




The Armistice Agreement



UNITED STATES ARMY IN THE WORLD WAR 1917-1919

The Armistice Agreement and Related Documents

Volume 10, Part 2



*CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY
UNITED STATES ARMY
WASHINGTON, D.C., 1991*

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
(Revised for volume 10)

United States Army in the World War, 1917–1919.

Contents: v. 1. Organization of the American Expeditionary Forces.—v. 2. Policy-forming documents of the American Expeditionary Forces—[etc.]—v. 10. The Armistice Agreement and related documents.

1. United States. Army—History—World War, 1914–1918. 2. World War, 1914–1918—United States.
I. Center of Military History.

D570.U55 1988 940.4'0973 88-600367

A new introduction has been added to Volume 1. Type has been reset, but original pagination has not been altered. Except for front matter, maps, illustrations, and some tables, camera-ready copy was produced by Susan Blair using optical scanning and laser printing technology.

UNITED STATES ARMY IN THE WORLD WAR, 1917–1919

Volume 1	Organization of the American Expeditionary Forces
Volume 2	Policy-forming Documents of the American Expeditionary Forces
Volume 3	Training and Use of American Units With the British and French
Volume 4–9	Military Operations of the American Expeditionary Forces
Volume 10	The Armistice Agreement and Related Documents
Volume 11	American Occupation of Germany
Volume 12–15	Reports of the Commander-in-Chief, AEF, Staff Sections and Services
Volume 16	General Orders, GHQ, AEF
Volume 17	Bulletins, GHQ, AEF

FOREWORD

Military historians and scholars of operational art have tended to neglect the role played by the American Expeditionary Forces in World War I. Although the Army organized a historical office in 1918 to prepare a multivolume history of the war, budget restraints and other considerations frustrated Chief of Staff Tasker H. Bliss' intention to "record the things that were well done, for future imitation . . . , [and] the errors as shown by experience, for future avoidance." The momentous events of succeeding decades only strengthened this tendency to overlook our Army's role in the fields of France in 1918. This neglect, although understandable, is unfortunate: World War I posed unique challenges to American strategists, tacticians, and logisticians—challenges they met in ways that could provide today's military student with special insights into the profession of arms.

To encourage further research in the history of World War I and to fill a gap in the Army's historical documentation of that conflict, the Center of Military History has created a World War I series of publications consisting of new monographs and reprints. Complementing our newly published facsimile reprint *Order of Battle of the United States Land Forces in the World War*, we are reprinting this seventeen-volume compilation of selected AEF records along with a new introduction by David F. Trask. Gathered by Army historians during the interwar years, this massive collection in no way represents an exhaustive record of the Army's months in France, but it is certainly worthy of serious consideration and thoughtful review by students of military history and strategy and will serve as a useful jumping off point for any earnest scholarship on the war.

There is a certain poignancy connected with the publication of this collection in the seventieth anniversary year of "the war to end all wars." Later this summer veterans of that war will gather together, perhaps for the last time, to discuss the history of the American Expeditionary Forces and to reminisce about their service. To them especially, but to all five million Americans who served in World War I, we dedicate this scholarly undertaking.

Washington, D.C.
1 June 1988

WILLIAM A. STOFFT
Brigadier General, USA
Chief of Military History

CONTENTS

	<i>Page</i>
Cost of Maintaining U.S. Army in Germany, February 6, 1919	647
Allied Conference Concerning German Violation of Armistice Terms Respecting Poland	673
Supreme War Council Meeting on Armistice Renewal	675
Method of Payment of Requisitions	689
Reciprocal Agreement for Return of Effects of Deceased Prisoners	699
Third Armistice Prolongation	718
Judge Advocate, AEF, Ruling on Entretien	776
Supreme War Council Meeting Concerning Food Supply for Germany	800
Spartacist-Bolshevik Rebellion in Berlin	820
German Government in Control of Situation in Berlin	843
German Government Agrees to Terms for Provisioning Germany	846
Provisioning Czechoslovakia	854
Repatriation of Sick and Wounded German Prisoners	871
Maintenance and Strength of American Army of Occupation, March 29, 1919	925
Agreement for Transporting Polish Troops Through Germany	949
Payment for Damages, Caused by Troops of Occupation	963
Allied Decision on Repatriation of Russian Prisoners	975
Germany Permitted Commercial Communications With Neutral Countries	989
German Delegates Invited to Versailles	1011
German Plan for Repatriation of Russians	1020
Initial Plans for Resuming War Should Germany Refuse To Sign Peace Treaty	1039
Analyzed Statement of Cost of Maintenance of U.S. Army of Occupation	1057
Initial Units and Services Forming Army of Occupation	1062
Removal of Restrictions on Exportation of Fish by Germans	1087
Discussion of Command Authority for Army of Occupation	1110
Foch's Plans for Possible Advance Into Germany	1119
Conference, May 24, 1919, on Reduction in Size of Armistice Commission	1133
French Attempt To Establish the Republic of Pfalz in the Palatinate	1135
Allied Policy Towards Baltic States	1167
Foch Sets June 20, 1919 as Date To Resume Offensive Operations	1179
Date for Offensive Operations Extended to June 23, 1919	1182
Germans, on June 23, 1919, Agree to Peace Terms	1195
President Wilson's Fourteen Points	1195

Map

No.

129. Allied Offensive Operations, July-November 1918	<i>Frontispiece</i>
--	---------------------

The Armistice Agreement

STATEMENT OF COST TO U. S. OF MAINTAINING ARMY OF OCCUPATION IN GERMANY

I. COMPOSITION AND STRENGTH:

(a)	Advanced G. H. Q.		
(b)	Third Army and Army Troops.		
(c)	III, IV, and VII Army Corps and Corps Troops.		
(d)	Eight Divisions.		
	aggregating: Officers	12,358	
	Field Clerks	234	
	Nurses	365	
	Men	275,018	
	GRAND TOTAL	287,975	
	Horses		58,755

II. COST OF MAINTENANCE:

(A) Daily average unit cost, per officer, per man, per horse:

One Officer	\$8.391
One Field Clerk	4.912
One Nurse	2.986
One Man	3.957

One Horse	\$1.587
-----------	---------

(B) Daily average unit cost of maintaining 1,000 men (including officers) and 250 horses:

1.	Signal Corps (including cost of maintaining lines)	\$	19.036
2.	Motor Transport Corps		570.85
3.	Engineer Corps		20.00
4.	Air Service		45.804
5.	Ordnance Department		574.35
6.	Chemical Warfare Service		9.595

Total costs per 1,000 men and 250 horses per day \$ 1,239.999

Note: The items under (A) are not included under (B). (A) and (B) must be added to obtain the total cost.

(C) Items which cannot be computed as in (A) and (B):

1. Engineer expense for roads and bridges, buildings, mess halls, horse shelters, shower baths, laundries, etc.---This to be adjusted later.
2. Cost of installation of Air Service in RHINE country,---\$446,994.00.
3. Training---Special course---\$209,100.00
4. Cost of constructing telephone and telegraph lines necessary to connect our lines with German lines---\$364,100.00.

NOTE

The total amounts ascertained to be due as a result of the application of the figures above established to the principles set forth in the definition of the work maintenance are subject to such adjustments as the transactions already had by the American Army with German local authorities may make necessary.

Maintenance of the Armies of Occupation

[Contemporary Translation]

No. 8828-011

Spa, Belgium, February 7, 1919.

From: Major Dusterburg

To: General Ronneaux

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE IX

[Extract]

* * * * *

3. The concept maintenance, and likewise the French expression, includes according to all the rights of international law only provisions, and at a maximum also quarters and clothing. As has already been made clear in the note of February 4, 1919, Wako Number 9145, this interpretation is explained in greatest clarity in Art. 7 of the Hague Convention. That the idea of maintenance does not include, according to international law, the personal pay of the people to be maintained is contained in the 7th Paragraph in connection with the 17th Article of the Hague Convention.

While Art. 7 regulates the maintenance of prisoners of war and explains this conception very clearly, Art. 17 adds special precisions concerning the recompenses of prisoners of war,---precisions which depart from the essential points accepted concerning maintenance, particularly in regard to the party obligated. If the expression maintenance included also recompenses in money, Article 7 would have had to call attention to the special regulation of matters of recompenses in money.

4. The German Government, at the time of the conclusion of the Armistice Agreement had no doubt but that the conception maintenance according to international law had no other meaning than the one above made plain. It was only the demands of the Allies for very high advances in Marks that awakened the doubt of the German Government as to whether its interpretation of the idea of maintenance was in agreement with that of the Allies. That was the reason why it asked for the convocation of a subcommittee, not in order to accept the interpretation of the meaning that seemed proper for the hostile party, but in order to determine the interpretation of the word according to the rules of international law.

* * * * *

DUSTERBERG.

Persons Involved in Removal of Industrial Machinery

AMERICAN SECTION,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, February 7, 1919.

No. 68

From: Acting Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

* * * * *

4. Punishment of People Concerned With Removal and Sale of Machinery in France and Belgium: General von Hammerstein submitted a note transmitting a document from a well known professor of law of the University of Goettingen, concerning the requisition, return, and purchase of machinery and materiel from France and Belgium.

The decision of the professor had to do with the arrest and punishment of people who took part in these acts. In the document the professor attempts to show that the parties who carried out these acts were acting under proper authority and not in their individual capacities. Therefore, they, and even the people who bought this requisitioned machinery from the State, should not be made to bear the blame. He claims that according to international law and according to military and civil practice the prosecution of these people is not justified. He calls attention to the fact that the French High Command makes these measures in general, dependent upon the fact that the German Government promulgate decrees and laws that were promised in the meeting of the Subcommittee on Return of Materiel.

General von Hammerstein stated that according to telephonic communications which he had received, the German Government has completed the promulgation of these decrees. He, therefore, requests that all further action against these people be cancelled and they no longer be held in confinement.

General Nudant replied, requesting that the text of the decree referred to above be furnished, and General von Hammerstein replied that it would be given to him as soon as received.

* * * * *

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Acting Chief, American Section.

Delay in Delivery of Agricultural Implements

[Contemporary Translation]

No. A. A. II No. 1656

Spa, February 7, 1919

From the Representative of the German Government

To Chairman of the P. I. A. C.

In the subcommittee upon agricultural machinery that must be delivered by Germany according to the demands of the Armistice Agreement of January 16, it was arranged that there should be handed over without delay, that is to say, probably January 31, or at the latest February 1, by Professor Ringelmann, the specifications requested by the French chairman in Paragraph 5 of the Protocol No. 392-T of January 30, the so-called Text C. These specifications form the basis of the embarkation and transportation of agricultural machinery from Germany. This list was not given over until February, and cannot reach the hands of the BERLIN authorities before the evening of the 7th. The German Government, therefore to its very great regret, finds itself obliged to declare that it will therefore not be possible to begin the deliveries at the delivery stations promptly on February 15 and to close them on March 1. The machinery stands ready in the factories but could not be loaded before each individual machine was marked with the special sign as had been arranged in accordance with Paragraph 5 of the Protocol 392 T, which naturally had to be done before the machinery was placed on the cars. The German Government, to its sincere regret, must state today that the earliest it can begin the deliveries will be February 21 with a corresponding postponement of the conclusion of the deliveries.

FREIHER von LERSNER.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1216: Letter

Food Supplies for Occupied Territory

AMERICAN SECTION
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION

No. 68

Spa, Belgium, February 7, 1919

From: Acting Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

1. Shipment of Foodstuffs: General Nudant read a despatch from Marshal Foch, dated February 3, authorizing the shipment of foodstuffs from the right bank to the left bank of the RHINE and permitting such foodstuffs to enter freely into the occupied areas. It was also announced that the circulation of food from one zone to another in the occupied regions would be permitted.

5. Payment for Foodstuffs Destined for Germany: General Nudant announced that the Financial Committee to determine the method for paying for foodstuffs delivered to Germany is due to arrive here on February 12. This committee will be an interallied one,--that is is to say, composed of delegates from the respective countries interested. He stated that the negotiations which they will have to carry out will be based upon those which are taking place today between delegates from the German and Allied countries looking to the supplying of food to Germany and the securing of ships for its transportation.

Baron von Lersner stated that on account of the importance of this question he would be glad if General Nudant would do everything in his power to hasten the arrival of these delegates. He added that it would appear that the work of these two committees was so similar that they were bound up in each other.

* * * * *

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Acting Chief, American Section.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1239: Memorandum

French Battalion Relieves Regiment in Luxemburg

3d Section, General Staff

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF,
February 7, 1919.

MEMORANDUM FOR Deputy Chief of Staff

G-3 of the VI Corps reports by telephone this evening that the 1st Battalion of French 116th Infantry (strength 600) relieved the 109th Infantry in Luxemburg on February 5, and that it is their understanding from what information they have been able to get from the XI Corps, that this is all the troops that are to be sent into Luxemburg. VI Corps further states that the Commanding Officer of the 116th Infantry is present in Luxemburg with the battalion.

FOX CONNER,
Brig. Gen., Gen. Staff,
Asst. Chief of Staff,
G-3.

Strength of Allied and Associated Armies

[Contemporary Translation]

ALLIED GENERAL HEADQUARTERS.
February 7, 1919.

MEMORANDUM

[Extract]

The meeting of the Commanders-in-Chief with Marshal Foch called for by the Supreme Council of the Allies on January 24, took place January 26. Its object was to define as exactly as possible [what would be] the situation of the Allied Armies on March 31, 1919, resulting from the measures of demobilization or repatriation taken by each government and also to make plans which should cover the longest possible time as a consequence of these measures.

* * * * *

The American Army on April 1, will have in France: 15 divisions in the zone of the Armies, 5 divisions near the ports of embarkation.

These forces represent an effective strength of 1,380,000 to 1,400,000 men of whom 680,000 are combatants.

On May 1, the American Army in France will include: 10 divisions in the zone of the Armies and 5 divisions near the ports of embarkation.

If on that date the preliminaries of peace are not signed, the American command plans, without making any engagements on this subject, that during the months of May and June there will remain in France enough troops and material to supply the transport trains without touching the 10 divisions above mentioned, so that on July 1, there may remain in France 10 divisions representing 380,000 men.

* * * * *

The diagram annexed hereto is a resume of the Allied Armies opposed to Germany on April 1.

This situation shows sufficient resources to oppose Germany up to April 1, on the western front.

It shows at the same time that when the date has been passed and if the peace preliminaries are not signed, the future can only be assured by maintaining the resources shown above by stopping demobilization.

ALLIED FORCES REMAINING ON APRIL 1st OPPOSED TO GERMANY AND READY TO FIGHT

BELGIUM	UNITED STATES			FRANCE			GREAT BRITAIN			TOTAL	
NO. OF DIV.	DIV. NO.	COMBATS	EFFECTIVE TOTAL	DIV. NO.	COMBATS	EFFECTIVE TOTAL	DIV. NO.	COMBATS	EFFECTIVE TOTAL	NO. OF DIV.	OF THE COMBATS NOT INCLUDING BELGIUM
12	(1) 15 D.I.	377,000	1,340,000	51 D.I.) 6 D.C.)	1,050,000	(2) 1,350,000	(3) 10 D.I. 2 D.C.	212,000	552,000	88	1,639,000

OF WHOM THERE ARE IN THE RHINE COUNTRY

4 D. I.	8 D.I.	19 D. I. 3 D. I.	10 D. I. 2 D. C.	41 5 D.C.
---------	--------	---------------------	---------------------	--------------

ITALIAN ARMY

Number of Divisions	31
Combatants	990,000 men
Effective Total	1,400,000 men

(1) - plus 5 in the region of the ports of embarkation

(2) - not including 575,000 men in the interior and the forces in the Orient (Near East) and in (French) North Africa.

(3) - not including 2 or 3 divisions from the Dominions.

Ordnance Factories in Neutral Zone

[Contemporary Translation]

No. 1649

Spa, February 7, 1919.

Representative of the German Government

To the Chairman of Interallied Armistice Commission

There are many factories in the Neutral Zone which manufacture ordnance. The German point of view is that these be allowed to function for the following purposes:

- (1) Munitions for the German forces insofar as its manufacture may be regarded as essential and where the closing down of the factories would throw many out of work.
- (2) Munition parts which are already ordered by neutral powers.
- (3) Machines for manufacturing munitions which were already ordered by neutral powers.
- (4) Hunting weapon and ammunition and parts required within [unoccupied] Germany.
- (5) Pistol cartridges for private use.

It is further essential that assurance be given that this German private property be safe and not be subject to requisition.

With a view to avoiding controversy or difficulties in the practical working out of this scheme, the above point of view is presented.

v. LERSNER.

Adv. GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 430: Memorandum

Enemy War Material

4th Section, General Staff
386-32/131

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.
February 7, 1919.

MEMORANDUM FOR: C. G., First Army, Second Army, and Third Army * * *

1. Following decision of February 1, rendered by the Judge Advocate, A. E. F., with reference to enemy material and munitions of war, copy of which was furnished you, attached hereto for your further information you will please find copy of another memorandum from the Judge Advocate under date of February 5, on this same subject.

GEO. VAN HORN MOSELEY,
Brigadier General, G. S.,
Asst. Chief of Staff, G-4.

MEMO: For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4

SUBJECT: Enemy Material and Munitions of War

1. In connection with the opinion submitted to you by this office on the above subject, dated February 1, 1919, I invite your attention to Paragraph S of Secret No. 62, February 1, 1919, just received from the Chief of American Section, Permanent International Armistice Commission. The secret letter is accompanied by a translation of a communication to the Germans (CIPA, No. 83 F) quoting instructions from the Allied Command.

2. In my memorandum I took the position that all of the enemy material and munitions of war delivered or abandoned by the Germans in the occupied territory fell under the provisions of Article VI of the Armistice Agreement and became the property of the Allies jointly rather than of the United States; also that the Armistice Agreement operated upon materials and supplies sold and delivered by the Germans to municipalities and private civilians. Our representative on the Permanent International Armistice Commission calls attention to instructions issued by the Allied Command to the effect that "under the provisions of Paragraph VI of the Armistice Agreement the equipment, provisions and material of a military nature which the Germans were unable to carry off in the course of their withdrawal were to be delivered to the Armies of Occupation." The Allied instructions, quoted in the communication to the Germans, recite that "any sale or any cession under whatsoever title it may have taken place, of material of a military nature made by the German military authorities after November 11, 1918, is considered by the Allied Command as null and void." The respective commanders of Armies of Occupation are directed to take action with respect to all this property in consultation with the Economic Section of the Armistice Commission and authorized to determine whether such property in the hands of municipalities or civilians will be repossessed in kind or whether the present possessors will be allowed to retain it upon the payment of its value.

3. It will be noted that this treatment of the matter by Allied authority and the action taken are in complete accord with the views expressed in my memorandum.

W. A. BETHIEL,
Brigadier General,
Judge Advocate.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1216: Letter

Visits to Prison Camps

No. 69

AMERICAN SECTION,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, February 8, 1919.

From: Acting Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

* * * * *

6. German Prisoners of War Still in the Hands of the Allies: Referring to subject number six, February 6, Secret No. 67, wherein I referred to letters which had been submitted by two Germans whom General von Hammerstein wished to have appear before the Prisoners of War Committee,---as they were not allowed to appear before this committee,* * * they give their views as to the consideration which is to be shown for German prisoners of war still in the hands of the Allies. The letters of these Germans are submitted in full and it is believed that our Prisoners of War Bureau may wish to go over them in detail. To do so will give them the view point of two Germans who have made a careful study of this subject and who claim to be the representatives of a society in Germany organized for the purpose of looking after the interests of prisoners of war and civilian prisoners.

While the majority of their recommendations are quite unusual and impracticable, there may be suggestions contained therein which will be of value. It is believed that the Allies would do well to permit delegates of the German Red Cross and German nurses to visit prison camps where these prisoners are being held in order that they may see for themselves the conditions under which these men are living and what is being required of them. No reports that can be submitted by any Allied inspectors or commission, or even inspectors or a commission from a neutral power can have the weight in Germany which such report would have when coming from a German source, such as the German Red Cross. The German Armistice Commission has made several pleas for steps that should be taken looking to the restoration of these prisoners. While such steps are unquestionably impracticable at this time and in view of the fact that it may not be the intention of the Allies to return them for some months to come, it is believed that to allow inspections, as stated above, would go a long way towards giving satisfaction to the relatives of these men in Germany and would also do much to establish confidence between the Germans and the Allies.

As the Germans and Allies must live as neighbors, the greater degree of confidence that can be reestablished the better it will be for all concerned.

* * * * *

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Acting Chief, American Section.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1216: Letter

Repatriation of Alsace-Lorraine Civilians

AMERICAN SECTION,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, February 8, 1919.

No. 69

From: Acting Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

1. Repatriation of Civilian Alsace-Lorrainers: General Nudant informed the President of the German Armistice Commission that he had charged General Dupont (in BERLIN) with taking charge of the repatriation of civilian Alsace-Lorrainers who were obliged to leave their homes in the course of the war. He added that General Dupont will handle this

question promptly with the Ministry of the Interior in BERLIN. He added further that those who left ALSACE-LORRAINE before the war and who now express a desire to return, will have their cases handled separately by the French Counsellor in BERLIN.

* * * * *

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Acting Chief, American Section.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1217: Telegram

Anti-Bolshevist Russian Officers to Aid in Repatriation

[Contemporary Translation]

No. 470/PG/2

PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, February 8, 1919.

From Marshal Foch

To General Nudant

February 7, No. 1001/0

1. General Denikine has asked for permission to send a few Russian officers to the BERLIN Mission with a view to their cooperating to the repatriation to the Denikine Army of Russian prisoners of war who are Anti-Bolshevists.

2. The French Government has given this permission believing that it is advisable for qualified Russians to associate in the Interallied work in the repatriation of Russian prisoners.

3. Request that the Interallied Commission BERLIN be notified indicating that Russian Mission should act in complete accord with this Mission. All measures should be taken to facilitate the union of the various Russian groups authorized to concern themselves with Russian prisoners of war and to avoid that they engage in particulars.

4. The Russian Embassy is sending instructions of this nature to Russian subjects, and in particular to the delegates of the Russian Red Cross.

Chief of Staff.

Deaths of Allied Prisoners

[Contemporary Translation]

MINISTRY OF WAR,
Berlin, February 8, 1919.

In answer to Note No. 1,491 of January 27, 1919, and No. 1,600 of February, 1919.

The Minister of War turns over herewith a numerical statement of the status of prisoners of war who have died in captivity in Germany. The list is drawn up according to nationalities and was closed on October 10, 1918. The list brought up to date will be turned over at an early date.

Measures of reprisal have not been applied except from time to time. That does not exist in the date concerning the number of deaths during the application of reprisal measures. If certain camps in Germany have been considered in France as being reprisal camps the Department requests that they may be designated in order that the number of prisoners of war who died in these camps may be established separately. As it appears from the instructions of the Central Bureau of Investigation (III 5.127 18 N B v. 13-12-18) nominal lists have been ordered to be drawn up concerning the prisoners of war who have died in Germany. These lists will be turned over to the Armistice Commission at SPA in measure as they are received.

v. FRANCESKY.

[Editorial Translation]

**STATUS OF PRISONERS OF WAR WHO HAVE DIED IN GERMANY FROM THE
DECLARATION OF WAR TO OCTOBER 10, 1918**

NATIONALITIES	OFFICERS	ENSLITED MEN	TOTAL
French	148	12,740	12,888
Russians	208	63,986	64,194
Belgians	7	742	749
British	145	5,442	5,587
Serbs	-	1,422	1,422
Romanians	10	10,967	10,977
Italians	8	7,740	7,748
Portuguese	1	115	116
Americans	1	20	21
Totals	528	103,174	103,702

DUPONT.

Polish Demands

[Contemporary Translation]

Annex C

AMERICAN COMMISSION TO NEGOTIATE PEACE
DEMANDS OF THE POLES

1. Restitution of industrial and agricultural material.
2. Restitution of rolling stock.

INDUSTRIAL AND AGRICULTURAL MATERIAL

DEMAND OF THE POLES

February 8, 1919.

On January 16, 1919, Marshal Foch signed the prolongation of the Armistice until February 17, 1919. In this agreement, we find the following paragraph: "Machines, parts of machines, industrial or agricultural implements, various accessories of all sorts and, in a general way, every industrial and agricultural object, taken from the territories which had been occupied by the German Armies on the western front under any pretext whatever, by German military or civil authority, shall be held at the disposal of the Allies to be sent back to their place of origin."

It is indispensable that in the next prolongation of the Armistice there is inserted an article absolutely analogous concerning Polish interests.

In place of the words: "On the western front,"

There must be inserted: "On the territory of the Kingdom of Poland, created by the Congress of VIENNA, as well as in the Governments of GRODNO, KOWNO [KOVNO] WILNA and MINSK."

At the end of the article, there must be inserted: "The material taken away must be sent to the Polish Government, at places indicated by the latter."

RULING OF THE COMMISSION:

1. After examination, the Commission rules as follows: That the restitution of the material of which the Poles have been despoiled by the Germans contrary to all principles of the law of nations is justified fully in the name of equity.

2. That the insertion of a clause favorable to this restitution in the next act renewing the Armistice should constitute, even if it did not take immediate effect, a moral comfort for the Polish Nation, and a guarantee calculated to encourage the efforts made for the resumption of economic activity and to deter numbers of Polish laborers out of work from the Bolshevist tendencies into which their lack of work might lead them.

The Commission considers it desirable that the proposition be inserted in the Armistice Act.

ROLLING STOCK

DEMAND OF THE POLES: The Poland of the Congress possesses 11,000 freight cars, instead of 34,000, GALICIA 6,000 instead of 20,000.

To supply the country with food and to allow them to ship at least a part of their commerce, it would be necessary to demand from Germany for Poland at least 25,000 freight cars and a number of locomotives corresponding, to replace the rolling stock which Poland was obliged to surrender.

RULES OF THE COMMISSION: The Commission considers it just, since Poland has been deprived of 40,000 cars, that at least 25,000 shall be restored to her.

Delivery of Agricultural Implements

[Contemporary Translation]

PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION.

No. 5/T. A.

Spa, February 8, 1919.

From General Nudant, President of the P. I. A. C.

To The Representative of the German Government

In answer to your A. A. I. I. No. 1656, February 7.

I cannot accept the reasons that you give for delaying the end of the delivery of the agricultural implements for six days.

1. The delay in handing over to you the information required by Annex C cannot result in putting off the beginning of operations until February 21; the intervening periods for execution are still sufficient to give the German Government an opportunity to show its desire to bring the matter to a close by making deliveries from the prescribed date, February 15.

2. In any case it must not be forgotten that the amount of agricultural materiel which, as the result of the statements of the German representatives, was agreed upon to be delivered before March 1, only amounts to three-fifths of the amount that was determined upon at TREVES to be delivered by that date. It would, therefore, not be allowed, in view of this decrease, that the Allies should not have received on March 1 the materiel called for by the protocol of January 30.

General NUDANT.

Meeting of Subcommittee on Delivery of Trucks

[Contemporary Translation]

PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION.

460/T

Spa, February 8, 1919.

Note for the Allied Missions at Spa, Squadron Chief, Major Brulard, at Metz

As a result of our previous conversations, it is understood that the meeting between the Allied and German Representatives with regard to auto-trucks that have been delivered will take place at MAYENCE at ALICE Barracks, on February 14, at 9 o'clock.

The purpose of this meeting at which Major Brulard will be present as representative of the Marshal, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies, will be as follows:

(1) To determine by means of a comparison of the documents brought by the German Representatives, the definite numbers of lorries received by each Allied Army with their characteristics (makes, horsepower, etc.)

(2) To make a study of the types of auto-trucks of each Army in order to

determine the possible interchanges from Army to Army for the purpose of fixing the distribution laid down by Marshal Foch and for the purpose of forming groups of the most homogeneous character possible, that will require a minimum of sets of spare parts.

(3) To determine the makes which ought to be returned to the Germans on account of the small number of vehicles, or, if possible, that could be kept with a smaller set of spare parts that would have to be determined.

I ask you to be good enough to give the necessary instructions so that your representatives may bring to this meeting all the information and documents necessary to put them in a position to realize the aims above stated.

COURTILLET,
President of the Subcommittee
on Transportation.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1216: Letter

German Prisoners Taken After November 11, 1918

AMERICAN SECTION,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, February 9, 1919.

No. 70

From: Acting Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

* * * * *

2. Status of German Officers and Men made Prisoners of War after November 11: Referring to my Subject Number 6, in my report of February 8, General Nudant, on behalf of the Allies, informed the German High Command that German officers and enlisted men who were made prisoners of war after November 11, on account of being left behind in the retreat because of misunderstanding, cannot be set free. He added that the conditions of the Armistice of November 11 must be applied.

* * * * *

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Acting Chief, American Section.

Care of Russian Prisoners

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,
February 9, 1919.

No. 2114-S

AGWAR WASHINGTON

For Chief of Staff

Paragraph 1. Extracts from recent telegrams from Brigadier General George H. Harries American Representative on Interallied Commission for Repatriation of Prisoners of War now sitting in BERLIN are as follows: "The situation with respect to Russian prisoner control is quite rapidly becoming desperate. German slackness and a thoroughly efficient force of Bolshevik agents provided with ample funds have obtained to bring Russian prisoners to the verge of revolt. German commandants of prison camps have generally lost control. The primary remedies are food and efficient camp administration. Pending the arrival of sufficient food supplies for the 700,000 Russians we must proceed to organize. Under the terms of the amended Armistice the Entente has become responsible for Russian prisoners. The Bolshevik apostles realize that as soon as we control camps and provide food their opportunities to cause uprisings of prisoners will cease, so they are now working at highest possible pressure to upset the Entente plans."

Subparagraph A. In view of these conditions the Interallied Commission for Repatriation of Prisoners of War which operates under the direction of the Permanent International Armistice Commission at SPA, has, under the authority of the extended Armistice and with Marshal Foch's approval, taken over the administration of all Russian prison camps in Germany, about 40 in number.

Subparagraph B. As the United States and Great Britain are already arranging through the Interallied Food Commission to furnish and transport food supplies for these Russian prisoners, the Commission has called upon the United States and British Armies to furnish the necessary personnel to administer these camps and supervise the distribution of food.

Subparagraph C. I have therefore authorized the immediate organization of 20 administrative groups, each consisting of 1 commandant, 1 adjutant, 1 medical officer, 1 quartermaster and 25 soldiers. Ten of these groups will go forward at once and ten others will be organized and held awaiting further call from General Harries. The British Government is furnishing an equal number of similar groups.

Subparagraph D. The American Red Cross is also sending a commission to Germany to assist in this work.

JOHN J. PERSHING.
General, U. S. A.

German Explanation of Delay in Delivery of Rolling Stock

[Contemporary Translation]

No. 9797/1921

Spa, February 9, 1919.

From General von Hammerstein

To General Nudant

**MEMORANDUM CONCERNING THE FULFILLMENT OF THE ARMISTICE
CONDITIONS AS TO RAILWAY MATERIEL**

[Extract]

In order to complete the delivery of 5,000 locomotives and 150,000 cars as well as the turning over of 19,021 cars due to bringing up the ALSACE-LORRAINE railway system to its full quota by February 16, Germany has expended the greatest efforts.

In the first place as to locomotives, about 9,000 were tested by February 8 of which only about 4,100 were accepted. Of these 6,300 were brought from Germany, of which in round numbers only 3,650 were taken. The remainder came from the materiel left behind in the evacuated territory. From these figures it is clear that the number of locomotives which had to be presented for inspection is considerably above the number of locomotives due for delivery. The locomotives presented are more than two-fifths of the stock of workable locomotives and more than half of the heavy locomotives in workable condition. The graphical sheet attached [not found] shows what inequality there exists among the separate reception groups for lack of fundamental principles to govern the acceptance of materiel brought from Germany; the uniform quality of which materiel was assured by careful restoration in the work shops at home, insofar as possible. Hence if the number of locomotives to be delivered on February 17 is 600 short of the number due, the cause lies in the circumstances of which Germany had no control and for which it, therefore, cannot be made responsible. The actual performance of the German railways is rather quite an extraordinary one if we consider the difficulties which confronted them; these difficulties will be further described below.

As to cars, according to the statement of the Allies, there were presented up February 8, 185,000 cars (according to the announcement of German delivery commissions the number was even 200,000) of which in round numbers 123,000 were accepted. Of these 125,000 came from Germany, about 19,000 being destined for ALSACE-LORRAINE. Of these 82,000 in round numbers were accepted, 12,000 being for ALSACE-LORRAINE. If we consider that further by February 16 still about 6,000 cars are to be taken, the number of cars accepted by the Allies will probably be about 129,000. Further, according to an agreement in the Transportation Subcommittee about 5,000 cars were to be delayed in delivery for the present, these being destined for the transportation of the agricultural implements and machines. In addition the cars destined for the bringing in of spare parts and the cars which are to be taken from the systems now in the hands of the Poles and delivered are to be added, approximately 4,000 to 5,000 altogether. Hence, the 12,000 cars which will still be presumably lacking on February 17 will be covered by the number to the delayed delivery of which Allies have considered in the Subcommittee except for passenger cars, if the cars which are still in Belgium insofar as they fulfill their conditions, are finally accepted.

The difficulties, which in spite of the greatest exertion on the part of the German railway authorities to make the full deliveries so urgently desired by Germany were encountered, lay in technical commercial and inner political troubles.

The condition of upkeep of German locomotives has grown worse and worse especially after the delivery of a number of the newer and heavier types far in excess of the number prescribed.

The locomotives of the weaker types are somewhat older, and during the war they could not be repaired nearly so well as was formerly the custom. However, since the reception committees measured the lighter locomotives by the same rule as the heavier ones, there had to be expended a much greater exertion in the work shops. This work could not be completed in the period of time set although nothing was left undone and nothing shall be left undone in order to increase the capacity of German workshops by increasing personnel and explaining to the workmen the importance of this task. The repairing of locomotives was further delayed by the stoppage of a great part of German machine industries in consequence of lack of coal and raw materiel. Further, in consequence of the difficulties of commerce, which will be further described below, the supplying of the workshops with leads (blechen), pipes, and other construction parts, has become more and more difficult. If in spite of this we have succeeded in bringing up a number of locomotives to the reception committees far in excess of the number due, this is the proof of the extraordinary exertion which has been expended in order to fulfill the Armistice conditions. In addition the tremendous traffic difficulties on the German systems must be mentioned. The traffic yards have not only been robbed of their best locomotives and cars by deliveries to the Entente, but they have been further considerably reduced by losses in cars on account of the new formation of states in Austro-Hungary, the Balkans, Poland and the occupied portions of eastern Germany; for example, the stock of coaches has been reduced in this way by one-half.

* * * * *

It is recognized that in spite of all of the efforts of the Germans, the wishes of the Allies in the number of important matters have remained unfulfilled up to the present; especially it must be acknowledged that delivery of the coaches has not taken place of the amount desired, not only by the Allies, but also by the German authorities who have the greatest interest in completing the delivery of the materiel as soon as possible. The delivery of coaches has been delayed because the condition of the coaches still on hand had suffered extraordinarily during the war and were not suitable to meet the exacting demands of the Allies; however, the repair of coaches requires much more time than that of other cars because the securing of the necessary building material grows more and more difficult. The measures that have been taken offer assurance that the cars still lacking will very soon be presented and that an equalization of the different kinds of cars will soon result. All details have been arranged in the Subcommittee for Transportation in common council and with the desire of fulfilling in letter and spirit the conditions of the Armistice.

The replenishing of the ALSACE-LORRAINE car yards has likewise, on account of the general difficulties described above, not yet reached the degree aimed at by Germany. The early conclusion of deliveries will be made in this case likewise.

* * * * *

von HAMMERSTEIN.

German Steamers Ready For Repatriation of Black Sea Troops

AMERICAN SECTION,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, February 9, 1919

No. 70

From: Acting Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

* * * * *

4. Repatriation of German Soldiers from the Vicinity of the Black Sea and Turkey: In accordance with instructions already received, General von Hammerstein, on behalf of the German Government, made the request that authority be secured from the Armistice Commission on Naval Affairs to have the Steamers *Keyoman* and *Prinzesen* start immediately for Turkey and the Black Sea for the purpose of repatriating German prisoners of war in those regions. He stated that these ships are now in HAMBURG, completely equipped for the work. That he would be very much pleased to have this authority granted.

General Nudant inquired if these ships would go with German or Allied crews. General von Hammerstein, after consulting with the German Naval Representative on the Commission, stated that the boats in question are equipped with German crews and that they are to carry medicine and clothing to the German troops and should return with German crews [troops].

* * * * *

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Acting Chief, American Section.

Germans Refuse Allied Authority in German Poland

AMERICAN SECTION,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, February 10, 1919.

No. 71

From: Acting Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

* * * * *

3. Germans Claim Control over Eastern Provinces:

Baron von Loersner on behalf of the German Government presented the following note:

The German Government takes note with extreme satisfaction of the fact that the Allied and Associated Powers want to send a commission to Poland that is fully empowered to put down as far as possible all disorders there and to induce the Polish Government to keep away from any use of force against the German fighting powers. The German Government will take all necessary measures for securing passage through its territory of this commission as soon as the time of its arrival and its itinerary definitely made known.

Further it is not at all its intention to go beyond the conditions which are laid upon the Government by the Armistice Agreement insofar as the passage through its territory is concerned of Allied and Associated States. It assumes on the contrary that the activity of the Commission will spend itself entirely to the provinces that are outside of those mentioned in the Armistice Agreement. The execution of sovereignty within these limits is entirely an official matter for the German Government.

It cannot, therefore, grant to representatives of other states the domination over any acts that it has not obligated itself to grant by agreement. The German Government will not grant that there is also a Polish Official Government and a public life depending upon it within the limits of the Government.

The German Government is determined to hold religiously to all its obligations which it has undertaken through recognizing the fourteen points of President Wilson in connection with the occupancy of parts of the kingdom that are undoubtedly Polish, but it cannot allow that subjects of the Government who are of Polish origin should seek to enforce the carrying out of any obligations by tearing away parts of the German Empire through power.

The German Government has never had the intention to act with force against the subjects of Polish origin. It is well known that it was the Polish citizens of the Prussian East Provinces who by breaking their oath to the flag took up arms against the Government and put down the authority of the State. To act against such rebellious attacks the German Government must continue to defend itself until it has driven out all armed Polish formations from its present Government territory.

Concerning the final decision as to whom the areas which Marshal Foch indicates as German Poland belongs that decision will be definitely made at the conclusion of peace. Until then Germany refuses any orders of its opponents concerning the exercise of its authority in these areas.

To the above General Nudant replied that this note constitutes a plain refusal to accept the point of view of the note which he transmitted on February 3. The decision as expressed above is a categorical one and I will immediately inform the High Command.

* * * * *

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Acting Chief, American Section.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1217: Letter

Decision on Communications for Members of National Assembly

No. 71

AMERICAN SECTION,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, February 10, 1919

From: Acting Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

1. Communications between the National Assembly and the Occupied Regions. In response to a request by the Germans that the greatest possible freedom of communication should be allowed between the members of the National Assembly and the occupied regions, Marshal Foch sent a reply to the effect that all liberties compatible with the state of war will be accorded in order to permit as far as possible relations between the National Assembly and the occupied regions, but it is not for the Allies to authorize an exchange of correspondence free from all control, and consequently the assurance requested in the German note is granted in the modified form expressed above.

* * * * *

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Acting Chief, American Section.

Information Sought on War Material in Germany

[Contemporary Translation]

AMERICAN SECTION,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, February 10, 1919.

From: General Nudant

To: The Chairman of the German Armistice Commission

The Marshal, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies, asks me to transmit the following communication to the German High Command:

The Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Governments asks the German High Command to furnish it immediately with all the information at hand concerning the number of machine guns, field cannons, heavy cannons, airplane motors and hydroplanes which are now in the hands of the German Government, or in its stores and factories.

The answer made by the German High Command to the demand of the Allied and Associated Governments to cease hostilities in Poland---in spite of the acceptance on the part of the Polish authorities of the request to refrain from the use of force against the Germans in Poland---makes the demand for this information immediately imperative, with a view to determining the clauses of the exactions that will be required when the renewal of the Armistice is taken up.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1217: Letter

Food Shortage in Rhine Provinces

AMERICAN SECTION,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, February 10, 1919.

No. 71

From: Acting Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

2. Food for the German Provinces on the Left Bank of the Rhine: Marshal Foch has sent a telegram informing the Chief of the German Armistice Commission that he had received word from the General Commanding the Sector of AIX-la-CHAPELLE, to the effect that in spite of his insistence the German Government has not as yet sent food for the Rhine Provinces. Shortage in potatoes and eggs is complete, and fats are about all out. The small present ration which theoretically is 50 grams but which in reality varies between 30 and 40 grams, is absolutely insufficient to keep men in condition for work. Marshal Foch

directs that the President of the German Armistice Commission take immediate steps to see that the German Government supplies the necessary foodstuffs for the left bank of the RHINE.

General Nudant requested General von Hammerstein to make known as soon as possible what steps are taken by the German Government.

Baron von Loersner requested that food supplies from Holland be transmitted to COLOGNE and to AIX-la-CHAPELLE.

* * * * *

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Acting Chief, American Section.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1217: Memorandum

Shipments of Coal by Sea to Eastern Germany

[Contemporary Translation]

Wako
No. 9913

Spa, February 10, 1919.

Chairman of Wako

To Chairman of P. I. A. C.

On February 1, the German Armistice Commission in BERLIN sent the following note No. W 1453 Ma through the intermediary of Wako Goette in WILHELMSHAVEN to the Allied Armistice Commission for Naval Affairs:

A complete breakdown of the railway transportation situation in eastern Germany, which is to be attributed especially to the closing by the Poles of the railway lines of communication, entirely apart from the difficulties in operation which have resulted from the necessary delivery of locomotives and cars, makes it impossible to provide the people of these areas with even the most necessary quantities of coal for household use. On this account, and in connection with the dangers of frost which are very much greater in that neighborhood than in other parts of Germany, unrest of the worst kind is to be feared which would have especially regrettable results in view of the military situation there. Help can be brought to the situation only by the transportation of coal by sea.

Anticipating your consent, and in view of the menacing danger, I have taken the responsibility for the beginning of the transportation by sea of the most necessary quantities of coal. The ships will sail under the control of the Government and their names will be communicated to you. The principal ports of departure are BREMEN, EMDEN, STETTIN, and the principal ports of landing are DANZIG and KONIGSBERG. I beg for your supplementary approval.

By Radio No. 1362 v.3.2 the Interallied Naval Commission refused its consent to this proposition and gave notice that it would take such coal transports captive. Now, the Entente demands of Germany the carrying out of measures of protection against Bolshevism, as well as the assurance of transportation of provisions to Poland.

The attitude of the German Government concerning Bolshevism has been set forth in

such numerous notes that have here been transmitted and has been reinforced by our own attitude that there can be no doubt about it.

The execution of measures against Bolshevism, the maintenance of the troops necessary for this purpose, as well as the protection and operation of the transports of provisions are only possible if the absolute lack of coal with reigns now in the east can be supplied. For this purpose, it is necessary that permission be given immediately to permit the shipments of coal by way of coastwise steamers.

I therefore, beg the Chairman of P. I. A. C. to transmit this request for the freedom of coastwise shipping for the purpose of transferring coal to eastern Germany, with as strong support as possible, to the High Command of the Allies. I would be as much indebted for emphasizing the extreme urgency of this matter and for as rapid an answer as possible.

v. HAMMERSTEIN.

G-4, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 16: Memorandum

Transfer of American Installations to the French

4th Section, General Staff

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,
February 10, 1919.

MEMORANDUM FOR: Lieut. L. H. Paul Chapin, G-4, Liaison Officer, Etat Major, Lamorlaye

1. Reference is had to your memorandum of February 15, 1919, on above subject, inclosing a letter from the D. G. C. R. A., requesting that the French civilian officials be given opportunity to take over American installations which may be of value to them in devastated regions.

2. You will kindly inform the D. G. C. R. A. that the United States will dispose of any barracks, shelter, or other installation which may be desired by the French on terms which may be agreed upon by proper representatives of both sides. However, the exact localities in which the French desire such installations to be left standing are not clearly indicated in the letter, nor are the terms of payment indicated.

3. Furthermore, the various divisions have already been instructed to dismantle their areas to the fullest possible extent prior to the departure of the troops for the United States. In all cases, the engineering units will remain behind for a stated period to complete the work, all of which is being done under the supervision of the C. G., S. O. S., and in particular by the Section Engineer, Advanced Section.

4. In view of these instructions, it will be necessary that the French indicate at once the installations which they desire to be left standing, and it is, therefore, recommended:

1st, that the D. G. C. R. A. indicate the areas or departments to which he has reference;

2d, that he indicate the terms or conditions of reimbursement to the United States for the value of such installations;

3d, that he indicate the names of officers of the civilian service (prefet, sous-prefet), who will indicate the particular structures desired;

4th, that he issue suitable instructions to these officials of the civilian service, furnishing these headquarters with a copy thereof;

5th, that he instruct these officials to at once get in touch with the C. G., Advanced Section, S. O. S., and indicate to them the particular structures desired---this in order that they may be left standing when the time comes.

5. With reference to this entire matter, it is to be understood that we cannot delay our operations in dismantling these areas to await decision by the French for the reasons that we are paying rent on the grounds occupied, and it is in the interest of all concerned that these grounds be returned to productivity without delay. Furthermore, it is essential that we utilize the services of our troops while they are in the area to be dismantled, and thus avoid the necessity of returning other troops to these areas for this particular purpose.

GEO. VAN HORN MOSELEY,
Brigadier General, G. S.,
Asst. Chief of Staff, G-4.

Adv. GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 578: Memorandum

Joint Commission to Deal with Sold Goods

[Contemporary Translation]

Deutsche Militar-Kommission
Dept. C

GERMAN MILITARY COMMISSION,
Coblenz, February 10, 1919.

CONFISCATION OF SOLD GOODS OF THE GERMAN ARMY

Memorandum to the Dept. for Civil Affairs

Colonel Odgan

The German War Ministry is very anxious to indemnify as soon as possible those buyers of goods of the German Army, which latter have been seized by the Americans. Apart from that there are very important interests emanating from commercial and agricultural circles in this connection calling for attention.

The German Military Commission at COBLENZ, as representative of the War Office, would feel much obliged by receiving as early as possible details and general rules regarding the following points:

1. Which of the goods seized are intended to be retained by the American Army of Occupation?
2. Is the American Army inclined to give some free and under what terms.
3. If so, which kinds of goods would be given free?

The German Military Commission begs to propose, in view of the abundance and complexity of the various questions to be dealt with, to appoint as early as possible an American-German Commission with the competency of tabulating the conditions and the settlement of the large number of various questions.

Roomy accomodation for the commission could be found in the building of the German Military Commission, Castorpfaffen Street 21.

Major of the General Staff and
Chief of the German Military Commission.

Control Stations for Private Shipments

[Contemporary Translation]

Note 437-G

February 11, 1919.

FROM: General Nudant

TO: President of the German Armistice Commission

The Marshal, Commander-in-Chief, writes you Note 810-E, that especial sections have been established for receiving individual requests to make shipments between the occupied and unoccupied regions. These services comprise:

Economic Section of the Belgian Army at AIX-la-CHAPELLE under the authority of General Michel, Chief of Staff of the Belgian Army.

Economic Section of the Belgian Army at MUNCHEN-GLADBACH under the authority of General Michel, Chief of Staff of the Belgian Army.

Economic Section of the British Army Military Government at COLOGNE.

Economic Section of the American Army, Advanced G. H. Q., TREVES.

Economic Section of the French Tenth Army at MAYENCE.

Economic Section of the French Eighth Army at LUDWIGSHAFEN.

Requests for shipping permits should, therefore, be addressed to Economic Section of the region in which lives the shipper or consignee.

G-1, GHQ, AEF: File 334: Fldr. 15: Telegram

Detachments for Duty in Russian Prisoner of War Camps

1st Section, General Staff

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,
February 11, 1919.

To. American Representative, Permanent International Armistice Commission Spa, Belgium

Number 5602 G-1. Request that General Harries be notified that 10 detachments for duty at Russian prisoner of war camps in Germany departed from TOUL en route to COBLENZE February 10, 20 officers with orderlies departed from TOUL en route to BERLIN by way of COBLENZ and COLOGNE on February 11.

AVERY D. ANDREWS,
Brig. Gen., U. S. A.,
Asst. Chief of Staff, G-1.

Number of French Prisoners Repatriated

AMERICAN SECTION,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, February 11, 1919.

No. 72

From: Acting Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

* * * * *

2. Number of French Prisoners of War in Germany: General Nudant announced that the number of French prisoners of war repatriated at the end of January exceeded 500,000. This number is in excess of that given by the German Government at the conclusion of the Armistice. This leads to the assumption that many of prisoners of war were removed from the control of the Ministry of War, which throws discredit on the report of that office. On the other hand, an uncertainty as to the fate of the missing who were for many months held prisoners of war without being identified, or at least their presence being disclosed to the French Government.

He called upon the President of the German Armistice Commission to place strongly before his Government the necessity of reporting with the least delay possible the list of prisoners of war who died in captivity. This list should have been delivered February 8, to General Dupont, in BERLIN.

* * * * *

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Acting Chief, American Section.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1197: Memorandum

German Operations Against Poles

Paris, February 11, 1919.

[Extract]

First Conference: Under the presidency of Marshal Foch, between United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan.

Marshal Foch opened the conference by saying that it had been found out that the Germans had not complied with many of the terms of the previous Armistice Conventions, and that a meeting of civilian and military experts had taken place on February 10 with the object of establishing:

- (a) A list of breaches of the Armistice by the Germans;

(b) Ways and means to be recommended so as to get complete satisfaction from the Germans.

The object of the present Conference was to study these questions and to enable members of the Conference to make whatever suggestions they saw fit.

A memorandum of the Conference referred to by Marshal Foch had been prepared and was read by General Weygand.

* * * * *

General Weygand then proceeded to read the following paragraph of the memorandum. This paragraph indicates that important numbers of German troops are being assembled on the Polish front.

Mr. Demowski, President of the Polish Committee, has just handed over to the Allies a document of high importance providing cooperation between the Germans and the Ukrainians against the Poles. It consists of a convention, signed but bearing no date passed between the German military authorities and the Ukrainians. This document is as follows:

(a) The Germans agree that the vast region of Polish territory which is indicated on a map is to be turned over to the Republic of the Ukrainian people as soon as the German troops evacuate it. The Germans pledge themselves to prevent the Poles from penetrating the region as long as it has not been occupied by Ukrainian troops.

(b) The Germans will make no opposition whatever to the operations conducted by the Ukrainians against the Poles in the direction VLADIMIR---VOLYNSKI---SOKAL [not identified]; furthermore, they pledge themselves to cover the left flank of the Ukrainians, in the course of those operations, against any attack from the Poles.

(c) The use of two important railroads is granted to the Ukrainians.

(d) Free passage is granted to the Ukrainians in the above mentioned area.

(e) Orders to carry out these general directions will be issued by January 31.

(f) The territory east of the BUG belongs to the Republic of Ukraina [the Ukraine], according to the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk of February 8, 1918.

This document is signed by the Commanding General, German XXIII Army Corps, Bieseck, and countersigned by the Chief of the German Mission with the Ukrainian Army, Major Muehlheim.

This is a very distinct violation of the Convention of Armistice of November 11, 1918, which provides that the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk is to be considered as non-existent.

General Weygand said that the second part of the memorandum which he was reading deals with the steps which it is proposed to take to compel the Germans to comply with their obligations. It is understood that it is only a draft which can be modified by the conference.

Military and naval conditions proposed as follows:

Impose on Germany a military and naval status which will in fact be the status imposed on her by the Peace Treaty.

The German Army not to exceed 25 infantry and 5 cavalry divisions.

It is demanded that further assembling of troops on the Polish border will be stopped immediately. (Two important groups now exist: one, under Marshal Hindenburg, with headquarters at KOLBERG; the other, under General Woyrsch, with headquarters at X).

The German troops will stop on the front they at present occupy, or, rather, withdraw to the border between the provinces of Silesia and Posnania [Posen?].

The base of DANZIG and the railroad lines DANZIG-MLAWA and DANZIG-THORN will be occupied by the Allies.

The German forces in East Prussia to be cut down to 5 divisions.

Accelerate the evacuation of Polish territory by German troops coming from Ukraina [the Ukraine] so that it be completed by March 1.

The Polish Army at present in France to be transported to Poland without delay.

Limitation of naval and aerial equipment.

The Allies to control the carrying out of these measures.

Should the Germans not agree, it is proposed that the plenipotentiaries of the Allied and Associated Powers declare that negotiations are interrupted, that the Armistice is broken, and that the Commanders-in-Chief resume entire liberty of action. A strict blockade of Germany will be resumed, all importation of foodstuffs will be stopped and the Allies will occupy the base of DANZIG.

General Bliss stated that in his opinion this is too complicated. He believes that it would be more feasible simply to state that if the Germans do not agree to the terms of the Armistice, hostilities will be resumed with the utmost vigor.

Marshal Foch said that he is ready to agree to that.

* * * * *

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1197: Memorandum

Supreme War Council Meeting on Armistice Renewal

MEMORANDUM ON THE MEETING OF THE SUPREME WAR COUNCIL
HELD AT THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

February 12, 1919

[Extract]

There were present among others:

U. S. President Wilson, Messrs. Lansing, McCormick, Baruch and Davis;
Generals Bliss and McAndrew, Admiral Benson.

France: Messrs. Clemenceau, Pichon, Klotz, Clementel, Loucheur, Berthlot;
Marshal Foch and Petain; General Weygand; Admiral De Bon.

Great Britain: Lord Milner, Mr. Balfour, Field Marshal Haig, Generals Lawrence
and Thwaites.

Italy: Messrs. Orlando, Sonnino and Crespi; Generals Diaz and Cavallero,
Admiral Grassi.

Japan: Several civilian representatives and Col. Nagai.

Mr. Clemenceau, opening the Conference, said that the report made yesterday by the Committees which had met under the Presidency of Marshal Foch, would be read.

* * * * *

Mr. Balfour said that three distinct questions are now under discussion: 1st, execution of the first conditions of Armistice; 2d, what policy did we intend to follow in the future concerning the renewal of Armistice; 3d, are we willing to state immediately the military conditions of peace.

* * * * *

Mr. Clemenceau said that the Committee expresses a wish to reach quickly a definite decision. We all agree to that wish. But we have one or two days to fix the conditions we are willing to impose on the Germans for a renewal of the Armistice. Marshal Foch is

leaving on February 14 for SPA. Therefore, let us limit the present discussion to the first two points indicated by Mr. Balfour.

Mr. Balfour agreed that we have not now the time to discuss definite terms of peace.

There now exist certain differences of opinion touching the successive renewals of the Armistice. Many members of the Conference do not agree to the method which consists in demanding every month a few more little things from the Germans. On the other hand, a big question is at stake; i. e., to place Germany in a condition making it impossible for her resume hostilities, and with that in view to compel her to carry out the Armistice.

On the other hand, the Allied and Associated Powers have toward the Poles duties which are imposed on them by the Armistice Convention. In his opinion the conditions of Armistice should be changed as little as possible up to the time when we will be in a position to impose on Germany a military status which will be equivalent to her authorized peace strength; this will enable everybody to demobilize.

President Wilson said that in his opinion what Mr. Balfour had just said is the first indication which he has had up to the present time of what can be a practical solution.

Each time a renewal of the Armistice has been granted, new demands have been made, and in the course of the following month it has each time been discovered that the conditions were not fulfilled. Each time he has asked how these conditions should be enforced. In his understanding, there is only one way, i. e., the breaking of the Armistice and the resumption of war.

He is perfectly willing to resume war should the Germans refuse to comply with the peace conditions of the Allied and Associated Powers but not for little breaches made to the terms of Armistice. He insists on the fact that it is worth while going again to war if our definite peace terms should not be accepted.

* * * * *

Mr. Clemenceau said that he deeply regrets to completely disagree with the President. We have been told, he said, that the Germans did not carry out the Armistice and that we were going to irritate them if we raised comparatively unimportant questions.

He wished to refer to the propositions made by the Committees that met yesterday. Should President Wilson's suggestion be adopted it would mean that we would condescend to explain to the Germans that we are immediately going to draw up military conditions of peace. But such conditions are dependent on the other conditions (territorial, political, economical, etc.). Should the latter give us the guaranties that we expect, military conditions can be less severe. They cannot, therefore, be considered independently from the others.

* * * * *

What about practical conclusions? We complain that the Germans did not carry out the Armistice. We must compel them to do it. We are told: do not demand new conditions. Well, what about the Polish Government? Is not that a new one?

He is absolutely certain that if we today formally express our will, Germany is incapable of resisting it.

He believes that the Germans must be warned that should they attack the Poles, the Allied and Associated Armies will advance.

* * * * *

Mr. Balfour says that he believes that there is a big misunderstanding at the bottom of all this discussion. We all agree that as far as the past conditions and the new conditions concerning Poland are concerned, the Germans must be compelled to comply with their engagements.

But, Mr. Clemenceau seems to be very much moved by the document which has just been handed over to the Conference. He wished to introduce in the conditions of Armistice a paragraph compelling the Germans to return stolen cattle. The same thing might be said of, say, the material of destroyed cotton mills. All these things belong to the general chapter of reparations to be demanded in the peace treaty. Among the men present in this room, there is not one who does not know to what extent France has suffered from the war. Now he wished to come to the point of the definite misunderstanding.

In Mr. Clemenceau's opinion the policy that we advocate is based on a desire not to irritate the Germans and to enable them to await very quietly the time when the Allied and Associated soldiers will have gone home. In fact, nothing is farther from our intentions. Our object is to do things quickly and to put Germany, from a military point of view, in a condition which makes any resistance impossible.

These eternal discussions which take place every month are dangerous. The very small number of American and British units indicated by Mr. Clemenceau as being kept in France are the best argument to decide us to proceed quickly. Once we have compelled the Germans to demobilize, we can then quietly proceed with our own demobilization.

* * * * *

SECOND CONFERENCE

Paris, February 12, 1919

Present: Same as conference in the morning.

Mr. Clemenceau reads the text of the decision voted by the Allied and Associated Governments. It runs as follows:

Paragraph I---Marshal Foch will notify the Germans to give up all offensive operations against the Poles, either at POSEN or anywhere else.

Marshal Foch asks for some explanations. In his opinion, the text read is not sufficiently clear. He points out that, the Poles occupying certain parts of German territory, the Germans might make, in that territory, some encircling movements which they would state not to be offensive operations. He suggests that a line be determined which the Germans will be forbidden to cross.

President Wilson, M. Clemenceau, M. Pichon approve the suggestion of the Marshal.

It is unanimously agreed that the Marshal will be entrusted with the determination of that line; once he had done this, that is, tomorrow morning, he will communicate his decision to M. Clemenceau, who, in return, will communicate it to the members of the Conference.

President Wilson points out that the complaints of the Poles concern not only attacks against their troops, but also bad treatment of the Polish civilian population of districts occupied by the Germans.

It is decided that the Marshal will submit that question to the Supreme War Council at a further date, should such complaints occur.

Paragraph II---The Armistice shall be renewed under the present conditions for a short and undetermined period, which the Allied and Associated Powers may bring to an end with a previous warning of three days.

Paragraph III---The definitive details of the military, naval, and aerial conditions to be imposed on the Germans will be established immediately by a committee presided by Marshal Foch. These conditions, after approval by the Supreme War Council, will be communicated to the Germans who will be notified that they constitute the policy of the Allied and Associated Powers.

M. Clemenceau explains that those conditions are to include everything; number of men, materiel, ammunition, details of military and naval laws to be established.

The idea is, as soon as the Military and Naval Committee has completed its work, to notify the Germans that the Armistice is interrupted and signify our conditions to them.
No objection is made.

* * * * *

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1223: Memorandum

Arrangements for Clearing Mines

[Contemporary Translation]

Annex to Wako No. 14136 Mar.

Berlin, February 12, 1919.

Admiralty Office

No. A. V. 130

A. Based upon the previous agreements for the participation of the German Navy in the work of clearing mines in the North Sea and the Baltic, the following listed ships have been equipped for this purpose:

1. 108 special mine-search boats (M-Boats) of the classes from M-1 to M-150.
2. 95 mine-search torpedo boats of the classes from T-90 to T-200, from V-1 to V-25, from D-3 to D-9, from A-26 to A-104.
3. 33 fishing steamers
4. 83 motor boats of the classes F. and U. Z.
5. 2 old ships of the line of the Prussia class.
2 old ships of the line of the Nittlesbach class.
2 old small cruisers of the Thetis class.
(to serve as mother ships for the motor boats)
1 small cruiser as a lead ship for the commander of the detachment of mine-search boats.

B. It is intended with this equipment to carry out the following evacuation work first of all:

1. For the security of mercantile shipping:
 - a. The completion of the evacuation work in the entrances of the Baltic.
 - b. The removal of the mines in the channel 10 nautical miles in width Helgoland-Norderney light-ship---Borkum Reef light-ship---Terschelling light-ship---and the coast waters south of this channel.
 - c. The clearing of a channel ten nautical miles in width Helgoland---Nornsrief [Horns Reef?] light-ship---Jutland Bank---and the coast waters east of this channel.
2. For the later resumption of fishing:
 - a. Clearing of the German North Sea bight inside of the line Horns Reef light-ship---Borkum Reef light-ship.
 - b. Clearing of the German coastal waters of the Baltic from LANGENGARD at RIXHOFT up to the German-Russian border inside of a coast line of 20 nautical miles.

All information about light ships is based upon their position in time of peace. In view of the urgency of the work of clearing the mines, it is requested that consent be given as rapidly as possible to the carrying out of these projects.

C. In order to simplify and hasten the work of clearing the mines, questions arising will be settled by consulting the areas noted under B, inclusive of the notifications about the kind and depth of the mines laid there.

D. In addition the German Armistice Commission suggests that as soon as possible a subcommittee be formed in which all questions that concern the work of removing mines may be treated. Is it the opinion of the Allied side that there should be admitted to participate in these questions representatives of neutral states? In case that it is so thought corresponding proposition will be made from here.

MICHAELIS.

To Wako Goette for transmission to the Allied Armistice Commission

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1193: Memorandum

Infringements by Germany and Measures to Enforce Terms

Annex A

February 12, 1919.

PART I - INDICTMENT

PARTICULARS OF INFRINGEMENTS BY GERMANY OF ENGAGEMENTS
ENTERED INTO BY HER UNDER THE ARMISTICE AND ITS SEVERAL RENEWALS

1. Questions Relating to the Surrender of the Mercantile Marine: While the German authorities have sought to reopen certain questions for discussion and have interpreted differently from ourselves certain possibly ambiguous phrases in the Agreement, the Committee cannot say on the evidence now before them that the Germans have yet committed any act which can be construed as an infringement of their engagements under the Armistice. They have in fact handed over, or are about to hand over, a substantial amount both of freight and passenger tonnage.

2. Surrender of Submarines:

(a) Under the Armistice renewal of January 16, 1919, the German authorities agreed as follows: "All submarines capable of putting to sea shall be handed over immediately and shall make for Allied ports." We claim that this involves delivery of the submarines by the Germans at Allied ports. As regards certain of the submarines, however, the German authorities, while ready to surrender the submarines in German ports, declare themselves unable to deliver them in Allied ports before February 17---in 20 cases of newly built submarines for lack of crews and 21 cases for lack of tugs available before February 17.

(b) The Germans have commenced to break up several completed submarines instead of surrendering them as above. The Inspection Subcommittee are now in Germany investigating this question and so far as the investigation has proceeded it appears that 15 boats have had their engines removed.

The German authorities do not admit that they are not fulfilling the terms of the Armistice and supplementary conditions.

3. Financial Clauses: The German authorities, as set forth below, have not completely executed certain of their engagements under the Armistice, whether by reason of their practical difficulties or by wilful default.

(a) Whereas, the German Government undertook under the Armistice to restore immediately all documents, cash and securities taken by them they have in fact delivered so far only an insignificant quantity alleging by way of excuse that the political crisis at home and transport difficulties have rendered more rapid compliance impossible.

(b) Whereas, under Article I of the Financial Protocol concluded in connection

with the Armistice renewal of December 13, the German Government undertook not to grant authorizations for the export of securities and other valuables without the previous agreement of the Allies, such securities have in fact been allowed to leave Germany in certain cases. In justification of this the German Government plead that under the strict wording of the agreement they have done nothing contrary to it, inasmuch as they did not agree to prohibit the export of securities, and the mere refusal to grant authorizations in circumstances where the law requires no authorization is naturally not equivalent to prohibition. This trick was protested against by the Allied Financial Representatives at the January Conference at TREVES and the German authorities then promised to submit revised proposals. These revised proposals have just been received, but have not yet been examined.

(c) Under Article IV of the Financial Protocol of TREVES of December 13 the German authorities undertook to examine in agreement with the Allies the question of what measures could be taken for the restoration with the least possible delay of Allied property which had been sequestered. These negotiations have not yet been initiated and the German authorities have declared that they propose to discuss at the same time the question of property, whether Allied or enemy, in invaded districts generally.

PART II - MEANS OF ENFORCING COMPLIANCE

The Committee, without expressing any opinion as to the desirability of these methods or their appropriateness to the acts to be remedied, find that the following are the methods open to the Allied and Associated Powers of putting pressure upon the German Authorities in order to compel them to fulfill their engagement under the Armistice.

1. Economic Methods:

(i) To withhold altogether pending compliance of all supplies food including those already promised.

(ii) To permit the first consignments of food already promised but to initiate that Germany cannot expect further supplies unless and until she mends her behavior.

(iii) To delay these supplies and proportion their rate of delivery to the rate at which the conditions so far infringed are complied with.

(iv) To impose, subject to any engagements which may have been entered into neutral governments, a strict and absolute blockade upon trade to and from Germany in the Baltic but the Committee doubt if practically this last proposal would produce much effect in Germany. There has been very little relaxation of the blockade since the Armistice and to withdraw this small relaxation would not make the blockade substantially stricter than it is at present, as far as Germany is concerned, while it would produce considerable hardship on the neutrals.

While the Committee is of opinion, assuming the conditions in Germany are as serious as some but by no means all observers think, the very considerable and effective pressure could be exerted upon Germany by withholding supplies of food, they desire to point out that any proposal to take action on such lines requires careful consideration in conjunction with its possible reaction on the internal condition of Germany. The Committee is itself doubtful whether it would be prudent to make use of this weapon except in the event of clear, unmistakable and deliberate infringements of the Armistice on points of substance and importance.

2. Military Conclusion Reached by the Military Subcommittee:

The following measures are submitted for the decision of the Supreme War Council:

(1) To impose at once on Germany fixed conditions as regards a military and naval status comprising,

(a) The limitation of personnel to 25 infantry divisions, 5 for the eastern front, 5 for the western front, 5 for the southern front, 10 in reserve and 5 cavalry divisions.

(b) Limitation of arms by land, sea, air and consequently the putting out of action of war material in excess.

(c) Control of these measures.

(d) Regulation of the situation in the east (Poland), limitation of forces in eastern Prussia to 3 divisions, hastening of evacuation of the Ukraine by March 1, occupation and operation of the base of DANZIG, the DANZIG-MLAWA Railway and the DANZIG-THORN Railway and the transport of the Polish Army in France to Poland.

If refused, set a date for the breaking of the Armistice * * * and the Allies reserve complete freedom of action.

1. Economic Measures: The blockade will be resumed with the greatest severity; therefore measures for supplying Germany with food will cease.

2. The Allied High Command will reserve unrestricted use of all its means of action. The whole Committee decided:

However, the members of the Committee desire to express this, their opinion: To obtain as rapidly as possible a final result and to put a stop to the difficulties which are constantly renewed by the Germans, the members of the Committee are of the opinion that naval and military terms of peace should be drawn up immediately by a commission appointed for the purpose, and shall be imposed on the enemy.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1193: Bulletin

Measures Proposed by Supreme War Council

Annex C
Bulletin No. 8

AMERICAN COMMISSION TO NEGOTIATE PEACE,
February 12, 1919.

I

The following resolution proposed by Mr. Balfour will be considered by the representatives of the five Great Powers at the meeting this afternoon, Wednesday, February 12, 1919, at 3 p. m.

The Supreme War Council Agree That:

(1) The Armistice with Germany shall be renewed on the present terms for an undefined period terminable by the Allied and Associated Powers at * * * day's notice.

(2) Detailed and final naval, military, and air conditions, shall be drawn up at once by a committee to be presided over by Marshal Foch and submitted for the approval of the Supreme War Council; these, when approved, will be presented for signature to the Germans.

(3) After the signature of these preliminaries of peace Germany will be permitted to receive such controlled quantities of food, and raw materials for the rehabilitation of her industry, as shall be deemed just, having regard to the prior claims of Allied countries, especially those on whose industries Germany has deliberately inflicted damages.

(4) The question of the quantities of food and raw material to be allowed to Germany after the signature of the preliminaries of peace shall be referred to the Economic Council for examination and report.

II

There will be a meeting of the Supreme War Council this afternoon at 5 p. m. Those who were present at the meeting of the Supreme War Council this morning requested to attend the meeting at 5 o'clock.

N. B.

General BLISS
Admiral BENSON
Mr. BARUCH
Mr. McCORMICK

Stipulations of Armistice Prolongation

Annex D

AMERICAN COMMISSION TO NEGOTIATE PEACE.

The Supreme War Council Agree That:

(1) As a condition of the renewal of the Armistice Marshal Foch shall stipulate that the Germans shall desist from all offensive operations against the Poles, whether in POSEN or elsewhere.

(2) The Armistice with Germany shall be renewed for a short period terminable by the Allied and Associated Powers at three days' notice.

(3) Detailed and final naval, military, and air conditions of the Preliminaries of Peace, shall be drawn up at once by a committee to be presided over by Marshal Foch, and submitted for the approval of the Supreme War Council; these, when approved, will be presented for signature to the Germans, and the Germans shall be at once informed that this is the policy of the Associated Governments.

(4) After the signature of these preliminaries of peace, Germany will be permitted to receive such controlled quantities of food, and raw materials for the rehabilitation of her industry, as shall be deemed just, having regard to the prior claims of Allied countries, especially those on whose industries Germany has deliberately inflicted damage.

(5) The question of the quantities of food and raw material to be allowed to Germany after the signature of the Preliminaries of Peace shall be referred to the Economic Council for examination and report.

February 12, 1919.

Committee to Deal With Polish Questions

[Contemporary Translation]

Annex F

February 12, 1919.

AMERICAN COMMISSION TO NEGOTIATE PEACE

Motion by Mr. Balfour

It is agreed: That a committee composed of one representative each of the Governments of the United States of America, British Empire, France, Italy and Japan be appointed to deal with all reports and requests for instructions from the Commission sent to Poland. On matters of high policy the Committee will refer to the Conference of the Associated Powers.

Summary of Meetings of February 12, 1919

AMERICAN COMMISSION TO NEGOTIATE PEACE

Summary of Minutes of Meeting of Supreme War Council, February 12, 1919.

[Extract]

I

Questions Relating to the Renewal of the Armistice: The Committee composed of one civilian and one military representative of each of the five Great Powers appointed at the meeting of February 10, 1919, submitted their report regarding the economic and military means available for enforcing compliance with the terms of the Armistice on the part of the German Government. * * *

* * * * *

IV

Mr. Balfour's proposal submitted at the morning session was considered at the meeting of the representatives of the five Great Powers at 3 p. m. Certain amendments were proposed, and a final draft accepted by all. * * *

It was decided that the first three paragraphs of the proposed instructions should be communicated to Marshal Foch and by him communicated to the Germans.

The last two paragraphs were not to be communicated to the Germans at the present time.

* * * * *

VII

It was decided to refer the request of the Poles regarding the restitution of agricultural and industrial material, and the restitution of railway material taken from them by Germany, to the Economic Commission, for consideration and report.

VIII

It was decided to refer also to the Economic Commission, the question raised by M. Clemenceau at the morning session, regarding a proposed demand on Germany for the restoration of certain domestic animals, and seeds and plants. * * *

IX

M. Clemenceau brought up the question of the exact meaning of the word attached in relation to the civil commissioners who were to be attached to Marshal Foch in connection with matters relating to the renewal of the Armistice. M. Clemenceau expressed the wish that Foch alone should talk to the Germans. It was his understanding that the civilians should talk to the Germans. It was his understanding that the civilians should not hold converse with the Germans.

President Wilson stated that his understanding regarding the appointment of the civilian advisers was as follows: That when a civilian question came up at any time

during the discussion of the terms of the Armistice between Marshal Foch and the German representatives, the Marshal would advise the civilian commissioners, who would refer the matter, together with their recommendations, to the Conference of the Associated Powers. The latter would then issue appropriate instructions to Marshal Foch, who would then take the necessary action vis-a-vis the German representatives.

This view of the matter was accepted by the Conference.

X

The proposal regarding the resumption of commercial relations with Turkey and Bulgaria was approved.

XI

M. Clemenceau read to Marshal Foch the instructions regarding the terms of the renewal of the Armistice which had been approved earlier in the afternoon.

The Marshal asked for an explanation of what was meant by the words whether in POSEN or elsewhere, in the first paragraph. It was agreed that the Marshal would draw a line, that is to say, an Armistice frontier between the German and Polish troops, as they now stood, and instruct the Germans that they were not to cross this line.

Marshal Foch asked for an explanation of the words for a short period in the second paragraph of the instructions.

M. Clemenceau explained that it was not desired to fix any period, but that the Marshal should inform the Germans that the Armistice was renewed for an indefinite period.

As regards Paragraph 3 of the instructions, M. Clemenceau explained that it was desired that the Committee to be presided over by Marshal Foch should fix the maximum military force which Germany should be permitted to maintain. The Committee should also recommend the steps that should be taken to insure a proper control.

On the motion of President Wilson, it was decided that the Committee should be composed of Marshal Foch, as Chairman, the Commanders-in-Chief of the Allied and Associated Powers, ex-officio, and three representatives of each of the five Great Powers, one military, one naval and one air expert. General Bliss, Admiral Benson and General Patrick were appointed to represent the United States of America.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1217: Memorandum

German Attitude Toward Passage of Polish Troops to Grodno

[Contemporary Translation]

No. 886

February 12, 1919.

From Representative of German Government

To the Chairman of the P. I. A. C.

On January 25, Marshal Foch demanded the free passage for Polish troops to GRODNO, as a view to resisting Bolshevism and indicated that the refusal by the German authorities to permit this passage by the Poles would be regarded as an indication of the unwillingness of the German Government to resist Bolshevism. The German Government thereupon directed their authorities to reach an accord with the Poles over their advance, and an accord has been formulated which at present is being studied by the Government. If the German

Government grants the desire of the Allied Powers to facilitate the advance of the Polish troops to GRODNO and in the regions east and south demands the following statement:

Information that the Polish advance would be permitted caused energetic protest among the Lithuanians and White Russians. Both parties protest against the turning over of non-Polish territory to the Poles and assert that the result will be brutal handling of the non-Polish inhabitants and a further release of the country to Bolshevism.

The German Government replied that it had been forced to take these measures by the Allied Powers. It cannot avoid mentioning the protests made. The government of the regions formerly Russian territory is a question for the peace negotiations. The leaving of Polish troops in a territory which was not promised to the Poles signifies a measure which is closely linked with the peace negotiations. The German Government is making this open statement in order that later it not be left open to misimpressions that the removal of troops from the disputed region constitute taking the opposition. This is brought to the attention of the Allied Powers. It must further be stated that the resistance of Polish troops against Bolshevism is very small in view of the strides Bolshevism has made in the Polish Army. Consequently, Polish resistance to Bolshevism is regarded with mistrust, not only by the Lithuanians and White Russians, but also by the Germans. In how far this mistrust is founded is indicated in the occupation of WILNA. The German troops were obliged to give this city over on the demand of Marshal Foch for the Poles to defend. The result of this measure was that the Poles had hardly occupied the town within two days after it was turned over to numerous and armed Red troops, so that the combined system of WILNA was shattered. The German Government, therefore, declines responsibility for the conclusions of the measures taken by Marshal Foch.

von LERSNER.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1239: Telegram

American Force to Garrison Strassen

February 12, 1919.

Commanding General, Second Army

No. 3258 G-3. Reference letter from the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, February 1, on evacuation by French of Grand Duchy of Luxemburg, Commander-in-Chief directs that a regiment of infantry less two battalions be sent at once to STRASSEN in 1800. Instructions not to occupy city of LUXEMBURG still govern. Garrison at STRASSEN is for purpose of having available near city of LUXEMBURG sufficient troops to utilize in city of LUXEMBURG should necessity arise. Acknowledge.

By order:

FOX CONNER,
Brigadier General, General Staff,
Asst. Chief of Staff, G-3.

Communications of German Deputies with Electors

[Contemporary Translation]

1st Section, General Staff
3d Bureau
No. 1101

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE ALLIED ARMIES.
February 12, 1919.

From: Marshal Foch, Commander-in-Chief of Allied Armies

To: Marshal Haig, Commander-in-Chief of the British Forces
General Pershing, Commander-in-Chief of the A. E. F.
Lt. Gen. Gillian, Chief of G. S., Belgian Army
Marshal Petain, Commander-in-Chief French Armies of East

The German Government has requested that measures be taken so that the deputies in territory occupied by the Allied troops may be able to maintain in WEIMAR, without restriction, telegraphic and postal communication with their electors.

I therefore request that you give the necessary orders to the Armies under your command so that the forwarding of German correspondence referred to above may be carried out as rapidly as possible, compatible with a state of war.

By direction:

WEYGAND,
Major General.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1217: Letter

German Vessels Held by French

[Contemporary Translation]

A. A. I.
No. 883

Spa, February 12, 1919.

For the Representative of the German Govt.

To the Chairman of the P. I. A. C.

In answer to Note No. 425/G of February 8, 1919

In a note of December 2, 1918, which General Nudant transmitted to General von Winterfeldt, General Nudant proposed that German ships be used for the repatriation of French prisoners of war from Germany. In the note he stated:

(English translation of French) Of course all arrangements will be made by me to assure to each boat free passage between the German port of embarkation and the Allied port of destination which will be designated through my orders, and vice versa.

Marshal Foch also started with the idea that these boats must be returned to Germany. He says in his telegram of January 23, transmitted on January 28, No. 4:

(English translation of French) The hospital personnel can be sent back by empty trains to concentration camps arranged for prisoners of war and then be transported to Germany by the empty German trains or else transported to German ports by empty boats which will be returned after having repatriated Allied prisoners of war.

Nevertheless, these boats have now been held back in CHERBOURG. The French Government declines to give them up. In a telegram handed over by General Nudant on February 8 the French Government bases its decision on the fact that in the Navigation Committees' Conference at SPA, on February 6 a decision would be made as to the temporary division of the German merchant fleet and, therefore, in order to avoid unnecessary expenses for the return trips of these boats the ships that were in the French harbors of BREST and CHERBOURG would be retained there.

The retention of these ships is in opposition to the conception of Marshal Foch and to the formal promise of General Nudant, that as far as the French were concerned the ships could immediately begin their return passage to Germany.

Entirely apart from the statements the German Government had already declared in the conference concerning the prolongation of the Armistice on January 16 and in the agreement concerning shipping of January 17 that it was ready to hand over the German merchant marine to the Allies, but the German Government never granted the Allies the right to take away the German merchant ships.

In addition the ships in question belong to a class which the German Government desires to withhold from delivery. To make exceptions of this kind was expressly stated in the Armistice Agreement and in the Agreement at TRIER. Those boats in addition to various others have been taken over by the Naval authorities in order to transport prisoners of war fugitives and other necessary government transports. Concerning these exceptions the Germans and Allied Navigation Commission negotiated here from February 6 to 8. A definite answer from the Allies has as yet not been received and, therefore, for this reason the contention of the French Government that the ships will be retained in order to save costs will not hold water.

The holding up of these ships, therefore, if they are not returned, would signify not only a breach of the promise given by General Nudant but also of the Armistice Agreement and the TRIER Compact.

In the name of the German Government I, therefore, enter most emphatic protest against the measures and request the immediate return of the German ships to Germany.

von LERSNER.

Maintenance of Armies of Occupation

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, February 12, 1919.

No. 73

From: Acting Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

* * * * *

6. Work of a Committee on Entretien: The officer at the head of the committee on Entretien recently visited TREVES and COBLENZ, where he got in immediate communication with officers interested in the study of this question.

This committee has its work well under way, and at present is awaiting the return of General Ronneaux who is visiting Marshal Foch for the purpose of getting more detailed instructions.

The question of the expense of our Army of Occupation has been worked out in detail through information received from G-4 and from TOURS, and from the Quartermaster Department at TREVES and COBLENZ.

Steps are being taken looking to securing immediate funds from the Germans to pay our current requisitions, so that we shall keep our credit good with the local population. Large sums have been advanced by the American Government during the last three months in maintaining our Army of Occupation; I do not know just what steps are to be taken to secure the return of this money from the Germans, but naturally it is a question too large to be handled through the Armistice Commission.

* * * * *

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier-General, U. S. A.,
Acting Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

Method of Payment for Requisitions

[Contemporary Translation]

General Staff
D. G. C. R. A.
No. 4280/CR

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE ALLIED ARMIES,
February 13, 1919.

MEMORANDUM for Lieutenant Chapin, Chief of the American Mission with the D. G. C. R. A.

The method of payment by the German Government for requisitions made by the different Allied Armies in occupied territory was fixed by the Interallied Conference held at PARIS and LAMORLAYE on Jan. 20 and 21, 1919, as set forth by my Letter 3492/CR of Jan. 24.

The American Army advises me that it desires, in payment of its requisitions, to follow a procedure given below:

Outstanding requisitions and new requisitions will be paid by the American Army in German money, Germany being required to furnish the necessary marks under the same conditions as those now requested from the Reichsbank every month. Such requisitions will not be paid except when the American Army has received the necessary marks.

This proceeding leaves to the Allied Armies the valuation of requisitions and avoids, consequently, an increase in prices which the German Government may be tempted to make in order to augment the amounts to its credit.

Further, this proceeding assures to the inhabitants of occupied territory regular and rapid payment of requisitions.

The system of payment by the German Government was adopted by an Interallied Conference. Therefore, I consider that no modification can be made except by agreement between the Allied Armies so as to avoid serious inconvenience which would result from a different proceeding in the different zones of occupation of the Allied Armies. The question raised may, therefore, be studied at the Interallied Conference planned for Feb. 28.

Nevertheless, in order to hasten the solution of this question, I would request you to inform me as soon as possible whether you accept the system of payment proposed by the American Army so as to make it immediately applicable in case of assent by all of the Allied Armies.

C. H. PAYOT,
Director General of Communications
and Supplies of the Army.

German Demobilization

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, February 12, 1919.

No. 73

From: Acting Chief

To: Commander-in Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

* * * * *

2. German Demobilization: General von Hammerstein called attention to the fact that in a Horsea radio of February 10, the statement was made that there was ground for belief that Germany is not continuing its demobilization and that at the present time there are eighteen divisions being concentrated on the western front under General von Hindenburg.

A newspaper communication states that eighteen divisions are being gathered together between THORN and BROMBERG.

Inasmuch as similar statements are cropping up repeatedly, and seemingly are beginning to find belief in official circles, General von Hammerstein felt it necessary to state expressly that all such statements are purely invention; that the German demobilization has been carried through.

To the foregoing, General Nudant stated that he was of the opinion that this does not throw further light on the question. We are familiar with the fact that demobilization continues, but we do not know where the German divisions are which are still under arms.

* * * * *

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier-General, U. S. A.,
Acting Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

German Demobilization

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, February 13, 1919.

No. 74

From: Acting Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

9. Demobilization of German Army: During the regular session General von Hammerstein announced that after the meeting he would like to have a private conference with the Chiefs of the Allied Sections and their Chiefs of Staff. Therefore, immediately after the adjournment we joined him and he took up the question of the demobilization of the German Army.

He began by recalling General Nudant's comment yesterday in regard to the demobilization not being complete and that the information conveyed to the Allies was not entirely satisfactory. He added that last evening he had received further information on this subject which he wished to convey to the Allies. He went on to say that the German Army, except the peace Army, has been demobilized with the exception of six army corps consisting of thirteen divisions, which are now being used to guard the eastern front. He stated that these divisions were very weak, many battalions being made up of volunteers, homeguards, labor organizations, etc., that the artillery was very weak and that the cavalry and technical troops were often lacking.

He presented a map showing the disposition of these corps and called attention to the fact that the greater part of them were in SILESIA for the reason that there the Germans have two fronts to watch,---one against the Czechoslovaks, and the other against the Poles, while at the east there are only the Poles, and at the northeast only the Bolsheviks.

He called attention to the fact that in Poland, proper, there was a Polish army of one hundred thousand, and in the Province of POSEN there was a Polish army of from forty to fifty thousand.

The map which he presented showed no German troops in the Province of POSEN. He stated that the morale of the German troops was now very poor as many of them were volunteers and were in the habit of coming and going very much as they pleased. That it was felt that as soon as the farming season opened, many would leave. He called attention to the fact that the peace army which had formerly been stationed in the occupied territory was not now in existence. He did not, however, give the location of any other troops than those mentioned above nor did he give any figures at all as to the present strength of the German Army.

While the corps formerly on the left bank of the RHINE have been demobilized, the staffs of these corps had removed to the right bank.

From the known strength and location of the Army before the war, considering the facts stated above, it is believed that the present German Army is somewhere between five hundred thousand and seven hundred thousand. He added that there was a Spartacus regiment in DUSSELDORF consisting of two battalions. That the Government was unable to control this regiment, in fact they are having much difficulty in controlling many of the coast cities.

General Nudant remarked before the close of the interview that it is not the German Army of today that is feared, but the one of tomorrow.

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier-General, U. S. A.,
Acting Chief.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1217: Memorandum

German Shipping Dispute

[Contemporary Translation]

A. A. II
No. 1896

Spa, February 13, 1919.

Representative of the German Government

To the Chairman of the P. I. A. C.

In today's Note A. A. II. No. 1868 it is stated that in view of the inseparable connection between the chartering of the German Merchant Marine, foodstuffs, and the financial accord, before the conclusion of the last two agreements the turning over of German ships cannot take place.

I am charged by the German Government to make the following addition to this note:

As a result of the early departure of the Allied Shipping Commission, the German Shipping Commission was not able either to take a position on the carrying out of the first provisions laid down by the accord at TREVES, or to make what seems to them new necessary propositions. The request made by the German Ship Commission for verbal discussion in SPA, of details with a view of getting information was rejected by the Allied Commission so that it found itself obliged to state its further position in writing. This followed in the note of February 12, A. A. II. No. 1859, a memorandum transmitted by the German Ship Commission which contains the demands and desires of the German Government.

The German Government cannot avoid again insisting that the conditions of details set by the Allied Ship Commission are a sharpening of the earlier conditions. To these belong:

1. The inclusion of newly constructed ships.
2. The only provisional settling of the exceptions.
3. The prompt removal of all personnel from the German ships. This leads to a force majeure in that the crews will refuse in advance to go on board.
4. The refusing to give information in detail as regards the conditions of charter.
5. The apparent intention to take away from the German Government a decision as to freight received.

On the German side the offer is maintained to make payments for food stuffs. The intention of the Transport Council to give the German delegation right to full collaboration.

von LERSNER.

Delivery of German Merchant Marine

A. A. II.
No. 1868

[Contemporary Translation]

Spa, February 13, 1919.

The Representative of the German Government

To the Chairman of the Interallied Commission

The Allies and the United States have, upon the basis of the treaty of January 16 and 17, concerning German commercial tonnage, demanded that the German commercial ships beginning with February 12, should stand ready to put out to sea on call and that the Neutrals shall be instructed on the same day concerning the delivery to the Associated Governments of German tonnage lying in neutral ports.

According to Article VIII of the Trier Agreement of January 16, The German Government declared itself ready to place the German Commercial Fleet under the associated control and flag in order to assure the provisioning of Germany and the rest of Europe. To attain this end, namely, the assuring of the provisioning of Germany, two essential factors are necessary:

1. Agreement concerning the amount and price of provisions.
2. Agreement concerning manner of payment.

As to provisions there was made a fast agreement (February 8, 1919) only concerning an amount which is very small in comparison with German needs. The delivery of further, not very considerable, amounts is placed in prospect but without any mention of price. Concerning the real plan of provisioning for Germany, no decision has as yet been made.

As to financing, the Associated Powers declared that the negotiations would begin about February 12, in SPA. In a Note of February 7, No. A. A. II, No. 1673, the representative of the German Government informed the President of the Interallied Armistice Commission that according to the German understanding the adjustment of navigation expenses and provisioning expense was inseparably bound up with formation of the finance agreement. And that it was, therefore, urgently requested that the finance delegates of the Associated Governments might be brought to SPA as soon as possible, in any case before February 12. Although the German finance delegates have been in SPA for some days, we have not yet received any definite information up to this forenoon, February 13, when or where the financial negotiations will be entered upon. The provisioning of Germany which forms the principal purpose in the giving over of the German Commercial Fleet is accordingly still held in abeyance.

The German Government is firmly determined to fulfill strictly and exactly all obligations arising out of the shipping agreement and it will continue its preparations to this end with all emphasis; however, it cannot at this time bring about the notification of neutrals demanded by the Associated Powers, and direct German commercial shipping to be ready to put to sea at call. For however much it may desire to carry out faithfully all its obligations yet it is not only its right, but its serious duty not to give up the German Commercial Fleet to foreign control and place the same under foreign flag before the purpose has been assured for which such a significant measure was expressly agreed to.

Further, there are still many important differences of opinion concerning details of execution, the clearing up of which was made impossible by the early departure of the representatives of the Associated Governments who had met in SPA for this purpose.

On this account a new note was delivered yesterday.

FREIHERR von LERSNER.

Repatriation of Germans from Riga by Sea

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, February 13, 1919.

No. 74

From: Acting Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

* * * * *

6. Relief for Germans in RIGA: General von Hammerstein stated that on account of the haste with which the city of RIGA was evacuated, a large number of German subjects had been left there in a very lamentable condition. That they are now completely unprotected from Bolshevist bands, and are, therefore, in a very dangerous position. He stated that it was the intention to send the German Steamer "Ostsee" from LIBAU to RIGA in order to repatriate these German subjects. The consent of the Lithuanian Soviet has not yet been obtained for this purpose. According to latest reports, RIGA is free of ice and the Baltic President has consented to the departure of these Germans. It will be necessary to take a German pilot on account of the danger of mines.

He then requested that the consent of the Supreme Council of the Allies be obtained for the passage of this steamer and that the necessary orders be procured from the Allied naval authorities so that the voyage of the "Ostsee" will not be interfered with.

In view of the serious conditions of these German subjects, an early and favorable reply would be greeted with thanks.

* * * * *

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier-General, U. S. A.,
Acting Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

Armistice Prolongation

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, February 13, 1919.

No. 74

From: Acting Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

1. Extension of Armistice: General Nudant handed to the President of the German Armistice commission the following note relative to the extension of the Armistice:

The Armistice renewed on January 16, last, expires on February 17; inasmuch as the extension beyond that later date and up to the signature of the preliminaries of peace has not been approved by the Allied Governments, there results from this

situation that a conference will take place to determine the prolongation of the Armistice beyond February 17, between the Allied and German plenipotentiaries who drew up the agreements of November 11, December 13, and January 16.

The Allied High Command has the honor to propose to the German High Command that this meeting take place on February 14, in the afternoon, at TREVES, under the same conditions as in the month of January.

General von Hammerstein in replying to this stated that among the German plenipotentiaries there will be the following changes: In the places of General von Winterfeldt and Count von Oberndorff, there will be General von Hammerstein and Baron von Haniel.

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier-General, U. S. A.,
Acting Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1195: Memorandum

Possible German Action and Military Situation to be Considered

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF,
February 13, 1919.

Memorandum for A. C. S., G-3

Following extract from daily letter of February 12, from A. C. S., Advance General Headquarters, is referred to you for study:

8. Monthly Armistice Extension: The local PARIS papers of the last five or six days have been suggesting new and severe conditions to be imposed upon Germany at the next session of the Armistice Commission, for the prolongation of the Armistice.

These statements have reached Germany, where they have been interpreted as more or less inspired and naturally, have led the German Government and people to consider the action of their own delegates should the Allies impose these conditions as essential for the renewing of the Armistice.

From the best information obtainable here, it is clear that Germany will not sign a renewal of the Armistice containing the radical alterations of the Armistice conditions outlined in the PARIS press.

On the other hand Germany will not renew the war, but will say to the Allies what Russia said to Germany in January 1917: We will not make peace terms with you on those terms, neither will we make war with you, you may do what you will.

Should this situation arise there are two military situations which should be considered by the Operations Section and by the Government. The first is: Will the answer by the Allies, to the refusal of Germany to a renewal of the Armistice under the new conditions demanded result in the further invasion of Germany by the Allies, and will the Army participate in such further invasion? Second, will the present plan for provisioning Germany, in the event of the armistice being broken off, be abandoned? If so, Germany will face famine and civil war. Will the Allies and the United States in that event invade Germany to restore order, or limit their efforts to maintaining order in, and securing the necessary provisioning for, the German territory now under military occupation?

LeROY ELTINGE,
Brigadier-General, U. S. A.,
Deputy Chief of Staff.

German Military Material

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,
February 13, 1919.

I. According to the terms of Paragraph 6 of the Armistice Convention, the Installations, the supplies and the military material which the German Armies were unable to remove in the course of their retreat should be delivered to the Armies of Occupation.

Consequently all sales and transfers of whatever nature of such material made by the German military authorities since November 11, 1918 are considered by the Allied Command as null and void.

II. There is occasion to seek these materials which belong to the Armies of Occupation, to prepare an inventory of them and to exact the restitution of or payment for them by the present holders.

III. 1st Case. The holder is by nationality French (including inhabitants of Alsace-Lorraine), Allied or Neutral (including inhabitants of Luxembourg):

In this case the holder will have the choice of restoring the objects irregularly in his possession or of paying their value to an official of the Treasury, or an accountable officer, according to a procedure of delivery, and valuation to be determined.

If, however, the holder can prove that he has paid a purchase price to the German authorities for such materials, if further he has made such purchase in ignorance of the convention of November 11, and if his good faith is evident, the sum which he paid to the German authorities will be deducted from the actual price of the objects and he will be allowed to retain them if he so desires upon payment of the difference between the two amounts only. If he prefers to restore the objects the sum paid by him to the German authorities may be reimbursed to him.

IV. 2d Case. The holder is by nationality German or enemy:

In this case advice will be given immediately that the objects held belong to the Army of Occupation by virtue of the convention of November 11. The procedure will be the same whether the objects have been bought by the holder from the German authorities or whether they have been seized under cover of the retreat.

The Generals in command of the Armies will decide, after consultation with the *Sections Economiques*, whether the material should be confiscated from the holder purely and simply or whether it is expedient to authorize the latter to acquire it regularly by payment of a fixed purchase price.

In the latter case the holder will be required to pay a fixed price immediately or restore the objects of which he has taken possession irregularly.

V. When the *Sections Economiques* do not possess sufficient information to give an opinion they will consult the Interallied Economic Committee at LUXEMBURG.

VI. A list of amounts and material recovered will be addressed to the Interallied Economic Committee. Special statements will set forth the amounts paid by individuals to the German military authorities and either deducted from the amounts claimed by the French military authorities or reimbursed to the holders.

In execution of Article 3, second case, of the present instructions copies of the papers submitted in proof of purchases will be annexed and duly certified in order to establish the debt of the German Government. G. H. Q., A. E. F., 4th Sec., G. S., February 5, 1919. - Official copy furnished to:

GEO. VAN HORN MOSELEY,
Brigadier General, G. S.,
Asst. Chief of Staff, G-4.

Distribution of War Material

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, February 13, 1919.

MEMORANDUM: For General Barnum

1. Heavy Guns that have been Definitely Rejected: In a telephonic message from the General Staff of Marshal Foch at LUXEMBURG, January 13, 1919, the following direction as to the disposition of these pieces was given, "guns not accepted cannot be made use of for exchange. Consequently all guns refused ought to be taken back by Germany with the briefest delay possible, the Allied Armies not being chargeable with guarding them." There are now 80 guns at COBLENZ that have been rejected definitely. In accordance with Marshal Foch's directions these should be turned over at once to the Germans.

2. Guns Accepted: These should for the present be held pending information from Marshal Foch's Headquarters as to the distribution of heavy guns among the Allies. It is understood that there are now at COBLENZ 106 of these guns, not counting five high-power railway pieces.

3. High-Power Railway Pieces: The five high-power pieces on railway mounts recently received at COBLENZ were sent there in conformity with an agreement of the Subcommittee on Materiel approved by Marshal Foch, to exchange these pieces for an equivalent of heavy guns due under the Armistice. These five pieces received at COBLENZ are the equivalent of 35 heavy guns. It was agreed in the Subcommittee on Materiel that these five pieces should be consigned to the American Army. Hence, it is not necessary to await distribution spoken of above before shipping these pieces home. They may be considered as part of the heavy artillery due the American Army and may be disposed of at once. It is recommended that they be definitely accepted and disposed of as desired by G-4.

4. On the renewal of the Armistice in December, 865 heavy guns remained to be delivered by the Germans. Of these 150 were to be delivered at COBLENZ. Of 152 delivered at COBLENZ, 80 as noted were rejected, leaving only 72 delivered when the Armistice was renewed in January. Under the agreement to accept certain equivalents as noted above the original distribution of 150 guns to COBLENZ became ineffective. There seems to be some misunderstanding on the part of the Receiving Commission at COBLENZ with respect to this. Counting railroad pieces and later deliveries the totals at present amount to 141 guns, and hence the Receiving Commission has been expecting nine more guns. There will probably be no more guns delivered at COBLENZ. The whole question of delivery of heavy guns, unless modified by the forthcoming meeting at TREVES to renew the Armistice, can be considered as practically settled except as to the final distribution referred to above.

5. The distribution of field guns, airplanes, machine guns and minenwerfer was the subject of a previous memorandum. This memorandum refers therefore only to heavy guns. It should be noted, however, that the distribution of 2,188 machine guns now in our hands in excess of our allotment is bound up with the question of the distribution among the Allies of the heavy guns.

6. It is recommended that the subject matter of this memorandum be brought to the attention of the officers concerned at TREVES and COBLENZ, through the proper channels in order to clear up some matter that they seemed to be in doubt about.

Sales of Material of War

4th Section, G. S.

ADVANCE GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,
February 14, 1919.

MEMORANDUM FOR: General Smith, Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs in Occupied Territory.
Assistant Chief of Staff, Advance G. H. Q.
Major Lewis Landis, War Materials Board, Third Army.
Lt. Col. Waller, War Material Board, Second Army.

[Extract]

* * * * *

2. General Moseley is particularly anxious to clear up this whole matter of the method of handling and disposition of war materials in general. While it is not permissible, as indicated in my notes, for American authorities to sell in the open market any material of war which though it may be of no value to the United States yet which has local economic value, authority is granted to take over in general all sums of money in the hands of corporations or towns which have been received from the sale of property which originally belonged to the German Army. In connection with the authority granted to deal with civilians who either have property in their possession which we can take or who have money for the sale of such property, instructions embodied in the attached copy of communication from the A. C. of S., G-4, G. H. Q. dated Feb. 5, with reference to nationality of the holder of such property of money, will be adhered to.

3. In the event that the holder of the property or of the money received for its sale refuses to give it up on official demand made by the board, action will be taken in the Provost Courts which are organized under the Department of Civil Affairs. These Courts will be empowered by General Smith to try the offender and to impose a fine equal to the some of money involved.

4. Immediate and thorough search will be made to include investigations of the books of all large towns and corporations which may have received material of war from the German Army.

5. Where the sum of money involved is so small that the question arises as to whether the time and labor expended to recover same would be worth while, you are authorized to confer direct with the Representative of G-4 at TREVES, who has been authorized to settle each instance.

6. It is believed that the above instructions will cover all cases with which the war material boards will have to deal, except that case where property has come into the possession of the board or has been surrendered to it, and which for one reason or another it is not desired to ship for the use of the United States, and the destruction of which would be an economic waste. No sales by American authorities will be made of war material pending further instructions.

CASEY HAYES,
Lt. Col. F. A.,
Representative A. C. of S., G-4.

Elections for Municipal Councils

[Contemporary Translation]

At Allied G. H. Q., February 14, 1919.

General Direction of Communications and of Supplies with the Armies

Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies (D. G. C. R. A.)

To Commander-in-Chief, British Armies at MONTREUIL
Commander-in-Chief, American Armies at CHAUMONT
Commander-in-Chief, Belgian Armies at BRUSSELS
Commander-in-Chief, French Armies at CHANTILLY

No. 43251 CR---In accordance with the proposal of the Belgian Command and after agreement with the Allied military authorities in the occupied territories, I have decided provisionally not to authorize for the present in these territories the execution of the Decree of the Prussian Government calling the elections for the complete renewal of the Municipal Councils in Rhenish Prussia. This step necessarily having consequences contrary to the interests of the Armies of Occupation as far as the billeting and supply services are concerned.

I ask you to inform by telegraph the military authorities concerned of this decision.

The Controller General of the territories will convey it to the Ober-President of the Rhenish Province.

By order, Chief of Staff,

WEYGAND.

G-1, GHQ, AEF: File 383.6 Fldr. 6: Telegram

Reciprocal Agreement for Return of Effects of Deceased Prisoners

1st Section, General Staff

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,
February 14, 1919

TO: American Representative, Permanent International Armistice
Commission, Spa, Belgium.

No. 5632 G-1. Please transmit following to Harries, BERLIN:

You are authorized to make reciprocal agreement with German authorities for return of personal effects and money of deceased prisoners of war. Effects and money of deceased German prisoners are now held at Central Records Office and will be returned promptly upon receipt from you of instructions for their disposition.

AVERY D. ANDREWS,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1.

German Observations on Execution of Armistice

[Contemporary Translation]

German Armistice Commission

Now at Treves [Trier],
Hotel de la Poste
February 14, 1919.

President: State Secretary Erzberger

To the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies,
Marshal Foch, Treves

[Extract]

* * * * *

NAVAL CLAUSES:

Article 5.---The Allied opposition that the provisions of Article 5 are not executed proves that new differences of interpretation exist. We are ready to settle these differences definitely and request that an opportunity be given on February 15, for officers of the German Navy who are present here to confer with officers of the British Navy.

Provisionally it may be said:

(1) The note of protest of January 16, declares on the subject of the demand which refers to new constructions: "In the name of the German Government I protest most vigorously against this act of violence and here declare that Germany must indeed cede to force, but must leave to the Allies the task of looking for new constructions which are not finished and which have not had their trial trip."

This declaration was made verbally and in writing and was received without contradiction. According to the usage of international law such a declaration is considered accepted when it is not declined. To the British idea that the signature of the convention rendered that declaration null is opposed the German idea that the declaration previous to the signature must be considered as accepted.

(2) On the German side a despatch was sent on February 6 to PANAC [Permanent Allied Naval Armistice Commission], in which the details of the makeup of the 64 submarines demanded by Admiral Browning on January 16, were explained according to the German opinion.

Until then Admiral Browning had only stated verbally that the total number was 64, and that the vessels in the Mediterranean were included; moreover, the commander also to be included. Admiral Browning who was sitting beside him made no objection to this declaration. Finally a wireless message brought the information that three vessels formerly belonging to Russia were to be counted among them.

On January 16, Germany had already delivered of the 64 vessels:

U 80, U 82, UB 77, and 13 vessels from the Mediterranean---16; 48 remain to be delivered, counting the 3 Russian vessels, = 45. These 45 vessels were divided up as follows:

(1) 7 vessels on neutral ports.

(2) Vessels referred to by Paragraph 1 of Article 5 of the Treaty of Prolongation is = 21 vessels formerly in service.

(3) The number of new vessels necessary to complete the figure 64 is = 17 new ships. These 17 new vessels were reported as being ready for the Allies.

The ships had been chosen according to their nearness of completion. All

other ships were ordered dismantled or destroyed according to Article 5.

No answer has yet been made to the despatch.

On the other hand independently of this on the following day, February 7, the inspection commission on Comus turned over a list which also gave more exact details on the figure 64.

It differed in essential respects from the German point of view. The following were not counted:

(1) 7 vessels in foreign neutral countries = minus 7.

(2) 8 fairly old vessels which used to be in service and which can be towed is minus 8. Together equal minus 15.

Recapitulation of figures.

English list	German list
13 vessels in the Mediterranean	13 vessels in the Mediterranean
3 - U 80, U 82, UB 77	3 - U 80, U 82, UB 77
3 old Russian vessels	0
0	7 vessels interned in neutral ports
13 vessels formerly in service	21 vessels formerly in service
32 new ships	20 new ships
<hr/> 64	<hr/> 64

Difference: 12 new ships to be built; more than Germany had counted on. The following only were excluded from the dismantling order: The 17 ships mentioned in the German despatch and 3 new ships in place of the 3 Russian ships which had not been considered at the beginning.

(4) The question of towing the 21 submarines cannot be estimated according to the number of vessels which can be towed and which exist by count in Germany.

Conditions are indeed so unfavorable that at the time referred to we could not get the necessary vessels to do the towing. All the high seas tugs (tugs) whose crews were willing to do the work were ordered to BRUNSBUTTEL to tow submarines from there. Of the 10 torpedo boats which could be maintained on duty, 8 had to be changed during the period referred to as a result of materiel inavailability as was reported to Captain Tottenham on the spot and to PANAC by wireless. Steam fishing vessels and mine sweepers will not obey for the present. Under these disrupted conditions there was nothing to be done except to declare honorably that for the present we could not. Naturally the vessels will be taken in tow there as soon as possible.

* * * * *

ERZBERGER.

German Demands on Use of German Ships by Allies

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, February 14, 1919.

No. 75

From: Acting Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

* * * * *

2. Use of German Shipping for Provisioning Germany and the Remainder of Europe: Under the provisions of Par. 8 of the Convention of TREVES of January 16, the German Government bound itself to take all necessary measures during the continuance of the Armistice to place all the German Commercial Fleet under the control and under the flags of the Allies, for the purpose of provisioning Germany and the remainder of Europe.

About a week ago, an Allied committee met here at Spa for the purpose of considering this matter. There were shipping representatives for the purpose of securing the necessary vessels, and the representative of Mr. Hoover for the purpose of considering the food part of the undertaking. It seems that the Germans were not given any hearing at the meetings of this Committee. As a consequence, they have submitted a long note presenting their view of the question. In this note, they make a number of demands of which the following is an abstract.

- I. An immediate final settlement of the ships exempted: i. e. ---
 - (1) Ships under 2,500 gross tonnage
 - (2) Ships under control of naval authorities as per List 4
(Reason of exemption in Annex I)
 - (3) Tank-ships
 - (4) 250,000 tonnage (additional) for ore and coal transport
 - (5) Ships chartered by the French before the Trier Convention
 - (6) Severely damaged ships, not repaired.
- II. A clear statement of how the income from use of German ships will be used. Germans say it should count as part-payment for the provisions supplied Germany.
- III. Clear explanation of what is meant by appropriate remuneration, scale of freight rates, charter rates, prewar wages, taxes, risks, etc.
- IV. Crews must remain German.
- V. German flag must fly along with the Allied flag.
- VI. Date of handing over the ships (February 12) is too early.
- VII. The parts of German crews not used should be kept in Allied ports at Allied expense or transported to Germany.
- VIII. Damaged ships cannot be made ready during duration of Armistice, nor can they increase the world's tonnage---should therefore be exempted.
- IX. The German representative must have full authority at the Allied Maritime Council in London, the same as any Allied representative; must not be merely a bureau of information.
- X. Correct the English text (Annex 2, Point 9) by adding the words, "or near neutral" between "German" and "ports."
- XI. Ships in Lower India should be allowed to return to Germany.
- XII. Absolute refusal to hand over plans of ships to be constructed or ships under construction.

ADDITIONAL DEMANDS

1. Pay counts from departure from harbor to return to hands of ship-directors.
2. Ships will not be loaded in excess of free board established by Seamen's Union.
3. Names of ships shall not be changed.
4. When ship is turned over a joint-committee will determine and report in writing its condition, equipment, etc.
5. The ships must be returned in a port of Europe to be agreed upon.
6. Another joint inventory when ship is returned. Allies to make good, at current rates damages done.
7. Provisions should be unloaded in German ports nearest to the region for which they are intended, as well as railway transport material is short.
8. As far as possible German ships should use their home ports, thereby keeping stevedores and repairers regularly at work.
9. Request that along with food, German ships transport necessary raw materials for manufacturers to keep workmen busy.

ANNEX 1

1. Ships taken over by the naval authorities are no longer "merchant ships" in the sense used in the Trier Agreement.
2. They will hereafter be designated as "Government ships."
3. They must be retained for government purposes until ready to be turned back to owners, then they fall under Trier Convention.
4. The ships have been long in service of the Marine authorities, even before the Trier Convention.
5. The Germans will give up five of them for the five ships held by the Allies at CHERBOURG.
6. Protest against the seizure of these five ships.
7. Don't take more ships than are needed.
8. The reasons will be given for keeping these ships exempt.
9. Ships must be kept for helping the opposition to Bolshevism on the east front.
10. The rest of the ships are needed for retransporting German prisoners of war and civilians from east Siberia, Japan, etc.
11. Germany must keep ships in order to have the assurance that their people in distant lands will get back in comfortable boats fitted out for the purpose of transport.
12. Beg oral discussions of all these detailed questions.
13. Government needs must be supplied.
14. Ships in List IV cannot be given up.
15. They can only be considered merchant ships if allowed to continue in service of Government.

ANNEX 2

Rights of German Delegates to Allied Maritime Transport

1. He shall have equal rights with the other members of the council
2. Have an office in LONDON.
3. Personal freedom.
4. Unhindered postal and telegraph communication with Germany.
5. Keep up contact between Allied Maritime Transport Council and German Government.
6. Follow the movements of German steamers.
7. To regulate questions of crews and letters.
8. To represent the German owners.
9. To note bookkeeping necessities on account of charters.
10. To keep abreast of all questions of charter.

On February 13, the Germans presented another note bearing on this same subject. * * * From this note it will be seen that the Germans include as a third point to be considered the financial arrangements which are to be concluded. Under this latter heading they cite two phases of the question: First, an agreement concerning the amount and price of provisions and second, an agreement concerning the manner of payment.

Following the above note, a second one * * * [not found] was submitted on the same day, February 13. These notes will without doubt raise a number of questions which may well be considered by the Allied Shipping Board.

* * * * *

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier-General, U. S. A.,
Acting Chief.

G-4, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 9:

Personal Supplies of German Railroad Personnel

4th Section, G. S.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,
February 15, 1919.

C-in-C

Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs in Occupied Territory, Advance G. H. Q.
Requisition of property of German railway personnel.

1. It has been stated by the D. G. C. R. A. that the Interallied Railway Commission reports that in certain sections in the occupied territory requisitions for supplies have been made on German railway personnel now engaged in service for the American Army.

2. In view of the fact that these employees themselves are on requisition and engaged in military service for the Allies, it is believed that they should be given certain preferred considerations as to the non-requisition of their personal supplies or the personal supplies of their own immediate families.

3. On the other hand it is not intended that they shall be exempt from furnishing billets in the same proportion as other inhabitants, or that any business connections outside of their railway duties or any property or possession connected with any outside business activities, be free from requisition.

By order of the C-in-C:

GEO. VAN HORN MOSELEY,
Brigadier General, G. S.,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4.

Provisioning Germany

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, February 15, 1919.

No. 76

From: Acting Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

Extract]

1. Arrival of Doctor A. E. Taylor: This afternoon Doctor A. E. Taylor arrived from BERLIN. He is associated with Mr. Hoover in the question of food supplies and is here to meet other members of the Food Commission. It is understood that the other members will arrive in SPA tomorrow, and that there will be further meetings of this Commission for the purpose of considering food distribution in Germany, and also financial questions relating thereto. Doctor Taylor states that conditions in BERLIN have changed very materially during the last ten days, the Germans having become more arrogant and assertive.

* * * * *

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier-General, U. S. A.,
Acting Chief.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1217: Memorandum

German Request to Negotiate with Argentine for Food

[Contemporary Translation]

Treves, February 15, 1919.

MEMORANDUM:

At yesterday's joint conference between the financial delegates of the Allied and Associated Governments with the financial delegates of the German Government the possibility was discussed whereby Germany should obtain food from Argentine and should seek to finance the deliveries through the use of her former channels of trade with South America. The financial delegates of the Allied and Associated Governments are, therefore, requested to make representations to their Governments to the idea that their Governments may grant the permission to Germany to begin negotiations directly with Argentine for the purpose of obtaining food supplies, so that the introduction of these food supplies will be permitted and so that the necessary tonnage may be assured.

German Version of Proceedings of February 14, 1919

[Contemporary Translation]

Treves, February 15, 1919.

[Extract]

* * * * *

General Weygand reads the new conditions.

Erzberger states he will reply to them in writing as the German Government and National Assembly must have the final say. He will go to the National Assembly tonight to give personal report.

* * * * *

On subject of prisoners Foch transmits note in answer to Erzberger. Another letter in answer to directors, etc. Both letters are refusals of requests. Erzberger claims arrests are unjust. Foch consents to investigate. Erzberger expresses grief and indignation over answer regarding prisoners of war.

Regarding dead line between Poles and Germans, Erzberger claims it includes territory the Poles do not occupy. Foch replies each side must leave troops where they are today. After discussion between the two Generals the line is moved so that east and upper Silesia remain clearly German territory, and the territory bounded on east by this line will not be governed by the Armistice Treaty.

* * * * *

Admiral Browning: A dispatch from HAMBURG informs me: The German ships are not moving out. I beg the German delegation to inform me if this agrees.

Erzberger: The position of the German Government is clear and decided on this point that the three agreements made during the last Armistice Conference namely; the foodstuff agreement, the shipping agreement and the financial agreement are inherently one. The moving out of our fleet can only be considered upon the practicability of these three agreements, otherwise never. If the moving out of our fleet is now hindered, the Allies themselves are at fault. Up until the present time the Entente did not give us the Charter and the conditions of the pool. On the other hand, the Entente has demanded much more, not only that the seaworthy ships should be included in the World Shipping Union, but they demand also those which are in course of construction. Furthermore it wishes to consider the exceptions in the original shipping agreement of Trier, as temporary so that they can be withdrawn at any time.

Admiral Browning: I do not know the individual agreement; I only know that the freight rates will be fixed by the Allied Governments.

Erzberger: Surely, but the existing regulation was at a rate of special agreement and the point of the special shipping agreement, gives Germany the right to a German delegate to have in all decisions.

Foch: It says expressly that the Entente delegates will be assisted.

Erzberger: Right, exactly as it was laid down in the Agreement at COMPIEGNE, that Marshal Foch will be assisted by Admiral Wemyss. Now then Admiral Wemyss has handled all shipping questions alone, and in the same sense we appreciate the abilities of the delegates in LONDON.

Foch: But I have greater authority than Admiral Wemyss.

Erzberger: That may be, but in reality Admiral Wemyss made all decisions concerning questions of the sea. We did not raise the point that the German delegates should have any voice concerning English or American ships, but we insist that the German delegates will have the deciding word of German ships and the control of them.

Foch: The control will be exercised in LONDON. The execution takes place in SPA

Erzberger: Excellent, just on that account the German delegates must have a seat and voice in LONDON.

Foch and Browning: We refer to our note given you today.

Erzberger: We will answer the note.

Foch: We must have the answer by 12 o'clock Sunday.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1189: Memorandum

Meeting of Third Prolongation Commission

ADVANCE GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,
Trier, February 15, 1919.

MEMORANDUM to Asst. Chief of Staff

The following has been reported:

From friends of Herr Triesen, secretary to Herr Erzberger, and Captain Vanzelow, a delegate, and through a reporter of the Trierische Volks Zeitung, I learned the following information about what happened at the transactions of the Armistice Commission sitting at TREVES:

1. The chief topic of debate concerned the border line between the Germans and the Poles, which it seems is going to assign a rich coal district to the Poles, alleged by the Germans to have been originally German. Also it has been emphasized that the Germans must refrain from further difficulties with the Poles.

2. The new terms do not mention period of duration, simply reading 'until further notice.' Erzberger declares that he has not the power to accept these additional terms and that he must get his authorization from Weimar. However, the German delegates are to hold a meeting tonight to discuss these terms and their action concerning them.

It is said that the Allies have only extended 72 hours for the acceptance of these terms, a fact which aroused the indignation of Captain Vanzelow. Further Marshal Foch must know in 12 hours, that is by 6 o'clock tonight, whether the 72-hour feature is acceptable to the Germans or not.

3. The German delegates seem to believe that they have discovered a slight current of discord between the Allies, especially as regards the questions of shipping, commerce, and finance. The French, as opposed to the rest of the Allies, are said to desire separate treatment of these questions, instead of 'en bloc' and the Germans are in accord with them. The Germans are going to endeavor to play on this difference believed to exist.

4. Nothing has been mentioned of ESSEN or DANZIG, as heralded by the press before the meeting, nor has anything further come up about the disarmament of the German Armies, up to now.

5. The morale of the German delegates is very low. The only exception of course is ERZBERGER, whom nothing could discourage.

6. In conversation in the lobby, I was told, some of the delegates, commenting on the new terms of the Armistice, said that there was not much to choose between the Armistice conditions and Bolshevism, and that Germany would be about as well off under Bolshevism.

7. Speaking of the Polish military situation, some of the delegates said that had not the best of the Army been demobilized and discharged, and the worst troops retained, the Poles would never have been able to register such successes on the eastern German border.

8. They expressed the belief that the terms would undoubtedly be accepted, as the new cabinet, while well-meaning would have insufficient experience to cope with the Allies and were besides too stupid.

9. The Allies are said to be playing their trump card in offering to relieve the blockade conditions if the Germans observed in good faith the new Armistice terms.

FREDERICK HENROTIN,
Major, General Staff.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1217: Letter

Bombardment of Windau

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, February 15, 1919.

No. 76

From: Acting Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

2. Bombardment of Bolsheviks in WINDAU: General Nudant presented a note to the German Mission informing them that the Naval Armistice Commission desired to have it made known to them that light British cruisers bombarded WINDAU on February 7. They afterwards withdrew on account of the ice.

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier-General, U. S. A.,
Acting Chief.

Work Instead of Propaganda for Germany

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, February 15, 1919.

No. 76

From: Acting Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

* * * * *

4. Spread of Bolshevism: Attached and marked B, is a translation of a document from the Chief of Staff of the German Armistice Commission relating to the spread and abetting of Bolshevism in Germany. The whole letter savors of propaganda, having for its purpose inspiring dread of Bolshevism in the minds of the Allies, not only in Germany but the possibility of its spread to other countries. In this document is the following statement, "These examples indicate that the Allies are still determined to damage Germany by all means and in every way." This statement show how little the writer realizes that Germany is a defeated nation and as such must expect to take the consequences of defeat. In his mind there seems to be no distinction between the intention to damage Germany in every way possible as a military power and the treatment that would be accorded her as one of the nations of the earth.

All of these papers from German sources, and even many from Allied sources, seem to make no distinction between Bolshevism and the usual unrest following from labor agitations. From an observation of numerous German official documents and some of the German newspapers, it would appear that the Germans, themselves, are taking the attitude that is most calculated to keep alive Bolshevism. In other words, they are constantly talking about it, advertising it, and in every way possible keeping it before the people. If instead of propaganda of this kind they would start a campaign of encouraging the people to go to work, make provision for throwing open to cultivation all possible Crown lands, and impress upon the people that it is for their own good that they should make greater effort to raise all the food possible this coming season, they would be serving the country much better. It will be but a few weeks before the farming season will open, and if inducements were given to many of the demobilized soldiers to go on to public land and cultivate it, it is not unlikely that many of them would do so and a movement would thereby be started which would be the best possible counteragent to Bolshevism.

The condition which is often referred to, namely, that food can only be had at exorbitant prices, will sooner be corrected by increasing the supply than by issuing propaganda against the prevailing conditions. The economic rule of supply and demand will control the prices of food in Germany and elsewhere about as much during these times of unrest as has been the case in the past. During the coming season if the German people can make the food supply equal or even surpass the demand, food prices will promptly yield to the changed conditions. The Allied High Command has already given modified consent to German fishing vessels operating off the coast. It is believed this industry should be encouraged to the maximum extent possible.

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier-General, U. S. A.,
Acting Chief.

[The following marginal note appears in pencil on this document: C. G. S. This is good. It might be used with effect in our own press. J. J. P. (John J. Pershing, General, United States Army)]

[Contemporary Translation]

February 15, 1919.

TRANSLATION OF A DOCUMENT

From the Chief of Staff of German Armistice Commission,

Relating to "The Spread and Abetting of Bolshevism."

It is insistently repeated that a great part of the terms of the Armistice and the way they are applied must result in a spread of Bolshevism in Germany. It is laughingly replied that, "The victor has nothing to fear from Bolshevism." The Allied press complains that the German request for a lightening of the terms of the Armistice has no other end than to prepare for a new opening of hostilities. The danger of Bolshevism which threatens all European civilization is not understood by the Allies, as also it was not formerly in Germany.

The German predictions are already taking place. Russian Bolshevism has overrun the Ukraine and the larger part of the Baltic Provinces and is nearing the weakly defended German borders. The Spartacus people have momentarily been suppressed in BERLIN but are active elsewhere. In many large cities, Bolshevism has led to open civil war, in others it has secured all power.

It does not seem to be understood that Bolshevism is moving toward the west. In Germany it has not come to an end. It results in renewed strikes, high pay and the diminished value of money---an endless chain. It is leading to the breakdown of industry now that raw materials and half-manufactured goods are lacking. Working capital will soon be used up through payment of high wages---the results of which are want of work and Bolshevism. Bolshevism cannot alone be blocked by force. Foodstuffs at sensible prices and possibility of work are essential. Germany lacks both of these. The Armistice conditions do not further this, but rather made an added obstacle to the fighting of Bolshevism.

Three measures are essential to prevent the spread of Bolshevism. The blockade, increased by the land blockade, and the compulsory giving up of rolling stock are the obstacles. These measures can only be explained in the light of military advisability. These were not, however, necessary in view of the fact that no further military danger exists owing to the breaking up of the German Army through the revolution. Studying the situation leads to the conclusion that the results will bring more damage than advantage to the Allies.

Numerous notes from the German Armistice Commission indicate the serious effects in the Rhineland and bordering Provinces, due to the blockade and trade restrictions. The results are being felt more and more in middle and eastern Germany.

(Specific instances are then given where the results are serious for German industry.) A shortage of coal, due in part to the hindrances of the blockade on land and sea, and in part to the shortage in locomotives. Transportation on many short lines is completely stopped and is greatly reduced on the main lines. By removing German crews from the German tradeships, the number of those out of work has been increased and is enlarging the ranks of the Bolsheviks. The expulsion of Germans from Alsace-Lorraine is also a source of uneasiness. The support given the Poles has weakened German influence in the east and resulted in a spread of anarchy.

These examples indicate that the Allies are still determined to damage Germany by all means and in every way.

The result is that the forces ready to combat Bolshevism are seriously

weakened. Until the Allies realize that Bolshevism is the common foe of all civilization, the possibility of combating it is but slight. While the Allies are attempting to injure a national enemy, an international enemy is increasing in power. There is only one way to combat Bolshevism: Return to normal economic conditions with foodstuffs and possibility for work at a fair wage. Such a situation is to the advantage of all civilized peoples.

G-1, GHQ, AEF: File 334: Fldr. 15: Letter

Administration of Russian Prisoner of War Camps

AMERICAN SECTION,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, February 15, 1919.

From: Acting Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

1. The arrangements which the Allied Commission for caring for Russian prisoners of war in Germany have made is that 20 of these camps are to be administered by the Americans and 20 by the British.

5. Having assumed the responsibility for these camps, we should take all necessary steps to make a success of the work. As we will be taking care of several hundred thousand Russians, it is going to be a work which will have a great influence on future relations of the United States with Russia, to say nothing of it as a great humanitarian work.

As there is probably no way in which people are more readily reached in their sympathies than through the care of the sick and destitute, it is believed that the medical personnel for each one of these camps should be made adequate. If the one medical officer can hold or secure the services of a sufficient number of German medical officers, it may be possible to give these prisoners proper medical attention, but this is not to be expected. As stated above, just as soon as we assume control of a camp, the Germans will undoubtedly shift most, if not all, of the responsibility, particularly the medical work.

6. As these prisoners are in poor physical condition, the work necessary to properly care for them will be very great. The possibilities will perhaps be limited by hospital accommodations, and to this end it is recommended that additional buildings be secured where necessary to provide hospitals.

7. As I understand there will be from 15,000 to 20,000 Russians in each camp, there will be required at least 10 medical officers for each one or a total of 200 additional medical officers.

8. In my letter to General Harries, I have asked him what medical assistance, if any, he expects to secure from the Red Cross. I doubt if they will be able to give him any personnel; but great assistance can probably be secured from that organization in the way of proper food and medical supplies.

9. An Allied commission in BERLIN, headed by General Ewart (British) is in charge of these prisoners, but this commission will not prescribe details as to the way we handle our camps and comparisons will inevitably be made between our camps and those managed by the British.

10. I have called upon General Harries for his views in regard to the foregoing, and will communicate them to the Commander-in-Chief, with any further recommendations of my own, at the earliest possible date.

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Acting Chief.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1195: Memorandum

Allied Action if Germany Refuses to Sign Armistice Renewal

3d Section, G. S.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF,
February 15, 1919.

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Chief of Staff

1. In compliance with the memorandum of the Deputy Chief of Staff, dated February 13, referring to the 3d Section certain questions regarding the above subject for study, the following is submitted:

2. Questions to be considered:

In the event that Germany refuses to sign a renewal of the Armistice and then assumes a passive attitude leaving the burden of action to the Allies:

- (a) Will the Allies conduct a further invasion of Germany?
- (b) If a further invasion ensues will the American Army participate?
- (c) If the Armistice is terminated, will the present plan for provisioning Germany be abandoned?
- (d) If civil war develops in Germany due to famine, will the Allies invade Germany to restore order, or will they limit their efforts to the occupied German territory?

3. Will the Allies conduct a further invasion of Germany?

When the Allied Governments lay down certain conditions to be met by Germany in order that the Armistice may be continued and the German Government refuses to meet the conditions imposed on her by failing to sign the renewal of the Armistice, then the Allied Governments find themselves in a position which demands that they take some positive action in order to dominate the situation and maintain their prestige. The particular form of positive action which the Allied Governments would agree to among themselves, is the question to be discussed herein.

Germany is already in the grip of a rigid blockade and nothing remains without her boundaries which can be seized upon to penalize her for refusing to accede to drastic forms for the renewal of the Armistice. More severe terms might be imposed upon her at the Peace Table, but this would be in the nature of negative action. It therefore appears that the Allies would be forced to carry out some form of a further invasion of German territory.

It is certain that both the British and American Governments would be very loath to involve their Armies in a further advance into Germany, particularly in view of the earnest desire of both Governments at the present time to carry out the rapid demobilization of their Armies in response to the demands of strong public opinion. It is considered probable that the French Government would not be opposed to engaging in a further advance into Germany. The Belgian Government may also be inclined to favorably consider an opportunity for bringing more German territory under the control of her Armies. An agreement between the foregoing powers as to the course of action to be

followed, would undoubtedly be fraught with many difficulties, but is is inconceivable that at the present time they would not present a united front to the German Government.

The conclusion is therefore reached that all four of the powers referred to would be obligated to participate in a further invasion of German territory, notwithstanding the fact that such action might complicate the present plans for the rapid demobilization of the Allied Armies. The extent to which this invasion would be carried is difficult to surmise at the present time, without a full knowledge of the situation. It would appear that the invasion should be only carried out to such extent as is deemed necessary in order to maintain the present dominant position of the Allied Governments and to definitely cripple the power of the German Government.

As advance from the RHINE to the line BREMEN---HANOVER---CASSEL---ULM could be affected by the divisions now occupying the present western front, and would present but few more difficulties to demobilization than are already presented by the occupation of the present bridgeheads. The seizure and occupation of the important German seaports at WILHELMSHAVEN, BREMERHAVEN, CUXHAVEN, HAMBURG, KIEL, STETTIN, DANZIG and KONIGSBURG could be accomplished by comparatively small naval and land forces and would secure for the Allies control not only of important strategical points, but of German property and manufacturing interests of greater value. The effect of the further invasion and the occupation of seaports indicated above would be to secure to the Allies the control of such a portion of German territory with its resources and population, as to render her impotent and at the same time give to the Allies a valuable mortgage on German property.

4. If a further invasion ensues, will the American Army participate?

As already indicated in Paragraph 3 above, it is believed that the American Government would be very loath to engage in a further invasion of Germany, but that under the special situation now existing the Government would be obligated to join with the Allies in pursuing the only effective course which appears available.

If the terms to be imposed upon Germany for a renewal of the Armistice are so severe as to lead to the belief that the German Government may not accept them, the American Government seems to be in a position which demands that it either should have refused to acquiesce to the conditions proposed or should be prepared to play its part in imposing the will of the Allied Governments on the German Nation.

5. If the Armistice is terminated, will the present plan for provisioning Germany be abandoned?

The termination of the Armistice presumes a renewal of hostilities, and even though the German Government may remain passive, it is not believed that any plan which contemplates sending provisions into unoccupied German territory could be considered at the present time. The provisioning of the occupied German territory would have to be assured by the Allies, and the provisions would probably have to be supplied by them as soon as the present German supplies in the occupied territory are exhausted.

Unless the action indicated in Paragraph 3 above resulted in the German Government's decision to acquiesce to the terms imposed for a renewal of the Armistice, the conditions in Germany with regard to food would be very liable to produce civil disorders, which might result in a general civil war. Such a denouncement would undoubtedly result in the destruction of the material wealth of Germany to such an extent as to render that Government incapable, at least for a long period of years, of making the monetary payments which will undoubtedly be demanded of her at the Peace Table. Such a development should therefore be prevented; which means that steps would have to be taken by the Allied Governments to insure the provisioning of Germany. Furthermore, such steps could be taken in the absence of an Armistice and previous to the signing of the Treaty of Peace, unless the Allied Governments practically placed all of Germany under military control.

The history of the German people shows them to be law-abiding, and opposed to acts of internal violence. Whether or not in the unusual conditions which may exist, the following four years of war, the people as a whole would still remain inclined to avoid internal disorders, if impossible to foresee.

6. If civil war develops in Germany due to famine, will the Allies invade Germany to restore order or will they limit their efforts to the German occupied territory?

This question has been partially discussed in the foregoing paragraph. A civil war resulting from famine could only be terminated in two ways, either by the extermination of the population or by the relief of the conditions of famine. The Allied Governments would undoubtedly have to furnish provisions for Germany. Whether or not they would be involved in an invasion of Germany to restore order would depend entirely upon the character of the civil war. If one side to the conflict was well organized, it might be possible to arrange for the provisioning of the country through medium of this force. If no definite line between the combatants could be drawn, it would be necessary for the Allies to restore order themselves if they desired to prevent the complete destruction of the material wealth of Germany and thus insure for their own people the benefits of the monetary payments which the German Government should be required to make.

FOX CONNER,
Brigadier General, G. S.,
Asst. Chief of Staff, G-3.

G-2-D, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 3: Memorandum

Reduction of the German Military Establishment

Paris, February 16, 1919.

MEMORANDUM FOR: General Bliss

1. The suggestion as to the number given above occurs in the report of the committee appointed by the Supreme War Council meeting of January 24, 1919. This committee consisted of:

M. Loucheur, as President (FRANCE).
Marshal Foch, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Forces.
General Bliss (American).
General Sir Henry Wilson, acting for Mr. Winston Churchill (Great Britain).
General Sir Frederick Sykes (Royal Air Force).
General Diaz, Chief of the Staff, Italian Army.

The additional clauses of the Armistice proposed by this committee contained the following:

3. Germany undertakes to reduce the effective personnel of her Armies to such numbers as are strictly necessary for the garrison of their frontier and the maintenance of order in the interior, that is to say:

25 divisions
5 cavalry divisions

4. Germany consequently undertakes to reduce the quantity of war material to be maintained to the following figures:

Note: General Weygand wishes to give further consideration to these figures before accepting them.

Heavy guns	1,000
Field guns	1,575
Machine guns	3,825
Automatic rifles	4,500
Rifles	412,500
Airplanes - see Pars.	5 bis
Trench mortars	1,400

5. Consequently, all war material of the above natures in excess of these figures will be delivered at places to be fixed by agreement, either in occupied or non-occupied portions of Germany or outside Germany, to commissions of Allied officers

who will be appointed for this purpose. These surrenders will apply to the whole of the war material existing either with the Armies or in the interior in parks, depots, factories, etc., whether finished, under proof, or in course of construction or repair. The Allied officers will carry out according to circumstances the removal or the destruction or the putting out of action of the war material so surrendered.

5. bis. Aircraft. With regard to aircraft, Germany to surrender the following:

- (a) 5,000 engines of types to be selected by the Allies.
- (b) 450 German marine aircraft (i. e., airplanes, seaplanes and flying boats) to be selected by the Allies.
- (c) 15 airships to be selected by the Allies.
- (d) All aircraft will be complete with all war equipment and armament and to be flown by German personnel to places to be specified by the Allies before a date to be fixed by the Allies.
- (e) 6 rigid airship sheds over 800 feet long, with complete hydrogen-producing plant for each of the airship sheds, will also be surrendered in an efficient condition.

* * * * *

9. In the event of Germany not agreeing to the foregoing proposals, or in the event of her not carrying them out after having agreed to them, the Allied Governments will proceed to the military occupation of the WESTPHALIAN Basin on the right bank of the Rhine * * *

You submitted a minority report in which you dissented from the provision of Paragraph 9, holding the question was one for negotiation and not for demand.

2. Another committee appointed by the Supreme War Council on February 10, 1919, considered the question. This committee was composed of:

America General Bliss, Mr. Norman Davis.

France M. Clementel, General Degoutte.

Great Britain Lord Robert Cecil, General Thwaites.

Italy M. Crespi, Brigadier General Caballero, with whom were associated

in accordance with the decision of the above council the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied forces:

Marshal Petain,

General Diaz,

General McAndrew, representing General Pershing.

Admiral Benson,

Admiral DeBon,

Admiral Hope,

Admiral Grassi.

The conclusions reached by the military subcommittee were as follows:

The following measures are submitted for the decision of the Supreme War Council:

(1) To impose at once upon Germany fixed conditions as regards a military and naval status, comprising,

(a) The limitation of personnel to a strength of 25 infantry divisions, of which -

5 for the eastern front,

5 for the western front,

5 for the southern front,

10 in reserve in the interior of Germany

5 cavalry divisions.

(Admiral Benson declares that he is opposed to the inclusion in the Armistice of clauses dealing with the limitation of naval forces.)

(b) The limitation of armaments by land, by sea and in the air, and consequently, the putting out of action of war material in excess.

(c) The control of these measures * * *

The whole committee decided at the conclusion of the meeting to add to their report the following declaration:

'However, the members of the committee desire to express this, their opinion: To obtain as rapidly as possible a final result and put a stop to the difficulties which are constantly renewed by the Germans, the members of the committee are of the opinion that naval and military terms of peace should be drawn up immediately by a commission appointed for the purpose, and should be imposed upon the enemy.'

In accordance with the recommendation of the committee from whose report we quoted above, the Supreme War Council met on February 12, morning and afternoon, to consider the above report. No reference was made in the morning proceedings of the Supreme War Council as to the number of divisions to be maintained by Germany. During the afternoon discussion, Mr. Clemenceau at first took the ground that no action in regard to this should be taken until the return of President Wilson from his trip to America. In reply to Mr. Clemenceau, Mr. Wilson made the following statement: "In technical matters most of the brains he used were borrowed; the possessors of these brains were in PARIS. He would therefore go away with an easy mind if he thought that his plan had been adopted in principle. He had complete confidence in the views of his military advisers. If the military experts were to certify a certain figure as furnishing a marginal safety, he would not differ from them. The only other question was to decide whether this was the right time to act. On this point, he was prepared to say yes. In another month's time, the attitude of Germany might be more uncompromising. If his plan were agreed on in principle, he would be prepared to go away and leave it to his colleagues to decide whether the programme drafted by the technical advisers was the right one. He did not wish his absence to stop so important, essential and urgent work as the preparation of a preliminary peace. He hoped to return by March 13 or 15, allowing himself only a week in America.

To this M. Pichon asked whether it would not be possible to obtain the report of the experts before the departure of President Wilson.

Lord Milner pointed out that the question had already been studied and the figure of 25 divisions had been laid down as the maximum Germany should maintain.

M. Orlando said that he was extremely glad of this agreement. He had felt that the difference was rather in the form than in the substance. It remained, however, to decide whether the Armistice should be renewed *sine die* or with a fixed term.

M. Clemenceau said that this question remained open.

M. Orlando said that it must also be decided whether the Germans were to be given a warning that the reduction of their forces was to be imposed on them. He, himself, had asked Marshal Foch whether the reduction to 25 divisions corresponded to the maximum force which could safely be left to Germany as its final establishment. Marshal Foch had replied in the affirmative. Italy, before the war, had 25 divisions on a peace footing. Germany was a far larger country, and he was therefore inclined to think that 25 divisions must be the minimum required for internal order.

M. Sonnino asked whether there should not be in the Armistice a clause enabling the Allies to exercise some supervision over the disarmament required, and to force the Germans to accept an organization of this kind.

President Wilson said that the military experts appeared to have means of obtaining knowledge.

M. Sonnino said that Marshal Foch appeared to have doubt on this subject. We should be in a position to obtain week by week, or even day by day, knowledge of the measures taken by Germany to fulfill our demands.

The French position was probably indicated by the following remarks of Mr. Clemenceau: "He pointed out that it would not be sufficient to tell the Germans to reduce their forces to a fixed number of divisions. Napoleon had done this and the Prussians had passed the whole population through the forces allowed them. It was, therefore,

essential that the military experts should lay down what was to be Germany's military law. It might further be necessary to control these operations by means of high commissioners appointed by the Allies."

3. I think it is clear from the above that the size of the force to remain to the Germans, fully armed and equipped, was first agreed to in the report of the Loucheur Committee---that is, 25 infantry divisions and 5 cavalry divisions. Italy, France, Great Britain and inferentially the United States accepted those figures, which I believe, were originally suggested by the British members of the Loucheur Committee. Again on February 10, America, France, Great Britain and Italy recommended this number of divisions to the Supreme War Council. The Supreme War Council in its meeting of February 12, morning and afternoon, from what is quoted above, appeared to accept the number as given as the maximum which Germany would be permitted to maintain.

D. E. NOLAN,
Brigadier General, General Staff,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

G-4, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 16: Letter

Transfer of American Installations to the French

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, ALLIED ARMIES.
OFFICE OF D. G. C. R. A.,
February 16, 1919.

Liaison Officer, G-4, G. H. Q.

Directeur General des Communications et des Ravitaillements aux Armees.

1. In answer to your Letter 3936/CR of Feb. 4, 1919, I have the honor to inform you that the American command is in accord with the principles laid down in that letter as regards the use of structures abandoned by the American Army as shelters for the population of the devastated regions.

2. In carrying out the details of these principles, however, the following points must in every case be covered:

1. The structure or facility must be one for which the American Army has no further use.

2. Proper financial remuneration must be made to the American Army for the structure or facility turned over.

3. The questions must be decided with all possible despatch in view of the fact that the American Army is paying rent on the ground occupied.

3. To facilitate and expedite the transaction of this business, our General Staff strongly recommends and requests that all French officers and officials who are charged with these questions (Prefects, or Sub-prefects, Chefs de Secteurs and Ingenieurs-en-Chef des Ponts-et-Chaussees) be instructed to establish contact at once with the following American officers:

Chief Engineer, American Second Army, Headquarters TOUL.

Col. Graves, Section Engineer, Advance Section S. O. S., Headquarters NEUF-CHATEAU.

Officers of American Salvage Service operating with the above-named officers.

4. Col. Graves at NEUFCHATEAU is the officer in general charge of this whole question and it is suggested by our General Staff that a good method of procedure would be to have the French officials interested look over the ground with a view to determining exactly what structures would be desired by the French and then transmit this specific information to Col. Graves, who has authority to act on the propositions.

5. For your information, I have the honor to inform you that instructions have been sent out to our Second Army to discontinue burning loose bits of wood and other material (formerly done for the purpose of thoroughly policing the ground), and in the future to leave such material on the ground for the use of the French civilian population.

L. H. PAUL CHAPIN,
1st Lt., General Staff.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1193: Memorandum

Third Armistice Prolongation

[Contemporary Translation]

Treves, February 16, 1919.

The undersigned plenipotentiaries, Admiral Wemyss having been replaced by Admiral Browning, General von Winterfeldt by General von Hammerstein (and the Minister von Obendorf), by Minister von Haniel, provided with full powers by virtue of which the Armistice Convention of November 11, 1918 was signed, have concluded the following additional agreement:

1. The Germans must give up immediately all offensive operations against the Poles in the region of POSEN or in any other region. For this purpose they are forbidden to cross the following line with their troops: The old frontier between east Prussia and west Prussia and Russia up to LUISENEELDE, and then starting from this point, the line---west of of LUISENFELDE, west of GROSS-NEUDORF, south of BREOZA, north of SCHUBIN, north of EXIN, south of SAMOCZIN [SAMOTSCHIN], south of CHODZEINZEN [CHODZICSEN] north of CYARNIKOW [SCHARNIKOU], west of MIALA, west of BIRNBAUM, west of BENTSCHEN, west of MOLBSTEIN [WOLLSTEIN], north of LISSA, north of RAWITSCH, south of KROTOZYN [KROTOSCHIN], west of ADELNAU, west of CHIDBERG [SCHILDBERG], north of VIERUCHOV [WIERUSZOW], then the frontier of SILESIA.

2. The Armistice of November 11, extended by the agreements of December 13, 1918, and January 16, 1919, up to February 17, 1919, is again extended for a short period without a definite date of expiration, at which date the Allied and Associated Powers reserve for themselves the right to bring the Armistice to an end on three days' advance notification.

3. The execution of the clauses of the Agreement of November 11, 1918, and of the additional agreements of December 13, 1918, and January 16, 1919, that have not been entirely completed will be continued and finished during the extension of the Armistice according to the instructions of the Allied High Command.

TREVES, February 16, 1919.

FOCH, BROWNING, ERZBERGER, VANSELOW, FREIHER von HAMMERSTEIN, Von HANIEL.

Extension of Armistice

France, February 17, 1919.

52 FC OB Rush Priority
Luxemburg, February 16, 1919
French Mission

For General Pershing, Chaumont

No. 1311. Terms of Armistice extended. Text of the extension will be sent you without delay.

MARSHAL FOCH.
9:30 p. m.

Supreme War Council: 15th Session: Minutes

Discussion Following Third Prolongation of Armistice

AMERICAN COMMISSION TO NEGOTIATE PEACE

MINUTES OF MEETING OF SUPREME WAR COUNCIL

Monday, February 17, 1919, 3 p. m.

[Extract]

* * * * *

Report of Marshal Foch on Renewal of Armistice:

1. M. Clemenceau said that Marshal Foch had returned that morning from his journey into Germany with the signature of the Germans to the Armistice conditions agreed on by the Supreme War Council.

Marshal Foch said that he had met the German plenipotentiaries at 3 p. m. on the 14th. He had put before Herr Erzberger the Convention decided on by the Powers. Herr Erzberger had taken the text, and, in reply, had handed in a declaration covering 23 pages. * * *. This declaration contained a justification from the German point of view of the execution of the terms of the original Armistice. The two principal demands made related:

(1) To the repatriation of prisoners.
(2) To the action taken by the French in Alsace-Lorraine against German industrialists holding property removed from France to Belgium.

(a) Repatriation of German Prisoners:

In respect to the first, Marshall Foch had addressed the following reply to the German Secretary of State:

In reply to your communication of February 3, I have the honor to inform you that the Supreme War Council of the Allied and Associated Powers considers the repatriation of German prisoners of war impossible for the moment; but these Powers will see to it with the greatest care that all the seriously sick and wounded are repatriated with the least possible delay.

Consequently, France is actually taking steps to begin the immediate repatriation of about 2,000 German prisoners of war besides the prisoners of war already sent to Germany or Switzerland. Great Britain is disposed to proceed in the same manner as rapidly as possible.

(b) Restoration of French and Belgian Property:

In respect to the second, Herr Erzberger's view was that proceedings could not be taken against private individuals holding property removed from France and Belgium during the war; because they had received it from the German Government. The restoration of this property must therefore be a matter for negotiation between the Governments. The Allied point of view was that these goods could be recovered wherever found. Marshal Foch had, therefore, addressed the following reply to the German Secretary of State:

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of the memorandum contained in your letter of January 27.

In this connection, I would remind you that in the course of the last interview at TREVES, I stated that I could not accept the view of the German Government; that is to say, that German subjects who had carried away and taken in charge industrial apparatus coming from the occupied territories should benefit by the terms of Article 6 of the Convention of November 11, as having participated in acts of war.

I merely undertake to transmit to the competent judicial authorities the special cases which you may think it your duty to submit to me.

I have, therefore, forwarded the memorandum to the said judicial authorities, who will decide on this particular question of law.

(c) German Reluctance to Sign New Armistice Conditions:

Continuing, Marshal Foch said that on the 15th the German plenipotentiaries alleged that, by reason of the slow communication with BERLIN and WEIMAR, they could not say when they would be able to sign the Armistice. Further, they wished to modify and extend the text of the Convention submitted to them. Marshal Foch, on the 16th, had sent them the following communication:

In reply to your letters of February 15, I have the honor to inform you that:

(1) The text of the Convention which was handed to you yesterday was drawn up by the chiefs of the Allied and Associated Governments.

I can neither change it nor add to it.

(2) As the Armistice expires on February 17 at 5 o'clock in the morning, the latest hour for signing a new extension is 18 hours on February 16, in order to give time for communicating orders to the troops.

If the Convention be not signed at the latter hour, I shall be obliged to leave TREVES, and the Armistice will cease to operate at 5 o'clock in the morning of February 17.

* * * * *

G-1, GHQ, AEF: File 334: Fldr. 3: Letter

Attitude of American Food Mission on Propaganda

UNITED STATES FOOD ADMINISTRATION,
10 Rue Pauquet, Paris, February 17, 1919.

General Andrews, Chief of Staff,
G. H. Q., A. E. F., CHAUMONT

Dear Sir:

Referring to your Telegram 5492 G-1 relative to German objection to Polish members on staff of American Food Mission, as stated in my telegram of February 12 the text of

your wire was communicated to the members of our Mission in Poland. I have today received a despatch from our Mission which reads as follows: (The Major Webb referred to is one of the members of our Mission who is now in charge of negotiations at DANZIG.)

On February 12, following letter signed by Webb was handed General Kommando, XVII Army Corps, DANZIG: 'In regard your letter concerning Polish members American Food Mission, we beg to state that on crossing frontier at SOLDAU each Polish member signed document drawn up by German officer in charge to effect that they would not indulge while on German territory, in any political propaganda. This same document was also signed as a further guarantee for them by Colonel Grove and 1st Lt. McCormick. Copies of these documents were presented to the General Kommando on our arrival at DANZIG. Kindly convey this information to General Barnum and tell him that the American officers of the American Mission will not tolerate any members of our Mission indulging in any political propaganda and that our only reason for being here is to carry out the terms of Article 16 of the Armistice Agreement between the United States Army and the Allied Armies on the one hand and the German Army on the other. Herewith list of names of Poles duly accredited to the American Mission: M. Jalowiecki, W. Wanlowicz, J. Rau. Signed for the American Mission, James W. Webb, Major, U. S. Army.'

Careful attention has been given by the American Mission to this matter of possible propaganda in DANZIG by Polish members and strict measures taken to prevent it all of which is known and has been known since first arrival members American Mission in DANZIG by the competent German military authorities in DANZIG.

This presents to you clearly, I think, the attitude which the members of our Mission are taking in this matter.

Yours very truly,

HERBERT HOOVER.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1217: Letter

German Tonnage, Provisioning, and Financing

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, February 18, 1919.

No. 77

From: Acting Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

* * * * *

3. Meetings of Committee on German Tonnage, for Feeding Germany and the Financing of Same: Minister von Haniel on behalf of the German Government presented a note * * * giving his views as to the operation of this Committee. He stated that the committees to consider the three different objects should meet at the same place. That for these committees there would be no less than sixty German delegates and for this large number there must be ample accommodations. He therefore suggests ROTTERDAM, AMSTERDAM, or The HAGUE. He considers that these committees are merely subdivisions of the P. I. A. C.

and that their holding meetings at another place is only for the convenience of better accommodations. The Germans have named Dr. Melchior as Chairman of all three committees.

* * * * *

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier-General, U. S. A.,
Acting Chief.

[Editorial Note: The substance of the German note referred to is adequately expressed by General Barnum's summary.]

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1217: Letter

Purposes of Armistice Prolongation

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMITTEE,
Spa, Belgium, February 18, 1919.

No. 77

From: Acting Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

* * * * *

2. Conference with General Nudant: Yesterday afternoon General Nudant, Chairman of the Allied Mission, asked the Chiefs of the Allied Sections to come to his house for a conference. There he told them something of the proceedings of the Convention at TREVES. He said that the Germans were given a paper to sign which was accomplished by them at seven o'clock in the evening of the 16th, after having submitted it to the new Government.

There were two main features of this paper, the first in regard to Poland: a definite line has been laid down beyond which neither the Germans nor Poles are to go, and a formal order has been given that they must cease hostilities awaiting the final demarkation of boundaries by the Peace Conference. During the day report of fighting at BANTZEN [BAUTZEN?] had been received but the Germans agreed to cease hostilities and said that orders had been given to that effect.

The second feature of the document was that the Armistice was prolonged for a short period only, the limit not being yet fixed. General Nudant said that according to his personal opinion the reason for reducing the period of extension was two-fold:

(1) For the purpose of echeloning the hard conditions that it is planned to impose, and thus avoiding the appearance of intolerable burdens that would result if several hard conditions were imposed at once, and

(2) To give the Germans less time to drag out the fulfillment of the conditions imposed.

It was made clear to the Germans that before the next renewal they must have fulfilled all the required deliveries of rolling stock and shipping materiel. Secretary Erzberger in a long twenty-five page document filled with the old well known tales of difficulties, humanity, danger of Bolshevism, injustice of the blockade, etc., stated that being loyal and honest people they must let the Allies know that much to their

regret they could not deliver the remaining 800 locomotives still due. To this Marshal Foch replied that just because they were people who vaunted their honesty and loyalty they would, of course, deliver the 800 locomotives and that within fifteen days.

To the end that the agricultural implements may be delivered as agreed upon, crude-iron ingots are to be allowed to cross the closed Rhine frontier.

It is probably planned to meet the Germans again in about fifteen days and to then impose new conditions which will probably include the following:

(a) Restriction of the German military effectives to nothing more than necessary for police work and national security. The newly organized bands of volunteer mercenaries are to be ordered disbanded.

(b) Putting the screws on the fulfillment of the naval clauses. It is the intention to have a special committee handle jointly the question of freight, finance, and feeding. The place of meeting of this Committee is not yet determined but it will probably not be at SPA, nor will it be answerable to the P. I. A. C. The Germans propose some neutral city as a meeting place, but General Nudant stated that he saw no reason for regulating their affairs on neutral ground. Admiral Browning will probably be in charge.

General Nudant further stated that the marking of the Polish border, the reduction of German armaments, the taking over of German shipping, etc., are all parts of the gradual movement towards peace preliminaries, which are probably not far away. He states that no official copy of the documents signed by the Germans could be furnished at present as Marshal Foch took the original with him. As soon as the Chairman of the P. I. A. C. receives a copy, other copies will be made and furnished to the Allied Sections.

* * * * *

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier-General, U. S. A.,
Acting Chief.

G-3, GHQ. AEF: Fldr. 1217: Letter

German Plea for Food

[Contemporary Translation]

A. A. II. No. 2100

Spa, February 19, 1919.

From the Representative of the German Government

To the Chairman, P. I. A. C.

That there exists in Germany an oppressive want of provisions has been emphasized again and again by the Germans in the negotiations with the Interallied Armistice Commission. At the short negotiations of the Committee on Provisions and Finance the Germans gave specific lists of the kind and quantities of provisions that were most urgently needed for the feeding of the German people. Among these the principal articles in addition to fats are wheat and corn.

The representatives of the Allied and Associated Governments replied to this statement that they were at present not in a position to deliver the desired quantities of wheat and corn, and they based these statements partly upon the difficulties of transportation and partly upon the lack of these articles in their own lands.

The solution was then taken under consideration to give Germany the possibility to get for herself from Argentine directly the above named articles, and the German representatives on the Committee for Provisions and Finance handed over to the representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers the memorandum contained in the accompanying appendix.

The Chairman of the Interallied Armistice Commission is requested to lend his special support to the German request of the Allied and Associated Governments as the immediate relief from the situation of want of food is of the very greatest importance for the maintenance of law and order in Germany.

FREIHERR von LERSNER.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1217: Letter

Delivery of Trucks

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, February 19, 1919.

No. 78

From: Acting Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

* * * * *

5. Report of meeting between Allies and German representatives held at MAYENCE on February 14 and 15, in regard to delivery of motor trucks and spare parts.

The representatives of the Germans and of the Allies met at MAYENCE on the above dates for the purpose of considering various questions in regard to motor trucks, spare parts, the assembling of trucks of different classes into groups, etc.

The number of motor trucks received up to February 15, is as follows:

Belgian Army	170
American Army	1,285
English Army	1,224
French Army	2,191
TOTAL	4,870

which shows a deficit of 130 trucks yet to be delivered.

The American Army has received 35 trucks in excess of its quota. These, and the 130 yet to be delivered by the Germans should be distributed as follows:

Belgian Army	130
English Army	26
French Army	9

In view of the fact that the complete number of trucks has not yet been delivered, it was deemed impracticable to decide just which trucks would be kept and which would be returned to the Germans. Those to be returned being makes of which the Allies had such a small number as not to constitute a group. When delivery commenced, the Allies told the Germans that trucks of which they could not deliver at least twenty-five, or one group, would not be received. The remaining 130 to be delivered may complete certain groups. Therefore, the final action of the committee in receiving trucks and determining what spare parts will be required, was deferred until a later date.

Some of the Allies stated that they had trucks of such good quality that they would

be glad to keep them even though they had but ten or twelve, provided the Germans would agree to deliver spare parts for this number, otherwise these would be returned.

* * * * *

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier-General, U. S. A.,
Acting Chief

G-1, GHQ, AEF: File 334: Fldr. 15: Telegram

Request for Medical Personnel for Russian Prisoner of War Camps

Spa, February 19, 1919.

Filed 1535 to Commander-in-Chief, G-1, G. H. Q., A. E. F., France

Number 535. Following telegram from Harries, BERLIN, repeated:

No. P 431. Until Red Cross Commissioner Carl Taylor arrived yesterday and gave me information as to his plans for medical personnel, it was not practicable for me to make requisition for Army medical personnel. After conference with General Ewart and Taylor I ask for 100 medical officers (who should be general practitioners) for camp hospitals. British, French, and Italian will contribute to the total number needed, and many Russian doctors will cooperate. The specialist requirements are as follows:

- 10 tuberculosis experts
- 2 psychiatrists
- 6 optical experts (each with field equipment)
- 40 dental officers and 40 assistants accompanied by
40 field dental outfits.

Medical Department Enlisted Personnel: 40 noncommissioned officers, 20 druggists, 40 pharmacists, 1st class (as many as practicable of this enlisted personnel to be familiar with Medical Department paper work), 40 medical field desks equipped with stationery, 40 typewriters with reasonable supply of stationery. Cannot now make requisition more specific.

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier-General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

G-4, GHQ, AEF: Armistice Fldr: Letter

Transfer of American Installations to the French

4th Section, G. S.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,
February 20, 1919.

From: C-in-C

To: C. G., Advance Sec., S. O. S.

[Extract]

1. Attention is invited to memorandum of G-4, G. H. Q., dated February 4, 1919, forwarding certain circulars in French relating to a French organization denominated

Le Service des Travaux de Premiere Urgence des Regions Liberees.

2. The purpose of this organization is to direct and coordinate efforts looking to the rehabilitation of the devastated areas of France. G. H. Q., Allied Armies has requested the A. E. F. to cooperate with this service, and to give it the option on all barracks, shelters and other American installations as rapidly as they may become available. It is particularly desired that we demolish none of these structures which may be useful to the French until after they have been given opportunity to say whether or not they will accept them.

3. We have agreed to this proposition and will turn over to the French such structures, subject to the following conditions:

(a) The structure or facility must be one for which the American Army has no further use.

(b) Proper financial remuneration must be made to the American Army for the structure or facility transferred to the French.

(c) The French must give prompt decision in respect to these structures or facilities, for the reason that the American Army is paying rent on the ground occupied and cannot delay removal without greatly increasing the expenses.

* * * * *

7. On account of complaints being received as to needless destruction of lumber and other material, it is important that action be taken at once to put this matter on an efficient basis in cooperation with the French authorities.

By order of the C-in-C:

GEO. VAN HORN MOSELEY,
Brigadier General, G. S.,
Asst. Chief of Staff, G-4.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1217: Letter

Meeting of Committee on Provisioning Germany and Payment

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, February 20, 1919.

No. 79

From: Acting Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, Am. E. F.

[Extract]

1. Meeting of Committee to Arrange for Importation of Foodstuffs and Payment Therefor: General Nudant read a telegram from Marshal Foch, advising that the settling of the questions relating to German tonnage importation and payment for foodstuffs will take place at SPA.

It will be recalled that when this question was raised before, the Germans suggested that the meeting take place in a neutral town, such as ROTTERDAM, inviting attention to the fact that they expected to have a good many delegates and that the accommodations at SPA were scarcely sufficient.

General Nudant stated that the question of billeting delegates need not be raised

because the meetings of the committee would last for only a very short time. Our delegates will live in their trains. He announced that it was probable that the first meeting would not be able to take place before Monday afternoon.

* * * * *

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier-General, U. S. A.,
Acting Chief.

G-1, GHQ, AEF: File 334: Fldr. 10: Telegram

Need of Food Supply for Russian Prisoners

No. 1415

Spa, Belgium, February 20.

Commander-in-Chief, G-1, G. H. Q., H. A. E. F.

No. 548. Your attention is invited to the great need of prompt supply of food for Russian prisoners of war in Germany. In a telephone message of February 19, General Harries states that the situation is already very serious and desired information at the earliest possible moment as to what steps are being taken. I transmitted this information as he requested to Doctor A. E. Taylor, who has recently been in BERLIN and is now with Mr. Hoover in PARIS. This morning I am forwarding for General Harries the following telegram to Colonel Robert Olds, Red Cross Commission in PARIS: "Food situation desperate. Only food available in addition to very insufficient German ration belongs to British Red Cross. They say this will be exhausted in about a week. Our work of no value if prisoners not fed. Cannot you arrange for a quartermaster to authorize us to use food at COPENHAGEN? This would greatly help to carry along until Hoover's food arrives." It seems quite evident that if these prisoners now under our charge are not fed they will very quickly develop serious unrest and the movement of caring for them may get out from under our control. The Germans have been supplying a limited ration but as shown above this is fast becoming exhausted. Would it not be possible to deviate food from DANZIG for use of Russian prisoners as it appears that the demand for food in Poland is not as immediate as is that for the Russian prisoners.

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM, 3:55 p. m.
Brigadier-General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

(Repeated by phone to Gen. McAndrew in PARIS, at 5 p. m., 2/21/19. E.)

Second Army Gen.: File 386 A-C: Order

Destruction of Machinery Taken from France and Belgium

ORDERS
No. 11

ADVANCE GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,
OFFICER IN CHARGE OF CIVIL AFFAIRS IN OCCUPIED TERRITORY,
Treves, February 20, 1919.

1. There is reason to believe that owners of factories in occupied territory who are in possession of machinery taken from France and Belgium are destroying this machinery and sending the metal to foundries.

2. Local commanders will at once take the necessary action to prevent this practice. Wherever it is possible to do so, a notice will be inserted in the local press to the effect that drastic action will be taken for offenses of this kind by way of trials before provost courts and military commissions. In addition, prosecutions will be instituted before these same military tribunals against all known offenders.

3. District commanders will at once investigate and report as to whether or not there is any agricultural material, removed from France by the Germans, now assembled within the limits of their respective districts.

4. The report herein called for will be submitted through military channels to these headquarters, and will contain the following data:

(a) That class of agricultural material taken from France or Belgium on which voluntary declarations of possession have been made by the inhabitants, together with the names of the declarants and the location of the property.

(b) Any other agricultural material removed in the same manner, but regarding which voluntary declarations of possession have not been made, with the names of persons in whose possession this class of property may be found, and the corresponding locations.

5. Pending the receipt of orders for retaking and shipping this material, the necessary steps will be taken to assure its preservation and to prevent its removal.

By command of General Pershing:

JAMES W. McANDREW,
Chief of Staff.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1218: Letter

Serbian Prisoners Remaining in Germany

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, February 21, 1919.

No. 80

From: Acting Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

6. Serbian Prisoners of War: From information received from General Harries, there are at the RASTATT Camp at present about fifty sick Serbian prisoners and forty well ones; there are thirty-nine well and sick at STARGARD, and a few hundred well ones at REGENSBURG where stragglers from all over Germany are being collected. The fourteen hundred and fifty Serbians at LECHFELD will be removed to AGRAM in two or three days.

To the best of his knowledge this constitutes all the Serbian prisoners remaining in German camps.

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Acting Chief.

German Prisoners

[Contemporary Translation]

Belgian Mission

PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, February 21, 1919.

To the Chiefs of the Allied Missions

Herewith is a copy of a bulletin of information from the Belgian Army of Occupation:

REPATRIATION OF HOSTILE PRISONERS OF WAR

It has been reported to me that on February 16, 1919, there was publicly read in all the Churches of the Diocese of COLOGNE, a pastoral letter from Cardinal Hartmann, Archbishop of COLOGNE, asking for spiritual and temporal succor for the prisoners of war that are still held in the countries of the enemy. One passage of this letter seems to express wonder because the prisoners have not yet been returned to their homes.

The Chief of the Censor Service at the General Headquarters of the Army of Occupation reports to me that he is able to state that in October and November of 1918, at the prisoners camp which he commanded as an officer of the Belgian Army, letters addressed from all parts of Germany spoke of the prompt return of prisoners to Germany. At the time of the renewal of the Armistice in December last, these letters showed great anger because the repatriation had been so long delayed.

Since that time newspaper articles examined by the Censor Department show that there is an attempt being made to excite in the people feelings of discontent with regard to the decisions of the Entente on the subject of prisoners.

The protest of the Germans to the Armistice Commission, the pastoral letters, the newspaper articles, private conversations, statements at the National Assembly, etc., etc., lead to the presumption that in this matter of the return of prisoners of war there exists a movement inspired by the Government of BERLIN.

I have the honor to beg you to pursue whatever investigations may seem useful for the purpose of discovering movements of this kind, to take whatever measures you may judge necessary to stop them and to render an accounting by means of weekly reports of the Censor Department of the results of the investigations that have been made.

MICHEL,
Lieut. General, Comdg.

Delivery of Rolling Stock

No. 80.

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, February 21, 1919.

From: Acting Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

* * * * *

7, Deliveries of locomotives and cars.

The Committee on Return of Locomotives and Cars reports that the total receipts up to February 19 are:

Locomotives	4,500
Cars	133,573

For ALSACE and LORRAINE:

Cars	16,433
------	--------

* * * * *

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Acting Chief.

G-4, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 9: Memorandum

Delays in Payment for Requisitions

4th Section, General Staff

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,
February 21, 1919.

Memorandum for Captain L. H. Paul Chapin, Liaison Officer, G-4, Etat-Major, Lamorlaye

1. The following extract from the daily letter from the Assistant Chief of Staff, Advance G. H. Q., is quoted for your information:

4. Payment for Requisitions: An increasing degree of unrest and dissatisfaction is being felt in the German Occupied Territory over the nonpayment by the occupying Armies for billets and supplies requisitioned.

The rich people naturally view this with a certain degree of equanimity, but it works considerable hardship on the poorer classes, especially since a growing doubt exists as to whether these requisitions will ever be paid by the German Government.

General Smith has twice taken up this question of Interallied Conference and found the British in favor of it, but the French and Belgians opposed. The matter is one which ought to be settled not later than the end of February. General Smith is of the opinion that if the Americans begin

payment the Allies will inevitably have to follow suit. It is not a question of payment for requisitions from U. S. Funds but merely of disbursing funds received from the German Government for the purpose.

GEO. VAN HORN MOSELEY,
Brigadier General, G. S.,
Asst. Chief of Staff, G-4.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1218: Letter

Maintenance of the Armies of Occupation

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, February 22, 1919.

No. 81

From: Acting Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.,

[Extract]

4. Work of the Committee on Entretien: The following note was received last evening from General Nudant:

The Marshal, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies telegraphs February 21, 1919, No. 5000---Radio: 'Communicate at once the following note to the Allied members of the Subcommittee presided over by General Ronneaux.'

After an examination of the study made by the Interallied Subcommittee on the evaluation of the cost of maintenance of the troops of occupation, Marshal Foch intends to fix as follows the maintenance to be asked for by virtue of Article IX of the Convention of November 11, and with analogy to what was done by the Germans [in France] in 1871:

1. Maintenance would include only the expenses connected with feeding and quartering: The other expenses (pay, etc.) being borne as expenses of war.

2. The feeding of the troops, officers included, has been calculated on a forfeitary charge of five francs per day which differs very little from the actual figures in the different Armies.

Quarters have been calculated at a tax of one franc per day per man. The feeding of the horses has been fixed at five francs per day.

While notifying the Allied delegates of these bases of calculation, the Marshal asks them to be good enough to make known to him any objections in principle which they might raise at a meeting at which the Marshal intends to preside at PARIS about the 25th.

The foregoing decision of Marshal Foch upsets and makes of no value a large amount of work that has been done by the Committee on Entretien. Our representative on this Committee has been to TOURS, PARIS, TREVES, and COBLENZ to secure the necessary documentary evidence on which to make his computations. I know that the British representative has spent much time and labor communicating with the War Office for the same

purpose. It seems a pity that all this time has been lost in working out principles which are not now approved.

General Ronneaux, the French Chairman of this Committee, was to arrive in SPA today, and there will be a meeting of the Committee tomorrow.

It is well known that the final demands to be made upon the Germans are so great that they will not be able to meet them. The bills for maintenance of the Armies of Occupation computed on the basis heretofore used made the amount to be paid by the Germans run into the hundreds of millions, or billions of marks. As the cost of maintenance of the British and American Armies was considerably greater than that of the French and Belgian, it was probably good finance to reduce these charges to the minimum, thereby necessitating as little German money as possible being paid to the British and Americans, and leaving as much as possible to go to the French and Belgians on other counts. Furthermore, if Germany should later be completely occupied by Allied Armies, the numbers would be very much greater than at present, and, therefore, the bill for maintenance would be still more stupendous. At the same time the new method of computation conforms to that employed by the Germans in France in 1871.

5. Payment of Requisitions and Fixing of Prices. In the letter of February 17, No. 4411, Radio, the Marshal, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies, announces that a meeting will occur at LAMORLAYE on February 28 for the purpose of drawing up a common Interallied ruling both as to payment of requisitions and to the fixing of the limited prices.

The Subquartermaster, Colonel Cahusac, will represent at this meeting the President of the Subcommittee on Interpretation of Article IX.

6. Payment for Requisitions: Major Dusterberg, of the German Armistice Commission, Chairman of the Committee on Entretien, states that in General Nudant's Note of January 28 there is demanded of the German Government the direct payment of requisitions and settlements monthly.

In his note of February 1 he stated that it was assumed that the value of requisitions was to be reckoned in the cost of maintenance, and as no objection has been made to this proposition he concluded that that assumption was satisfactory to the Allies. He adds that the people are pressing for payment of compensation due them and requests that the Allies agree that the determination of the amount of reimbursements shall be according to the regulations of the German Army Administration.

Now that Marshal Foch's decision has been received by the Committee on Entretien, it is to be hoped that an agreement on this matter may be soon arrived at in order that all concerned may know what amounts are to be paid for the maintenance of the Armies of Occupation, that requisitions may be settled and the Allies can know what expenses they are to pay.

* * * * *

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Acting Chief.

Plea for German Prisoners of War

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, February 22, 1919.

No. 81

From: Acting Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.,

[Extract]

* * * * *

3. Release of German Prisoners of War: General von Hammerstein announced that he had a long note concerning Prisoners of War and requested that General Nudant allow him to read it paragraph by paragraph.

The note follows:

No. 11283. Par. 1. For over three months the freeing of the German prisoners of war and civilians has been requested in vain of the representatives of the Entente. Now also, after the prisoners of war of the Allies that were captured have long ago left Germany, the return of German prisoners is limited to a number of seriously wounded delivered by the British, while the return from France has not yet begun, although it is now in the last weeks of the month of February, and although General Nudant promised that the period would be the end of February when this would probably take place. Germany returned in the very short time allowed by the Armistice Agreement all of the Allied civilian prisoners, overcoming therewith all of the difficulties in her own homeland brought on by the first weeks of the revolution; also the British Government allowed the civilian interned Germans to be transferred and enter into their homeland in the most thankful manner through the regular transportation from Holland.

In France, thousands who have been a sacrifice and have taken no part in the war are still being detained. According to international law, these cannot be forced to work, and so they remain behind the wires of the enemy without any purpose now for the fifth year of their lives, as most of them were interned in the autumn of 1914.

We again beg General Nudant to use the influence of Marshal Foch with the French Government to begin the immediate repatriation of all Germans, seriously wounded, and of German civilians who are interned.

Par. 2. The German Government, after the conclusion of the Armistice Agreement, and of its own free accord, brought about a great many alleviations for the Allied prisoners of war.

As was transmitted in the note of December 7, 1918, No. 66-12.18.U Wako, the limitations of the movement were removed to a great degree and the prisoners were put on the same footing as free workers. The postal censorship was raised, etc. On the contrary, all demands to alleviate the fate of the 800,000 prisoners of war, the Germans who remained in the hands of the Allies, have remained until now in vain.

* * * * *

7. Conversation with Baron von Lersner

* * * * *

In view of the long note which General von Hammerstein had just presented at the meeting, I took occasion to question Baron von Lersner in regard to this matter with a view to getting more detailed knowledge of the views held by the Germans in regard to this matter of the return of their prisoners of war. I called his attention to the fact that Paragraph X of the Armistice Agreement of November 11 was quite explicit in stating that the return of German prisoners of war would be regulated at the peace preliminaries. He stated frankly that he knew that they had no ground for their request as a matter of right, but that there were several reasons why they felt that the return of these prisoners should be taken up at once. The first of these being the fact that when the Armistice was signed it was fully expected that the preliminaries of peace would be well under way before this time. Another reason was that of humanity, and another as a recognition of the promptness with which Allied prisoners of war had been returned.

It seems highly probable that the main reason why the Germans have been pressing this matter is that the German people at home have been clamoring greatly that their Armistice Commission should do something for them in this matter. He stated to me very frankly that the members of the Commission were being very greatly embarrassed by the criticism of the German Press, demanding that they do something besides merely pass letters across the table concerning matters of but little general interest, that they get some results which would be of value to the German people, such as the release of their prisoners. He added that if they could secure results along this line it would improve their standing with the German people very materially, and he felt that it would be to the interests of the Allies to have their standing as good as possible, as they are the medium through which the Allies have to transact business, and if this medium has not the respect and confidence of the German people, the results secured through them will not be as great as the Allies themselves may wish.

I asked him what they would do with 800,000 more men in Germany, when they already had many thousands unemployed. He stated, "Oh! we do not want them all returned at once, we only want a start made, such as the return of the sick and seriously wounded, with assurances that the return of the others will soon commence."

* * * * *

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Acting Chief.

Municipal Elections not Permitted in Occupied Areas

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, February 22, 1919.

No. 81

From: Acting Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

2. No Municipal Elections to be Permitted for the Present in Occupied Areas: Marshal Foch replied to the German note of February 16 addressed to the Belgian Mission, to the effect that no municipal elections will be permitted in the occupied areas until further orders. This decision is based on the fact that it is to the advantage of the Armies of Occupation, especially as regards the service of billeting of requisitions with the municipal authorities at present in office, with whom the Armies have already been in contact and who have had experience in administrative affairs, be maintained in office.

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Acting Chief.

Suggested Transfer of P. I. A. C. Site

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, February 23, 1919.

No. 82

From: Acting Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

2. Suggested Removal of the P. I. A. C. from SPA: Attached, marked A, is a note from General von Hammerstein suggesting the removal of the Armistice Commission From SPA. He stated as reasons, first, that the hotel and other accommodations in SPA, now being used by the members of the Armistice Commission, will soon be wanted by the owners for use during the coming season. He also called attention to the fact that there has been manifested on some occasions a distinct feeling of hostility to the Germans. He suggested as a suitable place the town of WIESBADEN, which is in the occupied area, has

good telephonic communications in all directions, and is also quite a railroad center.

I am distinctly in favor of this move. It seems very probable that the Armistice Commission will continue its work for at least two months more, and possibly longer than that.

The American Section is occupying two private houses, both of which will be wanted by their owners in the near future to put them in condition for use during the coming summer season. As long as the Commission remains here, it is hardly possible for us to vacate these houses, but if the Commission moves to some city, such as WIESBADEN, without a doubt ample accommodations could be found that would not inconvenience any one.

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Acting Chief.

[Contemporary Translation]

No. 11481

Spa, February 23, 1919.

A. From General von Hammerstein, To General Nudant

In the note P. I. A. C. No. 474/G, and from the British Mission A. C./934, attention is called to the fact that the needs of the city of SPA as a health resort makes it seem desirable, in view of the expected visits of strangers in the near future, to limit the quarters assigned to troops, especially to free the hotels.

I do not fail to recognize the justice of these desires of the health resort, SPA, neither do I fail to recognize that the failure to meet them would create a growing animosity on the part of the people toward the Germans.

This animosity has been vented moreover recently in several newspaper articles. The results of such articles are shown in the unfriendly attitude of the people of SPA, and in slanderous cries, for example, *A la Gare les Boches*, with which German officers have been greeted on the street.

In the interests of both sides, therefore, I take the liberty to propose a removal of the P. I. A. C. As the new place of meeting I propose WIESBADEN. This health resort possesses sufficiently large hotels for the quartering of the necessary officials and lies in the occupied area. The telephonic communications in all directions are good, and the railroad connections would be essentially improved for both sides.

HAMMERSTEIN.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1218: Memorandum

German Reactions to Armistice Renewal

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, February 23, 1919.

MEMORANDUM FOR General Barnum

1. Many Germans at WAKO [German Armistice Commission] said that Erzberger would not sign a renewal at TREVES if new demands were made; that he would insist that it be submitted before the National Assembly and would not accept another Foch ultimatum, etc.

good telephonic communications in all directions, and is also quite a railroad center.

I am distinctly in favor of this move. It seems very probable that the Armistice Commission will continue its work for at least two months more, and possibly longer than that.

The American Section is occupying two private houses, both of which will be wanted by their owners in the near future to put them in condition for use during the coming summer season. As long as the Commission remains here, it is hardly possible for us to vacate these houses, but if the Commission moves to some city, such as WIESBADEN, without a doubt ample accommodations could be found that would not inconvenience any one.

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Acting Chief.

[Contemporary Translation]

No. 11481

Spa, February 23, 1919.

A. From General von Hammerstein, To General Nudant

In the note P. I. A. C. No. 474/G, and from the British Mission A. C./934, attention is called to the fact that the needs of the city of SPA as a health resort makes it seem desirable, in view of the expected visits of strangers in the near future, to limit the quarters assigned to troops, especially to free the hotels.

I do not fail to recognize the justice of these desires of the health resort, SPA, neither do I fail to recognize that the failure to meet them would create a growing animosity on the part of the people toward the Germans.

This animosity has been vented moreover recently in several newspaper articles. The results of such articles are shown in the unfriendly attitude of the people of SPA, and in slanderous cries, for example, *A la Gare les Boches*, with which German officers have been greeted on the street.

In the interests of both sides, therefore, I take the liberty to propose a removal of the P. I. A. C. As the new place of meeting I propose WIESBADEN. This health resort possesses sufficiently large hotels for the quartering of the necessary officials and lies in the occupied area. The telephonic communications in all directions are good, and the railroad connections would be essentially improved for both sides.

HAMMERSTEIN.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1218: Memorandum

German Reactions to Armistice Renewal

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, February 23, 1919.

MEMORANDUM FOR General Barnum

1. Many Germans at WAKO [German Armistice Commission] said that Erzberger would not sign a renewal at TREVES if new demands were made; that he would insist that it be submitted before the National Assembly and would not accept another Foch ultimatum, etc.

2. Erzberger came, however, with the intention to sign, and the time limit was not such as to permit previous debate by the National Assembly.

3. In what spirit were the new terms accepted and how are they now regarded? Erzberger's telegram to Weimar giving details with a view to their debate before the Assembly reached there 24 hours late. This made it impossible to involve the Assembly within the time limit. Not to make so momentous a decision, however, without party support, the Cabinet met with the party leaders. Von Brockdorff-Rantzau and one or two other ministers were opposed to signing. Their point of view was that Germany would not be much worse off as a result of the Allies' military measures than if she accepted the new terms, too severe to be fulfilled, and the German people would indicate to the world their will not to give way to the rapacity of the Allies. The responsibility for further suffering would fall on the Allies.

Erzberger and Scheidemann, in accord with the party leaders of the parties forming the majority, favored resigning of the Armistice. As Erzberger said a day or two later in explanation to the National Assembly: "I regret the harshness of the terms as much as you do, but these do not touch the Fourteen Points in my opinion. If you speculate on the discord of the Allies, I can only tell you that although there was violent argument among the Allies they finally secured the approval of the Americans and even of President Wilson to the terms. What would have happened to us if we had not signed. Clemenceau would have triumphed, the Fourteen Points would have been thrown overboard, and this doubtless through our fault."

Dr. Haas of WAKO, in close touch with Erzberger, states that despite the bravado of "refusing proudly to resign, the German people at heart fear further occupation and will go far to avoid it." The people have not yet given up the hope that the blockade will be raised shortly. To secure food and raw materials they will give up almost all else. Erzberger at the National Assembly said: "Hunger is the pathfinder of Bolshevism." Unless this can be reduced nothing can save the country, is Dr. Haas' opinion.

I suggested that the Germans seem to be using Bolshevism much as the French invoke Marshal Foch when other arguments fail. He admitted that many Germans are inclined to capitalize on Bolshevism, but insisted that it is a growing force in Germany.

The sitting of the National Assembly, February 18, is worthy of detailed study. Vogler of the Right opened it with an interpellation against Erzberger, which failed. Vogler is closely connected with the Steel Trust. He was reminded of this when Erzberger made a tirade against them. When Erzberger spoke of their pernicious influence through bribing the Government and accentuating pan-Germanism, the Assembly applauded. The Steel, Iron and Coal Trusts in Germany are now in complete disrepute. They regard them as the backers of the worst in the old system and now that this has gone to the wall they would send the steel crowd with them.

Stinnes, one of the big steel magnates, came to SPA as a technical adviser on the Armistice. Erzberger, however, could not keep him because of the bad impression his presence made on public opinion. This left Erzberger open to the charge of running his Commission with insufficient technical support. Erzberger, without discussing the fact, cleverly shifted the debate by challenging the Conservatives who raised the objection, to justify their own presence in the National Assembly. He caught Vogler in admitting that he represented an industry and not the people at the Assembly, and again by reminding him that he had not seen fit to grace the Armistice Commission with his presence when invited to come as a technical expert.

Other points of the Armistice renewal debated in the National Assembly were the Polish-German line, the fear expressed that the Poles overstep it. The 72-hour clause was regarded as one likely to lead to uneasiness in Germany and to discourage persistent effort.

A general impression from reading the reports of debates in WEIMAR the last few days is that of a growing pessimism there. Scheidemann, Erzberger, and others declare openly that Germany is smashed and in danger of falling apart. There seems to be little left

of the former effort to keep up appearances and to make Germany still appear a formidable power.

SANFORD GRIFFITH,
Captain, Corps of Int., U. S. A.,

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1218: Letter

Alleged Polish Hostilities

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, February 23, 1919.

No. 82

From: Acting Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.,

[Extract]

3. Continuation of Hostilities by the Poles: *** a note presented by General von Hammerstein, stating that the Polish troops have not ceased hostilities in spite of the understanding arrived at at the last TREVES Convention.

He cited several instances wherein Polish patrols have acted in a hostile way.

This matter is not one that concerns the Americans especially, but we are interested as one of the Allies. It is understood that an Allied Commission is in Poland, and, without a doubt, this Commission will take the necessary steps to see that even these minor hostilities are stopped. It is not at all improbable that thorough investigation would show that in some cases cited by General von Hammerstein German advance posts may have been the aggressors.

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Acting Chief.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1218: Letter

Repatriation

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, February 23, 1919.

No. 82

From: Acting Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.,

[Extract]

1. Repatriation of German Hospital Personnel: General Barnum, in accordance with instructions received from G. H. Q., presented the following note to the President of the German Armistice Commission:

You are informed that German sanitary personnel will be paid before repatriation in accordance with the GENEVA Convention. You are further informed that orders have been given for prompt repatriation of all German sanitary personnel whose services are no longer required. The exact date of repatriation will be made known to you later.

If there is no objection, LIMBURG-an-der-LAHN will be the place for transfer of this personnel, as in the case of those returned in January.

To which General von Hammerstein replied:

I thank General Barnum for the communication showing the American High Command is ready to repatriate hospital personnel.

* * * * *

4. Russian Prisoners of War: In response to a telegram which I sent to General Harries, he has informed me that there are Russian prisoners of war in more than one hundred camps, but just how many none in authority seem to know, nor are there any dependable figures as to the total number of prisoners.

The German War Office has made a recent estimate of 300,000. This following almost immediately after an estimate of 700,000.

The Russian Prisoners of War Commission is now making a survey and taking a census with a view to getting more accurate information.

He adds that a Russian officer, who is a prisoner and has considerable knowledge of the situation, believes that there are in excess of 700,000 of the Russian prisoners still in Germany.

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Acting Chief.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1218: Letter

Maintenance of the Armies of Occupation

No. 83

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, February 24, 1919.

From: Acting Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.,

[Extract]

* * * * *

3. Meeting of Committee to Act on the Question of Entretien: General von Hammerstein stated that he understood that General Ronneaux, Chairman of the Committee having this matter in hand, had returned to SPA.

He requested General Nudant to arrange a meeting of this Committee for February 25, in order to discuss the interpretation of the provisions of Article 9 of the Armistice Agreement of November 11.

General Nudant replied that he questioned whether such a meeting would be useful, at least until the Allies have themselves determined the construction to be placed upon the word Entretien. He further announced that General Ronneaux was leaving for PARIS tomorrow,

which would make it impossible to have such a Committee meeting as General von Hammerstein requested.

The question of payment for requisitions is also closely allied to that of Entretien and will be considered in connection with it. Marshal Foch has sent instructions here for this Committee to meet him in PARIS on Feb. 27. The members will, therefore, leave SPA tomorrow to attend this meeting. Major Cutchins represents the American Section. The Marshall was requested them to be prepared to present any objections they have to the construction placed upon the word Entretien, as it is proposed to apply it as shown in his telegram of February 21, 1919, given in my report Number 81, Paragraph 4, of February 22.

Telegram has this date been sent to the Commander-in-Chief in regard to this matter.

* * * * *

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Acting Chief.

G-1, GHQ, AEF: File 334: Fldr. 10: Telegram

Purchase of Supplies for Russian Prisoners

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF,
February 24, 1919.

General Barnum, Chief American Section, P. I. A. C., Spa, Belgium.

Please transmit the following to General Harries in answer to his telephone message to you re great need of prompt supply of food for Russian prisoners of war in Germany.

Mr. Hoover says that arrangements have been made with the French Government to furnish funds for the purchase of supplies to be used for the relief of Russian prisoners. The supplies are to be provided by the Red Cross, probably from ROTTERDAM and are to be paid for by the French, whose representative should be in BERLIN as he was directed to confer with General Harries. Supplies reported at DANZIG belong to the Poles and are not available for this purpose as recommended. It is believed that if the arrangement as indicated is carried out, the food situation should improve at once. Please keep us advised as to the situation. Signed McAndrew, Chief of Staff.

JAMES W. McANDREW.
Maj. Gen., U. S. A.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1239: Memorandum

Relief of Guard on the Luxemburg-Rhineland Frontier

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF,
February 24, 1919.

Memorandum for A. C. of S. G-3:

Both the Third Army and General H. A. Smith desire to have the guard which was put on the LUXEMBURG-RHINELAND frontier, at the request of the French, taken off.

Is there any reason why this should not be ordered by us?

LeROY ELTINGE,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Deputy Chief of Staff.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1218: Letter

Delay in Delivery of Agricultural Implements

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, February 24, 1919.

No. 83

From: Acting Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.,

[Extract]

2. Delivery of Agricultural Implements: General Nudant called the attention of the Germans to the fact that the delivery of agricultural implements to be turned over by the German Government was proceeding with regrettable slowness. The beginning of deliveries was put off from the 15th to the 21st of February, and in spite of the added time, the railway stations at HOHENBUDBERG and BISCHOFSEIM have not received anything up to February 23, and the station at NIPPES has received only about forty carloads. He requested the Germans to make every effort to hasten these deliveries.

General von Hammerstein, in reply to the above, stated that:

If these deliveries have been delayed, as General Nudant expresses, I would beg to call his attention to the fact that the first reason for it is due to the delay in handing over specifications that we were to have received on the 1st and did not receive until the 7th. It is due in the second place to the difficulties that are especially severe at the present time in regard to transports; and third, it is due to the special difficulties growing out of the revolutionary unrest.

I beg General Nudant, therefore, to believe that the German Government is doing everything that is possible to faithfully fulfill the conditions of this agreement, and I shall immediately give the necessary orders.

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Acting Chief.

Provisioning Germany

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, February 24, 1919.

From: Acting Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.,

[Extract]

1. Instructions from Marshall Foch in Regard to Carrying Out Provisions of Article 8 of the TREVES Convention of January 16: This Article has to do with the provisioning of Germany and the remainder of Europe, for which purpose all the German Commercial Fleet, under the control and under the flags of the Allied Powers and of the United States, are to be made available.

There have been three questions under consideration in connection with the fulfillment of this Article: (1) The supply of food; (2) Furnishing ships for its transportation; and (3) Payment for food and ships.

The instructions of Marshal Foch in regard to this are, as follows:

The representatives of the Associated Governments agree to the holding of a new meeting as soon as possible in order to discuss the points of Article 8 of the Armistice Agreement of January 16, that were left in suspense during the recent conference.

This meeting cannot take place before March 4, for the representatives of the Associated Governments did not have the necessary information concerning the financial propositions held on February 18, at TREVES.

Meanwhile the representatives of the Associated Governments inform Germany that they agree that the freight on German boats in the service of the Allies will be received as payment for provisions.

This acceptance regulates, therefore, the most important question left in suspense.

It is proper that the Germans understand that no import of food can be authorized into Germany until all boats, both cargo and passenger, have attained considerable progress.

The Germans must likewise understand that the delivery of food to Germany at a near date depends especially on the date on which the German tonnage will become available for the transportation of food production bought by Germany.

It is essential in the interest of the Germans themselves that the delivery of tonnages, both cargo and passenger, begin in the largest number possible and as soon as possible.

To the foregoing General von Hammerstein replied:

I regret very much this delay in putting off the meeting until March 4.

At the time of the last negotiations in TREVES with Marshall Foch, on February 16, it was promised by him that the matter would be regulated as soon as possible.

He stated that there would first have to be meetings in PARIS in regard to these matters. That he could not give the date, but he hoped that it would be Wednesday,---and the 16th was on Sunday. Although the Marshal did not give a definite date, he expressed the hope.

Recently, General Nudant gave the information in a note that the conference would begin probably today (Feb. 24), this afternoon, at the earliest. All the German Commissioners arrived yesterday. The German Government will not be pleased to hear that the meetings have been put off until March 4.

General Nudant replied:

I regret this incident. I do not know the cause of it. I know only the causes that are laid down in the note that concerns financial matters. I, too, was of the opinion that the meeting could take place as it had been provided for. I can give you no reason. I do not know what happened.

5. Food Situation in Germany: Minister von Haniel, on behalf of the German Government, announced that he had received several telegrams in connection with the food situation in the region of the RHINE and the RUHR. He added that without speaking of their general value he believed that they were of interest to the Allies because of the importance of the delivery of coal and coke from the RHINE and WESTPHALIAN districts. These telegrams also have a distinct bearing on the shipment of food into Germany.

Continuing, he stated that perhaps the inner-political situation of Germany has never been so threatening as now, not only in the regions of the RUHR, from which these telegrams came, but also in the largest cities of southern Germany, such as SCHWEIPART, HANNAU, NUMCHER, AUGSBURG. The radical elements have taken the upper hand, or are about to take the upper hand. The danger of Bolshevism is now greater than ever. The German Government is doing everything to oppose this danger, but the number of troops that are absolutely dependable over which the Government has disposition is extremely small. But in any case far too small to be engaged in several places at the same time.

On the contrary, it seems that the Bolshevik propaganda is breaking out in several different places at the same time in Germany. Moreover, the dangers of Bolshevism cannot be opposed permanently only by armies. The only lasting weapons against Bolshevism are bread and work. Whether these weapons will be given into the hands of the German people depends exclusively on the last analysis of the action of the Allies.

Following these remarks it was arranged that there should be a special meeting of the Commission at two o'clock this afternoon for the purpose of enabling the Germans to present any questions they desired, without waiting until March 4.

Doctor Melchior, Chairman of the German Committee on Food, Freight, and Finance, presented the situation, as follows:

(1) Doctor Melchior, by way of introduction, stated that the question of food and finance in Germany was a very much greater one than the payment for the few hundred thousand tons of potatoes and bacon that had already been contracted for.

(2) He stated that Germany was not in a position financially to pay for all the provisions that she would need unless she exhausted absolutely all of her reserve. To use her reserve would cause industrial and economic ruin and with it, the destruction of Germany as a political state.

(3) A financial condition must be devised therefore that will make possible the payment of the necessary food supplies, and likewise meet the

expenses for the up-building of the economic and industrial life of the country. Now, the Allies have demanded of Germany that she keep within her country all foreign securities. Germany proposes, therefore, to lay before the National Assembly a project for a law based on these national securities and which will secure two things:

(a) The authorization of the Minister of Finance to forbid the exportation of any foreign securities.

(b) The authorization of the Minister of Finance to requisition these foreign securities for the payment of food. In other words, the Government proposes to pay the Allies for their food supplies by using foreign securities.

(4) Before this project for a law can be put before the National Assembly, it is necessary that the Germans come to an agreement with the Allies on just what foreign securities may not be exported. For example, the Germans hold a large block of Russian securities. What will be the Allied point of view about them? Likewise, will the securities of the German Allies (Austro-Hungary, Bulgaria, Turkey) be acceptable to the Allies in payment for supplies? The German financiers conserved their securities on neutral countries. As soon as the Allies have made claim to the Germans what foreign securities would be acceptable to them as a basis for payment, this project for a law can be presented. That is the reason why the postponement of the Food, Freight, and Finance Commission meeting to March 4 is so disappointing to the German Subcommittee as these financial regulations must precede the food supply which is so urgently needed.

(5) General Nudant presented one or two questions and suggestions. His first question was: Suppose the Allied Governments, in answer, state that they are unwilling to have the securities of the German Allies blocked with the securities of neutral countries---what disposition will you make in your projected law? Doctor Melchior replied: 'Then we will have to ask for a special regulation concerning the securities of Austro-Hungary, Turkey, and our other Allies.'

(6) General Nudant emphasized the point that this projected law when presented before the National Assembly must not state that the Allies have accepted the plan. In addition, General Nudant asked whether there was any reason why the note presented by Doctor Melchior should not be sent on to the competent authorities of the French Government, to which Doctor Melchior replied: 'On the contrary, we wish that you would send it on.'

(7) Dr. Melchior requested that efforts be made to have the joint-committee meeting earlier than March 4, if possible, and General v. Hammerstein added the request that because the German delegates must come from widely separated areas and railway communications are bad, be begged for three days' advance notice.

He then went on to say that the German Government with the object of creating a broader basis for financing the import of foodstuffs, intends to take the following measures:

In the course of this week the German Government will bring before the National Assembly a bill forbidding the exportation of foreign securities out of Germany as well as the selling or the mortgaging of such to any person domiciled abroad. Austrian, Hungarian, Bulgarian and Turkish (former Allies) securities will be excepted, also such foreign securities certified by the Reichsbank or by a Devisenstelle (privileged banks) for remittance abroad for the purpose of renewing coupons, etc., or for exchange or stamping in the case of conversions or for similar transactions. In view of the negotiations now pending with the Allied and Associated Governments the export prohibition

will be in force until March 31, 1919. The Minister of Finance may grant dispensations from the export prohibition.

Under the order of the Federal Council of March 22, 1917, the German Government intends to call up for sale to itself or to a concern appointed by it (Bankers-Syndicate) all foreign securities of the kind mentioned in Section A, belonging to persons or firms residing in Germany, as far as such securities have not previously been placed at the disposal of the Government or mortgaged against foreign credits; it will make no difference whether such securities be held in Germany or abroad. Reservation is made that under the terms of this expropriation law exceptions may be granted. The expropriation will be effected as soon as the negotiations with the Allied and Associated Governments make clear which sorts of securities are apt to serve as basis for the financial arrangement. In order to come to an understanding with respect to the particulars (price, payment, mode of accounting, etc.) it is proposed to appoint on both sides a standing committee on export delegates at the earliest opportunity.

In conclusion he added:

In order to hasten the delivery of the food supplies, the German Government asks the Allied and Associated Governments for payments on account on terms to be agreed upon against the securities to be transferred to them.

* * * * *

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Acting Chief.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1218: Letter

Provisioning Germany

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, February 25, 1919.

No. 84

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

* * * * *

4. Food Supplies for Germany: Minister von Haniel on behalf of the German Government presented a note stating that in the agreement regarding the supply of food for Germany made on the 8th of the month, at SPA and the agreement at TREVES of the 16th of the month, immediate delivery of 30,000 tons of pork and 350,000 cans of condensed milk was agreed upon. It has been agreed upon that the payment should be partly made on March 1, and partly in installments during the month of March. There was a reservation to the effect that agreements concerning shipping should be accomplished first.

Yesterday the President of the Interallied Armistice Commission announced that further discussion on this subject was not to take place before March 4.

The carrying out of this agreement therefore has been postponed to an indefinite date. In view of the extraordinary lack of food in Germany and of the shortage of food for children and mothers, the Allied and Associated Governments are urgently requested to consent to these deliveries, for which the method of payment has already been settled, without waiting for the agreement regarding the shipping to be concluded. Owing to the transfer of the time of meeting, a telegraphic answer to this request is asked for.

According to the latest information, the death rate of children, especially in the large towns, is increasing in alarming fashion. In order to supply the nourishing material asked for by the Doctors, the Associated and Allied Governments are requested to allow the importation of twenty tons of food as early as possible and to arrange as early as possible for its shipment to Germany. The agent at ROTTERDAM who was to be appointed, has been appointed. He is already occupied in getting into communication with the Relief Committee, Mr. Browning.

* * * * *

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1239: Memorandum

Relief of Guard on Luxemburg-Rhineland Frontier

February 25, 1919.

Memorandum For The Deputy Chief of Staff

1. There seems to be no reason why this guard should not be removed provided the purpose for which it was intended can be arranged between the Third Army and General Smith.

2. Here is the situation---(a) Under date of December 9, Marshal Foch published an Instruction regarding the administration of affairs in the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg. (b) In a letter to the Commander-in-Chief December 14, Marshal Foch referring to the Instruction of December 9 says "the application of this instruction therefore requires that the frontier of LUXEMBURG and RHINELAND be strictly closed." (c) On December 23, the Assistant Chief of Staff, Advance G. H. Q. furnished the Commanding General, Third Army with a copy of the Instruction of December 9, and of Marshal Foch's letter of December 14, with instructions to take the necessary steps to carry out the instructions of December 9, 1918, and the request of the Marshal contained in the attached letter.

3. This guard was established to control frontier traffic under the direction of the Commandant d'Armes of LUXEMBURG. The functions of the Commandant d'Armes have been taken over by us, and it would therefore appear that it lies within our power to determine when and whether the guard is necessary.

FOX CONNER,
Brigadier General, General Staff,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3.

Delivery of Rolling Stock

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, February 25, 1919.

No. 84

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

5. Receipt of Rolling Stock: The Committee on Receipt of Rolling Stock reports that up to February 23, there had been received from the Germans 4,706 locomotives and 136,292 cars, and for ALSACE-LORRAINE 17,495 cars.

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief.

G-1, GHQ, AEF: 336.23: Fldr. 1: Memorandum

Release of German Sick and Wounded Prisoners

1st Section, General Staff

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,
February 25, 1919.

C-in-C, G-1

American Representative, Permanent International Armistice Commission, Spa, Belgium.

1. There is sent you herewith for your information copy of a memorandum of this date to the A. C. of S., G-2, on the above subject. The Wolff dispatch which was the cause of this inquiry from the Austrian and Hungarian representatives, and also of a similar inquiry from the German Red Cross, is as follows:

The United States yesterday informed the German Armistice Commission that German wounded and sick, as well as the German sanitary personnel, which are in American hands will be sent back to Germany.

2. In view of the widespread popular agitation in Germany on the subject of release of their prisoners, you may wish to take some action to dispel the false impression created, intentionally or otherwise, by the publication of this dispatch.

3. No steps will be taken towards the repatriation of sick and wounded prisoners captured during hostilities until the reply of Marshal Foch to the request from the German representatives recently reported by you is made known.

By order of the C-in-C:

AVERY D. ANDREWS,
Brig. Gen., G. S.,
A. C. of S., G-1.

Memorandum For G-2:

Subject: Repatriation of German Captives

1. Replying to your memorandum of February 22, and to the inquiry from the American Commission to Negotiate Peace, both of which are returned herewith, the following steps have been taken with reference to the repatriation of German captives:

The sick and wounded left behind by the Germans in their withdrawal after the Armistice were, under the ruling of the Armistice Commission, not considered prisoners of war. They have, therefore, been repatriated when their condition warranted and at the same time there were repatriated the sanitary personnel caring for them. The Wolff dispatch from BERLIN was evidently based on this fact, although, intentionally or otherwise, it was not stated that the information given the German Armistice Commission related only to personnel picked up after the Armistice.

2. Within the last week it has been decided to repatriate the sanitary personnel captured during hostilities, but no notification of this decision has yet been given the German authorities. There have been taken no steps whatever toward the repatriation of sick and wounded soldiers captured during hostilities.

3. An inquiry from the German Red Cross based on the same newspaper dispatch was recently received from the Military Attache at BERNE, and he was given the above information.

4. It is suggested that this information be transmitted to the Austrian and Hungarian representatives, with the statement that their Nationals will be treated on the same basis as Germans.

By order of the C-in-C:

AVERY D. ANDREWS,
Brig. Gen., G. S.,
A. C. of S., G-1.

G-4, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 107: Memorandum

Interpretations of Maintenance of Armies of Occupation

4th Section, G. S.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,
February 25, 1919.

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief of Staff

1. I understand the accompanying papers [not attached] are to be sent tonight to General Pershing for decision as to whether or not he will accept the Marshal's apparent decision that maintenance (in reference to our Army of Occupation) is to be understood to include only food and lodging and nothing more.

2. No policy has ever been announced on this subject. What actually happened is this: A subcommittee representing the various Allies has met a number of times and agreed tentatively that maintenance should include all items, that is, the total cost to the respective Governments of each Army of Occupation. They agreed also as to the various headings which should be included under maintenance. Each member then worked out the cost for his Army on a per capita basis for the items agreed upon as comprising maintenance. * * *

3. Of course if all items are included in maintenance, the cost of the American Army of Occupation will be much greater than the cost of the French and the cost of the British Army will also be far greater than that of the French. If this interpretation of maintenance was accepted a very large sum of money would be due the British and American Governments and a comparatively small sum to the French Government for the same purpose. In studying the detailed items involved in this maintenance, however, it appears that there is not much difference between the three Armies in items of food and lodging. If the French are willing to accept these two items only for maintenance they lose comparatively little. On the other hand if the British and American Governments accept the same two items for maintenance they will lose a great deal. The Marshal may have considered this point of view in stating that in his opinion maintenance should include only food and lodging.

4. The subcommittee has all the figures in the case and can quickly arrive at a per capita cost of maintenance just as soon as a decision is made as to what maintenance will include.

GEO. VAN HORN MOSELEY,
Brigadier General, G. S.,
Asst. Chief of Staff, G-4.

Second Army Gen.: File. 453: Fldr. 69: Memorandum

Ownership of Captured Enemy War Material

4th Section, G. S.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,
February 25, 1919.

Memorandum For: Representative, A. C. of S., G-4, Advance G. H. Q.

1. Receipt is acknowledged of your Memorandum of February 24, 1919 on the subject "Allied views on ownership of property found in area of advance of Allied Army." You have raised the question as to the ownership of property such as equipment of the East Railway originally French in origin, captured by the German forces and subsequently taken from them by capture or delivered by them to the American forces in accordance with the terms of the Armistice Agreement of November 11, 1918.

2. This question of title or, more properly speaking, the procedure and terms to govern the return of such property to our Allies have not yet been fully determined. The following indicates the history and present status of this matter, viz: after some correspondence with the French, in which the position was taken that according to international law, title to property captured in battle vests in the capturing Government, and this rule extends to property, at one time French property, which had formerly been captured by Germans and reduced to German ownership, and afterwards taken from the Germans by American troops. This opinion was confirmed by a decision on the return of approximately 25,000,000 rounds of small arms British ammunition discovered in our area of occupied Germany. In this case the decision was that British title to ammunition was wholly extinguished by capture by Germans.

3. Section VI of the original Armistice Agreement of November 11, reads: "All military installations of whatever nature will be handed over (to the Allies) intact; likewise all military supplies, foodstuffs, ammunitions and equipments which shall have not been taken away within the time limit set for the evacuation."

Cablegram from the War Department 2581-R, Jan. 30, 1919, announces a decision that:

the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied forces concerning the execution of Article VI, Par. 3 of the Armistice Agreement. In this order the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies takes the standpoint that all details concluded concerning military supplies and military material in the occupied areas after November 11, 1918, are null and unbinding, and that all these supplies and objects had passed over in the ownership of the Allied Armies and therefore the purchasers of them were under obligation either to deliver them up or to pay a certain purchase price. The German Armistice Commission in carrying out the prescriptions of the Armistice Commission which related to the evacuation of German territory arrived at an interpretation of Article VI, Subpar. 3 of the Armistice Agreement which does not agree with that of the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies. According to the view of the German Armistice Commission the deciding point for the application of the stipulations in Article VI, Subpar. 3, was that military stores, foodstuffs, ammunition and equipment was subject to delivery to the Allies only insofar as at the time of their passing into the occupied zone they could not be carried along, but still were in the possession of the troops and military authorities. The German Armistice Commission believed, however, that such military stores and objects as before the expiration of the period of evacuation had passed in a regular way out of the ownership of the Army authorities, and which had been given over by purchase to private persons, communes or economic corporations of the zone later to be occupied, would lose thereby their character as military stores. The Armistice Commission from due deliberation arrived at the conception that in all wars, and also with all armies, that the disposing of non-essential material through sale to the civil populations has always been customary, and there is to be added the fact that already during the movement of retreat of the Army there had been a beginning of demobilization of the Army throughout Germany and corresponding general instructions had been given. In this connection, finally, attention may be called to the fact that under the revolutionary conditions prevailing at that time in the zone to be occupied, later, and under the food shortage, the sale of a great part of the articles and objects which come into question appeared both a necessity to preclude anarchistic conditions and in order to effect a calming of the populations as far as possible, a movement which might be regarded as in the interest of the Allies also, whose troops were on the eve of marching into these districts. The German Government requests the Allied Governments to subject Article VI, Subpar. 3, of the Armistice Agreement to another examination upon the basis of the above points of view. Entirely aside from this, the German Government most emphatically and expressly makes protest against the passage in the order of the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies in which the objects in question are referred to as having become the property of the Allied Armies.

According to Article VI, Subpar. 3, of the Armistice Agreement, the stores more exactly described therein were to be delivered. Hereby it is expressly recognized that it is not a question of booty of War over which right of ownership could be laid at once. Rather by the delivery there is only a condition created for the time of the Armistice and a seat of the German Government is created, concerning which the Peace Agreement will make the proper dispositions. The population of the occupied district has depended upon the commands which have been issued on the basis of the interpretation which stands in contradiction to the German interpretation which has prevailed up to this time. Likewise in numerous circles of the population considerable doubt has arisen as to the sense in which to interpret the civil orders that have been given out by the military commanders. The greatest unrest and uneasiness (as has become known to the German Government) prevails therefore among the population of the occupied areas, especially also in view of the considerable fines with which they are threatened in some of the orders. The main question and issue is the interpretation of the phrase military stores. According to the interpretation of the German Government, only such objects fall under this head as:

- (a) Are suitable for the use of the Army;
- (b) Which are destined for the use of the Army and have already been allotted to that use; and,

(c) Such as were on November 11, 1918, the property of the Empire or of the Confederated States.

This interpretation results from the opposition to Subpar. 4 of Article VI, which speaks of provisioning depots of all kinds for the civil population. Not all stores, therefore, that the Army could have used, can be summed up as military stores in the sense of Article VI, Subpar. 3. Raw material and half finished products, therefore, as a rule, do not come under this stipulation. Further there is to be left out all of those military stores which to be sure were prepared for the use of the Army, but had not yet on November 11, 1918, passed over into the formal ownership of the Army authorities, but rather were still in warehouses, etc., of the supply agents. Especially are to be excepted also the supplies which on November 11, '18 were in the ownership of War societies. This is to be concluded from the fact that according to Article VI, Subpar. 1, private property is guaranteed. War Societies are, according to the memorandum laid before the German Reichstag in the year 1915, concerning economic measures brought about by the war, Supplement 2 (Pamphlet No. 44), Page 38, stock companies and companies with limited membership, also clearing houses that were created in connection with banks in order in the case of need and with official regulation to draw, to divide out, and to use the best advantage products and raw material, the carefully ordered husbanding of which was desirable in the interest of the provisioning of the land. The War societies are not branches of the Army Organization, but they are societies and organizations coming under civil law, occasioned by the war. They are, to be sure, equipped with official rights and accordingly are supervised by the State, but they serve the interest of general economy, and the stores turned over to them are bought by them with private capital, and are turned into account in the scope of the general economic plan for the entire population. These stores are consequently not the property of the Empire, but they are private property. In accordance with the task the War societies stand preeminently under civil authority insofar as their supervision is entrusted to military authority. This is accounted for merely in consideration of its exterior manner of organization.

The German Government requests, without prejudice to its request for the subjecting of this Article to a second examination, that the above interpretation of the conception of military stores is substantiated.

DUESTERBERG.

G-1, GHQ, AEF: File 334: Fldr. 10: Telegram

Need of Prompt Supply of Food for Russian Prisoners

Spa. Belgium, Feb. 24, 1919.

Chief of Staff, H. A. E. F.

Number 599. Referring to your telegram dated Feb. 24, subject great need of prompt supply of food for Russian prisoners of war in Germany, which was promptly transmitted to General Harries; following is his reply: "Number P-523. Appreciate announcement that arrangements have been made for purchase of relief supplies and that the purchasing officer has been selected. What troubles us is the fact that the expected purchasing officer - for whom we have been looking for three weeks and who was reported as leaving PARIS for BERLIN on the 19th instant - has not appeared and is said to be somewhere in Switzerland. The mere power to purchase and the funds with which to buy do not meet the situation. The urgent need is food and plenty of it. Carefully refined plans should not be permitted to obscure the real issue. Comparatively inconsequential details can be worked out at any time in the future, but the feeding of the Russians cannot be delayed much longer without bringing about the destruction of our entire plan." To the above I

can only add that I feel certain that more satisfactory results will be obtained if we depend upon our own agencies for supplying food rather than those of some other country whose ways are not ours and whose interests are not the same. We have embarked on a large proposition and should spare no effort to make it the fullest success possible. I believe that General Harries should be supplied at the earliest date possible with food in ample quantity for the Russian prisoners. As stated by him neither promises nor money are of any avail in lieu of food.

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM 7:38 p. m.
Brig. Gen., U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1218: Letter

Repatriation of Russian Prisoners

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, February 26, 1919.

No. 85

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.,

[Extract]

* * * * *

6. Repatriation of Russian Prisoners of War: * * * copy of a letter sent by General Ewart, (British) Chairman of the Russian prisoners of war committee in BERLIN, to General Nudant, President of the Allied Armistice Commission.

The original letter is not dated, but General Nudant's letter forwarding this to Marshal Foch is dated February 24, showing that General Ewart's letter was of very recent date.

It is of special interest to note from this letter:

(1) That he states that the Russian prisoners of war have but one idea in their minds,---namely, that of being repatriated.

(2) That after the month of March they feel that they would rather attempt to reach their homes than to remain in German prison camps, no matter what the conditions in the latter.

(3) The suggestion that prisoners for southern and even central Russia should be repatriated by way of the DANUBE. This plan would, however, require the cooperation of the Rumanian Government.

(4) His request that he be authorized at once to fix a date, if possible, not later than April first, when the repatriation of these prisoners would commence.

(5) Discrepancy in the numbers.

First reports were that there are something over 700,000 prisoners, and finally it was stated that there are not more than 250,000. The exactness of both figures (being from German sources), is doubted as it is assumed that the truth lies between the two, and that there are from 400,000 to 500,000.

In view of the urgent calls made by General Harries, which I have forwarded with added emphasis, for food for these prisoners, the facts as reported in this letter have special importance for us at this time.

If repatriation of these prisoners is to commence not later than April first, and if the number does not exceed 400,000, the policy to be adopted in regard to supplying food for them may well differ from the policy that would be adopted in case these prisoners are to be held for as long as six months.

No information is at hand here as to any decision of Marshal Foch in regard to fixing a date for commencing the return of these prisoners. Without a doubt, the announcement of a date, even though it might be later than April first, would help very materially in the control of these men.

In view of the large part that we have in this question, it is recommended that prompt steps be taken to determine the date when the repatriation shall commence. However, this should not delay the prompt supply of food.

7. Return of Baggage of Prisoners of War: The Minister of War in BERLIN has given the following orders with reference to the transfer of baggage of the Allied prisoners of war, which was left behind:

The General Kommandos are called upon to send all pieces of baggage of the repatriated Allied prisoners with a safe guard to the camps of transfer. These shipments will be accompanied by lists giving the owner and the number of pieces of baggage, which lists shall serve for a regular receipted delivery of the baggage.

As transfer camps there are designated:

Friedrichsfeld for Belgians, Japanese.

Wahn for English, American, and Portuguese.

Darmstadt for French.

Rastatt for Italians.

Greek baggage is probably being sent directly from GORLITZ by Czechoslovak trains.

8. Requests in Regard to Prisoners of War: The following are some of the requests made by the Germans in connection with their prisoners of war:

1. That the delegates of the Northern Unions of the Red Cross be permitted to take up their work of love in all districts of Russia.

2. That the German Prisoner of War Aid Commission now held in Siberia, and especially in OMSK, which are protected by the Red Cross, take up their activities in conjunction with the northern Red Cross and insofar as necessary be supplemented with new personnel.

3. That postal traffic with prisoners in Siberia, Turkestan, and the Cossack Provinces be restored as quickly as possible.

4. That all telegraphic or other means of news concerning the place and health of prisoners be passed through.

5. That in accordance with agreement made with the Kuban Government and with the Turkestan Government the head for head exchange of prisoners be allowed to be carried out and that the ships necessary therefor be permitted to move unhindered.

6. That the deportation of all invalids and sick prisoners of war be allowed to begin at once either to their homes or at least to more favorable climates.

7. That an agreement with the Siberian and Czechoslovak Governments be made as soon as possible for the repatriation of all German Prisoners still in Siberia. Considering the actual power relations in the regions concerned it is requested that British, French, and Japanese Governments be approached with the request for their agreement with the above purpose in the interest of humanity and for their intercession with the Siberian and Czechoslovak Governments in the interest of care for prisoners and exchange of prisoners in the manner described above with all dispatch possible.

* * * * *

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief.

Disposition of German Materiel in Hungary

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, February 26, 1919.

No. 85

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.,

[Extract]

* * * * *

2. Disposal of Arms and Ammunition Left by General von Mackensen's Troops: General von Hammerstein presented a note, stating that according to reliable information the Poles, with the help of the French Embassy of BUDAPEST, are buying arms and ammunition left behind there in Hungary by von Mackensen.

The first arms and ammunition are said to have arrived in GALICIA, under French officers, on January 20. Since then further convoys have been sent. Germany is in agreement with and is supporting Poland against Bolshevism, but before this can be done guarantee must be given that the arms will not be used against them. Before everything it must be emphasized that the disposal of the materiel left behind must be left entirely to the Germans. This has been expressly agreed upon with Hungary. The German High Command, therefore, expects that the French Government will forbid its Embassy at BUDAPEST to take part in the removal of German property. It is requested that this idea may be confirmed.

To the foregoing General Nudant replied:

I do not know whether arms have been transmitted from Hungary to Poland, but I doubt very much whether the point of view expressed in this note of the Germans will be agreed to by the Allies,---that is to say, that the Germans hold the right of title over the arms that were left behind in Austro-Hungary, but I will transmit the facts to the Allied Governments, and I will transmit to you the answer that is received.

* * * * *

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief.

Aeroplane Service Between Paris and Prague

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, February 26, 1919.

No. 85

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

1. The Concurrence of Germany in Aeroplane Service Between Paris and Prague: Marshal Foch telegraphed to the Chief of the Allied Armistice Commission requesting that the Germans be called upon to make reply to the proposition which has been put to them in regard to furnishing a landing place for aeroplanes operating between PARIS and PRAGUE.

General von Hammerstein stated that on February 16, he had communicated with General Weygand on this subject, saying that the matter had to be approved by the southern German Government. He added that the Allies must know that there is a large amount of unrest in southern Germany at present. The question of what Government is in power there is not yet clear. He regretted that on this account no definite answer on this question could be given at present, adding that he would do all that he could to hasten the matter.

* * * * *

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief.

Return of Industrial Machinery

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, February 26, 1919.

No. 85

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.,

[Extract]

* * * * *

9. American Representative to WIESBADEN: In view of the fact that Minister Lefevre (French) contemplates organizing such an extensive bureau at WIESBADEN for the handling of matters in connection with the return of machinery taken from France and Belgium, I decided to send to that point the Chairman of our Committee on this subject. He is now there and has instructions to learn exactly what steps are being taken in order to carry out this work.

The report reached me that it was the intention to send Allied agents all through Germany for the purpose of locating French and Belgian machines, and that incidentally they were expected to learn as much of trade methods and trade secrets as possible.

It must be noted that this report has no authenticity and may have had its origin only in German sources. Our representative is not expected to remain there, but I wish to keep him on the work as long as seems necessary in order that we may be fully informed as to methods; as this committee will have extensive work before it continuing for some time, it is probable that this officer may be sent back there from time to time to keep in touch with the progress of the work.

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1218: Memorandum

Provisioning Germany

[Contemporary Translation]

WAKO 11474

Spa, February 26, 1918.

Chairman of German Armistice Commission

To Chairman of P. I. A. C.

The 30,000 tons of fat and bacon that recently arrived at ROTTERDAM and that has been bought by Germany are destined in largest measure for BERLIN, Upper Silesia and the former Kingdom of Saxony. To transport these provisions by land across the entire German country is very expensive of time in view of the present situation as regards rail-ways and perhaps in a measure impossible.

It is evident from the situation in Germany in regard to food, and which is well known to the Associated Governments, that the important thing is to get the provisions delivered as rapidly as possible into the hands of the consumers.

As we stated above, it is not possible to do this by land. The only relief possible to bring to the situation is the use of the sea.

It is therefore requested that permission be given to send these provisions by boat from ROTTERDAM to HAMBURG and STETTIN. The names of the ships that would be used for the purpose will be communicated to the Interallied Naval Armistice Commission (PANAC).

I should be grateful to General Nudant to send forward this note at once and would especially welcome a favorable answer as rapidly as possible.

v. HAMMERSTEIN.

Information Concerning Zeppelins

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, February 27, 1919.

No. 86

From. Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.,

[Extract]

1. Information in Regard to Zeppelins: General Nudant presented a note to the Germans, stating that the French Ministry of Marine desires the following information:

The type and displacement of all zeppelins at the present time in condition for use in the German ports. Exact dimensions as to length, weight, and height over all of the zeppelins of the latest type from 70,000 to 75,000 M-3.

* * * * *

The President of the German Armistice Commission is requested to take the necessary steps to see that the documents requested are furnished as soon as possible.

In response to the above, General von Hammerstein asked if this is a question of the Naval Air Service. General Nudant replied:

So far as I know, it is only a matter of Marine dirigibles. But it is possible that within a short space of time a similar request will be made for the dirigible over land.

* * * * *

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief.

Relations Between German and Allied Officers

No. 86

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, February 27, 1919.

[Extract]

* * * * *

7. Question of Rendering Salutes: General v. Hammerstein, on February 26, presented the following note in regard to rendering salutes:

The request of the British Military authorities that seniority shall not affect saluting, has resulted in many unfortunate incidents in this connection and unjustifiable punishments. I regret to have to here state that the only apology that has yet been given is that of the Canadian Captain Moffet, which was seen by an eyewitness of the scene.

If officers of the German and British Armies do not know the various marks of rank, the only arrangement, which corresponds to sense of honor of the person and of the Army, is that which was agreed upon at SPA, and which without doubt holds good for the large number of officers of the Allies and Associated Powers in Germany namely, that only those officers salute who know one another. No difficulties will arise with tactful officers. Under no circumstances can it be demanded that an old German officer or a staff officer should stand to attention in front of a young British officer. I can only deeply regret that the British Military authorities have up to now been unable to accept this standpoint, the more so, as the idea that they have only to deal with young German officers is incorrect. In this connection it must be pointed out that many young German officers, in regard to their length of service, would hold a far higher rank in the British Army.

If the British military authorities refuse a proper treatment to German officers, who must move on duty within their command, I can see no way out of it but to order all German officers in territory occupied by the British to wear civilian clothes until such time as an agreement being arrived at with the British military authorities. I have informed my subordinates accordingly.

In response to this, General Haking, President of the British Mission, has sent the following to the President of the German Armistice Commission:

I have sent a copy of this to General Nudant and requested him, as President of the Interallied Armistice Commission, to inform General v. Hammerstein that if German officers who are authorized to enter the Allied zone of occupation appear in civilian clothes, they will be made prisoners of war. I will let you know what action is taken in the matter.

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief.

Polish Border Hostilities

AMERICAN SECTION A. E. F. ,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, February 27, 1919.

No. 86

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

* * * * *

2. Situation Along the Polish Border: General von Hammerstein called attention to the fact that in several notes presented recently he had shown the conditions existing between Germany and Poland. He called attention to the fact that he has recently received further information showing the real attitude in eastern Germany and the untruth of Polish reports. He called attention to the continuation of Polish attacks in spite of the line of demarkation definitely laid down, and presented certain papers which he considered proofs. He did not read these papers as they were quite lengthy but he called special attention to the protests from the population of the district of NOCOA* and of the district of MAZERETZ,* and of eleven other villages who have considered themselves greatly prejudiced by the line of demarkation.

He further remarked that the Germans considered they were entitled to expect that the Allies would cause a cessation of hostilities. No confirmation of this has as yet been received. On the contrary, according to the newspapers, only indefinite assurances were given that the Poles who bear the responsibility of the TREVES Agreement should cease all hostilities.

He stated that the conditions were not satisfactory, claiming that it is obvious from the statements of various people that the Poles have no intention of ceasing their attacks.

General Nudant replied to the foregoing, as follows:

You know we have at the present time in WARSAW a commission, the purpose of which is to see that the Poles maintain the line of demarkation. General Dupont, who is at present in BERLIN, has the same task as far as the German Forces are concerned. We need not be surprised because there are slight unrests in these neighborhoods. Military outbreaks do not exist there. There are disturbances caused by plunderers,---both Poles and Germans. General Dupont has just come back from this neighborhood. He saw and spoke with German officers of the regular active service, and the impression which he has communicated to me, which he received from them, is the one which I have given you. The instances which have been given over to me in the last week, and which naturally I forwarded to General Dupont, are attributable for the most part to the line of demarkation protecting the troops. We have only one aim, and that is to respect the line of demarkation laid down at the last meeting at TREVES, and to have it respected. As far as the general view of the Germans is concerned, which are concealed under protests which I have before me, it is not our province to treat them. They fall under the discussion and investigation of general subjects connected with the Peace Conference, and I have not, naturally, the power to intervene.

* Not identified.

Continuing along this line, General von Hamerstein added:

I thank General Nudant for the statement that General Dupont will interest himself in seeing that the demarkation line is respected by both sides, but unfortunately I must repeat what I said in my notes of February 20, 21, and 23, that as far as the Poles are concerned, it is not a question of small manifestations which obviously have no military character, I quote the time and place where Poles used force of arms from official statements. Towns have been bombarded by heavy artillery. I hope great things from the cooperation of General Dupont with our specialists in BERLIN. I give this information now in order that General Dupont himself and the competent authorities in PARIS may be informed from this end. If I was to give General Dupont a general idea of the attitude of eastern Germany, it is for the purpose and with the hope that these impressions will be communicated to PARIS and will receive due consideration at the Peace Conference at PARIS.

* * * * *

5. Further Reports as to Polish Activities: In addition to the reports given above in Paragraph 2, of threatened attacks by the Poles, General v. Hammerstein presented another note * * * in which it is claimed that the local police detachments were liable to make an attack against the bridgehead KOLMAR---MARGONIN---SAMOTSCHIN, inasmuch as they have brought up troops according to a definite plan.

As shown above, General Nudant has but little faith in the accuracy of most of these reports. Without a doubt the Allied Governments have reliable information bearing on this subject.

I forward these reports as being part of the transactions of the Armistice Commission, and possibly when taken in connection with other information on this subject they tend to show either the frame of mind of the Germans in regard to this question, or an attempt on their part to make capital out of the situation by presenting alarming reports, many of which have but poor foundations.

The report referred to above may easily be the result of an excited mind, as it makes no claims whatever to actual Polish aggressions,---simply calls attention to certain troop movements, and from these jumps to the conclusion that these movements presage a hostile attack.

* * * * *

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief.

Delivery of Boats for Provisioning Europe

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, February 28, 1919.

No. 87

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

1. Delivery of German Merchant Marine: General Nudant transmitted the following instructions from Marshal Foch:

On Sunday, I sent a telegram saying that no provisions would be granted to Germany until real progress had been made in the delivery of boats (both passenger and freight), according to the eighth clause of the Armistice Agreement of January 16.

The agreement of January 17, stipulates that the delivery of boats is a condition that must precede any importation of food.

Delay in the delivery of boats seriously threatens our means for the transportation of the necessary provisions to the liberated countries and to Germany. It cannot be expected that any food whatsoever may be given to Germany as long as this delivery of boats is lacking.

The provisions known to be at ROTTERDAM can be sold to Germany and arrangements for the balance of the shipments can be pushed forward rapidly as soon as appreciable progress has been made in the delivery of boats.

The delivery of all these ships stated to be ready to take the sea on February 10 and 12, would be considered as appreciable progress.

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief.

Prosecution of Persons Who Removed Machinery

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, February 28, 1919.

No. 87

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

* * * * *

5. Punishment of Persons Who Removed Machinery from Belgium or France: * * * copy of a letter presented by General v. Hammerstein, protesting against the arrest and prosecution of persons guilty of requisitioning machinery and materiel from France and Belgium.

The German plea against the prosecution of these persons is based on the first part of Article VI of the Armistice Convention of November 11. They make the claim that the French and Belgian Governments should stop those prosecutions that are now under way, and the judgments that have already been rendered should not be carried out, and that the German Government expects the prompt release of those who have been arrested for committing these offenses. They call attention to the legal steps taken by them calling upon all Germans to report machines which they have in their possession, these being the reports that are to go to the special committee now sitting at WIESBADEN which is to supervise the return of sequestered machinery.

* * * * *

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1218: Note

Prosecution of Persons Who Removed French and Belgian Machinery

[Contemporary Translation]

G. W. No. 215/11167

Spa, February 28, 1919.

From the Chairman of the German Armistice Commission

To the Chairman of the P. I. A. C.

On the occasion of the last negotiations at TREVES, Marshal Foch declared that he could give no orders concerning the release of arrested manufacturers, because he was not empowered to enter into questions of law.

It is questionable, therefore, whether such a statement would be sufficient to weaken the representations in the German Note of January 26, G. Q. No. 97/8140, according to which the French and Belgian courts had no jurisdiction at all over legal measures of punishment against German manufacturers according to principles of international law. In

any case the Allied and Associated Governments, by calling attention to the legal methods of their own lands cannot free themselves of the international obligation which is incumbent upon them according to Article VI, Paragraph 1, Sentence 2, of the Armistice Agreement. According to this regulation no one can be prosecuted because of his participation in war measures which preceded the signing of the Armistice Agreement by the commandeering of French and Belgian machinery and materiel, as well as the removal of machinery and iron construction are likewise to be considered as just such measures of war, whether they have served immediate use where found or have been transplanted to German war industries. They were caused by the blockade of Germany and they were ordered by the German Government and the German High Command of the Armies because they seemed to be essential for the further continuation of the war.

Manufacturers, promoters and workmen who took away or took over machinery or materiel of the aforementioned kinds, upon command of the German authorities, must, therefore, count as persons who took part in war measures in the sense of the Armistice conditions.

The German Commission allowed no doubt to exist but that the signification of Article VI, which was taken up in the Agreement in accordance with the German desire, should be applied exactly to cases of this kind. The statements which Marshal Foch made at the meeting of January 16, and the expression of opinion which was transmitted with the note of General Nudant of January 31, No. 3749, make it clear that he understood Article VI in the same sense. Accordingly the French and Belgian Governments have the international duty to see to it that no measures of punishment are applied to cases of the kind mentioned, that prosecution that is already started be stopped, and the judgments that have already been rendered be not carried out. In any case the German Government in accordance with Article VI of the Armistice Agreement can expect the immediate release of those arrested.

As had been already stated in the note of January 26, the German Government is ready to take legal measures on its own account against all persons who are suspected of having committed misdemeanors in connection with the prosecution of the measures of war above mentioned or upon any other occasion. The German Government, therefore, requests that the materials necessary for such action be transmitted to it and it pledges itself to make known to the Allied and Associated Government the results of its investigations.

The German Government at the same time calls attention to the fact that in its regulation of February 1, 1919, Government Laws Leaflet No. 28, severe punishment is threatened against those persons who do not do their duty in giving notice of machinery and materiel that has been carried off from France or Belgian, and that very soon a thoroughgoing regulation for the manner in which the notification is to be carried out will soon be promulgated.

In the interests of German subjects who remained in the occupied areas confident of the meaning of Article VI and relied upon the assurances of the German Government and who now are liable to the severe punishments by the courts of the occupying powers, the German Government requests urgent and unprejudiced study as well as immediate regulation of this thoroughly important question.

HAMMERSTEIN.

Access to Rhenish Factories

[Contemporary Translation]

General Staff
1st Section
3d Bureau
No. 1302

ALLIED GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,
February 28, 1919.

Marshal Foch, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies (D. G. C. R. A.)

To the Marshal, Commander-in-Chief of the French Armies

It is reported that the supervisors of the Industrial Service are experiencing difficulty in fulfilling their mission in the Rhenish factories, particularly those of the Badische Company at LUDWIGSHAFEN.

1st - I ask that you give orders to the commanders of the Armies of Occupation to give all facilities to the supervisors of the Industrial Service for the accomplishment of their mission.

2d - The supervisors should have access, without any formalities, freely and at all times, to all parts of the factories. In case of refusal or of ill feeling on the part of the employes of the factory to giving them access under the conditions above indicated, the Army commanders will open the doors of the factory and install there a post of police with sentinels to assure free circulation throughout.

WEYGAND.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1218: Letter

Delivery of Rolling Stock

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, February 28, 1919.

No. 87

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

* * * * *

4. Delivery of Rolling Stock: The Committee on Receipt of Rolling Stock reports that up to February 25, the following have been received:

Locomotives	4,752
Cars	137,795

For ALSACE-LORRAINE:

Cars	17,998
------	--------

* * * * *

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief.

Deliberations of Maintenance Subcommittee

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, ALLIED ARMIES,
February 28, 1919.

To: Asst. C. of S., G-4, G. H. Q., American E. F.

The subcommission under Article 9 of the Armistice met yesterday and today on orders from Marshal Foch at his headquarters. After lengthy arguments and apparant deadlock the British representatives, at the suggestion of their Government, proposed this morning, if all of the other Allies would agree, to accept the lowest daily cost of maintenance of any Allied soldier as the basis for all Armies. The Belgian representative immediately accepted, the French reported that the Chief of Staff was much interested, while I refused to commit my Government without advice from higher authority. The meeting then adjourned until Sunday, March 2, at 10 o'clock, to enable me to consult the American authorities. The general opinion is that this proposition will be immediately accepted by the other Governments in the event of our acceptance. The following facts leading up to the above proposition should be known by you in order that a decision may be reached. First, the subcommission on January 9, drew up and signed a Proces-Verbal [minutes] reporting the definition of the word Entretien as agreed upon. A copy of this Proces-Verbal was directed to be sent to Marshal Foch through the President of the Subcommittee and through the Armistice Commission. General Weygand stated that it had not reached his headquarters. A copy of it was delivered by me to you in person on January 13. It had been generally accepted as a fact by all of the representatives that Marshal Foch had approved this definition until a telegram was sent on February 21 stating that after an examination of the study made by the Subcommittee and with reference to the analogy with the Treaty of 1871 [between France and Germany] he conceived Entretien or maintenance included only food and cantonment [quarters] and that other expenses would be borne as expenses of war and he proposed a daily charge should be made for each army of five francs per day per man for food, one franc per day per man for bedding, straw, and other things of a similar kind connected with billeting, and five francs per day per horse for forage. He further asked that the delegates notify him by telegraph of any objections in principle which they had to his decision and which they would like to take up with him at the meeting of yesterday. I made the following objections. First, what was meant exactly by the first paragraph with reference to the other items being borne as expenses of war; and, second, where motor vehicles were substituted for horses, gasoline, etc., should be included in the costs. Other objections of a similar character were made by the various members. At the meeting yesterday the members of the Subcommittee were all strongly of the opinion that inasmuch as the definition agreed upon had been presented to the Germans by the President of the Subcommittee at the direction of the President of the Armistice Commission, and furthermore that this definition had been accepted by our respective Governments, that we did not feel authorized or willing to depart from it nor were we willing to accept a fixed price for certain articles and not for others. We were finally invited by the Marshal to express our views in writing. The British and American views were substantially the same: That we felt the definition should be adhered to and that a bill for the entire sum be presented and as much collected as possible from time to time, and payments so made be divided pro rata among the various armies according to the cost to them of maintenance. This morning the British presented the proposition first above stated. In effect this will be a concession on the part of the French to us in the matter of maintaining the definition; and on the other hand they will get the exact cost of maintenance of their Armies. The British concede a fraction of a franc per man per day and we approximately 15 francs per man per day. The Belgians will practically be paid their price. I did not feel authorized to make a decision of this kind and asked an

adjournment until March 2 at which time I hope to have a reply. I recommend the adoption of the British proposition for practical reasons as it seems that would get at least five francs more per man than under the opinion reached tentatively by the Marshal, and further our definition of Entretien would be maintained; finally, there is justice in fixing the price for maintaining a soldier of the largest army as the price for all. Also as the cost of the other three is so nearly the same it seems to me fairer and more advisable that we come to their figures rather than strike an average.

JOHN A. CUTCHINS,
Major, G. S.

AGO, GHQ, AEF: 20376-A-855: Minutes

Payment of Requisitions

REPORT ON ADMINISTRATION CONFERENCE AT LAMORLAYE

February 28, 1919.

MATTERS DISCUSSED

[Extract]

Payment of Requisitions:

General Payot opened the discussion with a statement of the action taken following the Interallied Conference of January 21, when it had been made known to the Germans through the International Commission at SPA that the German Government would be held responsible for the payment of Allied requisitions and would be required to submit cancelled vouchers at stated intervals to the Allied Armies to evidence payment. He then stated that since this time the American Army had put forward a proposition to pay these requisitions directly with money to be received from the central German Government and he stated that the French Army was in agreement with this view. The Belgian delegate signified his assent to adopting it, upon hearing the reasons of the Americans and the French. The British representatives signified their unwillingness to adopt the system and a long discussion followed.

The main points of the British were:

- (1) If the payment by the Armies was undertaken a large personnel of clerks would be needed to carry it out.
- (2) That the payment of the requisitions would inevitably be delayed by this method.
- (3) That it had been the custom of the British Army to proceed in the present method of having the occupied Government pay its citizens at all times.

General Smith then argued the question from the American point of view and General Payot did likewise.

General Payot then pointed out that the whole question of requisitions subdivided itself into four phases, upon the last two of which only was there a disagreement.

- 1st: The form of the order of requisition.
- 2d: The form of receipt.
On these two points there is unanimity.
- 3d: The establishment of the price for the commodity requisitioned.
- 4th: The method of payment of that price.

Considerable discussion ensued as to the method of establishment of the price and the different classes of articles which might properly be made subject to the requisition, as being articles with which the German Govt. could properly be charged. Discussion was then had on the fourth point. i. e., payment of the prices, in which the main issue arose between the British representatives and the other representatives. General Smith pointed out that the Americans, in the great majority of cases, intended to pay the prices to the municipal authorities through whom the requisitions were made, and not to the individuals furnishing the property or commodity, except in the case in which direct requisition had been made on the individuals. At the conclusion of the discussion the following points were decided upon unanimously:

1st: The prices of the articles or commodity are to be fixed by local commissions in each zone headed by an officer, and controlled by the local Army commanders.

2d: The prices thus established locally by the Army commanders through the above commissions are to be forwarded to the Interallied Headquarters (D. G. C. R. A.), LAMORLAYE, on the 1st of each month for the preceding month. The Interallied Headquarters will establish an average list of prices and circulate this list among the Allied Armies as a matter of information.

3d: Each Army is at liberty to proceed in the actual payment of the requisitions in its own chosen manner.

* * * * *

L. H. PAUL CHAPIN,
Captain, G. S.

(The above prepared by Captain Chapin is an accurate statement of the proceedings.)

H. A. SMITH,
Brig. Gen.

G-3, GHQ, AEF, Fldr. 1219: Note

Repatriation of German Specialists

[Contemporary Translation]

German Wako
Subcommittee, P. W.
No. 558-2.19.U-Wako. [12181]

Spa, February 28, 1919.

From General von Hammerstein

To General Nudant

Concerning:

- (1) Permission for return home of active sanitary officers left in occupied zone.
- (2) Correspondence between nurses and their headquarters houses in the occupied zone and vice versa.
- (3) Correspondence with wounded and sick in occupied zone and vice versa.

Request answer to Note No. 375-1.10.U-Wako No. 7154, of January 26, 1919.

To Paragraph 1 of the note it is remarked that among the doctors left behind in the occupied zone there are a great number of specialists whose capacities are not being used in consequence of work not suited to them.

Aside from the fact that the joy in their work and their further development is bound to suffer in consequence of their lack of occupation, I request that consideration be taken of the fact that a great number of physicians are needed in Germany for the care of numerous wounded and sick soldiers and prisoners. Their useless retention appears to be not merely a hardship upon the physicians who remained behind in the service of humanity, but it also works a hardship upon the already heavy lot of the soldiers wounded in their fight for the Fatherland.

Under Paragraph 2 to the request concerning nurses whose unselfish and sacrificing activities in behalf of friend and foe is beyond praise, I have nothing to add.

HAMMERSTEIN.

G-1, GHQ, AEF: File 383.6: Fldr. 6: Telegram

American Prisoners not Judicially Punished

Spa, Belgium, Mar. 1, 1919--6 p. m.

Asst. Chief Staff, G-1, G. H. Q., A. E. F.

No. 626. Following telegram from Harries, BERLIN, repeated:
"No. P-562. Ref. your No. 5049-G-1. The German War Office has notified me that it has completed an examination of the lists of Allied prisoners who were judicially tried and has thereby ascertained that no American prisoner of war was ever judicially punished while in German hands."

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier-General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1219: Letter

Maintenance of the Armies of Occupation

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, March 1, 1919.

No. 88

FROM: Chief

TO: Commander-in-Chief, American, E. F.

[Extract]

* * * * *

6. Construction to be Placed Upon the Word Entretien: General Barnum sent to General Nudant, the President of the Interallied Armistice Commission, the following letter: "I am directed by the Commander-in-Chief of the American Armies to inform the Armistice Commission that he is not prepared at present and without further consideration to adopt the construction placed upon the word Entretien in the Armistice, by the Interallied Command, but that he will give notification of his views a little later."

This letter was not read at the meeting of the Mission as, of course, it is not desired to give any information to the Germans of any differences of view held by the different Allies on this question.

* * * * *

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier-General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1219: Letter

Provisioning Germany

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, March 1, 1919.

No. 88

FROM: Chief

TO: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

1. French Mission to be Sent to BERLIN: General Nudant notified the Chief of the German Armistice Section that in accordance with instructions received by Marshal Foch, the French Government had decided to send a mission to BERLIN for the purpose of getting information with a view to eventually provisioning Germany. This mission is entrusted to Mr. Haguerrin, accompanied by four or five collaborators, who will go to BERLIN by way of Switzerland. General Nudant requested that the German Government be notified.

Later in the morning General von Hammerstein protested against this method of procedure, stating that if Germany had been informed that it had been decided to send a mission, the question should then have been asked as to whether such a mission would be welcome by Germany.

To the protest General Nudant stated that he considered that they must recognize in this note the manner of expression of a soldier and not that of a diplomat. This was quite a happy form of reply to make and was accepted by General von Hammerstein without further remark.

* * * * *

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier-General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section.

Supplementary Clauses Proposed by Germans

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, March 1, 1919.

No. 88

FROM: Chief

TO: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

* * * * *

5. Proposed Supplementary Clauses to the Armistice: General von Hammerstein called attention to the fact that in the negotiations of TREVES, on February 16, Minister Erzberger proposed the following supplementary clauses which should be inserted in the agreement proposed by Marshal Foch. As the Chiefs of the Allied and Associated Governments have laid down the above mentioned conditions and Marshal Foch is not in a position to alter them or to extend them, Marshal Foch stated that he was willing to submit to the Allied and Associated Governments as soon as possible for a decision the German proposal for the extension of the Armistice Agreement as laid down in the letter of Minister Erzberger, dated February 15, 1919.

This included the following: With reference to Article IV, immediate release of civilian prisoners of war. Article V, exemption from punishment of Germans for buying machinery and materiel in occupied territory. Article VI, putting into service of several German warships to support the fighting against Bolsheviks. Article VII, free passage for coastal shipping. Article VIII, guarantee that the German population of ALSACE and LORRAINE should have their rights. Article IX, free circulation between the occupied and unoccupied territories. Article X, low assessment of the charges of maintenance for the Armies of Occupation.

Marshall Foch declined to insert these supplementary clauses in agreement but stated that he was ready to submit the German proposals to the Allied and Associated Governments for consideration. In view of these facts the German Armistice Commission requested an answer from the Allied and Associated Governments regarding the above mentioned German proposals.

* * * * *

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier-General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section.

Complaints on Treatment of Germans

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, March 1, 1919.

No. 88

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

* * * * *

3. Protest Against Unfounded Complaints: General Nudant called attention of the Germans to the fact that recently there had been a number of complaints brought forward which upon investigation were found to be entirely without foundation. He called upon the Germans to make careful investigations of all cases before presenting the cases to the Armistice Commission. * * *

Replying to the above General von Hammerstein stated that he receives a large number of these complaints, * * * that he divides them into three classes: The first, sworn statements which he was bound to consider as reliable; the hearsay, --- which appear reliable, and; third, those which he considered improbable. He called attention to the fact that the first class of complaints he was bound to take note of and forward, of the second class he acted on only those which seemed probable and in which complaint would be justifiable. That of the third class he took no action.

General Nudant answered by saying that the commanders of the Armies and Groups of Armies complain that they have to waste much of their time in investigating cases which come under the second class, and that he would not consider them in future. General Nudant, therefore, announced that in future they would consider only complaints of the first class, although he added that if there seemed to be cases of the second class of special merit that they would also be investigated.

* * * * *

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier-General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section.

Provisioning Germany

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, March 2, 1919.

No. 89

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American, E. F.

[Extract]

1. Meeting of the Committee for Provisioning Germany: General Nudant stated that in accordance with telegraphic instructions received from Marshal Foch, delegates of the Allies for the Committee on Finance and Provisions who are to take part in the meeting in which will be discussed points of Article VIII of the Armistice Agreement of January 16 which have been left in suspense, will arrive at SPA on Tuesday, March 4 in the afternoon. He announced that the first meeting of the Committee considering this subject will take place on Tuesday at six o'clock in the afternoon.

* * * * *

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1219: Letter

Delivery of Agricultural Implements

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, March 2, 1919.

No. 89

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

* * * * *

4. Deliveries of Agricultural Implements: The attention of the Germans was called to the fact that according to the terms of the Armistice Agreement of January 13, 1919, the German Government is obliged to deliver before March 1, 1919, 31,204 agricultural implements representing values of 21,000,000 marks. On March 1, the receiving stations have not received more than 577 machines representing a value of 4,300,000 marks. Materiel arrives at these stations now in accordance with the terms of the protocol, but in separate cars which renders particularly difficult the sending of these machines to their destinations.

Whatever may be the reasons which the Germans authorities allege for such a consider-

able delay in deliveries, they are inadmissible, and reservation is made as to penalties which may be inflicted upon the German Government on account of the failure to comply with the terms of the protocol.

To the foregoing the Chairman of the German Armistice Commission replied that yesterday he received a communication from the officials entrusted with the duties of carrying out these measures. The Germans have done everything they can in this matter and regret the delays which have occurred. They claim that the delays have been due to the troubles arising as regards traffic which have been caused by the strikes and by revolutionary movements which have taken on a very serious aspect lately in Germany. It is a case of forced measures against which the German Government is at present powerless.

According to information received at several large railroad junctions such as ERFURT and HALLE, the rails have even been taken up in order to break communication. As a part of these communications have been restored, it is hoped that deliveries of agricultural implements will run more smoothly in the future and the German Government will do all in its power to accomplish this.

* * * * *

5. Shipments of Coal to the Railway System of the RHINE: General Nudant presented a note stating that on February 21, "I pointed out the disturbing decrease of sending coal to the depots of the railway system of the RHINE and ask that you might intervene in order to better this situation. Now, the President of the Interallied Commission for Railways sends me word today that not only has no betterment been brought about in this condition of affairs, but further that for several days shipments have entirely ceased. There are no longer in these depots at the present date, (of the first of March 1919) but a six days' supply of coal. I beg you again to intercede with the German Government in order that they may conform without delay to the requirements of Par. 7 of the Armistice Agreement of November 11, which imposed upon the Germans the duty of keeping up with shipments of coal and exploitation of the railways of communication for the west bank of the RHINE."

To this Minister von Haniel on behalf of the German Government replied as follows:

"As General Nudant perhaps knows, there has lately been a great deal of unrest in the RHENISH-WESTPHALIAN area. This has resulted in the Bolshevist element getting the upper hand there. They have forced the men who wanted to work to cease working. The result is that at nearly all the pits work had to be stopped. Naturally, as a consequence of this the coal center of that area could no longer be sent either to the occupied portion of Germany or to the remainder of Germany. It is only within the last few days that the Government has been able to, by force of arms to restore quiet in this area, and it is hoped that coal will be able to be sent again. I will not fail to draw particular attention of the German Government to this point."

* * * * *

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section.

Delivery of Rolling Stock

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, March 2, 1919.

No. 89

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

6. Receipts of Rolling Stock: The Committee on Transportation reports the following receipt of rolling stock up to and including February 27:

Locomotives	4,785	(96%)
Cars	138,577	(92%)

For ALSACE-LORRAINE:

Cars	18,665	(98%)
------	--------	-------

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section.

Delivery of Rolling Stock

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, March 3, 1919.

No. 90

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American, E. F.

[Extract]

6. Report of Committee on Rolling Stock: This Committee makes the following report of rolling stock received, up to and including March 1, 1919:

Locomotives	4,814	(96%)
Cars	139,016	(93%)

For ALSACE-LORRAINE:

Cars	19,159	(100%)
------	--------	--------

The Committee reports that from an examination of the records of the ALACE-LORRAINE lines, it has been determined that 17,955 cars should have been returned to these lines, instead of the number 19,021 cars which was the number originally calculated. German cars will, therefore, be returned to the Germans on account of the excess of the cars delivered by them above 17,955.

As the total amount of cars for ALSACE-LORRAINE lines has been delivered, figures for the delivery will be discontinued in the reports showing progress of delivery of rolling stock.

* * * * *

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section.

G-4, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 107: Memorandum

Judge Advocate's Opinion on Maintenance

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,
JUDGE ADVOCATE'S OFFICE,
March 3, 1919.

MEMORANDUM: For the Chief of Staff

1. The accompanying papers present a question of policy and not of law. We are not in a good position to argue with Marshal Foch as to the proper interpretation of the word *entretien*, which belongs to his language and not ours; and whether his interpretation of it be right or not, we are not bound to adhere to the original terms of the Armistice since those terms may be, as indeed they are, amended by subsequent Armistice Agreements.

2. Whatever interpretation may be agreed upon as to the word *entretien* and whatever loss may result to the United States therefrom may be remedied, if the United States Government is not satisfied, by the final terms of the Peace Agreement, which will settle all financial questions as between the United States and Germany growing out of this war.

3. For the present, harmonious action and agreement among the Allies is more important than the cost of maintenance of our Army. Any reasonable arrangements which the other Allies are willing to make should be agreed to by us. I think the one that is here proposed is reasonable and that we should agree to it, if the other Allies are willing to do so. So long as a condition of war lasts, the maintenance of our Armies is a war expense. We do not expect to get more than the smallest fraction of our war expense paid by Germany, and we should subordinate the question of this item of war expense to the matter of Allied cooperation.

W. A. BETHEL,
Brigadier General, Judge Advocate.

Communications for Interallied Missions at Berlin

[Contemporary Translation]

PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION.

No. 576/T

Spa, March 3, 1919.

From: President of the P. I. A. C.

To: President of Wako

The Marshal, Commander-in-Chief, of the Allied Armies, writes as follows: under date of February 27, No. 4859/Radio:

The number of Allied and Interallied Missions at BERLIN whose duty it is to supervise the carrying out of the different clauses of the Armistice, military, economic, food, etc., is being constantly increased.

It is probable that before the signature of the Preliminaries of Peace this situation will become still more accentuated. Especially is the service of food supply destined to increase considerably.

For the satisfactory functioning of these different missions it is most desirable that international satisfactory communications by telephone and telegraph be established between BERLIN and the left bank of the RHINE, and that these communications be under the exclusive care of personnel responsible to the Allied Governments.

The best method to insure good communications without disturbing the functioning of the German network consists in setting aside for this specific purpose a certain number of international lines and circuits which were in existence before the war.

I, therefore, beg you to ask the German representatives to take steps to secure the authorization:

(a) To set aside for the special service of the Allies a certain number of telegraph lines and telephone circuits.

(b) To install at BERLIN an interallied central to which these specialized wires should connect, as well as the lines connecting with the offices of the different Allied Missions at BERLIN. This central would be maintained by Interallied military personnel; the situation there would be similar to that at the German Central at SPA.

I ask you, likewise, to emphasize in the minds of the German representatives the general interest that these communications would present.

Inasmuch as the situation in Poland, as well as in Bohemia is analagous to that which exists in Germany there is reason to look forward to the establishment at an early date of good connections between France at the one end and WARSAW and PRAGUE at the other. Now, the main telegraphic arteries that connect these points pass through Germany. It would, therefore be necessary to set aside a certain number for the service of the Allies in all those portions that lie in German territory.

If the German representatives are agreed to the principle of setting aside certain lines and setting up a central station at BERLIN, the next proper step would be to call together at SPA, German and Allied technical experts for the purpose of working out the details of this project. It would be of most urgent importance to have such a meeting take place as soon as possible.

Capture of German Steamer

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, March 3, 1919.

No. 90

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

4. Capture of German Boat in the Baltic: Colonel von Mueller, representing the German Armistice Commission (during the temporary absence of General von Hammerstein) presented a note to the effect that the French destroyer *Obusier* has captured the German steamer *Pluto* in the Baltic. The steamer *Pluto* was sailing in connection with the transportation of materiel in the interest of demobilization. She had a complete, accurate pass on board and carried prescribed identification marks. The steamer *Pluto* thus carried out the conditions laid down by the Associated Governments, and its capture is thus illegal. He raised a formal protest against the capture of this steamer.

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section.

Work of Committee on Return of Industrial Machinery

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, March 3, 1919.

No. 90

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

7. Report from Committee on Return of Machinery to France and Belgium: Captain Griffith, the American Representative on this Committee, was sent to WIESBADEN about a week ago in order to keep me informed of the work being done. He was directed to make frequent reports, but until today nothing had been heard from him.

This afternoon he called up by telephone from COBLENZ, and when asked about his reports he stated that he had made several during the time that he had been there, which he has forwarded by French courier service. None of them has yet reached here, but I suppose they will in the course of time.

He stated that the Committee for the Return of Machinery is busy at work and that he has himself been assigned considerable work in this connection. He was directed to make another report covering his work since he has been there and to send it in through American sources, via TREVES.

* * * * *

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section.

Supreme War Council Fldr. 298: Report

Transport of German Troops by Sea

Annexure B
to
S. W. C.
384

NAVAL AND MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES,
SUPREME WAR COUNCIL,
Versailles, March 3, 1919.

REPORT
ON THE QUESTION OF PERMITTING TRANSPORT BY SEA OF GERMAN TROOPS
TO EAST PRUSSIA AND TO LATVIA

(In execution of the decision of the Supreme War Council of 17.2.19).

The Naval and Military Representatives of the Supreme War Council,

AFTER TAKING COGNIZANCE:

A. Of the request of the German Government for:
Free passage by sea between German ports in the west and ports of the eastern shores of the Baltic for ships carrying troops, military stores and coal, in order to continue the struggle against the Bolsheviks on the frontiers of East Prussia and in Latvia;

B. Of the opinion expressed by the Blockade Committee at their meeting of February 24 to the effect that the naval and military representatives on the Supreme War Council were alone competent to express an opinion;

CONSIDERING FURTHER:

(a) That the request of the German Government described above is contrary to Articles 12 and 13 of the Armistice Convention concluded on November 11, 1918, with Germany;

(b) That Marshal Foch has already, on several occasions, refused to comply with a German demand for the rearming of certain naval units, notably on January 24, 1919, and on February 13, and that a similar refusal was made by the Naval Armistice Commission;

(c) That the authorization for the Government of Germany to transport troops and material beyond the prewar frontiers of Germany would lead to the sanctioning of cooperation, in a common struggle against the Bolsheviks, of German forces on the one hand and of Russian contingents on the other, for whose upkeep and supply the Allies will be answerable;

That from this state of things might arise claims made by the German Government and even discussions with that Government likely to impede the work of the Peace Conference;

(d) That the Germans have already attempted to reestablish commercial relations in the Baltic, contrary to all the rules of the Blockade and specially to Article 8 of the Armistice Convention of January 16 last, which provides for the delivery to the Allies of the whole German Commercial Fleet for use in revictualling Europe;

THE NAVAL AND MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES ARE OF OPINION:

1. That there is no ground for granting the German request to transport troops and supplies in the Baltic from west to east;
2. That the blockade of Germany should be maintained in full force as at present in the Baltic;
3. That in order to prevent the Germans from representing this denial as an abandonment by the Allies of the Baltic Provinces to the mercy of Bolshevism, it is urgently necessary to examine the question of furnishing support to such local contingents as may be in a position to resist the Bolshevik troops.

FRANCE:

GENERAL BELIN,
Military Representative

de BON,
Naval Representative

GREAT BRITAIN:

C. SACKVILLE-WEST, M. G.,
Military Representative

R. E. WEMYSS,
Naval Representative

ITALY:

UGO CAVALLERO,
Military Representative

M. GRASSI,
Naval Representative

AMERICA:

P. D. LOCHRIDGE,
Military Representative

W. S. BENSON, Admiral,
Naval Representative

JAPAN:

I. TAKESHITA,
Naval Representative

Disturbances in Silesia

[Contemporary Translation]

WAKO No. 12476

Spa, March 3, 1919.

Chairman, German Armistice Commission

To President of P. I. A. C.

[Extract]

Numerous communications go to show that the danger seems imminent now of a Czech or Polish attack against the Province of Silesia.

* * * * *

Even in the case of the Polish part of the populace the national incitement has not succeeded in animating them to tear themselves apart from the German Government under whom they have always been economically successful. Inasmuch as the Poles recognize this they put every means into play to increase by means of Bolshevist activity the disturbances that have been brought on by the revolution. There is a Central Office for this purpose in Czenstochowa (Russian Poland) conducted by a certain Tannenbaum. Bolshevist agents well provided with Polish and Russian money are smuggled across the border, Polish aviators drop leaflets onto German Silesia territory, etc.

Whether the Poles are hoping to make the outbreak of disturbances a pretext for entering the country or whether a Polish attack, perhaps in connection with the Czechs, have brought these disturbances to the point of breaking out, cannot be accurately determined. However, the situation is extremely serious and is beginning to seriously disquiet the population. This is all the more serious because it has been definitely determined that the Czechs have concentrated strong military resources against the western boundary of German Silesia, while the Poles at the same time, since they have been relieved of military necessities in POSEN by the establishment of the boundary of demarkation have their resources on the eastern boundary of Silesia.

* * * * *

Impending Revolution in Germany

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, March 3, 1919.

No. 90

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

* * * * *

8. Conditions in Germany: A personal letter received from General Harries this morning, dated February 28, states that there is great probability of a general strike of workmen in all industries not later than Sunday or Monday (yesterday or today). The letter goes on to state that the strike is not for increase of wages or decreased hours of labor; it is a defensive measure. The workmen allege that their employers are holding back and concealing raw material which would give employment to a large number of men now idle. Also the Government is to be forced to give place in the new Constitution to some things which the workmen insist shall be in that document. Unless Providence intervenes, the second revolution is likely to be in full blast not later than Monday. It may be a very interesting revolution because an exceedingly large percentage of these workmen are armed.

He also adds that the number of applications from German officers and noncommissioned officers for employment in our military service continues.

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1219: Letter

Return of Industrial Machinery

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, March 4, 1919.

No. 91

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

* * * * *

7. Work of Committee on Return of Machinery to France and Belgium:
Referring to my Secret Report Number 90, Par. 7, the reports referred to therein, which have been made by Captain Griffith, our representative on this Committee, have been received today.

Mr. Lefevre (French) is President of the C. R. I. (Commission de Restitution

Industrielle), having received his appointment from Marshal Foch. According to this report, he looks to Marshal Foch merely for military support, having all his business transactions with the Service of Industrial Reconstruction in PARIS and with the economic commissions in LUXEMBURG and MAYENCE.

The Belgian representative is Major Messens, who participated in the negotiations at SPA. The British have no representative.

This Committee, having in charge the return of materiel, has decided to give the widest possible interpretation to the word materiel. The definition which they have given is that it includes everything taken away from the factories, except, in general, raw material. It may, however, be stretched to include certain of these materiels when they can be identified in Germany. It excludes, however, raw materials such as steel, iron, etc., which, because of the difficulty of identification, the probability of their subsequent transformation, and the difficulty of transferring them, makes their restitution at present of relatively small value to the Allies. Materiel will also include all machines, accessories, tools, etc.

It has not yet been determined how far the C. R. I. will undertake to make arrangements for replacing machines by equivalent machines where the former cannot be found or where it has been destroyed.

There will undoubtedly arise cases to be adjusted by the Committee such as the following:

The French manufacturer is in a position where he cannot begin again his industry as before the war, even though the machines taken from him were at his disposal. It is obviously to his advantage to leave them where they are as it is to that of the German manufacturer who is still using them, if a money consideration could be concluded satisfactory to both sides.

Another case would arise where the French manufacturer would want his machines returned, but owing to the fact of having to rebuild his factory he could make no use of them for at least a year. The German manufacturer having these machines would be willing to share profits if permitted to retain them during this time.

It has been estimated that the amount of this machinery will reach 300,000 tons and will require a year for its return.

Mr. Lefevre is of the opinion that there will be nearer 500,000 tons and that it will require two years for its return.

It is hoped, however, that the bulk of it will have been shipped or will have been stored in depots near the frontiers within eight months.

Both the French and Belgian representatives are anxious to begin shipments in the near future. They say that public opinion, especially among the manufacturers in Belgium, is becoming very insistent. Some are even demanding the right to go and get their machines. Consequently, immediate steps are being taken for the immediate shipment of a train load belonging to the five LILLE works, which machines are now near FRANKFORT. There are some fifteen hundred of these and Major Messens is now inspecting them with a view to their early return.

Mr. Guggenheimer, the German representative, states that the work of locating and cataloguing French and Belgian machinery in Germany is progressing as well as could be expected. Slips reporting machines are already reaching FRANKFORT, and a preliminary report will be submitted to the Committee within the next week.

It will be recalled that in one of my previous reports I stated that the German authorities had issued a decree imposing a penalty of ten thousand marks fine and imprisonment for one year for failure to make report of machines now in the hands of the Germans.

One difficulty of locating machines will arise from the fact that many have been shipped out of the country. Documents are at hand proving conclusively that Germans with such machinery in their possession were even given semi-official assistance in getting them shipped to Holland, for instance.

One factory where there is much French machinery is the electrical works [manufacturing plant of the] A. E. G. [Corporation], in STEINFORT [LUXEMBURG]. Here the Germans assembled machinery representing forty million francs in requisition receipts and of a real value probably equal to twice this amount. It is believed that this figure is large enough to give the French a controlling interest in this factory.

The offices for handling this work, which are being organized by Mr. Lefevre in WIESBADEN, will contain many hundreds of employees when in full operation. The work of this Committee is going to be very extensive, and as shown above, is liable to extend over a period of two years.

Our interest is so remote that I see no purpose in keeping our representative there much longer. It is easy to see that the longer he remains the more deeply he becomes involved in the organization. Already the French have called upon me to furnish him an automobile, which request was not granted.

I cannot see that this work is of any military value to us. If it has commercial value, I believe that civilian expert in this line of work should be assigned to the Committee with a view to remaining with it one year or two, as may be necessary.

I feel that our representative from here should be recalled in the near future for the two reasons: First, that his services are not of importance with that committee; and, second, because his services are needed here I shall, therefore, recall him in the near future.

If the Commander-in-Chief feels that it is desirable to keep some touch between the Armistice Commission and this special Committee, I can send this officer to WIESBADEN from time to time for the purpose of securing general information.

I shall be glad to have instructions in this matter.

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1219: Letter

Traffic Across the Rhine

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, March 4, 1919.

No. 91

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American, E. F.

[Extract]

4. Communication between the Right and Left Banks of the Rhine: Minister von Haniel, on behalf of the German Government, presented a note concerning the delivery of a certain article of machinery belonging to a German firm.

He added that: "Owing to this piece of machinery being away, the steel mill is not working. This puts about ten thousand workmen out of employment. It will, however, lead to a great crippling of industry, because a large number of other industries depend upon this steel being delivered and would also be forced to dismiss many of their employees. I should like to draw attention again in this

connection to the great interdependence between the right and left banks of the RHINE in the matter of the economic relations. By these two districts being separated from one another, German industry is being severely crippled, and owing to the dismissal of employees the danger of Bolshevism is ever growing. I, therefore, request that traffic between these two districts may be permitted as far as it is possibly consistent with military considerations.

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1219: Note

Disturbances at Libau, Bolshevist Gains

[Contemporary Translation]

GERMAN ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, March 4, 1919.

WAKO No. 12427

Colonel von Mueller

To General Nudant

[Extract]

By direction of German G. H. Q., I have the honor to state the following:

1. In answer to note Lieut. General Haking, A. C. No. 983 of February 18, concerning the sinking of arms and munitions at LIBAU.

In December 1918, 500 rifles were delivered by the British to the LIBAU City authorities. The Latvian companies armed with these weapons, had to be dissolved in January because they declared themselves Bolshevists. The arms and munitions taken from them were sheltered under a shed. On occasion of a labor uprising the masses tried to storm the shed. Only through personal interference of the German Governor were the weapons saved, the munitions were thrown into the sea by the Populists partly also by us in order to save them from the hands of the uprisers.

2. In connection with this the following incident is brought to your attention. In February, 1919, there were given out from a British ship 5,000 rifles to the Latvian Government. The entire forces of the Latvians who were opposing the Soviets consist of a few hundred men. Any further arming of the population gives them the desired means of working hand in hand with the Bolshevists. Already the most reliable Soviet troops are known to be Latvian regiments. The British ship itself, had to leave the quay and anchor in the outer harbor, and further post watches in order to guard itself against being stormed by the Latvian Populists. The German Corps Staff has, in this matter, reached an agreement with the Latvian Government that weapons are to be given out only with the consent of German military authorities.

3. Answer to the notes of Lieut. General Haking, A. C. 1094 of February 26 and A. C. 1120 of February 28 concerning German censorship and cable guard in LIBAU.

There exists a telegraphic censor in LIBAU only for private telegrams, the Latvian authorities being accorded further the use of the Latvian language in telephone conversation. The removal of the censorship is not possible in consideration of the fact that 60% of the Latvian population are Bolshevist sympathizers. On the other hand, it is desirable that a British liaison officer be sent to the German Corps Staff at LIBAU in

order that the British authorities may receive more correct news concerning affairs in LIBAU.

4. According to announcement of the marine officer the following decision of the Interallied Marine Armistice Commission has been made:

The sailing of ships *Hannover, Cassel, Schleswig, Badenia, Bjorn* and *Lena* with reinforcements for LIBAU is for the present not admissable. The matter is being considered in council with the Allied Powers. The above named ships fall under Article VIII of the Agreement of January 16, according to which they are to be held in readiness along with the other German passenger ships.

Concerning these four points the following is to be said:

The situation in the east, especially in Courland and Lithuania is terribly serious. The successes of the Soviet troops in the north and south of Russia have given the Soviet Minister, Trotski the chance to withdraw strong forces from these fronts to be used against the Poles, Lithuanians and Germans. A large offensive of the Red troops is announced for the spring. Heavy preliminary struggles are already under way. It is improbable that the Poles can ward off heavy attacks, the Lithuanian troops are unreliable and the Germans extraordinarily weak.

Behind our front Bolshevism is spreading more and more from day to day. A large number of the Latvians are ready to go over to Bolshevism. Attacks on the railroads and on the telephone connections are the order of the day. In East Prussia Bolshevik propaganda is taking root to an alarming extent.

Under these circumstances the Allies who clearly have not seized the seriousness of the situation, although their Governments demand of us that we oppose Bolshevism in the east, are striving to hinder us in execution of effective military measures. By holding up our transports, by incomprehensible interference and instructions the Allies are thus making impossible for us the last struggle in behalf of European culture, a struggle in which they are not taking any part.

The German G. H. Q., therefore, lays before the Allied and Associated Governments the plain question whether they are further interested in an opposition to Bolshevism by our troops or not. If not then it is better for us to use our small strength in the interior of the Empire. If they are so interested then they must assume finally a more cooperative attitude toward us if our struggle is not to be doomed *ab initio*, to failure

* * * * *

ROLF BRANDT.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1219: Letter

Disturbances in Poland and the Baltic Provinces

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, March 4, 1919.

No. 91

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

* * * * *

2. Czechoslovak or Polish Activity against the Province of Silesia: The Germans

presented a note * * * calling attention to the demonstrations that are being made along the Silesian border, which according to their judgment constitutes a threatened attack from either Poland or Czechoslovakia. They claim that the population of Silesia is overwhelmingly German, but that demonstrations or the activity of the Bolsheviks may cause serious disturbances there. It states that according to the previous attitude of the Allied and Associated Governments they consider that no warlike disturbance is to be permitted. They, therefore, call the attention of the Allied and Associated Governments to the serious conditions existing and make the suggestion that Allied officers in Warsaw and Prague be notified to take energetic measures against all military or Bolshevik activity against German territory.

General Nudant replied that he did not understand this note. He stated that according to the last two paragraphs it appears that the German Government fears that the Allied Commissions at WARSAW and PRAGUE are causing unrests and disturbances. Nothing supports this conception of the Germans, for all the measures that have been taken by the Allies in those districts are for the sole purpose of assuring order and maintaining it, and until now the success has not been bad. The Allied Governments are so interested in maintaining order in these regions that they have not only sent commissions there, but they have in mind sending garrisons there.

Colonel von Mueller, on behalf of the Germans, replied that he thought there was a misunderstanding as to the intention of the German note. That they have not doubted the desire of the Allied and Associated Governments to preserve order in those districts, but that the news from this region has recently been of such a disturbing character that they ask for the support of the Allied and Associated Governments to put an end to the more recent disturbances which if not threatening attack are at least threatening Bolshevism.

3. Conditions in the Baltic Provinces: Colonel von Mueller handed over a note * * * except newspaper reports which cannot readily be reproduced and which are of no special importance, showing the conditions in the Baltic Provinces, which note is intended as an answer to several which had been sent to them by the Chief of the British Mission. It concerns the sinking of arms delivered by the British troops at LIBAU and the telegraphic censorship there.

The note further deals with the decision taken by the Allied Naval Armistice Commission forbidding the sale of certain ships which were bringing reinforcements to LIBAU. It provides to show the ever increasing danger presented in Poland and Lithuania from the troops of the Soviet Government. It further points out the danger accruing from the further spread of Bolshevism behind the German front among the Latvian and east Prussian populations.

Colonel von Mueller then put the question: "Are the Allied Governments still interested in our troops fighting against Bolshevik forces?"

Continuing, he said "If it was not recognized that it was in the interest of everybody that our troops should fight against Bolshevism there, it would be perhaps better for us to collect our weak forces and employ them in the interior of Germany. It is further probable that the interest in our troops fighting Bolshevism in the Baltic area is present and in that case we must request that we be aided by a more considerate attitude on the part of the subordinate Allied organizations, otherwise our fight would be hopeless from the start."

* * * * *

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section.

Disturbances in Silesia

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, March 5, 1919.

No. 92

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

* * * * *

6. Meeting of Allied Committee at Bromberg: Referring to the above subject, General Nudant in addressing the German Chairman stated:

That Committee, in connection with the German delegates, will work to the aim of making definite the boundary in that region, and in handling certain questions of detail that will be brought forth by the new situation. I have informed General Dupont, who is to go to that meeting, of the principal questions in view, - question of Silesia. I imagine that the German delegates who are going there from BERLIN have been informed by the German High Command of the fears that seem to be present of possible dangers in Silesia. Therefore, there is at hand and right on the spot a Commission that is empowered to treat this question, provided these questions are really there. I notified General Dupont, who by the way, new nothing of this affair. Perhaps you and your side could ask your German delegates to busy themselves on this question.

To the above Colonel von Mueller replied that the work of this Commission was known to them. They knew of General Dupont's activity and that it had had good results. That it was to the interest of all concerned that hostilities cease on the German eastern front.

He added that the reason they presented these reports was because wireless messages were being sent from WARSAW stating that the Germans were the aggressors on this front, and they wished to make emphatic denial of these reports.

* * * * *

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section.

Return of Industrial Machinery

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, March 5, 1919.

No. 92

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

* * * * *

9. Report from Committee on Return of Machinery: In addition to the information given in regard to the work of the Committee on return of machinery taken from northern France and Belgium, a further report has been received from our representative.

In this it is stated that the French, under Mr. Lefevre will have 100 engineers and administrative officers working on identification, classification, and restitution of this machinery. The Belgians are to have 10.

The Committee is of the opinion that the Germans have not as yet made the necessary effort to assure and facilitate the return of this machinery. They are insisting that assurances be given them that Germans having such machinery in their possession will not be prosecuted or molested and they seek the release of those already in jail.

This report adds that the first shipments of machinery are now being made and that the classification cards are being received.

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section.

AFG(O. C. C. A.): File 144-A-2: Fldr. 31: Addenda

Method of Searching for Industrial Machinery

[Contemporary Translation]

March 5, 1919.

INTERALLIED ECONOMIC COMMITTEE

INSTRUCTION No. 5

(Addenda to Instructions No. 2 on Factory Inspection)

To Chapter II (Official Inspections) add the following paragraph:

3d.---The inspection of French and Belgian manufactories, with a view to finding machinery removed from their factory by the German Government or German individuals.

Manufacturers desiring to make a search for their materiel will make a request to PARIS, to the Office of Industrial Restitution (14 Rue de la Tremoille), or to BRUSSELS. This request should state definitely the object and the itinerary of the journey.

The PARIS and BRUSSELS offices will deliver the necessary permits to the party concerned for him to report to the Economic Section (Industrial Service) of the region in

which the factories to be inspected are located. This Economic Section will be advised of the inspection by the Central Service of Restitution at WIESBADEN. Whenever possible the inspector will be accompanied by an officer of the Industrial Service, who will call his attention to the following instructions which appear on his passport:

1st. It is forbidden to negotiate directly in any manner with the present holders of the materiel.

2d. It is forbidden to give directly, any order to the present holders of the materiel, and to leave with them any paper.

3d. All observations made should be forwarded through the Economic Section, to the WIESBADEN office, which is alone qualified to negotiate with the German Government.

To deal directly with the present holder may cause the responsibility of the German Government to be vitiated, and may give rise to difficulties and to grave frauds.

When the itinerary includes an inspection in nonoccupied Germany, the WIESBADEN office will forward the necessary passport to the Economic Section, which will give it to the party concerned.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1219: Note

Railways for Provisioning Prague Area

[Contemporary Translation]

PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, March 5, 1919.

No. 581/T

General Nudant

To President of Wako.

A study is being made to assure the provisioning of the neighborhood of PRAGUE. There is under consideration a daily transport of 3,000 tons from MANNHEIM to PRAGUE.

The following information has been asked of me to serve as a basis for this study:

1. What railways could be practically put to use on the general line MANNHEIM---WURTZBURG---NUREMBURG---PRAGUE?

2. For each of these lines, what would be:

(a) The maximum tonnage per train?

(b) The length of time for the trip between
MANNHEIM and PRAGUE?

3. How many trains per day and on which line could the German Government assure by its own means, account being taken of the length of time required for the return of the rolling stock?

4. In addition to the trains that could be used in conformance with the 3d paragraph, how many marches per line could be used to assure the passage of such trains as would be furnished by the Allied Governments?

Request is made that you furnish me as soon as possible with the different information here requested, principally that asked for in paragraphs 1 and 2.

The German-Polish Front

[Contemporary Translation]

Wako No. 0-12644

Spa, March 5, 1919.

From the Chairman of the German Armistice Commission

To the American Mission - General Malvern-Hill Barnum

According to a public telegram from WARSAW of the 25th of last month published in the *Demokratie Nouvelle* of the 27th of last month. Colonel Grove, the Chief of the American Food Commission in Poland telephones from POSEN that the Germans are continuing an active artillery fire along the entire front.

Against this statement of Colonel Grove, in case it should be given credence, protest must be entered, as it creates the impression that the Germans continued artillery fire with aggressive intention. As has already been made known by the varied protests entered by the Germans, the Poles have in no way adhered to the requirements of the Armistice Agreement, but on the contrary have continued their attacks against the German lines.

Especially noteworthy cases have been indicated in the notes that have been transmitted. Wherever the Germans have maintained artillery fire it was only for the purpose of defense.

I request, therefore, that information be sent to Colonel Grove that will correspond to the well-known character of the Polish announcements.

J. V. von MULLER.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1221: Note

Sale of Military Stores by Germans

[Contemporary Translation]

PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,

No. 592/G

Spa, March 5, 1919.

General Nudant

To General von Hammerstein

Marshal Foch writes the following, March 3, No. 1363:

Article VI of the Armistice Convention of November 11, 1918, stipulates that:

Military installations of every kind will be left intact; likewise, military stores, foodstuffs, ammunition, equipment which will have been carried away within the periods fixed for evacuation.

Insofar as stores are concerned, Article VI recognized therefore that the Germans had the right to carry away with them their military stores within the periods of evacuation determined upon, but did not authorize them in any way to sell these stores. Now, 2 telegrams at the present time in our possession give formal proof that the German Government ordered the sale of these stores, thus deliberately violating the engagements that they undertook through their representatives on November 11, 1918.

The first of these telegrams coming from Mr. Erzberger himself, dated BERLIN, November 26, 1918, and addressed to the Burgomaster of MAYENCE, authorizes the sale of military stores to the communities, to the cooperative stores and to individuals and brings out the fact at the end of the telegram that these sales can be proceeded with immediately.

The second, dated BERLIN, December 1, 1918, and addressed to the Quartermaster Department of the Army at FRANKFORT, specifies that "The German military administration has entire freedom to sell articles the transportation of which could not be cared for within the dates fixed for evacuation." He adds: "The only stores that must be given up are those that are still existing at the time of the arrival of the enemy troops of occupation." That is an undisguised invitation to see to it that everything disappears for which buyers could be found before the arrival of the Allied troops.

The violation of the clauses of the Armistice is thus clearly established, and I beg you to be good enough to formulate an immediate protest in this regard to the representatives of the German Government in the Commission over which you preside, notifying them that due note will be taken of this violation when it comes to a discussion of such compensations as are to be thought legitimate."

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1219: Letter

Delivery of Rolling Stock

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, March 5, 1919.

No. 92

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

8. Receipts of Rolling Stock: The Committee on the Receipt of Rolling Stock announces that up to March 2, there has been received:

Locomotives	4,834 (97%)
Cars	139,059 (93%)

It will be seen from these daily reports that the deliveries of rolling stock are nearing completion.

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section.

Nature of Demonstration in Berlin

Spa, Belgium, March 6, 1919.

Commander-in-Chief, G-1, G. H. Q.

Number 667. Reference article in Paris Edition Chicago Tribune showing extensive hostile demonstration against Americans in BERLIN, have just had telephone conversation with General Harries' aide, General Harries, himself not being available. I was informed that the demonstration was not at all serious, practically amounted to nothing, that conditions in BERLIN are fairly quiet, a few grenades being thrown last night and without a doubt some people killed, but this had no reference whatever to Americans.

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1219: Letter

French Domination of Commission

Spa, Belgium, March 6, 1919.

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief

1. The Allied Armistice Commission has worked up to date, and is still working, under the Allied High Command. It was natural that this should be so inasmuch as the Armistice was negotiated by that authority.

As long as the questions to be handled were military in character, this worked very successfully, but, of late, the character of the business being done has become more political, or economic, than it is military, most of the military conditions having been completed.

2. Up to the present the different Allied Governments represented here have not had equal opportunity to express their views or to have equal weight given to their views. The Germans present notes to the P. I. A. C., copies being furnished to each of the Allied Sections. These notes are handled by the President of the P. I. A. C. (General Nudant) direct with the Allied High Command and decisions are often announced which are not in accordance with the views of other Sections of the Commission. In the Councils of the Allied High Command it is believed that there are often no views represented other than those of the French.

3. It appears that the more the questions dealt with are political and economic, the wider is the divergence of view held by the different sections of this Commission.

4. The manner in which the question of supplying food to Germany has recently been handled illustrates the importance of having the view of each of the Allies given equal weight.

5. In my reports of today I have dwelt at some length on the details of the meeting of that Commission which has recently taken place here at SPA. That Commission will make its report to the proper authorities in PARIS, so the full proceedings will be known there, but I have dwelt upon it to some extent in my report as it is a question in which our military authorities are deeply interested and I feel that I must be their medium of information.

6. That Commission, on leaving PARIS, was given explicit instructions from the Allied High Command which tied their hands as far as any negotiations were concerned. They felt this quite keenly themselves, but considered they had no other recourse.

It has been a serious mistake that the supply of food for Germany was not definitely determined upon when that Commission was here. The requirements of Article XXVI of the Armistice of November 11, and of Article VIII of the Armistice Extension of January 16, called upon the Allies to supply this food. The time is near at hand when it will be urgently needed, and grave political consequences, and perhaps military consequences as well, are liable to follow the failure to arrive at a satisfactory conclusion.

7. In view of these facts, it is believed that the time has come when the P. I. A. C. should work along different lines. Each Allied Section should have an opportunity to express its views on questions of policy; in case the P. I. A. C. could not give definite answer, its recommendation should go to the Joint War Council for decision.

8. In a conversation which I had with the Chief of the British Section today he expressed the same view which I have voiced above and is making representations to that effect to his Government.

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1219: Letter

Provisioning Germany

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, March 6, 1919.

No. 93

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American, E. F.

[Extract]

* * * * *

2. Proceedings of the Allied Commission for Provisioning Germany; On Tuesday afternoon, March 4, the special train bearing the Allied Commissioners to arrange for provisioning Germany, arrived at SPA. There was a meeting with the Germans that evening at 6 o'clock, and another one yesterday morning at 11 a. m. Differences developed of a serious nature and in conversation with some of the American members of this Commission, last evening, I learned that they were quite disappointed at being obliged to come all the way here from PARIS with the restricted power of laying before the Germans but one condition. If the Germans did not accept this, they had no power to enter into negotiations looking to agreement along other lines. It was understood that the Allied High Command had laid down this one condition and limited them to presenting it to the Germans for acceptance.

Last evening, after the adjournment following their disagreement, the Germans consulted their Government at WEIMAR, and during the night the Government declined to accept this one condition. Thereupon, the special train bearing the Allied Commission left SPA about 3:30 a. m. to return to PARIS.

The one condition which the Commission was empowered to lay before the Germans was that the entire German Merchant Marine was to be turned over to the Allies. Following this, plans would be made for supplying Germany with 270,000 tons of foodstuffs and an additional 100,000 tons of Argentine grain.

3. Protest by Germans: The viewpoint held by the Germans and the grounds for failure to accept the condition of the Allies are set forth in a note from Minister von Haniel, received about noon today * * *

It will be noted from this letter that 270,000 tons of foodstuffs is claimed to be only sufficient to last for two weeks. All that the Germans asked in return for giving up their entire Merchant Marine was the assurance of the Allied Committee that food would be supplied to Germany in sufficient quantities to meet the requirements. This seems an extremely simple requirement and entirely in accordance with the terms of the Armistice referred to below, and it is therefore difficult to see why the Allied High Command should not have empowered this Commission to accept such terms.

One member of the Commission advanced the idea that the Allied High Command was holding off on supplying food in order to have this as a lever with which they compel the Germans to sign the Treaty of Peace.

Another source of information gives the German viewpoint as follows: The German Government could not give up its entire Merchant Marine without the assurance of a sufficient food supply. The Allies refused to grant this assurance. The German Government did not feel that it was in a position to face the German people with the statement, "Yes, we have given up your fleet and we have nothing to show for it, not even the assurances for food."

It was stated that they would have been willing to give up the fleet if they could have said to the German people, "Your food supply is definitely assured; go back to work."

The claim was made that the Allies have not played fair with them up to this time in the matter of ships. In the Armistice Agreement it is provided that their ships should be interned in Allied and neutral ports. The fact that neutral ports were to be used justified them in the conclusion that some of their ships would be returned to them. As a matter of fact, not a single German ship has been interned in a neutral port. Again, they sent five of their ships with repatriated prisoners of war to a French port under the express assurance that they would be returned. But they have been held up by the Allies and their return is refused.

The following is a statement made by a member of the German Armistice Commission:

We made the counter-proposition to the Allies as follows: 'You offer us 270,000 tons of food. We are willing to send you immediately enough of our ships to handle that amount, and as fast as you can assure us additional amounts of food, we will deliver additional ships.' To this proposition, which seems fair and just, the Allies who had come here from PARIS for the express purpose of settling these questions, replied: 'We are not empowered to treat with you.'

4. Provisions of the Armistice Agreement: The latter part of Article XXVI of the Armistice Agreement of November 11, is as follows:

The Allies and the United States to consider the provisioning of Germany during the Armistice to such an extent as may be recognized as necessary.

Article VIII of the Convention for the extension of the Armistice, dated TREVES, January 16, 1919, provides additional details covering this same point.

There is nothing specified in either of these articles as to when provisioning shall commence or end, quantities to be delivered, etc. Therefore, like all other interpretations of the Armistice Conditions, it is to be presumed they will be made by the Allied High Command.

However, it is believed that the interests of Germany in this respect have now become the interests of the Allies as well, inasmuch as the best information available indicates that the food supply of Germany will be exhausted about April 1. With the recent growth of disturbances in Germany, if the present German Government, with its seat at WEIMAR, cannot provide food for the people after April 1, it is highly probable that it will fall, and this may even occur before April 1. Following this, it is difficult to say what Government there will be left in Germany with which the Allies can deal. It therefore seems that to put food into Germany with the least possible delay is as much in the interests of the Allies as of the Germans. Other sources of information may not entirely corroborate this, but the foregoing is the best information obtainable from German sources on this point.

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1219: Note

Provisioning Germany, the German Merchant Marine

[Contemporary Translation]

Wako No. 12655-F-694

Spa, Belgium, March 6, 1919.

[Extract]

From the Representative of the German Government

To the President of the International Armistice Commission

The negotiations held on March 4 and 5, in SPA concerning the provisioning of Germany with foodstuff, the financing thereof, and the Merchant Marine to be placed at the Allies' disposition have passed off without result. The conference accomplished nothing because the Associated Governments demanded the immediate delivery of the entire German Merchant Marine with relatively few exceptions in exchange for the assurance of an importation into Germany of 270,000 tons of foodstuff, concerning which dealings had already been had in former agreements, and of 100,000 tons of Argentine grain, concerning which further details were yet to be arranged.

According to Article XXVI of the Armistice Agreement of November 11, 1918, it was intended to provide Germany during the length of the Armistice with foodstuff in such measure as should be recognized as necessary. The expectation based upon this condition that Germany would support an alleviation even during the Armistice of its dirth of foodstuff was one of the most cogent reasons which led to the acceptance of the extremely hard conditions of the Armistice Agreement.

In spite of the repeated requests on the part of Germany, the Associated Powers did not take up the question of provisioning Germany until January 15 and 16, 1919, in Article VIII of the TRIER Agreement of January 16, 1919. The German Government then put itself under obligation to place the German commercial fleet [Merchant Marine] under the control and flag of the Associated Powers during the Armistice in order to assure the

provisioning of Germany and the rest of Europe. It is clear that by such an enormously significant step as the giving up of the German Merchant Marine, the word provisioning must not mean the delivery of the largest in amount of foodstuff, but it must mean the carrying out of a program which assures the provisioning of Germany up to that time when help can be secured from its own resources, that is to say, until the next harvest. Hence it cannot be considered that by the delivery of 270,000 tons of foodstuff which in the first instance is to take place and which covers only two weeks needs, the provisioning of Germany is assured. With this amount there could only be a beginning made. The Navigation Agreement of TRIER of January 13, 1919 (especially Articles I and X), which contains only the elaboration of Article VIII of the TRIER Agreement is not to be understood without connection with this Article VIII. This connection leads inevitably to the conclusion that there can be question of an immediate placing of the fleet at Allied disposal only in case the purpose thereof, namely, the assurance of the provisioning of Germany is thereby attained. After the accomplishment of this purpose the fleet is to be assured to be placed immediately at the disposal of the Allies, which also would be in thorough accord with the purposes and views of the German Government.

* * * * *

In spite of the above mentioned stipulations of Article XXVI of the Armistice Agreement which placed in prospect the revictualment of Germany during the Armistice, which now seems to be about to come to a close. Germany has thus far not received a single ton of provisions from the Associated Powers, and has had to suffer only a more severe tightening of the hunger screws through the more severe blockade, whereby (leaving other things out of account) according to the average of the last few months 800 men per day have died. In spite of this bitter experience, Germany still assumes that the Allied Powers are ready to provide it with food beyond the relatively small amounts above mentioned. Germany can, however, not possibly leave the settlement of this business entirely to the good will of the Associated Powers under the present conditions. It is willing to believe in this good will, but it must emphasize the fact that the Allied Powers have often informed them that it is still war.

* * * * *

The German delegates have, following directions of the Imperial Government, attempted to find some way out. After the agreement concerning only a relatively small amount of foodstuff was to be accomplished, they proposed to the Allied Powers to place at their disposal immediately a part of the Marine. Hereupon, the German Government, which knows the desire of the Allied Powers to transfer overseas as soon as possible the troops that are to be moved, would have proposed only such ships in the first place as are suitable for the transportation of troops. But since the representatives of the Associated Governments declare that they are not empowered to negotiate concerning such a proposal, it is no longer possible to make known to them these purposes along with other details.

* * * * *

von HANIEL.

Selling of German Military Property

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, March 7, 1919.

No. 94

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

* * * * *

3. Removal of stores from Occupied Area: Under date of March 3, the Allied Commander, writes, as follows:

Article 6 of the Armistice Agreement of November 11, 1918, stipulates that, 'the military installation of every kind will be left intact, likewise military stores, food, ammunition, equipment which will not have been carried off within the time allowed for the evacuation.' In so far as stores are concerned, Article 6 recognized, therefore, the right of the Germans to carry away with them their military stores within the time fixed for the evacuation, but did not authorize them to steal them.

Now, two telegrams at the present time in our possession give formal proof that the German Government ordered the sale of these provisions, thus deliberately violating the engagements taken by German representatives on November 11, 1918.

The first of these telegrams, coming from Mr. Erzberger, himself, dated BERLIN, November, 1918, and addressed to the Mayor of MAYENCE, authorized the sale of military stores to the communes, to canteens, and to individuals, and brings forward the idea at the end of the telegram that there is every reason for proceeding from now on to these sales.

The second, dated BERLIN, December 1, 1918, and addressed to the Quartermaster Department of the Army at FRANKFORT that, 'the German military administration has entire liberty to sell the objects, the sending of which cannot be taken care of within the time fixed for the evacuation.'

He adds: The only stores that must be given over are those still existing at the time of the arrival of the enemy troops of occupation.

Here, therefore, there is an undisguised invitation to see to it that all that could be bought by other people should have disappeared before the arrival of the Allied troops.

The violation of the Clauses of the Armistice is, therefore, clearly established and I beg you to formulate an immediate protest directed to the representatives of the German Government at the Commission over which you preside, notifying them at the same time that full note has been taken of this violation and will be considered in view of any compensations which it will be judged to be legitimate.

To the foregoing, General von Hammerstein replied: The German standpoint regarding the legal question involved is as to whether before the arrival of the Allied troops in the occupied territory the property of the German military authority could be sold or not. This point of view is a

different one, and has been already stated in several notes that have been handed over. I will answer this note by a written note.

* * * * *

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief American Section.

A.F.G.(O.C.C.A.): File 334.8: Fldr. 91: Order

Shipments of Publications by Rail into Occupied Territory

[Contemporary Translation]

INTERALLIED RAILWAY COMMISSION OF RHINE PROVINCES,
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF ALLIED ARMIES,
TREVES, March 7, 1919.

No. 1410

ORDER NO. 64

As per terms of the order of the Marshal, Commander-in-Chief of Allied Armies, dated March 4, 1919, shipments into occupied territories of books, pamphlets, tracts and literary or artistic publications, with origin in non-occupied territories cannot be carried on except under certain restrictions.

The following regulations concern the railway service:

I. The shipments of books, publications of all sorts, and printed works can only be made to the address of the burgomeister in the city of consignment, mentioning the name and address of the bookseller who took the initiative and received the authorization for transportation. All shipments of this nature, made from non-occupied Germany to the direct addresses of the booksellers or, of some individuals in RHINE territories, cannot cross the posts of surveillance, and must be seized and turned over to the Armies of Occupation.

II. The railway administrations must inform the Allied military authorities empowered with the surveillance of municipal administration, of the shipments, whose nature is mentioned in Paragraph I of this order, to the addresses of burgomeisters, as soon as these shipments are forwarded to stations of consignment.

III. The packages delivered to the burgomeisters of the cities of consignment, must not be forwarded to the booksellers concerned except after the above mentioned military authorities have checked them up, and declared that the packages do not contain any works, tract or pamphlet of which introduction into occupied territories is prohibited.

IV. The order of the Marshal of France, Commander-in-Chief of Allied Armies prescribes that municipal authorities, booksellers, dealers or individuals who violate these rules will be court martialed, and be liable to punishment not exceeding 6 months imprisonment and 5,000 marks fine.

V. The posts of surveillance will assure the execution of Paragraph I of this order. The military subcommissions will assure the execution of Paragraph II and watch the surveillance of this execution.

GUITRY,
The President of the Interallied
Railway Commission of the Rhine
Provinces.

Provisioning Czechoslovakia

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, March 7, 1919.

No. 94

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

5. Food for Czechs: General Barnum presented the following note to the Germans, which note was based upon information which he had received from Mr. Hoover:

"Arrangements have been made with the Czechs, with the approval of the military and naval authorities, to ship food to them by way of the Elbe River. It is requested that you bring this matter to the attention of the German Government and that assurances of the protection of the cargoes in transit be given."

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section.

Supreme War Council: 17th Session: Minutes

Food Supply to Germany

I. C. 157

S. W. C. 386

Minutes of the 3d Meeting of the 17th
Session, Supreme War Council held at
the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Saturday,
March 8, 1919.

[Extract]

The food of
Germany: The
breakdown of the
negotiations
at SPA.

(a) Report of
Supreme
Economic
Council

5. LORD ROBERT CECIL said that the
Supreme Economic Council had that day been con-
sidering the situation created by the break-
down of the negotiations at SPA, and certain
definite conclusions had been reached.

In the first place, he wished to bring
to the notice of the Conference that the ques-
tion of the surrender of the merchant ships
by Germany was one thing, and the understand-
ing that the Allies should supply food to

Germany was quite another thing. Article 26 of the Armistice of November 11, 1918, read as follows: "The Allies and the United States contemplate the provisioning of Germany during the Armistice, as shall be found necessary." Again, in the agreement for the prolongation of the Armistice, dated January 16, 1919, it had been said: "In order to assure the provisioning of Germany and the rest of Europe, the German Government shall take all necessary steps to place the German Merchant Fleet for the duration of the Armistice, under the control and power of the Allied flags and the United States, who shall be assisted by a German delegate. This arrangement shall in no wise affect the final disposal of such vessels." That was the position so far as the Armistice was concerned. There was, however, another aspect of the case to which he need not refer at any great length; he meant the obligations of humanity and the grave danger of Germany drifting into Bolshevism unless food were sent into Germany.

When the negotiations at SPA had been broken off, the Supreme Economic Council had met together to consider the situation and had arrived at certain decisions, which had been embodied in the report which he would proceed to read to the Conference. Unanimous decision had been reached on all but two points, regarding which very strong differences of opinion appeared to exist.

LORD ROBERT CECIL then read the following draft report of the Supreme Economic Council:

The Supreme Economic Council report that, in their opinion a communication on the lines hereinafter stated, should be made to Germany.

The Supreme Economic Council should be authorized and directed to appoint a Committee with full powers to prepare the actual terms of the proposed communication including the financial and other arrangements necessary to carry it out.

Germany should be informed that:

(1) She is bound by the terms of the Armistice to hand over her mercantile fleet forthwith, under the terms settled at TREVES on January last.

(2) On grounds of humanity, the Associated Governments reiterate their decision to deliver to Germany the food now available in Europe for which payment has been arranged as soon as Germany shows her genuine intention to carry out her obligations referred to in the first paragraph, by sending to sea for that purpose the ships to be selected by the Associated Governments, and the Associated Governments will themselves provide (as quickly as transportation can be arranged) or will give permits for import from neighboring neutrals for the balance of the month's supply, that is of 270,000 tons agreed on, as soon as at least . . . ships have been similarly sent to sea, and as soon as payment for such food has been arranged.

(3) She may import up to (300,000) tons of breadstuffs and (70,000) tons of fats monthly until September 1.

(4) She must pay for this food and may pay in any of the following ways:

(a) By the hire of the ships.

(b) By the export of commodities and the sale of cargoes of German ships now in neutral countries.

(c) By credits in neutral countries.

(d) By the outright sale of foreign securities or properties.

(e) By the arrangement of advances against the use of foreign securities of properties as collateral.

(f) Further, gold also may be used as collateral for loans to be released as other means of payment to provide means of liquidating such loans. The outright sale of gold can only be permitted in the event of its being agreed by the Associated Powers that the above-named means of payment are inadequate.

(5) She may export commodities (except those on a black list) to any neutral or other agreed destination. The proceeds from these exports must be converted into payment for foodstuffs.

(6) A definite amount of the shipping handed over will be continuously available to transport food to Germany until next harvest.

(7) She may purchase and import foodstuffs within the limits above stated, from neutrals who will, when necessary, be allowed to reimport equivalent quantities.

(8) It is understood that the declaration of the Associated Governments under this communication will be null and void should a state of hostilities be renewed.

CLAUSES

1 and 2.

LORD ROBERT CECIL, continuing, said that in regard to Clause 1 and 2 above, complete agreement had been reached. But two objections had been raised in regard to Clause 3, namely, in connection with the relaxation of the blockade, and in connection

CLAUSE 3.

with the engagement to feed the Germans until September 1.

In regard to the first objection, it was obvious that if any food at all were to be imported into Germany, that would necessarily imply a certain relaxation of the blockade. But, in his opinion, the importation of food, far from weakening the power of the blockade, would strengthen it. The only way in which the blockade could be weakened would be by sending into the country so much surplus food as to allow large stocks to be constituted. On the other hand, if only just as much food as was required for immediate consumption were allowed to be sent in, the power of the blockade would thereby be strengthened. Once the Allies started feeding the German people, it would be easy for the latter to realize the full force of a threat to cut off further supplies.

In regard to the second objection, the French representatives held that the clause, as worded, implied an absolute engagement to feed the Germans until September 1. He did not think that was the correct English interpretation of the text. Obviously, as soon as the Armistice came to an end, further supplies of food could also cease. Moreover, Clause 8 made the supply of food dependent on a non-renewal of a state of hostilities.

CLAUSE 4. In regard to paragraph 4, the Council agreed that Germany must pay for the food supplied to her, but the gravest differences of opinion had been expressed in regard to the manner of payment, particularly in connection with Clauses (d), (e), and (f). As a matter of fact, he did not think his French colleagues had yet had an opportunity of considering Clause (f), which had been redrafted in order to meet, if possible, some of the objections raised by them.

CLAUSES 5, 6, and 7.

Finally he would add that Clauses 5, 6, and 7 had been unanimously accepted.

(b) Views of
French Represen-
tatives of
Supreme Economic
Council

M. Clementel thought it would be necessary, in the first place, to bring to the recollection of the Conference the exact terms of the decisions taken by the Supreme War Council, with particular reference to any promises said to have been made to Germany. In Clause 2 (b) of the first Armistice, dated November 11, the Allies had merely contemplated the provisioning of Germany

during the Armistice: But at the end of the second Armistice, in accordance with a decision reached by the Supreme Economic Council, it had been agreed to supply to Germany, from time to time such quantities of food as might be considered sufficient to meet her immediate requirements. Accordingly, on the advice of Mr. Hoover, 270,000 tons had been fixed as the amount of the first installment of foodstuffs; but difficulties had arisen as regards the payment, so that nothing had as yet been sent. That, however, was all that had ever been promised by the Allies to Germany. During the last negotiations, the Germans have asked for a guarantee that food would be supplied up to the next harvest. That request had been discussed by the Supreme Economic Council and

the French delegates had maintained that no undertaking could be entered into for so long a period: No agreement should be entered into for more than one month at a time, and the agreement should only apply to the duration of the Armistice. That is to say, the Germans would continue to obtain their food requirements during the period of the Armistice, but should the Armistice be broken for any reason, the supply of food would *ipso facto* cease. The British and American delegates had agreed to add Clause 8, which laid down that in the event of a renewal of hostilities, the engagements entered into by the Associated Governments would become null and void. The French representatives had accepted this Clause only on the understanding that the military experts were satisfied that it did not contravene any of the terms of the Armistice.

Clause 3 had been accepted by the French delegates in principle on the understanding that the figures given merely represented maxima and that the final quantities to be entered should be referred to the economic experts. The experts had not yet been consulted, but no delay need thereby be incurred, as the four competent ministers could settle that question within a few hours.

Clause 4. In regard to Clause 4, the French representatives held the view that people who eat should work. It was a well-known fact that in BERLIN, for instance, the unemployed received an unemployment indemnity of 8 marks per day and as a result, at the present moment, there were no less than 300,000 unemployed in receipt of gratuities. Furthermore, peasants were pouring into the town to have a rest and to draw their gratuities. This fact had had an enormous influence on the output of coal, potash, and other raw materials. In his opinion, therefore, the Germans should be given an ultimatum; they should be told that they would only receive food in return for raw materials. The Supreme Economic Council had thought this to be too harsh a condition to introduce into an agreement, but it had been decided to communicate it verbally to the Germans during the course of the recent negotiations at SPA. Unfortunately these negotiations had been broken off before that stage had been reached.

In regard to the method of payment for the food to be supplied to Germany the French representatives held that methods (a), (b), and (c) would be sufficient to meet all payments likely to fall due within the next few months. They had further suggested that the following Clause should be substituted for Clauses (d), (e), and (f), namely: "Should the above 3 ways be found insufficient to yield the sums required, it would be the duty of the Finance Committee to find supplementary ways."

Clause 7. Clause 7 laid down that Germany could purchase and import foodstuffs from neutrals, who would, when necessary, be allowed to reimport equivalent quantities. This meant that unlimited quantities of food could be purchased by neutral countries to replace equivalent quantities sold to Germany, thus practically abolishing the system of rationing which was still enforced in the case of neutral countries.

Lord Robert Cecil pointed out that in the British text the Clause in question read: "She may purchase and import foodstuffs within the limits above stated from neutrals, who will, when necessary, be allowed to reimport equivalent quantities."

M. Clementel said that the words "Within the limits above stated," gave complete satisfaction.

He wished finally to lay stress on the fact that in renewing the negotiations with the Germans the conclusion reached by the Conference should be communicated to the Germans by the President of the Armistice Commission at Spa, so as to avoid discussions being carried on by a large body of representatives.

M. Klotz suggested that Marshal Foch's views should be heard.

Marshal Foch held that Clause 3 created a somewhat dangerous situation, since the Allies thereby bound themselves to supply food to the Germans until September 1, unless, as stated in Clause 8, hostilities were renewed. Consequently, that Clause had the effect of disarming the Allies, who would be obliged to start hostilities should any difference arise with Germany, since, as long as the Clause remained, pressure could not be exerted by the fear of withholding food.

Mr. Lansing inquired what was the connection between the subject under consideration and the military situation.

M. Clemenceau replied that at the present moment the Allies possessed a method of applying pressure to Germany, without appeal to arms, but if the Clause suggested were accepted, the only method of exerting pressure would be the renewal of hostilities.

Mr. Hoover held that a very important difficulty had apparently been overlooked. It was essential that the Allies should obtain the German merchant ships in order to deliver the food supplies required by all countries of Europe, both friendly and enemy. It was evident, in his opinion, that Germany would refuse to give up her ships unless she were assured a supply of food until next harvest. If a monthly agreement alone were desired, Germany did not consider that a sufficient guarantee to justify the surrender of her ships. It may become desirable to shut off the supply of food in order to exert pressure on Germany. But, the delegates who went to SPA were positive that the German ships would never be surrendered unless the guarantee asked for was given. It would be possible for the Allies to go into German harbors and take the ships by force, but a great many of the ships were in neutral ports, and could not, therefore, be taken by force. Consequently, the Allies faced a dilemma: Either to abandon the point raised by Marshal Foch and so obtain the ships required, or deliberately refuse to supply food to Germany and break the promises made. He must, however, insist on the situation in Germany today. During the last four years Germany had divided its own food supplies into eleven packets, and a twelfth packet had been made up of the food stolen from the occupied territory. Since the Armistice the twelfth packet had been lost to Germany and the remaining eleven packets had, through unemployment and disintegration, been greatly reduced in size. Consequently, Germany now only possessed food sufficient to feed the country for eight months, and some time about May 1 next, food would become so scarce in all the towns of 50,000 inhabitants and more, that starvation would stare the people in the face, and that would constitute a very grave danger for the whole government of the country. That was the substance of the reports received from the most trustworthy sources in Germany. Therefore, unless the Allies were willing to run the risk of supplying certain quantities of food to Germany, in return for the possible surrender of her merchant ships, thus enabling her to maintain a stable government, the efforts of the representatives now sitting in the Council Chamber would be washed out to nothing within the next sixty days.

Mr. Lloyd George said that he had been rather staggered by Marshal Foch's proposition that we were parting with a very great effective power of exerting pressure on Germany. The difficulty was, however, more apparent than real, for the Allies were not in reality parting with the considerable power which food gave them. As a matter of fact, there were only two contingencies which might call for the exercise of that power. The Germans might refuse to carry out the terms of the Armistice, but in that case the Armistice would at once come to an end, and therefore the provisions of Clause 8 would apply. Again, the preliminary terms of peace would shortly be presented to Germany, and if Germany refused to accept those terms, that would put an end to the Armistice. But, when that happened, the Allies would be quite entitled to decide not to advance into Germany and to exert necessary pressure by the stoppage of food supplies. Consequently, the only two contingencies when food pressure might be required, had been duly provided for. The Conference was therefore not parting with any potent weapon. On the other hand, he wished to urge with all his might that steps should at once be taken to revictual Germany. The honor of the Allies was involved. Under the terms of the Armistice the Allies did imply that they meant to let food into Germany. The Germans had accepted our Armistice conditions, which were sufficiently severe, and they had complied with the majority of those conditions. But so far, not a single ton of food had been sent into Germany. The fishing fleet had even been prevented from going out to catch a few herrings. The Allies were now on top, but the memories of starvation might one day turn against them. The Germans were being allowed to starve whilst at the same time hundreds of thousands of tons of food were lying at ROTTERDAM, waiting to be taken up the waterways into Germany.

These incidents constituted far more formidable weapons for use against the Allies than any of the armaments it was sought to limit. The Allies were sowing hatred for the future. They were piling up agony, not for the Germans, but for themselves. The British troops were indignant about our refusal to revictual Germany. General Plumer had said that he could not be responsible for his troops if children were allowed to wander about the streets, half starving. The British soldiers would not stand that, they were beginning to make complaints, and the most urgent demands were being received from them. Furthermore, British officers who had been in Germany said that Bolshevism was being created, and the determining factor was going to be food. As long as the people were starving they would listen to the arguments of the Spartacists, and the Allies by their action were simply encouraging elements of disruption and anarchism. It was like stirring up an influenza puddle, just next door to one's self. The condition of Russia was well-known, and it might be possible to look on at a muddle which had there been created. But, now, if Germany went, and Spain: Who would feel safe? As long as order was maintained in Germany, a breakwater would exist between the countries of the Allies and the waters of revolution beyond. But once that breakwater was swept away, he could not speak for France, but trembled for his own country. The situation was particularly serious in MUNICH. Bavaria, which once had been thought to present the most solid and conservative part of Germany, had already gone. He was there that afternoon to reinforce the appeal which had come to him from the men who had helped the Allies to conquer the Germans, the soldiers, who said that they refused to continue to occupy a territory in order to maintain the population in a state of starvation. Meanwhile, the Conference continued to haggle. Six weeks ago the same arguments about gold and foreign securities had been raised, and it had then been decided that Germany should be given food. He begged the Conference to reaffirm that decision in the most unequivocal terms, unless this people were fed; if as a result of a process of starvation enforced by the Allies, the people of Germany were allowed to run riot, a state of revolution among the working classes of all countries would ensue with which it would be impossible to cope.

(c) M. Clemenceau's criticisms of Mr. Lloyd George's proposals.

M. Clemenceau expressed his desire to make a few observations in reply to Mr. Lloyd George's statement; and he would preface his remarks with the affirmation that his conclusions agreed with that of Mr. Lloyd George, namely, that Germany must be fed as soon as possible. That, however, was not the question now under discussion.

Mr. Lloyd George had said that the honor of the Allies was involved, since they had given the Germans to understand that food would be sent into Germany. That was not altogether a correct statement of facts. In the Armistice, no promise had ever been made to feed Germany.

Mr. Balfour, intervening, remarked that almost a promise had been made.

M. Clemenceau, continuing, said he would not argue the point, because, as he had already said, he was ready to give the food, whether promised or not. On the other hand, his information tended to show that the Germans were using Bolshevism as a bogey with which to frighten the Allies. If the Germans were starving, as General Plumer and others said they were, why did they continue to refuse to surrender their fleet? The Germans certainly did not act as if they were in a hurry, and it was curious that a people who was said to be so hard up for food should appear to be in no hurry to assist in obtaining it by giving up their ships. No doubt very pitiable reports were being received from certain parts of Germany in regard to food conditions: but those reports did not apparently apply to all parts of Germany. For instance, General Mangin had told him that there was more food in MAYENCE than in PARIS. In his opinion, the food hardship was probably due to bad distribution. Mr. Lloyd George had said that the Germans must be made to observe the conditions of the Armistice. But the Germans had promised to surrender their mercantile fleet, and so far they had not done so. In his opinion, the Germans were simply trying to see how far they could go; they were simply attempting to blackmail the Allies. To yield today would simply mean constant yielding in the future. He had that day received

the following telegram dated March 7, 1919, from the French Naval Attache, in LONDON:

Having been informed of the refusal of the German Merchant Shipping Commission to surrender the German mercantile fleet to the Allies, a refusal which had led to negotiations being broken off and to the return of the Allied Mercantile Marine Commission to PARIS, the Armistice Commission has forwarded the following telegram to the Allied Admiralties:

Begins. Urgent:

With reference to your 394 ANAC, it is proposed that the following action be taken, a limit of 3 days being imposed;- The Allied and Associated Powers shall insist that the Germans shall on or before the . . . March next execute without further discussion or reservations the conditions set forth in Article 8 of the agreement for the prolongation of Armistice, dated January 16, 1919, in regard to the surrender of the German merchant ships in Allied ports. The draft agreement dated . . . shall be accepted in its entirety. Should these conditions not be executed in their entirety within the prescribed period, the authorization accorded to German merchant ships, including fishing boats and minesweepers, to proceed to sea, shall forthwith be cancelled. Further, no neutral ship shall be authorized to proceed to German ports and the blockade shall be completely reestablished. Message ends.

ANAC requests that the above message be submitted to the Supreme War Council.

He himself did not wish to champion that text, but he accepted the spirit which it breathed. In his opinion Marshal Foch should be instructed to meet the German Peace Delegates at SPA, and to tell them that the Allied and Associated Powers refused to argue or to discuss matters concerning the accepted clauses of the Armistice. The Germans had promised to surrender their mercantile fleet, and immediate compliance must be demanded. The Germans could at the same time be told that food would be sent, but the conditions of Article 8 of the Armistice of January 16, 1919, must in the first place be fulfilled. It was essential that no signs of weakness should be displayed on the eve of the settlement of other large territorial, military and economic questions. The Germans must not be given any advantages today that might give them the impression that the Allied powers could be intimidated and made to yield. Therefore, in his opinion Germany should be asked point blank: "Are you or are you not going to execute the conditions set forth in Clause 8 of the Armistice?" If his proposals were accepted, the position of the Great Powers would be extremely strong and promises to supply food could then safely be made.

Marshal Foch had made an objection which he (M. Clemenceau) considered to be very strong, but a slight amendment of the text would easily put that matter right. In regard to the manner of payment, he would be prepared to waive his objection to the ear-marking of gold for the purpose, provided he knew that the Germans would work for their food. This was not an unreasonable request, and it would be found to be in agreement with the teachings of Christianity. In conclusion, he could not too strongly urge his view that the Germans should be made thoroughly to understand that the Allies would allow no non-sense in regard to the minute observance of the terms of the clauses of the Armistice. As soon as the Germans recognized this fact, he felt sure his colleagues, M. Loucheur, M. Klotz, and M. Clementel, who were ever ready to be guided by feelings of humanity, would easily arrive at an agreement in regard to the supply of food to Germany, and the payment therefor.

(d) Baron Sonnino's

amendment to Clause 8. M. Sonnino said that by way of conciliation, he desired to suggest a slight amendment to Clause 8 which, he thought, would give satisfaction to all parties. Mr. Hoover had argued that the Germans refused to surrender their ships

to the Allies because such a surrender would merely act as an incentive to the Allies to ask for new conditions. He (Mr. Hoover) therefore maintained that a complete agreement in regard to the two questions (the surrender of the ships, and the supply of food), must be reached simultaneously. On the other side, Marshal Foch had said that the acceptance of Clause 8 as at present drafted, would imply the renunciation by the Allies of all means of exercising pressure on the Germans, short of the renewal of hostilities. The Germans would thereby be given an incentive to break all the minor conditions of the Armistice, because they would know that the Allies would never go to war for small things, especially after demobilization had proceeded further. In order to meet these divergent views, he proposed that the words, "should Germany break the terms of the Armistice" should be inserted at the end of Clause 8 instead of "should a state of hostilities be renewed."

Mr. Balfour pointed out that M. Clemenceau's point was that the Germans had already broken the terms of the Armistice by their refusal to surrender the ships. On the other hand, M. Sonnino's amendment meant that no food would be supplied until the ships had actually been delivered. Mr. Hoover, had, however, laid the greatest stress on the importance for the immediate supply of food. Consequently he did not think M. Sonnino's amendment really met the difficulties of the case.

(e) Mr. Lloyd George's amendment to Clause 1.

Mr. Lloyd George said that he was most anxious to get on with the supply of food to Germany. No conditions requiring the surrender of the German mercantile fleet had been included in the original Armistice, but in the agreement for the prolongation of the Armistice, it had been stated that: "In order to assure the provisioning of Germany and the rest of Europe, the German Government shall take all necessary steps to place the German fleet for the duration of the Armistice under the control and the flags of the Allied Powers and the United States." That agreement had been entered into on the January 16 last, and for two months nothing had been done.

Personally, he accepted M. Sonnino's amendment, and if it should meet with the approval of the Conference, he would propose to add to Clause 1 of the proposed communication to be made to Germany, the following sentence: "On condition that Germany formally acknowledge her obligations under Clause 8 of the Armistice of January 16."

(f) M. Clemenceau's proposal in regard to procedure in presenting resolutions to Germans.

M. Clemenceau said that he would accept Mr. Lloyd George's proposal in regard to Clause 1. Furthermore he would suggest that Clause 1 be communicated forthwith to the Germans by Marshal Foch. In addition the Conference should that day also come to an agreement in regard to the remaining clauses of the draft under consideration, on the clear understanding, however, that these clauses would not be communicated to the Germans until Clause 1 had been accepted by them.

Mr. Lloyd George inquired how long it would take for a telegram embodying Clause 1 to reach the German delegates and for a reply to be received thereto.

Marshal Foch replied that a telegram would have to be sent to SPA and then repeated either to BERLIN or WEIMAR. He thought a reply might be received, at the earliest, on Monday evening, always supposing that the Germans were prepared to send an immediate affirmative or negative reply.

M. Clemenceau said that he had overheard a remark to the effect that an ultimatum of this nature would inevitably lead to war. In his opinion if the Germans were prepared to go to war over a question of food supplies, they would not hesitate to do so when the military economic and financial peace conditions came to be presented to them.

Mr. Lloyd George said that on second thought, it would probably be better to summon the German delegates to a meeting rather than to send a telegram. He was afraid the latter procedure might result in the despatch of a long argumentative reply by the Germans. In his opinion, the Allied delegates sent to SPA should receive definite instructions to tell the Germans that a formal acknowledgement to undertake their obligations

under Clause 8 of the Armistice of January 16, 1919, was required as a preliminary to any discussions whatsoever in regard to the conditions for the supply of food.

Mr. Lansing remarked that Admiral Hope had already put forward that very same proposition twice during the recent negotiations.

M. Clemenceau in reply pointed out that Admiral Hope had merely spoken as a great Admiral: He had not delivered a message to the Germans in the name of the Great Powers.

In regard to the statement made by Mr. Lloyd George, he wished to urge very strongly that the case of the Allies would be lost irretrievably should any discussions take place prior to the acceptance of the conditions contained in Clause 1. But as soon as the Germans had accepted their obligations under that clause, the remaining clauses could then be discussed. In conclusion, he wished to propose that Clause 1 should be presented to the German Peace Delegates by Marshal Foch himself since the terms of the Armistice were in question. Marshal Foch would naturally be accompanied by the economic experts, and he would retire as soon as the revictualling clauses came under discussion. He would merely present Clause 1, dealing with the German mercantile fleet.

M. Clementel said he agreed with the proposal contained in the document, but he wished to raise a very strong protest against the suggestion that an Allied Commission consisting of a large body of men should proceed for the third time to SPA, there to enter into lengthy disputations with a corresponding number of German experts. He would like to remind the Conference that the question of the surrender of the German mercantile fleet had been settled by Marshal Foch alone at an interview with Mr. Erzberger within the space of 20 minutes. Marshal Foch had given Mr. Erzberger a time limit which left the German delegate no option but to accept the conditions imposed. On the other hand, at the last meeting, the Germans had been represented by three separate sections within their delegation, namely, representatives of the Treasury, Food Department, and the Shipping Department. Each Section had held different opinions and had expressed antagonistic views. He did not think it was at all dignified that twenty representatives of the Allied and Associated Governments should enter into violent disputations with the Germans. He felt very strongly on that subject. In his opinion, only one delegate should be appointed to represent the Allies in any further negotiations, and that single delegate so selected, should be a military representative. In addition, technical advisors could accompany the official delegate merely as his advisors.

(g) Mr. Lloyd
George's pro-
posed final
draft of
Clause 1.

Mr. Lloyd George thought that the two questions, namely, the drafting of the text of the communication to be presented to the Germans and the procedure to be followed in communicating the same, should not be mixed up. Before proceeding further, however, he asked permission to read the following telegram which he had just received from General Plumer at COLOGNE, dated March 8, 1919, 2:45 p. m.:

Please inform the Prime Minister that in my opinion food must be sent into this area by the Allies without delay. Even now the present rations are insufficient to maintain life and owing to the failure of supplies from Germany they must very soon be still further reduced. The mortality amongst women, children, and sick is most grave and sickness due to hunger is spreading. The attitude of the population is becoming one of despair and the people feel that an end by bullets is preferable to death by starvation. All this naturally results in great activity by subversive and disorderly elements. Apart from the imminence of danger from the situation the continuance of these conditions is unjustifiable. I request therefore that a definite date be fixed for the arrival of the first supplies. This date should not be later than March 16 even if from that date regular supplies cannot be maintained.

He thought that General Plumer's telegram disclosed a very serious state of affairs and he felt certain that the Conference did not wish to create sympathy with Germany by a continuance of a system of starvation. To bring the discussion to a head he desired to make the following definite suggestion, namely, that the terms of the ultimatum to be presented to the Germans prior to the discussion of the conditions for the supply of food should be made to read as follows:

On condition that Germany formally acknowledges her obligations under Clause 8 of the Armistice of January 16, that is to say (here enter Article 8 of the agreement for prolongation of the Armistice dated January 16, 1919), the delegates of the Associated Governments are authorized and directed to proceed upon their instructions as to revictualling.

Marshal Foch thought that the mere recognition of Germany's obligations under Clause 8 of the Armistice would be sufficient, as the Germans had already recognized their obligations by accepting the clause. He suggested that the clause should be made to read: "On condition that Germany formally acknowledges and undertakes to execute her obligations."

(h) Proposals
regarding
delivery of
resolutions
to Germans.

Mr. Lloyd George accepted this amendment.
M. Clemenceau said that the next thing to settle was how the message should be delivered. He suggested that Marshal Foch should be authorized to meet the German delegates and communicate the message to them.

Mr. Lloyd George said he was the last man to have any distrust of Marshal Foch, whom he admired for his great qualities. On the other hand, the surrender of the ships really constituted a naval question and up to the present shipping part of the Armistice had always been left to Great Britain. Thus, Admiral Wemyss had been sent to negotiate all matters relating to ships. And although he realized that Marshal Foch was a master of land, he thought Admiral Wemyss should be allowed to retain his mastership of the ocean; otherwise he feared the British Admiralty might think they had been deposed. He wished to propose, therefore, that the procedure followed hitherto should be adhered to and that a British Admiral should be sent to deliver to the Germans the message relating to the surrender of ships.

M. Clementel said that the French delegates were firmly agreed that only one representative of the Allies should be appointed to meet a representative of the Germans. Should that principle be accepted, the one delegate could be accompanied by experts, if so desired, for consultation outside the Council Chamber. The French representatives quite agreed that the one Allied delegate should be a British Admiral. He would arrange to meet the German delegate and say to him: "I come from the Supreme War Council to demand that you accept these conditions without further discussion."

(i) Conditions
for supply
of food

M. Clemenceau said that that proposal having been agreed, the conditions to govern the supply of food should next be settled. Clause I of the original draft now disappeared and would constitute a separate document to be presented to the German Peace delegate by a British Admiral, as a preliminary to the discussion of the remaining clauses of the original draft.

Clauses 2 and 3 of the original draft had been unanimously accepted. In regard to Clause 4, subheads (a), (b), and (c) had been accepted, but he would call on M. Klotz to make a statement in regard to subheads (d), (e), and (f).

M. Klotz expressed the view that subheads (a), (b), and (c) by themselves would be sufficient to meet all requirements, and M. Clemenceau's statement that the Germans should be made to work in order to earn their food had merely confirmed that view. If the Allies put on the table all the German gold and foreign securities which the Allies held in trust, there would be no incentive for the Germans to work. In order to reach an agreement he would, however, suggest the addition of the following paragraph at the end of Clause 3,

namely: "The methods of payment provided in (d), (e), and (f) shall not be resorted to until, in the judgment of the Supreme Economic Council, the possibility of payment under (a), (b), and (c), shall have proved inadequate."

M. Loucheur thought that some misunderstanding existed in regard to the text. The American delegates had stated to him that two or three months would have to elapse before it could be known whether methods (a), (b), and (c) would provide sufficient funds. That was not the intention of the Committee. The wherewithal for the necessary payments would at once be made available by releasing the necessary quantities of gold and other securities. On the other hand, the Germans should be required to work in order to produce the raw material which would pay for the food supplies. Consequently, if at the end of a month or two it were found that the Germans were not producing any greater quantities of coal and other raw materials, the question as to whether the Allies should continue to feed people who refused to work would have to be reconsidered. It was essential that the Germans should not live at ease on the gold which was required for the payment of reparation for the damages deliberately committed by them.

Mr. Lloyd George said that on January 13, exactly the same speeches had been made by M. Klotz and he had then been overruled by the Supreme War Council. M. Klotz should, therefore, submit to the decisions then given by the supreme War Council. In support of his statement, he would read to the Conference excerpts from the proces-verbal of the meeting of the Supreme War Council held on Monday, January 13, 1919: (I. C. 104)

President Wilson expressed the view that any further delay in this matter might be fatal as it meant the dissolution of order and government. They were discussing an absolute and immediate necessity. So long as hunger continued to gnaw, the foundations of government would continue to crumble. Therefore, food should be supplied immediately, not only to our friends but also to those parts of the world where it was to our interest to maintain a stable government. He thought they were bound to accept the concerted counsel of a number of men who had been devoting the whole of their time and thought to this question. He trusted the French Finance Department would withdraw their objection as they were faced with the great problems of Bolshevism and the forces of dissolution which now threatened society.

M. Klotz said he would gladly meet President Wilson's wish. But it was not altogether a question of food supplies. They were all fully agreed as to the necessity of feeding the Germans but he would appeal to President Wilson to consider also the question of justice. He was quite willing to admit that German foreign securities should be earmarked for this purpose. But they were creating a new German debt. There were other German debts which were just as honorable and noble. Therefore, he would ask, as a matter of justice, why Germany should pay for food in preference to paying off debts incurred for the restoration and for the reparation of damage committed elsewhere. Why should exclusive priority be given to such a debt? As a solution of the difficulty he would agree that payment for this food should be made in foreign securities and values. But he would add that "these assets shall be pooled and distribution shall be made by the Allies taking into account such privileged claims as the Peace Conference would admit."

He would merely point out that it was not a question of food supply, it was purely a financial question and no delay need therefore occur in the supply of food.

President Wilson urged that, unless a solution for the immediate situation could be found, none of these debts would be paid. The want of food would lead to a crash in Germany. The great point, however, was this, that the Associated Governments have no money to pay for these supplies. Therefore, Germany must pay for them, but if they were not paid for and supplied immediately there would be no Germany to pay anything.

Mr. Bonar Law pointed out that, in calculating the sums, they had been going on the assumption that the supply of food would last for one year. He did not think that it would need to last more than a few months, or say, up to the harvesting of the next crop. The suggestion had also been made that the German merchant ships to be requisitioned

would yield funds for the payment of a portion of the sum in question.

M. Klotz proposed that they should accept, for a period of two months, the text as it stood. At the end of that period the Peace Conference would be able to come to a decision on the whole question of policy.

Mr. Bonar Law considered that if sanction for two months' payment only were obtained, the food supplies could only last for two months.

M. Klotz thought that this showed some confusion of ideas. It was not a question of supplying food for two months. Food supplies could continue. The question to be settled during the course of the two months was merely as to the priority to be given to the payment to be made by Germany. It would be admitted that foreign securities must be considered as gilt-edged securities.

Mr. Bonar Law thought they were arguing in a circle. The first question to be settled was whether a new debt which they had no necessity to incur should be added to previous debts.

M. Klotz agreed, but suggested that at the end of the two months a priority list could be prepared.

M. Pichon said he thought that an agreement had now been reached. Everyone was agreed that payment had to be made. The proposal could therefore be accepted. But the Conference could reconsider the question later on, should they wish to do so.

This was agreed to.

It was true that M. Klotz had then suggested that the question should be reconsidered at the end of two months, but in the interval nothing had been done and as long as people were starving they could not be expected to work, as M. Klotz proposed.

M. Klotz asked permission to point out that his contention to reality was in complete agreement with what had originally been settled on January 13. It had then been agreed that two months later the whole clause would be reconsidered. In other words, he had then agreed to the sum of 450 million francs being expended during a period of two months, an expenditure which could, in his opinion, be incurred without endangering the finances of his country. Now, however, the proposal involved an expenditure of 2 milliards of francs up to September 1 next, and for that purpose it was proposed to use up all the funds which might eventually become available for the payment of reparations. That was what he objected to. He had been willing and he was still willing to agree to an expenditure of 450 million francs; but he hesitated to go beyond that sum without a full and careful reconsideration of the whole question. Consequently, he had already shown a very conciliatory spirit and had made great sacrifices in agreeing to accept clauses (d), (e), and (f), with certain reservations; but it would be impossible for him to go further without compromising his country's interests, which had been placed in his charge.

Mr. Lloyd George appealed to M. Clemenceau to intervene in the matter. It was true that on January 13 it had been suggested that the question might be reconsidered at the end of two months. Nothing had, however, been done during those two months and now the question had been brought up for discussion with all the old arguments. He would not have raised the matter, but for the fact that during the past two months, in spite of the decision reached by the Supreme War Council in January last, obstacles had continually been put in the way with the result that nothing had been done. He appealed to M. Clemenceau to put a stop to these obstructive tactics, otherwise M. Klotz would rank with Lenin and Trotsky among those who had spread Bolshevism in Europe.

Mr. House said that it always made him unhappy to take sides against France. But the American delegates had told him that they had gone to the utmost limits to meet the wishes of the French, and unless Clause 4 were accepted practically as it stood, it would have no value.

M. Clemenceau exclaimed that his country had been ruined and ravaged, towns had been destroyed; over two million men had lost their lives; mines had been rendered unworkable; and yet what guarantees had France that anything would be received in payment for all this destruction? She merely possessed a few pieces of gold, a few securities, which it was now proposed to take away in order to pay those who would supply food to Germany; and that food would certainly not come from France. In a word he was being asked to betray his country and that he refused to do.

Lord Robert Cecil thought that there had been some misapprehension as to Clauses (d) and (e) which in his opinion, could easily be accepted by all the delegates. The strong opposition of the French representatives concerned Clause (f) which dealt with the question of gold. He would point out to M. Klotz that the clause as redrafted now read as follows: "Gold also may be used as collateral or loans to be realized as other means of payment, provide means of liquidating such loans. The outright sale of gold can only be permitted in the event of its being agreed by the Associated Powers that the other means of payment are inadequate." M. Klotz himself had admitted that something of the kind would have to be done, that is to say, that some liquid assets would be required in order to get over the period until money could come in from other sources, such as mines. Consequently, he had confidently hoped that an agreement could have been reached as the British, American and Italian delegates had gone a long way to meet the views of the French delegates.

M. Crespi said that the draft of Clause (f) which had been presented at that morning's meeting, had been different. He himself had suggested a new form as a compromise to reconcile the views of the French, American, and British. In his opinion, he thought, the clause as now amended, should satisfy all parties. Italy, who was sadly in need of coal, was prepared to accept it. He hoped, therefore, that M. Klotz would do the same.

(f) Mr. Loucheur's
proposal to
open a credit
for 1 milliard*
Francs

M. Loucheur thought that there had been a good deal of misunderstanding. He himself quite agreed that the Germans could not be expected to work until they had been fed. Two months ago a credit of 450 million francs had been voted; but so far that sum had not been utilized. He fully agreed that

Mr. Hoover should at once take all the necessary measures for the immediate supply of the necessary foodstuffs to Germany. Obviously, the credit of 450 million francs would not suffice. It had been thought that this sum could be supplemented by money to be obtained by the exportation of raw material from Germany; but there did not appear to be much likelihood of any great sums becoming available in that way in the near future. Consequently, as the matter was urgent, it would be necessary forthwith to open a credit for a much larger sum than 450 million. On that day, the Allies were, in fact, taking engagements to supply food up to a value which might amount to two milliards. He proposed, therefore, that the Conference should forthwith agree to open a credit for one milliard, to be made available immediately, and later on, if necessary, further credits could be opened.

(M. Loucheur's proposal, having been accepted, the Conference adjourned for a short time for the redrafting of the text of the communications to be made to Germany in such a manner as to embody the various amendments accepted that afternoon.)

After the adjournment the following draft was approved:

1. As a preliminary to any discussion whatsoever with the German representatives, the principal representative of the Allied and Associated Powers is to make the following statement:

On condition that Germany formally acknowledges and undertakes to execute her obligations under Clause VIII of the Armistice of January 16, that is to say - VIII.

* Billion

In order to assure the provisioning of Germany and the rest of Europe, the German Government shall take all necessary steps to place the whole of the German merchant fleet, for the duration of the Armistice, under the control and the flags of the Allied Powers and the United States, who shall be assisted by a German delegate.

This arrangement shall in no wise affect the final disposal of such vessels. The Allies and the United States shall, if they consider this necessary, replace the crews either entirely or in part, and the officers and crews replaced shall be repatriated to Germany.

Suitable compensation, to be fixed by the Allied Governments, shall be made for the use of such vessels.

All questions of detail, as also any exceptions to be made in the case of certain types of vessel, shall be settled by a special agreement to be concluded immediately.

The delegates of the Associated Governments are authorized and directed to proceed upon these instructions as to revictualling.

2. Subject to the above undertaking by Germany the principal representative of the Allied and Associated Powers is authorized to make a communication to the German representatives. (On the basis set forth in Annexure 1.)

3. An Admiral, to be nominated by the British Government, will be the principal representative of the Allied and Associated Powers in these negotiations.

4. In order to avoid delay, the negotiations shall take place at BRUSSELS.

The French Government undertake to make the necessary arrangements with the Belgian Government.

Marshal Foch undertakes to make the necessary communication to the Germans delegates.
Villa Majestic, Paris,
March 10, 1919.

ANNEXURE I

SUPREME ECONOMIC COUNCIL

1. On grounds of humanity, the Associated Governments reiterate their decision to deliver to Germany the food now available in Europe for which payment has been arranged as soon as Germany shows her genuine intention to carry out her obligations, by sending to sea for that purpose the ships to be selected by the Associated Governments, and the Associated Governments will themselves provide (as quickly as transportation can be arranged) or will give permits for import from neighboring neutrals for the balance of the month's supply, that is, of 270,000 tons agreed on, as soon as at least ships have been similarly sent to sea, and as soon as payment for such food has been arranged.

2. She may import up to (300,000) tons of breadstuffs and (70,000) tons of fats monthly until September 1.

3. She must pay for this food and may pay in any of the following ways:

(a) By the hire of ships.

(b) By the export of commodities and the same of cargoes of German ships now in neutral countries.

(c) By credits in neutral countries.

(d) By the outright sale of foreign securities or properties.

(e) By the arrangement of advances against the use of foreign securities on properties as collateral.

(f) Further, gold also may be used as collateral or loans to be released as other means of payment provide means of liquidating such loans. The outright sale of gold can only be permitted in the event of its being agreed by the Associated Powers that the above-named means of payment* are inadequate.

4. She may export commodities (except those on a black list) to any neutral or other agreed destination. The proceeds from these exports must, however, be converted into payments for foodstuffs.

5. A definite amount of the shipping handed over will be continuously available to transport food to Germany until next harvest.

6. She may purchase and import foodstuffs within the limits above stated, from neutrals who will, when necessary, be allowed to reimport equivalent quantities.

7. It is understood that the declaration of the Associated Governments under this communication will be null and void, should Germany break the terms of the Armistice.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1219: Letter

German Admiralty Refuses to Permit Inspection of Zeppelins

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, March 7, 1919.

No. 94

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

* * * * *

8. Information in Regard to Zeppelins: Referring to my Secret Report No. 86, part 1, containing a request from the Allies for certain information in regard to Zeppelins, the Germans made the following reply, which was sent from the German Admiralty:

* * * * *

* The methods of payment provided in (d), (e), (f), shall not be resorted to beyond the sum of \$200,000,000 (in addition to the financial arrangements already agreed upon in payment of the first 270,000 tons of food), until in the judgment of the Supreme Economic Council the possibilities of payment under (a), (b), and (c), have proved inadequate.

"The inspection of airship grounds by a French Commission for the purpose of obtaining information and study is not supported by an Article of the Armistice Agreement. It can, therefore, not be permitted. An inspection by an Allied Commission has already taken place in December."

* * * * *

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier-General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1219: Letter

German Shipments by Sea

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, March 7, 1919.

No. 94

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

* * * * *

2. Germans Not Authorized to Make Shipments by Sea: Marshal Foch informed the President of the P. I. A. C. that the Allied and Associated Governments have decided that Germany is not authorized to send ships by sea from the west to the east between the ports of Germany and the eastern Baltic. Likewise, the transportation by sea of coal is not authorized. All requests up to the present time of the German Armistice Naval Commission in this respect have been refused. To the above, General von Hammerstein replied as follows:

The Allied Governments cannot be in doubt on certain subjects that by means of these measures progress in Bolshevism will be greatly assisted. The only object of this transportation of troops is to reinforce Germany's front in the east against Bolshevism. The cargoes of coal being sent from EMDEN and STETTIN to East Prussia were for the inhabitants there, as they were unable to obtain coal by other methods of transportation owing to the difficulty of the railway situation, etc. The lack of coal increases the want of the population and the unemployment of them. In consequence, it is leaning towards Bolshevism.

6. Landing of Polish Troops at Danzig: General von Hammerstein presented to the Allies the following note:

On March 6 the Interallied Mission at WARSAW had a conference at the railroad station of KREUZ in German district of Posen, presided over by the Ambassador Mulanz, requesting the landing of Polish troops at DANZIG. With reference to my note of February 22, number 11,805, I emphasized the fact that the landing of strong Polish forces at DANZIG will undoubtedly give rise to new bloodshed. It would be considered by the excited Polish minority of West Prussia as the signal for an uprising that was intended by the Entente.

Allied officers who are said to be going to accompany these troops could not prevent this. Also the transportation of food from DANZIG to Poland would be greatly prejudiced by the transportation of troops. I especially emphasize the grave danger to the German front which is confronting the Bolsheviks which is raised by the disturbing of its communications.

If the Allies consider it necessary to send Polish troops to Poland via the Baltic at the present time, it proposes that these troops should be sent primarily via LIBAU.

According to unequivocal statements on the part of the Allied Governments it is their earnest desire to avoid outbreak of new hostilities between Germany and the Poles in the east. If this is to be done DANZIG cannot be used as a port of disembarkation for Polish troops and, therefore, I am instructed by the German Government to enter once again a protest on this subject.

By General Nudant:

I ask the following question. Have the German representatives who were informed of this question by the representative, Mr. von Neubant, answered?

By General von Hammerstein:

I will read you a telegram on this subject which I received from BROMBERG. BROMBERG is the seat of the conference of the Commission dealing with Polish officers in Germany. 'In today's conference the Interallied Commission at the station at KREUZ, a station near BROMBERG, this Commission refused to accept the German proposals and held to its original stipulation that the Polish troops could not be landed at DANZIG.'

Mr. Neubant does not consider himself competent to negotiate regarding any other point than DANZIG and for this reason I bring it to the notice of General Nudant so that the point of view can be transmitted to PARIS.

7. Remarks on above: The great concern felt by the Germans in regard to the new Polish boundary between that country and Germany has led to the most delicate military situation which the Allies have had to handle since November 11, last.

If the Germans could be made to realize that the presence of troops on that front, either Polish or German, will have little or nothing to do with the fixing of that boundary, it would save much embarrassment and work, to the advantage of both sides. There seems no question but that this boundary will be determined by the Peace Conference at PARIS, and no amount of physical force on the part of the Poles, or that of the Germans, will vary it one kilometer either way.

The withdrawal of all military forces from both sides, except a few battalions for duty as constabulary, would give to the Poles a fairly strong force to operate in either direction against Bolsheviks, and at the same time it would release to the Germans a very considerable military force (to the best of my information, at least, three or four divisions) for the support of their Government. Their refusal to consent to the Polish divisions from France to be landed at DANZIG also seems shortsighted, for with all their claims to be struggling against Bolshevism, they place an obstacle in the way of these Polish divisions taking their place with other Polish troops to combat the Bolsheviks who are advancing from Russia, and, therefore, threatening Germany as well as Poland.

Their claim that the landing of these troops in DANZIG would be considered by the excited Polish minority of west Prussia as the signal for an uprising that was intended by the Entente, is difficult to understand.

It is certain that the Entente are not planning or desiring any uprising and it does not seem probable that the Polish minority would find any solace, or assistance, in the presence of these troops while being landed and sent forward to Poland, but even if the situation developed, as predicted in this note, it seems that it would be the least of the evils, as the presence of these divisions for combatting Bolshevism would be very material, while any disturbance of the Polish minority would undoubtedly be shortlived, and, as stated above, would in no way enter into the final determination of the Polish boundary.

* * * * *

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1219: Letter

German Armistice Commission at Posen

No. 95

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, March 8, 1919.

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

* * * * *

3. Restrictions Placed upon an Armistice Commission at POSEN:

General von Hammerstein read the following telegram which had just been received from the German Section of the Interallied Commission at POSEN:

The German Armistice Commission at POSEN arrived there on March 6, and was accompanied to the hotel under military guard. The Commission is at the hotel under constant supervision of Gendarmes. They are not allowed to leave the hotel except under guard of the Gendarmes, according to definite Polish orders. A Polish officer is present at every conversation. The Armistice Commission, POSEN Section, has no commander. In view of these circumstances, there could be no sitting today. Try to have a note sent to Marshal Foch tomorrow asking him to issue orders that complete freedom of communication be given to the German Armistice Commission at POSEN. (signed) Erzberger.

The President of the German Armistice Commission raised a protest against the Allies' treatment of the German Armistice Commission in the town of POSEN. This Commission is an Allied one which has been endeavoring to keep the German and Polish troops from engaging in combat. Its place of sitting has been at POSEN, part of the time only. The French representative on this Commission is General Dupont; the American representatives are General Kernan and Colonel Lord.

In reply to the above, General Nudant stated that he would transmit this communication to Marshal Foch, but he asked why the Commission was at POSEN instead of at BROMBERG, where it was supposed to meet.

To this General von Hammerstein replied that POSEN was selected at the request of the Interallied Commission.

March 8, 1919.

Marshal Ferdinand Foch, Commander-in-Chief, Allied Armies.

My dear Marshal:

The matter of maintenance of troops of occupation having been referred to me, I beg to advise you that my ideas on this subject are as follows:

First: The expenses of maintenance as defined in the minutes of the session of the Armistice Subcommittee of January 9, 1919, represent the obligation assumed by Germany to the United States.

Second: Inasmuch as the average daily cost of maintenance of the American Army is greater than that of the other Armies, the United States cannot agree that the French average daily cost shall be taken as the measure of the amount of the obligation from Germany to the United States.

Third: In view of the fact that Germany is not presently able to meet the obligation to the United States in full, the United States is willing for the time being to receive on account from Germany payments at the same rate as may be paid by Germany per man and per month to the Allied Governments.

Fourth: Sums received from Germany pursuant to paragraph Third will be credited on the total amount due but not as complete or partial liquidation of certain or particular items of expenses.

Fifth: The United States reserves and will reserve the right to collect from Germany any balance now or hereafter due upon the German obligation and not otherwise paid, from any source, whether from funds or property in the possession of the United States or otherwise, which according to the judgment of the United States, may be or become available

The foregoing conclusions have the approval of the Financial Advisor for the United States in PARIS.

Sincerely yours,

JOHN J. PERSHING.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1234: Cablegram

Polish Prisoners Held by American Army

No. 2206-S

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,
March 8, 1919.

AGWAR

WASHINGTON

FOR CHIEF OF STAFF

Polish prisoners of war held by the French are released either for enlistment in Polish National Army, for repatriation, or for employment as free laborers in France. Polish National Committee has made urgent request that we take similar action. It is

recommended that Polish prisoners held by our Army who volunteer and are accepted for enlistment in the Polish National Army be released for that purpose and that other Polish prisoners be held until there is opportunity to repatriate them. Do you approve?

JOHN J. PERSHING,
General U. S. A.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1219: Letter

Reinforcement of German Garrisons in Neutral Zone

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, March 8, 1919.

No. 95

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

* * * * *

1. Reinforcement to the Neutral Zone: The Allied High Command has authorized the reinforcement in the Neutral Zone of 8 battalions, 2 squadrons, and 2 batteries, to wit: (1) 2 battalions in the sector of WESEL because of the troubles in the RUHR Basin; 1 battalion in the region of DUSSELDORF-MUHLHEIM; 3 battalions, 2 squadrons, and 2 batteries in the region of MANNHEIM, and 2 battalions at OFFENBURG. (2) Before coming to a decision on the new request to increase German effectives in the Neutral Zone it would be necessary to know how far reinforcement troops above mentioned have been kept in the Neutral Zone and what their present locations are. (3) The German Armistice Commission is requested moreover in addition to give exact information on the one hand as to the number of supplementary troops which it requests to be allowed to station in the Neutral Zone, and, on the other hand, the length of time in the Neutral Zone, which the German troops would occupy.

* * * * *

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section.

Report of Fighting in Berlin

2d Section, General Staff

March 8, 1919.

BY PHONE: From Colonel Conger to Colonel Moreno

LONDON WIRELESS PRESS, March 7, 1919, 12 p. m.: There is desperate fighting in BERLIN. On Friday, the most desperate effort to quell the rebellion took place, the Government using poison gas, bombing airplanes, tanks and minenwerfer. The Revolution has virtually begun. The Reds are planning to storm the Reichstag tonight, Friday. The Spartacists are shooting through the Leipziger Strasse. Men and women, including the ex-American Red Cross, are barricaded facing the Palace Hotel. The Americans are prisoners in the Mission (The Aldon Hotel), entrenched behind a border of machine guns. The rebels are entrenched over a dozen blocks, including the Alexander Platz. They have captured public buildings, the royal stables and the telegraph. It is the worst battle BERLIN has seen yet.

G-1, GHQ, AEF: 336.23: Fldr. 1: Telegram

Defeat of Spartacist Forces in Berlin

THIRD ARMY,
March 8, 1919.

Received G. H. Q., 3:30 p. m.

No. 357 G-2. Spartacist Forces have been completely defeated in BERLIN by the Luettwitz Army Corps Troops, according to dispatches in the Kolnische Zeitung, of March 8, and the Government troops are mopping up the city. The Spartacists Volksmarine Division has been practically all scattered or captured and the same is true of the Republican Soldatenwehr. One official statement of the Guard Cavalry Schuetzen Division states that the Volksmarine Division in the Volksmarine Haus melted away after this stronghold had been fairly hit with three shells from heavy Howitzers. An aviation detachment of the Luettwitz Army Corps, with three armoured biplanes, was especially useful in locating Spartacist machine-gun nests and cleaning them out with bombs and machine-gun fire.

RICHARD H. WILLIAMS,
Col, General Staff,
Asst. C. of S., G-2, Third Army.

Delivery of Trucks

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, March 8, 1919.

No. 95

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

7. *Distribution of Motor Trucks Among the Allies:* Based on information received from the Chairman of the Committee on the Receipt of Rolling Stock from the Germans, the following telegram was sent to Adv. G. H. Q.:

A meeting will be held at SPA on March 12, at 2 p. m. for the purpose of making a definite distribution of motor trucks among the Allied Armies. Request that the officer in charge of receiving motor trucks accepted showing number of each type, horsepower, and whether gear or chain drive. The list should bear the signature of the proper German representative in charge of deliveries acknowledging its correctness.

* * * * *

10. Transportation of Troops by Sea to Libau: The Germans submitted the following in regard to this subject:

The Note No. 602/G, handed me yesterday (by the Chairman of the Armistice Commission) answered one individual question which is very essential for the fight of the Germans against Russian Bolsheviks, namely, the question of transportation by sea to LIBAU.

* * * * *

Now, as far as the question of transportation by sea to LIBAU is concerned, I can do nothing more than to emphasize the extraordinary seriousness of the situation. I add the following:

When the British Commodore in LIBAU stated again to the German General Command there that he was obliged to prevent traffic on the sea, the German General Command saw itself forced to reply that it would then have to evacuate VENDEU (sic) and LIBAU and retreat to the German boundary.

There can be no doubt as to what serious results will accrue from that action. It must therefore be expressly stated that in case of a further retreat of the weak German forces the responsibility for the flood of Bolshevik misdeeds that would spread over the land would have to be borne entirely and exclusively by the Allied and Associated Governments.

* * * * *

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section.

Inundation of Mines

[Contemporary Translation]

No. 617-G

March 9, 1919.

From: General Nudant

To: General von Hammerstein

The Marshal, Commander-in-Chief of the Armies of the Allies, writes the following, dated March 6, 1919, Number 1395:

As a result of the inundation of the majority of the mine shafts in the north of France, and particularly those belonging to the companies at LENS, LIEVIN, DROCOURT, COURRIERES, and MEURCHIN, it has been impossible up to the present time to investigate the amount of destruction of the shoring caused by the Germans.

As this destruction was certainly done according to method and as the result of deep study, I beg you to ask the German Government to furnish immediately the documents bearing upon the destruction of each of the shafts enumerated above.

Just the same as Germany must restore all the machinery which it took away, it must likewise give all necessary information for the restoration of the mines which it systematically devastated.

The President of the German Armistice Commission is requested to see to it that the information asked for above is transmitted as soon as possible.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1220: Note

French Officers in German Factory

[Contemporary Translation]

A. A. I. I. No. 2466

March 9, 1919.

From the Representative of the German Government

To the Chairman of the P. I. A. C.

On January 28, the Baden Aniline and Soda Factory at LUDWIGSHAFEN on the RHINE and at OPPAU was put under surveillance of occupation forces. There are 7 French officers constantly present in the factories. All of the officers are experts, that is to say chemists and physicists. These officers are not only vigilant in the matter of seeing that no further material of war is manufactured in the factories, but they also are demanding information on all the secret formulas of the factory. They are seeking out information upon the construction of apparatus and methods of work in greatest detail and they are asking employees and workmen for the secrets of the manufactures.

The action of these French officers is not compatible with the spirit of the Armistice Agreement, on the contrary it is an unjustifiable attack upon the private rights and economic conditions.

In behalf of the German Government I enter most emphatic protest against this action and request that the necessary measures be taken to stop the above mentioned circumstances.

von HANIEL.

Provisioning Germany

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, March 9, 1919.

From: Chief

To: C-in-C, G-1, G. H. Q., American E. F.

1. I sent you this morning a telegram outlining the action which I have taken during the last three days in connection with conditions in Germany and the supply of food.

2. I am inclosing herewith a report from General Harries made after his arrival here and our conferences on the same questions. In my special report to the C-in-C, A. E. F., dated March 6, I touched on the same questions---see Paragraph 6 of that report.

3. As stated in General Harries report (Paragraph 3), the crux of the situation is the supply of food to Germany.

4. As I see it there are two essential points to be considered and two important ones though less essential. The essential points are:

(1) The fulfillment on our part of agreements entered into in the Armistice Conventions;

(2) The preservation in Germany of a responsible Government. The other two considerations are:

(1) The handling of the Russian prisoners; and,

(2) The welfare of our officers, enlisted men and Red Cross workers as well as those of our Allies who are now in Germany.

5. In regard to the first of the above considerations, Paragraph 26 of the original Armistice Agreement of November 11 states, "The Allies and the United States to consider the provisioning of Germany during the Armistice to such an extent as may be recognized as necessary." Paragraph 8 of the Armistice Convention entered into TREVES on January 16, 1919, states that, "In order to assure the provisioning of Germany and the remainder of Europe the German Government shall take all the necessary measures in order to put, during the length of the Armistice, all the German commercial fleet under the control and under the flags of the Allied powers and of the United States, assisted by a German delegate."

These agreements call upon the Allied Powers and the United States to provision Germany during the Armistice. The Armistice has now been in effect four months (less two days), and as yet no definite steps have been taken looking to carrying out our plans in this matter. There is a marked movement on foot at present to conclude a peace with Germany, reports showing that it is hoped that this will be accomplished by April 1. If this is correct it means that the period of the Armistice is nearly at an end and we have nothing to fulfill an agreement upon which the Germans very properly placed a very great value, and an agreement which has strong appeal to the man on the street. A failure to live up to this agreement is now injuring our prestige in Germany very greatly, and a continued failure may leave serious marks in that country as to our integrity.

6. In regard to the second of the above essential considerations, attention is invited to the last part of Paragraph 4 of General Harries report which states that, "Unless the German Government is speedily authorized to inform the German people that the promised revictualling of Germany will soon be a fact it will surely succumb to assault." Attention is also invited to the last part of Paragraph 10 of his report. It will be noted that Major General Ewart, the head of the Allied Commission in BERLIN is fully in accord with these views.

It is difficult to see how the Allies could take a step at this time which will be more pronounced in its benefit to themselves than will be the announcement to the German Government that food will be supplied in the near future, if possible fixing the exact date. This, of course, to be followed by the prompt shipments of food. The converse is, of course, true that it is difficult to see how the Allies could neglect a situation that is more serious than this, the neglect of which is fraught with more serious consequences to the interests of the Allies.

Summing up these two essential considerations, it is:

- (1) A question of our fulfilling our solemn agreement; and,
- (2) Taking action which is of the greatest importance to the interests of the Allies.

7. In regard to the first of the considerations of lesser importance, namely, the handling of the Russian prisoners, if the present German Government is overthrown it seems unquestioned that a largely irresponsible government will take its place, one which will have little or no interest in Russian prisoners of war unless that interest is to get rid of them. In this case these prisoners will unquestionably be turned loose and will become an irresponsible mass, and in most cases will probably join the Bolsheviks. If this transpires we shall have failed in a great enterprise, the success of which will redound greatly to our credit.

8. In regard to the second of the considerations of lesser importance, namely, the welfare of our officers, enlisted men and Red Cross workers in Germany and those of our Allies, attention is invited to Paragraph 9 of General Harries report. If the present Government is overthrown and an irresponsible one takes its place, the conditions of these officers and men can be imagined by anyone reading this report, as well as for me to attempt to picture it.

If such a situation arises the question may well be asked, what will the United States do about it? The answer is now easy. The British and French Governments have somewhat less concern in this matter than have we for the reason that their personnel now in Germany is very small as compared with ours.

9. There is, of course, no question but what the Allied and Neutral Governments should be fed first, but this work seems to be progressing. With the assistance of the shipping which the Germans are prepared to place at the disposal of the Allies for this purpose just as soon as assurances are given them that food will be sent, there should be no difficulty in sending food to Germany at the same time that it is being given to other nations. In any case it is difficult to see what reason there is for withholding from Germany the assurance that food will be supplied in necessary quantities at such time as the Allied Food Commission decides as practicable.

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1219: Memorandum

Political Necessity of Provisioning Germany

Spa, March 9, 1919.

MEMORANDUM FOR: Brigadier General Barnum, Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

1. Conditions in BERLIN, and throughout Germany generally, have reached a stage which compels me to send you this resume of facts and opinions, which will undoubtedly receive prompt consideration.

I have not thought it necessary to deluge you with correspondence over the minor phases of latterday political activities in Germany, but now that we are beginning to be involved in what is a serious condition, I am making this informal report.

2. For the past three months, as you know, I have been on duty in BERLIN. When I arrived in that city there was extended to me a hearty welcome, and this same sort of a welcome was given to all of the Allied representatives. During the past month there has been a great change in public sentiment toward the Allied representatives generally and a very marked change so far as we of the United States are concerned. Among the causes which brought about a more or less popular revolution of feeling are these:

(a) Disappointment because President Wilson has not done for Germany those things which Germany believed, without reason, he would do;

(b) A firm belief that the Armistice obligations to revictual Germany are being evaded or unreasonably postponed;

(c) German inability to comprehend our insistence upon doubling the bread ration for their Russian prisoners of war and our known plans to still further fatten the prisoner ration, while no definite announcement has been made as to an allotment of food for Germany;

(d) German complaint that we are holding a dangerous element (Russian Prisoners) in Germany for ulterior purposes, although it has been, and is, the German desire to repatriate the Russians as speedily as possible;

(e) Bolshevik propaganda and funds devoted to the creation of an atmosphere unfriendly to the Allies,---particularly England and the United States---because of our activities in behalf of Russian prisoners of war;

(f) Growing German resentment because we are constant and unwelcome witnesses of Germany's internal strife and because they feel as though we must be gratified by the exposure of German nakedness.

3. Of the cases mentioned, I now regard only one (b) as of vital importance, it involves the crux of a most serious situation.

4. The present Government of Germany has maintained existence in spite of the many determined efforts to overthrow it. I have no opinion as to whether the Government has been wise or otherwise. It is however, a Government and it has up to this time withstood the many physical and political attempts to overthrow it. It is, I firmly believe, a better Government than can be provided by those German elements which are endeavoring to destroy it. But unless the German Government is speedily authorized to inform the German people that the promised revictualing of Germany will soon be a fact, it will surely succumb to assault.

5. Just now the Government has troops---some capable and dependable, some dependable and inexperienced, and some of doubtful loyalty---but unless food supplies are soon provided the doubt as to loyalty will be resolved into disloyalty through the processes of hunger and criminal instinct.

6. From the time of the November revolution there has been slackness in the matter of food control and distribution, which means, of course, that the wealthy minority had the advantage, while the vast majority, particularly in the cities, suffered all the disadvantages. These disadvantages were later accentuated by Spartacist seizure of food stores and the liberal distribution thereof to those who would take up arms against the Government. As a natural consequence, there was great growth of Spartacist power, culminating for the present in the civil war which is now on in BERLIN and in other populous centers. The hungry man (with hungry family) easily lays aside his desire for an orderly life when it is made clear to him that participation in disorder will provide food for himself and those dependent upon him. All conscientious scruples are swept aside by the Primal Law. Few men starve calmly.

7. Thus has grown, Spartacism, or Bolshevism, or whatever else we may call it; every known criminal in the cities involved being in the ranks of the rioters or leading their companies. From the almost pardonable larceny of food to other and more flagrant varieties of crime is but a short step---even for a reasonably honest man. Therefore, has followed the looting of jewelry stores, cigar stores, clothing stores, and such other establishments as caught the eye of the mobs' fancy. Only troops, machine guns, and artillery saved hotels and the larger restaurants.

8. So far as we of the Allied Commission are concerned, there has not yet been any overt act. Epithets, denunciation, scowling faces, and clenched fists have been in evidence, but, except for one physical retort by an Italian officer, there has been no breach of the peace. Our defense has been avoidance---requested by the Government. We remain in our respective quarters and offices and do business as best we can. As during previous outbreaks, we have been practically interned. During this outbreak our telegraphic correspondence has sometimes suffered long delay and there has been interruption of telephone service. A general strike threatens all train service, so I requested the Headquarters Third Army to endeavor to maintain communication by motorcycle whenever it should learn that railway connections had been cut.

9. My real concern, however, is as to the approximately 700 of our officers and men (with almost 50 American Red Cross officials) who are scattered all over Germany in the Russian prisoners of war camps. Because we were originally informed that we would operate under the Geneva convention, all of us are unarmed. The small detachment of Puchheim felt compelled during the disturbances at Munich to seek safety in Switzerland, but so far there has been no serious effort to disturb other detachments.

10. With the Munich episode in mind, I sought information as to the desire and the power of the Government to afford protection, and was assured (through Major-General Sir Richard Ewart, President of the Commission) that the Government would do everything possible to protect Allied officers and soldiers on duty in Germany.

That assurance came from the German Foreign Office and was substantiated by the War Office. In conversation with a correspondent of the London Times, a foreign office official had stated only the day before that the period of Governmental capability was quite uncertain. The Government is emphatic in its announcement of belief that it will win in the present struggle, but it is my information and belief that nothing less than a definite promise of food by the Allies---given within not more than two weeks from this date---will enable this German Government to withstand the pressure which is, and will be, exerted by its adversaries. In this opinion I have the resolute support of Major-General Ewart.

11. I had expected to put the direct question to General Dupont, of the French Mission, but he is revisiting Poland. General Bencivenda, of the Italian Mission, has been in Germany only a few days and I was unable to see him before responding to your telephonic suggestion that I come to SPA for a conference. Since arriving here I find that Lieut. General Sir Richard Haking, Chief of the British Section of the Armistice Commission, had long ago reached the conclusion that without food for Germany the conditions in that country might easily become intolerable. The question of when a beginning is to be made in the revictualing of Germany is necessarily to be answered only by the Allied Supreme Command. If the answer is promptly affirmative, then I assume that we shall have no difficulty in continuing our work in behalf of the Russian prisoners. If the answer be delayed more than a week or two, we shall probably have a period of greater or less length during which our operations will be practically suspended. But, naturally, under any and all circumstances, we must be assured that our detachments are protected and rationed. The distribution of rations is not a small matter physically and it will be a difficult job if there is traffic interruption or if there be attacks upon our food convoys by hostile forces. To withdraw our troops and our Red Cross auxiliaries would be not only embarrassing but humiliating. Nothing but the direct necessity should cause us to leave the Russian prisoners---who are now dependent upon us---to the chaos which would ensue; out of hand, they would add greatly to the confusion which would necessarily follow.

12. We who have put our hands to this plow do not dream of looking back, but my duty and my inclination compel me to be mindful of our unarmed detachments.

13. You will, I know, give this matter the careful thought it deserves.

14. If the Supreme Command will promptly notify the German Government that revictualing of Germany will begin at the earliest practicable date, there will then be no problem.

GEORGE H. HARRIES,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1219: Note

Transportation of Food for Czechs

[Contemporary Translation]

No. 12902/2273

Spa, March 10, 1919.

From: General von Hammerstein

To: General Barnum

In answer to note of March 7, 1919.

As high as 3,000 tons of foodstuffs can be transported daily for the Czechs via HAMBURG and further by the ELBE. Transportation by water by means of the ELBE boats can proceed as far up the ELBE as the Bohemian transfer stations of LAUBE, TETSCHEN and SHOEN-PEJESEN (sic) duration of transport about 16 days, and in case of satisfactory navigation conditions as far as PRAGUE, duration of transport about 3 weeks. The transfer from boat to railway would also occur at the Saxon ports REISA and DRESDEN which are especially well equipped. Essential conditions, however, for this purpose are, that the Czechs must first of all put in both cities sufficient railway material at the disposal of the Allies in order to transport the materiels on their further journey; secondly, they must give back the 50 German locomotives that have been held up by them. The German Government further requests the assurance that the freight rates will be assured to them in moneys of the foreign countries so that they may be used by Germany for the purchase of foodstuffs.

In view of the difficult situation in Germany and with reference to the German people it would seem advisable that the transportation of foodstuffs to the Czechs should not occur without at the same time assuring the provisioning of the German people with food.

von HAMMERSTEIN.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1219: Letter

Industrial Subcommittee to Meet

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, March 10, 1919.

No. 96

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

* * * * *

8. Meeting of Representatives on Industrial Committee: General Nudant notified the Germans that French and Belgian representatives of the Industrial Subcommittee will

be at SPA Saturday morning, the 15th of this month, to discuss the application of the German decree of February 1, 1919, which is judged to be insufficient. Request the German Government to name representatives having full power and to notify us immediately of their names. The negotiations have to be ended on March 18, 1919, at the latest.

This meeting is for the purpose of discussing the German decree of February 1, 1919, a complete translation of which will be found attached to my Secret Report No. 69. Reference is made to this in Paragraph 4 of that report.

* * * * *

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1220: Note

Gold for Settlement of Notes

[Contemporary Translation]

No. 13339 F No. 743

March 10, 1919.

From the Representative of the German Government

To the Chairman of the P. I. A. C.

The German Bank must settle notes falling due within a very short time for credits obtained from neutral foreign countries. On March 15, a credit of 6,500,000 Crowns will fall due in Scandinavia; on March 31 a further amount that is estimated at approximately 45,000,000 francs will fall due in Switzerland. Further important sums will be due in Scandinavia in the course of the month of April. These obligations must be settled under all circumstances, for the neutral lands are pressing for payment and because the extension of other credits that extend over longer periods have been made dependent upon the punctual payment of these amounts. Therefore, failure to pay would not only make impossible the satisfaction of the normal needs of our economic life and the maintenance of previous imports of necessary articles of food and clothing from neutral lands, but would also lead to the collapse of the entire credit of the Deutschen [German?] Bank and of the important German firms which have underwritten these credits, and would thereby profoundly disturb the credit of the German Government. Further securities to cover these credits are no longer obtainable and cannot be expected to be obtained within a reasonable amount of time under the present conditions of export. Therefore these credits that are due must be covered by gold exports.

As far back as the first of March the Reichsbank presented a request to Mr. Martin in MAYENCE, the financial commissioner for the Allied Governments, for permission to export 75,000,000 marks in gold. Mr. Martin declared that he was not empowered to render a decision and he transmitted the request to the Interallied Economic Council in PARIS. Inasmuch as the date when the first credits will fall due is very close at hand, the German Government urgently requests that the necessary consent required in view of Article I, Paragraph 1, of the financial convention of TRIER for the exportation of gold be generously granted. The German Government calls attention to the fact that the collapse of German credit and the declaration in Neutral Zones of the inability of Germany to pay which would be the result of a refusal for this permission, ought to be avoided also in the interests of the Allied Governments.

von HANIEL.

Transport of Food from Mannheim to Prague

[Contemporary Translation]

No. 12754-2254

Spa, March 10, 1919.

From: General von Hammerstein

To: General Nudant

In answer to Note No. 581-T of March 6.

Information from the German Government announces that the question of the daily transport of 3,000 tons of foodstuffs from MANNHEIM to PRAGUE has been studied by the German railway authorities. The result of the investigation is that as a result of the transport situation on the German railways at the present time it is not possible to carry through this plan of transportation. It is therefore proposed that the transportation of the foodstuffs occur by the following route:

By sea to HAMBURG and thence by the ELBE.

But in the meantime details on this subject are contained in the answer. I have given in my note to the Chief of the American Section of the P. I. A. C. of March 7, in Note 12902-2273.

von Hammerstein.

Meeting of Committee on Provisioning Germany

[Contemporary Translation]

No. 635/G

PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, March 10, 1919.

From General Nudant

To the President of the German Armistice Commission

The Marshal, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies, sends the following telegram dated March 10, No. 1445:

The Allied Governments have decided that their representatives, in a restricted number, under the presidency of Admiral Wemyss will meet at BRUSSELS on Thursday, March 13, 1919, with the representatives of the German Government in order to communicate to them the decisions that they have made concerning the German commercial fleet, foodstuffs for Germany, and in order to regulate the financial questions attached therewith. The hour of the meeting will be fixed later. I request you to notify the German representatives immediately.

Russian Prisoners of War

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, March 10, 1919.

No. 96

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

3. Ukrainian Delegation in Berlin: General von Hammerstein presented the following note:

The agreement regarding the prolongation of the Armistice of January 16, 1919, lays down in Article 4 that a Commission of officers from the Allied and Associated Governments sent to Germany would take over the control of Russian prisoners of war and deal with all questions concerning Russian prisoners of war. At the negotiations held at TREVES in the middle of February for the further prolongation of the Armistice, Marshal Foch handed over a note in which a complaint was raised regarding Article 4 above mentioned and which stated that the activity of Bolshevist agents in Russian P. O. W. [prisoner of war] camps was continuing.

In answer to this note the Germans delegates state that the envoys sent to the Soviet Republic for the relief of Russian prisoners had been forbidden to continue their activities in the prisoner of war camps. The question as to whether the activity of the Interallied Commission includes dealings concerning prisoners of war of Ukrainian nationality and as to whether it is demanded that delegates from the Ukrainian Government should also be forbidden to carry out relief measures has not yet been decided. The German Government has recognized the Ukraine as an independent state and in accordance with the law of nations is not in position literally to renounce this recognition. Furthermore, it does not consider itself justified without further authority to forbid the Ukraine to send delegates for the relief of Ukrainian prisoners. I, therefore, request that Marshal Foch may be asked to give a ruling as soon as possible on this question.

To this General Nudant replied as follows:

Then I wonder why the German Government respects the identity of the Ukrainian Government. I don't understand why the German Government considers itself prohibited from prohibiting Bolshevist Ukrainian agents to enter Germany. We have been several times asked for our position in this matter. It is already firmly determined. I, therefore, interpret this note in this way: That the German Government does not wish to obey Marshal Foch's injunction to prevent Bolshevist agents to enter the prisoner of war camps.

In accordance with the request of General von Hammerstein, Major von Pabst, of the German Mission, gave the following explanation:

I think it is a question of a misunderstanding here. It is only a question of an explanation. The TREVES agreement speaks only of Russian prisoners of war. It does not differentiate between prisoners of Great Russia and from the Ukraine. A Ukrainian delegation has arrived at BERLIN and has made the request that Ukrainian delegates may be sent to the Ukrainian prisoners of war. Therefore, the German Government has considered it expedient to ask for an expression on the subject. It is not that the Germans have any wish whatever to receive Ukrainian delegates in our camps, but we only want some basis on which we can base our answer to the Ukrainian Government.

It will be noted that in these latter remarks it is stated that a Ukrainian delegation has arrived at BERLIN and has made the request that their delegates may be sent to the Ukrainian prisoners of war. There has never been any information to the effect that Ukrainian prisoners are in any way separated from other Russian prisoners, either in separate camps or in camps where both may be found.

As the United States is very deeply concerned with the care of Russian prisoners, the question of a Ukrainian delegation taking a hand in the management of these camps at this time is one which concerns us very largely. I cannot understand that such participation in the management at this time can do any good whatever and is liable to do very great harm.

The statement that these delegates expect to carry out relief measures seems quite preposterous, as they have no food whatever to give, or medicine, or other form of relief which it is believed can be genuine.

I am communicating with our Mission in BERLIN for the purpose of commanding first hand information as to what these delegates propose to do.

* * * * *

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1220: Radiogram

Ukrainian Delegation for Relief of Ukrainian Prisoners

No. 701

Spa, Belgium, March 10, 1919.

General George H. Harries,

Hotel Adlon,
Berlin, Germany

At meeting of Armistice Commission this morning Germans presented a note to the effect that a Ukrainian delegation has arrived in BERLIN for the purpose of carrying out relief measures for Ukrainian prisoners. Are Ukrainian prisoners in any way separated from those from other parts of Russia? Is it possible for this delegation to carry out relief measures? Does General Ewart consider that this Commission can be of any service whatever? Is there not much greater danger of their exciting the Russian prisoners and doing harm; If such is likely to result from the presence of these delegates, is it not desirable that they should be sent back to the Ukraine at once?

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section.

Supplies for Russian Prisoners in Germany

No. 2903-R

March 10, 1919.

PERSHING
AMEXFORCES

Cable from Hoover to the Secretary of War requests that the American Expeditionary Forces be asked to furnish supplies for Russian prisoners in Germany on order of General Harries in BERLIN, arrangements having been made by Hoover with French Government to pay for same. You are therefore authorized to direct General Harries to turn over such surplus and other Army supplies as may be called for by Hoover's representative in Berlin, for the use of Russian prisoners in Germany, to Hoover's representative, taking necessary receipt from said representative and forwarding same to Chief Quartermaster American Expeditionary Forces, for collection from either Hoover or the French Government.

P. C. HARRIS,
Maj. General, U. S. A.,
The Adjutant General.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1220: Note

Request for Opening of Additional Ports

[Contemporary Translation]

No. 13291

Spa, March 10, 1919.

From the Chairman of the German Mission

To the Chairman of the P. I. A. C.

In connection with Note No. 11474 of February 26, 1919, it is requested that permission be granted that not only the ports of HAMBURG and STETTIN be opened for the transportation of foodstuffs from ROTTERDAM by means of the coastal ships, but also that the ports of WARNEMUNDE, ROSTOCK, and WISMAR be also opened.

The interior situation in the above mentioned ports is thoroughly quiet.

von HAMMERSTEIN.

Allied Commission in Poland

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, March 10, 1919.

No. 96

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

2. Functions of the Allied Commission in Poland: At the opening of the session this morning General Nudant made the following statement:

General von Hammerstein at the last meeting asked me what is the mission of the Committee that is now in Poland. I have no absolute definite information in detail on the mission, but I believe that I can say that this Commission proposes, first, to take all necessary measures to obtain the respect of the line of demarcation just as it was laid down, to wit: If I remember correctly, leaving to the Germans BENTSCHEN and leaving to the Poles a sort of pocket that lies to the south of BROMBERG,---a pocket which moreover does not contain any important points. This decision was reached on the proposal of General Dupont in accord with the officials of the German Government---this was the practical solution to avoid further hostilities. Secondly, to establish a Neutral Zone. That is to say, a strip of land of, I believe, one kilometer in width that should be occupied neither by the Poles nor the Germans. Third, to come into an understanding with the German Government in order to bring peace into this territory. I believe that it was also to study the question of the transport by way of DANZIG of the Polish troops coming from France; and, in addition, and finally I believe it was to study likewise questions connected with the exchange of hostages. I give this merely by way of information and not with absolute certainty. The people who know best are the German Commission sitting in Poland.

To this, General von Hammerstein replied, as follows:

The opinion just expressed by General Nudant coincides with mine. Minister Nouleens should study the question of Polish troops disembarking at DANZIG. The question as to whether the troops are to be disembarked at DANZIG or not will rest naturally with Marshal Foch. In this connection I should like to raise one other point. General Nudant thinks that the third point studied by Ambassador Nouleens is the question of restoring peace and order into POSEN area. I have a report here, a wireless telegram, from POSEN to PARIS, stating Mr. Gretchewitz, the President of the Peoples Council at POSEN first of all greeted the representatives of the Allied Powers who had arrived in POSEN. Ambassador Nouleens replied by saying that POSEN was a part of Poland,---a statement which evoked loud cheers. If this information is correct I must protest against it as being in anticipation of the work of the Peace Conference, which would increase the unrest in POSEN and make more difficult the work of the Commission on both sides.

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section.

The Polish Question

Spa, Belgium, March 10, 1919.

NOTES ON THE TALK OF GENERAL VON HAMMERSTEIN TO THE CHIEFS OF THE ALLIED MISSIONS AND THEIR CHIEFS OF STAFF,

[Extract]

I. LANDING OF POLISH TROOPS AT DANZIG:

1. General von Hammerstein presented a map showing the outline of the German eastern front at present and the outline of the Polish front against the Bolsheviks as he understood it to be.

2. This front of the Germans, opposed to the Bolsheviks, extends in the general line from WINDAU, on the Baltic, through MOURAVJEVO to KOVNO and GRODNO. It is at present east of the NIEMEN River, between KOVNO and GRODNO,---this river in case of retreat forming a good line of defence, being supported on each flank by the fortresses of KOVNO and GRODNO.

3. He called particular attention to the difficulties of supplying the troops on the line north of KOVNO, i. e., the line running through the heart of COURLAND to WINDAU. He pointed out the lines of communication now used are the only ones available at present to the Germans,---due to their being cut off by sea from the ports of WINDAU, LIBAU and MEMEL.

4. These railroad lines coming from Germany pass across the Vistula at MARIENBURG, going through KASSCOWITZ on the one hand, and CANITZ on the other branch. There are two lines available to the Germans passing through east Prussia,---one by way of MARIENBURG, ELBING, KONIGSBERG, to the eastern front, and the other through MARIENWERDER, ALLENSTEIN and GUMBINNEN, also to the eastern front. The Germans have constructed a war-railway from MEMEL, north, which they are using as far as LIBAU in supplying the front line. He pointed out the lack of railroad communication in COURLAND, especially in the northern section, stating that WINDAU, the left flank of the line, was more or less in the air.

5. Having indicated the lines of communication upon which the Germans depend to supply their east front against the Bolsheviks, he stated further that along the Vistula and in the direction of DANZIG, where these lines cross, there are mixtures of Poles and Germans; that agitators were endeavoring to stir up the Poles against the Germans; that they had been unsuccessful so far in causing any serious difficulties; but that if the agitation in these sections succeeded, those lines upon which they depended for supplying their eastern front could be very easily cut. In this connection, he stated that in their agitation, Polish agents were not loathe to use Bolshevik propaganda to stir up the people against the Germans.

6. Having shown, in this section, the sensitiveness of these lines of communication, and the great importance of them and the possibility of further agitation resulting in their being cut entirely, he then referred to the danger of sending by way of DANZIG to this section the Polish divisions of General Haller, maintaining that the passage of these divisions would incite the Polish people; the agitators would take advantage of their presence for this purpose; that the very end that the Allies maintained that they want to reach would be difficult to attain, or impossible, by reason of the introduction of these disorders. It was because of these two reasons, namely the cutting off of the German troops fighting against Bolshevism in the east, and the increase of disorders, that the Germans protest against the landing of the Polish divisions at DANZIG.

7. He proposed instead of using the DANZIG landing place, that these divisions be landed either at LIBAU or MEMEL or PILLAU, which is the harbor of KONIGSBERG. He pointed out the lines running from MEMEL and KONIGSBERG, especially north and south, into Poland, stating that the line from KONIGSBERG to BIALYSTOK is a broad gauge main line and that this line is the shortest distance for these troops to take to the logical point of concentration, namely, BIALYSTOK, against the Bolsheviks in the east.

8. General von Hammerstein stated further that according to their information, the Bolsheviks were concentrating at VILNA; that there is now at VILNA a large concentration of Bolshevik troops, and a propaganda bureau headed by the notorious Joffe and that Lenin himself was there.

(Note) This information about Joffe agrees with that received from General Harries recently.

9. General von Hammerstein also stated that they had information that a great offensive against the Germans was to have begun about February 1, but that any one who had fought in Russia and knew the weather conditions could understand that such an offensive would have to be delayed until after April 1, calling this rainy season, lasting through March, the Rasputin---a period when the roads are obliterated.

10. He pointed out that assuming that the Polish divisions are to be used against the Bolsheviks in the east, BIALYSTOK would be the natural point of concentration and would form a point from which to launch a flank attack against VILNA.

11. On the general question of the use of railways for transporting the Polish divisions into Poland, he pointed out the congestion of the lines running from DANZIG and stated further that the lines, for example running from MEMEL down, would be carrying empty trains coming back from their eastern front.

12. Referring to a question put by General Haking, respecting the previous proposition to transport these Polish divisions by way of Rumania, or through the Ukraine from Odessa, General v. Hammerstein replied that they had during December and January transported 100,000 German soldiers from this region of ODESSA to BREST-LITOVSK, stating that this was one of the main lines of Russia.

* * * * *

183-23.1: Letter

Enemy Communist Propaganda in Third Army Zone

2d Section, General Staff

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,
March 10, 1919.

From: Asst. Chief of Staff, G-2, G. H. Q., A. E. F.

To: Asst. Chief of Staff, G-2, Third Army

1. The Commander-in-Chief has directed that enemy propaganda prepared for circulation among American and Allied troops be kept track of.

2. Copies of propaganda sheets, cunningly contrived, have been seized by this section. In these sheets the burden of the enemy appeal to our soldiers is that the war is over, their work is done and that they should emphatically demand to be sent home.

3. These pamphlets are headed, "Why American Soldiers Are in Europe" and are signed "The Communist Party of Germany."

4. It is requested that you cover all possible channels through which such propaganda can be brought into the Third Army zone, as it is believed extraordinary efforts are soon to be made to effect circulation of the pamphlets.

D. E. NOLAN,
Brigadier General, G. S.,
Asst. Chief of Staff, G-2.

By:

A. B. COXE,
Colonel, General Staff.

Official Copy furnished G-2, III Corps for notation and necessary action. Please report generally on subject of enemy propaganda among our troops---extent and measures taken against it or to be taken. Report to be confidential.

R. H. WILLIAMS,
Colonel, G. S.,
A. C. of S., G-2.,
Third Army, U. S.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1220: Letter

Maintenance of the Armies of Occupation

No. 97

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, March 11, 1919.

[Extract]

9. Work of the Committee on Entretien: Major Cutchins, our representative on this Committee, returned from PARIS several days ago. His reports of the proceedings there contain nothing of special interest other than the fact that it has finally been decided by our Commander-in-Chief that the American Forces will stand on the original definition of Entretien as agreed upon by the Allied Committee. This definition included all legitimate expenses for the upkeep of the Army of Occupation. It will be recalled that the French want to include only expenses of rations and shelter of troops and animals.

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section.

Red Cross to Deliver Food to Russian Prisoners

Telegram

March 11, 1919.

Brigadier General Malvern Hill Barnum

Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C., Spa, Belgium.

Number P. Please repeat following telegram to Herbert Hoover Commission, PARIS, referring your number 128 Interallied Commission has requested American Red Cross to assume responsibility for food supplies for Russian prisoners from point of delivery in Germany to prison camps. American Red Cross is sending their representative Captain W. H. Wynn to COBLENZ evening March 12, with instructions to communicate Quartermaster COBLENZ and arrange for transportation of supplies in Germany. To avoid delay and expense of storage and reloading at COBLENZ urgently request that cars which bring supplies to COBLENZ may be used to carry them to our central points of distribution in Germany. Red Cross representatives at COBLENZ will have information to enable him to route cars in solid trains from COBLENZ to points of distribution. Will take every precaution to see that cars are not scattered and promptly returned to COBLENZ. Please load separate cars each kind supplies and do not combine and send full information to Red Cross representative COBLENZ nature of supplies contained in each car. Our agreement with German Government by which bread ration was increased six hundred grams requires us to repay in kind flour used to increase ration by March 31. Germans used rye flour. Hope flour you are sending of the same character. If not please advise grade flour.

G. H. HARRIES,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Military Mission, Berlin.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1220: Note

French Commission to Visit Airfields

[Contemporary Translation]

Wako No. 13401 Mar.

Spa, March 11, 1919.

From the Chairman of Wako

To the Chairman of the P. I. A. C.

In connection with Note Wako 11995 of March 6, 1919, which was transmitted in answer to the Allied Note No. 541-G of February 27, 1919, the following answer of the German Admiralty to the oral statements of Captain d'Androzel is transmitted:

Energetic protest must be entered against the French Minister of the Marine anticipating the approaching Peace Negotiations by demanding permission for a French Commission to visit the German airship grounds thereby showing that there is in prospect a request for Germany to deliver her airships to France.

On this basis the granting of the French request could be considered as an agreement on the part of Germany that she would deliver the airships, and as a determination on the part of Germany of conditions which cannot even be discussed until the Peace Negotiations. On these grounds the demand must be refused.

Other requests made in Note 541-G have been answered in Note 11995 of March 6.

HAMMERSTEIN.

Threatened German Withdrawal at Libau

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, March 11, 1919.

No. 97

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

* * * * *

7. British Commission to Libau: The Germans presented a note giving the following report from the northern Russian front coming from the headquarters of LIBAU:

The British Commission consisting of a Captain and a civilian has arrived at LIBAU to obtain information regarding conditions there. The Commission was given every insight by us into the affairs available and our intentions. The following letter was sent to this Commission and to the command of the British squadron lying by LIBAU by the VI Reserve Corps: 'The situation of the Army makes imperative an early decision as to whether reinforcement by us in the way of food, wearing apparel and materiel can be permitted. If a decision is delayed any longer, I shall begin within the next few days to withdraw the troops under my command, commencing on the left bank of WINDAU, as the lack of supplies endangers fighting quality.'

The whole of WINDAU will thus be sacrificed to Bolshevism, who will follow up closely as the troops of other powers withdraw from its protection. The Baltic territorial forces are not anything like enough to hold the enemy up, and, in addition, depend entirely on German supplies. The conditions which the Entente has put in the way of German troops in COURLAND are attributable to the activity of the Latvian Government. I, therefore, emphasize the fact that an early decision from the Entente favorable to the German proposal is essential unless Bolshevism is to make further progress. In view of the situation Germany must renounce all responsibility.

General Nudant inquired the date of the above communication and was told that it arrived yesterday at their G. H. Q.

* * * * *

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section.

Communications for Allied Commissions in Berlin

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, March 11, 1919.

No. 97

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

1. Communications between the Allied Commissions in Berlin and Their Respective Governments: General Nudant referred to an answer that had been received from the Germans to a previous note of the Allies calling attention to the fact that the German Government is ready to authorize at once the exchange of despatches in cipher between certain commissions of the Entente that are at work in BERLIN and their respective Governments. In making this announcement General Nudant stated that while taking note of the offer which shows the good will of the German Government, he insisted that permission be given to set up in BERLIN an international central where the lines especially used by the Allies will center; and also that as soon as possible Allied technical experts should meet at SPA with similar German experts in order to determine just how this project shall be carried out.

Minister von Haniel on behalf of the German Government replied that he would send this note to BERLIN at once, adding that only yesterday he telephoned to BERLIN inviting attention to the urgency of the settlement of this question.

* * * * *

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1220: Note

German Request for New Map of Occupation

[Contemporary Translation]

No. 13197

Spa, March 11, 1919.

From the Chairman of the German Mission

To the Chairman of the P. I. A. C.

It is absolutely essential for the official and private circulation between the un-occupied and occupied parts of Germany that it be well known to which of the troops of occupation to turn in individual cases. It is therefore urgently necessary that more accurate information be given us as to the limits of the regions of authority of each Army of occupation. It is therefore requested whether there have been any changes in the 1 to 500,000 scale map that was given us in December.

Moreover, this map is of so small a scale that inaccuracies can hardly be avoided. I will be very grateful if we could be given shortly a more accurate map on which the limits of the zones of occupation of the different Armies could be shown.

von HAMMERSTEIN.

G-3, GHQ, AEF, Fldr. 1220: Note

Seizure of German Steamer

[Contemporary Translation]

PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,

C. I. P. A.
No. 650/G

Spa, March 11, 1919.

General Nudant to the Chairman of Wako

In answer to Note W 12340 of March 2.

The Minister of the Marine telegraphs under date of March 11, No. 2100:

"The Allied Armistice Commission maintains that the seizure of the steamer, *Pluto*, is regular and does not accept the German protest. The German Commission on February 21 had asked for authorization for the steamer *Pluto*, to transport materiel to Belgium. On February 22, the Allied Armistice Commission had refused this authorization."

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1220: Telegram

Status of Ukrainian Delegation

Telegram

March 12, 1919.

Brigadier General Malvern-Hill Barnum,

Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C., Spa, Belgium.

Number P-693. Reference your 701 Germans concentrated bulk of Ukrainians in special camps but small numbers are in other camps. Delegation cannot carry out relief measures but its advice may sometimes be useful. General Ewart discussed its status with General Monhewitz yesterday and they decided latter should try and arrange that delegation co-operates with him but both Generals adverse to any recognition as a separate body. They have been definitely warned that their representatives may only visit camps in company with Allied officers and no political propaganda will be permitted.

G. H. HARRIES,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Military,
Mission, Berlin.

Funds for American Army

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, March 12, 1919.

No. 98

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

* * * * *

6. Funds for the Use of the American Government: General Nudant presented a note to the Germans containing instructions from Marshall Foch to the effect that he notified the German Government that 19,000,000 marks should be placed at the disposal of the American Army for its needs during the month of March through the branch of the Reichsbank at COBLENZ, in addition to the 20,000,000 marks already received.

* * * * *

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier-General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section.

Communications for Allied and Associated Missions in Berlin

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, March 12, 1919.

No. 98

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

* * * * *

3. Installation of an Allied Wireless Telegraph Equipment in Berlin: In answer to the Allied request for authority to establish such communication with BERLIN, General von Hammerstein announced that in principle the German Government agrees to the request made on this subject. He added that:

It is believed that similar advantage will be accorded to the Germans at the Peace Conference. It is also presumed that this proposal only covers the time up to the conclusion of peace. In order to arrange technical details, it

appears necessary that the localities, apparatus, etc., should be examined by the Allied delegates on the spot. The German Government, therefore, proposed that Allied and Associated Government delegates should be sent to BERLIN as soon as possible. Delegates from the German post office are always available for further negotiations.

* * * * *

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1220: Letter

Transportation of Agricultural Implements

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, March 12, 1919.

No. 98

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

* * * * *

4. Return of Agricultural Machinery to France and Belgium: General von Hammerstein pointed out that the German authorities have several times called attention, both verbally and in writing, to the transportation situation as it exists in Germany on account of the strikes. He added that the difficulties arising out of these strikes have been great and are increasing. The fact that agricultural machinery has not been delivered in quantities as agreed upon and in the necessary time is largely attributable to these transportation difficulties. He stated that since February 25, there have been thirty motor plows loaded in cars at ELBING and waiting for despatch, but that as yet they have not been moved.

He inquired if it would be agreeable to the Allies to authorize the shipment of these plows in Entente ships from DANZIG, as it is quite uncertain when they can be shipped by rail.

* * * * *

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section.

Internal Political Situation in Germany

[Contemporary Translation]

Spa, March 12, 1919.

Note transmitted March 12, 1919 by Minister von Haniel coming from the German Government and showing the internal political situation in Germany.

The situation in Germany is judged by the Government to be the following:

After heavy sacrifices the Government is now completely master of the situation in BERLIN. The cessation of the general strike in middle Germany and greater BERLIN has in general caused a cooling off process, but on the contrary there is now new danger of strikes in Upper Silesia and in the lower RHINE districts, where the special question uppermost in importance is whether wages shall be paid or not on days of strikes.

The general unrest among the working classes has not been definitely squelched either by legal regulations nor by military actions. The Government by its decisive and sympathetic attitude has won considerable respect, but all successes that have been obtained must remain nevertheless only apparent successes unless the working classes can be offered in the immediate future an improvement however slight it may be in food conditions.

Just exactly because of the large numbers of unemployed and as a result of the increased amount of free time at the disposal of the unemployed, the lack of food is a catastrophe. Nothing can bring decisive rescue to the working classes except the possibility for obtaining work, and that means raw materials, and sufficient food.

von HANIEL.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1220: Letter

Alignment of German Troops Against Bolshevism

[Contemporary Translation]

Armistice Commission Spa
Wako No. 13490

Spa, March 12, 1919.

General von Hammerstein

To: General Nudant

In answer to Colonel Fournier's inquiry of the afternoon of March 12, the following statement is made.

The German front against the Russian Bolsheviks is under the command of the North Corps and is divided into:

Army	Front Line	Length of Front km.	Strength
Landwehr Corps	GRODNO-OLITA	120	8,200
Composite Res. Corps.	KOVNO	130	8,900
Hdqs. No. 52	Both sides of railroad TILSIT-SCHAULEN	120	1,000
VI Res. Corps.	LIBAU	200	10,300
4 Commands		570	28,400

Remarks:

The statement of strength is of the beginning of March and gives the approximate strength of available infantry, cavalry, artillery and pioneer units, including volunteer units, excluding purely local home guard. Troops not pure German are included with the Baltic Landwehr, 2,900 men. The attempts to form new troops (Latvians and Lithuanians) has unfortunately not yet yielded any result.

von HAMMERSTEIN.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1220: Memorandum

Redistribution of Trucks Delivered by Germans

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, March 13, 1919.

MEMORANDUM to: General Barnum

1. On March 12 and 13 meetings were held at Hotel Britannique for the purpose of determining the total number of all types and makes of motor trucks delivered by the German Army to the several receiving and inspecting committees of the several Allied Armies, deciding which vehicles should be returned to the Germans, what additional number should be delivered and where, and what redistribution should be made between the Allies in order that each Army should receive its quota grouped in the most practical manner as to makes, types, and numbers, and finally determining the number of groups of spare parts to be delivered at Mayence for all the retained motor trucks.

2. The meetings were attended by representatives of the receiving committees of the Allied Armies, members of the Armistice Commission (both Allied and German) and officers representing the delivery committees of the German Army.

3. The lists of trucks accepted by each army were verified with the German delivery officers, and found to agree in every case except that there was an apparent shortage of one truck on the British list, which being the subject of some difference of opinion or uncertainty of record was waived in the interest of expediting the final settlement. It was found that 5,005 trucks had been delivered in the total.

4. It was agreed that 45 trucks of odd makes should be returned to the Germans at COLOGNE, COBLENZ, and MAYENCE and that 40 additional trucks should be delivered at specified points, none of them however to be delivered to the American Army which already had received more than its quota, and which is to return 9 trucks to the Germans and engage in a redistribution with the Allied Armies in accordance with the * * * schedule, thereby eventually retaining its authorized quota 1,250.

5. A protocol is in preparation under the direction of the French Chairman summarizing the various transactions to be made, which will be signed by the several representatives, and copies of some should be sent to the American Third Army Headquarters for its guidance. This protocol will be forwarded to Marshal Foch for his final approval and transmission of orders for execution to the Allied Commands.

6. The number of groups of spare parts of all the different makes to be delivered at MAYENCE for distribution to the Allied Armies in proportion to the number of vehicles of each make retained will also appear in the protocol.

7. It will be observed that in the total of 1,224 trucks accepted by the American Army, 48 makes appear. The trucks withdrawn by the Director M. T. C. for shipment to U. S., those returned to the Germans and those transferred to the other Allied Armies have reduced these makes to 28. It is permissible for the adjacent Armies to make any

further redistribution that may be mutually agreeable, for the purpose of further reducing the number of makes in each army if possible, or to simplify the distribution of spare parts for same, but the Armistice Commission went no further into this matter than herein indicated.

8. The transfer of 49 trucks to the Belgians will be by rail to AIX-la-CHAPELLE, they to arrange for railway cars and convoy and we to load the vehicles after they have accepted them. The one truck they are to transfer to us will be shipped by rail to COBLENZ. The transfers between the British and French and ourselves will be made by road, each army receiving the vehicles at the initial delivery point. In other words we will take delivery at COLOGNE and MAYENCE and give delivery at COBLENZ. The Third Army Headquarters should arrange the details of these transfers with the Headquarters of the French and British at MAYENCE and COLOGNE.

ARTHUR J. SLADE,
Major, M. T. C., U. S. A.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1220: Letter

Funds for French Troops of Occupation

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, March 13, 1919.

No. 99

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

5. Funds for French Troops: General Nudant informed the Chairman of the German Armistice Commission that he had received the following telegram from the French Minister of Finance:

"I beg you to be kind enough to let me know at once the answer of the German Government in regard to the shipment of 100,000,000 marks which I have asked for through your intervention for the maintenance of the French troops of occupation on the left bank of the RHINE."

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section.

German Government Permitted To Export Gold

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, March 13, 1919.

No. 99

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

1. Return of Funds to Sweden and Spain: General Nudant informed the Germans that on February 21, Mr. Martin, the Financial Commissioner sent word to Mr. Baling, the German representative at FRANKFORT for the application of the protocol of TREVES, that a favorable reply was granted to the request of the German Government concerning the return to Sweden of 600,000 marks in gold received by the Central Zionist Office for relief work in the Palatinate.

At the same time favorable answer was given to the request for permission to send 24,308 1/2 pesetas to the Spanish Government.

* * * * *

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier-General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1220: Minutes

Provisioning Germany

[Contemporary Translation]

March 13, 14, 1919.

RESUME

of the meetings at BRUSSELS on March
13 and 14, in connection with the appli-
cation of Article 8 of the Armistice
Agreement of January 16, 1919.

March 13---Before beginning any negotiations Admiral Wemyss, President of the Commission, asked whether the Germans granted that they were ready to carry out the conditions of Article 8 of the Convention of January 16, which he read.

The German Commission, under the presidency of von Braun, declared that they were ready.

The Admiral made known then that under these conditions the Allies were ready to put at the disposal of the German Government immediately 270,000 tons of foodstuffs for the first month and for each succeeding month up to September 1, 300,000 tons of cereals and 70,000 tons of fats.

The Germans could obtain for themselves in addition to these quantities in Neutral Countries the materials which could be spared, and the Neutral Countries could receive authorizations for the reimportation of an amount corresponding to the amounts furnished to Germany.

For payment the Germans will be authorized, among other conditions, to export merchandise into Neutral Countries with the exception of certain restrictions which will be laid down in a black list.

Naturally, a partial lifting of the blockade will result.

It is understood that these promises will be annulled if the Germans do not faithfully execute all the conditions of the Armistice.

Inasmuch as a part of the German tonnage is all ready to be handed over to the Allies immediately, the Allies will take measures to deliver foodstuffs as soon as an agreement will be reached for the delivery of these ships. (The attached scheme for a protocol contains the details of the means of payment that are envisaged.)

Before starting the discussion on the detailed points, Admiral Wemyss asked whether the Germans accepted these conditions.

The Germans accepted, maintaining, however, that the deliveries, much below the needs that they had set forth in the preceding meetings, would be very much inferior to the real needs of their population, but that they would try to be satisfied with them.

March 14---It is understood that the provisioning of the people on the left bank of the RHINE will be taken care of by the Allies with the assistance of the civilian authorities, but with the reservation that payment be made. (It is understood among the Allied Governments that this provisioning will be under control of the Armies of Occupation.)

The Germans undertake to allow the passage of foodstuffs for Czechoslovakia.

The Chairman of the German Delegation stated that he is under orders from his Government not to sign the agreement unless it contains the necessary guarantees for the provisioning of Germany with foodstuffs.

These guarantees are not sufficient from the point of view of the financial question discussed by the subcommittee. In fact the means of payment that are indicated will not permit of the payment for more than half of the provisions furnished, and the Germans do not see how they will be able to buy provisions without credit, especially from Neutrals.

In the second place, it had been said at a preceding meeting that the Allies would furnish the foodstuffs to Germany.

Today Germany is authorized to import on her own account, and therefore she must enter into negotiations with Neutrals.

It is therefore necessary for that purpose to allow her facilities as far as financial and other communications are concerned and to suspend the blacklist.

"We have received," said Mr. von Braun, "nothing more than general assurances. To terminate the transaction it is necessary that we have as soon as possible, and within a week at the latest, formal assurances in this regard. We do not believe that we are authorized to sign the agreement unless we have the assurance that in case we lack credit we will receive means for supplementary credits from the Allies."------(a sentence lacking here.)-----

Admiral Wemyss answered: "We made a very definite statement yesterday in regard to the quantities. We are ready to consider any points indicated and transmit them to our Governments. We have already granted the principle of facilities for postal and telegraph communications with Neutrals. I do not see any reason for another meeting in a week for we will have nothing additional to say. As far as credits are concerned, I propose that we adopt the following text to be added to the protocol * * *."

"In case there is a lack of means for payment, the Allied and Associated Governments will consider the situation in order to procure additional new credits for the purpose of assuring the supply of the quantities of foodstuffs that have been indicated."

Mr. von Braun brought up again the question of communications and believed that he had not quite understood. The Commission is too large to discuss this question.

He declared that he would present the list of prohibited articles, and that this list ought to be reduced. (?)

He foresaw that a great deal of time would be lost before the regulation of this question, and that is why he asked for a meeting of the Committee for that purpose.

If that point is granted he declares that he is ready to sign the protocol and the addition to it.

Admiral Wemyss: "You desire us to intervene with the Commission on the blockade to have the matter rapidly settled. I repeat to you my assurances on this subject. I regret that I cannot tell you when the black list will be sent, but there will be no loss of time. The questions that have been brought up, the questions that concern the blockade and will be regulated as soon as possible by the competent authorities.

"If the German delegation is ready to sign I shall transmit the requests to the Allied Governments."

The Germans accepted and the signatures were exchanged.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1220: Note

Control of German Munitions Factory by British

[Contemporary Translation]

A. A. II No. 1344

Spa, March 13, 1919.

From the representative of the German Government

To the British Armistice Commission

The British officials of the Army of Occupation have sent the following communication to the firm Elberfelder Farbenfabriken (dye factory) formerly Bayer and Company:

5th Infantry Brigade, No. C. A/105.

Subject: Your letter of January 15, 1919, to Colonel Pipon, Commander of the 24th Royal Fusiliers, and further correspondence concerning the munitions factory that bears the name (Farbenfabriken Worringer).

The General in command of the 5th Infantry Brigade and Commander of the district wishes to clear up for the factory the question of its property.

Inasmuch as the only purpose of the factory was to provide the German Army with munitions of war the entire factory with all of its materiel and buildings that lie in its territory pass into the possession of the British military authorities.

Likewise the German personnel that remains in the factory for the protection of German interests fall under the orders of the British military authorities. The British guard has been put there in the property at the command of the Colonel and a request as to permission to do the same does not enter into the question at all. There must be complete clearness about this question. Electric light has been requested for the guard and you will receive a regular requisition slip for the same after it has been installed.

No materiel can be removed by you from the factory or from its grounds whether it be for the purpose of improvement or for any other purpose without the consent of the British military authorities. At the same time the personnel employed at the factory can receive what coal it needs upon request to the commander of the guard.

Dormagen, January 17, 1919.

W. H. ELEY, Captain,
Staff Captain for Civil Affairs,
Area of the 5th Infantry Brigade.

According to this letter the authorities of the troops of the occupation take possession for themselves of the property of a factory of the above mentioned firm in DORMAGEN on the left bank of the RHINE.

Such an action can find no justification in the conditions of the Armistice. On the contrary, it is entirely opposed to the text and spirit of the Armistice. On behalf of the German Government I enter most emphatic protest against the measures that have been taken and I request that they be immediately revoked.

von HANIEL.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1220: Letter

Return of Industrial Machinery

No. 99

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, March 14, 1919.

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

* * * * *

9. Work of Committee on Restitution of Machinery from Northern France and Belgium: A further report from our representative on this Committee states that the Restitution Bureau in FRANKFORT has already received some 28,000 cards identifying machinery. The Germans, however, decline to turn these cards over to the Committee as they fear that information will be used to make further arrest of Germans who have machinery in their possession.

It is claimed that Marshal Foch in January gave assurance that no more German possessors of machinery would be imprisoned.

This report shows that the first shipment of machinery consisted of a freight train of 45 cars which left FRANKFORT March 10 for FIVES-LILLE, France.

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section.

Food Supply of Left Bank of the Rhine

[Contemporary Translation]

MINUTES OF CONFERENCE HELD AT LAMORLAYE, MARCH 14, 1919,
BY THE INTERALLIED MILITARY COMMISSION
FOR THE FOOD SUPPLY OF THE LEFT BANK OF THE RHINE

[Extract]

1. General Payot recalls the object of the conference.

Germany forms two parts: The occupied territory (Rhineland and bridgeheads) which are under the authority of the Interallied Supreme Command, and the unoccupied territories subject to the German Government.

From a humanitarian standpoint, the Associated Governments have decided to supply Germany with food, but while the supply of the right bank depends on engagements made by the Germans (particularly the delivery of the merchant fleet) the Associated Governments will always be obliged to supply the left bank.

This is the reason for the decision of the Superior Economic Council dated February 25, as follows:

1st FOOD SUPPLY OF THE LEFT BANK OF THE RHINE

The Council has taken notice of a note of the Food Supply Section dated February 24 (7) containing propositions for the furnishing of commodities of food supply to the country of the left bank of the RHINE.

The Council decides:

(a) That this supply will be considered distinct from that of the right bank of the RHINE and that it will be provided for under auspices of an Interallied Military Commission to be formed under the authority of the Supreme Command, and which will forward its reports to the Supply Section of the Council.

(b) That propositions of a financial nature contained in the above note will be forwarded for the examination of the Financial Section.

The purpose of the conference is to call together the members of the Interallied Commission above mentioned.

General Payot adds that in order to avoid all misunderstanding, it should be remarked that this Commission is only an executive organization and cannot make any decision as to principles, neither from the standpoint of furnishing commodities nor from a financial standpoint, these decisions being made by the Superior Economic Council.

In every case it is necessary to be ready from now on and the conference is going to consider the conditions of supplying of countries of the left bank of the RHINE.

2d. BY WHOM SHOULD THIS FOOD SUPPLY BE ISSUED?

The Allied Governments are responsible for the maintenance of order on the left bank of the RHINE and they should keep in their hands the powerful lever which the food supply question constitutes. If the Germans do not fulfill their engagements, the supply of the right bank will be stopped, while it would be necessary to continue that of the left bank; therefore, distinct organizations are necessary.

Thus there is a general agreement on the necessity of keeping distinct the food supply of the two banks of the RHINE and of putting it under the supervision of the Allied Military Command.

3d. General Payot recalls the conditions of organization and of the functions of the Superior Economic Council composed of representatives of the Associated Governments which gives directions, and of its five subordinate sections (food supply, blockade, finances, military traffic, raw materials), which govern current matters.

In the matter of food supply of the left bank, the Interallied Military Commission will have to deal with the Superior Economic Council and a few of its sections; Food Supply (Finished Commodities) and Finances (Regulation of Payments).

The financial question is dependent on negotiations in progress; the Commission will only concern itself with the question of the food supplies.

4th. The Commission then considers the question of requirements.

It is necessary that each Allied Army show for its zone and by month the nature and quantities of commodities to be furnished until the next harvest (September 1).

For this it will be necessary to take into consideration commodities found on the spot and those coming from the right bank, then to know the general German food supply plan, information on which subject is requested from the Belgian General Staff, which has a copy of it.

Furthermore, it is necessary to insure a uniform disposition of commodities of each zone to avoid differences of treatment. It is therefore agreed that each army will establish a plan showing the conditions under which they think the population should be supplied with food (method, price and quantities of commodities).

The Interallied Military Commission will consider the proposition of the Armies at its next meeting, will compare them and will propose a uniform price to the Food Supply Section of the Superior Economic Council, which will make the decision.

As a guide, the members of the Commission are handed a plan established by the Eighth French Army, fixing for the zone of this Army the commodity requirements for the civilian population.

5th. SATISFACTION OF THE REQUIREMENTS.

It is agreed that the Food Supply Section of the Council will send the commodities to the ports of ROTTERDAM and ANTWERP. These commodities will be received in these ports either by the representatives of the Food Supply Section of the Superior Economic Council or directly by the representative of the Interallied Military Commission.

The representatives of the Interallied Military Commission will insure the division of boats by giving shipping orders to the Interallied Field Navigation Commission. When the boats arrive in the river base ports, the merchandise will be turned over to the Army Commanders; this principle is necessary in order to maintain control and means of command for the military authorities. After receipt and unloading of the commodities, the Army Commanders will deliver the commodities to the German organizations charged by them with the disposition; these organizations will then assure the disposition to the civilian population under the supervision of the military authority.

The Interallied Field Railways Commission for the Rhineland will then have to do the necessary shipping between the river base ports and the points of arrival.

6th. The members of the Commission are agreed on the principles which are summarized in the plan attached to these minutes.

It is furthermore agreed that the next meeting will take place at 10 o'clock, March 25, and that the members will be advised by their respective Armies:

1st: Of remarks which this plan may suggest.

2d: The propositions of the Armies concerning the requirements of their zones.

After discussion the Commission will forward its report to the Food Supply Commission.

CHARLES PAYOT.

General Staff

ALLIED GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,
March 14, 1919.

PLAN OF ORGANIZATION DRAWN UP AT THE CONFERENCE AT LAMORLAYE,
MARCH 14, 1919, BY THE INTERALLIED MILITARY COMMISSION
FOR THE CIVILIAN FOOD SUPPLY OF THE LEFT BANK OF THE RHINE

I. The Commission takes as a basis of its investigation the decision of the Superior Economic Council, dated February 25, as follows:

a. The food supply of the countries of the left bank of the RHINE will be considered as distinct from that of the right bank of the RHINE and will be provided for under the auspices of an Interallied Military Commission to be formed under the authority of the Supreme Command, and which will forward its reports to the Food Supply Section of the Council.

b. The propositions of a financial nature contained in the note of the Food Supply Section of February 24, will be sent for examination to the Financial Section.

II. Consequently, the Interallied Military Commission for the food supply of the countries of the left bank of the RHINE requests that:

Each of the Allied Armies of Occupation establish the nature and quantity of commodities to be furnished monthly until the next harvest (September 1) for the requirements of the population of its zone, taking into account resources existing on the spot or furnished by the right bank and proposing a ration price.

In its next meeting the Commission will establish with the assistance of these propositions, a plan of ration price equivalent for all zones and will submit it for approval to the Food Supply Section of the Supreme Economic Council.

The supply and demand to be carried out in the following manner:

The Food Supply Section will send the commodities to the ports of ROTTERDAM and ANTWERP; the representatives of the Interallied Military Commission will accept delivery either directly or through the representatives of the Food Supply Section.

The representatives of the Interallied Military Commission will insure the disposition between the various Allied Armies, forwarding the commodities to the RHINE ports indicated for each zone by the Army Commander.

On the arrival of these commodities at the river ports, the commanders of the Armies of Occupation will deliver them to the German organizations charged by them with the division and disposition to the civilian population, under the supervision of the Army.

III. The members of the Interallied Military Commission will advise - for their representative Armies - at the next meeting of the Commission which will take place Wednesday, March 25, at 10 o'clock:

(a) The remarks which this plan may suggest to their Army.

(b) The proposals of the Armies concerning the requirements of their zone (nature, price and quantities of the commodities).

The Commission will then draw up its definite plan and forward it to the Food Supply Section of the Superior Economic Council.

German Protests on Maintenance and Requisitioning

[Contemporary Translation]

No. 13659

Spa, March 14, 1919.

From the Chairman of Wako to the Chairman of the P. I. A. C.

The demands for marks from the Allied and Associated Governments for the use of the troops of occupation become higher and higher from month to month without the possibility having been reached from the German Government to obtain a regular basis for these payments. The only thing that has been definitely determined is that these payments will be counted off from the debt of the German Government for the maintenance of the troops of occupation. The negotiations of the subcommission on interpretation of Article IX of the Armistice Agreement to define the meaning of maintenance have apparently come to a standstill. While the Allies wish to understand under the word maintenance everything that the French Army authorities comprise in the meaning of the word, the German Government maintains the standpoint that according to Article VII of The Hague Convention the conception of international law of the meaning of the word maintenance includes only provisioning and at the very most also quarters and clothing, and, further, that only such charges can be reckoned in the cost of maintenance which are based upon the occupation of the left bank of the RHINE as a precautionary occupation and not as a military one.

Unanimity has been arrived at, it is true, on the subject that the cost of maintenance that is to be paid by the German Government is to be calculated on the basis of daily charges which are to be determined by each of the Armies of Occupation. However, the manner of determination and the extent of the determination of the expenses that are to be included have not yet been satisfactorily determined with sufficient clearness on account of the doubt existing as to the definition of the word maintenance. It is true that in the note of the January 30, 1919, the Allies had in view to reckon the average daily charge for the maintenance per man and per horse, and the effectives in men and horses, upon which this average daily charge was to be calculated, but in spite of constantly repeated reminders, none of the Armies of Occupation have as yet transmitted to us any communication on this subject. The German Government, therefore, has not been able to enter into any calculations of the financial effect of the duty of maintaining the troops, that is laid upon it by Article IX of the Armistice Agreement, a condition which cannot be borne for a much longer time, and which excludes any possibility of an orderly adjustment of finances.

The same sort of doubt still exists about the right of requisitions that is granted the Armies of Occupation by Article II, Par. 1. The only thing about which there is any unanimity is that requisitions may be undertaken only for the direct needs of the maintenance of troops of occupation further, that foodstuffs may not be requisitioned, especially not those which are included in the rations of the populace by the German administrative authorities. Meanwhile the matter of payment and of calculating the requisitions still remains in doubt. In the note of January 21, 1919, the request was made that the German Government should pay the requisitions and that every month they should hand the Allies a statement of the sums paid, to be counted off of the final reckoning. Concerning this note the Germans requested further details at the meeting of the Subcommission, and the Chairman of the Interallied Subcommission requested that these details would be given in the very immediate future. Nevertheless no further communication on this subject has reached the German Subcommission as yet, even though on February 22, 1919, Note No. 11287 requested once again a prompt response concerning the calculation of requisitions.

There is considerable doubt also as to the extent to which requisitions can be made. It has as yet not been possible for the Subcommission to sufficiently clarify the question of the use of railways, narrow-gauge rail-ways, street cars, and of other means of trans-

portation, as for example, the use of ships on the RHINE. Very important also seems to be the question of the requisition of horses in the occupied areas, especially of valuable breeding horses likewise of such horses as can be delivered in the areas on the left bank of the RHINE on account of the demobilization of the German Army. Finally, there is the greatest need to establish definitely the extent of the requisitions to be made for quarters for the troops both for the purpose of establishing surely and definitely the limits of the rights both of the troops of occupation and the people in the occupied areas. To all of these questions there has been as yet no possibility of getting a satisfactory answer from the Allies.

On account of the importance of the regulation of these charges I urgently request General Nudant once again to expedite the negotiations of the Subcommittee on the interpretation of Article II of the Armistice Convention.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1220: Letter

Provisioning Czechoslovakia

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, March 14, 1919.

No. 100

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

* * * * *

2. Foodstuffs for Czechoslovakia: In another note from Marshal Foch, dated March 11, he communicates the following to the Chairman of the P. I. A. C.:

(A) I beg you to make known to the German Armistice Commission the following decision: The Allied and Associate Governments have decided to provision the Czechoslovak State. The provisioning will be carried on at the same time by the two rivers, the ELBE and the RHINE, under the following principles: (1) That stocks of provisions that are sent to the Czechoslovak States which do not arrive at their destination will be subtracted from the amount of foodstuffs granted to Germany by the Supreme War Council (2) So far as the ELBE is concerned, first, at HAMBURG, MANNHEIM, and FRANKFORT, all stocks will be taken care of under the Naval protection that will be approved by the Associated Governments. (3) The Allied and Czechoslovak authorities must look after the control and supervision at HAMBURG of the operations connected with FRANKFORT in connection with the Naval authorities mentioned above, and on the ELBE must supervise the transportation by water. (4) Insofar as the RHINE is concerned, first, the stocks of provisions will be sent by sea to ROTTERDAM and to ANTWERP and then by the RHINE to the ports of MANNHEIM and FRANKFORT. They will then be transported by railway cars and taken to PRAGUE by the railway line WURZBURG, NUREMBERG, PILSEN, (5) The receipt of the provisions at ROTTERDAM and at ANTWERP and their transportation by the RHINE up to the river port and their transfer to the railways will be looked after by the Allied and Associated Governments in these ports, and the Interallied Commission for Navigation on the RHINE. (6) The transportation by railway from the river port of FRANKFORT on

the RHINE to Czechoslovakia will be carried out under the control and supervision of the Allied and Czechoslovakia authorities.

(B) I beg you to be good enough to ask the German authorities to make known first, the daily maximum service which the railway line from MANNHEIM to PRAGUE may supply for this provision; and, second, which of the two ports, FRANKFORT, or MANNHEIM would assure the transfer and re-expedition of these articles under the best conditions.

To the foregoing General von Hammerstein replied as follows; I will forward this note at once to the German Government but I think it is my duty to state that the German Government will undoubtedly protest against the form of this note. This note deals with a decision which has already been taken, and and is in the form of an order. The German Government must reserve to itself the right of any further decisions in this matter.'

General Nudant continued as follows:

The only thing that is said in this note is that any foodstuffs that do not arrive in Czechoslovakia or that are detained in Germany, will be deducted from the amounts that are to be received by Germany. In any case, I call the attention of the German Commission to the necessity of an early response from the German Government to this note, either negatively or affirmatively.

The discussion was terminated by the following remarks from General von Hammerstein:

As far as the subject matter of the note is concerned, I am incompetent to make any criticism or raise any objections regarding it. The answer has already been given to the question regarding the possibility of transportation by rail, also regarding transportation up the ELBE. We must recognize the point upon which General Nudant insisted---that is to say if some of these foodstuffs disappear in Germany, a corresponding amount would be deducted from the deliveries of food to Germany later. I will communicate this matter to my Government as soon as possible and will request an early answer.

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section.

193-23.1: Memorandum

American Policy on Inspection of German Factories

2d Section, General Staff

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,
March 15, 1919.

MEMORANDUM for Major Rice, Advance G. H. Q., A. E. F.

Subject: Inspection of Plants.

The following letter is quoted for your information:

1. In accordance with present arrangements, inspection of factories will be made from time to time by representatives of the Allied Armies. In each case, however, written approval for the visit will be given by the American Economic Section.

2. No trade secrets or special processes will be divulged by the factory management, and any attempt to secure these will be reported direct to the Economic Section, Advance General Headquarters, TREVES. Neither will an attempt to secure cost sheets or similar business secrets be allowed.

3. In certain cases the inspection will be witnessed by an American officer or interpreter. When an officer is to accompany the inspection, a letter will be written by the American Economic Section to the division commander in whose district the factory in question is located in order that he may make the necessary arrangements for the inspection and the report above indicated.

H. A. SMITH,
Brigadier General.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1220: Letter

Sale of Real Property in Occupied Areas

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, March 15, 1919.

No. 101

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

* * * * *

2. Attempt of Germans to Sell Real Property in Occupied Areas: The Germans were informed that the Commander-in-Chief of the Allies has received reliable information that the Rhenish Province is putting on sale at MALMEDY the lands which it owns, posters to this effect having already been put up. The Commander-in-Chief directs that the German Government be informed that it must give immediate orders to suspend any attempt to sell real property in the Allied areas.

* * * * *

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section.

The German-Polish-Bolshevist Situation

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, March 15, 1919.

No. 101

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

* * * * *

5. Observations on the foregoing: Attention is called to the fact that the Germans lose no opportunity to put forth their claim for permission to make shipments by sea, coastal shipments particularly have been requested of coal to DANZIG and of food supplies, and for authority to send out fishing vessels. Whether this constant effort to secure authority to send out vessels has for its ultimate end the breaking of the blockade or the saving of some of their merchant marine, it is hard to say; but the lack of consistency in their requests is frequently apparent. For instance for the last month or six weeks they have been claiming that unless they are authorized to send food by sea to their troops in LIBAU and WINDAU they will be unable to hold on at those points and will have to withdraw their troops, thereby giving the Bolsheviks free opportunity to advance through the Baltic Province. They have had these troops in these points probably for the last two years and have been supplying them, at least since the Armistice, by some communications other than by the sea, probably by rail, and there seems to be but little doubt that they can continue this method of supply if they so desire.

In regard to their claims that the Poles are the constant aggressors on the German-Poland front, I had an opportunity this afternoon to talk over the telephone with Mr. Lord, one of our Peace Commissioners who is just returning to PARIS from BERLIN. As he had been in BERLIN some little time, and I think also in POSEN, I took occasion to ask him what information he had on this subject. I told him that the Germans claimed that the Poles were the constant aggressors, and that they were appealing to the Allies to have these aggressions stopped. He said that not only was this not true, but that the Germans themselves were the aggressors. That he and his associates in BERLIN had much information to prove this, including intercepted messages which tend to show that the German military authorities were trying to keep matters stirred up on that front. As our conversation was over the phone, I could not go into it as fully as I should like to have done.

* * * * *

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section.

Provisioning by Sea of Garrisons at Libau and Windau

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, March 16, 1919.

No. 102

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

1. Provisions for the Garrisons at Libau and Windau: Marshal Foch telegraphed under date of March 15, as follows, in regard to the garrisons at LIBAU and WINDAU:

"If the British Admiral who commands on the Baltic thinks it necessary for the provisioning of the German garrison at WINDAU, I believe that authorization should be granted for coast-wide sea traffic between LIBAU and WINDAU. Consequently, orders have been sent to the Commanders of the Allied Naval Forces in the Baltic."

* * * * *

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1220:

Question of Continuance of Armistice Commission

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, March 16, 1919.

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, G-1

1. From press reports, it seems highly probable that the terms of peace will be completed in the near future, it even being predicted that the peace will be signed by April 1.

2. I desire to call attention to the fact that several provisions of the various Armistice Agreements are as yet, and will be for some time, far from completion. I refer particularly to the return of machinery to Northern France and Belgium and to the delivery of agricultural implements, as agreed upon in Paragraph 3 of the Armistice Convention of January 16.

3. Without a doubt the treaty will cover any unexecuted portions of the Armistice Agreements. If this were not done, the Germans might claim that as a later document it had the effect of annulling conventions.

4. Another point to be considered is whether or not the Armistice Commission as now composed, is to be continued after the signing of the Treaty of Peace. Without a doubt this is not contemplated, for after the Treaty of Peace is signed Armistice conditions would manifestly be out of place. These conditions are naturally much more binding upon the Germans than would be the peace conditions, which will be brought about by the signing of the treaty. It is, therefore, only to be expected that the Germans will object to continuing negotiations on an Armistice basis.

5. If it is decided to continue negotiations with the Germans, until such time as diplomatic relations are reestablished, through a commission similar to the Armistice Commission, such a commission should be organized differently from the present one. That is, each Allied country should have given number of representatives on the Commission and the voice of each representative should have equal weight in deciding all questions competent for the Commission to decide. Questions which are beyond its competence should be referred by each Allied section to its own military and civil authorities for further instructions.

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section.

G-4, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 12: Regulations

Circulation from and to Rhine Territory

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, ALLIED ARMIES.
March 16, 1919.

[Contemporary Translation]

SUPPLEMENT TO THE RULES OF CIRCULATION IN THE RHINE TERRITORY BY THE ALLIED ARMIES No. 5561/CR

(Adopted at the Interallied Conference of February 28, 1919.)

VII. Circulation between the Occupied Rhine Territory and Alsace-Lorraine.

(a) Enemy Subjects: Forbidden as a general rule.

Nevertheless, enemy subjects residing in ALSACE-LORRAINE may be authorized in exceptional cases to go into the RHINE territory either on a return trip or to establish a residence there when these journeys have been approved by the General commanding the Army of Occupation of the place to which these persons desire to go. In this case, the safe conducts are granted by the Services de Circulation operating at the headquarters of the superior commanding generals in ALSACE and LORRAINE (STRASSBURG and METZ).

(b) Allied Citizens:

1. To Enter the Rhine Territory: Circulation passes will be issued by the Services de Circulation operating at the headquarters of the superior commanding generals in ALSACE and LORRAINE (STRASSBOURG and METZ).

The circulation services of ALSACE-LORRAINE will send a Bulletin d'Avis (a notice) to the Army affected, indicating the pass or passes granted for its zone. Exception is hereby made for the reserve zone in which a prior authorization from the Army affected is necessary in all cases.

2. To Leave the Rhine Territory: Circulation passes will be issued by the various Allied General Headquarters. In the case where any General Headquarters considers

that the necessary information is not at hand to justify giving satisfaction to a request for a pass, it will submit such request to the Marshal Commanding-in-Chief of the Allied Armies (D. G. C. R. A.).

(c) Citizens of Alsace-Lorraine of French Origin: These are considered as Allied citizens.

(d) Neutral Citizens:

1. To Enter the Rhine Territory: Circulation passes will be issued by the Service de Circulation operating at the headquarters of the superior commanding generals in ALSACE and LORRAINE (STRASSBURG and METZ).

These passes should be issued only in limited exceptional cases: Business affairs of great urgency, family matters, etc.

The Circulation Services of ALSACE and of LORRAINE will forward a Bulletin d'Avis (notice) to the Army affected, indicating the pass or passes granted for its zone. Exception is hereby made for the reserve zone in which a prior authorization from the Army affected is necessary in all cases.

2. To Leave the Rhine Territory: The circulation passes will be issued by each Allied Headquarters upon receipt of favorable notification from the Services de Circulation operating at the headquarters of the superior commanding generals in ALSACE and LORRAINE (STRASSBURG and METZ).

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1221: Note

Occupation of Neutral Territory

[Contemporary Translation]

Wako No. 11764

Spa, March 16, 1919.

From the Chairman of the Wako to the

Chairman of the P. I. A. C.

Subject: The Neutral Zone between Coblenz and Mayence.

In answer to No. 532/G

After careful investigation the German Government cannot recognize as valid the grounds proposed by the President of WIESBADEN for the union of the two bridgeheads. The Government can, therefore, not declare itself in any way in agreement with the proposition to occupy this neutral territory.

HAMMERSTEIN.

Circulation of Polish Citizens

[Contemporary Translation]

No. 5026

March 16, 1919.

From the Headquarters of the Army of Occupation of the 4th Zone in the Rhenish Countries

For the information of the Military Governors of the 1st, 2d, and 3d Zones of the Occupied Rhenish Territory

By decision of the Belgian Headquarters I have the honor to announce to you that the Polish citizens coming from unoccupied Germany or from the 1st, 2d, or 3d Zones* of the occupied Rhenish territories cannot be admitted into the 4th Zone on any excuse whatsoever.

Instructions will reach you later concerning the destination to which Poles are to be sent who may have entered the 4th Zone since the beginning of the occupation.

I beg you to give the necessary instructions for immediately carrying out the above decision.

The Lieut. General in Command,

E. MICHEL.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1220: Letter

Provisioning Germany

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION
Spa, Belgium, March 16, 1919.

No. 102

From Chief

To Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

4. Proceedings of the Special Commission for Provisioning Germany: * * * an abstract of the proceedings of the special commission which considered this subject. The meetings took place at BRUSSELS on March 13 and 14.

* In General Barnum's report No. 102, it is stated that the "1st Zone" is that occupied by the French; the "2d Zone" that occupied by the Americans; the "3d Zone" that occupied by the British, and the "4th Zone" that occupied by the Belgians.

This abstract was furnished to me by the French and undoubtedly consists in notes made by some person during the course of the sessions, as it is readily seen that it is not a stenographic report of what took place.

As will be seen from the notes attached, an agreement was reached and signed by both parties, the essential facts being that the Germans are to turn over their merchant marine and the Allies are to begin furnishing Germany at once with food, 270,000 tons of foodstuffs are to be sent in the first month, and for each succeeding months, up to September 1, 300,000 tons of cereals and 70,000 tons of fats will be furnished. In addition to this the Germans are authorized to obtain other foodstuffs from neutral countries, these countries being allowed to import small amounts for their own needs. In payment, the Germans will be authorized, among other conditions, to export merchandise to neutral countries, with the exception of certain restricted articles which will constitute a black list.

The foregoing conditions naturally lead to a partial lifting of the blockade. The Germans claim that the amounts to be delivered, as stated above, are much below their needs but that they would accept them. It was also stated to be understood that the provisioning of the people on the left bank of the RHINE will be taken care of by the Allies with the assistance of the civil authorities with the understanding, however, that these foodstuffs will be paid for.

The Germans were very anxious to have the partial lifting of the blockade definitely provided for and endeavored to get assurance on this matter and especially that the black list be reduced as much as possible and announced at an early date.

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier-General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1221: Letter

Foch's Decision on Ukrainian Delegation

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, March 17, 1919.

No. 103

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

3. Ukrainian Delegation in Berlin: In my Secret Report No. 100, Paragraph 7 I refer to a Ukrainian delegation which arrived in BERLIN for the purpose of carrying relief to Ukrainian prisoners. In this paragraph and the succeeding one, are made references to telegrams passing on this subject.

Marshal Foch has telegraphed, under date of March 16, as follows:

(1) The Ukraine has been recognized neither by the French nor by the Allied Governments.

(2) The conditions concerning Russian prisoners of war which figure in the agreement for the extension of the Armistice of January 16, are applicable to all Russian prisoners of war without exception, including those of Ukraine origin.

(3) Under these conditions the Ukrainian representatives cannot be permitted with special powers to look after prisoners of war in Germany who are of Ukrainian origin.

* * * * *

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier-General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1221: Memorandum

Situation in Baltic Provinces

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, March 17, 1919.

MEETING OF CHIEFS AND CHIEFS OF STAFFS OF THE P. I. A. C.

Germans (General von Hammerstein): The Courland front in the last few days has been considerably improved. You can see that the improved road METZ [not identified] to SHOLAND [SCHAULEN] is now in the hands of the Germans, so that now the feeding lines to the front from LIBAU, TIALIT, and KOVNO to the front are very much more favorable. Of course, all these lines were built by the Germans during the war and are not equipped for use for peace, - after the war, so there are a good many of the stretches that are in pretty bad condition and it will take some time to get them into satisfactory condition for after-peace usage. The strength of our troops has not increased. The weakness of our troops as compared to the Bolsheviks, - opposing the Bolsheviks Armies is the same as it was, but in the rear the situation has been improved by the fact that according to information received from Marshal Foch yesterday the coastwise sea service between LIBAU and WINDAU has been allowed, and that according to information that reached us from BERLIN, ship traffic by KONIGSBERG and LIBAU has been allowed but the difficulties of transporting troops, provisions, and material from the western ports of LIBAU remains the same. The Poles on the border of Silesia are growing more active. There, also, national aims are being pursued under the cover of Bolshevism. This is bringing disturbances among the coal workers of Upper Silesia. The agitation of the Poles in East Prussia and likewise further to the east has not ceased. The question arises, have not the Poles a certain interest in growing more active against the Bolsheviks in the extreme east. In that way Poland itself would form a stronger dam against the floods of Bolshevism. That would be an advantage for us Germans and would stem the tide that is flowing from the east to the west.

ALLIES (General Nudant):

That is the intention of the Allies. You know that within the last few days the French General, General Henrys, who was commanding on the Macedonian front has been sent to WARSAW for the express purpose of organizing a defense on the eastern front under the title of "Military Advisor to the Superior Military Polish Council." As a result, the aims that are being pursued are the very ones that the Germans are after, and it is to be hoped that the decisions that will be arrived at shortly will attain the purpose of determining the firm rampart against Bolshevik advances.

G-3, GHQ, AEF, Fldr. 1221: Note

German Refusal of Proposed Bridgehead Extension

[Contemporary Translation]

Wako No. 13911

Spa, March 17, 1919.

From the Chairman of the Wako [German Armistice Commission]

To the Chairman of the P. I. A. C.

The British Second Army notified the commander of Sector two of the Neutral Zone that it would be advisable to draw into the administration of the COLOGNE Bridgehead, the region of REMSCHEID and CRONENBERG, as well as OBER-PLEIS, ITTENBACH, KONIGSWINTER and HONNEF. The communication does not contain any word about the justifiable grounds for this proposal.

The communities concerned have fallen prey to intense excitement over the matter. As far as I have been questioned I have answered that the British according to agreements have no right to make these demands. The British Second Army sent a copy of their communication to the Chairmen of the Interallied Armistice Commission in SPA. General Nudant was informed thereby of the incident. On the basis of Article XXXIV of the Agreement of November 11, 1918, I request him therefore to see to it that the British Second Army withdraw its communication as it is not justified in requesting such an essential change in the Armistice Agreement through direct negotiation with the commander of the sector of the Neutral Zone.

HAMMERSTEIN.

Ownership of Abandoned Enemy War Material

G-4

SECOND ARMY, A. E. F.,
OFFICE OF ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF,
March 17 1919

From: Chief of Staff, Second Army

To: Commanding General, VI Corps (Attention G-1)

1. Herewith copy of order from Marshal, C-in-C of the Allied Armies, with reference to ownership of abandoned enemy war material in area ahead of the line of November 11, and map showing area covered by the American Army subsequent to the signing of the Armistice.

2. You will note that under the terms of this letter all enemy war material ahead of the line Nov. 11, lying within the boundary of the American advance, is the property of the United States Government and full responsibility devolves upon those who are charged with its care in accordance with existing instructions from these headquarters.

3. With special reference to the area in Belgium now outside the present Second Army area, it is directed that an investigation be made to see whether property formerly reported in this area was properly cared for, removed, or turned over to an Allied military unit with proper receipts taken, report being made to these headquarters thereof.

4. If any doubt exists as to what disposition was made of this material, it is directed that you send representatives to the various places in this area where property was reported for the purpose of ascertaining its situation and if the property is still there. You will see that it is guarded and disposed of in accordance with instructions already issued you regarding Area 2.

By command of Lieutenant General Bullard:

STUART HEINTZELMAN,
Brigadier General.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1189: Telegram

Holding or Removing German Military Material

[Contemporary Translation]

1st Section, General Staff
3d Bureau

C-in-C, Allied Armies,
G. Q. G. A., March 17, 1919.

From: Marshal Foch, C-in-C, Allied Armies

To: General Nudant, C. I. P. A. [Permanent International Armistice Commission] Spa.

No. 1568. Pursuant to note of General Hammerstein
No. C. W. N. I. 240/11767 of February 25.

The French Government informs us that German subjects cannot be searched for holding or taking away material, when on their part it was only the execution of orders given or when they were simply holders of these objects.

Will you please advise the German delegates and ask, therefore, for the immediate return of the lists announced.

By order:

The Major-General,

WEYGAND.

GHQ, G-2-A-2 Translations: File 3630: Report

Conference on Propaganda in the Rhineland

[Contemporary Translation]

No. 3656

Paris, March 17, 1919.

INTERALLIED CONFERENCE

[Extract]

The meeting opened at 3 p. m. with Mr. Edmond Chaix, Chief of the Bureau for Propaganda against the Enemy, as president.

* * * * *

Mr. Edmond Chaix began by explaining the idea underlying the calling of the Conference.

In reality, from the viewpoint of its functions, it ought to be the normal outcome of the Conference of Propaganda within the Enemy Lines. But the purpose of its work has changed. It is a question now of rendering the administration of Rhenish Prussia and of Westphalia easier for the Armies of Occupation by combined action upon the minds of the population of these Provinces and of acquainting them with the truth as to the occurrences of the war, of which they appear to be ignorant.

In order to succeed, the principal action would have to be carried on indirectly by means of commerce with the Army of Occupation assisting.

The goals to be attained by the Interallied Conference are principally:

1. To come to an agreement as to the ideas to be disseminated.
2. To combine the means of action.

In order to realize the decisions reached at the Conference, an organization must be formed which shall be as simple as possible and which must add to controlling and executive qualities, that of information.

It would seem that the organization fitted for the centralization of this control and of this information is the service of the General Headquarters of the Allied Armies in charge of the administration of the Rhenish districts, the service of the Inspector General, Tirard.

Besides it is to this service that the Bureau has addressed itself in the course of the transition period which has just elapsed, on all questions concerning the civilian population in the zone occupied by the French Army.

As this principle arouses no objection, it is decided that the delegates will ask their respective Governments for the necessary authority to allow the executive agents of the different services of propaganda to accomplish their task in a uniform manner in the four zones of occupation, under the control of the General Headquarters of the Allied Armies. (Service of Mr. Tirard.)

* * * * *

Captain Hartzell then took the floor.

The Propaganda Service of the American Army was suppressed upon the signing of the Armistice and the officers of this Service were dispersed. It was under these conditions that Captain Hartzell was appointed to represent the American General Headquarters on the trip of investigation in the Rhine countries which took place at the beginning of February.

The report made by Captain Hartzell upon his return was addressed to the general in charge of G-2 on the American General Staff, but this general, after being absent several long periods, did not return until the 19th of this month. Therefore, nothing could be undertaken with regard to this so far as the American zone is concerned.

Mr. Edmond Chaix asked Captain Hartzell to see that instructions be given to the American commander at COBLENZ as soon as possible principally regarding the circulation of library and cinema agents within the COBLENZ zone.

* * * * *

DECISIONS MADE

I. The delegates will request their governments 1st - that instructions be given so that the executive agents of the various services of propaganda may do their work in uniform fashion in the four zones of occupation, under the control of the General Headquarters of the Allied Armies (Department of Mr. Tirard, Inspector General of the Administration of the Rhine Territories).

2.- That the various services of propaganda collaborate on certain publications which might be of interest to the four zones.

3.- That delegates be appointed as members of the Censorship Commission for Publications and Illustrations, and for the Censorship Commission for Moving Pictures (a commission which functions twice a month at the Center of Propaganda Against the Enemy).

4.- That instructions be given so that the Interallied Economic Commission, which has its headquarters at LUXEMBURG under the chairmanship of M. Tirard, be empowered to draw up a single list of newspapers authorized in the Rhine territories.

5.- That orders be given to the different services of censorship not to tolerate certain unseasonable manifestations of the press of the occupied territories, especially in what concerns the actions of the Peace Conference.

II. Captain Hartzell will request American G. H. Q. that instructions be given as soon as possible, especially in what concerns the actions of book agents and moving picture agents in the American zone of occupation. Captain Hartzell will also request that certain publications in English be distributed through the agency of the Army or at least of the Y. M. C. A. These publications would be distributed among the civilian population without it being necessary for the soldiers to mingle any more with the population.

III. Captain Kenny will direct the attention of the British authorities particularly to the great results which can be obtained by a well-conducted propaganda among the university circles of BONN, whose spirit is at present very hostile to the Entente.

IV. All the Allies can profit by the postal service which leaves BRUSSELS every day at 6 a. m. and distributes in five hours the daily papers in the occupied territory. The mail is carried by a Belgian military postal service.

V The delegates will search for publications which it would be good to distribute throughout the whole of the zone of occupation, with a view to drawing up a general plan of propaganda which will be decided on as soon as the decisions of the Peace Conference concerning the administration of the Rhine Provinces are known

EDMOND CHAIX,
The President.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1221: Letter

Suggested Transfer of Armistice Commission to Wiesbaden

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, March 18, 1919.

No. 104

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief

[Extract]

* * * * *

7. Change of Location of Armistice Commission: Attention is invited to Paragraph 2 of my Secret Report No. 82, in which it is reported that the Germans had presented a note suggesting the removal of the Armistice Commission from SPA, giving the reasons for such recommendation. In this note they recommended that the Commission be moved to the town of WIESBADEN.

In a special report which I made to the Commander-in-Chief, G-1, dated March 16, I called attention to the possibility of the reorganization of the Armistice Commission and referred to the length of time which the Commission may be expected to continue. If Armistice conditions are to be continued even after the signing of peace until such time as the peace shall have been ratified by the various Governments, it seems not unlikely that this Commission will continue for two or three months longer. If in the judgment of those best informed this seems probable, I desire to again urge that the location of the Armistice Commission be changed from SPA to WIESBADEN. I have before me a report from the member of our committee on the return of machinery made by him after he had been located in WIESBADEN for a few days. In this report he speaks very favorable of the accommodations which that city affords, the good communications which it has with BERLIN and PARIS and other advantages, such as diversions for officers and men when not at work.

The meeting place of the Commission has been changed from the Hotel BRITANNIQUE to a smaller hotel and there are many other signs showing the wish of the people of SPA to recover the use of their property. It will be impossible for this move to be carried to any material extent as long as the Commission remains here on account of the relatively large amount of billeting required by the Allied and German Sections. In WIESBADEN this amount of billeting would be inappreciable and would cause no inconvenience to anyone.

* * * * *

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier-General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

Search of German Factories

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, March 18, 1919.

No. 104

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

* * * * *

4. Persons Authorized to Search for Machines Taken from France and Belgium:
Minister von Haniel on behalf of the German Government presented a note, * * * calling attention to the fact that inasmuch as the German Government has issued a decree calling upon possessors of machines taken from northern France and Belgium to declare them, the investigation and search for such machines should be limited to those persons who are acting under the orders of the Interallied Subcommittee.

Undoubtedly the question at the bottom of this note is the search of factories, ostensibly for machines but incidentally for the purpose of learning trade secrets. I have referred to this matter in previous notes, and while the evidence is not positive to the fact that it is being done, the ease with which it could be done and the fact that the Germans now protest against unnecessary inspections tends to show that it is being done.

* * * * *

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier-General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1221: Note

Persons Investigating German Factories

[Contemporary Translation]

A. A. II, No. 2779

March 18, 1919.

Representative of German Government

To Chairman of British Armistice Commission

Answering Note A. C./1194 of March 5, 1919.

Subject: Distribution of Passes in the British Zone of Occupation for the Investigation of Machinery.

Inasmuch as the whole subject of the return of machinery and material has been specialized exclusively in the work of the Interallied Subcommittee for the return of machinery and materiel, as well as the German Subcommittee for the return of machinery and materiel, and inasmuch as, further, all possessors of machines coming from Belgium and France have been commanded by a Government order to give notification of such possession, the undertaking of such investigation by people who have no connection whatever with the above mentioned subcommittees will lead to great disorder and misunderstanding which will render extremely difficult the work of the Subcommittee.

It is requested that the investigation of factories, for the purpose of determining what machinery has been taken from France and Belgium be undertaken exclusively by persons under orders from the Interallied Subcommittee.

v. HANIEL.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1221:

Transportation of Food to Czechoslovakia

No. 104

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, March 18, 1919.

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

* * * * *

2. Transportation of Food for the Czechoslovaks: The Germans called attention to the fact that the only practical way of getting food to the Czechoslovaks through Germany is that mentioned in their note to General Barnum on March 10, 1919. This route is by way of HAMBURG and the ELBE River. That in view of the almost complete collapse of railway traffic, the way by railway from MANNHEIM to FRANKFORT cannot be used. Germany will take over the responsibility for the safe transit through Germany on the waterway of the ELBE as far as the boundary, except the risk for losses which may occur when the Germans are not to blame. Every kind of control of the transports inside Germany by Allied organizations or Czechoslovak organizations is therefore superfluous and cannot be allowed. The transportation will be carried out by the shipping section of the office of the Chief of the Railway Service. It is requested that transports may be addressed to the Navigation Group at HAMBURG. This office would take over the goods from the ELBE transport ships and would carry out their loading in the barges and start them on their way. These barges would be sealed in HAMBURG and if they passed the German frontier with their seals untouched Germany must be considered as being no longer responsible for them.

Similar method will be carried out in the matter of food transportation from DANZIG. Transportation will have to be taken over by Czechoslovaks at the boundary in return for receipts. As has been mentioned above, in view of the fact that

railway transportation is absolutely out of the question, owing to the collapse of the railway traffic, the details asked for in Paragraph three, Note No. 667-G, are not available. Payment to the Germans for carriage and for cost of loading, etc., are to be made in pounds or dollars and must be made available for the buying of food for Germany.

* * * * *

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier-General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1221: Letter

Repatriation of Wounded and Sick German Prisoners

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, March 19, 1919.

No. 105

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

1. Repatriation of Seriously Wounded and Seriously Injured Prisoners of War:

Marshal Foch has telegraphed to the Chairman of the P. I. A. C., as follows:

The French Government has decided upon the immediate repatriation of the seriously wounded and seriously ill of the German prisoners. The medical examinations have actually begun and their repatriation will take place in the very near future.

To the foregoing, General von Hammerstein made the following reply:

I greet this statement with the greatest satisfaction. In the course of negotiations at TREVES in the middle of February, Marshal Foch stated that about 2,000 seriously wounded German prisoners would be returned to Germany. I shall be interested to know if in consequence of this note we can expect to get more than 2,000 returned.

To this General Nudant replied:

We shall probably know very soon the number of prisoners who will fall under this category.

* * * * *

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier-General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

Selling of Army Materiel after November 11, 1918.

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, March 19, 1919.

No. 105

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.,

[Extract]

6. Arrest of Germans for Selling Army Materiel after November 11, 1918:

The Germans presented the following note on this subject:

The German Government has received information from various sources that officers and officials and inhabitants of the occupied areas have been arrested and handed over to the courts-martial for having sold, bought, and resold Army materiel after November 11, 1918, and before the time limit fixed for evacuation. Thus on the order of the American Commander, the Burgomaster and several citizens of AHRWEILER were arrested and were to be turned over to courts-martial on March 17. As has been stated in Note KM-11042 of February 26, 1919, the German Armistice Commission has always interpreted Article VI, Paragraph 3 of the Armistice Agreement in this way: That the military stores and articles which passed out of the possession of the Army authorities in correct manner before the expiration of the period fixed for evacuation, became part of the economic life of the territory and were available for sale and thus lost their character as military stores.

According to Note 592-G of March 6, 1919, the Allied Governments were aware that this interpretation had been officially published to the troops and the private individuals in the occupied area.

In view of this interpretation of Article VI, always considered by German Armistice Commission as proper, the inhabitants of the occupied territory have trafficked in the buying and selling of army materiel. The Allies must, therefore, give them credit for having acted in good faith.

I raise protest against the arrest and condemnation of the Burgomaster and individuals of AHRWEILER and request that this procedure may be suspended and the arrested persons be set at liberty. I also ask that assurance be given that no arrests or prosecutions will be carried out against the inhabitants of the occupied territory for traffic of this nature. At the same time, I request a prompt reply to my note of February 26, KM-11042.

I have sent a copy of this letter to the Commanding General, Third Army, for his information. I do not consider that any further action is necessary here in view of the fact that Commanding General, Third Army has a copy of the Armistice and has been kept fully advised of all rulings and interpretations placed on the various paragraphs. Without doubt he would not have ordered the arrest of the Burgomaster

and some citizens of AHRWEILER has it not appeared to him manifest, that they had violated the terms of the Armistice Agreement.

* * * * *

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier-General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1221: Letter

Disembarking of Polish Troops at Danzig

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, March 19, 1919.

No. 105

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.,

[Extract]

* * * * *

2. Disembarking of Polish Troops:

Under date of March 18, Marshal Foch has sent the following instructions:

The proposals of the German Government that aim at the disembarking of Polish troops at KONIGSBERG, MEMEL, or LIBAU have not been approved by the Allied and Associated Governments, and the latter have given full power to the Allied Commission at WARSAW to regulate the circumstances of the disembarking of troops. The German Government is therefore requested, in conformance with Article XVI of the Armistice Agreement of November 11, 1918 to give all facilities for freedom of circulations to the members of the Commission in order to allow them to study as rapidly and speedily as possible the question of the transportation of the Polish troops by sea to DANZIG.

General von Hammerstein made the following reply:

I have expressed the point of view of the German Government regarding the disembarkation of Polish troops at DANZIG several times already. According to the German interpretation of Article XVI of the Armistice Agreement of November 11, 1918, the Allied Governments have not the right to demand disembarkation of Polish troops at DANZIG. Paragraph XVI reads as follows: 'The Allies are to have free access to the territory evacuated by the Germans on their eastern frontiers, either by DANZIG or by the VISTULA, in order to feed the population of this territory and in order to be able to maintain order.' Leaving this Article out of the question, the landing of the Polish troops would in addition cause unrest in the German territories of DANZIG. The Polish population east of the VISTULA is only waiting for its chance when unrest breaks out. Numerous letters and telegrams from communities east of the

VISTULA request us to hinder the advent of Polish troops, as this would only be the signal for revolution. The German Government has officially authorized me to make the statement that it does not wish Polish troops to be disembarked at DANZIG. In conformance with this it is therefore no longer necessary that Allied officers should study the ground with the point of view of disembarkation of Polish troops at DANZIG. The offer for the ports of KONIGSBERG and PILLAU remain unchanged.

Continuing the discussion, General Nudant said:

The decision which was reached by the Allied Governments to make use of the port of DANZIG in order to transport there means of restoring order in that neighborhood is nothing more than purely and simply the carrying out or the execution of the XVI Article of the Armistice Agreement. The reasons brought forward by General Hammerstein in the name of the German Government and which aim at setting aside the use of the port of DANZIG because of the unrest that might be caused in the neighborhood of DANZIG, is a special point of view to which the Allied Governments cannot subscribe. Moreover, the question of DANZIG cannot be treated at the same time both at SPA and at POSEN. The Interallied Commission at POSEN has the necessary powers to end the matter favorably, and the note that I have just read is nothing more than a repetition of the order that was given to the Interallied Commission.

* * * * *

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier-General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

193-28.2: Memorandum

Conference Ordered on American Neutral Zone Offenses

March 20, 1919.

MEMORANDUM FOR COL. CLARK:

The Chief of Staff desires that you examine the correspondence herewith relative to our violations of regulations in Neutral Zone and that you go immediately to WESTERBURG and have a conference with Major General Pohlman of the German Army.

You will inform General Pohlman that we are most anxious to control in any way the incursion of our men into the Neutral Zone; that we appreciate as warmer weather comes on and as the men become more familiar with the surrounding country near the Neutral Zone that the effort to wander into the Neutral Zone will probably increase. You will tell General Pohlman that it is believed that some of the main attractions for our men in the Neutral Zone are places where cognac is sold and places where prostitutes gather. It has been stated that in several instances prostitutes, who have been ejected from the American bridgehead, have set themselves up in small villages not far from the perimeter. You will request that he make every effort on his part, through his police, to prevent the sale of cognac and the establishment of these women near the American perimeter.

You will request of General Pohlman any suggestions which he has that may aid in solving the question, and assure him that we will cooperate with him. Should he have no particular suggestions to make, you will inquire if he deems it advisable for us to send cavalry patrols into the Neutral Zone from time to time and without warning, and also to

send military police on motorcycles and in automobiles with orders to arrest and return any American soldiers found in the zone.

The Chief of Staff desires that you report to him before going.

ADNA R. CHAFFEE,
Colonel, G. S.,
A. C. of S., G-3.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1221: Letter

***Repatriation by Belgians of German Sick and Wounded;
Food for Russian Prisoners***

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, March 20, 1919.

No. 106

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

* * * * *

4. Repatriation of Hospital Personnel by Belgians: General Delobbe announced that he had received instructions from the Minister of War that orders had been given for the repatriation of hospital personnel, seriously wounded and sick German prisoners of war now in the hands of the Belgians.

To the foregoing, General von Hammerstein replied: "I take note of this communication with special satisfaction."

* * * * *

11. Food for Russian Prisoners: The following is a telegram sent by General Harries to the Chief of Staff, A. E. F. I incorporate this telegram in my report in view of the fact that some copies go to persons who will not have seen it and yet are concerned with providing food for Russian prisoners.

French are delivering some food supplies for Russian prisoners at MAYENCE and these are being turned over by the French to Captain Wynn, American Red Cross, who for this purpose represents our commission. Have just received telegram from Hoover announcing that the rations at MAYENCE are being delivered under orders from Marshal Foch and are addition to those which the Chief Quartermaster, A. E. F., has arranged to send to COBLENZ. Hoover tells me to accept all I receive and to keep him informed regarding deliveries. On my desk I find a telegram of March 13, from General Harbord by which the Secretary of War authorizes the turning over of surplus and other Army supplies to Hoover's representatives here for use of Russian prisoners in Germany. I am therefore assuming that suitable financial arrangements have been made at all points and I am at liberty to accept the supplies from both sources and

to issue same. General Harbord's telegram indicates that our Army will defray the costs of transportation from point of shipment to BERLIN. What about transportation from BERLIN to the camps?

* * * * *

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier-General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1221: Letter

German Stand on Polish Question

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, March 20, 1919.

No. 106

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.,

[Extract]

* * * * *

7. Landing of Polish Troops in Germany:

General von Hammerstein presented a note, stating that:

In addition to my verbal declaration in the plenary sitting on March 14, I have the following to communicate on behalf of the German Government. After handing over Note No. 716-G, I did not state that the Interallied Commission in POSEN had plenary powers to settle definitely the matter of the landing of Polish troops at DANZIG. In opposition to this, the German Government insists on its right according to Article XXXIV of the Agreement of November 11, in dealing with the matter at SPA, as this matter arises out of Article XVI of the Armistice Agreement. Note No. 716-G of March 19 cannot be considered as a definite settlement of the question of the landing of Polish troops; it only deals with my Note of March 7, the standpoint in the matter of principle of the German Government as shown in Note of March 8, No. 12984. The German Government must therefore first wait for the points in this Note to be examined before it can take further steps. The German Government lays great stress on the statement that in the offer made in Note No. 12984 of March 8, Paragraph 5, the German Government declares its willingness to undertake a task which was over and above the Armistice Agreement. The German Government must, therefore, insist upon the point that this task can only be carried out under conditions laid down by the German Government. The German Government is prepared to negotiate on this subject. It can, however, in nowise consent to allow passage of hostile troops through German territory where right is so very much on the side of the Germans. It cannot be supposed that the

Allied Governments are going to act contrary to their repeated assurance, that their only object in the east was to maintain order and to avoid new bloodshed. The German Government can state that at the time being there is quiet in the territories concerned, but it has added fear that the arrival of Polish troops would mean an attempt to protest the German majority and would lead to bloodshed. Under these conditions it cannot be expected from the German Government that it should consent to allow Allied persons, including Polish officers, without any limitation or supervision, to travel in the area east of the VISTULA. There is not a paragraph in the Armistice Agreement which binds the Germans to give such assent. According to the experience which the German Government has had in the matter of Mr. Paderewski and Colonel Wade, it must now be doubly cautious. The German Government, is, however, still ready to do its utmost and will be willing to examine every individual case and find out whether and under what conditions the assurance proposed may be carried out for a limited purpose and without endangering the peace and order.

8. Reply to the Foregoing:

To the preceding note of General von Hammerstein, General Nudant made the following reply:

Inasmuch as the POSEN Conference was interrupted, it is probable that the Allied and Associated Governments are completely informed on the contents of this note, but I shall not fail to send it immediately to Marshal Foch, because while a number of the notes have not been very clear, this one at least has the advantage of being so, being a clear and unequivocal refusal of the propositions and suggestions made by the Allied Governments. It creates, therefore, a situation of facts which will be treated as it deserves.

* * * * *

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

G-3, GHQ, AEF, Fldr. 1221: Note

Disposition of Excess Trucks

[Contemporary Translation]

PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION,
Spa, Belgium, March 20, 1919.

No. 548/T

In the Telegram No. 5503/CR of March 15, 1919, a copy of which has been sent to you, the Marshal, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies, has granted satisfaction to the German request asking for the reshipment into nonoccupied Germany or for the right to sell at the place of location the auto trucks which have been collected to be delivered to the Allies and which proved to be in excess of 5,000 required by the Armistice Agreement.

As a result of a joint understanding reached by the Subcommittee on Transportation, the following measures have been drawn up:

(1) The local German representatives will give the reception committees of the armies concerned the list of auto trucks for which they desire the authority to send them back to Germany or to sell them where they are.

(2) The automobile departments [motor transport services] of the armies will study these lists so as to supervise the affair, which, of course, cannot be extended so as to include auto lorries that might be declared war booty. Cases that might seem doubtful after discussion between the armies and the local German representatives will be put before the P. I. A. C. for examination.

(3) In cases where the armies authorize the requests made by the German representatives, the automobile department of the army concerned will deliver to the German representatives either a pass for the return of the automobile truck to nonoccupied Germany, or a title of ownership in case the lorry is sold on the spot. * * *

I request you to be good enough to transmit these measures to the department of your army that is concerned.

NUDANT.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1221: Letter

German Request to Commission Cruisers

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, March 20, 1919.

No. 106

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

* * * * *

6. Request for Authority to Commission Four Small Cruisers:

General von Hammerstein presented a note stating that:

According to a radio wire from the German central authorities, certain unions of radical seamen have constantly put conditions in the way of the ships destined for handing over, according to the BRUSSELS Agreement, for this purpose. The continuance of food which is to come in may also be jeopardized by this measure. It is, therefore, requested that the consent of the Allied Governments may be obtained as soon as possible for the immediate commissioning for four small cruisers. The ships are urgently required to secure the merchant ships which are to leave immediately and to protect the transportation of food which is coming in.

Later in the session General Nudant asked to be informed as to what ports the unrest referred to pertained, and to this General von Hammerstein replied:

We are only at the present time just recognizing that the danger is there owing to the attitude of Seamen's Unions, as these ships are at anchor at HAMBURG but mostly at BREMEN. These are the two ports which come into question before any others.

According to a newspaper article which I have just received, this movement has assumed a threatening character already.

* * * * *

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier-General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

G-3, GHQ, AEF, Fldr. 1221: Note

German Protests on French Propaganda

[Contemporary Translation]

Wako
B 14312

Spa, March 20, 1919.

Chairman of Wako

To Chairman of P. I. A. C.

According to information received here from the press and from other sources, all of the newspapers which appear in the Palatinate occupied by the French are forced to publish articles that are so conceived as though it had been composed by the editorial staff of the paper concerned, while they are conceived in such a way as to win over the populace on to the side of the French occupation and Government, and to spread a false impression contrary to the true attitude of the populace; by this process the German Government and at the same time the former attitude of the German Army command and its services in occupied parts of France and Belgium are weakened in popular esteem. In addition to this, the French officers are gathering signatures from their German billetkeepers in the Palatinate, signatures to statements which maintain among other things that they are very happy under the humane administration of the French and that they desire that, if they cannot belong to France, that at least the German left bank of the RHINE should be recognized as a neutral state under French protection.

In the National Assembly, in the press and in public gatherings, these reports that come from very reliable sources have awakened a great excitement and severe protests. I therefore request an investigation and a rapid response.

v. HAMMERSTEIN.

Alledged French Coercion in the Palatinate

[Contemporary Translation]

Wako

Spa No. 17020

(no date)

From the Chairman of the German Armistice Commission to the Chairman of French Armistice Commission.

Subject: Efforts of the French Authorities of Occupation to Induce Inhabitants of the Palatinate to Betray Their Country.

[Extract]

From reliable sources we learn that various authorities of the French troops of occupation invite influential citizens of individual towns in the Palatinate, especially in the southern Palatinate, to celebrations and after the meal had been served demand those who take part to sign the following declaration:

Thoroughly satisfied with the blameless behaviour and the generous correctness of the French military authorities, the inhabitants of the Palatinate, thoroughly conscious of the seriousness of the present moment express their deepest gratitude to General Gerard and all of the French authorities subordinate to him.

They are now in a better position than ever to promote their endeavors for the resurrection of the spiritual and economic life of the Palatinate, and it is a pleasure to them to be able to proclaim this fact loudly. Now that they are freed of German militarism, they are requesting the French Government, which is striving to attain an ideal of justice, to help them establish an independent state (a Rhenish or Palatinate Republic). This republic is to live in complete understanding with freed France, which, bound up in its traditions of 1793, will protect it from a counterattack by German militarism.

The Palatinate will develop in order their work and freedom.

* * * * *

I therefore enter most solemn protest against a method of leading astray a defenseless, intimidated and famished people, that are, contrary to the principles of President Wilson, being led to betray their Fatherland, to betray likewise their people to which they have belonged by customs, speech and origin, to which they still belong and will and shall belong forever.

von HAMMERSTEIN.

Return of Industrial Machinery

Wiesbaden, March 20, 1919.

REPORT OF TELEPHONE MESSAGE RECEIVED
FROM CAPTAIN SANFORD GRIFFITH, C. of I.,
FROM WIESBADEN, GERMANY, March 20, 1919.

1. I am informed by the Belgian Representative that the Belgian Government notes a growing dissatisfaction here in Belgium at the delay in the return by the German Government of machinery taken from northern France and Belgium. To date, only one trainload has come out. This had as destination LILLE, France. None has as yet been shipped to Belgium.

2. Mr. Lefebvre has a growing conviction that the Germans intend to delay these restitutions.

3. The Belgian Government, in accord with Mr. Lefebvre, is of the opinion that where the German Government failed to execute the protocol of January 17 and February 1, [17?], another arm should be used - the exaction of an equivalent. By equivalent, they mean a machine which would have about the same power. This equivalent would be taken at present from the occupied areas.

4. Where the menace of taking an equivalent does not apply, as in the case of machinery destroyed, or where it does not suffice to secure at a given date the return of existing machinery, the equivalent would be taken and given to the owner of the Allies as compensation for the loss of the machinery the German Government had failed to deliver.

5. The Belgian Minister of Economic Affairs, Jaspar, is leaving for PARIS tomorrow to ask for the inclusion of the principal of an equivalent in the TREVES renewal. The French and Belgian representatives are desirous that their point of view be made clear to the American Commission in PARIS.

6. Were the principle of an equivalent accepted at the present time, the French and Belgian proposition is that an Interallied Commission be established in WIESBADEN to decide each specific case. They are of the opinion that the representatives on the Service for Industrial Restitution could advantageously serve in this new capacity.

G-3, GHQ, AEF, Fldr. 1221: Note

German Exports of Gold

[Contemporary Translation]

Wako No. 14303 F 820

Spa, March 20, 1919.

From the Representative of the German Government

To the Chairman of the P. I. A. C.

In accordance with the TRIER Convention of February 16, three weekly installments of the 100,000,000 marks in gold that were to be delivered are due up to this time in ROTTERDAM, that is to say; two installments for the first two weeks of March and one installment for the third week of March. The Reichsbank would like to deliver, for practical reasons, the fourth installment for March at the same time. It is requested that

permission be given for this delivery at once, and the answer transmitted to us as rapidly as possible.

The Reichsbank has named Mr. Erick Deleurant and Mr. Ernst Wasserziener to convoy the money from ROTTERDAM to LONDON. It is requested that a travel pass be granted these two gentlemen for this purpose. The gentlemen will present themselves to the British Consul General at ROTTERDAM in order to receive their passes. On account of the large amount of the shipment it is unconditionally necessary that two gentlemen accompany the shipment.

The money will be sent immediately after the receipt of the answer requested in this note. The exact time of the arrival of the money will be communicated immediately thereafter.

FREIHERR von LERSNER.

G-3, JHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1221: Letter

German Delivery of Gold

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, March 20, 1919.

No. 106

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

* * * * *

5. Inquiry as to Delivery of Gold at BRUSSELS and Availability of German Merchant Marine:

General Barnum presented a note to the President of the German Armistice Commission, containing the following telegram which had been received from Mr. Hoover:

Would appreciate very much any information you may be able to secure for me relative to date when Germans will commence delivery gold at BRUSSELS with approximate quantities and date when they will commence sending out their merchant fleet in accordance with agreement reached at BRUSSELS Conference, March 13 and 14. Need this information early as possible so that we can commence to divert our shipping into HAMBURG to fill German order.

* * * * *

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier-General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

Disposition of Material Under Orders

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, March 21, 1919.

No. 107

From: Chief,

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

2. Germans Not to be Held Responsible for Materiel Taken When Acting Under Orders;
Marshal Foch sent a telegram under date of March 17 to the effect that German subjects cannot be sought out for having kept or carried away materiel when they were acting under orders that they had received, or when they have been simply handlers of the objects.

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier-General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1221: Note

German Request for Fishing Rights

[Contemporary Translation]

Wako No. 14652 Mar.

Spa, March 21, 1919.

From the Chairman of the Wako

To the Chairman of the P. I. A. C.

At BRUSSELS the German desire for the freedom of a fishing area in the North Sea was presented to Captain Marryat as the representative of Admiral Wemyss and to Mr. Hoover; they are confirmed in writing in the following page:

It is requested that freedom for fishing be granted in the former English closed Sea in the German Bight inclusive of the 6th degree longitude east of the SKAGERRAK, of the CATTEGAT and of the waters up to the East Sea [Baltic].

The western boundary of the desired free area * * * runs from the mouth of the EGER River toward the south on the 6th degree east longitude up to the northwestern corner of the English closed area, and from there to the North Doggerbank fireship [lightship] and then on past the buoys number 1, 2 and 3 in the so-called "neutral run," past the South Doggerbank fireship [lightship] and then on past the buoys numbers 4, 5, 5A and 6 up to the 53d degree north latitude and on the 53d degree north latitude to the east.

The limits of the area in the German Bight are clearly recognizable by the fireships and buoys that mark the "neutral run." It is, therefore, to be hoped that there will be no friction between the Allied and German fishermen. The fishing boats will be able, without any difficulty, to remain within the boundary of the 6th degree east before the SKAGERRAK.

The requested area is considerably limited in its uses on account of the large numbers of mines that are present almost everywhere. Permission ought to be given the German fishing boats at the end of their fishing trips to land their cargoes either in the ports of the East Sea or the North Sea. In case the requested area is allowed it is to be hoped that sufficient catches will result as to create a considerable increase in the possibility of feeding the German people. There would certainly not be a sufficiently large catch possible in the small area inside of the direct line HORNS REEF-BORKUM REEF, as the provision of mines in this area is particularly heavy.

In the interests of the complete use and as soon as entire as possible of the possibilities of obtaining food provided by nature I would be especially indebted to General Nudant if he would transmit to the Allied High Command with the greatest speed this circumstance and would underline its importance and urgency.

HAMMERSTEIN.

GHQ, G-2-A-2 Translations: File 3566: Report

Strength of the German Army

[Contemporary Translation]

March 22, 1919.

STRENGTH OF THE GERMAN ARMY FOR MARCH 13, 1919, AS GIVEN BY THE GERMAN MINISTER OF WAR TO COLONEL CONGER ON MARCH 18, 1919.

The figures for the strength of the German Army for March 1, 1919, have not yet been sent in. All corps headquarters complain about the marked slowness of the returns, exceptionally bad postal service, poor work of many of the army posts, hindrance by soldiers' councils, internal disturbances, etc.

According to telephonic communication there are:

1. In the Neutral Zone west	about 10,000 men
2. In the border patrol of the north, including the Baltic	70,000
3. In the border patrol south	80,000
4. Volunteer formations in the interior	60,000
Total	220,000

5. Civilian and soldier guard formations for immediate protection in the cities; they are taken care of as a rule by the military authorities, but serve only as police; in BERLIN, for example, there is a guard of about 16,000 men, which is to be reduced to 6,500. The number of men in the guards in the entire Empire probably amounts to 150,000 men.

6. Sick and wounded about 150,000 men.

7. The approximate number of those remaining in the garrisons for four months on account of lack of work (formed into agricultural companies, not available for work outside) about 150,000.

8. Besides this, a certain number of officers, officers of the Sanitary Corps, officials and reenlisted men not included in the numbers from 1 to 4.

The following table gives information as to the discharge by classes from the home army. According to this, the Class born in 1898 (with the exception of those in the eastern border guard) is discharged at the end of February. The Class born in 1899 is being included in the discharge in the I, III, IV, VI, IX, XI, XV Army Corps since March 10, for the other cause (with the exception of the organizations in the eastern border guards) discharge was ordered on March 12 (to end by April 30, 1919). Men of this Class, therefore, cannot be considered as ready for service any longer.

DISCHARGED FROM THE HOME ARMY ACCORDING TO CLASSES

The following discharges took place:

DATE	BORN	FROM -- TO
November 15, 1918	Up to and including 1876	Up to November 25, 1918.
November 15, 1918	1877 to 1879	Up to November 30, 1918.
November 25, 1918	1880 to 1886	From Dec. 1 to 15, 1918.
December 12, 1918	1887 to 1891, 1900 and Younger	From Dec. 16 to 21, 1918.
December 12, 1918	1892 to 1895	Dec. 22 to 31, 1918.
December 28, 1918	1896 to 1897	Up to Jan. 31, 1919.
January 11, 1919	1898	Jan. 15 to Feb. 28, 1919.
March 12, 1919	1899	Up to the end of April 1919.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1221: Letter

Extension of Bridgehead

No. 108

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, March 22, 1919.

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

5. Extension of Area Included in Mayence Bridgehead: In my report of March 18, I called attention to a note presented by the Germans on the subject of the extension of the bridgehead in the vicinity of FRANKFORT-on-the-MAIN.

The Germans this morning submitted the following note on the same subject:

In continuation of my note of March 18, No. 13966, I hand over the following letter which was sent by the German Sector Commander of FRANKFORT to General Mangin: 'According to reports received here, a new traffic control boundary has been fixed, by notice, in front of the previous one, not only on the west of NIEDERRAD and RODELHEIM, but also in the other subdistricts of the bridgehead. This has caused a great deal of unrest in the villages neighboring on the occupied area, as great

difficulties would ensue to the further industrial and agricultural work if the traffic control is to be moved to this new line. The disadvantages which would accrue to the town of FRANKFORT from these difficulties in traffic are also worthy of consideration. I, therefore, again protest against the alteration of the present traffic control line and I request that the sign boards may be taken back to the old line in order to avoid any further disturbances and trouble among the population.

* * * * *

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1221: Letter

Russian Prisoners of War

No. 108

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, March 22, 1919.

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

* * * * *

10. Conditions in Russian Prisoner of War Camps: Major-General Ewart of the British Service, Chairman of the Allied Commission in BERLIN looking after prisoners of war, was in SPA yesterday; after the meeting I had a conference with him concerning the conditions surrounding the Russian prisoners of war remaining in Germany.

He is quite stirred up over the conditions prevailing in these camps and feels that steps should be taken in the very near future looking to the repatriation of these men. That the movement should be commenced as soon as possible even though only a small number can be returned each month. There are agitators in practically all of the camps and he fears that if repatriation is not commenced very soon these agitators may so stir the prisoners of war that they will leave the camps, in spite of the guards.

Based on his report, General Haking has made recommendations to his Government on this subject.

Before I make recommendations regarding this matter, I consider it necessary to have information from General Harries, our representative in BERLIN, and to this end have called upon him for report on the situation and replies to a number of specific questions. As soon as this report is received from him, I will take up this question again, furnishing all information possible and such recommendations as seem practicable.

* * * * *

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

Supplies for Russian Prisoners

4th Section, G. S.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,
March 22, 1919.

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief of Staff

1. The following resume of recent correspondence on this subject is furnished to indicate its present status:

Item A. Letter dated March 11, 1919, signed by Chief of Staff, to the C. G., S. O. S., Paragraphs 4 and 5, as follows:

4. It is desired that you direct the Chief Quartermaster to get in touch with Mr. Hoover and see if there is any stock which we have on hand which Mr. Hoover desires for his activities. If so, you are authorized to sell the same to Mr. Hoover and make deliveries as he may request, provided the same do not violate General Pershing's instructions.

5. The reimbursement for any stocks transferred must include transportation of same to destinations requested.

Item B. Letter dated March 11, 1919, signed Herbert Hoover, to the C-in-C, paragraphs as follows:

I should be obliged if you would issue orders for the immediate delivery to COBLENZ of the following Quartermaster supplies:

1,000	tons of flour,
500	" hardtack, in cartons,
200	" sugar,
50	" tea.

The American Relief Administration will purchase these supplies from the Quartermaster and will be reimbursed by the French Government. I am now discussing with the General Sales Agent exact prices to be paid.

At COBLENZ the supplies should be delivered to the properly authorized representative of General Harries, who I understand, is the American representative of the Interallied Military Commission in BERLIN, and the American Red Cross for distribution to Germany.

Item C. Telegram dated March 15, 1919, from Mr. Hoover to the C-in-C, file No. HASH 163, concluding sentence is as follows:

I trust supplies covered by my letter of March 11, have moved forward promptly.

Item D. Letter dated March 17, 1919, from C. G., S. O. S. (file No. ACQM 430) to the C-in-C, contains a statement as follows:

The Quartermaster Corps, through the General Sales Agent, made the following arrangements with Mr. E. Sherman, of the American Relief Administration, representing Mr. Hoover:

To ship and convey to D. Q. M., COBLENZ, for delivery to authorized representative of General Harries, U. S. A., the following articles.

From GIEVRES:	From IS-sur-TILLE:	Total:
200 tons hard bread	300 tons hard bread	500 tons
150 tons sugar	50 tons sugar	200 tons
20 tons tea	5 tons tea	25 tons
900 tons flour	100 tons flour	1,000 tons

Tons are 2,000 pounds each.

Shipments are to be made in proportionate quantities in each train, and if possible, cars which may go through Germany are to be used.

Receipts are to be taken for delivery to said representative, and supplies invoiced to the Chief Purchasing Officer, Q. M. C., PARIS, who will collect from Mr. Hoover, American Relief Administration, PARIS.

Sales prices to be shown on the invoices are: Hard bread, 12 cents per lb.; sugar, 14 cents per lb.; tea, 40 cents per lb., and flour 10.89/100 cents per lb., F. O. B. COBLENZ.

In the meantime various letters and telegrams were exchanged between these headquarters and Mr. Hoover and between these headquarters and the C. G., S. O. S., resulting eventually in -

Item E. Telegram dated March 18, 1918, from G-4, G. H. Q., to Mr. Hoover, reading as follows:

Number 1883 G-4. Reference your HASH 163, Commanding General, S. O. S., has been requested to ship to Captain Wynn at COBLENZ 1,000 tons flour, 500 tons hard-tack, 200 tons sugar and in addition following telegram has been sent in accordance with letter from you to C-in-C, dated March 11, and his reply to you dated March 12: 'Reference our 1869 and conversation with Colonel Rhea, G-4, this date, you are advised that supplies can go forward. It is now understood here that General Harries is acting in this matter for Hoover who has assumed responsibility and will pay cash for these supplies all as covered by correspondence between him, the C-in-C, and Harries. American Army as such does not assume any responsibility for feeding Russian prisoners in Germany and costs thereof will not be charged against army appropriation. Harries and his personnel have been placed at disposal of Hoover to assist in this work.'

MOSELEY.

Item F. In reply to the foregoing letter March 20, 1919, from American Relief Administration, addressed to G-4, G. H. Q., reading in part as follows:

Mr. Hoover directs me to acknowledge receipt of your telegram No. 1883 of March 12, with regard to arrangements for shipment to COBLENZ for Russian prisoners. * * * we do wish to make it clear, however, that the American Relief Administration has not assumed any responsibility for feeding Russian prisoners, but has merely made arrangements to pay the money for the particular lot ordered on the promise of the French Government to reimburse us for that expense, as we have no funds legally available. The distribution within Germany is entirely independent of the American Relief Administration and we understand is in charge of an interallied military commission cooperating with the American and British Red Cross Section. Signed, American Relief Administration, by Robert E. Taft

Item G. To keep the C. G., S. O. S., informed, our telegram dated March 22, 1919, 1936 G-4, was forwarded, quoting the foregoing extract from Mr. Hoover's letter. The regulating office at IS-sur-TILLE has reported actual movement of supplies directed closely approximating the quantities above informed.

In the meantime, moreover, Marshal Foch has arranged for shipment to MAYENCE, care of the Base Port Commander, for the representative of the Interallied Control Commission, provisions corresponding to an estimated consumption for a period of about two months, consisting of the following items:

Flour	400 tons
Canned or salt meat	900 "
Fats	150 "
Tea	60 "
Sugar	120 "

These instructions were issued by him under date March 13, 1919, and bear file No. D. G. C. R. A. 5440/CR.

In view of the foregoing situation, the C. G., S. O. S., has been requested to make no further shipments of stuff for account Russian prisoners without referring the matter to these headquarters.

Measures have been taken to keep Mr. Hoover, Generals Barnum and Harries fully informed of developments. In a letter dated March 17, 1919, Mr. Taft, writing for Mr. Hoover, stated that arrangements with the Americans were made before the French had informed him (Mr. Hoover) that they were supplying foodstuffs at MAYENCE. He stated that if arrangements made by the French were satisfactory, he was in hopes that no additional shipments would be required from the Americans. For the present, therefore, our connection with this matter may be considered closed, excepting only the activities of General Harries serving as a representative for Mr. Hoover in connection with the distribution beyond the RHINE.

G. A. YOUNGBERG
for
GEO. VAN HORN MOSELEY,
Brig. Gen., General Staff,
Asst. Chief of Staff, G-4.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1221: Letter

German Funds for Payment of Food

No. 108

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, March 22, 1919.

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

* * * * *

6. German Reply to Note Asking About Funds for Mr. Hoover:

Baron von Lersner, the representative of the German Government, made the following reply to the note presented by General Barnum on March 20, regarding funds for the payment of food. This reply is in answer to a query made by Mr. Hoover in regard to when and where these funds would be available:

1. On Saturday March 22, the first shipment of 50 million marks of gold leaves for ROTTERDAM.
2. On Tuesday, March 25, the second shipment of 50 million marks of gold leaves for ROTTERDAM.
3. On Wednesday, March 26, the shipment of 220 million marks in gold leaves for BRUSSELS.
4. On April 1st, 25 million marks in securities will be placed at ROTTERDAM, among which will be 12 1/2 million of Dutch Gulden and 1 million each of Swedish, Norwegian and Danish Kronen (Crowns).

Concerning the date of the departure of the Commercial Fleet, an answer will be forwarded as soon as possible.

This reply was telegraphed to Mr. Hoover.

7. Certain German Ships to Retain their German Crews: Baron von Lersner presented a note calling attention to the desirability of such of the German marine as consistently could be allowed to retain their crews.

The full note follows:

In the course of the negotiations at BRUSSELS the Allies proposed that if German ships could get coal in Germany for a transatlantic voyage, and were thus not obliged to coal at a British port, the German crews would probably remain on board the ships. I request the President of the Interallied Armistice Commission to forward the following to the Naval Armistice Commission: 'The German Government is ready and is in a position to provide a certain number of ships with German coal at German harbors or at ROTTERDAM for a transatlantic voyage. It is known under the circumstances that the German crews may not be left on the ships. This has led to considerable unrest among the sailors at HAMBURG and also to a certain extent hindered the ships from setting sail. Under these circumstances, I request a ruling as soon as possible and I request you to communicate to me the names of the ships which it is proposed should make this Atlantic voyage.'

After the meeting I had a conference with Baron von Lersner in regard to this subject, and as was to be expected he was very anxious that I should press the above matter in the hope that some of their sailors might be able to retain their occupations. He said that it was causing great unrest among the Sailor's Union that these men were to be put off their ships and left practically without an occupation.

I asked him how such ships would be commanded, but, apparently, to this he had given no thought, as he had no solution to offer.

The German Merchant Marine to which he refers is unquestionably to be placed under Allied officers and it is extremely doubtful whether these officers would want German crews or whether they could properly handle their ships with such crews.

* * * * *

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

G-3, GHQ, AEF, Fldr. 1221: Note

Shipment of German Gold to Belgium

[Contemporary Translation]

Wako
Finance Commission
14669F 846

Spa, March 22, 1919.

Representative of German Government

To General Nudant

In the follow-up of note to Wako 14401 F 823, No. 3, information was given that the transport of gold to BRUSSELS, by reason of the BRUSSELS Food Agreement, could leave

BERLIN Wednesday the 26th inst., in an extra train of about 10 cars. The exact time of leaving, schedule, etc., will be given later. The train is accompanied by 3 higher officials: * * * and 10 treasury employees: * * *

All are provided with passes for Germany. It is requested to permit their entry into Belgium and to place passes for them in OHLIGS.

It is further requested that an official of the Belgian Banque Nationale go to OHLIGS to meet the transport. This official should arrange for transferring the transport of gold from the the station in BRUSSELS to the National Bank for Belgium,

It is requested that suitable shelter for the above-named persons accompanying the transport be provided. The train will be accompanied to OHLIGS by a military command of 100 men as guard. It is requested that military guards from OHLIGS be provided.

v. LERSNER.

G-3, GHQ, AEF, Fldr. 1221: Note

German Protest on Russian Officers Going to Berlin

[Contemporary Translation]

No. 1222/3.19 U/Wako, 14947

Spa, March 23, 1919.

General v. Hammerstein

To General Nudant

CONCERNING SENDING COMMISSION OF RUSSIAN OFFICERS TO BERLIN

It has become known to the German Government that Marshal Foch intends to send to BERLIN a Commission of Russian officers under the leadership of General Basaroff, which Commission is to cooperate in the repatriation of the Russian prisoners of war.

The German Government calls attention to the fact that Article 4 of the agreement concerning the extension of the Armistice of January 16, 1919, provides for members of the commissions concerned with Russian prisoners of war in Germany and representatives of the aid societies to come only from Allied and Associated Powers. The sending of Russian officers to BERLIN trespasses upon the above mentioned agreement, especially as it was ordered by Marshal Foch without any understanding having been reached with the German Government beforehand.

I am charged with protesting against the sending of this Commission and with informing you that German Government will not allow it to enter Germany.

Policy on Russian Prisoners

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, March 23, 1919.

No. 109

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.,

[Extract]

* * * * *

7. Russian Prisoners of War: In a conversation that I had with General Haking this morning he told me that General Ewart while here recently, visited General Nudant and laid before him his ideas regarding the present conditions of the Russian prisoners of war and what should be the future policy in regard to them.

Based on these views, General Nudant sent a long telegram to Marshal Foch, recommending that the Allies determine upon a policy to be adopted in regard to these prisoners of war and that it be announced. This policy should cover their early repatriation, which it is believed will be most practicable by way of the DANUBE.

8. Commissions of Russian Officers to go to Berlin to Cooperate in Repatriation of Russian Prisoners of War: * * * a letter presented by General von Hammerstein stating that it has become known to the German Government that Marshal Foch intends to send to BERLIN a commission of Russian officers under the leadership of General Basaroff, which commission is to cooperate in the repatriation of Russian prisoners of war.

The note calls attention to the fact that the Armistice Agreement of January 16 provides that members of such commissions shall be representatives of aid societies and are to come only from Allied and Associated Powers.

The note winds up with a flat refusal on the part of the German Government to allow this Commission to enter Germany.

* * * * *

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier-General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

Commission for Delivery of German Merchant Marine

[Contemporary Translation]

No. AAI-1610

Spa, March 23, 1919.

From: The Representative of the German Government

To: The Chairman of the P. I. A. C.

According to the agreements which were made by the representatives of the Allied and Associated Governments in SPA, and lastly in BRUSSELS, a special commission has been instituted at the shipping office of H. H. Schmidt Company in HAMBURG, which is to transmit all detailed information concerning the German ships that are to be handed over to the Allies and Associates.

It is, therefore, necessary to direct to the above mentioned shipping firm the questions about the ships that are lying in Dutch ports. As far as the Allies are concerned, it would serve their purpose best to have these communications made through the agency of the British-American Commission that is already active in HAMBURG.

I request the Chairman of the P. I. A. C. to inform the competent Allied and Associated authorities of these facts.

v. LERSNER.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1221: Letter

Delivery of Rolling Stock

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, March 23, 1919.

No. 109

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.,

[Extract]

6. Receipt of Rolling Stock: The Committee on Receipt of Rolling Stock from the Germans shows by recent report that up to March 20 there had been received from the Germans 4,948 locomotives and 142,180 cars. This report shows that there remains to be delivered only 52 locomotives and 7,820 cars.

The Chairman of the Transportation Committee in a communication dated March 16, 1919, announced that there will be a cessation of the delivery of cars for eight or ten days, with the exception of certain types such as passenger coaches, coal cars, tank cars, and

cars loaded with agricultural machinery. This cessation was ordered for the purpose of preparing an accurate list of the deliveries to date.

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

G-4, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 2A: Letter

Exchange of German Trucks

4th Section, G. S.
386.32/203

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,
March 23, 1919.

C-in-C

G-4 Rep., Advance G. H. Q.

1. In further reference to our letter March 20 on the above subject, there is inclosed a copy of the minutes of the meeting held at SPA March 12, which contains detailed information as to the various types of trucks to be further distributed among the Allies.

2. This report show that:

(a) The U. S. Army is to deliver to:

French Army	6	trucks
Belgian "	49	"
English "	31	"
German "	9	"
Total	95	

(b) The U. S. Army is to receive from:

French Army	5	trucks
Belgian "	1	"
English "	15	"
Total	21	

This will leave a balance of 1,250 trucks for the U. S. Army.

3. Kindly advise when the distribution directed has been completed.

By order of the C-in-C:

GEO. VAN HORN MOSELEY,
Brigadier General, G-3,
Asst. Chief of Staff, G-4.

Delivery of German Merchant Marine

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, March 23, 1919.

No. 109

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.,

[Extract]

10. Delivery of German Merchant Marine: In further response to my note of March 20 giving telegram from Mr. Hoover in which he desired information as to when funds would be available for payment of food and also when ships would be turned over, I am in receipt of a note from General von Hammerstein to the effect that the Reederei Steamship Company in HAMBURG states that the first ships will sail on March 22.

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier-General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

***Commission for Delivery of German Merchant Marine;
Modification of Blockade***

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, March 24, 1919.

No. 110

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

3. Special Commission Organized at the Shipping Office of H. H. Schmidt and Co., in Hamburg: The Germans presented a note * * * showing that agreements have been entered into by the representatives of the Allied and Associated Governments in SPA, and later in

BRUSSELS, organizing a special commission at the shipping office of H. H. Schmidt and Co., in HAMBURG, which is to transmit all detailed information concerning the German ships that are to be handed over to the Allies.

Questions effecting ships lying in Dutch ports should be referred to this Commission.

* * * * *

5. Modification of the Blockade: The chief of the British Section of the Armistice Commission has informed the Germans that he has received notification that the blockade has been removed in the North Sea in the area east of Longitude 4° 30' and between Latitude 53° 30' North and Latitude 56° North.

* * * * *

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier-General, U. S. A.
Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

G-3, GHQ, AEF, Fldr. 1222: Note

Coastal Shipping Requested for Transportation of Food

[Contemporary Translation]

Wako No. 15290 Mar.

Spa, March 24, 1919.

From the Chairman of the Wako to the Chief of the British
Armistice Commission.

IN ANSWER TO NOTE A. C. 1428, March 20, 1919.

The German Government requests the release of coastal shipping for the transportation of foodstuffs from ROTTERDAM to BREMEN, HAMBURG, KIEL, LUBECK, WISMAR, WARNEMUNDE, ROSTOCK, STETTIN, DANZIG, KONIGSBERG. Unless this release of the shipping is made the transportation of provisions for Germany from ROTTERDAM, as must be repeated over and over again, cannot possibly be assured on account of the completely insufficient traffic resources on the German railways.

The names of the ships that are contemplated for this transport service cannot yet be given as the amounts of foodstuffs that are to arrive at ROTTERDAM from time to time have not yet been made known.

According to the BRUSSELS Convention it is assumed that in the principal case ships loaded with loose grain for Germany are to enter German harbors directly.

Inasmuch as the other provisions of foodstuffs, such as milk, bacon, fats, flour, etc., are to be sent to Germany via ROTTERDAM, it is requested that notification be given us from time to time of the shipping room required.

It is further requested that we be informed of the proper authorities to whom to announce this shipping space.

HAMMERSTEIN.

Request That German Hospital Trains Enter Belgium

[Contemporary Translation]

No. 1162/3.19
Wako 11283/14680

Spa, March 24, 1919.

From the Chairman of the German Armistice Commission

To the Chairman of the Belgian Armistice Commission, General Delobbe

I have noted with peculiar satisfaction the note of General Delobbe to the effect that orders have been given by the Belgian Ministry of War to repatriate immediately the German hospital personnel and seriously ill and wounded that are in Belgium.

For thousands of German families this message constitutes a relief from desperate worry about their relatives that they have missed so long.

For the purpose of carrying out with special rapidity their repatriation, General Delobbe has given me permission to request the proper authorities to be willing to grant a permit for German hospital trains to enter Belgium.

It is now four months since these interned Germans have been hoping from hour to hour for the news of their emancipation. Numerous women are numbered among them who devoted themselves to tasks of love, mercy and personal sacrifices to friend and foe alike.

The Belgian Ministry of War would gratify a will of humanity were it to reach out its hand to lighten the repatriation of these people in every way possible.

I, therefore, request that permission be granted for the immediate entrance into Belgium of the German hospital trains that are ready at ELBERFELD, ESSEN and MUNSTER [in WESTPHALIA], and I further request that the stations be made known to which these trains may be sent.

HAMMERSTEIN.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1221: Note

Repatriation

[Contemporary Translation]

No. 1127/3.19. U/Wako
11283/14680

Spa, March 24, 1919.

From the Chairman of the German Armistice Commission

To the Chairman of the Interallied Armistice Commission

I have noted with great satisfaction that the French Government has given orders to repatriate without delay the German seriously wounded and ill.

I add the request that if it is possible the transports be sent by way of Switzerland, inasmuch as all arrangements are still at hand for that route left from the years of war that have passed, to lighten in every way the execution of the repatriation and to permit the proper care to be exercised for the sick and wounded.

I further request that I be informed as early as possible of the time of the departure of the trains so that the Germans may have the proper hospital trains at the proper transfer stations in time.

HAMMERSTEIN.

G-3, GHQ, AEF, Fldr. 1222: Note

Repatriation of German Prisoners

[Contemporary Translation]

No. 760/G

PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, March 24, 1919.

General Nudant, to the Chairman of Wako

On March 20 the President of the Council writes the following to Marshal Foch:

I have the honor to make known to you that the following information furnished by General d'Esperey showed on March 1, this situation: 12,000 Germans at CONSTANTINOPLE, 2,000 Germans plus 200 civilians at ODESSA, 9,500 Germans plus 200 civilians at NICOLAIEFF [NIKOLAYEV]. It is not possible to indicate exactly the effectives which were at FOCHI [not identified]; 11,000 Germans were said to have been there the end of January.

On the other hand according to information received from the British Admiralty seven German boats are said to be employed at the present time in the repatriation of German prisoners, of whom 10,000 are said to be now en route toward HAMBURG.

Moreover, investigation is being made as to the use of seven Austro-Hungarian steamers for repatriation of German prisoners of war from Turkey and from Southern Russia.

G-3, GHQ, AEF, Fldr. 1222: Note

German Coal Supply

[Contemporary Translation]

A. A. II, No. 2923

Spa, March 24, 1919.

From the Representative of the German Government

To the Chairman of the P. I. A. C.

SUPPLY OF COAL ACCORDING TO THE BRUSSELS FOOD CONVENTION

At BRUSSELS the German Representatives were requested by the Representatives of the Allied and Associated Governments for a report showing under what conditions coal could be exported from Germany to France, Italy and the Neutral lands that border upon Germany.

This report can be granted as follows, based upon the statements that have come in in the meantime from experts:

The quantities of fat, meat and flour which are to arrive in Germany based upon the negotiations of TREVES and BRUSSELS will be delivered by the German Government first of all to those districts in which miners are active.

For the demands of the coal mining region and for the execution of transportation it is further absolutely essential that the following necessary materials be delivered as soon as possible and in sufficient quantities:

Straps (amount follows)

1,500 tons of steam-cylinder oil, of a viscosity of 4.55 English degrees per 100 degrees centigrade, point of combustion over 300.

2,000 tons of Banca tin or Straits tin

Gasoline (quantity to be given).

It would be very desirable if both sides could send technical experts without delay to ROTTERDAM to negotiate over these questions.

Further, it is necessary that all difficulties of traffic between the right and left banks of the RHINE for everything having to do with the coal industry be removed, especially for all materials that are necessary in mining, for example, shaft borers, wood, combustibles, lime, stone, and sodium. Likewise, the personal travel communication must be unlimited and freedom of all restrictions for workmen, employees and directors. At the present time the coal industry suffers considerably from these difficulties of traffic.

Inasmuch as Germany cannot begin to satisfy the demands of her transport service with what remains to her of her own transportation service, as a result of the delivery of a large share of her locomotives and railway cars, the transportation rolling stock required for the exportation of the desired amounts would have to be supplied by the foreign countries.

The coal mining industry of Germany would be further considerably facilitated if they permitted transportation by ship from the ports of the North Sea to German ports of the Baltic at the same time supplying an alleviation of the blockade and an improvement of the difficulties of transportation in the interior of Germany. At the present time it is necessary to send one train almost every day with coal to eastern Prussia.

Further, it would be necessary to release the exportation of materials to Sweden, Norway and Denmark by way of the sea. For a long time important quantities of coal have been lying in Holland already loaded for Sweden that would mean considerable for the payment of foodstuffs that could be imported. It is extremely difficult to say just what amount of transportation service would be available for coal after all of the above conditions were fulfilled. The German Government assumes, however, that as soon as the workers have enough to eat, strikes and other disturbances will rapidly abate.

Fully conscious of the great importance which the exportation of coal might have for the payment of the supply of foodstuffs, the German Government is ready to attempt an increase in the amount of exportation of coal, even if the deliveries required inland would have to suffer somewhat thereby, so that perhaps it would result that there would be available for exportation about one-half of the over 22,500 cars that are daily produced in the districts of the RUHR and Upper Silesia. As soon as the production surpasses 26,000 cars daily, the entire production above the necessary would be released for export.

If all of the above mentioned conditions are accurately fulfilled and thereby all of the unforeseen difficulties in the composite situation would be levelled, it could be contemplated that for the months of April and May, 500,000 tons of coke and hard coal could be delivered for export monthly. For the following months it would even perhaps be possible to raise this quantity to 1,000,000 tons monthly, if all conditions should develop particularly favorable.

As far as the price is concerned the German coal industry would be agreed to calculate on the same price as is paid for the delivery of English coal.

FREIHERR von LERSNER.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1221: Letter

German Financial Committee

No. 110

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, March 24, 1919.

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.,

[Extract]

* * * * *

4. German Financial Committee to Proceed to Versailles:

The President of the British Section of the Armistice Commission has furnished me a copy of the following note, which he has sent to the German Armistice Commission:

I am directed to inform you that the Supreme Economic Council at PARIS has passed the following resolution:

1. That the German Government is invited to send a small Financial Committee to VERSAILLES not exceeding six members including secretaries.

2. This Committee will be given full facilities for rapid communications with the German Government and will be the regular channel of communication with the Financial Section of the Supreme Economic Council on all important financial questions, and in particular they will be authorized to deal with:

- (a) Questions connected with the disposal of requisitioned securities.
- (b) Questions of German liabilities in neutral countries immediately falling due and applications for export of gold.
- (c) Methods of securing for the Food Account the money proceeds of exports to neutral countries.

* * * * *

6. Report of Committee and Delivery of Agricultural Implements: Attached, marked A, is a statement setting forth the amount of agricultural machinery originally called for by the TREVES Convention of January 16, 1919, and by the Protocol of January 30, 1919.

It will be noted that the number of agricultural implements called for by the TREVES Convention is 6,541 over the number required by the Protocol to be delivered. This deficit will be taken care of by subsequent arrangements pursuant to Paragraph 7 of said Protocol.

Attached, marked B, is a statement setting forth the status of the delivery of agricultural implements up to and including March 20.

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

APPENDIX A

NAME OF IMPLEMENT	No. pieces called for by TREVES [TRIER] Convsn.	No. pieces required by Protocol	Excess of TREVES Convsn. over Protocol	Deficit of TREVES Convsn. Under Prot.
Steam plow groups	400	34	366	
Motor plows		195		195
Single share plows	6,500	10,000		3,500
Brabant plows	6,500	3,500	3,000	
Tractor plows		30		30
Harrows	12,500	12,500		
Cultivators	6,500	6,500		
Steel rollers	2,500	2,500		
Croskill and Cambridge rollers	2,500	2,500		
Manure Spreaders	6,500	6,500		
Drills	6,500	3,600	2,900	
Mowers	2,500	2,500		
Threshers	2,500	1,000	1,500	
Harvesters and Binders	3,000	500	2,500	
	58,400	51,859	10,266	3,725

APPENDIX B No. REQUIRED BY PROTOCOL

NAME OF IMPLEMENT	No. previ- ously re- ported del.	No. since reported delivered	Total del. to date	Feb. 15 to Feb. 28	March 1 to March 31	April 1 to May 31	TOTALS	Number undelivered
Steam Plow Groups	63	4	4	4		30	34	30
Motor Plows	63	86	149	150		45	195	46
Single Share Plows	190	3,631	3,821	10,000			10,000	6,179
Brabant Plows	40	100	140	500		3,000	3,500	3,360
Tractor Plows						30	30	30
Harrows		3,220	3,220	12,500			12,500	9,280
Cultivators	50	943	993	3,000		3,500	6,500	5,507
Steel rollers	100	125	225	650		1,850	2,500	2,275
Croskill and Cambridge rollers	30	355	385	1,400		1,100	2,500	2,115
Manure Spreaders		599	599	2,000		4,500	6,500	5,901
Drills	104	330	434	1,000		2,600	3,600	3,166
Mowers		80	80		1,000	1,500	2,500	2,420
Threshers		125	125		500	500	1,000	875
Harvesters and Binders		116	116		300	200	500	384
TOTALS	577	9,714	10,291	31,204	1,800	18,855	51,859	41,568

Provisioning Czechoslovakia and Germany

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, March 25, 1919.

No. 111

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

* * * * *

2. Food for Germany and Czechoslovakia:

The following telegram was received this morning from Mr. Hoover and shows the steps which he is taking in this matter. A copy has been transmitted to the Germans with the request that they state if the foregoing arrangements are satisfactory:

Our HAMBURG representatives together with Czechoslovak representatives will arrive HAMBURG in about one week to commence shipment supplies by ELBE to Czechoslovakia and Austria. To meet German request as to payment river freight will sell small quantity foodstuffs at HAMBURG for sufficient German marks to pay freight of German companies for Czechoslovak river movement. We will have representative at convenient point on ELBE River on Czechoslovak---German Frontier on April 5, to act as Chairman of an international committee composed of German and Czechoslovak representatives. This Committee will be charged with keeping a record of river equipment used in this movement on ELBE so as to insure return river equipment to country from which it originally came. This Committee will verify cargoes and will report on any shortages so that we will be in position to apply corrective measure. Request you ascertain from Germans and advise quick if foregoing arrangements satisfactory to them as I need this information for my guidance in determining detail of arrangement for sales of foodstuffs to Germany.

* * * * *

5. Distribution of Foodstuffs for Germany: General von Hammerstein presented a note * * * to the Chief of the British Armistice Section requesting the release of coastal shipping for the transportation of foodstuff from ROTTERDAM to BREMEN, HAMBURG, KIEL, LUBECK, WISMAR, WARNEMUDE, ROSTOCK, STETTIN, DANZIG, and KONISBERG.

The note claims that unless this coastal shipping is permitted it will be impossible to distribute foodstuffs on account of the insufficiency of rail transportation.

Such a claim as this is preposterous, inasmuch as Germany will not fail to distribute food as promptly as she can receive it no matter if other requirements for the railroads are abandoned for the time being, but even this would not be necessary as there are ample rail facilities and without doubt plenty of voluntary train crews could be secured if they were called for to make shipments of foodstuffs.

* * * * *

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

Decisions of Supreme Economic Council

[Contemporary Translation]

PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, March 26, 1919.

No. 766/G

General Nudant

To General von Hammerstein

Marshal Foch telegraphs as follows, March 24, under No. 6012/C. R.

Request you communicate to German authorities following decisions of Supreme Economic Council:

1. Below is list of prohibitions promised in Paragraph 4 of the minutes of the Agreement of BRUSSELS of March 14. This list will be enforced during the period of the Armistice only and without prejudice to dispositions which will be taken after the end of the Armistice.

War materiel of all kinds (including warships),
Coal and Coke of all kinds,
Wood, lumber, wood pulp,
Printing paper,
Dye-stuffs,
Products of iron and steel of the
following categories: Pig,
blooms, bars, construction steel,
steel rails, sheet steel.
Sugar,
Glass and glassware,
Tool-making machines, industrial machinery,
electrical machinery and their parts.

2. It is understood that the above prohibitions offer no obstacles to the privileges which Germany has for exportation over her land frontiers.

3. The existing prohibitions concerning export of gold, silver and securities remain unchanged.

4. The Allied and Associated Governments declare further that except for materiel of war of all sorts, including warships, the exportation of which is absolutely forbidden, they are ready to allow exceptions to the above prohibitions under the following:

a. Each of the Allied and Associated Governments has the right to buy during the Armistice, at just prices, lots of all the articles on the prohibited list which Germany may have at her disposition for exportation.

b. Representatives of the Allied and Associated Governments will meet immediately at COLOGNE or some other place which they shall designate with the delegates of the German Government in order to draw up agreements concerning these purchases. Similar meetings will take place every 30 days thereafter, at which meetings the German delegates will announce in detail the nature and quantity of the merchandise of the above list which is available for exportation during the period of the 30 following days.

The representatives of the Allied and Associated Governments will during the 4 business days following the reception of them of these lists announce what merchandise

they desire to buy and in what quantities. After the conclusion of the contracts for these quantities, all the balance of merchandise on the list shall then be available for exportation.

c. The rights of purchase by the Allied and Associated Governments resulting from this Agreement shall, however, not extend beyond 2/3 of the total excess of all merchandise available for exportation. In all cases Germany will be permitted to export to neutrals without restriction 1/3 of its excess available for exportation.

d. The net income from purchases made by one of the Allied and Associated Governments will be placed at Germany's disposal by the purchaser so that the funds accruing from the purchase may be employed by Germany for the payment of the imports of foodstuff according to the Agreement of BRUSSELS, but it shall be incumbent upon Germany to make such conversions as may be necessary.

G-3, GHQ, AEF, Fldr. 1222: Note

Delivery of German War Material

[Contemporary Translation]

O, Wako 14111

Spa, March 25, 1919.

From the Chairman of the Wako

To the Chairman of the P. I. A. C.

In answer to note No. 154/M, March 17, 1919.

The German High Command acknowledges receipt of the Note No. 154/M of March 17, 1919. The execution of Article IV of the Agreement of November 11, 1918, and of the supplementary agreement is therewith completed.

The German High Command will not fail, however, to state on this occasion once more and very definitely its justifiable point of view which has already been expressed in numerous notes and conferences. According to this point of view, on account of a one-sided and too broad interpretation of the meaning of the term in good condition, as a result of the failure to reckon and the retention of materiel which had been made ready in accordance with the Armistice conditions (for example, booty and older cannons), and as a result of the failure to count and the retention of materiel that was ready to be delivered in good condition but which the Allies did not accept as in good condition, although the blame was not Germany's the German Army has, as a matter of fact, delivered considerably more materiel than was required by the spirit and text of the original Agreement.

HAMMERSTEIN.

Civilian Supply of the Left Bank of the Rhine

[Contemporary Translation]

MINUTES OF THE 2d CONFERENCE HELD AT LAMORLAYE, MARCH 25, 1919,
BY THE INTERALLIED MILITARY COMMISSION ON CIVILIAN
SUPPLY OF THE LEFT BANK OF THE RHINE

[Extract]

General Payot explained conditions in regard to the question of supply for the civil population of the left bank of the RHINE as they appear, on the one hand, from the minutes of the meeting held at LAMORLAYE on March 14, and on the other hand, in the agreements of BRUSSELS (March 13/14, 1919).

In this connection, a file of papers was distributed to those present.

General Payot made clear that it is necessary to distinguish two divisions of supply. In the first place commodities delivered in accordance with the German plan of supply; in the second place, supplementary commodities delivered to reach the average ration rate required by the Allied Armies.

The first will be paid for by the German Government, the second will be settled for in accordance with a method of payment which remains to be determined. The Supreme Economic Council (Financial Section) is now studying what valuables may be accepted in payment for this second class of commodities.

It is understood further that the two classes of commodities will be delivered to the Allied military authorities.

The Commission then proceeded to examine the plan of organization for the supply of the civilian population of the left bank of the RHINE.

Paragraph I was adopted without discussion.

With reference to Section 1 of Paragraph 2, the Commission decided to determine, in the first place, the average ration rate necessary per person per day to be represented by R and equal for each zone; in the second place the average rate in existing local resources to be represented by r is different for each zone. The difference $R - r$ represents the quantity to be imported.

After discussion it was agreed that:

- (1) It is necessary to fix a ration rate, R, uniformly and submit it to the Supply Section of the Supreme Economic Council.
- (2) The prices of the supplementary commodities will be fixed by the Supply Section mentioned.
- (3) The commodities will be turned over by the Armies, not directly to the populations, but to the local organs in charge of distribution. Each Army will regulate as it sees fit the supervision of the processes of distribution.
- (4) The delegates to the Interallied Military Commission * * * will, in principle, meet once a month to determine the needs of the following month.
- (5) The representatives of the Allied Military Commission at ROTTERDAM and ANTWERP will be, in principle, the men who already attend to military supplies at these ports.

After these observations, Section 1 was adopted.

Section 2 was adopted with the following addition: "In addition, the commodities will be sold at a uniform price in all of the zones which is to be fixed by the Supply Section of the Supreme Economic Council."

Section 3 was adopted with an explanation of the functions of the delegates above mentioned.

With reference to Section 4 it was agreed that for the transportation of supplementary commodities destined to the civil population it should be specified upon the requisition the transportation is at the expense of the German Government.

It is necessary to add at the end of Subsection (b), the words "Request from the Interallied Field Navigation Commission the necessary transportation."

It is necessary to add to Subsection (c), the sentence "Railway transportation of the commodities will be carried out with priority by the Interallied Field Railway Commission of the Rhine Territory."

Under the reservations indicated above, the plan of organization was adopted.

II. Estimate of Commodities Necessary: The Commission examined the French average ration rate per person per day to be proposed to the Supreme Economic Council (Supply Section). The Commission compared the Allied proposals set forth in the table herewith.

A. Flour: The British figure represents seemingly that of the German Government, that is to say, the minimum.

The Belgian figure is low, for it was determined by exclusion of existing supplies.

Upon these statements the Commission adopted the American figure of 320 grammes.

B. Potatoes: The figures are not really at variance, as the British figure contemplates rice in addition to potatoes, while the French and Americans consider rice only in substitution.

The Commission adopted the French figure of 500 grammes of potatoes, it being understood that if rice is supplied this commodity will take the place of potatoes.

C. Fats: The figures vary widely; the French desire not to exceed the figure of 30 grammes which is the rate for troops. The American Army has also taken as a basis the ration of the American soldier and it is desired to restore the population rapidly to a proper state of health.

After discussion the figure of 30 grammes was adopted, it being understood that this includes only fats properly so-called butter, margarine, lard, etc., and not the salt meat distributed as meat (bacon, ham, etc.).

D. Meat: The French rate is low, because it does not include fats; it is important also not to exceed the rate adopted for Alsace-Lorraine (100 grammes); however, the German ration is at present only about 40 grammes; on these fats it was agreed to establish the figure of 80 grammes.

E. Rice and Dried Vegetables: The Commission considered rice as an article of substitution on the basis of 14 grammes of rice or dried vegetables for 100 grammes of potatoes.

F. Sugar and Coffee: In view of the small amounts available of these commodities, the Commission adopted the figures of 15 grammes of coffee and 20 grammes of sugar, it being understood that the Allies will not furnish any supplies, but that this ration must be obtained by deliveries from the right bank and by reduction of supplies on the left bank of the RHINE.

G. Condensed Milk: The Commission adopted the proposal of General Smith, that of considering only the sick and children.

The estimate was made provisionally on the basis of 1/2 centiliter of milk per person per day, it being understood that only the sick and children are to receive it.

III. Calculation of Existing Stocks; Calculation of Needs:

R having been determined, that is to say, the requirements r must be determined, that is to say supplies existing locally. After discussion the Commission adopted the proposition of General Smith:

In order to make the local reserves come out, it will be considered for the first month that local stocks do not exist ($r = 0$); the quantities to be imported will be, therefore, equal to the total requirements. The Supply Section will be asked to furnish all the commodities for the first month, that is R multiplied by the figure of population.

IV. In accordance with the plan of the Supply Section of the Supreme Economic Council foodstuffs already furnished as a measure of necessity will be deducted from the quantities to be imported after the first month.

It will, therefore, be necessary to advise the Supply Section promptly of the quantities which have been furnished by each Allied Army as a measure of necessity.

V. The Commission decided that:

1. The Permanent Center of Communication for requests and notices of meetings, etc., will be the D. G. C. R. A. at LAMORLAYE.

2. The next meeting of the Interallied Commission will take place in the Rhine territory at COLOGNE.

The date will be fixed as soon as the Supply Section of the Supreme Economic Council has replied to the proposals which will be submitted to it on the basis set forth above.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1189: Memorandum

Violations of Armistice by Sale of German Military Material

[Contemporary Translation]

General Staff
No. 6045/CR

G. G. G. A., March 25, 1919.

From: Marshal Foch, C-in-C, Allied Armies (D. G. C. R. A.)

To: Marshal Haig, C-in-C, B. E. F.
General Pershing, C-in-C, American E. F.
Lt-General Gillain, Chief of the General Staff of the Belgian Army
Marshal Petain, C-in-C, French Armies of the East

The German Armistice Commission reports that some Mayors and inhabitants of the occupied territories were arrested and tried by the Armies of Occupation for having bought and sold German military material between November 11, 1918 and the date fixed for the evacuation of the occupied territories.

*** Note No. 1363 of March 2, which I sent to General Nudant, President of the P. I. A. C., showing that the German Government was responsible for the sale of this material, sales ordered or authorized by it, and that I was taking account of the violation of the Armistice Convention in view of all compensations which will be judged legitimate.

The German Government supports itself on the text of Note No. 1363 which establishes its responsibility, asking, therefore, that no arrests or judicial trials be exercised against the inhabitants for buying or selling this material.

The French Government has, however, taken a decision according to the terms of which the Germans will not be searched for holding or taking away this material when on their part it was the execution of orders given, or when they were simply holders of these objects ***

Therefore, I have the honor to ask that you inform me of your decision on this question and, if you share my point of view, that you give all necessary orders so that the arrests and trials already started against the inhabitants be abandoned.

By Order:

The Major General

WEYGAND.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1222: Note

German Troops in the Ukraine

[Contemporary Translation]

O, No. 15481

Spa, March 26, 1919.

From the Chairman of the German Armistice Commission

To the Chairman of the P. I. A. C.

In behalf of the German High Command I have the honor to make the following statement:

The German High Command learns from a Russian radio message from NIKOLAYEV on March 21, that German troops are still in NIKOLAYEV and ODESSA, and that these troops are expecting their repatriation through the cordiality of the Ukrainian and Russian Soviet Governments.

From this message it appears that the Allies have apparently not kept their promise to repatriate our troops and that the Allies had left behind the German troops which were used to cover the rapid Allied departure.

It is certain that the Governments of the Republics of Ukraine and Russia as has appeared once before will do everything in their power, for very definite reasons, to help our troops. In this case the German soldiers will compare the negligence of the Allies and their unmeritorious behavior with the cordiality of the Bolsheviks, they will draw their own conclusions therefrom and will spread these throughout Germany when they return.

v. HAMMERSTEIN.

Delivery of German War Material

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, March 26, 1919

No. 112

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

* * * * *

6. Excess Delivery of War Material: The Germans presented a note * * * calling attention to the fact that on account of the interpretation placed upon the expression "in good condition" in the original Armistice Agreement, they have delivered more war materiel than was called for by that Agreement.

The American representative on the Committee for the Receipt of War Materiel to be delivered reports that questions of materiel have practically all been adjusted. There was an excess of some materiel abandoned in the retreat of the German Army but that when this was counted and inspected much of it did not come up to requirements.

In regard to machine guns which were delivered in excess of the number required by the Armistice, an agreement was reached by which a given number of these guns were to be accepted in lieu of a heavy field piece. Some materiel presented after the Armistice Agreement which did not come up to requirements was available for the Germans to remove

* * * * *

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

G-4, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 5: Memorandum

Summary of Lamorlaye Conference

Paris, March 26, 1919.

Memorandum for Chief of Staff, H. A. E. F.

Subject: Notes on conference at Lamorlaye, March 25, 1919.

[Extract]

* * * * *

2. Regulation of Circulation: It was agreed that permission for persons to pass from one zone to another should be granted by the commanding general of the zone in which

the person lives and honored in the zone to which the person goes. Such authorization should be put on identity card, accompanied by the proper seal. Permanent passes from one zone to another to be approved by commanding generals of both zones and identity cards to be stamped with two seals. Bridgeheads to be treated as part of zones of occupation.

3. Regulation of Postal Service:

(a) Parcel Post: Within the occupied territory it was decided to limit packages to 25 kilos. General Smith stated that 50 kilos was too much. In the discussion it was brought out that Bolshevik literature was not brought in by parcel post, but carried in by individuals. General Smith stated that he was in favor of allowing practically everything to come in from nonoccupied Germany except Bolshevik literature and firearms. General Clive, of the British Delegation, stated he considered it wiser to keep the door a little shut against too many things coming in by parcel post.

Between the occupied territory and Allied, neutral, or nonoccupied Germany, it was decided that the maximum weight of letter post be fixed at one kilogram, and for packages three kilograms.

The question of charges per package (50 centimes a package) is to be left to the decision of the PARIS Commission. (Translation of regulations will be sent to C. of S., by American Mission.)

(b) Movement of Funds and Securities: It was decided to adopt the British regulations regarding the exporting of funds and securities, but to include German securities as well as Allied or neutral securities. Funds and securities may go to unoccupied Germany only through the banks.

(c) Telephonic and Telegraphic Communications: The Decree regulating this question (copy of which is being sent to the C. of S. by the American Mission) was approved after a few changes.

4. Organization for the Supply of the Civilian Population: The organization and plan as worked out at the morning sessions of the Interallied Military Commission on civilian supply were approved. (Copy being sent to C. of S. by American Mission.)

5. Economic Regime of Rhine Territory: It was decided to leave this to be decided by the Luxemburg Committee.

6. Requisitions of Allied Armies: It was decided to leave this question to the PARIS Commission.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1222: Note

Extension of Bridgeheads

[Contemporary Translation]

O, Wako 15515

Spa, March 26, 1919.

From the Chairman of the Wako [German Armistice Commission]

To the Chairman of the P. I. A. C.

1. In connection with the Note No. 13911 of March 17, 1919, concerning the extension of the COLOGNE Bridgehead.

In response to a question concerning the reason for the requested extension of the COLOGNE Bridgehead, the British High Command answered:

The extension of the Bridgehead near REMSCHEID and CRONENBERG is the result of tactical plans. Tactical advantages were met also by the extension at KONIGSWINTER, etc.; and in addition BONN would be relieved of its very heavy quota of troops. A further reason lies in the fact that this bridgehead is very heavily visited during

the summer by COLOGNE and BONN people, and the German authorities have already made requests to have this neighborhood included in the occupied area.

The grounds are of course not tenable. The German populace is very positive in its refusal to accept any further extension of the occupied areas.

2. In connection with the Notes No. 13966 of March 18, and No. 14313 of March 21, concerning the extension of the MAYENCE Bridgehead, the Command of the IV Sector announces that apparently preparations are also being made opposite DARMSTADT for an advance of the frontier of the occupied area. His protests in this matter have remained unanswered.

3. The populace opposite COLOGNE as well as opposite MAYENCE is very much exercised over the anticipated preparations described above. Inasmuch as the occupying armies are bound by the conditions of the Armistice Agreement and by the later agreements that have been drawn out of them, a willful change of the frontiers without previous agreement with the Germans would be so contrary to law that assurances calculated to calm the protests have been given the communities. In order to strengthen these assurances it is urgently desirable that a very immediate declaration in the same sense come from the Armies of Occupation of both bridgeheads. It is requested that such statements be procured.

HAMMERSTEIN.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1222: Letter

Delivery of Rolling Stock

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, March 26, 1919.

No. 112

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

10. Delivery of Spare Parts By the Germans: The Committee on Receipt of Transportation reports that the Germans have requested a reduction in the number of spare parts to be delivered with locomotives, etc. They further ask that certain substitutions be allowed in equipment and that where no raw material was available in Germany the equipment would be manufactured by the Allies and the cost charged to Germany. The Allies replied by Note No. 647-T, dated March 19, in which there were set forth the modifications of specifications which the Germans would be permitted to make.

The Germans, by Note No. 2398, of March 17, requested that certain Belgian cars enumerated in lists attached thereto be accepted and repaired by the Allies at the cost of Germany.

Under date of March 20, the President of the Transportation Committee notified the Germans that the reception stations of HOHENBUDBERG, NIPPES and BISHOFSHEIM will be discontinued after April 1, after which date no cars loaded with agricultural machinery would be received, but would be resent to their destination from these stations. This

note was sent to the Food and Transportation Department of the French Army for its information with a request that personnel and transportation adequate for the needs of the Subcommittee be left at these stations.

* * * * *

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

G-4, GHQ, Fldr. 11: Memorandum

Responsibility and Accountability for Food Supplies

[Contemporary Translation]

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, ALLIED ARMIES,
OFFICE OF D. G. C. R. A.,
March 26, 1919.

MEMORANDUM FOR Col. Gignilliat, American Member, Interallied Military Commission.

Subject: Responsibility and Accountability of Interallied Military Commission.

1. In accordance with your instructions, I questioned General Payot yesterday afternoon on what he considers to be the measure of accountability and responsibility of the Interallied Military Commission for the food supplies to be handled by them. His opinion, as well as that of his Chief of Staff, is as follows:

2. The Military Commission being simply an organ of distribution assumes no accountability or responsibility for the materials which it handles. It is the idea of the Interallied Command that the accountability and responsibility for the foodstuffs passes from the Hoover Commission to the army commanders at the river ports and it is assumed that there will be no difficulty in having matters arranged in this way as the Hoover people have the bookkeeping personnel necessary and are the governmental agencies who have made themselves responsible for the supplies in the long run. General Payot, therefore, does not plan to have the Military Interallied Commission increased by any personnel which would be necessary were it to be made responsible and accountable.

3. Should that not be a satisfactory answer to your question, and should Gen. Moseley determine that the Military Commission should be made responsible and accountable, would you be good enough to let me know in order that I may present our views to General Payot.

L. H. PAUL CHAPIN,
Captain, G. S.,
Liaison Officer, G-4, G. H. Q.

German Fishing Rights

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, March 26, 1919.

No. 112

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

2. Germans Allowed to Fish: General Haking has informed the Commission that he has been notified from PARIS that the question of the Germans fishing in the Cattagat is under consideration, but that fishing will not be allowed in the Skagerrak.

In my Secret Report No. 108, Par. 4, it was stated that the Germans had renewed their request for authority to fish in the North Sea, the Cattagat, and the Skagerrak, and referred the German note which was attached to the report. By reference to this note, I see that they use these waters for the purpose of limiting the area in which they wish to fish. Their present request however is to be allowed to fish in these waters.

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1222: Note

Postal Communications of German Prisoners

[Contemporary Translation]

Spa, March 27, 1919.

Since the American Mission in its Note of February 28, 1919, has informed us that all previous limitations in the postal communications for German prisoners of war, for example, the number of letters and postal cards, the kind of writing paper and envelopes, as well as the statements which the prisoners of war might be allowed to make concerning the place and kind of work they are doing, has been removed, I request the Interallied Armistice Commission to put into force at least the same alleviations also for the prisoners of war who are in the hands of the remaining members of the Entente.

The reason which is given in the American note for the above meritorious measures, namely, the endeavor to lessen the natural worry of the relatives of the prisoners of war in view of the present situation, is of even greater moment for the remaining Allies, as a

large part of the prisoners of war which they hold have been torn from the circle of their families for nearly five years.

I should be especially thankful for an immediate statement as to what measures have been taken in this matter.

v. HAMMERSTEIN.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1222: Letter

German Commission to Go to Versailles

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, March 27, 1919.

No. 113

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

* * * * *

15. Free Communication for German Delegation to go to Versailles: Baron von Lersner presented a note announcing that the German Government had decided to send a Commission to VERSAILLES, consisting of seven or eight men and three assistants. He requested complete freedom of circulation for these persons and the possibility of keeping in communication with the German Government by means of clear and cipher dispatches. He also requests that facilities be given the Commission to make the journey.

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

Passage of Polish Troops Through Danzig

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, March 27, 1919.

No. 113

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

* * * * *

2. Repatriation of General Haller's Army through Danzig: The note referred to above was as follows:

Marshal Foch has empowered me to deliver the following communication to you: 'In conformance with the decision of the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Governments, General Nudant will ask that the Germans, by way of carrying out Clause XVI of the Armistice Agreement of November 11, 1918, will permit the free passage of General Haller's Army, which is a part of the Allied Armies, through DANZIG, to Poland, for the purpose of maintaining order there.

The Germans will likewise bind themselves to grant every facility for the temporary arrangements of every kind that are necessary for the troops passing through this port.

'Any refusal to grant these requests will be interpreted as a rupture of the Armistice by the Germans.

'Consequently I beg you to request the German Government to provide you with the necessary powers to draw up immediately and by common agreement the regulations for the execution of this measure.'

The importance of this note cannot be overestimated as the next to the last paragraph puts an ultimatum to the Germans of the gravest importance. The last paragraph enjoins upon them to secure from their Government the necessary authority to enter into a protocol which shall cover the details of the landing of the Polish troops.

3. Discussion on Above Note: At the opening of the regular meeting of the P. I. A. C. this morning General Nudant made the following remarks in regard to the above note:

I had the honor last night to deliver to you a note concerning DANZIG on behalf of the Allied Governments. You received that note? The note is the result of what occurred in POSEN, as a result of negotiations that were perhaps badly handled. I trust it will not be refused under the guise of not having been received and we may succeed in getting together in a meeting to negotiate the methods by which these events can be carried out without difficulty. As far as I am concerned, I am convinced that the matter can be brought to a successful conclusion with all precautions that we will be obliged to take, so that there may be no disturbance in the region in connection with the transportation that we are to attempt.

To these remarks, General von Hammerstein made this reply:

I forwarded this note immediately to my Government and I would like to make a short statement showing my point of view. The attitude of the German authorities regarding the landing of Polish troops in Danzig was known to the Entente since

February. In numerous notes during the month of March and in a verbal statement on March 10, I showed the great difficulties that would be occasioned by the landing of Polish troops at Danzig. We have as yet received no reply to the opinions expressed by us.

The discussion was continued by General Nudant, who said:

I am well acquainted with the reasons that were expressed in the various notes and if as I hope the negotiations in this matter will occur, we are not saying in any way that there will be no attention paid to these opinions which have been expressed.

General von Hammerstein then requested that the German representative of the Foreign Office, Baron von Lersner, be permitted to speak on this subject. His remarks were as follows:

I should like to draw General Nudant's attention to the fact that I must point out on behalf of the German Government that the Note which was handed over yesterday puts us in the position of making the most difficult decision that we have had to make since the Armistice.

I telegraphed this note in code to G. H. Q., and as soon as further important developments occur I will make further telegraphic report.

* * * * *

7. Supply of Coal to Libau: General von Hammerstein presented the following note on this subject:

Supply of coal will be exhausted by the 1st of April and all railway traffic will then have to cease and it will be impossible to supply the troops. Mutinies are expected as a consequence of this measure and the complete evacuation of COURLAND is absolutely necessary. In view of the number of times which the urgency of the transportation of coal has been mentioned, the last time in Note Number 15054 of March 21, no further comment is necessary. If General Nudant does not give immediate permission for the shipment of coal to LIBAU it must be presumed that the answer to the clear question in Wako No. 12427 of March 4, 1919, as to whether the Allied and Associated Governments had any interest in the fighting of Bolshevism by German troops must be considered as answered in the negative.

Continuing this subject, he said:

I have a verbal declaration to make in this connection. General Nudant must know that recently on the left wing of the front in COURLAND the National Guard of the Baltic Province has made progress in the direction of LIBAU, and that in consequence of this the German troops farther south have made a certain amount of progress eastward. The situation of communications is gravely complicated by this. The impossibility of obtaining coal would lead to the collapse of the front and would necessitate its withdrawal. It is equally imperative that it should be supplied also with the other necessities. I take the liberty of drawing General Nudant's attention once more to the urgency of the situation.

General Nudant, in response, said:

In a recent communication it was stated that the Allied Supreme Council granted provisioning by sea to WINDAU and the reason for the granting of this decision is the following: That the place WINDAU which served as the junction point between the left wing of the German forces and the right wing of the Balkan (sic) support forces was not served by railroad communication. That is why the completely justifiable request of the Germans was granted. I will transmit the new request that concerns I imagine principally the port of LIBAU, but it is very probable that they will ask me: 'Why don't they supply their provisioning of coal by railway for this region?' Because up

to this time, inasmuch as there was a blockade and it was not possible to use the coastal shipping, the provisioning of coal had to be taken care of by railway. That is the objection that I believe they will make and I call it to your attention.

General von Hammerstein closed the discussion with the following:

At LIBAU there is a store of coal which had been accumulated some time. The KONIGSBERG-LIBAU Railway was not able to bring up enough coal in order for the stock at LIBAU to remain untouched. Besides this, as is known, there has been great coal shortage at KONIGSBERG since February. It is for this reason that we have made repeated requests at LIBAU to send coal from the western Baltic Ports to east Prussia. All of these questions are connected one with the other. The railway question has become evermore difficult. We have at present only two ferries over the VISTULA. The southern road westward, via BROMBERG, is closed. The difficulties concentrate around one point.

8. Prussia and Posen: It is very evident that the greatest interest now centers in the determination of the Polish question. The Germans for a number of days have been presenting evidence endeavoring to show that the majority of the people in these areas are German. Along these same lines, the following was presented this morning.

No. 1558. Subject: Prussia and Posen: Further about Wako 14478 of March 22, 1919. The unrest in threatened German areas daily increases and expresses itself in numerous telegrams and statements throughout the whole of Germany. I handed over annexed hereto a further list of telegrams, for example. The latter have been chosen in order to show how all the parties agree with each other on this important matter. 'The majority is German and will remain German,' is the basis of all these telegrams. Extracts are found in them such as 'False' and 'The use of False Means.' The population insists on having right of self-determination and demands that Wilson's Fourteen Points shall not be considered as a scrap of paper. The originals of all these telegrams are available.

* * * * *

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1222: Letter

Military Personnel of German Peace Delegation

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, March 27, 1919.

No. 113

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

* * * * *

14. Representatives of the German General Staff Who Will Constitute the Military Personnel of the German Peace Delegation: According to information received by Wolfe's

Telegraph Bureau, the following officers of the German General Staff will represent the military in the German Peace Delegation: General von Hammerstein; Major von Bock, formerly the first General Staff officer of the Army Group of the German Crown Prince; Lieut. Colonel Xylander of the Bavarian General Staff; the Wuerttemberg Captain Geyer [of the Wuerttemberg Army].

The direction of the military representation will be undertaken by Major General von Wrisberg.

* * * * *

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1222: Note

Travel of Allied Missions at Berlin

[Contemporary Translation]

PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
No. 787/G *Spa, March 28, 1919.*

From General Nudant, President Interallied Armistice Commission

To Chairman German Armistice Commission

Marshal Foch writes as follows on March 24, No. 2257/DCFC:

"The German Minister of War, on February 25, 1919, announced to the Allied Missions at BERLIN that the following arrangements would hereafter apply to the travels of members of these missions or of representatives sent to Germany by the Allied and Associated Governments.

1. There would be no travel orders delivered.
2. The Allied representatives must buy tickets for each trip and the tickets would not be given to them except on presentation of identity cards or passes.
3. The German Government offers to reimburse the price of the tickets on condition that generals, civilian associates and aides-de-camp alone may buy first class tickets; other officers, second class; privates, except the couriers, third class tickets.

In view of the inconveniences and discomforts which would follow for members of our missions if they travelled in the manner suggested by the German Minister of War, I beg you to ask the German Government to deliver passes and free travel tickets for officers, privates and employees of the Allied Armies who are obliged to travel on missions by the railroads in nonoccupied territories, either for business connected with the food supply, or on business connected with the execution of agreements.

As for the conditions regarding the use of the different classes, the number of places to be occupied, etc., they are accepted by the Allied and Associated Governments.

I request you to be good enough to make known as soon as possible the new arrangements which the German Government will make after having examined these considerations.

Landing of Polish Troops at Danzig

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, March 28, 1919.

No. 114

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

1. Result of Note to the Germans Regarding Landing of Polish Division at Danzig: At the meeting of the P. I. A. C. this morning the Germans made no response to the note sent them the evening of March 26, in regard to the landing of Polish troops at Danzig. General Nudant asked General von Hammerstein in regard to it and the latter replied that he was waiting all the time for the reply.

This afternoon the following note was sent by General Nudant to General von Hammerstein:

The Marshal, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies, telegraphs as follows, March 27, under No. 1704: 'Not yet having received any response as to the subject of transporting Polish troops by DANZIG, I charge you in order to hasten the solution to the question to invite the German Government to send a plenipotentiary to SPA, where I am disposed to come in person.' General von Hammerstein is requested to make known as soon as possible the name of the German plenipotentiary chosen, as well as the date on which he will come to SPA.

The substance of this note has been sent in code to G. H. Q.

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1222: Note

Refusal of German Government to Allow Polish Troops to Land at Danzig

[Contemporary Translation]

Wako No. 15811

Spa, March 28, 1919.

From: Chairman of German Armistice Commission, General von Hammerstein

To: Chairman of P. I. A. C., General Nudant

I have the honor to transmit the following answer of the German Government to the Note No. 775/G:

In accordance with Article XVI of the Armistice Agreement of November 11, 1918, the German Government has obligated itself to grant to the Allies free entrance by way of DANZIG and the VISTULA for the purpose of maintaining order in the territories of the former Russian Empire. At the conclusion of this agreement, however, we assume that it could only be a question of the free passage of Allied troops, not of Polish troops. The German Government did not obligate itself to give free entrance for a Polish Army by way of DANZIG through west Prussia.

The German Government finds itself strengthened in this conception by the well-known events that occurred as the result of granting free passage for the Polish President, Paderewski. In coarsest violation of the hospitality granted him on German soil, M. Paderewski gave the signal for unrest and civil war in POSEN. At the time of his presence in DANZIG in December 1918, he said: 'Just wait until the Polish divisions from France and Italy have arrived in DANZIG, then DANZIG and all west Prussia will become Polish.' Also in all of the Polish public prints the Haller Army is designated as a Polish Army.

Further, since the conclusion of the Armistice Agreement of November 11, 1918, the entire situation in POSEN, west Prussia and DANZIG has completely changed. After the well known events in POSEN, a landing of Polish troops in DANZIG would endanger most seriously order in west Prussia. No one can take upon himself the responsibility for the Polish minority in west Prussia remaining calm if the Army of General Haller is landed in DANZIG. According to all the numerous messages that reach the German Government daily from the German majority in west Prussia account must also be taken of the fact that the German majority will offer powerful resistance to Polish attacks. At the present time, there is calm and security in these regions; but if according to the present state of affairs the request of landing leads to bloody strife in these regions, in addition, the German eastern front opposed to Russian Bolshevism will be in danger. The weak German forces that are holding back the Soviet troops would then find their enemy in their rear at the same time and would be between two fires. In that case the way to west Prussia and Poland is open to Bolshevism.

The German Government, after very searching investigation, cannot take the responsibility for a measure which without the creation of sufficient guarantee, is bound to call forth civil war in its own lands. But on the contrary the German Government now as before is ready to facilitate with all possible means the landing of the Army of General Haller in STETTIN, KONIGSBERG, MEMEL and LIBAU to give support with all its might to the purpose of the Allies, to maintain order in Poland. The German Government declares itself emphatically prepared to undertake all arrangements for the most speedy landing and through passage to Poland for the Haller Army. These roads from the technical standpoint of the railways lead to their goal much more rapidly and without any disturbance in the transportation of foodstuff to Poland.

In order to grant the power desired in the note of Marshal Foch for the regulation of the manner of execution of the landing of these troops, based upon a joint agreement, the German Government requests immediate information on the following points:

- (1) The composition of General Haller's Army and its strength.
- (2) The date of the landing of the Haller Army.
- (3) A statement of the length of time necessary for the transportation of the Army of General Haller through Poland.
- (4) What guarantee can the Allied and Associated Powers offer that the Army of General Haller or a part of the same will not take part in political activities or possible uprisings of the Polish minority as occurred at the time of the presence of the Polish President, Paderewski, in POSEN, or that they will not provoke such regrettable events, which are surely to be expected.

ERZBERBER.
von HAMMERSTEIN.

Propaganda of German Recruiting Offices

G-2

ARMY OF OCCUPATION, A. E. F.,
OFFICE OF ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF,
March 29, 1919

From: Asst. Chief of Staff, G-2, American Third Army

To: Asst. Chief of Staff, G-2, III Corps
IV Corps
VII Corps

1 There is quoted below for your information translation of a notice received from the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies, regarding propaganda of an official character exercised through German recruiting offices on the left bank of the RHINE:

The attention of the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies has been called to an active propaganda, of official character, which seeks to exercise itself on the left bank of the RHINE, for the purpose of recruiting and reconstituting the future German Army.

The documents used for this propaganda (Manifest of the League of Faithfuls to the Emperor, Notice of the German Association of the Eastern Markets, Journal of the Association of German Officers) are sent to the German recruiting offices, authorized to remain on the left bank of the RHINE, who make the distribution.

The activity of the Commission of Postal Control does not always succeed in preventing these documents from reaching their destinations.

There is occasion, therefore, in the future to exercise an active supervision over the recruiting offices maintained in the occupied territory.

The President of the Permanent Interallied Armistice Commission has been notified to signify to the German authorities that if the propaganda continues to be exercised by the recruiting offices these organs, whose maintenance was authorized only to facilitate demobilization, will be suppressed.

R. H. WILLIAMS,
Colonel, G. S.

Recovery of French and Belgian Horses and Cattle

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, March 28, 1919.

No. 114

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

* * * * *

2. Recovery of Horses and Cattle Taken from France and Belgium: General Nudant presented the following note to the Germans:

The Belgian and French Governments have decided to proceed immediately to recover the horses and all the cattle carried away from France and Belgium by the Germans. This was arrived at and will be carried out (a) in occupied areas, by the Armies of Occupation, who will proceed without delay to list the animals that are in their zone that came from France or Belgium. (b) In the rest of Germany, by a special service attached to the Industrial Reconstitutional Committee of WIESBADEN. The same committee will likewise be intrusted with the agricultural machinery carried away by the Germans. (c) German subjects will not be prosecuted for retaining or carrying off cattle that came from France or Belgium, if their only activity was to execute orders given them or if they had simply been the holders of these cattle.

3. Meeting Concerning the Purchase of Coal: In connection with this subject, General Nudant presented the following to the Chairman of the German Armistice Commission:

Note 782-G. In connection with Note No. 766-G of March 23, 1919, by way of carrying out Article IV, Paragraph B, of the Telegram No. 6012-CR of the Marshal, Commander-in-Chief of the Armies of the Allies, the meeting concerning the purchase of coal will take place at COLOGNE Monday, March 31, at four p. m., at Kunibert Kloster No. 18. The German representative will bring all of the necessary information foreseen in Paragraph B, concerning the kind and quantity of coal that is available for export during the month of April, with all necessary proposals concerning the price. (For the last paragraph has been substituted the following telegram which fixes the time, date, and other details.) From the Marshal, Commander-in-Chief of the Armies of the Allies, to General Nudant, President of the P. I. A. C. No. 611-CR I transmit to you to send to the German Government to BERLIN the following telegram from the Supreme Economic Council: 'Continuing the Clause 4-B of the telegram of March 24, 1919, the Associated Governments make known to the German Government that technical expert representatives for coal, wood, paper, and sugar are leaving today for COLOGNE where they will arrive March 28, Friday. The German Government is requested to appoint immediately the necessary technical expert representatives with

full power, who will meet with the Allied representatives at the Economic Section of the British Military Governor at COLOGNE.

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1222: Note

Importation of Food to Germany

[Contemporary Translation]

788/G

PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, March 28, 1919.

General Nudant

To General v. Hammerstein

Marshal Foch telegraphs as follows March 28, under No. 1701:

"In connection with communications already made to the German Government concerning the importation of foodstuffs and exportation of merchandises in conformity with the Agreement of BRUSSELS, the following supplementary information is given: With the view of aiding Germany in obtaining credits in neutral countries for the purchase of foodstuffs and in conformity with the Agreement entered into at BRUSSELS by the delegates sent to investigate the question, the Associated Governments give the information that in no neutral country will a firm incur the danger in the future of being put down upon the black list for having:

(A) Exported foodstuffs into Germany within the limits provided by the Associated Governments and in accord with the rules established by them.

(B) For having opened credits to Germany for the purchase of these foodstuffs.

(C) For having imported merchandise, the exportation from Germany of which the Associated Governments shall have authorized.

Germany may be authorized to negotiate and to commerce with firms of neutral countries, even if they are upon the black list, under the reserve of receiving the approval of the Superior Blockade Council.

Exports of Saar Coal to France

[Contemporary Translation]

Spa, March 28, 1919.

From Representative of German Government

To Chairman of P. I. A. C.

In connection with Note A. A. II of March 24, 1919, No. 2923.

According to reliable information that has reached here recently, the French Government for several months has been exporting to France and to Neutral Countries considerable quantities of SAAR coal. The French Government can be allowed a right of requisition of coal only within the limits of Article IX of the Armistice Agreement, that is to say, for the needs of the troops of occupation. The most emphatic protest must be raised against any intended requisition for other purposes.

Under the assumption that the French Government wishes to obtain its necessary supply of coal by the only possible way allowed by international law, namely, by purchase, the German Government is in principle prepared to meet the French Government in an agreement about the supply of Saar coal and enter into negotiations at once for this purpose in BERLIN. In this agreement Germany must demand that the prices for coal which are paid by France to England must be the basis, that the payment must be made in francs and that the payments can be reckoned off of the payments to be made for the shipment of food supplies to Germany.

In behalf of the German Government, I request that information be sent me as rapidly as possible concerning this proposition and if it is acceptable that a representative be announced for the negotiations in BERLIN.

v. LERSNER.

G-4, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 107: Letter

Unit Costs of Maintenance of the American Forces in Germany

March 29, 1919.

From: Lawrence H. Whiting, Major, A. G., Executive Officer,
Finance Bureau.

To: Norman Davis, Esq., U. S. Commissioner of Finance.

1. At the request of the Treasury Department the following report is made on the advisability of using German paper marks in lieu of French paper francs for the payment of troops and local civil purchases in the territory covered by the Army of Occupation. Definite recommendations are made and the supporting evidence is given. Certain other suggestions are made as to procedure.

2. The information upon which this report is based was obtained from the following sources:

1. U. S. Treasury Department.
2. General Moseley, G-4, G. H. Q., A. E. F.
3. General Goliger, British Undersecretary of Treasury for War.
4. General J. C. Dickman, C. G., Army of Occupation, and various members of his staff.

5. General H. A. Smith, C. G., in charge of Civil Affairs, Occupied Territory, and various members of his staff.

6. General M. H. Barnum, Pres. American Section, International Armistice Commission, SPA, and members of staff, SPA.

7. Two weeks personal investigation in a motor car in the territory occupied by the Americans, British, French and Belgians in Alsace-Lorraine, Luxembourg, Germany, Belgium, interviewing officers, disbursing paymasters, soldiers, German bankers, exchange bankers, hotel keepers and business men.

3. Since the whole question of our income from Germany depends upon the interpretation of the word maintenance in the 9th Article of the Armistice Agreement, the various interpretations are given. The Germans contend they should bear only the actual expense of maintenance, that is; food, equipment, shelter and transport. The American, British, French and Belgian armies definition is, in effect; "Covers all expenditures, including pay and allowances to troops, their lodging, heating, lighting, uniforms and equipment, expense of rolling stock, treatment of sick and wounded, veterinary service, transport service and in a general way expenses of every kind, whether administrative or technical, incident to the instruction and maintenance of troops in such conditions as will permit immediate resumption of hostilities." These payments necessarily to be paid in marks convertible into various currencies at rates to be agreed upon. This agreement was made January 15, 1919.

4. Subsequently (about March 1) after the cost of maintenance tables for each of the armies had been submitted to General Foch, which varied widely, the French requested that a standard cost per diem per man and per animal should be established. This because, it is rumored, the American, British and Belgian costs all exceeded the French cost. Their basis of argument is that since it is an Allied occupation all armies should be on one basis, and the Army having the largest number of troops in the occupied territory should be standard. The French Army has the most troops, therefore they maintain it should be standard. Their allowance is five francs per day per officer and soldier, for subsistence, plus one franc for shelter, a total of six francs, and an allowance of five francs per day for each animal. The British and Belgian costs while much higher than the French, are much lower than the American Army.

Actual compilations of cost have been made for the American Army by the Quartermasters Corps, Medical Corps, Ordnance Corps, etc.
The cost accounting sheet shows as follows:

**DAILY AVERAGE UNIT COSTS TO THE UNITED STATES OF
MAINTENANCE OF ARMY OF OCCUPATION IN GERMANY**

NATURE OF EXPENSE						
	Officer	Field Clerk	Nurse	Enlisted	Horse	REMARKS
Pay, including allotments, commutation for qtrs., etc.	\$8.239	\$4.85	\$2.923	\$1.408		Officers subsist and clothe themselves.
Subsistence (a)				1.048		
Clothing (b)	.90					
Medical Cost of maintenance	.06284	.06284	.06248	.06248	.01227	
Fuel				.037		
Gasoline and Oil				.103		
Miscellaneous Supplies (a)				.181		
Vehicles (animal drawn) including replacements, spare parts, etc.				.086		
Horse equipment, including harness, saddles, blankets, etc.	.09			.09	.1516	Q. M. and Ordnance costs.
Forage (b)					1.022	
Salvage and repairs (applies to QM Supplies only)				.018		
Overhead for Q. M. C. (Maintenance QMC and labor troops allocated to Army of Occupation)				.124		
Replacement and Depreciation					.401	
	\$8.39184	\$4.91284	\$2.98584	\$3.95784	\$1.58687	

(a) Includes ocean and rail transportation

(b) Includes ocean transportation on forage from U. S.

5. In a meeting held at SPA our representative on the Armistice Commission had to accept the French rate, but did so subject to approval of the Commander-in-Chief. Upon reviewing this General Pershing on March 4, laid down a firm decision as far as the American Army was concerned that the word maintenance would be interpreted to mean all costs on the basis of accounting in the preceeding table, i. e.:

For each officer	\$8.39	per diem
For each field clerk	4.91	" "
For each nurse	2.98	" "
For each soldier	3.95	" "
For each animal	1.58	" "

The strength of the Army of Occupation as of March 15, 1919 was:

OFFICERS 10,124: FIELD CLERKS 42; SOLDIERS 229,087; NURSES 300;
ANIMALS 45,140.

Taking this ruling as a basis from which to work it gives us a daily income of approximately 10,522,000 marks - divided as follows:

Officers	10,124	\$8.39	per	diem	:	\$84,940.36
Field Clerks	42	4.91	"	"	:	206.22
Soldiers	229,087	3.95	"	"	:	894,893.65
Nurses	300	2.98	"	"	:	894.00
Animals	45,140	1.58	"	"	:	71,321.20
TOTAL IN DOLLARS						\$1.052.255.43

6. The present rate is approximately 10 marks to the dollar so converting dollar earnings into marks we are earning a daily total of ten million, five hundred and twenty two thousand marks (10,522,000).

THE SITUATION IN THE THIRD ARMY

From figures furnished by Captain Frederick Pond,
Disbursing Paymaster - Third Army Major
Jackson Miller - Disbursing Officer,
Civil Affairs.

1. In December the payroll of the Third Army was paid in marks which were requisitioned from the German Government. There was at this time no exchange Bureaus set up and due to the fluctuation which occurred during the latter part of December and the early part of January, the mark became unpopular with the Army, and it was urged that the French franc be used. It was impossible to secure coin francs so a special arrangement was entered into with the French Government to furnish paper francs, good only in the zone of the armies and redeemable two years from date. Since January the troops have been paid in French paper francs, which were obtained by the Chief Paymaster through the French Treasury, PARIS. Thus, to make it possible for the soldier to obtain German marks, Exchange Bureaus were set up in each Disbursing Office where marks would be exchanged for francs or vice-versa. This system has worked very successfully.

2. Consistent with the American Army policy of paying the individual direct for local civil purchases, etc., it was ordered that all such bills emanating in the Third Army be paid in German marks which is being done. To do so, marks had to be requisitioned from the German Government. Sufficient marks to cover exchange operations had also to be requisitioned. Up to date approximately one hundred and sixty million marks (160,000,000) have been drawn - and the local civil purchases, etc., paid in cash.

(a) The average actual drawals per enlisted man in the Third Army is about \$20.00 per month. The rest of his pay goes for allotments, insurance, etc.

(b) About 30% of the officers draw their pay in cash. 70% draw their pay by check, of which ultimately the Disbursing Officer, Third Army, cashes 97%.

(c) It is estimated that these officers and soldiers spend about two millions of dollars per month in the occupied territory, or converted into marks about twenty million marks.

(d) This is supported by the fact that the Exchange Bureau at COBLENZ, Hqs., Third Army, alone exchanges more than 600,000 marks daily for organizations, officers and men on leave, post office, etc. At TREVES the daily average is about 50,000 marks. 30 x 650,000 per day is approximately twenty million of marks or about two millions of dollars as estimated. The exchange business is constantly increasing.

(e) Since every effort is made to stop gambling in exchange a soldier is limited to 400 marks in a single transaction except upon written authority from his commanding officer so it is easy to imagine the volume of small transactions that occur in a day's business.

3. The German mark circulates freely all through the occupied territory. The local banks and business houses place a higher value on the mark than the Army. The German is quite willing to take it for civil purchases, etc. In fact he prefers it to the French paper franc. The soldier needs it to make these purchases and there is no question but what it is feasible and practicable to pay the Army in marks providing the following safeguards and precautions are taken:

1. To have the American, British, French and Belgians agree to stabilize the mark setting a rate on the 20th of each month to hold good for the succeeding month.

2. To keep the Exchange Bureaus supplied with French and Belgian francs so to be able to exchange money for troops returning to America, France and Belgium and going on leave.

3. See that a proper campaign of publicity is run in the *Stars and Stripes*, *New York Herald*, *Daily Mail* and *Chicago Tribune* before the mark is made the official currency for troop payments. Explanation is necessary in order to establish confidence in the mark which the officers and soldiers now consider highly speculative.

4. See that all parties concerned, i. e., General Headquarters, Hq. S. O. S., all staff corps concerned and the Treasury Department are in agreement as to its use, the method of requisitioning and the method of accounting.

5. Everyone consulted agrees that it is practicable to use the mark in the occupied territory, excepting Alsace-Lorraine, Luxemburg, and Belgium where the paper mark is not legal currency due to special legislation against it. All persons consulted agree that it must be protected as much as possible by agreement among the several governments.

6. The French Ministry of Finance, and the British Exchequer agree to our views and are anxious to use the mark for troop payments. The Belgians have not yet been consulted but will agree.

7. France is anxious to keep its currency out of enemy countries. We are anxious to be able to use mark credits now accrued and thereby remedy the situation of establishing a monthly credit with the French Treasury of about thirty million francs (30,000,000) upon which it loses interest. It would also have the advantage of being able to spend its German marks at a time when the market was to its advantage. When the troops are withdrawn it will be difficult to sell German paper money.

8. We will probably spend about ten million dollars per month in the occupied territory (100,000,000 marks) while we will be earning about thirty-one million dollars per month or about (310,000,000 marks).

9. Since each month means at least ten million dollars to us it is suggested that an agreement be reached at an early a time as practicable, the procedure worked out by the Treasury Officials, the proper bulletins issued and the system instituted.

FURTHER SUGGESTIONS

1. The Post Office, Red Cross and Y. M. C. A. should all be consulted as they carry on a large exchange and money order business and must be protected. This is all for the convenience of the officers and soldiers.

2. If possible one of the American Trust Companies or the American Express Co. should establish a branch at COBLENZ. It is now impossible for an officer or soldier to deposit money without sending it to a French bank which is very difficult. It is estimated that 80% of the officers of the rank of captain or above have bank accounts in France. It is at present almost impossible for an officer to cash a personal check in Germany.

LAWRENCE H. WHITING,
Major, Adjutant General.

Requisitions by Armies of Occupation

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, March 29, 1919.

No. 115

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

1. Requisitions by Allied Armies in Rhenish Territory: General Nudant conveyed the following information which had been received from Marshal Foch:

The question of requisitions made by the Allied Armies in occupied Rhenish territories to meet the needs of their troops of occupation has been regulated by an International Commission which met at my staff headquarters. The arrangements determined in this matter are the following:

(1) For the British Zone, the requisitions will be paid directly by the German Government and the sums advanced will be credited to it.

(2) For the other zones of occupation, the occupying Armies will pay the requisitions directly by means of the Marks which are advanced by the German Government and which will be carried on account as a balance against the debt owed by the German Government to the Allies. In other parts of Germany the prices for requisitions will be fixed by local appraisal commissions formed in each Army of Occupation and each of which will be directed by a military representative of the Allied Armies. The railroads and navigable streams of the occupied countries, as well as the personnel, buildings, materiel, etc., that are used in their exploitation have been put at the entire disposition of the Marshal, Commander-in-Chief of the Armies of the Allies, according to the Armistice Agreement. He will use them for the needs of the troops of occupation. However, the necessary measures have been taken to be able to enter on the balance account the expenses occasioned by the transportation of the Armies. Until a new order is published, requisitions of horses are not intended.

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

Guarding of Russian Prisoners

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, March 29, 1919.

No. 115

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

* * * * *

11. Care of Russian Prisoners of War in Germany: Following the regular meeting of the Armistice Commission this morning, I had a talk with Baron von Lersner, the representative of the German Government, in regard to the Russian prisoners of war held in prison camps in Germany.

I wanted to get such information as possible in regard to their ability to continue to guard these prisoners. He protested as to the certainty of their being able to maintain guards of sufficient strength. He intimated that it might be a good thing if the United States would send guards for these prison camps. I assured him very emphatically that the United States had no idea of doing any such thing and that they must not allow themselves to entertain any such idea. Manifestly, if they think the United States is so much interested in these prisoners that it wants them safely guarded, even to the extent of sending their own troops to do it, the German authorities would naturally be inclined to relax to such extent as they might consider would bring about the desired change.

I asked him what was the strength of the guards at the various camps, and he said they furnish one soldier for every ten prisoners. This would mean that in a camp of 5,000 prisoners there would be 500 guards, which would be very ample. I called his attention to this and he replied that they could not depend upon the guards. They never knew whether they would remain loyal or not.

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

Prosecution for Dealing in Enemy War Material

4th Section, G. S.

ADVANCE GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,
March 22, 1919.

MEMORANDUM FOR: A. C. of S. G-4, Second and Third Armies

1. Herewith copies of communications received this office from G. H. Q., CHAUMONT, relative to prosecution of German individuals for disposition or retention of enemy war material in their possession.

2. Should experiences suggest any recommendations on this subject, submit the same to this office.

CASEY HAYES,
Lt. Colonel, F. A.,
Rep., A. C. of S., G-4,
Advance G. H. Q.

General Staff,
The Marshal Foch,

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF ALLIED ARMIES,
March 25, 1919.

D. G. C. R. A.,

No. 6.045/CR

TO: Marshal Haig, Commander-in-Chief of the British Armies in France.
General Pershing, Commander-in-Chief of the American Expeditionary Forces in France.
General Gillian, Chief of Staff of the Belgian Army.
Marshal Petain, Commander-in-Chief of the French Armies of the East.

2. The German Armistice Commission reports that the mayors and private persons in occupied territory have been arrested and prosecuted by the Armies of Occupation for having bought and resold German military material between November 11, 1918, and the date fixed for the evacuation of the occupied territory.

I enclose herewith copy of Communication 1363 of March 2, which I forwarded to General Nudant, President of the Permanent Interallied Armistice Commission, making clear that the German Government was responsible for sales of this material, such sales being ordered and authorized by the government and that I recognized the violation of the Armistice Convention with a view to all reparation which may be judged legitimate.

The German Government acting upon the text of Communications 1363, which established its responsibility, now requests that no arrest or judicial prosecution be carried out against the inhabitants for purchase or sale of such material.

The French Government has, moreover, taken a decision according to which the Germans will not be prosecuted for retaining or removing the materials, when such action of their part was simply the execution of orders given, or when they have been merely holders of these materials (herewith copy of Telegram 1568 advising General Nudant of this decision).

Consequently, I have the honor to request you to advise your decision on this question, and if you share my point of view, to give orders that the arrests and prosecution undertaken against private parties be discontinued.

By order of:

WEYGAND,
Major General,

1st Section, General Staff
Marshal Foch

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF ALLIED ARMIES,
March 2, 1919.

No. 1363

TO: General Nudant, President of the Interallied Permanent Armistice Comm.

Article VI of the Armistice Convention of November 11, 1918 prescribes that:

Military installations of all sorts will be left intact as well as military supplies, subsistence, munitions, and equipment which shall not have been removed within the period fixed for evacuation.

In regard to supplies, Article VI recognizes the right of the Germans to remove their military supplies within the period fixed for evacuation, but does not in any way authorize them to sell such supplies. Now, two telegrams actually in our possession give formal proof that the German Government ordered the sale of these supplies, this deliberately violating the obligations taken by its representatives on November 11, 1918.

The first of these telegrams sent by Mr. Erzberger himself is dated BERLIN, November 26, 1918, and addressed to the Bourgmester of MAYENCE, authorizing the sale of military supplies to the communes, cooperative stores and individuals and making clear at the end that there is reason to undertake these sales without delay.

The second, dated BERLIN, December 1, 1918, and addressed by the Department of Army Administration to the *Service de l'Intendance* FRANKFORT, specified that the German military administration has full liberty to sell objects which cannot be shipped during the period fixed for evacuation "only the supplies still existing at the time of the arrival of enemy troops of occupation are to be delivered." This constitutes an undisguised order to make everything, for which a purchaser could be found, disappear before the arrival of the Allied troops.

The violation of the clauses of the Armistice is, therefore, clearly established and I request you to present immediately, a protest on this subject, to the representatives of the German Government with the Commission of which you are president, informing them that this violation has been recognized with a view to all reparation which may be judged legitimate.

FOCH.

TELEGRAM

Marshal Foch, Commander-in-Chief Allied Armies

General Nudant, C. I. P. A., Spa

No. 1568 - pursuant to communication of General Hammerstein, No. C. W. N. I., 240/11767, February 25.

The French Government advises that German subjects cannot be prosecuted for retaining or removing material when such action on their part was in execution of orders given or when they have been merely the holders of these objects.

Please advise the German delegates of this and request immediate remittance of the lists announced.

By order:

WEYGAND,
Major General.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1222: Note

Destruction of Mines in Northern France

[Contemporary Translation]

Wako
G. W. 300/13125

Spa, March 29, 1919.

General von Hammerstein to General Nudant

Answer to Note No. 617/G of March 9 concerning the destruction of mines in Northern France.

The investigations instituted have shown that no records exist concerning the technical execution of the destruction of the mines since the explosions were not ordered according to a definite method but in each case according to the status of the war. There are only a few inconsecutive notes on hand which could not be explained except by an expert familiar with the districts, but which might still be of use in reconstruction.

The German Government would be ready, however, to send these notes in the hands of Bergassessor von Oheimb who could exchange views with the French mining directors (this being beyond the conditions of the Armistice) with the proviso that he should be guaranteed safe conduct, suitable treatment, shelter, board and transportation by rail an automobile. Bergassessor von Oheimb would be suitable for this task since he formerly belonged to the Administration of Mines of Valenciennes.

An expression of opinion is requested on this proposal.

von HAMMERSTEIN.

Maintenance Requested by German Government

[Contemporary Translation]

K. M. Wako No. 16201

Spa. March 30, 1919.

General von Hammerstein to General Nudant.

CONCERNING UPKEEP OF TROOPS OF OCCUPATION

The German National Assembly has passed a resolution providing for the emergency budget for the receipts and expenditures of the German Government. Hence no further payments may be made in Germany that have not been especially agreed to by the National Assembly as the representatives of the sovereignty of the German people, or which are not State expenses. The establishment of an expense, as a said expense, or obtaining special permission for payments is only possible in case these payments are to be sufficiently estimated as to their reason and as to their amount.

In order to continue furnishing the Entente the monthly advance of marks demanded for the payment of upkeep we, therefore, again urgently request detailed statement of the daily amount which is counted on for each separate army, as well as the strength in men and animals. After the transmission of this information care will be taken that the advance in marks sufficiently justified according to the above data will be made promptly.

von HAMMERSTEIN.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1200: Memorandum

Attitude of Civilian Population Along Railroads

4th Section, G. S.

ADVANCE GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,
Treves, March 30, 1919

MEMORANDUM FOR: Rep. A. C. of S., G-2, Advance G. H. Q.

SUBJECT: Information on railroads between Coblenz and Berlin.

1. It is requested that you furnish this office with the least practicable delay any information which you may have bearing on the subject of railroad facilities, civilian population of towns hereafter indicated, probable attitude of the civilian population in the area indicated in the event of an American advance; any detailed information available on the following named towns will be valuable: COBLENZ, LIMBURG, GIESSEN, MARBURG, CASSEL, MUNDEN, GOTTINGEN, GOSLAR, BURGDORF, MAGDEBURG, BRANDENBURG, and BERLIN.

CASEY HAYES,
Lieut. Col. F. A.,
Representative A. C. of S. G-4, G. H. Q.,
Advance G. H. Q.

1st Indorsement

Colonel A. L. Conger, G. S., A. G., H. Q. A. E. F., April 1, 1919

To: Rep. A. C. of S. G-4, A. G., H. Q. A. E. F.

1. The attached memorandum will give you information regarding the probable attitude of the civilian population in various places in Germany, as requested in your letter of March 30.

A. L. CONGER,
Colonel, General Staff,
By: J. H. MARSCHING,
Major, E. U. S. A.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1222: Letter

Return of Industrial Machinery

No. 116

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, March 30, 1919.

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

8. Report of American Representative on Committee for the Restitution of Machinery Taken from Northern France and Belgium: Following the meeting with the Germans on this Committee at BRUSSELS, the Allied delegates returned to WIESBADEN, where they resumed their work.

Our representative reports that they found the offices there well organized and that many identifying cards are coming in giving the lists of machines, location of which is desired. He reports that the FRANKFORT office has cards identifying some 72,000 machines, most of these in Government depots. The FRANKFORT office suggests collecting in depots smaller machines now in possession of German manufacturers. The Allied representatives would then pass on these machines. The Germans favor this scheme, inasmuch as it would reduce the number of visits to their factories by Allied inspectors.

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

German Financial Commission

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, March 30, 1919.

No. 116

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

* * * * *

2. Meeting of the Supreme Economic Council: On March 24, General Haking, head of the British Section of the P. I. A. C., presented a note to the Germans in regard to the meeting of such a commission. * * *

Baron von Lersner, on behalf of the German Government, announced at the meeting this morning that the Chief of the British Mission had informed him and General von Hammerstein that the German Commission was to proceed to a castle near COMPIEGNE, and that in accordance with the German wish for a larger commission they would be allowed to send six delegates and three clerks. Baron von Lersner stated that last night he had received a note from General Nudant to the effect that the German financial delegation which was provided for at the BRUSSELS Conference will be authorized to proceed to the meeting place which will be later fixed on the condition that it does not comprise more than six members, including secretary personnel.

Continuing his remarks, Baron von Lersner stated that, "The work which this Commission has to do, as shown in the first Note, is complicated and very important. The tasks allotted to the Committee, as laid down in the BRUSSELS Agreement, are only technical and much more simple, as that Committee was to deal only with foreign securities. The delegation proposed by the German Government in answer to the invitation of March 24, consisting of six delegates and three clerks, has been at SPA since yesterday evening. We are not quite clear as to our position, and we ask for an explanation from General Nudant, particularly on the point as to whether the Commission now at SPA has to leave SPA, and, if so, when and where it is to go."

General Nudant made the following reply to the above: "Yesterday evening, after having sent you the Note which you just mention, and after the chief of my staff had gotten into communication with Mr. von Becker, and after having learned from other sources that the German representatives were here in SPA, when we had believed they were elsewhere, I notified the Marshal, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies, at once that the German representatives were here in SPA and asked him for orders as to whether they were to be sent and notified him also that the point of view of the German representatives was that the number of representatives should not be decreased. I hope to have an answer to the communication today and will transmit it to you at once. I shall likewise transmit to you the place of the meeting which has been telephoned to Mr. von Becker."

3. Instructions from Marshal Foch in Regard to the Foregoing:
As stated in the latter part of General Nudant's remarks given above, he received definite instructions from Marshal Foch in regard to the meeting of this Commission, and

during the day sent a note to the Germans, * * * which authorizes the Germans to have the increased delegation which they requested; fixes the place of meeting at the Chateau VILLETTE near COMPIEGNE, and gives detailed instructions as to the trip which the delegates will make to the rendezvous.

* * * * *

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1222: Note

German Financial Commission

[Contemporary Translation]

809/G PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, March 30, 1919.

From General Nudant, President of the Interallied Armistice Commission.

To General von Hammerstein, President of the German Armistice Commission.

The Marshal, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies, has made known what follows on the subject of change of place of meeting of the German Financial delegation:

(1) The request of the German Government for six delegates plus three secretaries is granted.

(2) The place of the meeting is fixed for the Chateau de VILLETTE near COMPIEGNE.

(3) The trip of the German financial delegates will be assured by means of a sleeping car coming from France to arrive at SPA March 31.

Orders have been given that this car leave SPA, March 31, in the afternoon in time to be attached to the train leaving LIEGE at 6:20 p. m. for PARIS.

It will arrive at PONT-Ste-MAXENCE April 1 about 6:40 in the morning.

Provisioning Germany

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, March 30, 1919.

No. 116

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

7. Bunkering of Ships Taking Foodstuffs to Germany: On March 27, I presented to the Germans a note conveying the following telegram from Mr. Hoover:

Please inform German Representative our first ship arrived HAMBURG yesterday. Arrangements have been made to sell Germans first two cargoes. Remaining cargoes en route are for shipment via ELBE to Czechoslovakia. Please ask Germans if they could arrange to bunker our relief ships in North Sea and Baltic at HAMBURG, BREMEN, KIEL Canal, or in vicinity of these points, we to reimburse cost of such bunkering by delivering corresponding value in foodstuffs. If this arrangement can be effected wire approximately quantities of coal at various points and what date available. Also price in marks for same.

This morning the Germans made the following reply:

Germany is ready to bunker ships that are to bring in foodstuffs. This can be done in EMDEN, and BREMEN now. For transportation via HAMBURG and Baltic ports, the release of coastal shipping is prerequisite. When this is done, ships can be bunkered in all North Sea and Baltic ports, as well as the KIEL Canal. It is requested that the coal be valued at \$13.50 with the rate of exchange of today, and credited on foodstuffs account.

This information has been telegraphed to Mr. Hoover.

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

Landing of Polish Troops at Danzig

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, March 30, 1919.

No. 116

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

1. Continuation of Discussion Regarding Landing of Polish Troops at DANZIG: At the opening of the meeting of the Armistice Commission this morning General Nudant stated that he had transmitted the German Note of March 28, to the Marshal, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies, who submitted it for examination before the Allied and Associated Governments. Especial attention has been given to the part of the German Note, which stated, "After a thorough examination, the German Government cannot take upon itself the responsibility for a measure (that is to say, the disembarkation of Polish troops at DANZIG) which unless sufficient guarantees are given would provoke civil war in its own lands."

General Nudant then read the following telegram which he had received from Marshal Foch:

I, myself, at SPA, will give all the requested information and guarantees to the German plenipotentiaries, who should be provided with the full power necessary to decide the question within forty-eight hours. The meeting will take place April 3 unless it becomes impossible.

I telegraphed the substance of this Note to G. H. Q. this morning. It now seems probable that there will be no further marked developments in connection with this matter until Marshal Foch arrives here and has his conference with the German delegate on Thursday, April 3.

* * * * *

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

Return of Industrial Machinery

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, March 31, 1919.

No. 117

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

* * * * *

15. Return of Machinery to France and Belgium: The American representative on the Committee for the Restitution of Machinery taken from France and Belgium reports that a second train-load of machines destined from France left FRANKFORT, March 23, which weighed 553 tons, as compared with 531 tons on the first train-load. A third train will leave there within the next week which will carry some 801 motors from SCHWETZINGEN.

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

193-23.1: Memorandum

Control of Fraternization in the Neutral Zone

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,
Neuwied, March 31, 1919.

For: A. C. of S., G-2, 1st, 2d and 32d Divisions

The following is quoted for your information:

(TRANSLATION FROM THE OFFICIAL KREISBLATT OF WESTERBURG).

The numerous incursions of the Americans into the villages of the Neutral Zone, as a result of which several Germans have already fallen as victims, find their cause in liquor and women. I desire steps to be taken to the effect that any saloon man or inn-keeper who shall receive Americans and entertain them in any form shall at once lose his license. I request that such women as have anything to do with Americans be expelled from the Neutral Zone, that their names be published and that, wherever feasible, they be punished according to law. Among them are said to be women who, because of misconduct,

have been expelled from the occupied territory by the Americans. The population must be made thoroughly to understand the unworthiness of its conduct in making common cause with Americans, our enemies.

As soon as either American or French soldiers appear at any place in the Neutral Zone, the fact is to be telephoned at once by the burgomaster or gendarme concerned to the nearest commander of troops (ALTENKIRCHEN, HACHENBURG, LIMBURG) or to the Commander of Neutral Sector III. They will at once telephone to the Staff of the 1st American Division, at MONTABAUR, requesting that the American soldiers be removed from the places mentioned. The American military authorities will then order this to be done. The American soldiers charged with this mission will be recognized by white brassards, and will be in possession of passes.

I ask the various civil commissioners to see to it, in cooperation with the telegraph authorities, that telephone communication be possible on Sundays in even the smallest villages, since it is precisely on these days that these transgressions are the most frequent.

The American authorities have, on their part, ordered a stricter supervision of their enlisted men, and with my permission will send patrols for this purpose into the Neutral Zone. These patrols will be recognized as above described (white brassards and passes). They are to be given all assistance by our civil authorities and by our troops.
Westerburg, March 20, 1919.

COMMANDER OF NEUTRAL ZONE III.

Communicated to the Burgomasters of the Kreis, and to the Magistrate of the city of WESTERBURG, with request for strict attention, especially as to Paragraph 2.
Westerburg, Mar. 21, 1919

THE CIVIL COMMISSIONER III.

H. C. STEBBINS,
Colonel, G. S.,
A. C. of S., G-2.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1223: Letter

Maintenance of the Armies of Occupation

No. 118

AMERICAN SECTION,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, April 1, 1918.

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

* * * * *

3. Transfer of Funds for Armies of Occupation:

General Nudant notified the Germans that Marshal Foch had telegraphed that the amount of money necessary for the month of April for the British and American Armies, was, as follows:

English Army	10,000,000 marks
American Army	48,000,000 marks

The Germans were requested to take the necessary steps so that the payment for the British Army will be made at the Reichsbank in COLOGNE, and that for the American Army at the Reichsbank in COBLENZ.

* * * * *

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1223: Letter

Suggestions Toward Fostering Stable Government in Germany

AMERICAN SECTION,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, April 1, 1919.

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

1. With the growing menace of Bolshevism, the ability of the Allied Powers to establish stable Governments in the countries of Central Europe is becoming more difficult.

The effort that is now being made to reestablish peace with Germany must depend primarily for its success on the maintenance of a stable Government in that country.

2. One very great step was taken in this direction when arrangements were made for supplying food for the country. As a result of this step, the German Government is showing more strength, manifested by increased-opposition to Allied demands, and to this extent such opposition is not an unmixed evil.

Another manifestation of a stronger Government is the increase in military strength, for it is military strength that gives stability to a government under such conditions as exist in Germany today.

3. It is believed that the next step which should be taken looking to strengthening the German Government should be the complete raising of the blockade. It has already been partially raised but this is not enough. The moral and material benefit to Germany resulting from such a step would not only give greater power to the Central Government but would reduce unemployment and unrest. It is a mistake to believe that the raising of the blockade would lessen the hold of the Allies on Germany. The blockade is on and the country is struggling against, if not drifting toward, Bolshevism. With the blockade removed, manufacture and commerce would be resumed, and the tendency would be toward normal conditions. If, after a period of progress, the Allies found it necessary to bring pressure to bear on Germany, a threat to restore the blockade would be forceful, as the Government and the people would not want to return to the present conditions. Thus, raising the blockade now would produce a contrast which would at a later time make more effective the threat to restore it, or the actual restoration of it, if such became necessary.

4. A third step towards strengthening the Government is the proper safeguarding of the Russian prisoners of war. All are agreed that these prisoners should be repatriated just as soon as possible, but pending the time when this is possible they must be safely guarded by Germany in their present camps.

The best information obtainable shows that there are approximately 200,000 of them in the camps and approximately another 200,000 in the Kommandos. Holding them in the camps is not a matter in which the Allies can render direct assistance, for certainly no Ally has any intention of sending guards into Germany to be placed about the camps. All is now being done for these prisoners that is practicable, such as furnishing food, medical attention and hospital facilities for the sick, and instruction and diversions for others. Germany must do the rest.

5. The present Government will be further materially strengthened if a happy solution can be arrived at in regard to the Polish question now at issue. This is composed of two parts: First, the boundary between Poland and Germany, and second, the proposed landing at DANZIG of Polish divisions.

The former of these is such a vast subject that I will touch on it only to say that one of President Wilson's fourteen points announced the right of peoples to determine the Government under which they shall live; there is no doubt but that the Poles and Germans have both put a great store by this policy. Figures have been presented, from German sources, giving the percentage of Germans and Poles in the various provinces affected by the proposed boundary. If those provinces wherein there is a majority of Poles or Germans can be retained under their respective governments and Poland still be given free access to the sea by way of the VISTULA and DANZIG as a free avenue of commerce, justice will be done, confidence in the Allies increased, and contentment improved, all of which will strengthen the German Government.

In regard to the second of the above questions, it is believed that these Polish troops should be landed in the earliest possible date and made available for the defense of the eastern frontier of Poland against Bolshevism. But they should not be placed where they will be a source of further irritation between the Poles and the Germans.

6. With the two foregoing questions solved, there should be no occasion for Polish or German troops on their common frontier. This would give more Polish troops for defense against the Bolsheviks from the east, and more German troops for interior policing, and, if necessary, as guards for the Russian prisoners.

7. An important matter in every country is the stability of its currency. With all of the unrest that there has been in Germany and even with the tampering that there has been with her currency and the resultant decline in the value of the mark, still very little is heard as to her having great financial difficulties. This may be due to the fact that political troubles so much overshadow this question. With a view to helping to stabilize the country, financial conditions should not be overlooked.

8. It is believed that the foregoing recommendations will be thoroughly understood, -- namely, that each one is calculated to help the Allies more than it does the Germans, and that it is solely for the benefit of the Allies that such steps are taken. That the German Government shall also benefit is necessary in order that the desired results may be accomplished.

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief.

Internal Germany; Plight of the People

[Contemporary Translation]

[Spa, April 2, 1919.]

PERSONAL STATEMENT OF GEN. v. HAMMERSTEIN

In connection with the notes passed this morning regarding the lack of coal at KONIGSBERG and the seizure of the boat load of herrings destined for Germany, I should like to give a personal statement to the Chiefs of Missions regarding the internal condition of Germany.

Anybody who studies the internal situation of Germany will see clearly that the signs of the storm are growing daily more pronounced. The State of Bavaria has no regular Government; a general strike reigns in WURTEMBERG: trouble has broken out in the RUHR coal district, the men are asking for an 8-hour day. The BERLIN Workmen's Council have sent telegrams of sympathy to the new Communistic Government of Hungary. A new Congress of Councils will take place in BERLIN on April 8. The despair of the German people is growing perceptibly. The food which they have been expecting since November has at least been assured, but it is arriving in such small quantities that the people do not feel any improvement. The blockade has been maintained and has even been aggravated, why, the people cannot understand. Sea fishing has only been permitted in a limited area and is insufficient to supply the needs. Traffic for exchange of goods on the RHINE has not yet been permitted in sufficient measure. Our prisoners of war are still in the hands of the enemy. Our campaign against Bolshevism has been made more difficult by the Entente. All suggestions and representations made here at SPA for communication by sea between Baltic Ports and COURLAND have been ineffective. By enormous expenditure Germany has tried to raise a volunteer army for duty on the eastern front, and in the interior of Germany. The last class, the 1919 class, is being demobilized at the end of April. On March 18 at POSEN, Ambassador Noulens demanded that only regular troops should be posted on demarcation lines and no volunteer units should be employed. The carrying out of this demand is impossible. I cannot conceal from you that the indignation felt by the German people is increasing owing to the difficulties which the Entente is putting in their way. Many people can see no hope of improvement in the future peace, and who knows when that may come? Minister Scheidmann stated in the National Assembly on March 21 that the way in which the rights of the Germans are infringed at SPA becomes even more aggravated. The way in which the matter of the lack of coal at KONIGSBERG has dragged on (I first raised the question on February 1) will undoubtedly be considered by the people as an instance of this.

Even in moderate circles the saying "rather Red than slaves of the Entente, and dead" is being heard more and more every day. In view of the frank and open manner in which I have explained from time to time the internal situation of Germany I felt it my duty to present my own personal opinion to the Chiefs of the Missions here.

General Nudant: "These are your own personal opinions only, then?"

General v. Hammerstein: "Yes."

German Request for Coastal Transportation

AMERICAN SECTION,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, April 2, 1919.

No. 119

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

* * * * *

2. Germans Request to be Allowed to Make Coastal Shipments:

General Nudant informed the Armistice Commission that the Interallied Supreme Economic Council has rendered the following decisions:

During the negotiations at BRUSSELS the German representatives of the Subcommittee on the Merchant Fleet asked for certain exemptions amounting to 350,000 tons to make secure their coastal transportation. The Section of Transportation by Sea of the Supreme Economic Council studied this question and decided that it was not in possession of all the information necessary to come to a decision.

General Nudant continued by calling upon the Germans for complete information about the nature and amount of transportation required, also the tonnage necessary to insure that transportation. This information should include all necessary data on the ports of departure and arrival and the length of the round trips.

* * * * *

15. Communication with Czechoslovaks:

General Nudant presented a note inquiring of the Germans:

(1) Whether, if it is impossible to send foodstuffs to the Czechoslovaks by way of the MANNEHEIM-PRAGUE Railway, it would be possible to send post packages by that line from France to PRAGUE, and vice versa. (2) How many cars loaded with post packages could be transported daily in both directions? (3) What your proposals are with regard to measures of convoying, points of delivery, and reception of the cars by competent authorities.

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief.

Release of Coastal Shipping; Commerce with Neutrals

[Contemporary Translation]

Spa, April 2, 1919.

Chairman of Wako to President of P. I. A. C.

According to a radiogram Permanent Allied Naval Armistice Commission (PANAC) 2032 of March 27, German shipping for coastal trade and in commerce with Denmark, Holland, Norway, and Sweden for foodstuffs and such other articles as are included in the standing agreement with neutrals is allowed for German ships under 1,600 tons. There is placed a condition that separate lists of the ships for coastal trade and for trade with neutral ports be drawn up and sent to PANAC for their information.

1. Information is requested as to what "Standing agreement" is referred to and what wares may be now exchanged.

2. According to the BRUSSELS Agreement, not only ships up to 1,600 tons but those up to 2,500 tons were for the present excepted from delivery. It is therefore requested that the commerce mentioned above be left open for ships up to 2,500 tons.

3. The number of ships under 1,600 tons at our disposal for the 2 directions of trade is so short that it is likely that ships will have to be used in both directions, that is to say, that some ships will have to be used in coastal trade and also in trade with the neutral harbors, and it is hardly possible to draw up a separate list for each direction of commerce. Under these conditions separate lists of the bottoms for each of the two directions of commerce will hardly be able to be turned over.

4. Germany is very anxious to get the way to Finland also free. There can doubtless be no reason for the Allies to deny this. It may therefore be assumed that in enumerating the neighboring neutral states (with which commerce may be carried on) Finland was left out by oversight.

Verification of this view is requested.

In view of the difficult food supply and transportation questions in Germany, this business is extremely important and urgent. A very detailed answer is therefore requested.

v. HAMMERSTEIN.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1223: Note

Committee for Control of German Vessels

[Contemporary Translation]

Wako No. 16844 Mar.

Spa, April 2, 1919.

From the Chairman of Wako

To the Chairman of P. I. A. C.

In the BRUSSELS Agreement the Allied and Associated Governments planned to create an organization in a neutral harbor, for example ROTTERDAM, which would concern itself with

the control of the ships put at the disposition of the Allies by Germany. This organization was to be in constant communication with German delegates who were to be sent to ROTTERDAM by the German Government for the regulation of questions of shipping and loading.

Inasmuch as many questions are now coming up which could be solved properly by the proposed German representatives in consultation with the proposed Interallied organization, it is, therefore, requested that the Allied and Associated Governments arrange their organization in ROTTERDAM as soon as possible and announce to us the names of the proposed members. Thereupon the names of the German delegates named to the organization would be at once announced.

HAMMERSTEIN.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1223: Note:

Search for Naval Mines

[Contemporary Translation]

Wako No. 14136 MAR

Spa, April 2, 1919.

From the Chairman of the German Armistice Commission to the Chairman of the English Armistice Commission

Subject: Question whether a Commission Is being Formed in England for the Consideration of the Question of Destroying Mines

To the German proposition of the Admiralty Office A. V. 130, Paragraph D, dated February 12, * * * which was transmitted to the Permanent Allied Naval Armistice Commission through the German Armistice Commission Goette by F. T., the Permanent Allied Naval Armistice Commission answered by F. T. 1245 dated February 19, 1919, that the German proposition for the formulation of such a commission to search for mines would be investigated.

At the German Admiralty Office there now has arrived information to the effect that a Danish and a Swedish naval officer are traveling to LONDON in order to be at the disposal of the British Central Committee for the search for mines.

Information is requested as to whether a Commission is already being formed, as a matter of fact in England, for the purpose of treating the questions of search for mines and whether representatives of neutral states have actually been sent for.

von HAMMERSTEIN.

Conference on Landing Polish Troops at Danzig

No. 120

AMERICAN SECTION,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, April 4, 1919.

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

1. Arrival of Marshal Foch: Marshal Foch arrived at SPA yesterday morning for a conference with Minister Erzberger looking to the settlement of the question of the debarkation of Polish divisions at DANZIG. The Germans are considering the proposition and are expected to make a reply this evening.

* * * * *

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1223: Letter

Movement of Polish Troops

No. 121

AMERICAN SECTION,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, April 5, 1919.

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

1. Movement of Polish Divisions: This subject has already been reported to G. H. Q. both by telegraph and separate letter, but in order to make the records of this office complete and give the necessary data to others who do not see the special reports, this subject is here covered.

The Protocol covering the movements of Polish troops from the western front was concluded between Marshal Foch and Dr. Erzberger after conferences covering two days. Attached and marked A is a copy of the Protocol; the annex referred to therein being attached and marked B.

* * * * *

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief.

[Contemporary Translation]

PROTOCOL

A

Spa, [Belgium], April 4, 1919.

According to Article XVI of the Armistice Treaty of November 11, 1918, Germany is obligated to authorize the passage through DANZIG of Allied forces, and consequently according to the Allied viewpoint the passage of the troops of General Haller.

The German Government has proposed other ways of transportation, namely:

1. From STETTIN via KREUZ in the direction of POSEN-WARSAW.
2. From PILLAU---KONIGSBERG and MEMEL via KORSCHEN---LYCK---GRAJEWO.
3. By COBLENZ---GEISSEN---CASSEL---HALLE---EILENBURG and by FRANKFORT-on-the-MAIN---BEBRA---ERFURT---LEIPZIG---EILENBURG---then beyond by COTTBUS---LISSA and KALISZ.

The German Government guarantees absolute safety of these means of transportation. On the other hand, measures will be taken in order that transient troops in German territory shall avoid anything which might provoke disturbances in the population.

This transportation will begin toward April 15 and will last about two months.

The Polish troops transported are destined for the maintenance of order in conformity with Article XVI of the Armistice Treaty of November 11, 1918. The execution of the transportation is regulated by a supplement to the present protocol.

In case the use of the new means of transportation proposed by the German Government should lead to grave difficulties which the German Government, after having been warned of them by the Allied and Associated Governments, should not be capable of overcoming, Marshal Foch, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies, reserves the right to take up again the transportation provided for in Article XVI of the Armistice Treaty of November 11, under conditions of execution and with guarantees to be fixed by the P. I. A. C. of SPA.

FOCH.
ERZBERGER.

[Contemporary Translation]

ANNEX

to the Protocol of April 4, 1919

[Extract]

- I. The transport will take place by one of the following routes:
- (a) COBLENZ---CASSEL---HALLE) EILENBURG---COTTBUS---LISSA
FRANCFORT---LEIPSIC KALISZ
 - (b) STETTIN-KALISZ
 - (c) PILLAU---KONIGSBERG---KORSCHEN---LYCK---GRAJEW

* * * * *

II. The organization of the details of transport will be regulated by a mixed commission sitting at SPA and composed of the French and German Chairman of the Subcommittee on Transportation of the P. I. A. C. This committee should be notified immediately of any incident that arises concerning transportation, and especially of changes in the itinerary necessitated by *force majeure*.

* * * * *

III. MILITARY MEASURES: The troops will be transported by complete trains with their ammunition and food supplies.

* * * * *

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1223: Note

Investigation of German Factories by Allied Officers

[Contemporary Translation]

O. Wako No. 14604

Spa. April 5. 1919.

From Chairman of the Wako to the Chairman of the P. I. A. C.

[Extract]

The cases are increasing in number in which Allied officers are investigating unannounced the functioning of German industries in the Neutral Zone. * * * This action does not accord with the spirit of the Armistice Agreement according to which visits of the investigating officers in principal must be announced in advance.

The too frequent visits have also awakened the fear in the circles concerned that it is less a matter of controlling the factories than it is to learn the secrets of the working of the factories. This latter interpretation is in no way justified by the Armistice Conditions.

I would, therefore, greet with special thanks a statement of the orders that would remove the basis for the fears of the circles concerned.

HAMMERSTEIN.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1223: Letter

Prisoners of War

AMERICAN SECTION,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, April 4, 1919.

No. 120

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

* * * * *

2. Repatriation of Russian Prisoners of War: I have submitted special reports going into details as to the present conditions of Russian prisoners of war in Germany, and showing why it is deemed that these prisoners should be repatriated at the earliest possible date. The Allied Commission having in charge this matter came to SPA from BERLIN and have had one or two conferences here. This morning this Commission held a conference with Marshal Foch. They presented a note to him * * * [following] which sums up the view-point of this question.

The Marshal told them that he would give the matter early attention and gave them to understand that instructions will be transmitted to the Germans to commence repatriating these prisoners in accordance with the recommendations contained in the attached note.

3. Return of German Prisoners of War from Ukraine: General Haking presented a note to the German Armistice Commission informing them that to the best of their information there are from 5,000 to 8,000 German troops still in the Ukraine; that arrangements have been made for their repatriation by land across Russia. He also informed the Germans that troops to the number of 9,900 have already been evacuated by sea from CONSTANTINOPLE on the following transports:

Arrived in Germany

Ella Rickmers	1,800
Patmos	1,000
Kerkyra	1,300

En Route

Lily Rickmers	1,800
Asgard	2,000

Due in Channel

Ak Deniz	2,000
----------	-------

4. German Soldiers Interned in Serbia: Marshal Foch has sent information which was conveyed to the Germans, that the 4,000 German soldiers being used in Serbia as laborers were regularly interned in Hungarian territory in conformity with Article V of the Armistice Agreement of November 3, 1918, between Austria-Hungary and the Allies. Their repatriation, therefore, cannot be considered for the movement.

The officers commanding these 4,000 soldiers number 140 and not 200. They are at present at TEMESVAR, but orders have been given to the Serbian command that they may be brought back to the place where their men are located.

5. Marriage of Prisoners of War:

General von Hammerstein presented a note to General Nudant requesting the following information:

At the suggestion of the French Military Mission in BERLIN the Prussian Ministry of War directs me to request an expression of opinion of the Interallied Armistice Commission upon the question arising out of a prisoner of war who wished to marry a citizen of the country in which he was prisoner, as to whether he may take her back with him.

Will the State which holds the prisoner give the prisoner's fiance a pass for expatriation and will the home State give the necessary permission for entrance?

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief.

[Contemporary Translation]

Spa, April 4, 1919.

REPATRIATION OF RUSSIANS

and

PROPOSALS OF THE BERLIN COMMISSION OF CONTROL

In a few days the Russian prisoners will leave the camps in masses to turn their steps toward Russia through Germany and the boundary countries.

The Germans will not be able to prevent them by force nor will the Allies be able to prevent them by persuasion. It is impossible to repatriate them within a reasonable time as we had hoped to do, by way of the DANUBE, nor by way of the sea, into the regions where order reigns, and classified according to the provinces from which they originally came. All of the Allied Commanders, all of the boundary Governments, even the Russian Army commanders themselves are unanimous on this point.

A speedy decision is essential.

The Commission of Control sees only one solution: Say to the Germans:

We give back to you free disposition of the Russians. You will send them back to their homes but you shall not repatriate any of them by force, and you

will give back to those who leave sufficient foodstuffs to last them until they reach their lines from the points of debarkation.

The BERLIN Commission of Control will continue to function in order to assure the provisioning of the camps until their complete evacuation and in order to supervise the execution of the conditions of repatriation.

General EWART.
General DUPONT.
General HARRIES.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1223: Note

Reinforcement of German Garrisons Refused

[Contemporary Translation]

842/G

PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, April 5, 1919.

From General Nudant to the President of the German Armistice Commission

In answer to the Note No. 13007 of March 24, 1919

The Marshal Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies writes as follows, April 1, No. 1797:

1. At the present time there can be no question of satisfying the request of the German Armistice Commission, inasmuch as this request in its entirety amounts to nothing more than the reoccupation of the Neutral Zone by the units which were garrisoned there in peacetimes up to August 1, 1914.*

It seems, moreover, that the necessity of maintaining order in the Neutral Zone does not at the present time require an increase in the garrisons of this zone, since the German Command has only maintained a part of the reinforcing units for which authority has been granted. **

As a result the total number of units allowed to be stationed in the Neutral Zone cannot, until a new order is issued, surpass the number provided by the instruction of December 22, 1918 (10 battalions and 10 squadrons), increased eventually by the reinforcements already authorized (8 battalions, 2 squadrons, 2 batteries), in other words a total of:

18 battalions, 12 squadrons, 2 batteries.#

* Requested Garrisons: 31-1/2 battalions, 19 squadrons, 44 batteries, 1 battalion of foot artillery, 1 train battalion.

Peacetime Garrisons on August 1, 1914: 32 battalions, 21 squadrons, 45 batteries, 1 trained battalion, 3 aeronautic battalions, 1 aviation battalion, 2 telegraph battalions.

** The Allied High Command authorized the reinforcement of the Neutral Zone by 8 battalions, 2 squadrons and 2 batteries. Of these units the German Command maintained in the Neutral Zone only 5-1/2 battalions and 2 batteries.

This figure permits the German command to station in the Neutral Zone 2-1/2 battalions and 4 squadrons in addition to the units which are there at present, since the units at present in the Neutral Zone include only a total of 15-1/2 battalions, 8 squadrons and 2 batteries.

Article III of the Instructions of December 22, allows moreover a reinforcement of any part of the Neutral Zone whatsoever in case the necessity arises, subject to the authorization of the local Allied authorities who are concerned.

2. The stations of the garrisons of the Neutral Zone having been chosen by the German Command, it is possible for the German Command to modify those stations if it sees fit, subject to the approval of the local Allied Command concerned. If the desired change concerns several Allied Armies it must be submitted first of all to the Allied High Command.

3. By a change in the Instruction of December 22, 1918, the garrisons of the Neutral Zone will be authorized for the present to perform such military exercises as are calculated to maintain discipline, and to use those exercises for the maintenance of order to the exclusion of such exercises that have for their purpose to train troops in open warfare.

The programs of these exercises will be transmitted to the Allied authorities who are concerned, who will have the right to supervise them and to change them in accordance with the idea expressed above.

Shooting practice, for which authorization will be eventually granted must be regulated in accordance with the same idea (practice at short range, no artillery practice).

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1223: Letter

Appointment of General Dupont

No. 121

AMERICAN SECTION,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, April 5, 1919.

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

* * * * *

5. Brigadier General Dupont Accredited to the German Government:
General Nudant has notified the Germans, and also the Allied Sections of the P. I. A. C., that:

By the decision of the Marshal, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies, on April 3, 1919, Brigadier General Dupont is accredited to the German Government as the representative of the President of the P. I. A. C. for the purpose of treating all questions which are entrusted to him by this Commission.

The question of the P. I. A. C. having such a representative in BERLIN has never been brought before the Allied Section of this Commission. The purpose of this appointment is, therefore, not understood by me. It would appear that such an appointment having been made, it is the intention of the President of the P. I. A. C. to deal directly with the German Government and not through the German Section of the P. I. A. C. If this method of procedure is followed, copies of all transactions should be furnished the other

Allies. At the next meeting of the Commission, I shall bring this matter to General Nudant's attention and request that this procedure be followed.

* * * * *

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1223: Radio

Signing of Protocol Covering Danzig Question

Via Radio
L. R. No. 3615

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,
Spa, Belgium, April 6, 1919.

Commander-in-Chief, G. H. Q., American E. F.

No. 11-C. Protocol covering the DANZIG question was signed April 4, about 8 p. m. The Germans acknowledge the right of the Allies to send troops through DANZIG in accordance with the Armistice Treaty. The German Government has proposed the following other ways of transportation: First, from STETTIN via KREUZ in the direction of POSEN-WARSAW. Second, from PILLAU---KONIGSBERG and MEMEL via KORSCHEN---LYCK---GRAJEWO. Third, by COBLENZ---GEISSEN---CASSEL---HALLE---EILENBURG and by FRANKFORT-on-the-MAIN---BEBRA---ERFURT-LEIPZIG---EILENBURG---then beyond by COTTBUS---LISSA and KALISZ. The German Government guarantees the safety of these means of transportation. The Allies will take guarantee measures to prevent acts among transient troops liable to cause disturbance. * * * Transportation will begin about April 15, and will take about two months. Translation of the protocol and annex will follow by mail.

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

German Vessels under 2,500 Tons in Neutral Harbors

AMERICAN SECTION,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, April 6, 1919.

No. 122

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

* * * * *

3. Transfer of German Ships under 2,500 Tons Lying in Neutral Harbors: General von Hammerstein has presented a note * * * to the President of the P. I. A. C., requesting that interned German ships under 2,500 tons lying in neutral harbors shall not be transferred to the Allied and Associated Governments.

The note states that information has been received by radio from the P. A. N. A. C. showing that the Allied and Associated Governments construe the terms of the BRUSSELS Agreement in such a way as to authorize their seizure of these vessels. This matter was treated of in my secret No. 120, Paragraph 12.

In the note which was presented on this occasion the reference was to German ships available for coastal trade. Agreements entered into with reference to vessels engaged in this trade would not of necessity have any bearing on vessels lying in neutral harbors.

* * * * *

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1189: Memorandum

Instructions for Recovery of French and Belgian Animals

[Contemporary Translation]

April 7, 1919.

1. In order to allow the execution of the operations necessary for recovering the horses and cattle of every kind taken from France and from Belgium, the mayors, burgomasters, will have each one of their subordinates, or in default of these, will themselves make out lists giving the number and descriptions of the animals (horses, cattle of all kinds) coming from France and Belgium which are actually in their possession. these lists will be made out both for the animals acquired during the war and before the Armistice and for the animals left behind or sold to the German Armies during their retreat at the time of the Armistice.

2. From the lists made out by his subordinates, and verified by him, each mayor will draw up a combined report (even if there are none) certified by him as true and accurate, of all the animals within his jurisdiction specified in Paragraph 1 above.

This combined report, made out in triplicate, according to the attached form, will be ready within 10 days after the receipt of the present instructions.

3. The mayor will keep this report at the disposal of a duly qualified agent, French or Belgian, whose name will be communicated to him officially at a later date; this agent will give the mayor a receipt for the combined report handed him and therefore, a specimen of the agent's signature will be sent to the mayor beforehand.

4. There will be no search or pursuit of the German possessors of French or Belgian horses and cattle if they have legally profited by the legislative or regulating measures formulated by the German Government, nor of the German agents who have regularly carried out the legislative or regulating measures formulated by the German Government; but in case of non-declaration, of dissimulation, of false declaration, of secret slaughtering, etc., the guilty persons will be prosecuted and the communal authorities will be penally and pecuniarily responsible.

By order of Chief of Staff:

WEYGAND.

Adv. GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 430: Letter

Enemy War Material

4th Sec., G. S.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,
April 7, 1919.

FROM: Commander-in-Chief

TO: C. G., Third Army, Copy for C. G., S. O. S., Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs
in Occupied Territory, G-4, Advance G. H. Q.

1. There is in the possession of the American Army, particularly in the Third Army area, a considerable quantity of property, material of war, taken from or abandoned by the German Army subsequent to the Armistice of November 11, 1918, of such character that it is not of value to the American Army and which, in the light of the present military and political situation, can not be considered as an asset to the military power of Germany if disposed of to individuals of the occupied area. Examples are:

(a) Such manufactured articles as, due to lack of raw material, were manufactured from substitute materials of inferior quality (such as shoes with wooden soles and paper uppers, paper harness, etc.).

(b) Manufactured material other than the above, which is of value to the inhabitants of the occupied area only (such as dog carts, etc.).

(c) Manufactured material in use in all countries, on which nothing could be realized from its sale in other than the occupied area, due to the cost involved of collecting and shipping elsewhere (such as pots, kettles, other cooking utensils, etc.).

(d) Unserviceable material not worth salvaging. This would include all classes of material, except arms and ammunition.

(e) Animals which have no military value and which, due to old age or infirmities, can never become of military value.

2. In this connection your attention is invited to decisions of the Judge Advocate General, dated February 1 and 5 respectively, which were transmitted to you by memorandum early in February. These decisions concern the propriety of our disposing of certain classes of material formerly belonging to the enemy. It is understood that they have been interpreted in some quarters as forbidding the American Army to dispose by sale of articles such as described in Paragraph 1 above.

3. This interpretation is incorrect. It will be observed that the decisions apply only to (1) property taken from the enemy, which does not fall within the provisions of the Armistice Convention, and which, therefore, was affected by certain rules of The HAGUE Convention, and other rules and precedents of international law; or (2) property which belongs to the Allies jointly and is not exclusively the property of the United States. The Judge Advocate General however states specifically in his decision of February 1 that he "cannot conceive that there should be war materials turned over to our Army of Occupation, or abandoned, by the enemy in his retreat from one sector, which are not covered by the express terms of the Armistice Agreement." He then goes on to quote from Section VI of the Armistice Agreement of November 11, 1918, as follows: "Section VI. All military installations, of whatever nature, will be handed over intact; likewise all military supplies, foodstuffs, munitions, equipment, which shall not have been taken away within the time limit set for the evacuation." He continues by pointing out that the rules of The HAGUE Convention, etc., which he has above quoted, are abrogated in any case where they conflict with the specific terms of the Armistice Convention.

4. Property of the character described in Paragraph 1 does come under the terms of that portion of Section VI of the Armistice Convention quoted above, and it originally belonged to the Allies jointly. However, in conformity with a decision of the C-in-C of the Allied Armies, in which decision all have concurred, such property taken by the American Army in its advance has become American property.

5. It is legally proper to dispose of such property by inspection, condemnation and sale as provided in Army regulations, in cases where these apply. The law being clear, the matter of taking such action must be decided from the standpoint of policy.

6. Disposition is therefore authorized under the following conditions:

(a) Property disposed of must be of such a character as not to be utilizable by the American Army, and cannot be considered as an asset to the military power of Germany if disposed of to individuals in occupied area.

(b) It must further be of such a character that, on account of its poor condition, the cost of transportation or other considerations, it cannot be economically utilized for the civilian population of the Allied countries.

(c) It must not be disposed of to the German Army or Government. It may be disposed of to individual civilians, or to municipalities or local organizations which intend to use it for local and purely civilian or economic purposes.

7. Property which originally belonged to an Allied state or an individual of an Allied state shall not be disposed of by sale as hereinbefore described, but shall be held for return to its original owner in accordance with instructions issued to cover such cases. In this connection particular care must be taken in respect of articles coming under the Additional Armistice Convention of January 16, 1919, signed at TREVES, which additional convention relates to machines or parts thereof, industrial and agricultural implements or accessories thereof, and, in general, to all objects or appliances of an industrial nature.

By order of the Commander-in-Chief:

GEO. VAN HORN MOSELEY,
Brigadier, General, U. S. A.,
Asst. Chief of Staff, G-4.

Request for Swiss Delegation to Visit German Prisoners

[Contemporary Translation]

A. A. I. No. 2057

Spa, April 7, 1919.

Representative of German Govt. to President of P. I. A. C.

According to a report from the German Embassy at BERNE, the journey mentioned in the Note A. A. I. 1764 of March 26 to the destroyed areas of France to be made by the Swiss delegation, the purpose of whose visit will be to investigate the German prisoners of war who are at work there, can begin at any time that General Petain, who has recently been put in command of all of the territory that was previously occupied by the German Army, will give his consent.

In view of the great dissatisfaction in German public opinion on account of the fate of these prisoners of war, and in consideration of the circumstances that the French Government has declined to admit delegates of the German Red Cross, I request again that these visits of inspection of the representatives of the Swiss Embassy to the former battle areas be allowed as soon as possible.

I shall be grateful for an immediate reply.

Fr. v. BERCHHEIM.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1200: Letter

Railway Routes to Berlin

ADVANCED GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,
Treves, Germany, April 7, 1919.

FROM: A. C. of S., Advanced G. H. Q., A. E. F.

TO: Chief of Staff

[Extract]

1. There are two contingencies in which our Army might advance further into German territory:

- a: Upon the request of the German Government acceded to by the United States.
- b: Upon the refusal of Germany to accept Peace Terms offered.

2. An advance further into German territory might be participated in by one or more of our Allies, in which case the question of Zones of Advance and Lines of Communication would become of primary importance.

3. It is believed this should be studied in advance so that in case a quick decision has to be made, the C-in-C will have ready information as to the lines necessary to support an army advancing further into German territory, so as to preclude the possibility of agreeing to Zones of Advance which would place our Army on an unequal footing as regards

the railways at its disposal, owing to the principal trunk lines being allotted to the Armies of our Allies, as happened in the advance to the RHINE, last November.

4. This further brings up the subject of the desirability, in case of a further advance into Germany, undertaken jointly by the Allies, of giving the American Army a zone as far northward as possible, to secure its supply---as well as its ultimate withdrawal---through the North Sea ports more readily, and, also, to avoid its becoming entangled in the semi-mountainous and industrially unimportant parts of the Thuringian States and Saxony, which a straight forward movement of the Allied Armies from their present positions would involve.

* * * * *

A. L. CONGER,
Colonel, General Staff,

for PRESTON BROWN,
Brigadier General,
Assistant Chief of Staff.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1223: Letter

General Dupont's Position in Berlin

No. 123

AMERICAN SECTION,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, April 7, 1919.

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

* * * * *

7. Appointment of General Dupont as General Nudant's Representative in Berlin: In my Secret Report No. 121, Par. 5, I gave a decision which was rendered by Marshal Foch covering this appointment.

As stated in the last sentence of this paragraph, I had a conversation with General Nudant this morning on the subject of this appointment, stating to him that I did not understand the purpose of it nor the limit of General Dupont's Activities. After the meeting General Haking and I had a further conversation with General Nudant in which it was stated that the Allies might naturally feel that such an appointment as this opened the way for direct communication between the Allied High Command and the German Government without matters being brought before the Armistice Commission.

General Nudant quite emphatically denied any such purpose in the appointment, and without a doubt no such purpose is in mind. Nevertheless, if General Dupont were to become at all active, it would be a temptation to the Allied High Command to take matters to the German Government direct through the new agent in BERLIN, thinking that by so doing some time and circumlocution, which must follow if matters were handled by the Armistice Commission, would be avoided.

It will be seen from the following that this appointment does not meet with the approval of the German Government.

8. German Viewpoint Considering the Announcement of General Dupont as the BERLIN Agent for the President of the P. I. A. C.:

General Von Hammerstein presented the following note in regard to this matter:

In answer to your note of April 4, No. 839-G. I have the honor in behalf of the Imperial Minister Erzberger to inform you that the accrediting of General Dupont as Representative of General Nudant is not agreed to by me. Since Article XXXIV of the Armistice Agreement of November 11, 1918, does not give any basis for such a representation, and as no agreement upon this point has been reached, the Minister cannot agree to the one-sided conception of the note. The Reichs Minister is however ready to adopt General Dupont as General Representative, if Marshal Foch will agree that a German representation may be established at the Allied High Command.

To this General Nudant made the following reply: We do not understand one another. I will give you some oral explanation, which I will confirm in writing. It is not a question of making General Dupont my representative nor the Representative of the P. I. A. C. at BERLIN. It is rather a matter to provide for special cases in case they occur, so that General Dupont may be empowered to solve these special cases in the same way as he was empowered to look after the question of Allied prisoners of war, then the Russian prisoners of war, then the Line of Demarkation at POSEN, and following thereupon, general oversight of the Poland question. In the same way we must foresee, for example, in connection with the transfer of Polish troops through Germany and direct representation on the part of General Dupont at the Ministry of War to regulate questions that might arise. For example, in the same way General Dupont might be called upon to push the question of aviation that was taken up here about a month ago. In a word, aside from the position which he is now occupying, he may be able to facilitate the solution of many points, both for you, General, as for me, and that is why the limits of his mission have been extended. There is no other reason. In proportion as we accomplish our work here he will solve individual questions that arise just the same as had occurred up to this time. The really exact word to cover the situation is liaison officer.

Following this, General von Hammerstein stated that he would again present the question to the Minister of War in this sense and that he still thought that there will be objection to his activity without some kind of limitation. He likewise agreed that General Dupont's activities in BERLIN could facilitate treatment of matters for both General Nudant and himself.

* * * * *

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief.

Payment for Damages Caused by Troops of Occupation

[Contemporary Translation]

No. 856/G

PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, [April 7, 1919].

"The Marshal, Commander-in-Chief of the Armies of the Allies, makes known by Letter No. 6220-CR, dated March 29, that the following arrangements for the settlement of damages caused by the Troops of Occupation have been adopted:

(1) Damages caused by the Troops of Occupation in Rhenish countries must fall into the list of expenses to be borne by the German Government when they are not the result of serious negligence or of an important mistake, of a flagrant act of wilfulness by the occupant. For example, in this category will fall the numerous damages to cantonments, damages to property resulting from maneuvers and bivouacs, from the construction of target ranges---all must be included in the above-mentioned expenses.

(2) The determination and appraisal of the damages must be carried out:

(a) By competent Allied military authorities whenever the damages seem to be without any doubt a charge upon the Allied Armies;

(b) By the same authorities and with the assistance of a qualified representative of the local German authorities whenever the damage, although seemingly to be borne by the German Government, must demand an investigation that requires statements and interrogatories of the soldiers of the Allied Armies;

(c) By the competent German authorities in all other cases than those foreseen by Paragraph (a) and Paragraph (b).

(3) The payment of sums that are found to be due, after investigation, for the reparation of damages must be made by whichever one of the Governments upon whom the charge is definitely found to be incumbent.

(4) It is the responsibility of each of the Allied and Associated Armies in the zone which it occupies to see to it that the payments which are charged to the German Government are paid within reasonable time, and that time is to be determined clearly for each of the particular cases.

The preceding arrangements will become effective April 15. They will be likewise applied to the settlement of matters of damages that are still pending and for which no solution will have been made before this date."

GERMANS: (von Hammerstein).

This note is interesting for the reason that it gives the point of view of the Allied and Associated Governments concerning the damages that are caused by occupying troops in the occupied territory. I may, therefore, suppose that these fundamental principles are recognized also by the Allied and Associated Governments as applicable to the damages caused by the German Army in France and Belgium.

ALLIES: (General Nudant).

There is no comparison established between the situation that is discussed in this note and the one to which you allude.

GERMANS: (von Hammerstein).

I see a special difference in this point---namely, that the German troops caused their damage during the state of actual war, whereas, the damages caused by the occupying troops on the left bank of the RHINE at present are made during the time of peace, without the use of arms.

ALLIES: (General Nudant).

That is indeed the difference. There is no comparison to be made between devastation and damages.

Status of General Dupont in Berlin

[Contemporary Translation]

D
861/G

PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, April 7, 1919.

From General Nudant

To Chairman of German Armistice Commission

I have the honor to confirm in writing my oral explanations of this morning in regard to the extension of the word given General Dupont by Marshal Foch.

It is not a question of creating a branch of the P. I. A. C. at BERLIN at the head of which General Dupont would be placed, but of accrediting this general officer to the proper authorities for the purpose of facilitating the solution of various questions brought forward at Spa, both for the advantage of the P. I. A. C. and of Wako.

There can only be common advantages to be gained by this method of procedure. For each particular case it will avoid the necessity of giving General Dupont a special letter accrediting him as a representative, as was done for example in the recent matter of the German-Polish Conferences.

In a word, General Dupont's duty will continue to be what it always has been---simply the office of liaison officer. There can therefore, by that fact itself, be no question of reciprocity.

I beg you to make this point of view clear to the German Government and to ask it as a result to be good enough to receive him favorably.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1223: Letter

Necessity for Repatriation of Russian Prisoners

No. 124

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, April 8, 1919.

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

* * * * *

4. Russian Prisoners of War: General von Hammerstein presented the following note in regard to the release of Russian prisoners of war:

In the above mentioned note of March 26, 1919, I called insistent attention to the dangers which a checking of the transportation of Russian prisoners of war would have for the interior situation of Germany, and, in consequence, for the fight against Bolshevism.

In connection with the memorial that was handed over on April 4 to the Allied Missions, concerning the conditions in the Russian prisoner of war camps, I call attention to the request of the Minister of War in BERLIN once more to the fearful seriousness of the present situation and I endorse the proposals of the Minister of War for the immediate deportation of the Russian prisoners of war.

The President of the Interallied Provisioning Commission in BERLIN, General Ewart, has already been informed by one of the subchiefs of the Minister of War in BERLIN, concerning the status of things in the Russian prisoner of war camps, and he has declared himself in favor of action that the matter should be handled in SPA by a discussion by a representative of the Minister of War.

The creation of the Interallied Provisioning Commission for Russian prisoners of war in BERLIN has unfortunately not been attended with the success that was hoped for, because in the meantime conditions were changed by the extraordinarily rapid spread of Bolshevism and Sparticism in Germany, as well as in the eastern and southeastern border states. The Russian prisoners of war, for years influenced from within and without, are entirely honeycombed with Bolshevism and they are open in their purpose, being lead by agitators, to break forth at the very earliest moment as soon as weather conditions permit, with the use of every kind of force to break out of their camps. This means open rebellion.

Since the rage that has been held in check for years because of their long imprisonment is directed, first of all against the Allies, as can be clearly seen by numerous expressions that come from the prisoners, and because it is the Allies, whom, as the prisoners themselves know very well, have hindered the deportation of the prisoners, the Representatives of the Interallied Provisioning Commissions are exposed to the greatest danger in these camps, and, above all, the great number of Americans. The German authorities must decline any responsibility for this if the means of intervention is taken away from them by an internal collapse. And there exists the further danger that these uprisings of the Russian prisoners will be a sign to the Bolshevik and Spartacist element in Germany for a general uprising against the present Government. All attempts to calm Russian prisoners of war have come to naught. The only signal means to avoid a general catastrophe which is feared, is the immediate deportation of the prisoners of war from Germany. To be sure there are objections to be made against all the ways of deportation, whether through Finland or the Russian Baltic harbors or southern Russia. However, there must immediately be found some solution for this burning question, otherwise it will be too late for this also, as it is already now too late for deportation by way of the DANUBE. I consider it my duty to call attention once more to the enormous extent of the consequences which a long delay of the decision would have for the inner conditions of Germany, and in consequence also for the entire front which is maintained against Bolshevism and which, after the collapse of the last protecting wall that is held out against it, would overflow Germany and the RHINE and the neutral countries. The Allied Governments have a fearful responsibility for the fate of the entire civilized world, if they do not immediately put into action the command of this hour.

5. Reply of General Nudant to the Foregoing: "All the reasons that are set forth in this note and which justify the repatriation of the Russian prisoners were known to me. I presented them to Marshal Foch at the occasion of his last visit to SPA, and the Marshal departed with the conviction that the most rapid decision was necessary in this matter. I am led to believe that the decision will not be long delayed and I think that it can be transmitted to the German representative within a very short time."

Attention is invited to that portion of General von Hammerstein's note, wherein after speaking of the great danger that threatens the Americans in these camps, he goes on to say, "that the German authorities must decline any responsibility for this, if the means of intervention is taken away from them by internal collapse."

I shall make a reply to this part of General von Hammerstein's note endeavoring to impress upon him and those whom he represents that they cannot avoid by mere disclaimer their responsibility for the safety of the Americans in Germany.

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1223: Letter

***Holders of French or Belgian Industrial Machinery Not
to be Penalized***

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, April 8, 1919.

No. 124

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

2. Germans Having French or Belgian Machines Not to be Arrested or Prosecuted: General Nudant read a note to the effect that the President of the P. I. A. C., having received notification that a German decree had gone into effect from March 29, 1919, on, and published in No. 70 of the Government Law Leaflets for 1919, concerning the restitution of machinery carried off from France and Belgium, makes the following statement in the name of the Allied and Associated Governments:

There will not be prosecuted nor kept in a state of arrest or imprisonment neither the Germans who are holders of French or Belgian materiel, if they have regularly taken advantage of the legislative laws or regulations announced by the German Government, nor the German officials who have regularly carried out the legislative measures or regulations announced by the German Government.

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief.

Status of General Dupont in Berlin

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, April 8, 1919.

No. 124

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

* * * * *

9. Functions of General Dupont in BERLIN: General Nudant announced yesterday that he would make further explanation of the proposed functions of General Dupont under his appointment by Marshal Foch as the representative in BERLIN of the President of the P. I. A. C.

Pursuant to this, he presented a note to the Germans this morning, copy attached marked D in which he gives in writing a confirmation of his remarks of yesterday. He dwells on the fact that it is not intended to create a separate branch of the P. I. A. C. in BERLIN with General Dupont at the head of it, but refers to him as a liaison officer.

Following his explanation he urges that the German Government receive General Dupont. I have nothing further to add to my remarks of yesterday on this subject except to say that the foregoing explanation does not remove at all the objections which I see to the creation of a practically independent agent of communication between the Allied High Command and the German Government.

* * * * *

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1257: Letter

American Forces in Germany After May 1, 1919

April 8, 1919.

My dear Marshal Foch:

In my letter of January 26, 1919, I gave you a forecast of the approximate number of American divisions which would remain in the Zone of the Armies on certain dates. In that letter I pointed out that the controlling factor in the return of American troops was the available tonnage, and promised that should there be any material change in the tonnage situation I would inform you of any resulting revision in the estimate of American troops remaining in the Zone of the Armies.

I am now able to give you an approximate estimate beyond May 1. Under the present prospects of tonnage I will have in the Zone of the Armies on May 1, ten divisions, of which one will probably be preparing to move to base ports. On June 1, it seems probable that I will have seven divisions in the Zone of the Armies; and unless the tonnage available is considerably increased it does not seem probable that I will be able to reduce this number of seven divisions before July 1, 1919.

In order that there may be no misunderstanding I repeat that the situation of American forces in Europe is entirely dependent upon the tonnage available and that the above estimates in no way commit me to the retention of any particular number of divisions after May 1, except as may be determined upon by the President himself or agreed upon by him in the Peace Conference.

J. J. PERSHING,
General, United States Army.

Marshal Ferdinand Foch,
Commander-in-Chief,
Allied Armies.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1224: Letter

U. S. Commissions in Germany

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, April 9, 1919.

No. 125

FROM: Chief

TO: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

4. German Responsibility for American Detachments:

As stated in my Secret Record No. 124, Paragraph 4, I presented to the Germans this morning the following note:

1. In my Note Wako 8139, you call attention to the fact that the representatives of the Interallied Provisioning Commission are exposed to the greatest danger in the Russian prisoner of war camps, and, above all, the great number of Americans. Continuing, you state that the German authorities must decline any responsibility for this if the means of intervention is taken away from them by an internal collapse.

2. I wish to call attention to the fact that the American Government has sent to Germany several hundred men from its military forces and over one hundred from the Red Cross. They have gone there primarily for the purpose of doing a work of humanity. Secondly, their efforts are of great assistance to the German Government; for by aiding the Russian prisoners, as they have done, and are doing, they are assisting very materially in keeping these prisoners in a contented state of mind, thereby keeping them in their camps and facilitating the work of the German guards.

3. They have all entered Germany without arms, and, therefore, have no means of protecting themselves. The responsibility for their protection must rest entirely with the German Government.

4. As the representative of the American Government on the Armistice Commission, I do not hesitate to say that my Government would view with great displeasure any failure on the part of the German Government to give these men every protection which may be necessary.

If the German Government anticipates serious disturbances in the vicinity of any or all of these camps, it should immediately (if it has not already done so) formulate plans whereby protection can be furnished. In case of disturbances which might threaten their safety, the German Government should advise these men just what they are to do, or where they are to go, and should furnish all necessary transportation and guards.

5. As you know, they gave every hope of being able to continue their work as long as the Russian prisoners are in these camps.

6. History is full of international instances where harm has been done to foreigners in a country during periods of unrest, but this state of unrest has not been accepted as a satisfactory explanation, the Government still being responsible. An instance of this is the occurrence between the German and Chinese Governments during the Boxer uprising in 1900.

7. The *de facto* Government is and must at all times be fully responsible in this matter and no disclaimer of lack of authority can for a moment be accepted in lieu of complete protection.

5. Discussion on the above:

In reply to the above, General von Hammerstein stated:

I thank General Barnum for this note which I have listened to with the greatest interest. The work of the Americans in bettering the conditions of the Russian prisoners by sending Red Cross representatives into Germany has frequently been recognized with gratitude. I can state now that the German Government will do everything in its power to protect the American citizens who are engaged in this work. You will probably know from the papers that at the time being there is serious Spartacist unrest at MADGEBURG. Yesterday the mob attempted to storm a depot of stores which had been established at MAGDEBURG by the Americans. The Government troops at once took over the protection of the American citizens, who are now out of danger. It goes without saying that the same will be done everywhere the Government is in position to do so. I am sure that all the German authorities realize completely their responsibility in this matter, but I will again draw the particular attention of my Government to this point. The object of my note of yesterday was to show that circumstances may be stronger than the means to combat them and that the danger arises not only from the wave of Bolshevism, but also from the Russian prisoners of war themselves who are extremely anxious to get back home.

In response to his remarks, I added:

I am very much pleased with what General von Hammerstein has said. My particular purpose in presenting this note is that these men who are scattered in small groups in these camps shall not be overlooked in the midst of the very important matters which the German Government has to attend to at this time. If need be, preparation should be made in advance for their protection, not waiting until an emergency is upon us.

General von Hammerstein concluded the discussion on this matter with the following remarks:

I will transmit this suggestion, for which I am very thankful, to my Government and I am hoping that it will be favorably considered. The immediate evacuation of the Russian prisoners of war is the best means of avoiding any trouble in this

matter, and the Allied Governments should occupy themselves in seeing that this evacuation is carried out as soon as possible.

The above has already been reported to G. H. Q. in a separate communication, but I am including it in this report because the report goes to some persons who will not see the separate communication, and also in order that our records may be complete.

* * * * *

8. Return of German Prisoners of War: General von Hammerstein presented a note stating that on March 26 he handed a note to General Nudant concerning German soldiers, who during their retreat from Rumania had been captured in Hungary and sent to Serbia.

General Nudant stated that the return of these prisoners to their homeland was not permissible and that they were being employed working in Serbia. Concerning this matter, General von Hammerstein presented the following note:

I have taken note of the above note with the greatest regret. I protest firmly against the application of Article 5 of the Armistice Agreement of November 3, 1918 between Austro-Hungary and the Entente to have German troops interned in Hungary. I must also protest strongly against the fact that these troops interned in Hungary are now being deported into captivity in Serbia, or will be deported to captivity in Serbia.

I protest especially against German soldiers being compelled to work in a manner contrary to International Law. Article 6 of The HAGUE Convention definitely lays down that only prisoners of war can be compelled to work. Interned prisoners are not mentioned in this. The Allied High Command has repeatedly declared that The HAGUE and GENEVA Agreements are not affected by the Armistice Agreement. I, therefore, confidently expect that the interned officers and men will be treated, accommodated, and fed as befits them and that instructions will be issued to the Serbian Army as soon as possible to suspend the compulsory work for the interned soldiers.

* * * * *

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief.

Maintenance of the American Army

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, April 9, 1919.

No. 125

FROM: Chief

TO: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

9. Funds for the American Army of Occupation:

General Nudant, under date of April 8, informed the Germans that Marshal Foch had requested that:

The sum of 80,000,000 marks necessary for the needs of the American Army for the month of April should be sent to the Reichsbank at COBLENZ and put to the credit of Major F. J. Baker, P. M. G., Chief Disbursing Officer, at the following periods:

Immediately: 40,000,000

On or before April 15: 40,000,000

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief.

Recovery of French and Belgian Horses and Cattle

[Contemporary Translation]

April 9, 1919.

From: Marshal Foch, C-in-C of the Allied Armies

To: Commander-in-Chief of the A. E. F.

1. The French and Belgian Governments have decided to proceed as soon as possible with the recovery from Germany (both occupied and unoccupied territory) of the horses and cattle taken from France and Belgium by the Germans.

2. I have had this decision communicated to the German Government by the Armistice Commission at SPA. The measures in detail relative to the carrying out of the recovery will at once be decided with the representatives of the German Government.

3. But in order to hasten the search for the horses and cattle taken by the Germans, as much as possible, the French Armies of Occupation will immediately communicate to the German communal authorities the instructions of which a copy is attached.

I should be obliged to you if you would have the kindness to have the same instructions communicated to the German communal authorities in the zone of occupation in your Army.

By order of Chief of Staff:

WEYGAND.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1224: Note

Threatened Railroad Strikes in Occupied Areas

[Contemporary Translation]

A. A. I. No. 2105

Spa, April 9, 1919.

Hammerstein to the Chairman of the Interallied Commission

In answer to the note given on April 5 to Minister Erzberger

The German Government has received no [some] information concerning preparations for a general strike on the part of the German railway personnel in the occupied territory. In case these informations should be realized the German Government would, of course, do everything within its power to frustrate such a strike. The German Government believes, however, that it should call attention to the fact that if there is dissatisfaction in the occupied territory among the railway personnel this dissatisfaction is to be ascribed to the regulations of the Entente. The prohibition promulgated by the Entente against the execution of the eight-hour law as well as of the election of representatives of the officials and workmen is felt as a disadvantage that this personnel suffers under in contrast with the personnel in the unoccupied territory. By the numerous extremely severe cases of fine of even higher officials the bitterness of the railway officials has been provoked, and the authority of the higher officials has been shaken. Finally, the continued separation of the occupied territory from the rest of Germany has had a most unfavorable effect upon the minds of the population, and likewise of the railway employees. The German Government, therefore, repeats most urgently its demand for the admission of the execution of the eight-hour law and other social laws passed since October 9, 1918, and requests again an alleviation of the conditions of commerce between the occupied and unoccupied territory. The German Government states that all of the railway directions concerned have been correspondingly informed. The German Government would, however, if the influence of their superiors over the railway personnel should not be sufficient to prevent the outbreak of the strike, have to decline most definitely any responsibility of the German railway authorities for it, and to protest in case higher officials should be called to account by arrest.

The German Government is considering taking up with the railway unions the question of sending trustworthy persons of these unions into the occupied territory in order to have a quieting effect upon the railway employees. The German Government would in this case ask for free passage for these persons.

BERCHHEIM.

Conference on Raw Materials

[Contemporary Translation]

A. W. 440

Spa, April 9, 1919.

From the Representative of the German Government

To the Chairman of the P. I. A. C.

By means of Note 782/G of March 28, and Note 814/G, of March 31, the German Government has been invited to send a representative to COLOGNE to negotiate concerning coal, wood, sugar, and paper. In connection with the negotiations on April 3 and 4, it was discovered that the Allies did not have at hand any competent experts for wood. The Chairman of the Allied Commission, Colonel Gaillard, in the meeting in response to a question of a German representative as to when the negotiations about the sale of wood could take place, stated that he would lay the question immediately before the Allied Governments and would request a rapid response. In the meantime, four days have flown by without any definite statement having been provided the German Government.

The maintenance of our affairs is dependent upon the ability to give the German wood dealers definite information as to whether the taking over of the wood can be positively counted upon, as it is only under these circumstances that the execution of any of the proposals can be carried out. The wood dealers and wood cutters must immediately make their arrangements to carry out the delivery of the proffered material.

The German Government, therefore, requests a definite statement as to when the negotiations can take place. On account of the unfavorable conditions in COLOGNE for the German Representatives as far as lodging and telephone and telegraphic communications are concerned, the proposition is again repeated that the place of the negotiations be ROTTERDAM.

G-4, GHQ, AEF: 601/15: Fldr. 18: Letter

Rentals for Requisitioned Buildings

4th Section, G. S.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,
April 10, 1919.

From: C-in-C

To: C. G., Third Army

1. Reference is had to letter to March 16, 1919, from the director of the Y. M. C. A., Third Army, addressed to the A. C. of S., G-1, Third Army, on the above subject.
2. This letter was referred to these Headquarters by first indorsement dated March 22, 1919, with certain recommendations as to policy covering the payment of rentals for buildings, premises, and facilities requisitioned by the Army of Occupation for its uses. This included buildings required for billets, messes, offices, storehouses, canteens, etc., used exclusively by military personnel for strictly military purposes, and also buildings used by military personnel under the direction of the personnel of certain welfare societies for various activities with which these societies have been charged.

3. Questions arising in this connection have been presented to the Judge Advocate General, A. E. F., for opinion, and the following instructions are accordingly issued for your information and guidance, viz:

Case I. Where buildings, parts of buildings, premises or facilities have been acquired by welfare societies, and are utilized exclusively under orders and instructions from the Army of Occupation for canteens, hospitals, schools, and places of recreation, the cost of rentals and maintenance of such buildings and facilities is a legitimate expense of the Army of Occupation, and this is not altered by the fact that the welfare societies provided at their own charge the personnel employed in the operation of certain of these establishments.

Case II. Where, however, buildings, etc., have been procured by welfare societies on their own initiative, without military instructions, and are used exclusively by the welfare societies for their own distinct purposes, the costs thereof are not a part of the legitimate expenses of the Army of Occupation, and should be defrayed by the welfare societies from their own funds.

In either case, however, it is proper that the buildings be acquired by process of military requisition, and that the military authorities establish the prices to be paid, regardless of who pays it.

4. With reference to Case I above, the payment for the requisitioned buildings or facilities will be handled in the same way as any other payment incurred by the Army of Occupation as part of its legitimate expenses. In this connection attention is invited to second indorsement of G-4, G. H. Q., April 4, 1919, on your letter of March 26, on the subject "Funds for Road Work," and to a letter from the C-in-C to Marshal Foch dated March 8, copy of which was transmitted to you under cover of that second indorsement.

5. It is noted, per Paragraph 2 of your first indorsement of March 22, 1919, referring this question to these Headquarters, that you have issued instructions that buildings, etc., for the use of welfare societies shall "be secured by requisition as far as practicable and not paid for." This is not in accord with decision announced by Marshal Foch and agreed to by the A. E. F., to the effect that "The occupying army will pay the requisitions directly by means of marks which are advanced by the German Government and which we carry as an advance payment on the debt which that Government owes the Allies."

6. In connection with the C-in-C's letter of March 8, this may be interpreted as follows: All legitimate expenses of our Army of Occupation, including the expenses of requisitioned buildings for the actual needs of that army (as in Case I above) will eventually become a charge against the German Government. Any sums of money furnished by the Germans to our Army for the purpose of maintaining it will be credited to Germany against this general charge, and will be expended for the needs of the Army of Occupation. Where Germany does not furnish sufficient funds for current expenses, such expenses will of necessity be advanced by the American Government out of the proper appropriation; and careful record will be kept of such expenditures, with a view to eventually recovering the amount from Germany. This general policy includes the cost of requisitioned buildings, etc. Either these will be covered by current funds furnished by the German Government or else they will be advanced by the American Government.

7. In any event, insofar as disbursing officers of the Third Army are concerned, the result will be the same---for the reason that all funds received from the Germans are covered into the U. S. Treasury as miscellaneous receipts, and expenses incurred by the Army of Occupation are charged against specific appropriations available for the purpose. Moneys now received from the German Government are accounted for and credited to that Government as an advance on the debt which it will eventually owe the American Government.

By order of the C-in-C:

GEO. VAN HORN MOSELEY,
Brigadier General, G. S.,
Asst. Chief of Staff, G-4.

Repatriation of Russian Prisoners

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, April 10, 1919.

No. 126

FROM: Chief

TO: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

* * * * *

4. Repatriation of Russian Prisoners of War:

Marshal Foch has telegraphed to the President of the P. I. A. C., as follows:

The Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Governments has decided that the German Government will have complete freedom to repatriate the Russian prisoners of war.

However, none shall be repatriated by force and those who leave must be provided with sufficient food to reach their lines from the stations of embarkation.

The Interallied Control Commission at BERLIN will continue its work in order to supervise the execution of the repatriation and in order to ensure the provisioning of the camps until the evacuation has been completed.

I wired the substance of this note to G. H. Q., and also to General Harries. As he is in charge of the camps where these Russian prisoners of war are located, he will, of course, keep the proper authorities advised as to the reduction in the number of Russians so that remaining shipments of food can be properly regulated.

* * * * *

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1224: Note

Maintenance of the Armies of Occupation

[Contemporary Translation]

Wako 17495 F 1081

Spa, April 10, 1919.

The Chairman of Wako to the Chairman of the P. I. A. C.

Although the information requested in Note Wako 16201 of March 30, 1919, has not as yet been received, still requests will be met for advance payment of marks for the month

of April. An immediate response to the Note Wako 16201 of March 30, 1919, is unconditionally necessary, as otherwise Minister Erzberger will in the future not be in a position to be responsible before the National Assembly for the outlays that have to be made in advance.

HAMMERSTEIN.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1224: Letter

Return of Industrial Machinery

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, April 10, 1919.

No. 126

FROM: Chief

TO: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

* * * * *

3. Return of Machinery to Northern France and Belgium: The American representative on the committee for the restitution of machinery made a report from Luxemburg, most of which is of matter so extraneous as not to be of general interest.

He states, however, that there are agents of the committee in all of the German works in Luxemburg who are engaged in identifying sequestered machines. He adds that the first trainload of machinery to be returned was to leave on April 9. It is estimated that it will take six months to return the French and Belgian machines in Luxemburg.

* * * * *

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 990: Memorandum

Strength of A. E. F., July-December 1919

3d Section, G. S.

April 10, 1919.

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4

1. Under present plans there should be in the Zone of the Armies 7 divisions on July 1, 1919. Including these forces there would remain in France some 600,000 to

700,000 men. The reduction of this force could be accomplished at the rate of about 250,000 to 300,000 per month. It is therefore apparent that information concerning the probable strength of the A. E. F., July-December 1919 is wholly dependent upon any decision that may be taken as to an army of occupation to be left in Europe.

2. These headquarters have no information as to the intention of the President of the United States in this respect. Suggest the reply to the cable in question be to the effect that the strength of the forces during the period July-December 1919, is dependent on the decision of the President as to whether or not any troops are to be left in Europe.

FOX CONNER,
Brigadier General, General Staff,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1224: Letter

Occupation of Griesheim

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, April 10, 1919.

No. 126

FROM: Chief

TO: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

* * * * *

2. GRIESHEIM to be Occupied: The French have presented a note to the Germans, informing them that in spite of their protest about the occupation of GRIESHEIM, no reconsideration will be given to the decision as already announced.

* * * * *

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief.

Civil Affairs

THIRD ARMY, A. E. F.,
April 11, 1919.

No. 18

From: Chief of Staff, Third Army

To: All Corps and Division Commanders, Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs,
Area No. 1., Headquarters Commanders, TRIER

1. PROPERTY REMOVED FROM ALLIED COUNTRIES BY GERMANS

THIRD ARMY,
April 11, 1919.

Proclamation

All persons, corporations, or municipalities, who have in their possession or under their control or who have any knowledge of the possession or control by others of any of the following classes of property removed from France, Belgium, Luxembourg, Alsace-Lorraine, Romania, or Italy subsequent to August 1, 1914:

(a) Industrial machinery and material, such as factory equipment and shop machines, tools, raw material and supplies; or

(b) Agricultural machinery and farm implements; or

(c) Horses and cattle; or

(d) Furniture, house and store furnishings, books, jewels, clothing, furs, or works of art; or

(e) Any other property which was removed from France, Belgium, Luxembourg, Alsace-Lorraine, Romania or Italy, subsequent to August 1, 1914: Will report the facts to their Burgomaster of VORSTEHER on or before April 20, 1919.

This report will show:

(a) The location (county and town) so far as it is possible of the actual owner of the property; and

(b) The name and address (Kreis and town) of the present possessor or controller, (individual, corporation or municipality); and

(c) The present condition and serviceability of the property; and

(d) The source from which the present possessor or controller derived such property.

The complete report required by this order will be made as herein provided irrespective of any reports that may have been hitherto made in response to prior orders. All owners and holders of such property will, pending further orders on this subject, be held responsible for the safe-keeping of the same. Failure to comply with any part of the above order or false statements or omissions in regard thereto will subject the offender to trial by military tribunal.

J. T. DICKMAN,
Major General Commanding.

2. Copy of the foregoing proclamation in German herewith.

3. Each Burgomaster and Vorsthaler, respectively, will consolidate the above reports for his community into one report. This report will be in triplicate. One copy will be retained by him as a part of his records, and the other two forwarded to the Landrat of the Kreis on or before April 25, 1919.

4. The Landrat, upon receiving the reports from his whole Kreis, will forward them to the Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs for that Kreis on or before April 30, 1919, who will forward the one copy direct to the Office of Civil Affairs, Headquarters Third Army, retaining the other copy of his files.

5. The commanding general directs that you have the foregoing transmitted to each of the Landrate of the Kreise under your command and direct them to publish the same to the civil population of their respective Kreise.

By command of Major General Dickman:

MALIN CRAIG,
Brigadier General, G. S.,
Chief of Staff.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1224: Letter

Protest Against Occupation of Griesheim

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, April 11, 1919.

No. 127

FROM: Chief

TO: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

* * * * *

6. Protest against Occupation of GRIESHEIM:

General von Hammerstein presented the following protest against the occupation of this town:

In the name of the German Government, I have the following statement to make: Note 871/G has been transmitted to the German Government. The matter protests against the irregular form of the refusal of the reasons given by the German Government against the contemplated occupation of GRIESHEIM. These reasons do not appear to have been gone into. If this measure is carried out, in spite of the detailed reasons, both legal and technical, which were given against it, without these reasons having been refuted, the Allies appear to show that they are not acting in accordance with justice or reason, but merely arbitrarily. In view of this procedure the German Government regrets to have to make the open statement that it cannot in this case remove the impression that the French are merely acting in order to obtain the chemical factories of GRIESHEIM in their possession. The occupation of GRIESHEIM would make the worst possible impression all through Germany. The German Government,

therefore, formally protests. I request that this statement be forwarded to the Supreme War Council of the Allies at once.

In the foregoing, General Haking, Acting Chairman of the P. I. A. C., made the following reply:

I take note of this protest, but I should like to point out that the decision which has been arrived at by the Allied Governments, that it is not only the French Government which has come to this decision.

* * * * *

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1224: Letter

German Soldiers Captured in Hungary

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, April 11, 1919.

No. 127

FROM: Chief

TO: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

1. German Soldiers Captured after the Armistice: Marshal Foch has answered the note of the Allies regarding certain German troops captured in Hungarian territory to the effect that they are prisoners of war and, therefore, no further attention can be given to the claim of the President of the German Armistice Commission.

To this decision, General von Hammerstein replied as follows:

I showed in very many notes that these interned people are not prisoners of war. During the retreat which followed in due course after the Armistice of November 11, they were surrounded by superior numbers and captured, after hostilities between the German Army and the Allied Armies had ceased. I again raise formal protest against this way in which German soldiers' rights have been violated, and I maintain my statement that these unfortunate Germans, who are being kept in captivity in Serbia, are not prisoners of war, but interned.

* * * * *

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief.

Delivery of Coke to Alsace and Lorraine

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, April 11, 1919.

No. 127

FROM: Chief

TO: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

* * * * *

3. Coke for Alsace and Lorraine:

The Allies submitted the following note to the Germans in regard to the supply of coke:

The Commissioner General of the French Republic at STRASSBURG telegraphs, as follows: 'Germany never by a great deal furnished to ALSACE-LORRAINE the 13,700 tons of coke daily which she obligated herself to deliver according to the protocol of Luxemburg, dated December 25, 1918. In these recent days deliveries fell from 5,483 tons to 548 tons. All the factories of Lorraine will have to close if the deliveries do not take up again immediately.' The request of the Commissioner General of the Republic of STRASSBURG can be satisfied if General von Hammerstein will be good enough to intervene personally, for, according to information from reliable sources, there are large supplies of coke at the RUHR mines.

* * * * *

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1224: Note

German Demands on Coal Exports and Imports

[Contemporary Translation]

A. A. II. 3411

Spa, April 11, 1919.

Berchheim to Nudant

Concerning Conversation of German Coal

I have the following declaration to make:

The principal contents of the declaration given concerning coal in the negotiations at COLOGNE on April 3 and 4 from the side of the German delegates is herewith given in writing:

The handling of the Luxemburg Agreement of December 23 to 25, 1918, makes it impossible for the German Government to export coal upon the basis of the BRUSSELS Agreement for the payment of foodstuffs. The obligations for delivery assumed by the German Government in the Luxemburg Agreement as to coal and coke to be sent to the left bank of the RHINE presuppose that the German Coal Commissioner shall receive free disposal of coal production on the left bank of the RHINE, and accordingly that coal from the SAAR Valley, coal from the AIX-La CHAPELLE district and the Rhenish brown coal shall be available for use on the right bank of the RHINE also. As a matter of fact, however, all control over the coal production of the left bank of the RHINE has been taken away from the German Coal Commissioner during the entire time. There has also been no coal allowed into the districts on the right bank of the RHINE by the French, with exception of 18,000 tons monthly of SAAR coal and this only since about February 20.

In order to explain the effect of this failure to fulfill conditions presupposed for the Luxemburg Agreement your attention is invited to the fact that in September 1918, that is to say during a normal month, 670,000 tones of coal were sent from the left bank of the RHINE to the right bank and 860,000 tons from the right bank to the left bank, so that the reciprocal shipments about balanced. Since the Luxemburg Agreement the figures are about as follows for the German Government: From right bank to the left bank, including bridgeheads, there were delivered monthly about 360,000 tons of coal and 180,000 of coke, total 540,000 tons, while from the left bank of the RHINE to the right bank of the other hand there has been sent about 18,000 tons monthly since February 20, so that in opposition to the former balance of deliveries between the left and right bank there is now a disadvantage to the right bank amounting to about 520,000 tons. This condition is unbearable for the German economic life. It must lead to a complete paralysis of the economic life on the right bank of the RHINE and it naturally leaves no possibility for exportation of coal from the right bank of the RHINE, except in the small amounts that have been delivered heretofore to neutral countries upon the basis of existing agreements across the land frontier. The reasons why the exchange mentioned above between the two districts as to coal would be necessary are as follows:

1. Question of Kinds of Coal: The varieties of coal on the two banks of the RHINE are very different. In the RUHR district there is, for example, no brown coal but many factories on the right bank of the RHINE are constructed for the use of brown coal from the neighboring COLOGNE brown coal district. There is very little anthracite in the RUHR district, in the AIX-la-CHAPELLE district, however, there is much. The RUHR district has only a small amount of gas coal, the SAAR district on the other hand has an excellent gas coal from which gas is easily extracted. On the other hand there is a very good heavy coke produced in the RUHR district whereas the production of coke on the left bank of the RHINE is only very small. Almost all blast furnace coke must, therefore, be imported into the iron works of the left bank of the RHINE from the RUHR district.

2. Questions of Transportation: The SAAR district lies almost immediately near southern Germany, therefore, there were formerly on the average 350,000 tons of coal sold from the SAAR to southern Germany. The possibilities of transportation from the RUHR district to southern Germany do not permit an extensive use of RUHR coal in south German factories, aside from the fact that the production of the RUHR district is not capable of supplying the entire needs of southern Germany.

3. Allotment: The Imperial Coal Commissioner knows from long experience and needs of the consumers as well as in regard to the variety as in regard to the amounts of coal. In consequence of the newly introduced allotment there has resulted an enormous wastage of coal from the fact that the consumers do not receive the suitable varieties and consequently use more coal, as well as on account of the fact that they receive more coal than is absolutely necessary. What happens to the coal that in opposition to the Luxemburg Agreement is not being sent from the left bank to the right bank of the RHINE, the German Government cannot say definitely since the Imperial Coal Commissioner, contrary to Paragraph 5, Subparagraph 2 of the Armistice Agreement is cut off from all communication with his organs on the left bank of the RHINE. It is certain only that an amount of 200,000 tons monthly has been exported by the French Government from the SAAR district to France and Switzerland. Further, so far as our information goes, the Allies have exported coal from the AIX district to Luxemburg, Belgium, and Holland; whether to France also is not known. If only this coal which was exported by the Allies had been sent into the districts on the right of the RHINE there would be corresponding amounts now available for exportation for the purpose of payment for the shipments of foodstuffs. If the German Government is allowed full disposal of the production of the left bank of the RHINE so that it can go about a practical allotment of the coal and if the present difficulties of communication between the right and left bank of the RHINE cease whereby an increase in the coal production will result of itself, then it is to be presumed that at least from 300,000 to 400,000 tons can be released for exportation for the purpose of paying for foodstuffs. The damage which Germany has suffered from the deprivation of SAAR coal alone is shown clearly from the following figures:

The French Government credits the State Mining Direction of SAARBRUCKEN with 40 marks per ton (this is accordingly a credit and not a payment). The prices which the French Government receives for this coal are, according to our information,

in Alsace-Lorraine	50 francs
in France	60 francs to 80 francs
in Switzerland	90 francs to 120 francs.

Hence there must in any case be demanded that for all the coal which has crossed the German frontiers since the Armistice the German Government shall be paid the price (and in French money) which the French pay for English coal delivered in French ports. Further, the payment of the difference between the prices paid by the French Government to the Mining Direction of SAARBRUCKEN for deliveries to ALSACE-LORRAINE and the real sales price since the beginning of the Armistice must be made. Finally, the demand must be made that the value which the German Government has to demand for all deliveries of coal, coke and manganese on the basis of the Luxemburg Agreement shall likewise be placed at its disposal by the French Government for the purpose of payment for foodstuffs. The claims for delivery of auxiliary materials for the increase of coal production which were stated in the notes of March 22 and March 29 remain intact.

In case these well-based desires are not met in a very short time the German Government herewith gives express notice that it is determined in a very short time to nullify the Luxemburg Agreement.

BERCHHEIM.

Copy to: American Representative, Supreme Economic Council

Retention of Crews of German Vessels

[Contemporary Translation]

Wako No. 17984 MAR

Spa, April 11, 1919.

General Hammerstein to General Nudant

Protest against the treatment of crews of German ships unjustifiably retained in French harbors.

There are attached excerpts from testimony of the captains of the German steamers and German vessels unjustifiably retained in French harbors after the completion of their voyage transporting French prisoners of war.

From a part of these testimonies it appears that the crews were forced to leave their ships suddenly and in a very hasty manner. There could not be any question of an orderly transfer of the ships by a captain and the landing machinists to the French crew in spite of the fact that many days elapsed before the departure of the transport steamer. Only the *Scharnhorst* and the *Sierra Ventana* appear to have been exceptions to this rule.

In the French note to the captain there is contained a palpable untruth, since no agreement between the German and the Allied Governments has been made for putting these ships at Allied disposal; on the contrary the German ships were assured a free passage on the outward and return voyage.

Upon the basis of this status of the facts I make a formal protest:

1. Against the unworthy treatment of the men in that largely they were accorded an entirely insufficient time for packing up their belongings and debarkation, and against the manner of their housing on the transport steamer *Megalt-Hellas*.

2. Against the fact that on the occasion of the occupation of the ships by the French on only two ships could a transfer by the German captain take place, wherefore later claims are made impossible.

3. Against the unworthy housing and treatment of the crews of the ships *Sierra Ventana*, *Elbe*, and the *Berger I* on board the French destroyer *Meuse*.

4. Against the assertion that an agreement existed between the German and French Governments for the transfer of these ships. The navigation agreement was not made until March. There can, therefore, be no question of any agreement; this constitutes nothing more or less than an act of violence on the part of the French.

von HAMMERSTEIN.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1224: Note

Germans again Request Fishing Rights in Skagerrak and Cattegat

[Contemporary Translation]

Wako No. 17046 MAR

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, April 11, 1919.

General Hammerstein to General Nudant

Concerning the opening of SKAGERRAK and CATTEGAT for fishing requested on Note No. 14652 MAR of March 21.

In our No. 14652 MAR of March 21 a request was made for the freedom of fishing in the North Sea as well as the opening of SKAGERRAK and CATTEGAT upon the basis of the negotiations in BRUSSELS, and with a detailed statement of the reasons.

The district release does not allow the fisherman to use the neutral passage. Therefore, the possibility of arriving at the district opened up to them by a way that is more or less free of mines is taken away from them.

The release of SKAGERRAK and CATTEGAT is, aside from their richness in fish, especially important because the fisherman can then land their catch in North Sea or Baltic Sea harbors, according to their circuit.

The purpose alleged by the Associated Powers in BRUSSELS and maintained by Germany for the extension of the fishing district is in effect a real alleviation in food conditions in Germany.

This will not be possible from the district release for fishing up to the present on account of the reasons above stated.

We, therefore, again request the release of the district asked for in Wako No. 14652 MAR of March 21.

von HAMMERSTEIN.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1224: Note

German Economic Demands

[Contemporary Translation]

A. A. II 3410

Spa, April 11, 1919.

From Representative of German Government

To Chairman of P. I. A. C.

I have the following statement to make:

Berlin, April 10, 1919.

The BRUSSELS Agreement grants Germany foodstuffs in return for payment. Germany is not in a position to pay for these foodstuffs if the possibility is not offered her to compose her entire economic and industrial powers for concerted action according to a unified plan. Production and export is for Germany not only an assumption necessary for the execution of the BRUSSELS Agreement and for the payment to the Allies for foodstuffs, but also it is an irrenunciabile necessity for the restoration of peaceful, social conditions in Germany and for opposition to Bolshevism. Germany must therefore as well in her own interest as in the interest of the Allies and all Europe in general stand firmly upon the principle that the unified exploitation of

German territory shall not be interfered with, that especially the areas on the left bank of the RHINE must remain completely under the direction of the Economic Central Directorate of the German Government, that therefore any measures taken by the authorities of the troops of occupation shall constitute the economic exception for the left RHINE bank areas or have such an exception as their aim.

It is especially a basic demand in accordance with the BRUSSELS Agreement that the German orders concerning securities remain in full force and value in every connection in the areas left of the RHINE and that the export and import from these areas may remain without any limitation under the command of the German Government. That is the only way that the entrance of wares that are not necessary for the maintenance of line may be prevented and that the export of German products may be shaped so that therefrom the necessary securities for the payment of foodstuffs may ever come into the coffers of the German Government. But for this purpose the first thing that is necessary is that all the employees of the left bank of the RHINE receive their commands no longer from the German central authorities as well as from the Allied and Associated authorities, as is occurring at the present time, but that they receive them exclusively from the German authorities.

Particular mention must be made of the following:

(1) Securities are coming into the Reichsbank at BERLIN from the left bank of the RHINE in only extremely limited amounts; COLOGNE and AIX-la-CHAPELLE are delivering only small quantities, while the other branch Reichsbank, such as COBLENZ, MAINZ, TRIER, and SAARBRUCKEN have until now delivered no securities at all, which is a proof that, on account of the action of the Allied and Associated Governments who have carried out the closing of the left bank of the RHINE so thoroughly that they have locked up the organization so completely that the competent authorities have either not been able to get together the necessary securities or have used them for the purpose of covering local needs and contrary to the wish of the Central Authorities, and without the necessary consent of the Government Commissioner for Import and Exports.

In this connection it is to be noted that the postal communications between the branch Reichsbank and the Central Directorate drag along so slowly that frequently the weekly reports of the branch banks do not reach the Central Bank in less than 14 days, and that thereby this important means for supervising the traffic in payments and the regulation of same is removed since the bank statement which does not reach the hands of the central authorities until 14 days after the date it was drawn up is of no value for the purpose of regulating the state of payments.

(2) The Allied and Associated Governments have refused to allow the export of French franc notes from the left to the right bank of the RHINE. In that connection the following points are to be noted: The German Government is required to maintain the troops of occupation. The payment of the troops in occupation, carried out in the first months by means of French notes. These notes had to be exchanged by the banks into German money. This extraordinarily high amount of French notes have been reserved by the German Government according to the present organization of the securities the maintenance of which has been demanded by the Allied and Associated Governments at the BRUSSELS Convention, but as a matter of fact they are taken out of their control. For the most part they are used for the import of articles of luxury such as perfumes, women's dresses, etc. While the necessary securities for the most urgent needs of the people for the necessary elements of reconstruction of its work and social order are not to be at the disposition of the Government. In order to regulate the entrance of articles and the exit of means of payment and in order to be able to prevent a further drop in the rate of exchange on the mark, it is unconditionally necessary that the German regulations against transporting the mark into foreign lands also to be carried out by the German authorities on the customs

frontier of the occupied areas on the left bank of the RHINE. Germany must raise the demand that the German customs frontier as it was on August 1, 1914 be again occupied by German employees just as long as the Allied and Associated Governments leave the management of ALSACE-LORRAINE to the French Government, at least the border of ALSACE-LORRAINE toward BADEN, Prussia and the Bavarian Palatinate must be handled by German employees, who are bound solely by the orders of German authorities, otherwise these custom limitations must also include the imports from France, Luxemburg, and Belgium. Account must be taken of the exclusion of Luxemburg from the Customs Union by the creation of a corresponding customs limit toward Prussia.

(3) Of very striking signification in the matter of the execution of the BRUSSELS Convention and the payment of the foodstuffs supplied according to this agreement are the further facts:

(a) That the connection be again established between the Government Coal Commissioner and the local coal authorities in AIX-la-CHAPELLE and SAARBRUCKEN and that these coal distribution authorities be again placed under the exclusive authority of the Government Coal Commissioner in all matters of coal distribution.

(b) That the State Mining Directorate in SAARBRUCKEN be freed of the authority of the French Coal Controller. At the present time the French Coal Controller unlimited authority over the sending of state coal belonging to the Prussian and Bavarian Governments and is laying his hands upon the direction of the mines.

It is not only this action that makes any influence of the German Central Authorities ineffective, but also the interruption of the former official intercourse of the Government Commercial Bureau of the Mining Directorate with the Prussian Ministry of Commerce in BERLIN.

The demands herein raised are summed up in a way to make clear that the German Government must be in a position to have unlimited control over the economic life of the occupied areas of the left bank of the RHINE according to the present government laws, in order to be able to fulfill the obligations laid upon it by the BRUSSELS Agreement.

Minister ERZBERGER,
v. BERCHHEIM.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1224: Letter

Services for Recovery of Material

No. 127

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, April 11, 1919.

FROM: Chief

TO: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

* * * * *

4. Recovery of Materiel for France and Belgium:

Marshal Foch has informed the P. I. A. C. that there are attached to that organization all the services for recovery of materiel pertaining to France and Belgium, which includes the following:

- (a) Industrial
- (b) Fixed railway material
- (c) Agricultural implements, horses, cattle, etc.
- (d) Furniture and furnishings of every nature.

I. These organizations will be attached to the WIESBADEN office by which they will be directed.

II. Mr. Charles Lefebvre, Chairman of the Industrial Subcommittee of the P. I. A. C. and Director of the Service of Industrial Restoration will direct all of these services, and in case of need will cause the P. I. A. C. to form special sub-commissions to discuss with German representatives the necessary protocols.

III. Mr. Charles Lefebvre will use especially the following organizations to carry out these plans:

(a) The Central Commission for recovering and receiving fixed railway material.

(b) The Franco-Belgian Committee provided by the agreement arranged on March 27, 1919, between the English, French, and Belgian Governments.

(c) Whatever analogous commission that may in time be formed as a result of an agreement with the American or any other Government.

IV. Mr. Charles Lefebvre will preside over the general committee mentioned above in III, (a).

V. This order will be brought to the notice of all the services that are concerned through the agency of Mr. Charles Lefebvre.

* * * * *

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1224: Note

General Dupont's Activities in Berlin

[Contemporary Translation]

O. Wako No. 17141

Spa, April 11, 1919.

Concerning General Dupont

General Hammerstein to General Nudant

In behalf of the German Government I have the honor to inform you that the limitation ascribed to General Dupont's activities in your Note No. 861-G of April 7 is consented to. At the same time, however, it is requested that the President of the P. I. A. C. may inform me each time when General Dupont is to treat concerning a definite question in BERLIN, and that his activities may not begin until Minister Erzberger has given his consent in the special case concerned. Such a regulation would be practicable in consideration of the uniform continuation of negotiations here.

At the same time, however, attention must be called to the fact that the Germans likewise experience an urgent need of liaison organ at some other place in order to unburden the Wako. I, therefore, request the German Government as soon as possible to offer the possibility of sending a representative to the Supreme Economic Council of the Allies in Luxemburg, which representative should have similar duties to those of General Dupont.

von HAMMERSTEIN.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1224: Note

Commercial Communications Permitted with Neutral Countries

Spa, April 11, 1919.

To: President, German Armistice Commission

From: Chief of British Armistice Commission

I am directed to inform you that commercial communications on the subject of trade of the character authorized by the Associated Governments will now be permitted until further notice with all firms in neutral countries, under the following rules:

1. All available routes may be employed.
2. Communications regarding German imports must for the present refer only to foodstuffs.
3. Communications regarding German exports must refer only to commodities other than gold, silver, securities or other negotiable instruments and material of war.
4. Speculative transactions will not be permitted.
5. Telegrams must be in the clear and must be readily intelligible and contain no hidden meaning. They must be in French or English or in Italian in the case of messages exchanged via Italy or Italian colonies. Telegrams must refer solely to commercial matters. They must be signed with the name of the sender and addressed in full. In the case of telegrams sent via Italy or Italian colonies, Christian names must also be given. Registered addresses either in signature or address will not be permitted. The word telegram is understood to include wireless message.
6. Postal correspondence will likewise be permitted with regard to transactions of the character approved by the Associated Governments. It must be expressed in clear and unequivocal terms with the name and address of the writer shown clearly on the envelope.
7. Parcel post will not be permitted in either direction; but samples of the permitted commodities may be sent in postal packets.
8. The Associated Governments reserve power to detain any communications whatever without reason being given. No claim with regard to such detained correspondence will be considered.
9. The German High-powered stations at NAUEN, HANOVER, and BERLIN may be utilized for transmitting commercial telegrams under the conditions above laid down for communications by cable, but only under the control of Allied Commissions which will examine all messages to be transmitted through these stations and will have power to stop them and to control the operating of the station. These stations can only be used for commercial service.
10. Censorship of Associated Powers are being informed accordingly.

R. HAKING,
Lt. General.

Transportation of Polish Troops

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, April 11, 1919.

No. 127

FROM: Chief

TO: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

12. Transportation of Polish Troops from France to Poland: Marshal Foch has telegraphed, under date of April 11, that in accordance with the protocol of April 4, concerning the transportation of Polish troops, that this movement will begin on April 15. The first trains will arrive at NIEDERLAHNSTEIN, east of COBLENZ, and at RAUNHEIM, east of MAYENCE, on April 16.

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1225: Note

German Proposals on Estimating Requisitions Damages

[Contemporary Translation]

No. 16041/17381

Spa, April 12, 1919.

General v. Hammerstein to General Nudant

According to the note of March 29, No. 793/G, and of April 6, No. 856/G, the indemnification for requisitions on the one hand, and for damages which result from the use of buildings, ground or objects on the other hand, is to be variously adjusted. The estimation of the requisitions is to take place through the offices of an estimating commission presided over by a military delegate of the Allies. The estimating of requisition damages is to take place through German commissions and through Interallied Commissions insofar as the costs are to be borne by the Allied and Associated Governments. The payment of requisitions in the British sector is to be made by Germany, in the other sectors by the occupying armies; the payment of indemnities for requisition damages is to be made in principle by the German Government and only in special cases, where they are to blame, by the occupying armies.

This entire adjustment appears extraordinarily complicated and it is made more difficult for the German Government by reason of the fact that a special German law has been passed concerning the indemnification for services which have been furnished to the occupying armies in the occupied district of the left bank of the RHINE. This law gives the inhabitants of the occupied district a claim against the German Government for indemnification of service of the occupying troops according to the standard of the German War Service Law of June 13, 1873. According to this law, war services are indemnified as follows:

- (a) Quarters according to the service tariff.
- (b) Provisioning according to specially determined rates that are made upon the basis of the average market prices.
- (c) Teams of transportation services, including the furnishing of personnel, according to the tariff, which is determined for the various districts, and in case of personnel according to the local wage scale.
- (d) In all other cases upon the basis of estimates made by experts.

These last estimates are made by special expert commissions. The estimations have to take into consideration not only the value of the services rendered, but, in certain cases, also the earnings that have been foregone and always the damages which result from the service rendered. If the adjustment provided for in the Allied notes of March 29 and April 6, should remain in force then there would have to be along side of it another estimation by the German Government of the value of the requisitions and of the damages resulting according to the German indemnity law and that the case would even arise that indemnification which would be due to the inhabitants from the German empire would be estimated partly higher and partly lower than the indemnity that is determined upon the basis of operation according to the note of March 29 and April 6.

This condition is not only extremely undesirable for the German Government, but also for the Allied and Associated Governments, since it results in a great uncertainty for the population of the occupied district concerning the amount of their just claims and since the population will be offered manifold opportunity on the other hand to bring complaint concerning the estimates of the various estimating commissions working side by side, and the German Government would be forced to take account of the higher indemnities in local indemnity proceedings with the Allied and Associated Governments later. Further, it must be considered that the determination of the value of requisitions as well as damages arising from the requisitions is a government matter and according to Article V, Sub-section 2, of the Armistice Agreement, the administration of the occupied districts is given over to the local German authorities and the Allied and Associated Governments have only an oversight over these authorities.

In order to obviate all difficulties and especially in order to adjust the matter in harmony with Article V, Paragraph 2, of the Armistice Agreement, the following is therefore proposed:

Determination of indemnities for services for the occupying armies in the occupied district shall be done according to the German indemnity law which has been adopted by the National Assembly in an understanding with the committee of the States as well as according to the detailed regulations which have been promulgated pursuant to this law. The payment will be made in principle by the German Government. It will be charged up to the cost of maintenance due. If it is seen in estimating the services rendered with requisition damages that the amount determined upon is in part or in total chargeable to the occupying army, then the proper German administrative authority will propose the payment of this amount of the proper Interallied commander. If the latter refuses payment then the proper German administrative authority, in case he still considers the duty of payment incumbent upon the Interallied troops, will have recourse to the German Armistice Commission, which will take further measures to secure payment from the P. I. A. C.

According to the German Indemnity Law in connection with the German War Service Law, the immediate payment of indemnities is to be made by the local authorities charged with requisition matters for the German Government by way of advance, only insofar as the local authorities are in a position to make such an advance and insofar as the economic status of those furnishing the services may make the immediate payment necessary. In principle, however, the payment of the indemnities determined is made according to the German indemnity law only at a time which is fixed by a special law; up to this time the indemnity bears 5% interest. In case the Allied and Associated Governments consider immediate payment of indemnities as necessary in all cases the German Armistice Commission is prepared to propose corresponding measures to the German Government. * * *

v. HAMMERSTEIN.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1225: Memorandum

Strength of Armies and Cost of Maintenance

4th Section, G. S.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,
April 17, 1919.

MEMORANDUM FOR The Adjutant General

Article IX of the Armistice Treaty of November 11, 1918, provides that the cost of maintenance of the Allied Armies of Occupation shall be paid for by the German Government. The Commission of Maintenance of the Armies of Occupation has agreed that part of the cost shall be based on a per capita rate (as yet undetermined) and that the strength of each of the Allied Armies shall be calculated as follows:

1. The strength of a division shall be that shown in Tables of Organization, and a division shall be considered as a part of the Army of Occupation from the date the division headquarters passes into German territory until such headquarters passes out of such area.

2. The strength of corps and army troops shall be calculated on the strength shown in the Tables of Organization for the organizations assigned to the Army of Occupation, and shall be considered as a part of the Army of Occupation for the purpose of calculating the cost of maintenance in the same manner as outlined in preceding paragraph.

3. The strength of other units or organizations assigned to the Army of Occupation, for which there is a table of organization, shall be calculated in the same manner as outlined in Subparagraphs 1 and 2.

4. The strength of units assigned to the Army of Occupation, for which there is no authorized tables of organization, shall be calculated on the actual roll strength. They shall be considered as a part of the Army of Occupation according to the same principles as outlined for divisions, and corps and army troops in Subparagraphs 1 and 2 above.

It is requested that the above principles be communicated to those concerned, with the direction that no statement of the strength of the U. S. Army of Occupation, in conflict with these principles, be given out.

GEORGE VAN HORN MOSELEY,
Brigadier General, G. S.,
Asst. Chief of Staff, G-4.

German Government Refuses to Return Horses and Cattle

[Contemporary Translation]

No. KM 17511

Spa, April 12, 1919.

From General von Hammerstein, Chairman of German Armistice Commission

To General Nudant, Chairman of the P. I. A. C.

In answer to Note No. 781/G of March 27, 1919, No. 864/G of April 8, 1919, No. 869/G of April 9, 1919 and No. 881/G of April 10, 1919.

The German Government is not in a position to recognize any obligation on its part to restore horses and cattle taken from France and Belgium. Neither the Armistice Agreement nor the general rules of International Law lay any such obligation upon the shoulders of the German Government. As the result the German Government is also not prepared to send a representative to a meeting which is to occur on April 16 in BRUSSELS. The German Government can further not give its approval to the proposition that this question shall be treated by the Agricultural Commission in WIESBADEN.

Emphatic protest is raised against the proposed census of horses and cattle in the occupied area for the purpose of choosing the horses that have been taken from France and Belgium; these measures oppose Article VI, Paragraph 1 of the Armistice Agreement, which expressly guarantees the security of private property of the inhabitants.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1225: Note

Protests on Seizure and Restriction of German Vessels

[Contemporary Translation]

Wako No. 18305 Mar.

Spa, April 13, 1919.

General Hammerstein to General Nudant

Concerning:

1. Formal protest against the action of the French destroyers *Oriflamme*, *Temeraire* and *Obusier*.
2. Formal protest against the seizing of the steamer *Italia*.
3. Formal protest against the unjustifiable limitation of the freedom of the lightship *Eichbaum*.
4. A supplement to the protest in No. 11760 Mar. against the seizure of the steamer *Merkur*.

1. In behalf of the German Government I raise a formal protest against the action of the French destroyers *Oriflamme*, *Temeraire* and *Obusier*;

(a) Against the use of the German coastal and territorial waters for the execution of prize measures. These measures have made our waters a basis for enemy warlike excursions, an act which violates grossly the Armistice Agreement and which is repudiated from a standpoint of German dignity.

The consent given by a subordinate official of the harbor of HOLTENAU for the *Oriflamme* to enter with its prize, the KEIL Canal does not change the case.

(b) Against the retention of the prizes after entering into German territorial waters in spite of German protest. By bringing them into German territorial waters the prizes were free according to International Law, just as a neutral prize becomes free when in any way it reaches its home waters before the judgment of a prize court has been passed upon it. The demand against German protest to bring the prizes out of German waters before a French prize court was therefore unfounded and the threat to sink the prizes if they were retained in the KEIL Canal is not to be justified.

2. I raise a formal protest against the seizure of the steamer *Italia* by the French destroyer *Temeraire*. According to French statements the steamer was seized at 54° 29' north latitude and 10° 21' east longitude, therefore, within German territorial waters.

3. I raise a formal protest against the temporary retention of the canal lighter *Eichbaum* by the destroyer *Oriflamme*. This measure which cannot be justified in any way can only be characterized as an unjust interference with the ship's freedom. The escape of the steersman from the steamer *Elbe* did not constitute any violation of law which might justify the French destroyer in taking reprisal measures.

4. With Wako No. 11760 Mar. of February 25, 1919, a protest was made against the seizure of the steamer *Merkur* by the destroyer *Temeraire*. It has now been determined that this seizure also took place within territorial waters. I extend my protest made at that time, therefore, to cover this violation of law also.

HAMMERSTEIN.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1224: Letter

**Meeting of Officers Detailed to Supervise Transportation of
Polish Troops**

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, April 13, 1919.

No. 128

FROM: Chief

TO: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

* * * * *

2. Officers detailed to Supervise Return of Polish Troops: Yesterday afternoon eight officers from our service, accompanied by 16 enlisted men, arrived at SPA en route to COBLENZ. From there they were to take station at different points along the line of travel which will be followed by the Polish troops en route from France to Poland. These officers had been to the French Mission but had secured virtually no information there and were very much in the air as to how they were to maintain themselves, what their duties

were to be and the method of procedure to secure instructions covering these points. After looking over the orders and talking with them to determine what their troubles were, I telephoned to the Adjutant General's office at G. H. Q. to let them know more of what the nature of the instructions were that these officers wanted. During the evening I had them brought together and got an officer from the German Armistice Commission who is looking after this movement to meet these officers and explained to them something of the conditions under which they will have to work.

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1189: Order

Instructions for Handling Russian Agents

[Contemporary Translation]

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS OF THE ALLIED ARMIES,
April 13, 1919.

FROM: The Marshal, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies

TO: The Chief of the French Mission with the American Army
(For the Commander-in-Chief of the A. E. F.)

1. Information has been sent in that in the sector of one of the armies of occupation, Russian delegates pretending to be Commissioners of the people, and possessing neither order nor pass, have presented themselves to the military authorities, asking to be sent to Paris.
2. Orders have been given to return them to Germany.
3. As a general rule, since the powers of the Entente have not entered into relations with the Soviet Government, all Russian subjects who may present themselves within the lines under analagous circumstances are to be returned in the same manner.
4. But because of the interest which is attached to acquiring all useful information concerning agents who probably have no other aim than to organize Bolshevik propaganda in the Allied countries, it would be wise, first of all, to take down their description, to ask them their names, the place from which they come, the mission with which they claim to be charged, etc.
5. Besides this, it would be wise to advise the neighboring sectors in order to prevent any new attempt to pass on their part.
6. I have the honor to ask you to give instructions in this respect to the troops placed under your orders, and to finally inform them, through the 3d section of my General Staff, of any information which you may be able to receive under the conditions above mentioned.

WEYGAND.

French Mission
2d Section
No. 2225-R. S.

April 14, 1919.

Sent to the Commander-in-Chief of the A. E. F.
Chief of Staff

A. C. of S., G-2

Chief of the French Mission with the III AUS

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1224: Letter

Repatriation of Russian Prisoners

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, April 13, 1919.

No. 128

FROM: Chief

TO: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

* * * * *

11. Return of Russian Prisoners of War: Following a conversation between General Haking and myself, the former has submitted a note to the Germans calling upon them for information concerning the repatriation of Russian prisoners of war. His request calls for information as to when the movement will commence and the length of time necessary to complete it. On April 10 after the receipt of instructions from Marshal Foch that these prisoners were to be repatriated, I telegraphed General Harries requesting him to get all the details possible from the German Government as to how this movement was to be conducted, where the prisoners were to be sent, etc. I have not yet received a reply from him.

* * * * *

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1224: Letter

Repatriation of Russian Prisoners

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,

Spa, April 14, 1919.

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

1. Repatriation of Russian Prisoners: In response to a telegram which I sent to General Harries inquiring what steps the German Government was going to take to repatriate Russian prisoners of war, how soon it would commence, and where they were to be sent, I have received reply that the authorities commenced to plan yesterday, on April 11, and are still considering what they will do. He informs me that as soon as a program has been determined upon he will advise me.

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief.

G-3, GHQ, AEF; Fldr. 1224: Letter

Return of Industrial Machinery

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, April 14, 1919.

No. 129

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

12. Report from Committee on Return of Machines to France and Belgium: Our representative on this committee reports under date of April 9 that during the past week this work has progressed very slowly, owing partly to the absence of Mr. Lefebvre and partly to the internal political troubles in Germany. He states that although the Germans in FRANKFORT have some 78,000 slips of identification of machines, only about 15,000 have been forwarded to the S. I. R. [Service of Industrial Restitutions] at WIESBADEN. The Germans excuse themselves for this delay by saying that the demands the S. I. R. make for translations and copies are such that they cannot forward them faster.

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief.

British Mission to Study Provisioning Germany

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION
Spa, April 14, 1919.

No. 129

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

* * * * *

2. British Mission to Visit Germany:

The British presented a note to the President of the German Armistice Commission, informing him that their Government desires to send an economic mission, composed of two or three officers, to HAMBURG and MAGDEBURG, returning via HANOVER; the object of the mission is stated to be, as follows:

(A) To study the effect on the morale of the population produced by the importation of food into the country.

(B) To investigate the conditions under which the imported food is being distributed to ensure that the inlying districts are allotted a fair share.

(C) To ensure that an undue share of foodstuffs is not being distributed to the troops at the expense of the civil population.

(D) To investigate existing conditions with a view to reporting whether present quantities of foodstuffs imported into Germany should not be further increased.

The note requests the German Government to authorize this mission to proceed to Germany.

* * * * *

17. Germany Authorized to Trade with Finland: General Haking, Acting Chairman of the P. I. A. C., has informed the German Armistice Commission that trade is now authorized between Finland and Germany upon the same conditions which govern trade between Germany and northern neutral countries. That is to say, exportation is authorized from Germany to Finland of approved articles as specified in the BRUSSELS Agreement, and importation from Finland to Germany of food shipments of the latter to be charged against the German food ration, as specified in the BRUSSELS Agreement.

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief.

American Authorities Prohibit Public Meeting in Neuwied

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, April 14, 1919.

No. 129

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

9. German Population of NEUWIED not Permitted to Hold Public Meetings: The people of NEUWIED-on-the-RHINE proposed to hold an open meeting in order to protest against the founding of a west German republic. The American authorities in NEUWIED have, however, forbidden them to hold such a meeting.

Freiherr von Berchheim enters a protest against this order claiming that it is an interference with the free expression of opinion; he requests a revocation of this order.

* * * * *

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief.

G-4, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 107: Report

Computation of Expense of American Forces in Germany

4th Section, G. S.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,
April 14, 1919.

From: C-in-C

To: C. G., S. O. S., G-4

1. Reference is had to a letter of March 13 from the D. G. T., to the C. G., S. O. S., subject Operation ports of ROTTERDAM and for Third Army Supply," transmitted to us by your 1st Indorsement of April 1. In the letter of the D. G. T., the question is raised as to whether certain expenditures connected with the Army of Occupation are to be charged against Germany.

2. The questions raised are directly connected with our general policy in the matter of the cost to be borne by Germany for the maintenance (Entretien) of our Army of Occupation. Our position in this is as follows:

(a) The Interallied Armistice Subcommittee in Article IX, at a session on Jan. 9, 1919, defined expenses of maintenance as including "all expenses imposed on Allied Governments by the daily life of the troops of occupation, as well as all those entailed

by the obligation of constantly keeping these troops up to their fixed effective and in a condition which will make it possible at any moment to resist aggression and to resume hostilities immediately, therefore included is food of personnel and mounts, their lodging and cantonment, pay and accessories, salaries, bedding, heat, light, clothing, equipment and harness, armament and rolling stock, air service, service of transport of all nature, service of communications, and in general way expenses of all administrative or technical service."

(b) In a letter from the C-in-C to Marshal Foch, dated March 8, 1919, it was stated that this was the expense which we would require Germany, now or eventually, to bear; any actual present payments by Germany to be considered as a partial liquidation of the entire sum, but not of certain or particular items of expense. A copy of this letter was furnished you by memorandum of March 9. Another copy is attached hereto.

(c) The exact application of the definition of Jan. 9 to particular cases is expected to come before the Supreme War Council and the Peace Commission for decision. Pending their decision, careful account is to be kept: on the one hand of all items of expenditure involved in the upkeep of our Army of Occupation; on the other hand of all moneys turned over by Germany for the expenses of that army, and all labor or materials furnished by the Germans without remuneration; to the end that a balance may be struck, as required by the letter of the C-in-C, when the Peace Commission shall have made an accurate definition of the expense to be borne by Germany.

3. In substance, then Germany is to pay for the entretien of our Army of Occupation; the exact extent of entretien is as yet undecided; pending a decision, we are to itemize and keep account of all expenses caused by our Army of Occupation, and carry them provisionally as a charge against Germany; and we are to itemize and keep account of all money payments made by Germany, and of all expenses defrayed directly by Germany, as a credit against this provisional charge.

4. This answers points (a) (b) and (c) of the letter of the D. G. T. All costs of ocean, river or land transportation, handling and storage, rentals of buildings, warehouses and other facilities arising out of the needs of our Army of Occupation, are a provisional charge against Germany. All sums paid to us by Germany for the upkeep of the Army of Occupation; and all expenses met directly by Germany (as in the case of the RHINE barges furnished and paid for by her) are a credit against this charge. In the latter case (expenses met directly by Germany) there are in effect two identical entries, credit and debit.

5. No new element is introduced in the case of rentals of buildings in Germany (point (c), letter of the D. G. T.). These are in general requisitioned and paid for by United States Treasury funds, and the cost is a charge against Germany. If sufficient moneys are furnished by Germany, they are covered into the United States Treasury and expended on the proper appropriation for this or other purposes; and such moneys are credited to Germany's account.

6. Regarding point (e) of the letter of the D. G. T., it is evident that a special form of receipt, or special notation thereon, will be required, in order to permit of our account with Germany being accurately kept. There should be emphasized here the importance of keeping all the entries of this account itemized in detail, so that there will be no difficulty in identifying proper and legal charges against Germany, as these may subsequently be defined by the Peace Commission.

7. Regarding point (d) of the letter of the D. G. T., it is understood that the A. E. F. is required to pay port charges at both ROTTERDAM and ANTWERP, but no duties.

8. In this connection, your attention is invited to a letter from G-4, G. H. Q., dated February 20, 1919, on the subject Expenses of Armies of Occupation. This letter carried a compilation of costs of maintaining the Army of Occupation, as based on the individual soldier or officer. In arriving at the data, costs of transportation were included for certain items. This was, frankly, an estimate, and would not be as valuable

in billing costs against the German nation as would exact data of the kind presented by the foregoing letter, and it is believed that special effort should be made to maintain records which will permit our presenting to the German nation in future an exact statement of costs, rather than an estimate.

By order of the C-in-C

GEO. VAN HORN MOSELEY,
Brigadier General, G. S.,
Asst. Chief of Staff, G-4.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1228: Letter

Enemy Prisoners in Siberia

No. 49397/W/57

FOREIGN OFFICE, GREAT BRITAIN,
April 15, 1919.

Sir:

I have the honor to inform you that His Majesty's Government have had under careful consideration the communications which have been addressed to them by the German and Austrian Government through the good offices of the Swiss Government, on the subject of enemy prisoners of war in the Far East.

It has for some time been apparent that the facilities at the disposal of the Danish and Swedish Red Cross Organizations are not altogether adequate to cope with the critical situation which has arisen in connection with these prisoners, and His Majesty's Government have accordingly been in communication with their representative at VLADIVOSTOK, with a view to ascertain the measures which it would be desirable to adopt in the circumstances.

As a result of the inquiries which have been made by Sir C. Eliot, it appears that the main problem to be dealt with is that the prisoners about two hundred thousand of whom are collected west of Lake BAIKAL, and after consultation with the Danish, Swedish, Canadian, and United States Red Cross representatives on the spot, Sir C. Eliot has expressed the opinion that a sum of at least one hundred thousand pounds a month will be required to place the work of relief on a satisfactory basis, while the Canadian Red Cross representative considers that ten million dollars should be immediately made available for the purpose.

Subject to these funds being forthcoming, Sir C. Eliot considers that the Danish and Swedish Red Cross should be placed in a position to extend their operations, more especially as the Canadian and American Red Cross have declared their willingness to cooperate in the work to be undertaken.

I should be glad if the Swiss Government would be so good as to communicate to the German and Austrian Governments the conclusions which have been arrived at by the competent authorities in Siberia as the result of the investigations which have been made, and ascertain whether they would be willing to assume responsibility for the expenditure estimated to be necessary.

In the event of the German and Austrian Governments seeing their way to assume this responsibility, His Majesty's Government are of the opinion that the necessary sum should be placed at the disposal of the Allied representatives at VLADIVOSTOK, for distribution among the respective Red Cross organizations as circumstances may require. In the meantime, His Majesty's Government would be prepared to instruct Sir C. Eliot to afford all

possible assistance in the furtherance of the work of relief, as well as to attach officers to the respective organizations, should that be found necessary.

In communicating with the German and Austrian Governments, His Majesty's Government would be glad if it could be pointed out that they attach considerable importance to some announcement being made by the German and Austrian Governments that the Allied Governments are interesting themselves in the fate of their prisoners, who should be instructed to desist from all operations which may obstruct the work of the Allied Governments in Siberia. One of the main difficulties with which the Allied Governments have hitherto had to contend in considering the problem has been the fact that large numbers of German and Austrian prisoners of war have identified themselves with the Russian Bolshevik Government and have cooperated with the forces of that Government in their military operations. Unless these activities are forthwith suspended, His Majesty's Government feel that the measures of relief to be undertaken will be greatly impeded and that the assistance which it is hoped to afford to German and Austrian prisoners of war in Siberia will be jeopardized.

In conclusion I feel bound to inform you that recent reports which have been received from Siberia are of the most alarming nature. Spotted typhus is said to be making serious ravages in certain camps, while among the two hundred thousand prisoners already referred to it is stated that there are no less than thirty to forty thousand invalids. The matter is in fact one of grave urgency on which an immediate decision is required if the relief measures to be undertaken are to prove of any avail.

[Unsigned]

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1225: Note

Request for Repatriation of German Prisoners of War in Russia

[Contemporary Translation]

No. 1870. 4. 19.U. Wako. 17929

Spa, April 15, 1919.

From the Representative of the German Government

To the Chairman of the P. I. A. C.

[Extract]

1. The fate of German prisoners of war and civilians in Russian territory is extremely grave. Far the greater part of them have been for over four years in imprisonment and have been cut off for more than 18 months from any communication with their homes.

In consequence of the political and military confusion in Siberia of the last several months the prisoners of war in that district are having to suffer especially because the present powers in Siberia have put a stop to all aid activities, even from neutral organizations. It may be added that the physical condition of the prisoners in Siberia, on account of the extremely poor hygienic conditions and the lack of all medical care as well as on account of the crowding together of the prisoners in the smallest kind of space, is so very alarming that if help is not rapidly brought numberless persons must in a short time die. In TURKESTAN, where in consequence of the insufferable climate numerous persons died during the course of last year, and in TRANSCAUCASIA, conditions are similar.

According to information at hand the care of the German prisoners of war in the camps there is being carried on to a certain extent by the Japanese troops, and in central and western Siberia the American Red Cross has begun an extensive aid activity, which

however has apparently up to the present been principally limited to the population and the troops in that country. As to TURKESTAN and CAUCASIA it would under the conditions doubtless be easiest for the commanders of the British troops at those places to extend aid to German prisoners there.

* * * * *

2. According to the reports at hand 80 to 90 per cent of the prisoners of war in Russia are to be classed as seriously ill. The passing of another winter would doubtless be fatal to thousands of weakened, suffering and spiritually depressed prisoners of war, especially in the inhospitable climate of Siberia. If further numerous deaths are to be avoided among them it is urgently necessary that there be a beginning made of the repatriation of all German prisoners of war still in Russia at the earliest possible moment.

To this purpose it seems necessary for those prisoners that have been quartered in Siberia to use the coming summer months in order to collect the prisoners in the Priamur [General Government---Amur Province, Siberia] district or in Japan.

The repatriation would then have to take place over sea as soon as possible, to which end the American or Japanese hospital ships in the east might perhaps be used.

The repatriation of the prisoners in TURKESTAN and in the CAUCASUS could easily take place by way of the Caspian or the Black Sea by the British Governments. The Representatives of the Swedish Red Cross still in Russia could be called upon for cooperation by England and America as they are thoroughly conversant with conditions.

Independent of the proposals made, it is again requested that some German commissions be allowed to go into Siberia to care for the prisoners and prepare for their repatriation.

* * * * *

I should be extremely grateful for an early answer.

v. MULLER.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1225: Letter

Requisitions by and Maintenance of Armies of Occupation

No. 130

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, April 15, 1919.

FROM: Chief

TO: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

* * * * *

12. Payment for Requisitions and for Damages in Occupied Area: General von Hammerstein presented a note * * * in which he discusses at some length the German viewpoint of handling requisitions in the occupied area and also the manner in which payment should be made for damages resulting from the presence of the Armies of Occupation.

The note suggests a proposed method of procedure both for the payment of requisitions and for handling indemnities. This is one of the very big subjects in which as yet the Allies themselves have not been able to agree. The Committee on Entretien seems to be at a standstill awaiting further instructions from the Allied High Command. It seems very likely now that the questions involved in this connection will be settled by the Peace Treaty, rather than that they will be negotiated by the Allies with the Germans.

In this matter the Americans are following their own policy of paying for supplies and services as they get them, which is unquestionably much more satisfactory to us. So far the Germans have been supplying funds to enable our Army of Occupation to do this and it is to be hoped that they will continue to do so.

* * * * *

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1225: Letter

Return of Industrial Machinery

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, April 15, 1919.

No. 130

FROM: Chief

TO: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

* * * * *

Return of Machines to France and Belgium: Our representative on the Committee looking after the return of machines taken from northern France and Belgium, reports that he is informed by the Belgians that as yet no shipments have been made of machinery from unoccupied Germany to Belgium. A certain number of cars containing Belgian machinery were to leave SCHWETZINGEN [not identified] last week. Reports from the occupied regions are more satisfactory. Twenty carloads out of fifty have reached Belgium from NEUSS. These cars contained tools and lathes. Twenty cars out of a hundred and ten have been shipped from REISHOLZ [not identified] and loading progresses at the rate of five cars per day. There have also been shipped ten carloads of iron frames, scaffolding, etc.

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

Germans Request Repatriation of von Mackensen and Troops

[Contemporary Translation]

Wako No. 18511

Spa, April 15, 1919.

From the Chairman of the German Armistice Commission

To the Chairman of the P. I. A. C.

We have reliable information that in consequence of the political happenings in Hungary all connection with the staff of the interned Field Marshal General von Mackensen in FUTTAK is suppressed.

The German Government is in greatest anxiety concerning the fate of this worthy commander and of the Germans interned with him.

I request information concerning the following:

- (1) What is known concerning the fate of Field Marshal von Mackensen.
- (2) Whether in view of the confusion and uncertain conditions in Hungary the internment of Field Marshal von Mackensen and the Germans with him may not now be removed and their repatriation to Germany be permitted and begun.

I should be especially grateful for early information.

v. MULLER

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1225: Letter

Naval Questions

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, April 17, 1919.

No. 131

FROM: Chief

TO: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

* * * * *

6. Committee for Clearance for Mines: General Haking has informed the President of the German Armistice Commission that: "An international mine clearance committee has been established in LONDON, but it is not at present intended that Germany should send a representative. Any necessary communication on this subject should be sent through PANAC."

7. Reported Sale of Submarines: General Haking presented a note informing the German that a wireless message had been sent direct to Admiral Guethe on April 8 by the

PANAC informing him in regard to the question of a reported sale of a submarine. The note calls the attention of the Germans to Article 22 of the Armistice and concludes with the statement that the question will not be discussed.

* * * * *

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American, Section.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1225: Letter

Return of Industrial Machinery

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, April 17, 1919.

No. 131

FROM: Chief

TO: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

* * * * *

11. Return of Machines to France and Belgium: The American Representative on the Committee for the Restitution of Machinery in a recent report again refers to the slowness with which this work is progressing. He states that in a conversation with a German representative at FRANKFORT this official claimed that the delay had been largely due to lack of organization but that now this was practically completed and he promises to send identification slips at the rate of about 500 a day, but it is stated that there are approximately 500,000 machines to be identified, but up to the present slips have been furnished the Allied Committee covering only about 10,000 of these.

* * * * *

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1225: Letter

Delivery of Agricultural Implements

No. 131

FROM: Chief

TO: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

1. Delivery of Agricultural Implements: Marshal Foch presented a note to the Germans calling attention to a list, * * * showing the condition of deliveries of agricultural implements up to April 10.

This list shows that while so far as two articles are concerned the deliveries are greater than the quantities expected according to the initial protocol, the deficit on almost all other articles is still very large, so far as the amount to be delivered by March 1 is concerned. Since this deficit consists principally in materiel necessary for the present period of cultivation, I ask you to take steps to see that the shipment of the materiel that is lacking be done immediately. The crisis in the railway transportation cannot justify a new delay as long as the German Government has succeeded in furnishing materiel useful for the harvest season for which it was evident there was no necessity for priority. It cannot be admitted that the German Government may keep for itself materiel necessary for the working of the present season and try to compensate it by materiel which is useful for the summer season.

The two articles referred to as surplus are one steam cultivator and three hundred haymakers.

* * * * *

2. Transfer to the Right Bank of the Rhine of Securities:

Marshal Foch has replied to the repeated requests on the part of the Germans for authority to transfer securities from the left to the right bank of the RHINE, or to BERLIN, stating that:

The question has been studied by the proper Interallied Mission which will make known its answer within a few days. Until a new order is given there can be no change in the regulations forbidding the transfer to the right bank of the RHINE of foreign securities and other securities.

3. Restoration by the Reichsbank of Gold to Depositors:

Marshal Foch has informed the Germans that: There is no reason to authorize the Reichsbank to restore the gold which it is holding to the account of its depositors. The Directorate of the Reichsbank at BERLIN, without consulting us, hastened this restitution by a note which is dated after the Armistice (November 23, 1918). Originally it had not obligated itself to make this restitution until within the twelve months which followed the conclusion of peace.

* * * * *

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

Russian Prisoners; Rumanian Prisoners

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, April 17, 1919.

No. 131

FROM: Chief

TO: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

5. Repatriation of Russian Prisoners of War:

In a personal letter, General Harries has informed me that: The officials of the German War Office and of their transportation departments are still working over plans for the Russian repatriation. Until this afternoon I wondered why a prompt determination was not practicable, but now I know that before any plan is made effective it is to receive the sanction of the Lenin-Trotsky Government. The German Government is therefore, negotiating with the Russian authorities, and until an agreement is reached we do not expect to make much progress.

10. Release of Rumanian Prisoners of War and Interned Civilians: General Harries is the Acting Chairman of the Allied Committee on Repatriation of Prisoners of War and has sent to me a report calling attention of the failure of the Germans to release some Rumanian prisoners of war and interned civilians. Attention is called to the fact that in accordance with Articles 10 and 18 of the Armistice Agreement of November 11, 1918, they should have been released and repatriated as were other Allied prisoners of war in Germany. His report states that all the efforts of the Rumanian Mission in BERLIN to obtain the release of their fellow countrymen have as yet been without results.

I am forwarding this paper to the Chairman of the P. I. A. C., as I consider that this is not a strictly American question, and, therefore, should be taken up by the Chairman of this Commission who represents all of the Allies.

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1225: Letter

British Economic Commission

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,

Spa, Belgium, April 17, 1919.

FROM: Chief

TO: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

* * * * *

14. Authority for British Economic Commission to Enter Germany:

The representative of the German Government has replied to the British note of April 15 as follows:

On behalf of the German Government I have to inform you that the permission for entry to Germany for the British Economic Commission, consisting of two or three officers, is herewith granted for the purpose named in the note. Minister Erzberger would be grateful if the gentlemen would call upon him before they return.

* * * * *

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section, P.I.A.C.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1225: Note

Food Supply for Czechoslovakia and Germany

[Contemporary Translation]

No. A. W. 550

Spa, April 17, 1919.

From: The representative of the German Government

To: The Chairman of the P. I. A. C.

In behalf of the German Government I have the following statement to make:

The Steamer *Samaranda*, which arrived recently from America loaded with flour and bacon, was transferred to the Czechoslovak State during the time it was being unloaded in Germany. Quantities of foodstuffs that were already unloaded had to be transferred. The Steamer *Samaranda* is the fourth steamer which has arrived in HAMBURG with foodstuffs for the Czechoslovak State and to be transported through Germany. As yet only two steamers have been unloaded for Germany while a third arrived in BREMEN on April 11.

It is urgently requested that representation be made to Mr. Hoover to revoke the re-transport of the provisions of the Steamer *Samaranda*, and to call his attention to the fact that the secure execution of transportation of foodstuffs for the Czechoslovak State will be endangered if greater amounts of supplies do not reach Germany than has already arrived and if much greater quantities of necessary foodstuffs, especially bacon and fat, are not allotted to the German population.

The present food situation and the present attitude of the German populace demand a more just distribution in comparison with the amounts delivered to the Czechoslovak State.

as otherwise responsibility for the undisturbed execution of the transportation cannot be maintained. Germany has already provided steamers to the amount of 1,200,000 tons carrying capacity and has, therefore, showed far-reaching desire to fulfill Germany's obligations.

It is, therefore, with justice that the German population demands rapid and comprehensive shipments of foodstuffs, and not to be made subservient to the amounts delivered to the Czechoslovaks.

v. OW-WACHENDORF.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1225: Note

Policy Regarding German Communications

[Contemporary Translation]

Spa, April 17, 1919.

CIPA 750-T

From: The Chairman of the P. I. A. C.

To: The Chairman of Wako

Dr. Melchior, Chairman of the German Financial Commission, has made a request for the establishment of a direct telegraphic line between BERLIN and the Chateau de VILLETTE for the transmission of telegrams for the German Financial Commission.

The Marshal, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies, has given the following answer to M. Lasteyrie, who is in charge of the question:

In answer to your communication, I have the honor to notify you that I am disposed to satisfy as far as possible the desire of the German Commission; however, the destruction of the telegraph and telephone system in France and Belgian territory evacuated by the German troops makes the establishment of the requested line exceedingly difficult. The most practical means of establishing the telegraphic communication desired seems to be to organize a telegraphic connection direct between the Chateau de VILLETTE and the German Central in the Hotel Britannique at SPA; it would then be the work of the Germans to use the wires that they already control between SPA and BERLIN for transmitting telegrams coming from or destined for the Chateau de VILLETTE.

Therefore, I give necessary instructions to the proper authorities for the prompt carrying out of this communication which, for the reasons spoken of above, will require nevertheless a few days' delay.

The Chief of the French telegraph service at SPA will be instructed accordingly.

FOURNIER.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1225: Note

German Communicatians for Peace Negotiations

[Contemporary Translation]

Spa, April 17 1919.

From the Representative of the German Government

To the Chairman of the P. I. A. C.

In connection with our note of the 17th of this month, No. A. A. I. 2340 and today's negotiations in the Subcommittee for Telegraph and Telephones, I have the honor to hand over in the attached Annex a statement in which are expressed the German desires for telegraph and telephone lines to be made ready for the Peace Conference negotiations.

I would be grateful if the statement could be transmitted as rapidly as possible to the proper authorities for their study.

WACHENDORF.

Annex to Note A. A. I. No. 2366

It is considered that the following installations of telegraph and telephone lines are essential for the German Peace Representatives at the place of negotiations in France:

1. Three telephone lines to BERLIN, SPA, and WEIMAR.
2. Three telegraph lines to the same places.
3. Installation of a telegraph and telephone central in the quarters assigned to the German Peace Commission.

* * * * *

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1225: Note

German Delegates Invited to Versailles

[Contemporary Translation]

CIPA 919/G

Spa, April 18, 1919.

FROM: General Nudant

TO: General von Hammerstein

The President of the Council, Minister of War, telegraphs as follows, April 18, 1919:

Please have transmitted to the German Government the following communication:

1. The Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers has decided to invite the German delegates furnished with full power to present themselves at VERSAILLES April 25, in the evening in order to receive there the text of the Preliminaries of Peace agreed on by the Allied and Associated Powers.
2. The German Government is requested consequently to indicate immediately the number, name and the status of the delegates that it proposes to send to VERSAILLES, as well as the number, the name and the status of the persons who accompany them. The German delegation should remain strictly limited in its character and should include only persons qualified for their special mission.

Threatened Strike

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, April 18, 1919.

No. 132

FROM: Chief

TO: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

* * * * *

9. Threatened Strike in Lighting and Power Plant at Hohn: A telegram was received from G. H. Q. repeating one from the Third Army in which the Commanding General recites the danger of a strike in the heating and power plant at HOHN and the consequent shutting off of all light and power from COBLENZ, as the city and suburbs depend upon this plant for these facilities.

Instructions from G. H. Q. directed me to take up this matter with the Germans, and accordingly I immediately sent the following letter to them:

I am in receipt of notice from our G. H. Q. that there is grave danger of a strike at the central electric plant located at HOHN, a short distance from COBLENZ. This plant is in unoccupied territory and is, therefore, at present, entirely under German control. It furnishes the light and power for the city of COBLENZ, in which is located the Headquarters of the American Third Army.

You will appreciate the gravity of the situation of our Third Army knowing that if this strike occurs the city of COBLENZ and its suburbs will be without light and power.

I hasten to bring this matter to your attention and to urge that the German Government take all steps necessary to prevent the threatened strike. I will appreciate very much your taking prompt steps to meet this situation and request that you inform me at the earliest moment possible what action has been taken and the result secured.

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section.

Occupation of Griesheim

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,

Spa, Belgium, April 19, 1919.

FROM: Chief

TO: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

7. Occupation of Griesheim: Yesterday General Nudant informed the Germans that the French troops in the MAYENCE bridgehead expected to occupy the town of GRIESHEIM.

Replying to this, General von Hammerstein submitted the following note:

On behalf of the German Government, I protest against the occupation of the town of GRIESHEIM for the following reasons:

1. The administration of GRIESHEIM by the German authorities has at present led to no friction whatever. Any alteration of the condition at present would only disturb things, like the food supply which comes from FRANKFORT. FRANKFORT and GRIESHEIM are more or less one town, they are only divided by a few houses.

2. There is no Bolshevism in GRIESHEIM. The workmen there are quiet and the workmen's council is moderate. Occupation of the town would not, therefore, help to combat Bolshevism. On the contrary, the occupation of a further German town by the Allies without any apparent right would have a great irritating effect in Germany and would strengthen the Bolshevistic element there.

3. The authorities of the biggest works at GRIESHEIM, which employs over a thousand workmen, have their headquarters at FRANKFORT. The working of this factory would be greatly hindered by the occupation of GRIESHEIM.

4. Further difficulties and serious damage would also occur, as half the population of GRIESHEIM works in FRANKFORT, whereas many people from FRANKFORT work in GRIESHEIM.

5. There is a shortage of houses at GRIESHEIM and troops could only be billeted there if measures which would be very severe to the inhabitants were carried out.

6. In connection with a series of notes, the last one on the first of April, No. 16493, we pointed out our standpoint which stated that the moving of the boundary of the occupied territory was not admissible without mutual consent. The thirty-kilometer boundary was only approximate and an agreement on this subject was reached sometime ago. It was to be decided on the spot locally to what extent the occupation was actually to take place. This was done in December 1918. Now if the principle is being maintained that the occupying power has the right to depart from the agreement taken at that time without reference to the other, there can only arise general uncertainty as to what is right and wrong. The German Government, therefore, considers that the occupation of GRIESHEIM contemplated by the Allied Armies is not justified and that the reasons shown in Note 860/G not only are not applicable, but also militate against the occupation itself. The German Government, there, requests that the contemplated measure may not be put into execution.

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

Maintenance of the British and American Armies

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, April 19, 1919.

No. 133

FROM: Chief

TO: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

1. Money for the British and American Armies for May:

General Nudant presented a note to the Germans informing them that the Commander-in-Chief, Marshal Foch, calls upon them for the sums of money for the month of May, as follows:

For the British Army	25,000,000 marks
For the American Army	100,000,000 marks

The Marshal's instructions were to see that the necessary measures were taken so the payment would be made to the British Army at the Reichsbank at COLOGNE on May 1. For the American Army, at the Reichsbank at COBLENZ, 75,000,000 marks between May 1 and 7, and 25,000,000 marks on May 15. The Marshal's instructions also direct that the Germans arrange to place 5,000,000 marks at the disposal of the British on April 26.

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1225: Note

German Delegates to Receive Peace Preliminaries

[Contemporary Translation]

A. A. I. No. 2393

Spa, April 19, 1919.

From Representative of German Government, Secretary of the Legation, Baron von Ow-Wachendorf

To the Chairman of the P. I. A. C., General Nudant

In behalf of the Government Minister, Count Brockdorff-Rantzau, I request that the following communication be transmitted to the Allied and Associated Powers:

The German Government has received the communication of the French President of the Ministry and of the Minister of War of April 18. The German Government will send to VERSAILLES for the evening of April 25, Representative von Haniel, Privy Councillor of the Legation von Keller and the actual Councillor of the Legation, Ernst Schmitt.

The representatives are provided with the necessary plenary powers to receive the text of the Peace Preliminaries, which they will carry back at once to the German Government. They will be accompanied by two office employees, Court Councillor Walter Reinke and Assemblyman Alred Luders, as well as by two secretaries, Mr. Julius Schmidt and Mr. Niedek.

von OW-WACHENDORF.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1225: Letter

Germans Left in Riga

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, April 19, 1919.

No. 133

FROM: Chief

TO: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

* * * * *

6. Request for Transfer of Germans Left in Riga:
The Germans presented the following:

In my Note 10192 of February 15 [13?], for authorization for the Steamer *Ostsee* to fetch the Germans who had been left behind at RIGA. This request was repeated on March 12, and it was added that the Germans had no objection to Norwegian subjects in RIGA being fetched at the same time, if this free passage was accorded. No answer has as yet been received to either of these notes. There are several thousand Germans concerned and according to the latest information received here they are being deliberately starved to death by the Bolsheviks. It is not known how many Norwegian subjects are there or whether they are suffering the same fate. In the interest of humanity, it is therefore urgently requested that authorization be given for the passage of this steamer.

* * * * *

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1225: Note

Allied Economic Control to be Maintained

[Contemporary Translation]

FROM: General Nudant

TO: Chairman of Wako

The Marshal, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies, writes as follows on April 16, No. 77/ATRT.

1. The BRUSSELS Agreement concerns only the food supply for Germany through the assistance of the Allies. There can be no question of the German Government pretence of eliminating of Allied control over the occupied territories under the pretext of payment of foodstuffs.

2. We are at the present time in a state of war. The German authorities in the occupied territories are and still remain under the control of the Allied authorities, the latter must see to it that the means of payment of reparation be not destroyed.

3. The German Government for all such special questions relating to occupied territories and especially for those which are mentioned in the note of April 10 (distribution of coal and raw materials, exports and imports, transfer of securities) must enter into relations with the already formed proper Interallied authorities; the LUXEMBURG Committee, the COLOGNE Coal Committee, the MAYENCE Finance Committee.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1225: Letter

Requirements of Mining Materials; Exports

No. 133

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, April 19, 1919.

FROM: Chief

TO: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

2. Supply of Coal Under the Brussels Agreement:

General Haking presented a note to the Germans informing them, as follows:

1. The Allied Governments note the requirements for mining materials of the German Government and are prepared in principle to permit the importation of those goods.

2. In order, so far as possible to make arrangements for actual purchases, it is necessary that the German Government should supply full commercial specifications of the description, etc., of each of the articles enumerated by them and that they should indicate what proposals they make for financing such purchases and with regard to the source of supply.

3. In view of the apparent difficulty of providing sufficient finance for immediate shipment of foodstuffs, the German Government will no doubt desire so far as practicable to procure these materials on credit from neutral countries.

4. With regard to the large quantity of petroleum required, 30,000 tons, the Allied Governments desire to be informed of the uses to which the petroleum is to be put and of its precise importance from the point of view of increasing coal production.

It is understood that this decision has been rendered by the PANAC and as the head of that Commission is a British admiral, the decisions rendered by it are transmitted through General Haking, head of the British Section of the Armistice Commission.

3. Germany Permitted to Export Certain Goods: General Haking presented another note stating that he was directed to inform the German Government that they are permitted to export to Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Holland, and Finland all articles which are not on the prohibited list contained in Note C. I. P. A., No. 766/G, dated March 25, 1919.

The question of export of articles on prohibited list over which Allies have preemption rights is still being discussed. The German Government can import foodstuffs and other articles which by Allied Agreement with Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Holland, and Finland, they are specially permitted to import.

The I. A. T. C. in the northern neutral countries are empowered to license such articles for export to Germany and the German Government can ascertain all details by applying to those bodies. Traffic to and from Germany may be carried out in neutral vessels, which must carry an I. A. T. C. license, or in German vessels under 1,600 tons gross who must carry an I. A. T. C. license on the inward voyage to Germany.

As regards coastal voyages on German coast line, Germans may employ ships under 1,000 tons gross in this trade, but vessels carrying coastal cargoes or cargoes consisting in part of goods for coastal distribution will not be permitted to touch at neutral ports. The Germans are required to furnish A. N. A. C. with list of vessels they propose to employ on (a) Coastal trade, (b) Trade to neutrals.

If it is intended to use a vessel on both trades her name should appear on both lists. It is not intended that permission should be asked for each individual voyage.

As regards German vessels between 1,600 and 2,500 tons gross, such vessels are not permitted to sail at present until the completion of discussion now going forward as to whether or not they are to be handed over to the Allies.

* * * * *

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM.
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1225: Note

Delivery of Rolling Stock

[Contemporary Translation]

From the Chairman of the German Armistice Commission

To the Chairman of the P. I. A. C.

At the conclusion of the Armistice Agreement, the railways in the entire far reaches of the German Empire stood at the disposition of the German Government. The 5,000 locomotives and 150,000 cars that were to be delivered to the Allies were, therefore, distributed equally to all districts. In the meantime very large areas in the east of Germany inclusive of the railway exploitation material therein located were withdrawn from the control of the German Government by the action of the Poles, whereby also the delivery of the locomotives and cars destined for the Allies from these areas was rendered impossible. There are concerned in this matter 90 locomotives, 230 passenger cars, 89 baggage cars, and 2,050 freight cars. However, the actual state of affairs that has been brought about by the action of the Poles does not change at all the fact that the areas that are here in question must still do their part just the same as the rest of the Government areas to fulfill the obligations laid upon Germany by the Armistice Agreement. In the interest of a speedy accomplishment of these obligations, it is therefore requested to cause the Poles to transfer the above mentioned railroad rolling stock to the German Government for the purpose of delivering it to the Allies, or else that they declare themselves in agreement with the solution that this rolling stock should be reckoned to the account of Germany in the financial settlement of the amount delivered.

For the purpose of transporting foodstuffs from the port of DANZIG to the Poles as requested by the Allies, approximately 1,200 freight cars will be required. These cars also must, at least for the present, be counted off of the total number.

A request tending to this same purpose was transmitted in the Note AA 721 of February 1, 1919, and remained unanswered by the Allies.

von MULLER.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1225: Note

German Protest of Seizure of Vessels in the Baltic

[Contemporary Translation]

Wako No. 19167 Mar.

Spa, April 20, 1919.

From the Chairman of the German Armistice Commission

To the Chairman of P. I. A. C.

1. I protest in principle against the exercise of the right of seizure by Allied Naval Forces in the Baltic. This has hindered and partly paralyzed German navigation in the Baltic. The capture of German ships in the Baltic is an aggravation of the blockade as opposed to the conditions of the Armistice of November 11, 1918 and thus contrary to Article XXVI of the Armistice which provides that the blockade is to be maintained under the actual existing conditions

2. Until now protest has only been made against the seizure of ships within German Imperial waters or when ships captured have returned into German waters. The fact that no protest has been raised in other cases, in fact quite to the contrary that request has been made in individual cases for the most necessary transports, although the German Government has been convinced of the injustice of the conception of the Allies, so based upon the fact that on account of the *force majeure* we were obliged to bow before the use of force in the practices of the Allies inasmuch as the Armistice had prevented us of the possibility of giving expression to our right. On the other hand, the necessities of exacting the demobilization and the Armistice force us to maintain in the desired extent the required transportation of troops of prisoners of war and evacuation of material.

3. Most emphatic protest is raised against the seizure of the following ships:

- | | | |
|----|----------|----------|
| a. | Steamer | Elbe |
| b. | " | Italia |
| c. | Schooner | Meta |
| d. | Steamer | Vesta |
| e. | " | Wotan |
| f. | " | Berger I |
| g. | " | Merkur |
| h. | " | Pluto |

v. MUELLER.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1225: Letter

Repatriation of Rumanian Prisoners

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, April 21, 1919.

No. 134

FROM: Chief

TO: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

5. Return of Rumanian Prisoners of War:

Referring to Paragraph 10 of my Secret Report 131, General Nudant this morning presented a note to the Chairman of the German Armistice Commission informing him that:

General Barnum, President of the American Armistice Commission, has transmitted to me a report from General Harries, from which it is seen that the German Government refuses to deliver Rumanian prisoners of war and civilians interned in German prisons in consequence of legal sentences or awaiting trial.

This refusal constitutes a flagrant violation of the Armistice Convention of November 11, 1918 (Article X and XVIII).

Under this agreement I request:

1. The immediate liberation of the Rumanian Nationals mentioned above.

2. That they be collected in the camps of NEUHAMMER and RATISBON [Regensburg] with a view to repatriation.

3. A declaration of the German Government that satisfaction will be given to the above requests.

* * * * *

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1225: Note

German Plan for Repatriation of Russians

[Contemporary Translation]

Wako

Subcommittee, P. of W.

No. 2083. 4. 19 U. Wako. 19197

Spa, Belgium, April 21, 1919.

From the President of the German Armistice Commission

To the President of the P. I. A. C.

Answer to Note of April 12, 1919, No. 786 P. G. 2.

In the question of repatriation of Russian prisoners of war in Germany the following was addressed by the Prussian Ministry of War to the Interallied Commission in BERLIN:

The German Government is prepared to repatriate the Russian prisoners of war as follows:

1. Men from Baltic Provinces and from Esthonia and Latvia who live east of the German front, by means of coastal steamers and of steamers that are left as an exception from List 4 of the BRUSSELS Agreement, from German Baltic ports to REVAL or to the Island of OSEL.

The necessary condition is the freedom of shipping in the Baltic and the consent of the Esthonian Government for the searching of the waters for mines and for the embarkation and debarkation of the prisoners of war.

2. Great Russians as far as:

- (a) KOSCHEDARI, east of VILNA
- (b) ILLOWO
- (c) ALEXANDROW

Remarks concerning route (a). The German High Command is of the opinion that with the continued repatriation a notification of the Russian Government concerning the number and strength of the troops and concerning the places where transfers are to be made is not to be avoided. For the beginning this might remain in the hands of the northern headquarters.

Remarks concerning (b) and (c). For transports destined for ILLOWO and ALEXANDROW the consent of the Polish Government should be secured through the Interallied Commission, to take over the prisoners.

3. The Ukrainians as far as the German frontier at PASSAUR or BODENBACH or ODERBERG.

4. About three trains daily with a total of 3,000 prisoners of war can be expedited. The first train via VILNA can leave this week. More exact information will follow.

5. In view of the very limited capacity of German railroads and of necessity of accelerating the repatriation on account of the political condition in Germany, the repatriation by sea is especially recommended. Prerequisite to this end is the furnishing of the necessary tonnage by the Allied and Associated Governments.

Ports of embarkation would be HAMBURG, BREMERHAVEN and STETTIN (Georgians).

For Great Russians to ARCHANGEL,

For South Russians (Trans-Caucasians, Cossacks,

Georgians, Turkestanese (sic,) to the Baltic Sea,

For Siberians to VLADIVOSTOK.

It is proposed with Japanese tonnage to bring German prisoners from Siberia and to meet the Siberians being transported from Germany halfway, and to exchange loads since otherwise it would no longer be possible this year to complete the repatriation considering the great number of prisoners.

Bolshevistic agitators are to be sent with the first transports. The necessary preparations have already been made to this end.

Next, such camps will be given preference as on account of the vicinity of Spartacist disturbance centers from a political meance.

For the rest, the camps are to be treated alike in evacuation. Elderly people, fathers of families and men of good behavior are to be favored. The number to be transported at various times is to be determined by the Ministry of War.

The selection of those within the camp is a matter of the Interallied Committee in cooperation with the camp officials. The route to be taken is determined by the place where the prisoner lives.

Collection camps that will be necessary to be formed will be announced later.

The repatriation is a voluntary one except insofar as it concerns people who are working hand in glove with the German Spartacists and who for this reason forego repatriation.

The prisoners who remain in Germany of their own accord will be collected in special camps.

The Russian officers will be repatriated separately from the men.

For the clearing of all other questions connected with the repatriation of these prisoners, the subsection (U 7) of the Quartering Department will enter into direct relations with the Interallied Commission.

SCHLESINGER
von FRANSECKY.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1225: Letter

Village Elections in Neutral Zone

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, April 21, 1919.

No. 134

FROM: Chief

TO: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

* * * * *

4. Village Elections in the Neutral Zone: The Marshal, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies, has decided that the village elections in the Neutral Zone may take place, but it is understood that they must cause no manifestation or assembly nor bring about any troubles nor cause the German authorities to put in a request for reinforcement of the troops of occupation in the Neutral Zone. Such a reinforcement, under these circumstances, could not be granted.

* * * * *

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1225: Note

Repatriation of German Prisoners

[Contemporary Translation]

No. 1825-4. 19.U.-Wako 19200

Spa, April 21, 1919.

From the President of the German Armistice Commission

To the President of the Interallied Armistice Commission

In behalf of the German Government I have the following statements to make:

The preparation for a smooth running repatriation of German prisoners of war and for their absorption into the German economic life must, in the interest of the maintenance of internal order as well in unoccupied Germany as in the part of Germany for the present occupied by Allied troops, be entered upon at this time.

A number of important questions on this subject are in need of immediate solution. The routes to be used, the places of transfer on the RHINE and in the sea ports, the separation of prisoners living on the left bank of the RHINE and the camps for their sanitary isolation and regular discharge, the coordination of the German commissions for the reception of prisoners of war with the Allied High Command and with the staffs of the occupying Armies, all of these are points concerning which a fundamental understanding is immediately necessary, since otherwise in view of the unsettled inner condition of Germany the necessary preparations cannot be completed at the proper time.

Of especial importance, also, would be a separation of the prisoners according to their condition of health and strength to their age, to the number of their children, to the length of imprisonment and also according to certain occupations. For example, this would permit of miners being repatriated first, since only in this way can the forwarding of coal and consequently the exportation thereof for Allies and neutrals be accelerated.

Without wishing to prejudice in any way the fundamental decisions concerning repatriation of prisoners of war, I request that the consent of the Allied High Command be secured for the subcommittees on prisoners of war to begin discussions immediately, which committees will clear up the questions above mentioned and can only be of use to both sides. The participation of officers from the staffs of the occupying Armies is to be

recommended since they are familiar with local conditions and could give valuable suggestions. One of the Army headquarters on the RHINE might be selected for this discussion as for example, was done in December 1918. I should be grateful for an early answer.

ERZBERGER.
German Minister.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1225: Letter

Requisitioning of Foreign Securities

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, April 21, 1919.

No. 134

FROM: Chief

TO: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

* * * * *

6. Requisitioning of Foreign Securities on the Left Bank of the Rhine:
Marshal Foch telegraphed to the Chairman of the P. I. A. C. on April 19, that:

The interpretation which the German Government means to give to the BRUSSELS arrangements cannot be admitted. The order of March 26, 1919, regarding the requisitioning of foreign securities will be made applicable on the left bank of the RHINE with the following reservations:

1. These securities will be centralized under the control of the Allied military authorities in the German banks on the left bank of the RHINE.
2. They will be used under the same control for the payment of food supply for the left bank and eventually for any other purpose, which the Allies may decide; this procedure is perfectly in conformance with the stipulations of the BRUSSELS Agreement. It is desired by the populations that are concerned who because of the internal situation in Germany are opposed to sending their securities outside of the occupied zone.

* * * * *

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1225: Letter

Discussion on Alleged Violations of Armistice by Poles

No. 134

FROM: Chief

TO: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

* * * * *

8. Disregard of the Armistice by the Poles:

Colonel von Mueller, Acting Chairman of the German Armistice Commission, presented the following note:

1. In continuation of my Note of April 18, No. 18761, I have the following information to impart: On April 16 the city of NAKEL was again bombarded by Polish artillery and a postal official was killed, an engine driver and a fireman wounded. The engine driving personnel has in view of this refused to run the BROMBERG-SCHNEIDEMUHL line. The BROMBERG-SCHNEIDEMUHL line is one of the greatest importance for the supply of the German eastern front, and if this is crippled it is doubtful whether the German eastern front can be sufficiently supplied.

2. Report has been received from the German Polish front that on April 18, in addition to similar attacks, the village of [?], northeast of LABISCHIN, was attacked by two companies of the 4th Polish Artillery Battalion. The Polish attack was repulsed by the German outposts. Thirteen prisoners and one machine gun were captured by the Germans. According to statements of the prisoners, the Polish General made a speech to the Polish troops stating that attacks were to be recommenced from that date. From the increased activity shown by the Polish troops it must be concluded that the statements of the prisoners regarding the above mentioned speech are true. This goes to show that the Polish Government is without scruples disregarding the measures laid down by the Supreme Allied War Council for an Armistice. In spite of my numerous notes on this subject addressed to the President of the International Armistice Commission at SPA, no alteration in the attitude of the Polish troops has yet been made. I, therefore, again raise a most emphatic protest against the attitude of the Polish Government which daily commits breaches of the Armistice Agreement, and I request General Nudant to use his personal influence to restore order and quiet on the front. According to later notice, NAKEL was again bombarded by Polish artillery on April 18.

To this, General Nudant made the following reply:

Since yesterday I have been busy with this question. I have requested General Dupont to do everything possible to put an end to these warlike manifestations on the frontier line. There are two bells ringing announcing this news, - one on the side of the Poles and one on the side of the Germans. The truth lies just between. It is regrettable that apparently on neither side can tranquility reign. As far as I am concerned, I am disposed to do all that I can possibly do to stop these manifestations, but I should like to add that if the negotiations which recently took place between the Ambassador from France, Mr. Noullens, and the German Ambassador had been successful, the thing would have been very much simplified, but insofar as the negotiations concerning DANZIG were concerned the German representative broke off the negotiations.

Therefore, the measures that might have been taken to bring peace into this region could not be taken and especially the question of hostages. I believe that peace will come again into this region when these questions, which are capable of solution, are solved.

The remarks on this subject were closed by the following from Colonel von Mueller:

I should like to make an answer to General Nudant's statement. The Poles have disregarded the Armistice for the whole period and have irritated the troops opposite them to the greatest possible extent. It is quite possible that excesses have been committed by the German troops in isolated cases, but the great majority of these excesses have been committed by the Poles, and this is shown in a startling way by the continual bombardment of NAKEL. The negotiations and the rupture of the negotiations appear to us in quite a different light in view of the claims made by the Poles. I do not wish to discuss this point any further, but I think that as regards the military side of the question, it would be easy for General Dupont to convince himself that we are right, and I again request that everything may be done to prevent these Polish excesses and thus prevent the German troops and civilian population being irritated to the extent of bloodshed.

9. Treatment of German Prisoners of War by the Poles:

Colonel von Mueller read the following note on this subject:

I have received communications that the German prisoners of war at the Polish prison camps at GRESEN [not identified] have been compelled to crawl across the parade grounds on hands and knees by blows from rifles and butts of bayonets. This treatment of prisoners of war shows such a disregard of all principles of humanity that I again refer to my notes of April 12, April 9, and March 14, and urgently request the Armistice Commission to intercede in order to obtain humane treatment for German prisoners of war in the hands of the Poles.

* * * * *

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1225: Letter

Qualifications of German Delegates to Versailles

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, April 21, 1919.

No. 134

FROM: Chief

TO: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

* * * * *

7. Envoys Authorized to Receive Peace Terms:

The Chairman of the P. I. A. C. received a telegram from the President of the Council and Minister of War instructing him to transmit the response of the Allied and Associated Governments to the German note in regard to the delegates which they were to send to VERSAILLES on April 25. These instructions were that:

The Allied and Associated Governments cannot receive envoys who are authorized simply to receive the text of the Articles of Peace as the German Government proposes. The Allied and Associated Governments are under the obligation to require of the German Government that it send to VERSAILLES plenipotentiaries as completely authorized to treat fully of the question of peace as are the representatives of the Allied and Associated Governments.

Upon receipt of this note from General Nudant yesterday afternoon it was immediately telegraphed to G. H. Q.

* * * * *

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1225: Letter

German Delegates

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, April 22, 1919.

No. 135

FROM: Chief

TO: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

* * * * *

2. German Delegates for the VERSAILLES Conference:

Last evening the following note was received from the Germans through the Chairman of the P. I. A. C.:

No. AAI-2425. On behalf of the Imperial Minister, Count Brockdorff-Rantzau I request the transmittal of the following communication to the Allied and Associated Governments:

Since the French Minister President---Minister of War has sent to the German Government the demand of the Allied and Associated Governments to provide the German delegates with as complete powers for negotiating concerning the sum total of Peace questions as are possessed by the representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers, the German Government has with the assumption that negotiations concerning their content are proposed upon the transmittal of the draft of the preliminaries designated the following persons as delegates provided with corresponding plenary powers:

Imperial Minister for Foreign Affairs Dr. Count Brockdorff-Rantzau, Imperial Minister of Justice Dr. Landsberg; Imperial Minister of Posts Giesberts, President of the Prussian Assembly Leinert; Dr. Karl Melchior, Professor Dr. Schucking. As attendants of these delegates, other persons are held in view, whose names and status the German Government will make known as soon as possible in a second telegram. The German Government is prepared to send the above mentioned persons to VERSAILLES as soon as it shall be assured that the delegates during their stay there will be guaranteed freedom of movement as well as the free use of the telegraph and telephone for communication with the German Government. It reserves the right to name later special technical persons for individual peace questions. The departure of these delegates and their attendants will likely be delayed for some days.

This was telegraphed to G. H. Q., but as in the case of similar notes is included in this report for the purpose of keeping the records of this mission complete.

* * * * *

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1225: Letter

Equivalents in the Return of Industrial Machinery

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, April 22, 1919.

No. 135

FROM: Chief

TO: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

* * * * *

8. Report from Representative on Committee for the Restitution of Machinery to France and Belgium: Our representative on this Committee, under date of April 17, makes report that the question of equivalents has again come up, this time for zinc.

The German Commission at FRANKFORT offer to return a quantity of zinc taken from a Belgian factory (VIEILLE-MONTAGNE). As this represented but a part of the zinc removed, they offer to make up the difference with an equivalent amount. In this the French insist on having a share. The French representative states that he is going ahead completing his estimates on the amount taken from France in the hope that the principle of equivalents will in the meantime be given a solution.

The new law requiring declaration of Allied machines to be made by April 20 has been published throughout Germany, including the occupied zone. A delicate question comes up in regard to the application of this law to ALSACE-LORRAINE. The question is: Will the German law be enforced there?

A representative has been sent there to fix up a solution of this question. The outcome will probably be a French Ministerial Decree containing an equivalent of the German text.

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1226: Letter

Return of Industrial Machinery

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Brussels, April 22, 1919.

From: American Representative, S. I. R.

To: Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

1. The Chief of the Belgian Mission, S. I. R., states that opinion in Belgium is much reassured by the steady arrivals now of machinery. He estimates that in the near future, 10 days, there will be on an average of 3 trains of 50 tons each per day of Belgian machinery entering Belgium. This will be the normal rate of reshipment of machinery. To date, however, no shipments of machinery from unoccupied Germany have actually entered Belgium.

All have been made from the occupied areas. In the immediate future, however, shipments will be largely from the unoccupied areas owing to difficulties raised by the authorities of occupation.

2. The Belgian Assistant Director is fairly optimistic about the possibilities of transportation. He does not think that this will be a serious problem and result in long delay. He therefore is opposed to hasty shipments of machinery; especially before classification as to specific destination. The method of packing is to group by car the machinery belonging to each manufacture.

3. He showed me the Table of Organization of the Belgian Service. It comprises a larger personnel than was originally intended. It has an identification service, a technical inspection, a transportation service, a travel bureau, etc. Each section has well-defined functions. The French Service is organized rather by individuals. They have made a less complete separation of the different sections giving more attention to the personal capacities of the various subheads.

There is growing friction between the French and Belgian Services, which on a number of occasions has retarded shipments and led to confusion. The Belgians complain that the French are attempting to get the entire service into their hands, while the French replied that the Belgians are not living up to the agreement concluded in BRUSSELS in March with the Minister of Economic Affairs, that all correspondence with the Germans pass through a central control and in the name of the S. I. R., rather than that of their respective mission. The chief subject of discord at present is the organization by the Belgians of an office in COLOGNE which functions apart from the Economic Committee there, through which the S. I. R. should operate in the occupied areas.

It looks as though the French and Belgians must have a knock-out before the service functions smoothly.

In this particular, it must be noted that there is considerable friction between the French and Belgian services. Here in BRUSSELS, for example, in the services concerned with the return of railroad equipment there is the same difficulty about reaching an accord. There is a quantity of materiel removed from France by the Germans which the Belgians are unwilling to account for. The French go further and say that the Belgians sold a quantity of machinery left by the Germans which beyond doubt was from France. It is regrettable that the French and Belgians, who have everything to gain by working together during the period of reconstruction, did not throw over their old administrative machinery and work together.

The same failure to work together is conspicuous in Belgian industry. The French offered to make a large contract for glass in Belgium, supplying the raw materials. The Belgian Minister of Labor, in accord with the Labor Unions, is supposed to have blocked this.

SANFORD GRIFFITH,
Captain, C. of I.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1226: Letter

Formation of Allied Commission of Reconstitution

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Brussels, April 22, 1919.

From: American Representative, S. I. R.

To: Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

1. Mr. Lefebvre writes me, April 19, that Marshal Foch, by an order of April 7, provides for the formation of an interallied commission of reconstitution (recuperation).

Extracts from the letter which defines this new Commission:

(1) It should be an interallied organization establishing a liaison and coordination between the different commissions and services concerned with reconstitution.

(2) It should study the numerous questions of daily application of accords concluded with the Germans, or measures taken by the French and Belgians.

(3) The French and Belgians should settle in a broad, mutual spirit and confidence, and after study and discussion, the difficulties arising from applications in principle. Where exchanges or equivalents are necessary, with or without the intervention of the Germans, they should be carried out without threatening even indirectly the legitimate interests of our Allies, the Americans and British.

(4) Uniform methods of work in the different services concerned in reconstitution.

(5) A united front should be presented to the Germans in the Services of Reconstitution.

2. A general interallied commission of reconstitution would comprise French, Belgian, British, and American delegates. The French Ministry of Reconstruction, the French and Belgian Sections on the Interallied Economic Commission of Luxemburg, the French and

Belgian Sections S. I. R., WIESBADEN, and the British and American Sections, P. I. A. C., would be represented. * * *

The Franco-Belgian Committee is one sitting here in BRUSSELS dealing with questions of booty of war, more especially in relations with the British.

The French Service of Reconstitution is dependent on the French Ministry of Reconstruction, PARIS.

The Economic Committee, Luxemburg, is that which is dependent on the Interallied Commission for the Rhineland and which handles all economic questions in the occupied areas.

(A) A general secretariat would be organized in BRUSSELS. The Commission would meet once each month, or more often if convoked by the President. The Secretary's office would have the following functions:

- (1) to maintain liaison
- (2) to study questions to be submitted to the Commission
- (3) to execute the decisions of the Commission
- (4) to register and notify its decisions
- (5) to supervise their execution
- (6) in emergencies, to secure the opinion and decision of the President.

Copies of this letter have been sent to the other persons it concerns.

3. I take note of your approval of my serving on this new commission, and repeat that the principal object of my present visit to BRUSSELS is to come into contact with the French and Belgians engaged in this work, to get the opinion of the British delegate, and to form some estimate of the scope and probable duration of the new commission. M. Lefebvre is not yet quite clear as to how this new commission will be affected by the preliminaries of peace, which may possibly reduce the scope of Marshal Foch's authority. He has received assurance, however, that the commission can be formed and function.

M. Lefebvre tells me that he has received word that practically all the French and Belgians designated to serve on the commission have accepted. Mr. Jeffes is inclined to serve on the same commission, and is really reserving his answer until he is officially accredited.

The first meeting of the General Interallied Commission will take place within 10 days.

SANFORD GRIFFITH,
Captain, C. of I.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1225: Letter

Delivery of Rolling Stock

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, April 22, 1919.

No. 135

FROM: Chief

TO: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

* * * * *

7. Further Deliveries of Cars by the Germans:

For the last two or three weeks there have been practically no deliveries of rolling stock by the Germans. As was stated in a previous report of mine, the Committee desired to check up on receipts to date. Our representative on this Committee reports that the Allies on April 19, made formal demand on the Germans to resume at once the suspended deliveries, and made special request for the following cars:

1,500 passenger cars
400 baggage cars
2,000 flat cars
250 tank cars

* * * * *

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1226: Letter

Return of Industrial Machinery

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Brussels, April 22, 1919.

From: American Representative, S. I. R.

To: Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

[Extract]

1. I had a long talk with Mr. Jeffes, who is suggested as the British delegate on the new Commission. He handles the claims for the British Foreign Office and has considerable private legal practice here. He is ready to serve on the new commission as soon as he receives the proper authority from his government.

* * * * *

4. The BRUSSELS Branch of the S. I. R. has received a large increase in French personnel from WIESBADEN. Owing to want of proper direction here, the restitution from Belgium is considerably delayed. As yet, the French have no very definite ideas as to quantity and location of their machinery in Belgium. They find that the Belgians themselves sold a certain amount of it after the Armistice, as did the British Army of a part regarded as booty of war. Accords have, however, been concluded with the Belgians, on the one hand, and with the British Army on the other, which provide for restitution after identification.

5. In regard to private property (furniture and household articles, etc.), M. Lefebvre has not yet taken over the service. There have been French and Belgian committees working on the matter, but without centralization of the data gathered.

6. The Commission for Restitution of Cattle is practically organized--but for the cattle. Until the Germans consent to talk, nothing further can be done in the immediate future.

7. M. Lefebvre tells me that he is completely reorganizing the services for the restitution of railroad equipment and that of machinery. He hopes to have this completed and the new services organized prior to the first meeting some ten days hence.

8. I have had a long talk with Major Blaise who in the Belgian Ministry of Economic Affairs, directs the Services of Restitution. He states that the feeling is still strong among manufactures, that the return of their machinery is moving too slowly. They come back from visits to German factories and find their machinery being used by the Germans, and the factories functioning intact. The Germans are storing up stocks of certain manufactured goods, similar to articles made by the Belgians, and against which the Belgians cannot compete until their own machinery has been replaced and until they have the necessary raw materials and have time to manufacture these. They therefore, demand that they be protected until this be possible.

9. Major Blaise attaches great importance to an acceptance in the near future of the principle of equivalents. The official Belgian point of view is that the Germans should be given an opportunity to restitute Belgian machinery. If the machinery is not to be found, or is worn out, they should be given a delay of one month to offer an equivalent for the Belgian machinery taken. On failure to do this, a machine of corresponding value should be taken from the regions occupied by the Allies. From the way he spoke, I see that the Belgians look forward to making extensive levies in the occupied areas. I objected that such procedure, if generalized, would permanently cripple German industry in the Rhineland. He seemed to regard this as an advantage rather than the contrary.

10. According to last reports, about 1,000 machines, 23 train loads, have entered Belgium from Germany. The Director of the Service of Restitution, M. Schuel, states that fully 90% of Belgian manufactures have desired to see their machinery. They are afraid that they will be obliged to take back machinery which has so depreciated as to be of no further value. Most of them, however, prefer to take back their machinery, if it can be of any use, so as to have something of tangible value. There have been a few cases where manufactures have attempted to avoid taking back their machinery in the hope of getting a cash payment with which they would buy something else. These cases, however, are rare.

The BRUSSELS service is now functioning smoothly. Some 10,000 slips out of a probable 50,000, identifying machinery, have been received and catalogued. Arrangements have been concluded for the reception of machinery in Belgium. Freight trains are being unloaded daily at LIEGE and at NAMUR. Here they are inspected by technical experts.

M. Schuel calls attention to the fact that it is easier often to get machinery from the unoccupied areas rather than from the occupied regions. This is partly due to the fact that accords have not been concluded with all the Armies of Occupation, and, consequently, because the German Government is not in a position to requisition as directly machinery there. The German manufactures are inclined to disregard the orders of the German Government knowing that they have no means of coercion.

After the machinery has been received by the owners they are obliged to make a declaration as to amount of depreciation. Where this is within the limits of 10%, the claim will be admitted. Where it exceeds this amount, there will be a contradictory examination by Government experts. Where it is impossible to reach an accord the courts of military damages will settle the affair.

This same Bureau of Restitution is also concerned with works of art, documents relating to factories, securities, and jewels.

SANFORD GRIFFITH,
Captain, C. of I.

Germany to Discontinue Delivery of Raw Materials

[Contemporary Translation]

A. A. I. I. 3652

Spa, April 23, 1919.

From General von Hammerstein

To General Nudant

Minister Erzberger has charged me in the name of the German Government to make the following declaration.

In connection with the note turned over to General Gaillard in COLOGNE on April 3, and with the one handed over in SPA on April 10, the German Government must now,* that on the part of the Allies there has been no consideration of these notes, state that it now regards itself as no longer bound by the Luxemburg Agreement and consequently will discontinue the deliveries of coal, coke, maganese, slack, and maganese ore from the first of May. The Government sees itself urged to this determination all the more, as General Gaillard in a conversation on April 17 made explanations from which it is clearly seen that the needs of the Allies and the possibility for demands (these conditions were connected with the deliveries of iron ore in the Luxemburg Agreement) admit the delivery of iron ore, but that now in spite of this, deliveries are held in prospect in case German Government agrees to deliveries of coal to France in excess of what was called for in the Luxemburg Agreement; an obligation which besides the German Government is by no means in a position to fulfill so long as disposal of the coal from the left bank of the RHINE is not in its hands.

* Garbled

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1226: Note

Use of Foreign Securities in Germany

[Contemporary Translation]

Wako. 18705 F. 1274

Spa, Belgium, April 23, 1919.

From the Representative of the German Government

To the Chairman of the P. I. A. C., General Nudant

ANSWER TO NOTES 929/G OF APRIL 20, 1919, AND 933/G OF
APRIL 21, 1919.

I have the following explanation to make:

The Brussels Agreement will be strictly adhered to. The conception which is given by the Supreme Commander of the Allied Armies is not shared by the German Government, and it enters most emphatic protest against this interpretation.

According to the Brussels Agreement the provisioning of the Empire with foodstuffs and the payment for the foodstuffs were to occur as a unit. A division of the management of the right bank of the RHINE and the left bank would be contrary to the agreement. The

demand directed to the German Government to permit the foreign securities possessed in the areas on the left bank of the RHINE not to be used for the financing of the entire importation of foodstuffs in which the areas on the left bank of the RHINE likewise have a share, but on the contrary to use these securities for other possible purposes determined by the Allies, that demand is without any basis of right. According to the agreement, the foreign securities requisitioned in the entire Empire, must be used only for the payment of foodstuffs. The gathering together of the securities in BERLIN was ordered only for this purpose.

In order to meet the anxiety already discussed by the Finance Commission at CHATEAU [de]VILLETTE against the sending of these securities to BERLIN, orders have been given to keep in the areas on the left bank of the RHINE the foreign securities requisitioned there and to gather them together in COLOGNE at banks that are as yet undetermined, until the further disposition of the matter is regulated. The names of the banks will be communicated.

The German Government requests very urgently that the necessary orders be given so that the execution of the collection of foreign securities in the occupied areas may continue without hindrance.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1226: Letter

Disposition of Funds Accruing from Fines

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, April 23, 1919.

No. 136

FROM: Chief

TO: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

* * * * *

7. Disposition of Funds Accruing from Fines Imposed in the Occupied Areas: After the meeting this morning I had a conversation with the British representative on the Committee of Entretien. He asked me what disposition the United States Government was making of the funds accruing from fines imposed in the occupied area. I was unable to inform him at that time, but later got in telephonic communication with General Smith at TREVES and I then informed him that the Comptroller for the United States Treasury in PARIS has decided that all funds accruing from fines imposed upon Germans in the occupied area must be deposited in the Treasury. That it had been proposed to use this money for the repair of road, etc., the Comptroller would not agree to this, so the money is deposited as stated above. The question of crediting the Germans with the amount of these fines has not yet been determined, but as the sum total will be several hundred thousand marks he considers that the Germans would unquestionably make claim for credit, and that he thought without a doubt it would be the policy of the United States to allow the credit on the expenses of the Army of Occupation.

He was anxious to know the policy being adopted by our force in order that the British might make their line of action coincide.

* * * * *

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1226: Letter

German Failure to Deliver Coal

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, April 23, 1919.

No. 136

FROM: Chief

TO: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

* * * * *

2. Shipments of Coal from WESTPHALIA:

The Chairman of the P. I. A. C. presented the following note to the Germans:

1. The shipments of coke from WESTPHALIA which the German Government obligated itself to furnish in carrying out the Luxemburg Protocol and which never has been carried out in the proportions agreed upon, have entirely ceased since April 13;

2. This complete failure to abide by written agreement cannot be permitted and must cease at once;

3. The bad faith of the German Government is made evident by the fact that very large amounts of coke are being stored up in the mining districts;

4. The German Note AAII/3411 of April 10, 1919, shall be the subject of an answer later.

To the foregoing, General von Hammerstein made the following reply:

This note will be forwarded to the German Government and the answer will be transmitted in due course, but I now raise a formal protest against the opening sentence of paragraph three which states that the bad faith of the German Government is obvious.

General Nudant replied to these remarks with the following:

Then we are to conclude that there is no bad faith shown? Then how does it happen that with 1,000,000 tons of coal in the RUHR district you have not delivered one carload? According to my opinion there is lack of good will and since the agreement has been made and the deliveries not carried out, we ask: What is the German Government doing? I can understand very well that perhaps the German Government cannot supply 13,600 tons daily that was agreed upon. In Luxemburg we agreed that we would take account of the difficulties, the accidents, and troubles that might

arise, but it is no less true that since April 13, that is to say, for the last ten days, not one single carload of coke has come over. Anyone can draw his conclusion therefrom.

The dialogue was continued, as follows:

General von Hammerstein: 'A detailed statement will be given regarding the reasons why these deliveries have not been made.'

General Nudant: 'There is no reason. Our officers there who are on the ground and are working in connection with authorities tell us that there is no reason.'

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1226: Letter

Political Conditions in Luxemburg

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, April 23, 1919.

From: American Representative, S. I. R.

To: Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

[Extract]

1. The political situation in Luxemburg continues to be one best qualified by want of policy and want of decision. The Grand Duchess has no opinion. The Government, as apparently all parties agree, is incapable of making decisions and, finally, the people are afraid to change the Government for fear that it might make decisions and put the country in an embarrassing position as regards the Allies. The Luxemburgers seem to feel that they have run out of statesmen after having tried six Ministries during the war. No one wants the job.

2. Inspired by a communication from the Luxemburg Charge d'Affaires in PARIS, the Government abruptly announced that a referendum would be taken for economic union with either France or Belgium. It was suspected that this followed an assurance given by the French that the form of government in Luxemburg would not be charged by such a union with France, and the assurance of an advantageous arrangement as regards coals. At this time, also, the effort was made by the French to take over the German iron and steel industries in Luxemburg. * * * There is little doubt that if a referendum were made, the majority of the people would prefer economic union with France. A curious aspect of the project was that neither the French nor Belgian Governments had made a definite proposition as to what it would give.

SANFORD GRIFFITH.
Captain, C. of I.

Arrangements for German Delegates to Versailles

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, April 23, 1919.

No. 136

FROM: Chief

TO: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

1. German Delegates of the Peace Conference to go to VERSAILLES:

In reply to the last note of the Germans in regard to sending their delegates to VERSAILLES, the Marshal, Commander-in-Chief of the Armies of the Allies, has telegraphed the following to the Chairman of the P. I. A. C.:

Please transmit the following answer of the Allied and Associated Governments to the German Government:

1. The German representatives may leave when they are ready. The German Government is requested to make known as soon as possible the date of their departure. The trip through the Allied territory will be arranged so that they will reach VERSAILLES in the evening in order that they may be undisturbed in getting established.

2. The German representatives will have complete freedom of circulation for the accomplishment of their mission, as well as complete freedom of telegraphic and telephonic communication with their Government.

3. The German representatives may send to VERSAILLES at once their delegation of three members to prepare the necessary arrangements.

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section.

British Support Latvian Government

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, April 23, 1919.

No. 136

FROM: Chief

TO: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

* * * * *

3. Coup d'Etat of Germans at LIBAU:

General Haking presented in accordance with instructions from his Government, the following communication:

I am directed by his Majesty's Government to inform you that they demand the immediate restoration of the situation in LIBAU as it existed prior to the Coup d'Etat carried out recently by the German troops against the Latvian Government. That is to say, - that the Latvian Government is to be fully reestablished and permitted in every way to carry out its duties as the government of the state including absolute freedom for the enlistment of Latvian troops.

* * * * *

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1226: Letter

Return of Industrial Machinery

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Brussels, April 24, 1919.

From: American Representative, S. I. R.

To: Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

1. Mr. Lefebvre has asked me to go to LAMORLAYE tonight to take up the question of booty of war insofar as it regards the General Interallied Commission on Restitutions. An accord has been concluded with the British and is being negotiated with the Americans. He wishes that I explain to the G-4 there, as I have to the British here, the scope of the work of this Commission. It also will be an occasion for me to get into contact with the officers in PARIS connected with it and find out where such questions as that of equivalents, etc., stand. I must be back here in BRUSSELS at least two days before the meetings of the Commission begin here, and therefore will try to finish my work in PARIS in 3 or 4 days.

2. A report from a Belgian engineer of factories in the region of EHRENFELD in the region of COLOGNE may be taken as typical of conditions elsewhere. This report is of April 4. In a gas motor factory, Schmitz, he found 31 machines of Belgian origin bought at very low prices. Most of these had been transferred for the manufacture of shells and were in bad condition. All except six had been junked and sold as scrap iron. Only two of these six can be repaired sufficiently to warrant their reshipment to Belgium.

One of the machines which the Belgians had indicated on their lists could not be found; despite the assertion of the German employees that the machine had probably been

sold as junk, he continued his search and eventually found it. He then looked for other machines which might not have been listed, in the same factory, and found two machines not indicated.

He noted also that there was a large number of new lathes, etc., from BERLIN, which were either new or had been but slightly used, leading to the conclusion that the Allied machines have been used to spare German ones. He recommends, therefore, that the possibility be considered for French and Belgian manufactures to take new German machines instead of their old ones - again raising the question of equivalents.

In the Humboldt Works they found a number of Belgian lathes, but minus the spare parts. It was requested that these be produced; but this was not done. They explained that in view of the fact that these spare parts were not needed for the manufacture of shells, they had probably been junked. The Belgian engineer asked therefore to visit the supply room. They objected that there was nothing there; but a visit proved that the spare parts were carefully assorted and stored there. As these were new, there is every reason to believe that the Germans proposed to keep them and pass off equivalent used ones on the Belgians.

In another machine works, Kalker, the visit was not anticipated. The Belgians noted that their lathes, side by side with the German ones, were being used, while most of the German ones stood idle.

SANFORD GRIFFITH,
Captain, C. of I.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1197: Memorandum

***Plans for Resuming the War Should Germany Refuse
to Sign Peace Treaty***

MEMORANDUM OF A CONFERENCE AT 4BIS BOULEVARD DES INVALIDES
APRIL 24, 1919.

[Extract]

* * * * *

2. Marshal Foch opened the Conference by stating that the Allied Governments had charged him with an examination of the question as to how the war should be resumed in case of a refusal of the Germans to sign the Treaty of Peace to be submitted to them.

3. Marshal Foch stated that it would, of course, be necessary to go wherever resistance might be encountered but that it was impracticable to say where the centers of resistance would be found. We might look forward to having to occupy such places as WEIMAR and BERLIN and would certainly be compelled to make a considerable advance. For the time being, Marshal Foch stated, the German Army was disarmed and practically nonexistent; therefore it was an advantageous time to resume hostilities.

4. With reference to forces available, Marshal Foch stated that he counted upon 44 Allied infantry divisions and 5 cavalry divisions. These division were made up as follows:

Belgian	6 infantry divisions	1 cavalry division
British	10 infantry divisions	1 cavalry division
American	10 infantry divisions	
French	18 infantry divisions	3 cavalry divisions

5. A certain number of divisions would, of course, have to be held in the country which is now occupied, but before considering this the Marshal desired to know whether or not the figures which he had given were correct. The Belgian, French, and British representatives announced that the figures were correct for their forces. The Chief of Staff said that for the moment the American figures were correct. Marshal Foch said that out of these 44 divisions it would be necessary to leave about 8 divisions in the Rhenish Provinces; that these divisions would, he considered, be made up as follows

3 Belgian
2 British
3 American

Insofar as concerned the French occupied zone along the RHINE, it would be possible for the French to find the necessary units without reducing the 18 French divisions which he counted upon for the forward movement. General Robertson stated that he thought 4 divisions must be left behind in the zone now occupied by the British. Marshal Foch stated that he did not think so; that he would take that question up later. Marshal Foch then said that the forces available for the forward movement would consist of 36 infantry divisions and 5 cavalry divisions.

6. The French mass would start from the right of the line, - naturally from around the bridgehead at MAYENCE, while the American mass would move forward from COBLENZ, the British from COLOGNE, while in the extreme north the Belgian forces---plus 3 French divisions---would be found. The reserve of these forces would consist of 3 French and 2 British divisions, and, therefore, the opinion of General Robertson that 4 divisions should be left in the British occupied zone would be met.

7. Marshal Foch asked if the Americans would have trouble on account of S. O. S. troops, and he was answered that we would not.

8. General Robertson brought up the railroad question, and General Weygand replied to the effect that there was every reason to believe that there would be no great difficulty concerning the railroads as measures could be taken to make the Germans desire to continue the operation of the railroads. It was manifest, General Weygand said, that as the Army moved forward it would be to the advantage of the Germans for the railroad employees to continue, since the Germans must look to the Allies for all foodstuffs. Nevertheless it would be necessary to have cadres to control the railroads. This question was now being studied by the French, and it was believed that several thousand French officers, noncommissioned officers, etc., could be obtained for the purpose of controlling the railroads. General Robertson stated that while there was no difficulty with the railroad personnel at present he thought that difficulty would exist if anything should happen to require an advance,---that in such case the attitude of the people would, to say the least, not be friendly. Marshal Foch said that he thought there would be no difficulty as the masses of the people were not bad and the control of the Allies over all foodstuffs, etc., would make them reasonable. General Robertson said that the British could handle the situation as far as his forces could go, but the distance to which his forces could go depended very much upon the attitude of the population---that in the RUHR Valley there were 4,000,000 or 5,000,000 people, and that it was not at all certain that the British could go to BERLIN---that he, himself, had been in the COLOGNE area only a short time but that the reports from his officers were that the area was quiet and was likely to remain so.

The Belgians stated that they could handle the railroad situation.

9. Marshal Foch asked whether or not the divisions were organized with necessary officers, including staffs---whether or not corps staff, etc., existed.

The Chief of Staff replied that so far as concerned the Americans the organization was in good condition.

The Belgians replied that they were very short of officers since all reserve officers who so desired had been allowed to go.

10. Marshal Foch then took up the question of motor transportation.

General Robertson stated that the British Army was very short in chauffeurs, and asked Marshal Foch if he could not take up with the Council of Four the matter of securing necessary chauffeurs.

The Belgians stated that they also were very short of chauffeurs.

Marshal Petain stated that while the divisions along the RHINE were properly equipped, there would be difficulty concerning chauffeurs for reserve trains, etc.

General Weygand stated that the question of utilizing chauffeurs who had been demobilized as civilians was being studied.

11. Marshal Foch then took up the question of command---as to whether each country would organize its force as a group of Armies and as to whether orders would pass through the General Headquarters or directly to the commander of the force concerned.

Marshal Petain answered that, so far as concerned the French, the orders should be given directly to General Fayolle's Group of Armies and that a copy of these orders should be sent to his (Marshal Petain's) headquarters since the tactical movements had a certain bearing on administrative matters.

The Chief of Staff stated that this question of command must be reserved for the decisions of the Commander-in-Chief insofar as the American Expeditionary Forces were concerned.

General Robertson remarked that so far the British were concerned the orders would go to him since he at the same time was at G. H. G., the actual commander, and would move forward with those troops.

12. Marshal Foch then took up the question of the time which would be required to take whatever measures might be necessary---such as recalling officers and soldiers absent from units and concentration of troops---before actually beginning the advance beyond the limits of the present bridgeheads.

Marshal Petain stated that the French would require 6 days.

The Belgians stated that they would require 8 days and perhaps more.

The British stated that they would require 8 days.

The Chief of Staff said that 6 days would be sufficient for the Americans, but that in this connection he desired to invite attention to the fact that, before May 15, 3 of the 10 American divisions which were for the moment available in the zone of the Armies would be on their way to ports of embarkation.

13. Marshal Petain called attention to the fact that if any very extensive advance were made it would be necessary to reconstitute the Services of Supply.

Marshal Foch said that the Germans had no Army, that the entire question was one of mobility, and he called particular attention to the desirability of utilizing the cavalry for the purpose of seizing railroad junctions, etc.

General Robertson said he agreed that the cavalry could do all that was necessary, but the trouble was he had no cavalry, other than about 2,000 all told. (Note: It will be noticed that the British had been given credit for 1 cavalry division by Marshal Foch). General Robertson further stated that he was trying to devise some scheme for increasing his cavalry or to provide detachments of mounted infantry. General Robertson stated that some units of his command, as for example the motorized machine gun battalion, had been sent to England for strike duty and that he was endeavoring to secure the return of these units.

The Belgians stated that they had the necessary officers and men for their cavalry division but that they had no horses.

14. The question of effective strengths was then taken up, and Marshal Foch stated that he would like to have the strengths in the form to be prepared by his staff.

15. The conference then adjourned.

Further Occupation of Germany

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,
Paris, April 25, 1919.

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Chief of Staff

[Extract]

1. General Bliss stated that he had come directly from the President (2:30 p. m.) and that the President stated that no orders had been given by the Governments to Marshal Foch to consider the question of a further occupation of Germany. However, it may be that Marshal Foch considered that he had authority to commence such a study in connection with a report which had been called for some time ago as to measures that could be taken against Germany in case she refused to sign a treaty of peace.

2. The President told General Bliss that the Commander-in-Chief should make no movement of any kind looking toward a further occupation of Germany unless instructions to that effect were given to the Commander-in-Chief by the President in person and not through Marshal Foch.

3. General Bliss intimated that the President would be glad to see the Commander-in-Chief during the latter's stay in PARIS, and General Bliss intimated that he thought it would be very desirable for the Commander-in-Chief to see the President.

4. General Bliss stated that Marshal Foch was still very insistent in his demand for the occupation of the line on the RHINE; also that it appeared that Marshal Foch had lost favor with the Council of Four and that it was within the possibilities that Marshal Foch might be relieved. In this connection General Bliss stated there seemed to be an idea among the Governments that Marshal Petain would be a more suitable man under the present conditions than Marshal Foch.

5. General Bliss said that the President had had his attention drawn to the fact that the bills for the maintenance of the present Armies of Occupation appear to be very great, and that a further occupation of Germany might bring about an absurd situation if a very large force were employed, since such a force might tax the resources of Germany to pay for their maintenance, leaving nothing to be applied as indemnities.

6. Marshal Foch had spoken to General Bliss about the letter of April 8 which the Commander-in-Chief sent Marshal Foch concerning the rate of departures of our troops for home. General Bliss stated that Marshal Foch and his advisors were evidently extremely worried about the reduction of our forces, especially in view of the Italian situation and of the possibility of similar action by the Japanese on account of Schan-tung (which the Japanese desire to annex) situation.

* * * * *

FOX CONNER,
Brigadier General, General Staff,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3.

German Communications with the Neutral Countries

[Contemporary Translation]

A. A. II. No. 3675

Spa, April 25, 1919.

From the Representative of the German Government

To General Haking

Concerning: The extension of postal and telegraphic communication between Germany and neutral countries.

In Note A. C. 1629 of April 12 the President of the British Commission gave information concerning the conditions under which in the present circumstances, an extension of postal and telegraphic communication between Germany and neutral countries may be permitted. Whereas, the German Government is generally in agreement with the Conditions Numbers 1 to 8, I have the honor to inform you that as to the Conditions in Number 9 it cannot accept the control provided for in it over all of the German major wireless service, and that consequently the German major wireless systems will not for the present be used to any further extent for commercial purposes than has been the case during the state of war and during the Armistice.

Fr. v. BERCHHEIM

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1226: Letter

Germany to Discontinue Delivery of Raw Materials

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, April 25, 1919.

No. 137

FROM: Chief

TO: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

* * * * *

8. Statement by Minister Erzberger in Regard to the Luxemburg Agreement for the Delivery of Coal, Coke, etc: * * * a note presented by General von Hammerstein to the Chairman of the P. I. A. C., in which he states that Minister Erzberger has charged him, in the name of the German Government, to make a certain declaration which is given in the note.

The note states that on account of the failure of the Allies to give consideration to two German notes of April 3 and 10, that the German Government regrets it is no longer

bound by the Luxemburg Agreement and consequently will discontinue the deliveries of coal, coke, maganese slack, and manganese ore after May 1.

This is a very drastic announcement and will undoubtedly be taken up by the Allied High Command in order that the necessary steps may be taken in this matter.

* * * * *

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1226: Letter

German Fishing Rights not Extended

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, April 25, 1919.

No. 137

FROM: Chief

TO: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

* * * * *

11. German Request for Wider Fishing Area in the SKAGERRAK and CATTEGAT: In reply to German note of April 18, General Haking has informed the Germans that the telegram which was sent to Admiral Goette on the 19th inst. contains the utmost fishing concessions which can be granted at present.

* * * * *

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1189: Memorandum

Movement of Polish Troops

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,
Paris, April 25, 1919.

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Chief of Staff

[Extract]

7. General Bliss took up the question of the officers who were sent to Poland, and said that he understood that eight of these officers were to be used within Germany at stations which had been designated as Rest Stations for the Polish troops. This would indicate that the remainder of the officers who were assigned to duty in connection with the movement of Polish troops, would go through to Poland. General Bliss stated that the President was extremely desirous that any officer who went to Poland should return at once to France and that no American officer sent with Polish troops should perform any duties whatsoever in Poland. Above all, they should take no orders from the French. This matter was brought up in connection with a letter in which General Weygand had stated that the tour of duty would be at least two months.

FOX CONNER,
Brigadier General, General Staff,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3.

AGO, SOS: File 372.4/12: Fldr. AFIG: Memorandum

Expenses of Army of Occupation

SERVICES OF SUPPLY, A. E. F.,
April 25, 1919.

Memorandum for: Chief Quartermaster
Chief Engineer
Chief Signal Officer
Chief Ordnance Officer
Chief Air Service
Chief Chemical Warfare Service
Chief Surgeon
D. G. T.
D. T. C.

[Extract]

1. The following letter from the C-in-C concerning the position of the A. E. F. in reference to "Computation of Expenses of Army of Occupation" is furnished for your information and necessary action. * * *

1. Reference is had to a letter of March 13 from the D. G. T. to the C. G., S. O. S., subject "Operation Ports of ROTTERDAM and ANTWERP for Third Army Supply," transmitted to us by your 1st Indorsement of April 1. In the letter of the D. G. T., the question as to whether certain expenditures connected with the Army of Occupation are to be charged against Germany

2. The questions raised are directly connected with our general policy in the matter of the cost to be borne by Germany for the maintenance (entretien) of our Army of Occupation. Our position in this is as follows;

(a) The Interallied Armistice Subcommittee in Article IX, at a session on Jan. 9, 1919, defined expenses of maintenance as including "all expenses imposed on Allied

Governments by the daily life of the troops of occupation, as well as all those entailed by the obligation of constantly keeping these troops up to their fixed effective and in a condition which will make it possible at any moment to resist aggression and to resume hostilities immediately, therefore included is food of personnel and mounts, their lodging and cantonment, pay and accessories, salaries, bedding, heat, light, clothing, equipment and harness, armament and rolling stock, air service, service of transport of all nature, service of communications, and in general way expenses of all administrative or technical services."

(b) In a letter from the C-in-C to Marshal Foch, dated March 8, 1919, it was stated that this was the expense which we would require Germany, now or eventually, to bear; any actual present payments by Germany to be considered as a partial liquidation of the entire sum, but not of certain or particular items of expense. A copy of this letter was furnished you by memorandum of March 9. Another copy is attached hereto.

(c) The exact application of the definition of Jan. 9 to particular cases is expected to come before the Supreme War Council and the Peace Commission for decision. Pending their decision, careful account is to be kept; on the one hand of all items of expenditure involved in the upkeep of our Army of Occupation; on the other hand of all moneys turned over by Germany for the expenses of that Army, and all labor or materials furnished by the Germans without remuneration; to the end that a balance may be struck, as required by the letter of the C-in-C, when the Peace Commission shall have made an accurate definition of the expenses to be borne by Germany.

3. In substance, then, Germany is to pay for the entretien of our Army of Occupation; the exact extent of entretien is as yet undecided; pending a decision, we are to itemize and keep account of all expenses caused by our Army of Occupation, and carry them provisionally as a charge against Germany; and we are to itemize and keep account of all money payments made to us by Germany, and of all expenses defrayed directly by Germany, as a credit against this provisional charge.

4. This answers points (a), (b) and (c) of the letter of the D. G. T. All costs of ocean, river or land transportation, handling and storage, rentals of buildings, warehouses and other facilities, arising out of the needs of our Army of Occupation, are a provisional charge against Germany. All sums paid to us by Germany for the upkeep of the Army of Occupation; and all expenses met directly by Germany (as in the case of the RHINE barges furnished and paid for by her); are a credit against this charge. In the latter case (expenses met directly by Germany) there are in effect two identical entries, credit and debit.

5. No new element is introduced in the case of rentals of buildings in Germany (point (c), letter of the D. G. T.). These are in general requisitioned and paid for by the United States Treasury funds, and the cost is a charge against Germany. If sufficient moneys are furnished by Germany, they are covered into the United States Treasury and expended on the proper appropriation for this or other purposes; and such moneys are credited to Germany's account.

6. Regarding point (e) of the letter of the D. G. T., it is evident that a special form of receipt, or special notation thereon, will be required, in order to permit of our account with Germany being accurately kept. There should be emphasized here the importance of keeping all the entries of this account itemized in detail, so that there will be no difficulty in identifying proper legal charges against Germany, as these may subsequently be defined by the Peace Commission.

7. Regarding point (d) of the letter of the D. G. T., it is understood that the A. E. F. is required to pay port charges at both ROTTERDAM and ANTWERP, but no duties.

8. In this connection, your attention is invited to a letter from G-4, G. H. Q., dated February 20, 1919, on the subject "Expenses of Armies of Occupation." This letter carried a compilation of costs of maintaining the Army of Occupation, as based on the individual soldier or officer. In arriving at the data, costs of transportation were included for certain items. This was, frankly, an estimate, and would not be as valuable in

billing costs against the German nation as would exact data of the kind presented by the foregoing letter, and it is believed that special effort should be made to maintain records which will permit of our presenting to the German Nation in future an exact statement of costs, rather than an estimate.

By order of the C-in-C:

GEO. VAN HORN MOSELEY,
Brigadier General, G. S.,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1226: Letter

German Proposal for Naval Representatives on Armistice Commission

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, April 27, 1919.

No. 139

FROM: Chief

TO: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

* * * * *

7. German Proposal to Have Marine Representatives on the Armistice Commission at SPA:

General von Hammerstein presented a note to the Commission proposing that Marine representatives of the Allied and Associated Governments be sent to SPA to consider questions affecting the Armistice. The note goes on to state that:

In the letter of Marshal Foch of February 15, 1919, request was made that maritime business should likewise be settled in SPA,---since negotiations concerning these officers by means of wireless communication from flagship to flagship has proved itself entirely inadequate. This request has not thus far been granted. The experience of the last two months has again shown that through these negotiations which are carried out simply by means of wireless communication numerous misunderstandings and unpleasant delays are unavoidable. Since, in the meanwhile, the military business which comes under Subsection E of the Armistice Agreement of November 11, 1918, has been very nearly finished, there is to be dealt with henceforth hardly anything except questions arising under Article XXVI, questions concerning the blockade. These questions often are in close connection with economic and other matters which can only be dealt with in their entirety in SPA. The request of February 15 is herewith repeated and it is requested that from now on maritime affairs also and special affairs coming under Article XXVI shall be negotiated in SPA. and that for this purpose marine representatives of the Allied Governments be sent to SPA for carrying out of the Intelligence Service (the movement of ships and commerce and Interallied ships in SCAPALLOW [Not identified; probably intended as Scapa Flow]), as well as for commerce with the Allied C. R. and commissions. The

Armistice Commission of Admiral Goette in WILHELMASHAVEN shall remain for the execution of the C Clause as has been the case heretofore.

* * * * *

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1226: Note

German Commission for Provisioning Germany

[Contemporary Translation]

961/G

PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, April 26, 1919.

General Nudant

To General v. Hammerstein

M. Clemenceau, President of the Peace Conference, telegraphs April 25, under Number 2135:

Please communicate immediately to the German Armistice Delegation the following telegram which I address to the German Government in the name of the Governments of France, Great Britain, America, Belgium, and Italy. Be so good as to request the German Government to take all necessary measures for giving satisfaction to the requests of the Allied and Associated Governments.

With a view of facilitating and expediting the economic negotiations, in course in Germany of the Allied and Associated Powers in what concerns the supplying of Germany with food products and raw materials, the 5 Allied and Associated Governments request of the German Government to send immediately to VERSAILLES a commission limited to technical experts for food, maritime transportation, raw materials, commerce and communications. It is the intention of the Allied Governments that the German Financial Commission actually installed at COMPIEGNE be transferred to VERSAILLES and form a part of the German Economic Delegation.

This Commission should not have more than 25 delegates, including the financial delegates to be brought from COMPIEGNE. They will be furnished by the German Government with plenary powers to decide every question concerning immediate economic relations of the Allied and Associated Governments with Germany.

The Delegation ought to be supplied with all facilities which will be necessary to communicate with the German Government and to be able to function conveniently and rapidly. These different experts ought to be furnished with all statistical information treating of their branch of industry and of commerce which will be necessary to permit the Allied and Associated Governments to proceed with the supply of Germany with food products and raw materials.

The German Government is requested to make known the names of the delegates and the probable date of their arrival.

Requisitioning of Funds by French

[Contemporary Translation]

964/G
General Nudant

PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION.
Spa, April 26, 1919.

To General v. Hammerstein

In answer to Note K. M. Wako 13337 of March 14, 1919

The Marshal, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies, writes as follows, April 22,
No. 4942/F:

From an investigation which was undertaken at my orders, it is plain that the requisitions which have been blamed were carried out in accordance with the instructions of the French Government.

The purpose of these requisitions was to form a fund of ready money which was to be created in each office of the treasurer in the occupied country for the purpose of meeting the first needs of the troops of occupation.

It was in conformance with the stipulations of Article IX of the Armistice Agreement of November 11, 1918, according to the terms of which maintenance of the troops of Occupation is a charge upon the German Government.

Therefore, no irregularity in these requisitions could be found.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1226: Note

German Shipment of Gold to Brussels

[Contemporary Translation]

Wako 19854 F 1305

Spa, April 26, 1919.

Representative of the German Government

To General Nudant

[Extract]

On Monday, April 28 at 8:17, a special train will leave the POTSDAM railway at BERLIN in order to take gold to BRUSSELS in accordance with the agreement concerning provisions. Three cars will leave BERLIN which will be joined in ELBERFELD and OHLIGS by five additional cars. Accurate time of departure will be announced later.

BERCHHEIM.

Luxemburg Protocol

[Contemporary Translation]

PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, April 26, 1919.

No. 963/G

From General Nudant, Chairman of the P. I. A. C.

To the President of the German Armistice Commission

In answer to Note A. A. II. No. 3411 of April 10

The Minister for Industrial Reconstruction writes as follows on April 24, under
No. 3346 2/M:

I.

The German Government established between the Protocol of Luxemburg of December 25, 1918, and the BRUSSELS Agreement of March 14, 1919, a connection which does not exist.

The Agreement of BRUSSELS is absolutely silent concerning the Luxemburg Protocol. It is hence impossible to admit that it weakens this Protocol in any respect. With a view to permitting the payment of foodstuffs the Allied and Associated Powers partially opened the blockade and authorized German exportation which had been up to that time prohibited. But it did not enter into their minds to modify the regime any more than the manner of payment for exportations which had been formerly imposed by the Armistice.

The Allied High Command, in entire agreement upon this point, the Supreme Economic Council, therefore rejects the German proposal for allotting the payment of foodstuffs to shipments made under the Luxemburg Protocol.

II.

The sums which the French Government owes the German Government for coal are infinitesimal in comparison with the sums due from the German Government to the French Government for the payment of the expense of occupation. The principle of allotting these sums to the payment of foodstuffs being then set aside, there remains only an entirely secondary question of compensation. In order to put an end to all discussion on this point the French Government declares itself in advance disposed to put this regulation into effect insofar as the price and the manner of payment is concerned, as well for the coal of WESTPHALIA as for that of the SAAR Valley which shall have been taken before the signature of the Peace Preliminaries, in conformity with rules which shall be fixed by the Peace Treaty for later deliveries of German coal.

III.

The French Government does not accept the arguments developed by the German memorandum which tends to show that the coal policy followed by it has been contrary to the Protocol or of a nature to trouble the normal equilibrium of exchange and of distribution of coal.

The deficit of 320,000 tons alleged by the said memorandum to the detriment of the territory of the right bank is reduced in reality to 45,000 tons if we take into

account consumption of the bridgeheads. It is only necessary to compare this figure with the figure of the production of the RUHR Basin (4 to 6 millions tons) in order to realize its insignificance. If one notes further that there exists in the RUHR Basin a stock of coke which has not ceased to grow ever since the Armistice and which today amounts to 1,000,000 tons, it is quite apparent that it is not for lack of fuel that the German Government has not kept its engagements. It is not for lack of means of transportation either, for if the German Government insists upon the fact that the changing of the allotment of the SAAR coal obliges it to undertake longer transportation by rail to southern Germany, it forgets this point which removed all force from their argument, that the RUHR coal for these regions passes down the RHINE as far as MANNHEIM.

IV.

The French Government is not ignorant that the principal grief of Germany in this question rests in the refusal up to the present (on the part of the French Government) to send iron ore to the right bank. Although the memorandum does not make mention of this grievance, it is judged useful to come back to it and to recall that the French Government has always declared itself and now declares itself again ready to examine this question as soon as the German Government shall fulfill the engagements of the Luxemburg Protocol which constitute for it an obligation with conditions.

The French Government is likewise disposed, and under the same reserve, to give the German Government, in agreement with the Allied and Associated Governments, the facilities for provisioning which it has requested in the notes of March 22 and 29, 1919, for the intensification of production in the mines.

The German Government which has no period of effected deliveries beyond the half of the requested quantities caused shipments to fall to an infinitesimal figure ever since the beginning of April, and has caused them to cease entirely since April 13.

The Allied and High Commissioners note that the German Government deliberately forgets the engagement that it made, and call upon it again to conform strictly thereto.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1226: Note

Transfer of Public Funds to Right Bank of Rhine

[Contemporary Translation]

PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, April 26, 1919.

Subcommission on Finance

From General Nudant, Chairman of the P. I. A. C.

To the President of the German Armistice Commission, General von Hammerstein

[Extract]

From November 15 to 18, 1918, under orders issued from the Finance Ministry of the State of Bavaria, the Government of the Palatinate caused to be sent to INGOLSTADT deposits of public and private funds from the Provincial Treasury and from the receiving offices of the Palatinate.

The sending of public values to the right bank of the RHINE is contrary to the stipulations of Article XIX of the Armistice Protocol of November 11.

The investigation of the military authorities has enabled us to determine that there had been sent to INGOLSTADT 61,598,000 marks, * * *

I beg you to intercede with the German Government with the view to returning in the shortest possible time the sums above indicated into the Treasury of the Reichsbank of LUDWIGSHAFEN and to the principal revenue offices of LANDAU and KAISERSLAUTERN.

The President of the Palatinate Province has for the rest, himself insisted upon this before the Commanding General of the Army of Occupation and he has further requested the return to the Palatinate of the private funds sent to INGOLSTADT at the same time that public values by the Reichsbank of LUDWIGSHAFEN (110,000,000 marks) and by private banks (4,790,000 marks) were sent.

I transmit this request for the shipment to the left bank of the RHINE of funds belonging to the inhabitants of the occupied zone.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1226: Note

Conference on Raw Materials

[Contemporary Translation]

No. 965/G
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, April 26, 1919.

From General Nudant

To the President of the German Armistice Commission

Answer to Note A. A. II 3018 of March 29

The Marshal, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies, writes as follows on April 20:

The German Government makes an error in indicating that the sugar refineries of the occupied territory have received for some time through the offices of the German Government quantities of sugar to continue manufacture or to resume the manufacture in case it had been interrupted.

On March 24, on which date a conference took place in COLOGNE of representatives of different refineries of the occupied territory, these representatives declared that for three months the factories had not received, so to speak, any quantities of raw sugar. Some of the factories are still lying idle.

The responsibility for this situation is upon the German Government which for three months, from October to February, neglected to make regular shipments of raw sugar destined for the left bank of the RHINE. These shipments were not resumed until after instructions of the note of January 27, No. 458/ATR from Marshal Foch, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies. The German Government has attached to its note a scheme for regulating the supply of the sugar plants of the occupied territory. This scheme calls for the following observations:

(a) Errors in copying have doubtless slipped into the last paragraph of Page 2, the different indications of which are hard to understand.

(b) The project provides that the allotment of raw sugar just as refined sugar shall be effected exclusively through the care of the BERLIN authorities without any control from Allied organizations. This point of view is inadmissible: The principle of interallied control must be formally maintained.

(c) The German project calls for liberty of all postal, telegraphic and telephonic relations between a large number of German authorities on the right bank and their suppliers of customers both in the occupied territory and in nonoccupied territory; the liberty of relations between the two categories of territory, etc.

Such a system is inadmissible. It is absolutely important that the service of allotment of sugar shall be centralized in the hands of a single mandatory of the German Government having its residence in a city in the occupied territory, for example, in COLOGNE. This mandatory shall act under the control of the Interallied authorities. Thus there will be centralized postal, telegraphic and other relations.

(d) The principle of an equitable allotment of sugar among the occupied regions and the nonoccupied regions will be admitted, but Interallied organs intend to reserve for themselves the absolute right of allotment according to their views in the interior of the occupied regions.

(e) The points brought out in Paragraphs 2, 3, 4, and 5, are matters of detail which give no rise to objection.

On the contrary the liberty called for in Paragraph 6 for navigation in the Baltic and in the North Sea of ships loaded with sugar raise a question of principle which cannot be settled except by the blockade commission.

The mandatory of the German Government should be designated as soon as possible.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1226: Note

Payment of Requisitions

[Contemporary Translation]

PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, April 27, 1919.

No. 972/G

From General Nudant

To the President of the German Armistice Commission

In answer to Note No. 16041/17391 of April 12, 1919

The Marshal, Commander-in-Chief, of the Allied Armies, writes as follows, No. 7444/CR, April 26, 1919:

Article 52 of Convention IV of The Hague of October 18, 1907, concerning the laws and customs of war states in its last paragraph that "requisitions in raw materiel will be paid immediately as far as possible; if not a receipt will be given for them and the payment of the sums due will follow as soon as possible."

Therefore, the Allied and Associated Armies have the right to choose either of these methods of regulation for requisitions made in the occupied areas, and when they choose the immediate payment, they are conforming to the arrangement which The Hague Convention considers as the preferable one. Moreover this method of procedure is in conformance with the action followed in 1871 by the German troops of occupation in France, and is all the more entitled to be observed at the present time because the expenses of materiel of the Allied troops of occupation in the Rhenish territory will probably be reckoned as a forfeitary charge.

In addition the Allied Troops cannot be held to conform to the arrangements of a special law for the Rhenish territory promulgated after the date of the Armistice.

I have the honor to beg you to be kind enough to notify the representative of the German Government at the Permanent Armistice Commission of this point of view.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1226: Letter

Requisitioning of Funds by French

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, April 27, 1919.

No. 139

FROM: Chief

TO: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

* * * * *

5. Money Requisitions by the French: Under date of March 14, 1919, the Germans presented a note to the French in which it was stated that certain French troops secured over 200,000 marks from banks in AACHEN in December. The German note demanded the return of this money with 4% interest.

To this demand, General Nudant today presented a note * * * in which the instructions of the Marshal, Commander-in-Chief, are given.

This note states that the purpose of this requisitioning of money was to form a fund which was to be created in each office of the treasury of the occupied area for the purpose of meeting the first needs of the troops of occupation. These requisitions were made in accordance with the provisions of Article IX of the Armistice of November 11, according to which the German Government was to bear the expense of maintaining the troops of occupation. The Marshal's instructions announce that there was therefore no irregularity in these requisitions.

* * * * *

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1226: Letter

German Denial of Coup d'Etat at Libau

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,

FROM: Chief

TO: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

6. Coup d'Etat of Germans at LIBAU:

Referring to Paragraph 3 of my Report No. 136, the Germans today presented a note in response to the complaint put forward by General Haking. The note states that the Imperial Minister Erzberger has telegraphed that the German Government:

Declares in answer to the note of the British Government, concerning the *coup d'etat* in LIBAU, that the German Government does not interfere in the inner political relations of Latvia; that also it does not recognize the right of another government to mix in the inner political relations of the Latvians. In opposition to the statement in the British note, the German Government has found out that the German troops and German officials have not made any *coup d'etat* against the Latvian Government and that it has not taken part in such action. The change of government which took place in LIBAU is, according to information that has reached us hitherto due to the intercession of the population there, as has been found out from investigation.

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1226: Letter

Withdrawal of Trade Blacklists

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, April 27, 1919.

No. 139

FROM: Chief

TO: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

11. Lists of Persons and Firms Blacklisted against Trade to be Withdrawn:

General Haking, Chairman of the British Section of the P. I. A. C. presented a note to the Germans stating that he was directed to inform them that the Allied and Associated Governments have decided that:

1. After midnight, April 28/29, all blacklists of firms and persons, which they have published or compiled, shall be withdrawn, and that all disabilities attaching to trade and communication with firms or persons on such lists shall cease to operate.
2. The Allied and Associated Governments reserve the right to reintroduce all or any of such blacklists, should such action become necessary.

* * * * *

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section.

HS Secret Docs.: Vol. H-1: Memo

Action to be Taken Should Germans Decide not to Accept Peace Conditions

April 28, 1919---11:30 a. m.

[Extract]

Memorandum of conversation between Marshal Foch and General Pershing, 11:30 a. m., April 28, 1919.

After the usual greetings between the Marshal and the General, Marshal Foch said: General, I invited you to a meeting of the Commanders-in-Chief on April 24, to which, being prevented from coming yourself, you sent General McAndrew and General Fox Conner. I had an entirely satisfactory conversation with these officers. I propounded to them certain questions, in writing, and the answers to these General McAndrew informed me would be furnished very shortly. I have no doubt that these officers have told you the subject of our conversation. It was to decide what course of action we will take in case the Germans refuse to sign the conditions of peace which will be presented to them. Of course, it is an eventuality which has to be considered and prepared for in advance.

What do you think, General, do you believe that the Germans are going to sign?

General Pershing: Yes, I think they will. I don't see how they can do anything else; they may try to postpone it but in the end I think they will sign the conditions proposed to them.

Marshal Foch: Precisely so. They will put it off as much as they can; they will neither refuse outright to sign the conditions nor will they immediately accept them. They will try to open up conversations to the right and left and feel their way. They will spar for time but in the end when confronted with the necessity, I don't believe that they will flatly refuse to sign the terms.

General Pershing: Yes, I think that is just about what will happen. They will feel around and endeavor to obtain such changes as they think it possible to obtain and take advantage of events which they may hope will happen or which they may try to create.

Marshal Foch: Nevertheless we must be prepared with a plan of action on the supposition that they should finally refuse to sign. The situation presented will probably be one of two aspects:

First, we may find ourselves face to face with an organized government feeling itself strong enough to refuse its signature. In this case it would be the duty of the Allied Armies to seek out that government wherever it may be found and compel it to sign or overthrow it. This would mean marching upon WEIMAR or BERLIN or wherever the seat of government was established.

Second, we may not have in front of us a strong government refusing to sign but a weak one which abdicates its powers and says you exact certain conditions of Germany which we lack the authority to accept and execute. It would then be for the Allied Armies to carry out the conditions by force. This would mean the occupation of certain German territory where wealth in tangible form exists, such as mines, forests and factories which we would take possession of and hold as guarantee of payment of what Germany owes. For instance, the region on the right bank of the RHINE between MAINZ and COLOGNE is a very rich country full of tangible wealth which we could seize and hold. From a military point of view this would be a very easy operation as our Armies would have merely to advance forward from their present positions and occupy this territory. Our right flank would rest on the Main and our left flank on the LIPPE River, while our front would be covered by the WESER. That is the operation as I see it.

* * * * *

G-4, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. Armistice: Memorandum

Cost to Germany of American Army of Occupation

4th Section, G. S.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,
April 28, 1919.

MEMORANDUM TO General Moseley

1. Attached hereto are three copies of the complete statement of the cost to Germany of the Army of Occupation, up to and including March 31, 1919. This statement also gives in detail the principles underlying every calculation, the calculations being based upon information as indicated in the statement.

2. The tentative statement of the total cost to Germany shown in tabulated form is subject to revision when an accurate statement is received of the units which may have left the Third Army since the receipt of the information upon which this report is based.

3. It is recommended that a certain confidential distribution be made on this entire statement to such officials as may have any future dealings, as contracts or other arrangements with the Germans, particularly to the Deputy Chief of Staff in Charge of Civil Affairs, the Base Commander at ANTWERP, and G-4, S. O. S. (for purposes of comparison).

JOHN A. CUTCHINS,
Major, G. S.

AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS

MEMORANDUM IN RESPECT OF THE COST OF MAINTENANCE OF THE ARMY OF OCCUPATION UNDER THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT OF NOVEMBER 11, 1918

SCOPE OF MEMORANDUM

This memorandum sets forth the principles followed in determining the cost of maintenance of the American Army of Occupation as shown by the accompanying statement of such cost during the period from the date of occupation to and including March 31, 1919, the sources from which the various unit costs employed were secured, and brief details relative to such costs.

PRINCIPLES FOLLOWED

The Subcommittee under Art. IX of the Armistice handed to the German representatives, January 30, 1919, a note from which the following are extracts:

For the duration of the present Armistice, which includes the occupation of war, by expenses of maintenance of the troops of occupation in the Rhineland countries is meant all the expenses that are imposed upon the Allied Governments by the daily life of the troops of occupation, as well as all those expenses that are incumbent upon them by the necessity of keeping these troops constantly at the fixed effective and in a condition which will allow them at any moment to resist aggression and to resume hostilities immediately.

As a result, the expenses of maintenance include all the expenses that are connected with the feeding of the personnel and animals, - their quarters and cantonments, - their pay and allotments, - salaries and wages, - bedding, - heating and lighting, - clothing, equipment and harness, - armament and rolling stock, - aeronautics, - treatment of sick and wounded, - veterinary service and remounts, - the service of transport of all kinds (railroad, sea, river, auto truck, etc.), - the service of communications and correspondence, - and, in a general way the expenses of all the administrative or technical services the running of which are necessary for the instruction of troops and for the upkeep of their effectives and their military power.

The principles set forth in the above extracts have been approved by the Commander-in-Chief, and Marshal Foch has been notified by him, that it represents the American interpretation of Entretien as used in the IX Article of the Armistice Agreement.

In connection with the above it must be remembered that only the expense of maintenance of the troops in German territory is contemplated. Troops in Luxemburg and France are not included in the Army of Occupation, but where units not in the Army of Occupation have been employed in construction or installations outside of Germany, which were for the sole benefit of the troops in Germany, that has been included as a fair charge.

Instead of adding to the cost of each article certain amounts to represent overhead as the other Armies have done, our Q. M. C. has preferred, for the purpose of arriving at this figure, to allocate 12% of our S. O. S. to the Third Army and to add that as an item of expense.

Transportation charges are figured only to the frontiers of Germany, since the transportation in Germany is done by governmental agencies upon requisition.

QUARTERMASTER CORPS

PER CAPITA CHARGES:

Based on data supplied by the Chief Quartermaster, evidenced by memorandum of January 29, 1919, signed by R. H. Hess, Major, Q. M. C., and accompanying statements, the elements

of the cost of maintenance were determined to be as follows:

Per enlisted man, per day:

Pay	\$1.4080
Subsistence	1.0480
Clothing	.8000
Fuel	.0370
Gasoline and oil	.1030
Miscellaneous supplies	.1810
Vehicles (animal-drawn)	.0860
Salvage and repairs	.0180
Overhead of S. O. S.	.1145
Depreciation	.0095
TOTAL	<u>\$3.8050</u>

Per officer, per day:

Pay and allowances	\$8.2390
--------------------	----------

The average cost per man per day was determined on the basis of the above reported data and the assumption that each unit of 1,000 represents 960 enlisted men and 40 officers, field clerks and nurses being included as enlisted men.

The formula for the determination of the cost per day per man on this basis is, as follows:

960 enlisted men x \$3.805	\$3,652.80
40 officers x \$8.239	<u>329.56</u>
1,000	TOTAL <u>\$3,982.36</u>

The above calculation determines the average cost per man to be \$3.98236 per day for Quartermaster Corps expenditures only.

In respect of the maintenance of animals the above mentioned memorandum shows, as follows:

Per animal, per day:

Equipment	\$.040
Replacement and Depreciation	.401
Forage	<u>1.022</u>
TOTAL	<u>\$1.463</u>

The Q. M. C. equips 95 of each unit of 250 animals, the Ordnance Department equipping the remaining 155

MEDICAL CORPS

PER CAPITA CHARGES:

Based on data supplied by Chief Surgeon, Walter D. McCaw, Colonel, M. C., evidenced by memorandum of January 20, 1919, supplemented by his memorandum of January 22, 1919, the cost per man, per day and per animal, per day for medical attendance is, as follows:

Per man, per day	\$.06284
Per animal, per day	\$.01227

ENGINEER CORPS

PER CAPITA CHARGES:

Based on data supplied by the Chief Engineer, S. O. S., evidenced by memorandum of January 22, 1919, signed by W. C. Langfitt, Major General, U. S. A. (by Geo. K. Spaulding) and by letter of February 16, 1919, signed for W. P. Wooten, Colonel, Chief Engineer, Third Army (by S. C. Godfrey, Colonel Engineers,) supplemented and corrected by data given over telephone to Lt. Colonel H. H. White, G-4, G. H. Q., April 23, 1919, the cost of engineer supplies and equipment from depots in France incident to maintenance was stated to be \$20.00 per 1,000 men per day, or 2 cents per man, per day.

OTHER CHARGES:

Based on the above mentioned memorandum, as supplemented and amended, the construction incident to the Army of Occupation completed to and included March 31, 1919, amounted to \$923,592.55 and the maintenance, in respect to roads and bridges, amounted to \$65,000, making an aggregate sum of \$988,592.55.

ORDNANCE DEPARTMENT

PER CAPITA CHARGES:

Based on data supplied by Chief Ordnance Officer, evidenced by memorandum of January 21, 1919, signed for J. H. Rice, Brig. General, Ord. Dept. (by T. L. Ames), and accompanying statements, the elements of the cost of maintenance were determined to be, as follows:

Per man, per day:

Equipment	\$.09000
Repairs and replacements of artillery	.02000
Armament and ammunition	.55100
Transportation	.00335
TOTAL	\$.66435

In respect to the maintenance of animal equipment the above mentioned memorandum shows, as follows:

Per animal, per day:

Equipment	\$.220
Forage	1.022
Replacement and depreciation	.401
TOTAL	\$1.643

The Ordnance Department, of each unit of 250 animals, equips 155, the Q. M. C. equipping the remaining 95.

SIGNAL CORPS

PER CAPITA CHARGES:

Based on memorandum of January 21, 1919, signed by Roy H. Coles, Lt. Col., Signal Corps, supplemented by memorandum of April 19, 1919, signed by L. M. Perrin, 1st Lieut., Signal Corps, Supply Division, Procurement Section, the elements of cost of maintenance were determined to be, as follows:

Per man, per day:

Replacements	\$.01440
Transportation	.00104
TOTAL	\$.01544

MONTHLY FIXED CHARGES:

Based on the above memorandum, and the supplemental memorandum, the cost of maintenance of telegraph and telephone lines connecting with the German system was determined to be \$30,000 per month, irrespective of the strength of the Army of Occupation.

OTHER CHARGES:

The above mentioned memorandums show construction necessary to establish connection with the German systems, aggregating charges of \$364,000.00, subdivided as follows:

Pay of officers and men	\$146,000
Sustenance (food, clothing and medical supplies)	47,000
Material	<u>171,000</u>
TOTAL	\$364,000

The pay and sustenance charges above shown are for units not a part of the Army of Occupation but represent expenditures incident to units especially engaged on construction, wholly necessitated by the fact of the occupation.

MOTOR TRANSPORT CORPS

PER CAPITA CHARGES:

Based on data supplied by F. F. Scowden, Lieut. Colonel, M. T. C., Executive Officer, the cost of maintenance and the elements of such cost were determined to be, as follows:

Per man, per day:

Trucks	\$.46009
Motor Cars	.04556
Motorcycles	.02594
Ambulances	.01830
Trailers	<u>.01538</u>

TOTAL \$.56527

Service and overhaul parks \$.00558

TOTAL \$.57085

AIR SERVICE

MONTHLY FIXED CHARGES:

Based on data supplied by B. D. Foulois, Brig. General, Air Service, Assistant C.A.S., evidenced by memorandum of January 24, 1919, signed by him and accompanying statements, supplemented and amended by memorandum of April 22, 1919, signed by H. S. Bacon, Captain, Air Service, the monthly fixed charges were determined to be, as follows:

Gasoline and oil, airplane spares and replacements,
Aviation clothing, squadron supplies, balloon maintenance and
Replacements, photograph materials, etc \$377,895

The gasoline and oil above mentioned is in addition to such material supplied by the Q. M. C.

OTHER CHARGES:

Based on the above mentioned memorandums the cost of construction in the zone of occupation incident to the Army of Occupation was determined to be, as follows:

Bessonneau hangers - 23 at \$4,700 each	\$108,100
Tent hangars - 50 at \$400 each	20,000
	<hr/>
TOTAL	\$128,000

MONTHLY FIXED CHARGES:

Based on data supplied by Deputy Chief, Chemical Warfare Service, evidenced by memorandum of January 22, 1919, signed for E. N. Johnson, Colonel, C. W. S. (by H. H. Stickney, Jr., Lieut. Col., Executive Officer), supplemented by memorandum of April 19, 1919, signed by Lieut. Col. H. H. Stickney, which memorandum was discussed in conference with Major Walter F. Beyer, C. W. S., the monthly fixed charges for maintenance were determined to be, as follows:

Replacement of gas masks and canisters	\$78,966
Training material	3,200
Maintenance of storage depots	17,860
	<hr/>
TOTAL	\$100,026

OTHER CHARGES

Based on the above mentioned data the flat charge for maintenance of certain storage depots up to and including February 28, 1919, after which date such charge becomes a monthly charge, was determined to be \$6,287.

An additional cost on account of training should be charged, when the training course authorized by G. H. Q. has been given in the Army of Occupation. This charge will occur but once.

STRENGTH OF ARMY OF OCCUPATION

Based on data supplied by the Statistical Department, G. H. Q., the dates upon which the several units and organizations of the Army of Occupation entered into the occupied territory were, as follows:

UNITS AND ORGANIZATIONS	DATES
Advanced G. H. Q.	December 1, 1918
Third Army Headquarters and Army Troops	December 4, 1918
Corps and corps troops:	
III	December 4, 1918
IV	December 4, 1918
VII	December 4, 1918
Divisions:	
1st	December 1, 1918
2d	December 1, 1918
3d	December 1, 1918
4th	December 3, 1918
32d	December 1, 1918
42d	December 3, 1918
89th	December 4, 1918
90th	December 4, 1918

The morning of December 3, 1918, as been determined as the date of the beginning of the period of occupation.

During the period of occupation up to and including March 31, 1919, the strength of the Army of Occupation, on the basis of the tables of organization, has been determined to be, as follows:

Officers	12,358
Field clerks	234
Nurses	365
Men	275,018
	<hr/>
	TOTAL 287,975
Animals	58,755

In the preparation of future statements of cost of maintenance of the Army of Occupation, for periods subsequent to March 31, 1919, it must be borne in mind that the table of organization strength, rather than the roll strength, is the basis of all calculations of strength, and therefore, when an organization is withdrawn its full table of organization strength should be deducted, regardless of its actual roll strength.

SUMMARY OF COSTS

PER CAPITA:

Per man, per day:

Quartermaster Corps	\$3.98236
Medical Corps	.06284
Engineer Corps	.02000
Ordnance Department	.66435
Signal Corps	.01544
Motor Transport Corps	.57085
	<hr/>
TOTAL	\$5.31584

Per animal, per day:

Quartermaster Corps:	\$138.985
95 animals at \$1.463	
Ordnance Department:	
155 animal at \$1.643	254.665
	<hr/>
250	TOTAL \$393.650

Or an average of -(\$393.65 divided by 250 animals) -
\$1.5746, per animal, per day.

Quartermaster Corps and Ordnance Department - as above	\$1.57460
Medical Corps	.01227
	<hr/>
TOTAL	\$1.58687

FIXED MONTHLY CHARGES:

Signal Corps	\$ 30,000.00
Air Service	377,895.00
Chemical Warfare Service	100,026.50
TOTAL	\$507,921.50

OTHER CHARGES:

Engineer Corps	\$988,592.55
Signal Corps	364,000.00
Air Service	128,100.00
Chemical Warfare Service	6,287.00
TOTAL	\$1,486,979.55

GENERAL

Apportionment of General Expenditures: In all calculations involving an apportionment of any specific expenditure between the Army of Occupation and the remainder of the A. E. F., the percentage of such expenditure applicable to the cost of maintenance of the Army of Occupation has been determined as twelve per cent.

In respect to the statement of cost up to March 31, 1919, the above percentage was used in connection with two services only, the Quartermaster Corps and the Chemical Warfare Service. In the former to apportion the overhead of the S. O. S. and in the latter to apportion the cost of maintaining storage depots during the period prior to March 1, 1919, after which date these depots will be maintained solely for the Army of Occupation.

Basis of transportation charges: All costs involving transportation charges have been determined on the basis of including the transportation cost by way of French base ports to the frontier of Germany only. Transportation within German territory will be requisitioned and supplied by German State agencies. Transportation by Belgian barges by way of ANTWERP and the RHINE has not been considered in determining costs. The transportation costs used in determining maintenance costs in this statement, are ample to cover the charge for the use of Belgian barges when the ANTWERP-RHINE route is utilized as this route eliminates the long rail haul through France.

Lieut. Col. R. H. Hess, Q. M. C., stated that recent information seemed to show that freight rates of \$60.00 used in the calculation of the costs submitted by the Q. M. C. might be reduced to \$35.00, as of December 15, 1918, but even though this information is correct the rate should not affect this statement until March 31, 1919, since the supplies used by the Army of Occupation for at least three months would be those transported at the former rate. If this information is found to be correct the next statement should show proper deductions for the last half of the month of March in all departments affected by the change of rate.

Salvage: In respect to construction and installation costs included in this statement, or statements for subsequent periods, attention is directed to the fact that salvage from such construction or installation, when determined, should be credited on the current statement.

JOHN A. CUTCHINS,
Major, General Staff,
G-4, G. H. Q.

AMERICAN SECTION

PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION

SPA, BELGIUM

STATEMENT OF THE COST OF MAINTENANCE OF THE AMERICAN ARMY OF OCCUPATION
UNDER THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT OF NOVEMBER 11, 1918, DURING THE PERIOD
FROM THE BEGINNING OF THE OCCUPATION OF GERMAN TERRITORY TO AND
INCLUDING MARCH 31, 1919

PER CAPITA CHARGES:

Cost of maintenance of the Army of Occupation of the aggregate strength of 287,975 men at the rate of \$5.31584 per man, per day, during the period of occupation to and including March 31, 1919	\$182,168,653.86
Cost of maintenance of animals and animal equipment of the said Army during the said period, aggregating 58,755 animals at the rate of \$1.58687 per animal, per day	\$11,095,149.08

MONTHLY FIXED CHARGES:

Cost of maintenance of telephone and telegraph lines storage depots, chemical warfare equipment, aviation equipment and training supplies during the said period of occupation at the rate of \$507,921.50 per month	\$2,014,755.28
--	----------------

OTHER CHARGES:

Cost of construction and installations necessitated by the said occupation, constructed and installed during the said period of occupation to and including March 31, 1919	\$1,486,979.55
--	----------------

TOTAL	\$196,765,537.77
-------	------------------

AGO, GHQ, AEF: AG20376-B73: Letter

Damages by American Troops in German Territory

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,
JUDGE ADVOCATE'S OFFICE,
April 29, 1919.

MEMO: For assistant Chief of Staff, G-4

[Extract]

1. Except under the 105th Article of War there is no legal authority for the payment to enemy persons of losses and damages occasioned by our troops.

2. Your proposed instructions would direct that the damages and losses chargeable to the Germans "may be paid for out of funds furnished by Germany for the upkeep of our Army of Occupation, where such funds are adequate for the purpose; following, of course, the usual method of covering these funds into the Treasury and then expending them against the proper appropriation." I believe that method of payment is legally untenable. The difficulty is that there is, as just stated, no appropriation from which funds once covered into the Treasury of the United States may lawfully be expended in payment of such losses and damages. The fact that losses and damages of this class are necessarily incident to the military occupation does not make them any the less losses and damages nor bring them within any known appropriation. If, therefore, these claims are to be paid with money furnished by the German Government, they must be paid directly and without passing the fund through the United States Treasury. That is the course evidently contemplated by the Interallied instructions which recite, in Paragraph 2 (c), that claims of this class will be paid "by the competent German authorities," and again, in Paragraph 3, that "the payment of amounts due after investigation, for reparation of losses and damages, should be made by that government on which the expense is definitely charged." It would be interesting to inquire by what means it is expected to supervise and control the payment of these claims by the German authorities, but I see no escape from the legal conclusion that it is impossible for the American authorities to make the disbursements themselves. For both legal and practical reasons I feel very positive that we should leave this matter, which is one between the German Government and its people, to be adjusted by the parties interested.

3. The losses and damages referred to in the instructions may well be considered "expense of the United States Army of Occupation," but the Armistice Convention did not impose upon the enemy the obligation of meeting all the expenses of the Army, but only the support of the troops,---*l'entretien des troupes d'occupation*. The Commander-in-Chief has taken the strong position that the word embraces all items of maintenance and supply, including pay. The French and Belgians would limit the term to quarters and subsistence. I think it is important that we should be consistent and I feel that the Interallied Command is not consistent in excluding the pay of the Army from *l'entretien des troupes d'occupation*, and at the same time including in the phrase incidental damages and losses caused to enemy persons and property. We are not charged with the primary duty of protecting enemy persons in relation to their own government, and it is much more important from an American viewpoint to insist that the Germans charge themselves with the pay of our troops, which they have plainly agreed to, than to compel them to compensate their own nationals which, as yet, they have not agreed to do.

4. For the foregoing reasons, I recommend that no instructions of this sort be issued for the present, but that the matter be brought at once to the attention of the proper American representatives of the Peace Commission in order that they may take the measures that they may deem advisable.

W. A. BETHEL,
Brigadier General, Judge Advocate.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1226: Note

Telephone Communications with Berlin

[Contemporary Translation]

PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,

Spa, April 29, 1919.

From: General Nudant, President of the P. I. A. C.

To: The Chief of the American Mission

I have the honor to inform you that in conformance with the Convention of April, 1919, concluded at BERLIN between the Interallied and German expert representatives with regard to the organization in Germany of a special telegraphic and telephonic system for the needs of the Allies:

1. One direct telegraph wire BERLIN-SPA connects the French telegraph central at SPA with the Interallied telegraph central at BERLIN. All telegrams coming from your mission destined for BERLIN can be sent by this wire. All that is necessary to be done is to give them into the hands of the French telegraph central at NEVEZE Farm [not identified].

2. A direct telephone circuit BERLIN-SPA connects the French telephone central at SPA with the Interallied central at BERLIN, which is likewise connected with the American, Belgian, British, and French Missions at BERLIN.

This telephone circuit is at the disposition of all the Allied Missions who will simply have to apply to the French telephone central to be connected with BERLIN.

AFIG: 016.7: Fldr. 48: Letter

Commercial and Economic Problems in Occupied Germany

AMERICAN COMMISSION TO NEGOTIATE PEACE

Paris, April 29, 1919.

My dear General:

An Interallied Commission has been appointed to deal with the commercial and economic problems in the occupied territory of Germany.

The terms under which this Commission was established, as agreed upon at a meeting of the Secretary of State of the United States and the Foreign Ministers of Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan, at the Quai d'Orsay, April 21, 1919, are in substance, as follows:

1. That an Interallied Commission, consisting of four commissioners, one from each Ally concerned with the administration of the occupied territories, should, together with an Italian liaison officer, be set up with full authority to coordinate the administration of the four Army commands on all economic, industrial and food questions, in accordance with the policy laid down from time to time by the Supreme Council.

2. That orders should be issued under the authority of the Supreme War Council, to the Army commands in the various areas, that directions given by the Commission shall be uniformly executed throughout the whole area.

The American Commissioners have appointed Mr. P. B. Noyes as the American Commissioner, and I wish that you would be good enough to notify the General commanding our forces in the occupied territory of this appointment and give the necessary orders that Mr. Noyes and his staff may be furnished with the necessary passes to enable them to travel freely at all times through the different zones of the occupied territory.

Mr. Noyes, on his arrival at TREVES, will furnish General Smith, the Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs, with the list of the Americans attached to the Commission.

Yours sincerely,

ROBERT LANSING.

General John J. Pershing, Commander-in-Chief of the American Expeditionary Forces.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1226: Letter

Provisional Government for the Palatinate

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, April 30, 1919.

No. 142

FROM: Chief

TO: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

* * * * *

6. A Council of Notables in the PALATINATE: General von Hammerstein presented a note to the P. I. A. C., stating that according to reliable information the French in the PALATINATE have formed a council of notables, the site of which is in LANDAU.

The purpose of this Council is supposed to be to form a provisional government in case the PALATINATE later should wish to release itself from Germany and to come under French protection. With reference to my note of April 6, 1919, No. 17020, I can only repeat that Germany would regard such notables who united themselves for such a purpose as guilty of high treason and would treat them accordingly. I request an explanation concerning these happenings.

To the foregoing, General Nudant replied:

I do not believe that there is any importance to be attached to this news. I do not believe a word of it. As far as I am concerned, it is simply gossip. The PALATINATE is the PALATINATE. We have nothing to do with those papers.

To the above, General von Hammerstein stated:

This is not a question of a mere tale, it is a question of a fact to which I have witnesses. I therefore request General Nudant will comply with my request.

* * * * *

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section.

Post-Bellum Occupation of Germany

AMERICAN COMMISSION

TO NEGOTIATE PEACE

HOTEL de CRILLON, PARIS,
May 1, 1919.

My dear General McAndrew:

I enclose, herewith, a copy of a document handed to me today by General Thwaites representing the British Chief of Staff, General Sir Henry Wilson. He tells me that it was prepared by the British Commander-in-Chief at COLOGNE after consultation with the French. He considered the matter urgent and wanted my recommendation. I told him that it was not for me to speak for General Pershing in this matter. The document having been prepared in collaboration by the Chiefs of the other Armies, General Pershing ought to be consulted also. I told him that I would send the document to General Pershing's Headquarters by courier tonight (he is about leaving) and request you to have as speedy action taken on it as possible. General Thwaites did not know whether the document would be embodied as new clauses in the Peace Treaty or would go into a subsequent convention. In the latter case, there would be plenty of time. But, as a matter of fact, I have no doubt that they intend to have it put in as a clause of the Treaty. The matter, therefore, must have prompt action if the Americans are to express any opinion. If General Pershing is with you, or if you can act for him, you could telegraph to me your approval, provided you do approve, or your approval with such modifications as you desire to suggest. I will then transmit your reply to the British.

Cordially yours,

TASKER H. BLISS.

GENERAL CLAUSE PROVIDING FOR THE
POST-BELLUM OCCUPATION OF GERMAN
TERRITORY

All matters regarding occupation not provided for by the present Treaty shall be regulated by a subsequent convention or conventions which shall have the same force and effect as if embodied in the present Treaty.

Settlement of Damages

4th Section, G. S.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,
May 1, 1919.

From: C-in-C

To: C. G., Third Army

Copy to: Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs in Occupied Territory
" " C. G., S. O. S.

1. The following provisional instructions will govern until further orders regarding responsibility and settlement for damages caused by our troops in the portion of Germany occupied by us.

2. Losses or damages to the property of Germany or German citizens, caused by our troops, may be divided into three classes:

Class A. Those incident to our occupation, and to the necessary functioning of our Army of Occupation, and not a result of unlawful act or negligence on the part of individuals of the American Army.

Class B. Those which are a result of unlawful acts or negligence on the part of individuals of the American Army, and where the circumstances are such that the 105th Article of War cannot be applied.

Class C. Those which are a result of unlawful acts or negligence on the part of individuals of the American Army, and where the circumstances are such that the 105th Article of War can be applied.

3. Where cases arise under Class C, the procedure directed under the 105th Article of War may be followed; it is proper to assess and collect indemnification for the damages, and to pay them to the person or persons injured.

4. There exists at present no authority by which the American Army can pay for damages arising under Class A or Class B, from moneys originally American or which have been furnished by Germany for the upkeep of the Army of Occupation and covered into the Treasury.

5. For the present, therefore, in all cases under Class A, in order that the individual citizens may be protected, the procedure will be as follows, viz:

Claim will be thoroughly investigated and the amount (money value) thereof will be fixed in accordance with instructions previously issued, and by agencies already established for this purpose. Vouchers will be forwarded in duplicate to the Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs, and a triplicate copy or equivalent memorandum will be left with the individual citizen. As stated intervals, the Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs will present these vouchers to the proper officials representing the German National Government, according to their respective jurisdictions, and will require payment at their hands from national funds. Such payment will be made by the German official directly to the German citizen whose receipt will be taken, and who will be required to surrender his triplicate copy of the voucher or equivalent memorandum. In all such cases payment will be witnessed by an American Army official, who will sign the original voucher as a witness.

By these means, reasonably prompt payment will be made at the expense of Germany, and the funds will at no time have been the funds of the United States, nor will they have come into the hands of American officials. Careful record will be kept as to names of

complainants, character and extent of the damage, amount awarded, date of payment, names of witnesses, and all other data necessary to fully protect the interests of the United States in future.

6. For cases arising under Class B, the only action that can now be taken is to make a careful investigation and keep a record of the matter, with a view to future settlement when, and if, funds become available.

7. The method of settlement of claims coming under Classes A or B will probably be decided by the Peace Conference, to whom the question has been referred for consideration. In the meantime, records should be kept of claims of all classes, with a view to their settlement in accordance with rules to be prescribed later.

By order of the C-in-C

GEO. VAN HORN MOSELEY,
Brigadier General, G. S.,
Asst. Chief of Staff, G-4.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1227: Note

Alleged Concentration of Polish Troops

[Contemporary Translation]

Spa, May 1, 1919.

From General von Hammerstein to General Nudant.

In behalf of Imperial Minister Erzeberger, I transmit the following note:

To Marshal Foch.

The German Government has received reliable information lately of the fact that the Polish Army proposes in the next few days to undertake a military advance involving large numbers of troops against the German district in POSEN and Upper Silesia. The concentration of Polish troops on the German border reinforces the correctness of this announcement.

In view of the circumstance that the Allied and Associated Governments have undertaken binding obligations to Germany that the Poles will not undertake any kind of warlike engagements against Germany, and in view of the further fact that Germany confiding in this binding promise of the Allies has permitted the march through its territory of General Haller's Army and has aided therein, I consider myself justified and obligated to call this fact to the knowledge of Marshal Foch, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies.

The German Government is convinced that the Allied and Associated Powers will make every effort in order to hinder new bloodshed which might arise from a Polish attack. It is, however, impossible for the German Government to undertake any sort of guarantee that the Armistice between Germany and Poland will be maintained if the Polish Army should advance for an attack against German territory. The German Government could, after such an attack, naturally not permit any further transportation of General Haller's troops through its territory. It would have to decline any responsibility for consequences which might

arise out of an attack against German territory, and attention is called to the high pictured excitement of the German population in the eastern territory.

Imperial Minister Erzberger,

A copy of this note was handed over by the Imperial Minister to General Dupont on April 30th with a request that it be immediately forwarded to the Interallied Commission at WARSAW.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Third Army Fldr. 278: Telegram

American Forces in Europe and Control of Same

May 2, 1919.

General Tasker H. Bliss,

Hotel Crillon, Paris

Reference documents accompanying your note of May 1 to General McAndrew Under Article 1 we would be bound to maintain present forces in occupied territory. My recommendation is that no American forces be left in Europe, but if it be decided otherwise then, I recommend that such forces be reduced to lowest possible numbers.

Under Articles 9 and 11 essential utilities are placed under the control of an Allied Commander-in-Chief and the document as a whole takes as a basis the exercise of command by an Allied Commander-in-Chief. I consider this unwise and likely to involve our Government in complications. If an American force is to be left in Europe, its commander should control its action and the agencies necessary for its supply under the exclusive direction of our Government, cooperation with forces of other countries to be secured by agreement between the commanders concerned and not through an Allied commander who would inevitably follow to a greater or less extent the desires of his own Government.

PERSHING.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1227: Note

Rolling Stock of French Firms to be Accepted

[Contemporary Translation]

PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION.

No. 861/T

Spa, May 2, 1919.

NOTE FOR THE BELGIAN MISSION

From the President of the Subcommittee on Transportation

To a question that I had asked with regard to the restoration by the Germans of privately-owned Belgian rolling stock, the Marshal, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies, announces the following:

I have the honor to make known to you that the railway rolling stock belonging to private French firms may be included in the French share of the 5,000 locomotives and 150,000 cars that are to be delivered by the Germans, but only after the decision concerning them has been made by the Minister of Public Works and Transportation.

The Belgian Government may not accept the same manner of procedure. In that case the restitution of rolling stock belonging to private Belgian firms becomes a question of reparation for damages, must be treated as such, and must, therefore, fall to the Peace Conference.

Pres. of the Subcomm. of
Transportation

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1227: Letter

Delivery of Rolling Stock

No. 144

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, May 3, 1919.

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

11. Delivery of Locomotives and Cars to Date: The verified minutes of April 25 gives the following status of delivery of rolling stock on April 14, 1919:

	Due	Delivered	Deficit
Locomotives	5,000	4,948	52
Cars	150,000	140,393	9,607

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1227: Note

German Request for Receiving Camp in American Sector

[Contemporary Translation]

General Hammerstein to General Barnum

Concerning American Note of April 29 about the return of German Prisoners of War in American hands.

I have noted with extreme satisfaction that the American Government is making all preparations to send back to their homes and as rapidly as possible and without exception the German prisoners of war in their hands when the proper moment shall arrive.

Under these circumstances I consider the separation of the prisoners according to their age or their civil occupation, etc., as dispensable.

As a terminus for railway transportation the transfer station LIMBURG is thoroughly suitable. There is already there a German receiving commission and a receiving camp.

However, your note did not touch upon the question of the prisoners of war destined for the left bank of the RHINE. In case of exchange of severely wounded, those which lived on the left bank of the RHINE were sent likewise through to LIMBURG, from which they were returned to the left bank of the RHINE with the returning American hospital trains, and were parcelled out among German hospitals in the American sector.

This course is not to be recommended for the mass of prisoners returning. Since the receiving camp at LIMBURG has only limited number of places, it would in a short while be filled. This fact will force us soon to send further on into Germany the prisoners as they arrive and along with them those that are destined for the left bank of the RHINE. After their regular mustering out the prisoners of war who belong to the left bank of the RHINE would have to be returned into the occupied area where they would probably have to go through a new quarantine and would thus arrive at their final destination only with great delay.

The danger of Bolshevistic infection of prisoners of war during their stay on the right bank of the RHINE is not to be lightly considered, and it is not desirable for the American or for the German Governments. It is, therefore, urgently in the interests of both sides to bring the prisoners of war that belong on the left bank of the RHINE into a receiving camp in the American sector where they will be cared for, clothed, deloused, physically examined and regularly dismissed after a decision concerning their claims for pensions, by German personnel under the supervision of the American military authorities.

Since it is a question of several thousand German prisoners, extensive preparations are unconditionally necessary. I therefore, again request that the German Subcommittee on Prisoners of War be permitted to discuss as soon as possible with gentlemen of the American Armistice Commission and of the American Headquarters of the troops of occupation all preparations that are necessary.

I should be expressly grateful for the earliest possible communication concerning the time and place of meeting.

von HAMMERSTEIN.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1227: Note

Poles Deny Troop Concentrations

[Contemporary Translation]

PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION.

General Nudant to the Chairman of the German Armistice Commission.

In answer to Note W. No. 20563, May 1, 1919.

The Marshal, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies, telegraphs as follows, No. 2289, May 2, 1919.

Mr. Paderewski, Head of the Polish Government, denies most categorically that the Polish Government has any aggressive intentions in POSEN and in Upper Silesia, and denies moreover that Polish forces have been sent there.

He adds that if troop movements have been observed in these regions it must be nothing more than local detachments that are there relieving or supplying with food the troops already on the ground.

As far as he knows, moreover, no Polish troops are in Upper Silesia unless it be in the region of TESCHEN which is of no interest to Germany.

Mr. Paderewski declares, moreover, that Poland has determined to respect in every way the Armistice conditions arranged with Germany.

Be good enough to bring these statements to the attention of the German Government.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1227: Note

Raw Materials

[Contemporary Translation]

PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION.

No. 993/G

Spa, May 3, 1919.

From General Nudant to the Chairman of Wako

The French Minister of Industrial Restoration telegraphs, May 2, No. 4162 Bis 2/M:

I beg you to transmit at once the following communication to the Chairman of the German Armistice Commission in the name of the Raw Materials Section of the Supreme Economic Council:

In view of the position taken at the various conferences at COLOGNE by the German Government in regard to the execution of the Luxemburg Protocol and the supply of certain products to the Allies, the German Government is requested to send to SPA representatives who are empowered to discuss the different questions regarding the furnishing of various raw materials by Germany. The Allied representatives will be at SPA on May 6 in the morning. The German representatives are requested to present themselves likewise the same day, May 6, before 11 a. m. to General Nudant, Chairman of the Allied Armistice Commission at SPA.

The Chairman of the German Armistice Commission is requested to be kind enough to transmit as soon as possible the answer of the German Government.

Raw Materials

[Contemporary Translation]

PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION.

No. 998/G

Spa, May 4, 1919.

From: General Nudant, Pres. P. I. A. C.

To: General Hammerstein, Pres. German Armistice Commission

In connection with Notes 961/G and 993/G.

The Marshal, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies, telegraphs the following
No. 2324:

In view of telegram 2135 of April 25, which gives the information that the Allied and Associated Governments have determined upon VERSAILLES as the place for the conferences regarding raw materials, I beg you to transmit to the German Government the following communication: "The German Government is requested to consider the meeting of the sixth of May at SPA as annulled. The conferences* regarding carrying out the Luxemburg Protocol will take place at VERSAILLES. The German Government is requested to send to VERSAILLES at once the representatives so that conferences may be in on May 9 at the latest, and to announce by telegram the names of these delegates and the date of their arrival.

LOUCHEUR,

Control of German Banks

[Contemporary Translation]

Wako-20783 F. 1430

Spa, May 4, 1919.

From: General von Hammerstein

To: General Nudant

In answer to Note CIPA 758/G. March 24, 1919.

The following answer is made to the communication of the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies, No. 2676-ATR: The obligations entered into by the German Government in the TREVES Financial Agreement not to grant permission for exportation into foreign countries of holdings or foreign securities in the possession of private individuals without a former understanding with the Allies does not give the Allies any right to exercise a direct control over banks and similar institutions. Therefore, the sharpest protest is made

* Documents concerning the proposed conference have not been found.

against the regulation of the French Military Commander of the SAARLOUIS district and against the interpretation that has been put upon the stipulation concerned in the TREVES Financial Agreement as this interpretation exists in the note of the President of the French Armistice Commission of March 24, 1919, made in answer to our representatives against the disposition taken by the French military command above mentioned, and protest is likewise made against the demand of the American Financial Section in TREVES for the monthly delivery of bank statements from the bank in COBLENZ; and the general removal of the orders and measures concerning the control of banks and similar institutions on German soil is requested.

von BERCHHEIM.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1227: Note

Expulsion of Germans From Occupied Zones

[Contemporary Translation]

WAKO
Abt. K. M. No. 21041

Spa, May 4, 1919.

General Hammerstein to General Nudant

We are informed from a reliable source as follows:

The general expulsion of people in the SAAR district who hold fast to their German sentiments and who are *personae non gratae* to the French will be followed in a few days by further expulsions. According to a command of the military governors of the SAARBRUCKEN and SAARLOUIS districts all officers and N. C. O. 's of the active German Army together with their families are to be transferred compulsory to the right bank of the RHINE. After April 30, the German administrative officials will be made personally responsible to the French military authorities if such persons remain with the SAAR district.

According to Article XXXIV of the Armistice Agreement the International Armistice Commission has to assure the best possible execution of the agreement. As chairman of the German Mission I am under obligation to preserve the interests of Germany.

The Armistice Agreement for the preservation of which all Governments concerned obligated themselves by the written signatures of their representatives, gives nowhere the right to the troops of occupation to expel Germans. On the other hand Article VI, Paragraph 1 of the Agreement provides expressly for the protection of German inhabitants. I repeat the clear wording:

In all evacuated districts the abduction of inhabitants is forbidden. The property of the inhabitants is not to be subject to any hurt, or damage. No one will be prosecuted for taking part in acts of war which preceded the signing of the Armistice Agreement.

In spite of these irreproachable international obligations, binding for the Allied and Associated Powers as well as Germany there has been, not merely from ALSACE-LORRAINE but also from all districts occupied by Allied Troops, thousands of expulsions of Germans under every possible kind of excuses and with the application of unexampled severities and

cruelties. All protests, both by my predecessor and myself have been in vain. I call attention to note of January 7, 1919, No. 5273, and January 16, No. 6087 to which I have not even received an answer.

Aside from the stipulations of the Armistice Agreement these military persons in question come further under the protection under the written regulation of Marshal Foch (General Staff, 1st Section, 2d Bureau, No. 6326/2 of November 18, 1918). Relying on the words of Marshal Foch these military persons have returned to their own homes from which now they are to be expelled, and who do not wish to give up their nationality.

I cannot assume that Marshal Foch will silently approve when he learns of the proposed violation of the Armistice Agreement which bears his signature.

General Nudant knows that on account of the severe restrictions imposed by the headquarters of the troops of occupation it is impossible for me to investigate many of the complaints which come to me so thoroughly as I should wish. I call attention to my note of March 6, No. 12818.

Since however General Nudant as Chairman of the International Armistice Commission has in accordance with Article XXXIV of the Armistice Agreement to look out for the best possible execution of the Agreement, I now once more appeal to him confiding in his sense of justice with the hope that his influence with Marshal Foch may succeed in hindering the expulsion of German military personnel from the SAAR district in case this is really planned.

von HAMMERSTEIN.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1227: Note

German Military Material

[Contemporary Translation]

Wako Abt. K. M. No. 20987

Spa, May 4, 1919.

[Extract]

General Hammerstein to General Nudant

In answer to General Nudant's discussion upon the handing over of note Wako No. 19828 in the session of April 30, I make the following statements:

1. The note is addressed to the Belgian Mission since newspaper announcements of such sales have been made only in Belgium.

2. By military values the German Government means materials of every kind including food stocks, horses and cattle which was used by the Army authorities and which was the property of the State and which was either left behind in the evacuated districts or was delivered upon the basis of the Armistice Agreements.

3. No other conception can be derived from the note concerned, No. 19828.

The German Government has always held the viewpoint that the stipulations of the Armistice does not decide concerning the property right over military values left behind or delivered, by using the words which often recur, namely *livrer* or *abandonner* (delivery or abandoned).

The German Government has expressed its view that the final determinations of the right of ownership will not be made except in the Peace Treaty.

* * * * *

By direction of the Imperial Minister, Erzberger, the matter of financial adjustment has been delegated to the Peace Commission at VERSAILLES.

von HAMMERSTEIN.

G-4, GHQ, AEF: File 20376-B-65: Memorandum

Report of Lamorlaye Conference of May 2

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, ALLIED ARMIES.
OFFICE OF D. G. C. R. A.,
May 4, 1919.

MEMORANDUM FOR Asst. C. of S., G-4, G. H. Q., American E. F.

1. There is enclosed for your information a report prepared by me for Gen. Smith of the matters transacted at the Administration Conference held at Lamorlaye on May 2. I delivered the original report to General Smith yesterday. The official French Proces-Verbal [minutes] and documents annexed, to which documents reference is made in my report, will be forwarded as soon as received from the D. G. C. R. A.

L. H. PAUL CHAPIN,
Captain, G. S.,
Liaison Officer, G-4, G. H. Q.

REPORT ON INTERALLIED ADMINISTRATION CONFERENCE HELD AT
LAMORLAYE ON FRIDAY, MAY 2, 1919

* * * * *

Matters Discussed

I. CIRCULATION:

(a) Interzone circulation by Germans.

The following change was adopted in Paragraph I, Section E of the rules adopted March 25, 1919:

The identity card which every inhabitant of the occupied territories above 12 years old has in his possession, will be used as a permanent title for circulation in all the Army zones on the condition that it will show a stamp giving it this right. This stamp will be delivered either directly by, or by an agent of, the Army commander of the area in which the holder of the card lives.

The card will show also the official stamp of this Army.

The form of the stamp to be placed on each identity card was discussed and it was agreed that Gen. Payot would order 20 of these for the American zone and forward the same to Gen. Smith. The stamp will read "Good for 3 months from " (date)

(b) Passes for Interzone Circulation of Allied Officers.

At the suggestion of Gen. Clive, the Conference agreed to adopt a pass to facilitate the circulation of Allied officers on duty between zones. This pass, which is to be issued only to a limited number of officers, will be substantially the same as the French General Headquarter's pass good for the zone of the Armies in France during the war. General Payot will prepare these passes for the signature of Marshal Foch. Each Army is to forward to the D. G. C. R. A., a list of the officers to whom they wish these passes issued, together with the pictures of the officers concerned. Gen. Payot will forward the necessary passes to Gen. Smith.

(c) Circulation of Allied Citizens between France and Belgium and the Occupied Territories.

On the suggestion of M. Tirard, the Conference agreed that on and after May 15, Allied citizens desiring to go from France and Belgium into the occupied territories will only need as credentials the certificates which will be issued as follows:

- (1) For French and Belgians - by the local mayor or prefect of police.
- (2) For English and Americans - by their consuls or vice-consuls.

Upon arrival in a garrison town in the occupied territories, each citizen will present himself at once to the town commandant or town mayor to have this pass stamped.

II. POSTAL CONTROL:

(a) Between Allied and Neutral Countries and the Occupied Territories.

The Conference agreed that on and after May 15, censorship of mail of the above class would be carried on by roving commissions (Controle Volant) instead of passing the mail through certain centers of control as is now done. This will permit letters to take their shortest and most normal route and at the same time will insure adequate control. It is an adaptation of the French military censorship methods.

(b) Parcel Post: Gen. Payot submitted the proposition for the regulation of the parcel post traffic with the occupied RHINE countries and on the suggestion of Gen. Clive it was agreed to submit this proposition for study to a meeting of the postal heads of each Army and for them to determine the principles of action. This meeting was called for Tuesday, May 6, at 3 p. m., at TREVES, in the office of the Interallied Field Navigation Commission there.

III. COLLECTIVE FINES: The Conference was unanimous in agreeing that this method of punishment be maintained.

IV. ADMISSION OF POLES TO OCCUPIED TERRITORY: Gen. Clive called the attention of the Conference to a letter which had been received asking that a group of Poles now in the Neutral Zone be allowed to enter the British zone for the purpose of assisting in the sugar cultivation. After discussion and consideration it was decided unanimously that owing to Bolshevik activities no Poles would be allowed to enter the occupied territories from unoccupied Germany.

V. THE EIGHT-HOUR DAY IN ITS APPLICATION TO RAILWAYS: Gen. Payot stated that up to the present time he had not permitted any application of the eight-hour day to be made on the railways of ALSACE-LORRAINE and the occupied territories. That his idea was to wait until the French law had been published in its official form and thereafter to send it to the President of the Interallied Field Railway Commission at TREVES to be put into effect by him as the local conditions warranted. The Conference was agreed that this was the best method of handling the matter.

VI. **SOCIALIZATION OF THE MINES:** Gen. Clive submitted a study made by the British on this subject, which study is to be annexed to the official Proces-Verbal [minutes] of the Conference. No discussion was had thereon and no copies furnished to the American representatives.

VII. **DATE OF NEXT MEETING:** The next meeting of the Conference will be held on June 3 at LAMORLAYE at 2:30 p. m., unless events of the Peace Conference require the calling of it for an earlier date, in which event, Gen. Payot will notify all concerned.

L. H. PAUL CHAPIN,
Captain, G. S.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1227: Letter

Recall of General von der Goltz Demanded

No. 145

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, May 5, 1919.

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

1. **Coup d'Etat of Germans at LIBAU:**

Referring to Note No. 2020 handed to the Germans by General Haking, Chief of the British Armistice Section on April 22, and referring to Paragraph 3 of my Report No. 136, and Paragraph 6 of my Report No. 139, General Nudant, this morning, communicated the following to the President of the General Armistice Commission:

From the President of the Interallied Armistice Commission to President of the German Armistice Commission, SPA, May 3, 1919. No. 1003/G. Mr. Balfour, on behalf of the Allied and Associated Governments, on May 4 sends the following telegram to be communicated to the German Armistice Commission:

The request transmitted in Note A. C. 2020 on April 22 by the Chief of the British Mission to the Germans has not been satisfied in any way. On the other hand:

'(1) The Latvian Government has not yet been able to resume its work for the ministers are kept in their homes by the Baltic sentinels [sic] of the troops of Baron von de Manteuffel and as a result of the hinderances put in their way by General von der Goltz;

'(2) The information given by General von der Goltz that British arms stolen from the Latvian soldiers had been restored was found to be false when the British Military Mission tried to verify it;

Communicate these facts to the Germans and renew the request made on April 22 in Note A. C. 2020. In addition to this request, give notice that the immediate recall of General von der Goltz is now demanded, as well as the designation German Auxilliary Forces, instead of Army of Occupation for the German forces in Latvia. This change in name will be announced publicly by the German Govern-

ment. Until these conditions are fulfilled no foodstuffs of any kind will be unloaded at LIBAU for the German forces'.

* * * * *

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier-General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1227: Note

Alleged German Hostilities Against Poles

[Contemporary Translation]

CIPA No. 995/G

Spa, May 4, 1919.

FROM: General Nudant

TO: Chairman, Wako

In connection with Note 994/G of May 3.

The Marshal, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies, telegraphs as follows, No. 2293, of May 3.

Be good enough to forward from me to Mr. Erzberger the following answer:

The Allied and Associated Governments have always maintained every desire to cause the hostilities to cease on the German-Polish front. The attention of the Polish Government has recently been called to the very clear expression of this desire.

My telegram No. 2289, May 2, which was sent you by the Armistice Commission made known to you the formal statement made in this regard by Mr. Paderewski and the contents of which I herewith resume:

1. Poland is determined to respect in their entirety the conditions of the Armistice arranged with Germany.

2. It has no aggressive intention in POSEN or Upper SILESIA.

3. No reinforcement of Polish troops has occurred in these regions.

The information received on May 3 from WARSAW confirms moreover the fact that no Polish reinforcements were sent to POSEN; in fact some units of General Haller's troops which on account of facility of transportation crossed the regions near Upper SILESIA left none of their detachments anywhere along the road.

The statement and the information which precede show that the situation in Upper SILESIA and in POSEN is not of a kind to justify worry on the part of the German Government.

On the other hand, it is known that on April 29 Germans fired eighteen cannon shots into WIERUSZOW, in the district of CZENSTOCHOWA, killing four persons and wounding three. After the bombardment was over the German troops raised a white flag and demanded the return of a horse which they pretended had been stolen from them.

These provocative attacks which according to the Polish Government occur every day cannot be permitted. The German Government must take energetic measures to prevent their being renewed.

MARSHAL FOCH.

Delay in Delivery of Agricultural Implements

[Contemporary Translation]

A. W. 714

Spa, May 5, 1919.

Representative of the German Government to the Chairman of the P. I. A. C.

I have the following declaration to make:

Berlin, May 3, 1919.

The German Government has noted with astonishment the reproach made to it in the French Note No. 215/TA., of April 16, 1919, to the effect that the German Government had withheld agricultural machines for its own use which would be used for the present season and had replaced them by others that would be required in the summer season. The concluding sentence of this reproach can only refer to the fact that the German Government in opposition to the Agreement of January 30, 1919, delivered 800 hay turners instead of 500. Upon this subject it may be remarked that these 800 hay turners were expressly demanded in the French list for April, and that they were expedited by the Germans with the express end that they would be delivered in spite of the fact that they had not been stipulated at the time in the protocol of January 30. This is the only single instance in which machines to be used in the summertime were delivered beyond the original number called for.

If the spring season implements, especially plows, harrows and steel rollers, did not arrive in France and Belgium in the quantities as they should have according to the protocol of January 30, 1919, the reason lies for the greater part in the fact that large percentage of the implements delivered at the delivery stations were refused by the Reception Commissioner.

There were thus refused:

Out of 7,676 plows delivered up to April 10---3,236 refused.
Out of 5,562 harrows delivered up to April 10---913 refused.
Out of 762 steel rollers delivered up to April 10---300 refused.

The reason for the refusal lies in the fact that the plows, harrows and steel rollers concerned did not, according to the view of the Receiving Commissioner, come up to the standard laid down in the protocol of January 30, 1919. On this subject it must be remarked that the German negotiators insisted over and over upon the fact that for the so-called February deliveries these standards could only have an indicative value. For the February deliveries they stated that the German Government was not in a position, on account of lack of time to undertake any new manufacture, but that it would have to draw upon stock which was in the hands of dealers or stored in factories or was in course of construction, but that it would do its best to secure all the stock that in any way corresponded to the desired standards.

When the receiving commissioners have believed that they were under obligation to refuse deliveries which did not entirely come up to the standard, the German Government has noted this fact with regret and has always taken back the delivery concerned without objection; but the German Government must call attention to the fact that new manufacture

proceeds only very slowly and in the case of plows so long as the necessary raw material for them is not delivered from the occupied territory is entirely impossible. The raw stuff necessary for manufacture of plows (iron and plow share is entirely exhausted in unoccupied Germany).

The differences are, aside from the material refused, which exists between the figures of the protocol of January 30 and those for the period ending on April 10, 1919, have their basis in the interior condition of Germany, in unrests and in transportation difficulties, etc. All of this is too well known to the Allies to need any new discussion.

The German Government considers it beneath its dignity to answer the reproach that the German Government loaded cars with summer season implements, that is to say, with 300 hay turners instead of loading them with spring season implements, and refers to the French list of apportionments.

ERZBERGER.

BERCHHEIM.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1227: Note

Shipments of Food to Austria

[Contemporary Translation]

No. 882/T

PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, May 5, 1919.

From: General Nudant, President of the P. I. A. C.

To: Chairman, German Armistice Commission

The Marshal, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies, announces the following:

The food situation in German/Austria needs the immediate shipment of large amounts of provisions, it would be desirable to have a certain number of food trains pass by way of France or the RHINE to Austria using the railways of southern Germany.

Therefore, I have the honor to ask you to be good enough to make a request of the German representatives and to investigate with them under what conditions it would be possible to send food trains to Austria and what lines these trains could use.

I beg you to make known to me as soon as possible:

1. What line could be used.
2. How many trains could be sent on this line per day.
3. The gross tonnage possible for these trains.
4. The details that you will suggest for carrying out this plan.

NUDANT.

German Petroleum Needs

[Contemporary Translation]

Spa, May 7, 1919.

Representative of the German Government

To Chairman of British Armistice Commission

In answer to Note A. C./1979 of April 19, 1919, I have the following statement to transmit:

As the basis for the increase in the demand of 30,000 tons of petroleum, I transmit the following information:

(1) The largest amount of consumption of lighting oil in Germany according to our exports has occurred in the mining districts of the Rhineland, WESTPHALIA and Upper SILESIA. The mine workers of Germany in 1913 attained the number of approximately 880,000 (879,600). This number must, however, be increased in consideration of the families of the mine workers, in which calculation an average of 5 persons per family may be counted, so that multiplying by 5 there are approximately 4,400,000 persons entitled to special provisions. Statistics show that the average necessity of illuminating oil in Germany in 1913 was 15.23 kg. per head. Therefore the 4,400,000 entitled to the provision of oil would need 67,000 tons during the year, or 5,600 tons per month.

(2) It is not possible to reckon so accurately the needs for cooking and heating, but it so happens the mine workers are accustomed to use in largest measure petroleum cookers for the preparation of their meals.

(3) In addition must be considered the needs for lighting the mine shafts, the driving of motors, day and night, the illumination of passages, and the signal and position lanterns (the latter being of special importance for the maintenance of orderly traffic in the industrial areas that are very difficult of supervision).

The needs set forth in Paragraphs 2 and 3 must be reckoned at at least 6,000 tons per month; in other words, a total monthly requirement of 11,600 tons which means 34,600 tons for a period of 3 months. The further requirement as set forth by the merchants which are necessary for the supply of coal will follow shortly in a special note. The financing of the desired material would occur by means of a credit establishment for the countries that furnish the petroleum deducted from the supplies of coal.

Minister ERZBERGER.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1227: Letter

German Steamers Authorized to Operate

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION.

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

* * * * *

1. Small German Steamers to Operate between German Ports and the RHINE via ROTTERDAM:

The president of the P. I. A. C. has informed General Haking, Chief of the British Mission, that the Marshal, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies, states that: "There is no military objection to an authorization being granted by P. A. N. A. C. to small German steamers to operate between seaports and the RHINE via ROTTERDAM and the RHINE, subject to the condition that these steamers be under the supervision of the Inter-allied Navigation Committee at COLOGNE, and its services, just the same as all boats navigating on the RHINE."

* * * * *

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1227: Note

Modifications on Requisition of Foreign Securities

[Contemporary Translation]

No. 1013/G

Spa, May 7, 1919.

General Nudant to Chief of German Armistice Commission

In answer to Note Wako 18705 F. 1274, April 23, 1919

The Marshal, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies telegraphs as follows - No. 2339, May 6, 1919:

I beg you to announce to the German Armistice Commission that the Allied and Associated Governments have decided to make the following modifications to the telegram of April 19 concerning the requisition of foreign securities on the left bank of the RHINE.

1. Returns from the sale of securities will be used for the payment of foodstuffs in the proportion and according to the conditions laid down by the BRUSSELS Convention. This return cannot be used for any other purpose except by common agreement.

2. The result of requisitions on the left bank of the RHINE will not be used especially for the provisioning of the local population except, however, that the local population may be provisioned in conformance with the BRUSSELS Agreement.

3. Securities belonging on the left bank of the RHINE will be centralized and preserved in local banks to be named by the German Government in agreement with the Allied Governments, for example at COLOGNE and MAYENCE. Under these conditions the necessary instructions will be given so that the decree of the German Government, dated March 26, may be applied immediately in the different zones of occupation under the understanding that requisitioning will occur on both banks of the Rhine according to the same principles and methods.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1227: Letter

Removal of Restrictions on Exportation of Fish; Occupy Piers to Cooperate in Supply Problems

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION
Spa, Belgium, May 8, 1919.

No. 147

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

1. Removal Restrictions Upon Germany so as to Permit Their Fishing: The Chairman of the P. I. A. C. has notified the President of the German Armistice Commission that the French Minister of Foreign Affairs has addressed to the German Government the following telegram in the name of the French, British, American, Belgian, and Italian Governments: "The Allied and Associated Governments have decided that all prohibitions and quantitative restrictions imposed upon the exportation of herring and shell fish from Holland to Germany will be removed to the extent of the power of the Allied and Associated Governments in this matter."

It will be noted that in the above message the Chairman of the P. I. A. C. names the Marshal, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies, and his authority to speak in the name of the French Minister of Foreign Affairs in the name of the French, British, American, Belgian, and Italian Governments. It is not known whether this is merely incidental or whether it marks a change in policy. No information has been received here regarding the matter. It will be noted that other notes which follow still quote Marshal Foch as the authority from which the note emanates.

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier-General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

Removal of Securities from Left Bank of the Rhine

[Contemporary Translation]

Wako 20095 F. 1348. II

Spa, May 8, 1919.

von Berchheim to General Nudant

ANSWER TO C. I. P. A. NOTE 179/F OF APRIL 26, 1919

In the first place it is stated that the sending of the securities concerned from the left RHINE to the right RHINE district of Bavaria was not for the purpose of doing away with or destroying public securities in order to withdraw them from availability for meeting Allied demands, but purely for the purpose of safe keeping of these securities against plundering which was at that time feared in the PALATINATE. Through the official transfer of public securities from the left bank of the RHINE to the right bank of the RHINE there is not any diminution of public securities produced in violation of Article XIX, Par. 3, of the Armistice Agreement. Rather these securities on the right banks of the RHINE as well as on the left banks of the RHINE are subject likewise to the stipulations of Article XIX, Par. 3. Hence it results that there does not exist any lawful duty on the part of Germany to return these public securities concerned. It must, therefore, be left to the free will of the proper German authorities who are instructed of the French proposals as to whether and when a return of the public securities to the PALATINATE may take place. In the interest of an adjustment as soon as possible which shall correspond to the public and private interests in the PALATINATE it is requested again that private and official intercourse between the left and right banks of the RHINE be permitted in such a manner that a direct free understanding of those interested on the right and left banks of the the RHINE may take place concerning the further custody of their values. The intercession on the part of the troops of occupation cannot be recognized by the Germans because it is contrary to the Armistice Agreement. In this connection it may be remarked that the securities mentioned in the French note are for the most part property of private individuals.

BERCHHEIM.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1227: Letter

Restitution of Machinery

SERVICE OF INDUSTRIAL RESTITUTION,
Wiesbaden, Germany, May 8, 1919.

From: The American Member S. I. R.

To: The Chief of the American Section, P. I. A. C.

1. Restitution of machinery is now functioning normally. The office here is well organized; FRANKFURT is showing a willingness to facilitate the return. If anything the delay comes from the Ministry in PARIS which has as yet not secured more than a fifth of the necessary declarations from manufacturers in France for the return of their machinery.

2. In March 1,385 tons were shipped to France.

In April 3,270 tons were shipped to France.

At present some 6,000 tons are being packed for shipment this month. M. Corne estimates that in the month of June the figure will reach 25,000 tons and as high as 35,000 tons in July and August. There are already 35,000 tons identified merely awaiting the decision of the owners before shipment. The shipment of machinery to France and Belgium will remain within the limit of three trainloads per day---that is to say a potential total of 45,000 tons per month.

3. There is a notable difference in attitude between the French and Belgians at present. At first both did everything to make the Germans enjoy a taste of their own medicine. At present the French are much more ready to negotiate and reach business accords. Instances are not hard to find.

The Longwy Smeltering Works, especially anxious to get back their machinery, now indicate that they are negotiating with the German firms having it with a view to leaving them some 20,000 out of a total of 30,000 tons. 5,000 tons have already been returned to them from Luxemburg.

Cail is negotiating with a German firm to leave them two large stamp hammers. The Germans want to keep them three months more until they can secure new ones. It is possible that Cail will take substitute ones, and, this is the French proposal, accept a share in the output.

The scheme of sharing the output is one in favor with the French, and to a lesser degree with the Belgians for securing raw or manufactured goods rather than cash payments. These deals may often prove advantageous to the French because they do not prevent the manufacturer from demanding back his own machinery should the German offer not seem satisfactory. Such exchanges are most likely to be made for factory structures and semi-permanent installations of machinery where the cost of demounting and reshipment would make it to the advantage of all concerned to leave the objects in question in Germany and arrange another compensation.

4. The Germans have a convenient way to delay or to avoid making restitutions. They need merely indicate that the workmen in such or such a factory object to the removal, and threaten to strike or smash the machinery if touched. This is the case at the Vogel Works near BERLIN where the Workmen's Council threatens to strike if certain factory structures are removed. As a result Vogel asks that he be permitted to keep them and a quantity of machinery two months longer. Here again the French are negotiating to see if a business deal can be concluded. There is a similar incident at Hirsh and Kupfer's in BERLIN.

5. To date but very limited restitutions have been made from ALSACE-LORRAINE. The policy has been the same there as for Germany except that more pains are taken to reach an agreement satisfactory to the Alsatians. An order has just come, however, excluding ALSACE-LORRAINE from the field of operations of the S. I. R.

In the SAAR, restitution has proceeded along the same lines. More consideration here is shown than for unoccupied Germany not to disturb the general economic life.

6. A number of French factories (French in ownership and direction) installed in Germany with German personnel and catering to the German market are attempting to start up again. Among these is the Hutchinson Auto-Tire Firm at MANNHEIM, which asks for authorization to open again to sell to the ALSACE-LORRAINE, and the German markets.

7. There are many curious ideas of what constitutes industrial materiel in the terms of the Armistice. It appears that beer kegs fall under the definition but that plate glass does not. When the plate glass is unusually thick, however, it is materiel because as such it is destined for an industrial usage. The German office in FRANKFURT declined to search factory books, accounts, etc., on the grounds that these were not included. It now, however, is inclined to include these. In short, there is no definition, and merely two policies---that of the French to include as much, and that of the Germans to include as little as possible under the term.

8. Now that the terms of peace have been published it will be known shortly what new lines of work will fall to the commissions of recuperation.

SANFORD GRIFFITH,
Captain.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1227: Note

Alleged Damages by Allied Armies not Recognized

[Contemporary Translation]

PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION

No. 1028/G

Spa, May 9, 1919.

From: General Nudant, President of the P. I. A. C.

To: President of the German Armistice Commission

The Marshal Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies, writes May 6, No. 225/A.T.R.F.:

The Bavarian Ministry of the Interior has sent to the officials in the PALATINATE an order No. 447, dated April 25, 1919, at BAMBERG, the object of which is to empower a commissioner to take up the cases of German civilians for the purpose of collecting for damages committed by the enemy in connection with the occupation of the Rhenish countries and of ALSACE-LORRAINE. This order asks the officials in the occupied area to send reports directly to the Ministry for the purpose of forming a document to be drawn up eventually by the German Government.

The German Government is hereby informed that these orders cannot be permitted because of the kindly attitude of the Allied authorities in occupied areas and because of the fact that not even the slightest excesses can be charged against the Allied troops, even at the time of their entrance into occupied territory when they had just passed through regions willfully devastated by the German Armies and where they could see excesses that had been committed contrary to the most elementary laws of humanity.

As a result the Allied Command announces to the German Government that steps will be taken against the officials in occupied areas who conform to order No. 447.

FOCH.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1227: Note

Transportation of Food to Austria by German Railroads

[Contemporary Translation]

Spa, May 9, 1919.

General Hammerstein to General Nudant

Concerning the answer to Note 882/T of May 5, 1919 about the transportation of food-stuffs through southern Germany for German-Austria.

Germany declares it is in principle ready to undertake the transportation of food-stuffs for German-Austria according to the following statement:

I. The taking over in ANTWERP and ROTTERDAM and the forwarding on the RHINE will be done by the German transportation organization and the same for shipments taken over in MANNHEIM. In consideration of the especial urgency of these shipments there will be sent weekly 4,000 tons, that is to say daily one or two trains from MANNHEIM to REGENSBURG or PASSAU. From there on further transportation would have to be effected on the DANUBE with German means of transportation. Prerequisite for the execution of this transportation is a supply of coal and lubrication oil in sufficient quantities for the railway and boat transportation.

II. Before making any declaration concerning the undertaking of more extensive transportation a statement is necessary as to the amounts in question:

1. For the RHINE.
2. From France (giving the transfer station).

Prerequisite for the undertaking of this further transportation are:

- (a) The furnishing of freight train locomotives in sufficient number capable of performing the work.
- (b) The furnishing of coal and lubricating oils.
- (c) The furnishing, upon demand, of the necessary freight cars insofar as the transfer takes place upon the RHINE. It is assumed that in cases of arrivals by rail that the rolling stock of the Entente will proceed through.

III. The adjustment of freight charges will be in accordance with the rates of public commerce, the payments to be reckoned in francs (1 mark equals 1.25 franc). It is requested that the freight costs be paid in foodstuffs.

Protection and guards with transports will be taken care of by German personnel. The inner political condition of Bavaria will not interfere with the execution of this transportation.

HAMMERSTEIN.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1227: Note

Withdrawal of German Troops from Latvia and Lithuania

[Contemporary Translation]

Wako. No. 21094/21557

Spa, May 9, 1919.

From: General Hammerstein, President of the German Armistice Commission

To: General Nudant, President of the Interallied Armistice Commission

In answer to Note C. I. P. A. No. 1003/G of May 5, 1919, I have to hand over to you the following note of the German Government:

The note of Mr. Balfour of May 4, 1919, has occasioned the German Government to undertake anew investigations concerning the latest events in LIBAU and at the

same time to take into consideration the details of the content of Mr. Balfour's note. The result of the investigation and the measures taken by the German Government there upon are as follows:

1. The German military authorities in Latvia again expressly deny that any German troops whatever took any part in the overthrow of the Latvian Government. It is perfectly clear that the Baltic storm troops acted independently and capriciously and with disregard of all of the negotiations of their Baltic fellow countrymen. There is no Government hindered by the Germans in LIBAU from exercising its right as a ruling administration. The principle of noninterference in the inner affairs of Latvia is scrupulously observed from the German side.

2. The front committee in Latvia has accepted the stipulations of the ultimatum of the Allied Powers concerning a new formation of a cabinet. The Latvian Government accordingly is not hindered in its work by the Baltic bodies of troops either.

3. The Latvian troops have already been given back the arms mentioned in Mr. Balfour's note.

4. The demand to assume the name German Auxiliary Troops instead of German Army of Occupation cannot be acceded to by the German Government. The compliance with this demand would result in the German troops receiving orders of the Entente through the medium of a cabinet dependent upon the Allies.

5. Rather, the German Government is withdrawing all of its forces out of Latvia and Lithuania within a short period of time. It has already begun preparatory steps for the bringing about of the cessation of hostilities and a following Armistice with the opposing troops. The withdrawal will be carried out in a period of time which will guarantee the security of the property in Latvia and Lithuania belonging to the German Empire. The consequences for the evacuation of Latvia and Lithuania rests upon the Allied and Associated Powers.

ERZBERGER.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1227: Note

Alleged French Propaganda in Saar District

[Contemporary Translation]

A. A. I. 2618

Spa, May 9, 1919.

Representative of the German Government

To the President of the P. I. A. C.

There arrived again a number of reliable notices from the SAAR district which show clearly and unequivocally that the French authorities of occupation are using the period of occupation for preparing by means of a zealous propaganda the way for a proposed later political orientation. Above all the attempt is made to win the influence over the minds of the population of the mines in this direction. To this end they are employing the most diverse means, the forcing of the German press to misleading the consciousnessless inhabitants to high treason, changing the names of the streets, a steady undermining of the respect

of the rightful authorities to the extent of carrying on an open propaganda through flying machines and the ousting and expulsion of officials who are sensitive in their patriotic feelings and through similar persons of standing. In this connection I call attention to the ousting of Oberburgomaster Mangold in SAARBRUCKEN and the expulsion in mass of respectable citizens of SAARBRUCKEN. To this may be added three further, especially characteristic cases in which well deserving officials of the City Government of SAARLOUIS, Police Commissioner Schneider, Revenue Secretary Jochum and Architect Heinmann, who were removed from their offices simply on account of their patriotic sentiments by the order of the French authorities of occupation.

In behalf of the German Government I make the most decided protest against these new violations at the same time maintaining my earlier protest, and at the same time I request that all means be used to the end that the removal from office of the above named officials be reconsidered, and that this propaganda which is unpermissible from every point of view be ceased.

BERCHHEIM.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1227: Letter

Return of German Prisoners

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, May 10, 1919.

No. 148

FROM: Chief

TO: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

* * * * *

3. Return of German Prisoners of War:
General Nudant, addressing General von Hammerstein, informed him of the following:

I have been informed that Major von Pabst would like to gather together representatives of the Missions represented here now and start the negotiations in this matter. Without considering whether this conversation could be useful at this time, I believe it would be wise to defer it for a few days. As a matter of fact, I have informed Marshal Foch of the subject and I am awaiting his decision on it. It will not be necessary to wait long for it and therefore it seems of interest that we be well informed of the bases on which this operation can be carried out so that it may be well done. It is a question that in my opinion should be treated largely in a general way rather than through the meeting of individuals.

In regard to the foregoing, Major von Pabst through our representative on the Prisoners of War Committee applied to me for a letter of instructions to the Commanding General, Third Army, with whom he wished to take up the question of the return of German

prisoners of war. I sent word to him that I could see no possible good to result from his doing this as the matter was already under consideration and all necessary preparations were being made by the American authorities, and I therefore declined to encourage his visiting the Commanding General, Third Army, on this subject.

* * * * *

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief American Section, P. I. A. C.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1227: Letter

Seizure of Red Cross Supplies by Germans

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION.
Spa. Belgium, May 10, 1919.

No. 148

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

* * * * *

4. Red Cross Supplies for Poland:
General Haking presented the following note:

I am directed to inform you that information has been received by the British Government that eighteen truck loads of United States and British Red Cross supplies which are intended for the POLES and were landed at DANZIG have been detained by the German authorities. This is in direct violation of Article XVI of the Terms of the Armistice Agreement and I am directed to request that the German Government will arrange for these supplies to be forwarded to their destinations without further delay, and that an assurance be given that a recurrence of similar incidents will be avoided.

Continuing the discussion, General von Hammerstein said:

I have a question to ask the General. The same matter was raised by General Barnum and I have been busy with it for the last few days. There are one or two contradictions in the two different statements. I am not quite sure how Article XVI of the Armistice Agreement of November 11, 1918, can be applied here. I will read the sentence in question in French: 'The Allies will have free access in order to supply the population.' This shows that it can only be a question of food. General Barnum and General Haking have mentioned Red Cross material, but according to the information I have received from DANZIG there are totally different things in these trucks. There are mowing machines, motor cars, rubber tires, and all sorts of clothing. I must, therefore, raise the question: Are these articles

destined for the population of POLAND, or for General Haller's troops or other Polish troops?

The question of forwarding of medical stores for the population would receive favorable consideration from the German Government. I request an answer concerning the other objects.

Continuing the discussion, General Haking said:

As regards the first question raised by General von Hammerstein, I am not sure whether these things reported in my letter are the same as reported in General Barnum's letter. When General Barnum presented his note to General von Hammerstein I called the attention of the British High Command to Article XVI of the Armistice Terms, in order that there should be no doubt as to the interpretation of the Articles on the part of the Allied and Associated Governments, and the governments concerned to be able to study the Articles before giving their replies. General von Hammerstein has quoted the first part of the article, that is to say, the question of sending food from DANZIG across German territory. You will find in the last part of that Article there is another phrase which is something to the effect that 'maintenance of order' is agreed to.

General Barnum added the following:

I would like to say in regard to the note which I presented that I do not think that there can be any question of any of these supplies being intended for any of General Haller's troops, or for other Polish troops. The American Red Cross does not engage in that kind of work. Food supplies or supplies to alleviate suffering very properly may be introduced there under previous conventions under which the American Red Cross operates. Such matters as automobiles or tires would very likely be for the equipment of the Red Cross itself and to enable it to carry on its work.

To this General von Hammerstein stated:

I think that I shall shortly be able to give General Barnum my Government's decision on this subject. I should be glad if I could have an answer from General Haking shortly regarding the contents of the trucks in the case mentioned by him, eighteen trucks.

* * * * *

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1227: Letter

Admission of Official Journals Into Occupied Territory

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, May 10, 1919.

No. 148

FROM: Chief

TO: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

* * * * *

18. Admission of Newspapers into the Occupied Territory: General Nudant has informed the Germans that in response to their note of March 22, concerning the admission into occupied territory of official journals (newspapers), that the request is granted.

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1228: Note

Allotment of Foodstuffs to Civilian Population in Occupied Zones

[Contemporary Translation]

A. W. 769

Spa, May 10, 1919.

From the Representative of the German Government

To General Nudant, President of the P. I. A. C.

[Extract]

On the part of the Imperial Minister I have the following note to transmit:

Commanding generals of the separate zones of occupation have given orders according to which provisions of food that are to be allotted to the civilian population of the occupied areas from the stores of the troops of occupation, or from importations according to the BRUSSELS Agreement are to be given to this population by these Armies in amounts determined by them without regard for the arrangements made by the proper Imperial authorities. The rations fixed by the occupying authorities are often far greater than is warranted by the entry amount of importation in consideration of the general provisioning of Germany. On account of this violation of the BRUSSELS Agreement (No. 5 of Annex IV) the population in the remaining parts of the Empire are subjected to an extraordinarily great disadvantage. The low prices set by the troops of occupation form at the same time a heavy burden and a financial danger for the communal societies.

* * * * *

So far as the business handling of the taking over and of the apportioning of the imported foodstuffs is concerned this is planned in such a manner that all of the provisions arriving in ROTTERDAM shall first be taken over by the representatives of the proper Imperial authorities (Imperial Wheat and Meat and Fat Bureaus) on the account of the Empire. Then the amount destined for the occupied areas according to Par. 5 of Annex IV will be separated and placed at the disposal of the military authorities of the Associated Powers. For the subsequent distribution to the German population it would be advisable; first to determine the portions for the separate zones of occupation and to turn these over to a special central station for each zone of occupation by which the provisions are to be taken over and to be divided out among the separate communal societies according to the principles laid down.

* * * * *

Under most emphatic protest against the present interpretation of the legal regulation of an economic provisioning in the occupied zone, I urgently request that directions be given to the military commanders that the principles laid down above may be correspondingly observed.

Third Army Gen. File 430.2: Tables

Provisions Sent to Germany

SCHEDULE NO. 1

Statement of Hoover Provisions Imported in Germany up to date of
May 11, 1919

Nature of provisions	Per Rotterdam in tons	Other German ports in tons	Total in tons
Wheat	9,001	13,093	22,094
Indian corn		1,997	1,997
Rye	6,276	17,274	23,550
Wheat flour	28,849	28,426	54,275
Flour of other sorts	24,309	24,538	48,847
Rice	11,367	1,349	12,716
Peas and beans	12,418	1,009	13,427
Meat in barrels	1,705		1,705
Bacon	19,369		19,369
Lard	1,533	815	2,348
Lard (ersatz) [substitute]	5,220	292	5,512
Pork	2,045	3,786	5,831
Vegetable oils	322		322
Milk	12,056	524	12,581
Dripping	368		368
Linseed Oil	1,371		1,371
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
	134,209	93,103	227,312

SCHEDULE NO. 2

State of the Hoover Provisions from ANTWERP and ROTTERDAM to the occupied areas up to the date of May 14

French area		Flours	Rice	P. Har.	Bacon	Dripping
May 1 from ANTWERP	tons	600	376	580		
May 9 from ROTTERDAM	tons				321	24
Belgian area						
May 5 from ANTWERP			100		200	
May 11 from ANTWERP		255	100			
British area						
nought						
American area						
May 1 from ANTWERP		1,400				
May 9 from ROTTERDAM				112		
	Total	2,255	576	580	433	24
		4.078				

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1227: Letter

German Census of Rolling Stock

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, May 10, 1919.

No. 148

FROM: Chief

TO: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

10. Information in Regard to Locomotives:

The Chairman of the German Committee on Transportation states that there has taken place in Germany a census of all locomotives and cars. In order to bring about certainty as to the rolling stock that has been transferred, he requests of the Chairman of the Allied Committee on Transportation the following information:

1. How many German normal guage locomotives and cars were captured in the west during the war?
2. How many German locomotives and cars were declared as booty of war in the district east of the line of demarcation during the Armistice period?

In case of locomotives, a statement is requested as to the serial number and the type, and in case of cars, a statement of type is desired.

* * * * *

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1228: Note

Arrest by Germans of Polish Officials in Danzig

1048/A

PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, May 11, 1919.

General Nudant

To General v. Hammerstein

M. Labzewski, President of the Supreme Popular Council of POSEN, for east Prussia as well as members of the Polish Popular Council of DANZIG, have been arrested in DANZIG by the Germans in the accusation of high treason.

Now, according to the very text of the agreement between M. Noulens, on the one hand, and the German plenipotentiaries on the other hand, persons arrested for reasons of national politics were to be set at liberty if no judicial proceeding had been opened against them. They were to be reciprocally set at liberty provisionally in one week if the prosecution had not been started.

I am charged by the Marshal, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies, to intercede energetically with the German Government with the view of obtaining the immediate liberation of the above named prisoners arrested for reasons of national politics and contrary to the spirit of the Armistice which was concluded on February 16, 1919.

I request an early answer on this subject.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1227: Letter

Allied Circular to Russian Prisoners in Germany

No. 149

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, May 12, 1919.

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

* * * * *

3. Russian Prisoners of War in Germany: Copies have been received from General Malcolm of various memorandums which have been published by the BERLIN Committee on Repatriation of Prisoners of War. In one of these it is stated that as repatriation is now starting, the figures showing the numbers of prisoners of war in various camps must be kept up to date and the figures should be as accurate as possible. These figures up to the present, so far as reported here, have been very vague, and during my recent visit to BERLIN I took up with the Chief of Staff of the Mission this question of numbers, but was unable to get any accurate figures.

The following is a copy of a circular which that Mission has sent to the Russian prisoners of war camps:

No. 68. Circular to all Russian prisoners of war from the President of the Interallied Commission at BERLIN. I think that a good many of you do not realize why you were not repatriated at the same time as the Allied prisoners and why you have been kept so long before being allowed to return to Russia.

When the German Government started repatriating some of you at the beginning of this year, they sent them over the frontier where they fell into the hands of the Bolsheviks in a weak condition and without either clothing or food. Many of them died either before or shortly after crossing the lines.

The Allied Powers therefore ordered that this repatriation should cease and appointed an Interallied Commission in Germany to try to improve the moral and living conditions of the prisoners by providing better food and better accommodation.

It has been the aim of every Allied officer to try and better the conditions under which all Russian prisoners of war have lived, to try and provide amusements and in every way to alleviate the long and tedious hours of captivity.

Owing to the weakening of the Bolshevik forces it was considered possible to repatriate the Russian prisoners and on April 11, 1919, permission to do so was obtained from the Allied Powers even though the conditions were not what the Allied Powers had hoped they would be.

Three groups of prisoners have already been sent into Russia by the northern route through KOSCHODARI. As the situation improves it is hoped to increase the numbers being sent, by arranging more routes across other parts of the Russian frontier.

Every effort is being made to send all Russians to those districts in Russia where they live.

Considerable difficulty is at present being found in providing coal and sufficient rolling stock to cope with the situation.

Repatriation to Russia is entirely voluntary and no Russian prisoner of war is to be forced to proceed to Russia. Those remaining behind will be concentrated together in certain camps.

From the above you will fully realize that every effort is being made to repatriate you as early as possible and as near to your homes as can be done.

You have now, most of you, been confined in camps for four years, but you must have patience for a few months more.

You will help the Interallied Commission in carrying out their work by maintaining good order in the camps and trying to help the Senior Allied Officer or Russian Officer in Charge of the camp, to do all he can to look after your welfare in every respect.

* * * * *

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1228: Letter

Report by American Representative on Return of Industrial Machinery

Wiesbaden, Germany, May 12, 1919.

From: The American Representative S. I. R.

To: The Chief of the American Section, P. I. A. C.

1. M. Corne still complains of the delay caused by the Ministry in PARIS due to failure to forward the declarations made by manufacturers of their machinery. These declarations are carded and classified in PARIS and it is here that the delay takes place.

2. He foresees the necessity of extended negotiations with the Germans on the application of the peace terms which relate to the services of restitution. These will probably take place either in BRUSSELS or PARIS. M. Lefebvre is in PARIS now studying the question.

3. Ct. Messens is to be replaced here in the near future. It appears that the Ministry of Economic Affairs in BRUSSELS is not entirely satisfied with the rapidity with which machinery is being returned. The total to date is 2,400 tons to Belgium. This is not a bad figure considering the difficulties of organization which the Belgians have encountered. There are no complaints that the Germans are seeking delays at present.

4. The FRANKFURT office is reducing the number of visits to German factories as much as possible. A French manufacturer at the same time he was looking for his own machinery wanted to study a process in a neighboring factory. The reasons he gave as a pretext made FRANKFURT suspicious and they flatly refused to let him make the visit.

5. The scheme of restitution by region which I recommended last month to the S. I. R. here is now being applied. An Allied delegate has been appointed with the approval of FRANKFORT to visit factories in the RUHR, with headquarters in DUSSELDORF. He will visit the industries there systematically without waiting for a French manufacturer with machinery there to come in each case. His estimates will then form a basis for the systematic reshipment of machinery. Groups similar to this one will be formed in other regions, one of the next to be in that of LEIPZIG.

6. Lists of machinery belonging to the Allies in the RUHR Bassin, notably in the Works of Thyssen, Phoniz, Deutscher Kaiser, and Westpahlsh Eisen, are now practically complete. The reports from Allied engineers who have checked them over in the main indicate that the declarations made by the Germans were exact and complete.

7. In the Phonix Works the workmen protested against removal of machinery. Their resistance however was not prolonged. A recent visitor to Krupps tells us that workmen are still finishing the work on a number of heavy guns the caliber of which he estimated at 570.

8. There is a depot of 1,200 machines, enough for 200 freight cars, at RHEYDT. The machinery has been piled in pellmell and has not been properly greased and packed. This negligence is greater than that reported from other depots.

9. A German aluminum firm has three large presses taken from the Belgian-Netherlands Co. It desires to keep them and offers the Belgian Co. new ones in exchange. The Belgians have indicated their willingness to accept provided:

(a) The Germans deposit an amount equivalent to the value of the machines in a Belgian bank.

(b) That they supply equivalent machines within eight months time.

(c) That the Belgian firm not be obliged to show its plans for reestablishment to the Germans.

(d) That until the equivalent machinery is supplied the German firm permit the Belgian firm to buy a part of its output at cost price.

This last clause is especially interesting in that it would make the Belgian firm a competitor in the general market with German goods. The idea is not new, however, in the Belgium will be exactly in the same position with a large part of the coal she will receive annually from Germany. The French as well as the Belgians are making wider applications of the principle of sharing in the profits of German industries directly, in other words, of making the German industries work for them. To a certain point the Germans do not seem to oppose the idea. It is one of the easiest ways for them to pay, and instead of paralyzing German industry will be a boon to it.

This can well be seen in the instance of the SOLINGEN Cutlery Works. The British are reported to have taken over the output for three years and may even put "Made in England" on the wares. At the end of this time, or shortly after, the Germans will again begin manufacturing cutlery under their own name, all the better equipped to compete with British competition in the same field.

SANFORD GRIFFITH,
Captain, I. C.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1228: Letter

Relief of General von der Goltz Again Demanded

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION.,
Spa, Belgium, May 14, 1919.

No. 150

FROM: Chief

TO: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

9. Coup d'Etat of Germans at Libau: Referring to paragraph one of my Report No. 145, the Allies under date of May 10, in a note presented by General Nudant, called the attention of the Germans to the fact that without prejudice to the decision which will be made by the Entente on the question of the German Coup d'Etat at LIBAU, their attention is

called to the fact that no action has been taken in regard to the relief of General von der Goltz and the demand was repeated in the name of the Allied and Associated Government for the immediate relief and recall of this officer.

10. Continuing the above subject.

Under date of May 12, 1919, General von Hammerstein presented a note to the P. I. A. C., as follows:

As answer to the Note C. I. P. A. Note 1043/G of May 10, 1919, I have to state that the minute investigation has proved the innocence of General Count von der Goltz and that hence the German Government has nothing to add to its declarations formerly transmitted (Note of May 9, 1919, Wako No. 21094/21557, Abt.O).

* * * * *

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier, General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1228: Letter

Repatriation of German Prisoners

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, May 14, 1919.

No. 150

FROM: Chief

TO: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

* * * * *

4. Repatriation of German Prisoners of War.

The Marshal, Commander-in-Chief, has given out the following for the information of the Germans:

The question of the repatriation of German prisoners of war is at present being studied by the Allied and Associated Governments. The German Government may at present proceed with its study, but a contact between Allied delegates and the German delegates will not take place until later according to instructions which will be given at the proper time.

* * * * *

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

Safety of Americans in Uniform

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, May 14, 1919.

No. 150

FROM: Chief,

TO: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

* * * * *

15. German Responsibility for American Detachments:

On May 12 the following was received by telephone from General Harries:

The German authorities have informed General Harries that they will not be responsible for the safety of Americans in uniform, and advised that Allied officers and soldiers wear civilian clothes.

General Harries has no means of procuring civilian clothes and requests advice with respect to this matter, or such other instructions as the Commander-in-Chief may give him.

The Commander-in-Chief being here at the time this message was received, the question was laid before him in person and the following instructions were sent to General Harries:

Replying to your telephone message, the Commander-in-Chief directs that you inform the German Government that the American officers and men are in Germany for purposes well understood by the German Government, and that Government will be held entirely responsible for their safety. The Commander-in-Chief directs that this message be delivered in no uncertain terms.

In this connection I desire to call attention to my note of April 9 to the Germans bearing on this same subject. This note will be found in Paragraph 4 of my Report No. 125. The German reply to this note will be found in Paragraph 9 of my Report No. 147.

It appears that practically the same instructions have been sent to all members of the Allied Missions in BERLIN.

The following is a copy of the British reply:

I am instructed by his Majesty's Government to inform you that the German command of LIBAU: 'In consequence of excitement created amongst Germans by the peace conditions you are informed not to appear publicly in uniform. The German command decline to accept any responsibility.'

I am directed by the British Government to inform you that British officers in Germany and in other territories where there are German troops will continue to wear uniforms. The German Government will be held responsible for their safety.

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

German Propaganda in Alsace and Lorraine

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, May 14, 1919

No. 150

FROM: Chief

TO: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

* * * * *

12. German Propaganda in Alsace and Lorraine:

General Nudant presented a note to the Germans containing the following instructions from Marshal Foch, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies:

Manifestations of German propaganda in ALSACE-LORRAINE have taken place for sometime under the form of tracts, newspapers, offers to members of the teaching staff of posts in Germany, etc.

Such movements cannot longer be tolerated. In case these are not stopped immediately there would be reason to contemplate for the future a more severe regulation of the conditions of postal traffic between ALSACE-LORRAINE and non-occupied Germany, or in case it need be of any other measures.

* * * * *

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

Repatriation of Russian Prisoners

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, May 16, 1919.

No. 151

FROM: Chief

TO: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

* * * * *

11. Repatriation of Russian Prisoners of War: * * * copy of a note presented by General von Hammerstein to General Nudant on the above subject.

The note shows the small numbers of such prisoners, as were repatriated between April 29 and May 9, amount to about 1,600 only. There appear to have been none sent since that date, unless perchance General von Hammerstein had not been advised of the later shipments.

The note discusses the various possible routes by which the Russian prisoners could be repatriated, showing the difficulties and the possibilities in each case. It terminates by calling attention to the great homesickness of the Russian prisoners who have been waiting impatiently for a long time and calls attention to the danger of insurrection and attempts at disturbances. The note concludes with an appeal to the Allies to see that the roads of departure, especially by way of Poland and by way of the DANUBE may be opened as soon as possible.

It is presumed from the presentation of this note that the Germans are fully prepared to furnish railway transportation either from the camps to Russia or Polish boundaries or else to sea ports.

General Malcolm, Chairman of the Allied Commission in BERLIN, which is looking after the repatriation of these prisoners, has recently been in PARIS conferring on this subject. He passed through here yesterday and during his short stay I had a talk with him on this subject. It is understood that the Allies intend to repatriate these Russians belonging in the northern part of the country by way of ARCHANGEL.

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1228: Letter

Retention of Arms by Civil Police in British Zone

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, May 16, 1919.

No. 151

FROM: Chief

TO: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

* * * * *

6. Instructions Given in the British Occupied Area Concerning the Civil Police:

General Haking, Chief of the British Section of the Armistice Commission, presented a note to the Chief of the German Section containing the following orders in regard to civil police in the British occupied sector:

The following orders on the subject have been published by the military governor of the German territory occupied by British troops:

1. The civil police may be allowed to retain their swords (28.12.18).

2. The retention of pistols by the civil police and other civil officials may be authorized by area commandants when considered necessary for the maintenance of discipline amongst the civil population (dated 3.1.19). 3. It is essential that sufficient civil police and other officials should be armed to enforce that authority (dated 5.2.19).'

* * * * *

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1228

Peace Conference Adopts Maintenance Subcommittee's Views

[Contemporary Translation]

No. 1074/G

PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, May 16, 1919.

From: General Nudant

To: Chiefs of the Belgian, British and American Missions
General Ronneaux and Colonel Scimeca

Insofar as expenses of the Armies of Occupation are concerned, the point of view of the SPA Subcommittee presided over by General Ronneaux has been adopted by the Peace Conference in the following terms:

The total cost of upkeep of all of the Allied and Associated Armies in German occupied territory shall be at the expense of Germany, beginning with the signature of the Armistice of November 11, 1918, including the subsistence of men and animals, lodging and cantonment, pay and allowances, wages and salaries, bedding, heating, lighting, clothing, equipment, horse equipment, armament and rolling stock, aeronautical services, care of sick and wounded, veterinary and remount services, services of transportation of all kinds (by rail, by sea or river, by truck, etc.) communications and correspondence and in general all of the administrative and technical services, the functioning of which is necessary for the training of the troops, for the maintenance of their effectiveness and of their military power.

The reimbursement of all of these expenses coming under the above category insofar as they correspond with purchases or requisitions made by the Allied and Associated Governments in occupied territories shall be paid for by the German Government in marks to the Allied and Associated Governments at the rate of exchange current or accepted.

All of the expenses above enumerated shall be reimbursed in marks in gold.

The work of this subcommittee is then ended.

Consequently the officers forming a part of General Ronneaux's Mission will be put at the disposal of the French General Headquarters which will give them an assignment.

They will, however, keep themselves ready to furnish to the Reparations Commission instituted by the Treaty of Peace, all useful information and explanations.

NUDANT.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1228: Letter

Seizure in Danzig of Red Cross Supplies

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, May 16, 1919.

No. 151

FROM: Chief

TO: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

* * * * *

5. Seizure of Red Cross Stores En Route from Danzig and Poland:
General Haking, Chief of the British Section of the Armistice Section, presented a note to the Germans as follows:

Information received from DANZIG that German authorities held up and refused transportation British Red Cross stores DANZIG to POLAND. Excuse is 'only agreed to send food.' Head American Mission and Captain Harvey British Mission, DANZIG, demanded these Red Cross and relief supplies be transmitted under Article XVI, Armistice Terms. Matter taken up with Kriegministerium here but without result. Kindly arrange for instructions to be given German military authorities, DANZIG that these stores consisting of invalid comforts, dressings, etc., will be transmitted at once to Poland.

* * * * *

10. Red Cross Supplies for Poland: Referring to Paragraph 4 of my Report No. 148, which treated of the delay in shipment of Red Cross Supplies for Poland in which there is some discussion on this subject between General von Hammerstein, General Haking, and myself. General von Hammerstein this morning presented a note informing me that the German Government states that it has arranged for the cars containing Red Cross Supplies at DANZIG to be forwarded.

* * * * *

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section.

Transportation of Red Cross Supplies Through Danzig

[Contemporary Translation]

No. 22229/3605

Spa, May 16, 1919.

From: General Hammerstein, Chairman Armistice Commission

To: General Haking, Chairman British Mission and General Barnum,
Chairman American Mission

Answer to the American note of May 7, as well as to the British Note
A. C. 2243 of May 9 and A. C. 2319 of May 14, concerning transportation
via Danzig to Poland.

On the basis of the request of General Nudant in Note 311/G of January 21, 1919, the German Government in Note No. A. A. 641 of January 27, 1919, declared itself ready to admit food transportation for the Polish population. General Nudant in his Note 361/G of February 1, took express notice of the fact that the German Government was prepared to admit food transport through Germany to Poland. This obligation has been up to the present time conscientiously observed.

If cars which contain other objects than foodstuffs were held back, it was because the local services were acting in conformity with the order which had been given them at the proper time.

Now that the desire for the dispatch of Red Cross material is made of the German Government it is ready to cooperate and declares itself reconciled to the transportation of Red Cross material by way of DANZIG in case the assurances given that only foodstuffs and Red Cross material shall be transported by way of DANZIG to Poland.

The German Government, can, however, in no case consent to the transportation of war materiel by way of DANZIG. The danger of the dispatch of war materiel by way of DANZIG and this standpoint of refusal which in this respect is necessary, has been expressed by the German Government through its plenipotentiaries in SPA on April 3/4, 1919. In the SPA Agreement an understanding was reached to the effect that the sending of the Haller Army with its appurtenances would be made over land and all reinforcements of the Army of Haller should be sent by way of STETTIN and from there overland via KREUZ to Poland. These routes of transportation for war materiel must absolutely be maintained.

After General Barnum in the plenary session of the 10th of this month and General Haking in the conversation of yesterday, have declared to me that the cars mentioned in the notes contain nothing but Red Cross materiel, a regulation has been made to forward these cars for later transportation, and assurances in conformity with paragraph three of this note is requested.

HAMMERSTEIN.

Prices of Agricultural Implements and Machines

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, May 16, 1919.

No. 151

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

* * * * *

2. Prices of Agricultural Implements and Machines: General Nudant presented a note to the Chairman of the German Armistice Commission calling his attention to the fact that in the note of April 28 the German Commission obligated itself to furnish as soon as possible the prices of agricultural implements and machines by class and by kind. The prices have not yet been sent.

The French Minister of Liberated Regions insists in the most urgent manner that this information be communicated in the shortest possible time.

Attention is called in the note to the French Minister of Liberated Regions, which seems to be a new designation and possibly a new cabinet minister.

* * * * *

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1197: Memorandum

Conference on American Troops and Chain of Command

3d Section, G. S.

May 17, 1919.

MEMORANDUM FOR The Chief of Staff

1. In compliance with the orders of the Chief of Staff, I reported to the Commander-in-Chief at LUXEMBURG on May 14. The Commander-in-Chief directed me to be present at the conference between the Commanding General, Third Army and Marshal Foch. The Commander-in-Chief stated that if the question was raised he desired that Marshal Foch be informed that orders for any action by the Third Army must come from G. H. Q.

2. Immediately after arrival at COBLENZ, Marshal Foch took up a discussion of the projects shown in the accompanying note [not found]. The copies of these notes are undated, but I saw a map accompanying the originals which bore the date of May 11. At this first conference Marshal Foch asked that staff officers of the Third Army study the

question during the afternoon, with particular reference to the practicability of sending a division forward in motor trucks and as to the need for a cavalry division in maintaining contact with the British on the left. Certain officers of the Marshal's Staff discussed details with the Third Army Staff. During this discussion the Third Army Staff gave the French officers to understand that the Third Army would make no move without the orders of G. H. Q.

3. After the discussion between staff officers Marshal Foch asked for a further conference. At this conference there were present: General Liggett, Colonel Grunert, Colonel Montgomery, Marshal Foch, General Weygand and myself. The conversation soon turned to what I believe to have been the principal things in which the Marshal was interested---available troops and the question of command. As for troops, I stated that further reductions of the Third Army was dependent upon questions of policy which would probably be settled within a few days. As for the question of command I stated that G. H. Q. must give the orders. The Marshal showed disagreement, brought up the question of the French and British being willing to accept his orders given direct to the Armies, etc. Among other things the Marshal stated that his present trip along the RHINE was in obedience to directions from the Governments to prepare for a rapid resumption of hostilities and that the instructions of the President of the United States would be given directly to him (Marshal Foch), and that he could not delay matters to send orders through the Commander-in-Chief. Finally the Marshal expressed considerable annoyance in a manner which has become somewhat characteristic of him. Up to this time my statements had been made as tactfully as I was able, but believing that a plain statement was needed, I said: "In any event the Third Army will make no move except on the direct order of General Pershing." The Marshal stated that command under such circumstances was not practicable and intimated that he would take the matter up with the President of the United States. I intimated that that was his privilege and the interview closed.

4. With reference to the plan proposed by the Marshal the Third Army finds that it would be able to move a division forward in motor trucks and that the division of cavalry would be of very great value. In this connection, it is understood that prior to the conference the French began moving a division of cavalry into their portion of the COBLENZ bridgehead.

5. During the conference General Weygand's attitude seemed to be that of tempering the Marshal's attitude.

6. The above is of course a very brief resume of considerable discussion.

FOX CONNER,
Brig. Gen., General Staff,
Asst. Chief of Staff, G-3.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1197: Instructions

Role of Motorized Troops and Cavalry

[Contemporary Translation]

GREAT GENERAL HEADQUARTERS OF THE ALLIED ARMIES,
May, 1919.

Commander-in-Chief
of the Allied Armies
General Staff

SCHEME OF SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS CONCERNING THE ROLE
OF THE TROOPS TRANSPORTED BY AUTOMOBILE AND OF THE
CAVALRY.

[Extract]

The essential role of the troops transported by automobile and of the cavalry during the forward march into German territory must be to seize as rapidly as possible all enemy organizations which permit: Movements, communications, and supply of the Allied Armies.

In particular:

(1) Concerning Railroads: To occupy the railroad stations and important junctions, to prevent all destruction, all departures of the personnel, and to place signs, * * * to occupy administrative headquarters of railroad directions of the different German railroad nets * * *, to oblige the German personnel to remain on their duty, to make sure of the persons of the directors of the different railroad directions and of their principal assistants, to stop all train movements until the beginning of the railroad operations by the Field Railway Subcommissions.

To only carry out on the German railroads minor destructions and then only to make such destructions in case of a withdrawal (simple breaking of rails) in order to prevent the circulation of German railroad trains while waiting for the resumption of the forward movement.

The Field Railway Subcommissions who are charged with assuring the resumption of the railroad traffic will accompany the advance guards in automobiles.

(2) Concerning the Telegraphic and Telephonic Communications: To occupy the post offices and postal headquarters and important telephonic stations and to oblige the German personnel to remain in place, to assure control of the persons of the directors of these services, to prevent all destruction, and to prevent all traffic until the arrival of the Allied military telegraph and telephone personnel.

To carry out in the offices and on the lines no destruction but in case of withdrawal to bring away the apparatus, leaving the lines intact.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1228: Note

German Protest on Belgian Machinery Questionnaire

[Contemporary Translation]

A. A. I. I. No. 3997

Spa, Belgium, May 17, 1919.

From: Friedrich von Berchheim to General Delobbe

Concerning: The filling out of Questionnaires

[Extract]

The Belgian authorities of occupation in the occupied area have sent detailed questionnaires to the firms in their sector concerning the number of machines and apparatus which each firm holds. * * *.

The firms are called upon to hand in within a certain time limit, these forms filled out, the time limit being between May 5 and 30, according to the size of the business. As is seen from the directions and from the separate questionnaires it is a question of a

census of all of the technical apparatus of firms in the Belgian Zone of Occupation. The census covers not only machines and accessories which were brought over from France and Belgium, but it covers expressly also all machines or apparatus that was secured before August 1, 1914.

In behalf of the German Government I call the attention of the Allied and Associated Governments to the fact that the exaction of such a statement does not appear to be justified in any of the conditions of the Armistice Agreement, that it runs counter to agreements reached in negotiations of the Subcommittee for the return of machines and material taken from Belgium and northern France, and finally that this measure has provoked most acute unrest in the circles of population that has been affected by it. I therefore make most emphatic protest against this procedure and request an immediate removal of the order.

BERCHHEIM.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1228: Note

Delivery of German Vessels to Danish Firm

[Contemporary Translation]

Wako 22584 Mar.

Spa, May 18, 1919.

From: General von Hammerstein

To: General Nudant

Concerning the delivery of 13 ships built by German firms for the Danish Reeder Lauritzen, to the consignee.

The Danish Shipping Firm Lauritzen ordered the following ships from German firms:

(a) Three steamers of about 1,300 tons, ordered from the Shipbuilding Company Unterweser LEHE-BREMERHAVEN. The first one contracted for on May 12, 1915, the second two were according to contract of November 30, 1915.

Of these ships, two have been finished for some time and the completion of the third is daily expected.

(b) Six steamers of about 1,500 tons, ordered from the Atlas Works, at BREMEN, four of them according to contract of November 30, 1915., and the last two according to contract of December 29, 1915. The completion of the two ships is expected to take place within a few months the completion of the others during the course of the summer.

(c) Four steamers of about 1,500 tons, ordered from Nuscke and Company, a stock company of STETTIN, according to contract of June 16, 1915. The completion of these four steamers is expected during the course of the year at intervals of a few months. The Danish Government has requested the German Government to have these steamers sent out.

Since all of these steamers are under 1,600 tons gross and since such steamers are not subject to delivery according to agreement made, Article XXXIII of the Armistice Agreement cannot be applied to them. Therefore, it is purposed to deliver the boats in question to the Danish Shipping Company Lauritzen. An early substantiation is requested of the view point that vessels ordered by neutral countries which according to the type and size are not to be delivered, are not subject to Article XXXIII of the Armistice Agreement.

HAMMERSTEIN.

COPY TO:

American Representative, Supreme Economic Council,
Transportation Section, PARIS, France.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1228: Letter

***Entry of American Representative into Germany to Investigate
American Property***

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, May 18, 1919.

No. 152

FROM: Chief

TO: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

8. Entry of American Representative into Germany to Secure Information About American Property: Freiherr von Berchheim presented a note in answer to a request of April 27, concerning the entry of Mr. Lee J. Wolfe into Germany for the purpose of securing information about American property in Germany. The note continued by stating that the German Government is ready to permit Mr Wolfe to proceed provided the American Government gives assurance that the journey to America of corresponding German commissioners may take place and that proper rights be guaranteed to these commissioners with respect to their freedom of movement and inspection of factories and with respect to freedom of communication with all persons interested.

The granting of this request with such proviso attached seems quite preposterous, and if Armistice conditions continue it would seem only logical to demand of the Germans, a right for Mr. Wolfe's entry as requested without any corresponding concessions being granted to the Germans.

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

German Aid to Bolshevists

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, May 18, 1919.

No. 152

FROM: Chief

TO: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

1 German Aid to Bolshevists:

General Nudant presented a note to the Allies informing them that the Marshal, Commander-in-Chief, had advised under date of May 16 that:

According to reliable information I am informed that German elements continue to lend their aid to Bolshevist Armies in southern Russia, especially in the region of ODESSA.

This situation is squarely contrary to the stipulation of Clause XIII of the Armistice Agreement of November 11, 1918.

It is all the less justifiable since arrangements have been made at the instance of the German Government for the evacuation by the Allies of German subjects from southern Russia.

I beg you to make known to the German Armistice Commission that the Allied and Associated Governments take note of this violation of Clause XIII above mentioned and that they demand of the German Government that instructions be given in order to assure a strict observation of that clause.

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

Shipments of Red Cross Supplies Through Danzig

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, May 18, 1919.

No. 152

FROM: Chief

TO: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

* * * * *

6. Shipments of Red Cross Supplies Through Danzig: General von Hammerstein presented to General Haking and to General Barnum a note * * * in continuation of the discussion regarding the transportation of Red Cross Supplies for Poland by way of Danzig.

This matter was treated of in Paragraph 4 of my Report 148; the German note * * * being a continuation of that discussion and states that now that the desire for the dispatch of Red Cross material is made of the German Government it is ready to cooperate and declares itself reconciled to the transportation of Red Cross material by way of DANZIG, in case assurance is given that only foodstuffs and Red Cross material shall be transported.

In the former discussion attention was called to the last part of Article XVI of the Armistice Agreement which states that the Allies are authorized to use DANZIG or the VISTULA River in order to convey supplies to the population, or for the purpose of maintaining order,

This latter clause is sufficiently broad in its scope and would not necessarily limit shipments as called for in General von Hammerstein's note.

* * * * *

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1228: Letter

Prohibitions on Exportations Modified

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, May 20, 1919.

No. 153

FROM: Chief

TO: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

* * * * *

10. Exportations from Germany:

In accordance with a decision of the Supreme Economic Council of May 13, concerning the execution of the BRUSSELS Agreement, the following has been decided:

1. That it is absolutely prohibited to export from Germany gold, silver, securities, and material of war without the special consent of the Allied Government.
2. Concerning all other exportations, comprising merchandise figuring on preferred lists, all requests for authorization to the Interallied Commerce Commission or to the blockade authorities with a view to exportation may be considered as unnecessary, and all requests heretofore presented will be granted.

The foregoing information is communicated to the Blockade Committee of LONDON and of the different neutral countries interested. I requested the Minister of Marine to inform the Interallied Naval Commission. It is understood that the above instructions are transmitted for information, but ought not to be communicated to the Germans.

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1228: Note

German Reply on Arrest of Polish Officials

[Contemporary Translation]

A. A. I. No. 2952

Spa, May 20, 1919.

Representative of the German Government

To the Chairman of the P. I. A. C.

On behalf of the German Government I have the honor to answer your Note No. 1048/G of May 11 to the effect that Councillor Laszewski is indeed involved in an act of high treason, but that he is enjoying complete liberty. The statement that he is under arrest is therefore inexact and probably is based upon a false description which comes from a deputation sent to PARIS and consisting of several DANZIG Poles under the leadership of Mr. Marczewski, which deputation has been making itself notable in the last few days by the dissemination of false information.

As far as the report is concerned that several more members of the Polish People's Council of DANZIG are under arrest, accurate information can only be obtained if the names are given as at the present time the members have their domicile outside of the city of DANZIG.

BERCHHEIM.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1228: Letter

Relief of Member of the German Armistice Commission

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, May 20, 1919.

No. 153

FROM: Chief

TO: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

* * * * *

4. Relief of Major von Pabst as member of the German Armistice Commission: Under date of May 18, Marshal Foch, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies telegraphed as follows:

I beg you to notify the German Armistice Commission that the presence on that Commission of Major Pabst von Ohain, who took part on May 14 in BERLIN in a public meeting and made violent and defamatory remarks against the Allied Armistice Commission, will not be longer tolerated, and in consequence this officer will be invited to leave SPA.

General Nudant in transmitting the above to General von Hammerstein, added the following:

Consequently the passport of Major von Pabst will be turned in without delay to the Interallied Armistice Commission. This officer will leave SPA on May 18.

5. Relief of Major von Pabst as a Member of the German Armistice Commission:

The following is the reply of General von Hammerstein to the above note:

I express my regret that Major von Pabst, who is reproached with *des propos diffamatoires* (derogatory remarks) has not been given any opportunity to defend himself. General Dupont had the intention of giving him this opportunity as appears from the attached copy of a note from General Dupont to the German Armistice Commission. The text of Major Pabst's speech would of course have been placed at his disposal.

I might also expect that the Allies would have assumed a less harsh attitude, especially toward Major Pabst who took such a predominate part in the quick deportation of about 800,000 Allied prisoners of war in two months, which performance General Nudant himself designated long ago as splendid. If Major Pabst used bitter words in saying that he has not succeeded during 6 months of Armistice in alleviating the extremely severe fate of German prisoners of war and in effecting at least the beginning of their repatriation, this is quite easy to understand.

Marshal Foch expressed the opinion that Major Pabst requested to leave SPA. General Nudant sharpened the injunction from Marshal Foch and by his addition and the setting of a time limit of a few hours clothed it in a form which I can only greatly regret. I do not receive any commands from General Nudant.

* * * * *

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section, P. I. A. C.

Preparations for Possible Advance into Germany

May 21, 1919.

From: The Chief of Staff

To: The Commanding General Third Army, A. E. F.

1. There are enclosed herewith copies of documents Nos. 2577, 2583 and 2584, received from Marshal Foch.

2. You will make such arrangements as may be necessary to enable you to begin an advance, in accordance with the terms of the enclosed documents, on or after May 27 in the event that instructions for actual advance be received on or after May 24. Orders for initiating the movement, should the advance be found necessary, will come from these headquarters

3. For your information, it is hoped that by May 24, conditions will permit resuming the withdrawal of the 5th Division and of at least a part of the 4th. In any event, it is desired that that part of the 4th Division employed to relieve Pioneer Infantry close unimportant railheads as rapidly as practicable.

By direction:

J. W. McANDREW,
Major General, U. S. A.,
Chief of Staff.

[On this letter appears a pencil note in General Conner's handwriting, as follows:

Col. Marshal phoned at 1:40 p. m. May 22 that orders received from Foch changing [changed] date of May 22 to May 30.

This phoned to Third Army, 3 p. m., May 22.

F. C.]

[Contemporary Translation]

G. Q. G. A. May 20, 1919.

Commander-in-Chief Allied Armies

Marshal Foch, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies

To General Pershing, Commander-in-Chief, American Expeditionary Forces
in France.

No 2577

1. The Supreme War Council has decided that the Allied Armies should be ready, on and after May 27, to resume active operations immediately upon the order therefore being given.

2. Please profit, therefore, of the interval between now and the 27th in taking all necessary measures so that the forward movement may be begun without delay, if necessity should arise.

3. The preliminary movements, which it has been intended should be carried out during the last three days notice heretofore contemplated, will in principle be executed during the last three days of the period from now until the 27th; this so that the preliminary movements may not be made prematurely and so that they may be postponed if necessary. This will also avoid holding the troops on the alert for too long a time.

4. The operations will in principle be conducted according to the program which I discussed with General Liggett. My written directives follow.

F. FOCH.

[Contemporary Translation]

G. Q. G. A. May 20, 1919.

Commander-in-Chief Allied Armies

General Staff, 1st Section

No. 2583

DIRECTIVE FOR THE HIGH COMMAND ONLY

1. Should the German Government refuse to sign the preliminaries of peace, it would be necessary, in order to break its resistance and to impose peace upon it, to seek this resistance at its source---WEIMAR, BERLIN---with indisputably superior military resources.

To this end the greatest possible mass of the Allied Armies would be sent forward toward WEIMAR, BERLIN, centers of German resistance by the shortest routes and from the nearest points: MAYENCE, COBLENZ, COLOGNE.

2. Thus constituted and launched in this direction, with its flanks well covered by the Main to the south and the LIPPE to the north, the mass of the Allied Armies would obtain during the advance results calculated to weaken the German State:

By greatly weakening southern Germany, for the possession of the valley of the Main will separate north from south Germany.

By a great reduction of the German resources by the occupation of the Basin of the RUHR.

3. Perhaps the German Government, thus deprived of an important part of its means of resistance will be led to submit to the conditions of the Entente without further delay.

In this case, the Allied Armies, if their advance should be stopped, would remain with their flanks covered on the south by the Main and on the north by the LIPPE.

4. The Allied forces on a war footing permit the execution of this plan of operations. They would include from the beginning:

37 divisions of infantry and 5 divisions of cavalry (*) Of this total it would be sufficient to maintain in position for the occupation of the Rhenish Provinces about:

6 divisions of infantry.

There would therefore remain available for the first operations:

31 divisions of infantry and 5 divisions of cavalry, as follows:

A French mass	(12 Div. Inf. ((2 Div. Cav.	(operating to the south of (the general line (exclusive) (COBLENZ, LIMBURG, GIESSEN, (EISENBACH.
An American mass	(2 Div. Inf. (((1 French Cav. Div.	(operating to the north of the (above mentioned line inclusive (and to the south of the line (exclusive: REMAGEN---SIEGEN---BRILON--- (BEVERUNGEN.
A British mass	((6 Div. Inf. (1 Div. Cav.	(operating to the north of the (above mentioned line inclusive (and to the south of the line: (DUSSELDORF (common to the (Belgians and the British) road (DUSSELDORF-RATTINGEN---WUFFRATH--- (HATTINGEN---WITTEN---HORDE---UNNA--- (DINKER---LIPPBORG, this road in (its entirety to the Belgians ex- (cept UNNA, which is common to (the two Armies. (
A French mass	(3 Belgian Div. of Inf. (2 French Div. of Inf.	1 Div. Cav.	(Operating between the line (above mentioned inclusive, (and the LIPPE.
In general reserve 6 Div. Inf. at the disposition of the C-in-C of the Allied Armies.	(3 French Div. Inf. (2 Eng. Div. Inf. (1 French Div. Inf. ((31 Div. of Inf. 5 Cav. Div.		(in the region of MAYENCE (in the region of COLOGNE (in the region of NEUSS.

F. FOCH.

Belgian Forces	6 Div. Inf. and 1 Div. Cav.
British Forces	10 Div. Inf. and 1 Div. Cav.
American Forces	3 Div. Inf.
French Forces	18 Div. Inf. and 3 Div. Cav.

Total 37 Div. Inf. and 5 Div. Cav.

3 Belgian Div.	(The French Forces of
2 British Div.	(Occupation are drawn
1 American Div.	(from other forces than
	(those indicated above.

6 Divisions

G. Q. G. A. May 20, 1919.

Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies

1st Section, G. S.

No. 2584

NOTE

1. The operations prescribed in the directive of May 20, looking to a penetration of the enemy's country, to be made as rapidly as possible in the indicated directions.

2. Consequently the character of these operations exact that the important points of the country and, in particular, the railroad junction points should be held at the earliest moment by advance guards reaching to this end the places:

WURTZBURG, GEMUNDEN, SCHLUCHTERN (junction point of ELM), KIRCHAIN, FRANKENBERG, ARNSBERG (junction point of OLPE), SOEST, HAMM.

3. This result will be sought:

(a) By troops transported in motor trucks (in principle one division on each line of communication), who should reach the points indicated on the day J and be in condition surely to hold them. These divisions will leave detachments to guard principal points of these lines of communication.

(b) By cavalry troops moving by ordinary road, who must reach these points on the day J plus 1.

4. The main bodies of the forces of operations will be put in movement on the day J by ordinary road for the nearest units and by railroad for the more distant units so as to effect their concentration in rear of the line indicated above.,

5. In order to meet any unexpected resistance which might develop on the central part of the general front of advance, which is the weakest on account of the strength given to the Armies on the flank, it is desirable to prepare for concentration in this central part by assuring the liaison between the Armies. To this end, French and British troops must march with but little interval between them and the American Army so as to be ready to support in case of need the latter Army. Similarly, the French and Belgian troops must be held in close proximity to the British zone of operations.

It goes without saying that in addition to these tactical dispositions, reciprocal liaison must be established between the commanders of neighboring Armies.

6. It is well understood that in each Allied Army, the dispositions ordered for the advance and for halts will assure:

The eventual employment of the troops in battle

The security of the troops

The protection of the communications in rear.

Consequently movements in tactical formations with distant reconnaissance and with the various units carefully protected and closely connected, as well as the usual dispositions for security of troops at the halt must be methodically organized.

The occupation of the country in the rear should not retain more than the necessary forces for the security of the lines of communication or those strictly necessary for the maintenance of order so that the greatest possible strength will always be available for the forward movement.

* The French 2d Cavalry Division stationed to the south of COBLENZ in the region KAMP, KESTERT, GONDERSHAUSEN, DOMMERSHAUSEN, SALZIG, (G. H. Q. NIEDERLAHNSTEIN, 5 km. south of COBLENZ (information by phone from Col. Marshall to James L. Collins, Sec. G. S.) is placed at the disposition of the American Army in order to assure the latter's liaison with the English Army.

7. These operations will be prepared so that beginning on May 27 they may be executed without prior notice on a day J which will be fixed by further orders.
Before this day no Allied unit will pass the line now held by the outposts.

F. FOCH.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1228: Note

German Protest on Expulsion of Officers from Occupied Zone

[Contemporary Translation]

K. M. No. 22411/12

Spa, Belgium, May 21, 1919

From the Chairman of the German Armistice Commission

To the Chairman of the French Armistice Commission

IN CONNECTION WITH NOTE A. A. I. No. 2859

From a circular which the District Councillor of SAARLOUIS upon the representations of the military authorities was obliged to make public (Circular No. S 1209/C of April 14, 1919), it appears that the active officers, employees and N. C. O.'s of the German Army who were still inactive service on November 11, 1918, were to be expelled with their families to the right bank of the RHINE.

From a further circular that has come to me I see that the execution of this regulation has already been put into practice and that the date of the last expulsion has been set as April 30.

Such an action would be in stringent opposition to the basic regulation of Marshal Foch of November 18, 1918, according to which "all persons demobilized from the Army, officers inclusive, may remain resident in the Rhinelands or return there insofar as they had their residence there before the war." From this regulation it is clearly evident that there possibly was intended to be given to the numerous officers who lived before the war in the towns on the left bank of the RHINE after their regular demobilization [permission] to return to their homes even after in case their original detachments have moved to other sections. It is further plainly evident without further explanation that the execution of the above mentioned orders which have previously remained unknown to me, have added new difficulties to the hardships already suffered by the populace on account of the occupation. Innumerable families of officers, employees and N. O. O.'s will on account of this order be seriously injured.

I entered formal protest against this order and request that I be given an explanation of it. In view of the evil results that are to be expected from it, I request that the order be revoked.

HAMMERSTEIN.

Third Army Proclamation and German Protest

[Contemporary Translation]

A. A. II No. 4102

Spa, May 21, 1919.

Representative of German Government

To President of P. I. A. C.

The Headquarters of the Third Army of the American Expeditionary Forces promulgated the following proclamation on April 11:

All persons, institutions or communities that are the possessors or holders of property that was taken away after August 1, 1914, from France, Belgium, Luxemburg, Alsace-Lorraine, Rumania or Italy and which falls in one of the following categories or whosoever knows of other persons who have such property in their possession or under their jurisdiction will give notice of the fact to their Mayor or local authorities on or before April 20, 1919:

- (a) Industrial machinery such as factory equipment and workshop machinery, tools, raw materials and articles, materiel or,
- (b) Agricultural machinery and implements or,
- (c) Horses, cattle or,
- (d) Books, jewels, clothing, skins, works of art, or,
- (e) Any other property which was removed from France, Belgium, Luxemburg, Alsace-Lorraine, Rumania or Italy.

These notifications must give the following data:

- (a) Geographical location (district and locality) and as far as possible the name of the possessor and,
- (b) The name and address (district and locality) of the person, owner or possessor (person, institution or community) and,
- (c) The present condition and serviceability of the property.
- (d) The place from which the present owner or possessor received such property.

The complete report which is required by this notice must, as is announced here, be given without any addition being paid to previous reports which may have been made in accordance with previous regulations. All owners or possessors of such property are made responsible for the surveillance of the property until further orders are published. Whoever fails to obey any part of the above regulations or gives incomplete or false information will be brought before court martial.

J. T. DICKMAN,
Major General, Commanding.

The extent of the obligation for resitutions undertaken by the German Government based upon Article XIX of the Armistice Agreement was determined absolutely, binding for both parties, by the special agreements of the Finance Subcommittee of Dec. 1, 1918 and the negotiations of the subcommittee on the return of machinery and material to Belgium and northern France. According to these agreements the German Government undertook for the duration of the Armistice Agreement merely the return of financial securities,

documents, archives and objects of art, as well as the return of industrial and economic articles in accordance with the detailed conditions laid down in the above mentioned agreements. It was further prescribed that in these agreements that the obligation for restitution to the Allied Governments was incumbent only upon the German Government and not upon the individual German owners and possessors. The above promulgation lays a direct obligation upon the private owners and possessors through requiring a notification to be made of articles which fall under the conditions of the above-mentioned conventions as especially industrial machinery, etc. This measure is an encroachment upon the rights reserved to the Government in accordance with agreement toward the subjects of the German Government. In addition, the imposition of the obligation of notification of such a far-reaching extent represents such an extreme encroachment upon the conditions of ownership and right and upon the economic life of the population of the occupied areas that it appears to be an act of *Force Majeure* which belongs in no wise to the authority of the troops of occupation, but rather must remain in any case the task of the German Government and its administrative organs.

The imposition of a so far-reaching requirement must be considered to be preparatory measure for further regulations probably looking to the imposition of an obligation to restore the articles. A one-sided promulgation of an order requiring such return of articles would be a stringent violation of the Armistice Agreement in general and of the invulnerability of the property of the inhabitants of the occupied area granted by Article VI, Paragraph 1, of the Armistice Agreement which the German Government would not be in a position to accept.

On behalf of the German Government I enter emphatic protest against the proclamation and request its immediate revocation. I further ask for information as to whether in the other areas of occupation similar orders or proclamations having the same purpose have been issued.

BERCHHEIM.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1228: Letter

Restitution of Cattle

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION
Spa, Belgium, May 22, 1919

No. 154

FROM: Chief

TO: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[EXTRACT]

* * * * *

8. Restitution of Cattle from Belgium to France:

The American Representative on the Service of Industrial Restitution Committee at WIESBADEN has the following to say respecting the return of French cattle left in Belgium, or taken to Belgium by the Germans:

The Commission charged with the restitution of cattle from Belgium has practically failed in this work. Out of 80,000 head it has only been possible to secure some 8,000 and this at the cost of much hard feeling. The remainder of the cattle taken from France had already either been slaughtered or so scattered through Belgium that no trace could be found of them.

* * * * *

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1228: Letter

Return of Industrial Machinery

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, May 22, 1919.

No. 154

FROM: Chief

TO: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

* * * * *

3. Proclamation of the American Third Army Respecting the Notification of Possession in Articles of Restitution: In a note from the German Government to the President of the P. I. A. C. dated May 21, AAI No. 4102, emphatic protest is made against the order published by the Commanding General, Third Army, concerning the notification of possession of machines, raw-material, horses, cattle, clothes, works-of-art, etc. In addition to the protest, request is made for a revocation.

Evidently the object of this is to discover property of the Allies taken by the Germans with a view of restitution and has been published in line with the policy of the Allied Governments.

A copy of the protest has been furnished the Commanding General, Third Army, and information as to the action of the other Governments concerned with respect to this same matter will be requested. * * *

* * * * *

9. Attitude of the German Workmen with Respect to the Removal of Machinery from Germany:

The following quotation from the report of the American representative of the S. I. R. is of interest as showing the attitude of German workmen on this question:

In the Kaiser-Wercken they were told by the directors that the workmen opposed any removal of machinery. The French, however, insisted on visiting the works. Here

they talked with the workmen explaining to them that by taking the machines away from France in the first place thousands of laborers had been thrown out of work. The workmen were entirely in accord with the French on the removal of the machinery and it appears had in no way made the opposition the directors had pretended.

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1228: Letter

Censorship

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, May 22, 1919.

No. 154

FROM: Chief

TO: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

* * * * *

2. Postal Communications Between the Occupied and Unoccupied Territories of Germany: In a note presented by General Nudant dated May 21, CIPA-1105/G, to the German Armistice Commission in reply to a note of the Germans of May 12, No. 3914, respecting the censorship applied by the troops of occupation and the consequent delays in postal communication, Marshal Foch is quoted as saying that the postal communication between the occupied and unoccupied territories of Germany before the reestablishment of peace is a favor granted by the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies, and, therefore, the protest of the German Government as to the method of application cannot be entertained.

* * * * *

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section.

***German Refusal to Reduce Number of N. C. O.'s of Neutral
Zone Garrisons***

[Contemporary Translation]

Wako O. 20557

Spa, May 22, 1919.

From: General v. Hammerstein

To: General Nudant, Chairman of the P. I. A. C.

In answer to notes P. I. A. C. 982/G, April 29, 1919, and 1039/G, May 9, 1919, I have the following explanations to make:

The troop detachments in the Neutral Zone consist of volunteers only. In the very essence of the newly founded volunteer system one of the first principles is that non-commissioned officers of the active list enter the ranks. For this the practice of the soldiers career is a question of life and death until they have attained some other method of earning their living. If the number of N. C. O.'s permitted is to be limited as the Allies demand the majority of the N. C. O.'s will be without food or position. In addition the already very feeble strength of the troops of surveillance would fall so materially that the detachments would no longer be sufficient to maintain order and calm. Inasmuch as these noncommissioned officers do the work of private soldiers they are only insofar as their appearances and pay are concerned in the relationship of officers.

Inasmuch as the Allied and Associated Governments themselves have great interests in the efficient occupation of the Neutral Zone, and inasmuch as any attack upon the present arrangement of the troops of occupation that have been tried and have worked together for a long time would bring with it serious results, the German military authorities have no reason to allow any change to enter into this question, all the more so because the question is one of internal arrangement of the service.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Third Army, Fldr. 278: Message

Change of J-day

[Contemporary Translation]

Chief Command of
the Allied Armies
1st Section, General Staff

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,

May 22, 1919.

Operations - Priority

No. 2621

From: Marshal Foch

To: General Pershing, Commander-in-Chief of the American Expeditionary
Forces in France.

Because of the progress of negotiations, the operations set forth in my Telegram No. 2577 of May 20 as being able to be undertaken after May 27 are not to be considered before May 30.

By order of the Major General:

WEYGAND

Transmitted by fast messenger to General Pershing, 45 Avenue Montaigne, PARIS.

AGO, GHQ, AEF: 20376-B-104: Telephone Message

Action of Third Army on Political Agitation in Rhineland

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF,
May 22, 1919--2 p. m.

General Eltinge: I got a report from Preston Brown about their wanting to put some French agitators in your zone. I telephoned that report to General Pershing, and he wanted to be sure that the report was perfectly accurate, because he is going to take it up with the President. Will you . . .

General Liggett: This morning General Mangin sent one of his staff, a colonel, and said they wanted to know what our attitude would be on a proposition for a sort of political revolution. They had 50 deputies that were coming up here for the purpose of proclaiming the west bank of the RHINE an independent affair - it was to remain German but separate from the Prussian and that France would recognize them at once - and wanted to know whether we would acquiesce. I said that we did not have anything to do - that we did not have any authority to acquiesce in anything of the kind, and advised them that they take it up with Trier - with Brown - and he substantiated this decision - said we would stand pat. They evidently wanted to come up here, have a political meeting, declare this outfit an independent republic, and then wanted to know if we would do business with the new Government. I said we would not have anything to do with the new government - or anything - there were 50 deputies - then they went back to General Mangin's Headquarter with the advice to take it up with the people at TRIER.

General Eltinge: I communicated the matter to the Commander-in-Chief. He directs me to say to you - and I will send it to you by telegram - with reference to telephone conversation relative to possible political agitation by outsiders in territory occupied by the Army of Occupation, the Commander-in-Chief approves the action already taken by you and he further directs that you refuse to allow French or other political agitators to operate in the territory controlled by you, no matter by whose orders they may claim to be operating or desire to be permitted to operate.

ELTINGE.

[Phoned to Quekemeyer - May 22, 1919 - 2:40 p. m.]

Action of Third Army Approved

May 22, 1919.

Commanding General, Third Army, A. E. F.

With reference to telephone conversation relative to possible political agitation by outsiders in territory occupied by the Army of Occupation the Commander-in-Chief approves the action already taken by you and he further directs that you refuse to allow French or other political agitators to operate in the territory controlled by you no matter by whose orders they may claim to be operating or desire to be permitted to operate.

JAMES W. McANDREW,
Maj. Gen., U. S. A.,
Chief of Staff.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1228: Letter

Alleged French Propaganda in the Palatinate

[Contemporary Translation]

Wako
Bayern 22974

Spa, May 23, 1919.

From: Chairman German Armistice Commission

To: President of the P. I. A. C.

In the meeting on April 30, in the courses of the discussion of the German Note 20447 concerning the founding of councils of prominent citizens in the PALATINATE, General Nudant stated among other things: "The PALATINATE is the PALATINATE and we have nothing to do with it."

I attach herewith a copy of a French secret order that comes from the French Eighth Army of March 16, 1918, from which it appears that apparently on the French side there is still considerable interest in the PALATINATE. Otherwise there would be no special notice necessary for influencing the people of the PALATINATE.

The Command reads:

Eighth Army
General Staff.
G-5,
5th Section,
No. 3810

Headquarters March 16, 1919.

ARMY ORDER

Directions about the attitude which officers and soldiers of the Army of Occupation in the PALATINATE are to observe toward population. (Down to battalion commanders inclusive.)

The preliminary conditions of peace to be imposed on Germany are at the present time under discussion. Such of these conditions as relate to the frontiers of Germany will no doubt regulate the situation of the countries on the left bank of the Rhine.

Up to the present time our actions in the PALATINATE have been limited to conciliating the attitude of the people without prejudicing the future. We ought to take advantage of the present circumstances to take one step further.

The events that have occurred in Germany recently have no doubt made a strong impression upon the populations of the left bank of the RHINE, and have brought them nearer to us. They see in our presence an assurance against anarchy and a guarantee for a better future. Fearing Bolshevism above all, they are aware that the troops of occupation are their best safeguard. That is the reason for the tendencies toward separation which are evident almost everywhere in the PALATINATE. It is that tendency which we ought to exploit from now on by making the populations of the left bank of the RHINE understand that their material and moral interest lies in separation from the right bank.

For this purpose it is proper that we first of all remove from the minds of the inhabitants any fear that they may have concerning the future of their country by showing them that the Allies are pursuing no plan to annexing but that they desire simply to protect themselves by the occupation of the RHINE from any new aggression on the part of Germany. It is in their own interest just as much as in ours that war should not begin again.

The countries on the left bank of the RHINE will remain free, free to be grouped according to the affinities of race, according to historic laws or economic advantages, free to be administered and to be governed by themselves.

It is this supreme idea of liberty which we must above all emphasize; political, industrial, religious, commercial liberty in all its forms; guaranteed by the Allies and especially by France. It has always been the glorious role of France to bring liberty to people and to assure it wherever its flag floats, the rule of right and justice.

It may be added that the PALATINATE will be freed of military burdens which will continue to weigh more or less heavily upon the other people, that the PALATINATE will remain in free communication with the sea by way of the RHINE, that the protection of its economic interests will be better assured by France's factories than by Germany conquered. That perhaps a part of the burdens which would have to be borne by the PALATINATE as a result of the defeat of Germany might be erased

This propaganda must be spread with discretion, that is to say, without ostentation or machinery, by individual actions, notably in regard to people who are occupying positions of authority (representatives, mayors, various officers, the heads of factories, members of the clergy, etc.)

As far as the PALATINATE especially is concerned it must remain understood that the frontier can be stretched according to the wishes of the people beyond the present limits by the addition of provinces which formerly belonged to them.

Two ideas must be opposed absolutely:

1. The formation of a single republic or of the federation of republics on the left bank of the RHINE. The best method is to play off the inhabitants of the PALATINATE against those of the north Rhenish Provinces.

I beg for an explanation of this affair.

v. HAMMERSTEIN.

Release of American Divisions

OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF,
May 24, 1919.

CONFERENCE HELD ON MAY 24TH IN PARIS BETWEEN MARSHAL FOCH,
GENERAL PERSHING, GENERAL WEYGAND AND COLONEL
MARSHALL

[Extract]

1. Movement of the 5th Division and of the Artillery of the 4th:

General Pershing said he had come, as had been agreed to previously, to talk over the question of moving the 5th Division and the Artillery of the 4th. It was, if possible, advisable to take full advantage of the available sea tonnage for the transportation of troops. Furthermore, between the time when a division was released and the time when it was actually on board ship, a delay of 25 to 30 days was necessary.

Marshal Foch said that the question was this: Would it be necessary to take action on the RHINE and when? This question he was not at present in a position to answer definitely. However, he could state that, from the military point of view, nothing stood in the way of starting the transportation of the two above-mentioned units.

General Pershing said that he was not willing at all to take the attitude of sending away troops if they were necessary. He pointed out that the 5th Division and the Artillery of the 4th Division would always be available for duty even after their release, all the time they were present in France.

Marshal Foch pointed out that he was very much embarrassed. The question was one of governments. From the military point of view the situation was this: May 30 was the day on which action might have to be taken. Preparatory movements of concentration had been ordered and were to start on the morning of the 27th, unless countermanded. Would they be countermanded? The reply to this question would depend largely on the question which he was going to put to the Allied Governments, and for which he would ask a reply for the 26th. However, he did not feel very sure that he would get a very definite reply from the Allied Governments.

General Weygand pointed out that whether this reply be given or not the Marshal would have to give instructions on the 26th, since movements of concentration were beginning early on the 27th. General Pershing said that in his opinion the question was more or less a diplomatic one on account of the impression that the transportation of American troops would give.

Marshal Foch said he entirely agreed to that. President Wilson, he thought, was much better than he in a position to give a reply to the question under discussion, because he, President Wilson, knew if action would be or would not be taken on the 30th.

General Pershing said he doubted if anybody positively knew at the present time. He therefore suggested that the matter be dropped for the present and taken up again at an early date, when the situation would be more clear.

Marshal Foch said this was also his opinion and the matter was dropped.

* * * * *

Reduction of Armistice Commission

OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF,
May 24, 1919.

CONFERENCE HELD ON MAY 24 IN PARIS BETWEEN MARSHAL FOCH,
GENERAL PERSHING, GENERAL WEYGAND, AND COLONEL MARSHALL

[Extract]

* * * * *

2. Armistice Commission at SPA: General Pershing expressed his opinion that the number of American officers at present a part of the Armistice Commission at SPA could be greatly cut down.

General Weygand said that this was absolutely certain. The French had been cutting down themselves very drastically the number of their representatives. They had suppressed the Committee in charge of the reception of war material. Possibly that Committee could be later on transformed into one of the control committees provided for by the Peace Treaty. The Committee in charge of claims has been suppressed too. However, the members of these committees were held in readiness with a view to their possible employment in the commissions provided for by the Peace Treaty.

The only thing that was useful was to maintain the chiefs, so that they could turn over their business to the members of these commissions after the signature of peace.

Marshal Foch said he entirely agreed.

The Conference adjourned.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1228: Note

Immunity for German Holders of Industrial Material

[Contemporary Translation]

1121/G

PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, May 24, 1919.

From: General Nudant, President of the P. I. A. C.

To: General v. Hammerstein, President of the German Armistice Commission

Answer to Note 568/19467 of April 25

The protocol of March 28 relating to the restitution of industrial materiel and the Letter Number 863/G of April 8, relative to the immunity granted German holders of French or Belgian material were sent on May 3 to the commanders of the troops of occupation by the Marshal, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies.

The attention of these authorities was formally called to the fact that German holders of French or Belgian material must not, according to the terms of these two notes, be prosecuted nor kept under arrest no matter what the nature of their material might be.

These prescriptions are applicable to the holders of materiel of any kind and not only of those who are in possession of German military materiel.

The only ones who can be prosecuted are those who have not made declaration or who may have injured the materiel in their possession. Insofar as the particular case of Messrs. Hinsberg and Rochling is concerned, I have asked for special information which I will send you as soon as it has arrived.

C. D. F./1

Copy to: C. G. American Third Army.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1228: Letter

Allied Decisions Concerning German Baltic Forces

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, May 25, 1919.

No. 155

FROM: Chief

TO: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

11. Polish, Lithuanian, and Latvian Fronts:

In a note dated May 25, General Nudant was transmitted to General von Hammerstein the following telegram from Marshal Foch dated May 24:

The Allied and Associated Governments, May 24, have taken the following decision with respect to the conditions of the application of Article XII of the Armistice of November 11 in what concerns the Polish, German-Lithuanian, and Latvian fronts:

'1. The German Government should arrange and assure the maintenance in place of the combatant German forces of Latvia and of Lithuania.

The Allied representatives sent into these regions will fix finally, after a development of the organization of local forces, the period in which the evacuation of these countries can be realized by the German troops.

'2. In the districts of AUGUSTOWO, SUWALKI, and GRODNO, and in particular of the district of SEINY, situated west of the river TSCKERNOGANSKA (MARYCKA River) the retreat of the German troops should commence immediately.

'3. General Henrys, Chief of the French Military Mission at WARSAW, is charged with communicating this decision to the Polish Government and with assuring the control of the evacuation by the German troops of the districts designated above.

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section.

Creation of Neutral Republic of the Pfalz [Palatinate]

[Contemporary Translation]

Wako 23126

Spa, Belgium, May 25, 1919.

From: General von Hammerstein

To: General Nudant

I said in my Note of yesterday, No. 23126, in which I transmitted the first reports respecting the proclamation of a neutral republic of the PFALZ promoted on the part of the French, that the reports appear to me unbelievable.

This is not correct. That which is unworthy of belief is a fact. The Government President of the PFALZ, von Winterstein, who opposed sharply the efforts of the Committee of twenty-one in LANDAU, supported by General Gerard, to proclaim an independent PFALZ Republic, had been expelled by force cross the RHINE. All PFALZ officials have been asked by the French occupying authorities to render an oath of allegiance to the newly planned government, the Independent Republic of PFALZ, which is to be formed out of the twenty-one LANDAU men under the leadership of Haas, Schenck and Hofer named in my Note No. 23126. General Gerard has published the following notice for the PFALZ in which he says:

It has come to the knowledge of the Chief Command of the French Army that the inhabitants of LANDAU have had to experience inconveniences because of their sympathetic bearing toward France, on the part of certain German officials. Such treatment on the part of these officials is a misuse of the privileges of their office and a violation against the orders of Marshal Foch, as well as an incorrect attitude against victorious and well-meaning France.

Finally it was made known in this declaration that the French occupying command of the PFALZ will favor all efforts toward the independence of a PFALZ Republic in connection with the best interests of France, and considers suppressing of opposing steps.

In the name of the German Government I have the honor to make the following declaration:

The French Chief in Command of the PFALZ [i. e., The French Commander in the PALATINATE district], General Gerard, and the French authorities under him have undertaken by the misuse of the rights given them by the Armistice Agreement to promote and support the revolution which has as its object the separation of the PFALZ from Bavaria and from the German Empire. The attempt to proclaim an independent republic of PFALZ and the forceful separation this political unit from Bavaria and the German Empire has been initiated by about twenty-one persons. The great majority of the PFALZ inhabitants are stirred up and excited about the treasonable doings of these persons and are convinced that the leader of the movement has been influenced by low and material reasons.

On May 18 the PFALZ delegates, members of the PFALZ diet as the constitutional administrative body of the PFALZ, the leaders of the political parties, representatives of trade, industry and commerce of the wine industry of the PFALZ, societies of the Christian Union and of the District Union of PFALZ, of the Union of Bavarian Officials and Teachers came together at the call of the Government President. They ascertained in unanimous decision the will of the people that the PFALZ remain as part of the common Fatherland also in hour of need. If after this indisputable proclamation of the will of the PFALZ people the French commander continues to

support the treasonable plans of a handful of men by force against the PFALZ officials and against the population then this procedure violates the law of nations and international morality. The German Government raises anew the sharpest and most solemn protest against the procedure of the French Chief in Command of the PFALZ. The German Government cannot conceive that at the present time when the plenipotentiaries of the German Government and the Allied and Associated Governments are assembled in VERSAILLES with the object of bringing about the conclusion of peace, an open breach of right and of flagrant violation of the right of self-determination, such as the procedure of General Gerard must be designated, with the approval of the Chief in Command of the Allied Forces, Marshal Foch, and with the approval of the French Government.

The German Government believes, therefore, that it can appeal, not without success, to the principles of future League of Nations approved by all peoples and states and to righteousness as well as to international morality in that it expects the immediate recall of the French Chief of Command in PFALZ and the immediate withdrawal of his measures of exploitation.

I request information on this subject as soon as possible.

HAMMERSTEIN.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1228: Note

Establishment of the Council of Notables in PFALZ

[Contemporary Translation]

Wako No. 23126

Spa, May 26, 1919.

From: General von Hammerstein

To: General Nudant

Subject: The Council of Notables in Landau

In the French reply to my Note No. 20447 of April 30, with respect to the establishment of the Council of Notables in PFALZ, it is set forth that the German Government had suspended the furnishing of food and fuel to the PFALZ and that for this reason a Council of Notables was necessarily established.

Even if this were the fact, this could not be taken as sufficient grounds for the establishment of a new economic committee. The objection raised, however, is really not justified. In numerous notes it has been pointed out from here that the left RHINE district has been furnished according to the measure of the supplies on hand and to the extent of the existing possibility so that it was not placed in a worse position than the right RHINE district. It should not be left unmentioned that the measures of the occupying authorities, especially the blockade measures taken and the limitation of the German administration has made difficult rapid and successful work of the German agencies.

The necessity for the foundation for this council cannot, therefore, be recognized. With this reservation, however, it is admitted that against the members of the Council who have placed themselves at the disposition of the French occupying authorities at their request no reproach will be raised so long as they limit themselves to purely economical activity. I also acknowledge that political activity is not desired on the part of the French. The suspicion that the members of the Council could, therefore, be selected to

form a Provisional Government of a Neutral Republic of PFALZ actually attempted in the meantime by the French is therefore removed from the members.

HAMMERSTEIN.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Third Army: Fldr. 278: Telegram

Change of J-day

L. R. No. 3668

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,
May 26, 1919.

Pershing, Chaumont

2285 Twenty-sixth. Following received from Marshal Foch. "2690. Kindly defer preparations movement for May 27 and following day. These movements will only be undertaken on further orders.

Indication as to the new date contemplated will doubtless be forwarded to you about the 30th. Signed Major General Desticker."

MOTT.

Third Army: Gen. File: Fldr. 278: Memo

Information on Possible Resumption of Hostilities

3d Section, General Staff
G-3

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,
May 26, 1919.

MEMO FOR: The Chief of Staff

1. General Craig telephoned the following interest items this afternoon:

(a) The Third Army has the complete text of the treaty as submitted to the Germans by the Allies, this text being both in French and in English. The book was obtained from a German who had received it in some manner unknown.

(b) According to all indications General Craig states that neither the French or the British intend to carry out the orders of Marshal Foch for rapid movement to the front in case of further orders.

FOX CONNER,
Brig. Gen., General Staff,
Asst. Chief of Staff, G-3.

Possible Advance

3d Section, G. S.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,
May 26, 1918.

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Chief of Staff

1. General Craig called by telephone at 5:30 p. m. and stated that General Fayolle, Commanding the French Armies of Occupation, had visited Third Army Headquarters and had stated that he intended to commence the preliminary movements required under existing orders on J-3 day (provided further notice be given) tomorrow morning, May 27. General Fayolle expressed surprise that the Third Army was not moving and it developed that the purpose of his visit was, in part at least, connected with his desire to move a cavalry division in COBLENZ and turn it over to the Third Army.

General Fayolle was informed that the Third Army had no orders to move and could not accept the cavalry division until they had received such orders. General Craig was informed by me that this action was correct. In this connection it is to be noted that the Third Army requires only 24 hours notice in order to be able to execute existing orders.

FOX CONNER,
Brig. Gen., General Staff,
Asst. Chief of Staff, G-3.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1228: Letter

Allied Military Jurisdiction Over German Civil Authorities

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, May 27, 1919.

No. 166

FROM: Chief

TO: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

1. Military Authorities to Decide in Regard to Actions of German Civil Authorities: Marshal Foch has transmitted the instructions and these were conveyed to the Germans that as long as the state of war lasts the military authorities are the only ones who are competent to judge whether actions of the German civil authorities are in the interests of the Armies of Occupation or contrary to their interests.

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section.

Reported Anti-Separation Demonstration in Cologne

3d Section, G. S.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,
May 27, 1919.

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief of Staff

1. General Craig called up at 4:45 p. m. and said that the British authorities in COLOGNE had telephoned to the Third Army that a demonstration was in progress in COLOGNE against the reported separation of the Rhenish Provinces from the remainder of Germany. The British authorities stated that the agitators at COLOGNE claimed that this separation had been announced from COBLENZ.

2. The Third Army informed the British authorities that this was not true and General Craig reports that German bankers in COBLENZ also informed the bankers in COLOGNE that there was no truth in the report. General Craig adds that the civil authorities in COBLENZ appear to be aware of the efforts made a few days ago by the French toward the creation of a separate Rhenish State.

FOX CONNER,
Brig. Gen., General Staff,
Asst. Chief of Staff, G-3.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1228: Note

Dismissal of German Member of Armistice Commission

[Contemporary Translation]

No. 1144/C

Spa, May 27, 1919.

From: General Nudant, Chairman of the P. I. A. C.

To: General von Hammerstein, President of the German Armistice Commission

I acknowledge receipt of your Note No. 22582 of May 26, regarding the departure of Major Pabst von Ohain.

I am not satisfied to recognize this incident to be a misunderstanding for it is easy to discover in the text as communicated - and which was probably even more severe in tone in the personal lecture - imputations that tend to oppose the Allies one against the other and to represent the French especially as being animated by a motive which is not at all in their character.

I consider this affair closed.

Foreign Banks in Occupied Zones

[Contemporary Translation]

AAII No. 4200

Spa, Belgium, May 27, 1919.

From: The Representative of the German Government

To: The Chairman of the P. I. A. C.

[Extract]

The legal measures adopted by the German Empire for the protection of German securities and for the prevention of the withdrawal of capital into foreign countries are prejudiced to a great extent in that a carrying out of the German regulations in the occupied districts meets with difficulties or is made impossible by the interference of the authorities of the occupying forces. . .

Whoever of the foreign occupying authorities is empowered to go back and forth across the boundary can regardless of the German regulations take along money and securities and other valuables without hindrance. . .

A fact that recently foreign banks have been set up in the occupied district gives occasion for special consideration. Thus the bank of Thos. Cook and Son, LONDON, has opened recently an office in COLOGNE. The firm of Cox and Co. Ltd., of France which is connected with the First Bank of England will according to report open an office in a short time. In the bank circles of the Rhineland and Westphalia a lively unrest has sprung up insofar as it is feared that these banks will not observe the German regulations under any circumstances and thus they will draw to themselves a large clientele . . .

Circumstances of this kind have a reactionary effect on the unoccupied districts. It is well known that at present in Germany, partly from the expected high taxes, partly from the fear of Bolshevism, it is sought by every means to take securities out of the country. It is argued that the present circumstances in the occupied districts favor such attempts.

It is not a question of a single case but a complete system has been built up for taking securities from the unoccupied district by way of the occupied districts into foreign countries. This will bring ruin to German finances. It is important that the occupying forces recognize German regulation in the occupied districts and place no hindrance in the way of carrying them out. . . .

It is also emphasized that the supervision of the execution of these German laws and regulations be under German officials, German boundary officials and German post supervisors.

WACHENDORF.

Political Activities in Rhineland

[Contemporary Translation]

Wako 23605

Spa, May 28, 1919.

From: The Chairman of the German Armistice Commission

To: General Nudant

The German Government has made the following proclamation:

WARNING

According to reliable information, there exists a criminal plan to proclaim the Rhineland Province as an independent Republic.

Under the Constitution, the Province of the Rhineland forms a part of the Prussian state.

Whoever undertakes to change this Constitutional status by separating the Rhineland Province from the Prussian state renders himself guilty of high treason, which according to Art. 81 of the Criminal Code (Reichsstrafgesetzbuch) is punishable with life imprisonment in penitentiary or in fortress.

The organs of Criminal Prosecution are duty bound to take steps to the limit of the law against every one who has any part in these treasonable activities.

Berlin, May 28, 1919.

The Imperial Government.

It is in the interests of the population that this warning shall find a broad dissemination. In the occupied portion of the Rhine Province, however, the publication in the papers so far as is known here, is possible only with the permission of the censorship authorities.

In order to prevent different censorship authorities from assuming different attitudes, it is requested in the interest of the population that the Allied High Command issue general instructions that the publication of this warning be neither hindered or delayed.

HAMMERSTEIN.

Transportation of Food and Other Supplies Through Danzig

[Contemporary Translation]

No. 993/T

Spa, May 28, 1919.

From: General Nudant, President of the P. I. A. C.

To: General von Hammerstein, Chairman of the German
Armistice Commission

The Marshal, Commander in-Chief of the Allied Armies, telegraphs the following, May 27, 1919, No. 8889/CR:

1. The German Government recently held up a certain number of cars bearing supplies for the Red Cross and sent to POLAND by way of DANZIG.

2. As a result of a protest entered by the Chief of the American Mission and by Captain Harvey of the British Mission at SPA, orders were given to allow this transport to continue but the request was made that guarantees be given that only foodstuffs and Red Cross supplies should be transported to POLAND through DANZIG.

3. According to the terms of Article 17 of the Armistice Agreement the Allies have free access to territory evacuated by the Germans on the eastern front either via DANZIG or the VISTULA, for the purpose of being able to reprovise the people and for the purpose of maintaining order.

4. Upon the request of the German Government the Allies admitted other methods of transportation through the protocol of April 4, 1919, but this protocol refers only to transportation of the troops of General Haller's Army, and all transportation food stuffs and reconstruction materiel, especially the transportation of railway material, food supplies and articles acquired by POLAND in the Allied countries may be secured by way of DANZIG in conformance with Article 16 of the Armistice Agreement.

5. I beg you to transmit this communication to the German Government so that no further incident may occur as far as transportation by way of DANZIG is concerned.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1228: Note

Suspension of German Newspapers by the British

A. C./2513

Spa, May 29, 1919.

To: The President, Interallied Armistice Commission, General Nudant

From: Chief of the British Armistice Commission, General Haking.

The Military Governor of COLOGNE has informed me that he has suspended on May 28 the German newspapers Rheinische Zeitung, Koelnische Zeitung and Stadt-Auzeiger. The first mentioned is suspended for May 28/29 and the two last for May 28 to 30. The reason given for this suspension is that articles appeared in these papers concerning the Allies and

with reference to the formation of a west Rhineland Republic. I have not seen these papers but I infer from the Military Governor's letter that the articles indicated that the Allies were supporting the establishment of such a republic which of course is ridiculous. It is useless, however, to estimate what the reasons are for the suspension until we get copies of the papers in question.

Meanwhile General von Hammerstein has sent you a protest on the subject Wako No. 23605 of 28th, and he has today sent me a protest regarding the above newspapers, Wako No. 23605 of 29th instant.

The Military Governor of COLOGNE has informed me that the German Armistice Commission at SPA have been telephoning to the chief towns of the British area and giving information regarding the Proclamation of the German Government which proclamation was included in General Hammerstein's letter to you No. 23605 of May 28. The Military Governor of COLOGNE requests me to take action to stop such irregular procedure on the part of the German Armistice Commission here.

I would suggest for your consideration that we should first obtain copies of the newspapers that have been suspended before we take any action in reply to General von Hammerstein's letter to you. Secondly, that you, if you think fit, should inform General von Hammerstein that he has not right to telephone any communications to the Germans in the occupied area.

No doubt you will give me your views on the subject tomorrow so that we may act in concert in the matter.

R. HAKING,
Lieut. General.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1228: Note

German Protest on British Censorship

[Contemporary Translation]

Wako No. 23605

Spa, Belgium, May 29, 1919.

From: General von Hammerstein

To: General Nudant

The Koelnische Zeitung and the Rheinische Zeitung in COLOGNE have been from time to time suspended, according to reliable information by the British censorship authorities in COLOGNE on account of their opposition to the plans for the establishment of a Rhenish Republic.

The attitude of these newspapers represented an intercession in behalf of the existing constitutional order. If the suspension was actually made because of the reasons above mentioned, then this would be tantamount to supporting a revolutionary movement against the existing order of government.

An explanation is requested and if necessary the removal of the prohibitory measures.

HAMMERSTEIN.

German Interpretation of Article XII of the Armistice

[Contemporary Translation]

Wako No. 22249

Spa, May 29, 1919.

From: General von Hammerstein

To: General Nudant

As an answer to Note C. I. P. A. No. 1125/G of May 25, 1919, I am charged with handing you the following notice:

The German Government has repeatedly presented its attitude toward Article XII of the Armistice Agreement of November 11, 1918 to the effect that the conception of the Allied and Associated Governments that we in Article XII had placed ourselves under the obligation to leave our troops in the east until such time as the Allies should consider their withdrawal as suitable, is not in accord with agreement made. The German Government on its part, when the immediate withdrawal was demanded of us made a request, in consideration of the impossibility of the immediate execution on account of lack of railway material and in consideration for the fate of the districts threatened, that our troops might be permitted to remain there longer.

The German Government has already, in the note of December 27, 1918, expressed its viewpoint to the effect that the words in the final draft of Article XII 'as soon as the Allies shall judge the moment' according to the conception apply merely to the latest moment up to which we might be allowed to occupy the districts and not to the earliest moment at which we would be justified in evacuating these districts. Consequently the German Government cannot recognize an order for the retention of German troops on the spot, and we must rather persevere in its conception that all the German troops which are still in the district belonging to Russia before the war are at liberty to withdraw behind the German border according to their desire.

Minister ERZBERGER.
HAMMERSTEIN.

British View of Third Army Proclamation

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, May 30, 1919.

No. 157

FROM: Chief

TO: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

* * * * *

8. Order of the Third Army as to Notification of Possession of Articles of Resitution: Referring to Secret Report 154, Paragraph 3, it is of interest to note here that in a note presented by General Haking to General Nudant, A. C./2511, of May 29, 1919, in reply to the German request as to whether the other occupying Armies had issued such an order, it is said that the British Army has not issued such an order and has no intention of issuing a similar order, but if it were found necessary such action would be considered quite within the rights of the British military authorities.

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1228: Letter

Controversy over the Baltic Provinces

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, May 30, 1919.

No. 157

FROM: Chief

TO: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

* * * * *

2. Evacuation by the German Troops of the Baltic Countries:
General Nudant presented the following note of the Germans:

No. 1152/G. The Marshal, Commander-in-Chief of the Armies of the Allies, telegraphs the following May 28, No. 2725:

'I am informed that the Germans in view of the coming evacuation of their troops east of the Baltic countries are concentrating a large stock of supplies, and especially railway materiel. These actions are contrary to the stipulations of Article XII of the Armistice Agreement of November 11, 1918. I beg you to demand the German Government to stop this concentration immediately.'

Upon the presentation of this note, the following discussion took place:

GERMANS (General von Hammerstein). I handed over to General Nudant yesterday a note on this subject from the German Government. This note shows the German point of view of Article XII of the Armistice. I will transmit this Note of General Nudant's to the German Government, but before I give any answer to it, I should like an answer to my note of yesterday.

ALLIES (General Nudant). The interpretation given by the German Government cannot be accepted. The text of the Armistice is perfectly clear and gives no ground for further discussion. It is there stated that the Germans will evacuate these regions, the Baltic Provinces, when the Allies judge that the proper moment has come. That is clear. The Allied Governments determined the proper moment when the German troops must withdraw. That was definitely stated in the conditions of the Armistice. At the time of the signing of the Armistice the German plenipotentiaries did not raise any objections to these conditions, although they were perfectly aware of the meaning of it. All of this means that undoubtedly the interpretation set forth in the German note of yesterday will not be accepted by the Allied and Associated Governments. It happens that I have just received, although too late to put in form to transmit to you, a note that makes precise the purposes of the Allied and Associated Governments in this matter. I will have the honor to transmit it to you this afternoon. In general, it concerns the following: First of all it determines the line north of which the German troops must be. Second, it treats of the question of General von der Goltz. This will be given to you later.

GERMANS (General von Hammerstein). I take the liberty of referring only to the origin of Article XII. It is said in this Article that the areas outside of Germany occupied by German troops are to be evacuated immediately. Our negotiators at COMPIEGNE in November as far as I am informed brought forward the point that it was in our interest that the Germans should not withdraw from all these places in order that they might have time to assess the materiel, etc. This was also suggested in the interest of the population in order to avoid the exposure of the latter to the onslaughts of the Bolsheviks, and that is why the German troops remain in the Baltic Provinces. It was this consideration that lead to the text of Article XII being adopted as it stands at present. When we were still masters of the situation in the east we had an interest, in the Germanic sense of the word, in certain portions of the Baltic Provinces, and this caused the German Government to adopt the standpoint that the fixing of the time for evacuation of these Provinces must be left to the Germans. I have thus made the statement with the following object,---namely, to give the German standpoint showing the origin of the text of Article XII.

ALLIES (General Nudant). I do not oppose at all the statement that the Germans made clear their point of view at the time of the discussion of the Armistice Agreement. That was their right and duty. I state merely that after they had presented their objections, the text was drawn up and they signed it and the text is perfectly clear and in accordance with that text the note has been drawn up which

has just come and of which I just spoke to you. The note is as follows:

'No 1153/G. The Marshal, Commander-in-Chief of the Armies of the Allies, telegraphs the following on May 28, 2726:

'1. In addition to the orders laid down in telegram No. 2627 of May 24, the maintenance of the German fighting forces in Latvia and Lithuania is required to be north of the following line: The demand is made that the German fighting forces of Latvia and Lithuania be held north of the line marked by NIDOKI, KOSHEDARI, the River NIEMEN below JIJMOPI as far as BALWIERZVSKI, LUDWINOW, the River SCHESCHUPPE-VIJAINY, the towns of PALVERJISHKI, LRUDVINOF, JVIJAINY, (exclusive) the other localities inclusive.

'2. The Allied and Associated Governments allow General von der Goltz to remain in his commanding in Latvia under the following conditions:

A. The General will receive instructions with a view to facilitate the formation of a coalition government representing all parties in Latvia in proportion to their importance.

B. He will return the arms to the Latvian troops who have been disarmed.

C. No hindrance will be allowed in the mobilization and instruction of the local Latvian troops.

D. The new Latvian Government will be allowed complete liberty to carry out its function without any obstacle on the part of German authorities.

'Fifteen days will be granted from the first of June for carrying out these conditions. At the end of this period the Allied and Associated Governments will examine again the attitude they will take with regard to General von der Goltz.'

GERMANS (General von Hammerstein). I take note with satisfaction that the demand for the dismissal of General von der Goltz is not maintained. With regard to General von der Goltz's further employment, I shall have to obtain instructions from the German Government.

The note referred to by General von Hammerstein in his remarks to which he desired an answer presents a note of Minister Erzberger, and outlines the German interpretation of Article XII of the Armistice Agreement. * * *. It is the reply to the note transmitted by General Nudant to the Germans, reported in Paragraph 11 of my Report 155.

* * * * *

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section.

AGO, GHQ, AEF: 20376-B-131: Letter

Internal Policy in Occupied Areas

ADVANCE GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,
Trevés, May 31, 1919.

FROM: A. C. of S.

TO: Chief of Staff, A. E. F.

[Extract]

1. I attach copy of telegram received in cipher from Marshal Foch, addressed to the Commanding General, American Army, TREVES.

* * * * *

3. The contents of this message have not been transmitted to the Commanding General, Third Army.

PRESTON BROWN,
Brig. Gen., G. S.

[Contemporary Translation]

TELEGRAM IN CIPHER

The reports of the Armies have informed me of political movements in favor of the formation of an autonomous Republic in the occupied territory.

The attitude observed by the Army commanders in view of this movement seems to be regulated by the following lines:

A. The armies should not mix in the questions of internal policy, they should neither impede nor encourage the trend of opinion, affecting liberty which the population follows as it is itself disposed.

B. Especially should there be no impediment offered against the liberty of the people to express by means of posters or any other means their vindication concerning these questions.

C. The Allied military authorities shall inform the Prussian and Bavarian officials that they shall continue to function until the troops arrive and that they need not fear that they will limit their functions or encroach on the political liberty of the people and that no damage appertaining to this shall be tolerated.

D. If any property shall be damaged or destroyed, commanders of Armies should only interfere to prevent strife at the same time that they shall receive and transmit to their governments at once the protests and grievances of the conflicting parties.

I shall be grateful if you will inform me of any happenings which may take place in the territory which you are commanding.

MARSHAL FOCH.

AGO, GHQ, AEF: 20376-B-141: Message

Autonomy of Rhenish Republic

2d Section, General Staff

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,
June 1, 1919.

Telephone message received 2:30 p. m. from Col. R. H. Williams, G. S.,
A. C. of S., G-2, Third Army

The first delegate of the Rhenish Committee to the Commanding General of the American troops at COBLENZ, MAYENCE, June 1, 1919, 12:30 p. m.

The deputies of Rhenish Prussia, Old Nassau, Rhenish Hesse and of the Palatinate in answer to the imperative wish expressed since more than six months ago by the Rhenish people, after holding a meeting at AIX-la-CHAPELLE, WIESBADEN and SPEYER proclaim, dating from June 1, the autonomy of the Rhenish Republic from the interior of Germany.

The new republic will have its capital at COBLENZ, the provisional seat of the government to be at WIESBADEN, wish to hasten as much as possible the proclamation of peace; further, wish to join to avoid any new deliberations. The deputies seek from the Peace Conference to be simply and purely recognized as the republic of a new state, the laws of which will be made by a popular vote. Being faithful to its Fatherland, which has just had an unheard of misfortune, but the terrible responsibility for the same can be traced to Prussian militarism and having affected all of Germany, the new state does not wish in any way to seek any way out of sharing in the reparation which is due to France and Belgium for the damages caused to those countries. The Rhenish populations wish to detach themselves definitely from all feudalism and Prussian militarism. Always since they can remember, being the born enemies, they seek the Allied Powers to protect them now, and in the future, against all revenge and strive from the elements and bodies incapable to appreciate the justice and loftiness of their aspirations; further, against all those who threaten from the prisons and their fortresses the partisans of the Rhenish freedom. They also count on them for protection to assure them of the freedom of the approaching elections which are going to make the change and will fix the status of the new republic.

Long live the Republic of the Rhineland - long live liberty.

The Provisional Government asks the Commander-in-Chief of the American troops to advise his Government of the last happenings at WIESBADEN on June 1.

Dr. DORTEN,
Chief of the Provisional Government.

A delegation of the Provisional Government asks permission to go to PARIS immediately in order to tell the Peace Conference the wishes of 12,000,000 people of the Rhineland.

AGO, GHQ, AEF: 20376-B-132: Memorandum

Alleged Establishment of Rhenish Republic

2d Sect., General Staff

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,
June 2, 1919.

Memorandum for the Chief of Staff

1. In connection with the report received on June 1 from Col. R. H. Williams, A. C. of S., G-2, Third Army, regarding the establishment of the Rhenish Republic, the following has just been received:

Yesterday, Sunday morning, General Mangin, commanding the French Tenth Army had conversation over the telephone with General Clive, Chief of Staff and Military Governor at COLOGNE, and told him that a Republic had been proclaimed in WIESBADEN this morning.

Doctor Dorten was proclaimed as President of the Republic and that he (Dr. Dorten) was sending a telegram to the Commanding General, British Army on the RHINE, requesting that the creation of the new Republic be announced to his Government, and that the French were in support of this movement.

General Mangin indicated that they would like the support of the British Army. General Clive replied that he could not commit the British Government in the matter.

Additional - At 6 p. m., last night, the following telegram came to the Telegraph Office, COBLENZ, addressed to the Civil Affairs of the American Army; to Commandant Gloeze, who is French Liaison Officer with American Civil Affairs, Third Army; to Lt. Colonel Coche, French Liaison Officer, Civil Affairs, Advance G. H. Q. and to the Cercle Dell:

Mayence, June 1. This morning the RHINE Republic was proclaimed in all cities without difficulty. Provisory Government presided over by Dr. Dorten is at present installed at WIESBADEN and is obeyed. This event which ends annoyed incidents appears very fortunate to a majority of the population who remain very calm. Dr. Dorten has addressed a message to Marshal Foch for the Peace Conference and to all Generals commanding Armies of Occupation for their respective Governments.

(unsigned)

This is the attitude of General Liggett:

He does not recognize Dr. Dorten and he does not know who he is. That there is one set of officials in the American occupied area whom he will recognize and that they are the ones with whom we have been carrying on official relations since occupying Germany. We will not allow any demonstrations that will tend a breach of peace, nor will we allow any public building, to carry on official business with these headquarters.

D. E. NOLAN,
Brigadier General, G. S.,
A. C. of S., G-2.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1229: Letter

Reports on Return of Machinery, Cattle; Relief of American Member of Committee

No. 158

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, June 2, 1919.

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

1. Work of the Committee on Return of Machinery, etc. to Northern France and Belgium:

The report from the American member on the Committee having in charge the above work, which covers the period from May 20 to May 30, shows that approximately 8,000 tons of machinery have been returned from Germany during the month of May. This is several thousand tons less than it was anticipated would be returned, but the deficiency is explained partly by delays in the PARIS office and to postponements in the Ministries in BERLIN awaiting the decision of the peace negotiations.

The requisitioning of cattle in Germany to replace those taken from France has not advanced far and only can be fixed definitely by the Treaty of Peace. Likewise, French cattle transferred to Belgium are being returned very slowly owing to the opposition of

the peasants and of the Ministries. The French have practically renounced all expectation of securing further cattle from this source.

It is also reported that shipments of agricultural machinery have practically stopped.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1229: Note

German Protest on French Propaganda for Rhenish Republic

[Contemporary Translation]

No. Wako 24071

Spa, June 2, 1919.

From General von Hammerstein to General Nudant

I am asked to transmit the following note:

"Trustworthy information has reached the German Government to the effect that the French troops of occupation in the areas on the left bank of the RHINE, misusing the authority granted them by the Armistice, are fostering and supporting treasonable activities in the occupied area. The German Government regrets greatly that as the result of the measures taken by the Allies it is not in a position to cause direct investigation to be made of the information which has reached it. It must therefore base its action upon the trustworthy reports that have come to it.

According to these reports persons of no political influence and who have not been empowered by the people have repeatedly carried on negotiations with the purpose of calling forth a Rhine Republic and tearing the Rhenish Republic loose from the German Empire and especially together with the French officers General Mangin, General Gerard, Colonel Pinot, and Captain Rostan. French authorities of the occupying troops also permitted placards to be posted on June 1 inciting to the formation of a Rhenish Republic while their authorities of the troops of occupation forbade the publication of the warning of the German Government of May 29 against treasonable activities.

According to reports that have already reached the Government, on Sunday morning MAYENCE was placarded with calls for the formation of a Rhenish Republic and these were signed by names unknown and committees. In order to express its disapproval and the people pulled down most of the placards. The French military authorities then took steps and arrested the Germans who had torn down the placards, and up to the present time have not released them.

At a conference which the Nassau authorities had with Col. Pinot against the founding of a Rhenish Republic, the Colonel answered a German employee, who, as was his duty, called the attention to the fact that the French military authorities were supporting treason against the German Government, stating that he would cause the cities who were not in agreement with the formation of a new Republic to be shut off from a supply of food, and he added that the employee in question would be expelled within 24 hours from the occupied areas.

According to official information, the President of the Government, Winterstein, the highest administrative authority in the Palatinate has been expelled from the Palatinate

by the French authorities of occupation. In addition, French officials of the troops of occupation have accepted two dispatches from a States' Attorney, Dorten, of WIESBADEN, who of his own accord dignified himself with the title of President of the New Republic, dispatches direct to the Peace Commission of the Allied and Associated Powers in PARIS, and in which among other things he requested that he be allowed to go to PARIS for negotiations.

These actions of the French authorities of the troops of occupation stand in sharpest opposition to the conditions of the Armistice Agreement of November 11, 1918, and to the repeated declarations of M. Foch at the time of the signatures of the renewals of the Armistice. The action of the French military authorities represents a severe violation of the international obligations undertaken.

The German Government enters emphatic protest against this action and expects that nothing will be undertaken by the authorities of the occupying troops at the time of the peace negotiations that might lead to destroy the successful course of the negotiations and might make them unsuccessful.

Minister ERZBERGER.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1229: Note

Withdrawal of German Troops in the Baltic

[Contemporary Translation]

PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, June 2, 1919.

No. 1172/G

From General Nudant, President of the P. I. A. C.

To: General Von Hammerstein, Chairman of the German Armistice Commission

In Note No, 1125/G of May 25, I transmitted to you Telegram No. 2672 from the Marshal, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies, on the subject of the movement of German troops in LITHUANIA and LATVIA.

It is especially said in this telegram that in the district of AUGUSTOWO, SUWALKI and GRODNO and in a part of the district of SEINY west of the river CZERNEHANJE (MERYOKA), the withdrawal of German troops was to begin immediately.

It has been pointed out that the Germans have at their disposal in the region of SUWALKI several armored trains.

I am instructed by Marshal Foch, in case this information is correct, to invite the German command to withdraw these armored trains from the region the evacuation of which is prescribed in Note 1125/G and from the lines from SUWALKI and GRODNO to VILNA by way of ORANY, which lines must be left to the free disposal of the Polish command.

I request that you inform me concerning the orders given upon this subject by the German command.

German Proposals on Delivery of Agricultural Implements

[Contemporary Translation]

AGR No. 23

Spa, Belgium, June 3, 1919.

From Freiherr von Berchheim to General Nudant

**CONCERNING THE EXECUTION OF THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT
OF JANUARY 16, 1919, INsofar AS THE DELIVERIES OF AGRICULTURAL
IMPLEMENTS ARE CONCERNED**

In order, once and for all, to set aside the difficulties and objections between the German Government and the Allied Governments, which constantly arise in the delivery of agricultural implements according to the Armistice Agreement of January 16, 1919, the German Government proposes that upon the occasion of the discussion which will take place in SPA on June 5, 1919, concerning material to be delivered by the Germans to Belgium, that negotiations shall be entered into for the following purposes.

1. To attain an absolutely complete agreement as to the exact details of quantity, of quality and type of the balance of deliveries to be made by Germany in order to accomplish the final fulfillment of the Armistice Agreement of January 16, 1919. The German Government must here call attention to the fact that since the Allies decline the excess deliveries of steam plows against the first amount agreed to by Germany, compensations must be sought from other sources than agricultural implements, and that accordingly the Allied representatives should come provided with full powers. Attention may here be invited to the offer of mill machines and large gasoline motors (explosions motoren).

2. To conclude a binding agreement concerning the delivery of raw material and half finished products from the occupied zone to unoccupied Germany for the purpose of manufacturing agricultural machines called for in the Armistice Agreement of January 16, 1919. The German Government now in advance, referring to its numerous written and oral representations upon this subject that outside of the 8,000 tons short and which is due to be shipped for the fulfilling of the Armistice requirements of January 16, 1919, a further amount of 30,000 tons of raw material and half finished products from the occupied districts will be absolutely necessary. At that a punctual delivery of the finished agricultural implements can be promised only when the separate factories shall have received the necessary raw material and half finished products at least two months before the date of delivery. The German Government requests that delegates with full powers be sent to discuss this question also. It is proposed that the Chairman of the German Sub-commission for Delivery of Agricultural Implements, Freiherr von Gebattel, meet with Lieut. Passelegue in SPA, June 5, 1919, in order to arrange technical details of the negotiations that are to be entered into.

BERCHHEIM.

German Protest on Activities of French Officers in the Palatinate

[Contemporary Translation]

Wako 24106

Spa, June 3, 1919.

From Hammerstein

To Nudant

In my Note No. 22974 of May 23, 1919 and 23126 of May 24, and May 25, I have protested against the attitude of French troops of occupation in the Palatinate toward the treasonable activities of a small minority of the population.

From later announcements of German authorities it appears that no account whatever has been taken of protests made hitherto.

French officers of control travel over the Palatinate, work with the Burgomasters, call together meetings and are openly active in the interests of a Neutral Independent Republic of the Palatinate. They threaten with court-martial any officials who refuse to cooperate with them. Treasonable placards are posted and given out. Communication with the right bank of the RHINE is entirely cut off: the Government and the press are completely gagged so that no protests or explanations are possible. The officials state that they refuse their service to the Neutral Republic and the people are behind them.

I again make the sharpest protest against this new manifestation of the attitude which is contrary to international law.

I request information concerning steps taken.

HAMMERSTEIN.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1229: Note

German Announcement to People of Rhineland

[Contemporary Translation]

Wako 24114

Spa, June 3, 1919.

From General v. Hammerstein, Chairman of the German Armistice Commission

To General Nudant, President of the P. I. A. C.

Supplementary to my note of yesterday, No. 24071, I am charged to transmit the following unanimously adopted announcement:

"TO THE GERMAN PEOPLE ON THE RHINE

"We, the representatives of the Rhineland in the German National Assembly and in the Prussian Diet make a protest against the proclamation of separate republics in West Germany. In the occupied area the people themselves have not the possibility of expressing their opinions, therefore, we, your chosen representatives, raise our voices and we repulse the machinations of those in opposition to the will of the entire people of

the Rhineland turn to the foreign ruler in order to ask his help against the German Fatherland. Only complete lack of a National spirit can explain such a shameful plot. At this time of general misfortune it is the duty of every German to remain faithful to his people and to his Fatherland instead of aggravating its misfortune through the disintegration of such state organization as still exists. Every part of the German people will have its place under the new constitution, will come into its rights, and will be able to foster its individuality in all freedom. There is no need of any treasonable activities to accomplish this end. No Government can suffer that its people during the negotiations of peace conditions should be encouraged to revolt by official representatives of its enemies. The spirit of confidence without which peace negotiations cannot be carried on may be stifled by such activity. People of the RHINE we call to you. Preserve your steadfastness, your unity and your fidelity to the German cause.

BERLIN, June 2, 1919, (Signed) Representatives of the Rhineland in the German National Assembly and the Prussian Diet."

v. HAMMERSTEIN.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1229: Note

Treasonable Activities in the Rhenish District

[Contemporary Translation]

Wako No. 24071 II

Spa, June 4, 1919.

From: General Von Hammerstein, Chairman of the German Armistice Commission

To: General Nudant, President of the P. I. A. C.

I am directed to transmit the following note:

"The activity described in my note of the 2d inst. No. 35047/1540 (Wako No. 24071)---activity of treasonable circles in the Rhenish District---is hindering the German Government in the exercise of Governmental functions in provinces which according to the right of states and constitution of right, form a constituent part of the Empire and of the Federal States, and deprives the German Government of the possibility of the honorable execution of the obligations undertaken in the Armistice Agreement insofar as the occupied districts are concerned.

To tolerate these machinations is to offend against Article 5 of the Armistice Agreement of November, 1918. Upon the final determination of which on the part of the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies, Marshal Foch, it was stated in writing with reference to the supplementary propositions made by the Germans that the text of the Article named did not include any change in the existing Governmental organization.

The modus operandi of those individuals constitutes an undertaking involving high treason against the Empire according to the stipulations of the Imperial Penal Code. According to the German constitutional laws the German Imperial Court in LEIPSIC has jurisdiction over this crime.

The German Government has directed the Imperial Attorney General at LEIPSIC, whose duty it is to prosecute the crime of high treason, to bring legal proceedings against the traitors.

Appealing to the above mentioned Article 5 of the Armistice Agreement the German Government expects that the Allied and Associated Governments will take measures so that the local authorities of occupation will offer no kind of hindrance to the execution of

the measures taken by the Attorney General, nor to the regulations of local state police authorities in the measures they take under his orders, and that the Allied and Associated Powers especially will permit that all those persons who shall be under strong suspicion of high treason shall be arrested and brought before the proper Imperial court for hearing.

The German Government expects further that no interference will be offered to the legal proceedings already entered upon against the BERLIN Lawyer Dr. Dorten in WIESBADEN who has designated himself as President of Rhenish Republic and has presumed treasonably to enter upon official activities. Erzberger."

HAMMERSTEIN.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1229: Note

Third Army Order Upheld

[Contemporary Translation]

No. 1.192/G

PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, June 4, 1919.

General Nudant to General von Hammerstein.

In answer to Note A. A. II 4102, May 21, 1919

The Marshal, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies, writes on June 3 , 1919,
No. 9158/CR:

"I have the honor to make known to you that I believe the German protest is without foundation.

According to the agreements made with the Germans for the carrying out of the clauses of the different Armistice Agreements relative to restitution the Allied and Associated Governments have indeed agreed to free individual Germans of any penal responsibility for the detention of materiel or of articles coming from France and from Belgium, not to enter any prosecution against them on account of this fact and to admit the substitution of the responsibility of the German Government for that of the individuals in this question.

But the importance of the order issued by General Dickman is quite different. Its purpose is to obtain information which the Allies believe is necessary. It orders a certain form for that purpose; namely, the declarations by the possessors of materiel or of articles coming from France and Belgium that they have in their possession. It is only because of the failure to carry out this formality that certain sanctions are foreseen in the orders of General Dickman with regard to individual Germans and not because of the the fact they have in their possession materiel or articles carried away from France and Belgium.

None of the agreements to which the Germans call attention in their protest prevent the Armies of Occupation from ordering measures of the kind undertaken by General Dickman."

* * * * *

Control of Civil Affairs in the Palatinate

[Contemporary Translation]

Wako No. 24369

Spa, June 5, 1919.

From: General v. Hammerstein, Chairman of the German Armistice Commission

To: General Nudant, President of the P. I. A. C.

I am in possession of the following order of the French Commission for the Control of civil affairs in the Palatinate, Colonel de Metz:

Translation

Army Group Fayolle
VIII Army
Control of Civil Affairs
No. 3/S

Speyer, June 1, 1919.

From: Colonel de Metz in Charge of the Control of Civil Affairs in the Palatinate

To: Mr. Speyer, Director of the Bureau of Internal Affairs

I have the honor to transmit to you herewith, most esteemed sir, an order which I have just promulgated in the name of the Commanding General of the Army.

It will be your task, most esteemed sir, to immediately acquaint the heads of all subordinate authorities of the spirit of the order in order that the regular continuance of the administration and of the subordinate authorities be secured against every possible event in the interest of the populace.

There can be no doubt but that you yourself, most esteemed sir, will acquaint the officials subordinate to you with the measures of punishment to which they will make themselves liable in case they fail to obey the orders of the military authorities.

L. de METZ.

VIII Army
No. 2/S

Speyer, June 1, 1919.

From the Commanding General of the Eighth Army

To the President of the Government

Empowered by the conditions of the Armistice Agreement of November 11, 1919, in accordance with the request of November 30 of the Marshal, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies, the military authorities of the Allies seized the administrative power over the country, and demanded the most strict obedience from everybody.

The German officials have the duty to continue the functioning of the various public services under the direction and supervision of the military authorities.

The Commanding General of the Army announces to you, esteemed Sir, the command that you secure the continuation of the public services against every eventuality. This is an essential condition to the preservation of public order for which you, honored Sir, bear the responsibility.

On behalf of the Commanding General of the Eighth Army.

Colonel de Metz intrusted with the
Control of Civil Affairs in the Palatinate.
L. de METZ.

This order stands in open opposition to the Armistice Agreement of November 11, 1918, upon which it attempts to be based. Article V, in Paragraph 2, mentions only the control by the troops of occupation. It does not speak at any place of direction. Therefore, the results of this wilful extention of the interpretation of the Article are contrary to the agreement, and, therefore, valueless and nonapplicable.

As Chairman of the German Commission of the P. I. A. C. I enter most emphatic protest against this violation of the Armistice Agreement, based upon Article XXXIV.

I beg you to let me know what steps you take in this matter.

HAMMERSTEIN.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1229: Note

German Protest on Promoting of Treason by French Army

[Contemporary Translation]

Wako 24219

Spa, June 5, 1919.

From: General v. Hammerstein, Chairman of the German Armistice Commission

To: General Nudant, President of the P. I. A. C.

I transmit the following supplementary notes.

"In connection with my two former notes, I have a more decided complaint to make concerning the outrageous favoring of treasonable activity in the occupied zone by the French Army of occupation.

"The Hessian Government states in a public proclamation: 'In the most flagrant violation of international law the French have arrested several political leaders, among them the leader of the Hessian Popular Chamber Deputy Adlung of MAYENCE. Supported by the unequivocal declaration of the will of the population of the Rhineland, the Hessian Government makes a loud protest before the entire world against the attempts of the French military authorities to throttle the true expression of will of Rhenish Hesse.'

"I petition for the immediate release of the President of the Hessian Popular Chamber Deputy Adlung in order that he may perform the functions of the office conferred upon him by the Hessian people freely and unhindered. The arrest of the President of a Popular Chamber who in accordance with his duty opposes the conscientiousless and dangerous activities, is an attempt against the sovereignty of a people. I appeal against such outrageous action on the part of the military commanders to the Allied and Associated Governments collectively.

"General Mangin in MAYENCE continues the most shocking violations of the Armistice Agreement. According to creditable information he had posted in MAYENCE placards with the following notice: 'Numerous newspapers announce that the German Government will take

measures against such citizens as declare themselves in favor of the new Government. This Paragraph 81 of the German Penal Code to which the German Government appeals is abrogated. Mangin.'

"This action of General Mangin is open violation of the Armistice Agreement. All German officials of the occupied area must regard them as null and void since the authorities of occupation have not the right to abrogate laws of the existing German Penal Code. The faithful German population in the occupied areas have the same feeling of revolt and scorn for such breaches of right on the part of the French occupying authorities as they give passionate expression to toward the small number of German traitors. The German Government expects that the Allied and Associated Governments will put an early stop to the political activity of these irresponsible military leaders unless they wish to take the responsibility to themselves for the methods of militarism which have been cast by all peoples coming into renewed and brutal domination. Erzberger."

v. HAMMERSTEIN.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1229: Letter

Return of French and Belgian Cattle

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, June 6, 1919.

No. 160

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

* * * * *

13. Return of French and Belgian Animals: The Germans have made further reply to the demand of the French and Belgians for return of animals, calling attention to the fact that the High Command of the Allied Armies sent out regulations in April concerning the return of animals. In order to be able to take the necessary steps for the carrying out of the return of horses taken from France and Belgium, the Burgomasters in the occupied zone are requested to hand in lists of all animals (horses, cattle, etc.), in the hands of the local population which were brought from France or Belgium and which are still in the possession.

The standpoint of the German Government, according to which the obligation for the return is not recognized was explained in the note of April 12, 1919, KM-17511, to which note attention is again invited.

* * * * *

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section.

Transportation of Polish Troops Through Germany

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, June 6, 1919.

No. 160

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

* * * * *

3. Transportation of General Haller's Troops from France to Poland: In accordance with instructions from Marshal Foch, General Nudant has presented a note to the Germans inviting their attention to the fact that in accordance with the terms of the protocol signed at SPA on April 4, 1919, regarding the transportation of the troops of General Haller from France to Poland, this movement which began about April 15 was to last approximately two months.

The Marshal directs that German authorities be requested to authorize the use of German railways for this purpose until such time as new arrangements may be concluded after the signature of peace.

* * * * *

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1229: Note

Allied Guard Ships

[Contemporary Translation]

No. 119/G

From: General Nudant, President of the P. I. A. C.

To: General Dupont, Head of the Military Mission at BERLIN

In regard to the telegram sent on May 15, by General Spire to Colonel Reboul and to the suggestion made by you to send Allied guard ships to KONIGSBERG and MEMEL, the Marshal, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies sends the following communication:

"In conformance with the decision made by the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs at its meeting on May 23, the Admirals representing the present Allied and Associated powers met on May 27 to study the proposal made to send Allied guard ships to

KONIGSBERG and to MEMEL in order to supervise the transportation of German noncommissioned officers intended for the Bolshevist Army.

Inasmuch as:

1. It is possible for the Germans to communicate with the Bolsheviks by land.
2. It is impossible for ships stationed in a port to exercise any control over such transportation either by land or by sea except to supervise the ships that leave the port in which the guard ships are.
3. It is extremely difficult to withdraw the ships from the more immediate useful tasks in which they are at present employed.
4. It is necessary to have a previous agreement with the Germans since none of the clauses of the Armistice provides for the stationing of Allied prisoners of war in the ports of KONIGSBERG and MEMEL.

The Admirals unanimously agree that there is no reason to send guard ships to German ports for the purpose of supervising the transportation of German N. C. O.'s destined presumably for the Bolshevik Army.

GEORGE P. HOPE, British Empire,
Admiral W. S. BENSON, American Chief
of Naval Operations,
R. RONARCH, France,
M. GRASSI, Italy,
ISANI TAKESHITA, Japan.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1229: Note

Naval Incident at Libau

[Contemporary Translation]

No. 1206/G

PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, June 7, 1919.

From General Nudant, President of the P. I. A. C.

To General v. Hammerstein, Chairman of the German Armistice Commission

The Marshal, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies, telegraphs the following
June 6, 1919, No. 2862:

1. At LIBAU on May 23, two German soldiers arrested a cadet of the British Navy in uniform on the pretext that he carried a gun. This cadet was released but no excuses were offered.

On May 24, five officers of the British Navy in uniform and provided with passes from Admiral Cowan were arrested, searched, relieved of their arms and badly handled by German soldiers, and then sent back on board ships under escort after having been under arrest for two and one-half hours. Admiral Cowan demanded apologies of the German Command at LIBAU for these two incidents. This request for apologies has not been met by the local command, and, therefore, the Allied and Associated Governments make request of the German Government that it be given immediate consideration.

2. The Allied and Associated Governments demand at the same time the cannons be removed which have recently been placed by the Germans in a position to command the fortified port of LIBAU.

3. The attention of the German Government is again called to the conditions imposed by the Allied and Associated Governments for the provisional maintenance of General von der Goltz in the Baltic countries, conditions which were definitely laid down in Telegram 2726 (transmitted to the German Armistice Commission on May 28, 1919 No. 1158/G.)

4. Until the above requests have been met, no German boat will be authorized to enter or leave LIBAU, except under authorization which may be given by the Interallied Naval Armistice Commission to the German coast steamers that are caring for the repatriation of Russian prisoners of war whose homes are in Latvia.

FOCH.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1229: Note

Removal of Funds from Left Bank of Rhine

[Contemporary Translation]

No. 1215/G

PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, June 8, 1919.

General Nudant to General von Hammerstein

The Marshal, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies, writes as follows on June 6, No. 6959/F:

IN ANSWER TO NOTE 20095.F/1348 II, May 8, 1919

1. The fear of pillage after the Armistice, alleged by the representative of the German Government in order to justify this transfer, is only an excuse, and I protest against its insulting nature with reference to the French Army: The previous Armistices granted by the Allies to Bulgaria and Austria were not followed by pillaging on the part of the victors. In alleging such a motive, the Germans underline the unusual nature of this transfer: They acknowledge that if it had not been for our arrival the funds deposited in the public treasuries of the Palatinate would have remained there.

2. Contrary to the terms of the aforementioned note, which speaks of a French request, it is the local German authority that asked for the return to the Palatinate of the funds transferred to the right bank of the RHINE in the fear 'that the safety of these funds might be compromised by the attempts threatened by a Communist government;' that is the expression of the President of the Province of the Palatinate in the request, the text of which is in the hands of the P. I. A. C.

3. It is not true that the securities mentioned above in Note 179/F of the P. I. A. C. under date of April 26 (transmitted to Wako) can be even partly the property of individuals; the request of the President of the Palatinate was transmitted to the German Government with regard to public funds only (Article III and IV a and b).

4. These funds which belong to the Public Treasuries of the Palatinate were withdrawn under orders sent from MUNICH and NUREMBERG of November 16; at that date the withdrawal could be authorized only by the Allies in conformance with Article 19, of the Armistice Agreement, of which Paragraph 3, stipulates that 'during the duration of the Armistice the enemy will not withdraw any public securities that might serve the Allies as a guarantee for the recovery of reparation.'

5. Therefore, the above mentioned funds must be replaced in the Ludwigshafen Branch of the Reichsbank within two weeks after the receipt of this protest by the P. I. A. C.

German Forces in the Baltic

[Contemporary Translation]

Wako O 23769

Spa, June 8, 1919.

General v. Hammerstein

To General Nudant

I am charged with transmitting the following note from the German Imperial Government to Marshal Foch:

In Answer to Telegrams No. 2725 and 2726 of May 28, 1919:

(1) In opposition to Marshal's telegram of May 28 which demands the retention of German forces in Lithuania and Latvia north of a definite line, the German Government must maintain its standpoint that upon the basis of Article XII of the Armistice Agreement it has the right to carry out the evacuation of the districts belonging to Russia before the war, which evacuation is already in process of execution. The justification of this conception has already been stated at various times by the German Govt. I direct attention especially to my notes of December 27, 1918, and of May 29, 1919.

The German Government can therefore not acknowledge that upon the basis of the Armistice Agreement it is bound to receive any instructions concerning the mode of evacuation although it has no objection to giving up, first those districts which lie south of the line mentioned. The evacuation of Lithuania and Latvia according to plan will probably be completed in 6 or 8 weeks.

(2) With reference to the stipulations for the continued presence of Count von der Goltz, I have the following information to transmit. In answer to (a) General Count von der Goltz is under orders not to busy himself with the interior affairs of Latvia. Therefore, he can neither facilitate nor hinder the setting up of a government. In answer to (b) General Count von der Goltz has not kept back from the Latvian troops any kind of arms. The arms which were formerly taken from the Latvians by Pfeffer's free corps have been left behind, according to Captain Pfeffer in the barracks occupied by the Latvians. In answer to (c) the strengthening of the Latvian Army is thoroughly agreed to by us. However, general mobilization, so long as we are in the land must be in so far hindered as the compulsory levying of Bolshevistically inclined people would endanger the safety of our troops. In answer to (d) General Count von der Goltz is responsible solely for the leadership and protection of our troops. Insofar as these two points are not concerned he has nothing to do with the Latvian Government and he is to interfere with its activities in no case.

(3) As to the compositions of units mentioned in Marshal Foch's Telegram No. 2725, of May 28, these concern only formations which in the meantime have been deported from the Baltic Provinces.

Minister ERZBERGER.

Recovery of Furniture

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, June 9, 1919.

No. 161

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

5. Identification and Recovery of Furniture: The Germans have been informed that the organization for the recovery of furniture and furnishing articles of all kinds is attached to the organization for industrial restitution directed by Mr. Lefebvre whose office is at WIESBADEN.

They are requested henceforth to send to this latter address all documents bearing on this subject as well as articles of art which were collected or carried away by the Germans from the invaded districts. They are also directed to treat directly with Mr. Lefebvre concerning all questions connected with the restitution of these articles.

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section.

Dissemination of Propaganda by German Wireless Station

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, June 9, 1919.

No. 161

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

6. Dissemination of Bolsheviks and Anti-Entente Propaganda in Russia: General Haking, Chief of the British Section of the P. I. A. C., has submitted a note to the Germans as follows:

I am directed by the British Government to request that the German Government may take immediate action to stop the dissemination of Bolshevik and Anti-Entente propaganda in Russia and throughout the world by the German wireless station at NAUEN.

I am further directed to request that immediate steps be taken to control the NAUEN press which is reporting and, in the process, magnifying minor labor troubles in Entente countries, which reports are carefully picked up and re-produced by Russian Bolshevik stations.

It would seem that a matter of this sort should be handled through the Chairman of the P. I. A. C., but the information having been received by the British they have seen fit to take up the matter directly and it is probably of little or no moment who calls upon the Germans to stop the practice.

* * * * *

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1229: Note

Alleged Attack on Germans by Poles

[Contemporary Translation]

Wako 24593

Spa, June 10, 1919.

General von Hammerstein to General Nudant

I herewith bring to your knowledge a new unheard of breach of the Armistice Agreement on the part of Polish troops and I request that you transmit it to Marshal Foch.

On the night June 5/6, 1919, Polish troops made a regular attack upon KOLONIE-TANNENHOFEN and KLEIN-WERDERSHAUSEN (south of BROMBERG).

The Poles began after midnight to shell the German positions from MINUTSHOF to KOLONIE-TANNENHOFEN with light and heavy artillery. At one o'clock in the morning they advanced against the southeast border of KOLONIE-TANNENHOFEN with about 200 men. They succeeded in piercing our lines at one place. By a counterattack from FORSTEREI and NEUDORF the Poles were thrown back with heavy loss. On this action one person and a light machine gun were captured.

Near KLEIN-WERDERSHAUSEN at the same time about 80 Poles attacked the village of FRANTAL on both sides and entered into the village. They were driven out again by counterattacks. The old position was again occupied. The German losses were 5 dead and 6 wounded. Two were killed by bayonet and mutilated with the butt of a gun. The Pole who was taken at KOLONIE-TANNENHOFEN belongs to the personnel of a Polish armored train.

It has been determined beyond a doubt that the Poles fired gas shells. Two gas duds (75 calibre) of French origin were found. Several soldiers were gassed.

I make the sharpest protest against these brutal violations of the Armistice Agreement on the part of Polish troops.

I request that measures may be taken so that such occurrences may not be repeated and I further request that care may be taken that the Polish leaders giving the command for this attack be punished.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1229: Note

German Conditions for Transportation of Polish Troops

[Contemporary Translation]

Wako No. 24665

Spa, June 10, 1919.

General Hammerstein to General Nudant

I am requested to transmit the following note from the German Government with the request that it be handed on to Marshal Foch:

The military transport of the Polish troops from France to Poland is awakening extraordinary excitement and worry throughout the entire German Empire, especially among the population of the eastern provinces, which worry has been greatly increased because large detachments of the Haller Army are gathered very close to the German eastern boundary.

It is therefore, only with the most serious doubt and in requesting the following assurances that I can agree to the increased length of time for the transportation of these troops over and above that agreed upon in SPA on April 4:

1. The transfer of these troops must not last longer than June 1, 1919. [?]
2. The troops sent from France through German territory to Poland must not be used in any way for attacks against German territory.
3. The Allied and Associated Governments agree to direct negotiations between German and Polish representatives concerning the release of hostages, interned persons, etc.
4. Shipping is allowed free of hindrances on the NETZE, the stoppage of which by the Poles in the neighborhood of CZARNIKAU carries with it immense economic damage, not only to the provinces of west Prussia, Posen, and Silesia, but also to the rest of Prussia. In this connection it is essential that the Poles withdraw their troops to a distance of at least six kilometers from the NETZE. It is further absolutely essential that the work carried on by the Poles to prevent the water supply from reaching the NETZE and the BROMBERG Canal, that is to say the drying up of the Canal, be stopped. The Allied and Associated Governments undertake to guarantee in fullest measure the undisturbed traffic on the NETZE.
5. The release of the railway barges at BENTSCHEN and KREUZ for the transportation of potatoes, to Germany, as well as the removal of the restrictions on the postal, telegraph and railway traffic to the Province of POSEN.

Minister ERZBERGER.

No. 1666/IX - 1597

Policy of Allied and Associated Powers Toward Baltic States

SUPREME WAR COUNCIL,
Versailles, June 11, 1919.

REPORT TO THE SUPREME WAR COUNCIL BY ITS MILITARY
AND NAVAL REPRESENTATIVES
ACTION OF THE GERMANS IN THE BALTIC STATES

At a meeting of the principal Allied and Associated Powers held on June 7, 1919 a memorandum prepared by the British delegation on the subject of the action of the Germans in the Baltic States subsequent to the capture of RIGA on May 24 was discussed and it was agreed:

That the memorandum should be referred for report to the military representatives of the Supreme War Council at VERSAILLES, with whom should be associated for the purpose of this enquiry, representatives of the Navies of the United States of America , Great Britain, France and Italy. To the Supreme War Council:

The military and naval representatives of the Supreme War Council find themselves in agreement with the terms of the memorandum which has been referred to them. Considering:

That the events of the period under review show clearly that the Germans and Bolsheviks are cooperating and that at the present time, the national forces of the Baltic States are subject to combined attacks by German and Bolshevik forces.

The military and naval representatives Recommend:

- (i) That the Germans should be ordered
 - (a) To stop all further advance northward toward Esthonia.
 - (b) British text.

To evacuate LIBAU and WINDAU at once, and to make preparations to complete the evacuation of all territory which before the war formed part of Russia with the least possible delay in accordance with Article 12 of the Armistice terms.

French, Italian and American Text: In accordance with the conditions of Article 12 of the terms of Armistice to evacuate immediately LIBAU and WINDAU as well as the districts of AUGUSOTOWO, SUWALKI, GRODNO and that part of the district of SEINY which lies to the west of the River CZERNAKANJA (MARYCHA) and as quickly as possible those territories which before the war formed part of the Russian Empire, with the understanding that this evacuation shall also commence immediately.

(ii) That as it seems impossible to send Allied troops to the Baltic Provinces, it is more than ever necessary to support the local national forces in these provinces with equipment, arms, ammunition, clothing and supplies generally, and to make available such sums of money as may be required.

(iii) That the action recommended above should be taken without delay.

(a) In order that it may be in force during the period of the Armistice and before the conditions of peace are signed.

(b) So that the local Baltic forces, may not be unnecessarily weakened by German action before having to defend themselves against their Bolshevik enemies.

Note: In view of the possibility of the Germans refusing to comply in flagrant defiance of Article 12 of the Armistice Convention, the Allied and Associated Governments should be prepared to take such steps as may be necessary to enforce compliance, including the full force of the blockade.

General BELIN,
Military Representative,
French Section,
Supreme War Council.

R. LANXADE,
Naval Representative.

C. J. SACKVILLE,
Major General
Military Representative,
British Section,
Supreme War Council.

George P. W. Hope,
Naval Representative.

UGO CAVALLERO,
Military Representative,
Italian Section.
Supreme War Council.

UGO CAVALLERO,
for
Naval Representative.

TASKER H. BLISS,
Military Representative,
American Section,
Supreme War Council.

H. S. KNAPP
Naval Representative.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1229: Letter

Release of German Hospital Personnel Refused

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, June 13, 1919.

No. 162

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

* * * * *

2. Return of German Hospital Personnel: General Nudant has informed the Germans that in answer to their Note of May 27, No. 22999, the Undersecretary of State for Military Justice announces that:

The German hospital personnel, the repatriation of which is requested by the German Armistice Commission, was sent into the liberated regions to care for the German prisoners in accordance with the GENEVA Convention.

The release of this hospital personnel can, therefore, not occur until the other prisonews of war are released.

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1230: Note

Repatriation of German Troops in Salonica

[Contemporary Translation]

No. 24848 Mar.

Spa, June 12, 1919.

From: General v. Hammerstein, Chairman of the German Armistice Commission

To: General Nudant, President of the P. I. A. C.

All efforts of the German Armistice Commission to secure the repatriation of the remnant of interned Black Sea troops from SALONICA have hitherto been in vain.

Through Note C. I. P. A. 1025/G of May 8, I was simply informed: "The question of the repatriation of German troops from CONSTANTINOPLE and SALONICA is being investigated. The Central Allied Service of Transportation is occupied with the question." Since that time one month has passed and nothing has happened. In answer to my question of May 29, in Wako 23537, as to when the repatriation would begin, I have up to this date not received an answer.

The German troops have the binding promise of the Allied Commanders that they would be repatriated immediately. The proof of this, General, I have already sent to you. I am supplementing it herewith by sending you a copy of a letter which Vice Admiral Hopman sent to the French General d'Esperey with two telegrams which are likewise attached in copy, and which two telegrams he sent upon receiving news of the internment order [following this document] * * *

I cannot possibly assume that the Allied Governments will longer delay in keeping the word of their proper representatives.

The German people are very much excited that this word had not already been made good. I, therefore, again request:

1. That the troops be sent home as soon as possible and that I be informed at the earliest possible moment when the transportation will begin.
2. That I may be informed where and how the troops are housed, and that I may be expressly assured that they are not treated as prisoners of war.
3. That steps may be taken so that the units may immediately send a nominal list of their relatives through the Interallied Armistice Commission into my hands in which exact details concerning killed and died, and concerning the fate of others who are still alive, both of officers and enlisted men, may be given.

In case against expectation, repatriation by way of the sea should not be possible, then I request that repatriation by way of Italy may be considered so that the troops

may be sent in groups from SALONICA to an Italian port, perhaps BRINDISI, and from there by rail to Germany. The necessary steamers and the necessary railway cars would have to be furnished by the Interallied Governments since the German Government has not at its disposal any suitable steamers, and the economic condition of the country does not permit of a dispatching of any railway cars. The transports would then be received at the border of the Empire by German railway authorities.

I request, in case this plan is accepted, that the earliest possible assent may be given in order that the details may be agreed upon without loss of time.

HAMMERSTEIN.

[Contemporary Translation]

To the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies in the Orient, General Franchet d'Esperey,
CONSTANTINOPLE

I have the honor to bring to your Excellency's attention attached copies of two telegrams which have been sent by General Anselme, as well as the copy of a letter addressed to me by Colonel Lejay. The German troops coming back from NIKOLAYEV have thus received the absolute and repeated promise of the responsible French General that they would be repatriated without interruption as rapidly as possible. Through the intermediary of the British 17,000 men have already been transported by water via GIBRALTAR to Germany. The remainder amounting to about 8,500 men is to be repatriated by the French authorities, for Admiral Calthorpe told me himself today that their departure was not the business of the British authorities. Of these 8,500 men about 1,500 men are still in HAIDER-PASCHA. The remainder, about 7,000 men, have been sent by the Steamers Rodosto, Noltschanoff, Vellikarossia and Jerusalem to SALONICA.

In consequence of the refusal of your Excellency to receive me this morning it has been impossible for me before my departure on the Jerusalem for SALONICA to procure the certainty that the Austrian boats already promised by Admiral Exelmans at ODESSA can be immediately put at our disposal in order to permit the continuation without interruption of the transportation of German troops. According to information from your Excellency's representative, Lieut. Colonel Clemenceau, at the sitting yesterday at the house of Major Burt Marschall (General Staff, Allied Forces H. 1.), I suppose that it may be considered that the question as to when the boats will arrive and whether the boats are fitted out or not cannot be definitely answered for the present. I have the honor to call your Excellency's attention to the fact that according to all precedent, and especially according to the promise given and repeated a longer sojourn of the German troops in SALONICA is inadmissible. I, therefore, request your Excellency to be good enough to accelerate by all means this decision and to kindly communicate to me when the necessary boats especially fitted out for these remaining 8,500 men can be put at our disposal. If the French should not have within a very short time, that is to say, by April 1, the necessary tonnage at their disposal, I again propose to bring to SALONICA the German transport boats which stand ready at HAMBURG. Their immediate departure for this purpose has been proposed at different times on the part of the German Government by the German Armistice Commission at SPA. In any case I think I may assume that the authorities of SALONICA will receive orders to avoid all appearances of an internment of the German troops during their stay in SALONICA. Such an internment would not be in conformity with the conditions of the Armistice. These conditions have been kept by the German troops under extremely difficult circumstances. A fact which has been expressly acknowledged by the French commanders. The troops have done

their duty up to the final evacuation of NIKOLAYEV by the Entente, and with arms in their hands made possible the departure of all Allied troops without any untoward incident.

HOPMAN,
Vice Admiral.

First group to Admiral Hopman, commander of the German troops in NIKOLAYEV, No. 7077/3.

I have already asked PARIS that boats be sent from HAMBURG. I am again repeating the request. I do not know yet whether boats which carry Germans will go directly to HAMBURG, but in any case if they stop en route it would only be for a very short time while awaiting the arrival of boats from HAMBURG. It is to HAMBURG that these contingents will return and not to TRIEST.

It is useless for you to take any steps concerning food. If there is any stop en route provisions will be assured by Allied authorities.

General Anselme to Vice Admiral Hopman

The embarkation continues regularly, and I have promised that it shall continue without interruption. I am keeping my promise.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1230: Note

Transportation of Polish Troops

[Contemporary Translation]

S./Com. of Transportation
No. 1104/T

PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, June 13, 1919.

General Nudant, President of P. I. A. C.

To General von Hammerstein, Chairman of the German Armistice Commission

The Marshal, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies, telegraphs the following, June 13, No. 5432:

I am giving the French Mission at WARSAW the necessary order to have the empty trains reach LISSA at the same time as the full trains.

I beg you to notify the German Armistice Commission to that effect, at the same time calling their attention to the fact that delays may occur on account of *force majeure*, and I demand that the full trains leave LISSA regularly even if the empty trains have not yet reached there.

In case the six empty trains which must pass LISSA every 24 hours do not arrive or arrive considerably delayed, let me know immediately so that I may again intervene in the matter.

I beg you to transmit this communication immediately to the German Government and to let me know as soon as possible the decision the German Government takes with regard to

the transportation of General Hallers's Army in view of the above statement made by the Marshal, Commander-in-Chief.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1230: Note

Political Situation of Poles in Germany

[Contemporary Translation]

A. A. I. No. 3321

Spa, June 14, 1919.

From: Representative of the German Government

To: General Nudant

The official district newspaper for the district HOCHST-on-the-MAIN of May 23 has the following announcement from the French Military Governor of the district of HOCHST.

The Poles who are staying in the district of HOCHST-on-the-MAIN and who desire to be recognized as Polish citizens may address a request to the French District Governor, No. 1 Seilerbahn, in HOCHST-on-the-MAIN.

They will state in their request the exact reasons which cause them to retain this nationality and they will show any papers in their case which they have to show.

They will be able to buy the necessary forms beginning with May 23 in the press bureau, Konigsteinerstrasse 7, HOCHST, for the price of 5 pfennings, and they will fill out these forms according to the directions. The requests will be handed in to the Military Governor of the district of HOCHST-on-the-MAIN, No. 1 Seilerbahn, on or before June 5.

The French Military Governor,
RENE ALTMAYER

This announcement is evidently based upon Article 91 of the peace proposals in which the right of option for all Poles dwelling in the German Empire is maintained.

There can be no doubt that the French authorities of occupation have no kind of right to take such measures upon the basis of the one-sided Peace Proposal of the Allied and Associated Powers. I, therefore, makes the sharpest protest against this action, and request that the official announcement be at once withdrawn.

I should be grateful for a statement of the measures taken.

HAMMERSTEIN.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1230: Note

Delay in Transportation of Polish Troops

[Contemporary Translation]

No. 24074/4045/25143

Spa, June 14, 1919.

From: General v. Hammerstein, Chairman of the German Armistice Commission

To: General Nudant, President of the P. I. A. C.

[Extract]

Imperial Minister Erzberger telegraphed to me the request to transmit the following note to Marshal Foch:

Local German authorities on the German-Polish line of demarcation, without the knowledge of the German High Command and without my consent; entirely on their own initiative based upon the reports of Polish intentions to attack as reported to General Dupont in my note of June 12, stopped the transportation of the Haller Army. I have asked General Dupont to clear up these reports and to stop the attacks in case the reports agree with the facts.

* * * * *

The German Government cannot give better proof of its preparedness to continue the transportation of the Haller troops than by stating that it has given orders to the local German authorities to first of all continue the transportation of the troops.

In regard to the return of empties from Poland by way of FRAUSTADT the German Government states that it is satisfied with the explanation given by Marshal Foch in Note No. 1104/T of June 13, 1919, but that it expects speedy explanation of the reports contained in the note transmitted yesterday to General Dupont. Imperial Minister Erzberger.

HAMMERSTEIN.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1230: Letter

Office for Return of Securities, Documents, and Works of Art

No. 163

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, June 15, 1919.

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

* * * * *

15. Financial Securities, Documents, and Works of Art: General von Hammerstein has presented a note to the Chairman of the P. I. A. C. to the effect that:

The Imperial Minister, Erzberger, agrees that all matters concerning French financial securities, documents, and works of art, in the future instead of being handled through SPA shall be handled through FRANKFORT-on-the-MAIN and WIESBADEN. For this purpose a special office of the Financial Section of the Wako, BERLIN (Restitutions-Zentrale fur Finanzwerte, Dokuments and Kunstwerte), will be erected in FRANKFORT-on-the-MAIN. As heads of this office the former Finance Delegates in SPA, Doctor Becker and Captain Schroeder are under consideration.

Captain Schroeder will probably be in WIESBADEN on June 17, 1919, for personal discussion of the business.

In the interest of a rapid practical course of this business, special value must be placed upon the condition that the activities of this newly erected office be sharply distinguished from the Reception of Industrial Materiel, and it is requested that an office be set up in WIESBADEN which shall deal exclusively with the same questions.

The *Service de la Restitution* in WEISBADEN has been notified to the same effect by the FRANKFORT office of the Wako.

* * * * *

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1230: Letter

Deficit in Delivery of Rolling Stock

No. 163

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, June 15, 1919.

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

* * * * *

18. Rolling Stock Still Remaining to be Delivered: The American representative on the Committee for the Return of Rolling Stock has reported on May 24 that there still remains the following deficit in deliveries:

Locomotives	50
Cars	6,284

* * * * *

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.
Chief, American Section.

Germans Disclaim Responsibility for Bolshevist Propaganda

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, June 15, 1919.

No. 163

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

11. Dissemination of Bolshevist and Anti-Entente Propaganda in Russia: Referring to Par. 6 of my Report 161, in which General Haking, Chief of the British Section of the Armistice Commission submitted a note to the Germans protesting against their permitting the circulation of propaganda by means of radio, the Germans have replied that the censorship in Germany has been removed and the German Government is not in a position to prevent the Russian Government from spreading false radio messages, whether they emanate from Germany or enemy stations.

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1230: Letter

Delay in Transportation of Polish Troops Through Germany

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, June 15, 1919.

No. 163

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

2. Delay in Movement of Polish Troops: On June 12 General von Hammerstein presented a note to the Allies informing them that:

"According to information that has just reached here, congestion has arisen on the railroads in the east from reasons that are not yet clearly defined, which have made necessary the temporary stoppage of the transportation of Polish troops. As it is not yet clear when the congestion will be relieved for the present no further transportation can be undertaken in EMS and RAUNHEIM. Proper information to this effect has already been sent to the line commanders at FRANKFORT by the competent German authorities. It is, therefore, requested that on the Allied side appropriate orders be given. As soon as further information is obtained it will be transmitted."

3. Answer to the Above: Following the receipt of information contained in the above paragraph, Marshal Foch telegraphed to the Chairman of the P. I. A. C. directing him to turn over without delay the following communication to Minister Erzberger:

"I have been informed that this morning at five o'clock the transportation of the Haller [Polish] Army is said to have been stopped everywhere along line by order of the German High Command. I ask Mr. Erzberger to give orders to start again immediately the transportation of the Polish troops, in conformance with the agreement which he reached with me on last April 4.

His telegram concludes:

"I beg of you to let me know immediately the answer either positive or negative of the German Government in this matter."

4. Extension for Transfer of Polish Troops from France to Poland: In Par. 8 of my Report No. 162 I gave the response of Minister Erzberger to a prior request on the part of the Allies for an extension of the time for transporting these troops. The demand of Marshal Foch contained in the above paragraph seems to have had the desired effect of securing the continuation of this movement.

General Nudant presented a note to the Germans stating that on June 14, the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies telegraphed the following:

Except for later agreements which might be made in conformance with the Protocol of April 4, the duration of the transportation of Polish troops across Germany is limited to approximately two months.

As a result and taking account of the 48-hour interruption which has occurred in the transportation of these troops, the last trains will be started from EMS on June 22 at 17 o'clock, and at RAUNHEIM on June 22 at 21 o'clock.

These dates are given in case there is no new interruption in the transports. In the opposite case Marshal Foch reserves the right of extending the dates as much as he wishes.

5. Return of Empty Trains Conveying Polish Troops: Marshal Foch commanding the Allied Armies has informed the Germans through the President of the P. I. A. C. that empty trains conveying Polish troops will be returned as promptly as possible, but that if these empty trains do not arrive at LISSA at the exact time when they should in order to correspond with loaded trains going the other way that there must be no delay in the movement of the loaded trains.

* * * * *

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.
Chief, American Section.

German Troops in Salonica

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, June 15, 1919.

No. 163

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

9. Request to Send German Civilians to Salonica: General von Hammerstein in a note presented to the Allies states that: "The idea of sending a German civilian to SALONICA was held in consideration after the receipt of news from SALONICA which made it clear that the German troops there, on account of their long absence from Germany, have been in nowise sufficiently informed as to the political changes that have been accomplished in Germany. This lack of accurate information, reinforced by contrary information from the homeland, has given rise to an attitude among the German troops which is harmful to discipline and the preservation of order. In order to avoid any unpleasant events which might arise from such an attitude, I repeat my request once more, and calling attention likewise to my notes of May 16, 1919, KM. No. 20243 and of June 6, 1919, KM No. 23415, to permit the immediate trip of a German civilian with several persons to accompany him to SALONICA."

10. Repatriation of German Troops in Salonica: General von Hammerstein has presented a note * * * calling attention to the repeated requests which they have made for the repatriation of German troops still remaining in SALONICA. He reviews the notes that have passed on this subject claiming that the Allies had promised that these troops would be promptly repatriated. He renews the subject in the form of three specific requests: First, that the troops be repatriated as soon as possible; second, that he be informed how the troops are housed and assured that they are not treated as prisoners of war; and third, that steps be taken so that units may immediately send a list of their relatives concerning the details of those killed and died.

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section.

Farmers Permitted to Cross Rhine for Cultivation

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, June 15, 1919.

No. 163

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

* * * * *

6. Landlords on the Right Bank of the Rhine Permitted to Enter Occupied Territory: Marshal Foch has informed the Germans through the President of the P. I. A. C., as follows: "In principle, I am not opposed to the granting of permission to landlords on the right bank of the RHINE to go into the occupied areas for the purpose of cultivating their fields; those concerned must send their individual requests to the Commanders of the Armies in the zone into which they wish to enter. These requests will be investigated with the greatest generosity."

* * * * *

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section.

Third Army: Gen. File 3: Fldr. 279: Note

Resumption of Hostilities

[Contemporary Translation]

1st Section, General Staff
No. 2999

ALLIED GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,
June 16, 1919.

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF ALLIED ARMIES

The day upon which operations are resumed, the suspension of hostilities accorded to the enemy by the Armistice will be terminated.

It is no longer, therefore, a question of a simple march to the front, like that which we executed in advancing to the RHINE. At that time hostilities being suspended, the march was subject to the conditions of the Armistice Convention.

When we advance again upon the right bank of the RHINE we will be in a state of hostility, and our progression will be made in enemy country.

This new situation gives to the Army commanders or any troop commander the right of taking against the enemy, or against inhabitants suspected of hostile intentions, all measures conforming to the laws of war and which those commanders may judge necessary in order to permit the advance or to assure the security of their troops.

Consequently the command will break any resistance of any enemy forces* which may oppose us, employing to that end the means of combat at the disposal of the troops. Similarly, there is all latitude to assure, by seizing hostages, the correctness of the attitude of the inhabitants.

However, in principle we should abstain from using means which would not benefit the kind of operations which we must expect, and especially must we avoid taking useless measures to affect the civil population.

Therefore, gas shells and all means of destruction at a great distance (long range artillery, bombardment aviation) will not be used except against centers of resistance which are determined to be in the hands of troops or insurgent populations or against the seat of an enemy government.

F. FOCH.

Third Army, Gen. Corres. Fldr. 279: Letter

Preparation for Offensive Operations

[Editorial Translation]

No. 3015

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED ARMIES.
June 16, 1919--8:10 p. m.

Very urgent

Marshal Foch to General Pershing

1. Confirming my Message No. 2995 of June 15, the Allied Armies will be in position to resume offensive operations effective June 20.
 2. Consequently, the preliminary movements will begin June 17.
 3. However, the offensive operations will be carried out only on order of the Marshal, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies. Therefore, the outpost line will not be crossed before the time indicated by this order.
 4. I have not sent any direct orders to General Liggett.
-

Third Army: Gen Corresp. File 3: Fldr. 279: Memorandum

Instructions Relative to Russian Prisoners

[Contemporary Translation]

* The only enemy forces to be recognized as belligerents are those which belong to the Reichwehr or to formations of the old Army not yet dissolved.

The Office of the Marshal C-in-C of the Allied Armies

Direction Generale of C. R. to the Armies

INSTRUCTION
RELATIVE TO THE RECEIVING OF RUSSIAN PRISONERS
IN CASE OF THE RESUMING OF MILITARY OPERATIONS

Large numbers of Russian prisoners of war are now actually stationed in German territory where the Allied Armies can be easily reached in case military operations should resume.

It is a foregone conclusion that the Germans will endeavor, just as they have done after the signing of the Armistice terms, to rid itself of these prisoners by turning them loose or sending them into the Allied lines.

The brisk influx of these prisoners will probably cause a noticeable hindrance to the Armies. The transportation outside of the zone of operation as well as the guards for these contingents will call for a great deal of transportation facilities and personnel which could be more advantageously used elsewhere.

Therefore, the Armies shall take into consideration, only those of the Russian prisoners who actually remain in their regular camps.

The others will be forced back into the German lines.

WEYGAND,
P. O. Major General.

Third Army, Gen. File: Fldr. 279: Instructions

Repatriation of Allied Missions

[Contemporary Translation]

The Marshal's Office C-in-C of the Allied Armies

General Chief of Staff, D. G. C. R. A.

9733/ C R

June 16, 1919.

INSTRUCTIONS TO INSURE THE REPATRIATION OF THE ALLIED
MISSIONS SENT TO NON-OCCUPIED GERMANY IN CASE THE GER-
MANS SHOULD NOT SIGN THE TREATY OF PEACE

I. All necessary measures are to be immediately taken to call back the Allied Missions operating in Germany, in case of a rupture of the pourparlers of peace by the German Delegates with a view of having them return to occupied territories without delay.

II. Allied Mission of Berlin: As soon as pourparlers are ruptured, a request will be made to the German Government to form a train (more than one, if necessary), to take the Mission to COLOGNE. It will be at the station of COLOGNE where will be effected the exchange of trains of those coming from Germany on one side and of those carrying the German delegates of the Versailles Conference on the other side, as was the case of the Armistice Commission.

The Interallied Armistice Commission at SPA have received special instructions on the above subject.

III. Members of the Mission Traveling Casually in Non-Occupied Germany: These will do their utmost to return to the seat of their mission, and in case where the Mission has departed, will request from the German authorities, transportation to occupied territory. It is prudent besides that immediately, those who are now traveling casually, be recalled to the seat of their mission, whenever it is possible and as long as the Treaty of Peace shall have not been signed.

IV. Trains on Destination to Poland Caught in Nonoccupied Germany: The trains which are loaded will be turned back to the RHINE, the trains which are empty will continue their trip. The officers placed as commanding officers along the large stations of the transportation line will cease functioning immediately after the passage of the last train on return trip and they will take reservations on that train.

V. The members of the Allied Missions in nonoccupied Germany, as soon as they will have been advised of the rupture of the pourparlers will claim aid and protection from the German authorities, and at the same time insist on their being sent to COLOGNE.

They will use for argument, the official matter given to the German Government that:

1st---The Allied Missions are protected through diplomatic immunity.

2d---All measure of violence taken with regards to them, even only the mere internment of them will have as an immediate reply on the part of the Allies, severe reprisals with regards to either hostages to be taken among the German delegation at VERSAILLES or at SPA, or even with regards to German prisoners.

VI. The instructions above mentioned are to be rigorously treated in a secret manner. Only the members of the Allied Missions, who are detached and for reasons of service cannot be sent to the seat of their mission, are to be instructed of these decisions; furthermore they should be informed that the matter is strictly for them.

F. FOCH,
The Marshal,
C-in-C of the Allied Armies.

Third Army, Gen. File: Fldr. 279: Minutes

Conversation Reference Resumption of Hostilities

June 17, 1919---10:50 a. m.

General Fox Conner had the following telephone conversation with General Malin

Craig, Chief of Staff of the American Third Army, at 10:45 a. m., June 17, 1919

General Conner: Have you a stenographer there?

General Craig: I will get one.---All right; I'm ready.

General Conner: Commanding General, Third Army: Following telegram repeated to you for necessary action: Extremely urgent. No. 3015. Marshal Foch to General Pershing.

1. Confirming my Message 2995 of June 15, the Allied Armies must be ready to resume offensive operations on and after June 20.
2. Consequently, the preparatory movements will begin June 17.
3. However, no operations will be undertaken without the order of the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies. Consequently the line of outposts will not be crossed before receiving further orders.

By order:

CONNER.

You understand the thing, do you?

General Craig: Yes, I understand all right.

General Conner: You don't have to do anything at all, do you?

General Craig: Nothing except move the French cavalry division up. We have to move it up.

General Conner: What time will you have to move it?

General Craig: Start it right away.

At 11 a. m., June 17, General Craig called General Conner

General Craig: Just received notice from G-2 that they had extended the date to the 23d.

General Conner: You mean the time limit was extended to the 23d?

General Craig: Yes.

General Conner: I have no doubt of it.

General Craig: Don't forget that the 4th and 5th Divisions are still without equipment. Leave them that way?

General Conner: Yes; unless something happens. You are not going to move your cavalry division, then, until further notice, are you?

General Craig: No

General Conner: You won't need it anyhow.

Third Army: Gen. Cor. File: Fldr. 279: Telegram

Preparation for Resumption of Offensive

[Contemporary Translation]

No. 3022

Paris, June 17, 1919---4:30 p. m.

Marshal Foch to General Pershing

1. My Telegram 3015 of the 16th prescribed that: In order that the Allies should be prepared to resume the offensive on the 20th the preparatory movements should begin on the 17th.
2. Notwithstanding the extension until June 23 at 7 p. m. accorded to the Germans to make their reply, it is indispensable to be in position to meet the situation which would arise upon the rupture of negotiations prior to the expiration of this delay.
3. Orders already given are, consequently, maintained.
4. I have not sent any direct order to General Liggett.

G-3, to transmit to C. G., Third Army

J. G. H.

Rec'd by G-3 9:45 a. m., June 18, 1919

Substance telephoned to C. of S., Third Army at 10 a. m., June 18.

F. C.

Third Army, Gen. File: Fldr. 279: Minutes

Conference Reference to Resumption of Hostilities

June 17, 1919--5:30 p. m.

At 5:15 p. m. General Fox Conner called General Malin Craig, Chief of Staff of Third Army, and they had the following conversation:

General Conner: When I phoned you this morning I mentioned a Note 2999. You haven't gotten a copy of it, have you?

General Craig: No.

General Conner: I am sending a copy of it by courier. It will reach you day-after-tomorrow morning. In the meantime I will tell you what is in it. There is nothing particular in it, except that in case you advance you go to war again---the Armistice is over---it is a question of hostilities. If you meet anything you have to reduce it. The only thing of importance is this: That gas shells and long-range artillery and bombardment aviation are not to be used until it is against centers of resistance or where there is real need for it.

General Craig: I rather gathered from my conversation with you this morning that I need not get in a sweat over this.

General Conner: Yes; I think not.

General Craig: The French are moving rather fast, and have shunted some of their artillery right into COBLENCE and we are going to have to billet some of them here tonight.

General Conner: You don't need any considerable time, do you? You are ready, aren't you?

General Craig: We require for concentration of the 1st Division 24 hours. General Liggett doesn't want to move them out of billet until it is necessary. Will you give me 36 hours' notice? We can get everything in place in 36 hours except that French cavalry.

General Conner: I will give you all the notice I can.

Resumption of the Offensive

[Editorial Translation]

1st Section, General Staff
No. 3025

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED ARMIES,
Paris, June 17, 1919.

Memorandum from Marshal Foch

The offensive of the Allied Armies is ready to start again on the day prescribed by the Governments; the Armies, alerted the first time on May 20, have been alerted again by orders issued by Marshal Foch June 14 and confirmed on the 16th. Unless orders to the contrary are received from the Governments, the operations will begin the day indicated: 7 p. m., June 23.

This offensive will be undertaken and pursued in conformity with the program studied with the Commanders-in-Chief of the Allied Armies April 24, submitted to the Government heads May 10, and prescribed for the Commanders-in-Chief by directive * * * of May 20; that is, in the direction of WEIMAR and BERLIN, with a view to compelling the German Government to sign the peace.

It is difficult to foresee at what point along that route we shall secure peace, and whether it will be necessary to go as far as BERLIN to overthrow the German Government.

But what is certain is that as we advance we shall be encumbered by an occupation in rear, increasingly so as the overrun populations, with their returned male contingent, can form strong groups to start riots, insurrections, or just strikes, of such nature as to impede, weaken and even stop the advance of the Allied Armies, or break down their communications,* if these people are not held in check. Naturally, it is impossible to estimate the difficulties we shall encounter and the consequent expense of occupation. But it is important to begin at once to reduce these expenses as much as possible and it is therefore necessary to relieve ourselves of the burden of the peoples we can, at the same time, bring to peace terms; Grand Duchy of Baden, Wurtemberg, Bavaria.

That result will be obtained by the scheme indicated in Par. 2 of the directive referred to above: "Force placed in the MAIN Valley to separate north Germany and south Germany." It will be exploited while completing the strategic separating action by:

1. An operation to separate which, by successive Armistices, will stop hostilities in the subdued zones.
2. Also a military operation for reduction and occupation of south Germany at the base of French forces debouching from the Black Forest and Italian forces debouching from l'INN.

This anxiety to realize materially on the results obtained implies neither irresolution nor delay in the march toward the final objectives. The command desires only, as is its duty, to neglect nothing and leave behind it no cause for failure.

Finally, in the joint military operations to be made against Germany, it is expedient to give the greatest consideration to our Czech and Polish Allies in the matter of having the Czech forces intervene offensively on German territory or support the Polish Army in the fight which seems to be shaping up for it.

* The railroad service necessarily is assured by German personnel.

The force placed as rapidly as possible in the MAIN Valley assures our communications by rail with Czechoslovakia and Poland. It unites into a single theater of operations all the countries that can operate against Germany. Concentrated action, well established, coordinated, and supported, against the heart of Germany, will be made possible, as also the supply of these countries, a part of which is now provided by roads which the resumption of hostilities would close to us.

Briefly, the march beginning at the RHINE, with the available forces, will have all the more chance of reaching the destination of BERLIN as we shall have more quickly detached the elements of the south from the German block; we shall have put the states of the south out of the war by successive armistices which I ask the Governments to realize right now; we shall have extended the Czech and Polish forces along the MAIN with a view to a later movement converging on BERLIN.

As it appears, the initial stage of our offensive is assured; its conclusion can not be guaranteed a priori. It will be greatly facilitated by the conditions above enumerated.

I have the honor to ask the Governments to be kind enough to consider these conditions seriously and advise me if they share my views.

F. FOCH.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1230: Note

Further German Protest on French Politics in the Palatinate

[Contemporary Translation]

Wako No. 23126 II. Ang.

Spa, June 17, 1919.

From: General von Hammerstein, Chairman of the German Armistice Commission

To: General Nudant, President of the P. I. A. C.

On May 25, 1919, in Note No. 23126, I delivered a declaration of the German Government which concerns itself with the behavior of French troops of occupation in violation of international law and of the Armistice Agreement, and especially in the case of General Gerard concerning the treasonable attempt to proclaim a neutral republic of the Palatinate.

The German Government appealing to the principles of the future League of Nations and the principles of justice and of international ethics, expresses the expectation that the French commander in the Palatinate will be recalled at once, and that his arbitrary regulations will be immediately revoked.

Up to the present no answer has been offered me to this communication. I may be permitted to expect that an answer will be given at once to this declaration of the Government and I request General Nudant to take the necessary steps to this end.

HAMMERSTEIN.

Sec. L-A, Wako 25438

Spa, June 17, 1919.

From General von Hammerstein to General Nudant

In behalf of the Imperial Minister, Erzberger, I have the honor to inform you that the German Armistice Commission in SPA and also the Armistice Commission in FRANKFORT-on-the-MAIN have received orders to remain at their posts, and the latter even in case that an advance of the Allied Armies, involving FRANKFORT, should take place.

The stay of these two commissions, however, makes prerequisite that their members shall receive corresponding assurance from the Allied and Associated Governments as to their personal safety and inviolability of their archives, etc. Likewise that they shall retain their freedom of extra-territoriality. Especially the German Government must be assured that the Armistice Commission in SPA after the lapse of the Armistice shall be permitted free and unhindered return to unoccupied Germany with all their archives and possessions. The subcommissions of the German Armistice Commission at SPA which are occupied outside of SPA and for which the same guarantees must be commanded are listed in the attached document.

Likewise the remaining of the Armistice Commission in FRANKFORT-on-the-MAIN depends upon the assurance that its entire personnel and its offices will in case of necessity be placed under the protection of the Allied and Associated military authorities.

The binding assurance of the Allied and Associated Governments to the above effect appears to be absolutely necessary in view of the unexampled happenings upon the departure of the peace delegates from VERSAILLES.

I look forward to an early answer.

HAMMERSTEIN.

Third Army, Gen. File: Fldr. 279: Letter

Withdrawal From Nonoccupied Germany

Section 4, General Staff

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,
June 18, 1919.

Commander-in-Chief

Brig. Gen. G. H. Harries, Chief of American Military Mission, Berlin, Germany

[Extract]

* * * * *

3. In the event the Treaty of Peace is signed, the necessity for the continuance of your commission will at once cease and it is desired that it be withdrawn immediately from Germany and reported to the C. G., S. O. S., for evacuation to the United States. In either case, therefore, your commission will be withdrawn from unoccupied German territory and it is desired that all preliminary arrangements, looking to this withdrawal, be made at

once. No actual moves should be executed until it is known definitely that the German delegates have refused to sign the treaty.

By order of the C-in-C.

GEORGE VAN HORN MOSELEY,
Brigadier General, G. S.,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4.

Third Army Gen. File: Fldr. 279: Telegram

Points to be Occupied on Resuming Advance

OFFICE OF COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, A. E. F.,
Chaumont, France, June 19, 1919.

FROM: General Pershing

TO: Marshal Foch, Paris, through French Mission, Chaumont

Replying to your Telegram 3055: The occupation of the following points is planned for the evening of the 23d, LIMBURG, WESTERBURG, HACHENBURG, and ALTENKIRCHEN.

PERSHING.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1189: Telegram

Preliminary Operations Toward Resumption of Hostilities

[Contemporary Translation]

FROM: Marshal Foch, in Paris

TO: (1) French G. H. Q.
(2) Hq. French Group of Armies Kaiserslautern
(3) Mission Chaumont for General Pershing
(4) Commanding General XXXVI Army Corps (for General Michel)---
Aix-la-Chapelle
(5) Mission Brussels---for General Gillain
(6) Mission Cologne---for General Sir Robertson

No. 3055

The delay granted the Germans for a reply expires on the 23d at 7 p. m.

In case of a refusal to sign, hostilities may be resumed from that time on. It would be advisable to undertake without any delay and in the last hours of the evening still available, preliminary operations with a view to occupying important objectives not far from our lines and whose immediate possession would ensure or facilitate the general operations that are to be undertaken in the very first hours of the following day.

You are requested to let me know through a telegram in code what preliminary operations can be foreseen along those lines and to prepare their execution from now on.

Marshal FOCH.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1230: Letter

Evacuation of German Troops From the Baltic

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, June 19, 1919.

No. 164

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

* * * * *

8. Limitations Placed on Movement of German Troops in Esthonia and Vicinity.

Marshal Foch has informed the Germans that:

"The Allied and Associated Governments request the German Government to give as speedily as possible the necessary orders for the purpose:

1. Of preventing in the future any further advance of German troops northward toward ESTHONIA;

2. Of evacuating WINDAU and LIBAU immediately, and of speeding up as rapidly as possible the evacuation of all territory which before the war formed a part of the Russian Empire, in conformance with the requirements of Article XII of the Armistice."

* * * * *

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section.

Exchange of Missions

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, June 19, 1919.

No. 164

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

1. Exchange of Allied Missions in Case Germany Does Not Sign Peace Treaty: In accordance with instructions received from Marshal Foch, General Nudant, President of the P. I. A. C., is to proceed to COLOGNE and make the necessary arrangements for the exchange of Allied Missions in nonoccupied Germany and German Missions in France, Belgium and occupied Germany. This in case the Germans do not sign the Peace Treaty.

General Green, Chief of Staff of the British Section of the P. I. A. C. is to go to COLOGNE for the purpose of making the necessary preliminary arrangements. Each Allied Section of the P. I. A. C. has been called upon to designate representatives to accompany General Nudant. I have designated Major Frank, who will be accompanied by a field clerk and an orderly, and I will also give him a motor car. As Major Frank speaks both French and German, he should be able to carry out all the duties that may be required of him in representing the American Section of the P. I. A. C. I shall be in telephonic connection with him and in case any questions require consideration which he has an doubt about I can reach COLOGNE in about three hours myself.

Attached hereto, marked A is a copy of the instructions from General Nudant to General Green in regard to this movement. Nothing is to be done except in a tentative way until it is known definitely whether or not the Germans will sign.

2. Wish of the German Armistice Commission to Leave Spa on Thursday, June 19: General Nudant has presented the following note to the Germans which contains the response of Marshal Foch to their request to leave SPA on Thursday, June 19:

I have informed the Marshal, Commander-in-Chief, of the intention which you have expressed to me this morning concerning the eventual departure on Thursday, the 19th, of the German Section of the Armistice Commission.

I have just received in response to this communication the following telegram:

'3005. Marshal Foch considers indispensable that the German Commission should continue to function as well as the Interallied Commission in order to assure the adjustment during the present period of all questions being liquidated and in particular the execution of the Polish transports.'

3. Instructions From Minister Erzberger in Regard to German Commissions Remaining at their Posts: General von Hammerstein has presented to the Allies a note, copy attached marked B, containing instructions from Imperial Minister, Erzberger, to the effect that the German Armistice Commission at SPA and also that in FRANKFORT-on-the-MAIN have received orders to remain at their posts. The latter even in case of [an advance of] the Allied Armies' advance, involving FRANKFORT.

The note continues to specify certain conditions which Imperial Minister Erzberger claims should be carried out in accordance with international customs in like cases.

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section.

[Contemporary Translation]

No. 1273/G PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, June 19, 1919.

From: General Nudant, President of the P. I. A. C.

To: General Green, of the British Mission

[Extract]

In case the Treaty of Peace is not signed, General Nudant will go to COLOGNE under orders of Marshal Foch to regulate the exchange of the Allied Missions in nonoccupied Germany and the German Missions in France, Belgium and occupied Germany.

He will be accompanied by seven officers and twenty-one men of the Allied Missions at SPA.

* * * * *

7. To see to it that measures are taken to secure the guarding and protection of the German personnel by military detachments furnished by the Army of Occupation in COLOGNE, both at the railway station and about the quarters which might be designated for the German personnel in case of the hold up of the trains for a considerable time, it being understood that the measures that are taken must not be of an harassing nature, and that the German representatives must be treated with all the attention that diplomatic courtesy allows them.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1230: Note

Departure of German Armistice Commission

[Contemporary Translation]

1291/G *Spa, June 20, 1919.*

From: Major Paris, of the French Mission

To: Chief of Staff of the German Mission

In answer to Note 25507 of June 16.

[Extract]

I have the honor to return to you copy intended for you and beg you to be good enough to change it in accordance with the following points:

1. The train for the Armistice Commission was brought from ELBERFELD to HERBESTHAL on June 20. It can be ordered for Monday, June 23, at 6 o'clock in the evening. (End of time allowed.) The departure (entraining in the evening and during the night) may take place any time after Tuesday, June 24 at 6 o'clock in the morning.

* * * * *

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1230: Note

Establishment of General Provisioning Bureau

[Contemporary Translation]

A. A. I. No. 3452

Spa, June 21, 1919.

From Hohrer to General Nudant

In behalf of the Imperial Minister, Erzberger, I have the honor to transmit the following note:

The Headquarters of the French Tenth Army, General Staff for Civil Affairs, has ordered on April 25, 1919, under No. 7732 A. G., the establishment of a central provisioning bureau for the organization of the provisioning of the civil population in the Army zone, after there had already been organized in MAYENCE, WIESBADEN and KREUZNACH, bureaus for the provisioning of the population, the placing of which bureaus under the BERLIN Central Officer, however, had not at that time been brought about.

Upon the establishment of the Central Provisioning Bureau, however, it is expressly stated that this Bureau is to act in the stead of the Imperial Office, that is to say, instead of an Imperial Provisioning Ministry, and that is destined to centralize all questions concerning the provisioning the zone occupied by the Tenth Army.

As justification it is stated that in consequence of the ever increasing exhaustion of food supplies of occupied Germany, the importation of foodstuffs to the left bank of the RHINE is becoming rarer, and also on account of difficulties of transportation between the occupied and unoccupied districts, that the Imperial Provisioning Ministry is daily losing its interest in the question of provisioning occupied areas.

These reasons alleged by the General Staff of the Tenth Army are inapplicable; especially the assumption that the Imperial Provisioning Ministry is losing interest in the question of provisioning of the occupied area must be denied. Lately the delivery of grain to the left bank of the RHINE by the Imperial Grain Central Office has been increased since the stock on the left bank which was to be used up first is dwindling. The difficulties of transportation alleged by the Tenth Army are caused by the troops of occupation themselves, and indeed to a greater extent in the French zone than in the other zones, by reason of the stipulations which have been made there to the hindrance of commerce.

The justification of these measures upon the bases of negligence of German deliveries appear so much the less applicable since it is the French authorities of occupation themselves who insist that the occupied areas shall continue to receive deliveries in accordance with the old schemes of provisioning, for example, in the case of deliveries of seeds for the Palatinate and the providing of the flour mills on the left bank of the RHINE with wheat from occupied Germany, etc.

According to Article V of the Armistice Agreement the deliveries on the left bank of the RHINE are to be administered by the local authorities under the supervision of the troops of occupation of the Allies and of the United States. The occupying powers are not competent to establish new authorities. The establishment of provisioning bureaus and of a central provisioning office is contrary therefore to the Armistice Agreement, therefore, a sharpest protest is made against these measures and an early location of the regulations mentioned and the establishment of the old authorities in their full capacity is demanded.

Imperial Minister ERZBERGER,

HOHRER.

Third Army, Gen. Corres. File: Fldr. 279: Telegram

Restricted Order for Offensive

[Editorial Translation]

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED ARMIES,

June 21, 1919..

No. 9/K

Copy of a coded telegram

Headquarters Bacon to General Pershing

Take note that it is understood that the instructions in Paragraph No. 3 of my coded Telegram 3015, dated June 16, apply to all operations which have been planned for the Allied Armies. Consequently no operation will be executed the evening of June 23 unless further orders have been given by me.

[Following notation appears on telegram]

Telephoned to C. of S., 3d Army at 11:50 a. m. June 23.

F. C.

[Editorial Translation]

1st Section, General Staff
No. 3,084

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED ARMIES,
June 21, 1919.

Marshal Foch

To: Headquarters Kaiserslautern
French Mission, Cologne (for General Sir W. Robertson)
French Mission, Chaumont (for General Pershing)
French Mission, Bruxelles (for Lt. General Gillain)
Headquarters French XXXIII Corps, Aix-la-Chapelle (for General Michel)

In case of resumption of hostilities, a list of men of military age, from 17 to 45, will be compiled in each locality of territories recently occupied, by the civil authorities and as their responsibility.

These men will pursue their occupations but will hold themselves ready to respond immediately to all calls of the military authorities, with whom the list will be placed immediately upon their arrival in billets.

By order:

DESTICKER,
Chief of Staff.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1230: Letter

French Protest on German Propaganda

No. 165

AMERICAN SECTION, A. E. F.,
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, Belgium, June 22, 1919.

From: Chief

To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

1. German Propaganda in Alsace: General Nudant sent a note to the Chairman of the German Armistice Commission enclosing two tracts sent from nonoccupied Germany; one of them to the inhabitants of Upper ALSACE and the other to the Mayor of OBERSTEIN.

General Nudant calls upon the Germans to use their influence with the German Government to see that this kind of propaganda is stopped immediately. The note terminates with the statement that in case the request remains without results, the Germans are informed that rigorous measures will be taken even going so far as expelling those to whom the tracts are sent.

Copies of the tracts furnished with the original note were not sent to us.

* * * * *

MALVERN-HILL BARNUM,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Section.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1189: Order

Marshal Foch's Headquarters

[Editorial Translation]

No. 5951/CA

FRENCH MILITARY MISSION WITH THE AMERICAN ARMY,
Chaumont, Haute-Marne, June 22, 1919.

Le Colonel Linard, Chief of the French Military Mission with the American Army

To: The Commander-in-Chief, American Expeditionary Forces

Marshal Foch's headquarters will be stationed at KREUZNACH under conventional name
Etat-Major Bacon from June 22, 10 a. m. on.

From that date all postal, telephonic and telegraphic communications for the Marshal
will be sent to Kreuznach at the following address:

Etat-Major BACON.

193-32.16, Fldr. B.: Telegram

Orders in Case of Advance into Germany

4 A ON 79 OB

June 23, 1919.

Commanding General, Third Army, Coblenz

In case the German Government should not sign the treaty and the Allied Armies move
forward for further occupation of Germany initial orders for movement will be given by
these headquarters. Thereafter orders from the Allied Commanders-in-Chief, so far as
concerns the American Forces, may be given direct to the Commanding General Army of
Occupation, provided that copies are immediately sent to the American Commander-in-Chief.

HARBORD.
Chief of Staff.

Signing of Peace Terms

[Editorial Translation]

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED ARMIES,
June 23, 1919--6:45 p. m.

No. 29/K

- I. The German Government has agreed to sign without reservations.
- II. The operations prepared for the Allied Armies are suspended for the time.
- III. The Commanders of the Allied Armies will assume such dispositions as they consider necessary to establish their troops under the proper comfortable conditions, all the while holding themselves ready, until the actual signing of the Treaty, to resume operations upon notice.

FOCH.

Note: The Mission at COBLENZ received the same message. Confirmation will follow by telegram.

[Editorial Note: With this document, the depicting of Armistice conditions ceases. It is true that the Permanent Interallied Armistice Commission worked on for some months longer, but, the signing of peace terms automatically cancels the provisions of Armistice terms.]

"The Armistice---Rudin*: Army War College Library: Memorandum

President Wilson's Program for Peace Negotiations

[The following data have been added to this compilation to clarify the numerous references in American documents to the President's message to Congress in January, 1918]

[Extract]

A. THE FOURTEEN POINTS, JANUARY 8, 1918

1. Open covenants of peace, openly arrived at, after which there shall be no private international understandings of any kind but diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in the public view.
2. Absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas, outside territorial waters, alike in peace and in war, except as the seas may be closed in whole or in part by international action for the enforcement of international covenants.
3. The removal, so far as possible, of all economic barriers and the establishment of an equality of trade conditions among all the nations consenting to the peace and associating themselves for its maintenance.

* Harry Rudolph Rudin, Yale University.

4. Adequate guarantees given and taken that national armaments will be reduced to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety.

5. A free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims, based upon a strict observance of the principle that in determining all such questions of sovereignty the interests of the populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims of the government whose title is to be determined.

6. The evacuation of all Russian territory and such a settlement of all questions affecting Russia as will secure the best and freest cooperation of the other nations of the world in obtaining for her an unhampered and unembarrassed opportunity for the independent determination of her own political development and national policy and assure her of a sincere welcome into the society of free nations under institutions of her own choosing; and, more than a welcome, assistance also of every kind that she may need and may herself desire. The treatment accorded Russia by her sister nations in the months to come will be the acid test of their good will, of their comprehension of her needs as distinguished from their own interests, and of their intelligent and unselfish sympathy.

7. Belgium, the whole world will agree, must be evacuated and restored, without any attempt to limit the sovereignty which she enjoys in common with all other free nations. No other single act will serve as this will serve to restore confidence among the nations in the laws which they have themselves set and determined for the government of their relations with one another. Without this healing act the whole structure and validity of international law is forever impaired.

8. All French territory should be freed and the invaded portions restored, and the wrong done to France by Prussia in 1871 in the matter of ALSACE-LORRAINE, which has unsettled the peace of the world for nearly fifty years, should be righted, in order that peace may once more be made secure in the interest of all.

9. A readjustment of the frontiers of Italy should be effected along clearly recognizable lines of nationality.

10. The peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose place among the nations we wish to see safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the freest opportunity of autonomous development.

11. Rumania, Serbia, and Montenegro should be evacuated; occupied territories restored; Serbia accorded free and secure access to the sea; and the relations of the several Balkan states to one another determined by friendly counsel along historically established lines of allegiance and nationality; and international guarantees of the political and economic independence and territorial integrity of the several Balkan states should be entered into.

12. The Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development, and the Dardanelles should be permanently opened as a free passage to the ships and commerce of all nations under international guarantees.

13. An independent Polish state should be erected which should include the territories inhabited by indisputable Polish populations, which should assured a free and secure access to the sea, and whose political and economic independence and territorial integrity should be guaranteed by international covenant.

14. A general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike.

B. THE FOUR PRINCIPLES OF FEBRUARY 11, 1918

1. That each part of the final settlement must be based upon the essential justice of that particular case and upon such adjustments as are most likely to bring a peace that will be permanent.

2. That peoples and provinces are not to be bartered about from sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were mere chattels and pawns in a game, even the great game, now forever discredited, of the balance of power, but that,

3. Every territorial settlement involved in this war must be made in the interest and for the benefit of the populations concerned, and not as a part of any mere adjustment or compromise of claims amongst rival states; and

4. That all well-defined national aspirations shall be accorded the utmost satisfaction that can be accorded them without introducing new or perpetuating old elements of discord and antagonism that would be likely in time to break the peace of Europe and consequently of the world.

C. THE FOUR POINTS OF JULY 4, 1918.

1. The destruction of every arbitrary power anywhere that can separately, secretly, and of its single choice disturb the peace of the world; or, if it cannot be presently destroyed, at the least its reduction to virtual impotence.

2. The settlement of every question, whether of territory, or sovereignty, of economic arrangement, or of political relationship upon the basis of the free acceptance of that settlement by the people immediately concerned, and not upon the basis of the material interest or advantage of any other nation or people which may desire a different settlement for the sake of its own exterior influence or mastery.

3. The consent of all nations to be governed in their conduct toward each other by the same principles of honor and of respect for the common law of civilized society that govern the individual citizens of all modern States in their relations with one another; to the end that all promises and covenants may be sacredly observed, no private plots or conspiracies hatched, no selfish injuries wrought with impunity, and a mutual trust established upon the handsome foundation of a mutual respect for right.

4. The establishment of an organization of peace which shall make it certain that the combined power of free nations will check every invasion of right and serve to make peace and justice the more secure by affording a definite tribunal of opinion to which all must submit and by which every international readjustment that cannot be amicably agreed upon by the peoples directly concerned shall be sanctioned. These great objects can be put into a single sentence. What we seek is the reign of law, based upon the consent of the governed and sustained by the organized opinion of mankind.

D. THE FIVE PARTICULARS OF SEPTEMBER 27, 1918

1. The impartial justice meted out must involve no discrimination between those to whom we wish to be just and those to whom we do not wish to be just. It must be a justice that plays no favourites, and knows no standards but the equal rights of the several peoples concerned.

2. No special or separate interest of any single nation or group of nations can be made the basis of any part of the settlement which is not consistent with the common interest of all.

3. There can be no leagues or alliances or special covenants and understandings within the general and common family of the League of Nations.

4. And more specifically, there can be no special, selfish, economic combinations within the League, and no employment of any form of economic boycott or expulsion except as the power of economic penalty by exclusion from the markets of the world may be vested in the League of Nations itself as a means of discipline and control.

5. All international agreements and treaties of every kind must be made known in their entirety to the rest of the world.

The three following documents are taken from the Report of the Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs, Third Army, and have been included as an annex to the compilation of Armistice documents because they give a good, over-all statement, from Army level, of conditions existing during the period of the Armistice.

R. S. T.

Library, AWC: Report

Interallied Control

THIRD ARMY AND AMERICAN FORCES IN GERMANY,
OFFICE OF THE OFFICER IN CHARGE OF CIVIL AFFAIRS,
January 10, 1920.

AMERICAN MILITARY GOVERNMENT OF OCCUPIED GERMANY

1918 - 1920

REPORT OF THE OFFICER IN CHARGE OF CIVIL AFFAIRS

THIRD ARMY

AND

AMERICAN FORCES IN GERMANY

[Extract]

* * * * *

CHAPTER NO. 3

INTERALLIED CONTROL

* * * * *

INTERALLIED HIGH COMMAND

On November 15, 1918, Marshal Foch, in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief, issued to the Allied Generals commanding the Armies of Occupation, a list of principles and instructions for use in the formation and exercise of the military government about to be established in the occupied area. A synopsis of these instructions follows:

According to the principles laid down by convention of the THE HAGUE, control of German administration was to be exercised by the Commanding Generals of the Allied Armies, under the supreme control of the Marshal, Commander-in-Chief, German officials were to continue to fill the offices which they occupied at the time of the Armistice and to conduct the administration of occupied territory under the direction and control of the military authorities. The generals commanding the Armies throughout the territories under

their control were to receive general governmental powers as far as concerned administrative decisions and regulations to be observed by the civil population. They were also to designate the officers who, in each of the territorial divisions of occupied districts, would control the operation of civil administration through the German officials. These officers were to be subordinate to their superiors, based on the administrative decision of the territory, and also subordinate to any local military commanders to whom the general commanding an army might have delegated a part of his authority. Parenthetically, it may be stated that this plan of subordinating officers engaged in local administration to both the officer charged with the general administration of civil affairs and to the local military commander, resulted in the confusion inseparable from dual control. Decrees concerning police, public order, or the safety of the Armies, were to be made by the Allied military commanders, or be approved by them when emanating from the German authorities.

The Marshal realized that administration of the civil population during the period of the advance would be extremely difficult, and that no hard and fast rules could be provided for that period, but that each situation would have to be met as it arose. He therefore directed that as soon as the plans for the occupation had been drawn up by the Commanding Generals, the officers to be charged with civil administration of the various sectors should be severally attached to the tactical unit which would eventually occupy their sector, and should move forward with it. During the advance, unit commanders were merely to take necessary steps to ensure the safety of their troops, maintain order in the locality temporarily used for their cantonment, and, if necessary, lend support to the civil administration.

Marshal Foch at the same time laid down principles for the guidance of officers charged with the administration of civil affairs. A synopsis of these principles follows:

Laws and regulations in force at the time of occupation were to be respected in so far as they did not effect the occupying power or compromise its security. Requisitions were, however, to be permitted in accordance with the laws and regulations of the Allied Armies. It will be noticed that the Allied and not the German system of requisition was followed. This meant, in the case of billets, that the inhabitants were not required to prepare food for Allied soldiers during their stay in a house. Requisitions were to be made only by the commanding officer of the troops in that municipality or by his representative, and then only when such requisition was served upon the chief official of the municipality. By this system, the American Government became indebted to the municipality direct, and the municipality was left to settle with its own citizens. By this arrangement also, the Allies managed to avoid a great deal of petty bookkeeping. Furthermore, the food supplies necessary for the sustenance of the civil population were not to be requisitioned, to avoid the social unrest produced by hunger. The officers in charge of administration were directed to call on the competent German officials for all information which they might desire of an administrative or judicial nature, and to make use of the libraries and records of public offices and courts.

It was provided that public utilities should be maintained under the strict control of the Allied military authorities. Every effort was to be made to start and encourage the normal peacetime activities of communities; churches, schools, courts, and eleemosynary institutions were to be fostered, as were administrative assemblies, such as chambers of commerce, administrative councils, etc. Rules regulating rates of exchange, financial institutions, collection of taxes, payment of salaries, issues of stamps, bonds, money, etc., were not discussed in these preliminary instructions.

All German civil officials were to be temporarily confirmed in their offices, but provision was made for new appoints, removal from office or transfer, whenever such action was deemed necessary or advisable by the military authorities. Officials were not to be required to serve against their will, but all who served were to be warned that they would be held criminally responsible for misfeasance or neglect in the performance of their duties. The administrative councils and committees were to come together only upon

order or under authority of the Allied authorities, and then were to deliberate solely on questions expressly mentioned in the order authorizing the convocation.

Proclamations were to be issued by the commanders of armies or groups of armies, to inform the population of the occupation, and of the duties and obligations resting upon them, and for which they would be held responsible. Police regulations in German, and either English or French, were to be published at once by the officers in charge of civil administration dealing with such matters as the police of billeting areas, travel, sale of drinks, meetings, censorship of the press, photography, carrying and sale of arms, etc. A series of model regulations were drawn up, and permission granted to modify it as circumstances might require.

The Marshal also established in these instructions rules for enforcing the regulations laid down, by means of court martial, and a limit was placed on the latter's powers of sentence. It was also provided that generals commanding groups of armies or armies, and officers in charge of civil administration might order the deportation of persons who had disobeyed these regulations and also order if it should prove necessary, the provisional or final closing of refractory commercial or industrial establishments. It was also provided that convicted Germans might appeal to the various Army commanders, and finally to the Allied Commander-in-Chief.

Marshal Foch, issued at the same time, very detailed instructions regarding the declaration of residence, which was to be required of all German citizens, and the form of identity cards which they would be directed to carry. In addition, German municipal authorities were directed to keep a list of the names and domiciles of all persons within their jurisdiction. Regulations governing travel were also issued. Assemblage, except upon authorization of the military authorities was prohibited. A censorship was established of press, post, telegraph and telephone. The circulation of false information or of stories which might tend to spread disorder, was prohibited. The taking of photographs without a special permit was forbidden. A large number of other rules were also published pertaining to pigeons, arms and ammunition, methods of requisition, restaurants and cafes, etc. All these matters were discussed by the High Command with great attention to detail.

Another appendix to the "Instructions for Civil Administration" dwelt on "The Measures incumbent upon Commanding Officers of Troops passing through Enemy Localities not yet Occupied." These measures related to posting of guards and necessary police measures, namely, protection, seizure of important places, public buildings, telephones, telegraphs, records, maps, etc., and those of "Secondary Urgency" which concerned arrest of suspicious characters, obtaining of lists of names of men between 28 and 45 who had not been called to the colors, and of horses and vehicles, opening of dove-cotes, supervision of physicians and veterinarians, and publication of sanitary regulations.

Immediately on the occupation of Germany, Marshal Foch in his character of Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies because, of course, the supreme power in the Rhineland, and issued the first proclamation to the inhabitants.

This proclamation was followed by other proclamations issued by the Army commanders under authority given them by the Marshal in his letter of instructions. The subsequent proclamations were based upon the general principles laid down by the Marshal, but promulgated with greater attention to detail and conformed to the established customs of military occupation as practiced by the respective Armies.

It must be admitted that in the proclamations issued by the Army Commanders, the regulations, so exactly laid down by the Marshal, were not always followed. Such action was perhaps unavoidable, as the customs of the various nations taking part in the occupation differed so widely, that a complete unit could not be expected. In some cases, no attempt was ever made to enforce the regulations of the High Command, when they lay counter to the national policy of the Army in question.

COMMISSION DIRECTLY UNDER MARSHAL FOCH

Paragraph XXXIV of the Armistice states that "to assure the best execution of the present agreement, the principle of a Permanent International Armistice Commission is admitted. This Commission will perform its duties under the high authority of the military and naval commander-in-chief of the Allied Armies."

(a) Permanent Interallied Armistice Commission. The Commission appointed under this paragraph of the Armistice was known as the "Permanent Interallied Armistice Commission" and was charged with the general supervision of Armistice conditions and with formal communications to the German Government. Seven subcommissions operated under this permanent Commission. The first, for financial and administrative questions, was concerned with the recovery from Germany of the costs of maintaining the troops in occupied areas, under Article IX of the Armistice. The second, for restitution of industrial machinery, dealt with the restoration of Germany of confiscated French and Belgian machinery. The third was for return of French and Belgian securities. The fourth, for agricultural implements received from Germany in lieu of rolling stock. The fifth took over surrendered railway material, while the sixth and seventh dealt with the military equipment and motor transportation which Germany was required by the Armistice to surrender.

It being sometimes impossible to apply the laws of war to the conditions in Germany, since, in some cases, the terms of the Armistice took precedence and, in others, the views of the Allied and Associated Governments differed, Marshal Foch thought it advisable to appoint additional commissions to deal with questions of policy and administration as they arose. Fifteen additional commissions were thus appointed.

(b) Interallied Commission for the Rhineland. The most important of these was the Commission Interalliee des Territoires Rhenans, commonly known as the C. I. T. R. This Commission was originally charged with the general supervision of occupied territories. It was authorized to appoint commissions to deal with specific phases of the occupation, and to assign to each its duties. Once it had appointed these commissions and assigned them their duties, however, it was no longer in control of their acts or decisions. The importance of the C. I. T. R. lay in the fact that General Payot, a Frenchman and a member of Marshal Foch's staff, was appointed as its Chairman and was put in charge generally of affairs in occupied territories. All the decisions of all the commissions having to be approved by Marshal Foch before they were put into execution, General Payot advised the Marshal in regard to promulgation by the High Command of any order affecting the Rhineland. As Chairman of the C. I. T. R., he was expected to consult his fellow-commissioners before making recommendations to the Marshal. Consequently, this Commission exercised an influence far greater than was indicated by its charter.

The C. I. T. R. appointed fourteen commissions, which it charged with supervision of the more important phases of the occupation. All matters not specifically turned over to the committees, were reserved by the C. I. T. R. to itself. There were in all, sixteen central commissions of importance, including the Permanent Interallied Armistice Commission and the C. I. T. R.

(c) Interallied Economic Commission. The third Commission dealing with matters pertaining to the occupation, was the Interallied Economic Commission of occupied territories, commonly known as the LUXEMBURG Commission. This body was formed on December 13, 1918, and was charged with supervision of the distribution of raw materials to factories in the Rhineland, with distribution of the products of factories and with regulation of interchange of goods between occupied territories and the rest of Germany. This commission had six Economic Sections operating under it, at AIX-LA-CHAPELLE, MUNICHEN-GLADBACH, COLOGNE, TREVES, MAYENCE and LUDWIGSHAFEN, - which carried out the decrees of the main Commission.

(d) Interallied Railway Commission. The fourth commission, the Interallied Railway Commission, was to administer the railways of LUXEMBURG and occupied territories. There were subcommissions at COBLENCE, SAARBRUCKEN and LUXEMBURG City.

(e) Interallied Waterways Commission. The "Interallied Waterways Commission" was to

control navigation on the Rhine. This Commission had also a branch at COBLANCE and control centers at DUISBURG and EMMERICH.

(f) Road Commission. The sixth commission, the "Road Commission," was to provide for the maintenance of roads in occupied territories.

(g) Coal Distribution Commission.

(h) Commission for Government of the Rhineland. The eighth commission, that for Government of the Rhineland - was composed of civil administrators and officers in charge of civil affairs.

(i) Receiving Commission. The ninth commission - the "Receiving Commission" - was to inspect and receipt for the rolling stock and raw material handed over by Germany under the terms of the Armistice.

(k) and (l) Calais Railway and Calais Waterways Commission. The tenth and eleventh commissions - the "Calais Railway and Calais Waterways Commission: - were to administer the Belgian waterways and railways. These two Commissions only incidentally affected occupied territories.

(m) Commission of Postal Control.

(n) Shipping Commission. The Shipping Commission was to deal with established questions pertaining to the turning over to the Allies of German shipping, including rivercraft.

(o) ROTTERDAM Food Commission. The ROTTERDAM Food Commission was established to settle commercial and other details arising from the sale of foodstuffs to Germany by the Allies.

(p) COMPIEGNE Finance Commission. The fifteenth commission was the COMPIEGNE Finance Commission. This undertook to manage financial matters between the Allies and Germany.

(q) Interallied Military Food Commission. The sixteenth commission was the Interallied Military Food Commission. This was created to distribute rations for the Rhineland supplementary to the amounts granted Germany as a whole by the Hoover Commission. The Interallied Military Food Commission accomplished a great deal during the critical Spring months of 1919.

Marshal Foch had appointed these sixteen commissions to deal with such matters pertaining to the Rhineland as he desired, for reasons of national policy or the necessity for uniform control, to influence himself. All such commissions were accordingly to work under his direct supervision. They however failed to achieve the success expected of them, partly because their duties were not clearly defined and partly because, as will be seen later, other persons than the Marshal undertook, on several occasions, to issue instructions to the commissions direct, which naturally caused friction. The relative importance of the commissions also proved to be very unequal. Certain of them accomplished practically nothing, while others became dominant forces in the life of the Rhineland. The most important was without doubt the Interallied Economic Commission of Occupied Territories or, as it was more commonly known the LUXEMBURG Commission.

Each commission comprised American representatives, who unfortunately failed at first to maintain adequate liaison with the American Commander-in-Chief. In order to coordinate their work and obtain a definite control over their actions and decisions, General Pershing, on January 18, 1919, issued instructions to the Commanding General of the Third Army directing that in future, the senior American member of every Interallied Commission of Subcommittee which dealt with economic, industrial or financial questions, or any matter affecting the government of occupied territories, should take notes of the proceedings of each meeting. Two copies of these notes were to be sent to G. H. Q., A. E. F., and one copy to Brig. Gen. H. A. Smith, O. C. C. A. in occupied American territory. General Smith was directed to establish a bureau to coordinate the actions of all commissions and subcommissions and to see that the action of the American representative was in every case in accordance with the views of the Commander-in-Chief. In order to avoid the danger involved in dealings with these subjects by numerous unrelated commissions, the

following general principles were laid down:

When a conference was to be held which involved policies or matters tending to commit American Headquarters to a particular course of action, and it was necessary that a final decision should be reached in the conference, the American representative was directed to learn beforehand the opinion of the Commander-in-Chief on the matter which was to come up for decision. If such could not be obtained, the American representative was to make it clear at the conference that he must refer the matter to G. H. Q. before taking final action. All the American members of commissions or subcommissions were furthermore directed to keep in touch with the Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs in occupied territory and to act in harmony with the general policies that had been adopted by the American Commander-in-Chief. A single incident will illustrate the importance of, and necessity for, these instructions. Prior to their issue, the American representative on the Waterways Commission consented in the name of his government to police of the the RHINE throughout the zone of American occupation, by a joint British and French river patrol. As soon as the matter was brought to the attention of the Army command, steps were taken to withdraw such consent and thereby much confusion and possibly friction was avoided. A river patrol under American officers and marines was established, which accomplished this work with entire satisfaction to the High Command and retained, as was entirely proper, the control in the American zone in the hands of our own forces.

ECONOMIC CONTROL

Paragraph XXVI of the Armistice stated, "The blockade of the Allied and associated powers is to be continued as at present, German merchant vessels found at sea being liable to capture." This clause apparently gave the Allies the right, as well as the power, to continue the blockade on the entire territory which was included within the boundaries of Germany as they existed in 1914. Furthermore, Article 1, Annex No. 2, of the Armistice agreement, stipulated that lines of communication, up to and including the RHINE, or on the right bank within the bridgeheads, were to be under full control of the Marshal, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies, who had the right to take all measures he might consider necessary to provide for the security of the Armies. This provision entitled Marshal Foch to make such regulations regarding transportation and circulation as were required by the situation. The result of a complete exercise of the right of blockade would have been to isolate Germany from the rest of the world, and, further, to isolate occupied territory from the rest of Germany, in fact, this was accomplished only too well during the early days of the Armistice. Circulation within occupied territories was greatly impeded by an elaborate and cumbersome system of passes which were required not only between occupied and unoccupied territories, but even between the zones of the different Armies.

The last paragraph of Section VI of the Armistice stated: "There shall be no general measure or official order having as its consequence an impairment of the industrial establishments or a reduction of their personnel." This clause was in reality a contradiction of Section XXVI for the complete isolation of occupied territories and unoccupied Germany would have as its direct "consequence, and impairment of the industrial establishments and a reduction of their personnel," since the industrial establishments could not hope to continue operations with only local markets for their source of raw materials and for the sale of their products. Furthermore, the closing of factories in occupied territories by means of the blockade presented a very serious military problem, for the employees thus thrown out of work would have shortly been reduced to a condition of starvation. Rioting and disorder would have been the inevitable consequence of such action.

THE LUXEMBURG COMMISSION

This was established to supervise the distribution of raw materials to factories in the occupied territories, to control their output of manufactured goods, and to so regulate the economic relations of occupied territories with the rest of Germany, that industrial plans could be kept operating and yet prevented from competing unfairly with similar factories in France and Belgium. It must be remembered that Germany, having almost entirely demobilized her Army after the Armistice, had thereby obtained a considerable potential economic advantage over her enemies, who were still obliged to maintain great Armies in the field.

On December 13, 1918, Marshal Foch made the first tentative plan for organization of the LUXEMBURG Commission. Pending its formation, he delegated power to authorize import and export of certain commodities to the President of the Interallied Railway Commission. This authorization was at first limited to import raw material, fuel, food supplies and spare parts necessary for operation of factories. All exports were forbidden.

The LUXEMBURG Commission came into being on January 6, 1919. It was composed of delegates from the American, Belgian, British and French Armies and of a French civil official. General Maugas, representing France, was appointed President. This Commission was expected to be the supreme authority on economic matters in the Rhineland. It actually acted only from January 6 until May 15, when it was superseded by the Interallied Rhineland Commission, a civilian body.

OPERATION OF ECONOMIC CONTROL

The LUXEMBURG Commission directed the organization of a number of economic sections scattered throughout occupied territories. These sections were charged with the duty of carrying out the instructions issued by the Commission, and with the collecting of certain statistical data. Economic sections were established at:

AIX-la-CHAPELLE	(Belgium)
MUNCHEN - GLALBACH	(Belgium)
COLOGNE	(English)
TREVES	(American)
MAYENCE	(French)
LUDWIGSHAFEN	(French)

Each economic section was given authority to determine upon its own method of work, and there was consequently considerable divergence in the methods employed. The duties of the sections were however very similar, consisting of granting authorization for export and import of certain commodities, and refusing it for others. In the case of a third class of commodities, economic sections would not act themselves, but forward requests to the Central Commission at LUXEMBURG. During the first months of the occupation, separate authorizations were required for each individual shipment, but after April 15, 1919, large industrial establishments were given authorizations covering their monthly requirements. This change of policy, of course, considerably reduced the work of economic sections.

The American Economic Section at TREVES by informing the Chambers of Commerce of COBLANCE and TREVES of all rules and regulations issued by the LUXEMBURG Commission and of alterations of policy as they became effective, placed responsibility for proper working out of requests on these chambers of commerce. This method also greatly lessened the work of the economic sections and permitted them to keep up a maximum efficiency with a minimum personnel. The economic sections of the various Armies constantly exchanged

statistical data on economic matters.

In spite of the fact that the six economic sections were theoretically identical and worked under the directions of the LUXEMBURG Commission, they soon began to develop certain differences of policy. This was due partly to the different points of view of the Allies, and partly to the fact that a plural control began to assert itself strongly in economic matters.

THE SUPREME ECONOMIC COUNCIL

This was a Subcommittee of the Peace Commission at PARIS. It was originally charged with studying and drawing up the economic terms of the peace treaty. However, it soon commenced to lay down rules for the economic management of the Rhineland and to give orders to the LUXEMBURG Commission which, in theory, that organization should have received only from Marshal Foch. Sometimes the LUXEMBURG Commission carried out these orders and sometimes it ignored them. In still other cases, the LUXEMBURG Commission disapproved them, while one or more of the economic sections formulated their policy in accordance with the Supreme Economic Council. It was therefore natural that slight differences of economic policy arose.

POLICY OF AMERICAN MILITARY AUTHORITIES IN ECONOMIC MATTERS

The tendency of the early decisions of the LUXEMBURG Commission was to throttle German trade, a tendency which the American military authorities foresaw would result in the complete closing of all factories, if it was pursued to its logical end, since large numbers of workers would be thrown out of employment. Unemployment ever breeds social unrest, which is a condition that a military government always strives to avoid. The American military authorities therefore decided that they should have the final decision in all matters vitally affecting industrial life and commercial activity in the American zone, and not be subject entirely to the instructions of the LUXEMBURG Commission. This decision was taken because it was believed that the Commission was not in so favored a position to judge economic conditions as were the American officers who were assigned specifically to these duties. However, the principles and policies announced by the LUXEMBURG Commission were carefully followed, whenever they seemed consistent with the responsibility of the Commanding General, and with his desire to keep the population engaged in productive efforts. The results of this decision may be judged by the fact that the number of unemployed in American territory, instead of increasing, shrank from 4,073 on January 1, 1919, to a negligible figure on July 1, 1919.

FOOD

The second paragraph of the XXVI Section of the Armistice terms states: "The Allies and the United States are to consider the provisioning of Germany during the Armistice to the extent recognized as necessary." Such action proved to be urgently necessary, as the German food situation showed signs each day of becoming worse instead of better. This was due partly to the continuation of the blockade and partly to the fact that the greater part of the agricultural laborers had been in the Army for more than four years and that the productivity of the soil had decreased owing to the lack of fertilizers.

THE HOOVER COMMISSION

This was a commission originally appointed and presided over by Mr. Herbert Hoover. Its work during the war had been the study, development, distribution and control of the food supply of the world. After the Armistice, when it became necessary for humanitarian reasons to ration Germany, this task was assigned to the Hoover Commission, it being the

only agency in existence which was really competent to carry it out. The Hoover Commission had in theory nothing whatever to do with any of Marshal Foch's commissions for occupied territories of Germany, since it was a purely civil organization and in no sense connected with the military. In practice, however, since it supplied food to both occupied and unoccupied Germany, it came in close connection with the Allied Armies in the Rhineland. The Interallied Food Commission finally came to use bases of the Hoover Commission at ROTTERDAM and ANTWERP as a source from which to draw food.

THE INTERALLIED FOOD COMMISSION

The food situation in Germany grew more and more serious in the months following the Armistice, until it approached a point at which hunger-riots and disorders were to be feared in both occupied and unoccupied territories. The Supreme Economic Council, to avoid this, decided on February 24, that the food supply of occupied territories of Germany should be considered as distinct from that of unoccupied ones and should be administered under auspices of an Interallied Military Food Commission to be organized by Marshal Foch. This organization was the sixteenth of the commissions, through which Marshal Foch endeavored to exercise a personal control in the Rhineland.

While the question of food supply is treated at greater length in another chapter of this report, it is advisable to speak here of the functions of the Interallied Food Commission, since it was of the greatest importance as an agent of the Interallied Control. An inequality or partiality in the distribution of food by any of the Allied or Associated Powers would at this time have created a lasting prejudice in Germany against the nation responsible.

DUTIES OF INTERALLIED FOOD COMMISSION

These were: to ascertain the actual food situation in the various occupied territories; to calculate on a ration basis, the amount of food thus found; to determine a reasonable ration for the population; to supplement the actual ration by importations, until a reasonable ration was obtained. This last duty required the Armies to make arrangements for supply, importation and sale. This distribution of the food, after its arrival, was directly almost entirely by the German authorities, though the Allies reserved the right to supervise the distribution, if they so desired. The source of supply was originally intended to be solely the Hoover stocks which were held by the Permanent Supply Commission at ROTTERDAM and ANTWERP. For several months, however, nothing was received from this source. This was due partly to the fact that the Belgians could not guarantee the safety of German crews in Belgian waters, and partly because the Germans and Belgians could come to no terms for its shipment in Belgian bottoms. Finally, in order to avoid a very grave crisis, the British Army was obliged to sell a portion of its reserve stocks to save the population of COLOGNE from starvation. The French soon did likewise and the United States followed these examples. All such sales were of course from stores belonging to reserve supplies of the Armies, and were independent of the Hoover supplies. The various food commissions made their own arrangements with the local German authorities and financiers as to payment, but it was arranged by Interallied agreement that each Army should supplement the German per capita ration in equal amounts.

INTERALLIED RAILWAY COMMISSION

Section VII of the Armistice terms states:

Roads and means of communication of every kind, railways, waterways, highways, bridges, telegraphs and telephones shall be in no way impaired.

All civil and military personnel at present employed on them shall remain.

Further, the material necessary for the exploitation of the territory on the left bank of the RHINE shall be left in situ.

All supplies of coal and fuel, of material for roadways and for signals shall be left in situ and maintained by Germany for the operation of the means of communication in the countries on the left bank of the RHINE.

The Allies, under authority granted them in this provision, took over the waterways and railways with their complete personnel and material as soon as they entered the Rhineland. Means of transportation had necessarily to be kept under Interallied control, because not only their use, but also their physical condition made them of common value to all the occupying Armies. The divisions of railways into zones following military delimitations would have been utterly impractical. Furthermore, as transportation is one of the most vital factors in modern war, the Commander-in-Chief believed it advisable to keep it under his control. He therefore appointed an Interallied Railway Commission soon after the Armistice to supervise railway transportation in LUXEMBURG and the occupied portion of Germany. He also appointed an Interallied Waterways Commission to supervise navigation on the SAAR, RHINE, and MOSELLE Rivers.

INTERALLIED RAILWAY COMMISSION

This Commission, formed immediately after the Armistice, consisted of an American, a Belgian, an English and a French delegate. Lt. Col. Guitry of the French Army was appointed president. This Commission, which sat at TREVES, promulgated a large number of carefully drawn-up and highly technical orders, minutely covering every phase of railway activity. Five subcommissions - in LUXEMBURG, SAARBRUCKEN, MAYENCE, COLOGNE and COBLENCE - were under it. These subcommissions were charged principally with administrative duties, although they exercised a certain amount of executive power.

In order to carry out orders of the Railway Commission, each subcommission was provided with a more or less technically trained personnel, which was detailed from the Army in whose area it was operating, and distributed at the most important railway centers and at points along the boundaries of occupied territories.

German railways, unlike American ones, are publicly owned, the main lines in the Rhine Province being the property of Prussia. For purposes of administration, they are divided geographically into units known as Direktionen; for example, the Direktion of COLOGNE, Direktion of Saarbrücken, etc. Each Direktion has its president and board of directors, who manage it, much as an American railway is operated, although all railway employees are government employees.

The first order of the Interallied Railway Commission requisitioned all railways of occupied territories, with assurance of proper pay and treatment as long as their duties were properly performed, but threatening severe punishment in case of strikes or other misfeasance.

DUTIES OF RAILWAY COMMISSION

These fell naturally into two classifications: first, that of attending to operation of maintenance of railways; the second, that of enforcing purely military orders, such as those pertaining to the blockade and to circulation.

Duties under the first classification consisted in supervising German railway officials, planning timetables, maintaining train schedules, taking necessary measures for prompt execution of repairs, keeping the amount of rolling stock in occupied territories at the required level and, finally, insisting that a supply of fuel and oil sufficient to last thirty days was kept on hand by the railways. In addition to ordinary administrative duties, careful study was made of the entire railway system in occupied territories, maps were prepared of railways and yards, and plans were drawn up so as to

permit the Allies to take over the entire operation of railways in the event of an outbreak of hostilities or of a strike of the German personnel.

Duties under the second classification pertained to the enforcement of purely military measures. At first, before the formation of the LUXEMBURG Commission, The Interallied Railways Commission promulgated and enforced regulations concerning such commodities as were permitted to pass in and out of occupied territories. It contented itself later with enforcing the rules laid down by the LUXEMBURG Commission, placing small detachments for that purpose at stations along the borders of occupied territories. These detachments examined all incoming and outgoing consignments, and confiscated those not properly authorized. The Commission issued orders to the German personnel, forbidding them to sell tickets to civilians not provided with proper passes, thus enforcing circulation regulations and, at the same time, making the blockade effective.

For further details of the Interallied Railway Commission see Appendix No. 47.

INTERALLIED WATERWAYS COMMISSION

This worked hand in hand with the Railway Commission, to maintain the blockade. It was appointed under the provisions of Article I, Annex No. 2, of the Armistice, which stipulates that lines of communication up to and including the RHINE or on the right bank with the bridgeheads, should be under the full control of the Marshal, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies, who was to be given authority to take all measures he believed necessary for the safety to the Armies of Occupation. This Commission was composed, as were all the others, of delegates from each of the commissions, was also a Frenchman. It was charged with the responsibility of regulating navigation on the SAAR, RHINE and MOSELLE Rivers, in the same way that the Railway Commission was to regulate land traffic of railways. As a matter of fact, in practice it concerned itself only with navigation on the RHINE, because the other rivers of the RHINELAND are navigable only to a small extent.

GERMAN INLAND NAVIGATION SYSTEM

Inland navigation prior to the war was practically as free in Germany as it is in the United States. The pressure of war forced Germany to intensively organize her means of transportation, and a department, the Ministry of Public Works was instituted at BERLIN for the management of navigable waterways. This department was known as the Schiffahrtsabteilung. It was intended that it should so manage inland water transportation as to produce maximum results with a minimum outlay of material, always insuring priority to military supplies. This department, which had developed a strong and efficient organization by the beginning of the Allied occupation, had its headquarters for the western group of rivers at DUISBURG at the mouth of the RUHR.

The Allies, having decided to avail themselves of this organization, moved the headquarters of the Commission to COLOGNE, and thereafter issued all orders to German navigators through its agency.

Control posts for regulating transportation and circulation were established by the Interallied Waterways Commission as follows:

Belgian Control Post at	EMMERICH
English	" " " RUHRORT-DUISBURG
English	" " " COLOGNE
American	" " " COBLENCE
French	" " " MAYENCE
French	" " " LUDWIGSHAFEN-MANNHEIM

These control posts were charged with the duty of carrying out orders of the Interallied Waterways Commission, which was accomplished by giving clearance papers to vessel commanders and by organizing and supervising the operations of armed patrol boats. Police, transportation, and circulation regulations along the river were enforced in this manner.

The French and British Navies furnished suitable craft for these purposes, but the American control post, on authority of the Interallied Waterways Commission, requisitioned German boats, manned them with marines and armed them with machine guns. Each nationality patrolled that portion of the river included within its boundaries, but the American control post at COBLANCE controlled the French patrol boats between HORCHHEIM and BINGEN, in the area which originally intended to form a part of the American zone.

The original duties of the Interallied Waterways Commission were carried out as indicated above, and as more fully described in Appendix No. 47. Its duties were later considerably extended by the inclusion of matters pertaining to the transportation and supplies of the United States Army.

USE OF THE RHINE BY THE AMERICAN ARMY AS A SUPPLY ARTERY

Soon after the Allied Armies had settled in the Rhineland, an effort was made by France to reduce her Army to a partial peace basis. Demobilization was begun and every effort made to assist her factories to resume normal production. One of the chief difficulties encountered was of transportation, for the French Railways had greatly deteriorated during the war and a large part of the available rolling stock was still retained by the Army in order to maintain its supply. The American Army was therefore approached by France, and requested to divert as much of its traffic as possible from French railways.

The RHINE, as the time-honored commercial river of central Europe, presented obvious advantages as an artery of supply for the American Army. Its use would not only relieve the railways of France, but also reduce the cost of transportation for the American Army.

It was therefore decided to ship supplies from the United States to ANTWERP or ROTTERDAM, according to the port facilities available, to transfer them from ships to river barges, and tow them up the RHINE to suitable ports within American occupied territory. The ports chosen were BENDORF on the right bank, and ANDERNACH and COBLANCE-LUTZEL on the left bank. Large ration dumps were established at ANDERNACH and BENDORF and a quartermaster depot at COBLANCE-LUTZEL.

It having been resolved to make use of the Schiffahrtsabteilung, Gruppe West, the Interallied Waterways Commission gave orders to that organization that it should unload all supplies which were to be sent up the river. It was further to provide coal, derricks and stevedores in sufficient quantity to insure proper performance of the work.

The Interallied Waterways Commission merely notified the Schiffahrtsabteilung of the number of barges needed, and the amount and destination of the expected supplies. The Schiffahrtsabteilung, Gruppe West performed all the work and paid all the costs, including those of labor, merely requesting receipts to show the amount of work done. This system greatly eased the task of the American Army, and at the same time was entirely agreeable to the German Government, inasmuch as it was thereby permitted to control expenditures which it was in any case required to pay under the terms of the Armistice.

The first supplies for the American Army came up the river on March 23, 1919, and continued to arrive thereafter at an average rate of 1,216 tons per week at Andernach, and of 1,912 tons per week at BENDORF. One shipment of 977 tons of quartermaster stores was sent to COBLANCE-LUTZEL. Each port commander was required to render a daily report of goods unloaded. These reports enabled the COBLANCE delegate of the Interallied Waterways Commission to verify the amount of work credited to the Schiffahrtsabteilung.

Labor difficulties were experienced early in April 1919. A large strike occurred at ANDERNACH, possibly encouraged by the authorities of that town in the hope of getting the contract for unloading of barges, transferred from the Schiffahrtsabteilung to a local

contractor. The only result of the strike, however, was that the strikers were tried before American provost courts and sentenced to ninety days hard labor for conspiring to interfere with the supply of the Army. This was also a limited sympathetic strike at BENDORF, which resulted only in the loss of a half days's work. No arrest was made at BENDORF.

It is interesting to note in connection with the work of the Commission, that it required an average of five and a half river barges a week to transport the necessary supplies for the American Army, and that the gross river tonnage passing through the American sector of the river averaged about 300,000 tons a week.

When the American combat divisions began to leave Germany for the United States all heavy ordnance property was shipped down the RHINE in barges, instead of sent by rail through France. Holland permitted this material to pass through her borders, Germany having informed Holland that she would raise no objection thereto.

All river shipping was at first managed from ROTTERDAM by the Schiffahrsabteilung, Gruppe West. Later, the Belgians made a strong plea to have it managed from ANTWERP. Although ANTWERP was almost three days further from BENDORF and ANDERNACH than was ROTTERDAM, yet its storage facilities were better than those at ROTTERDAM, and the Belgian Government guaranteed that the cost of handling goods from ANTWERP would be no greater than from ROTTERDAM. A change of base was therefore made to ANTWERP. This involved using Dutch boats and crews for transportation of supplies, inasmuch as the Belgian Government would not guarantee safe conduct to German crews operating in Belgian waters. The Schiffahrsabteilung, Gruppe West, continued to unload supplies whenever they were carried on German or Dutch boats.

* * * * *

Armistice Interpretations Affecting American Occupied Territory

THIRD ARMY AND AMERICAN FORCES IN GERMANY,
OFFICE OF THE OFFICER IN CHARGE OF CIVIL AFFAIRS,
January 10, 1920.

AMERICAN MILITARY GOVERNMENT OF OCCUPIED GERMANY

1918 - 1920

REPORT OF THE OFFICER IN CHARGE OF CIVIL AFFAIRS

THIRD ARMY

AND

AMERICAN FORCES IN GERMANY

[Extract]

* * * * *

CHAPTER NO. 13

ARMISTICE INTERPRETATIONS AFFECTING

AMERICAN OCCUPIED TERRITORY

ORIGIN AND DUTIES OF THE ARMISTICE COMMISSION

The third paragraph of the last article of the Armistice is:

To assure the best execution of the present agreement, the principle of a Permanent International Armistice Commission is admitted. This Commission will perform its duties under the high authority of the military and naval Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies.

This paragraph provided for an Armistice Commission, but in no way defined the duties of this Commission. Clearly, however, it was to be the main liaison agency between the Allies and the Germans. All communications between the hostile powers passed through its hands, all complaints were taken up by it, all requests were submitted through it, and all interpretations of the Armistice were made by it. The Germans very early began to use the Commission as if it were an agency through which new agreements, modifying the terms of the Armistice, might be made, and they submitted a number of requests to that end. The Allies did not agree with the German conception of the functions of the Armistice Commission, and in order that a clear understanding should be had, General Nudant, the French representative on the Commission, made the following statement to the German delegates on January 24, 1919:

The German viewpoint of the offices of the Permanent Interallied Armistice Commission is, that they are a place for agreements whereas, my understanding is, that they are simply a place for arranging the details for compliance with agreements already entered into.

Since the Armistice as originally drawn, and as extended on two occasions, is quite general in its terms, there arise many questions as to details.

The Germans frequently bring up questions which involve a distinct departure from the Armistice conditions as laid down. One instance of this was their urgent request for the return of German prisoners.

It is readily understood that their arguments and discussions on such points are for the purpose of getting what they can, or saving what they can. At the same time, it is readily understood that conditions in Germany have changed greatly since November 11, when the first Armistice agreement was entered into. Most of the German pleas for consideration because of failure to comply strictly with the prescribed conditions are based on the impossibility of so doing, owing to the revolution.

The interpretations of the Allies of the duties of the Armistice Commission were of course accepted without more ado. As a matter of fact, there can be no doubt that General Nudant's explanation was a correct one, for it is inconceivable that the Allies should allow the Armistice Commission to modify the terms of the Armistice. At any rate, the Armistice Commission never was anything more than a liaison agency for the purpose of arranging as expeditiously as possible the details involved in carrying out the Armistice. From time to time they took notice of German protests and rectified mistakes or abuses of subordinates, but this part of their duty occupied only a small portion of their time.

RELEASE OF PRISONERS OF WAR

Article X of the Armistice provided for "the immediate repatriation without reciprocity . . . of all prisoners of war, including persons under trial and persons convicted, belonging to the Allies and the United States."

Hardly had the guns ceased firing on the morning of November 11, when Allied prisoners began to struggle over from the German line. These returning prisoners were in a pitiful condition. They were all ravenously hungry, and most of them in rags and indescribably filthy. This exodus lasted for about a week, and the sight of the deplorable condition of the prisoners caused bitter resentment among the Allied troops. Some of these prisoners brought stories of terrible conditions of hunger in the prison camps from which they had been released.

The allied members of the Armistice Commission protested vigorously against this treatment of their prisoners by the Germans and threatened reprisals. The Germans explained the condition of the prisoners by stating that as soon as the Armistice was signed, the Allied prisoners had practically mutinied, that they had demanded immediate release and refused to obey orders, but without waiting for proper transportation for their return, had escaped and made their way back to Allied lines. This, they said, accounted for the famished and ragged appearance of the prisoners.

As the weeks passed, other stories began to be heard about the starvation of prisoners who had not escaped but were still in German camps in the interior. New protests were made to the Germans by the Armistice Commission. This time the reply was received that the Germans were doing all in their power to feed and care for Allied prisoners, but that the utmost difficulty was being encountered, partly because the German Government had, to a very large extent, lost its control over the country as a result of the revolution and partly because of the conduct of the prisoners themselves, who refused any longer to obey orders or to submit to the regulations necessary for their proper maintenance and orderly release.

Some stories were also received to the effect that American prisoners had been brutally treated by German guards after the signing of the Armistice. These also were duly protested against in the Armistice Commission. It was not possible for the Allies

to investigate the charges made nor to determine the truth about the condition of prisoners, until about the middle of December 1918. It was then discovered that the statements made by the Germans were, in fact, true. The stories of brutalities to American prisoners were found to be without foundation. The American representative on the Armistice Commission stated this openly in the Commission's meeting of December 17, 1918, in order to show the Germans that the Americans intended to deal with them honorably and to give them credit when it was due. General von Winterfeldt, the German representative, expressed himself as indebted to the Americans for this communication.

It was learned later that the Allied prisoners who, at the time of the Armistice, were interned near the front, had, in fact, broken out of the prison camps and returned to the Allies on their own initiative and without resources. They had for a more or less prolonged period been living on the German ration, which at that time was exceedingly scant for all except the fighting forces, and the additional strain of hunger and exhaustion which they underwent in their dash for freedom, was sufficient to account for the deplorable condition in which they arrived.

In regard to the shortage of food in the camps of interior Germany, it was found that the reports from German sources were again substantially true. At the time of the revolution, the greater part of all German organization broke down. This was particularly true of railways, and also of a good many of the German military organizations, where Soldiers' Councils attempted to supersede the officers, with a consequent loss of efficiency. Furthermore, in a number of instances, food trains were broken into and robbed by the revolutionists in the first days of disorder. As a matter of fact, it has been established that the American prisoners were, on the whole, well treated in the German internment camps. To be sure, their ration was far from sufficient, but most of them agree that it was the same ration on which the German civil population lived, and many have said that, with the addition of the weekly packages received from the Red Cross, they actually fed better than the German troops which were guarding them.

ABANDONED ENEMY WAR MATERIAL

The second paragraph of the sixth article of the Armistice is:

No destruction of any kind shall be permitted, military establishments of all kinds shall be delivered intact; so, also, military stores, food, munitions and equipment, not removed during the period fixed for evacuation.

This clause clearly established that property abandoned by the German Army in its retreat from the battle line to interior Germany was to become the property of the Allied Armies as spoils of war. The property received in this manner was not considered as part of the material which the fourth article of the Armistice required the German Army to surrender to the Allies unless it was officially turned over and accepted. The abandoned property was in addition to such property so surrendered.

As the Third Army advanced into the Rhineland, it found along the roads, German equipment, wagons, trucks, etc., that had broken down during the enemy's retreat. This material, of course, became the property of the Third Army, but was of little value, since it was generally worn out. However, shortly after the American Army of Occupation settled within the area, it came to the attention of the military authorities that there was a substantial amount of war material, that obviously would come within the description of military stores, food, munitions and equipment, still within the American territory and in use in different towns, hospitals, etc. An investigation was ordered by the Army commander on December 12, 1918, for the purpose of determining how these military stores came into the possession of private citizens and public civil officials. These investigations developed the fact that the German Army had discovered, during its retreat, that it would not be able, within the thirty-six days allowed for its evacuation, to get all its material out of the area to be occupied. Acting on instructions from BERLIN, German unit

commanders had sold whatever property they thought it impossible to take with them, to private individuals and public corporations for whatever price they could get, rather than suffer the property to fall into the hands of the Allies.

Probably the underlying motive of the Germans in thus disposing of this property, was simply to evade the terms of the Armistice. Their official reason was quite different. They contended that they were merely giving the inhabitants of the Rhineland an opportunity to reap a share of benefits from liquidation of military stores - benefits which the rest of Germany would enjoy later when general demobilization was effected. They held that military stores which they sold to bona fide purchasers thereby ceased to become military stores and instead became private property and were therefore immune from seizure. They argued that there was nothing in the Armistice forbidding the German Army to sell its property during the period fixed for evacuation, and that therefore, if such a sale was made for value and not for the express purpose of defrauding execution of the Armistice, a valid title was passed to the vendee.

Had the Americans accepted the German point of view on this matter, every individual sale of military stores would have had to be made the subject of an exhaustive, critical examination, to determine whether it was made in good faith, or whether merely to avoid fulfilling the terms of the Armistice. The American authorities wished to live up both to the letter and the spirit of the Armistice, but they were determined not to allow the Germans to impose upon them. Therefore, on December 27, 1918, the Army commander issued an order directing a careful investigation to be made to discover abandoned enemy war material. This was to be placed under guard and inspected by technical experts. As a result of the investigation made under this order, it was discovered that a large amount of property in the area apparently was of the sort described in Article 6 of the Armistice, and that a great deal of it was in the possession of persons and corporations, many of whom held bills of sale for it from the German military authorities. It was found that all the war material in the area could be divided into three classes:

1. That which had been abandoned by the German Army.
2. That which had been transferred by the German Army to a third party through the medium of a legal sale effected previous to November 11, 1918.
3. That which had been transferred by the German Army to a third party through the medium of a sale effected on or subsequent to November 11, 1918.

Clearly the first class mentioned above became the property of the United States under the Armistice. Equally clearly the property mentioned in the second class was not transferred to the United States by the Armistice. Presumably the German Government had a good title to it, and certainly the Government had a perfect right to convey that title to a private individual, before it became bound by the Armistice Agreement. At the time of such a legal conveyance, the goods in question ceased to be military stores and become the property of an individual, which could not legally be touched. The type of property of the third class was more difficult to determine. The Armistice did not prohibit Germans from selling their military stores directly. They always contended that if there was any ambiguity in the terms of the Armistice, it should be decided in their favor, because during the Armistice of 1871 between the French and the Prussians, all points in which the terms of that agreement were decided in favor of the French. This was, however, because of a clause in the Armistice of 1871 which specifically provided that any doubt as to terms should be decided in favor of the French; from this, the Germans argued that according to precedent, doubtful points should be settled in favor of the defeated side, whether specifically so provided or not. On the other hand, the Armistice of November 11, 1918, contained nothing at all about abandoned military stores, but merely spoke of "military stores, food, munitions and equipment not removed during the period fixed for the evacuation." Clearly, the property in question had not been removed during the period fixed for evacuation. The Germans argued that since the property had been conveyed to purchasers who acted in good faith, it had become theirs and it would be wrong to take it from them. Americans did not accept the German point of view, holding that whatever might

be claimed by German law officials as to the good faith of a particular purchaser, such purchaser was legally bound by the Armistice, which had been signed by his representative in his behalf. The Armistice made certain definite disposition of property described as "military stores, food and munitions," which might be in the area of occupation upon a fixed date, and while the American Army would not question the right of the German Army to remove this property during the period of evacuation, it asserted its right and seized the property after December 8, 1918, in spite of the fact that it had perhaps been sold to a German citizen. The American Government maintained that the physical characteristics of the property remained the same and it was war material after the sale just as much as before, because as a matter of law, title to this property could not pass from the German military authorities to a German citizen, since the German Government had said that that class of property would belong to the United States after December 8, if left within the American area. The question of individual good faith on the part of the purchaser therefore became immaterial, as all goods passing under such sale were, by virtue of the Armistice, affected by a subsequent condition which defeated the title of the vendee in favor of the United States.

This interpretation was adopted and published in Letter of Instruction No. 8 of the Third Army on January 10, 1919, as follows:

1. The Commanding General directs that you have the following order published for the guidance of the civilian population of the districts of Germany occupied by the American forces under your command:

2. Paragraph VI of the Armistice, signed upon the 11th day of November 1918, is in part as follows:

- a. Military establishments of all kinds shall be delivered intact; so, also, military stores, food, munitions and equipment not removed during the periods fixed for evacuation.

- b. Pursuant to the above provisions of the Armistice, all military stores, food, munitions and equipment which belonged to the German Army upon the 11th day of November, 1918, the day of the signing of the Armistice, and which had not been removed from the zone of the American Army of Occupation during the period of time fixed by the Armistice for evacuation, are hereby declared forfeited under the terms of the Armistice, to the American Army of Occupation.

- c. Considerable quantities of material of the kind set forth in Paragraph A, and especially clothing, leather, iron, blankets, motor trucks, etc., were abandoned by the German Army prior to its evacuation or sold by it to individuals and cities after the Armistice went into effect. All such sales are hereby declared null and void. The title of all such property so abandoned or sold vests in the United States.

- d. All individuals, corporations and municipalities having possession or custody of any property described in Paragraphs A and B are hereby directed to turn over the same to the nearest military commander or to the Burgomaster, on or before noon of January 20, 1919.

- e. Any property described in Paragraphs A and B of this order in the possession of any individual, corporation or municipality after noon on January 20, 1919, will be seized by the American Army and the owner and holder thereof brought to trial forthwith before a military court for violation of this order.

The Germans protested vigorously against this order, - at first, to the Commander of the Third Army, from whom they received no response, and subsequently the Armistice Commission and to Marshal Foch himself. Both the Commission and the Marshal endorsed the decision of the Army commander, and the Germans had nothing to do but submit. A good many individuals attempted to evade the necessity of turning over property and disobeyed the order, although by far the greater majority of them, realizing that the Americans had

access to German papers which recorded the sales and consequently would be able to ascertain who had the property, complied with it.

Those who disobeyed the order were tried by Provost courts or commissions and were sentenced. The property was confiscated. Many Germans thought that these persons were tried because of their purchase of German war material in the period between the Armistice and Allied occupation of the left Rhine bank, which purchase they believed the Americans had decided was criminally illegal. As a matter of fact, the Americans never prosecuted anyone for purchasing war material; what they tried them for, was for failure to obey Letter of Instructions No. 8, directing them to turn over the property they had purchased. Nevertheless, acting on their false assumption that the Americans were trying German citizens because they had purchased war material prior to the occupation, the Germans filed a number of protests, not only with the Army commander, but with the Armistice Commission and even with Marshal Foch, against the alleged illegal trials. It took several weeks and considerable correspondence before this misunderstanding was cleared up. Finally, to make our position in the matter perfectly clear, General Pershing issued Orders No. 22, Advance G. H. Q., March 30, 1919, as follows:

Civilian inhabitants of occupied territory will not be prosecuted for retaining or removing German military material between November 11, 1918, and the date of the evacuation of the German forces from territory now occupied by United States troops, when it can be established that such action on their part was in obedience to the orders of the German Government, or when they have been merely holders of German war material found in their possession.

Disposal of this enemy war material, collected as a result of the foregoing orders, proved no small undertaking. A special board called "The Enemy War Material Board," operated under G-4 of the Army, took the matter in hand.

A great mass of material of all descriptions and value was reported throughout the area. It soon became apparent that to collect all this from many different places, would prove a complicated matter and not in the interests of economy. For example, much of the property was of such little value that the cost of moving and guarding it would offset any benefit which might accrue to the Army through its collection. Large number of horses in such poor condition as to forbid any further service, had been left behind by the German Army in its retreat. They had in some cases been abandoned, in others, sold to the civilian population, mostly the farmers, who nursed them back to strength and put them to work on their farms. To have taken charge of these horses, for example, would have meant the cost of feeding them, the necessity of caring for them, etc., but further and more important, it would have deprived the farmers of necessary assistance in their efforts to produce those foodstuffs which were needed in Germany.

In view of the above and because it was the intention of ultimately disposing of most of this property through sale, it was decided in most cases, particularly with regard to horses and property of little real value, to permit the holders of them to retain possession, after declaring them to the Army authorities and receiving instruction to care for and guard them. In order to protect individuals who retained their possession from trial by the Army for failure to comply with Letter of Instructions No. 8, papers were left in their hands as evidence that, for the particular property mentioned, possession by them was authorized, pending its final disposition by the Army. Lists were then compiled in each Kreis or division area of this class of enemy war material and forwarded to the enemy War Material Board in COBLENCE.

There were, then, three classes of this enemy war material; that actually collected in dumps by the Army, that actually in possession of private parties under the conditions mentioned in the last paragraph, and that not reported nor turned in according to Letter of Instructions No. 8.

One source of information with regard to the latter class proved to be the records of sales of enemy war material kept by various agents of the BERLIN Government, many of whom

were civil government officials, such as Landraete and Burgomasters. By far the greatest amount of information, however, was obtained from the records of the German VIII Army Corps whose headquarters had been in COBLENCE. Inasmuch as most of these records, however, were discovered previous to the date of issue of Letter of Instructions No. 8, it is needless to say that the amount of property disclosed by them was not so great as otherwise might have been expected. The mere knowledge on the part of the civilian population that the Army had obtained access to some or all of these records undoubtedly led to voluntary reports which otherwise might not have been made. These records also proved particularly valuable in that they contained, in addition to the date of sale (a vital matter itself), the amount of money realized by the German Army from each article sold.

With the latter information at hand, it was but one step further to seize the money which these agents had collected, - this in lieu of the property itself. When this was done, the private purchaser was at the same time given a title to the property by the Army. In other words, the Army by this means did not disturb the existing possession of the property, but did receive the money derived from the sale, instead of the German Government. Although this policy had advantages, it also had disadvantages. For example, "A" in good faith bought through his Burgomaster a broken-down wagon from the German Army. He sold it to "B." "B" sold it to "C" Now in going over the records of the Burgomaster, it was found that "A" had bought this wagon, consequently the money was seized. Also "C" had by now reported his wagon and no records disclosed the fact that "C" had bought the wagon from the German Army, consequently "C's" wagon was seized. Here, then, the Army had seized both the property and the money. There proved to be many such cases and they were difficult to handle. In order to straighten this matter out, the following order was issued:

ENEMY WAR MATERIAL

(a) Where material, previously purchased from the German Army or any regularly constituted government or municipal authority acting for, or in behalf of, the German Army, within the American zone of the occupied area, has been confiscated from any person or corporation, and where the American Army has also taken the money which was paid for the said material from the Kreis concerned, and where the property has not been returned or resold to the purchaser, the person or corporation from whom the property was confiscated may present a claim for the amount paid for the said material. The claims, together with proper receipts and certificates, must be presented to the Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs in the Kreis concerned, within ten (10) days from the date of this notice.

(b) This notice will be brought to the attention of the civil population by the Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs through the Landraete concerned.

(c) All such claims will be investigated by the O. C. C. A., and if considered just, forwarded within 48 hours to G-4 (Munitions), Third Army.

The American authorities disposed of the property abandoned or sold by the retreating German Army as rapidly as possible by sales. The money received as proceeds therefrom was stored in the vaults of the headquarters building at COBLENCE and after being deposited to the credit of the United States, was invoiced back to the Army and used to pay the troops, as already described in Chapter XII. By the middle of August 1919, all of the enemy war material had been sold or otherwise disposed of by the Army, and a receipt was in the hands of every authorized possessor of this class of property. The magnitude of the task accomplished may be realized from the fact that about 10,000,000 marks were obtained from these sales.

MATERIAL SURRENDERED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE ARMISTICE

Article IV of the Armistice Agreement of November 11, 1918, is as follows:
Abandonment by the German Army of the following equipment in good condition:

5,000 guns (2,500 heavy; 2,500 field)
25,000 machine guns
3,000 minenwerfer
1,700 fighting and bombing planes.

First, all D-7's and night bombing planes, the above to be delivered in situ to the troops of the Allies and of the United States in accordance with the detailed conditions laid down on Supplementary Note No. 1, fixed at the moment of the signing of the Armistice.

Paragraphs 3, of Article VII, states:

There shall be delivered to the Allied and associated powers:

5,000 locomotives and 150,000 cars in good working order, with all necessary spare parts and fittings, in the periods fixed in detail by Supplementary Note No. 3.

There were in addition many clauses dealing with the surrender of ships and naval material which did not concern the Army of Occupation directly.

Article IV, Supplementary Note No. 2, of the Armistice Agreement regarding material, contained the following:

(a) Rolling-stock. The rolling-stock delivered to the Allied Armies in the zone included between the present front and Line No. 3, not including Alsace-Lorraine, shall be in importance at least equal to:

5,000 locomotives
150,000 cars.

This surrender shall be made in the periods fixed by Clause 3, Article VII, of the Armistice, and under detailed conditions which shall be decided upon by the Permanent International Armistice Commission.

All this material shall be in good usable condition, and provided with all the usual spare parts and fittings. It may be used with its own or other personnel at any part of the railway systems of the Allied Armies.

The material necessary for the maintenance of the railway system of Alsace-Lorraine shall be placed at the disposal of the French Army.

The material left in place in the countries on the left bank of the Rhine up to the bridgeheads on the other side, must be sufficient to permit the normal operation of the railways in these territories.

Paragraph IV, Article VII, of the Armistice follows:

There shall likewise be delivered 5,000 motor lorries in good condition within a period of 36 days. The railways of Alsace-Lorraine shall be handed over in a period of 31 days, together with all personnel and material organically connected with the system.

The Germans were remarkably slow in carrying out the above quoted clauses of the Armistice, and continually attempted to foist material on the Allies that was not in good condition. On the other hand, the Allies subjected every piece of material to a rigid inspection and accepted nothing that was not in first class condition. As a result of this, on December 16, 1918, which was the last day of the 31-day period agreed upon on November 11, the Allies had accepted only 2,000 locomotives out of the 5,000 due, and 20,709 cars, instead of 150,000. The Germans claimed that as a result of the war, practically none of their locomotives were in such condition that the Allies would accept

them. They stated that the difficulties of the revolution prevented their delivering the material on time; that they could not find men to do repair work; that the receiving facilities of the Allies were not adequate; that the personnel who delivered the surrendered material to the Allies were so badly treated that it was almost impossible to induce men to undertake its transport.

Not only were the Germans dilatory in delivering railway transportation, but they were equally so in delivering other kinds of war material. At times, they even endeavored to surrender obsolete cannon without recoil cylinders. They failed to turn over the required number of aeroplanes, and a compromise was offered, in which the Allies agreed to accept twenty heavy draught-horses for every aeroplane not surrendered. The delivery of motor lorries was particularly delayed. This was probably because most of the German Army lorries belonged to private German business firms which the government had subsidized in time of peace and requisitioned during the war. As soon as the war was over, a good many of the firms got their lorries back, and it became very difficult for the government to reacquire them in order to surrender them.

By February 6, 1919, the Allies had received and accepted 3,861 locomotives and 118,698 cars. The Germans asserted that in order to get this number accepted, they had offered 9,000 locomotives and 200,000 cars, and that the locomotives which had been accepted, represented two-fifths of their entire stock of serviceable engines. They also said that the delay was in part due to the fact that the different Allied committees for the reception of surrendered war material demanded such different standards of excellence, that they were never certain whether an object would be accepted or not.

As the full quota of material to be surrendered by the Germans was approached, the Allies made an arrangement among themselves for division of the property. Under this arrangement, Belgium was to receive one-tenth of all the war material surrendered; America was to receive two-tenths; England, three-tenths, and France, four-tenths.

By February 13, 1919, the Americans had received their full share of guns and machine guns, and by February 19, of the motor lorries. By March 1, all the railway material, including that necessary for maintenance of the Alsace-Lorraine line, had been delivered, and by March 13, all the motor lorries due.

THE NEUTRAL ZONE

Paragraph 3, Article V of the Armistice prescribes that:

A neutral zone shall be set up on the right bank of the Rhine between the river and a line drawn parallel to the bridgehead and the river and ten kilometers distant, starting from the Dutch frontier and extending to the Swiss frontier.

The Armistice also provided in Article V that the countries on the west of the Rhine should be assured by garrisons holding the principal crossings of the river (MAYENCE, COBLENCE, and COLOGNE), together with bridgeheads at these points of a thirty-kilometer radius on the right bank. The bridgeheads were thus originally prescribed as segments of circles, whose centers were the centers of the towns mentioned and whose radii were thirty kilometers in length. It was discovered shortly after the Armistice that if these bridgeheads were occupied as thus provided for, considerable administrative difficulty would arise. For instance, the MAYENCE bridgehead would cut into the Stadtkreis of FRANKFORT on Main in such a way as to paralyze the efficient administration of that city. Consequently, the perimeters of the bridgeheads were modified somewhat to conform to the expediency of local administration. An indentation was made in the MAYENCE bridgehead excluding the Stadtkreis of FRANKFORT, and the perimeter of the COLOGNE bridgehead was modified to conform as nearly as possible with the administrative boundaries of the Kreise and Buergermeistereien in the area. The COBLENCE bridgehead, however, was maintained as laid down in the Armistice, its bordering remaining the arc of the circle.

In the early part of 1920, when it seemed likely that peace would soon be ratified by the Senate, it was decided to modify the boundary of the American portion of the

COBLENCE bridgehead. This was because of the fact that a good many Buergermeistereien and several Kreise were arbitrarily cut by the boundary of the occupied zone as laid down in the Armistice, and because the administration of these political areas was consequently rendered exceedingly difficult. The Army therefore arranged to modify the boundary of the bridgehead by ceding portions of the area to the Germans and accepting portions in return which had formerly been in the neutral zone, so that the new boundary, which would be in existence during the ten years of occupation provided by the peace treaty, would conform to the boundaries of German administrative districts. This alteration, however, had not been accomplished when the Interallied Rhineland High Commission assumed control.

The question of control of the Neutral Zone lying between occupied territory and unoccupied Germany was not taken up in the Armistice. As soon as the occupation had been established, Marshal Petain, Commander of the French Armies, submitted the following memorandum on the subject to Marshal Foch, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies. The suggestions contained therein were adopted in their entirety, and the Neutral Zone was thenceforth governed under their provisions.

SUGGESTION FOR A NOTE RELATING TO CONTROL IN NEUTRAL ZONE

Execution of Note No. 7281, from the Marshal Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies, November 29, 1918.

I. General Arrangements

I. In each Army and in accordance with the general conditions fixed by the above-mentioned Note No. 7281, control will be enforced by officers provided with an order, either permanent or special, issued by a General in command of an Army, or on his authority.

These officers may be accompanied by the personnel necessary for the accomplishment of their task. They may present themselves without being announced in advance, and will do so under a flag of truce. Orders will be given by the German military authorities to allow them to move about freely upon presentation of their passes.

II. The number and the duration of missions are unlimited.

III. In the exercise of control, the officers entrusted with these missions will appeal to the civil authorities and to the commanders of police sectors, to be mentioned later in Article VIII. These agents will offer every facility necessary for the accomplishment of the missions of these officers.

IV. The officers entrusted with missions may ask any one of the authorities mentioned in the preceding article for any papers that they judge necessary. These papers will be signed, and responsibility will rest with the signer. Officers on missions may also ask for certain other papers, to be mentioned later. Lastly, they may require that all necessary verifications, identifications and instructions be carried out according to their orders and in their presence, even if individual dwellings are concerned, and that no objection be opposed in these matters.

V. In case a part of the community lies in the Neutral Zone, and the capital of the community is outside of that zone, officers on missions may proceed freely to the capital under the conditions fixed in Article I, above.

II. Limits and Organization of Territory in Neutral Zone

VI. The eastern limit of the Neutral Zone is fixed by the attached map.

VII. The Neutral Zone is divided into police sectors * * *

VIII. Command in each sector is exercised by a field officer, who is assisted by an interpreter. In everything concerning control on behalf of the French Armies, commanders of the police sectors will correspond directly with the French command.

III. Military Government in Neutral Zone

IX. No modification may be made without previous authorization of the French command. As soon as the rules for government of the Neutral Zone come into force, commanders of police sectors will make known the distribution of troops of their sectors in the different towns and villages. Later modification will be made the subject of a special report. A report will likewise be drawn up in case of a relief. In case use is made of the police forces for the maintenance or reestablishment of order, a report should be sent without delay to the commander of the sector.

X. Inasmuch as the German troops that are allowed in the Neutral Zone are retained there for policing it, steps will be taken without delay to dissolve civil guards. However, municipalities are authorized to maintain police agents to the limit of the personnel as it existed on August 1, 1914, on condition that a list of the agents be sent without delay to the local French command, and that each agent be provided with a regular uniform bearing distinctive and indubitable insignia. In case of necessity, local civil authorities may ask the French command to consent to abrogation of the present article.

XI. German troops in the Neutral Zone having merely police duties may not perform any military maneuvers. They may not practice shooting, even at barracks, or throwing grenades or any other weapons.

XII. No work shall be done in the Neutral Zone that may be considered as contributing in any way, even indirectly, to the offensive or defensive equipment of the zone, not excepting work done by civil workers. Especially there shall be no placing nor removal of railways, no change in the existing systems of railways, even of narrow-gauge systems. In case work appears necessary or urgent, an authorization for it may be asked of the local French command. No beginning of such work may take place before the authorization is granted.

XIII. Supplies of all kinds existing in the Neutral Zone, without distinction as to whether they belong to the State or to individuals, will be immediately listed with the local French command, who may demand that they be given up if they are capable of use for military purposes. The French command reserves to itself the right to determine these matters.

XIV. The use of optical or other signals is prohibited in the Neutral Zone. This prohibition applies both to soldiers and civilians. No wireless station will be maintained or established in the Neutral Zone without authorization of the local French command.

XV. Pigeon-cotes, either civilian or military, are prohibited.

XVI. Aviators are prohibited from flying over the Neutral Zone.

XVII. No camouflage may be carried out in the Neutral Zone, not even for practice.

IV. Control of Police Garrisons

XVIII. The commander of each police sector will make known in writing within twenty-four hours after these regulations take effect, a list of personnel and the distribution of local police forces in the sector. These forces may not exceed the normal strength of the territorial police in time of peace. No increase in the personnel may be made without previous authorization from the local French command.

XIX. The commander of the sector must have a list in his possession, kept accurately up to date, of all soldiers composing each garrison. This list must be presented to the officers of missions upon demand. Officers of missions may also ask to see all food tickets, lists of ration strength or any other administrative tables whatever.

XX. Within the limits fixed by Article XVIII, the commander of each sector will make known in writing the civilian population in each of the communities of his sector. The inhabitants of each community will be listed according to profession and name. This list will be kept up to date and presented to officers of missions whenever they see fit to require it.

XXI. Any increase in population of a community will be brought to the knowledge of the local French command as soon as that increase passes the number of 50. A list of names of transients will be kept in each community. This list will be presented whenever required by officers of missions.

XXII. Any increase in the population considered as unusual by the French command, may be construed by him as constituting a violation of Note No. 323-2 of the Marshal Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies.

XXIII. Officers on missions may make investigations in industrial establishments to find out whether the persons listed as workmen may not be soldiers brought into the Neutral Zone in excess of the numbers fixed by Note No. 323-2, previously cited.

XXIV. Demobilized German soldiers may not be authorized to enter the Neutral Zone nor to take up their residence there, unless they had lived there before August 1, 1914. Return to every demobilized soldier should be immediately made known by the commander of the sector to the local French command. The same applies to the departure of any demobilized soldier whose residence has been in the community. A list of demobilized men will be kept in each community, as well as of soldiers who have been demobilized and whose legal residence is in the community.

XXV. German soldiers coming into the Neutral Zone on leave will present themselves upon arrival to the commander of the police sector. The names of these soldiers will be written on the list of transients mentioned in Article XXI, above. Rank, organization and length of stay will be stated opposite each name.

V. Arms and Ammunition

XXVI. Importation of arms and ammunitions into the Neutral Zone is prohibited. This prohibition applies to arms and ammunition of all kinds; side arms, firearms, artillery ammunition of all calibres, cartridges, grenades, firearms, signalling flares, etc.

XXVII. Arms and ammunition for use of the Army will be evacuated to the rear of each community of the Neutral Zone without delay. Arms and ammunition belonging to civilians must be given up to the authorities and kept in store by the authorities. A table of the arms and ammunition in storage in the community will be drawn up and given to the local French command, who may order their evacuation to the rear.

XXVIII. Arms and ammunition belonging to police troops will be kept by them. However, these troops will keep only their regular arms and the ammunition forming the normal supply, i. e., ammunition carried by a man and that carried by a combat train. A list of the arms and ammunition kept for this purpose will be drawn up by the commanders of police sectors.

VI. General Arrangements

XXIX. The local French commander must be kept informed of any indication or incident that might presage excitement or conflict, and of all preventive or repressive measures taken by German authorities.

XXX. Hunting in any form is prohibited in the Neutral Zone. Should it become necessary to take steps to destroy predatory animals, these steps can be done only upon authorization of the local French command and under conditions fixed by him.

XXXI. Fireworks are prohibited.

XXXII. Passage of boats from one bank of the RHINE to the other is prohibited for civilians, other than regular boatmen.

XXXIII. Telegraphic or telephonic communication between the neutral zone and territories occupied by the Allied Armies may take place only upon authorization of the local French command. The French command reserves the right to control the communications above mentioned. Authorizations already granted may likewise be revoked.

As might have been expected, the Germans protested against these regulations. They objected to control of the circulation of German civilians, on the ground that that was "none of the Allies' business." Marshal Foch insisted on it, however, pointing out that it was necessary for him to have a control on immigration into the Neutral Zone in order that he might prevent the bringing in of German soldiers in civilian clothes in sufficient numbers to endanger the safety of the bridgeheads in the event of the reopening of hostilities. The Germans also protested against the unannounced arrival of Allied officers on tours of inspection. Marshal Foch replied that this was necessary in order to detect possible construction of fortifications, etc., because if the visits were not made unexpectedly, it would be possible for the Germans to camouflage any military works on which they might be engaged.

The Allies, and particularly the French, were caused a great deal of inconvenience by the small strip of Neutral Zone, not more than a kilometer wide in some places, which lay between the COBLENCE and the MAYENCE bridgeheads. The Regierungspraesident of WIESBADEN and some of the inhabitants of this strip of Neutral Zone petitioned the Allies to occupy it, in order to eliminate the difficulty that was had in the distribution of food, fuel, etc. The Allies did bring up the question several times before the Armistice Commission and requested that this narrow strip be surrendered to them. The German representatives, however, consistently refused to do so, on the ground that the inhabitants of the district did not wish it occupied. As the terms of the Armistice on this point were explicitly in favor of the German point of view, the latter carried the day.

Early in March 1919, the industrial situation in unoccupied Germany had become very critical and Bolshevism was spreading rapidly, particularly in DUSSELDORF and the adjacent RUHR district. In order to combat this menace, the Allies permitted to the Germans to strengthen the forces maintained by them in the Neutral Zone. A month later, when order had been restored, the Germans petitioned that they be allowed to increase their garrisons in unoccupied territory to equal the number of troops that had been maintained there prior to the war. This petition was denied as unnecessary and possibly dangerous. It was found later that the German forces in the Neutral Zone, though less than the number allowed by the Allies, were composed almost entirely of noncommissioned officers acting as privates. When the Allies protested against this, the Germans replied by saying that they were unable to recruit sufficient soldiers from the ranks, that since service as noncommissioned officers was a profession in Germany, it would be unfair to allow men who had devoted their life to the work to lose their occupation as a result of the country's defeat.

RESTITUTION OF FRENCH AND BELGIAN PROPERTY

Germany, during the war, despoiled many factories and manufacturing plants in northern France and Belgium of their machinery, tools, material, etc. This was done with a double purpose: first, to obtain material necessary for warwork in Germany as cheaply as possible; second, to so injure the industrial efficiency of France and Belgium, that when peace should come, neither of these countries would be able to successfully compete with Germany

in commerce. The extent to which this exploitation was carried on, may be gathered from the following letter of the American representative on the Commission of Industrial Resitution:

1. Evolution. There were two main periods of the exploitation of Northern France and Belgium, - that in the early part of the war, when requisitions were made by various military units to meet immediate needs, and a later period beginning 1915, but only completely organized in 1917, when requisitions were made to meet more general needs. In the latter part of 1918 there were a number of Industrial Committees (Wirtschaftsausschüsse) attached to the higher staffs to exploit the (a) agriculture, (b) forests, (c) and the industries of the occupied regions. These had the power of requisition, and exercised it to meet the demands of German industry.

2. Alongside of these committees worked delegates from the Ministry of War who had about the same powers. The demand for materials from the occupied regions became so great, that in 1917 it was decided to create a higher organism which would tend to centralize the whole. By the spring of 1918, it may be said that the system was completed which, based on the carefully compiled lists of materials available, was destined to permit full exploitation.

3. Organization. The listing and requisitioning was made by (1) the Ministry of War, (BDKM) within Germany, by the Quartermaster General at the front and by the military governor of Belgium in that country.

4. The Ministry of War had a number of organs charged with this work, the principal of which was the Wumba (Waffen-und-Munitionsbeschaffungsamt). This society was divided into sections, one for handling plants and large machines, another for tools and electrical machinery, a third for raw materials, and another for booty of war.

5. The service of the Q. M. General was divided by regions - five for the entire front, which also included the rear (Etappen). At the head of this system was Colonel von Mueller of the Wako. In each region was a representative of the Q. M., another from the Ministry of War and finally a number of military organizations (aviation and artillery), which had limited powers of requisition.

6. Its Functioning. Wumba was the point of contact between the German manufacturer and the Government. According to a document signed by Moeller (one of its members), "Wumba is simply an intermediary with powers to meet the needs of German industry and at the same time to fix prices." It was organized as a commercial firm, touching a 5% commission on all transactions, with smaller profits from sales of iron in bulk and from the use of prisoners of war.

Wumba has complete lists of machinery available and put these at the disposition of the German buyer. He picked the machines he wanted, settled on the price with Wumba and then entered into relations with the military organization which had powers to requisition them.

7. The demounting or demolition was done by one of five firms recognized by Wumba. These firms had expert personnel comprising German engineers, adjusters, and as many prisoners of war as they needed. To one of these firms, the same engineer Moeller wrote on November 17:

We have recently become more and more inclined to carry out the complete demolition of Belgium. I feel no hesitation in energetically exploiting Belgian territory at present. We are now in position to accept large orders for demolishing industries in Belgium. I leave you therefore quite free to receive orders.

8. The value of requisition of machinery was fixed at what it had been in July 1914, provided it had undergone no depreciation. The price was always arbitrarily fixed and was always far below the real value of the machine.

9. The profits realized by the demolition firms, as their books show, averaged 20%.

10. These totals are but partially complete. In fact, the Germans themselves do not know the full extent of the exploitation in Northern France and Belgium. It was not until March 1918, that the Wumba really centralized the demands from the German buyers and worked in complete coordination with the organs, with powers of requisition. The result is, that data in regard to the machines is scattered in a dozen different offices in BERLIN. There are machines which were turned over to manufacturers without record having been taken of the transaction, and there are manufacturers who, as the big iron manufacturers, used their influence to secure machines outside regular channels.

The people of the Allied countries, especially France and Belgium, always desired that Germany should be made to pay damages for the destruction wrought in France and Belgium. Nothing concerning this was mentioned in the Armistice Agreement of November 11, 1918. All that appears in this document concerning the payment of damages, is contained in Article XIX, which follows:

XIX. Financial Clauses. Without prejudice to future claims and demands on the part of the Allies and of the United States:

Reparation of Damages

While the Armistice lasts, no public securities which can serve as a pledge to the Allies for the recovery of or reparation for war losses, shall be removed by the enemy.

Immediate restitution of the cash deposit in the National Bank of Belgium, and a general immediate return of all documents, money, securities, personal and fiduciary, together with facilities for the issue thereof, belonging to public or private interests in the invaded countries. Restitution of the Russian and Roumanian gold taken by the German or delivered to them by Russia or Roumania. This gold will be taken in charge by the Allies until the signing of peace.

The plan of restoring the material taken from France and Belgium was first officially broached to the special Economic Commission at LUXEMBURG, December 22, 1918, by Marshal Foch. The American delegate on this Commission asked the Marshal under what clause of the Armistice such a restitution could be compelled. The Marshal replied that the phrase reparation of damages in Article XIX, above, was sufficiently broad to cover the matter.

On January 16, 1919, the protocol extending the Armistice for a second time was signed by the Germans and the Allies. The Allies at that time insisted on inserting clauses requiring specifically that Germany should restore what she had taken. The Germans objected. They offered to pay an indemnity for the property removed, but desired to keep the machinery as necessary to their commerce and industries. The Allies were obdurate on the matter, however, and the following paragraphs were finally included in the protocol of January 16, 1919.

RESTITUTION OF MATERIAL REMOVED FROM BELGIAN AND FRENCH TERRITORY

1. The restitution of material removed from Belgium and French territory being indispensable to the starting up of factories, the following measures will be taken:

2. Machines, pieces of machinery, tools, industrial and agricultural, parts of every kind, and, in general, every industrial or agricultural tool removed

from territory occupied by the German Army on the western front, under whatever pretext it may be, by German authority, military or civilian, or by German individuals, will be held at the disposal of the Allies, to be sent back to the place of origin, if the French or Belgian governments so desire. These objects will not be subjected to any changes or damage.

3. To prepare for this restitution, the German Government will immediately give to the Armistice Commission, all official accounts and memoranda relative to the objects, all contracts of sale, contracts of lease or otherwise, all correspondence which has reference to them, statements and other papers of value in regard to their existence, origin, transformation, actual condition and present location.

4. Delegates of the French and Belgian Governments will proceed to Germany for inspection and examination on the spot of the specified objects, if this appears to them to be necessary

5. The return of these goods will be carried out according to specified instructions, which will be given by the French or Belgian authorities as they shall decide.

6. In particular, there shall be declared, with a view to immediate restitution, depots of all sorts in parks, at anchor, in boats or in factories, also belts, electric motors, parts of motors, or parts of sails taken away from France or Belgium.

7. The accounts mentioned under #3 and #6 will be begun after eight days, dating from January 20, 1919, and will be furnished by April 1, 1919.

As soon as the protocol of January 16 had been agreed upon, a subcommission was appointed by the Interallied Armistice Commission known as the Service of Industrial Restitution, or S. I. R. The members of the S. I. R. held their first meeting at SPA on January 22, 1919, and proceeded at once to organize for their tremendous task. On January 24, they required the Germans to issue a decree ordering all German citizens in possession of any machinery, parts of machinery, or agricultural implements, requisitioned in France or Belgium, to report them to the German government authorities. These instructions were at once complied with, and a decree was issued on February 1, 1919, which called for all reports to be made before February 20.

Carrying out the provisions of the protocol of January 16, the S. I. R., early in February, passed a resolution requiring the German Government to furnish the Commission with forms made from official records, showing the exact place in which requisitioned French and Belgian material was situated. They also provided at the same time that French and Belgian representatives of the Commission should make tours of inspection throughout Germany, seeking machinery which had been removed from their countries. The expense of these tours of inspections was to be borne by the German Government.

The S. I. R. finished its work of organization on February 5, and moved to WIESBADEN to commence arbitrations. Simultaneously, a corresponding German committee was organized at FRANKFORT. The duties of this latter committee were to facilitate the collection by the German Government of French and Belgian machinery from individual Germans.

There were many delays in restoring this property, and the date on which it had to be declared was extended from time to time until it was April 20, instead of February 20. The German excuses claimed that the delays were due to the lack of governmental organization resulting from the revolution, lack of transportation, etc. The French and Belgians were inclined to give the Germans a taste of their own medicine in the matter, and at first insisted on immediate return of the property, regardless of possible effects on industrial conditions in Germany. By the beginning of March, it was seen that the restoration of the property was not a matter of concern for Americans, but rather for the French and Belgians alone; and the American representative was accordingly withdrawn from the S. I. R. Thereafter, he made occasional trips to WIESBADEN, but more as a liaison agent than as an actual member of the Commission.

Shortly after the Commission was organized, a number of Germans who, in accordance with instructions received from their government, had been actively engaged in removal of material from France and Belgium during the war, were arrested. The Germans protested vigorously against their arrest, claiming that it was a violation of that clause in the Armistice which provided that no one should be punished for an act of war perpetrated before November 11, 1918. They claimed that the removal of French and Belgian property was necessary as a military measure and consequently was an act of war. On April 8, the Allies definitely pledged themselves not to prosecute anyone for having removed property in pursuance of orders, and to release any German individuals who might be in captivity awaiting trial on such a charge. This agreement, of course, did not protect Germans who, on their own initiative, and for their own benefit, had taken property from France or Belgium while members of the occupying forces. The conduct of these latter was not an act of war, but common pillage, which is of course not permitted under the laws of civilized warfare.

During the period of Allied occupation of the Rhineland, two Germans living in the American area were accused by the French of specific acts of pillage. In both these cases, the American authorities decided, after proper evidence sustaining the accusations had been submitted, to permit the houses of the accused to be searched. In one case, none of the property claimed to have been stolen, was found, and no further action was taken. In the other, some of the stolen property was discovered, and the thief, a Captain, was delivered to the French military authorities for trial on the charge of violating the laws of war. He committed suicide in jail before trial.

The Germans entered frequent protests that the French and Belgian officers, while on tours of inspection in Germany to discover stolen machinery, were using their official position to obtain trade secrets. The American authorities thereupon issued strict orders requiring these inspectors to notify the Americans before they made a tour of inspection in the American area, and requiring them to refrain from prying into business secrets.

When the Armistice was again extended by the protocol of February 16, 1919, it was provided that the Germans should return the railway fixtures which they had taken from France and Belgium during the war. At the same time, an active campaign was started to recover live stock, horses, cattle and chickens, which had been taken away. The Germans protested against this latter action, claiming that the live stock was properly requisitioned as a necessity of war, and maintaining that as it had not been specifically agreed that it should be returned, they had a right to keep it. No consideration, however, was paid to this point of view.

About this time, the Germans entered still another protest against their designation by the Allied press as thieves, robbers, etc. They claimed that inasmuch as the blockade of the Allies had prevented their purchasing material from abroad, they had been compelled by military necessity to requisition property from the Allied lands in which they had had control, and that they were justified under military law in so doing. As might have been expected, the Allies sharply disagreed with this point of view.

On April 11, 1919, four subcommittees were attached to the S. I. R. at WIESBADEN and placed under its control. These committees were:

- (a) Committee for Return of Industrial Machinery.
- (b) Committee for Return of Railway Material.
- (c) Committee for Return of Agricultural Machinery, Implements, Horses, Cattle, etc.
- (d) Committee for Return of Furniture and Furnishings of all kinds.

The Allies caused a census to be taken of the horses and live stock in the occupied area. The Germans objected very strongly to this, maintaining once more that live stock could be properly requisitioned in war time, and arguing that the removal of such live stock from private persons in occupied territory was a violation of the right of private ownership guaranteed in the Armistice. The work of recovering live stock progressed very unsatisfactorily. For instance, 80,000 head of cattle had been requisitioned in Belgium,

and of these, only 8,000 could be recovered. This was because many had been slaughtered, and also because they had been so mixed in removal from one district to another, that they could not be identified.

The Germans were accused by the French of intentionally delivering harvest machinery first and planting machinery later - too late, in fact, for the planting of the spring crop. The Germans denied this, claiming that they sent forward what they could get.

It was soon found that the Germans would be able to restore only a part of the machinery removed, and the question arose of how they should pay for the rest. It was impossible to estimate the cost of each machine, partly because of the enormity of such a task, and partly because the price of all kinds of machinery had very greatly increased between the time of their purchase and the spring of 1919. It was finally decided that the Germans should pay on the basis of the cost of an average machine on August 1, 1914, averaged with the cost of the same machine on April 1, 1919.

The French and Belgians demanded immediate return of their machinery. German workmen, on several occasions, threatened to demolish the machines rather than see them removed. Such threats as these induced the Allies to modify their policy. Even from the very beginning they had been much more yielding in their demand for the return of machinery which had been set up in operation in Alsace-Lorraine and the Saar districts, where the French were anxious to conciliate the population. Machinery in those districts was permitted to remain *in situ* until some business arrangement could be arrived at which would hurt both parties as little as possible. The French realized that although the machinery had been unlawfully removed, it would be unwise to remove it in an arbitrary manner, since it was now in the hands of virtually innocent purchasers.

A very curious situation arose with regard to property in Alsace-Lorraine which had been requisitioned by the German Government during the war. Since these provinces were at that time German territory, the whole matter appeared to be a problem of internal German administration. Nevertheless, when Alsace-Lorraine had passed to France, the Allies required that this property be restored. Fortunately, the larger part of it was church bells which had been taken into Germany and stored as a metal reserve. Inasmuch as these bells had not yet been melted up, it was easily agreed that the Germans should return them upon receipt of the price paid for them when they were requisitioned.

Gradually, the lenient and business-like system of restitution which the French had inaugurated with respect to property in Alsace-Lorraine and the Saar Valley, was extended to that in Germany itself. The French permitted the German firm in possession of the machinery and the French firm who owned it, to make agreements as to its restoration to their mutual advantage. An example of such an agreement is given below:

A French firm agreed that the Germans might keep their machinery, provided that the Germans deposited money to the value of the machinery in a French bank; that the Germans should supply equivalent machinery within eight months; that the French firm should not be obliged to show the Germans their plans for reestablishing their factory; that until the machinery arrived, the Germans should supply the French with a certain portion of their product at cost.

Such agreements as these were not disadvantageous to Allied businessmen, were even an advantage to the Germans and at the same time tended to stabilize the economic conditions in Europe, which after the war, were very precarious.

* * * * *

Industry and Labor

THIRD ARMY AND AMERICAN FORCES IN GERMANY,
OFFICE OF THE OFFICER IN CHARGE OF CIVIL AFFAIRS,
January 10, 1920.

AMERICAN MILITARY GOVERNMENT OF OCCUPIED GERMANY

1918 - 1920

REPORT OF THE OFFICER IN CHARGE OF CIVIL AFFAIRS

THIRD ARMY

AND

AMERICAN FORCES IN GERMANY

[Extract]

* * * * *

CHAPTER NO. 10

INDUSTRY AND LABOR

INDUSTRIAL CONDITIONS DURING OCCUPATION

When the American Army entered the Rhineland, in December 1918, industrial conditions were in a very chaotic state. The signing of the Armistice had of course destroyed the market for war supplies which, for four years, had consumed the larger part of the production of Germany. The demobilization of the Army after the Armistice had had an even more disastrous effect. Hundreds of thousands of soldiers released from military duties, thronged into the cities, creating a vast Army of unemployed which could not be absorbed by industry. These difficulties were serious enough, but the surrender of 5,000 engines and 150,000 railway cars to the Allies, by paralyzing transportation, placed almost insurmountable obstacles in the way of the resumption of industry. The very existence of the German people depended on their being able to keep their industries going and on their being able to change from a war to a peace basis despite the difficulties under which capital was laboring. How great these difficulties were, may be judged by a consideration of the restrictions imposed by the Allied Governments on exports and imports.

HISTORY AND EFFECT OF RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED ON GERMAN INDUSTRY BY ALLIES

The reasons for imposing a commercial blockade on occupied and unoccupied Germany even after the Armistice, as well as the reasons for not making that blockade absolute, have been set forth in Chapter 3 of this report. The duties and operations of the Central Economic Commission, the Interallied Economic Committee of Occupied Territories and the Interallied Railways Commission, have been described in that chapter as well as

the procedure whereby authorizations for imports and exports were requested and granted.

It should be clearly understood that a double commercial blockade of Germany had been established. There was first a deadline drawn along the 1914 western boundary of Germany, from the borders of Holland to those of Switzerland. A second deadline was established along the line of the front of the Allied and Associated Armies. Neither of these lines could be crossed without special authorization from the Allied High Command. There never was a blockade on goods passing from one of the Army zones to another, although there were temporary restrictions on the circulation of individuals between the zones. Goods could always be forwarded between any two points in occupied Germany, but persons were required to have a special pass to travel from one Army zone to another. Another point that must be constantly borne in mind is the fact that the Allies had no means of enforcing such a blockade except indirectly. There was, however, a complete blockade of the German coast-line, the British fleet, after the Armistice, having entered the Baltic from the high seas.

It will be remembered that as the German Armies withdrew from the western front, they were required to pass certain imaginary, numbered lines on definite dates, these lines being fixed in a protocol to the Armistice. During the forward movement of the Allied Armies, no trains were permitted to pass between the hostile Armies except such as carried workmen to and from work in the industrial and mining centers, and a few freight trains which carried supplies to the Allied and associated Armies. In certain other cases, complete trains of ore, coal, coke, etc., and trains of supplies for civilian populations were permitted to pass, subject to the rules of the Interallied Railways Commission.

An order was published on December 2 by the High Command, which was to become effective on the day on which the Allied Armies reach the RHINE. This order provided that no passenger, freight or empty train should thereafter cross the RHINE unless it fell within one of the following classes: (1) military trains of the Allied Armies (troop, military material, or supply trains) destined for the territory forming the bridgeheads of COLOGNE, COBLENCE and MAYENCE; (2) trains of returning empties, which had been used for transporting the above mentioned supplies, material or troops; (3) trains bringing raw material from the right bank of the RHINE, destined for Alsace-Lorraine and the Rhine Provinces; (4) similar trains returning empty; (5) trains of rolling stock which were being delivered by Germany to the Allies under the Armistice. This order was the first attempt to commercially favor Alsace-Lorraine and to prevent the closing of factories and consequent industrial disaster in the occupied territories. An explanatory order was shortly issued to the effect that the left bank of the RHINE should be interpreted to include the three bridgeheads of COLOGNE, COBLENCE and MAYENCE.

The Interallied Railways Commission issued Orders No. 15 on December 16, in which five Rhenish bridges to be used for railway crossings were named. The order provided that the following trains might cross the RHINE freely: (1) Allied military trains and returning trains of empties; (2) rolling stock from Germany to be turned over to the Allies; (3) all freight trains, provided they carried only the articles listed below, to wit: raw materials necessary for the operation of factories; food supplies; fuel of all kinds (coal, coke, gasoline, crude oil, etc.); tools for shops or factories; spare parts; transmission belts; motors; light supplies for shops and factories; automobile spare parts and rolling stock parts; machinery necessary for operation of factories, powerhouses, etc. All these articles required special authorization from the nearest representative of the Interallied Railway Commission. These authorizations were obtained by the prospective consignee, on application to one of the offices of the Interallied Railways Commission.

It will be noticed that no supplies of any kind were permitted to pass from occupied into unoccupied Germany. The Interallied Railways Commission issued Orders No. 27 on December 28, which regulated railway transportation with greater elaboration of detail. It will be found complete in Appendix No. 47 of this report. In brief, it established the following regulations in respect to the blockade at the bridgeheads: Freight trains originating in occupied territories were permitted to pass into occupied Germany by certain

fixed routes, provided they contained the following raw materials: Coal, coke, lime, limestone, iron ore, zinc ore, lead ore, phosphates, saltpeter, mine-props, gravel, plaster, cement, leather, hides, lubricating oils, heavy oils, newsprint paper, tobacco, sand, calamite, copper ore, crushed stone, basalt, lead scraps, salt and rock salt, kerosene, gasoline, clay, grain, seeds, or kinds of fuel and necessary transportation for supply of the civil population, food-stuffs, necessary spare parts for factories and electric plants, transmission belts, motors, etc., spare parts for automobiles and railway equipment. All of the above articles were permitted to enter without special authority. Certain others, necessary for the operation of factories in the occupied areas, were allowed to enter only on special authority. Goods trains which carried goods listed above were also allowed to pass between the bridgeheads through unoccupied territory, provided the cars were sealed beforehand. Empty trains which had brought in articles authorized by the Commission, were at the same time permitted to return to occupied territories. Commercial traffic originating in occupied Germany and consigned to unoccupied Germany was still forbidden, but special permission for the transportation of certain raw materials and manufactured products might be obtained under conditions laid down by the Interallied Annulment Committee.

The blockade was still further relaxed on January 18. Imports from unoccupied Germany were permitted without special authorization or formality when they consisted of (a) necessary civilian supplies; namely, food, including beverages, hay or grain for fodder, agricultural seeds; (b) necessary raw materials for industries, including fuel of all kinds; (c) manufactured articles necessary to industries. This last applied to industries only, and did not authorize dealers to sell manufactured products, either wholesale or retail, in occupied territories. In addition to this list, the following commodities might be imported if special permission were obtained from the occupying Army: (a) products not mentioned in Paragraph 1 and which were considered necessary to the economic well-being of occupied territories. Permission for import of such articles could be granted by the Economic Section of the Army, acting under instructions of the LUXEMBURG Commission.

Later transportation from occupied to unoccupied Germany through the bridgeheads was permitted in the case of food, beverages, raw materials and empty railway equipment, provided the transportation was accomplished in complete trains, unmixed with cars destined for the occupied zone.

Commercial traffic originating in occupied Germany and consigned to unoccupied Germany was, in principle, forbidden, but as this prohibition in practice destroyed the principal market of factories in occupied territories, the Armies came to realize that exceptions would have to be made. Exportation of certain manufactured products was authorized on condition that each consignment be strictly limited to the base production of the factories and that the stock on hand on January 15 was thereby not diminished. Exportation of raw materials was forbidden, in principle, in the case of the following commodities, but was permitted under special circumstances: coal and fuel, sheet iron, girders, rails, mouldings, commercial iron, railway-sleepers, wires, special steel, zinc, lead, aluminum, copper, motors, locomotives, cars, machine tools, electrical apparatuses, looms, cement, plate and roof glass, tiles, sawed timber, mine stulls, leather, hides, sugar, chemicals of all kinds, dyes, pharmaceutical products, paper.

This order of January 18 remained in effect until July 1, when order No. 76 of the Interallied Railways Commission was published. The new order took notice of the fact that Germany had assented to the peace terms, and provided that imports from Allied countries into occupied Germany should be unhindered, excepting only arms, munitions and articles specially manufactured for war; that imports from neutral countries should be subject to previous authorization of the Interallied Economic Committee. Imports from unoccupied Germany were to be free in the case of grain and grain products for fodder, and seeds and fertilizers. For all other articles imported into the Rhineland from unoccupied Germany, authorization had to be obtained from the economic section concerned.

Exports from occupied Germany to Allied and neutral countries were permitted upon permission from the Economic Section. Economic sections were further authorized to grant permits for exportation from occupied to unoccupied territory of all goods, provided they were not entirely manufactured from material imported from Allied or neutral countries or contained 25% of such material.

The following list of articles required special authorization from the Central Economic Committee for their importation into unoccupied Germany: Foodstuffs, living animals, window panes, roofing glass, bottles, empty phials, gold, platinum, silver, copper, locomotives, cars, electrical machines, material for spinning or weaving, agricultural machines, leather, skins, boots, shoes, transmission belts, manufactured fur, chemical products, coloring matters, except pharmaceutical products. In the case of these articles, requests were forwarded by the economic section concerned, with its recommendation, to the Interallied Economic Committee. Fuel, minerals, coal, coke and brickettes were permitted to pass from unoccupied Germany either into occupied Germany or into Allied countries.

The blockade of Germany was formally lifted on July 12, except for import and export of firearms and ammunition and other war material. The exportation of coal and coke was permitted to continue, although the Allies reserved the right to make further regulations for these articles. Export from Germany of dyes, chemical drugs, platinum, gold, silver and foreign securities, was prohibited unless authorized by the Interallied Rhineland Commission at COBLENCE, which, among its other duties, had taken over those of the Interallied Economic Commission of LUXEMBURG. All other goods might circulate freely. Restrictions on imports and exports were cancelled as far as LUXEMBURG was concerned. None of these Army orders of course attempted in any way to alter the customs-regulations of Allied and neutral countries.

The removal of the blockade was the result of a promise made by the Allies to Germany towards the end of June, to induce her to sign the peace treaty as speedily as possible.

It will be observed that during the period of occupation, the severity of the blockade was constantly lessened. This was because the Allies realized that it had become too absolute and severe, and dreaded lest its severity might drive the German people into Bolshevism and their industries into bankruptcy, thereby causing the Allies to lose not only the restitutive indemnities which they hoped to collect under the peace terms, but also prevent the economic restoration of Europe for an indefinite period.

Severe as were the restrictions on exports and imports, they were not the only handicaps under which German industry labored. The railways were in very poor condition owing to the shortage of rolling stock and primarily by its prolonged intensive use during the war with inadequate repairs and the surrender of locomotives and wagons to the Allies after the Armistice. A strict censorship had been established on all postal, telephonic and telegraphic communications. The severe regulations on circulation also tended to incommode the free movement of buyers and salesmen. The post, too, functioned with great difficulty, due not only to poor traffic conditions, but also to the censorship restrictions. The shortage of coal was so great that it kept every industry in constant dread of being forced to close. In the face of such tremendous impediments to successful business, it is immensely to the credit of industrial Germany that she was able to overcome the obstacles which confronted her.

LABOR CONDITIONS DURING OCCUPATION

The situation confronting German labor during the occupation was, if possible, even more serious than that confronting German capital. The interests of capital and labor being vitally related and yet interdependent, labor was confronted with the danger that all, or at least the bulk of industrial plants would be forced to close down indefinitely and that laboring men would thus be thrown out of work. In addition to this danger, prices were exorbitantly high and kept rising as the value of the mark decreased.

High prices were also partly due to diminution in the supply of the necessities of life. The demobilized Army flooded the country with unemployed men, and the fact that industries needed time to change from a war basis to one of peace, prevented them from absorbing the unemployed. The Armistice had also shattered all hope that exsoldiers might get employment in the country. To meet this condition in occupied territories, thousands of men were set to work repairing roads.

In addition to these very material dangers which confronted German laborers at the beginning of what threatened to be a long and hungry winter, they were also faced with certain psychological dangers that were no less real for being immaterial. The former Imperial German Government, which they had been trained to believe was the strongest and finest of human institutions, had crumbled in a week. The invincible German Army had, for all practical purposes, capitulated, and exhausted and defeated, was vanishing like the snows of spring. The Kaiser, whom they had been taught to honor and revere almost as a God, had shamefully deserted them, animated by most ignoble human fear. Their country was invaded, the RHINE, for the generations their traditional bulwark, was gone, incomprehensibly swept away. They were hungry, unhappy, dazed, and for many months did not know which way to turn. Russian Bolshevism with its false promises of wealth and a social millennium was urging them to throw off all restraint and indulge in an orgy of destruction.

When one considers the tremendous physical and psychological pressure bearing on them, it is to the credit of the stable character of German workingmen that they did not really rally to the red lure of disorder, even in unoccupied territory. In occupied Germany, where the strong hand of the Allies held them to the paths of duty, the matter was of course entirely different.

AMERICAN POLICY TOWARDS STRIKES

When the industrial condition of Germany in 1918/1919 is considered, it must be admitted that a certain number of strikes were inevitable and that only great tact and, on occasions, a judicious display of force by the military, combined with a forbearance on the part of employers and laborers, prevented a complete standstill of industries in the occupied territories. The military authorities, for the purpose of better dealing with them, divided strikes into two classes: those purely industrial in character and not involving the Army; those involving the Army, either (a) directly, when laborers were employed by the Army, or (b) indirectly, as in the case of strikes in public utility plants which were serving the Army. These two classes of strikes were dealt with in different manners.

Strikes and labor disputes were due to a variety of causes. These have been mentioned previously in a general way. Specifically, the chief causes of strikes were: decreased purchasing power of the mark with relation to all the necessities of life, and especially to foodstuffs; unsettled trade conditions, which made employers unwilling to grant increases in wages until they had assurance that they could market their product; transportation difficulties; shortage of raw materials; radical tax laws; distrust of the new government; mental unrest and unwillingness to work on the part of many laborers as a result of the revolution; radical agitation, often emanating from unoccupied territory.

It was obviously to the interest of the military authorities to prevent any sort of strike, whether or not they were directly interested, for any strike is a fertile source of disorder, and disorder cannot be tolerated in a military government. No effort was, however, ever made to compel strikers to work, nor employers to come to terms with workers, if the strike involved purely industrial concerns. Only one statement of policy was ever issued in the matter of purely industrial strikes. This was in the form of an indorsement to a communication of the Commanding General of the VIII Corps. It is quoted below:

1. The policy of the Army in the event of strikes, as per instructions received by this office, is as follows:

(a) There is no objection to strikes when not in conflict with Memo. Third Army, under date of April 6, dealing with the subject of strikes (i. e.; those directly involving the Army).

(b) There shall be permitted no picketing; in the event of such procedure, pickets shall be arrested and fined.

(c) There shall be no labor agitation in conjunction with any strike. In the event of such procedure, the leaders shall be arrested and tried.

(d) There shall be no protracted idleness on the part of strikers. Strikers must within a few days, if no agreement is reached between the employer and employe, secure some supporting employment elsewhere.

(e) Strikers who refuse to secure work in the event of disagreement between employer and employe shall be deported without the area occupied by the Allied forces.

The first three clauses are practically the same as the American laws dealing with strikes at home. The only difference was, that in Germany the Army, not the civil authorities, enforced them. The last, which under other circumstances might well be construed as unfair to labor, was necessary for the preservation of order.

The difficulties confronting both employers and employes in these disputes had to be carefully investigated before any such dispute could be properly dealt with. Employers were harassed by many difficulties, which the laborers were either unable or unwilling to understand, and the latter were driven by the ever-increasing cost of living and the agitation of labor leaders. Because it was a well-known fact that the cost of living was beyond the rate of pay obtained by the average worker, the American authorities adopted the policy of allowing it to be known that they were interested in every strike, but would remain neutral except when their own interests were directly concerned. It was early seen that any other attitude would have placed the American Army in the position of being forced to arbitrate strikes, and the difficulties and complexities of the many questions involved, forbade this. The Army had to be very careful, for if strikes were forbidden, unscrupulous and short-sighted employers might easily have utilized the decision of the American authorities to hold the wages of their laborers down to the minimum, and discontent would have grown on all sides. On the other hand, if strikes had been allowed *ad libitum*, the fires of agitation would have been fanned and workers encouraged to make unreasonable demands, which, if not complied with, would have resulted in disorder and violence. It was the primary concern of the American authorities to prevent this.

The policy was early adopted of confining all labor troubles to the status of disputes and of preventing strikes and lockouts if possible. After a body of workmen had once laid down their tools and gone to strike, it became doubly difficult to effect an adjustment, as the labor leaders would not permit the workers to go back without gaining some advantage, fearing a loss of prestige for themselves, and the semblance of a defeat for their cause. The employers once having said they would not accept the demands of the workers, were not thereafter inclined to submit easily. It therefore became necessary that local Officers in Charge of Civil Affairs should be notified of labor disputes as soon as they occurred, and before the dispute could become a strike. Orders were accordingly issued to all Landraete and Burgomasters that they were to notify their respective Officer of Civil Affairs whenever a strike appeared imminent. As soon as the Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs of a Kreis was thus notified, he was directed to summon both parties to the controversy to appear at the Office of Civil Affairs. These summons were printed forms bearing the official stamp of the office, and thus threw the moral weight of the occupying forces into the dispute. The effect produced on employer and employe

was equal, and pleased the laborers in particular, who felt that their side of the dispute was considered by the Army just as seriously as was the employer's. The time set in the summons for the conference was usually two or three days in advance of the anticipated strike, depending on the nature and seriousness of the controversy.

When both sides came to the conference, each was allowed to state his case, the workmen generally having precedence. The calm statement of both sides, which was required always, had a good effect. It was intended primarily to show the Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs the extent of the dispute, and whether it was possible to settle before it came to an actual strike. After each side had stated its case, the Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs explained the position which the United States would adopt in the matter; that in all disputes between employers and employes, the military authorities remained neutral and would not interfere unless its own interests were threatened. He further explained what the interests of the American Army as an occupying force were, and what their probable action would be in case disorder followed the strike. He then stated that it was practically impossible for the Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs or any other military man to act as an arbitrator for the dispute, inasmuch as he was relatively ignorant of such fundamental matters as transportation, normal cost of living, trade-union precedents and regulations involved; and that the wiser course was for both parties to settle the dispute amicably among themselves, rather than thrust to a representative of a foreign Army, particularly since he was untrained for that duty and would likely enough settle it to the dissatisfaction of both sides. Finally, the Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs asked employers and employes whether they believed that they could not settle the matter themselves without further participation on the part of the occupying forces.

One conference of this sort was generally sufficient to induce both sides to reach an agreement. In the great majority of cases, both employers and workers promised that they would effect an adjustment. In a large number of the remaining cases, the workers returned to work pending a settlement between the employers and their own representatives. In a few cases, a second conference was necessary.

After such a conference as is described above, the matter was in most cases dropped officially for several days, but the Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs made it his business to call personally at the plant, in order to see how the matter was progressing. He also, incidentally, listened to the statements of both parties to the dispute. If any agitators were believed to be busy, their names were carefully noted, and if a later investigation disclosed the fact that they were strangers in the locality, a hint was dropped that their presence was not desired. By such a system, both employers and workers were impressed with the fact that the military authorities were taking a very active interest in seeing that the dispute was settled without a strike. Parenthetically, it may be stated that the Vagrancy Court established in October 1919, and described at length elsewhere in this report, was intended in part to be used to punish labor agitators who were without visible means of support.

When strikes involved the Army directly, as, for instance, when the Army was employer, or, indirectly, when the Army was dependent on the product of the striker's labor, they were handled in a different manner. In December 1918, when the railways were requisitioned, or rather taken over from the German Government, the personnel was also requisitioned. Paragraph 3, Orders No. 1, Interallied Railways Commission of the Rhine Provinces, November 24, 1918, which dealt with this matter, reads as follows:

All the personnel mentioned above will be considered as requisitioned and will come under the military regulations of the Allied Armies in the zone of operation. This personnel may be sure, if it performs faithfully its duties, that it will be treated well, and paid at the present German rate, and will have its food supply assured. On the other hand, anyone who abandons his post, will be subject to court martial. Any negligence in the execution of the service will be severely punished. It is everyone's interest to remain at

his post. It is also in the interest of the population, for their supplies and the maintenance of the economic life in occupied territory could not be assured if transportation did not work normally.

As a matter of fact, railway employes never actually struck in the American zone. They threatened to do so at the beginning of June in protest at the establishment of the Rhine Republic in the French area. The President of the Interallied Railways Commission of the Rhine Provinces at once issued an order, stating that due to external political conditions, the German railway personnel had threatened to strike, and that they must not participate in political demonstrations of any sort and must remain peacefully at work. It further stated that no digression from this policy would be tolerated, no matter under what pretence. The Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs, Third Army, simultaneously informed Herr von Groote, Oberpraesident of the Rhine Province, that in view of the threats of strikes by government officials and by employes of public service corporations, such as railways and trolley systems, he wished to call attention to the fact that the American authorities could not permit strikes by employes engaged in such vital matters to the Army as transportation, inasmuch as they would materially impede the administration of government of the occupied area. As a result of this pressure, the strike was averted and thereafter none was even attempted.

In regard to another class of strikes, in which German laborers were engaged in work on which the United States Army was directly dependent, the restrictions were likewise very severe. On March 28, 1919, Major General Dickman issued a proclamation on the subject, which read as follows:

HEADQUARTERS THIRD ARMY

AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES

Letter of Instructions
No. 17

March 28, 1919.

* * * * *

PROCLAMATION

All German laborers who have voluntarily entered the service of employers engaged in work for the United States Army of Occupation, or who are working for the said Army, under requisition or otherwise, are forbidden jointly or in conspiracy to plan, attempt or carry out any scheme to strike or abandon work. Any breach of this order will be punished by the American Military Tribunals.

By command of Major General Dickman:

MALIN CRAIG,
Brig. Gen., G. S.,
Chief of Staff.

A memorandum was issued on April 6 to corps commanders and chiefs of sections in support of this proclamation. The memorandum required that:

(a) Immediate steps should be taken to ascertain the name, occupation, residence, etc., of the leaders of the various labor unions in the American occupied territory and of any other persons living in the American occupied territory who might be considered as leaders of organizations of any kind that might be concerned in a possible strike.

(b) Should it become fairly certain that a strike is about to be called and that such strike would involve directly or indirectly, interference of any kind with the supply

or the arrangement of the American Army of Occupation, the leaders mentioned will be immediately arrested, with a view to their trial for attempting to interfere with the supply or other arrangements of the American Army of Occupation.

(c) If not already arrested, immediately on the calling of the strike, should such strike be thought to involve directly or indirectly, interference of any kind with the supply of other arrangement of the American Army of Occupation, the leaders mentioned in Paragraph (a) above will be immediately arrested with a view to their trial for interfering with the supply or other arrangements of the American Army of Occupation.

In spite of the severity of these regulations, strikes of this nature did occur on two instances, when the stevedores engaged in unloading American supplies at the ports of ANDERNACH and BENDORF left their work simultaneously. The men were working directly for the United States Government. The strike was severely dealt at ANDERNACH, all the prominent strikers being arrested, tried and sentenced. It is rather humorous to note in this regard that they served their sentences doing gratuitously the very work for which they had previously been hired and paid. The officer in charge at BENDORF did not act so promptly as his colleague at ANDERNACH, and before he had taken any action, the strikers at BENDORF, hearing of the method adopted by the American authorities at ANDERNACH, returned to work after an absence of only a few hours. No disciplinary action was taken in this strike. As far as can be ascertained, these were the only two strikes in the area in which the United States figured directly as employer.

In the case of strikes of laborers in such public utilities as electric, gas and water works, quarries furnishing stone for the United States engineers, and other concerns engaged in work directly affecting the Army, matters were treated more drastically than was the case in purely industrial strikes, but less so than when they were aimed directly at the American Army. At first, even such strikes had been prohibited, as will be noted by an examination of the preceding order; but it was soon realized that such drastic action was unfair to the laborers, as well as impracticable. Restriction by the Army of the use of the strike by the workingman in public utilities, soon caused wages in these establishments to remain fixed; wages in commercial establishments rose with the cost of living. The result was a natural flow of machinists, electricians, and skilled workingmen, to the purely industrial establishments. This was gradual, and there was no strike, but at the end of a short time, public utilities found themselves without skilled help. Employers were then faced with the problem of either voluntarily raising their wages or losing a considerable number of their employees.

If positions outside public utilities were not available, skilled workers often found that they were paid less wages than unskilled laborers. Requests that they be allowed to strike were repeatedly made to the Army by laborers in public utilities. These came to the attention of the Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs and efforts were made by labor to induce him to use his influence to obtain satisfaction for laborers from employers. The military authorities realized that when employers were unable or unwilling to meet the demands of the workers, steps would have to be taken to adjust the matter amicably, as, otherwise, a continual agitation and unrest would be going on under the surface and would furnish a fertile field for radical propaganda. A policy was finally adopted for labor troubles in public utilities, which was almost identical to that used in the case of purely commercial strikes, the only difference being that in the case of public utilities, the pressure exerted by the military authorities was greater, since their interests were more involved than in others.

REQUISITION OF LABOR

The right of an occupying Army to requisition laborers from the inhabitants of the occupied territory is well recognized and is especially provided for in Article 2 of The Hague Rules. The Hague Rules and the customs of civilized warfare require, however, that

the laborers shall receive cash payment for their services, and that the occupying Army not employ them in work directly furthering military operations.

During the march from Luxemburg into Germany in 1918, the roads were found to be in bad repair. Weather and heavy traffic incident to the retreating and advancing Armies had necessarily considerably damaged them. The problem of repairing them arose therefore, even before the RHINE was reached. Requisition of German labor to accomplish this task was one of the first solutions suggested. As has been mentioned, the entire German railway personnel in occupied territories had been requisitioned by Marshal Foch shortly after the Armistice. It therefore seemed an unwise extension of policy to requisition labor for use on roads. There was no doubt of the legal power resident in the Army to make such requisition, but when the matter was submitted to the Commanding General it was decided not to do so, inasmuch as the Americans would later have to pay the laborers direct or, at least, furnish them with rations, which was at that time impossible.

On December 24, 1918, a few days after the occupying forces had reached their permanent stations, Memorandum No. 36 was issued by the Commanding General, Third Army, under the title of "Instructions for the Procurement of Supplies, Services and Billets by Requisition on the German Authorities, and Reports to be made in Connection therewith." One paragraph of this memorandum stated that local commanders were not authorized to requisition labor without the approval of higher authority, except in cases in which the repair and the maintenance of existing buildings were such as to require immediate action. The higher authority was described as the first sections of the staffs of divisions and corps and of Army headquarters.

It was also announced to be contrary to the policy of the Army to requisition direct labor except in emergencies. In the event of such emergencies, labor might be requisitioned for such government buildings, barracks, depots, hospitals, waterworks, electric light plants, etc., as had been taken over by the Americans and which already had a working force of janitors, charwomen, mechanics, etc. The requisition for the building was permitted to include the necessary personnel. The local civil authorities were required to pay these employees out of their public funds at rates similar to those in force prior to the occupation. American officers in charge of these buildings were directed to see that the employees were paid promptly by the officials concerned. When private buildings and utilities, such as hotels, hospitals, factories, etc., which already had a working force were taken over by requisition and it was necessary to retain such force, the following procedure was observed: The individuals included in the working force were paid either from United States funds or from funds turned over by the German Government, at the same rate that they received prior to the occupation. It was made incumbent on all United States officers and agents in charge of private buildings or utilities to take such steps as would insure prompt payments.

Road work was carried on for a long time by voluntary German labor, but towards the end of February 1919, this labor being no longer forthcoming, the Commanding General authorized corps commanders to serve requisitions upon local officials for such as was necessary to repair the roads, if sufficient voluntary labor could not be obtained at current prices. Requisitioning of personal services was not authorized except under these conditions.

Conditions had undergone a change by March 1919, and a great deal of German labor was then required by the Army, partly because the coming of Spring had further damaged the roads and partly because the change of base of the Army from France to ROTTERDAM and ANTWERP required the employment of German stevedores to unload the RHINE boats. The Commanding General therefore issued a letter of instructions to corps and division commanders on March 6, revising the previous regulations regarding the employment of German labor.

The instructions read as follows:

As a general policy, American soldiers serving within the limits of the American Army of Occupation will not be employed on duties which will tend to belittle their dignity or lower their status in the opinion of the German population. This will apply in particular to such work as the construction and maintenance of roads, which while necessary to the Army of Occupation, will benefit directly or indirectly the German population. Under such circumstances, whenever practicable, German labor will be employed under American supervision, but this American supervision will not go to the extent of supplanting German road overseers or others who are in a position to more efficiently conduct the labor under consideration.

Payment for these services was made on payrolls in German marks supplied by the German Government, as required by the terms of the Armistice. Because of the shortage of food in Germany and the necessity of properly feeding the laborers in order that they might perform the heavy work, a policy was adopted of giving them a part of their pay in food. It was optional with the laborer whether or not he took his pay entirely in money or partly in money and partly in food. He was not allowed to draw more food for a day's work than that authorized in the German ration, this to prevent his profiteering in American food supplies. An elaborate table was worked out, giving the German ration in the component equivalents of the American ration. The cost of each in this way to deduct the amount of food taken by each laborer from his daily wage. The balance was paid in cash. The tables figuring the cost of supplies in marks had to be frequently changed, as the rate of exchange on marks became more and more unfavorable.

It was the policy of the American Army to procure voluntary labor whenever possible, but a sufficient number of volunteers was frequently not obtainable. In such cases, a requisition for additional labor was served on German civil officials. The labor for the port of BENDORF was obtained through a requisition served upon the Regierungspraesident of COBLANCE. The American forces paid the laborers so requisitioned with money furnished by the German Government to defray the cost of the occupation. The requisition calling for 300 laborers at BENDORF was the only one over which any trouble arose, and this occurred through a bureaucratic row between the acting Regierungspraesident and the Oberbuergermeister as to who should furnish the labor. As the labor was not forthcoming at the appointed hour, both officials were arrested and given twenty-four hours additional in which to comply. It was then furnished as directed. No further action was taken by the American authorities, other than a severe reprimand; but the Regierungspraesident - a superannuated government official - was soon after retired by the German Government on its own initiative.

INSURANCE OF LABORERS IN SERVICE OF UNITED STATES ARMY

It has been seen that throughout the period of the occupation, the Army authorities employed a large number of civilian laborers, recruited either voluntarily or by requisition upon the civil authorities. These laborers were paid at the rate current for such work. When, toward the end of March, owing to the change of base from BREST to ANTWERP and ROTTERDAM, a greater number of laborers was required than theretofore, the question of government insurance of these laborers was brought up, and had finally to be settled by a military order.

All workmen whose incomes are deemed insufficient to keep them from want in case of disability through illness or injury, or to enable them to save a competency for old age, are required by German law to insure themselves in the Government Insurance Bureau. They must pay weekly premiums to this Bureau, fixed according to the amount of their earning. These payments are duly recorded in a book commonly called the stamp book, which is kept by the beneficiaries. One stamp book is for old age pension and another for disability insurance. Not only must the German workingman pay the premiums on both kinds of insurance, under penalty of a fine, but the employer must also, under a like penalty, pay

a prescribed premium on the insurance of each of his employes.

The military authorities took no notice of this law during the early part of the occupation, with the result that the insurance of many of its German employes lapsed. This was felt to be very impolitic, and the Officer in charge of Civil Affairs made a recommendation on April 21 to G-4, that the American authorities should lay the insurance premiums of its employes according to the German law and charge the cost to the German Government. This recommendation was approved and an order issued on May 16, providing that the employe should pay his part of the insurance premium and that the employer's share be paid by the Disbursing Quartermaster upon presentation by the German civil authorities of a certified statement from the Government Insurance Bureau of the amount due in each case under German law.

The Regierungspraesident of TREVES objected to this order, on the ground that German laborers and employers had in practice changed the mode of operation of the law, so that the employer, as a matter of fact, paid the entire premium, deducting the employe's share from his wages, and that the laborers, being required to pay the premium themselves, would not understand the procedure and would regard it as an imposition. This objection was considered but was finally disapproved, partly because of the additional work that its adoption would have thrown on the Department of the Disbursing Quartermaster, and partly because it was found that the practice by which the employer paid the entire premium was by no means universal. It was therefore arranged that the Buergermeister would regularly send a representative on the days when wages were paid, and that this representative should collect the employes' share of the premiums when they received their money from the Disbursing Quartermaster. These amounts, together with the share of the premiums paid by the American authorities at the same time, were sent to the local Government Insurance Bureau. Inasmuch as this arrangement threw a very considerable burden of administrative work on German officials, the American authorities lent every possible facility to them in order to help them to calculate the amounts of insurance. These officials were always to be notified before payments were made, and were to be given access to the civilian payroll in order to determine the proper premiums.

* * * * *
