remington in November 1890.
Courtesy of the Anne S. K. Brown Military Collection, Brown University Library

building homes, seed and training to farm, and "trespassers turned out" or bought out from reservation lands. Casey continued to be an advocate for his troops, some who had fought against the Army at Little Big Horn, and by August 1890 had recruited forty-eight scouts for his detachment.[19]

In November, the Cheyenne Indian Commission led by General Miles, commander of the Military Division of the Missouri, visited to "investigate the removal of the Cheyennes." An escort, which included Casey and his scouts, met the commissioners. Accompanying them was the celebrated frontier artist Frederic S. Remington. Remington was taken with Casey's "fine Indian soldiers," later describing them in a December 1890 *Harper's Weekly* article "as a "perfectly

A sketch of Lieutenant Casey by Frederic Remington. Remington was an admirer of Casey's Scouts and featured them prominently in a *Harper's Weekly* article only nine days before Casey's death.
Harper's Weekly

uniformed and organized troop" and "the finest I had ever seen." Afterward, the Northern Cheyenne kept their reservation, and one writer believed the Army, and "respect for the scouts," played a major role in the tribal lands' successful continuation.[20]

Unfortunately, Casey's command of his celebrated "demonstration troop," now known as "Casey's Scouts," was short-lived. "Insufficient food, crop failures," and an "absence of game" gave rise to the messianic and nonviolent Ghost Dance religious movement, which promised "the resumption of the traditional way of life." The Lakota Sioux in southern South Dakota were particularly desperate after years of Bureau of Indian Affairs mismanagement. By the end of November, Army units took the field to suppress the movement. After the death of Sitting Bull in December, all elements were in place for the horrific Ghost Dance tragedy at Wounded Knee. The "largest troop movements since the Civil War" had begun and they included Casey's Scouts.[21]

Riding out from Fort Keough, the fifty-one scouts boarded a train at Belle Fourche, South Dakota, bound for the Pine Ridge Indian Reservation. Described by a reporter as "well mounted on splendid horses; armed, equipped and provisioned the best the law allows," it took seventeen days to ride and move by rail to the scene. Arriving on 30 December, the day following the Wounded Knee debacle, Casey's Scouts were attached to the 9th Cavalry under the command of Lt. Col. George B. Sanford "in the vicinity of White River and White Clay Creek." Assigned the mission of "locating and watching this camp of Sioux" some 8 miles away, Casey and his scouts demonstrated restraint and avoided confrontation.[22]

A week of watching passed, including "by Lieutenant Casey's invitation" a meeting on 6 January 1891 with "6–7 Sioux to visit for a talk" from the "hostile camp." Encouraged, the following day Casey and scouts White Moon and Rock Road rode up White Clay Creek toward the camp, intending to meet with Red Cloud and other chiefs to avoid a possible second Wounded Knee. Speaking with several groups along the creek, Casey and the scouts continued until receiving word that Red Cloud would not meet with them. Convinced to return, Casey "turned his horse" to leave but was shot in the back of the head by Plenty Horses, a "young Sioux educated at Carlisle Indian School" with whom the lieutenant had been speaking with for the past hour. Death came instantly to Casey, "who, as

Two of Casey's Scouts, White Moon (*left*) and Rock Road (*right*) photographed during the trial of Plenty Horse. White Moon, who fought against the Army at Little Big Horn, lived until 1931, and drew a modest monthly pension for his scout service.
Courtesy of the University of Michigan Library



(at large)!

STATION: Ft. L. Bat. Cavalry

Remaining from last month.	During Year 189_	Number of Days and Place of Treatment. Quarters.	Hospital.	Field.	Remaining at end of month.	Classification of Admission. No.
	Jan.					Rank: Lieut
	Feb.					Arm. of Serv.: 22 Inf.
	Mar.					Age: 40
	April,					Race: White
	May,					Nativity: U. S.
	June,					Length of Serv.: 21
	July,					Residence at Sta.: 0
	Aug.					Line of duty: Yes
	Sept.					Source of Adm.:
	Oct.					Disposition: Died
	Nov.					
	Dec.					Classification of Disposition. No. 324
	Total.					

Not on sick report

~~Cause of Admission:~~ Killed while reconnoitering camp of hostiles

Complication:

Date of Admission:

Date of Disposition: Jan. 7

No. ......; Name: Casey, Edward W.

(S. G. O. Statistical, No. 3.)

Killed by Indians

The form listing Lieutenant Casey as being "killed while reconnoitering camp of hostiles."
National Archives

Lieutenant Casey, "one of the most brilliant and beloved officers of the service," was buried at the family farm in Rhode Island in January 1891.
Courtesy of the Casey Farm

Lieutenant Getty and Casey's Scouts return to Fort Keogh in March 1891. The Cheyenne Scout guidon is clearly visible.
National Archives

a man, was an honor to his regiment and service" according to the telegram report back to Fort Keogh. His men recovered his body, horse, and pistol. Plenty Horses was arrested, tried twice for murder, and found not guilty because a state of war existed at the time.[23]

The following day, the news of Casey's death was front-page news from California to New York. Sensational newspaper headlines that informed readers of "one of the best young officers in the Army" having been "treacherously shot in the back" by "hostile Sioux fed by the government" did nothing to calm tensions in the West. Miles, who "viewed Wounded Knee as an outrageous blunder," relieved the officer responsible for the tragedy, Col. James W. Forsyth, commander of the 7th Cavalry. Miles slowly used diplomacy and threats of force during the next several weeks to resolve the situation without further bloodshed.[24]

As Casey's body began the journey by rail back for interment at the family farm near Wickford, Rhode Island, the tributes began. From the secretary of war down to the humblest Indian Scout, seemingly all had praise and "his early death ever regretted" for what might have been. Frederick Remington, who had seen Casey in the field days before his death, said "[his scouts] would follow him anywhere" and he was "a sincere friend" to "his Cheyenne Scouts, the best in the service." Back at Keough, the wives of Casey's scouts "wailed and sang their death chants" when news of his death arrived. A civilian scout said no "braver officer never more nobly honored the service." First Lt. Edmund K. Webster, a West Point classmate of Casey's, stated, "you cannot praise him too highly." Webster also reported that Casey had turned down an offer by Miles to be an "aid[e]-de-camp on his staff" because "he felt bound to remain with his regiment." Chief American Horse also described Casey as "a brave man and good one" who "did much for the Indian."[25]

Casey's Scouts continued their mission and rode "first in line" at Miles's grand "final review at Pine Ridge" on 21 January 1891. However, it was not until late March that the "badly worn" scouts and "their animals," under the command of Lieutenant Getty, returned to Keogh after escorting 700 Cheyenne from Pine Ridge. In April, "the major general commanding the Army" instructed that "the scouts organized and commanded by the late Lieutenant Casey will be officially designated as Troop L, Eighth Cavalry Regiment, "Casey's Scouts." This was a unique and rare honor for a fallen officer. Later, the troop "in some degree lost its identity," but the Cheyenne scouts continued to serve. They kept the peace and escorted elements of "Coxey's Army," a protest march of unemployed workers moving through Montana on their cross-country journey to Washington, D.C., in 1894. However, the following year

in May, newspaper headlines proclaimed, "Lieutenant Casey's Famous Scouts No Longer in Existence" as the last "remnant was disbanded."[26]

The Indian Wars were over, along with Casey and his "famous scouts." First Lieutenant Edward W. Casey was "one of the "most promising young lieutenants" who demonstrated "the highest type of leadership" required for an Indian Scout detachment. He was "particularly gifted for command" as per his efficiency report and possessed the necessary traits to command such an unconventional force successfully. After his death, Casey continued to be remembered by retired generals and luminaries writing their memoirs and retired Native American scout veterans drawing a modest pension for their service. Decades later in 1942, then Col. Robert T. Frederick picked Casey's crossed arrow insignia for his 1st Special Service Force after the Army commando force was activated in World War II. In 1987, the Army approved the popular and historic insignia for the newly created Special Forces branch.[27] Today, we continue to see the legacy of the "final Army casualty of the Indian Wars" and his celebrated Cheyenne scouts in the Army's special forces crossed arrow insignia.

Robert D. Seals is a retired special forces officer and the command historian for the Joint Special Operations Command at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. His previous assignments include service with the Special Forces Doctrine Division at the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, and as the special forces branch historian for the U.S. Army Special Operations Command. He lives on a horse property with his wife, a retired Army Veterinary Corps officer. Their son, is an Army cavalry officer with the 5th Squadron, 7th Cavalry Regiment, 1st Brigade Combat Team, 3d Infantry Division currently deployed in Eastern Europe.

Notes

1. G. Timothy Cranston, "The View from Swamptown: Remembering Lt. Casey, the Final Casualty of the Indian Wars," *The Independent*, 31 Aug 2017; "Miles Report," *Lawrence Daily Journal*, 8 Jan 1891; and "Branch Insignia: Special Forces," The Institute of Heraldry, n.d., https://tioh.army.mil/Catalog/Heraldry.aspx?HeraldryId=15361&CategoryId=9362&grp=2&menu=Uniformed%20Services&ps=24&p=0, accessed 25 Jun 2024.

2. Edward M. Coffman, *The Old Army: A Portrait of the American Army in Peacetime, 1784–1898* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 254; Britton Davis, *The Truth About Geronimo* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1976), v.

3. Robert M. Utley, *Frontier Regulars: The United States Army and the Indian, 1866–1890* (New York: Macmillan Publishing, 1973), 54–56; *Report of Brigadier General Crook, Headquarters, Department of Arizona*, Annual Rpt of the Sec of War for 1883 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1883), 166–68; and E. J. McClernand, "Obituary," *1891 Annual Reunion of the Association of Graduates Office, U.S. Military Academy*, West Point, NY, 47–49. Crook, in his report, highly regarded scouts and believed the "only hope of success in Indian combats" was reconnaissance "done by Indian scouts."

4. *Report of Major General Miles, HQs, Department of the Missouri,* 14 Sep 1891, Annual Rpt of the Sec War for 1891 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1892), 154 (hereinafter Report of Miles, 1891); and Nelson A. Miles, *Personal Recollections and Observations of General Nelson A. Miles* (New York: Werner, 1896), 532. General Miles specifically mentioned fifteen officers, including Casey, in his memoirs as providing "services, invaluable to the country."

5. Lt. E. W. Casey, 22 Inf, "Statement of Birth to Adjutant General, U.S. Army, Washington, DC," 22 Jul 1882, Appointment, Commission, And Personal (ACP) File, Record Group (RG) 94: Records of the Adjutant General's Office, 1780s–1917, National Archives Building, Washington, DC (NAB), hereinafter Casey ACP File, NAB; *Official Register of the Officers and Cadets of the U.S. Military Academy, West Point, NY, June, 1873* (West Point, NY: United States Military Academy Printing Office, 1873), 383–86, Silas Casey, Cullum Number 467; Thomas Lincoln Casey, Cullum Number 1536, 471–73; Silas Casey III, *Register of the Commissioned and Warrant Officers of the Navy of the US and of the Marine Corps to January 1, 1904* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1904,) 106–7.

6. William A. Ganoe, *The History of the United States Army* (New York: D. Appleton-Century, 1924), 298; *Official Register of the Officers and Cadets of the U.S. Military Academy, West Point, NY, June, 1873*, 9, 19, 26, Edward W. Casey, Cullum Number 2501; "Lieutenant Edward W. Casey," *Times-Picayune*, 11 Jan 1891, 4; "Lieutenant Casey," *Philadelphia Times*, 2 Feb 1891, 5; "Churchill's Military School," *Port Chester Journal*, 8 Jul 1869. As a West Point tactical officer, a former cadet remembered Casey in the *Times-Picayune* as a "delightful fellow" willing to bend regulations when a "box of Christmas goodies" was discovered during a December barracks inspection.

7. Edward W. Casey, 2d Lieut. 22nd Inf, 3239 AGO, 1877, filed with 4163 AGO, 1877; and Extract from Report dated 16 May 1877 of Colonel Nelson A. Miles of action Rose Bud (Muddy Creek), Montana, against hostiles under "Lame Deer," Casey ACP File, NAB.

8. "Research: Indian Wars Campaigns," U.S. Army Center of Military History, n.d., https://history.army.mil/Research/Reference-Topics/Army-Campaigns/Brief-Summaries/Indian-Wars/, accessed 11 Aug 2025. Casey also participated in the "Ute Expedition in Colorado," giving him Indian Wars service in three campaigns, Little Big Horn, Utes, and Pine Ridge.

9. Maurice Frink and Casey E. Barthelmess, *Photographer on an Army Mule* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1965), 55–61; Leave Application, Lt. Casey, 29 Jul 1884, West Point, NY; and Ltr, War Dept, Adjutant Gen Ofc, to Sec of War, 4 May 1887, Casey ACP File, NAB. The year 1887 proved to be frustrating. Casey also had a "stoppage of $110 pay" from an approved two-month leave from the Military Academy en route back to the 22d Infantry from three years prior. The Commanding General of the Army, Lt. Gen. Philip H. Sheridan, approved his leave; Ltr 4 May 1887, Casey ACP File, NAB.

10. Thomas W. Dunlay, *Wolves for the Blue Soldiers: Indian Scouts and Auxiliaries with the United States Army, 1860–90* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1987), 60; Brian McAllister Linn, *Real Soldiering: The US Army in the Aftermath of War, 1815–1980* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2023), 29–40; "Efficiency Report in case of E.W. Casey, Reported by himself," 23 Apr 1890; "Efficiency Report in case of E.W. Casey, 1st Lieut. 22nd Inf, Fort Keogh, Mont., May 1st 1890," Casey ACP File, NAB.

11. Edward W. Casey, "An Officer of His Own Regiment Writes," *Stockgrowers Journal*, 10 Jan 1891, 4; and Katherine M. Weist, "Ned Casey and his Cheyenne Scouts: A Noble Experiment in an Atmosphere of Tension," *Montana: The Magazine of Western History* 27, no. 1 (Winter 1977): 26.

12. Thomas B. Marquis, *Cheyenne and Sioux: The Reminiscences of Four Indians and a White Soldier* (Stockton, CA: Pacific Center for

Western Historical Studies, University of the Pacific, 1973), 38–45; Casey, "An Officer of His Own Regiment Writes." James Tangled Yellow Hair, in *Cheyenne and Sioux*, remembered Casey as "Red Hump Nose" and recalled that monthly pay was $25.30, food was plentiful, and scouts could buy beer at the canteen. Yellow Hair also thought "Scouting in the Sioux country was hard work."

13. Circular 10, War Dept, 11 Aug 1890, Section VI, 2–3; War Department, GO 96, Adjutant Generals Office, Washington, 19 Nov 1875; Jacques Noel Jacobsen Jr., "The Uniform of the Indian Scouts," *Military Collector & Historian* 26, no. 3 (Fall 1974): 137–44; William K. Emerson, *Encyclopedia of U.S. Army Insignia and Uniforms* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1996), 286–87. Emerson writes in his *Encyclopedia* that the Army in November of 1875 had transitioned from the European-inspired hunting horn as infantry insignia to "two gold-embroidered rifles without bayonets, barrels upward," so Casey's crossed arrow design was a logical adaptation.

14. Tlg, HQ, Dept of Dakota, to Cmdg Ofcr 22nd Inf, Fort Keogh, MT, 22 Apr 1890, RG 393, Entry 1167, NAB; "White Moon Enlistment Form AGO [Adjutant Gen Ofc] No. 23," 27 May 1890, RG 94, Entry 93, Box 63, NAB; "Indians for Soldiers," *Army and Navy Journal* 27, no. 33 (19 Apr 1890): 613.

15. Tlg, HQ, Dept of Dakota, to Cmdg Ofcr 22nd Inf, Fort Keogh, MT, 26 Apr 1890, RG 393, Entry 1167, NAB; Weist, *Ned Casey and His Cheyenne Scouts*, 31–32; Marquis, *Cheyenne and Sioux*, 38–41; "Indians for Soldiers."

16. S. C. Robinson, "Our Indian Contingent," *Harper's Weekly* 36, no. 1834 (13 Feb 1892): 157–58; and Frink and Barthelness, *Photographer on an Army Mule*, 113–14. Author Lt. S. C. Robinson, 1st Cavalry, was an admirer of Casey's who raised a Crow Indian Scout troop along similar lines and methods at Fort Custer, Montana. Robinson gives Casey "sole credit," and describes him as "earnest" with an "enthusiastic nature." Robinson's article, accompanied by Frederick Remington's drawings, provides an excellent illustrative narrative of how the two Indian Scout troops were trained in 1890 and 1891.

17. George B. Grinnell, *The Fighting Cheyennes* (New York: C. Scribner's Sons, 1915), 412, 416–17; Philip Burnham, "Unlikely Recruits: Indians Scouting for America," *Military History Quarterly* 17, no. 3 (Spring 1999): 78–85. According to one Arizona Chiricahua scout quoted in Burnham's article, the rifle "was our most cherished possession and there was not a man who did not envy the scout [with] his rifle."

18. Tlgs, HQ, Dept of Dakota, to Cmdg Ofcr, 22nd Inf, Fort Keogh, MT, 24 and 30 May 1890, RG 393, Entry 1167, NAB; Weist, *Ned Casey and His Cheyenne Scouts*, 32–33.

19. Josef James Warhank, "Fort Keogh: Cutting Edge of a Culture" (master's thesis, University of Southern California, Dec 1983), 37–40; Weist, *Ned Casey and His Cheyenne Scouts*, 34.

20. Tlgs, HQ, Dept of Dakota, to Cmdg Ofcr, 22nd Inf, Fort Keogh, MT, 16, 18, 19, and 30 Nov 1890, and 2, 3, 4 Dec 1890, RG 393, Entry 1167, NAB; Frederic Remington, "Indians as Irregular Cavalry," *Harper's Weekly* 34, no. 1775 (27 Dec 1890): 1004–6; "Great Love for the White Man," *Pittsburgh Dispatch*, 6 Nov 1890. During Miles's visit, the scouts escorted the commission from Keogh to Tongue River, riding "sixty-five miles in nine hours." The Army became increasingly concerned as November became December after receiving alarming Indian agent messages calling for "the military at once." Message traffic cancelled leaves, ordered "buffalo overcoats" and "Hotchkiss mountain guns," instructed posts to "shod all horses," and be "ready for prompt movement."

21. "A Tribute to Casey," *Yellowstone Journal*, 17 Jan 1891; Col. George B. Sanford and E. R. Hagemann, *Fighting Rebels and Redskins: Experiences in Army Life of Colonel George B. Sanford, 1861–1892* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1969), 85–93; "Casey," *Delaware Gazette and State Journal*, 15 Jan 1891; and Army campaign summary for Pine Ridge, "Research: Indian Wars Campaigns," n.d. Sources in the *Yellowstone Journal* article agree that Native Americans "were virtually starved" and hunger was "the cause of the trouble." Journalists who observed distribution of rations reported food weights "guessed at" or scales weighing short. A weekly ration amount for "one person would last a healthy soldier about two [days]."

22. "Indians Moving," *Stockgrowers Journal*, 13 Dec 1890, 1; "Indian U.S. Soldiers," *Deadwood Pioneer-Times*, 26 Dec 1890, 1; Rpt, Lt. Robert N. Getty, to the Asst Adjutant Gen, Dept of Dakota, 13 Apr 1891, sub: Circumstances concerning the death of the late Lieutenant Casey, Casey ACP File, NAB.

23. Rpt, Getty to the Asst Adjutant Gen, Dept of Dakota, 13 Apr 1891, sub: Circumstances concerning the death of the late Lieutenant Casey; Tlg, HQ, Dept of Dakota, to Cmdg Ofcr, 22nd Inf, Fort Keogh, MT, 8 Jan 1891, RG 393, Entry 1167, NAB; Rpt, E. L. Ten Eyck, 1st Lt. and Asst Surgeon, to Medical Director, Dept of Dakota, Saint Paul, MN, 7 Jan 1891, Casey ACP File, NAB; "Lieutenant Casey's Death," *Miller Press*, 15 Jan 1891; Robert M. Utley, "The Ordeal of Plenty Horses," *American Heritage* 26, no. 1 (Dec 1974): 15–19, 82–86. Utley states in his article that Plenty Horses later testified that Casey "rode up, [extended] his hand [saying], 'How Kolia' How do you do, friend" and they shook hands.

24. "The Indian of It," *Topeka State Journal*, 8 Jan 1891; Utley, *Frontier Regulars*, 415–20.

25. "Harper's War Artist," *Inter Ocean*, 9 Jan 1891, 8; "Lieutenant Casey's Last Scout," in Frederic Remington, *Pony Tracks* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1895), 22–48; "Secretary Proctor Said," *The New York Sun*, 9 Jan 1891, 1; "Remington on Lieutenant Casey," *Fergus County Argus*, 22 Jan 1891, 1; Report of Miles, 1891, 154; Oliver O. Howard, *My Life and Experiences among Our Hostile Indians*, (Hartford, CT: A. D. Worthington, 1907), 481, 484; Utley, "The Ordeal of Plenty Horses," 15–19, 82–86; Weist, *Ned Casey and His Cheyenne Scouts*, 38–39; G. Sam Carr, "Plenty Horses' Vengeance," Historynet, 20 Sep 2018, https://www.historynet.com/plenty-horses-vengeance/.

26. Jerome A. Greene, ed., *Indian War Veterans: Memories of Army Life and Campaigns in the West, 1864–1898* (New York: Savas Beatie, 2007), 209–19; "Casey Scouts' Hard Journey," *Deadwood Pioneer-Times*, 27 Mar 1891, 1; "Enlistments of Indians in Dakota," *Kansas City Times*, 10 Apr 1891, 3; "Making Indian Soldiers," *Stockgrowers Journal*, 14 Jan 1893; *Report of Brigadier General John R. Brooke, HQs, Department of Dakota*, 23 Aug 1895, Annual Report of the Secretary of War for 1895 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1896), 132–33; "No Indian Soldiers," *River Press*, 15 May 1895; Warhank, "Fort Keogh," 40. Veterans of the Pine Ridge Campaign recalled in *Indian War Veterans* that "deep snow and weather 25 to 35 degrees below zero" for January 1891.

27. Robert D. Seals, "Honoring an ARSOF Legend, Major General Robert T. Frederick," *Veritas* 18, no. 1 (Apr 2022), 75, https://arsof-history.org/articles/22apr_mg_robert_frederick_page_1.html; Bob Seals, "'Two Arrows Crossed:' A History of U.S. Army Special Forces Branch Insignia," Military History Online, n.d., https://www.militaryhistoryonline.com/Modern/SpecialForcesInsignia; and Casey Efficiency Rpt, Casey ACP File, NAB. Casey was mentioned by Miles, Howard, and Grinnell in their books. Grinnell, a famous anthropologist, and naturalist, wrote in *The Fighting Cheyennes* that Casey's Scouts "were devoted to him."

(*continued from page 4*)

to be made into the bowl by the silversmiths Arthur & Bond. A U.S. cruiser delivered the bowl to the regiment at Madison Barracks in New York in April 1903.

The final result was a 14-gallon punch bowl with four handles in the shape of Eastern dragons, a platter with dragon designs, a ladle, and fifty-two small cups (five more were added later). Each cup is engraved with multiple names of the officers of the regiment, a tradition that continued until the 1970s. During the Korean War, the regiment would add forty-four larger cups to the set, engraved with the names of soldiers who died during the conflict.

The Liscum Bowl and set remained in the possession of the regiment until they sent it for much-needed restoration. Afterward, the U.S. Army Center of Military History (CMH) placed it on display in Washington, D.C., at Fort Lesley J. McNair. In 2006, CMH sent it to Korea following the activation of the 1st and 2d Battalions as part of the 2d Infantry Division. It remained on display at Camp Red Cloud until it followed the 4th Battalion to Fort Carson, Colorado, in 2018. It remains on display at the 4th Infantry Division and Fort Carson Museum.

Daniel W. Roberts *is a museum specialist at the 4th Infantry Division and Fort Carson Museum at Fort Carson, Colorado.*

Further Reading

Brown, Fred Radford. *History of the Ninth U.S. Infantry, 1799–1909* (Chicago: R. R. Donnelley & Sons, 1909).

The 9th Infantry Regiment coat of arms (*above*) displayed in the exhibit case chronicles the history of the unit. The field of the shield is blue, for the Infantry Branch. The shield is divided by a wavy white chevron to symbolize the regiment's crossing of the San Juan River at the "Bloody Angle" during the Battle of San Juan Hill in the Spanish-American War. The Chinese dragon at the top left signifies the regiment's service as part of the China Relief Expedition during the Boxer Rebellion in 1900. The sun at the top right is representative of the regiment's service in the Philippines—Filipino nationalists commonly used the device during the Philippine-American War. The wigwam in the lower half stands for the numerous campaigns the regiment participated in during the Indian Campaigns following the Civil War.

A REVOLUTION IN CRISIS

A New Exhibit at the U.S. Army Quartermaster Museum

By Weldon Svoboda

To commemorate the 250th anniversary of the founding of the United States Army and the U.S. Army's Ordnance Corps, the U.S. Army Quartermaster Museum on Fort Lee, Virginia, unveiled a temporary exhibition illustrating American Revolutionary War ordnance operations. The museum created the exhibition in conjunction with the opening of the Fort Lee Museum enclave, which now allows visitors direct access to the U.S. Army Quartermaster Museum, the U.S. Army Women's Museum, and the U.S. Army Ordnance Training Support Facility.

The exhibit, titled *A Revolution in Crisis*, provides an overview of the dire situation facing the patriots in the Revolutionary War regarding the supply of artillery, guns, gunpowder, and other types of ordnance in their bid for independence against the British. In addition to educating the public on issues surrounding procurement and production, the display also details the technical aspects of the weapons involved. For example, the exhibition teaches visitors the difference between a field gun, a howitzer, and a mortar, as well as the functions and capabilities of the different types of artillery ammunition produced for these weapons.

The exhibition concludes by looking at logistics at the tactical level. One effective strategy for winning a conflict involves disrupting the adversary's supply and logistical lines, which are essential to sustain combat capabilities, while simultaneously safeguarding and maintaining your own and those of your allies. The concept is expounded by the example of the French Navy successfully obstructing the British Royal Navy from accessing the Chesapeake Bay. This maneuver held significant strategic importance as it thwarted Britain's ability to either resupply or evacuate their forces entrenched at Yorktown, Virginia, in the autumn of 1781. Subsequently, the Royal Navy's withdrawal to New York enabled the French to gain control over the maritime routes, thereby providing the Franco-American forces with vital siege artillery and additional troops. These contributions played a pivotal role in the British surrender at Yorktown, which ultimately secured independence for the American colonies.

Weldon Svoboda is an Army veteran who has been with the U.S. Army Center of Military History and the Army Museum Enterprise for fifteen years. He currently serves as the collections manager for the Fort Lee Museums and Ordnance Training Support Facility located on Fort Lee, Virginia.

Views of the *A Revolution in Crisis* exhibit

This British 3-Pounder Field Gun was called the "Galloper" or "Grasshopper" cannon, as it was significantly lighter than most field guns and cannons of the time. Its reduced size and weight allowed it to be moved by a single horse or pack animal, or even carried by soldiers, which made it ideal for deployment in rough terrain. British forces often embedded these cannons with infantry units for close combat support. This gun was one of the 240 artillery pieces captured at the siege of Yorktown.

(*Above*) A French-made 9-inch mortar shell

(*Left*) A 24-Pounder American howitzer produced during the colonial period.



Many period muskets are on display, including this British Long Land Pattern "Brown Bess" Musket (Wilson Contract). Many of these older-pattern smoothbore muskets were stored in British armories located throughout the colonies. At the outbreak of the revolution, patriot colonists raided these armories, supplying the American forces with much-needed weapons. Richard Wilson of London made the rare variant of musket shown here. Wilson made it on contract for the colony of New Jersey during the French and Indian War (1754–1763).

Included in this display is a French saber produced under contract for the State of Virginia. The French "Grenadier of Virginia" saber refers to a specific type of short sword copied from the French Model 1767 Grenadier Hanger. France produced them and exported them to Virginia in 1779 and the state of Virginia subsequently issued them to militia troops during the Revolutionary War.

This saber is characterized by a curved, single-edged blade, etched with "Grenadeer of Virginia" on one side and "Victory or Death" on the other.

THE ARMY MULE THAT FIGHTS LIKE AN EAGLE

Boeing artist's representation of the armament installation for the aircraft. The crew of "Easy Money" would add two M60D machine guns to the cargo hatch to keep the vulnerable underbelly of the aircraft covered during low passes. This graphic appeared in "Armed/Armored CH–47a (A/ACH–47A) Flight Test Report," November 1965. *U.S. Army Aviation Museum*

By Bryant D. Macfarlane

Thunder Over Trang Bang

On 19 July 1966, near Trang Bang, South Vietnam, the soldiers of Company A, 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry "Wolfhounds," found themselves pinned down in an ambush. With enemy fire raking their position and the jungle canopy complicating support, the situation was dire. Then, a distinct, deep thumping sound cut through the chaos—not the high whine of a Huey, but the heavy rhythm of a Chinook.

However, this was no cargo run. The ACH–47A "Guns A Go-Go" gunship dipped its nose, but instead of dropping supplies it unleashed a massive barrage. The nose-mounted 40-mm. grenade launcher began to thump, flanked by the roar of 20-mm. cannons and the chatter of five .50-caliber machine guns. As it circled, the "Go-Go Bird" created a "ring of steel" around the Wolfhounds that decimated the enemy position and allowed the infantry to maneuver.

For the soldiers of Company A, the effect was immediate. Unlike standard gunships that had to dive and break, the ACH–47A maintained a continuous circuit and provided unbroken suppression. The enemy withered under the relentless fire. The engagement proved that the platform validated the Chinook's capability. A ground commander's assessment was recorded officially in the Army's final evaluation of the program: the ACH–47A was "the best thing to happen to the infantry since the squad radio."[1]

A Bold Experiment

The ACH–47A "Guns A Go-Go" program, a bold Vietnam-era experiment, holds significant historical impact not just for its formidable combat record but also for the critical lessons it provided on military strategy, innovation, and procurement. Although short-lived, the saga of these four heavily armed CH–47 Chinook helicopters illuminates key historical themes: the evolution of airmobile warfare, the brutal realities of combat-driven innovation, and the persistent interservice rivalry that shaped military doctrine for decades.

A Powerful, Yet Imperfect, Solution

Born from the U.S. Army's need for more sustained firepower than the lighter UH–1 Iroquois helicopters could provide, ACH–47As (nicknamed "Go-Go Birds") were an impressive feat of engineering. The Chinook's stable tandem-rotor design and substantial cargo capacity made it an ideal candidate for a gunship conversion. Armed with a 40-mm. grenade launcher, 20-mm. cannons, and multiple machine guns, the Chinook was a flying fortress. Its 360-degree field of fire was a unique advantage, and it could loiter longer and carry more ammunition than any other helicopter gunship of its time.

This experimental platform, with its impressive firepower, demonstrated the immense psychological and physical impact of concentrated aerial fire on the battlefield. Ground troops consistently praised the four Go-Go Birds (named "Easy Money," "Stump Jumper," "Birth Control," and "Co$t of Living"), noting the enemy's rapid retreat whenever they appeared. The heroic actions of Easy Money during the Battle of Hue—rescuing the crew of the downed Birth Control under heavy fire—stand as a testament to the ACH–47As effectiveness and the courage of its crews. The

The first two converted gunships 64-13145 (B–117) "Co$t of Living" (*front*) and 64-13149 (B–121) "Easy Money" (*rear*) are seen here outside the Boeing Center Two facilities at the Philadelphia International Airport in Pennsylvania during the Army's acceptance of the aircraft, ca. December 1965. Their crews would soon wipe away the bright roundel, gloss exterior, and bright yellow markings.
Tedesco Collection, U.S. Army Aviation Museum

ability to deliver sustained, omnidirectional suppressive fire proved decisive in the dense, urban environment of Hue, where fixed-wing support was often less precise.

Enduring Lessons from a Short Life

Despite its combat success, the ACH–47A program faced a series of challenges that ultimately led to its demise, providing invaluable lessons that resonate with modern military practitioners.

1. The Perils of Low-Volume, Specialized Platforms: With only four aircraft built, the program was highly vulnerable to attrition. The loss of Stump Jumper in a taxiing mishap and Cost of Living to a catastrophic mechanical failure left only two operational gunships. This limited number made the program logistically difficult to sustain and strategically unviable. For modern military acquisition, these issues highlight the need for a robust industrial base and a clear sustainment plan for any new platform.

2. The Importance of Rigorous Testing: The tragic loss of Cost of Living and her entire crew underscores the critical importance of comprehensive testing before full-scale deployment. A seemingly minor mechanical issue—a loose mounting pin—

ACH–47A "Easy Money" after arrival at Vung Tau Air Base, Vietnam, ca. mid-1966. Note the loss of the glossy stateside paint job, though it is still possible to see portions of the roundel under the rapidly applied matte paint job for its field testing in Vietnam.
Tedesco Collection, U.S. Army Aviation Museum

"Easy Money" as a parts bird at Vung Tau Air Base, Vietnam, shortly after its final flight. Cannibalization and the environment would ravage the aircraft for decades to come before it would be saved. *Tedesco Collection, U.S. Army Aviation Museum*

had devastating consequences, reminding the Army that even the smallest component can be a point of catastrophic failure under combat conditions.

3. Balancing Specialization and Versatility: The ACH–47A's modifications made it a single-purpose asset, ill-equipped for its original transport role. As the war progressed, the U.S. Army had a far greater need for standard CH–47 transport helicopters than for a specialized gunship. This scarcity, combined with the high cost of conversion and sustainment, made the program unsustainable. The Go-Go Bird became a victim of its own specialization, failing to adapt to the broader strategic needs of the war.

A Battle of Turf and Doctrine

Perhaps the most historically impressive aspect of the ACH–47A program was its role in the long-standing interservice dispute between the U.S. Army and the U.S. Air Force over close air support (CAS). Established by policies like the Key West Agreement of 1948, fixed-wing CAS was largely the Air Force's domain. The Army, however, consistently argued for organic air support, believing its attack helicopters were better suited for close-proximity engagements.

Guns A Go-Go was a direct challenge to this established doctrine. It was a bold, heavy-handed statement from the Army, directly infringing on what the Air Force considered its turf. This bureaucratic conflict reflected divergent philosophies on the nature of warfare. The ACH–47A, despite its battlefield effectiveness, was a mismatch of interservice doctrine, making it politically and bureaucratically difficult to sustain as a long-term program. This historical friction between the services over emerging technologies and capabilities remains a relevant challenge for today's militaries.

"Easy Money" arrives at Fort Rucker, Alabama, fifty-seven years after its final flight. The aircraft will go through restoration and conservation work before joining the collection of aircraft on display at the U.S. Army Aviation Museum. *Author Photo*

A Standout Piece of Army History

What makes Easy Money a fitting piece for inclusion in the U.S. Army Aviation Museum? Beyond its value for preservation as a rare airframe, it highlights the Army's "Soldier First" philosophy. For the infantryman on the ground in 1966, this aircraft represented the Aviation branch's commitment to clearing the way and bringing the infantry home, regardless of the engineering hurdles.

The ACH–47A also is a testament to the Army's readiness to modify and adapt machinery to meet the needs of a soldier in a battle. As part of the Aviation Museum's collections, Easy Money is a teaching tool with lessons applicable to soldiers at all levels of professional development. In addition to its meaningful legacy as an example of the ways in which Army Aviation protects troops on the ground, it serves as a reminder to current and future Army leaders that innovation often comes from the bottom up, born of necessity amid chaos in battle.

Restoration and Legacy

Easy Money completed its final combat mission on 2 February 1968, participating in the rescue of the Co$t of Living crew in Hue, Vietnam. Adhering to authorization and doctrine requiring two Go-Go Birds for operations, Easy Money subsequently was disarmed and transferred to the Boeing training facility at Vung Tau. There, it served as a frequently cannibalized donor aircraft until the conclusion of the war.

Following the war, the aircraft was moved to the Savanna Army Depot in Illinois with the intention of contributing to the development of what would become the CH–47D. However, because of significant battle damage, corrosion, and prior cannibalization, Army leaders deemed it unsuitable for this purpose. After being stored at the depot for several years, it was transferred to the U.S. Army Aviation Logistics School at Fort Eustis, Virginia. There, it functioned as a training aircraft for the Sheet Metal Repairer Course until its unique identity was discovered around 1997.

Upon rediscovery, Easy Money underwent extensive corrosion abatement, exterior restoration, and fabrication. It subsequently was placed on exterior display, with parts sourced as available. In December 2024, Easy Money was transferred to the U.S. Army Aviation Museum at Fort Rucker, Alabama, for a comprehensive restoration and conservation effort. The aircraft is currently in storage, awaiting restoration, and is slated to become a permanent exhibit at the William A. Howell Aviation Training Support Facility upon completion.

The ACH–47A was a formidable weapon, born of battlefield necessity and a spirit of innovation. Its combat record, particularly the heroic actions of Easy Money, demonstrated the immense value of responsive, sustained close air support. Yet the program's short life and ultimate cancellation provided invaluable, if painful, lessons. It highlighted the challenges of interservice doctrinal disputes, the logistical and financial burdens of niche platforms, the critical importance of robust testing, and the ever-present tension between specialization and versatility. The story of the Go-Go Birds is a powerful reminder that even the most impressive combat capabilities must be balanced against strategic needs, fiscal realities, and the persistent, evolving challenges of military collaboration.

Note

1. Rpt, U.S. Army Concept Team in Vietnam, "Final Report, Project No. ACN 44F-I-114: Evaluation of Armed/Armored CH-47A Helicopter," San Francisco: Headquarters, U.S. Army Vietnam, 16 Nov 1966, 22.

Author's Note

All information, photographs, and surviving aircraft referenced are part of the holdings of the U.S. Army Aviation Museum's archival and catalogued collection. The archival collection is open to researchers by appointment. Contact information can be found at https://www.armyaviationmuseum.org/contact/.

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The Soldier's Shift from Animal to Motor Power

BY LISA M. MUNDEY

Army tanks, supported by cavalry, advance in a downpour during the Louisiana Maneuvers in September 1941.
National Archives

As the American people transitioned from animal to motor power, so too did the United States Army adopt motorization and mechanization. Motorization refers to the substitution of motor vehicles for animal-drawn transportation, whereas mechanization denotes the use of mechanical and motorized equipment for combat.[1] With more Americans becoming comfortable with motors, increasing numbers of U.S. Army recruits also had familiarity with vehicles. Of course, there were bumps along the path to adaptation of motors, and horse culture proved enduring. Though there is ample documentation of the views of decision-makers on the adoption of motor vehicles for transportation and combat, the voices of the enlisted, noncommissioned, and junior officers are far more elusive. A way to try to capture some of these voices is through cultural artifacts such as songs and cartoons, which illustrate the ways in which soldiers accommodated the transition from animal power to motor power: praising and poking fun at both.

Scholars have written much about the U.S. Army's debates concerning mechanization, particularly within the U.S. Cavalry, with researchers often casting the dynamic along a dichotomy of acceptance or rejection, innovators or traditionalists. Scholars contrast promechanization advocate Maj. Gen. Adna R. Chaffee Jr. against the stubborn proponent of the horse, the last chief of cavalry, Maj. Gen. John K. Herr. Chaffee famously denounced the traditionalism of the Army's Cavalry School by declaring "the motto of the School says 'Through Mobility We Conquer.' It does not say, 'Through Mobility on Horses Alone We Conquer.'"[2] The generals' contemporaries framed the debate in similar terms. In 1935, Lt. Col. Jonathan M. Wainwright, then assistant commandant of the Cavalry School at Fort Riley, Kansas, noted that "the Cavalry School is accused by the strong proponents of the horse as being too mechanical minded, and, by the stout supporters of mechanization, of being over 'horsey.'"[3] Other scholars recognize that acceptance and accommodation for new technology fell along a spectrum, even for Army decision-makers.[4]

With the establishment of the American automobile industry in the mid-1890s, Army leaders in the Quartermaster Corps soon began to contemplate what motor vehicles might mean for the service. Could motors replace the mule?[5] At the turn of the century, the Quartermaster Corps experimented with internal combustion engines, but the technology initially proved unreliable. Additionally, the Army already had an existing infrastructure to support animal-based transportation, from the animals themselves and the stables that housed them to the forage, wagons, and depots they used. Soldiers from the enlisted ranks through officers knew how to care for the animals and maintain the equipment and facilities. Should the Army adopt motor transport, the service needed not only to invest in the new technology, but also train drivers and maintenance personnel as well as build entirely different infrastructure to support it all. Even civilian

***Horses swimming ashore at landing at Daiquiri*, William J. Glackens, 1898**
Library of Congress

infrastructure, such as paved roads outside of city limits, had not been constructed yet.[6]

In the Spanish-American War in 1898, Army troops deployed to Cuba with their horses and mules. With the logistics challenge facing the Army, the animals sometimes had to swim to shore. For instance, when the 10th Cavalry reached Daiquirí, which lacked port facilities, the soldiers could reach shore only by small boats. The animals had to swim, and some drowned in the process when they headed out to sea instead of to land.

Though the war with Spain did not last long, the taking of San Juan Hill near Santiago, Cuba, captured the public's attention. Led by Col. Theodore Roosevelt, the 1st U.S. Volunteer Cavalry, dubbed the "Rough Riders," and the 10th Cavalry advanced on the Spanish forces atop San Juan Heights, though the U.S. soldiers mostly advanced dismounted up the lower part of the heights, known as Kettle Hill. Facing jungle vegetation, heavy Spanish fire, and barbed wire, the American troops proceeded slowly. Eventually, the Spanish fled Kettle Hill for higher ground on the neighboring San Juan Hill. American Gatling guns poured fire on the new Spanish position, forcing the defenders to abandon their post to the American troops. The successful assault made Roosevelt a national hero.[7] Numerous musical compositions celebrated Roosevelt and his Rough Riders, including "Charge of the Rough Riders," "Roosevelt's Rough Riders," and "Rough Riders in Cuba." The horses are praised as well in "The Hero of San Juan Hill" with the lyric, "With the flashing of sabres/And the prancing of steeds" as the troops fight bravely, following their leader.[8]

Animals also deployed with cavalry and artillery units to the Philippines, as the American annexation of the islands following Spain's defeat prompted armed resistance by the Filipinos. As Lt. Edmund Louis "Snitz" Gruber led a detachment through the Zambales Mountains, located on Luzon, he reportedly heard an artillery section chief call out to his horse drivers, "Come on! Keep 'em Rolling!" Reflecting on this experience, and with the help of his peers, Gruber composed "The Caissons Go Rolling Along," published in March 1908, memorializing the horse-drawn artillery. The tune and words spread through the Army:

> Over hill, over dale
> As we hit the dusty trail,
> And those caissons go rolling along.
> In and out, hear them shout,
> Counter march and right about,
> And those caissons go rolling along.
> Then it's hi! hi! hee!
> In the field artillery,
> Shout out your numbers loud and strong,
> For where e'er you go,
> You will always know
> That those caissons go rolling along.[9]

Soldiers stationed in Manila and Corregidor during and after the war enjoyed Army amenities and pastimes similar to their counterparts in the continental United States. They had sports, clubs, and dances. Polo had a particularly lauded place in Army culture, and officers stationed overseas even received extra pay to care for their horses.[10]

Soldiers loved their animals. As Marc Blackburn notes, the soldiers' emotional attachment to the horses and mules "runs all through the archival records of the period and is found in military journals published

Soldiers from the 16th Infantry and their horses take cover in the San Juan creek while under fire from Spanish troops on San Juan Hill, 1 July 1898.
Library of Congress

by the Army, most particularly the *Cavalry Journal*."[11] Across Army posts, soldiers played polo, went on hunts, and mastered equestrian events. Well before becoming a champion of mechanization in the cavalry, a young Adna Chaffee's talent on horseback earned him a spot on the team representing the United States at the International Horse Show in London, an event celebrating the coronation of George V in 1911.[12]

While the Army continued to rely on animal power, civilians adopted motor trucks for commercial freight transportation. Once internal combustion engines proved reliable, it became clear that motor trucks could transport heavy loads over long distances safely and more quickly than animals could. Plus, trucks had the advantage of not getting tired. Trucks also operated in all weather conditions, where cold, heat, and precipitation affected animals. Even in safety, trucks had the advantage. Although it might seem intuitive that slow-moving animal wagons could stop more swiftly than a faster moving truck, the opposite proved true. At moderate speeds, a truck stopped quicker.[13]

As the Quartermaster Corps came to accept the efficacy of motor transport, the true test of its operational worth came during the Mexican Expedition in 1916. At this point, few soldiers had experience maintaining or driving motor vehicles. Such inexperience and lack of care with standard operating procedures led to engine problems, broken suspensions, and other preventable damage. To find enough drivers for the expedition, the Army sought experienced soldiers from various Regular Army units, the National Guard, and even civilians.[14] Even so, the Army had to rely on soldiers who had never driven before to operate the vehicles. As Tim McNeese reports, the animal-centric culture colored soldiers' responses: a field artilleryman read up on how to drive, "took a couple of hands-on lessons, and spoke of his truck and fuel as one would a horse and hay."[15] Because there were plenty of horses available with the deployment of four cavalry units to Mexico, soldiers played polo and even went hunting during their downtime.[16]

Despite the mechanical drawbacks and driver issues, trucks did prove superior to animal-drawn wagons in Mexico and thus the American Expeditionary Forces used them in World War I. Much as it had experienced in Mexico, the Army discovered that it did not have enough vehicles, spare parts, or drivers to maintain the motor pool.[17] The Army's first foray into mechanized vehicles also encountered difficulties. Though Tank Corps training centers were established in the United States, slow production of the vehicles meant that American troops used French and British tanks. At Saint-Mihiel in September 1918, American tanks suffered mechanical failures and bogged down in mud. Tank units took heavier casualties in the Meuse-Argonne sector in September and October, while continuing to face breakdowns and mud against German trenches.[18]

A 5th Infantry wagon train crossing the desert during the U.S. expedition into Mexico, 6 May 1916.
Library of Congress

Though most of the songs created during and after World War I focused on soldiers' experiences leaving home, traveling to France, heartbreak, and patriotism, the song "The Yanks with the Tanks (Will Go Through the German Ranks)" celebrated the new tanks. Dubbed "the official song of the U.S. Tank Corps," it ignored the problems and enthusiastically promoted the service. The lyrics promised that the Americans will "roll right thru Berlin." With their new armor, it claimed, "We'll go over the top/And we're not going to stop" until the Germans surrender.[19]

A more shocking development stemming from World War I came when horse cavalry was found to be of little use on the battlefield. Though four cavalry units deployed overseas, only the 2d Cavalry Regiment faced limited combat. The rest were scattered across France. Moreover, modern battlefield conditions, such as machine guns, artillery, barbed wire, muddy shell holes, and trenches all posed problems for the animals.[20] The war had lasting effects on the Army with both a slow but advancing process of motorization and mechanization and a strong cultural rededication to the horse in combat.

Field artillery was the first combat arm to embrace motorization, even if postwar budgets made the process sluggish. In the early 1920s, the branch started motorizing its headquarters, then corps artillery, and then some of the artillery units stationed in Panama and Hawai'i. The Quartermaster Corps set up the Motor Transport School at the Holabird Quartermaster Depot in Baltimore, Maryland. It served the active and reserve components and instructed both officers and enlisted in mechanics and vehicle operations. Between 1919 and 1927, the school graduated 1,915 enlisted soldiers as well as 186 officers and 8 warrant officers.[21]

Although automobiles were still fairly scarce in 1920, with only about one-third of households having a car, by 1930 around 80 percent of households had one.[22] This widespread adoption of automobiles "changed the way people worked, conducted their business, shopped for necessities and desires, and spent leisure time."[23] Similarly, adoption of trucks and tractors changed work patterns for businesses and farmers. Trucks allowed greater distances between worksites and encouraged regional commercial and services centers. The adoption of tractors

The 1925 Fort Bliss, Texas, polo team. Major Truscott is third from left.
Courtesy of the National Museum of Polo and Hall of Fame

on farms offered significant time savings caring for draft animals. Additionally, farmers did not have to grow feed for their animals, putting more acreage into produce. Many farmers initially did not benefit from these savings because they had an emotional attachment to their animals and kept them.[24] A similar pattern emerged in the Army.

Though motorization began to be implemented, Army culture continued to cling to animals, particularly in field artillery and cavalry units. On every post, horses and riding facilities were available not only to soldiers but to their families as well. Classes were available to instruct Army spouses and children how to ride.[25] Oliver McKee, a reporter from the *Boston Evening Transcript*, visited Fort Riley and observed that soldiers' families all rode horses at the post and that "even the youngsters at the post have an eye for horse flesh and know by their first names every animal in the stables."[26] A photograph of the Ladies' Riding Group mounted outside the West Riding Hall on post attests to McKee's observations. More than a dozen women sit astride their horses, holding the animals in line for the photograph. The women appear comfortable and ready for their equestrian jaunt.[27] Besides riding, both polo and hunt clubs were popular on Army posts. In the winter months, soldiers put on equestrian displays, sometimes open to the public. Well into the 1930s, one could follow the horse shows, polo matches, and fox hunts in the *Cavalry Journal*.[28]

Songs reveled in the old horse cavalry. Along with pride in the regiment, singing together created a bond among soldiers, and the troops often sang together in groups. In 1925, D. Scotti and Joseph G. Garrison presented a nostalgic and idealized view of the horse soldier in their musical composition, "The Dashing Cavalree." The lyrics proclaim how much the cavalryman loves the combat branch and his trusty horse. The cavalryman dashes over hills and plains, where "of bit and spur I'm King." This verse depicts movement and openness, not the stagnant lines of trenches that had characterized World War I. This imagery also connotes a carefree spirit and taps into the traditional identity of American ruggedness and independence. The cavalry soldier is not so free that he neglects his obligations. When called to duty, "I will mount with saber, gun and all/ On my charger I will ride with glee." Yet even though the lyrics present the cavalry as being eager for combat, they assure listeners that the horse soldier would "ne'er forget my loved ones far and near."[29] In this song, cavalrymen exhibit the perfect balance of individualism, responsibility, and martial and riding skill.

The Cavalry School's yearbook, *The Rasp*, reflected an enthusiastic spirit for the horse. Located at Fort Riley, students learned horsemanship, participated in horse shows, and played polo. Indeed, the Special Advanced Equitation Class during the 1920s included courses on "Practical Polo" and "Conditioning and Care of Polo Ponies." Maj. Lucian K. Truscott Jr., a student in the 1925 Troop Officers Course and then an instructor at the Cavalry School, noted that "it was in horsemanship that most of the legends of the school originated."[30] The pages of the yearbooks are filled with pictures of shows, demonstrations, competitions, jumping matches, sketches and photographs of horses, and inside jokes long since lost to memory. The 1924 yearbook even featured biographies of the horses.[31] *Boston Evening Transcript* reporter McKee warned that "unless you like horses you had better steer clear of the Cavalry and The Cavalry School."[32]

Nonetheless, soldiers love to complain as much as anyone, even about the things they hold dear. And horses proved just as susceptible to students' griping as any other classroom exercise. Compared to sliding down the side of a canyon while hanging onto one's mount for dear life or struggling with a recalcitrant horse on a march, motor vehicles appeared quite comfortable and appealing.[33] For all the school's emphasis on horsemanship and love for one's horse, they could not deter one officer from writing in the 1921 yearbook, "This flesh is all right when it's on the ground or/Seated in motor car/But it suffers much when it feels the pound of a/Nag whose gait's a jar."[34]

In the 1922 edition of *The Rasp*, at least three officers poked fun at the cavalry's role in future wars. They humorously explored in sketches the ways in which the modern battlefield affected the horse cavalry and recognized some of the drawbacks it offered. In one cartoon, a winged horse and rider fly to carry a message to an airplane in the sky. The caption reads, "In case communication between the ground and plane fails, a mounted messenger will be sent up." A second illustration presents a horse and rider climbing up a telephone pole, an absurd scenario where "a mounted man on a horse equipped with spikes can string wire on telephone poles." A final sketch features a horse reared up on hind legs and a rider brandishing a sword in a charge, both wearing looks of trepidation. This caption states, "the horse is an offensive animal."[35] No matter the high-level discussions of the future of the horse in combat, these students recognized the incongruity of horses replacing modern technology.

Motorization offered some clear advantages over horses. Another sketch illustrates a convoy of motor vehicles returning from "A Tactical 'Ride.'" In this

Students at the Cavalry School at Fort Riley, Kansas, poked fun at the ways in which modern technology affected the horse in combat with this sketch in the 1922 edition of their yearbook. Martin, "Three Uses of the Horse in Future Wars," *The Rasp* (1922), 40.
U.S. Cavalry Memorial Research Library, Fort Riley, Kansas

instance, motor vehicles replaced horses for a field exercise, much to the delight of these soldiers. A student in one car comments, "pretty soft this sort of riding!!" and another one adds "this beats hell outa riding a horse!!"[36] These students appear particularly upbeat and positive concerning motor vehicles, at least as it pertained to their rear ends. Another verse suggests that the students at the Cavalry School had their fun with motor vehicles as well. A stanza from "That School at Riley" indicates that after riding tanks and writing about roads, the students took a "joy-ride in an armored car."[37]

Motor vehicles arrived on Army posts through private ownership when officers and troops brought in their personal vehicles. A student in *The Rasp* captured a moment with Maj. Henry H. "Hap" Arnold's automobile. He wrote, "Major Arnold, on a winter's night/Parked his auto, turned out the light." Another officer in the class recently had purchased a new vehicle and was immortalized in the verse, "A nice long gun and a horse to boot/A brand new car, now ain't he cute?"[38] Photographs from the era show parked cars outside

Students at the Cavalry School enjoyed some early experiments with motor vehicles replacing horses on tactical rides in this cartoon featured in their 1928 yearbook. "A Tactical 'Ride,'" *The Rasp* (1928), 145.
U.S. Cavalry Memorial Research Library, Fort Riley, Kansas



Seeing surplus World War I vehicles transporting officers around post, students at the Cavalry School lampooned the practice in their 1925 yearbook. "The Life O'Riley," *The Rasp* (1925), 46.
U.S. Cavalry Memorial Research Library, Fort Riley, Kansas

buildings and on the roads around post. One striking photograph captures Olympic equestrian Lt. Col. Hiram E. Tuttle's car covered in snow. Spouses drove families around the post in cars, and automobiles brought crowds to cavalry parades. Fort Riley had also received surplus World War I reconnaissance vehicles, which were employed to drive officers around. Students at the Cavalry School made note of these official vehicles.[39] The 1925 edition of *The Rasp* featured one speedy vehicle, dubbed "The 8 A.M. Special," rapidly whisking stern-faced officers somewhere on post.[40] As with their fellow Americans in civilian life, soldiers integrated motor vehicles in their personal life. They still worried about what motors meant for their professional lives.

Although mechanization prompted controversy, the use of motors to transport or assist the horses proved appealing. Trailers were used to transport horses. A yearbook cartoon labeled "Major Bohn's Return" captures this development. It depicts a farmer and officer riding in the front seat of an open-bed truck. A horse is laying down in back, happily dreaming of oats.[41] Soldiers also worried about horses sharing the streets with automobiles. One officer supported transportation for West Point's polo ponies and show horses. He wrote, "it is dangerous for the pedestrian to walk on the highways in this vicinity, so you can see what chances a string of horses has of going over the roads safely."[42] The Army experimented with horse transportation. For instance, Troop A, 13th Cavalry, successfully marched from Fort Riley to Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, with horses riding in trucks.[43]

Motor vehicles transported horses, captured humorously in this 1928 yearbook sketch for The Cavalry School. "Major Bohn's Return," *The Rasp* (1928), 204.
U.S. Cavalry Memorial Research Library, Fort Riley, Kansas

Though motor vehicle technology continued to mature, the earliest vehicles, especially the ones left over from World War I, were prone to breakdowns. One student criticized the new armored cars in the 1928 edition of *The Rasp*, lamenting taking off his spurs and hanging up his saddle for the mechanized vehicles. Not only do the machines stall, endure flat tires, and experience grit-filled spark plugs, "They cannot jump high hurdles/Cross streams or leap a ditch." In his view, motors are noticeably inferior to the grace and skills of a trusty horse. He complains further, "To start and stop is not an art/'Tis Done by a small switch," thus depreciating the riding skills of the horse soldier. The writer concedes that the horse cavalry did not monopolize pride and morale. He expects that a new armored car component would create its own esprit de corps "like Armored Knights," then concludes, "But when upon their mission bold/Along some well worn trail/Me thinks this whole idea will prove/Another Holy Grail."[44] His imagery of knights and the quest for the Holy Grail evokes stateliness and bold adventure, but from an era long past and one that has faded into memory. More tellingly, by conjuring visions of the fruitless pursuit of the Holy Grail along that "well worn trail," the student suggests that mechanization too will prove empty, useless, and a waste of time and energy.

This student did surmise correctly that the new mechanized units would begin to assert their own esprit de corps. Although the horse cavalry struggled with their relationship to motor vehicles, those who made the jump to the new technology turned to history for validation. In 1930, Sgt. M. M. Lyle and WO1 John A. Dapp of the 1st Tank Regiment composed the song "The Tank." Returning to the days of the First World War, the lyrics connote power and danger.

> O' She's a slashing, crashing terror,
> day or night
> She's a raging, roaring demon, full
> o' fight
> Over the top in no man's land,
> Bellowing doom on ev'ry hand,
> She's a rolling battering ram,
> Is the Tank

The song goes on to describe the tank as a "grinding, blinding devil" and "a bloody, blooming war'ior," powerful and terrifying descriptors. These images are dark and foreboding, evoking fear and helplessness against an unstoppable machine. This song contrasts starkly with the fun, entertaining, and light air of the "Dashing Cavalree." A jaunt over hills and plains is no match for "a rolling battering ram."[45]

In the 1930s, the civilian transition to the automobile for personal transportation and the truck for commercial conveyance continued to advance. With more vehicles in use, Americans became increasingly unfamiliar with animals. They simply did not own or use them anymore and thus were no longer acquainted with their upkeep or training. These same civilians became the recruiting pool for the Army.[46] So, the Army spent time teaching soldiers how to overcome their fear of horses, how to care for them, and how to ride. For the inexperienced, learning how to ride left them stiff and sore.[47] Soldiers' unfamiliarity with animals was on display when, in 1934, a battery of the 6th Field Artillery had to return to using horses after experimenting with trucks. "Since these soldiers had no training with horses and did not know how to handle the huge Belgians and Clydesdales, accidents were frequent," according to military historian Edward M. Coffman.[48] He suggested also that higher than average desertions in the cavalry and field artillery could be attributed to soldiers' dislike for the horses.[49] Unsurprisingly, when traveling in trucks rather than on horseback from Marfa, Texas, to Camp Knox, Kentucky, in December 1932, soldiers "were pleased with the comforts of riding such a long distance 'fast and smooth' in trucks that did not need grooming."[50]

Even the newly appointed chief of staff, Maj. Gen. Douglas MacArthur, realized motor cars were there to stay. As Coffman explains, MacArthur "called in the chief of cavalry [Maj. Gen. Guy V. Henry Jr.] and [gave] him a blunt message. He gestured toward the parked cars on the street outside his office and said, 'Henry, there is your cavalry of the future.'"[51] The transition—and acceptance—of mechanization still had a bumpy road ahead, and animals and motors coexisted for several more years. Although Henry did support the mechanization of the cavalry, Coffman also notes that he nevertheless rode horses and participated in horse shows.[52] Indeed, soldiers continued to play polo and run hunting clubs. So pervasive was polo as a pastime, the pilots at the Air Corps Tactical School also indulged. As Coffman and Peter F. Herrly observe, "in the Depression, newspaper photos of these foxhunts probably did not enhance the officer image for the general public."[53]

With the use of motor transport for horse cavalry in the 1934 Fort Riley Maneuvers, the acceptance of motorization appeared complete. Even the predominantly proanimal *Cavalry Journal* acknowledges that without motor transport at the 1934 Fort Riley Maneuvers, the movements of the horse cavalry would have been curtailed by half.[54] In appreciation of the cavalry's move toward motorized transport, M. Sgt. John J. Reardon from the chief of cavalry's office wrote to the *Cavalry Journal*, "We can well remember the days—not so long ago—when, going into the field, we depended upon our escort wagon and four-line team of mules to get our camp and field equipment up. We also remember the late arrival of this equipment, with growling bellies and growling soldiers."[55]

In contrast, Maj. Wilfrid M. Blundt took the opposite view in his 1935 article in the *Cavalry Journal*, titled "Motor Truck or Covered Wagon?" He pointed out that motorized transport burdened horsed combat units because they did not have vehicles to replace broken down supply trucks or a proper reserve of maintenance personnel. Although the text of the article is moderate in tone, the author's accompanying cartoons offer a more biting view of the issue. One frame shows a covered wagon pulled by cheerful horses and directed by a cavalryman. With a fair bit of nostalgia, it suggests that animal-drawn transportation ran smoothly in the days past, keeping everyone happy and encountering little difficulty.



Nostalgia colored the view of animal-drawn transport as proceeding more smoothly than modern supply trucks in this 1935 sketch in the *Cavalry Journal*. Wilfrid M. Blundt, "Motor Truck or Covered Wagon?" *Cavalry Journal* (Jan–Feb 1935), 14.
Texas A&M University Libraries

In the next picture, a broken-down motor truck sits on the road. A very unhappy horse strains to pull the truck, while his worried rider looks back over his shoulder. Its caption questions, "Economical Use of Transportation?" and Blundt's answer is clearly in the negative. It also suggests that motor vehicles cause more problems with supply than they solved. A third sketch shows two soldiers hunched over the hood of a broken-down truck with the label, "Fighting Men on the Job." Blundt did not appreciate the unreliability of the machines and believed breakdowns wasted the time of combat soldiers. It also is mocking mechanical skills as unsoldierly. Finally, the fourth drawing depicts soldiers hiding behind trees in a forest with the caption, "Problem: Find a Trained Soldier."[56] Blundt suggests both that there were few soldiers trained to operate and maintain motor vehicles and that soldiers avoided those duties anyway. Nevertheless, the times were changing.

Motorization affected the course work at the Cavalry School. Along with traditional horsemanship, the school added new courses in radio and motor vehicles to the curriculum and eventually established a separate Motor Department. Instead of fine-tuning riding skills, the Horsemanship Department faculty taught riding basics to officers who had little prior experience with animals.[57] Polo, hunting, and horse shows remained popular, but trucks and automobiles sped about post.[58] To gain convoy experience, the 2d Cavalry Regiment assisted the Civilian Conservation Corps by hauling supplies via motor transport to their camps.[59]

As the Army experimented with mechanization, the new machines drew corresponding critical humor from soldiers. Soldiers poked fun at the early versions of J. Walter Christie's tanks—dubbed "combat cars" to conform with the National Defense Act of 1920, which assigned tanks to the Infantry branch, or "Christies" after the name of their designer.[60] They invented new lyrics to Gruber's field artillery song, "The Caissons Go Rolling Along," calling the new tune "Lament of the Cavalry Tanker." Noting that the vehicles were "first on wheels then on tracks," the frequent breakdowns meant that the soldiers had to "break our bloody backs" to "keep those Christies a-rolling along." By the end of the song, the soldiers prayed "Lord keep them rolling/ Keep those Christies a-rolling along."[61]

Even the *Cavalry Journal*, long a bastion of horse advocacy, finally reflected the changing times. In 1938, the publication included on its pages a crest that featured an airplane, machine gun, scout car, and armored car surrounding a horse. Though still focusing on the centrality of the horse, the crest accounted for the modern elements as well. In 1940, the *Cavalry Journal* acknowledged the motor components of the cavalry by adding to its cover silhouettes of a motorcycle, a scout car, an armored car, cavalry trailer, and other modern equipment. The new icons sped along in a line underneath the Frederic Remington sketch of an equestrian that had featured prominently on the cover for decades.[62]

During World War II, Fort Riley hosted the Cavalry Replacement Training Center. There instructors educated cavalrymen in both horse and mechanized principles, though no horse cavalry originating from



Focusing on the drawbacks of motor vehicle breakdowns, the author looks back with nostalgia on animal-drawn transport in this 1935 sketch in the *Cavalry Journal*. Wilfrid M. Blundt, "Economical Use of Transportation?" *Cavalry Journal* (Jan–Feb 1935), 15.
Texas A&M University Libraries

the U.S. saw action in the war. One soldier, J. F. Carithers, trained at Fort Riley as a horse cavalryman. He noted that his fellow recruits, unfamiliar with horses, looked upon them with fear. After his horse instruction, Carithers stayed on post for the Advanced Communications course, where his field experience came in jeeps and command cars. He then headed out to the South Pacific, where he never used his equestrian skills.[63]

Capt. Robert Meredith Willson tried to imbue the new mechanized units with the history and esprit de corps of the horse cavalry. In "Hit the Leather: Cavalry Song," dedicated to the Cavalry School, Willson intermingled lyrics for both the old horse cavalry and the new armored branch. He connected elements such as "Now the spurs blend their jingle with the clank of a tank" and "Let every son of a gallopin' Yank/ jump in a saddle or tank/hit the leather and ride all the way." His words praise both the horse and tank and give them a common heritage. Willson penned, "Although we're glad to know the Infantry's behind us/ They'll have to eat Cavalry dust to find us"—dust kicked up from either the horses or the mechanized cavalry. In either case, it was better to be in the cavalry than in the infantry. For the tanks he writes, "our mechanized security is money in the bank," an assertion of assurance and confidence in the new arm. For the horses, he envisions "Let the hoofs ring true/in a wild tattoo," a statement tinged more with nostalgia than with any sense of the horse's ability to fight and win the current war. Despite the new machines, Willson assures his listeners, "you'll recognize the outfit" as cavalry. He had faith that the cavalry in whichever form would, as "Colonel Teddy and Custer know, . . . muster when the great day comes."[64]

Once motor vehicles were entrenched securely in the Army, poking fun at their drawbacks became an officially sanctioned practice. The official Army songbook included yet another parody of Gruber's field artillery song. In this version, the lyrics proclaimed, "Over hill, over dale, motorized from head to tail/With the caissons and hosses all gone." Just like the earlier "Lament of the Cavalry Tanker," the soldiers were stuck with broken-down vehicles: "Stop to fix up a flat, or to get the captain's hat/Motor trucks with the pieces hooked on." Instead of sounding off one's numbers, soldiers were instructed to "sound off your klaxon loud and strong (SQUAWK! SQUAWK!)." With a bit of nostalgia the song concludes, "If our engines go dead, won't our faces all get red!" with the consequence, "For the foreman, of course, will yell at us, 'Get a horse!'"[65] No one expected the field artillery or the cavalry to return to horses, though some traditionalists continued to advocate such a move.[66] Perhaps the soldiers knew the "Parody Field Artillery Song" well. A War Department study on the "Attitudes of American Troops" published in December 1943 indicated that marching songs and service songs were popular with service members, apparently as much as the latest radio tunes.[67]

Both animals and motors coexisted in the decades from the introduction of the automobile to the Second World War. Just like American civilian society, the soldiers of the U.S. Army initially accommodated the new technology, while remaining attached to their animals. As motor vehicles increasingly became prevalent in society, soldiers became more familiar with that technology and less with animal care. With a soldier's right to complain, both horses and motor vehicles were targets for praise, criticism, and parody in song and cartoons. By the time the Army adopted the lyrics of the present version of "The Army Goes Rolling Along" in 1952 (also sung to Gruber's tune), a verse of the song could—without irony—place "San Juan Hill and Patton's tanks" in the same line, tension between horses and motors already forgotten.[68]

Dr. Lisa M. Mundey earned her PhD from Kansas State University. She has worked in government and academic history and has published on the American antimilitarist tradition, the U.S. service member experience in Iraq and Afghanistan, and Cold War history. She volunteers at the New York State Military Museum.

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1. David E. Johnson, *Fast Tanks and Heavy Bombers: Innovation in the U.S. Army, 1917–1945* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998), 98; The Command and General Staff School, *The Tactical Employment of Cavalry (Tentative)* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Command and General Staff School Press, 1937), 80; Vincent J. Tedesco III, "'Greasy Automatons' and 'the Horsey Set': The U.S. Cavalry and Mechanization, 1928–1940" (master's thesis, Pennsylvania State University, 1995), 7–8.

2. Johnson, *Fast Tanks and Heavy Bombers*, 125; Mildred Gillie, *Forging the Thunderbolt: A History of the Development of the Armored Force* (Harrisburg, PA: The Military Service Publishing Company, 1947), 68; George F. Hofmann, *Through Mobility We Conquer: The Mechanization of U.S. Cavalry* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2006), 183. Other key studies on mechanization include Dale E. Wilson, *Treat 'Em Rough! The Birth of American Armor, 1917–20* (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1989); Timothy Nenninger, "Organizational Milestones in the Development of American Armor, 1920–1940," in *Camp Colt to Desert Storm: The History of U.S. Armored Forces*, ed. George Hofmann and Donn Starry (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1999), 37–66.

3. Jonathan M. Wainwright, "Mobility," *Cavalry Journal* 44, no. 191 (Sep–Oct 1935), 20.

4. Tedesco, "'Greasy Automatons,'" 11, 17–18. Tedesco adopts the framework established in Harold Winton, *To Change an Army: General Sir John Burnett-Stuart and British Armored Doctrine, 1927–1938* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1988). Whereas Winton's spectrum runs from reactionaries to conservatives, progressives, reformers, and revolutionaries, Tedesco argues that the Americans fell mostly into the conservative, progressive, and reformer groups. Alexander Bielakowski examines general officers exclusively and divides them into three groups: Traditional (John K. Herr and Hamilton S. Hawkins), Progressive (Daniel Van Voorhis, Adna Chaffee Jr., Guy V. Henry Jr., and Leon B. Kromer), and Pragmatic (George S. Patton). Alexander M. Bielakowski, "U.S. Army Cavalry Officers and the Issue of Mechanization, 1920–1942" (PhD diss., Kansas State University, 2002), 6–9. See also Alexander M. Bielakowski, *From Horses to Horsepower: The Mechanization and Demise of the U.S. Cavalry, 1916–1950* (Charleston, SC: Fonthill, 2019).

5. Vincent Curcio, *Henry Ford* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 25–27; Marc K. Blackburn, *The United States Army and the Motor Truck: A Case Study in Standardization* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1996), 5–6.

6. Blackburn, *United States Army and the Motor Truck*, 7; Curcio, *Henry Ford*, 40.

7. Tim McNeese, *Time in the Wilderness: The Formative Years of John "Black Jack" Pershing in the American West* (Lincoln, NE: Potomac Books, 2021), 205, 212–15. See also Graham

A. Cosmas, *An Army for Empire: The United States Army in the Spanish-American War* (Shippensburg, PA: White Mane, 1994).

8. Henri Hertz Andrews, "Charge of the Rough Riders," 1900, Dr. Danny O. Crew Theodore Roosevelt Sheet Music Collection, Theodore Roosevelt Center, Dickinson State University, Dickinson, ND (hereinafter Roosevelt Sheet Music Collection), https://www.theodorerooseveltcenter.org/Research/Digital-Library/Record?libID=o293262; Sylvester Prout, "Roosevelt's Rough Riders," 1898, Roosevelt Sheet Music Collection, https://www.theodorerooseveltcenter.org/Research/Digital-Library/Record?libID=o293314; Frank J. Bohacek Novak, "Rough Riders in Cuba," 1907, Roosevelt Sheet Music Collection, https://www.theodorerooseveltcenter.org/Research/Digital-Library/Record?libID=o293374; Naomi E. Nicholson (words) and Victor Arnette (music), "The Hero of San Juan," 1904, Roosevelt Sheet Music Collection, https://www.theodorerooseveltcenter.org/Research/Digital-Library/Record?libID=o293373. The spelling of "sabres" appears in the original sheet music.

9. "The Army Goes Rolling Along," Library of Congress, https://www.loc.gov/collections/patriotic-melodies/articles-and-essays/army-goes-rolling-along/, accessed 30 Apr 2025. In 1917, John Philip Sousa wrote a march for the lyrics and it became "The Field Artillery Song." "The Army Song," U.S. Army, https://www.army.mil/values/song.html, accessed 18 Apr 2025. For the Philippine War, see Brian McAllister Linn, *The Philippine War, 1899–1902* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2000); David J. Silbey, *A War of Frontier and Empire: The Philippine-American War, 1899–1902* (New York: Hill and Wang, 2008).

10. Brian McAllister Linn, *Guardians of Empire: The U.S. Army and the Pacific, 1902–1940* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997), 120. He notes that the officers received the subsistence pay for the horses immediately but had to wait until five years of service was complete to receive extra pay for wives.

11. Norman Miller Cary Jr., "The Use of the Motor Vehicle in the United States Army, 1899–1939" (PhD diss., University of Georgia, 1980), 83.

12. Gillie, *Forging the Thunderbolt*, 27.

13. Blackburn, *United States Army and the Motor Truck*, 8.

14. Cary, "Use of the Motor Vehicle," 95, 99; Blackburn, *United States Army and the Motor Truck*, 19.

15. McNeese, *Time in the Wilderness*, 321. See also Blackburn, *United States Army and the Motor Truck*, 18–22; Julie Irene Prieto, *The Mexican Expedition, 1916–1917* (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2016).

16. McNeese, *Time in the Wilderness*, 343–44. The 7th Cavalry, 10th Cavalry, 11th Cavalry, and 13th Cavalry deployed.

17. Blackburn, *United States Army and the Motor Truck*, 32; A. Ludlow Clayden, "Must Train Military Truck Drivers," *The Automobile* 36, no. 16 (19 Apr 1917): 768; Rpt, "Report of the Inspector General," War Dept Annual Rpts, 1919, vol. 1, part 1, 651, Folder: War Department Annual Reports, 1919, Box 196, Motor Transport, US Army Chronological File, 1890–1947, Historical Manuscript File, Office of the Chief of Military History, Record Group (RG) 319, National Archives, College Park, MD (NACP).

18. Dale E. Wilson, "World War I: The Birth of American Armor," in Hofmann and Starry, *Camp Colt to Desert Storm*, 1, 7, 14, 21–28; Hoffman, *Through Mobility We Conquer*, 63.

19. "World War I," The Library of Congress Celebrates the Songs of America, Library of Congress, https://www.loc.gov/item/ihas.200197499, accessed 1 May 2025; Jimmie Shea, "The Yanks with the Tanks (Will Go Through the German Ranks" (New York: Broadway Music Corporation, 1918), Library of Congress, https://www.loc.gov/item/2009371498/, accessed 1 May 2025. The original lyrics use the word "Boches," a derogatory term for German soldiers.

20. Johnson, *Fast Tanks and Heavy Bombers*, 124; Hoffman, *Through Mobility We Conquer* 60–62. The 2d Cavalry, 3d Cavalry, 6th Cavalry, and 15th Cavalry deployed with the American Expeditionary Forces.

21. Blackburn, *United States Army and the Motor Truck*, 53, 57; Rpt, "Report of the Quartermaster General," War Dept Annual Rpts, 1928, Folder: War Department Annual Reports, 1919, Box 196, Motor Transport, US Army Chronological File, 1890–1947, Historical Manuscript File, Office of the Chief of Military History, RG 319, NACP.

22. David E. Kyvig, *Daily Life in the United States, 1920–1939: Decades of Promise and Pain* (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 2002), 21.

23. Ibid., 22.

24. Ibid., 34–36.

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26. Oliver McKee Jr., "With the 'Cavalree' at Fort Riley," *Boston Evening Transcript*, reprinted in *Cavalry Journal* 34, no. 138 (Jan 1925): 72.

27. Photo, "Ladies Riding Group Outside West Riding Hall, 1920s–30s" (HCAB 4391), Photos, Buildings, U.S. Cavalry Memorial Research Library, U.S. Cavalry Association (USCA), Fort Riley, Kansas.

28. Coffman, *The Regulars*, 254, 258, 260; Johnson, *Fast Tanks and Heavy Bombers*, 125. The *Cavalry Journal* offers a steady report of polo matches and horse shows by regiment. The journal also offers numerous articles on these subjects, such as "Hunts at Fort Riley," *Cavalry Journal* 40, no. 164 (Mar–Apr 1931): 54; Maj. W. M. Grimes, "Fox Hunting in the Army," *Cavalry Journal* 43, no. 181 (Jan–Feb 1934): 9–12; Capt. Clark L. Ruffner, "Polo in the 5th Cavalry," *Cavalry Journal* 46, no. 200 (Mar–Apr 1937): 130–32; James V. Morrison, *F Troop–The Real One* (Hiawatha, KS: R. W. Sutherland Printing, 1988), 58.

29. Lucian K. Truscott Jr., *The Twilight of the U.S. Cavalry: Life in the Old Army, 1917–1942* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1989), xiv; and D. Scotti and Joseph G. Garrison, "The Dashing Cavalree," in Maj. Vern D. Campbell, "Armor and Cavalry Music Part II," *Armor* 80, no. 3 (May–Jun 1971): 33–34.

30. Truscott, *Twilight of the U.S. Cavalry*, 85.

31. R. M. Eichelsdoerfer, ed., *The Rasp: The Cavalry Service Annual* (Fort Riley, KS: U.S. Army Cavalry School,1924), 13, 15, 44–59.

32. McKee, "With the 'Cavalree' at Fort Riley," 71.

33. "Magazine Canyon Slide," in *The Rasp: The Cavalry Service Annual*, ed. W. R. Pope (Fort Riley, KS: U.S. Army Cavalry School,1926), 246; "Dismount and Pull," in *The Rasp*, ed. Richmond, Bauskett, Gregory (Fort Riley, KS: U.S. Army Cavalry School,1921), n.p.

34. "Gaits A Jar," in Richmond, Bauskett, Gregory, *The Rasp*, n.p.

35. "Three Uses of the Horse in Future Wars," in *The Rasp: The Cavalry Service Annual*, ed. John T. McClane (Fort Riley, KS: U.S. Army Cavalry School, 1922), 40. Emphases in the original.

36. "A Tactical 'Ride,'" in *The Rasp: The Cavalry Service Annual*, C. L. Clifford (Fort Riley, KS: U.S. Army Cavalry School, 1928), 145.

37. "That School at Riley," in ibid., 183.

38. "Idols of the Air," in *The Rasp: The Cavalry Service Annual*, ed. E. L. N. Glass (Fort Riley, KS: U.S. Army Cavalry School, 1927), 171–72.

39. Photograph: Car Outside Arnold Hall taken in 1920s (HCAB 4109), Photos, People, The U.S. Cavalry Memorial Research Library, USCA, Fort Riley, Kansas; Photograph: Scout Cars 1930s (HCAB 1455), Photos, People, The U.S. Cavalry Memorial Research Library, USCA, Fort Riley, Kansas; Photograph: Snow on Hiram Tuttle's Car, 1930s (HCAB 4352), Photos, People, The U.S. Cavalry Memorial

Research Library, USCA, Fort Riley, Kansas; Pope, *The Rasp*, 44, 137, 182; Truscott, *Twilight of the U.S. Cavalry*, 73.

40. "The Life O'Riley," in *The Rasp: The Cavalry School Annual*, ed. R. S. Parker (Fort Riley, KS: U.S. Army Cavalry School, 1925), 46.

41. Frank M. Harshberge, "Major Bohn's Return," in Clifford, *The Rasp*, 204.

42. Ltr, Capt. Martin, West Point, to Lt. Col. J. J. O'Hare, Ofc of the Ch of Cavalry, 4 Oct 1920, Untitled Folder, Box 48, Document File, 1923–1942 451.3-451.4, Office of the Chief of Cavalry, RG 177, NACP.

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45. Quoted in Campbell, "Armor and Cavalry Music, Part II," 34.

46. Cary, "Use of the Motor Vehicle," 227.

47. Coffman, *The Regulars*, 308–9.

48. Ibid., 267.

49. Ibid., 313.

50. Ibid., 271.

51. Ibid., 270.

52. Ibid.

53. Edward M. Coffman and Peter F. Herrly, "The American Regular Army Officer Corps Between the World Wars: A Collective Biography," *Armed Forces and Society* 4, no.1 (Fall 1977): 58.

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55. M. Sgt. John J. Reardon, "The Evolution of Transportation," *Cavalry Journal* 44, no. 187 (Jan–Feb 1935): 46.

56. Wilfrid M. Blundt, "Motor Truck or Covered Wagon?," *Cavalry Journal* 44, no. 187 (Jan–Feb 1935): 14–16.

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

ARMIES IN RETREAT: CHAOS, COHESION, AND CONSEQUENCES

EDITED BY TIMOTHY G. HECK AND WALKER D. MILLS

Army University Press, 2023
Pp x, 436. Free Download

REVIEW BY TOM VANCE

I was an Army ROTC cadet sitting in a Military Science tactics class when I raised my hand and asked how to retreat. Of course, my classmates met my question with great laughter. Our instructor, however—an infantry captain with combat experience in the Vietnam War—was not laughing. It turns out that a retreat is one of the most difficult military maneuvers.

This volume, *Armies in Retreat: Chaos, Cohesion, And Consequences*, comprises eighteen case studies.[1] Per the introduction: "Some failed on the battlefield while others retreated to prepare for counterattacks or to buy time. While retreating, some armies were unable to maintain cohesion and hold together while others succeeded. Some remained relatively stable, others did not" (3). With that, we have the genesis of the subtitle and the book's three themes: chaos, cohesion, and consequences, arranged chronologically within each section.

Both editors serve in uniform. Timothy Heck is a reservist and a joint historian with the Marine Corps History Detachment and Joint History Office. Trained as an artillery officer, Heck is the author of *Enduring Success: Consolidation of Gains in Large-Scale Combat Operations* (Army University Press, 2022). He coedited *On Contested Shores: The Evolving Role of Amphibious Operations in the History of Warfare* (Marine Corps University Press, 2020) and wrote chapters in *Deep Maneuver: Historical Case Studies of Maneuver in Large-Scale Combat Operations* (Army University Press, 2018).

Walker Mills is a Marine Corps infantry captain with a bachelor's degree in history from Brown University and a master's degree in international relations and modern war from King's College London. He is a nonresident fellow at Marine Corps University's Brute Krulak Center for Innovation and Future Warfare and a nonresident fellow with the Irregular Warfare Initiative, a collaboration between West Point's Modern War Institute and Princeton's Empirical Studies of Conflict Project. Mills's writing includes chapters in three books and more than sixty articles.

Heck and Mills bring together a diverse group of authors, including both armed forces and civilian military historians, active-duty and retired personnel, and independent scholars. In-depth notes support this collection, and they are positioned at the end of each chapter for easy reference. This volume is visually engaging, featuring subheads, thirty-two color maps, dozens of black-and-white photos, and organizational tables, charts, and orders of battle. The addition of an index may have been useful, especially for those looking for particulars such as rearguard actions.

This broad brush of history takes us from a night evacuation during the Peloponnesian War to the book's conclusion, addressing the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan. According to Mills, Afghanistan was "a tragic validation of one of the initial sparks for this volume: that the U.S. military needed to study historical cases of withdrawals and retreats because it would one day need to draw on that knowledge" (423).

World War II receives the most coverage, with five chapters. There are two chapters each on the Revolutionary War, the Napoleonic Wars, the American Civil War, World War I, and the Korean War, as well as one chapter each on the Seven Years' War (focused on Frederick the Great) and cyber warfare. Students of the Napoleonic Wars (such as me) will be surprised that Napoleon Bonaparte's infamous 1812 retreat from Moscow does not make the cut, but is mentioned as an example of how retreat studies are often undervalued. Perhaps the most dramatic chapter is Eric Allan Sibul's account of the "spectacular logistical operation" of the fighting withdrawal of X Corps, 1st Marine Division, during the Korean War—trains continued to move supplies forward to the rear guard while personnel, refugees, and materiel withdrew (253).

In keeping with the U.S. Army's 250th anniversary, the American Revolutionary War chapters deserve special mention. Writing in the cohesion section, Jonathan D. Bratten, a National Guard officer and Army historian, brings us "Retreat to Victory: The Northern Army's Campaigns, 1775–1777." Bratten pens the most notable comment in the book when he states, "The birth of the U.S. Army lies in retreat" (137). He recounts the 350-mile-long retreat of the Continental Army following an unsuccessful attack on British forces in Canada. To maintain their army's integrity, this retreat provided the opportunity for victory at Saratoga in 1777, marking the first surrender of a British field army in the war. Bratten's reasons for this success: Northern Army's generals "shared the hardships of their soldiers and led by personal example," the retreat "bought the time to concentrate more forces," General George Washington "was willing to take operational risks," retreat into interior lines

allowed for resupply, and "leaders at all levels did not lose their fighting spirit or desire to seize the momentum again." He also notes that the Continental Army realized that keeping the army intact was more important than holding ground (151).

In the first chapter of the consequences section, Patrick H. Hannum shares, "Cornwallis in the 1781 Yorktown Campaign: When an Attack Becomes a Defense, a Siege, and a Surrender." Hannum, a retired Marine Corps lieutenant colonel and a recently retired civilian professor at the National Defense University, reminds us that the American Revolution was a global war "involving great powers using proxies to engage in direct conflict" (280). Thus, Yorktown was not a traditional retreat. As part of what the British Army called its southern strategy, they "envisioned liberating the rebellious southern colonies" (281). Lt. Gen. Charles Cornwallis faced strong resistance, particularly from irregular warfare between patriot and loyalist militias. Even with battlefield victories, he could not sustain offensive operations and sought safety at Yorktown, Virginia. Although the Royal Navy typically enjoyed command of the North American coast, a two-month window of British naval repositioning allowed the French navy to control the Chesapeake Bay, preventing the British navy from reinforcing or evacuating Cornwallis, and bringing the war to an end. Overextended lines of operations and the lack of a British joint commander in the theater were other causes for failure. Overall, the British "did not possess the numbers of ground troops needed to seize, pacify, and secure the countryside" (284).

Acknowledging the importance of chance and uncertainty in warfare, Walter Mills concludes that, "During the confused chaos of a retreat or collapse, armies and units are held together by their leaders—whether generals, admirals, captains or sergeants. These leaders—more than any other single factor—determine whether cohesion is maintained or lost" (427).

Congratulations to the Army University Press for publishing this readable and well-documented collection of lessons learned in a neglected genre of military studies.

Tom Vance is a retired Army Reserve lieutenant colonel with bachelor's and master's degrees in history from Western Michigan University, where he received his Army ROTC commission, and branched into the Adjutant General Corps. He served on active duty in the New York Area Command (Brooklyn); 1st Armored Division (Germany); and Second ROTC Region (Fort Knox, KY), followed by reserve duty as an evening ROTC instructor at his alma mater and in public affairs assignments in Washington, D.C.

Note

1. Available from Army University Press as a1. PDF: https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/Research%20and%20Books/2023/ArmiesRetrt-HeckMills-2023.pdf



FRONT TOWARD ENEMY: WAR, VETERANS, AND THE HOMEFRONT

By Daniel R. Green

Rowman & Littlefield, 2021
Pp. x, 215. $38

Review by Robert T. Carter Jr.

This book can be considered a prerequisite or staple for understanding veterans. *Front Toward Enemy: War, Veterans, and the Homefront* synthesizes many of the issues related to wartime service in a very readable and well-documented manner. We benefit from the author Daniel R. Green's conversations with other veterans to "broaden the public discussion about veterans returning home from war" and his research and use of sources from the Revolutionary War to current operations (x). He does this from the perspective of one who has served, as well as from his overlapping vocations as a political scientist and former defense official. The book is broken down into nine chapters. Each chapter offers a reflection that begins with a quote and is supported by applications from other literary sources on war, trauma, and examples from real life and media. A recurring theme in the text is the changes that occur because of the experience of military service during a time of war. The author has earned his bona fides from his academic work as a PhD and being a commander in the U.S. Navy Reserve with four mobilizations supporting the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as serving with the U.S. Department of State as the political adviser for a provincial reconstruction team in Afghanistan.

The book begins with a prologue that sets the stage for the author's intentions in his writing and concludes with an epilogue that closes out his thoughts. The text includes notes at the end, as well as a bibliography and index. The quotes that start each chapter and the examples used throughout will provide a list of next-to-read recommendations from sources readers have not already explored, helping us discuss *War, Veterans, and the Homefront*.

One of the book's strengths is the use of quotes to open each chapter, illustrating the points the author is making. These quotations, unlike many other books in this category, stretch back to the Revolutionary War, the Civil War, and the World Wars and are not focused just on Vietnam or the Global War on Terrorism. They draw from both fiction and nonfiction. The use of literature helps underscore some of the diverse ways that veterans have developed to reenter and react in society after their participation in armed conflict has ended. In the military, we develop and adapt systems that work for us physically, mentally, and spiritually, enabling us to function effectively when engaged in war. Those systems do not always work for us when we return home. Green has an insight from his reserve service that resonates with those who have transitioned from the National Guard and Reserve (components 2 and 3) services, which is not always present when an author draws solely from active-duty service (component 1). The scope of the book illustrates the changes that have occurred in our society, contributing to

various stressors and strains on relationships for veterans from different conflicts. In reading the book, we gain insight into the generational experiences of serving and returning home from war—what each of those generations faced as challenges and contributed to society in general, and those who would serve later. The writing also highlights the sense of separation that is prevalent in our country now because of the transition to an all-volunteer force. The first chapter, "No Victory Parades," explores the tension many veterans have when "[t]hey often long to return to war but hope to never go again and are stuck in a nether world of war without end and peace that does not exist" (2). This chapter provides a foundation, drawing on quotes from subject matter experts who have examined the wartime and veteran experience. For the veterans from components 2 and 3 who are not among peers still serving or living in an area with a large veteran community, this chapter can validate the normalcy of what they are feeling and thinking. It also explores the terms those who were "in" used and the thoughts and biases that exist in society. In addition to the changes wrought by the all-volunteer force, Green looks at the results that have come from integrating men and women into jobs that were exclusively male in the past, and how that has influenced how society defines masculinity.

The second chapter, "The Mind of the War Veteran," identifies factors that influence veterans based on what phase they were serving in during a campaign (invasion, endurance, surge, and withdrawal) (33) and the conditions that they experienced—"(1) risk tolerance, (2) rules and regulations, (3) different levels and types of violence, (4) knowledge of insurgency, and (5) understanding of local culture and relationships with locals" (33)—as well as the type of job and location for their service. What we may perceive as an unconscious habit or personality trait, often because of training, becomes an obvious function of decisions made to minimize risk and maximize success, as observed in this section.

The third chapter, "Camaraderie, Love and Humor," begins with a personal reflection from a conversation with the author's grandmother. The book is dedicated to his grandfather who served in World War II. Green's grandmother taught him about the cost of service and the marks it left on his grandfather to be a member of the club for "those who went to war." In exploring how military members adapt to the value of selfless service, he begins to reveal some of the character differences that develop between those who have served and those who have not. The training and relationships provided to war veterans include both skills and strategies that can be beneficial, as well as those that create challenges upon their return home.

The fourth chapter, "Zombies, Movies, and Video Games," unpacks how many veterans struggle because "the authority and, frankly, power they had in war is difficult to replicate on the home front once they demobilize" (87). In addition to the ways this can be addressed in video games and zombie-themed shows, there are recommendations made for media to watch that can help those who have not gone to war understand this. It also gives us pause to consider how a generation/culture remembers its war, how it is written about in fiction, science fiction, and portrayed in films and television shows that craft the myths and legends of those conflicts.

The fifth chapter, "War Memoirs," is the story of a generation that has gone to war: "these books are communications among the members of that secret army, the men who have been there and will understand, as other generations will not and cannot" (91). This element connects with points made in the previous chapters. In addition to the differences between how war is imagined in our minds and how it unfolds in real life, this section also leads to issues that will be discussed in chapter 8 regarding stolen valor. The chapter includes black-and-white photos from the author's own service.

The sixth chapter, "Vietnam War," delves into how the media has portrayed the war, often with a theme of loss of innocence. The chapter also looks at back-home estrangement and what that negative sentiment contributed to how those who have not served view veterans. The author describes the prominent books of this era and what they offer in terms of lessons learned and points developed, contributing to the myths and legends that emerged from that war and how they resonate with the veterans' "war-in-his-head" (117). As the author notes, "These myths and legends became the reference points for many Afghanistan and Iraq veterans of what fighting and insurgency by U.S. forces really entailed and will impact how these wars are remembered and chronicled for future generations" (117–18). This has affected U.S. strategic thinking, how the military has been shaped for the modern age, and our culture.

The seventh chapter, "Militaria," looks at what members of the military bring back and hold onto. War veterans also return with mementos of close calls with death, such as bullets and shell fragments, or deeply meaningful items from their time in a country such as a stone, some dirt, or an item connected to the death of a comrade (128). The chapter explores what has been sent home and collected in past conflicts, as well as the art of what is collected now.

The eighth chapter, "Stolen Valor and Fake Veterans," delves into the reaction of those who have served that leads them to unmask those who seek to feign service experience or claim awards they did not earn. The chapter explores how the medals soldiers currently receive have evolved and some of the functions and rules governing these awards. This aspect is tied back to the author's exploration of the changing conceptions of masculinity in American culture.

The ninth chapter, "Veteran Politicians," explores how status as a veteran can be beneficial for those aspiring to serve in the political sphere. The author examines what a veteran gains from serving and interacting with others from diverse ethnicities and economic backgrounds, which can aid them in their quest for political office. The lessons learned and politics from fighting the counterinsurgencies of Afghanistan and Iraq have raised new issues for today's veterans to work through. The chapter highlights the service of significant candidates for public office who have veteran status.

"In wars without victory parades, when there is no decisive victory, are veterans ever truly home?" is the author's closing question (183). How do we treat those who served in Afghanistan and Iraq? How did those who grew up in the shadow of Vietnam War's legacy and with the lenses of success from World War II and the Gulf War, temper their views? The tragedy of Somalia and the "Black Hawk Down" incident (182) is a key example of this problem. The current generation of veterans may have ended their military service as a casualty, completed the time they were obligated to serve, or reached their mandatory retirement date (officers) or expiration term of service (enlisted). They are looking for discussions and congratulations on a job well done,

which show that their service and sacrifice have been valued.

Front Toward Enemy is recommended highly for anyone who wishes to learn more about how veteran culture is formed and about the challenges that veterans face upon return from war. It can be beneficial for those who have not served, family members, and generations from other wars to assist their understanding. It will help to build bridges for communication and support with their fellow brothers and sisters in arms from other conflicts and eras.

Robert T. Carter Jr. retired from military service with over thirty-one years in the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve, finishing as a chaplain (colonel). He entered military service after receiving a Reserve Officers' Training Corps commission and a bachelor's degree from Loyola University, Chicago. He is a veteran of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, serving as an embedded trainer in the Afghan National Army and mobilized as a chaplain in support of COVID–19 mitigation operations. He also holds a master's degree in library science from Southern Connecticut State University, a master's in divinity from Concordia Seminary, St. Louis, and a doctorate in ministry (mental health and chaplaincy) from Vanderbilt University, Nashville. He is a board-certified chaplain working as the director of pastoral care for Montefiore Nyack Hospital, New York, and leads Lutheran worship at the Old Cadet Chapel at the U.S. Military Academy.



CONNECTED SOLDIERS: LIFE, LEADERSHIP, AND SOCIAL CONNECTIONS IN MODERN WAR

BY JOHN SPENCER

Potomac Books, 2022

Pp. xxiii, 246. $24.95

REVIEWED BY SAI ON NG

John Spencer's book offers a unique perspective on the lives of soldiers in combat and the leadership challenge of building a team in the era of the internet. He underscores the importance of cohesion in the military, a concept he explores through the lens of Audie Murphy, the most decorated soldier of World War II, who famously fought bravely because his friends were being killed (5, 71). Spencer's book is a valuable resource for those seeking to understand the complexities of military life and the role of leadership in fostering cohesion. According to Spencer's book, proficiency in influencing others toward the right standards and fostering teamwork characterizes good leadership (108). He illustrates this claim through his firsthand experiences as a platoon leader and testimonies from his soldiers on fostering cohesion during his first deployment to Iraq in 2003. Later, Spencer recounts how he transformed an incohesive company within a battalion into a champion team during his second deployment to Iraq in 2008, despite the challenges of maintaining soldier connections in the digital age.

Murphy stated that an organic approach is essential to building unit cohesion, where soldiers see each other as friends. Spencer provides numerous insights and research into the natural development of cohesion. One interesting point is about boredom. He writes, "Research indicates that strong bonds are actually forged through social cohesion during the long hours of boredom that characterize soldiering" (69). His experience during his first deployment supports this, as the downtime allowed soldiers to share their experiences and lives, fostering deeper relationships. Another point is the significance of receiving physical mail. Spencer highlights the importance of mail call, during which soldiers would share their care packages with one another (57). He uses these examples to explain why, during his first deployment, his soldiers fought together even when they were injured.

Spencer's positive experience with a cohesive platoon in 2003 contrasts sharply with the challenges he faced when he took command of a company in 2008. The company's lack of cohesion stemmed from the poor leadership of his predecessor. Soldiers lacked a sense of group identity and were reluctant to endure hardships together. Spencer also attributed the lack of cohesion to technology, noting that "Soldiers now talk to each other less, especially about their shared experiences from patrols and missions, and instead fill their hours of boredom with Facebook updates, real-time messaging, and phone calls home" (95). He poses a series of questions challenging the integration of technology into soldiers' daily lives in combat: "How would this work in a world where Soldiers are more connected to their outside social networks than to each other? How did they cope with the stresses of combat through Facebook posts and phone calls to people who were not there with them?" (134).

Is it fair for Spencer to blame technology for causing a lack of cohesion within military units? Soldiers voluntarily join the military with the expectation of camaraderie and teamwork, reinforced through military training. Although heavy internet or social media use may distract soldiers from social interactions, it may not cause a lack of cohesion within a unit, but instead may reflect an existing lack of cohesion. Therefore, even though Spencer's attribution of disunity to technology may have some validity, it is important to avoid placing the blame on technology as a scapegoat for poor leadership.

To restore unity within his company, Spencer reverted to his proven strategy: facing challenges together, maintaining standards, fostering communication during downtime, and instilling the company's identity and self-esteem in the soldiers. As he puts it: "Similar to a parent or coach who imposes rules and discipline and are loved more by their children or athletes for that strictness, a military leader who enforces military standards is followed more readily by soldiers who are accustomed to such standards" (134). Soldiers were directed to focus on their teams, despite having the internet readily available to them. He writes: "Soldiers need to talk to other soldiers to process what they have seen, hear how others perceived it, understand why it bothered them, and to grasp that they are not alone in struggling to cope" (161).

Spencer's journey with his company concludes on a high note. His company earned the highest respect within the battalion, achieving a significant milestone by capturing Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, an Iraqi militant and high-value target (185). This could have been the end of his story, but he does return to his discussion about the use of the internet in soldiers' lives. He acknowledges that the internet has both advantages and disadvantages in connecting soldiers with the outside world during deployment (189). It can be a distraction, but it also provides significant benefits by helping soldiers stay in touch with family and prepares them for their postdeployment life with social media and supportive networks across the country.

The final chapter reflects Spencer's reassessment of the internet, prompted by his wife Emily's military deployment to Kuwait. He maintains that no amount of technology can replace the physical presence and the feeling of someone being there (208). However, he also acknowledges that modern technology enabled his wife to be part of their daily lives despite their physical distance (212). These dual perspectives highlight technology's limitations and its potential as a double-edged sword. However, the book concludes without offering specific solutions for enhancing unit cohesion through technology. It leaves the challenge of balancing soldiers' online and social lives for future research.

As an Army Reserve chaplain for fourteen years, I concur with Spencer that cohesion is most effective at the company level, which is around 150 soldiers (182). However, after reading this book, one might question the role senior personnel play in building cohesion in the Army. Spencer does not delve deeply into this topic and, in fact, highlights instances where senior personnel have had counterproductive effects. For example, a two-star general made a false promise to soldiers of a quick end to the war (36); a battalion command sergeant major immediately left the combat zone when attacked (47); and a colonel prioritized internet connectivity over the safety of soldiers (131).

Although Spencer's book does not discuss the role of senior leaders in building cohesion, it still offers valuable insights. His concerns about the impact of the internet and social media on team cohesion are well-founded. Excessive internet use during downtime in an operational environment is likely a symptom of poor leadership, if not the primary cause. Addressing the role of technology in soldiers' lives is crucial for building a cohesive unit. The key takeaway from the book is that good leadership is more critical than ever, as today's soldiers face greater distractions.

Chaplain (Lt. Col.) Sai O. Ng serves as the deputy chaplain for the 63d Readiness Division, a U.S. Army Reserve unit based in Mountain View, California. He completed this book review while deployed to Kuwait. Chaplain Ng holds a master's degree in divinity from Fuller Theological Seminary, Seattle, Washington, and a doctorate in ministry from Liberty University, Lynchburg, Virginia.



REAL SOLDIERING: THE US ARMY IN THE AFTERMATH OF WAR, 1815–1980

By Brian McAllister Linn

University Press of Kansas, 2023

Pp. xx, 300. $49.95

Review by Charles R. Bowery Jr.

Since the publication of his first book on the United States Army in the Pacific before World War II, Brian McAllister Linn has established himself as one of the foremost scholars of modern American military history, with a prolific list of publications that remain staples of both professional military education and university reading lists. His 2007 *The Echo of Battle: The Army's Way of War* (Harvard University Press), a concise meditation on American debates over the nature of war and national defense, is consulted frequently and remains a favorite of instructors and senior military leaders. Much of Linn's scholarship focuses on the Army, and *Real Soldiering* reflects Linn's continuing fascination with how the Army as an institution reacts to the changing landscape in which it operates.

In this spirit, *Real Soldiering* focuses not on interwar periods, an intellectual framework that considers peacetime bookended by conflict, but on the so-called "aftermath armies" that followed each of America's conflicts from the War of 1812 to Vietnam. Linn argues that rather than changing over time, America's postwar

armies have been remarkably similar in their reactions to conflict. In each postwar decade, the Army has spent approximately five years making deliberate reactions to the just-ended conflict, followed by another five years of implementing those changes with an eye toward the future. "Real soldiering," in Linn's thinking, happens in these times of peace—when the Army reckons with what it thinks just happened, and what might happen the next time.

Although historians generally prefer to eschew such rigid categorizations of the past, Linn makes a persuasive case for these continuities. What makes *Real Soldiering* truly effective is the author's incisive, often contrarian, view of the past, and his grounding of the book's argument in the lived experience of both officers and enlisted men (and women) through time—the people who had to implement plans and policies. Although the institutional army draws lessons, develops plans, and proceeds with those plans, the "real soldiering" happening in units usually takes place in an environment of scarce resources, national fatigue, and amnesia following conflict, and the demands of balancing a large bureaucracy with the needs of the people who inhabit it. How these postwar professionals sought to carry out the Army's strategies has frequently led to victory or defeat in the next conflict.

Real Soldiering is a crowning achievement for a historian renowned for more than four decades of scholarship. It manages to be at once both immensely authoritative, a demonstration of Linn's absolute mastery of modern U.S. government records and personal histories, and deeply entertaining, owing to Linn's acerbic wit and distinctive writing style. Serving soldiers and Army veterans will encounter their own experiences repeatedly in this book, scholars of modern American history will benefit from it, and serving senior leaders should make it mandatory reading. It is recommended most highly.

Charles R. Bowery Jr. is the executive director of the U.S. Army Center of Military History and the Chief of Military History. He is a retired Army colonel that served in Army aviation units in the United States, Korea, Germany, Iraq, and Afghanistan, where he commanded an attack helicopter battalion. He holds a master's degree from North Carolina State University. He also taught military history at West Point and served on the Joint Staff.



TO THE LAST MAN: A NATIONAL GUARD REGIMENT IN THE GREAT WAR, 1917–1919

By Jonathan D. Bratten

Army University Press, 2020

Pp. vii, 271. Free Download

Review by Cary Collins

Military service touches every aspect of the human experience, particularly in the extreme conditions of wartime. Combat, by its very nature, is a ceaseless struggle for survival, where the specter of injury or death looms at every turn. In this crucible, the American soldiers of World War I—known as "doughboys"—demonstrated unparalleled commitment and courage. These soldiers risked everything, not for personal glory, but to serve a cause they believed was far greater than themselves. Few warriors have surpassed their dedication to the mission. Their contributions on the Western Front were instrumental in securing victory, yet today, their sacrifices—overshadowed by the scale and immediacy of other conflicts—are slipping from collective memory and often underappreciated in the broader narrative of American history.

The citizen-soldiers who answered the nation's call and filled the ranks of state National Guard units remain among the most overlooked participants of the First World War. These volunteer forces played key roles in Allied operations, often shouldering the burden of decisive victories. A striking example is the 26th Division, the Yankee Division of New England, which became the first full American Army division to deploy to France. Composed of recruits from states such as Maine, New Hampshire, and Vermont, the division distinguished itself through its unshakable esprit de corps and notable accomplishments in the field. Within the Yankee Division, Maine's 103d Infantry Regiment takes center stage, its compelling story brought to life in *To the Last Man: A National Guard Regiment in the Great War, 1917–1919*.[1] This powerful book offers fresh insights into the United States military during the Great War. It also serves as a poignant reminder that the legacy of World War I is essential to understanding the rise of modern America and its role in global military affairs.

Maj. Jonathan D. Bratten, an engineering officer with the Maine Army National Guard, has crafted a comprehensive and meticulously researched chronicle of the Yankee Division's formation and history. Through rigorous investigation, he explores its mobilization, training, and battlefield service, offering a perspective shaped by both academic rigor and firsthand military experience. A skilled storyteller, Bratten masterfully weaves historical detail with personal insight, critically assessing the decisions that shaped the division's actions and outcomes. He honors the soldiers who, when called into the fray, executed their orders with unmatched determination, often achieving feats that seemed beyond human capability. *To the Last Man* delves into the harsh realities of warfare, exposing the physical and emotional suffering of both enlisted men and officers. It brings to light the immense struggles faced by those on the frontlines of one of the most brutal conflicts in history.

Arriving in Great Britain in late October 1917, the 26th Division swiftly advanced to southeastern France by November. There, its soldiers underwent a rigorous two-month training program, sharpening critical skills in trench warfare, bayonet combat, grenade tactics, and gas mask usage. By February 1918, the Yankee Division was battle-ready, prepared to join the American Expeditionary Forces on the front lines.

For these eager yet untested warriors, the realities of combat unfolded in a series of battles, each more harrowing than the last. Their baptism of fire came in the Chemin des Dames sector, where they were thrust into the harshest conditions of modern warfare. Poison gas, unceasing artillery barrages, and the constant threat of death became the grim rhythms of daily life. It was here that the division recorded its first battle casualty—signaling the start of their transformation. Chemin des Dames forged the doughboys, hardening them from raw recruits into experienced warfighters.

The next major engagement took place in the Toul sector—known as the American sector—where the fighting was both relentless and costly. In Seicheprey, a village on the southern edge of the Saint-Mihiel sector, the division suffered a setback, a reminder of the war's unforgiving nature. Yet, in the subsequent battles at Apremont and Flirey, the Americans proved their resilience. With each engagement, they grew more confident and effective, showcasing their ability to endure, adapt, and continue the fight, regardless of the challenges. By mid-June, at the village of Xivray-et-Marvoisin, that resilience was put to the test. Three companies from the 103d Infantry Regiment held their ground against a ferocious assault by 600 elite German raiders, a testament to their grit and determination on the battlefield.

The Aisne-Marne Campaign, fought along the Marne River in July 1918, is the centerpiece of *To the Last Man*. This campaign followed the vicious, monthlong slugfest of the 4th Marine Brigade at Belleau Wood, where American marines earned their immortal moniker, "Devil Dogs," for their unmatched ferocity and unbreakable spirit. During the epic clash of the Aisne-Marne, the Yankee Division cemented its own legendary title, "To the Last Man." Exhausted, understrength, and sleep-deprived, with hunger gnawing at their bones, the division's soldiers made a solemn vow: to yield not one inch, no matter the cost. As the brutal fighting raged, their iron will held firm, safeguarding the Allied line and marking a turning point in the war. Their victory shifted the momentum by halting the German advance, triggering a retreat that spelled the beginning of the end of the enemy's ability to continue. During the offensive,, the resolve of the doughboys became a living symbol of American valor, their sacrifice helping to turn the tide of history.

One of the greatest strengths of *To the Last Man* is Bratten's sharp analysis of U.S. military leadership and strategy. When the United States entered the First World War, General John J. "Black Jack" Pershing rejected the static nature of trench warfare in favor of an "open warfare" approach. He prioritized mobility and aggressive offensives, directing American forces to make bold, fluid advances across exposed terrain and often against well-entrenched enemies. This strategy stood in stark contrast to the rigid, tightly packed formations that had come to define the stalemate of the Western Front. By swiftly maneuvering across the battlespace and exploiting breakthroughs, Pershing aimed to achieve greater flexibility and mobility. However, his approach carried significant risks, particularly in coordination, logistical support, and overcoming concentrated machine gun and artillery fire. As Bratten observes in his analysis of the Second Battle of the Marne, open warfare, though bold in theory, often turned out disastrously ineffective in practice. The result was heavy casualties and, at times, self-inflicted destruction. Relying on infantry armed with rifles and bayonets for frontal assaults proved woefully inadequate against the enemy's buttressed defensive positions.

As a result, machine guns, trench mortars, organic 37-mm. guns, snipers, and rifle grenades became essential for suppressing enemy response and allowing friendly troops to advance with less resistance. Small, specialized infantry teams could flank German strongholds, reducing the need for costly frontal assaults. Fortified positions could be bypassed or neutralized through a combination of firepower and maneuver, rather than sheer attrition. Artillery superiority was crucial, as it disrupted enemy lines of communications and prevented reinforcements from reaching the front. Breaking the deadlock on the Western Front demanded a coordinated, combined-arms approach that integrated artillery, tanks, and armored cars to maximize flexibility, speed, and firepower. It was a bloody lesson, but by midsummer 1918, the U.S. Army had learned it.

Amid the strategic and tactical innovations that reshaped the nature of warfare, the Yankee Division paid a heavy toll during the war. In the 103d Infantry alone, 371 soldiers were killed in action, with an additional 21 succumbing to disease or accidents. In sum, nearly half of the New Englanders who served were either killed or wounded. However, the true extent of the division's suffering is immeasurable, as countless soldiers carried the lasting effects of illness, debilitating injuries, poison gas exposure, and psychological trauma. The 26th Division's endurance was extraordinary—only one other division spent more time on the front lines. Facing overwhelming adversity, these troops were pushed to the brink yet never faltered. Their resilience stands as a testament to their strength, determination, and commitment to both their fellow soldiers and the mission. As Bratten describes so eloquently, the warriors of the Yankee Division were hewn from the strongest stone in America.

Cary Collins teaches military history of the United States at Tahoma High School in Maple Valley, Washington. He has been writing and publishing history for the past thirty-five years. His first teaching assignment was in 1983 in Wenatchee, Washington. Currently, he is focused on several projects related to the First World War.

Note

1. Available in PDF format from Army University Press: https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/combat-studies-institute/csi-books/to-the-last-man.pdf.



CORPS COMPETENCY?: III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE HEADQUARTERS IN VIETNAM

By Michael F. Morris

University Press of Kansas, 2024

Pp. xvi, 331. $54.99

Review by Arrigo Velicogna

In *Corps Competency?: III Marine Amphibious Force Headquarters in Vietnam*, retired Marine Corps lieutenant colonel Michael F. Morris sets out to judge the performance of the U.S. Marine Corps' III Marine Amphibious Force (MAF) in Vietnam as a corps-level command. It is a welcome approach to a topic usually dominated by tactical studies or campaign histories. The book presents a high-level approach to marine operations in Vietnam, focusing, as the title implies, on the corps level.

This book is structured broadly, containing two main parts and a conclusion. In the first part, spanning the introduction and prologue, the reader is presented with a short introduction on higher-level command in the Marine Corps and the genesis of the Marine Expeditionary/Amphibious Force concept. It also provides a quick primer of the war in South Vietnam's northernmost provinces, specifically the I Corps Tactical Zone. The second, larger part of the book analyzes the role of the III MAF headquarters in the Vietnam years. It is divided into thematic chapters, providing a general historical summary of III MAF operations, and then covering specific topics: command and control, intelligence, personnel, operations, plans, and the hybrid war. Each chapter covers a separate topic. Morris analyzes each topic in depth with case studies and plenty of references to primary sources. He aptly places each element in the larger context of the conflict, providing the reader with sufficient information to understand how the III MAF acted as part of Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. The only downside of this approach is that there are some instances of repetition and overlapping. The concluding chapter, fittingly titled "Epilogue," summarizes lessons the U.S. Marine Corps learned from the conflict.

Morris quickly outlines his thesis: that the III MAF failed as a field corps organization. The more the book goes into details, the longer the litany of failures grows. Staff billets in Da Nang resembled musical chairs more than proper assignments. In several cases, critical positions such as operations and intelligence saw appointments made in weeks rather than months. Operational matters were left to division commanders with little to no input from the MAF headquarters. Units were broken up and reassembled without pause, with battalion headquarters going into actions commanding everyone else's companies rather than their own. Although Morris credits the III MAF with being able to ad-lib a system to satisfy logistical needs successfully, improvisation and extemporization, rather than planning, were the norm. The system was also a success because of the U.S. Navy. The MAF concept cracked under the pressure of an outsized span of command. A headquarters is designed to control one Marine division, and one Air Wing controls up to five divisions, and an Air Wing twice its supposed size. One wonders, as the author does, why the Marines never actually activated and deployed a Marine Amphibious Corps Command rather than a MAF.

The book is also scathing in its analysis of the MAF's effectiveness in achieving results. According to Morris, the III MAF had three primary goals: to keep the Viet Cong down, to prevent the North Vietnamese from advancing, and to build up the South Vietnamese army (ARVN). Achieving any two of these three goals would have ensured success. Yet the III MAF failed at all three. Although the MAF placed a great deal of emphasis on pacification (the hybrid war), it focused entirely on the Combined Action Program, excluding everything else. Training the ARVN was neglected and dumped on the U.S. Army. Again, the Marines appeared to be focused single-mindedly on training their local counterpart, the Vietnamese Marine Division. The author is extremely critical of the III MAF's unwillingness to work closely with the ARVN I Corps in joint operations. The few combined operations attempted early in Lt. Gen. Lewis W. Walt's command were failures, often because of marine bungling rather than Vietnamese incompetence. Although it could be argued that III MAF lacked the resources for another daunting task, it was no excuse. In "keeping the North Vietnamese out," III MAF certainly was hamstrung by restrictions from above, a fact that the author emphasizes. In the end, it was the MAF emphasis on strategic defense and operational offense, and its inability to reassess its tactics, properly evaluate its opponents, and exercise effective command and control, that caused failure. Here, Morris is particularly critical of Lt. Gen. Robert E. Cushman Jr.'s tenure, especially during the first critical days of the 1968 Tet Offensive.

One of the most intriguing arguments in the book is Morris's approach to the controversial McNamara Line—an effort to create a defensive barrier to detect and prevent North Vietnamese cross-border infiltration. Historians usually have criticized the project, accepting General Cushman's conclusion that it was a "stupid idea." Morris instead argues that the plan had merits and that III MAF missed an opportunity in not completing it. The argument in support of the project is twofold. First, the anti-infiltration barrier would have provided III MAF with enhanced early warning of enemy incursions, helping the mobile defense strategy used by the Marines. Second, if the barrier proved effective in reducing infiltration across the Demilitarized Zone, III MAF could have made a clear case to extend a manned barrier into Laos. Although it was not certain the White House would have approved, it at least would have represented a serious alternative to the failing strategy. Morris cogently notes that the Marines were not opposed to barriers at all, having built a similar structure to protect their installation at Da Nang.

For those accustomed to publications that lavish praise on Marine Corps operations in Vietnam, often authored by serving or former Marine officers,

Corps Competency? represents a valuable and serious counterpoint. Furthermore, the author's criticism is supported by substantial evidence, making it difficult to refute. As with every human endeavor, *Corps Competency?* is not perfect. Although the author demonstrates the III MAF commitment to civic action with impressive statistics, he ignores the even more impressive numbers coming from U.S. Army formations. He also skips over the poor state of combined arms tactics in 1965, a product of the Marine Corps leadership's fascination with helicopters. Yet these are minor flaws that do not detract from the book's main analysis.

Corps Competency? does not present III MAF in a glowing light. In Vietnam, the Marines showed the ability to learn and adapt at the tactical level. However, their major command in Vietnam failed to properly analyze the situation on the ground, adapt to it, and exert effective control over its forces. The reasons for this abysmal failure are tied to service (or strategic) culture and personalities. Marine Corps training and education were focused on battalions and regiments. Marine doctrine was centered on amphibious assault and Marine Air-Ground Task Force concepts to the exclusion of anything else. On top of these issues, only a few of III MAF's commanders showed an aptitude for higher command. Most delegated authorities and responsibilities to an ad hoc staff that often could not cope. Even worse, the Marine Corps itself failed to learn any relevant lessons on corps command from the war, opting instead to select only lessons that supported its doctrine.

With the Marine Corps again undergoing a significant structural change, and with a new, unproven, and, according to some, unsuitable littoral combat concept at its center, one could wonder if history is repeating itself.

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

CONFESSIONS OF A WEEKEND WARRIOR: THIRTY-FIVE YEARS IN THE NATIONAL GUARD

BY PAUL "GREG" SMITH

McFarland & Company, 2024

Pp. viii, 246. $29.95

REVIEW BY NICHOLAS J. HURLEY

Many people have written and talked about the National Guard's transformation from a strategic reserve to an operational force over the past fifty years. The Reagan years, the end of the Cold War, the beginning of the Global War on Terrorism, and the subsequent changes to national defense strategy have all had a tremendous influence on how the Army funds, equips, trains and deploys the guard.

One thing that has remained constant throughout this period of transformation is the guard's role as a dual status force: in addition to maintaining their readiness for potential federal service, units provide support to state and local governments in times of emergency. This latter mission defined the career of the author, retired Brig. Gen. Paul "Greg" Smith, from fighting a flood during his very first drill in 1979 to commanding the Massachusetts Army National Guard in the aftermath of the Boston Marathon bombings in 2013. His thoughtful retelling of these and other events makes *Confessions of a Weekend Warrior: Thirty-Five Years in the National Guard* an entertaining and informative read.

The title of this book is entirely appropriate given its contents. Smith offers plenty of confessions, many in the form of anecdotes from his time as a junior officer in the late 1970s and early 1980s when the National Guard at times resembled, in his words, the "gaggle of card-playing, beer-swilling amateurs" that the American public made them out to be (2). He is just as quick, however, to point out how flawed this stereotype actually was, highlighting the professionalism, initiative, and adaptability he witnessed from reservists who made up for their lack of parade-ground spit and polish with a willingness to answer the call whenever their community needed them. This disparity between perception and reality is so significant at times that the title's reference to the "weekend warrior" comes off as tongue-in-cheek, given how frequently the author and his comrades found themselves in uniform outside of a typical drill period.

Besides telling the story of his time in uniform, Smith's self-proclaimed goals for this book are to "paint a realistic portrait" of the people who make up the National Guard and share his thoughts on leadership through lessons learned during his many years of service (2–3). He is successful on both counts. There are numerous references within the text to individuals with whom Smith served and how those associates affected his career. Although he depicts some of these interactions as cautionary tales, the vast majority are positive; Smith clearly has respect for many of the men and women with whom he served and is not afraid to praise and thank them, often by name, publicly.

Smith is equally candid when evaluating his leadership over the years, highlighting his successes and reflecting on instances where he believes he could have done better. While noting that this is not a book on leadership theory, Smith nonetheless finds a way to share his views and advice on the subject without preaching. He concludes many of his chapters about a particular assignment or event with a brief overview of lessons learned and how those lessons influenced his development as an officer and leader.

Although the text proceeds more or less chronologically, the chapters themselves could have benefited from more deliberate organization. Some pertain to a specific assignment or anecdote from Smith's career but interspersed among these are others more thematic in nature, offering his views on issues such as race, gender, and sexual

orientation in the military. Placing these latter chapters at the end of the book and consolidating the few that are less than five pages long would have allowed for better delineation between Smith's retelling of events and his thoughts on military life in general.

Given how introspective Smith is throughout much of the book, the lack of a final chapter discussing the legacy and impact of his long career is surprising. As it stands, he devotes just three pages to his decision to retire and his last day in uniform. In all fairness, Smith notes that on the day he relinquished command in 2014, he purposely avoided thinking too much about what was transpiring, finding it slightly overwhelming. Because this book was published ten years later, however, it would have been nice to know his thoughts after a decade of hindsight and reflection.

These issues notwithstanding, *Confessions of a Weekend Warrior* provides a unique and honest perspective on change and continuity within the National Guard across five decades and it will be of interest to a wide audience. As a primary source, it holds value for any scholar studying the guard's long-term transformation and its role in supporting civilian authorities. As a collection of war stories, Smith's often humorous account of the challenges, rewards, and eccentricities that come with being a citizen-soldier will appeal to anyone who has served time in the reserve components.

Capt. Nicholas J. Hurley was the U.S. Army Center of Military History's historian-in-residence for 2024–2025. A museum curator and public historian in civilian life, he joined the Army National Guard in 2010 and has served with military police and field artillery units in Connecticut and Rhode Island, including nearly six months on active duty during the COVID–19 pandemic. He taught history at the United States Military Academy from 2023 to 2024.



EXPECTATION OF VALOR: PLANNING FOR THE IRAQ WAR

By Kevin C. M. Benson

Casemate Publishers, 2024

Pp. xxii, 250. $34.95

Review by Nicholas J. Schlosser

Upon assuming duties as the director of plans, J–5, for the Third United States Army, in June 2003, Col. Kevin C. M. Benson found his staff working on a request for information from Deputy Defense Secretary Paul D. Wolfowitz. In the wake of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, U.S. national security personnel had been preparing diligently for a possible campaign against Saddam Hussein's Iraq. The Third Army, as U.S. Central Command's Combined Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC), would be responsible for any major land war against that country. Wolfowitz wanted to know why the United States could not invade Iraq; reach its capital, Baghdad; and depose Saddam using just one brigade. Benson assumed the question was a prank being pulled by his staff on their new commanding officer.

As Benson relates in *Expectation of Valor: Planning for the Iraq War*, his sobering and revelatory account of his tenure as the chief of plans at Third Army from June 2002 until July 2003, it was no joke. "It was an amazing question and was answered only after we did the math on the amount of fuel, ammunition, water, and goods it would take to move one M1A1 Abrams tank and its four-man crew from Kuwait to Baghdad, and the support structure required to move that much fuel, ammunition, water, and food" (4). Ominously, Benson notes this would not be the last such query from his superiors in the Defense Department regarding Iraq.

Colonel Benson's task at Third Army was formidable. Arguing that Saddam Hussein's regime constituted an unacceptable threat to regional stability, President George W. Bush's administration concluded that the United States would need to remove the leader from power using military force. It fell primarily to Benson and his staff to create plans for how to do this. Yet, critically, senior leaders at the Defense Department—such as Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz—were convinced that the United States did not need to commit as many troops to the operation as Central Command's existing plans recommended. Benson thus had to plan a major campaign using far fewer forces than prescribed by accepted doctrine and then reconcile these plans with imprecise and contradictory guidance. As he notes, "In Washington, people were constantly talking about 'off-ramps' even though many of our units were not even on the highway" (71).

A 1977 graduate of the United States Military Academy, Benson's career included critical assignments as a planner at the XVIII Airborne Corps and Third Army. Altogether, Benson's experiences provided ample preparation for designing the deployment of hundreds of thousands of troops in a large-scale offensive. Although Benson references his schooling, especially at the School for Advanced Military Studies, throughout his account, he does so not to preen but to lay out a seeming contradiction. The military invested considerable time and resources into training Benson to become a professional planner, yet that same military leadership often dismissed his expertise and experience. Repeatedly pressed to "Think outside the damned box, Benson," the author lamented that "my particular 'box' remained bounded by Newtonian physics, wherein it took time to move mass over distance" (108).

Nowhere did Benson encounter more frustration than when he tried to prepare Third Army for operations after Saddam Hussein's fall, a period known as Phase IV of the operation. The author's account of this process dominates much of the book's latter half. Benson makes several attempts to

disabuse readers of the idea that the Army did not plan for the posthostilities phase of the conflict. "This is truly a myth: we did plan for what to do after we completed the decisive maneuver, which delivered two corps formations to Baghdad and isolated Saddam Hussein's regime from the country" (87). As the author notes, CFLCC planners commenced these efforts in early 2003. Benson's staff recommended using the Iraqi Army and police force to maintain order following Saddam's fall. His team also hoped to rely on the existing Iraqi bureaucracy to govern the country. Additionally, he warned his superiors that persistent resistance from irregular Iraqi groups such as the Fedayeen Saddam portended a possible postwar insurgency. Importantly, Benson believed the coalition would need to push back against the Defense Department's impulse to withdraw forces and instead commit more soldiers to the occupation.

Yet for all his assertions that the Army planned for Phase IV, Benson's account features many examples of Army and Defense Department officials showing little interest in the matter. When Benson asked Third Army's commander, Lt. Gen. David D. McKiernan, to review Phase IV plans in March 2003, the CFLCC commander rebuffed him, stating, "Kevin, I cannot think about Phase IV until we get through Phase III. . . . Men are going to die in Phase III" (84). The next month, when CFLCC's deputy commander, Maj. Gen. William G. Webster, asked Benson how long he believed Phase IV would last, the author said three to five years. Webster replied, "Oh, bullshit" (170). Benson also found opposition from senior Defense Department officials such as Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Douglas J. Feith, who disagreed with the CFLCC plans to use the Iraqi military and police for security purposes. Thus, while individuals and teams may have planned for Phase IV, the constant struggles the author faced in getting his superiors to appreciate the challenges of Phase IV demonstrate that the Army and Defense Department did not pay adequate attention to what would happen after the fall of Saddam's Ba'thist regime. Third Army's planners may have prepared for Phase IV; CENTCOM and the Defense Department did not.

Benson's insider viewpoint, clear analysis, and approachable prose make his account essential for historians of Operation Iraqi Freedom. It serves as a reminder that preparations alone are inadequate when policymakers and commanders executing those plans choose to overlook or outright ignore warnings that contradict their aspirational thinking. Benson regularly had to reconcile contradictory guidance and fashion incongruous directions into plans that were achievable and sustained by the necessary resources. His years of experience gave him valuable insight into what would happen to Iraq once Saddam's regime fell—yet his calls for caution went unheeded or outright ignored. His account is vital reading for anyone seeking to understand how the United States prepared for war in Iraq and why the initial lightning-quick campaign of 2003 devolved into an eight-year insurgency.

Dr. Nicholas J. Schlosser is a supervisory historian at the Center of Military History, where he specializes in the Iraq War. He holds a PhD in history from the University of Maryland, College Park. His publications include *The Surge, 2007–2008* (CMH, 2017) and *Cold War on the Airwaves: The Radio Propaganda War against East Germany* (University of Illinois Press, 2015). He is also the coauthor of *Army History and Heritage* (CMH, 2022) and the editor of *The Greene Papers: General Wallace M. Greene Jr. and the Escalation of the Vietnam War* (United States Marine Corps History Division, 2015).

chief historian's FOOTNOTE

Jim Malachowski

TRANSFORMING THE FOUNDATIONS OF ARMY HISTORY

In 1946, as the United States grappled with the transition from global war to uneasy peace, the War Department undertook a sweeping internal reorganization that shaped the Army's institutional trajectory for decades. These reforms offer a rich case study in bureaucratic agility, strategic foresight, and the balance between tradition and innovation. Today, the Army is again in a period of remarkable change that will set the course of land warfare for decades to come.

Just as history is not static, neither is the Center of Military History (CMH). Like many Army organizations, CMH has entered a new phase of transformation—one that demands operational agility, technical precision, and doctrinal clarity, along with historical insight. This year will mark a turning point in how we define our mission and measure our impact.

Over the past year, CMH accelerated its modernization efforts across critical areas in institutional and warfighting history operations and integrated our archival processes with Army Historical Research Online (AHRO). However, it also has more infrastructure, tasks, and mission sets to manage than it has the people to do so properly. Even as the size of the CMH workforce has decreased, the Army's need for our services has increased exponentially. The legacy framework, while foundational, no longer fully addresses the speed, complexity, and data demands of contemporary conflict. It is not the enduring question of whether we can do more with less, but what functions best support the Army of today and the future.

The process of change creates difficult and sometimes passionate discussions on where to balance traditional scholarship and evolving enterprise-level needs. There are few easy answers, but we have a path forward. CMH leaders are leveraging the Baldrige Excellence Framework to guide revisions in strategy, policy, doctrine, and organizational structure to reflect the realities of multidomain operations and strategic competition. The framework has been proven to help organizations improve performance and get sustainable results. It is integrated into how CMH operates rather than as extra work for an already overtaxed staff. Rather than managing individual processes, the Baldrige framework helps look at the organization holistically in a systems approach. Viewed this way, all work at CMH—from writing our flagship books and monographs, answering inquiries, or creating exhibits that engage the public—revolves around institutional memory as a strategic asset.

This approach, along with the Center's practical experience and lessons learned, is driving an update to the Army's historical operations doctrine. Last released in June 2014, Army Techniques Publication 1-20, *Military History Operations*, is in revision now to adapt historical operations to the changing character of war and the evolving role of the Army in joint operations. At the Army level, the shift is not theoretical. It is already influencing how the Army is organized and how Army Service Component Commands (ASCCs) deploy historical assets to document and interpret military operations and outcomes.

Looking at few redesigned fundamental principles from a systems approach, it is evident how doctrinal and training processes interlock from the tactical edge to the archive.

- Forward Integration: Historians are at the right place, at the right time, and have built trust with units and commanders. Collection plans are tailored to mission, unit, and operation. Embedding historians earlier in planning cycles helps to inform and shape operational narratives, preserve decision logic, and prevent gaps in the historical record.
- Mission Relevance: Historical coverage balances content and focus, while considering causative factors, decision points, and historical proportionality to answer vital questions. This provides the basis for analysis that directly supports operational assessments, observed lessons, and future narrative history.
- Strategic Accessibility: CMH is restructuring the archive to improve support research, doctrinal development, and public engagement. At the same time, it is leaning into writing more monographs accessible to today's and tomorrow's readers.
- Solve Gaps and Share: The expeditionary history team, working with ASCC and deployed warfighting historians, certify the record of Army operations is complete.
- Public Trust: Accurate, authoritative, and credible data provide the ability to reconstruct decisions, defend actions, and shape institutional identity.

Although we may be feeling overwhelmed by change, the 1946 War Department reorganization reminds us that reform is not rupture—it is continuity with purpose. By revisiting this pivotal moment, we gain not only historical insight but strategic perspective.

As we navigate the complexities of the present, the historian's work becomes a guidepost. It tells us that change, to be enduring, must be rooted in memory, and memory, to be useful, must be cultivated actively—not just preserved.

AH

Notes

1. See James E. Hewes Jr., *From Root to McNamara: Army Organization and Administration 1900–1963*, Special Studies Series (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1975).

2."Baldrige by Sector: Nonprofit," NIST Baldrige Performance Excellence Program, 3 Nov 2023, https://www.nist.gov/baldrige/self-assessing/baldrige-sector/nonprofitgovernment.

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