





Policy-forming Documents  
of the  
American Expeditionary Forces




American Troops Parading Through Paris, July 4, 1917



# UNITED STATES ARMY IN THE WORLD WAR 1917–1919

Policy-forming Documents  
of the  
American Expeditionary Forces

Volume 2



*CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY  
UNITED STATES ARMY  
WASHINGTON, D.C., 1989*

## **Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data**

United States Army in the World War, 1917–1919.

Contents: v. 1. Organization of the American Expeditionary Forces.—v. 2. Policy-forming documents of the American Expeditionary Forces—v. 3. Training and use of American units with the British and French.

1. United States. Army—History—World War, 1914–1918. 2. World War, 1914–1918—United States.

I. Center of Military History.

DS570.U55      1988      940.4'0973      88-600367

A new introduction has been added to Volume 1. Type has been reset, but original pagination has not been altered. Except for front matter, maps, illustrations, and some tables, camera-ready copy was produced by Susan Blair using optical scanning and laser printing technology.

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First Printed 1948—CMH Pub. 23-7

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office  
Washington, D.C. 20402

## UNITED STATES ARMY IN THE WORLD WAR, 1917–1919

Volume 1	Organization of the American Expeditionary Forces
Volume 2	Policy-forming Documents of the American Expeditionary Forces
Volume 3	Training and Use of American Units With the British and French
Volume 4–9	Military Operations of the American Expeditionary Forces
Volume 10	The Armistice Agreement and Related Documents
Volume 11	American Occupation of Germany
Volume 12–15	Reports of the Commander-in-Chief, AEF, Staff Sections and Services
Volume 16	General Orders, GHQ, AEF
Volume 17	Bulletins, GHQ, AEF



## FOREWORD

Military historians and scholars of operational art have tended to neglect the role played by the American Expeditionary Forces in World War I. Although the Army organized a historical office in 1918 to prepare a multivolume history of the war, budget restraints and other considerations frustrated Chief of Staff Tasker H. Bliss' intention to "record the things that were well done, for future imitation . . . , [and] the errors as shown by experience, for future avoidance." The momentous events of succeeding decades only strengthened this tendency to overlook our Army's role in the fields of France in 1918. This neglect, although understandable, is unfortunate: World War I posed unique challenges to American strategists, tacticians, and logisticians—challenges they met in ways that could provide today's military student with special insights into the profession of arms.

To encourage further research in the history of World War I and to fill a gap in the Army's historical documentation of that conflict, the Center of Military History has created a World War I series of publications consisting of new monographs and reprints. Complementing our newly published facsimile reprint *Order of Battle of the United States Land Forces in the World War*, we are reprinting this seventeen-volume compilation of selected AEF records along with a new introduction by David F. Trask. Gathered by Army historians during the interwar years, this massive collection in no way represents an exhaustive record of the Army's months in France, but it is certainly worthy of serious consideration and thoughtful review by students of military history and strategy and will serve as a useful jumping off point for any earnest scholarship on the war.

There is a certain poignancy connected with the publication of this collection in the seventieth anniversary year of "the war to end all wars." Later this summer veterans of that war will gather together, perhaps for the last time, to discuss the history of the American Expeditionary Forces and to reminisce about their service. To them especially, but to all five million Americans who served in World War I, we dedicate this scholarly undertaking.

Washington, D.C.  
1 June 1988

WILLIAM A. STOFFT  
Brigadier General, USA  
Chief of Military History



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Policy-forming Documents  
of the  
American Expeditionary Forces



# POLICY-FORMING DOCUMENTS, A.E.F.

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The following documents were selected to show the development of policy in General Headquarters, A. E. F., as the operations of American troops abroad made necessary administrative arrangements from the High Command downwards.

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Les Armees Francaises, Tome V, 2d Vol., Annexes, 1st Vol.: Letter

## ***Plan to Injure Germans by Attrition***

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff  
No. 17356

ARMIES OF THE NORTH AND NORTHEAST  
May 19, 1917

For the Commanders of the Groups of Armies and the Armies Alone

### Directive No. 1

The equilibrium between the opposing forces facing each other on the north and north-east front does not permit us, for the time being, to contemplate a breakthrough of the front followed by strategic exploitation. Therefore, what is important at the present time is to bend our efforts to wear down the opponent with a minimum of losses.

It is unnecessary, for the purpose of obtaining this attrition, to mount large-scale attacks in depth, with distant objectives. These attacks do not provide the advantage of surprise, because by reason of the numerous preparations they require, they are recorded on the terrain far in advance of the attack. They are costly because in them the attacker generally is used up more than the defender. They are hazardous, because, tending to the extension of the initial artillery preparation to take in the full depth of the organized zone, they risk, by diluting the fire in this manner, gaining but insignificant results on the whole and exposing the attack to the danger of breaking down against the first position which has not been completely destroyed.

It is advisable to give preference over deep attacks, to those with limited objectives which are abruptly released on a front as extensive as the number and characteristics of the various pieces of available artillery permit.

So that this plan may be realized the attacks should:

1. Be conducted economically as far as infantry is concerned and with the maximum of artillery means;

2. Operate by surprise which offers the opportunity of shifting from mass shock action to a normal status and of obtaining important results. It is expedient to note that surprise will be obtained only if the sector of attack, having been prepared for a long time, has been put to sleep for several weeks or even several months before the attack is made;

3. Be carried out one after the other at different sectors of the front, chosen among those that the enemy has the best reasons not to evacuate of his own accord;

4. Succeed each other as rapidly as possible in trail in order to fix the enemy and take away his freedom of action.

This manner of employing forces, based essentially on the mobility of the means to be used and on their sudden entry into action, presupposes a suitable organization of the front.

While endeavoring to wear down the enemy indefatigably, in the manner just indicated, it is advisable not to lose sight of the fact that in consequence of changes in the situation in other theaters of operations new reserves can become available to the enemy who can have them intervene with diversions wherever he wishes. Therefore, it is important to foresee these attacks and to prepare to meet them by constant improvement of the agencies of defense. The offensive organization of the front will already have contributed to the worked improvement of its defense which should be completed by a series of other measures, notably by setting up plans for moving supplies and reinforcements corresponding to the varying eventualities to be considered.

Lastly, it is absolutely necessary in the general distribution of forces that the groups of armies and the armies have relative autonomy and that they can manipulate their own reserves to carry out the general missions entrusted to them.

Such are, on the whole, the preparations to be made and the course to be followed during the present phase of war. They correspond to the situation of the opposing forces on the western front. If this situation were to change, commanders of groups of armies and of armies would receive new directives for the rest of the operations.

PETAIN.

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Les Armees Francaises, Tome V, 2d Vol., Annexes, 1st Vol.: Letter

### ***Directives for Cooperation of American Forces with Allied Armies***

[Editorial Translation]

No. 1

FRENCH MISSION TO THE UNITED STATES,  
*Aboard the Lorraine, May 20, 1917.*

Subject: Report of the Mission

Marshal Joffre to the Minister of War

[Extract]

In your letter No. 53 of April 13, 1917, you defined the object of the mission entrusted to me by the government as follows: "To draw up immediately, and in their broader aspects, the directives for the cooperation of American forces with the Allied armies."

On May 14, at a recent conference with Mr. Baker, Secretary of War of the United States, and the American chiefs of staff, these directives were drawn up in very plain terms. I immediately submitted them to the French Government by telegram transmitted by Mr. Viviani, Minister of Justice and chief of the mission.

The purpose of the report which I have the honor to send you today is not only to submit the program adopted by the American Government and to furnish on the various chapters of this program, details and necessary information of a military nature, but to convey to you in addition the attitude of the men of the Government and the Army of the United States who have worked on the elaboration of this program and who will direct its accomplishment. It is important to be accurately informed on their ideas, their views, and their hopes, if prompt and uninterrupted results to the best interest of both the United States and France are desired.

With this in mind, a statement of the method of operation employed will permit me to furnish some useful information.

## ***Chapter I***

### ***Method of Operation of the Mission and History of Negotiations with the American Government***

#### **1. Elaboration of a Program**

The studies made on the voyage over led me to base the method of operation of the mission on the following considerations:

a. To concede from the beginning that the United States was capable of organizing a large army, that such was its desire, and that it would take any measures necessary to that end.

Events have shown that this was certainly the case; the Federal Government desires to create a large national army; the passage of the conscription law is the clearest proof of that.

b. To offer to the United States the aid of France, highly experienced after three years of war, in order to make easier the gigantic task it was undertaking. And so we offered ourselves, not as unskilled beggars in disguise or as pretentious instructors, but as friends desirous that their friends avoid errors and delays. This attitude was deeply appreciated.

c. To gain consent for the American army to fight beside the French army. It appeared possible to procure the immediate dispatch of an expeditionary force, and necessary to reach an agreement to the plan of successive shipments of large units of the American army, as their organization and facilities for transportation and supply would permit.

Thus, as early as 1917, an act would be obtained from the United States, which would be of considerable moral significance, and preparations would be made for actual cooperation, by 1918, between the American and French armies.

d. The preceding considerations inspired the wording of the program covered in Annex I; the intention was to deliver it to the American authorities to serve as a basis for formal conferences which would follow the preliminary conversations.

The text was concerned with gratifying and safeguarding American self-respect, and it is to that end that, abandoning the policy of sending small units to France (battalions and regiments), I agreed to the American division as the type of unit, as far as possible, to be transported to France. It is in the form of this large unit that the immediate dispatch of an expeditionary force was approved.

Discussion with the American General Staff soon revealed that it had decided beforehand to sanction only one solution respecting the autonomy of the American division and army in France; the method of instruction I proposed in Par. B of the program (See Annex I) gained the immediate assent of the American Government.

## **Chapter II**

Minutes of the conference of May 14 with the Secretary of War, during which a definitive plan of cooperation was drawn up.

The purpose of the conference was to bring out clearly the intentions of the American Government.

To that end, a memorandum had been drawn up to serve as a basis for the discussion. \* \* \*

It was approved entirely by the minister exactly as it appears here. Annex II. I informed Mr. Baker that I would send it in this form to the French Government. It constitutes a kind of agreement which the American Government has pledged itself to carry out.

\* \* \* \* \*

1. Article I: The shipment of an expeditionary force calls for the following explanations:

\* \* \* \* \*

It is very probable that the expeditionary force will take with it its full equipment of artillery materiel. Otherwise, it is understood that it will be completed with French materiel. It will likewise be expedient to supplement its infantry materiel. But it is believed that the United States will take pride in sending to France a very well-outfitted unit.

\* \* \* \* \*

The dispatch of this expeditionary force, as well as of all other units, depends on transportation facilities. The secretary gives me to understand that, from now on, the efforts of the United States will be restricted only by transportation difficulties.

\* \* \* \* \*

The commander of the expeditionary force has been designated: It is General Pershing, who is back from Mexico where he has proven himself to be a vigorous, active, and intelligent leader.

The designation of General Pershing is very well received in military circles. He was presented to me on leaving the conference. He made a good impression.

He was to leave America 8 days after us.

He will bring to France the American Mission designated to organize the American base. The Direction of the Rear had proposed the port of La Pallice. It is of the greatest importance that nothing be overlooked to make this organization satisfactory from every standpoint, and that the first impressions of the Government and the American army be good.

2. Article II: The organization and training of the American Army raises the following points:

\* \* \* \* \*

4. The reading of the memorandum completed, the secretary declares his entire approval of the contents and I state that I shall transmit it to the French Government.

The secretary then asks me to what authority General Pershing should report on his arrival in France. I respond that he will present himself to the Minister of War who will regulate, between governments, his relations with the French command. I have, moreover, in all the conferences, laid down the principle that, from the standpoint of operations, the commander of the American division would be under the orders of the commander of the French Armies of the Northeast. But General Pershing, designated to become

the Commander-in-Chief of the American forces, will nevertheless have a task of organization to perform and will, in order to do this, be responsible to his government whose instructions he will take with him. The question of the relations of the American command with the various French authorities must be decided before his arrival. Mr. Baker indicates his intention to organize at once the future command of the American army, by asserting that General Pershing could not be placed under the orders of the French Government except for matters concerning operations.

\* \* \* \* \*



### **Chapter III**

To what extent will the plan thus adopted be carried out?

\* \* \* \* \*

2. With reference to the organization\* of a large American army, there is no doubt that it will be entirely successful. The enthusiasm and pride of the country demand this army and the necessity for it at this time is realized only too well. The enlightened persons see in it a means of better uniting the many peoples of the United States, of bringing more discipline into the family, and to the masses. In addition, the resources placed at the disposal of the President by law are considerable. \* \* \* It would be a mistake to believe that it [the American army] cannot be strongly and solidly organized by 1918.

Will it be in France by that time? In part, certainly, but not in large numbers unless its transportation and supply are assured. That is a question of prime importance which will be studied in its entirety immediately.

At this point one may wonder if it would not be an advantage to contribute, if necessary, materiel of several French divisions to American units. We would thus gain men we shall be lacking in 1918 and the question of ammunition supply would be solved satisfactorily. Moreover, it is probable that the United States will have resources in men much more quickly than they will manufacture artillery materiel. \* \* \*

Be that as it may, we should feel confident from now on that the American army can be an enormous contribution to the 1918 campaign and, by establishment of a comprehensive plan, we must take all necessary measures that it may play this great role.

No doubt should be entertained that the United States is eager to play it, very particularly with France. \* \* \*

In any event, the Government, political circles, financiers, and military men, at this time, are obviously happy to make unlimited sacrifices of men and money for France. The watchword that has come to me from the lips of the highest authorities, the most prominent men, and the masses is: For France, to the last dollar, to the last man.

The country and the Government merit our complete confidence; we have no Allies who are such friends. There is no sacrifice we should refuse to make in order to have their army join ours on the French front.

J. JOFFRE.

---

### **Annex I**

#### **PROGRAM**

France, convinced, first, that the military effort of the United States will be considerable and will be in proportion to its strength;

Second, that this effort is capable of hastening the victorious end of the war, expresses the following desires:

Immediately:

A. Dispatch of an Expeditionary Force

With a view to representing the American flag as soon as possible on the French

---

\* It may be noted that the proposed organization does not conform completely to ours, but it appeared necessary not to be too exacting and to let the Americans have the advantage of continuing their existing form of organization in all instances where it did not seem necessary to change it.

front, dispatch of an expeditionary force \* \* \* in the form of a division of 9 regiments and equipped with artillery and services corresponding to those of a French army corps, all or part of the armament possible to be furnished by France, if necessary.

The expeditionary force thus organized would be assembled in one or several camps in the zone of the French armies, where the American troops would find, from the moral as well as the material point of view, the most favorable conditions for completing their training with all the resources of the French front.

Concurrently:

B. Organization of an American army

1. Choice of type of large unit. It would be advantageous for the United States to adopt for the organization of their army a type of large unit (division) very similar to the type approved by all belligerents at the present time (division consisting of 3 or 4 regiments).

2. Organization and training of the army. It would be advantageous to have accepted the principle of organizing these large units and training them briefly in America, with the cooperation of a French mission, and completing their training in France, in close contact with the French front, under the direction of the American high command.

3. Appropriate measures: A group of preparatory measures, designed to facilitate the assembly on French soil and the training of American units, should be adopted immediately. Particularly:

a. Organization of a base (La Pallice, for example);

b. Cadres: Immediate dispatch of all officer personnel designated to learn present combat methods and later to be responsible for the command and training of the American army. A general officer of the American army (the commander of the expeditionary corps, for example) would have control of this training, for which he would draw up the program after consultation with the French command.

\* \* \* \* \*

## ***Annex II***

Memorandum approved by the Secretary of War pertaining to the cooperation of the American army on the front of the Allied armies.

The studies made by the French mission with the Federal Government permit today the laying out of the following program, according to which the American army will be organized for the war.

I. Dispatch of an expeditionary corps

With a view to representing the American flag as soon as possible on the French front, the United States will send an expeditionary force, equivalent to a division, of all arms of 16 to 20,000 combatants, comprising basically 4 infantry regiments, 12 field batteries, 6 heavy batteries, and the corresponding services. This expeditionary corps, the shipment of which will begin about June 1, will be assembled in a camp in the French army zone. The American troops will find there, from the morale as well as material standpoint, the most favorable conditions for completing their training under the direction of the American high command, which will determine when they are able to take their place on the front.

II. Organization and Training of the American army:

a. The organization of the American army will be based on the adoption of a large combat unit similar to the type recognized as the best adapted to modern warfare; that is, an army corps with 2 divisions of 3 or 4 regiments each, possibly including, in addition, an infantry brigade as corps reserve. This latter arrangement would permit the utilization of the manpower resources of the United States, before even producing the corresponding amount of war materiel for these troops.

The large American units, after receiving preliminary training in the United States, will be shipped to France as they are organized, and according to a transportation

plan which will be sent to the French Government. They will complete their training in the camps of the French army zone in the same manner as the expeditionary corps.

b. The assistance to be given by France to the American army in embryo will aim principally at the training of staff and line officers.

The American Government will send at once to France a number of selected staff or line officers - some intended to teach later in the staff schools, the others to take up duties on the staffs of the American units, either in France, on their arrival, or in the United States before their departure.

It would likewise be advantageous, for training purposes, for general officers detailed to command large American units in process of formation, to make a preliminary tour of the French front, for observation and study.

The Government, on the other hand, will send to the United States a military mission placed, we will say, under the direction of General Vignal, French military attache.

\* \* \* \* \*

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Les Armees Francaises, Tome V, 2d Vol., Annexes, 1st Vol.: Letter

### ***Relations between French Authorities and American Command***

[Editorial Translation]

No. 2

FRENCH MISSION TO THE UNITED STATES,  
*Aboard the Lorraine, May 20, 1917.*

Subject: Efforts to be made immediately to assure cooperation of the American army.

Marshal Joffre to the Minister of War

As an addition to the report I have the honor to send you separately, I believe that I must again insist on the necessity for regulating without delay the question of relations between the American command and the various French authorities.

It is, in my opinion, extremely important that the American command and Government, very inexperienced in military organization, not suffer any disillusionment which would turn them against us or discourage them.

To that end, it seems necessary that the American mission be placed, immediately on its arrival, in touch with an organization capable of helping and advising it in the accomplishment of its task.

In order to avoid any misunderstanding and delay, a similar military authority should centralize the study of all questions and serve as an intermediary between the American command and the various French authorities, and which a permanent liaison would be established.

The staff of this organization, composed of staff officers and specialists of the Service of the Rear and the Medical and Administrative Services, would prepare a general plan, the various parts of which would be put into effect when agreement is reached between the American command and the authorities or French services directly concerned.

Among the problems which must be solved immediately, I consider the following of importance:

1. Reception of the American mission.
2. Organization of a base (in agreement with the Director of the Rear and the department of transportation and supply).
3. Study (with General Pershing) of a plan for transportation, debarkation and supply.
4. Study of an installation plan. Particularly, it will be expedient, along these

lines, to take all the necessary precautions and disciplinary measures toward protecting the soldiers of the expeditionary forces from any contamination that might injure their health; failure to do so would be publicized in the United States to our detriment.

5. Assembly of a corps of interpreters, either by utilizing the resources of the French front or by recruiting in America through our military attache.

6. Study of a training plan for American units in agreement with the American command and the Commander-in-Chief of the French Armies of the Northeast.

7. Later, study of a plan of employment of American troops.

8. Formation and despatch of the French mission with proper instructions to direct its work.

The American Government and command approach us with utter confidence; this confidence must be fully justified from the beginning, under penalty of jeopardizing important results already obtained.

J. JOFFRE.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 682: Letter

***Instructions to General Pershing***

WAR DEPARTMENT,  
Washington, May 26, 1917.

From: The Secretary of War

To: Major General J. J. Pershing, U.S. Army

[Extract]

The President directs me to communicate to you the following:

The President designates you to command all the land forces of the United States operating in continental Europe and in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, including any part of the Marine Corps which may be detached there for service with the army.

\* \* \* \* \*

NEWTON D. BAKER.

-----

**Instructions to General Pershing**

WAR DEPARTMENT,  
*Washington, May 26, 1917*

[Extract]

Dear General Pershing:

In compliance with the orders of the President, assigning you to command of the United States forces in France, the Secretary of War directs that you proceed, with the necessary staff, to Paris, France, via England.

\* \* \* \* \*

Very sincerely,

TASKER H. BLISS,  
Major General,  
Acting Chief of Staff.

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C-in-C Rept. File: Fldr. 18: Letter

**Relations with French**

3d Bureau A, General Staff  
Advance Group

FRENCH MINISTRY OF WAR,  
*Paris, June 3, 1917.*

No. 2,207 BS

From: Minister of War

To: Marshal Joffre

In acknowledging receipt of the report which you submitted to me on your return from the United States, I am happy to extend to you the thanks of the Government for the results which you have obtained.

On the other hand, when the American troops will land in France, it seemed to me necessary that you should continue the work which you were engaged in during your mission.

The moral authority of your own personality and high position, as well as your wide experience of the present war, will enable you, in accord with the American High Command, to give to the troops of our Allies the advice and information which they will require to prepare themselves morally and materially for the efforts which they will be called upon to make.

The chief of the general staff of the Army, having taken as a basis the conclusions of your report, has established the programme of the American cooperation and will carry it out - after agreement with the Commander-in-Chief of the Armies of the North and North-east and the ministerial departments concerned.

He will forward to you all information and documents which you may need to carry out

the mission of inspection with which you are charged.

I request you to kindly in turn send me your reports of inspection addressed  
"Etat-Major General de l'Arme - Groupe de l'Avant - 3eme Bureau A."

PAINLEVE.

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Cable: P-1-S

***Arrival of General Pershing and Staff at Liverpool***

No. 1.

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
Liverpool, June 8, 1917.

Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

Number one. Report arrival my headquarters in Liverpool this date. Baltic sailed via Halifax. Was met four hundred miles west of Liverpool by U. S. Destroyer *Tucker* and *Rowan* which acted as escort through war zone. Cable care American Ambassador, London, to include ninth instant after that date, care American Ambassador, Paris.

PERSHING.

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Cable: P-4-S

***Arrival of General Pershing's Party at London***

No. 4

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
London, June 9, 1917.

Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

Number four. Late arrival here Friday makes it advisable to remain until Tuesday. Reach Paris Wednesday and Board of Staff Officers leave tomorrow visit proposed base ports for full investigation and study. Our reception in England very cordial and very sincere.

PERSHING.

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Cable: P-6-S

***Arrival of General Pershing's Party at Paris***

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Paris, June 13, 1917.*

No. 6

The Adjutant General, Washington

Accompanied by staff arrived Paris today from London. Most cordial welcome extended at Boulogne and en route to Paris where practically entire populace filled street from Gare du Nord to Place de [la] Concorde, according party wildly enthusiastic reception and demonstrating the deep feeling existing among French people over our participation in this war.

PERSHING.

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Hist. Sect. AWC: Important Letters File: Folder-1

***Collaboration with French Government***

[Editorial Translation]

No. 18/M. A.

FRENCH REPUBLIC,  
*Paris, June 16, 1917.*

MARSHAL JOFFRE

to General Pershing, Commander-in-Chief of the American army.

I have the honor to bring to your attention a copy of the letter [dated June 3, 1917] which was sent to me by the Minister of War. You will find defined therein the official mission to the American army in France, which the French Government has intrusted to me.

I draw your attention particularly to the fact that this mission is to be fulfilled "in agreement with the American High Command"; it is my intention fully to bring about this agreement, which is to grow out of the talks we shall have. In the course of these talks we can, when you consider it desirable, examine together, before you make a definite decision, all questions relative to the organization, training, and employment of the American army, and also any recommendations which might be made to you on this subject by the French Command. We can also discuss the proposals you will be called upon to present to your Government, if you deem it helpful.

The officers of my staff will always be at your service to prepare studies on all these questions with your staff. They will give the officers under your command any information you consider of value.

You will find me ready at all times to collaborate with you whole-heartedly for the complete success of the common mission which is intrusted to us.

J. JOFFRE.

-----

***Communications Relating to the American Expeditionary Forces  
to be Referred to Headquarters, A. E. F.***

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
Paris, June 17, 1917.

HIS EXCELLENCY, THE MINISTER OF WAR,

EXCELLENCY:

My attention has been called to the numerous requests which have been made on your department by various Americans, official and others, asking for facilities to visit the front and for special arrangement and privileges in order to carry out various missions. I desire to express to you my thanks and appreciation for the many courtesies you have already extended and my apologies for the resulting inconveniences to you. The time, I believe, has now come to centralize all these requests at my headquarters where they may be properly passed on before being transmitted to your department. I would be gratified if the necessary instructions be issued to your officers in order that no action be taken on any of these requests not passed on by my headquarters, and that all applicants be referred to these headquarters, or to such branch offices of these headquarters as may be hereafter created.

My attention has also been called to the inconveniences your officers have experienced in the past in submitting directly to the American War Department through your Military Attache in Washington many questions which may be handled more expeditiously through my headquarters. I therefore request that in the future all matters relating to the organization, equipment and operation of the American Expeditionary Forces be handled directly with my headquarters.

I take this occasion to renew to you the expression of my highest regards.

I have the honor to be, Sir

Very respectfully,  
Your obedient servant,

JOHN J. PERSHING,  
Major General, U. S. Army,  
Commander-in-Chief,  
Expeditionary Forces.

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***Request that Missions and Officers Report to Headquarters, A. E. F.***

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Paris, June 18, 1917.*

[Extract]

THE ADJUTANT GENERAL, WASHINGTON

No. 8. British and French war office both complain of considerable annoyance by independent missions and individual officers who present requests from our War Department or from heads of our departments in Washington, often for same information. They desire that all such requests in future be made by these headquarters. Strongly approve their view, which will be complied with as far as possible here. Request that all officers sent to Europe in future for any duty be directed to report to these headquarters first where detailed arrangements with other armies will be made so that investigations by our officers may be coordinated.

\* \* \* \* \*

PERSHING.

-----

Les Armees Francaises, Tome V, 2d Vol., Annexes, 1st Vol.: Letter

***Problem of Transportation of an American Army to France***

[Editorial Translation]

No. 22

FRENCH MISSION TO THE UNITED STATES,  
*June 18, 1917.*

Marshal Joffre

to the Minister of War (Army Headquarters, Advanced Group, 3rd Section)

Pursuing further the subject of my letters No. 4/M. A. of June 8 and No. 21/M. A. of June 18, I have the honor again to call attention to the necessity for bringing out very clearly and immediately the viewpoint of the French Government and the American Government in the matter of transportation of the American Army.

It appears to me that the following points should be kept in mind:

The goal to be reached is to have in France in April 1918, an American army of at least three or four hundred thousand men - 15 to 20 divisions - capable of launching a strong offensive.

The military organization provided for in the United States will warrant expecting even better results if difficulties of transportation and supply do not interfere.

The mass of this army will have to be transported from America to France from September-October, 1917, to April 1918.

Therefore it is necessary to specify for the transportation of the American army a fleet assuring monthly delivery of at least 2 to 3 divisions (supply included).

That is the problem to be solved, the study of which will have to be given priority by the Allies. The transportation of the American army will continue to be an American undertaking; the Allies will first endeavor to have the United States make up, with its own resources, the fleet necessary for the transportation and supply of its army; failing this, they will seek means for helping the United States, even at the price of agreeing to the sacrifice of transportation allocated to their own supply requirements.

If these combined measures are still not adequate, it would be necessary to give up the idea of having, by the spring of 1918, an American army capable of undertaking and sustaining an offensive operation by its own means.

JOFFRE.

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Les Armees Francaises, Tome V, 2d Vol., Annexes, 1st Vol.: Letter

***Marshal Foch Makes Special Request for American Technical Units***

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section  
No. 3372/S

FRENCH GENERAL STAFF,  
ADVANCED GROUP,  
*Paris, June 30, 1917.*

The Minister of War

to General Pershing, Commander-in-Chief of the American Forces in France.

In the agreement of May 14 between Mr. Baker, Secretary of War, and Marshal Joffre, it was proposed to send to France American technical units of the various services as follows:

1. Railways
2. Brigade of Coast Artillery
3. Automobile Service
4. Road Repair Service
5. Main Artillery Parks
6. Medical Service
7. Forests and Waterways Service
8. Provisions and Forage Service
9. Military Telegraph Service

Total: about 50,000 men

According to information I have received, it seems that instructions relative to the constitution and despatch to France of these units have so far been issued only for railway regiments, the coast artillery brigade, and medical units.

For my part, I believe it would be highly desirable to have all proposed technical units sent to France as soon as possible.

In addition to rendering valuable assistance to our various services, the technical units would in fact at the same time be preparing for the entrance into line of the American army and would later form the first nucleus of the services of the rear of that army.

The transportation of these units could take place immediately after that of the first division, following, as far as possible, the order indicated in the above list, but so as to take full advantage of available tonnage at all times.

If you share my view, I should be very grateful if you would use your influence with the United States Government for the constitution and despatch to France of the technical units whose formation is proposed. I have every reason to believe that your intervention would add considerable weight to requests to that effect forwarded by the High Commissioner at Washington to the Secretary of War.

By order:

FOCH,  
General,  
Chief of the General Staff  
of the French army.

-----

Cable: P-30-S

### ***Plan for One Million Men***

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Paris, July 6, 1917.*

[Extract]

\* \* \* \* \*

Paragraph five. Plans [should] contemplate sending over at least one million men by next May. British estimate fifty per cent for replacements and forty per cent noncombatants in the zone of interior. This estimate would give practically half million men for trenches. In as much as question affects all allies whose common interests demand that we exert maximum military power consistent with transport problem suggest early agreement be reached among Allies which would provide requisite transportation for our regular use. Also recommend understanding among Allies that would limit sea transportation to food and military supplies and the exclusion of every kind of luxury as well as other supplies in excess of immediate needs of countries dependent upon oversea supplies.

\* \* \* \* \*

PERSHING.

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***American Cooperation in Aviation***

[Editorial Translation]

1st Bureau, Aviation, General Staff  
No. 3868 B. S.

MINISTRY OF WAR,  
ADVANCED GROUP,  
*Paris, July 10, 1917.*

The General, Chief of General Staff,

to the Under Secretary of State for Military Aeronautics (Paris).

By letter No. 5598, dated May 6, 1917, the General, Commander-in-Chief, announced the number of aviation and balloon units it was advisable to request the United States to organize with a view to employing them on the French front:

1. Pursuit aviation: 30 groups of 6 pursuit squadrons of 12 planes each.
2. Bombardment aviation: 30 groups of 6 squadrons of 12 planes each.
3. Balloon companies: 16 groups of 3 balloon companies.

He indicated, in addition, that it was advisable to proceed first of all with the formation of:

1. First priority:
  - 5 groups of pursuit squadrons
  - 5 groups of balloon companies
2. Second priority:
  - 5 groups of bombardment squadrons

Now, the American aviation program, voted by the Congress, includes the formation of: 250 squadrons with 19 pilots and airplanes\* composed of

- 120 pursuit squadrons
- 80 divisional squadrons
- 40 heavy artillery squadrons
- 10 cavalry squadrons

making a total of 4,500 pilots and 9,000 planes (including 4,500 in reserve).

From the point of view of number of planes in line, this program is slightly higher than that proposed by the General, Commander-in-Chief which calls for only 4,300 planes, reserves not included.

It differs from the latter only in number, type, and composition of squadrons.

But the American program has been set up only to permit the Congress to vote the necessary appropriation for its execution, and it remains understood that the final organization of 250 squadrons which it allows will be regulated in France by General Pershing in agreement with the French High Command.

In this connection it seems therefore that it would be desirable that a commission, made up of representatives of the Under Secretary of State for military aeronautics, General Headquarters, and the General Staff, study this program for the following purposes:

1. To adapt it to the necessities of the present war, resulting from three long years of experience;
2. To propose to the representatives of the American Government, with changes which would appear necessary, the order of priority to be followed with a view to its execution.

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\* In addition, a reserve of 18 planes per squadron is provided.

Consequently, I have the honor to ask, if you share my view, that you be kind enough to call together, as soon as you can do so, the representatives of the foregoing services, to study with them the different questions which arise in the execution of the program voted by the American Congress.

FOCH.

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AG, GHQ, AEF: 510: Memorandum

***Delivery of Letters of May 26, 1917, to General Foch***

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF,  
*Paris, July 10, 1917.*

MEMORANDUM:

In accordance with the instructions of the Chief of Staff, the original copies of the attached letters\* were handed by me today in person to General Weygand, Assistant to General Foch, Chief of the French General Staff. When I presented the copies to General Weygand I told him I had been instructed to do so by the Chief of Staff. He informed me that that was the first time they had received official information as to the exact nature of General Pershing's orders and as to his functions while in France.

JAMES. A. LOGAN,  
Assistant.

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Cable: P-40-S

***Passports not Recommended for Families of Officers or Men***

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Paris, July 14, 1917.*

ADJUTANT GENERAL, WASHINGTON

[Extract]

\* \* \* \* \*

Paragraph five. Question of feeding the people in Allied countries is sure to become very serious before the winter is over. British Government has found it necessary to return to Canada sixty thousand Canadians who followed Canadian troops over. Stringent rules should be established at once with reference to Americans coming to Europe.

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\* Letters of instruction to General Pershing, May 26, 1917, signed by Secretary of War and by General Bliss, published earlier in this volume.

Recommend no passports families of officers or men connected with expeditionary force be granted unless applicants are to be engaged in necessary and profitable employment.

\* \* \* \* \*

PERSHING.

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Cable: P-45-S

***Conference of Allied Powers to be Held***

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Paris, July 15, 1917.*

AGWAR, WASHINGTON

For Chief of Staff and Secretary of War. Am officially advised by French Government that a conference of the Allied powers has been called for July 25, in Paris. Members of conference will include Commanders-in-Chief of different Allied armies. Important questions relating to military operations on various fronts for remainder of nineteen seventeen and probably for spring campaign of nineteen eighteen will be discussed. These questions will naturally involve consideration of the relative ability of interested powers to furnish men and means for their respective tasks. Understand certain governments desire to limit conference to discussion of immediate military problems only, leaving campaign of nineteen eighteen for later conference and omitting altogether any matter affecting political questions. Seems probable, however, that conference will assume very broad scope. Deem it extremely important that our participation in this our first conference be of such a character that our aims and purposes be clearly indicated so far as may be advisable. In view of the above, especially preceding sentence and of my general instructions from the Secretary of War to which attention is invited an early reply is requested.

PERSHING.

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Cable: P-55-S

***Participation in Conference of Allied Powers***

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Paris, July 20, 1917.*

AGWAR, WASHINGTON

For Chief of Staff and Secretary of War. Reference confidential cablegram fifteenth instant, information came to me unofficially that French Government intended to invite commander American forces participate in conference. Was advised regarding probable discussion military questions as stated my telegram. Later when paying call M. Ribot [Premier of France] voluntarily stated that he had requested Washington to designate Mr. Sharpe and myself as American representatives. There was no expression on my part of desire to participate. Today M. Cambon of French Foreign Office asked me to meet him and he brought up the subject and showed me dispatches sent Washington and the answers received. He stated that his Government was very anxious to have representation by the United States and suggested the possibility of my urging it. He said intention was to discuss Balkan question only but probably military questions would be discussed also. Informed him that I could take no further action but must await instructions. I expressed no opinion to him one way or the other. However, after full consideration and consultation with Ambassador Sharpe, my own view is that if we participate in conference our discussion should be limited to military questions in which we are immediately interested and believe it wiser not to discuss any other questions at this time.

PERSHING.

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Cable: A-49-R

***General Pershing not to Attend Conference of Allied Powers***

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Paris, July 23, 1917.*

PERSHING, AMEXFORCES, PARIS

1. Here follows cipher code. With reference to your number 55, dated July 20, Secretary of War approves and commends attitude taken by you in your interview with M. Cambon of French Foreign Office. Before receipt of your cablegram questions of participation by you and Admiral Sims in conference referred to by you had been received by the State Department through diplomatic channels. The President decided that this Government at the present time prefers not to take part in any War Conference at which all the Allies are represented. A second request was then received to allow the presence of yourself and Admiral Sims at the proposed conference for the purpose of participating in military discussions. After consideration by him, the President decided that the presence of yourself and Admiral Sims at the conference, even as visitors, could be misunderstood. You will be guided accordingly. End of cipher code.

McCAIN.

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Cable: P-65-S

***Officers of Full Mental and Physical Vigor Required***

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
Paris, July 28, 1917.

AGWAR - WASHINGTON

1. For the Chief of Staff. My observation of British and French armies and most exacting arduous service conditions at the front fully convinces that only officers in full mental and physical vigor should be sent here. Contrary course means certain inefficiency in our service and possible later humiliation to officers concerned. General officers must undergo extreme effort in personal supervision of operations in trenches. Very few British French division commanders over forty-five or brigadiers over forty. We have too much at stake to risk inefficiency through mental or physical defects. Strongly recommend conditions be fully considered in making high appointments and suggest that no officer of whatever rank be sent here for active service who is not strong and robust in every particular. Officers selected for appointment as general officer of line should be those with experience in actively commanding troops. Officers not fulfilling above conditions can be usefully employed at home in training troops.

PERSHING.

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Cable: P-66-S

***Recommendation Concerning Headquarters, A. E. F. to be an Army Headquarters***

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
Paris, July 28, 1917.

AGWAR, WASHINGTON

[Extract]

\* \* \* \* \*

8. Present laws and Tables of Organization 1917, do not prescribe organizations of headquarters of an army leaving this matter to President. To provide such organization and define doubtful status of enlisted men now on duty at these headquarters recommend that these headquarters be designated as an army headquarters and that headquarters troops comprise following officers enlisted men and transportation: One captain, three first lieutenants, 35 sergeants-major including five sergeants-major from engineers, one first sergeant, four mess sergeants, four supply sergeants, two stable sergeants, eight sergeants, sixteen corporals, four horseshoers, four mechanics, three saddlers, ten cooks, two trumpeters, two hundred privates first class (89 as chauffeurs), 200 privates (120 as orderlies), one motor truck company, 70 motor cars, 30 motorcycles, 160 riding horses. Total enlisted 493. This is smaller than corresponding detachment at either British or French General Headquarters and is as necessary during period of preparation and organization as it will be later. Officers and enlisted men now on duty here as headquarters



detachment are as follows: One captain, five sergeants, four corporals, one saddler, 60 privates. Request that said headquarters troops be organized in United States and sent here with material as soon as practicable first deducting number of officers and enlisted men now on duty here as noted above and who should be transferred to said troop by War Department order.

\* \* \* \* \*

PERSHING.

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Cable: P-69-S

### ***Military Conference***

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Paris, July 30, 1917.*

AGWAR, WASHINGTON

For Chief of Staff

Informal conference Commander-in-Chief Allied Armies held Paris, July twenty-sixth, present Generals Robertson, Petain, Foch, Cadorna, and Pershing. Steps to be taken in case Russia should be forced out of war considered. Various movements troops to and from different fronts necessary to meet possible contingencies discussed. Conference also weighed political, economic, and moral effect both upon Central and Allied powers under most unfavorable aspect from Allied point of view. General conclusions reached were necessity for adoption of purely defensive attitude on all secondary fronts and withdrawing surplus troops for duty on western front. By thus strengthening western front believed Allies could hold until American forces arrive in numbers sufficient to gain ascendancy. To accelerate participation American forces and provide necessary transport for American army and movement of armies from secondary fronts, conference recommends that question of shipping be immediately taken up by interallied commission. However, consensus of opinion was that steps should be taken by Allies to determine part to be played by America, England, and France and possible Japan to support Russia with view to avoiding extreme eventualities. Have sent full report of conference by Major Frankforter, Reserve Corps who sailed twenty-eighth instant. Similar naval conference held Paris twenty-fifth instant of which report has been made to Navy Department by Admiral Sims, copies of proceedings in my possession.

PERSHING.

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Cable: A-79-R

***Passports for Wives of Officers not to be Issued***

PERSHING, AMEXFORCE, FRANCE

A. G. O. WAR DEPARTMENT,  
Washington, August 5, 1917.

[Extract]

\* \* \* \* \*

5. The Secretary of War in concurrence with the Secretary of State and guided [by] your views as well as by the known wishes of the British and French Governments has adopted a rigid policy of declining passport for the wife of an officer ordered to France. So long as this policy is adhered to, the Secretary of War will make no exceptions. He will not permit the policy to be violated unless it should be entirely reversed and he thinks misgoverned reversal of it would result in very unfortunate consequences. \* \* \*

\* \* \* \* \*

McCAIN.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 655: Letter

***Choice of Location for American General Headquarters***

Paris, August 8, 1917.

C-in-C, A. E. F.

C-in-C, Armies of the North and Northeast

General

I have attentively examined the question of choice in the Zone of Armies of a place where I could install my headquarters.

After having carefully thought over it, and chiefly following our interview, I decided to install my headquarters at Chaumont.

I am sending several officers of my staff to Chaumont, towards the end of the week for the purpose of drawing up plans of different buildings we shall need, and I should be most obliged to you to kindly give the necessary instructions to the Commandant de la Place in order to facilitate as much as possible the work of said officers.

(Written in the General's hand)

Will you accept, General, the assurances of my most cordial sentiments.

JOHN PERSHING.

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***Information Furnished Germany by Wireless from Spain***

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Paris, August 10, 1917.*

AGWAR, WASHINGTON

For the Chief of Staff

The following was given me by the French General Staff having been intercepted by French Government between a wireless station in Spain and one in Berlin: "The German General Staff has been informed the fourth of August that in the port of Nantes there was a considerable movement of steamers and principally American steamers. Within a short time at St-Nazaire several transports have arrived with ten thousand soldiers from America. The American convoys seem now to take the direction of Ouessant at the extremity of Brittany." Another from the same source: "The General Staff is informed of the departure on July 10, from New York of six American transports and eight British transports with American troops not instructed." Another from the same source: "St-Nazaire, Le Havre, Bordeaux are the ports which the German General Staff believe will be utilized as ports of debarkation for the American troops arriving in France." Admiral Sims informed.

PERSHING.

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AG, GHQ, AEF; COR: 19: Letter

***Reception and Movement of Incoming Troops via England from America***

Administrative Section, General Staff

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Paris, August 15, 1917.*

From: C-in-C

To: C. G., L. of C.

1. It is the policy of our War Department to send to France via England a great many small organizations and detachments which finally arrive in France through the different channel ports. The orders for the organization of the L. of C. have created Base Sec. No. 3 of the S. S. and T. Ser., L. of C., which includes the various channel ports, viz: Cherbourg, Le Havre and Boulogne. Captain Liebman, Q. M. R. C., is at present at Le Havre and under your orders.

2. The C. G., L. of C., will make all arrangements at these ports for the reception and movement of incoming troops and arrange for their rail movement to the points indicated in orders received from Hq., A. E. F. These orders will either indicate that the troops or detachments are for service with the L. of C., or that they are to be attached to particular organizations or services in our (American) Zone of the Advance (see page 122, F. S. R.). In the first case, in the absence of specific orders to the contrary, you will determine to what point or points in the zone of the L. of C. these troops shall be sent, and make all necessary arrangements for the rail movement. In the second case,

following the orders issued, you will make all arrangements for the rail movement, supply, etc., up until the time of their delivery by the railroad to the designated railhead or regulating station.

3. The procedure under the new arrangements will be as follows, viz.:

(a) The Military Attache in London will advise you by wire of the arrival in England of all American detachments and organizations, and will indicate in the same telegram the following information:

- French port of arrival
- Date and probable hour of arrival at port
- Branch of service to which they belong
- Number of officers
- Number of enlisted men
- Number of female nurses
- Number of civil employees (with organizations to which they pertain)
- Number of vehicles accompanying them (whether horse-drawn or motor-driven)
- Tonnage of material accompanying them
- Any splitting up of units, with all necessary details, which would affect in any way railroad arrangements for their prompt removal from the different French ports.

It is believed that the foregoing information will give you all the necessary data required for the arrangements at French ports and for the prompt evacuation by rail of these ports by the troops.

(b) The Military Attache in London will notify the C-in-C, A. E. F. --- (at the same time that he notifies you as specified in (a) above) --- of the arrival of all detachments and organizations and of the date and port of their arrival in France, giving only details as to arm or branch of service to which they belong, and the total strength. This notification from the Military Attache will serve as a basis for the issuance of orders from these headquarters to you as to whether the troops are to be sent to a particular destination in the Zone of the Advance or are for service with the L. of C.

4. If you so desire, you may communicate directly with the Military Attache in London for the purpose of amplifying as far as you think necessary the information indicated in paragraph 3-a above.

5. These instructions will go into effect at once.

By command of Major General Pershing:

ADJUTANT GENERAL.

Official copy furnished Military Attache, London, England, with request that he follow the line of action indicated in this letter with regard to all detachments and organizations passing through England.

CHIEF OF STAFF.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: 2292: Memorandum

***Military Missions at French and British Headquarters***

Operations Section

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF,  
*Paris, August 15, 1917.*

Memorandum for the Chief of Staff.

1. The work falling upon our representatives at French and British General Headquarters is already great in both volume and importance and it will constantly grow in both respects. It is thought that, as this condition can be foreseen, steps should be taken now to meet it. The organization of such a mission and selection of suitable officers for its personnel will probably require some weeks.

2. Of course, having decided that it is desirable to send such missions, the first step is to enquire of French and British General Headquarters whether it will be agreeable to them to have us do so; at the same time letting them know that considerable delay in the complete organization of such a mission is to be expected.

3. Consideration of the arrangements that the French and British General Headquarters have made for dealing with each other leads to the belief that the United States should establish a military mission on similar lines at each of the French and British Headquarters.

4. In selecting personnel for such military mission it is of first importance that the officers selected be fully in sympathy with the people of the nation to whose headquarters they are sent.

Personnel for the French Mission should also be able to speak French fluently.

Any communication with reference to detailing personnel for such a mission should emphasize this point.

5. A suitable organization for such a Military Mission is shown in attached report, submitted by Major Frank Parker.

This organization generally corresponds to that now in use by the French and British General Headquarters for dealing with each other and appears to be suitable and necessary for us.

Subject to the limitations of paragraph 3 and the change of wording noted on the face of the diagram accompanying Major Parker's report, it is recommended.

J. McA. PALMER,  
Lieut. Col., General Staff,  
Chief of Section.

[Pencil notation] Approved. J. J. Pershing.

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G. O. G.

S. P. No. 1

From: The Chief Liaison Group, G. O. G.

To: The Chief of Staff, A. E. F. (Through Operations Section)

Subject: Proposed organization of a Military Mission at French Headquarters.

*August 11, 1917.*

I. The following proposed organization of a Military Mission at these headquarters is based on the following principles:

1. A Military Mission must have an organization that corresponds in a general way to that of the headquarters to which it is accredited.

2. This organization must be clearly divided into:

A. Section of Operations, which will include (1) Operations (2) Materiel, Organization and Instruction (3) Information.

B. Section of Services, i. e., all matters pertaining to transport and supply.

3. Of these two, the operations section is the one in closest contact with the General Staff.

II. Therefore, a Military Mission must have a Chief (Lieut. Colonel or Colonel), whose duties are:

1. Relations with the Commander-in-Chief

2. Relations with Chief of Staff

3. Relations with Assistant Chiefs of Staff

and under him two sections:

1. Operations (Materiel, Organization and Instruction).

#### Personnel.

(1) First Assistant (Major) whose duties are:

a. Questions pertaining to Operations;

b. Questions of Organization, Instruction and materiel.

This Assistant is the Vice-Chief and should be kept in touch with everything.

(2) Second Assistant (Captain) whose duties are:

Relations with 2d Bureau (Information)

Order of Battle of the enemy, events on the fronts, visits of American officers to French war zone and vice versa, Press, etc. . . .

Note: The technical work of the 2d Bureau (detailed description of order of battle, identifications, etc.) may be done by telephone directly between the two 2d Bureaus interested without passing through this officer.

III. Section of Services: This Section deals with all the questions of Supply and Transport, i. e., the Services of the Rear; it should have:

1 Officer (Lieutenant Colonel) in charge (Supplies, Evacuation,  
(Railroads, Auto Trans-  
port, etc.

1 Assistant (Major or Captain).

The Chief of Mission should have only a general supervision over this Section, which carries on its work directly with the departments concerned.

One French officer should be permanently assigned to each of the two Sections of the Mission.

IV. This report is based on careful study of the matter with the French Mission at British Headquarters and British Mission at French Headquarters.

The views of both these Missions are practically the same and the accompanying proposed organization is based thereon.

Note: Both the missions above referred to believe it wise to keep the rank of a mission down to that of lieut. colonel or colonel, at the highest, as almost all staff officers at French Headquarters are below the rank of colonel.

FRANK PARKER,  
Major, Cav.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: 2292: Letter

***Exchange of Military Missions with French Headquarters Proposed***

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Paris, August 18, 1917*

From: Chief of Staff\*

To: Major Frank Parker, Cav., Liaison Officer, at French General Headquarters

1. The Commander-in-Chief is considering the desirability of having an exchange of military missions with French General Headquarters, and consequently wishes you to ascertain whether the sending of such a mission to that headquarters would be entirely acceptable.

2. You should exercise discretion in making inquiries and, in the first instance, should indicate no more than a desire to learn the views of French General Headquarters as to the desirability of such missions.

3. In the event of French General Headquarters entirely favoring the proposal, the Commander-in-Chief would be prepared to establish the mission at the French General Headquarters as soon as suitable officers become available. This time cannot be definitely fixed. Probable organization of mission enclosed. [Published in this volume with Operations Section Memo date August 15, 1917.]

4. The Commander-in-Chief would find it acceptable to have such a French Mission arrive at these headquarters soon after the move to a new location, which will take place about September 1.

J. G. HARBORD,  
Lt. Col., General Staff,  
Chief of Staff.

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\* An identical letter was sent the same date to Capt. J.G. Quakemeyer, Liaison Officer at British General Headquarters.

***Transportation Overseas for American Troops***

[Contemporary Translation]

FRENCH HIGH COMMISSIONER TO UNITED STATES,  
*Washington, August 20, 1918.*

HIGH COMMISSIONER TO THE PRIME MINISTER

For the Prime Minister, Minister of War, and Marshal Joffre

During the course of a long interview with the Minister of War, the latter told me that his available transports would permit him to send to France from September 1, 5 divisions every two months. This figure is superior to that indicated in my Telegram No. 1010. Considering Mr. Baker's character and his habit of precision, I have full confidence, under reserve of unforeseen difficulties, in his [firmness?].

We took up several other questions, notably that of the 10,000 mechanical engineers. Baker promised me to do everything in his power. But I point out to you again that the sending of units not [destined] to the American army itself meets here with the most serious opposition. It is thought that their sending is contrary to the interest of preparedness and it is feared furthermore that conscription will be made unpopular in giving the newspapers the opportunity to say that American workmen are being taken away from the factories in order to permit the sending back of the French workman to theirs. I am obliged to take in series consideration this state of mind and act with caution.

In this particular case, however, I hope to arrive at a favorable result.

TARDIEU.

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Cable: P-119-S

***Shipping Tonnage and Naval Action Needed***

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Paris, August 23, 1917.*

AGWAR, WASHINGTON

For the Chief of Staff

1. Reference my numbers 69, 74 and 101 and proposed meeting of shipping representatives Allied powers London September 4. American representatives will be confronted with question of shipping required by United States and should be strongly supported in demand upon Allies for sufficient commercial shipping to carry out army program outlined your confidential Cablegram No. 57 if not already assured. Any consideration of less tonnage should be opposed by our representative. As indicated in former cablegrams, the British and especially the French have reached absolute limit of manpower and any augmentation their military forces cannot be expected. Imperative hasten our organization and training so that we will have the troops contemplated your project in Europe for active service by May or June. Military activities of Allies on land should be strongly reenforced by combined navies and destruction U-boat bases accomplished if possible. High British army officers confidentially condemn waiting policy British admiralty, and regard British navy management as extremely inefficient and totally lacking in initiative. In view of gravity of shipping question recommend our government insist upon aggressive policy by combined



British and American navies. Generally conceded that our entrance saved the Allies from defeat. Hence our position in this war very strong and should enable us largely to dictate policy of Allies in future. Allies now fully realize dependence upon our cooperation and we need not hesitate demand both aggressive naval policy and full share Allied commercial shipping. Recommend American representative shipping conference be instructed accordingly.

2. Confidential report to French General Staff indicates further domestic trouble in Russia. French expect to aid Russian army by sending French officers to help organize army. Considerable store placed in assistance of Americans in reorganizing railroads. Reported here that America will aid in this work.

3. Cable from High Commissioner Tardieu to French Prime Minister obtained through confidential sources indicates French pressure to divert United States from program of using all available shipping to land and supply an army in France. He reports difficulty in persuading Secretary of War to send units other than those destined for the army and that he is obliged to act with caution implying that further demands are to be made on us for men. This constant pressure for units outside of military requirements seems to be reversion to the original *plan de Nivelles*\* which contemplated our participation in the war should be to furnish laborers and technical troops. Suggest such requests receive very careful consideration and that own military requirements be given full weight. Attention invited to first paragraph this cable on necessity of using shipping for landing and supplying army. Suggest a review of memorandum of May 25, from General Bliss to Secretary Baker as to deliberate desire of French and English. My observations in France have confirmed impression stated in that memorandum.

PERSHING.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: 2263: Memorandum

### ***General Headquarters Move to Chaumont***

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
Paris, August 24, 1917.

No. 70

#### **MEMORANDUM FOR THE STAFF**

General Headquarters will move to Chaumont on August 31.

An officer will be designated as post commander in Paris to command casals, military police, etc., with headquarters at 10 Rue Ste-Anne (under L. of C. ).

The purchasing and disbursing officers connected with the General Supply Board, and such officers as may be designated by the C-in-C and C. G. , L. of C., will remain in Paris. Each chief of staff department and each chief of general staff section will at once submit a memorandum of the personnel (commissioned and otherwise) which they desire to retain in Paris, and what liaison they propose, and reasons.

Arrangements will be made by the C. Q. M. for shipping to Chaumont all the records, etc., between the 27th and 31st. Office furniture will be provided at Chaumont.

The French system of billeting officers and installing *popottes* (messes) will be followed. Major Robert Bacon, Q. M. C., U. S. R., the representative of the C-in-C at Chaumont, will make the general arrangements for billeting and *popottes*. Each head of staff department will send a representative not later than August 27, to report to

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\* General de Nivelles, Commander-in-Chief of French armies.

Major Bacon. This representative will be accompanied by one cook and one waiter for each ten officers or less of his staff department. Arrangements will be made for equipping and starting the necessary messes.

Each head of staff department will submit at once a list by name of all officers accompanying him, and indicate his desire as to those who will live together, or as near each other as can be arranged; also the names of those who will mess together, but not to exceed ten to a mess.

Clerks will be quartered and messed in barracks, and will be furnished cots. Each head of staff department will furnish the number of his clerks.

Mail for headquarters or those on duty at headquarters will be addressed to Headquarters American Expeditionary Forces, France, as heretofore.

By command of Major General Pershing:

BENJ. ALVORD,  
Adjutant General.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: 681

### ***Number and Location of Allied Divisions--Morale and Manpower of Germany***

General Staff

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
INTELLIGENCE SECTION (A)  
*Paris, August 28, 1917.*

#### **SPECIAL REPORT**

The Allied troops in all zones of warfare outside of Africa are divided as follows:

FRANCE			
French	108	Div.	
English	62	"	
Belgium	6	"	Germany 146 Div.
American	1	"	
Portugese	1 1/2	"	
ITALY			
Italy	61	Div.	Austria 31 Div.
RUSSIA			
Russia	223	Div.	
Roumania	10	"	German-Austrian 137 Div.
MACEDONIAN			
French	8	Div.	
English	7	"	
Serbs	6	"	
Russia	1	"	
Italy	21/2	Div.	
Greek	2	"	
CAUCASUS-PRUSSIA			
	15	Div.	

MESOPOTAMIA

5 Div.

SYRIA-PALESTINE

4 Div.

ARABIA

10,000 Men

- - -

#### EXTRACT FROM A NOTE TO F. M. C-IN-C., C. G. S. AND O.

MANPOWER: The question of manpower is necessarily one about which there must be great divergence of opinion. On the one hand there are a large number of definite facts accepted by all, which tend to show great exhaustion of manpower. On the other hand, there are undoubtedly great resources of an empire of the size of the German Empire. Between these two extremes, there is a large amount of "No Man's Land" in which opinions must largely vary.

It can, however, now be definitely accepted that:

- (1) The 1918 Class as a means of supplying drafts to the field army is exhausted.
- (2) The 1919 Class is, in a large measure, either in front-line units or front-line depots.
- (3) Combining has not been able to provide men to meet the losses of the Battle of

ARRAS.

- (4) Company strengths are being steadily reduced.

(5) The average expenditure in classes of German during the preceding years of war has been at the rate of 2 annual classes per year, and she has now her 18 year old boys in the field.

SUMMARY: The two vital factors which, from a military point of view, will be decisive in this war are clearly:

- (a) Morale, of which the evidence given above shows a steady deterioration in the German army.
- (b) Manpower, of which the figures given above show without doubt that even the resources of the German Empire cannot stand the strain of war on its population for more than a very limited number of months, providing the fighting remains at its present intensity.

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#### NOTE REGARDING GERMAN MANPOWER CASUALTIES AND MORALE

MANPOWER: The 1918 Class is at present providing percentages of the total prisoners varying from 17 in certain divisions to 25 in other divisions.

Experience has shown that when a class furnishes more than 15 to 16% of prisoners, then that class has ceased to exist as a draft-furnishing source within Germany, i. e., it is exhausted as a means of replacing future casualties.

The 1917 Class first appeared in the front line in September of last year. It was not until six months after that date that it furnished a high percentage of prisoners and casualties. The 1918 Class first appeared in April of this year, i. e., after three months it is furnishing the highest percentage of prisoners of any class previously experienced during this war.

The evidence of prisoners is unanimous that the 1919 Class is now either actually in units opposite our front or in the field depots immediately behind the front. In spite of this, only a few prisoners of this class have so far been taken. The reason is almost certainly that the Germans are saving this class by putting it into the 4th Platoons of companies, which are used as ration carriers, and are by other means saving it from taking part in the fighting.

The 1920 Class, although it has been called up in almost all areas, will not have completed its training until the end of this year, and even then, judging by our experience of the 1918 Class, will be much too young to take its place in the firing line. It seems improbable that it will have matured sufficiently to fight until April of next year.

The fact that the 1918 Class has been called on to furnish drafts to replace approximately 80% of the casualties suffered in April and May is conclusive proof that, at the present moment, Germany has no other resources except this class and returned wounded to meet the casualties she is suffering. In other words, combat is at a standstill at the moment.

CASUALTIES: Twenty-four divisions have been withdrawn exhausted from the front in Flanders and in LENS. Thirteen more divisions have suffered heavy casualties in the Flanders area, although not sufficient to entitle them to be classified as fully exhausted. Four more divisions are now employed in the LENS front, and are known also to have suffered considerable casualties.

It may be estimated that a division which is withdrawn exhausted will have suffered approximately 3,000 casualties in its infantry and 200 casualties in its other services. Based upon this, it is estimated that the total casualties suffered by the Germans since the middle of July amount to:

Flanders	90,000
LENS	10,000

MORALE: The best evidence of morale is that by an army of the army immediately opposed to it.

The Fifth Army sums up on August 11, the general impression of the morale of the Germans as follows:

The impression made by the prisoners and the result of hostile counterattacks is that the general morale of the German soldier is undoubtedly lowered. Few cases are reported of protracted resistance, and counterattacks made have not been pushed home with determination.

Such captured orders as the following demonstrate the low morale:

Regimental Order, 226th Reserve Inf. Regt., 49th Res. Div:

From reports received from front line and support battalions, a large number of men, some pleading sickness, are leaving their posts without orders.

Regimental Order, 450th Inf. Regt., 233d Division:

Identifications by prisoners made have allowed the enemy to draw conclusions as to the quality of the troops of the 233d Division. The men are too young to make a long resistance in a critical situation. They have, however, done well on the whole. The unit cannot be described as fully efficient. It is only fit for trench warfare.

Numerous letters confirm these orders.

The following report was rendered by the officer commanding the 9th Co., 358th Inf. Regt., 214th Division:

Hand grenades issued this morning to the company	120
At present in hand	70

The remainder were partly left behind by the men, and partly thrown away by them during the march back today.

Accounts of incidents in the fighting still further emphasize the depreciation of the German morale. Two whole regiments of the 79th Reserve Division openly took to their heels on August 16. Seven officers of the same regiment were found hiding in dugouts and surrendered without fighting.

The Bavarian 6th Reserve Division, previously considered a good division, was in a state of indiscipline verging on mutiny on July 31, and had to be withdrawn from the front line prior to our attack.

Numerous cases are reported by prisoners of men of the 49th Reserve Division refusing to go into the line.

A captured battalion commander of the 5th Grenadier Regt. of the 36th Division, referred openly to the low morale of both the officers and men of his regiment.

Evidence appears to be conclusive that the morale of the German army opposed to us in Flanders and in LENS at the present moment is as low as that of the German army at the conclusion of the battle of the Somme, when the advent of the bad weather alone prevented the full results of the victory being obtained.

PRESENT STATE OF GERMAN DIVISIONS: An analysis of the German divisions at present on the western front shows that 79 have been engaged in battle since June 1 and have suffered such losses as to be at the present moment of greatly reduced value as fighting units. Of the remaining 67 divisions, 14 are Landwehr divisions, so that only 53 can be considered of full fighting value at the present moment.

J. CHARTERIS,  
Brigadier General  
General Staff.

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P Cables 133-S

### ***Use of Marines***

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
Chaumont, August 31, 1917.

AGWAR, WASHINGTON

[Extract]

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14. The 5th Marines, a fine regiment, arrived in June complete, and there has now arrived for it a fourth battalion with an extra headquarters and machine gun company evidently intended as replacement troops. The divisional supply machinery, trains, etc., are based on four regiments and the fifth regiment is an inconvenient addition. Its uniform, certain features of supply, inability to meet hospital expenses and this odd replacement organization do not assimilate with army organization. If Marines can be spared from the customary duties for which maintained, it is believed their force thus surplus should become a part of the army and that otherwise no more Marines be sent to France.

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PERSHING

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**Supply Problems**

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Paris, August 31, 1917.*

From: The Commander-in-Chief

To: Ministry of War, General Staff of the Army, Forward Group, American Section, Liaison

1. As I informed you in my letter yesterday, I am retaining an office in Paris at 31 Rue de Constantine, for the purpose of keeping in touch with you and, in addition, I am leaving Major General Blatchford, Commander of the Line of Communications, for the present with his headquarters at 10 Rue Ste-Anne. This service of the line of Communications corresponds generally to the 4th Bureau of your General Staff.

2. Brigadier General W. H. Allaire, Provost Marshal General of my headquarters, will also remain for the present, and be in command of such American troops and casualties as may be in Paris.

3. It has also been necessary to establish a General Purchasing Board with a General Purchasing Agent at its head, Lieutenant Colonel Charles G. Dawes, U. S. R. E., with office at 10 Rue Ste-Anne, who will be my representative in liaison with the various Allied purchasing agencies, and through whom all purchases of supplies in Europe will be made for the American army.

4. Colonel Jefferson R. Kean, Medical Corps, U. S. A., 10 Rue Ste-Anne, will remain in Paris in command of the American Ambulance Service, now on duty with the French army.

5. Major G. M. P. Murphy, Infantry, U. S. R., representative of the American Red Cross in Europe, 4 Place de la Concorde, and Mr. E. C. Carter, secretary of the Y. M. C. A., 31 Avenue Montaigne, will continue here in charge of their aid services under the general control of my headquarters.

6. In the organization and supply of the American forces, a number of other of my staff officers will have frequent occasion to consult and continue their relations with various bureaus of your ministry.

JOHN J. PERSHING  
Major General, U. S. Army.

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***Recommended Arrangements for Transfer of American Citizens  
in British Armies to the American Army***

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
Chaumont, Haute-Marne, August 31, 1917.  
Mailed p. m. September 6, 1917

Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig,  
Commander-in-Chief,  
British Expeditionary Force

Dear Sir Douglas:

Applications have been received at these headquarters from a number of officers and soldiers (American citizens) in the Canadian and British armies, who desire to transfer for service with the American army. It is, of course, quite natural that these men should wish to join the American army and to serve with their own countrymen. Moreover, such of them as may be competent to instruct troops would really be of much use to us. These applications have been filed without action until the matter could be taken up with your headquarters.

I should like to suggest that, if entirely agreeable to you, some arrangement be made to enable these applicants to obtain release and enter our service. Possibly such men as your officers could recommend could be authorized to take a few day's leave of absence to visit Paris for examination. After completion of their examination, they could return to their stations in your service, and I could advise you in due time as to the names of those found qualified, so that the necessary steps could be taken to discharge them from the British service.

A list of the names of the officers and men who have made such application is enclosed. [List omitted.] If you approve of this, perhaps these men could be granted permission to visit these headquarters for the purpose indicated. This subject is taken up in this manner in the hope of thus resolving the situation in the interest of both services. If this plan meets with your approval, perhaps you would kindly turn the matter over to the proper staff officer for action.

I may add that our War Department has ruled that all men who have entered the British or Canadian Service and have hence taken the oath of allegiance to the British Government have lost their American citizenship. Applicants for appointment as officers in our service should, therefore, produce an authenticated copy of the obligation they have assumed, in order that their status may be determined. Those men who desire to enlist as soldiers in the American army may do so without submitting evidence of citizenship.

With great respect and high esteem, I remain

Very sincerely,

JOHN J. PERSHING.

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***General Pershing Directs Study of Front Verdun to Switzerland***

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F. ,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, September 3, 1917.*

I desire, at an early date, a study of strategical fronts, with special reference to the German Front from the Verdun front to the Switzerland frontier, with strategical questions involved in undertaking a campaign along that front. This should be prepared and necessary maps presented with the study.

J.J.P.

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Cable: P-140-S

***G. H. Q., Established at Chaumont.***

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, September 4, 1917.*

ADJUTANT GENERAL, WASHINGTON

General Headquarters established at Chaumont where accommodations very satisfactory and capable of expansion. Only such staff officers will remain in Paris as may be required to transact business there. Location of our headquarters should be held confidential.

PERSHING.

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Cable: P-145-S

***Policy Concerning Shipment of Bodies of Deceased Soldiers***

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, September 7, 1917.*

AGWAR, WASHINGTON

[Extract]

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11. Recommend that definite policy be adopted during continuation of war that bodies of deceased officers and soldiers will not be shipped from France to the United States. This decision would follow British announced policy this matter. Have organized burial corps and will arrange with French Government established cemeteries in France where dead may be buried. This corps charged with carefully recording graves and with proper arrangement of cemeteries. Transportation and other difficulties in shipping remains home will be practically insurmountable especially when operations begin. Understood that French do not permit disinterments in the army zone. Recommend that definite policy on the foregoing lines be adopted.

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PERSHING.

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Cable: P-153-S

***Corps Commanders not to be Designated at Once***

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, September 9, 1917*

ADJUTANT GENERAL, WASHINGTON

For Chief of Staff

In connection with organization divisions and assignment of general officers it is deemed advisable in the interests of efficiency that assignments of corps commanders be delayed until after divisions shall have served in Europe long enough to test ability of division commanders in actual handling of divisions in the field. Otherwise, shall get officers who have never personally commanded such units in active service and who will lack experience in commanding divisions necessary for efficiency in commanding corps.

PERSHING.

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**Information Regarding Western Front**

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
INTELLIGENCE SECTION,  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, September 9, 1917.*

MEMORANDUM I FOR OPERATIONS SECTION

(Information requested Operations Memorandum of September 4, 1917.)

ANNUAL DRAFT OF NEW MEN

GERMAN ARMY: The class of 1918, which normally would enter the army in October 1918, was drafted in October 1916, but was not called to the colors at the same time but taken by installments, for convenience in training, and drilled in recruit formations in November and December 1916, and January, February, and March 1917.

During the summer of 1917 many combed men from industries and from the lesser fit, have been called to the colors, but there is no evidence that the class of 1918 (18 year old) has yet been called out for instruction, although a few volunteers of that age have been captured. The following table shows the relative losses of the class of 1917 and 1918, during this year to include the month of July:

Class	Published losses in	Jan.	Feb.	March	April	May	June	July
1918		0.1	0.6	0.9	1.3	2.4	2.4	4.7
1917		8.3	9.8	11.7	12.1	12.1	13.	12.5

From this table it would appear that the main portion of the class of 1917 has joined the colors in June 1917, and that the major part of the class of 1918 was still in recruit depots.

On the other hand, of 3,669 prisoners captured by the British during July 1917, 12 1/2% were of the class of 1917 and 17% of the class of 1918. I do not think, however, that this percentage warrants the conclusion that there is a larger proportion of the class of 1918 in the active army than of the class of 1917. Such recruits are sent rather indiscriminately to fill vacancies wherever they occur and it may be possible that the particular units in the front line where the attacks occurred had a larger percentage of this class than the average, while it is also possible that the younger men may have surrendered with less attempt at resistance, or less zeal to make their escape than the older men.

In considering the recruitment of the German armies during the summer of 1918, there must be taken into account the fact that in 1916 a considerable portion of the harvest was reported to have been lost through lack of men to gather it in in season. The German general staff took this into account in 1917, and not only refrained from calling to the colors men engaged in agricultural pursuits, during the summer, but sent back for work in the fields (temporarily) men of the older classes who were skilled agriculturalists.

The British estimated the German recruit reserves on the first of June to consist of seven hundred thousand men. Of this number, I consider that about 300,000 have been sent

to replace losses during the summer, leaving in the recruit depots on September 1, 400,000 assuming that the class of 1919 has not yet been called out.

It may be remarked that beginning September 1, a material augmentation in the size of units, and possibly the creation of new units, is to be expected owing to the return to the front of the agriculturalists which had been sent back for the harvest.

This fall will, however, see the high-water mark of the German army in numerical strength for the present war since every effort was made to turn out every available man fit for military service this year, and subsequent classes called to the colors cannot be expected to replace the annual losses although the reduction in numbers for the year 1918 will probably not be a very material one.

AUSTRIAN ARMY: The losses of the Austrian army have been far heavier than those of the German army. The data as to the number of prisoners captured by the Russians is very inconclusive, but it is probable that it is not less than a half million, whereas in the German army less than 100,000 have been captured by the British and less than 200,000 by the French during the entire war. No data are available on the number of Austrian reserves available, but the Austrian Government has shown far less enthusiasm than the German in the matter of combining, and it is not probable that the Austrian army has anything like the proportionate number of recruit reserves back of it that the German army has.

RAILROADS, ROADS AND CANALS: Maps showing permanent railroad systems of Germany and Austria.

The single set of these maps is on file in Intelligence Section A, and available for the use of the Operation Section when needed. It is noted that in the French and British Intelligence Sections a general staff officer devotes his entire time to the study of these systems and the subject cannot be handled satisfactorily unless an officer is available for this study in the A. E. F. Intelligence Section. If the Operation Section attempts to study the railroads of Germany and their military use without the assistance of a trained specialist in the Intelligence Section, it simply amounts to their detailing a man to engage in this branch of Intelligence Section work.

Information as to changes in the above systems which have occurred during the war.

There have been no important changes in the German railroad systems proper except the addition of switching facilities and additional trackage at junctions. To follow the changes and development of the German railways requires the study of the special intelligence officer mentioned in the paragraph above.

Maps showing the system of railways developed and used on the German western front during the war.

The German railroads on the British front are shown on special maps which are available for the study of the Operation Section in the western front room. German railroads on the western front opposite the French are shown on the *Plan Directeur* maps, a complete set of which is furnished herewith for the use of the Operation Section. As soon as we take over a section of the front, the Intelligence Section would have an officer who can devote his entire time to the study of the German front line railroads and light railroads, and the German supply service including location of supply depots, ammunition dumps, etc., of the front occupied and other parts of the front, the taking over of which is under consideration. The study of this subject by the Operations Section without the assistance of such a specialist in the Intelligence Section, who devotes his whole time to the subject simply amounts, as in the case of (1), to the devoting of an Operations officer to the performance of Intelligence Section work.

Maps showing the system of roads existing and developed on the German western front.

Maps showing the system of canals available for use on the German western front.

Information of any nature of military value relating to the German transportation facilities, etc.

The information under these headings is shown for the western French front on the *Plan Directeur* maps furnished. The same officer of the Intelligence Section who studies

railroads behind the front is also charged with information as to roads and canals and the supply and ammunition services at the front.

TERRAIN: Taking the line for discussion from right to left, from the Swiss frontier north, 35 kilometers of the line is over rolling ground affording strong defensive positions, but not unsuitable for active operations. This part of the line is at present lightly held by both sides.

From east of THANN, north for 90 kilometers the line crosses the VOSGES Mountains. This is a rugged country difficult for either attack or for active operations on a large scale and is the most lightly held part of the line (by both sides) on the western front. These two sectors together comprise the sector held by the French Seventh Army.

Behind these two sectors lies the fertile Rhine Valley, varying from 30 to 40 kilometers in width and in which the Germans are prepared to fall back, in case of need, behind the Rhine between Basle and Strassbourg, holding the line extending from Strassbourg to Metz.

From Cirey to a point 15 kilometers east of St-Mihiel lies the sector held by the French Eighth Army. The southeastern part of this line is rugged, the middle part less so. Although this country is more favorable for active operations than the sector to the south and although this part of the line is at present lightly held by the Germans, more stubborn resistance to an attack is to be expected in this part on account of the successive prepared lines in rear of the front and on account of interference of the enemy's communications between Strassbourg and Metz, which would be interrupted by an Allied advance in this sector, and on account of the fact that an advance here unless made on a very broad front would find itself enveloped on both flanks. Nevertheless, an advance on this front as far northward as Saarbrücken would have the largest strategic consequences by throwing out of gear the railroad communications of the troops in the Metz-Verdun sector and might easily lead to the compelling of a general withdrawal of the entire southern part of the German line in France. A further advantage of the advance on Saarbrücken is that the advancing line would soon be on German territory where the Germans could not afford to destroy the country as they retreated as they did last year in France, and where the French would not have the same objection which they have in the line farther north, to destructions carried on in rear of the enemy's line by aeroplane and otherwise, and also to the baring of the airable soil by heavy bombardments. The moral effect of carrying the war into the enemy's country and at the same time the regaining of part of Lorraine would also be very great.

The importance of the St-Mihiel salient lies in the fact that: First it cuts the French communications between Verdun and Nancy and thereby seriously interferes with the shifting of the troops as well as with their supply. Second, that it affords to the Germans the means of an attack upon Verdun from the rear (south) as well as from the front (north). Third, that it furnishes a base for a concentric advance by the Germans against Nancy. Fourth, that its occupation serves to protect the Briey and Metz iron foundries against bombardment by long-range guns and against aeroplane bombing. This salient is technically a very strong position on account of the triple range of hills which prevents artillery cooperation between the Allied forces on the two faces of the salient. Nevertheless, a very slight advance on either side would render such cooperation possible and compel the evacuation of the salient. The fact is thoroughly appreciated by the Germans who have prepared a complete defensive system to fall back on in the rear of them. The natural and easy attack of this salient would be from the south, on account of difficulties of terrain (hills and forest) on its western face. This seems to offer an especially inviting first objective to the American army, one which is relatively easy of accomplishment and one the attainment of which would give it great prestige and produce a large moral effect both in Allied and hostile countries. It would not, however, pave the way for a further attack in the same locality, although its occupation would be equally favorable for supporting an advance northward from Verdun or northeastward from Nancy.

An advance northward from Verdun against Longwy and Sedan offers perhaps the quickest

and most efficacious means of compelling the evacuation of French territory to the West, by the German army in the west by cutting the railway lines absolutely essential to the supplying and munitioning of that army. It is probably that the fear of such an attack led in part to the decision to make the German attack on Verdun in 1916 to safeguard these necessary lines of communication by a further advance in that direction. This advance would, of course, have to be made in the valley of the Meuse; possession of the Argonne Forest naturally going to the possessor of the ground on either side of it. West of the Argonne Forest, in the Champagne district, an advance would be very difficult, would have to be made on a broad front, would be very costly, and would not be especially profitable.

GERMAN FORTRESSES: The German fortified areas prepared for all-round defense and as pivots of operation are at Metz, Longwy, and Strassbourg. Of these, Metz is the most strongly fortified and the best adapted for stubborn defense by reason of its natural situation. To attempt its capture without first cutting it off may be regarded as the most difficult task which could be undertaken.

ARSENALS, MANUFACTURES, SUPPLY CENTERS, ETC.: A great mass of information is available on these subjects in the files of the Intelligence Section. These are at the disposal of the officers of the Operations Section for study. Owing to the shortage of intelligence officers, no member of the intelligence staff is at present available to digest these reports and study these questions in detail.

It may be said in passing, however, that the chief center for the manufacture of munitions is Essen where probably 80% of the guns and ammunition are produced. 60% of iron ore used in the production of these munitions comes from the Briey---Metz---Luxembourg iron fields and smelters. These smelters constitute an important objective for air raids as they are very valuable and, once destroyed, would require a year to rebuild. Their destruction would, therefore, deal a heavy blow to the enemy's munition supply. The French ownership of some of these smelting plants is said to have interfered, in the past, with the execution of orders for their destruction.

The Germans have no central depot of manufactured munitions, but tranship them from the manufacturing plant to the various army bases from which they are distributed to advanced dumps.

D. G. NOLAN,  
Major, General Staff,  
Chief of Section.

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**Information Regarding Western Front**

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
INTELLIGENCE SECTION  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF.  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, September 10, 1917.*

MEMORANDUM II FOR OPERATION SECTION

(Information requested in Memorandum of Operation Section, dated September 4, 1917)

1. The British army has, in the theaters of war (except Africa):

France	62	Divisions	(1,500,000 combatants (1,000,000 service of rear
Macedonia	8	"	
Palestine	4	"	(X)
Mesopotamia	5	"	(XX)

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(X) Reinforcements expected from Salonica.  
(XX) " " " India

The British recruit reserves are estimated to have been 400,000 on July 31; of these half have probably been used up during August, and the rest will be used up in the offensives, if continued, during September and October, after which troop units will have to be employed with reduced effectives.

The age of British recruits is not known, but it is believed that England has called to the colors all men who can be spared from work, over eighteen and under 40, of military effectiveness. It is probable, therefore, that the British army, like the German, has reached its maximum strength in 1917 and will not be able to increase (without conscription in Canada and Australia) its number of organizations for next year, and it is even doubtful if, on the same terms, it can maintain its present number of units and engage in effective offensive action.

2. The French army has in the theatres of war (except Africa):

France	108	Divisions
Macedonia	7	"

Its reported strength on April 1 (in France) was:

Combatant troops	1,322,000
Service of rear	800,000
Recruit reserves	400,000

This force represented the last combing possible of the military population down to include men 19 years old.

Since then the losses have been very severe, especially in the spring offensive in the Chemin-des-Dames and Verdun sectors, and the number of effectives per organization has had to be materially reduced in the French army. It may be said to be impossible for France to maintain its present number of organization at full strength and engage, either this year or next year, in any extensive operations involving large losses.

3. The Italian army has in the theaters of war (except Africa---where it has retired

to the coast line of Tripoli and abandoned all attempts at military control of the interior);

Italian Front	61	divisions
Albanian "	2 1/2	"

There are no data available on the number of recruit reserves but it may be said that both Government and people are lukewarm towards continuing the war, and excessive in their demands on England and France for coal and other necessities and that any further calling out of men or attempt to employ Italian forces in other theatres is not considered possible. If Italy can hold half the number of Austrian divisions on her frontier which she has there herself, as she is now doing, and not lose her present foothold, she will be doing as much as can be expected until Austria is much weaker than she is now.

4. The Russian army had in the theatres of war:

Russian-Rumanian Front	223	Divisions
Caucasus Front	15	"
Macedonian Front	1	"

However, through French sources, we have heard of the breaking up of one Russian army (sent south to reinforce the Rumanian front), which became so disaffected that it had to be amalgamated with others, while it is hinted that the enemy's advances at Tarnopol and Riga was due to the disintegration of the Russian troops opposed to them rather than to any well-organized German offensive.

It is doubtful if Russia has at the moment any recruit reserves which it can dispose of, due to the spirit of unrest and insubordination among the civil population. The only question is, therefore, how much of the present organized Russian army can the Government and army leaders hold together, and for how long. The answers to these questions depend largely upon the ability of the Government to feed, clothe, quarter, pay, and munition the troops; granted these conditions, discipline could undoubtedly be restored, but the transportation system of Russia, as well as its finance, industry, agriculture and manufactures, has been so thrown out of joint by the war and especially by the overthrow of all the machinery of government, such as it was, due to the revolution, that the solution of these basic problems appears now most difficult.

D.G. NOLAN.  
Major, General Staff.  
Chief of Section.

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Cable: P-161-S

***Shipping Difficulties***

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, September 15, 1917.*

AGWAR, WASHINGTON

For Chief of Staff and Secretary of War

[Extract]

1. Reference my confidential Cablegrams 94 and 119 have received confidential letter today from General Robertson, Chief of Staff, British army. In substance letter states that shipping question becoming increasingly difficult account submarines; that British fear that transport our troops will be jeopardized; that British admiralty agree question of shipping is between England and America only as other Allies have no shipping worth considering. General Robertson suggests that Admiral Mayo and myself be sent to England with authority to discuss with admiralty arrangements for shipping needed for American troops during the next year. Recommend approval General Robertson's suggestion. Am not informed regarding details of shipping available for our use but if recommendation is adopted request necessary information regarding our requirements. Consider it highly important that we take advantage of this opportunity to arrange for shipping to meet our needs during the next twelve months.

\* \* \* \* \*

PERSHING.

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Cable: A-183-B

***Organization of Army and G. H. Q.***

A. G. O., WAR DEPARTMENT,  
*Washington, D.C., September 17, 1917.*

PERSHING, AMEXFORCE

[Extract]

\* \* \* \* \*

4. Mail your recommendations for organization in detail for headquarters of an Army headquarters and for General Headquarters American Expeditionary Forces, including commissioned and enlisted personnel all grades and arms or branches and transportation. Desired for use in preparing tables of organization.

McCAIN.

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***Proposal Concerning Transfer of American Citizens from British  
Armies to The American Army***

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, B. E. F.,  
*September 19, 1917.*

Dear General Pershing,

Field Marshall Sir Douglas Haig has transferred your letter of August 31 to me for action.

While readily appreciating your desire to collect such of your own countrymen as would be useful to you from a military point of view, yet I am not sure that your proposal to have the applicants mentioned in your letter sent to Paris for examination is feasible. In the first place the majority of the officers and a considerable proportion of the men are in England, and it would not be expedient to fill up shipping space with men whose retention out here was not assured.

It might hence be equally as convenient to you to send one or two officers to see these officers and men concerned who are serving out here. I do not anticipate any difficulty in getting them collected at their respective army headquarters, those on the L. of C. being arranged for separately.

So far as we are concerned, we are only too anxious to help you in every possible way, but I believe the arrangement that has been entered into by the two War Departments concerned is to the effect that the American Embassy in London will take any necessary executive action as regards applying for the release of any individuals whose services are required by the American Government.

On receipt of a reply from you, I will inform our War Office of your desire in respect to the men noted on the lists accompanying your letter of August 31, but I think it would be convenient to be able to state that arrangements for any examination of the men will be such as to enable the examination to take place near where the men are serving.

Yours sincerely,

G. H. FOWKE.

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Cable: A-190-R

**Shipping**

A. G. O., WAR DEPARTMENT.  
*Washington, D. C., September 19, 1917.*

PERSHING, A. E. F.

[Extract]

\* \* \* \* \*

3. Reference your number 161, President of United States says question of shipping is being looked after from here, and that arrangements now being made would be confused by such a conference as you suggest. Our shipping must necessarily be supplied by ourselves, and the shipping board here is in direct conference with British authorities controlling their shipping.

McCAIN.

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Cable: P-175-S

**Organization of Headquarters of Army and G. H. Q.**

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, September 22, 1917*

AGWAR, WASHINGTON

[Extract]

\* \* \* \* \*

2. For the Chief of Staff. With reference to paragraph 4 your number 183, your number 200 and my 172. Study is being made and will be forwarded promptly for organization in detail of army headquarters and for General Headquarters. This study when completed and contemplating presence here of full number of divisions will probably include rank of general officer for heads of sections of the general staff, not necessary, however, at this time.

\* \* \* \* \*

PERSHING.

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***Restrictions on Release of Information on Sailing of Military Personnel***

A. G. O., WAR DEPARTMENT,  
Washington, D. C., September 24, 1917.

PERSHING, AMEXFORCE

[Extract]

\* \* \* \* \*

Orders have been given that no information be communicated to any representatives, military or civil, of any foreign power, about the sailing of any military personnel to the theater of war in Europe until twenty-four hours after this information shall have been communicated to you. Please inform at once whether this is satisfactory. If, notwithstanding these orders, you learn of advance information being communicated to any French official, endeavor to ascertain the sources from which it came and report facts.

McCAIN.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: 683-A: Memorandum

***General Summary of European Situation***

[Contemporary Translation]

General Staff

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
INTELLIGENCE SECTION (A), G. S.,  
September 25, 1917.

Russian Mission, Interallied Section

**MILITARY INFORMATION**

BULGARIA:

MILITARY OPERATIONS: It is reported from an authentic source that Germany, from the beginning of August, was attempting in every way to force Bulgaria to undertake an offensive on the Macedonian front. The Bulgarian General Staff refused absolutely to comply with this wish. After the Kaiser's trip to Sophia and Constantinople, the situation changed. The Emperor persuaded the Bulgarians that Germany and Austria-Hungary would again prove anew their military supremacy. This statement alluded to the Italian campaign, then under preparation. As a result he succeeded in persuading the Bulgarians to comply with his request in the following manner:

1. Assemble all available Bulgarian forces on the southern part of the Bulgarian front, laying emphasis on the historical hatred nourished by the Bulgarians against the Greeks. The military authorities are compelled to resort to every effort in order to incite the Bulgarian soldiers against the Greeks, assuring them of the occupation of Salonika and the remainder of Macedonia which Emperor William has solemnly promised the Bulgarians.

2. Consolidate in the best possible manner all the Thracian front for a defensive war, consent to remove from this front all available units near Constantinople (*elements de la garnison*) and develop all railroads as much as possible.

3. Mass the best Bulgarian forces in the southwestern part of Macedonia, especially in the OKHRIDA and PRESPA region. This section is designated as the starting point of the intended active operations.

4. Develop the railroads and build a railroad between Lakes OKHRIDA and PRESPA to secure direct communication between the cities of OKHRIDA and PRESPA (there is already a narrow-gauge railroad from SKOPIE to OKHRIDA).

In return, Germany promises to strictly fulfill all pledges made towards Bulgaria, namely:

1. To have 180,000 German troops on the Bulgarian fronts.
2. Cooperate with the Bulgarian engineers in the reinforcement of their line of defense.
3. Provide the Bulgarian army with arms of kinds in sufficient quantity necessitated by the technical personnel.
4. Strengthen the air fleet.
5. Force Turkey to renounce its claim to southern Thrace.
6. To straighten out the differences existing between Bulgaria and Austria-Hungary.
7. To take necessary steps to guarantee Bulgaria's possession of the Dobroudja, all Macedonia, a part of Old Serbia, of Salonika, of Thassos Island, of the Chalcidique Peninsula, of Seros, Drama, and Cavalla.
8. Assume all military expenses.

The plan of the proposed offensive on the Macedonian front is the following: The principal Bulgarian forces should assemble in the OKHRIDA region. The offensive will be carried out in three columns, in three directions from the west, the south and the east, after that the invasion of Greece. It is proposed to start a revolt in Greece in favor of CONSTANTINE, in order to cut off all communication between SARRAIL and ATHENS. On all parts of the Salonika front active preparations are being made for this offensive, principally in the OKHRIDA section. There is no doubt but that the offensive on the Macedonian front will be carried out. The Bulgarian army has decided to undertake it because it is convinced that this drive will end the war and assure Bulgaria's possession of Salonika.

It is learned from other sources that a large number of German troops has been sent to Bulgaria. It seems that in early October as many as 2 German divisions arrived in Bulgaria.

COUNT IGNATIEFF II,  
Colonel,  
Chief of the Russian Mission.

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***Use of American Freight***

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section  
No. 8329 BS/3

FRENCH GENERAL STAFF,  
ADVANCED GROUP.  
*Paris, October 3, 1917.*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE OFFICE OF THE MINISTER OF WAR

In his Telegram 2102 M. O., \* \* \* the high commissioner of the republic to the United States reports difficulties he is having in obtaining the delivery of boats previously ordered.

He states that these difficulties stem from the present inclination of the Federal Government to retain solely for the transportation and supply of the American army all tonnage available to the United States.

Mr. Tardieu points out apropos of this, that an interallied conference, at which the United States would be represented, would be the only means of presenting the question on its true basis, the general interest of the coalition, and reaching the best solution for that interest.

Mr. Tardieu's suggestion seems to be entirely fitting and the sole means, in fact, of inducing the American Government to make the best use of its merchant fleet for the fundamental needs of the Allies.

It seems, however, that, before the assembly of the interallied conference in question, and as the high commissioner stated in the next-to-last paragraph of his telegram referred to above, it is advisable, first of all, to coordinate closely the various French needs and requests, that are seeking to obtain the use of American freight.

Up to this time, as a matter of fact, all requests could be sent for this purpose to the high commissioner by the various departments without having the Government determine by a joint study the actual seasonableness, or even the order of priority, of all these requests.

The army general staff (advance group) considers it the province of the office of the minister to submit this question to the council with a view to assembling shortly an interministerial commission, charged with determining:

1. What are the essential needs requiring the use of American freight by the different ministries;
2. The total tonnage necessary to meet them, with allotment of that tonnage to the departments and order of priority for each of them.

Then, it is the duty of the government to call the interallied conference in which French requirements, thus clearly determined, could be submitted.

FOCH,  
General, Chief of the General Staff  
of the French army.

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***Movement of Troops to France via England***

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F..  
ADMINISTRATION SECTION, GENERAL STAFF,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, October 6, 1917.*

From: Commander-in-Chief, American Expeditionary Forces

To: Chief, French Military Mission

1. You are of course fully aware of the difficulties presented in procuring tonnage for the movement of troops of these forces from America to our various Atlantic base ports. To hasten the troops here, the American Government is making every effort to use the passenger carrying accommodations on Atlantic boats plying between England and America for troop transport. The effect of all this is that we have reason to expect that the number of troops coming to France may possibly reach an aggregate of 10,000 men per week, arriving through England.

2. It is understood informally that the disembarkation and expedition of those troops at the French channel ports present certain difficulties due to lack of port facilities, etc. On the other hand, any attempt to ship these troops after their arrival in England to base ports we are now using would require an amount of tonnage which we have not available; and in addition would subject the troops, it is believed, unnecessarily to enemy submarine attack.

3. Another difficulty presents itself in that the troops coming via England must of necessity bring with them a certain amount of supplies and equipment. This naturally occasions an additional load at the French channel ports. Up to the present time the amount of impedimenta accompanying American troops routed via England has been reduced to the very minimum. In certain cases with engineer troops much time has been lost awaiting the arrival of tools and equipment necessary to their work.

4. This matter is presented to you with the request that it be taken up with the proper French authorities so that we can arrive at some adjustment of the existing difficulties at the channel ports, to the end that the American Expeditionary Forces may not be delayed in their arrival in France. Both our governments are in accord as to the necessity of expediting the arrival of American forces, and an early reply will be appreciated.

By direction:

J. G. HARBORD,  
Chief of Staff.

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***Schedule of Priority of Shipment of Personnel***

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF.  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, October 7, 1917.*

From: The Commander-in-Chief

To: The Adjutant General, U. S. Army, Washington, D. C.

1. Herewith is a schedule showing the order in which shipment should be made to France of the troops called for in the following:

(1) A. E. F. General Organization Project forwarded to the War Department with letter dated July 10, 1917.

(2) Service of the Rear Project forwarded to the War Department with letter dated September 21, 1917.

(3) Tank Project forwarded to the War Department with letter dated September 24, 1917.

2. The following units are herein added to the Service of the Rear Project. These additions meet with my approval.

4 R. R. Telegraph Battalions	920	men
1 Regiment of Cavalry (dismounted) for guard on L. of C.	1,600	"
4 Battalions railway operation	3,200	"
3 " " maintenance of way	2,400	"
	<hr/> 8,120	"

3. Troops already in France and en route are included in the schedule and should be checked off as already furnished. This does not however, apply to railway, sanitary, forestry or other troops furnished the British and French which are not covered by this schedule. As far as practicable the notes show the troops on hand and en route.

4. Strengths of units given herein are in many cases only approximate. Replacement drafts are not included in the totals and shipping must be allowed for them separately. This schedule does not cover personnel for General Headquarters or L. of C. Headquarters, which will be requested as required.

5. This schedule has for its purpose to provide a proper balance between all the various elements of the expeditionary forces, aviation troops excepted. Aviation must be given a separate schedule of shipments for the reason that the aviation program, in order to lend the most rapid assistance possible to the Allied cause, has been made much larger than necessary for a properly balanced army. To carry out this plan the aviation program must provide personnel as rapidly as the material will be ready, irrespective of the rate of shipment of the rest of our forces.

6. This schedule was the subject of a careful study by the General Staff at these headquarters. The order and rate of shipment of personnel and organizations pertaining to the several staff departments was the subject of conferences with the heads of the respective departments at these headquarters and agreement was reached thereon. The schedule meets with my approval.

7. The existing situation is difficult on account of our not having Service of the Rear troops in France in adequate proportion to our combat troops already here or expected in the near future. I request that future shipments of troops be made so as to correct this and bring the several arms, auxiliaries and Service of the Rear troops into harmony with this schedule. The fact is recognized that this may cause difficulties in

the United States. It is, however, clear that only by establishing and adhering to such a schedule can a well-balanced force be maintained. I, therefore, request that this schedule be approved and put into effect at once.

JOHN J. PERSHING.

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### ***American Expeditionary Forces***

### ***Schedule of Priority of Shipments***

#### PERSONNEL

#### SUMMARY

[Extract]

#### FIRST PHASE

Service of the Rear	83,482
Army Troops	7,200
I Corps	174,118
Army Troops	<u>10,400</u>
Total First Phase	275,200

#### SECOND PHASE

Service of the Rear	73,114
II Corps	178,114
Army Troops	<u>16,262</u>
Total Second Phase	267,490
Total to date	542,690

#### THIRD PHASE

Service of the Rear	52,124
III Corps	177,070
Army Troops	<u>17,054</u>
Total Third Phase	246,248
Total to date	788,938

#### FOURTH PHASE

Service of the Rear	40,951
IV Corps	177,070
Army Troops	<u>13,722</u>
Total Fourth Phase	231,743
Total to date	1,020,681

#### FIFTH PHASE

Service of the Rear	27,174
V Corps	177,070
Army Troops	<u>5,856</u>
Total Fifth Phase	210,100
Total to date	1,230,781

#### SIXTH PHASE

Service of the Rear	16,618
Grand Total (excluding aviation and replacements)	1,247,399

For items pertaining to the Service of the Rear and Tank Projects item numbers and units used herein are as given in those projects. For other items pertaining to the General Organization Project of July 11, 1917, item numbers have been assigned herein. \* \* \*

#### NUMBERS

1 -100 items pertaining to divisions  
 101-200 items pertaining to army corps  
 201-500 items pertaining to armies  
 301-400 items pertaining to G. H. Q.  
 401-500 items pertaining to L. of C.



NOTE: All divisional units including those pertaining to base and training divisions are included under items 1- 100.

#### LETTERS

No letter---Nondepartmental troops regarding which all records are kept by the Adjutant General, A. E. F.

Q - Quartermaster Corps units regarding which records are also kept by Chief Q. M., A. E. F., who is responsible for recommending action necessary to the best efficiency and utilization of such units.

M - Medical corps units	)	
E - Engineer units	)	Chiefs of respective staff
O - Ordnance units	)	departments have same duties
S - Signal Units	)	as above indicated in case of
A - Aeronautic Units	)	Quartermaster Corps Units.
P - Provost Marshal	)	

\* \* \* \* \*

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AG, GHQ, AEF: 3140: Letter

#### ***Recommendations Based on Experience of 1st Division***

1st DIVISION, A. E. F.,  
*Gondrecourt, Meuse, October 8, 1917.*

From: Commanding General, 1st Division

To: Commander-in-Chief, A. E. F.

1. In accordance with instructions contained in your communication of September 29, the following report is submitted as result of the experience of this division in France.

2. The following officers of a division should precede the division to France by at least two weeks: Division Commander, a General Staff officer, a Quartermaster, and a Surgeon. These officers should familiarize themselves with conditions over here--billeting, water, fuel, methods of supply, training, etc.

3. Before leaving the states, division headquarters should be completely organized as to officers, noncommissioned officers, and clerks. They should bring with them on deck the following: Typewriters, mimeograph, stationery, office supplies, orders, regulations, blank forms, and the latest pamphlets and publications on modern warfare. All schedules of instruction and training to be carried out on shipboard should be prepared and issued at the mobilization or concentration camp.

The automobiles, motorcycles, mounts, field trains, supply trains, and sanitary train should accompany the division to France. Each transport, particularly the boat carrying division headquarters, should have aboard, in the upper holds, automobiles and motorcycles. All transport should be assembled in the United States and every spare part and accessory provided before being loaded. Each automobile and motorcycle should have, packed with it, two extra tires, a full set of tools, chains, a certain number of important spare parts, etc. No dependence should be placed upon obtaining these extras during the first month in France.

4. Rail movements: French rolling stock for troops is made up in trains, usually according to a fixed standard for transporting an infantry battalion, a battery of artillery or a squadron of cavalry - about 50 cars. Our units, particularly infantry, do not fit these trains; our escort wagons are difficult to load and only one can go on a flat car, where two French carts can be loaded; our men have more baggage than the French soldier; etc. As a result the first experience of loading is rather hard. Officers and men are apt to try to have things done in American fashion which only results in misunderstandings and serious delays. The arrangements made by the French railroad officials should be carefully observed and any ideas regarding the American way of doing things subordinated for the time being.

5. Billeting: Immediately upon landing in France an advance party (already decided upon during the voyage) should proceed to the billeting area so as to arrive there at least three days in advance of the troops. A senior line officer should be in charge of the advance party. The latter should consist of:

- a. Temporary Staff: Adjutant, Quartermaster, Inspector, Surgeon, interpreter, clerk and personal orderlies. 1 automobile and 2 motorcycles with drivers.
- For each village:
  - 1 officer, Town Major
  - 1 Surgeon
  - 1 interpreter
  - 1 N. C. O. clerk
  - 2 orderlies
  - 1 motorcycle and driver

For entire area: Minimum of 1 motor truck company.

The transportation for officers is most important. Without it the efficiency of their work is seriously reduced.

(b) Regulations for Town Majors and billeting should be issued to all officers at the port of debarkation.

At the same time a leaflet should be issued to each soldier briefly describing the nature of life in billets, and pointing out the necessity for respecting the rights of property owners, avoiding women, not spending money recklessly and thus forcing up prices for ourselves and the poorer inhabitants, etc. Rustling of lumber, etc., should be expressly forbidden.

(c) In dealing with the inhabitants and local civil authorities, a degree of formality and courtesy not customary with Americans is essential if satisfactory results are to be obtained. The French stand ready and anxious to do whatever they can to assist us, but the assistance will be rendered in French fashion and not American.

(d) French troops should not be quartered in the same villages with American troops.

6. Interpreters: Much trouble has been experienced with interpreters. It is particularly difficult to secure an interpreter who will convey the full meaning of one's remark to the person addressed. It is also hard to be certain that the interpreter understands what you mean. Whenever an important matter is being adjusted the question or decision should be written in English, then given to an interpreter to translate into French; then retranslated into English by a second interpreter in order that one may be sure that the exact meaning desired has been expressed. The French version, after being satisfactorily corrected, should then be delivered to the French official concerned. In this way many serious and entirely unnecessary misunderstandings can be avoided. An American who speaks French is the most satisfactory interpreter, but even his work should be checked in very important matters.

7. Training:

(a) The training in France is carried on in camps within the billeting areas. A camp is a section of land set aside under a special provision of the law, within which

trenches may be dug, firing with certain, specified weapons carried on in specified directions, etc. Ordinarily, troops may drill or maneuver on any farm land so long as growing crops are avoided. A French officer is permanently in charge of each camp and lives in some village adjacent thereto.

(b) Training in conjunction with French troops is slow and we have found that after one or two demonstrations by French organizations it is difficult to keep our soldiers interested. The principal assistance we can derive from the French or English will be from officers and specially selected noncommissioned officers of those armies acting as advisors and critics.

Our officers are not sufficiently familiar with trench warfare conditions to draft good problems and both the officers and men fail to visualize the possible effect of hostile artillery and trench mortar fire. Consequently dispositions of troops, liaison arrangements, et cetera, which seem satisfactory to us frequently meet with severe and absolutely correct criticisms from the French officers observing the exercises. They will quickly explain to our satisfaction how impossible or dangerous the dispositions, liaison arrangements, et cetera, would be under battle conditions.

We have made the most rapid progress since adopting the following arrangement:

French officers prepare a series of company, battalion, and regimental problems involving all the various phases of trench warfare and give a setting on the centers of resistance which each regiment has prepared (entrenchments, barbed wire, etc.). Our officers take these problems, state them in American fashion if necessary, and proceed to prepare the necessary orders. The problem is then gone over on the map, rehearsed on the ground and corrected, and, finally, the unit or units concerned carry out the orders on the ground. French officers observe the work of the troops and are called upon in the critique to criticize all mistakes observed. The problem, with the orders and a summary of the critique, is then forwarded to division headquarters and a general summary of all the mistakes noted during the week is prepared by selected officers (instructors in the Unit Commanders School of the division and members of the Operation and Intelligence Sections of the division staff).

(c) It has been found that the work in the specialties (bayonet, musketry, machine gun, auto rifle, grenade, etc.) develops very much faster than the instruction in tactics proper and liaison matters.

(d) It is difficult, in France, to obtain the longer ranges and material for target practice. It is recommended that target practice, especially at the longer ranges, close order and disciplinary drills, be had, as far as practicable, in the United States.

(e) A French and a British staff officer should be attached to each division headquarters immediately upon its arrival in France to assist in organizing and instructing our staff. This is regarded as of the utmost importance as the work of the staff in this war is of a most detailed and comprehensive nature, requiring very special and careful training for its successful accomplishment. Staff work in trench warfare is far more complicated and difficult than in open warfare and our recognized weakness has always been our undeveloped and untrained staff personnel. Poor staff work at division headquarters will more than nullify the work of the best trained regiments.

WM. L. SIBERT,  
Major General, U. S. A.

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***Movement of Troops to France via England***

[Contemporary Translation]

4th Bureau  
No. 11,121

FRENCH MILITARY MISSION WITH AMERICAN ARMY,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, October 20, 1917.*

General Rageuneau, Chief of the French Military Mission with the American army  
To the Commander-in-Chief of the American Expeditionary Corps, G. H. Q.

In reply to your letter of October 6, 1917, I have the honor to inform you that after agreement with the British military authorities, the Commander-in-Chief has judged it possible to receive some American troops in the ports of the English Channel occupied by some English Bases, up to a strength of ten thousand men per week.

The British authorities only express the desire that there be disembarked not more than 250 officers per day, on account of the difficulty there is in lodging a greater number of them.

All dispositions will be taken by the French authorities to assure the transportation of the effectives announced by railroad to their point of destination.

F. REBOUL,  
Colonel, Director of Services.

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Cable: P-242-S

***Shipping Situation***

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, October 21, 1917.*

AGWAR, WASHINGTON

For the Chief of Staff

1. British report that owing to the fact cross-channel cargo service is being worked to its full capacity at present any additional transport of stores, et cetera, via England would meet with serious delay. State that transport horses, guns, mechanical transport equipment, et cetera, including baggage, should not pass through England but be landed directly in France. Also state it very unlikely any greater assistance for transporting troops across channel can be given by British ships owing to shortage of tonnage. State some action necessary on foregoing as maximum number American troops that can be handled via England is 600 per day on average with limit for bunching of 5,000. French place number of men they can handle at channel ports at about same figure as British.

a. British report regarding very big ex-German liners of *Vaterland* type that it will be impossible to handle these ships in Liverpool. They state Gladstone Dock will in all probability be used for repairing large steamers and cannot be counted on. This will leave only landing stage and buoys. Under these circumstances they propose we not use Liverpool except in exceptional cases and that every effort be made by us to have these vessels proceed direct to France.

b. British Admiralty while pointing out danger in use of large ships *Vaterland* type on account of being big target for submarines states that if military situation requires risk they recommend such alterations be made as will enable these vessels coal in

United States for round trip. They suggest economy in coal be obtained by proceeding at reduced speed say nineteen or twenty knots for vessels of twenty-three or twenty-four knots except in areas where submarines may be expected to be active. They also suggest in cases where it is necessary to take any large amounts of coal ships be taken to Southampton after disembarkation, this especially in case of ships which it is not possible to coal at Brest.

c. In view of necessity of transforming cargoes by lighters to shore at Brest it would be advantageous to send such of these ships as do not draw too much water to ST-NAZAIRE, La PALLICE or BORDEAUX so as to utilize full cargo space which would not be possible at Brest without undue delay in turnaround.

d. French have always interposed objections to our extended use of Brest on grounds of already congested dock facilities and limited rail evacuations. Have so far been unable to get definite statement from them as to maximum amount tonnage that may be evacuated by rail from this port. They, however, offer to evacuate fairly large personnel if not bunched. Water supply on shore very short necessitating holding troops on ships until a few hours before evacuation of troops by rail. In view of draft of our available ships it is believed we must use this port to its maximum. Adequate number of lighters to handle debarkation not available in France and must be sent from America before arrival first troops. Will endeavor to make French state definitely maximum number of troops and tonnage that can be evacuated by rail from Brest and will report this. Lighters, however, must be sent.

e. Am informed that American Line steamers at present plying between English and American ports not being operated to maximum war advantage. If this is so believe corrective steps be taken by government. Recommend study be made of situation with view of determining possibility of withdrawal of American Line steamers from English ports and their diversion to our French ports.

f. In view of the foregoing request you cable results study of this situation in America and also approximate number of men and tons of supplies that would have to be handled at Brest to utilize to fullest advantage shipping we have which is of too great draft to operate in our other ports, also number of lighters that could be sent before arrival troops. This information necessary to enable us to push French.

c. Reference your Cablegram 293 [not printed] regarding desire to ship largest possible number of troops through England have appointed Lassiter [Brig. Gen. Wm. Lassiter, Military Attache, London] on board to confer with British authorities. All above based on correspondence with British previous your telegram. Doubt whether British will be able to do more than set forth above.

PERSHING.

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***Representation on Supreme War Council***

No. 407

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, October 22, 1917.*

For Chief of Staff, Secretary of War

Pending decision as to permanent representation on Supreme War Council and in order to aid in reaching conclusion as to the value of this council in securing cooperation among Allied Armies, recommend that a temporary appointment be made from our forces here. Members of council are anxious that we should be represented. Mr. Frazier who is attending meetings for United States suggests that he is not conversant with military affairs, and is therefore not in position to participate in deliberations on military subjects. All matters involving military questions are now referred by him to me. If authorized to designate an officer as suggested would select General Liggett\* provided he would be acceptable to the War Department.

\* \* \* \* \*

PERSHING.

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Cable: LR 279: Telegram

***Transport of American Troops Across Channel***

L. R. No. 279

*LONDON, October 29, 1917.*

PERSHING, AMEXFORCE

Definite statement in writing not yet secured, but indications from conference yesterday are that British Government will inform us it is impracticable for them to transport American troops across Channel except in very small detachments. This is due to greatly increased number of British soldiers---leave during the winter months and consequent great demands on cross-channel traffic. If we could provide additional boats to move our troops across British will receive troops in England and furnish huttled accommodations for 28,000 men and stores. But Admiralty has investigated matter and does not believe that boats of required type can be had in United States. They have sent additional cablegrams on the subject. Moreover, the post and railroad accommodations at Le Havre are probably not equal to large increasing demands. As it looks as if movements of American troops through England will thus be very greatly restricted, board requests you telegraph whether large movements of our troops through England is vital your plans and if we shall so represent matter. In this connection it would be important for board to be able to show what monthly rate of arrivals in France is to our plan, what proportion of to be sent direct to France, and hence serious objections remain for shipment through England. In any case board recommends immediate steps to enlarge to their fullest capacity accommodations at all ports France available to us. Board further recommends that

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\* General Pershing's Diary for January 24, 1918 contains this entry, "Had dinner with General Bliss, who has returned from Washington to be our military representative on the Supreme War Council."

Washington be notified that large additional numbers American troops should not be sent via England until question of cross-channel transports has been settled.

BARTLETT.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: 2185: Memorandum

***Recommended Coordination in Headquarters Operation***

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
COORDINATION SECTION, GENERAL STAFF,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, November 2, 1917.*

MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF STAFF

1. The working of the Hq. A. E. F., has reached a stage where it is time to take stock and look ahead and determine exactly how the machine is to function in the near future. I believe it is self-evident that the supply and transportation departments must operate through the G. S., because unity of action is essential and can only be obtained by coordination on all points. The only coordinating heads now recognized by those departments are the C. of S., or the C-in-C, because they only can make final decisions. It is only a question of time, however, until they will be forced by more important duties to delegate this authority to someone. The task of coordination is going to be difficult at best, and it will be an almost impossible one if it is suddenly turned over to the G. S., after it has grown to such proportions that the C-in-C and C. of S., are forced to drop it by its very size. On the other hand, if the work is now turned over to the sections of the G. S., which are to handle it ultimately, they will have an opportunity to grow up with the job and both will reach maturity at the same time.

2. Today the chiefs of the Supply and Transportation Depts. go to the A. G., C. of S., and the C. G. to have certain questions settled, whereas certain other questions are sent to sections of the G. S., for their consideration, usually the Coordination Section or the Administrative Section. This makes five different agencies which handle similar subjects and sometimes decisions are not known until a long time after they have been made by the highest authority. These decisions are frequently verbal and not of record, thus giving rise to misunderstandings as to what the intent of the question or the decision actually were. Such conditions cannot lead to efficiency for it is manifest that the Coordination Section administer unless all questions on these subjects are handled by them and not simply the minor questions, while the more important ones are taken elsewhere for decision.

Since Major Logan and I are members of staff corps ourselves, we can hardly be looked upon as enemies of these corps, and we both are firmly of the opinion that the administrative methods must be changed before efficiency can be obtained.

I have no desire to aggrandize the G. S., nor to minimize the importance of the Supply and Transportation Departments; my sole desire is to have the staff a machine which will work with the maximum efficiency and the minimum of lost motion, and my conviction is that all questions arising in these departments should be handled through the Administrative and Coordination Sections of the G. S.; that power should be given to those two sections after consultations with the chiefs of the services concerned to settle ordinary questions; and that only questions of considerable importance should be brought to the

C. of S.; and only those of very far-reaching results should ever go to the C-in-C. All questions should be first taken up with the chiefs of those G. S. Sections and only brought to higher authority when in the judgement of the chiefs of those sections the importance of the question necessitates it, the chiefs being responsible to the C. of S., for the accuracy and correctness of their decisions. If the chiefs of those sections make too many mistakes, then new chiefs of sections should be obtained, but the method of procedure itself will not have been proven wrong.

The present staff bears the same relation to an efficient staff that an All-American football team does to a good college team. They are all stars in their own lines, but they have never worked together; they have no policy of action, and there is no teamwork. Consequently as now organized, the individual ability of the separate members amounts to but little in the final result.

The technical staff of these headquarters undoubtedly contains the best men available in the various staff services which they represent, and their one desire is to perform their functions in the best possible manner, but they are all accustomed to doing things, not talking about them, and are men who have always been used to obtaining prompt decisions on their proposals, or, in fact, of making such decisions on very important matters themselves. It is, therefore, only natural that they should desire to obtain prompt action on their proposals and not to waste time discussing matters with subordinates whose action is not final. I think this is the crux of the whole matter.

Decisions on all such subjects ought to be made by the G. S., but it would be ridiculous to have junior officers, possibly reserve officers, pass on the accuracy or correctness of men like the chief staff officers, A. E. F. The work should be conducted by these chiefs themselves and decisions made after interviews with them. But in order to have those chiefs satisfied to work this way, the chiefs of the G. S. Sections must be authorized to act as well as talk.

If the C-in-C will delegate authority to make final decisions to certain G. S. officers, the business of the staff departments can be conducted promptly and smoothly. In delegating such authority he must be prepared to uphold the decisions made by his delegate, with the understanding that such delegate will not decide questions concerning which there is any doubt as to the wishes of the C-in-C and that the chiefs of sections will keep the C. of S. informed daily as to their action on various subjects.

3. I, therefore, proposed in construing G. O. No. 8, that all questions regarding policy enumerated in Table II-A, prescribing the functions of the Administrative Section, G. S., including all questions of personnel, leaves of absence, and replacements of men and animals be handled through the Administrative Section; that all questions regarding the subjects enumerated in Table II-E prescribing the functions of the C. S., G. S., including all questions having to do with transportation by rail or automobile; supply of organizations, distribution of labor and labor troops; evacuations and means of communication be handled through the C. S., G. S., that all questions on these subjects shall be taken up originally with the chiefs of the A. S. and G. S. Sections, G. S., respectively; that the chiefs of those sections shall be given authority to settle all questions arising in their sections after full conference with the departments concerned.

A representative of each staff or transportation department should ultimately be assigned to each of the two sections G. S., not to pass upon the projects of the chief of his corps or department but for information as to how projects of other departments affect the interests of his own, to keep the chief of his corps fully informed on subjects under consideration, and for technical use in the sections.

4. I believe that if the foregoing policy be adopted, many difficulties will be avoided and that a degree of efficiency will be obtained which is impossible under the present method.



5. The foregoing plan is that outlined by the C-in-C when he decided upon the existing organization of the G. S. It is only a question as to whether or not the time is ripe to put his plan into full operation and I believe that it is.

W. D. CONNOR,  
Colonel, 13th Engrs., N. A.,  
Chief of Section.

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G-1, GHQ, AEF: Report

***Movement of American Troops via England***

HEADQUARTERS AMERICAN TROOPS IN ENGLAND,  
*London, November 3, 1917.*

From: Board convened by S. O. 131 Hq. Amexforce, Oct. 19, 1917.

To: Commander-in-Chief, American Expeditionary Forces, France.

1. The written instructions of the board required it to determine the possibility of securing shelter in England for 28,000 American troops.

The board has conferred with the British Secretary of State for War, Lord Derby, and is informed officially by him that hut camps now in existence for the use of British troops will be put at our disposal in sufficient numbers to shelter 28,000 men. Accommodations for 16,000 men are now available and those for 12,000 will be available if we give the necessary notice.

2. Lord Derby also informed the board, however, that there are serious limitations on the matter of transporting our troops across the Channel from England to France. This is caused by the congestion of cross-channel traffic. At the present time only 600 of our men per day can be transported across the Channel. But when the increased leave privileges for the British army are put into effect, no American troops can be taken across the Channel by British transports; and the intention is to grant these additional privileges to British soldiers at a very early date.

As the board deemed it necessary that the authorities at Washington should know at once what numbers of American troops, if any, can continue to be sent via England, Lord Derby was asked for a definite statement as to how long it would be before increased leave privileges for the British army would stop our use of the British cross-channel boats. He mentioned December 1 as a tentative date. Asked then if we were to understand that no American troops could be sent via British boats across the Channel after December 1, he said he was not prepared to make such a statement; that getting troops across the Channel was an Admiralty question and that we would have to see the 1st Lord of the Admiralty.

As the matter thus became a Naval one, Admiral Sims has been asked to take it up and he is doing so.

Even if we could get our troops by our own boats from Southampton to Le Havre, the French railways cannot move more than 5,000 men per week for us from that port, as per official statement made to the Commanding General of our Line of Communications.

Hence if we are to have a large flow of troops via England to France it looks as if we must establish our own ferry service across the Channel from Southampton, not only to Havre but also to such ports as Cherbourg and Brest. This will require bringing over a number of fast, roomy and very seaworthy vessels from the United States; and it will also mean providing the destroyers for a separate convoy service across the Channel.

Arrangements of this kind will take time; they certainly cannot be effected by December 1.

It is probable that Admiral Sims will be able to arrange with the Admiralty some working plan whereby the two navies will succeed in maintaining a constant flow of our troops across the Channel. The board believes this will be done since it does not think the British Government will want to be in the position of declining altogether to help in getting our troops to France. But as negotiations will take time, the board thinks it best to submit its report now so that the other information contained in the report may be available at once. In the meantime the board recommends cabling to Washington that no more than 15,000 troops per month are to be sent via England and that no heavy baggage, no wagons and no mechanical transport are to come this way.

It may be that the British Government will have to be strongly urged to assist in making provision for moving through England American troops in far larger quantities than they now regard as feasible. But in order to do this successfully, it will be necessary to show the British Government what number of troops we expect to move by given dates, what number we can direct to France by ships we provide ourselves, and what number remain to come via England on British ships.

3. The board deems it of first importance to formulate at once a comprehensive program for moving our troops, based on conditions existing not only in America but upon those which exist in France and England. There is much evidence to the effect that the conditions in France and England are not appreciated in the United States. With a view to representing certain of the conditions existing on this side of the Atlantic, the board submits what follows, and does this in view of the Commander-in-Chief's verbal instructions to the board through General Lassiter to go into this whole subject rather fully.

Major Wilgus, U. S. Engineer Reserve Corps, who has been directed to report to the board, has been of great service in this matter.

4. Tonnage Requirements: High British authorities have several times inquired of American army officials in London, as to how we expect to solve our tonnage problem. To get to Europe the troops and supplies called for by our ambitious program, a great deal of tonnage will be required, and they do not see where it is to come from unless we dislocate traffic already of vital importance to the conduct of the war.

With a view to showing how our tonnage requirements look from this angle, the statement prepared by Major Wilgus, is submitted. This is necessarily a rough synopsis of our needs. A complete statement cannot be made without detailed knowledge as to proportions of animals, motor transport, etc., which we intend to send over, and of the characteristics of the ships available. But the figures given are based on recent British experience and may be taken as giving a good picture of our shipping requirements.

For moving troops it is estimated that we need 1,150,000 tons in service at once, if we expect to maintain arrivals at the rate of 500,000 men half-yearly. In this connection it may be said that the fleet of passenger vessels, 16 in number, taken from the Germans comprises only 280,000 tons.

For moving munitions of all kinds, representing current needs, 130,000 tons of shipping for every 100,000 men in France are estimated as necessary.

For building up within a year's time a reserve of supplies for 1,000,000 men a fleet of 300,000 tons must be in constant service, and immediately available.

Our progressive tonnage requirements may be stated as follows:

<i>Date</i>	<i>No. of Men</i>	<i>Gross Tonnage</i>
	100,000	1,580,000
March 1, 1918	300,000	1,840,000
Mid-May, 1918	500,000	2,100,000
Sep. 1, 1918	800,000	2,490,000
Dec. 1, 1918	1,000,000	2,750,000
Dec. 1, 1919	2,000,000	4,050,000

5. Port and Rail Facilities in France: According to Major Wilgus' statement herewith, the berthing space for ships and the railway rolling stock now at our disposal in France are sufficient for dealing with a force of 300,000 men; moreover, enlargements are in train, which will care for a force arriving at the average rate of 500,000 men every six months.

But it is questionable whether troops are not even now arriving at a faster rate than their indispensable stores and munitions, and whether shelter for men and stores is being provided at an adequate rate.

Certainly it must be kept in mind that the whole scheme for enlarging ports, rail facilities, warehouses, hospitals, camps, etc., to meet our increasing needs is predicated upon the timely arrival of labor, material and tools.

It is a matter for examination and decision whether the flow of troops should not be checked until adequate supply arrangements have been made.

6. Ports and Vessels: In order to get our troops and supplies to France, we will probably have to make use of every vessel and every port that is available to us. But it would seem that we should exhaust the possibilities of the direct route to France in addition to availing ourselves of the circuitous route via England. The possibilities of the route via England are at present strictly limited; those of the route via France are also limited, but they can be greatly enlarged if we will promptly provide the necessary labor, material and tools.

It is thought that the importance of the following should be impressed on our authorities in the United States:

(a) The port of Brest is the only French port which will receive our largest ships. But such ships cannot get up to the docks; they must lie in an open roadstead and be lightered. All authorities agree that heavy baggage cannot be handled in the Brest roadstead and that troops coming into Brest on big ships must bring only light baggage with them; that their heavy baggage must come to the more southerly ports. Moreover, the water supply at Brest is limited and of poor quality so that a rest camp could scarcely be established there, and it will be necessary to keep our troops on the ships until they can be lightered ashore and entrained for the journey to their permanent camps. Another difficulty is that of coaling large ships. They cannot recoal at Brest. If they cannot bring coal for the return trip they must go to Southampton or Liverpool, thus prolonging their stay in dangerous waters and increasing the time required for a round trip.

However, with all these limitations, it appears that we must use Brest and must send the necessary tugs and lighters there at once.

(b) It is important to route our troops to ports as near as may be to the camps they are to occupy, so as to avoid unnecessary rail traffic. Troops are now coming via England which might be landed within 50 miles of their training camps in France.

(c) It is of vital importance for our officials on both sides of the Atlantic to have closer touch with one another's plans and difficulties. To this end a shipping commissioner thoroughly posted as to affairs at home should be sent at once to France to explain what ships are to be employed, at what rate and according to what program; both troops and supplies are to arrive; and to see for himself the capacity, the limitations, and the needs of the situation on this side so that he can promptly and intelligently supply the officials in the United States with the information which they now lack. Close and constant communication should then be maintained between the shipping manager on this side and the one at home so that adaptations may be made to meet constantly changing requirements.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That the War Department be informed that accommodations may be secured in England for 28,000 men, but that due to congestion on the British cross-channel boats and on the French railways leaving Le Havre, not more than 15,000 can be moved per month from England to our camps in France. That, unless the British and French arrange to do more

for us the only way for us to improve the situation is to provide our own boats for the trip from Southampton to French channel ports, and our own Naval convoys for these boats. Furthermore, that no heavy baggage or animal or mechanical transport should accompany troops coming via England.

2. That studies be made at once of Brest and the railway leading therefrom with a view to determining the number of troops that can be received there, and moved away daily by the railway; likewise the number of lighters, tugs and other facilities needed. That as soon as arrangements can be made to receive troops at Brest the War Department be notified of the fact, with statement of limitations as to coal, as to baggage and as to the number of troops which can be daily moved by the railways. The necessity of feeding troops on shipboard until railways can transport them should also be pointed out.

3. That similar studies be at once made of Cherbourg and any other available French channel ports with a view to determining their capacity to receive our troops coming from England, and to determine the capacity of railroads to move these troops.

4. That cable request be made for shipping commissioner to come at once to France to explain the plans of the authorities at home, and to see for himself the needs of the situation in France so that he can at once provide the authorities at home with the information they lack.

5. That the War Department be advised of the estimate here made of our tonnage requirements as based on British experience, so that these figures may be used to check those made in Washington.

That based upon exact information as to shipping and port capacities a program be arranged with the Washington authorities as to the times and the order in which both troops and stores will arrive, so that all necessary arrangements may be made.

6. That examination be made of the question of whether we are to receive supplies and munitions for our fighting troops and labor, tools and material necessary for receiving, forwarding and sheltering the same, at a rate equal to that of the arrival of troops.

7. That consideration be given the idea of conferring with the British Government as to the best way of allocating existing shipping and supplies. We may not want to pool either shipping or supplies, but a conference with the highest members of the British Government on this subject might serve to show each party how they could help the other with advantage to the general cause. We are seeking many things from the British and they from us. It would seem that there should be a clearing house where these claims could be passed upon, with the requirements of the Allies as a whole in view.

GEO. T. BARTLETT,  
Major General, U. S. N. A.,  
President.

WM. LASSITER.  
Brigadier General, U. S. N. A.,  
Member.

H. F. RETHERS,  
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. A.,  
Member.

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***Operations Section Directed to Study the Effects of Events in Italy***

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF.  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, November 5, 1917.*

For: The Operations Section

Will the operations section please confidentially consider the possibility of the A. E. F. being compelled by events in Italy to take a place in line at once?

1. In some part of the front now occupied by the French, replacing units of the latter.
2. To be used south of Switzerland.  
What units could we use in such an emergency?  
Which theater would be preferable?  
Please give this prompt confidential consideration.

J. G. HARBORD,  
Chief of Staff.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: 1853: Letter

***Authority Requested to Send American Liaison Officers to Italy***

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
Chaumont, Haute-Marne, November 6, 1917.

From: The Commander-in-Chief

To: Chief of French Military Mission

1. In view of present circumstances in Italy, it would seem of great importance that the American General Staff be represented on the staff of the French army there.
2. If this suggestion is concurred in by the French Commander-in-Chief, it is requested that authority be granted for two or more members of the General Staff of the United States Army to be attached to the Staff of the French army in Italy.

By direction:

JAMES G. HARBORD,  
Chief of Staff.

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***Possibility that Events in Italy May Force A. E. F. into the Line***

Operations Section

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, November 6, 1917.*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

1. No units of the A. E. F. are at present in proper condition to be employed in the line for other than training purposes.

2. Only such conditions as would justify a belief that France or England in addition to Italy was in the act of collapsing could make it advisable for the A. E. F. to engage in active operations (other than in quiet sectors for training) until a reasonable number of trained divisions are available. This time will not arrive before the coming spring.

3. There is no present prospect of England collapsing and the French morale appears to be much better than it was 6 or 8 months ago.

However, possible events in Italy may have very serious effects both materially and morally on France.

4. The Italian power has been definitely reduced, but only the utter collapse of Italy would give the enemy such a definite superiority (including the possibility of countries now neutral joining the central powers) as might enable him to undertake an offensive gravely threatening France; and even so a considerable time must elapse before such an offensive could be developed.

Such a collapse of Italy is possible but not yet probable.

5. It is reasonable to suppose that even the present events in Italy somewhat disturb the French morale. The A. E. F. might assist in counteracting this by propaganda in the French press, concerning the aid now being furnished France in materiel and money as well as concerning the presence of our troops in the trenches for training purpose.

6. A threatened collapse of France during the next six months or more would be a threatened Allied defeat which would become a reality should the collapse become complete. Should the indications of such a collapse become unmistakable, every available man of the A. E. F. should be employed, with the sole remaining hope of assisting in averting the evident catastrophe.

7. It is not believed that a catastrophe is probable, but should it occur before the coming spring it would be impossible to employ our troops as an independent force. For the next two months only the 1st Division could be employed as a divisional unit. All other troops could be employed as a desperate measure by battalions.

8. Only the actual breaking of the French line or a marked failing in morale of a portion of the French army would be a positive indication of a French collapse. Only such an indication would justify the desperate measure of employing our troops before they are ready. Such an employment could only hope to assist in restoring the failing morale - by the presence of American troops amongst those affected. The places at which our troops should be so employed would depend upon the nature and place of the French failure, and such places cannot, therefore, be exactly located in advance.

9. The bulk of the forces now operating against the Allies in Italy (or which are likely to operate in that region) are Austrian. The United States is not at war with Austria and this alone seems sufficient to exclude the south of Switzerland for the employment of our troops under conditions which should now be considered. Moreover, any emergency action should consider the eventual employment of our troops in the regions recommended in the strategical study made by this section. The conclusions therein are believed to be sound and it is believed that the emergency employment of our troops south of Switzerland would decidedly interfere with the ultimate realization of those conclusions. Conditions of terrain and possibilities of hostile offensives seem to render it inadvisable to employ our troops in the Vosges.

10. Should the necessity of employing our troops before the spring of 1918 become inevitable, it would be necessary to attach our troops to French organizations and the replacing of larger French units by our forces would not be advisable.

11. Conclusions:

(a) It does not now appear probable that the employment of our troops before spring will be inevitable.

(b) Under our present plans our troops are well placed for any eventuality.

(c) Unless and until we declare war on Austria, no conditions can now be reasonably foreseen which would justify employing our forces south of Switzerland.

(d) Our forces should not be employed in the Vosges.

12. Recommendations:

(a) That we continue our present program and resist any tendency toward the premature employment of our forces unless and until such employment is necessitated by a threatened collapse of France; a collapse appearing by actual events.

(b) Definite plans for the emergency employment of our forces should not be decided upon until the place and nature of a collapse justifying such employment are known.

(c) That the Intelligence Section, General Staff, prepare and carry out in the French press a program of advertising the aid now being rendered France and the presence of units of the A. E. F. in the line for training.

FOX CONNER,  
Colonel, Inspector General,  
Acting Chief of Section.

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*RAPALLO, November 7, 1917---4 p.m.*

[Extract]

MINUTES OF A CONFERENCE OF THE BRITISH, FRENCH, AND ITALIAN GOVERNMENTS,  
HELD AT THE NEW CASINO HOTEL, RAPALLO, ON  
WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 7, 1917, AT 4 p. m.

Fifth Session\*

FIRST SESSION OF SUPREME WAR COUNCIL

PRESENT

ENGLAND

The Right Hon. D. Lloyd  
George, M. P. Prime  
Minister.

Lieutenant General the  
Right Hon. J. C. Smuts,  
K. C.

General Sir W. R. Robertson,  
G. C. B., K. C. V. O.,  
D. S. O., Chief of the  
Imperial General Staff.

General Sir H. H. Wilson,  
K. C. B., D. S. O.

ITALY

Baron Sonnino, Minister  
for Foreign Affairs.

FRANCE

M. Painleve, President  
of the council

M. Franklin-Bouillon,  
Minister of State and  
Member of the War  
Committee

M. Barrere, French  
Ambassador, Rome.

General Foch, Chief  
of Staff.

General Gondrecourt

General Weygand

SECRETARIES

Lieutenant Colonel Sir M. P. A. Hankey, K. C. B., Secretary, British War Cabinet.

Count Aldrovandi, Chef de Cabinet to Baron Sonnino.

Commandant Helbronner, C. M. G., D. S. O., M. C., Secretary, French War Committee.

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Mr. Lloyd George said that he had discussed with his colleagues the question of the place at which the Supreme War Cabinet was to meet. Though anxious to fall in with the views of the French Ministers, particularly in view of the fact that they were supported by Baron Sonnino, he did not feel able to do so. He had had an informal conversation with M. Painleve and had asked him to select some town outside Paris, and he understood M. Painleve had consented. If it was found impossible to work in these conditions, it would be necessary to consider the matter again. He desired, however, above all things, that the Supreme War Council should be independent, and further should give an impression of

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\* The Supreme War Council was formally constituted at this meeting, and the new organization took its first decisions (Annex II). Consequently this was the first meeting of the Supreme War Council.



independence. He understood that the French Government favoured Versailles, and he recalled the historical fact that the German Empire had been built up at Versailles, and he hoped equally that Prussian domination might be broken down at the same place.

M. Painleve said that he was anxious to show the spirit in which the French Government approached the organization of this Supreme War Council, and consequently, although adhering entirely to the views he had already expressed in regard to the advantages of Paris, he and his colleagues were willing to assent to the establishment of the Council at Versailles.

M. Franklin-Bouillon supported M. Painleve's views. He still remained convinced that Versailles was not the best choice, but in order to create an atmosphere of unanimity he was willing to accept Versailles. There were so many great matters to discuss that he did not wish to lose too much time over what was a matter of detail.

Mr. Lloyd George thanked the French Government. He then proposed the text of the document constituting the Supreme War Council, and nominating the Generals representing the three powers, which was adopted. (Annex I)

Baron Sonnino asked that the agreements should be published simultaneously, the Italian Parliament would meet on Monday, and the Italian Government would make its declaration on that day.

Mr. Lloyd George said that he and M. Painleve could make the declaration at the Parliamentary *dejeuner* on Monday.

M. Franklin-Bouillon said the French Government accepted this proposal.

Baron Sonnino read the terms of reference given to the military representatives by the Supreme War Council, which was accepted. (Annex II)

He said that the Italians had decided to send immediately to the front the whole of the 1899 class, which would represent about 200,000 men. They would anticipate the calling up of the 1900 class. To call up fresh classes now, when sowing had to be done, would only increase dissatisfaction in the country and lower its morale. Included in the previous classes which were already under arms were men born in 1874.

Mr. Lloyd George said that General Robertson had something to ask concerning the Italian divisions in Albania and in the Salonica armies.

Baron Sonnino said that we had learned that some German troops passing along the islands along the Dalmatian coast were to be disembarked at Durrazzo.

General Robertson said that we had just asked the French Government to ask General Sarraill to send reports on the actual situation and in future to send them in a regular manner.

Mr. Lloyd George asked that the Supreme War Council should concern itself with all the fronts where the Allied armies were fighting in common.

M. Painleve said that he absolutely agreed in this.

Baron Sonnino also agreed in this proposal, which was adopted by the conference. (The conference approved the publication in the Italian Press of an announcement proposed by Baron Sonnino.)

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### **Annex I**

#### **DECISIONS OF A CONFERENCE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE BRITISH, FRENCH, AND ITALIAN GOVERNMENTS ASSEMBLED AT RAPALLO ON NOVEMBER 7, 1917.**

I. The representatives of the British, French, and Italian Governments assembled at Rapallo on November 7, 1917, have agreed on the scheme for the organization of a Supreme War Council with a permanent military representative from each power, contained in the following paragraph.

## SCHEME OF ORGANIZATION OF A SUPREME WAR COUNCIL

II. (1) With a view to the better coordination of military action on the western front a Supreme War Council is created, composed of the Prime Minister and a member of the government of each of the Great Powers whose armies are fighting on that front. The extension of the scope of the council to other fronts is reserved for discussion with the other Great Powers.

(2) The Supreme War Council has for its mission to watch over the general conduct of the war. It prepares recommendations for the decisions of the governments, and keeps itself informed of their execution and reports thereon to the respective governments.

(3) The general staffs and military commands of the armies of each power charged with the conduct of military operations remain responsible to their respective governments.

(4) The general war plans drawn up by the competent military authorities are submitted to the Supreme War Council, which, under the high authority of the governments, ensures their concordance, and submits, if need be, any necessary changes.

(5) Each power delegates to the Supreme War Council one permanent military representative whose exclusive function is to act as technical adviser to the council.

(6) The military representatives receive from the government and the competent military authorities of their country all the proposals, information, and documents relating to the conduct of the war.

(7) The military representatives watch day by day the situation of the forces, and of the means of all kinds of which the Allied armies and the enemy armies dispose.

(8) The Supreme War Council meets normally at Versailles, where the permanent military representatives and their staffs are established. They may meet at other places as may be agreed upon, according to circumstances. The meetings of the Supreme War Council will take place at least once a month.

III. The permanent military representative will be as follows:

For France	General Foch
" Great Britain	General Wilson
" Italy	General Cadorna

Rapallo,

November 7, 1917.

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### **Annex II**

#### SUPREME WAR COUNCIL

##### TERMS OF REFERENCE TO THE PERMANENT MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES

1. The Supreme War Council, assembled at Rapallo on November 7, 1917, directs its permanent military representatives to report immediately on the present situation on the Italian front. In consultation with the Italian General Headquarters they should examine into the present state of affairs, and, on a general review of the military situation in all theatres, should advise as to the amount and nature of assistance to be given by the British and French Governments, and as to the manner in which it should be applied.

2. The Italian Government undertakes to instruct the Italian Supreme Command to give every facility to the permanent military representatives both in regard to documentary information and movements in the zone of operations.

Rapallo,

November 7, 1917.

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**Handling Troops Through Great Britain**

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, November 9, 1917--1 p.m.*

AGWAR, WASHINGTON

For the Chief of Staff

[Extract]

\* \* \* \* \*

1A. Special reference subparagraph A your above cable. Bartlett president of the board detailed under instructions contained in your 293, advises results of conference with British indicate it will be impracticable for them to transport American troops across channel except in very small detachments, this being due to greatly increased number of British crossing channel on leave during winter months. Bartlett states if we could provide boats to move our troops across channel, British will receive troops in England and furnish hut accommodations for 28,000 men and stores. He states British Admiralty has investigated matter but does not believe that channel boats required type can be obtained in United States and that docks and railroad accommodations at Le Havre are probably not equal to large increasing demand. This latter agrees with French statements. Bartlett believes previous reports of maximum average of 600 per day and not exceeding 5,000 at one time is practically all we can get through England and even with this number we may have some difficulty. Recommend while utilizing British movement we place main reliance on Brest for our deep draft transports.

\* \* \* \* \*

PERSHING.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: 681-III-IV: Memorandum

**Transportation for Troops in Divisional Areas**

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, November 9, 1917.*

MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF OF ADMINISTRATIVE SECTION

1. It is thought that the strategical situation of the A. E. F. is likely to become dangerous through lack of mobility of troops in the forward areas. This is based on the following considerations:

(a) It is the German policy to smash a new enemy before he is ready to become desperately engaged.

(b) It takes a long time to establish a training system in any given area. Hence, it would greatly embarrass us and thus aid the enemy should he attack and destroy our training area when it is full of partly trained and equipped troops.

(c) The Russian and Italian situations indicate Germany may have troops available for this purpose. She could probably assemble 30 additional divisions on this front within 60 days.

(d) It is, therefore, a fair presumption (one of several possible enemy plans) that such an attack may occur about February 1, as a winter campaign, when we would have 9 or 10 divisions in the training areas, or as an early spring campaign.

(e) The result of the present campaign in Italy plainly shows that troops without full field transportation that are close to the front that is attacked are so immobile that they are sure to suffer disaster.

2. It is realized that constant efforts in this direction have already been made but in view of the danger it is urged that these efforts be redoubled.

FOX CONNER,  
Colonel, Inspector General,  
Acting Chief of Section.

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Cable: P-279-S

***Request that Units Sent to France be Equipped with Transportation***

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
Chaumont, Haute-Marne, November 10, 1917.

Adjutant General, Washington

[Extract]

\* \* \* \* \*

5. For Chief of Staff. Request that all divisions and other units sent to France be completely equipped with authorized transportation, both mechanical-driven and animal-drawn, and organized before leaving America. Various division commanders temporarily in France state War Department staff departments advise them motor transportation, wagon trains, harness, et cetera, will be furnished in France where their equipment is to be completed. So far this is not the case, therefore, recommend that chiefs of staff departments and divisional and other commanders embarking for France be directed to complete the combat, field, supply, ammunition, sanitary, engineer trains before departure. If personnel of units be sent via England or Brest necessitating sending transportation units via other bases it is very important the transportation arrive here before the troops so that transport units completely organized with its personnel may be dispatched to billeting areas to provide transportation facilities for the troops upon their arrival. At present time one division dispersed in billeting area some ten miles long by five miles wide, with one railhead in area has only two motor trucks available for its supply. French are helping out, otherwise there would be a breakdown but their ability to assist is limited. Recommend all division and other commanders of units coming to Europe and the various staff services be advised that organization and equipment of transportation units are vital to efficient operation. \* \* \* Again recommend that divisions be assembled at or near port of embarkation in plenty of time to complete their organization and equipment before sailing.

\* \* \* \* \*

PERSHING.

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**Organization of General Staff, Headquarters, Line of  
Communications Ordered**

Administrative Section

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, November 10, 1917.*

From: Commander-in-Chief

To: Commanding General, Line of Communications

1. The C-in-C desires that you proceed at once with the organization of the General Staff, Hq. L. of C. The General Staff at these hq. will be organized on the same lines as the G. S., Hq. A. E. F. as follows: Chief of Staff, an Administrative Section, an Intelligence Section, an Operations Section, and a Coordination Section.

2. The C-in-C desires that the general staff functions as described in G. O. No. 8, these hq. be put into effect in each one of these sections, and that the general staff control as indicated in this same order be put into operation as rapidly as possible in the L. of C.

3. It is the purpose to decentralize, as far as possible, the general staff functions being exercised by A. E. F., Hq., General Staff, and to place much of the detail now being carried on by the A. E. F., Hq., General Staff, in the corresponding sections of the general staff attached to the Hq. L. of C.

4. As soon as the General Staff, L. of C., begins to function, it is the desire of the C-in-C that the officers of the various sections of the General Staff of the L. of C. maintain constant contact with the corresponding sections of the General Staff, A. E. F., to the end that there is a frequent interchange of ideas, explanations, etc.

5. Everything that can possibly be done to strengthen the control of the C. G., L. of C., over the operations of the L. of C. will be done by these hq. In this same connection, it is believed that the formation of a strong general staff with the L. of C. will considerably aid the C. G., L. of C., in his operations. Incidentally, the desired result of making it possible to decentralize, and place with the L. of C. much of the work at present being carried on by these hq., and the various sections attached to it, will be accomplished.

6. Officers will be assigned to report to you for duty as chiefs of the various sections of your general staff. You are also authorized to detail any officers at present under your command for duty with these sections.

7. In view of the fact that various officers of the general staff act under delegated authority, there is no requirement that the chief of staff should be senior in rank to the chiefs of the various sections.

8. The D. G. T. will be directed to assign an officer of his dept. in direct liaison with your hq. In this manner the movement of troops and personnel may be quickly and promptly handled.

9. In principle, all communications coming to the hq. of the L. of C. from the various C. O.'s of the S. S. and T. Service Sections, L. of C., will be handled directly by your general staff, as well as all communications coming from these hq.

By command of General Pershing:

DAVIS,  
Actg. Adjutant General.

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***American Liaison Officer to go to Italy***

[Contemporary Translation]

No. 6,154/3

*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, November 10, 1917.*

From: General Ragueneau, Chief of French Military Mission at American Hq.

To: Commander-in-Chief, A. E. F. (Operations Section)

(Reply to letter No. 8501 ASK of Nov. 6, 1917)

The Commander-in-Chief this day advises me by telephone that your suggestion is accepted, relative to sending officers of the Staff of the American Army to the Staff of the French Army in Italy.

I have the honor to request that you kindly communicate to me as soon as possible the names of the officers that you will designate and the date on which they will be ready to leave.

(Unintelligible)

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Cable: P-280-S

***Vigorous Division Commanders Required***

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, November 10, 1917---12 p. m.*

AGWAR, WASHINGTON

For: General Biddle and Secretary of War

[Extract]

Reference subparagraph B, your 379, earnestly request that only division commanders who have strong mental and physical vigor be sent here as observers. Division commanders who are in any way unable to stand continuous work actually in trenches under conditions found on western front are useless here. Consider it imposition on Allies to send officer not fit in every particular.

\* \* \* \* \*

PERSHING.

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***Relief, Promotion, and Assignment Policy Regarding Officers***

A. G. O., WAR DEPARTMENT,  
Washington, D. C., November 12, 1917.

PERSHING, AMEXFORCE, H. A. E. F.

With reference to your 280 every effort will be made to send you suitable division commanders. In sending over those already gone it had been hoped they would be able to do the work until such time as the efficiency of the younger officers had been determined. You will be thoroughly supported in the relief of any officers that you care to relieve and any recommendations made by you as to promotion or assignment will be given greatest weight. If you cannot make use of the officers behind the lines return them to the United States. Secretary of War desires particularly for you to understand that he will give full support to anything you may do or recommend in that regard.  
Biddle.

McCAIN.

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AG, GHQ, AEF: 8059: Memorandum

***Preparation of 1st, 2d, and 26th Divisions for Operations***

Operations Section

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF,  
Chaumont, Haute-Marne, November 20, 1917.

For: Chief of Staff

1. In order to prepare the above divisions for operations and for possible emergencies in the spring, indicated in papers submitted by this section, it is recommended that, as far as practicable, steps be taken to place these divisions at full strength and also that all absent units now in France join their divisions. The 42d Division (replacement division) is partially available for the above purposes. The release of absent units especially those on the Line-of Communications, can be facilitated by utilizing therefor the 2d Brigade of the 42d Division, upon its arrival in France.

2. The steps necessary to accomplish the foregoing include:

(a) The relief of all detachments in the 1st, 2d, and 26th Divisions, that are now absent on duty with the Line of Communications, etc.

NOTE: A number of combat troops of these divisions have been detached from their divisions for Line of Communications purposes without any information thereof being furnished this section. In order to insure proper administration, training and readiness for operations, it is believed that no combat units should be detached from their regular organizations without giving this section an opportunity to express its opinion concerning the same.

(b) Increasing the strength of the divisions named to that authorized by Tables of Organization.

(c) Replacing in the divisions named, officers now absent as permanent instructors, etc., at schools.

3. In this connection the following organizations have been definitely requested by the training section for school purposes. It is recommended that these units be furnished as indicated below:

(a) For each army corps center of instruction.

1 battalion of infantry	To be taken from the first replacement division of each corps. Recommend that for the present these be limited to 2 companies.
1 battery of field artillery 75-44	To be taken from the 3-inch regiment of the first replacement division of each corps.
1 battery of field artillery 155-mm. or 6-inch howitzers	To be taken from the 6-inch howitzer regiment of the second replacement Division of each corps. This unit to be temporarily supplied from the 3d Regiment of the first replacement division of each corps.
1 squadron of cavalry for 1 Corps center of instruction	To be supplied from cavalry regiments of the I Corps, temporarily from the 3d cavalry.

(b) For the army center of instruction at Langres.

1 battalion of infantry	To be taken from the second replacement division of the I Corps. For the present this to be limited to two companies, taken temporarily from the first replacement division of the I Corps.
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150 mounts to be supplied by staff departments.

NOTE: Training section has been consulted in connection with the foregoing and concurs except as to the reduction of the infantry to be supplied the I Corps center of instruction and army center of instruction. The training section believes that the full number of one battalion to each school should be furnished at the present time. Operations section believes that this should be done but in view of the necessity of bringing the combat divisions to near their authorized strength it is unable to see where the required number of men may be secured at the present time.

4. Under the organization project of these headquarters, the commander of the 67th Field Artillery Brigade, 42d Division, will perform the duties of Chief of Artillery of the I Corps and for this purpose should have the following additional staff officers:

- 1 officer as chief of staff for corps artillery
- 1 officer in charge of heavy artillery duties
- 1 officer in charge of light artillery duties
- 1 officer in charge of trench and antiaircraft artillery duties
- 2 officers for information duties.

Recommend that the above officers be detailed as soon as practicable. The first course of the field artillery school of instruction at Saumur will be completed on January 1, 1918. Several officers suitable for junior staff positions will be released at that time.

5. If the recommendations contained in the foregoing paragraphs are approved it is



recommended that this communication be referred to the administration and coordination sections to arrange the necessary details.

FOX CONNER,  
Colonel, General Staff,  
Acting Chief of Section.

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Cable: A-426-R

***Authority Granted to Discharge Officers Except from Regular Army***

A. G. O., WAR DEPARTMENT,  
Washington, D. C., November 22, 1917.

PERSHING, AMEXFORCE

[Extract]

1. Paragraph 9, your 288. Authority granted you to discharge by order of the President inefficient officers of all branches of the service without citing statute or general orders. This includes all officers excepting those holding permanent commissions in regular army or officers given temporary promotions in regular army. It includes a discharge of regular officers from their national army commissions, also officers holding temporary appointments in regular army as distinguished from officers who have been given temporary promotion. This replaces instructions in our number 362, paragraph one. Cable this office action in each case.

\* \* \* \* \*

McCAIN.

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***Sector for the American Expeditionary Forces Recommended***

Operations Section

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, November 24, 1917.*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF

1. In confidential studies submitted by this section it has been stated that, assuming no great change in the general situation, the A. E. F. will find its natural employment during 1918 on the front immediately west of Pont-a-Mousson. Further study confirms these views.

2. It is, of course, not impossible that there will be a totally different general situation before our troops are ready. Such a change is, however, not yet evident.

3. Preparation to meet the present conditions on the western front requires far more time than would arrangements to meet a more mobile form of war.

4. Should it be determined to employ our troops in a small offensive west of Pont-a-Mousson, it is estimated (based on all previous experience of our Allies) that in the present form of the war nearly four months be required in preparation. Thus, if we intended attacking in June, we should have to begin preparations in the immediate rear of the sector soon after February 1.

5. Various questions concerning the location of troops and establishments are constantly arising. Studies of possible operations should now be undertaken, but the available personnel does not permit completing a study of each possible contingency. These questions and studies would be more satisfactorily settled and conducted were we working toward a definite operation while at the same time making our preparations to be ready for any eventuality.

6. Instructions to the chiefs of sections of the general staff would, for the present, suffice to coordinate all efforts.

7. It is recommended that chiefs of section be informed, confidentially:

(a) That our present plans contemplate placing our troops in the sector immediately west of Pont-a-Mousson during the spring and summer of 1918.

(b) That during 1918 it is planned to conduct a limited offensive in the region mentioned.

(c) That the necessary studies, with a view to formulating detailed plans for such an operation, will be made in each section.

(d) That, while all decisions as to location of troops, etc., will be made with a view to carrying out the offensive in question, no arrangements will, for the present, be made which will interfere with our freedom in changing our plans.

8. It is further recommended:

(a) That, provided no great change in the general situation occurs, a definite proposition to prepare the Pont-a-Mousson---Seicheprey sector for our troops be taken up with the French about January 15, 1918.

(b) That, in the event a definite decision is reached, about the middle of January, to take over the sector considered, the chiefs of supply and transportation services be notified of such decision not later than February 1, 1918.

FOX CONNER,  
Colonel, General Staff,  
Acting Chief of Section.

[Pencil note below signature reads: "Accepted by C-in-C, Dec. 15, 1917."]

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***Notes of a Conference held at Paris on November 25, 1917.***

HOTEL de CRILLON,  
*Paris, November 25, 1917.*

[Extract]

1. Yesterday afternoon Mr. House received a note from M. Clemenceau requesting Mr. House and General Bliss to meet M. Clemenceau and General Petain at the former's office in the Ministry of War at three o'clock this afternoon for a conference on a subject not mentioned in the note. The conference terminated a few minutes before four o'clock. After our arrival and the exchange of usual courtesies, M. Clemenceau said that he would get straight to business and discuss the subject of the conference, to wit, the effective force of the French army in its relation to the arrival of American troops. He then requested General Petain to make a general statement.

2. General Petain began by saying that there are now 108 divisions of competent French troops at his disposition, including all troops on the immediate front and those which are held in reserve. He said that the French losses have been approximately 2,600,000 men, killed, died of wounds, permanently incapacitated, and prisoners. This is in addition to all men on the lines of communication and in the general service of the rear. Eight of these divisions, by about the beginning of the new year or soon thereafter, will have been transferred to northern Italy, leaving 100 for service in France. As these divisions are not more than eleven thousand men strong each, this will give him a disposable force of not more than eleven hundred thousand men. He stated that the English have in France and Flanders sixty divisions which, as their divisions approximate twenty thousand men each, gives them a force of approximately twelve hundred thousand men.

3. He further stated that the English with this force of twelve hundred thousand men are occupying a front of about 150 kilometers, and M. Clemenceau then added that the French with their eleven hundred thousand men were occupying about 500 kilometers.

4. General Petain estimated that on the German front there was an equal number of troops but that there were no means of determining with accuracy how many disposable men the latter had in the rear. He thought it possible that the Germans might be able to transfer from the Russian front as many as 40 divisions if they were not held there by active operations on the part of the Russians and Roumanians.

5. He seemed to think that the preliminary instruction of American troops in the trenches was not proceeding as rapidly as it might. I shall make no further note of this part of his statement until I can confer with General Pershing because, I think, General Petain's view was based upon a misconception of the troops now actually with General Pershing and available for the instruction in question.

6. General Petain, in reply to the question as to how many American troops he desired to have available at a fixed date, replied that as many as possible should be there as early as possible but that they must be soldiers and not merely men. It being explained to him how desirable it was that we should have an approximate definite number by a fixed date in order to make our negotiations with those who must provide the necessary tonnage, he stated that we must have a million men available for the early campaign of 1919, with another million ready to replace and reinforce them. Asked, how many we should have in France for a campaign in 1918, he said that this was answered by fixing the number for the campaign of 1919 since, in order to have this number for the latter campaign they would have to arrive at a fixed rate from this moment and extending throughout the year 1918; the number that would thus have arrived at any fixed date in the year 1918 was all that he would ask for that date. He explained that for the campaign of 1918 he would utilize the American troops in holding those parts of the line on which he would not make an offensive, thus relieving the French troops now there and making the latter available for

an offensive elsewhere. In order to carry out this plan, he stated that we should move troops to France at the rate of two divisions complete per month with corresponding service of the rear troops, until about the first of May when the rate should be increased to three divisions a month and continue thus through the calendar year.

7. It will be noted that at this rate, including the four divisions now in France, there would be there at the end of the year a total of thirty divisions. Since the American division as now organized consists of 27,000 men, these thirty divisions would be equivalent to seventy-three French divisions of 11,000 men each.

\* \* \* \* \*

No notes were taken during the conference between three and four p. m. of this date but the foregoing was dictated by General Bliss as his best recollection of it immediately after returned to his hotel.

[UNSIGNED.]

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Cable: P-318-S

### ***Recommended Rate of Forwarding Replacements***

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, November 26, 1917.*

AGWAR, WASHINGTON

[Extract]

\* \* \* \* \*

B. As approximately one-half of the first phase, priority schedule, is here now, replacement drafts should be arriving at approximately one-half the rate indicated note on page 9 of priority schedule; that is we should now be receiving about 2,000 men per month as replacement drafts in addition to those which are being sent to fill up the divisions, corps, army and service of rear troops to authorized strength. In this connection see paragraph 18, my Cablegram 212, and paragraph 4 E, my Cablegram 287. Pershing.

C. It is of vital importance to the efficiency of our forces here that the system of regular shipment of replacement drafts be established as soon as possible and maintained at approximate rates called for in priority schedule notes on pages 15, 21, 27, and 32, that is 2 per cent per month of the total strength in France. Question of portion of replacement required for various arms of the service is being carefully watched and you will be advised from time to time as to any modifications necessary in rate of shipments. In the meantime please ship replacement drafts as indicated in this cable. Request information as to when you can begin such shipments as this is very important in working out our plans for handling replacements. Pershing.

\* \* \* \* \*

PERSHING.

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Cable: P-322-S: Cablegram

***Request to have Priority Schedule Followed***

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, November 27, 1917.*

AGWAR, WASHINGTON

[Extract]

\* \* \* \* \*

2A. For Chief of Staff. It would save a great deal of cabling and much uncertainty on part of all concerned here if you could cable that our priority schedule of October 7, is being strictly followed and if you would give a forecast of the dates on which various units necessary to complete the first phase will be organized and when they will be shipped. Again strongly urge that all necessary steps including use of the draft be taken to put our priority schedule into full effect.

\* \* \* \* \*

PERSHING.

G-1, GHQ, AEF: 11: Memorandum

***Operation of the Priority Schedule Program***

3d Section, General Staff

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, November 29, 1917.*

MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF, OPERATIONS SECTION, GENERAL STAFF:

In compliance with instructions of November 28, the following data regarding the above subject are furnished.

1. During the latter part of July or early August 1917, an embarkation service was organized at the War Department, the function of which was to effect the shipment of forces overseas. General Kernan was first appointed Chief with Colonel C. B. Baker, Q. M. C., his principal assistant. When General Kernan left, General C. B. Baker, Q. M. C., became Chief, with Major F. T. Hines (C. A. C.), General Staff, his principal assistant.

2. The first priority of shipment schedule was drawn up by an officer of the Operations Committee, War College Division, General Staff, after consultation with the office of the embarkation service. The tonnage available and in sight was divided into five fleets, the tentative dates of sailing of which with man-carrying capacity, are given below:

FLEETS	DATES OF SAILING	MAN-CARRYING CAPACITY
A	Sept. 6, 1917	6,800
B	" 6, 1917	4,000
C	" 15, 1917	10,500
D	" 30, 1917	8,000
E	Oct. 1, 1917	36,000

plus 7,000 to be shipped on commercial liners in September.

A	Oct. 13, 1917	6,800
B	" 13, 1917	9,000
C	" 22, 1917	13,000
D	" 30, 1917	14,000

plus 10,000 to be shipped on commercial liners in October.

E	November 8, 1917	36,000
A	" 20, 1917	6,800
B	" 20, 1917	9,000
C	" 29, 1917	13,000

plus 10,000 to be shipped on commercial liners in November.

3. The original priority of shipment schedule was amended and amplified about September 16. It was also based on the fleets available indicated in paragraph 2, above. This schedule was the principal guide in shipment. However, as the chief of staff directed that but one copy of this schedule should be made, and as after it had been received by him it was not turned over to the embarkation service, the latter was more or less handicapped by not knowing sufficiently in advance the entire program. This priority of shipment schedule follows:

#### PRIORITY OF SHIPMENT SCHEDULE

<i>September:</i>	<i>Strength</i>	
1. 7 Replacement Battalions	8,400	(these are the provisional recruit bns. for infantry and artillery of 1st Div.)
2. 6 Machine Shop Trucks and 1 Motorcycle Co.	124	
3. Aero Squadrons Nos. 48, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 11th Telegraph Bn.	1423	
4. 2 Bakery Cos. (for 26th and 42d Divisions)	200	
5. Ordnance Auxiliaries for Ammunition Depots, Storehouses and Advance Repair Shops	1349	
6. 2 Base Hospitals (for 26th and 42d Divisions)	500	
7. Such Stevedore Units not exceeding 4 bns. as may be ready to go in advance of any other	4,000	
8. 26th Divisions (Nat. Guard)	27,152	
9. 2,200 Reserve Officers	2,200	
Total for September		45,348

At the request of air division, aviation section, signal corps, there was added to above as item,

3 1/2	5 officers and 175 men to Italy	
	12 squadrons to England for Mechanics	
	12 squadrons to France for Mechanics, to go in French transportation which was never forthcoming	
	Total additional for September	3,780

October

1.	Remainder of 26th Division (Nat. Guard)	
2.	Remainder of 2d Div. (Regular)	10,000
3.	42d Division (Nat. Guard)	27,152
4.	4 engineer service battalions	4,000
5.	41st Division (National Guard)	27,152
6.	Auxiliaries up to 14,000, including those shipped on commercial boats	14,000
Total for October		82,304

November

1.	33d Division (Nat. Guard)	27,152
2.	All corps troops for I Corps	15,310
3.	Auxiliaries up to 32,000 including those shipped on commercial boats	32,000
Total for November		74,462

4. It will be noted that space for 14,000 auxiliaries was left in October. It became necessary to specify in detail the units which were to comprise these 14,000. General Pershing's Cable No. 150 giving desired priority of shipment of auxiliaries was taken as a guide and the Operations Committee, War College Division, arranged a schedule of shipment for auxiliaries up to 14,000 for October, consisting of labor troops, highway troops, forestry troops, railroad troops, stevedores, etc. It was found, however, that these troops were not organized nor [sic] equipped except partially, as in some cases they were waiting for voluntary enlistments, and there were other factors of delay. The chief of engineers was, therefore, ordered to have ready for shipment overseas on specific dates in October, a certain number of forestry troops, a certain number of labor troops, etc. It was more or less of a physical impossibility for these troops to be organized and equipped by the dates indicated but it was the only way to get things started; and by asking the impossible, a great activity and concentration of effort was obtained.

5. Consideration of the organizations which have thus far arrived in France show that the embarkation service has not been able to keep up with the shipping program laid down by the Operations Committee, War College Division, which was based on the fleet schedules given in Paragraph 2, this report.

The reasons for this may be summed up as follows:

(a) On account of delays at ports of embarkation and debarkation, the length of turnaround has been increased so that fleets have not sailed on the dates indicated in paragraph 2 of this report.

(b) The man-carrying capacity of fleets given in paragraph 2 was dependent upon certain ships being turned over to the embarkation service by the Navy Department on certain dates. There have been delays in turning over the ships; also there has been a shrinkage in the estimated man-carrying capacity of certain ships. For example: The *Vaterland*, now the *Leviathan*, was to be turned over ready for service at a certain date but a delay of over a month has occurred in doing so, and its estimated man-carrying capacity has shrunk from 10,000 to 8,000.

(c) Units scheduled to go are not ready because they have not complete personnel and equipment.

6. Subparagraph (c) above needs explanation.

The general policy of priority and supply of clothing and equipment is as follows:

(a) The Secretary of War ordered under date of September 16 that personnel of

the aviation service under orders for service abroad should be equipped with clothing, etc., regardless of any delay that this might cause in completing the equipment of other forces.

(b) Next to be supplied are troops ordered for service overseas.

(c) Next, the troops of the national army stationed at northern cantonments.

(d) Other troops stationed in the north.

The policy included a six months' reserve supply for troops in France and for troops under orders therefor.

7. Now, the elaborate program of the aviation section for shipment of units abroad, which has been approved by the Secretary of War, demands considerable clothing; and this fact, taken in conjunction with the demand for clothing and equipment in northern cantonments which must be met in the interests of health, and the fact that until recently organizations scheduled for service overseas were notified of that fact only a short time before they were due to sail, when clothing and equipment was low, has caused delay.

8. In the matter of personnel several organizations have been required to recruit by voluntary enlistment which has not met with rapid results, and the transfer of drafted men to fill up these organizations has only been made at the eleventh hour.

9. To ameliorate the situation the following plan has now gone into effect. On the 22nd of each month, the Chief of the Operations Committee, War College Division, reports to the Chief of Staff for the orders of the Secretary of War as to the shipments he desires made during the three months following the month subsequent to the date the Chief of the Operations Committee reports. The operations committee then draws up and submits for approval about the first of the month following the 22d above mentioned, a general schedule of priority of shipment for the ensuing three months, giving the space available for auxiliaries each month. An itemized list of units scheduled to go in the space for auxiliaries is then prepared, based on cables from General Pershing, and on an adjustment of the conflicting requests of the various staff departments. Copies of this schedule when approved are then furnished the board of priority of equipment (General Baker, Lt. Col. J. R. McAndrews, and Major W. K. Wilson), who give the organizations selected a place on the priority of clothing and equipment schedule; and the embarkation service, which, when they are ready to receive the organizations for shipment at the port of embarkation, calls upon the Adjutant General of the Army for appropriate orders to get them there.

In this way it has become possible to get organizations for overseas service equipped in time without resorting to the hand-to-mouth methods which have heretofore obtained.

Intelligent teamwork and cooperation become possible, even at the expense of a certain degree of secrecy and at the risk of the dislocation of the arrangements due to political pressure to have certain national guard organizations sent before others appearing on the list.

10. The above system went into operation on October 22. A general project for shipment for the months of December, January and February was then drawn up after consultation with the chief of staff and was submitted and approved as follows:

<i>December</i>	<i>Strength</i>
3d Division(regular)	27,658
31st Div. (Nat Guard)	27,658
Auxiliaries	11,414
Total	66,730

<i>January</i>	
35th Division (N. G.)	27,658
4th Div. (Regular)	27,658
29th Div. (N. G.) (Part)	13,074
Corps Troops and Auxiliaries	13,410
Total	81,800



February

29th Division (N. G.) Remainder	14,584
32d Div. (N. G. part)	13,074
Corps Troops and Auxiliaries	11,142
Total	38,800

Grand Total	187,330
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11. When the undersigned left Washington on October 29, 1917, the operations committee was at work drawing up a schedule of shipment of auxiliaries for November and December, based on conflicting demands of staff departments for space which was not sufficient for all, the staff departments basing their requests on General Pershing's cables.

12. In conclusion it should be noted that the tonnage or man-carrying capacity of the fleets given in paragraph 2 herewith, is not sufficient to put one million men in France by June 1, and keep them supplied, even if that rate of transportation, given in paragraph 2, could be maintained. The paramount problem is tonnage and every exertion should be made to get the shipping board to obtain and turn over more ships to the embarkation service. Representations from this end would have great weight as Washington is trying to comply with all cables from General Pershing.

WALTER S. GRANT,  
Lt. Colonel, General Staff.

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G-4, GHQ, AEF: 431: Letter

***Order of Battle to be Furnished British Headquarters***

Administration Section, General Staff

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
Chaumont, Haute-Marne, November 30, 1917.

From: Commander-in-Chief

To: Chief, French Military Mission

1. In reply to your communication No. 9,508, of November 20, 1917, the Commander-in-Chief directs me to state that a copy of the Order of Battle of the American Expeditionary Forces will be furnished from these headquarters to the British Headquarters.

2. In this connection it will be of value if arrangements can be made for furnishing regularly to these headquarters a copy of the French Order of Battle.

By direction:

JAMES G. HARBORD,  
Chief of Staff.

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***Number of American Troops Required by the End of June***

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, December 2, 1917.*

AGWAR, WASHINGTON

For Secretary of War and Chief of Staff

1. With the apparent total collapse of Russia and the recent success of the Central Powers in Italy, German morale is undoubtedly much improved and the probability of a serious offensive against the western front is greatly increased. In fact, information indicates German concentration in the Vosges opposite Nancy and also near the Swiss frontier. It seems probable that such an offensive may begin this winter. French military authorities are of this opinion and are actually moving troops to meet further developments at both above points. While it is not probable that the Central Powers can concentrate their full strength on the western front for some months, yet their resumption of the offensive clearly points out their purpose to push the war here before the Americans can bring over a large force.

2. With Russia out of the war it is possible for the Central Powers to concentrate 250 to 260 divisions on the western front and still leave a certain number on the eastern front and 26 divisions to hold the Italians. They could do this without interfering with status quo at Salonika, and these estimates do not take into account the possibilities of using Bulgarian or Turkish troops on western front. Against these German and Austrian divisions the Allies have 169 divisions some of which are under orders for Italy. This relative strength would give the Central Powers about 60% advantage and make it difficult to hold them. The Allies have had about 30% advantage all summer. Details set forth in letter to Secretary of War now en route.

3. In view of these conditions, it is of the utmost importance to the Allied cause that we move swiftly. The minimum number of troops we should plan to have in France by the end of June is four army corps or twenty-four divisions in addition to troops for service of the rear. Have impressed the present urgency upon General Bliss and other American members of the conference. Generals Robertson, Foch, and Bliss agree with me that this is the minimum that should be aimed at. This figure is given as the lowest we should think of, and is placed no higher because the limit of available transportation would not seem to warrant it.

4. A study of transportation facilities shows sufficient American tonnage to bring over this number of troops, but to do so there must be a reduction in the number allotted to other than army needs. It is estimated that the shipping needed will have to be rapidly increased up to two million tons by May, in addition to the amount already allotted. The use of shipping for commercial purposes must be curtailed as much as possible. The Allies are very weak and we must come to their relief this year. The year after may be too late. It is very doubtful if they can hold on until 1919 unless we give them a lot of support this year. It is, therefore, strongly recommended that a complete readjustment of transportation be made and that the needs of the War Department as set forth above be regarded as immediate. Further details of these requirements will be sent later.

5. As to heavy artillery and ammunition it is now probable, after full consideration and investigation that the French and British will be able to make up our deficiencies.

6. The question of both sea transportation and artillery are under further discussion by the Allies and full report and recommendation will be made in few days.

PERSHING.

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***Priority Schedule is being Followed***

A. G. O., WAR DEPARTMENT,  
Washington, D. C., December 3, 1917.

PERSHING, AMEXFORCE, FRANCE

[Extract]

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8. With reference to paragraph 2A, your 322: Priority schedule of October 7, is being followed as rapidly as units can be organized and equipped. Shipment made in order asked for except in cases of units first on schedule not ready while others lower down are ready. This is done to prevent delay in shipping and to utilize shipping to full capacity Forecast of completion of first phase later. Biddle.

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McCain.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: 1943: Study

***Military Geography of the Western Front***

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
Chaumont, Haute-Marne, December 4, 1917.

**MAIN FEATURES OF THE TERRAIN**

The battlefront crosses several general areas which one must appreciate in order to obtain an understanding of the conditions along the western front. Taking up these various areas from northwest to southeast they are:

(a) All of Belgium north of the line Liege---Namur---Maubeuge may be spoken of as the plain of Flanders. If this line be extended west to the sea, the part of France thus set off is of the same general character. This area is low, some parts being only a few meters above sea level. It has some small undulations of terrain with no large forests. It is given both to agriculture and industry. Before the war, it supported a very dense population. It is well supplied with both roads and railroads and offers facilities for the employment of very large masses of troops. Both combatants here employ denser lines than anywhere else, sometimes as many as 11 men to the yard. Measured straight across the area, without counting minor bends, this part of the battle front has a length of about 75 miles.

(b) Following the general direction of the battle front a broad open belt of rolling country, about 20 to 30 miles wide, runs in a southeasterly direction from the area just described under (a). In this belt lies the valley of the Aisne and the upper portions of the Oise and the Somme. For a distance of about 120 miles the battle front lies in this

general belt, which is open, slightly rolling, agricultural country, well supplied with roads and railroads. It is not so thickly inhabited as the plain of Flanders. South of this belt there is a large wooded triangle with its base on the belt and its apex at Paris. Northeast of this belt, the large general area Meyence---Thionville (Diedenhofen) ---Cambrai---Namur---Liege---Cologne is hilly and wooded. East of the Rhine this hilly wooded area extends well into Germany. Compared with the surrounding areas it is not well provided with roads or railroads and is also less densely populated. It is unsuitable for the employment of large masses of troops. On account of the location of this area the German armies of this part of the front are supplied over roundabout routes and in part over some routes that are used for supplying other sectors of the battle front. As a result, Germany here employs battle lines that are much less dense than those in Flanders. The Allies hold it in a strength proportionate to that of the enemy as a general attack by them here would not threaten any vital part of the German system.

(c) From St-Menehould on the Aisne east to the Moselle just south of Metz, we cross first the narrow strip of lower land on the east bank of the Aisne, then rise sharply to the higher wooded region of Argonne. The latter extends almost to Verdun. In the vicinity of Verdun is the narrow valley of the Meuse. East of the Meuse the ground is higher, but soon descends to a plain, called the plain of the Woevre, rising again in the hills to the west of the Moselle. In this latter locality and just north of the battle front lies the Lorraine iron area. Excepting the salient of St-Mihiel this district is well provided with roads and railroads, and, in addition, canals from here connect with the inland waterways in all directions. With the exception of the forests of the Argonne, this country is agricultural and industrial. The German possession of St-Mihiel cuts both canal and railroad at that place and greatly embarrasses the French transportation system.

Excluding all the smaller bends, the general battle front in this sector has a length of 80 miles. The part about Verdun is strongly held. The remainder is held more lightly by both sides.

(d) From the Moselle to a point about 15 miles east of Luneville, there is a stretch of comparatively open ground well supplied with transportation facilities and suited to military operations. This sector of open country has a breadth of about 45 miles. At the beginning of the war, the Germans made a determined advance here, but were checked on the heights of Le Grand Couronne, northeast of Nancy. There has been no very heavy fighting in this sector since that time. The inland waterways may be best described by regarding Nancy as the center, though this city must not, for that reason, be considered as the metropolis on which this system converges. In peacetime waterways existed from Nancy east to connections with those of the Rhine and the Saar; north to Metz and the navigable waters of the Moselle; northwest, to Verdun, to the frontiers of Belgium; west, to Chalons, Paris and Le Havre; southwest, to Nevers, Orleans and St-Nazaire; south, to Marseilles; and southeast, to Belfort and Basle (Switzerland). Events of war have decreased the traffic over these waterways but they are still in use by both sides, though, of course, not right up to the front.

(e) The sector of the Vosges mountains is rough, wooded land and is rather sparsely inhabited. It is reached by railroads from both the French and German sides, but these are branch routes and do not cross the battle front. Thus it is comparatively easy for either side to supply itself on this front, but these conditions would change to its disadvantage were either side to make advance. These mountains are easily defended and offer no advantageous objective for a powerful attack. This has resulted in both sides holding the line very thinly. The battle front in this sector, excluding bends and turns, is about 50 miles long.

(f) The gap at Belfort between the Vosges and the Jura mountains of the Swiss frontier is an open valley, largely of an agricultural nature, and has a breadth of about 25 miles. From the German side it is reached by both railroad and water transport routes through the upper valley of the Rhine. One main railroad and one canal pass through this gap into France and there connect with the French systems. Moderate-sized armies can pass

through this gap from either side to the other, but exceedingly large masses so operating would be cramped for room and, after a short advance, would be isolated from the rest of their whole force by the Vosges area. Either side might use this route for the advance of a secondary force, but could hope for great success only after a considerable advance (France to Strassburg - Germany to Gray and Dijon) which could not be effected through this cramped valley unless the opponent was so fully occupied elsewhere that he would be unable to spare the troops to properly oppose such an offensive.

## SWITZERLAND

There are two main routes across Switzerland from west to east. One runs from Lake Geneva, through the valley which is behind the Jura mountains, eastward into Austria and south Germany. The other runs from Lake Geneva southeast to Milan (Italy). Both are tortuous and unsuitable for the supply of very large forces. This probably explains why Germany did not violate Swiss territory as she did that of Belgium.

## RELATIVE RAILROAD SYSTEMS

The heart of the French railroad system is Paris. From that place the main routes radiate like the spokes of a wheel. Distinct main routes, not so clearly defined as the statement below would indicate, lead from Paris as follows:

- 4 to the north coast of France
- 3 to the west coast, one continuing on south into Spain
- 2 to the south coast, one continuing south into Spain, the other by two branches southeast into Italy
- 3 towards Alsace-Lorraine; one now cut by the battlefront
- 4 towards Flanders

These are tied together by many lesser routes and by several cross routes towards the circumference of the wheel.

For military purposes the German controlled railroads center in two localities, namely, the triangle, Liege---Brussels---Maubeuge, and the area about Saarbrücken. These two areas are connected with each other and the whole front unified by two distinct lateral 2-track railroads (called *Voies de Rociade*) that extend in the rear of and generally parallel to the whole German western front. The first area is connected with north Germany through the narrow space north of Liege, which is on the north edge of the hilly wooded area called the Ardennes and south of the Dutch border. The second is connected eastward with south Germany and Austria. Back of the two *Voies de Rociade*, the main connection between these two vital railroad areas is the Rhine Valley, which is an inland waterway and has a double-track railroad more or less closely following each bank.

## MINERALS

### IRON

Four-fifths of the iron of Continental Europe lies in the small area shown west of Metz (which may be roughly located on the map by the quadrilateral Metz---Thionville (Diedenhofen)---Longwy---Conflans). In addition to this iron area, Germany has access to the iron of Sweden, exchanging coal therefor. This Swedish iron is of a very superior quality and is also valuable because neutral miners furnish the manpower for its extraction.

In French possession there is a small iron area about Nancy.

## COAL

In southern and western France there are numerous small coalfields.

In the area roughly indicated (shown N. W. of Saarbrücken) in German-Lorraine, about 15 million tons of coal are produced annually. This area is connected with the iron area above described by two inland waterways and by rail. Iron ore is hauled to the coal and coal returned to the iron mines. There are smelters in both iron area and coal area. Also inland waterways and railroads connect both these areas with the great German industrial area and coal field surrounding Essen. On account of its location the above described coal area is of the greatest industrial importance, but in quantity of production it is only one-tenth as great as the main coalfield which will be next described.

The largest coalfield of Europe begins in France not far from Bethune and extends as a long narrow strip on the line; Mons---Namur---Liege---Aix-la-Chapelle, and then widens into a broad area in Germany where it may be roughly located as the area: Aix-la-Chapelle---Cologne---Essen, though it extends well north of this. The part of this area that lies in Germany produces more coal than the remainder of this and all the remaining fields of western Europe combined.

## SALT

(Source of Chlorine Gas)

About Nancy in France there is a large saltfield. About Chateau Salins, in German Lorraine, there is also a large saltfield, with a similar one not far away at Saaralbe.

There are other sources of salt in Europe, but these are the principal ones that lie close to the western front.

## CRUDE OIL

There is an oil field at Pachelbronn, about 30 miles north of Strassburg. It now produces about one-twentieth of Germany's oil, and is the only field in western Europe. The Galician and Roumanian fields are Germany's other sources of supply.

## ZINC

Before the war both Belgium and Germany were exporters of zinc. Germany attempts to make use of this excess of zinc by employing it for purposes to which it is not well suited but where it will save other metals of which she is short. Her greatest shortage is copper.

## OTHER MINERALS

Small quantities of copper and manganese are found all along both sides of the western front. There are no important centers and these workings do not furnish a major part of the supply of either combatant. Small deposits of other minor minerals are found at various places along the western front. They are not of great military importance.

## LeROY ELTINGE

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***Conference in London; Military Situation; Need for Tonnage***

No. 10-SWC

AMERICAN SECTION, SUPREME WAR COUNCIL,  
*London, December, 4, 1917.*

The Adjutant General, Washington

For the Acting Chief of Staff

All military authorities here since my arrival in England have represented with growing urgency the grave possibilities of the military situation early in 1918. This culminated in a conference between the British and French Chiefs of Staff and General John J. Pershing and myself immediately after the first session of the interallied conference held in France on November 29. As a result of this conference I have submitted to the committee on maritime transportation, appointed by the interallied conference, the following communication.

At a conference between General Tasker H. Bliss, Chief of Staff of the American army, General John J. Pershing, Commander-in-Chief of the American Expeditionary Forces, General Robertson, Chief of the Imperial General Staff of Great Britain, and General Foch, Chief of the General Staff of the French army, the military situation on the western front and its requirements as to manpower from the United States was carefully considered. As the result of this conference it was unanimously agreed that the United States should, as its minimum effort send to France, as rapidly as possible, 4 complete corps of 6 divisions each or 24 divisions in all, the last divisions to arrive not later than the end of June 1918.

In order to accomplish this program, and after making every possible reduction in the personnel of the divisions, in the number of animals to be transported, and the amount of reserve supplies to be on hand in France not later than June 1 next, it is estimated there must be added to the tonnage now available for the transportation of American troops, 1,500,000 gross tons by January 1, 1918, 300,000 gross tons by March 1, 1918, and 200,000 gross tons by June 1, 1918, or two million gross tons in all. The foregoing is presented to the committee on maritime transportation with the earnest request that it receive immediate and most careful consideration. For any assistance that they may be able to give, Gen. Tasker H. Bliss and General John J. Pershing place themselves at the disposal of the committee. Tasker H. Bliss, (General) Chief of Staff of the American army.

I assume that the transportation thus made available will continue to bring troops until at least the V Corps, making a total of at least 30 divisions, shall have arrived in France by the end of the summer. The military situation for 1918 is undoubtedly critical and grave. All chiefs of staff of the armies of the western front and the representatives of the commanders in the field at the conferences here urge that the United States must be prepared to make a great effort as early in the year as possible. With this end in view and in order to insure the equipment with artillery and ammunition of the American troops as fast as they arrive in France, the Minister of Munitions of France and England and Perkins\* representing the United States, have exhaustively examined the situation and adopted the following resolutions for their respective governments.

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\* Thomas N. Perkins, War Industries Board.

The representatives of Great Britain and France state that their production of artillery (field, medium and heavy) is now established on so large a scale that they are able [to] equip completely all American divisions as they arrive in France during the year 1918 with the best make of British and French guns and howitzers. The British and French ammunition supply and reserves are sufficient to provide the requirements of the American army thus equipped at least up to June 1918 provided that the existing 6-inch shell plants in the United States and Dominion of Canada are maintained in full activity and provided that the manufacture of 6-inch howitzer carriages in the United States is to some extent sufficiently developed. On the other hand the French and to a lesser extent the British require as soon as possible large supplies of propellants and high explosives and the British require the largest possible production of 6-inch howitzers from now onwards and of 8-inch and 9.2-inch shells from June onwards. In both of these matters they ask the assistance of the Americans. With a view, therefore, first to expedite and facilitate the equipment of the American armies in France and second to secure the maximum ultimate development of the ammunition supply with the minimum strain upon available tonnage the representatives of Great Britain and France propose that the American field, medium, and heavy artillery be supplied during 1918 and as long after as may be found convenient from British and French gun factories and they ask (A) that the American efforts shall be immediately directed to the production of propellants and high explosives on the largest possible scale and (B) Great Britain also asks that the 6-inch, 8-inch and 9.2-inch shell plants already created for the British service in the United States shall be maintained in the highest activity and that large additional plants for the manufacture of these shells shall at once be laid down.

In this way alone can the tonnage difficulty be minimized and potential artillery developments both in guns and shells of the combined French, British and American armies be maintained in 1918 and still more in 1919.

With regard to very heavy artillery and certain special classes of long-range guns the representatives of France and Great Britain recommend a separate and original manufacture by the United States. They also recommend that the existing production of 8-inch and 9.2-inch howitzers equipment in the United States shall be continued.

Finally if the above general principles are approved by the governments of the three countries the precise measures of manufacture and supply with programs and timetables shall be concerted by a technical commission composed of representatives of the three great powers concerned.

3. The situation will be quite different in 1918 from what it has been in 1917. In 1917 the British and French guns and howitzers output has been below the ammunition supply. In 1918 the reverse will be true. The situation as to guns and ammunition supply and capacities now are as follows. The French can and are willing to supply the American army as it arrives in Europe with its full quota of 75-millimeter field guns and with adequate supplies of shells for this size provided that the United States furnish raw materials, propellants, and explosives in advance. The British have capacity to manufacture 6-inch howitzers sufficient to supply their own needs and to supply the American army as it arrives in Europe with its full quota if United States can supply 400 carriages for such howitzer. The British have not sufficient 6-inch shell capacity to supply their own requirements to say nothing of American requirements unless the supply of such shells which they have been obtaining from United States and Canada is continued at least to the extent available before United States entered the war. That is to say the British have relied upon getting this shell from United States and Canada and have concentrated upon increasing their supply of this howitzer and need this shell to carry out the 1918 program. The British have reserves of propellants and explosives sufficient to complete United



States full quota 6-inch shells if American army should adopt that howitzer provided that United States can replenish those reserves beginning July 1, 1918. The French capacity for making 155-millimeter howitzer and shells is sufficient to enable France to supply the American army as it arrives in Europe with its full quota for 1918 of both howitzers and shells of this size provided that the raw materials for both howitzers and shells and propellants and explosives are furnished in advance by United States. Inventory shows requirements due to recent losses must, however, be met either by British or French to a very substantial amount. The British can furnish 8-inch and 9.2-inch howitzer to equip the American army for 1918 as it arrives. They urge continuance American activities in the manufacture of howitzers and shells of these sizes. I am satisfied that only by co-ordination of all available capacities in the three countries can American troops here and troops of British and French be fully equipped for the great effort necessary in 1918 and urge that development of independent American program be subordinated to the making of this effort.

4. Specifically it is recommended that (A) sufficient 75-millimeter field guns and ammunition be purchased from the French to equip the first 30 divisions sent to France. The home program for manufacture of this material should be continued. The home output for 1918 will probably all be required for equipping and training of troops at home. The home manufacture of 75-millimeter ammunition should be expedited as far as possible and troops in France supplied from home as soon as home production is on an assured basis. (B) That the factories of the United States and Dominion of Canada heretofore engaged in the manufacture of British 6-inch howitzer ammunition be continued indefinitely and extended if necessary to meet British requirements. This is of vital importance as these shells are essential to 1918 campaign from every point of view. Serious consideration should even now be given to the question of our adoption of the British 6-inch howitzer in place of the French 155-millimeter howitzer. The answer must depend to a large extent upon the extent to which American program for manufacture 155-guns and shells has advanced. British and French are agreed that 1 howitzer is substantially as easy to make as the other. French are confident we shall have no difficulty in manufacture of shell. British have had difficulty in making French shell and fear that we will, whereas they point out that we have been making British shell for several years with great success and have men as well as plants that have proved they can turn them out. We cannot urge too strongly the importance of producing the largest possible amount of shells of this size and recommend that the amount of shells which can certainly be produced be given great weight in determining type to be adopted. Subject to your decision as to type we recommend that sufficient howitzers of the type selected be purchased from the French or the British to equip the first 30 divisions to arrive in France. We have bought 260 [155] howitzers from the French and must start with these. Home manufacture of the piece selected and its ammunition should be continued, the 1918 output being used for the equipping and training of troops at home. When the home output of ammunition is on an assuring basis troops in France should be supplied with ammunition from home sources. If the British 6-inch is adopted provision should be made also for developing the manufacture of British 6-inch howitzer carriages in the United States to the extent of 400 for the year 1918. (C) Sufficient (155 millimeter) Filloux guns and ammunition for the first 50 divisions to arrive in France should be purchased from the French. Home manufacture of this piece and of the 4.7-inch guns and of ammunition for both these pieces should be developed energetically. No guns of these calibers are obtainable from British sources. (D) Concerning heavy howitzers of the 9.5-inch type the outright adoption of the British 8-inch and 9.2-inch howitzer is considered imperative. These calibers are of great and increasing importance. There is no hope of home production of 9.2-inch howitzer before 1919. Sufficient 8-inch and 9.2-inch howitzers can and should be obtained from British sources to equip the first 30 divisions to arrive in France. The existing capacity for manufacture of British 8-inch and 9.2-inch howitzer in the United States must be continued and existing plants for the manufacture of ammunition for these pieces must be maintained and others laid

down in order to insure a sufficient supply of ammunition not only for our own needs but to provide a part of the needs of the British. Present plans for the manufacture of 9.5-inch howitzer should be entirely subordinated to the preceding. Boxes of trench mortar ammunition, of 3-inch Stokes, 6-inch Newton Stokes, and 240-millimeter type are obtainable from the British and French sources to meet American demands until these demands can be supplied from home sources. Particular efforts should be made to develop home manufacture of 6-inch Newton Stokes ammunition and 240-millimeter trench mortars and ammunition.

(F) With regard to super heavy artillery great efforts should be made for home production of railroad mounts for 12-inch mortars and 10-inch, 12-inch, and 14-inch seacoast guns. It is imperative that sufficient number of these calibers be withdrawn from seacoast forts to supply our armies in France and if necessary to assist the British and French.

5. The whole question as to how England, France, and the United States can put forth their maximum efforts during the critical year of 1918 has been considered in great detail by the Minister of Munitions of Great Britain and France and by Perkins representing the United States and by their technical assistants and the preceding plan was fully and cordially agreed upon by all parties.

6. It is most urgently recommended that the plan as outlined above be adopted by the United States and that existing plans be subordinate where necessary for the purpose of carrying out these specific recommendations and especially that all plans for the development of an independent program by the United States be subordinate to the idea of the strongest possible joint effort and that, in every instance where we have established capacity and ability to manufacture, no experiments be tried.

7. You will see that the foregoing leaves everything in the hands of the Americans and British who must furnish the necessary tonnage. The commander in the field wants our troops as fast as they can come. If you accept program of supply proposed by Allied Minister of Munitions then troops can be equipped as fast as they come. As to the necessary tonnage, the interallied conference at final session afterwards adopted a resolution of its committee on maritime transportation as follows:

The Allies, considering that the means of maritime transport at their disposal, as well as the provision(s) which they dispose of, should be utilized in common for the pursuit of the war, have decided to create an interallied organization for the purpose of coordinating their action to this effect and of establishing a common program, constantly kept up-to-date, enabling them by the maximum utilization of their resources to restrict their importations with a view to liberating the greatest amount of tonnage possible for the transportation of American troops.

8. But to secure results there must be continued insistence by our War Department.

*BLISS.*

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***Shipments, Priority Schedule, Reduction in Service of Rear Troops***

Administrative Section, General Staff

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, December 8, 1917.*

MEMORANDUM:

1. The C-in-C directs attention to the following extracts of cables sent and received:

No. 322, Par. 2-A, 11-27-17. For Chief of Staff. It would save a great deal of cabling and much uncertainty on part of all concerned if you could cable that our priority schedule of October 7, is being strictly followed and if you would give a forecast of the dates on which various units necessary to complete the first phase will be organized and when they will be shipped. Again strongly urge that all necessary steps, including the use of the draft be taken to put our priority schedule into full effect. PERSHING.

No. 474, Par. 8, 12-5-17. With reference to paragraph 2-A your 322. Priority schedule of Oct. 7, is being followed as rapidly as units can be organized and equipped. Shipments made in order asked for except in cases of units first on schedule not ready while others lower down are ready. This is done to prevent delay in shipping and to utilize shipping to full capacity. Forecast of completion of first phase later. Biddle.

2. Attention is also directed to Memo. dated Oct. 16, 1917 \* \* \* indicating how any questions of alteration in the schedule of priority of shipments should be submitted. Changes in the schedule should not be requested unless there is a decided advantage to be gained by asking the particular change desired. It is, however, very desirable to communicate to the War Department any special information which will show the organization and equipment of units called for in the schedule but not already covered in tables of organization and equipment manuals.

3. As the tonnage situation will probably in the near future require a reduction of about 30% in the service of the rear troops the C-in-C desires that you submit promptly a statement giving the 30% of the service of the rear troops pertaining to your department which can be omitted or reduced in number with least detriment to your department. The list should indicate the order in which the troops can best be spared.

By order of the C-in-C:

J. A. LOGAN, JR.,  
Chief, A. S. G. S.

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**Aviation Tonnage**

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, December 11, 1917.*

AGWAR, WASHINGTON

[Extract]

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2. For the Chief of Staff. With reference to paragraph 5 your Cablegram 431 not considered advisable to increase program construction night bombers at present.

a. Account tonnage situation and very large estimates just completed of tonnage required to bring over and maintain aviation program, it seems clear that no increase above the existing program as shown in service of rear project of September 17, should be considered at present. Unofficial reports received here indicate plans being urged on War Department to greatly increase aviation program. Recommend War Department disapprove any such increase pending completion investigation which I am having made as to extent of air program which strategical situation and tonnage situation considered together and with Allies will warrant. Will advise you promptly as to air program recommended, and recommend that in the meantime work on air program be limited to present approved plans.

\* \* \* \* \*

PERSHING.

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GHQ, AEF: General Orders

**Method of Supply of American Troops**

GENERAL ORDERS  
No. 73

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, December 12, 1917.*

[Extract]

1. The supply of American troops in France is divided into three phases: The first is the procurement of such supplies; the second is their care and storage; the third is their transportation. The responsibility for the first lies with the chiefs of various supply departments, A. E. F.; for the second with the C. G., L. of C.; for the third with the D. G. T. The general supervision of all is exercised by the general staff, as a rule through the coordination section. [For details of operation see complete copy of orders in this series.]

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***Recommended System of Promotion***

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, December 14, 1917.*

ADJUTANT GENERAL, WASHINGTON

FOR CHIEF OF STAFF

[Extract]

\* \* \* \* \*

1A. With reference to General Orders No. 132, your office system of promotion therein enunciated while satisfactory for national army and national guard, seems inapplicable to regular army in commands wholly or partially regular. Also system of lineal promotion in regular army involving units as widely separate as America, Europe, and Philippines cannot be applied in present emergency and should give way for time being at least to promotion by selection. Conditions of active service will in a short time force interchange of officers between regular, national guard, and national army divisions. To promote officers to national army and carry them in new grades attached to the regular army or national guard and likewise with officers of national army or national guard attached to regular would involve endless paper work and would probably in the end substantially result in transfer regular commissioned list to national army. Believe better consolidate all forces on one list for period of war according to date of present commissioned securing rights of regular officers as to retirement, and proper place in reorganization at close of war. Following is suggested as substance of law which it is recommended be asked of Congress as an emergency measure:

On and after January 1, 1918, and for the period of the present emergency the regular army and all forces raised by draft, enlistment or appointment under the act of May 18, 1917, shall constitute one force which is hereby designated as the United States Army. Appointments to all vacancies occurring among the commissioned officers of said force shall be made by selection based on merit and efficiency and under such regulations as the President may prescribe. Provided, that appointments to the grade of 2d Lieutenant in the regular army shall continue to be made under existing law so long as the total number of regular army officers on the active list does not exceed that now authorized by law. Provided further, that on the termination of the present emergency each officer now holding a commission in the regular army and each officer hereafter appointed therein shall be appointed to the grade in the army or corps and with the rank therein that he would have attained had this act not been passed. Provided further, that nothing in this act shall deprive any regular officer of his present commission or of his right of retirement under existing law with the grade he would have attained had this act not been passed.

PERSHING.

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***Contingent Intervention of American Forces in Italy***

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff  
No. 14534

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,  
FRENCH ARMIES OF THE NORTH AND NORTHEAST,  
*December 14, 1917.*

The General, Commander-in-Chief of the Armies of the North and Northeast

To the General, Chief of the French Military Mission with the American Army at Chaumont

The president of the council sent to me, and you also, copy of telegrams 679 and 680, from Washington and 12,505 BS/3 from Paris, on the subject of possible intervention of American forces in Italy.

I desire to convey to you my point of view in this matter:

1. My opinion is that the American divisions should not be engaged in Italy. The most that may be contemplated is the possibility of employing, for a time, some elements of American communications troops in that theater of operations.

2. The exigencies of the situation on the northeast front may force us to utilize American troops in France before their training, in the case of organized divisions, is adequate. Therefore I consider it necessary for you to endeavor to accustom the American High Command to the idea that American regiments, indeed even American battalions, could well be called upon to serve as separate units, in the cadre of a large French unit and under the orders of the French command.

PETAIN.

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**Attacks with Limited Objective**

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,  
FRENCH ARMIES OF THE NORTH AND NORTHEAST,  
THE CHIEF OF STAFF,  
*December 15, 1917.*

Memorandum on the attacks with limited objective.

[Extract]

I. In the month of April 1917, the French army put forth a very great effort.

It was not possible to contemplate a second effort of such magnitude, in the same year, and the problem confronting the Commander-in-Chief was to reach the end of the year with an army in full vigor, that is, well armed, trained, and confident, capable of a general offensive in 1918.

The method adopted harmonized with the attitude of preparation and waiting. \* \* \*

By this method of course one cannot see it possible to gain a decision; attacks with limited objectives can result only in attrition and seizure of ground.

The Commander-in-Chief selected portions of terrain whose capture was a valuable gain: Liberation of Verdun and the *rocade*\* of the Chemin-des-Dames. He waited for the most favorable tactical conditions in order to produce the greatest attrition. But never did he count on these operations leading to a decision.

He attained the objectives he had set himself: He now has at his disposal an army in good shape whose armament is considerably increased and whose training has been perfected.

\* \* \* \* \*

III. What can we see ahead for 1918? That depends naturally on the plan: What plan, then?

The defection of Russia brings back to the western front the main forces of the two sides. On both sides these bodies form a whole; that of the Austro-German is organized, that of the Entente inevitably will end by being so.

We do not conceive that the English, French, Italian, American, and Belgian armies will give battle independently of each other; that is, that they will decide to fight separately. It is the province of the governments to define the powers of a single head charged with coordinating the actions and exercising supreme direction.

It is that head who will draw up the 1918 plan along broad lines.

The French Commander-in-Chief naturally has had certain probable elements of the offensive plan worked out by his staff, but it is impossible for him to establish a plan without taking cognizance at least of the presence in the same theater of operations of the British, American, and Belgian armies. What will these armies do? How will they co-operate with the French army? Only supreme direction can determine that.

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\* A railroad generally paralleling the front for the lateral movement of troops and supplies.

While waiting for this plan, the French Commander-in-Chief has prepared a certain number of offensive operations with limited objective. These objectives have been selected with a view of facilitating later operations on a broad scale which can be undertaken with the cooperation of the Allied armies or in order to take advantage of opportunities.

There again the purpose of these operations is that of waiting; they do not hope for a decision.

In the case of the defensive plan, the defense can always be prepared for the strongly occupied front and that plan is made, but, to tell the truth, that is only a preliminary part of the plan, the precaution of the first days.

A large-scale attack on one or several portions of the front affects the entire front. Then what course should be followed? Should there be passive resistance with request to adjoining units to send their reserves to support the attrition? Or should a counteroffensive be organized somewhere else? And, in that case, in what zone? At what time?

The course to be followed in case of attack is the second part of the defensive plan; the supreme command alone can draw up its general lines.

The Allies won the defensive battle of 1916 because the defense of Verdun was combined with the Franco-British counteroffensive of the Somme by a higher direction.

Thus, for 1918, the French Commander-in-Chief has set up a defensive plan (1st part); he is prepared to set up speedily the 2d part of the defensive plan, as well as his offensive plan, as soon as he has the necessary directives for, let it be said again, he cannot make his calculations unless he has the directives of the Allied Armies which are acting in the same theater of operations.

In the defensive plan (1st part) are included offensives with limited objectives for liberating the parts of the front attacked which might be situated in the vicinity of organized terrain. These would be, correctly speaking, large-scale counterattacks.

IV. Under these circumstances, what are the anticipated losses for 1918?

If the Germans have the initiative of the offensive, the defensive plan will be put into effect and we cannot make any estimate of losses. They will depend on the intensity of the German effort and the support our Allies give us.

\* \* \* \* \*

V. Just what the value is of the method of limited objectives can be seen.

It may be added that its tactical characteristic has been the employment of an enormous proportion of artillery and the attempt to effect surprise.

It is probable that in 1918 the increase in our armament and weapons of all kinds will permit us to modify some of its features by steering us more in the direction of surprise.

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***Methods of Decentralization***

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, December 15, 1917.*

From: The Adjutant General, A. E. F.

To: The Inspector General, A. E. F.

1. There is evidence of a tendency on the part of staff departments to centralize at these headquarters much work which should not be handled here, tendency which, if unchecked, will produce serious consequences as the A. E. F. grows. The result will be the establishment of a set of administrative bureaus here, the building up of an unwieldy clerical and official personnel, expensive and unnecessary.

2. As indications of the above, there is noted a desire to place auditors offices in the departments here, a tendency to centralize the remount service and motor transport service here; a proposal to create a water supply and electrical service administered from G. H. Q.; and the establishment in each staff department of what is actually a small Adjutant General's Office but which is called a Personnel Branch.

One can easily see the evils of such tendency. A concomitant of this is the meddling with transportation, personnel, etc., that pertain to the Line of Communications and to divisions.

3. In order to put a check on such improper expansion of the technical and administrative staff department offices at these headquarters; to prevent the creation of bureaus modeled on those of the War Department and insure the carrying out of the policy of decentralization desired by the Commander-in-Chief, he directs that you investigate and report as to what work now being handled here can be decentralized to the Line of Communications or other subordinate headquarters and other classes of same which would be centralized in particular offices at these headquarters.

By command of General Pershing:

ROBERT C. DAVIS,  
Adjutant General.

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## ***Conduct of Operations for 1918***

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff  
No. 22759

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,  
FRENCH ARMIES OF THE NORTH AND NORTHEAST.  
*December 22, 1917.*

### Directive No. 4 for the Groups of Armies and Armies

[Extract]

The conditions of the conflict on the western front are modified for the time being because of the Russian defection: The conduct of our operations therefore, must take on a new direction.

The purpose of the present directive is to define that direction.

I. The Entente will not recover superiority in manpower until the American army is capable of placing in line a certain number of large units: Until then, we must, under penalty of irremediable attrition, maintain a waiting attitude, with the idea firmly fixed in mind of resumings as soon as we can, the offensive which alone will bring us ultimate victory.

The exigencies of this passing necessity are met by the arrangements that have not been decided upon for the general disposition of forces, the distribution of heavy artillery, and for the maneuver of reserves in rear of the front.

\* \* \* \* \*

II. In case of an enemy offensive on a broad scale, the commanders of armies and groups of armies will conduct the battle, being guided by the following controlling ideas:

To hold the first positions so as to crush, or at the very least, to slow up and disorganize the first dash of the enemy there.

Initially, however, assign to the defense of these first lines only the means necessary to assure a good return from the consolidation of the position that has been effected and, in any case, to assure the movement of the mass of the troops to the second positions and the switch positions;

To make secure under any possible circumstances, the second positions and the switch positions;

To employ their reserves, not only in counterattacks in the zone of enemy penetration, but also in counterthrusts directed either against the flanks or against a part of the front adjoining that zone.

G. H. G. reserves can introduce either:

As reinforcement of the armies attacked;

Or as an attack launched at an opportune time on terrain and in a direction, considered favorable.

It will therefore be incumbent on the high command to take the proper steps to limit to the loss of our first lines, if the latter cannot be held, the consequences of a powerful attack executed by surprise, and to retain all its initiative toward the enemy by giving to the defense a clearly aggressive character.

III. The application of the methods described above depends on the energy which the armies will expend on organizing the ground.

This consolidation includes:

On the one hand, improvement of existing defenses and creation of new positions:

On the other, preparation of certain parts of the front with a view to offensive operations.

\* \* \* \* \*

V. Commanders of groups of armies will insist, in the orders they are called on to issue for the application of the present directive, on the following points:

Liberty of action of the French armies, either in the period of waiting upon which we are entering or when that period reaches an end and the Commander-in-Chief decides to pass to general offensive operations, will depend essentially on the results obtained in the offensive preparation of the front;

Remunerative local attacks constitute the best means of preserving the combative value of our troops, figuring out the enemy's plays, and consequently providing beforehand against surprise;

In the waiting situation which is imposed on us, it will be to the advantage of the enemy to increase his threats or feints at attack and, as soon as he has resolved to pass to the offensive, to strike at several points so as to cause a dispersion of our efforts, which will favor his maneuver;

It is therefore of the greatest importance that the armies not lend themselves to this game and that they maintain, in the interpretation of indications or intelligence brought to their attention, an attitude sufficiently cautious to avoid expending their reserves prematurely.

VI. By imparting to their operations the characteristics just described, the commanders of groups of armies must bear in mind that the Commander-in-Chief is determined to let no favorable opportunity escape during the year 1918, to impose his will on the enemy by bringing the enemy to battle when he so elects.

They have the duty of maintaining constantly at the highest level the moral and physical state of the troops and to supervise personally the development of the training of the large units.

PETAIN.

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Les Armees Francaises, Tome VI, 1st Vol., Annexes, 1st Vol.: Report

### ***Training of American Divisions for the Front***

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,  
FRENCH ARMIES OF THE NORTH AND NORTHEAST,  
*December 23, 1917.*

Resume of interview of December 23, 1917 (General Petain - General Pershing)

General Petain: Necessity of expediting training of American units which we need as soon as possible on the front. Prospect of a battle in the early future in which the Germans will make a most violent effort.

Proposals: To continue training of the American 1st and 26th Divisions as planned, but adoption of a new method (amalgamation) for the other divisions. Insertion of American regiments into French divisions.

The 1st Division would go to the front as soon as possible. The 26th Division would join it after a tour of two months, by regiment, in French divisions and after having been assembled for its combined training as a division. The nucleus of the autonomous American army would thus be formed.

General Pershing: The training of the 1st Division is not finished, the cadres have been broken up through the necessity for satisfying the needs of the schools and various positions. The original officers have been almost entirely replaced by new ones who have had no training. The division commander has just been changed. Basic infantry training is lacking.

If the division were to be sent to the front, it would be at the cost of training. But it is understood that, if events necessitate it, the 1st Division would enter the front to relieve French units. It would be well if this did not take place before February 1.

General Petain: Declares his intention of taking advantage of the offer to have the 1st Division go into sector if necessary. As far as possible that measure will not be resorted to until after February 1. It is understood that the American units would be employed only to relieve French units on defensive fronts and would not go into combat.

General Pershing: Asks if the point where the 1st Division will enter the front corresponds approximately to the future American sector.

General Petain: Replies that the 1st Division will enter the future American sector, but that the other divisions, before completing their training, can be placed anywhere on the front.

Takes up again and discusses further the question of amalgamation. Refers to the telegram from Washington on the subject. [Not selected]

General Pershing: Says he has not yet any knowledge of that telegram. The "Jusserand" telegram is read and translated to General Pershing who states that is a reply to recommendations he made in the event the situation became so grave that American forces in France would have to be employed immediately. But that does not provide for the present case and the training of the troops.

General Petain: Emphasizes the training benefit American units would derive from amalgamation. In 4 months, a regiment would be fit to enter the front line, while the regiments of the 1st Division are going to require 8 months to obtain the same result. Necessity for speedy intervention for the sake of French morale.

General Pershing: Appreciates the importance of the moral side of the question. Stresses his desires to see American forces on the front as soon as possible, but does not concede our point of view. Brings out difficulties encountered in training. American troops are not yet thoroughly organized; they are groups of civilians whom it is necessary to militarize, the ground is not ready to receive training by French troops. Necessary to adopt an American training method. He has sent to the United States a training program which, he hopes will expedite the molding of the troops before their arrival in France. The schools which have just been organized will produce results. When the regiments are trained according to his idea it will perhaps be well to place them in French divisions. He will think over that solution.

General Petain: Urgently requests that amalgamation be tried. General Anthoine observes that the French I Corps is fully qualified to receive American units.

General Pershing: Reserves his reply and turns to another subject. Installation of the divisions to come in the training areas of the interior.

Suggestions from Marshal Haig concerning amalgamation. American troops routed by way of England. Training of American troops by the English. Entrance of American troops on the front at the present junction of the French and British armies. Asks General Petain's opinion on training of Americans by the English.

General Petain: Gives his opinion of the British methods and his estimate of the British troops.

The question of diverting a portion of the American forces to the English zone is the province of the Government.

There can be no thought given to Americans' entering the front at the junction of the British and French armies. This entrance can be made only on the French front.

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1st Ind.

Hq. A. E. F., O. I. G., Jan. 6, 1918 - To the A. G.

Report of investigation ordered herewith.

A. W. BREWSTER,  
Major General, N. A.,  
I. G., A. E. F.

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[Inclosure]

*December 31, 1917.*

From: Maj. Gen. A. W. Brewster, N. A. I. G., A. E. F.

To: The Commander-in-Chief

1. In conformity with your commands contained in the letter from the Adjutant General, A. E. F., dated December 15, 1917, subject "Methods of Decentralization," the following report of an investigation made by me as to what work now being handled by staff departments at these headquarters can be decentralized to the L. of C. or other subordinate headquarters, is submitted:

2. It is my purpose to deal with the question by departments.

3. Adjutant General's Department.

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### STATEMENT OF ORGANIZATION AND PERSONNEL

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DIVISIONS	OFFICERS	CLERKS	SOLDIERS
Miscellaneous )		8	
Correspondence )	1	2	
Mail and Records )		31	7
Cable	1	9	
Officers	1	4	
Enlisted	1	2	
Orders and Printing	3 *	9	17 *
Statistical	5	28	7
Reserve )		4	
Property )	1	3	4
Permit Office	1	1	
Code Office	3	9	
	17	110	35

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\* Two officers and sixteen men Q. M. C., are in the printing office.

Conclusions: I cannot see how any of the work of this office at present can be decentralized. Later on as our force grows it is believed that as much of the statistical work as possible should be removed to the L. of C., as when this force reaches its maximum strength the burden of maintaining all the necessary personnel for this bureau would be too great a strain on these headquarters, and I believe that this question should be taken up by the proper bureau of the General Staff with a view to determining what class of statistical work they deem advisable to keep in the Office of the A. G. at these headquarters, and that the rest should be sent to the A. G. O., L. of C. I believe that all statistics relating to personnel of all the bureaus which it is necessary to keep here should be handled in the A. G. O. at these headquarters; in other words the A. G. O. should be the library of statistical information at these headquarters. Special lists regarding recommendations for promotions of higher officers or special commendation lists of rating, I understand, are to be kept in the Office of the Secretary of the G. S. for the information of the C-in-C which is considered proper.

4. Quartermaster Department.

### STATEMENT OF ORGANIZATION AND PERSONNEL

DIVISIONS	OFFICERS	ENLISTED MEN	FIELD CLERKS	CIVILIANS
Chief Quartermaster	1			
Executive Officer	1			
Administrative Division	1	6	1	1
Personnel Branch	3	12		4
Records Branch		9		2
Telegraph and Cable Br.		13	1	3
Contract and Lease Br.	1			
Finance Division	1 )	11	1	
Accounting Division	2 )			
Graves Registration Ser.	2	5		
Supplies Division	8	11	2	1
Motor Transport Service	21	21		2
Remount Service	4	5		1

Lt. Col. H. E. Wilkins, Q. M. C., with station in Paris, temporarily with Purchasing Board. Maj. J. P. Castleman, Q. M. C., temporarily with Purchasing Board, Capt. F. T. Hill, Q. M., U. S. R., Asst. to Lieut. Col. Wilkins, on special duty in connection with supply of fuel.

Administrative Divisions: It is believed that the Personnel Branch of this division duplicates much of the work already done in the Statistical Division of the Adjutant General's Office.

In the technical and supply branches information as to prior occupation and personal history which is not kept in the A. G. O. is necessary in order to secure the assignment of officers to that class of duty for which they are best fitted. It would seem that the best place to put in operation information cards of this character would be at depots where representatives of the various departments could carry it out and could fill calls for assignment of personnel.

Finance and Accounting Division: I see no reason why the accounting could not be done at Headquarters, L. of C.

Graves Registration Service (Burial Department): It is believed that this service should be turned over to the L. of C.

Motor Transport Service Division: Much of the work of this division is research,

getting up tables of the supplies, and catalogues of material, spare parts, etc., drawing up forms and pamphlets of instruction, arranging plans for the handling of salvage for the various units, and outlining plans and instruction for the organization of reserves and other parks. This, it is believed, is necessary to the proper information of the chief quartermaster and should be performed in his office. This office has done a great deal of pioneer work. It was not done in the L. of C. or any other place, and it was necessary to take up many questions which might have been handled in the L. of C. The process of organizing and supplying the M. T. S. starts in this office and is done through the chiefs at the various troop commands and the L. of C. On account of shortage in motor transportation and its personnel, the distribution of motor vehicles has been made in this office; also the locating of shops and various agencies necessary for the proper functioning of the service.

At present all the motorcycle vehicles are received here at these headquarters and distributed; distribution of gasoline and oil are also made from these headquarters.

I believe that the planning of the organization of the service should properly be done in this office, but all transfers of personnel, assignment and distribution of vehicles and supplies should be transferred to the L. of C., and I am informed it is the intention of the chief quartermaster to do this. There is no reason why it shouldn't be taken up now and put into effect. While the L. of C. distributes the transportation, there must be always an authority higher than the L. of C. who can instruct him as to the assignment and distribution of vehicles and supplies outside of his own command, and that should be done by the C. S., G. S.

The movement and supply of motor transportation in connection with troop movements should be, in my opinion, operated from the proper bureau of the general staff, and not the office of the C. Q. M. It is believed that the operation of all motor transportation, including that of the Q. M. C. elements, should be in the hands of organizations to which it is assigned and the L. of C. I believe that chiefs of M. T. S. at various headquarters should report to the office of the C. Q. M. statistics regarding the operation of motor transportation and supplies used, in order that the office of the C. Q. M. can intelligently make up his requisitions and purchase orders.

This office also keeps in touch with the motor transport offices at the various bases and supervises the forwarding of spare part to Nevers; this should be done more or less automatically. If they were properly marked and labeled at home the officer at the base would know where to ship it without any instructions from these headquarters, and the C. Q. M. office is endeavoring now to have that done. This office charges itself with seeing that supplies are not hoarded by individual units but this is a matter of proper distribution and belongs to the regulating officer. At present all requisitions are supervised in this office; this should be done in the office of the C. of M. T., L. of C., but it does not seem that at present his office is equipped to handle this. I am informed in the office of the C. Q. M. that it is planned that when the entire system of requisitioning and supply, as now planned, is completed, requisitions from organizations in the service of the rear will not go through this office at all but will be filled through the office of the C. Q. M., L. of C., who will forward them to the motor transport depot.

The records of the registration of all motor vehicles in the A. E. F. are secured by this branch. It is reported that the record is for the purpose of identification and providing data from which the supply branch can provide their estimates for purchasing spare parts, tires, etc. I believe this information is necessary for the requisitioning and purchasing branch here.

The maintenance branch which was to do with the establishing and maintenance of repair shops should be transferred to the L. of C., although this office will always have to figure on the upkeep and operation of such establishments. It would seem that all instruction relating to the M. T. S. should be transferred to the L. of C. but this office should supervise with a view to suggestion and improvement.

The foregoing shows the centralized condition existing in the M. T. S., which as has

been shown was due to present conditions as to shortage of vehicles and supplies. As soon as practicable a radical change with a view to decentralization should be effected. This would probably ultimately result in the removal of the Chief, M. T. S., from the office of the C. Q. M., these headquarters, to the C. Q. M., L. of C. With the system of automatic supply functioning properly from Base M. T. S. Groups to Advance M. T. S. Groups, the function of movement and distribution of units of the M. T. S. should pass from the M. T. S. to the C. S., G. S., A. E. F., and to the C. S., G. S. of the various armies.

Remount Service Division: This division has charge of the entire question of remounts, including the distribution of the same. Also the procurement of forage. I believe that the distribution of animals should be placed under the charge of the L. of C., and the procurement of forage in the Supplies Division, Office of C. Q. M.

Salvage: This question is now being taken up and plans for putting it into effect on a large scale are being made. While it is quite proper to plan for the future, it must be remembered that at present our sea transportation limits us to the carrying of men and materiel for the fighting line rather than men and materiel for the purpose of saving material, i. e. money---and that it will be some time before this work can be undertaken on a large scale.

As regards this office, while the policy of decentralization has not been carried out and as I have pointed out there is much work done here that was intended to be done by the L. of C., it must be said that the administration of the office is well organized. I find no work here that is not necessary, and all were busy. Work that could have properly been done in the L. of C. was not undertaken by them, and had the chief quartermaster not taken hold himself unsatisfactory results with respect to supplies and transportation would have followed. I believe that this office should be charged with the general plans for all enlargement of quartermaster activities to meet the growing necessities of our army.

There is a branch post office in this department whose function is to distribute all mail for the personnel of the Q. M. C. on duty in France. The only mail that should be received here is mail for employees of the Q. M. C. stationed at these headquarters.

Another matter that apparently requires attention is this: The chief quartermaster should be informed that the post quartermaster and all officers, clerks and soldiers of the Q. M. C. on duty with the post quartermaster are not under his control but are absolutely under the control of the Commandant, H. A. E. F.



5. Office of the Chief Engineer

### STATEMENT OF ORGANIZATION AND PERSONNEL

DIVISIONS	OFFICERS	CLERKS	SOLDIERS
Chief Engineer	1		
Clerical Section		17	6
Administration Division	1		
Personnel Section	5	4	2
Military Information Sec.	1		
Transportation Sec.	1	1	8
Accounts and Contract Div.	2	8	
Operations Division	1		
Water and Sewage Section	15	5	13
Electrical and Mechanical Sec.	4		
Forestry Section	4		
Technical Military Eng. Sec.	1		
Office Engineering Sec.	1	3	4
Construction Section		1	
Geological Section	3		
Supply Division	1	3	
	41	42	33

Personnel Section: The work of this section is subdivided into four classes: (a) Gathering data relating to engineer personnel from telegrams, cables, orders, and correspondence; (b) the compiling, filing, and cross-indexing of all data gathered; (c) gathering information regarding the wants of the various engineer services and making recommendations for the supplying of their wants; (d) handling of correspondence relating to the engineer personnel and drafting all orders.

It is believed that most of the work of this section can be decentralized to the L. of C., providing that the policy of assignment of officers of the engineer corps is changed and assignments made at a depot of the L. of C. by the engineer representative there instead of as at present in the office of the chief engineer, these headquarters.

The engineer department maintains a branch post office in charge of two clerks who get and distribute all mail for the various engineer regiments and personnel on duty in France. As the office of the chief engineer is the only one which has the addresses of the organization and members of the engineer corps, this cannot be changed at once, but when the records of the personnel are removed to the L. of C., they should attend to the distribution of mail and only the mail intended for persons serving at these headquarters should be sent here.

Transportation Section: This office has its own automobile transportation, why I do not know, but it was necessary for them to have automobiles when they arrived and they purchased their own with engineer funds rather than wait until the quartermaster could furnish cars. There are six automobiles, I am informed.

Accounts and Contract Division: At present this is a very small section, but it could be removed, it is believed, to the L. of C.

Operations Divisions: Water and Sewage Section: This section is practically the office of a consulting engineer, an expert on the water supply. They perform no administrative function at present. It involves geological study and research. Later as corps and armies are formed it is proposed to assign much of the work to the various headquarters of those commands. The water question is so closely allied to troop movements and areas occupied by troops, that it is believed for areas outside of the L. of C. the question of

water supply should be handled in the office of the chief engineer at G. H. Q. and army and corps headquarters.

The other sections of the operations division exercise no executive control.

6. Office of Chief Ordnance Officer.

## STATEMENT OF ORGANIZATION AND PERSONNEL

DIVISIONS	OFFICERS	CLERKS	SOLDIERS
Chief Ordnance Officer	1		
Assistant to Chief Ord. Officer	1		
Attached to Gas Service	2		
Attached to A. S., G. S.	1		
Supervision of matters pertaining to Gen. Staff and Staff Depts.			2
Equipment Division	1		2
Automatic Arms Division	4		4
Trench Warfare Division	3	1	
Field Artillery and Anti-aircraft Division	6		8
Heavy Artillery Division	6		4
General Supplies Division	7		11
General Utility Orderlies, care of property, kitchen police, etc.			5
Office and Records Division	3	2	12
Personnel Division	1		7
	38	3	53

Personnel Division: The duties performed by this division are as follows: Special orders relating to assignments and movements of all officers of this department on duty at these headquarters; service record cards are kept in triplicate; special orders, H. A. E. F. and L. of C., and telegrams effecting station of personnel are noted on cards; reports to C. O. O., A. E. F., by ordnance officers, ports of debarkation, of all officers, soldiers and civilians of the ordnance department upon arrival in France, as required by par. 1, G. O. 24, H. A. E. F., are kept in this division; also monthly reports by all officers of the ordnance department commanding depots, subdepots, detachments or units of the ordnance department relating to officers, soldiers and civilian employees; also a card index system showing business experience, qualifications, knowledge of foreign languages, etc., for all officers, soldiers and civilians, ordnance department; all correspondence relating to personnel and money papers, and to supplies, such as stationery, forms, returns, etc., for the Office of C. O. O.; also all personnel on duty at these headquarters.

When the system of automatic replacements is put into effect it is believed that much of the work of this office will pass to the L. of C., especially that part of it which keeps the record cards of personnel.

There is a post office here in which is distributed all the mail arriving in France for the personnel of the ordnance corps and department, officers, soldiers, and civilians. It is believed that immediate steps should be taken to have the mail distributed elsewhere and that only mail for those on duty in the ordnance department at these headquarters should come here.

Automatic Arms Division, Trench Warfare Material Division, Field Artillery and Anti-aircraft Material Division, and Heavy Artillery Division: As much of the work of these divisions has to do with research, all technical questions including repair, maintenance, etc., and data concerning the consumption of ammunition, it is not believed at this time

that any of these divisions could be decentralized without impairment of efficiency. It would seem that at present the questions concerning the supply of artillery and ordnance material of all classes are too closely associated with plans of certain sections of the general staff to move the bureaus which handle these matters from these headquarters.

General Supplies Division: It is believed that the foregoing remarks apply as well to this division which has charge of the actual requisitioning and placing of purchase orders for all ordnance supplies. It keeps records of all supplies on hand and required, and sees that the necessary supplies are obtained and delivered to the L. of C. While not actually making purchase of material in Europe, it places orders with the chief purchasing officer, ordnance department, its representative on the General Purchasing Board. The division keeps record of all supplies on hand in the different storehouses of the L. of C., and also keeps track separately of all ammunition supply.

I believe that the chief ordnance officer should have personal supervision over all matters relating to equipment of all kinds, including artillery, and all research work and study connected therewith.

7. Office of the Chief Surgeon:

### STATEMENT OF ORGANIZATION AND PERSONNEL

DIVISION	OFFICERS	CLERKS	SOLDIERS
Chief Surgeon	1		
Personnel	5 *		10 **
Hospitalization	5		3
Supply	2		2
Sanitation and Statistics	2		10
Records and Correspondence	2	4	18
Dispensary	2		9
Dental Office	2		2
	21	4	54

\* 2 Veterinary Corps (temporary duty)

\*\* 3 Sorting mail

Personnel Division: This division keeps record of all the personnel of the Medical Corps: All officers, regular or otherwise, hospital corps sergeants, and nurses, on duty in France. Most of the records concerning personnel are kept on cards; these cards give name of college; date of graduating; whether medicine, dental, or veterinary surgery; previous military service and date of appointment and call into active service; and special character of professional work; also specialty and ability to speak or translate French. These cards are made out in cases of all medical reserve corps men. All medical personnel arriving in France are now assigned to duty from this office. When the system of automatic replacements is put into effect this work should be decentralized to the L. of C.

Hospitalization: This division handles all questions relating to the establishment of hospitals in France. The selection of sites is passed upon by the general staff at these headquarters after conference with the French Mission. It is not seen how this can be divorced from the office of the Chief Surgeon. The actual building and plans, etc., are now centralized to the L. of C.

Sanitation and Statistics: All reports concerning sanitation, sick, and wounded, etc., from the medical sections of all units, come to this office. Statistics and reports are made up concerning them; also the weekly report to the Commander-in-Chief. If the statistical bureau is established at these and other headquarters, it is believed with [the] representative of the medical department serving thereat that most sanitary reports and reports of sick and wounded could come to this bureau.

There is a certain amount of data, though, which should, in my opinion, come to the Chief Surgeon, who after all is responsible for the evacuation of sick and wounded and their care, and it is believed that in case of heavy casualties or epidemic the Chief Surgeon at these headquarters should receive the necessary data in order to enable him to understand the situation. Practically, the evacuation of sick and wounded will be automatic, but in times of emergency, the Chief Surgeon may have to act and exercise supervision over situations, and he must be kept informed as to the general situation. It is not necessary for him to have all the information in detail that is required for final reports to Washington. Data required for furnishing reports to the Commander-in-Chief should come to the statistical bureau at these headquarters. Others which are only required for the Chief Surgeon's Office in Washington could be sent to the statistical bureau at the Headquarters, L. of C., it is believed.

Records and Correspondence: When the automatic replacement is put into effect much of the records and correspondence work will naturally go from the Chief Surgeon's Office to the depots on the L. of C.

There is a post office here in which is distributed all the mail for the personnel of the medical department serving in France. It is recommended that immediate steps be taken to have the mail distributed elsewhere, and that only mail for the personnel on duty in the medical department at these headquarters be forwarded here.

8. Office of Chief of Air Service

### STATEMENT OF ORGANIZATION AND PERSONNEL

DIVISIONS	OFFICERS	CLERKS	SOLDIERS
Chief of Air Service	11	10	16
Supply Department	16	11	3
Operations Dept.	14	5	2
Headquarters Detachment	3	0	43
	44	26	64

The Chief of Air Service is now engaged in a radical reorganization of his service and it is believed that it would not be in the best interests of the service to interfere with the organization of his headquarters at the present time. It is possible, however, when he has effected his reorganization that it may be found advisable to decentralize his administration to some extent. At present it is believed he should be given every latitude in order to reorganize his service and place it on a firm working basis.

9. Office of Chief of Gas Service

### STATEMENT OF ORGANIZATION AND PERSONNEL

DIVISIONS	OFFICERS	CLERKS	SOLDIERS
Administrative	2	1	
Intelligence	3		
Offensive	1		
Defensive	2		
Supply	1		
Ordnance	2		
All sections		8 *	2
	11	9	2

\* Includes draftsman.

It is believed that the work of the gas service is so intimately connected with the troops serving in the line that for the present at least, no change should be made with respect to decentralization.

10. Office of Chief Signal Officer

STATEMENT OF ORGANIZATION AND PERSONNEL			
DIVISIONS	OFFICERS	CLERKS	SOLDIERS
Service of the Front	2		1
Administrative Division	1		
Telegraph, Motor and Time			
Distribution Division	1		16
Personnel Division	1	1	1
Records Division	1	7	5
Liaison Division	1	2	1
Engineering Division	5	1	22
Property Division	1	2	1
Special Services			
Radio Division	3	1	3
Photographic Division	1		2
Pigeon Division	1		1
Meteorological Division	-	-	-
S. C. Intelligence Division	1	1	8 *
Research and Inspection Div.	-	-	-

\* 2 French.

Personnel Section, Administration Division: At present this is the only part of the administration division which it is believed should be decentralized, which will naturally take place when the system of automatic replacement is put into effect.

Otherwise the service of information of the Signal Corps is so interwoven, the front with the rear, that it is believed it should be under one head, and that head should be at these headquarters; I believe this to be necessary for the best interest of this service. I can see no other decentralization which at present should take place in this department. The maintenance of proper information is closely allied with operations and it is believed that the chief and his principal assistants should be here for the convenience of the operations section of the general staff.

The photographic division, meteorological division, and research branch of the research and inspection division, are all in Paris. They are administered from the Office of the Chief Signal Officer who points out to them the line of work desired. I do not think that it would serve any good purpose to put these divisions under the L. of C. They are decentralized as far as their administration is concerned.

11. Judge Advocate's Office: The personnel of this office comprises six officers, four clerks, and one soldier detailed as messenger from the headquarters troop.

With respect to this office no decentralization is recommended.

12. Office of Inspector General: The personnel of this office comprises four officers, four clerks, and one soldier detailed as messenger from the headquarters troop.

The work of this office is entirely decentralized with the exception of inspections of money accounts which I decided to begin here for these reasons: First, I wished to see how these officers, who were expert accountants before they were commissioned in the national army, performed their duties; second, I wished an entirely independent examination made of all money accounts in France without any previous notification. The various inspectors were inexperienced as such, and do not understand the necessity of

making these inspections unannounced. When these first inspections are finished I shall recommend that one of these inspectors be sent to the L. of C. The other I shall wish to keep in my office in order that he may be available to make such thorough examination as I deem necessary in case of any investigation I may have with respect to the conduct of affairs by disbursing officers or any investigation where the question of money responsibility arises.

A. W. BREWSTER.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: 1880: Memorandum

***Requisites for Base Division Areas***

Operations Section, General Staff

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, December 17, 1917.*

MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF OF ADMINISTRATIVE SECTION

1. Referring to your memorandum of December 11, and a memorandum from this office of December 9, the following is submitted:

2. It is recognized that it would be advantageous to have base divisional areas established on the Line of Communications. However, such areas must afford facilities for training and it is believed that the railroads must meet the necessities of training rather than the stations of troops meet the necessities of the railroads.

The areas on the main Line of Communications at Perigueux and near Blois might be utilized for such training as is necessary in base divisional areas. It is to be remembered, however, that all of the divisional areas on the Line of Communication may be necessary for the temporary accommodation or billeting of combat divisions, should the tonnage question be solved in the first six months of 1918. The Commander-in-Chief has directed the establishment of Le Corneau as a base divisional area. It is recognized that La Courtine is more or less inaccessible from the great lines of railways. On the other hand, La Courtine offers ample accommodations for a division, and moreover, is an excellent training camp for a base division. It is believed that we should retain La Courtine as a base division camp. It is not thought that once a division is installed there the railroad question will be of great importance; this for the reason that movements to and from the camp will be of personnel rather than of complete materiel for a division. The base divisional areas to the north of St-Nazaire would, it is recognized, involve an amount of construction which would seem to be more or less impracticable in view of the tonnage situation.

3. All things considered it is believed that the best solution of the present problem would be as follows:

Retain La Courtine as a base divisional area. Retain Le Corneau for the reason that construction has already begun there and that the Commander-in-Chief has personally occupied himself with this area. Utilize the billeting facilities at Perigueux and near Blois as base divisional area. This would provide for four corps; the provision for the fifth corps can well be made at a later date, after the various ports are developed and the number of ships arriving in the several ports has become more certainly fixed. The solution thus proposed would leave six areas on or near the Line of Communications in which troops could be billeted in emergencies. If you agree with the above proposed

solution this section will prepare the necessary memorandum for the Chief of Staff.

FOX CONNER,  
Colonel, General Staff,  
Acting Chief of Section.

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GHQ, AEF: War Diary: Item 193-a

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*December 19, 1917.*

General Pershing had a frank interview with Prime Minister Clemenceau this date in which he emphasized the necessity of frankness and directness in the dealings between French and Americans. He referred in detail to the complaints made to the House Mission by M. Loucheur, Minister of Munitions, regarding the supposed raising of prices of American purchases, which complaints had never been brought to his attention. He also pointed out that General Petain had criticized the American training in an interview with Colonel House, and yet, notwithstanding their many opportunities and the importance of such matters to us, had never mentioned his criticisms to General Pershing. He emphasized the necessity of closer cooperation in their mutual relations and took up in detail the matter of the Franco-American Purchasing Board, designed to coordinate French and American Purchases in adjoining neutral countries, to prevent competition, and secure best results for all concerned. M. Clemenceau agreed entirely with General Pershing on the matters presented and expressed chagrin and surprise that the Petain-House interview had been without previous discussion between Generals Petain and Pershing.

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G-4, GHQ, AEF: 748-7: Memorandum

### ***Channel for Requisitions for Supplies***

Administrative Section

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, December 19, 1917.*

#### MEMORANDUM:

1. Hereafter all requisitions for supplies on the United States, on European Government Agencies or requisitions for purchases in Europe, including those through the G. P. B., with the exception of those noted in par. 2, will be submitted for the approval of the Commander-in-Chief, Administrative Section, General Staff.

2. These instructions will not apply to requisitions on European Government Agencies or for purchases in Europe involving less than 100 cubic tons (40 cubic feet per ton), unless they require replacement in kind or of raw materials by shipments from the United States, in which case they will be submitted for approval irrespective of the cubic volume thereof.

By order of the C-in-C:

JAMES A. LOGAN, JR.,  
Chief, A. S. G. S.

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AG, GHQ, AEF: 3952 B: Decree

***Decree Creating Central Office of Franco-American Affairs***

[Editorial Translation]

PRESIDENCY OF THE COUNCIL, MINISTER OF WAR,  
*Paris, December 19, 1917.*

The President of the Council, Minister of War, in accordance with the decree of November 21, 1917 [not printed], defining the functions of the Undersecretary of State for War, attached to the Presidency of the Council;

In accordance with the decree of November 19, 1917, providing for the nomination of a Councilor of Franco-American affairs;

In accordance with the articles of November 22 and 23, 1917;

DECREES: Articles 4 and 5 of this decree, taken from the copy in the Library of Congress, Washington, D. C., are given here as being pertinent to the present subject. They were not in the above extract of the decree. Article 4 [see below].

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Article 3. A Central Office of Franco-American Relations is established under the Undersecretary of State to the Presidency of the Council.

This office is charged with coordinating, under the authority of the Undersecretary of State, requests made by the American authorities in France, for the purpose of supplying the needs of their troops; it will transmit them to the departments concerned and will see to it that they receive prompt attention.

It receives requests addressed to the various ministerial departments by the Office of the Missions and refers to the Undersecretary of State those whose fulfillment requires an examination of the matter by the various services concerned.

This office is authorized to carry on ordinary correspondence that pertains to the same subject and demands immediate attention.

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Done at Paris, December 19, 1917.

GEORGE CLEMENCEAU.

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Article 4. Departmental decisions will determine the composition of the missions to be created with the American territorial organization for the purposes of providing and maintaining liaison with the central office.

The Chief of the French Mission with the Commander-in-Chief of the American armies is, with that general officer, the only representative of the French Government and of the General, Commander-in-Chief of the Armies of the North and Northeast.

For all matters relating to the interior, he comes under the jurisdiction of the Undersecretary of State to the Presidency of the Council.

However, the personnel of instructors, technical advisors and translators attached to the troops and schools of the American army in France, in the zone of the interior as well as in the zone of the armies, remains under his authority; he will issue its general directives for training and will submit to the Minister or to the General in Chief, as the case may be, all matters relative to this personnel, especially those concerning transfers and promotions.

Article 5. The Paris section of the French Mission with the American army is attached to the central office of the Franco-American affairs.

The mission of the Minister of War with the American army is abolished. Direction of control of all questions of administration raised by the presence of American troops in France and coming within the province of that mission is vested in the Ministry of War. An administrative office is created with the French Mission with a view of centralizing, for the General Commanding this Mission, questions of an administrative and controversial nature and to establish liaison with the control direction.

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AG, GHQ, AEF: 3952-B: Decree

[Editorial Translation]

PRESIDENCY OF THE COUNCIL.  
UNDERSECRETARIAT OF STATE OF WAR,  
*Paris, December 19, 1917.*

#### General Instructions on the

#### Organization and Operations of the Franco-American Liaison Services

##### Article 1:

(a) A special Franco-American service is established in each of the Ministerial Departments, in each of the Undersecretariats of State, and with the General Staff of the army (Advanced Group and Group of the Interior).

(b) Franco-American sections are established in all services of these departments that are particularly concerned, and especially in the various sections of the General Staff of the army, in the administrative directorates of the Ministry of War, in the General Staffs of the regions which have relations with the American authorities, and in certain services of those regions which are more particularly concerned.

Article 2: These services or sections are exclusively charged with the direct study, on behalf of the authorities with whom they are accredited, of all Franco-American questions which are transmitted to them and the following up of these questions until their final solution.

Article 3: The strength of these services or sections varies according to the importance and the volume of Franco-American affairs which are within their province.

\* \* \* \* \*

Article 11: Permanent liaison agents, preferably selected from the American officers attached to the Franco-American sections or services will insure speedy transmissions and will daily ascertain the status of problems under consideration. They will report both to the French and to the American authorities.

Article 12: These reports are periodically communicated to the Undersecretary of State of the Presidency of the Council (Office of Franco-American relations). Delays are immediately reported to him.

G. CLEMENCEAU.

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AG, GHQ, AEF: 3952-B: Decree

### ***Counselor of Franco-American Affairs***

[Editorial Translation]

PRESIDENCY OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS,  
*Paris, December 19, 1917.*

The President of the French Republic

On a report of the President of the Council, Minister of War, in accordance with the decree of November 21, 1917, defining the functions of The Undersecretary of State for War attached to the Presidency of the Council.

#### **DECREES:**

Article 1: M. Jules Cambon, Ambassador, is attached to the president of the council in the capacity of counselor of Franco-American affairs.

Article 2: He centralizes all information necessary for the unified cooperation between the Government of the United States and the Government of the French Republic.

Article 3: He determines, in accord with the Allied authorities and the ministries concerned, the general directives to be supplied to the executing services. He communicates these directives upon approval by the Undersecretary of State attached to the Presidency of the Council, who alone is charged with the direction of the general coordinating services.

Article 4: He has authority to examine all matters concerning Franco-American co-operation.

Article 5: The President of the Council, Minister of War, is charged with the execution of the present decree.

Done at Paris, December 19, 1917.

R. POINCARE.

By the President of the Republic:  
President of the Council, Minister of War,

GEORGE CLEMENCEAU

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AG, GHQ, AEF: 3952-B: Decree

### ***Head of Office Named***

[Editorial Translation]

PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL, MINISTRY OF WAR,  
*Paris, December 20, 1917.*

In accordance with the decree of November 21, 1917 [not printed], determining the functions of the Undersecretary of State attached to the Presidency of the Council;

In accordance with the decree of November 23, 1917 [not printed], designating an official of the control office to assure the General Direction of the Services of the Undersecretary of State with the Presidency. In accordance with the order of December 19, 1917, providing for the organization of the Undersecretariat of the Presidency of the services charged with the coordination of the affairs relating the the Franco-American liaison.

ORDER:

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Article 2: M. Ganne (Jean-Maurice) Professor of the Central School of Arts and Manufactures, Inspector General of Instruction, Captain of Territorial Artillery, on leave without pay, former Director of the Service of War manufactures to the French High Commissioner to the United States, of the Mission of the Undersecretary of State with the President of the Council, is designated to head the Direction of the Central Office of Franco-American Relations.

Article 3: The Undersecretary of State with the President of the Council will be responsible for the execution of this decree.

Paris, December 20, 1917.

GEORGE CLEMENCEAU.

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***Shipments of Troops behind Schedule***

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, December 20, 1917.*

AGWAR, WASHINGTON

For Chief of Staff

Understood here that a shipping program based on tonnage in sight prepared in War College Division in September contemplated that entire I Corps with its corps troops and some 32,000 auxiliaries were to have been shipped by end of November, and that an additional program for December, January, and February, contemplates that the shipment of the II Corps with its corps troops and other auxiliaries should be practically completed by the end of February. Should such a program be carried out as per schedule and should shipments continue at corresponding rate, it would not succeed in placing even three complete corps, with proper proportions army troops and auxiliaries in France by the end of May. The actual facts are that shipments are not even keeping up to that schedule. It is now the middle of December and the I Corps is still incomplete by over two entire divisions and many corps troops. It cannot be too emphatically declared that we should be prepared to take the field with at least four corps by June 30. In view of past performances with tonnage heretofore available such a project is impossible of fulfillment, but only by most strenuous attempts to attain such a result will we be in a position to take a proper part in operations in 1918. In view of fact that as the number of our troops here increases a correspondingly greater amount of tonnage must be provided for their supply, and also in view of the slow rate of shipment with tonnage now available, it is of the most urgent importance that more tonnage should be obtained at once as already recommended in my cables and by General Bliss. Investigations are now being made at these headquarters with a view to paring down existing requirements for tonnage and for cutting down time occupied in turnaround at this end, but I again urge the immediate acquisition of an additional one million five hundred thousand tons of gross tonnage which should not be postponed on that account, and it is also necessary that steps for the further acquisition of still more tonnage at an early date be taken. With a view to making intelligent cuts in requisitions for exceptional supplies, quantities of which in many cases are dependent on our total strength in Europe, such as material for harbor facilities, railroad rolling stock, and so forth, request to be informed of approximate dates when additional tonnage asked for will enter service; and approximate dates when the different phases of the priority schedule will probably be completed, in order that supply and transportation situation may be kept balanced with number of troops in Europe and their transportation requirements.

PERSHING.

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***Amalgamation of American Forces with French and British***

No. 19

E. L. S. 1403

NOTE FOR COLONEL FAGALDE

French Military Attache in London

AMERICA:

From French Ambassador, Washington, received December 20

The United States Secretary for War has wired to General Pershing that, in compliance with request of Great Britain and France prompted by the expectation of a strong German offensive, the President agrees to the American forces being, if necessary, amalgamated with the French and British in units as small as the company. General Pershing is to make the final decision in this matter after consultation with the British and French Commanders-in-Chief. It is suggested to him that it might be suitable for the American forces to be placed close to the point of junction of the British and French armies so as to enable them to be used wherever their assistance can be most useful; this is, however, left to General Pershing's judgment.

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HS Brit. File: 900-32.9: Minutes

***General Pershing Given Authority to Amalgamate Forces***

No. 18

WAR CABINET, 304

EXTRACT FROM MINUTES OF A MEETING OF THE  
WAR CABINET HELD AT 10 DOWNING STREET, S. W.,  
ON FRIDAY, DECEMBER 21, 1917, AT 11:30 a. m.

\* \* \* \* \*

AMERICAN MILITARY ASSISTANCE

0.1/135/388

12. The Prime Minister read a decipher of a telegram just received from Sir C. Spring-Rice, Washington, dated December 20, containing a paraphrase of the telegram sent by the American Secretary of War to General Pershing, giving General Pershing a free hand regarding the decision to be come to concerning the amalgamation of American forces in French and British divisions.

The War Cabinet requested Lord Milner to see General Pershing in Paris, and to urge him to accede to the representatives made in regard to this matter by the British Government and by the general staff.

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MEM: 17: Memorandum

***Relations between Heads of Staff Departments, A. E. F., and Line of Communications***

No. 148

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, December 21, 1917.*

MEMORANDUM

1. The Commander-in-Chief desires to clear up in the minds of all concerned the relations that should exist between heads of staff departments, A. E. F., and the L. of C. Ordinarily the control by heads of staff departments should be limited to such supervision and instruction of their own subordinates as, when once assigned, may be necessary to insure efficiency, and to the allotment of materiel in general to the L. of C.

Troops, individuals and materiel assigned to the L. of C. should be considered as at the disposition of the Commanding General, L. of C. and it therefore follows that orders affecting the L. of C. should be given only through the recognized channels for such communications. This view will apply equally to the D. G. T. and to division, army and corps commanders.

The foregoing is dictated in order to carry out the spirit of our organization, and to obtain supervision and instruction of personnel of the different departments and to insure the procurement and allotment by the Staff departments, of materiel and supplies through its personnel. The object is to secure coordination and cooperation in every detail between the staff departments themselves and in their relations to the general staff, which, under the Commander-in-Chief, must be supreme.

2. As viewed by the Commander-in-Chief, the efficiency of various staff and administrative departments referred to must be maintained by their respective chiefs, and proper coordination with other departments, as far as necessary for the smooth working of their organization is enjoined.

In order to keep themselves entirely familiar with their departments, the respective chiefs should make frequent visits to their various units and investigate the efficiency with which the duties are being administered.

By command of General Pershing:

ROBERT C. DAVIS,  
Adjutant General.

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**Priority Schedule**

No. 553-R

A. G. O., WAR DEPARTMENT.  
Washington, D. C., December 22, 1917.

PERSHING AMEXFORCE HAEF

1. The following auxiliary troops of the first phase of your priority schedule of October 7, and the additional troops called for by you are now on equipment schedule here and will be forwarded as shipping is available. Enlisted strength only is given. Engineers, all combined 38,600 field signal and telegraph battalions, 2,000 quartermaster auxiliary, 16,300 ordnance detachment(s) 1,000, 2 brigades six and eight-inch guns, 11,000 medical units, 2,950 replacement draft, 3,600 1st Division train 930, 4 reinforcement recruit battalions, 3,000, and in addition to first phase motor mechanics 1,400, crane operators 250, 3 colored infantry regiments, 1,050, airplane and balloon squadrons 12,800.

2. Aggregate auxiliary and additional troops approximately 120,000. Last division of first phase---abroad soon. Do conditions warrant a modification of your schedule of priority of shipments of October 7, so as to call for divisions of second phase before the entire first phase is forwarded to you? Should you desire any modification of your shipping schedule, state definitely which auxiliary you wish displaced to meet conditions, also when field artillery should come. At present rate of shipping, approximately two months will be required to complete shipment of first phase including troops mentioned above. Bliss.

McCAIN.

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***Visit to King Albert Suggested***

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, December 22, 1917.*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF

[Extract]

1. I understand that the Germans are doing their best to win over little Belgium. The Belgians are a little disgruntled with their British and French Allies. They still like us, and Minister Whitlock stands well with them. They are likely to wobble if America does not hold them on the track. I suggest you pay an early visit to King Albert by appointment and then ask him to return the visit. He is very highly considered in America and the fact that America has done as much as it has for the Belgians makes us feel close to them. I think the exchange of visits, or rather King Albert's visit to you and your troops, would make good press propaganda at home.

2. I believe we should have a good officer attached to the Belgians as soon as practicable. \* \* \*

J.G. HARBORD,  
Chief of Staff.

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HS Brit. Files: 900-32.9: Note

***Use of American Forces***

No. 22

*December 24, 1917.*

E. L. S. 1441

NOTE FOR COLONEL FAGALDE

FRANCE:

General Foch informed General Petain by letter dated December 23, that President Wilson agrees to American troops being employed as isolated units with French units if necessary.

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***Question of Amalgamation of American Forces with French and British  
Confused***

WAR CABINET 307

No. 27

EXTRACT FROM MINUTES OF A MEETING OF THE WAR

CABINET, HELD AT 10 DOWNING STREET, S. W. ON

THURSDAY, DECEMBER 27, 1917 AT 3:30 p. m.

\* \* \* \* \*

American Military Assistance

01/135/388

4. In reference to War Cabinet 304, Minute 12, the chief of the Imperial General Staff stated that the question of the amalgamation of American forces with French and British divisions had become rather confused owing to the intervention of the French.

The War Cabinet decided that: The discussion of this matter should be deferred until the return from Paris of Lord Milner, who had been requested to interview General Pershing on the subject.

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G-4, GHQ, AEF: 19: Memorandum

***Role American Aviation Can Play***

[Contemporary Translation]

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,  
AIR SERVICE,  
*December 29, 1917.*

From: General Petain, Commander-in-Chief of the Armies of the North and Northeast

To: General Pershing, Commander-in-Chief of the A. E. F. in France.

My dear General:

Your Chief of Air Service, General Foulois, asked me, in the course of his last visit, my opinion concerning the part which aviation will be able to play in the coming battles.

Concerning the assistance which America might give French aviation in view of the large operations which are to be expected in the very beginning of 1918.

And concerning the relative importance which should be given aviation as compared to other branches.

I have the honor to advise you of the substance of the replies which I made to these questions, as follows:

I. Role of the Aviation in the Coming Battles: I consider that in the coming battles aviation will play the following important parts:

A. It will participate in the action of the other branches of service on the battlefield:

(1) By observing artillery fire.

The importance of counterbattery fire and of isolating fire has caused the ranges of guns to be increased; this in turn has considerably increased the necessity for airplane observation.

(2) By carrying out infantry and liaison missions. In this way aviation will very largely facilitate cooperation of infantry and artillery, and the conducting of the battle by the command.

(3) By direct action; attacking with bombs, machine guns, and cannon the reserves of the enemy.

B. It will attack the Lines of Communication.

This role could be decisive, if carried out with sufficient means. The factor which, in present conditions of warfare, prevents the exploitation of an initial success is the quickness of the transportation of the enemy, who is able, through immediate concentrations, to parry endeavours to break through the front.

Aviation would bring about a decision if it were able, for a certain time, to paralyze a large part of the traffic of the enemy's lines of communications.

This preponderant and decisive part can only be played by aviation if we give it the maximum power achievable in the lapse of time at our disposal before the end of the war.

C. Aside from operations for the purpose of breaking through the enemy's front, aviation is the branch which will enable us to attack at its very sources the industrial and financial power of the enemy, and to cause panics and demoralization far to the rear of the lines. This role is also of great importance in present conditions of warfare, as the morale of the troops and of the population in the rear are essential factors in the struggle.

D. Finally, aviation is the only branch capable of fighting against enemy aviation, of preventing it from flying over our lines, and of destroying it even on its own grounds.

These important roles will be played by aviation on a constantly increasing scale.

The number of observation airplanes must be proportional to the size of the other branches. But there is no limit to the number of fighting airplanes. Thus both sides are always obliged to aim at the maximum development of this special branch.

Furthermore, the efficiency of this branch will increase as the war goes on; there will be improvements in the methods of using airplanes, in their power, in their speed, in their armament, in the power and number of their projectiles, etc.; the powerful airplane of tomorrow will be to that of today what the heavy long-range gun is to the 75-mm. or to the 120-mm. gun.

II. Assistance which the United States can give to French aviation in view of the large operations which are to be expected in 1918: There is one important and pressing question. It is probable that the year 1918 will be marked by violent efforts on the part of the Central Powers in view of obtaining a decision prior to the entry into the line of large American forces.

What is the quickest and most effective way America can help us?

I consider that it is in the domain of aviation and of effectives that the United States can bring us the greatest help in 1918. Aviation is the branch which the United States will be able to prepare most quickly, with the help of France.

The United States could help us in the following ways, some of which would have an immediate effect:

(1) Immediate shipment of all tools, raw materials, and labor for the purpose of continuing in France the building of material for the benefit of both the French and the American Air Services.

(2) Employment of a large number of men for laying out and organizing aviation grounds (sheds, barracks, roads, etc.). A large number of good aviation grounds constitute the basis of every aviation maneuver, for they are necessary for concentration. At the present time, we have not yet, on our front, the number of aviation grounds necessary for the aviation concentrations demanded by the coming important operations. Thus the American army would bring us valuable assistance were it immediately to start organizing a large number of aviation grounds. Indeed, these grounds could, in case of necessity, be used by our own aviation prior to the employment of the forces of the U. S. Air Service. Furthermore, the American army would thus be preparing the way for its own aviation.

(3) Immediate sending of officers, N. C. O.'s, and working personnel to the important organs of the French Air Service: parks, warehouses, repair shops, training centers, schools. This personnel would increase the numerical strength of the French aviation and would at the same time obtain experience which would enable it efficiently to run similar American formations when they are formed.

(4) Immediate sending of the personnel and material necessary for the creation, within a short time, of the American Air Service's supply and repair formations. This would free French aviation from a great burden.

(5) Cooperation of American aerial units in the operations of French and English aerial units.

a. On the active front, the fighting units and some of the bombarding units would participate in the destruction of Lines of Communication.

b. On the quiet fronts, the remaining bombing units would actively attack the enemy's sensitive points and keep in the vicinity of these points an important part of the enemy's fighting airplanes, thus helping to clear the active front.

III. Relative importance which should be given aviation as compared to other branches: Finally, a more general question arises: What relative importance should America give aviation as compared to other branches? On the solving of this question depends the orientations to be given to a large part of America's industrial effort and the proportion of tonnage to be reserved for the transportation of aviation material from America to France.

We have already stated that there is no limit to the number of fighting airplane units and that *priori* this number should be increased as much as possible.

But to answer this question one may further ask what will be the relative efficiency of America's effort in the different branches of service, and how effective will be her effort in aviation.

We consider that the Central Powers could obtain a marked numerical superiority on the Franco-English front. Nevertheless we feel certain that this superiority is not large enough to enable the enemy to obtain a decision.

Thus, if we wish to defeat the Central Powers by a wearing out battle, we would be obliged to achieve an even greater numerical superiority. This would mean that we would have to ask the United States for a considerable number of divisions and heavy artillery batteries.

The difficulties attendant upon the transportation and supplying of these forces are self-evident, as also is the length of time which would be necessary; in this matter the assistance which the United States can give us is unhappily limited.

How efficient can America's effort in aviation be?

The effort which the United States can make in America in the domain of aviation is very great, as everyone appreciates; furthermore, it is evident that Americans are apt at waging aerial warfare.

If properly handled, this effort on the part of the United States would not suffer very much from transportation difficulties: Indeed the tonnage necessary for transportation of air service material, etc., will always be well within the limits of available transportation, however great may be the development of the aviation branch.

Then America's assistance could enable us to obtain a great numerical aviation superiority over the enemy; this superiority might be of 3 or 4 to 1, for example.

It would then be possible to destroy or neutralize a large part of the enemy's aviation; this would considerably increase the effectiveness of the Allied aviation.

Were aviation to be developed to such a degree, it is a question whether it would not become the decisive branch of the army, by rendering the enemy blind, paralyzing his communications, and lowering his morale.

Thus it would seem logical for the United States to concentrate a large part of their effort on the branch which is the most efficient, which has the smallest volume, and which is complete in itself, as it fulfills the functions of all others. It seems evident that it would be advantageous for the United States, in order to increase their efficiency in the present war, to cause as much fighting as possible to be carried out in the air.

At all events, if it be desired that American aviation play the part which is demanded by public opinion, we must remember that very great means must even now be placed at its disposal: Large industrial resources should be devoted to its work, much labor should be placed at its disposal in France, all the tonnage which it may need for its proper development should be placed at its disposal, and its orders and needs should be given precedence by all services, both French and American.

This matter concerns the American command, and even the American Government. I can but say that I, personally, would approve such measures.

PETAIN.

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Cable: P-432-S

***General Staff Officers in Division Increased***

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, January 1, 1918.*

ADJUTANT GENERAL OF THE ARMY, WASHINGTON

[Extract]

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2. For Chief of Staff. Have found it necessary to increase the number of general staff officers for a division to four with following distribution: Chief of Staff one; operations one; administration and coordination one; intelligence one. Chief of Staff should have rank of colonel and others should have rank of lieutenant colonel or major. Request change in organization accordingly including divisions at home and cable acknowledgment. Pershing.

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PERSHING.

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Cable: P-432-S

***Need to Expand Headquarters Troop of A. E. F.***

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, January 1, 1918.*

ADJUTANT GENERAL OF THE ARMY, WASHINGTON

[Extract]

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B. To avoid confusion later when it may become necessary to divide expeditionary force into separate armies recommend designation these headquarters as General Headquarters American Expeditionary Forces which corresponds British and French practice. Pershing.

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PERSHING.

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***Use of American Companies or Battalions in British or French Divisions***

No. 433-S

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, January 1, 1918.*

For Chief of Staff

Reference confidential Cablegram 558 from Secretary of War. Do not think emergency now exists that would warrant our putting companies or battalions into British or French divisions, and would not do so except in grave crisis. Main objections are first, troops would lose their national identity; second, they probably could not be relieved for service with us without disrupting the Allied divisions to which assigned, especially if engaged in active service; third, the methods of training and instruction in both Allied armies are very different from our own which would produce some confusion at the start and also when troops return for service with us. Attention should be called to prejudices existing between French and British Governments and armies, and the desire of each to have American units assigned to them to the exclusion of similar assignment to the other. Also each army regards its own methods as best and they do not hesitate to criticise each other accordingly. We have selected what we consider best in each and added to our own basic system of instruction. After consultation with both French and British commanders, have arranged to take every advantage of aid from both Allies in pushing forward our instruction as rapidly as possible and are availing ourselves of additional instructors and units to assist. Shall probably place first division in trenches by brigades about middle of January for further trench experience and training. This will permit continuation of special training by brigade not in trenches. Period of time to be kept in lines not yet definitely determined, but will be followed by active assignment to temporary sector as circumstances may dictate. Other divisions will follow as rapidly as their progress in training will warrant. Believe that this action will stimulate morale of French and will satisfy clamor for our entry into lines which has become very persistent. Sector scheduled for this training quiet now and full cooperation with adjacent French troops arranged to prevent serious mishap. Will wire definite location of sector in separate cable. Further conference with French and British Commanders-in-Chief being arranged to determine definitely eventual American sector, and manner of employing American troops in general.

PERSHING.

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***Location of an American Sector to be Studied***

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, January 1, 1918.*

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL CONNER:

Please have operations make a confidential study of the best place to employ the A. E. F. on the western front. Heretofore we have approached this subject on the understanding that we were limited to some sector far enough to the east to permit of the employment of much of the French armies between the A. E. F. and the B. E. F. Without the limitation please now study the question not only from the standpoint of strategy but including political considerations; the installations we already have in the intermediate section of the L. of C.; and the necessary continued use of our present base ports. When you have reached a conclusion, then consider as a factor the possibility that in addition to our priority schedule for personnel, the British might be induced with their own shipping to land at channel ports one or more of the high-numbered divisions of the national army, and permit them to be trained in areas already prepared behind the present B. E. F. lines. The study will be needed within a week.

J. G. HARBORD,  
Chief of Staff

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HS: Brit. Files: 900-32.9: Letter

***Acceleration of the Arrival of American Troops***

C. I. G. S.  
0153/3081

*LONDON, January 3, 1918.*

The Field Marshal,  
Commander-in-Chief  
British Armies in France

With reference to my telegram No. 48732 of December 26, 1917, concerning the acceleration of the arrival of American troops, the matter has become somewhat complicated owing to the fact that several different proposals have been put forward. I think it advisable, therefore, to restate the case.

First Proposal: The Prime Minister made a proposal to Colonel House for using any infantry which may be surplus to those which can be formed into completely equipped divisions under General Pershing, by incorporating them temporarily by small units in the British army. The proposal was that they should be brought over as soon as possible from

America and be trained and equipped in either England or France, and that they should then be used as companies of battalions to reinforce British divisions. It was made quite clear that we did not wish to delay the formation of General Pershing's army in any way. This proposal Colonel House undertook to recommend to President Wilson on his return to the United States.

Second Proposal: On December 26, a telegram was received from the British Ambassador stating that President Wilson had accorded to General Pershing full authority to use the forces under his command for amalgamation with French and British forces by regiments and companies, after consultation with you and General Petain. This is an entirely different proposition to that made to Colonel House. It would result in delaying the formation of General Pershing's army, and this I consider inadvisable, even if General Pershing should be willing to carry it out.

Third Proposal: I understand that as a result of a meeting with General Pershing on December 28, you have now put forward a 3d proposal for accelerating the arrival of certain units of General Pershing's army, for attaching these units to British formations for training, with a view to the ultimate conversion of a certain number of British formations into American formations. This amounts to accelerating the formation of General Pershing's army.

2. The War Cabinet are very desirous of carrying out the first proposal, as it undoubtedly offers the best prospect of making additional American troops available quickly.

The board of trade have submitted to the war cabinet a scheme for removing 200,000 tons of shipping from the carriage of foodstuffs and using it to bring over 200,000 American infantry during the next four months, over and above any numbers which are being transported in accordance with the American program for General Pershing's army. The object of this proposal is to provide immediate reinforcement in manpower, and the scheme is contingent on General Pershing's agreement to the incorporation of these men by companies or battalions in the British army until they are sufficiently trained to be collected into larger units.

I hope to proceed to France shortly to discuss the matter with General Pershing, and will inform you as to the result.

3. The adoption of this proposal need not interfere with any arrangements which you may make with General Pershing for assisting him in the training of the American troops under his command.

W. R. ROBERTSON,  
General,  
C. I. G. S.

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AG: GHQ, AEF: 3952C: Letter

***Creation of a Central Office for Franco-American Relations***

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, January 3, 1918.*

From: The Commander-in-Chief, A. E. F.

To: The President of the Council, Ministry of War

1. I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of December 31, 1917, from the Undersecretary of State of the Presidency of the council enclosing copy of a decree from the President of the Republic, dated December 19, naming Mr. Jules Cambon, Ambassador, with the functions of Counselor of Franco-American affairs, and certain other papers.

2. In reply, permit me to express my thanks for the interest which the President of the Council has shown in facilitating the cooperation between the French Government and the American Expeditionary Forces. There can be no doubt that the establishment of this bureau with such a distinguished diplomat as Mr. Jules Cambon at its head will contribute very greatly to the expeditious transaction of business in which France and America are mutually interested.

3. I am in thorough accord with the principles set forth in Article II of the general instructions for the organization and the working of the Franco-American services of liaison. Suitable officers will accordingly be carefully selected as representatives of the American forces in the different services.

JOHN J. PERSHING,  
General, U. S. Army.

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Cable: P-441-S

***Use of Southampton for Deep-draft Troop Ships***

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, January 4, 1918.*

AGWAR, WASHINGTON

For Chief of Staff

With reference to your Telegram 588 and my Cablegram 433, have discussed with British possibilities of using Southampton for discharging our deep-draft troop ships, having in view expediting arrival American forces and giving quicker turnaround to big boats. British have made tentative offer to handle such troops through Southampton and provide cross-channel transports. They would allot us training areas in Amiens region. They propose to place our troops there and provide ratios while training, other matters of supply to be subject of future agreement. Sole object of this on my part is to expedite arrival and training our troops. Project would include assistance of British divisional staffs of skeleton divisions for instruction if desired, also opportunity to train higher

commanders and staffs by actual command of British units in the field. Command in areas would be exercised by our officers and the training of troops would be our responsibility. Conference leading to this contemplates no change in our present plans of priority schedule which would be carried on as now through some ports and using all tonnage available for such ports. But it is thought that discharging our deep-draft vessels at Southampton where they could coal quickly and return to states without delay would be advantageous. British offer to ration them would obviate aggravation of supply situation, where, through delays of supply or embarkation authorities in America, troop and supply shipment do not balance. In the discussion with British they promised also to consider the possibility of aiding us in transporting troops by using additional British tonnage not now availed by us. Question of manpower and supply so important and our shipping program so far behind that opportunity should not be lost if on further study British conclude they can handle Southampton project and especially if they can provide any additional tonnage. It is imperative, however, that all this be regarded as strictly supplementary to our own regular program, and not as a substitute for any part of it except such changes as may be necessary in using Southampton instead of Brest. Prompt information of feasibility of plan from your standpoint is requested.

PERSHING.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: 1824: Letter

***French Mission with Headquarters, Line of Communications***

Administration Section, General Staff

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, January 4, 1918.*

From: Commander-in-Chief

To: French Military Mission

1. The Commanding General, Line of Communications, advised that he has just been informed by the local French mission now attached to the Line of Communications in Paris that, owing to the limited number of officers with that mission and the fact that so much of their business is performed with the Purchasing Board in Paris, it will be impracticable for them to detach any officers to go to Tours when the Headquarters, Line of Communications, are changed to that place on or about January 10.

2. In view of the foregoing information, it is requested that your government kindly consider the question of establishing liaison with the Headquarters, Line of Communications, at Tours. You are fully aware of the importance of this agency of the Expeditionary Force at Tours, so it does not appear necessary to go further into this question in this letter.

3. Will you please advise as promptly as possible of the action taken on this request?

By direction:

J. A. LOGAN, Jr.,  
Chief, A. S., G. S.

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***Inexpediency of Cabling to Washington on Certain Subjects***

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F..

*January 5, 1918*

President of the Council

Ministry of War

Paris

Dear Mr. President:

Permit me to quote the following cablegram from the War Department at Washington:

The French Ambassador called on Secretary of War today and read to him a dispatch from M. Clemenceau to the effect that General Pershing and General Petain had conferred as to the wisdom of seasoning of American troops by attaching their regimental units to French divisions before committing a part of the line to an American division made up of troops not so accustomed to actual front conditions.

M. Clemenceau's cablegram stated that General Pershing had reported himself and General Petain in substantial agreement after conference on this subject; but General Petain conveyed to M. Clemenceau an opposite opinion.

The French urge the action outlined above as being safer for the American troops than it would be to give them at once an independent place in the line, and urge very strongly that the Secretary of War here accept their view and commend it to you. This the Secretary of War is not willing to do, desiring to leave the matter wholly within your discretion after full consideration of the important elements of the matter.

May I not suggest to you, my dear Mr. President, the inexpediency of communicating such matters to Washington by cable? These questions must all be settled here, eventually, on their merits, through friendly conference between General Petain and myself, and cables of this sort are very likely, I fear, to convey the impression in Washington of serious disagreement between us when such is not the case.

With cordial sentiments of high personal esteem and regard, I remain,

Yours very sincerely,

JOHN J. PERSHING.

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**Situation at Base Ports**

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, January 5, 1918.*

AGWAR, WASHINGTON

For the Chief of Staff

1. The general situation at our ports is becoming serious. We are not able to handle transports quickly enough to get full service from the limited amount of tonnage that up to the present seems available for military use. There are several reasons for this state of affairs.

A. The first is the failure of supply departments to provide sufficient material long since and frequently requested for the construction of our port facilities, the larger proportion of such material having been so much delayed that completion of docks is now three to four months behind our expectations.

B. The second is the shortage of railroad rolling stock in France and Italy. The deficiencies already existing in France have been emphasized by the demands for the transportation of troops and supplies to Italy during November and December. This situation may improve some during the winter but there is also a possibility of its becoming much worse.

C. Another difficulty arises from our inability so far to control the destination of transports which has resulted in serious congestion especially at St-Nazaire. At one time there were 26 transports there and there are 16 at this date, with only 3 at Brest and 3 at Bordeaux. If transports could be more evenly distributed it would prevent delay in unloading, and also cut the time now required for vessels to make the turnaround, also enable us to dispatch troops and cargo to destination instead of piling things up at ports.

D. There is much delay on account of lack of ballast for returning transports and little prospect of early improvement in this regard.

2. A. To meet the first difficulty the French may be able to increase at all ports the number of berths available for our use. This will help us tide over our own deficiencies as to berths, although all these ports sadly lack facilities for handling cargo and we shall need to improve their facilities as rapidly as possible. And port construction must be pushed vigorously at a somewhat later date after the car situation is relieved.

B. To meet the shortage of railway cars it is proposed to defer temporarily the shipment of timber for port construction and ship over railway cars instead. However, will give further particulars later. In addition to this expedient, every effort is being made to repair French cars now useless of which there are some ten thousand in France that could readily be repaired. We are also pushing repairs on Belgian locomotives. Railway car repair troops with tools should be expedited with all possible haste. As a precaution against just such a contingency have selected several areas near the ports for use in training in order to save rail transportation and thus temporarily relieve any congestion that might occur.

C. Controlling the destination of transports presents a most serious problem. Under present arrangements, see paragraph 13 my Cablegram 224, cargo is supposed to be loaded for a particular port of debarkation according to cargo, but in practice transports hitherto have nearly always been directed to St-Nazaire. As shown in cablegram this date number 441 an effort was made to divert transports from point of rendezvous to desired ports but the navy now reports that this will be impossible because of limited number of destroyers available. Admiral Sims' representative at Paris still seems to think navy could divert cargo boats where we want them but thus far they have not favored taking

transports to Bordeaux. From this it appears imperative that we have greater number of destroyers set apart for service with our own convoys. Nothing can possibly be more important than the rapid movement of our transports under proper protection and enough destroyers should be taken from service with British fleet or elsewhere without delay to service fully our own needs. Request that this be taken up with the navy department at once.

In the meantime am in communication by telegraph with Admiral Sims seeking a solution.

D. We are trying to get the French Government to undertake the solution of this ballast question by themselves handling sand barges. Will make further recommendations later. Water ballast may be the only solution.

3. After setting forth the above brief outline of the situation your attention is invited to my cablegram number 441 regarding the dispatch of troops by our deep-draft vessels at Southampton.

PERSHING.

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Cable: P-452-S

### ***Information Concerning Military Missions***

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F..  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, January 5, 1918.*

AGWAR, WASHINGTON

[Extract]

1. For the Chief of Staff. With reference to paragraph 7 your cablegram 536, the French army receives at its headquarters a British mission consisting of 6 officers, an American mission consisting of 5 officers, a Russian mission consisting of 2 officers, a Belgian mission of 3, Japanese mission of 2, Roumanian mission of 1, Serbian mission of 1, and Italian mission of 2 officers. These missions, with the exception of the American and British missions, which have actual work in connection with the operations of the American, French and British armies in France, are really observers in every case. Pershing.

A. It is the practice of the British Headquarters to have no missions accredited to it in France, except the French and American missions, which are with it for purely business purposes. The British practice is for missions from Allied and neutral governments to be received and quartered in London, giving permission to the officers to visit the British front from time to time as guests of the British army. Pershing.

B. The American Headquarters in France has now attached to it a large and growing French mission, and a small but growing English mission, for the purpose of coordinating the work of our forces. Our situation here largely parallels the British situation and the same reasons which have impelled the British to refuse to have foreign observers or foreign missions permanently attached to their headquarters in France, except they represent armies fighting on this front, apply with equal force to our own army. Pershing.

C. It is recommended that all missions from Allied and neutral countries be taken care of in the United States, as is now done in England, and that the only missions that are permanently assigned to these headquarters be composed of these Allies whose forces are actually employed with our forces in the fighting on this front.

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PERSHING.

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***Alleged Disagreement between Petain and Pershing***

[Contemporary Translation]

No. B-4450

FRENCH REPUBLIC,  
*Paris, January 6, 1918.*

My dear General:

I hasten, without losing a moment, to reply to your letter dated January 5, 1918. I found myself under the necessity of cabling to the Ambassador of France at Washington, because the two contradictory answers which I had received from General Petain and yourself, when you did me the honor of calling on me, compelled me, in the interests of the common cause, to seek an arbitration between the two Commanders-in-Chief.

I need not conceal the fact that I placed all confidence in this regard in the American Government. However, it was not to the American Government that I addressed myself. I cabled to the Ambassador of France, as was my right and duty, in order to give him directions for the conversations which might take place either with the Secretary of War or the President of the United States.

It might very well have happened that I would have addressed myself to the American Government later on, but I insist on the point that I did nothing of the sort. I had not authorized the Ambassador of France to read all or part of my despatch to the Secretary of War. I regret that he did so, but I do not disavow anything of what I wrote.

So I am giving you here the explanation which I owe you, and I shall exercise all the patience of which I am capable in awaiting the good news that the American commander and the French commander have finally agreed on a question which may be vital to the outcome of the war.

With the assurance of my feelings of high esteem and of respect for you personally, I beg you, my dear general, to believe me.

Sincerely yours,

CLEMENCEAU.

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Cable: P-454-S: Cablegram

***Details Concerning Priority Schedule***

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, January 6, 1918.*

AGWAR, WASHINGTON

1. For the Chief of Staff. With reference to paragraph 2 your Cablegram 553 [Dec. 22, 1917], thorough consideration of conditions shows inadvisable to modify priority schedule of October 7. Request first phase be carried to completion before beginning shipment of divisions of second phase except those divisional elements which should arrive one month in advance of their divisions as indicated in divisional shipping schedule page six, priority schedule note c.

A. To limit number of animals to be brought over ponton train item E 105 and one of corps cavalry regiments item 131 should be sent without animals.

B. Above action essential to completion of lines of communications facilities for our I Corps. It need not, however, interfere with possible movements referred to in my confidential cablegram 441 [Jan. 4, 1918] if latter movements can be arranged to make no demands on tonnage allotted or to be allotted to carry out our program.

C. With regard to numbers of service of rear troops still due on first phase our figures correspond closely with yours, total about 60,000. With regard to other troops included in the 120,000 mentioned in your cablegram to be shipped January and February following points should be noted.

D. Replacement drafts and recruit battalions should be shipped without fail each month as scheduled, as first and most important thing is to keep all our forces up to authorized strength.

E. Total number of motor mechanics for French service is 12,000 instead of 14,000. Of these only 3,000 are to be transported by our shipping, remaining 9,000 to be transported by the French if possible. See separate cable this subject.

F. The two brigades of army artillery referred to in paragraph 3 your Cablegram 522 [Dec. 16, 1917] should be shipped in January and February, all to arrive by March 1 as requested in paragraph 1D [Dec. 20, 1917] our Cablegram 425.

G. Under existing program aviation and balloon personnel required amounts to about 8,000 per month coming of which the larger number will go to England in accordance with agreement for training 15,000 mechanics there. Air personnel to come direct to France in our shipping should not exceed about 3,000 monthly during the next few months.

H. With regard to four colored regiments referred to in Adjutant General's confidential letters of November 28 and November 30, of which one regiment and about two-thirds strength is already here, and three regiments are to be shipped as stated in your cablegram 553, these regiments will serve as infantry pioneers and will cover item Q 104 first phase page six priority schedule and item Q 208 second phase page ten priority schedule. As the three regiments you are about to ship will thus belong to the second phase they can be used temporarily as a substitute for certain troops of first phase intended for work on lines of communication, just as we have been forced to use other combatant infantry. In view of the above, if these three colored regiments amounting to 10,500 men are shipped with first phase it will be satisfactory for the same number of men pertaining to quartermaster personnel for service on lines of communications item Q 418 page one priority schedule be postponed so as to arrive with early elements of second phase, as was intended for the three infantry pioneer regiments item Q 208 page ten priority schedule. Advise whether above understood and satisfactory.

I. Summary of situation. 60,000 service of rear first phase including 10,500 colored troops from second phase. Additional to arrive January 6,600 replacements about 5,500 coast artillery about 3,000 air service personnel to France and 3,000 motor mechanics for French. Also 5,000 air service mechanics to England. Additional to arrive February about 5,500 coast artillery and 3,000 air service personnel to France. Also 5,000 air service mechanics to England. Grand total 96,600. Above is exclusive of automatic replacements for February which should arrive here by February 1.

J. In order to insure complete understanding between War Department and these headquarters as to shipments made and to be made in accordance our priority schedule, requested you mail first day of each month statement of exactly what troops have been shipped up to that date with reference to phase and item number, number of officers, men, animals, et cetera. Also similar detailed statement as to prospective dates of shipment of units ready to come during next month. In addition request that when advising of departure of troops by cable you give phase and item number for each unit shipped in addition to information you are now cabling. At present it is often impossible identify organizations from descriptions given.

PERSHING.

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### ***Situation on Western Front***

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section  
No. 316 BS/3

FRENCH GENERAL STAFF,  
ADVANCE GROUP,  
*Paris, January 6, 1918.*

To the Supreme War Council

The letter of January 1, 1918, No. 84 BS [selected], sent by the Chief of Staff to the Supreme War Council, has demonstrated the necessity to be ready to meet a possible enemy offensive by a combined Franco-British counteroffensive.

It specified that combining this counteroffensive was the responsibility of the Supreme War Council, while its preparation devolved upon the Commanders-in-Chief.

The conditions of the future execution of the counteroffensive for disengagement thus conceived and prepared remain to be determined.

As soon as the enemy offensive is launched it will be necessary:

To hold out at all costs the counteroffensive for disengagement;

To take from the available resources of the coalition no more than the forces strictly necessary to meet the enemy offensive of attrition;

To decide the moment and the conditions under which the counteroffensive will be launched.

This triple mission can be entrusted neither to the Commanders-in-Chief who are prevented by their very functions from judging with the necessary impartiality the needs of that part of the front for which they are not responsible and who cannot at one and the same time perform the duties of commanders of their armies and of the over-all command; nor to the Supreme War Council, an organ of consultation and studies, but unsuited, by its very composition and the intermittent character of its functioning, for decision and swift action.

This mission can be entrusted only to an agency of supreme command, alone capable of constantly defending the general plan against special tendencies and interests, of making quick decisions and putting them in execution without loss of time.

With this in view, it would seem indispensable to appoint, at least for the front located between the North Sea and Switzerland, a military authority exercising, for the coalition and in conformity with the views of the Supreme War Council, its directing action on the whole of this front, managing the common reserves, holding back the counteroffensive for disengagement, ordering it at the desired moment.

This authority would begin its functions on the date the enemy himself would choose for his offensive; moreover, it could be agreed that, once the operations are terminated, it would be dissolved.

For obvious reasons this temporary supreme command should be French.

It is therefore logical to think that the French Chief of Staff would naturally be qualified to assume the duties of the contemplated mission.

Finally it is recommended that there be submitted to the decision of the Supreme War Council:

1. The idea of creating, for the whole Franco-British front, a temporary organ of supreme command, acting as delegate of the coalition for the execution of the latter's plans;

2. The appointment of the French Chief of Staff for this post.

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***Personnel Bureau to be Established***

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, January 7, 1918.*

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Chief of Staff

Please establish a personnel bureau under the Adjutant General and place Colonel James A. Shannon in charge of it. The idea is that this will develop into a bureau which will handle confidentially all matter relating to the personnel of officers as far as it is necessarily of record at these headquarters. As such it will be a special section of the A. G. O., not connected with the statistical bureau nor with the ordinary routine of the Adjutant General's office, but under it for convenience and good administration. The A. G. O. will provide the necessary clerical assistance. Its duties will be:

1. To collect all official information regarding officers, such as reports and recommendations from superiors, etc.
2. To prepare efficiency blanks for distribution, upon which the efficiency of officers is to be recorded.
3. To keep lists of officers available for various classes of duty in the several staff departments and their qualifications for command.
4. To keep track of personnel of divisions and other units, and to see that they are correctly balanced according to organization tables and with officers of proper rank.

The most stringent rules will be put in force by the Adjutant General, confining the information of the personnel bureau to the officer in charge and selected subordinates and clerks, all of whom will be charged with the necessity of absolute secrecy in guarding these records.

J. J. PERSHING.

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Cable: P-460-S

***British Policy Regarding Passports to Wives and Relatives***

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, January 7, 1918.*

AGWAR, WASHINGTON

[Extract]

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8. For Chief of Staff: With reference to paragraph 4 your Cablegram 541 British War Office issues passes to wives and relatives only on recommendation from Surgeon Base Hospital that visit is necessary. It is a matter of a few hours only to travel from England to the patient. Relatives are made to leave promptly when emergency ceases. Owing to length of time it takes to travel from United States to France strongly recommend that no passports be issued wives or relatives of wounded officers or soldiers except upon special request of these headquarters.

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PERSHING.

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
January 7, 1918.

## NOTES

received at G. H. Q., A. E. F. from Col. LeRoy Eltinge

The 3d Bureau - Operations part - is organized as follows:

- 1 colonel chief of section (not chief of 3d Bureau)
- 1 lieut. col. subchief (acts like a chief of staff for a commander).

Assignment and movements of army artillery:

- 1 major.

Liaison:

- 1 major with American mission (connection with Ragueneau).
- 1 major with British and Belgian missions and French corps on British front.
- 1 major with North Group of Armies and Second Army.
- 1 major with Third and Sixth Armies.
- 1 major with Fourth and Fifth Armies and with tanks.
- 1 major with Seventh Army and Eastern Group of Armies.
- 1 major with Eighth Army.

Secretaries: (Like Maj. A. S. Kuegle, Sec. G. S., G. H. Q., A. E. F., except their office is in same room as chief of operations section).

- 2 captains

As I told you yesterday there is also a subchief for aviation and one for dealing with civil and political authorities. Also a section for making maps, etc., as Maj. Xenophon H. Price does.

They make a great point of the liaison which works as follows:

Take, for example the major liaison officer for Eighth Army. He has a file of maps of all information of enemy on front of Eighth Army. Also he has one of daily situation maps of Eighth Army. He keeps up to date on these. Every order issued by Eighth Army and every letter from that army is put in a special basket. At 11 a. m. he goes to this basket and goes through it. In the same room are the baskets for other liaison officers. Each glances through the papers in all the baskets and makes a study of those in his own. In an order coming up from the Eighth Army there appears something that does not conform to General Petain's orders. The liaison officer takes a copy of it and looks up to see if there is any special reason (special condition) that warrants the Eighth Army in not conforming to said order. If so - all right. If not he takes an automobile and goes to Eighth Army where he says that General Petain has noticed this discrepancy and wishes to know what is the special condition that caused the failure to carry out the order or whether the language of the order was not clearly understood by Commanding General, Eighth Army. On his return the liaison officer reports the facts to chief operations section who either accepts the explanation or carries it to the Chief of Staff as facts warrant. While at Eighth Army this officer would also take a look around, both in the office and at front and report on that also.

Meanwhile each Tuesday the commander of each army or a deputy sent by him reports to Petain in person. A general conversation ensues in which each army or group of armies presents a statement of orders they have received that were not wholly workable on their front and why; these concern most important matters only. Petain then outlines his views of the situation and what he considers will be done next. These officers then depart and each visits his liaison officer on the operation section of 3d Bureau. Here he tells his

troubles in detail and an understanding is arrived at for all the questions that were not sufficiently general to be presented to Petain.

They make a great point of friendliness and courtesy between the liaison officer and the army to which he is assigned and try to develop good relations and mutual confidence and respect.

Now an order from Petain to the commander of eastern group would be written about like this (drawn of course by Chief, 3d Bureau):

I desire two divisions from the Eighth Army to be ready to entrain at

Blank on Blank date for transportation to Fifth Army.

This will be shown to the major liaison for Eighth Army who says, "Eighth Army has no divisions that have been fit for battle lately. If they are to be used for attack a period of training will be necessary. The divisions that most likely to be selected are X and Y. These are now located (see map). The entraining point selected is inconvenient for them and it had hell bombed out of it night before last. Such and such entraining points are more convenient and in better working order."

The points he brings up are considered. Finally the order in two or three lines is written and dispatched to eastern group, which goes through a similar process and forwards it changed by, perhaps, specifying a desire that a certain part of the Eighth Army front be not unduly weakened.

Eighth Army on receipt selects the particular divisions to go and issues necessary order.

Meanwhile order as soon as written was communicated to the director of service of rear who has his main arrangements made and is ready to talk specific points to director of service of rear for Eighth Army by time the order reaches him.

Such orders are usually sent by motor car messenger (liaison officer of that army) but wire is used if in great hurry.

This is all logical and you probably know it all before I write it out. I am doing so only as a sort of review that may bring a point or two out in your mind so it will not be overlooked later. If this sort of running notes bores you say so, and I will choke them off.

Sincerely,

ELTINGE.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1917: Memorandum

***Opinion on Personnel Bureau by G-3, G. H. G.***

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
Chaumont, Haute-Marne, January 8, 1918.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

1. For the first time in our history these forces are developing a general staff which is becoming a real agency of the several commanders in all that pertains to planning, coordinating, supervising, and executing.

There can be no doubt but that these are the proper functions of the general staff. The execution of plans is largely dependent upon the choice of commanders and general staff officers of all grades. In exercising the choice of commanders and of general staff officers it is impossible to admit any agency other than the higher commander and his general staff. If any other officers (such as those of the Adjutant

General's Department) are better qualified to exercise this choice, then those officers are out of their proper sphere and should replace less competent officers on the general staff.

Instructors at schools are in a sense officers of the general staff and should be selected as are general staff officers.

2. The exercise of control over promotions and details to the general staff does not necessarily imply that the agency exercising such control must be the office of record. At the same time it is to be remembered that the centralization of all records in one office delays the transaction of business and may render it impossible. Each office must have records of some sort; this is a necessity that cannot be avoided, however, it may be camouflaged. Yet, it is perfectly possible that an officer may make extracts or abstracts from original records and return such records to a central office for file.

3. Answering the first question of the chief of staff specifically, it is believed that all original records relating to promotions, selection of general staff officers, and of instructors for schools should come to the general staff. After the general staff has made the necessary extracts or abstracts the original records should be returned to the Adjutant General. All recommendations for action should be made by the Chief of Staff.

4. A separate bureau for considering promotions would be advisable only if such bureau depended directly on the Chief of Staff.

The Commander-in-Chief is unusually vigorous, both physically and mentally, but it is believed that he is already carrying too great a load and to attempt to regulate promotions, etc., by a bureau reporting directly to him would be a vicious solution.

5. It is believed that at these headquarters the Secretary's office is the most convenient location for handling matters of personnel.

At army corps and division headquarters the administrative section of the general staff would appear to be the proper agency.

6. With reference to Item 4 of the Commander-in-Chief's memorandum, it is believed that the administrative section is the proper agency for the performance of the duties named.

7. It is recommended:

(a) That promotion and general staff and school details be handled by the general staff; at these headquarters by the secretary's office or by a bureau directly under the Chief of Staff.

(b) That replacements, including balancing of rank, etc., be handled by the administrative section, general staff.

(c) That all other personnel matters be handled by the Adjutant General.

(d) That, in order to decentralize, the general staff of the various headquarters have duties as indicated in general outline below.

1. General Headquarters:

(a) All G. S. details.

(b) All promotions to any assignments of general officers.

(c) All promotions of officers not under other hq.

2. Army Headquarters:

(a) Promotions and assignments of regimental commanders.

(b) Promotions and assignment of officers of all army troops not under army artillery commander.

3. Army Corps Headquarters:

(a) Promotions and assignments of officers of corps troops.

(b) Supervision of promotions and assignments made by division commanders.

4. Division Headquarters:

(a) Promotion and assignment of officers junior to colonel.

5. Army Artillery headquarters:

(a) As for corps and division headquarters.

6. Commanding General, L. of C.:  
(a) As for division commanders.
7. Director General of Transportation:  
(a) As for division headquarters.

FOX CONNER,  
Colonel, General Staff,  
Chief of Section.

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Cable: P-465-S

***Commander-in-Chief Requests to be Consulted Concerning Promotions***

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, January 8, 1918.*

AGWAR, WASHINGTON

[Extract]

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1D. In carrying out the department's promotion policy as outlined in G. O. 132, all promotions to be based on demonstrated efficiency, there is sure to be lack of coordination if officers on duty in France be promoted by the department without ascertaining first their demonstrated fitness here. Many officers who have had most excellent records in peacetime have shown themselves utterly unfit for our service in France. In view of this I request that before any promotions are made either in staff or line of officers on duty in France that I be given an opportunity to state the result of experience here.

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PERSHING.

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P Conf. Cable: 1-500

***General Pershing's View on Breaking up Divisions***

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, January 8, 1918.*

No. 467-S

For Chief of Staff

Reference your Cablegrams 558 and 588, am in conference and communication on subject mentioned. French have not been entirely frank, as unofficial information indicates they really want to incorporate our regiments into their divisions for such service in the trenches as they desire. As to our instruction, a certain amount of work with French

troops is beneficial and this we are having and expect to have. We are following closely latest developments and are using French and British instructors as we think best. Our men are working hard and instruction is progressing favorably. Have expressed a willingness to aid in any way in an emergency but do not think good reason yet exists for us to break up own divisions and scatter regiments for service among French and British, especially under the guise of instruction. As we are now at war ourselves the integrity of our own forces should be preserved as far as possible. Shall see M. Clemenceau Wednesday the ninth instant and expect to hold joint conference with Field Marshal Haig and General Petain within a few days. Shall have frank discussion of the whole subject. The President and the Secretary of War may depend upon it that every endeavor will be made to arrive at satisfactory agreement consistent with maintenance of our own national military identity.

PERSHING.

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G-3: GHQ, AEF: 1706: Letter

### ***Conditions at Ports of Debarkation in France***

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, January 8, 1918.*

President of the Council  
Ministry of War  
Paris

Dear Mr. President:

In view of the prime importance of expediting in every possible way the movements of our transports, may I take occasion to call your attention briefly to the conditions at ports assigned to the American Expeditionary Forces, and set forth some of the difficulties that call for a speedy remedy, if we are to get the results expected of the very limited sea transportation at our disposal for bringing American troops and supplies to France, as well as personnel and material for the French Government.

At the outset, and very soon after my arrival in France, the Bureau of Transportation of the French Government, in discussing the question of dock construction, gave encouragement to the idea that we could obtain in France all necessary material, including piles and heavy timber, required for these works. Later on, in the month of August, it was learned that there was no available material here of the character required. Notwithstanding our cable requests to the states asking that the material be supplied, the delays incident to sawing and shipping timber from Oregon leaves us with our orders only partially filled and docking facilities of our own incomplete. Unless arrangements can be made to meet the emergency that now exists there will be further and more serious delays to our program. Already we have had as many as twenty-six ships at one time at St-Nazaire and Nantes, and because of the excessive delay in unloading, our vessels are unable to make anything like schedule time on their trips. It is calculated that an average of fifteen days is lost to every ship.

It is not to be understood that this situation is entirely due to lack of berths. There are other reasons, such as lack of cooperation on the part of certain French officials, inefficiency due to duality of control, inadequate means at French berths of handling heavy cargo, and there is delay because of shortage of ballast. On our own account, there is not sufficient naval escort. The deficiencies of rail transportation have already been made the subject of a separate communication.

This question of tonnage is absolutely vital to the success of the Allies. So that in order to get the greatest use of our limited tonnage I wish to emphasize our difficulties in the strongest terms, and impress upon you the importance of early action, if we are to avoid unnecessary delay, and get the quickest possible dispatch of our ships.

As a beginning in the solution of the question, the first thing I would suggest is for the French Government to authorize us to use and control the entire docking system at St-Nazaire with all its accessories. After several months' trial, it is believed that transports cannot be successfully and quickly handled under the present arrangement. Without ample port facilities that can be utilized to the full capacity, our efforts in this war may come to nothing.

Summarizing the difficulties, we find:

1. Great lack of docking space for transports.
2. Insufficient facilities for handling cargo at such berths.
3. Shortage of storage space at or near ports in which cargo can even temporarily be stored.
4. Failure of cooperation on the part of certain French port officials.
5. Shortage of ballast for returning vessels.

Allow me to present the following summary of remedial action recommended:

1. That the French Government turn over the whole system of docks and storehouses at St-Nazaire to the American Expeditionary Forces, under the same conditions accorded the British at Le Havre.
2. That as many berths as can possibly be spared at Bordeaux, La Pallice en Brest be placed under control of the American Expeditionary Forces.
3. That the facilities for the quick handling of cargo from transports be increased to the fullest extent as early as possible.
4. That all available storage space in port towns that can be spared be set apart for our use, in order to save construction and, what is more important, save the transportation of material for such purposes.
5. That the best competent and reliable French officers be selected for command at all the above ports, each to have a working staff whose duty it shall be to hasten the discharge of cargo from our transports and expedite its transfer to the railways.
6. That each of the ports of St-Nazaire, Bordeaux, and La Pallice be placed in *etat de siege* in order to enforce through military means, a strict compliance with every rule and regulation that will aid in getting men and supplies quickly handled.

I am appealing to you in this manner as I know you will give this matter very serious personal consideration. I have presented the situation personally more than once to the Ministry of War and have sent my representatives to urge action, but the results so far are not satisfactory.

My dear Mr. President, I sincerely trust that you will understand my attitude on these questions. We have drifted along here now for several months without being able, for the various reasons set forth above, to organize our ports, and we are now confronted with a situation that demands the immediate application of certain correctives which no one can apply except yourself.

With the highest official and personal regard, and a full confidence of complete cooperation, I remain,

Very sincerely yours,

J. J. PERSHING.

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## ***Plans for the Campaign of 1918***

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff  
No. 8358\*

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS.  
FRENCH ARMIES OF THE NORTH AND NORTHEAST,  
*January 8, 1918.*

The letter of January 1, 1918, addressed to the Supreme War Council considers it eminently desirable to have the armies of the Entente assume the offensive:

1. In the form of powerful counteroffensives for disengagement if the enemy attacks, or
2. In the form of operations with limited objectives to dominate and wear the enemy down if he does not attack.
3. These procedures having in either case the object of bringing us to a combined offensive seeking a decision.

The principle is incontestable.

But whatever our desire to resume the initiative in the operations we must submit to what is patent and base our plans not upon abstract notions but upon realities. The American effort cannot make itself felt in the battle before 1919 and until then Franco-British forces will have to be husbanded with a prudence which leaves only the smallest possible part to chance.

A concrete case will demonstrate immediately the situation that the Russian collapse is creating for us in 1918.

Let us suppose a major German attack in Champagne on a 30-km. front occupied by 5 divisions between the Aisne and the Suippe, for instance, and a secondary attack in Lorraine on a 20-km. front from Arracourt an Arnaucourt, held, let us say, by 3 infantry divisions. (The enemy is able to launch these two operations simultaneously on a front totaling 50-km. before March 1.) What will this cost us in divisions in the first fortnight?

In Champagne, the plan of reinforcement which doubles the number of the divisions in line will absorb 5 divisions. Then, to plug the gaps and to launch counterattacks, a force estimated at 1 division per 2 1/2 km., or a total of 12 divisions will be needed immediately; subsequently an equivalent force will be needed to relieve the divisions thus engaged, the rapid attrition of which must be anticipated. Total: Approximately 30 divisions. These effectives cannot hope to do anything more than block the enemy attack.

In Lorraine 4 reinforcing divisions will be needed. The enemy offensive being limited it can be admitted that it will not be necessary to relieve in a short time the elements which will have come to reinforce the front nor the elements which were already holding the front, and that one division for each 2 1/2 km., or 8 divisions, will be sufficient. An anticipated total of 12 divisions.

Putting together the needs of the 2 sectors we reach a grand total of 42 divisions.

That is the first outlay: The system of rotation of reliefs of the large units between the active fronts and the fronts which have remained quiet will then have to be established. Now, after the relief of the Third Army by British forces, French reserves will number 39 divisions. The operation of the plan of reliefs without replacement on fronts not under attack will bring this number to 44.

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\* Handed to General Gramat, Chief of Staff of the French Army, to General Anthoine, Chief of Staff, French G. H. Q.

When all that is done, we shall finally have at our disposal a reserve pool of 2 divisions to assure the rotation of reliefs, a number altogether insufficient. Therefore we may be obliged to have part of the first group of reorganized divisions participate in the relief.

Suppose even that we can operate our system of rotation of reliefs. The first 42 divisions coming from the front will have to be organized, some of them in sector. At an average rate of 3,000 men per division, they will absorb then a reinforcement of more than 125,000 men, which represents about double the resources we will have at hand in February and March (including the class of 1918) for the maintenance of the combat infantry units. In a word, after the first outlay of 42 divisions, we will almost immediately find it impossible to replace the losses suffered by the large units which will enter the fight.

What would we use for powerful counteroffensives for disengagement? We do not even mention the combined offensive to seek a decision, the preceding figures forbid considering it.

Even if we have to bear the weight of only one of the above mentioned attacks, it will be very difficult to have reserves at hand to undertake operations other than to block the enemy's way or to help our Allies.

And this reasoning leaves no room for a false move on our part. Still it is a contingency which cannot be ignored. How, indeed, can we distinguish from the beginning between the main attack and the secondary one? The one and the other will probably assume the same initial form, but the main attack will subsequently be fed by the flow of the mass of reserves; the other one, limited in its scope, will be equipped only to jolt our troops on an extended front but to a relatively small depth.

Can it be positively stated, even, that in the enemy's intention one of these attacks shall be decreed *a priori* to be the main effort and the other secondary? Will not the character of the one and the other be determined, rather, by the extent of the initial success, the reserves being lavished on the army or armies which have obtained the most promising results at the first impact?

In connection with this subject it is proper to remember that the collapse of the Russian front does not liberate only German divisions and probably 25 Austrian divisions; it makes available large resources in commanders and staffs of army corps and armies which assure to enemy reserves the solidity and flexibility of operation propitious to the calculations of the high command.

These perspectives and the precarious situation of our effectives oblige us to observe great prudence in the use of our means if we want to hold out in 1918 to reach, without excessive and irremediable attrition, the moment when our American Allies will be in a position to give appreciable help in the battle.

Of course the form the German offensive will take may be different than the one contemplated in this letter. It is possible that, for various reasons, the enemy may attack on narrower fronts, bringing about a smaller initial outlay on our part. In this hypothesis various counteroffensives are planned for the purpose of replying to the enemy's action or disengaging from his attacks, and the work of preparing the terrain was begun long ago. But we must realize that these counteroffensives cannot be powerful; their effect will perforce be local and transient, for we will have to think of the continuation of the operations. Now, if the Germans attack on a narrow front or fronts, it is because they are not seeking a swift decision and that they are starting on a battle of attrition. We would be playing into their hands if we were to throw our cards on the table at the very start.

Finally, if our front is attacked on a total extent of more than 50 km., we have not even the strictest minimum of forces to meet the attack and it is absolutely necessary for the British to come to our help.

To sum up, the battle of 1918 will be a defensive one on the Franco-British side, not through absolute choice of the command, but from necessity. Our lack of means is the cause. It is better to realize it now and to get organized accordingly.

Directive No. 4, the instructions issued for the offensive as well as the defensive organization of the terrain and for the distribution of means, is written with this problem in view.

PETAIN.

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Cable: P-471-S

***Attachment of General Staff Officers to The Polish Army***

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, January 9, 1918.*

AGWAR, WASHINGTON

[Extract]

\* \* \* \* \*

2A. With reference to paragraph 2 your Cablegram 589. In view of fact that Polish army is now being formed in France under French general staff and in accordance with French organization, believe best military practice dictates complete French staff organization. Would be unwise for us to mix up in the details of this matter. Our intervention now in matter suggested am satisfied would only result in our being charged with our proportionate burden of the supply of this army which for many reasons do not believe desirable we should assume. Finally as previously reported, we are very short of general staff officers for our own units. Pershing.

\* \* \* \* \*

PERSHING.

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Cable: A-619-R

***Routing of Deep-draft Vessels to Southampton***

A. G. O., WAR DEPARTMENT,  
*Washington, D. C., January 10, 1918.*

PERSHING, AMEXFORCE

With reference to your Confidential No. 441 Operations, navy taking up with Admiral Sims question of routing deep-draft vessels to Southampton. Transports *Aquitania* and *Mauretania* have been offered through British Embassy here. This offer is acceptable and British authorities here communicating with their government relative to method of operation, and question of landing additional troops for transportation through England being considered. Project of using Southampton should be considered, it is thought, in connection with use of these large vessels as well as Brest group(s). Unable at this time to give total troop-carrying capacity of the two British vessels named as they are now being refitted for such service. Believe plans entirely feasible and suggest that you press negotiations with this in view, in cooperation with Vice Admiral Sims. Bliss.

McCAIN

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***Possibility of Attaching a Liaison Mission to the Polish Army***

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, January 12, 1918.*

AGWAR, WASHINGTON

[Extract]

\* \* \* \* \*

C. With further reference to paragraph 2 your Cablegram 589, our reply paragraph 2A our Cablegram 471, on account of possible political effect believe advisable that we give support and sympathy to Polish army now being organized by French from Poles and Czechs.

For reason stated our cablegram not advisable to assume responsibility for organization by formally attaching general staff officers, none of whom are available, but can arrange to attach mission of liaison which would serve desired purpose without involving us in details which French better able to handle. If approved such mission will be created and as much publicity as possible given to this action. Pershing.

\* \* \* \* \*

PERSHING.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: 1801: Letter

***Diversion of Transports to the Different French Ports***

AMERICAN NAVAL FORCES OPERATING IN EUROPEAN WATERS.  
*London, January 12, 1918.*

No. 01

My dear General:

I am very much indebted to you for sending me your aides to acquaint me with your needs in the matter of diverting transports and supply ships to the different French Atlantic ports.

They have acquainted me fully with your needs, and I shall take immediate steps to arrange the operation of our naval forces so that your wishes can be fully met.

Very truly yours,

WM. S. SIMS  
[Admiral, U. S. Navy].

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***Diversion of Transports to French Ports***

HEADQUARTERS BASE SECTION NO. 3.,  
LINE OF COMMUNICATIONS, A. E. F.,  
*London, January 12, 1918.*

From: Colonel R. E. Wood

To: Commander-in-Chief, A. E. F.

1. After an interview today with Admiral Sims, the navy has agreed to the diversion of troop transports to any port we may designate on the coast of France.

2. They have asked us, however, for the next thirty days, until they have better organized their destroyers, to divert as few ships as possible to the port of Bordeaux.

R. E. WOOD  
Colonel, N. A.

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Les Armees Francaises, Tome VI, Vol. 1, Annexes Vol 1: Report

***Summary of Conversation of January 11 between General Petain and General Pershing***

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,  
FRENCH ARMIES OF THE NORTH AND NORTHEAST,  
*January 13, 1918.*

Subjects Discussed:

- A. Employment of American Units with the French Army.
- B. Employment of American Units with the British Army.
- C. Horses
- D. Aviation
- E. Ports

A. Employment of American Units with the French Army: Reading of reply No. 11,318, January 11, to the letter of January 6 of the Commander-in-Chief of the American Expeditionary Forces.

Then, upon request of General Pershing its different points are discussed successively.

1st Division: Complete understanding: General Pershing approves General Petain's proposition to put the division in sector again with brigades side by side after it has been there by successive brigades.

26th Division: General Petain proposes putting its 4 regiments in sector at the rate of one in each of the 4 divisions of General de Maud'huy's army corps behind the Ailette.

General Pershing, after asking and having been shown, the exact location of this sector, answers that he agrees.

Upon the request of General Petain, he gives as date of entry in sector the early days of February. He will give the exact date in writing.

It is agreed that the division headquarters shall be either beside that of an infantry division of the French corps, or divided between several headquarters, or will go from one to the other. General Petain specifies that the choice is left to the American command.

2d Division: No discussion. General Pershing indicates that he is going to expedite its reassembly and training.

42d Division: Was the subject of a prolonged discussion.

General Petain refused definitively to try out the experiment proposed by General Pershing (to keep 2 regiments training under the present conditions, the 2 others being entrusted exclusively to the French command during this time).

He says that his refusal is based upon the fact that this procedure is not taking into account the necessity of training the command and the staff, training which is more important still and more difficult than that of the troops.

He suggests returning the entire 42d Div. into the hands of the French command. Thus the American command will be able to compare the results obtained in this division with those obtained in another division training according to present methods.

General Pershing maintains his viewpoint, justifying it by the necessity for the staff of the 42d Inf. Div. to observe the training of its 2 brigades and to compare the result of the methods followed by each of them.

Finally, he closes the discussion with a last recommendation to follow the same method for the 42d Inf. Div. as for the 26th Inf. Div.

General Petain replies that he prefers this procedure to the one which was proposed, and the matter is thus settled.

Colored Troops (4 regiments): General Petain asks for information as to their value.

General Pershing replies that he is fairly sure of the value of 2 of the regiments (those of Illinois and of New York), these regiments having served a long time on the Mexican border. However, it must be taken into account that they include a large proportion of recruits incorporated last September. The large majority of the officers are white, the noncommissioned officers are colored. He does not have exact information on the other 2 regiments but will send it in shortly.

Incidentally General Pershing expressed the idea of announcing in the press the entry of American troops into sector.

General Petain answers that he thinks it would be better to wait for the entry into sector of the regiments of the 26th Inf. Div. (danger of a strong raid which the Germans would attempt on the 1st if its entry into sector were published at the time when it is the only one with elements in the front line; advantage there is in keeping the enemy in the dark).

General Pershing adopts this point of view.

During the conversation General Pershing mentions several times that the detaching of American units to French divisions is essentially temporary.

He thinks that the American I Army Corps will be formed toward April or May, and that at that time the American army will take charge of a sector which will be selected according to the military situation of the moment and which may be located either in the region where the American 1st Inf. Div. is in line at present or in any other part of the front.

General Petain agrees completely.

B. Employment of American Units in the British Army: General Pershing announces that Sir W. Robertson has asked him to attach some American battalions to British units.

He asks the advice of General Petain on this subject, it being understood that these battalions would be brought to the British front from shipments passing through England, that not a single man would be taken from shipments now enroute to the French

front; therefore, it would be only a question of bringing extra infantry forces to the western front.

General Petain replies that, with these reservations, he sees only advantages in acquiescing in Sir W. Robertson's request.

C. Horses: General Petain expresses the opinions that the formation of the large American units might be delayed by the shortage of horses. He says that the French army now has 700,000, that this number is the extreme minimum necessary, and that he is concerned over the question of oats.

General Pershing offers spontaneously to send a wire to Washington immediately requesting the shipping of oats to France.

General Petain replies that a survey of the situation will be forwarded to him shortly and asks him to withhold sending his telegram until he has received it.

D. Aviation: General Pershing expresses misgivings over the situation of French manufacturing; he attaches great importance to its acceleration.

He has asked his government for intensified shipping of raw materials, of automobile mechanics for the relief of French specialists. He is ready to do everything General Petain could suggest in that line.

General Petain replies that it is a fact that past orders very much exceed the output to be expected from French manufacturers. He thinks that we must pool our resources, in raw materials as well as in personnel. He tells General Pershing that he will send him shortly a detailed memorandum on the subject.

E. Ports: In closing General Pershing hopes that General Petain will explain to the French government the capital importance of taking radical measures to remedy the present situation in the ports serving the American army, particularly at Saint-Nazaire where this situation is truly alarming.

General Petain answered that he is informed on the subject and he is going to see what he can do about it.

The interview ends at that time.

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***Troops to be Embarked Prior to March 1, 1918***

No. 639-R

A. G. O., WAR DEPARTMENT,  
Washington, D. C., January 14, 1918.

PERSHING, AMEXFORCE, H. A. E. F.

At request of French Military Attache the following information is forwarded to you to give the French General Staff if you see proper. French Military Attache was requested not to send any similar information directly to French General Staff:

In addition to the troops now in France it is expected to embark prior to March 1, the personnel of the divisional artillery for two more divisions, and six regiments of coast artillery troops to handle six-inch guns and eight-inch or 9.5 howitzers, the material to be furnished by France and England. Between March 1 and July 20, it is expected to embark the personnel of the divisional artillery for 11 divisions and 12 regiments of coast artillery, and three regiments of field artillery for army troops. The artillery material to be furnished by the United States includes 28 5-inch and 92 six-inch guns to be delivered in April 1918. Delivery of carriages and eight-inch guns are expected to begin in August. Field artillery material for the troops to be sent during the next six months is expected to be furnished by our Allies. Besides the troops above mentioned, there are in process of organization, training and equipment, 26 divisions and a fair proportion of army troops with the authorized complement of artillery. The organization and equipment of all troops proceeding as rapidly as practicable and is expected to be completed in ample time for embarkation. Bliss.

McCAIN.

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AG, GHQ, AEF: 3925G: Letter

***Liaison with Central Office for Franco-American Relations***

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF,  
Chaumont, Haute-Marne, January 14, 1918.

From: C-in-C

To: Major H. J. Harjes

[Extract]

1. You are hereby designated as chief liaison officer between these headquarters and the headquarters of the central office for Franco-American relations.

\* \* \* \* \*

J. G. HARBORD,  
Chief of Staff.

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**Personnel Bureau**

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, January 15, 1918.*

There is no reason for:

1. Thinking of the possibility of building up in the Adjutant General's Office any powerful agency through the personnel if handled as I have indicated. [See Fox Conner's Memo. to C. of S., Jan. 8, 1918, printed in this volume.]
2. I have not now nor have I had any idea of personally handling the personnel bureau. It would be under the general staff in the sense that all departments or bureaus of service supply, etc., are under the general staff.
3. If the Adjutant General's Office controlled, as I have indicated in my memorandum, the general staff would be freed from a lot of detailed work that is not naturally a part of its role.
4. Naturally the general staff would be called on for recommendations from time to time, but this does not make it necessary that the records in question be kept in whole or in part by the general staff (nor does the above preclude consultation with any other department chief or office regarding promotions).
5. The instructions contained in my original memorandum will be carried out except as to replacement control which as now will be with the administrative section.
6. The general plan laid down by the operations section will be followed with the understanding that it shall be the duty of the personnel division to keep a close scrutiny over all promotions made by subordinate commanders.
7. The chief of the personnel division will handle these matters there under the Adjutant General instead of under the secretary of the general staff and will furnish the Chief of Staff data or recommendations of records when called for, and follow generally the line of action in handling personnel that may be indicated by the C-in-C or the C. S.

J. J. PERSHING.

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AWC Library: General Order

**General Headquarters, A. E. F., Established**

GENERAL ORDERS  
No. 11

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, January 17, 1918.*

[Extract]

1. Pursuant to authority contained in War Department Cablegram (No. 636-R), these headquarters will hereafter be designated as General Headquarters, American Expeditionary Forces, abbreviated G. H. Q., A. E. F.

\* \* \* \* \*

By command of General Pershing:

JAMES G. HARBORD,  
Brigadier General,  
Chief of Staff.

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Cable: P-504-S

***Authority to Organize Army Corps Requested***

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, January 17, 1918.*

AGWAR, WASHINGTON

[Extract]

1. For Chief of Staff: In view of provisions of Defense Act approved June 3, 1916, request President's authority be cabled to organize army corps in France as the number of troops and circumstances justify, including assignment of necessary staff, et cetera. Corps commanders will at first be given only temporary command of corps.

\* \* \* \* \*

PERSHING.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: 1338: Report

***Meeting of Military Representatives on General Reserve***

S. W. C. (M. R.) 12

SUPREME WAR COUNCIL,  
*Versailles, January 19, 1918.*

MINUTES OF THE MEETING OF THE MILITARY  
REPRESENTATIVES HELD IN THE COUNCIL  
CHAMBER, VERSAILLES, ON SATURDAY,  
JANUARY 19, 1918, AT 11 a. m.

PRESENT

FRANCE	GREAT BRITAIN	ITALY
General Weygand	General Sir H. Wilson	General Cadorna

IN ATTENDANCE

Major Pagezy	Maj. Gen. Sackville-West	Col. Bianchi d' Espinosa Lt. Col. Pintor
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SECRETARIAT

Major Decrais Lt. Duhamel	Lt. Col. Storr Captain Wright	Major Martin Franklin Lt. Gallerati Scotti
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CHAIRMAN

1. General Weygand acted as Chairman.

FORMATION OF  
A GENERAL  
RESERVE

2. General Wilson put forward a draft resolution on the subject. General Weygand expressed the opinion that no general reserve was possible without a single Commander-in-Chief for all armies

to deal with it. General Wilson contended that such a Commander-in-Chief was impossible, but, a general reserve being highly desirable, it was equally desirable to find some other arrangement so as to be able to deal with it.

No decision was arrived at.

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AG: GHQ, AEF: 211.39: Letter

***Supplementary Instructions to Chief Liaison Officer***

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, January 19, 1918.*

From: The Commander-in-Chief

To: Major H. H. Harjes

1. Supplementing instructions of January 14, and with a view to defining further your present mission, it should be understood that, as chief liaison officer, you are for the time being attached to the person of the *Conseiller de Affaires Americaines pres du President du Conseil*, who, as understood by these headquarters, is in complete charge of the study and solution of all questions affecting the cooperation of the United States in France.

2. You will, in accordance with his instructions, work with *Office Central des Relations Franco-Americaines* and any other Franco-American or French Bureau with which he is connected, in order to devise and establish the best kind of liaison to the end that the relations of the American Expeditionary Forces with all French administrations be placed on the most amicable and efficient footing.

JOHN J. PERSHING.

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***Recommended Responsibility for Arrangements for Putting Troops into the Trenches***

Operations Section

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, January 19, 1918.*

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief of Staff

1. After conference between the chiefs of the respective sections, the operations and training sections recommend:

(a) That recommendations as to what troops are to go into the trenches for training purposes be made by the training section.

(b) That after the decision is reached as to the troops which are to go into the trenches, the operations section be responsible for all preliminary arrangements and for all action that may be necessary during the time that such units are in the trenches.

FOX CONNER,  
Colonel, General Staff,  
Chief, Operations Section.

PAUL B. MALONE,  
Colonel, General Staff,  
Chief, Training Section.

[Note in ink: App. by direction J. G. H., C. of S.]

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***Extension of the British Front; Campaign Plan for 1918; Single Command***

[Editorial Translation]

French Section  
No. 105/91 bis

SUPREME WAR COUNCIL,  
*Versailles, January 19, 1918.*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL

(Handed by General Weygand to General Foch, January 20, 1918)

Concerning the next meeting of the Supreme War Council

[Extract]

Extension of the British Front

The military representatives have come to a decision concerning the subject; it forms the subject of joint memorandum No. 10\* handed to the governments. But this decision will have an executory value only on the day it is adopted by the Supreme War Council in plenary session.

Now, the relief of that part of the front on which the Commanders-in-Chief had previously agreed (Barisis-aux-Bois) will be completed toward February 3. For the uninterrupted continuation of the relief in the remaining sector south of this point so as to have it completed February 20, in accordance with General Petain's request, the Supreme War Council must decide and announce its decision soon enough for the Commanders-in-Chief to have time to take appropriate measures (preparation of the relieving troops, etc.), that is to say, about January 25.

This is all the more necessary because we must give the British command no excuse whatever for a delay and because \* \* \* the military representative has been advised that the War Cabinet has postponed the examination of joint Memorandum No. 10 pending completion of a complementary study motivated by new reports of Marshal Haig and General Robertson. Everything would therefore be discussed again after having agreed, however, to leave it to the decision of the military representatives.

From a more general point of view, the meeting of the Supreme War Council is indispensable in the very near future for the following reasons:

1. To decide on a plan of action.
2. To assure the execution of this plan, that is to say, settle the question of command.

Today, under the threat and on the eve perhaps, of the most powerful effort that the enemy has yet attempted against us, there is as yet neither an overall plan nor a chief.

1. Even if we have decided on the defensive, a plan of action is indispensable; the defense has to be directed. If it is simply accepted, it places us at the mercy of the enemy.

The defense has at its command defensive organization of terrain, troops to defend it, reserves. It requires coordination of purely defensive actions, of counter-attacks, of offensives for disengagement, etc. in which these various elements have to play their role.

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\* Memorandum No. 10, not selected, was drafted for the Supreme War Council January 10, and besides discussing the limiting point between the British and French fronts, recommended studies be made with a view to furnishing mutual assistance in the event of a major attack against either front.

They can do it only if these operations have been prepared, in a word, if there is a plan of action. Of course this plan of action must exist in each of the Allied armies. But the combinations having to be anticipated, not only within each of the Allied armies but for these armies as a whole, it is necessary for this plan to be an overall plan decided by an authority superior to the commanders of these armies.

\* \* \* \* \*

The creation of a general interallied reserve administered by the Supreme War Council would perhaps assure, for a certain time, a smaller expenditure of our reserves. But on the fateful day when the employment of this reserve will have to be decided upon without delay, the problem will still be unsolved. When it is a question not of deliberation but of action, a council, whatever its composition may be, will not be able to take the place of a chief.

\* \* \* \* \*

To sum up it seems indispensable to the French military representative that the Supreme War Council meet without delay and decide on the three following points: Extension of the British front, establishment of a plan of action, organization of a supreme direction of operations, and that this meeting be preceded by a complete agreement on these points between the government, the chief of the general staff, and the French Commander-in-Chief, an agreement set down in written memoranda, stating the French point of view and intended to serve as a basis of discussion.

It would be necessary also to forward to the governments belonging to the Supreme War Council the agenda of the meeting.

WEYGAND.

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***Use of American Units with British and French***

[Editorial Translation]

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,  
FRENCH ARMIES OF THE NORTH AND NORTHEAST,  
*January 20, 1918.*

[Extract]

SUMMARY OF THE CONFERENCE OF JANUARY 19, 1918 BETWEEN  
GENERAL PETAIN, MARSHAL SIR DOUGLAS HAIG, GENERAL PERSHING

Subjects Discussed:

- A. Employment of American Units with the British Army
- B. Speeding up of Shipments of American Units to France

\* \* \* \* \*

A. Employment of American units with the British Army: General Pershing recalls that he was handed a request by General Robertson for the purpose of attaching to British units American battalions which will be transported to France and British ships, about 200,000 tons having been allocated to this transportation.

Nothing will be diverted from the flow of shipments already planned or to be planned, bound for points in the present American zones by means of American or French tonnage; therefore it has only to do with an increase of the total number of American troops to be directed to France.

General Petain informed him that he approves of this project. Washington has been apprised of the approval. Secretary of War Baker, General Bliss, General Biddle are also in favor of the idea.

There is also a second question to be settled, that of the American units to be transported to the rear zone of the British armies to be trained on terrain now available there. This would in no way indicate that these units would be attached to British divisions after completing their training.

Sir Douglas Haig observes that General Bliss raised this last question.

General Petain, intervening, says that there is a distinction to be made between the two questions.

He approves entirely of the first one, but sees serious problems where the second is concerned.

After American units have completed their training in the rear zone of the British armies, they would have to be transported to the present American zone, skirting Paris on the northeast. Now, in spite of the double tracking in progress on the belt lines around Paris, the railroad lines available for the purpose would be blocked in case of a German attack in the general direction of Paris. It would then be necessary to establish for these American units a north-south route, passing west of Paris and meeting the present line of communication Tours-Bourges; hence operating problems, bad use of rolling stock, etc. Moreover, the zones available for the training of American units behind the French armies are at present far from being occupied to their maximum capacity. Let us wait until they are before tackling the problem.

Sir Douglas Haig approves and says that as soon as American battalions are placed at his disposal, he intends to send them directly to British army corps which have their own training grounds.

General Pershing declares himself in entire agreement.

Sir Douglas Haig observes that it seems impossible to have more than 2,000 men per day in transit through Southampton-Le Havre. This flow of shipments would therefore seem to be absorbed for the major part by the shipment of American battalions on their way to the British front.

B. Speeding up of the Shipping of American Units to France: General Pershing announces that he has sent officers to England and to French ports (Le Havre, Cherbourg, Brest), to study the possibility of making the best use of large-draft ships available in the United States. As soon as he knows their findings he will pass them on to General Petain and Marshal Haig.

With regard to Saint-Nazaire he renews his request General Petain for his help in obtaining additional capacity and a larger American share in the exploitation of the port.

General Petain asks General Pershing to send him a memorandum with all particulars concerning the question and promises to attend to it.

General Pershing replies that this memorandum shall be sent to him at once.

In the course of the conversation the three Commanders-in-Chief declare themselves several times in complete agreement concerning the absolute necessity of accelerating by all possible means the shipping of American units to France.

In closing General Pershing announces that the shipping board estimates that for July 1918, it will be able to send to France the complete artillery of 3 army corps (18 divisional artilleries with their heavy artillery).

This indication, supplied by individual best qualified in matters of maritime transportation, warrants the estimate of 18 divisions for the American forces which will arrive in France in July.

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G-1, GHQ, AEF: 12: Memorandum

### ***Promotion Policies Announced***

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E.F. .,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, January 21, 1918.*

#### MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEFS OF GENERAL STAFF SECTIONS:

The following policies regarding promotions have been approved by the Commander-in-Chief:

1. Promotions should be for demonstrated efficiency in the service. That is, an officer should not be promoted simply because of the fact that he has been an expert in civil life in the line in which he is now working in the military service. It is assumed that all of his qualifications were taken into consideration when he was first commissioned.
2. Promotions may be given in special cases on account of the position of the officer. That is, an officer who is in command of or directing the work of other officers should, where practicable, be senior to them.
3. Promotions in the line should be in combat divisions, and not in replacement divisions.
4. Transfer of an officer from a replacement to a combat division should be considered a promotion and should be given to the most efficient officer of the replacement division in the particular grade.
5. It is believed that the question of promotion at the front as compared with promotion at the rear will adjust itself when casualties begin to appear.



6. It is not necessary or desirable to lay down a rule as to adjusting or equalizing promotions between the line and the staff, but the general policy should be that promotion in staff corps or departments should, in general, be no faster than promotion in the line for officers of equal length of service. The point is that the whole army should know that no officer will be favored in the matter of promotion by being away from the front, whether it be at headquarters or elsewhere.

7. For the present, the policy should be to hold back on promotions, especially in the senior grades in staff corps and departments. Line troops should be kept filled up with officers for the sake of disciplines and efficient training. In order that this may be done, an unassigned list should be started at once, and authority therefor has been requested from the War Department. Officers detached from their organizations for duty which will probably last more than six weeks should be at once placed on this list and their places in their organizations filled.

8. Replacements in combat divisions should be made automatically according to a policy already approved.

9. I believe that the above considerations should be given as a policy, not to provide promotions, but to get the right officer in the right place with suitable rank for the exercise of the office.

JAMES A. SHANNON,  
Major, N. A.,  
Coordination Section, G. S.

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G-1, GHQ, AEF: 1: Letter

***Report on British Camp Facilities and Cross-Channel Traffic***

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
OFFICE OF GENERAL SUPERINTENDENT, ARMY TRANSPORT SERVICE,  
*January 21, 1918.*

From: General Superintendent, Army Transport Service

To: Commander-in-Chief, G. H., A. E. F. (Through Military Channels)

1. Captain Ryan and myself held two conferences at the Ministry of Shipping while in London. Sir Joseph Maclay was present at one, and Sir Thomas Roydon, with Messrs. Warner and Foley, assistants of Sir Joseph Maclay, present at the other. I also held conferences with our own naval authorities, with a representative of the director of movements, and with other British transportation authorities.

2. While in London, General Bartlett showed me a cablegram which had been received from Washington, which requested him to find out whether additional camp facilities near Southampton could be found. Our authorities are assuming that there will be a largely increased movement of troops through England and especially to the port of Southampton.

3. I find that the English authorities are working to a certain degree at cross purposes and with different objects. The object of Sir Joseph Maclay is to eliminate all cross-channel transportation, and he, personally, wants to send the *Mauretania*, *Aquitania*, *Olympic*, and *Leviathan* direct to French ports. In addition, he wants to send some of the smaller Cunard liners, which now carry American troops to Liverpool, direct to French ports. His idea is to load ships with cargo for the French Government and troops for ours, and expects the French to release the British cargo carriers that have been loaded by the British.

4. The English transportation people are working on the idea of eliminating the railroad haul across England, i. e., Liverpool to Southampton. It is immaterial to them whether Southampton or French port is selected.

5. The military authorities are evidently not particularly concerned about either cross-channel transportation or railroad facilities, their object being to get troops in their areas and on the front.

6. Our own naval authorities are much opposed to sending troops or troop ships to Southampton on account of the increasing danger of cross-channel transportation. \* \* \* As far as our own ships are concerned, all of them with the exception of the *Leviathan* can be discharged at Brest or other French ports. The *Agamemnon* and *Mount Vernon* are the only ones so far that have been coaled at Southampton on the return trip. This was done on their first voyage when they brought only enough coal for the single trip. However, they are better equipped than the Cunard boats, and I am advised by the navy that they can carry coal enough for the round trip, or almost enough for the round trip, and there is no reason, if we so desire, why these boats and all our other converted German liners used as troops ships cannot continue to go to Brest.

7. I have been able to obtain reliable data on the Port of Southampton. The White Star Dock will take the *Mauretania*, *Aquitania*, and *Olympic* without any difficulty whatever. It will probably take the *Leviathan*, as the water at low tide is 40 feet and the vessel draws 41.

8. Sir Joseph Maclay was of the opinion that the four large ships can be discharged at Brest and possibly at Cherbourg. After a conference with the Cunard Line Officials, and with their marine superintendent, I do not believe this is possible due to the coaling situation. The *Mauretania*, *Aquitania*, *Olympic*, and *Leviathan* cannot carry enough coal for the round trip; the first three named need 6,000 tons of coal for a single trip. Even lying at anchor in the harbor they have to keep up steam all the time and require 200 tons of coal a day. The *Mauretania* and *Aquitania* have to be coaled from side ports. Unless special arrangements can be made the process of coaling is a very slow one. I do not believe, under present conditions, we can put in over 300 or 400 tons of coal daily at Brest unless we can make special arrangements, which will take some time. I consider Brest out of the question for these ships. I have made an appointment with the marine superintendent of the Cunard Line to meet him at Cherbourg this week. We can then decide whether this port can receive any large ships, either Cunard or converted German liners, but from the data that I have so far received, I consider it doubtful.

9. The question as to whether we should continue to send our own large troop ships to French ports or to Southampton, as to whether the Cunard boats should go to Southampton, Liverpool, or French ports (assuming that they can get into French ports) hinges on the general policy you desire to adopt.

10. If American troops are to be sent to British training areas as units of reinforcements of British units, all such troops should go to England and be taken from Southampton or other British channel ports to Le Havre or other French ports by the existing English cross-channel transportation. If on the other hand, the American troops are to continue to be sent to the present American army front in France, they should be sent direct to French ports. We know all of the large ships with the exception of the *Mauretania*, *Aquitania*, *Olympic*, and *Leviathan* can be discharged at Brest. It is barely possible that some of these four can be sent to Cherbourg, or, if we can make special coaling arrangements, ultimately send them to Brest. Such coaling arrangements will take a great deal of time.

11. If some of the American troops are to be sent to the British front and others to the present front, the portion to the British front should be sent to Southampton and the cross-channel transportation handled by the British.

Summarizing, I would recommend:

1. That if American troops are to be sent to British areas, the *Mauretania*, *Aquitania*, *Olympic*, and *Leviathan* to be sent to either Southampton or Liverpool with such

troops; that the British handle these ships from New York to England, convoying them at their own risk and furnishing cross-channel transportation to France.

2. That the present service of Cunard ships to Liverpool be continued whether the troops carried on these ships go to British training areas or to the American front in France.

3. That all present American troop ships except the *Leviathan* be sent direct to French ports, and that they carry troops intended for the American front in France.

4. That the British authorities be advised that it is impracticable to carry American troops to French ports when such troops go to the British training areas.

5. That where some go to the British front and others to the American front, that the ships be loaded in accordance with transportation arrangements recommended above.

R. E. WOOD,  
Colonel, Inf., N. A.  
General Supt., Army Transport Service.

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SWC: 1339: Joint Note

VERSAILLES, January 21, 1918.

#### JOINT NOTE NO. 12

Joint Note to the Supreme War Council by the Military Representatives

#### 1918 CAMPAIGN

To: The Supreme War Council

[Extract]

The military representatives have the honor to inform you that at their meeting held on January 21, 1918, they passed the following resolution:

1. In submitting to the Supreme War Council their advice on the military action to be undertaken during 1918, the military representatives think it necessary to place before the Supreme War Council in the briefest possible manner the grounds on which their advice is based.

2. Looking out over all the theaters of war, they examined the state of affairs both in the main theaters and in the secondary theaters, first of all from the point of view of the security of the fronts in those theaters, and then from the point of view of the opportunities which may present themselves for gaining a decisive or, at any rate, far-reaching success in any of those theaters.

3. It was assumed that the United Kingdom was safe from all serious invasion and that the necessary measures, both naval, military, and air for its defense against the contingency of an attack, involved no interference with the operations of the British forces overseas.

4. It was agreed, after the most careful and exhaustive examination, that the safety of France could also be assured. But in view of the weight of attack which the enemy can bring to bear upon this front, an attack which may possibly, in the opinion of the military representatives, attain a strength of 96 divisions, exclusive of roulement, they feel obliged to add that France will be safe during 1918 only under certain conditions, viz.:

(a) That the French and British forces in France are continuously maintained at their present total aggregate strength, and receive the expected reinforcement of not less than two American divisions a month.

(b) That there shall be a substantial progressive increase in the total Allied equipment in guns of all calibers, in machine guns, in aeroplanes, and in tanks, with the personnel necessary to man them, and the most effective coordinated employment of these and all other mechanical devices.

(c) That every possible measure shall be taken for strengthening and coordinating the Allied system of defenses, more particularly in the sectors most liable to a heavy attack.

(d) That the rail transportation be improved and coordinated.

(e) That the whole Allied front in France be treated as a single strategic field of action, and that the disposition of the reserves, the periodic rearrangement of the point of junction between the various Allied forces on the actual front, and all other arrangements should be dominated by this consideration.

5. It was agreed that Italy was safe, but again under certain conditions, viz:

(a) That the Italian army be reformed, trained, and reequipped with artillery before May 1, and that several positions in rear of the present line be constructed on modern principles.

(b) That the power of rapid rail transport be increased both in the interior of Italy itself, and between Italy and France in order to secure strategic unity of action over the two theaters.

(c) That, in addition to the necessary measures taken against pacifism by the Italian Government itself, the Allies should assist Italy by the provision of coal, wheat, and other necessities, as well as financially, in order to prevent the creation of economic conditions which would diminish the strength of the interior resistance of the country.

6. If the assumptions in pars. 3, 4, and 5 are accepted, then we have got this far in our examination of the problem, viz: That the enemy cannot in 1918 gain a definite military decision in the main theaters which would enable him to break finally the resistance of any of the Allied powers.

7. If the enemy cannot gain a final decision against the Allies, the question arises whether there is any opportunity in the course of 1918 for the Allies to secure, in the main western theaters, a final, or even a far-reaching decision, against the enemy. The military representatives are of the opinion that, apart from such measure of success as is implied in the failure of the enemy's offensive, or may be attained by local counterstrokes, and leaving out of account such improbable and unforeseeable contingencies as the internal collapse of the enemy powers, or the revival of Russia as a serious military factor, no such decision is likely to be secured during the fighting period of 1918. Neither the addition of the American troops in view during this period, nor such reinforcements as could be secured for any one of the main theaters by withdrawing from the secondary theaters any margin of troops that may be available above the necessities of local defense, would make a sufficient difference in the relative position of the opposing forces to justify the hope of attaining such a decision. This should not prevent the Allied General Staffs closely watching the situation in case an unexpected favorable development should furnish an opportunity for vigorous offensive actions for which they should always be prepared. In any case the defensive on the western front should not be of a merely passive character, but be worked out definitely and scientifically, with the intention of gaining the maximum advantage from any opportunities offered in this theater. A detailed consideration of the nature of the measures that should be envisaged is given in a paper which is appended as an annex to this note.

8. The Allies are, therefore, confronted with a fundamental, though not permanent, change in the conditions upon which their strategy has to be based as compared with the conditions existing or anticipated, as long as the Russian armies kept the field. They are accordingly obliged to consider how that strategy must be modified in order to take the fullest advantage out of such opportunities as remain open to them during the phase of deadlock on the western fronts. In other words, pending such a change in the balance

of forces as we hope to reach in 1919 by the steady influx of American troops, guns, aeroplanes, tanks, etc., and by the progressive exhaustion of the enemy's staying power, it remains to consider what action can be taken against the enemy, elsewhere than in the main western theaters, which may enable us to secure a decision far-reaching in its effect upon the political situation in the near east and in Russia, both during and after the war, and valuable in paving the way towards a subsequent definitive decision against the enemy's main armies. To allow the year to pass without an attempt to secure a decision in any theater of war, and to leave the initiative entirely to the enemy would, in the opinion of the military representatives, be a grave error in strategy apart from the moral effect such a policy might produce upon the Allied nations.

\* \* \* \* \*

WEYGAND,  
Military  
Representative,  
French Section,  
Supreme War Council.

HENRY WILSON,  
21.1.18 General,  
Military  
Representative,  
Supreme War Council.

L. CADORNA,  
Military  
Representative,  
Italian Section,  
Supreme War Council.

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#### ANNEXURE TO JOINT NOTE NO. 12

(Paper referred to in Section 7)

In its sitting of December 1, 1917, the Supreme War Council instructed its military representatives to study in detail the whole of the situation and the report on the military operations which should be undertaken.

The military representatives after having carefully considered the situation are of opinion that:

(1) On the western front, the desertion of Russia, increasing to a menacing extent the numbers on the side of the central powers, imposes an expectant attitude on the Armies of the *Entente*, for the first months of 1918 and that up to the time that the American army can really come into line.

This attitude, far from being passive, involves, on the contrary, for these armies the necessity of taking advantage of every occasion offered to impose their will on the adversary and also involves the idea of taking the offensive, which alone is capable of leading to victory, as soon as possible. With this object these armies should:

(a) In case of any attack by the enemy, not only stop it and counterattack on the very ground of this attack, but also make extensive counterattacks as a diversion on ground selected and prepared beforehand for as rapid an operation as possible.

(b) In case the enemy does attack, find itself in a position to take the initiative in military operations with a limited objective, for the purpose of dominating the enemy, wearing him out, and maintaining the fighting spirit of the troops.

(c) In both cases, to be able ultimately to engage the whole of their forces in a combined offensive as far as our effectives permit, so as either to stop the enemy if he attempted by a violent and obstinate effort to bring about the material and moral exhaustion of one of the Allies, or to obtain a decision, if the losses suffered by the enemy, or any other favorable fact in the general situation, brings such a result within reach.

It is therefore necessary that, as soon as possible, the Commanders-in-Chief of the British, French, and Italian armies should:

(i) Organize grounds of attack corresponding to the conditions outlined above in subsections (a) and (b), and take all necessary steps for launching these attacks rapidly if they are decided upon.

(ii) Prepare plans of joint operations corresponding to the conditions outlined above in subsection (c), which would involve:

So far as the Commanders-in-Chief of the British and French armies are concerned, the drawing up of a plan of a combined offensive on the Franco-British front;

So far as the chief of the general staff of the Italian army is concerned, the drawing up of a plan of an offensive as extensive as possible on the Italian front.

The governments will have the plans and schemes sent to the Supreme War Council which will assure the coordination of this combined action, and will be entitled to take the initiative in any proposals with this object.

[UNSIGNED].

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Les Armees Francaises Tome VI, Vol. 1, Annexes Vol. 1: Letter

### ***General Interallied Reserve***

[Editorial Translation]

French Military Representative  
No. 103 a

SUPREME WAR COUNCIL.  
*Versailles, January 22, 1918.*

To the President of the Council

#### INTERALLIED RESERVE AND SINGLE COMMAND

[Extract]

In a defensive situation, to decide on a plan of action is not the most difficult thing to do; to execute that plan in spite of the enemy, that is the big difficulty.

Who will make certain that it is executed in the face of an enemy who is attacking where and when it suits him? Who will take care that the reserves do not rush prematurely to the point where enemy action calls them, that the will to counterattack persists in spite of partial checks, that the necessary means are at first held out and then put to work? Who will direct one of the Allied armies to attack so as to disengage the other, etc.?

Only a chief can do that, a chief who sees the entire picture, who is responsible, invested with the necessary authority.

The ideal conception is that of a generalissimo commanding all the armies of the Entente, but it seems that multiple reasons prevent its realization.

Considering the importance attached, especially in the defensive, to a proper economy of reserves, the creation of a general interallied reserve proposed by the military representatives would be a step in the sense that it would assure for a certain time a smaller expenditure of reserved forces.

But who will be responsible for the employment of this reserve? The Supreme War Council? Even admitting that this body is in a position to accept or reject the request that might be submitted to it by the Commanders-in-Chief for its partial or total use, would the council be able to take the initiative for its use in operations that have been decided upon? Evidently not, since according to the terms of the Rapallo agreement the Supreme War Council may not interfere in the conduct of operations. Finally on the day when a crisis arrives, when speed is necessary in decision and action, a council, whatever its composition may be, cannot take the place of a chief. The problem therefore is still unsolved: The creation of an interallied general reserve does not take the place of a chief, it calls for him.

Therefore, faced by this necessity which, answered or not, can be heavy with consequences, a formula must be found which will give a chief or at least a superior direction. It seems that the heads of government responsible for the conduct of the war could increase the scope of the functions of the Supreme War Council with regard to the general conduct of operations and give it the right to delegate its powers even for a limited period to one of the chiefs of the general staff, making him responsible for the general interallied reserve. An unassuming title and the temporary character of the duties would, of course, be such as to avoid wounding any susceptibilities.

Inclosed herewith is a draft of a resolution, drawn up along the lines of the ideas developed above.

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## RESOLUTION PROJECT

A general interallied reserve is constituted, composed of:

a. 4 French infantry divisions taken from the front of the Armies of the North and Northeast.

3 British infantry divisions taken from the British front in France.

2 Italian infantry divisions taken from the Italian front.

b. The British and French divisions now in Italy:

5 British infantry divisions.

6 French infantry divisions.

For administrative purposes, discipline, training, and instruction, these troops will remain under the control of the Commanders-in-Chief of the British, French, and Italian armies.

They will be stationed near the railroads paralleling the front: The French divisions west of the Chalons meridian, the British divisions south of the Somme.

For tactical control, they are placed under the control of the general designated for this purpose by the Supreme War Council.

\* \* \* \* \*

WEYGAND.

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HS AS: 77: Letter

## **Organization**

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, January 22, 1918.*

From: Col. Carl Boyd, A. D. C.

To: Chief, Air Service, A. E. F.\*

The Commander-in-Chief directs me to send you the following:

The present organization of general headquarters has been in operation now for some months, and it is presumed that all officers concerned have had an op-

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\* This was a circular letter all staff officers.

portunity to make a thorough test of its soundness. It is, however, my belief that no organization is so perfect that it cannot be improved upon. The single purpose of this organization is to have the duties of each staff department, including the general staff, so simply defined and so thoroughly coordinated that it will meet the requirements of direction and supply both in the preparation for and in the actual conduct of active operations.

Having this in view, it is requested that you set forth, fully and frankly, as indicated below, your views with such detailed suggestions for improvement as may appear necessary:

For heads of administrative and staff services.

1. Please define the duties of your department, as you understand them, including control of personnel and supply of materiel.
2. Give your idea as to the relationship that now exists between the general staff and your department.
3. Set forth, in detail, your notion as to the cooperation between your department and other administrative and staff departments (not including the general staff).
4. Make such recommendations as may be considered advisable in the light of experience under the present organization.
5. A very frank and full discussion is requested, especially as regards your relations with the general staff and the direction that should prevail as applied to your department.

For chiefs of sections in the general staff.

1. Discuss briefly and make recommendations as you desire upon the present organization of the general staff.
2. State your views of the relations that should exist between the supply departments and the general staff.

For commanders of divisions and brigades.

1. Please state your views of the present organization of these headquarters, especially as it affects your division.
2. Submit any recommendations that you may care to make as a result of your experience.
3. Submit any recommendations you may care to make with reference to the organization of your own division staff, including the general staff.

J. J. P.

Please give the above your early attention and send your reply to the undersigned.

CARL BOYD,  
Colonel, A. D. C.

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***Replacement Division***

Administration Section

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F..  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF.  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, January 23, 1918.*

MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF OF STAFF:

1. Attached hereto is a memorandum showing our situation today relative to replacements. I believe the factor of officers need not be so seriously regarded as is the question of men, in view of the fact that we have actually here in France many student officers, all of junior grade, but nevertheless sufficient in number to approximately fill these units.

2. This statement shows very clearly our situation today, which is that our combat units are all short of men, and that we are not now in a position to make good this shortage. Even assuming the arrival of the 13,600 replacements now ordered, we would then only have our base division theoretically full, plus a surplus of 111 men. It is problematical whether these replacements will come in any reasonable time. We are in addition filing another cable today asking for additional exceptional replacements. The item "Troops ordered up as replacements to divisions," will be reduced to about 3,800 men when those under orders are actually sent forward. The 41st Division has just telegraphed that they cannot maintain their cadres of the different units if we order any further men away and reduce the division below approximately 3,800 men.

3. We expect to get into contact very shortly with the enemy, and we must expect big losses. If at the time of our entry into combat we have not adequate replacements behind the line, our units (accepting the present large strength of our divisions as sound) will shortly look curious. The whole history of this war and the history of our Civil War has clearly demonstrated the fact that the only effective way is to have enough manpower behind the fighting troops to maintain them always at their full fighting strength.

4. The 20,000 men we are asking for as exceptional will only cover the minimum number of noneffectives who will be continually in hospitals. This factor alone might under a vigorous offensive by ourselves or by the enemy aggregate as much as 20%.

5. For the reasons above given I believe we will have a much more homogenous fighting unit if we use our next division as already contemplated for the replacement division of the I Corps rather than to attempt to use it as an additional combat division.

If we do not attain our Italian labor, we must call for additional thousands of labor troops from America, which will only result in reducing the flow of combat troops, which will directly reflect itself on the number of replacement troops we can bring over.

6. I therefore urgently recommend that we use the 33d Division as a replacement division.

J. A. LOGAN, Jr.  
Chief, A. S., G. S.

Pencil note at bottom of document: Note: In artillery replacements the 41st Division cannot furnish enough. Two of its F. A. regiments are corps artillery, the third only

is replacement. Of the next replacement division, 1 regiment becomes army artillery,  
2 regt., replacement.

J. G. HARBORD.

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[Inclosure]

<b>41st DIVISION (BASE DIVISION)</b>				
	<b>OFFICERS</b>	<b>MEN</b>	<b>OFFICERS</b>	<b>MEN</b>
Authorized Strength	906	26,405		
Shortage upon arrival in France			227	2,420
Troops ordered for Service, L. of C.			212	7,844
Troops ordered for Service at Schools			150	2,544
Troops ordered up as Replacements to Divisions			0	5,662
Present shortage in Division	589	18,470	589	18,470
Troops Remaining in Division	317	7,935		
Replacements required for all divisions in France	329	13,489		

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### ***Antiaircraft Defense***

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, January 24, 1918.*

From: Commander-in-Chief, A. E. F.

To: Commanding General, L. of C.

1. It can be assumed that the enemy will attempt to anticipate the U. S. aviation program and that bombing raids on a far larger scale than formerly will be a part of any offensive program. The actual damage caused by a raid is generally small, but any locality raided that has not a definite plan of defense known by all will suffer severely morally in addition to the actual damage that might have been prevented.

2. From time to time a limited number of antiaircraft guns and machine guns will become available for use at important advance depots. The Commander-in-Chief directs that you be prepared to indicate the location of those assigned to your command. They can be quickly installed, provided emplacements and intercommunication have been prepared beforehand. In fact, such a mobile defense is the only one that will meet the conditions.

3. The Commander-in-Chief further directs that you cause the commanding officers of all billets, depots, and camps within your command, which, on account of their location, importance, or size, are liable to be raided, to prepare and execute a local plan of anti-aircraft defense and publish the necessary instructions along the following lines:

4. Antiaircraft guns and machine guns tend to prevent daylight raids and keep the night raiders high in the air. This last, and being under fire, affects the bomber's aim. On the other hand, the falling fragments and noise increase the confusion. The following measures require forethought, considerable inconvenience, and work, but are efficacious even without the use of antiaircraft guns:

5. Billets, depots, and camps should not be concentrated so as to form one target. When practicable, landmarks that will be sharply defined at night such as railroad yards, water, very prominent buildings, etc., should be avoided. Large towns are easily located and their buildings and pavements increase the effect of the bombs.

6. When conditions oblige the above locations, all available bomb-proof shelters should be marked with suitable signs. Sandbag ramparts must be prepared as additional protection to localize the effect of the bombs and all the military personnel must be assigned their places. Their conduct during a raid must be prescribed; if optional, lack of discipline results and the morale is lowered.

7. Arrangements should be made with the local authorities to receive prompt notice of an impending raid, to post observers, to have communications to include any anti-aircraft guns. A suitable alarm for extinguishing lights, and a general alarm, not to be sounded until a raid is reasonably certain, should be prescribed.

By command of General Pershing:

DAVIS,  
Adjutant General.

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***Report of Meeting at Compiegne, January 24, 1918***

[Editorial Translation]

FRENCH GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,  
*Compiegne, January 24, 1918.*

MINUTES OF THE CONFERENCE HELD AT COMPIEGNE  
FRENCH G. H. Q., JAN. 24, 1918.

PRESENT:

FRANCE

General Foch  
General Petain  
General Anthoine  
General de Barescut  
Colonel Desticker

ENGLAND

Marshal Sir D. Haig  
General Sir W. Robertson  
Major General Sir H. A.  
Lawrence  
Major General Davidson  
Col. W. M. St. G. Kirke  
Lt. Col. Spiers

UNITED STATES

General Pershing  
Colonel Boyd

General Petain gives the floor to General Robertson.

General Robertson states that he and General Foch have asked for this meeting in view of their responsibilities to their respective governments. They would like to know, in a general way, the plans prepared by the Commander-in-Chief and to get from them a general statement of the situation with respect to the following matters:

- (1) Mutual support of the Allied armies.
- (2) Situation in the matter of reserves and formation of a general reserve.
- (3) Withdrawal of the Allied forces in Italy.
- (4) Questions of the shipment of American troops and the facilities placed at their disposal in France.

General Petain, in reply to the first question, states that the French army, because of its limited means, will await the German attack, remaining on the defensive. The diminution of our effectives has already forced us to inactivate 5 divisions. Our resources in the zone of the interior do not permit us to keep our front supplied later than the beginning of April, even without battle. From then on we shall be forced to inactivate more units. Indeed we have to face the necessity of dissolving 20 divisions by the end of 1918. To this diminution of effectives we must add the losses resulting from battle.

We will therefore remain on the defensive, operating on successive prepared lines. However, we have organized 4 offensive battlefields, which we will use if circumstances are favorable.

Furthermore, we have made preparations to move available reserves by rail. They will be employed on the French or British front for relief or to check the enemy on a threatened front.

General Robertson asks how important the offensive operations are that have been prepared.

General Petain replies that these operations are prepared on 4 army fronts, each involving the employment of 15 divisions.

Sir D. Haig remarks that the English have adopted the same line of procedure as the French. One-third of his division are in reserve or will be after February. Generally speaking, his troops have three lines available on which to offer resistance.

General Foch asks for information concerning the offensive battlefields prepared on the British front.

Marshal Haig states that he has prepared 3 battlefields, one near Gonnelleu, the second around Lens, the third near Gheluvelt-Becelaere, and that it is planned to engage 5 divisions on each of them.

General Foch states that the best way to stop a powerful and sustained hostile offensive, an offensive of attrition and desperate stubbornness, is to open a powerful offensive of one's own.

The German offensive at Verdun was checked, not by our resistance at Verdun, but by our offensive on the Somme.

But such an operation is possible only if it is anticipated and prepared. And with what will it be carried out? With whatever French and British forces may be available.

Therefore the entire Franco-British front must be considered and not the French front or the British front independently of each other. What we need is not two separate plans, but one joint plan, looking toward and preparing for offensive action at the chosen moment and on a common battleground of all available Allied forces.

General Petain makes the observation that in 1916 the Germans attacked at only one point and that they had only 125 divisions. They will now have 170, 180, possibly 200 divisions and will attack in three places simultaneously or successively; at each point the attacks can be more violent than at Verdun.

In that case, when shall we launch our reserves? If we engage them in an offensive, we shall find ourselves stripped in the face of an enemy attack following the first.

General Foch replies that our combined offensive must be launched with the objective for which it was planned. It is impossible *a priori* to determine the exact time. The attack on Verdun began February 21, and the Somme offensive was not launched until July 1. But it is certain that this offensive, which had a decisive effect on the campaign of 1916, could not have been staged, if several months had not been devoted to planning and preparing for it. We do not want to forget this in 1918.

General Petain declares himself to be substantially in agreement with the foregoing but again observes that the inactivating of 20 French divisions in 1918 results in our not having troops available to enable us to take the offensive.

General Robertson remarks that in the discussion thus far we have assumed that the Germans would start several powerful offensives simultaneously. It is nevertheless possible that their attacks may have neither the severity nor the multiplicity attributed to them.

Moreover we have been talking about attrition of our effectives. But does anybody know what the attrition of German effectives is?

General Petain replies that the Germans still have the means to refill all their divisions once, whereas we cannot do it.

Marshal Haig observes that he is ready to launch a counteroffensive. The business of picking the troops who will have to execute it still remains, but the work of equipping the selected sectors has been completed.

General Robertson inquires whether General Foch is inclined to more offensive action in the conduct of the operations.

General Foch replies in the negative but again observes that nothing in our plans concerns the final battle, when every last available Allied man, French, British, and American, will be used.

He requested then that no more battlefields be organized but that preparations be made for the employment of the Allied forces that are available at any given moment.

General Petain replies that in 1917 French forces went to the assistance of the British army (French First Army in Flanders, French divisions sent toward Cambrai). He

adds that he would render our Allies the same assistance again if the situation should arise, and that he counts on reciprocity.

General Robertson observes that it seems essential to point out specifically those parts of the front on which withdrawals may be made and those where it is necessary to fight in place at all costs.

General Petain says that the parts of the French front that he considers sensitive are: Alsace, the Nancy region, Champagne, the region between the Aisne and Reims; and that the region between Arras and St-Quentin seems to him the most sensitive part of the British front.

On the French front there can be no falling back in the Nancy region nor in that around Reims.

Marshal Haig states that the whole British front is sensitive. Nowhere can there be any falling back, unless it might be in the zone immediately south of St-Quentin.

General Robertson says that it is not certain that the Germans will attack at as many points and in as much force as has been thought. How are we to count on winning the war? It cannot be won if we remain always on the defensive. We must therefore take the offensive at some time or other. Could General Foch explain how and where he thinks this offensive might be undertaken?

General Foch replies that he has not been charged with the study of a combined offensive plan and could not therefore indicate in what region this plan could be put into effect. But he points out insistently that we have only prepared palliatives for the enemy offensive. We have no large-scale, vigorous parry. The offensive that must be prepared must be greater and of a joint nature.

General Robertson is of the opinion - concurring with General Foch - that a good strong offensive would be an excellent thing, but states that he cannot see how, where, or with what means it is to be executed. We cannot, he adds, win the war by staying on the defensive.

Marshal Haig remarks: "Let's bring back the troops from Salonika, and we'll start offensives."

General Foch replies: "We're not talking about offensives but about counter-offensives."

General Petain says that on this basic idea there is complete agreement, but that the means are lacking unless we can count on the Americans in 1918.

The Somme region seems, furthermore, the best for a joint offensive.

Employment of French and English reserves on a common battleground will be covered by an understanding, General Petain being entirely agreeable to supporting Marshal Haig by sending him his reserves if he [Petain] has any.

General Robertson declares: "As I see it, reciprocal support of the French and British armies amounts to this: Either by making reliefs to assist each other, or by sending reserves to the threatened point, or by starting counteroffensives. What more can be done?"

## COOPERATION OF AMERICAN FORCES

General Petain replies: "Nothing, without the Americans."

General Robertson then inquires concerning the extent of American cooperation then being planned on the French front.

General Petain says: "We expect that in the month of May one American army corps of four divisions will be in line. But these four divisions will not yet be ready for an offensive."

"To hasten the time when American aid will really be of use to us, it would be highly desirable to amalgamate the American forces in the French divisions, at the rate of one American regiment to the French division, this regiment being considered as part of the division, not only for training but also for employment." This procedure would be applied until such time as the American army is strong enough to be independent.

General Robertson dwells upon the necessity of the rapid arrival of American forces.

General Pershing says that this arrival depends on shipping, over which he has no control; everybody is familiar with the tonnage situation and its problems.

As to the employment of American troops, he declares that on the day that offensive action is required of American troops, the American army must be independent.

He declared that he is opposed to amalgamation of American troops with Allied troops, except for training; that amalgamation with French troops presented further special difficulties because of the difference in languages.

Amalgamation of American and Allied troops for battle could not take place except in case of absolute necessity.

General Petain observes that language differences being no obstacle to joint training, they should not prevent joint employment.

General Robertson inquires whether, in this matter of the arrival of American troops, French port and railroad capacity does not contribute a greater problem than the present insufficiency of shipping.

General Pershing says that difficulties have been encountered due to the lack of liaison between the army and the navy, to questions of ballast, to the number of officials to whom it is necessary to go at the ports, and to the lack of rolling stock.

These difficulties have been reported to the ministers of war, Messrs. Painleve and Clemenceau and to Mr. Claveille.

General Petain and General Robertson inquire whether General Foch cannot see to it that the difficulties reported are removed.

General Foch replies that he will very willingly apply himself to that effect when the problem is referred to him. But he adds that the speed of the arrival of American troops depends not only on debarkation facilities, but also on departure conditions.

General Pershing replies to a question by General Petain, that departures from America are under the direction of the Secretary of War, acting in conjunction with the shipping board, and that he, General Pershing, can do nothing except to expedite debarkations.

General Robertson asks General Pershing whether, in case sufficient shipping were immediately available, it would be possible to count on finding in the United States at this date, ten divisions absolutely ready and prepared to leave.

General Pershing replies: "No. Our plan is to ship or embark some 12 to 13 divisions from now to July, which will make a total of about 18 divisions around that date. Of course, once these divisions reach France, they will still need more training."

General Robertson asks whether the different divisions have about the same value in quality and training.

General Pershing says that it is difficult to answer this question. The National Guard was organized [sic] in August and after some time devoted to getting it located, it began its training. Generally speaking, its officers are not of the best, but the majority of the enlisted personnel composing it have already received a certain amount of training. As for the draftees, they belong to the first category to be called and the first of them entered the service last October. They are, General Pershing states, men of very high military value.

#### WITHDRAWAL OF ALLIED FORCES IN ITALY

General Robertson states that inasmuch as there appears to be no reason to fear an enemy offensive in Italy before the month of May, the time would seem opportune to bring the Allied forces back to France from Italy, especially since the German attacks on the Franco-British front may be launched well before the month of May. He requests the opinion of General Foch on this point.

General Foch replies that, if, as a matter of fact, an enemy offensive in Italy is not to be expected before the month of May, still it is necessary to leave a certain number of troops in Italy, because of the need further to strengthen the Italian army and to go ahead with its reorganization and training.

Nevertheless a part of these forces could be withdrawn right away, if it were necessary.

Plans should also be laid to ship all of these forces back to France. It should be noted that the movements from Italy to France will be much speedier than movement in the opposite direction, because it will be unnecessary, at least initially, to pay any attention to the shipment of food and munitions.

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SWC (MR) 14: Joint Note

***Formation of a General Reserve Proposed***

SUPREME WAR COUNCIL, MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES,  
*Versailles, January 25, 1918.*

JOINT NOTE NO. 14

Joint Note to the Supreme War Council by its Military Representatives

THE GENERAL RESERVE

To: The Supreme War Council

The military representatives have the honor to inform you that at their meeting held on January 23, 1918, they passed the following resolution:

The military representatives are of opinion that the formation of a general reserve for the whole of the Allied forces on the western front, both in France and Italy, is imperative.

The military representatives recommend that in view of its urgency the creation of this reserve should be decided at the next meeting of the Supreme War Council, and, so as to prepare for this decision, the governments should inform the military representatives as soon as possible of the views of their chiefs of the staff and Commanders-in-Chief on this subject, in particular with regard to the number, situation, and command of this reserve.

WEYGAND,  
Military  
Representative,  
French Section,  
Supreme War Council.

HENRY WILSON,  
25.1.18 General,  
Military,  
Representative,  
British Section,  
Supreme War Council.

L. CADORNA,  
Military  
Representative,  
Italian Section,  
Supreme War Council.

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***Organization of Communications for the American Army***

[Contemporary Translation]

4th Bureau  
No. 3771/TR

FRENCH MILITARY MISSION WITH THE AMERICAN ARMY,  
*Postal Sector No. 10, January 25, 1918.*

From: General Ragueneau, Chief of the French Military Mission with the American Army

To: The General, Commander-in-Chief of the American Expeditionary Forces.

[Extract]

\* \* \* \* \*

During their last interviews General Pershing and General Petain have considered the conditions under which the American army might possibly be employed upon any part of the front.

It is in accordance with these considerations that the present study has been made.

Two hypotheses may be considered:

1st Hypothesis, The American troops occupy any part of the front between Belfort and Reims: In this case the supplies destined to be forwarded to the American troops may be directed from the depots and stocks around Is-sur-Tille and the regulating station charged with supplying the American troops.

This regulating station would be, according to the exact location of the American troops, either Liffol-le-Grand or the French regulating station (Connantre, St-Dizier, or Gray), assigned to the American army in exchange for Liffol-le-Grand.

2nd Hypothesis, The American troops are engaged in the part of the front between Reims and l'Oise: In this case the American troops could be resupplied, according to their exact location, by one of the regulating stations of Creil, Bourget, or of Noisy-le-Sec, which the French army would turn over to the Americans in exchange for Liffol-le-Grand.

However, the depots and supply dumps of Is-sur-Tille are too far away from these regulating stations, which could only be reached by following one of our lateral lines of maneuver railroad, to be able satisfactorily to serve as depots midway between the bases or the depots of the interior and the regulating stations. Under this assumption it would be necessary to create between Les Aubrais and Juvisy an installation similar to that at Is-sur-Tille. The region Toury-Angerville appears to be well placed for this installation. Is-sur-Tille would then function as an annex of Toury-Angerville.

Conclusion: Under the first hypothesis it is necessary to continue to work at Is-sur-Tille and to complete it as rapidly as possible in accordance with the original plan and therefore to undertake immediately the work on Liffol-le-Grand.

Under the second hypothesis it is necessary to finish up as above the works at Is-sur-Tille and Liffol-le-Grand, and in addition, to study the installation of the new depots, etc., between Angerville and Toury.

I have the honor to ask you to be kind enough to inform me as to your opinion on this subject, inviting your close attention to the urgency which there is in any case to push very actively the work at Is-sur-Tille and at Liffol-le-Grand.

By order:

(Signature illegible),  
Chief of the General Staff.

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Cable: A-697-R

***Use of French Liners for Transportation of American Troops***

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, WAR DEPARTMENT,  
*Washington, D. C., January 26, 1918.*

GENERAL PERSHING, AMEXFORCE, H. A. E. F.

[Extract]

\* \* \* \* \*

8. Question of using French liners for transportation American troops now being considered with French High Commissioner. These vessels land at Bordeaux necessary to obtain permission [will it be practicable] to perfect arrangements for handling approximately 2,500 troops per month through this port? Your recommendations desired. Biddle

\* \* \* \* \*

McCAIN.

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AG, GHQ, AEF: 9110-A28: Memorandum

***Instruction Governing the Casual Officers Depot at Blois***

LINE OF COMMUNICATIONS, A. E. F.,  
*Tours, January 26, 1918.*

MEMORANDUM TO: C. O., Blois

[Extract]

The following general instructions are furnished for your information and guidance:

1. The C. O. is charged with all duties connected with reception, classification, and forwarding of all casual officers and enlisted personnel at Blois.

\* \* \* \* \*

By command of Major General Kernan:

F. A. WILCOX,  
Adjutant General.

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***Authority to Organize Army Corps in France***

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, WAR DEPARTMENT.  
*Washington, D. C., January 26, 1918.*

PERSHING, AMEXFORCE

[Extract]

\* \* \* \* \*

13. With reference to paragraph 1 your 504 under the provisions of Section 3 Act of Congress approved June 3, 1916, President of the United States authorizes you to organize army corps in France as recommended by you.

\* \* \* \* \*

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SWC: 3d Session: Minutes

***Utilization of American Forces***

*January 30, 1918.*

[Extract]

\* \* \* \* \*

M. Clemenceau suggested that the Supreme War Council should first consider Note 12 of the military representatives dealing with the general plan of operations for 1918.

Mr. Lloyd George concurred and suggested that the note should be given what in English Parliamentary procedure would be called a second reading, i. e., that its general principles should be accepted, subject to such amendments or alterations in detail as might emerge as a result of subsequent discussion.

The Supreme War Council having accepted the note in principle, M. Clemenceau invited General Foch to open the discussion in detail.

General Foch said that he was in agreement with the note that the Allies would have to be on the defensive on the western front from Nieuport to Venice, at any rate in the opening stages of the campaign of 1918, but that this defensive might, according to circumstances, be converted into an offensive, as indicated in the plans annexed to the note. It was necessary to envisage the possibility of attacks for the purpose of which the enemy would have absorbed large forces brought over from Russia. The Allied plan must take account both of the defensive organization of each of the armies and, in the event of a really important attack, of the necessity of a general reserve. A general reserve which could be moved from one part of the front to the other was a necessary feature of a plan of defense involving so long a front with limited resources. He summed up the fundamental bases of the Allied defense for 1918 as, firstly, the complete arrangements on the front of each army, and, secondly, the possibility of an appeal to the total reserves of the coalition in order to meet a very heavy attack. He presumed that the respective chiefs of staff and Commanders-in-Chief would work out their plans on these lines.

Signor Orlando expressed the view that the arrangements for the defensive and the constitution of the general reserve were intimately connected.

Sir W. Robertson agreed with General Foch that it was necessary to have arrangements for an offensive combined with the defensive. The offensive was, in fact, the best form of defensive. General Foch, however, proposed an offensive on a bigger scale than he thought possible. It was all a question of means. He suggested that the opinion of the Commanders-in-Chief should be asked as to the means at their disposal.

General Cadorna said that the principles expressed by General Foch and Sir W. Robertson were the same as those upon which the military representatives had based their plans. The only question was carrying those principles into execution.

General Bliss said that he was in full concord as to the necessity for a general defensive in 1918, coupled with preparations for making use of every opportunity afforded for a counteroffensive. In his opinion, the formation of a general reserve was an essential part of the general plan.

Sir Douglas Haig agreed with General Foch and Sir William Robertson as to the necessity for acting on the defensive to begin with, and if possible passing over to the offensive later. He doubted, however, if means for the latter were available. He had prepared three sectors on the front for an offensive, and General Petain had, he understood, four similar sectors. The idea was to attract the enemy's reserves, but it was always possible, or, indeed, probable, that the enemy would take countermeasures, and that these local attacks might fail to draw away many of the enemy's reserves. In fact, we cannot hope, with the small means at our disposal, to secure very great results from these offensives. On the other hand, a large offensive such as had been indicated by General Foch was not, in his opinion, practicable. He considered that if the enemy attacked in force the situation would be very serious by the autumn. In the case of the British army the normal excess of recruits coming in over casualties was about 5,000 a month. It was necessary to admit the possibility of a loss of 500,000 men, equivalent to the loss of 33 divisions, by November in the event of heavy fighting, or, deducting for the normal excess of recruits coming in for the nine months, for a net loss of 30 divisions. The present strength of the British army was 57 divisions and even after allowing for the addition of American units of a total strength equivalent to 8 divisions, that would mean that by the end of October the British force would have sunk to about 35 divisions.

As regards the American forces, our own experience had been that our new divisions required nine months' home training and six months' training in France before they were fit for hard fighting, though they could be put into quiet sections of the line before that. Nor could one expect that the American divisions could be placed in the line together in any number without inviting a heavy German attack. He consequently did not consider the Allies could expect the American force, as a force, to be of offensive support this year.

General Petain agreed with the principles expressed by the previous speakers in favour of combining the measure of offensive with the defensive. He had already organized schemes for the offensive, and the whole of the plans, both for the defensive and for the preparation of sectors for local attacks, had been completed between Sir Douglas Haig and himself. He would have an army ready to support Sir Douglas Haig in an emergency, and he knew Sir Douglas Haig would be ready to assist him in the same manner. With regard to the question of effectives, he agreed with Sir Douglas Haig that the situation was very serious. The French nation had made all the effort it could make, and could go no further. Men of fifty years of age were with the colours, and every man who could dig or handle an instrument of any sort was in the trenches. He had already been compelled to suppress 5 divisions, and though he would be able to fill up the gaps in his army up to April 1, he would be compelled between that date and October 1 to suppress 25 divisions more, bringing the army down to something like 75 divisions, simply in consequence of the normal losses along the front, and without any heavy fighting. If there were a big battle the losses of that battle would involve still further reductions.

As regards the American army, he agreed entirely with the conclusions arrived at by Sir Douglas Haig. In fact, in his opinion, the American army, if it wished to retain its

autonomy, would be of no use to the Allies in 1918, except, perhaps, along some quiet section of the front. There was only one way in which the American army could really participate in the operations of 1918, and that was by amalgamation with the British and French armies. In his opinion, the entry of American troops by battalions or regiments into French or English divisions, not only for training, but also for fighting, was much the greatest assistance that the United States could give the Allies, and would furnish the solution of the crisis with regard to effectives. It would also mean a saving of tonnage if the United States concentrated on sending over their infantry in the first instance, and leaving the artillery, horses, etc., to come later. The suggested amalgamation, of course, was only temporary. The American army would get back its units afterwards and become fully autonomous. Unless this were done the reductions in divisions foreseen by him and by Sir Douglas Haig would certainly come into effect, and the war would enter into a very critical period.

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(The Supreme War Council adjourned till 3 p. m. on January 31.)

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SWC: 3d Session: Minutes

#### AMERICAN ATTITUDE TOWARD AMALGAMATION OF TROOPS IN BRITISH AND FRENCH UNITS

In regard to the question which had been twice asked by Baron Sonnino as to whether the American Government would allow the minor units of each division to be amalgamated with British and French divisions, in order that they could most effectively perform their part in the emergency which was assumed to be approaching within the next few months, General Bliss stated in substance as follows:

To ask the United States formally to declare now and in advance of the emergency that it will permit its units to be amalgamated with British and French divisions is to make unnecessarily difficult the solution of the problem which you are studying, i. e., the most effective utilization of American manpower under present conditions. Everything possible is now being done to prepare for this effective utilization of American manpower without the formal declaration by my government which Baron Sonnino appears to desire. Yesterday the British Government agreed to bring over six American divisions, with the understanding that they would train the infantry battalions of these divisions on the British front. If the German attack finds these battalions on the British front they will fight to the extent of their capacity wherever the attack finds them. Also, General Pershing entered into an agreement with General Petain by which the organizations of his divisions will receive their final training on the French line. It goes without saying that neither our battalions on the British front nor our other organizations on the French front can be withdrawn for the purpose of forming complete American divisions under their own officers while the German attack is being made or is being prepared. If the crisis should come the American troops will undoubtedly be used in whatever way their services will be most effective, either in defense or offense, with the British and French troops with whom they are at the time serving. It is to be clearly understood, however, that this training of American units with British and French divisions, whether behind the lines or in actual combat on the line, is only a stepping stone in the training of the American forces, and that whenever it is proper and practicable to do so these units will be formed into American divisions under their own officers. Such a thing as permanent amalgamation of our units with British and French units would be intolerable to American sentiment.

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MINUTES OF THE SECOND MEETING OF THE THIRD SESSION  
OF THE SUPREME WAR COUNCIL HELD AT THE TRIANON PALACE, VERSAILLES  
ON THURSDAY, JANUARY 31, 1918, AT 3 P. M.

[Extract]

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M. Clemenceau, as chairman, put forward the Joint Note 12 submitted by the military representatives on the 1918 campaign.

\* \* \* \* \*

M. Clemenceau expressed his disapprobation of the eastern plan of the Joint Note, and insisted that the security of the western front overrode all other considerations. The treason of Russia (he used the word deliberately) has exposed the Allies to the greatest danger they had yet run in the war, but the accession of America to the Alliance would counterbalance it. This was his plan to hold out this year, 1918, till the American assistance came in full force; after that America would win the war. All he asked was, hold out on the western front this year. He protested against embarking on this eastern adventure, when so dreadful a danger was imminent near to Paris itself. He proposed to accept the first part of the note, and, without in any way questioning Great Britain's right to engage in a campaign in the east, to reject the second.

Baron Sonnino proposed, as it was agreed that no further resources in manpower could be found among the western Allies, to ask the Americans what their views on the proposed embodiment of American units in the French and British armies were; the adoption of this proposal might considerably accelerate the usefulness of the American help.

Mr. Lloyd George in answer to the last remarks of M. Clemenceau, urged the Supreme War Council not to lose sight of the importance of the east, and insisted that, on the figures prepared by the general staffs, the Allies were in the west taking risks considerably less than had been taken by the Germans on the same front during the war. He asked whether M. Clemenceau proposed we should retire from Jerusalem, Bagdad, and Salonica. He pointed out that we would not get more than two divisions out of the abandonment of the eastern offensive campaign; that was all even that Sir Douglas Haig hoped for.

A general discussion to which Generals Bliss, Pershing, and Petain, and other members of the Supreme War Council contributed, then followed. It was ascertained how the American troops were to be embodied, and at what rate they would become an effective combatant force.

General Bliss explained that the principle on which he calculated his effective combatant forces, after the spring of this year, was to take the total number of American troops on French soil at a given date and to deduct from it the number of troops that had arrived during the three months previous to that date at the rate of two divisions a month. At the end of September he would have 24 divisions on French soil, and 28, therefore, effective combatant divisions.

In order to expedite their training, some of the American troops would be attached as battalion or regimental units to the Allied forces for purposes of training; when undergoing this training they would, of course, do their duty and take part in any engagements in which they might find themselves involved, if judged capable to do so. But when this period of training was over, they would be assembled in purely American divisions under their own commanders.

(The meeting adjourned at 6:45 p. m. to 10 a. m. the following day.)

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***Headquarters I Army Corps Organized***

I ARMY CORPS, A. E. F.,  
*January 31, 1918.*

Return of the Headquarters I Army Corps for the months of January 1918

[Extract]

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RECORD OF EVENTS

I Army Corps organized January 20, 1918, under provisions of G. O. 9, H. A. E. F., 1918.

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H. LIGGETT,  
Major General, U.S.A.  
Commanding.

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SWC: 3d Session: Resolutions

***General Reserve Established***

SUPREME WAR COUNCIL,  
*Versailles, February 2, 1918.*

Resolutions passed at the Third Session of the Supreme War Council,  
January to February 1918.

[Extract]

\* \* \* \* \*

BRITISH TEXT

\* \* \* \* \*

Resolution No. 13

1. The Supreme War Council decides on the creation of a general reserve for the whole of the armies on the western, Italian, and Balkan fronts.
2. The Supreme War Council delegates to an executive committee composed of the permanent military representatives of Great Britain, Italy, and the United States of America, with General Foch for France, the following powers to be exercised in consultation with the Commanders-in-Chief of the armies concerned:
  - (a) To determine the strength in all arms and composition of the general reserve, and the contribution of each national army thereto.

(b) To select the localities in which the general reserve is normally to be stationed.

(c) To make arrangements for the transportation and concentration of the general reserve in the different areas.

(d) To decide and issue orders as to the time, place, and period of employment of the general reserve; the orders of the executive committee for the movement of the general reserve shall be transmitted in the manner and by the persons who shall be designated by the Supreme War Council for that purpose in each particular case.

(e) To determine the time, place, and strength of the counteroffensive, and then to hand over to one or more of the Commanders-in-Chief the necessary troops for the operation. The moment this movement of the general reserve, or of any part of it, shall have begun, it will come under the orders of the Commanders-in-Chief to whose assistance it is consigned.

(f) Until the movement of the general reserve begins, it will, for all purposes of discipline, instruction, and administration be under the orders of the respective Commanders-in-Chief, but no movement can be ordered except by the executive committee.

3. In case of irreconcilable differences of opinion on a point of importance connected with the general reserve, any military representative has the right to appeal to the Supreme War Council.

4. In order to facilitate its decisions, the executive committee has the right to visit any theater of war.

5. The Supreme War Council will nominate the president of the executive committee from among the members of the committee.

#### Resolution No. 14

The Supreme War Council designate General Foch as president of the executive committee for the general reserve.

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SWC: 315-1: Cablegram

***Two Divisions per Month Required***

No. 19-S

AMERICAN SECTION, SUPREME WAR COUNCIL,  
*Paris, February 2, 1918.*

AGWAR, WASHINGTON  
For Acting Chief of Staff

1. As stated in my number 16 the British have agreed to bring over in their own tonnage the personnel of six complete American divisions the last troops arriving not later than June. We have now in France five organized divisions. Yesterday the Supreme War Council adopted a resolution addressed to the four governments stating as an absolutely necessary condition for the safety of the western front during the year 1918 that American troops must arrive at the rate of not less than two complete divisions per month. This rate of movement must begin at once. If it can be done we will have here 21 divisions by about July. It is of vital importance that this be done. Can you do it? It requires only a moderate increase in troops.

BLISS.

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SWC: 315-1: Cablegram

***General Military Policy***

No. 21-S

AMERICAN SECTION, SUPREME WAR COUNCIL,  
*Versailles, February 3, 1918.*

AGWAR, WASHINGTON  
For the Acting Chief of Staff

1. The third session of the Supreme War Council began Wednesday, January 30 and continued till final adjournment at noon, February 2. It considered 14 joint notes of the military representatives and two separate resolutions the full text of which will be forwarded by confidential hands. The action on those of essential importance is indicated below.

2. The approved joint notes numbers seven, eight, nine, and thirteen created as sub-agencies of the Supreme War Council Interallied Commissions on aviation transportation tanks and supply.

3. All that follows to be held in absolute confidence;

Joint notes number one and number twelve were on the subject of general military policy for 1918 and general plan of campaign for 1918 respectively. The general military policy approved by the Supreme War Council for 1918 involves a general defensive attitude combined with readiness to take advantage of any opportunity for the offensive. The general plan of campaign for 1918 is to be one of general defense on the western, the Italian, and the Macedonian fronts. The English insisted upon an offensive campaign in Asia Minor with a view to detaching Turkey from alliance with the Central Powers. This was supported by the Italians. The French strongly objected. Mr. Lloyd George and Lord Milner said that this offensive campaign would be conducted by British forces now in the eastern theatre and would not divert troops from the western front. The British Military

Advisor supported this position. The British Commander-in-Chief and Chief of Staff opposed it. The final action of the Supreme War Council was as follows:

The Supreme War Council accepts Note 12 of the military representatives on the plan of campaign for 1918, the British Government having made it clear that, in utilizing in the most effective fashion the forces already at its disposal in the eastern theatre, it has no intention of diverting forces from the western front or in any way relaxing its efforts to maintain the safety of that front which it regards as of vital interest to the whole alliance.

In Note 12 the arrival in France of at least two American divisions each month is stated as an essential condition on which the plan of campaign is based and is *sine qua non* to the safety of the western front. This imposes on us the obligation to provide this monthly minimum and necessary tonnage must be obtained from our own resources.

4. Joint Note Number 14 was on the subject of an interallied general reserve for the campaign of 1918 for use according to circumstances on the British, French, Italian, or Macedonian fronts.

5. By the adoption of the first paragraph of Note 14 the Supreme War Council decided to establish a general interallied reserve. A special executive consisting of General Foch, chairman, and Generals Wilson, Cadorna, and Bliss, military representatives with the Supreme War Council of Great Britain, Italy, and the United States was created and was charged with the duty of determining the composition and strength of the general reserve and the contribution of each nation thereto; the selection of localities in which the general reserve is normally to be stationed; the decision and issuance of orders as to time, place, and period of employment; the determination of the time, place, and strength of the counteroffensive and the transfer to the proper Commanders-in-Chief of the troops necessary for the operation.

BLISS.

NOTE: All the above joint notes were prepared before the arrival of American military representative and were not signed by him. Copies furnished to Gen. Pershing.

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SWC: 315-1: Cablegram

### ***Creation of the Interallied General Reserve***

No. 22-S

AMERICAN SECTION, SUPREME WAR COUNCIL,  
*Versailles, February 4, 1918.*

AGWAR, WASHINGTON  
For Acting Chief of Staff

At their meeting today the military representatives of the Supreme War Council adopted the following resolution: "The military representatives wish respectfully to draw the attention of the governments represented on the Supreme War Council to the undesirability, for military reasons, of any public discussion in the press or otherwise, of the arrangements now being taken in hand for the creation and employment of an interallied general reserve." The foregoing resulted from a message received today from Mr. Lloyd George calling attention to the grave embarrassment that would result from publicity especially in the British and American press.

BLISS.

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***Loading of Troop Transports***

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, WAR DEPARTMENT,  
*Washington, D.C., February 5, 1918.*

PERSHING, AMEXFORCE, H.A.E.F.

[Extract]

\* \* \* \* \*

2. Advise your views on the following recommendations made by Vice Admiral Sims.
  - a. That the army authorities be directed to give troop transport preference in unloading.
  - b. That freight carried on troop transports be of such nature that it can be readily handled in any of the French ports that is it should contain no heavy weights; no material difficult to handle.
  - c. Troop transports destined to France should have minimum of freight.
  - d. Deep-draft vessels should be operated in the same group if practicable.

Recommendations made in (b) now in effect full cargo capacity troop transports being utilized for troop equipment, subsistence, and clothing which is necessary at this time.  
Biddle.

\* \* \* \* \*

McCAIN.

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***Interallied Reserve***

[Editorial Translation]

SUPREME WAR COUNCIL, EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE,  
*Versailles, February 6, 1918.*

No. 2 C/E

MEMORANDUM FOR THE COMMANDERS-IN-CHIEF OF THE BRITISH, FRENCH,  
AND ITALIAN ARMIES

The Supreme War Council has decided upon the creation of an interallied general reserve and, after consultation with the Commanders-in-Chief, has delegated to the executive committee the mission of organizing it, of determining its location and of deciding upon its employment.

Concerning the first two points, alone considered in this memorandum, the executive committee is of the opinion that:

(1) The general reserve should be made up of a sufficient number of divisions to make it possible directly to meet the immediate needs of the defensive, as well as to undertake a powerful counteroffensive on a rather extensive front. This means temporarily allocating some thirty divisions to it.

This figure represents only about a seventh of the total number of English, French, and Italian divisions, a proportion smaller than the proportion generally allowed for reserves; it is therefore a minimum, to lower which would mean giving up a general reserve really capable of swaying the issue of battle.

(2) The committee is of the further opinion that it is necessary to determine the contribution of each of the Allied armies toward the formation of this general reserve of 30 divisions according to the following table:

	English Army	French Army	Italian Army
English Front	6 or 7 *		
French Front		9 or 10 **	
Italian Front	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>7</u>
	9 or 10	13 or 14	7
[TOTAL]		about 30	

\* This last figure, provided in the reorganized Belgian army can extend its front to the general vicinity of the LANGE-MARCK Railroad, which would free about 2 English divisions.

\*\* Including inf. divs. held in reserve in the Dunkirk region.

In this distribution, the following has been taken into account:

- (a) The proportion of one-seventh of the forces indicated above.
- (b) The fact that the 11 French and English divisions now in Italy must be considered as a part of the interallied general reserve, placed in November at the disposal of the Italian High Command.

The necessity, from the standpoint of morale and for the sake of close comradeship between the Allied armies, of initially keeping some of these French and English divisions in Italy.

(3) It is also the opinion of the committee that the divisions of each army designated to be part of the general reserve should be quartered as a rule in the zone of their army:

- (a) The French and English divisions on the Franco-British front at such distance from the front as to permit rapid intervention: Whether on the French front in

the case of the English divisions, or on the English front in the case of the French divisions; and prepared for an immediate move to any point on the Italian front.

(b) The Italian divisions on the Italian front in the zones lending themselves both to rapid intervention on the Italian front and to movement to the Franco-British front.

(c) The French and English divisions on the Italian front widely distributed so as to be able to cope with the following different eventualities:

(1) Reinforcement of the Italian front.

(2) Protection of the Italo-Swiss frontier in case of violation Swiss territory by the enemy.

(3) Employment on the French front. (These considerations would result in effecting a distribution on both sides of the Alps, of the divisions of the general reserve taken from the English and French divisions of the Italian front; on the side, in the region of MILAN-NOVARE, on the other side, in the LYONS region. In that case, their distance from the different fronts would create difficulties in the training of these divisions, such as the rotation of units for service at the front, etc. The commanders are requested to make known their opinions on this subject.)

\* \* \* \* \*

The executive committee requests the Commanders-in-Chief to examine without delay the inquiries that have been submitted to them.

In presenting the remarks suggested by these inquiries they are requested to state the exact quartering zones they recommend and the number of divisions of the general reserve located in each of these zones, as well as the units of heavy artillery and aviation which in their opinion should enter into the composition of the general reserve in addition to those belonging organically to the divisions or army corps designated to make it up.

It is of the utmost importance that the interallied general reserve be organized without delay.

Representing France, President of the Executive Committee	British Military Representative to the Supreme War Council	Italian Military Representative to the Supreme War Council	American Military Representative to the Supreme War Council
FOCH, General.	WILSON, General.	CADORNA, General.	BLISS, General.

For General Foch,  
President of the Executive Committee of the Supreme War Council.

WEYGAND,  
General.

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***Location of an American Sector***

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, February 6, 1918.*

1. The memorandum of the operations section is very exhaustive.
2. The question of building up an American sector between St-Mihiel and Pont-a-Mousson has been practically decided by agreement between General Petain and myself. As to the extension of the line to the east or west, it is likely eventually to be extended in both directions, beginning probably by extension toward the west.
3. Therefore we should begin to make plans to carry out necessary construction leading up to what is to become the American sector.

J. J. PERSHING.

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GHQ, AEF: War Diary: Item 242-1-t

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*February 6, 1918.*

3-727-R. Following is substance of communication received from British Ambassador at Washington on which is approved by Secretary of War:

British military authorities have represented that an emergency might occur such as imminence of raid or invasion by enemy, in which it would become necessary to employ British and Allied troops in England in combined operations. In case of such emergency they request that the officer in command of American troops in England be instructed to receive his orders from the senior combatant British officer present who could act as mouthpiece of the Commander-in-Chief of the command in which such troops are employed. From military standpoint consider it very desirable that an understanding as to command be reached previous to any emergency.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 681-IV: Memorandum

***American Sector***

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, February 7, 1918.*

MEMORANDUM FOR: Colonel W. D. Connor

The Commander-in-Chief made a tentative decision yesterday to adopt the present section occupied by our 1st Division and to extend our line to the left. The understanding was that this decision would only be tentative until an opportunity was had to make a study of it.

General Ragueneau suggested that a combined study be made by French and American officers. General Pershing desires you, representing the supply end of it, and Colonel Fox Conner, operations, to represent us in this study.

Please call on General Ragueneau to name the French officer or officers to accompany you and take the necessary action. The idea was that our railhead would be at Sorcy-sur-Meuse and that our supplies will take the line Gondrecourt-Sorcy.

Colonel Fox Conner is at the headquarters of the 1st Division, but you can communicate with him and have him meet you wherever you desire.

J. G. HARBORD,  
Chief of Staff.

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SOS: Gen. File No. 14: Letter

### ***Labor Troops***

Coordination Section, G. S.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, February 7, 1918.*

From: C-in-C

To: C. G., L. of C.

1. Authority has just been obtained from the C-in-C for a certain draft on the next troops to arrive in France for construction purposes. The entire situation as regards labor has been presented to him and he has approved a definite program for the next three months.

2. In order to make a satisfactory distribution of labor it is desired that you submit, as soon as practicable, a program to cover your needs for the next month and that a similar program be submitted on March 1 covering the month of March. These programs should be in detail and should show the number of men required for the different places, in order that some order of priority can be established and should include your needs for depot troops and other purposes.

3. Similar programs will be called for from the D. G. T. and based upon these programs labor will be assigned for the best interests of the service.

By order of the C-in-C:

W. D. CONNOR,  
Colonel, General Staff, N. A.  
Chief of Section.

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***Employment of Combat Troops as Labor Troops***

Operations Section

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, February 8, 1918.*

MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF OF STAFF:

1. The attached communication [omitted] authorizes the employment of the troops of the next division to arrive in France on the line of communications and in the transportation department.

2. The question involved has a special significance in the relation to the employment in the near future of the combat divisions of the I Corps.

3. We have taken over a sector of the line and made public announcement thereof. For reasons of morale, if no other, we will probably have to retain troops in this sector. We cannot expect the 1st Division to perform this duty indefinitely, another division should be available for this work in March.

The situation on the western front is liable to become active at any time. There seems to be every assurance that this situation will be acute if not critical by spring, that is, April or May. There can be little doubt but that the I Corps will be called upon to play some part in these operations. While it may start its operations in an inactive sector, the uncertainty of the whole situation makes possible rapid tactical changes. Once the corps occupies a sector, we can hardly expect its relief therefrom during the period of actual operations. There are then, possibilities of the I Corps becoming involved in a permanent sector for a long time, and also of having to undertake operations therein resulting in serious losses.

4. Every effort should be made to prepare for the above contingencies. Our divisions are now under going intensive training and their supply is gradually being perfected. However, the replacement system is not functioning. The four combat divisions of the I Corps are now short approximately 8,500 officers and soldiers. The only replacement division (41st) is short on paper about 4,500 officers and soldiers. Practically, it cannot furnish any replacements, as the existing personnel has not been trained and is now employed as labor troops and at schools. We have, therefore, no trained replacements in France available to meet the losses we may expect in the near future. At the same time we have no replacements in France undergoing training for this purpose. With the class of soldiers now arriving in France, individual training requires a minimum of two months before these men should be used as replacements in combat divisions.

5. The urgency for replacements and their training is evident. The urgency of the construction, etc., on the line of communications is also appreciated. However, the relative value of these two urgencies should be weighed on the scale of operations. It does not seem desirable or practicable and it may not be possible to keep the I Corps out of operations this spring. In an emergency, we can utilize French Lines of Communication facilities. It therefore appears more practicable to delay, if necessary, the line of communication's plan than to delay the preparation of the I Corps for its use in the coming operations.

6. It is therefore strongly recommended that:

(1) No line troops, especially infantry, of the next division (32d) to arrive in France be diverted for the line of communications or transportation department work.

(2) That all engineer troops and any other detachments of the combat divisions of the I Corps now employed under the coordination section, A. E. F., be returned to these divisions with the least practicable delay.



7. If the foregoing recommendations are put into effect, we will have by early spring at least one corps ready for operations. This corps will be a complete tactical unit with sufficient trained replacements to insure a strength necessary for operations and to maintain the desired morale.

If necessary, the arrival of combat troops of the second phase should be delayed in favor of labor troops. Such a policy seems to be wiser than one which prevents the complete organization, etc., of the only tactical unit available for certain active employment.

LeROY ELTINGE,  
Colonel, General Staff.  
Acting Chief of Section.

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AG, GHQ, AEF: File 341: Letter

### ***Study of Staff Reorganization***

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, February 8, 1918.*

From: The Chief of Staff, A. E. F.

To: Colonel Johnson Hagood, Chief of Staff, L. of C.

1. The Commander-in-Chief has selected you as the senior officer of a board which he wishes to consider the desirability of any changes in the present organization of the Headquarters A. E. F., including a revision of G. O. 8 and Memorandum 129, these headquarters, 1917.

As a basis of the study to be made by your board, there are placed at your disposition the replies to the Commander-in-Chief's memorandum of January 22 which invited comment and criticism on our organization from the chiefs of sections, general staff; heads of administrative and staff services; and the commanders of divisions and brigades; also a report by the Inspector General on the several staff departments at H. A. E. F.

Your board need not, however, confine its recommendations to the subject matter contained in these papers.

In general, the organization of the H. A. E. F. is working satisfactorily but it is realized that it is necessarily imperfect and that there is no doubt some overlapping of duties in some cases, and lack of clear definition as to the powers and duties of the several departments.

In general, the organization of the H. A. E. F. is working satisfactorily but it is necessarily imperfect and that there is no doubt some overlapping of duties in some cases, and lack of clear definition as to the powers and duties of the several departments.

2. The officers to be associated with you on this study are:

Colonel A. D. Andrews, Transportation Department  
Lieut. Col. Frank R. McCoy, General Staff  
Lieut. Col. Robert C. Davis, Adjutant General  
Major S. P. Wetherill, Q. M. O. R. C.

3. While the Commander-in-Chief desires that this study be very carefully made,

it is desired that it have the exclusive command of your time until completed, and that it be expedited as much as possible.

J. G. HARBORD.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1868: Memorandum

### ***Classification and Use of Troop Areas***

Operations Section, General Staff

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, February 9, 1918.*

MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF, ADMINISTRATIVE SECTION:

1. Due to the many changes which have recently taken place in the officers charged with the procuring and developing of the areas in which troops are to be placed, it is thought advisable to draw up the following memorandum on the different troops areas as they exist today with as accurate a prediction as possible with regard to their future use.

Troop areas may be divided roughly into the following classes:

- Combat divisional areas, of which there are 13
- Corps troop areas, of which there are at present 3
- Replacement division areas
- Base division areas
- Billeting areas in proximity to the L. of C., and artillery instruction camps

#### COMBAT DIVISION AREAS

There have been, up to date, reconnoitered and turned over for our use by the French, thirteen combat division areas. Of these areas, the first has been almost entirely temporarily turned back to the French, the fifth has been entirely temporarily turned back to the French, the sixth has been temporarily turned back to the French with the exception of the aviation camp at Colombey-les-Belles, and the French has signified the possibility of our having to turn back the second area, now occupied by the 26th Division. The tenth divisional area has been designated as the replacement division area for the replacement division of the I Corps (32d Division). (Note: Verbal information has just been received that this has been changed to the seventh area); and the twelfth divisional area, in which the II Corps schools are now being located, will, in all likelihood, become the replacement divisional area for the replacement division of the II Corps when that corps is formed.

#### CORPS TROOPS AREAS

Of the three corps troops areas, the third has been designated as the area for the corps troops of the I Corps.

#### REPLACEMENT DIVISION AREA

Of the thirteen areas selected for combat divisions, five of the most southerly will eventually be selected for the placing of the replacement divisions of the five corps.

#### BASE DIVISION AREAS

The areas of St-Rivoal, Malestroit, Landes-de-Bagaron, La Courtine, and Castlejaloux were originally requested from and reconnoitered by the French as base division areas,

but due to the way in which matters have developed, La Courtine is the only one of these areas which is likely to be used for the purpose for which they were first intended. These areas should, however, be kept available for future use as rest areas, prison camps, or divisional training areas.

It will be seen later under the heading "Billeting Areas in Proximity to the L. of C." how two of these areas have developed into base division areas. It is thought that the final development of the base division areas for the five corps will be as follows: La Courtine, St-Aignan-des-Noyers, Perigueux West, Le Corneau, and a combination of the two artillery instruction camps now at Coetquidan and Meucon, this latter proposition under the supposition that by the time the last corps has arrived these two camps will have served their purpose as artillery instruction camps and can be turned for use by the base division of the last corps to arrive.

#### BILLETING AREAS IN PROXIMITY TO THE L. OF C.

These consisted originally of the following areas:

- The St-Aignan-des-Noyers area
- The Chinon area
- The Ruffec area
- The Pons area
- The Perigueux West area
- The Perigueux East area
- The Marmande area, and
- The Agen area

They were asked for originally with the idea of providing spillways or reservoirs into which troops could be put for a short time upon arrival in France, in the event of congestion in the divisional areas or on the L. of C.

With this end in view, areas were asked for in which a complete division could be billeted with the absolute minimum of necessary construction. In the course of development, two of these areas, the St-Aignan-des-Noyers area and the Perigueux West area have developed into base division areas for the base divisions of the I and II Corps respectively. It is thought that the remainder of these areas should ultimately serve the purpose for which they were originally intended.

#### ARTILLERY INSTRUCTION CAMPS

The field artillery instruction camps are as follows: Le Valdahon, Coetquidan, Meucon, and Souge. Of these camps, Le Valdahon is for one brigade, Coetquidan is for two brigades, Meucon is for two brigades, and Souge is for two brigades. Of these camps, Meucon is not yet completed. It was stated to an officer of this section about the middle of January, by the American engineer officer who was at Meucon watching the progress of the work the French are doing there, that with good weather, Meucon should be ready for the reception of one brigade of field artillery by February 1 and complete for the two brigades by March 1. The officer of this section who was at Meucon is inclined to increase this time limit by about a month from what he observed during about a half hour's stay at Meucon.

2. The above cannot be taken as a definite plan for the future use of all these different classes of areas; but is given as a short summary of the history of the various areas up to date, and of their future possibilities as seen under existing circumstances.

LeROY ELTINGE,  
Colonel, General Staff,  
Acting Chief of Section.

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***American Government in Accord with Principles of Program Outlined  
in Resolution***

No. 22

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, WAR DEPARTMENT.  
*Washington, D. C., February 9, 1918.*

Bliss, Amembassy, Paris

With reference to your Number 10, Secretary of State has been requested to advise Governments of England, France, and Italy that this government is in accord with general principles of program outlined in resolutions quoted in paragraph 2, your cablegram, and that it will cooperate in carrying out, so far as possible, general program outlined.

A. In connection with further steps to be taken through Department of State toward organizing technical commission referred to in these resolutions, your recommendations are desired as to following:

B. It is desirable that this commission be related in its organization to Allied War Council, or should it be organized independently of all existing organizations?

C. Please state the number and names of representatives for the United States recommended by you.

D. Where should first meeting be held? Biddle.

McCAIN.

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Les Armees Francaises, Tome VI, Vol. 1, Annexes Vol. 1: Memorandum

***Recapitulation of the War Plan for 1918***

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff  
No. 12769

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,  
FRENCH ARMIES OF THE NORTH AND NORTHEAST,  
*February 11, 1918.*

**SUMMARY OF THE WAR PLAN OF THE GENERAL COMMANDING THE ARMIES OF THE  
NORTH AND NORTHEAST FOR 1918**

[Extract]

To the Ministry of War

The plan of the Commander-in-Chief for the battle of 1918 is set forth in Directive No. 4 dated December 22, 1917, and in the instructions issued for the application of this directive with respect to the defensive and the offensive. It can be summarized as follows:

I. The superiority in combatant forces obtained by the Central Powers through the neutralization of the Russo-Rumanian front prohibits the French and British armies, both of them affected by the critical situation of effectives, from taking the initiative in attack.

Our armies therefore will be obliged to adopt a waiting attitude and will avoid any rash move.

But this attitude precludes neither continuous activity in works of a defensive or offensive nature nor the conditioning of troops physically, morally, and technically.

\* \* \* \* \*

II. The first thing to do is to take measures to receive the initial enemy shock under the best conditions possible and to carry on the defensive battle with the strictest economy.

For this purpose a battlefield organized in depth is necessary and the forces must be disposed within it and in rear of it in such a way as to prevent the enemy from gaining anywhere a decisive result by a sudden attack surprise. \* \* \*

III. Secondly, it is necessary to be able to pass to the *riposte* within the minimum time when the enemy shows his hand.

This requires:

1. Terrain prepared for the attack
2. Available means.

As far as the offensive is concerned, Directive No. 4 \* \* \* designates the various terrains and establishes the order of priority to be followed in preparing them.

As to the means to be applied to the *riposte*, these have been estimated. For the infantry divisions, in particular, their number will vary from 15 to 30, 15 representing the margin of available units which the Commander-in-Chief will endeavor to leave untouched during the conduct of the defensive battle.

IV. The plan of the Commander-in-Chief is therefore very clear; it is founded on the will to make up for our numerical inferiority by: A defense systematically organized in depth; a disposition of forces enabling us at one and the same time to get into position to parry in the minimum of time and to execute the parry with the minimum of forces; preparation of fronts for the offensive distributed widely enough so there is a chance of keeping at least one offensive base intact.

PETAIN.

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AWC Lib.: General Order

### ***Liaison Service Established***

GENERAL ORDERS  
No. 28

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, February 13, 1918.*

#### ORGANIZATION OF LIASION SERVICES, A. E. F.

[Extract]

1. A special liasion service, A. E. F., is hereby established for the purpose of facilitating the transaction of business between the Allies and the American authorities. Tactical liasion, being handled directly by combatant commanders with the Allied commanders, does not come within the scope of this service. [For complete text, see orders volume.]

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**Report on Hagood Board on Staff Changes**

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, February 14, 1918.*

PROCEEDINGS OF A BOARD OF OFFICERS CONVENED BY LETTER FROM THE CHIEF OF  
STAFF, GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F., FEBRUARY 8, 1918

I. The board met on February 8, 1918; all members present, and remained continuously in session, as directed, for approximately seven days. It carefully considered all written statements submitted to it, and the statements of the following officers who appeared in person, viz: Chiefs of the Administrative and Coordination Sections; The Adjutant General; the chief quartermaster; chief surgeon; chief engineer officer; chief ordnance officer; chief signal officer; chief of air service; Colonel Mosely of the C. S., G. S.; and Colonel Bjornstad of the Staff College.

II. A study of the papers and verbal statements indicated that substantially all the views and suggestions placed before the board could be reduced to a few groups, involving the following important questions:

First: What changes, if any, should be made in the administration of supply, in order to relieve the Commander-in-Chief from the immediate direction thereof, and place direct and complete responsibility therefor upon some competent authority?

Second: What changes, if any, should be made in the organization of the general staff, in order to insure greater efficiency, and more harmonious relations?

Third: What further changes, if any, should be made as a result of the disposition of the foregoing questions?

III. The board, after careful consideration, recommends as follows:

Proceedings 1:

1. That the line of communications as herein reorganized shall hereafter be known and designated as the service of the rear (S. O. R.);

2. That the chief of the administrative and technical staff services, under their present titles and authority as members of the staff of the Commander-in-Chief, will exercise all of their functions in matters of procurement, transportation, and supply under the direction of the commanding general, service of the rear, by whom these activities will be coordinated;

Proceedings 2:

3. That the headquarters of the following chiefs of services be moved to Headquarters S. O. R.:

Chief Quartermaster  
Chief Surgeon  
Chief Engineer Officer  
Chief Ordnance Officer  
Chief Signal Officer (for the present)  
Chief of Air Service (for the present)  
Chief of Gas Service (for the present)  
Director General of Transportation  
Provost Marshal General

4. That the headquarters of the following chiefs remain at General Headquarters,  
A. E. F.:

Adjutant General  
Inspector General

Judge Advocate  
Chief of Tank Corps (for the present)

5. That the greater portion of the statistical division of the Adjutant General's Office, together with all branch post offices, be transferred to the service of the rear, where they will, at some place, be in close proximity with each other, and with the War Insurance Bureau.

6. That the postal service of the A. E. F. be placed under military control.

Proceedings 3:

7. That there be a deputy chief of staff, whose duty is to assist the chief of staff and to act as such during his absence; that such officer be selected without regard to rank, and that the same principle of selection and understudy be applied to all staff services.

8. That the terms administrative, intelligence, operations, coordination, and training sections be eliminated, and these sections be known hereafter as follows:

1st Section, General Staff

2d Section, General Staff, etc.

respectively in order named; to be abbreviated G-1, G-2, G-3, etc.;

9. That the heads of these sections be hereafter known as assistant chiefs of staff, instead of chiefs of section as heretofore, and that their titles be as follows:

Assistant Chief of Staff, (A. C. of S., G-1)

Assistant Chief of Staff, (A. C. of S., G-2)

the numbers to indicate no relative rank, and the heads of sections to be selected and designated without regard to rank.

10. That the chief of each of the services be authorized to designate an officer of his service to represent him with each general staff section, as he may deem advisable.

11. That General Order No. 8 be amended as shown in the revision submitted herewith. [omitted]

12. That the Headquarters S. O. R. be at Tours; and that its organization, to meet the new conditions, be made the subject of a later report to be submitted after further investigation.

IV. In recommending that the chief of the air service should move his headquarters to that of the S. O. R., it is realized that, at some future time, it may be necessary for the chief of this service, or his representative, to be attached to General Headquarters, A. E. F., and occupy a position analogous to that of a chief of artillery.

Proceedings 4:

V. As to the general purchasing board, it seems clear that, as a matter of principle, its important functions of supply should be coordinated with all other supply services and through the same headquarters, otherwise there cannot be a complete coordination of supply. The board does not recommend that the headquarters of the purchasing board be removed from Paris.

VI. The board considered that the most important single question presented to it was the necessity for providing a single and direct line of responsibility for all matters of supply; and, at the same time, to utilize to the fullest possible extent the services of the experiences and able chiefs of the administrative and technical services who are now on the staff of the Commander-in-Chief.

VII. It was found that great diversity of opinion and practice existed among the different chiefs of services with respect to the degree of personal responsibility assumed and methods employed in the matter of supply. The chief quartermaster was of the opinion that responsibility for supply was, in a recent case, shown to be divided among seven different officials without the ability to place the entire responsibility upon any single individual, while, in another case, that of the medical department, the chief medical officer was of the opinion that practically the entire responsibility for supply had already been placed upon the L. of C. In another case, that of the engineers, it was found

that the chief of engineers was exercising control to the extent of passing upon requisitions submitted by the combat forces to the L. of C.

VIII. The board fully realizes that its recommendations involve the creation of an enormous business machine which will include within itself the entire service of the rear, in the organization and operation of which the highest form of specialized business methods, and the ablest and most experienced personnel will be essential for its successful operation. The board considers, however, that the necessity for so centralizing responsibility and control of the service of the rear, and removing it from general headquarters, has been amply demonstrated, and, therefore, so recommends.

Proceedings 5:

IX. It is believed that the physical removal of the headquarters of several services from Headquarters A. E. F. to Headquarters S. O. R., will not prevent the Commander-in-Chief from availing himself of the personal services of the chiefs of these services whenever needed; and that their advice and assistance will be more valuable to him by reason of their intimate association with and direct responsibility for all questions of supply in their respective departments.

X. If the above recommendations are approved, it will be necessary to transfer from General Headquarters to Headquarters S. O. R. a portion of the present personnel of the coordination and administrative sections, general staff, in order to maintain a continuity of policy.

JOHNSON HAGOOD,  
Colonel, General Staff.

AVERY D. ANDREWS,  
Colonel, R. T. C.

ROBERT C. DAVIS,  
Lt. Col., Adjutant General.

F. R. McCoy  
Lt., Col., General Staff.

SAM'L WETHERILL, Jr.,  
Major, Q. M. R. C.

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AG, GHQ, AEF: 341: Letter

### ***Study on Staff Reorganization***

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, February 14, 1918.*

From: The Chief of Staff, A. E. F.

To: Colonel Johnson Hagood, Chief of Staff, S. O. R.

1. The Commander-in-Chief has this date approved the proceedings [preceding document] of the board of which you were president. He directs that in accordance with the recommendation contained in Paragraph 12 of the report, you and the officers associated



with you in this study, proceed to the headquarters service of the rear; to the regulating station at Is-sur-Tille; to the ports of debarkation, and to such other points in the S. O. R. as you may deem advisable, for the purpose of further investigating the organization of the service of the rear.

2. He desires that you take up for consideration the matter of light railways; regulating stations; control of cables and of cable communication with the United States; construction at ports; relations between the quartermaster department and the transportation department, especially as to construction; and the relations between the general staff and the various staff and administrative services. Also the general question of policy.

3. The board should bear in mind that to obtain efficient and willing service on the part of the staff departments, care should be taken to leave them with as much initiative as possible and still insure coordination.

4. The essentials of the organization of the service of the rear are the prompt procurement and forwarding of necessary supplies for the troops at the front. The line of responsibility of staff departments should be as clearly defined as possible and the control by the general staff should be to the extent of insuring expedition and promptness in carrying out the purpose of this organization.

5. Your board need not, however, confine its recommendations to the subject matter specifically mentioned paragraph two above.

6. While the Commander-in-Chief desires that this study be very carefully made, it is desired that it have the exclusive command of your time until completed, and that it be expedited as much as possible.

J. G. HARBORD.

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SWC: 315-1: Cablegram

### ***Status of the Interallied General Reserve***

No. 30-S

AMERICAN SECTION, SUPREME WAR COUNCIL,  
*Versailles, February 17, 1918.*

AGWAR, WASHINGTON, D. C.

FOR ACTING CHIEF OF STAFF

The cause of the resignation of the British Chief of Staff, announced in the press this morning, is not well understood, but ostensibly is the following:

The Supreme War Council unanimously agreed, with concurrence of all military authorities including General Sir Douglas Haig and General Sir William Robertson, on the creation of an interallied general reserve. The American proposition to have one commander of the reserve was rejected by all military and political authorities of England, France, and Italy. By final unanimous agreement it was decided to place control of the interallied general reserve in the hands of a committee consisting of the British, Italian, and American representatives on the Supreme War Council with General Foch, French Chief of Staff, as head of committee. It was also decided that when the time should come for the reserve to be placed at the disposition of any particular Commander-in-Chief, the orders to each national contingent in the reserve to report to such

Commander-in-Chief should be given by the corresponding national representative on General Foch's committee. The British order in council dated January 27, 1916, makes the British Chief of Staff responsible for the issuance of all orders from his government relating to military operations. He apparently holds that orders to the British contingent in the interallied general reserve must be given by him, which would result in much loss of time since he cannot be present. It is possible that the difficulty would not have arisen had the French Chief of Staff not been made head of the committee controlling the reserve. The Prime Ministers agreed among themselves to give this position to General Foch and no objection was made by any British military official. Real facts will probably come out in announcement by Mr. Lloyd George in House of Commons early this week. Had the American suggestion been accepted of having the Commanders-in-Chief agree on one commander for the reserve, assisted by an interallied general staff, there would probably have been no trouble. Its acceptance was prevented by fear of the use which a single commander might make of the reserve.

BLISS.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 682: Memorandum

***Prospective Availability of Divisions and Other Troops***

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
Chaumont, Haute-Marne, February 17, 1918.

MEMORANDUM:

1. The availability of the 4 combat divisions (as divisions) now in France in indicated below:

DIVISION	COMPLETES TRAINING PERIOD IN TRENCHES ABOUT	AVAILABLE AS A DIVISION
1st	----	Now
26th	March 10	May 1
42d	March 20	May 15
2d	April 15	June 1

The corps artillery for the I Corps is now in France and provided it can be fully equipped should be ready for service prior to June 1. Certain corps troops have not yet arrived, but all troops for the I Corps should be ready for service by June 1.

2. According to cable 639 (received Jan. 14) the plan at home contemplates a shipping schedule amounting to two divisions per month and in addition the proper complement of corps, army, and service of the rear troops; this schedule to begin with March 1. The transportation and preliminary training; including tours by regiments at the front, may be considered as resulting in an interval of five months between the date on which the first elements of a division leaves the United States and the date when the division, as such, is prepared to enter the line. This delay of five months can hardly be reduced for any division leaving the United States prior to July 1, 1918; after that date the delay should be reduced.

Remembering that the 3d and 6th Divisions of each corps are replacement troops, the following shows the availability of combat divisions under the War Department shipping schedule:

MONTH	DIVISIONS TO SAIL	DATE AVAILABLE AS DIVISIONS
March	2	August
April	2 (1 replacement)	September
May	2 (1 base)	October
June	2	November
July	2	December

3. Some doubt has been expressed as to whether or not the War Department shipping schedule can be carried out. Very limited information is available here but certain facts may assist in checking the proposed program. Counting all corps and army troops it appears that each division transported to France involves the transportation of, in round numbers, 47,000 persons. The average monthly arrivals for December and January were, in round numbers, 51,000. Many of these individuals came by way of England and, although the arrangements for the transportation of certain divisions by the British is not supposed to interfere with further similar arrivals, it must be anticipated that there will be a falling off in the War Department schedule due to the recent agreement with the British.

This same agreement with the British, while ultimately resulting in a very considerable increase in combat divisions at the disposition of the Commander-in-Chief, will have as an immediate result the further falling off in the War Department schedule due to the necessity of displacing some combat divisions in our own shipping schedule in favor of the army and service of the rear troops which will ultimately be needed for the six divisions to be temporarily placed at the disposition of the British.

Again, the War Department program is not known to include replacements. Henceforth, this item will amount to several thousand soldiers per month and will constantly increase. Based on these considerations it is believed that the table given in the preceding paragraph should be revised to read:

MONTH	DIVISIONS TO SAIL	DATE AVAILABLE AS DIVISIONS
March	1	August
April	1	September
May	1 (replacement)	(Replacement)
June	2	November
July	2 (1 base)	December (1)

4. It is understood that the British expect to begin the transportation of the six divisions, temporarily placed at their disposal, without delay. The British plan contemplates, the arrival of as many as 40,000 men per month beginning with March. While this may be discounted, we should, allowing six months from departure from the United States to the time when these divisions are returned to us, receive two combat divisions from this source during the month of October and two during November.

5. Combining the foregoing it appears that we may conservatively count on having available for service as such, on the dates indicated, the number of combat divisions together with the proper proportion of corps and army troops shown below.

LAST DAY OF	NUMBER OF COMBAT DIVISIONS
April	1
May	3
June	4
July	4
August	5
September	6
October	8
November	12
December	13

After, and possibly during, December the number of divisions should increase very rapidly.

FOX CONNER,  
Colonel, General Staff,  
Asst. Chief of Staff, G-3.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 975: Memorandum

***Operations Views as to a Sector for the A. E. F.***

G-3

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, February 18, 1918.*

MEMORANDUM FOR:

1. All studies made by G-3 (operations) have pointed to the desirability of employing our forces in the sector Pont-a-Mousson---St-Mihiel during 1918. The same studies have also pointed to the region Luneville-Chateau Salins as the decisive region in which to utilize our forces when those forces have become sufficiently numerous to enable us to give such a balance of power in favor of the Allies as will warrant undertaking an extended offensive.

2. It is not believed that the fact that the initiative during the greater part of 1918 appears to have passed to the enemy necessitates any radical change in the former conclusions of this section; it does appear improbable, however, that an extended Allied offensive can be undertaken before the fall of 1919.

No probable changes in the front east of St-Mihiel result in a necessity for modifying our eventual plans. In fact such a modification would only be essential in the event of a French retreat to the south and west of the line St-Mihiel---Toul---Epinal; such a retreat is not probable.

When supply and other arrangements force us, as they do, to lay our plans far in the future, it is the most probable situation which we must consider and not the worst situation which may possibly result. General plans must not be based on a situation outlined by extreme pessimism, but the worst of the possible eventualities must be met by special plans. In our case the location of our lines of communication and service of the rear depots are in themselves a sufficient preparation for the eventuality of an extensive Allied defeat in 1918. Such are the general considerations which lead to the conclusion that no radical changes in the original plans of this section are necessary.

3. In order that we may prepare for 1919 we must put our divisions into an American sector so that we may become a homogeneous force. For reasons of morale, we must also plan to make at least a limited offensive during 1918. By a judicious choice of a sector, such a limited offensive should be possible, even though Germany should retain, for the front as a whole, the initiative throughout 1918.

Taking into account the small forces we shall have available, these special considerations lead, after a study of the entire front, again to the conclusion that Pont-a-Mousson---St-Mihiel is a suitable portion of the front in which to engage our forces during 1918.

4. The length of the front Pont-a-Mousson---St-Mihiel is in a straight line about 40 kilometers. This front has for a long time been held by only five German divisions in first line, but the two camps of Conflans and Mars-la-Tour furnish the enemy with readily available reserves. Consequently the Allied forces available for this front must be very considerably in excess of the number required to face the present enemy forces in line. In sum, a very much larger force than we can possibly have available in 1918 would be necessary for the occupation of the front Pont-a-Mousson---St-Mihiel if we are at the same time to carry out an offensive however limited.

It is therefore necessary to consider such parts of this front as may be suitable not only for engaging our forces but also for carrying out the limited offensive which we have every interest in attempting before the end of 1918.

5. For the purpose of a limited offensive three sectors of the front Pont-a-Mousson---St-Mihiel may be considered. The first of these extends from the Moselle to the vicinity of Remenauville, a front of about 8 kilometers. The second extends from the vicinity of Remenauville to a point northwest of Flirey; a front likewise of about 8 kilometers. The third sector would be limited to the heights of the Meuse, a front of about 5 kilometers, for the main effort, but would involve the forces in the flat country to the east as far as the eastern limit of the front now occupied by the 1st Division.

6. As between the first and second sectors there is very little choice insofar as the terrain, forces necessary, and ultimate results of success are concerned. The 1st Division, however, is now immediately west of the second sector considered and in fact a part of the present front of the 1st Division would be involved in any offensive launched from the second sector. This fact, the installations already made by the 1st Division, the comparative absence of complications in arranging to extend the existing front rather than to move to another part, all indicate that the second sector should be preferred to the first. The sector Moselle-Remenauville is therefore eliminated from further consideration.

7. A successful advance in the second sector (Remenauville---northwest of Flirey) would be more certain of far-reaching results than would an equal advance in the third sector (heights of the Meuse). On the other hand, the possibility of an advance in the second sector would require greater forces and would be more dependent upon the cooperation of the forces on either flank than would be the case in the third sector.

The third sector is more wooded than the second, a disadvantage from the standpoint of cooperation of artillery and infantry, but this difference in terrain is not sufficiently great to affect the choice.

Either the second or third sector may be occupied, as already noted, by extending the front now held by the 1st Division. By extending toward the east we would at once occupy terrain included in the second sector proper, while in extending toward the west it would be necessary to occupy a strip of low marshy ground (a front about appropriate to one regiment of infantry) before reaching the essential part of the third sector. On the other hand, forces on the present front of the 1st Division would be of more immediate assistance to an offensive in the third than in the second sector.

In favor of extending to the west is the tentative decision of the Commander-in-Chief to extend in that direction. This statement is made with full knowledge that the

statement of the Commander-in-Chief was in no way binding and that the decision was explicitly stated to be subject to study. Nevertheless, since consistency is of value to us in the present state of our relations with the French, there would be great advantage in confirming the tentative decision.

8. It is practically certain that during the months of June and July we shall have to put into the line three of the four combat divisions which we shall then have available. It must be assumed that the attitude of these three divisions can be defensive only. An extension of the present front of the 1st Division to a front appropriate to the three divisions in a purely defensive attitude would, whether the extension be to the east or west, overlap the sector strictly involved in the corresponding offensive. In the case of the second sector, no importance is to be attached to this, but in the case of an extension wholly to the west a front of three divisions would carry us to the west of the Meuse; the natural resting place of the left flank being, at the present junction of the French First and Second Armies, on the Meuse about 2 1/2 kilometers northwest of St-Mihiel. This passing to the left bank of the Meuse is objectionable in that more complications with the French would result through the fact that our troops on this bank might need to utilize facilities which might in part be also needed by troops belonging to the Verdun salient. In favor of passing to the left bank, some advantage in artillery preparation must be considered; due to the long ranges necessary, however, this advantage would not be very great.

In favor also of extending to the present junction of the French First and Second Armies we should consider the fact that we would probably have less friction in realizing complete independence for our forces.

9. It would of course be possible for us to place three divisions in the line by an extension in both directions. Our left would then naturally rest on the right bank of the Meuse and the disadvantage of crossing that stream would thus be avoided. However, the division put into line east of the present front of the 1st Division could have no immediate cooperation with troops in the third sector proper. If we extend west at all and put three divisions in defense in first line, the extension should all be to the west.

10. No extension north of the present point of junction of the French First and Second Armies should be considered. The line immediately north of that point is essentially a part of the Verdun salient and the division of that salient between independent commanders is impossible. Any troops which we might put north of the point in question would therefore necessarily be left under French command indefinitely.

11. While it is believed that an extensive German offensive early in 1918 on the front Pont-a-Mousson---St-Mihiel is improbable, such a contingency is possible and must be considered in deciding upon the extension of our front. It is evident that until our divisions have been habituated to the trenches and until we have ample reserves it must be desirable to select our front so as to avoid any decisive onslaught by the enemy. Should the enemy attack in Lorraine it seems probable that the sector immediately west of the Moselle would be involved sooner or later. It appears evident in fact that, in the front Pont-a-Mousson---St. Mihiel, the probability of a decisive German attack on the west third of the line is very much less than on the remaining two-thirds. From this standpoint we would be led, then, to favor a decision to extend toward the west.

12. Believing as it does that for reasons of morale, both in our forces and at home, some offensive during 1918 is essential, this section considers it necessary to make an estimate as to the forces required in carrying out a limited offensive in each of the two sectors considered and then to make an approximation as to the forces which we shall probably have available at different periods of the present year.

13. The essential front of an offensive in case we decide to extend to the east would be about 8 kilometers. To insure success the initial attack must dispose of 8 divisions. Moreover, due to the fact that an advance would form a salient, we should need additional troops to provide for lengthening our lines until such time as a sufficient advance brought about final success; the additional troops necessary may be estimated at 2 divisions. Counting the two divisions, which we would probably have been forced to put in

for defensive purposes, outside the sector of main attack we would require 12 divisions for the case of an extension to the east.

14. In the case of an extension to the west 4 divisions would be sufficient for the main offensive. Although an advance would not result in forming a salient, two additional divisions should be provided to cover contingencies and to take full advantage of success.

The above, together with the one division which we would probably have in line on either flank of the main attack, gives a total of 8 divisions required in the case of an extension to the west.

15. A separate study shows a conservative estimate of available divisions to be as indicated below:

<b>MONTH</b>	<b>NUMBER OF DIVISIONS (together with proper proportion of army corps and army troops) available as such on last day of corresponding month.</b>
April	1
May	3
June	4
July	4
August	5
September	6
October	8
November	12
December	13

After December the number of divisions available should increase very rapidly.

16. From the table in the preceding paragraph it appears that we cannot reasonably be certain of having the troops considered necessary for a limited offensive in case of an extension to the east prior to December 1. Weather conditions to be expected after that date are very unfavorable. In case of an extension to the west the full number of divisions considered necessary would be available after November and since in this case the estimate includes two divisions against contingencies, the offensive might be undertaken as early as October 15.

17. The foregoing study indicates the advisability of extending our front to the west as far as the present point of junction between the French First and Second Armies and that we should not extend north of that point. This extension should not be begun by an extension of front by the 1st Division.

18. Should it be definitely decided to extend our front as indicated in paragraph 16, our troops would hold the line from east of Seicheprey to north of St-Mihiel, a front of about 30 kilometers. For defensive purposes this front would normally be held by three divisions. Considering the location of the sector, two divisions should form all the reserves ever likely to be needed. This calls for a total of 5 divisions for the maximum defensive forces needed in the sector. Paragraph 14 indicates that on a conservative estimate we will have 5 divisions available by September 1. This section knows of no consideration which would permit leaving any troops in the front considered under French command after September 1.

From the standpoint of training it is highly desirable to establish a purely American sector under American control at the earliest practicable date. The separate study herewith indicates that, although, to be on the safe side, we have not counted 4 divisions until the end of June, we should actually have that number on June 1. On the same date we will have an additional division which will have been in France for two months and which we should be able to utilize as such. Still another division will have been in France for one month and ample replacements will be available. There is no apparent reason why we should not insist on fixing the date when we become a purely American force under American command alone as June 1, 1918.

19. Recent conversations between Major Clark and certain French officers, between the Chief of Staff and General Ragueneau and between Colonel W. D. Connor and General Ragueneau clearly indicate (at least in the mind of the undersigned) that the French Command has every intention of postponing to the latest possible date the establishment of a real homogeneous American army under the exclusive command of Americans. The sooner the French mind (including staff officers) is disabused of our submission to such an idea the better for all concerned.

20. This paper has not considered supply arrangements but assuming that necessary arrangements can be made without detriment to more far reaching plans it is recommended:

(a) That we decide to extend the present front of the 1st Division toward the west as far as the point marking the present junction between the French First and Second Armies, this extension not to be commenced by an extension of its present front by the 1st Division.

(b) That the French be informed of this decision and of the further decision that we desire that the sector in question become a purely American sector on June 1.

(c) That no supply installations for the front in question be undertaken until the French have formally assented to the decisions noted in (a) and (b) and that the French be so informed.

FOX CONNER,  
Colonel, General Staff,  
Asst. Chief of Staff (G-3).

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Supreme War Council: 117.2: Memorandum

### ***Training and Utilization of American Troops***

AMERICAN SECTION, SUPREME WAR COUNCIL,  
*Versailles, February 18, 1918.*

MEMORANDUM: For the Military Representatives

SUBJECT: Statement made by General Tasker H. Bliss before the Supreme War Council at its second meeting, third session, January 31, 1918, in regard to the training and utilization of American troops.

In regard to the question which had been twice asked by Baron Sonnino as to whether the American Government would allow the minor units of each division to be amalgamated with British and French divisions, in order that they could most effectively perform their part in the emergency which was assumed to be approaching within the next few months, General Bliss stated in substance as follows:

To ask the United States to formally declare now and in advance of the emergency that it will permit its units to be amalgamated with British and French divisions is to make unnecessarily difficult the solution of the problem which you are studying, i. e., the most effective utilization of American manpower under present conditions. Everything possible is now being done to prepare for this effective utilization of American manpower without the formal declaration by my government which Baron Sonnino appears to desire. Yesterday the British Government agreed to bring over six American divisions, with the understanding that they would train the infantry battalions of these divisions on the British front. If the German attack finds these battalions on the British front, they will fight to the extent of their capacity wherever the attack finds them. Also, General Pershing entered into an agreement with General Petain by which the organizations of his



divisions will receive their final training on the French line. It goes without saying, that neither our battalions on the British front, nor our other organizations on the French front can be withdrawn for the purpose of forming complete American divisions under their own officers while the German attack is being made or is being prepared. If the crisis should come, the American troops will undoubtedly be used in whatever way their services will be most effective, either in defense or offense, with the British and French troops with whom they are at that time serving. It is to be clearly understood, however, that this training of American units with British and French divisions, whether behind the lines or in actual combat on the line, is only a stepping stone in the training of the American forces and that whenever it is proper and practicable to do so, these units will be formed into American divisions under their own officers. Such a thing as permanent amalgamation of our units with British and French units would be intolerable to American sentiment.

TASKER H. BLISS,  
General, Chief of Staff, U. S. A.,  
American Military Representative.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 681-IV: Memorandum

***Decision as to American Sector***

Operations Section (G-3)

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, February 19, 1918.*

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief of Staff

1. From the memorandum (Feb. 7) of the chief of staff, it appears that on February 6 the Commander-in-Chief, at an interview with General Ragueneau, tentatively decided to adopt as an American sector the present front of the 1st Division, extending the lines to the left.

2. Although General Ragueneau suggested a combined study of this proposition, he informed Colonel W. D. Connor on February 15 that no discussion of anything other than the extension of the front of the 1st Division can now be considered. General Ragueneau further stated that a discussion to the latter end could be arranged with the French First Army. On February 17, General Ragueneau made a similar statement to the Chief of Staff and Colonel Eltinge. The extension of the front of the 1st Division has already been disposed of by the letter signed by the Commander-in-Chief on February 15 [14].

3. A study in connection with French officers is at present impracticable. Nevertheless, a decision is urgently needed with a view to the proper coordination of supply and other arrangements. As evidencing this we may cite the fact that the artillery alone of the 1st Division has already found it necessary to lay 315 kilometers of twin wire cable. The 1st Division is now under orders from the French to lay some 110 kilometers of 10 pair lead covered cable, buried two meters in the earth. This amount of cable represents some 200 tons of transport.

There is no question but that this work is necessary; neither is there any question as to the inadvisability of our undertaking such installations unless and until we decide to include the present front of the 1st Division in a distinct American sector.

Many other instances might be quoted, all tending to show the urgency of deciding upon an American sector and of reaching a formal agreement on such sector with the French.

4. G-3, after studying the question, has made the following recommendations:

This paper has not considered supply arrangements, but, assuming that necessary arrangements can be made without detriment to more far reaching plans, it is recommended:

(a) That we decide to extend the present front of the 1st Division toward the west as far as the point marking the present junction between the French First and Second Armies, this extension not to be commenced by an extension of its present front by the 1st Division.

(b) That the French be informed of this decision and of the further decision that we desire that the sector in question become a purely American sector on June 1.

(c) That no supply installations for the front in question be undertaken until the French has formally assented to the decisions noted in (a) and (b) and that the French be so informed.

5. Considering the recommendations of G-3, in which the undersigned concur, it is first necessary to take up the general problem of supply the 20 or more combat divisions which we shall eventually have to the east of St-Mihiel.

6. The present installations at Is-sur-Tille can be depended upon to supply 4 combat divisions on the front Pont-a-Mousson---St-Mihiel except in the case of intense activity in Lorraine. In the latter event the comparatively great distance of Is-sur-Tille from the front results in insufficient flexibility. The necessary flexibility would be obtained by reducing the distance from the front and installing a regulating station at Liffol-le-Grand.

7. A regulating station at Liffol-le-Grand is especially well located for supplying the front Chateau Salins---St-Mihiel. Liffol-le-Grand could also supply the front south-east of Chateau Salins as far as Blamont. A further extension of front to the southeast or very great forces in the region of Luneville would however tax Liffol-le-Grand, and an additional installation in the vicinity of Epinal would become necessary.

8. The construction work at Liffol-le-Grand is estimated to require five months to complete. If it be decided to utilize our forces in the sector Pont-a-Mousson---St-Mihiel during 1918, this construction should be undertaken without delay.

9. If it be decided to employ our forces approximately as outlined by G-3 during 1918 and 1919, Liffol-le-Grand will probably be the only regulating station needed until the latter half of the year 1919. No decision as to a regulating station in the vicinity of Epinal is therefore necessary until the early spring of 1919.

10. The congested conditions of Toul makes it necessary to establish a railhead of our own if we are to increase our forces in the sector Pont-a-Mousson---St-Mihiel.

If it be decided to extend from the present front of the 1st Division toward the west, the natural place for such a railhead is at Sorcy (southwest of Commercy).

11. Sorcy is centrally and suitably located and is the only railhead essential to the supply of as many as 3 or 4 divisions on the front Seicheprey-Meuse, south of St-Mihiel. Near Trondes a suitable additional railhead may readily be established for the supply of as many additional divisions as might be necessary for an offensive in the sector considered.

12. For the one division which it is contemplated that we might have west of the Meuse, Sorcy is not ideally situated. A division so located could, however, be supplied by us as follows:

(1) From Sorcy by motor truck (2 roads) to Gimécourt as a distributing point.

(2) By rail via Gondrecourt and Nancois to Loxeville (to be utilized as a minor railhead); thence by motor truck to Gimécourt as a distributing point.

(3) By rail via Gondrecourt to Bar-le-Duc and thence by motor truck to the vicinity of Gimécourt.

The particular method to be used cannot be definitely recommended in the absence of a reconnaissance, but there is no question as to the practicability of supply.

13. It is recommended:

(a) That we decide to extend the present front of the 1st Division toward the west as far as the point marking the present junction between the French First and Second Armies, this extension not to be commenced by an extension of its present front by the 1st Division.

(b) That the French be informed of this decision and of the further decision that we desire that the sector in question become a purely American sector on June 1.

(c) That no supply installations for the front in question be undertaken until the French have formally assented to the decisions noted in (a) and (b), and that the French be so informed.

(d) That immediately upon the formal acceptance of the French of an American sector as outlined in (a) and (b), we undertake the construction of a regulating station at Liffol-le-Grand and of a railhead at Sorcy.

(e) That in addition to the construction noted in (d), we undertake, after the assent of the French to our general plans, all installations necessary for the proper preparation and service of the American sector.

W. D. CONNOR,  
Colonel, General Staff,  
Asst. Chief of Staff, G-4

FOX CONNER,  
Colonel, General Staff,  
Asst. Chief of Staff, G-3

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SWC: 315-1: Cablegram

***Effect of Treaty of Peace between Germany and Bolshevik Government***

No. 33-S

AMERICAN SECTION, SUPREME WAR COUNCIL,  
*Versailles, February 20, 1918.*

AGWAR, WASHINGTON, D. C.

For the Secretary of State, Secretary of War, and Acting Chief of Staff

Reference my number thirty-two of February nineteen and press despatches this morning announcing Treaty of Peace between Bolshevik Government and Germany, if confirmed, will modify the views expressed in paragraph four of my number thirty-two insofar as they were based on the assumption of a state of war between Germany and the Bolshevik Government. My views expressed in paragraph five of my number thirty-two remain unchanged.

BLISS.

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**Franco-British Cooperation**

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff  
No. 22782

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,  
FRENCH ARMIES OF THE NORTH AND NORTHEAST,  
*February 20, 1918.*

To: General Foch

[Extract]

Memorandum summarizing the studies made and the measures taken for possible intervention of the French forces in the British zone.

\* \* \* \* \*

I. Studies: The necessity of preparing for French intervention in the British zone has been contemplated by the Commander-in-Chief from the time when the Russian defection seemed certain, that is to say from the end of November.

The studies made since that time have served as a basis for drawing up the program of studies sent for execution on January 21 to the general commanding the French Third Army. This program had in view the preparation of the intervention in the three following forms:

- a. Relief of the British Fifth Army by a French army made up of 8 infantry divisions, organized as 3 army corps.
- b. Direct participation in the battle of the British armies of a French army of a strength of 12 infantry divisions (4 army corps), with proportional amounts of heavy artillery and aviation.
- c. Counteroffensive by means of a mass of 20 infantry divisions (7 army corps) at the maximum, in case the British armies were unable to resist the enemy drive successfully.

A few days later, on January 25, representatives of the Group of Armies of the North, of the Third Army, of the French Mission of Montreuil, of the direction of the rear, of the military transportation services of the armies and of the bureau of motor transport service were assembled at French G. H. Q. to receive precise instructions on the method to follow in the execution of the studies and reconnaissances prescribed by the program of January 21. These instructions were confirmed by the issue of a memorandum (No. 1375/3 of January 25) [not selected], which determined the three main concentration zones of the French forces in rear of the British front and specified the different ways in which these zones were to be studied and reconnoitered.

This memorandum also determined precisely the transportation plans to be drawn up to assure a rapid and coordinated flow of means into the concentration zones.

It prescribed the study of the organization of supply and evacuation to complete the study of the concentration.

It made it incumbent on the Third Army to keep itself constantly informed of the disposition of the forces and of the progress being made on the defensive works in the British armies where its intervention was contemplated.

From February 1 the studies of the Third Army assume an essentially practical character, thanks to the close collaboration of that army with the Montreuil Mission and French G. H. Q.

The concentration zones are reconnoitered, the probable routes to be used for forwarding troops are determined; the mechanism of transportation and supply is specified. The Third Army, thanks to the facilities accorded by the British Headquarters, is methodically documented about the front and the rear areas of the British armies as far as the region of Arras.

The rules which will regulate the concentration of the French forces in the British zone can then be settled precisely. \* \* \*

But all this work is a staff job and moreover unilateral. An agreement is still to be reached with Marshal Sir Douglas Haig as to the nature of the support which the French armies will bring to the British armies if the need arises.

\* \* \* \* \*

II. Means of Execution: A certain number of measures have already been taken for the purpose of accelerating our intervention in British zone. They are:

a. Movement into position of a reserve army (French Third Army), composed of: \* \* \*

5 infantry divisions with a corps headquarters

1 cavalry corps \* \* \*

3 heavy artillery regiments \* \* \*

b. Maintenance in the British zone of the great artillery park, the engineer park, and of the chief service agencies of the Third Army.

c. Establishment, after reconnaissance of the terrain, of the plan for the organization of the offensive bridgehead of Peronne.

d. Assignment of Italian workers to the British Fifth Army for speeding up the organization of the Peronne bridgehead.

e. Putting to work of territorial elements charged with repair of the road net which would be used by our troops being transported to the region of Peronne and across the Somme upstream or downstream of this town.

III. Conclusions: From the preceding outline it follows that at this time the necessity for intervention in the British zone, be it either in the form of relief in the sector of the British Fifth Army, or in the form of support given to our Allies by occupying rearward delaying positions (plugging gaps in the line), or in the form of a counter-offensive, will surprise French G. H. Q. neither in thought nor in deed.

But it will find British G. H. Q. much less prepared. It must be added that British G. H. Q. is not yet convinced of the necessity of parrying a powerful German offensive by means of a counteroffensive.

The Commander-in-Chief, whose offensive plans (*ripostes*) were defined in Instructions No. 12754 [not selected] of February 11, 1918 (application of Directive No. 4 [not selected] with regard to the offensive) and since then have been known to British G. H. Q., is not informed of the projects of the same nature which may have been decided upon by Marshal Haig.

The situation may, it is true, have its explanation, on one hand, in the repeated absence of the Marshal and of the high officers of his staff, on the other hand, in the necessity under which the British Headquarters often finds itself to have in hand a French piece of work to extract from it a similar work which in a way duplicates it.

ANTHOINE,  
Chief of Staff.

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***Information Furnished French and British***

3d Section, G. S.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, February 20, 1918.*

MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF OF STAFF:

1. Reference to your memorandum of February 19 on this subject, no information is regularly furnished to either French or British Headquarters or their liaison officers by this section. When specific questions are asked by their liaison officers at these headquarters they are answered. In practice they very seldom ask any questions, usually appearing to have the information previously from other sources.

2. It is believed that it is desirable to regularly furnish our general staff representatives at French and British General Headquarters (Major Clark and Major Quekemeyer) with the tables furnished by the statistical department relative to the present condition of our forces in France, and that these officers at the same time be given general instructions as to the use to which they are to put this information. At the present time our liaison officers at Allied Headquarters, particularly French G. H. Q., find themselves in the embarrassing position of being given information about our own forces by the staff to which they are attached and being unable from information received from American sources to tell whether this information is correct or not.

LeROY ELTINGE,  
Colonel, General Staff,  
G-3.

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P Confidential Cables 501-1000

***Request Tonnage Movement Report***

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
Chaumont, Haute-Marne, February 21, 1918---4 a.m.

To: The Adjutant General, Washington

No. 628-S

For the Chief of Staff. With reference to paragraph 11C your Cablegram 755 shipments if they are made during the period indicated will make some strain at our ports and may cause some additional delay in turnaround of ships. However, ship all as it is needed. So far as forage concerned is our understanding correct that this tonnage is only for our own troops and that it is not confused with shipments for French and to be handled by French port facilities not now being used by our forces? In this connection again urgently recommended that the personnel to repair French rolling stock, called for Paragraph 1 BCDE my Cablegram 521 be expedited. Only by most strenuous action can we prevent congestion ports and delays in turnaround of ships. La PALLICE is only port to which cars could be shipped and St-NAZAIRE for locomotives.

A. Request that you cable fully prospects as to probable tonnage movements remainder this month and next month. Tonnage in this sense to be estimated as 40-foot space tons. Difficulties making this estimate thoroughly appreciated but rough forecast would aid materially our work here. Forecast should show approximate classifications by percentage of tonnage you contemplate shipping for each staff service, considering transportation departments and aviation separate from engineer and signal supply. Would like to know whether you are following any special priority scheme in forwarding of supplies. If so cable details. Request that you indicate aggregate space tonnage that will be available for one or two months in advance if possible as basis of recommendations for allotments to be made to each service as would best meet our requirements. At time of indicating these allotments please also indicate general description of supplies to be forwarded. We are now entirely in the dark as to tonnage possibilities.

B. Request by mail information, studies, or tabulations prepared in War Department or at United States ports, showing actual movements of supplies and troops in the past also prospective movements as indicated in preceding paragraph. This information extremely important and should be regularly furnished as available transportation increases.

C. Through French sources understand that in Congress, February 5, French port facilities were criticized even to suggestion that expedition cease until a certain port be placed under our exclusive control. In this connection the principal difficulties at ports may be again summarized: First, shortage of storage space in and near ports. Have repeatedly urged French that whole system of docks but more especially storehouses at St-NAZAIRE be turned over to us and that additional berths and storage facilities at BORDEAUX, La PALLACE and BREST be turned over to our control. Some concessions have been made but not sufficient for our immediate and prospective needs. Our own storage construction of new docks and storehouses being pushed as rapidly as possible but storage necessary for classification of supplies anyway, and especially on account of lack of railroad facilities to move freight promptly. Second, lack of berth space and insufficient mechanical freight handling facilities. We have 31 berths available today with prospective possible increase of 13, but depth of water at some berths do not balance with the requirements of the draft of such existing transports. This result in delays in the turnaround of our transports has materially reduced the tonnage discharge possibilities. The lack of freight tug facilities at all ports also restricts the discharge of our ships today to not over 400 tons per berth per day even when worked for 24 hours. Third, the shortage of railroad cars. Urgency of providing railroad cars already indicated in this cable makes imperative that repair personnel from United States be sent at once. Some 15,000 French cars now out of repair and which French claim they have not men to repair. If these cars can be put in serviceable condition promptly it will afford temporary relief to situation. We are now unloading approximately total 8,000 tons per day at all ports but due to shortage of railroad cars evacuating only about 3,000 tons. This will mean ultimate congestion as rate of discharge will increase while the car situation will remain the same until we can repair these French cars. This in turn makes additional storage facilities at ports very necessary. Fourth, shortage of ballast for returning vessels. This condition exists because in peacetime no necessity existed for providing ballast. Ballast as already reported will not be as important after April 1 as it is today because of more favorable weather. As already recommended this situation must be corrected preferably by installation of water ballast facilities before next fall. In the meantime as already recommended permanent ballasting of billets should be provided in those ships which have been seriously delayed in French ports on this account. French endeavoring to cooperative with in extending port facilities and in providing cars but bureaucracy system in vogue is most difficult obstacle to overcome. Shall continue to press for further freedom in handling our own business but French now claim they are giving us same freedom they give British at Le HAVRE and other

ports. If efforts now being made to clear situation do not succeed shall ask Secretary of War to make necessary representations to French Government.

PERSHING.

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Cable: P-640-S

***Utilization of Regular Officers Considered***

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, February 23, 1918.*

AGWAR, WASHINGTON

[Extract]

\* \* \* \* \*

2. In regard to matter contained in Paragraph 1 recommend earnest consideration be given earliest possible moment of entire question best utilization services of regular officers on active list. Consultation with visiting division commanders indicates that a number of regular officers of long experience with troops are now engaged on work of far less importance than duty in theatre of operations in France. For example remount duty, assistant to the adjutant of a division, detail in quartermaster corps, detail Philippine Scouts. It is understood French and British Governments have recently transferred large number of experienced officers from supply departments to combatant forces. It is believed that a considerable number of regular officers of experience now on duty with quartermaster and other supply departments could be replaced by reserve officers thus releasing the regular officers for other duty. Such officers are vitally needed here in France at present time to assist in training of troops and to assist in the training of young officers for staff work. It is believed that some officers now on duty with depot battalions of divisions might be spared. It is believed all intelligence officers of the general staff of divisions could receive better training in France under present conditions than in the United States and be better equipped to join their divisions when they arrive. It is thought possible some officers now in the Philippines or Hawaii could be spared in addition to those already taken from those places. It is not intended to make a special plea for services of these officers in France as against their service in the United States but the subject has been gone into thus in detail because of its vital importance to the success of entire military effort. Recommend board of officers be convened at once to include some of the generals who have recently returned from visits this theatre of operations to consider this matter from point of view of best interests of entire American military effort and to recommend immediate action.

PERSHING.

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Cable: P-659-S

***Effect of Press Reports Concerning American Pilots and Aeroplanes  
in France***

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, February 28, 1918.*

AGWAR, WASHINGTON

Newspaper clipping from United States received here to effect that United States has thousands of fliers in France and that thousands of American aeroplanes are flying above the American forces in Europe today. As a matter of fact there is not today a single American-made plane in Europe. In my opinion the result of such bombastic claims in the American press has had the effect of materially stiffening German production. Some sane statement might be given the press at home to counteract these exaggerations. These statements are grossly exaggerated and are extremely detrimental to the future efficiency and expectations of the Air Service, American Expeditionary Forces. Emphatically protest against newspaper publicity of this nature and urgently recommend drastic steps be taken to stop publication of such articles. One clipping in question is being returned by mail today. Suggest this matter be brought to the attention of Mr. Howard Coffin.

PERSHING.

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A Cables 851-900

***Separate National Organizations for Poles to be Drafted***

No. 856-R

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, WAR DEPARTMENT,  
*Washington, D. C., March 1, 1918.*

WASHINGTON

PERSHING AMEXFORCE G. H. Q.

[Extract]

\* \* \* \* \*

6. Mr. Paderewski informs me that the Poles to be drafted would much like to be made into separate divisions with Polish and American officers to be sent early abroad. He also states that this would give political encouragement to Poles in Europe. General policy, this office, has been against forming separate national organizations. Secretary of State says he believes that the political effect on Poles would be good. Recommendations requested. Biddle.

\* \* \* \* \*

McCAIN.

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***Part of Front on which American Troops will be Employed***

BRITISH MISSION IN PARIS,  
*March 1, 1918.*

From: British Mission, Paris

To: War Office

Dispatched 1:45 p. m. 3-1-18  
Received 3:30 p. m. 3-1-18

1795

Following for Colonel Fagalde  
For Director of Military Operations

On January 1, the French Prime Minister instructed French Commander-in-Chief to confer at French G. H. Q. with Pershing and Haig as to the part of the front on which American troops will be employed. He added that the question will be settled by Supreme War Council in case of disagreement. See my E. L. S. 1403 please.

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AG, GHQ, AEF: 341: Board Report

***Further Proceedings of Hagood Board***

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, March 1, 1918.*

PROCEEDINGS OF A BOARD OF OFFICERS CONVENED IN ACCORDANCE WITH  
INSTRUCTIONS OF THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF DATED FEBRUARY 14, 1918

1. The board visited Paris, Bordeaux, La Pallice, La Rochelle, St-Nazaire, Tours Gievres, Nevers, Is-sur-Tille, Langres, and Chaumont. It interviewed the Commanding General, S. O. R., the Director General of Transportation, the Director of Light Railways, the various section commanders, the engineer officers in charge of construction, quarter-masters, transportation officers, the regulating officer at Is-sur-Tille, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, G. H. Q., and a number of others. It also carefully considered a number of written memoranda and recommendations, including those on the matter of construction drawn up as a result of the recent conference between the C-in-C and officers representing the transportation and engineer departments.

2. The board found everywhere failure to develop full efficiency. Local authorities attributed this to lack of proper organization and misunderstanding as to the respective spheres of responsibility. It found that such results as had been accomplished were due to the determination of the personnel to get results in spite of the lack of definite system.

3. Conflicts have been found as to the interpretation and immediate effect of

General Order 31, G. H. Q., A. E. F., 1918, particularly as to the new status of the transportation department and the other technical services. This board was convened under its present instructions, for the purpose of recommending to the Commander-in-Chief the details of carrying into effect the general principles laid down in General Order 31. But without waiting for further instructions in the matter, there has been a disjointed effort on the part of the local authorities and others to make readjustments and consolidations, many of which have very greatly interfered with the efficient operation of the transportation department. These conflicts and unwarranted assumption of authority will continue until the new status is thoroughly established.

4. The board urgently recommends that the heads of all departments be directed to proceed at once to Tours, and that the Commanding General, S. O. R., be instructed to lay before the Commander-in-Chief, at the earliest practicable date, for his decision, any changes of policy or established practice as he may have in mind as necessary to put the new organization into effect.

5. It is of the opinion that further remedy lies in a simpler form of administration, a clearer definition of duties and a direct line of responsibility for results. This should be accomplished.

(a) By localizing purely local agencies and placing upon local authorities complete responsibility within their respective spheres, but reserving to central authority all matters of general policy and the control of general operations, particularly as to transportation.

(b) By having the D. G. T., under the direction of the C. G., S. O. R., retain control of the personnel of the T. D. and determine the locations and scope of their employment. Responsibility for the efficient operation of the T. D. should be placed directly upon the D. G. T., without the intervention of section commanders.

6. Taking up specifically the several propositions upon which the board was directed to report, the following is recommended:

7. Construction: It is believed, as a matter of principle, that the services of the army should be divided into three distinct functions, viz: Construction, transportation, and supply, and that in theory they should be entirely separate. It is considered inadvisable, however, to attempt at this time to establish an entirely new construction department. The evidence before the board was overwhelming in favor of all construction being done by a single department. As it is manifest that maintenance, renewals, and extensions incident to railroad operation cannot be done by the engineer department, and as it is also clear that the engineer department could not take over any extensive railway construction in case of an advance, the board was forced to the conclusion that all construction work in the service of the rear should be performed by the transportation department, and so recommends.

8. Motor Transport Service: It is recommended that the motor transport service be transferred to the transportation department. This should include all motor transportation, except special equipment to be subsequently indicated by proper authority.

9. Light Railways: The board recommends that no change be made in the present status.

10. Coordination of labor, materiel, and transportation: It is recommended that in each section there shall be, on the staff of the commanding officer, a general staff officer, to be known as G-4, whose duty it will be to keep in touch with G-4, S. O. R., to assist in regulating shipments and deciding questions of priority. In case of conflict between different sections, coordination will be made through G-4, S. O. R. In case of conflict within sections, coordination will be made through the local G-4.

11. Regulating officer: Since the Commanding General, Service of the Rear, is now responsible for procurement, transportation, and supply from the ports up to and including the railheads, it follows that the regulating officer at Is-sur-Tille should not be a member of the General Staff, G. H. Q. Such a status leads the regulating officer to issue orders in the name of the C-in-C, affecting the control of matters specifically delegated

to the Commanding General, S. O. R., thus breaking the continuity of the latter's responsibility. The board feels that this regulating officer should either be a member of the corps, army, or group or armies being served, as is prescribed in the original copy of General Orders No. 73, H. A. E. F., 1917, or should be a member of G-4, S. O. R. The board recommends the former, and further that the relation of the regulating officer to the transportation department be strictly those defined in paragraph 6 of General Order No. 73 which has not been adhered to in practice.

12. Policy: Plans and policies affecting military strategy and international relations should be initiated at G. H. Q., and all matters of broad policy or changes in adopted policy should be referred to G. H. Q. for final decision. Plans and policies affecting procurement, supply, and transportation should be initiated in the S. O. R. The chiefs of the technical services should be especially charged with the initiation of plans and policies which they deem necessary for their departments. Initiative should in like manner be encouraged in all subordinates.

13. Cables: For the present, War Department should continue to be handled as heretofore at G. H. Q. The C. G., S. O. R., should be charged with preparation and coordination of all cables relating to supply and transportation, forwarding them to G. H. Q. for vise and coding. Later and as soon as practicable such cables should be handled direct by the C. G., S. O. R.

14. Telephones and Telegraphs: It is recommended that effort be made to expedite telephone and telegraph construction to the maximum extent possible. The successful operation of the service of the rear will depend, in the last analysis, upon ample and direct means of communication between important centers. This necessitates private trunk lines between Tours, the ports, G. H. Q., and other essential points.

15. Name, Service of the Rear: During the visits of the board it was developed that there was a very decided feeling among officers that the substitution of the term Service of the Rear for the term Line of Communications had carried with it certain opprobrium which had been overlooked by the board when it recommended the change. There is a very general feeling that the term Service of the Rear implies a character of service which tends to lower those in that service in the estimation of those at home. The board, therefore, recommends that we return to the term Line of Communications which, while perhaps not so well describing the service, at the same time is free from the objections just mentioned, and, on the whole, suits the new conditions quite well enough.

JOHNSON HAGOOD,  
Colonel, General Staff.

AVERY D. ANDREWS,  
Colonel, R. T. C.

ROBERT C. DAVIS,  
Lt. Colonel, Adjutant General.

F. R. McCOY,  
Lt. Colonel, General Staff.

SAMUEL P. WETHERILL, Jr.,  
Major, Q. M. R. C.

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***Enemy Military Situation***

No. 40-S

AMERICAN SECTION, SUPREME WAR COUNCIL,  
*Versailles, Seine-et-Oise, March 1, 1918.*

THE ADJUTANT GENERAL, WASHINGTON

FOR ACTING CHIEF OF STAFF

Enemy force western front has reached one hundred eighty-two and one-half plus two cavalry divisions. The placing on the western front of divisions transferred from other fronts and the rearrangement of divisions due to transfer of divisions from one part of the line to another indicate a massing of troops in the sectors of the enemy line commanded by the Crown Prince of Bavaria and the Imperial Crown Prince, with increases particularly in the Fourth, Second, First, Third, and Fifth Armies. There has been no increase in the army commanded by Duke Albrecht, Wurtemberg; on the contrary there has been a decrease of two divisions since February 1, 1918. Italians believe there has been increase from forty-six to fifty-two enemy divisions Italian front. Definite confirmation lacking. There still appears to be only forty-six divisions there but west sector this front has been strengthened by enemy at expense of east sector. Nothing new other fronts.

BLISS.

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Les Armees Francaises, Tome VI, Vol. 1, Annexes Vol. 1: Letter

***General Interallied Reserve***

[Editorial Translation]

HEADQUARTERS OF THE BRITISH ARMIES IN THE FIELD,  
*March 2, 1918.*

O. A. D. 770/1

The Commander-in-Chief of the British Armies in France

To The Commander-in-Chief of the French Group of Armies of the North and Northeast

My dear General:

So as to keep you informed of my position with regard to the formation of an inter-allied general reserve, I am sending you herewith a copy of the letter which I forwarded this day to the British military representative at the Supreme War Council.

Very cordially yours

D. HAIG.

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To the British Military Representative, Supreme War Council, Versailles

[Extract]

In answer to your letter of February 27, 1918, to which was attached a memorandum from the executive war committee concerning the creation of an interallied general reserve, I have the following remarks to make:

An enemy offensive seems imminent on both the French and British fronts. I have already made an estimate of all the troops now under me to meet this attack. It would therefore be necessary for me to alter my plans and dispositions if I had to earmark 6 or 7 divisions among these troops. It is evident that this is impossible and consequently I regret being unable to acquiesce in the propositions which form the subject of the memorandum.

I would like also to advise you that I anticipate a more extensive use of Allied reserves than is indicated in the memorandum.

In case the enemy were to execute a prolonged attack with large forces against one of the Allied armies of the western front, it might be necessary to send considerable numbers of troops to the support of the attacked army and to maintain these forces by a rotation of divisions. But these forces can be neither earmarked nor stationed in definite zones before the enemy has attacked or disclosed his intentions; the situation may indeed require, in the last analysis, the use of all the resources of each army.

It is with this in view and to meet any eventuality that, as a preliminary measure, I have taken up, along with the Commander-in-Chief of the French armies, suitable dispositions for the rapid dispatch of a force intended to support him, a force consisting of 6 to 8 British divisions with the corresponding artillery and services.

General Petain has taken similar dispositions to execute a relief or intervene on the British front with French troops. These projects, be they French or British, are now decided upon, and organization has begun on the zones of concentration located in rear of the most vulnerable fronts, against which enemy attacks are most likely to be directed.

\* \* \* \* \*

D. HAIG,  
Field Marshal,  
Commander-in-Chief of the British  
Armies in France.

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***Railway Personnel Required***

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, March 3, 1918.*

AGWAR, WASHINGTON

FOR CHIEF OF STAFF

[Extract]

\* \* \* \* \*

E. With reference to your eight hundred two and further reference subjects included in our six twenty-eight\*, am sending you by General Bell important report on tonnage situation. Supply of our troops already here and due to arrive up to August 31 means great increase in tonnage receipts at base ports. We are having difficulty in obtaining sufficient supply of cars to move our freight. With receipt of additional tonnage the situation must be met as follows: First, increase storage facilities at base ports pending arrival of additional freight cars and locomotives. This has been ordered but storage system will require one hundred twenty-five miles of track per month with eight switches and frogs per mile for at least three months. Second, repair of French cars. This makes it mandatory that you send during month of March if possible all car and locomotive repair troops available up to forty-eight hundred called for in paragraph one B to E our cablegram five twenty-one. Send with them necessary tools and equipment. Third, shipment of American freight cars at rate of fifteen hundred per month and locomotives at rate of seventy-five per month for the next three months and probably two months thereafter. Erecting machinery and equipment for 35th Engineers for car erection should accompany first shipment. After repeated recommendations as to necessity of tools and equipment accompanying technical troops cannot understand why such troops are sent without same. These shipments of freight cars, locomotives, and track should be given priority over everything except subsistence, clothing, and forage. Attention invited to paragraph one B to G inclusive our cablegram five twenty-one. French cars in bad order have increased to nearly thirty thousand and bad order locomotives to over two thousand. These can only be put in repair by our labor. Railroad situation is serious and we must have engines, cars, and car-repairers. Docks have never been in as good condition but number ships have arrived within last day or so and we have reports of many more coming into various ports, all of which makes above demands for railroad repair personnel, rolling stock and track imperative for clearing our ports. When can we expect arrivals of the personnel and material mentioned?

\* \* \* \* \*

PERSHING.

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\* Printed in this volume under date, Feb. 21, 1918.

***Rate of Transporting Divisions to France***

No. 42-S

AMERICAN SECTION, SUPREME WAR COUNCIL,  
*Versailles, Seine-et-Oise, March 4, 1918.*

AGWAR, WASHINGTON, D. C.

FOR SECRETARY OF WAR AND CHIEF OF STAFF

Your number twenty-two stated that the American Government will cooperate in carrying out, as far as possible, general program outlined in resolutions of the Supreme War Council. Among the documents from the Supreme War Council carried home by General March will be found Joint Note Number twelve of the military representatives which was approved among the resolutions of the Supreme War Council. This joint note lays down as an essential condition for the safety of the Franco-British front that American divisions should arrive in France at the minimum rate of two per month. I believe that we are now bringing troops to France at the rate of one and one-third divisions per month. If we cannot at once increase this rate to two divisions per month we should accordingly notify the French and British Governments in order that they may not rely for the security of those fronts on a rate of arrival of our troops which we may not realize. Had a long conference with Mr. Raymond Stevens this morning. His committee is tabulating demands of Allies for tonnage for all purposes. He should receive at once information called for in his cablegram to the President today asking for minimum demand of War Department for tonnage to bring a minimum of two divisions per month France. All these demands will probably have to be submitted to Supreme War Council to determine priority. I have urged Mr. Stevens that this must be done without an instant of unnecessary delay.

BLISS.

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Cable: P-681-S

***Separate National Organizations not Recommended***

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, March 5, 1918.*

ADJUTANT GENERAL OF THE ARMY, WASHINGTON

[Extract]

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1B. Replying to paragraph 6 your Cablegram 856 strongly recommend continuation present policy against forming separate national organizations. All should be American. Believe this a most important principle that should never be departed from under any circumstances.

\* \* \* \* \*

PERSHING.

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Cable: P-687-S

***Recommendations Regarding Publication of Casualty Lists***

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, March 5, 1918.*

AGWAR, WASHINGTON

1. For Chief of Staff. The recent gas attack on our 1st Division and the more recent trench raids against our 1st and 26th Divisions bring up for consideration the question of publishing the casualties resulting from such operations in the public press in such a way as to connect the published casualties with the operation which caused them, thus giving the enemy complete information as to what was accomplished in regard to killed and wounded by the operations. The French published no casualty lists. The British publish casualty lists but in such a way as to prevent absolutely the published lists being connected with any particular operation. The Germans no longer publish correct statements of their casualties.

A. The whole matter is emphasized at this time by the French military authorities formally calling attention to the danger involved in the publication of such casualty lists with special reference to the publication in the press here of a cablegram from America giving the casualties due to the recent gas attack on our 1st Division. They point out that the publication of this news is of such a nature as to harm seriously not only the American troops in the sector but also all the troops at the front by revealing to the Germans the result of their gas attacks.

B. Instead of publishing casualty lists the French practice is to notify the mayor of the town from which the soldier comes and he in turn notifies the family. This is the only method of publication of casualties the French have used during the war.

C. It is realized that the question of policy involved in publishing casualty lists in the United States is one presenting many difficulties, but in view of the great disadvantage to our operations and the great advantage accruing to the operations of the enemy through being able to learn from such published lists the actual losses inflicted on our troops by any particular operations, I recommend that the press in the United States be not given the casualty lists as officially cabled from here as at present, but that the lists be published in such a way as to not directly connect the casualties published with the operation which caused them. In order to assure this I will, therefore, unless the department otherwise directs, cable the casualties due to particular operations, as distinguished from the ordinary daily losses, in groups to the War Department from time to time instead of giving the numbers and names at the time of or immediately after an operation. I further recommend that the giving of these lists to the press at home and the handling of the whole subject of publicity regarding our losses be placed in the hands of a specially selected regular officer in the War Department of experience and proven good judgment.

D. In the future, for the reasons given above and for the additional reason that very frequently names of killed and wounded cabled by the correspondents here, through held 24 hours after the official cable, reach families through the press before the War Department has had sufficient time to send notification, no casualty lists will be given to the press here.

PERSHING.

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SWC: 315-1: Cablegram

***Recommended Increase in Rate of Transporting Divisions***

No. 43-S

AMERICAN SECTION, SUPREME WAR COUNCIL,  
*Versailles, Seine-et-Oise, March 5, 1918--6:20 p. m.*

AGWAR, WASHINGTON, D. C.

For the Chief of Staff

1. Further reference my number forty-two, Joint Note Number twelve, which was approved by Supreme War Council, February 1, carried in it the declaration that the safety of the Franco-British front could be guaranteed only on the condition that from that date American combatant divisions should arrive in France at the rate of not less than two per month. At that time there were five organized American divisions in France. Therefore, in opinion of Supreme War Council, safety of Franco-British lines can be maintained during coming summer only provided two American divisions per month arrive continuously beginning with February 1. This means that by July one there must be fifteen organized divisions here in addition to the six which the British propose to bring over and which will be disorganized by using the infantry on the British front. I cannot convey too strongly the seriousness of the situation from the point of view of our Allies. To carry out this program every ounce of unnecessary material, every unnecessary horse and unnecessary non-combatant man must be cut out. My colleagues are waiting for me to assure them whether the

United States can meet the condition imposed. French Minister of War, M. Clemenceau has asked for an interview with me on this subject at three o'clock tomorrow afternoon. Can you rush me a reply giving me any assurance to communicate to him? Can you assure me whether beginning with the month of March there will be a material increase in the rate of despatch of our troops and whether the increase in rate will give us fifteen combatant divisions by July 1?

BLISS.

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SWC: 315-1: Cablegram

***Status of the Interallied General Reserve***

AMERICAN SECTION, SUPREME WAR COUNCIL,  
Versailles, Seine-et-Oise, March 5, 1918.

No. 44-S

AGWAR [WASHINGTON, D. C.]

FOR CHIEF OF STAFF AND SECRETARY OF WAR

1. Connect the following with paragraph five of my number twenty-one dated February 3 on subject of interallied general reserve.

2. The special executive committee mentioned in paragraph five of my number twenty-one was charged with the duty of determining the composition and strength of the general reserve and the contribution of each nation thereto and so forth. The committee began its work immediately and unanimously agreed upon the number of British, French, and Italian divisions that should form the reserve. After conference with each of them the French and Italian Commanders-in-Chief concurred after certain minor modifications to which the committee agreed. Yesterday the British Commander, Field Marshal Haig, submitted a letter in which for reasons given he declined to take part in the formation of the interallied general reserve. After very careful consideration the committee adopted the resolution which is quoted in following paragraph number three. Before communicating it to the respective governments the committee decided to wait twenty-four hours in order to enable General Rawlinson, the British Military Representative, to visit General Haig's headquarters and discuss the matter with him. He has done so and has informed us that General Haig declines to change the view taken in his letter. Our resolution follows:

3. The Supreme War Council, at its session of February 2, in the presence of the Commander-in-Chief of the French and British armies and of the Italian Minister of War, decided upon the creation of an interallied general reserve and delegated to an executive war board its powers in all that concerns the constitution, positions and use of this reserve. The executive war board, at its sitting of February 6, drew up a joint letter to the Commander-in-Chief, making proposals in regard to the constitution and positions of the general reserve. By written and verbal communications with General Foch and General Petain, an agreement with the French Commander-in-Chief was reached on February 19. By written communications between General Giardino and General Diaz, the agreement with the Italian Commander-in-Chief was reached March 1, as is shown by the minutes of the meeting of March 2. In his letter of March 2, the Field Marshal, Commander-in-Chief of the British armies, states that he is unable to comply with the request contained in the first letter of the executive war board. Under these circumstances, the executive war board

finds itself unable to continue its work and therefore unable to organize the interallied general reserve, as the Supreme War Council at its sitting of February 2 had instructed it to do; and the executive war board decides that each military representative shall so inform his own government and ask for instructions.

4. Field Marshal Haig and all military men present at the recent third session of the Supreme War Council, end of January and beginning of February, were unanimous in belief that success of the Allied cause in approaching campaign required the creation of an interallied general reserve, I suggest that this matter be taken up with the President at once and that with his approval, acknowledgment of receipt by our government of the resolution quoted in paragraph three above be cabled to the British Government. I further suggest that the American Government in its message to London, while admitting the possibility that the military situation on the British front may make it impracticable to assign British divisions to the interallied general reserve, nevertheless the principle of such a general reserve should not be abandoned and the other Allies who are able to contribute to it should promptly do so. My personal opinion is that there is danger that the Italian and French commanders may hold aloof when they learn the attitude of the British commander although they may not have the same reason for doing so. If the entire line from the North Sea to the Adriatic were held by one homogeneous army, its Commander-in-Chief would not hesitate to form his general reserve from his right and center even although he could not use any troops on his left for that general reserve. That should be the view taken in this case. Wire me action taken.

BLISS.

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SWC: 316: Cablegram

### ***Two Divisions to be Despatched Each Month***

No. 32-R

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, WAR DEPARTMENT.  
*Washington, D. C., March 6, 1918.*

AMERICAN SECTION, SUPREME WAR COUNCIL, VERSAILLES

With reference to paragraph 1 your 43, two divisions per month will be despatched commencing April 1; shipments for March will be materially increased but due to withdrawal of certain vessels originally contemplated as troop transports for transportation of cargoes, full 2 divisions cannot be met although material increase over February will be made. The despatch of 2 divisions per month is dependent upon full utilization of all commercial space used heretofore, also use of the *Aquitania* and *Mauretania*, commencing early in April. All American cargo tonnage will have to be withdrawn for use in maintaining this increased force. It is still important that English and French understand that for America to furnish 2 combatant divisions per month will require an increased number of troops to be despatched through England, also handling of troops and cargoes promptly in ports of debarkation. In accordance with the foregoing, you are authorized to assure your colleagues that beginning with the month of March there will be a material increase in rate of despatch of our troops; from April 1 a minimum of two divisions a month, and that very endeavor will be made to place in France by July 1 fifteen combatant divisions. March.

McCAIN.

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***Liaison between the French and American Air Services***

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, March 6, 1918.*

From: The Commander-in-Chief, A. E. F.

To: The Chief of the French Mission

1. In taking up with General Foulois, Chief of Air Service, the subject of liaison between the French and American Air Services, I find that such American Air Service personnel as now remains in Paris is limited in its functions to the procurement of supplies through the office of the *Sous-Secrétaire d'Etat*. The chief of air service has arranged with the *Sous-Secrétaire d'Etat* to handle this subject of supply through one of his assistants directly with an officer to be designated by the *Sous-Secrétaire d'Etat*, which will result in the release of all French Air Service officers now on duty with the American Air Service in Paris, who are subject to the orders of the *Sous-Secrétaire d'Etat*.

2. It is the understanding of the chief of air service that Commandant Armengaud has plans to establish an office in Paris to keep in touch with the American Air Service work. In view of the arrangement above referred to, this appears to be no longer necessary. If you agree with me in this view, will you kindly inform Commandant Armengaud?

3. With reference to all other French Air Service officers on duty with the American Air Service, including those accredited to the zone of the advance, to Tours, to Issoudun, and other American aviation centers, General Foulois will shortly submit to you a recommendation with a view to effecting on our part the efficient cooperation between the French and American Air Services which we all desire to see.

PERSHING  
by  
J. G. HARBORD,  
Chief of Staff.

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***Tonnage and Flow of Troops Through England***

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, WAR DEPARTMENT,  
*Washington, D. C. March 6, 1918.*

PERSHING, AMEXFORCE, G. H. Q., A. E. F.

[Extract]

1. Confer with General Bliss regarding his cablegram number 42\* and 43\*\* and our reply number 32 dated March 6. Very important.

A. The United States is committed to increase cooperation as indicated in cablegram referred to. To do this it will require greatest cooperation both at home and abroad. Can you suggest any new means or methods that, in your opinion, would result in more expeditiously carrying into effect this program? With our limited tonnage it will be necessary to operate at maximum efficiency. Use of the *Aquitania* and *Mauretania* necessarily increases number of troops to be transported across channel, unless these vessels are sent direct to French ports. Landing of troops at Liverpool and Southampton materially shortens turnaround and more extensive use of these ports offers quickest means of increasing flow of troops. With cooperation of Admiral Sims, British, and French authorities, can you arrange to materially increase flow of troops through England and transfer of troops across channel to some French channel port?

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McCAIN.

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GHQ, AEF: War Diary: Item 272-i-t

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*March 8, 1918.*

6-856-R. Mr. Paderewski informs me that the Poles to be drafted would much like to be made into separate divisions with Polish and American officers to be sent early abroad. He also states that this policy would give political encouragement to Poles in Europe. General policy, this office, has been against forming separate national organizations. Secretary of State says he believes that the political effect on Poles would be good. Recommendations requested.

BIDDLE.

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\* Printed in this volume under date, March 4, 1918.

\*\* Printed in this volume date, March 5, 1918.

***Transportation of Troops to France***

HEADQUARTERS U. S. NAVAL FORCES IN EUROPEAN WATERS,  
*London, March 11, 1918.*

TO OPERATIONS, NAVY, WASHINGTON

Your 3615. At joint conference March 11 with Ministry of Shipping and Admiralty, following facts were brought out:

(a) Ministry of Shipping and Admiralty are now placing British shipping in hand to transport troops from U. S. at the rate of 60,000 a month. This shipping includes *Olympic*, *Mauretania*, *Aquitania*, and *Leviathan* and 40 additional British liners. The 60,000 troops mentioned are in addition to any that may be carried in American ships or French ships and in addition to the troops now being carried by U. S. transports direct to France.

(b) The conference was of the opinion that there is no difficulty to be anticipated in transporting two divisions of troops per month and that necessary facilities would be afforded in English ports for handling the additional troops.

(c) It was the sense of the conference that the only difficulty that may arise is that of providing adequate tonnage to transport supplies. The Allied Maritime Transport Council is holding its first meeting in London, March 11, 1918, and proposes to deal fully with the whole question of Allied tonnage. I have delegated two officers to attend this council and its conclusions will be forwarded promptly to the department.

(d) The conclusions reached by the department at the conference of March 7 for expediting the flow of troops are concurred in, subject to modifications necessitated by enemy activities, especially mining.

Southampton is congested by cross-channel service to France. Ministry of Shipping therefore recommends use of Liverpool for large ships.

General Bliss and General Pershing have been furnished copies of this cable, together with copies of your 3615.

SIMS.

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***Executive War Board Reported Unable to Function***

*VERSAILLES SEINE-et-OISE, March 11, 1918.*

To: The Acting Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, Washington, D. C.  
From: The American Military Representative, Supreme War Council  
Subject: Interallied General Reserve

1. I forward here official copy, signed by four members of the Executive War Board, of the joint letter notifying their governments of their resolution of March 4, which was the subject of my cablegram No. 44.

TASKER H. BLISS,  
General, Chief of Staff, U. S. Army,  
Permanent Military Representative.

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*VERSAILLES SEINE-et-OISE, March 7, 1918.*

JOINT LETTER

From: The Executive War Board  
To: The Acting Chief of Staff, Washington, D. C.  
Subject: Interallied General Reserve

The Supreme War Council, at its session of February 2, in the presence of the Commanders-in-Chief of the French and British armies and of the Italian Minister of War, decided upon the creation of an interallied general reserve and delegated to an Executive War Board its powers in all that concerns the constitution, positions, and use of this reserve.

The Executive War Board, at its sitting of February 6, drew up a joint letter to the Commanders-in-Chief, making certain proposals in regard to the constitution and positions of the general reserve.

By written and verbal communications between General Foch and General Petain, an agreement with the French Commander-in-Chief was reached on February 19.

By written communications between General Giardino and General Diaz the agreement with the Italian Commander-in-Chief was reached March 1, as is shown by the minutes of the meeting of March 2.

In his letter of March 2, the Field Marshal, Commander-in-Chief of the British armies, states that he is unable to comply with the request contained in the first letter of the Executive War Board.

Under these circumstances, the Executive War Board finds itself unable to continue its work and therefore unable to organize the interallied general reserve, as the Supreme War Council at its sitting of February 2 had instructed it to do; and the Executive War Board decides that each military representative shall so inform his own government and ask for instructions.



FOCH,  
General,  
Representing  
France  
Chairman of  
the Executive  
War Board.

H. RAWLINSON,  
General,  
Military  
Representative,  
British Section,  
Supreme War  
Council.

GIARDINO,  
General,  
Military  
Representative,  
Italian Section,  
Supreme War  
Council.

TASKER H. BLISS,  
General,  
Military  
Representative,  
American Section,  
Supreme War  
Council.

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Cable: A-915-R

***Policy of Rotation of General Staff Officers***

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, WAR DEPARTMENT,  
*Washington, D. C., March 14, 1918.*

PERSHING, AMEXFORCE, FRANCE

[Extract]

1. In order to put the work of General Staff in Washington more closely in touch with that of the General Staff of the American Expeditionary Force, the Acting Secretary of War has approved a policy by which there will be a rotation of general staff officers between the War Department and the American Expeditionary Force. This policy will not only serve to keep the general staff here in intimate touch with what is being done and what is proposed to be done in France, but it will also give officers who are doing excellent work in Washington an opportunity for having field service instead of being punished for good work by being kept in Washington for the period of the war.

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McCAIN.

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***Monthly Troop Capacity not Sufficient***

No. 918-R

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, WAR DEPARTMENT,  
*Washington, D. C., March 14, 1918.*

PERSHING, AMEXFORCE

G. H. Q., A. E. F.

Our maximum monthly troop capacity will be 92,000 men. Under approved plan of sending two divisions monthly this capacity will barely transport two divisions plus proper proportion of corps, army, and service of rear troops. Your recommendations desired regarding reduction of aviation program or temporary omission of least essential service of the rear troops.

McCAIN.  
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SWC: 315-1: Cablegram

***Composition of the Interallied General Reserve***

No. 49-S

AMERICAN SECTION, SUPREME WAR COUNCIL,  
*London, March 14, 1918.*

AGWAR, Washington, D. C.

For Secretary of State and Secretary of War

1. The Supreme War Council met in its fourth session at 11:30 this morning in the British Cabinet Room at Number 10 Downing Street. Before the meeting I was officially informed that only the following would attend as representing each of the four Allied nations, namely two ministers, the permanent military representative, the chief of staff, and the secretary of each military section at Versailles. The first question considered was the interallied general reserve. Mr. Lloyd George stated that the prime ministers had before them the note addressed to the British Government by the American Ambassador in London, dated March 12, conveying the views of the American Government to the effect that there should be no abandonment of the principle underlying the establishment of such a general reserve. Mr. Lloyd George said that he regarded this as a very important state paper. After full consideration, the Supreme War Council formally adopted the following resolution: "The Supreme War Council agree on the following resolutions:

One: The creation of a general reserve for the whole of the armies on the western, Italian, and Balkan fronts, as decided at Versailles on February 2, 1918, is maintained in principle.

Two: In view of the great enemy concentration on the western front, and the likelihood of an early attack on the British section of the line, the proposals of the Executive War Board for the composition of the general reserve require modification.

Three: The British and French divisions now on the Italian front, together with the British division which has just left that front, and a quota of Italian divisions, to be determined by the Executive War Board, shall form the nucleus of the general reserve.

Four: The Executive War Board are at once to decide the following questions:

- a. The number of divisions to be allotted as the Italian quota of the general reserve.
- b. The desirability of an immediate transfer to the western front of some of the British, French, and Italian divisions now on the Italian front.

Five: To assist them in carrying out resolution 4 the Executive War Board, or a committee of general officers nominated by them with the approval of their governments, are at once to confer with the Commander-in-Chief of the Italian army.

Six: The decision of the Executive War Board on the above points will immediately be notified to the four governments so that if political considerations are involved the governments may intervene.

Seven: In the event of the Executive Board being unable to reach a unanimous decision on Resolution 4, the question will be decided by communications between the governments or at a meeting of the Supreme War Council.

Eight: The nucleus of the general reserve will be formed from such divisions as may be decided as provided above, and the general reserve will thereafter be gradually expanded as the arrival of fresh divisions from the United States of America, by relieving the pressure on the other armies, enables further divisions to be released."

2. The foregoing resolutions are transmitted for formal action by the government in Washington. I recommend that it concur.

3. The next question considered was that of Japanese intervention in Siberia. In view of the note which was read to the Ambassadors of Great Britain, France, and Italy by the Secretary of State and transmitted by him on March 5 to the American Embassy in London, Mr. Lloyd George proposed that in view of the political character and importance of this question it should be considered by the prime ministers alone at a session tomorrow morning. Mr. Frazier of our Embassy in Paris will be present at that meeting to report the views of the prime ministers to the government in Washington.

4. The next question considered was that of the proposed requisitioning of idle Dutch tonnage in American ports. As you know, this action was approved by the Permanent Military Representatives on the Supreme War Council from the military point of view alone. It was also approved by the Interallied shipping Council whose recommendation I am informed was cabled to Washington by Mr. Stevens. It was disapproved by the Interallied Naval Council. There was an evident desire on the part of the British and Italian representatives to recommend the requisitioning of this Dutch shipping. At the request of the French representative action was postponed until a meeting tomorrow.

5. The question of the Dutch tonnage has brought up the whole question of the use of available tonnage of the Allies. The immediate situation of Italy due to lack of coal is represented as exceedingly grave. To get coal to Italy via France is held by the English to require assistance from American tonnage. They also insist that it will require the use of all French railway material now being used by the American army in France. If both these assertions prove true, as now seems not unlikely, it will require a radical change in the American military program. For this reason Lord Derby, the British Minister of War, has asked me to wire Mr. Baker in France that he considers it of the utmost importance that Mr. Baker should meet him in London next Monday or Tuesday for personal conference on this vitally important question.

BLISS.

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***Committee to Proceed to Italy***

No. 50-S

AMERICAN SECTION, SUPREME WAR COUNCIL,  
*London, March 15, 1918.*

AGWAR, WASHINGTON, D. C.

For the Secretary of State, Secretary of War, and Acting Chief of Staff

A. At the third meeting of the fourth session of the Supreme War Council, held at 10 Downing Street, London, at 11 a. m. on Friday, March 15, 1918, the Supreme War Council adopted the following resolutions:

(1) Resolution in regard to aerial reprisals. The Supreme War Council agree that the British and French Governments should announce that the operations of British and French aircraft, even when carried out as measures of reprisals for the bombardment of open towns by the enemy, are always as a matter of fact directed against objectives of military importance.

(2) Resolution on the proposal to requisition Dutch shipping. The Supreme War Council have carefully considered the memorandum of the Allied Naval Council, setting forth the disadvantages of drawing Holland into the war, whether as an ally or as any enemy. They have also considered Joint Note Number 17 of the permanent military representatives on the possible military consequences of such an eventuality. The Supreme War Council are of opinion that the risk of Holland being drawn into the war in consequence of the requisition of Dutch shipping is a remote one, and that, in view of the urgent and immediate need of shipping, as set forth in the note of the Allied Maritime Transport Council, the risk is one that should be accepted. They, therefore, recommend that the policy of requisitioning Dutch shipping should be adhered to.

(3) Resolution in regard to the employment of requisitioned Dutch shipping. As the French Government have agreed not to discontinue the transport of 350,000 tons of French coal into Italy by April 15, 1918, the Supreme War Council are of opinion that the Dutch shipping in American ports should be used, in the first place, for the indispensable requirements of the American military program.

(4) Resolution in regard to the creation of an interallied transportation council. The Supreme War Council approve the recommendation of the Major General Sir P.A.M. Nash, for the creation of an interallied transportation council at Paris, under the Supreme War Council, consisting of a representative of each of the four Allied governments, and charged with the functions set forth in Section 3, Par. 11 of General Nash's report: I recommend that an interallied transportation council should be created at Paris under the Supreme War Council, consisting of a representative of each of the four Allied governments. This council should be charged with fulfilling the following main functions:

(I) (A) To advise the Supreme War Council at Versailles of the transportation aspect of all plans of campaign on the western front.

(B) To negotiate with the Allied governments concerned as to the provisions of such additional railway facilities as are necessary to give effect to any accepted plan of campaign, or to relieve the general position, and to arrange for any extraneous assistance required in men or material.

(II) (A) To prepare, when called upon to do so, schemes for the consideration of the Supreme War Council for all large movements of troops between one section of the front and another.

(B) To make, when instructed to do so, necessary preparation with the interallied governments concerned for the carrying out of such movements, including when necessary a redistribution of mobile resources of railway material and personnel.

(III) To study the enemy position regarding transportation facilities of every kind and advise the Supreme War Council as to the enemy's capabilities of concentrating and maintaining their forces on any particular sector of their front, and as to the points at which and methods by which the enemy's railway communications can be attacked from the air with greatest effect.

(IV) To prepare schemes to develop continental railway lines of communication so as to relieve sea lines of communication, and to negotiate with the governments concerned regarding the best utilization of the Allied railway resources to economize sea transport.

(V) To watch the performance of the different agencies operating the lines of communication on the western front, bringing to the notice of the governments or armies concerned cases in which the fullest use does not appear to be made of available resources, and suggesting remedies.

(5) With reference to paragraph 5 of the resolutions adopted by the Supreme War Council at the second meeting of the fourth session, in regard to the Allied General Reserve, the Supreme War Council approve the proposal that the following general officers should form a committee which should proceed at once to Italy, in order to confer with Commander-in-Chief of Italian army: General Maistre, General Rawlinson, General Bliss, General Giardino.

(6) The functions of the executive war board, and the creation of an Allied General Reserve. The Supreme War Council took note of a statement made by General Foch with regard to the functions of the executive war board and the creation of an Allied General Reserve.

(7) The Supreme War Council decided: (i) That the agreement arrived at between the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied armies in France for mutual support shall be communicated formally to the permanent military representative at Versailles. (ii) That the permanent military representatives shall prepare forthwith, in consultation with the Commanders-in-Chief concerned, a plan for supporting the Italian army in the event of an enemy offensive on that front.

B. After passing above resolution, the Supreme War Council adjourned until its next session. In compliance with its instruction, I leave for Italy tomorrow, March 16, remaining at Versailles until Monday, March 18.

BLISS

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G-3 GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1880: Letter

***Areas for Base Division, II and III Army Corps***

1st Section, General Staff

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, March 15, 1918.*

From: C-in-C, G-1

To: C. G., S. O. S.

1. It is necessary to establish base division depots for the II and III Corps. In this connection attention is invited to the fact that the II Corps is that corps which is going into training with the British. The III Corps, on the other hand, is that which is just commencing to arrive in France through our own ports. It is advisable to locate the base depots of these two corps on railroad lines used in the movement of troops from the

various ports of debarkation forward. An area, in the neighborhood of Le Mans would be a convenient point for the reception of incoming casualties through Brest and, therefore, a suitable location for a base div. depot. It is also suitably located to serve the II Corps during the short period of its training with the British. It is also a good location for the movements forward to the II Corps after the latter have moved over into our sector on the front.

2. It is believed possible to find an area for the III Corps Base Div. Depot somewhere along the railroad line Saumur---Tours---Vierzon---Nevers. It had been the intention to locate the base division depot of the II Corps in the Perigueux area, but as our incoming troops will probably arrive through ports farther north than the Gironde, this location is not suitable.

3. Please take the question up with the French and have the necessary reconnaissance made in the vicinities indicated and report to these hq. as soon as possible the results. Your attention is particularly invited to the advisability of locating these areas as close as possible to the railroad, as there may be some delay in furnishing them with transportation.

4. In view of urgent demands elsewhere it will not be possible for us to undertake much, if any, new construction in the areas selected, and, therefore, it would be advisable to select the areas with particular reference to their billeting possibilities.

By order of the C-in-C:

JAMES A. LOGAN, Jr.,  
Lt. Col., G. S.,  
A. C. of S., G-1.

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Cable: P-753-S

### ***Exchange in Staff Officers Considered Advisable***

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
Chaumont, Haute-Marne, March 19, 1918.

AGWAR, WASHINGTON

For Chief of Staff

Reference hour number 915.\* Believe the interchange of staff officers will bring excellent results that service in Washington of officers who have had considerable experience here will materially strengthen your general staff. Just at this time matter presents difficulties and actual operation of plan as suggested cannot now be put in operation without material and serious disruption of my general staff and will set us back at least four months which is the shortest time officers can be expected to qualify for duty here. Most of the officers here were selected because of their special qualifications and should not be replaced now by any fixed rule. It should be borne in mind that this organization is new and is really in the making and that it is the most difficult thing to get officers competent for service with combatant units. To send the number you mention

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\* Printed under date, March 14, 1918.

would take thirty of the sixty-four general staff and acting general staff officers on duty here. Coming at a time of prospective early German offensive and just as our first corps is about to take its place in our own sector it might be disastrous. The limited number of trained staff men at my disposition has already, as you know, been a serious handicap and has caused much anxiety. Training here in France under active conditions is absolutely necessary to prepare officers for our work. They must learn this class of warfare and must study our organization and must be able to cooperate with the French before they become at all dependable. I earnestly recommend that you send over the number of staff men you can now spare for actual service and training here. As soon as possible thereafter, when these men have had some experience, I could then return a like number to you for duty in Washington. This could be carried out within three or four months and the system repeated as often as advisable. Your attention is invited in this connection to the fact that several general staff officers who have had training at our general staff school are now en route for Washington having had excellent opportunity for instruction and observation. The greatest need at this time as viewed for this end is for the exchange of officers in the technical and supply departments when such officers become available through experience. I do not fail to appreciate fully your difficulties but think the requirements of our fighting forces should be our immediate concern.

PERSHING.

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Les Armees Francaises Tome VI, Vol. 1, Annexes Vol. 1: Report

### ***Information of the Enemy***

[Editorial Translation]

2d Section, General Staff

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,  
FRENCH ARMIES OF THE NORTH AND NORTHEAST,  
*March 20, 1918.*

SUMMARY OF INTELLIGENCE NO. 1371

[Extract]

- I. Western Front.  
Number of divisions: 182, including 74 at the rear 108 divisions are at the front.  
Of the divisions in rear of the front, 51 have been located, 23 have not.

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### ***Service of Rear Troops***

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, March 21, 1918.*

AGWAR, WASHINGTON Via ANGLO

For the Chief of Staff

1. Reference our recommendations regarding shipments of material and supplies in accordance with phase program of priority schedule, am making further detailed investigation with view to considerable reduction in shipments from America of all classes building material and other supplies, either by postponement or cancellation in order especially to assist you in tiding over next 3 or 4 months. Shall have revision made in automatic and exceptional requisitions of material and supply and will send them to you as soon as possible. Meanwhile it will be possible to regulate immediate shipments by present method. But think it necessary that these revised requisitions should be in your hands as general guide. Fully realized here that shortage in tonnage makes stringent revision necessary at this time.

A. Reference your confidential cable 918, see sub-paragraph L, paragraph 1, our Confidential Cable 705 [March 10, 1918]. No reduction whatsoever or temporary omission of service of rear troops called for by 1st, 2d, and 3d Phases our priority schedule must be made. Port situation due to failure to send labor troops and material becoming serious. The dispatch of combat troops of 3d Phase in advance of remaining service of rear troops of 1st Phase not yet supplied, and in advance of service of rear troops of 2d and 3d Phases will not hasten creation of formidable army to put against enemy. Expediting movement combat troops by advancing their order of priority will surely result in confusion and delay. Leading elements 3d and 5th Divisions, combat units of 3d Phase, now commencing to arrive. Strongly urge completion of 1st Phase service of rear, corps troops, and army troops. Existing shortage 1st phase: Service of rear 28,000, corps troops 9,000, army troops 12,000. Also strongly urge that completion of 2d Phase, service of rear, corps troops, and army troops before commencing 3d Phase. 2d Phase Priority Schedule calls for 73,000 service of rear and 16,000 army troops which should be moved by our tonnage simultaneously with movement of six divisions of II Corps by British for training with British army. So far as 3d Phase is concerned, note A page 16, priority schedule states "At least 50 per cent of the service of rear troops should precede combatant troops. The other 50 per cent may be shipped simultaneously with first half of combatant troops." The total number service of rear troops called for this phase 52,000. We are making every endeavor to procure European labor. Impossible to estimate at this time results our endeavors this particular. As this labor becomes available we will recommend corresponding reductions in unskilled military labor units shown our priority schedule in 3d Phase. Important that no reductions be made in service of rear troops of 1st or 2d Phases on this account, that the 3d Phase be fully organized, and that reduction in 3d and succeeding phases be made only after recommendation from here.

B. Attention invited to paragraph A our Cablegram 591 stating four Negro regiments not available for labor as previously proposed in paragraph 1 H our Cablegram 454. For this reason they must not be confused with any pioneer regiments of corps, army, or service of rear.

C. On account military importance aviation do not now desire any reduction made in existing aviation program. This question being studied and if any reduction found advisable will cable.



D. Renew previous recommendation that all skilled labor troops bring their tools with them on same boat, so as to prevent delay in getting to work.

E. Attention again invited to necessity of expediting every possible way movement car and locomotive repair men called for in paragraph 1 B, C, D, E, and F our Cablegram 521. Is foregoing thoroughly understood and will recommendations be followed?

PERSHING

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SWC: 315-1: Cablegram

***Italian Representation in the Interallied General Reserve***

No. 55-S

AMERICAN SECTION, SUPREME WAR COUNCIL,  
*Versailles, Seine-et-Oise, March 21, 1918.*

AGWAR, WASHINGTON, D. C.

For Secretary of State, Secretary of War, and Acting Chief of Staff

1. The following relates to paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 of my cablegram number forty-nine sent from London dated March 14, 1918, and to paragraph 5 of my number fifty sent from London dated March 15, 1918.

2. The committee appointed by paragraph 5 of my number fifty proceeded to Turin, Italy, on the night of Monday, March 18, and met in conference there on the night of March 19 with General Diaz, Commander-in-Chief of the Italian army, General Cavan, commanding the British contingent with the Italian army, and General Radcliffe, Chief of British Military Mission at Italian Headquarters. After discussion until late that night and during the following day the committee agreed upon a report to the Executive War Board at Versailles. The committee left Turin for Versailles on the night of March 20 and reported to the Executive War Board this morning, March 21. This afternoon the Executive War Board received the report of the committee of general officers which went to Turin and after full discussion adopted the following resolution to be submitted to the Allied Governments in accordance with paragraph 6 and 7 of my cablegram to you number forty-nine, dated March 14.

3. The Executive War Board assembled to decide the question submitted to its decision by the Supreme War Council at its meeting of Thursday, March 14 (Resolution No. 4).

After having considered the recommendations of the meeting of general officers which convened at Turin on March 20, answers:

(a) The number of divisions to be allotted as the Italian quota of the general reserve.

General Giardino estimates that the number may be four Italian divisions on condition that only two French divisions are to be assigned to the general reserve.

General Diaz, in fact, state that if, as the governments indicated it in their Resolution Number 3, all the French and English divisions in Italy should be placed in the general reserve, he will not be able to furnish any Italian divisions for this general reserve.

General Bliss, Rawlinson, and Foch estimate that the number of divisions to be put in the general reserve should be four Italian divisions and, for the present, two French and one English division.

(b) The desirability of an immediate transfer to the western front of some of the British, French and Italian divisions now on the Italian front.

General Giardino considers as opportune the immediate transfer of two Italian divisions and thereafter, of two French and one English division if the military situation permits it.

General Bliss, General Rawlinson, and General Foch consider it opportune that two Italian divisions, two French divisions, and one British division be transferred.

Since these divisions are part of the general reserve, the executive committee will fix the order of the transfer of these units, having agreed that transportation will begin with the two Italian divisions if the military situation permits.

4. You will observe from the foregoing that the British, French and American representatives were in full agreement and that the Italian representative disagreed on only a minor point and probably for political reasons. In order to reach harmonious agreement it is very desirable that American Government should immediately concur in the recommendations of General Foch, Rawlinson, and Bliss as given in paragraph 3 above. The prompt concurrence of American Government will probably settle the matter at once. Please telegraph me decision.

BLISS.

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G-4, GHQ, AEF: File 80: Letter

***Query Concerning Movement of Troops through England***

4th Section, General Staff

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, March 22, 1918.*

From: C-in-C

To: Chief of British Mission

[Extract]

1. \* \* \* If practicable, it is desired to have an understanding as to what method is to be pursued in handling all the troops that will come via England during the next few months, in order that we may make preparations to do our share of the work promptly and satisfactorily.

2. The questions arising are substantially as follows for troops destined to both British and American areas:

(a) Will the British or American authorities handle them during their disembarkation?

(b) What arrangements will be made for their transportation across England?

(c) Will the British or American authorities in England care for them in case it is necessary to detain them in camp for a certain time?

(d) Will the British or American authorities make the preliminary arrangements for their transportation across the channel?

(e) Will the British or American authorities send notification to these headquarters of the organization, destination, number of effectiveness and time of arrival in France?

3. Inasmuch as parts of one division may arrive simultaneously with part of another, this information should be full and complete in order that we may know exactly what troops are referred to and what provision must be made for their reception and transportation.

By direction:

W. D. CONNOR,  
Colonel, General Staff, N. A.,  
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4.

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SWC: 315-1: Cablegram

***German Attack on March 21, 1918***

No. 58-S

AMERICAN SECTION, SUPREME WAR COUNCIL,  
*Versailles, Seine-et-Oise, March 23, 1918.*

AGWAR, WASHINGTON, D. C.

German attack on 21st carried out by thirty-seven divisions on a front of forty miles as follows: Fifteen divisions on a 10-mile front between the Sensee and Canal du Nord, twenty-two divisions between Gouzeaucourt and La Fere about thirty miles. Of the 37 divisions, 9 were already in the line and 28 came from the reserve. Very severe fighting continued the 22d. British line has been withdrawn so that night of the 22d it was as follows: Beginning at Cherisy a point on old line---thence to Croisilles---thence to Doignies---thence to Ribecourt---thence to Ronssoy---thence to Hesbecourt---thence to Maissemy---thence to Happencourt---thence to St-Simon---thence along west bank Crozat [St-Quentin?] Canal to Tergnier---thence to point on old line Barisis. Today enemy is reported to have broken through the reserve line in Fifth Army area at Vaux, Beauvois, and Poeuilly. British have called on French to extend their line north Peronne for which purpose French are moving twelve divisions at rate of six divisions in 24 hours beginning at daylight this morning. It is estimated that at least sixty-four enemy divisions are now engaged in the attack. Three German divisions heretofore reported on the Italian front now probably on western front. An additional division has arrived from Russia and is on western front, total enemy divisions now on this front at least 189 1/2. Apparent objective of Germans is Amiens by breaking the line of the Somme south of Peronne. Should they succeed in doing this they may place detaining force on the Somme against the British and operate against the French, or they may place detaining force on the Oise against the French and operate against the British.

BLISS.

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***Antiaircraft Defense***

3d Section, General Staff

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, March 23, 1918.*

From: Commander-in-Chief

To: Army Artillery Commander

[Extract]

1. The Commander-in-Chief directs that you be charged with and take up at once the whole problem of antiaircraft organization and defense for the A. E. F. Your responsibility for the study, and upon approval of the plan proposed for the installation of proper defense measures extends over all the area now occupied by our forces, except the sectors of the front line where antiaircraft defense is provided by the French armies with which our units are serving.

2. It is considered that antiaircraft defense must be handled as a sector or area problem, the least area within which along the front there can be no division of command, being that occupied by an army. There must be coordination of defense between the front and rear areas. With no present responsibility for defense in the sectors of the front line, your work of actual defense installations for the present should be directed toward the rear areas, but your study of the problem of the proper administrative and command organization apart from the study of the ground organization for any particular locality, must have in view the extension of the defense scheme toward the front. Immediate attention should be given to the installation of a defense for Is-sur-Tille, and for Chaumont and Jonchery.

3. Considerable study has already been given to the whole antiaircraft problem, and some definite conclusions have been reached in regard thereto. It is considered that you will be best informed of these, and as well of the present status of the personnel and materiel for this service, by having one of your staff officers confer direct with G-3, these headquarters \* \* \*

By direction:

J. G. HARBORD,  
Chief of Staff.

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Cable: P-779-S

***Objection to a Branch of the Judge Advocate General's Office***

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, March 24, 1918.*

ADJUTANT GENERAL OF THE ARMY, WASHINGTON

[Extract]

\* \* \* \* \*

3A With reference to a branch of the Judge Advocate General's office in France to review certain court martial proceedings after they have been acted upon by the Judge Advocate here, the reason for this is not clear. It submits to review cases within the jurisdiction of department commanders in time of peace and is in direct conflict with broad and liberal character President's instructions at inauguration of command. Any authority outside of control of the Commander-in-Chief will cause delay in handling cases. Beyond doubt punishment for desertion or misconduct in front of the enemy must be almost summary if it is to have deterrent effect. This is practiced in both the British and French armies. Any method that causes delay and possible miscarriage of justice would be unfortunate for us and injurious to morale of our Allies. The circumstances under which we are serving are in no sense comparable to our Civil War conditions as here we are fighting a strong and virile foreign nation and every possible means must be placed in the hands of the supreme commander to enable him to maintain the morale and integrity of the army. Any thought in the minds of men that they can possibly escape punishment for such misconduct would be disastrous. I am very strongly of the opinion that final authority in these cases should rest with the supreme commander here.

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PERSHING.

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Cable: P-781-S

***Labor from Italian Government***

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, March 24, 1918.*

AGWAR, WASHINGTON

FOR CHIEF OF STAFF AND ACTING SECRETARY OF WAR

In view of the great need for labor and the shortage of tonnage every endeavor is being made to secure labor from Italian Government. Therefore request you present following letter from Colonel Dawes to Secretary McAdoo:

Because of the great necessity existing for building line of communications we are employing about twenty thousand combatant troops for labor purposes. For

every civilian laborer we can secure at present we can release a soldier for combatant activity at the front. The emergency is evident. The Italian Government has already furnished 100,000 militarized laborers to the French. Have sent Captain Cutcheon\* to Italy with Crosby\*\* to urge our necessities to the Italian Government concurrent with Crosby's consideration of the Italian request for a loan of thirty million dollars from the United States. Crosby's concern in this situation is of course not direct, but very sympathetic. Captain Cutcheon reports his belief that if Mr. Crosby persists strongly he can get, without creating any serious strain, considerable number of men immediately and probably more later, and says that if Mr. Crosby concedes what the Italians want in the nature of exchange provisions before leaving and without getting a definite promise in our matter, his task will become practically hopeless. And that the American ambassador agrees with his view. Having procurement of labor in charge, strongly feel that the State and Treasury Departments in consultation should instruct Crosby and the American ambassador to urge the matter of supplying at once at least 15,000 militarized laborers to the A. E. F., and that unless some concessions are made further negotiations in connection with the loan must be suspended. Dawes.

Have requested Crosby to hold loan in abeyance until this matter could be taken up. I believe it only necessary to suggest this situation to the civil departments of the United States Government which have so far supported the A. E. F. to have them create the proper atmosphere around their representatives at Rome which will result in an arrangement through which all our combatant troops can be released for the front. In my judgment this result can best be obtained by the attitude suggested in Colonel Dawes' telegram.

PERSHING.

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Cable: 1137-L. R.

### ***American Units to Help French and British***

*LONDON, March 25, 1918.*

C-in-C, G. H. Q., A. E. F.

Very urgent. I have just had a long talk with the Prime Minister. He urges 3 proposals for your consideration. First, that our division in France be placed immediately in line to relieve French divisions for service elsewhere; quiet sectors being chosen for troops with least training. Second, that all available engineer troops be taken from lines of communication work and sent to aid of British engineers preparing positions back of present lines. It is urged that the suspension of our work would be but temporary and that the work suggested is imperative. Third, that infantry be sent first of the entire 6 divisions to be transported by British in view of present acute needs of that arm. No answer to the foregoing is necessary until I see you tomorrow when we can discuss the suggestions fully. If railroads in France are too fully occupied to make Italian trip possible, I would abandon it. At any rate we should not permit diversion of engines and cars if they can be used in present emergency. We leave here tomorrow Tuesday at 7:50 for Paris.

BAKER.

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\* Capt. F. W. M. Cutcheon, Head of Contract and Adjustment Board.

\*\* Mr. Oscar T. Crosby, President, Interallied Council.

***General Foch Designated to Coordinate Allied Operations***

O. A. D. 795

Record of Third Conference held at DOULLENS  
at 12 noon, March 26, 1918

PRESENT

M. Poincare  
M. Clemenceau  
M. Fouchel  
General Foch  
General Petain  
General Weygand  
Field-Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, Commanding-in-Chief  
General Sir H. A. Lawrence  
General Sir H. Wilson  
Lord Milner  
General Montgomery

[Extract]

The Field Marshal Commanding-in-Chief pointed out the absolute necessity of the French hurrying forward as large reinforcements as possible from the south to support General Gough's army which had been in the battle since the 21st without a pause.

General Petain said that the Fifth Army was no longer a fighting force. He explained the French situation, and what action he had taken. The French were detraining at MOREUIL and MONTDIDIER. He explained the dangers involved by pushing these troops in in dribbles. Nine divisions were already engaged; fifteen more divisions were being brought up to the battle.

After some discussion it was unanimously agreed that "AMIENS must be covered at all costs." The point was how to do it and who was to replace General Gough's tired troops in front of AMIENS. This was the difficulty. All the French troops are being hurried up as fast as possible.

It was agreed that it was essential that all British troops must hold on from ARRAS to the SOMME at all costs or another break might take place which would be very much more dangerous to the safety of AMIENS.

General Petain said that the leading division from the north had had to be moved up to MOREUIL instead of detraining at ABBEVILLE.

Lord Milner impressed on the meeting the importance of putting in fresh troops at once, as although our men were tired, so were the Germans.

General Petain said he was moving everything as fast as possible.

General Foch emphasized the necessity of instant action and of impressing on all troops that they must give up no ground.

General Wilson said he entirely agreed with General Foch.

Sir Douglas Haig thought that he could guarantee to do this without French help provided the French did not uncover his flank south of the SOMME. General Gough had been ordered to hold on to BRAY with his left.

It was also agreed that the French were to hurry on all movements of troops to the utmost. All troops south of the SOMME, British and French, were to be ordered to hold on whether tired or not. The French would be responsible for the front south of the SOMME.

M. Clemenceau pointed out that in his opinion the burning question was, at present, not how many divisions can be spared from the French front but how quickly reinforcements can arrive on the battle front. Time was of vital importance.

Everyone at the meeting was in agreement with this.

General Petain explained how long it would take his troops to arrive.

M. Clemenceau then said he thought that all were agreed on the principles involved and what it was essential for the French and British to do. The only difficulty was the realization of the measures involved in these principles.

After private discussion between ministers and generals concerned, a resolution by M. Clemenceau was drawn up proposing that General Foch be appointed to coordinate the operations of the Allied armies about AMIENS to cover that place.

The field marshal pointed out the difficulty of such a task unless General Foch had full authority over all the operations on the western front. M. Clemenceau agreed, and this proposal was unanimously adopted by the representatives of the French and British Governments. G. H. Q., March 26, 1918.

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[Editorial Translation]

*DOULLENS, March 26, 1918.*

#### DOULLENS AGREEMENT

General Foch is charged by the British and French Governments with the coordination of the military operations of the Allied armies on the western front. To this end, he will make arrangements with the Generals-in-Chief, who are requested to furnish him all necessary information.

CLEMENCEAU.

MILNER.

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Les Armees Francaises, Tome VI, Vol. 1, Annexes 2d Vol.: Instructions

#### ***Mission of Reserve Group of Armies***

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff  
No. 1/P. C.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,  
FRENCH ARMIES OF THE NORTH AND NORTHEAST,  
*March 26, 1918.*

#### INSTRUCTIONS TO THE GENERAL COMMANDING

#### THE RESERVE GROUP OF ARMIES

The prime mission of the reserve group of armies is to close the route to Paris to the Germans and to cover Amiens.

The direction of Amiens will be covered as follows:

North of the Somme by the British armies under the orders of Marshal Haig, who will hold the line Bray-sur-Somme---Albert at all costs.

South of the Somme by the reserve group of armies under your orders (British Fifth Army, French First and Third Armies), maintaining contact with the forces of Marshal Haig at Bray and the Group of Armies of the North at the Oise.



The present instructions, which seek to keep Amiens in our hands as well as preserve an unbroken Allied front between the Somme and the Oise, countermand all previous instructions, especially Order No. 26, 225 of the 24th instant.

PETAIN.

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SWC (MR): Fldr. 24: Minutes

***Military Representatives Discuss Incorporation of American Forces***

[Extract]

MINUTES OF THE MEETING OF THE MILITARY  
REPRESENTATIVES HELD IN THE COUNCIL  
CHAMBER, VERSAILLES, ON WEDNESDAY,  
MARCH 27, 1918, AT 3 P. M.

PRESENT

FRANCE	GREAT BRITAIN	ITALY	AMERICA
Major Pagezy	General Rawlinson	General Giardino	General Bliss accompanied by General Pershing

IN ATTENDANCE

Major Lacombe	General Sackville-West	Colonel Bianchi d'Espinosa
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SECRETARIAT

Captain Portier	Colonel Storr Major Caccia Captain Wright	Lt. Col. Martin Franklin	Colonel Grant
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CHAIRMAN - General Giardino

General Giardino: In accordance with the desire expressed by military representatives in their meeting of March 24, General Rawlinson had proposed a resolution for discussion with regard to the incorporation of American forces. He favored this project, except in certain particulars. He wished that the question be solved not with regard to England alone, but that the principle be established for all the Allies.

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General Bliss being consulted asked General Pershing to speak.  
General Pershing made, in substance, the following statement:

You may remember General Rawlinson that when this matter was first discussed here with General Robertson and Mr. Lloyd George, it was decided that 6 divisions rather than 150,000 infantry would be transported in British ships. I desire to help in every way possible, but I am not ready to commit myself, or my government, to furnish this number of infantry first to England

and then to France. This would require nearly all available shipping until late in the autumn, without our being able to bring over a proportionate number of artillery and auxiliaries in time to complete their training. It would amount to the United States giving up any expectation of participating in the war to the United States giving up any expectation of participating in the war with a force adequate to accomplish anything; would be practically agreeing to maintain the British and French divisions at full strength. This would in my opinion not be best either for the United States or for the Allies. A better procedure would be for the Allies to amalgamate their weakened divisions into a lesser number and let the American divisions take their proper places in the line wherever that may be. I think this the safest and most rational plan. The question may arise as to whether the American divisions are competent to take their places as suggested, to which I answer decisively and without hesitation in the affirmative. I am prepared to put the American divisions on the line as fast as they arrive. They have had much training at home and the short experience on the front would enable them to make a creditable showing.

However, in order to show my desire to cooperate and help, I am ready, in view of the heavy losses of the British to agree that infantry be sent according to the existing agreement with the British under the condition that their artillery may be brought over when we ask for it, and that the infantry units be withdrawn and united in their own divisions when required by the American Commander-in-Chief. I therefore suggest that the resolution take about the following form:

It is believed that in view of and during the present emergency on the western front, the infantry of the American divisions that are to be trained with the British should be given precedence in sea transportation and that the agreement made between the British and Americans regarding training of divisions with the British should be modified to that extent, with the understanding that this is a temporary measure and that these units of infantry are to be reunited with their artillery and auxiliary units when so desired by the Americans, in order, as planned, that an American army may be built up which shall take its place beside the other Allied armies.

General Giardino then called attention to the fact that apparently this proposal referred only to the 6 American divisions to be transported by the English, and inquired whether if the German attack should exhaust the Italian effectives, the American army would be able to furnish them infantry.

General Pershing stated that he understood only the present emergency was being considered, and that the step proposed applied only to the 6 divisions to be transported in the English shipping. That the question of sending American troops to Italy could be settled only by his government.

General Giardino said that he wished to know whether it was intended that the text offered by General Pershing should acknowledge the general principles of the resolution as first proposed by General Rawlinson.

General Pershing thought he could clear the matter up. He said it had been agreed that the British should transport 6 divisions and that the infantry of these divisions should be trained with the British; that the artillery of these divisions was to be trained under him. To meet the emergency, he now proposed that all of the infantry of these 6 divisions should be brought over first; and the artillery subsequently. As to France, this same procedure had been followed all along. He had had one division, and he just added 2 divisions, the infantry of which was training with the French divisions, and the division commanders of which were training with the corps commander. If they had to participate in the fight, they would fight. This plan had been agreed upon by General Petain who is perfectly satisfied with it. The completion of the French and British divisions by drafts of the American troops had not been contemplated.

General Giardino thought that they were not looking at the matter from the same point

of view. He desired to know whether it was deemed necessary to meet the German attack, and our infantry were disrupted, would the American army furnish more infantry to replace it.

General Pershing stated that the United States would be undertaking a very large contract if they agreed to this, and he was not sure that they were prepared to do so.

General Giardino said he did not doubt the American divisions would be most helpful; but the critical question now was one of time, and they would not be on time if the Allies had already suffered defeat. While the Americans were bringing over two complete divisions a month, they could be bringing the infantry of at least four, and the needed help would therefore be more likely to arrive in time; this seemed especially important to the French and English.

General Rawlinson pointed out that the decisive battle is at this moment being fought; it is all a question of time; and requested that infantry and machine guns be brought, if transports are not full of artillery and other services, they will be able to bring us a greater number of infantry. He said the English and the French require the infantry of six divisions.

General Pershing declared himself ready to recommend the bringing over first of the infantry of the six divisions intended to be trained with the British; he thought that this would provide for British needs arising out of the present emergency; after considerable study and discussion, he and General Petain had arrived at the arrangement now in force with the French army, and they were both entirely satisfied with this arrangement. He did not think it necessary to make a radical change to meet a future emergency until the latter should have arisen.

General Pershing then left.

General Bliss remarked that General Pershing expressed only his personal opinion, and that it is the military representatives who must make a decision.

General Bliss then proposed a version to which all the military representatives agreed. This, with a part of General Rawlinson's scheme formed the subject of Collective Note No. 18. [Follows]

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## JOINT NOTE NO. 18

Joint Note to the Supreme War Council by its Military Representatives.

### AMERICAN REINFORCEMENTS---WESTERN FRONT

To: The Supreme War Council

1. The paragraph 4 of Joint Note No. 12, dated January 12, 1918, the military representatives agreed as follows:

After the most careful and searching inquiry they were agreed on the point that the security of France could also be assured. But in view of the strength of the attack which the enemy is able to develop on this front, an attack which, in the opinion of the military representatives could reach a strength of 96 divisions (excluding reinforcements by *roulement*); they feel compelled to add that France will be safe during 1918 only under certain conditions, namely:

- (a) That the strength of the British and French troops in France are continuously kept up to their present total strength, and that they receive the expected reinforcement of not less than two American divisions per month.

2. The battle which is developing at the present moment in France and which can extend to the other theaters of operations may very quickly place the Allied armies in a serious situation from the point of view of effectives, and the military representatives are from this moment of opinion that the above detailed condition (a) can no longer be maintained and they consider as a general proposition that the new situation requires new decisions.

The military representatives are of the opinion that it is highly desirable that the American Government should assist the Allied armies as soon as possible by permitting, in principle, the temporary service of American units in Allied army corps and divisions, such reinforcements must however be obtained from other units than those American divisions which are now operating with the French, and the units so temporarily employed must eventually be returned to the American army.

3. The military representatives are of the opinion that, from the present time, in execution of the foregoing, and until otherwise directed by the Supreme War Council, only American infantry and machine-gun units, organized as that government may decide, be brought to France, and that all agreements or conventions hitherto made in conflict with this decision be modified accordingly.

WEYGAND

Military Representative,  
French Section,  
Supreme War Council.

RAWLINSON

Military Representative,  
British Section,  
Supreme War Council.

GIARDINO

Military Representative,  
Italian Section,  
Supreme War Council.

TASKER H. BLISS

Military Representative,  
American Section,  
Supreme War Council.

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HS: Brit. File, 900-32.9: Minutes

### ***Meeting of War Cabinet***

No. 105

WAR CABINET 374

EXTRACT FROM MINUTES OF A MEETING OF THE WAR CABINET

HELD AT 10, DOWNING STREET, S. W., ON WEDNESDAY, MARCH

27, 1918 at 11:30 a. m.

\* \* \* \* \*

Assistance by United States troops in France:

8. With reference War Cabinet 373, Minute 6, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff reported that General Rawlinson had seen General Pershing at VERSAILLES yesterday, and that General Pershing would not agree to put the American battalions in the British divisions, as he was very anxious to keep his organization of divisions intact. He had, however, agreed to send American engineers to the front, and to put American divisions into the line to relieve French divisions. General Wilson said that there was to be another meeting at VERSAILLES today.

The War Council decided that:

A strongly worded telegram, drafted by the Prime Minister, with a view to ultimate publication, should be sent direct to President Wilson from the War Cabinet, explaining the whole situation.

\* \* \* \* \*

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HS: Secret Documents: Vol. D-4: Message

### ***Suggested American Assistance***

*LONDON, March 27, 1918*

TELEPHONE MESSAGE FROM SECRETARY, WAR CABINET, TO LORD MILNER

Prime Minister wished you to discuss following possibilities with General Pershing. He has already had a preliminary discussion of them with Mr. Baker, Mr. Balfour being present:

1. Cannot American divisions take over more of the Allied line in order to enable French divisions to be withdrawn for support of British? Such American divisions might be placed more thickly in the line than the French whom they relieve, viz: 3 American divisions where there were two French.
2. For the present, American infantry only should be shipped to France.
3. Engineer and other American troops, etc., now employed in making or improving communications for the American army in France should suspend their present work and be drafted behind the Allied front in order to construct fresh defensive lines.

#### **SUBSIDIARY POINTS**

(a) It is believed that there are in France some American batteries, with trained crews, in excess of their divisional establishments. Could not these be sent to the British front, or be sent to the French front, to enable French batteries to be withdrawn for British support?

(b) It is not known whether the British recent artillery losses comprised gun crews as well as guns. If gun crews have been lost as well, could not American artillerymen be sent to British batteries to replace losses of our artillery personnel?

In my previous message I omitted to include a suggestion that one of the American divisions which is reported to be complete with transport should also be employed in the line either as a separate division or to increase the infantry in the combatant divisions.

[Unsigned]

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***Antiaircraft Defense to be a Separate Establishment***

3d Section, General Staff

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, March 27, 1918.*

MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF OF STAFF:

1. Conforming to the idea of the Commander-in-Chief, that antiaircraft defense should be a separate organization, there are herewith, a general order [omitted] providing for the establishment of an antiaircraft service at these headquarters, and a special order [omitted] for the detail of such officer as the Commander-in-Chief may decide upon as chief of this service.

2. This order has in view a separate organization in charge of a chief who works through the Chief of Staff, A. E. F. His duties are prescribed in the order only in general terms because working under the chief of staff, his activities can always be regulated by the proper sections of the general staff.

3. It is considered desirable that a selection be made at once of an officer to act as chief of this service. While the materiel immediately available for antiaircraft defense is very small, the matters of proper organization and administration can be settled upon at once. Schemes for organization, for employment, and detailed defense plans for a number of specified points are in possession of this section and can be turned over to the chief of the antiaircraft service as soon as he is appointed.

FOX CONNER,  
Colonel, General Staff,  
Asst. Chief of Staff (G-3).

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Les Armees Francaises, Tome VI, Vol. 1. Annexes 2d Vol.: Letter

***Orders to Hold Ground at All Costs***

[Editorial Translation]

*March 27, 1918.*

General Foch to the General Commander-in-Chief of the Armies of the North and Northeast.

General:

The ideas governing my thoughts while I am on the road are as follows:

1. Not one more foot of French soil must be lost.
2. It is imperative that the enemy be stopped just where he now is; for this reason it is necessary quickly to organize a sound defensive front and prepare powerful reserves in the rear for maneuver, determinedly collecting troops for this purpose all along the front.
3. Only then can one dream of relieving the troops actually engaged.

4. These troops must organize themselves with the aim of holding their ground at all costs.

I add that under the present circumstances an order from you to these troops who have every confidence in you would make them fully sensible of their duty and insure the desired result.

Yours,

FOCH.

-----

C-in-C: Fldr. 20: Cablegram

***Joint Note 18 with Recommendations of Secretary of War***

No. 67

AMERICAN SECTION, SUPREME WAR COUNCIL,  
*Versailles, Seine-et-Oise, March 28, 1918.*

AGWAR, WASHINGTON

[Extract]

[Pars. 1 and 2 deal with despatch of telegram advocating action on Joint Note 18, printed herein under date, March 27, 1918.]

\* \* \* \* \*

3. \* \* \*

The following is the action recommended by the Secretary of War:

To the President:

The foregoing resolutions were considered by General Bliss, General Pershing and me. Paragraph 3 proposes a change in the order of shipment of American troops to France and necessarily postpones the organization and training of complete American divisions as parts of an independent American army. This ought to be conceded only in view of the present critical situation and continued only so long as that situation necessarily demands it. The question of replacements will continue to embarrass the British and French Governments, and efforts to satisfy that need by retraining American units assigned to them must be anticipated, but we must keep in mind the formation of an American army, while, at the same time, we must not seem to sacrifice joint efficiency at a critical moment to that object. Therefore I recommend that you express your approval of the joint note in the following sense:

The purpose of the American Government is to render the fullest cooperation and aid and therefore the recommendation of the military representatives with regard to the preferential transportation of American infantry and machine-gun units in the present emergency is approved. Such units when transported will be under the direction of the Commander-in-Chief of the American Expeditionary Forces and will be assigned for training and use by him in his discretion. He will use these and all other military forces of the United States under his command in such manner as to render the greatest military assistance, keeping in mind always the determination of this government to have its various military forces collected, as speedily as their

training and the military situation will permit, into an independent American army, acting in concert with the armies of Great Britain and France and all arrangements made by him for their temporary training and service will be made with that end in view.

BAKER

BLISS.

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GHQ, AEF, War Diary, Book II: Page 446

***Dispose of Us as You Wish***

*Clermont, March 28, 1918.*

[Extract]

\* \* \* \* \*

At a meeting on March 28, 1918, at the front, when General Petain, M. Clemenceau, and M. Loucheur were also present, General Pershing, when he greeted General Foch, said to him:

I come to tell you that the American people would consider it a great honor that our troops should be engaged in the present battle. I ask this of you in my name and theirs. There is no question at this moment except fighting. Infantry, artillery, aviation, all that we have is yours. Do with it as you choose. Other forces are coming as numerous as shall be necessary.

I am here for the express purpose of telling you that the Americans will be proud to be engaged in the greatest battle of history.

\* \* \* \* \*

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C-in-C: Fldr. 20: Cablegram

***All Resources Made Available to French***

No. 801-S

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, March 28, 1918.*

ADJUTANT GENERAL, WASHINGTON

FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF

Have just returned from French Field Headquarters and conferred with Foch and Petain. Find situation improved but Germans still have many fresh divisions. British line north of ALBERT holding well and British Fifth Army appears to be getting a foothold across the SOMME east of CORBIE for protection of AMIENS. French have launched a counterattack against MONTDIDIER today. French Third Army is counterattacking northward between that point and LASSIGNY and have made considerable progress this afternoon. Success of the counteroffensive very important. French are in fine spirits and both armies seem confident.



Have made all our resources available and our divisions will be used if and when needed. 26th and 42d are to relieve French divisions in LORRAINE. 1st Division is considered fit for any service and will probably be taken at early date if battle continues.

PERSHING.

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SWC: 317-39: Telegram

***British Request to Extend General Foch's Authority to the American Army***

No. 39

VERSAILLES, SEINE-et-OISE, March 29, 1918.

Commanding General Amexforce

For the Secretary of War. The following has been handed me by the military representative of Great Britain and is transmitted for the information of the Secretary of War and General Pershing:

From the Prime Minister

a. Please communicate to General Bliss that I have cabled to President Wilson asking him to approve of Foch exercising the same coordinating authority over the American army as he is now exercising over the British and French. To send men over to France with the utmost possible speed to make good losses and to agree to arrangements made by General Pershing to their being brigaded as they become available with French and British divisions for the duration of the crisis.

b. The Prime Minister thinks that before this fighting is over, every man may count, and he can see no other way of making splendid American material available in this crisis of the war.

BLISS.

-----

SWC: Fldr. 316: Cablegram

***Joint Note 18--Military Situation and Need of Infantry and Machine-Gun Units Only***

No. 39-R

A. G. O. WAR DEPARTMENT,  
*Washington, D. C., March 29, 1918.*

AMERICAN SECTION, SUPREME WAR COUNCIL, VERSAILLES

FOR SECRETARY BAKER:

Reference Cable 67 signed Bliss the action of the President is as follows:

The President concurs in the joint notes of the permanent military representatives of the Supreme War Council in the sense formulated in your Number 67, March 28, and wishes you to regard yourself authorized to decide questions of immediate cooperation or replacement. Major General Peyton C. March.

McCAIN.

Forwarded to Secretary of War by Lt. Col. Poillon leaving Paris 8 p. m. train for Chaumont March 30, 1918.

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Cable: P-820-S

***Commander-in-Chief of Allied Armies Suggested***

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, March 30, 1918.*

To McCain for the President

I have just been shown a copy of a message from Lloyd George to you with regard to General Foch and American troops. The situation seems to be that Lloyd George is personally in favor of a Supreme Commander but fears British opinion will be the other way because such a commander could sacrifice the channel ports to the defense of Paris. The arrangement therefore is that General Foch is to be supreme enough to coordinate but without being called supreme commander. General Pershing will of course act under General Foch as Petain and Haig have already agreed to do. I venture to suggest that in replying to that part of Lloyd George's message you might go further than he asks and say that we are willing to accept a general supreme command whenever the French and British are. Perhaps the relative smallness of our present force and our having no immediate defensive object in France would make it unwise for us to urge the point though the present events would seem to have demonstrated the need. The second part of Lloyd George's message is covered by joint note of Versailles conference about which I wired you two days ago. General Pershing's prompt and fine action with regard to the use of our troops and facilities here in the emergency has won enthusiastic commendation from French and British. Our 1st Division will shortly be withdrawn from trenches and used in battle.

BAKER.

-----

***American Units to be Given Transportation Priority***

No. 40-R

A. G. O., WAR DEPARTMENT,  
*Washington, D. C., March 30, 1918.*

AMERICAN SECTION, SUPREME WAR COUNCIL, VERSAILLES

[Extract]

With reference to your 67 the recommendation of Secretary of War to President in your paragraph 3 that preferential transportation be given to American infantry and machine-gun units in present emergency understood and will be followed.\* \* \*

\* \* \* \* \*

McCAIN.

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GHQ, AEF: War Diary: Item 294-b

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*March 30, 1918.*

Under this date, Colonel T. Bentley Mott, American army, submits the following report to the Chief of Staff, A. E. F., regarding the Italian situation.

Italian forces: 49 organized divisions, also 80 battalions armed and instructed, in the depots.

French forces: 6 divisions; 2 en route now for France, leaving 4 in Italy. British, 5 divisions, 2 en route for France, leaving 3 in Italy. Franco-British, 7 divisions.

Total Ally---56.

Enemy forces: 46 1/2 divisions, all Austrian.

The instruction of the Italian army has been progressing since January, due to Franco-British example and influence, rather than to the independent action of the Commando Supreme. The latter have shown themselves jealous of any attempts of French and British to improve the instruction of the Italian army and it was only by arranging for an exchange, on terms of entire equality, that it was obtained to have Italian officers sent to the schools of the French and British armies in Italy.

The weak point of the Italian army is its ignorance of the most modern methods of fighting, especially artillery work and liaison. There are plenty of men of capacity in all grades in the army but they have not been taught the newest methods. What prevents this is alleged Italian pride and susceptibilities.

The private soldier is brave, self sacrificing, most patient under privation. He is badly led, especially at the top. The morale of the army is constantly improving and is now good. The disaster in October was more due---at least in its extent---to faulty military dispositions than to any treason or propaganda. The latter causes, freely alleged at first, are now seen to be small as compared with the military vices existing and faults committed. This is the view of the British, French and American observers and of most Italian officers. Just after the disaster, socialists, clericals, civilians in the rear, generals at the front---each found in the other the causes of the defeat. The matter is now better understood.

The Commander-in-Chief at the time was Gen. Cadorna. He was relieved and at first sent to represent Italy at Versailles. He is now replaced there by Gen. Giordino. Gen. Diaz took the place of Commander-in-Chief with Gen. Badoglio as assistant. The British and French have no great confidence in Gen. Diaz as a general, and his pride and distance do not make for good cooperation.

The Italians do not like the French; they want their divisions in Italy, indeed claim it as a right, but show no gratitude. They have none of this resentment toward the British but even to them show little appreciation of the aid they sent.

The Italians have persistently exaggerated the number both of German and Austrian divisions on their front and have constantly asserted that a great offensive and preparing there. Yesterday, March 29, the Chief of Staff of the French army in Italy asserted that he saw no reason to expect an Austrian offensive in the near future---there were no signs of it. The Austrians are only too glad to be let alone.

The British and French Generals-in-Chief and their officers work in perfect harmony in Italy. Both have striven earnestly and tactfully to help the Italians, especially in the matter of instruction and in correcting vital defects in locating lines and occupying them. The lower Italian officers willingly accept and sought this cooperation but Gen. Diaz has refused it as far as he could.

The morale of the interior is better now than it was before the disaster of October and the army and the interior act and react on each other in a healthy way.

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Les Armees Francaises, Tome VI, Vol. 1, Annexes 2d Vol.: General Directive

### ***General Directives for the Coordination of French and British Operations***

[Editorial Translation]

General Staff  
No. 10

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED ARMIES,  
March 30, 1918.

The following directives have been decided upon with a view to coordinating the operations of the British and French armies at the point which they have now reached:

In the present battle the Allied armies continue to have the job of stopping the enemy above all else; close liaison will be maintained between the British and French armies, particularly by the occupation of Amiens, then by having absolute disposal of this locality.

The following will aim at this result:

1. Maintenance and organization of a sound defensive front, on the positions now held.

The armies should attain this objective with the troops at their disposal. For the time being we cannot consider relieving large units, for this would play into the hands of the enemy, leading us into a battle of attrition and would prevent establishing a mass of maneuver.

2. Constitution of strong reserves for maneuver to reply to the attack of the enemy or take the offensive. These reserves to be constituted as follows:

North of Amiens by the British forces;

North and northeast of Beauvais (west of the line Beauvais---Crevecœur---Poix) by the French forces.

It is really in the latter region that it is expedient to organize the command of French reserves as well as regulate their arrival by march and rail.

3. In order to constitute this mass of maneuver as strongly and quickly as possible. troops should be resolutely drawn from fronts not under attack. All measures should be taken accordingly.

The Commanders-in-Chief are requested to be good enough to advise me as to the measures that they prescribe to the above effect, as soon as they are decided upon.

FOCH.

-----

Les Armees Francaises, Tome VI, Vol. 1, Annexes 2d Vol.: Letter

***Supplement to Decision Adopted March 26***

[Editorial Translation]

General Staff

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,  
March 31, 1918.

General Foch to the Minister of War

Prompted solely by the demands of the present situation, I am submitting the attached memorandum to you.

Would you be good enough to inform me as to your reaction to my recommendation.

---

MEMORANDUM

In order to gain the best results from the strategic combination on the various fronts as well as power in the present battle it seems necessary to supplement the decision adopted March 26 in the following respects:

1. It would be expedient to request the Italian Government to give its assent to this arrangement with a view to having the operations on the Italian front incorporated in the overall scheme of the contemplated strategic combinations and hence the movements of the troops between this front and the French-British front as well.

2. To complete, under this arrangement, the terms defining the function of General Foch: "To coordinate the action of the Allied armies on the western front. For the purpose of accomplishing this an arrangement will be reached by him with the Commanders-in-Chief who are invited to furnish him all necessary information."

By the following terms:

"He is instructed at the same time to direct the total operations in conformity with the views of the governments to apportion the offensive and defensive missions among the various fronts and make appropriate allotment of the necessary supplies to those fronts. He has the authority to inform the commanders in chief of the directives which shall result from these duties and to see to their execution. The commanders-in-chiefs will continue to direct the conduct of the operations on their various fronts."

3. It is of course understand that if the point of view set forth in paragraph 2 is accepted, it is the final draft of the British and French Governments that should be submitted to the Italian Government.

FOCH.

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***Troop Requirements of an Army***

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, March 31, 1918.*

ORGANIZATION OF AN ARMY BASED ON FORCES NOW IN FRANCE AND ARRIVAL OF 360,000  
INFANTRY AND MACHINE GUNS

1. Three hundred sixty thousand infantry and machine guns are equivalent to twenty-one divisions.

NOTE: While all these units may be used at first as combat organizations, it is expected that infantrymen will be withdrawn for replacements.

The foregoing are therefore equivalent to 3 1/2 army corps.

2. To complete the organization of these 3 1/2 army corps, including the proper proportion of army troops the following will be necessary:

(a) Auxiliary divisional troops:		
Division Headquarters	5,000	
Artillery	104,500	
Engineers	35,600	
Signal Troops	10,200	
Divisional Train	60,100	
Total Divisional Troops		215,400
(b) Army Corps Troops:		
Infantry pioneers	11,940	
Cavalry	11,050	
Artillery	8,000	
Engineers	6,800	
Aviation	3,500	
Miscellaneous	3,000	
Total Army Corps Troops		44,290
(c) Army Troops:		
Infantry Pioneers	29,000	
Artillery, all classes	36,000	
Sanitary Units	3,500	
Signal Troops	1,500	
Engineers	8,500	
Aviation	3,500	
Miscellaneous	2,000	
Total Army Troops		84,000
(d) Total combat troops required in excess of 360,000 infantry		343,690

The foregoing total is subdivided as follows:

Artillery	148,500
Engineers	50,900
Signal	11,700
Trains including sanitary	63,600
Cavalry	11,050
Infantry pioneers	40,940
Aviation	7,000
Miscellaneous	10,000

(e) Service of Supply troops required for this force	268,411
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3. Replacements needed:

(a) Now needed and also for period of eight months for troops now in France	47,000
(b) For infantry of 360,000 men for eight months	96,000
(c) For other arms for eight months	15,000
Total	158,000

(d) In case of all 360,000 infantry are retained as combat units additional divisional replacements will be needed.	140,000
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4. (a) Forces now in France	300,000
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RECAPITULATION

(a) Infantry and machine-gun units to be sent separately (3 1/2 corps)	360,000
(b) Combat units required to complete army (army of 27 combat and replacement divisions)	343,690
(c) Service of supply personnel required for above army	268,411
(d) Replacements for above army for eight months	158,000
Total to be shipped	1,130,101

NOTE: In case all of the 360,000 infantry are retained as combat units additional replacements	140,000
Total to be shipped	1,270,101
Forces in France	300,000
Grand total for completion of army	1,570,101

[Unsigned]

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***Formation of a Division Composed of Marines***

No. 1020-R

A. G. O., WAR DEPARTMENT,  
Washington, D. C., April 1, 1918.

PERSHING, AMEXFORCE

[Extract]

\* \* \* \* \*

7. Do you desire the present force of marines in France increased by addition of other units now on trial as infantry and what are your desires in regard to formation of a division composed of marines for infantry and machine-gun units with its artillery and auxiliaries taken from army? March.

\* \* \* \* \*

McCAIN.

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Les Armees Francaises, Tome VI, 1st Vol., Annexes, 3d Vol.: Letter

***Foch Demands Increased Power***

[Editorial Translation]

General Staff  
No. 34

FRENCH GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,  
April 1, 1918.

General Foch to the Minister of War

I have no reason to complain of anyone. I am carrying the heaviest responsibility, the burden of which was placed upon me though I did not ask for it, which implies a commensurate liberty.

However, nowadays, I run up against vexing delays because I have to persuade (which is not always easy) instead of directing. So that, too often, it is somewhat difficult for me to obtain the execution of measures which I hold to be pressing or even immediately necessary.

This is why a power of direction superior to the one I now possess with regard to the Commanders-in-Chief seems to me indispensable to achieve success.

FOCH.

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### ***Extension of the French Front***

[Editorial Translation]

General Staff

FRENCH GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,  
*Dury, April 1, 1918--3:30 a. m.*

I. The French will relieve the British during the night of April 1/2 as far as the valley just south of the Amiens-Roye Road (the valley to the British).

II. The French will relieve the British during the night of April 2/3 as far as Hangard (Hangard to the French).

III. After these reliefs the French will be responsible for the defense of the Luce Valley and the region to the south.

The British will remain responsible for the defense of the Villers-Bretonneux Plateau.

IV. The boundary limits will be as follows:

Hangard (French)---Domard (French)---bridge and road of Boves (common to the two armies)---Bois de Boves (British)---Sains (French)---Bacouel (French)---then railroad to Poix (French).

The British establishments south of this line will remain in position.

V. All arrangements for the reliefs indicated above will be made by direct agreements between the French First Army and the British Fifth Army.

VI. Effective at once the British Fifth Army is returned to the control of the marshal commanding the British troops in France.

FOCH.

-----

Les Armees Francaises, Tome VI, 1st Vol., Annexes 3d Vol.: Report

### ***Intentions of the Enemy***

[Editorial Translation]

2d Section

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,  
FRENCH ARMIES OF THE NORTH AND NORTHEAST,  
*April 1, 1918.*

[Extract]

There has been little change north of the Somme or between Montdidier and the OISE for the last 5 days, and from the SOMME to MONTDIDIER for the last 3 days.

There is a tendency toward stabilization of the attack front.

The enemy was very probably planning to separate the British from the French by an initial rapid breakthrough of the front between ARRAS and the OISE, to reach AMIENS on the 4th day (corroborating statements obtained by special interrogations of prisoners).

On the 6th day (26th) an attack in CHAMPAGNE between the REIMS area and the SUIPPE. Another [attack?] in LORRAINE would weaken that front, from which French reserves have already been withdrawn. The entire French military structure at the front, obliged to retreat, would be followed by the German armies.

But the rapid rupture of the front between ARRAS and the OISE is not being accomplished. The French are succeeding in reestablishing the situation south of the SOMME at the point where it was the most endangered and where they were on the verge of being separated from the British on the 3d day.

They are maintaining a liaison which appears secure, no matter what may happen.

The Germans are giving up, for a time at least, the offensive planned in CHAMPAGNE. Between the 21st and 31st, they engaged most of the divisions they had in reserve in rear of that front and even took one division off the line on that very front.

\* \* \* \* \*

Hence the Germans do not seem to be persisting in their initial plan to march on AMIENS on both banks of the SOMME. Will they continue to direct their main effort south of the SOMME, combining it with an attack on ARRAS and one on the left bank of the OISE?

With the exception of the difficult crater zone, in this extension of the attack they would have the advantage of their incontestable numerical superiority over the Franco-British before the latter could gain a hold on the terrain.

It will be observed that the Germans still have at their disposal at the present, beside what they have put in line, 29 fresh divisions of which at least 19 are already at hand at the scene of the fighting; that they could easily set aside 15 divisions by reducing the density of the quiet sectors;\* that they can, after a certain delay, bring back from Russia 12 to 15 divisions, which adds up to a total of 55 to 60 divisions without counting those set free by the replacement of the divisions in sector by divisions from the front.

The assumption of an extension of the front is therefore very plausible.

Besides, it is possible for the Germans to commit a larger proportion of forces in the main zone of attack between the SOMME and the OISE to renew a powerful attack of the breakthrough type.

\* \* \* \* \*

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Les Armees Francaises, Tome VI, 1st Vol., Annexes, 3d Vol.: Letter

### ***Necessity for Unified Command***

[Editorial Translation]

*April 1, 1918.*

Mr. President [of the Council of Ministers]:

[Extract]

As far as can be judged today the enemy offensive from ARRAS to MONTDIDIER and to the OISE seems to be checked; only a few local operations are still being carried out. If the offensive is resumed on a larger scale but with only those means permitted by a rapid advance, the arrival of our reserves, more numerous each day, will enable us to stop it.

To overcome the obstacle facing him the enemy may have recourse to an attack with much heavy artillery. The preparations for such an operation will require considerable time, during which the improvement of our installations and the reinforcement of our artillery will enable us to meet it.

---

\* A larger number by using in sector some Austrian divisions.

Therefore, from today on, the enemy's initiative can be considered as having been checked.

But the final situation which will result for us from the check of his offensive deserves to be anticipated and given some degree of study.

From certain points of his front the enemy will be able to reach, with his long range artillery at least, important communication centers such as Amiens, St-Just. Undoubtedly it will be necessary to drive him off, which will bring about local offensives on our part.

A more general offensive would be justified by the necessity of retaking from him the region recently captured before he has had time to effect a systematic and complete defensive organization.

In short, on the Franco-British front it will be necessary to execute either local or major offensives. They will also be governed by the state of our available means and by the forces we and our Allies can devote to them. The operations will have to be considered from the standpoint of comparative results and costs.

At that time also the political situation will come up for consideration. The question may be asked whether, after having checked the German army, it would not be more telling for the dissolution of the enemy coalition, to strike a blow in Austria, in Italy.

The enumeration of these various questions, the answers to which brook no delay, proves the necessity for a comprehensive study of the war of the Entente and for a direction of the war.

It is for this reason that it is not enough to coordinate the actions of the British and French armies as is prescribed in the Doullens Agreement, but that to this function must be added the mission of directing the war in conformity with the views of the governments, with military means adequate for the required efforts, if it is desired to pursue the objectives assigned by politics, and that the directing agency be given sufficient authority over the Commanders-in-Chief.

The agreement of April 1 in Dury which necessitated the presence of Marshal Haig and General Foch to settle the matter of one division shows once more the paralysis of our system when this authority is lacking.

\* \* \* \* \*

FOCH.

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Les Armees Francaises, Tome VI, 1st Vol., Annexes 3d Vol.: Memorandum

### ***British Fifth Army to Hold Out in its Present Positions***

[Editorial Translation]

General Staff  
No. 30

FRENCH GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,  
*April 1, 1918--9:30 a. m.*

#### **MEMORANDUM FOR MARSHAL HAIG**

As has been demonstrated in the course of March 21 the two French armies surrounding Montdidier are in full action. It is also in the direction of Montdidier that the Germans have made their main effort. Consequently it is to these armies that the command must devote unconditionally all available troops, even those kept in second line.

On the other hand the retention of the line Demuin-Hamel is absolutely indispensable for the possession of Amiens. It can be assured only by the British Fifth Army.

In the circumstances you will doubtless agree with me that it is essential to maintain the Fifth Army on its present front. Therefore I request that you issue firm directions once more to the general commanding the army to hold out at all costs on his present positions and to place at his disposal sufficient troops to enable him to fulfill this mission.

FOCH.

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SWC: 376-1: Agreement

***Authority of General Foch Extended***

MINUTES OF A CONFERENCE HELD AT THE HOTEL DE VILLE, BEAUVAIS, ON  
WEDNESDAY, APRIL 3, 1918, AT 3:15 p. m.

[Extract]

PRESENT

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau, President of the  
Council, Minister of War.

General Foch, G. C. B., Chief of  
the Staff

General Petain, Commander-in-Chief  
of the Armies of the North and  
Northeast.

GREAT BRITAIN

The Right Hon. D. Lloyd George,  
M. P., Prime Minister

Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig  
K. T., G. C. B., G. C. V. O.,  
K. C. I. E., Commander-in-Chief  
British Armies in France

General Sir H. H. Wilson,  
K. C. B., D. S. O., Chief of  
the Imperial General Staff.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

General J. J. Pershing, Commander-in-  
Chief, American Expeditionary Force

General Bliss, Permanent Military  
Representative, Supreme War Council

Brigadier General E. O. Spiers, M. C., Interpreter.

Lieutenant Colonel Sir M. P. A. Hankey, K. C. B., Secretary

COORDINATION OF THE HIGHER COMMAND ON THE WESTERN FRONT

M. Clemenceau said that the subject of discussion was a very simple one and related to the agreement reached by the British and the French Governments at Doullens on March 26, 1918, which had subsequently been accepted by the American Government. Since Field Marshal Haig and General Petain had succeeded in checking the German attack, this scheme had worked well. The situation now, however, was developing, and a stage had been reached when it was necessary to define, with greater precision, the position of the general of the Coalition, as he would like to call General Foch. Mr. Lloyd George was in London, and he himself was in Paris. The Commanders-in-Chief of the British and French armies were very busy with their own operations. Hence it was necessary to decide on the means for ensuring

that the coordination of the two armies was carried out with promptitude and energy. In fact, a decision was required as to whether the Doullens arrangement should stand as it was, or whether it required widening. He suggested that General Foch should explain his views to the conference.

Mr. Lloyd George asked that General Foch, in giving his views, would particularly specify in what respects he considered that the Doullens arrangement conferred insufficient authority on him to coordinate the action of the two armies.

General Foch reminded the conference that the Doullens arrangement stated that he was charged with coordinating the action of the Allied armies on the western front. This implied that if there were no action there was nothing to coordinate. If the French were taking no action, and if the British army were taking no action, it was impossible to coordinate their action. Consequently something more was now wanted. He required the power to imply an idea of action to the Commanders-in-Chief, and to have this action carried out. In fact, before coordinating he must have the power of creating action. For this reason the text of the Doullens arrangement was insufficient, and should be made to include "power for the infusion of an idea of action." Moreover, it was not so much necessary to coordinate the action itself as the preparation of action. In quiet times it was necessary to create an idea around which the preparations should be made in coordination. On March 26, at Doullens, the situation was very different from what it was on April 3, at Beauvais. On the former date it was a question of coordinating action which was in full swing. On the latter date it was a question of coordinating preparation for future action. On March 26 our armies were submitting to a battle imposed on us by the enemy, but today, at Beauvais, we were thinking of our own action. In this latter case the powers of mere coordination of action were insufficient.

General Wilson read the words of the Doullens arrangement, under which General Foch was charged "*de coordonner l'action des armees allies sur le front ouest.*" It appeared to him that, in those words, General Foch would find all the powers he required.

General Foch again insisted that, if there was no action, or no movement, there was nothing to coordinate. His requirements would be met by the insertion of some words such as "order" (*ordonner*), or "or give orders" (*donner des ordres*).

Mr. Lloyd George said that, speaking on behalf of the British public, they were very anxious to ensure that divided counsels should not end in disaster. A real effort had been made to coordinate the action of the Allies by means of the Supreme War Council and the permanent military representatives at Versailles, because it had been realized that the Germans had one army and the Allies had three. Even last year the Allies on the western front had had two strategies: Field Marshal Haig's and General Petain's.

Field Marshal Haig interpolated that, last year, he was under the orders of General Nivelle.

Mr. Lloyd George said that he did not refer to that period, although he reminded the conference that General Nivelle's strategy had achieved the most valuable results, so far as the British army was concerned, of the whole year's fighting, since it had put the Allies in possession of the Vimy Ridge and the country east of Arras.\* What he had referred to, however, were the operations later in the year, when Field Marshal Haig had been fighting in Flanders and General Petain's army had been carrying out operations with limited objectives at considerable intervals. The consequence was that, although the Allies had had a superiority against the Germans of something approaching 3 to 2, they had,

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\* In returning the draft minutes, Field Marshal Sir D. Haig asked that the following note might be added to the *proces-verbal*: "With reference to Mr. Lloyd George's statement that 'it (Nivelle's strategy) had put the Allies in possession of Vimy Ridge,' Sir D. Haig interrupted, and stated that the British army attacked and captured the Vimy Ridge contrary to the advice of General Nivelle, who wished that the left flank of the British attack should be on the south of the River Scarpe. Also that the one complaint brought against the field marshal at the famous Calais Conference was that he (the field marshal) insisted in attacking the Vimy Ridge in spite of his (Nivelle's) remonstrance."

in fact, achieved very little. In their recent offensive, however, the Germans, though probably not superior in numbers, had achieved this very considerable result, and this was mainly due to their unity of control. Versailles had been set up with the object of securing a similar unity of action, but it had not been in full operation when this offensive commenced and none of its decisions had been carried out. Whatever had resulted from the recent actions must be credited entirely to the old system for coordinating the higher command. What he was apprehensive of was that the Allied Governments would today merely reach a new formula without achieving any real unity of command. The British public wanted, and intended, to know whether there was real unity. What we had now to decide was that General Foch should really have all the powers he needed. He said that the British public entirely believed in General Foch, as proved by the way in which his appointment had been received in the press. Of course, if General Foch should put the British army in great peril, Field Marshal Haig would appeal to his own government, and no paper that could be drawn up could prevent this. Consequently, there was no objection to some words being put in to this effect. Unless he had the necessary power, however, General Foch would prove worse than useless. He said he would much like to hear the views of the American generals on the subject, more particularly as General Bliss and General Pershing now had a special claim to attention, since the army of the United States of America would be fighting side by side with their Allies under President Wilson's recent decision.

General Bliss said that two facts specially struck him. The first was that at Doullens the two Allied Governments principally concerned, namely, those with the greatest stakes on the western front, had come to an agreement which, he understood, had been accepted with cordiality by all concerned. Their agreement had been to the effect that it was necessary to create an organ of command which had not existed before. Under that agreement power was given to one designated officer, who was charged with the responsibility for coordinating the action of the Allied armies on the western front. It was inconceivable that the governments concerned should have given him this great charge without meaning to give him the necessary powers. According to the agreement, the designated officer was to come to an understanding with the Commanders-in-Chiefs concerned, and they were to give him all the necessary information. Why was this latter provision inserted? Evidently in order to enable him to issue instructions based on the information given. The second point which impressed him was that the designated officer now found himself unable to comply with his orders to carry out the duties of coordination entrusted to him. He could not conceive how the responsibility could be imposed on the designated officer without the necessary powers. He believed that a reasonable interpretation of the "Agreement of Doullens," a copy of which he had before him, gave to the designated officer full powers to effect the coordinated military action of all forces on the western front, with the duty of doing which that officer was charged by the Doullens Agreement, both now and for the future, until the Allied Governments rescinded that agreement. But, from what had been said at this conference this afternoon, it appeared that there was some doubt as to the correct interpretation of the powers conferred upon the designated officer by the document accepted at Doullens. His own opinion, therefore, was that if any doubt existed, the terms of the original agreement should be altered so that he should have full powers.

General Pershing said that it appeared to him that we had now reached a point in the war where entire cooperation of the Allied armies should be assured. As a matter of principle, he knew no way to ensure such cooperation except by a single command. It was impossible for two or three Commanders-in-Chief, whose commands were spread over such a huge front, by themselves to coordinate their activities unless the armies were under one head. The experiments in this direction had already gone far enough. They had proved completely that coordination was impossible. Each general had his own responsibilities to think of. Success from now onwards would depend upon the Allies having a single command.

Field Marshal Haig said he was in entire agreement with what General Pershing said. There should be only one head in France. His own instructions from the British Government were to take his ideas of strategy from the French Commander-in-Chief, although he was

responsible for the safety of the British army. Consequently, he had always, subject, of course, to the orders of the British Government, looked to the Commander-in-Chief of the French army for his strategical ideas. It would be very easy to insert in the agreement what General Foch required, and he thought that General Wilson's draft was satisfactory. What was really needed, however, was that the Commanders-in-Chief should work whole-heartedly and willingly in the closest cooperation with General Foch.

M. Clemenceau then read a draft of a new agreement based on proposals made by General Wilson. (See conclusion below)

Mr. Lloyd George accepted this on behalf of the British Government.

General Petain pointed out that the provision as regards the tactical conduct of the armies could not, in practice, at present apply to the American army, since, under the latest arrangement made with General Pershing, the American army would be working tactically with the British and French armies. He suggested words should be inserted to show that this would not apply to the American army until it consisted of three or four army corps and had assumed autonomy. It was generally agreed, however, that as a practical working proposition it was unnecessary to insert General Petain's proposal.

General Bliss and Pershing accepted the agreement, subject to the approval of their government, and asked that words might be inserted to make it applicable to the American as well as to the British and French Government and army.

#### Conclusion

The conference decided that:

The arrangement for the coordination of the higher command on the western front, concluded at Doullens on March 26, 1918, should be superseded by the following arrangement:

\* \* \* \* \*

(English text): [Contemporary]

General Foch is charged by the British, French, and American Governments with the coordination of the action of the Allied armies on the western front. To this end all powers necessary to secure effective realization are conferred on him. The British, French, and American Governments for this purpose entrust to General Foch the strategic direction of military operations. The Commanders-in-Chief of the British, French, and American armies have full control of the tactical employment of their forces. Each Commander-in-Chief will have the right of appeal to his government if in his opinion the safety of his army is compromised by any order received from General Foch.

\* \* \* \* \*

2, Whitehall Gardens, S. W.  
April 4, 1918.

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SWC: 315-1: Cablegram

***Results of a Conference at Beauvais***

No. 76-S

AMERICAN SECTION, SUPREME WAR COUNCIL,  
*Versailles, Seine-et-Oise, April 3, 1918.*

[Extract]

AGWAR, WASHINGTON

FOR ACTING CHIEF OF STAFF. Not to be made public

\* \* \* \* \*

2. For the President, Secretary of War and Acting Chief of Staff. In the conference at Doullens on March 26, General Foch was charged with the responsibility of coordinating the military action on the western front but he was not specifically given full power to do this. The result has been what might have been expected. He has been obliged to persuade the Allied commanders when he ought to have had the power to give them orders. Yesterday General Pershing and myself were requested by Mr. Lloyd George and M. Clemenceau to attend a conference at Beauvais at about noon, today. There were present Mr. Lloyd George, M. Clemenceau, and Generals Haig, Petain, Foch, Wilson, Pershing and Bliss. The following agreement was made with perfect unanimity and cordiality. [See preceding document for text of agreement.]

\* \* \* \* \*

BLISS.

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Cable: A-1036-R

***British Tonnage Available in April and Later Months***

No. A-1036-R

A. G. O., WAR DEPARTMENT,  
*Washington, D. C., April 3, 1918.*

PERSHING AMEXFORCE

The following extract of a cablegram from the British Ministry of shipping to their representative in the United States is repeated for your information.

We have informed war cabinet that in shipping provided by Great Britain we shall be able to embark in America in April some 60,000 men, Admiral Sims' estimate of carrying power of American troop fleet is 52,000 per month. In addition there is certain Dutch tonnage available for use by America and we are obtaining use of certain Italian tonnage. In total it is considered that 120,000 American troops can be embarked in April and, if anything, rather more in following months. In view of urgent military needs and Lord Reading has approached the President with the view of obtaining dispatch of 120,000 infantry per month to Europe between now and July, infantry and machine-gun units only.



Men to be brigaded with British and French divisions on the same basis as in the case of six-division plan. This means using all troop carrying ships to carry American infantry without reference to recent controversies. The President agrees that all possible measures must be taken to insure maximum use of troop tonnage.

This program would practically stop all shipments of artillery, technical units, service of rear, army, and corps troops. It is requested that you cable at once what arrangements, if any, you have made with British and French for the supply and maintenance and land transportation of the infantry and machine-gun units that are now being given preferential transportation as far as practicable in accordance with General Bliss' cable number 67. [March 28, 1918] Your attention is invited to my cable Number 40 [March 30, 1918] to General Bliss which was requested to be repeated promptly to you. Repeat promptly to General Bliss. March.

McCAIN.

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P Cables

***Use of Marines***

No. 850-S

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*April 3, 1918.*

AGWAR, WASHINGTON

VIA ANGLO

[Extract]

1.

\* \* \* \* \*

C. With reference to paragraph 7 your cablegram 1020 please see paragraph 14 my cablegram 133. My views as expressed in last sentence of that cablegram are unchanged. The larger the force of marines in France the more complicated will be the system of supply, accounts, promotions, et cetera. The marine brigade here gives such representation as might, for the sake of sentiment, be desired for that corps in France. They are a fine corps, officers and men. If more can be spared from their statutory duties they should be discharged from the navy and taken over by the army.

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PERSHING.

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***Contemplated Increase in American Military Effort***

No. 43

A. G. O., WAR DEPARTMENT,  
Washington, D. C., April 5, 1918.

AMERICAN SECTION, SUPREME WAR COUNCIL, VERSAILLES

1. Acting upon the call of the Interallied Supreme War Council for the fullest possible immediate American military participation the President has decided after consultation with representatives of England and France and heads of government departments to increase our military efforts as follows:

(1) A minimum of 91,000 troops will be shipped overseas monthly commencing April 1. Every available American transport, the transports loaned by the British, and American and British liners will be used for this movement. We understand England to have guaranteed besides sufficient additional tonnage to carry at least 29,000 additional troops per month. This makes a total of 120,000 troops per month as a minimum.

(2) A cargo movement will be carried out consisting of the necessary engineering materiel for ports and lines of communication, such parts of the aviation and ordnance program as will be ready for shipment including replacement materials 438,000 long tons for France and 50,000 long tons for England, quartermaster, medical and miscellaneous supplies for monthly increments of 91,000 men, plus maintenance of our troops now in France and the establishment of reserves. Great Britain to furnish the materials and supplies for the additional troops according to her agreement as fully stated in Pershing's Cablegram Number 596 dated February 12, and Number 705 dated March 10.

A. After careful study of all tonnage requirements of the United States it is clear that this movement can be carried out, but only with the greatest difficulty. The execution of the undertaking is subject to the provision that we retain all neutral tonnage now employed in the service of the United States, that the submarine sinkings do not develop to an unusual extent above the present losses, that the Emergency Fleet Corporation's promised deliveries of ships be carried out, and that the import reductions now planned be not impeded. All tonnage owned or controlled by the United States will be required by the shipping board to meet the military program and other imperative needs and command of ships loaned to France and Italy will not now be disturbed but we must utilize all Dutch ships requisitioned in our harbors to meet our present program. We cannot divert any additional tonnage without impairing the military program to which we are thus definitely committed. British and French Ambassadors notified. Send copy of this cable by officer to General Pershing. March.

McCAIN.

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***Request for Title to use on Official Communications***

[Editorial Translation]

General Staff  
No. 92

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED ARMIES,  
*April 5, 1918.*

General Foch, Chief of the General Staff of the Army

To the Minister of War

[Extract]

I have the honor to ask you to be kind enough to let me have a copy of the Beauvais agreement, dated April 3, confirming my mission as set forth by the Doullens Agreement and adding the necessary powers enabling me to fulfill it.

I would like to avail myself of the present opportunity to request that you let me know in an official letter the title I am to assume with the armies in official written communications. The only title I hold at present, that of Chief of the General Staff of the army, whose functions are set forth in Paris by executive decree and for whose duties no provisions are made in the armies, is insufficient to justify certain orders or instructions which I have occasion to give.

The title could be replaced by that of commander of the Allied armies.

At the same time the position of my general staff with the armies could be set forth. \* \* \*

FOCH.

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SWC: 315-1: Cablegram

***Query from Secretary of War Concerning Shipping Arrangements***

No. 79-S

AMERICAN SECTION, SUPREME WAR COUNCIL,  
*Versailles, Seine-et-Oise, April 5, 1918---Midnight.*

THE ADJUTANT GENERAL, WASHINGTON

1. The Secretary of War directs that you hand this following message to the President as early as practicable and cable his reply direct to me for the Secretary: The reply should reach here by Saturday evening April 6.

To the President: Mr. Lloyd George read to General Bliss and General Pershing on Wednesday, April 3, a cablegram from Lord Reading which reported that in an interview with him you agreed to the transportation in American and British ships, of infantry and machine-gun units to the extent of one hundred and twenty thousand a month for four months. I have General March's cablegram Number thirty-nine informing me of your approval of resolutions of Supreme War Council as recommended by me in Bliss Cablegram Number sixty-seven, March 28, but no

numbers of troops are stipulated in those resolutions. As I am to confer with British and General Pershing on Sunday morning to arrange details it would be helpful if I could have particulars of any agreements reached with Lord Reading and particularly numbers of infantry and machine-gun units per month and for how many months, if such details are definitely arranged. Baker.

BLISS.

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Cable: A-1048-R

***Tonnage Increase***

A. G. O., WAR DEPARTMENT,  
Washington, D. C., April 6, 1918.

Pershing, Amexforce

It has been necessary for the War Department to give positive assurances that you will be able to unload promptly monthly shipments April to December inclusive aggregating 5,680,000 tons. All estimate of cargo movements based upon 60 day turnaround. Tonnage in army cargo service to be increased by 140,000 tons dead weight of Dutch ships. Further increase will be made therefore to meet your increasing requirements as set forth in the schedule of cargo movements. This procedure will entail many sacrifices and some hardships which cannot possibly be justified except by most efficient use of the ships turned over to army service. If army cargo ships are delayed in French ports for an average period exceeding [two weeks], the utmost difficulty will be experienced in securing from month to month the required number of additional ships. I realize fully the difficulty confronting you but hope that in the light of a complete understanding relative to our position you will be able to secure assistance from the French and British that will be required in order to meet rapidly increasing demands which will be made upon you. Hereafter your priority schedules covering monthly shipments from our ports should equal in the aggregate the monthly shipments set forth in the Cable Number 43 to Bliss. In accordance with your request H. H. Raymond member of Shipping Control Committee leaves New York on Wednesday for France. Send copy to Bliss. March.

McCAIN.

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***Priority of Infantry***

Operations Section

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, April 6, 1918.*

MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF OF STAFF

1. This cable 1036-R shows that the British are endeavoring to extend the principle of priority of infantry until July. The cable also indicates that the British hope that their shipping and our own will be able to transport 120,000 infantry and machine-gun personnel per month during the three months involved.

2. The cable does not indicate that the French and Italians are cooperating with the British in insisting on this project. Based on past experience however, it may be assumed that both the French and Italians have joined the British in the representations made by the latter.

3. The phrase in the cable "The President agrees that all possible measures must be taken to insure maximum use of troop tonnage" appears clearly to indicate not only that our government is not yet wholly committed to this project, but that the administration desires the recommendations of its military advisors before formulating its course of action.

4. It is known that the incorporation of Americans in British units is the only alternative to an early reduction in the number of British units. The gradual reduction in the strength of their units which the British foresaw last spring was undoubtedly one of the causes which led to their written proposal to draft our men under their colors.

It is well to inquire whether or not the present project will not in the end accomplish what was proposed and rejected last spring.

5. The British have already lost not less than 250,000 men in the present battle. Even before the present battle the British units were below strength. While by combining the manpower of Britain it may be possible to replace the present losses it is impossible that Britain can replace the further losses which she is to suffer.

As a consequence we may expect the British to attempt to hold any of our units incorporated under their colors; for only by so doing can they avoid reducing the number of British divisions.

The natural conclusion appears to be that from the standpoint of forming our own forces it is at least as easy to resist incorporating our soldiers with the British as it will be to secure the return of our units once we have brigaded them with the British.

6. The 360,000 infantry and machine-gun personnel which are involved in the present project represent the contingents of those arms required for 21 divisions. To complete the organization so that we may bring these 360,000 officers and soldiers together with American forces, we must bring over [542,592]\* other troops including army corps, army and service supply troops. In addition, we are now 22,120 short in these latter categories. The total excess required over the 360,000 infantry and machine guns is thus 564,710 officers and soldiers.

In addition, before all these troops can be brought over the replacements which we shall need will amount to about 158,000.

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\* [Bracketed change in figures appears in pencil on document, and following 3 sentences are lined out in pencil.]

It will thus be not less than 7 months after July 1 before we could completely re-assemble our forces if the project is accepted.

7. But the delay in assembling our troops is not the most serious side of the question. Should we accept the plan it must be with the fullest realization that we will be totally unable to supply our troops or to exercise anything more than a purely fictitious control over these officers and soldiers for many months after July 1, 1918. Instead of relieving us from a burden, acquiescence in such a plan delivers over 360,000 officers and soldiers to foreign commanders, down to include the regiment, but leaves us unable to evade ultimate responsibility. There is no precedent for such a plan in all the history of equal nations. Great Britain did not even follow such a course with her dependencies, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, but formed the contingents from those countries in complete divisions and army corps,

8. If the proposed plan be adopted, only continuous success could avoid the resentment of our people at seeing our soldiers incorporated on a wholesale scale under other colors. It is understood that the press representatives have shown a tendency to formulate criticisms that after nearly a year we have no independence.

These moral factors cannot be neglected and there is no certainty, and in fact little probability, that 360,000 infantry and machine guns can definitely turn the present Allied situation into a decisive victory.

9. Infantry alone cannot stop the German. However, much we may need the tutelage of the British and the French, we need not fear to assert that troops of all arms are as essential in the defense as in the attack.

10. The only hope of really winning this war lies in an American army. The formation of that army is a paramount consideration and any scheme which postpones the organization of our army, and which virtually eliminates the possibility of carrying on the training of our higher officers and staffs in conjunction with that of the troops, is fundamentally unsound.

11. In developing the army not the least essential element is the development of the service of supply, including its staff. That service is already short of its proper ratio of troops. We are even now unable to operate the trains which feed our troops.

The present project stagnates the service of supply and, in short, means that not until the summer of 1919, if then, could we hope to handle our own supply.

12. The present call upon us may be likened to the calls made by local commanders for reserves during battle. The commander who accedes to all these local calls uses up his reserves piecemeal and prematurely, and is beaten. America possesses the only potential reserve. Even though that reserve should not be exhausted its use piecemeal is nonetheless a grave mistake. Even though such piecemeal employment of our forces should against all precedent result in a tactical victory, America would not accomplish her object. America must have a voice in the peace councils if a peace satisfactory to her is to be formulated. She will have no such voice if her forces are used up by putting her battalions in French and British units.

13. Familiarity with past events forces us, willingly or unwillingly, to the conclusion that both the British and the French are determined to delay in every possible way the organization of a purely American force under American command. Although such a belief is mortifying, the undersigned believes that in acting thus the British and French, actuated by the highest motives, are convinced that we are incapable of handling large forces. If we are incapable, then the war is lost, for neither our people nor our soldiers will consent to the indefinite virtual drafting of our men under foreign colors.

14. The method of pushing this project is very similar to that adopted in other cases. First an opening is obtained here or in Washington and then a further development is sought at the other end.

15. The execution of the present project ends any hope of forming even a single army corps this year, if indeed it does not end all hope of seeing an American army in this war.

16. No action in rejecting this proposal can be too energetic.

FOX CONNER,  
Colonel, General Staff,  
Asst. Chief of Staff, G-3.

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Les Armees Francaises, Tome VI, 1st Vol., Annexes 3d Vol.: Letter

***Measures to Ward off an Enemy Offensive on the Bethune-Arras Front***

[Editorial Translation]

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS BRITISH ARMIES IN THE FIELD,  
*April 6, 1918.*

To General Foch

My dear General

Our intelligence all indicates that the enemy intends to continue his efforts to destroy the British army.

With this in view it appears that he is preparing a force of 25 to 35 infantry divisions to deal a serious blow on the Bethune-Arras front.

To meet this attack all British forces available will be required including the troops located in the sector south of the Somme.

With regard to this threatening situation I recommend the execution without delay of one of the three following propositions:

1. A vigorous offensive by the French armies within the next 5 or 6 days, on a large scale, so as to divert the enemy reserves; or
2. The relief by the French of the British troops south of the Somme, a total of 4 infantry divisions; or
3. A groupement of 4 French infantry divisions to be moved to the vicinity of Saint-Pol in rear of the British front as reserves.

I would be very much obliged if you could meet me in Abbeville tomorrow at about 3 p. m. to talk over the situation.

HAIG.

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**General Headquarters will Function at Sarcus**

[Editorial Translation]

General Staff  
No. 110

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED ARMIES,  
*April 6, 1918.*

CODED TELEGRAM

General Foch

To Minister of War, Minister of Armament, French General Headquarters, French Military Mission attached to the British army and General Headquarters, French Military Mission with the Belgian army, Supreme War Council, Generals commanding the region of the North, the Third, First, Tenth, and Fifth Armies.

General Foch's Headquarters will function at Sarcus, northwest of Grandvillers, beginning at 3:30 p. m., April 7, 1918.

By order:

WEYGAND,  
Chief of Staff.

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HS, Secret Documents: Fldr. D-4: Notes

**Discussion of Agreement for Shipping Priority**

*April 7, 1918.*

[Extract]

NOTES OF CONFERENCE AT GENERAL PERSHING'S QUARTERS IN PARIS, APRIL 7, 1918

*Present*

Secretary of War Baker  
General Pershing  
Colonel Boyd

Major General R. D. Whigham  
Major General R. Hutchison

General Whigham stated that he had come to discuss arrangements for carrying out the agreement of the Supreme War Council dated March 27, whereby American infantry and machine-gun units are to be given priority of shipment. He stated that according to the present understanding, the British will be able to ship 60,000 troops per month and the Americans 60,000 making a total of 120,000 men per month beginning with the month of April.

The Secretary of War brought out that no figures were mentioned in the Versailles Agreement.

General Whigham suggested that a certain proportion of the infantry coming over would necessarily have to be kept apart as replacement troops and that these replacements



would probably be landed and kept in England, whereas the fighting troops could be sent directly to France.

The Secretary of War asked why these replacements should not be sent to France and left with General Pershing for training until needed.

General Whigham stated there would be difficulty in railroad transportation from the American sector to the British in northern France.

General Pershing stated that the American idea had been that this infantry should go to British units for training and, as soon as trained, was to be replaced by other infantry and that he had not considered the subject of replacements for troops while on this period of training.

The Secretary of War stated that he had understood that the infantry and machine-gun units were to be sent to the British for training and that as soon as trained they were to be replaced by others; that in the event of an emergency, they were to fight and that, in this case, he saw no necessity for replacements.

A discussion followed as to the recommendation of the Versailles Conference.

General Whigham insisted on the necessity for replacing at once small losses while American units are with the British troops; he suggested having a small proportion of the reserves in France and the remainder in England. He stated that the British did this way and that they would handle the American reserves in the same way; that shipping across the channel is uncertain and therefore a small proportion of the reserves should be in France.

The Secretary of War inquired as to the origin of this figure of 120,000 troops per month, and called attention to the fact that there had been no obligation on the part of the Americans to send any number of troops or for any particular period. He did not think it was clear that the original six-division decision was annulled by the Versailles Agreement; that the Versailles agreement simply was to the effect that American infantry and machine-gun units should be given priority of shipping until further orders and this further order might come tomorrow.

General Whigham stated that the interpretation of the British War Office was that the Versailles Agreement wiped out all previous agreements and that it is now a question of sending infantry and machine-gun units to be trained by British, French and Americans, the proportion to go to each army to be decided later.

The Secretary of War stated that what is pertinent to the present discussion is American troops going to the British for training; that he did not want the British public or the British army, or the French public or the French army to have an exaggerated idea that this scheme provides or will provide a means by which their losses are to be made up in the future; that he does not want any feeling of disillusionment when General Pershing calls for the return of the troops entrusted to these armies for training.

General Whigham stated that this was thoroughly understood by the British. He then outlined a scheme for placing American battalions in line, later uniting them as American regiments and still later as brigades and so on.

General Pershing asked what would become of British divisions when, in a month or so, American troops serving with them are withdrawn.

General Whigham stated that he hoped these troops would not be withdrawn so soon; that when this does happen, some British divisions will be broken up, that they also hope to get 400,000 or 500,000 troops through conscription. He talked of the gradual increase of American personnel in divisions to such a point when all the infantry might be American and artillery British. He stated that at some such period the division will be considered an American division and that there was no reason why British artillery should not serve in American divisions.

General Pershing stated that if the 120,000 men, infantry and machine-gun units, per month were shipped for three months, this would make 360,000 men. He called attention to the fact that it would take several months to bring over the additional men and build up divisions around these infantry and machine-gun organizations. \* \* \*

The Secretary of War stated that he wished the British to understand that when the Americans decide to discontinue the Versailles Agreement that the British will be notified.

General Whigham asked what proportion of the first 60,000 men to be brought over by the British might the British count on having for the present.

General Pershing stated that they should have all of them.

General Whigham insisted on the necessity of bringing them over in organized units; he stated that it is understood that these men are to come over as completely clothed and equipped as possible; that what is necessary to make up any deficiencies in clothing and equipment will be supplied by the British.

The Secretary of War insisted that the uniforms must be American.

It was also stated that the land transportation furnished for use of these troops would be kept by them and passed over to the Americans by the British when these troops are replaced in American divisions.

The Secretary of War resumed the conclusions of the meeting as follows:

That it is agreed by General Pershing that the 60,000 men to be brought over by the British in April will be turned over to the British; the disposition of the troops to be brought over in the month of May will be determined later; that the 60,000 troops to be brought over in April and turned over to the British shall include 20,000 replacement troops; that these troops are to be trained in accordance with an agreement between General Sir Douglas Haig and General Pershing; that the disposition of all troops to be brought over by the British shall be fixed by General Pershing and the British War Office; that the land transportation to be turned over by the British to the American troops is to be kept by these troops; that clothing for these troops is to be furnished by the Americans as far as possible and any deficiencies are to be made up by the British; that the British are to furnish machine guns for the machine-gun units and any units which they cannot supply with machine guns will be turned over to General Pershing.

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Les Armees Francaises, Tome VI, 1st Vol., Annexes 3d Vol.: Memorandum

### ***Concentration of French Forces West of Amiens***

[Editorial Translation]

General Staff  
No. 121

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED ARMIES,  
April 7, 1918--10:15 a. m.

I. In order to be able to intervene swiftly either in the region of Arras or of Amiens, a group of French reserves composed of:

- 1 cavalry corps (3 divisions)
- 4 infantry divisions

will be placed in the British zone west of Amiens, in the region of Conty, Poix, and to the north.

The Marshal Commander-in-Chief of the British armies will kindly indicate the billeting areas available for these units so that their movement can be effected without delay.

II. In the event of a powerful enemy attack in the Arras area, the manner contemplated in the first place for the employment of the French forces indicated above being that of freeing British reserves, these forces will be disposed so as to enable them to move easily by marching in a northeast direction. This movement will have to be prepared.

FOCH.

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Les Armees Francaises Tome VI, 1st Vol., Annexes 3d Vol.: Memorandum

***Intentions of the Enemy***

[Editorial Translation]

No. 55882

*April 7, 1918.*

General Wilson to General Foch

I am persuaded that the enemy should operate as follows: Take under the fire of his guns the town of Amiens and the Amiens Railroad and its branch lines so as to prevent any important movement; then execute a large scale attack with 40 to 50 divisions against the British between Albert and the La Basse Canal. If the enemy proceeds in this manner and at the same time is ready to yield some ground before a French attack I am convinced that the British line cannot resist such an attack without the direct help of French divisions, or unless the French can relieve a sufficient portion of the British front to enable the marshal to have at his disposal a much larger number of troops in reserve than he has now. I am quite sure that you have given thought to all this and to the necessity of improving the existing crossings of the Somme between Amiens and Abbeville. A considerable French reserve astride the Somme west of Amiens would parry this danger; the relief of a large portion of the British line by the French would be another method. I beg you to consider this question very seriously for I am convinced that the plan which in my opinion should be followed by the enemy would be the most dangerous for us and consequently the most likely. No success of the French armies south of the Somme could compensate us for a disaster north of the river.

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***Movement of the French Fifth and Tenth Armies***

[Editorial Translation]

From: General Weygand  
At: Headquarters Allied Armies  
Date: April 8, 1918      Hour: 9:15 p. m.  
To: Col. Dufieux at French General Headquarters

I have just returned from Montreuil. The British are giving up to us only the southern half of the zone we were asking for Maistre's army and that too, only from noon, April 11, on.

I had with me an officer of the Fifth Army and one of the Tenth Army; I have sent them ahead to notify their armies so as to avoid all useless movement. But why have you been in such a hurry to put the troops in movement?

Reply: Because we had received the order for it from the C. P. and because we had good reasons to believe that:

- a. It was urgent
- b. The British would consent.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1302: Telephone

***Priority Desired for Combat Troops***

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, April 8, 1918.*

Report of telephone conversation between General Pershing at Paris, and Colonel Conner.  
11 a. m.

General Pershing said that he was sending Col. Simonds down to Chaumont to talk over the question of handling the British troops and Col. Fiske is going back to Chaumont also. He also stated that he went over the memorandum submitted by Col. Drum giving the requirements of replacements and service of the rear and artillery, and said it seemed to him that Col. Drum was a little off in his estimates. He had tried to make it look a little more than it is, on the total requirements for everything except combat troops.

Colonel Conner stated that Col. Drum's figures were in accordance with the priority schedule.

General Pershing stated that Col. Drum was calculating on a basis of 300,000 already here.

Colonel Conner stated that the estimate was made on the basis of what combat troops were here and 360,000 more, and that on the replacements the estimate was rather under if anything because we took as basis for replacements the 3,500 men per corps per month.

General Pershing stated that what we wanted to get at was the following:

We have now to meet the situation here that confronts us. My idea is to bring over as many combat troops as possible and as few service of the rear and other troops as possible, to fill this emergency.

I want to calculate on bringing over 60,000 infantry and machine-gun units as planned and then hold up for the next month until we can bring over such proportion of other troops, especially the artillery, and then perhaps get started in on more infantry and machine-gun units for the succeeding month, we need not go by months, but the movement of troops could be regulated by the amount of transportation available. I would like to have some new figures made out on this so that we can present them to the War Department.

I want to encourage, just as far as possible to do so, the bringing over of combat troops. For the time being the English will take care of a good many of these troops while they are being trained there, for a couple of months, and we can probably reduce the number of service of the rear troops, and maybe cut down some of our corps and army troops a little, postpone them a little, but the idea is to revamp our personnel schedule and priority schedule with the idea of pushing as fast as possible combat units, divisional units, mixing the other troops in with successive waves of combat troops, without sitting down and saying we need so many service of the rear and other troops. I don't think that attitude is the correct one to take even if those troops of the rear are more or less delayed two or three months. I would keep putting them a little further on in the future in order to enable them to bring over as many combat troops as we can.

The British want to take care of the first 60,000 that the British bring over. We are going to be pushed by our Allies to continue that as fast as possible, but I want to insist that instead of having 60,000 infantry and machine gun units, that we bring over immediately the personnel of the artillery so that they will not be far behind and can be training and they will be ready about the time the infantry is ready, and we can call out these units and bring them in to our own organization.

Colonel Conner then said:

What you want done is to make a study to see what can be done in the way of reducing everything except combat units and especially divisions, to eliminate as far as possible service of supply and also corps and army troops to the advantage of bringing over divisions.

General Pershing stated that the question had been presented yesterday of replacements. He said:

I admit that as far as the first 60,000 are concerned, one-third of them may be replacements and they will probably be brought in behind the British lines, and possibly into England. I much prefer to have them brought here to give them immediately 40,000 combat troops with 20,000 replacements standing by. Of course, this looks as if those men were going right into the fight but this cannot be avoided. We cannot get away from that.

We can of course keep up replacements and this in a much shorter time than we have figured, and we can pull them out and put others in for training. We will probably keep a flow through the British ranks without allowing it to accumulate to any great extent.

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***Priority Schedule Changed***

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, April 8, 1918.*

AGWAR, WASHINGTON

FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF

In conference yesterday between two representatives of British War Office and Secretary of War and myself, it was agreed that the 60,000 troops to be brought over in April by British tonnage should go to them under the same conditions as previously agreed upon for the six divisions, one-third of which are to be for replacements. Further allocation of units brought over by the British was left for future consideration. The new plan to give priority to certain infantry and machine-gun units makes it necessary to readjust entire priority schedule which is now being prepared. Propose to postpone shipment of all noncombatant troops to the utmost extent possible to meet present situation and at same time not make it impossible to build up our own army. Will cable you full report in two or three days. Meanwhile request you follow recommendations made in my 844 [printed in "Training with British"].

PERSHING.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1302: Memorandum

***Revision of Priority Schedule***

Operations Section

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, April 9, 1918.*

MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF OF STAFF

1. The principles which the Commander-in-Chief has enunciated are understood to be:
  - (a) That priority shall be given to the transportation of a certain number of infantry and machine-gun units.
  - (b) That infantry and machine-gun units will serve for a period not to exceed two to three months in the divisions of our Allies; especially the British.
  - (c) That artillery and other combat troops be given such priority as will ensure our being able to form our infantry into divisions promptly at the expiration of the period mentioned in (b) above.
  - (d) That arrivals of corps, army and service of supply troops be postponed to as late a date as practicable consistent with being able to take care of the divisions to be united as outlined in (c) above.
  - (e) That plans formulated at this time be limited to a period of the next three months.

2. Considering the number of troops yet to come in the first phase and those belonging to the second phase it is apparent that the plans for the next two or three months will involve only the remainder of the 1st Phase, the 2d Phase and such elements of the succeeding phases as must be considered on account of the fact that certain units belonging to those phases have already arrived.

3. Based on Par. 2 this study will then be limited to a rearrangement of the priority schedule for the remainder of the 1st Phase and for the 2d Phase, and will concern itself very little with succeeding phases.

4. Since difficulties of obtaining materiel render it impossible to hope to equip them within the next three months, we may at once postpone the arrival of all tank personnel and army artillery.

5. In aviation we have more personnel than can be equipped in the next three months. Except that we require two additional balloon companies, we also have now a greater proportion of aviation personnel than will be required to balance our forces at the end of June. \* \* \* Aviation, except for two balloon companies, may therefore be eliminated.

6. A detailed consideration of the 2d Phase appears to justify us in postponing the arrival of a total of 78,747 officers and soldiers until after the end of June 1918. \* \* \*

7. Since we are already obligated to furnish 3 additional Negro regiments for service with the French, those regiments are retained in the revised schedule.

On the other hand, the remainder (7,786) of the motor mechanics for service with the French have been dropped.

8. According to the information available there is sufficient tonnage, equally divided between that which we control and that controlled by England, to transport 120,000 men per month. This gives a possibility of 360,000 men during the months of April, May, and June. This number corresponds to the number of troops remaining after making the deductions referred to in the preceding paragraphs.

9. In view of the former agreement with the British concerning the 6 divisions and the desire to assist the British by putting as many as practicable of our infantry units temporarily with British divisions, it appears logical for the British to transport all infantry units plus such auxiliaries and replacements as make up the numbers needed to fully utilize British shipping.

10. Based on the idea expressed in Par. 9, Table I has been prepared showing the assignment of troops between our own and British shipping. It will be noted that the majority of the army and S. O. S. troops retained in the revised schedule are assigned to American shipping.

11. Under the priority schedule the greater part of the army and S. O. S. troops of the 2d Phase appear at the beginning of that phase. Under the revised schedule these troops are echeloned; the bulk of them coming however in May; that is, at the middle of the revised schedule.

12. It will also be noted that under the revised schedule the artillery should complete its training by the time the several infantry units are relieved by the British.

13. While it is estimated \* \* \* that up to the end of June, 60,022 replacements will be required, it has only been possible to provide for 44,000 in the revised schedule.

\* \* \* \* \*

15. It may be anticipated that the proposed schedule will not please the French since they seem more than ever anxious to incorporate our units in their divisions.

16. It is recommended that after final decision has been reached a written agreement be drawn up between the Commander-in-Chief and the British commander in France and also between the Commander-in-Chief and the British War Office.

In this way the misunderstanding which arose with reference to the 6 divisions should be avoided.

FOX CONNER,  
Colonel, General Staff,  
Asst. Chief of Staff, G-3.

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TABLE I TROOP SHIPMENTS

	BRITISH SHIPS			UNITED STATES SHIPS			TOTALS	
	APRIL	MAY	JUNE	APRIL	MAY	JUNE		
Inf. and M. Guns II Corps	53553	53553					107106	This equals infantry etc., of six divs., II Corps
Inf. and M. Guns III Corps			<sup>a</sup> 17851	<sup>b</sup> 35702			53553	This equals infantry etc., of three divs., III Corps
Artillery, etc., II Corps				10990	32970	21980	65940	This equals arty. etc. of six divs., II Corps
Artillery, etc., III Corps				10990		10990	21980	This equals arty. etc., of two divs., III Corps
1st Phase	3000				9652		12652	This completes 1st Phase
2d Phase (Less Divs.)		3000	6000		17300	6465	32765	This completes 2d Phase (Less 18,000 laborers)
3d Phase (Less Divs.)			12149			1500	13649	
Replacements			24000			20000	44000	
Negro Regts. 3	3000	3000		3000			9000	
TOTALS	59553	59553	60000	60682	59922	60935	360645	

## RECAPITULATION

TROOPS -- 257579 -- 8 complete divs. and infantry of 1 div. Complete II Corps, and  
2 complete divs. and 1 infantry of a div., III Corps, and 3 colored regts.  
PHRASE TROOPS -- 59066 -- Completes 1st and 2d Phases (less 18,000 laborers) and 13649 on 3d Phase  
REPLACEMENTS -- 44000 -- Note: July mostly needed for 3d Phase and Replacements  
(b) This is the infantry of the 1st and 3d Divs. of III Corps  
(a) This is the infantry of the 2d Division

***The General Principles Governing the Training of Units of the  
American Expeditionary Forces***

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
April 9, 1918.

[Extract]

1. The general principles governing the training of troops of the American Expeditionary forces will be announced from these headquarters. Strict compliance with those principles will be exacted and nothing contrary thereto will be taught. Among these principles are the following:

(a) The methods to be employed must remain or become distinctly our own.

(b) All instructions must contemplate the assumption of a vigorous offensive.

This purpose will be emphasized in every phase of training until it becomes a settled habit of thought.

(c) The general principles governing combat remain unchanged in their essence. This war has developed special features which involve special phases of training, but the fundamental ideas enunciated in our drill regulations, small arms firing manual, field service regulations and other service manuals remain the guide for both officers and soldiers and constitute the standard by which their efficiency is to be measured, except as modified in detail by instructions from these headquarters.

(d) The rifle and the bayonet are the principle weapons of the infantry soldier. He will be trained to a high degree of skill as a marksman both on the target range and in field firing. An aggressive spirit must be developed until the soldier feels himself, as a bayonet fighter, invincible in battle.

(e) All officers and soldiers should realize that at no time in our history has discipline been so important; therefore, discipline of the highest order must be exacted at all times. The standards of the American army will be those of West Point. The rigid attention, upright bearing, attention to detail, uncomplaining obedience to instructions required of the cadet will be required of every officer and soldier of our armies in France. Failure to attain such discipline will be treated as lack of capacity on the part of a commander to create in the subordinate that intensity of purpose and willing acceptance of hardships which are necessary to success in battle.

In striving to secure proper standards of discipline, officers will not lose sight of their personal obligation to provide for the comfort of their men. No proper opportunity will be lost to improve their condition and surroundings and create a spirit of contentment and confidence in the future. Every effort must be made to preserve at all times the highest possible morale, the external sign of internal discipline.

Small derelictions of duty will be disposed of so far as practicable by immediate commanders. Confinement in the guard house will be resorted to only in case of incorrigibles.

(f) Training will be based on developing sound leadership in succession in the squad and section, the platoon, the company, and finally in the higher units. To this end commanders will be required to lead their respective units in person in the most energetic manner. As far as possible the integrity of these units will be preserved in quarters, on the march and in combat. In making details this principle will be rigorously enforced and responsibility for satisfactory performance will always rest with the leader of the unit concerned.

(g) As soon as proficiency in elementary methods is attained, the applicatory system of training will be employed. All tactical exercises will be based on an assumed

situation and responsible officers will require their subordinates to dispose their troops in accordance with the situation assumed. The adoption of normal methods of attack or defense which limit the use of troops to fixed formation is prohibited.

(h) Each tactical exercise will be followed by a critique to be conducted, if practicable, on the ground on which the exercise took place.

The necessary umpires will be designated by the commander of the next higher units: The battalion commander for company problems, the regimental commander for battalion problems, etc.

The procedure will be substantially as follows:

(1) The commander of the unit concerned will state his problem, and briefly discuss the manner in which he executed it.

(2) Subordinate commanders will briefly discuss the part of their work pertinent to the problem.

(3) The junior umpire will make his criticism for the side concerned.

(4) This procedure will be repeated for the opposing troops if the problem is two-sided.

(5) The senior umpire will then conduct his critique pointing out only important errors and the lessons to be learned therefrom.

(6) The commander of the next higher unit concerned will then sum up. Throughout the procedure he will prevent acrimonious debate and lengthy discussion of irrelevant matters.

### THE FUNCTION OF THE SCHOOLS\*

2. In order that the foregoing principles and their logical amplification may be quickly propagated a school project for the American Expeditionary Forces has been established.

The plan contemplates a group of army schools and a center of instruction for each corps. At the army schools the student personnel will be trained for duty as instructors for the corps schools and as staff officers for divisions and higher units.

At the corps schools the student personnel will be trained for duty as unit commanders in the organizations from which they are drawn.

The doctrine of combat announced by the Commander-in-Chief will be taught in the army and corps schools and will be followed in carrying out the programs prepared at these headquarters for the training of divisions. It is of the utmost importance that the best men in each organization be selected for attendance at these schools in order that they may return to their commands and teach the doctrine which has been taught them. The sending of inferior men to these training centers will defeat the object for which the schools were created, and retard the training of the units to which they belong.

### MARCH DISCIPLINE

3. The highest possible standards of march discipline will be exacted at all times. The following will govern:

(a) The habitual formation for marching will be the column of squads, the present organization of units conforming thereto as nearly as practicable.

(b) Whenever units march in column of squads, except during ceremonies, company, battalion, and regimental commanders will, from time to time, march in rear of their respective units and will check every breach of march discipline. The company commander responsible for the pace of a column will march at the head of the company to which he

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\* See General Orders No. 14, G. H. Q., A. E. F., January 23, 1918 establishing the II Corps School at Chatillon-sur-Seine.

belongs. Commanders of covering detachments, advance guards, etc., will march as contemplated in F. S. R. for such units.

(c) Marching troops will habitually cover a mile in twenty minutes, two and one-half miles during the fifty minutes of marching time in the hour. An officer will set the pace. He will constantly check the rate by counting his paces against the watch. Each company officer, by pacing over the measured mile, will determine the number of his paces per minutes required to give the desired rate of a mile in twenty minutes.

(d) File closers, including officers, will form additional ranks at the head and rear of the organizations to which they pertain. No one will be permitted to march habitually outside of the column which must at all times present an orderly, compact appearance.

(e) The elements of the column will cover accurately in file and keep accurately dressed toward the side of the guide. Rifles will be carried either slung vertically or in such manner on the shoulder, muzzle up and elevated, as not to interfere with the soldier next in rear.

(f) No one will fall out of ranks on the march except with the specific authority of his company commander. Authority will be given only for the most urgent reasons. The equipment of a soldier authorized to fall out will be left with his squad.

(g) The drinking, while on the march, of anything except water, is strictly prohibited. Lunches carried on the person will not be eaten until permission to do so it announced by the company commander.

(h) In addition to the driver, one soldier only, generally a cook, will ride on the field train. All men who accompany the field and combat trains will wear their full equipment less the pack, the latter being carried on the train. All other personnel with these trains will be formed and marched in one group under the senior present at the tail of each battalion group.

(i) All columns and trains will travel on the right-hand side of the road. The left side of the road must, both at the halt and on the march, be kept clear of officers, soldiers, and transport.

(j) Unless specifically ordered otherwise, halts will be made at 50 minutes past each hour, and the march will be resumed on the hour. Troops will not close upon halting.

(k) Marching in cadence when at ease will be practiced and encouraged in all commands.

#### PERSONAL APPEARANCE

4. Smartness in dress and manner being an indispensable quality in both officers and soldiers without which they fail to command the respect of their associates, officers will exact the most scrupulous attention to this matter on the part of subordinates. One soldier as orderly will be assigned to each officer above the rank of lieutenant and one to every two lieutenants. One of the duties of the orderly will be to take care of the equipment of the officer to whom assigned. Soldiers designated as orderlies will be selected ordinarily from those least capacitated for other duty. If capable of other duties they will be trained as messengers in liaison groups prescribed in tables of organization.

#### MILITARY COURTESY

5. The requirements of military courtesy will be carefully observed. Alertness in saluting will be exacted. When a superior officer approaches a group of soldiers, whether in barracks or in the street, any soldier observing the officer will sharply command "Attention," whereupon all will face towards the officer and all will salute. Soldiers seated in theatres, at meals in cafes or restaurants, and clerks at work at their desk will not rise upon the approach of an officer unless personally addressed or unless specially called to attention by their senior; if standing, the proper salute will be rendered.

Soldiers passing in vehicles will salute without rising. Smoking materials will be removed from the mouth before saluting. Drivers actually handling teams or chauffeurs actually driving automobiles will not salute. If halted, they will salute without rising. Salutes will be rendered before passing. It is a common fault to salute after the senior has passed.

## FIELD CLERKS

6. Field clerks will be governed by the instructions herein prescribed for soldiers.
7. Suggestions for correcting defects and improving methods are desired and will be sent through proper channels to these headquarters.
8. The foregoing directions will be scrupulously observed in carrying out the following program of training.

## GENERAL PLAN

The scheme for training contemplates progressive instruction from the smallest to the largest units, but in each period time is given companies to complete their training in target practice, assure collective skill in the special arms and to maintain the requisite standards in disciplinary drills. These periods will also enable junior commanders to correct such deficiencies in training as become evident from time to time and to train recruits who may join during the progress of the course. The organization commanders must be impressed with the necessity for energetic and progressive training. Inclement weather must not be permitted to interfere. Where training grounds are at any distance from billets, the noon meal will customarily be served on the training ground.

## SCHEDULES OF INSTRUCTION

The commanders concerned will prepare schedules of instruction covering each one of the periods of time allotted below, and in such schedules they will subdivide and reallocate the prescribed hours in the order that will best meet the needs of their units. When practicable, they will specifically assign the work to be covered from day to day by the units concerned.

The allotment of time below is based upon a minimum day of six hours; Sundays and holidays excepted. This allotment will be followed as closely as practicable, but unit commanders are authorized to make such minor variations as the particular requirements of their units demand.

## ALLOTMENT OF TIME

1st Week:	Individual and section
2d "	Chiefly platoon
3d "	Company
4th "	Company and Battalion

Refer to General Orders No. 4, G. H. Q., A. E. F., 1918, which contains instructions for the preparation of training schedules. The manuals listed below will govern the training of the command:

	(Instructions for the Offensive Conduct ( of small units with supplement
Tactical	(Manual Chief Platoon (Chapter III, Training and Employment of Platoons, 1918 (British)
Machine guns	(Handbook of the .303-in. Vickers Machine Gun (The Employment of Machine Guns, Parts I and II (British)

Other weapons	(Bayonet Training (British)
	(Tactical Employment of Lewis Guns (British)
	(Instructions on Bombing, Part I, Part II (British)
	(Provisional Instruction for the 37-mm. Gun (Light Trench Mortar D. R., A. E. F.
Signals	(Liaison for Troops of all arms
Gas	(Defensive Measures Gas Attacks
	Scouting and Patrolling
	For regimental and higher commanders:
	Instructions on the Offensive Action of Large Units
	Instructions on the Defensive Action of Large Units
	Organization of Ground
	For reference: Training and Employment of Division, 1918 (British)

#### FIRST WEEK (after receipt program)

RIFLE COMPANY	HOURS
Close order drill by platoon	3
Intrenching (Manual Chief of Platoon, p. 49-59)	
Battalion commanders will prepare for the instruction of their companies in intrenching by study of Chapter VI, Principles of Field Fortification p. 173, Manual Chief Platoon, and by preliminary reconnaissance of the ground. If practicable, they will lay out battalion centers of resistance and all work in intrenching will, from the beginning, be devoted towards the complete organization, at full scale, of these centers of resistance.	6
Instruction individuals and sections	12
Rifle: Range practice. Six hundred yard ranges will be improvised, and the unamended qualification course S. A. F. M. will be fired.	
Daily practice loading and unloading ball cartridges; sight-setting; manipulation bolt, cut-off, reduction jams, blindfolded; mechanism fire, use gun sling, without removing rifle from shoulder.	
Bayonet: (Bayonet Training)	
Hand Bombers: (Instructions on Bombing)	
Rifle Grenadiers: (Instructions on Bombing)	
Lewis Gunners: (Tactical Employment of Lewis Guns)	

Outposts, patrols, advance and rearguards	12
MACHINE GUN COMPANY	
Individual instruction	
Nomenclature guns and accessories	8
Operation and mechanisms	8
Stripping and assembling	8
All three of the above subjects will be taught simultaneously, one platoon one each--- platoons passing at convenient intervals from one subject to another.	
Physical training and hand bombing	3
Training and exercising animals, packing carts, and dismounted gun drill.	6
Manuals: Handbook of the .303-in Vickers Machine Gun Employment of Machine Guns Parts I and II	
HEADQUARTERS COMPANY	
1. Signal Platoon	33
Instruction Specialists. Refer to: Section VII, G. O. 30, G. H. Q., A. E. F. 1918 Manual: Instruction on liaison for troops of all arms	
2. Sappers and Bombers Platoons:	
Bombers: Schools, Squad and Platoon Manual Light Trench Mortar Drill Regulations Sappers: Instruction with Pioneer Platoon	
3. Pioneer Platoon: Trenches, Saps, Shelters, Wiring, Revetting. (Manual Chief Platoon, pages 49-78). If possible this work should be done on one of the battalion centers of resistance.	
4. 1-Pounder Gun Platoon:	
Schools, piece and platoon: Manuals: Provisional Instruction for 37-mm. Gun Manual Chief Platoon, pages 95, 96, 171	
REGIMENT	
Defense against gas, all officers and soldiers (Manual: Defensive Measures Gas Attacks)	2
Instruction Care of Feet. To be given by the regimental surgeon. Fitting shoes and socks---care of feet and nails---foot inspec- tion---trench feet, causes, appearance, prevention.	1
See G. O. 11, G. H. Q., A. E. F., 1918	

## SECOND WEEK

### RIFLE COMPANY

Close order drill by platoon	3
Intrenching	6
Instruction company specialists (refer to pages 379 and 380, Manual Chief Platoon)	
Range and pistol practice, bayonet training	12
Deployments of the platoon (Manual Chief Platoon, p. 33/37; combat of the Platoon and the Group, p. 325/329)	8
Outposts and patrols	4

### MACHINE GUN COMPANY

Range practice, known distance	
Position and aiming exercises and range practice and on the 1,000 inch range (Chapters I to III, incl. Part II, M. G. F. M., W. D.)	20
Automatic sight correction	2
Use of auxiliary aiming targets	3
Physical training and hand bombing	1 1/2
Training animals, mounted machine gun drill	6 1/2

### HEADQUARTERS COMPANY

Continuation work of first week

### REGIMENT

Defense against gas	
Instruction care Feet	3
	<hr/>
	36

### TERRAIN EXERCISE

In command and communication. For brigade and regimental commanders.  
 Division commander and staff to accompany as observers.  
 Exercise to be prepared and conducted by corps headquarters.  
 Situation to involve attack by a reinforced brigade acting as an  
 advance guard in a meeting engagement. Signal companies and the liaison  
 groups of brigades and regiments to participate.

## THIRD WEEK

### RIFLE COMPANY

Close order drill	3
Instruction company specialists, range and pistol practice, bayonet training	6
Organization of a company strong point (Manual Chief Platoon, p. 177, and pages 286-306)	12
Company in attack (Manual Chief Platoon, p. 330- 338, 371-377)	4



## MACHINE GUN COMPANY

Mechanism of the pistol	3
Position and aiming drills, pistol	1
Siting guns, emplacements, and night firing (platoon at a time on each subject)	6
Platoon drill, drill on rough ground, trench drill (platoon at a time on each subject)	9
Company drill, drill on rough ground	3
Indirect fire, without map	3

## HEADQUARTERS COMPANY

Continuation work of first week

## BATTALION (reinforced by platoon machine guns)

Outposts, advance and rearguards	9
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## REGIMENT

Defense against gas	2
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## TERRAIN EXERCISE

In command and communication. For division, brigade and regimental commanders. Problem prepared and conducted by corps headquarters.

Situation to require:

An attack, including march of approach, deployment, assault, measures to resist counterattack, organization conquered ground, redistribution in depth for defense.

All means of communication to participate: Infantry and artillery aeroplanes, signal battalion, liaison groups of brigades and regiments.

## FOURTH WEEK

## RIFLE COMPANY

Close order drill	3
Instruction company specialists range and pistol practice, bayonet training.	6
Company in attack	3

## MACHINE GUN COMPANY

Barrage drill	4
Use of instruments for indirect fire	8
With rifle battalion in defense operations orders (siting guns and assignment of sectors)	
Range cards	
Emplacements	

Reliefs	
Trench routine	16
With rifle battalion in attack	
Operation orders	
Movements to position	
Replacements and reinforcements	6

## HEADQUARTERS COMPANY

Continuation work of first week except when, in part, attached to a battalion.

BATTALION (reinforced by platoon of the machine gun company, trench mortars, and 1-pounder gun)

Defense: Preparation and occupation center resistance, relief of battalion therein, day and night; sentries, patrols, raids. Dispositions to repel raids. Dispositions to undergo heavy bombardment, and receive hostile attack. Arrangements against gas. Counterattack.

Emphasis will be laid upon proper measures for security of small groups in isolated strong points and upon arrangements for repelling and defeating raids. (Manual Chief Platoon, "Principles of Field Fortification," p. 173-224, "Infantry in the Trenches," p. 286-314. For raids see pages 166, 167).

### Attack:

The approach	
Organization zone	
Execution assault	
Reduction strong points	6
Liaison	
(Manual Chief of Platoon, pages 316-323, 330-399, 344-347, 373, 374).	

## REGIMENT

Defense against gas	2
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### TERRAIN EXERCISE:

In command and communication. For division, brigade, and regimental commanders. Problem prepared and conducted by corps headquarters.

Situations to require: A reserve division to pass first line divisions which have broken through hostile intrenched system, to initiate pursuit, drive in hostile outposts, attack enemy rearguard in position.

All means of communication to participate.

## FIELD BATTALION---SIGNAL CORPS

1. The organization commander must be impressed with the necessity for energetic and progressive training. Inclement weather will not be permitted to stop the training.

Much instruction can be given under shelter. The organization commander will arrange the work so that no time will be lost.

2. The division signal officer will exercise such supervision of this training as is necessary to secure the result desired, viz: A battalion which will furnish the division with a reliable system of communication.

3. All trench and aerial lines constructed for instruction purposes will be utilized in the battalion period for combined training. The division signal officer will therefore prescribe the plan of construction so that the system of lines thus constructed will simulate the wire system of a division. This system will include stations for headquarters and posts of command for all units in the division.

#### First Period: Company Instruction---2 weeks

	HOURS
OUTPOST COMPANY	
Visual Signals, Lamps, Panels, Fireworks	6
Trench Line Construction---Aerial and Cable	36
Telephones and Switchboards	12
Fullerphones	12
Defense against gas	6
WIRE COMPANY	
Visual Signal, Lamps, Panels, Fireworks	6
Line Construction and Operation	18
Trench Line Construction---Aerial and Cable	18
Telephones and Switchboards	12
Fullerphones	12
Defense against gas	6
RADIO COMPANY	
Earth Telegraphy	18
Radio Telegraphy	18
Visual Signals, Lamps, Panels, Fireworks	9
Buzzer Practice	12
Codes and Ciphers	9
Defense against gas	6

#### Second Period: Battalion Instruction---2 weeks

Operations of a division system of communications	36
Operating of Stations	
Handling of messages	
Locating and Repairing Faults	
Correction deficiencies in companies	36

4. The signal corps will take part in weekly terrain exercises as required by the division schedule.

5. Schools will be conducted three hours weekly, as follows:

#### Officers School:

Liaison for all arms  
Sec. VII, G. O. 30, G. H. Q., A. E. F., 1918

- Solution of Signal Problems
- (a) Assuming Offensive Combat
  - (b) Assuming Defensive Combat

Company Noncommissioned Officers School:

Liaison for all arms  
 Sec. VII, G. O. 30, G. H. Q., A. E. F., 1918  
 Pamphlets descriptive of new equipment

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## PROGRAM

For Training Sanitary Troops and Bands

For period of four weeks, supplementing General Program

FOR OFFICERS AND SOLDIERS OF ALL SANITARY UNITS AND BANDS

FIRST WEEK	HOURS
Close order drill, D. R. and S. M. For Sanitary Troops	3
The Loaded Litter and First Aid for Sanitary Troops	3
Defense against Gas	6
Personal hygiene---Venereal prophylaxis, care of feet, shoes, trench feet, G. O. 11, G. H. Q., A. E. F., 1918	2
General hygiene---March, camp, trench, combat, disposal of the dead	3
Water and Food---Supply, examination, treatment, preservation in trench and field	1
Clothing---Laundries, Bathing---Supplies, methods of cleansing, devices, delousing, insecticides	2
Shelter---Selection, improvisation, construction of huts, barracks, billets, and their sanitary inspection	2
Disposal of wastes ) Human, animal, kitchen and and demonstration ) camp garbage, in field and of sanitary devices ) trench warfare	2
Organization of the American Exped. Forces	1
Disposition of combatant and auxiliary troops---March, attack, defense, retirement, trench warfare	3
Field Orders	1
Field sketching and map reading	6
Artillery and infantry weapons---Effects	1
 SECOND WEEK	
Close Order Drill	3
The Loaded Litter and First Aid	3
Defense against Gas	2
Fire cover---Use and construction, trenches, dugouts, bombproofs, drainage, ventilation	6
Field transportation---Use and care of animals, their equipment, wagons, and motors	6

Organization of the Sanitary Service---Battalion and regimental detachments, camp infirmaries, camp hospitals, the sanitary train, the sanitary column and other establishments and units of the line of communications; their personnel, functions, and equipment for open and trench warfare	3
Casualties---Classification and disposal	1
Field duties---Of personnel of the various units	2

## FIELD TRAINING

- (a) For Battalion and Regimental Detachments and Regimental Bands:  
Practice and training in methods and duties pertaining to the sanitary service of the units to which attached

### Open Warfare:

- (b) Sanitary service of the march, camp, attack, defense, retirement, advance and rearguard. Solution and execution of problems independently, and combined with the organizations to which attached. Solutions to cover recommendations as to sanitary procedures and sanitary orders; selection of sites for unit stations; selection of routes of approach and sanitary evacuations; actual establishments of stations and dressing and evacuation with preparation of casualty lists, with patients represented by tagged individuals.
- 5

### Trench Warfare:

- (c) Solution of problems given above under open warfare together with actual construction of shelter and adaptation of equipment and procedures to changed conditions due to type of action
- 5

- (d) For Ambulance Companies and Field Hospitals:

Field instruction by single company and combined with sanitary train in special duties of their units, as outlined in b-c, except that the application will be to sectors normally covered by the single or combined divisional sanitary units employed.

Training in packing and management of transportation will be secured in connection with the field exercises.

10

## THIRD WEEK

Close Order Drill	3
The Ambulance and First Aid	3
Use and application of the Thomas Splint	6
Defense against gas	2

## FIELD TRAINING

- (a) For Battalion and Regimental Detachmental and Regimental Bands:

Practice and training in methods and duties pertaining to the sanitary service of the units to which attached.

Open Warfare:

(b) Same as for Second week ) 22

Trench Warfare: )

(c) Same as for Second week )

(d) For Ambulance Companies and Field Hospitals: 22  
Same as for Second week

a, b, c, d:

Battalion, regimental, division surgeons, Commanding officers  
sanitary trains and directors and all sanitary units and  
bands will participate in terrain exercises with the units  
to which attached in connection with the general program.

FOURTH WEEK

Close Order Drill 2  
The Loaded Litter; the Ambulance, First Aid 6  
Defense against Gas 2  
Use and application of the Thomas Splint 6

FIELD TRAINING

(a) For Battalion and Regimental Detachments and Regimental Bands:

Practice and training in methods and duties pertaining to the  
sanitary service of the units to which attached.

Open Warfare:

(b) Same as for Second Week )

Trench Warfare: ) 20

(c) Same as for Second week )

(d) For Ambulance Companies and Field Hospitals: 20  
Same as for Second week

a, b, c, d:

Battalion, regimental and division surgeons, Commanding Officers  
Sanitary Trains, Directors and all Sanitary Units and bands will  
participate in terrain exercises with the units to which attached  
in connection with the general program

\* \* \* \* \*

FOR MEDICAL OFFICERS ONLY- - - In addition too time allotted  
for other instruction.

- |   |    |
|---|----|
| 1. Military Surgery: Sepsis, antiseptis, infection by Anaerobes, shock, special methods of treatment including prophylaxis and treatment of trench feet | 10 |
| 2. Military Medicine: Psychology, psychiatry, malingering, special diseases including gas poisoning and treatment                                       | 10 |

NOTE: The instruction will consist of conferences, practical exercises, demonstrations, and problems for the purpose of training the personnel of the sanitary service in its duties, both in open and trench warfare, and must be thorough and practical. Instruction in sanitation, medicine and surgery will be limited to preparation for the mastery of the problems presented by the service conditions which may be encountered by the American Expeditionary Forces in open and trench warfare.

### DIVISIONAL ENGINEERS

The training of the divisional engineers will include instruction as infantry and as engineers. For infantry training the engineer companies will be formed and trained as infantry rifle companies (less automatic rifles). For engineer training the companies will be formed into four platoons. Each platoon will be trained to undertake independently any of the duties prescribed by Volume I---No. 4, Official Bulletin, May 1917, and

Notes on Engineer work during operations (British No. S. S. 145, 1918)

FIRST WEEK	HOURS
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#### ENGINEER COMPANY:

##### Infantry training:

- |   |    |
|---|----|
| Close order drill by platoon  | 3  |
| Instruction individuals and sections  | 15 |
| Rifle (including range practice, regular course),<br>bayonet, hand grenades, rifle grenades and pistol.<br>(Manual: S. A. F. M., Bayonet Training and<br>Instruction on Bombing). |    |

##### Engineer training:

- |   |    |
|---|----|
| Individual and platoon (under company commander)  | 15 |
| Programme to be so planned that at end of three weeks<br>each platoon will have had instruction in: |    |

- (a) Roads: Preparing routes across country, over shell holes, or through woods for columns, artillery, or supplies to move forward in an advance, particular attention to be paid to organization for work, issue of tools, and prompt undertaking of task; boarded walks; trails for pack transport.
- (b) Bridges: Short hasty bridges, trench bridges, single span, spar, trestle, and stock span, particular attention to be paid to organization for work, issue of tools and equipment, and prompt execution of work.

- (c) Light railways and tramways
- (d) Demolitions: Removal of obstacles for an advance, and execution of obstacle in a retreat.
- (e) Fortifications: A battalion section to be laid out and work of entire regiment to be coordinated so as to develop as much of section as practicable in time available. The first work of each platoon to be under an assumed situation in open warfare under fire. At the end of three weeks each platoon should have had experience on the following: Wire entanglements, fire trenches, supporting points, communication trenches, particular attention being paid to organization for work, issue of tools and equipment and prompt execution of work; shelters including dugouts; sapping, revetments; sortie steps; drainage; duck boarding; observation and command posts including concrete; machine-gun emplacements; battery emplacements; water supply. Particular attention to be paid to camouflage throughout.

(Manuals: Official Bulletin Vol. I---No. 4, Notes on engineer work during operations (Br. S. S. 145, 1918), Organization of the Ground, Manual Chief of Platoon, Engineer Field Manual, Wire Entanglements, Addenda No. 1 to Engineer Field Manual, and Military Railways).

REGIMENTAL HEADQUARTERS DETACHMENT	HOURS
Close order drill by platoon	3
Individual instruction infantry weapons; rifle (including range practice), bayonet, pistol	15
Instruction in liaison for troops of all arms: All buglers, all motorcyclists, and all cyclists of the regiment (Manual: Liaison for troops of All Arms)	15
Reconnaissance and Topography: Mounted detachment	15
ENGINEER TRAIN	
Close order drill	3
Individual instruction infantry weapons; rifle (including range practice), bayonet, pistol	15
Instruction in care of animals and equipment, operation of motor trucks, engineer reconnaissance, procuring engineer supplies, transportation and distribution of tools and supplies and collection of same for all classes of divisional operation	15
REGIMENT	
Defense against gas; all officers and soldiers (Manual: Defensive measures Gas Attacks)	2
Instruction Care of Feet. To be given by regimental surgeon (See G. O. 11, G. H. Q., A. E. F., 1918)	1
SECOND WEEK	



## ENGINEER COMPANY

### Infantry training:

Close order drill by platoon	3
Instruction individual and section: Rifle (including range practice), bayonet, grenades and pistol.	10
Deployments and combat of platoon and group (p. 33-37 and 325-329 Manual Chief Platoon)	5

### Engineer training:

Continuation of first week	15
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## REGIMENTAL HEADQUARTERS

Continuation of first week	33
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## ENGINEER TRAIN

Continuation of first week	33
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## REGIMENT

Defense against Gas	2
Instruction care of feet	1

## THIRD WEEK

## ENGINEER COMPANY

### Infantry Training

Close order drill by platoon	3
Instruction individual and section: Rifle (including range practice), bayonet, grenades and pistol	7
Outposts and patrols	4
Company in attack (Manual Chief of Platoon p. 330-338, 371-377)	4

### Engineer Training:

Continuation of first week	16
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## REGIMENTAL HEADQUARTERS

Continuation of first week	34
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## ENGINEER TRAIN

Continuation of first week	34
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## REGIMENT

Defense against gas	2
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## FOURTH WEEK

## ENGINEER COMPANY

## Infantry Training:

Close order drill	3
Advance and rearguards	4
Company in attack and defense	4

BATTALION (reinforced by platoon of a machine gun company, trench mortars, and 1-pounder guns)

## Infantry Training:

Defense: Preparation and occupation of center of resistance, relief, sentries, patrols. Disposition to repel raids, undergo bombardment, receive hostile attack. Counterattack (Manual Chief of Platoon, p. 173-224, 286-314. Ground developed during engineer training to be used)	4
Attack:	2
The approach	
Organization zone	
Assault	
Reduction strong points	
Liaison.	

(Manual Chief of Platoon, pages 316-323, 330-339, 344-347, 373-374)

## ENGINEER REGIMENT AND ENGINEER TRAINING

### Engineer Training:

Field exercises prepared and given by regimental commander.

Each exercise will be conducted under an assumed situation for an engineer regiment serving with a division. As many features of engineer work as practicable for each class of divisional operations given below will be covered by each exercise. The exercise will consist of the issue of proper orders by commanders and subordinates to insure proper security, assignment of tasks, distribution of equipment and supplies necessary for a safe and prompt execution of the work. Tasks will be assigned and staked out, tools and supplies distributed and work begun and, where practicable, completed. A critique will follow the exercise in which task assigned to and executed by various units will be explained and errors corrected. Particular attention will be paid to orders given by commanders and subordinates and the prompt undertaking and execution of tasks. The exercises will cover the following divisional operations:

1. Engineers with a division on the march, deployment for attack, and attack (open warfare). 3
2. Engineers with a division taking up a defensive position (open warfare). 3
3. Engineers with a division in preparation for attack (trench warfare). 3
4. Engineers with a division in consolidation of captured ground (trench warfare). 3

(Manuals: Official Bulletin Vol. I---No. 4 and Notes on Engineer Work during Operations (British No. S. S. 145, 1918), Offensive Conduct of Large Units, Defense Conduct of Large Units, Organization of the Ground).

By command of General Pershing:

BENJ. ALVORD,  
Adjutant General.

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HS Brit. File: 900-32.9: Cablegram

***Brigading of Infantrymen and Machine-Gun Units with British and French Divisions***

No. 127

*April 10, 1918.*

SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION

Decypher. Lord Reading (Washington)

R. 1:40 p. m., April 11, 1918

No. 1526

Your telegrams No. 2017 and 2049

I have just seen the President and have placed substance of your communications and views before him. We had some conversation about request made by you on March 30 and my report of his compliance with it. I found President Wilson rather disinclined to answer specific points although he was emphatic in his assurances to me that whatever it was possible for him to do to help the Allies in present situation would assuredly be done but that he had to consult his military advisers and be guided by them as to details. He informed me Secretary Baker was on the high seas traveling home and that immediately upon his arrival President thought it would be advisable for me to see Secretary Baker with President.

President showed extreme reluctance to express any decided view on question raised in your telegrams and I drew inference that he wished to avoid saying anything which might be reported to or used in London or Paris until he had had the opportunity of conferring with Secretary of State for War (group undecipherable) present discussions in Europe and knew General Pershing's views. In my opinion President did not wish even to appear to give a decision without waiting for arrival of Secretary of State for War. Consequently I did not press for any further answer and have no doubt I took right course notwithstanding great urgency of matter as represented by you. I have no doubt that the President will act in accordance with my original reports to you. I expect but do not know that his military advisers see objection to brigading of so many infantrymen and machine-gun units with British and French divisions because they fear this will retard, as it probably must, formation of an American army and American divisions. President will form his own conclusions after he has heard Mr. Baker and will issue instructions accordingly.

I beg of you not to regard this report as indicating a change of view of President. I see nothing to indicate although I agree that I am not able to give you a definite confirmatory statement.

It is highly important that nothing of my conversation with President or my inference from it or views that I express to you should leak out.

Misunderstanding should be left to be cleared up by President Wilson direct with General Pershing doubtless with the assistance of Secretary Baker and it maybe General Bliss. Forgive this warning. I give it for reason that otherwise President's task would be rendered more difficult if he wished to act after concluding, if he did conclude, that there had been some misapprehension in General Pershing's mind but I need not dilate upon importance of this aspect to you.

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P Confidential Cables 501-1000

***Tonnage to be Handled and Ports to Handle it***

No. 887-S

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, April 10, 1918.*

AGWAR WASHINGTON

[Extract]

\* \* \* \* \*

1. C. With reference to your cablegram 1048 [April 6, 1918] the subject of handling aggregate tonnage mentioned is being given serious study. The output with present port facilities will be increased to maximum and the use of additional ports is being taken up with the French and British authorities. Have no doubt of our ability to handle the amount of tonnage mentioned. Further detailed recommendations will be sent on the subject of systematic loading, reductions in existing requisitions and priority of shipments after study has been completed.

PERSHING.

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Les Armees Francaises, Tome VI, 1st Vol., Annexes 3d Vol.: Memorandum

***Direction of the Battle***

[Editorial Translation]

General Staff  
No. 133

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED ARMIES,  
*April 10, 1918.*

[Extract]

General Foch has the honor to request the Marshal, Commander-in-Chief of the British armies, to apprise him of the directives he has issued to his First and Second Armies and

to inform him as to preparations that have been made to dispatch reinforcements to them, or whether reinforcements have actually been sent. In this manner he can be kept informed of the intentions and needs of the British High Command.

Moreover it remains understood that the absolute preservation of the present front in Flanders is as compulsory as in the Arras region; that any voluntary evacuation, such as that of the Passchendaele Ridge, can only be interpreted by the enemy as a sign of weakness and an incentive for an offensive and is therefore not to be carried out without being compelled to such action by a direct enemy attack.

\* \* \* \* \*

FOCH.

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Les Armees Francaises, Tome VI, 1st Vol., Annexes 3d Vol.: Memorandum

***Measures Taken to Parry the New German Offensive***

[Editorial Translation]

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS BRITISH ARMIES IN FRANCE,  
*April 10, 1918.*

No. OAD 810

[Extract]

General Foch:

In answer to your Memorandum No. 133 of April 10:

The directives given to the British First and Second Armies are for them to hold their present front at all costs. This front runs approximately along Passchendaele Ridge---Wyschaete---Messines---the line of the Lys and Lawe Rivers to Lestrem---Givenchy.

The following reinforcements are in movement toward the troops already engaged on this front. The present local reserves are now counterattacking the enemy who has crossed the Lys between Estaires and Bac-Saint-Maur and had pushed toward Ploegsteert.

The 31st and 33d Inf. Divs. in reserve in the south part of the First Army are moving northward to the vicinity of Vieux-Berquin and Bailleul respectively. The 5th Inf. Div. in reserve in the Third Army zone will be moved by rail tomorrow to the vicinity of Aire and Steenbecque. Elements of the 3d Inf. Div. are in support behind Givenchy.

The marshal intends to send the Australian 1st Inf. Div. and the 8th Inf. Div. from the British Fourth Army toward the north; this will leave only local reserves and the 3d Cav. Div. to reinforce the front; Luce River-Albert.

The cavalry corps (less 3d Cav. Div.) is marching northward and will reach Doullens this evening.

\* \* \* \* \*

H. A. LAWRENCE,  
Lt. General, Chief of Staff.

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**Support of British Armies by French Forces**

[Editorial Translation]

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS BRITISH ARMIES IN FRANCE,  
*April 10, 1918---noon.*

My dear General Foch:

You have certainly been informed already of the outcome of last evening's attack north of the La Basse Canal. This morning the enemy's attack has spread north of Armentieres to the vicinity of Messines.

These events bear out even more the opinion I expressed yesterday that your intention of placing the heads of columns of the French divisions on the Somme just west of Amiens is no longer suitable to the present military situation of the British Armies.

The enemy will doubtless continue to attack my troops furiously until they are exhausted. Consequently it is of extreme importance that the French army should take immediate measures to relieve a portion of the British front and participate actively in the battle, so as to enable us to continue to fight for an extended period.

It is for you to decide regarding the portion of the front to be relieved by the French. But I insist on my first opinion that the military situation is such that an immediate decision and action in conformity with the above one are indispensable in the common interest of the Allied armies.

HAIG.

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Cable: P-891-S

**Changes in Priority Schedule**

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, April 11, 1918.*

AGWAR, WASHINGTON

FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF

[Extract]

1. Reference my cablegram numbers 844 and 876 [printed under "Training with British"] relating to priority of combat troops and allocation of unit to British. Readjustment of priority schedule, based on agreement indicated in above cablegram and the availability of shipping for 120,000 men per month (equally divided between British and U. S.), provides for total shipment in April, May, and June of eight complete divisions, the infantry and machine guns of one division, three colored regiments, for French, 44,000 replacements and 59,000 Service of Rear troops.

A. As indicated hereinafter the revision provides for shipment on British shipping of infantry of three divisions in April, same in May and for the infantry of one

division in June. While present plan contemplates holding each of these divisions with the British in France for about two months, when, unless circumstances demand otherwise, they will be withdrawn and joint their artillery in rear of French front, existing agreement with British covers only the month of April. Decision as to the training and employment of the other units transported by British held in abeyance for the present. The employment of our own shipping provides for the entire 3d Division and one other complete division in April, the artillery and auxiliaries of three divisions in May and the artillery and auxiliaries of three divisions in June. This arrangement should result in the progressive training, etc. of the various divisional units so that when infantry is withdrawn from British the complete division will shortly thereafter be available as a unit. Considering the number of our troops now with the French, the three colored regiments and those mentioned above, the French phase of the situation should be satisfactory.

B. In order to accomplish the foregoing and as indicated below, it has been necessary to postpone the sailing of about 78,000 Service of Rear troops of the first and second phases and all air service except two balloon companies and all tank personnel. The postponement of the latter two services is practicable and desirable as necessary equipment will not be available, and as needs of our forces in aviation can be met by the addition of the two balloon companies to that now in England and France.

C. The reduction of Service of Rear troops is practicable with the possible exception of 18,000 laborers. However, if necessary this shortage can be met by employment of combat troops which otherwise will be available for active service.

D. Recommend investigation as to employment of space on cargo transports and commercial liners for some of our Service of Rear troops. Indications here are that several thousand per month could be sent in this way, especially during the summer.

E. In addition, the sailing of remaining motor mechanics about 7,700 for the French will have to be postponed.

F. Plans for months subsequent to June will depend on future conditions, and will be held in abeyance until about the end of May.

G. Following gives revised priority shipment schedule in detail. By British ships during April, the infantry, etc., of three divisions of II Corps, 3,000 Service of Rear, first phase and one colored infantry regiments; during May, the infantry, etc., three divisions of II Corps, 3,000 Service of Rear, second phase, and one colored infantry regiment; during June, the infantry, etc., of one division, III Corps, 6,000 Service of the Rear, second phase, 12,150 Service of the Rear, third phase, and 24,000 replacements. By U. S. ships during April, the entire 3d Regular Division, infantry, etc., of one division, III Corps, artillery and auxiliaries of one division, II Corps, and one colored infantry regiment; during May, the divisional artillery and auxiliaries of three divisions of II Corps, 9,600 troops Service of the Rear, first phase, and 17,300 troops Service of the Rear, second phase; during June, the divisional artillery and auxiliaries of two-divisions, II Corps, and the same for one division, III Corps, 6,500 troops Service of the Rear, second phase, 1,500 troops Service of the Rear, third phase, and 20,000 replacements.

\* \* \* \* \*

I. The following are the units of each infantry division which should be shipped by British ships: Division headquarters, 2 infantry brigades complete, including machine gun battalions, divisional machine gun battalion, headquarters train and military police and 4 camp infirmaries. The rest of each division, including the following troops attached to each division should be shipped U. S. ships: 2 sanitary squads, 1 mobile laboratory, 1 bakery company, 1 butchery company, 50 dentist corps, 2 base hospitals, 3 laundries.

J. Request you cable as soon as practical action taken in this connection and also a plan of shipment showing the organizations and services by month by both British and our shipping.

PERSHING.

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Les Armees Francaises, Tome VI, 1st Vol., Annexes 3d Vol.: Letter

***Support of British Troops by French Forces***

[Editorial Translation]

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS BRITISH ARMIES IN FRANCE,  
*April 11, 1918.*

Dear General Foch:

I visited my Second Army today. The fighting is still furious; the enemy seems to have considerable reserves at hand; he is pushing forward energetically on Merville and northward.

Almost all the infantry divisions of my army have participated in the fight and I cannot send more reinforcements to the Second Army without weakening the Arras front too much.

Looking ahead and almost certain that the enemy is going to exploit his success in the direction of Hazebrouck and Calais, I consider it urgent that steps be taken to concentrate immediately a French force of at least 4 infantry divisions between St-Omer and Dunkirk, ready to support the British.

I am sending this letter by General Davidson who will explain exactly the positions of my troops and the great inroads this battle is making into the effectives of my army.

Very sincerely yours,

D. HAIG.

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***Intervention at Murmansk and Archangel***

No. 85-S

AMERICAN SECTION, SUPREME WAR COUNCIL,  
*Versailles, Seine-et-Oise, April 12, 1918.*

THE ADJUTANT GENERAL, WASHINGTON

FOR SECRETARY OF STATE, SECRETARY OF WAR, AND ACTING CHIEF OF STAFF

[Extract]

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2. The Allied Naval Council and the military representatives, Supreme War Council, at a joint meeting March 23, 1918, adopted a report concerning Allied intervention at Archangel and Murmansk expressing briefly the following opinions:

From a military point of view military resources are not available for expeditions to either point;

From naval viewpoint use of transports or men of war for Archangel expedition would be severely felt both in antisubmarine warfare and in transportation;

That all possible steps should be taken to destroy stores at Archangel to prevent their falling into enemy hands;

That naval steps being taken with respect to Murmansk be continued in order to retain the place for the Allies as long as possible. No action by American Government required.

3. The Secretary of War en route home has with him the draft of a joint note proposed by British and dated March 29, intended to be submitted to military representatives on the subject of "The Situation in the Eastern Theater" with special reference to Japanese in Siberia. Consideration of the note was urged by the British. It was adopted as Joint Note Number 20 by the British, French, and Italian Military Representatives after departure of Secretary of War from Paris. The American Military Representative informed his colleagues that his last information was to effect that this matter was subject of diplomatic negotiation by his government which hoped that matter would not be pressed. General Bliss therefore declined to take part in the action of his colleagues, but said that he would forward their action for the information of his government. On arrival of Secretary of War compare the following with original proposed draft in his possession.

4. A. In Secretary of War's draft omit all of paragraph one except first sentence. In the first sentence omit words "under Bolshevik control" and add words "unless there is an immediate interallied intervention in that country,"

B. In Secretary of War's draft omit in first sentence of paragraph 2 the words "and which will be facilitated wherever Bolshevism has had time to prepare the ground."

C. In Secretary of War's draft add to first sentence of paragraph 5 the words "with the eventual assistance of Czech and other elements which can be organized on the spot." Add to the end of paragraph 5 the sentence "The military representatives are of opinion that such intervention would have an international character."

5. My colleagues state that the essential object of the note signed by them is to make clear a military aspect of the situation which was not considered when Joint Note Number Sixteen was adopted February 18. This aspect is the military danger resulting from unchecked German influence in fostering Pan-Islamism in Persia, Afghanistan, and

Mohammedans of India. The British apprehend this in near future with result that their military efforts must be diverted from Europe to India to prevent disruption of Empire.

BLISS.

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Cable: P-898-S

***More Regular Army Officers Requested***

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, April 12, 1918.*

ADJUTANT GENERAL OF THE ARMY, WASHINGTON

[Extract]

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3. For the Chief of Staff. Recommend that every effort be made to supply troops sent abroad with as many regular army officers as possible. With the possibility of open warfare being substituted for trench warfare experience, previous training and the sound knowledge of tactical principles possessed by our regulars will be more and more valuable. At present less than one per cent of our captains have had one year's service, while I understand that infantry officers of less than ten year's service in the regular army are still captains. Is it not possible to relieve for service abroad all suitable regular officers now on recruiting, remount, or duty of a similar nature in the United States? The percentage of regulars on duty with the I Corps including its headquarters is 7 per cent, and while that may be a higher percentage than similar organizations in the states believe the fact should not be lost sight of that there now exist an extreme emergency which may be regarded as the critical period of the war. Earnestly recommend that this be given immediate and most serious consideration.

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3. C. Request authority to exercise power of the President to assign an officer to command without regard to seniority in rank in the same grade as given in the first clause of the 119th Article of War.

PERSHING.

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**Organization of the Defense East of Hazebrouck**

[Editorial Translation]

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS BRITISH ARMIES IN FRANCE,

O A D 812

*April 12, 1918--10:30 a. m.*

To the First and Second Armies

It is of the utmost importance that the enemy drive in the direction of Hazebrouck be checked. To that end the First and Second Armies will organize immediately a line Kemmel---Neuve-Eglise---Bailleul---Foret-de-Nieppe---vicinity of Hinges, on which the enemy will be stopped at all costs.

The French 133d Inf. Div. arriving in Bergues April 13 will be directed on Cassel. A French cavalry corps is moving toward St-Omer where it will arrive tomorrow.

The British cavalry corps will move immediately to Aire and will act under the orders of the General commanding the First Army.

Acknowledge receipt.

H. A. LAWRENCE,  
Lt. General, Chief of Staff.

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Les Armees Francaises, Tome VI, 1st Vol., Annexes 3d Vol.: Memorandum

**Considerations of the General Situation**

[Editorial Translation]

BRITISH GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,

*April 13, 1918.*

Memorandum submitted by Marshal Haig at the Abbeville Conference of April 14, 1918

The Germans have attained their success north of the La Basse Canal by using fresh divisions against a front held by 1 fresh British division, 1 Portuguese division of doubtful value, and some tired British divisions. Up to now the force used by the enemy north of the La Basse Canal was drawn mostly from divisions which were in line or resting in Flanders on March 28 when the attack was planned, and the reserve of fresh divisions and of artillery available for a new offensive on some scale has not been appreciably reduced. The lesson to derive from the last attack is that the Germans can put all their weight against the decisive front held by British army from the coast to Amiens, and as the evident intention of German High Command apparently is the destruction of the British army, which is the sole obstacle between them and what they call a strong peace, before the American army can come to our help in an appreciable manner, the front of the British army must be shortened if we do not want to risk a decisive defeat. The enemy's second great blow is still to be struck. It can come at any moment. It will be against the British front. When the blow falls, each of the British divisions will have been heavily

engaged in the fight and an immediate rest would be necessary for many of them. At the present time our reserve is so small that divisions which have suffered heavy losses cannot be withdrawn. They can be moved to a sector of the line which seems quieter, but the Germans would oppose them at once with fresh divisions taken from the 43 divisions which are holding the quiet front from the Oise to Switzerland. Consequently if our front is not shortened by extending the front held by the French, very few of our divisions will be able to get any rest. The enemy will be in a position to make local attacks against them at any time with fresh divisions while he is resting and reorganizing his divisions prepared specially for the final attack.

The enemy is able to carry out his final attack with even more infantry and artillery than he used in his initial attack. This he has made evident by thinning out his line from the coast to Passchendaele so as not to squander his troops in quiet sectors. After the second big attack has been launched the enemy will know that the offensive power of the Allied armies is completely destroyed. He will be able to thin out his entire front from the oise to Switzerland and to concentrate on the decisive front the infantry divisions and artillery thus freed.

Consequently we may state as a positive fact that even if our front is shortened we shall be defeated in the third battle if our reserves are not increased. It is useless to count upon American divisions. If we compare the number of American divisions now in France with the forecast made a few months ago, we will see that it would be criminal to count upon the presence of an important American force this summer.

There exists a tendency to think that the Germans would be prepared to negotiate if their second attack is checked. There is no foundation for such an idea. If they see that we are prepared to increase our reserves to the maximum and that their third attack could not have any success, they might be prepared to parley. If they see that we are making no effort to add to our forces, they will realize that victory is sure for them and will certainly make terms only as conquerors.

The majority parties of the Reichstag, even the controlling socialists, have clearly indicated during the last few days that they have abandoned their peace project of last July and that they no longer advocate no annexations, no indemnities. The idea that heavy losses would cause the Germans to hesitate in prosecuting the struggle may be put aside. The heavier their losses the more the German High Command would insist that a decisive victory alone can compensate Germany for its sacrifices. If we do not take immediate measures to increase our forces, the German High Command will have no trouble in convincing the Reichstag that a decisive victory is assured.

It may be thought that I have exaggerated the gravity of the situation. Such is not my desire and I am convinced that I have not done so. Months before the German attack it was constantly stated that because of the approximate equality of forces, Allied and enemy, there was no possibility of a German success. The warnings given during those months that the relative strengths could not be estimated by a numerical comparison of rifles and guns were invariably ignored. The fallacy of these comparisons is now demonstrated.

The situation must be faced squarely. If the necessary measures are not taken immediately the British army will be sacrificed and sacrificed in vain. The question of who shall be responsible is of no importance. What is important is that Europe will be dominated by a race whose ideal is fundamentally opposed to ours, and that despite the justice of our cause, we shall be defeated because of our lack of efficiency and our refusal to face facts.

GENERAL STAFF [sic],  
Brigadier General.

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***Tonnage Requirements Increasing***

A. G. O. WAR DEPARTMENT,  
Washington, D. C., April 14, 1918.

PERSHING, Amexforce G. H. Q., A. E. F.

[Extract]

1.

\* \* \* \* \*

B. If the present flow of troops abroad is maintained, the aggregate cargo tonnage necessary to maintain them increases rapidly between now and August. With the tonnage now available and that in sight, it will be necessary to reduce the number of days in ports abroad to fourteen or better. Cargo vessels are now averaging twenty.

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McCAIN.

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Les Armees Francaises, Tome VI, 1st Vol., Annexes 3d Vol.: Telegram

***Title Corresponding to the New Functions of General Foch***

[Editorial Translation]

Operations, General Staff  
No. 176

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED ARMIES.  
April 14, 1918--9:45 a. m.

General Foch to the Minister of War

At the Beauvais Conference of April 3 I was given adequate powers for conducting the war of the Allies. Subordinates know nothing of them. Hence indecisions, delays in execution.

To remedy the situation I had the honor of asking you in my letter of April 5 to be kind enough to let me know the title I should assume for my new functions.

I suggest that of Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies.

As the direction of operations brooks of no delay I beg of you to forward my request to the British Government immediately so it can give its answer at once.

FOCH.

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**Title Given to General Foch**

[Editorial Translation]

No. 149/H. R.

MINISTRY OF WAR.  
*April 14, 1918---4:45 p. m.*

CODED TELEGRAM

The Minister of War

To Headquarters Foch

By dispatch of this date Mr. Lloyd George informs me that he agrees with me to give you the title of: General Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies in France.

G. CLEMENCEAU.

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Les Armees Francaises Tome VI, 1st Vol., Annexes Vol. 3: Letter

***Development of the Support Lent by French Reserves***

[Editorial Translation]

*ABBEVILLE, April 14, 1918.*

For General Foch

The situation at the front of my armies is such that, because of the state of my troops who have been engaged continuously since March 21, I am asking you to move the 4 divisions commanded by General Maistre [French Tenth Army] to the line Bethune-Lillers. These divisions would be followed by the army corps of General Micheler [French Fifth Army].

In this way General Maistre's troops will be placed so as to reinforce the British armies either in the direction of the La Basse Canal-Arras line, or toward the Bethune-Hazebrouck line.

General Micheler's troops would be disposed so as to reinforce the British army between Arras and the Somme.

D. HAIG,  
Marshal.

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***Title of Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies***

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, April 15, 1918.*

AGWAR, WASHINGTON

FOR SECRETARY OF WAR AND CHIEF OF STAFF

The following letter from M. Clemenceau has just been received:

Mr. Lloyd George informs me that he accepts propositions to bestow upon General Foch the title of Commander-in-Chief of the Allied armies in France. I hasten to ask if you agree to this proposition, subject naturally to the approval of the American Government.

To which I replied as follows:

In reply to your letter repeated to me this morning by telephone I hasten to express my full and complete agreement with your view and that of Mr. Lloyd George as to conferring on General Foch the title of Commander-in-Chief of the Allied armies in France. This is subject to confirmation of my government, which I have no doubt will be immediate.

PERSHING.

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AG, GHQ, AEF: 16721: Letter

***Reassignment of Divisions to Corps***

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, WAR DEPARTMENT,  
*Washington, D. C., April 16, 1918.*

No. 322.03

From: The Adjutant General of the Army

To: The Commanding General, American Expeditionary Forces, France

1. Confirming my cablegram of April 13, 1918, the following reassignment of divisions to corps has been made:

II Corps - for training with British:

77th, 82d, 35th, 28th, 4th, and 30th Divisions.

III Corps:

3d, 5th, 27th, 6th, 78th, and 33d Divisions.

2. The reassignment was necessary by reason of the fact that upon receipt of your Cablegram No. 891, parts of several divisions were either on transports or at ports and concentration camps near the port. In order to carry out your wishes and agreement as to shipping the infantry of the II Corps by British ships, this reassignment had to be made.

3. Of the above divisions, the 82d is a training division and the 33d, 35th, and 77th are replacement divisions.

4. As it was impossible to avoid these assignments here, it is thought that you can make the necessary reassignments and reorganizations of artillery regiments after all the divisions reach France and after the infantry has been released by the British.

5. Your attention is also invited to the fact that until the receipt of your 891 the assignment to corps was as follows, and the model of rifle in possession of divisions is noted after each:

II Corps		III Corps	
Division	Model	Division	Model
77th	1917	3d	1903
82d	1917	5th	1903
28th	1917	35th	1903
80th	1917	4th	1903
78th	1917	6th	1903
30th	1917	33d	1903

To facilitate shipment without the delay incident to rearming and to take advantage of troops at or near the ports of embarkation the rearrangement of divisions in corps became necessary, one division, the 80th being removed and its place being taken by the 27th which was better prepared to meet the requirements of the amended program. The result is as follows:

II Corps		III Corps	
Division	Model	Division	Model
77th	1917	3d	1903
82d	1917	5th	1903
35th	1903	27th	1917
28th	1917	6th	1903
4th	1903	78th	1917
30th	1917	33d	1903

It is well understood that it is not desirable to have divisions of the same corps armed with a different model rifle, but to avoid delay in shipment it is believed that this is a matter that can be easily adjusted by you by the transfer of the 35th and 4th Divisions from the II to the III Corps and the transfer of the 27th and 78th Divisions from the III to the II Corps, the result being that all divisions of the II Corps will have the 1917 rifles and the III Corps the 1903 rifles, as follows:

II Corps		III Corps	
Division	Model	Division	Model
77th	1917	3d	1903
28th	1917	5th	1903
82d	1917	35th	1903
27th	1917	4th	1903
78th	1917	6th	1903
30th	1917	33d	1903

By order of the Secretary of War:

ROY A. HILL,  
Adjutant General.

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Cable: A-1113-R

***The President Approves General Foch as Commander-in-Chief***

A. G. O., WAR DEPARTMENT,  
*Washington, D. C., April 16, 1918.*

PERSHING, AMEXFORCE, G. H. Q., A. E. F.

The President has approved for the United States the designation of General Foch as Commander-in-Chief of the Allied armies in France. March.

McCAIN.

Same message to Supreme War Council.

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A Conf. Cables: 1101-1500

**Conference Relative to Shipment American Troops**

A. G. O., WAR DEPARTMENT,  
*Washington, D. C., April 17, 1918.*

No. 1122-R

PERSHING AMEXFORCE G. H. Q., A. E. F.

[Extract]

1. Cable complete for information Secretary of War who is now here your memorandum containing record of conference held between Secretary of War, yourself and two British representatives reference shipment of American troops to France during coming months in both English and American tonnage. \* \* \*

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McCAIN.

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Cable: A-1123-R

***Marine Machine Gun Platoons Accepted***

A. G. O., WAR DEPARTMENT,  
Washington, D. C., April 17, 1918.  
[Received April 18, 1918.]

PERSHING, AMEXFORCE, G. H. Q., A. E. F.

The Secretary of War has this date accepted the offer of the Secretary of the Navy to furnish in this emergency the infantry and machine gun platoons belonging to one brigade of marines, it being understood that the transfer of these units will be in navy transports and that the replacements for the marines will continue to be furnished by the navy. March.

McCAIN.

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Les Armees Francaises, Tome VI, 1st Vol., Annexes 3d Vol.: Letter

***Need of Increasing Support by French Reserves***

[Editorial Translation]

O. A. D. 822

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, BRITISH ARMIES IN FRANCE,  
April 18, 1918.

To General Foch, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied armies in France

I am sending you by way of information the enclosed report [not selected] of General H. Plumer, commander of the [British] Second Army, regarding the state of the troops under his orders.

As you will see, these troops have suffered very heavy losses during the engagements of the last ten days. Moreover, nearly all the divisions had been previously engaged in the battle which began March 21, so that in one month they were twice depleted of almost all their personnel.

With the serious reductions in strength sustained by the companies and battalions during the present hard fighting, the losses in company and battalion commanders and experienced noncommissioned officers and also in staff officers have been great. These losses will increase gradually as the troops grow less in number and this state of affairs will make the reorganization of these divisions much more difficult or even impossible.

To enable the British army to continue its role in the war I must ask you to be good enough to send your reserve divisions in sufficient numbers to assure the situation.

I know that when the orders now issued are executed, General Plumer's army will be increased by 5 French infantry divisions and 3 French cavalry divisions. I strongly urge that 3 additional French divisions at the minimum be sent without delay to the zone of the Second Army.

If this situation is not settled quickly it will be necessary to alter our line of conduct.

D. HAIG,  
Field Marshal,  
Commander-in-Chief of the British  
Armies in France:

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**Shipment of Troops**

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, April 19, 1918.*

AGWAR, WASHINGTON

FOR THE SECRETARY OF WAR

Reference your Cable No. 1122 paragraph one, following is report of conference: General Whigham stated that he had come to discuss arrangements for carrying out the agreement of the Supreme War Council dated March 27 whereby American infantry and machine-gun units are to be given priority of shipment, according to the present understanding the British will be able to ship 60,000 troops per month and the Americans 60,000 making a total of 120,000 men per month beginning with the month of April. The Secretary of War said that no figures were mentioned in the Versailles agreement. General Whigham suggested that a certain proportion of infantry would necessarily have to be kept apart as replacement troops and that these replacements would probably be landed and kept in England, whereas the fighting troops could be sent directly to France. General Pershing stated that the American idea had been that this infantry should go to British units for training and, as soon as trained, was to be replaced by other infantry and that he had not considered the subject of replacements for troops while on this period of training. The Secretary of War stated that he had understood that the infantry and machine-gun units were to be sent to the British for training and that as soon as trained they were to be replaced by others; that in the event of an emergency, they were to fight and that, in this case, he saw no necessity for replacements. A discussion followed as to the recommendation of the Versailles conference. General Whigham insisted on the necessity for replacing at once small losses while American units are with the British troops; he suggested having a small proportion of the reserves in France and the remainder in England. He stated that the British did this way and they would handle the American reserves in the same way; that shipping across the channel is very uncertain and therefore a small proportion of the reserves should be in France. The Secretary of War inquired as to the origin of this figure of 120,000 troops per month, and called attention to the fact that there had been no obligation on the part of the Americans to send any number of troops or for any particular period. He did not think it was clear that the original six-division decision was annulled by the Versailles agreement; that the Versailles agreement simply was to the effect that American infantry and machine-gun units should be given priority of shipping until further orders and that this further order might come tomorrow. General Whigham stated that the interpretation of the British War Office was that the Versailles agreement wiped out all previous agreements and that it is now a question of sending infantry and machine-gun units to be trained with the British, French, and Americans, the proportion to go to each army to be decided later. The Secretary of War stated that what is pertinent to the present discussion is American troops going to the British for training; that he did not want the British public or the British army, or the French public or the French army to have an exaggerated idea that this scheme provides or will provide a means by which their losses are to be made up in the future; that he does not want any feeling of disillusionment when General Pershing calls for the return of the troops entrusted to these armies for training. General Whigham stated that this was thoroughly understood by the British. He then outlined a scheme for placing American battalions in line, later uniting them as American regiments and still later as brigades and so on. General Pershing asked what would become of the British divisions when, in a month or so, American troops serving with them are withdrawn. General Whigham stated he hoped these

troops would not be withdrawn so soon; that when this does happen, some British divisions will be broken up; that they also hope to get 400,000 or 500,000 troops through conscription. He talked of the gradual increase of American personnel in divisions to such a point when all the infantry might be American and the artillery British. He stated that at some such period the division would be considered an American division and that there was no reason why British artillery should not serve in American divisions. General Pershing stated that if the 120,000 men, infantry and machine-gun units, per month were shipped for three months, this would make 360,000 men, that it would take several months to bring over the additional men and build up divisions around these infantry and machine-gun organizations, as more than that many additional personnel would be required to make complete divisions; that the proposition for bringing over infantry and machine-gun units should have to be considered as a temporary measure and also that other units would have to be brought over. The Secretary of War stated that he wished the British to understand that when the Americans decide to discontinue the Versailles agreement that the British will be notified. General Whigham asked what proportion of the first 60,000 men to be brought over by the British might the British count on having for the present. General Pershing stated that they should have all of them. General Whigham insisted on the necessity of bringing them over in organized units; he stated that it is understood that these men are to come over as completely clothed and equipped as possible; that what is necessary to make up any deficiencies in clothing and equipment will be supplied by the British. The Secretary of War insisted that the uniform must be American. It was also stated that the land transportation furnished for use of these troops would be kept by them and passed over to the Americans by the British when these troops are replaced in American divisions. The Secretary of War resumed the conclusions of the meeting as follows:

That it is agreed by General Pershing that the 60,000 men to be brought over by the British in April will be turned over to the British; the disposition of the troops to be brought over in the months of May will be determined later; that the 60,000 troops to be brought over in April and turned over to the British shall include 20,000 replacement troops; that these troops are to be trained in accordance with the agreement between General Sir Douglas Haig and General Pershing; that the disposition of all troops being brought over by the British shall be fixed by General Pershing and the British War Office; that the land transportation to be turned over by the British to the American troops is to be kept by these troops; that clothing for these troops is to be furnished by the Americans as far as possible and any deficiencies are to be made up by the British; that the British are to furnish machine guns for the machine-gun units and any units which they cannot supply with machine guns will be turned back to General Pershing.

PERSHING.

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***Branch Office of the Judge Advocate General Justified***

A. G. O., WAR DEPARTMENT,  
Washington, D. C., April 19, 1918.

PERSHING, AMEXFORCE, G. H. Q., A. E. F.

[Extract]

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4. The order which included the establishment of a branch of the office of the Judge Advocate General in France was promulgated after the most thorough consideration on the part of the War Department. The existence of this order has already justified itself in preventing the execution of one illegal death sentence not coming, however, from your command. The operation of the order has not delayed the administration of military justice in this country and the establishment of the branch office in France will prevent delay in the administration of military justice in cases arising within your forces. It is believed that when its purposes and operation are thoroughly understood it will be no longer objectionable to you. Your suggestion that it may result in miscarriage of justice, is not concurred in, since it is believed that it will operate to prevent miscarriage of justice by assuring that legality without which no serious sentence should ever be carried into execution. It is desired that conference be held with General Krueger.

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McCAIN.

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Les Armees Francaises Tome VI, 1st Vol., Annexes 3d Vol.: Letter

***Defense Against German Calais Offensive***

[Editorial Translation]

General Staff  
No. 266

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED ARMIES,  
April 19, 1918.

General Foch

To the Marshal, Commander-in-Chief of the British Armies in France.

My dear Marshal,

I have directed the enclosed memorandum to the French armies.  
It would doubtless be profitable to bring it to the knowledge of the British armies.  
To that end I have the honor to send you five copies of it.

Very sincerely yours,

FOCH.

---

MEMORANDUM

We cannot afford to lose any ground on the Franco-British front, whether it be a question of blocking the road to Calais to the enemy, or of protecting the mining region, the Amiens railway junction or the Paris-Amiens Railroad.

Therefore the territory must be defended step by step.

The defense must be based on a succession of defensive organizations and on the installation and action of a large and powerful mass of artillery.

It must be conducted with the utmost energy.

The defensive organizations must constitute 2 positions at the minimum. The second position is prepared in case the first should be broken into in spite of all resistance. It must be occupied at the critical time by a few light elements, infantry and artillery, specifically designated beforehand, specially equipped and organized for this mission and standing in the immediate vicinity of the position.

Counterattacks especially will check the progress of the enemy and recapture lost ground. On each part of the front the terrain will be the decisive factor in determining the objectives to be assigned to counterattacks and the scheme of maneuver to be employed. From these considerations must be deduced the size of the counterattacking forces and their source. Troops in local or in general reserve:

The troops intended for counterattack must not be simply thrown into the line that is under attack. They usually melt away there as a total loss. To counterattack to advantage they must be organized as an entity, have their base of departure, their objectives, a specified formation, artillery support and, if the counterattacks are to be executed with the precision, opportuneness, and coordination from which they derive all their results, they must have been previously planned, prepared, and regulated in the armies, corps, divisions, or regiments. The officers entrusted with their execution (artillery and infantry) must know beforehand the units, point of departure, direction, objectives, so that there is no hesitation whatever in their minds when the time comes.

Therefore it devolves upon the reserve troops to play a double role:

1. To occupy the 2d position swiftly with a few very light elements to ensure checking the further retirement of troops which have been thrown back;

2. The counterattack immediately with all their means. This manner of defense demands distribution in depth of infantry and artillery means in advance of the situation.

Finally attention is called again to the urgent necessity of:

- a. Increasing the defensive lines and distributing the troops in depth;
- b. Reinforcing the batteries of the defense with a powerful force of heavy artillery also disposed in depth;
- c. Preparing the counterattacks in all their details, these details to be made known to the participants.

FOCH.

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***Shipment of Infantry and Machine-gun Units***

SUPREME WAR COUNCIL, AMERICAN SECTION,  
*Versailles, Seine-et-Oise, April 20, 1918.*

Major General Peyton C. March  
Acting Chief of Staff, War Department  
Washington, D. C.

My dear March:

[Extract]

\* \* \* \* \*

You already know from the urgent requests of our Allies that what they now want is men, men, and still more men. I am fully convinced, and it is the unanimous opinion of the American section here, that the quickest and most effective way for us to bring our manpower to bear is in the way now proposed, to wit: To send over our infantry and machine-gun units for an indefinite time. I believe they can very soon be formed into brigades and will in the near future constitute the complete infantry of a certain number of British and French divisions. From the brigade commanders who will thus gain their experience and be tried out, we will get the commanders for American divisions to be formed out of our troops loaned to the British and French as soon as the present emergency is over, provided this emergency is to be followed by another campaign. If another campaign follow this one, I believe that in that way we will secure most quickly and effectively a well trained and independent American army, and if this campaign is not followed by another one, we will have avoided the horrible conclusion of having the war end without our having taken an effective part in it.

\* \* \* \* \*

Hastily but cordially yours,

TASKER H. BLISS,  
General, Chief of Staff, U. S. A.  
American Military Representative.

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Les Armees Francaises Tome VI, 1st Vol., Annexes 3d Vol.: Study

***Importance of the Northern Ports of France***

[Editorial Translation]

*April 20, 1918.*

To Headquarters Allied Armies

[Extract]

If Calais and Boulogne were to fall into the hands of the enemy a very important and most unfavorable change would result in the naval situation.

The question can be considered from three different points of view, to wit:

- A. Maintenance of the army
- B. Fight against the submarines
- C. Commercial traffic to London

## A. MAINTENANCE OF THE ARMY

This part of the problem can be treated under two headings:

1. Troops
2. Supplies

1. Troops: At present the greater part of the troops are sent to France via Folkestone and Dover, Boulogne and Calais, especially because of the fact that the route is short and well protected. In case of emergency 18,000 men can be shipped to France via route each day.

If Calais and Boulogne ceased to belong to us, these troops would have to embark in Newhaven, Southampton, Portland, and Falmouth for Dieppe, Le Havre, Rouen, Cherbourg, or ports located even farther west. In that case the line Newhaven-Dieppe would provide a welcome auxiliary to the Southampton-Le Havre line, but in practice it might be found too near the ports occupied by the enemy. The major part of troop shipments would then fall to Southampton and be directed to Le Havre or Cherbourg.

The transport of any considerable bodies of troops via this route could not be assured with the ships now available. Some of them, appropriate for the service on the lines Folkestone-Boulogne and Dover-Calais do not possess a radius of action sufficient for the crossing from Southampton to Le Havre or other ports farther west.

However, as long as no large number of men on leave are transported, no great difficulty is foreseen in maintaining the service from Southampton to Le Havre adequate for the number of British and American effectives to be brought to the front, that is to say, according to present figures, about 200,000 men per month or an average of 7,000 men per day.

If the situation in the channel forced us to transport the troops farther west than Cherbourg we would have to use a certain proportion of ships slower and of greater tonnage instead of the transports now used.

If the port of Le Havre or ports farther west were to be used for the debarkation of troops, French railroads would naturally be taxed further in their efforts, but not beyond their transport capacity.

II. Supplies: The stores to be transported to France each week amount to about 180,000 tons. Of this tonnage 30,000 tons come from overseas, leaving 150,000 to be shipped from England to France. Of that number 50,000 tons are shipped from England through ports located east of Newhaven, including the barge service crossing the straits and starting from Richborough. At present Dunkirk, Calais, and Boulogne receive on an average 90,000 tons per week. This tonnage would have to be directed to Dieppe, Le Havre, Rouen, Cherbourg, and perhaps to some less important ports like Fecamp and Caen; anyhow this would depend on the number of ports open to receive freight from overseas.

The problem is then twofold:

a. To ship the 50,000 tons in question from Newhaven or from ports located west of Newhaven;

b. To head for Dieppe or for ports located west of Dieppe the tonnage totalling 90,000 tons per week now directed to Dunkirk, Calais, and Boulogne.

Regarding the problem in Par. a, no difficulty is anticipated.

Concerning Par. b, the figures are large, but we could do much better than we are doing at present, in the docks now available to the British Expeditionary Forces in Le Havre and in Rouen.

The increase of traffic in Le Havre, Rouen, and Cherbourg will no doubt create difficulties for the French railroads and will probably prevent the Americans from making any use of these ports, which will aggravate the congestion already prevailing in the ports used by the Americans in the Bay of Biscay.

Until all concerned are completely familiarized with the new situation resulting from these changes, jams and loss of time in the turnaround of the ships will be inevitable.



Greater effort will have to be made in the transport of maritime freight, even if the amount of the supplies being shipped is reduced.

However the problem of transportation does not stop there and the changes which would occur in the traffic across the channel would have an inevitable repercussion on the French railroads.

Anyhow the situation discussed in the above paragraphs would grow worse as sure as fate, the farther the front line would move toward the west. It is a fact that the nearer the battle front would move toward the ports of Le Havre and Rouen, the more these ports would resemble, to the army, a bridgehead and the less they would be capable, in the long run, of receiving oversea supplies.

\* \* \* \* \*

Therefore it can be concluded that from the point of view of maritime transportation, even though such a change is bound to bring about great difficulties and temporary lags in the delivery of men and supplies, it is nevertheless not thought that the maintenance of the army would become impossible.

## B. FIGHTING THE SUBMARINES

If the enemy were in possession of Calais and Boulogne, the Dover minefield could no longer be maintained. It would be wholly under enemy fire. Part of it, it is true, would be exposed only to the fire of long-range guns, but it would be useless to keep up half of the field while the enemy could pass freely through the other half. We would have to establish a field between Beachy-Head and Dieppe, but, not to mention the time necessary for the work, it would be at least 55 miles long instead of the 17 miles it now measures and the only British base available would be the altogether mediocre port of Newhaven, which would moreover be filled to capacity by transports. This field would be of little value, the danger run by the ships crossing the channel would be greatly increased because of the submarines and the mines and a new danger would threaten, that of attacks by enemy surface vessels, a risk which at present is nonexistent.

It must be stressed here that an efficient field in Dover constitutes the keystone of our policy in the struggle against submarines. Without this field the German submarines would cross the straits of Dover to reach with relative freedom their theatres of operations in the English Channel, in the Irish Sea, and the waters commanding the approaches to the St-George and North Channels. Though it cannot yet be said that the Dover straits are hermetically closed, the measures adopted to deny the straits to enemy submarines have been extremely satisfactory and their value is increasing daily.

The enemy, who realized the situation perfectly, has been obliged to detour his submarines around the north coast of Scotland, thus reducing by several days their period of activity; carefully studied measures are now being applied in the north to fight the submarines in that zone. These measures would lose all their value if the Dover straits were free to enemy submarines.

There is no doubt that the long-range possibilities of success of our policy in the struggle against submarines would be greatly reduced if the Dover field were no longer available. Its breakdown would mean an increase in our tonnage losses and it may be foreseen that our traffic across the straits which heretofore has suffered only remarkably little would be considerably affected thereby.

## C. COMMERCIAL TRAFFIC TO LONDON

If the Dover field were shifted to the new line Beachy-Head---Dieppe the merchant ships passing between Beachy-Head and Dover would be exposed to greater danger from submarines, mines, and surface attacks. Sufficient forces would have to be based at Dover to assure systematic mine sweeping and effective patrols would be needed on the coastal road between Beachy-Head and Dover. It would be extremely difficult to bring this about, first

because of the increase in the number of light naval units needed, secondly because it can be foreseen that the port of Dover itself would before long be under the fire of enemy long-range guns.

The navigation situation would become critical if the enemy succeeded in establishing in Calais and Boulogne bases for submarines and light surface craft. Though before evacuating the ports measures would be adopted to make them as useless as possible to the enemy it must be admitted that, should such be the case, our opponents would succeed in making them serviceable again.

Navigation would then be exposed to attacks carried out by surface craft as well as by submarines and a situation would result which could well cause us to abandon the English Channel route.

\* \* \* \* \*

The above survey shows how disastrous it would be, from a naval point of view, to give up the northern ports of France. If it is admitted, as one must, that the Dover field is the keystone of our antisubmarine policy and that, without the possession of the French coast of the English Channel the Dover field cannot be maintained, the retention of this coast must be considered as representing a matter of great interest to the Allies. It cannot be stressed too energetically that this phase of the problem should be examined in all its consequences if unfortunately it becomes necessary to decide whether or not these ports are to be defended at all costs.

R. E. WEMYSS,  
First Lord of the Admiralty.

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HS Secret Documents: Fldr. D-4: Cable

***Priority to be Given Infantry and Machine-Gun Personnel***

WASHINGTON, April 21, 1918--6:50 p. m.

From: Lord Reading

Following for Prime Minister:

Last night Secretary Baker after long consultation with President submitted a memorandum to me substantially in terms set out hereunder. I considered it this morning with Generals Bridges, Hutchison, and MacLachlan who accompanied me later to Secretary Baker's office. Following is the text of the memorandum:

Beginning of D.

Pursuant to the directions of the President and in conformity with his approval of Joint Note of Permanent Military Representatives at Versailles, United States will continue throughout the months of April, May, June, and July, to supply for transportation both in its own and controlled tonnage and in that made available by Great Britain, infantry and machine-gun personnel. It is hoped and on the basis of study it is so far believed that total number of troops transported will be 120,000 per month. These troops when transported will under direction and at the discretion of General Pershing be assigned for training and use with British, French, or American divisions as exigencies require from time to time, it being understood that this programme to the extent that it is a departure from the plan to transport and assemble in Europe complete American divisions is made in view to the exigencies of the present military situation and is made in order to bring into useful cooperation with Allies at the earliest possible moment largest number of American personnel in the military armament needed by the Allies.

It being also understood that this statement is not to be regarded as a commitment from which the United States Government is not free to depart when exigencies no longer require it, and also that preferential transportation of infantry and machine-gun units here set forth as a policy and principle is not to be regarded as so exclusive as to prevent Government of United States from including in troops carried by its own tonnage from time to time relatively small numbers of personnel of other arms as may be deemed wise by U. S. A. as replacements and either to make possible use of maximum capacity of ships or most efficient use of infantry and machine-gun units as such transported or maintenance of sources of supply already organized and in process of construction for American army already in France.

These suggestions are made in order that there may be a clear understanding of intention of U. S. and of mode of execution of that intention and they are not stipulated as indicating any intention on the part of the U. S. until situation has in its judgement changed, to depart from full compliance with recommendation of permanent military representatives as nature of the cases will permit.

(End of D.)

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Les Armees Francaises, Tome VI, Vol. 2, Annexes 1st Vol.: Memorandum

***State of the American Army in France on April 20, 1918***

[Editorial Translation]

General Staff  
No. 316

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED ARMIES,  
*April 21, 1918.*

General Foch, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies in France

To the President of the Council and the Minister of War

I have the honor of submitting to you a memorandum attached hereto which sums up:

1. The existence of the available American forces in France.
2. The program of arrivals of American divisions.
3. The measures to be taken to have more infantry arrive than our artillery resources allow to be utilized immediately and fewer American artillery or service troops.

If you share in the view considered in this memorandum, I request you to take it up with the American Government at once.

FOCH.

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General Staff  
No. 314

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED ARMIES,  
*April 21, 1918.*

MEMORANDUM OF THE AMERICAN ARMY

I. As of April 20:

The American Army has the following troops in France:

The I Army Corps, complete, comprising 6 divisions, of which: 4 are at the front, the 1st in Debeney's army, 3 others (Nos. 2, 26, 42) in quiet sectors:

1 (No. 32) will have its 4 infantry regiments assembled in the region of

Is-sur Tille on April 22,\* where they will enter French divisions in turn to complete their training and participate in the employment of the divisions.

1 (No. 41) is just a depot; responsible for the maintenance of the others, it can not be considered as a combatant force.

To sum up, 5 divisions are used:

4 of which are employed as divisions (infantry and artillery), nucleus of the American Army, representing a strength of	108,000
1 whose infantry will reinforce French divisions (provisionally at least)	16,000
In addition, 2 Negro regiments are serving in the French divisions	7,000
	<hr/> 131,000

Thus, of a total strength of 335,000 Americans\*\* present in France on April 1, 131,000 are combatant troops, and of these, 23,000 infantry are reinforcing French divisions for the time being.

II. 3 divisions are in the process of being shipped:

1 of the II Army Corps, which is being shipped in British bottoms and whose 6 divisions, as far as the infantry is concerned, are intended for employment in the British army. This is the 77th Div., 5,000 men of which have already arrived.

2 of the III Army Corps, being shipped in American bottoms and intended for the French front. These are the 3d Div., whose entire infantry has landed in France, and the 5th Div., just announced. The infantry of these two divisions will be placed in French divisions\*\*\* within 3 to 5 weeks.

According to information received from General Pershing's staff, the artillery and services of these divisions would be shipped immediately after the infantry.

Such is the program for April. As can be seen, probable shipments totaling 100,000 men will only give the combined British and French armies the infantry of 3 divisions or:  $16,000 \times 3 = 48,000$  infantry, without counting the complements in artillery and services, for which there is little need.

III. Program for the following months:

If, as information from the American General Staff seems to indicate, the same method of shipment continues to be used, each of the months of May and June will permit the shipment of 3 divisions under similar conditions: Infantry first, then artillery.

Just as the method used in April, it will only supply the combined British and French armies with 48,000 infantry, in addition to complements in artillery and services which are of no use for the time being.

Thus, the second quarter of 1918 will only add  $48,000 \times 3 = 144,000$  infantry to the Allied armies.

Consequently, there will be 60,000 to 70,000 men for the British and French armies each.\*\*\*\*

These results, taken in the light of the momentous crisis in numerical strengths which the Allied armies face, are too ineffective for words.

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\* The artillery of this division will receive its training at Camp-de-Souges.

\*\* The remainder is comprised approximately as follows:

Artillery, engineers, aviation, etc.	76,000
Noncombatants	107,000
Miscellaneous serving in the British and French Armies	23,000

\*\*\* Under the conditions indicated above for the American 32d Div.

\*\*\*\* And still, in the mind of General Pershing, this aid is momentary, since he has the intention of regrouping these infantry units in divisions as soon as possible; it is for this purpose that he has them followed by artillery. Nevertheless, it does not seem advisable at the present time to enter into a discussion on the question of the time during which this infantry will remain in the Allied divisions; the important thing is for it to be there.

First of all, the British army, which has lost 220,000 men and which already lacks the resources to replenish 9 of its divisions, will not benefit before September by the new laws that have been passed, and meanwhile the only aid they would receive during the three months of battle to come would be 70,000 American infantry; and the same applies to the French army, the bulk of whose forces will enter the battle in its turn.

Therefore, the matter of prime importance today is for the American army to furnish immediately a quantity of infantry sufficient to bridge this crisis.

This result can be attained if the order of shipments is changed, if priority is given to shipments of infantry and machine-gun units and if this principle of priority is applied not to a period of one month (that, in reality, is of no advantage, since the advance in infantry gained during the first half of the month is lost during the second because of the shipment of artillery), but to a period of 3 months, that is to say, if during the 3 months to come only infantry and machine-gun units are shipped.

The results obtained by this procedure can be calculated as follows:

Thanks to the means of shipping available, British as well as American, 59,000\* men were shipped from America to France during the first half of April---this permits us to count on shipping 100,000 to 120,000 men per month.

Thus, in the period of three months a total of 300,000 to 350,000 infantry would be obtained, which would allow an addition of 150,000 to 200,000 infantry to be made to the British and French armies each.

The Allies need these troops if they are to win the battle. Moreover, they have sufficient artillery and ammunition.

In the attached Joint Note No. 18 [selected] of March 27, by the military representatives of the Supreme War Council, General Bliss, permanent military representative at Versailles, has already considered and recommended to his government this manner of serializing shipments.

The American Government seems to have adopted these recommendations on March 31, as General Bliss' memorandum of April 2 [not selected] attached hereto testifies.

However, General Pershing, his mind set on commanding a large American army as soon as possible, without thoroughly examining present necessities and wishing to have fully constituted divisions, urges that the artillery and services of each group of 3 divisions be shipped as soon as the infantry of these three divisions is transported.

This being the case and to put an end to any doubts in the matter, it is necessary to inform the American Government of our needs and the manner in which they can be met more fully.

After having explained to the American Government:

That the measures recommended are necessary in order for American to give her Allies the proper military aid which they need at this time;

That these measures will not interfere with the autonomy of the American army in the future, but will only retard its realization;

That it will in no way impede the American army's organization of bases and transportation lines, as the army now has at its disposal a sufficient number of men of the various services to assure this organization.

Therefore, it is expedient that the American Government be requested at once that during the coming three months there be transported to France in British as well as American bottoms, only infantry and machine-gun units.

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\* But the number of infantry shipped is greatly reduced proportionately:  
Last week of March 1,800 infantrymen out of 17,000  
First week of April 4,500 infantrymen out of 21,000

***Discussion of Available Shipping and Troop Transportation***

*LONDON, April 22, 1918.*

MEMORANDUM OF GENERAL PERSHING'S VISIT TO THE BRITISH WAR OFFICE, AND  
INTERVIEW WITH GENERAL SIR HENRY WILSON, AND LORD MILNER

[Extract]

By appointment General Pershing called on General Sir H. Wilson, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, at 3 p. m., April 22.

General Wilson opened the conversation by reading a telegram or memorandum from - Hankey,\* the British shipping man. This stated that a review of the shipping situation indicated that the British would be able to produce enough tonnage to bring to Europe by July 31, three-quarters of a million men (750,000).

This statement was questioned somewhat by General Pershing as being greatly in excess of anything previously considered, also stating that it was necessary to consider a moment the disposition and supply of such a force if it could be brought.

\* \* \* \* \*

The conversation then took the form of taking stock as to what troops the British may expect from the American shipping program for the next two months. General Pershing read the cablegram 901-R and portions of the agreement between Secretary Baker, Generals Whigham and Hutchinson and himself, showing that while the shipping program might call for a certain number of troops to come, the only actual obligation to the British was to give them for training approximately 60,000 infantry, including replacements. General Pershing then read the memorandum by General Laurence of the conversation between Field Marshal Haig and General Pershing, including the offer of Sir Douglas Haig to turn over the artillery of six divisions with which American infantry should constitute American divisions.

The conversation with General Wilson was adjourned at 3:30 p. m. to the office of Lord Milner, Secretary of State for War.

After a few explanatory remarks as to what the conversation had been in the office of the Chief of Staff, General Wilson said that he had been trying to ascertain just where the British stood on the matter of American infantry.

Lord Milner referred to the original Versailles agreement which he styled Plan B, which called for the infantry of six divisions or about 96,000 men plus necessary replacements. That number was to have come by British tonnage in April and May. The plan for bringing over 750,000 by July 31 was referred to with some doubt as to whether that number existed in the United States. It was pointed out that it was about the infantry of 45 divisions, the original number raised last year, of which six divisions and a part of two others are already in France. Lord Milner and General Wilson referred to a supposed promise of the President to Lord Reading to send over 480,000 infantry. General Pershing stated that no such promise had been made, and it was admitted that possibly Lord Reading had misunderstood the President or the war office had misunderstood Lord Reading.

It was admitted that the agreement is for the infantry of six divisions to be trained by the British and brought over by them, but Lord Milner said it was very important to know whether concurrently with their bringing of the infantry the U. S. tonnage would be bringing artillery, etc., or more infantry. He thought it should be nothing but infantry for

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\* Lt. Col. M. P. A. Hankey

the present. General Pershing quoted Sir D. Haig as in favor of building up an American army at the earliest moment, and his offer to lend artillery for the present, but stated that when the British replacements required their artillery in perhaps July or August, the American infantry would then be without artillery unless America had brought it over. He pointed out the necessity for artillery to build up American divisions. Lord Milner continued to emphasize the urgent necessity of continuing to use all transportation to bring infantry. He considered the crucial moment of the war to be here, and that if the Germans reached Calais and the channel ports, the American divisions would be too late. Complete divisions were no doubt the best in the long run - if there is to be any long run. He thought Haig's plan would give us the necessary artillery until ours could come. General Pershing agreed that such use of artillery would permit American tonnage to bring over some more infantry, but thought it was about as broad as long, as the British artillery could if necessary be used as infantry. Lord Milner did not agree and continued to urge more infantry: Men! Men! Men! General Pershing thought our American artillery could train with British guns. He stated the war would undoubtedly be fought out on the Flanders front, and pointed out the great moral and psychological effect of an American army fighting side by side with the British. Lord Milner stated that such an army would eventually turn the scale and win the war. He pointed out that the Germans are counting on beating the Allies before the American army can be made. Time is needed to set up such an army, and in the meantime every possible man must be flung in during this emergency, just as Foch has relinquished his cherished plans, to send French divisions to the north behind the British lines. No doubt Foch bitterly hated the necessity of doing it, as Lord Milner hated to urge this. Allusion was made to General Pershing's recent offer to General Foch of all our American resources.

The interview terminated by General Pershing agreeing to study the matter and submit a proposition as to what he believes can be done, at 4 p. m. April 23.

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Cable: P-960-S

***Medium Speed Transports Recommended***

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*April 23, 1918.*

ADJUTANT GENERAL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

For the Chief of Staff and Secretary of War

Have discussed with naval authorities the question of using medium speed transports for shipment of troops to France. Admiral Sims believes that use of these ships would not involve any greater danger than use of larger transports. Concur in this view and recommend that matter be given further consideration by War Department in order to expedite shipment of personnel.

PERSHING.

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**Promotion of General Officers**

A. G. O., WAR DEPARTMENT,  
Washington, D. C., April 23, 1918.

PERSHING, AMEXFORCE, G. H. Q., A. E. F.

[Extract]

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2. Your 954 has been personally shown Secretary of War who directs you be informed as follows: The American Expeditionary Force is only a part of the American army and whatever promotions to the grades of Major General and Brigadier General are necessary will be made by him from the entire army. You were directed to submit recommendations as were other general officers. These instructions did not limit your recommendations in any way. Your recommendations are regarded as especially valuable as far as they are limited to the American Expeditionary Forces, but the efficiency of senior officers at home is determined by what there is actually accomplished here, based upon specific reports of inspectors and division commanders. The Secretary of War demands the utmost efficiency in his generals and is going to get it, regardless of rank and seniority in appointments. There will be no changes in the nominations already sent to the Senate.

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McCAIN.

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P Confidential Cables: Cable 961-S

**London Agreement**

LONDON, April 24, 1918.

Adjutant General, Washington

For the Chief of Staff and Secretary of War

1. The following memorandum regarding the shipment of American troops has been agreed to as indicated:

London, April 24, 1918. It is agreed between the Secretary of State for War, representing the British Government, and General Pershing, representative of the American Government, that for the present American troops be sent over in the following order:

A. That only the infantry, machine guns, engineers and signal troops of American divisions and the headquarters of divisions and brigades be sent over in British and American shipping during May for training and service with the British army in France up to six divisions and that any shipping in excess of that required for these troops be utilized to transport troops necessary to make these divisions complete. The training and service of these troops will be carried out in accordance with plans already agreed upon between Sir Douglas Haig and General Pershing, with a view at an early date of building up American divisions.



B. That the American personnel of the artillery of these divisions and such corps troops as may be required to build up American corps organizations follow immediately thereafter, and that American artillery personnel be trained with French materiel and join its proper divisions as soon as thoroughly trained.

C. If, when the program outlined in paragraphs A and B is completed, the military situation makes advisable the further shipment of infantry et cetera of American divisions, then all the British and American shipping available for transport of troops shall be used for that purpose under such arrangement as will insure immediate aid to the Allies, and at the same time provide at the earliest moment for bringing over American artillery and other necessary units to complete the organization of American divisions and corps. Provided that the combatant troops mentioned in A and B be followed by such service of the rear and other troops as may be considered necessary by the American Commander-in-Chief.

D. That it is contemplated American divisions and corps when trained and organized shall be utilized under the American Commander-in-Chief in an American group.

E. That the American Commander-in-Chief shall allot American troops to the French or British for training or train them with American units at his discretion, with the understanding that troops already transported by British shipping or included in the six divisions mentioned in paragraph A are to be trained with the British army, details as to rations, equipment and transport to be determined by special agreement.

2. The plan seems to meet the situation as it appears at present and leaves shipment of service of the rear troops and other necessary contingents for our own determination as may be required. It also provides for and is understood to cover the question of bringing over artillery with very little delay to complete our divisional and corps organizations. There now seems to be a real desire on the part of Sir Douglas Haig and Lord Milner to do this as early as practicable.

3. Memorandum of agreement between Field Marshal Sir D. Haig and General Pershing:

It is agreed that American troops arriving in France for service with British be disposed of as follows: American divisions will be allocated for training as agreed upon by the respective staffs to English cadre divisions. The training staff of the English divisions to be at the disposal of the American regiments for instructions in English rifle, Lewis and machine gun, gas precautions and details of various kinds. As soon as approved by the American divisional commander each American regiment will be attached to an English division in the line so that one American battalion will be attached to each 3 brigades of the English division. The American battalion will be commanded by its own officers and will work as part of the English brigade. The staff of the American regiment will be attached to staff of an English brigade for instruction. In the next stage the American regiment (3 battalions) under its own commander will be attached as a brigade to an English division. Finally the American regiments will be grouped again as a division under their own commander. The field marshal will be prepared when this stage is reached to place the artillery of an English division, up to 6 divisions at present, at the disposal of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Army, until such time as the U. S. divisional artillery arrives or the English cadre divisions are made up to full strength.

4. It is confidentially asserted by the British shipping authorities that the shipment of personnel by both British and American shipping can be very much expedited which, if possible of accomplishment, will enable us without doubt to bring over whole divisions and all other personnel necessary for organization of units and for various other services. In this connection it should be remembered that England has Irish conscription question on her hands. Number of British troops will probably be sent to Ireland to enforce conscription. The possible political effect on American troops of Irish origin fighting under

British flag even temporarily should not be lost sight of. This only emphasizes the desirability of our organizing American units as such and uniting them into an American army at the earliest possible date.

The following estimate as to troop transportation from America is made by the British:

British ships: April 60,000, May 130,000, June 150,000, total 340,000.

American ships: April 58,000, May 70,000, June 70,000, total 198,000, grand total 538,000 men. To the end of July it is thought that a total of 750,000 can be provided for.

PERSHING.

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P Cablegrams: 951-1000

### ***Lack of Training***

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, April 24, 1918.*

AGWAR, WASHINGTON

FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF AND SECRETARY OF WAR

1. Have learned from division commanders and staff officers recently arrived from the United States that large numbers of recruits have been assigned to divisions designated for service in Europe. The same lack of training is found in replacements as already reported in previous cables. In view of the urgency of the situation here there is no time to drill raw recruits in France in elementary work. To send them into the trenches or into battle without requisite training would mean useless and unwarranted loss of life. Therefore urgently recommend that no men be sent over who have not had at least four months' intensive training and who have not also had full and thorough instruction in target practice and that a limited number of divisions to be broken to accomplish this if necessary. Attention invited to original project which contemplated organization of 7th Division for training recruits.

2. Reference target practice have been informed that none of our troops have had practice above 300 yards. Consider this very grave oversight that should be corrected as soon as possible. Target practice should embrace instruction in skirmish firing and practical application of the principles of fire direction, control and discipline with especial emphasis upon instruction of younger officers in musketry as applied to tactical problems in open warfare. Request advice as to action taken upon above recommendation and also information regarding what instruction has been carried out in divisions to come over within the next three months.

3. Regard it most imperative that there be no delay in calling out a new draft and the entire summer season devoted to instruction and training so that new troops may be thoroughly and systematically trained without disturbing organizations when formed. Believe German offensive will be stopped but Allied aggressive must be undertaken as early as possible thereafter and American forces must be in position to throw in their full weight. Recommend that a call be issued at once for at least one million and a half men. Having in mind large replacements of losses that are sure to occur, and the delays of organization equipment and training of new drafts this is the smallest number that should be considered.

4. Attention invited to reports from reliable sources that Germans contemplate using Russians to build up larger army. There is little doubt that German influence in western Russia is rapidly becoming effective and that peasants may easily be led to believe their future lies with Germany. Every means at hand to combat this movement should be exerted by the Allies but especially by our country.

PERSHING.

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***Forces for Italy***

A. G. O., WAR DEPARTMENT,  
Washington, D. C., April 24, 1918.

NO. 49-R

BLISS, AMERICAN SECTION, SUPREME WAR COUNCIL, VERSAILLES

1. When I was in Italy I was urged by everybody with whom I talked to bring about the appearance of American troops in that country for the purpose of showing America's interest in the Italian situation and strengthening the Italian morale. The present situation in France obviously makes such a thing not justifiable, and General Pershing gravely doubts its advisability for two reasons; first, all American troops are needed in France, and second, any small contingent sent would create expectations of larger forces to follow, which it would be difficult to satisfy. I would like to have your opinion whether something could not be done by sending a single regiment or, as an alternative, require the British or French to brigade some of the infantry troops assigned to them with their divisions on the Italian front. If neither of these plans is promising, have you any suggestions? It seems important to do anything we can to stimulate morale and show American interest. Baker, Secretary of War.

2. Cable strength, composition, organization, distribution and quality British forces within Egypt. What part of the force within Egypt is British, what part Colonials and what colonies, what part is Indian, and what part native Egyptian. Number of guns, machine guns and airplanes maintained for this force within Egypt.

A. Similar information desired concerning army within India, including what part British, what part Colonials and what colonies, what part Indian and what percentage Indians are Mohammedans, what percentage Hindus. March.

McCAIN.

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Les Armees Francaises, Tome VI, 1st Vol., Annexes 3d Vol.: Letter

***British and French Efforts Compared***

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff  
No. 25972

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,  
FRENCH ARMIES OF THE NORTH AND NORTHEAST,  
April 24, 1918.

The General Commander-in-Chief

To General Foch, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies in France

On the day after the intervention of a large part of the French army on the British front and on the eve of the arrival of some British divisions on the French front I deem it

my duty to call your attention to certain dispositions taken or contemplated by the British High Command and which, to my mind, appear to augur badly for the future.

The more the Allied armies are called to merge and help each other in the great battle in which we are now engaged, the more the efforts of either one must match the efforts of the other so as to attain an unshakable esteem and faith mutually.

Now, the British High Command, upheld by its government and its press, seeks too evidently to forget yesterday's effort and to underestimate the present effort of the French army. They lose sight of the fact that the battle will last a long time, a very long time and they tend toward lessening the effort of the British army, prematurely drawing available French forces into the British fight when these forces will be so necessary for the development of subsequent operations.

1. The falling off of the British effort is marked by the dissolving of 5 divisions (14th, 16th, 66th, 39th, 30th), already accomplished, and by the contemplated elimination of 4 divisions (40th, 31st, 59th, 34th).

Such procedure is inadmissible.

If indeed the figures furnished by Lt. Col. Fagalde in his memorandum addressed to the president of the council on the present possibilities of British recruiting are consulted, it will be ascertained:

a. That the total effectives of British troops of all categories mobilized within the United Kingdom amounted on January 28 to 1,493,863 men, of which more than 700,000 were for the home defense troops;

b. That, in spite of this important number, nothing has been done to make up the 200,00 men shortage existing before the battle in the strength of the British army in France;

c. That in the period from March 21 to April 11, to make up the shortage that had mounted to more than 400,000 men through losses sustained, returns show only:

30,000 men present in the depots of the armies in France

120,000 men drawn from the interior of England, from the depots as well as from the home defense troops;

d. That in the estimates for the period April 11, May, July, the figures provided for are limited to:

30,000 men from April 11 to April 30

23,000 men for each of the months of May, June, and July.

At the same time it is a shock to learn that it will be a very long time until the new recruiting law produces results, though it is known that it will provide important resources.

Are these not reasons to believe that the British High Command, enlightened as it must be by the knowledge of these resources, desires to conceal its potentialities from us?

It has received and is going to employ as an independent division the American 77th Inf. Div. Why plan on employing the other American reinforcements by separate battalions, to increase to 12 battalions the 11th, 46th, and 55th Inf. Divs. and the guard, instead of reconstituting the divisions that have been dissolved?

Why does the general, chief of the British military mission with French G. H. Q., repeat to whoever will listen to him that the British army will be a very small army from now on?

Why does the general, chief of the Imperial British Staff, ask of the French Government by coded Telegram No. 1173 of April 20, 1918 whether it has been possible to bring all the French divisions engaged in the attack up to strength and whether a reduction is contemplated in the present number of combat divisions, thereby displaying his concern over a comparison in which our effort would appear inferior to that of the British?

All these are questions which it is not my concern to answer. But I have felt it necessary to pass them on to you so that, subject to the approval of the president of the council, Minister of War, you could approach the British Government and the high command.

2. We went into the British battle because it is the battle of the Allies without reservations, with a speed and ardor which do not need to be underscored.

As early as March 22, at the time when the Marshal, Commander-in-Chief of the British Armies, was asking for nothing more than possibly the intervention of 3 French divisions, I decided to move 2 army corps headquarters (V and II Cav. Corps), 6 divisions (25th, 9th, 10th, 1st Dismtd. Cav. Div., 22d, 62d) and 3 regiments of heavy artillery behind the British right; the major part of these troops (125th, 1st Dismtd. Cav. Div., 9th, 10th) was already engaged east and north of Chauny the evening of the 23d.

Beginning with the 23d, the date on which General Humbert (Third Army) and General Fayolle (Group of Armies of the Reserve) assumed command, all my available resources\* were oriented toward the battle and, on the fronts of the Group of Armies of the North and of the Group of Armies of the East, plans of withdrawal were in operation.

So that finally on March 27 the French army had:

16 divisions engaged from the Oise to the Avre (that is to say, on more than half of the new battle front), holding in front of them von Hutier's entire army, the most formidable, the best equipped of the enemy's offensive armies;

27 divisions in movement toward this new front.

From this time on, the dispositions which I have taken or that you have ordered can be assumed as follows:

a. In the Group of Armies of the Reserve, defensive and offensive actions sustained on the average by 16 infantry divisions in the first line and 8 infantry divisions in the reserve line;

b. In the Tenth Army, movement into position of 4 divisions ready to cooperate with either the British Third or First Army.

c. In the army detachment of the north, constitution of an army detachment of 6 infantry divisions and of a cavalry corps to hold part of the front of the British Second Army and support the junction between the British First and Second Armies;

d. In the Fifth Army, disposition of a force consisting of 4 infantry divisions, to support either the British Fourth or Third Army;

Echelonment between Beauvais and the Oise of a reserve of about 6 divisions to assure against all contingencies and without delay the action of the Group of Armies of the Reserve, of the Tenth Army, and of the army detachment of the north.

Altogether in one month we have established on the British front a force of approximately 47 divisions (including 3 cavalry divisions) for the relief or support of the British army on the front with which it has been entrusted by common agreement of the Allied Governments.

And this at a time when, in the battle we may be called upon to fight on our own front, probably no fresh British troops will come to aid us.

Yet, is not the British High Command, on the eve of sending 4 tired divisions (50th, 19th, 25th, 36th) for reorganization behind and on our front in exchange for the 47 fresh divisions we have placed on the British front, asking us to replace these 4 divisions by 4 new divisions?

It seems indeed as if we were the debtors!

This is an incomprehensible error, to say the least.

If we wanted to be mercenary with our Allies, many a British division could be put on our front without putting us under the obligation to give anything in exchange.

Moreover the French army asks for nothing better than to fight. But it cannot shoulder alone the load still left.

With all that it has, it will fight tomorrow on the British front, the day after tomorrow on the Belgian front perhaps, later on the French front, as yesterday on the Italian front, as everywhere on the one and only front.

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\* Totalling 39 divisions (including 2 dismounted cavalry divisions) on March 21.

But it must have the certitude that the British army and the British Empire, the same as the French army and France, are determined to put forth their maximum effort.

PETAIN.

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HS Secret Documents: Fldr. F-1: Report

***Conference on Transportation and Employment of American Troops***

*SARCUS, OISE, April 25, 1918.*

REPORT OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN GENERAL PERSHING AND GENERAL FOCH AT  
SARCUS, APRIL 25, 1918

Present at the conversation were:

General Bliss

General Harbord

General Weygand

Colonel Boyd

Colonel Mott and a French captain who made notes on the conversation.

General Foch referred to General Pershing's offer of March 28 and asked for some details as to the State of preparedness of the American divisions now in France.

General Pershing told him that these divisions should go in in the following order:

1st, 26th, 42d, 2d,

and that the 32d would follow as soon as possible. (Some regiments of this division are ready now, and others within a few weeks.) That the 26th and 42d could go now at any time and the 2d very soon afterwards; that naturally these divisions would have to be withdrawn from the front they now occupy for a short period of rest and instruction before going to the battle front.

General Foch called attention to the very great need of infantry, on account of the present emergency, and requested that America bring over, especially for the English army, as much infantry as possible. He referred to the Versailles recommendation that America, for the present send to Europe only infantry and machine-gun units, and stated that he supposed General Pershing agreed with the principle of this.

General Pershing stated that he did not agree with this; that he could not commit himself to such a proposition; that we must in every step we take prepare for the formation of an American army in France; that the tonnage facilities for the next three months would bring at least 360,000 men; if these be of infantry and machine-gun units, it would be October or November before the corresponding artillery and auxiliary troops could be brought over, and that we may not foresee the formation of an American army before next spring.

General Foch found this estimate a little pessimistic and stated that if we brought infantry during May, June, and July, the artillery could be brought over in August, and that in October the formation of the American divisions could begin.

In view of General Pershing's disagreement with the Versailles recommendation, General Foch asked what he would propose in this connection.

General Pershing stated that he thought we should bring over infantry for the month of May. This would amount, according to the estimates of experts, to more than 120,000 infantry; that the artillery and auxiliary troops for this infantry should follow in the month of June: That he was not willing to have artillery and auxiliary troops arrive more than one month later than their infantry.

General Foch stated that, assuming that 100,000 men can be brought over per month and if we brought infantry, we could have 100,000 by the end of May, 200,000 by the end of June, and 300,000 by the end of July; that this would be a factor worth considering in the present battle where the need for infantry is so urgent; that if in the month of May we could bring over 120,000 infantry this would still lack 100,000 of making up the losses which the British have already suffered; that taking into consideration the losses which they will suffer in the meantime, the Allied forces would rapidly be declining; that if in the month of June we brought over no infantry we would still have no more infantry than at the end of May; meanwhile the infantry of the Allied forces would be still further declining.

General Pershing stated that the proposition of bringing over 120,000 infantry in May and following them by the artillery, etc., in June had been agreed to by the British; that he had just spent three days in London talking this matter over with Lloyd George, and General Wilson, and Lord Milner, and that he was in full accord with them on this proposition. He stated further that Sir Douglas Haig is very anxious to have an American army in the line as soon as possible and fighting on the right of the British; that we must not lose sight of the importance of having this American army.

General Foch stated that he wanted to see an American army - as soon as possible, as large as possible, as well instructed as possible - taking its place on the Allied front, but that if we did not take steps to prevent the disaster which is threatened at present the American army may arrive in France to find the British pushed into the sea and the French back of the LOIRE, while they try in vain to organize on lost battlefields over the tombs of Allied soldiers. He stated that we must look to the present needs, without considering propositions agreed to before we become engaged in the present struggle.

General Pershing stated that he wished to make himself as clearly understood as possible; that he favors bringing over American troops as rapidly as possible; that these troops are to go with the British or the French for a period of training; that during this period of training they will follow the sort of troops with which they are serving, but that we must foresee and prepare an American army fighting as much under American commanders.

General Foch asked General Bliss to explain the reasons which led the Versailles Council to adopt the measure referred to as the Versailles proposition. General Bliss gave the only reasons which he knew.

General Pershing asked General Foch how he contemplated employing American units assigned for temporary duty with the Allied forces.

General Foch replied that he thought by regiments or by brigades.

Finally, four American regiments might be united with French or British artillery and called an American division.

General Pershing asked how long he thought they would have to serve as regiments before being united into brigades and as brigades before being united into divisions.

General Foch thought it not possible to say, except that this would depend on General Pershing and on the troops themselves.

General Pershing outlined the system agreed upon by himself, General Petain, and General Haig, and stated that it worked very satisfactorily with the troops we had had with the French. None have yet had an opportunity of trying it with the British. He stated that he wished his brigade and division commanders during the periods of instruction of the troops to be attached to the headquarters with which their troops are serving, so as to learn something of their own duties, and that he wanted the regiments united as soon as possible into divisions under American commanders.

General Foch agreed to the principle but stated that the time for forming American divisions could not now be stated. He still further insisted on its not being necessary for the Americans to have an artillery but they could use French or British artillery.

General Pershing stated that the proposition is as long as it is broad, and that if American artillery is brought over to serve with American infantry, the British and French artillery thus not needed can be used by the British and French as they see fit.

General Foch stated that to bring over 120,000 troops in the month of May is a splendid effort, that this effort should be continued in June in the same way, and that in June we should certainly not contemplate bringing over any artillery.

General Pershing stated that the plan which he had outlined was one which had been drawn up by Lloyd George, Lord Milner, General Wilson, and himself, and that the procedure had been agreed to by Sir Douglas Haig. He further stated that an examination of the British shipping facilities made by Sir Joseph Maclay revealed, according to Sir Joseph, that the British have more shipping than has been thought which they can place in the troop transport service; that they are going to put all of their available shipping to this use, and that they have reported that they can bring within the next three months 750,000 men. General Pershing had read to General Foch part of a statement made by the British on the shipping situation; that he had agreed with the British to bring over 120,000 infantry and machine-gun units in May, these to be followed then by their artillery, etc., and that the British were disposed to bring over any other American units; that toward the end of May it is to be decided what shall be the shipping program for the month of June. This is to be dictated by the situation at that time.

General Foch stated that if the British had this much shipping to place in the troop transport service that it would be a wonderful asset, but we must still foresee the needs in infantry for the month of June.

General Pershing asked General Foch if the British were capable of bringing over troops as stated, would he (General Foch) agree to their bringing over entire units as planned.

General Foch agreed, but he still insisted on planning for the transportation of a large amount of infantry for the month of June.

The conversation ended with mutual assurances of confidence and cooperation.

General Pershing asked General Foch if he had heard anything of the reported situation as to shortage of coal.

General Foch appeared not very familiar with this situation and no decision was taken in the matter.

[Unsigned]

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C-in-C Rept. File: Fldr. 19: Cablegram

### ***Coal for Italy***

A. G. O., WAR DEPARTMENT,  
Washington, D. C., April 26, 1918.

American Section  
Supreme War Council  
Versailles

Number 50

The President has approved Joint Notes Numbers 21, 22, 23, and 24 in principle with the understanding that the approval in principle of the collection of 150,000 tons coal in Italy does not commit the United States in any way to furnishing tonnage for the supply of this coal. Joint Note Number 19 has not been located. Request that you repeat it. Joint



Note Number 20 is not one of those upon which you request action, but the President has seen it and will take no action on it. March.

McCAIN.

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Cable: A-1184-R

***Information on Agreement for Shipment of Divisions***

A. G. O., WAR DEPARTMENT,  
Washington, D. C., April 26, 1918.

PERSHING, AMEXFORCE, HAEF

1. Following notes have been furnished British Ambassador to the United States:  
April 19, 1918. Pursuant to the direction of the President and in conformity with his approval of the joint notes of the permanent military representatives at Versailles, the United States will continue, throughout the months of April, May, and June, and July to supply for transportation, both in its own owned and controlled tonnage, and in that made available by Great Britain, infantry and machine-gun personnel. It is hoped, and on the basis of study so far it is believed, that the total number of troops transported will be 120,000 per month. These troops when transported will, under the direction and at the discretion of General Pershing, be assigned for training and use with British, French, or American divisions as the exigency of the situation from time to time requires; it being understood that this program, to the extent that it is a departure from the plan to transport and assemble in Europe complete American divisions, is made in view of the exigency of the present military situation and is made in order to bring into useful cooperation at the earliest possible moment the largest possible number of American personnel in the military arm most needed by our Allies. It being also understood that this statement is not to be regarded as a commitment from which the government of the United States is not free to depart when the exigency no longer requires it; and also that the preferential transportation of infantry and machine-gun units here set forth as a policy and principle is not to be regarded as so exclusive as to prevent the Government of the United States from including in the troops carried by its own tonnage from time to time relatively small numbers of personnel of other arms as may be deemed wise by the United States as replacements and either to make possible the use of a maximum capacity of ships or the most efficient use of infantry and machine-gun units as such transported, or the maintenance of the service of supply already organized and in process of construction for the American army already in France. These suggestions are made in order that there may be a clear understanding of the intention of the United States and of the mode of execution of that intention, and they are not stipulated as indicating any intentions on the part of the United States, until the situation has in its judgment changed, to depart from as full [compliance] with the recommendations of the permanent military representatives as the nature of the case will permit.

In connection with foregoing, General Hutchison of the British army has suggested to the Secretary of War the feasibility of placing American infantry in British divisions where the largest number of such infantry can be utilized with the idea that in a comparatively

short time such divisions would consist entirely of American infantry with British field artillery and that at that time they should be turned over to you as American divisions. Not now [it is] understood that General Hutchison has cable these suggestions to his government. Your views are desired. March.

McCAIN.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 2209: Memorandum

***Appointment of a Chief of Infantry Recommended***

3d Section (G-3)

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, April 27, 1918.*

MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF OF STAFF (Through Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3)

1. The creation of the Office of Chief of Infantry, A. E. F., is recommended.
2. The following summarizes from two viewpoints the reasons prompting this recommendation:

A. At all general headquarters there is a vital need for an agency to fulfill for all arms the functions indicated below. This agency should exist as a part of the general staff of these headquarters. There should be a section of this staff for the combined services which is subdivided into subsections for each arm. However, if the staff organization at a general headquarters does not include these functions in its general staff but has separate agencies therefor, then there should be an agency for each of the primary arms, such as chief of infantry, chief of artillery, etc. If a separate agency is created for the artillery, it follows that a similar agency is needed for the infantry.

1. As the infantry is the basic and decisive arm, all other arms should be equipped and employed to support its action. The equipment and tactical action of the infantry should therefore be known to all the other arms.

2. The present weakness (numerical and combat) of the Allied infantry is recognized. This is due to an improper balancing between all arms of the available manpower and false doctrines as to the usefulness of open warfare training.

3. The armament of modern infantry includes ten primary and several secondary weapons. Aside from the usual equipment, infantry now employs many special equipments, such as telephones, radio sets, telegraph, and visual signals, entrenching, wiring, fire control for four weapons, observations, etc.

The training of the infantry includes all of these weapons and equipments individually, collectively and in combination with the other arms, both in open and in trench warfare.

There is an urgent need for a uniform doctrine which will guide not only the infantry but all other arms in the foregoing features.

4. The various infantry specialties, automatic rifles, infantry guns, machine guns, bombs, etc., need the special attention of one head which can direct individual and insure collective efficiency. This applies especially to the training of specialists and the efficient employment of their knowledge. For instance, the existence of such an office should insure officers and men trained in machine gun, Stokes mortar, etc., work being constantly employed with these weapons.

5. New infantry weapons, equipment and methods are developing very rapidly. There should be an office to cover this subject.

6. Uniform doctrines will hardly be secured without enunciation and subsequent inspection which should be directed by an authoritative head.

7. The advice of an expert in infantry matters and of one who is continually studying such matters is constantly needed at a general headquarters in order to insure sound and uniform doctrines, organizations, etc.

8. Authoritative and sound conclusions can only be surely secured through a representative and final reviewing head who has had access to all studies of each question. Such conclusions will be needed to guide the infantry and other arms, not only in this war, but also in the future when our army organization, training, etc., should be based on well founded lessons resulting from this war.

B. The employment of an army should be the basis of its organization. There is a psychological factor in all armies which bears a distinct relation to its organization and employment.

1. In any army successfully organized for offense, the infantry should be the paramount arm, to which all other arms serve as aids.

An army in which the artillery is the paramount arm, as in the French of today, is, whether intentionally or otherwise a defensive army.

2. The role of the American army in this war should be offensive. All services then must be grouped about the infantry. That will not be the case unless the recognition of the infantry's preeminent position is made clear. That preeminent position cannot be clear to all concerned when the artillery has a separate chief and the infantry has not, except in an old army where through tradition the infantry's position is unassailable. The inevitable result of the appointment of a chief of artillery without at the same time appointing a chief of infantry will be the undue elevation of the artillery arm and the consequent early production of a purely defensive army.

3. The infantry and artillery should be inseparable. The latter is valueless in a decisive way without the former as a basis for its employment. They should be organized and represented so as to insure a team that will work hand in hand and in harmony. Both arms should have this feeling of comradeship and mutual support.

4. One of the surest means of securing the foregoing is equal and mutual representation through a general staff. However, a chief of artillery, A. E. F., is provided for in G. O. 31 current series these headquarters. Therefore, it is my firm and impartial conviction that to avoid an undesirable psychological effect, both in morale and efficiency, the Office of Chief of Infantry, A. E. F., should be created with similar functions as assigned to Chief of Artillery, A. E. F.

H. A. DRUM,  
Lieutenant Colonel, G. S. (G-3).

[The following pencil note appears at end of this document:] For C. S. to HAD [Drum] this appears sound and is under consideration. Duties should be clearly defined and in no manner conflict with General Staff control. J. J. Pershing.

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***Tonnage Deficit***

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, April 27, 1918.*

AGWAR, WASHINGTON

FOR THE SECRETARY OF WAR

A. Mr. Stevens, the American delegate to the Allied Maritime Transport Council, has handed me a copy of the statement of the tonnage position of the Allied and neutral world for 1918 and the various demands upon that tonnage for military, naval and general transport needs. A full copy of that statement has been forwarded to the President by Mr. Stevens. It shows an estimated tonnage deficit for 1918 of almost 2,000,000 dead weight tons unless some of the existing programs can be reduced. Obviously the military program on the western front cannot be reduced. In fact it must be increased, especially the participation of the United States therein. But it is strongly believed by the council and by me that much more efficient service from the tonnage available for supplying this front can be obtained if the following suggestions be approved: First, that the use of merchant tonnage by Allied navies might be materially reduced by joint reconsideration of naval programs; Second, that considerable tonnage might be saved by suspending or reducing military activities in theatres of war other than the western front. (While we have no direct interest in campaigns other than on the western front, we have a decided indirect interest therein because of withdrawal of tonnage from the common store for such purpose may actually paralyze our own efforts in the common cause on the western front); Third, that further reductions in civilian imports carefully considered by interallied criticism can release additional tonnage and Fourth, that the insistence upon the part of our government of the adoption by all the Allies of a unified action in supply services along the western front by some such procedure as suggested in my Cable No. 953.

B. I, therefore, heartily approve the recommendation made by the Allied Maritime Transport Council (which, it is important to note, is a body upon which French and English ministers are sitting) that all of the military programs of the Allies be brought under joint review by the appropriate military authorities to the end that effort may be concentrated on the western front. While this is of vital importance to the common cause, it is of peculiar and of almost supreme importance to our own rapidly growing army. If programs are allowed to remain in effect which call for more tonnage than is in existence, the calls for diversion of our ships for food supplies, coal, nitrates, and other things essential to our Allies will become more and more insistent. They will tend to converge more and more upon our program because our program is rapidly expanding and the others are comparatively rigid. Therefore a cutting down of all military programs that do not directly contribute to the common cause and a greater unity in the prosecution of those plans that do contribute to the common cause are essential during the next few months if we are to avoid the disaster that will come from haphazard curtailments of absolute essentials at the eleventh hour.

C. The naval authorities are of the opinion that the defense against the submarine is becoming more and more effective and that there is ground for expecting that it will be under control during the present summer. The tonnage situation should therefore improve rapidly after the next six months. During those six months when tonnage will be at its lowest point we must use every effort to avoid putting a greater strain on existing tonnage than it can possibly bear.

D. The question of tonnage transportation is naturally intimately connected with that

of pooling supplies, referred to in my Cable No. 960. Both should be equally under military control as far as possible. The necessity for the use of all supplies and facilities, including sea transportation, for the the common military end is realized and agreed to in principle by both the French and British and presumably by the Italians. In order to get this complete concert of action the allotment of shipping and supplies should be under military control. Have suggested appointment of a military expert by each government who would together form a board with executive powers that should determine all questions of allocation of general supplies, and, in consultation with the Allied Maritime Transport Council, would direct the allotment of Allied tonnage. Such a board could at least consider ways and means of bringing about this concert of action and would be the first step out of which it is believed joint control under one executive head would probably grow.

PERSHING.

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HS, Brit. File: 900-32.9: Notes

***M. Clemenceau Complains that British and Americans Made Agreement  
without Consulting French***

O. A. D. 832

*April 27, 1918.*

Notes of a conference held at ABBEVILLE at 10 a. m., Saturday, April 27, 1918.

Present:

M. Clemenceau  
Lord Milner  
General Foch  
General Weygand  
General Sir H. H. Wilson  
Field Marshal Sir D. Haig  
Lieut. General The Hon. Sir H. A. Lawrence  
Lieut. General Sir J. P. DuCane  
Brigadier General F. L. Spiers

1. M. Clemenceau complained that the British and Americans had made an agreement without consulting the French, and that General Pershing had gone to London to discuss this matter without any French representative being present. By the agreement come to, the American contingent for the French army was to go to British formations. M. Clemenceau did not dispute the desirability of the arrangements made, but he could not understand how such an agreement could have been arrived at without the French being present. M. Clemenceau said he understood General Pershing was against American infantry and machine guns preceding other arms to France. What General Pershing wanted was to form a great American army. M. Clemenceau asked that a French and British General should go to Washington and present a joint memorandum in favour of the view that infantry and machine guns should be sent to France. The agreement with General Pershing dated April 24, was read. M. Clemenceau and Lord Milner agreed that this paper should be submitted to the Supreme War Council.

Lord Milner explained his policy as follows:

Every month the first 120,000 men should be infantry and machine gunners, certainly for the first 3 months, and if possible afterwards, and that all surplus tonnage in any one

month should be for the purpose of carrying artillery and administrative units at the disposal of the Americans. This was agreed to.

2. M. Clemenceau complained that the British had decided to withdraw 10,000 men from Salonika without consulting the French. It was agreed that this question should also be submitted to the Supreme War Council.

3. M. Clemenceau stated that he wished to send two colonels to examine the question of drafting and manpower in England. Lord Milner replied that he would consider the question when he receives M. Clemenceau on the subject.

4. Lord Milner raised the following points on the military situation for the information of the British Government:

(a) Relief of British III Corps:

General Foch said that he had already arranged to carry out this relief. A letter from General Foch to the Commander-in-Chief was read.

(b) The Chances of Improving the Situation at AMIENS:

General Foch said that the AMIENS railway junctions were of the most vital importance. They were assured by the position of the VILLERS-BRETONNEUX plateau. This, however, is sufficient. General Foch is considering the question of an attack from various points of view, but at present the battle in Flanders proceeds and prevents any immediate action in this direction.

(c) Proposals for Relief of British Troops:

General Foch explained the arrangements for carrying out a roulement of 4 British divisions on the French front in the south. It was agreed that British divisions should be kept together. The desirability of reducing to a minimum the points of contact between British and French troops was also agreed to.

The undesirability of having too large a block of tired troops on any particular section of the front was discussed and agreed to.

5. The C. I. G. S. raised the question of the British losses and the French part in the battle. General Foch explained that the French were taking part in the battle wherever it broke out, especially at this moment at YPRES and VILLERS-BRETONNEUX.

The Commander-in-Chief did not consider that the echeloning of French reserves behind the British front was a good solution to the question of the employment of reserves on account of the mixing up of troops of the two armies. A paper on this subject marked B was read and handed to General Foch.

General Foch said he did not consider there would be any question of taking over sectors in a battle. He would reinforce the front when and where he considered such a course necessary. General Foch agreed to consider further the paper handed to him.

6. C. I. G. S. said that under certain circumstances it might become necessary for the British and Belgian armies to fall back to the line BETHUNE---St-OMER---DUNKIRK, and asked General Foch if he had considered such a withdrawal. General Foch stated that he did not wish to consider the question of a withdrawal in the north at all. He is fighting to cover the channel ports and also to maintain touch between the French and British armies. His plans to attain these ends do not include any considerable withdrawal and certainly no voluntary withdrawal. General Foch pointed out that the daily progress made by each of the two big hostile attacks had gradually diminished until, in the first of these attacks, the line had once more become stable. In his opinion each succeeding hostile attack would share the same fate.

7. Lord Milner raised the questions of the Belgians and the inundations. He asked who is responsible for the management of the latter. General Foch said General de Mitry, who was under General Plumer for tactical purposes, but under General Foch for the purpose of administering the military areas.

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***New Shipments of French Forces in the North***

[Editorial Translation]

From: General Weygand

At: Headquarters Marshal Foch

Date: April 27, 1918                      Hour: 9 p. m.                      Sent by: Telephone

To: Col. Dufieux, 3d Section, French G. H. Q.

We must expect to send further forces to the north. See what can be sent by rail and tell me tonight or tomorrow morning.

Upon the remark that this concentration of troops in the north makes the use of the *noria*\* [great general reserve] indispensable, General Weygand answers that he is attending to it, but that it is very hard to manage. Today in Abbeville Clemenceau and Milner had an interview in which some harsh truths were spoken albeit in a courteous manner.

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Cable: P-1020-S

***Recommendation that Unity of Command Include Italy***

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, April 29, 1918.*

AGWAR, WASHINGTON

FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF AND SECRETARY OF WAR

Realizing that the President approves of unity of command of the Allied forces and that the principle is now accepted by the Allies in France, recommend for consideration the extension of the principle to the Italian army. General Foch has the confidence and even the affection of the Italians, grateful for his energetic help after their disaster last autumn. It is suggested that the President might with propriety make an appeal to the Italian Government to complete the unity of command of all the Allied armies by placing its army under the same control. No one is so qualified to make this request; no one would be listened to with such respectful attention. This suggestion coming from France or Great Britain might excite suspicion; coming from the President only the highest motives touching the general good would be ascribed. It seems possible that the Italian Cabinet is already willing to take this step if it felt able to protect itself from hostile criticism in the Italian Parliament and the Italian opposition press. This protection would be amply furnished by the fact that the suggestion came from the President. Both the Italian Government and the people would see in his action only a desire to serve the common cause. Should the President not wish to make the recommendation directly to the Italian Government

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\* This term, in constant use in 1918, signifies the regular rotation of tired divisions taken out of the line of battle on active fronts and sent to the rear area on quiet fronts, where fresh divisions are taken out of the line to replace them on the active front.

the next best solution would then be to communicate his views to the French and British Governments and authorize them to present it to the Italian Government. I am making this recommendation on my own initiative and have consulted no one. Its realization would strengthen us with the Italian Government and would have a happy effect in France and Great Britain.

PERSHING.

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SWC: 315-2: Cablegram

***Concerning Milner-Pershing Agreement***

AMERICAN SECTION, SUPREME WAR COUNCIL,  
*Versailles, Seine-et-Oise, April 30, 1918.*

No. 102-S

AGWAR, WASHINGTON

FOR ACTING CHIEF OF STAFF

I leave seven a. m., Wednesday for Abbeville for session Supreme War Council which will probably last two days. I learn from M. Clemenceau that one question for consideration will be agreement signed by Lord Milner and General Pershing about transportation American troops. The French strongly oppose this agreement. Other questions will be withdrawal of more troops from Italy and Salonika and extending General Foch's powers as Commander-in-Chief to include Italy. These questions are liable to produce friction.

BLISS.

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Cable: A-1217-R

***Units to be Shipped from United States in May***

No. 1217-R

WAR DEPARTMENT,  
*Washington, D. C., May 1, 1918.*

PERSHING, AMEXFORCE, FRANCE

1. With reference to your 961, present plans contemplate shipment in May of A units, that have not already been shipped, of following divisions: 77th, 82d, 35th, 28th, 4th, 30th, 3d, 5th, 27th, 33d, 80th, and 78th. First six are our original assignment to II Corps for training with British. Second six our assignment to III Corps for training as you direct. These to be followed by B units of the same divisions that have not already been shipped. These to be followed by replacements. These to be followed by all other troops of first and second phases. Either replacements of corps, army, and service of rear troops will be interspersed with divisions when necessary to fill space, or when specially called for. Do you desire the suspension of shipment of troops mentioned in 1 B and 1 H your 891 continued March.



2. With reference to paragraph 2 your 755, 305th Artillery, 77th Division, sailed April 26. March.

HENRY P. McCain,  
The Adjutant General.

G-1, GHQ, AEF: 320.2: Table

**Strength as of May 1, 1918**

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
Chaumont, Haute-Marne, May 1, 1918.

Report A. <b>STRENGTH AS OF MAY 1, 1918</b>										
	American Forces			With the French			With the British			
Organization	Off.	Sol.	Total	Off.	Sol.	Total	Off.	Sol.	Total	Grand Total
Infantry	3949	118165	122114	167	3921	4088	265	9594	9859	136061
Machine Gun	593	13829	14422				26	716	742	15164
Field Art.	1690	30816	32506							32506
C. A. C.	574	14411	14985							14985
A. A. Art.	30	864	894							894
Cavalry	238	5747	5985							5985
Eng. Pioneer	222	8112	8334	51	2293	2344	242	7753	7995	18673
Eng. S. O. S.	1746	47524	49270							49270
Aviation	2872	33195	36067	120	4762	4882	31	550	581	41530
Field S. Bn.	110	3029	3139				14	472	486	3625
Signal, S. O. S.	248	3903	4151							4151
Div. Sup. Tn.	72	3892	3964							3964
Q. M., S. O. S.	1453	32098	33551	6	140	146				33697
Ord. Attach.	4	510	514							514
Ord. S. O. S.	313	3203	3516							3516
Med. Attach.	1250	5360	6610	52	160	212	60	120	180	7002
San. Trains	319	5693	6012				11	302	313	6325
Med. S. O. S.	1346	10636	11982	91	3644	3735	184	1213	1397	17114
Amm. Train	180	6889	7069							7069
Tn. Hq., Mil. P.	76	2176	2252				10	311	321	2573
Hq.	1412	10321	11733							11733
Schools	1887	4289	6176							6176
Cas. and Misc.	439	6409	6848							6848
Civ. Labor*			5186							5186
Eng. Civ.*			138							138
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>21023</b>	<b>371871</b>	<b>392094</b>	<b>487</b>	<b>14920</b>	<b>15407</b>	<b>843</b>	<b>21031</b>	<b>21874</b>	<b>429375</b>

\* Civilians not in totals.

NOTE: Aviation cannot be tabulated by classes of squadron until England reports individual squadrons instead of total.

***Employment of American Troops***

Third Meeting, 5th Session

SUPREME WAR COUNCIL,  
*Abbeville, Somme, May 1, 1918--2:45 p. m.*

SUPREME WAR COUNCIL

[Extract]

Minutes of the first meeting of the fifth session of the Supreme War Council, held in the *Chambre des Notaires*, at ABBEVILLE, on Wednesday, May 1, 1918, at 3:30 p. m.

PRESENT:

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau, President of the Council, Minister of War (in the Chair).

GREAT BRITAIN

The Right Hon. D. Lloyd George, M. P., Prime Minister  
The Right Hon. the Viscount Milner, G. C. B., G. C. M. G., Secretary of State for War.

ITALY

His Excellency Signor Orlando, Prime Minister.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Mr. A. H. Frazier, First Secretary, United States Embassy in Paris.

The following also attended:

FRANCE

General Foch, Commander-in-Chief, Allied armies in France.  
General Petain, Commander-in-Chief of the Armies of the North and Northeast.  
General Belin, Permanent Military Representative.  
Admiral de Bon.  
General Mordacq.  
General Weygand  
Commandant Lacombe

GREAT BRITAIN

Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, K. T., G. C. B., G. C. V. O., K. C. I. E.,  
Commanding-in-Chief, British armies in France.  
General Sir H. H. Wilson, K. C., B., D. S. O., Chief of the Imperial General Staff.  
Major General the Hon. C. J. Sackville-West, C. M. G., Permanent Military Representative.  
Lieutenant General the Hon. H. A. Lawrence, K. C. B., Chief of Staff, British Armies in France.

Admiral Sir Rosslyn Wemyss.  
Lieutenant Colonel Sir M. P. A. Hankey, K. C. B. [In charge of shipping]  
Sir William Wiseman, Bart.

ITALY

His Excellency General di Robilant,  
Permanent Military Representative.  
Colonel Businelli.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

General J. J. Pershing, Commander-in-Chief, American Expeditionary Force.  
General Tasker H. Bliss, Permanent Military Representative.  
Brigadier General Lochridge.  
Colonel Eltinge.  
Colonel Boyd.

SECRETARIAT:

FRANCE

Captain Portier.

GREAT BRITAIN

Lieutenant Colonel L. Storr.

ITALY

Lieutenant Colonel Martin-Franklin

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Colonel U. S. Grant.

INTERPRETER:

Professor Mantoux

M. Clemenceau said that the first item on the Agenda which the Supreme War Council had to consider was that of the employment of American troops. It had been recommended by their military representatives at VERSAILLES in Joint Note No. 18 that only American infantry and machine guns should be sent to France for the present. He proposed to ask the interpreter to read out the note.

(Professor Mantoux then read out Joint note No. 18.)

M. Clemenceau said he wished also to draw the attention of the council to the terms of the Pershing-Milner Agreement of April 24, 1918, which altered to some extent the arrangements which had been agreed upon by the military representatives. It had been understood at VERSAILLES that the United States were to send over 120,000 men a month, half of whom were to join the British and half the French army. Under the new arrangement it appeared that none were to join the French. Now, the French had not been consulted in this matter. It might have been supposed that the American troops arriving in June would be allotted to the French, but it now appeared that the arrangements were that these also

would join the British forces. He felt bound to protest against this arrangement, as he could not regard it as satisfactory. In order to make the discussion more definite in its character, he was prepared to accept that the 120,000 to be sent in May should go to the British. He wished, however, that he had been consulted in the matter, so that he might have had the opportunity of recording his assent to these arrangements. But he felt he must insist on the French getting a similar number in June. He further wished to point out that although there were about 400,000 American troops now in France, only 5 divisions, or the equivalent of 125,000 men, were combatants. This is not a satisfactory proportion.

Lord Milner asked if he might say a word of explanation. M. Clemenceau seemed to be thinking that the Pershing-Milner Agreement was a reversal of a Supreme War Council decision. To his recollection there had been no such decision. There had only been a joint note embodying the recommendations of the military representatives. No such recommendations had any validity until it had been endorsed by the Supreme War Council. M. Clemenceau further was under the impression that it had been decided that half the American troops should go to Great Britain and half to France. He himself could recollect no such decision. All that he and General Pershing had urged had been that infantry and machine guns should be sent to France. Neither he nor General Pershing had any intention of depriving the French of American troops. He did not know that anything had been said as regards their allocation on arrival in France. The one object of himself and General Pershing had been to get these reinforcements over with the least possible delay.

General Pershing said that in making the agreement with Lord Milner he had only the idea of bringing troops as rapidly as possible in order to meet the existing situation. Lord Milner was quite correct in stating that there was no agreement as to the allocation of American troops either to the British or the French armies. There was no agreement between his government or the Commanders-in-Chief and anybody else that any single American soldier should be sent either to the British or to the French. There was in existence an agreement which had been accepted in principle by M. Clemenceau and General Petain, between himself and Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, and signed by Mr. Lloyd George, to the effect that the infantry and machine-gun units of 6 divisions should be brought to Europe, and this agreement had been signed by his government.

Mr. Lloyd George said he wished to ask General Pershing what would be the total number of men in the infantry and machine-gun units of 6 divisions.

General Pershing said that these would amount to about 120,000, which, of course, would include a certain number of auxiliary troops.

M. Clemenceau said that he had an observation to offer. They were not there today to discuss personal matters or to raise personal issues. They were informed that nothing had been decided at VERSAILLES, but evidently something had been decided in London, and France was very intimately concerned in this question. Nothing apparently had been decided on behalf of the French. He wished again to say that he was sorry that the French had asked for certain technical units, but it apparently was not possible to accede to these requests. General Foch had asked General Pershing what American troops would be allocated to the French, and the reply had been that nothing would be given to the French army in May and that it was impossible to say at present what might be allocated in June. He reminded the council that General Foch had been appointed to the Supreme Command in France. This command was not given as a mere decoration. It involved, amongst other things, serious responsibilities, including suitable provision for the future. In conclusion, he said he did not wish to object to what had been arranged about the allocation of American troops in May, but he desired to know what it was intended should be done with troops arriving from America in June.

Mr. Lloyd George associated himself with M. Clemenceau's view that this was not a personal matter. The interests of the Allies were identical and the problem must be approached from this point of view, otherwise the unity of command which they hoped they had achieved had no meaning. What it had to consider was what was best for the common cause. What was the situation today? The British army had been most heavily engaged and had

suffered the most serious losses. All available drafts in depots in England had been sent over to France, and every single man who becomes available in May or June would be sent out. This would be still the case even if they were sure every American soldier who might arrive in Europe in those months would be allotted to the British army. The position was that some of the British divisions had been so severely handled that they could not be reconstituted. General Foch would know the actual number.

General Foch said the number was 10.

Mr. Lloyd George said that as these 10 divisions could no longer be placed in the line they must be replaced by other divisions which must be French. The Germans were fighting with the object of exhausting our reserves. If they could do this without exhausting their own reserves, they might be able to deliver a blow which we could not parry. He suggested that the decision regarding the allocation of American troops in June should be taken when that month arrives, that is to say, the decision whether such troops should be drafted to broken British or French divisions. The decision depended upon who would have to bear the brunt, the British or the French. He thought it was not desirable at this stage to decide how troops from the United States arriving in June should be allocated.

General Foch said that it was incontestable that the situation today so far as the British were concerned was that they were practically exhausted. None disputed this fact any more than they disputed that American troops arriving in May should be drafted to British divisions. The British certainly had suffered very heavily at the start of the present battle, but lately the French had also had grave losses, notable at MONTDIDIER, and both during the last few days and previously the French and English were fighting shoulder to shoulder. American help was now almost as much needed for France as for Great Britain. That, however, was not the point. The American assistance was not wanted for the French or for the British, but for the Allies generally. They agreed that American troops arriving in May should reinforce the British army. In June too, their first need was for infantry and machine-gun units. They looked to General Pershing to display his customary generosity and breadth of view and for him to admit the justice of this opinion. They merely asked him to extend his May program over the following month.

Mr. Lloyd George said he wished to add a word in support of General Foch. He suspected that the French depots were by this time as much reduced as the British. The new manpower bill in England would only begin to take effect in August. By August the men who became available under that bill as well as the French 1920 Class would be coming in. The American troops arriving in May would not be ready for service till August. This meant that June was the critical month. He appealed to General Pershing to ask that the program for May should be extended over June.

M. Clemenceau said he was in absolute agreement with Mr. Lloyd George and General Foch.

General Pershing said that he did not suppose that he was to understand that the American army was to be entirely at the disposal of the French and British commands.

M. Clemenceau said that, of course, this was not the case.

General Pershing said that he spoke for the United States Government and for himself when he said that they looked forward to a time when the United States would have its own army. He must insist on its being recognized. The principle of unity of command in the United States army must prevail, and that army must be complete, homogeneous, and under its own supreme command. He would like the council to fix some date when this principle will materialize. It was only fair to Lord Milner and himself to remind the council that 4 United States divisions were now with the French, a fifth division would be ready in a week, and two more divisions shortly afterwards. He wished it to be quite clear that all American troops in France were consequently not going to the British. As regards the suggested extension of the May program into June, he was not quite prepared to consent. Troops arriving in June would not be ready for the front until late in July or the middle of August. They had the whole of May before them, and there was sufficient time therefore to consider if the emergency in June was likely to arise. His reasons for declining now to commit the American army to a program so far in advance he had communicated to Lord Milner

and to General Foch. If the emergency should arise he would recommend the extension of the program to his government, but he did not recognize that the need for a decision existed at the moment.

Mr. Lloyd George said, speaking on behalf of the British Government, he entirely accepted the principle laid down by General Pershing. It would be unreasonable and impertinent on their part to treat American troops as drafts for the British army. It was to our advantage that the American army as such should take the field as soon as possible, and, speaking as the head of the British Government, he accepted that principle.

We were, however, now fighting what was probably the decisive battle of the war. If we lose this battle we shall have to provide tonnage to take what is left of the British army and the American army back to their homes. How can we best hope to win this battle? The decisive months might well be next September, October, or later. If the United States Army could come in then as an army, this would suit them all. He saw no reason to believe that the two ideas could not be reconciled, but they could not wait until the end of May to decide, as there was the question of tonnage to be considered.

General Pershing agreed.

Mr. Lloyd George thought that we might wait a fortnight. Hitherto the United States Government had objected to sending over troops in slow vessels. Otherwise another 30,000 to 40,000 men per month would be available.

General Pershing said that both he and Admiral Sims had pressed this point with government.

Mr. Lloyd George said he understood the government at Washington was now prepared to consider this point and to send over troops in ships of 9 1/2 knots and over. The British Shipping Controller thought that 150,000 a month was the maximum which British bottoms could take. American ships can bring another 40,000 or 50,000 men. There was no reason, therefore, why they should not be able to transport the infantry and machine guns as desired as a temporary reinforcement, while General Pershing would also be able to bring over the auxiliary services he required to complete his divisions and armies. In August we should be getting over our reinforcements, and thus by September or October General Pershing would be able to take the field with a formed army made up of experienced soldiers. According to the calculations which had been submitted to him, they could transport 200,000 American troops in May in British and American ships, and 220,000 in June, which would enable both programs to be carried out.

General Pershing said that he understood this increase of tonnage would enable America to send over complete units.

Mr. Lloyd George said that this was the case. What was important in view of the urgency of getting infantry was that priority should be given to infantry and machine guns.

General Pershing agreed up to the extent of 6 divisions. The continuance of this program might be discussed on May 10 or 15. This would give him time to consult his government.

Mr. Lloyd George thought that it must be decided sometime before the end of the month.

General Foch said that nobody appreciated better than himself the principle of an American army as an homogeneous unit. This principle applied to every army. There was nothing to compare with a national army under the national flag and national commanders. He supported the principle of the American army as a separate unit. But they had today to face an immediate situation. The best thing to do in this view was to extend the May program. If the tonnage sufficed for both, so much the better, but before the council rose they ought to agree then and there to extend that program. He suggested that Lord Milner, General Pershing, and himself should meet at once to see how this could be done with the least possible delay.

General Pershing said he was glad to hear the French Generalissimo express himself so strongly in favour of the United States army as a unit under its own flag. Nobody appreciated the immediate situation more thoroughly than he did. He was still ready to recommend to his government that all possible assistance must be rendered in France, but he did

not think it necessary for the council to commit themselves today to an extension of the program.

General Foch pointed out that he was in supreme command, and that his appointment had been sanctioned not only by the French and British Governments, but also by the President of the United States. In that capacity he felt it his duty to insist on his point of view. There was the Pershing-Milner Agreement. If, as supreme commander, he were to have nothing to say to such conventions his position was stultified. He again suggested that the three officers he had named should at once prepare a fresh agreement. He could not forget the responsibility devolving upon him in consequence of the powers granted to him by the three governments to control the fighting on the western front.

General Pershing said that he thought General Foch should be a party to the agreement he had made with Lord Milner.

M. Clemenceau said that, of course, this committee would report at once to the Supreme War Council. At first he had been in agreement with Mr. Lloyd George's views, afterwards he had come round to General Foch's opinion.

It was both an obligation and a necessity to form a single great American army. He deeply sympathized with General Pershing's feelings in this matter. General Pershing was rightly impressed with his duty to form a strong and autonomous American army, but he begged General Pershing to consider carefully the arguments of General Foch and Mr. Lloyd George, and to face the immediate situation. The Germans were confronting us at Villers-Bretonneux. If they broke through there they might soon be at the gates of Paris. They were also hammering on our front to the north, and if they broke through by Hazebrouck they might reach the Channel ports. In either case the consequences would be most grave. Hitherto it was the British who had suffered the greatest losses, now it was the French Army's turn. It was essential that both in May and June, when they would be most short of drafts, that they should have men. General Pershing thought it was better to wait before deciding, but time was pressing. Could they afford even a fortnight's delay? Further, the situation might not have changed in any striking fashion in a fortnight, in which case there would be no new basis on which to form a decision. From the point of view of morale it was most important not only to say to our soldiers that the Americans are coming, but to show them that the Americans are actually there. They had, of course, no right to order the United States Government to do anything, but what they could do was to put the situation before the American Government and to point out its gravity. Another point was that a fortnight would make a great deal of difference as regards the training of the men. Let General Pershing reconcile his own principles with the emergent needs of the moment, which were to have American soldiers at once in France, mixing with the British and the French. He proposed to adjourn the council for a short time, in order that the committee suggested by General Foch should meet and examine the question.

(The session adjourned at 5 p. m.)

(The session reopened at 6:10 p.m.)

M. Clemenceau said that the discussion on the question of American troops would be continued on the following day, when the report of the committee would be considered. He asked the council to consider item 2 on the Agenda, which was "The Strength of the Allied Forces and the Future Policy to be pursued in Salonika."

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## SUPREME WAR COUNCIL

Minutes of the third meeting of the fifth session of the Supreme War Council, held in the *Chambre des Notaires*, at ABBEVILLE, on Thursday, May 2, 1918, at 2:45 p. m.

### PRESENT:

#### FRANCE

M. Clemenceau, President of the Council, Minister of War (In the Chair).

#### GREAT BRITAIN

The Right Hon. D. Lloyd George, M. P., Prime Minister

The Right Hon. the Viscount Milner, G. C. G., G. C. M. G., Secretary of State for War.

#### ITALY

His Excellency Signor Orlando, Prime Minister.

#### UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Mr. A. H. Frazier, First Secretary, United States Embassy in Paris.

The following also attended:

#### FRANCE

General Foch, Commander-in-Chief, Allied Armies in France.

General Mordacq

General Weygand

Commandant Lacombe

#### GREAT BRITAIN

General Sir H. H. Wilson, K. C. B., D. S. O., Chief of the Imperial General Staff.

Major General the Hon. C. J. Sackville-West, C. M. G., Permanent Military Representative.

Lieutenant General Sir J. P. DuCane, K. C. B.

Brigadier General P. P. de B. Radcliffe, C. B., D. S. O., Director of Military Operations, War Office.

Lieutenant Colonel Sir M. P. A. Hankey, K. C. B.

Sir William Wiseman, Bart.

#### ITALY

His Excellency General di Robilant, Permanent Military Representative.

Colonel Businelli.

#### UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

General Tasker H. Bliss, Permanent Military Representative.

General J. J. Pershing, Commander-in-Chief American Expeditionary Force.

Brigadier General Lochridge

Colonel Eltinge

Colonel Boyd.



SECRETARIAT:

FRANCE

Captain Portier.

GREAT BRITAIN

Lieutenant Colonel L. Storr.

ITALY

Lieutenant Colonel Martin-Franklin.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Colonel U. S. Grant.

INTERPRETER:

Professor Mantoux.

M. Clemenceau said that he proposed to invite the Supreme War Council to approve of Joint Note No. 25 of the military representatives regarding the transportation of Czech troops from Russia, and to pass the following resolution arising out of it:

Resolution No. 4:

The Supreme War Council approve Joint Note No. 25 of the military representatives, and agree on the following action:

(a) The British Government undertake to do their best to arrange the transportation of those Czech troops who are at Vladivostock or on their way to that port.

(b) The French Government undertake the responsibility for these troops until they are embarked.

(c) The British Government undertake to approach M. Trotski with a view to the concentration at Murmansk and Archangel of those Czech troops not belonging to the army corps, which has left Omsk for Vladivostock.

(This resolution was formally adopted.)

M. Clemenceau read the following draft resolution regarding General Foch's powers and duties in respect of the Allied forces in Italy. This resolution, he said, had been agreed to by Signor Orlando.

Resolution No. 5: The extension of General Foch's powers to the Italian front.

(a) General Foch is Commander-in-Chief of the Italian troops in the French front just as he is of the other Allied troops.

(b) The powers of coordination conferred on General Foch by the agreement of Doullens are extended to the Italian front.

(c) Should circumstances bring about the presence on the Italian front of Allied armies fighting together in the same conditions as in France, Signor Orlando would agree that there should be a General-in-Chief of the Allied armies on the western front, and that this General-in-Chief should be General Foch.

It is understood:

- (1) That the western front extends from the North Sea to the Adriatic.
- (2) That in conformity with the Beauvais Agreement, the General-in-Command of one of the Allied armies can always refer to his government if he considers that the orders received from the General-in-Chief constitute a danger to his army.

Mr. Lloyd George said that he also accepted this resolution.

(The resolution was then formally adopted.)

General Foch then asked permission to make a statement.

General Foch said that today was May 2, and a great battle was now raging on a front of more than 150 kilometers. The Allied armies had been fighting hard since March 21. Their effectives had been seriously reduced, and their resources were rapidly dwindling. Nobody could say how long this battle would continue.

General Foch said that he had been chosen by the Allied Governments of Great Britain, France, and America to hold the Supreme Command of the French, British, and American forces in France, and his command had now been extended over the Italian troops in that country. In that capacity it was impossible for him, at one of the gravest moments of the biggest battles of the war, not to give expression to his views on the conditions of the arrival of American infantry in France. He felt very deeply his own responsibility at a time when this great German offensive was threatening Paris on the one hand, and the channel ports on the other. He would now ask each government to realize its own responsibility in the matter of supporting his views or otherwise.

Speaking in the fullest sense of the gravity of the situation, he said it was essential that at least 120,000 infantry and machine-gun units should, during the months of May, June, and July, be given priority of transportation from America over other arms. If tonnage permitted, then this number of infantry and machine-gun units should be increased, for the greater the figure of American troops able to take their place at short notice in the trenches, the nearer and the more decisive the success of the Allies would be.

He wished the council to realize what had been the effect of this last great enemy offensive. It had caused losses in infantry and machine guns out of all proportion to the experiences of the last three years. The British losses in these respects had exceeded in unforeseen proportions any previously suffered. The same applied to the French insofar as they had been engaged. In the coming weeks the scale of loss in infantry is bound to be intensified. It was essential to replace the losses in infantry and machine-gun units without losing a moment. The German reserve resources in these arms amounted to between 500,000 and 600,000 men. On the other hand, the English depots are practically empty, and the French depots would not begin to fill up until next August. General Foch wished most earnestly to beg the Supreme War Council to submit to President Wilson a statement pointing out the gravity of the situation. General Foch fully appreciated the arguments of General Pershing, who naturally desired to bring to France troops of the supplementary services as well as the infantry in order to form as soon as possible the army of which he was the chief. In the formation of that army, the concession of General Foch's demands would cause a delay of a few weeks only. Speaking as a soldier, and as the soldier in supreme command of the Allied troops, he put it to the council that when the German army was making its biggest attack before Amiens and Ypres, and a success at either place might decide the war, it was impossible to hesitate. The huge losses the British had suffered had been sustained with magnificent steadfastness, but as had been stated at the previous meeting, they had been compelled to reduce their army by a whole 10 divisions, and their mere replacement was not enough. New infantry and new machine guns were necessary without delay. His argument in favor of priority being given to their transportation was reinforced by the fact that American troops after landing, would require some training before they could be put into the line. He appealed to the governments at this grave hour to think solely of their common duty to the cause they served. He spoke as the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied troops in

France, and his position as such made it imperative for him to submit this request to the governments of the United States of America, France, and Great Britain. The heads of these governments must decide.

Mr. Lloyd George said there could be no question about the urgency of our need. The Germans had not only got a larger number of divisions than the Allies in the west, but they had larger resources with which to replace losses. It was clear that they were reckoning on the numerical superiority. Nothing else could explain their stupendous efforts in order to gain comparatively inadequate territorial results. They counted on gradually exhausting us until they overwhelmed us. The crisis might come either in May, in June, or in July, and would be due to the exhaustion of British and French reserves. Neither France nor Great Britain was in a position to make good their losses. Great Britain had called up her very last men, and was even taking men of 50 years of age. This effort of hers involved the destruction of a great number of industries. The total effort, indeed, amounted to the calling up of six million of men for the army and navy, and this number, if the whole empire were included, amounted to over seven million.

We had now reached the stage when our resources were exhausted. We had taken boys of 18, and, as he had said, we were taking men of 50. The position of France in regard to manpower was the same as our own. Unless the United States of America came to the rescue, there was a serious risk that the German calculations might prove to be correct. If Great Britain and France had to go under, it would be an honourable defeat, because each had put the very last man into the army, whereas the United States would go under after putting in only as many men as had the Belgians. He was sure that the American nation would feel it a matter of prestige and national pride not to accept defeat after, if he might put it so, hardly putting their little finger in the struggle.

Mr. Lloyd George was sure that General Pershing was doing his best to meet this emergency. General Pershing desired that any assistance America might give should not be incompatible with the existence of a separate American army at the earliest possible moment. Mr. Lloyd George said that he counted on seeing such an army formed and taking the field this year, possibly in time to win the war by striking a final blow. In the meantime, the Allies had to makeshift somehow until well into August. He quite hoped that it would be possible to reconcile the two ideas; the assistance of the American troops during the critical period of the battle, and the formation of an American army that would win the campaign. General Pershing had submitted a document which was a modification of what was known as the London Agreement. So far as the month of May was concerned, the original program stood, that is to say, the British Government guaranteed to supply shipping for 130,000 American troops, provided that the United States could find the men. He would remind the council that during April the full numbers promised by America had not been made available. The British Government, therefore, could only undertake to provide ships for 130,000 men of those men were brought on to the quay for embarkation. General Pershing was prepared to extend his May program into June if Great Britain would provide shipping for 150,000 men. He would ask General Pershing whether, in the event of Great Britain, by sacrificing many assential commodities, being able to scrape together shipping for 200,000 men, he would let the extra 50,000 be infantry and machine-gun units only, subject to the same conditions as before. As previously stated, we were already short of the numbers promised by America for April. General Pershing calculated by the end of July he would be short 100,000 men to complete his larger units up to establishment, that is, that if Great Britain could get ships for 280,000 men by the end of June and the United States provide for another 140,000 making a grand total of 420,000, the new American army by the end of July would still have a deficit of 100,000 men on its full establishment. Mr. Lloyd George suggested that America should provide both in May and in June 120,000 infantry and machine-gun units, and an additional 50,000 infantry and machine-gun units for each of these two months if the shipping can be scraped together.

Lord Milner confirmed the fact that only 26,000 men had been despatched in April for brigading with the British forces.

Mr. Lloyd George said that he wished to make another suggestion to General Pershing, that is, that he should undertake at the beginning of June to review the situation with a view to the further extension of the above amended program into July, should the emergency still be great.

General Pershing said that what Mr. Lloyd George now proposed was going far beyond the original agreement.

General Foch inquired what was actually meant by the deficit referred to.

General Pershing replied that it covered corps and divisional and railway artillery, as well as technical troops and rear services.

Mr. Lloyd George asked that the amended agreement suggested by him should be accepted, which would complete the program for May and June, but that if this was found not to be enough, and the situation was still serious, General Pershing should examine it during June with a view to making the necessary timely arrangements for July.

General Pershing said that he agreed with General Foch as regards the seriousness of the situation. They were, in fact, all agreed about this. Speaking for the American army and for the American people, he wished to express their earnest desire to take their full part in this battle and to share the burden to the fullest possible extent. The desire of all of them was the same. They only differed in their methods of attaining that desire. His own views were based on this fact, namely, that the United States entered the war as an independent power, and she must always look forward to fighting the war with an army of her own. There was one important point upon which he desired to lay stress, and that was that the morale of the American troops depended on their fighting under their own flag. Already today America was asking where her army was. Moreover, the Germans were busily engaged in circulating propaganda stating that the British and French had so little confidence in American troops that they parceled them out among their own divisions. The American soldier had his own pride, and before long both the troops themselves and the American Government would demand that they should fight as a separate entity as soon as it were possible to organize them as an American army. The proposal, as he understood it, was that in June the situation should again be reviewed. His own view was that this was far as they could go at present, and by this arrangement he thought that they were meeting the situation fairly and squarely.

General Foch wished to be quite clear about the new agreement so far as June was concerned.

M. Clemenceau suggested that the draft agreement should be read to the council.

(Professor Mantoux then read out both the British and French texts of the following Draft Agreement.)

Resolution No. 6: Regarding the Cooperation of the American Army:

It is the opinion of the Supreme War Council that in order to carry the war to a successful conclusion, the American army should be formed as early as possible under its own commander and under its own flag.

In order to meet the present emergency, it is agreed that American troops shall be brought to France as rapidly as Allied transportation facilities will permit, and that, without losing sight of the necessity of building up an American army, priority of transport be given to infantry and machine-gun units for training and service with the French and British armies - on the understanding that such infantry and machine-gun units are to be withdrawn and united with their own artillery and auxiliary troops into divisions and corps at the discretion of the American Commander-in-Chief, after consultation with the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies in France.

It is also agreed that during the month of May preference shall be given to the transportation of infantry and machine-gun units of 6 divisions, and that any excess tonnage shall be devoted to bringing over such other troops as may be determined by the American Commander-in-Chief.

It is further agreed that this program shall be continued during the month of June, upon condition that the British Government shall furnish transportation for a minimum of 130,000 men in May and 150,000 men in June, with the understanding that the first 6 divisions of infantry shall go to the British for training and service, and that troops sent over in June shall be allocated for training and service as the American Commander-in-Chief may determine.

It is also further agreed that if the British Government should transport any number in excess of 150,000 men in June, such excess should be infantry and machine-gun units and that early in June there should be a new review of the situation to determine further action.

M. Clemenceau said that so far as he could see this agreement might be acceptable, but he would like to examine it with General Foch before finally endorsing it. He enquired whether American tonnage would also be employed.

General Pershing said that it would be so employed for the transportation of personnel.

M. Clemenceau (after a brief discussion of the draft with General Foch) said that he was prepared to accept the resolution.

(The above resolution was adopted by the Supreme War Council.)

M. Clemenceau said that he proposed that the three heads of governments present should retire to consider General Foch's statement and to decide whether it should, in its present, or in a slightly modified, form be transmitted to the President of the United States.

(The Supreme War Council concluded its 5th Session at 3:50 p. m.)

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SWC: 115: Resolution

### ***The Executive War Board Dissolved***

[Extract]

Resolutions passed at the Fifth Session of the Supreme War Council,  
May 1918

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BRITISH TEXT

Resolution No. 2

The Executive War Board

The Supreme War Council are agreed that, in view of the extended powers conferred on General Foch by the Doullens and Beauvais Agreements, the Executive War Board, set up at the meeting of the Supreme War Council held on February 2, should be dissolved.

The Executive War Board is therefore dissolved.

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## ***Transportation of American Troops***

[Editorial Translation]

ANNEX E

SUPREME WAR COUNCIL,  
*Abbeville, Somme, May 2, 1918.*

### MEMORANDUM FROM GENERAL FOCH

I have been designated Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies by the Governments of the United States of America, France, and Great Britain; wherefore, it is impossible for me, and in fact incompatible with the greatest battle of the war, to admit that I do not have the right to declare myself on the proposition of the arrival of American infantry in France.

That is why, impressed with the heavy responsibility resting upon me, at the moment when the greatest German offensive today threatens, at one and the same time, Paris and our line of communications with Great Britain via Calais and Boulogne, I am anxious that each of these governments assume its share of the responsibility devolving upon it.

In all conscience, it is of the utmost necessity that there arrive each month in France from America, at least during the months of May, June, and July, on a priority basis, 120,000 American infantry and machine gunners. I am even of the opinion that, tonnage permitting (as we have been led to understand that it will), it would be highly desirable that this figure be exceeded. For, the greater the numbers of American infantry that can speedily appear on the battlefields, the more rapid and more decisive will be the success of the Allied armies.

It must in fact be clearly understood that the nature of the last enemy offensive was such as to carry infantry and machine-gun losses out of all proportion to losses in the war during the past three years. Infantry losses in the British army exceeded to an unanticipated degree all those previously suffered. The same was true of the French to the extent of their participation in the battle, and it is inevitable that during the ensuing weeks infantry losses will grow worse. Losses in infantry and machine-gun troops must therefore be made up without losing an instant, the more so since the resources of the German depots in infantry and machine gunners are estimated at 500,000 or 600,000 men, whereas the British depots are almost depleted and the French depots will be without any resources until next August.

I ask in the most positive manner that the Supreme War Council, composed of the Allied Governments, declare itself on this request and that it submit it to the President of the United States.

It is not that I do not value the views of General Pershing, who justly wishes to bring to France as soon as possible all the auxiliary services needed to bring about at an early date the organization of the great American army that he commands and that we call on most fervently. But, admitting that my request can only cause a delay of a few weeks, my imperative duty as a soldier and as General-in-Chief forces me to declare that, when the greatest German army opens the greatest offensive of this war in front of Amiens and Ypres, so slight a delay cannot be taken into consideration when the very issue of the war may depend on a success of the enemy against the two above named objectives.

After the enormous losses that the English army has sustained with magnificent valor, it has just seen 10 of its divisions made inactive. Replacing them is not enough to check the German armies decisively. What we need without any delay are new infantry forces and machine gunners. And when we consider that American troops, on disembarking, will need a quick period of training to round out their instruction, we can understand how urgent is

the decision confronting us on that account. Let each of the governments concerned, in this most critical hour, be inspired solely by its duty to the great cause whose servants we are.

I have here stated the step that my position as Commander-in-Chief of the Allied armies compels me to submit to the Governments of the United States, France, and Great Britain. It is for the heads of these governments to decide.

[No Signature.]

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C-in-C Rept. File: Fldr. 19: Cablegram

***Approval of Joint Note***

AGO, WAR DEPARTMENT,  
*Washington, D. C., May 3, 1918.*

American Section  
Supreme War Council  
Versailles

Number 52

\* \* \* \* \*

2. President has formally approved Joint Note 19 of Interallied War Council.

\* \* \* \* \*

March

McCaIn.

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Relations with Allies: C-in-C Rept. File: Fldr. 20: Cablegram

***Transportation for Six Divisions***

No. 1042

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, May 3, 1918.*

For the Chief of Staff and Secretary of War

Following agreement adopted by Supreme War Council May 2 at ABBEVILLE. Will cable more in detail later.

It is the opinion of the Supreme War Council that, in order to carry the war to a successful conclusion, an American army should be formed as early as possible under its own commander and under its own flag. In

order to meet the present emergency it is agreed that American troops should be brought to France as rapidly as Allied transportation facilities will permit and, that as far as consistent with the necessity of building up an American army, preference be given to infantry and machine-gun units for training and service with French and British armies; with the understanding that such infantry and machine-gun units are to be withdrawn and united with its own artillery and auxiliary troops into divisions and corps at the discretion of the American Commander-in-Chief after consultation with the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies in France.

A. It is also agreed that during the month of May preference should be given to the transportation of infantry and machine-gun units of six divisions, and that any excess tonnage shall be devoted to bringing over such other troops as may be determined by the American Commander-in-Chief.

B. It is further agreed that this program shall be continued during the month of June upon condition that the British Government shall furnish transportation for a minimum of 130,000 men in May and 150,000 men in June with the understanding that the first six divisions of infantry shall go to the British for training and services, and that troops sent over in June shall be allocated for training and service as the American Commander-in-Chief may determine.

C. It is also further agreed that if the British Government shall transport an excess of 150,000 men in June that such excess shall be infantry and machine-gun units, and that early in June there shall be a new review of the situation to determine further action.

PERSHING.

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Bliss Cables: 101-200

***American Approval of Including Italian Army under General Foch***

*VERSAILLES, SEINE-et-OISE, May 3, 1918--7:47 a. m.*

No. 103-S

The Adjutant General, Washington

For Secretary of State, Secretary of War and Acting Chief of Staff

1. Supreme War Council met for its fourth session at 2:30 p. m., May 1, and adjourned at 4 p. m., May 2. Following is the summary of business transacted.

2. First subject taken up was the shipment and employment of American troops, the French Government requesting amendment of agreement made between General Pershing and Lord Milner in London so as to provide for exclusive shipment of infantry and machine-gun units not only in May but also in June. After considerable discussion subject was referred to a committee consisting of Lord Milner, General Foch and General Pershing with instructions to draft a form of resolution and submit it at 5 p. m. In order to communicate with London for information regarding it, reports of subcommittee were delayed until the next day session when their drafts were considered. After impassioned appeals by Mr. Lloyd George, Mr. Clemenceau, and General Foch, a modified form of General Pershing's proposal was adopted, the essential point of which is:

A. Allied transportation facilities to be used for transportation of American troops, preference being given to infantry and machine-gun units, as far as consistent with



the necessity of building up an American army for training and service with French and British armies subject to provision that they are to be formed into divisions and corps at discretion of American Commander-in-Chief after consultation with Commander-in-Chief of Allied Armies in France.

B. During May, infantry and machine-gun units of six divisions to be transported and any excess tonnage available applied to transportation of such troops as American Commander-in-Chief may desire.

C. This program to be continued in June, provided British Government furnishes transportation for minimum of 130,000 men in June; that first six divisions infantry go to British for training and service and those brought over in June to be allocated for training by American Commander-in-Chief.

D. If British Government transports more than 150,000 in June excess shall be infantry and machine-gun units and situation shall be reviewed early in June with a view to determining program for July.

3. In view of the reinforcement Allied forces at Salonika by newly formed Greek divisions, British Government desired to withdraw 12 battalions of their troops from Salonika front. Supreme War Council decided that it should be possible to do this but that no transfer should be made without consultation with Commanding General Allied armies there. The Supreme War Council agreed that a French and a British General Officer should be despatched forthwith to Salonika where in association with the General commanding the Italian forces at Vallona they will confer with Commanding General of Allied Armies on this question, to arrange with him for the immediate withdrawal of Allied battalions.

4. The Executive War Board established by resolution number 13 of the third Session, Supreme War Council was dissolved: The main duties having already been transferred to General Foch.

5. Mr. Orlando on behalf of Italy agreed to extension of the powers of General Foch over the Italian troops in France under conditions of Beauvais agreement, April 3. He agreed to General Foch's exercising over the troops on the Italian front coordinating powers granted to him over British and French by agreement at Doullens, March 26.

6. Formal acceptance was given to Joint Notes numbers 19 to 24, inclusive, of the military representative. Joint Note number 20 relating to Japanese question was not signed by American military representative but was transmitted by me to Washington.

7. Joint Note 25 passed by military representatives on April 27 expresses the following conclusions: "That there is everything to be gained by securing the transportation of Czech contingents from Russia; and that, as the greatest rapidity can be ensured by using Archangel and Murmansk, all Czech troops which have not yet passed east of Omsk on tran-Siberian railroad, should be dispatched to these two ports."

A. The Supreme War Council approved the aforesaid joint note, the British Government undertaking to arrange as far as possible for transportation of Czech troops already at Vladivostok or on their way there, and to request Russian Government to concentrate other Czech troops at Murmansk and Archangel; French Government retaining general charge of Czech troops until embarked.

8. The Supreme War Council considered report of Allied Naval Council, April 3, April 26, and 27, and agreed that transfer to Corfu of Italian dreadnaughts would be desirable to free French bay for Allied naval forces in Aegean Sea and urged the Italian Government to comply with the least possible delay.

9. Documents by mail.

BLISS.

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Cable: A-1235-R

***Assignment to Command***

A. G. O., WAR DEPARTMENT,  
*Washington, D. C., May 3, 1918.*

PERSHING, AMEXFORCE, H. A. E. F.

[Extract]

1. With reference to paragraph 3C your 898, President authorizes you to assign officers to command without regard to seniority in rank in same grade in accordance with provisions of 119th Article of War. Report of action taken under this authority to be made in each case without delay. Orders in such cases to state "By direction of the President." March.

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McCAIN.

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Cable: P-1043-S

***Unity of Command Extended to Italy***

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*May 3, 1918*

[Extract]

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3. Confidential for the Chief of Staff and Secretary of War. Reference my cable 1020 on question of extending to Italian army the principle of unity of command, resolution adopted by Supreme War Council, May 2, settles question to apparent satisfaction of all concerned and no further action is considered necessary. Text of this resolution will no doubt be cabled by General Bliss.

PERSHING.

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***Italian Government Accepts General Foch as Supreme Commander***

No. 103-S

AMERICAN SECTION, SUPREME WAR COUNCIL,  
*Versailles, Seine-et-Oise, May 3, 1918.*

AGWAR, WASHINGTON

FOR SECRETARY OF STATE, SECRETARY OF WAR, AND ACTING CHIEF OF STAFF

[Extract]

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4. The Executive War Board established by Resolution Number 13 of the Third Session, Supreme War Council was dissolved; the main duties having already been transferred to General Foch.

5. M. Orlando on behalf of Italy agreed to extension of the powers of General Foch over the Italian troops in France under conditions of Beauvais agreement, April 3. He agreed to General Foch's exercising over the troops on the Italian front coordinating powers granted to him over British and French by agreement at Doullens, March 26.

6. Formal acceptance was given to Joint Notes Numbers 19 to 24, inclusive, of the military representatives. Joint Note Number 20 relating to Japanese question was not signed by American Military Representative but was transmitted by me to Washington.

7. Joint Note 25 passed by military representatives on April 27, expresses the following conclusions:

That there is everything to be gained by securing the transportation of Czech contingents from Russia; and that, as the greatest rapidity can be ensured by using Archangel and Murmansk, all Czech troops, which have not yet passed east of Omsk on tran-Siberian Railway should be despatched to these two ports.

A. The Supreme War Council approved the aforesaid joint note, the British Government undertaking to arrange as far as possible for transportation of Czech troops already at Vladivostok or on their way there, and to request Russian Government to concentrate other Czech troops at Murmansk and Archangel; French Government retaining general charge of Czech troops until embarked.

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BLISS.

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SWC: 316: Cablegram

***Italian Army Under General Foch***

No. 53-R

A. G. O., WAR DEPARTMENT,  
*Washington, D. C., May 4, 1918.*

AMERICAN SECTION, SUPREME WAR COUNCIL, VERSAILLES

Reference Cablegram 1020 from Pershing, the President authorizes you to express the favorable opinion of this government toward the proposition to include the Italian Army

under the same terms as British, French and American Armies now placed under General Foch, the supreme commander. Notify Pershing. This approval given before receipt of your 103, paragraph 5. March.

McCAIN.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: 687: Letter and Enclosure

***Request for American Artillerymen***

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, B. E. F.,  
Abbeville, Somme, May 5, 1918.

Dear General Pershing:

I beg to enclose a note showing how I stand in the matter of artillery personnel. You will see that there is a considerable shortage, and consequently if you could arrange to let me have 10,000 American artillerymen, it would be of very great assistance to us.

With kind regards, believe me.

Yours very truly,

D. HAIG.

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NOTE ON ARTILLERY PERSONNEL

The Adjutant General's Branch estimates that on May 31, 1918, the deficits in personnel as regards Royal Horse and Royal Field Artillery may amount to 3,500 and as regards Royal Garrison Artillery to 1,900.

These net deficits will entail R. F. A. field units being about 6,000 short and R. G. A. field units 4,000 short, owing to the fact that casualties continue to occur while drafts previously demanded are en route.

The Major General R. A. recommends that the services of 10,000 American artillerymen should be asked for, two-thirds being field artillery, one-third heavy artillerymen. These men to be attached to British batteries in the first instances and trained as N. C. O.'s, gunners, drivers, etc.

Subsequently they could be collected to form American batteries to be attached to British brigades and, finally, these batteries could be organized as American brigades.

As a rough guide, the following figures indicate the percentages of the various ranks required to meet the estimated casualties:

	Field Artillery	Heavy Artillery
N. C. O.'s	8%	10%
Gunners	52%	60%
Drivers	18%	4%
Signallers	14%	16%
Layers	8%	10%

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Cable: P-1042-S

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
May 5, 1918.

AGWAR, WASHINGTON

FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF AND SECRETARY OF WAR

Following agreement adopted by Supreme War Council, May 2, at Abbeville. Will cable more in detail later.

It is the opinion of the Supreme War Council that, in order to carry the war to a successful conclusion, an American army should be formed as early as possible under its own commander and under its own flag. In order to meet the present emergency it is agreed that American troops should be brought to France as rapidly as Allied transportation facilities will permit and, that as far as consistent with the necessity of building up an American army, preference be given to infantry and machine-gun units for training and service with French and British armies; with the understanding that such infantry and machine-gun units are to be withdrawn and united with its own artillery and auxiliary troops into divisions and corps at the discretion of the American Commander-in-Chief after consultation with the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied armies in France.

A. It is also agreed that during the month of May preference should be given to the transportation of infantry and machine-gun units of six divisions, and that any excess tonnage shall be devoted to bringing over such other troops as may be determined by the American Commander-in-Chief.

B. It is further agreed that this program shall be continued during the month of June upon condition that the British Government shall furnish transportation for a minimum of 130,000 men in May and 150,000 men in June with the understanding that the first six divisions of infantry shall go to the British for training and service, and that troops sent over in June shall be allocated for training and service as the American Commander-in-Chief may determine.

C. It is also further agreed that if the British Government shall transport in excess of 150,000 men in June that such excess shall be infantry and machine-gun units, and that early in June there shall be a new review of the situation to determine further action.

PERSHING.

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Cable: P-1057-S

***Tonnage to be Handled and Ports in Europe to Handle it***

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
Chaumont, Haute-Marne, May 6, 1918.

AGWAR, WASHINGTON

FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF

Further reference your cable 1048 [April 6, 1918] and our cable 887 [April 10, 1918] paragraph 1, subparagraph C. We can handle all tonnage indicated your cable with minimum

turnaround. In addition to existing ports which in themselves will be fully capable shortly handling this tonnage, we have completed arrangements this end for use Marseilles which gives us total capacity much in excess your figures. Latter port probably best equipped French port and is now working at less than one-half normal capacity. Highly desirable we should have the advantage of Marseilles facilities as soon as possible because the additional shipments of coal from England to France may throw some extra burden upon the French ports now used by us, which might delay our getting the increasing tonnage out of these ports which we are now confidently expecting. Moreover, Marseilles has the great advantage of affording car capacity now not being utilized inasmuch as shipments for Salonica from England and France and shipments of French coal for Italy result in a back movement of empty cars which we can take advantage of. Have consulted Admiral Sims who agrees to our use Marseilles for cargo ships. He will recommend to navy department type of ships and armament of same which should be used this movement. Understand his views to be that these ships should be of approximately 7,500 tons, fast and well armed. Ships to cross Atlantic to Gibraltar without convoy, to be convoyed from Gibraltar to Marseilles and return to Gibraltar and subsequently convoyed from Gibraltar out to sea. Appreciate that we will lose certain space due to extra bunker coal. However this loss will be more than compensated by general results in turnaround and aggregate cargo delivered. Sims believes that the specially selected ships crossing Atlantic without convoy will require only from two to five days extra in net turnaround over and above same ships convoyed all across Atlantic to Bay of Biscay ports. Am having cable recommendations prepared indicating character and amount of tonnage to be diverted to Marseilles. In meantime request matter be taken up with Navy Department so that preliminary arrangements as to particular ships, armament, et cetera for this purpose may be adjusted without delay. Will also incorporate in cable recommendations to effect that cargo consignments for Marseilles be limited to replaceable material of current issue so that no embarrassment will be occasioned in the event of loss of steamer. Sims of opinion that additional risk is not substantial.

PERSHING.

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Cable: P-1064-S

***Terms of Abbeville Agreement Discussed***

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
May 6, 1918.

AGWAR, WASHINGTON, Via ANGLO

FOR THE CHIEF OF STATE AND SECRETARY OF WAR

1. Reference conference of Supreme War Council at Abbeville, May 2, agreement between Lord Milner and myself seems to have displeased the French notwithstanding their previous approval in February of our sending six divisions for training with British. London agreement was principal question of discussion at Supreme War Council. French insisted upon commitment for June and July for exclusive infantry program and would not accept condition London agreement that infantry would be continued for June should situation still appear critical. British were entirely satisfied with London agreement and were willing that decision regarding June program be left until later. After rather warm discussion between the French on one side and the British and ourselves on the other, Mr. Lloyd George

proposed to guarantee to transport 130,000 in May and 150,000 in June by British tonnage alone. As this offered opportunity for greatly increasing arrival American troops and as arrangement for May was already made, seemed wise to accept British guarantee and extend infantry program for infantry of six divisions during June and my memorandum was drawn accordingly. Mr. Lloyd George later proposed that shipment of extra personnel in excess of 150,000 by British shipping for June should be infantry on condition that British should assist us in July to make up other deficiencies caused thereby to which I agreed. This latter promise by British was not part of my memorandum but was agreed to verbally. The conference ended in good feeling and satisfaction all around and will have good effect on Allies. Also believe that question is now settled definitely.

2. Reference conference with Secretary of War regarding sending small number of troops to Italy, had conference with Mr. Orlando and outlined proposed plan of sending not more than one regiment to begin with and possibly gradually increasing number during succeeding four or five months up to a division, upon the condition that the Italians furnish transportation which Mr. Orlando thinks can be done. The Italians are immensely pleased over the prospect and the proposition is cordially approved by Mr. Clemenceau and Mr. Lloyd George. Am awaiting cable from Mr. Orlando in regard to transportation before taking any further action.

3. Had further conference at Abbeville with Mr. Clemenceau, Mr. Lloyd George and Mr. Orlando on subject of pooling supplies, and a military man of business experience has been selected by each government to meet on May 6 to outline plans. The suggestion seems to appeal to all concerned. Believe that considerable can be accomplished although it may not be possible to extend it as far as would be desirable. Believe the plan offers no serious obstacles. It simply means that each army will share surplus supplies with others, and that general stocks will be regulated not by each army for itself but by this executive committee for all. Will keep you advised as matter progresses.

PERSHING.

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182-35.5: Letter

### ***Instructions Regarding Liaison***

3d Section, G. S.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF,  
May 6, 1918.

From: The Chief of Staff

To: Chief of Staff, II Corps, A. E. F.

#### **1. LIAISON:**

(a) Recent experiences of our Allies as well as of our own divisions have emphasized the special importance of a thorough functioning of all methods of liaison.

(b) The essential principles of liaison, as well as most of the necessary details, are set forth in the "Instruction on Liaison for Troops of all arms."

(c) These principles have not however been put into working effect in our divisions. Specific cases which have come to the attention of the Commander-in-Chief indicate a lack of appreciation on the part of division, brigade, regimental, battalion and company

commanders of the principles and of the prime importance of liaison. Specific defects have been noted as follows:

1st. Failure to establish liaison with neighboring units.  
2d. Failure to provide liaison officers exchanged between larger units with adequate means of communication.  
3d. Failure to provide for possible means of communication but trusting instead to a single method which frequently fails at a critical moment.  
4th. Failure to realize the importance of frequent messages in critical situations.  
5th. Failure to indicate hour at which the situation reported exists.

6th. Failure to realize that effect cooperation between artillery and infantry is above all dependent upon effective liaison and prompt interchange of information between the two arms. So essential is this liaison and interchange of information that it is a rule that each arm must establish its own liaison with the other.

7th. Failure to provide for any but a paper plan of liaison coupled with a failure to realize that no better place than an actual sector can be found in which to perfect liaison instruction. When troops are in sector all methods of transmission of information should be tested daily.

(d) Advantage must be taken of all opportunities for instruction in liaison between infantry and airplanes as well as between artillery and airplanes.

(e) The records of such interception posts as have been established near our divisions show a general lack of proper maintenance of telephone lines and a lack of proper discipline of operators and others using the telephone.

## 2. OCCUPATION OF FRONT LINES AND OBSERVATION:

(a) Notwithstanding the information contained in various pamphlets and manuals issued from these headquarters and the instructions given in many cases by the Commander-in-Chief in person, it appears that there is still a lack of understanding as to the principles involved in organizing or occupying a defensive position.

(b) The means available in this war enable the enemy to deliver a blow on the forward trenches which cannot be withstood however densely the most advanced elements of the trenches may be occupied. To meet this condition and to limit and localize a hostile attack the organization in depth is essential. The occupation in the defense of extreme front line trenches (observation lines) should be light at all times but especially so at night and in dense fogs.

(c) In certain cases it appears that the cause of too dense an occupation of forward trenches is found in replacing a French unit by one of our own without considering differences in strength. When our divisions are placed in sector under the orders of a French corps commander the latter's orders are of course final as to the method of occupying the trenches. This does not, however, excuse a failure on the part of a division commander to bring to the attention of the French command differences in the strength of American and French units.

(d) In certain recent events involving our own as well as Allied troops there is some reason to believe that units larger than platoons have actually been surprised to the extent that they are engaged in practically a hand-to-hand fight before they were aware of the immediate presence of the hostile infantry. Such surprise is inexcusable. A defensive sector must be occupied in its forward elements by bodies of troops whose organization, distribution and duties are exactly analogous to those of outposts. This again requires organization in depth and it is manifestly impossible adequately to protect from surprise considerable numbers of soldiers by sentinels a few meters to the front. At night or in heavy fogs and when not prevented by intense bombardment, patrols must be constantly active.

(e) A thorough understanding on the part of all concerned must exist as to the methods to be used by patrols and sentry squads in giving the alarm. In addition to



rifle fire and the use of messengers advantage must be taken of any other practicable method such as the use of bugle calls, etc.

3. The defects noted above concern fundamental principles and do not relate to new developments. The Commander-in-Chief regrets that it is necessary to call the attention of experienced officers to such glaring errors and expects that division commanders will, by their own action, as well as their supervision of subordinates, render further action unnecessary.

4. The Commander-in-Chief directs that a copy of this letter be furnished each of the division commanders of your corps and to the commandant of the corps school.

J. W. McANDREW,  
Chief of Staff.

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Cable: A-1255-R

***Daily Communique to be Sent***

A. G. O., WAR DEPARTMENT,  
Washington, D. C., May 6, 1918.

PERSHING, AMEXFORCE, HAEF

With reference to paragraph 3A your 818, the rules for handling publicity prescribed therein by the Secretary of War have been rescinded by him after further consideration. It is his desire to give out from the War Department whatever the condition of the public mind of America makes desirable and in order that he may be informed of all the facts of substantial value occurring in the American Expeditionary Forces you are directed to send a communique daily which will contain such matter. In this connection it has been noted, that the information heretofore received has been of less interest than similar information received by the Navy Department from Admiral Sims, and he desires you to make your report as full as may be necessary to give matter of interest to him. Copies of the Stars and Stripes received here indicate that you allow to be published in France articles describing the heroism of officers and men of the American Expeditionary Forces which in his opinion would be of distinct value in keeping up the interest of people at home in our army abroad, and there is no objection to having such facts with names of officers and men who have been mentioned for heroism contained in the daily communique. March.

McCAIN.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1303: Memorandum

***Concerning the Abbeville Agreement***

3rd Section, General Staff

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
Chaumont, Haute-Marne, May 7, 1918.

MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF OF STAFF:

1. After carefully reading the two cables sent by the Commander-in-Chief with reference to the Abbeville agreement, I am of the opinion:

(a) That the six divisions referred to as coming in the month of May in this agreement concern a total of six divisions for service with the British.

(b) That the Abbeville agreement in referring to priority for infantry and machine-gun units was not intended to abrogate the London agreement whereby engineer and signal corps units would be included with the divisional infantry and machine-gun units.

(2) On (a) above, the Commander-in-Chief expressed an opposite opinion from that given by me in the verbal conference this morning. As noted above, I am, however, convinced, after a careful reading of the cables, that the British expect six divisions only in May, and do not expect six divisions in addition to units which may have sailed prior to May 1. The further cable which it is necessary to send is dependent upon a correct interpretation of the two points mentioned in 1 above. Before finally drawing the cable I request that I be given definite instructions as to the interpretation to be placed on these questions.

FOX CONNER,  
Colonel, General Staff,  
Asst. Chief of Staff, G-3.

[Pencil Note appearing at head of document:] C-in-C states through C. of S. that there was verbal understanding that 6 A units must be brought in May.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1034: Memorandum

### ***Code for Designating Organizations and Commanders***

3d Section, G-3

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
Chaumont, Haute-Marne, May 7. 1918.

#### **MEMORANDUM FOR:**

1. The enclosed code for designating organizations, commanders and staff officers, is furnished to you for use, when necessary in communications between you and the following officers only:

<b>G. H. Q.</b>	<b>HQ. S. O. S.</b>	<b>EACH ARMY</b>
C-in-C	C. G.	C. G.
C. of S.	C. of S.	C. of S.
Deputy C. of S.	A. C. of S. G-1	A. C. of S. G-1
A. C. of S. G-1	" G-2	" G-2
" G-2	" G-3	" G-3
" G-3	" G-4	" G-4
" G-4	C. Q. M.	Comdt. Army Schools
" G-5	C. S.	
Chief of Artillery	C. E. O.	<b>EACH CORPS</b>
Chief of Tank Corps	C. O. O.	
A. G.	C. S. O.	C. G.
I. G.	C. A. S.	C. of S.
J. A.	C. G. S.	A. C. of S. G-1
	P. M. G.	" G-2
		" G-3
		Comdt. Corps Schools

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### EACH SECTION

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	S. O. S.	EACH DIVISION
C. G., Army Artillery	C. G.	C. G.
C. of S., Army Artillery	C. of S.	C. of S.
Reg. Off., Le Bourget	C. of S.	A. C. of S. G-1
Reg. Off., Is-sur-Tille		" G-2
C. G., Troops in Paris		" G-3

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2. This code becomes effective at midnight, May 14-15, 1918.

3. The attached receipt will be accomplished and returned to the Secretary, G-3, G. H. Q., Postoffice 706.

By order:

FOX CONNER,  
Colonel, G. S.,  
A. C. of S., G-3.

### FOR OFFICIAL USE OF OFFICERS TO WHOM ENTRUSTED CODE FOR DESIGNATING ORGANIZATIONS, COMMANDERS AND STAFF OFFICERS No. 339

1. This code will be used when it is necessary to conceal the true designation of organizations, commanders and staff officers in letters, telegrams or telephone conversations.

2. An organization is designated by a single Christian name. Example: 33d Division - NANCY.

3. A commander is designated by two names. Example: C. G., 33d Division - NANCY BROWN.

4. A staff officer is designated in the same way by two names.

5. This code must not be used for telegraphic addresses or telephone calls. (The operators are not furnished with the code.)

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### ORGANIZATIONS

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G. H. Q.	Mary	10th Division	Sarah
First Army	Louise	11th Division	Gladys
Second Army	Elizabeth	26th Division	Jane
		27th Division	Rita
I Corps	Rose	28th Division	Kitty
II Corps	Agnes	29th Division	Nell
III Corps	Pauline	30th Division	Eva
IV Corps	Kate	31st Division	Florence
V Corps	Grace	32d Division	Eliza
VI Corps	Addie	33d Division	Nancy
		34th Division	Belle
1st Division	Anna	35th Division	Alice
2d Division	Peggy	36th Division	Maude
3d Division	Jennie	37th Division	Lucy
4th Division	Irene	38th Division	Mildred
5th Division	Maggie	39th Division	Ruth
6th Division	Edna	40th Division	Elsie
7th Division	Jessie	41st Division	Barbara
8th Division	Mabel	42d Division	Carrie
9th Division	Nora	43d Division	Clara

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ORGANIZATION			
76th Division	Daisy	90th Division	Beulah
77th Division	Dolly	91st Division	Christine
78th Division	Fanny	92d Division	Charlotte
79th Division	Frances	93d Division	Leona
80th Division	Gertrude		
81st Division	Hazel	H. Q. S. O. R.	Helen
82d Division	Ida	A. S. S. O. R.	Julia
83d Division	Martha	I. S. S. O. R.	Della
84th Division	Olive	Base Sec. No. 1	Josephine
85th Division	Ray	Base Sec. No. 2	Edith
86th Division	Sadie	Base Sec. No. 3	Irma
87th Division	Stella	Base Sec. No. 4	Lydia
88th Division	Susan	Base Sec. No. 5	Marian
89th Division	Virginia		

TITLES OF OFFICERS			
C-in-C or C. G.	Brown	I. G.	Hales
C. of S.	Long	J. A.	White
Deputy C. of S.	Dewey	C. Q. M.	Page
A. C. of S. G-1	Smith	C. S.	Black
A. C. of S. G-2	Harper	C. E. O.	Fuller
A. C. of S. G-3	Adams	C. O. O.	Wells
A. C. of S. G-4	Brady	C. S. O.	Burns
A. C. of S. G-5	Lewis	C. A. S.	Green
Chief of Artillery	Wilson	C. G. S.	King
Chief of T. C	Hunt	P. M. G. or P. M.	Kelly
A. G.	Jones		

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES  
3d SECTION

*May 21, 1918.*

Amendment to memorandum dated May 7, 1918, accompanying code for designating organizations, commanders, and staff officers. ADD: Regulating Officer, Is-sur-Tille, to the list of authorized users of the code.

By order:

FOX CONNER,  
Colonel, General Staff,  
Asst. Chief of Staff, G-3.

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***Character of Training of Troops being Sent to A. E. F.***

No. 1259-R

A. G. O., WAR DEPARTMENT.  
Washington, D. C., May 7, 1918.

PERSHING AMEXFORCE FRANCE

1. With reference to paragraph 1 your 990 [April 24, 1918], troops sent you have been best available. Divisions became depleted during the winter on account large number being taken for staff corps and other unavoidable causes, and lack of equipment for replacements. Conditions will begin improve early in July so that eventually only those divisions with at least six months training will be sent. Question of breaking up divisions for trained men has been fully considered, as was the one of organizing 7th Division, and it was decided that depot brigades and replacement camps are better solution. Breaking up divisions now would not help situation.

A. With reference to paragraph 2 your 990, your information that target practice for troops has not been had above 300 yards incorrect. Course provides instruction to include 600 yards as well as combat firing and practical application of fire control and discipline. School of musketry established Camp Perry, Ohio, for instruction of officers and noncommissioned officers as instructors in divisions.

B. With reference to paragraph 3 your 990, 643,198 white and 73,326 colored men, total 716,524 have been drafted since January 1, including May draft. Draft will be continued monthly to maximum capacity. Impracticable to draft million and half at one time. Draft already called will fill all divisions now organized and all other troops for second and third phases. Question of organizing new divisions under consideration. We now have troops of all classes under training in replacement camps.

C. Paragraph 4 your 990 noted. March.

McCAIN.

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Les Armees Francaises, Tome VI, 2d Vol., Annexes 1st Vol.: Report

***Results of Conference with General Pershing Regarding the  
Employment of American Troops***

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section  
No. 1089/C. A.

FRENCH MISSION WITH THE AMERICAN ARMY,  
May 7, 1918.

General Ragueneau, Chief of the French Mission with the American Army to the General, Commanding the Armies of the North and Northeast:

I have the honor of giving you a report of the interview that I had this morning with General Pershing.

1. General Pershing, who, at the beginning of the conference seemed a little ill at ease, asked me, right away, without waiting for the questions which I came to discuss with him, when he could hope to see favorable action on his request for the creation of an American sector. It seems to him that, be reason of the situation on the front in Lorraine and the Woevre, which is now very quiet, the time has arrived.

He explained to me that the number of American divisions shipped to France is going to increase rapidly and that it is not possible to consider the continued dispersion of these divisions among the French armies.

His preference for the creation of this American sector inclines toward the region north of Toul, a part of which is already held by an American division. It would be desirable, furthermore, in the event that this sector were entrusted to him, to develop the installations already begun insofar as regards the supply depots and the telegraph lines.

I called his attention to the fact that there are no fresh divisions to put in sector in this region now; that on the contrary, the 26th and 42d Divs. will soon be relieved in order to enter the battle and that there is no other division sufficiently trained to take a sector.

The general replied that the 26th Div. can be relieved by the 1st Div. when the latter is tired and withdraws from combat. Furthermore, he would like for the divisions which have just debarked, namely: The 3d and 5th, to have their regiments assigned for their training and tour in sector to French divisions that hold the front in this region, instead of being scattered among the various French armies.

He said that by doing so he saw the advantage that these troops would become familiar with the sector that they will have to take over later on.

I called his attention to the fact that this familiarity with the sector is important to the staffs above all and that, in this connection, it would be highly desirable for the staff of the I Army Corps of the army to come and establish itself at Toul with the staff of the French XXXII Army Corps, instead of remaining at Neuchateau where it has no unit at its disposal to furnish it information.

The general replied that this step would only be desirable in the event that the commander of the I Corps should actually assume, within the not too distant future, the command of the sector in that region and that, consequently, this question ought first to be decided in a general sort of way.

2. During the conversation of this same subject the general asked me why the regiments of the 32d Div., instead of being sent into the Haute-Alsace sector for their training, could not be with the divisions which occupy the Woevre.

I called his attention to the fact that all the measures for the reception of these regiments in the sector of Haute-Alsace have already been taken, where they are being counted upon to take part in holding the line and where, consequently, the front of the French divisions has been considerably extended. In the assignment of these regiments, allowance, of course, was made for the aid which they were to bring to French elements for the relief of fresh divisions and for sending these latter into battle. At this time the dispositions which have been decided upon for the employment of the 32d Div. cannot be changed.

The general seemed to me to be convinced by my reasoning and did not urge the matter.

Then I reminded him that a week ago he had promised to put these regiments at the disposal of the French command immediately and that I have the mission of insisting that this operation take place without delay.

The general then told me that the inspectors that he had sent to the 32d Div. brought back an unfavorable impression of it and that this division was to remain in its present zone a few more days. Nevertheless, he promised me an answer to this question which I have already put up to him in writing and that he would set the date.

3. I informed the general of plans for the relief of the American 2d Inf. Div. This division will be relieved between the 10th and 15th of May, and will be regrouped in the zone of Combles and Vanault-les-Dames. Immediately afterward, between May 16 and 20, it will be moved to the Reserve Group of Armies in such a way as to clear the regroupment zone on the last date mentioned.

The general raised no objections; he asked about the zone where it is planned to unload the division and the army to which this division will be attached.

He expressed the desire that it might be possible to send it to the army of General Debeney. I told him that the unloading zone had not yet been determined, but that you intended to attach this division initially to the reserve army\* of General Micheler, in order to allow it to undergo training like the 1st before going into battle.

4. The general, as is the custom, asked me for any information that I could give him about the general situation.

From my conversation as a whole I gained the impression that he viewed the present situation with a certain optimism and the modifications in his program that he had consented to under pressure of circumstances six weeks ago no longer seem to him justified to the same extent.

I endeavored to combat any undue optimism on his part (or that of his staff) by repeating that the Germans will do everything within their power to obtain a decision this year and that the question of numerical strength continues to be the primary one for us in the operations of the campaign of 1918.

Incidentally, I called the attention of the general to the fact that our front between the Oise and Switzerland is not occupied by only 46 divisions in the face of 55 German divisions superior in strength to ours.

This simple comparison justifies the necessity for American troops to make every effort to aid our divisions in holding quiet fronts.

5. I asked the general if he had any new information to give me on the program of shipments of troops from the United States to France. I was forced to approach this subject cautiously, not having exact knowledge of the results of the Abbeville conference. So I took a position looking at the matter especially from the point of view of the urgent preparations to be made for the installation of these troops in French territory.

The general told me that a study is now in progress at his headquarters and that he will inform me as to its results as soon as it is finished.

The only thing that he could definitely see arrive in May is the infantry of 6 divisions, but he stated that this infantry would be followed immediately by the artillery and other troops and services necessary to complete these divisions.

To sum up, I took away from this interview the general impression that the general is still striving to realize his original plan of forming independent and autonomous American units and that he has apparently decided to resist more and more any fusion whatsoever of his elements with French or British units.

From information gathered from other sources it is concluded that it would be quite in order to begin a fresh discussion of the arrangements made with the British, in the event that the latter should not carry out to the letter all provisions of past agreements.

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Cable: A-1266-R

### ***Use of Marseilles as Port***

No. 1266-R

A. G. O., WAR DEPARTMENT,  
Washington, D. C., May 8, 1918.  
[Received May 9, 1918.]

PERSHING, AMEXFORCE, FRANCE

With reference to your 1057 [May 6, 1918] the Secretary of War has notified the Navy Department that the War Department will undertake to utilize Marseilles subject to proper

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\* French Fifth Army in reserve in Picardy, in rear of the French Reserve Group of Armies.

escort and suggestion is made that it would be desirable to include ships which are scheduled for that port in the present Gibraltar convoy. March.

McCAIN.

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Cable: A-1270-R

***Divisions in United States, June 1, 1918***

A. G. O., WAR DEPARTMENT,  
*Washington, D. C., May 9, 1918.*

PERSHING, AMEXFORCE, FRANCE

[Extract]

1. With reference to paragraph 3 your 1051 following divisions will be left in United States on June 1: 6th, 7th, 8th, 29th, 31st, 34th, 36th, 37th, 38th, 39th, 40th, 76th, 79th, 81st, 83d, 84th, 85th, 86th, 87th, 88th, 89th, 90th, 91st, 92d. Of the above, the following are now scheduled to leave during the month of June: 29th, 37th, 83d, 89th, 90th, 92d. \* \* \*

\* \* \* \* \*

McCAIN.

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SWC: 315-2: Cablegram

***Tonnage Assigned by Italian Government***

No. 107-S

AMERICAN SECTION, SUPREME WAR COUNCIL,  
*Versailles, Seine-et-Oise, May 9, 1918.*

AGWAR, WASHINGTON

FOR ACTING CHIEF OF STAFF

I have communicated to General Pershing the following received from Prime Minister Italy through Italian Military Representative here:

Please communicate to General Pershing that the Italian Government can assign for the transportation of American troops to Italy the steamships *Duke of Abruzzi* and the *Duke of Aosta*, which are at this moment in New York and are able to carry 4,000 men in all. These steamships are part of those that the Italian Government was to consign to the United States and it is therefore understood that should they be utilized for this transportation they will be replaced. In that case the departure of the first American contingent for Italy could be within 15 days. If that solution be not accepted, the Italian Government will employ for the transportation of American troops



to Italy the two steamships *Taormina* and *Verona*, with a capacity of 6,000 men in all, and these steamships will be disposable about the end of the present month and can complete their loading in New York, June 20.

BLISS.

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SWC: Interallied Aviation Committee: Minutes

***Draft of Minutes***

198-3

SUPREME WAR COUNCIL

DRAFT OF MINUTES OF THE 1ST MEETING OF THE INTERALLIED AVIATION COMMITTEE, HELD IN THE COUNCIL CHAMBER, VERSAILLES, ON THURSDAY, MAY 9, 1918, AT 10 A. M.

PRESENT

FRANCE	GREAT BRITAIN	ITALY	AMERICAN
General Duval	General Sykes	General Bongiovanni	Brig. General Foulois

IN ATTENDANCE

Lt. Col. Dhe	Gen. Salmon Gen. Wittington Lt. Col. Buzzard Commander Peel	Lt. Colonel Constange	Colonel Embick Lt. Orr
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SECRETARIAT

Captain Portier	Major Caccia	Lt. Colonel Franklin	Major Wallace
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INTERPRETER -- Lieutenant Duhamel                      CHAIRMAN -- General Duval

PRESENT SITUATION AND FUTURE PROGRAMS:

General Duval took up question No. 1 with a brief statement of the French program for 1918, and then called upon General Sykes for a statement of the British program.

General Sykes said that he was not prepared to give the figures by machines but gave them by squadrons. He then asked that each member prepare, in detail, and to be presented at the next meeting, the exact figures as to construction program contemplated by the various Allies.

This was agreed to.

BOMBING POLICY:

General Duval said that this question could be examined in two ways:

- (a) Objectives.
- (b) Distribution of squadrons and maintaining of liaison between Allies.

General Sykes said that in his opinion the first thing to decide would be what targets or objectives should be allocated to the army squadrons, as it was of primary importance that the army be supported and their air service be kept complete. After that had been done the special bombing squadrons could take up long-range work, their targets or objectives might be classed, in order of priority, as follows:

Communications

Factories

Towns

Types of machines must be considered; no hard and fast rule could be laid down.

In considering factories, chemical factories should come first.

General Duval said that it was for the high command to determine as to certain targets, such as aerodromes, immediately in rear of the lines. After these had been considered, this committee should determine objectives and priority. Then determine the contribution of the Allies to the bombing squadrons and select the starting points.

General Foulois, having been asked to express his views, stated that he did not want to see them start something that could not be carried to a successful conclusion. A number of raids had been started but had never been properly followed up. He asked, "Are we ready to start this policy?"

The United States is not ready and will not be for three or four months.

Once this policy is started it must be continued until completed.

As to objectives, he thought this was a matter for the high command, otherwise there would be conflict of authority.

General Bongiovanni said that he was in accord with the statements as to objectives and priority, but prior to decision on any such policy the committee must decide on:

(a) Means

(b) Methods

Up to the present, he said, enough had not been done. He thought steps should be taken to design and build a special bombing model.

General Duval agreed with General Foulois on the real policy of carrying through to completion any project once started.

One of our chief reasons for meeting here is to pool our resources. After that has been done then we must do the best with what we have.

The policy of adopting a new plane cannot be considered now, as it could not be completed before 1920.

However, work on starting places must be concerned. He suggested several places.

He thought that at today's meeting we should review our agenda, then at a later date we could meet again and bring up our resolutions.

This was agreed to.

#### ANTISUBMARINE POLICY:

It was agreed that this question must be carefully investigated before further discussion could be held, as it affects allocation of materiel. It was suggested by General Duval that, as it had a particular bearing on the U. S. transport problem, the United States should have a naval representative on the committee.

It was agreed that this subject be brought up at the next meeting.

#### REINFORCEMENT FACILITIES:

General Duval said he considered this a very important subject. The French have selected certain routes. Landing places must be provided, for a great deal of work must be done and this was the best season of the year in which to do it.

General Sykes asked that a list of all existing aerodromes be submitted, this list include those completed, under construction, and those contemplated. But to include only those in back areas - say 40 miles from the front; those on lateral communications only.

General Foulois asked that General Duval submit a plan to carry into effect.

General Duval said that if agreeable he would submit, direct, several plans on this subject.

He asked that prior to the next meeting all members of the committee send in any papers or recommendations that they desired to have considered at the next meeting.

PRODUCTION:

It was agreed that all of the questions relating to production would be taken up at the next meeting.

General Duval suggested that any papers that were to be considered be sent to Lt. Col. Dhe not later than May 20, 1918.

It was agreed that the next meeting would be held Tuesday, May 28, 1918.

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Cable P-1086-S

***Present Disposition of American Expeditionary Forces***

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, May 10, 1918.*

AGWAR, WASHINGTON

FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF

1. In order that the War Department may be fully informed as to the present disposition of our forces in France and of the assistance now being rendered the Allied armies by these forces, the following summary is given:

A. On March 19, two days before the German offensive began, there were in France 296,819 officers and men, of which 167,672 were combatant troops, represented by 4 combat divisions, 1 replacement and one depot division and one regiment of infantry - colored troops - serving with the French.

B. At present there are in England and France, 466,412 officers and men, of which 290,765 are combatant troops. To these should be added 21,812 en route from ports of embarkation giving a grand total of 488,224. The combatant troops are represented by the following complete divisions: 1st, 2d, 3d, 26th, 32d, 41st, 42d, and 77th and the following incomplete divisions: 5th, 28th, 35th, 82d and 93d. There are also 3 brigades of heavy coast artillery, the 30th Gas and Flame Engineers, 4 regiments of cavalry and certain special troops giving a total of 290,765 officers and men.

C. Organizations serving in American divisional sectors are: 1st Division, 2d Division, 26th Division, 42d Division, 1 brigade heavy artillery. Total 4,100 officers, enlisted men 98,989. These organizations are tactically under the French corps sector staffs, but for administration, replacements and supply are under our own I Corps Headquarters.

D. The 1st Division is in the Picardy battle near Montdidier; the 2d Division holding a sector near Verdun, but will be withdrawn within a few days (being replaced by a used French division) and take position on the Picardy front, the 26th Division is holding a sector north of Toul and the 42d Division is holding a sector near Luneville. The 32d Division which, because of the present emergency, has been reconstituted from a replacement to a combat division, will shortly enter the line in a quiet sector and relieve further French troops. Our divisions being approximately double the strength in infantry of a French divisions we are taking over a length of front in proportion to the strength of our troops, thus relieving double the number of French divisions from the line for participation in the Picardy battle.

E. The infantry and machine-gun units of the 77th Division which have arrived in the British area, are receiving preliminary training preparatory to entering the line

by battalions in British brigades for initial trench training. The 35th and 82d Divisions are now arriving and will undergo training with the British preparatory to entering the line under the same conditions as the 77th Division. We have sent to the British the following auxiliary troops: 4 regiments railroad engineers, 1 regiment pioneer engineers, 1 battalion forestry engineers, 1 telegraph battalion signal corps and six base hospitals, also 9,826 officers and men of air service, (4 aero squadrons being at the front).

F. The French have had turned over to them 4 Negro regiments, of the 93d Division, approximately 5,500 motor mechanics, 6 machine shop truck units and 80 sections of the U. S. Ambulance Service.

G. To accomplish the above, the A. E. F. services of supply has contributed every available unit not absolutely essential to continuing the operation of our supply service.

H. The following organizations are now undergoing training: The 3d Division, the 5th Division, less its artillery which has not yet sailed, the 41st Division (depot) which is composed of necessary personnel only for instruction and administration of newly arriving replacements, heavy artillery, consisting of 31st and 32d Artillery Brigades, which arrived during past month and is in training and the 54th Heavy Artillery Regiment which has been designated as a replacement for these brigades; the artillery of the 77th Division. Total for training and replacements officers 5,500, enlisted men 101,600.

J. Services of supply troops total 140,049. Combatant troops attached to services of supply include 4 cavalry and two infantry regiments, 1 engineer regiment and two ammunition trains. Total 16,885.

K. Troops with the British in training 34,334, of which 27,960 are infantry, the rest special units. Troops in service with the British 11,410, all of which are special units, giving a total of 45,744.

L. Troops with the French in training 8,199, all infantry. Troops with the French in service 12,234, all of which are special units. Total 20,423.

M. Recapitulation. In service. Serving with American sectors of the line 103,089, service of supply troops 140,049; combatant troops used in service of supply 16,885; serving with the British 11,410; serving with the French 12,234; total 283,667. In training. In American training areas, including aviation, 133,534; with British forces 34,334; with French forces 8,199; total 176,067. En route from ports of debarkation to join A. E. F. and B. E. F. 21,812; sick and detached 6,678; making a grand total of 488,224.

N. In addition to the assistance being given to the French and British army in the form of infantry and special troops, as has been enumerated herein, our troops are actually holding thirty-five miles of the front line. The significance of this fact can be better appreciated when it is realized that this is more than double the front held by the Belgian army and more than the front held by the British army during the first year of the war.

PERSHING.

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Cable: P-1092-S

***Movement of Ships via Gibraltar without Convoy***

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, May 10, 1918.*

AGWAR, WASHINGTON

FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF

Reference your 1266 Admiral Sims agreed that by using specially selected fast and well-armed ships no substantial increased danger existed in their trans-Atlantic movement without convoy. Sending same to Gibraltar in present convoys would probably result in delaying turnaround some 10 to 15 days on account of loss of time awaiting convoy and slow speed of same. Sims states ships going to Bay of Biscay ports require strong convoy on account of activity smaller type enemy submarines in these waters which submarines are particularly effective with their torpedo fire. Enemy submarines operating off Gibraltar of large type which attack usually with gun fire only and not so effective with torpedo. Recommend matter be taken up with Navy Department as originally outlined, Navy to select vessels to be used in this movement and type of armament to be installed and that they make trans-Atlantic movement without convoy. Have quoted this cable to Sims with request that he transmit similar recommendations to Navy Department.

PERSHING.

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Cable: A-1285-R

***Cavalry Division not Available***

A. G. O., WAR DEPARTMENT,  
*Washington, D. C., May 10, 1918.*

PERSHING, AMEXFORCE, FRANCE

Major General W. A. Holbrook, commanding Southern Department has recommended that remaining troops of cavalry division be placed at his disposal for border patrol work. Situation along the border extremely critical and giving administration great concern. In view of demands from abroad for infantry and machine-gun platoons impossible to divert such forces for use along the border. As this cavalry division was organized in response to your request the Secretary of War directs me to inform you of the necessity for its present use elsewhere than in France so that you may understand why it is taken off your priority schedule during present emergency. March.

McCAIN.

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***American War Department's Understanding of the Pershing-Milner Agreement***

No. 165

From: Lt. Gen. G. T. M. Bridges, British Military Representative, Washington

To: War Office

B. 24

*Received at 4 p. m. [May 10, 1918.]*

Summarizing various cables to you. The Pershing-Milner agreement of April 24 and the subsequent modification made by the Supreme War Council at ABBEVILLE, May 2 is understood by the American War Department as follows: By the Pershing-Milner Agreement of April 24 preparations were made to ship troops in May in the following sequence:

Firstly: 118,758 men, that is to say six divisions of a strength of 19,793 each. The figure 19,793 for each division is compiled as follows:

Divisional Hq.	238
Infantry and Machine-Gun Units	17,223
Engineer Regiment and Train	1,779
Field Signalling Battalion	488
4 Camp Infirmarys	65

Secondly: 20,000 so called replacement troops, two-thirds of which have usually been infantry, but since these troops are sent as Pershing asks, there is no guarantee that infantry will be sent. He has already asked this month for 3,000 out of the 20,000 to be medical units.

Thirdly: 88,292 artillery and ammunition supply and trains. The figure 88,292 is accounted for by 9,965 men left behind by each of the four divisions which sailed in April and 8,072 divisional troops left behind by each of the six divisions sailing in May.

Fourthly: There remains 8,000 to complete first combatant corps in France.

Fifthly: 14,372 to complete the second combatant corps in France, and

Sixthly: 90,000 so called service battalions of the rear troops, which means troops to complete the first and second phase of building up one complete American army consisting of five combatant corps, complete with numerous army troops and general troops which have all been detailed to be sent over in five phases.

The agreement made by Supreme War Council meeting of May 2 now modifies the above as follows:

Firstly: In May six divisions, the 4th, 30th, 27th, 33d, 80th, and 78th, making a total of 118,758 will be shipped;

Secondly: 20,000 replacement troops, such as General Pershing may require;

Thirdly: As many of the 88,292 divisional troops of the Pershing-Milner Agreement of April 24 as can be carried over before June 1. As interpreted by War Department here, on June 1 the program, as outlined by Pershing-Milner Agreement, ceases and another similar program headed by six divisions, that is to say, 118,758 infantry and machine gunners, etc., begins. As has been shown above, out of the 19,793 in the 1st Echelon of each division only 17,223 are machine gunners and infantry. Therefore to complete the 120,000 infantry monthly required by General Foch's memorandum the 17,000 replacement troops should be infantry and machine gunners. In some units the training is backward. General Trotter tells me some 10 per cent of men going over in May in two divisions have less than eight weeks service.

Can you let me know the numbers of the divisions allotted for training to British army. At present this information is not obtainable here.

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**Results of Conference at Sarcus, May 10, 1918**

[Editorial Translation]

General Staff

HEADQUARTERS, ALLIED ARMIES,  
May 10, 1918.

[Extract]

Present:

General Weygand  
" Davidson  
" Du Cane  
" Clive  
" Grant  
" de Barescut

Questions Discussed:

\* \* \* \* \*

II. Maintenance of the British infantry divisions, the dissolving of which was originally decided upon and the possible dispatch of a greater number of British infantry divisions to the French front.

\* \* \* \* \*

II

General Davidson brought up the question, purely unofficially, of the rotation on the French front of a greater number of British infantry divisions than that contemplated up to this time.

This question gave General Weygand an excuse for broaching the problem of the reduction in the number of British divisions. He set this problem forth in the following manner:

The British army, which now occupied an active but stabilized front, has in line or in reserve in its Second, First, Third, and Fourth Armies a number of infantry divisions (34 in line, 13 in reserve) which will permit it to hold out as long as there is no change in the situation.

If the enemy executes an attack on any considerable scale, the entry in line of elements drawn from a general reserve will be a matter of absolute necessity. This reserve cannot be formed by means of the aforesaid British units, since the act of altering the present arrangements would result in disrupting the established system, and not by means of the supplementary British units (9 besides the 4 British divisions of the French Sixth Army), since it has been decided to dissolve them.

Therefore, in the present situation, the general reserve will be formed from French units. This reserve, however, would not be sufficient to enter combat without reinforcements or a pool of reinforcements which only can come from the 6 British infantry divisions, whose dissolution has not yet begun.

There are ways of maintaining at adequate strength the British infantry divisions, whose dissolution has not yet begun:

1. Reducing all British infantry divisions to a strength of 8,000 men - this would permit a gain of 1,200 officers and 25,000 men;
2. Utilization of the Americans (assigning 3 American battalions to the British infantry divisions, not to reinforce the British infantry divisions, but to replace the 3 British battalions thus gained);
3. Revision of categories and the dispatch to France of men of the Home Defense (England's defense is in France).

General de Barescut is in complete agreement with the view expressed by General Weygand, he insists on the absolute necessity of a pool of reinforcements formed, if need be, by extremely tired British units. Thus a corresponding number of fresh French units could be sent into battle.

The British officers present did not conceal the fact they personally thought that the British infantry divisions, whose dissolution has not yet been completed, should be maintained, but they pointed out that General Wilson, Marshal Haig, and General Lawrence [Chief of Staff of British Army in France] were opposed to this measure (preference being given by them to units which, though less in number, are filled up rather than to units which are more numerous, but have a lower numerical strength; this representing opposition on the part of commanders of large units).

General Du Cane and General Davidson have decided to take it up with the Marshal. They pointed out to General Weygand that in order to succeed it is necessary to write to the Marshal and meet his arguments.

General Davidson added that the colonial infantry divisions will inevitably be reduced to the point of consisting of only 9 battalions at the close of 1918.

General Du Cane pointed out that the utilization of the Americans under the conditions indicated by General Weygand will result, at the end of a short time, in the reduction of the British infantry divisions under consideration to 6 battalions.

General Weygand answered that the critical period in British forces will be shorter than the corresponding one for the organization and training of American artillery. By the time American battalions are regrouped to form American infantry divisions, it will have been possible to reconstitute the necessary British battalions.

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Cable: A-1292-R

### ***Convoy to Marseilles***

A. G. O., WAR DEPARTMENT,  
Washington, D. C., May 11, 1918.

PERSHING, AMEXFORCE, FRANCE

With reference to your 1092 [May 10, 1918] the Marseilles proposition was originally taken up with the Navy Department as outlined by you, and approval of the War Department scheme was based on the concurrence of the Navy. The War Department does not intend to interfere in any way with convoys which are arranged by the Navy. March.

McCAIN.

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Cable: A-1297-R

***Troops Available***

A. G. O., WAR DEPARTMENT,  
*Washington, D. C., May 11, 1918.*

PERSHING, AMEXFORCE, FRANCE

[Extract]

1. The following from the Secretary of War:

The President asked me to say to you that he has been much impressed and disturbed by representation officially made to him here by French and British Ambassadors showing the steady drain upon French and British replacements and the small number of replacements now available. He feels that you on the ground have full opportunity to know the situation and fully trusts your judgment as to how far we ought to give additional priority to infantry and machine-gun units, in view of the fact that such troops seem to be the most immediately serviceable and urgently needed. The Abbeville Agreement, of course, provides less priority for infantry and machine-gun units than was recommended by the Supreme War Council, but with shipping at present in prospect will result in practically 120,000 infantry and machine-gun units, signal corps, and engineer corps per month during May and June. It has been suggested to the President that General Foch may reopen this subject with you and the President hopes you will approach any such interviews as sympathetically as possible, particularly if the suggestion as to replacements which has been presented to him is as critical as it seems.

In this connection, for your confidential information, there is now left in the United States, excluding three divisions at ports of embarkation, 263,852 infantrymen of sufficient training for overseas service, so that unless the acceptance of untrained infantrymen is desired, there is a practical limit to the extent to which the infantry and machine-gun program can be carried. The number quoted above troops augmented during this month by some 200,000 men but of course these men should not be sent abroad without at least three months' training. March.

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McCAIN.

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Cable: P-1099-S

***Priority of Troop Shipments***

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, May 12, 1918.*

AGWAR, WASHINGTON

FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF

1. Reference all previous cables on priority of troops shipments and especially your 1217 and my 1042. Abbeville Agreement given in my 1042 and especially that set forth in my

1064 require a change in program outlined in your 1217. The latter agreement is much more favorable to ultimate formation of a distinctly American force. Therefore recommend following priority for May and June, schedule for July subjects to future consideration.

2. Recommend for May, assuming that available shipping will be British 130,000 and American 70,000 priority to conform as far as practicable to the following: British shipping to bring A units (see my 961) [April 24, 1918] of six divisions for training with British, total about 118,000, the balance of available space to be utilized for replacements Item 650 R; American shipping to bring, in order stated, units to complete 3d and 5th Divisions about 9,600, 19,000 service of supply, B and attached units for three divisions about 27,400, six balloon companies and three photographic sections about 1,200, and remaining available space to be utilized for replacements Item 650 R.

3. For June, assuming available shipping will be British 150,000 and American 70,000, recommend priority as follows: British shipping to bring, in order stated, A units of six divisions about 118,000, B and attached units of three divisions about 27,400, and remaining available space to be utilized for replacements Item 666 R, grand total about 150,000; American shipping to bring, in order given, B and attached units of six divisions about 54,700 and remaining available space to be utilized for replacements Item 666 R.

4. B units referred to above are remainder of each division after deducting A units outlined in my 961. Attached units comprise for each division two sanitary squads, one mobile laboratory, one bakery company, one butchery company, dentist corps, two base hospitals (reduced from four) and three laundries.

5. It will be noted that foregoing requires further suspension priority of shipment of units referred to in 1 B and 1 H my 891 [April 11, 1918] and your 1217. Reference paragraph 1 H my 891 request substitution of depot battalion Item S-302 page 4 priority schedule in place of one construction battalion Item S-404, page 13.

6. Your 1247 [May 5, 1918] concerning replacements understood. Essential that divisions be completed by bringing over all units contemplated in foregoing, only a few replacements will be delayed to meet this necessity. Considering number of A units already shipped it will be noted that upon completion of program herein outlined there will be several divisions in France without their B units. Please cable action taken on these recommendations as soon as practicable.

7. Reference paragraph 12 your number 1251. Agreement with British precludes sending sanitary train companies with A units. However no objection to attaching camp infirmaries to infantry regiments. Will endeavor to have some ambulance and field hospital companies join their A units after former arrive in France.

PERSHING.

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***Necessity of Maintaining Adequate Reserves***

[Editorial Translation]

General Staff  
No. 743

HEADQUARTERS, ALLIED ARMIES.  
May 11, 1918.

General Foch, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies

To Marshal Haig, Commanding the British Armies in France

[Extract]

My dear Marshal:

I deem it necessary, under the present circumstances, to call your attention to the following considerations:

The following steps are necessary if the defensive battle is to be conducted with success:

1. To break down the effort of the enemy wherever it is being made is the business of the troops in line and in army reserve;
2. To dam up any exploitation of a success on the part of the enemy, if surprise or strength of his forces have enabled him to break through the front;
3. In conclusion, to deliver a powerful counterattack against him on a terrain and at a time which are favorable. In order to be prepared to succeed in carrying out these last actions, the high command should draw on fresh general reserves which are as strong as possible.

However, such is not the case: The number of general reserves diminishes each day. In this there exists a real danger which it is necessary to guard against without delay. To accomplish this, investigate the causes of this decrease and apply the necessary remedy.

In my letters, 265 of April 18 and 493 of April 30, I explained the reasons which imperatively require that in order to maintain reserves, there must be an exchange of fresh and tired divisions between the two fronts, the French and British. You have been good enough to show your agreement by sending 4 divisions to the French front and taking under consideration the departure of a fifth in the near future.

In order to have the number of units in general reserve raised high enough, it would be necessary for this movement of divisions to be followed by another of at least the same number of divisions.

However, as it stands now, the British armies have 34 infantry divisions in line, supported by 12 infantry divisions in army reserve. These units have their mission; diverting them from this mission is out of the question for the time being.

Besides, 5 infantry divisions have been sent to the French front or are going to be.

That leaves 9 infantry divisions. This is exactly the number of units that you are thinking of dissolving.

If such a step were taken, it would be impossible to move other British units to the French front for the time being and, consequently, to increase the obviously insufficient number of our general reserves.

The necessary conclusion is that all or at least the major part of the divisions, whose dissolution you have considered, must be kept and sent to the French front.

Only at this cost will a sufficient general reserve be formed.

It seems that keeping these divisions active is a practicable thing. To accomplish this it is a matter of making these divisions hold out during the period of crises which will last until the effects of the new laws passed in England will be felt---that is to say, until around August. The means of attaining this seem possibly the following:

\* \* \* \* \*

d. Employment of American battalions, not for the purpose of bringing a reduced number of English divisions up to 12 battalions, but for the purpose of maintaining all British divisions at a level of 9 battalions.

This measure could be applied effectively at once in the divisions that are to be sent into a quiet sector on the French front, where the initial training of small American units would be carried out under good conditions.

\* \* \* \* \*

To sum up, I ask you to take into consideration the fact that the total number of Allied forces, already inferior to that of the enemy forces at the beginning of the battle, cannot be further impoverished by some ten more infantry divisions without jeopardizing the ultimate success of this battle, imperiling our defensive and preventing the realization of vital counter-offensives.

In the face of this supreme concern: "Win the battle," I ask you, while awaiting the benefits of your new laws and the result of the intensive cooperation of American, to be good enough to take without delay, in spite of the inevitable inconveniences, all necessary measures to ensure the maintenance of all British infantry divisions; and, in the event that you are unable to entertain the realization of this step, to inform me of the reasons opposed to it.

Most sincerely,

F. FOCH.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 116A: Memorandum

***French and British Relations and their Attitude Regarding American Command***

3d Section, General Staff

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, May 13, 1918.*

MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF OF STAFF:

1. The following extract is from a report by Major Lewis of this section, now on duty as liaison officer for the 1st Division with the Headquarters, French X Corps.

One of the most striking things I notice is the open way in which the French and the British are beginning to criticize each other to me. It does not look good to me at all. The French say that the British soldier is magnificent but that his staffs are rotten and that they won't learn. The British say that the French are piddlers and do not live up to their agreements as to furnishing reserves and relieving worn out British troops in the line.

They are all working on me here to impress me with the advisability of our not trying to form anything larger than divisions at present on account of the lack of experience of our staffs, but to turn over our divisions for service under their corps as fast as they are ready. I can see it sticking out all over. The Asst. Chief of Staff, G-3, even went so far as to suggest to me yesterday the advisability of sending the Deputy Chief of Staff of the corps over to the staff of the 1st Division in case an attack were planned in this sector. He argued that all the credit of a possible success would be attributed to the Americans in order to get the most of the moral effect but that the D. C. of S. would be a sort of power behind the throne. I try to be absolutely noncommittal with them as I do not know whether the policy at G. H. Q. has changed from the old views of unity of American command since I have been away or not. If you have time would like to have latest views on this subject.

FOX CONNER,  
Colonel, General Staff,  
Asst. Chief of Staff, G-3.

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Cable: P-1124-S

***Effect of an Exclusively Infantry Program***

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, May 15, 1918.*

AGWAR, WASHINGTON

FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF AND SECRETARY OF WAR

Reference cable 1297 [May 11, 1918]. The original recommendation by the military representatives on the Supreme War Council of an exclusively infantry program for troop shipments from America was evidently made without considering the serious effect upon our plans, although it was explained to them that certain classes of troops and service of the rear organizations would be necessary not only to carry out our purpose of building an army but to meet present requirements. However, the Abbeville conference took little note of the original recommendation as the sole request made was that the London agreement be extended to include June and July. I stated in substance that our program had been already materially reduced and that the extension of an infantry program for three months would defer the shipment of artillery and other troops and make it impossible with the shipping then in sight to catch up for several months and the organization of American divisions would be indefinitely postponed and our service of the rear would be unable to function sufficiently to meet our increasing demands for supplies, and urged that we could meet the situation later if the crisis seemed to demand it. After full discussion in committee, Mr. Lloyd George said: "I agree that you should form American divisions and I think we shall be able to bring over all the infantry we want and also bring over the extra troops you want." He then guaranteed the extra shipping mentioned in the agreement, and we agreed to include June in the infantry program leaving July to be reviewed later. This was declared entirely satisfactory by all concerned. Lord Milner came to me afterwards and said: "I wish you to know that I have been no party to this as I was entirely satisfied with the London Agreement." General Foch afterwards said in the most friendly manner: "We

area in thorough accord as always, I am very satisfied." His Chief of Staff sent word that General Foch was very much pleased. Although the British War Office was quite satisfied with the London Agreement, it is understood that Lord Reading took Lord Milner severely to task for accepting the London program.

A. The aid we shall furnish with shipping promised during May and June will be first, the 240,000 infantry and machine-gun units, and, according to British estimates, possible about 50,000 more in June; second, practically five divisions in line, two in Picardy, or on the way, and three in Lorraine, including the 32d now moving into line; and third, the 3d and 5th Divisions, which will be hurried as much as possible and will replace French divisions within a short time. This will make about 175,000 men in divisions plus 240,000 men in infantry units, with possibility 50,000 additional in the battle or preparing to go in, besides four regiments of colored troops and several batteries of heavy artillery already with the French or British, not to mention the divisional artillery that follows the infantry in May and June - approximately half a million men.

B. If we include July in the program, the troops would not be ready to take their places in line until some time in August. But the British state that in August they will have 400,000 to 500,000 drafts and the French 1919 class, about 200,000, will also be coming in then. The main reason for our hurrying infantry units for service with the Allies is to help out until the Allied drafts are available. Notwithstanding Allied demands for infantry alone, a recent request comes from the British for 10,000 artillery men. While appreciating that we should give every early assistance possible to meet an emergency, I am strongly of the opinion that we must form our own divisions and corps as rapidly as possible and use them as such for the additional moral effect such an army would have. Many French officers of high rank hold this view and want entire divisions. Sir Douglas Haig said he would like to have our divisions placed beside the British divisions as soon as possible. Our own officers and men are constantly asking whether newspaper reports are true that we are to be amalgamated with French and British units, and are unanimous in their desire to fight under our own flag. It is not impossible that we shall find Irishmen refusing to fight under the British. We cannot ignore what our own soldiers and our people will think and should not keep units too long with either Ally. The Germans are now saying that Americans are inefficient and that French and British do not trust them and so are absorbing them in Allied divisions.

C. In conclusion, I think we have fully and fairly met the situation. We have given the Supreme War Council all it asked at Abbeville. The statement in your cable places a limit upon further concessions which have really been about reached in the Abbeville Agreement. It is believed that the action at Abbeville should be considered as the deliberate expression of the Supreme War Council's latest view and that the matter be regarded as definitely settled as to May and June, otherwise as long as there is the slightest hope of getting further concessions, there will be a continual clamor regardless of how it affects us. I have fully set forth the above to present the matter as it appears to me.

D. Judging from what occurred at Abbeville and from the expressions of approval by General Foch, I think he cannot consistently reopen the subject until the question of July needs arises. But above all, I wish to be understood as having every desire to meet this question in the broadest way possible and do everything to aid in this emergency, and both the President and the Secretary of War may be fully assured that I shall approach any future discussion in the spirit suggested by the Secretary of War.

PERSHING.

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***Official Communique to be Included in Daily Cablegram***

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, May 16, 1918.*

ADJUTANT GENERAL OF THE ARMY

FOR CHIEF OF STAFF

In compliance with your number 1255 of May 6 rescinding the rule for handling publicity prescribed by the Secretary of War while here, instructions have this date been given to the troops concerned to submit, not later than 3:45 p. m. daily, by telephone or in case it is impossible to communicate by telephone then by telegraph a full summary of the activities during the preceding 24 hours. These instructions will enable the cable for the War Department to be coded not later than 9. p. m.

Considering the size of our forces now in France and the increasingly important part being taken by these forces in the operations now in progress on the western front and the necessity on that account of issuing an authoritative official statement from these headquarters regarding these activities, it is deemed advisable to begin issuing an official communique from these headquarters of the Allied Armies in France. This communique will each day constitute the first part, marked A, of the daily cable for the information of the Secretary of War.

The second portion of the cablegram, marked B, will contain the information of general interest which is given daily to or is ordinarily known by the accredited correspondents accompanying the army and will be additional to that given in the communique. It will, among other things, contain the names of officers and men who have been mentioned for heroism with a brief description of the action which occasioned the mention for heroism.

The third portion of the cablegram, marked C, will deal with the Allied operations and changes in the order of battle on the western front, which information is now covered in a separate confidential daily cablegram.

The fourth section, marked D, will contain confidential information regarding movements of troops, actions, etc., which ordinarily would not be made public at the time and elaborating if necessary the information contained in the other three sections of the cablegram.

Owing to the congestion of telegraphic and telephonic communications particularly as regards divisions serving in British and French areas, it may frequently happen that information will arrive too late to be included in the cable of that date, in which case it will of course be included in the cable of the following day.

PERSHING.

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### ***Divisional Organization***

3d Section, General Staff

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, May 18, 1918.*

MEMORANDUM FOR: Asst. Chief of Staff, G-3

1. History of organization: Prior to our entrance into the war, the U. S. had a prescribed division, consisting of 9 infantry regiments (3 brigades), and 3 artillery regiments (1 brigade), and certain auxiliary units. This division totaled about 27,000 men. It varied from the European division mainly in the infantry organization, the total infantry being about the same. The variation related first to the infantry company (the European company numbers 250 men and the American company 150), and second to the organization based on the 2 or 4 unit in preference to the 3 unit. The European armies had two large regiments to the brigade and two large brigades to the divisions, whereas the American division had three small regiments to the brigade and three small brigades to the division.

The American organization as indicated above was adopted due first to the existing statute, which limited our infantry company to 150 men and second to results of the Russo-Japanese War. The above organization corresponded to the Japanese. However, it is well to bear in mind the condition incident to this war and also that no European nation changed its organization as a result of this war.

With the foregoing thoughts in mind, a study of the divisional organization was made by a committee of this section after our present headquarters was created in France. This work included studies prepared by separate French and British G. H. Q. officers specially selected for their expert knowledge on organization.

The operation section committee held conferences with the above experts and discussed all sides of the question. At this time, the existing French organization was in force. The French experts clearly indicated that this organization was forced upon them due to lack of manpower. There appeared to be no doubt in their minds as to the efficiency, power, etc., of our present infantry and artillery organization. They recommended this organization prior to the conferences. In fact, the French have today several divisions organized with four infantry regiments into two brigades. It is worthy of note that these latter divisions include the special good offensive divisions, such as the Moroccan.

The foregoing is set forth in detail, as the source of the present agitation is apparently junior French commanders and staff officers.

The British organization was at the time of the conferences the same as had existed before the war. The British had been actively engaged for two years and had not changed their organization, still remaining the 250 men company, etc. Recently the British have been forced to reduce their companies and even the number of battalions. This has been due solely to the lack of manpower as was stated by the British authorities.

From the foregoing it can be realized that we discarded as organization based on 150 men to a company, due mainly to the expert advice of the French. This change met all ideals set forth by these experts and the lessons of this war.

2. Basis of Organization: There are many elements that enter into the organization of a division, which do not appear in a discussion limited to the division itself.

Sound divisional organization can hardly be secured unless considered from the viewpoint of an army. There are several schools on military organization which, while being radically different, accomplish more or less successfully the same end. For instance, the British base their organization on the 3-unit system and an artillery concentrated primarily on the corps. Whereas the French and Germans take the opposite view, i. e., the 2 or 4-unit system with the preponderance of the first artillery echelon in the division.



Some systems employ the corps as an administrative unit and others solely as tactical ones. Such basic principles must be definitely determined before a sound minor organization can be arrived at. There is no half-way road between the various schools on organization. One or the other of the stems should be adopted and not part of both.

We have accepted the following principles in this connection:

(1) The corps will be a tactical unit and will function in administrative matters only until an army is organized.

(2) The preponderance of the first echelon of artillery will be grouped in divisions and not pooled in the corps.

(3) The 2 or 4 system of organization will be followed.

There is no need to open a discussion on the foregoing points. Their soundness is well known. They have been accepted and form the basis of our whole army organization. In addition, these principles affect our whole organization down to the infantry company and artillery battery. Any radical change in the minor organizations reverts to the basic principles and interferes with their sound application. As an illustration, take the strength of a division in relation to the system adopted for the employment of artillery and for supply.

The factors governing the employment of artillery in support of the infantry are, first the needs of the infantry and second the utilization of the full power of the artillery. The weaker the division is in infantry, the smaller the amount of artillery needed for immediate support, also the weaker the infantry is, the smaller the front it holds and correspondingly the more limited the radius of action of its artillery. Whereas, with a strong infantry element in the division the greater the possible action of the artillery assigned thereto. Therefore, the strength in infantry of a division influences directly the system to be adopted for the artillery. With a weak division, the system of pooling the artillery in the corps should be adopted.

The factors governing supply are railroad and road conditions. The most economical and efficient railroad supply system is one which is capable of meeting the needs of one unit at one railhead and by uniform trains which use the motive power and crew to full capacity. The division of about 28,000 men meets this condition. If the division is considerably reduced, efficiency, etc., requires a grouping of divisions and the transfer of the administrative supply function to the corps, etc. The same principles applies to road capacity. The efficient employment of a road results from having a unit which can be marched and by supplied on one road. Incidentally, this factor has greater influence on the tactical handling of large units. In a war of masses, roads are scarce and must be utilized to their full capacity. Our present division, both from the supply viewpoint and from that of the tactics of masses, meets these requirements. If the division is reduced, we will be forced to group our divisions by two's or even three's on the same road. Under such circumstances, our supply and administrative organization must be changed and the burden thereof centered in the army corps.

The foregoing points out of a few items to illustrate the necessity for consideration of the principles involved in the basic policy before any radical change is permitted in a minor organization. For instance, the reduction of 75 men in each infantry company is equivalent to a reduction of more than a regiment in the division. A corresponding reduction in the artillery should be made, and the system of pooling the artillery in the corps adopted. To secure the full efficiency of railroads and road space, the administration of supply should pass to the corps and we should rearrange each division so as to permit the placing of two divisions on the same road.

It therefore seems evident that no radical change should be permitted in our divisional organization without first reconsidering our basic principles. So long as these are accepted and the system adopted is based thereon, we must resist changes in divisions, otherwise an unsound, uneconomical and inefficient organization will appear. Such an organization has been forced upon the Allies. We should not accept it when means and power are available for the efficient organization.

3. The principle of 2 or 4 unit system: This principle has been advocated by France and Germany for years, in opposition to the 3-unit system. Its efficiency is more evident today than ever before. It applies to all units from the company to the corps. In the warfare of small forces, the tactics of the high command being mainly the envelopment, etc., of the enemy, the 3-unit system has many advantages. In the war of masses and protected flanks, the offensive produces success by surprise blows, whose power is insured by great depth. The envelopments on the western front, considered tactically, are the functions of the smaller units. The requirement is depth of formation so arranged as to permit a constant pressure from the rear combined with local envelopments, etc. Success in this particular is best insured by organization of the attack units so that depth may be secured within an organization and not by combining several larger organizations and thus disrupting the machine at a time when smooth running is essential.

Based on the foregoing, we have organized our corps of four divisions and our divisions of four infantry regiments.

The strength of the regiments plus the artillery of the division insures to the division the ability to carry an attack by its own power through to a reasonable objective. This avoids mixing units at the critical time. Back of each division, the corps has a corresponding unit ready to carry on the attack, meet counterattacks or, if needed, to relieve the exhausted division.

Following this same thought through in the division, the four regiments organized into two brigades operate in a similar manner. With the system of zone defense now in force, a serious offensive will require each regiment of infantry to be formed at least in battalion columns in depth and in special cases each brigade may have to be so formed. If the division is reduced to three regiments, the special case can hardly be met without mixing units. In the ordinary case, where the regiments of the divisions may be deployed side by side, the full value of the artillery of the division is secure with four regiments. If a three regiment division is provided, the artillery should be reduced as there is an excess. Additional artillery would then have to be provided, the same as additional infantry for the special case.

Carrying the foregoing principles into the battalion and company, we find the same tactical needs for depth of formation within the unit, with the added difficulty of direct control and necessity for local envelopments. The deployment of today at 3 or 4 paces forced by machine-gun fire, etc., necessitates the employment of platoons and companies in waves in depth. This formation also answers the tactical needs of a serious offensive, i. e., reinforcing by same unit to gain fire superiority and to provide fractions of the same company and battalion for local envelopments. This requires the battalion and company to consist of two or four companies and platoons respectively. The latter number is essential in a serious offensive if the company and battalion is to carry out as a team the capture of one objective. The platoon should be organized into two waves not only for the reinforcing phase but also for the efficient employment of the infantry weapons.

The remaining question in this phase of the discussion is the desirable strength of the platoon. There are many viewpoints from which to consider this. The main elements are the tactics of the enemy, and control, and the efficient employment of the weapons comprised in the platoon.

The enemy's defensive tactics include the utilization of small defensive groups and machine-gun groups, which are located at wide intervals and which cover considerable front, as much as 100 meters. There is no line defense. Provision is made for local counterattacks between groups. The attacking platoon must have available men to attack at least one of these groups from the front, envelop it on one or both flanks and additional men to cover the attack against local counterattacks from the flanks. In special cases men are needed to clean up the trenches. These groups of the offensive platoon must work as a team under the direct control of one head. From fifty to sixty men are needed for this purpose.

Control is more difficult, due to the wider deployment of the enemy. Yet in

some cases the enemy's deployment may be so dense that the old time shoulder to shoulder function will be required. In the first case, control is secured by subdivisions led by noncommissioned officers. We cannot sacrifice the tactical needs to insure direct control by officers. The tactics of the day require efficient noncommissioned officers. We are able to supply them and train them. Further, the employment of the automatic rifle, the rifle, the hand and rifle grenades in one team require a grouping of men necessitating from 10 to 15 men per group, and four of these are desired to a platoon.

Finally, we must keep in mind the objective of our organization, i. e., a serious offensive. The organization discussed above is required for this purpose. If our plans are limited to a defensive attitude, many changes could be advocated. The offensive requires infantry and strong infantry. This assertion is borne out by this war. So soon as we reduce our infantry below the needs for an aggressive offensive and increase our artillery beyond the proportion needed therefor, we are bound to the defensive as are the French and British.

In addition, it is evident that any radical change in our present division must result in disrupting our whole plan of organization. Even if there were any question as to the size of the platoon, it must be kept in mind that any change in this unit effects our whole divisional organization and when the time arrives, our offensive power.

#### RESUME OF COMMENTS BY DIVISION COMMANDERS

All division commanders of combat divisions except the 1st (the 2d, 26th and 42d), have submitted their views in this connection. The following are quotations from their conclusions:

From the Commanding General, 42d Division (from Colonel Kelton's report):

He (the division commander) states further that he is especially loath to recommend any changes in the organization of the A. E. F. divisions until further actual test in operations has been made.

The present day A. E. F. division has not been tried in actual operations and does not fight the same actually in trench warfare as does its French namesake - but in open warfare it will surely have greater weight and power for operations than two French divisions with less overhead troops and closer cohesion in attack.

Added to this there is the further reasons that a change now would mean endless confusion in the divisions still preparing in the United States and react badly against the confidence now reposed in the A. E. F. by the President and public.

Therefore, it is recommended that no change in strength be made, surely not until greater experience than what we have already had warrants the decision. From the Commanding General, 2d Division:

It would be unwise to change our organization until experiences has taught us that a change is necessary and has demonstrated what those changes should be. Since on the western front open warfare will occur only in periods, followed by long periods of trench warfare, the ideal organization is that best suited for offensive trench warfare. It is this organization that should be our aim and not that best suited for purely defensive warfare.

It is presumed that our service as parts of the French and British High Commands is only temporary and that when the present emergency shall have passed, our army will take over its own part of the front. It will then be possible to arrange our positions to suit our organization. In the meantime, we can make our present organization fit in with the temporary positions occupied by giving the desired greater depth to our formations and possibly by holding in back areas a larger reserve. If this reserve should be kept at such a distance to the rear as to permit a continuous training, the objection that our present organization does not fit in with that of our Allies would be reduced to a minimum.

From the Commanding General, 26th Division:

I am not prepared to condemn present division organization. I have heard objections and have discussed the subject much and do not think the objections are controlling.

I believe it to be a powerful organization that can carry on with a few minor changes and the essential change of policy which I take up in the next paragraph.

All the parts of the division are, as I know, essential today. I have been agreeably surprised and impressed in the recent battles how the exigencies with the critical conditions that we faced proved the various parts were essential in battle and how well they functioned even in the absence of specific plans in anticipation of the smashing attacks that we received. In other words, the daily experience is that one of these big divisions will be the best and only guide to the minor practical changes in organizations and employment.

The essential change I would recommend to keep the division a going concern and have it carry on until it is so destroyed that it has to be withdrawn for reorganization is the question of replacements. I believe a depot in rear under the sole charge of the division commander is the solution and I am inclined to think the best kind of a depot would be a brigade with only enough replacements and trained elements like the artillery for its comparatively small replacement of troops. I believe this from an organization and economical standpoint applies, but especially advisable in the element of psychology.

I would, therefore, not radically tamper with the organization as it exists today. I have been converted to it, all due to my practical experience. It is ably thought out and with the exception of the recommendations in paragraph 2, I am only prepared to recommend minor changes.

The following are the opinions in this connection of well known officers serving with various divisions stated above:

Colonel M. C. Kerth, G. S., who was serving at the time with the 26th Division:

Any ideas I may have personally as to the desirability of changes in the present divisional organization must be almost entirely based on theoretical reasons, since I have been on duty with American troops under the present organization scarcely a month, previous to which I was on duty in Roumania.

I am safe in saying, however, that if the 26th Division as at present organized is heavy or unwieldy, it is due more to lack of training and initiative on the part of the staff and higher line officers, which is reflected by general listlessness and inertia among the company officers, than it is to any inherent defect in the organization of the division as such. This evil is much accentuated by the constant drafts on the commissioned personnel of the division to supply its most efficient officers for detached service in both France and the United States. Under similar conditions, I am of the opinion that any other divisional organization would be equally heavy.

Colonel George H. Shelton, U. S. Army:

There are only a few minor changes which seem to me should be considered at this time. These refer rather to the interior organization of the units of the division instead of the division itself and so are not entered upon here.

On the other hand, I am strongly of the opinion that there should be no drastic changes in the division organization at the present time. The existing organization was evolved after much labor and study; it has been put into effect throughout a large force of new troops; opportunities to test it thoroughly have not yet been presented; changes of importance would involve considerable labor and new confusion at a time when efforts should be expended

in another direction, and still leave us with an organization that remains to have its work tested by experience.

Colonel LeRoy Eltinge, G. S.:

Recommendation that a permanent decision be made at once as to the form of warfare towards which we are working.

If the decision is for defensive employment, no time should be lost in definitely deciding whether a change of organization is desirable or not. If the decision is for keeping an offensive on a large scale as the ideal towards which to work, the possibility of changing the existing organization should be dismissed. \* \* \* A definite and continuous policy is of first importance.

Colonel R. H. C. Kelton, G.S.:

Some comments as stated from the Commanding General, 42d Division.

Colonel Preston Brown, Chief of Staff, 2d Division:

Our Field Service Regulations, para. 122, states:

The purely passive defense is adopted only when the mission can be fully accomplished by this method of warfare. In all other cases, if a force be obliged by uncontrollable circumstances to adopt the defensive, it must be considered as a temporary expedient, and a change to the offensive with all or a part of the forces will be made as soon as conditions warrant such change.

It seems to me that the above quotation answers the question as to a reduction in size of divisions. Our divisions are organized for offensive combat, trained for offensive combat, and should be used for offensive combat. It is true they are larger than the French purely defensive divisions, about equal to a two division corps. In taking over a sector, one of our divisions should therefore take over a sector held by a French two-division corps.

Any change now, not based on actual experience in combat and maneuver, would be a grave mistake. For the past few years our army has been almost disorganized by reorganization. We took the present organization a year ago on the advice of the French and shaped it to meet the demands of cooperation and interlocking tactical unity with their command. We should adhere to that command. No one should ever enunciate an adoption that presupposes for one moment that the United States army is, has been, or will be organized for defensive combat.

The Commanding General, 1st Division, has not submitted any comments to date. However, his action in reducing the strength of infantry platoons, as pointed out in a recent memorandum, indicates his views, i. e., the platoon should be reduced to about 40 men. This reduction is prompted by a French corps commander.

Some of the arguments presented in behalf of the change inaugurated by the Commanding General, 1st Division are:

(a) Inability of junior commanders to control and handle the platoon of 50 men, etc.

This is not sound. The difficulty of the infantry combat of today is due not so much to the inability to control men as it is the lack of men available to meet each new situation. Difficulties of control arise through lack of sufficient men to meet the situation and not through an excess. There is not doubt in my mind that the platoon leader who controls only 20 men in a task requiring 50 will make more tactical errors than if he had an excess of 30 men. The tendency to disperse 20 men so as to accomplish the task requiring 50 will often lead to disastrous results.

Moreover it is false practice to organize an army on the assumed capabilities of the platoon leaders. Platoon leaders are more easily made than supply systems, artillery organization, etc. Then again, one cannot acknowledge, even if it happens to be so, that one cannot train lieutenants to command fifty men.

(b) Our division does not fit into the French organization and is, therefore, difficult to handle by the French.

Our service with the French is temporary. We cannot base an organization

for an aggressive offensive thereon. Have the French changed their divisions now serving with the British? The two divisions are radically different in infantry and artillery organization.

(c) There is need for a depot which will make available immediate replacements. It is unsound to reduce the divisional organization to meet this situation unless the manpower of the nation forces such action. We have a replacement system. It is suitable to meet this situation. This scheme contemplates holding the replacements in a divisional area near the front of the corps. However, when the corps is temporarily dispersed, there is no reason why the replacements cannot also be separated so as to be nearer the divisions. A regiment of replacements can be sent to an area near the 1st Division if deemed necessary. It should be kept in mind that up to date our replacement system has not been tried out. This cannot be done until the 32d Division takes over its function as a replacement division.

The division replacement unit has been discarded and for many reasons is not desirable for us. The organization of such a unit in the 1st Division seems to be prompted by the French, as it corresponds to their system. There seems to be no other reason therefore if the 32d Division is made to function as a replacement unit.

Conclusions:

1. Succinctly, the agitation concerning the size of our division springs from the influence of junior French commanders and their staff officers. It is based on a desire to facilitate the handling of our divisions by French commanders and staff and not on sound organization. When viewed from the standpoint of an offensive army, the highest French commander and his staff (French Chief of Staff in General Petain's name), advocated the division we now have.

2. If our plan is to fight this entire war as a part of a French corps, there might be some excuse for this change. However, as there must be an American army and an American offensive before the conclusions of this war, such temporary situations as indicated above must now allow us to be deviated from the sound offensive organization we have planned.

If the reasons indicated in para. 1, above, are allowed to govern, why have not the French changed their divisions serving with the British to correspond to the British divisions?

In addition, we now have a sound organization which has just become known to the army. Some 43 divisions etc., are affected thereby. Constant changes in organization can only result in inefficiency and in lack of confidence, especially when the existing unit has not had the experience of an actual offensive.

It is therefore recommended that all changes suggested in our divisional and other organizations be held in abeyance without action until the experience of combat shows conclusively that our basic principles are wrong.

H. A. DRUM,  
Lieut. Colonel, G. S.,  
G-3.

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***Interview on Occupation of American Sector***

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,  
ARMIES OF THE NORTH AND NORTHEAST,  
*Chantilly, Oise, May 19, 1918.*

I. QUESTION OF AN AMERICAN SECTOR: The following is agreed upon: As soon as circumstances permit, the American army will take complete charge of the sector of the Woevre.

The nucleus of this sector is formed by the sector actually occupied at the present by the American 26th Division.

As other American divisions become available, each of them will be sent to take its place on the right and left of this subsector.

Until the moment when four American divisions are in the line and two in reserve, these divisions will continue to be placed under the authority of the French general commanding the army in which the sector is located.

As soon as there are four American divisions in the line and two in reserve, the sector will be definitely turned over to the American army and will function with the American army's resources (supply stations, ammunition depots, etc.) as an army sector.

If the fluctuations of the battle make it necessary for the Supreme Command to take American divisions from the American sector, after such sector has been definitely established, and to replace these divisions by French divisions, the French divisions would, during their tour in the American sector, be placed under the American command.

Incidentally, General Pershing makes it understood that:

1st - the American divisions now in the zone of the British armies will, as soon as their instruction is completed and the present crisis has reached its termination, be brought to the American sector of the Woevre.

2d - The instruction of the 3d and 5th Divisions is being pushed with great activity and these divisions will be ready to appear on the front with but little delay.

II. AMERICAN PERSONNEL PUT AT THE DISPOSITION OF THE FRENCH HIGH COMMAND: The aviation pilots and the personnel of the signal corps which have been recently requested are put at the disposition of the Commander-in-Chief of the French armies.

The orders to this effect have been given.

III. COLORED REGIMENTS: For certain internal reasons a certain number of American units have Negroes as their officers.

General Pershing is in some doubt as to the aptitude for command of these Negro officers. He asks that the French command report to him all cases in which these Negro officers appear to be incapable in order that he may immediately take such measures as may be necessary. A suitable method seems to be to place a French officer alongside of each Negro field officer. This method gave good results when applied by the English to the Hindoo officers.

General Pershing sees no objection to the French employing, in case of necessity, the Negro troops by battalions instead of by regiments.

IV. FRENCH AND AMERICAN DECORATIONS: The following is agreed upon: In the future, propositions for bestowing French decorations on American officers and soldiers will be, before being put into effect, transmitted to the American General Headquarters in order to obtain the opinion of those headquarters.

Similarly, General Pershing will transmit in the near future to the French General Headquarters lists of French officers and soldiers upon whom he proposes to bestow American decorations.

V. REINFORCING FRENCH DIVISIONS: General Petain set forth to General Pershing the grave disadvantage which would result if French divisions were broken up on account of a lack of a sufficient number of replacements.

The most critical period from this point of view will exist during the months of July, August, and September; that is, this period will extend up to the time when the class of 1919 will be available for the front.

He asked General Pershing to examine what can be done to assist in this matter through temporarily incorporating for short tours, the tour of one unit to be followed by the tour of another unit, American battalions, regiments or brigades in French divisions, it being well understood that these units would be returned to their own command as soon as the class of 1919 is available.

During the critical period he (General Petain) would keep General Pershing thoroughly informed as to the exact situation of our French effectives.

General Pershing promises to study the question in all its detail and to do all that he may be able to do.

General Pershing made it clear that in the future American units arriving in France will have had much more instruction than any of the units which may have preceded them and that this fact will have as a result reduction of the tour which American regiments now have for instruction purposes in French divisions.

VI. POOLING OF ALL THE RESOURCES OF THE ALLIES (SUPPLIES OF ALL KINDS AND MEANS OF TRANSPORT): General Pershing and General Petain are both very strongly in favor of this idea and consider that it must be fully developed, whatever reservations may be made by the English.

VII. MANUFACTURES OF AVIATION MATERIEL: General Pershing stated that the manufacture of the Liberty motors is progressing very favorably.

On the other hand the manufacture of airplanes is not progressing very well in the United States.

On the other hand the manufacture of airplanes is very satisfactory in France.

As a result, General Pershing considers it desirable to find a solution without delay to the question of the adaptation of Liberty motors brought over from America to airplanes manufactured by the French.

Incidentally, General Petain stated that the American sector, once it is constituted, should be provided with a sufficient number of American air squadrons.

In case of need, the materiel of French squadrons could at that time be turned over to the American army.

VIII. HEADQUARTERS OF GENERAL PERSHING: General Pershing made it known that the influx of American troops into the northwestern region of France would oblige him to organize an advance General Headquarters from which he could easily visit the northwestern region of France.

The Interview of the two generals terminated at this moment.

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Cable: P-1156-S

***Aspects of General and Service of Rear Projects***

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, May 20, 1918.*

AGWAR, WASHINGTON

[Extract]

1. For Chief of Staff. Replying to paragraph 8 your cablegram 1345 and your cablegram 1224: See paragraph 3 my cablegram 981. Developments to date do not indicate the necessity for any change in my General Organization and Service of the Rear Projects approved here July 11 [see Vol. 1, this series] and September 18, 1917 [superseded by S.O.S., report of which is printed in Vol. 6, this series] respectively.

A. These projects set forth our needs and desires to include June 1919. Our plans contemplated that about 1/5 of the total of these projects should reach the front in France with each corps of the army. However early delays which have occurred in the production of army air service material, etc., should be compensated for by an increase of units arriving with the last corps.

\*\*\*\*\*

PERSHING.

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Cable: A-1352-R

***Convoy***

A. G. O. WAR DEPARTMENT,  
*Washington, D. C., May 20, 1918.*

PERSHING, AMEXFORCE, G. H. Q., A. E. F.

[Extract]

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2. With reference to paragraph 1, your 1126 confidential. After consultation with Navy decided to run vessels to Gibraltar unescorted and without convoy. Ships will be selected with speeds not less than 10 knots, armed with 5-inch guns aft. Navy will arrange convoy from Gibraltar to destination. You will be advised later names of vessels diverted to this port character of cargoes to be carried. Goethals.

\*\*\*\*\*

McCAIN.

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**American Sector**

[Contemporary Translation]

3d Section, G. S.  
No. 27247

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,  
ARMIES OF THE NORTH AND NORTHEAST,  
May 21, 1918.

To: The Chief of the French Military Mission with the American Army at Chaumont.

I. It has been decided, during an interview which took place on May 19, between the Commander-in-Chief of the Armies of the North and of the Northeast and the Commander-in-Chief of the American Forces, that a sector for the American army would be established in accordance with the following principles:

(a) The nucleus of this sector is formed by that portion of the front held at the present time by the American 26th Division.

(b) As instructed American divisions become available they will be sent, each in their turn to take their places to the right and to the left of this nucleus. These divisions will continue to be placed under the authority of the General commanding the local French army until the moment when four American divisions are side by side upon the front with two instructed American divisions behind the line in reserve.

(c) From that moment the American sector will be definitely constituted and will function by its own means as an army sector. The sector will include a deep rear zone independent (Translator's Note: That is, independent of all French army authority) within which all establishments and all services will be American.

II. In order to prepare in a methodical manner for the actual constitution of the American sector, studies and projects will be established at once by the interested authorities and services.

The principal questions to be considered are the following:

1st - Determination of the limits of the sector and of the rear of the sector under the initial hypothesis of four divisions in the line and two divisions in reserve.

Communications, establishments, local services, etc., to be turned over to the Americans.

Successive measures to be adopted and the order of urgency of those measures.

2d - Progressive extension of the American sector toward the east and toward the west in accordance with the increase of the American army.

All dispositions should be foreseen which are necessary in order to carry out this extension.

The General commanding the Group of Armies of the East will establish a short project for the constitution of the American sector in accordance with the principles indicated above, after an understanding with the General commanding the Group of Armies of the North and General Chief of the French Mission at Chaumont. This project will be forwarded in duplicate to the Commander-in-Chief (3d Bureau and D. A.).

P. ANTHOINE,  
Major General.

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**Conference with M. Clemenceau and General Foch, American Advanced G. H. G.**

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, May 23, 1918.*

AGWAR, WASHINGTON

For the Chief of Staff and Secretary of War

1. Reference your cable 1297 [May 11, 1918] paragraph 1, have had satisfactory conferences recently with M. Clemenceau and General Foch. Again stated to M. Clemenceau our earnest desire to render all possible assistance to the cause. He expressed some solicitude to the available manpower for June, upon which I told him that a further study was being made to see if tonnage might possibly permit us to advance some more infantry on the schedule.

A. In interview with General Foch same subject was discussed among others and he expressed himself as very much pleased. We agreed upon a permanent American sector in Lorraine and its organization as fast as possible. Units with the French as they are ready will receive first trench experience there and other divisions will return there for rest and recuperation after their tour of active service in battle.

2. In view of the growing numbers of American troops at the active front, both with the British and French, it is very necessary to have an advanced headquarters with a small staff. Gremevillers, a small town west of Montdidier half an hour from General Foch's headquarters, has been selected. I shall exercise a direct personal control of combatant units, and assume personal command when circumstances of the present emergency make it possible to group a certain number of divisions and organize them into provisional corps.

3. Have been with 1st Division several times recently and just returned from two days' stay with this division. Am pleased to report that it is doing its work well and is ready for any emergency. Is considered by the French as very efficient. Both officers and men are in most excellent spirits. I was four days recently with 2d Division now in an area in Picardy. After short period of training in open warfare will take its place in the active line. The 42d and the 26th Divisions will follow shortly.

\* \* \* \* \*

PERSHING.

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***Arrival, Training and Supply of the II, III and IV Corps***

4th Section, General Staff

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, May 23, 1918.*

From: C-in-C

To: C. G., S. O. S. (G-4)

1. The following information is compiled from cablegrams and other sources for your information:

The composition of the II, III, and IV Corps is as follows: II Corps, ---4th, 28th, 30th, 35th, 77th and 82d Divisions, of which the 82d is a training division and the 77th and 35th are replacement divisions. III Corps, ---3d, 5th, 27th, 33d, 80th and 78th Divisions, of which the 33d is a replacement division; IV Corps, ---29th, 37th, 83d, 89th, 90th and 92d Divisions. There is no training or replacement division in the IV Corps. Assignments to the V and VI Corps will bring the total of training and replacement divisions to six in these three corps.

2. A units (see note at end of letter) of divisions of the II Corps have been designated for training with the British. Also the A units of the 27th, 33d and 80th Divisions of the III Corps, which will be on exactly the same footing as regards supply, etc., as the II Corps.

3. The shipping schedule contemplates sending: In April - A units of the 3d, 5th, 35th, 77th and 82d Divisions, and the B units (see note at end of letter) of the 3d and 77th Divisions of the II and III Corps;

In May - A units of the 4th, 28th, 30th, 27th, 33d, 80th and 78th Divisions of the II and III Corps, and the B units of the 4th, 28th, 35th and 82d Divisions of the II and III Corps; also 19,000 replacement and S. O. S. troops;

In June - A units of the 29th, 37th, 83d, 89th, 90th and 92d Divisions of the IV Corps, and the B units of the 30th, 5th, 27th, 33d, 80th and 78th Divisions of the II and III Corps; also 63,000 replacement and S. O. S. troops.

In July - B units of the 29th, 37th, 83d, 89th, 90th and 92d Divisions of the IV Corps.

Included herein are six balloon companies, 3 photographic sections and a depot battalion (S-302) to be shipped in May.

4. There have recently arrived in France and England or are now en route the A units of the 4th, 28th, 30th, 35th, 77th and 82d Divisions of the II Corps, the A units of the 3d, 5th, 27th and 33d Divisions of the III Corps, the B units of the 77th Divisions of the II Corps and the 3d Division of the III Corps, and the 16th Reg., F. A., of 4th Div. of the II Corps.

5. The minimum allowance of time for training the A units of a division with the British will be two months. It will, therefore, be necessary to have preparations made for supplying these units that have been sent to the British two months after they have arrived in the British area. B units must be supplied on arrival in France.

6. The schedule of arrival of the V Corps has not been announced but it is presumed that the entire priority schedule will have been completed by August 1.

(Note) A units comprise division headquarters, two infantry brigades, division machine gun battalion, engineer regiment, field signal battalion, four camp infirmaries, headquarters train, military police and engineer train. In addition to above A units, certain ambulance companies and field hospital companies, to be designated by the C-in-C, will be

sent to British after arrival. B units, balance of division and attached units.

By order of the C-in-C:

GEO. VAN HORN MOSELEY,  
Colonel, General Staff,  
Asst. Chief of Staff, G-4.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1304: Note

### ***Shipments of Service of Rear Troops***

3d Section, General Staff

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, May 24, 1918.*

#### NOTES ON S. O. S. CABLE

1. According to S. O. S. cable following shipments of S. O. S. troops necessary:  
By June 7 about 65,000  
By June 30 about 50,000 additional  
By July 31 about 66,000 additional
2. Under Cable R-1316 [May 14, 1918] which is certainly a very favorable construction of the Abbeville Agreement for the S. O. S., the S. O. S. and replacements combined receive in May 19,000 and in June 63,000.  
Of this total of 82,000---38,500 are replacements (Cable R-1247) [May 5, 1918] and 4,095 are special sanitary replacements (Cable R-1247) leaving a balance of some 39,405 for the S. O. S. for the months of May and June. The S. O. S. cable asks for about 65,500 men during those months over this.
3. The Abbeville Agreement, as did the London agreement, contemplated bringing over combat troops to meet a definite emergency. Under the disposition to be made of these troops a large portion of them are independent of the S. O. S. activities.
4. Under the Abbeville Agreement we shall have 6 divisions which will have sailed on June 30 without B units (or a total shortage of about 50,000 divisional units).
5. The only way to increase S. O. S. troops prior to June 30 is either to reduce replacements or to delay other B units in addition to those of the 6 divisions already mentioned. Both of these solutions are extremely inadvisable. Neither one would satisfy the S. O. S. demands and of the troops remaining to be shipped both together could not satisfy the S. O. S. cable.
6. The S. O. S. cable brings over 181,000 troops to the end of July, and the first four phases of the priority schedule would lack but some 20,500 of completion.
7. To complete the 4th Phase in combat troops we shall have to bring over after July 1:

B Units of 6 divisions	50,000
Corps troops	59,000
Army troops	72,000
Replacements (minimum)	40,000
Total, exclusive of tanks	221,000

8. Assuming that we have as much passenger shipping in July as in June we shall be able to transport about 225,000. If we bring over 181,000 S. O. S. troops to the end of

July we shall be short that exact number of combat troops and to say nothing of corps and army troops we shall have at least one division without artillery.

9. Taking up the S. O. S. subparagraphs in order:

Subparagraph on medical

Requests personnel called for by 1037-S [May 2, 1918] namely:

500 officers

554 nurses

3,040 soldiers

S. O. S. cable states these in lieu of corresponding number of base and evacuation hospitals. All these replacements will sail in May per Par. 1 Cable R-1247 (copy of which was furnished the S. O. S.), and they were not asked for in lieu of any other medical personnel. S. O. S. cable states that base hospitals were erroneously stated to come 2 instead of 4 per division. This was not an error. The reduction was due to the fact that our troops are to be largely cared for by the British during the time they are on British front.

Subparagraph on Stevedores.

This part of the S. O. S. cable calls for at least 6,000 stevedores including 2,400 already asked for. The S. O. S. cable places them under Item E-464. That item only contains 4,000. All these remain in our plans. However, by 1311-R all stevedores and labor battalions are consolidated and known as Q-418.

10. It is believed that the best that can be done is to allot the 39,000 odd S. O. S. troops now allowed in the most advantageous way and to frame a cable now for July shipments.

FOX CONNER,  
Colonel, General Staff,  
Asst. Chief of Staff, G-3.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1338: Letter

### ***Information on American Forces in France***

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, May 24, 1918.*

From: Commander-in-Chief, American Expeditionary Forces

To: General Tasker H. Bliss, American Representative, Allied Supreme War Council.

1. In compliance with request contained in your telegram of May 19, the following information is furnished.

1. Dates on which figures apply: May 20, unless otherwise stated.
2. Numbers of divisions:
  - A. Infantry. Infantry of 13 1/4 divisions on hand.  
Auxiliary arms complete in 8 of these divisions.
  - B. and C. Dismounted cavalry and cavalry. No divisional organization of cavalry in A. E. F.
3. Number of battalions of infantry and dismounted cavalry:
  - Infantry. 159 battalions. (Note. - This includes 11 battalions passing through England and 12 battalions serving with French.)

Dismounted cavalry: 12 squadrons. (Note. - This includes 9 squadrons, to be mounted squadrons eventually.)

4. Number of combatants all arms:

	OFFICERS	SOLDIERS
Infantry (excluding machine gun bns.)	5,870	178,149
Machine gun battalions	765	18,649
Field artillery	2,203	48,071
Antiaircraft artillery	50	1,672
Coast artillery	574	17,941
Cavalry	254	6,353
Engineer sappers	836	23,843
Signal (field battalions)	149	4,936
Aviation service squadrons	613	14,586
Tank service	168	1,179
Unclassified replacements, school detachments, etc.	2,231	15,664
Total in France	13,713	331,043
ARM	OFFICERS	SOLDIERS
Passing through England, not included in above		
Infantry (excluding machine gun battalions)	279	9,707
Machine gun battalions	92	2,700
Total	371	12,407
Grand total (France and England)	14,084	343,450

5. Rifle strength of infantry  
and  
Dismounted cavalry  
(Actually in the line)

(5 division: 1st,  
(2d, 26th, 32d,  
(and 42d.

Infantry	2,601	63,725
Dismounted cavalry	None	None

6. Sabre strength of cavalry

None.

7. Machine guns:

With Troops and  
Schools

A. Heavy	1,893
B. Light	None
C. Auto rifles	5,925

8. Artillery strength:

A. Number of field guns of each caliber separately.

CALIBER	
75-mm.	627
155-mm. howitzers	189

B. Number of heavy guns of each caliber separately.

CALIBER	
155 G. P. F.	70
8" howitzers	36
9.2" howitzers	6

C. Number of antiaircraft guns of each caliber separately.

CALIBER	
75-mm.	2

9. Number of Aeroplanes:

- |                   |   |
|-------------------|---|
| A. Battle Planes  | )This information not now available,<br>)air service has not replied to re-<br>)quest for information, which will<br>)be forwarded when received. |
| B. Scout Planes   |   |
| C. Bombing Planes |   |

#### ARM

10. Number of tanks: None with troops and none available for issue. American forces have 10 tanks which have been borrowed from the French for instruction purposes.

11. Losses, since March 21, 1918  
(The following losses were taken into account in the foregoing figures.)

A. Men and officers each separately.

	OFFICERS	SOLDIERS	TOTAL	REMARKS
Returned to the U. S.			1,147	Includes both officers and soldiers. No separate figures available. Compiled from A. G. O. Statistical figures of May 8.
Missing			256	
Deaths	54	847	901	Compiled from daily casualty telegrams of A. G. O. to May 18 inclusive.
Members of combat units now in S. O. S. hospitals	10	2,093	2,103	Compiled by A. G. O. Statistical Division including May 15.
AGGREGATE			4,407	



B. Guns: Field, heavy and anti-air separately.

Losses to May 24, inclusive. Obtained by G-4 from Ordnance Department.

FIELD GUNS	FAIR WEAR	PREMATURE	ENEMY FIRE
55-mm.	1	7	3
155-mm.		1	
37-mm.		3	
<b>HEAVY GUNS</b>			
None			
<b>ANTI-AIRCRAFT GUNS</b>			
None			

C. Aeroplanes:

No information available. Air service has not replied to request for information, which will be forwarded when received.

D. Tanks

None.

E. Machine Guns: Heavy, light, and auto-rifles separately.

This information not now available. Understood that ordnance department does not have the figures

12. Replacements effected since March 21, 1918.

A. Of men and officers, each separately.

Following replacements effected between March 21 and May 18.

ARM	OFFICERS	SOLDIERS
Infantry, excluding machine gun battalions	371	12,234
Engineer sappers	67	549
Machine gun battalions	43	1,904
Signal (field battalions)	23	563
Artillery	152	535
Trains	75	1,995
Total	731	17,780

B. Of guns: Field, heavy and anti-air separately. Replacements to May 24.

FIELD GUNS	NO.
75-mm.	11
155-mm.	1
37-mm. T. R.	3

C. Of aeroplanes. No information available. Will be forwarded when received.

D. No tanks: None.

E. Of machine guns; heavy, light and auto rifles separately.

This information not now available. Will forward when received.

13. Number in depots available for replacements on May 17:

A. Of men and officers each separately:

ARM	OFFICERS	SOLDIERS
Infantry, excluding machine gun battalions	220	7,336
Machine gun battalions	23	706
Field artillery	112	1,589
Engineer sappers	45	1,514
Signal (field battalions)	22	399
Trains	39	1,477
Aviation	6	815
Cavalry	12	172
Coast Artillery	69	1,788
Unclassified	7	3,997
TOTALS	555	19,793

B. Of guns, field heavy and anti-air separately.

FIELD GUNS	IN DEPOT AVAILABLE FOR ISSUE
75-mm.	43
155-mm. howitzers	8
HEAVY GUNS	
155-mm. G. P. F.	0
8" howitzers	12
9.2" howitzers	4
ANTIAIRCRAFT	
75-mm.	3

C. of aeroplanes: No information available. Will be forwarded when received.

D. of tanks: None available for issue

E. of machine guns: Heavy, light, and auto rifles separately.

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IN DEPOT AVAILABLE FOR ISSUE

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Heavy machine guns	799
Light machine guns	None
Automatic rifles	3966

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J. W. McANDREW,  
Major General,  
Chief of Staff.

For and in absence of Commander-in-Chief.

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C-in-C Rept. File: Fldr. 26: Cablegram

***Pooling Supplies***

No. 1169

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, May 24, 1918.*

For the Chief of Staff and Secretary of War

Reference my cable 1147, following is text of preliminary agreement signed by M. Clemenceau and myself with reference to the pooling of supplies, which is to form the basis of future developments in this direction:

1st. That the principle of unification of military supplies and utilities for the use of the Allied armies is adopted. 2d. That in order to apply this principle and as far as possible coordinate the use of utilities and the distribution of supplies among the Allied armies, a board consisting of representatives of each of the Allied armies is to be constituted at once. 3d. That the unanimous decision of the board regarding the allotment of material and supplies shall have the force of orders and be carried out by the respective supply agencies. 4th. That further details of the organization by which the above plan is to be carried out shall be left to the board, subject to such approval by the respective governments as may at any time seem advisable.

We agree to the above and wish it to be submitted to the British and Italian Governments.

PERSHING.

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**Enlistment of Poles**

A. G. O. WAR DEPARTMENT  
Washington, D. C., May 24, 1918.

American Section  
Supreme War Council  
Versailles

Number 57

1. With reference to your number 111, the following replies are made:
  - a. Law forbids the enlistment in America of Poles for service in so called Polish army. Voluntary enlistment of alien Poles in American army is authorized. Polish-Americans who have taken out first papers and who are within draft age are subject to the provisions of selective draft law.
  - b. Impracticable.
  - c. Difficulties referred to apparently not applicable to non-citizens. Cases of Polish-Americans who have declared intentions and who are within draft age are permitted exactly the same claims for exemption as others if called to the colors.
  - d. First: In view of the circumstances, it is not believed that the conditions requiring this will arise. Second: Law does not authorize freedom of mails. Third: Energetic measures against hostile propaganda are being taken. If you can furnish recommendation for additional measures against hostile propaganda of certain agencies such information desired. March.

McCAIN.

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Cable: P-1186-S

**Priority Schedule for S. O. S. Troops**

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
Chaumont, Haute-Marne, May 25, 1918.

ADJUTANT GENERAL OF THE ARMY, WASHINGTON  
FOR CHIEF OF STAFF

1. Place at head of priority schedule of S. O. S. troops for promptest possible shipment 6,000 stevedores in addition to 2,400 called for in paragraph 3 G 704 and checkers, coopers, and gearmen called for in paragraph 1 cable 869 and paragraph 1 A cable 684. Also 3,000 railway operating personnel from items E. 453 and E. 453 A for handling terminal work at ports and depots. All totaling 12,100. These are indispensable to discharge of ships and are needed by June 20. Send them in units or as individuals as may be most expeditious. In addition to this and repeating previous request, it is urged that all available space not otherwise assigned be utilized to send small service of supply units or detachments or individuals as nearly as practicable in accordance with priority schedule. The large increase in the number of troops is adding greatly to the burden on ports, railways and S.O.S. generally.

A. Preliminary studies show that it is essential that large amount of available tonnage for July and August be devoted to bringing over indispensable service of supply troops and combat units necessary to care for our troops and to complete division elements of which will have embarked prior to June 20. A reference to priority will show original scheme which is now far behind. Detailed study of subject now being made and will be cabled within few days.

PERSHING.

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GHQ, AEF Cables

***Troops Destined for Service in British Area***

No. LR 1688

BASE SECTION 3, A. E. F.,  
*London, May 25, 1918.*

C-in-C

H. A. E. F.

Hq. 3431 reference headquarters 2770 these headquarters May 3, information received from war office that May program provides for conveyance of certain troops designated for service with British in ships carrying supplies for the American army direct to France. As this program cannot now be altered these troops must arrive at French ports the use of which war council was endeavoring to avoid.

BIDDLE.

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Cable: P-1200-S

***Views on Issuing a Daily Communique***

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, May 28, 1918.*

AGWAR, WASHINGTON

FOR CHIEF OF STAFF

In compliance with the instructions contained in paragraph 4 your cablegram 1389, I have given instructions that the communique which for the past 10 days we have been issuing for the information of our troops and of our Allies and which has been embodied in Section A of our daily cable to the War Department be not released here for publication.

By communique is meant here only the brief official announcement of the day's operations contained in Section A of the daily cable and does not include Sections B, C or D of that cable which have never been released here for publication.

Paragraph 2 my cablegram 1132 [May 16, 1918] outlining the procedure in the preparation of the daily cable covers this point as follows:

Considering the size of our forces now in France and the increasingly important part being taken by these forces in the operations now in progress on the western front and the necessity on that account of issuing an authoritative official statement from these headquarters regarding these activities, it is deemed advisable to begin issuing an official communique from these headquarters following in general the lines of the official communiques issued from the headquarters of the Allied Armies in France, if it meets with the approval of the War Department.

As Commander-in-Chief of the overseas forces I believed it incumbent upon me to issue such a daily communique concerning our operations. This is primarily intended for the information of our own and the Allied Armies. Such a communique cannot be prepared except at these headquarters of which it is a function as it is of all other army headquarters. It

should not interfere in any way with the statements or communiques issued by the War Department as the latter will necessarily cover a much broader field. All commanders, including the British, French, Belgian and Italian, issue daily communiques to their troops and the Allied Armies. These are published in the European press as the most convenient means of dissemination to the troops.

To delay the publication of a statement of our operations until after our Allies or enemies have published their statements of events may injuriously affect morale. It is necessary that our troops and our Allies shall receive official information of our operations with the last practicable delay. Our Allies issue usually two communiques each day. This procedure is the result of experience which has imposed on them as well as on our enemies the importance of being first to publish the story of operations. The bad psychological effect of allowing the enemy to publish his version first has been noted in numerous cases. The whole question was carefully weighed by the operation and intelligence sections of the general staff and by myself in connection with the answer to your cablegram 1255. [May 6, 1918].

The matter of the communique is vitally concerned with the whole problem of publicity and of censorship. Field service regulations provide that censorship within the theatre of operations be controlled by the commander of the field forces because he alone is in a position to prescribe what should be published about the operations of the army under his command, since once published it becomes immediately available for the information of the enemy. This does not imply that the War Department should not give out information, on the contrary it is deemed most advisable that it should give out whatever the condition of the public mind of America makes desirable, as indicated in your cablegram 1255 [May 6, 1918].

The communique as defined above, has been issued to our troops for the last 10 days. Its effect upon their morale has been excellent. The effect upon our Allies has been extremely satisfactory, particularly with regard to the French and British armies, to which it has contributed to inspire confidence in the reality of the service now being rendered at the front by American troops.

In view of the foregoing I recommend that the instructions contained in paragraph 4 your cablegram 1389 be modified so as again to permit the issue of the usual communique to our own and the Allied Armies as outlined in my cablegram 1132 [May 16, 1918] and that I be notified promptly of the decision of the Secretary of War on this recommendation.

PERSHING.

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Cable: P-1206-S

***Request for 12,000 Service of Supply Troops***

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, May 29, 1918.*

AGWAR, WASHINGTON

FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF

Immediate attention Chief of Staff, reference my cable 1186 [May 25, 1918] regarding shipment of 12,000 S. O. S. troops, it is important to know at once whether this request can be approved and the troops sent accordingly. The need for them is so great that our railroad facilities are likely to fail unless they are sent. If they cannot be sent with-

out delay it will be necessary to search available men of the classes mentioned from combatant troops now here. This should be avoided if possible, but we must have the men. The French railroads are straining every nerve to meet our requirements but they have got to have this relief as they have no more men to call on. Answer at once what you can do.

PERSHING.

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C-in-C Rept. File: Fldr. 19: Cablegram

### ***Russian Conditions***

A. G. O., WAR DEPARTMENT,  
Washington, D. C., May 29, 1918.

American Section  
Supreme War Council  
Versailles

Number 59

1. Secretary of War has presented your Number 115, May 26, to the President. The President's attitude is that Russia's misfortune imposes upon us at this time the obligation of unswerving fidelity to the principles of Russian territorial integrity and political independence. Intervention via Vladivostok is deemed impracticable because of the vast distance involved, the size of the force necessary to be effective, and financing such an expedition would mean a burden which the United States at this time ought not assume. In order to be effective, either create a military situation on the eastern front which would relieve the pressure on the western front, or to prevent the central powers from exploiting the agricultural and other resources of Russia, such an intervening expedition would have to penetrate into European Russia, and, however such an expedition were safeguarded by the approval and concurrence of the Allies, its appearance would be such that German propagandists would be able to persuade the Russian people that compensation at their expense and out of their territory was ultimately to be exacted. In this way and others Germany would be able to arouse Russian patriotic feeling and thus secure military and other aid from the Russians far outweighing any foreseeable advantages from so difficult an intervention.

2. The idea of compensating Japan by territory in Asiatic Russia is inadmissible. The President is heartily in sympathy with any practical military efforts which can be made at and from Murmansk or Archangel, but such efforts should proceed, if at all, upon the sure sympathy of the Russian people and should not have as their ultimate objects any restoration of the ancient regime or any other interference with the political liberty of the Russian people. March.

Thank you very much for paragraph two.

March.

McCAIN.

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Bliss Cables: 101-200

***Action of President on Resolution of Last Session Supreme War Council***

No. 119

AMERICAN SECTION,  
SUPREME WAR COUNCIL,  
*Versailles, Seine-et-Oise, May 29, 1918.*

The Adjutant General, Washington

For Secretary of State and Secretary of War

[Extract]

1. Sixth session of Supreme War Council will be held at 3 p. m. Saturday, June 1.
2. As I will probably be asked the attitude of my government on subjects discussed at last session of Supreme War Council I request that I be informed if practicable before the hour set for next meeting what is the action of the President on resolutions reported in paragraphs 2, 4, 5, 7, and 8 of my cable number 103 [May 3, 1918].

\* \* \* \* \*

BLISS.

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Cable: A-1426-R

***Field Headquarters, A. E. F.***

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, May 30, 1918.*

PERSHING, AMEXFORCE, PARIS

Report by cable when you move to your new field headquarters and take personal charge.  
March.

McCAIN.

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***Action on Various Questions Submitted by General Bliss***

Number 60-R

A. G. O., WAR DEPARTMENT,  
*Washington, D. C., May 31, 1918.*

To: Amsec. Versailles

Your Cablegram 119, May 29, received. Following is action on various questions submitted.

Your number 103, paragraph 2, deals with Milner-Pershing London Agreement. President regards the Foch-Milner-Pershing Agreement covering May and June, as in substitution for all previous arrangements, and we are attempting to live up to it. In view of the confusion arising from attempt to settle such questions here while they are being also considered in Europe, we feel that any modification of this program as set forth in your subparagraphs A, B, C, and D, should be made only with concurrence of Foch, Milner, and Pershing. If this or any other program is to be adopted for July and later months, it should be worked out by conference with British, French, and American commanders all present. Pershing has been supplied full statement of available infantry and machine-gun units in this country who have had requisite minimum training. He is therefore prepared to confer on the subject. French and British Ambassadors here have sought to open discussion on this subject for July, but have been told that in our judgment General Foch should open the subject in Europe with General Pershing and reach an agreement there mutually satisfactory.

Your Number 103, paragraph 4. President concurs in the dissolution of Executive War Board and transfer of its functions to General Foch.

Your Number 103, paragraph 5. President believes extension of powers of Supreme Commander to Italian front highly desirable, but defers to opinion of Italian Government upon a question so peculiarly affecting its own frontiers.

Your Number 103, paragraph 7, deals with Joint Note 25 covering transportation of Czech regiments from Russia. President concurs in recommendations of the note, but points out that if Allied Military operations are in contemplation in Russia from Murmansk and Archangel these Czech contingents might be especially valuable in association with any such expedition because of their familiarity with Russian language and previous employment on Russian front.

Your Number 103, paragraph 8, deals with report of Allied Naval Council, April 26 and 27, covering transfer of Italian dreadnaughts. President concurs in recommendations.

Your Number 114, Joint Note 26, covers recommendations reducing employment of horses for the conservation of forage. President concurs.

Your Number 114, Joint Note 27. President concurs in analysis of situation. Believes that the continued neutrality of Holland is of the highest importance and feels that no steps should be taken which would give even a colorable pretext to the enemy to claim that Holland had, by compromising her neutrality, justified aggression against her.

Your Number 114, Joint Note 28. President concurs in proposed mode of action of Interallied Transportation Council.

Your Number 119, Joint Note 29. President concurs in the importance of the study suggested. Baker.

McCAIN.

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## **Replacements**

No. 1222-S

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, May 31, 1918.*

AGWAR, WASHINGTON

[Extract]

\* \* \* \* \*

4. For Chief of Staff. In order to enable us to be adequately prepared to receive and assign to stations the rapidly increasing number of arriving troops, it is requested that you cable as of 12 noon each Wednesday complete data as to troops shipped during week ending that date and a program of intended troop shipments for at least three weeks in advance of that date. The data for preceding week should give with reference each ship, name of ship, designation each organization, item numbers, priority schedule designations, and number officers and men in each arm or staff corps. The data for intended shipments should include above without designation of ships or subdivision into ship cargoes. This Wednesday cable will cancel request for Saturday cable contained in paragraph 1 our cablegram 751. Pershing.

5. For Chief of Staff. With reference to paragraph 1 B your cablegram 1247 [May 5, 1918] and paragraph 3 our cablegram 1089. In order to comply with your request that in making our monthly requisition for replacements we do not include replacements requested in the preceding month, it is requested that you give an item number and letter to each shipment of personnel as noted in paragraph 1 our cablegram 751 and paragraph 3 B our Cablegram 946. Our request as to use of item numbers and letters has been complied with only in part. See paragraph 1 B your cablegram 1247. When item numbers and letters are not designated from here, request you designate same in accordance with scheme to be adopted by you, informing us of same. It will add greatly to efficiency of handling arriving personnel at our base ports if you can give item numbers and letters to each isolated individual or separate group of personnel shipped from United States. The personnel where not a part of authorized organizations should be formed into provisional organizations, each composed of soldiers of one arm or staff corps and in no case mixed unless imperatively necessary to do so. Each isolated individual or group of personnel not a part of a division or other large organization should have a proper item number and letter and an order stating for what purpose sent to France, so that upon arrival this information could at once be furnished our representative at Base Port and no delay caused in endeavoring to find out for what service the individuals or units were intended. Both individuals and groups of personnel have arrived without item number, orders or other source of information telling why they were sent abroad. It is requested that a routine system be instituted, if not already in operation, and a careful check be made before each troop ship sails. Pershing.

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***Reinforcement of the French Front by British and Americans***

[Editorial Translation]

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,  
FRENCH ARMIES OF THE NORTH AND NORTHEAST.

Telephone Conversation at 10:45 a. m., May 31, 1918, between General Weygand and Colonel Dufieux. (Extracted from the order register of the 3d Section, General Staff, French General Headquarters.)

Colonel Dufieux: It is a hard fight and is eating up men. Our means are limited because of the heavy burdens north of the Oise and especially north of the Somme. Very soon we will find it impossible to go on with the rotation of reliefs of the divisions because the first divisions withdrawn from the front are so cut up and weakened that they will be unable to take over a sector immediately. The time has come when we have to do something in a big way.

General Weygand: What do you intend to do then?

Colonel Dufieux: We need something to relieve divisions in the east at the earliest practicable moment. All I can see is the American divisions of the British zone. We shall throw them into the trenches in the Vosges and Lorraine. The men are good with a rifle, they will fight well and anyhow they will have nothing in front of them but Landwehr.

General Weygand: But it will be very hard to get them; moreover the questions of attachment to French units, armament, supply will have to be settled; it will take a long time. What are you going to do in the meantime?

Colonel Dufieux: It is up to you to get these divisions quickly; we will settle the less important questions. General de Barescut [Deputy Chief of Staff to General Petain] who is with me agrees with me entirely. With the Tenth Army and with the Americans we shall manage in the present battle and in the east.

But that isn't all. The Group of Armies of the Reserve is very depleted and there are indications of an attack on its front. Its reserves have castled toward the Oise, toward the battle, its left and its center are weak; they have to be supported. What are you waiting for before sending us British reserves?

General Weygand: It is impossible. The current battle has not absorbed a single reserve of the Bavarian Crown Prince; we cannot invite the British to strip themselves for our benefit.

Colonel Dufieux: Indications point to the arrival of 6 divisions of the Bavarian Crown Prince toward the Aisne. Moreover an attack south of the Somme would be far more dangerous than in the north. Look at the map. You will have to bring British reserves down to the Somme as soon as possible and give us the Americans at once. It is urgent.

General Weygand: I do not agree with you about the British reserves. About the Americans I will see, but it will not be easy.

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P-Conf. Cables: 1001-1400

***Cantigny Affair Emphasizes Importance of Organizing our Own Divisions and Higher Units***

No. 1223-S

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, June 1, 1918.*

The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

Personal and confidential for Chief of Staff and Secretary of War

While relatively small, the affair at Cantigny on the 28th was well planned and splendidly executed. The 28th Infantry under Colonel Hanson Ely made the attack supported by our artillery and several additional batteries of heavy guns specially sent to the sector for the purpose. Our infantry reached its objective in schedule time and immediately organized its new position. It was important in this first attack that we should succeed and that we should hold our ground, especially as the French had previously taken Cantigny twice and had each time been driven out by the Germans. Under my personal direction additional troops of the 18th and 26th were at once brought up to support the line. Five strong counterattacks were made by the Germans all of which were dissipated, leaving prisoners in our hands. Our staff work was excellent and the liaison perfect. Twenty minutes after the new position was reached the information was at divisional headquarters; soon thereafter telephone communication was established and maintained. The Allies are high in praise of our troops. This action illustrates the facility with which our officers and men learn, and emphasizes the importance of organizing our own divisions and higher units as soon as circumstances permit. It is my firm conviction that our troops are the best in Europe and our staffs are the equals of any.

PERSHING.

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Cable: P-1228-S

***Strength of American Forces in Europe on May 31***

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, June 1, 1918.*

Adjutant General, Washington

For the Chief of Staff

Reference your paragraph 2 cablegram 1276 [May 9, 1918], status May 31 total A. E. F. in American area, 489,117; in British area 115,407; in England 23,149. There are included in the above 12,762 in the American areas ultimately for the British which have not moved up to the British areas, and 3,300 in England ultimately for the British area in France which have not moved over to France included in total in England.

PERSHING.

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***Allied Armies in Defensive Battle***

HEADQUARTERS, ALLIED ARMIES,  
*Mouchy-le-Chatel, Oise, June 1, 1918.*

GENERAL-in-CHIEF

COMMANDING THE ALLIED ARMIES

MEMORANDUM

I. The Allied armies are engaged in a defensive battle with forces inferior to those of the enemy.

They can only obtain a successful issue by the intervention of their reserves which must therefore be kept as large as possible.

On March 21, the situation of both armies was the following:

ALLIES		ENEMY
American	4 *	
Belgian	12	
British	57	
French	99	
Portugese	2	
TOTAL	174	195

\* Divisions with full strength

that is an inferiority of 21 divisions on the side of the Allies.

On May 30, the situation was modified as follows:

ALLIES		ENEMY
American	4 *	
Belgian	12	
British	53 **	
French	103 ***	
Italian	2	
TOTAL	174	207

\* Divisions up to strength to which the infantry of 3 divisions should be added.

\*\* Plus 4 (2 from Italy, 2 from the east) - 8 broken up.

\*\*\* Plus 4 from Italy.

that is an inferiority of 33 divisions on the Allied side.

This inferiority is made worse by the fact that the 12 Belgian divisions, whose action is limited to their own front, and in spite of the extension of this front as far as Ypres, are only opposed by 7 German divisions, which fact amounts to this: Viz, 162 Allied divisions are opposed to 200 German divisions, thus giving the enemy the advantage, to the extent of 38 divisions. On the other hand the increasing development of the battle, the extension of the fronts of attack, compel the Allies to engage on these fronts and there-

fore to keep there, an ever increasing number of units, with the result that there is a corresponding decrease of units in reserve.

The grave danger which threatens the Allies today is to see this number of units being reduced to such an extent that it may be impossible to keep sufficient reserves to meet fresh attacks which are sure to take place.

Also to maintain the necessary strength to feed the battle and insure the relief of tired units.

It is therefore of vital importance, that at all costs, the total number of French and British divisions should be maintained and that the whole of the Allied forces should be progressively and rapidly increased by the entry into the line of American forces.

II. The measures taken or to be taken in order to achieve these results are considered below:

1. As regards the French Army: France in spite of her shortage in manpower has done everything in her power to avoid any reduction in the number of her divisions.

The measures taken are summed up.

(a) Breaking up of battalions or regiments in excess of the normal number of battalions or regiments which standard units consist of, whether this number is attained by means of French units or Allied ones. \* \* \*

(b) Delay in making up to strength units which have been engaged so as to keep a sufficient margin, in order that the return to their units of the slightly wounded, evacuated in the army zone, shall not create any surplus of strength in some formations.

(c) Utilization of creole and colonial natives to replace French effectives of the same importance, not as drafts.

The measures in (a), (b), (c) are taken not successively but simultaneously, so as not to be reduced at a given moment to break up units, in order to make others up to strength, or to stop the creation of new artillery formations with a view of keeping up the effective of artillery units in existence.

(d) Increasing manpower by:

The intensive training of class 1919.

Combing out of men employed in factories on national work.

These measures, of which some may be called expedients, will enable France to keep all her divisions, provided that the total casualties of the French army from May 1 to October 1 do not amount to more than 500,000.

But one realizes what the cost is!

2. As regards the British army.

As early as the end of January 1918, the attention of the Supreme War Council was drawn, in a pressing manner, to the insufficiency of manpower obtained by British recruiting in order to keep up the British armies in France.

At the same session of the Supreme War Council, the Field Marshal, Commander-in-Chief of the British armies, stated that if he had to meet an important offensive, he would have to consider the breaking up of 30 of his divisions, owing to shortage in effectives.

In fact, before March 21, no measures had been taken to increase these effectives, with the result that in the month of April, Marshal Haig had to break up successively 9 divisions.

On May 14, the attention of the marshal was called by General Foch on the necessity of reconstituting these units. The field marshal agreed and applied to the war office for drafts to be sent especially for the purpose.

The chief of the imperial staff gave hopes for the sending of the following drafts: 4,000 to 5,000 men belonging to Class A, 15,000 men belonging to Class B and 50,000 men of classes not stated.

In fact, from May 1 to 31, there arrived in France only 28,000 men [the number provided normally] of Class A and 7,000 men of Class B. Only one of the 9 divisions which were to be broken up was kept up. None of the other 8 were reconstituted.

What is more, owing to heavy losses sustained by units of the British IX Corps on the Aisne, the British General Staff contemplates breaking up 2 other divisions, which would mean the suppression of 10 divisions.

So that, at the moment of a decisive effort, on the part of the enemy, the strength of the British army is decreasing day by day. It even decreases more rapidly than that of the American army increases. (The entry of the American army into the line can only be made progressively.) The result is a decrease in the total strength of the Allies.

This consequence is exceptionally grave; it may mean the loss of the war. The most drastic and quickest measures must be taken in order to avert this danger which has been pointed out for some considerable time. That is to say: British effectives must be supplied without delay, either by the home country or by armies operating in distant countries, in order to make up the total number of British divisions.

3. As regards the American army.

The program of American arrivals in France for the month of June was decided at Abbeville on May 2.

It includes, as that of May, the transportation by priority of 120,000 men (infantry strength of 6 divisions).

When this program is carried out, there will be 24 divisions landed in France (totally of infantry only).

The program of transportation for July is not yet decided on.

Circumstances which demanded for May and June the arrival of infantry before anything else, still demand today and more imperiously than ever, that during the month of July, infantry should be sent first and that the strength of this infantry should be increased from 120,000 to 200,000 men; that is the infantry of 10 new divisions.

A similar program is contemplated for the month of August.

But, after having fulfilled the immediate requirements of the coalition, one must consider further.

As soon as the program for July is carried out, 34 divisions will be in France, that is to say almost the total number of divisions for the formation of which provisions have been made by the American Government (42?).

The United States, who, when they joined the war, expressed their will to obtain the victory and who have already shown, by the results obtained in May (184,000 men transported or on the way) their energy in the realization of this main idea, the United States cannot limit their efforts to this program.

They must now consider a greater effort in order to pursue a war which will last a long time. For this object, they must contemplate a progressive increase of their army up to 100 divisions, and achieve this result by using their available shipping.

If they do so, then we can expect to turn the scales in our favour as regards the strength of the opposing armies and thus insure victory for the Allies.

Under these circumstances, the Supreme War Council is asked to decide:

1. The total number of French divisions which will be maintained in accordance with means provided for.

2. The total number of British divisions which will be made up again without any delay, by means of resources drawn from the home country and from armies fighting on fronts out of France; these divisions will be kept up to strength, by means of resources obtained through the carrying into effect of the new law.

3. To ask the United States:

(a) For transportation over to France, during July with priority of transport of the infantry of 10 more divisions (200,000 infantry men or machine gunners).

A similar program must be considered for August.

(b) To undertake, at once, the increasing of their army up to 100 divisions, the transportation of which will be carried on without a stop so as to utilize

all available tonnage; the training of these troops will be intensified in France as well as in United States.

F. FOCH,  
The General Commander-in-Chief  
of the Allied Armies.

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HS, Secret Documents: Fldr. F-1: Notes

***Conference on Transportation of American Troops***

*VERSAILLES, SEINE-et-OISE, June 2, 1918.*

Present: General Pershing  
General McAndrew  
Colonel Fox Conner  
Colonel Boyd

French: M. Clemenceau  
General Foch  
General Weygand  
General le Rond

British: Mr. Lloyd George  
Lord Milner  
General Wilson  
Lieut. Colonel Hankey

Italian: Mr. Orlando  
Mr. Sonnino

Mr. Lloyd George stated that a recommendation must be made to Mr. Wilson for bringing over large numbers of American troops.

General Pershing stated that large numbers of trained troops are not available in America, the present supply being almost exhausted.

M. Clemenceau called attention to the advantage of training in France.

General Foch insisted on transporting the largest possible number of troops, trained or untrained.

General Pershing stated that sufficient importance had not been attached to the statement of the situation which he had made the day before.

M. Clemenceau stated that he was astonished to learn that American was short of trained men; that it was only this morning that he learned that America was short of trained men; that the Abbeville Agreement was made under the assumption that no such difficulty would arise.

General Pershing stated that if we ship in June 200,000 men we would have in July only about 50,000 trained men from which the War Department would have to choose such as would be necessary for instructing the new drafts. He stated that if the month of July were devoted to the general necessities in completing the units already sent over we would commence in August the transportation of infantry which would have had by then two months' instruction.

General Foch insisted that we carry out for July a program as nearly as possible the same as that for June.

Mr. Lloyd George stated that he believed that General Pershing would see that his (General Pershing's) position is appreciated in the proposition which he (Mr. Lloyd George) proposed to make. He recommended that General Foch and General Pershing send a telegram to the United States Government recommending a shipping program for the month of July and that the Prime Ministers send also a cablegram giving a statement of the situation and stating that we are facing disaster if prompt measures are not taken. He then proposed that General Pershing and General Foch send a telegram recommending that, in July, 170,000 American troops be sent over and that this number be increased to 200,000, if possible.



General Foch stated that he would accept this proposition and that it would enable General Pershing to bring over a large proportion of the extra troops.

General Pershing pointed out that this would not permit of shipping the extra troops which he needs and that he could not see the advantage of sending over troops which cannot be used for at least two months, when we have urgent present need of other troops for the S. O. S.

Lord Milner made the statement that we form a coalition and must make concessions; that General Foch says the training will be more rapidly pushed in France, and, therefore, it would be well to consider his recommendation for sending untrained troops from America.

General Pershing stated that he could not concede that this point was a small one; that the needs of extra troops for the expeditionary forces are becoming very urgent, and he called attention again to his remarks about the urgent need for such troops, whereas untrained troops, if sent over in July, could be of no help for more than two months.

Lord Milner pointed out that the proposition as proposed would allow a considerable number of extra troops for the American commander which would afford considerable relief to his need for such troops.

M. Clemenceau pressed General Pershing to know whether he would agree or not to this proposition.

General Pershing stated that he would agree with modifications.

General Foch insisted on agreeing to the proposition as proposed by Mr. Lloyd George.

General Pershing stated that he did not believe that the French and British Governments are prepared to supply these troops. With the facilities which they have on hand we are obliged to look to our own supply departments. That now, our troops with the British are not receiving all of the supplies necessary; that the French railroads are breaking down, and, without some improvements, are not capable of handling the number of men which it is proposed to send. He urgently requested postponing of shipping of untrained infantry until August and the transportation in July of troops necessary for preparing to receive troops that are to follow in August. By this method we are only postponing the shipment of untrained infantry for one month and we prepare ourselves to receive them on their arrival.

M. Clemenceau stated that General Foch agreed to Mr. Lloyd George's proposition and General Pershing does not, and asked if this was correct.

General Pershing stated that he thought it would be well to have an intermission to consider the proposition.

Mr. Lloyd George stated that he believed it would be possible to find more tonnage.

Mr. Lloyd George presented a proposition which he stated was destined to make for a more rapid use of American divisions now in France. He stated that only people who are on the ground with the troops are capable of judging their degree of training. He then read a paper in which he suggested that General Pershing agree to allowing the commander of the British troops with whom Americans are serving to determine when the American troops had had sufficient training to place them in the line and to leave the power of saying when they should go into the line in the hands of the British Commander-in-Chief.

General Pershing stated that he could not give up his prerogatives; that he had responsibilities toward his own troops which he could not, if he wished, renounce; that he did not consider that he had ever taken an attitude which justified anyone bringing up in a meeting like this such a proposition, especially without having said anything to him about it beforehand; that it was with great regret that he found himself obliged to disagree so strongly with the proposition presented by the Prime Minister but that he felt duty-bound to do so in the strongest terms. That, furthermore, this proposition is not practical since the Americans themselves know more than anyone else about their own training.

Mr. Lloyd George stated that he thought Sir Douglas Haig did the training.

General Pershing stated that this was not the case; that the training is done by the Americans - that the British stand by and assist; and that he wishes it understood that he

was ready to do all possible, but that he could not agree to a proposition which would relieve him of his responsibility in this matter.

M. Clemenceau asked what resolution General Pershing proposed in this respect.

General Pershing stated that it was not a question of a resolution; that when any American troops are needed for service, an intimation from General Foch was sufficient; it is a question to be decided with General Foch, whom he considers his superior officer.

(General Foch made a short remark which was not intelligible.)

General Foch then read his proposition recommending that the American Government prepare to raise an army of 100 divisions. Then followed a long discussion between the French and the English as to the number of divisions which the British proposed to keep in France, General Foch stating that the Allies have 150 divisions with which to oppose 204 German divisions on the western front.

Lord Milner stated he should like to know the authority for the statement that the Allies have 150 divisions; that yesterday this figure was presented as 160 and that he had heard it variously estimated.

General Foch went on stating that we must retain the present number of British divisions, or face failure.

Lord Milner stated that General Foch himself had stated yesterday that on the French front are 101 French divisions, two Italian and four American, making 107; 11 Belgian, making 118, and 51 English, making 169.

General Foch asked how many divisions the British proposed to maintain and when they will be established on that basis.

General Wilson stated that they have no guarantee that the British will have no more losses; that he hopes to maintain 47 divisions, of which ten should be American.

Lord Milner did not agree with these figures.

General Wilson went on stating that when the recruits come, probably in August, they will be able to raise a certain number of divisions.

General Foch asked what use they expect to make of the Americans and if they expected that America would be willing to give them her troops until August.

General Pershing stated that according to the plan the American troops are to go with the British for training, with the understanding that they accompany the troops with which they are training when necessary, and that it is understood by Marshal Haig and by Lord Milner that by July or August the Americans would be replaced by English drafts.

General Foch remarked that the British count on the Americans until August or September and that the Americans count leaving the British in July or August. He then asked what would happen. General Foch had several times previously remarked on the extreme gravity of the situation, the inferiority of our troops and the constant wear and tear on the Allied armies.

Mr. Lloyd George stated that he was sorry that this discussion had come up. He asked if we would not be killing Germans in the meantime; that he had formerly been told that the Germans had 400,000 men available in depots; that he is now told that they have 300,000. He asked why we should expect that the Germans could keep up 204 divisions when we, who have more reserves and men than they, must reduce our number of divisions.

Lord Milner stated that most of the figures of this discussion had been given in absolute error and that it was useless to take up time in such discussion; that he was sorry that the British had not gotten together before the meeting and agreed on their own figures. He made some remark about having had nothing but erroneous figures since the statement placing the Allied resources at 150 divisions.

General Foch stated that he abandoned his figure of 150; that Lord Milner was correct and that he was not wrong, as, according to reports, the British will have 10 divisions to reconstitute and he wished to know when this will be done.

Lord Milner stated that he could not say as to this until the figures are available, but as to the 10 divisions just mentioned, he was glad at least to admit that a figure had been presented, the accuracy of which he could admit.

General Foch stated that if the number of British divisions is not maintained, we will fail.

Lord Milner said that he thought the number of divisions could be maintained.

M. Clemenceau stated that the dates given by Lord Milner and General Pershing were not far apart - General Pershing expects that the American troops will be withdrawn from the British in July or August, and Lord Milner expects recruits in August or September; that this indicates the hope that they might come to an understanding.

Mr. Lloyd George thought that one of the most important questions is that of the utilization of American divisions which are to be shipped to France.

General Foch made some remark about the number of divisions going down; that very soon there will be only 37 British divisions.

Mr. Lloyd George asked if General Foch could explain to the average mind why the number of Allied divisions should become relatively inferior to those of the Germans, when the Allies have in their depots more men from which to draw than the Germans have in theirs; why General Foch assumes that the German divisions will be kept up to 204 with 300,000 men in their depots?

General Foch stated that this was because they managed better; that the Germans maintained 204 divisions with a population of 68 million; that the British with 46 million cannot maintain 53 divisions; and remarked again that we will fail if our number is reduced.

Discussion continued on this line for some time.

Lord Milner then stated that he wished to enter a formal protest against all figures given in this discussion.

It was finally agreed that Lord Milner, General Foch, and General Pershing should recommend a shipping program for the month of July and that the Prime Ministers should send simultaneously a cablegram to President Wilson giving their estimate of the situation.

Lord Milner, General Foch and General Pershing after some discussion drew up the Versailles Agreement of June 3, prescribing that in June at least 170,000 infantry and machine-gun units should be shipped over and that absolute priority to 140,000 similar troops should be given for the month of July.

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SWC: Gen. File 6th Session: Resolution

### ***American Cooperation***

SUPREME WAR COUNCIL,  
*Versailles, Seine-et-Oise, June 2, 1918--4:45 p. m.*

#### SUPREME WAR COUNCIL

[Extract]

\* \* \* \* \*

Minutes of the Second Meeting of the Sixth Session of the Supreme War Council, Held at the Trianon Palace, Versailles, on Sunday, June 2, 1918 at 4:45 p.m.

PRESENT:

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau, President of the Council, Minister of War (in the Chair)

M. Stephen Pichon, Minister of Foreign Affairs.

## GREAT BRITAIN

The Right Hon. D. Lloyd George, Prime Minister.  
The Right Hon. The Viscount Milner, Secretary of State for War.  
The Right Hon. A. J. Balfour, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

## ITALY

His Excellency Signor Orlando, Prime Minister.  
His Excellency Baron Sonnino, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

## UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Mr. A. H. Frazier, First Secretary, Embassy of the United States of America, Paris.

The following also attended:

## FRANCE

M. Georges Leygues, Minister of Marine.  
General Foch, General-in-Chief, Allied Armies on the Western Front.  
Admiral de Bon.  
General Belin, Permanent Military Representative.  
General Weygand.  
General Mordacq.  
Commandant Lacombe.

## GREAT BRITAIN

Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, Commander-in-Chief, British Armies in France.  
General Sir H. H. Wilson, Chief of the Imperial General Staff.  
Lieut. General Hon. Sir H. A. Lawrence, Chief of Staff, British Armies in France.  
The Right Hon. Sir Eric Geddes, First Lord of the Admiralty.  
Admiral Sir R. E. Wemyss, First Sea Lord and Chief of the Naval Staff.  
Lieut. Col. Sir Maurice Hankey, Secretary of the War Cabinet.  
Major Gen. Hon. C. J. Sackville-West, Permanent Military Representative.  
Brigadier General H. W. Studd.

## ITALY

His Excellency Gen. di Robilant, Permanent Military Representative.  
Admiral Thaon di Revel.  
Rear Admiral Grassi.  
Colonel Businelli  
Capitaine di Corvetta Ruspoli.  
Capitaine di Corvetta Barengi.  
Count Aldrovandi.

## UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

General Tasker H. Bliss, Permanent Military Representative.  
General J. J. Pershing, Commander-in-Chief, A. E. F.  
Major General James W. McAndrew.  
Brigadier General P. D. Lochridge.  
Colonel Fox Conner.

SECRETARIAT:

FRANCE

Captain Portier.

GREAT BRITAIN

Major A. M. Caccia, M. V. O.

ITALY

Captain A. Jones

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Colonel U. S. Grant.

INTERPRETER:

Professor P. J. Mantoux.

\* \* \* \* \*

AMERICAN COOPERATION

Lord Milner explained that the object of American cooperation had been discussed during the past two days between the British and French Governments and their Military Advisors, General Foch and General Pershing, and finally with the representatives of the Italian Government, with the result that the following resolution had been agreed to. It would be noticed that the last paragraph of the resolution referred to a separate telegram containing the arrangement which General Foch, General Pershing, and Lord Milner had agreed to recommend to the United States Government, and this was appended to the resolution.

The Supreme War Council then approved the following:  
Resolution in regard to American cooperation.

The Prime Ministers of France, Italy, and Great Britain, now meeting in Versailles, desire to send the following message to the President of the United States:

We desire to express our warmest thanks to President Wilson for the remarkable promptness with which American aid, in excess of what at one time seemed practicable, has been rendered to the Allies during the past month to meet a great emergency. The crisis, however, still continues. General Foch has presented to us a statement of the utmost gravity, which points out that the numerical superiority of the enemy in France, where 162 Allied divisions are now opposed to 200 German divisions, is very heavy, and that, as there is no possibility of the British and French increasing the number of their divisions (on the contrary, they are put to extreme straits to keep them up), there is a great danger of the war being lost unless the numerical inferiority of the Allies can be remedied as rapidly as possible by the advent of American troops. He therefore urges with the utmost insistence that the maximum possible number of infantry and machine gunners, in which respects the shortage of men on the side of the Allies is most marked, should continue to be shipped from America in the months of June and July to avert the immediate danger of an Allied defeat in the present campaign, owing to the Allied reserves being exhausted before

those of the enemy. In addition to this, and looking to the future, he represents that it is impossible to foresee ultimate victory in the war unless America is able to provide such an army as will enable the Allies ultimately to establish numerical superiority. He places the total American force required for this at no less than 100 divisions, and urges the continuous raising of fresh American levies, which, in his opinion, should not be less than 300,000 a month, with a view to establishing a total American force of 100 divisions at as early a date as this can possibly be done.

We are satisfied that General Foch, who is conducting the present campaign with consummate ability, and on whose military judgment we continue to place the most absolute reliance, is not over-estimating the needs of the case, and we feel confident that the Government of the United States will do everything that can be done, both to meet the needs of the immediate situation and to proceed with the continuous raising of fresh levies, calculated to provide, as soon as possible, the numerical superiority which the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied armies regards as essential to ultimate victory.

A separate telegram contains the arrangement which General Foch, General Pershing, and Lord Milner, have agreed to recommend to the United States Government with regard to the despatch of American troops for the months of June and July.

G. CLEMENCEAU,  
D. LLOYD GEORGE,  
V. E. ORLANDO.

The telegram referred to above is as follows:

An agreement concluded between General Foch, General Pershing, and Lord Milner with reference to the transportation of American troops in the months of June and July.

The following recommendations are made on the assumption that at least 250,000 men can be transported in each of the months of June and July by the employment of combined British and American tonnage.

We recommend:

(a) For the month of June:

1st. Absolute priority shall be given to the transportation of 170,000 combatant troops (viz: Six divisions without artillery, ammunition trains or supply trains, amounting to 126,000 men and 44,000 replacements for combat troops).

2d. 25,400 men for the service of the railways, of which 13,400 have been asked for by the French Minister of Transportation.

3d. The balance to be troops of categories to be determined by the Commander-in-Chief, American Expeditionary Forces.

(b) For the month of July:

1st. Absolute priority for the shipment of 140,000 combatant troops of the nature defined above (4 divisions minus artillery, etc., amounting to 84,000 men, plus 56,000 replacements).

2d. The balance of the 250,000 to consist of troops to be designated by the Commander-in-Chief, American Expeditionary Forces.

(c) It is agreed that if the available tonnage in either month allows of the transportation of a larger number of men than 250,000, the excess tonnage will be employed in the transportation of combat troops as defined above.

(d) We recognize that the combatant troops to be despatched in July may have to include troops which have had insufficient training but we consider the present emergency is such as to justify a temporary and exceptional departure by the United States from

sound principles of training, especially as a similar course is being followed by France and Great Britain.

(The meeting adjourned at 7 p. m. to 3 p. m. the following day.)

\* \* \* \* \*

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G-3, GHQ, AEF; Fldr. 1305: Cablegram

***Order in which Reinforcements to be Sent from America Should Come***

*VERSAILLES, SEINE-et-OISE, June 2, 1918.*

Following message for the President of the United States from General Foch and Pershing, and Lord Milner.

Begins:

We recommend that the reinforcements to be sent from America in the immediate future should come in the following order:

During the month of June infantry and machine gunners should have absolute priority to the number of 170,000, and this should, if possible, be increased to 200,000.

During the month of July the same arrangement should hold good as far as possible. Inasmuch as this would exhaust all the infantry and machine gunners recruited before May, the numbers of men of these classes should, if possible, be made up to the figure contemplated by sending some of the May levies. It is recognized that it is undesirable in principle to send out men having so short a period of training at home, but we consider that the present emergency is such as to justify a temporary and exceptional departure from this principle, and under the circumstances the training of the men so sent can be completed with equal rapidity on this side.

In making this recommendation we base ourselves upon the assumption that combined American and British tonnage will render possible the shipment of at least 250,000 in each of the months of June and July, so that even if a maximum of 170,000 infantry and machine gunners each month were attained, at least 160,000 men of the categories required by General Pershing can be sent over during June and July. Indeed it is anticipated that the number will be even more considerable.

We agree that this arrangement should now be adopted in substitution for that made at Abbeville at the beginning of May.

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***Movement of American Divisions***

[Contemporary Translation]

HEADQUARTERS, ALLIED ARMIES,  
*June 2, 1918.*

The Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies

To: Commander-in-Chief of the American army  
Commander-in-Chief of the British armies  
Commander-in-Chief of the French armies

In order to assist in the relief on calm fronts of French troops which must go into battle, I have decided, with the consent of the Commander-in-Chief of the American army, that a certain number of American divisions at present in training in the British army will be transported to the French front and placed temporarily at the disposal of the Commander-in-Chief of the French armies.

The questions concerning the designation of the divisions capable of being transported, the dates of their transportation, their armament, their equipment, their supply, etc., will be regulated at a conference which will take place at French G. H. Q. on June 3 at 17 h., to which the Commanders-in-Chief are requested to send an officer of their staff who will have power to settle such questions on the spot.

F. FOCH.

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Cable: A-1447-R

***Use to be Made of Colored Troops***

A. G. O., WAR DEPARTMENT,  
*Washington, D. C., June 3, 1918.*

PERSHING, AMEXFORCE, FRANCE

The question of the best use to make of the large number of Negroes being received from the draft is under consideration. It is proposed to use these for labor and service battalions, pioneer infantry regiments, and to form the remainder into regiments of infantry. The French say they can train and use all colored regiments of infantry we can supply. It is proposed to replace the white pioneer infantry regiments that will be sent you by colored regiments as soon as they are ready and to use the white regiments so replaced informing new divisions. Colored pioneer infantry regiments also to be used for your Second Army. Your recommendations desired. March.

McCAIN.

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**Advanced General Headquarters at Gremevillers**

ADVANCED GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
Gremevillers, Oise, June 3, 1918.

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL CONNER

[Extract]

1. We arrived here Wednesday morning early and at once began to get our office into shape. The general was absent for the following two days but he reached here Thursday evening, leaving early Friday morning. He told us that he desired to have at his disposal here all information that he might be able to obtain at Chaumont relative to the Allied and enemy order of battle and such other information that might enable him to make plans for the troops in this area.

2. The office is organized and we are waiting for the motor dispatch service from Chaumont in order that we may be kept fully apprised of what is transpiring.

3. Liaison: The following liaison has been established.

(a) Telephonic and telegraphic communication have been established with:	
Chaumont	Colonel Mott (at General Foch's Headquarters)
Fruges	Headquarters of 1st Division
Montreuil	

(b) Motor Dispatch Service: Headquarters 1st Division. It is desirable that M. D. S. be established with British G. H. Q. This will suffice to bring over any reports that Colonel Simonds may have because he has a service from Fruges to Montreuil.

4. We have heard rumors that this Advanced P. C. is not to be kept. Do you know anything about this? I am going ahead, however, just the same and will have everything, as far as possible, ready for the general in case he desires it. I have not yet submitted any reports because I have nothing of any importance to send you. Once or twice I have telephoned Captain A. S. Kuegle [Secretary G. H. Q. at Chaumont] giving him what little information I have been able to obtain.

5. Colonel Mott has moved with the French Advanced P. C. to Mouchy-le-Chatel. I have seen Colonel Mott and hope to get some help from him regarding the Allied forces.

6. We are very comfortably located here in an old chateau \* \* \*

7. Our organization is lacking in suppleness. \* \* \* We have here sixteen men and a few signal corps men whose orders read that they shall be paid commutation of rations, but no provisions is made for the payment. The officers here have been paying for their food for the last week, and while there is, of course, no objection on our part to doing this for awhile, still it is improper staff work and administration which should be corrected. \* \* \*

8. I saw General Vandenberg of the X Corps a few days ago and he was very enthusiastic regarding the attack made by the 1st Division. His operations officers also told me that from point of view of an operation the Cantigny affair was perfect.

With kind regards.

R. C. RICHARDSON, Jr.  
Major, General Staff.

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### ***Transfer of American Divisions***

[Contemporary Translation]

No. 5361/OW

FRENCH GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,  
*June 3, 1918.*

#### REPORT OF CONFERENCE OF JUNE 3, 1918 (EXECUTION OF THE DECISION OF THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE ALLIED ARMIES)

Transport to the east of U. S. divisions now in the British zone.

1. Situation of American units attached to the British army.

a. Complete divisions (at least in infantry) actually in the British zone: 77th, 35th, 28th, 4th, 82d.

b. Divisions entirely debarked in France and in England and which are being assembled in the British zone: 30th, 27th, 33d.

c. Divisions now at sea: 80th and 78th.

2. Designation of American units to be transported to the east. Order of transport according to the possibilities of transport. Movements by road.

It is decided that the 77th, 35th, 4th, and 28th Infantry Divisions may be taken now. The 35th and 77th will be transported first. The 35th will proceed to the zone of NEUFCHATEL so as to be ready to embark at the railroad stations of NEUFCHATEL, CRITOT, BUCHY, MORGNY beginning on the evening of June 8.

The 77th will proceed by marching as soon as possible towards the zone of GOURNAY-GISORS where it will be entrained.

The 4th and 28th Divisions will be directed as soon as possible towards the region of AUMAËLE, from which they may be embarked either in the zone of NEUFCHATEL or in the zone of GISORS.

The 82d Division may be taken in about two weeks. For the other divisions General Pershing requests some delay for their assembly and instruction. He will put them at the disposition of the French command when General Foch gives the order therefor.

3. Conditions under which the American units will be transported.

Armament, equipment, wagons and teams.

The American divisions will be transported without the British cadres. The American infantry will receive its own rifles (Springfield) before entraining and will turn in the English rifles.

The British and American General Headquarters will give the necessary orders to assure the transportation of American arms which are now in CALAIS, BOULOGNE, and Le HAVRE, and their distribution to the troops which are about to leave.

The American troops will receive after detraining in the east, French machine guns, Chauchat rifles, and 37-mm. guns.

The English machine guns will be turned in before entraining.

The English will leave with the troops of the 10 divisions their battalion supply wagons and the horses of the machine gun companies.

The completion of the units in horses, wagons and machine-gun carts will be taken care of first with the American resources and afterwards if necessary from French resources.

For the journey, rations for the voyage and for use immediately after detraining will be furnished by the English army.

The American divisions will be given ambulance units (as far as possible from the American Sanitary Section Units) by the French army.

4. Supplies: Supplies will be assured under the same conditions as for the other U. S. divisions in the French zone.

The French will assure the supply of the divisions after they have detrained during the first few days.

The 77th and 35th Divisions will be given motor supply trains by the American command.

The supply of the other divisions will be assured if necessary, in awaiting the arrival of American motor supply trains, by the local French command.

5. American units in the course of debarking or to be debarked and destined for the divisions to be transported.

The necessary orders will be given by the American headquarters and the British headquarters to direct the elements which have debarked as soon as they have debarked, to their divisions which will have them transported by rail.

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#### OFFICERS PRESENT AT THE CONFERENCE

##### *British Army*

Brigadier Gen. Bonham Carter  
Brigadier Gen. Lyon

##### *French Army*

Colonel Dutilleul  
Lt. Col. Delalin  
Lt. Col. Rozet

##### *American Army*

Colonel Fox Conner  
Lt. Colonel Drum

NOTE: The 35th Division has as its destination GERARDMER, French XXXIII Army Corps (General Le Comte).

The 77th Division will have as its destination the region of LUNEVILLE (General Duport), where it will be placed in the vicinity of the 42d Division.

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Cable: P-1235-S

#### ***Military Situation and Desires of Supreme War Council for Infantry Only***

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, June 3, 1918.*

THE ADJUTANT GENERAL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF AND SECRETARY OF WAR

1. Consider military situation very grave. The French line gave way before what was thought to be a secondary attack and the 8 divisions that occupied that front have lost practically all their materiel and a large percentage of their personnel, although actual numbers of men and guns are yet unknown. The German advance seems to be stopped for the time being. The railroads in the area they have taken are not available for their use principally because of the destruction of the tunnel at Vauxaillon. As already reported, the infantry of our 3d Division is being used in Lorraine and the 5th along the Marne. Our 2d Division entire is fighting north of Chateau-Thierry and has done exceedingly well. It is General Foch's plan to take the divisions from behind the British lines as needed and use them with French artillery in Lorraine to replace French divisions for the battle.

2. The attitude of the Supreme War Council which has been in session since Saturday is one of depression. The Prime Ministers and General Foch appeal most urgently for trained or even untrained men, and notwithstanding my representations that the number of trained infantry in America would be practically exhausted by the middle of July, they still insisted on a program of infantry personnel. The agreement entered into however was not entirely satisfactory as to July, but instead of sending raw infantry troops it is believed wiser to send more of the classes we need for various services. I hope we shall be able to make heavy shipment of combat personnel in August and succeeding months.

3. The utmost endeavor should be made to keep up a constant flow of personnel to the full capacity of tonnage, and I very strongly urge that divisions be organized as rapidly as possible and be sent over entire after July, and also that auxiliary troops of all kinds be shipped in due proportion. It should be most fully realized at home that the time has come for us to take up the brunt of the war and that France and England are not going to be able to keep their armies at present strength very much longer.

4. I have pointed out to the prime ministers the necessity of both the French and British governments utilizing every possible man at this time, including 1919 drafts who still lack a month or so of completing their training. Attention is invited to general reference to this matter in the agreement which implies that both governments are doing this, but I am not sure however that this is the fact. It might be wise to request the respective ambassadors to urge their governments to put in every available man to meet this crisis and hold on until our forces can be felt.

5. In view of recent losses, the question of divisional artillery is also very serious. It is doubtful now whether the French will be able to supply us with the artillery we require. It is also reported that our program at home is very far behind. I most sincerely hope this is not so, as it is unlikely that France will be able to do more than meet her own requirements from now on. Will advise you more in detail later.

6. The urgent cable sent by the three prime ministers giving General Foch's views as to Allied needs in troops and asking for an increased American program was read to me. I told them that America was fully alive to the necessity of doing everything possible and would do so. I can only add that our program should be laid out systematically and broadly and men called out as fast as they can be handled.

PERSHING.

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GHQ, AEF: Cables 1040-1305

***Priority for 50,000 S. O. S. Troops***

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, June 3, 1918.*

Commanding General, Service of Supply

Prepare list of desired priority for 50,000 Service of Supply troops, excluding 12,000 railroad troops and stevedores already requested and 15,000 requested by the French, but including Service of Supply replacements. In preparing the list each item should appear in order of priority. It is hoped to transport these troops during the months of June and July. List should be prepared as early as possible and sent to headquarters by an officer familiar with all details.

McANDREW.

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***B Unit Sailings in May***

3d Section

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, June 4, 1918.*

MEMORANDUM FOR ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-3

[Extract]

1. In April, B units of following divisions sailed: 3d, 77th.
2. In May, B units of following divisions sailed: 4th, 28th, 35th, 82d (as originally planned by War Department) and also 30th, 5th, 80th, 33d, 78th.
3. Therefore it is seen that the B units have sailed for all divisions now in France (I, II, III Corps) except in the case of the 27th Division, for which no B units have sailed. The B units have not sailed complete, however, in case of the following divisions, 27th not included: 30th, 82d, 5th, 33d, 78th.

A statement in detail as to shortage, B units, for these and for 27th Division, has been given in a separate memorandum and tabulation.

\* \* \* \* \*

S. R. GLEAVES,  
Lt Col., General Staff,  
G-3.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1305: Letter

***Priority Schedule for Service of Supply Troops for June and July***

1st Section, General Staff

SERVICE OF SUPPLY, A. E. F.,  
*Tours, Indre-et-Loire, June 5, 1918.*

From: C. G., S. O. S.

To: C-in-C, A. P. O. 706

[Extract]

1. In compliance with your telegram, dated June 3, the following recommendations are submitted as to the desired priority for 50,000 S. O. S. troops to be shipped during the months of June and July.
2. According to the troop shipment schedule, the prospective number of troops in France August 1, should equal about three and three-fourths phases of the priority schedule. Excluding the troops with the British and French, the troops to be supplied by the A. E. F. appear to amount to about two and three-fourths phases of the priority

schedule. In view of information just received as to prospective withdrawal of certain troops intended for the British, the nearest approximation for present purposes will be assumed as three complete phases of the priority schedule.

3. The number of S. O. S. troops required to complete the first three phases of the priority schedule are, approximately, as follows:

1st Phase	6,230
2d "	54,262
3d "	<u>50,478</u>
Total	110,690

4. The priority schedule has been carefully scanned with a view to omitting every element which can possibly be omitted. These items which are recommended for temporary postponement and of which the detail is shown below are, as follows:

2d Phase	1,387
3d "	<u>2,527</u>
Total	3,914

5. As it is necessary to make still further radical cuts in the priority schedule this must be effected in the item of labor, i. e., Q. M. labor, engineer labor, and pioneer infantry. This shortage of labor will have to be supplied as far as possible from European labor supplemented, when necessary, by the use of combat troops. The total of labor still required for the S. O. S. under the first three phases is, as follows:

1st Phase	4,000
2d "	38,080
3d "	<u>24,080</u>
Total	66,160

The above does not include three regiments of pioneer infantry called for by the priority schedule for the first three corps.

6. If all the labor and other items listed in the two preceding paragraphs are temporarily omitted, there remain of the S. O. S. troops still to come under the priority schedule, the following balances which are considered essential:

1st Phase	2,230
2d "	14,759
3d "	<u>23,871</u>
Total	40,896

Additional troops required, as indicated below	8,300
Available for S. O. S. replacements	804
Total for shipment - June and July	50,000

\* \* \* \* \*

F. J. KERNAN,  
Major General, N. A.,  
Commanding.

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***American Divisions Sent to the Group of Armies of the East***

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff  
No. 5382

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,  
FRENCH ARMIES OF THE NORTH AND NORTHEAST,  
*June 5, 1918.*

MEMORANDUM

For the General Commanding the Group of Armies of the East at Mirecourt  
And the General Chief of the French Military Mission with the American Army at Chaumont.

[Extract]

I. It has been decided that the American infantry divisions located at present in the British zone will be placed at the disposal of the French armies.

I intend to send these divisions to the Group of Armies of the East, where they will go into sector affiliated with tired French divisions coming from the battle front, in order to free French units. \* \* \*

\* \* \* \* \*

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 597: Telegram

***Disposition of American Divisions***

*June 5, 1918.*

From: Sir Douglas Haig

For: General Pershing

I have sent the following message to General Foch:

I am of the opinion that it would be desirable and more expeditious if the five American divisions are left with the British and to release the D. A. N. [Detachments Army of the North] in their place. If you agree with this proposal, I am prepared to commence despatching the divisions of the D. A. N. to the south at once. This proposal will involve less movements on the railways and produce the necessary reserves more rapidly.

If General Foch agrees, it would involve your divisions being put into the line more quickly, but I hope you will agree.

-----

***Proposed Use of American Troops in Aisne Operation***

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff  
No. 6926

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,  
ARMIES OF THE NORTH AND NORTHEAST,  
*June 6, 1918.*

The Commander-in-Chief to General Pershing, Commander-in-Chief of the A. E. F. in France, Chaumont.

General Ragueneau has informed me of your intentions in the matter of the use of American forces in the present battle, and he has transmitted to me your desire to see the American 26th, 42d and 32d Divisions used as soon as possible on the battle front.

First, I must express my deep gratitude for the prompt and very important help which you are giving me in the present crisis. The American troops already engaged in the battle provoke the unanimous admiration of the whole French army. For the Allies---and above all for France---the power of the effort which your country is at present showing, as well as the resolute and generous spirit in which you enter the struggle, are a comfort in the grave times through which we are passing and a pledge of hope for the future.

I therefore very willingly accept the offer of all the units which you place at my disposal. The five American divisions which are to come down from the British zone will be placed in quiet sectors in the east, and as soon as possible each will hold a divisional sector. As for the divisions of the American I Army Corps, I will make arrangements to assign them a zone of action in the vicinity of the American 2d Division. The American 42d, 26th and later the 32d Divisions, when relieved from the east, will be transported toward the battle. The command of all of these divisions will be entrusted to the General commanding the American I Army Corps if you wish.

I am giving orders at once to assure the relief of the 42d and later of the 26th Divisions at the earliest moment practicable.

Will you please inform me on what date the headquarters and the services of the American I Army Corps will be in condition to be sent to the front?

PETAIN.

-----



***Five American Divisions to Move from British Zone for Employment with French***

[Editorial Translation]

General Staff  
No. 1244

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED ARMIES,  
*June 6, 1918.*

General Foch, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies

To General Pershing, Commander-in-Chief of the American army at Chaumont

My dear General:

In conformity with our agreements, preparations for the movement of the 5 American divisions from the British zone, whose employment with French divisions you have kindly agreed to, are completed and the movement is about to begin. General Petain decided, in principle, to employ them, keeping the infantry of each division grouped with a French division.

In the case of the other 5 American divisions in training in the British army, I have no intention to request of you their shipment to the French zone. Their training thus will not be interrupted and you can give final instructions on the subject of their equipment.

According to your intentions of which you informed me, I think that you will have a number of divisions which will debark in June, assembled and trained in the French zone.

I shall be grateful if you will let me know what you have decided on this subject.

Sincerely yours,

F. FOCH.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 597: Telegram

***Disposition of Units not having Joined American Divisions***

No. 994 - L. S.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*June 7, 1918.*

To: General Biddle

Americally [American Military Attache], Wire, London

G-3-46. Reference your Hq. 3745, Troops now floating for 4th, 28th, 35th, 77th, 82d Divisions, and troops to sail in June pertaining to divisions embarking that month should receive destination Is-sur-Tille, from which point the troops will be diverted to our divisional areas. Above instructions do not apply to artillery brigades, nor parts thereof, nor to ammunitions trains. These excepted units, upon arrival at French ports, will be

diverted by instructions there awaiting them to our various artillery training camps.

FOX CONNER,  
Colonel, General Staff,  
Asst. Chief of Staff, G-3.

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P Conf. Cables 1001-1400

***Troop Shipments Under Versailles Agreement***

No. 1267-S

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, June 8, 1918.*

Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

For the Chief of Staff

[Extract]

1. Reference my 1236 concerning Versailles agreement on priorities. The following summary of troop shipments requested under agreement is arranged separately for months of June and July. It is fully realized, however, that conditions at home ports and other reasons may make it impossible to comply with priorities requested for June and that you may have to consider June and July together.

2. Shipments requested for month of June (all figures in round numbers):

A. Agreement requires priority of shipment 6 divisions, less artillery, ammunition trains and supply trains, total 126,000. \* \* \*

B. 44,000 combat replacements (see paragraph 4 below).

C. Supply trains for the 6 divisions shown in A above, total 3,000.

D. Remaining B units of divisions of II and III Corps, total 15,000.

E. Attached units for 6 divisions shown in A above, total 5,800 \* \* \*

F. 3 Survey and ranging companies, 1 survey and printing company and 175 replacements for survey and printing battalion 29th Engineers, total 1,300.

G. Headquarters 2d Battalion and Companies E and F, 30th Engineers (gas and flame), total 500.

H. 10 batteries semi-fixed antiaircraft guns, organization table 208, total 700.

I. 1 remount depot and 1 mobile veterinary hospital (corps), total 400.

J. Aviation. 9 balloon companies including 6 ordered in May, 10 photo sections, 25 radio officers, 200 radio mechanisms, 50 radio code operators, 1 motor mechanic regiment less one battalion, 2 service aero squadrons, total 5,000.

K. 48,300 service of supply troops as shown in paragraph 6 below.

3. For month of July:

A. 4 divisions, less artillery, ammunition trains and supply trains, total 84,000.

B. 56,000 combat replacements (see paragraph 4 below).

C. Supply trains for the 4 divisions shown under A above, total 2,000.

D. Attached units for 4 divisions, total 4,000.

E. Divisional artillery and ammunition trains of the 6 divisions shipped in June, total 40,000.

- F. 10 semi-fixed antiaircraft batteries (Organization Table 208), 1 antiaircraft gun (3-inch) battalion and one antiaircraft machine gun battalion, total 2,000.
- G. Corps supply trains for 4 corps, total 2,000.
- H. 2 trench mortar battalions (corps), total 2,000.
- I. 2 telegraph battalions and 2 field signal battalions (corps), total 1,400.
- J. 2 searchlight companies, total 500.
- K. 14 base hospitals \* \* \* Total 4,600.
- L. Aviation - 6 balloon companies, 14 photo sections, 1 motor mechanic regiment, 1 motor mechanic battalion remaining from June, 61 service aero squadrons, total 15,000.
- M. 36,500 service of supply troops as shown in paragraph 7 below.
4. The total of combat replacements shown in paragraph 2 and 3 above is 100,000 of which 44,000 should be sent in June and 56,000 in July. Reference your 1247 paragraph 1-B, your 1457 paragraph 1 and my 1213 paragraph 1, it will be seen that replacements now scheduled for the two months, assuming no combat replacements covered in your 1247 were shipped in May, are in round numbers, 19,500 short of those which must be shipped under Versailles agreement. Request 19,500 be distributed as follows: Add 18,000 infantry to June and July infantry replacements. 1,500 field artillery to July field artillery replacements. \* \* \* If our figures do not agree with yours due to shipments already made by you and not taken into consideration above, add sufficient infantry to June and July replacement shipment in addition to what we have already called for to bring the total combat replacements shipped during June and July to 100,000. The service of supply replacements are covered by paragraphs 6 and 7 below.
5. To facilitate handling \* \* \* the combat replacements must be organized into provisional companies and each company composed of a single arm of the service and with two officers and a full complement of non-commissioned officers and cooks. See in this connection paragraph 1 our 1010.
6. June shipments of service of supply troops should be as follows: First, complete the 12,000 stevedores, checkers, gearmen, winchmen and railway operating personnel called for in my Cable 1186 \* \* \* Second, complete car and locomotive repair personnel per paragraph 1 B my cable 521 and continue shipment of railway operating items E-453 and 453 A, maintenance of equipment Item E-456, railway construction Item E-451 and maintenance of Way Items E-454 and 454 A. 13,400 of above should be shipped in June complying with request of French Minister of Transportation. \* \* \* Third, ship 24,300 other Service of Supply troops following as closely as practicable the priority schedule with modifications given in paragraph 8 below. Fourth, ship remainder of noncombatant replacements indicated in your Cablegram 1247 \* \* \* Total service of supply for June 48,300.
7. July shipments of service of supply troops should be as follows: First, ship 32,500 service of supply troops \* \* \* Second, ship 4,000 service of supply replacements called for in my Cable 1213. Total service of supply for July 36,500.

\* \* \* \* \*

PERSHING.

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***Divisions Dispatched to French Ports***

A. G. W., WAR DEPARTMENT,  
*Washington, D. C., June 8, 1918.*

PERSHING, AMEXFORCE, A. E. F.

[Extract]

\* \* \* \* \*

18. With reference to paragraph 1D, your 1205 [May 29, 1918] in accordance with your agreement both British and American tonnage used during first part of May for dispatch of infantry and machine-gun units. Due to the availability of troops it was necessary to dispatch in American convoy part of 4th and 35th Divisions to your ports. To have done otherwise would have resulted in delaying movement of these units abroad. Troops of divisions originally scheduled for service with British were dispatched on British tonnage as far as availability of troops would permit. Goethals.

McCAIN.

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G-4, GHQ, AEF: 322.02 Corps: Letter

***Policy Regarding Employment of Corps Commanders and Staffs***

3d Section, General Staff

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, June 10, 1918.*

From: Chief of Staff, A. E. F.

To: Commanding General, I Corps

[Extract]

1. The Commander-in-Chief has prescribed the following policy regarding the employment at this time of corps commanders and their staffs:

a. That corps commanders and their staffs will be used without regard to any fixed order of battle with the corps.

b. That the corps commanders and staff will for the present, exercise administrative control and supervision, and control of all arrangements with the French, excepting actual tactical command, in the case of American troops serving in the sector of the French Eighth Army.

c. That the II Corps staff will exercise similar control in the case of all troops serving on the British front, base hospitals and engineer regiments (railway) excepted.

d. That the III Corps staff will exercise similar control in the case of all troops serving in the sector of the Seventh French Army.

e. That arrangements will be made for utilizing the I Corps staff in connection with the corps which will probably be formed on the battle front toward the end of the present month.

f. That a IV Corps staff will be formed and will take over the I Corps staff, upon the relief of that staff, all matters relating to troops in the French Eighth Army.

2.

\* \* \* \* \*

b. In order to facilitate your control and supervision of these many units, you are authorized and directed to classify them according to arms of service and duties now being performed by them under existing orders, and, insofar as it may appear to you advisable, to designate, for each local group so formed a properly qualified officer now in the sector to exercise, under your orders, such administrative and disciplinary control as may conduce to the efficient exercise of the responsibility placed upon you by par.

1 (b). For instance, artillery units not part of the 26th Division but serving near it might be placed under the administrative and disciplinary control of the Brig. Gen. Wm. Lassiter; engineer troops and labor troops in the same vicinity under Colonel Ernest D. Peek, 21st Engineers.

You should refrain, in this connection, from issuing any instructions which will tend to prevent these units from discharging the duties for which they were sent into the sector.

Nothing in these instructions is intended to modify the status or orders under which G-4, First Army, is now operating, or the duties of the several staff officers who have already been appointed for that army.

c. In the case of additional troops which may from time to time in the future be sent into the sector of the Eighth Army, it is to be understood that the same instructions as to administrative control and supervision will apply until otherwise directed. In all such cases you will be furnished with information as to the intended addition to troops under your administrative control; the designation of the organization and its date of movement will be given you, and, where necessary, a statement as to the duties ordered.

3. It is desired that you furnish to such commanding officers of troops in Eighth Army sector as are affected by these instruction, an exact copy of the portions necessary for their information and guidance; extract copies should similarly be sent to commanding officers of units sent into the sector in the future, until a change is directed in the system of control herein prescribed.

4. A copy of this letter has been furnished the Chief, French Mission, for the information of the French military authorities concerned.

J. W. McANDREW,  
Chief of Staff.

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***Probable Effect of Loss of Paris***

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, June 10, 1918.*

THE ADJUTANT GENERAL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF AND SECRETARY OF WAR

[Extract]

1. Since the last successful offensive by the Germans against the French north of the Marne, the possibility of losing Paris has become apparent, and has brought out many conjectures as to its effect upon the French people. A few French officers think that it would cause the fall of the present ministry and its replacement by a ministry in favor of peace. I have discreetly discussed the subject with M. Clemenceau and General Foch and presented to them unfortunate position in which the Allies of France would find themselves in such eventuality. Both gave strong assurances that France would continue to the end. M. Clemenceau told me that this conclusion had been reached between him and Mr. Lloyd George. A determined effort will be made by the Allies to save Paris, but if it should be lost the present French Government and the military will do everything to keep France in the war. In conclusion, the consensus of French opinion, in which I concur, is that the French people will hold the ideals for which the Allies are fighting above any temporary loss of territory and that the country will firmly stand by the coalition.

2. Reference my Advanced Field Headquarters, have made frequent short stops there, but situation changing so rapidly especially as regards use of our troops that shall probably relocate and occupy headquarters farther east very shortly. It is planned to put in our divisions as corps and organize field army as soon as possible. Will keep you advised.

\* \* \* \* \*

PERSHING.

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G-4, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 60: Telegram

***Readjustment of Supply***

4th Section, G. S.  
Telegram No. 1551

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*TOURS, June 11, 1918.*

Commanding General, Services of Supply

[Extract]

A general redistribution of American divisions has been ordered which will require a readjustment of our supply arrangements on two broad lines. The Paris group will consist of 1st, 2d, 3d, 4th and 28th Divisions with the 42d Division to be added within a few days and the 26th Division to be added later. The Toul group will consist of the 32d, 5th

35th, 76th, and 26th Divisions, the latter until relieved to join Paris group, and probably the 82d to arrive later. \* \* \* For the Paris group the following supply arrangements will govern: Divisions in Paris group will, for the present, be supplied as now provided for 1st Division. Gievres and Mehun are hereby announced as advance depots to serve Paris group. \* \* \* You must so stock Gievres and Mehun depots that after Paris divisions have been equipped all calls for Paris group can be met at depots named without waiting for material to arrive from other points. When this readjustment is completed there will be no cross shipments behind the line. That is, Is-sur-Tille will not be permitted to serve the Paris group. The two channels of supply to the groups named will be kept separate and distinct. Colonel Hilgard remains Regulating Officer at Is-sur-Tille and his decision will govern in all questions of emergency. \* \* \* Major Kilpatrick will remain Regulating Officer for the Paris group and is authorized to call on Gievres and Mehun direct. \* \* \*

MOSELEY.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1305: Letter

***Concerning Abbeville and Subsequent Agreements***

3d Section, General Staff

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, June 11, 1918.*

From: Asst. Chief of Staff, G-3

To: Commanding General, S. O. S.

1. The Chief of Staff, A. E. F. directs me to give you a statement relative to the Abbeville and subsequent agreements.
2. I enclose herewith copy of cablegram\* covering troops to be shipped under what has become known as the Versailles Agreement.
3. There is but little that I can add to the information contained in the cable which I enclose. In general it may be said that the London Agreement, Abbeville Agreement, and the Versailles Agreement, represent a compromise which had to be made between the desirability of building up all parts of the A. E. F. progressively and the imperative necessities of strengthening the combatant forces of the Allies, therefore giving priority to certain combat units. The disadvantages attending this conceding of priority to certain combatant units have been fully appreciated by the Commander-in-Chief and his entire staff. Nevertheless the conditions seemed to the Commander-in-Chief to demand that the concessions be made.
4. The difficulties which would face our Service of Supply on account of refusing that service an adequate personnel have been fully appreciated by the Commander-in-Chief and have been presented by him to our Allies. While no formal agreement as to the assistance in the way of supply which is to be rendered us by our Allies has been made it has nevertheless been understood that the Allied resources would in case of dire necessity be at our disposal. I think I correctly interpret the ideas of the Commander-in-Chief and of the Chief of Staff in saying that the S. O. S. is expected to do all that is humanly possible with the resources at its disposal but that our Allies are responsible for supplying any deficiencies which we may, after our best efforts be unable to make up.

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\* [See Pershing Cablegram 1267-S printed under date June 8, 1918.]

I believe also that the Commander-in-Chief and Chief of Staff feel as I do that our Allies will assist us in every possible way.

5. While it is impossible to forecast the troop shipments which we will be compelled to adopt for August and September, I am confident that the Commander-in-Chief will do all in his power to bring the S. O. S. up to the full complement of personnel necessary to enable the service to fulfill all of its functions.

6. I regret that I am unable to furnish you a copy of the Versailles Agreement but insofar as concerns the personnel to arrive and priority for that personnel during the months of June and July, the cablegram herewith covers everything that is contained in the Versailles Agreement.

FOX CONNER,  
Colonel, General Staff,  
Asst. Chief of Staff, G-3.

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HS Brit. File: 910-32.9: Telephone Message

### ***Training of Americans with French or British***

Telephone message from General Du Cane,\* 6:45 p. m., 13.6.18.

1. General Pershing does not intend to send any more Americans to either the French or the British for training.
2. The Prime Minister told General Du Cane to find out if General Foch agreed to this.
3. General Foch said:
  - a. This proposal of General Pershing's did not contravene either the ABBEVILLE or VERSAILLES Agreements.
  - b. That he had not seen the American troops, and therefore could not say whether their state of training was such that they should be trained by British or French.
  - c. That he expected that General Pershing would place at his (General Foch's) disposal, such American infantry as he could not embody in those American divisions which have American artillery.
  - d. That the arrangements are at present so much in the air that he could not say how many, if any, of the American infantry thus placed at his disposal (para. c) would be sent to the British.

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G-1, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. No. 1956: Letter

### ***Establishment of Corps Replacement Depots***

1st Section, General Staff

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
June 13, 1918.

From: C-in-C, G-1

To: C. G., II Corps

1. Corps commanders will receive replacement requisitions from those divisions under their administrative control and supervision as outlined in letter from 3d Section, General

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[\* Major General Sir. J. P. Du Cane. British Mission with Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces.]



Staff, dated June 10. It is requested that you notify the divisions concerned and also the divisions formerly under your command.

2. A provisional replacement depot will be established by each corps headquarters at a suitable location with reference the troops under its administrative control as outlined in the above mentioned letter. The personnel for this provisional replacement depot should consist at the start of 1 provisional replacement battalion in accordance with the tables of organization already furnished you. This personnel should be added to as necessity demands.

3. Each provisional replacement depot should be enlarged as soon as practicable so as to be able to accommodate at least 5,000 replacements. There should be on hand the required personnel and the required amount of food, clothing and equipment to take care of the full number of officers and soldiers that may at any one time be evacuated from the hospitals in the vicinity of this replacement organization.

4. You are requested to make the necessary reconnaissance to determine the proper location of this provisional replacement depot and to notify these hq. of action taken. Our former instructions for the organization of a similar provisional replacement depot for the II Corps are superceded by these instructions to organize a depot for the particular troops under your administrative control as outlined in letter From G-3, dated June 10.

5. Upon the establishment of this depot, hospitals in the vicinity will be notified by the C. G., S. O. S., to send all officers and soldiers evacuated to duty as of Class A to this depot. They will be returned therefrom to their original organizations in accordance with the replacement needs of the organizations as determined by reports received by you.

6. As organizations are sent to the region and placed under your administrative control, they will be notified that this replacement depot is functioning for them, and similarly as organizations leave the region over which you have administrative control and come under the administrative control of another corps commander, they will similarly be notified that their replacements will be handled through the particular corps headquarters to whose administrative control they have been transferred.

7. When officers and soldiers of organizations not under your administrative control are evacuated to the provisional replacement depot under your command, they will be forwarded as soon as practicable to the replacement depot which furnishes replacements to their particular organizations. Arrangements should be made beforehand in each case with the corps commander concerned.

8. If a provisional replacement depot has already been established under your supervision, it will be transferred to a convenient locality with reference the organizations under your command, as outlined in the letter of June 10, from G-3.

By order of the C-in-C:

JAMES A. LOGAN, Jr.,  
Col. G. S., N. A.,  
A. C. of S., G-1.

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Cable File: A1520

***Transfer of Units***

WASHINGTON, D. C., June 14, 1918.

CABLEGRAM SENT

Pershing, Amexforce, Paris

Number 1520      June 14

(C. of S.) Paragraph 8 C your 1,284, is disturbing to the Secretary of War, who desires to know why the divisions enumerated have been transferred to you immediately and by whose order. British here have been imperatively insisting on using those divisions as long as possible and question of supplies for the very large increase of troops now being floated is inevitably dependent upon the length of time the British retain, subsist and equip the troops allotted to them temporarily. Is the question of supply of these troops covered by the pooling of supplies which has been agreed to by you and the French and as now understood by the British? A complete statement regarding this whole matter is desired. March.

HENRY P. MCCAIN.  
The Adjutant General.

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Cable: P-1304-S

***Status of the American Expeditionary Forces***

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, June 14, 1918.*

ADJUTANT GENERAL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF

At present there are in Europe 713,828 officers and men of which 510,635 are combatant troops. The combatant troops are represented by eighteen divisions, four colored regiments, three brigades of heavy artillery from the coast artillery corps, six tank companies, one battalion of gas and flame troops (30th Engineers) four regiments of cavalry, and certain special troops. There are now occupying sectors in the front line the 1st, 2d, 3d, 5th, 26th, 32d, and 42d Divisions. Of these the 1st, 2d and 3d Divisions are occupying sectors in the zone of the great offensive. In addition to these the 4th, 28th, 35th, 77th and 82d Divisions are now preparing to enter the line. Of these the 4th and 28th will enter the zone of the offensive near the 2d and 3d Divisions. The divisions of the I Corps are supported by American artillery. Serving at the front with other American troops are the railway artillery reserve, eight aero squadrons and three balloon companies, and 2 companies of gas and flame troops.

A. The 30th, 27th, 80th, and 33d and 78th Divisions, less artillery, and 17,120 officers and men of the air service giving a total of 104,446 officers and men now in training with the British. We have serving with the British the following auxiliary troops; two regiments of railroad engineers, one battalion of forestry engineers, six base hospitals and four aero squadrons giving a total of 10,708.

B. We have turned over to the French four colored infantry regiments and approximately 5,500 motor mechanics, six machine shop truck units and eighty sections of the U. S. Ambulance Service.

C. Organizations in training in American areas and for replacement: The 31st and 32d Artillery Brigades, C. A. C., the 30th Engineers, less two companies, tank corps, and schools and the following replacement organizations: The 41st Division (depot) composed only of necessary personnel for instruction and administration of newly arrived replacements and the 54th Regiment C. A. C., a replacement unit for the army artillery. Total for training and replacement 83,123.

D. Service of supply troops total 203,193. Combatant troops attached to services of supply, four cavalry and two infantry regiments, total 11,207.

E. Recapitulation: In service in American sectors 251,298 in service with British 10,708, in service with French 23,031, in training in American areas including aviation 83,123, in training with the British 104,446, services of supply troops 203,193, combatant troops attached to services of supply 11,207, sick and detached 26,822. Total 713,828 officers and men.

F. Length of front now held is 63 kilometers.

PERSHING.

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Cable: A-1523-R

### ***Requests Denial of Stories about Colored Soldiers***

A. G. O., WAR DEPARTMENT,  
*Washington, D. C., June 14, 1918.*

PERSHING, AMEXFORCE, HAEF

For Nolan: Stories, probably invented by German agents, have been widely circulated among colored people in this country to effect that colored soldiers in France are always placed in most dangerous positions and sacrificed to save white soldiers; that when wounded they are left on ground to die without medical attention that other forms of discrimination are practiced against them; and that the Germans, if victorious, have promised to set aside a portion of this country where the colored people could rule themselves. A cabled denial of these stories with a statement of actual conditions is wanted for publication to counteract effects. Make statements clear, specific, and emphatic.

March.

McCAIN.

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***Training of American Divisions in the British War Zone***

[Editorial Translation]

*June 15, 1918.*

[To Hq. Allied Armies]

My dear friend:

Just two lines in answer to your letter received yesterday inclosing a copy of a memorandum you had sent to the Marshal.

I have discussed the situation with General Lawrence; he has assured me that everything possible is being done and will be done to equip the B divisions with all the artillery and machine guns possible, and we are working here unceasingly to do all we can in that direction for the B divisions we are organizing here. It is not an easy thing to assemble thousands of plain individuals coming from all corners of the United Kingdom and Ireland, to organize them into battalions, then into brigades, then into divisions, with all or some of the services absolutely necessary; but we are doing it as fast as we can and I hope soon to be able to give you a few dates.

At the same time I am very much disappointed by the recent decision of General Pershing not to send other divisions for training in our zone. It appears to me a disavowal of our line of conduct and of all our plans of the last six months. I think this deserves to be examined a little more closely.

Mr. Lloyd George has reached a plain and clear arrangement with President Wilson; the repeal of this arrangement without any warning or motive seems to me a little rough, to say the least. In my opinion all our needs will be better served by 6 American divisions constantly under training in the British rear area. As soon as they are considered trained they would be placed directly under the command of General Pershing and would be replaced by other divisions following the same method of training. General Pershing would receive trained divisions much more rapidly and we would have the constant support and assurance that such a magnificent body of troops would always give us.

Please think this over. I know that the Prime Minister is much distressed by this affair.

Always yours,

HENRY WILSON,  
Chief of Imperial General Staff.

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***Moment of American Divisions from British Front***

No. 1317-S

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, June 16, 1918.*

ADJUTANT GENERAL, WASHINGTON

FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF AND SECRETARY OF WAR

1. Reference your 1520, the divisions named were withdrawn from the British front at the request of the Allied Commander-in-Chief. The recent offensive of the Germans north of the Marne was so successful that a serious situation was presented and there were no French divisions immediately available that were not already in the line. General Foch asked if there would be objection to using American divisions then with the British, to which I replied that they were available in the emergency for such use as he wished to make of them. The five divisions were then ordered and the decision by the Allied Commander-in-Chief was, without doubt, sound. The British Commander-in-Chief did not approve of General Foch's view, but after some discussion, it was agreed to. It is not unlikely that the other five divisions may be needed somewhere else on the line before they are needed with the British. It was clearly understood, both by the British and the French, that the American troops, like troops of the British and French troops, are subject to use where there is urgent need of their services. Any claim on the part of the British that the troops training with them were being taken unnecessarily or in violation of our understanding is untenable. General Foch has been selected as Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Forces, and unless his orders as to the disposition of divisions are obeyed by the Allied commanders, the theory of a supreme command fails. The situation on this western front is so critical that troops must be shifted wherever they are needed regardless of whether they are in training with the British or the French.

2. The divisions in question are located as follows: The 35th Division is now entering the line in the Vosges and is relieving French troops which will become available for the battle front. The 77th Division is about to enter the trenches relieving the 42d Division for duty on the battle front. The 4th and 28th Divisions have joined French reserves to the east and northeast of Paris. The 82d Division commences its movement today and will be used to relieve the 26th Division, thus releasing that division for the battle front. Proper artillery support for all five of the divisions withdrawn from the British has been provided by joining these divisions with depleted French divisions until such time as our own artillery is available.

3. As to the pooling of supplies, the principle is of general application, and in that sense will assist in the supply of all of our divisions, but no special application is made on these particular divisions except for machine guns and automatic rifles and some transportation. The divisions serving with the French are to be rationed and supplied as far as possible by them, as they would have been with the British, and in fact, all the divisions serving on the active French front are to be furnished French ration and such French material as we find ourselves in need of.

PERSHING.

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**Replacements Needed**

No. 1316-S

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, June 16, 1918.*

AGWAR, WASHINGTON

[Extract]

\* \* \* \* \*

2C. In all our requisitions for replacements it has been considered that all organizations sent to France would come at full strength. Organizations are arriving at considerably reduced strength. The II Corps arrived below authorized strength as follows: Infantry, 5740; Artillery, 2276; Engineers, 437; Signal 99; Trains 1513; III Corps as follows: Infantry 7580; Artillery 1691; Engineers 365; Signal 87; Trains 1172; total required to bring these organizations to full strength not counting losses in France as follows: Infantry 13,320; Artillery 5967; Engineers 802; Signal 186; Trains 2685. Grand Total 20,960. Replacements at present are not arriving at rate sufficient to supply initial shortage in personnel of organizations. Pershing.

D. With reference shipment of replacements during June and July there is urgent need of replacements at this time especially infantry. It is requested that you place at an early date as practicable on the shipping schedule the 20,960 replacements distributed among the arms of the service as shown above. It is to be understood that those replacements are included in the total number of 100,000 requested in our Cablegram 1267 [June 8, 1918].

PERSHING.

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HS Secret Documents: Folder G: Notes

**Conference at Chaumont on the General Situation**

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, June 17, 1918.*

NOTES ON CONVERSATION WITH GENERAL FOCH AT CHAUMONT, June 17, 1918

Present also were General Weygand and Col. Boyd.

General Foch stated that General Weygand is making a careful study of the general resources of the French army and that he thought when this study is completed it would be well for General Pershing to send Colonel Fox Conner or some other officer to make a study with General Weygand and to draw up a plan of shipment of troops, furnishing supplies, etc., based on the resources commanded by France and the United States.

He thought that it would be well for General Pershing and himself to come to an agreement based on the study of General Weygand and the American officer so that at the next meeting of the Supreme War Council, if one should be held, General Foch and General Pershing would have a well-studied-out agreement already planned, thereby saving much time and useless discussion.

General Pershing stated that he is now having a study made of our general situation; that he has recommended very strongly to our War Department that they plan to call out enough men to enable us to have in France three million men by the first of next April; that he is urging them to have these men called out by the first of next December; that he is also urging a careful study of our resources of all kinds, and is urging the government to adopt measures for taking advantage of all possible tonnage, including British tonnage.

General Foch stated that it is of the greatest importance that we thus look ahead and that we should urge the shipment of men as rapidly as possible.

He mentioned the very valuable effect which the presence of American soldiers is having on the French army. He stated that all French troops which have come in contact with the Americans are in much better state of morale. He dwelt at length on this point.

General Pershing mentioned the importance of getting the Americans together. He stated that all soldiers like to be with their own people and that he felt he should consider as soon as possible the uniting of the Americans into one American fighting army to be used for whatever purpose might be deemed expedient.

General Foch agreed, stating that we would do well to organize this American army; that we might find it expedient to push an offensive this September or that we might, according to circumstances, wait until next spring.

General Pershing thought that the American army would be ready in September. He thought that it would be well to consider, for example, having the 2d and 3d Divisions united into a corps, and a little later on the 26th and 42d Divisions might be also united; thus four or six divisions might be brought together into an American field army which could be placed at a desirable point and used for whatever purpose might be deemed most advantageous; that in expectation of such a move as this, he had already sent a corps commander to the 3d Division to study the situation.

General Foch stated that he understood that General Pershing had already planned the organization of his army corps.

He stated that, while agreeing perfectly with this idea, he wished to say to General Pershing that he should like him to consider turning over from some of the divisions going into the American training sector a few of the best advanced regiments to serve in the most fatigued French divisions. He stated that the effect of young, vigorous American soldiers on the wornout French divisions would be most advantageous; that the Americans might in the meantime learn something and that they would certainly have a very strong tendency to put the tired French divisions on their feet.

He dwelt at length on this point, and insisted on the need of having some Americans to brace up the French morale.

He stated that these regiments would be needed for only a few weeks and that it would not delay their incorporation into American divisions; that they could be returned the latter part of July. Later on he mentioned their returning the first part of August.

General Foch stated that he would like to have General Pershing draw up his program contemplating, for the month of July, letting the French have a number of regiments for French divisions; then beginning in August the organization of these regiments into divisions in view of possible operations in September.

He stated that we have two tasks in the month of July.

First, building up the British army in manpower and second building up the morale of the French army, and in August the assembling of the American army.

General Pershing stated that he would make a careful study of General Foch's proposition for using American divisions to improve the morale of fatigued French divisions.

General Foch stated that General Weygand is now studying plans for supplying the American troops.

First, the needs of the troops scheduled to arrive between now and July 1. He stated that of 28 divisions expected by that time, the French could supply artillery for 24.

Second, a study should be made together of the question of supplying troops that are to come after July.

General Pershing stated that American shipping is being turned out in a very satisfactory manner, but that the aviation and ordnance production has not been so good, and that we are going to need many guns.

General Weygand suggested that we urge the production in the states all we can, and that he himself is working with Mr. Loucheur and others on what France can produce and that between the two we will be able to produce an arrangement; that he will be ready to report on the result of his investigation by June 25, and will then take up the matter with the American officer designated to make a study with him on a concerted plan.

[Unsigned.]

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 829: Memorandum

### ***Shipment of Troops Discussed***

3d Section, General Staff

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, June 18, 1918.*

#### MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF OF STAFF

1. The last agreement for the shipment of troops from the United States covered the months of June and July 1918. Upon completion of this agreement there will be left for shipment the following troops in order to complete our first five corps, army troops, and service of supply troops, as provided for by our priority project:

B units of 4 divisions

2 complete divisions

Certain corps and army troops

S. O. S. troops, especially those of the 3d, 4th, 5th, and 6th Phases.

Total for all of above classes: 275,825

In order to maintain the first five corps, the following additional replacements will be needed for August: 50,000.

Grand total: 325,850.

However, there are six brigades of army artillery included in the foregoing figures only two of which can be supplied with materiel before November or December of this year. In view of the immediate need for further development of our S. O. S., it is believed best to substitute for these four brigades of artillery the equivalent in new S. O. S. troops, and to delay the personnel of these artillery brigades until later in the fall.

On the basis of shipping 250,000 men per month, the above numbers can be transported by September 15, 1918.

2. Further shipments need immediate attention as additional drafts and new units must be organized. Table No. 1 attached hereto sets forth in detail the estimated possibilities in this connection. Assuming that we continue the shipment of the troops called for by the priority schedule, we should complete the same (20,000 new S. O. S. troops substituted for 20,000 army artillery) by September 15, 1918. From this date to May 30, 1919,



it is estimated that we can ship 1,862,000 men. This force will provide for six complete corps (36 divisions), the necessary army and additional S. O. S. troops and also 375,000 replacements. The table attached marked No. 1 sets forth the details of this scheme. Upon the completion of this project, we should have in France, that is, by May 1919, 66 divisions and the necessary corps, army and S. O. S. troops.

3. In addition to the troops necessary to complete the organizations called for by our general organization and priority projects, it is understood that there are now organized in the United States 13 divisions and some air service and tank corps units. All other troops, except for the few replacements, will have to be drafted, organized and trained. It is estimated that the following periods of time should be allowed for this work:

(a) To organize, equip, train and transport divisions, corps and army troops, six months. (One month for organization, four months for training, and one month for shipment.)

(b) To organize, equip, train and transport S. O. S. troops and replacements, three months. (One month for organization and equipment, one and one-half months for training and one-half month for shipment.)

Based on the foregoing conclusions, Table No. 2 has been prepared which indicates when the various new divisions, etc., should be called and organized in order to be trained and ready for shipment at the time when transportation will be available. From the data included in Section 2 of this table, it is clear that the drafting, organizations, etc., of some of the new units should have been under way before this date.

In addition to the troops required to complete our priority project, the replacements already called for and the 13 divisions now organized in the United States, Table No. 2 shows that the following additional troops should be in service on the dates indicated below.

DATE	MONTHLY DRAFT	PROGRESSIVE TOTAL	DIVISIONS
June 1918	157,000		1
July 1918	210,000	367,000	4
August 1918	210,000	577,000	4
Sept. 1918	204,000	781,000	5
Oct. 1918	230,000	1,011,000	5
Nov. 1918	180,000	1,191,000	4
Dec. 1918	71,000	1,262,000	
Jan. 1919	85,000	1,347,000	
Feb. 1919	75,000	1,422,000	
Mar. 1919	100,000	1,522,000	

4. The ratio between army and S. O. S. troops followed in preparing the attached tables was derived in the following manner:

Army troops the same ratio as used in our general organization project, except that all railway artillery has been eliminated.

S. O. S. troops have been taken as one-fifth of the grand total less replacements. This was determined after conference with Colonel Barber. Our existing S. O. S. project has provided for a number of different elements which do not need to be duplicated nor expanded, thus permitting this reduction.

FOX CONNER,  
Colonel, General Staff,  
Asst. Chief of Staff, G-3.

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**TABLE NO. 1**  
**ESTIMATED SHIPMENTS FROM U. S. CLASSIFIED**

MONTHS	DIVISIONS					TOTALS
	ESTIMATED INCLUDING PRO SHIPPING AVAILABLE	RATA OF CORPS TROOPS (30,000 PER DIVISION)	ARMY TROOPS	S. O. S. TROOPS	REPLACE- MENTS	
1918	ALL ARRANGED FOR AND ORDERED					
June						
July						
August	250,000	COMPLETES PRIORITY PROJECT				
1st Half Sept.	75,000			(a) (20,000)	50,000	325,850
2d Half Sept.	175,000	4 divs.		30,000	25,000	175,000
October	250,000	5 divs.	10,000	40,000	50,000	250,000
November	225,000	5 divs.	27,000 (b)	30,000	18,000	225,000
December	200,000	4 divs.	(c) 35,000	26,000	19,000	200,000
1919						
January	200,000	4 divs.	10,000	51,000	19,000	200,000
February	200,000	5 divs.	10,000	21,000	19,000	200,000
March	250,000	5 divs.	10,000	40,000	50,000	250,000
April	250,000	4 divs.	20,000	35,000	75,000	250,000
May	112,000		12,000		100,000	112,000
TOTAL	1,862,000	36 divs. (1,080,000)	(b-c) 134,000	(a) 293,000	375,000	1,862,000

**Notes**

(a) Includes 20,000 new S. O. S. troops substituted for same number of army artillery carried later.

(b) Includes 10,000 army artillery of priority project.

(c) Includes 10,000 army artillery of priority project.

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**TABLE NO. 2**  
**SAILING AND DRAFT DATES**

SECTION I - SAILING DATES						SECTION II - DRAFT DATES				
MONTH	DIVS. AND CORPS TROOPS	ARMY TROOPS	S. O. S. TROOPS	RE- PLACE- MENTS	TOTAL	DIVS. AND CORPS TROOPS	ARMY TROOPS	S. O. S. TROOPS	RE- PLACE- MENTS	TOTAL
1918								(c)	(b)	(d)
June	Now Ordered					1	27,000	50,000	50,000	157,000
July						4	25,000	40,000	25,000	210,000
August	Complete Priority Schedule					4	10,000	30,000	50,000	210,000
1st Half Sept.	4 divs. Units	B 2 Divs.	(b) (c) 175,850	50,000	375,000					
2d Half Sept.	(a) 4 divs.		30,000	25,000	175,000	5	10,000	26,000	18,000	204,000
October	5 (a)	10,000	40,000	50,000	250,000	5	10,000	51,000	19,000	230,000
November	5 (a)	(c) 27,000	30,000	18,000	225,000	4	20,000	21,000	19,000	180,000
December	4	(c) 35,000	26,000	19,000	200,000		12,000	40,000	19,000	71,000
1919										
Jan.	4	10,000	51,000	19,000	200,000			35,000	50,000	85,000
Feb.	5	10,000	21,000	19,000	200,000				75,000	75,000
March	5	10,000	40,000	50,000	250,000				100,000	100,000
April	4	20,000	35,000	75,000	250,000					
May		12,000		100,000	112,000					
	36	134,000	273,000	375,000	1,842,000	23	114,000	293,000	425,000	1,522,000
FOR BALANCE *			(b) 20,000	(c) 50,000	70,000	13 divs.				390,000
TOTAL					1,912,000					1,912,000

June 18, 1918

(a) 13 of these divisions  
now organized

(b) Includes 20,000 new S. O. S.

(c) Includes 10,000 army art.  
old priority project each  
month not included

\*Document torn

(d) 50,000 for August and 1st half of September

***British Assistance in Obtaining Animals Requested***

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, June 19, 1918.*

Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig,  
Commander-in-Chief, British Expeditionary Forces

My dear Sir Douglas Haig:

In view of the interest you have always taken in the organization of our forces here in Europe and your kind assistance at all times, I venture to bring to your personal attention the situation now confronting us relative to the procurement of the necessary supply of animals to put our forces on a fighting basis.

I have written Major Griscom asking him to take up the question with Lord Milner, who no doubt will refer the question to you.

I would appreciate very much any assistance that you could render in this very important matter, and also any advice you might care to give me as to procedure which I should follow under the circumstances.

With highest personal and official esteem, believe me.

Very sincerely yours,

JOHN J. PERSHING.

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G-1, GHQ, AEF: File 63: Letter

***Liaison Officers with French Army Units***

1st Section, General Staff

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, June 19, 1918.*

From: Commander-in-Chief, G-1

To: Chief Liaison Officer

1. The chief of the French Mission complains that officers of our liaison service are arriving at the headquarters of various French units without arrangements having been made through him. As he keeps a record of all American officers at the various French headquarters, and assigns visiting American officers to French commands for instruction, special service, liaison, etc., he is much embarrassed in performing his duties by this procedure, and is unable to make arrangements for these liaison officers, or for others, whom he must delegate some French unit to receive.

2. In view of the foregoing, the procedure which we are forced to follow, so far as relates to assignments of liaison officers in the French zone of the armies, will be the following:

You will recommend such liaison as you think necessary to carry out the desires of the C-in-C, to these headquarters (G-1), where necessary detailed arrangements will be made with the chief of the French Mission, and at which time you will be informed, so that you can place the officers in accordance with verbal instructions already communicated to you.

3. The military situation at the present time makes it undesirable to extend the operations of our liaison service in the French or British zone of armies. However, so far as it applies to the French zone of the interior, this you will handle as you have been handling it in the past, without reference to these headquarters. In this connection, it is pertinent to remark that reports from all sides indicate that the best results that could have been hoped for have followed the operations of the liaison service in the French zone of the interior, and particularly in the relations that have been established with the various ministries in Paris. This is clearly indicated by the fact that the great masses of correspondence from the French addressed to these headquarters containing requests for information, complaints, reporting misunderstandings, etc., have ceased.

4. In view of our dependence on French territory for animals to insure the mobility of our troops, no more immediate important military problem faces us, nor no problem where the liaison service can do more good work, than in smoothing out the difficulties which are bound to arise in a great operation of this kind. You will please bring this matter to the attention of the various liaison officers of your service.

5. It is understood that many officers of our liaison service desire service with combat units. Their desire in this particular will be met whenever you desire. The procedure, however, must be the following:

Based on your recommendation, officers in the liaison service, recommended by you for duty with combat units will be detached temporarily from the liaison service and assigned to combat units where required. Upon completion of their service with such combat units, they may again be ordered returned to the liaison service. This procedure is necessary, as tactical liaison can only be created and maintained by tactical commanders. These latter commanders must have no restrictions placed on their choice of their tactical liaison agents, and on this account, it is necessary to relieve officers temporarily from duty with the liaison service when assigned to combat units.

By order of the C-in-C:

JAMES A. LOGAN, Jr.,  
Colonel, G. S., N. A.,  
A. C. of S., G-1.

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Cable: A-1566-R

### ***Replacements and Casuals***

A. G. O., WAR DEPARTMENT,  
Washington, D. C., June 19, 1918.

PERSHING, AMEXFORCE, HAEF

1. Reference 2C your 1316 [June 16, 1918] all divisions have been filled to maximum strength at their stations before shipment. Many men are absent without leave at time of sailing, others are necessarily left behind for various reasons, and others are rejected at eleventh hour. Casuals are shipped as soon afterwards as possible. See my weekly report of personnel shipped. Nearly every transport carries casuals of II and III Corps.

2. Reference 2D your 1316, replacements are now sailing in large numbers. All asked for in your 1222 [May 31, 1918] will sail this month. Last week 1,520 casual soldiers and 158 [12,158] replacements sailed. 9,240 more will sail shortly.

3. With reference to your request for 19,500 additional replacements for July, contained in paragraph 4 your 1267 [June 8, 1918] it is impossible to send any more men who have had any training than have already been scheduled. In order to give you these men all pioneer regiments of first three phases will be sent. You can use as many as necessary in trenches until sufficient replacements arrive. These are the best trained men available without breaking up divisions, but part of them will not be able to sail before late July. March.

McCAIN.

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Cable: P-1342-S

***American Effort Needed to End the War***

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
Chaumont, Haute-Marne, June 19, 1918.

AGWAR, WASHINGTON

FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF AND SECRETARY OF WAR

1. The present state of the war under the continued German offensive makes it necessary to consider at once the largest possible military program for the United States. The morale of the French Government and of the High Command is believed to be good but it is certain that the morale of the lower grades in the French army is distinctly poor. Both the French and British peoples are extremely tired of the war and their troops are reflecting this attitude in their frequent inability to meet successfully the German attacks. It is the American soldiers now in France upon whom they rely. It is the moral as well as material aid given by the American soldier that is making the continuation of the war possible. Only the continual arrival of the American troops and their judicious employment can restore the morale of our Allies and give them the courage to fight. The above represents the viewS of the Allied military leaders as told me in person by General Foch himself, and I believe it is also the view of the civil leaders. We must start immediately on our plans for the future and be ready to strike this fall in order to tide us over till spring, when we should have a big army ready. The war can be brought to a successful conclusion next year if we only go at it now. From a purely military point of view it is essential that we make this effort especially for the reasons above stated and on account of the grave possibility that the enemy will obtain supplies and men from Russia before next year.

2. To meet the demands imposed by the above plan our minimum effort should be based on sending to France prior to May 1919 a total force, including that already here, of 66 divisions (or better if possible) together with the necessary corps and army troops, service of supply troops and replacements. This plan would give an available force of about three million soldiers for the summer campaign of 1919 and if this force were maintained would in conjunction with our Allies give us every hope of concluding the war in 1919.

3. A detailed study of the possibilities of meeting the above demands results in the following: Troop shipping available between August 1918 and May 1919 is estimated as capable of transporting two million one hundred eighty-seven thousand men divided as follows:

August, September, and October two hundred fifty thousand men per month, November two hundred twenty-five thousand, December, January, and February two hundred thousand men per month, March and April two hundred fifty thousand per month and for May more than one hundred twelve thousand.

A. The general distribution by classes of the troops which I recommend be transported by estimated available shipping is as follows: First, complete existing general organization and priority projects and add fifty thousand replacements to those already requested (this will require shipment of three hundred twenty-five thousand men in addition to shipments already arranged for June and July), Second, 6 complete army corps (36 divisions and army corps troops are per general organization project total one million eighty thousand), one hundred fourteen thousand army troops, two hundred ninety-three thousand service of supply troops and three hundred seventy-five thousand replacements.

B. Monthly distribution of foregoing is---for August and first half of September complete general organization and priority projects, less four brigades army tractor artillery for which materiel will not be available until late fall total two hundred fifty-five thousand, twenty thousand new service of supply troops (classes specified later) and fifty thousand replacements grand total for August and first part of September three hundred twenty-five thousand---for second half of September four divisions with proportions of corps troops one hundred twenty thousand, thirty thousand service of supply troops and twenty-five thousand replacements total one hundred seventy-five thousand---for October five divisions with proportion of corps troops, ten thousand army troops, forty thousand service of supply troops and fifty thousand replacements total two hundred fifty thousand---for November five divisions, twenty-seven thousand army troops (includes two brigades army tractor artillery of original general organization project) thirty thousand service of supply troops and eighteen thousand replacements total two hundred twenty-five thousand---for December four divisions including corps troops, 35,000 army troops including two brigades army tractor artillery of original general organization project), twenty-six thousand service of supply troops and nineteen thousand replacements total two hundred thousand---for January four divisions including corps troops, ten thousand army troops, fifty-one thousand service of supply troops and nineteen thousand replacements total two hundred thousand---for February five divisions including corps troops, ten thousand army troops, twenty-one thousand service of supply troops and nineteen thousand replacements total two hundred thousand---for March five divisions including corps troops, ten thousand army troops, forty thousand service of supply troops and fifty thousand replacements total two hundred fifty thousand---for April four divisions including corps troops, twenty thousand army troops, thirty-five thousand service of supply troops and seventy-five thousand replacements total two hundred fifty thousand---for May twelve thousand army troops and one hundred thousand replacements total one hundred twelve thousand. Note in above one division with proportion of corps troops is taken as equivalent to thirty thousand men end note.

C. On the assumption that after shipments as now arranged for June and July have been provided for, thirteen complete divisions and sufficient personnel to complete general organization and priority projects and to furnish the fifty thousand replacements for August will be available in the United States; it will be necessary to draft between June 1918 and March 1919 one million five hundred fifty-two thousand men in order to complete in time the project as given in Subparagraph A.

D. It is urgent that all forces arriving in France be fully organized and sufficiently trained for immediate use in case of necessity. The time necessary for these purposes including periods of organization and transportation is placed at not less than six months for divisional, corps and army troops and at not less than three months for service of supply troops and replacements. On this basis the minimum requirements of personnel for organizing new units and to provide replacements for France are as follows: For June 1918 a total of one hundred fifty-seven thousand men divided into one division including army corps troops, twenty-seven thousand army troops, fifty thousand, service of

supply troops and fifty thousand replacements (replacements are those required for August); for July two hundred ten thousand men divided as follows four divisions including army corps troops, twenty-five thousand army troops, forty thousand service of supply troops and twenty-five thousand replacements; for August two hundred ten thousand men divided into four divisions including army corps troops, ten thousand army troops, thirty thousand service of supply troops and fifty thousand replacements; for September two hundred four thousand men divided into five divisions including army corps troops, ten thousand army troops, twenty-six thousand service of supply troops and eighteen thousand replacements; for October two hundred thirty thousand men divided as follows five divisions including army corps troops, ten thousand army troops, fifty one thousand service of supply troops and nineteen thousand replacements; for November one hundred eighty thousand divided as follows four divisions including army corps troops, twenty thousand army troops, twenty-one thousand service of supply troops and nineteen thousand replacements; for December seventy-one thousand men divided as follows twelve thousand army troops, forty thousand service of supply troops and nineteen thousand replacements; for January eighty-five thousand men divided into thirty-five thousand service of supply troops and fifty thousand replacements; for February seventy-five thousand replacements; for March one hundred thousand replacements.

E. Experience to date shows that training of personnel is not homogeneous even within small units and that many units arrive with from ten to twenty per cent of raw recruits. In order to remedy this in future and to take care of the coming out mentioned in your 1543 the figures for each monthly draft proposed in the foregoing subparagraph should be increased by twenty per cent.

F. The organization of divisions, corps and army troops and service of supply troops should follow the general proportion and classes as given in the general organization and priority projects. In the new forces there will be some reduction in army railway artillery personnel and some classes of service of supply troops. Studies are now being made in this connection and results will be cabled.

G. While the foregoing is based on the maximum achievement considered practicable it should not be construed as limiting the effort of the United States either during the period covered or thereafter. I cannot insist too strongly that the greater the effort of the United States during the next twelve months the less will be the ultimate effort required of her in bringing the war to a successful conclusion.

4. Deducting probable losses it is estimated that the foregoing project will place in France by May 30, 1919 an army of three million men. To maintain this force and to furnish the necessary facilities therefor it is calculated that our cargo shipping will have to be increased monthly and to a minimum of one million six hundred thousand cargo short tons per month by May 1919. This is based on thirty pounds per man per day and two hundred fifty thousand tons per month for installations. In order to provide for the movement of this cargo, it is estimated that about five million two hundred thousand dead weight tons of cargo transports will be required, based on a seventy-two day turnaround. The very satisfactory progress which is being made in ship building in the United States encourages the belief among our shipping men that this tonnage will be available. It is imperative to assign to our transport service for immediate emergency service sufficient vessels to move all cargo as soon as it is ready for shipment. As it will be impossible to obtain delivery in the United States of all the supplies and materials required in the proportion and rate at which it is proposed the men should be shipped, it is also important that every additional vessel which can be put into the service be so employed at the earliest possible date, and that every effort be made to create a large stock of essential supplies not obtainable under pooling system for all services, in order that later on the shipment of such classes of supplies may be suspended and the space be available for shipment of materials which cannot be obtained in the earliest months. Every energy will be put behind our port construction program in order to assure the prompt discharge of the increased number of vessels required, and dispatch will be given at French ports to enable



a seventy-two day turnaround. It is necessary, however, that every effort be made to forward railway rolling stock as rapidly as required.

5. Success in carrying out the above program is largely dependent upon utilizing to the full all resources available in Europe. Only a beginning has been made in this respect by the introduction of the pooling system, but without doubt enormous quantities of supplies of all kinds can and must be obtained in Europe. I am confident that confidential notification of the adoption of our plan of troop shipments for the next ten months will tremendously stimulate our Allies and induce them to place all their resources of essential supplies at our disposal.

6. The foregoing is a brief outline of the program recommended. If more haste can be made by all means let it be done. But the above is the least that should be thought of. Request early advice as to action taken on above plan.

PERSHING.

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Cable: P-1335

### ***Negro Troops***

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.  
*June 19, 1918.*

FOR CHIEF OF STAFF:

Reference your Cablegram 1523, the stories probably invented by German agents that have been widely circulated among colored people in the United States to the effect that colored soldiers in France are always placed in most dangerous positions and sacrificed to save white soldiers; that when wounded they are left on ground to die without medical attention, etc., are absolutely false. The following are the losses as reported up to June 18 in the 4 colored combat regiments now in France: 369th Infantry, died of wounds 3; died of disease 8; severely wounded 2; 370th Infantry, died of wounds 0; died of disease 3; severely wounded 0; 371st Infantry, died of wounds 0; died of disease 8; severely wounded 0; 372d Infantry, died of wounds 0; died of disease 3; severely wounded 0. These figures show conclusively that Negro troops have not thus far occupied positions as dangerous as those occupied by white troops and that their physical condition is excellent.

A tour of inspection just completed among American Negro troops by officers of the Training Section, these Headquarters, show a comparatively high degree of training and efficiency among these troops. Their training is identical with that of other American troops serving with the French army, the effort being to lead all American troops gradually to heavy combat duty by preliminary service in trenches in quiet sectors. Colored troops in trenches have been particularly fortunate, as one regiment had been there a month before any losses were suffered. This almost unheard of heretofore on western front.

Exploit of 2 colored infantrymen some weeks ago in repelling much larger German patrol killing and wounding several Germans and winning croix de guerre by their gallantry has aroused fine spirit of emulation throughout colored troops all of whom are looking forward to more active service. Only regret expressed by colored troops is that they are not given more dangerous work to do. They are especially amused at the stories being circulated that the American colored troops are placed in the most dangerous positions and all are desirous of having more active service than has been permitted them thus far. I cannot commend too highly the spirit shown among the colored combat troops who exhibit fine capacity for quick training and eagerness for the most dangerous work.

PERSHING.

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***Incorporation of American Units***

[Contemporary Translation]

3d Section, Staff  
No. 22,779

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMIES OF THE  
NORTH AND NORTHEAST,  
*June 19, 1918.*

FOR GENERALS COMMANDING ARMY GROUPS AND FOR GENERALS COMMANDING ARMIES

It has been proposed that the question relative to the rights and duties of Commanders of French Infantry Divisions or Divisional Infantry, towards American units placed at the disposal of infantry divisions, be solved.

These units are placed at our disposal for an unlimited length of time but they are not assigned to the French Army, in a definite manner, as the American Command reserves the privilege of possibly regrouping its divisions later. The American units while assigned to French infantry divisions, are still responsible to American General Hq. in the questions of advancement, discipline within organizations, administration and jurisdiction.

The functions of commanders of infantry divisions and of divisional infantry in relation to American regiments cannot therefore be the same as to French regiments.

In all that pertains to tactical employment and general discipline (routes, cantonments, supplies, etc.) the American regiments are entirely subject to the orders of the command of the division.

In all important questions concerning instruction, the method of instruction of the French command will not deviate from those given May 1, 1918, on the instruction of American infantry units. Nevertheless, the American command has issued to its regiments schedules of instruction, which will be taken into consideration insofar as circumstances authorize.

No modification will be made in the organization of the units without prior authorization of the Commander-in-Chief, to whom furthermore everything will be submitted if any complexities present themselves.

All questions in reference to rewards will be likewise taken up with the Commander-in-Chief (Personnel Section) that they may thus be subject to the approbation of the American command in accordance with agreements established on this subject.

The steps to be taken in the event of insufficiency or grave blunders on the part of American troops of officers will make up the context of special justified proposals submitted to the Commander-in-Chief of the Armies of the North and Northeast. (3d Section).

PETAIN.

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***American Support***

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff  
No. 22775

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS.  
FRENCH ARMIES OF THE NORTH AND NORTHEAST,  
*June 19, 1918.*

The General Commander-in-Chief

To the President of the Council of Ministers, the Minister of War

I have the honor to call to your distinguished attention a trend of opinion which is beginning to manifest itself among the public and even in the army, regarding the support our American Allies are bringing us. Certain persons seem to think that this help should permit us to limit our efforts and that, among other things, our troops will be able to rest by handing things over to the Americans, so to speak.

This conception appears to me very dangerous, threatening, if it gains circulation, to give false ideas concerning the American cooperation by exaggerating the latter; it opens the door to illusions which will confuse minds as to the real value of the effort to be put forth by the Allies. It will be a long time before American forces can seriously turn the scales in our favor.

I therefore deem it necessary to react against the trend of opinion to which I allude, a trend which is already voiced in the press, in an article of "Le Matin," June 18, entitled: Furlough for our soldiers (from Mr. Bouilloux-Lafont), and I would ask you, if you share my point of view, to be good enough to take such measures as you think appropriate.

PETAIN.

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SWC: 316: Cablegram

***Project for Use of American Troops***

No. 64-R

A. G. O., WAR DEPARTMENT,  
*Washington, D. C., June 24, 1918.*

AMERICAN SECTION, SUPREME WAR COUNCIL, VERSAILLES

With reference to your 137 [June 22, 1918] the British Ambassador has been informed that the President will not consider any project for the use of American troops emanating from a single nation, but that such recommendations must come from the military representatives at Versailles representing all the nations. It is understood that Lord Reading is cabling that decision to Lord Milner, March.

McCAIN.

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**Textiles**

A. G. O., WAR DEPARTMENT,  
*Washington, D. C., June 25, 1918.*

American Section  
Supreme War Council  
Versailles

Number 65

Joint Note Number 29 referring to textiles has been read by the President and referred to the war trades board by him. March.

McCain.

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Cable P-1369-S

**Enlargement of Military Program**

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, June 25, 1918.*

AGWAR WASHINGTON

FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF AND SECRETARY OF WAR

1. Held conference 23d instant with General Foch regarding American effort. Detailed study by respective staffs and full consideration of future deficiencies of Allies in manpower, and new indications of probable substantial increase of German forces from eastern front lead to inevitable conclusion that our part on Allied effort must be enlarged beyond minimum outlined in my cablegram No. 1342 [June 19, 1918]. In order to express our joint views and to place before the War Department the necessities of the situation, we have agreed to the following recommendation:

Val-des-Ecoliers [Gen. Pershing's chateau at Chaumont] June 23, 1918. To win the victory in 1919 it is necessary to have a numerical superiority which can only be obtained by our having in France in April 80 American divisions and in July 100. At Versailles on June 2, 1918 the three prime ministers, in order to obtain this result, requested President Wilson to draft 300,000 men per month. This draft should be made up as follows:

1. For the creation of six new divisions per month with the corresponding troops for corps, army and service of the rear, 250,000 men per month, beginning with July 1, 1918.

2. For replacements which we determine according to the experience of the French army at 20% per year of the total strength, a figure which will vary from month to

month, but which for the whole period considered would bring the monthly figure of 250,000 men mentioned above to 300,000 men.

By the measures indicated above we will assure the existence and the replacements in France of an army of 46 divisions in October, 64 in January, 80 in April and 100 in July. Signed F. Foch, John J. Pershing.

2. Recommend that above program be adopted in place of minimum outlined in our Cable No. 1342. Am confident that with our tonnage liberally allotted for war purposes from now on, and augmented by available British and French shipping, we shall be able to handle both troops and supplies. M. Clemenceau, who was present at conference, gives assurances that every possible effort to supplement deficiencies in our supplies and equipment, including munitions and aviation, will be made by the French Government. No doubt British will do likewise.

3. In working out details of Cable No. 1342 we took into consideration our information regarding limited cantonment accommodations and lack of equipment, neither of which should enter as factors to delay immediate action on largest program possible. If cantonment facilities be lacking, recommend that billeting be given consideration. Will outline details of above extended plan in a day or so.

PERSHING.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: 675: Letter

### ***American Divisions for Service with British***

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, June 26, 1918.*

My dear Sir Douglas:

I have given the question of sending additional divisions to you much thought.

At the request of General Foch I have planned to send all divisions embarking during the present month to our own divisional areas. Then, too, the fact that American units are so widely dispersed causes me, as you know, no little concern. I feel that the matter of assembling the larger American units is becoming more and more urgent as my forces increase.

All of this, together with the possibility of a much changed situation a month hence, makes it inadvisable to decide the matter of sending additional divisions to you at this time. However, if it becomes desirable later on to form, as you have suggested, an American corps sector on your front, it is apparent that it would then be desirable to send you at least one more division.

I am glad to learn that you would be able to furnish the necessary transport in that event.

Be sure that I shall let you know as soon as conditions permit a final decision.

JOHN J. PERSHING,  
[General, U. S. Army].

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**Organization of Replacement Battalions**

1st Section, General Staff

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*June 26, 1918.*

MEMORANDUM:

1. To meet the need arising through the absence of replacement divisions for our army corps, steps have been taken to organize provisional replacement battalions under the control of the hq. of each corps.

2. It is not intended that the strength of such a replacement battalion should be fixed. Its permanent personnel is intended to be sufficient only to handle the replacement troops sent to it. Its principal function is to receive and forward to their organization officers and soldiers evacuated from S. O. S. or army hospitals as of Class A. There is a possibility of its being developed into a reservoir for a greater or less supply of replacements for the corps.

3. The provisional replacement battalions for the I, II, and III Corps are now functioning. Their location is as follows:

I Corps	VAIRES (Just east of Paris) Co. A - EU
II Corps	Co. B - HESDIGNEUL
III Corps	BAINS-les-BAINS

(The battalion for the IV Corps will be located at FREVILLE just southwest of NEUFCHATEAU.)

JAMES A. LOGAN, JR.,  
Col., G. S., N. A.,  
A. C. of S., G-1.

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Cable: P-1377-S

**Sufficient Tonnage Available**

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, June 26, 1918.*

AGWAR, WASHINGTON

FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF AND SECRETARY OF WAR

Reference verbal assurance regarding tonnage given by British as already reported, have received confirmation today from Lord Milner that we are sure of sufficient tonnage for transportation of at least 250,000 men of all arms and classes per month for the next year. This should settle question as to the shipment of personnel recommended in my Cablegram Number 1369 [June 25, 1918]. I sincerely urge that there be no delay in approving the general plan as outlined. The whole energy of the country should be exerted to

carry it out. Please let me know if there is any further information required by the department as to details of Allied supply for such a force.

PERSHING.

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Cable: 1028-L. S.

***Italian Mission at General Headquarters Approved***

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, June 26, 1918.*

GENERAL BLISS, SUPREME WAR COUNCIL, VERSAILLES, FRANCE

Your letter of June 23 regarding the Italian Military Mission at American General Headquarters has been received. Please advise General Robilant that I should be pleased to have such a mission at my headquarters and that the selection of Brigadier General Ippolito Perrelli as the head of the mission meets with my entire approval.

PERSHING.

[Initialed in ink:] O. K., J. J. P. and J. McA., C. of S.

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Cable: 1029-L. S.

***Shipment of at Least Six Divisions per Month***

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, June 26, 1918.*

GENERAL BIDDLE, AMERICALLY WIRE, LONDON

For Major Griscom. Reference your telegram please inform Lord Milner confidentially that strong recommendations have been sent to Washington for shipment of at least six divisions each month with necessary auxiliary troops, service troops and replacements. General Foch joined me in this recommendation. Will mail you copy of our joint telegram. Very much pleased with assurance of sufficient tonnage for 250,000 men per month for a year. This has been cabled to Washington. Please extend to Lord Milner my warmest greetings.

PERSHING.

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**Views of General Pershing on Age and Fitness of Officers**

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, June 27, 1918.*

AGWAR, WASHINGTON

FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF AND SECRETARY OF WAR

1. Reference my cablegram 65 [July 28, 1917] regarding the ages of officers for higher commands, our own, and more recent experience of both the French and British, bears out the conclusions that younger men must be chosen. Monsieur Clemenceau himself, who is 76 years of age, states that the French greatly erred in retaining their older officers in command and have had to retire them by the hundreds. Without exception British and French higher commanders have commented unfavorably upon age and physical qualifications of general officers sent over here for observation with their armies and for service with our own. Only strongest men can stand the continuous and nerve racking physical strain of battle.

2. The severe conditions of service in this war have never been equalled, and higher officers have never been compelled to perform such arduous work. Their duties require intimate personal supervision day and night, both in offensive and defensive operations. They must spend much time with their troops in the trenches to maintain that high morale that enables our soldiers to withstand the losses that continuous battle entails. It is idle for us to overlook the experience of our Allies. Practically every Allied disaster has been due in large part to lack of aggressiveness on the part of the old commanders who have failed to appreciate that eternal personal supervision has been necessary to success. The experience of the Civil War fully confirms this view.

3. Personal considerations of course cannot be taken into account. Individual desires and records of long and faithful service are not sufficient to warrant our overlooking the stern requirements of war. We must profit by the experience and advice of our Allies who are quite as fully concerned as ourselves in the issue. We cannot listen to theories or take into consideration the few isolated exceptions where old men have commanded in past wars. The spirit of the nation requires youth and vigor in commanders. The fine personnel of the ranks demands the best leadership we can find.

4. The services of officers not considered physically fit should be utilized in lighter work in territorial commands at home, or on recruiting duty, or in training troops, than which there is nothing more important. The necessity of experts in training becomes more and more apparent as the war progresses. Many of the older officers of the French and British armies are doing their part in the training camps at home, while the more strenuous duties at the front are left to younger men. Such work is equally honorable and necessary, and men past middle age not up to field work should accept these assignments in a patriotic spirit.

5. It is not merely a question of passing a medical examination, such as would be required for life insurance, but it is a question of youth, vigor, and leadership, with full use of all physical faculties and without ailments or infirmities of any sort. Officers with physical defects or who are old and inactive only throw extra burdens upon staff officers.

6. In view of the scarcity of trained officers for higher commands, the ages mentioned in my Cable No. 65 are probably low, but I would recommend with all the emphasis possible that officers beyond the age of 45 for brigadier generals and 50 for major generals should not be selected for active command over here except in rare instances where



they are perfect physically and otherwise possess exceptional ability, energy and activity, and as far as possible have actual experience in this war, but in no case should the ages exceed the above by more than three or four years.

7. Referring to my 1118, I adhere to the recommendations therein made as the few officers recommended who are beyond maximum age limit herein laid down come within the exceptions noted in last paragraph and have demonstrated their ability and their physical fitness for active command.

8. I suggest that the War Department announce some general policy as to age and physical requirements in selecting officers for service here. It would prevent the constant recurrence of troublesome personal appeals by officers quite unfitted for this active service and would avoid the chagrin and embarrassment to officers who must be returned to the states or placed on noncombatant duty because of physical unfitness through age or other causes.

PERSHING.

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Cable: A-1630-R

***Officers and Noncommissioned Officers for New Divisions***

A. G. O., WAR DEPARTMENT,  
Washington, D. C., June 28, 1918.

PERSHING, AMEXFORCE, PARIS

In order to provide officers and noncommissioned officers for new divisions about to be organized it is necessary to have some of the officers and noncommissioned officers selected from your forces who are efficient, who have had training in France in the latest methods of warfare, experience in the face of the enemy and who are deserving of promotion.

You will therefore send officer each week until further orders from each infantry, field artillery, and engineer regiment that has completed its training. Select them in the ratio of 2 captains to 16 first lieutenants to 16 second lieutenants. They will be promoted one grade on arrival here. You will fill their vacancies by promotions in France. Follow the same plan---machine-gun officers by sending 1 machine-gun officer from each division in the same ratio as to rank.

Likewise select and send 1 noncommissioned officer per month from each company or battery of infantry, field artillery, and engineers that has completed training and one each alternate month from each machine gun company. March.

McCAIN.

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***Estimate of Tonnage Requirements***

1st Section, General Staff

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, June 29, 1918.*

MEMORANDUM REGARDING TONNAGE:

[Extract]

1. It is assumed that the number of men in France will be as follows:

August	1,200,000	January	2,213,000
September	1,450,000	February	2,394,000
October	1,625,000	March	2,575,000
November	1,825,000	April	2,775,000
December	2,032,000	May	3,000,000

2. In the absence of accurate estimates of the tonnage of supplies and materials which will be required by each branch of the service, it is thought that an all-round allowance of 30 pounds per man per day, plus 150,000 short tons per month, to cover construction, rolling stock and contingencies, for the months of July and August, and the monthly increasing of these figures by 15,000 tons until 250,000 tons per month is reached will provide sufficient tonnage.

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L. H. SHEARMAN.

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SWC: 315-2: Cablegram

***Intervention in Russia and Siberia***

No. 138-S

AMERICAN SECTION, SUPREME WAR COUNCIL,  
*Versailles, Seine-et-Oise, June 29, 1918.*

THE ADJUTANT GENERAL, WASHINGTON

FOR THE SECRETARY OF WAR AND CHIEF OF STAFF

A session of the Supreme War Council has been called for July 2. Subjects to be discussed are:

First, Intervention in Russia and Siberia,

Second, The arrival of American troops for August and thereafter and,

Third, The general situation in Macedonia and the Balkans.

Reference your Number 64 [June 24, 1918] the British Government has not requested any further study of the military expedition that should go to Murmansk and Archangel if any goes. My present opinion is that the sending of a considerable force will be abandoned unless at the same time there is intervention through Siberia. Reference the Macedonian question it seems quite likely that there will be a strong effort made to secure consent of Supreme War Council to a determined offensive by the Allied army in Macedonia against

the Bulgarians. I do not know whether this offensive would embarrass the United States Government if it is actually taking any action on the line indicated in Subparagraph B of Paragraph 1 of my Number 106 dated May 7. I submit matter for your consideration.

BLISS.

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SWC: 315-2: Cablegram

***Tonnage for 100-Division Program***

AMERICAN SECTION, SUPREME WAR COUNCIL,  
*Versailles, Seine-et-Oise, June 30, 1918.*

No. 139-S

AGWAR, WASHINGTON

FOR SECRETARY OF WAR AND CHIEF OF STAFF

1. At urgent request of M. Clemenceau I have had today an interview with M. Tardieu on the subject of tonnage necessary to meet the requirements of program of June 23 agreed to by M. Clemenceau, M. Tardieu, General Pershing and General Foch relative to one hundred American divisions in France in July 1919. I explained that I could give no exact information on this subject but that it must be obtained from General Pershing and authorities in Washington. I learned however that it was not desired that I give detailed information but that I cable conveying M. Clemenceau's urgent request that the Secretary of War cable me the opinion of our government on the following subject which M. Clemenceau thinks of greatest importance to be communicated to the Supreme War Council at its meeting on Wednesday, July 3.

2. The agreement of June 23, 1918, calls for a total American force in France by July 1919, of 4,160,000. The numbers of men that will have to be transported each month to accomplish this program are given in cables numbers 8663 to 8669 O. M. of M. Tardieu to French commissioner, United States, which cables are understood to be in possession of Colonel Requin, and copies are assumed to have been delivered to the War Department. In addition to the shipping required for the transport of these troops, it will be necessary to add (see cable from French Commissioner General to French Ambassador, Washington, June 29) shipping for the following:

First, for supplies for maintenance;

Second, for the transport of horses on the basis indicated in cable number 8797 of French Commissioner General to M. de Billy. M. Tardieu stated that Washington had been informed as to the number of horses that will be furnished by France to our forces;

Third, forage and grain for horses;

Fourth, of war material, as this material leaves American shops;

Fifth, of railway rolling stock, to extent required to meet increased rail transport of troops in France.

3. The specific point upon which M. Clemenceau desires information by Wednesday, July 3, 1918, for presentation to the Supreme War Council, is:

Can approximately sufficient troop and cargo shipping be made available to carry out above program, month by month?

4. Copy of this cablegram goes to General Pershing. He is somewhere in the north and I cannot communicate with him at this time.

BLISS.

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### ***Combat Instructions***

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*June 29, 1918.*

#### THE OCCUPANCY OF THE GROUND---TACTICAL INSPECTION OF COMMANDS

1. The purpose and use of the entrenched position nearest the enemy do not seem to be clearly understood by all concerned. This advanced system of trenches ordinarily constitutes only an outpost line, intended to be more or less lightly occupied by detached groups. Its purpose is to hold the enemy under observation, screen the main line of resistance, which may be several thousand meters behind, and deny the ground occupied by these groups to any but hostile attacks in considerable force. Only very special conditions of terrain will cause the outpost line and the line of resistance to coincide. In the usual case, the plan of defense does not contemplate the reinforcement of the outpost groups, and the order for defense definitely prescribe the amount of resistance to be offered by each and its action in case of attack. If the enemy advances in strength, he is to be defeated, not from this line, but from the main line of resistance behind. To send additional troops into the first or outpost line will not add to the likelihood of defeating the attack, but will merely offer better targets to the enemy's preliminary bombardment, and therefore increase the casualties of the defender. The fire of a few small groups who escape the bombardment and man the parapet in advance of the enemy's arrival will be sufficient to stop any but a determined attack in considerable strength. If the enemy advances with small forces his chief aim is probably the capture of prisoners. Reinforcing the first line adds little to the chance of defeating a carefully prepared raid, but ordinarily adds very greatly to the number of prisoners taken by the attacker. A raid can often best be defeated by timely withdrawal from the sections where it is evidently the enemy's intention to enter, followed when the enemy is therein by an immediate counterattack, delivered preferably from a flank.

2. Brigade and division commanders of troops in the line will frequently inspect sectors occupied by their commands. They will visit all trenches, including the most advanced, unless the local situation renders doing so entirely impracticable. They will question officers and noncommissioned officers concerning the plan of defense and the part these subordinates are to take therein, and will learn how each expects to handle his command in the several contingencies likely to arise. So far as lies within the province of the officer inspecting, faulty tactical dispositions, misunderstandings, and wrong intentions will be corrected. In so doing the principles outline in Par. 1 will receive due application.

3. When the Commander-in-Chief, or officers delegated by him, visits the headquarters of a division in the line, the division commander will be expected to give, without reference to documents, the dispositions and tactical function of each portion of his command down to and including the battalion. Similarly at any inspection, commanders of all grades will be prepared to explain the disposition and functions of their own and included commands.

PERSHING.

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1. The principles enunciated in Bulletin No. 30, May 23, 1918; memorandum for corps and division commanders, August 5, 1918, and notes on recent operations, No. 1, August 7, 1918, are not yet receiving due application. Attack formations of platoons, companies, and battalions are everywhere too dense and follow too rigidly the illustrations contained in the offensive combat of small units. Waves are too close together; individuals therein have too little interval. Lines are frequently seen with the men almost elbow to elbow, and seldom with intervals greater than two or three paces. Columns, when used, are too long; in first line companies they should rarely have a greater depth than ten files. All formations are habitually lacking in elasticity; there is almost never any attempt to maneuver, that is, to throw supports and reserves to the flanks for envelopment. Scouts, if used, are frequently only a few yards in front of the leading waves, where the only purpose they can serve is to blanket or to receive the fire of the men behind them. Subordinate officers display little appreciation of the assumed situation and how best to meet its requirements. It is necessary, therefore, to repeat once more a few fundamental principles which must be impressed upon all concerned.

2. The essential difference between open and trench warfare, so far as effect upon formations is concerned, is characterized by the presence or absence of the rolling barrage ahead of the infantry. From a tactical point of view, the method of combat in trench warfare presents a marked contrast to that employed in open warfare, and the attempt by assaulting infantry to use trench warfare methods in an open warfare combat will be successful only at great cost. Trench warfare is marked by uniform formations, the regulation of space and time by higher command down to the smallest details, absence of scouts preceding the first wave, fixed distances and intervals between units and individuals, voluminous orders, careful rehearsal, little initiative upon the part of the individual soldier. Open warfare is marked by scouts who precede the first wave, irregularity of formation, comparatively little regulation of space and time by the higher command, the greatest possible use of the infantry's own fire power to enable it to get forward, variable distances and intervals between units and individuals, use of every form of cover and accident of the ground during the advance, brief orders, and the greatest possible use of individual initiative by all troops engaged in the action.

3. The following principles deal chiefly with warfare in the open. In a trench-to-trench attack, where a moving barrage is to be followed closely, uniform formations are generally expedient until the enemy's first line trenches have been entered. Thereafter, the principles outlined below should be applied.

4. Scouts: When closely following a moving barrage, there is seldom room for scouts. When the barrage has been lost or does not exist, as is ordinarily the case in the open field, scouts should precede the first line companies. They should deploy at wide and irregular intervals, 10 to 50 paces, to present a poor target to hostile machine guns. They should take every possible advantage of the ground to obtain cover, provided their advance is not thereby unduly delayed. Exposed ground should be crossed at a run. Their distance in front of the main bodies of their platoons should follow no set rule, but should constantly vary with the ground and with the anticipated position of the enemy. One moment they may be 500 meters ahead of their platoons; a few minutes later they may be absorbed therein. Their purpose is to compel the enemy machine guns to open fire and so disclose their location or be run over by the scouts. When the hostile machine guns have been located, the scouts should at once open fire.

5. Platoons: Under cover of the fire of the scouts, enough men from the platoon behind work forward individually or in small groups to this thin and very irregular line of scouts in order to give it sufficient fire power to pin the machine-gun crew to the ground. Or, if the scouts are in low ground, it will sometimes be advisable for the platoon to open fire over their heads from commanding ground behind. But the firing line, however formed, must remain a thin one, with no two men ever less than five meters apart,

and in the usual case preferably at much greater interval. The first reinforcements for the scouts should contain one or more automatic rifle teams. At the same time, riflemen and bombers, and, if the ground favors it, automatics also, begin to work from the second wave around one or both flanks of the firing line to get at the flanks of the machine gun, and thus close on its crew. All detachments or units attempting such an attack must take proper measures to secure their own flanks. If the hostile gun is shifted to meet the new attack, a whole or part of the firing line should take prompt advantage of that change in position or direction of fire to rush directly forward. As soon as the scouts have located the machine gun, the rifle grenadiers assist the advance of everyone by heavy fire from suitable positions behind the first line. The ability of the platoon leader is displayed by prompt reconnaissance of the ground, by a rapid estimate of what it offers toward facilitating the advance of his men, and by immediate decision upon a simple plan for the use of his combined weapons and of the ground to enable him to close with the enemy. His plan should habitually include pinning the enemy to the ground by frontal and flanking fire, under cover of which some portions of the platoon, usually those sent against the hostile flanks, can close by short rushes with the enemy. The training and discipline of the platoon are shown by the skill with which the men carry out the plan of the leader. A platoon should by itself be able to capture one or even a pair of hostile machine guns.

6. Company: The capture of a nest of machine guns will probably be beyond the capacity of a platoon, and will require the company to send its support platoons to the flanks to envelop or encircle.

7. Machine Guns: Every first line battalion should habitually be reinforced by a machine gun company, which reports to and is under the orders of the battalion commander. He should not in turn pass the company on by platoons to his rifle companies, but should command it as a fifth company. This does not mean that the company should be assembled at one place for massed fire. In fact, the contrary is usually advisable. The company should ordinarily work by platoons, one supporting each first line company, while one, if two rifle companies only are in first line, is charged with defense against hostile aircraft, with replacements for the first line platoons and with securing the flanks of the battalion. When initiating an attack, the machine gun platoons will at first usually follow in rear of the first line companies, provided the character of the terrain renders their early use probable. When such is not the case, they should follow in rear of the support companies. After the enemy has been located, the guns of each platoon habitually work in pairs, one pair remaining in position on commanding ground to cover the advance of the other pair to a suitable firing position in advance. All changes of position are, as a rule, made by bounds of half platoons. Except in the early stages of an attack, as noted above, a steady advance of machine guns will seldom be advisable. A platoon supporting the advance of an infantry company ordinarily fires from commanding positions over the heads of the troops. The company commander remains near the battalion commander. He takes full advantage of every opportunity to concentrate the fire of his platoons, usually without changing their position, on those hostile nests or strong points which are making most trouble. He shifts the fire of his platoon, whenever practicable, to give flanking instead of direct fire. He must take every opportunity to bring forward his gun and ammunition carts.

Platoons in support of first line companies should send agents, usually a non-commissioned officer and two privates, forward to the rifle companies. A rocket signal will, as a rule, most promptly secure fire from the supporting machine gun.

8. One-Pounder Gun: The one-pounder guns will usually be assigned to the first line battalions, and will be placed under the command of the infantry majors. When there is only one battalion in the first line, two guns should ordinarily be assigned to it. The remaining gun may be held under the order of the colonel between the leading and the second battalion to replace any gun lost in the first line and to secure the flanks. The one-pounder gun is intended for direct fire against machine guns, in which it is of the utmost possible value. In fact, the one-pounder is the most effective single weapon in

the infantry regiment for use against machine guns. It is so effective that the hostile artillery will not permit its approach within short range unless its advance is so carefully screened that the enemy does not discover it until it opens fire. It should not be used against other targets than machine guns or tanks. These guns advance by bounds from one firing position to another along defiladed routes, which should be reconnoitered in advance.

9. Light Mortars: The light trench mortar should be assigned by pairs to first line battalions, and placed under the battalion commander. Its principal use is also against machine-gun nests, where its fire is both physically and morally highly effective. Like the machine guns and the one-pounder, the advance of the mortar must be by bounds from one position to another from which it can support the first line companies. In open warfare its use is hampered by the difficulty of transporting by hand both the mortar and its bulky ammunition. Economy in the use of ammunition and careful organization of the system of supply will do much toward overcoming these difficulties. When the Brandt-Maurice shell can be obtained 75 per cent of the ammunition should be of this type.

10. Recapitulation: To recapitulate, the German machine guns constitute the chief weapon to be combated by our infantry. The platoon commander must oppose them by fire from his rifles, his automatics and his rifle grenades, and must close with their crews under cover of this fire and of ground beyond their flanks. The battalion commander, in addition to the weapons of the platoon, has his machine guns, one-pounder gun, light mortars and accompanying field piece. The battalion commander who makes the most intelligent use of the combined fire of these weapons and of the ground will lose the fewest men. The success of every unit from the platoon to the divisions must be exploited to the fullest extent. Where strong resistance is encountered, reinforcements must not be thrown in to make a frontal attack at this point, but must be pushed through gaps created by successful units to attack these strong points in the flank or rear.

11. Artillery: The division artillery, for open warfare, is divided into two classes: (a) That retained by the division commander under the command of the artillery brigade commander, and (b) That assigned to infantry units under the command of the infantry commanders.

The proportions to be assigned to these two classes depend on the following considerations:

The retention of a large proportion under the division commander permits rapid and powerful concentration on decisive points anywhere on the division front. But unless communications are perfect and information complete, it renders the close support of local actions difficult.

The assignment of artillery to infantry units binds such artillery closely to the infantry it is supporting, and gives the infantry commander a powerful combination of arms with which to handle local situations without loss of time. On the other hand, it tends to lessen the power of artillery concentration of the division as a whole, and may render the infantry unit clumsy and immobile. Moreover, it demands a high degree of decision and initiative in the part of both the infantry and artillery commanders immediately involved.

In whatever manner the artillery is assigned, close and direct liaison between the artillery and the infantry which it is supporting must be maintained.

A suitable proportion of artillery for assignment under infantry commanders, is, as a rule, one battalion of light artillery to each infantry brigade. With respect to its mission and employment, this artillery is divided into two classes: Infantry batteries and accompanying guns. If a battalion is assigned to each infantry brigade, a suitable disposition will frequently be to use two batteries as infantry batteries, and to break up one battery for use as accompanying guns. Infantry batteries should be fought as batteries; accompanying guns always by piece; each under an officer when practicable.

12. Infantry Batteries: With two infantry batteries per infantry brigade, they may be either assigned one under each infantry regimental commander, or both held under the infantry brigade commander. The former disposition is ordinarily preferable when regiments are deployed abreast.

With both infantry batteries held under the infantry brigade commander, the artillery battalion commander commands these batteries, ordinarily remaining with the infantry brigade commander or in close communication with him. When the infantry batteries are assigned to infantry regiments, the artillery battalion commander supervises the employment of his batteries, as well as of the replacement of personnel, materiel, and ammunition.

The missions of infantry batteries include the attack of the stronger points of resistance, defense against local counterattacks, and firing on hostile reserves.

Fire is habitually by direct observation from near the battery positions on specific objectives. The range finder should be at hand and used when accurate map ranges are not available and for moving objectives. Free use must be made of scouts for securing information and for protection against surprise. Visual communications are important. Positions should be forward, well reconnoitered, but occupied with rapidity and boldness.

13. Accompanying Guns: These are assigned first line infantry battalions and placed under the command of the infantry majors. The proportion may be one or even two per battalion, depending on the front covered.

Accompanying guns attack hostile machine guns, tanks and strong points.

Fire is direct in the case of clearly visible or moving objectives; otherwise indirect with flash defilade and observation at the piece. The range should be from 500 to 1500 meters. Ranges are ordinarily estimated. A wide bracket of say 400 meters is quickly obtained and searched. Ineffective ranges are eliminated during fire for effect.

The pieces are ordinarily moved horsed, unlimbered under cover, and run forward by hand. Caissons are brought as near the pieces as conditions permit. Accompanying guns find their protection principally in the small target presented, in concealment by natural features, and in their mobility. Two or more caissons should be assigned for the ammunition supply of each piece.

Captains of batteries broken up for accompanying guns may devote their attention to superintending ammunition supply and replacement of materiel and personnel, or they may assign lieutenants to this duty and themselves command pieces.

Nearby infantry reserves should be called upon to assist in ammunition supply and in the movement of the piece when necessary.

A portion of the batteries personnel for information and communication should be assigned to each piece. This personnel is pushed forward to secure information and locate objectives, to reconnoiter positions, and to secure liaison with the infantry commander and the ammunition supply.

14. The functions of infantry commanders having either infantry batteries or accompanying guns under their command generally consist in the indication of missions and supplying information as to enemy and friendly dispositions. Technical details and methods should be left as far as possible to the artillery commander. However, in the absence of specific mission, the artillery commander should, on his own initiative, use the means at his disposal to locate and attack suitable objectives.

In general, the artillery commander is responsible that the full power of his weapons is developed and aggressively used. The infantry commander must apply this power where it will best assist his infantry.

15. Division Trench Mortars: The 6-inch Newton trench mortar, while developed primarily for position warfare, is capable of utilization in open warfare. Its motor transport enables it to follow the advance, and assures ammunition supply. If conditions render it necessary, a portion of the mortars may be left behind. This affords a reserve of personnel and transport for ammunition supply to hasten the occupation of a position and to replace casualties promptly.

16. The mission of the division trench mortar battery in open warfare is solely a close support of infantry in overcoming strong points which are holding up the advance. Except when the attack is at dawn of days succeeding the first day of the advance the position warfare conception of elaborately prepared emplacements must be entirely abandoned.



It requires too much time. For missions undertaken and executed by day, the rapid occupation of a position and opening of fire is essential to success.

17. When the nature of the action is such that the mission of the trench mortar battery can be anticipated, it should preferably be attached to the infantry regiment or brigade which it will be required to support. When its mission cannot be foreseen, it must be held subject to orders of the division or brigade in such a way that its prompt assignment to any mission arising during the action can be effected. Its assignment to the division infantry reserve is feasible when this will not result in its being held too far to the rear for prompt entry into action. Whatever be the tactical assignment of the battery, the battery commander must take all possible measures to push his unit forward in order to hasten its entry into action when called for.

18. Infantry commanders assigning a mission to the battery should state definitely the locality to be fired upon, and the positions of friendly troops. The selection of positions should be left within rather large limits to the battery commander. The time of attack should be arranged after consulting the battery commander as to the time necessary for the latter to go into battery.

19. Up to the time of the assignment of a mission, the battery commander remains with, or in close liaison with, the infantry commander to whom attached. When assigned a mission the battery commander hastens to join the infantry commander whose unit he is to support. After obtaining the necessary information as to the operation contemplated, he makes a rapid reconnaissance of position, and meets the battery on arrival in the vicinity or sends an agent to conduct it to the position. The position selected should be at as short a range as is possible consistent with proper concealment and ammunition supply.

20. Visual concealment in position must be had, but protection must be limited ordinarily to that afforded by the natural features of the position selected. The construction of emplacements is carried only as far as absolutely necessary to fire. Previously prepared sandbags are necessary. Protection for the cannoneers must not be allowed to delay the opening of fire. The deep defilade possible with this piece is ample protection against hostile fire under open warfare conditions. The moral and material effect of a rapid fire, promptly delivered, is great. But if the fire is delayed, the enemy is allowed to perfect his dispositions, all the while inflicting losses on our infantry.

21. When a mission has been accomplished, the materiel should be at once withdrawn and loaded on the transport for further advance.

\* \* \* \* \*

22. Division commanders will secure full compliance with the principles herein enunciated.

23. Copies of all standing instructions upon tactical matters which have been, or may be, issued by division or higher headquarters will be forwarded through channels to general headquarters.

PERSHING.

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**Status of American Divisions in France**

July 1; 1918.

MONTHLY SUMMARY OF A. E. F.

[Extract]

1. RIFLE STRENGTH	1 Jan.	54,000	RATION STRENGTH	1 Jan.	160,000
	1 Feb.	57,000		1 Feb.	215,556
	1 Mar.	64,000		1 Mar.	245,000
	1 Apr.	75,000		1 Apr.	319,737
	1 May	117,000		1 May	431,959
	1 June	215,000		1 June	601,243
	26 June	271,000		26 June	820,000

2. On January 1 there were four and a half divisions in France; there are on July 1, twenty-one divisions. Owing to the agreement between the Allies to bring over American infantry of the II and III Corps before their artillery, the arrival of the latter with their divisions in the line has been delayed.

3. Formerly, American corps consisted of 6 divisions of which 4 were combat, 1 replacement and 1 base.

Owing to operations and the present emergency, the replacement division of the original I Corps has been turned into a combat division and so far of the divisions in the country, only one, the 41st, has been used as a depot division. (Strength on July 1, 8,000 Inf.) It is probable that after the present emergency is over that each corps will have a replacement and a depot division again.

Although nothing has been definitely decided yet about reverting to the replacement and base divisions in each corps when operations permit, the Commander-in-Chief has decided that the 83d will assume the functions of a depot division now; also that divisions will be allotted to any corps as circumstances demand in the same manner as British divisions are. On July 1, the distribution list is as follows:

I Corps	Battlefront	La Ferte-sous-Jouarre
	1st Div.	Tartigny
	2nd Div.	Bezu-le-Guery
	3d Div.	Viffort
	4th Div.	La Ferte-sous-Jouarre
	26th Div.	Trondes
	28th Div.	Rebais
	42d Div.	St-Germain
II Corps	(With British)	Fruges
	27th Div. (less artillery)	Beauval
	30th Div. (less artillery)	Nordausques
	33d Div. (less artillery)	Molliens-au-Bois
	78th Div. (less artillery)	Nielles-les-Blecquin
	80th Div. (less artillery)	Samer
III Corps	Remiremont	Alsace front
	5th Div. (less artillery)	Anould
	32d Div.	Rougemont
	35th Div. (less artillery)	Arches
IV Corps	Boucq.	Lorraine front
	77th Div.	Baccarat
	82d Div. (less artillery)	Boucq

V Corps	Training	
	29th Div.	
	37th Div.	Bourmont (arriving)
	83d Div.	Montigny-le-Roi
	89th Div.	Reynel
	90th Div.	[Aigny-le-Duc]
	92d Div.	Bourbonne-les-Bains
	41st Depot Div.	St-Aignan

\* \* \* \* \*

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SWC: 316: Cablegram

### ***Military Program for 1918-1919***

No. 66-R

A. G. O., WAR DEPARTMENT,  
Washington, D. C., July 1, 1918.

AMERICAN SECTION, SUPREME WAR COUNCIL, VERSAILLES

[Extract]

With reference to your 138, General Foch and General Pershing have joined in a recommendation that the United States greatly enlarge its military program and send to France during 1918-1919 much larger forces than the present program contemplates. Possibilities of compliance are being studied here. Many questions of material and industrial output are involved, and no immediate determination can be made. It is of great importance that no expectations be held out of ability to comply with this enlarged program until studies are completed. Meantime, it is highly desirable that the July rate of shipping of troops from America be maintained through August. If military representatives will so recommend, the British will no doubt continue their shipping, upon which we must depend in the matter.

\* \* \* \* \*

McCAIN.

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Cable: A-1640-R

### ***One Hundred Division Program***

A. G. O., WAR DEPARTMENT,  
Washington, D. C., July 1, 1918.

PERSHING, AMEXFORCE, FRANCE

With reference to your 1369 [June 25, 1918] the 100-division program suggested therein is being studied and it is considered by the President and Secretary of War of the greatest importance that no expectation be held out by you to representatives of foreign armies that the United States will be able to carry out such a program until you are informed so from here. We intend to keep up the increased program through August provided shipping can be definitely obtained from Great Britain. Before that time consideration must be given to

question of shipping, material, and the industrial output of the United States, concerning which conferences will be held with representatives of the Shipping Board, War Industries Board, War Trade Board, and other civilian agencies initiated for the purpose of handling such matters by the President. March

McCAIN.

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SWC: 7th Session: Minutes

***Shipping Requirements for American Reinforcements from August Onwards***

MINUTES OF THE FIRST MEETING OF THE SEVENTH SESSION  
OF THE SUPREME WAR COUNCIL, HELD AT THE TRIANON PALACE, VERSAILLES,  
ON TUESDAY, JULY 2, 1918, AT 4 P.M.

[Extract]

\* \* \* \* \*

M. Clemenceau called upon M. Tardieu, Commissaire General, to make a statement concerning the shipment of American forces from the month of August onwards.

M. Tardieu said that the measures which they were called upon to examine today owed their origin directly from the decision taken by the Supreme War Council at their last meeting, and, followed more especially from the telegram sent to President Wilson in the name of Mr. Lloyd George, M. Clemenceau, and Signor Orlando. In this message the President of the United States had been asked to transfer to France a force which in July 1919 would amount to 100 divisions, and this would entail the calling up of 300,000 men monthly. They had to examine the means to obtain this result. The telegram in question had been presented by M. Jusserand, the French Ambassador in Washington, to President Wilson on June 6 last. The President had replied that, as far as he was concerned, he saw no objection to the figures mentioned, which he thought could, in fact, be increased if necessary. A report of the conversation which had taken place between President Wilson and M. Jusserand had been duly communicated to the British and Italian Governments. Later on, the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Forces in France and General Pershing had prosecuted an inquiry into the measures to be taken to give effect to the proposals made. Further, the French Government had been examining the questions connected with the supply of machine guns, guns, aircraft, etc., to the American troops as they arrive in France. As a result of these studies, it could be said that the French Government was in a position to supply all that was required, with the exception of horses, from August onwards. The French Government had laid down that the first condition required in order to ensure the transport of the necessary troops and material was that the same provisions which had been made during the months of June and July should be continued until the end of the year. This matter had been discussed in Washington between the French and British representatives, and the conclusion arrived at was that it would be possible to continue the present tonnage contribution until the end of the year. As a result of this meeting, Lord Reading had telegraphed for instructions to England, but at the same time he had expressed confidence that the proposals just mentioned would be accepted.

The second question to be considered related to the steps to be taken by the United States of America to supply the number of men laid down in the program dated June 2, 1918. On June 23, 1918, a conference was held at the French *Grand Quartier General* between Generals Pershing and Foch (M. Clemenceau being present), when a dispatch was drafted for submission to President Wilson.

This dispatch stated that, in order to ensure victory in 1919, a numerical superiority of the Allies over the enemy must be assured, and this could only be attained by having in France 80 American divisions in April 1919, and 100 divisions in July 1919.

At Versailles on June 2, 1918, the three prime ministers in order to attain these result asked President Wilson to enlist 300,000 men monthly. The men so enlisted would furnish the complement for the following units:

1. New divisions at the rate of six a month, together with army and army corps headquarters units and lines of communication troops, required to complete them, i. e., 250,000 men a month from July 1, 1918.
2. To drafts, fixed according to the experience gained by the French army at 20 per cent a year of the total effectives. This figure would not be constant month by month, but for the whole period in question would have the effect of raising the monthly figure given above from 250,000 to 300,000 men.
3. The above measures would assure the maintenance in France of an army of the following strength:
  - 46 divisions in October 1918
  - 64 divisions in January 1919
  - 80 divisions in April 1919
  - 100 divisions in July 1919

\* \* \* \* \*

The dispatch in question had been duly presented to President Wilson, who had stated that he would take the advice of his war minister and expert advisors, but that the recommendations of Generals Foch and Pershing appeared to be reasonable. The French Ambassador, M. Jusserand, in presenting this telegram, took the opportunity to urge that the recruitment of American troops should not be limited to the tonnage possibilities. Recruitment should precede the supply of tonnage. This fact had been clearly proved by what had taken place recently. Unexpected tonnage had been found, and large numbers of troops, in excess of the numbers contemplated, had been brought over to France. President Wilson had accepted these views, and had agreed not to slacken enlistment in any way. As a result of this interview, General Bliss had today received a telegram from the American Minister of War, Mr. Baker, stating that Generals Foch and Pershing had sent a joint recommendation asking the United States Governments to increase their military programme in 1918-1919, and to despatch to France a far larger number of troops than was actually agreed on in the programme. Mr. Baker went on to say that they were studying over there the question of complying with the General's demands, but that as important questions of equipment and manufacture were concerned, it was impossible to give an immediate response. Before these studies were completed it was most essential that no answer should be given which might raise false hopes. Meanwhile, however, it was greatly hoped that the same amount of tonnage for troops would be available in August as in July.

In anticipation of the acceptance of the programme proposed, detailed studies of the problem involved had been undertaken with a view to determining the means of execution. Figures had been prepared showing the numbers of men and horses that could be transported. The question of the transport of horses was a very important one, as the French could not continue to supply horses to the American forces after the month of July. An estimate had been made of the tonnage needed to keep the force in being, to endow it with rolling-stock, munitions, etc. Though this estimate was not complete in all details, it could be stated broadly that no difficulty would be found in moving the men, but considerable difficulties might be found in the shipment of supplies.

The figures so far obtained would tend to show that the tonnage required would amount to:  
3,000,000 tons in July  
3,500,000 tons in August  
4,000,000 tons in September

and thereafter the amount would go on increasing at a proportional rate, since the quantity of supplies required to revictual would naturally increase with the size of the forces.

Lord Milner asked if the calculations could be taken as maximum numbers.

M. Tardieu replied that they were, but he insisted that the numbers he had given should be considered as only approximate.

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SWC: 315-2: Cablegram

### ***Tonnage for 100-Division Program***

No. 140-S

AMERICAN SECTION, SUPREME WAR COUNCIL,  
*Versailles, Seine-et-Oise, July 2, 1918.*

AGWAR, WASHINGTON

FOR SECRETARY OF STATE, SECRETARY OF WAR AND CHIEF OF STAFF

[Extract]

\* \* \* \* \*

3. When the subject of the one hundred American division program came up for discussion, I presented a paraphrase of the first paragraph of War Department cable Number 66 dated July 1. The Supreme War Council then adopted its Resolution Number two of this session as follows: First, that General Bliss is requested to ascertain in what measure the American Government can furnish the tonnage necessary to transport to France the troops called for by the approved program (one hundred divisions by August 1, 1919) both for men and supplies, and Second, that after this estimate has been obtained, the British Government will examine to what extent it can make up any deficiency.

BLISS.

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SWC: 316: Cablegram

### ***One Hundred Division Program***

No. 67-R

A. G. O., WAR DEPARTMENT,  
*Washington, D. C., July 2, 1918.*

AMSEC, VERSAILLES

With reference to your 139,\* it is out of the question for the War Department to answer the question in your Paragraph 3, about which M. Clemenceau desires information. My

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\* [Printed in this series under date, June 30, 1918, and deals with troop and cargo space available for the 100-division plan.]

cablegram Number 66 [July 1, 1918] to you stating the attitude of the department with reference to the one hundred division program is the only answer that can be given at this time and it must be reiterated that no American representative must give expectation of the one hundred division program going through until definitely informed to that effect by the War Department. I am sending for M. de Billy to get copies of cablegrams referred to and which have never been furnished us. March.

McCAIN.

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SWC: 339: Joint Note

### ***Military Policy for 1918-1919***

JOINT NOTE NO. 37

#### GENERAL MILITARY POLICY OF THE ALLIES FOR THE AUTUMN OF 1918 AND FOR THE YEAR 1919

To: The Supreme War Council

(Study submitted by the Permanent Military Representatives to the Supreme War Council, in accordance with a resolution of the Supreme War Council, dated July 4, 1918.)

#### PART I

#### WESTERN FRONT

[Extract]

1. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS: France and Italy remain, as always, the main theatres of the war. A decisive victory can only be gained by the Allies by the decisive defeat of the German army, and its defeat would necessarily entail the total collapse of enemy resistance on the remainder of the western front and in all other theatres of war.

The Allies must, therefore, concentrate their resources both in manpower and in material on the western front for the decisive struggle.

The decisive defeat of the enemy coalition can only be achieved on the portion of the western front between the North Sea and Switzerland. And, even though it might appear possible to crush the Austrian army on the Italian front, and a portion of the German army with it, the final defeat of Germany, the real foundation of the hostile coalition, can only be brought about in the theatre of operations where the main German armies are to be found, that is to say, between the North Sea and Switzerland.

Operations in the other theatres of war must be made to play their part in the decision sought for on the western front by contributing to the moral and material exhaustion of the enemy. But such operations must not be allowed to absorb resources which are required by the armies of the Entente on the decisive front. The defeat of the Central Powers in any of subsidiary theatres of war could only be a step on the road to the defeat of Germany: It could not bring about the final decision.

A. The front from the North Sea to Switzerland:

By the continued arrival of American troops in increasing numbers the Allies will have from the Autumn of 1918 onwards a numerical superiority which will be appreciable.

But if, in spite of the reverses he has met with during the summer and autumn of 1918, the enemy's fighting power still remains unbroken, it will only be in the spring of 1919 that the Allied superiority in men, in tanks, in aeroplanes, and in other material of war will justify the expectation of a great success, which would be capable of being exploited to the extent necessary to bring about a final decision.

Moreover, this superiority can only be obtained and developed

(a) If France, Great Britain, and Italy maintain their present effort, and

(b) If American troops continue to arrive in such numbers as have been demanded by the Marshal, Commanding-in-Chief the Allied armies in France.

If, however, it is evident that the fighting power of the enemy has diminished, it will be the duty of the Marshal, Commanding-in-Chief the Allied armies in France to consider if active operations can be successfully carried out before the spring of next year.

B. Italian Front: It is clear from the present situation of the opposing forces:

(a) That, for the present, the Allies could contemplate no considerable withdrawal of troops from their armies in Italy,

(b) That so long as the Austrians are not largely reinforced by German troops, the Allied forces in Italy appear to be able not only to hold their own but, if an opportunity should occur, to hasten the exhaustion and disorganization of the enemy by offensive action.

## II. GENERAL PLAN

A. Autumn and Winter, 1918 and the year 1919:

(a) Front from the North Sea to Switzerland: From what has already been stated it follows that the Allies must, during the autumn and winter 1918-1919, first of all render their front secure against any hostile attack and, secondly, must make preparations, which are complete in all respects, for those offensive operations by which it is hoped to reach a final decision as soon as a sufficient superiority has been realized, and climatic conditions permit.

The Allied front can only be made secure by a solid, vigorous and active attitude of defense, which must include such local offensives and counteroffensives actions, as may be required, to disturb the enemy's preparations.

For the preparation of offensive operations it is necessary:

(i) To ensure, to adjust, or to develop more fully, the programmes for munitions, for tanks, for aviation and other material so as to meet, as far as possible, the wishes of the Marshal Commanding-in-Chief the Allied armies in France:

(ii) To put the troops through a systematic course of training for offensive operations:

(iii) To push forward the preparation of the theatre of operations as rapidly as possible, in accordance with the plans of the Marshal Commanding-in-Chief of the Allied armies in France:

(iv) To spare no effort to accumulate in the shortest possible time the greatest possible numerical superiority. For this purpose it is very important that American troops should continue to be sent to France, to the exclusion of other theatres of operations, and to be placed at the disposal of the Marshal Commanding-in-Chief the Allied armies in France, until such time as the Supreme War Council may decide otherwise and with this object in view the necessary tonnage should be made available.

Finally, it is necessary to think out beforehand all such operations as are calculated to improve our chances, from a military and an economic point of view, for the final decisive operations; and as are calculated to keep the initiative in the hands of the Allies; or to prevent the enemy from reorganizing his forces; or to take full advantage of any mistakes he may make or any weakness he may show. It will be the duty of the Marshal Commanding-in-Chief the Allied armies in France to determine the scope of such



preparatory operations, having regard to the relative conditions of the Allied forces and those of the enemy, while remembering that the final decisive operations must be executed with the greatest possible force.

(b) Italian Front: Similar preparations should be made for the Italian front. If the conditions in Austria render it advantageous to support an active diplomacy by military action, offensive operations in Italy might be advisable. Such operations should be executed with a concentration of resources as great as the Marshal Commanding-in-Chief the Allied armies in France considers that the situation on the front between Switzerland and the North Sea will permit.

In order to facilitate a concentration of troops in Italy not only for offensive operations, as indicated above; but also in order to deal effectively with a possible attack by the Austro-Hungarian army, reinforced for that purpose by a number of German divisions, it is essential for the Allies to push forward as rapidly as possible such improvements to communications as will enable a sufficient force to be transferred from France to Italy before a hostile attack can achieve success.

B. Year 1919: Although the Allied forces will not be fully developed before the Summer of 1919, the offensive operations by which it is hoped to gain a final decision should be begun as soon as the weather permits. If this is not done the enemy might forestall the Allies and seize the initiative, thus compelling the Marshal Commanding-in-Chief the Allied armies in France to employ his troops in a manner other than that intended

These operations will be carried out on the front between the North Sea and Switzerland with the maximum available resources.

As soon as offensive operations are begun in France the utmost vigour must characterize our operations on the front in Italy, and in every other theatre of war, so as to take advantage of any favourable developments and prevent the Germans from obtaining help from their Allies.

It must not be forgotten:

(i) That a considerable offensive operation by the Italian armies, if carried out in conjunction with the general offensive in France might contribute largely to the final decision by the defeat of the Austrian army, which could not at such a time count on any help from Germany;

(ii) That the opportunity may arise for the Allied armies to undertake in Italy in the autumn and winter of 1919 the offensive intended for the autumn and winter of 1918.

\* \* \* \* \*

GAL BELIN,	C. SACKVILLE-WEST,	ROBILANT,	TASKER H. BLISS,
Military	Maj. Gen. 13.9.18,	Military	Military
Representative,	Military	Representative,	Representative,
French Section,	Representative,	Italian Section,	American Section,
Supreme War Council	British Section,	Supreme War Council	Supreme War Council
	Supreme War Council		

Given at VERSAILLES on September 10, 1918.  
Certified to be true copy of the original document.

VERSAILLES, 13/9/18.

[Stencil signature undecipherable]

Major,  
Secretary, British Section,  
Supreme War Council.

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***Functions of the Permanent Military Representatives at Versailles***

No. 141-S

AMERICAN SECTION, SUPREME WAR COUNCIL,  
*Versailles, Seine-et-Oise, July 4, 1918.*

AGWAR, WASHINGTON

FOR SECRETARY OF STATE AND SECRETARY OF WAR

1. The Supreme War Council adjourned its Seventh Session at five fifty this afternoon.
2. The last action taken was unanimous adoption of the following resolution:

In order to secure the fullest utilization of the services of the Permanent Military Representatives at Versailles to assist the Supreme War Council in the general conduct of the war and to avoid any confusion between their functions and the duties assigned by the Supreme War Council to General Foch, or to any other executive authority, the Supreme War Council lays down the following propositions:

First. The Military Representatives at Versailles are the competent advisers of the Supreme War Council on general military policy. Their duty is, in consultation with the Allied Chiefs of Staff and Commanders-in-Chief, to study the military situation in its broadest strategic aspect, taking into consideration all such factors as political developments, the naval and shipping situation, the utilization of new instruments of warfare or of new tactical methods, et cetera, and to consider them over the whole field of actual or potential warfare. This duty cannot be undertaken by any executive commander concerned with the urgent decisions of the situation in front of him, and requires both the leisure and the opportunity of access to all sources of information and to the point of view of all the Allied Governments which is afforded by Versailles:

Second. The military representatives are responsible for embodying the results of their study of the situation in recommendations to the Supreme War Council. Such recommendations may be furnished on particular questions referred to them by the Supreme War Council, or on any matters on which, in the judgment of the military representatives, it is desirable that the Supreme War Council should be informed or come to decisions. More particularly it is the duty of the military representatives, in the present state of affairs, to study the Allied plan of campaign for the approaching autumn and winter, and for the summer of 1919, consulting with General Foch with regard to the prospective situation on the western front, and with the other competent authorities with regard to the other theatres of war, and to present their conclusions to the Supreme War Council at an early date.

3. Other matters discussed will be reported tomorrow.

BLISS.

[See Cable 143-S July 5, 1918, change in functions.]

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***Main Theatre of Operation for the American Army***

I CORPS, A. E. F.,  
*La Ferte-sous-Jouarre, Seine-et-Marne, July 5, 1918.*

MEMORANDUM

At present in the Paris Group of American troops there are seven divisions. Of these, four are complete, the remaining three in training and not yet complete in all elements. These seven divisions represent a fighting force of about 150,000 men. If this force is to be permanently stationed north of the theatre of operations of the main American army it should be increased by two divisions and then organized as a field army of 3 army corps of 3 divisions each and should work together on such part of the line as superior authority may decide.

The position of the enemy, in the Montdidier front, and especially in the Chateau-Thierry salient is not sound. It might be well to plan an attack upon him in this angle (Chateau-Thierry). A mass of 12 or 15 divisions striking upon his front between Dormans and Reims, combined with an energetic pressure applied along the rest of this line, may lead to great results. Whether there are now sufficient reserves to use in this way or not is, of course, a question for the higher command.

A study of the location of American bases and lines of communication, A. E. F., seems to indicate most clearly that the main theatre of operations for the American army, will be from Verdun, south to the Swiss border. If this long sector should be taken over, French divisions now on that line will become available in front of Paris.

It is suggested that one field army have the front from Verdun to the Moselle; one field army from the Moselle to the Vosges; one field army along the Vosges to the Swiss border, and that a large reserve be placed near Luneville. If this distribution is effected, the enemy will be obliged to strengthen his forces on this front, or else to shorten his lines. There is a probability that he would shorten his lines by abandoning the St-Mihiel salient and establishing himself from the Meuse north of Verdun to Metz and thence to Strassburg.

Should he not do this, but attempt to hold his present lines, we may have an opportunity to reduce the St-Mihiel salient, and could also strike heavily in the direction of Sarrburg.

Whatever line of action the enemy may take, in order to successfully hold in the south, he must draw heavily upon his reserves in the north, and by weakening himself in that theatre making it possible for the main French and British armies to operate offensively.

H. L.  
HUNTER LIGGETT.

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Cable: P-1419-S

***Shortage of Organizational Equipment***

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, July 5, 1918.*

AGWAR, WASHINGTON

[Extract]

\* \* \* \* \*

1C. Confusion exists due to the fact that organizations are still arriving without their equipment. They embark believing that they are equipped and arrive in France under the same impression. It then develops that their equipment was not loaded on the same transport, sometimes not in the same fleet, and often not shipped at all. Divisions arrive in training areas without their equipment and we are obliged to equip them from our reserve stocks which are not intended for this purpose. Their own equipment sometimes finds its way to the organization for which it was marked after the organization has been reequipped by us thus causing duplication of equipment. It is vital that one of two courses be adopted: The first and preferable way is to have organizations embark with their equipment on the same transport. If this is not possible, then organizations before embarking in the United States should be stripped of organizational equipment which should be turned into depots and shipped in bulk without reference to any particular organization and thus become available for general issue. The present method is entailing wastage in the issue of equipment which our stocks cannot stand and causes newly arriving divisions to lose much time in training due to the fact that they arrive in their area unequipped. It is recommended that foregoing be given attention and that I be advised of method adopted to correct condition reported.

\* \* \* \* \*

PERSHING.

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Cable: P-1419-S

***Priority of A Units of Divisions***

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, July 5, 1918.*

AGWAR, WASHINGTON

[Extract]

\* \* \* \* \*

1D. Request that every effort be made to complete shipment of A units of one division before commencing on A units of the next. Failing this, concentrate on finishing A units of 2 divisions before commencing on the remaining divisions of group to be sent. This

will facilitate provision of cantonments and will assist greatly as regards training and supply. Small units of each of the 6 divisions of the IV Corps arrived practically simultaneously and all these divisions are building up slowly and irregularly as units arrive for each.

\* \* \* \* \*

PERSHING.

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SWC: 315-2: Cablegram

***Functions of the Permanent Military Representatives at Versailles***

No. 143-S AMERICAN SECTION, SUPREME WAR COUNCIL,  
*Versailles, Seine-et-Oise, July 5, 1918.*

AGWAR, WASHINGTON

FOR SECRETARY OF STATE, SECRETARY OF WAR AND CHIEF OF STAFF

[Extract]

\* \* \* \* \*

2. Resolution of Supreme War Council transmitted in my number 141 was prepared by prime ministers in closed session and adopted by them without discussion. After further conference with General Foch it was changed in two important points in paragraph two of my number 141 as follows. Change sentence beginning with the words "their duty is" to read as follows "their task is, so far as the Anglo-French-American front is concerned in consultation with General Foch, and so far as other theatres are concerned in consultation with the Allied Chiefs of Staff and Commanders-in-Chief, et cetera." Omit sentence beginning "This duty cannot be." Change last paragraph of resolution to read as follows:

The military representatives present the results of their study of the situation in the form of advice to the Supreme War Council. Such advice may be furnished on particular questions referred to them by the Supreme War Council, or by the governments, or on any matters considered desirable by the military representatives themselves, or on any questions which General-in-Chief Foch may refer to them. The decision belongs to the Supreme War Council. More particularly it is the task of the military representatives in the present state of affairs to study the Allied plan of campaign for the approaching autumn and winter, and for the summer of 1919, but without intruding on the personal studies of General Foch in regard to which he is accountable only to the heads of governments. They consult with the other competent authorities with regard to the other theatres of war and are to present their conclusions to the Supreme War Council at an early date.

BLISS.

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**Information on American Forces in France**

3d Section, General Staff

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
Chaumont, Haute-Marne, July 5, 1918.

From: Commander-in-Chief, American Expeditionary Forces

To: General Tasker H. Bliss, American Representative, Allied Supreme War Council.

I. In compliance with your telegram of June 27, 1918, the following information is furnished.

1. Dates on which figures apply: June 27, unless otherwise stated.
2. Number of divisions:
  - A. Infantry. Infantry of 23-1/2 divisions on hand.  
Auxiliary arms complete in 17 of these divisions.
  - B. and C. Dismounted cavalry and cavalry.  
No divisional organizations of cavalry in A. E. F.
3. Number of battalions of infantry and dismounted cavalry:
 

Infantry	278 Battalions (1)
Dismounted Cavalry	12 Squadrons (2)

  - (1) This includes 6 battalions passing through England and 12 battalions serving with French.
  - (2) 9 squadrons included to be mounted squadrons.
4. Number of combatants of all arms:

ARM	OFFICERS	SOLDIERS
Infantry	9,604	331,900 <sup>(1)</sup>
Machine Gun Battalions	1,564	39,875
Field Artillery	4,049	88,598
Antiaircraft Artillery	69	2,304
Coast Artillery	1,108	25,031
Cavalry	268	6,679
Engineer Sappers	1,152	43,216
Signal (Field Battalions)	330	10,676
Aviation, Combatant	886	19,172
Tank Service	255	2,037
Trains	2,968	59,788
Unclassified replacements		
School Detachments, etc.	1,740	7,797
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>23,993</b>	<b>637,073</b>

NOTE (1): Excluding Machine Gun Battalions

5. Rifle strength of infantry and dismounted cavalry (actually in the line)
 

(9 divisions: 1st, 2d, 3d, 5th, 32d, 35th, 77th, 82d, 93d, (Provisional.
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ARM	OFFICERS	SOLDIERS
Infantry	3,917	110,641

Rifle strength of infantry and dismounted cavalry (ready to enter the line) (4 divisions: 4th, 26th, 28th, (42d. (

ARM	OFFICERS	SOLDIERS
Infantry	1,518	50,862
Dismounted cavalry	None	None

6. Sabre strength of cavalry: 6,679
7. Machine Guns: (Figures as of July 3)
  - A. Heavy 2,806
  - B. Light None
  - C. Automatic rifles 9,216
8. Artillery strength: (Figures as of July 3)
  - A. Field guns, 75-mm. 264
  - 155-mm. 120
  - B. Heavy guns, 155-GPF 8
  - 8" How. 36
  - C. Antiaircraft 75-mm. 2
  - Hotchkiss 192
9. Number of Aeroplanes: (Figures as of July 3)

TYPE	IN COMMISSION	UNDERGOING REPAIRS
Observation	124	42
Bombing	51	16
Observation and bombing	27	57
Pursuit	47	4
Training	486	645
TOTAL	735	764

10. Number of tanks: All the tank service personnel in France are still in training. They are equipped with 25 French tanks. The tank service personnel in England is training with British tanks. It is expected that a battalion will be brigaded with the British in the near future and be equipped with heavy British tanks. Number not known. No tanks have been lost and none are available for replacement purposes.

11. Losses since March 21, 1918:

A. Officers and men separately, to June 19 inclusive. Compiled by A. G. O. Statistical division. No separate figures on officers and soldiers prior to June 5:

OFFICERS AND SOLDIERS (3/21/18-6/5/18 INCL.)		(6/6/18-6/19/18 INCL.)		TOTAL
		OFFICERS	SOLDIERS	
Returns to U. S.	2,345	163	137	2,645
Missing	289	8	188	485
Deaths	1,429	35	568	2,032
Members of combat units in S. O. S. Hospitals June 19		41	5,517	5,558
AGGREGATE	4,063	247	6,410	10,720

B. Guns: Information as of July 3. Sources of information: Battery commanders' reports indorsed by mobile ordnance repair shop and corps inspector.

Field Guns,	75-mm.	6
	155-mm.	4

Heavy artillery	None
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Antiaircraft	None
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C. Aeroplanes---Information not available.

D. Tanks: (See No. 10) None

E. Machine guns, heavy 39

Automatic rifles 627

Information from replacements and reissues of depots (Figures as of July 3).

12. Replacements effected since March 21:

A. Officers and soldiers, each separately:

Following replacements effected between March 21 and June 19.

ARMS	OFFICERS	SOLDIERS
Infantry, excluding machine gun battalions	814	19,548
Engineer sappers	77	892
Machine gun battalions	110	2,566
Signal (Field Battalion)	25	678
Field Artillery	213	1,207
Coast Artillery	240	3,090
Trains	124	2,710
TOTAL	1,603	30,691

Reported as received by division (Stat. Div.)

B. Guns, Field	75-mm.	6	Premature
	155-mm.	4	(2 Premature)
			(2 Enemy Fire)

C. Aeroplanes - Information not available

D. Tanks (See Par. 10) None

E. Machine guns, heavy 39 \*

F. Automatic Rifles 627 \*

Information from replacements and reissues of depots. (Figures as of July 3.)

\* No authentic information is available as to the causes for losses of machine guns and automatic rifles.



13. Number in depots available for replacements:

A. Of officers and soldiers each separately. (Figures as of June 27)

ARMS	OFFICERS	SOLDIERS
Infantry, excluding machine gun battalions (Includes Marines)	140	1,162
Machine gun battalions	12	157
Field Artillery	28	396
Engineer sappers	12	1,475
Signal (Field Battalions)	10	31
Trains	0	280
Cavalry	0	27
Coast Artillery	26	678
Unclassified	28	2,325
TOTAL	256	6,531
At ports	299	13,217
On way from United States	168	12,347
GRAND TOTAL	723	32,095

B. Guns: (Figures as of July 3)

Field guns, 75-mm.	9
155-mm.	2
Heavy	None
Antiaircraft	5
Hotchkiss	146

C. Aeroplanes: (Figures as of July 3)

(1) Observation	121
(2) Bombing	0
(3) Observation and bombing	29
(4) Pursuit	31
(5) Training	220
TOTAL	401

D. Tanks: (See Par. 10) None

E. Machine guns, heavy (Figures as of July 3)

Hotchkiss	630
Vickers	1,739
Total	2,369
Automatic rifles	3,858

[JOHN J. PERSHING]  
General U. S. Army.

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**General Goethals to Command Services of Supply, A. E. F.**

OFFICE OF SECRETARY OF WAR,  
WAR DEPARTMENT,  
*Washington, D. C., July 6, 1918.*

[Extract]

\* \* \* \* \*

My dear General Pershing:

\* \* \* \* \*

\* \* \* The American people think of you as their fighting general, and I want them to have that idea more and more brought home to them. For these reasons, it seems to me that if some plan could be devised by which you would be free from any necessity of giving attention to services of supply it would help, and one plan in that direction which suggested itself was to send General Goethals over to take charge of the services of supply, establishing a direct relationship between him and Washington and allowing you to rely upon him just as you would rely upon the supply departments of the War Department if your military operations were being conducted in America, instead of in France. Such a plan would place General Goethals rather in a coordinate than a subordinate relationship to you, but of course it would transfer all of the supply responsibilities from you, to him and you could then forget about docks, railroads, storage houses, and all the other vast industrial undertakings to which up to now you have given a good deal of your time and, as you know, we all think with superb success. I would be very glad to know what you think about this suggestion.

\* \* \* \* \*

Cordially yours,

NEWTON D. BAKER,  
Secretary of War.

\* \* \* \* \*

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Cable: P-1423-S

**Concerning the 100-Division Program**

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, July 6, 1918.*

AGWAR, WASHINGTON

FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF AND SECRETARY OF WAR

Reference your No. 1640 [July 1, 1918] appreciate great importance of not holding out any expectations to Allies with reference program recommended. It is fully understood by

all any recommendations made here must be approved by the President. This is understood not only by army officials but by members of the Supreme War Council as well. However have taken occasion at recent meeting of Supreme War Council to impress this upon all concerned. Fully recognize difficulties to be overcome in carrying out this program of which very earnest study is being made here. In private conversation with M. Clemenceau and Mr. Lloyd George, July 3, the latter affirmed Great Britain's intention of providing all the shipping possible, showing that they fully appreciate the situation.

PERSHING.

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SWC: 315-2: Cablegram

***Concerning Tonnage for 100-Division Program***

No. 144-S

AMERICAN SECTION, SUPREME WAR COUNCIL,  
*Versailles, Seine-et-Oise, July 6, 1918.*

AGWAR, WASHINGTON

FOR SECRETARY OF STATE, SECRETARY OF WAR AND CHIEF OF STAFF

[Extract]

\* \* \* \* \*

D. With reference to paragraph three of my 140 as soon as you inform me of total tonnage required for the one hundred division program of June 23 and the amount that can be furnished by the United States I shall ask the military representatives to adopt a resolution asking the British to make up the deficiency. Reference last sentence of first part paragraph of your 66 M. Clemenceau informed Supreme War Council at meeting of July 3, that Mr. Lloyd George had assented to continue for the month of August same British tonnage as had been supplied in July.

BLISS.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: 672: Letter

***Horses for Artillery***

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, July 7, 1918.*

My dear General Foch:

I have reason to believe that Sir Douglas Haig may be able to provide horses for the artillery of the 5 divisions now on the British front.

As you know, the entire question of horses is a most embarrassing one and I have therefore written to Sir Douglas offering to send the artillery of the five divisions to him provided he can furnish the necessary horses. I also assured him that in the event he found this possible I would undertake to give him ample notice of any decision to withdraw any of these divisions from his front. I am sure that all of this meets with your full approval.

Although I am certain that you are aware of the conditions with reference to horses, I take this occasion to invite your special attention to the paramount importance of the entire horse question. So far the results of requisitioning horse have been very disappointing. During the first 13 days I am informed that we only received about 10,000 animals instead of the 20,000 expected. Moreover, there is an alarming rumor that all requisitioning is to cease about August 1. Unless some means of obtaining animals in France can be found the inevitable result will be the conversion of many of our ships into animal transports, thereby reducing the rate of arrival of American troops and war material. May I not ask your further cooperation in obtaining every possible animal from French sources?

To: General Ferdinand Foch,  
Commander-in-Chief,  
Allied Armies.

J. J. PERSHING.

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Cable: P-1428-S

### ***British, French, and German Manpower***

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, July 8, 1918.*

AGWAR, WASHINGTON

FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF AND SECRETARY OF WAR

The following figures, not regarded as either complete or entirely accurate, but based on the best available information, express the manpower situation of Great Britain, France, and Germany.

Great Britain: Combatant strength in France, about July 1, 1918, 58 complete divisions---1,044,000. Supposed home army of which 80,000 are probably in Ireland and the remainder in use as line of communication troops et cetera, in England---336,000. Line of communication troops, et cetera, in France---536,000. Expectations from the manpower bill, which were originally 500,000 now taken to be only 50,000 miners and 30,000 farmers---80,000. Remainder supposedly in depots after the deduction of all replacements known to have been made to July 1, 1918---484,000. Wounded estimated as returnable to the firing line in 1918---113,000. Total resources for 1918 (total of the above figures)---2,593,000. Of this total, 872,000 are thought not available for combat leaving 1,721,000 available for combat and for replacement on the western front. There are also 3 British divisions in Italy, 3 in Macedonia, 2 in Palestine, 1 in Mesopotamia and 1 in Egypt. Ten of the divisions now in France are from the dominions of Great Britain.

France: Combat strength in France, July 1, 1918, 101 divisions---1,283,000. Add 6 cavalry divisions---50,000. Total combatant strength---1,333,000. Class of 1919, not available until September 1, 1918---200,000. Remainder supposedly in depots after deducting all replacements known to have been made---366,000. Line of communication troops,

et cetera---381,000. Wounded returnable to the firing line---50,000. Total resources for 1918 (total of the above figures)---2,330,000. Of this total, 381,000 are thought not available for combat, leaving 1,949,000 available for combat and for replacement on the western front. The above figures do not take into account 2 French divisions now serving in Italy and 2 Italian divisions serving with the French in France.

Germany: The following is taken from a French, confidential, official statement and purports to show the status of the German forces on June 1, 1918: Combatant strength, French front---3,557,000. Line of communication troops, French front---400,000. Combatant strength, exterior fronts---608,000. Line of communication troops, exterior front---320,000. In depots---340,000. Zone of the interior---620,000. Men in civil service---150,000. Men temporarily exempted---500,000. Wounded under treatment---509,000. Germans abroad---200,000. Unfit at enlistment---2,230,000. German losses in battle during May are placed at 240,000: Other additional wastage during May amounts to 182,000. This loss of 182,000 is stated to be composed of 80,000 losses other than in battle; 2,000 reconstitution of units from Russia; and 100,000 return of Class of 1899 to civil life.

Resume of this information shows: Combatant strength on French front: Great Britain 1,044,000; France 1,333,000; Italy 25,000; total 2,402,000. Germany 3,557,000. Additional prospective reinforcements that may be used on the French front in 1918; Great Britain 677,000; France 616,000; total 1,293,000; Germany 340,000.

Referring to additional prospective reinforcements in the last paragraph, the British claimed that in producing 130,000 replacements for June they have raked up everything available and will not be able to cover any more losses until October. The French claimed on June 18 that their units at the front were short 80,000 men and that they had only 60,000 men in depots with which to replace. Further that there are no more available replacements until the class of 1919, 200,000 men, becomes ready for service on September 1. Our figures, however, show that the British should have a residue to 484,000 in depots and the French a similar residue of 366,000. These facts appear in the data given in the preceding paragraphs and are deduced from a statement made to the Versailles Council about February 1, 1918. Neither the British nor the French, so far as is known, have made use of this surplus manpower, apparently available for combatant service.

The figures and statements given in the preceding paragraphs of this cable must be considered as extremely confidential and under no circumstances should they be published. The main reason for this is that there is going on between the French and British Governments at present an acrimonious dispute as to whether Great Britain is throwing her full weight against the Germans in France. The French claim to believe that the British are holding an organized force of about a million men, nearly all fit for service in France, in England and Ireland as a home army.

PERSHING.

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Cable: P-1432-S

### ***Balkan Situation and Use of American Troops***

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
Chaumont, Haute-Marne, July 8, 1918.

AGWAR, WASHINGTON

FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF AND SECRETARY OF WAR

Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces in Balkan front desires I report that Bulgarians are tired of war; Austria-Hungary is in unstable condition and her troops on this front not the

best. Line of least resistance to decisive Allied victory is now through Balkan ways. With additional help of one American infantry division, without artillery, Bulgaria can be defeated and Germany attacked through Austria-Hungary where Slavs and Jugo-Slavs would aid Allies. American division should arrive with as little delay as possible for action before snow fall. All Greeks, Servians, and Slavs in the American army should come to Balkan front to encourage Greece and Servians and to discourage Bulgaria. Declaration of war by the United States against Bulgaria would greatly increase discouragement in latter country which now consider United States her friend on final peace congress. All British troops are now leaving Struma section having been replaced by three Greek divisions. One of every four British infantry battalions are now leaving Balkan front for another front. Bartlett.

The foregoing seems to be based on fact but think it impracticable for us to send American troops there. Have replied to this effect.

PERSHING.

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Cable: A-1685-R

### ***Shipping of Troop Equipment***

A. G. O. WAR DEPARTMENT,  
Washington, D. C., July 9, 1918.

PERSHING, AMEXFORCE, H. A. E. F.

[Extract]

1. With reference to paragraph 1C, your 1419 [July 5, 1918] instructions at ports of embarkation require troops' equipment to accompany troops in all vessels where such is possible. In case of British vessels and in cases of army transports carrying large numbers of troops, it is not always practicable to transport entire equipment on same vessel. In these cases, such equipment is forwarded on next available transport and if possible, on another ship in same convoy. Proper investigation cannot be made of cases referred to unless you specify name of vessels or organizations, also whether conditions refer to units transported on British tonnage or on American tonnage. British have insisted from first in taking very little organizational equipment, due to their needs for all cargo space.

\* \* \* \* \*

McCAIN.

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***Offices of Chiefs of Infantry and Cavalry to be Created***

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, July 9, 1918.*

MEMORANDUM TO A. C. S. G-3, G-5

1. The Commander-in-Chief wishes an order published creating the offices of chief of infantry and chief of cavalry.
2. It is desired that G-3 and G-5 submit a joint study with recommendations for this order.

LeROY ELTINGE,  
Deputy Chief of Staff.

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HS Secret Documents: Fldr. F-1: Conference Report

***Conference at Bombon on Employment of American Troops***

*BOMBON, SEINE-ET-MARNE, July 10, 1918.*

CONFERENCE HELD ON JULY 10, 1918, BETWEEN

GENERAL PERSHING  
COLONEL FOX CONNER  
GENERAL FOCH  
GENERAL WEYGAND

(Written up by Capt. de Marenches)\*

I

HORSES FOR THE A. E. F.

General Pershing points out that the deliveries of horses to the A. E. F. by the French Govt. have been lately far less important than was anticipated. Only 10,000 have been delivered where 20,000 were expected.

General Weygand says he wishes to go into a few details in that matter. The first results of the requisition have been a delusion for the French as well as for the American authorities. This is due to the fact that the requisition committees have not taken full advantage of the recent increase in the prices they are authorized to pay. They frequently hesitate to requisition animals because they do not consider that those animals are worth the maximum prices authorized by the new regulations.

The French authorities have just taken necessary steps to ensure the full delivery of 80,000 horses to the A. E. F., i.e.,

1st. Two-thirds of the animals supplied through the requisition will be turned over to the Americans.

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\* [Captain Charles de Marenches, French Army---Aide to General Pershing.]

2d. In the 13th Region (Clermont-Ferrand) this proportion is raised to 3/4.

3d. If toward the end of July the deliveries should still be inadequate, the whole amount of animals supplied by requisition should be turned over to the A. E. F.

It must therefore, be considered as certain that the total number of animals (80,000) which the French pledged themselves to supply will actually be delivered with a delay which will not exceed the maximum limit of 10 days, i. e., before Aug. 10.

It is, however, well understood that M. Jeanneney's letter still stands. The supply of 80,000 animals to the A. E. F. is the limit of the effort that can be demanded from the French agriculturists. When their delivery is completed, i. e., by the beginning of August, the A. E. F. can rely only on importations to meet their requirements.

General Pershing replies that he has already recommended that 8,000 animals be shipped every month from America. He will take necessary steps to have the necessary number of animals imported after the beginning of August.

## II.

### EMPLOYMENT OF AMERICAN TROOPS

General Pershing says he wishes to consider two points:

- A. American troops presently with the British.
- B. American troops presently with the French.

A. TROOPS WITH THE BRITISH: Sir Douglas Haig has proposed to organize them immediately in complete divisions.

All the personnel will be American.

The artillery will be provided from American materiel.

The British will supply the horses for the artillery.

General Foch replies that he hopes that those horses will not be taken from British divisions. He considers it as essential that the British army do not cut down the number of their divisions. The British are themselves short of horses and are compelled to import from America.

General Pershing says that the British Commander-in-Chief should be very anxious to keep as long as possible the American units now with the B. E. F. However, it has always been and always is his intention, when circumstances permit, to withdraw those troops and transport them to an American zone, where they will be organized in American army corps and armies under American command. He hopes that General Foch will take necessary steps not to leave the British in an embarrassing position when these American troops will be withdrawn from the British zone.

General Foch makes no objection.

B. TROOPS WITH THE FRENCH: General Pershing insists on the necessity of organizing the large American units (army corps and armies) as soon as possible. He asks General Foch to help him in that direction.

What concerns the divisions that have recently arrived and are not yet provided with artillery, he suggests that they could temporarily use French artillery (materiel, horses, and some proportion of personnel).

He points out that the solution of all the above questions is associated to that of the question of the American sector. He considers that the time has come to settle that question once for all. The American sector should, in his point of view, be in the region Toul-Nancy.

The British are compelled to have their forces in front of the channel ports and to use, to their utmost capacity, the line of communications leading to these ports.

The French must naturally wish to be close to the British and hold the roads leading towards Paris. Their lines of communication are congested.



The Americans, therefore, must have their zone placed in such a way that their lines of communications, leading to the only available ports (Atlantic and Mediterranean) should not be mixed up with those of the French and British.

It is therefore difficult to contemplate having the main American forces west of St-Mihiel and the American sector should, generally speaking, stretch out from Verdun towards the east.

From the strategical point of view, such a sector would be a good base for an offensive. An advance to the northeast would lead us into vital parts of Germany and deprive the Germans of some of their resources in coal, steel, etc.

Furthermore, less important operations might be contemplated, for instance the wiping out of the German salient at St-Mihiel would give a more favorable base for an offensive start.

From the technical point of view it must be considered that the Americans have already begun some very important construction work in that zone---railroads, depots, etc.

Under the present conditions, with American units scattered all along the western front with no particular zone assigned to the American army, American technical units (railroad engineers, etc.) cannot be utilized in any general plan; their working capacity is not taken advantage of.

For all of the reasons above stated, time has come to a decision on the question of the American sector.

General Foch says he wishes to express his satisfaction about the fact that General Pershing's views on the situation are so much like his. He is going to be still more American than the Americans.

It is, in his opinion, absolutely necessary to organize the American troops in American army corps and armies, with a view to operate them in an American sector on an American battlefield.

This is true for the American divisions that have already arrived in France. For the divisions that have not yet arrived, the question has to be studied.

He wishes to look at things from an elevated point of view.

One million Americans are now in France. It is the absolute right of the American army to play, as an army, a role corresponding to the above figure. The American army must really exist.

The cause of the Entente will be much better helped by an American army than by scattered American units. If we work along sound lines we can by the end of July, have an American army consisting of 13 American divisions.

If we are willing to score a decisive victory we must:

1st. Have a total number of men superior to that of the Germans.

2nd. Have a number of Allied divisions superior to the number of German divisions, whether those Allied divisions be French, British, or American.

Therefore, we must:

1st. Maintain by all means the existing number of French and British divisions.

2nd. Organize as soon as possible the maximum number of American divisions.

General Foch, summing up a document which he holds in his hand, again states that, by the end of July, 13 American divisions can be ready (including two divisions now in the British zone who will, by that time, have received their artillery). In August four new divisions will be organized.

He wishes to emphasize again the fact that the presently existing British and French divisions must be maintained at all cost, however weak they can be.

Temporarily, as long as the present battle lasts or threatens to be resumed, he intends asking the American army to help the French army by the loan of the American divisions that have not yet received their artillery. These American divisions should either be put into quiet sectors of the front, or be sent to complete their training behind parts of the front where they could, if necessary, be called upon to lend a hand to the French troops holding the line in front of them.

General Pershing expresses his appreciation of the fact that General Foch adopts a point of view which had always been his own. The expressed desire of American troops serving with the British and French is to serve, as soon as possible, in American units, under strictly American command. That wish of the American troops only reflects the will of the American people. We are going to carry it out with the maximum activity.

What concerns the use to be made of recently arrived American troops, he wants to point out that they have but little training. He agrees with the suggestion of putting them into quiet sectors, for instance in the region of the Vosges.

General Foch states that everybody agrees on principles. The point now is to carry them out. He suggests that General Weygand and Colonel Fox Conner have immediately a conference and settle all questions for which they have authority from their respective chiefs.

General Pershing agrees.

General Foch draws the attention to the fact that the program of shipment of American troops in August has not yet been settled.

General Pershing replies that it is understood that the total number of American troops to be shipped in August should be the same as in July. They include:

2 divisions complete

(C. B. 4) divisional artilleries.

12 regiments of infantry pioneers.

The shipment in August are intended to complete the program of an army of 30 divisions, except for the fact that the army artillery will not be shipped on account of the shortage of equipment. Therefore, with that one exception, the A. E. F. will consist of 30 divisions by the end of August.

The number of men to be shipped in August is 250,000.

General Foch expresses the opinion that this is not sufficient to take advantage of all the available tonnage. If advantage is not taken of all the British tonnage, the British will, he fears, take back their ships.

General Pershing says that it has been absolutely understood that the American Government will utilize all the available tonnage to its utmost capacity for the shipment to France.

Furthermore, to be able to state exactly what organizations will be shipped in August, we must wait for information from the War Department. This information he expects to receive at an early date.

The afternoon conference dealt only with questions of operations. General Foch explaining that the theater of operations in 1919 would necessarily be within certain limits---that the American sector should be within these limits. He did not seem to admit that there is any difference in a sector which might be held by the Americans and one in which they might eventually assume an offensive.

[Unsigned]

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[Editorial Translation]

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS OF THE ALLIED ARMIES IN FRANCE  
*Bombon, Seine-et-Marne, July 10, 1918.*

#### MEMORANDUM

The day when there are one million Americans in France, America cuts a figure in the war. American has a right to an American army; the American army must be. The Allied

cause moreover will be better served by having an American army under the orders of its own leader, than by an American army scattered all about. Therefore, it must be formed as soon as possible, at the side of the British and French armies, and it must be made as big as possible.

What does the Allied cause need anyway to be victorious?

A. It needs incontestable numerical superiority, a greater number of divisions than the enemy. At the moment we are weaker in divisions. So, the number of Allied divisions must be increased as much as possible, and as quickly as possible.

There is only one way to do it, viz:

(a) Maintain all English and French divisions.

(b) Create new American divisions as soon as possible. Do so by assembling as American divisions, infantry troops, troops that have their artillery and other organic divisional elements.

B. So long as the battle lasts or threatens to begin again, and until this numerical superiority in divisions becomes a fact, the Allied cause demands that French or English divisions, reduced in infantry strength, be built up and reinforced, whenever the need arises---especially in quiet sectors---by American infantry. To this use, American divisional infantry units can be devoted, that cannot get artillery or other divisional elements for a certain time (about two months).

FOCH.

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AG, GHQ, AEF: 16907-3: Directive

### ***General Tactical Instructions***

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, July 11, 1918.*

#### INSTRUCTIONS ON TACTICAL DISPOSITIONS

1. The ultimate purpose of the American army is the decisive defeat of the enemy and not the mere passive result of the pure defensive. To realize this ultimate purpose it is essential that every officer and soldier of these forces be imbued with the offensive spirit.

2. So far as practicable American divisions are placed in quiet sectors for the completion of their training. These quiet sectors afford an exceptional opportunity for cultivating the offensive spirit of the troops and the initiative of junior officers through the constant use of patrols and by minor operations.

The American idea must be that we will control "No Man's Land," and this idea must be established and cultivated from the moment an American unit enters the line.

3. Liaison is to be understood to signify:

Constant and reliable communication between the echelons of command (secured by many necessary means and by personal representatives), in order to have accurate, up-to-date knowledge by every headquarters of the dispositions and tactical situation of every unit of its command, and also of the units adjacent thereto.

Effective and continuous liaison is essential, both on the offensive and the defensive. Liaison between infantry and artillery must be particularly close.

4. To maintain such liaison, a complete and multiple system of communication must be maintained and tested daily. Great attention must be paid to visual signalling of all kinds.

5. In the preparatory plans for any offensive, there must be provided a deeply organized and abundant system of observation posts so that once the advance is made the system becomes immediately operative. For the defensive, such a system must be constantly maintained, including at least one post in the immediate vicinity of each battery.

6. Two of the main characteristics of the successful German offensive were: The intelligent initiative of junior officers and superiority of fire. Americans have inherent qualities in both these respects far superior to those of the Germans. It is the duty of commanders of every grade to develop these American qualities. All infantry officers must pay especial and constant attention to perfecting the instruction of the infantry soldier in the use of the rifle and to increase his reliance on that weapon as his only indispensable arm.

7. The sole reason for the present defensive attitude of the Allies is to gain time for the arrival of the American troops who are to ensure the victory.

8. No defensive, however, can be successful without a large use of counterattacks. Such attacks must be prepared and launched on a large scale, as well as locally, and must be directed against critical points such as one of the flanks of the enemy's attacks.

9. The missions given the elements of advanced positions depend primarily on the particular terrain considered in connection with the general plan of defense. No fixed mission applicable to all elements of a force can therefore be given. There must, however, be a definite defensive plan which should be framed with a view to securing concentration of effort. The mission of the advanced units is based on the definite plan adopted for the particular sector. When this plan contemplates withdrawal of advance posts, the method and direction thereof should be carefully determined and fire of artillery coordinated therewith.

10. One of the factors upon which the enemy's artillery relies to obtain fire superiority is a brief but powerful preparation. This preparation is followed by the actual advance which is usually immediately accomplished by light guns only. Once the attack is launched, therefore, the enemy must not only move his infantry and light guns over ground which should be thoroughly registered by our artillery, but his artillery support is very much reduced. These facts enable the artillery of the defense to play a very important role provided special attention be given to the following points:

(a) Artillery positions should be as far to the rear as is consistent with the several missions assigned and should be organized in depth so as to cause the enemy to disperse his fire and especially to permit the continuous support of our infantry in case of a counterattack or of a retirement.

(b) As few changes of position as practicable; all changes to be made by echelons on such a way as not to interrupt the continuity of fire.

(c) Special arrangements to preserve the continuity of action of the heavier calibers after the beginning of the hostile advance with a view to being able to destroy or neutralize such hostile light guns as may succeed in advancing with the enemy's infantry.

(d) A carefully prepared plan for counteroffensive preparation to be promptly opened on the first certain indications of the attack; barrage fire to be withheld until the actual hostile advance.

PERSHING.

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***Ships not Loaded to Cargo Capacity***

1st Section, General Staff

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, July 13, 1918.*

From: C-in-C, G-1

To: C. G., S. O. S.

1. It is noted that out of a total cargo capacity of 51,900 tons for 28 troop ships, which have discharged at Brest, there was actually carried 31,326 tons. This indicates an apparent loss of about 20,000 tons of cargo.

2. Do you anticipate that the facilities at this port will be sufficiently increased so that there would be no lengthening of stay in port for troop transports were they loaded to their cargo capacities? As it would be highly desirable to accomplish this, your recommendations are requested, so that the United may be advised to utilize the cargo space of these troop transports to better advantage.

By order of the C-in-C:

BRUCE PALMER,  
Lt. Col., G. S.,  
Actg. A. C. of S., G-1.

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HS Secret Documents: Fldr. G: Notes

***General Situation and Distribution of American Divisions***

FRENCH GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,  
*Provins, Seine-et-Marne, July 13, 1918.*

NOTES ON CONVERSATION AT PROVINS, BETWEEN GENERAL PERSHING  
AND GENERAL PETAIN

Present also were Colonels Boyd and de Chambrun.

General Petain made some remarks on the situation generally, indicating that he had considerable difficulty in getting a decision from the commander of the Allied forces as to definite steps which should be taken to meet the impending offensive.

General Pershing asked General Petain if he thought that the American divisions were employed to the best advantage.

General Petain replied that he thought so, with the exception of the proposition to place one American division behind another in the Vosges.

General Pershing explained that the intention was to place an uninstructed division behind a division holding a sector in the Vosges with a view to having the division holding a sector give instruction to the other division and eventually to be replaced by it.

General Petain stated that this would require a long time and that there were not enough divisions in the French army to allow them to place one thus behind the other.

On General Pershing stating that these divisions placed behind other American divisions were largely composed of recruits and that it was thought that they would learn more rapidly by this method than by any other---that we did not contemplate devoting a great amount of time to this disposition, General Petain stated that if it were executed rapidly, he saw no objection to the plan.

General Pershing then asked General Petain what he thought of the present distribution of American divisions. He called attention to the fact that we have now American divisions scattered from the Channel to Belfort, and in no place a sector which was known as an American sector; that no progress was being made in the organization of our corps and our armies.

General Petain replied that no French corps are functioning with all their divisions at the present time; that divisions are drawn from corps and sent here and there according to needs, and that some of his corps have not a single one of their proper divisions serving with them at the present time.

General Pershing remarked that the people of the United States have been given to understand that there is an army of a million American men in France. The American public will therefore soon begin to ask why there is not an American army fighting as such, or whether our soldiers are not good enough to hold a front of their own. That failure to meet this inquiry will have a serious effect on the morale of our people.

General Pershing stated that he fully understood that in a battle it is difficult to unite particular divisions, but that we might have a sector of the front which would be turned over to the Americans to exercise command of such troop as might occupy this sector. For example, we have six divisions in the vicinity of Chateau-Thierry. A part of this front might be turned over to American command. Such French divisions as come into it would come under the orders of the American commanders just as our own divisions come under command of the French divisions when they go to other sectors.

General Petain stated that the coming fight would probably cause him to have 30 divisions which would be very seriously reduced in strength. He could break up half of these divisions to fill up the other half, or he might reduce the number of battalions per regiment by one, having regiments of two battalions instead of three. This, he thought, might be preferable, because it would keep the same number of divisions, which follows a greater pliability in the army. In any event, he said, some of our divisions which have not yet their artillery might be supplied with French artillery, materiel and personnel; at least as a temporary measure.

General Petain stated that he would send Colonel de Chambrun to American headquarters to discuss the details of these questions with the American staff and a definite plan of action might be adopted after this study. One thing he insisted upon and that is that we cannot afford to have a reduction in the number of divisions facing the enemy. If the French divisions are broken up, they must be replaced by American divisions.

[Unsigned]

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**Policy Concerning Army Corps**

3d Section

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, July 14, 1918.*

MEMORANDUM:

[Extract]

1. With regard to the constitution and employment of army corps, it is the policy of the Commander-in-Chief:

(a) To assign divisions to army corps in such numbers and in such grouping as will best meet the constantly changing needs of the military situation.

A corps will therefore consist of a varying number of divisions; it will not necessarily contain the particular divisions provisionally assigned it by the War Department.

(b) Corps staff will be shifted from one region to another as the military situation may require; they will be utilized without regard to any fixed order of battle within the corps.

Thus, if it becomes immediately necessary to consolidate two or more divisions operating in a particular region into a separate corps, a commander may be designated and the staff of a corps already in existence may be ordered to report to him for duty. The official designation of the new corps thus formed will be that of the existing corps from which the staff is withdrawn. This latter corps will then receive a new designation and a new staff.

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3. As a matter of information it may also be here stated that, until further orders:

(a) The Commanding General, V Corps, is exercising administrative control and general supervision, excluding tactical command for which French authorities are responsible, over all A. E. F. troops including combat divisions, serving within the sectors of the French Seventh Army.

(b) Similar control is exercised over A. E. F. units in eighth army sector by Commanding General, IV Corps, A. E. F.

(c) Similar control is exercised over A. E. F. units serving on British front by Commanding General, II Corps, A. E. F., excepting base hospitals, railway regiments and certain other items.

The corps commanders exercising control as above are also charged with the conduct of necessary arrangements and negotiations with the French authorities in the regions named.

By order:

FOX CONNER,  
Colonel, General Staff.

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# COMPOSITION AND LOCATION OF ARMY CORPS, A. E. F.

July 14, 1918

UNITS	COMMANDING GENERAL AND CHIEF OF STAFF	LOCATION CORPS HEADQUARTERS	REGIONS OCCUPIED
I Corps 3d Div. 4th Div. 26th Div. 28th Div.	Major Gen. Liggett Brig. Gen. Craig	La Ferte-sous- Jouarre (Seine-et- Marne)	Vicinity of Chateau-Thierry
II Corps 27th Div. 30th Div. 33d Div. 78th Div. 80th Div.	Major Gen. Read Col. Simonds	Fruges (Pas-de-Calais)	British front
III Corps 1st Div. 2d Div.	Major Gen. Bullard Brig. Gen. Bjornstad	Nanteuil-le- Haudouin (Oise)	Vicinity of Meaux
IV Corps 77th Div. 82d Div. 29th Div. 37th Div. 89th Div. 90th Div. 92d Div.	Commander-Vacancy Lt. Col. Heintzelman	Neufchateau (Vosges)	Woivre, Lorraine and training areas
V Corps 5th Div. 32d Div. 35th Div.	Major Gen. Wright Brig. Gen. Burt	Remiremont (Vosges)	Alsace
Unattached 42d Div.			North of Chalons- sur-Marne
93d Div. (Colored provisional)	Note: 4 regiments only. Serving with French forces		Argonne
Depot Div. 41st Div. 76th Div. 83d Div.			Depot Divisional Area

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***Location of American Sector Discussed with General Foch on July 10 at Bombon***

3d Section, General Staff

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, July 14, 1918.*

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief of Staff

1. The Commander-in-Chief outlined to General Foch the various reasons for the early assembly of the American forces.

Insofar as concerned the immediate future, the Commander-in-Chief stated his willingness to assemble these troops wherever necessary, as around Chateau-Thierry for example. He stated, however, that it was necessary to look further into the future and to consider the early establishment of a somewhat permanent American sector within which our forces might be developed and which could be expanded as our troops arrived. The Commander-in-Chief said that various reasons, which he outlined, point to the region Toul-Nancy, and beyond as the logical American sector.

2. In reply to the question of principle involved in the organization of an American army General Foch stated as follows:

A. Today when there are a million Americans in France, America must have her place in the war. America has the right to have her army organized as such; the American army must be an accomplished fact. Moreover the cause of the Allies will be better served by an American army under its own chief than by an American army with its units dispersed. Therefore it is necessary at the earliest possible date to constitute side by side with the British and French armies the American army; and it is necessary to make this American army as large as possible.

Q. Besides, what is needed to bring victory to the cause of the Allies?

A. It demands an incontestable numerical superiority, a number of divisions greater than that of the enemy. The number of our divisions is inferior. It is necessary then to increase the number of our divisions as soon as possible and as rapidly as possible.

There is only one way of doing this:

(a) To maintain all existing French and English divisions.  
(b) To form as soon as possible new American divisions, uniting to this end, into American divisions, the infantry whose artillery and other constituent auxiliaries are available.

B. As long as the battle lasts or threatens to reopen, before the superiority of divisions has been realized, the cause of the Allies demands for the moment that the French and English divisions, reduced in infantry effectives, be supported, reinforced when necessary---in calm sectors especially---by American infantry. There should be assigned to this role the infantry of divisions which will be without their artillery and other divisional elements for a certain time (about two months).

3. With reference to assembling our forces into an army with a temporary sector in the vicinity of Chateau-Thierry, General Foch stated that this accorded with his plans. He gave an extended explanation of a proposed attack however and indicated that he expected the 1st and 2d Divisions to take part in this attack which may occur between the 20th and 31st instant.

General Foch also stated that an attack would probably be made by the Allies in September for the purpose of reducing the Marne salient, should that salient still exist

at that time. The possibility of an attack in the region of Amiens for the purpose of freeing the railroads through that place was also discussed.

All in all, the impression gained by the undersigned was that General Foch was not favorable to the idea of establishing an American sector of any degree of permanency prior to October 1.

4. The Commander-in-Chief returned to the question of an American sector within which our forces could be developed. This led to a discussion by General Foch of his tentative plan of campaign for 1919. In brief the plan amounts to an attack by the British, French and American armies on the front Arras-Argonne forest. This plan would involve, he stated, the employment of the American forces between the Argonne and Reims.

General Foch concluded by asking the Commander-in-Chief to study this plan and present his views at the earliest practicable date as it was intended to have a conference at which the Commander-in-Chief of all the Allies would be present.

5. The following resume of the reasons brought forward in support of the above plan for the 1919 campaign is based partly on General Foch's conversation and partly on statements made later by General Weygand.

(a) There is every reason to make the effort to win the war in 1919.

(b) The French and British armies as well as peoples are tired of war. Their morale requires that the minimum result of the campaign of 1919 be the freeing of northern France and at least a portion of Belgium from hostile occupation.

(c) Securing the minimum result which is indispensable demands that all three Allies utilize every available division in coordinated attack.

(d) To bring about a certain spirit of emulation, considered (by Foch and Weygand) as essential in securing the necessary coordination, the attacks must be launched in the same general region with interdependent objectives. At the same time this conception is in accord with the principle of the concentration of effort.

(e) The English must cover the channel and if they are to conduct an offensive their effectives will not allow them to extend farther south than the region of Amiens. The French must cover Paris and their available effectives limits the front on which they can attack to from the vicinity of Amiens to the vicinity of Reims. The location of the Americans must on account of the location of the ports and railroads serving them, be toward the east but the coordination of the attacks forbids the Americans going farther east than the Argonne forest. Hence the American sector should be the Argonne forest---vicinity of Reims.

(f) The front Argonne-Arras corresponds to the forces which should be available for an offensive in 1919. This front also corresponds, as indicated above, to the national necessities as to the location of troops of the various nations. It remains to enquire whether the natural objectives of an offensive in this region would, if attained, be sufficient to accomplish the minimum result demanded.

(g) The objective, other than the enemy's forces, of an offensive in the region considered is naturally the railroad net as far as and including the *voie de rocade* Mezieres via Cambrai toward Valenciennes and the north. Success in reaching this *voie de rocade* would throw the bulk of the enemy's rail traffic on the lines through Liege and would in addition force a considerable part of his army against the Ardennes. These conditions would be so embarrassing to the enemy as to make it practically certain that he would, including the country, actually regained by the offensive proper, relinquish practically all of northern France and also a part of Belgium. The minimum result would thus be obtained.

(h) Another reason (Foch and Weygand) for the selection of the front Argonne-Arras is that the terrain lends itself to offensive movements. On the other hand the railroad systems and the fortresses of Metz and Saarbourg give a certain advantage to the German defense of Lorraine.

(i) An American attack in the region of Nancy would be in the nature of a diversion (Foch and Weygand). The vital spark of emulation would misfire should the

plan be an attack by the Americans in Lorraine while the French and British attack in the north (Weygand).

6. We are certainly in accord with the ideas of General Foch, as outlined in the preceding paragraph, as to the effort to be made next year and as to the necessity for coordinated attack by every available division whether it be American, French, or British.

But it does not appear that, in the attainment of these ends, it is essential that the front of attack be continuous. There are indeed certain very good reasons why the front of attack should not be continuous:

(a) The preparation for and the launching of the attack in places somewhat widely separated favors surprise, leads to uncertainty on the part of the enemy, and allows full advantage to be taken of initial success at any particular part of the front.

(b) The essential cooperation required is concerned only with the time of the attack and taking into consideration the national characteristics of the several Allies it is believed that such cooperation is really the major portion of all that is attainable.

7. The strategical importance of the objectives selected by General Foch justifies, of course, the belief that the attainment of these objectives will realize the minimum results which he lays down as essential during 1919. But a campaign limited to the front planned by General Foch carries with it no reasonable prospect of final victory during 1919. This final victory can only be had by reaching the vitals of Germany and by destroying her armed forces. Since her vitals are in Lorraine the simplest method is to take the most direct road to that region.

Even though we assume the improbability of reaching those vitals during 1919 yet a serious threat to Lorraine will at any time so relieve the pressure in the north of France as to facilitate an offensive in that region and therefore facilitate the attainment of the minimum result laid down for 1919 by the Allied Commander-in-Chief.

From the enemy's point of view the proposed plan enables him to utilize his best railroad net, to exert his best concentration of defensive effort, removes the war from territory claimed by him (Lorraine) and gives him the certainty of prolonging the war.

8. The decision to adopt the tentative plans outlined by General Foch would carry with it the wide separation of active and quiet sectors. Since we must continue to bring over new units until the end of the war such a separation carries with it a certain mixing of our units with, or control by, the French. Should we be assigned a sector in Lorraine, however, the natural training ground of our new units would be the Vosges, which amounts to a continuation of our sector and the retention of our control over all American units.

9. As against the question of installations brought forward by the Commander-in-Chief as necessitating the selection at an early date of a sector for our forces and for favoring the region of Lorraine for this sector, General Foch laid stress on the necessity for supply following the armies and not the reverse as well as on the relief afforded in this matter by the pooling system initiated by the Commander-in-Chief.

While this attitude of General Foch is quite correct it does not, it is believed, take into account all the factors. First of all there are certain facilities which cannot be extensively pooled: We must take care of our own sick and wounded and hospitals (other than field) cannot be moved in a minute---in certain matters the very custom of our country requires greater facilities than are needed by the French, telephones and care of troops for example. Then too we will bring more and more materiel from America and this constant changing of ideas as to the permanent American sector entails our installing various facilities for other troops. However devoted we may be to the Allied cause our first duty is toward our own forces; and by faithfully fulfilling this duty we shall best aid the Allied cause.

It is hardly necessary to add that nothing in the above contemplates our settling down in the defense of a sector. It is evident, on the other hand, that once we have allotted to us a certain region we can proceed with our installations after our own fashion and with the full knowledge that no matter how far we may advance those installations will be of value to us.

10. After mature reflection, it is believed that the most valid of the reasons advanced by General Foch and General Weygand in support of the practically continuous front of attack is to be found in the idea of securing emulation between the several armies. The very distinct impression left on my mind by the conversation of both General Foch and General Weygand was a doubt on their part of the ability of both the French and British attack unless carried along by the enthusiasm of Americans acting in the same region against common objectives. If such were the fact it would perhaps be sufficient reason for adopting the proposed plan. It is not believed, however, that the Allied morale is so low that it will never recover. There is even now great doubt as to any considerable numerical superiority on the part of the Germans. The unquestioned superiority of the enemy at present is believed to be due to his possession of the initiative and its accompanying benefit to morale rather than to any mere numerical superiority. The effort of the United States should give both the advantage of superior numbers and of the initiative before spring. The Allied morale will be regained with the regaining of the initiative and at least a part of both the French and British armies will be available for attack without the immediate presence of Americans. In any event it seems unwise to associate our troops with troops who could only be drawn into an attack by our immediate presence.

11. General Foch is the Allied Commander-in-Chief and if he finally decides to adopt his tentative plan for 1919 we are bound to play our part in all loyalty. On the other hand the Commander-in-Chief has the right to insist upon the immediate assignment of an American sector so that we may develop on our own lines in our own way. Moreover the Commander-in-Chief has, as already indicated, been requested to submit his views on General Foch's tentative plan.

12. It is recommended that General Foch's request for comments on his tentative plan be answered along the following lines:

(1) There can be no question of the necessity of exerting every effort to end the war in 1919 nor as to the minimum result essential to the Allies in that year.

(2) Since it is admitted that America must play a large part in providing the necessary superiority in troops it must also be admitted that America must now be assigned a permanent sector which can be developed in accordance with our own ideas and within which our forces can be developed in our own way in accordance with our national characteristics. The absence of such an American sector has hampered us in the past, has retarded our development, has diminished our value to the Allied cause and is no longer tolerable.

(3) The American army expects to be employed in attack and has no idea of settling down in a sector for defense. But the assignment of a region for our operations enables us to provide installations which will continue to be of benefit to us no matter what the measures of success attained by the offensive. The pooling system, which is so essential, does not obviate the necessity for our having certain installations peculiarly our own, such as hospitals, telegraph and telephone systems, etc. etc.

(4) The American army is not so presumptuous as to believe that the attacks which it may be able to deliver in 1919 could within themselves suffice to end the war. But while it is recognized that every available division must be brought to the attack in 1919 it is submitted that the essential requirement is that the attacks of the several Allies be coordinated in point of time rather than that they be conducted on a practically continuous front. The present front may be compared to a river line and the methods employed in the attack of the latter apply to the former.

(5) A powerful attack between Baccarat and Nancy so threatens the vital region of Germany as to make certain the withdrawal of masses of hostile troops from northern France. Notwithstanding the capacity of the enemy's *voies de rocade* the launching of two attack rather than one is advantageous in the present form of the war, provided that each attack is on a sufficiently large scale and provided the two are properly synchronized with regard to time. It is quite possible to make each attack sufficiently powerful and to synchronize the time.

(6) Although no relaxation of effort to put as many divisions on the line as is possible can be thought of as yet we must not become pessimistic on the question of our superiority in 1919. Virtually the only superiority the enemy now possesses is in the passing to the Allies through the arrival of American troops and with the consequent regaining of the initiative by the Allies, the enemy has but a gloomy future before him. He already confronts difficulties of all kinds and once his morale declines these difficulties will become more and more acute.

All in all it is believed quite possible to win the war in 1919. But to do this it is believed that an attack on Lorraine as well as in northern France is essential.

(7) The front of Lorraine is better suited for an American sector than the Champagne or any other part of the front for the following reasons:

(a) The location of our ports, depots and line of communications is in better relation to the front St-Mihiel---St-Die.

(b) It has been understood from the beginning that Lorraine was the portion of the front which we were to occupy and our developments have all been to that end. A change now would delay matters and would render necessary the duplication of much work and materiel peculiar to our own needs.

(c) With an American sector in Lorraine we have the possibility of extending our front into the Vosges where we could place the new divisions which must continue to arrive. This would give us control over our new units to an extent which would be impracticable were our sector elsewhere and it becomes necessary to send incoming divisions a considerable distance for their first training in the trenches.

13. It is further recommended that, while the definite assignment of Lorraine be urged, General Foch be informed that his final decision as to a permanent sector for us will be accepted without question but that it is insisted that this decision must be made without delay.

FOX CONNER,  
Colonel, General Staff,  
Asst. Chief of Staff, G-3.

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C-in-C Rept. File: Fldr. 19: Cablegram

### ***Railway Labor***

A. G. O., WAR DEPARTMENT,  
Washington, D. C., July 15, 1918.

American Section  
Supreme War Council

Number 69

With reference to your 147, Joint Note 33 has been submitted to the President and is approved by him in principle. He desires it made clear however that United States cannot contribute any material or labor for handling work upon these railways at the present time. He will be glad to have a report upon this subject however. March.

McCAIN.

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***Considerations Relating to Location of the First Army, A. E. F.***

G-3

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, Prior to July 15, 1918.*

1. German Intentions: It is believed that the Germans will continue the present battle until the French salient south of Noyon is clear. Following such action several propositions are open to the Germans:

a. To attack at Reims and to the east thereof. There is little in a decisive way to be gained by such an attack. A most important gain would be derived by an advance as far as Chalons which would open to the German the railroad along the Marne, and the connection therewith to the German railroad center at Mezieres. To accomplish this the Germans would have to advance not only east at Reims but also from Chateau-Thierry to the east. However, the advantage gained by such an advance does not seem to warrant this step by the Germans, especially as there is little in the way of decisive results which may be obtained thereby. It seems evident that the railroads to the west of Chateau-Thierry will answer all German needs. Unless the German feels that he can break through and get into the open by a surprise attack on this front there seems to be little likelihood of his carrying out this operation.

b. An attack against the British. The destruction of the British army and the channel ports are still main objectives. Recent fighting has forced all French reserves to the vicinity of Paris. The British must stand alone, especially in the earlier stages of an attack. At the same time the Germans will hardly be able to launch a large attack against the British for at least four weeks. This time will be required for the preparation and concentration of sufficient troops. The time factor is important and every delay favors the Allies. We must grant that the Germans realize what one month's delay means to the Allies and that he will exert every effort to take advantage of this one month. At the same time it looks as though the Germans are able to make an attack against the British army with from 20 to 25 divisions. However, a decisive success can hardly be expected with this size force.

c. To continue the attack against the French. This would have the double object of wearing down the French and the psychological effect of bombarding Paris. So long as the Germans direct the attack towards Paris they will be faced by the main French army. If his plan is to wear down by losses the French army and thereby force submission, his best scheme is to continue the battle towards Paris. Such a plan can in the immediate future follow one of two lines of operation:

1. Directly on Paris on the front Montdidier and the Marne, or;
2. First attacking on the front Montdidier-Albert and then turning south in the direction of Beauvais.

In the first case he will have the shortest route to Paris or to within bombardment distance of Paris. At the same time he will have the mass of the French army against him. An advance in this direction will be guided by the railroad net which follows the lines:

1. Compiègne-Creil (OISE River);
2. Crepy-Nanteuil;
3. Neufchelles-Meaux (Ourcq River).

It will hardly go east of the Marne unless the railroad along the Marne has previously been opened to include Reims and Epernay. This direction of the attack will surely force decisive fighting from the wearing down viewpoint, but favors the French as it will strike them at their strongest point.

The second line of operation has several advantages. The Germans will not have to delay long before making an attack as his reserves are near and he has been preparing this area for some time. Neither the British nor the French will be able to spare many reserves to oppose such an attack. The desire to separate the British and French will proceed. By extending the line to Beauvais the Germans will have a longer line, which, however, is an advantage to him in that he will have more opportunity for the use of his mass of maneuver. By securing the high ground from Estrees--St-Denis to Beauvais he will command the vital railroad systems leading north and northeast of Paris. At the same time, success (unless far more complete than in previous operations) will not be decisive in this connection. Further large attacks will have to follow. It is hardly possible that the German figures on completing the war in one more attack, no matter where it is made. The position indicated above will give him a better command and location for a subsequent operation.

In summing up we may therefore conclude that the next German offensive will be either against the British somewhere in the vicinity of Arras, or against the French, either in continuation of the present battle, or from the vicinity of Montdidier north. The chances seems to indicate that the last proposition will be followed.

2. The position of the American Expeditionary Forces: To make an estimate in this connection we must look into the future and endeavor to see a picture of this situation at the time when we will be able to form the First Army, say about July 25.

What would be the object of this army?

The lessons to be derived from the immediate past show us clearly that our best help can be given in maintaining the morale of our Allies. We cannot win the summer's campaign by our own fighting efforts but we can forestall a decision by so raising the Allied morale as to keep them in the fight. This can be best accomplished in two ways:

First, by forming an army, and second, by having troops available to enter critical phases of the fight wherever they may appear. We can do both. The British are now provided with five divisions for this purpose. We will have four divisions available to work with the French (4th, 28th, 35th, and 77th). We will have left by July 25, six divisions for the start of the First Army (1st, 2d, 3d, 42d, 26th, and 32d; 82d retained in Toul area and 5th in Vosges). It is believed that the foregoing conclusions should be kept in mind and especially that part relating to the availability of the divisions not included in the First Army for use with our Allies. If this is not done the formation of the First Army will surely be interrupted as we will not be able to avoid sending some of our divisions to help our Allies in the midst of the heaviest fighting.

3. Place to be selected for the formation of the First Army: The location may be selected on the basis of one or two desires. That is, to select a place where the presence of the First Army will be constantly felt from the beginning of its formation in critical fighting, or, to select a place where it can be thoroughly and completely formed and later moved to the critical battlefield existing at that time. The former proposition is a very difficult undertaking and one which will hardly succeed. German attacks will no doubt interfere or at least force such a hasty formation that disaster might result. However, such a place would be anywhere between Montdidier and Villers-Cotterets. The second proposition is the soundest and even in these critical times the surest policy from the broad viewpoint. A position may be found where considerable moral effect may be secured and at the same time the formation of the army may progress with comparative certainty. Such a sector can be found along the Marne about Chateau-Thierry. This vicinity has other advantages. We now have a footing in this region. From here we could be moved with facility in any direction. (Excellent railroad connections.) Moreover, this position bears a safe relation to our own S. O. S., and our installations in the east. There are questions that cannot be neglected. Paris may be invested or captured but the war must go on. What little we have, in such an event, should not be cooped up in Paris. If the moral factor of the present situation were not so great it would be more practicable to form the First Army more to the east.

It therefore seems feasible to narrow down this question to which bank of the Marne we should select. The right (north) bank is not advocated for the following reasons: In this position we would be involved in the critical fighting but at a point where success would not have a vital effect. We would be on a flank which the Germans would desire to contain or invest on drive into or across the Marne. With the force available our front could not be extended, at least for the present, north of the railroad near Neuilly---le-Poterie. If the Allied troops to the north, or we, are forced back from this position, the direction of the course of the Marne is such that we would be forced to retire across the river. This is a serious disadvantage and would entail a difficult operation. Our supply facilities would be somewhat difficult due to lack of railroads and the Marne crossings. In addition, the Ourcq does not help matters. An offensive on our part on this front could only have as its objective the railroad from near Neuilly---Fere-en-Tardenois. This is some 15 kilometers distant from the present line. It is doubtful if we could carry out an attack to such a depth with the forces available.

The left (south) bank of the Marne is strongly advocated for the following reasons:

- (a) The desired moral effect will be secured by this position;
- (b) We would be able to complete our army organization with some degree of certainty. By taking over the line from Chateau-Thierry to the east, we will have the Marne in our front and on both flanks instead of in our rear.
- (c) The railroad situation is excellent and would cover not only our immediate supply arrangements but also our rapid movement to needed points from east to west.
- (d) This position would make us available to be transported not only to critical battle points to the east or west, but also it would insure us an opportunity to cover our own vital rear elements of the S. O. S. and those to the east.
- (e) The risk of being cooped up in the vicinity of Paris is avoided.
- (f) We would have comparative quiet for the earlier stages of forming the army and thereafter could be used for any special case.

If it is necessary that our forces be utilized on both banks of the Marne we should insist on the smaller element being located on the right bank, especially in the beginning of the formation of the army.

H. A. DRUM,  
Lt. Col., General Staff,  
G-3.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: 212-A: Station List

### ***Location and Employment of Divisions***

3d Section, General Staff

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, July 15, 1918.*

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#### **LOCATION AND EMPLOYMENT OF DIVISIONS - A. E. F.**

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<b>DIVISION</b>	<b>LOCATION</b>	<b>HEADQUARTERS (Nearest Village)</b>	<b>EMPLOYMENT</b>
I CORPS (Marne Group)		La Ferte-sous- Jouarre.	
3	Vicinity of Chateau-Thierry	Viels-Maisons (P. C. Viffort)	In sector



## LOCATION AND EMPLOYMENT OF DIVISIONS - A. E. F. (Continued)

DIVISION	LOCATION	HEADQUARTERS (Nearest Village)	EMPLOYMENT
4	N. E. of Meaux	Lizy-sur-Ourcq	Division divided between 2 Fr. divs. (4th and 164th) for instruction. Fr. 164th Div. is in sector---Am. units in rear. Fr. 4th Div. in reserve. Will hold 2d position in case of attack.
26	Vicinity of Chateau-Thierry	Gennevrois (S. W. of Bezu-le-Guery)	In sector
28	E. of Chateau- Thierry	Saulchery	Divided between 2 Fr. divs. (39th and 125th) for instruction. Fr. divs. are in sector---Am. units on 2d Line.
II CORPS (British Group)		Fruges	
27	North of Cassel	Oudezeele	Training with British Second Army according to schedule.
30	N. E. Cassel	Watou, Belgium	On 2d line of British Second Army. Training with British according to schedule.
33	N. E. of Amiens	Molliens-au-Bois	Training with British according to schedule. Small units in line.
78	S. W. of Lumbres	Nielles-les-Blequin	Training with British according to schedule.
80	S. of Doullens	Beauval	Training with British according to schedule.
III Corps			
1	N. W. of Meaux	Dammartin-en-Goele	In reserve Fr. Sixth Army.
2	Vicinity of Chateau-Thierry	Chamigny	On 2d line of Fr. Sixth Army. Resting
IV CORPS (Toul Group)		Neufchateau	
77	Near Baccarat	Baccarat	Holding sector with Fr. 61st Div. In act of taking over sector alone.

## LOCATION AND EMPLOYMENT OF DIVISIONS - A. E. F. (Continued)

DIVISION	LOCATION	HEADQUARTERS (Nearest Village)	EMPLOYMENT
82	N. of Toul	Lucey	Holding sector with Fr. 154th Division
29	10th Div. Area	Prauthoy	Training
37	3d Div. Area	Bourmont	Training
89	4th Div. Area	Reynel	Training
90	14th Div. Area	Aignay-le-Duc	Training
92	11th Div. Area	Bourbonne-les-Bains	Training
V CORPS (Epinal Group)		Remiremont	
5	Vosges	Gerardmer	In sector alone without artillery. Attached with Fr. 21st Div.
32	Gap of Belfort	Rougemont-le-Chateau	Holding sector mixed with French 53d and 151st Divs.
35	Vosges	Wesserling	Holding sector with French 22d Div.
UNATTACHED 42	N. of Chalons-sur-Marne	Vadenay	In position on 2d line of French Fourth Army.
S. O. S.			
41	St-Aignan Area	St-Aignan	Base Division
83	Le Mans Area--- N. W. of Tours	Ecommoy	Base Div. Regt. destined for Italy still in 8th Div. Area. Hq. at Montigny-le-Roi.
WITH FRENCH			
93 (provisional colored troops)	French Fourth Army Near Vienne-la-Ville	369th Infantry Vienne-la-Ville	In sector with French 16th Div.
	French Second Army E. of Four-de-Paris	370th Infantry	In sector with French XIII C. A.
	W. of Avocourt	371st Infantry P. C. at S. W. corner of Bois-de-Hesse	In sector with French XIII C. A.
	S. of Vauquois	372d Infantry	In sector with French XIII C. A. Hq. Fr. XIII C. A. at Triaucourt

Cable: A-1742-R

***Effect of Shipment of Animals on Cargo Shipments***

A. G. O. WAR DEPARTMENT  
Washington, D. C., July 19, 1918.

PERSHING, AMEXFORCE, G. H. Q., A. E. F.

With reference to your number 1474:

1. Pending receipt of further recommendation from you, based on studies you now have under way, shipment of animals will not be undertaken unless you report them more important than cargo.

a. To make shipment of 25,000 animals per month, recommended by you as necessary to meet your requirements, would result in the withdrawal from cargo service of all animal transports available. This would result in a reduction in cargo shipments of approximately 100,000 tons per month. Such reduction would be serious at this time, in view of present troop movements.

b. As stated in my 1686, not more than 11,000 animals could be shipped prior to September 1. This number would not materially alter situation. Believe best plan for the present will be to expedite shipment of motor transportation. Between now and September 1. better estimate of tonnage situation can be made. When studies with reference to number animals actually needed are completed future requirements can be more definitely estimated. March.

McCAIN.

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Cable: P-1487-S

***Tonnage Requirements***

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
Chaumont, Haute-Marne, July 19 1918.

AGWAR, WASHINGTON

FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF AND SECRETARY OF WAR.

1. A. Expected tonnage as reported in your 1712 entirely inadequate to supply even the 30 divisions that will be in France by September. Since the successful outcome of this war is dependent on maintaining an uninterrupted flow of men and supplies from America to France, I urge the revision of the estimates to conform to the figures of my 1342 [June 19, 1918] which were on the extremely low basis of 30 pounds per man per day plus construction materials. This will involve shipments of thousands of short tons of cargo as follows: July 690, August 803, September 903, October 1,021, November 1,131, December 1,220. Horses will be in addition to these figures. Our records indicate that by careful economy our operations can be maintained on the basis of tonnage thus computed, but they cannot be maintained on the basis suggested in your 1712.

B. While I realize that this would involve the closest economy in the United States, it would appear to be possible since only about one-quarter of the tonnage so far

built for the shipping board has been assigned to direct army use, while less than half the Dutch, Swedish, and other ships recently taken over are in army service, and the new estimates of your 1712 appear to contemplate the assignment to the army of less than half the new steel tonnage estimated to be completed before the close of the current year.

C. It is my very best judgment that the satisfactory outcome of the war is absolutely dependent on the United States increasing its forces to at least 80 divisions by May or by July next year at the latest. In order therefore to enable the continuation of shipment of the maximum number of troops and supplies, including horses, I request and recommend in detail:

First. That at least 500,000 dead weight tons of vessels now employed in other trades be withdrawn and placed in army service. The fact that out of 530,000 dead weight tons of Dutch vessels requisitioned only 244,000 tons have been assigned to army transport; that no part of the tonnage secured under the Japanese agreement has been so assigned; that 200,000 tons is being secured by the Swedish agreement, of which 100,000 tons has been assigned to the army or Allied service, leads me to conclusion that not less than 500,000 dead weight tons of vessels can be diverted to meet this most pressing need.

Second. That the equivalent of all new steel cargo tonnage be assigned to army as fast as completed.

Third. That as far as possible, all new wooden and composite ships, be so employed that an equivalent amount of steel tonnage may be released for army service.

D. The tonnages mentioned can be unloaded promptly and handled through ports here without delay, and every energy is being devoted to increasing our capacity to handle cargoes. Please advise as early as practicable as to possibility of securing necessary shipping to carry out our program. The importance of making the necessary allotments suggested is imperative.

PERSHING.

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SOS Gen. File: 579.5: Letter

### ***Cargo Space Available on Troop Transports***

1st Section, General Staff

HEADQUARTERS SERVICE OF SUPPLY, A. E. F.,  
*Tours, Indre-et-Loire, July 20, 1918.*

From: C. G.

To: C-in-C, G-1

1. Referring to your letter of July 13, in regard to troop transports arriving at Brest carrying cargo considerably less than their rated capacity.

2. A large proportion of the apparent loss of 20,000 tons of cargo referred to on 28 troop ships can be accounted for by the small cargoes carried by a few ships of the type of the *Aeolus*, *America*, *Martha Washington* and *President Grant*. These ships have a cargo capacity exclusive of space occupied by troop property of 2,500 to 4,000 tons and have only been carrying 500 to 1,000 tons of cargo. Because of their deep draft and troop carrying capacity these ships must run to Brest in convoy with other troop ships which carry practically no cargo. To add 2,000 to 3,000 tons to their cargo seems impracticable for the following reasons.

3. To maintain the proposed schedule of troop arrivals it is believed everything must be sacrificed to the most efficient use of our large troop ships. They must be sent

to the nearest deep draft port (Brest) and given every available facility while there to complete their discharge and make ready to sail together with other ships in convoy to the United States. These large troop convoys are at the present time averaging less than two days in port and to carry an appreciable amount of cargo on any of these ships could not help but delay them, even with the best facilities for handling. In addition any slight delay to certain ships may mean the holding of others ready to sail in order to be properly conveyed.

4. Considerable study has been given to the subject of operating these troop ships in order to maintain our troop schedule by the navy and A. T. S. authorities and they are in accord in believing that certain changes should be made as follows:

(a) Troop convoys to run to Brest and not be split and certain ships diverted to St-Nazaire and Bordeaux (recommended by navy) as Brest is the port farthest east and time is lost and danger is involved in sending certain ships down the coast to St-Nazaire and Bordeaux.

(b) Ships operating in convoys to Brest should carry no cargo except troop property and occasional small amounts of quartermaster stores and light baggage freight enabling them to receive equally quick turnarounds.

(c) Certain ships which carry considerable cargo or refrigerated beef and whose light draft enables them to dock at other ports, to be segregated and operated by themselves in convoys to St-Nazaire and Bordeaux. The following ships are of this class: *Calamares, Pastores, Tenadores, Ulua, Vauban, Finland, H. R. Mallory, Kroonland, Manchuria, Matsonia, Mercury, Mongolia, Ryndam, Susquehanna, and Maui.*

5. It is understood that the A. T. S. are soon to make definite recommendations covering the above points to the authorities in the United States with the view to enable us to fulfill the schedule of troop arrivals we are expected to handle.

6. The adoption of these measures will mean the loss of cargo space on a number of large deep draft troop ships but it will assure a quicker total turnaround for all ships operating in these Brest convoys with better protection, while the other cargo troop ships operating in direct convoy to Bordeaux and St-Nazaire will save considerable time en route, obtain much better protection, can carry to capacity and handle same direct to a dock.

F. J. KERNAN,  
Major General, N. A.,  
Commanding.

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Les Armees Francaises, Tome VII, Vol. I, Annexes Vol I: Notes

### ***Use of American Divisions***

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,  
FRENCH ARMIES OF THE NORTH AND NORTHEAST,  
July 21, 1918.

Summary of conference at BOMBON, July 21, attended by General Foch, General Petain, General Weygand, General de Barescut. Also present Colonel Boyd and Lt. Colonel de Chambrun.

General Pershing proposed that American divisions be grouped so as to form two sectors: One in the zone that is active at present, the other on a quiet part of our front. This latter sector would become the American front proper.

A. FORMATION OF THE ACTIVE SECTOR: The American divisions now engaged: The 3d, 4th, 28th, 26th, to which will be added the 42d now in transit and the 32d which will begin to move tomorrow, would form two army corps each having 2 divisions in 1st line and one division in reserve. These two army corps would be placed side by side and in position so as to embrace or extend the American 26th Division on its right or on its left.

These two army corps would form a part of the American First Army the headquarters of which would be either in Coulommiers or in Montmirail, and of which General Pershing would take command, placing himself of his own accord under the control of a French Group of Armies Commander.

These proposals are accepted by General Foch.

B. ORGANIZATION OF THE QUIET SECTOR: General Pershing requests that the sector where his divisions not sufficiently seasoned for battle and his battle-tired divisions will be placed side by side, be quickly designated, and in the St-Mihiel---Toul---Nancy region if possible.

General Foch said he would give his answer to the matter tomorrow probably and certainly before 10:30 a. m., Wednesday.

General Pershing specified that these groupments would not be rigid and it was quite possible that his divisions would participate in the attacks in other sectors, and that a French division might be put in line on an American front.

General Petain, invited by General Pershing to express his opinion on the propositions formulated by General Pershing, made no objection; he even called attention to the fact that the portion of our line requested by General Pershing to constitute the permanent American front was well chosen, since it covered rear areas already organized by our Allies where there are numerous training camps, rifle ranges, etc.

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SWC: 316: Cablegram

### ***Military Policy of the United States***

No. 73-R

A. G. O. WAR DEPARTMENT,  
Washington, D. C., July 22, 1918.

AMERICAN SECTION, SUPREME WAR COUNCIL, VERSAILLES

The President has handed the Ambassadors of England, France and Italy a statement of the military policy of the United States, which follows:

The whole heart of the people of the United States is in the winning of this war. The controlling purpose of the Government of the United States is to do anything that is necessary and effective to win it. It wishes to cooperate in every practicable way with the Allied Governments, and to cooperate ungrudgingly; for it has no ends of its own to serve and believes that the war can be won only by common council and intimate concert of action. It has sought to study every proposed policy or action in which its cooperation has been asked in this spirit, and states the following conclusions in the confidence that, if it finds itself obliged to decline participation in any undertaking or course of action, it will be understood that it does so only because it deems itself precluded from participating by imperative considerations either of policy or of fact.

In full agreement with the Allied Governments and upon the unanimous advices of the Supreme War Council, the Government of the United States adopted, upon its entrance into the war, a plan for taking part in the fighting on the western front

into which all its resources of men and material were to be put, and put as rapidly as possible, and it has carried out that plan with energy and success, pressing its execution more and more rapidly forward and literally putting into it the entire energy and executive force of the nation. This was its response, its very willing hearty response, to what was the unhesitating judgment alike of its own military advisers and of the advisers of the Allied Governments. It is now considering at the suggestion of the Supreme War Council, the possibility of making very considerable additions even to this immense program which, if they should prove feasible at all, will tax the industrial processes of the United States and the shipping facilities of the whole group of associated nations to the utmost. It has thus concentrated all its plans and all its resources upon this single absolutely necessary object.

In such circumstances it feels it to be its duty to say that it cannot, so long as the military situation on the western front remains critical, consent to break or slacken the force of its present efforts by diverting any part of its military forces to other points or objectives. The United States is at a great distance from the field of action on the western front; it is at a much greater distance from any other field of action. Instrumentalities by which it is to handle its armies and its stores have at great cost and with great difficulty been created in France. They do not exist elsewhere. It is practicable for her to do a great deal in France; it is not practicable for her to do anything of importance or on a large scale upon any other field. The American Government, therefore, very respectfully requests its associates to accept its deliberate judgment that it should not dissipate its forces by attempting important operations elsewhere. It regards the Italian front as closely coordinated with the western front, however, and is willing to divert a portion of its military forces from France to Italy if it is the judgment and wishes of the Supreme Command that it should do so. It wishes to defer to the decision of the Commander-in-Chief in this matter, as it would wish to defer to all others, particularly because it considers these two fronts so closely related as to be practically but separate parts of a single line and because it would be necessary that any American troops sent to Italy should be subtracted from the number used in France and be actually transported across French territory from the ports now used by the armies of the United States.

It is the clear and fixed judgment of the Government of the United States, arrived at after repeated and very searching reconsideration of the whole situation in Russia, that military intervention there would add to the present confusion in Russia rather than cure it, injure her rather than help her, and that it would be of no advantage in the prosecution of our main design, to win the war against Germany. It cannot, therefore, take part in such intervention or sanction it in principle. Military intervention would, in its judgment, even supposing it to be efficacious in its immediate avowed object of delivering an attack upon Germany from the east, be merely a method of making use of Russia, not a method of serving her. Her people could not profit by it, if they profited by it at all, in time to save them from their present distresses, and their substance would be used to maintain foreign armies, not to reconstitute their own. Military action is admissible in Russia, as the Government of the United States sees the circumstances, only to help the Czecho-Slovaks consolidate their forces and get into successful cooperation with their Slavic kinsmen and to steady any effort at self-government or self-defense in which the Russians themselves may be willing to accept assistance. Whether from Vladivostek or from Murmansk and Archangel, the only legitimate object for which American or Allied troops can be employed, it submits, is to guard military stores which may subsequently be needed by Russian forces and to render such aid as may be acceptable to Russians in the organization of their own self-defense. For helping the Czecho-Slovaks there is immediate necessity and sufficient justification. Recent developments have made it evident that that is in the interest of what

the Russian people themselves desire, and the Government of the United States is glad to contribute the small force at its disposal for that purpose. It yields, also, to the judgment of the Supreme Command in the matter of establishing a small force at Murmansk, to guard the military stores at Kola and to make it safe for Russian forces to come together in organized bodies in the north. But it owes it to frank counsel to say that it can go no further than these modest and experimental plans. It is not in a position, and has no expectation of being in a position, to take part in organized intervention in adequate force from either Vladivostok or Murmansk and Archangel. It feels that it ought to add, also, that it will feel at liberty to use the few troops it can spare only for the purposes here stated and shall feel obligated to withdraw those forces in order to add them to the forces at the western front if the plans in whose execution it is now intended that they should cooperate should develop into others inconsistent with the policy to which the Government of the United States feels constrained to restrict itself.

At the same time the Government of the United States wishes to say with the utmost cordiality and good will that none of the conclusions here stated is meant to wear the least color of criticism of what the other governments associated against Germany may think it wise to undertake. It wishes in no way to embarrass their choice of policy. All that is intended here is a perfectly frank and definite statement of the policy which the United States feels obliged to adopt for herself and in the use of her own military forces. The Government of the United States does not wish it to be understood that in so restricting its own activities it is seeking, even by implication, to set limits to the action or to define the policies of its associates. During the interim it hopes to carry out the plans for safeguarding the rear of the Czecho-Slovaks operating from Vladivostok in a way that will place it and keep it in close cooperation with a small military force like its own from Japan, and if necessary from the other Allies, and that will assure it of the cordial accord of all the Allies Powers; and it proposes to ask all associated in this course of action to unite in assuring the people of Russia in the most public and solemn manner that none of the governments uniting in action either in Siberia or in northern Russia contemplates any interference of any kind with the political sovereignty of Russia, any intervention in her internal affairs, or any impairment of her territorial integrity either now or hereafter, but that each of the associated powers has the single object of affording such aid as shall be acceptable, and only such aid as shall be acceptable, to the Russian people in their endeavor to regain control of their own affairs, their own territory, and their own destiny.

It is the hope and purpose of the Government of the United States to take advantage of the earliest opportunity to send to Siberia a commission of merchants, agricultural experts, labor advisors, Red Cross representatives, and agents of the Young Men's Christian Association accustomed to organizing the best methods of spreading useful information and rendering educational help of a modest sort, in order in some systematic manner to relieve the immediate economic necessities of the people being introduced in every way for which opportunity may open. The execution of this plan will follow and will not be permitted to embarrass the military assistance rendered in the rear of the westward moving forces of the Czecho-Slovaks. Woodrow Wilson.

The foregoing is furnished you for your guidance in dealing with such military international questions as involve the United States. March.

McCAIN.

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***Creation of American Army Discussed***

[Editorial Translation]

General Staff  
No. 2,280

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED ARMIES,  
*July 22, 1918.*

General Foch, Commander-in-Chief of the Allies Armies

To the General, Commander-in-Chief of the American Army

My dear General:

In connection with the interview which we had at my headquarters on the 21st in the presence of General Petain:

1. I have the honor to confirm to you my entire adherence to the project of uniting in an army under American command those of your divisions whose state of instruction permits them to engage in the battle. I am particularly happy to think that you will take command of this army yourself and I thank you for the generosity with which you offered to place yourself in all that concerns operations under the command of the General Commander-in-Chief of the French Armies of the North and Northeast.

As we have agreed, this American First Army will be formed in the region north of the Marne around the nucleus already in this locality in your I Army Corps under conditions the details of which I ask you to please draw up with General Petain.

General Petain has informed me that previously to this agreement he had given the order to direct your 32d Division to the French Tenth Army where he had foreseen its entry into the line. This disposition could not be modified except by disturbing the whole play of movements which had already been arranged in order to support the battle being carried on by this army and I ask you in consequence, in order to avoid all changes, to accept that your 32d Division be placed for the moment at the disposal of the French Tenth Army.

2. With reference to the quiet sector which you desire to be immediately given to the American Army, the examination which I have made of this question has shown me that there is no inconvenience in placing it in the region which you consider best. I have, then, the satisfaction of informing you that, in agreement with General Petain, I have decided on account of the advantages which you find in this, that the sector extending from NOMENY to north of St-MIHIEL will be placed progressively under American command as the units which can be sent there are available. I ask you also to arrange all details concerning this occupation with General Petain.

FOCH.

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***Program Involving Delivery in France by June 30, 1919 of 80 Divisions***

No. 74

WAR DEPARTMENT,  
Washington, D. C., July 23, 1918.

American Section, Supreme War Council, Versailles

After a complete study of all American resources, the recommendation of the War Department has been approved by the President that we attempt a program involving the delivery in France by June 30, 1919 of 80 divisions provided the following can be obtained:

1. A change in the ages now prescribed by law for the limits of the draft so as to produce in such a short time the required number of men, the program in its entirety forwarding 80 divisions in France and 18 at home.
2. That the consent of France and Great Britain is assured for the continued supply of field guns and ammunition and of the heavier calibers until the American artillery program comes through.
3. That Congress will appropriate the billions of dollars necessary for the 80-division program.
4. That Great Britain will furnish us troops and cargo ships to supply our deficiencies in that respect until our shipping program comes through.

The first and third of these requirements while needing legislation can be assumed to be a certainty. The promise already made by Great Britain to continue the use of the present troop ships which are aiding in the transportation of American units will it is assumed practically care for that deficiency. The deficiencies in cargo tonnage are estimated as follows by months.

For August, 1918	1,217,755	dead weight tons.
September	1,165,384	
October	1,117,734	
November	859,949	
December	731,274	
January	497,016	
February	209,641	

Our expected production of shipping will take care of the cargo program for 80 divisions from that point on until June 30, 1919. In this connection it may be pointed out that the United States has been continuing the shipment of troops during July on the basis of this program and a little more and that the cargo tonnage available in July has not been sufficient for the proper supply of our troops now in France.

Referring to the second requirement, it is understood that the French can continue to furnish guns and carriages and ammunition at least as rapidly as they have been furnishing them up to the present time. It is desired that this be confirmed. March.

McCAIN.

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***Command of an American Sector***

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff  
No. 1,204

FRENCH GROUP OF ARMIES OF THE EAST,  
*Mirecourt, Vosges, July 23, 1918.*

MEMORANDUM

For the French Seventh Army

(Confirmation and continuation of telegram 1570/C)

[Extract]

I. The American Commander-in-Chief strongly urges that the generals commanding the American divisions placed at the disposition of the armies should immediately take command of a sector with their divisions complete and under their own orders.

These units will as a matter of fact be sent into the line after a very short period at the front, perhaps even on the arrival of their own artillery, if circumstances require. American G. H. Q. is consequently very desirous of having these general officers exercise full command as soon as possible, and of getting their general staffs and services working without further delay.

It is well to meet the views of the American Commander-in-Chief and to reduce to the absolute minimum the intermediate period of the distribution of American units in French sectors.

\* \* \* \* \*

DE CASTELNAU  
General of Division,  
Commanding the Group of Armies  
of the East.

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III Corps Gen: 000.7: Memorandum

***Secrecy in Troop Movements Required***

4th Section, General Staff

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, July 24, 1918.*

Memorandum for: Col. DeWitt  
Col. Hilgard  
Capt. Biggar  
Capt. Day  
C. G., S. O. S.

1. The following letter from the chief of the French Mission is repeated for your information and necessary action:

I have the honor of calling your attention to the interest of keeping the movement of troops secret; especially where large units of combat troops are moved, it is desirable that information relative to dates and points of entrainment and especially the destination, should not be divulged. It is in this way that itineraries are often broken up and a first destination is always where the troop trains receive the rest of their itinerary.

The regulating commissioner notifies me that during the last movement of the 42d Division that American officers in charge of detachments sent telegrams to a divisional officer who was at the station of first destination, in uncoded words, giving for each train the effectives transported and the number of units.

When communications of this kind are necessary, it is preferable to designate the units by conventional names or by the names of their commanders.

Moreover, each transportation series is represented by a number, and each train has a number in the series. The regulating commissioner of embarkation has a table giving the distribution of units and copies of this table are carried by the first train to the station of the first destination and to the regulating station of debarkation. In this way each train can be identified by the number of the series and by the order number.

On the other hand, if the unit commanders have communications to send to the point of destination, they can address themselves to the regulating commissioner of embarkation, or to American officer attached, and the latter will give them the necessary forms to keep the operations secret.

If you have no objections to these provisions, it is requested that the necessary instructions be given.

RAGUENEAU.

By order of the C-in-C:

GEO. VAN HORN MOSELEY,  
Brig. Gen., General Staff,  
Asst. Chief of Staff, G-4.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 2212: Letter

### ***Colored Pioneer Regiments to Replace White Regiments***

WAR DEPARTMENT, THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE,  
*Washington, D. C., July 24, 1918.*

From: The Adjutant General of the Army

To: The Commanding General, American Expeditionary Forces

1. As stated in cablegram No. 1447, from this office, of June 3, 1918, colored pioneer infantry regiments will be sent you to replace all white pioneer infantry regiments.

As rapidly as the colored regiments arrive, organize the white regiments into national army infantry brigades according to Tables of Organization, Series A, January 14, 1918.

The white regiments will be renumbered and assigned as follows:

1st Pioneer Inf. to become	377th Inf.	189th	Brig.	95th	Div.
2d " " " "	378th "	189th	"	95th	"
3d " " " "	381st "	191st	"	96th	"
4th " " " "	382d "	191st	"	96th	"
5th " " " "	385th "	193d	"	97th	"
51st " " " "	386th "	193d	"	97th	"
52d " " " "	389th "	195th	"	98th	"
53d " " " "	390th "	195th	"	98th	"
54th " " " "	393d "	197th	"	99th	"
55th " " " "	394th "	197th	"	99th	"
56th " " " "	397th "	199th	"	100th	"
57th " " " "	398th "	199th	"	100th	"
58th " " " "	401st "	201st	"	101st	"
59th " " " "	402d "	201st	"	101st	"
60th " " " "	405th "	203d	"	102d	"
61st " " " "	406th "	203d	"	102d	"

2. The remaining units to complete these divisions will be organized here and sent to France.
3. The 62d Pioneer Infantry will be used and designated as the 2d Headquarters Guard and Traffic Police Regiment of the Second Army.
4. Colored pioneer infantry regiments will be sent for the Second Army.
5. Upon arrival of colored regiments now numbered from 801 to 816 inclusive, and upon the assignment of white regiments referred to above, change the colored designations to 1st to 5th (incl.) and 51st to 62d (incl.) Pioneer Infantry.
6. Acknowledge receipt of these instructions and report reorganizations as rapidly as they are made.

By order of the Secretary of War:

H. G. LEARNARD,  
Adjutant General.

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SOS Gen. File: 37: Telegram

***Combat Troops to be Released from the Services of Supply***

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
Chaumont, Haute-Marne, July 24, 1918.

Commanding General, S. O. S., Tours

The urgent need for replacements in our units that have been lately engaged in severe fighting requires that every available man of the replacement organizations be used. The S. O. S. now have approximately thirty per cent of all the troops in France. This in addition to civilian labor and to the prisoners of war employed. Arrangements must be made at once, by a more efficient distribution of the troops pertaining to the S. O. S., to

release from the S. O. S. duty combatant troops and to make them available for use at the front. Wire these headquarters what measures you are taking to comply with these instructions.

McANDREW.

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SEC: Minutes

***Interallied Aviation Committee Affairs***

S. W. C. 282

*Versailles, July 24, 1918.*

SUPREME WAR COUNCIL

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS REACHED AT THE 3D SESSION OF THE INTERALLIED  
AVIATION COMMITTEE, HELD AT VERSAILLES ON JULY 21 AND 22, 1918.

PRESENT

FRANCE	GREAT BRITAIN	ITALY	AMERICA
General Duval	Major General F. H. Sykes, CMG	General Bongiovanni	Brigadier General Foulois

IN ATTENDANCE

Colonel Dhe Major de Tarle	Colonel C. N. Buzzard, DSO Major Guest	Lieut. Colonel Costanzi Commandant Giusti	Colonel Embick
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SECRETARIAT

Captain Portier	Major A. M. Caccia, MVO Captain E. Abraham	Captain A. Jones	Colonel Wallace
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INTERPRETER - Lieut. Billot

CHAIRMAN - General Bongiovanni

(Copy of the Agenda placed before the Committee)

Items 1, 2, 3, 4, and 7 of Agenda

1. The interallied aviation committee were unable to reach agreement on the necessity for the immediate formation of a permanent and specialized long distance bombing force. The committee therefore request the military representatives to submit the question to the Supreme War Council.

2. The interallied aviation committee studied the question of establishing a plan for long distance bombardment independently of the formation of an interallied force, but unanimity was not obtained on this question.

#### Item 8 of Agenda

3. The interallied aviation committee examined question 8 of the Agenda:

Should the above (question 7) proposals be accepted by the interallied general staff, will it be advisable to put them at once into execution? Or, would it be better in the first place to call on the enemy to put a stop at once to the bombing of Allied towns, with a threat that it would otherwise be subjected to methodical reprisals? Further, would it not be possible by means of such threats to obtain even more far reaching results?

The following conclusion was reached:

- (1) From the military point of view summons or negotiations are undesirable.
- (2) On the political and moral side, the question concerns the Supreme War

Council.

4. The committee agreed to adjourn until summoned to deliberate on an important question.

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HS Secret Documents: Fldr. F-1: Notes

### ***Allied Conference at Chateau Bombon***

*CHATEAU BOMBON, July 24, 1918.*

Notes on conversation between General Foch, General Petain, Sir Douglas Haig and General Pershing, on July 24, 1918, at Chateau Bombon. Present also at conversation were General Lawrence, General Weygand and General Buat, Colonel Boyd, and Capt. de Marenches.

First, General Foch had read and translated a note which he had prepared on the general military situation, a copy of which is attached. General Foch stated that this note simply gave a general idea of the situation---that there was no definite plan proposed in it---but he submitted it for the examination of the Commanders-in-Chief, and it would afford a basis for determining upon a general plan of action.

He called attention to the important points in the note relative to points against which operations might be carried out. He stated that he would like to have from the Commanders-in-Chief expressions as to how these ideas might be carried out.

Marshal Haig stated that he agreed fully with the general ideas expressed in the note and would do all in his power to carry them out.

General Petain stated that at first view he was fully agreed. He stated that he would want time to think the matter over and draw up a plan as to possibilities.

General Pershing agreed to the principle of assuming the offensive wherever possible. As to the American army, questions of organization and supply are to be taken into consideration. He would expedite to the extent of his power the carrying out of the idea of General Foch.

General Foch stated that the note foresees a possibility of the falling back of the Germans to the Hindenburg Line, and directed that Commanders-in-Chief take precautions to meet such a movement. He stated that for the end of 1918 that is all that can be said; that we must also look forward to 1919, in supposing that the close of 1918 sees no decision, and make our preparations for bringing about a decision in 1919---and for this we must prepare as large an army, and as quickly as possible, for the spring operations.

In order to accomplish this, each must examine the situation now and look into the question of men and materiel for the early part of 1919. It is the duty of Commanders-in-Chief to submit to their governments suggestions concerning the supplies of whatever material is the most necessary, and in addition asking them to cut down the production of such material as it is thought will not be essential for the prosecution of the war. He then stated that in order to have a similar system in each army he had prepared a list of questions which he would submit to the Commanders-in-Chief with a request that they answer them within the next two or three weeks.

General Weygand said that he wanted to know the number of divisions that we had on January 1 and March 1 and the necessary number to keep them up to strength. (He mentioned field artillery, heavy artillery, and railroad artillery.) As for the question of artillery, there would be a great advantage in acting in close unison; that if we were to accomplish something in this line it would be very interesting from the French point of view to have, as soon as possible, information of the probable output of the United States in guns and ammunition, because if we knew, for instance, that the output of the U. S. in guns will be sufficient, this would enable the French to turn over to the making of shells a proportion of the steel that they now use for the making of guns, which is very interesting on account of the steel situation in France.

General Pershing stated that this is a difficult question; that the government is pushing the production of artillery; that we all know from experience, that of the many plans made but few are actually carried out. He then referred to the fact that Mr. Stettinius is here studying this question.

General Foch, talking of the question of mechanical transportation across country, said that in view of the present shortage of horses it would be very advisable, in his opinion, that the Commanders-in-Chief should approach their governments on that question at the earliest possible date. He mentioned the fact that the battle often stops because ammunition or supplies cannot be brought to the troops in the first line.

General Foch stated that he would like to take this occasion to impress upon those present the importance of tanks. He expressed the opinion that under present conditions the possibilities of an offensive depended on the number of tanks that are available.

Marshal Haig stated that before the end of the summer the British army would have all the tanks which they need; that at present they have three brigades of three battalions each, amounting to between 700 and 800. (144 tanks per brigade)

General Petain stated that the French army is very short of tanks.

General Foch asked Gen. Pershing to look into the question of tanks and the possibilities of assistance from America in the production of tanks.

After this conversation was over, General Pershing had a conversation with General Foch on the subject of the desire of Italy for more troops, and the proposition to send three American battalions to Russia.

[Unsigned]

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***Present Situation and Future Operations***

[Editorial Translation]

1st Subsection, 3d Section, General Staff  
No. 2,374

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED ARMIES,  
*July 24, 1918.*

General Foch, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies

To the General Commander-in-Chief of the American Expeditionary Forces in France.

My dear General:

I have the honor to submit to you the accompanying memorandum on the present military situation and the operations to take place in the near future, of which you were advised at the meeting of the Commanders-in-Chief on July 24, and in regard to which you were kind enough to say you agreed with me.

I would like to ask you now to let me have without delay your reaction to this program after more deliberate consideration.

There is also appended hereto the questionnaire which was read to you. It would help me if I could receive the information requested before the next conference in about a month, which I would like to have you attend.

Very sincerely yours,

F. FOCH.

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General Staff  
No. 2,375

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED ARMIES,  
*July 24, 1918.*

Memorandum read at the meeting of the Commanders-in-Chief of the Allied Armies.

I. The German Fifth offensive which was stopped at the jump-off was a check from the very beginning.

The offensive taken by the French Sixth and Tenth Armies transformed it into a defeat.

This defeat is first of all to be exploited thoroughly on the same battlefield.

This is our purpose in carrying on our attacks without relaxation and with the utmost energy. Its consequences however extend beyond this one battlefield.

II. The defeat of the enemy influences also the general attitude which the Allied Armies must adopt. Indeed, although we still do not have superiority in divisions at this time, we have at least already reached equality in the number of battalions and in a more general way in the number of combatants.

For the first time, by reason of the number of divisions which the Germans have been obliged to engage, we have superiority in reserves, and because of the large number of tired divisions which the Germans will be obliged to relieve on the battle front, we shall soon have superiority also in the number of fresh reserves.

On the other hand, all information points to an enemy compelled to have two armies; a holding army, sacrificed, lacking effectives, long kept in line; and, maneuvering behind this frail front, a shock army, well cared for by the German High Command but already badly weakened.

In addition, unquestioned superiority on materiel exists on the Allied side in aviation and tanks. In artillery the superiority, while yet small, is certain to increase steadily with the arrival of American artillery.

Finally, behind the armies, on the Allies' side, the powerful reserve strength of America is pouring 250,000 men each month onto the soil of France; on the enemy's side, the exceptional measures which he was forced to take to stave off the crisis in effectives during the month of May is known and it is apparent from the difficulty which he is still experiencing in maintaining the effective strength of his units that a new crisis is manifesting itself.

To all of this testimony of the return in our favor of the factor of material force is added the moral ascendancy maintained on our side since the beginning of the battle by reason of the fact that the enemy has not been able in spite of unprecedented efforts to obtain the decisive results which were necessary to him. This moral ascendancy is increased today by the victory of the Allied armies.

The Allied armies then are arriving at the turn of the road; they are retaking the initiative while the battle is in full swing; their strength permits them to keep it and the principles of war demand that they do so.

The moment has come to abandon the general defensive attitude imposed up to this time by numerical inferiority and to pass to the offensive.

III. Without seeking a decision, this offensive by a series of actions to be undertaken from now on, will aim at results useful for:

- (1) The subsequent development of operations;
- (2) The economic life of the country.

Moreover, it will retain the initiative on the side of the Allies.

These actions must be executed in such a rapid manner as to permit striking the enemy repeatedly. This condition necessarily limits their extent. This extent is also limited by the reduced number of units which the Allied armies will have available for the offensive after four months of battle.

Keeping these considerations in view the program of these early offensive actions shapes itself as follows:

(1) Operations with a view to freeing the railroads indispensable to later operations of the Allied armies:

(a) Freeing of the Paris-Avrincourt Railroad in the Marne region. This is the minimum result to be obtained from the present offensive.

(b) Freeing of the Paris-Amiens Railroad by a combined action of the British and French armies.

(c) Freeing of the Paris-Avrincourt Railroad in the region of Commercy by the reduction of the St-Mihiel salient. (Apart from the advantage resulting from the reduction of the front, to both combatants, of course, this operation will put us within reach of the Briey region and enables us to act on a large scale between the Meuse and the Moselle, something that may become necessary some day.) This operation is to be prepared without delay and to be undertaken by the American army as soon as it has available the necessary means.

(2) Operations aiming at the liberation of the mining regions of the north of France and the definitive expulsion of the enemy from the region of Dunkirk and Calais.

These operations comprise two attacks which may be executed separately or in conjunction with each other.

As has been said above, these actions are to be carried on with brief intervals between them so as to hinder the enemy in his use of reserves and to leave him no time in which to rebuild his units.

They must be powerfully equipped with all the necessary means to ensure success. They must at all costs effect surprise. The recent operations have shown that this is an indispensable condition for success.

IV. How far the different operations outlined above will carry us in space and time it is impossible to foresee now. However, if the results which they have in view are achieved before the season is too far advanced, it is advisable to plan at this time a large-scale offensive for the end of the summer or for the fall, the nature of which should increase our advantages and give no respite to the enemy.

It is now still too soon to decide on the exact operation in a more precise manner.

V. Finally it must be foreseen that in the course of these operations the enemy will try to avoid our pressure and save his effectives by successive withdrawals to shorter lines prepared in advance. These maneuvers must not surprise the Allied armies.

In each army it is therefore important to determine possible withdrawals by studying how the terrain is organized in the enemy's rear, to watch the enemy so as to note every indication of withdrawal, and to have all necessary action prepared to prevent his executing these maneuvers leisurely.

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Cable: P-1522-S

### ***Scope of Responsibility of Commander-in-Chief***

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
Chaumont, Haute-Marne, July 27, 1918.

AGWAR, WASHINGTON

FOR THE SECRETARY OF WAR

[Extract]

1. Reference your letter of July 6 just received, I very much appreciate your desire to relieve me of every burden that might interfere with the direction of military operations. However there appears to be an exaggerated view concerning the personal attention required in handling the details of administration of this command. Our organization here is fulfilling its functions as planned. Since your visit, the greater part of the details have been shifted to the general staff and an increasing amount to the services of supply. When it becomes necessary for me to be constantly at the front I shall retain general control through the general staff.

2. Further reference service of supply, the system includes transportation up to the trenches and is intimately interwoven with our whole organization. The whole must remain absolutely under one head. Any division of responsibility or coordinate control in any sense would be fatal. The man who fights the armies must control their supply through subordinates responsible to him alone. The responsibility is then fixed and the possibility of conflicting authority avoided. This military principle is vital and cannot be violated without inviting failure. It is the very principle which we all urged upon the Allies when we got a supreme commander. It is applied in the British army in France and as far as possible in the French army. As in those armies the general in charge of the services of supply and lines of communication of our forces must be subordinate to the Commander-in-Chief. I very earnestly urge upon you Mr. Secretary that no variation from this principle be permitted.

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PERSHING.

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***French Officers and Soldiers with American Units***

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, July 28, 1918.*

From: Commander-in-Chief

To: Chief of the French Mission

1. I have always had a keen appreciation of the great assistance rendered our forces by the assignment of French officers and soldiers thereto, but I am now compelled to realize that the rapid growth of the American army is making a very great drain upon French personnel. I feel that the time has come when we are no longer warranted in imposing upon the generosity of the French and permitting the American forces to deprive the French army of so many of its highly trained officers and men.

As time goes on, the greater will be the drain so that it is most desirable that we begin to rely entirely upon our own resources.

I also consider it most important that the whole American army be imbued with the spirit of self-reliance and believe this end may be best attained by removing all external aid.

2. I have therefore decided that I must dispense with the services of all French officers and soldiers on duty with American divisions and various army schools except the usual agents of tactical liaison with adjoining units in the actual line of battle.

3. I cannot, however, part with these officers and soldiers without expressing the great admiration that I have for their splendid efforts and the high opinion that I hold of their military attainments. Their work has been of great value to the American army, and the splendid spirit of good will and enthusiasm which they have brought to it merits our closest emulation.

By direction:

J. W. McANDREW,  
Chief of Staff.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 312: Letter

***Movement of Troops***

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, July 28, 1918.*

From: The Commander-in-Chief

To: The Chief French Military Mission

1. It appears that orders to the 1st Division to move to the region of Toul have been issued direct to that division without these headquarters having been previously informed. This matter has been brought to your attention before and the undesirability of such methods has been explained. It is evident that unless orders are issued to our troops by these headquarters all control over our troops ceases. I fully appreciate that in the

present case the movement is in exact accord with proposals made by me. I must, however, insist that in the future no orders for the movement of our troops be issued until a definite agreement has been made and until these headquarters have issued the necessary orders to the American troops involved.

By direction:

JAMES W. McANDREW,  
Chief of Staff.

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HS French Files: Allied GHQ: 402-30.1: Letter

### ***Arrangements to Establish American Sectors***

[Editorial Translation]

1st Subsection, 3d Section, General Staff  
No. 2468

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED ARMIES,  
*July 28, 1918.*

General Foch, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied armies

To the General Commander-in-Chief, American Expeditionary Forces

Your letter to the chief of the French Mission on the subject of steps to be taken to establish American sectors, raising certain questions of general interest for the employment of Allied forces in the battle, has been transmitted to me by General Petain who believes that it is for me to decide these questions with you.

In a general way, I am in agreement with you on the matter of the constitution of your First and Second Armies, which has already been determined between us. The constitution of your First being accomplished in the midst of battle and during a full pursuit of the enemy, it is essential that the process of organization shall not slow the action, and I request of you, that all arrangements be made in accordance with the situation of the moment which requires an uninterrupted drive and, consequently, the greatest activity on the part of the American commanders of army corps.

Concerning the Toul-Nancy sector, I invite your attention to the necessity of rapidly freeing the fresh French units which hold the front there, the use of which is necessary elsewhere to relieve the great number of French divisions which have just taken part in the battle of the Aisne and the Marne. To this end I request you send your 1st and 2d Divisions without delay and for the time being, to the Woevre front - the 90th and 92d Divisions not being capable of holding a quiet sector before August 10, as you have advised me.

It will be possible for the 1st and 2d Divisions to do this without any difficulty, since taking the place of French divisions half as strong in infantry, they will be able to keep one-half of their units resting.

Finally, once the two American armies are formed, situations may present themselves which will require either that newly disembarked American divisions go to hold a quiet sector in the French zone to free units necessary for the battle, or that American divisions ready for combat go to hold a part of the front under attack and insufficiently manned. Therefore, if this eventuality comes to pass, I reserve the privilege of invoking your assistance, which you have always so generously lent to the Allied armies.

I attach the greater value to knowing that we are in agreement on these various points.

FOCH.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 550: Telegram

***Additional Combat Troops not to be Assigned to S. O. S. Duties***

3d Section, General Staff  
No. 170

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, July 29, 1918.*

Commanding General, S. O. S.

Reference your F-435. No authority will be extended by the Commander-in-Chief for use of additional combat troops for S. O. S. duties so long as there are any replacement requisitions remaining unfilled. With reference to 85th Division, you are directed to hold 339th Infantry intact for special employment to be later indicated by these headquarters. This regiment will not be utilized for replacement purposes.

McANDREW,  
Chief of Staff.

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Cable: P-1533-S

***Organizational Equipment should not Accompany Troops***

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, July 29, 1918.*

AGWAR, WASHINGTON

[Extract]

1. For Chief of Staff and for the Commanding General, Port of Embarkation---Attention Colonel Logan with reference to paragraph 1C our cablegram 1419 [July 5, 1918] and your reply in paragraph 1 your cablegram 1685 [July 9, 1918] and our further report contained in paragraph 6B our cablegram 1480, a further investigation has been made into this entire subject. It seems that it will not often be possible to float troops and their equipment on the same transport. Even when this is possible the troops are disembarked promptly and must be forwarded by rail to clear our ports, generally before their freight can be discharged from the transport. The troops then arrive in training areas with only a small part of their equipment and the remainder follows them in small lots over a period of two, three or four weeks. This produces a very unsatisfactory condition as it has often been necessary to train and employ troops before their own equipment arrives. In order to so employ them it has been necessary to make good their many deficiencies in equipment from our reserve stocks. This results in confusion and a waste in equipment as already reported in our cablegram above referred to. To correct the foregoing it is recommended that the general principle be adopted that all troops will hereafter be floated without organiza-

tional or unit equipment and that they will be equipped after arrival in France. To carryout the foregoing policy, the following procedure should govern. Troops under orders for service in the A. E. F. should turn in all their organizational equipment. This equipment then becomes immediately available for reissue in United States, or for shipment to France in bulk, as part of our general stock. Officers and enlisted men embarking for France should have only the personal equipment enumerated in paragraph 1 our cablegram 1368, excepting subparagraph L, and in addition their limited authorized records and field ranges. Upon arrival in France officers and enlisted men with personal equipment referred to and records and field ranges can be forwarded promptly to the training areas. Upon arrival in training areas, organization can be supplied at once with full equipment from the nearest depot. Some of this equipment can be placed in training area awaiting arrival of troops. In order to carry out the foregoing program, it will be necessary to assemble at depots referred to and maintain there, unit equipment for supply of divisions upon arrival and our stocks should be ahead of the schedule of troop arrivals by no less than stock necessary to equip ten divisions. This matter was taken up with Major Mattice in accordance with his instructions from Colonel Logan and Major Mattice fully concurs in foregoing recommendations.

\* \* \* \* \*

PERSHING.

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SWC: 315-2: Cablegram

***Definition of the Words "Supreme Command"***

No. 162-S

AMERICAN SECTION, SUPREME WAR COUNCIL,  
*Versailles, Seine-et-Oise, July 29, 1918.*

The Adjutant General, Washington

For the Chief of Staff

In third paragraph of your 73 occur the following two sentences:

It regards the Italian front as closely coordinated with the western front, however, and is willing to divert a portion of its military forces from France to Italy if it is the judgment and wish of the supreme command that it should do so. It wishes to defer to the decision of the Commander-in-Chief in this matter as it would wish to defer to all others.

The words supreme command are of importance in connection with the following. The Convention of Doullens on March 26 gave General Foch certain consulting and coordinating powers but without specific power to issue orders to enforce coordination. This led to friction and resulted in the Convention of Beauvais on April 3 in which specific powers were given to General Foch to issue orders necessary to carry out his plans. Neither the Convention of Doullens nor that of Beauvais gave any powers in respect to the Italian front. The Supreme War Council in session at Abbeville May 2 and 3 vested in General Foch over the Italian front the powers of the Doullens Convention namely consulting and coordinating powers. But the Italian Government refused to allow him any power of command on the Italian front until there should be Allied armies operating in Italy in the same sense as in France. There are now Allied troops in Italy but they are amalgamated with

the Italian army and do not form separate Allied armies as in France. The words supreme command are the words habitually used by the Italians to designate their Commander-in-Chief. But I assume that those words as used in your Number 73 mean General Foch the Allied Commander-in-Chief in France where he has full powers as such. The Italian section here has submitted a proposition coming from General Diaz for a possible reenforcement of the Italian army by the transfer of at least 20 divisions from France to Italy including several American divisions but exact number not stated. On the above assumption I have objected to its consideration until it should be approved and urged by General Foch after necessary consultation with General Pershing. I have stated that Government of the United States would not even consider a proposition to divert American troops now in France to Italy under any other conditions. If I am right I recommend that Italian Ambassador be informed that the words supreme command in your Number 73 do not mean *Commando Supremo* but mean General Foch the Interallied Commander-in-Chief in France. This is important though it may not appear so.

BLISS.

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SWC (MR) 41: Minutes

***General Bliss Presents American Attitude on Unity of Command***

MINUTES OF THE 41st MEETING OF THE PERMANENT MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES

HELD IN THE COUNCIL ROOM AT VERSAILLES

MONDAY, JULY 29, 1918, AT 10 A. M.

[Extract]

\* \* \* \* \*

General Bliss:

\* \* \* \* \*

With regard to the use of the American divisions, the Government of the United States has left the question entirely in the hands of General Foch. In other words the American Government unreservedly recognizes the powers of the unified command in its fullest scope so far as the western front is concerned, with certain powers of coordination on the Italian front. And every time I send a note to my government it replies: "Have you consulted General Foch? Does he agree with you? Does he ask our assistance in gaining approval of this measure?"

\* \* \* \* \*

Gal. BELIN,  
General,  
French P. M. R.

C. SACKVILLE WEST, M. G.  
12.8.18  
General,  
British P. M. R.

ROBILANT,  
General,  
Italian P. M. R.

TASKER H. BLISS,  
General,  
U. S. P. M. R.

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***Equipment and Tonnage***

1st Section, General Staff  
No. P-635-S

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, July 30, 1918.*

MEMORANDUM FOR G-4

Subject: Cable 1533-S, Par. 1, July 29, 1918

1. In connection with above described cable, it is suggested that you have instructions given at once to the various staff departments concerned, to include in their monthly tonnage allotments, equipment necessary to equip the arriving troops in France.
2. Your attention is invited to the fact that under the tonnage allotment scheme, equipment not accompanying troops is considered as part of the regular supply, and therefore it will have to be called for and tonnage allotments made in exactly the same manner as for other current supplies. If the foregoing be not thoroughly understood, it is believed that confusion will result, and if sufficient stocks are not in depots, the necessary articles for supply will not be available. This same confusion might result in connection with the supply of equipment for the various elements of the medical dept.
3. I concurred in your cable and thoroughly agree with the principle, but the monthly tonnage allotment and priority phase must not be overlooked, or otherwise we can only expect difficulty.
4. Will you please, therefore, have the necessary instructions given by your section so that no misunderstanding will arise in the future.

JAMES A. LOGAN, Jr.,  
Col., G. S., N. A.,  
A. C. of S., G-1.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 694: Telegram

***Movement of American Units***

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, G. S.  
No. 40535

HEADQUARTERS FRENCH ARMIES OF THE NORTH AND NORTHEAST,  
*Provins, Seine-et-Marne, July 30, 1918.*

From: Commander-in-Chief

To: French Mission, Chaumont

In reply to your letter 9080/3 of July 29. First, your recommendations are approved. I am issuing orders that henceforth, except for the restrictions provided in your letter, the American G. H. Q. will be advised as soon as possible, through you, of movements of American units. Second, please communicate this decision to the American authorities concerned.

PETAIN.

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***Concentration of Effort on Western Front***

[Editorial Translation]

General Staff  
No. 2550

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS OF THE ALLIED ARMIES,  
*July 30, 1918.*

My dear General:

In answer to your message of July 29 I hasten to let you know that I share entirely your and President Wilson's viewpoint on the necessity of concentrating our military effort on the western front.

Consequently the idea of diverting toward another region any part of the American forces couldn't enter my mind.

It is in this sense that I would answer the Superior War Council were they to study the question; but I do not think it will be done before we have had the opportunity to discuss it together.

Very sincerely yours,

FOCH.

To General Pershing.

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First Army: Adm 1: Letter

***Separation of Troops and Equipment***

4th Section, General Staff

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, August 1, 1918.*

From: C-in-C

To: C. G., S. O. S.

[Extract]

1. There is enclosed herewith copy of a cablegram [see 1533, July 29, 1918] which has been sent on the subject of equipment. Everyone realizes that the ideal way would be to have troops floated with their complete equipment, debarked with it, entrained with it and thus arrive in divisional areas fully equipped. This has been found to be clearly impossible and it is therefore believed that the government at home will accept the policy and procedure outlined in the enclosed cablegram.

2. At the present time there is a considerable shortage of equipment to meet the needs of incoming troops. This condition is growing more serious every day. As an example, the motor transport service was allotted liberal tonnage for July to meet their needs, and the government at home only shipped about 40% of what was called for.

3. \* \* \* It is important that requests for allotments of tonnage be made for equipment called for. It is desired that each supply department take this matter up, by cable, with the head of their department at Washington, calling attention to the state of our equipment, the new system recommended in our cable 1533-S and calling special attention to important shortages.

\* \* \* \* \*

By order of the C-in-C:

GEO. VAN HORN MOSELEY,  
Brigadier General, G. S.,  
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 694: Letter

***Movements of American Units***

3d Section

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF STAFF  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, August 1, 1918.*

From: Commander-in-Chief

To: Chief of French Military Mission

1. I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your 9132/3 [July 31, 1918] relative to notice to be given these headquarters and agreements to be made concerning the movement of American divisions temporarily serving in French higher units.

2. The methods outlined by you are entirely satisfactory, and I take this occasion to thank you for the satisfactory arrangements which you have been able to make.

By direction:

JAMES W. McANDREW,  
Chief of Staff.

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280-50.3: Memorandum

***Training of Divisions in Reserve***

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*August 5, 1918.*

MEMORANDUM FOR CORPS AND DIVISION COMMANDERS:

1. Divisions returning to back areas after duty in the line will give their men two or three days for rest and police. During this period necessary issues of clothing and equipment will be made; men will bathe and clean their clothes, arms, equipment, vehicles,

animals, and billets. This work of police will proceed systematically under orders which the division commander will issue. The exact time allotted for the purpose will depend upon the situation of the division, including the likelihood of an early reentry into the line; but should seldom exceed three days.

2. At the conclusion of this period, the training of the division will be resumed. Extreme smartness in clothing, appearance, set-up, and saluting of individuals and in all formal drills will be insisted upon. Sufficient practice marches will be taken by organizations to attain a fine march discipline by all troops and trains.

3. Five days each week and at least five hours each day will be devoted to training. Saturday morning will be used for a rigorous inspection of commands and quarters. Saturday afternoon and Sunday will, unless the situation of the division requires otherwise, be given the soldiers for rest and recreation.

4. Higher Units: A terrain exercise for division, brigade, and regimental commanders will be prepared and conducted each week by corps headquarters; and a similar weekly exercise for the reinforced infantry brigade will be conducted by division headquarters. All means of communication and connection, including the liaison groups of regimental and brigade headquarters, will participate. Airplanes and units on the ground will be drilled to work in close liaison. All other means for sending and receiving information will be developed and the personnel therefor will be thoroughly trained to the end that commanders of all grades may at all times have the fullest possible information of the enemy and of the position of their own troops. Wherever suitable ground is available, one or more maneuvers of the complete division will be substituted for terrain exercises. Situations for both classes of exercise will be based upon the maneuvers of open warfare and with incidents like those encountered by our forces in the operations of the last few months. The aim of this training will be to make of each division a handy, flexible team capable of rapid maneuvering to meet the varying situations of warfare in the open under current conditions in France.

5. Small Units - Infantry: Replacements will be given such recruit instruction as is required to bring them up to standard. The training of individuals and groups in the use of their weapons will be freshened by suitable courses. A high standard of marksmanship with rifle, pistol and automatic weapons will be reached and maintained. Wherever practicable, there will be daily practice with service ammunition for all men. Riflemen will not be permitted to neglect the longer ranges (500 and 600 yards).

6. Each week will contain tactical exercises (maneuvers) on varied ground for platoons, companies, and battalions. These will habitually be conducted by the next higher commander. Situations will as far as practicable be based upon those of recent operations, and will include the attack of machine-gun nests and strong points. In these maneuvers, the enemy will usually be imaginary or simply outlined. In the attack of machine-gun nests, strong emphasis must be laid upon the full use of all available cover and upon the great value of flanking and encircling movements. Troops will be taught to locate the enemy by thin lines of scouts (at 10 to 50-pace intervals), while the bulk of their supports follow in thin lines or in small columns at considerable distances behind, ready to reinforce the scouts directly or to maneuver to the flanks when the enemy has been compelled to disclose himself. On open ground the nearest echelon to the scouts may be anywhere from 100 to 400 meters back. It will be insisted that platoon, company, and battalion commanders adopt no set formations for the attack in the open field, but that each commander make the best possible use of the particular ground and of the various weapons at his disposal. Rushes of individuals or small units must be covered by fire; intelligent use of fire to cover movement enables ground to be gained at relatively small cost. In securing fire superiority, battalion commanders must not be permitted to forget the extraordinary value of attached machine guns, Stokes mortars, and one-pounders and must be trained and accustomed to their use. The absolute necessity for the maintenance of communication, lateral and in depth, and painstaking drill in acquiring suitable methods and means therefor will be impressed upon all. Recent fighting has proven the principles of the offensive combat of

small units to be correct. Those principles, but not necessarily the formations illustrated in the text, will govern. Intelligent troop leading by commanders of all grades will be insisted upon.

7. Measures for security and for the organization of conquered ground will receive due consideration.

8. In all exercises in attack, first line battalions will be reinforced by machine gun companies, Stokes mortars, and one-pounder guns, and from time to time by single pieces of artillery for the close support of the infantry against machine guns.

9. The aim of this training will be the production of an aggressive infantry accustomed to work well with its artillery, but which will never hesitate, when the situation renders it expedient, resolutely to advance under the cover only of the fire of its own weapons.

10. A set piece, trench-to-trench attack, will occasionally be practiced.

11. Artillery: Faults of cannoneers will be corrected by carefully supervised and checked laying drills. Stress will be placed upon laying with the range scale of the 75 as opposed to the quadrant, which should be used for precision fire.

All officers and a certain number of noncommissioned officers will be practiced in the rapid preparation of fire, particularly on visible objectives with the parallel method. The accuracy of deflection determination should be frequently checked at the base piece.

Facility in the adjustment and use of the range finder should be acquired. At least two soldiers in each battery or headquarters will be trained in its use. The methods of fire when using it will be practiced.

12. Officers and certain noncommissioned officers will be practiced in the conduct of fire, under the supervision of battalion and higher commanders. The supervising officer will assign problems on the ground, and announce the results of simulated fire, the officer conducting the fire giving appropriate commands. For the less experienced officers, the terrain board should be used. Every effort will be made to perfect officers in the conduct of time fire.

13. The rapid selection and occupation of positions in open warfare will be given careful attention to insure correct practice and smooth working of the various personnel involved. Special attention will be paid to the placing of teams and combat trains.

Rapid changes of positions by echelon will be practiced.

14. Specialists will receive careful attention, particularly scouts, agents and route markers, as laid down in the drill regulations. All specialists will be practiced in semaphore signalling. There is evidence that agents were used in the recent operations to convey information which could have been more quickly transmitted by visual signals.

15. All officers and selected noncommissioned officers will be practiced in finding targets with field glasses. A certain number of targets to represent the usual objectives will be placed at artillery ranges and the observers required to search for them, noting those found on a panoramic sketch.

16. Situations will be created at exercises by causing men previously placed at various points to appear suddenly as hostile formations. They will be located by observers, who send back information with a view to the prompt delivery fire on such points. It must be borne in mind that, unless the artillery obtains prompt information as to difficulties encountered by the infantry, and handles this information so as to delivery fire promptly, the infantry must attack practically unsupported by artillery, with consequently greater losses. Systematic fire is better than no fire at all, but is greatly inferior in effectiveness to fire adjusted by observation.

17. The use of single pieces to accompany the infantry will be practiced by chief of platoon and section. Direct fire is the general procedure, but, when horse-drawn, pieces should whenever possible be unlimbered under cover and run into direct fire positions by hand.

18. Engineers: The training of the engineers will include instruction in their duties both as infantry and as engineers (for combat duties as infantry see Par. 126, F. S. R.). The infantry training will follow in general the instructions given above for infantry. Special attention will be given to range practice, transmitting information, security defensive problems for checking hostile penetration and closing gaps in a line, and counter-attacks. The engineer training will be devoted to engineer work required for mobile warfare. (See Engineer Field Notes No. 25) Each platoon should be trained to undertake independently any of the work required for all classes of divisional operations in mobile warfare. Special attention will be given no communications for moving forward artillery columns and supplies.

19. Signal, sanitary units, and trains will work in accordance with such modifications of the programs issued divisions upon arrival in France as meet the necessities of the organization concerned.

20. Suitable programs and schedules to carry the foregoing instructions into effect will be prepared by the division and subordinate commanders concerned, and all training after a tour in the line will proceed systematically in accordance therewith.

21. Corps commanders are charged with direct supervision of the training of their divisions.

22. Nothing in this memorandum will be construed as modifying programs issued by general headquarters for the first phase of divisional training in France.

(3551-249-A.)

By command of General Pershing:

JAMES W. McANDREW,  
Chief of Staff.

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Med. Gen: File 402: Letter

### ***Initial Equipment of Troops Arriving in France***

4th Section, General Staff

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, August 5, 1918.*

From: C-in-C

To: C. G., S. O. S.

1. With reference to instructions recently issued, directing that Headquarters Second Army will have supervision of the supply of initial equipment, you will issue the necessary instructions so that representatives of the supply departments at Advance Depot No. 1 will be kept thoroughly informed of the quantities of all these supplies available, especially with regard to such supplies as may be short of the contemplated requirements.

2. In all cases where there is not sufficient supply of an article on hand, the quantity available will be proportioned between the following:

(a) Requirements for replacement of old equipment, especially for all troops in the line, both of the First and Second Armies, as well as troops of the S. O. S.

(b) Initial equipment of artillery brigades in training in territory of the S. O. S., and whose equipment is not furnished by Headquarters Second Army.

- (c) Initial equipment of combat divisions in training area:

By order of the C-in-C:

GEO. VAN HORN MOSELEY,  
Brigadier General, G. S.,  
Asst. Chief of Staff, G-4.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1307: Memorandum

***Shipment of Troops from the United States***

3d Section, General Staff

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, August 6, 1918.*

MEMORANDUM FOR ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-3

1. The following summary indicates briefly the arrangements made by cable between the War Department and the A. E. F., in recent months, relative to the shipment of troops to France. It will be noted that the War Department has not adhered to the schedule provided for it.

2. (a) Cable sent from A. E. F. No. 1267, June 8:

This cable itemizes specifically the troops to be sent in June and July, the important elements of which are as follows:

June: 6 divisions (less artillery and ammunition trains). The delayed B units of II and III Corps. 44,000 replacements, etc.

July: 4 divisions (less artillery and ammunition trains). The delayed artillery and ammunition trains of the June 6 divisions. 56,000 replacements, etc. That is, for June and July 10 divisions, less the artillery and ammunition trains of the 4 divisions sent in July.

- (b) Cable sent No. 1342, June 19:

This cable gives the project for a large program to be completed before the summer of 1919. The monthly distribution of troops to be shipped is given. Subparagraph B of Paragraph 3 states:

For August and first half of September, complete general organization and priority projects, less 4 brigades army tractor artillery, etc.

For second half of September, 4 divisions, a proper proportion of corps troops, etc., are requested;

For October 5 divisions, etc.

- (c) Cable sent 1369, June 25:

This cable still further enlarges the program stated under cable sent 1342, but does not prescribe any change as to the requirements for August and the first half of September, as indicated in Cable 1342-S [June 19, 1918].

3. Cable sent 1288, June 11, protested to the War Department that according to War Department Cable 1478 our Versailles agreement was not being carried out, in that our 1267 [June 8, 1918] prescribed leaving 2 complete divisions of the V Corps plus artillery and ammunition trains of the remaining 4 divisions of that corps for transport after July 31. War Department Cable 1478 indicated that 2 of the divisions of the VI Corps might sail in July. Statement was requested as to whether or not our 1267 would be followed.

The above cable was answered by War Department Cable 1528, June 14, saying that our 1267 would be followed as nearly as practicable, and further stated:

Under your 1267, IV Corps will be shipped in June and 4 divisions of V Corps, less artillery, in July.

4. Actually, the following were shipped during July:

All 6 divisions (A units) of the V Corps sailed in July, B units (artillery and ammunition trains) of 2 divisions only failed to sail in July, but are reported by the War Department as scheduled for early convoy.

Also the advance party of the 7th Division, VI Corps, sailed in July. A units of the 81st Division, VI Corps, are being made ready for early convoy in August (reported by War Department Cable 1803, Aug. 1). A units of the 7th Division, VI Corps, are similarly scheduled by War Department for early convoy.

5. A comparison of the preceding paragraph with the cables as summarized in this memorandum, shows that the War Department has apparently disregarded the request to devote August and the first half of September to completing the priority project, First Army; that it has on the contrary determined to send, in August, divisions pertaining to the VI Corps, Second Army.

The War Department also stated, as indicated in Paragraph 3 above that 4 divisions, less artillery, of the V Corps would be sent in July; as a matter of fact they sent all 6 divisions of the V Corps in July and also the artillery for all of these divisions except two.

S. R. GLEAVES,  
Lt. Colonel, General Staff,  
G-3.

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Cable: P-1567-S

### ***British Difficulties in Supplying Tonnage for 80-Division Program***

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, August 7, 1918.*

AGWAR, WASHINGTON

FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF

1. Following telegram from Mr. Lloyd George to M. Clemenceau dated August 2 repeated for information of the Secretary of War:

a. Recent dispatches from Washington give reason to believe that the United States Government has abandoned its program for putting 100 divisions on the western front by July 1919 and that the greatest possible number would only comprise 80 divisions. We have also been advised that this program reduced to 80 divisions can only be realized if Great Britain should continue to furnish its help for naval transportation. Because of the serious character of this information I immediately made a preliminary study of the questions with the Minister of Naval Transportation Sir Joseph Maclay. I regret to declare that we shall not be able to continue our help as far as cargoes of merchandise are concerned and that we shall probably have to cut down the tonnage assigned for troop transportation. In the last few months we have lost several troop transports of large tonnage, notably the *Justicia*, which could carry 5,000 men and 10,000 tons of materiel per trip. As far as merchandise shipping is concerned we are already grappling with serious difficulties. Every day Australia and New Zealand ask for a help we are



unable to give them. In Lancashire 40,000 cotton workers at least are idle because of lack of raw material and to increase the cotton supply we have been forced to cut short our program for cereal supply. Another very serious difficulty results from the lack of coal by reason of our need of manpower to keep the armies going in the recent military crisis. The coal question is giving me the greatest anxiety because the situation in France and Italy as well as our own munition production depends upon a suitable coal supply. By reason of the lack of coal a large number of ships have been subjected to delay in our ports and our whole program of naval transportation has been shaken up by this fact. This increases our difficulty to help the Americans in executing their program with regard to merchant shipping. While continuing naturally to do our best for the Allies in the future, as we have in the past, I think it best to let you know without delay what difficulties we may meet in attempting to realize the American program in its entirety.

b. The foregoing telegram was handed to me confidentially. The views of the British Prime Minister as shown therein seem to be an indication of his attitude on the question of aiding us with shipping to carry out even the 80-division program. It suggests the desirability of an early and complete understanding with the British Government on this subject.

PERSHING.

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Cable: P-1569-S

### ***Program of Troop Shipments***

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, August 7, 1918.*

AGWAR, WASHINGTON

[Extract]

1. For the Chief of Staff. Reference our cablegrams 1342 [June 19, 1918] and 1369 [June 25, 1918], a program of troop shipments is proposed for August and September as follows: Complete original priority schedule as amended, about 277,300; additional services of supply troops, 63,000; replacements, 105,000; 5 divisions of VI Corps, about 139,300; corps troops about 12,500; army troops, about 2,600. \* \* \*

a. Most urgent that service of supply, auxiliary troops and replacements, sailing of which classes has been postponed in the past, should so far as possible have absolute priority over divisional troops. If this is not done the inevitable result will be the diversion of combat troops to service of supply duty which is undesirable from every point of view.

\* \* \* \* \*

PERSHING.

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Cable: P-1582-S

### ***Equipment Shortages***

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, August 10, 1918.*

AGWAR, WASHINGTON

[Extract]

\* \* \* \* \*

3A. With reference to Paragraph 1G your Cablegram 1779, Paragraph 9 our Cablegram 1419, Paragraph 3 our Cablegram 1505 and Paragraph 1B our Cablegram 1551, 25th\* and succeeding divisions are arriving short of number of important items their machine-gun equipment particularly tripods, water boxes, machine-gun carts and harness. Situation with carts and water boxes exceedingly serious. In some cases it has been necessary to take Browning machine guns away from troops and re-arm them with Vickers. All possible steps should be taken to forward the machine-gun equipment left behind in states and to provide replacements and reserves here. Request action taken.

\* \* \* \* \*

PERSHING.

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SOS: File 370.5: Fldr. Rep. Misc. 1: Letter

### ***Replacements***

1st Section, G. S.

SERVICE OF SUPPLY, A. E. F.,  
*August 11, 1918.*

From: Commanding General

To: Commander-in-Chief, G-1

1. Attention is invited to the fact that replacements now arriving from the United States for combat units in France in general are not sufficiently trained to warrant their immediate use for the purpose intended.

2. The commanding officer, artillery replacement regiment, reports the arrival on August 8, of 2,200 men belonging to the Camp Jackson automatic replacement draft, individuals of which have had approximately three weeks training in the United States prior to departure. There are also at the 2d Depot Division over 1,000 recently arrived replacements who are practically recruits and entirely lacking in the training necessary to fit them for front line service.

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\* [Editorial Note: This does not refer to particular numbering of an American division - we had no 25 Division, hence its application is to the total number of divisions which had reached France at the time of the dispatch of this cablegram.]

3. With the continuance of automatic arrivals as scheduled and inability of various depots to send forward replacements, due to their lack of training, a congestion will soon result, the only remedy for which is adequate training in the United States.

4. It is recommended that the War Department be advised that replacements for combat units should receive not less than two months training prior to departure from the United States.

J. C. HARBORD,  
Major General, N. A.,  
Commanding.

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C of S: Fldr. 337: Letter

***Officers not to Commit General Headquarters without Authorization***

Corrected Copy

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, August 13, 1918.*

From: The Chief of Staff

To: The Chief of Artillery

1. The Commander-in-Chief has noticed that the many conferences by our services and arms with the corresponding services and arms of our Allies are resulting in a constantly increasing tendency to commit these headquarters to a course of action at variance with policies established for these forces as a whole.

2. In order to avoid the manifest danger involved in the tendency noted the Commander-in-Chief directs:

(a) No officer when representing the A. E. F. at a conference with representatives of our Allies shall commit these headquarters to a particular course of action, unless it be one that he has been specifically authorized to accept for and on behalf of the A. E. F.

(b) Whenever a representative of any service or arm, or other officer, discusses, in conference with representatives of our Allies, matters involving changes of policies or the establishment of new policies, the American representative will make clear to the conference that such matters must be referred to these headquarters before final action is taken.

(c) Chiefs of services and other officers attending conferences, except those to discuss questions of supply under definite established policies, will prior to such conferences submit to these headquarters a list of the subjects to be discussed together with such recommendations as may be necessary.

LeROY ELTINGE,  
Deputy Chief of Staff.

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First Army: Adm 1: Memorandum

***Order of Priority in Equipping Divisions***

4th Section, General Staff

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, August 13, 1918.*

MEMORANDUM

1. Below is given the order of precedence in which divisions should be equipped. The divisions listed in each group should receive equal priority. This corrected memorandum supersedes the one previously written:

1st Group: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 26, 42, 82  
2d Group: 35, 79, 89, 90, 91  
3d Group: 92, 36, 6 (30, 33, 78) - Should retain British Transportation  
4th Group: 7, 81  
5th Group: 37, 29  
6th Group: 28, 32, 77

DISREGARD

*British Divisions*

27  
80

*Depot Divisions*

41  
76  
83  
85  
39

2. The supply of these divisions will be undertaken by G-4, First Army and the Regulating Officer, Is-sur-Tille.

3. All should be equipped as soon as possible, not later than August 20.

GEO. VAN HORN MOSELEY,  
Brigadier General, G. S.,  
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4.

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Cable A-1844-R

***Organizations to Sail without Equipment***

A. G. O., WAR DEPARTMENT,  
*Washington, D. C., August 14, 1918.*

PERSHING, AMEXFORCE, G. H. Q., A. E. F.

[Extract]

\* \* \* \* \*

10. With reference to paragraph 1c your 1419 [July 5, 1918] order has been issued that organizations embarking will be stripped of all organizational property which will be

shipped independent of organization and thus become available for general issue. If it is desired that this equipment arrive in advance of troops for which intended, it is requested that you make the necessary allotment of tonnage.

\* \* \* \* \*

McCAIN.

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SWC: 315-3: Cablegram

***Eighty and One-Hundred Division Programs***

No. 180-S

AMERICAN SECTION, SUPREME WAR COUNCIL,  
*Versailles, Seine-et-Oise, August 14, 1918.*

AGWAR, WASHINGTON

FOR THE SECRETARY OF WAR AND THE CHIEF OF STAFF

1. The personal letter of the Secretary of War Number five dated July 28 just received says that your studies into possibilities of 80-division program were being sent to me with a view to my taking up with my British colleagues question of assistance in cargo tonnage. These studies not yet received without which I can do nothing definite. Can a full abstract of requirements be cabled to me? Meanwhile I suggest careful consideration of the following.

2. Some days ago Mr. Hoover asked me to consider whether an agency could be created that could coordinate all other Allied and interallied agencies controlling such questions as food supply, allocation of shipping for different lines of trade, et cetera. He believes that if this could be done demands for food and other things could be greatly reduced, thus releasing much tonnage for military program. In subsequent interview I told him I did not believe such a coordinating agency could work successfully; that individual nations refuse to surrender certain interests to interallied control; that existing interallied agencies can be controlled only by another Allied agency or by a Dictator; and that I believed the former useless and the latter impossible.

3. There is only one solution to Mr. Hoover's problem and I believe it is in the power of the United States Government alone to attain it. The Allies must agree upon some one question as absolutely paramount agree to subordinate all other questions to it. In that way alone can we determine the sacrifices that must be made in subordinate matters in order to attain the paramount result and also whether the Allies will endure these sacrifices. Everything now points to favorable conditions for launching a conclusive campaign on the western front next year, and if enemy resistance is crushed on this front it will cease everywhere. Therefore I believe that the United States should aim at the successful termination of the war in 1919 and make that the paramount question. Our Allies agree that it can be ended only by American troops supplies and money. But when the end comes they want certain favorable military situations to have been created in different parts of the world that will warrant demands to be made of the United States as perhaps the principal arbiter of peace terms. To secure these favorable situations they are constantly considering schemes that would result in diversions of military effort from this front. If sufficiently favorable military situations are not created on certain secondary theatres by beginning of autumn next year the governments of our Allies may be willing to con-

tinue through 1920 and at the cost of United States troops and money a way which may possibly be ended with complete success for us by operations on the western front in 1919. But if the mass of the peoples here knew that the United States was demanding a policy to successfully end the war next year they would support it and would endure any possible sacrifices to carry it through. As it is now no one proposes to them a definite object for the sacrifices demanded of them. We merely ask for as many soldiers and guns and airplanes etc. as possible but the nations will not make their maximum sacrifices blindly. They will make them only for a definite object which they know justifies them. They have a definite object in getting all the food supplies that they can and in keeping up all the lines of trade that they can. They will make further sacrifices in these directions only when the military men tell them that these temporary sacrifices will bring the end of the war into definite sight. The military men asked of the United States the hundred-division program. This would give a certain numerical superiority next summer but no one knows whether it is on a definite plan for what the interallied Commander-in-Chief expects to be the final campaign or whether it only leads to another one for which a like demand will be made. The time has come to plan a campaign with reasonable hope that it will be the last one. The United States was obliged to put that program to one of 80 divisions because it knows that the world will not surrender the necessary tonnage unless it has reasonable hope that this is the final supreme sacrifice. If the Allied Commander-in-Chief can now inform the United States that a certain definite military effort on their part will give him reasonable belief that the next campaign will be conclusive the United States will be in a position to demand of all the Allies including itself the sacrifices without which the necessary tonnage cannot be made available.

4. Preparatory to an interview which Marshal Foch asked with them the military representatives have submitted to him their individual views on the situations. We are in substantial agreement on the essential points. My expressed opinion is that with a superiority of approximately one million rifles by next July maintained for a few months we can accomplish our object next year. Marshal Foch has this under consideration but when I saw him today he was not prepared to express an opinion. This year the Germans with a superiority of 250,000 rifles failed to reach a vital objective, but it is generally believed that with double that superiority they would have been successful. The Allies must go farther than the Germans to reach a vital objective but there is good reason for believing that we will be successful with double the superiority that would probably have made them successful. By next July, French rifle strength will diminish to 650,000, British rifle strength will diminish to 420,000, and Belgian rifle strength will be 42,000. If the 80-division program can be carried out, American rifle strength fit for the front line July next will be 1,184,000. That excludes ten divisions which will not have been here two months and which include 169,000 rifles. Total Allied rifle strength in France fit for line on July first next 2,302,000. Total German rifle strength will be 1,378,000. This will give an approximate Allied rifle superiority next July of 924,000. But if obliged to do so the Germans might withdraw divisions from Russia to the number of thirty-two which might reduce Allied superiority to 637,000 rifles. If the 100-division program could be carried out the Allied rifle superiority July next would in the first case be 1,127,000 and in the second case 850,000. The foregoing calls for the execution of a minimum program of 80 divisions by July first next. It would be much safer if the 100-division program could be carried out.

5. If Marshal Foch will state that the 80-division program gives reasonable assurance of a final campaign next year I feel sure that United States can demand and secure the necessary tonnage. If he should demand the 100-division program in order to have the same assurance my hope is that the Allies will make the necessary sacrifices to carry out a plan which has for its definite object the conclusion of the war on this front next year. If we cannot do this we must deliberately contemplate a campaign of 1920 with its untold losses in life and money most of which will be American. I had a long interview with Marshal Foch today on this subject. He left me with the distinct understanding

that he would promptly inform our President of the definite effort which we must make by next summer to give good hope to ending the war by winter. If he does this I suggest that our Government immediately put the proposition before its Allies with the demand that all contribute in the necessary effort. If the United States gives its money and blood the others can diminish their secondary demands and give the necessary ships. The peoples will not sacrifice much more without a definite object; with a definite object they can sacrifice a good deal more. It is not improbable that this supreme effort of the United States to be made by a definite time and with a definite object in view may be the only thing that will hold the Allies together for another year. If it becomes evident that the war is to drift into 1920 some nation here may accept terms that will make all our sacrifice a sheer waste. If Marshal Foch should not submit a definite proposition my present opinion is that it would be wise for our Government to force this issue at the next meeting of the Supreme War Council.

BLISS.

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Cable: P-1602-S

***Reported Plans to Amalgamate American Troops with Allied Units***

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, August 15, 1918.*

AGWAR, WASHINGTON

FOR THE SECRETARY OF WAR

1. Reference confidential cablegram No. 1567, following telegram was also sent by Mr. Lloyd George to M. Clemenceau, copy of which has been handed to me confidentially:

After having read your telegram I am afraid I did not clearly show the object of my dispatch of July 13. I did not ask for the transfer of American divisions to the British front. The brilliant part taken by them in the second great Marne victory has more than justified the use General Foch made of them. What I asked was that a few American divisions at most, from among those recently arrived in France and who could not be put in the line without some training, should be sent to complete their training behind the British lines. My purpose was to form a reserve capable of being used in the critical situation of a break in our front by the enemy permitting the holding with our local reserves until the arrival of divisions from the general reserve of the Allied armies on the western front. I did not consider my demand excessive for it must not be forgotten that the greater part of the American troops were brought to France by British shipping and that because of the sacrifices made to furnish this shipping our people have the right to expect that more than five divisions of the twenty-eight American divisions now in France should be put in training behind our lines. We are informed that a serious attack on the British front is still probable now. I do not wish to hamper you by asking for detailed explanation but in the interests of that unity of command for which I made so great an effort, I urgently ask you to support the very modest request made by me from our Commander-in-Chief.

A. Have just received information that Mr. Lloyd George is now preparing program for Supreme War Council which will include suggestion for formation of an American army

for service with British and proposing the use of Dunkerque as port of American supply. The principal arguments to be used are first that such plan would reduce the scope of dock and railroad construction by Americans and second, because British shipping is being used to bring over American troops, they have a claim to our services with their army. These views of Mr. Lloyd George are quite at variance with his previous expressions on several occasions when he favored the formation of an American army to fight under its own command. The latter opinion was strongly stated at the time he argued for amalgamation as a temporary measure.

B. Also have confidential information from French Prime Minister that recent meeting was held in London between Italian Ambassador and British Prime Minister regarding disposition of American troops, in which Italian Ambassador urged that every influence be brought to bear upon Marshal Foch and myself to obtain American divisions for Italy. British officials have previously been active in presenting needs of Italians for support of American divisions, even suggesting that they be grouped with British.

C. Another proposal which I understand confidentially has been submitted to Marshal Foch is the amalgamation of American troops with reduced British, French, and Italian units. The plan contemplates placing American infantry with the artillery and other services. This is also likely to be presented by Mr. Lloyd George for discussion at the next meeting of the Supreme War Council. The approval of any of these plans is of course unthinkable. I am certain that the French, including General Foch, oppose them all. They seem now committed to the rapid consolidation of our army in its own sphere of activities.

D. To carry out these suggestions would result in the parceling out of the American army to the different Allied armies with a view possibly of retarding or preventing the formation of a large American force as much, and perhaps check the growth of too friendly relations between Americans and the French which is feared by the British and probably the Italians, but it would certainly result in the utilization of our troops to strengthen and possibly replace their own.

E. It appears likely also that foregoing propositions may be set forth by the British Prime Minister as conditions upon which they would continue to furnish shipping for bringing over American troops and supplies or to obtain some political advantage and possibly the financial gain that would follow their having American troops to supply may not have been overlooked. Notwithstanding his present attitude, it should be stated that no condition whatever as to the use of British shipping has hitherto been raised by the British Prime Minister, who has on several occasions stated that Great Britain would supply all shipping possible to carry out the large American program recommended by General Foch and myself.

F. In view of possible representations in Washington by the interested parties, and in view of the Secretary's early visit here I deem it advisable to make the facts known.

PERSHING.

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SWC: 316: Cablegram

***Eighty-Division Program***

No. 80-R

A. G. O., WAR DEPARTMENT,  
*Washington, D. C., August 15, 1918.*

AMSEC, VERSAILLES

[Extract]

1. With reference to your number 180, paragraph 1. Have you not received our number 74 dated July 23. This cablegram sets forth the decision about the 80-division program and gives specifically what assistance will be necessary from the powers in order for us to carry it through. We have been expecting daily a report from you as to whether that assistance can be granted. If you have received our Number 74 your paragraph 1 Number 180 is not understood.

2. On the assumption that our Number 74 has been withheld from you it is repeated here entirely to save time. \* \* \* [The remainder of the cablegram quotes Cable 74 from War Department to Gen. Bliss.] March.

McCAIN.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1019: Instructions

***Function of Liaison***

No. 144

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, August 16, 1918.*

**INSTRUCTION ON LIAISON**

Liaison is for the purpose of securing team work. It must provide for the rapid and reliable transmission of information and orders between the various headquarters, between the various arms of the service, and between adjacent units in order that all shall strive for the success of a common plan.

It is the duty of each commander to establish a system of liaison for his unit which will accomplish the above purpose.

It is the duty of every subordinate to forward, without delay, through the system of liaison, the information of the situation which he acquires. A failure to do so is a mark of inefficiency and a neglect of duty. It is a mistake to delay information in the hope of later being able to furnish more complete data. A definite statement from the front as to the location of small units, and even negative information of the enemy, is valuable to higher headquarters. When to send messages and what to report is a part of tactical training.

Liaison between the infantry and artillery is particularly essential. The infantry must keep the artillery informed as to its needs and its location. The artillery cannot effectively support the infantry without that information. If the location of the infantry is not made known to the artillery, the latter's fire may fall on its own infantry. Not

only must the infantry keep the artillery informed, but the artillery will also take measures to obtain this information by means of its own liaison agents.

Signal lines are a part of the system of liaison. They must be planned to fit the needs of the command and be in accord with the signal personnel available for its upkeep and operation. A system of lines which is well built, well operated and well maintained furnishes more efficient service than an over-developed system which is insufficiently manned.

Messages near the front sent by wire, radio, earth telegraphy and visual means are intercepted by the enemy. Such messages must be in code. Failure to comply with the regulations on this subject is a mark of poor discipline.

A system of liaison makes use of many means and devices. A careful planning of the system must be followed by thorough and continuous training of the personnel. This training must include not only the personnel who are a part of the system, but also the personnel who use the system.

A system of liaison does not excuse a commander from keeping himself informed, by personal observation, of the condition of his command. The failure of a subordinate to forward information by the usual system of liaison must not prevent the commander from obtaining that information by other means. If necessary, he will send a member of his staff to obtain the information desired.

PERSHING.

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Cable: P-1604-S

***Concerning Program of Troop Shipments***

No. 1604-S

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, August 16, 1918.*

THE ADJUTANT GENERAL OF THE ARMY, WASHINGTON

1. For Chief of Staff. Paragraph 1 your cablegram 1842 not understood in view of our Cablegram 1569 [Aug. 7, 1918] which gives program of troop shipments requested for August and September. If our essential needs as set forth in that cablegram are met there can be but 5 divisions in all shipped during August and September unless transport is provided for more than 300,000 troops per month. Again call attention to subparagraph A of my above cablegram. It is most urgent that S. O. S. auxiliary troops and replacements, sailing of which classes has been postponed in the past, should so far as possible have absolute priority over divisional troops. Attention is especially invited to the very great shortage in arrivals of replacements heretofore requested. Situation with reference to replacements is now very acute. Until sufficient replacements are available in France to keep our proven divisions at full strength replacements should be all means be sent in preference to new divisions. The 105,000 replacements mentioned in paragraph 1 my cablegram 1569 should be increased rather than decreased. In addition to other reasons the limiting of the number of divisions to be shipped during August and September, and the substitution of an equivalent number of other troops, will give an opportunity to accumulate necessary equipment for combat divisions. Shortage of items of equipment which must come from home now causes most serious delays in training. Request I be informed whether my cablegram 1569 will be followed as nearly as practicable.

PERSHING.

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***Deficiencies in Tonnage Affect 80-Division Program***

AMERICAN SECTION, SUPREME WAR COUNCIL,  
*Versailles, Seine-et-Oise, August 17, 1918.*

No. 183-S

AGWAR, WASHINGTON

FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF

1. Receipt today of your number eighty is acknowledged.
2. I received your number seventy-four but in the light of paragraph one of your cablegram of today it was apparently entirely misunderstood. It came on day of arrival of Mr. Stettinius and I at once showed it to him. Your cablegram stated deficiencies in cargo tonnage that must be supplied from August to February inclusive but with no statement that anything was expected to be done here. I assumed that it was intended that I should impress on my colleagues the difficulties in the execution of the eighty-division program and that no one should count on it as an assured fact until definitely informed by the United States that it could be carried out. Accordingly I gave them emphatic caution. Both Mr. Stettinius and I assumed that the question of tonnage would be taken up in the usual way by existing councils of shipping experts. This seemed to be confirmed by cablegram received by Mr. Stettinius from Secretary of War dated August 4 in which it was stated "We count with confidence on the British tonnage assistance." No one at Versailles is informed as to shipping details. Nevertheless on receipt today of your number eighty I took up with British colleagues your statement of deficient cargo tonnage. They said all they could do was to telegraph it to British War Cabinet which they did.
3. The last sentence your number seventy-four stated your understanding that French could continue their assistance in artillery program and added "It is desired that this be confirmed." When I showed this to Mr. Stettinius he said that he was here with large staff to consider matters relating to armament and munitions and that he would take up our artillery necessities with the French Minister of Munitions and also with the interallied munitions council at its meeting on August 14. Independent investigations with the same French officials could not be pursued at the same time by him and myself and I have waited for the result of his. I am informed today by Colonel Dunn and Mr. Gifford, members of Mr. Stettinius' staff, that a detailed statement was prepared in collaboration with General Wheeler showing our artillery requirements from the French. This was to be presented by Mr. Stettinius to the French with information that the eighty-division program was entirely tentative until we know that among other things these requirements could be met. I understand that he may have already received information on this subject both from British and French. He is absent today at French front and I shall have conference with him on his return at 9:30 tonight.

BLISS.

Copies Furnished to Gen. Pershing

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**Equipment Delays**

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, August 17, 1918.*

ADJUTANT GENERAL OF THE ARMY, WASHINGTON

[Extract]

1. For Chief of Staff. Equipment for troops not keeping abreast of troop arrivals. The reserve equipment which we were able to assemble during period when tonnage was more than equal to our requirements has largely been dissipated, in the manner described in paragraph 1 our cablegram 1,533 [July 29, 1918] in recommending increased program of troop arrivals it was assumed that equipment would be speeded up in the same proportion and kept abreast of needs of troops in France. This has not been done and as a result we are now confronted with a very serious situation. It must be remembered that the items which we find difficult to obtain are generally the same which our Allies find difficult to obtain and in these cases we can not look to them for any great assistance. As an example of this we recently requested assistance from the French in motor ambulances but instead of receiving same, the French asked if we could help them out on the same item. Excepting where we have definite assurances covered by written contracts or agreements that we can obtain certain equipment material in Europe, we should be self sustaining. Otherwise the plans which we have for the extensive employment of our forces cannot be executed with the independent initiative which the situation demands. Attention is called to my recommendation contained in first clause of paragraph 3 cablegram 1,342 [June 19, 1918] in which it was recommended that August and first half September be devoted to completing our general organization and priority projects, with certain exceptions which were stated. This is not being done. Notwithstanding the present emergency we received less tonnage during July than during June. The army cannot be supported in France on basis of July tonnage. Ample tonnage was allotted motor transportation for July but only about 40 per cent was actually received. Paragraph 8 D your cablegram 1819 only meets about 33 per cent of our expectations. Your weekly statistical report number 48, dated July 27, shows a very great discrepancy between tonnage allotted motor transportation and amounts actually shipped. While the needs of the various departments have been represented in detail to the chiefs of the supply and technical services in the U. S. by their representatives here, attention is invited to the following shortages which must be made good at once, over and above necessity for meeting normal program for any period. We are able to handle the tonnage involved. Tonnage must be in addition to allotments already made, as we cannot afford to make up present urgent shortages by curtailing other essential supplies.

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PERSHING.

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***Necessity for 100-Division Program by July***

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, August 17, 1918.*

AGWAR, WASHINGTON

FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF AND SECRETARY OF WAR

1. Reference my confidential cablegram No. 1369 [June 25, 1918], from War Department cablegrams it appears that 80-division program is considered maximum effort that we should undertake. Wish again to urge 80 divisions by April and that the 100-division program be adopted as minimum by July. On account of shortage in manpower of Allies, it is my fixed opinion after careful study that this is very least American force that will insure our victory in 1919. The Allied authorities also feel this to be the lowest number consistent with plans to succeed next year. They will more freely concede additional tonnage and supplies needed if convinced that we intend to make the maximum effort, therefore consider it very important that this decision be made by ourselves. Such sacrifices as may be necessary at home to save food, and to insure full program of manufacture of war materials, and provide additional ships tonnage ought to be determined upon at once in order to be ready to meet demands of situation next year. In conference with Mr. Hoover on question of food supply, with shipping representatives on tonnage, with Mr. Stettinius on production of manufactures, and further with Marshal Foch on military requirements, each separately agrees that the extreme maximum program thought necessary to end the war should be undertaken for next July. Believe prompt confidential instructions to all interested sea transport and supply agencies based upon proposed limit of endeavor would meet with hearty response.

A. Have impression that War Department considers inadvisable to send over men without having our own tonnage in sight for their food supply and without first providing additional facilities but the point is that all tonnage must be utilized constantly for both personnel and cargo or we shall fall short of our aims. I ask consideration of the fact that instead of having 300,000 men here now as previously calculated, we have nearly one million and a half and they have been transported to France, handled by rail and fed during active operations without special inconvenience. The food supply of the large number of troops asked for could be similarly met for short periods without danger of food shortage as might be the case were this war being conducted in a barren country. Any temporary shortages in food and clothing that have occurred have all been met and can undoubtedly be met in future from Allied sources. All our calculations based upon fixed number of pounds per man per day are only approximations. If we start out with a continuous flow of men and material and supplies to the extreme limit of present American and Allied tonnage we shall be able to force new tonnage into war service instead of debating the question beforehand with shipping people. Therefore the high program recommended should be adopted instead of something less which moreover may cost us an extension of the war over another year with all its misery and loss of life.

B. As to handling the increased tonnage at ports we could have discharged at least one hundred and fifty thousand tons in excess of the tonnage allotted. Attention is also invited to the fact that the immediate increase of tonnage itself would enable us to bring over cranes and other port facilities and much needed and already delayed railroad cars and engines and material whereby the permanent utilities for handling our present tonnage, as well as any future increase of tonnage, may be assured. In view of the fore-

going, it is again earnestly recommended that there be no hesitation or delay in entering upon the maximum undertaking recommended as there is no doubt that if all concerned units do put it through, the task will prove much easier than it is made to appear.

C. Foregoing recommendations are reiterated because of necessity of making plans now if maximum program is to be undertaken. I ask that it be given every consideration.

PERSHING.

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SWC: 316: Cablegram

### ***Tonnage from British for Troops***

No. 81-R

A. G. O., WAR DEPARTMENT,  
Washington, D. C., August 19, 1918.

AMSEC, VERSAILLES

With reference to your 183, in view of paragraph 3 your 140 transmitting resolution Number 2 of the Supreme War Council at last session reported "First that General T. H. Bliss is requested to ascertain in what measure the American Government can furnish the tonnage necessary to transport to France troops called for in approved program," our number 74 was sent to you direct instead of "Assuming that the questions of tonnage would be taken up in the usual way by existing councils of shipping experts," the cablegram in question indicated clearly that the British Government intended to give us the tonnage both for the additional troop transports and cargo transports necessary for the increased program. However on August 7, General Pershing sent us his number 1567 which contained a copy of a very confidential cablegram from Mr. Lloyd George to Clemenceau dated August 2 in which he completely reverses his former position and states among other things "I regret to declare that we shall not be able to continue our help as far as cargoes of merchandise are concerned and we shall probably have to cut down tonnage assigned for troop transportation." If General Pershing has not given you a copy of this cablegram get it from him. March.

HARRIS.

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SOS: 10: Memorandum

### ***Reserve of Supplies***

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F., SECRETARY, GENERAL STAFF,  
August 20, 1918.

MEMORANDUM FOR D. C. of S., A. C. of S., G-1, A. C. of S., G-4, D. G. T.,

C. Q. M., D. C. and F., C. E. O.

The Commander-in-Chief has today ordered that the reserve of supplies to be kept in France be 45 days instead of 90 days as heretofore. Also that when the 80-division program is referred to it means 80 combat divisions. Depot divisions have been asked for at the rate of one for every five combat divisions.

The commanding general directs that the general staff at once consider after consultation with the chiefs of supply departments, D. G. T and the chief engineer, the proper distribution between advance, intermediate, and base sections of the 45 days' reserve supplies.

JAMES G. RIDER,  
Secretary, General Staff.

[Pencil note:] Call upon supply depots, for recommendations. The conference with D. G. T. and C. E. O. To Col. Poole.

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Cable: A-1859-R

***Concerning Shipment of Divisions***

A. G. O., WAR DEPARTMENT,  
*Washington, D. C., August 20, 1918.*

PERSHING, AMEXFORCE, G. H. Q., A. E. F.

1. Reference P 1604, A 1842 was unauthorized. Divisions will be shipped only when necessary to avoid shipping space going vacant. It is frequently impossible to secure sufficient S. O. S. troops to fill available shipping space. 6 divisions were at ports or en route for August embarkation and have been sent. 3 had been planned for embarkation in September but will now be postponed to October if possible to provide other troops.

All replacements called for by you are being shipped but they are often delayed by quarantine.

Your 1569 [Aug. 7, 1918] will be followed as nearly as practicable but it will be impossible to ship many of the new organizations called for in September. Cable your needs further in advance. March.

\* \* \* \* \*

HARRIS.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1036: Letter

***French Requested to Continue Antiaircraft Defense***

3d Section, General Staff

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, August 22, 1918.*

FROM: THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF

TO: THE CHIEF OF FRENCH MILITARY MISSION

1. On account of the lack of antiaircraft artillery materiel, the American Expeditionary Force is unable to take over the antiaircraft defenses of the area in which our First Army is operating. It would be most gratifying to the Commander-in-Chief if the

French authorities continue these defenses until such time as the American materiel is available.

2. There are several French demi-fixed antiaircraft batteries installed in the First Army area; this armament is of great benefit but it is believed that the defenses would be strengthened, materially, if these guns were replaced by 75-mm. auto cannon. The Commander-in-Chief requests that you ascertain if it is practicable for the French authorities to make this substitution of armament.

3. Battery B, 1st Battalion Antiaircraft Artillery (American), is equipped with 75-mm. auto cannon. This battery is now on duty with the French Sixth Army. It is desired to withdraw this battery from its present duty and utilize its services in the defense of the sector Richecourt---Pont-a-Mousson. Kindly communicate the Commander-in-Chief's desires, in this regard, to the proper authorities and request authority for the withdrawal of this unit.

By direction:

Le ROY ELTINGE,  
Colonel, General Staff,  
Deputy Chief of Staff.

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AWC Lib.: "Les Armees Francaises dans la Grande Guerre"  
Tome VII, Vol. I, Annexes, 2d Volume: Letter

### ***Foch Objects to Withdrawal from Western Front***

[Editorial Translation]

[Annex 788]

1st Section, 3d Bureau, General Staff  
No. 3206

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED ARMIES,  
August 22, 1918.

Marshal Foch, Commander-in-Chief, Allied Armies

To: The President of the Council, [French] Minister of War (General Staff of the Army,  
3d Bureau)

[Extract]

\* \* \* \* \*

\* \* \* I am of the opinion that the question as to whether or not the Interallied Expeditionary Corps is to be reinforced by American forces, in conformity with Mr. Nouleus' request, should be decided at the next meeting of the Supreme War Council and that this matter should not form the subject of an individual proposal on our part to the American Government at Washington.

In any event, should such reinforcements be decided upon, it should not be effected by withdrawals from any of the units which are actually engaged on the Franco-British front or which are earmarked for that front.

FOCH.

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***Marshal Foch Proposes to General Pershing the Commitment  
of Certain American Divisions***

[Contemporary Translation]

1st Section, 3d Bureau, G. S.  
No. 3201

ALLIED GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,  
*August 23, 1918.*

Marshal Foch, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies

To General Pershing, Commander-in-Chief of the American Expeditionary Forces in France.

My dear General:

The offensive battle begun July 18, is continuing with benefit to the cause of the Allies. It will be continued without respite to prevent giving the enemy time to reestablish himself.

Today extending from the Scarpe to the Champagne it may soon stretch as far as the Moselle. This extension will be sought and with it in view the attack in the Woevre now in course of preparation by the American army will be undertaken as soon as possible with the troops and under the conditions agreed upon.

To sustain the offensive battle of long duration and increasing extent in which we are engaged, it is necessary that all troops of the different arms take part therein or prepare to take the part which the amount of instruction permits to be demanded of them with no loss of time.

Along this line of thought, it is necessary for the American 27th and 30th Divisions, even without American artillery, to participate in the attacks of the British army and to be placed with this in view at the disposal of Marshal Haig - as the American 28th, 32d and 77th Divisions take part in the operations of the French G. A. R.

It is equally necessary for the American 37th and 29th Divisions at present in sector in the Vosges to be relieved by recently unloaded American divisions (the 79th and 91st, for instance) and to be ready to come into the battle.

I ask you to kindly let me know by August 25 what arrangements you will make in consequence.

Very sincerely yours,

F. FOCH.

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***Agreement re American Offensive and Command***

[Annex 823]  
1st Section, 3d Bureau, General Staff  
No. 3266

HEADQUARTERS OF THE MARSHAL,  
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, ALLIED ARMIES,  
August 24, 1918.

During a conference held at Bacon, August 24, 1918, between Marshal Foch and General Pershing:

1. It is acknowledged that there is complete agreement concerning the questions which formed the subject of Letter No. 3061, of August 17, and 3062, of August 18 [both printed in St-Mihiel documentation], namely: General plan for the operations of the American army and organization of the command for this operation.

2. It has been decided:

a. That the American 27th and 30th Infantry Divisions, now in the British zone can, beginning August 31, be employed by Marshal Haig in the offensive operations of the battle. For this purpose they will receive some British artillery and, in principle, they will operate under the orders of an American army corps commander.

b. That, beginning September 8, two American infantry divisions, without artillery, from General Pershing's reserve (not counted among the 14 infantry divisions earmarked for the operation to be executed by the American army), will be held in readiness to participate, according to circumstances, either in the operations conducted by the French armies, or in the operation conducted by the American army.

By order:

WEYGAND,  
The Chief of Staff.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 658: Memorandum

***Shifting of Division***

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
August 24, 1918.

On the morning of August 24, the Commander-in-Chief discussed with the undersigned the question of the reply to the above-mentioned letter. After discussion it was decided that the withdrawal of the 37th and 29th Divisions was impracticable and that the 79th and 91st Divisions were in better condition to take part in operations than were the 37th and 29th.

With reference to the divisions with the British, the undersigned recommended that those divisions be allowed to participate fully in operations after a period of two weeks. The Commander-in-Chief directed that the artillery of the 27th Division be sent when ready to join its divisions, arrangements being made for the British to supply the necessary animals.

The Commander-in-Chief decided that he would reply to the letter of August 23 in the interview which he was to have with Marshal Foch at noon, August 24.

FOX CONNER,  
Colonel, General Staff.

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AWC Lib.: "Les Armees Francaises dans la Grande Guerre"  
Tome VII, Vol. I, Annexes, Second Volume: Letter

***Objections to Release of Certain American Regiments***

[Editorial Translation]

[Annex 848]  
1st Section, 3d Bureau, General Staff

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED ARMIES,  
August 26, 1918.

No. 3315

Marshal Foch, Commander-in-Chief, Allied Armies

To: General Pershing, Commander-in-Chief, American Forces in France

[Extract]

My dear General,

The Chief of the French Military Mission with the American army has transmitted to me the request which you addressed to him, on August 16, for the purpose of securing the return of the American 369th, 370th, 371st and 372d Infantry Regiments (Colored), which are actually on duty with the French Second and Fourth Armies, to your command.

At present, such a move would have serious consequences: In fact, two of those regiments form part, as combat units, of a French division, while the other two are to be similarly assigned to two of our divisions.

If, therefore, your suggestion was followed through, the Commander-in-Chief of the French Armies of the North and Northeast would be obliged to immediately withdraw two of his divisions because, at the moment, he would be unable to bring them up to strength again; something which is unthinkable at this time.

After thus bringing the facts to your attention, I feel sure that you will agree with me that any change made this day in the employment of the colored regiments of the American 93d Infantry Division, which have been trained and used as combat units, would have unfortunate consequences, \* \* \*

\* \* \* \* \*

FOCH.

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***Omission of Replacement Divisions Recommended***

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, August 26, 1918.*

ADJUTANT GENERAL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF

[Extract]

1. Due to critical situation existing until recently five out of six divisions arriving in France have been used as combat divisions and replacements have been handled through base divisions and provisional replacement depots without the intermediary of replacement divisions contemplated by original A. E. F. organization project. Experience thus gained shows that original organization project may profitably be modified by omitting replacement divisions but continuing one base depot division in each group of six divisions. While experience shows that original project of four combat divisions per army corps and the provision of corps troops on that basis is in general correct it has also been clearly demonstrated that no fixed order of battle can be preserved within the corps but that corps staffs must be considered as a unit and that divisions must be transferred from corps to corps to meet varying necessities. In order, however, to provide sufficient flexibility especially in preparing for future offensives it is necessary to create a few corps staffs in addition to one corps staff for each four combat divisions. The number of corps and divisions per army will necessarily vary but experience to date indicates that army troops should continue to be furnished for each group of 20 combat divisions as provided for each army of 30 divisions in original A. E. F. organization project and approved modifications thereof. Summarizing the above I recommend that replacement divisions be omitted; that one base depot division be provided in each group of 6 divisions; that corps troops be provided for each four combat divisions; that army troops be provided for each twenty combat divisions as contemplated by the original A. E. F. organization project and approved modifications thereof.

A. Under this plan in 36 divisions comprising original first 6 corps, following have been designated and will be employed as depot divisions: 41st, 83d, 76th, 85th, 40th, 39th. Other 30 divisions will be used as combat divisions organized into the necessary number of corps. Reorganization of first 36 divisions on this basis calls for \* \* \* additional corps troops to complete 7 corps by transfers and adjustments to be made here \* \* \*

B. The preceding subparagraph provides proper ratio of corps troops for 28 combat divisions. For the purpose of fixing the basis upon which further corps troops must be provided, the two remaining divisions of the first 30 combat divisions should be considered as being combined with the 2 combat divisions next to arrive, after the original 36, to form an eighth corps and corps troops should be shipped accordingly; thereafter the necessary complement of corps troops as per original organization project A. E. F. and approved modifications thereof should be provided for each 4 combat divisions.

C. To insure clear understanding I repeat that the assumption of 4 combat divisions per army corps and of 20 combat divisions per army is merely for the purpose of determining the proper proportion of corps and army troops and is not intended as establishing a fixed order of battle. Whatever the number of available combat divisions and whatever the size of each army required to meet any particular situation the necessary

distribution of the total available army troops can be made according to the necessities as they arise. Request approval of foregoing plan by cable.

PERSHING.

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Cable: A 1877-R

### ***Cavalry Regiments***

A. G. O., WAR DEPARTMENT,  
Washington, D. C., August 26, 1918.

PERSHING, AMEXFORCE, HAEF

With reference to your request for 8 regiments cavalry P 1569 [Aug. 7, 1918] paragraph 1D it is impossible to ship them at present. All are imperatively needed on Mexican Border, where General Willard A. Holbrook has asked for 5 more regiments. We have authorized Governor of Texas to organize 10 regiments National Guard Cavalry for border service and when they come in it may be possible to release regular regiments for you. At present we have not enough horse boats to carry the draft animals and mules asked for by you and tonnage is not in sight to carry horses for cavalry regiments and the forage for them. If Great Britain agrees to furnish cargo tonnage for 80-division program we will include a request for horse boats among the cargo boats asked for proceed with shipment of animals vigorously. March.

HARRIS.

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Cable: A-1879-R

### ***Contemplated Shipments of Divisions***

A. G. O., WAR DEPARTMENT,  
Washington, D. C., August 26, 1918.

PERSHING, AMEXFORCE, FRANCE

Many of the new units asked for in P 1569 [Aug. 7, 1918] cannot be made ready for September shipment so three divisions will be sent.

Our plans contemplate shipping divisions as follows: Five in October, four in November, four in December, four in January, four in February, five in March, five in April, five in May, five in June. Cable at once priority of other units to be sent. Give these by item numbers for each month. March.

HARRIS.

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***Troop Arrivals to be used in Estimating Tonnage***

1st Section, General Staff

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, August 30, 1918.*

From: Commander-in-Chief, G-1

To: Commanding General, S. O. S.

1. You have recently stated that a special board was studying the subject of tonnage requirements of the A. E. F. for several months in advance, and desired to know whether the secret memorandum of July 9, 1918 would govern with respect to future troop arrivals.

2. We now confirm the conversation over the telephone today to the effect that "For the purpose of estimating tonnage, you may use the following estimated troop arrivals, viz., from September 1918 to March 1919 inclusive 300,000 arrivals per month; for April 1919, 335,000; for May 1919, 350,000; and for June 1919, 350,000."

3. This adds 475,000 arrivals to the total covered in the secret memorandum of July 9, 1918, or approximately full strength for 16 depot divisions in addition to the 80 combat divisions previously estimated.

4. The C-in-C directs that his interpretation of the so-called 80-division program has always been, and is now, that of a program calling for 80 combat divisions, plus the necessary number of depot divisions. This number is now considered to be 16, or one for each 5 combat divisions.

5. It is to be particularly noted that the instructions of the C-in-C are that the 80-division program is not to be considered as having been amended by the addition of 16 depot divisions; but simply that the original program is being adhered to.

By order of the C-in-C:

AVERY D. ANDREWS,  
Colonel, G. S.,  
A. C. of S., G-1.

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***Discussion of Abandonment of St-Mihiel in Favor of Other Operations***

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED ARMIES

*Bombon, Sept. 2, 1918.*

NOTES ON CONFERENCE BETWEEN  
GENERAL PERSHING, MARSHAL FOCH, AND GENERAL PETAIN  
AT BOMBON

Present at the conference were Generals McAndrew, Fox Conner, Weygand, Buat and Dufieux, Colonels Boyd and Payot, and Captain de Marenches.

Marshal Foch referred to a note which he had handed to General Pershing on August 30 and to General Pershing's reply thereto dated August 31, in which General Pershing had referred to the difficulties that would be encountered in carrying out all the operations referred to by the Marshal. He asked for any observations General Pershing might have to make on the situation.

General Pershing stated that he was in absolute accord with the Marshal as to the desirability of carrying out to the fullest possible extent the ideas which the Marshal had proposed; that if it should be decided to abandon the St-Mihiel project with a view to carrying out the other two, that he considered that all the preparation that had been made for the St-Mihiel operation had not been in vain as it had been a valuable experience to the various staffs and had brought together different elements of the army; that he was quite disposed to direct all of his efforts toward carrying out the operations wished by Marshal Foch. In view of the situation as indicated by the Marshal, General Pershing recommended, as stated in his letter, giving up the St-Mihiel operation for the present and directing all energies toward the other operations suggested by the Marshal.

The Marshal stated that if he understood General Pershing correctly, General Pershing recommended postponing the St-Mihiel operation and concentrating entirely upon operation on the Meuse.

General Pershing stated that his idea was that it would be well for them to postpone the St-Mihiel operation and to concentrate the Americans at the place where Marshal Foch would wish to attack.

The Marshal asked when General Pershing considered he would be ready to make an attack on the west front of the Meuse.

General Pershing stated that he had made a brief calculation and believed that it would be possible to undertake by about the 15th; that this would naturally depend upon the transportation put at our disposition.

The Marshal stated: "General Pershing then assumes that he could undertake an attack west of the Meuse by the 15th."

General Pershing replied: "Yes, depending on transportation and other facilities placed at our disposition."

The Marshal stated that all these conditions are what must be taken into consideration just as food, munitions, etc., and that they are the factors which determine when an operation can be started. Delays are necessary he said for placing munition supplies, etc., and for the arrival of troops; naturally one can not fix a day by saying that the attack will be executed then providing conditions are fulfilled. On the contrary, he said, the day should be determined after consideration of these conditions.

General Pershing stated that he would like to invite the Marshal's attention to the fact that he, General Pershing, does not control the transportation and that this is the principal controlling factor in determining when an attack can be undertaken.

The Marshal stated that it is not sufficient to have the things to be transported, but we must have the transportation, which is limited. His ideas, he stated, was that Sept. 15 would be a little early.

General Pershing stated that it would be a great strain on the transportation, but that a number of divisions could arrive by marching if a decision be taken at once.

The Marshal asked as to the number of troops which might be engaged west of the Meuse.

General Pershing stated that we now have 16 complete divisions with artillery; that they are ready for an operation; five are now in line.

The Marshal asked if General Pershing thought this sufficient.

General Pershing stated that it depended on the front which the Marshal expected them to occupy.

The Marshal stated that the front he had indicated was from the Meuse to the Main-de-Massiges; that it has been proposed to divide this attack, but it could perhaps be done otherwise, but that the force mentioned by General Pershing did not seem to be sufficient; that the other day he had proposed to General Pershing to divide his force into two parts, and that General Pershing had presented difficulties which were brought out also in his letter of the 31st. He had taken them into consideration and thought of giving the whole front, but that 16 divisions do not seem enough.

General Pershing stated that this would require some consideration and asked the length of this front.

The Marshal stated that it was 35 kilometers in all, of which the front attack might take up 20 to 25 kilometers; that all of the front was not suitable for attack.

General Petain remarked that the Valley of the Aisne was not practicable.

General Buat stated that the Forest of Cheppy, the Argonne and the Valley of the Aisne were not practicable.

The Marshal stated that what we can conclude is that 16 divisions are hardly enough; to have more would possibly necessitate delaying the operation. Therefore, September 15 might be a little early; that we might have to wait for more divisions; that as General Pershing said, this question depends upon the transportation and he sees that he may have to delay beyond the 15th. Therefore, in spite of his desire, we may not be ready before the 20th; to wait until the 20th or 22nd without doing anything would be to rest inactive too long; in waiting, could not General Pershing execute a rapid operation, with a limited objective, in the St-Mihiel sector while preparing the other attack; while the divisions, ammunition, etc., were being transported to the new scene of operations? He therefore asked if it would not be possible to have an operation before the 10th with a limited number of divisions and a limited objective, lasting, say, from about the 10th till about the 15th of September, while another operation was in the meantime being prepared with all possible haste.

He stated that he had calculated that there are 22 divisions in the American Army; that 8 or 10 of these could be used for the St-Mihiel operation, leaving 12 or 14 available.

These could go to the Meuse and prepare while the St-Mihiel operation was in progress. The St-Mihiel operation would last four to five days, he thought. He asked if General Pershing would not care to make a study of this proposition at once, and placed a room apart at his disposition and stated that if General Pershing wanted to call General Weygand in for discussion on any point, that General Weygand was at his disposition.

General Pershing and his officers withdrew, and after some consultation called for General Weygand and went over certain points with him. They then returned to the conference room and Marshal Foch asked for General Pershing's conclusion.

General Pershing stated that he had made a study of Marshal Foch's proposition and considered that it would be difficult to tell when the divisions taking part in the St-Mihiel fight will be available for the second operation; of the 16 divisions mentioned to the Marshal as available for the formation of the American force west of the Meuse, he calculated that 12 must be used even in the reduced operation in the salient. He stated



that the divisions in this attack would be used in the following manner: seven divisions in the first line on the south face of the salient and they had calculated on two or three in reserve, as it could not be foretold what resistance would be encountered. On the west face there should be a small attack in the direction of St-Remy; one American division, with one or perhaps two French divisions for the reduction of Combres and Les Esparges, and we should have one American division in reserve there. This would make 12 first line divisions in the attack and it of course would be difficult to tell whether any or what of these divisions would be available for the attack west of the Meuse, and when they would be available; that in view of the results to be obtained by this attack---the possession of the Commercy-Verdun railroad, etc.,---it is one of importance to the operations to be conducted to the north along the Meuse; but that he was trying to weigh this in his own mind, taking into consideration the importance of beginning the operation west of the Meuse, and he found it a question which only the Marshal could decide; that after the St-Mihiel operation we will have some of our divisions so reduced as to be only considered as second line divisions.

The Marshal stated that we must act without delay; that we are in error to act at St-Mihiel and then elsewhere; that the principal operation, so far as results are concerned, is the one to the west of the Meuse; that we must act on the St-Mihiel without involving a large mass of forces; therefore this operation must be done with reduced forces while we prepare that of the Meuse with the main force; that we must execute at once the St-Mihiel operation and prepare without delay that of the Meuse; that we must have the St-Mihiel operation toward September 10 with eight to ten divisions, and prepare the action on the Meuse for the remainder. As for the resources of the American Army, the Marshal stated that it has in France about 30 divisions. He could not understand how it should furnish 12 divisions for this operation and having only two with the English could furnish no more; that he could now himself account for 22 divisions out of 30, and could not see why they could, at the most important moment of the war, find only 12 divisions ready for the other operation; that 22 divisions are now ready; eight to ten for St-Mihiel. If eight are used, 14 remain; if ten are used, 12 remain; which could be started at once. Of course, he stated, all of these 22 divisions have not received the same amount of instruction. At St-Mihiel, if the first line has to have first class divisions, those of the 2d line need not be of the same degree of instruction. He therefore suggested eight or ten divisions, of which three or four should be among those recently arrived, leaving 12 to 14 for the Meuse operation; that St-Mihiel could be done with limited number of divisions and a limited objective, and could be undertaken toward September 10. There should, therefore, be available for the Meuse operation 12 to 14 divisions which will not have been in the St-Mihiel operation. To these could be added some divisions from St-Mihiel when this operation was finished, but that he was not counting on these; if ten are engaged in the St-Mihiel fight, there would be, depending on events, about 20 for the Meuse operation.

General Pershing stated that in presenting the situation as to the relative condition of these divisions he did not mean to give the impression of any hesitancy in undertaking, with all vigor and enthusiasm that he can muster, the execution of the projects in view; that he will undertake St-Mihiel at once, and, if humanly possible, on the date set; that he will also prepare for another operation in whatever sector the Marshal might designate --- he understood this to be west of the Meuse, for the earliest possible date and he would undertake the operation there when the salient fight should have been finished; that he would place every available man in these attacks; that everything that is possible would be done to carry them out.

The Marshal stated that he had never doubted the sentiments which animated General Pershing; that he is not surprised, therefore, to hear him express himself in this way. He thanked General Pershing for his splendid expression of good will, and admitted that the program was difficult to follow; that he would ask General Pershing to prepare for

the St-Mihiel fight on or about the 10th with a limited objective, and that this attack could probably be stopped after three or four days; that it would be begun without any idea of making it an extended attack; that he should prepare this attack for eight or ten divisions; three or four of which might be, should General Pershing decide, from recently arrived divisions; that he should prepare for the attack on the Meuse for the 20th or 25th with what would remain of the 22; 12 or 14 of them could be taken there when the St-Mihiel fight was finished and what remains available after that fight about the 14th or 15th.

He asked General Pershing to think this matter over, and did not insist on the exact number of divisions which he had indicated; and as to dates, when he mentioned one, he meant on or about that date---sooner or later; that the plans he submitted were general; that he asked General Pershing to give him the dates, as he must combine this St-Mihiel fight with French and British attacks. If General Pershing agreed to the General principles, we can proceed to the organization of commands. First, it was his intention to organize the American Army in one command. He asked whether or not General Pershing could adopt the general lines of action proposed and when.

General Pershing replied that he could adopt them now.

General Weygand stated that it would be advisable to determine the number of divisions to be engaged.

Marshal Foch stated that there would be eight or ten in the salient, and 12 or 14 on the Meuse, to which would be added those that might be later brought up from St-Mihiel; that the right of the American Army would rest on the Meuse, and would extend west according to the number of divisions.

General Petain stated that it was necessary that the American Army extend to the Argonne, otherwise there would be no dividing line between the French Second and Fourth Armies.

This, after a short calculation, General Pershing stated would be practicable.

The question of command was then taken up and the Marshal stated that General Pershing would command from the right of the present American First Army to the Argonne, and that the details as to exact limits and other details as to command in this sector would be regulated by General Pershing and General Petain.

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**Corps and Army Troops Needed**

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, September 3, 1918.*

ADJUTANT GENERAL OF THE ARMY, WASHINGTON

FOR CHIEF OF STAFF

[Extract]

With reference A 1896, P 1627 [Aug. 26, 1918] paragraph 1 A is repeated and amplified as follows: Under this plan from the 36 divisions comprising original first 6 corps, the following have been designated and will be employed as depot divisions: 41st, 83d, 76th, 85th, 40th, and 39th. The remaining 30 divisions will be used as combat divisions and will be organized into the necessary number of corps on the basis indicated in paragraph 1. The organization of these 30 combat divisions on this basis calls for additional corps troops because corps troops for only 6 corps have been provided in the first 36 divisions. For the corps formed from these 30 divisions, 7 corps artillery brigades are necessary. These are to be formed by using brigade headquarters and 2 regiments of each field artillery brigade of 4 of the depot divisions. Four remaining regiments of these brigades will be used as 3-inch army regiments on motor trucks. Field artillery brigades of 2 remaining depot divisions used for school and replace work and to furnish 2 additional 3-inch army regiments on motor trucks, which will complete six 3-inch required for army troops for 36 divisions. With one corps artillery brigade which we now have this would give 5 corps artillery brigade. Two more needed to make 7. Necessary transfers and adjustments will be made here. In the absences of 4.7" guns, both regiments of one corps artillery brigade already formed have been equipped with 155 G P F guns and for this reason one of the corps artillery brigades asked for should consist of 2 regiments of 4.7-inch guns to permit of readjustment to normal organization. Out of total of 36 divisions 7 artillery brigades, less one 75-mm. regiment have been taken to form corps, army, and replacement artillery, which leaves for 30 combat divisions 29 artillery brigades and one 75-mm. regiment. Therefore, in order to have field artillery brigade for each of 30 combat divisions one combat division artillery brigade less one 75-mm. regiment should be sent. In order to make up other corps troops and proportion army troops necessary incident to increase in number of corps \* \* \* are also necessary.

\* \* \* \* \*

PERSHING.

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***Changes in Shipping Priority of Troops***

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, September 3, 1918.*

AGWAR, WASHINGTON

FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF

[Extract]

1. Reference A 1879 [Aug. 26, 1918] it is urgently requested that no divisions be shipped in October but that shipments for that month be as shown in this and the following subparagraphs. The extra division referred to in A 1842 [Aug. 15, 1918] paragraph 1 (6 shipped instead of 5 requested) and the 3 divisions for September referred to in A 1879 will replace about 112,000 troops asked for in P 1569 [Aug. 7, 1918]. This 112,000 includes the 8 cavalry regiments of about 12,600 cancelled in A 1877 [Aug. 26, 1918] and about 14,200 air service which is the difference between P 1569 subparagraph F and P 1643 [Aug. 20, 1918]. This leaves about 85,200 additional troops requested for August and September but which according to A 1879 can not be shipped before the end of September. This number practically coincides with the strength of all new units requested by P 1569. It is believed that all these units can be organized and shipped in October and it is urged that this be done even though perfecting the organization must be done here. It is also urged that there be shipped in October, even though organization must be completed here, the personnel asked for in P 1563 paragraph 1 C, P 1595 paragraph 1, P 1618 paragraph 4, P 1622 paragraph 1, P 1626 [Aug. 25, 1918] paragraph 2 B, P 1627 [Aug. 26, 1918] paragraph 1 A, totaling about 93,900. The above makes a total of 179,100 for the October program. Assuming a capacity of 300,000 for October there remains about 120,900 to be covered in the following subparagraphs to complete the October program. [Detailed lists omitted]

\* \* \* \* \*

C. Reference A 1860, paragraph 2, First Army Surveying and Printing Battalion will be completed on arrival of Company C, 29th Engineers. It is requested that Companies K and L, 29th Engineers, be organized without delay and forwarded as soon as possible. Company I and battalion headquarters will be organized here from personnel already familiar with duties.

\* \* \* \* \*

R. The 55,000 replacements shown above are all in addition to replacements now due on former requests. Our records show that those now due are over 111,000. The total of 165,000 replacements are urgently needed and should all be shipped by the end of October. Due to units arriving under strength and failure of replacements to arrive situation is now serious. After forwarding all available replacements from base divisions combat divisions are now over 60,000 below strength and no reserve of replacements is available.

T. Request for November shipments will follow in two or three days.

PERSHING.

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***Liaison Representative at American General Headquarters***

1st Section, General Staff

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, September 4, 1918.*

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL ANDREWS:

1. The activities of the liaison service are of three sorts: (a) the liaison with the French bureaus and administrations of the various ministries in Paris; (b) liaison in the French regions; (c) liaison with the French or Allied armies. The first is functioning well through headquarters at Paris, and I see no particular reason why an officer of the liaison service on duty at G. H. Q. would help matters, so far as it is concerned.

2. A representative at G. H. Q. would be useful in connection with the second group of liaison by keeping us in closer touch, through the regional liaison officers, with conditions that affect our billeting, remount, and Provost Marshal General activities. The third group, with the French or Allied armies, to a certain extent comes in conflict with the liaison that G-3, for purely tactical reasons, maintains with the French and British. However, there are many functions that the G-3 tactical liaison officers do not interest themselves in, which the liaison service officers can and do perform. For example, they have done well in maintaining friendly relations with our Allied troops; have smoothed over many difficulties; and have furnished considerable valuable information. They send in now to G-2 certain reports which that section of the general staff finds useful. A liaison representative G. H. Q. could improve their services by keeping them informed of the nature of reports desired from time to time, and from here, also, he could make a better distribution of these officers than perhaps now exists.

BRUCE PALMER,  
Lt. Col., G. S.

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C-in-C: Fldr. 175: Memorandum

***Conference on Supply Matters***

FRENCH GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, September 5, 1918.*

MEMORANDUM:

CONFERENCE BETWEEN GEN. MOSELY AND COL. PAYOT (SEPTEMBER 5, 1918)

A. AT CHAUMONT

1. The first matter discussed was that of Col. Havard's mission at the Regulating Station of Is-sur-Tille, Gen. Moseley approving as written and signing with Col Payot the order of mission and the special instructions.

I. RELATIONS BETWEEN G. H. Q. and S. O. S.: General Moseley indicated his entire concurrence in the principles of the order proposed by Col. Payot; he agreed that as soon as the American General Order is drafted covering these points, he will submit it to Col. Payot for approval and phraseology.

Col. Payot brought out the following points as the essential ones which must be covered in this order.

(a) That all decisions of principle regarding the creation or the functioning of all installation or units upon which the supply of the army depends, shall be made exclusively by the A. C. of S., G-4, whether the location of these proposed installations be within the zone of the armies or the zone of the interior.

(b) That accordingly all requests for installations relative to the American Supply Service, be centralized entirely in the A. C. of S., G-4, from whatever American authority or service these requests may emanate.

(c) That all these requests be addressed, in order to secure the necessary agreement of the French C-in-C, directly by General Moseley to Col. Payot through General Moseley's liaison officer with the *Direction de l'Arriere*.

(d) That all important requests for supplies from the American army to the French army be addressed exclusively by General Moseley to Col. Payot in order to avoid all misunderstanding.

General Moseley agreed with Col. Payot upon all the above points.

## II. MISCELLANEOUS QUESTION OF SUPPLY

(a) Gasoline: Col. Payot brought to General Moseley's attention the fact that the requests made lately by the American army for gasoline were very large, and that in addition they were made by different American authorities so that it is difficult to determine whether or not double demands are being made.

For example:

1,500 Hectolitres were requested by St-Dizier, Sept. 4, 1918

3,000 " " " " Is-sur-Tille the same day.

Col. Payot notified General Moseley that he is unable to furnish more than 1,500-2000 Hectolitres a day, and that if further assistance is necessary for the moment it can be furnished as a loan to be reimbursed in kind after a short time.

(b) AMMUNITION: Col. Payot brought to General Moseley's attention a request made by the General Purchasing Agent, A. E. F., to the French Minister of Armament in Paris, for the shipment to American ammunition depots of munitions of French manufacture stored in French depots, the delivery of which to the Americans had been agreed upon before hand. He pointed out that the munitions for the French and [American] armies having been pooled, distinction between the two categories in the depots does not exist any longer. He further pointed out that the munitions in the French depots should be considered as belonging to the French army and that the ceding of munitions by the French to the American army takes place at the moment the deliveries are made from the French depots to the American army, following the needs of the American army. General Moseley stated that he understood the matter in the same way and kept a copy of the letter of the General Purchasing Agent in order to officially answer Col. Payot.

On Sept. 9, I received a letter from General Moseley stating that he had instructed Col. Bricker to withdraw his request (General Purchasing Agent) and that he had explained to him the pooling agreement as outlined above, I transmitted this information to Cdt. Maugin.

AT IS-SUR-TILLE: There was present at the conference at Is-sur-Tille in addition to General Moseley, Col. Payot and Col. Havard, the following: Col. Boquet, Col. Hilgard, Lt. Col. Clemenson, Cdt. Poupinel, Lts. de Sieyes, Davenport, and Chapin.

I. COL. HAVARD'S REPORT RE GIEVRES SUPPLY TRAINS: Col. Havard went over carefully the results of his inspection of the trains, from the time of their makeup at the depot of Gievres, to their passage through various stations along the lines to St-Dizier and Is-sur-Tille. He analyzed carefully all of the facts in the depot and to whom these defects were attributable. He then analyzed the reasons for the delays at the various stations along the routes.

His observations have been incorporated into a long report with schedules which I

forwarded to General Moseley on Sept. 8. The main conclusions arrived at, at the conference were these:

(a) A representative of the French railways will be stationed with the American railway officers at the Depot Gievres to assist them in the correct method of making up their trains, etc.

(b) Definite orders will be given to the locomotive engineers and firemen to limit their tour of duty so that it runs, not as measured by hours but as measured by distance to be traveled between any two given points.

(c) Definite orders will be issued to the American Director General of Transportation that the work of constructing necessary measures to increase traffic circulation on these lines will be given priority over all other construction work.

II. IS-SUR-TILLE CONGESTION: General Moseley and Col. Payot then received the reports of Col. Hilgard and Lt. Col. Clemenson relative to the number of cars received and forwarded each day by Is-sur-Tille, the average number of loaded cars which are continually in the station and which represent the Centinon check on the relief of the congestion, and other pertinent matters relative to the situation.

General Moseley explained to Col. Hilgard that he would place an absolute embargo on all shipments to Is-sur-Tille not requested by the regulating officer, that with this embargo and with Col. Havard's assistance, he hoped to return in ten days with the Secretary of War and find the place running smoothly.

Col. Havard was then given his order of mission and a copy of the same in English signed by Col. Payot and General Moseley was given to Col. Hilgard.

All through this conference General Moseley had me act as his interpreter and had Lt. Davenport take the necessary notes.

[Unsigned]

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II Corps Gen. File: Fldr. 1: Letter

### ***Rotation of Training Cadres***

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
September, 6, 1918.

From: Adjutant General

To: Commanding General, II Corps

1. In order to insure instruction in depot divisions by officers and noncommissioned officers of experience at the front, combat and depot divisions will be grouped as indicated below, and a rotation of officers and noncommissioned officers by transfer, will be effected in the following manner:

For this purpose all officers below the grade of major and all noncommissioned officers who are regularly assigned to depot divisions will be transferred to combat divisions. Officers sent to depot divisions as casuals are not affected by this order, but will be passed through to combat divisions as at present. The details of transfers will be made by the depot division commander after direct communication with the combat division commanders of the group. Transfers will be made each month and a sufficient number of officers and noncommissioned officers will be transferred so as to make a complete rotation of officers and noncommissioned officers in the depot divisions every five

months, and, in general, these transferred from a depot division will be those longest on duty with that division. These officers and noncommissioned officers so transferred from a combat to a depot division will in their turn be returned to the division from which they came. In working out these details, depot division commanders will arrange so that transfers out of combat divisions will be made only while divisions are in a rest or training area.

2. For the purpose of carrying out the provisions of this order, and for this purpose only, divisions are grouped as follows:

41st Depot	-	1st, 35th, 78th, 29th and 7th
83d	"	- 26th, 5th, 30th, 36th and 6th
76th	"	- 42d, 4th, 33d, 37th and 81st
85th	"	- 2d, 77th, 27th, and 90th
39th	"	- 32d, 82d, 28th, and 79th
40th	"	- 3d, 80th, 89th, and 91st

3. General and field officers regularly assigned to depot divisions will be transferred to combat divisions for instruction or permanent assignment by orders from these headquarters upon the recommendation of the division commander. Such recommendations will be submitted to these headquarters on the first Monday of each month.

By command of General Pershing:

ROBERT C. DAVIS,  
Adjutant General.

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Les Armees Francaises, Tome VII, Vol. 1, Annexes 2d Vol.: Letter

### ***Necessity for Revision of Program of Troop Shipments***

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff  
No. 9506

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,  
FRENCH ARMIES OF THE NORTH AND NORTHEAST,  
September 7, 1918.

General, Commander-in-Chief

To the Marshal, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies

I have the honor of calling your attention to the present situation of the American forces in France from the standpoint of the ratio between combatant troops and services. As a result of the exigencies of the situation created by the German offensive of March 21, the American Government and High Command was requested to accelerate shipments of combatant units to France, and the results obtained up to now have fully met all our requirements. But I think that we have reached a limit beyond which we must not go. It is advisable to reestablish the equilibrium between the so-called combatant elements and the services whose duty it is to insure the material existence of the combatants. Already considerable annoyance has arisen in the region of the east from the fact that we are obliged to furnish the Americans all the accessory units they lack (various services, laborers, etc.)---an annoyance all the more acute since the French elements to whom they are turning are already insufficient to insure our needs under good conditions.



Accordingly, I believe it necessary to submit to you this question which, in the event that you see the problem in the same way I do, would require a revision of the program of shipments as it affects priority of combatant troops and services.

An exact list of the initially essential services could be established by mutual agreement between the French and American G. H. Q.'s, and the American Government, suspending the shipping of divisions until further orders, could be requested to transport these services as soon as possible. Later shipping plans would be based on a normal ratio of combatant troops and services.

PETAIN.

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Cable: P-1668-S

### ***Arrival of the Secretary of War***

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, September 8, 1918.*

AGWAR, WASHINGTON

FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF

The Secretary of War and party arrived September 7.

PERSHING.

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Cable: A-1926-R

### ***Shipping Program for October***

A. G. O., WAR DEPARTMENT,  
*Washington, D. C. September 9, 1918.*

PERSHING, AMEXFORCE, FRANCE

1. Reference P 1655 no divisions will be shipped in October unless sufficient troops of other classes to fill shipping space are unavailable. However, due to short time available to organize these new units, it is probable that some new divisions may have to be shipped. If troops are to be shipped in months you want them it is absolutely necessary we know your needs further in advance. It is inferred that old system of phases has been abandoned and that troops will in future be scheduled by months in accordance with your monthly cabled needs. Is this correct?

2. Reference P 1627 [Aug. 27, 1918] and P 1652 [Sept. 3, 1918], additional corps troops will be shipped as soon as possible, but some may not sail by October 31. For 8th and subsequent corps do you want corps groups X, Y and Z of your October 7 shipping schedule? Do you want ambulance companies and field hospitals added for each corps? If so, how many? Following sentence in P 1652 not understood - "Make up other corps troops in

proportion army troops necessary." What army troops do you want to every 20 combat divisions? What artillery do you want in future depot divisions? March.

HARRIS.

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Cable: P-1675-S

***Request for Information Concerning Mobilization in the United States***

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, September 9, 1918.*

AGWAR, WASHINGTON

FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF

1. The conception of the campaign for next spring must be based upon the number of trained combat troops that will be available. The operations that can be undertaken during this fall and winter also must be determined upon after consideration of the same information. In order to form a basis for plans for the employment of the American army and to enable me to arrange our participation in future operations of the Allied armies I must have complete and accurate data regarding the number of fighting troops I will have available each month from now until next July, what their state of instruction will be and what replacements will be available for keeping them at full strength.

A. It takes months to fully prepare the railroads, roads, depots, supply dumps and other structures which will be needed before a great campaign can be undertaken with prospects of success and weeks of preparation are necessary for each separate operation. Future projects require the employment of large numbers of labor and S. O. S. troops. As a consequence before deciding upon any plan of operations, I not only must have assurance of sufficient fighting troops for the execution of the plan but also of sufficient labor and S. O. S. troops to permit of the construction of the necessary works and structures that must be completed in advance.

B. Divisions which arrive in France must have had at least the full four months' training as complete divisions, not counting the time for transportation of men to their training camps or for the organization of the division, as recommended by P 1482, paragraph 1, and should have as much training in addition to this as possible. Even then divisions will always need special work in liaison and maneuver of larger units after arrival here. Upon reaching France they consume supplies and occupy areas and billets and therefore this period should be reduced by giving all possible training in the states. For above reasons it is important that divisions should be organized far enough ahead so that the flow of fully trained divisions may keep every available troop transport busy from now on until the program is completed.

C. For the foregoing reasons it is essential that I be informed at once.

- (a) The number of divisions that have already been called to the colors.
- (b) The dates at which it is contemplated to call other divisions to the

colors.

(c) Similar information concerning corps troops, army troops, S. O. S. troops and replacements.

(d) Whether or not divisions arriving in future will have the training recommended in P 1482. If not, which of these divisions will be exceptions, and the time when such divisions will arrive in France.

D. Request that the above information be outlined to me by cable and that fullest possible details of the future program that has been decided upon be sent by first courier.

PERSHING.

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Cable: A-1935-R

***Requests Program for Corps, Army, and S. O. S. Troops***

A. G. O., WAR DEPARTMENT,  
Washington, D. C., September 12, 1918.

PERSHING, AMEXFORCE, H. A. E. F.

Reference P 1675 paragraph 1 C [Sept. 9, 1918] you are informed that fifteen new divisions are now training and organizing here. Total divisions here and abroad, 57. Four new divisions will be organized each month including February and five monthly thereafter. We have no program for corps, army, and S. O. S. troops beyond your cabled requests for shipment in October. This handicaps greatly. We should have an extensive project such as you submitted last October [Oct. 7, 1917]. We have estimated for 15,000 such troops to each division. Our program provides for 600,000 replacements of all classes this fiscal year. We have planned to have 18 divisions organizing and training here at all times. This will give them all four months' training if too many changes are not made in schedule. All divisions train as units, excepting artillery which trains at artillery training centers. Copy of detailed program by courier. March.

HARRIS.

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Cable: P-1686-S

***Status of Equipment Shortages***

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
Chaumont, Haute-Marne, September 13, 1918.

AGWAR, WASHINGTON

FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF

Experience of last three months, during which our tonnage receipts fell far short of our expectations, makes it necessary to call attention in most positive terms to conditions which have resulted. It has been necessary to place combatant troops in the line shortly

after their arrival in France. Divisions have therefore been employed in quiet or active sectors according to their degree of training, but all must be employed if we are to reap full advantage of the present favorable situation. In most essential articles of engineer and quartermaster equipment we are over our estimated allotments for June, July, and August, but all other departments are short in percentages, figured on a tonnage allotment basis, as follows: Ordnance Department 33%, Signal Corps 52%, Chemical Warfare Service 51%, Medical Corps 23%, Motor Transport 81% and Railway Transportation 20%. At the present time our ability to supply and maneuver our forces depends largely on motor transportation. The shortage in motor transportation is particularly embarrassing now due to shortage of horses for our horse-drawn transport. We are able to carry out present plans due to fact that we have been able to borrow temporarily large numbers of trucks and ambulances from French. We have also borrowed fifteen American ambulance sections from Italy. The shortage of ambulances to move our wounded is critical. Attention is called to our shortages in motor transportation as contained in our Cable 1606 [Aug. 17, 1918], subparagraph A. These shortages have been augmented by troops arriving since that time. In this connection, attention is called to the fact that we have already been called upon to equip with motor transportation eight of the ten divisions which have come over to us from the British. We have reached the point where we can no longer improvise or borrow. The most important plans and operations depend upon certainty that the home government will deliver at French ports materiel and equipment called for. It is urged that foregoing be given most serious consideration and that tonnage allotted for supply of army in France be sufficient to deliver materiel and equipment, properly proportioned in kinds and amount, to meet the needs of our troops. The need of motor transportation is urgent. It is not understood why greater advantage has not been taken of deck space to ship motor trucks. Trucks do not overburden deck accommodations nor require railroad transportation which in fact it relieves. Can you not impress this upon shipping authorities?

PERSHING.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1308: Memorandum

***Recommendation Concerning Divisions to be Shipped in December***

3d Section, General Staff

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, September 15, 1918.*

MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF OF STAFF:

1. It is urgently recommended that not more than two divisions be requested for December shipment and that, of the nine divisions thus requested from Sept. 1 to December 31, at least two be depot divisions. Reasons showing the urgency of this recommendation are summarized in the following paragraphs:

2. Divisional Artillery Materiel: Shortage of howitzers makes it impossible to equip any divisional howitzer regiments before January. Regiments for 8 complete brigades can be equipped during that month. By reducing the guns in depot brigades a total of 9 brigades including 2 depot brigades can be equipped in January and no more. After January the situation with reference to artillery will improve, although it should be speeded up; consequently, it is evident that auxiliaries should be brought now to the advantage of bringing an increased number of divisions later.

3. Animals: Assuming no losses in animals and that all units are motorized to

the maximum we shall be short 22,000 animals on December 1. With no losses in animals and with the number of units which it is estimated can be motorized by December 1 we shall be short 86,000 animals. In these figures G-1 has taken into account probable receipts from the United States, Spain, Portugal, and France. We have two divisions now going to the front with 200 animals between them.

These figures would indicate devoting all of December to S. O. S. and auxiliary troops.

4. Replacements: Prompt replacement of losses is universally recognized as the best means of maintaining morale. We have never had a working balance of replacements. In round numbers our shortage in organization in France on Sept. 1 was 128,000 and it is in excess of this today. While we have already requested a considerable number of replacements the estimates as to the number which should be requested in December vary from 100,000 to 140,000. These figures do not take sufficient account perhaps of men who will be returned to duty but after carefully considering the detailed figures I am convinced that we must ask for a minimum of 75,000 replacements in December. I am also convinced that our effective fighting strength in the early spring would be best augmented by bringing over 125,000 replacements in December and bringing no additional divisions until January.

5. Services of Supply: The S. O. S. claims and with considerable reason that it is reduced to the breaking point on account of demands made on it by the First Army. In any event the tonnage discharge for August averaged 18,424 tons daily. Since September 1, with more than 200,000 additional men in France, to Sept. 11 (the last date on which figures are available) the average daily discharge is 17,520 tons. For the last day on which data are available the tonnage discharge had fallen to 14,584 tons.

The Commanding General, S. O. S., has already asked for the use of three combat divisions. I am convinced that bringing combat divisions in December means breaking them up for use in the S. O. S. It would be illogical to do otherwise as we will be unable to employ them as divisions.

6. Other equipment: The shortage in motor equipment, ambulances, rolling kitchens, machine guns, and practically everything else pertaining to combat divisions is fully as marked as is the shortage in artillery and horses.

7. The above brief summary seems to me to point conclusively to the desirability of bringing no divisions in December but of utilizing that month to build up our replacement system and the S. O. S. In any event to bring more than 2 depot divisions in December means either breaking up divisions or leaving them idle as such.

It is quite possible to frame a cable so as to set forth fully the conditions to Washington and to prepare them to increase the number of divisions shipped per month after January.

8. It is recommended that no divisions be brought in December. In the event that the Commander-in-Chief disapproves this recommendation it is further recommended that he be urged not to order the inclusion of more than 2 depot divisions in December priority without examining the details as to equipment, etc.

FOX CONNER,  
Brigadier General, General Staff,  
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3.

[Note at head of document:] C. of S. request decision be telephoned tonight.

F. CONNER.

September 16, 1918.

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL CONNER

(Telephoned from Waterfall) [First Army]

The Commander-in-Chief approves your recommendation that no divisions whatever be included in our December program. Please revise your priority cable accordingly, and prepare draft of other cable mentioned in your memorandum of yesterday, that is, the one advising Washington of our wishes in respect to the dispatch of divisions after December.

JAMES W. McANDREW,  
Chief of Staff.

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Cable: P-1691-S

***Troops to be Shipped***

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, September 15, 1918.*

AGWAR, WASHINGTON

FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF

[Extract]

1. Reference A. 1926, paragraph 1 [Sept. 9, 1918] cable covering November has been sent and cables for other months will be sent as rapidly as possible. While cables will be based on monthly shipments with an assumed capacity of 300,000 each lot of 300,000 should be considered as a phase to be completed before starting on next 300,000 unless specific requests for changes are made. Due to constantly changing situation and therefore varying necessities it may be expected that specific requests for modification of shipping program will be necessary. It is therefore highly desirable that all classes of troops including replacements be organized several months in advance of dates of shipment originally requested. This would permit more rapid modifications of shipping schedule to meet necessities here and in addition due to better organization and training would enable us to employ all classes of troops and replacements in minimum time after arrival in France. Cables now being prepared showing monthly requests based on capacity of 300,000 will give detailed information necessary in organizing in advance and as proposed above the various units. In the meantime it may be assumed that we will require all classes of troops shown in original organization project and approved modifications thereof and that the order in which they will be requested is approximately that shown in original priority project.

2. Reference A 1926 paragraph 2. Troops requested in P 1627 [Aug. 26, 1918] complete 7 army corps, 2 extra combat divisions, and 6 depot divisions except the artillery brigades of 4 depot divisions which need not however be completed as the total artillery to be available in these six depot divisions will be sufficient for present school and replacement training needs and the present depot artillery will be augmented by the depot divisions to come. Corps troops will be required \* \* \* cables covering monthly phases of 300,000 men each will show these corps troops in detail. It is to be noted that a brigade of one 6-inch and one 4.7-inch artillery regiment, formerly taken from replacement

division (third) must now be furnished as separate organization. Ambulance companies and field hospitals are required for each corps of four combat divisions; these will also be itemized in each monthly phase cable. Sentence quoted in A 1926 from P 1652 should read "In order to make up other corps troops incident to increase in number of corps following additional are also necessary;" the list of troops then following are those necessary to complete 7 army corps already formed from the 30 combat divisions. The sound and flash ranging and searchlight companies included are not army troops but are needed.

\* \* \* \* \*

5. Future depot divisions should have one brigade of artillery organized as follows, one 75-mm. horsed, one 155-mm. howitzer motorized, and one 75-mm. carried on motor trucks; the first two regiments to be used as school and depot regiments and the 75-mm. carried on motor trucks to be used as army artillery.

6. The materiel mentioned in P 1666 and the personnel for same, and the two additional gas regiments requested in P 1679 [Sept. 12, 1918] pertain to the A. E. F. as a whole and have no direct relationship with the number of armies.

7. Aviation requirements have been given separately (See P 1623) but each month's priority will be given in monthly phase cables.

PERSHING.

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G-1, GHQ, AEF: File 68: Memorandum

### ***Liaison Service Discussed***

3d Section, General Staff

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, September 18, 1918.*

MEMORANDUM FOR A. C. of S., G-1

1. G. O. 28 [Feb. 13] 1918, organized a liaison service for the transaction of business between the Allies and American authorities. Tactical liaison is exempted from the scope of this service. The manual Liaison for All Arms, p. 12, places the responsibility for tactical liaison upon combatant commanders, and gives the rules regarding liaison in combat that shall govern.

The above is the understanding of this section regarding the status of both classes of liaison.

2. It appears, however, that the liaison service has detailed officers to various Allied Headquarters, where there was no business to transact within the meaning of the above order, so that naturally these officers began to inquire for instructions regarding their duties in a tactical sense. At once they looked to G. H. Q. for instructions. Therein has arisen the vagueness of their status. They had lost contact, so to speak, with their own service, and under existing orders they had no connection with G-3, G.H.Q.

3. Organization: It is believed desirable to retain a liaison service as outlined by G. O. 28, for the purposes stated therein, and restrict its activities to business transactions. These officers would then look to their chief in Paris, who should prescribe their duties and exact such reports as he desired. Uniformity of control for this

class of liaison officer should automatically result under this organization. No reports are desired by this section from these officers. G. O. 28 does not contemplate the detail of liaison officers with combatant units to maintain tactical liaison.

4. It is, however, recommended that a subsection of the liaison service be organized of a small group of officers for detail at the various Allied army groups and army headquarters, for both business and tactical purposes. They should be under the chief of the liaison service, render the reports he requires, but in addition obtain certain military information for G-3, rendering reports as specified below.

5. It is recommended, further, that these officers be kept permanently at the headquarters to which assigned, so that they become known to the French. In this way they will be able to facilitate business more quickly and obtain more specific G-3 information than if constantly changed. These officers should be furnished suitable transportation and an orderly, so that they will be under no obligation to the French. The orderly should be a Class B man.

6. A general order should be published announcing the headquarters at which American liaison officer will be maintained, and directing all American officers visiting the respective headquarters to transact their business through the liaison officer. He is there for that purpose, and his acquaintance with conditions will enable him to aid the transaction materially. If ignored by visiting officers, both suffer. The mission is not so well performed, and the liaison officer is placed in an embarrassing position by his own people. A good liaison officer at these headquarters can render valuable service to visiting American officers.

7. Following out the recommendation for a subsection in the liaison service it is suggested, therefore, that the liaison service detail suitable officers at the following headquarters:

(a) The Army Group of the North	1
(b) The Army Group of the Reserve	1
(c) The Army Group of the Center	1
(d) The Army Group of the East	1
(e) Headquarters of each French Army	9
(f) Headquarters of each British Army	5
TOTAL	18

The names of officers so detailed to be furnished by the chief of the liaison service to G-1, G-3, G. H. Q., and the American Missions at French and British G. H. Q., respectively. Any subsequent changes in personnel to be promptly reported.

8. Relationship of these officers to G-3, G. H. Q.:

(a) When the unit to which they are attached is engaged in active operations, to send by telegraph to G-3, G. H. Q., a brief daily situation report.

(b) To submit brief periodical reports, preferably once a month, covering any new ideas in equipment, organization, tactics, that may have come under their notice.

(c) Where isolated American units are serving in the army to which they are attached, to render such assistance as they can in facilitating dealing with the French. In this case to report any comments favorable or otherwise on the state of efficiency of our troops, as expressed by commanding general or his Chief of Staff. To report any item of historical interest affecting our troops.

9. The above recommendations define the status of these officers as far as tactical liaison is concerned within the liaison service, and set forth their duties, and the number and character of reports desired by G-3, in connection with their other duties of the liaison service proper.

FOX CONNER,  
Brig. General, General Staff,  
Asst. Chief of Staff, G-3.

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**General Pershing takes Command**

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff  
No. 29376

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,  
FRENCH ARMIES OF THE NORTH AND NORTHEAST,  
*September 20, 1918.*

The proposals which formed the subject of General Pershing's memorandum of September 19 last are approved.

Consequently:

1. Beginning at midnight, September 21/22, General Pershing will assume command of all the Allied forces located in the American zone as defined in Orders Nos. 444 of August 29 and 6.7551 of September 19, 1918\* Hq. Zone of Communications.

General Pershing will open his headquarters in Souilly.

2. At the same date (midnight September 21/22) the headquarters of the French Second Army will be placed at the disposal of General Pershing under the conditions stated below (Par. 4).

3. General Hirschauer, retained in Laheycourt, will exercise command of all French troops\*\* stationed in the zone of the American First Army as well as in the present zone of the French Second Army, in everything except their tactical employment.

4. The mission of the French Second Army Hq., which is placed at the disposal of General Pershing, will be:

a. To contribute to the conduct of the operations on the present front of the French Second Army under the high direction of General Pershing and with the collaboration of American officers.

b. To ensure the administration and the supply of the French units stationed in the zone of the American First Army and in the present zone of the French Second Army, under the direction of General Hirschauer and in conformity with the provisions of Orders No. 7550 and 7551, September 19, Hq. Zone of Communications.

However, the supply of the French units stationed in the zone of the American First Army will continue to be assured by the French Mission at Ligny. The present functions of this mission will remain unchanged. It will be under the orders of General Hirschauer beginning midnight September 21/22.

5. The general commanding the American zone of communications will exercise territorial command as provided for in the orders of the Zone of Communications Commander Nos. 7550 and 7551, of September 19.

By order:

BUAT,  
Chief of Staff.

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\* With the exception of the French 73d and 120th Inf. Divs. which, after their relief by the American 91st and 28th Inf. Divs., will revert to the control of the General Commander-in-Chief of the Armies of the North and Northeast.

\*\* With exception of the communications zone troops which will be under the orders of the general commanding the American zone of communications.

***Plan of Transportation of Troops for January to June 1919***

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, September 21, 1918.*

AGAR, WASHINGTON

FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF

1. Reference P 1701 paragraph 1 [Sept. 19, 1918] based upon promised deliveries of equipment, especially in artillery and motor transport, and assuming that animals will be received under conditions stated in A 1949, recommend the general plan of transportation shown in paragraph 2 for January to June inclusive. This plan assumes that shipments called for in monthly phase cables (P 1569 [Aug. 7, 1918], P 1655, P 1678 [Sept. 11, 1918] and P 1701 [Sept. 19, 1918]), to December inclusive will be complete before January 1 or before beginning on this general plan. In view of increase of shipping now assured or in sight it is also assumed that we will have an average shipping capacity of 350,000 per month from January to June, inclusive.

2. Request monthly shipping phases be approved as follows:

For January, 4 combat and 2 depot divisions, total about 168,000; 24,000 corps and army troops; 18,000 aviation; 100,000 S. O. S.; 40,000 replacements; Grand total 350,000.

For February, 5 combat and 1 depot division, total about 168,000; 37,000 corps and army troops; 15,000 aviation; 90,000 S. O. S.; 40,000 replacements; Grand total 350,000.

For March, 6 combat division, total about 168,000; corps and army troops 47,000, aviation 15,000; S. O. S. 80,000; replacements 40,000; Grand total 350,000.

For April, 5 combat and 1 depot divisions, total about 168,000; 57,000 corps and army troops; 15,000 aviation; 70,000 S. O. S.; 40,000 replacements; Grand total 350,000.

For May, 5 combat and 1 depot divisions; total about 168,000; 57,000 corps and army troops; 15,000 aviation; 60,000 S. O. S.; 50,000 replacements; Grand total 350,000.

For June, 5 combat and 1 depot divisions, total 168,000; 80,000 corps and army troops; 2,000 aviation; 50,000 S. O. S.; 50,000 replacements; Grand total 350,000.

Each monthly program as shown above should be considered as a phase to be completed before beginning on the next phase (see P 1691 [Sept. 15, 1918]). As stated in P 1691 changes in situation may require modification above general plan. This is especially true of replacements which must be drawn upon to form special units authorized to be organized here and to fill shortages in arriving organizations as well as to replace losses. Recommend that in addition to providing for monthly shipments of replacements as above outlined a reservoir of 50,000 fully trained replacements be constantly maintained at home to meet any emergency calls from here.

The above totals will leave us short about 85,000 corps and army troops for 3 armies and 16 corps. These 85,000 should be available for shipment in July.

3. Under present prospects materiel for corps and army artillery brigades will be available for brigades shipped as follows:

For January, 1 corps gun brigade, 1 army howitzer brigade;

For February, 1 corps gun brigade, 2 army gun brigades, 1 army howitzer brigade;

For March, 1 corps gun brigades, 3 army gun brigades, 1 army howitzer brigade;

For April, 1 corps gun brigade, 2 army gun brigades, 1 army howitzer brigade;

For May, 4 corps gun brigades, 1 army gun brigade, 1 army howitzer brigade;

For June, 3 army gun brigades.

Request personnel be prepared accordingly and held subject to monthly phase cables.

4. Detailed priority cable for January phase now being prepared and others will follow at intervals of a few days.

PERSHING.

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Les Armees Francaises, Tome VII, Vol. 1, Annexes Vol. 2: Instructions

***Major Offensives Carried out by the Group of Armies of the Center***

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff  
No. 33497

FRENCH GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,  
September 23, 1918.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE GENERAL COMMANDING  
THE GROUP OF ARMIES OF THE RESERVE

[Extract]

I. Beginning September 26 the French Group of Armies of the Center, in liaison on the right with the American First Army, will undertake the following offensive operations:

1. Operation C: On September 26 the French Fourth Army will attack the enemy positions between the Aisne and the Suippe.

As soon as it has reached the hills south of Monthois---Saint-Etienne-a-Arnes it will develop in the direction of Warmeriville, a maneuver of exploitation aiming at the fall of the line of the Monts. It will be prepared at the same time to exploit the success in the general direction of Attigny and Rethel.

2. Operation D: Beginning at noon, September 28, the French Fifth Army will be ready to attack the enemy position between the Aisne and Reims in the General direction of the line Fismes-Bourgogne, joining its action with that of the Fourth Army with the objective of causing the fall of the line of the Monts.

This attack of the Fifth Army will be executed only upon order of the Commander-in-Chief.

II. For information: Moreover, toward the . . . . \* the British armies will execute a general offensive for the purpose of forcing the Hindenburg Line.

III. During the course of these operations the mission of the Group of Armies of the Reserve will remain unchanged \* \* \*

a. On the right of the Group of Armies of the Reserve, the enemy, driven by the Fifth Army from the hills south of the Aisne, may seek to reestablish himself on the Chemin-des-Dames and the Craonne Plateau or to fall back north of the Ailette.

At that time an opportunity intervention of the right wing of the Tenth Army might precipitate the withdrawal of the enemy on the Ailette.

Consequently the Tenth Army will prepare an offensive of its right wing in the direction of Chavignon and of La Malmaison, but this operation will be launched only upon order of the Commander-in-Chief, after a 24-hour notice given as soon as possible after midnight, September 27/28.

\* \* \* \* \*

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\* Sic in the original in the archives; date not indicated.

b. On the left of the Group of Armies of the Reserve, the First Army will retain the mission of supporting the British attacks and exploiting their success.

\* \* \* \* \*

PETAIN.

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Cable: P-1717-S

### ***The Eighty-Division Program Explained***

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, September 23, 1918.*

AGWAR, WASHINGTON

FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF

1. The eighty-division program approved July 25 contemplates total shipment of troops from July 1918 to June 30, 1919, of 2,760,000, resulting in an aggregate total force American Expeditionary Forces by June 30, 1919, 3,760,000 including wastage replacements of 400,000.

A. Some confusion exists here as to what is meant by the eighty-division program. Authorities here contemplate a total force by the same date of 4,700,000 or 940,000 more than our figures. The authorities here interpret eighty-division program as meaning eighty combatant divisions, with sixteen depot division, which in effect gives a total force approximately equal to ninety-six divisions.

B. For details of monthly shipment contemplated by A. E. F. authorities see Cables 1655-S, 1678-S [Sept. 11, 1918] 1701-S [Sept. 19, 1918], 1713-S [Sept. 21, 1918].

C. It is my understanding that after careful study we found that the eighty-division program, as indicated in Paragraph 1, was all that we could safely figure on and that production and tonnage requirements accordingly would be so based.

D. General Pershing's cable 1713 outlines shipping program of 350,000 troops per months, from January to June inclusive. This number is far in excess of program in Paragraph 1. I suggest that General Pershing be advised definitely the details contemplated by the eighty-division program as you interpret it, that is, the number and strength of combatant divisions, the total corps, army and service of supply troops involved and rate of shipment of each, in order that requirements worked out here may be in accord with plans in the United States.

E. If since my departure you have made fresh studies modifying program of July 25 or can now see your way clear to more nearly comply with program suggested by General Pershing you should advise him immediately. If full and definite response is not immediately possible and send as soon as practicable your best estimates as I want personally as much information as possible before I leave. It is understood that the program of shipment is contingent upon procurement of adequate cargo tonnage. We have presented the requirements of the eighty-division program, as we brought them, to the British shipping authorities but estimates of requirements and tonnage made here are in excess of our estimates due to the inclusion of the 16 depot divisions above referred to.

BAKER.

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***Cargo Tonnage***

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*September 23, 1918*

AGWAR, WASHINGTON

FOR THE PRESIDENT

1. The British have put the matter of cargo tonnage in the hands of Lord Reading who has been too ill to carry on the work. I saw him in London and arranged to have our experts prepare the preliminaries for our consideration the latter part of this week when he will be well enough to conclude the matter. In the meantime the British have definitely allotted to us for export use 200,000 deadweight tons and these ships will be immediately diverted to us.

2. The British view is that tonnage diverted to us is withdrawn from essential Allied needs, principally cereal imports, and will be required to be made good later in the cereal year by assistance from us when our new ships make it possible. Their suggestion will be that America cooperate through Allied Maritime Transport Council and the existing program committees in using any surplus we develop for whatever may be agreed to be the most pressing Allied need at the moment. They concede that the control of American tonnage must remain with America and that no vote of Allied Maritime Council can be permitted to control it but urge that the American representatives on the Maritime Council and program committees be authorized to make full display of American needs and facilities as representatives of other nations will do and that the relative needs of the various Allies as they thus appear be sent to America for our information in determining our use of our ships.

3. This use of aggregate facilities for the paramount needs as they appear from time to time we would doubtless consent to in any case, but with your approval I would like to agree with Lord Reading as follows:

First. There can be no diversion of ships either American or British from American army supply use below the amount needed for constant maintenance for such American forces as are already in Europe from time to time.

Second. We will cooperate with the British, French, and Italians in using their tonnage for our military program and our tonnage for the essential supply of their military and civil programs by counsel changing the use of ships as their needs become paramount, we reserving the right to use our own judgment when informed by common counsel as to the fact of any Allied need being really greater than the next items in our own programs.

BAKER.

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***Railroad Policy***

4th Section, General Staff

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, September 23, 1918.*

From: C-in-C

To: Lt. L. H. Paul Chapin, Liaison Officer, G-4, French G. H. Q.

1. I beg to acknowledge receipt of your notes [Sept. 20, 1918] on the above conference and to advise you that the same are in the main very accurate.

2. In reference to Col. McCrea's position, it must be kept clear that Colonel Payot and I will decide all questions of railroad policy coming up in the zone of the army, including locations of depots, regulating stations, etc., and after these general considerations have been approved, the details will be executed directly between Colonel Boquet, Col. Payot's representative in the zone of the army and Col. McCrea, my representative in the same area. Of course, it is understood that when we discuss railroad questions of any kind, both Col. Payot and I will have our railroad representatives present, and the matter being decided, the details of execution will be left to them.

By order of the C-in-C:

GEO. VAN HORN MOSELEY,  
Brigadier General, G. S.,  
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1036: Memorandum

***Deficiencies in Antiaircraft Machine Gun Battalions***

3d Section, General Staff

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, September 24, 1918.*

MEMORANDUM FOR A. C. of S. G-3:

1. The arrival of corps troops has not kept pace with the organization of army corps, and while realizing the fact that it is out of the question for us to make up all of the deficiencies that now exist it is believed that there are certain organizations here in France that could be utilized.

2. We are quite deficient in antiaircraft machine gun battalions and it would seem desirable that we should speed up any means of antiaircraft defense that are at hand.

3. At present we have in France three antiaircraft machine gun battalions, one functioning, one awaiting transportation and the other undergoing training. One more is scheduled for early convoy.

4. This should give us by December 1 four antiaircraft machine gun battalions for combat while by that time we should have seven corps functioning.

5. Unless the shipment of these units from the states is speeded up it is apparent that we will not have enough to support the various corps.

6. It is understood that at present there are facilities for training three battalions at one time at the antiaircraft machine gun school, and in view of the fact that one battalion is about ready to leave the school, leaving one there, and one on the way, there will be room for one more battalion.

7. It is recommended that a battalion be selected from among the 12 with the 6 base divisions, and that if the next corps battalions arrives before there is room for it at the school it replaces the base division battalion selected.

8. It is further recommended that this be adopted as a policy, as two months are required for training, and the school should be kept filled at all times, by taking battalions from the base divisions and replacing them with corps battalions as they arrive.

T. E. BURLEIGH,  
Major, Infantry, G-3.

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1st Ind.

G. H. Q., A. E. F., G-1

*September 26, 1918.*

To A. C. of S., G-3

The recommendations contained herein are concurred in.

AVERY D. ANDREWS,  
Colonel, General Staff,  
A. C. of S., G-1.

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Cable: A-1982-R

### ***Shipping Program Considered Excessive***

A. G. O., WAR DEPARTMENT,  
*Washington, D. C., September 25, 1918.*

PERSHING, AMEXFORCE, HAEF

With reference to your cablegram leading up to and including your number 1713 [Sept. 21, 1918], your plans of transportation as shown in these cables, added to what we have already shipped in July and August, represents total shipment for the year ending June 30, 1919 of 3,890,000 men or 1,130,000 more than our program contemplates. It is impracticable to carry out such program. Our 80-Division program, approved by the President and Secretary of War, July 26, means a total of 80 divisions in France, including both combat and base divisions, with 18 divisions in the United States, the strength of a division in France being taken including its quota of service of supply, army and corps, troops at over 40,000 men. An outline of this program cabled you in A 1935 [Sept. 12, 1918] and copy of correspondence detailed program sent you by courier about September 13. This 80-Division in France program is the official program, and you will give instructions that

rate of shipments and requirements be worked out to correspond therewith. Should it be possible to exceed it that will be done and you will be advised. It is, moreover, desirable that monthly shipments, as far as practicable, including a certain number of divisions and a proportion of corps and army artillery as well as services of supply troops, in order that a steady and regular flow of troops with standard period of training may pass through our training camps and ports. The plan of sending all the services of supply in the earlier months and concentrating divisions and artillery in the later months results in requiring an excessive amount of space to take care of the number of divisions during the autumn that would be required to carry out your proposed rate of shipments from January to June. Our camp space is based on a total of 18 divisions at all times in this country, 6 or 8 army artillery brigades under training in their own area, and the necessary replacement camps for the several arms of the service. March.

HARRIS.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1309: Memorandum

### ***Troop Shipment Program***

3d Section, General Staff

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, September 29, 1918.*

#### MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF OF STAFF

1.	The following summarizes our troop shipment program.	
2.	Divisions here and arriving in September	40
	Asked for:	
	October	0
	November	4
	December	0
	Jan. to June, 1919	36
	Total	80

These 80 divisions are all that are to come, and include the depot divisions, as well as the combat. Considering the other troops and services complementary to 80 divisions, this is the maximum that can be brought over with shipping available and estimated to become available.

This basis of this program is a shipping schedule of:

	300,000 per month, August to December 1918	
	350,000 " " , January to June, 1919	
3.	(a) Troop arrivals to June 30, 1918	894,569
	(b) For year July, 1918 - June 1919	
	Arrived July - August	572,375
	Asked for Sept. 1918 - June 1919	3,300,000
	TOTAL to July 1, 1919	4,766,944
	(c) Asked for July 1919, to complete corps and army troops for 3 armies, 16 corps	85,000
		4,851,944
	Replacements asked for to July 1, 1919	686,825
	Total force of 80 divisions	4,165,119
	Per division strength (excluding replacements)	52,000



Corps and army troops have been asked for on the basis of 16 corps and 3 armies, corresponding to 64 combat divisions for corps troops, and 60 combat divisions for army troops. Of the 80 divisions, more than the above numbers will probably be combat divisions, so that our corps and army troops are probably in a less proportion than they should be.

4.	Replacement Situation	
(a)	Asked for to Sept. 18, 1918	174,000
	Received " " " "	163,704
	Deficit	10,296
(b)	Asked to Sept. 18, 1918 to fill up units arriving under strength	44,309
(c)	Replacements required Sept. 18, 1918	71,605
	Replacements available " " "	46,363
	Shortage	25,242
5.	S. O. S. Situation	
	S. O. S. Strength, per Org. Proj., Oct. 1, 1918	304,277
	Unfilled requests to Sept. 19, 1918	114,794
	Estimated to arrive, or to be en route Sept. 19-30, 1918	32,000
	Deficit Oct. 1, 1918	82,794
	S. O. S. Strength estimated strength, Oct. 1, 1918	304,277
	Deficit Oct. 1, 1918	82,794
	Asked for Oct. 1, 1918-June 30, 1919	713,713
	TOTAL S. O. S., July 1, 1919	1,100,784
6.	Total A. E. F. ( including S. O. S.) for 80 divisions	4,165,119
	Total S. O. S. for 80 divisions	1,100,784
	S. O. S. percentage of A. E. F.	26.4
7.	From the above analysis, in connection with Cable 1717-S, September 23, 1918 (Secretary Baker), and 1982-R, September 25, 1918, it will be noted:	
	a. Our program is a total of 80 divisions of all kinds in France by July 1, 1919.	
	b. The strength of a division, including the complement of corps, army, S. O. S. troops, but excluding replacements, must be taken as 52,000.	
	The War Department has figured the division at 40,000. This difference between their divisional figure and ours make a difference of 960,000 in the total strength of 80 divisions.	
8.	With further reference to 1982-R:	
	1st: No divisions were asked for in October or December, because of:	
	(a) Deficiency in divisional howitzer materiel before January 1919.	
	(b) Shortage of animals.	
	(c) Shortage of replacements.	
	(d) Shortage of S. O. S. troops.	
	(e) Shortage of other equipment.	
	(See Memo for C. of S., from G-3, September 15, 1918, copy attached.)	
	2d: Available tonnage was therefore allotted to needed replacements and S. O. S. troops.	
	3d Beginning with January, proposed troop shipment program provides for:	
	(a) A uniform shipment of 6 divisions per month.	
	(b) A uniform shipment of replacements per month.	
	(c) A decreasing rate of shipment for S. O. S. troops.	

A higher rate during the earlier months of 1919 is necessitated by present shortages.

(d) A rate of shipment of corps and army artillery units corresponding to the dates when materiel for their equipment becomes available.

FOX CONNER,  
Brig. Gen., General Staff  
Asst. Chief of Staff, G-3.

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G-1, GHQ, AEF: File 41: Memorandum

***Discussion of War Department Plan of Troops Movements***

1st Section, General Staff

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
Chaumont, Haute-Marne, September 29, 1918.

MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF OF STAFF

[Extract]

1. Cable 1982-R, of September 25, 1918, calls for a regular flow of divisions with a due proportion of army, corps, and S. O. S. troops. It disapproves our plan of first sending a larger proportion of S. O. S. troops and fewer divisions, to be followed later by fewer S. O. S. troops and more divisions.

2. While War Department plan may be most convenient in the United States, it does not conform to the imperative requirements of the military situation. There are two obvious reasons for this, each of great importance:

(a) There is already a large shortage in S. O. S. troops which, as of October 1, 1918, is estimated at approximately 83,000. This shortage has resulted from the necessity which has hitherto existed of bringing to France every possible combat unit. This has been done with the clear intent of making up, at the earliest opportunity, the due proportion of S. O. S. troops. It is now important that this shortage should be made up at the earliest possible date.

(b) It is universally agreed that port and harbor facilities, including cranes, unloading machinery, locomotives, rolling stock, and certain other installations, must now be provided at the earliest possible date, in order to adequately unload, transport, and store the essential supplies for the army now here, and that which is to follow. It requires no demonstration to understand that these important works, which have been delayed on account of the imperative requirements of the military situation, must now be completed without delay.

3. This necessity has been recognized by orders for and preparations to ship the necessary materiel; but it is useless to ship the large amount of materiel, without also shipping the corresponding personnel. Therefore, while the perfectly balanced program recommended by the War Department in 1982-R is undoubtedly the most convenient in the United States, it does not, for reasons herein very briefly stated, conform to the requirements of the A. E. F.; and insistence by the War Department upon its program may result in sending to France more divisions than can be transported or supplied.

\* \* \* \* \*

5. It is to be noted that under this program the estimated shortages of S. O. S. troops, on different dates, would be as follows:

October 1, 1918	83,000	March 1, 1919	129,000
November 1, 1918	96,000	April 1, 1919	135,000
December 1, 1918	75,000	May 1, 1919	131,000
January 1, 1919	130,000	June 1, 1919	169,000
February 1, 1919	113,000	July 1, 1919	197,000

6. It requires no argument to prove that such a program is impracticable from every standpoint; and that it would be futile to ship either divisions or the material required for transportation and installation purposes, unless the necessary S. O. S. personnel is also promptly shipped..

\* \* \* \* \*

AVERY D. ANDREWS,  
Colonel G. S.,  
A. C. of S., G-1.

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Les Armees Francaises, Tome VII, Vol. 2, Annexes, 2d Vol.: Letter

### ***Operation and Employment of American Forces on both Sides of Meuse***

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff  
No. 4353

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED ARMIES,  
*September 30, 1918.*

Marshal Foch, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies

To the General, Commander-in-Chief of the French Armies of the North and Northeast

The battle is developing under the most advantageous conditions to the north.

This fortunate development demands that the battle which has slowed up too much in the east, be renewed without delay, intensifying it and permitting it to develop to the full extent of its power immediately.

To that end, it is advisable to extend, to the east of the Meuse on the one hand, to the west of the Argonne on the other, the action of American troops unemployed between the Meuse and the Argonne, and, if necessary, to draw on those which are holding the Woivre front in too great density.

In order to effect this extension in the minimum time, the American divisions will be placed inside the French army corps now on the spot (2 to 3 divisions in the XVII Corps, on the right; 1 to 2 divisions in the XXXVIII Corps, on the left).

From the standpoint of the higher command, and likewise in order to avoid any loss of time, it is advisable to place:

1. Under the orders of General Pershing, the Franco-American forces operating on both banks of the Meuse;

2. Under the orders of a French army commander, the Franco-American forces operating on both sides of the Argonne.

The objectives to be reached remain those fixed previous instructions. The action to be launched on the right bank of the Meuse should have as objective the seizure of the massif of Les Cotes de Meuse: Damvillers, Dun, so as to cover the flank of our general

offensive toward the north, and to increase the facility for maneuver of our armies by the possession of the roads and the railroad of the Meuse.

I request you to guide in this direction the operations under your direction.

FOCH.

Delivered to General Petain morning of October 1.

Copy sent to General Pershing (with letter No. 4354 [not selected]) by General Weygand at 1 p. m., October 1.

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Cable: P-1742-S

***Shortages Resulting from Failure to Follow Priority Schedule***

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, October 2, 1918.*

AGWAR, WASHINGTON

FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF

1. Reference A 1982 [Sept. 25, 1918]. I invite attention to the fact that our Allies and Marshal Foch understand our 80-division program to mean that by July 1, 1919, we shall have in France 80 combat divisions with all necessary corps, army and S. O. S. troops.

A. However P 1713 Sept. 21, 1918 is based on only 80 divisions all told in France by July 1, 1919. All our priority cables for personnel have been so based. We have figured on 3 armies of 16 army corps in all up to July the first 1919.

B. The figures you give as to strength of divisions are in error and apparently not based on approved tables of organization. Divisional combat troops with the proportion of corps and army troops number about 40,000 per division. The S. O. S. troops and replacements are in addition to the above. The former, which include the medical corps attached thereto, are figured at 25 per cent of the whole force. The latter at 686,000. The program of 80 divisions in all will call for approximately 3,370,000 men for divisional, corps and army troops, air service, tank corps, railway reserve, etc.; a minimum of 800,000 for the S. O. S., including medical corps, and of 600,000 replacements, which gives a total of approximately 4,770,000 personnel demanded by our 80-division program. Deducting troops now in France, we must bring over approximately 3,000,000 men in the next nine months if we are to complete our program by July 1, 1919.

C. The plan for shipment of troops outlined in A 1982 may be most convenient for the United States but it will not meet needs of the situation here. Due to the necessity of bringing over only infantry and machine-gun units to meet the critical situation that existed in April and succeeding months, the needs of the S. O. S. and of auxiliary units were not met. The shortage thus caused has grown in the past three months due to failure to follow our calls given in our priority cables. Today we are short approximately 129,000 army troops; 93,000 corps troops; 83,000 S. O. S. troops and 65,000 replacements. The formation of corps and armies is meeting with delays because the necessity auxiliary troops are not here. Divisions have come with shortages in personnel aggregating 45,000 men to date. We have not the troops necessary to replace even our ordinary casualties.

D. To take care of the troops called for in our program, port, harbor, railroad, storage, hospital, training and other, facilities must be provided in advance of the arrival of the troops. The materiel necessary has been ordered and preparations to ship it made, but it is useless to ship the materiel without also shipping the corresponding personnel. The needs of the S. O. S. must be met now---not months from now. If your program is followed the shortage of 83,000 S. O. S. troops now existing will be heavily increased.

E. The needs of the A. E. F. and the order in which they should be met are best known here. I cannot plan future operations intelligently without knowing that I will have at hand the means necessary to carry them out. If our calls cannot be met because of insurmountable difficulties I ask that I be so informed in order that necessary revision in the schedules to meet such condition be made here and not in the United States.

PERSHING.

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Les Armees Francaises, Tome VII, 2d Vol., Annexes: Letter

***Organization of Command***

[Editorial Translation]

1st Subsection, 3d Section  
No. 4412

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED ARMIES,  
*October 2, 1918---11:30 p. m.*

Marshal Foch, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies

To General Pershing, Commander-in-Chief, American Expeditionary Forces in France

My dear General:

I have just received your letter which General Weygand brought to me.

Amending what I wrote you September 30, I agree to maintaining the present organization of command, as you propose, under the condition that your attacks start without delay and that, once begun, they be continued without any interruptions such as those which have just arisen.

Very sincerely yours,

FOCH.

Copy sent to the Commander-in-Chief of the French Armies of the North and Northeast.

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Cable: P-1746-S

***Replacements Needed***

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, October 3, 1918.*

AGWAR, WASHINGTON

For: The Chief of Staff

1. Over 50,000 of the replacements requested for the months of July, August, and September have not yet arrived. Due to extreme seriousness of the replacement situation it is necessary to utilize personnel of the 84th and 86th Divisions for replacement purposes. Combat divisions are short over 80,000 men. Vitally important that all replacements due including 55,000 requested for October be shipped early in October. If necessary some divisions in the United States should be stripped of trained men and such men shipped as replacements at once.

PERSHING.

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G-1, GHQ, AEF: File 33: Letter

***Tonnage Requirements for 80-Division Program***

SERVICE OF SUPPLY, A. E. F.,  
*Tours, Indre-et-Loire, October 4, 1918.*

From: Commanding General, Service of Supply

To: Commander-in-Chief (G-1)

1. The estimates of our tonnage requirements have just been completed in accordance with the 96-Division troop program furnished by G. H. Q. under date of August 30, 1918. Since these estimates constitute the argument upon which we must base our demands for additional tonnage urgently required, they should be submitted at the earliest possible moment.

2. To make these estimates conform to the 80-Division program now contemplated and at the same time expedite their revision the following basis of estimate has been adopted: the estimates will be modified to provide for 80 divisions in France on June 30, 1919, comprising 3 armies, 16 corps, 67 combat divisions and 13 depot divisions with dates of arrivals, strictly in conformity with your confidential cable of September 21, 1918. For the number of men in France at any given time however, we are holding to the figures originally furnished by G. H. Q. on August 30, 1918, as modification of these figures will require complete revision of all our estimates and greatly delay their submission. While these figures are slightly less than the total troop arrivals, should shipments from the

United States conform strictly to the request contained in your confidential cablegram 1713-S, dated September 21, 1918, they differ but little and are believed to be as good as any estimates that can be made at the present time. Moreover changes in these figures that may be required later will not affect the value of our estimates for the purpose intended.

J. G. HARBORD,  
Major General, U. S. A.,  
Commanding.

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G-1, GHQ, AEF: File 22: Memorandum with Enclosures

### ***Estimate of Animal Shortages***

1st Section, General Staff

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, October 5, 1918.*

#### MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF OF STAFF

1. There is submitted herewith a brief computation showing an estimated shortage of animals on November 30, 1918 of 25,000.
2. The earlier estimate calling for average shipments of 31,700 animals per month, commencing October, was on the theory that motor transportation would be furnished in such volume that the average rate of shipment would approximately supply the needs of the armies; although it was recognized that at times there would be shortages, to be made up later.
3. Recent consultations with G-3 and G-4 indicate that not more than 13 regiments of artillery can be motorized during the months of October and November, which will reduce animal requirements by not more than 15,000. These figures have therefore been made up upon a basis of 6,000 animals per division, instead of the reduced number of 3,803, and crediting 15,000 animals saved by expected motorization, and crediting also the maximum number of animals expected from France.
4. No reply has been received from Washington as to future arrival program, except 1949 of September 17, 1918, indicating that shipments of 30,000 animals per month are impossible except by diverting other essential tonnage, and stating that large increase in animal shipments would depend upon the success of Secretary Baker's negotiations in London.
5. With the delay in receiving even a small number of animals from the French, with no definite shipments arranged from the U. S., and heavy losses continually occurring, the animal situation will soon become desperate.
6. There is submitted herewith a draft cable [omitted] reviewing existing position. This cable does not ask specifically for increased shipments for the reason that after asking for 31,700 per month, we are practically without action of any kind. It is therefore suggested that the first essential step is to endeavor to impress upon Washington the extreme urgency of complying with our previous requests, before heavily increasing them.

AVERY D. ANDREWS,  
Colonel, G. S.,  
A. C. of S., G-1

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# STATEMENT SHOWING CONDITION OF ANIMAL SUPPLY FOR LINE

## TROOPS---A. E. F.---TO NOVEMBER 30, 1918

Two armies	at 6726	13,452	
Nine Corps Troops	at 4709	42,381	
Thirty-six Combat Divisions	at 6000	216,000	
Eight Depot Divisions	at 2000	16,000	
Total Minimum for Line Troops		287,833	287,833
Total Animals now with Line Troops		136,654	
Expected from France		43,000	
Expected from Spain and Portugal		5,000	
Requested from U. S. October and November		63,400	
		248,054	248,054
Short			39,779
Deduct for expected motorization, 13 regiments Artillery, October and November			15,145
Total Shortage, November 30, 1918			24,634

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HS Fr. File: 403-30.1: Letter

### **Strength Discussion**

[Contemporary Translation]

3d Bureau      GENERAL HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMIES OF THE NORTH AND NORTHEAST,  
No. 11.263      *October 8, 1918.*

THE GENERAL COMMANDING-IN-CHIEF TO MARSHAL FOCH, C-IN-C OF THE ALLIED ARMIES

[Extract]

By letter No. 9506 dated September 7, I invited your attention to the disproportion, which now exists in the American army between the strength of combat troops, and that of the services, to the aid which the French army is obliged to furnish the Americans so as to supplement their insufficient resources in labor troops and services and to the embarrassment thus imposed upon the French army in view of the fact that, already, it is quite difficult for the French army to meet its own requirements.

You informed me by letter No. 3706 dated September 8 that the transport program provides for the transportation to France, until April 1, of five divisions (about 135,000 men) on the average per month; that there can be no question of suspending or delaying this movement; but that, the movement of these divisions having been assured, there remained a margin of from 100,000 to 165,000 men per month available for the corps and army troops, for replacements, and for the various services. In order to be able to determine in what proportion these several categories should enter into the transport program, you have directed me to draw up the statement concerning the existing services and concerning those which are immediately indispensable.



From the information furnished by the French Military Mission it appears that, as of September 20, the strength of the American army was:

A. Total effectives (this includes the American depot divisions)	1,239,000 *
B. Numbers of noncombatant and services with the armies	60,000 *
Ratio between numbers B to A.	5%

(\* Approximate figures, the information concerning the division of the services between the advance and the interior not having been transmitted yet.)

In order to estimate in what proportion the number of noncombatants should be increased to correspond to the needs of the American army, we can take as a basis the strength of the French army.

This was on September 1.

A. Total effectives (this includes instruction units)	2,632,000
B. Numbers of noncombatants and services with the armies	715,000
Ratio of numbers under B to A	27%

On this basis the actual deficit of noncombatants and services of the American army would therefore amount to about: 275,000

On the other hand it is planned, that up to April 1 the Americans will bring over to France an average of 5 divisions per month, or for the six months from October inclusive to April exclusive:

$$6 \times 135,000 = 815,000 \text{ men}$$

At the same time the corresponding numbers of noncombatants and services should be brought over, in the proportion of 27%, or 220,000 men.

To sum up, to reestablish, and then maintain a proper proportion between the total strength and the number of noncombatants and of the services, it would be necessary to bring over up until April 1, in addition the five divisions planned:

$$275,000 \text{ plus } 220,000 = 495,000 \text{ noncombatants and services.}$$

This figure is a minimum. As a matter of fact this estimated proportion of 27% corresponds to the requirements of a period of stabilization. During a period of progression and of open warfare this figure will become insufficient on account of the importance of the works to be constructed in the liberated regions (railroads, roads, various installations---) and it should therefore be increased to about 30%.

It can therefore be estimated, that, in round figures, 550,000 men will be the strength of the noncombatants and services to be brought to France before April 1 for service with the armies.

It is desirable that the several categories of noncombatants be brought over simultaneously and in proper proportions, without completion of one service to the detriment of another. \* \* \* It will be necessary besides to bring over within the same period of time:

(1) All the materiel necessary for the units brought over each month (divisions and army troops or units);

(2) The materiel not yet brought over required for units which have already landed in France;

(3) The supplies and materiel necessary for the supply of the units which have landed in France.

(4) The amount of railway materiel which the Americans have agreed to import into France monthly, namely: 50,000 tons of rails, 250 locomotives, 7,500 R. R. cars.

(5) The complement of horses which France will be unable to furnish.

By reason of the transportation crisis in France the shipping program for railway materiel and for motor trucks (including the necessary personnel) must be fulfilled entirely, as well as that of munitions (particularly the 75-mm. ammunition).

If the tonnage requirements which are required for the transportation of the services could not be realized, the American point of view should be modified; instead of using all the American divisions in an autonomous army, it would become advisable to limit such

autonomy to the number of divisions and army corps which could be served by existing services and to distribute the other divisions among the French armies until, in turn, such divisions can be used to form larger units.

PETAIN.

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# DISTRIBUTION OF NON-COMBATANTS

(Other than those included in the divisions)  
between the several services

Auxiliary Laborers		
Infantry, pioneer, etc.	45%	
Special Workmen		
Railway Engineer troops	5%)	
Narrow-gauge 60 (cm.)	3%)	
Road	4%)	
Engineers (parks, specialists of various kinds)	2%)	
Artillery (Main Artillery Park, Repair Parks,	)	
Ammunition Depots)	5%)	20%
Air Service	1%)	
Motor Transport		16%
Animals Trains and Baggage trains		4%
Medical		6%
Intendance		4%
Remount Service		2%
Miscellaneous (Telegraph, Military Police, etc.)		3%
		<hr/> 100%

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Cable: P-1770-S

## **Status of Animal Supply**

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, October 9, 1918.*

AGWAR, WASHINGTON

For: The Chief of Staff

1. On account of non-arrival of motor transportation and animals as hitherto requested our situation with respect to animal transportation is becoming increasingly and alarmingly serious.

A. P 1474 July 16 forecasted necessity of average shipment of at least 25,000 animals per month to which A 1742 [Oct. 2, 1918] replied that not more than 11,000 could be shipped prior to September 1. P 1518 July 26 urged immediate transformation numerous vessels into horseboats and P 1684 estimated minimum requirements at 30,000 per month from October to June inclusive which was subsequently increased by C. G., S. O. S. to average of 31,700 per month.

B. A total of 1839 animals were received in France in September which constitutes total receipts from U. S. since shipments were discontinued in April. We are not advised of any further shipments.

C. The French at great inconvenience and sacrifice to themselves are continuing to furnish small numbers of animals and very few are coming from Spain and Portugal. These receipts and an adequate supply of motor transportation were fully considered and discounted in making up our minimum requirements of 31,700 per month which for reasons above given is now insufficient.

D. A continuing failure to receive animals as called for means immobilization of our armies. Please advise me what action will be taken on this request.

PERSHING.

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Cable: A-2040-R

***Number of Men to be Raised and Troops to be Forwarded***

A. G. O., WAR DEPARTMENT,  
Washington, D. C. October 10, 1918

PERSHING, AMEXFORCE, HAEF

1. Reference P 1742 [Oct. 2, 1918] and P 1746 [Oct. 3, 1918] the number of men in the United States military program by July 1, 1919 has been clearly stated to our Allies as well as to you. The demands for tonnage made upon Great Britain were not based upon divisions or other units but upon the number of men which we propose to transport and the necessary cargo tonnage to supply that given number of men.

2. The maximum number of Class A men made available by the changes in the draft law is estimated at 2,300,000, which will permit us to have on July 1, 1919 an army of 4,850,000 men, of which 3,360,000 men will be in France and the remainder in America or insular possessions and Siberia.

3. The recent changes in the organization of our expeditionary forces, which were approved, giving corps troops for each 4 combat divisions and army troops for each 20 divisions was approved in principle, but such a change in program has required a new demand upon Congress for over one billion dollars to meet the increase in artillery and ammunition thus made necessary. We have made a demand upon Congress for this extra billion and have not as yet succeeded in getting it through the House, which is extremely skeptical about the capacity of the United States to turn out any such amount of artillery as is now demanded within the time set.

4. If we are not stopped on account of influenza which has now passed the 200,000 mark, you will get the replacements and all shortages in divisions up to date by November 30. S. O. S. troops will be given priority in shipments, but in order to fill the ships which are at our disposal, it will be necessary to forward to you as far as we can foresee, 4 divisions, which will be the 8th, 31st, 34th, and 38th.

5. The strength of divisions is fixed by approval of the War Department and is clearly known here. The effect of your various recommendations with reference to numbers of auxiliary troops upon the sum total is of course understood when they are approved.

You will plan your operations upon the basis of the maximum strength in France stated in the foregoing and set forth in detail by months in the approved program already forwarded to you by courier. March.

HARRIS.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1734: Memorandum

***Motor Transportation Requirements and Estimated Receipts***

4th Section, General Staff

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, October 11, 1918.*

MEMORANDUM FOR A. C. of S., G-3:

1. Attached is a summary of the motor transport requirements of various organizations now in the A. E. F. and shortly to arrive, together with an estimate of the receipts of motor transportation from date to November 1.

2. The estimate of receipts is based on cable advice of floatings in September and anticipated floatings in October, hence actual receipts will not agree with the estimate.

3. In addition to the total shown, the requirements of any of the following organizations which may be called for must be considered:

Each howitzer regt. to be motorized	(tons) as may be determined
Each corps artillery park	342 tons
Each corps supply train	340 tons
Each army artillery park	342 tons
Each army supply train	340 tons
Each army artillery brigade amm. train	339 tons

At present there are three corps artillery parks and three corps supply trains equipped (some of which are provisional).

4. It is requested that priority be designated for equipping the organizations listed and such of those mentioned in Par. 3 as may be demanded. Future requests for priority designations will be made as conditions change. It is also requested that the priority for motorization of the 6 regiments of 75's mentioned in your memorandum of Oct. 8, be included in the above.

GEO. VAN HORN MOSELEY,  
Brigadier General, G. S.,  
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4.

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### F. A. BRIGADES NOT WITH DIVISIONS

	HAVE	ALLOWANCE	SHORT
162d	0	30	30
59th	0	30	30
159th	0	30	30
161st	0	30	30
		TOTAL	30

### AMMUNITION TRAINS

The shortages in equipment of the ammunition trains mentioned are for that part of the ammunition trains with the F. A. brigades. The equipment of two companies of each train (except the 312th and 114th) are with the division to which they belong. Trains 312 and 114 complete are with the F. A. brigades.

	HAVE	ALLOWANCE	SHORT
7th	20	116	96
312th	50	228	178
115th	0	116	116
306th	20	116	96
114th	0	228	228
313th	20	116	96
109th	30	116	86
309th	0	116	116
311th	30	116	86
104th	0	116	116
317th	0	116	116
6th	58	116	58
316th	20	116	96
304th	20	116	96
301st	0	116	116
310th	0	116	116
111th	20	116	96
		TOTAL	1,908

# DIVISIONS NOT YET BROUGHT TO STRENGTH

Allowance does not include F. A. brigades and that portion of the divisional ammunition train with the F. A. brigades.

29th	456	585	129	
6th	225	585	360	
7th	225	585	360	
87th	110	585	475	
81st	225	585	360	
88th	225	585	360	
30th	0	472	472	(With British)
27th	0	472	472	" "
84th	110	585	475	
86th	110	585	475	
TOTAL			3,938	

C. A. C. REGTS.	HAVE	ALLOWANCE	SHORT	
64th	18	350	332	
70th	18	350	332	
71st	18	350	332	
63d	18	350	332	
61st	18	350	332	
62d	18	350	332	
66th	18	350	332	
72d	18	350	332	
68th	18	350	332	
69th	18	350	332	
TOTAL			3,320	

56 Air Service Units			2,800	
Anticipated Arrivals				
3 divs. complete	0	2,100	2,100	
2 corps art. parks	0	684	684	
1 army art. park	0	350	350	
5 regts. 6" hows.	0	1,170	1,170	
TOTAL			4,304	

SUMMARY		
F. A. Brigades		120
Ammunition Trains		1,908
Divisions		3,938
C. A. C. Regiments		3,320
Air Service Units		2,800
Anticipated arrivals		4,304
TOTAL		16,390

	CARGO TRUCKS (Cap. Tons)	AMMUNITION TRUCKS
Estimated Receipts to Nov. 1	4,000	1,500

NOTE: Trucks, aggregating 1,110 tons truck tonnage, are now en route to army, most of which are to be distributed between artillery units and divisions with army.

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SOS Gen: File 370.53: Letter

### ***Priority of Supply of Equipment***

4th Section, General Staff

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, October 15, 1918.*

From: C-in-C

To: C. G., S. O. S.

1. Divisions being used for combat purposes should have priority over those being employed as depot divisions and in the S. O. S.
2. Depot divisions and those being employed by the S. O. S. should be equipped only sufficiently for them to function in connection with the work they are being called upon to do.
3. In each of the above classes priority should be based on priority of arrival.
4. For artillery organizations, priority of supply of artillery materiel should follow the weekly list showing availability of artillery organizations.
5. For artillery organizations which have completed their training and are now in service, priority of supply of artillery materiel should be based on priority of arrivals.

By order of the C-in-C:

GEO VAN HORN MOSELEY  
Brigadier General, G. S.,  
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4

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***Pershing to Receive Orders Direct from Foch***

[Editorial Translation]

1st Subsection  
3d Section, General Staff

ALLIED ARMIES,  
October 16, 1918.

No. 4844

Marshal Foch, Commander-in-Chief, Allied Armies

To the General Commander-in-Chief, Armies of the North and Northeast

In conformity with the decisions made September 2 (No. 3528, September 2), the operations conducted by the French Fourth Army and the American First Army have been carried out up to this time under your high direction.

General Pershing, having formed a Second Army and a group of armies command, requested of me on the 13th, after having conferred with you on the subject, that he receive his orders directly from me as do the other Allied Commanders-in-Chief.

I complied with that request.

So, hereafter, the tactical directives will be sent to him by me. It is understood that General Pershing will continue to deal directly with you on all practical questions arising from the close collaboration of numerous French units with the American armies.

FOCH.

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Cable: P-1812-S

***Units to be Given Priority Shipment***

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
Chaumont, Haute-Marne, October 19, 1918

THE ADJUTANT GENERAL OF THE ARMY, WASHINGTON

1. For Chief of Staff. It is requested that in the different phases of troop shipment every effort be made to give priority over all other troops in each phase to shipments of personnel as follows:

- Infantry and machine-gun replacements;
- Medical department units, casualties and replacements;
- Motor transport corps units, especially for repair purposes;
- Ordnance department personnel.

Our supply of infantry and machine-gun replacements is exhausted. P 1766 paragraph 7 and P 1785, paragraph 1 gives the medical department situation. The following motor transport units were requested to be shipped before September 30:

- 5 repair units
  - 65 service parks
  - 4 motor car companies
  - 17 motor transport companies
  - 4 headquarters motor commanders
- a total of 10,339.



Ordnance personnel amounting to 4,140 included in Items 0-421 to 429 inclusive was requested for shipment before September 30. A-2040 paragraph 4 [Oct. 10, 1918] leads us to expect that we may expect this personnel in the near future. Advise.

PERSHING.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1824: Letter and Note

***Role of French Military Mission***

1st Section  
No. 4986

HIGH COMMAND OF THE ALLIED ARMIES,  
*Senlis, October 21, 1918.*

GENERAL WEYGAND, CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE MARSHAL, COMMANDER OF THE ALLIED ARMIES

TO: GENERAL McANDREW, CHIEF OF STAFF, AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES

I have the honor to forward you herewith, for your information, a note defining the role and organization of the French Military Mission with the American armies, in accordance with the formation of the two American armies just constituted by General Pershing, and in conformity with the verbal agreement on this subject between Marshal Foch and General Pershing.

WEYGAND

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[Inclosure]

1st Section, 3d Bureau  
No. 4987

HIGH COMMAND OF THE ALLIED ARMIES,  
*October 15, 1918.*

NOTE DEFINING THE ROLE AND ORGANIZATION OF THE FRENCH MILITARY MISSION WITH THE AMERICAN ARMY

I. ROLE OF THE MISSION: The French Military Mission with the American armies is the normal agency of liaison between the American command on the one hand and the command of the Allied armies, the French command, the French administrations and populations on the other.

Furthermore, it is charged with furnishing the American units and services with the officers informers asked for by the American command.

It furnishes the American units and services with interpreters, officers and men, who are the real intermediaries between these units and services and the local French administrations and population. This personnel must be carefully trained in its duties.

Consequently:

1. In regard to Operations: It obtains from the American command all information concerning the carrying out of the operations, order of battle, movement and strength of units, etc., which it is necessary to communicate to the command of the Allied armies and to the command of the French armies.

2. As to supply, materiel, munitions, transportation, maintenance of roads, etc., the mission insures the liaison between the French G. H. Q. and the American armies, as well as the general direction of communications and supply (D. G. C. R. A.)

All questions pertaining to the organization of the lines of communication (railroads, depots, various installations served by the railroads, etc.) and the general organization of supply are settled directly by the D. G. C. R. A.

The mission is kept informed by the D. G. C. R. A. and French G. H. Q. of all important questions which the American General Staff takes up directly with them.

3. From a territorial and administrative standpoint (requisitions, installations, damages, claims, etc. . .) it ensures the liaison between the American command and the D. E. of the American zone.

However, all current questions are handled directly by the D. E. of the American zone with the American staffs and services within said zone.

The D. E. of the American zone comes directly under the control of the Commander-in-Chief of the French armies as far as administration and discipline are concerned, as well as all exclusively French questions which it has to handle.

All other French military personnel detached on any duty whatsoever with the American army comes for administrative purposes and discipline under the control of the chief of the mission.

Exception will be made to this rule so long as French divisions and services will be with the American armies.

These units and services will be administered and supplied in accordance with instructions given by the General, Commander-in-Chief of the French armies.

## II. GENERAL ORGANIZATION

The mission includes:

(1) At G. H. Q. of the American armies a staff functioning under the immediate direction of the chief of the mission.

It includes sections and services corresponding to each section and service which form the general staff of a French army. It includes besides an administrative section under the direction of a *Sous-Intendant* (Officer of the Q. M. C.).

(2) At hq. of each American army, a liaison group including a chief and a few officers, as small a number as possible, distributed among the sections corresponding to those of the staff of the mission (in principle one for each of the 1st, 2d, and 3d Sections and two or three for the 4th) with the strictly necessary number of clerks, orderlies and interpreters.

(3) In the units:

Per A. C. - An officer of liaison and his assistant

Per infantry division:

A liaison officer, chief of the service

An artillery liaison officer

An officer of the liaison service

Per brigade: A liaison officer

These officers have with them the strictly necessary number of interpreters and men.

At present and until further orders:

The liaison officers of an infantry division will have an assistant liaison officer.

Besides, an informing personnel, is attached to each infantry division as long as the American command considers it necessary.

This personnel includes:

A superior officer, chief of the group, and 12 officers of infantry, artillery, and engineers.

### III. GENERAL REGULATIONS GOVERNING THE FUNCTIONING AND SUBORDINATION OF THE DIFFERENT AGENCIES.

(a) Each section or service of the general staff of the mission and liaison groups ensures the close liaison between the American sections and services and the corresponding French agencies. The service is particularly organized at each echelon in order to permit rapidly and accurately the daily transmission of information concerning the operations to the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied armies and the Commander-in-Chief of the French armies

The army, army corps, and division liaison groups are furthermore charged with the liaison between the American and French troops operating in their zone or neighborhood.

At every echelon, the officers will endeavor by their tact, devotion to duty and professional ability to deserve the confidence of the American staffs in order to work in continued closer cooperation with the latter, this being indispensable to the success of operations.

(b) The regulations which govern the subordination of the different agencies of the mission to its chief are the same as those which govern the staffs of large French units: Army, A. C., divisions with an army.

The chiefs of army liaison groups are the direct subordinates of the chief of the mission.

They forward to him every day reports concerning operations and current matters.

(c) Their sections only handle directly questions with the French services in cases of absolute urgency and with the understanding that a report will be made to the chief of the mission.

All the personnel (officers and men) attached to American units in the zone of an American army are under the control of the chief of liaison group of that army as far as discipline and the service are concerned. The chief of the group is responsible for the judicious use, appearance and discipline of this personnel.

The same is true with regard to the chiefs of liaison of the A. C. and I. D. and the personnel attached to said units.

### IV. FRENCH OFFICERS ATTACHED TO GENERAL PERSHING'S PERSONAL STAFF

If officers are attached to General Pershing's staff as liaison officers with the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied armies or the Commander-in-Chief of the Armies of the North and Northeast, these officers are the direct liaison officers of General Pershing for all questions which General Pershing wishes to handle personally and directly with Marshall Foch or General Petain.

They must transmit to the proper sections of the mission all other questions which an American or French staff may take up with them.

When in urgent cases they transmit directly these matters to the French services, they must immediately so inform the chief of the mission.

By direction:

WEYGAND,  
Chief of Staff.

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***Temporary Reduction of Authorized Strength of Divisions***

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, October 22, 1918.*

From: Chief of Staff

To: The Commanding General, First Army, Second Army

1. During the continuance of the present shortage of replacements the authorized strength of divisions will be reduced by 4,000 men. This will require you to make certain readjustments within units so as to equalize infantry companies at about 175 men per company. Calls for replacements will be made on the basis of the full authorized strength, as heretofore, but the only requirements in excess of 4,000 men per division will be forwarded.

2. Army commanders will take immediate steps to utilize to the utmost available motor transportation by forming army and corps pools from surplus divisional transportation. Constant reports of half empty trucks going to the front indicates an inefficiency which demands immediate corrective measures.

3. The salvage of materiel at the front must be organized and exploited to the utmost.

J. W. McANDREW,  
Major General.

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First Army Gen. File: Brigades: Letter

***Correspondence Channels with French***

4th Section, General Staff

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, October 23, 1918.*

From: Commander-in-Chief

To: Commanding General, First Army (for G-4 and chief engineer)

1. There is transmitted herewith certain correspondence which seems to have originated with a letter from Hq. American First Army to headquarters of the French Army Group of the North and Northeast, by which it was in turn transmitted to French G. Q. G.

2. There is no information on file at these headquarters in regard to this matter, papers herewith being the first to come to hand.

3. This brings up the question of correspondence with the various French Headquarters. In order that confusion may be avoided in correspondence with the French military authorities, it is important that all matters which will eventually be referred to French G. Q. G. be routed through these headquarters, and not directly from American armies to French armies or army groups nor to French G. Q. G.

4. A number of instances of this kind have come up recently in regard to correspondence originated by the American First Army, and the situation is further complicated by the transfer of territory formerly occupied by the American First Army to the American Second Army.

5. In this connection it appears that there are certain matters which are wholly within the jurisdiction of the French armies. These are comparatively unimportant and do not cover large transactions or transfer of equipment of a permanent or semi-permanent character as distinguished from supplies which lose their identity by incorporation in military field works. The French armies also appear to have authority to transfer, without reference to superior headquarters, limited amounts of small tools, such as picks and shovels.

6. In all cases which by any chance may have to go to French G. Q. G. for decision, it is preferable that the papers be transmitted to these headquarters for action, and it is desired that you issue instructions accordingly.

By order of the C-in-C:

GEO. VAN HORN MOSELEY,  
Brigadier General, G. S.,  
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4.

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G-1, GHQ, AEF: File 61: Memorandum

### ***Status of Replacements***

1st Section, General Staff

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, October 24, 1918.*

MEMORANDUM FOR C. of S.

1. Total replacements required for all 29 combat divisions amount to 119,690. Of this total, 95,303 are infantry, 8,210 machine gunners, and 9,475 artillery. These figures are based on replacement requisitions dated October 16 from all divisions except the 30th and 36th, the last requisitions from which are of October 9.

2. Replacements for infantry and machine-gun units which are now available or will be available within a reasonable time are as follows:

En route to divisions and awaiting transportation	5,110
Partly trained, to be forwarded	4,300
Untrained in depots	6,800
At base ports, probably untrained	3,520
En route from U. S., probably untrained	1,760
Probably personnel from 31st, 34th and 38th Divisions when all have arrived	35,000
Probable personnel from 4th, 55th, and 77th	
Pioneers after training is completed	10,000
TOTAL	66,490

3. Replacements and casualties to fill units to authorized strength have not arrived from the United States in numbers as requested. There is an apparent shortage to October 31 of 81,538. This shortage will be reduced by arrivals between now and the end of

October. 68,000 replacements were requested for the month of November and 106,000 replacements were requested for the month of December. In order to fill our requisitions it will thus be necessary to ship from the United States between now and the end of the year 256,538 replacements.

AVERY D. ANDREWS,  
Brig. Gen., G. S.,  
A. C. of S., G-1.

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Cable: P-1839-S

***Automatic Supply of Officers Recommended***

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, October 25, 1918.*

ADJUTANT GENERAL OF THE ARMY, WASHINGTON

FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF

1. Reference A - 2060 [Oct. 16, 1918] plan recommended in P-1782 [Oct. 11, 1918] was result careful study. Request your modification increasing number experienced field officers be reconsidered as increased number can not be spared. Reference automatic supply of infantry and other arms based on program of five new divisions per month following is recommended: Officers first two items to be promoted one grade upon arrival in United States: Beginning at once experienced officers to be sent to the United States in monthly quotas as follows: Ten lieutenant colonels and ten majors for regimental duty, five majors for divisional machine-gun officers, five lieutenant colonels or majors general staff. No automatic supply company officers recommended. Believe better policy to send divisions with full quota captains and lieutenants from United States and make replacements here from graduates line school sending greater portion company officers incoming divisions to school. This expedites training of divisions here and saves time otherwise consumed in ocean travel. Greater proportion losses in junior grades necessitates retention of all available lieutenants and captains here. Relative infantry or cavalry lieutenant colonels or majors first item monthly quota indicated above, recommend colonelcy or lieutenant colonelcy be left vacant in each regiment coming over, such vacancy to be filled by experienced officer on arrival of regiment. Experienced commander of trains can also be provided each division after arrival here if necessary. At present no officer can be spared for return to United States for duty as division inspectors, division judge advocates, division ordnance officers. Signal corps has sent enough division signal officers to cover program to include June 30, 1919. Beginning December 1 this year it will send thirty field battalion commanders at five per month and one hundred thirty company officers at twenty per month. No automatic supply engineers because of completed arrangements to include January 1, 1919 heretofore made by chief engineer as per paragraph one cable number S 233 and S. O. S. 159-R.

PERSHING.

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### ***Replacements***

1st Section, General Staff

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, October 29, 1918.*

From C-in-C, G-1

To: C. G., S. O. S., G-1

[Extract]

1. The 3d Depot Division (76th Division) and the 5th Depot Division (39th Division) will be discontinued as depot divisions. You will send the untrained replacements in those two depot divisions to either the 1st or 2d Depot Division, and utilize all remaining personnel at once for replacements, retaining personnel to care for records as indicated below.

2. The 34th, 38th, 84th and 86th Divisions will be further skeletonized, retaining only such personnel as may be necessary to care for records, as indicated below.

3. The following units of the 31st, 34th, 38th, 39th, 76th, 84th and 86th Divisions will be skeletonized: Division headquarters, brigade headquarters, infantry regiments, machine gun battalions, train headquarters and military police, ammunition trains and supply train.

\* \* \* \* \*

5. Engineer regiments and trains will remain temporarily on present duty.

6. Send the field signal battalions of the 34th, 38th, 84th and 86th Divisions to the Signal Corps Replacement Depot at Cour-Cheverny. \* \* \*

7. Artillery brigades will be disposed of as directed by G-3, G. H. Q.

8. All medical (including sanitary and veterinary) personnel, trains and equipment will be utilized in accordance with recommendations of the chief surgeon.

9. The ordnance personnel will be disposed of on recommendation of chief ordnance officer.

10. Field officers, captains, and lieutenants will be available as replacements for their own arm or service. The names of general officers and surplus field officers will be reported to the personnel bureau, G. H. Q. for assignment.

11. Chaplains will be ordered to report to the Chaplains' School at Le Mans.

12. The names of field clerks will be reported to the Adjutant General for assignment.

13. Instructions concerning disposition of bands will be furnished you at a later date. These bands and also those of any pioneer regiments which may be ordered to depot divisions for use as replacements will be kept in tact and not disposed of except on orders from G. H. Q., G-1.

14. Animals and property will be disposed of as directed by G-4, G. H. Q.

By order of the C-in-C:

AVERY D. ANDREWS,  
Brig. Gen., G. S.,  
A. C. of S., G-1.

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***French Officers to be Attached to the American Expeditionary Forces***

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, October 30, 1918.*

From: Adjutant General

To: Asst. Chief of Staff, G-3, G. H. Q.

1. The Commander-in-Chief has arranged with Marshal Foch to have a number of French artillery and cavalry officers, and veterinarians attached or loaned to the American E. F. to assist commanders with their advice in tactical maneuver of the artillery in the war of movement, and assist the veterinary and remount corps in the matter of horse care and management.

2. The Commander-in-Chief desires army, corps, and division commanders, and the general staff to know his wishes in this matter, and that they be warned so that they can make plans as to where to send these officers, and how to use them and what instructions to issue to American commanders with whom they are attached, before the French officers arrive. It will probably take specific instructions and an intelligent handling in order that the American officers will understand the Commander-in-Chief's desires, and that the natural feeling of some American officers, that they don't wish French officers to interfere with them, be subordinated to the general plan, which is to use the high technical experience which these French officers possess, and take full advantage of their knowledge and experience.

By command of General Pershing:

ROBERT C. DAVIS,  
Adjutant General.

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Cable: P-1861-S

***Need for Replacements***

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, November 2, 1918.*

THE ADJUTANT GENERAL OF THE ARMY, WASHINGTON

FOR: CHIEF OF STAFF

1. Reference P 1746 [Oct. 3, 1918], A 2040 [Oct. 10, 1918], P 1812 [Oct. 19, 1918] and A 2088. It is evident that necessary preparations were not made to meet our replacement needs. It was reported to you that 50,000 of the replacements requested had not arrived up to the end of September. In addition, 55,000 replacements were on priority for October. During October 33,000 replacements and casualties have been received. As a result we are short over 72,000 replacements which were requested and for which priority was given. Priority for November provides for 68,000 replacements. This makes a total of 140,000 replacements due by the end of November and conditions imperatively demand that they be



shipped early in that month. Four combat divisions and three depot divisions have been skeletonized and four depot divisions have been reduced to training cadres in order to obtain replacements absolutely necessary for divisions in the line. It is again recommended that, if necessary, divisions in the United States be stripped of trained or even partially trained men and that they be shipped immediately. To send over entire divisions which must be broken up on their arrival in France so we may obtain replacements that have not been sent as called for is a wasteful method and one that makes for inefficiency, but as replacements are not otherwise available there is no other course open to us. New and only partially trained divisions cannot take the place of older divisions that have had battle experience. The latter must be kept up numerically to the point of efficiency. Cannot this matter be given the consideration its importance deserves?

PERSHING.

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SOS: Gen. File 1: Letter with Enclosure

***Tonnage for Supplying the Army***

GENERAL STAFF

WAR DEPARTMENT,  
*Washington, D. C. November 5, 1918.*

By courier

From: The Director of Purchase, Storage and Traffic, Washington, D. C.

To: General J. G. Harbord, Commanding General, S. O. S., American E. F.

1. I attach copy of report submitted by the Director of Purchase and Storage, covering the tonnage necessary for supplying the army in France. While on certain classes of supplies, notably ordnance, and on certain items of all classes there have been some shortages, there is on hand at the ports, in transit to the ports and coming out of production, material enough to fill your requirements. Tonnage to ship this available cargo is not on hand, due in the main to failure to obtain deliveries from the emergency fleet as fast as was estimated in June. Only 150,000 of the 500,000 tons from the British has as yet been delivered.

2. Every steamer is being taken out of all the import trades, even slow vessels, or vessels that up to the present were considered unsuitable for trans-Atlantic travel.

GEORGE W. GOETHALS,  
Major General,  
Director of Purchase, Storage  
and Traffic.

Incl.

Copy report, Gen. Wood

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[Enclosure]

November 1, 1918.

From: The Director of Purchase and Storage

To: The Director of Purchase, Storage and Traffic

Subject: Tonnage Necessary for Supplying the Army in France

1. The supply situation in France is becoming more difficult every week, on account of the shortage of tonnage. All letters and cablegrams from abroad emphasize the serious situation in this respect. The priority cablegram for September read as follows:

1. The following tonnage allotment and priority schedule for September calling for 1,022,135 short tons and 1,751,000 ship tons represents the minimum tonnage necessary to meet the actual needs, and supersedes the tentative tonnage and priority list for September mailed under date August 27, 1918. It is most essential that these schedules be followed as closely as possible as the several supply services here have carefully prepared them to meet troop arrival schedules. Please have the supply bureau advise the respective service . . . of items called for which can not be loaded. Please see S 107 which explains our serious shortage of standard railway equipment and invites attention to other shortages as indicated by your supply bureau estimate of freight available for flotation. Please cable full reply. Harbord.

The priority cablegram for November is quoted below:

1. The following tonnage allotments add priority schedule for November calling for 981,340 short tons and 1,857,430 ship tons represent the minimum needs of the supply service based upon present schedule of troop arrivals. Requirements have been reduced to the lowest practical limit, and it is imperative that supplies called for on these schedules be shipped during November.

2. An examination of the following table will show how these cables are justified:

PRIORITY CABLE		SHIPPED (short tons)	SHORTAGE
September	883,628	687,000	196,628
October	1,068,340	700,000(estimated)	368,540
November	1,036,132	800,000 "	236,132
December	1,222,494		
January	1,229,302		

3. The shipment overseas of pounds per man per day has been as follows:

Average June 1917 to Feb. 1918	53 pounds
March 1918	52 "
April 1918	52 "
May 1918	44 "
June 1918	37 "
July 1918	28 "
August 1918	27 "
September 1918	23 "
October 1 to 20 pro rated	22 "

The above figures show a most serious situation, one that is increasing in seriousness every month.

4. The table below gives the actual number of men in France on October 1 and the estimated number for November, December and January:

October 1, 1918	1,834,100
November 1, 1918	2,034,000
December 1, 1918	2,300,000
January 1, 1919	2,500,000

5. Attention is called to General Pershing's cablegram, dated July 8.

For the Chief of Staff and Embarkation. With reference to paragraph 2 your cablegram 1,658. On the basis of 30 pounds per man per day and 150,000 tons for installation, railroads and construction material, and reckoning 1,200,000 troops in France early in August, will require shipment of 890,000 tons of cargo in July. 30 pounds per man per day in addition to supplies which can be secured in Europe will meet normal requirements but consider it lowest figure that can be used with safety. Motor transport service requires shipment 30,000 tons in addition to allotments cable paragraph 1 G my cablegram 1,366. Very desirable July shipments be increased to 750,000 tons as requested paragraph 3 my cablegram 1,331.

6. If the supply of the army is based on 30 pounds per man per day and an additional 150,000 tons per month for plant and this cargo is carried on ships which will load on a basis of 66 2/3% of their deadweight tonnage and make an average turnaround of 70 days, the amount of shipping required is as follows:

November 1	3,375,000
December 1	3,840,000
January 1	4,160,000

If the basis of loading is increased from 66 2/3% to 70% and the turnaround reduced from 70 days to 64 days, the tonnage required will be as follows:

November 1	2,957,000
December 1	3,340,000
January 1	3,643,000

This latter basis may be considered as entirely too optimistic, for with the class of cargo carried for the army we will be fortunate to obtain a 65% loading and, while time lost in convoys may be reduced, turnarounds in winter will show the effects of slower loading and unloading at the ports and slower passages due to bad weather.

7. The total available cargo tonnage as of October 28 was 2,335,000, a shortage of over 1,000,000 D. W. T. on the first basis mentioned above and a shortage of over 600,000 tons on the second basis mentioned. The available sources of supply are the promised British shipping, suitable United States controlled steamers left in the principal import trades and new construction from the Emergency Fleet. According to present indications, not over 300,000 additional tons can be counted on from the British sources. There were 620,000 D. W. T. in the principal import trades as of October 1. A portion of this shipment has already been withdrawn and is included in the cargo tonnage available October 28. Not over 500,000 additional tons can be counted on from this source.

8. If, to the cargo tonnage of 2,335,000 are added 300,000 deadweight tons of British shipping and 500,000 tons of American shipping diverted from other trades, there

will be available January 1, 3,135,000 D.W.T., a shortage of over 1,000,000 tons based on the first and most probable assumption of turnaround and loading, and of 800,000 tons based on the second assumption.

9. To summarize, if we are to maintain a supply of the army in France, it will be necessary to obtain from the new construction of the emergency fleet a minimum of 1,000,000 tons during November and December, based on probable loadings and turnaround; and this amount of tonnage should be available for actual loading in the time mentioned, for a ship completed and not ready to load with army cargo is not available as far as army supplies are concerned.

R. E. WOOD,  
Brigadier General,  
Director of Purchase and Storage.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1309: Memorandum

### ***Status of Troop Shipments***

3d Section, General Staff

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, November 5, 1918.*

MEMORANDUM FOR ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-3

1. At the end of September the actual shipment of troops was about 118,000 behind our priority schedules. It is estimated that at the end of October this number had been increased to between 200,000 and 250,000. It is probable that by the end of January the number will have been further increased, so that our priority schedules up to and including January will actually extend over into March. It seems likely that the February phase would be shipped in the latter part of March and the first part of April.

2. Our proposed project from January to June, inclusive, as outlined in P-1713, paragraph 2 [Sept. 21, 1918], is as follows:

	COMBAT DIVS.	DEPOT DIVS.	CORPS AND ARMY TROOPS	AVIATION	S. O. S.	REPLACE- MENTS	GRAND TOTAL
January	4	2	24,000	18,000	100,000	40,000	350,000
February	5	1	37,000	15,000	90,000	40,000	350,000
March	6		47,000	15,000	80,000	40,000	350,000
April	5	1	57,000	15,000	70,000	40,000	350,000
May	5	1	57,000	15,000	60,000	50,000	350,000
June	5	1	80,000	2,000	50,000	50,000	350,000

The project of the War Department dated Sept. 13, 1918, covering the fiscal year 1918-19 provides for approximately 1,000,000 men less than our schedules and our project referred to above. From January to June, inclusive, the War Department's schedule of troop shipment is as follows:

January	175,000
February	175,000
March	235,000
April	250,000
May	250,000
June	250,000

3. In view of the differences between the two projects referred to above, and the situation as outlined in paragraph 1, is any change desired in the priority for the February phase as outlined in our proposed project shown in paragraph 2 above?

V. D. DIXON,  
Colonel, General Staff,  
G-3.

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Cable: A-2162-R

### ***Officers for New Divisions***

A. G. O., WAR DEPARTMENT,  
Washington, D. C., November 8, 1918.

PERSHING, AMEXFORCE FRANCE

1. Reference P 1782 [Oct. 11, 1918] and P 1589 [P 1839, Oct. 25, 1918] paragraph 1 also A 2060 [Oct. 16, 1918]. Organization of 5 divisions per month in United States with prescribed proportion corps, brigade, parks, and trains requires monthly 25 colonels, 24 lieutenant colonels, 61 majors. Number of officers proposed by you in P 1782 will leave 3 organizations commanded by officers of less rank than lieutenant colonel even if no organization has both colonel and lieutenant colonel. There will be an additional shortage of 11 majors. Shortage of material here for field officers qualified to command is acute. At the present time after the promotion to field rank of all available officers 54 vacancies exist in grade of lieutenant colonel and 9 in grade of major. This does not include brigades to be organized in November. There are now on duty in field artillery activities 9 colonels and 11 lieutenant colonels who should be replaced by overseas officers within three months. Figures given A 2060 are absolute minimum to fill immediate requirements here. 700 selected officers below the grade of major will be sent over in a few days. Only 59 officers have returned under A 1630 [June 28, 1918] since September 1.

A. Automatic supply of infantry officers proposed in paragraph 1 P 1839 disapproved. This blocks all chance for active service overseas of regimental field officers in this country above the grade of major. There are many excellent officers who would be available if others physically unfit but otherwise efficient could be returned for duty here. Company officers who have seen service overseas are badly needed in this country to properly train new organizations. The present scheme returning 4 lieutenant colonels and 12 majors weekly reference A 1968 also one company officer weekly from each

infantry regiment that has finished its training reference A 1630 will be continued until the supply of infantry lieutenants in the United States warrants the adoption of a scheme similar to the field artillery. This should be about January 15. March.

HARRIS.

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Cable: A-2191-R

***Appointment and Promotion of Officers***

A. G. O., WAR DEPARTMENT,  
*Washington, D. C., November 15, 1918.*

PERSHING, AMEXFORCE, HAEF

War Department has adopted as a policy not to appoint or promote any further officers in the United States army for the period of the emergency. This policy to be effective November 11, 1918. March.

HARRIS.

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Adv. GHQ, AEF: 21Y: Memorandum

***Advance General Headquarters at Treves***

ADVANCE GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Ligny-en-Barrois, Meuse, November 18, 1918.*

MEMORANDUM FOR ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF G-1

[Extract]

1. It is the intention of the Commander-in-Chief to establish Advance G. H. Q. at Treves, on or about December 1.

\* \* \* \* \*

By order:

LEROY ELTINGE,  
Deputy Chief of Staff.

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***Priority Schedule Cancelled***

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, November 21, 1918.*

ADJUTANT GENERAL OF THE ARMY, WASHINGTON

[Extract]

1. For Chief of Staff. Reference A 2174 it is recommended that all existing priority of troop shipments be cancelled and the following be substituted: A, medical personnel to be sent as casualties, 750 nurses item M 1210X; B, quartermaster corps, 9 clothing and bath units item Q 451 X; C, signal corps, 85 German speaking telephone operators item S 945 K and 84 German speaking radio operators item S 1092 K. This personnel represents our minimum requirements for completing the work of the American Expeditionary Forces so far as can now be foreseen. It is believed that all other necessary personnel can be obtained from men now in France. It is requested that these requests be filled at the earliest possible date.

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PERSHING.

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SWC: File 315-3: Cablegram

***Use of American Troops***

No. 287-S  
AGWAR, WASHINGTON

AMERICAN SECTION, SUPREME WAR COUNCIL,  
*Versailles, Seine-et-Oise, November 26, 1918.*

FOR THE SECRETARY OF WAR AND CHIEF OF STAFF

Admiral Benson handed me today two dispatches received by him yesterday from Rear Admiral Bullard the American naval representative in the Adriatic. First dispatch follows:

Have received report that Italian authorities have ordered two companies American troops to Cettinge. This does not seem provided for in the Armistice. Army officials apparently have not proper instruction and are dominated by Italians. Italian troops formerly sent there were ordered back by Serbians. It is possible there may be clashes if terms of Armistice are not rigidly followed.

Second dispatch follows:

Confidential report my representative Fiume indicates Italian authorities have gone much further than necessary preserving life and property or that demanded by the terms Armistice and Fiume has appearance permanent Italian occupation. It is my judgment that

unless Fiume can be placed under real Allied control it will be difficult to preserve peace and order. It appears American troops are being used to promote rather than curb Italian activities and our army representative probably has not definite instructions. French support proposition of making Fiume base for French evacuating troops operating Serbia which further reason why Fiume should be under Allies control and not simply Italian.

It seems to me that there is danger, at this juncture, in leaving small American detachments remote from the control of the American Supreme Command.

BLISS.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1282: Memorandum

***Movement of Advance General Headquarters to Treves***

3d Section

ADVANCE GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,  
*Treves, December 4, 1918.*

MEMORANDUM FOR ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF G-3 (G. H. Q.)

[Extract]

1. The Advance P. C. from Ligny moved to Treves yesterday December 3, arriving about 3 p.m. The enlisted personnel arrives tomorrow morning December 5 by truck.

\* \* \* \* \*

4. The Headquarters Commandant, is Colonel H. J. Hunt, commanding officer of the 6th Infantry, which is the garrison of Treves.

5. The army post office number for the Advance G. H. Q. is: 930.

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ROBERT C. RICHARDSON, Jr.,  
Colonel, General Staff, G-3.

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### ***Promotion of Officers***

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, December 7, 1918.*

THE ADJUTANT GENERAL OF THE ARMY, WASHINGTON

1. For the Secretary of War. Reference A-2191 [Nov. 15, 1918] it is urgently recommended that the decision of the War Department to discontinue further appointments or promotions, of officers, be reconsidered, insofar as the American Expeditionary Force is concerned.

A. On account of the activity of operations that continued to the date of the signing of the Armistice, it was impossible, in many cases, for commanding officers to learn the facts before November 11 upon which to base recommendations to these headquarters of officers and soldiers, whose gallantry or conduct, during the period from November 1 on, had entitled them to this reward.

B. Due to the casualties among officers, during the recent operations, many junior officers had been called on to assume the duties of higher grades; and, performed these duties in such a creditable manner as to warrant their promotion.

C. At the date of signing of the Armistice, different staff corps and auxiliary services were in the process of organization. Officers had been attached for duty with these services, and were occupying positions of increased responsibility but, as the details of organization and tables had only recently been approved, these officers had not received the promotion to which they were entitled by the character of their duties, and the positions they have occupied.

D. At the different candidate schools, many selected soldiers had been assured of commissions should they successfully complete the course prescribed. Some of the soldiers in question were graduated after the date of prohibition of further appointments, while others are now about to graduate.

E. The failure of all these officers and soldiers to receive the recognition, to which they are entitled, has produced very great dissatisfaction, as it is felt, now the war is won, the government has not given them the consideration they deserve, and that it takes no further interest in rewarding their efficient and loyal efforts. This attitude is general and it is of course natural.

F. The duty of all connected with the military establishment to exercise the greatest economy, and to inaugurate every measure calculated to reduce the expense of maintaining our army is fully appreciated, but it is believed that the small outlay involved in giving these officers their promotions, especially in view of the short period during which they would receive this pay before being finally mustered out, would be more than compensated by the satisfaction that it would give to these men to receive well merited reward from a government they have so faithfully served.

G. Beyond the question of justice there is a question of policy to be considered. The entire military policy will depend after this war upon the good will and the interest of the American people. If, from the present army, there are turned back into civil life many men who feel that they have not been justly treated, not only will the military establishment suffer because of having made enemies rather than friends, but any broad military policy looking to the training of the youth of America, fathered by the War Department, would not receive the support that it would have if the splendid work of these citizen officers were given just recognition. Moreover, action taken now may avoid criticism and probable action by Congress.

H. In view of the above statements, it is earnestly requested that I be authorized to make such appointments and promotions in the American Expeditionary Forces as have been merited, and as the continued efficiency of these forces may require; and, if the Secretary of War does not personally desire to modify the rule prescribed by A-2191, I request his approval of my taking it up with the President upon his arrival in France.

PERSHING.

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**Strength of A. E. F. as of December 4, 1918**

3d Section, General Staff

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F..  
Chaumont, Haute-Marne, December 11, 1918.

MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF OF STAFF:

[Extract]

1. The following statement, desired immediately by the Commander-in-Chief, shows the strength of American Expeditionary Force as of December 4, 1918:

DIVISIONAL TROOPS		28 combat divisions		
COMBAT			633,714	
NONCOMBAT			47,801	
			<hr/>	681,515
CORPS	9 CORPS			
		Combat	46,461	
		Noncombat	9,308	
			<hr/>	55,769
ARMY	3 ARMIES			
		Combat	77,925	
		Noncombat	52,857	
			<hr/>	130,782
G. H. Q.		Combat	38,213	
		Noncombat	31,015	
			<hr/>	69,228
S. O. S.	Combat Inf. 8,542)			
	Pioneers 16,316)		40,992	
	Others 16,134)			
		Noncombat	395,725	
	Sick -	Combatant	127,376	
		Replacements	70,834	
			<hr/>	634,927
WITH ALLIES				
	1 Prov. Div.	Combat	20,369	
		Noncombat	16,677	
			<hr/>	37,046
	2 replacement divisions )			
	11 skeletonized - ordered to U. S. A. )			322,887
	and other unassigned. )			<hr/>
				1,932,154

\* \* \* \* \*

FOX CONNER,  
Brig. Gen., General Staff,  
Asst. Chief of Staff, G-3.  
by  
UPTON BIRNIE, Jr.,  
Colonel, General Staff.

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***Promotion after Armistice***

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, December 19, 1918.*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF GENERAL STAFF

The other day I had a conversation with the President regarding this question of promotion, and went all over it very fully. He offered the same objections that were offered by the War Department, saying that it was a question which would give us a lot of trouble, he feared, if opened up again.

In the conversation he said that he feared that many men who thought they should be promoted would regard themselves as slighted if they did not get promotions and, perhaps, many would not be deserving of promotion. I told him that my idea was to promote only those who had been recommended or seriously considered before November 11 when the telegram was received suddenly closing down on promotions.

He seemed loath to open the question up. I asked him if I might bring it up again, and to that end I desire a very careful study made, with the object of limiting these promotions to those about whom there can be no question; especially those who were recommended, or about to be recommended, before November 11, although, of course, not all of these would necessarily be promoted.

Please have a very careful study made of the question again and have a list prepared showing the numbers in the line, of each grade, and the numbers on each staff department in each grade who have been passed by our personnel board and who would be recommended in case the matter is opened up again.

It is my thought that the question of promotions should be limited to the A. E. F. and should not be extended to people in the United States.

J. J. PERSHING.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1282: Telegram

***Advance General Headquarters Ordered Discontinued***

3d Section  
No. 3754 G-3

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
*Chaumont, Haute-Marne, June 1, 1919.*

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF

ADVANCE G. H. Q., A. E. F. TREVES

No. 3754 G-3. Advance G. H. Q. will be discontinued at once. The assistant chief of staff at Advance G. H. Q. will arrange with the Third Army to turn over to that army such personnel and records as may be necessary to the Third Army in the performance of its work in connection with the occupied territory. Remaining commissioned and enlisted personnel will be returned to proper organization or released to S. O. S. Brigadier General H. A. Smith and personnel of his immediate office will report to the C. G., Third Army, with

records pertaining to his office. Present artillery course of instruction will be completed. Arrangements for continuance of artillery instruction planned to extend beyond present course will be made after consultation with C. G., Third Army, and under his supervision at Hq. Third Army. Military records of Advance G. H. Q. will be turned in to corresponding sections at these headquarters.

By order:

CONNER.

[Note in ink:] G-3, In telephone conversation with Gen. Brown I modified the above to require that Col. Conger be ordered here instead of released.

J. G. H.

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SWC: File 316: Cablegram

***German Prisoners of War***

No. 145-R

A. G. O., WAR DEPARTMENT,  
*Washington, D. C., August 6, 1919.*

General Bliss, American Section, Supreme War Council, Paris

General Pershing has cabled that our holding German prisoners of war necessitates the retention of approximately 10,000 officers and men in France and recommends that they be repatriated in order to release our men. The President approves of this provided it is done with the knowledge and approbation of the other governments. Will you please take this matter up with the Peace Conference to ascertain whether there is any objection now to the immediate repatriation of prisoners of war held by the American army? March.

HARRIS.

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GENERAL ORDERS  
No. 49

WAR DEPARTMENT,  
*Washington, D. C., August 14, 1920.*

[Extract]

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I. Discontinuance of headquarters of the American Expeditionary Forces. Effective August 31, 1920, headquarters of the American Expeditionary Forces, Washington, D. C. will be discontinued.

[323.31, A. G. O.]

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