


Historical Work in the  
United States Army  
1862-1954

*Stetson Conn*




U.S. ARMY CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY  
WASHINGTON, D.C.



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## Preface

This study is the result of a project undertaken at leisure after my retirement. Initially it had the more ambitious objectives of tracing in some detail the evolution and accomplishments of official historical work in the Army from the Civil War through the recent conflict in southeast Asia. This span proved to be a longer one than I could cover before events in 1976 put a practical end to my research and writing on this subject. I had to conclude the story at the end of the Korean War, and leave a somewhat unbalanced and incomplete account of happenings from the World War I years up to that time. Readers undoubtedly will notice, for example, the contrast between the coverage of overseas and Army Medical historical work in and after World War I and the tenuous treatment of such topics in relation to World War II. I hope the holes in my work can some day be filled, and the rest of the story brought up to date.

I could not, of course, have accomplished what I have been able to do without the hearty support of the Chief of Military History and of the chiefs of the Histories Division, without free access to all relevant records and freedom to use them as I thought best, and without the helpful aid and ~~criticism~~ of many of my former civilian colleagues in the Center of Military History. I am especially grateful to Robert W. Coakley for all that he has done in helping to prepare this work for publication. Chief Historian Maurice Matloff and Charles B. MacDonald contributed helpful reviews. Detmar H. Finke has made a substantial contribution both as historian and archivist, as has Hannah M. Zeidlik through her remarkable knowledge of the available historical records. Editor in Chief James E. McSherry and his aides have offered many helpful suggestions for literary

improvement. I am nevertheless responsible for the finished product and thus for any errors or other deficiencies this work may contain.

Waynesboro, Virginia  
15 May 1980

STETSON CONN

## Chapter 1

### THE BEGINNINGS, 1862-1918

Officially, the historical activities of the United States Army began during the American Civil War, starting in the Office of the Surgeon General and thereafter broadening to include a plan to publish all historically significant records of the Union and Confederate armies and their headquarters relating to the military conduct of the war. Before this time the War Department and other agencies of the United States government had published many records and other materials of great historical value, as in the annual reports of the Secretary of War and the American State Papers; but none of these undertakings was considered to be nor did it have the true character of an official historical effort.

Although not the first, by far the greatest of the Civil War productions was the selection, arrangement, and publication of the records of the armies and their headquarters, a task begun in 1864 and not completed until 1901. The project originated in a recommendation of Union General in Chief Henry W. Halleck. Because of his difficulties in assembling materials for his 1863 annual report, Halleck urged therein that military records be properly collected and published. Acting on Halleck's recommendation, Senator Henry Wilson of Massachusetts, chairman of the Committee on Military Affairs, on 26 January 1864 introduced Senate Joint Resolution No. 21 "to provide for the printing of the official reports of the armies of the United States." The House adopted an amended resolution drafted by John D. Defrees, Superintendent of Public Printing, that proposed including all significant Union official military records relating to the war, dating from 1 December 1860 onward, to be arranged in chronological order and printed in 10,000 copies. Senator Wilson strongly supported the amended



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resolution. It received Senate and House approval on 18 May 1864, and President Abraham Lincoln's signature the following day. Work began almost immediately under Army Assistant Adjutant General Edward D. Townsend. In the summer of 1865 his office sent the first eight volumes, containing field reports of commanding officers, to the public printer.<sup>1</sup>

Observing that the volumes transmitted by the Adjutant General lacked the breadth of coverage contemplated in the May 1864 resolution, Public Printer Defrees delayed publication. Instead he communicated with Senator Wilson. In May 1866 the senator introduced a new resolution designed to carry out a broader plan, this time including Confederate military records and providing for the appointment of a competent editor at an annual salary of \$2,500. In a spirited Senate discussion, Wilson estimated the project might involve publishing about fifty volumes at a maximum cost of \$500,000. Opponents asserted that without a careful selection of documents the series might run to five hundred volumes and cost millions. As passed, the resolution specifically rescinded the act of 1864 under which the Adjutant General's Office was preparing volumes for the printer. Instead it provided that the editor to be chosen should within two years come up with a new plan for publishing the war's military records. This act, signed by President Andrew Johnson on 27 July 1866, christened the project official history. The President appointed former Assistant Secretary of War Peter H. Watson as the editor, but Watson never served. In effect the act of 1866 stopped all work on the history, leaving some thirty chronologically arranged documentary volumes either completed or in preparation.<sup>2</sup>

Pressure from veterans' organizations persuaded the Secretary of War to request in his annual reports of 1870 and 1873 appropriations for resuming work on Civil War

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records. Congress responded in 1874 by voting \$15,000 to pay publication costs of what were now designated "The Official Records of the War of the Rebellion." Other appropriations followed, including money for overtime work by employees of the Adjutant General's Office. This funding permitted the completion of forty-seven chronological volumes, and the printing in preliminary form of thirty copies of each, by December 1877. In that month the Secretary of War removed the project from the Adjutant General's jurisdiction and placed it in a new organization called "The Publications Office, War Records," directly under his control. Capt. Robert N. Scott, 3d Artillery, was assigned as chief. Scott had been an aide to General Halleck both during and after the Civil War and had shown his scholarly talent in compiling a Digest of the Military Laws of the United States, published in 1872. He would stay with the War Records Office until his untimely death nearly ten years later. As chief, Scott developed a new and truly historical publication plan and personally superintended the completion of eighteen volumes and the near readiness for publication of as many more. A mostly civilian staff of twenty-five to thirty-two members and annual appropriations of about \$80,000 after 1879 made this accomplishment possible.<sup>3</sup>

The volumes compiled and printed before 1878 consisted of separate chronologically arranged series of field reports, letters, telegrams, and so forth. From 1874 onward there was no intention of distributing them. Before the days of the typewriter, it was more accurate and almost as cheap to set type directly from the originals as to copy them by hand. The thirty sets made were actually used as working copies from which the final compilation was produced. This practice continued throughout Scott's term, with printers forming a third of his staff; it was also considered necessary for detecting duplications and gaps in the

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records. Within a general chronological framework, the final compilation was topical. Both Union and Confederate items related to a given topic, such as a battle, were grouped together. The principle of selection and other scholarly practices made the final product a true if not perfect documentary history. A half century later much the same method and practices would be adopted as the only practicable way to prepare World War I records for publication.<sup>4</sup>

It was necessary to apply the principle of selection to the Union records because of their sheer bulk. War records of Washington agencies held by the Adjutant General filled a third of the old War Department building, and records of discontinued commands occupied a four-story warehouse. Items dealing with individuals, except those of high rank, were generally excluded. A policy of including only contemporary records was vigorously defended by Scott against all attempts by officer veterans to submit ex post facto reports of participation. The records were also printed without factual correction in order to present the reader with exact data upon which wartime participants based their actions. Because so many of the Confederate records were missing, the principle of selection was not applied as rigorously to them as to the Union records. Every effort was made to locate and secure copies of Confederate records in private hands. Some were purchased from funds voted by Congress in 1878, but most of the missing records that turned up were obtained through friendly negotiation. Their acquisition was eased by the employment of a number of Confederate officers in records work in Washington, including Brig. Gen. Marcus J. Wright, used by the War Records Office as its liaison man.<sup>5</sup>

The overall plan for the records project developed by Scott was approved by the Secretary of War on 23 August 1880. It called for four series: I, on operations,

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with 111 volumes; II, on prisoners of war, 8 volumes; III, miscellaneous Union records, mostly administrative, 5 volumes; and IV, Confederate records of a similar nature, 3 volumes. The volumes prepared under the new plan and published through the Government Printing Office bore the title The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies. The first ones were ready by late 1880 but were not distributed until July 1881. The 128th and last book of the project, the General Index, appeared twenty years later. Work on a supplementary atlas, sometimes counted as two volumes, began in 1889. This latter task included the preparation of more than 1,000 maps, with 181 plates. It was accomplished during the next six years under the close supervision of Capt. Colvin D. Cowles. The printing was done in New York between 1891 and 1895 by the specialist firm of Julius Bien. Of substantial help in the compilation was the acquisition by the War Department in 1875 of a set of the Brady Civil War photographs. In 1893, at peak strength, a staff of 123 people worked on the project, some indication of the cost in manpower of producing a documentary history. More than 1.6 million volumes, in more than 12,000 complete sets, were printed by 1902. Less than one-sixth of the sets found their way to educational institutions or into state or local libraries. The volumes were sold to the public at considerably less than their actual printing costs (only one being sold for more than ninety cents). The overall cost of the project, including estimated military pay and allowances, was calculated at \$3,158,514.67.6

Scott's successor as chief of the Army records project ran into trouble in 1888 for publishing an apparently doctored troop list. Congress then voted to establish a three-man Board of Publication to take over the work on the remaining volumes. This board had a military president, Maj. George B. Davis until 1895 and Maj. George W.

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Davis, 1895-98, and two civilian members, Leslie J. Perry and Joseph W. Kirkley. Perry, an ex-Union prisoner, worked particularly on the prisoner-of-war series. Kirkley, a civilian clerk with the project under the Adjutant General before 1878, was the only person to stay with it throughout; every volume published in the Official Records reflects his personal examination of the documents and vast knowledge of the war. When Col. Fred C. Ainsworth, the chief of the War Department's Record and Pension Office, also became president of the Board of Publication in the summer of 1898, he immediately cut the board's staff by two-thirds. Six months later he transformed it into the Publication Branch of his office, with Kirkely as chief. The last sixteen volumes appeared under the auspices of this branch in the two years before the project came to an end.<sup>7</sup>

The publication and wide distribution of Civil War military records by the Army was a truly monumental undertaking, although not one that has escaped criticism. In 1916 America's leading military historian called the project "a botched job from beginning to end," particularly because of wasteful distribution. In his judgement until that time only five European and American writers, one of them himself, had made intelligent use of the series. Others have deplored its overwhelming concern with campaigns and battles, to the neglect of the war's logistical aspects, or have expressed the somewhat contrary view that the Official Records failed to include data on a host of minor operations. The inadequate indexing, both overall and for individual volumes, has been evident to every serious user. In assessing such criticisms, one should keep in mind that the Civil War series was not planned as a documentary history for professional historians. The profession was in its infancy during the period of preparation and publication of the volumes. They were intended as reading for the



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veteran and as source material for the narrator of campaigns. Most twentieth century scholars who have made extensive use of the volumes have found them an honest attempt to print everything of consequence within the prescribed scope of the project. Great use of the compilation did not come about until the middle decades of the century following the one in which they were published. Judgements in this period were generally favorable, typified by the observation of the Library of Congress that thanks to this "unprecedented documentary publication . . . it is nearly as easy to study the Civil War in detail in Europe as in America." In the centennial bibliography of the war scholars called the Army Official Records "the major source of Civil War research material and absolutely indispensable to the serious student."<sup>8</sup>

The Army's medical history of the Civil War had its inception in a requirement laid down in May 1862 by the Surgeon General. He first called for more detailed and accurate reporting from the field and for the transmission of specimens to a newly established Army Medical Museum. Soon thereafter he announced that his office "intended to prepare for publication the Medical and Surgical History of the Rebellion." The inspiration for this latter undertaking was the British multivolumed Medical and Surgical History of the Crimean War, published in 1858, the first clinical history of war in any detail. When the Surgeon General established the Army Medical Museum in 1862 as an institution "to collect and preserve specimens illustrating injuries and diseases that cause death and disability during war," the closely associated history was viewed as the vehicle for the general dissemination of information on these matters. The men put in charge of the museum work, Dr. Joseph J. Woodward on its medical side and, from 1864, Dr. George A. Otis on its surgical aspects, became the principal compilers of the history. During and immediately after the war

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they concentrated on collecting specimens and records. Their publication, Report on the Extent and Nature of the Materials Available for the Medical and Surgical History of the Rebellion, printed in November 1865, was widely distributed to encourage the inflow of records and other materials. The following April the Surgeon General directed that all Civil War medical records be turned over to his office for the use of Drs. Woodward and Otis.<sup>9</sup>

With Secretary of War Edwin Stanton's enthusiastic support, on 8 June 1868 Congress approved publication of the medical history. The following spring it appropriated enough funds to permit publication in 1870 of 5,000 copies of the first two of six oversize volumes, each numbering 800 to 1,000 pages. The original plan had contemplated covering hospital operations as well as medical and surgical matters, but the series never got beyond the latter. Each of the series' three parts contained medical and surgical volumes. Part I was published in 1870, Part II in 1876, and Part III in 1883 (Surgical) and 1888 (Medical). The first medical volume was primarily tabular, separately covering "Sickness and Mortality of White Troops" and "Sickness and Mortality of Colored Troops." It also had a 365-page fine-print appendix consisting of 289 chronologically arranged narrative reports of Union field medical officers. The second medical volume featured a single 842-page chapter on the Union Army's greatest health problem, "Diarrhea and Dysentery," that is certainly one of the longest chapters ever written. The volumes of Part III were completed by others after Drs. Otis and Woodward died. Although they and their successors had the help of large staffs, Otis and Woodward were the real "giants" of the project. The Medical and Surgical History of the War of the Rebellion, which despite its name was not as truly historical in character as the Official Records, nevertheless through its elaborate statistics and reports provided a

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wealth of medical and historical data for later generations. Whether it helped greatly in World War I is not so clear, because tremendous medical changes and advances occurred in the half century after the Civil War. 10

During the period of peak activity on the Civil War records, congressional acts of 1892 and 1894 directed the other executive departments to turn over to the War Department all military records in their possession relating to the American Revolution and the War of 1812. In due course, these and the War Department's own records of those wars were to be indexed and prepared for publication. The Secretary of War assigned this task to Ainsworth's Record and Pension Office. That office received a large quantity of records from the Interior and Treasury Departments, but it soon became evident that there were so many gaps in the federal holdings on the Revolution that a search of material in state hands would be essential. After 1894 Ainsworth's office borrowed and made copies of military records held by New Hampshire, Vermont, New York, New Jersey, and Delaware. But duties connected with the Spanish-American War and Philippine Insurrection, together with Ainsworth's own preference for preparing a roster of Union and Confederate officers and men, a project approved by Congress in 1902, sidetracked work on the American Revolution for more than a decade.11

The growth of the historical profession generally after 1900 increased interest in access to pre-Civil War military records. Plans for their eventual publication were expanded in 1907 to include those of the Mexican War. It was in that year also that, through the intervention of President Theodore Roosevelt and Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, historian Justin H. Smith became the first scholar to be given full access to War Department records. This opening enabled him to prepare his classic volumes on The War

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With Mexico. But it was not until five years later, after Ainsworth's resignation, that an order of 26 March 1912 allowed other serious students to do research in Army records. Even then poor working facilities limited the number who could take advantage of the order.<sup>12</sup>

Proposals to publish War of 1812 and Mexican War records died after scholars obtained direct access to them, but such was not the case for Revolutionary War records. It was commonly recognized that the federal government would have to acquire many more materials before publication would be meaningful. Historians gave enthusiastic backing to congressional action in March 1913 that provided \$25,000 to the Army and \$7,000 to the Navy for collecting and publishing the "scattered military records of the Revolutionary War." The Secretary of War assigned responsibility for Army work on it to the Adjutant General's Office and signed letters to state governors urging their cooperation. Little was accomplished until October 1913, when Capt. Hollis C. Clark became a civilian director of the project, with a staff of one under the Adjutant General. In December, after attending the annual meeting of the American Historical Association (AHA) in Charleston, South Carolina, Clark secured the appointment of an association-sponsored advisory committee. Historians Frederic Bancroft, James Franklin Jameson, and Justin H. Smith were among its five members. To complement the work already done in state materials, Clark and his advisers decided to concentrate on the records of Massachusetts, Virginia, and North Carolina. In 1914-15 four historians working in state capitals selected and photographed more than thirty thousand documents, two-thirds of them in Massachusetts, and added these copies to the War Department's Revolutionary War collection. The project came to a halt in the spring of 1915 when the appropriated money was exhausted, leaving the acquisition of

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copies of state records far from finished and the whole collection too incomplete to warrant publication. More than half a century would pass before the records would become more generally available for research through microfilming.<sup>13</sup>

Official Army historical work more sophisticated than editing and publishing military records evolved from the General Staff Act of 14 February 1903. A section of this act specified among general staff duties preparing plans for national defense and for mobilizing military forces in time of war. Army regulations based on this section charged the General Staff Corps, among other duties, with "the preparation of plans of campaigns, of reports of campaigns, battles, engagements, and expeditions, and of technical histories of military operations of the United States."<sup>14</sup> For history, the General Staff Act had its first impact in Leavenworth, Kansas, rather than in the nation's capital, after the Line and General Staff College introduced the teaching and practice of professional historical research methods in its new two-year program. These methods were used particularly in a teaching seminar led by Harvard trained Capt. Arthur L. Conger. Conger was assisted by Professor Fred M. Fling of the University of Nebraska, an enthusiastic but unpaid consultant. As a result, a small but growing group of regular officers developed an interest in and understanding of military history at Leavenworth. One, honor graduate Charles W. Weeks, later became the first chief of the Army's World War I historical office in Washington.<sup>15</sup>

The beginnings of a new historical office stemmed also from the persistent efforts of Assistant Professor Robert Matteson Johnston of Harvard University to stir professional interest in a new approach to military history and to persuade the Army to establish a historical office. Conger later characterized Johnston as "America's first critical military historian." In 1912



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Professor Johnston arranged for a round table discussion at the annual AHA meeting in Boston "on the organization of an historical section on our general staff and of other means of promoting the scientific study of military history." Former President Roosevelt and three Army officers, one of them Conger, were among the participants. As an aftermath, the association established a Standing Committee on Military History, chaired by Johnston. At the next annual meeting, the scope of the committee was broadened to include naval history. Thereafter its members included Fling and Navy historian Charles O. Paullin, Assistant Secretary of War Henry Breckinridge, and Assistant Secretary of the Navy Franklin D. Roosevelt. At the second meeting, in Charleston, Johnston persuaded Roosevelt to deliver an address to "a very crowded and successful" military history session. After the Charleston meeting Johnston went to Washington where, on 1 January 1914, he presented a copy of his report as chairman of the AHA Committee on Military and Naval History to Secretary of War Lindley M. Garrison. On the following day he lectured at the Army War College on "The Function of Military History," attended a conference in Breckinridge's office on the Revolutionary War records project, and discussed the establishment of an Army historical section with Chief of Staff Maj. Gen. Leonard Wood.<sup>16</sup>

Johnston had met General Wood the preceding spring when both he and the Chief of Staff were visiting the War College faculty and students during their annual "historical and staff ride" to Civil War battlefields. These horseback rides, which had become a popular feature of the War College course, occupied its last six or seven weeks, following a month or more of intensive study and preliminary work on a "War College History" of the Civil War. The realization that this project needed constant professional guidance, coupled with his talk with Johns-

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ton, led General Wood in early January 1914 to propose establishing a historical section of the General Staff at the War College. He instructed his subordinates to find the right person to head up this work. When the Secretary of War referred Johnston's AHA Committee report to the Chief of Staff for appropriate consideration, Wood sent it along to the President of the War College, since he thought it might "contain some valuable suggestions in connection with the establishment of the historical section."17

The chief of the War College Division, Col. John Biddle, responding to General Wood's proposal, stated that he had been considering establishing a historical section for some time but had done nothing because there was no qualified general staff officer available to direct it. The best man, Capt. John McAuley Palmer, had returned to troop duty. Leavenworth's Captain Conger was a possibility. As an immediate step Biddle recommended the appointment of a three-man historical committee headed by Maj. Daniel W. Ketcham. With Wood's approval the Army War College formally appointed the members of this committee on 10 January 1914 and specified their mission as "the study and publishing of such military works as is appropriate to come from the General Staff." In late February Captain Conger was brought from Leavenworth for a conference at the War College with historical committee members on problems of historical research. Apparently his principal contribution was to discourage further work on a War College Civil War history until an expert in modern historical methodology became available to direct it.18

As an initial step, the War College Historical Committee asked American military attaches to collect information about official military history work in Europe. Replies indicated thirty or more officers so employed in France, Germany, and Austria-Hungary, with a smaller number in Great Britain. Late in 1914 the president of the

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War College agreed to a joint effort with Professor Johnston to complete his unfinished work on Second Manassas. He also arranged for Johnston to give three lectures in February 1915 on historical research methods and problems to introduce a two-months' study of the Civil War. But more pressing needs arising out of critical relations with Mexico and the outbreak of the European war led to cancellation of the historical rides after 1913 and, from April 1915 onwards, of all other formal historical work within the General Staff and its War College Division until American entry into World War I. Meanwhile, Johnston and Conger helped keep interest in military history alive by coediting a new scholarly journal, the Military Historian and Economist, eleven issues of which appeared in 1916-18. 19

In June 1917 the War College Division reactivated the historical committee to the extent of designating one officer "to record complete data on the participation in the war of all troops in the Federal service, including the National Guard." Two months later the editor of Collier's urged the Secretary of War to employ a historian in the War Department. The General Staff opposed such action, holding that the collection of documents by one officer was all that should be attempted during the war. The staff agreed that after it was over "an official history of the war should be undertaken at once," either by the General Staff alone or by a special commission of general staff officers in collaboration with one or more civilian historians. A few days later the War College Division discontinued even the collection of documents because the task was much beyond the capability of a single officer, and others could not be spared to help him. 20

Overseas, in late September 1917, General John J. Pershing talked with his chief of staff, Maj. Gen. James G. Harbord, about setting up a historical office in the General

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Headquarters of the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF). Harbord suggested getting Professor Johnston to assist in its work. In Harbord's view the principal need was an adequate war diary, a historical narrative "written in careful style by an officer experienced in historical research," that would not only recount events but also "to some degree analyze the motives of the Commander-in-Chief." He proposed that West Point Professor Col. Cornelis W. Willcox head the AEF historical office, with Johnston as an assistant. Willcox was brought to France, and after a two-week study recommended that the principal mission of an AEF historical section should be preparing a war diary, to be supplemented later by a "refined narrative." The section should also gather records, maps, photographs, and so forth. He thought the section should be small, with a military author assigned to the war diary, perhaps with a qualified civilian assistant trained in historical research and able to write with appropriate facility.<sup>21</sup>

The day after Colonel Willcox presented his advice to AEF headquarters, the ubiquitous Professor Johnston wrote to Army Chief of Staff Maj. Gen. Tasker H. Bliss again urging the establishment of a historical office in Washington. Apparently Johnston's prodding was the immediate stimulus for Bliss's recommendation to the Secretary of War on 2 January 1918 that he approve the organization of a general staff historical section that would employ competent civilian as well as military historians. Bliss believed that work on an official history of American participation in the war ought to begin at once, and start with the story of preparations for war. The history he had in mind "would record the things that were well done, for future imitation [and] it would record the errors as shown by experience, for future avoidance." Further, "it would enable the War Department to be prepared at all times

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with a truly historical statement" of just what it had done to date. Secretary of War Newton D. Baker promptly approved the recommendation and directed a study and report on the organization of a historical section.<sup>22</sup>

The required report was embodied in a memorandum of 18 January to the Chief of Staff from Colonel Ketcham, by this time the acting director of the War College Division. It provided the basis for the organization and mission of the Historical Branch, which began its work about six weeks later. Ketcham recommended establishing the new office at the War College, that Colonel Conger be recalled from Europe to head it, and that it have an initial complement of seven general staff and six attached officers, with enough enlisted strength to support them. Qualified retired and limited service officers should be used as much as possible. He opposed using civilian historians because civilians "naturally see only the historical features of the work and will not thoroughly comprehend the limitations imposed by the more immediately important duties connected with the successful prosecution of the war." Besides, civilians were apt to be impatient of restraint and "if balked in their endeavors to secure material . . . their tendency will be to go directly to higher authority for backing." Somewhat similar sentiments would inhibit the employment of civilian historians by the Army for many years to come, except briefly during World War I. The report also recommended a narrower set of functions for the new office than the Chief of Staff had envisioned: collecting and arranging records and maps; operating the War College Library; preparing histories and historical studies; and studying the current military situation with a view to applying lessons learned and preparing reviews of current events. The report clearly visualized an office serving primarily the immediate needs of the General Staff, not one whose principal mission would



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be to write and publish a general history of the war. 23

The decision to establish an Army historical office having been made, on 19 January the War Department informed General Pershing about it and asked for his "recommendation as to organization desired" and whether he had "initiated any similar activity." Pershing answered by recommending a section of five officers and two civilian experts, with suitable enlisted support, which would be sent to his headquarters in France "where the work should be conducted." His response arrived just as the War Department published a general order of 9 February 1918, effective the following 4 March, providing for a reorganization of the General Staff and the inclusion therein of a Historical Branch in a redesignated War Plans Division. Without informing Washington, a week later the American Expeditionary Forces published a general order establishing a Historical Subsection under the Secretary of the General Staff at General Headquarters to collect data for an official history of the war and to keep a war diary. After the War Department decided to establish a historical section in its own General Staff, it notified Pershing that this step was about to be taken, "after which the necessary personnel will be detailed for service at your headquarters." The aftermath of these plans, general orders, and exchanges was the activation in March 1918 of two Army historical offices, one at the War College in Washington and the other in AEF General Headquarters in Chaumont, France.24

## Chapter 2

### WORLD WAR I AND AFTER, 1918-1921

The Army has maintained a central historical office since the assignment, on 5 March 1918, of general staff officer Lt. Col. Charles W. Weeks as chief of the newly established Historical Branch of the War Plans Division. The new branch was physically located with the rest of the division in the Army War College building, the college itself had been suspended for the duration of hostilities. With an initially authorized strength of seven officers, fifteen enlisted men, and five civilians, before the Armistice the branch reached a Washington officer strength of thirty, and by the end of June 1919 a peak strength of forty officers, six field clerks, and thirty-five civilian employees. Colonel Weeks, who remained the chief until August 1919, had entered the Army during the Spanish-American War as a member of the famous University of Nebraska battalion that enlisted as a unit fourteen years before he graduated from Leavenworth. Acting quickly in his new assignment, Weeks recruited Professors Johnston of Harvard and Fling of Nebraska for his staff. Johnston reported for duty early in April, Fling in June. Although commissioned as majors, they and other academic historians similarly recruited were customarily referred to as civilian members of the professional staff. Several of the other qualified professionals were retired or limited service regulars. Among them were the professors of military science and tactics at Princeton and Rutgers who were brought in to head sections in the new office. Another, Maj. John R. M. Taylor, previously retired for disability and then recalled for active limited service, was the author of the basic plan for an official history of the war that the Historical Branch proposed to prepare and publish.<sup>1</sup>

*World War I and After, 1918-1921*

Major Taylor's plan, developed by mid-March 1918, contemplated a general volume surveying all aspects of American participation in World War I and specific volumes or subseries dealing with American diplomatic activities, naval operations, the military action in France, and economic and military mobilization. His aim was to cover everything a general staff officer should know about American participation in the war, not only the Army's role. The plan also included a multivolumed pictorial history of the war. The Historical Branch was organized into sections along these topical lines, with the Pictorial Section being organized first. This section, with a separate Motion Picture Section, had twenty-one people at work by the end of June. The research sections developed more slowly, as men to man them became available. Military Mobilization began in May under Maj. John Bigelow, Diplomatic in June under Professor Fling, Economic Mobilization in early August following recruitment of Professor Frederic L. Paxson of the University of Wisconsin, and Operations in April under Professor Johnston. Actually Johnston did not begin his work until he reached Pershing's headquarters in June. Fling, Paxson, and Johnston were exempted from active military training and physical requirements when they were commissioned as majors. In effect the official history plan defined the major mission of the Historical Branch, for its duties had not been spelled out when it was established. In practice, scholarly work in Washington during and immediately after the war was largely confined to collecting data.<sup>2</sup>

The plan for the "General Staff History of the War of 1917" had received formal approval at least from the War Plans Division by the end of May 1918. The history was to be "an official account of the part taken by the United States in the European War." It would give due consideration to "the activities of the Government and people of the United States behind and in support of our army in

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the field." But it also assumed that the conditions of participation in the war, the mobilization and conduct of industry, and the creation and training of the forces at home were of equal interest to the conduct of field operations. The staff of the Historical Branch realized that to prepare a history of the scope planned would require the cooperation of all elements of the War Department as well as of outside agencies and particularly the Navy and the Department of State. Each of the War Department bureaus was asked to appoint an officer who would collaborate with the branch in the collection of data. Some of the bureaus were already engaging in historical work on their own account, the Medical Department, for example, having organized a section of three officers assigned to gather material for a medical and surgical history of the war. A request to the Navy for its cooperation elicited no direct response, the Navy instead establishing its own historical office in June 1918 just after the request was received. The Army thereupon dropped its plan for a naval volume. Initially the Department of State promised to place all its facilities for historical research at the disposal of the War Department. But eventually it, too, established a historical office which prepared but never published several volumes on the diplomatic history of the war.<sup>3</sup>

The Army's Diplomatic History Section, scheduled to contribute three volumes (of about 250,000 words each, as planned for all the volumes), remained the smallest of the research and writing sections, consisting as it did of Major Fling and one professional assistant. From June 1918 through November they did research at the Department of State, the Library of Congress, and the War Department Library. In early December they departed for Paris with President Woodrow Wilson's huge peace conference party. Although efforts to get them attached formally to the Peace Commission failed, they stayed on in Paris until June 1919, recording

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the proceedings and incidents of the negotiations and gathering a large quantity of documentary material.<sup>4</sup>

Major Bigelow's Military Mobilization Section planned to turn out four volumes covering all aspects of the Army's noncombat activities related to World War I. When it proved too difficult to get adequate data from overseas about service support in France, responsibility for this topic was passed to the Operations Section of Major Johnston. In practice such work in France was undertaken only within the Services of Supply historical organization. After the armistice, plans were broadened to include demobilization. Much of the work in Washington was farmed out so that at its peak in June 1919 the Military Mobilization Section had six officers engaged in writing within the section and a dozen officers and civilians doing professional work on the outside. About 5 percent of the projected writing had been finished when Bigelow was discharged on 5 July 1919.<sup>5</sup>

The Economic Mobilization Section under Major Paxson became the largest of the topical research and writing segments of the Historical Branch. The basic objective of its four projected volumes was "to portray the intimate relationship of the economic forces to military success, and to show how the military progress depended on industrial efficiency." Paxson, then forty-one, was perhaps the best known of the men recruited by the Army's historical office from the academic world during World War I. He brought to his section several historians of later renown, including Solon J. Buck, who was recruited as a captain from the Minnesota State Historical Society, and Charles C. Tansill, who was commissioned a second lieutenant soon after he received his doctorate from Johns Hopkins. With such talent and a professional force averaging fourteen in number during the first half of 1919, Economic Mobilization accumulated a

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very large quantity of documents and data. This material acquired an orderly arrangement from the detailed working outline for volumes developed by March 1919. Earlier the section had prepared and in December 1918 the Historical Branch had published a monograph entitled Economic Mobilization in the United States for the War of 1917, which contained a briefer statement of the projected scope of work on the topic. It also prepared a 350-page Handbook of Economic Agencies in the World War, published in September 1919, which became an invaluable reference tool. The handbook and the files of the section--which with the documentary files of the other topical sections were turned over to the Adjutant General in 1922--were judged in the mid-1920's to be the most valuable relics of the Army's World War I historical effort.6

The numerous other duties that devolved upon and developed within the Historical Branch in addition to its preparations for writing a big narrative history of American participation in the war included the work of the Pictorial Section. By June 1919 this section had a collection of 460,000 photographs, nine-tenths of them from unofficial sources, 342 war posters, and 450 paintings and drawings by the Army's official artists. By the same time the Motion Picture Section had in its holdings 600,000 feet of film relating to the Army and also the films made by the defunct Committee on War Information. The branch began keeping a file of news clippings in June 1918, and a year later three women were still engaged in such work. Aside from strictly administrative matters an Administrative Section handled a growing number of inquiries for historical information and also prepared brief divisional histories. From the outset special historical assignments were given to the Historical Branch, such as one to help prepare an article on war accomplishments for the Literary Digest. Finally, a Records Section gained in importance as historical material flowed into the branch from other

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War Department agencies and from France. Robert S. Thomas joined the branch on 6 January 1919 and became chief of the Records Section. He was to become the senior civilian employee of the World War I historical organization and remain with it until its dissolution three decades later.<sup>7</sup>

In December 1918, Colonel Weeks requested authority to recruit five civilians trained in military history to be paid annual salaries not to exceed \$5,000. Recruiting historians into uniform had been easy during the fighting, much easier than it would be during World War II. But Weeks foresaw the likelihood that most men recruited as officers for the emergency would soon be discharged and that it would be all but impossible to replace them with qualified regular or reserve officers remaining in service. In any event, a nucleus of civilian professionals would provide the best assurance of stability and continuity "in carrying on the General Staff account of this and previous wars." A few days later Major Paxson submitted a more elaborate analysis of the program's status and outlook. He concluded that "if the work is to go on the Historical Branch must acquire a group of professional historians equal in all ways to the men now holding full professorships in great universities." He believed the branch should set a definite goal for completing drafts of the World War I narrative volumes and proposed December 1920 as a target. Paxson also suggested ultimate publication of a documentary series on a scale similar to the Civil War's Official Records.<sup>8</sup>

In France formal Army historical work began at General Pershing's headquarters before the arrival of Professor Johnston. On 19 March 1918 Capt. Joseph M. Hanson reported to AEF General Headquarters at Chaumont to establish a historical office that would record "the nature and repositories of all important documents and communications, not secret, originating in or coming to the staff

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sections and the administrative and technical branches of General Headquarters." Before Hanson arrived, Maj. Frederick L. Palmer, a news correspondent and writer who was an old friend of Pershing and had otherwise won favor at headquarters as the author of its censorship plan, had been assigned to prepare the GHQ war diary. In early April the historical activities under Hanson were transferred to GHQ's Intelligence (G-2) Section, but Palmer and work on the war diary--previously conceived as the principal function of a theater historical office--remained under the Secretary of the General Staff. In late March eight artists commissioned in the Engineers were assigned to Hanson's office, the beginnings of an official war art program. Photographic activities also came within the jurisdiction of this historical subsection before Major Johnston arrived at Chaumont on 8 June to supplant Hanson as chief.<sup>9</sup>

Professor Johnston, who because of age (fifty-one) and dubious physical condition (asthma and a weak heart) obtained a commission and served overseas only after waiving all claims against the Army for what might happen to him in uniform, had reported at Washington for duty on 8 April 1918. Two weeks later and in response to Pershing's February request the War Department informed him that it could send Johnston, two junior officers, and six trained clerks and translators, if he wanted them, to man his historical office, and Pershing responded that he wanted them as soon as possible. It took another month to get Johnston and his group aboard the Leviathan, along with nearly 11,000 other soldiers and a crew of over 2,000. On 30 May as the big ship approached the harbor of Brest a pack of four or five German submarines launched the principal attempt during the war to torpedo the Leviathan, an attack vividly described by historian Johnston in his reports back to Washington.<sup>10</sup>



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Johnston reported from Chaumont that he had found everyone cooperative and friendly except the photographic people who were transferred to the Signal Corps a week after his arrival. Also, the artists were transferred to the Press Section. Hanson became Johnston's assistant. Johnston's nominal chief was his old friend and professional colleague, Col. Arthur L. Conger. But Conger spent most of his time in the field, and in his absence Johnston found it difficult to get his plans approved. He also discovered that he could not see or use confidential documents. The best he could do was to arrange with the Adjutant General to have tabs placed on those of historical significance so that they could be found and used later. Pershing had directed that the historical office prepare short statements on military operations, and two of these were nearing completion on 12 July when Colonel Conger finally returned to headquarters and gave informal approval to the other parts of Johnston's proposed program. These were (1) to establish a true historical journal (that is, a war diary) system at General Headquarters and in its several staff and technical sections, with all of the work to be assigned to officers detailed from the Historical Subsection but with Palmer left in charge of the public relations type of war diary that he was then superintending; (2) to establish similar journals at the headquarters of the Services of Supply and of major field units; (3) to prepare monographs on operations for the general reader based on unclassified material only, similar to a German General Staff series then being produced, and with the first one to be on "Origins of the AEF (June 1917-1918)"; and (4) to investigate the archival and historical systems of the British and French armies. Johnston believed that this program would require a larger staff, backed by a GHQ general order embodying the essentials of the plan and directing support of it.11

Approval for a visit to the British and

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the French armies' historical offices came easily. On 16 July Johnston departed on a three-week journey to London and Paris. While he was away, Captain Hanson made preliminary arrangements through the staff of Stars and Stripes to get the projected monographs published and circulated by a New York firm. The GHQ staff formally approved preparation of the monographs in mid-August, but a week later it disapproved the war diary plan. Nor was any more detailed general order on history forthcoming. More and more it seemed to Johnston that history was an unwanted stepchild at General Headquarters, and one kept under close check by a complete lack of transportation facilities. Possibly this situation developed from the unnatural dual attachment of the AEF historical office. Washington viewed it as the Operations Section of the Historical Branch, War Plans Division; Chaumont viewed it as the Historical Subsection of G-2, General Headquarters. It also seemed evident to Johnston that there was disinterest at General Headquarters in serious and critical historical study.<sup>12</sup>

Somewhat in desperation, on 2 October Johnston bypassed his immediate superiors and addressed his troubles directly to GHQ's chief of staff. The next day the chief directed compliance with the February general order that put history under the Secretary of the General Staff and defined its mission as collecting data for an official history of the war and keeping a war diary. But no one bothered to tell Johnston about the new directive. Two weeks later he again addressed the chief of staff urging the very step that had already been ordered. It was not for another month and until after the armistice that the reassignment of the history office and the realignment of its functions was completed. The change then included approval of a new strength of nine officers and twelve field clerks and enlisted men for the office. Presumably it was no coincidence that almost all of the officers serving with Johnston

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after mid-October were men with Harvard connections. Among them was 1st Lt. Dexter Perkins, whom Johnston understandably described as "my best historian." Another lieutenant, whom Johnston asked for by name, turned out to be the same individual who, under a slightly different name, had been sent back from France eight months earlier and discharged for inefficiency. When this was discovered, he was promptly returned once more to his native land. One result of the November 1918 changes was to bring the GHQ war diary into the main historical orbit. Palmer was assigned to other duties, but the transfer did not occur until the fighting was nearly over. Perhaps the most important result was the establishment within what was now termed the Historical Section of orderly archives to which all AEF offices and units were directed to turn in documents of historical value.<sup>13</sup>

Major Johnston's problems at General Headquarters were not resolved by the reassignment of his office, as the fate of its monographic program illustrates. In mid-August when work was beginning four were planned: the one on the formation of the American Expeditionary Forces, already mentioned; "The Second Division at Chateau Thierry," an undertaking of Colonel Conger; "The July Counter-offensive"; and "The Army Schools." But while writing was authorized, there was no approved plan for publication. The writing was further hampered by the inability of the authors to travel to the front. Another work, requested by Colonel Conger and entitled in its published form A Survey of German Tactics, 1918, was completed in October, printed by the American Expeditionary Forces in France in November, and again in Washington in December 1918 as the Historical Branch's Monograph No. 1. Getting approval for the publication of works on American operations proved much more difficult. On Major Johnston's formal request of 22 October for such approval, General Pershing personally noted: "Am doubtful,

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very, of the wisdom of this at this time. Think this should be very carefully considered. I want to know more about it." A week later the staff spelled out the general's wishes in these terms:

The Commander-in-Chief has given some very explicit instructions as to what he desires in the way of historical literature to be compiled by your Section . . . as follows:

That you prepare brief articles on the subjects which you enumerate in your recent memorandum, not too lengthy, and suitable for reproduction not only as monographs but also as newspaper articles.

It is to be understood that G-3, G-5, and G-2 will all assist in outlining the frame for these studies, G-3 being primarily responsible for the tactical correctness.

The C-in-C desires to see each one of these studies in the rough draft before any work on any of them is put into print. He is also anxious to have them pushed to completion as rapidly as possible.<sup>14</sup>

Two staff sections, one of them G-2, disapproved of the monographic program altogether. Nevertheless after a talk with General Pershing the chief of G-2 told Major Johnston that the general wanted the monographic work continued. What he wanted most was short statements on the Argonne operations that could be used to brief negotiators of a now prospective armistice. Preparing these statements separately and quickly allowed Major Johnston to go ahead with the monographs. When a draft of Conger's "The Second Division at Chateau Thierry" was circulated for comment later in November, several staff sections proposed changes. Johnston agreed to revise the draft "in general accord" with the comments and criticisms received but he insisted that the Historical Section as the highest professional authority must reserve the right of deciding what changes were necessary. Some-

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what later, General Pershing emphasized that anything written on American operations in his headquarters for public consumption must receive his personal "full review and approval" before publication. He added: "I think that it is a little bit dangerous anyway to write these things up at this time from a General Staff point of view, that is to say, that it is too early yet to begin to publish anything that might be considered as a well digested, thorough analysis of the military principles and tactics involved."<sup>15</sup>

Johnston expressed his discouragement with the situation in a December letter to Colonel Weeks, written before he could have known of Pershing's latest comment:

It is difficult to convey the dead-weight that the Section is always up against. This deadweight is the complete absence of understanding on the part of almost everybody that the work we are trying to do has a scientific basis. We are always viewed, automatically, as a sort of halting adjunct of propaganda. When, at infrequent intervals, it occurs to someone that we may be useful for something, that usefulness is inevitably for propaganda purposes.<sup>16</sup>

In January 1919 when one staff section kept insisting on a change in the Chateau Thierry monograph that Johnston could not accept, the monograph was withdrawn from circulation. Work on other monographs continued, but, as Colonel Weeks pointed out, the time probably had now come to turn from monographic work to preparation of the five volumes of operational history planned for the Army series. Weeks doubted that the volumes could be written in Europe, as Johnston had planned. "History must tell the truth," he wrote, "and it is obvious that the officers with whom you are dealing at GHQ consider history as a report of their conduct of the campaign . . . . A report is a piece of special pleading."<sup>17</sup>

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Meanwhile Johnston decided that the definitive volumes could not be written at General Headquarters unless several regular officers were assigned to the work with a qualified senior officer to lead them. He recommended that his friend Colonel Conger be made chief of the Historical Section as soon as possible. It was agreed to appoint Conger as chief, but the availability before the end of January of another qualified officer who ranked him, Brig. Gen. Oliver L. Spaulding, Jr., led to the latter's selection as Johnston's successor.<sup>18</sup>

Army historical activity began independently elsewhere in France in the spring of 1918 at the Services of Supply (SOS) headquarters in Tours. Before Johnston's arrival at Chaumont, the staff there had ordered an end to this activity and the concentration of all historical work at General Headquarters. But later, after General Harbord became the SOS commander, he detailed his G-4, Col. John W. Wright, to organize a historical program. Wright, whom Harbord's predecessor described as "one of my very best men," had directives issued to all the subordinate elements of Services of Supply thereby initiating widespread historical activity. At the end of 1918 Johnston sent one of his junior officers to Tours to find out what was going on. He reported that a general narrative history was in progress at SOS headquarters, with three chapters already in draft. Elsewhere historical officers had been appointed "in all departments, special services, base, intermediate, and advance sections, ports, depots, and even smaller organizations." These organizations were preparing historical reports on their activities in accordance with a general outline drafted by Colonel Wright. One of the most elaborate of these reports, that of the Chief Engineer, became a government publication in 1919. Major Johnston planned to recommend GHQ supervision of SOS historical activity but withheld action pending the anticipated appointment of Colonel Conger as his successor.<sup>19</sup>

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General Spaulding took over as the new chief of the GHQ Historical Section on 4 February 1919. He would be the dominant figure in Army historical work for a quarter century thereafter and become a widely known and respected leader in the field of military history. The new chief was a forty-two-year-old graduate of the University of Michigan. He had joined the Army during the Spanish-American War and had risen to temporary general officer rank and command of an artillery brigade in France. Between wars he had been an honor graduate of the Artillery School in 1903 and subsequently graduated from the Staff College in 1905 and the Army War College in 1911. After the armistice, with the availability of a large number of qualified officers for at least temporary assignment, Spaulding soon headed a historical office much larger than it had been under Johnston. Shortly before its dissolution it reached a strength of twenty-four officers and sixteen field clerks, the total of forty being about half the peak strength of the Washington office. Major Johnston, soon outranked by several officers other than the chief, remained with the historical office, although he was hospitalized during April and granted extended convalescent leave to recuperate on the Riviera.<sup>20</sup>

Spaulding believed that the principal duties of the historical office should be collecting historical documents and conducting field surveys to improve the documentation of operations. Although AEF orders of the preceding fall had directed transmission of historical documents to the section, many of them were still being sent back to the States through normal AG channels. After friendly and close coordination with the Historical Branch in Washington, and with the concurrence of the Adjutant General, in March the War Department issued a directive to Pershing's headquarters requiring that all AEF historical documents be sent to the GHQ Historical Section for its immediate use and for eventual transmission to the

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Historical Branch in Washington for use in completing the projected Army history of the war.<sup>21</sup>

To supplement existing records of operations, Spaulding thought it essential to make a survey of the ground at the earliest possible moment. In terms of French weather this meant by early April, and until then the officers selected to make the surveys engaged in intensive study of the available records pertaining to the areas they would visit. The chief thought that four months of field work would be required, but after it got under way he decided the task could be completed in half that time. The evidence gathered was put into the form of maps, sketches, photographs, and written field notes. In due course this material became part of the reference collection of the Washington office, although by 1930 almost all of the field notes had disappeared.<sup>22</sup>

Work on monographs also continued under Spaulding. A plan evolved to publish seven of them--the four original ones plus studies of St. Mihiel, the Meuse-Argonne offensive, and the occupation of the Moselle Valley--to be included in a volume to be entitled "Operations of the A.E.F." In mid-March the Chateau Thierry monograph was again submitted for staff comment with a note that arrangements had been made with a Parisian publisher to print it. Word promptly came back that "the Commander-in-Chief has definitely decided that monographs of this nature shall not be published in any commercial manner," although he might approve a small edition for official circulation. Several weeks later Pershing was still holding the draft for further study. What happened to the monographs thereafter remains a mystery.<sup>23</sup>

Orders of 20 May 1919 led to a quick closeout of the Historical section as well as of other elements of AEF headquarters. The Section completed its work as best it could before 2 June, releasing half of its people



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from duty before then. Spaulding, Johnston, and about eight other officers were ordered to report to the Historical Branch in Washington as soon as possible, carrying with them the field data compiled during the spring. Four junior officers would remain behind to handle the flow of AEF historical documents. Henceforth all historical work on AEF operations was to become the responsibility of the Washington office.<sup>24</sup>

Several months earlier in Washington the author of the plan for The War of 1917 series, Colonel Taylor, had taken a step that helped to precipitate decisions on the future course of Army historical work. Taylor sent a brief article describing his plan and the reasons for its broad approach to J. Franklin Jameson, editor of The American Historical Review. Jameson told Secretary of War Newton D. Baker about the article and sent him a copy. In late February 1919 the secretary let it be known through Chief of Staff General Peyton C. March that he thought the history outlined by Taylor went "far beyond what should be expected of the Military Establishment in such an undertaking." In particular, Baker felt that the Army should not attempt to write in any detail about the diplomacy of the war and the events preceding American entry. He thought the story of economic mobilization ought to be told by those who had directed it rather than by the War Department. General March added that a series of seventeen volumes of 250,000 words each seemed to him "beyond the scope of what is desirable," and he thought an operational history similar to those published by European nations during the preceding half century would be more appropriate. But he was willing to consider additional arguments for the broader approach. In response, the Director of War Plans signed a letter drafted by Colonel Weeks which disavowed the official character of Colonel Taylor's article but defended an almost identical plan for an official history of the war. The letter pointed out, among other arguments, that the

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previous official military histories of European countries, whatever their titles, had actually devoted a substantial amount of space to diplomatic and economic matters. The Historical Branch was then working on a detailed plan for the series, which would be refined into final form by early May. Acting through the War Plans Division, Weeks urged the Chief of Staff to consider this plan "in the light of a guide for the gathering and assimilation of data [rather] than as the final form in which the history will be officially published . . . [and] that the assumption be made that the field of inquiry must be far wider than the finished work."<sup>25</sup>

By the spring of 1919 it appeared likely that the Historical Branch would soon be short of qualified people to complete the projected history. The commissions of officers appointed during the emergency would soon expire, and the number of regulars was certain to be reduced. The branch therefore asked for an appropriation of \$50,000 to hire civilian historians. On 20 May this request was denied. Nine days later Major Paxson became the first of the uniformed "civilian" historians to accept discharge. Major Johnston decided to do the same as soon as he returned from France, although he stayed in uniform until the end of July. Fling remained until September, although it became clear before the end of July that no diplomatic history such as he had hoped to write would be written within the Army.<sup>26</sup>

In late June 1919 a new War Plans chief had an unrecorded discussion on historical matters with Chief of Staff March. He agreed with the position taken by March and Secretary Baker the preceding February, that the Army's official history of the war should be restricted to activities under military control. Spaulding, selected in July to become the chief of the Historical Branch, had held the same opinion since reviewing a copy of The War of 1917 plan while in France. He also believed the history should be writ-

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ten by a small group of officer historians with "some experience in the particular lines they are going to study." On 29 July the War Plans chief appointed Spaulding, Conger, Johnston, and Fling to be a committee to determine the future of Army historical work. Spaulding was now a lieutenant colonel, having been reduced like all of his brother officers to permanent rank. Weeks, also now a lieutenant colonel but junior to Spaulding, sat with the committee and concurred in its findings. The committee met the day it was appointed and unanimously recommended.

1. That the Historical Branch become a permanent institution responsible for dealing with all the wars of the United States.

2. That the plan for the World War I history be retained, "subject to modification."

3. That the World War I history plan be used as a guide for collecting data, and that, for the time being, writing be restricted to monographs on selected aspects of military mobilization and operations from which, in due course, complete volumes would be constructed.

4. That the branch be reorganized along lines proposed by Colonel Spaulding, except that some civilian experts might be added to the staff.

5. That the branch chief maintain close relations with the American Historical Association.<sup>27</sup>

The committee's report was forwarded with concurrences to Secretary of War Baker. Because of the long-term impact of his response of 4 August 1919 it is quoted in full:

I have read the attached papers.

The work of the Historical Section should in my judgment be limited to the collection, indexing, and preservation of records and the preparation of such monographs as are purely military in character and are designated to be of use to the War Department. The War Department ought not to undertake the preparation, either by way of monograph or connected discourse,

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of a narrative history of the war. Such a history would be incomplete unless it undertook to discuss economic, political, and diplomatic questions; and the discussion of such questions by military men would necessarily be controversial, and many of the questions appropriate to be discussed in a narrative history would be impolitic and indiscreet for treatment by the War Department.

In a general way, it may be said that the writing of history is the interpretation of facts in accordance with a philosophy. Each historian has his own philosophy and his own method, and an official historian would be but one of many historians and yet his philosophy and method would be stamped with approval while the deductions perhaps equally sound, of other scholars from the same facts would not be so approved. As a branch of the Government, the duty of the War Department is merely to present facts that is, present records and to make them available to historical writers generally so that each historian who so desires may put his own interpretation upon the facts, unembarrassed by the existence of an official interpretation.<sup>28</sup>

Technically, Baker's action merely approved the recommendations made by senior historical representatives. But by its obiter dicta, it would tend to restrain the writing of official history within the Army for many years to come.

The day after Secretary Baker wrote the above letter, Colonel Spaulding succeeded Colonel Weeks as chief of the Historical Branch, with Weeks remaining as a senior assistant. Among those joining the branch and temporarily outranking the chief, was SOS historian Col. John W. Wright. Ten days after the change of command the historical office moved from the War College building to the third floor of the Quartermaster building (20-A) at Washington Barracks (now Fort McNair). The move was made necessary by the

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plans to reopen the Army War College (designated General Staff College, 1919-21). This move provided enough space for the anticipated flow of records from France as well as for the existing collection; but it separated the historical office from its parent organization, the rest of the War Plans Division moving to the Munitions Building. After the move Spaulding directed a reorganization of the branch along lines he had recommended in July. The topical sections were consolidated into a single research and writing group over which he acted as the immediate director. The section files were turned over to a combined records shop. Spaulding's ultimate goals at this time were to put the mass of historical records being accumulated into either a War Department or a national historical collection, and to attach the writing group to the War College where it might in due course become a department of history.29

For a new general staff handbook, Spaulding defined the functions of the Historical Branch as follows:

to preserve historical documents relating to the wars of the United States; to make these documents and the information therein contained, accessible to agencies of the War Department, and to students and investigators when properly accredited; and to prepare monographs on matters of military history of interest to agencies of the War Department.

By November 1919 the branch's officer strength had dropped from forty to fifteen, with five more due for discharge before the end of the fiscal year. The number of civil servants had fallen from thirty-five to eighteen. Eleven of those remaining were people detailed from other agencies which wanted either bodies or spaces returned. To one observer, it appeared that the Historical Branch was rapidly becoming an Army stepchild that few people cared about. A full colonel

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again by 14 November, Spaulding described his branch to the Army public in a more optimistic light. He called it a well established organization whose products should become of increasing value in military education, and again suggested that its most natural home would be the War College.<sup>30</sup>

By December 1919 the Army's Historical Branch had developed a new publication program consistent with the guidelines put forth in August. It proposed publishing in limited editions and as soon as possible compilations of field orders, operations reports, and so forth of larger units. These publications were to be the same in character as the preliminary compilations of Civil War documents. When the series was reasonably complete, the objective was to "arrange the material by subjects rather than by units, somewhat as was done with the Rebellion Records, publication of which was not commenced until 1880, fifteen years after the end of the war." It would also be fifteen years after the end of World War I before the historical office would take a similar step in preparing its documents for final publication. In March 1920 the Secretary of War formally approved the plan for the initial publishing of World War I documents. Of the many hundreds of preliminary documentary compilations planned, 350 on operations alone, thirteen were actually compiled and two were published. Monographs on combat and supply operations overseas and military activities in the United States constituted the second part of the publication program. Fourteen monographs were worked on during the next year and a half, and, of the eight completed by the summer of 1921, five were published. The branch proposed also to compile and publish a division order of battle. A severe paper shortage impeded the publication of both documents and monographs until the autumn of 1920. Thereafter a lack of publication funds led the congressional Joint Committee on Printing in June 1922 to decide against printing more World War I Army

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documents until all were ready for publication, a decision that helped prevent the publication of any more of them until 1948. Work on monographs continued, but none were published for several years after 1922.<sup>31</sup>

In addition to its work on publications the Historical Branch became increasingly involved in a miscellany of other activities related to history and to its historical knowledge, including assistance during the winter of 1919-20 in preparation of the annual reports of the Secretary of War, Chief of Staff, and Director of Operations. It answered hundreds of requests for information, including a growing number concerning Army units and their battle participation. Almost in self-defense the branch compiled brief histories of divisions, regiments, and coast defenses and became more and more involved in the determination of unit history and honors for World War I and previous conflicts. On occasion the War Department temporarily attached collateral activities to the branch. An early instance occurred between November 1919 and May 1921 with the attachment of the American Section of the international Military Board of Allied Supply. The work involved completion of and some translation for a "Comparative Study of the Supply System of the Allied Nations," and also, at the request of the War College, a study of the German supply system.<sup>32</sup>

A new type of documentary support for the Historical Branch began after the appointment in November 1919 of Maj. Henry duR. Phelan as its representative in Paris. Phelan became a liaison officer between the American and the French armies' historical offices; he also copied material from the French archives relating to American operations in France. A civilian assistant was employed to help him in an activity that continued until 1940. Similar representation in London and Berlin was established in 1922. The former lasted only two years, but the latter endured until 1938. In another move to improve documen-

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tation of the war, and especially of military operations in France, the branch sponsored formal War Department letters that went out in December 1919 to 153 active and retired officers. The list was headed by Lieutenant Generals Hunter Liggett and Robert Bullard. The letters requested answers to a number of questions, and any papers of historical value. Responses came from most of the officers addressed, some of them lengthy, but there is no clear evidence that they were ever properly digested and used.<sup>33</sup>

In August 1919 War Department orders were renewed requiring the transfer of all Army World War I historical documents, when no longer needed for current operations, to the Historical Branch instead of the Adjutant General's office. But in December an effort to acquire the records of Army operations in Mexico in 1914-17 backfired. While the War Plans Division continued to support the branch's claim to be the proper depository of World War I historical records, the Adjutant General objected to recognizing it as an office of record or allowing it any more than temporary custody of any historical documents. The Chief of Staff's office ruled that the branch should confine its work to World War I and should not become an office of record and that the ultimate status of the historical office in relation to record keeping would be determined in the reorganization of the War Department then under way. During the latter part of the 1920 fiscal year, the flow of historical documents into the branch almost ceased. Even so, the branch continued anticipating that eventually it would acquire custody of all AEF GHQ records, including the large collection of historical documents amassed in France by the Historical Section. The "World War I only" restraint did not apply to unit history work, nor did it prevent the branch during fiscal year 1921 from acquiring the records of the defunct Board of Ordnance and Fortification that were most helpful in that work.<sup>34</sup>



*World War I and After, 1918-1921*

Until 1920 the Historical Branch had no responsibility for supervising the historical activities of other agencies of the War Department, although after the armistice its chief did chair three conferences with representatives from other Army staff historical organizations, conferences also attended by Navy and Marine Corps representatives. These conferences, suggested by the historian of the Army's Office of the Chief of Engineers, were considered by the participants to be of considerable value for exchanging ideas and information. But they did not develop any systematic relationship between the Army's new central historical office and those that had sprung up in a number of the War Department's bureaus. As Colonel Weeks remarked at the first of these meetings on 15 November 1918, "it was not considered a function of his branch to exercise any control over the work of the individual historians" located elsewhere in the War Department. Through normal liaison the branch did expect "to get assistance from them and give them assistance in return."<sup>35</sup>

After looking into the matter, in February 1920 Assistant Secretary of War Benedict Crowell and the Chief of Staff decided that the Historical Branch should supervise all War Department historical offices and insofar as possible fit their work into a common pattern. A survey by Colonel Weeks in February of Army historical activities outside of the branch produced the following picture: Among the traditional arms only the Field Artillery was collecting historical material, particularly on operations in France, with two officers and a clerk so employed, but with no plan for publication. In the new arms and support elements there was or had been significant historical activity, much of it a carry over from France, in the Air Service, Chemical Warfare Service, Medical Department, Ordnance Department, Signal Corps, Construction Division, Quartermaster Corps, and Transportation Corps. The historical officer of the last

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named, 1st Lt. George J. B. Fisher, would become coauthor of one of the Army's official history volumes on the next great war. Altogether at least thirty-five people were employed in historical activity, but most were archival assistants rather than writers. Among these various efforts, that of the Medical Department would be by far the most productive in terms of publication.<sup>36</sup>

The Surgeon General's office took the first step toward producing an Army medical history of World War I in August 1917. It established a three-man Historical Board to encourage preserving the information that would be needed. During field visits at home and abroad members of the board sought to stimulate interest in the future history and improve the records being accumulated for it. From the outset the Medical Department planned to have the actual participants who did or directed medical work during the war also do the basic writing for the history. An Editorial Board was established in January 1919 to oversee the work of preparing authors' drafts for publication. It was done within the Surgeon General's office by officers assigned full-time to the Historical Board. Their task was facilitated by making the board--redesignated the Historical Division in December 1919--the recipient and custodian of all retired medical records of historical value. The plan for the history that evolved after the armistice contemplated fifteen volumes covering a much wider range of topics than the similar Civil War medical history. Their scope would reflect the revolutionary changes in medical knowledge and practice of the preceding half century, and include more thorough coverage of administration. Various elements of the Surgeon General's Office were to contribute individual chapters in the latter area. The history was designed to help the medical profession at large as well as the Army, for the war "afforded an experience in professional lines of unexcelled professional importance and extent."<sup>37</sup>

*World War I and After, 1918-1921*

By early 1920 work toward producing a medical history was well advanced. The Historical Division, which then had a staff of eight, estimated that if publication money were forthcoming five volumes could be ready for the printer by mid-summer and the rest before late 1921. Congressional appropriations of \$50,000 each for fiscal years 1921 and 1922 permitted printing to get under way. The first book appeared in 1921, but the last one in the series would not be published until eight years later, partly because it was so difficult for the many author-participants who had returned to private practice across the nation to complete their writing assignments in a satisfactory manner. The huge quantity of material frustrated hopes to publish the history in normal medical book size. The finished product consisted of fifteen volumes in seventeen oversize books and differed considerably in arrangement and coverage from the original plan. Nevertheless the Medical Department series, more truly historical in character than the earlier Civil War history, was by a wide margin the Army's most successful undertaking in narrative history on World War I.

A formal War Department directive of 5 April 1920 put the preparation of historical works intended for publication by the Medical Department as well as all similar activity in Army headquarters under the supervision of the Historical Branch. Each agency that undertook histories for publication was to appoint an historical officer to work with the branch. Histories dealing with the activities of a single service would be prepared by that service with help as necessary from the Historical Branch. Those dealing with the activities of two or more services would be the responsibility of the central historical office, with assistance from other agencies as required. War Department historical writing for publication was to be neither too technical nor too popular. The goal was histories "that the thoughtful military man or an educated, interested civilian could follow." All such histories were to be care-

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fully documented, and all were to be submitted to the Historical Branch for its comment and approval before publication. The pattern thus prescribed has remained essentially the same for Army historical work ever since.<sup>38</sup>

Before the end of fiscal year 1920 the Historical Branch had reviewed two service histories, "Railway Artillery," and "Construction for War." Neither one was subsequently published. It regularly reviewed the volumes of the Medical history before they went to the printer. During the 1919-1920 year the branch also reviewed four unofficial histories dealing with the late war, including one by AEF historian Robert M. Johnston entitled "12 Months at GHQ." This work, also never published, should make interesting reading if it could be found. Its author, the dean of modern American military historians, lived only four months after resuming his professorship at Harvard in September 1919.<sup>39</sup>

In his 1920 annual report the Chief of Staff presented an optimistic view of the historical effort at Army headquarters, whereas in fact, except in the Medical Department, a rapid decline in the number of officers assigned to such work brought all but the most routine activities to a virtual standstill during General March's last year. Officer strength in the Historical Branch dropped from sixteen to six between June and October 1920. In August, the Historical Branch moved from Washington Barracks to Federal Building E, at 6th Street and Adams Drive, Southwest, where the Adjutant General maintained the bulk of the World War I historical records under his control. This move naturally facilitated handling the 327 spot studies and problems that came to the branch for action, as well as its unit history work, during the 1920-21 fiscal year. But such duties all but stopped the preparation of documents and monographs for publication. While the War Plans Division continued to desire that a historical office

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be "kept open," in October it had Colonel Spaulding submit a study of what his office could accomplish if it kept only the two general staff positions then authorized. Seven months later that prospect loomed as a reality. General March denied an increase in strength recommended by his staff divisions with a ruling that historical work "must be cared for in the future by the authorized G.S."<sup>40</sup> When General Pershing became the Army Chief of Staff on 1 July 1921, official historical activity in the Army--again, except in the Medical Department--was casting no more than a pale shadow of the organization and work that had been generated during and immediately after World War I.

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### BETWEEN WORLD WARS, 1921-1942

Soon after Pershing became Chief of Staff he reorganized the War Department General Staff along lines proposed by a board headed by his AEF Chief of Staff, General Harbord. In accordance with recommendation of that board, on 1 September 1921 the Army's Historical Branch was transferred to the Army War College and redesignated the Historical Section, a transfer Colonel Spaulding had suggested two years earlier. Apparently he still had hopes of forming a close attachment to the War College, but in practice this development never occurred. The historical office remained physically separate from and subject to somewhat fitful direction by a nominal parent. For the next quarter century the Historical Section, like its parent, was technically a "field" agency, but the General Orders directing the transfer and later interpretations of them made clear that the functions of the office remained unchanged, except that it would have to perform such additional duties as the Commandant of the War College might direct. For the most part Spaulding's shop continued to be treated as the central historical office of the War Department, particularly of its General Staff.<sup>1</sup>

With a work force in the fall of 1921 of three officers and nine civilian clerks, the productive capacity of the section was reduced almost to zero. It retained responsibility for "the preservation of certain historical archives, and their arrangement and administration to facilitate use," but Spaulding hoped to see them go into a new national archives. The section continued to be responsible for supervising historical work in other War Department agencies; but there was very little such work outside the Surgeon General's office after the summer of 1921. In the central office preparation of monographs and collections of

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documents for publication had come to a virtual standstill. Answering questions on Army history and servicing the archives took up most of the time of both its officers and civilians. In November a review of this situation and a comparison with the British, French, German, and Canadian official military history organizations showed that even the last named had a considerably larger professional staff. The review helped to persuade the Commandant of the War College to recommend a strength of twelve officers for U.S. Army historical work, three of them for duty abroad. This strength was to be attained during the calendar year 1922 and was to include several men who would be graduated from the War College and from Leavenworth the following spring.<sup>2</sup>

On the last day of January 1922, General Pershing approved the recommended increase in officer strength and, with one exception, functions for the historical office that had been recommended to him "in order of importance" by his G-3, as follows:

- a. The collection and preservation of historical archives, and their arrangement and administration to facilitate use.
- b. The preparation of monographs upon mobilization, supply, and operations, etc., during the World War, in order that the experience of that war may be properly studied. . . .
- c. The editing and preparing for eventual publication of the important records of the World War.
- d. The supervision of all historical work undertaken by any agency of the War Department.
- e. The reply to questions dealing with military history arising in or reaching the War Department.

The exception concerned the maintenance of archives by the Historical Section, and the transfer to these archives of the AEF GHQ records. On this matter Pershing withheld

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approval pending further study. A later request to transfer only the records accumulated by AEF's Historical Section precipitated a War Department decision in July 1922 that the Adjutant General's Office should henceforth be the custodian of all Army historical records, including those held by the Washington Historical Section which then filled 267 filing cases. In practice the transfer of records to the Adjutant General made little difference in their accessibility, since for most of the time until late 1941 the Historical Section was in the same building as the branch of the Adjutant General's Office that stored and administered World War I records. In a separate action, on 9 December 1921, the Historical Section was formally named the repository for all Signal Corps and other photographic items pertaining to the history of the Army, a function it kept until these items were turned over to the National Archives in September 1941.3

The increase in officer strength to twelve came in the nick of time. In February 1922 the Historical Section was down to an all-time low of two officers fit for duty; and it would not have more than four in Washington until the next fiscal year. Efforts to obtain more enlisted men and civilians for the Washington office were unsuccessful, but Pershing's action did provide for hiring local clerical assistants for each of the three officers to be stationed abroad. From a scholarly point of view, the most distinguished of the recruits for the Historical Section was Lt. Col. John W. Wright. On 1 July 1922 Wright rejoined the history office after a year of duty elsewhere. A graduate of the College of William and Mary and the George Washington University, Wright in due course would join Colonel Spaulding as a co-author of two volumes and collaborate with him in many other respects during the next quarter century. The addition of Wright and the other new officers in the latter part of 1922



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enabled the Historical Section to resume its work on monographs and other scholarly products.<sup>4</sup>

The initial expansion of the historical staff in 1922 was a result of the Chief of Staff's approval of the program for gathering copies of documents in Paris, London, and Berlin to complement American records of U.S. Army operations in France. The officers so employed were members of the Historical Section, although they worked in close association with the military attaches. Their task was to select and verify documents; clerical assistants did the actual copying. The most notable among them was Col. Walter Krueger, of later World War II fame. Krueger opened the historical effort in Berlin, an especially notable one undertaken with the wholehearted cooperation of the German government. In a typical year (1935-36), the Historical Section received from Germany 200 documents totaling 2,632 pages and 156 map tracings. By the time the program ended the United States had acquired copies of almost all the worthwhile records of German units of high and low degree that operated against American troops. The United States had promised to reciprocate, but it never had to do so to any significant extent because the German official history had not gotten beyond 1917 when Historical Section representation in Berlin ended in 1938.<sup>5</sup>

In the early months of 1922 the Historical Section began to acquire greater authority in the field of unit history. Since Civil War days the War Department had periodically required Army units to maintain an historical record of their activities. For example, General Orders No. 1 of 4 January 1905 specified that "in every staff corps and department, regiment, battalion not forming part of a regiment, and independent troop, battery, or company, will be kept a detailed history of the services of the organization." After World War I, as interest in the general history, lineages, rightful honors, and

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battle participation credits of units grew, the Army's new historical office became increasingly involved in answering questions on such matters. In 1919 it compiled a list of campaigns and battles of American wars, which it periodically revised thereafter, to help in the determination of battle credits. The section also prepared brief histories of the major units involved in World War I. From 1919 onward War Department agencies routinely turned to the historical office for authoritative answers to questions concerning unit history, except for World War I matters. These became, for two years, the specific province of a Battle Participation Board established in February 1922 with Colonel Spaulding as one of its three members. When this Board was dissolved in 1924 the Historical Section inherited its function of determining World War I battle credits. The section's authority as an arbiter of unit history matters generally was never seriously challenged thereafter.<sup>6</sup>

Some units received more direct assistance in their historical work. Working space was provided for their historians within or near the Historical Section as well as expert guidance from it. Active duty officers and enlisted men were sometimes detailed to participate in the work. The most notable instances were the 1st and 2d Division historical projects that began about 1925 and continued for nearly a decade, with two officers and eight enlisted men assigned to each of them in 1931. Division associations paid publication costs. The 2d Division project resulted in ten mimeographed volumes of records and maps, nine mimeographed volumes of pertinent enemy records, and a hard-backed narrative history of the division written by Cols. Oliver L. Spaulding, Jr., and John W. Wright.<sup>7</sup>

Responsibility of the Historical Section for organizational history was further enhanced in the spring of 1922. General Pershing directed that henceforth War

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Department agencies were to obtain the views or the concurrence of the Historical Section before initiating or deciding matters relating to the following:

(a) All phases of battle participation of organizations including award of battle streamers.

(b) Disposition of flags, colors, and standards of World War organizations.

(c) All cases involving military accomplishments of organizations.

(d) Carrying out the National Defense Act in perpetuating World War organizations through organizations of the National Guard and Organized Reserves.

(e) All matters involving consolidation, revival, or creation of organizations.

Some three months later, Colonel Spaulding learned that G-3 was undertaking a regimental history study without consulting his office. Assurance was soon obtained that the G-3 shop would consult with the Historical Section before taking any final action.<sup>8</sup>

From the time he became chief of the historical office in 1919, Colonel Spaulding maintained as close ties as he could with the American Historical Association and with civilian historians interested in military history. In 1919 the association resumed military history sessions at its annual meetings, and Spaulding presided at one such meeting. He also became a member of the Association's committee on Military History and Public Archives. Unable to attend the December 1921 meeting of the association at St. Louis, Spaulding asked Col. Conrad H. Lanza, then on the Leavenworth staff, to attend as a representative of the Historical Section. Lanza reported a growing interest in military history among those attending. Several civilian historians, he said, thought the Historical Section ought to pass judgment on civilian works on military history as they appeared, and that it should also prepare a

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history of the U.S. Army. With Lanza's report as a basis, in February 1922 Colonel Spaulding composed a series of recommendations sent through the Commandant of the War College to the Chief of Staff. General Pershing gave his immediate and blanket approval. They read as follows:

(a) The Historical Section, besides placing its own and other proper files at the disposal of civilian students when properly accredited, should render assistance to such students desiring to secure copies of documents from the military archives of foreign countries . .

(b) The Historical Section should be directed, at such time as in the opinion of the Commandant its force will permit, to undertake the preparation of a manual of American military history from the Revolution down, consulting in regard to the work with the ROTC Branch. . . .

(c) The Historical Section should be further directed . . . to furnish to educational institutions or to the American Historical Association reviews of books or other publications dealing with military history . . . ; provided, that such reviews shall not purport to convey official approval or disapproval.

(d) Relations between the Historical Section and the Historical Association should be made as close as possible. Personal conferences between the two should be held whenever occasion arises, and a representative of the Historical Section should habitually attend officially at the annual meetings of the Association.

(e) Whenever any study on military history, prepared in the Historical Section, has been approved by the Chief of Staff, then whether or not funds are available for printing it officially, the writer should be authorized to publish it, if he so desires, at his own risk and on his own responsibility. . . .[Official] approval should not appear in the printed

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work; the work should appear as prepared, not by the Historical Section, but by the writer individually; but, in order to give the writer a definite standing, . . . he should be authorized to add to his name "of the Historical Section, Army War College," or their equivalent.

In accordance with an additional Spaulding recommendation, the War Department formally notified the American Historical Association of its plans for close cooperation of the Army's historical office with the historical profession. AHA Secretary J. Franklin Jameson commented in return that "the liberal spirit shown by the Historical Section is highly appreciated by all those who have come in contact with it."<sup>9</sup>

A notable work produced in accordance with the last of the recommendations approved by General Pershing was the volume Warfare: A Study of Military Methods from the Earliest Times, by Colonels Spaulding and Wright and their Historical Section associate Maj. Hoffman Nickerson. Commercially published in 1925, this volume was written at the direction of the War Department during normal office hours, and was "the result of many months of the best technical effort of the authors." In approving it for commercial publication, ostensibly because of a lack of public funds, the Adjutant General admonished the authors not to identify themselves in any way with the Historical Section, thereby modifying the policy previously approved by the Chief of Staff.<sup>10</sup>

Before the end of 1922 General Pershing asked the Historical Section to undertake a rather different kind of review of private publications than the type he had approved earlier in the year. After a talk with the Chief of Staff a representative of Ginn and Company sent him four secondary school textbooks for review. The Ginn people had been particularly disturbed by recent, almost vicious attacks on author David S. Muzzey as

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un-American, due to the way he treated certain matters in the 1921 edition of his American history text. Independent reviews by Colonel Wright and another officer found nothing to warrant such criticism. It had been based on such items as the author's attempt to give a fair look at both sides in treating the American Revolution instead of blaming everything on the British. From the point of view of Wright and his colleagues, the weakness of Muzzey's work and some others they reviewed was instead that the authors knew too little about military history. Thus even with the best of intentions they presented slight and distorted accounts of military activities and operations. The following spring Dr. Muzzey visited the Historical Section to discuss its criticisms of his work, and indicated that he had found them helpful. Colonel Spaulding also took up the matter of improving military history coverage in texts with the AHA's representative on the joint committee of professional societies then studying methods of teaching history and social studies in secondary schools. General Pershing personally prepared an "open letter" on the subject that was published in the American Historical Review.<sup>11</sup>

The best way to improve the understanding and coverage of American military history, Colonel Spaulding informed General Pershing in March 1923, would be for the Historical Section to prepare a manual on the subject. Pershing had approved such a project a year earlier, but the section had only recently become strong enough to undertake the task. Preliminary work was already underway, and Spaulding estimated it would take two officers two years to complete it. Pershing promptly approved the project, and work went forward. It took the section a year to complete three chapters, which carried the story only through 1776! Each received the Chief of Staff's personal review and approval. As these chapters were being written, Spaulding tried to find a commercial

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publisher for the manual, but without success. Justin H. Smith wrote him sympathetically, "The truth is that serious books of any kind are not in demand at present." This failure and Spaulding's departure led to the project's suspension in the summer of 1924. The three draft chapters rested in the files, eventually to appear in print, in somewhat reduced form, as the opening three chapters of Colonel Spaulding's The United States Army in War and Peace, published commercially in 1937.<sup>12</sup>

To succeed Colonel Spaulding as Chief of the Historical Section, the Army chose Lt. Col. Christian A. Bach, a cavalryman, an appointment in which Spaulding concurred. Bach began his tour 1 July 1924 soon after graduating from the Army War College. He had previously worked in the section on a history of the 4th Division. As the College Commandant stated, he was "a practical man of wide military knowledge and experience and not a mere historian" and thus well qualified to head the historical office. When Bach took over, the office in Washington had a strength of nine officers, one field clerk, one warrant officer, and eight civilians; abroad there were three officers and three civilian clerks. The most recent description defined the section's duties as follows:

The function of Historical Section, Army War College, is the study of military history, primarily that of the United States. To this end it prepares historical studies for publication or for the use of the War Department; supervises historical work undertaken by any of the War Department offices; reviews historical textbooks; prepares material for use in the War College course; assists in the arrangement of historical documents in the War Department files; collects such material from foreign countries; and answers questions on military history arising in the course of War Department business or received from outside the War

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#### Department.13

In addition to a new major monographic program undertaken during Colonel Bach's four years as chief the Historical Section was increasingly called upon to prepare a variety of special studies. Examples include two it was directed to undertake in early 1925, one on the "Operations of the Air Service in the A.E.F.," and the other a parallel "Study on Anti-Aircraft in the A.E.F." 14

A much more elaborate work, on the employment of artillery in the St. Mihiel and Meuse-Argonne offensives, was undertaken in 1925 and 1926 by Colonel Lanza, who in 1918 had been the G-3 of the First Army Artillery. Lanza was somewhat upset on reaching Washington to discover that he would be working under a man who was his junior. He completed the study after a year of work that included a trip abroad to collect material from French and German archives. Colonel Bach judged the result of substantial value as a source but too biased to be published as a monograph. In 1941 the study was turned over to the War College Library to permit wider reference use.15 To provide a filler for the program of the Army Relief Society, in 1927 the Section prepared "A Guide to the Military Features in and about Washington," a carefully done piece by an officer who, after doing all of the documentary research possible, "took his own car and went over the ground" to verify the locations of Civil War forts.16 A year or so earlier the section had been required to prepare an article on "United States Army, 1910-1926" for a forthcoming new edition of the Encyclopedia Britannica.17

Preparation of the Britannica article touched off the ire of a new Army War College Commandant, Maj. Gen. Hanson E. Ely, because the request for it had not been sent through the War College as technically it should have been and it also triggered an effort by the Adjutant General to take over the Historical



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Section which will be considered presently. For several years General Ely and his successors paid closer attention to the Historical Section than had been the custom. Instructions issued in November 1926 aimed at making the section more of a supporting facility for the War College and the other Army schools. They admonished the section to confine itself to securing facts, and to leave views, opinions, deductions, and "lessons learned" to the faculties of the War College and other schools. They also specified that War College requests for support must be given priority except when the commandant directed otherwise. Despite these instructions, no very close connection developed between the activities of the War College and those of the Historical Section, the latter being able to keep a majority of its officers at work on monographs.<sup>18</sup>

The new monographic program was approved informally by the War College before the end of 1924. It had its inception in a plan developed at Colonel Bach's request by Col. Gustave J. Fieberger, a former professor at the Military Academy. Fieberger's proposal envisaged a coordinated and comprehensive series of monographs on the U.S. Army's part in World War I that could form the basis for a relatively short general history of the Army's role in the war. At the AHA meeting in Richmond in December 1924, Colonel Bach discussed the plan with a number of civilian historians, including Professor Charles K. Webster of Great Britain. He found them much interested. Thereafter Bach developed the plan more precisely into a project for covering thirty-five topical areas in sixty-two monographs that would provide a balanced coverage of mobilization and demobilization, supply at home and abroad, and operations. General Ely had a board of War College instructors review the plan before he approved it in January 1926. Actually his faculty advisors were somewhat distrustful of the proposal. They urged indefinite postponement of any general

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history, and insisted that the monographs must be strictly factual and free of any "criticism, censure, commendation, praise, blame, or opinion on the part of the compiler."<sup>19</sup>

Superior officers were more sympathetic to the plan, especially Maj. Gen. Fox Connor, the Deputy Chief of Staff, who informally offered some particularly helpful suggestions. Colonel Bach also sent the plan for comment to the ex-Army historians of World War I, Professors Paxson and Fling, and to AHA Secretary Jameson. To them he described the goal as comprehensive coverage in monographs of "all of the activities in which the American Army was engaged during the war," with each fully documented and "as long and detailed as a full study and exposition of the subject matter" required. The monographs would provide the basis for a history of not more than three volumes addressed primarily to the American public.<sup>20</sup>

In April 1926 the Chief of the Historical Section submitted the monographic plan for formal approval, accompanying it with a request for a number of additional officer historians. Bach pointed out that with thirty additional qualified officers and suitable civilian support, all of the monographs could be completed within three years. Even with an increase of eleven (double the existing number on the Washington staff), he thought the section could finish the task in eight years. A month later the War Department approved preparation of the monographs but not of the capstone three-volume history. It promised ten more officers to the Historical Section if funds for more civilians to support them could be obtained. Funds proved not to be available until fiscal year 1929, so that the ten additional officers did not appear until the summer of 1928. When Colonel Bach's successor, Col. Stanley C. Vestal, discovered it was taking an average of three man-years to complete a monograph he asked for more writing help. But Chief of Staff

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General Charles P. Summerall responded with an emphatic no, and insisted that program be completed by 1936 as earlier forecast.<sup>21</sup>

Soon afterwards the Chief of Staff dealt the monograph program a mortal blow, but the immediate cause of its demise must be considered in a broader setting. One important factor was the hostility of the Adjutant General toward the program of historical writing as it developed after 1924. This attitude was evident in the AG's effort to take over the Historical Section in 1926, touched off by the complaint of the Commandant of the War College over preparation without his knowledge of the article for the Encyclopedia Britannica. The Adjutant General based his proposal on the grounds that the work of the Historical Section was "almost entirely" dependent on records in his custody, that its primary duty was compiling factual data for the use of "historical writers, government agencies, and military students," and its functions were related only remotely to those of the Army War College. Naturally, Colonel Bach disagreed with the Adjutant General's definition of the historical function, and insisted that General Pershing had approved preparing historical monographs that would be much more than mere collections of facts. In a rebuttal the Adjutant General recalled the 1919 dictums of Secretary of War Baker, and added the argument that no historical writing on World War I could be considered authoritative until all significant records of that war had been assembled, classified, and arranged. His office had embarked upon just this task, the month before. In the end, Chief of Staff John L. Hines decided to leave the Historical Section with the War College. The next spring, nonetheless, the Adjutant General, in opposing any increase in its officer strength, renewed his recommendation to Hines' successor, Charles P. Summerall, that the Historical Section be transferred to his office.<sup>22</sup>

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After Maj. Gen. William D. Connor became Commandant of the Army War College in December 1927, he learned that there was a good deal of criticism within the Army of the writing of history by officers who were not trained historians, and of writing before all of the relevant World War I records had become readily available. Criticisms of this sort made him wonder if it would not be better to concentrate on collecting and publishing documents. Connor first sought the counsel of Justin R. Smith, whose eyesight by then was too poor to allow him to be of much help. He next sought advice from ex-Army historian Frederic Paxson. Although Paxson was unable to serve personally, he supplied a list of other historians who might be consulted. This list enabled General Connor to establish an "Advisory Board on Historical Work." The board, approved by the Chief of Staff, was to meet about two weeks each year to scrutinize the Historical Section and recommend changes in its program. Initially the board consisted of Colonel Vestal, who was about to succeed Bach as chief of the section, and four civilians, Professors Herbert C. Bell of Wesleyan University, Carlton J. H. Hayes of Columbia University, Wayne E. Stevens of Dartmouth College, and Mr. Thomas H. Thomas, a friend of Stevens. The civilians were paid for their travel expenses and work by commissioning them as majors in the Officers' Reserve Corps and calling them to active duty for the annual meetings. The first meeting was held from 4 through 15 June 1928. In its report following this meeting the board, while generally praising the monographic program, put great emphasis on undertaking a parallel compilation and publication of source material. It suggested that each monograph have a back-up of at least one large volume of documents, and that monographic and documentary volumes should be prepared simultaneously with appropriate cross-referencing. The board also recommended some revisions in the monographic plan, a reduction to fifty-seven titles, and priority

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for the operational monographs.<sup>23</sup>

In commenting on the report of the Advisory Board, shortly before his tour expired, Colonel Bach acknowledged its helpfulness but took exception to some of the proposed changes in the monographic program. He also pointed out that compiling and publishing documents would be costly and that there appeared to be no prospect of obtaining publication money for sixty or seventy additional bulky volumes. On the day that Colonel Vestal succeeded Bach as Chief, 28 June 1928, General Connor directed that the Advisory Board's recommendations be carried out insofar as practicable. Vestal personally favored documentary publications to monographs. Even so, he did his best during the following year to continue work on monographs along lines recommended by the board.<sup>24</sup>

In December 1928 Congressman A. Platt Andrew of Massachusetts introduced a joint resolution calling for publication of Army and Navy official records of World War I in a manner similar to the volumes of Civil War records. In a hearing on 28 February 1929, Generals Summerall and Connor and Colonel Vestal endorsed the proposal in principle. General Connor indicated that he now favored publication of documents rather than monographs. Colonel Vestal spoke in terms of 150 documentary volumes to be compiled by officers and published within ten to fifteen years, at a cost exclusive of labor of about three million dollars. The Andrew resolution and Army testimony on it appears to have exerted considerable influence on the deliberations of the Advisory Board at its next meeting.<sup>25</sup> About a week after the Congressional hearing, the Historical Section sent the draft of a new comprehensive directive redefining its functions to the War College Commandant for approval. After some preliminary modifications Connor and Vestal decided to await the next report of the Advisory Board before putting the directive

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into final form.26

When the Advisory Board met again on 17-31 May 1929, one World War I monograph had just been published, another was in the press, work on twelve others was in progress, and documentary volumes for each of them were being compiled. In its open report, the board praised the monographs and stated that it looked forward to their "eventual assembly in sequence" into eight or ten volumes that would constitute "an authoritative and attractive history of American Military Participation in the World War." In a confidential supplementary report, the board informed General Connor that it had found three of the monographs that supposedly were complete or nearly so too poor to be published unless rewritten. It urged that officers who proved incompetent as historical writers be weeded out quickly instead of being allowed to stay for years. Concerning documents the board recommended their compilation by topic in a manner similar to the published Civil War records, and that the Secretary of War appoint a separate board (very similar in composition to the existing Advisory Board) to supervise their compilation and publication.27

The first of the new monographs to be printed was The Genesis of the First Army, by Maj. Julian F. Barnes. When copies reached the Historical Section, its Secretary, Maj. William A. Ganoë, called in a representative of the Washington Post and gave him an exclusive release. The Post's printing of the release on 10 May 1929 not only stirred the ire of other press representatives but also headlined how the United States had triumphed over France in establishing an autonomous Army on the Western Front. The announcement was played up by the European press at about the worst possible time. General Pershing was then in Paris to attend the extensive ceremonies that followed the death of Marshall Foch. Pershing was furious, and demanded by cable that "in the interest of

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historical accuracy that opportunity be given me to examine and comment on manuscript before approval and issue." He had forgotten that he had reviewed the Genesis draft a year earlier and expressed his entire satisfaction with it except for a few points on which he suggested changes, all of which were adopted verbatim in the printer's copy. No one dared to remind the General of the Armies about his lapse of memory. Nor could General Summerall recall having seen the Genesis draft. He probably had not, although it had been approved for publication by his office in his and the Secretary of War's name. Pershing's protest prompted a stern directive that "in future no manuscript of any kind on the World War will be published until it has been submitted to General Pershing and until it has received the personal approval of the Chief of Staff." Colonel Vestal hastened to respond that it was already the practice to send everything to General Pershing and to adopt his suggestions before publication, and that there was really no way for the Historical Section to know whether the Chief of Staff personally saw items formally approved by his office for publication.<sup>28</sup>

In the midst of this contretemps, the Army War College on 3 June 1929 submitted the proposed comprehensive directive for the Historical Section, first drafted in March, to the War Department General Staff for its approval. Revisions in the directive, made after the May meeting of the Advisory Board, took into account its recommendations. It opened with the statement that "the primary mission of the Historical Section, The Army War College, is to produce in suitable form, material which will give a complete and accurate account of the U.S. Land Forces in the World War," in a manner "strictly scientific and objective" and in both monographic and documentary form. The Adjutant General would not concur in the proposed directive, and resurrected all of the arguments against writing history in the Army that he had advanced in 1926 and 1927.

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He again recommended that the Historical Section be transferred to his office. After a lengthy conference of representatives of all interested agencies with the Chief of Staff on 16 July 1929, the War College and the Historical Section prepared rebuttals which in effect accepted the termination of the monographic program and concentration on compilation and publication of documents. Any "synoptical studies" (the word "monograph" would be eschewed) undertaken from this time forward would be for internal reference use. The only World War I historical publication contemplated in the near future would be the Order of Battle volume on the land forces overseas then nearing completion.<sup>29</sup>

The upshot was that General Summerall decided in early August to leave the Historical Section with the War College but to accept verbatim the restraints on its writings on World War I proposed by the Adjutant General. He made the section's major mission the collection of the Army's records of that war for a publication similar to the Official Records of the Civil War. He further directed the suppression of monographs already prepared, forbade any printing until all of the documentary work was completed, and sanctioned the preparation of "synopses of facts" relating to major units by properly qualified officers, that is, those who had served as commanders or staff officers with those units during the war. The synopses were to be censored by a General Staff Advisory Committee and withheld from open publication until all of the documentary collections and all of the synopses had been completed and were ready for publication. The staff embodied these decisions in a formal directive for the Historical Section of 14 August 1929 that took the place of the comprehensive one proposed on 3 June. The new directive omitted mention of all of the secondary functions that the section then had and which it continued to perform. Some work on monographs actually continued until early November, when General Connor issued detailed



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instructions to govern the preliminary selection and arrangement of World War I documents. Most of the section's officer strength would be employed on this task for the next four years. About five hundred copies of the Genesis monograph had been printed before the furor over it arose. All but one of the remaining copies on hand, the page proofs of another monograph, and the drafts of other completed and partially completed World War I monographs, were turned over to the War College, from which in due course they disappeared. The Historical Section managed to keep copies of all but four, and their back-up collections of documents, for internal reference use.<sup>30</sup>

Professor Bell of the Advisory Board took exception to some of the decisions of late 1929, and General Connor politely dispensed with his services. On the other hand Professor Hayes was delighted by the turn of events, acknowledging that the collection and publication of documents was the only phase of Army historical work which had seriously interested him from the beginning. The board, minus Bell and with Lt. Col. Charles E. T. Lull replacing Colonel Vestal, met again on 17-29 May 1930, and in its report expressed "hearty acquiescence" with the suppression of the monographic program. It commended "without qualification" the decision of the War Department to go ahead with the collection of documents for publication. Its only concern was the mass of such records and the consequent need for careful selection, and it urged a series shorter than that for the Civil War. This was the Advisory Board's last meeting and report. The session scheduled for 1931 was called off because of a shortage of travel funds and the board was considered disbanded thereafter.<sup>31</sup>

One phase of the Historical Section's scholarly work, a battlefield commemoration program, was so autonomous and remote from the criticism of participants that it continued without interruption--or even

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mention--during and after the attack on the monographic program. As a result of postwar popular and congressional interest in memorializing battlefields within the United States, in 1925 the Army's historical office had been directed to make a study of such sites to determine their relative importance. Retired West Point professor Colonel Fieberger, the author of the monograph plan, was again called upon to draft this study. The product became the basis for legislation in 1926 directing the Army to undertake further historical research. The assignment naturally went to the Historical Section, which administered a small Battlefield Sub-Section that handled the activity from 1927 until 1933. For political reasons the Office of the Secretary of War kept the work of this subsection under its direct supervision. The four published monographic studies of Revolutionary War battles prepared by the subsection were printed as House and Senate documents instead of being handled through normal Army publication channels. These studies were primarily the handiwork of Col. Howard L. Landers, a soldier who knew how to write good history. Landers stayed with the project for almost five years. His volume on the Yorktown Campaign, published in 1931, is evidence that the Army's inhibitions concerning historical monographs did not extend to writing about earlier wars.<sup>32</sup>

Because most of the records relating to earlier wars were then located in the Munitions Building more than a mile from the rest of the section, Colonel Bach arranged for Colonel Landers and his small staff to work there. At its peak the subsection staff numbered six. The four civilians were paid from special appropriations rather than War College funds. In addition to the printed studies, Landers and others prepared at least three more on battles of the American Revolution, one on the Battle of New Orleans, and at least fourteen on Civil War battles. They also gave briefer consideration to literally thousands of other engagements that

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might justifiably be memorialized at least by markers. In the summer of 1932 the Chief of the Historical Section looked upon this activity as a useful complement to its lineage and honors and general inquiry work and anticipated that the battlefield studies might eventually provide authoritative histories of all important land engagements that had taken place within the bounds of the United States. A year later the Battlefield Sub-Section was abolished and its functions transferred to the Department of the Interior's Office of National Parks. And five years later the Army turned over the records and map collections relating to the earlier battlefield work to the Park Service historical office.<sup>33</sup>

Another Historical Section activity that continued unaffected by the events of 1929 was the compilation of an Order of Battle for the Army's units of World War I. This work, begun in 1926, was designed to present concise factual information about the command and composition of units and the major events in which they had participated. Though planned primarily for internal reference use, it would also provide the military student and the public with "a sort of compendium of the American Army in the World War." Col. Henry Hossfeld was the principal architect and executor of the Order of Battle project, with important assistance from Warrant Officer Charles H. Collins. The fact that "two commandants of the War College, two Chiefs of the Historical Section, and the head of the publication division of the Adjutant General's Office" had all taken a keen personal interest in making the Order of Battle a reality helps to explain the separate directive that exempted the project from the orders ending the World War I monographic program and from the general prohibition on Army historical publications. The historical office also used proper caution in getting General Pershing's blessing before publishing the Order of Battle volumes that appeared in 1931 and

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1937. The first dealt with the AEF's divisions and the second with its headquarters and larger field units. Two volumes covering the Army's units at home, completed as a labor of love by Colonel Hossfeld after he retired, would not appear until a dozen years later.<sup>34</sup>

The major task of the Historical Section from 1929 onward was preparing the Army's World War I records for publication. Initial instructions for this work specified that priority be given to the operational records of the AEF, that one copy of each document selected as possibly worthy of publication go into a topical file and another (when applicable) into a unit file, and that no work on the final compilation of documents for publication or on the writing of factual "synopses" about units be undertaken until the preliminary selection process was complete. With a dozen or more officers regularly employed on this work, it took over four years to select 100,000 AEF documents relating to operations as worthy of consideration for publication, from 12,000,000 examined. Even then the search generally extended downward only through the division level. Under the procedures followed, it took one year for an officer to search and select the items to be published from the records relating to each active division. The second phase of the work, the actual compilation of documentary volumes for publication, began in December 1933. Selection was made not only from the 100,000 items obtained during the preliminary screening but also from the additional 100,000 AEF GHQ and SOS documents collected by the historical organization in France in 1918 and 1919 and from the foreign documents collected for the Historical Section since 1920. In this second phase, each document was examined to determine whether it should be printed in full, in part, or merely listed in a catalogue of documents of secondary historical interest. With this screening and a somewhat reduced force after 1 July 1933,

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the Historical Section estimated that the anticipated forty or so volumes of AEF command and operational documents could be ready for the printer by 1940. After a further sharp cut in the staff in 1935, the estimated completion date became much later. The whole documentary series was projected in 1931 at 80 to 100 volumes, but until 1940 there were no detailed plans for the selection and final compilation of records on supply operations overseas or activities on the home front during mobilization and demobilization.<sup>35</sup>

On 1 July 1931 Colonel Lull, who had been chosen previously to serve on the Advisory Board, became Chief of the Historical Section. Lull was a widely respected scholar, a graduate of Lehigh and Columbia before entering the Army and of Leavenworth and the War College afterwards. In 1932 he took the lead in planning the establishment of an "American Military History Foundation," and on 9 June 1933 he chaired the assembly that formally organized it. Several other Historical Section officers were among the charter members. This organization, later named the American Military Institute (AMI), became the society of professional historians active or interested in the field of American military history. Its Journal, later called Military Affairs, became the principal scholarly periodical in the field. Illness forced Lull to give up his position and Col. Walter D. Smith succeeded him as chief of the section on 29 June 1933. Smith was the first graduate of West Point to hold the position. He was succeeded in turn by Colonel Spaulding who returned to the Historical Section for his second tour on 6 October 1935. For the preceding four years Spaulding had served as Professor of Military Science and Tactics at Harvard University where he had taught military history and worked on his notable history of the United States Army.<sup>36</sup>

During Colonel Lull's incumbency as chief, Army historical work had its best manpower

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support between world wars. The average number of people associated with historical work during his two years approximated seventy-four, a total which included about twenty-eight officers, twenty-three warrant officers and enlisted men, and twenty-three civilians. In late 1931 Lull was looking forward not only to the successful completion of the World War I documentary project at a reasonably early date and eventual monographic work in that area but also to publishing the records of the War with Mexico and of other wars inadequately covered by existing publications and to a variety of unit history publications. He was generally successful in getting properly qualified officers assigned to the section. His standard was "at least . . . the benefit of training at the Command and General Staff School." But he failed to persuade his superiors that officer tours on historical assignments should be extended beyond the maximum of four years when necessary to complete projects. He also wanted more warrant officers, since they generally were highly competent and could be kept with the section indefinitely, but he did not get them. Even so, the Army's historical staff in Washington in the early 1930's was much the largest among those of Federal agencies. The Navy's "World War Section" was but a minor part of its Office of Naval Records and Library, which altogether had only two officers and a total of twenty-one employees assigned. The Department of State's "Office of the Historical Advisor" with **ninety-three** employees actually had only eight professionals engaged in historical work. Most of those employed under the banner of this office were assigned to the department's library and archives and to its general publication activity.<sup>37</sup>

After Franklin D. Roosevelt became President, budget cuts induced by the Great Depression resulted in major strength reductions in the Historical Section between 1933 and 1935. In 1933 it lost ten officers and its entire

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enlisted strength. By late 1935 it had been reduced to an effective officer strength in Washington of eight, and to the same number of civilians. These actions left the section only about one-third as large as it had been just two years earlier. Since its secondary and routine duties continued and were even enlarged in the later 1930's, work on the major documentary project languished.<sup>38</sup>

As late as the autumn of 1932, the Historical Section still lacked a comprehensive directive. Colonel Lull proposed one to a new commandant of the War College based on the following division of labor:

a. To establish the facts of our military history is the function of the Historical Section, Army War College.

b. To deduce from these facts the lessons of our past, and to apply them, are functions of the War Department General Staff, the Army War College, the Army Industrial College, and the service schools, military students, and historians.

c. To preserve the original evidence of these facts is the function of the Adjutant General.

The draft emphasized the documentary work of the section as its primary mission, and enumerated its secondary missions of battlefield study, preparing World War I Order of Battle and unit histories, determining battle participation credits and battle honors, procuring records from foreign archives, answering inquiries, and supervising and reviewing historical work carried on in other War Department agencies. With the last-named activity practically defunct, the commandant agreed that work on the other functions listed should continue; but he decided not to issue any new written instructions. In practice after 1932, and especially after Colonel Spaulding's return as chief in 1935, the War College took less notice of the Historical Section. As a new

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deputy commandant commented in 1935, there was really no reason for it to be attached to the War College; the section was actually performing a General Staff function, and "no doubt was placed under the Army War College as a matter of convenience."<sup>39</sup>

While the historical office lost the battlefield commemoration function in 1933, it did add some new missions under Colonel Spaulding. After the National Archives opened in 1935, the Secretary of War made the Chief of the Historical Section responsible for all War Department liaison with the new institution. Spaulding also served on its associated committee on historical publication. As another duty, he was named Chief of the Translation Section of the Army War College, a section actually manned as required by linguists of the Historical Section. After Spaulding called attention to errors in the brief regimental histories that were published through 1938 in the annual Army Register, responsibility for revising them and reproducing the results in pamphlet form passed to the section. This was a foundation step to the later preparation of certificates of unit lineages and honors by the historical office. As for inquiry work, the more the Historical Section built up its reference files, the more queries it was called upon to answer. The number of official and unofficial inquiry actions was reported as more than 2,100 in fiscal year 1937. As Colonel Spaulding expressed it, his office was becoming a "mouthpiece not only of the Army War College but the War Department."<sup>40</sup>

A new brush with the Adjutant General occurred in 1937, when Spaulding moved to republish the Genesis of the First Army monograph. While officially suppressed, printed copies of the 1929 version had gotten out and from one of these the National Tribune in May 1936 started to print the monograph in installments. After corrections, and a few further minor changes by General Pershing, Colonel Spaulding recommended its



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official publication in revised form, and in doing so described it as "a well-planned and well-written paper" for which there was "a need and a demand." The Adjutant General objected, citing the 1922 Congressional injunction against printing any World War I records until all material to be reduced to print was collected. But the staff of the G-3 Division ruled that the injunction applied only to documentary records and not to monographs, and Genesis was republished in 1938.<sup>41</sup>

Having received the degree of Doctor of Laws from his alma mater in 1938 and widespread recognition as an outstanding authority on American military history, Colonel Spaulding retired from active duty with his earlier rank of brigadier general on 29 May 1939. Five months later his successor, Col. Robert Arthur, received a revised general directive such as the Historical Section had been seeking since the mid-1920's. In recognition of the realities, it made no mention of narrative writing or of any supervisory function. Then, on 23 October 1940, after the United States had begun a large-scale mobilization to prepare for possible participation in a new great war, the War Department issued two directives that changed the course of the World War I documentary work and set the stage for Spaulding to return once more as chief of the section.<sup>42</sup>

The new directive on documentary work specified that the Historical Section was to complete and have ready for the printer all volumes on overseas operations by 30 June 1946. By the same date it was to complete the preliminary screening of documents from which selection would thereafter be made for volumes dealing with supply overseas. The other directive stated that the section's officer requirements would henceforth be met by recalling retired Regular Army officers to active duty, and possibly by obtaining some suitably qualified reserve officers for

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extended active duty. All regular officers then serving with the section were to be released to other duties by 30 June 1941. It was clear to Colonel Arthur that the new documentary assignment would require a good many more officers than the ten then authorized. With an increase to twenty or twenty-five officers and concentration on the documentary work, he thought the SOS volumes might be ready for the printer by 1953. Privately he doubted that any documentary work on home front activities would ever be undertaken. After Arthur was reassigned under the new personnel policy, on 10 March 1941 Spaulding once again became Chief of the Historical Section. He was recalled and served as a colonel, although he usually signed himself and was addressed in his retired rank of brigadier general. Spaulding promptly recruited his earlier co-worker and collaborator in authorship, Col. John Wright, to be his principal assistant. The two served together in the management of the Historical Section, Army War College, through August 1945.<sup>43</sup>

As mobilization got under way, the War College suspended its normal school operations and was put under the command of a junior colonel as an administrative caretaker. Because General Spaulding outranked him, the acting commandant in April 1941 urged that the Historical Section be transferred to Army Headquarters, either to the Secretary of War's or the Chief of Staff's area. Spaulding at first concurred, but when it was found that such a transfer would cost the section its nine warrant officers and enlisted men, the proposal was dropped. The Historical Section could not avert another action which affected its efficiency. On 25 October 1941 it moved from Building E where it had been for most of the time since 1920 to the National Guard Armory at 20th and East Capitol Streets, two miles away from the records upon which the bulk of its work was so intimately dependent.<sup>44</sup>

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The Pearl harbor attack and formal American entry into World War II did not immediately change the section's routine. At the beginning of 1942 it had seventeen officers at work in addition to Spaulding and Wright, nine of them on World War I operational documents, five on the overseas supply documents, two on a home front Order of Battle volume, and one on general historical research. Two of the five warrant officers handled unit history matters, two helped in searching and maintaining the records, and one was a draftsman. The four enlisted men were linguists employed in the translation and typing of foreign documents. The civilian staff, in process of being increased from thirteen to twenty-two, was mostly clerical, although its senior members handled most inquiries. Then, immediately after America's formal entry into World War II, General Spaulding and his office began to give it some special although very limited attention.<sup>45</sup>

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### HISTORICAL WORK DURING WORLD WAR II

On 11 December 1941, the day that the United States and Germany exchanged declarations of war, General Spaulding recommended redefining the duties of the Historical Section, Army War College. "For the period of the present war" he wanted the section to become the depository for all Army records of historical value that had ceased to be live files, these files to be arranged to insure "ready accessibility, ultimate publication, and final transfer to the Adjutant General as permanent custodian." He added that no historical writing of any kind on World War II was contemplated, and that except for the new responsibility for acquiring records the functions of the Historical Section should remain unchanged.<sup>1</sup>

On reflection the Historical Section changed its position in respect to the inactive World War II records. The plan approved by the War Department the following March called for retiring all such materials to the Adjutant General for permanent custody, the same procedure followed since 1922 for World War I records. Representatives of the Historical Section would then develop a card index of papers of historical value, in a manner similar to the handling of World War I documents. In practice this function remained purely theoretical until the establishment in 1943 of a new Army historical office dealing with World War II. The volume of records turned in to the Adjutant General before that event was simply too small to warrant any systematic cataloging.<sup>2</sup>

Meanwhile the section itself, without specific authorization, undertook a new function when it began the compilation of a World War II chronology for reference purposes. The chronology, dated from 7

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December 1941, consisted primarily of clippings from the New York Times, with an index. It continued to be compiled until 1 March 1946, and was extensively used in answering official and public inquiries.<sup>3</sup>

A more challenging function for the section began in early 1942, in response to requests from War Department agencies for information about the handling of particular matters in past wars, and especially in World War I, that might throw useful light on solving similar current problems. These requests resulted in a series of special studies. The first of them, on "Deficiencies in Transportation, 1917-1918," was completed on 6 March 1942. Four of the first seven requests for studies came from the office of Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy. Exchanges between General Spaulding and the Chief of Staff's office in June and July formalized this special studies program, and by early August the Historical Section had received forty-six requests for studies on various subjects. The studies were prepared by one or more senior officers diverted from their other duties and normally took two weeks or longer to complete. Based as much as possible on readily available secondary materials, they were intended to be strictly factual in content. The bulk of the sixty-two such studies undertaken during the war were completed during 1942 and 1943.<sup>4</sup>

As the war progressed, an increasing number of inquiries on military matters of all kinds poured into the Historical Section. A total of 10,520 requests from War Department agencies were received during the first ten months of 1943; in contrast only 713 had come in in the corresponding months of the preceding year. Most of them could be handled quickly by telephone, but others generated official communications (about 500 annually by 1943). The Historical Section continued during World War II to be the arbiter on all unit history matters, and inquiries from troop units about their

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history increased in volume from 506 in 1941 to 18,133 in 1944. Until April 1943 the section exercised its assigned responsibility for determining battle participation credits for World War II actions indirectly through a **Battle**Participation Board. At that time the General Staff's Personnel Division (G-1) took this function away from the section and vested it in the Adjutant General's Office. Later it was exercised directly by G-1 itself.<sup>5</sup>

These service functions of the Historical Section in support of the Army's World War II effort, together with the responsibility added to them of supervising World War II administrative history work in other Army historical agencies presently to be described, made relatively minor inroads on the section's continuing work on World War I projects. This work was naturally slowed in October 1942 when the Adjutant General moved World War I operational records to a warehouse in High Point, North Carolina, to provide more space for offices in Washington. A year or so later the records were brought back to Washington and put into the National Archives building. In early 1943 the Historical Section was itself moved from the Armory to the Army War College, still some distance from the records. Keeping one of its warrant officers at High Point and, later, two at the Archives, helped bridge the gap. When the records returned to Washington, it became customary for officers working on them to spend much of their time in the Archives. Despite the concentration during most of the war of three-fourths or more of the section's manpower on the World War I documentary and order of battle projects, they were far from complete when the fighting ended in 1945. Only about a quarter of the operational documents and maps were nearing readiness for printing, only token work had been done on the overseas supply documents, and the domestic order of battle volume (which became two thick books when printed in 1949) was a year or more away from completion.<sup>6</sup>

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The Historical Section grew to a strength of about fifty during the war. In January 1945 the breakdown was twenty-eight military and twenty-two civilian employees. All of the senior officers were retired men recalled to active duty; General Spaulding, who turned seventy in 1945, was by no means the oldest. Officers continued to do most of the professional work. Only one civilian, Mr. Thomas, attained true professional status. A number of the men recalled were not properly qualified, for Spaulding had no voice in their selection. As a result, Mr. Thomas later recorded, "much time was lost and labor mis-spent." The section was able to provide the Army with satisfactory historical services during the war, and carry on its World War I work despite somewhat adverse circumstances. On the other hand, as constituted it was not really qualified to give vigorous leadership to the Army's historical work on World War II.<sup>7</sup>

The strongest impetus to that work came from a letter of 4 March 1942 that President Franklin D. Roosevelt was prompted to sign, proposing the establishment of a scholarly committee to oversee the production by federal agencies of "an accurate and objective account of our present war experience." By this action the President formally endorsed work begun six months earlier in the Bureau of the Budget under Dr. E. Pendleton Herring who was on leave from Harvard's Graduate School of Business Administration. This work now expanded in civilian agencies with the objective of "assembly and analysis of the administrative developments in each of the major fields of war administration exclusive of the strictly military."<sup>8</sup>

To secure appropriate coverage of the "strictly military" administrative developments, Dr. Herring turned to the military departments. At the suggestion of one of his recent graduate students, Lt. Col. Otto L. Nelson, Jr., then an assistant in the

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Chief of Staff's office, Herring approached Assistant Secretary McCloy and obtained his support. As requested by McCloy's office General Spaulding submitted a plan for the preparation of administrative histories "by each bureau or other office of the War Department, as may be designated by the Secretary." But, after staffing, the plan was applied only to the new major commands that had been created in the War Department reorganization of March 1942--Army Ground Forces (AGF), Army Air Forces (AAF), and the Services of Supply (SOS), later redesignated Army Service Forces (ASF). The plan, promulgated on 15 July 1942, called for appointment of historical officers with the necessary staffs in each command to prepare narrative histories of activities both of their headquarters and of their subordinate organizations, "to insure complete coverage of administrative events of historical significance." The Historical Section, Army War College, was designated the "advisory and coordinating office" and given the authority to fix standards for selecting material and methods of documentation. These new responsibilities did not require any change in the section's organization or other duties. Beyond circulating two advisory memorandums on procedures, until the following spring General Spaulding's office did little to control the work undertaken within the major commands.<sup>9</sup>

Some of that work had already begun without any prompting from the Bureau of the Budget or Army Headquarters. A Medical Department historical office had been established in August 1941. Under its very able chief, Brig. Gen. Albert G. Love, this office laid the groundwork for the multi-volume History of the United States Medical Department in World War II. In May 1942 the Quartermaster General established an Historical Section in his office that would set high standards for professionalism and accomplishment. Ten days before being formally directed to do so the Services of



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Supply selected Maj. John D. Millett--in peacetime, a Columbia University Professor of Public Administration--as its Historical Officer. Before the end of 1942 nine other elements of the service command had begun historical programs. Much of the work undertaken within the Services of Supply could be construed as coming within the framework of the administrative histories directed by the War Department under the program initiated by the President and the Bureau of the Budget. This situation did not hold as well for the programs undertaken by the Army Air and Army Ground Forces. The Air Forces program began with the appointment of Col. Clarence B. Lober as its Historical Officer in September 1942, and soon expanded its horizons to include Army air activities overseas as well as at home. The Army Ground Forces program had its start on 15 October 1942 with the appointment of Maj. Kent Roberts Greenfield--until recently Chairman of the History Department at Johns Hopkins University--as Historical Officer. Greenfield likewise developed an interest in events overseas. The principal mission of the Ground Forces Command was the training of troops and the development of tactical doctrine, and the ultimate proving ground was in the overseas theaters.<sup>10</sup>

As a preliminary step the Ground Forces historian made a careful survey of his own projected task and of other developments under the War Department's 15 July directive. He found general agreement, except from General Spaulding, that meaningful World War II coverage must include operations as well as administration. Everyone agreed it should also include individuals and organizations in the War Department Secretariat and General Staff involved in decision-making. Spaulding contended that combat history should not be written before official determinations on battle participation had been made and all relevant records, including those of the enemy, were secured in unclassified form. Greenfield and others agreed that definitive

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or official histories of military operations could not be written until after the war was over, but contended that it was important to prepare first narratives based on all available records regardless of classification for current restricted use and as groundwork for a future definitive history of the war.<sup>11</sup>

In November 1942, eleven days after the allied invasion of North Africa, the G-2 of the European Theater raised the question of historical coverage in his area, at least to the extent of indexing and cataloging the records of historical significance in his headquarters. Spaulding recommended appointing historical officers at overseas headquarters to prepare synopses of important documents on cards that would then be forwarded to the Historical Section in Washington for later use when the records had been retired to the Adjutant General's custody. This was approximately the same system that had been followed since 1929 for the World War I documentary project. He opposed preparation of any narrative historical studies on operations as premature. Noting that as of December 1942 about forty officers were engaged in World War II administrative history work on the home front, he implied that appointment of historical officers overseas would not be inconsistent. Spaulding's recommendations and guidelines for overseas wound up in the powerful Operations Division, through which all proposed overseas activities had to be cleared. That division, in presenting the matter to the Deputy Chief of Staff for decision, with Spaulding's consent, enlarged the proposal to include records of units in home commands as well as those overseas. But it refused to allot additional officers to historical duties exclusively, insisting that at each echelon an historical officer be assigned to do the records work "in addition to his other duties," a provision that did not promise much effective work.<sup>12</sup>

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Before these recommendations were acted upon, Spaulding submitted another proposal to improve World War II historical coverage, suggesting that an historical office be established in the General Staff to perform the same functions being undertaken in the major commands, thereby closing the major decision-making gap at the top noted in the Greenfield survey. Otherwise the gulf in viewpoints and actions between Spaulding's section and the new World War II historical offices in the major commands would widen. This fact was underlined by a dinner conference on World War II military history staged by Dr. Herring on 29 January 1943. The Archivist of the United States, the Librarian of Congress, Navy and Marine Corps historians, and thirteen Army representatives, including Col. Otto Nelson, the historical officers of the major commands, and historians from subordinate service organizations attended. No one from the Historical Section, Army War College was present. As an outside observer noted at about this time, rather clearly the Army had no overall control of its World War II historical activities.<sup>13</sup>

After General Spaulding's proposals for a limited expansion of the Army's World War II historical work reached Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff Col. Otto Nelson for consideration, he developed new recommendations of a very different character. He believed the Army needed a new organization and system for "writing a history of American war operations" comparable to that established by the British. The Navy, Nelson said, had commissioned an "outstanding historian from Harvard University" (Samuel Eliot Morison) to handle their program and he suggested the Army should likewise select "outstanding individuals as key men in the project." These key men would "organize a system of writing a history of our military operations which will provide a first narrative and a proper documentation of sources." The new organization, Nelson suggested, should be in either the Intelligence or Operations Division of the

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General Staff or in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War. Over the initials of his superior he put these thoughts into a draft memorandum of 20 February 1943 which was circulated to the General Staff for comment. He also discussed his ideas with Mr. McCloy, and found him intensely interested. The Chief of G-2, in approving Nelson's recommendations, urged that the new office be put under the Assistant Secretary of War. Before acting McCloy sought the advice of several scholars in uniform. In conference with them on 23 April he tentatively decided that preparatory work should begin immediately for a large-scale operational history of the war to be written later, and that, in the meantime, smaller studies on particular operations should be written while the war was in progress. McCloy consulted separately with General Spaulding, who appears to have agreed that this work should be undertaken in the General Staff with assistance as required from the Historical Section. McCloy then also decided that the new office should be located in G-2 and he persuaded his senior military colleagues to agree. As a result, Deputy Chief of Staff Joseph T. McNarney on 30 April 1943 directed G-2 to establish a new historical office "to plan and supervise the compilation of the military history of the second World War." Its purview was to include not only planning and supervision of preparation of "first narrative" histories of operations, but also coordination and supervision of administrative histories in the War Department. The new organization would also be responsible for overseeing the establishment of historical offices in the overseas theaters, for determining the methods to be used in accumulating the necessary documentation, for the dissemination of information concerning current operations as an aid to training, and finally for "the determination of functions, duties, and responsibilities of the Historical Section, Army War College."<sup>14</sup>

While the new departures in Army historical work were still under consideration

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General Spaulding had appointed a full-time liaison officer to improve coordination of the administrative history program and, coincidentally, he circulated a new advisory letter to the major commands. In this communication and elsewhere he made it clear that coordination to him meant "consultation, advice, and suggestion but not the exercise of authority nor the issuance of instructions." He cautioned his liaison man to take great care on visits "not to give any impression that you are inspecting or interfering." Spaulding also emphasized that his Historical Section had no responsibility for coordinating anything but strictly administrative history, although he agreed that commanding generals were free to prescribe broader areas for historical investigation. It did not take Spaulding's liaison officer long to discover that "the whole question of Army historical work" on World War II seemed to be getting "more and more involved and unsatisfactory." He advised that "perhaps the only satisfactory procedure is to try to reorganize the whole situation from the beginning," and recommended a new central historical authority to exercise firm control over all World War II history work. He believed this work should include an operational history similar to the Navy's; and he and others in the Historical Section appear to have preferred a new and separate organization to the assignment of these functions to the Historical Section, Army War College. These views throw some light on General Spaulding's relatively moderate reactions to the McNarney directive of 30 April and to later developments based on it.<sup>15</sup>

In G-2, action on the directive went to Lt. Col. John M. Kemper, a thirty-year old graduate of the Military Academy. More recently, while teaching history at the academy, he had been a junior colleague of Otto Nelson and had acquired a Master's degree in history from Columbia. In discussions with Nelson, Kemper soon discovered that McCloy was adamant about putting the

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projected history office under G-2, although he agreed that "if not entirely satisfactory" it might be transferred elsewhere at a later date. And although "administratively and organizationally" it was to be a part of G-2 he conceded that it should "report directly to the Assistant Secretary of War for instructions." While it was generally recognized that the historical and intelligence functions had little in common, McCloy's decision was not an arbitrary one. Traditionally, in the absence of separate historical officers or offices in the field, history had been handled through G-2 (as in France in the summer and fall of 1918); both the Air and Ground Forces historical organizations had been established under their G-2's; and only G-2 had the network extending into the theaters that would make immediate historical work on Army operations possible. As suggested by Colonel Kemper, McCloy also agreed to appoint a planning committee to advise on the structure of the new organization and the scope of its work.<sup>16</sup>

The planning committee became known as the Historical Advisory Committee after its formal appointment by and initial meeting with Assistant Secretary McCloy on 28 May 1943. The committee consisted of three civilian and three military members. James Phinney Baxter, President of Williams College, then serving in Washington as Deputy Director of the Office of Strategic Services, was selected by Mr. McCloy to be the committee's chairman. The other members were Dr. Herring, Professor Henry Steele Commager of Columbia University, Col. Thomas D. Stamps, who handled military history work at West Point as head of the Department of Military Art and Engineering, General Spaulding, and Colonel Kemper, who acted initially as secretary. The Advisory Committee met six times in less than one month, and consulted with existing Army historical organizations, with those of the Navy and Marine Corps, with the Librarian of Congress, with the President and Secretary of the American Historical Association, and with

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other eminent historians. The committee apparently gave serious consideration to a proposal for transferring the existing Historical Section from its nominal Army War College connection to the War Department Secretariat or General Staff, and adding to it about twenty people to handle World War II historical matters. In the end it rejected this idea and, in its report to Assistant Secretary McCloy on 26 June, recommended that a new Historical Branch be established in G-2 to "plan and supervise the compilation of the military history of the Second World War," that its chief be a senior officer in the grade of brigadier general, that he be assisted by a civilian Chief Historian to be engaged at the top (P-8) Civil Service grade, and that the committee itself continue to advise these officials on the manning and work of the new office. As Chief Historian the committee proposed Mr. Henry F. Pringle, a Columbia University Professor of Journalism and well-known biographer, who until recently had been with the Publications Division of the Office of War Information.<sup>17</sup>

Mr. McCloy promptly approved the committee's recommendations although he wanted to talk with Mr. Pringle before his final selection and be consulted in the choice of a general officer to head the new branch. When none of the senior men proposed by G-2 for the chief's job proved acceptable to both Mr. McCloy and Colonel Nelson, Colonel Kemper suddenly found himself nominated for the position by default. Everyone approved. G-2 then formally established the Historical Branch on 20 July 1943 and designated Colonel Kemper as its chief. On 3 August the War Department informed the Army at large of this action by circulating a detailed directive to the new office that echoed in abbreviated form the June recommendations of the Advisory Committee.<sup>18</sup>

The directive made the branch responsible for supervising or undertaking all Army historical work relating to World War II, for

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determining the functions and responsibilities of the Historical Section of the Army War College, and for final editing and approval of all historical manuscripts prepared for publication by Army agencies. Work on World War II was to take six forms: brief monographs on individual military operations; more comprehensive theater and campaign histories; administrative histories; a general popular history (wanted particularly by McCloy); an official history; and, ultimately, the publication of documents. The directive also made the branch responsible for establishing and manning historical organizations in the theaters and prescribing how they should go about their work, and for superintending the accumulation of the documents that would be needed for the official history to be written after the war. It assigned broad functions to the Chief Historian, including "such historical writing as is in harmony with his other duties"; and it gave a more official standing to the Advisory Committee, of which Colonel Kemper now became a member ex officio. Although it stated that members were to be appointed by the Assistant Secretary of War, it made no mention of the branch reporting to him directly for instructions, as specified by McCloy the preceding May. Nevertheless he continued to consider the branch his creation, writing some two years later, "I started the Historical Section."<sup>19</sup>

The directive to the Historical Branch, G-2, was strong, comprehensive, and flexible. A contemporary commentator described it as a "block-buster." He pointed out that the new branch had been given absolute power over all Army historical publications and that the manner of its creation had changed the course of Army history work in several other vital ways: it required the writing of operational histories, forbidden in the Army since 1929; it centralized the direction and supervision of all Army Historical work, superseding the Historical Section, Army War College, as the primary supervisory agency; and it extended



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authority for historical coverage to every element of the Army from its headquarters downward.<sup>20</sup>

Nevertheless, as in World War I, Army historical work had made a belated start and had a long way to go before an effective coverage of the Army's experiences in World War II could be achieved. Furthermore, Army officers generally had only a dim appreciation of the function and value of historical work in their organizations. The task of persuading them of its utility had fallen on the shoulders of a young and comparatively junior lieutenant colonel who, however able and affable he was, had to feel his way most carefully in asserting the responsibilities given to the new historical office.

One of Colonel Kemper's first actions as Chief of the Historical Branch was to recommend that the choice of Henry Pringle as Chief Historian be disapproved. Pringle had expressed discontent over the subordination of this position to the military chief, and there were reports that he was something of a prima donna who might not become an effective member of a team. After Pringle dropped from the picture sometime in August, Professor Commager was approached, but he like Pringle was principally interested in writing and not in exercising the supervisory and editorial responsibilities prescribed for the Chief Historian. In mid-September Dr. William L. Langer of the Office of Strategic Services suggested Dr. Walter Livingston Wright. Following service as President of Roberts College and the American College for Women in Istanbul, Turkey, "Livy" Wright had recently joined the Library of Congress as a consultant. Wright quickly won the enthusiastic endorsement of all who knew him. He was strongly recommended on behalf of the Advisory Committee by President Baxter, and was approved by McCloy on 22 September. It took another two months to get a formal release from the Library of Congress so that he could join the Historical Branch and

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become the Army's first Chief Historian. In Colonel Kemper's judgment he proved to be an ideal man for the post.<sup>21</sup>

The Historical Branch began its work with almost no staff, no planned internal organization, and no articulated plan for action. Although authorized thirteen military and twenty-two civilian employees at the end of 1943, the actual number working in Washington by early March 1944 was seven officers and sixteen civilians. The first man to join Kemper in the new office was Maj. Charles H. Taylor, a tower of strength in Army history work until he returned to his professorship in medieval history at Harvard three years later. Other recruits during August included Lt. Col. S. L. A. Marshall, in civilian life a military analyst for the Detroit News; Maj. Jesse S. Douglas, previously of the National Archives staff; Capt. Roy Lamson, a teacher of English at Williams College; and Dr. George S. Auxier, previously head of the Engineers' historical office and the ranking civilian professional until Dr. Wright joined the staff.<sup>22</sup>

On 30 August 1943, the chief of G-2 put the branch under his Deputy for Administration, although the deputy apparently did little to affect its development. Also the branch's location on the top floor of the Pentagon isolated it from the rest of G-2. In March 1944, in order to make it easier for historians to get at records coming in from overseas, a transfer of the Historical Branch to the Operations Division almost came about. But a new chief of G-2, Maj. Gen. Clayton Bissell, helped persuade the branch to stay by placing it under his direct supervision and promising his effective support. Shortly thereafter Kemper characterized Bissell as "the stoutest champion we could have on our team." Coincidentally the branch announced a firm plan for its internal organization, and by the time it did so, 15 May 1944, it had nine officers and twenty-two civilians aboard.<sup>23</sup>

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Although the Historical Branch started without clearly defined objectives to govern the immediate thrust and scope of its activities, a number emerged in practice in 1943 and early 1944. The branch aimed to make itself primarily a supervisory and editorial office by encouraging a maximum decentralization of research and writing; it was, as Colonel Kemper put it in early 1944, "less concerned with writing history itself than with assuring that such history as is written is of high quality." For many months the office concentrated on promoting work in operational history, the area previously neglected. Rather than issuing formal directives, it depended on helpful assistance and informal liaison visits to guide the development of theater historical programs. It tried to limit research and writing within the branch to those subjects and areas that it was not practicable for any other Army historical office to cover. Both in and outside the branch it urged the importance of writing preliminary narratives as soon as possible both for current use and as groundwork for the official history to come. Finally, as the Chief Historian pointed out in March 1944, while "the Historical Branch was created in order to insure the writing of a definitive history of the Army in World War II," that history could not be written or even planned in detail until the fighting was over. In the meantime the branch's principal objective was to facilitate production by other Army historical offices of the maximum amount of sound historical work, to encourage and increase rather than to limit their work, and to disturb as little as possible writing and publication programs already in existence.<sup>24</sup>

The Historical Branch received its first specific assignment on 1 August 1943. It was to prepare relatively brief studies of particular military operations to be written and published as quickly as possible. Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall had asked for such studies the preceding April. He

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wanted them published for internal Army circulation only, and particularly for distribution to hospitalized soldiers who had been wounded in the actions described. The Special Services Division, given the task first, persuaded the Chief of Staff's office that the Historical Branch was a more appropriate agency to handle it. Lt. Col. S. L. A. Marshall and others were made available to work on the studies, and Colonel Kemper was delighted to get the assignment. After six weeks or so of work in collaboration with Air Forces and Navy historians, in October 1943 Colonel Marshall completed a draft manuscript on "The Tokyo Raid" of April 1942, the first historical narrative produced by the branch. That work never saw the light of day, but a less worthy item, "To Bizerte with the II Corps," written principally by Lt. Harris Warren, was approved for publication on 4 November 1943. With mapping assistance from the Historical Section, Army War College, the following February it became the first publication of the World War II historical office, and the first of fourteen paper-back volumes to appear in The American Forces in Action (AFA) series. The second title in this series, on the Buna-Gona action in the far Pacific, was published in July 1944 as The Papuan Campaign.<sup>25</sup>

Colonel Kemper doubted that units in combat operations were keeping useful and accurate records. To check on the matter, he left his new office on 6 August 1943 for the Aleutians, where on and after 15 August he participated in the operations against Kiska. His experiences there, coupled with the evident inadequacy of the records available in Washington for preparing a study on the campaign in North Africa, convinced him that if good combat history was to be written trained men must be sent from Washington to the active theaters to help correct defects in record keeping and to obtain additional information through interviews with participants. Information from interviews would fill in gaps and correct inaccuracies

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in such records as had been and were being compiled. Since the theaters were retaining their most important records, it also seemed necessary to do most of the preliminary research and writing overseas, with drafts returned to Washington for editing and publication. With high-level backing, Kemper obtained permission to send nine three-man teams overseas to work on combat studies, hoping at the time to keep the work of these teams under the control of his branch. In late October, even before approval of the plan for teams, Colonel Marshall left for the Pacific. And early in December Kemper himself accompanied the first two teams to the Mediterranean, spending two months visiting there and in England. In the Mediterranean he helped establish a separate Army historical office in what was about to become a theater under overall British command, and he drafted a directive to guide its work. The directive was issued internally rather than as orders from across the Atlantic that might have been resented or ignored. In the Pacific, where he stayed until April 1944, Marshall was a participant in the Makin and Kwajalein operations and developed a new technique for group combat interviews that became a model for historical work dealing with restricted or smaller unit actions.<sup>26</sup>

Meanwhile, some further joint ventures with the Navy in operational history were brewing. One began with a proposal in October 1943 for Mr. Bernard De Voto, well-known author and Pulitzer Prize winner, to undertake a combat history of the North African campaign for the Army. About the same time the Navy was beginning a work on Guadalcanal. After a conversation with Colonel Kemper, and with McCloy's enthusiastic backing, the Army proposed that De Voto, instead of working on North Africa, undertake the Guadalcanal study as a joint Army, Navy, and Marine Corps project. It had to give up that idea after the Office of Naval Intelligence refused to go along, and other commitments prevented De Voto from

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returning to the North Africa project. While the Guadalcanal proposal was under consideration, the War and Navy secretaries discussed the possibility of working on an overall joint popular history of military operations. The Historical Branch discouraged this proposal. Although it favored collaboration on monographs covering particular joint operations such as the Tokyo raid, the Branch thought it preferable for each service to prepare its own popular history, as the Army was then planning to do in one or two volumes. After the services had completed their individual popular histories, a joint work based upon them might be undertaken. A third prod in the direction of joint historical work came when Dr. Herring's Bureau of the Budget organization sponsored a new Advisory Council on War History with the Executive Secretary of the American Historical Association as its chairman. Despite presidential backing, this council had no success in persuading the services to undertake a joint history. Indeed, in Dr. Wright's opinion, the job could be done only by an outside civilian historian of the highest academic respectability as well as outstanding writing ability, one who was armed with an authoritative presidential mandate to the services to open up their records. In practice the Army and Navy were content from 1944 onward to follow their own separate paths in recording the history of World War II.<sup>27</sup>

In the spring of 1944 the fruits of overseas historical work began pouring into the Historical Branch. The number of historical teams was substantially increased, and the practice of sending or stationing branch representatives overseas for extended periods was expanded. At the beginning of June the historical office was working on six studies that its chief hoped to see ready for the printer during the month. By special arrangement, two were being readied for publication by the Infantry Journal's press as small books: The Capture of Attu, on which

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the branch then had Mr. Sewell T. Tyng working as an expert consultant; and Island Victory, the principal literary fruit of Colonel Marshall's visit to the Pacific. Both went to press in June and were published in October. Marshall had also written a half dozen other pieces for the Infantry Journal, and the branch hoped in due course to reprint all of Marshall's Pacific writings in a single larger volume that it believed could have great value as a training vehicle. As for the historical teams, while the members henceforth would clearly come under the jurisdiction of overseas commanders after they arrived in the theaters, their preliminary indoctrination in the branch, the almost continuous presence (at least in the European area) of branch representatives, and voluminous unofficial correspondence with them and with theater historians everywhere, tended to give the program a good deal of unity. Following Colonel Kemper's tour the principal overseas tours of branch representatives in 1944 in the Atlantic area were those of Major Lamson in the Mediterranean from January to June, of Colonel Taylor in the European Theater from April 1944 to January 1945, of Colonel Stamps (under branch auspices) and Colonel Marshall to the European Theater shortly after D-Day, and of Colonel Kemper to that theater again in November. Before departing Marshall was formally designated "Popular Historian," and his trip was designed primarily to complete his orientation for the task of writing the Army's popular history of its military operations. Actually he remained in Europe to become deputy to the Army's theater historian, Col. William A. Ganoe, and to succeed Ganoe when the latter returned to the United States.<sup>28</sup>

The Historical Branch had hoped to send four more combat studies to the printer in June 1944 but these hopes were shattered by personnel changes, by underestimation of the time required for editing and mapping, and by the discovery that at least two of the

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studies needed basic rewriting. In analyzing the problem, Dr. Wright pointed out that the academic professionals (in and out of uniform) in Army combat history work, both in Washington and overseas, were not the types to produce the sort of short, journalistic narratives, quickly written and printed, that General Marshall had had in mind for hospitalized soldiers. If that were still the goal, he thought the task ought to be turned over to journalists. The branch opted instead for improving the historical and literary quality of its combat histories, and rewriting or discarding those that did not measure up to acceptable historical standards. The basic manuscripts of the accepted histories were fully documented, although they were printed without footnotes. Fortunately, three manuscripts on late 1943 operations in southern Italy, written by members of the first historical teams sent overseas, showed marked improvement over the first two AFA pamphlets and could be published in the series in late 1944 and early 1945.<sup>29</sup>

Colonel Taylor returned from Europe in early 1945 to take charge of the branch's editorial section and complete his own study on the invasion of Normandy. At the time he surmised that two to three dozen more studies for the AFA series might be forthcoming in the following two years, but far fewer were actually to appear in print as official histories. Colonel Marshall's work on Bastogne was diverted to the Infantry Journal's press in order to get a quicker printing and broader circulation. Several other works (as one on Sicily) were discontinued, judged not redeemable after being worked on extensively in the branch. Planning was beginning on a definitive official history to include combat operations, a project that would eclipse the AFA series in 1946. And Taylor himself charted a new course for the series and for all Army combat history productions with his work on Omaha Beachhead. Much longer than the



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preceding combat histories, it required a larger format which in turn allowed better and more elaborate mapping. Taylor's access to German records captured in France made Omaha a pioneer work in covering the enemy's side of the story authoritatively. And it was the first volume in the AFA series to be openly published, as all the others would be presently. Aside from their intrinsic merit, Omaha and the other AFA volumes published during and immediately after the war went a long way toward arousing both Army and public interest in further Army historical work on World War II and in establishing standards for the Army's official history series launched in 1946.30

In May 1944 the Branch undertook a different sort of theater history, when Dr. T. H. Vail Motter began work on recording the story of the United States Army Forces in the Middle East. Enough of the records of this noncombat theater had been returned to the United States to permit Dr. Motter to do his first year's work in Washington and New York. Then the branch sent him as a civilian historian to the theater's headquarters in Cairo, and beyond, "to function there with authority" in getting at the records necessary for his work. A somewhat thorny character, Motter asserted his rights to the records so assiduously that he almost landed in jail. In due course strong messages from Washington clarified his status and secured for him the access to classified material that he needed. This project was another step in the transition from wartime monographs to the official history. After the theater's responsibility broadened to include the Persian Gulf Command Motter turned his interest in that direction, and his volume on The Persian Corridor and Aid to Russia became one of the earlier titles in the postwar series.31

A request from a G-2 committee of which Colonel Kemper was a member led to one of the first monographs produced by the Historical

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Branch, "Materials on the History of Military Intelligence in the United States, 1885-1944," a short narrative with voluminous appendices completed by Dr. George Auxier in January 1944. But later in that year, when G-2 tried to get the branch to prepare a detailed history of its operating organization, the Military Intelligence Service, higher authority backed the branch's resistance to embarking on such an undertaking. It thereby established an important principle: even though administratively under G-2, the Branch "should not undertake a specific study of any one division of the General Staff, but should keep its perspective, viewing the whole of the General Staff as a unit."<sup>32</sup>

At the time the Historical Branch was established, at least three Army offices were compiling chronologies of World War II, General Spaulding's Historical Section, the Special Services Division, and G-2's Dissemination Unit. G-2 directed the transfer of its unit's chronology effort to the Historical Branch in December 1943. Based on all accessible operational records as well as more readily available published material, the task became increasingly complex for the branch as the fighting spread and grew in intensity. Within a year the staff working on the chronology grew from two to five people; nevertheless it fell progressively behind in its production schedule. Continued after the war, the project provided the basis for the Chronology volume of the official series published in 1960.<sup>33</sup>

During the war, a principal use of the chronology was in providing information to the writers of a concise history of the war's combat operations published by the Infantry Journal's press in 1945 and 1946. In 1943 Special Services had elaborated its chronology into a periodically produced outline of the war's developments. The whole was compiled by Maj. Harvey A. DeWeerd and

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published as The War in Outline, 1939-1944 by the Infantry Journal's press. Both this press and Special Services wanted a more sophisticated narrative version, and the Historical Branch reluctantly agreed to assume responsibility for its preparation, though not for its publication. As author, it employed Dr. Roger Shugg, who had entered government service from teaching at Indiana University. Working rapidly in 1944, using information supplied by the branch's Chronology Section to the extent possible, and getting a good deal of assistance from other branch members, Dr. Shugg turned out a book-length narrative published as The World at War, 1939-1944, covering operations through October 1944. When the manuscript was ready for printing at the end of that year, the branch sent it to the Information and Educational Division, which had inherited Special Services' responsibility for using this material. In turn, that division sent the manuscript to the Infantry Journal. The Journal copyrighted it and printed 100,000 copies before the end of April 1945, the largest circulation of any Army-produced historical work for many years to come. After Dr. Shugg left the Historical Branch in the spring of 1945, Major DeWeerd, who was by then with the Infantry Journal, produced a new edition of the volume that covered the fighting to the end of the war in 1945. This version became World War II: A Concise History, published by the Infantry Journal in 1946.<sup>34</sup>

Another task undertaken reluctantly by the branch at the direction of "higher authority" was preparation of a guide to the Pentagon. The draft was completed in mid-October 1944. Dr. Wright found it in some ways very good, but too flippant in its approach, particularly in its early pages. The Pentagon had already become the butt of jokes, and the Chief Historian felt there was a very real chance of attracting unfavorable attention to the Historical Branch and its other work unless the draft as submitted was

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considerably modified. So did Otto Nelson, now a general. After discussing the matter with Under Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson, Nelson directed a complete revision of the draft, to include reducing the narrative to allow more room for pictures, eliminating all touches of humorous treatment, and adopting all corrections, deletions, and suggestions made by the Under Secretary's office unless there were very good reasons not to do so. The Historical Branch was made responsible for publishing the guide. As a consequence Dr. Wright himself had to spend about three weeks in rewriting the Pentagon narrative; and after General Nelson approved the revised product, Major Lamson had to go to New York for a fortnight to expedite its publication. He brought back the first printed copies on 9 December 1944. This was one product the branch was happy to have published without credits or any indication that it had originated in an Army historical office.<sup>35</sup>

On a considerably more exalted plane, Colonel Kemper and Dr. Wright had worked informally from late 1943 onward to initiate historical work in the offices of the Secretary of War and Chief of Staff. In the latter office, both in the fall of 1943 and about a year later, General Nelson rebuffed Kemper's approaches, principally because he felt the Historical Branch should stick to what he considered to be its basic mission, **producing** combat studies. In the meantime the Chief Historian had more success with the War Department's civilian leadership. In February 1944 representatives of Under Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson told Dr. Wright that they would like to have an historian. A month later Wright found one in the person of Dr. Troyer S. Anderson, who had been teaching at the University of Iowa. Although employed by the Historical Branch, Anderson was assigned by it to work in the Under Secretary's office. A similar approach through a senior advisor of Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson secured his agreement to

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accept an historian. Dr. Rudolph A. Winnacker, who had been with the Office of Strategic Services and its predecessor for three years, began work in Stimson's office in October 1944 under an employment arrangement similar to Dr. Anderson's. Placing an historian in the Chief of Staff's area would have to await the end of the fighting.<sup>36</sup>

Both Dr. Anderson and Dr. Winnacker made substantial progress on their projects during the succeeding two years although both became engaged in various tasks only indirectly related to their assignments. In 1944 and 1945, Anderson had to prepare annual and "five-year" reports as well as shorter periodic reports and drafts of speeches for the Under Secretary. Nevertheless, by the summer of 1946 he had completed the bulk of the research required for the story of the Under Secretary's office during World War II --basically, the high level story of Army supply during the war--and also the draft of a 500-page manuscript covering the period to the spring of 1942. Dr. Winnacker had even more of his history in preliminary draft form by the early spring of 1946, but thereafter other assignments prevented him from doing much more. Together these projects helped materially to improve the interest and support of the Army's civilian leaders in historical work. Rather curiously, considering McCloy's active interest in that work, no evidence has been found of any proposal during the war for historical coverage of the Assistant Secretary of War's activities.

For some time, Major DeWeerd had wanted to become the Chief of Staff's historian. In August 1945, soon after the Japanese offer to surrender, he asked General Marshall for access to his papers in order to prepare a definitive history of his activities since 1939. This led General Marshall to assign DeWeerd the task of preparing a "classified fully documented account of the strategic direction of the war" in coordination with

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the Historical Branch and with a view toward publication of an abridged version. DeWeerd was placed in the Current Group of the Operations Division instead of the Chief of Staff's office, so that he could simultaneously fulfill a separately levied requirement to produce an administrative history of OPD during the war. At the end of October DeWeerd proposed a professional staff of five to complete work on these projects within a year and a half. Although DeWeerd himself left a few months later, the work he launched developed into one of the more fruitful of the Army's World War II historical efforts, producing three major volumes for the official history.<sup>37</sup>

Under prodding from the American Council on Education, in the spring of 1944 the Army undertook an extensive historical coverage of its educational and training activities. While the bulk of this work was to be done in the major commands under the supervision of the Historical Branch, the Secretary of War directed that the branch itself prepare an overall "elaborate study of the Army's training program and methods" to include General Staff supervision through G-3 as well as a synthesis of activities within the commands. Fortunately the branch had a very good man to assign to this project, Capt. Elmer Ellis, a professor of history and future president of the University of Missouri. After Ellis returned to teaching in early 1945 the training history became the responsibility of two lieutenants, Dr. Boyd C. Shafer, later Executive Secretary of the American Historical Association, and Dr. H. Fabian Underhill, a teacher at Indiana University. It took such talents to handle the constant and sometimes difficult cooperation with the American Council on Education representatives that the project required, as well as to put together a history of the Army's tremendously variegated training and educational activities. The work that was completed by 1947 would have made a stout volume in print, but it was never

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published. In fact the Army never did succeed in producing a general history of training considered acceptable for inclusion in the official history of World War II.<sup>38</sup>

It was apparently a young Negro historian, Dr. John Hope Franklin, who stirred the Army toward recording the World War II military experience of America's largest racial minority. On 23 February 1944 Assistant Secretary of War McCloy recommended that the Historical Branch prepare a "factual study and history of Negro participation in the current conflict." He believed such a history would be of great value to future Army planners. Although acknowledging its potential importance, Kemper and Wright were reluctant to tackle such a study because of its sensitivity. They soon discovered they had no choice, although Mr. McCloy's executive (a personal friend of Kemper's) did point out that the branch "could move as slowly as desirable to lessen the risk" of stirring up antagonism among either Whites or Negroes until the fighting was over. In 1944 and 1945 the Chief Historian assumed responsibility for collecting materials on the subject, working in friendly cooperation with the Civilian Aide to the Secretary of War. Dr. Wright discovered that among Negroes themselves there was a sharp conflict of opinion over the desirability of a separate treatment of their role in the Army. Initially it was hoped to feed the material relating to Negro participation into other branch projects to obtain a balanced and impartial picture. It was with this objective in view that, at the end of 1945, the branch sought the services of another young Negro scholar, Capt. Ulysses Grant Lee, Jr., to guide the work.<sup>39</sup>

During World War II Army policies required the rotation of officers to and from overseas duty. In consequence, in February 1945 Colonel Kemper left to assume a command in Italy and Lt. Col. Allen F. Clark, Jr. was assigned as Chief of the Historical Branch in

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his place. Two years older than Kemper, Clark came to the branch from duty as an engineer combat group commander on the Italian front. After graduating from the Military Academy he had taken a civil engineering degree at Princeton. Subsequently he taught military engineering and history at West Point for four years and there became well acquainted with Colonel Kemper. As it happened, Kemper would return to the historical office before the end of 1945, and during the ensuing two and a half years he and Clark did yeoman work in establishing the office on a solid postwar footing.

It will be recalled that one of the major objectives of the Historical Branch from its beginning had been a popular history to be published as soon as possible after the fighting was over, and that in June 1944 Col. S. L. A. Marshall had been formally designated "Popular Historian." His transfer to the European Theater left the project unassigned, and one of Colonel Clark's first actions as chief was to seek a new author for the popular history. After Douglas S. Freeman declined, Clark and his colleagues chose Sewell Tyng, by profession a lawyer and mining engineer, but by avocation a military historian of note. The West Point history staff had considered outstanding his Campaign of the Marne, 1914, published in 1935. Tyng, who had been on the branch's books as a consultant in 1944, on 3 April 1945 eagerly agreed to accept the assignment. The plan that evolved by the end of June contemplated a two-volume work on strategic planning and execution of Army operations in Europe and the Pacific. The European volume was to be prepared first and to be ready for publication by 1 January 1946 or as soon thereafter as possible. The author would receive all necessary access to records, help in visiting overseas and interviewing combat leaders, and research assistance. He would be given authorship credit on the title-page, but no other recompense beyond expenses. After clearing and editing the manuscript, the branch would turn it over to a commercial



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publisher, hoping for an initial run of 100,000 copies, with little or no profit to the publisher. The text would be of modest length, with relatively profuse cartographic and photographic illustration.<sup>40</sup>

The plan for the popular history received firm backing from G-2, Mr. McCloy, and, on the publishing angle, from the Judge Advocate General, but it ran into strong opposition from the Operations (OPD) and Personnel Divisions (G-1). Operations adamantly opposed commercial publication, authorship credit, and allowing an outsider like Tyng access to its records. The impasse was broken only after Dr. Baxter was persuaded to intervene with Mr. McCloy, who took the matter up in a War Council meeting and secured the approval of Secretary Stimson and General Marshall to going ahead with the plan as proposed. A formal letter of 22 June to Tyng cleared the way for action. Before he began to write Tyng felt that he needed to visit the European and Mediterranean combat areas to examine the terrain and interview leaders. The Army Air Forces provided him with a special plane complete with jeep for a five-week overseas tour in August and September. Thereafter, working mostly in New York, by the end of 1945 he completed drafts of about a third of the chapters planned for the European volume. His work then ceased as his health rapidly declined. Tyng died in May 1946 and the historical office decided to cancel the project, partly on the ground that the Supreme Commander's Dispatch on operations in Europe then being published would summarize "in fairly good fashion" the ground the popular history was intended to cover. By then also, the branch was concentrating on carrying out the plan for the official history of the war.<sup>41</sup>

The fight over the popular history nevertheless had its significant aspects. For the first time the Historical Branch had "flexed its muscles" and invoked higher authority on matters of principle, and had

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"put it over in spite of the opposition," as Colonel Clark commented later.<sup>42</sup> It had established the principle of proper authorship credit in Army historical publications, in contrast to the practice of anonymity that had become the fashion. It won access as necessary to all relevant records, within the bounds of true national security. It won legal approval of at least one plan for commercial publication, in place of the customary use of the Government Printing Office. And for the first time since its establishment, the branch had invoked the aid of the Historical Advisory Committee and its potent chairman to win topside support.

The German collapse and surrender in May 1945 brought a number of high ranking German officials into the hands of the American Army. Prompted by his historian, the Under Secretary of War proposed that the Historical Branch organize a small group of experts to go to Europe and interview these men on all sorts of questions related to the German war effort. With some difficulty the branch enlisted a five-man team headed by Dr. George N. Shuster, President of Hunter College, and including Lt. Col. Oron J. Hale of the G-2 staff, in civilian life a professor of history at the University of Virginia. After Colonel Clark tried unsuccessfully to get Colonel Kemper assigned to handle interrogations on military matters, Maj. (and future Congressman) Kenneth W. Hechler of the Army's European Theater historical office took on that responsibility. The team stayed in Europe about three months, and during its visit Shuster came under sharp attack from fringe groups advocating a hard line with Germany and the Germans. Much of the work of the Shuster mission turned out to be of questionable value. Colonel Clark later called it a boondogle. But Major Hechler's participation marked the beginning of a much larger use of senior German officer prisoners of war in the Army's postwar historical work in occupied Germany, work that would be of prime importance to the official history to

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be undertaken in the months and years to come.<sup>43</sup>

As the fighting in Germany ended, Army manuscript histories from around the world poured into the Historical Branch. Two weeks before the German surrender the branch had distributed a list of some 600 titles of works that had been in preparation or projected at the beginning of 1945. Existing directives required the branch to review histories only if prepared for publication; but in order to establish better control of the quality of works being produced officially throughout the Army, it began in the summer of 1945 to review all manuscripts coming in. In September the War Department made it mandatory for Army historical agencies to send their completed products to the branch for review. A separate Review Section was established to handle this work, headed by Colonel Hale after his return from Europe.<sup>44</sup>

With world-wide victory in sight in July 1945, President Harry S. Truman urged all Federal agencies to bring their administrative histories "to a current basis during 1945" in order to complete them as soon as possible after the war was over. After Japan surrendered, the Historical Branch suddenly found itself required to send directives to all military elements of Army headquarters and to overseas commands instructing them to begin or expedite narrative accounts of their administrative experiences during the war and otherwise prescribing what they should do to bring their wartime historical work to a fruitful termination. The implication of these directives of course was that the Army as well as other Federal agencies would be sharply reduced in strength as soon as wartime tasks were completed. But it had been intended from the beginning that the Historical Branch should perform its major role after the fighting was over. As its chief later put it, VJ Day marked the

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transition of the branch "from an agency primarily concerned with the preservation of records and other historical material to an agency charged with the responsibility of reducing those records of the war to a more usable form and disseminating them to the Army, to the schools, and to the general public." To accomplish that mission the branch would need a larger staff and a stronger position in Army headquarters.<sup>45</sup>

In the spring of 1945 the Historical Branch had an actual strength of fifteen officers, twenty-six civilians, and five enlisted employees, the total of forty-six being about equal to that of the Historical Section, Army War College. The branch's authorized strength of fifty-six included five temporary officer positions for trainees for overseas, a category that was about to become unnecessary. In May difficulties in recruiting qualified civilian professionals led the branch, with G-2 backing, to seek a permanent increase in officer strength to handle its growing review load and the anticipated inflow of operational monographs for editing and publication. Instead, a rather cursory survey of the branch by representatives of the War Department Manpower Board was followed by a recommendation to reduce its authorized strength to the number then actually employed. This recommendation was approved by the Chief of Staff's office on 2 July. The action took scant account of the fact that definitive historical work can only be done after a war and not during it. While preparing a rebuttal, Colonel Clark discovered that G-2 had accepted the reduction without protest and without consulting his branch. Earlier, and two days before Clark learned about the new barrier to increased strength, he and Dr. Wright had decided the time had come "to start feeling out higher authority on a more permanent and higher level" in the War Department hierarchy for the branch. The manpower problem, and another discovery that G-2 was planning to put the branch into its

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Military Intelligence Service after the war, naturally strengthened this resolve.<sup>46</sup>

With regard to manpower, the Deputy G-2, with the approval of General Bissell, made amends by giving strong backing to an appeal of 10 August that the Historical Branch be given a personnel ceiling of fifty-eight, including nineteen officers and thirty-nine civilian employees and enlisted men. This recommendation for a modest increase rather than a reduction in personnel strength was sent first to the Assistant Secretary of War's office for concurrence. There it received such firm backing from McCloy as practically to assure affirmative action by the Chief of Staff's office. As for the branch's organizational position in the War Department, as stated earlier in 1943 the new history office had been put into G-2 as a wartime expedient, and not because there was any real affinity between the historical and intelligence functions. At the beginning of 1945, Colonel Kemper had suggested locating the branch in peacetime in the Secretary of War's office. In early July an informal conference between representatives of the branch and of the older Historical Section revealed that the section, which for some time past had been reporting directly to the Army's Deputy Chief of Staff, was technically a notch higher in the War Department structure than the branch was under G-2. The conference also reached agreement that the Historical Section's work had no connection with the operations of the Army War College, that the Army's current division of historical functions in its headquarters was unnatural, and that the two offices should eventually be combined into a historical division at the War Department Special Staff level.<sup>47</sup>

After V-J Day, and before learning about the impending favorable outcome of the manpower appeal, Colonel Clark decided to seek the support of the Historical Advisory Committee on both the manpower and organi-

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zational questions. Following its meeting on 21 August 1945, the committee sent McCloy a report urging that the Historical Branch be given greater strength to handle its rapidly increasing workload. In doing so, the report emphasized the fundamental difference between the historical function and about every other War Department activity in terms of the volume of postwar work. It then went on to recommend that consideration be given to relocating the Historical Branch either by making it a section of the Special Staff or a separate branch under the General Staff's secretariat, preferably the latter. Finally it recommended, with no recorded objection from General Spaulding, the transfer to the Historical Branch of the functions and personnel of the War College's Historical Section. This report, with a covering summary sheet signed by Dr. Baxter and marked for General Marshall's consideration after the Assistant Secretary had seen it, was hand carried to Mr. McCloy by Dr. Baxter. Baxter orally requested assignment of a general officer to head the relocated office, as had been recommended in 1943. He later recalled that McCloy responded that major generals were about to become very plentiful, and also that "he could understand our wish to get out from under G-2 lest they put an undue number of their personnel cuts on the historians." Forwarding the committee's report and recommendations to General Marshall, McCloy stated that they had his full endorsement. He urged particularly considering the branch's personnel needs separately from those of the rest of Army headquarters. Without comment the Chief of Staff's office asked G-2 to draft a reply to the Committee's report for Mr. McCloy's signature.<sup>48</sup>

The G-2, General Bissell, had already received a copy of the Advisory Committee's report directly from Colonel Clark as an attachment to a comprehensive study Clark had prepared on postwar historical matters. On 10 September 1945, Bissell called Clark in and in effect rebuked him for acting, as a member

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of the Advisory Committee, in a manner that was disloyal to his military superior. A day or two later, when the referral from General Marshall's office reached him, General Bissell was furious. After sessions with Clark and Baxter, the G-2 drafted a reply for Mr. McCloy's signature assuring the Advisory Committee that the manpower needs of the Historical Branch would be met, but urging that the Committee's other recommendations be reconsidered. Bissell also moved to supplant Colonel Clark as branch chief. He asked the Mediterranean Theater to release Colonel Kemper so that he could again head the historical program in Washington.<sup>49</sup>

In the meantime, on 31 August 1945, General Spaulding had again retired from active duty. His successor, Col. Clarence C. Benson, mounted a counterattack against the proposed absorption of his section by the Historical Branch. He proposed enactment of legislation to establish an "American Battle Monuments and History Commission" to coordinate the entire armed forces historical program. Pending that action, he urged consolidating all Army historical work under the Chief, Historical Section, Army War College. He also recommended publishing the World War II records before undertaking an official narrative history, and he made no effort to conceal his desire to kill the latter project. The War Department rejected his proposals, Colonel Clark actually drafting the rebuttal. Benson then turned to General Eisenhower, still in Europe but slated to become Chief of Staff, to enlist his support; and Eisenhower gave it, agreeing in a letter of 12 October that the War Department's World War II historical office should be confined to the collection, arrangement, and publication of records, and that "by no means should it attempt now to write the history." Colonel Benson, of course, was delighted, and proceeded to circulate copies of the pertinent passages of Eisenhower's letter.<sup>50</sup>

The letter came too late to have any

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significant effect. On a visit to Mr. McCloy on 19 September, Dr. Baxter learned that the Assistant Secretary's office was working on a revised plan for relocating the historical function. Matters might have come to a head more quickly had not McCloy soon thereafter embarked on a trip around the world. On 24 October 1945, a week or more before he returned, the Advisory Committee (less General Spaulding) met again and redrafted its August recommendations in terms designed to soothe the wounded feelings of General Bissell. Except for the omission of any reference to the Historical Section, Army War College, it did not alter their basic character. The committee also endorsed plans drafted by the Historical Branch during October for a multi-volume official history, but left their formal presentation for approval for separate action through military channels. What it now recommended was continued special consideration of the manpower needed to perform the historical function, and establishment of a new "top level historical agency" in the War Department under which the Historical Section and all other Army historical offices would function, to be headed by a general officer and ideally to be located in the Office of the Secretary of War or, as a second choice, in the Office of the Assistant Secretary. If neither were practicable, establishing it as a separate division of the War Department Special Staff would be a "satisfactory alternative." Knowing that Mr. McCloy would approve the recommendations, his office immediately forwarded them to the new Secretary of War, Mr. Patterson. Patterson's executive officer and his historian, Troyer Anderson, endorsed them enthusiastically. By 26 October the secretary had given them his informal approval, indicating that he preferred that the historical agency become a Special Staff division. This status seems by this time also to have become the preference of the Historical Branch itself.<sup>51</sup>

When word of the impending establishment



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of a new historical agency reached Major DeWeerd in the Operations Division, he sounded out Maj. Gen. Edwin F. Harding, then Chief of the Historical Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and discovered that he might be interested in becoming head of the new Army office if it were made a Special Staff division. General Harding had commanded the 32nd Division in New Guinea. His varied career as an infantryman also included nearly a decade of instructing at West Point and the Infantry School. For several years he was editor of the Infantry Journal. At DeWeerd's suggestion Colonel Clark prepared a detailed analysis of the background and status of the Historical Branch for General Harding, and on 30 October 1945 spent three hours with him discussing the branch and its work. The next day Harding and DeWeerd visited the branch, lunched with its senior members, and, prophetically, with Colonel Greenfield of the Army Ground Forces. All were enthusiastic about Harding as a prospective leader. Clark passed this sentiment on to Dr. Baxter who relayed it to Mr. McCloy's office. Thus, when the Assistant Secretary returned from his trip, he found with the papers relating to the proposed new historical office a note recommending General Harding to head it.52

The final steps in establishing the Army's new central historical office followed almost automatically. On or before 2 November 1945, Dr. Baxter called on Mr. McCloy and learned he was about to initiate formal action creating a new Special Staff historical division with General Harding as its director. Only after he was thus **assured** did Dr. Baxter send a letter through Colonel Clark to General Bissell, **enclosing** a copy of the Advisory Committee's most recent report. The letter was, in effect, a diplomatic notification of the parting soon to come and an expression of the Advisory Committee's appreciation for the good support that G-2 had given the historical function during the war. This communication reached G-2 while General Bissell was away on a trip to South

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America and his deputy accepted the situation with equanimity. The action to create the new historical office never did go through military channels. On 9 November, after receiving Mr. McCloy's formal recommendation, Secretary of War Patterson approved the establishment of a separate Special Staff agency to handle the historical function. The agency would report directly to the Deputy Chief of Staff and exercise staff supervision over all Army history work. Patterson directed the Chief of Staff to transfer the Historical Branch, G-2, to it. He also asked the Chief of Staff to appoint General Harding as director of the new office, and Harding was so appointed on 14 November. The formal announcement of the creation of the Historical Division, Special Staff, and the transfer to it of the "functions, records, personnel, office space, and equipment" of the Historical Branch, came three days later.<sup>53</sup>

General Eisenhower succeeded General Marshall as Chief of Staff just two days after the foregoing. At General Harding's suggestion Mr. McCloy sent the new chief a friendly note expressing his own great interest in the Army's historical work and the hope that Eisenhower would keep his eyes on it, adding that "we haven't many results to show after the last war, and I think, after the effort made in this war, the country deserves good material."<sup>54</sup>

Fortunately for the cause of history, Eisenhower would completely reverse the position he had recently taken and become one of the strongest supporters of the Army's historical series on World War II that was about to be launched.

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### LAUNCHING "THE UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II"

The establishment by the War Department of the Historical Division, Special Staff, in November 1945, and the assignment of a general officer to head it, were essential foundations for launching the largest undertaking in narrative historical work that the American nation had ever known. The basic objective behind establishing a new Army historical office in 1943 had been the ultimate production of an official history of the United States Army's participation in World War II. By "official," Army planners of this period meant a history as nearly comprehensive and factually correct as possible, not one that would present an official point of view. In contrast to the large history projected and begun by the Army during and after World War I, the scope of the new undertaking was to be confined to military matters of direct concern to the Army and largely based upon the Army's own records. The first known plan for an official history of World War II, labelled "Military History of the War: American Phase," was dated 21 February 1944 or about three months after Chief Historian Livy Wright's arrival in the Historical Branch. Whether or not Wright was the author of it is uncertain. In any case, this plan called for a multi-volume history under six general headings, including an opening section on the background of American participation in the war and a closing one on demobilization, areas left largely or wholly uncovered when the official history was actually undertaken. A month later Dr. Wright drafted a very different plan which emphasized coverage of major commands at home and overseas. Ten or so volumes would be devoted to each of the major commands in the United States, with a large but unspecified number of volumes on operations in the various overseas theaters.

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Of course Dr. Wright and his colleagues realized that no very specific planning could be done before the fighting ended. Until then they concentrated on stimulating as much historical activity as they could within the Army at home and overseas in order to lay the groundwork for the comprehensive history to be prepared as soon as possible after the war was over.<sup>1</sup>

In the spring and summer of 1945, as the fighting neared its end, Colonel Clark spent many hours with his senior colleagues, Dr. Wright and Colonel Taylor, drafting and discussing plans for the official history. At first they favored a work of relatively modest length that might be published in ten to fifteen volumes and become widely known and read. But such a work, however comprehensive it might appear to the public, would have to leave out a great deal of detail that the Army itself needed for educational purposes. Material for those purposes would have to be printed if it was to survive and not be forgotten. Thus a more detailed series would have to be prepared and published also, probably before the more condensed series. There was no argument with Dr. Wright's projection for the scope of the work:

Military history as conceived by the modern historian is not merely an account of battles and campaigns, but of a whole national society organized for war, using all of its resources both human and material. Within the larger picture of American society at war, the mission of the Historical Branch is to record that part of the war effort which is under the direct or effective influence of the War Department.

Wright recognized that the scope thus defined was "enormous," and held that the product "must be well done or another generation may be left to repeat the same mistakes." For his part Colonel Clark felt very strongly that

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after the war the Army must depend on professional civilian historians to write the official history, not on Regular Army officers. He thought the peacetime experience of the War College Historical Section had proved conclusively that the historical office could well become a refuge for officers who were not adequately qualified to undertake historical research and writing, and perhaps of equal importance, who were liable to be ordered to duty elsewhere before they could finish a major writing assignment.<sup>2</sup>

In August 1945 at least two plans were drafted that were designed to be a compromise between the "condensed" ten-to-fifteen volume plan and the very detailed monographic writing that had characterized most of the Army's historical work until then. One plan contemplated about forty volumes, half of them on operations. The presumption was that the majority of these volumes would be prepared by the existing major command and overseas historical organizations rather than in the central historical office, and that about ten years would be needed to prepare the official history in this way. A second plan, drafted by Dr. Wright, also projected forty volumes in a main series, with greater emphasis on administration and logistics than proposed in the first plan. There were also to be additional publications to include the two-volume popular history, two volumes on Army training and education, an indefinite number dealing with the activities of the seven technical services, and an indefinite number of documentary volumes, the last to be prepared in compliance with the original directive to the branch in 1943.<sup>3</sup>

Colonel Clark was probably working on the second of these plans when in early September he confided somewhat prophetically to his diary that "this particular project gives me a sense of cobwebs and old millstones turning over . . . it will grind on and on for years." A month later the branch's records

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specialist, Lt. Col. Jesse S. Douglas, advanced a more immediately pertinent criticism of a revision of Dr. Wright's plan. He objected to the publication by the branch of a core of forty to forty-five volumes of official history and separate publication of other series of Army histories by the major commands, the technical services, and so forth. He thought the official history ought to contain all the volumes, including the detailed accounts that the ground, air, and service forces were planning to publish. The only Army histories Douglas thought the branch should exclude from the big series were highly specialized technical monographs and studies on classified subjects. Despite these objections, the Wright plan was still the accepted one only five days before the Advisory Committee met in October 1945. Then, on the very eve of that meeting, the Historical Branch changed its course and presented instead to the committee a much broader plan for the official history--essentially the same as that which would be submitted for formal War Department approval in December.<sup>4</sup>

This change resulted from several factors, apparently beginning with the criticisms of Colonel Douglas. About this time Dr. Wright told Colonel Clark that he intended to return to teaching in the fall of 1946, and after mid-October he took little part in the planning for the official history. It is also evident that before the end of the month Colonel Clark and others were looking toward the Ground Forces historian, Dr. Greenfield, as Wright's most eligible successor. Among programs outside the branch, the historical work of the Army Ground Forces was considered the highest in quality and its monographs most nearly ready for publication. Possibly a decisive factor in the change of course for the official history plan was the discovery that Greenfield, with his commander's blessing, had begun to make arrangements with the Infantry Journal's press to publish an eight-volume Army Ground Forces history.

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Getting Greenfield as Chief Historian seemed also to require putting the Ground Forces volumes into the official history.<sup>5</sup>

During the three days preceding the Advisory Committee meeting, Colonel Clark rewrote the plan for the official history in a manner which gave it a much broader coverage and a goal of about 125 volumes. In refining the revised plan, Clark was aided by suggestions from Dr. Wright and Colonels Taylor and Douglas. When the Advisory Committee met on 24 October it approved the new plan. Within a fortnight all of the major command and technical service historical chiefs had added their enthusiastic endorsements. The War Department Printing Board gave its approval on 13 November, and in doing so recommended that the publication of the official history be financed by an initial "no year" appropriation large enough to cover the whole cost of printing. By 24 November this plan for "The History of the Army in World War II" had assumed its final form, but it was not sent through channels to the Chief of Staff and Secretary of War for formal approval until mid-December.<sup>6</sup>

In the plan formally submitted on 18 December 1945, General Harding estimated that the full series would contain about 120 volumes, although only 101 of them were specified in an accompanying list. The stated objective of the series was to present to the Army and to the American people a comprehensive account of the administration and operations of the War Department and the Army during World War II. The history was to be basically a reference work and not a popular summarization. It was not the aim to make it a final and definitive history, but rather a "broad and factual foundation for further specialized research and study." Since the sheer bulk of the records involved made it impossible to publish them in a series similar to the Civil War Official Records, the decision for such a detailed history had been made especially so that the

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Army's schools could use the finished products as basic texts for study. The plan contemplated that the Historical Division would prepare the volumes on the War Department's general direction of the Army's war effort and those treating overseas operations. The major commands and technical services were to prepare their own volumes. The plan called for the use of professional civilian historians to write the history. They would either be employed as full-time workers in government service or obtained by contract to prepare volumes on subjects about which they were especially well qualified to write. The Historical Division hoped such contracts could be paid for from the guaranteed appropriation that it planned to request. All volumes were to be published by the Government Printing Office, at an estimated cost of \$8,000 per volume for 5,000 copies, and were to be as nearly uniform as possible in size, binding, and format. The plan admitted that "some of the work will take years to complete," but it did not try to estimate how many.<sup>7</sup>

After two minor revisions to satisfy objections raised by the Operations and Intelligence Divisions, the proposal reached the Secretary of War and was approved by him on 7 February 1946. An Army circular published five days later described the plan and assigned responsibility to the Historical Division and to other Army agencies for the parts that they were to play in producing the volumes. General Harding informed Dr. Baxter that the plan which the Advisory Committee had approved had won the support of the Secretary of War and Chief of Staff, clearing the way "for the preparation of a detailed and comprehensive history such as the Army has never before attempted." In a personal letter written about the same time, Colonel Clark explained why nearly two-thirds of the volumes were to deal with the major commands and technical services. These, he said, were works "which the respective CG's thereof would have published anyway whether we liked



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it or not." "This way," he added, "we have control of them and can review and edit them carefully to insure a high standard."8

Included in the plan as submitted was a recommendation that the Historical Division be authorized to initiate action to establish a continuing fund to finance preparation and publication of the official history. The War Department's budget authorities, in commenting on the plan as it passed through the Chief of Staff's office, stated that the establishment of such a continuing fund would require a special act of Congress and that it had been the long-standing policy of Congress to oppose such appropriations except for large construction projects. It would therefore in all probability be necessary to procure the funds required through appropriations on a year to year basis. This verdict made it very unlikely that the Historical Division could contract with outside scholars for very much of the work, if indeed it could contract for any of it.9

Not everyone either within or outside of the Army was happy over the decision to undertake under official auspices a massive narrative history of the Army's part in the war. In December 1945 the chief of the War College Historical Section, Colonel Benson, minced no words in writing to his new technical supervisor, General Harding. He voiced his opposition to the official history proposal and expressed his strong preference for collecting and publishing the source materials in order to make them available to historians generally. The following April Douglas S. Freeman, the dean of American military historians, wrote editorials and a letter to the Secretary of War that were even more adamant in their opposition. He held that "no adequate unrestricted history of America's participation in the Second World War can be written during the lifetime of the principal leaders in that struggle," and that "historians will not be grateful for our attempt to write an official history before

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we publish the basic documents." A conciliatory reply drafted by the Chief Historian-elect, Dr. Greenfield, does not seem to have changed Freeman's mind.<sup>10</sup>

Except for the appointment of General Harding as Director (Chief after June 1946), the new Historical Division changed very little in organization or size in the first few months after its establishment. Physically it remained in the same fifth floor location in the Pentagon that it had occupied as the Historical Branch. On November 1945 Colonel Clark, in consultation with his senior colleagues, drafted an organizational directive for the division, which would be issued, with two significant changes, as an Army Staff Circular on 7 January 1946. It provided for an organization under the Director consisting of five elements: (1) an Advisory Committee appointed by the Secretary of War and representing the professional historical scholarship of the nation, with the duty of advising the Secretary, the Director, and the Chief Historian on all matters relating to Army historical activities; (2) a civilian Chief Historian to be the principal full-time historical advisor to the military Director, and who would be primarily responsible for supervising the production and quality of the division's historical work and for establishing and maintaining professional relationships (Colonel Clark in his November draft had proposed that the Chief Historian be appointed by the Secretary of War, on the advice of the Advisory Committee, but this provision was dropped); (3) a Planning Branch, to handle planning and to supervise other Army historical organizations (but not to control them, as Clark's November draft had proposed), with a Records Analysis Section to be responsible for securing, handling, and analyzing documentary materials, including establishment "of standards for the retention and processing of War Department and Army records of value in the preparation of military histories;" (4) a

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Research and Writing Branch to prepare historical studies "not within the province of other . . . Army organizations"; and (5) an Editorial Branch to establish standards for and review Army historical manuscripts and publications, and to edit and prepare for publication works to be published by the division. In two areas the new organization was assigned responsibilities that encroached upon functions normally exercised by the Adjutant General: supervision of the process of retention and processing of Army records to be used in military history, and editing of Army publications for printing. In both of these areas there would be problems to resolve in the years ahead.<sup>11</sup>

In the new organization Colonel Clark became the Deputy Director and Colonel Kemper, who had returned in November 1945, the Chief of the Planning Branch. General Harding, whose residual duties with the Joint Chiefs of Staff occupied much of his time, left the routine administration of the division very largely to Clark, Kemper, and Chief Historian Livy Wright. It was they who fought off a proposal in January 1946 to annex the Army Library to the Historical Division. They were less successful in fending off the amalgamation of the War College Historical Section and the division, when the former had to find a new home following the decision to establish a national war college at Fort McNair. On paper this consolidation occurred on 1 May 1946, although the possible embarrassments of physical integration were postponed until early the following year.<sup>12</sup>

At the beginning of February 1946 the strength of the Historical Division was twenty-nine officers and forty civilians, but a proposal for a much larger staff (thirty-four officers and eighty-three civilians) to handle the big history project was in the mill. This enlargement was made all the more necessary by two developments: the disintegration of overseas historical

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organizations during the rapid postwar demobilization, which made it impossible for them to prepare volumes for the World War II history as originally contemplated, and the discouraging prospect for contracting with outside scholars to prepare volumes.<sup>13</sup>

During a month's visit to the European Theater in December, Colonel Clark had confirmed a growing realization in Washington "that no historical program covering operations during the war could be accomplished [overseas] under the confused conditions caused by the redeployment schedule." It would therefore be necessary, if at all possible, to persuade the best of the overseas historians to return to Washington to do the work. The ablest of the Army's professional historians in Europe was Dr. Hugh M. Cole, then the deputy theater historian. Cole expressed willingness to consider civilian employment with the Historical Division only when he learned that Dr. Wright was leaving and would probably be succeeded by Dr. Greenfield, whom Cole admired. Cole's apparent willingness promised to win over several of his more able colleagues, if satisfactory salaries could be offered to them. After his return to Washington, and somewhat to his surprise, Colonel Clark managed to persuade the Civil Service Commission to approve salaries high enough to attract top-notch people, salaries substantially higher than America's colleges and universities were then paying scholars of comparable ability and experience. To complete the Army's best historical work then underway in the Pacific, on the battle for Okinawa, the team of five men in uniform then working on it in Hawaii were brought to Washington and made a temporary part of the Historical Division's staff. Because only one of them would remain as a civilian historian and he for only a short while, writers for the other Pacific volumes had to be recruited from outside this highly qualified group.<sup>14</sup>

In recruiting competent people, the

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enlistment of Dr. Greenfield as the future Chief Historian was of almost equal importance to an attractive salary schedule. Greenfield was widely known and highly regarded in academic circles. Fortunately for the Army, a feud with the president of Johns Hopkins made him reluctant to return there and resume the chairmanship of its history department. But he was also reluctant to commit himself to peacetime government service unless he could be assured that the work he would supervise would be well supported and conducted in accordance with the principles of sound historical scholarship. As a practical matter, it was also necessary to resolve the inconsistency between the approved World War II history plan that contemplated publishing all of the volumes through the Government Printing Office and the Army Ground Forces' arrangement to have its volume published by the Infantry Journal's press.

In mid-February 1946 after conferences between Harding, Clark, Greenfield, and the editor of the Infantry Journal, the editor agreed to government publication of the Ground Forces' volumes. Two weeks later the first volume, Greenfield's own work on the history of General Headquarters, was delivered to the Historical Division for preparation for the press. A conference at the end of February also reached preliminary agreement on more or less uniform characteristics for all series volumes. Still, Greenfield did not commit himself until after two more significant meetings the following month. The first, on 13 March, was a session of the Advisory Committee, at which its members were briefed on the development of the official history program since the last meeting five months before. Presumably they expressed approval of the selection of Dr. Greenfield as Dr. Wright's successor. The second, two days later, was a forty-minute interview between Dr. Greenfield and General Eisenhower. The Chief of Staff expressed keen interest in the official history project, promised that those working on it would be

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given access as necessary to Army records, and agreed to allow Colonels Clark and Kemper to remain with the project until it was on a firm footing. A month later, with some difficulty, the Historical division obtained Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson's signature to a letter to Dr. Greenfield (still in uniform as a lieutenant colonel) assuring him support from the secretariat for the World War II history project and expressing appreciation for Greenfield's willingness to leave university life and devote himself to it.<sup>15</sup>

The Eisenhower interview convinced Greenfield and his prospective senior colleagues of the Historical Division that the auspices for official history work were good. They were assured that as government historians working on the history they would have access to all relevant Army records, individual authorship credit, and the freedom "to call the shots as they saw them." These assurances were all the more necessary because among academic historians in the United States, military history after World War I had become a neglected and disparaged field, and among them and the American public generally official publications had never acquired a reputation for scholarly objectivity. If the volumes of the official history of the Army in World War II were to be accepted and used both within and outside the service, they would have to be as good and trustworthy as their authors could possibly make them.<sup>16</sup>

The day after the War Department publicly announced the appointment of Dr. Greenfield as Chief Historian, Colonel Clark learned that General Harding felt he must soon retire, because in the postwar reduction of temporary grades he was to revert to the Regular Army rank of colonel. Within a week Clark and Greenfield had lined up Maj. Gen. Harry J. Malony as Harding's successor. Malony took over as Chief of Military History on 12 July 1946, about three weeks before

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Greenfield himself reported for duty. The new chief, described as a "natural" for the job by one of his most knowledgeable military colleagues, had been a Deputy Chief of Staff at General Headquarters before Pearl Harbor and afterwards the leader of the 94th Division in training and battle. Shortly before he became chief, he reverted to the rank of brigadier general, which was the grade formally allotted to the Chief's position effective 1 July 1946. Malony's rank of major general was restored in 1948 and he and his successors during the decade following all held that rank, a step higher than the position actually required. During Malony's tour, Chief and Chief Historian worked closely together. Greenfield carried the major responsibility for molding the World War II series into shape and Malony exercised aggressive leadership in other matters, particularly in directing the division's broadening range of historical activities.17

The exchange of military and civilian chiefs in the summer of 1946 was but a part of a larger turnover in the division staff. Thanks to General Eisenhower's intervention, Colonels Clark and Kemper were allowed to complete their normal tours, but Colonel Taylor, Major Lamson, and several other officer-historians decided to return to teaching, and an entirely new staff for the Editorial Branch had to be found. With some reluctance, Dr. Winnacker agreed to suspend work on his history of Secretary Stimson's activities and take temporary charge of editing. Under him newly recruited senior editors included historians Dr. Stetson Conn from Amherst College and Dr. Albert K. Weinberg from the United Nations' relief organization. Fortunately, the largest writing sections, the European under Dr. Hugh Cole and the Pacific under Dr. Louis Morton, acquired not only strong leadership but also a core of authors who, like their chiefs, had served overseas during the war. New people had to be found for Mediterranean coverage

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and for many administrative and logistical topics. Getting them in the summer of 1946 was not easy in competition with colleges and universities emerging from their wartime doldrums. Both newly recruited historians and those already aboard met with Chief of Staff Eisenhower for half an hour on 30 July to receive his greetings and assurance of enthusiastic support.<sup>18</sup>

A most important ingredient in the success of the Army's Historical Division was what Dr. Pendleton Herring called the "honest cooperation between two professional groups, the professional officers of the Army and the professional historians of the nation, each recognizing and respecting the needs and interests of the Army." Dr. Greenfield described it more simply as "a happy marriage of the military and historical professions." There were, of course, occasional instances of misunderstanding and friction, but they were generally overshadowed by a spirit of harmony. In part this harmony reflected the care taken in selecting officers and civilians for the Historical Division. It also flowed, as Colonel Clark emphasized, from the administration of the division's work as a "consultative operation," no major step being taken without careful preliminary discussion and substantial agreement among military and civilian leaders.<sup>19</sup>

The Historical Advisory Committee provided another pillar of strength as the Army's World War II series took shape, especially after it was enlarged in the winter of 1946-47. Planned since the spring of 1946, this expansion retained the four original "outside" members chosen in 1943, and added seven civilian historians appointed by the Secretary of War to increase total membership to eleven. Dr. Baxter continued as chairman, and all civilian appointments were for an indefinite term. Four of the newcomers were alumni: Dr. Wright, Colonel Taylor, and the ex-chiefs of the overseas European and Mediterranean theater historical offices. Two



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were professors at the universities of Chicago and California, added to give the committee nation-wide geographical representation. The seventh was Douglas Freeman, who agreed to serve but never really became a convert to the World War II program. Before the expansion, the remnant of the original committee held an all-day meeting on 7 November 1946 devoted to reports on the development of the World War II series; and in April 1947 the enlarged committee, during a two-day meeting, heard addresses from both Chief of Staff Eisenhower and Secretary of War Patterson attesting to their interest in the historical program. After 1946 individual members kept in touch between meetings by receiving copies of the Chief Historian's progress reports. From time to time they helped in the review of volumes nearing readiness for publication. Naturally, the distinguished members of the expanded committee gave the World War II program a strong tie with the historical profession across the nation.<sup>20</sup>

In 1946 and 1947 the major problems the division faced were obtaining assured access to the Army's records, refining the official history plan and establishing its standards and objectives, and substantially enlarging a professional staff at a time of general retrenchment. Until the summer of 1946 the authors of the official history volumes had no formal assurance that they could use the wartime files of the War Department as necessary. Indeed, the only authorized access they had was to after-action reports from overseas sent to the Operations Division during the war, although in practice they managed to see and use a good many other records. Immediately after General Eisenhower promised Dr. Greenfield in March 1946 that Army historians would be able to use all the records they needed, the Historical Division drafted a directive giving its authors blanket access to all files in War Department custody. In the normal staffing of this draft, the Intelligence and Operations

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Divisions insisted on qualifications that were accepted by the Chief of Staff. The G-2 reservations, which were intended to prevent the disclosure of intelligence sources and methods, did not greatly matter; but those of the Operations Division, if narrowly interpreted, would have made true histories of the war's major plans and operations impracticable.<sup>21</sup>

Acting as the Army Chief of Staff's command post during the war, the Operations Division (OPD) had overshadowed all other elements in the military hierarchy of the War Department. It had handled all Joint and Combined Chiefs of Staff actions for the Army, acquiring in the process a complete set of formal JCS and CCS papers. And the OPD files were filled with individual joint and combined papers interlaced with important martial on Army policy. Guardians of the OPD files were reluctant to allow anyone to use them unless they were subject to court martial. Moreover, OPD persuaded General Eisenhower to require the Historical Division to make its own special arrangements with the Joint Chiefs of Staff on access to joint and combined papers. Thus, the access paper signed by Eisenhower at the end July 1946 left a good deal to be desired.<sup>22</sup>

Initially it appeared that only very limited access to OPD files and no authority to use joint and combined papers would be granted to Army historians. Then in October 1946 Colonel Clark learned that the Joint Chiefs were allowing Army schools to use their records, and he persuaded General Malony to reopen the question. A staff study prepared by Colonel Clark supplied General Eisenhower with the ammunition to carry the day at a JCS meeting in early January 1947. A few days later the Plans and Operations Division, OPD's successor, capitulated and henceforth allowed Army historians to use its most privy records under appropriate controls. The last barrier fell when the Joint Chiefs, after a masterly presentation

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by General Malony at a meeting on 21 June 1948, granted service historians the authority to cite JCS and CCS papers in their publications.<sup>23</sup>

Both military and civilian leaders recognized in 1946 that good public relations, and especially relations with the historical profession, depended in considerable measure on extending to private individuals as much freedom as possible in research in the Army's World War II records. With rare exceptions private research had not been allowed in Army records before 1946. The first break came in April when representatives of the Historical Division and the Adjutant General's Office agreed to open unclassified combat analysis files to outside research. Freedom of access to almost all unclassified material soon followed, but the files that scholars were most anxious to use were under security controls that would not be generally removed for decades. Only the sheer bulk of this material prevented the declassification of most of it much earlier. Beginning in 1947 the Army tried to find ways to give responsible outsiders access to the information in its classified files that could be made public.<sup>24</sup>

These efforts to gain access to Army World War II records for both Army historians and outside researchers received strong backing from Chief of Staff Eisenhower. In a directive of 20 November 1947, he took the positions that the record of the Army's activities in World War II was public property, that its official history then in preparation must tell the whole story without reservation "whether or not the evidence of history places the Army in a favorable light," that preparation of this history should not be a barrier to private research in Army records, and that no information in them should be withheld from public release except when such release would "in fact endanger the security of the Nation." In practice this directive helped official more

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than it did private research in records. Although it did lead to the adoption of procedures that permitted controlled research by outsiders in classified records relating to the war, procedures which the Historical Division helped to publicize, only a limited amount of private research in such records ensued. While the controls imposed on outsiders were similar to those under which the Army's own historians worked, it was much easier in practice for the latter, working as full-time government employees, to learn how to extract the maximum of information that could be released without endangering the national security. Indeed, perhaps the basic justification for undertaking the Army's World War II history as a public enterprise was that it could not have been compiled and made public in any other way.<sup>25</sup>

The plan for the World War II history approved in February 1946 was refined considerably in the following months. In the spring of 1946 the Historical Division was contemplating an eventual total of eighty or more volumes dealing with the activities of the War Department and the major commands and services operating within or under it, many more than actually would be undertaken. The list then included seven volumes dealing with the Army Air Forces and ten each for the Army Service and Army Ground Forces. In the reorganization of the War Department in June 1946 the Army Service Forces disappeared, and the Historical Division was never able to fully cover its manifold activities. The projected number of Ground Forces volumes shrunk during 1946 from ten to three. And the Air Forces, while keeping its seven, tended more and more to go its separate way in historical work as in other matters. In September the Army's technical services assumed responsibility for accounts of the overseas activities relating to their respective branches. As a result the number of volumes they were scheduled to produce increased to twenty-eight. The major coverage of overseas operations was to be,

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nevertheless, in the theater volumes. By August the chiefs of the European and Pacific writing sections had worked out reasonably firm volume plans for their areas. The first World War II volume, rushed to the press in September 1946, contained an estimate that the Army's official history of the War would eventually total ninety-nine volumes, a considerable drop from earlier projections. The new figure, no more than an educated guess, still contemplated devoting more than two-thirds of the series' coverage to the nonoperational aspects of the war.<sup>26</sup>

One consequence of the big series planning was a decision by October 1946 to curtail the American Forces in Action series and to convert some of the manuscripts being prepared for it into volumes for The United States Army in World War II. The three AFA pamphlets appearing after 1946 were works begun earlier that could not be fitted into the official history. Two others in progress in the summer of 1946, dealing with the Okinawa and Guadalcanal operations, became the first combat volumes to be published in the World War II series. At the end of December the Chief Historian hoped that Okinawa could be published not too long after the Navy's first operational volume, then scheduled to appear within two months. In the event, the Army volume was not ready for distribution until December 1948. Guadalcanal, on which Dr. John Miller, jr., had begun work in November 1945, became the first volume in the series written entirely within the Historical Division, although Miller benefited from extensive work done overseas. Completed in draft form in two years, its editing and publication took almost as long as its composition.<sup>27</sup>

Work on many other theater volumes was just beginning in the summer of 1946. An exception was the work of Dr. Forrest C. Pogue on the history of General Eisenhower's European headquarters, The Supreme Command, which he had begun overseas during the

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preceding winter. Another project well underway was a history of the Women's Army Corps, being written by Maj. Mattie E. Treadwell, who had joined the division the preceding autumn. After Captain Lee joined in February 1946, the division found the scheme for feeding material on the participation of Negro troops into other authors' volumes too difficult. In mid-summer 1946 he was assigned to write a separate volume on the employment of Negro troops during the war, a volume that would not appear in print until two decades later. Works planned on the Army's part in the higher direction of the war effort included the history of the Operations Division and two or more volumes on the activities and contributions of Chief of Staff George C. Marshall. Work began on the Operations Division history in October 1945, and in September 1946 Mr. Mark S. Watson, a distinguished war reporter for the Baltimore Sun, undertook the work on the Chief of Staff's office. The histories of secretariat activities had been started in 1944 by Drs. Winnacker and Anderson. Dr. Anderson had hoped to complete his work on the Under Secretary of War's activities before he returned to teaching in September 1946, but he actually produced only an introductory portion before his untimely death in April 1948. After nine months' duty as Chief Editor, in January 1947 Dr. Winnacker resumed his work on Secretary Stimson; but two tours of duty with the new National War College and other outside engagements inhibited much further progress before his appointment in 1949 as Historian for the Office of the Secretary of Defense.<sup>28</sup>

As noted above, the historical studies of the Army Ground Forces, prepared by and under the direction of Dr. Greenfield before he became Chief Historian, were considered in early 1946 the works most nearly ready for publication in the official history. In mid-February, Dr. Wright and Colonel Kemper in a conference with Greenfield approved the immediate publication of the latter's own

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short work (220 typed pages) on General Headquarters, AGF's predecessor, as a separate volume in the World War II series. Two months later his executive sent the Historical Division three more studies, totalling 285 pages, for a second AGF volume. These studies had already been revised in accordance with comments and criticisms made by the division in an earlier review. In July 1946 General Malony and his helpers decided these works were too short to be printed as separate volumes in the rather large book size that had been adopted for the World War II series. Even before then Dr. Winnacker and his assistants had begun to question whether the AGF studies were really ready for publication. Yet it was essential for the division to publish a volume in the new series as soon as possible. Combining the GHQ history with five other studies made a book of suitable length. Two months of intensive work made it ready by 17 September for delivery to the Adjutant General's Office, the channel through which all Army publications had to be transmitted to the Government Printing Office. In November Dr. Greenfield was hoping to get this volume "out of the trenches before Christmas," but in fact this first book in The United States Army in World War II was not published until the fall of 1947.29

The second AGF volume proved even more a testing ground for the series than the first. As the time scheduled for its delivery to the printer approached, Dr. Winnacker took the position that the studies to be included needed a broader perspective and other improvements before publication. Dr. Greenfield took exception to some of his criticisms but accepted others, and personally devoted two or three months to revising these studies and others added to flesh out the volume. It finally went into the publication channel in April 1947, but another fourteen months passed before it appeared in print.30

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That complex historical volumes would take far longer to print through the Government Printing Office than anyone had anticipated was but one of the lessons learned from experience in the preparation and publication of the AGF and other early volumes. Work on these volumes also led to development of more explicit standards and objectives for the series than those set forth in the approved plan. A necessary degree of uniformity in style was obtained by preparation of a style manual for series volumes. Distributed in October 1946, the manual allowed some leeway for variations, but not within the same book. All authors of series volumes, both within and outside the Historical Division, were expected to adhere to accepted standards of historical scholarship and methodology. Their works were to be fully documented, not only to indicate the sources on which they relied but also to provide the reader with a guide to the documents. While bearing in mind that the series had been conceived as a work for training and reference, authors were expected to write their books in clear and common English. Full responsibility for authorship was to be recognized by placing the author's name on title-page and spine, and by inclusion of a signed author's preface. That signature meant that nothing had been included in his book, nor any changes made in its language, without his consent. Also, the Army faithfully adhered to a policy of never publishing a censored or "sanitized" version. Recognizing that documentary evidence was frequently inadequate, from the beginning authors were encouraged to interview participants. The Army was thus a pioneer in oral history. Moreover, draft manuscripts were circulated widely to obtain as much helpful criticism as possible from both participants and other historians. Both authors and Army history were protected by a basic rule against changing any statement of fact unless new and convincing documentary evidence was produced.

As for objectives, authors had necessarily to keep in mind that the series was intended



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primarily for Army use: for the instructor in Army schools, for the "student-officer educating himself for a position of responsibility in another war" as the Chief Historian once put it, and for a broader professional scholarly public and a "general but limited public of thoughtful citizens." As reference works its volumes were not expected to be popular histories or, to quote Dr. Greenfield, "bedtime reading for anybody." Content was to be confined to topics of Army-wide interest and to subject matter of sufficient import for it to be useful for the Army to know about for a half-century or more.

A periodic seminar launched by the Chief Historian 1 November 1946 became a major vehicle for developing common standards and objectives. Dr. Greenfield modeled it on a seminar he had developed as chairman of Johns Hopkins' history department. Looking back in 1948, Colonel Clark characterized the seminar system as "invaluable in indoctrinating our authors with the level of scholarship demanded in the division." For each seminar an author submitted what he considered a finished and properly documented piece of thirty or so pages written for a major division publication. Reproduced and distributed a week in advance, this paper was read critically by about a dozen individuals including the Chief Historian or his representative, one of the division's senior military critics, a member of the editorial staff, one or more knowledgeable critics from outside the office, and a half dozen or more of the author's peers, including some working on dissimilar topics. The author was present at the meeting of the members of the seminar, and normally received a barrage of criticism, most of it helpful. The realization by all the writers that they would be subjected to the seminar system provided a most effective spur to better scholarship. Participation of top Army and Navy officers was not only helpful to authors but also it made these officers aware of the trustworthy manner in which the Army's history was being written.

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Attendance of the ex-commander of the China Theater, Albert S. Wedemeyer, and key members of his staff at a seminar in January 1947 won for the authors of the China-Burma-India theater volumes both the promise and practice of whole-hearted support. Later in 1947 Chief of Staff Eisenhower twice took the time to participate in seminars on topics related to his European command. While seminars were held less frequently as work on the series progressed, for a decade or more they continued to be a useful device. In later years they were used particularly for technical service historians preparing volumes for the big series who lacked the advantage that historians within the division had of working closely together.<sup>31</sup>

As work on the World War II history gathered momentum in the second half of 1946, the problems of manning the Historical Division increased. However logical the argument that the war's history could not be written until the fighting ended and records became available and therefore that the Army's central historical office needed substantially greater peacetime strength than had been allotted to it during the war, from the spring of 1946 the division had to fight off attempts to include historical activity in the general curtailment of War Department operations and its accompanying sharp reductions in authorized military and civilian strengths. Under the policy of relying on civilians to write the history and to undertake most of the other tasks related to its preparation and publication, the division needed fewer officers, but many more civilian professionals and the necessary clerical support for their work. By the summer of 1946 its goal was a strength of twenty officer and eighty-three Civil Service positions, exclusive of those required by the World War I section attached the preceding May. In fact during the second half of 1946 the division could not find enough qualified people to reach the authorized civilian strength of seventy-four. At the end of the

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year a further reduction in the authorization for the succeeding quarter brought it in line with actual strength, but the new ceiling precluded any more recruiting for World War II history work. Furthermore, sharp reductions in other Army agencies posed more than a threat of large-scale "bumping" of division employees by considerably less qualified people from the outside.<sup>32</sup>

As Colonel Clark lay awake on the night of 16 January 1947 worrying about personnel and money, an idea came to him that would prove to be the salvation of the Army's big official history project. He knew that the Army had accumulated a large surplus of funds from operating post exchanges during the war, and that it had begun turning this money over to the Treasury. Why not ask the Secretary of War to allocate enough of this nonappropriated money to the Historical Division to pay civilians working on the World War II project? Exploring his idea informally with the executive to Assistant Secretary of War Howard C. Peterson, Mr. McCloy's successor, he received an encouraging response. Before the end of January he learned that Mr. Peterson, whose duties included supervising nonappropriated funds, had recommended to his superior that some of this money be allocated to the preparation and publication of The United States Army in World War II.<sup>33</sup>

Thus encouraged, Colonel Clark and the division's chief planning officer worked up a detailed statement of how much it would cost to complete the World War II series, as then planned, within five years. As Clark later acknowledged, the total they came up with, \$3,974,000, was related more to the maximum of \$4,000,000 they dared ask for than to their actual calculation. General Malony's formal request on March 7 for nonappropriated funds in this amount set off a struggle with the War Department's budget officer that remained unresolved until after Assistant Secretary of War Peterson returned in June

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from a trip around the world. During this interlude the Historical Division was threatened with a 50 percent cut in its civilian professional ranks, from which it fortunately escaped. Then in early June the Division learned that its civilian strength was to be cut by 25 percent in the coming fiscal year. The Chief of Military History and his Chief Historian, working in close cooperation, tried every approach they could think of in attempts to mend the situation, including an alert to the Historical Advisory Committee that its members might be called upon to help lobby for a special appropriation from Congress. On 10 June, with the budget officer still adamant, General Malony in a third formal appeal asked the Chief of Staff and Secretary of War to overrule him and grant the total originally requested, or as much less as they were willing to make available, in order to save the World War II history program. At a meeting of the War Council on 16 June, with Patterson and Eisenhower present, Mr. Peterson brought up the proposal and the council agreed to make not more than \$4,000,000 in nonappropriated funds available to support the World War II project. Until this news reached the Historical Division, which it did on or about 20 June, the outlook there was a gloomy one indeed, even the Chief Historian seeing no hope for more than a very incomplete windup of the program during the next two years. Now the Army's World War II history, in contrast to almost all of the Federal historical projects inaugurated during the war, could be carried through to a fruitful conclusion.<sup>34</sup>

In hurried action during the week preceding the new fiscal year, the Historical Division established a War Department Historical Fund to administer the money, with the Army Central Welfare Fund serving as its formal custodian. An increment of a million dollars was made available immediately, and effective 1 July 1947 nearly half the division's civilian workers were transferred from

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Civil Service to nonappropriated fund status as employees of the War Department Historical Fund. They continued to receive the same salaries and all the usual Civil Service prerequisites except retirement benefits. With satisfactory performance they had job security for at least the next five years. As an interim arrangement the division put Fund employees into new World War II and Editorial Groups, which would be consolidated as the World War II Group in a formal reorganization on 1 January 1948. With the Fund at hand the Historical Division was willing to accept a reduction in its authorized Civil Service strength from eighty to sixty-four. It now had the financial means to hire as many employees as it needed to work on the history of World War II, and to defray the costs of publication.<sup>35</sup>

The immediate transfer of civilian employees from Civil Service to the Fund on 1 July included historians of the OPD, Signal Corps, and Transportation Corps historical offices. The latter two had been abolished in the widespread reduction of Civil Service strengths among Army agencies, and all historical and clerical personnel of the former would in due course be taken over by the Historical Division. The absorption of the OPD section, under Dr. Ray S. Cline after Colonel DeWeerd's return to teaching in 1946, was accompanied by a recasting of its work to include not only an administrative history of the Operations Division by Dr. Cline but also two volumes on the high level strategic planning in which that division had been so intimately involved and concerning which its records were the primary American source. These two volumes were written principally by Cline's successor as section chief, Dr. Maurice Matloff.<sup>36</sup>

The Fund also made it possible for the Historical Division to add new professional and clerical employees both for existing and new projects. For example, in September 1947 Dr. F. Stansbury Hayden was engaged to

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complete the voluminous unfinished history of Army training left by Dr. Shafer on his departure a year earlier. Several months later the Chief Historian, attracted by the excellence of a recently published narrative by Mr. Charles B. MacDonald of his wartime combat experiences, persuaded him to join the division and undertake a volume on small unit combat actions. To bolster one of the weakest of the surviving technical service historical offices, the division employed Dr. Constance M. Green, a well-known economic historian, to take charge of the Ordnance Department's historical work. To support the historians of the European, Mediterranean, and Pacific theater sections, the division also employed from late 1947 onward several research assistants with the language capacity to work in the large volume of German and Japanese material that was becoming available in Washington. Presently there would emerge out of this activity a separate foreign studies section. Actions such as these led to a threefold increase in the division's civilian Fund employees in the two years after it was established, to a total of about 100. The division's whole strength increased from 130 on 1 July 1947 to 210 on 1 April 1949.<sup>37</sup>

Even though money was now available, the Historical Division in only three instances entered into contracts for outside preparation of volumes for the World War II series, a procedure that the original plan had proposed for much wider use. Only two of these contracts produced books. In the spring of 1948, the division let a Fund contract with Professor Irving B. Holley of Duke University to do a work on the procurement of air materiel. This subject might seem of more concern to the Air Forces than to the Army, but the Air Forces did not plan the detailed coverage of it that the division considered desirable. The other contract was for the "biography" of Army Service Forces' headquarters mentioned below. Beginning in 1942, the Army Air Forces (Department of the Air Force from 1947) had developed a large

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historical organization both at home and overseas; and its historical work, like its other functions, became increasingly independent of Army control. This autonomy accelerated after the reorganization of June 1946; for all practical purposes after the fall of that year the Air Forces historical program was no longer under Army supervision. The original World War II series plan had included seven Air Forces volumes; but instead of central editing in the Historical Division and publication through the Government Printing Office the Air Forces arranged to have its volumes edited and published by the University of Chicago Press. While the Historical Division formally reviewed the first two Air Forces volumes, published in 1948 and 1949, its criticisms were offered as friendly suggestions rather than as mandates for change. In July 1947, the Air Force applied for and was allocated a fair share (over \$300,000) of the War Department Historical Fund to pay for the preparation and publication of the seven Air Forces volumes, all of which would eventually appear.<sup>38</sup>

Recording the history of the Army Service Forces (ASF), in contrast to that of the Air Forces, became a major problem for the Historical Division and one that was never adequately solved. The abolition of the huge ASF headquarters in the reorganization of June 1946 eliminated the wartime ASF historical organization, and the technical and administrative services that had been under ASF's close supervision recovered most of the autonomy that they had enjoyed before the war. The General Staff's Supply, Services, and Procurement Division inherited many of ASF's logistical responsibilities, but the single historian it employed could do no more than plan what his agency should do if and when its historical section was enlarged. For ASF's personnel and administrative areas there was no prospect of securing historical volumes from agencies outside the Historical Division suitable for

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the World War II series. Of the elements that had made up the ASF empire, only the technical services (Chemical, Engineers, Medical, Ordnance, Quartermaster, Signal, and Transportation) had sizeable and generally adequate historical staffs that could produce volumes for the official history.<sup>39</sup>

As soon as the Historical Fund became available, the division detailed Dr. Conn of the Editorial Branch to survey the ASF-technical services historical situation and its relation to the official history as a whole. The survey provided the basis for intensive discussions in late summer 1947 within the Army and with outside experts that produced agreement on the need for employing a top-notch scholar in the Historical Division to head up an ASF-type program, including technical supervision over volumes being undertaken by the technical services. A division of the ground to be covered by the authors that the Historical Division itself would engage for ASF work was also agreed upon. In November Troyer Anderson tentatively agreed to accept responsibility for a background work on Army procurement and supply before ASF's establishment in March 1942, but shortly thereafter he was struck down by cancer. Professor John D. Millett of Columbia University, who had been ASF's principal historian during the war, agreed to write a one-volume administrative history of the Army Service Forces on a Fund contract. By the spring of 1949 he completed a draft that in due course would become the only volume in the series dealing directly with ASF's organization and activities. Dr. Richard M. Leighton, who had also been an ASF historian during the war, joined the division in January 1948 to work on the story of Army supply from March 1942 onward. This project developed rather differently, into a two-volume work entitled Global Logistics and Strategy covering the years 1940-45. Dr. Robert W. Coakley, an Army historian in Europe during the war, was coauthor. The division never did find the senior historian



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it wanted to coordinate the ASF-technical service area. It did get a competent man in 1950, Dr. R. Elberton Smith, a former economics professor at Northwestern University, to provide broad coverage of Army procurement. His work, The Army and Economic Mobilization, along with Holley's volume on air materiel, the volumes on global logistics, and several volumes of the technical services provided a fairly comprehensive coverage of Army logistics in the World War II series.<sup>40</sup>

The areas of ASF responsibility that remained largely uncovered in the World War II series, except for separate treatment in technical service volumes, were the recruitment and training of military and civilian personnel, and the activities of the Army's administrative services (Adjutant General, Chaplains, Finance, Judge Advocate General, Provost Marshall General, Special Services). For years the Historical Division tried diligently but without success to find historians who were both competent and willing to undertake a general work on personnel, and on one or two topical rather than organizational volumes on the administrative services that would stress the "segregated community" and "housekeeping" aspects of Army service and employment. When work on a general history of training bogged down in 1949, it too became a topic covered only in scattered accounts in the Ground Forces and technical service volumes.<sup>41</sup>

Until the demise of ASF headquarters, the Historical Division had no direct channel of technical supervision over the historical activities of the technical services. They had, indeed, received very little supervision from ASF's own historical office. Army directives of February and September 1946 assigned them the task of preparing volumes on both the domestic and overseas activities relating to their service. By 1947 the seven services had developed plans for contributing a total of thirty-eight volumes to the official history, or more than two-fifths of

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those that were then planned for Army publication through the Government Printing Office. These services had fifty-seven civilian professional workers in the spring of 1947, a considerably larger number than were then in the Historical Division itself. Threats of drastic cuts in this employment were carried out only by the Signal and Transportation Corps.<sup>42</sup>

During the war, all of the technical service historical sections had produced a goodly number of unpublished monographs of varying quality. The Quartermaster Corps in particular had prepared twenty-one studies of sufficient merit to warrant their publication in a monographic series in the years 1943-51. Wartime technical service historians had not worked on the overseas activities associated with their services, since such activities came under theater rather than the service chiefs. Accordingly, overseas coverage became a principal area for new research. To coordinate their work on the World War II series volumes more closely with that of the Historical Division, technical service historians were brought into the seminar system. And, in the continued absence of a senior historian in the logistical field, Dr. Conn was detailed for nine months in 1948-49 to serve as deputy to the Chief Historian for the technical services. A new and more comprehensive survey persuaded the Chief of Military History that the number of volumes they were to contribute must be cut back. On 15 July 1948 the number was reduced from thirty-eight to twenty-four volumes, with each service thereafter allocated either three or four volumes. By the end of 1948 the forty historians employed by the technical services were much more closely allied with their counterparts in the Historical Division than they had been a year earlier. Conn's successor, Lt. Col. Leo J. Meyer (who as Dr. Meyer had been a professor of history at New York University), would carry on the work of professional supervision of and liaison with their historical organizations for a number

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of years thereafter.<sup>43</sup>

Meanwhile, the Historical Division developed other new projects for the series. A reorganization and reorientation of its editorial area, presently to be described, released Dr. Weinberg to undertake a history of the Army's role in military government. A year later the division temporarily absorbed the historical staff of the Civil Affairs Division, which had been preparing a multi-volume history of wartime and postwar civil affairs and military government in Europe. The only fruit of these efforts in the World War II series would be its sole documentary volume, Soldiers Become Governors, compiled by Weinberg and Harry Coles and covering only the war years. In late 1948 the Division assigned former editor Conn to work on two volumes on the Army's role in Western Hemisphere defense that had been proposed in the original series plan. In the summer of 1949, work began on a volume on military intelligence; but it never developed into the type of treatment visualized for a work on this topic in the basic plan, and it wound up in G-2 files as a manuscript for reference use. Other significant gaps in the series that would remain, beyond those noted elsewhere, would be lack of any coverage in the area of top-level civilian control, and a volume on General Staff administration that Colonel Kemper had hoped to undertake. The series would also omit the Army's wartime planning for its postwar activities, and most post-August 1945 events and operations, such as demobilization and military government in Germany and Japan.<sup>44</sup>

In preparing the series volumes, it was difficult to prevent undue overlap among related projects. This problem was particularly acute among authors at work in the secretariat, Chief of Staff, strategic planning, and global logistics areas, and between them and the theater historians who customarily wanted to begin their volumes with detailed accounts of planning for

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particular operations. Under the guidance of the Chief Historian, a series of conferences in the year 1947-1949 helped to mitigate the problem, at least preventing extensive overlap in basic research.<sup>45</sup>

Some significant personnel changes occurred in 1948 and 1949. In June 1948 Colonel Kemper left the division and the Army to become Headmaster of Phillips Andover Academy in Massachusetts. Some weeks later Colonel Clark returned to his primary field of duty with the Corps of Engineers. As a successor to Kemper the Division was most fortunate to have Col. Allison R. Hartman, who took over administrative control of the World War II work when Kemper left. He served for four years as the division's principal and very able military critic of its writings. Clark was succeeded as Executive by Lt. Col. Edward M. Harris, like Hartman a man of broad education and experience who fitted very well into the division. In mid-summer retired Brig. Gen. Paul M. Robinett served the division as a reviewer. He soon was to head up an applied studies program (described in the following chapter). Shortly thereafter, General Malony announced his decision to retire. He was succeeded as Chief of Military History on 1 April 1949 by Maj. Gen. Orlando Ward. A division commander during and after World War II, Ward remained with the Historical Division until his retirement nearly four years later. On 8 March 1949 Dr. Greenfield suffered a heart attack and was away from the division for the next six months; because of his rather accidental acquaintance with the duties and business of the position, Dr. Conn was drafted to act as Chief Historian during Greenfield's absence.

One of the least troublesome aspects of preparing World War II series volumes for publication in the late 1940's was the selection and placement of photographs. During this period the division was fortunate to have at least three officers highly skilled in this area, and they helped train a civilian photographic editor who would serve

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after they left. With General Ward's encouragement in the summer of 1949 the photographic experts began work on three pictorial volumes to be included in the series. One volume was to be devoted to each of the major areas of operations--Northwest Europe, the Mediterranean, and the Pacific.<sup>46</sup>

In contrast to photographic illustration, mapping of the World War II series was a serious problem for many years. It was not a question of quality but of keeping pace with the completion of manuscripts requiring extensive and careful cartographic illustration. The historical office had been peculiarly fortunate in 1944 in acquiring the services of Mr. Wsevolod Aglaimoff, a professional soldier of the Czar who had escaped from Russia after the Revolution. Before and during his employment by the American embassy in Paris he absorbed a massive knowledge of European military terrain. His skill in mapping was matched by a meticulous attention to checking details. This checking extended to an independent review of the sources of an author's work whenever he deemed it necessary. The result was not only maps of the highest quality but both maps and texts of about the highest attainable degree of factual accuracy. But Mr. Aglaimoff's methods took time and no adequate substitute for them could be found. By the end of 1946 mapping had become a serious bottleneck and it remained one for many years thereafter.<sup>47</sup>

As the Chief Historian reported in December 1946, work on the Army Ground Forces volumes had "demonstrated forcibly the need for expert statistical services in the Division." Nothing could be done about this situation until the summer of 1947 when the Historical Fund permitted engaging a senior professional statistician as consultant and statistical editor. After some early difficulties the statistical advisory role played by George M. Powell proved to be both helpful and highly acceptable to authors. The Fund also provided the means for employing a number of people to work on two volumes of

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statistics that were part of the original plan for the World War II series. Work on tables for those volumes, some of which had begun much earlier under other auspices, proved to be one of the more costly and futile undertakings under the Fund. Good statisticians were both scarce and expensive, and presently a new war and mobilization would divert most of the Army's best ones to other work. With no more than half the work on them completed, the statistical volumes would eventually be abandoned, not only leaving a serious gap in the World War II series but also in the whole realm of statistics compiled and published on the war.<sup>48</sup>

The most serious contention in preparing the volumes of the World War II series for publication during the immediate postwar years arose in the area of writer-editor relations. The practice of employing senior historians as editors had made sense during the war, when most items processed for publication were rough drafts received from overseas. But writings of the senior historians recruited in 1946 and after were a different matter. They too required objective historical as well as literary criticism, but assigning both tasks to an individual editor, especially to one who was himself an historian, almost inevitably led to clashes between editors and writers. Almost as soon as Dr. Hugh Cole arrived he had urged changing the editorial system, and experiences in 1946 and 1947 in editing the Ground Forces volumes, Okinawa, and others confirmed the need for change.<sup>49</sup>

Recognizing that production of the World War II series had in effect made the Historical Division into a publishing house, Dr. Greenfield sought the advice of university presses and other publishers of scholarly works. On the basis of experience as well as this advice the Historical Division during 1948 instituted a new system of editing and review. This change involved transferring the historians who had been working as editors to other duties, and

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recruiting a new editorial staff from the publishing world. These new editors would provide literary criticism and perform other editorial tasks required in preparing volumes for the press but would not indulge in substantive historical criticism. As senior editor the division engaged Hugh Corbett, who came from Henry Holt and Company in March 1948. Later in the year Corbett was joined by Joseph R. Friedman, who would succeed him as literary Editor-in-Chief.<sup>50</sup>

To provide a wide spectrum of criticism on broader substantive grounds, the division developed a system of panel and outside review. As refined in 1948 and 1949, this system involved a careful reading and written review of each manuscript by members of a panel. Appointed and chaired by the Chief Historian or his deputy, each panel normally included one or more of the author's own peers drawn from within the division, a division officer as military critic (a task ably performed by Colonel Hartman during his tenure), an editor, an historian from the outside (frequently in the late 1940's a member of the Advisory Committee), and one or more participant critics. After individual reviews, the panel members met without the author present for a frank and thorough discussion of the manuscript. If they decided that the author could make his draft, with appropriate revision, into an acceptable book for publication, they then discussed what he should do to improve it. During the panel process, the division circulated other copies of the manuscript to knowledgeable participants of the events it described to obtain an even wider range of useful criticism. The Chief Historian then assembled all of the comments and recommendations that appeared to have merit into a composite and more or less anonymous critique for the author's guidance in revising his manuscript. After the revised manuscript was approved by the Chief Historian and formally accepted by the Chief of Military History for final literary editing and publication, it was exempt from further major changes in content. Also, while the Chief Historian was made the arbiter of

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disputes arising during the final editorial process, he rarely had to exercise this responsibility. The new review system, although time consuming, was well worth the time and effort involved. Not only did it eliminate most of the earlier strain in editor-author relationships but it also provided the authors of the World War II volumes with a more searching review and criticism of their writings than most scholarly works receive before publication.<sup>51</sup>

The principal safeguard against including in the volume information whose revelation "would in fact endanger the security of the Nation" was the knowledge and good judgement of the authors themselves. For this reason the clearance of manuscripts for open publication by Army Intelligence and (from 1949) by the Office of the Secretary of Defense was largely a formality, although sometimes a time-consuming one. The Army also sent completed manuscripts to sister services and to Britain's war history office for comment on sections bearing upon activities of concern to them and customarily it reviewed Marine Corps and British histories in the same manner. The actual printing of Army historical publications by the Government Printing Office had to be handled through the Adjutant General's Office. While that office provided some necessary services, such as retouching and sizing photographs and drafting charts, it was slow in transmitting manuscripts to the printer, and until 1949 it prevented the historical and printing offices from getting together informally to help resolve printing problems. Fortunately, a very able and interested AGO man, Mr. Robert Rose, was most helpful in 1946-1948 in improving and expediting his office's work on the first World War II series volumes. After his departure the Adjutant General's organization was generally willing to accept manuscripts coming from the division's new professional editorial shop as final copy for the printer and otherwise give the division greater leeway in the publishing process. But getting an author's completed manuscript into print continued to take considerably longer



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than division planners calculated it should. In May 1948 they plotted an ideal span of about 200 days between completion of a draft and its publication; in practice in the ensuing years at best the processing (review, revision, editing, printing) took about two years.<sup>52</sup>

From 1946 onward a number of the division's authors and editors advocated a shift from government to commercial publication. In view of the technical nature of many volumes, it appeared doubtful that any commercial publisher would be willing to print them all without subsidy. The Historical Fund made commercial publication financially practicable, and the Judge Advocate General's office endorsed its legality with nonappropriated funds. In the spring of 1948 the new Editor-in-Chief, Mr. Corbett, reported that several commercial presses had expressed a strong interest in publishing the World War II series as a prestige item. He and others believed commercial publication would bring faster printing, better publicity, and wider distribution. On the other hand publication by the Government Printing Office carried with it automatic free distribution to several hundred depository libraries across the land and to members of Congress. Most importantly, successive Chiefs of Military History were advocates of using the Government Printing Office, believing that if publication funds were depleted it would be much easier to get more money from Congress for public than for commercial printing. When the Historical Advisory Committee in April 1949 cast its vote in favor of continued reliance on the Government Printing Office, General Ward was greatly relieved.<sup>53</sup>

From the beginning, the World War II volumes cost the Army more, and fewer of them were sold to the public, than Historical Division planners had anticipated. Costs of printing, rising after the war, soon were more than double the estimate of \$8,000 a volume in the series plan. The books purchased for official distribution cost the

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Army substantially more per copy than their selling price to the general public, the latter varying between \$3.25 and \$6.00 for the first volumes printed. Actually, there is no clear evidence that their selling price significantly restricted sales, and their total distribution exceeded that of most comparable scholarly works. Of the early series volumes printed, the Historical Division purchased 3,000 copies for the Army's own use and official distribution. The Government Printing Office ran off about 1,000 for depository library and Congressional distribution and as many more as it thought it could sell to the public. Such sales actually totalled between 1,000 and 5,000 copies per volume, with Okinawa heading the list. By way of comparison, while the commercial publisher's public sales of the Navy operational volumes by Samuel Eliot Morison were considerably higher, their total distribution about matched that of the most popular volumes in the Army's official history.<sup>54</sup>

To compensate for the meager publicity given to its publications by the Government Printing Office and for the difficulties in purchasing them, the Historical Division did whatever it could to publicize the volumes among scholars and other members of the thoughtful reading public. The Chief Historian, in accordance with his assigned duties, spread news about progress on the series among his academic associates individually and through professional associations. He carried on a wide personal correspondence and arranged sessions at annual professional meetings on the military aspects of World War II in which historians from the division participated. The division also exhibited its wares at professional meetings whenever it could and indirectly encouraged the leading scholarly and literary reviewers, including those of newspapers, to give adequate attention to its publications.<sup>55</sup>

The Advisory Committee continued to be one of the strongest links with the historical

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profession; and its 1948 meeting became a vehicle for closer coordination of the United States Army's historical work on World War II with that of its British and Commonwealth allies. In February official military history representatives from Great Britain, Canada, South Africa, Australia, and New Zealand assembled in Washington for a three-day meeting with the Historical Advisory Committee. Members of the United States Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps historical organizations, as well as the senior staff of the Historical Division, were present to discuss matters of common concern. One result was the establishment of particularly close ties between the Historical Division and its counterparts in Canada and Great Britain, including an arrangement with the latter for checking the factual accuracy of works prior to their publication.<sup>56</sup>

While the merits, or even the existence, of the Army's World War II series and of its other historical publications would never become an item of general public knowledge, by late summer 1949 students of military history and scholars generally had come to accept these publications, as well as those of the Army's sister services, as trustworthy and valuable works of scholarship. By this time the Historical Division was nearing its maximum strength, with over 220 individuals on its rolls, most of them at work on World War II projects. While only four of the official history volumes had been published, two more were being printed and work was underway on more than seventy other Army and Air Force volumes, or about three-fourths of the total of 104 projected in a fresh survey of progress on the series compiled in August 1949. Greater progress had been made on operational than on administrative volumes, mainly because of the operational orientation of the Army's new central historical office since its establishment in 1943 and the strong early manning of the principal theater sections. Leaders of the division in mid-1949 still hoped to complete the bulk of its work on the official history by mid-1952, but they no longer expected to complete drafts of all

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the volumes by that time.<sup>57</sup>

In commenting on the series early in 1948, Dr. Greenfield observed that most of the volumes would present "a young man's history of the war," since most of the authors were in their thirties or even younger. He nevertheless considered them a "first-rate team" for the task at hand. Its youthful authors, he thought, had brought to it not only competence and high spirit but also "an irreplaceable personal interest and direct knowledge of the war and its records which only historians who were themselves in the war fully possess." In a detailed analysis in November 1948 he described his colleagues as a "Department of History" within the Army, and testified that in their work they had met with no infringements upon the principles and rights of historical research. What distinguished them from historians generally was that they were working primarily in response to a pressing need, the Army's own need for "an organized, comprehensive, and objective record" to which it could refer. But there was also the hope that from this effort would come "the thought and study" that would "ultimately produce not only a better understanding of the problem of war among professional and lay students, but also the impetus and basic sources for future interpretive histories of World War II."<sup>58</sup>

## Chapter 6

### A WIDENING RANGE OF HISTORICAL ACTIVITY

A general broadening of the responsibilities and activities of the Army's central historical office accompanied the launching and substantial growth of the World War II project between 1946 and the advent of a new major conflict in the Far East in June 1950. By March 1948, as a contemporary study noted, the Historical Division had become involved in "a wide range of peripheral activities including the stimulation of interest in the study of military history, conducting a training program for historical personnel for the Organized Reserves, organization of military museums and collections, coordination of replies to historical inquiries by agencies of the Department of the Army, and the care, preservation, and disposition" of historical properties. Staff and policy making responsibilities for historical properties had been acquired by the Historical Division in the fall of 1946. Although the physical consolidation of what had been the Army War College Historical Section with the division in May 1947 did not in itself introduce new functions, it did require readjustments. Ancillary activities of the older organization were dispersed among other parts of the division, leaving the World War I Group, as it was designated, free to concentrate on completing its documentary and order of battle volumes with a view to an early close-out of this work. New historical activities were generated in 1947 and 1948 by the growing availability of enemy records. The Army Staff and schools pressed for information from these records and for other special or "applied" studies and historical information of all sorts in greater quantity.<sup>1</sup>

The way in which the Historical Division actually operated also changed. As Colonel Hartman observed, until the summer of 1948 the division, whatever its paper organi-

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zation, operated in a highly personalized manner with all actions and supervision stemming directly from the Chief's office and centering around the "personalities of the Kemper, Clark, and Greenfield team." General Malony left the World War II history largely to Dr. Greenfield, but he was the active leader in other directions and was primarily responsible for the expansion of activities that occurred during his tour of duty. Even as Greenfield remained fairly exclusively concerned with the big history project and its promotion, he readily acknowledged the "wisdom and value" of Malony's effort "to hold the ring for The U.S. Army in World War II, by getting out the foreign studies and making them known, by setting in motion the Applied Studies project, by temporary diversion of our historians, and ingenious devices of personal propaganda." After the departures of Colonels Kemper and Clark, the division began to function in a more conventional manner, with greater decentralization of authority to chiefs of major groups. Under General Ward normal methods of military administration became even more the practice.<sup>2</sup>

Shortly after General Ward became Chief of Military History, and while Dr. Greenfield was convalescing, new special regulations of the Department of the Army appeared which defined the organization and functions of the Historical Division. They reflected the expansion of its mission during the preceding three years. The redesignation of the division in March 1950 as the Office of the Chief of Military History (OCMH) made no real difference, but certain changes instituted by General Ward later on in that year did, in Dr. Greenfield's opinion, circumscribe the Chief Historian's responsibilities and authority. After Greenfield's return to duty in September 1949 a degree of strain developed between Chief and Chief Historian, perhaps inevitably so because of Ward's belief in orderly military administration. In April 1950 the Chief directed that henceforth progress reports should be addressed to him

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and forwarded through division chiefs for consolidation, instead of going first to the Chief Historian for summarization. Later in 1950 the general approved a revision of the special regulations governing the office's activities which the Chief Historian thought narrowed his responsibilities and denied him direct access to the Advisory Committee. In practice these changes would not significantly affect the Chief Historian's scholarly leadership in Army historical work, and the increased conformity to normal administrative practices may well have helped to stabilize OCMH's position in the Army's staff structure.<sup>3</sup>

Two recurring threats to the strength and effectiveness of the Army's central historical office first appeared in the summer of 1948. The Army was then attempting to reduce the number of general officers stationed in Washington, and when General Malony indicated his desire to retire, the Deputy Chief of Staff proposed downgrading the Chief's position to colonel. About the same time a consultant to the Secretary of Defense recommended consolidating the Army, Navy, and Air Force historical organizations into one office and removing it to Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Through Dr. Greenfield, General Malony brought these matters to the attention of Dr. Baxter, the Chairman of the Advisory Committee. Fortunately both proposals were sidetracked and the committee's intervention was therefore unnecessary. Without the prestige of general officer leadership the Army's ambitious postwar program would have had a much slimmer chance of survival. Whatever the merits of a consolidated historical organization at Carlisle, its distance from the records in Washington would have made an effective writing program all but impossible.<sup>4</sup>

As a consequence of the postwar enlargement of the World War II program and the expanding scope of other historical activities, the

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number of people employed in the Historical Division increased four-fold in the four years after its establishment, to a peak of about 225 in January 1950. Of this total about 50 were officers and 175 were civilians. More than half the officers were located in the new Applied Studies Group; approximately 100 of the civilians were Fund rather than Civil Service employees. Viewed in another way, about a tenth of the peak total represented administrative overhead. Of the remainder about half were at work directly on the history of the Army in World War II, and the other half were engaged in other historical activities, though some were contributing substantially though indirectly to the World War II enterprise.<sup>5</sup>

With its growth the Historical Division needed more room. In April 1947, it moved to a new location on the Pentagon's fifth floor large enough to accommodate the addition of the World War I Branch that arrived in May. Two years later Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson decided to bring Army, Navy, and Air Force offices together in the Pentagon. In the general reshuffling in June 1949, the Historical Division moved from the top to the first floor of the building--mostly to open space that lacked the quiet and privacy that historians and other professionals believed they needed to work effectively. Although partitions and other conveniences were promised before the move, nothing happened for several weeks after it, despite earnest efforts of the division's executive to get some action from the building's management. The result was a miniature rebellion. The top civilian historians collectively submitted their resignations, effective in one week, if the work they felt necessary was not begun. Redoubling his efforts, and presumably aided by General Ward, the Executive somehow persuaded the Pentagon's managers to undertake the desired work. Reasonably satisfactory working conditions were soon restored and tempers cooled. Fortunately this was a unique experience in the recent story



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of Army history.6

The establishment in the late 1940's of Civil Service standards for senior historical positions and of a Civil Service register based on these standards, was a lift to the morale of Army historians both within and outside the Historical Division and gave them a greater feeling of security. Until that time the Civil Service Commission had no established standards for grading positions for senior historians, one consequence being that they could be newly hired only as "temporary indefinites" on Civil Service. As such they were not eligible for Federal retirement benefits. In setting up positions under the Fund the division tried to follow Civil Service principles, but for authors it worked out its own promotion policy. That policy contemplated hiring promising younger writers as P-4's (subsequently GS-11's) and, after a satisfactory year's training, assigning them to preparing volumes on their own at the next higher grade. When an author's volume had been accepted for publication and another was assigned, he would become eligible for a second promotion, to P-6 (GS-13). The division and other agencies persuaded the Commission to incorporate somewhat similar policies in its new standards. The publication of standards and the holding of examinations (unassembled, not written) for historians in 1948-1950 in all of the Commission's professional grades (P-1 through P-8, later GS-5 through GS-15) were of more immediate benefit to civilian historians employed by the technical services and other agencies outside Army headquarters than they were to those in the Historical Division. For the latter they did have the longer range benefit of making permanent Civil Service status both accessible and more attractive. But in effect they also inhibited the exchange of historians between government and outside academic positions, because they made it extremely difficult for academicians to move into short-term Federal service.7

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The World War I Branch that joined the rest of the Historical Division in the Pentagon in May 1947 had only about half the wartime strength of its predecessor, the Army War College Historical Section. Between 1945 and 1947, the section's turbulent and precarious manpower situation impeded its efforts to complete its World War I projects on the schedule called for by Army headquarters in 1940. During the year after the Japanese surrender, all of the senior retired officers recalled to active duty during the war had to be released, and qualified replacements for them in the proper grades were difficult to find. In August 1946 the Historical Division estimated that its World War I Branch needed twenty-five military and twenty-five civilian workers to complete the World War I publication projects and perform its other duties; at the same time the Army's Budget Officer was planning to reduce its existing strength of about thirty-five and phase it out altogether by the end of June 1947. Furthermore, for a period of two years the branch had to detail about a fifth of its attenuated staff to work on declassifying World War I records selected for publication. The allocation of nonappropriated funds in June 1947 saved the World War I as well as the World War II historical program, since the Historical Division had been planning to sacrifice all of the former in order to preserve as much as possible of the latter.<sup>8</sup>

By early 1946 the War College Historical Section had ready for printing or final editing about one-quarter of the AEF operational documents that it planned to publish, enough translations of French and German documents to fill three or four volumes, and maps to fill at least two more. The section planned to provide an elaborate index for all the volumes. Some time before, when it had suspended the screening of Services of Supply records, only 7 percent of preliminary processing of SOS documents had been completed. The section was still working

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on a third order of battle volume on units that never left the United States during the war, and hoped to complete it by the end of 1946. It must have been clear to the section's chief, Colonel Benson, that completing all these projects as scheduled was unlikely. On the eve of the Historical Division's establishment, in November 1945, he had asked its representatives to confer on ways and means to make a more economic reproduction and distribution of the World War I material. Dr. Wright suggested microfilming the bulk of the documents rather than printing them. Estimates obtained in early 1946 indicated that standard printing of a thousand copies of the operational documents then scheduled for publication and their supplementary material would cost at least \$750,000, and that microfilming the same number of copies would cost as much or more.<sup>9</sup>

In late 1946 General Malony approved a modified plan for publishing the World War I documents and abandoning further work on SOS records. A year later he and Colonel Benson agreed to reduce the number of operational documents to be published by about two-thirds and to eliminate foreign documents and the atlas volumes. At Benson's urging the division also tried, although unsuccessfully, to get the Army Staff to approve a redesignation of the first world war as "World War I." In August 1947 the division decided, as a measure of economy, to employ a lithoprint rather than the standard linotype method of printing. By the following February, fifteen of the seventeen projected documentary volumes and three index volumes were ready for the printer. The documentary volumes were dispatched to the Government Printing office in the spring of 1948. They were published in a 1,000-copy edition in 1949-1950 at a cost to the Army of about \$108,000. The elaborate index planned for them was never prepared, an omission that substantially restricted their effective use. Coincidentally, the third World War I order of battle volume was published in two parts in 1948 and 1949.<sup>10</sup>

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The World War I shop was disbanded a fortnight after the last of the documentary volumes went to the printer. Mr. Thomas and his principal helper were assigned to the Applied Studies organization where they continued to help in the publication and distribution of the World War I volumes. At General Ward's suggestion Thomas began writing a narrative history of the U.S. Army's role in World War I. His manuscript was completed in 1951. Its formal review indicated a need for substantial revision, a task that the author was unable to undertake before his retirement. Two days before the World War I Branch disbanded, it turned over to the National Archives 270 cubic feet of index cards summarizing American operational records, copies and translations of British, French, and German documents pertaining to American operations, and another 100 cubic feet of cartographic records, the accumulation of nearly three decades of Army historical enterprise.<sup>11</sup>

As reorganized in 1948 the Historical Division had three operating groups (later called branches, and still later divisions following the office's redesignation in March 1950), designated through 1950 as Service, World War II (much the largest), and Applied Studies. The principal functions in the service area were supervising all Army historical work outside the division, planning and conducting training, handling general reference work, the organizational history and honors activity inherited from the World War I Branch, and matters relating to Army museums and historical properties.

Until June 1946 the Chief of Military History was responsible for exercising "supervision and direction" over all Army historical activities except current reporting, and afterwards for "supervising and coordinating" these activities. In practice the Historical Division exercised only very general supervision rather than close coordination or direction of the work

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of other Army historical organizations, except for the World War II series volumes of the technical services. Informal liaison with the five technical service organizations that remained separate after June 1947 was maintained principally through the Chief Historian's office. In addition to the technical services only the Army Field Forces (successor to the Army Ground Forces) continued any significant historical program within the continental United States between 1946 and 1950. Overseas, after the close-out of historical work in the Caribbean in 1948, historical activity continued only in the major commands in Germany and the Far East. Quarterly progress reports became the division's principal formal means of keeping informed of what other Army historical offices were doing. After 1948, monthly reports were required of the technical services. A 1947 directive required that narrative historical manuscripts prepared outside the division be sent to it for review, and that its approval be obtained before publication. The Historical Division had very little formal communication with the historical organization in Tokyo until after General MacArthur's relief of 1951. It had much closer ties with the historical office of the U.S. Army in Europe, in part because of the German studies program that had to be coordinated across the ocean.<sup>12</sup>

The Service Group's planning and training activities centered around mobilization and other contingency planning; revising Army Regulations 345-105, the prescription for the "After Action" report of World War II; revising tables of organization and equipment for historical teams in the field; preparing a field manual for historians serving in active operational areas; and commissioning officers and establishing historical units in the Army Reserve. Historians working on World War II had found a large proportion of the narrative after-action reports submitted by unit commanders unsatisfactory in many respects. As early as 1943, the G-2

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Historical Branch had begun work on a revised regulation in an effort to improve them. The six years that it took to complete the new AR 345-105 paid off, for the "Command Report" of the Korean War period was considerably more informative and reliable than its World War II counterpart. By 1949 also new tables of organization and equipment for historical teams had been approved, and a field manual to guide them had been drafted. All of this work was helped early in 1948 when an historical unit closely associated with the Historical Division was established in the Army Reserve. Most of its members were division historians who had been in uniform during the late war. Initially under the command of the Chief Historian in his capacity of Reserve colonel, the unit held biweekly meetings after office hours in the division's conference room. Acting as a committee, the unit did much of the spade work for the Service Group in 1948 and 1949 in the revision of regulations and preparation of a field manual for historians. With a designation of 2921st Historical Training Group it was for many years the only active organization of its kind in the Army Reserve, although the division urged forming others for service during maneuvers, or in war if one came.13

The Service Group's general reference work had begun soon after the Historical Branch was established in August 1943. The new branch was fortunate to enlist for this work not only Colonel Douglas from the National Archives but also Mr. Israel Wice from the Adjutant General's Office. In 1944, Wice became the very able chief of the Records Analysis Section, later known as the General Reference Branch. At the outset the Historical Branch decided it should not become a depository for official records of historical value, as its predecessor had attempted to do after World War I, but that all such records when retired should be in the custody of the Adjutant General. Nevertheless, it did build up an extensive

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and well indexed reference collection of its own, containing a variety of printed and manuscript materials on military history, and especially on World War II. By May 1947 this collection had become an unofficial library with some 3,000 books, nearly as many typescript volumes of Army historical manuscripts, and a large miscellany of unpublished materials such as postwar interrogations of German prisoners of war and internees and a collection of situation maps prepared in Washington and in the field.<sup>14</sup>

The reference collection became the principal tool that enabled the Historical Division in the post-World War II years to function as the organized memory of the War Department and the Army, and Mr. Wice and his helpers as the efficient dispensers of historical information both within and outside the division. Initially General Reference provided research and reference assistance primarily to workers within the division on World War II matters. Later, after it inherited the reference responsibilities of the disbanded World War I section, the work broadened to include the supply of information on all aspects of Army history in response to inquiries that came more and more from other Army and Federal agencies and the general public. Between 1947 and 1950 the number of requests for reference help increased about four-fold, to 1,000 or more a month, and after 1948 considerably more than half of them came from outside the Historical Division.<sup>15</sup>

To handle the tremendous volume of official records created during the war by Army agencies in the nation's capital, the Adjutant General in 1943 set up a War Department Records Branch. In August 1945, as an adjunct to it, he established an Historical Records Section which for several years was conveniently located in the Pentagon's mezzanine basement. In accordance with the historical office's advice, this section became the depository for records retired by

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top War Department agencies and for almost all Army combat unit records from overseas. Other records were added: the retired papers of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the original records of Eisenhower's Supreme Command, microfilm copies of the Mediterranean Allied Headquarters records, copies of the combined South East Asia Allied Command war diaries, and (under separate management) 350 tons of captured German records, mostly on military operations on the Western and Eastern fronts. Although the historical office had agreed that the Historical Records Section was the logical depository for completed Army historical manuscripts as well as for historians' notes and drafts, for the most part manuscript histories remained in its own reference collection. The records most division historians considered important remained in or near the Pentagon for nearly as long as the Army's history office stayed there. With unusually cooperative working relationships between the Army's archivists and historians, problems in using the records deposited in Washington all but vanished. This cooperation included generous arrangements for the loan of records to historians. General Reference assisted in the identification of the most useful ones and acted as a funnel to keep track of the borrowed items. Working with the retired records of nonoperational Army domestic and overseas headquarters, which came to rest in St. Louis and Kansas City rather than in Washington, posed somewhat greater difficulties.<sup>16</sup>

Another service function had originated after World War I, when the Army's central historical office was given the mission of "determining the military history of all organizations [i.e., units] of the Army of the United States with a view to establishing historical continuity and awarding battle honors," as General Spaulding defined it in 1942. During World War II the War College Historical Section normally could spare only two officers or warrant officers to handle this work. Their efforts through



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1946 were confined almost entirely to handling the thousands of inquiries received each year on unit history matters, and in effect the section lost the function of determining battle credits for World War II actions. By early 1947 the World War I office appears to have been reconciled to the transfer of its unit history responsibility to another part of the World War II organization. It also transferred its very large file of information accumulated during the three preceding decades on the history of individual Army units.<sup>17</sup>

After a brief attachment to the Historical Division's Order of Battle Section, unit history acquired separate status in an organization which by 1948 had a dozen people at work under the aggressive leadership of Mr. Frederick P. Todd. During World War II, Todd had been a senior historical officer in the Pacific. By summer 1948 his section had become fully responsible for all matters pertaining to the history of Army units, and it generated new regulations on unit lineage and battle honors and on preparing and using unit histories, regulations that reflected the broadened responsibility that the Historical Division was now able to exercise in these areas. If only because of their number, the one task the section could not undertake was the review and criticism of histories prepared by or for the units themselves. During its first full year, the new organization was able to determine and publish official lineage and honors statements for 500 Army units, representing the beginning of an endeavor that was to become its principal function in the decades to come.<sup>18</sup>

The main purpose of all unit history work was the stimulation of esprit de corps, in order to make soldiers and their commanders aware of the past accomplishments of their unit, and to instill in them enthusiasm and pride. Written lineage and honors statements and unit histories also furnished the basis for a wide range of symbolism, including the

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heraldic work performed by the Quartermaster Department, the award of unit colors and standards, the design of distinctive insignia, the designation and celebration of unit days, and the establishment of local museums for the display of mementos of the past. As it had before World War II, the unit history organization also asserted itself in advising the General Staff on matters relating to organizational history, including the designation of newly activated units in a manner that would most effectively maintain the Army's heritage of valor. It cooperated with other Army agencies in their use of radio and of still and motion pictures in "efforts to make the men of the Army aware of its history and the traditions they are expected to emulate." It prepared a lengthy section on Army history and symbolism eventually included in The Soldier's Guide in June 1952, and Todd contributed guidance for unit leaders through his article, "Harness Your History," published in the Officer's Call in 1954. Finally, it began preparing for handy reference use publications containing the official lineage and battle honors statements of all active Army units. The first fruit of this project, known familiarly as the "Infantry Book," with its lineages supplemented by heraldic illustrations and a narrative historical introduction, appeared in 1953.<sup>19</sup>

Responsibilities for Army historical properties and museums, also in the service area, were handled somewhat gingerly by chiefs of the Historical Division for some years after its establishment. An Army war art program during World War II, considerably larger than that of World War I, produced a large number of paintings that with a small number of other war relics came into the custody of a Historical Properties Section which was established under the Army Headquarters Commandant, Military District of Washington (MDW), in June 1945. A large part of its work was managing exhibitions and loans of the art items from the collections.

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A great many of them were used to decorate Pentagon offices. The existence of this collection and similar ones in the other services led to a movement to create a national war museum. From 1945 onward, the military chiefs of the Historical Division would serve as Army members of the committees appointed to plan such a museum. In 1946 the Chief, Historical Division was also assigned staff and policy making responsibilities in relation to the Army's historical properties and museums, but for another three years the division shied away from talking over the Historical Properties Section.<sup>20</sup>

After the fighting ended in Europe the Army acquired custody of a collection of German war art much larger than that its own artists had produced. In the spring of 1947, 8,000 or more German art items were shipped to the Historical Properties Section in Washington, greatly increasing the volume of its work. After a round of exhibitions had subsided, and with a large part of the German as well as the American war art on indefinite loan, General Ward agreed to take over full responsibility for all activities relating to properties, except those connected with art items in Pentagon offices and the Army Medical Department's collections. MDW's Historical Properties Section and three of its five people were transferred to the Historical Division on 1 September 1949. Shortly thereafter new regulations required an inventory of all Army historical properties; but the Properties Section did not have the means to develop from this inventory a central catalogue of properties or to lend any real help to Army post and unit museums. The Historical Division's principal interest continued to be in establishing a national military history museum, but the project languished after the outbreak of the Korean War. The rest of the properties work languished as well, especially after September 1951 when the number of people assigned to it was temporarily reduced to one. For some months

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thereafter both this person and the function were placed under the Organizational History and Honors Branch. The Army's central properties collection at this time consisted of about 1,900 American and 8,500 German items of war art, and fewer than 250 other war relics. Two thirds of the American and one third of the German pictures were on indefinite loan. In the 1960's about 1,500 paintings by German artists with nonmilitary themes were returned to what by then had become the West German ally of the United States. In that decade and after the Office of the Chief of Military History would take a much more active interest in the Army's own museums and properties and in renewed planning for a national military museum.<sup>21</sup>

Besides the large and regular stream of requests for historical information and assistance that flowed to the Historical division's reference and organizational history offices, the division had to satisfy more pressing calls for help, as for example those from the offices of the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff. Secretary Patterson was less interested in the historical program than his predecessor had been, but he did value the historical office as a ready source of speech material. General Malony had the courage to call on Mr. Patterson and tell him "why it was so hard" for his office "to do flash research for the Secretary's speeches in view of our responsibility to produce careful long-term research." But Malony did promise that whenever the historians came across good "now-it-can-be-told" material they would note it as likely input for secretarial speeches. From the beginning, the military chiefs of the historical office drew the line against actually writing or drafting speeches except under the most extraordinary circumstances, thus avoiding a type of distraction that is sometimes the bane of institutional historians. Responding to direct requests from the Army's Chief and Deputy Chief of Staff naturally had a high priority. As an

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example, when General Malony met with General Eisenhower on the morning of 12 November 1947, the Chief of Staff asked for brief historical summaries on why the Germans had fought so hard for Tunisia in 1943 and on American military preparedness between 1920 and 1940 (the latter needed as backup for an impending session with a Congressional committee). Both were prepared and hand-carried back to Eisenhower that same day.<sup>22</sup>

Much more time-consuming was the work done by the Historical Division on Eisenhower's report, as Supreme Commander, on operations in Northwest Europe in 1944 and 1945. The draft of this report had been prepared in Europe, and when it arrived for editing and publication in December 1945 the Division found it poorly written and full of inaccuracies. Its revision required nearly five months of intensive work that involved Dr. Wright, Colonel Taylor, Dr. Cole, and others for days and sometimes weeks at a time. The third Chief of Staff's biennial report, for the years 1945-1947, threatened to be almost as great a diversion, but one the Historical Division felt bound to do if requested. Army historians had helped informally in the production of the two earlier reports covering General George C. Marshall's years; and when a direct assignment of responsibility for a new report was made to the Historical Division in September 1946, the task was accepted without protest in order to strengthen the division's position with the Chief of Staff and his assistants. Fortunately for progress on the World War II volumes and performance of other assigned duties, in November General Eisenhower decided to have the report prepared in his own office. In fact the type of report issued at the end of Eisenhower's tour bore little resemblance to the preceding biennial reports and required no input from the division.<sup>23</sup>

About the same time, the Historical

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Division on its own volition assumed the task of editing Military Affairs and of otherwise aiding its parent, the American Military Institute. In the 1930's the Army War College Historical Section had taken the lead in establishing the Institute and its professional journal. After World War II Chief Historian Greenfield and a number of his colleagues played an active role in the Institute's affairs. In January 1947 the division took Military Affairs informally under its wing, assigned an officer full time to edit and manage it, and provided for clerical assistance. Soon after General Ward became chief, he expressed doubts about the propriety of supporting the Institute and Military Affairs in this fashion, and by summer 1950 their official ties with the historical office had been severed.<sup>24</sup>

An Order of Battle Section was established in December 1946, inaugurating a new activity for the division. Although the energies of its members were diverted for a year, September 1947-August 1948, to work with the War Department Personal Records Board (Stroh Board), it was in work that also provided much usable input for order of battle volumes planned for publication. The section, which numbered nearly a dozen people by 1948, at first planned to compile a World War II Order of Battle for all Army organizations of division size or above on a scale comparable to the one prepared for World War I. The volumes were to include all "information needed to establish the actual relationship" among the Army's larger units and organizations, at home as well as abroad during the war, including data on "activations, redesignations, and the inactivations of units, higher and lower echelon assignments and attachments, locations of command posts, names and ranks of officers in command of principal units and their staff, and a record of events giving a brief statement of the major units involved" in particular operations. By late 1949 and early 1950 the Order of Battle Section was

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planning to contribute up to eight volumes of such information to the World War II series, and predicting that the first would be ready for editing by the summer of 1950.<sup>25</sup>

During 1950 both the Chief Historian and the Chief of Military History became alarmed over the scope of the Order of Battle project and the cost involved in time and funds. The Order of Battle chief defended his staff's "stringent standards of scholarship and, consequently, of accuracy," but admitted that the cost to the Historical Fund, then estimated at \$216,000 for three volumes plus officer and Civil Service salaries and publication expenses, might seem excessive. Based upon this defense General Ward and his superiors approved a revised three-volume project. But during the next eighteen months work was done only on a Pacific volume and at a pace that indicated even the three-volume project would take many years and cost nearly half a million dollars. As a consequence work on all but the Pacific volume was indefinitely postponed. When this volume was completed in November 1953, reviewers found the "Unit Directory" part, on which three-fourths of the time and money had been spent, contained too many uncorrectable errors (for lack of adequate records) to warrant publication or distribution in the World War II series or in any other form. The remainder did not appear until 1959, and then only in soft-cover manuscript form for very limited distribution.<sup>26</sup>

Work on a military chronology of America's participation in World War II met a better fate. The division carried on the work which the War College Historical Section had begun in 1942, primarily because it was believed the chronology would provide the historians working on the official series with a useful and accurate basis for their research and writing. But the chronology as revised during the postwar years was not ready in time to be of much help to the division's own people; on the contrary this

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revision came increasingly to depend on information from authors' drafts. Work continued because the division believed the chronology would be useful for professional and public reference. As of August 1949 the four or five people engaged in this work hoped to complete a two-volume chronology acceptable for publication in the World War II series by summer 1950. This forecast, like so many others, proved much too optimistic. The Chronology Section dwindled to a single member before its abolition in 1954, but did produce the draft of a single volume which, after extensive checking and elaborate indexing, was deemed acceptable for the series, and was published in 1960.<sup>27</sup>

The greatest postwar expansion of effort in the Army's Historical Division occurred in its Applied Studies Group, formally established on 2 August 1948. Its creation showed that General Malony and his colleagues recognized that Army staff agencies and schools had immediate needs for more historical information and assistance than the World War II series could give them for many years. Only the two Army Ground Forces volumes were in print by the summer of 1948. Moreover, in May 1948 responsibility previously exercised by the Army Ground Forces for historical coverage of demobilization and other postwar Army activities in the continental United States was transferred to the Historical Division.<sup>28</sup>

There was nothing new in 1948 about the Historical Division's concern for making itself and its products more useful to the Army schools, as indicated by meetings in Washington with school representatives in the spring of 1946. But aside from the publication of the American Forces in Action pamphlets and the two AGF volumes little had actually been done. General Malony's awareness of the need for greater service to Army headquarters was underscored by a report of Dr. Winnacker, following a two-month tour of duty in the late spring of 1948 with a



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board headed by Lt. Gen. Wade H. Haislip, that emphasized the crucial importance of making the Historical Division more useful to the Army Staff. Dr. Greenfield was especially concerned with obtaining postwar historical coverage that would provide the basis for a volume on demobilization which he and others intended, at least until the end of 1948, to include in the World War II series. It was Greenfield who proposed the organizational plan and allocation of responsibilities that was actually adopted for the new organization. The Applied Studies Group initially comprised two branches, a Research and Writing Branch and a Review and Translations Branch, their titles indicating the functions they would perform. The Research and Writing Branch contained two sections, the first charged with preparing special studies involving American military experience and the second a Foreign Studies Section that would work extensively in the captured German documents. Colonel Clark, who was soon to leave the division, was named nominal chief, but Lt. Col. Thomas S. Badger actually acted in that capacity until retired Brig. Gen. Paul Robinett rejoined the division at the end of November 1948. Robinett was a fifty-five year old Cavalry/Armored officer widely known and respected within the Army. In May 1943 while leading a combat command of the 1st Armored Division in Tunisia he was wounded. Although the wound left him partially crippled, his great energy and devotion to duty remained unimpaired. Robinett's initial contribution to Army historical work as a temporary employee in the summer of 1948 gained him high praise from Dr. Greenfield and this must have influenced General Malony's decision to make him acting head of applied studies work on 29 November 1948 and permanent head seven months later.<sup>29</sup>

Aside from the establishment and maintenance of closer ties with the Army Staff and schools, the new organization had as a major purpose the training of qualified

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Army officers during their assignment to the Historical Division. Under professional guidance, these officers would prepare studies useful to the Army; work on them would in turn make their officer-authors more useful to their respective branches in their later careers. Applied Studies was also made responsible for reviewing all Army historical studies prepared outside the division and determining their suitability for distribution. At the outset Foreign Studies work became the largest single activity under Applied Studies, occupying the time of more than three-fourths of those employed within the new organization at the time General Robinett took over.<sup>30</sup>

By summer 1949 the Applied Studies Group contained more than a quarter of the Historical Division's people, and its chief was moulding it into an increasingly autonomous area of historical activity. At this time the panel review system for the World War II series was taking shape under the aegis of the Chief Historian. From the beginning of 1949 Robinett had insisted that he should coordinate the review of works prepared under his direction and prepare such post-panel critiques as were necessary for authors' guidance. During and after Dr. Greenfield's illness in 1949 responsibility for the review and editing of works prepared within the Applied Studies area drifted out of the Chief Historian's grasp. General Robinett also believed he should follow the letter of the regulation that gave his organization responsibility for supervising, preparing, or directing the preparation of all historical studies required by the Army, except volumes prepared for inclusion in the U.S. Army in World War II. He was frank to acknowledge that two of the first three general studies tackled by officer-historians were failures, only the one on demobilization showing promise; but with the assignment of a number of younger and better qualified officers in 1949 he was able to initiate seven more such studies with a reasonable degree of

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hope for their success.<sup>31</sup>

The function inherited by the Applied Studies organization of reviewing historical manuscripts prepared by Army agencies other than the Historical Division and of determining their suitability for distribution and publication had been vigorously exercised for about a year by the Review Section established in the summer of 1945. By June 1946 that section had reviewed most of the nearly 600 such manuscripts that the division had received, and it was therefore abolished at the end of the month, leaving the review function to be handled on a haphazard basis. An Editorial Branch already overloaded with other work had the task of reviewing works prepared for publication; but until the summer of 1948 this task was, in the Chief Historian's words, "largely perfunctory, if done at all."<sup>32</sup>

After his transfer to Applied Studies, Mr. Thomas became primarily responsible in 1948 and 1949 for reviewing historical manuscripts. War Department directives of 1947 and earlier exempted unit histories and operational reports from division review; but for General Robinett and others in his organization the review load included the drafts of non-historical Army publications such as Field Manuals that contained historical material and implications. By the spring of 1949 Thomas and others had completed the critical review of about 140 historical manuscripts. Thereafter, with the volume of work diminished, Thomas turned to the preparation of his narrative history of the Army's participation in World War I.<sup>33</sup>

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A lesser activity of the Applied Studies Group was its assistance to the American Battle Monuments Commission and The Quartermaster General in preparing plaques, maps, and other items for historical commemoration at eighteen overseas military cemeteries. While the three civilians engaged in such work were paid from the Historical Fund, the agencies which they supported reimbursed the fund. Therefore this activity cost the Army's historical office no more than administrative support. Begun in 1948, the memorial work was completed by 1951.<sup>34</sup>

The work of the Army's historians on the enemy side of the war began with collection of German materials by the Historical Section, ETOUSA, and the work of the Shuster Mission. After Germany's surrender, Allied officials collected as many of the enemy's records as they could and shipped the German Army records to Camp Ritchie, near Frederick, Maryland, for use by intelligence officers. These records were later moved to the Pentagon, but few Army historians there had the language capacity to use them. In consequence, Mr. Detmar Finke, proficient in the German language, was hired in January 1946 to do research in the German records. On the other hand, there were neither historians nor translators who could make use of the sizeable collection of similar records seized and moved to Washington after the Japanese surrender. More help with the German records became available in 1947 from the Translation Section of the World War I shop, and one junior officer who could handle Japanese was assigned to the division. But even with such help the records available had too many gaps to be the only source of the enemies' side in the World War II volumes. Authors writing on combat operations, and particularly those dealing with the war against Japan, came to depend also on interrogations and narratives of military and civilian leaders of the defeated nations.<sup>35</sup>

In Europe the interrogations of the

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Shuster mission were continued under Col. S. L. A. Marshall's vigorous leadership. During his December 1945 visit to France, Colonel Clark encouraged a more formal exploitation of the knowledge of senior German officers, and soon thereafter such an effort was undertaken in Germany on a large scale. By mid-summer 1946 more than 500 prisoner-of-war general officers were at work under Army auspices recording their war memories. The blessing and leadership that General Franz Halder, former Chief of the German Army General Staff, gave to this endeavor had much to do with its fruitfulness, and Halder's own war diary was among the most useful of enemy records. General Malony gave solid support to the enemy studies work in Europe, including its broadening to encompass coverage of the eastern as well as the western theaters of the war. In December 1947 he made a special trip to Germany to thwart its suspension. The result was an outpouring of more than a thousand manuscripts, records of interrogations, and monographs by the spring of 1948. On the other side of the world a somewhat similar program had evolved under the auspices of General Douglas MacArthur's historical office in Tokyo. By 1948 translations of manuscripts by ex-Japanese officers were beginning to flow into Washington.36

General Malony did all that he could to advertise within the Army the wealth of information his division was receiving about the enemy side of the war. He was ably assisted by a young captain, Frank Mahin, who came to the division after playing a leading role in superintending the German manuscript work in Europe. Mahin set up an exhibit in the Deputy Chief of Staff's office, and on 22 July 1948, with Chief of Staff Omar Bradley and all of the General Staff's directors present, joined with General Malony in explaining the value of this material for Army study and reference. General Bradley then authorized a large-scale expansion of the program of translating German materials

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and disseminating them within the Army and especially to Army schools. Eleven days later the German studies and translation work came under the Applied Studies Group. The two were combined in a Foreign Studies Branch in early December 1948. By that time the Branch had translations of nearly half of the German report material, and copies of 620 of the studies had been disseminated to staff divisions and Army schools. After 1948 this sort of activity tended to overshadow the primary mission of the foreign studies program as originally conceived, support of the U.S. Army in World War II series.<sup>37</sup>

In support of the series, Foreign Studies performed a two-fold task. Beginning in August 1948, it assigned to each author working on a European or Mediterranean combat volume a bilingual research assistant. In close collaboration with the author the assistant compiled a parallel account that told the enemy side of the story. The author then integrated the information in this account into his finished draft. During the panel review, Foreign Studies made a careful check of text and footnotes of the draft manuscript. It remained the author's prerogative to decide how much of the enemy story he should use and how he should use it.<sup>38</sup>

In reports of April 1949 General Robinett described his Foreign Studies organization as a "clearing house for [German] studies of current or future use to the staff and schools." He pointed out that it had already provided the latter with translated copies of 721 studies of the 1,022 requested. At the request of Army customers, Foreign Studies also undertook special research in the German records in Washington, and arranged for the preparation in Europe of additional studies for which there was a demonstrated need. It established a separate publishing program at G-2 request, initially for editing the best and most needed of the German studies, later for overseeing their printing as Department

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of the Army pamphlets, and finally as a vehicle for writing new works on the enemy side of the war in eastern Europe. Sixteen pamphlets on German operations were publishing by OCMH between 1950 and 1954, and a number of others in the later 1950's.<sup>39</sup>

Work in the new Applied Studies organization on more general historical studies was overshadowed for several years by the German studies program but was firmly established before the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950. By then eight "Special Studies," as they came to be called, of "recurring staff problems and aspects of war" were underway, all but one by officers. The exception was Mr. Thomas's work on World War I. Ideally, these studies were initiated by having the Army staff division that requested or suggested a study detail one of its members to prepare it. Afterward he could return to his division as "a well informed, or possibly expert, officer in a highly specialized field of staff work."<sup>40</sup>

While the special studies program fell far short of this ideal, it did produce some historical works of substantial value for Army staff and school as well as general public use. Histories of the Army's experience from the American Revolution through World War II with mobilization, demobilization of personnel, replacement of personnel, and the employment of prisoners of war, were printed during the 1950's as Department of the Army pamphlets. As an aspect of this program General Robinett in 1955-56 would superintend the preparation of an American military history text for ROTC use which became the most widely circulated of the Army's historical publications. Two works undertaken by officer-historians were accepted as doctoral dissertations by Harvard and Columbia Universities. One of them, on Military Relations between the United States and Canada, 1939-1945, was published in the World War II series in 1959.<sup>41</sup>

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These doctoral dissertations reflected the Army's postwar policy of encouraging qualified young officers to obtain graduate training in civilian institutions. General Robinett's organization helped on this score by circulating a list of thesis and dissertation topics the exploration of which would be of practical value to the Army. It was hoped, indeed, that some of those who obtained advanced degrees in history might be recruited into OCMH. While this happened in a few instances, the Army usually assigned highly educated officers to duties with a higher priority than history.<sup>42</sup>

The Applied Studies organization was at its peak of activity and strength in the spring of 1950. General Robinett anticipated its becoming eventually "the heart of the history program within the Army," and strongly affirmed his belief that Army history should be written by officer rather than civilian historians. "The true role of civilian historians," he wrote, "is to bring their special research and writing skills to the assistance of their military colleagues." In practice, the whole process of preparing, reviewing, and editing foreign and special studies became exempted from the professional jurisdiction of the Chief Historian and the office's Editorial and Publication Division. Robinett expressed to General Ward the opinion that OCMH was giving too much attention to the World War II series, and that its major function should be historical support and service to Army headquarters. At the end of 1950 his assumption was that work on World War II would be phased out by 1953 and that OCMH would continue thereafter "as a study group for the Chief of Staff."<sup>43</sup>

While General Ward had some sympathy with Robinett's views on using officers as historians, the reorganization of OCMH after the outbreak of the Korean War took away some of the functions of the Special Studies Division, as Robinett's organization was redesignated. It made a new War Histories



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Division responsible for all official histories of the United States Army's participation in wars or similar operations. During the Korean War General Ward tried to get as much as possible of the historical work on the new conflict done by officer-historians, in Washington as well as in the field. The relative merits of officer versus civilian historians became the principal item of discussion at the closed session of the Historical Advisory Committee's meeting in 1952. The committee came out rather overwhelmingly in favor of employing civilian historians. While Ward still held to the view that the Army needed both qualified officers and civilians as historians, he had already begun transferring civilians from the Fund payroll to Civil Service to provide the military history office with a permanent core of skilled senior historians.<sup>44</sup>

OCMH's historians were as surprised as almost all other Americans by the overwhelming attack of the North Koreans on South Korea in June 1950, and were unprepared to adjust their program to it. For the first six months of the war, a single officer was assigned to cover what was happening, and about all he could do was collect materials. It was not until President Truman issued a directive on 29 January 1951--one considerably stronger than Roosevelt's of March 1942--that Federal agencies, including the Army, received a firm mandate to record their experiences in the new conflict and in the national emergency that the Cold War had brought.<sup>45</sup>

During 1951, General Ward and his advisers developed a plan for a five-volume history of the new war. In so doing, they applied four principles: to continue the World War II series work with the least possible interference, to use qualified reserve officers called to active duty on current history work as much as possible, to coordinate as closely as possible historical

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work undertaken in Washington and the Far East (in contrast to World War II and after) and to concentrate on combat and related operations. OCMH established a new Current Branch in the War Histories Division to work on the Korean War. By October 1951 it had a strength of eight officers and three civilians. Early fruits of the work included two semi-pictorial volumes describing and illustrating operations in Korea in 1950 and in 1951-53 respectively. Published by the Government Printing Office, they were similar in form to volumes of the American Forces in Action series. Soon after the fighting ended, the Combat Forces Press published two works, also products of the current history program, describing small unit combat actions and combat support in Korea. An approved plan of January 1953 contemplated eight volumes of a more definitive nature. In addition to topical histories undertaken in Washington and the Far East Command, after Truman's letter the Department of the Army levied a requirement on all except its top agencies and OCMH to prepare and submit to the latter periodic historical summaries. This requirement helped to stimulate other projects for more scholarly historical works in the Army's technical services which still had autonomous historical offices.

After the Korean Armistice in July 1953, the Army lost its authority to hold reserve officers called up for the emergency, and OCMH continued to prefer allotting its senior Civil Service professional strength to the World War II series. An estimate of early 1954 indicated that the office would require fifteen or more professional and clerical people working five years to complete its "Korean Conflict" and "Current National Emergency" series as then planned. It also appeared that the acquisition of a new nonappropriated fund of \$500,000, similar to that granted to the World War II history project in 1947, was the only likely way that these volumes could be completed. But no such fund was forthcoming, the work was strung

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out, and major Army histories concerning the Korean War would not appear until 1961, 1966, and 1972.

Several other factors affecting Army historical work during the Korean War deserve brief mention. In 1951-52, General Ward was pressed to consider broadening the activity of his office to include operational research, possibly by assuming the functions of the Operations Research Office, established by 1948 as a nonprofit corporation under the sponsorship of Johns Hopkins University, mainly to perform research for the Army. While accurate historical information was an essential ingredient of the new discipline of operations research, it employed other ingredients and methods that were alien to history. General Ward resisted the pressure, but not without losing five of the office's senior historians, including Hugh Cole, Forrest Pogue, and Roland Ruppenthal, to the Operations Research Office. Seemingly more urgent needs for office space in the Pentagon led to the move of the Military History office in the spring of 1951 to an old office building at 119 D Street, N.E., near Union Station. Since World War II archival materials that had been kept in or near the Pentagon had already been moved to Alexandria, the office move did not make access to them much harder, but it did make close relationships with other elements in Army headquarters more difficult. After General Ward was succeeded in January 1953 as Chief of Military History by Maj. Gen. Albert Cooper Smith, the coordination between the military and civilian professional chiefs was somewhat closer, not only between Dr. Greenfield and the new Chief but also between the Chief Historian and the new head of the office's War Histories Division, Col. George G. O'Connor. Shortly before General Ward left, he got approval to change the composition of the Historical Advisory Committee. Beginning in spring 1953, the committee was to include representatives of

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the senior Army schools and its major training command, and civilian members were to be limited to five-year terms. In effect this change gave the committee a military-civilian balance and the military history office a closer tie with the Army's system of higher education. This step re-emphasized OCMH's basic mission of helping to train the Army by making it aware of its past experience and achievements.

The primary vehicle for accomplishing the training mission was the World War II series, but only four of its volumes were in print when the Korean War broke out. Even so, as late as the beginning of 1951 the goal remained to have drafts of all the volumes (a number of them not yet begun) completed and ready for panel review by 30 June 1952, as had been projected at the time of the allocation of the War Department Fund in 1947. By spring 1952 OCMH had to accept the fact that even its more talented and industrious authors, with adequate research assistance, could not complete draft manuscripts for operational volumes in much less than three years of those dealing with administrative, logistical, or strategic history in much less than five. Even if authors had been able to complete drafts more expeditiously, the office's panel-review and editorial systems could not have handled more completed manuscripts than they were processing during the Korean War years. When the Advisory Committee met in 1952, the office acknowledged to its members that its World War II research and writing task was still less than two-thirds accomplished. The statistics of accomplishment by the time the Korean fighting ended were nevertheless impressive: another fourteen volumes of the series had been published and four related Air Force volumes were also in print. Work on more than two dozen other books in the Army series had been entirely or substantially completed.<sup>46</sup>

In such a large project, changes in

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coverage as well as postponements in publication were inevitable. Three pictorial volumes were added to the series in 1949 and rather quickly prepared and published. Mark Watson's return to his primary occupation of war correspondent forced cancelation of any further volumes on the Chief of Staff's role. Their projected subject matter was to be covered elsewhere in the series. After he became the historian of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Dr. Winnacker could never find the time to complete his volume on the Secretary of War's office. Among additions, volumes such as the one on military relations with Canada and another on rearming the French came into the series because of the excellence of draft histories prepared for a more modest purpose. Some authors who left OCMH with their books unfinished completed them under contract; others after departure were reluctant or unable to finish their works and in some instances a new author had to be assigned to help revise or rewrite another's manuscript. One small but attractive change was the adoption in 1951 of a distinctive colophon for Army historical publications. Entitled "Military Instruction," it was copied from the monument honoring Baron von Steuben of Revolutionary War fame that stands in Lafayette Park across from the White House.<sup>47</sup>

Because of continuing international tension, the end of fighting in Korea was not followed by as rapid and drastic a demobilization as had been the case after World Wars I and II. But a substantial effort to reduce Army headquarters staffs, coupled with the depletion of the War Department Historical Fund, meant a sharp decline in the strength of the central Army historical office and especially in the number of its historians of demonstrated writing ability. In examining the situation in March 1954, Dr. Greenfield expressed concern that the office was entering a critical phase in scholarly work "with reference to standards of quality." There seemed to be no way of

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holding for more than a few months several outstanding scholars still paid by the Fund, including its most seasoned specialists in strategy and logistics. The Chief Historian noted that the outlook for Korean and "Cold War" coverage was even gloomier than that for continuing work on the World War II history. He was also concerned about increasing difficulties in obtaining clearances for the open publication of completed manuscripts; at least one work had been held up for two years on this score.

Soon after the Chief Historian compiled the above analysis, the Military History office had a fortuitous opportunity to improve its situation and outlook. In 1954, Forrest Pogue's volume The Supreme Command, the history of the command in Western Europe headed in World War II by General Eisenhower, was published, and Eisenhower was now President of the United States. General Smith and Dr. Greenfield joined Dr. Pogue in a presentation ceremony at the White House in May 1954, and were able informally to convey to President Eisenhower their concern over the state of Army historical work. Shortly thereafter a presidential note enabled the office to transfer five more of its senior civilians to Civil Service. In a broader way the President's evident interest in maintaining a scholarly Army historical program--"you musn't lose your swing," he said--made it easier in the ensuing years for the Office of the Chief of Military History to perform its proper mission.<sup>48</sup>

## NOTES

### Chapter 1

1. (1) Charles W. Franklin, "Study on Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, 1861-1865," in Thomas file 5255, hereafter referred to as T 5255, etc. This study is cited below as HS, AWC, monograph. A 480-page monograph completed by the Historical Section, Army War College, in 1931, it is the major source of information on the project, containing all relevant extracts from congressional hearings, Secretary of War reports, and the like, as well as other detailed data. (2) The Preface to the General Index volume published in 1901 also describes the undertaking. (3) Dallas D. Irvine, "The Genesis of the Official Records," Mississippi Valley Historical Review 24, no. 2 (September 1937): 221-29, throws new light on the project's development to 1877.
2. (1) Irvine, "Genesis of the Official Records." (2) HS, AWC, monograph, pp. 55ff.
3. Works previously cited, and Josephus N. Larned, The Literature of American History, (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1902), pp. 213-15.
4. (1) HS, AWC, monograph, pp. 349 ff. (2) On World War I practice, see Chapter 3.
5. (1) General Index, pp. x ff. (2) On the War Department's collection of Confederate records, see Dallas D. Irvine, "The Archive Office of the War Department," Military Affairs 10, no. 1 (Spring 1946): 93-111.
6. (1) General Index, pp. iv ff. (2) HS, AWC, monograph, pp. 473ff. (3) On the atlas, see Henry Steele Commager's Introduction to The Official Atlas of the Civil War (New York: Thomas Yoseloff, 1958). (4) In a parallel undertaking, the U.S. Navy in 1884 began to collect Union and Confederate naval records for publication, and these appeared in a series of thirty-one volumes including an index, Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies in the War of the Rebellion (Washington: GPO, 1894-1927).

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7. (1) General Index, pp. xii ff. (2) Mabel E. Deutrich, Struggle for Supremacy: The Career of General Fred C. Ainsworth (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1962), pp. 61-62.

8. (1) Robert M. Johnston, editorial comment in Military Historian and Economist 1, no. 2 (April 1916): 199-200. (2) Dallas D. Irvine, Genesis of the Official Records," and his Introduction and Endnote to Prospectus, Military Operations of the Civil War: A Guide-Index to "Official Records, Armies" (Washington: GPO, 1966). (3) Library of Congress, Guide to the Study of the United States of America (Washington GPO, 1966), p. 448. (4) U.S. Civil War Centennial Commission, Civil War Books: A Critical Bibliography, 2 vols. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1967), II:31.

9. (1) Casey A. Wood and F. H. Garrison, "The Medical History of the War, I, Retrospective," Military Surgeon 44, no. 3 (March 1919). This article and the introduction to the reports published in 1865 are reprinted in Robin Higham, ed, Official Histories (Manhattan: Kansas State University Library, 1970), pp. 574-87. (2) D. S. Lamb, "A History of the U.S. Army Medical Museum, 1862 to 1917," photostat of typescript, n.d., in Library of Congress, pp. 3-29.

10. (1) The Medical and Surgical History of the War of the Rebellion, 6 vols. (Washington: GPO, 1870-88). The Preface to Volume I, The Medical Department of the United States Army in the World War (Washington: GPO, 1923), pp. 13-18, describes the project.

11. (1) "Report of Chief, Record and Pension Office, 1901," in Annual Report of the Secretary of War, vol. I, pt. 2, pp. 1103-12. (2) Act of 18 August 1894, copy in T [Thomas file] 5741, Folder A. (3) Papers in T 3819. (4) Deutrich, Ainsworth, pp. 53-75.

12. Deutrich, Ainsworth, pp. 89-131.

13. (1) Act of 2 March 1913, copy in T 5741, Folder A. (2) Ltr, Capt Clark to SW (through AG), 7 June 1915, in T 3819. (3) Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1915, I:223-24. (4) National Archives and Records Service, M847, 853, and 859.

14. Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1903, I:59, 64.

15. (1) Ltr, Chief, War College Division, to CofS, 6 Jan 1914, HRC 314.71 HS, WPD (1914-19). (2) Lecture by President, Army War College, 15 Feb 1916, The Scientific Study of Military History, in "AWC, Session 1915-16, Pt. V, Lectures, Vol. 62," CMH files. (3)



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Lecture by Lt. Col. Oliver L. Spaulding, Research Work in the Historical Branch of the General Staff, December 1920, copy in T 3336/H.

16. (1) Article on Robert M. Johnston by Arthur L. Conger, Journal of the American Military Foundation [Military Affairs] 1, no. 2 (Summer 1937): 45-46. (2) Lecture by President, AWC, 15 Feb 1916, cited in preceding footnote. (3) Committee Report and covering note, Johnston to SW, 1 Jan 1914, and Ltr, Johnston to CofS, 31 Jan 1914, both in HRC 314.71 HS, WPD (1914-19).

17. (1) Lt. Col. George P. Ahern, "A Chronology of the Army War College, 1899-1919," pp. 189-99, copy in CMH. (2) Ltrs and Memo, CofS to Chief, War College Division, 3 Jan and to Brig Gen Hunter Liggett, President, AWC, 3 and 5 Jan 1914, all in HRC 314.7 HS, WPD (1914-19).

18. (1) Ltr, Col Biddle to CofS, 6 Jan, Memo, CofS to Col Biddle, 9 Jan, and WCD announcement of Col Biddle, 10 Jan 1914, all in HRC 314.71 HS WPD (1914-19). (2) Ahern, "Chronology of the Army War College," pp. 211-12.

19. (1) Reports received in 1914 on European military history offices and a detailed analysis of them, 1 Sep 1915, and exchanges between Johnston and Brig Gen Montgomery Macomb, President AWC, 9 Oct- 7 Nov 1914, all in HRC 314.71 HS, WPD (1914-19). (2) Ahern, "Chronology of the Army War College," pp. 237-38. (3) In the event, Johnston's work on Second Manassas remained unfinished.

20. Various papers in WCD file 10163-1, 2, 3, especially Memo, Ch, WCD, for SW, 21 Aug 1917, and notation of WCD action on Memo, Ch, Military Intelligence Service, for Ch, WCD, 25 Aug 1917. After the staff's Historical Branch was established in March 1918, a list of References for War History, dated 1 April-31 July 1917 (copy in WCD 10163-7), was furnished to it, presumably the fruit of work done in June-August 1917. The WCD and WPD files referred to here and hereafter are in the National Archives.

21. (1) Memos, Gen Harbord to Gen Pershing, 30 Sep, and Col Willcox to GHQ, CofS, 20 Dec 1917, both in Thomas file, T 333, Folder 1. (2) Instead of being made head of a historical office, on 18 Dec 1917 Willcox was assigned as GHQ's liaison officer with French headquarters. Apparently on his own initiative he began writing an AEF history and brought the story

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up to the landing of the first American troops at St. Nazaire. Memo, Maj Palmer to Sec GS, GHQ, 2 May 1918, in HS, GHQ file 68. The HS, GHQ, files referred to here and hereafter are with the AEF GHQ files in the National Archives.

22. Ltr, Johnston to CofS, 21 Dec 1917, and Memo, CofS for SW, 2 Jan 18, with added note of SW's approval and directions, in HRC 314.7 HS, WPD (1914-19).

23. Memo, Acting Director, WCD, for CofS, 18 Jan 1918, in HRC 314.7 HS, WPD (1914-19).

24. (1) WD G.O. 14, 9 Feb 1918, and AEF GHQ G.O. 31, 16 Feb 1918. (2) Telgs, AG to Pershing, 19 Jan, Pershing to AG, 8 Feb, and AG to Pershing, 1 Mar 1918, all in T 333, Folder 1. (3) Joseph W. Hanson, "The Historical Section, Army War College," Journal of the American Military History Foundation 1, no. 2 (Summer 1937): 70-74.

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1. (1) Various papers in Thomas files T 1, 4, 6002. (2) Memo, WPD for CofS, 21 Mar 1918, in HRC 314.71 HS, WPD (1914-19).

2. Papers in T 1 prepared in September as input for the Chief of Staff's 1918 Annual Report.

3. (1) Memo, WPD for CofS, 1 May 1918, and related papers in HRC 314.71 HS, WPD (1914-19). (2) Ltrs. and Incls. in WCD 10163-11, 12, 14. (3) Walter G. Leland and Newton D. Mereness, Introduction to the American Official Sources for the Economic and Social History of the World War (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1926), pp. 61ff. (4) Newton D. Mereness (ed.), "American Historical Activities during the World War," in American Historical Association, Annual Report, 1919 (Washington: GPO, 1923), 1:160-61.

4. (1) Annual Report of the Ch, HB, 20 Jun 1919, in T 1. (2) Ltr, Col Weeks to Maj Johnston, 3 Dec 1918, in T 4. (3) Ltrs, SW to Sec State, 7 Jan and Sec State to SW, 6 Feb 1919, in WCD 10163-30. (4) Elizabeth B. Drewry, "Historical Units of Agencies of the First World War," in National Archives Bulletin, no. 4 (July 1942), p. 10.

5. Information primarily from the HB Annual Report of 20 June 1919, in T 1.

6. (1) On recruiting, various papers in HRC 314.71 HS, WPD (1914-19); and on accomplishments, the Annual

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Report of 20 Jun 1919 in T 1. (2) The judgement is that of Messrs. Leland and Mereness in their Introduction to the American Official Sources for the Economic and Social History of the World War, previously cited.

7. (1) Information principally from the Annual Report of 20 Jun 1919 previously cited. (2) On the Literary Digest item, Memo, Acting Sec GS for Chief Military Censor, 15 March 1918, in WCD 10163-6.

8. Memos, Ch, HB for Col Hickman, WPD, 7 Dec, and of Maj Paxson for Ch, HB, 12 Dec 1918, both in T 333.

9. (1) Hanson, "The Historical Section, AWC," Journal of the American Military History Foundation 1, no. 2 (Summer 1937): 70-74. (2) Various exchanges between the War Department and AEF GHQ in HRC 314.71 HS, WPD (1914-19). (3) Memo, Maj Palmer for Sec GS, GHQ, 2 May 1918, in HS, GHQ file 68. (4) Apparently, after Johnston's arrival the GHQ staff continued to view Palmer's work in connection with the war diary as a part of the historical effort, although Johnston did not recognize it as such. From the spring of 1918 onward most of the actual writing of the war diary was done by a Sergeant O'Rourke under Palmer's supervision.

10. Papers in T 4, including two letters from Johnston to Colonel Weeks (n.d., written aboard ship; and 3 Jun 1918 from Brest), with attached accounts of his trip and the submarine attack.

11. Ltrs, Johnston to Weeks, 14, 21, 28 Jun, and 5, 12, Jul 1918, in T 4. These weekly letters constituted Johnston's report to the Washington historical office.

12. Johnston's letters and memorandums (including attached detailed reports on his findings in London and Paris), 9 Aug-9 Sep 1918, in T 4.

13. (1) Various papers, 2 Oct-22 Nov 1918, in T 4 and HRC 314.71 HS, WPD (1914-19). (2) As Johnston told Weeks in a confidential letter of 21 November 1918 (in T 1718), the AEF historical chief came to view Frederick Palmer as his chief nemesis at GHQ. To be sure Palmer, with his senior rank, personal favor, and control of the GHQ war diary which he had turned into a general AEF record of accomplishments, posed a substantial obstacle to the establishment of a sound historical program at Pershing's headquarters. But, as another explanation of his difficulties, it seems never to have occurred to Johnston that his GHQ military superiors may have wondered what went into his letters to Colonel Weeks. (3) The Historical Archives thus collected are with the AEF GHQ records

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in the National Archives.

14. (1) Memo, DCofS GHQ for Maj Johnston, 30 Oct 1918, in T 4. (2) The Memo of 22 October, Johnston to Sec Gen Staff, with Pershing's comment, is also in T 4, and the preceding portion of the paragraph is based on other items in this same file. The original is in HS, GHQ file 68-3.

15. (1) Memos, Johnston for Sec GS, 6 Nov, and for Lt Col Kuegle, 7 Nov 1918, and of General Pershing for CofS, 22 Dec 1918, all in HS, GHQ file 68. (2) Memo, Johnston for Sec GS, 11 Dec 1918, in T 4.

16. Ltr, Johnston to Weeks, 23 Dec 1918, in T 4.

17. Ltr and Incl, Johnston to Weeks, 11 Jan, and Ltr, Weeks to Johnston 21 Jan 1919, in T 4.

18. Ltrs, Johnston to Sec GS, 28 Dec 1918, and Johnston to Weeks, 11 and 27 Jan 1919, in T 4.

19. (1) Memo, Lt J. G. Babb for Ch HS, 6 Jan 1919, in T 4. (2) Ltr, Col Wright, Sec HS, to Lt Col Calvin Goddard, Ch HS, Ord Dept, 5 Apr 1944, in T 3514/F 2-b. (3) Johnson Hagood, The Services of Supply (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1927), p. 172.

20. (1) On Spaulding, Army biographical data sheet, and general reference works. (2) Memo, Spaulding for CofS, 28 May 1919, and other papers in HS, GHQ file 80.

21. Telg, AG for AEF GHQ, 20 Mar 1919, and other papers in T 333.

22. Various papers in HS, GHQ files 50 and 80, and in T 4946.

23. Memo, Ch, HS, for CofS, 15 Mar 1919, and other papers in HS, GHQ file 80. (2) Memo, CofS for DCofS, GHQ, 8 Apr 1919, in HS, GHQ file 178. (3) Copies of the "2nd Division at Chateau Thierry" monograph (43 pages and appendices) are in HS, GHQ file 179; but no trace of the three others known to have been in draft form has been found.

24. Memo, Spaulding for CofS, 28 May 1919, and other papers in HS, GHQ file 80.

25. (1) Ltr & Incl, Jameson to SW Baker, 21 Jan, and Memo, CofS for Director, WPD, 26 Feb 1919, both in T 3336/H. (2) Memo, Director, WPD, for CofS, 15 Mar 1919, in WPD 10163-36. (3) Taylor's article was published without change in the American Historical Review 24, no. 4 (July 1919): 637-40.

26. On the request for civilians, Memos, WPD for CofS, 12 May, and ACofS Operations for WPD, 20 May 1919, both in HRC 314.7 HS, WPD (1914-19).

27. (1) Memo, WPD for CofS, 24 Jun; Memo for Record

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of Spaulding, 24 Jul; Memo, Director, WPD, for Executive, 29 Jul; and Report of Committee Meeting, 29 Jul 1919; all in T 3336/H. (2) Ltr, Spaulding to Weeks, 26 Apr 1919, in HS, GHQ File 50.

28. Memo, SW for CofS, 4 Aug 1919, copy in T 3336/H.

29. (1) Memo, WPD for CofS, 12 Jun, and Memo for Record of Spaulding, 24 Jul 1919, both in HRC 314.7 HS, WPD (1914-1919). (2) Memo, Spaulding to Director, WPD, 25 Aug, and HB Office Circular, 28 Aug 1919, both in T 333. (3) HB Annual Report, 30 Jun 1920, in T 1.

30. (1) Memo, Spaulding for Chief Clerk, WPD, 3 Oct 1919, in T 333, and included without change in GS Handbook issued on 19 Nov 1919. (2) Memo (Pers. and Conf.), Maj J. E. D. Melvin for Commandant, General Staff College, 26 Nov 1919, in T 333. Possibly this was a communication inspired by Melvin's chief. (3) Spaulding, "Historical Branch of the General Staff," Infantry Journal 16, no. 6 (December 1919): 450-54.

31. (1) Memo, Ch, HB, for Director, WPD, 2 Dec 1919, in WPD 4307. (2) Memo, Ch, HB, for Asst Director, WPD, 27 Jan 1920, in T 3336/H. (3) Memos, WPD for CofS, 2 Mar 1920, and Ch, HB, for AG, 8 Jun 1922, both in HRC 314.71 HS, AWC, WTY. (4) HB Annual Reports, 1920 and 1921, copies in T 1. (5) For the later work on documents, see Chapter 3.

32. (1) HB Annual Reports, 1920 and 1921, in T 1.

(2) HB Memo for Record, 17 Feb 1920, in T 1371.

33. (1) On overseas representation, information in WPD 2170, HRC 314.71 HS, AWC, Vol I, and T 3336/H. (2) On the letters to participants and their responses, Memo, WPD for CofS, 4 Dec 1919, and other papers in T 1063. (3) See also Charles B. Burdick, "Foreign Military Records, World War I, in the National Archives" Prologue (Winter 1975), pp. 213-20.

34. (1) Memo, WPD for AG, 25 Aug 1919, in T 900. (2) Memos, AG for CofS, 17 Dec, and of Exec Asst to CofS for WPD, 29 Dec 1919, and other papers in WPD 2914. (3) HB Annual Report, 1921, in T 1.

35. Maj. W. A. Cattell, "History of the Historical Data Section of the Office of the Chief of Engineers, U.S. Army, to June 1, 1919," pp. 78-84.

36. Memo, Ch, HB for ASW, 19 Jan, Memo for Record [Weeks' survey], 17 Feb 1920, and other papers in T 1371.

37. This paragraph and the one following are based on: (1) Casey A. Wood and Fielding H. Garrison, "Medical History of the War. 2. Prospective," Military Surgeon 44, no. 5 (May 1919): 521-29. (2) The Medical

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Department of the United States Army in the World War (Washington: GPO, 1923), 1: 11-18, 525-29. (3) Memo, Surgeon General for ASW, 27 Jan 1920, in T 1371.

38. (1) Ltr, AG to Chiefs of all Staff Bureaus and HB, WPD, 5 Apr 1920, in T 1371. (2) Memo for Record of Conference of HB and service representatives on 29 Apr 1920, in T 3514/7-18/2.

39. (1) Appendix A to HB Annual Report, 30 Jun 1920, in T 1. (2) The review of Volume II of the medical series of 24 September 1926, in HRC 314.71 HS, AWC, Vol. 18, is typical. (3) Alexander Baltzey, "Robert Matteson Johnston and the Study of Military History," Military Affairs 21, no. 1 (Spring 1957): 26-30.

40. (1) Annual Report of CofS, 30 Jun 1920, in SW Annual Report, 1920, Vol. I, pp. 214-16. (2) HB Annual Report and Supplement, 1921, in T 1. (3) Memo, Ch, HB for Director, WPD, 13 Oct 20, in T 3336/H. (4) Memo, ACofS Operations for CofS, 26 May 1921, and General March's undated endorsement thereon, in T 333.

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1. (1) WD General Orders 41, 16 Aug 1921, par. 3p. (2) Office Memo, HS, AWC, 1 Sep 1921, in T 3336/H. (3) Exchanges of 24 and 25 Oct 1921 between Spaulding and CofS's office, in T 1371. (4) The dismantling of the old War Plans Division in the reorganization made the transfer of the Historical Section to some other agency all but inevitable.

2. (1) Memo, Ch, HS, for Commandant, AWC, 22 Aug 1921, in T 3336/H. (2) Memo, Commandant, AWC [drafted by Spaulding], for CofS, 14 Nov 1921, in T 333.

3. (1) Memo, G-3 for CofS, 10 Dec 1921, in T 2600. (2) Memo, CofS for DCofS, 31 Jan 1922, and Memo, AG for Commandant, AWC, 8 Jul 1922, both in T 3336/H. (3) Memo, Commandant, AWC, for G-1, 8 Feb 1922, in HRC 314.71 HS, AWC, Vol. IV. (4) Memo, Commandant, AWC, for CofS, 8 May 1922, and Memo for Record, 3 Feb 1932, both in T 900. (5) Study, 16 Jul 1945, by Mr. R. S. Thomas, par. 5, in HRC 314.71 HS, AWC, Vol. 1.

4. (1) Items (1) and (3) in preceding footnote. (2) On Wright, College of William and Mary Alumni Gazette, May 1946, p. 11; and Army biographical data sheet.

5. (1) Resumes of the activities of HS representatives in Paris, London, and Berlin, compiled by Mr. R. S. Thomas in May 1944, copies in HRC 314.71 HS, AWC, Vol. VI. (2) Memo, Ch, HS, for Commandant,

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AWC, 3 Aug 1938, and other papers in HRC 314.71 HS, AWC, Vol. 22. (3) Local clerks continued to forward previously selected documents from Berlin and Paris until the spring and summer of 1940.

6. (1) Statements on general unit history responsibilities based on a review of OCMH precedent files, including OHB file 126. (2) On the Battle Participation Board, items in OHB 126, and WD Special Orders No. 17-0 of 21 Jan 1922, and No. 176 of 26 Jul 1924.

7. (1) Colonel Spaulding's contribution on Army historical work in Newton D. Mereness, "American Historical Activities During the World War," in American Historical Association Annual Report, 1919 (Washington: GPO, 1923), 1: 144-55. (2) On 2d Division, HS memos of 13 Jan 1931 in HRC 314.71 HS, AWC, Vol. 21, and of 7 Aug 1935 in HRC 314.71 HS, AWC, Vol. XI, and various papers in HRC 314.71 HS, AWC (1928), Compilation of Division Records.

8. (1) Memo, Commandant, AWC, for CofS, 25 Apr, and Memo, Sec GS for Commandant, AWC, 15 May 1922, both in T 1371. (2) Memo, Ch, HS, for Commandant, AWC, 23 Aug, and 2d Ind, AG to Commandant, AWC, 30 Aug 1922, in HRC 314.71 HS AWC (MISC 216/51-100).

9. (1) Memo, Commandant, AWC, for CofS, 8 Feb, and Pershing's approval, 9 Feb 1922, in T 2242. (2) Ltrs, SW to Dr. J. F. Jameson, 2 Mar, and Jameson to SW, 9 Mar 1922, in HRC 314.71 HS, AWC, Vol. IV.

10. (1) Warfare. . ., (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1925). (2) Ltr, AG to Col Spaulding, 14 Dec 1923, in HRC 314.71 HS, AWC, Vol. X. (3) Ltr, Ch, HS, through AWC to AG, 2 Aug 1926, in HRC 314.71 HS, AWC, Vol. 18.

11. (1) Various papers, dated 3 Nov 1922-26 Apr 1923, in T 2383. (2) Pershing's letter of 29 March 1923 with other related material was published in the American Historical Review 28, no. 4 (July 1923): 699-704.

12. Memo, Col Spaulding for General of the Armies, 20 Mar 1923, and other papers in T 2184. The draft chapters are in a separate folder of this file.

13. (1) Memo, Commandant, AWC, for AG, 15 Dec 1923, in HRC 314.71 HS, AWC, Vol. X. (2) Memo, Col Spaulding for Exec, AWC, 10 May 1923, in HRC 314.71 HS, AWC, Vol. V.

14. Correspondence and actions in HRC 314.71 HS, AWC (1925) Operations of the Air Service, AEF, and HRC 314.71 HS, AWC (MISC 216-219).

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15. Papers in HRC 314.71 HS, AWC (216-138).
16. In HRC 314.71 HS, AWC (MISC 202-16).
17. HRC 314.71 HS, AWC 1925-26 (Encyclopedia Britannica).
18. (1) Memo, Commandant, AWC, for Ch, HS, 22 Nov 1926, in HRC 314.17 HS, AWC, Vol. II. (2) Memo, Ch HS, for Exec Off, AWC, 11 Apr 1928 in HRC 314.17 HS, AWC, Vol. V.
19. (1) Memo, Lt Col Bach, Ch, HS, for Commandant, AWC, 13 Nov 1924, in T 333. (2) Memo, Ch, HS, for Advisory Board, 2 Jun 1928, in T 3336/H. (3) Memo, Lt Col Burt et al for Commandant, AWC, 9 Nov 1925, in HRC 314.71 HS, AWC, Vol. II.
20. Memo, Ch, HS, for Advisory Board, 2 Jun 1928, and Ltrs, Bach to Paxson et al, 16 Mar 1926, all in T 3336/H.
21. (1) Memo, Ch, HS, for AG (thru Commandant, AWC), 6 Apr 1926, and Ltr, AG for Commandant, AWC, 6 May 1926, in T 3336/H. (2) Ltr, Ch, HS, to AG (thru channels), 27 Mar 1929, and accompanying note, in T 5741.
22. Various papers, dated 21 Jul 1926-13 Apr 1927, copies in T 5741.
23. (1) Various papers in HRC 314.71 HS, AWC (1928-31) and T 4286, the board's report being in the latter file. (2) When Professor Hayes' work with the Advisory Board became known, the War Department received several letters attacking his alleged radicalism and lack of patriotism; but apparently they had no affect on the Army's attitude toward his service.
24. Memo, Ch, HS, for Commandant, AWC, 23 Jun, and Ltr, Commandant, AWC, for Ch, HS, 28 Jun 1928, in T 4286.
25. Papers in HRC 314.7 HS, AWC (1928-37).
26. Draft of 5 Mar 1929 and comments on it in T 4286.
27. The open report dated 29 May 1929 is in T 4286; the confidential report of the same date, is in HRC 314.71 HS, AWC (1928-31).
28. (1) Various papers in the T 3336 "Genesis" folder, including Pershing's cable of 10 Jun and the CofS directive of 12 Jun 1929 quoted above. (2) "Memorandum of Conversation with General Pershing this Day" (29 Jun 1928) by Colonel Bach, 29 Jun 1928, in T 3336/H folder. (3) Ltr, Ch, HS, thru AWC to AG, 19 Jun 1929, in HRC 314.71 HS, AWC (MISC 216/142/2).
29. (1) Ltr, Commandant, AWC, to AG, 3 Jun 1929, in



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HRC 314.71 HS, AWC, Vol. 2. (2) Memo, AG for G-3, 9 Jul 1929, and other papers in T 5741.

30. (1) Papers in T 5741, including copies of General Summerall's undated pencil memorandum of decisions (written before 8 Aug 1929) and General Connor's 13-page mimeographed "Instructions for the Historical Section" dated 4 Nov 1929. (2) Ltr, AG for Commandant, AWC, 14 Aug, and Memo, HS for Commandant, AWC, 23 Nov 1929, in T 3336. (3) For lists of the unpublished works retained by the historical office, most of them still in its files in 1973, see Memo, Ch, HS, for Commandant, AWC, 23 Nov 1929, in T 7493; and Memo, Maj Barnes for Maj Buckner, 9 Feb 1932, in HRC 314.71 HS, AWC, Vol. 15.

31. (1) Ltrs, Prof Hayes to Capt Leon Denez, AWC, 6 Feb, Prof Bell to Capt Denez, 15 Feb, and Gen Connor to Prof Bell, 19 Feb 1930, all in RC 314.71 HS, AWC (1928-31). (2) The papers concerning the cancellation of the 1931 meeting and the board's disbandment are in the same file, and the board's 1930 report is in T 4286.

32. (1) Memo, Ch, HS, for Commandant, AWC, 28 May 1925, and other papers in HRC 314.7 HS, AWC, Vol. 12. (2) Ltr, AG to Commandant, AWC, 20 May 1927, in T 3336/H. (3) Incl 4 to Memo, R. S. Thomas for Exec, AWC, 8 Nov 1944, in HRC 314.71 HS, AWC, Vol. 1. (4) The other monographs, published in 1926 and 1929, dealt with the battles of Camden, King's Mountain, and Cowpens.

33. (1) Various papers in HRC 314.7 HS, AWC, Vols. 12, 21, and 22. (2) The transfer was directed by Section 2 of Executive Order 6166, 10 June 1933.

34. (1) Papers in T 5706, especially Memos of WO Collins for Ch, HS, 27 Feb 1932, and of Maj R. B. Patterson for Ch, HS, 16 Aug 1932, from which the above quotations were taken. (2) Memo, Gen Pershing for Gen Craig, 21 Nov 1936, in HRC 314.71 HS, AWC, 216/149/2.

35. (1) Ltr, Commandant, AWC, to Ch, HS, 4 Nov 1929, in T 5741. (2) Memo, Ch, HS, for Commandant, AWC, 21 Apr 1933, in HRC 314.71 HS, AWC, Vol. 14. (3) Memo, Maj H. E. Maguire for Ch, HS, 25 Jun 1934, in T 5602. (4) Memo, Ch, HS, for Congressional Committee, 30 Jan 1937, in HRC 314.71 HS, AWC, Vol. 2. (5) Joseph W. Hanson, "The Historical Section, Army War College," in Journal of the American Military History Foundation 1, no. 2 (Summer 1937): 73-74.

36. (1) CMH office lists, and plates on photographs

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in the Conference Room, which incorrectly date Lull's accession as of 1 July 1932. (2) In addition to the Army Register and other Army biographical sources, see on Lull: Alfred Hasbrouck, "Colonel Charles Edward Lull. Father of the Foundation," Journal of the American Military History Foundation 1, no. 4 (Winter 1937-38): 174-76, and Jesse S. Douglas "Let History Arm the Mind," Military Affairs 8, no. 1 (Spring 1944): 16-32. On Spaulding, see The National Cyclopedia of American Biography 35: 329-30.

37. (1) Memo, Maj Clarence C. Benson for Col Lull, 2 Oct 1931, in T 4435. (2) Various papers, 13 Jan 1931-24 Feb 1932, in HRC 314.71 HS, AWC, Vol. 21. (3) Memo, Ch, HS, for Commandant, AWC, 24 Feb 1933, in HRC 314.71 HS, AWC, Vol. 14. (4) Notes on Navy and State Historical activity prepared in 1931, in T 4122.

38. (1) Memos, Maj Benson for Col Riggs, AWC, 29 Nov 1932, Col Lull for Commandant, AWC, 24 Jun 1933, and Ch, HS, for Congressional Committee, 20 Jan 1937, in HRC 314.71 HS, AWC, Vols. 21, 13, and 2, respectively. (2) HS, AWC personnel chart, 1918-44.

39. Memo, Ch, HS, for Commandant, AWC, 24 Sep 1932, Notes on Conference, 24 Oct 1932, and Memo, Asst. Commandant for Commandant, AWC, 29 Mar 1935, in HRC 314.71 HS, AWC, Vols. 2, 14, and 19 respectively.

40. (1) Memos, Ch, HS, for Acting Commandant, AWC, 12 Nov 1935, and of Ch, HS, for Congressional Committee, 30 Jan 1937, and unsigned Summary, 1 Feb 1938, all in HRC 314.71 HS, AWC, Vol. 2. (2) Ltr, AG to Commandant, AWC, 16 Dec 1937, in T 5741.

41. Papers in T 3336 "Genesis" folder, especially 1st Wrapper Ind, Ch, HS, to Sec, GS (thru Commandant, AWC), 2 Dec 1936, and Memo, G-3 for CofS, 9 Apr 1937.

42. (1) Ltrs, AG to Commandant, AWC, 30 Oct 1939 and 23 Oct 1940, in T 5741. (2) Ltr, AG to Commandant, AWC, 23 Oct 1940, in T 3514/F-2.

43. (1) Papers cited in preceding footnote, and also Memo, Ch, HS, for Commandant, AWC, 4 Oct 1940, in T 3514/F-2. (2) Memo for Record, 4 Jan 1941, in T 3514/F-3. (3) Army Biographical data sheets.

44. (1) On the proposed transfer from the War College, papers in HRC 314.71 HS, AWC, Vol. 19. (2) On the move to the Armory, List of Quarters, 1918-46, in T 333, Folder 1.

45. Compilation of HS Duties, 10 Jan 1942, in T 1792.

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1. Copies of this letter and of many other 1942 and 1943 documents cited hereafter may be found in Vol. II, DOCUMENTATION, of Royce L. Thompson's "Establishment of the War Department's Historical Program for World War II," manuscript in GRB, CMH. Hereafter cited as Thompson Documents.

2. (1) Papers in HRC 314.71 HS AWC, Vol. 3. (2) Memo, Spaulding for OCS, 30 Nov 1942, in WDCSA 314.8. (3) Ltr. Ch HS, AWC to AG, 10 May 1943, in HB 314.72. 3. (1) Ltr, Spaulding to DCofS, 2 Jul 1942, in WDCSA 062.1. (2) Ltr, Ch HS, AWC to AG, 1 Jun 1945, paragraph 6, item 3, in T 333/F-1.

4. (1) Copies of these studies are in T 7200. (2) Various exchanges between the Historical Section and the Chief of Staff's office, 18 Jun-7 Aug 1942, in WDCSA.1, cover the establishment of this program. (3) Ltr, Spaulding to Dr. Pendleton Herring, Bureau of the Budget, 30 Jun 1942, in T 3514/F2-B.

5. (1) Ltr, Ch HS, AWC to AG, 1 Jun 1945, paragraph 6, items 4 and 6, in T 333/F-1. (2) "Headquarters Gazette," Military Affairs 7, no. 2 (Summer 1943): 97-98. (3) Memo, Ch, Liaison and Policy Sec., to Ch, HB, G-2, 19 Jul 1945, cy in Wright Papers, points out that the Historical Section, AWC, continued to be charged by directive with responsibility for determining battlefield credits, even though in practice it had lost the function in 1943.

6. (1) Various papers in T 333/F-1. (2) Memo, Col. John M. Kemper for Gen Harding, 8 Jan 1946, HDSS Planning Branch Papers.

7. (1) Org. chart, HS, AWC, 15 Jan 1945, in T 5602. (2) Ltr, Ch HS, AWC to AG, 1 Jun 1945, in T 333/F-1. (3) Memo, Thomas for CHM, 14 Sep 1951, in HRC 314.7 W.W. I History.

8. (1) Copies of President Roosevelt's letter to Director, Bureau of the Budget, and other papers, in Thompson Documents. (2) Harry Vanneman, "Records of War Administration," Military Affairs 6, no. 3 (Fall 1942): 191-96. (3) Developments of 1942 and 1943 described in this and succeeding paragraphs are traced in greater detail in Thompson's "Establishment of the War Department Historical Program for World War II," cited above, and in Bell I. Wiley, "Historical Program of the U.S. Army, 1939 to the Present," Chs. I and II.

9. (1) Various papers in Thompson Documents, 11 Jun-4 Aug 1942. (2) Ltr, Spaulding to Dr. Herring, 30

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Jun 1942, in T 3514/F2-B. (3) Memo, Ch HS, AWC for WD Hist Officers, 2 Dec 1942, in HRC 314.71 HS, AWC, Vol. 3. (4) Originals of these and other related documents are in HRC 337 Hist Program (1949).

10. Victor Gondos, "Army Historiography in the Second World War," Military Affairs 7, no. 1 (Spring 1943): 60-68.

11. "Memorandum on Plans for the Historical Section of the Army Ground Forces," 16 Nov 1942, in Thompson Documents.

12. Various papers, 18 Nov 1942-16 Jan 1943, in Thompson Documents.

13. (1) Memo, Ch HS, AWC for Secretary, General Staff, 16 Feb 1943, and list of attendees at dinner conference on 29 Jan 1943, both in HB 314.72. Although invited General Spaulding was unable to attend and did not send a representative. (2) Gondos, "Army Historiography in the Second World War," Military Affairs 7: 68.

14. Various papers, 20 Feb-30 Apr 1943, in Thompson Documents, and corroborating evidence in ASW 314.7.

15. Various papers, 24 Mar-10 May 1943, in HB 314.72 and T 3514/F2-B.

16. Memos, Col Nelson to Mr. McCloy, 4 and 13 May 1943; Note of Interview, Royce Thompson with Col John M. Kemper, 20 Mar 1947; and Ltr, Otto Nelson to Col Kemper, 17 Mar 1947; all in Thompson Documents. (2) Ltr, Kemper to Maj. Leonard M. Friesz, CMH, 4 Jun 1953, in Wiley Papers.

17. Papers, 27 May-26 Jun 1943, in Thompson Documents. Almost no records of the committee's work during this initial period of activity, except as stated in the 26 June report, have been found. The report attached a dissenting opinion of General Spaulding on two points, the necessity of a new agency and the choice of Mr. Pringle.

18. (1) Ltr, Kemper to Friesz, 4 Jun 1953, cited above. (2) Various papers, 6 Jul-3 Aug 1943, in Thompson Documents.

19. (1) WD Memorandum W345-21-43, 3 Aug 1943. (2) Memo, McCloy for CofS, 21 Nov 1945, in ASW 314.7.

20. Victor Gondos, "Army Historiography: Retrospect and Prospect," Military Affairs 7, no. 3 (Fall 1943): 133-40.

21. (1) Various papers, 16 Jul-21 Sep 1943, in Thompson Documents. (2) Memo, Kemper for Col Nelson, 20 Jul 1943, in WDCSA 314.7. (3) Memo, Kemper for ASW (thru ACofS G-2), 22 Sep 1943, and other papers in ASW

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314.7. (4) Ltr, Kemper to Friesz, 4 Jun 1953, cited above.

22. (1) Robert R. Smith, "The Historical Branch, G-2: Getting the Program Underway," p. 25, for the strength and tentative internal organization at the end of 1943. (2) Ltr, Kemper to Lt Col E. Dwight Salmon, 4 Mar 1944, in HB 314.75.

23. (1) G-2 Organization Memorandum, 30 Aug 1943. (2) H. B. Administrative Memorandum No. 4, 15 May 1944. (3) Ltrs, Kemper to Lt Col Paul Birdsall, AFHQ, 20 Mar 1944, to Col Marshall, 24 Mar 1944, and to Col William A. Ganoe, ETO, 12 May 1944, all in HB 314.75. (4) Dr. Auxier, dissatisfied with his reassignment in the Branch's May reorganization, left it in June for the War Production Board.

24. (1) Memo for Record, Kemper, 19 Feb 1944, in HB 314.732 War in Outline. (2) Dr. Wright summarized the final points above in Memos to Kemper of 15 February and 17 March 1944, in Wright Papers.

25. (1) Various papers, 28 Apr-1 Aug 1943, in HRC 020, OCMH Hist. Prog. (2) HB 314.72 G-2 Survey, 1 Jan 1944. (3) Ltr, Kemper to Spaulding, 20 Oct 1943, in HRC 314.71 OCMH Hist. Prog. (4) Wiley, "Historical Program," Ch. III, and Smith, "Historical Branch," pp. 6ff, dealing with the AFA series and overseas history work, had the advantage in the 1950's of a file on those topics subsequently misplaced.

26. (1) Kemper File, Combat History No. 3, various papers, 1943-44. (2) Notes of Conference, Kemper with Lt Gen Walter B. Smith, 16 Oct 1943, in HB 210.31. (3) Memo for Record, Kemper, 16 Nov 1943, in WDCSA 314.7. (4) Ltr, Taylor to Dean Paul H. Beech, Harvard Univ., 28 Sep 1945 in Clark Personal File, 1945. (5) Ltr, Kemper to Lt Col C. D. McFerren, 22 Jun 1954, Wiley Papers.

27. (1) Ltrs, De Voto to ASW McCloy, 11 Oct 1943 and 16 Feb 1944, and other related papers in ASW 314.7. (2) Ltr, SW to Secretary of the Navy, 26 Nov 1943, and Memos, SW for Sec GS and Sec GS for SW, both dated 1 Dec 1943, in WDCSA 314.7. (3) Ltrs, President Roosevelt to the Chairman, Advisory Committee on War History, 17 February 1944, and also to Director, Bureau of the Budget, 25 January 1944, praising progress on the administrative history program, the two letters together naturally giving further strong topside support to war history work; copies of both in T 3514/F-2 B. (4) Comments of Dr. Wright, 10 May 1944, on "Memorandum Regarding Project of the Advisory

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Committee on War History," in Wright Papers.

28. (1) Papers in Kemper File, Combat History No. 3. (2) Ltrs, Kemper to Taylor, 2 and 30 May and 13 Jun 1944, in HB 314.75.

29. (1) Dr. Wright's "Reflections on the Pamphlet Problem," 17 Jun 1944, in Wright Papers. (2) The Chief Historian's weekly progress reports, in HIS 319.1, are a useful source of information on the development of the AFA series in 1944-45.

30. (1) AFA planning papers, Jan-Mar 1945, Taylor File. (2) Chief Historian's progress reports, cited above. (3) Memo, Chief, HB for Theater Historians, 10 Apr 1945, and Ltr, Col Taylor to Dean Paul H. Buck, Harvard University, 28 Sep 1945, both in Clark Personal File, 1945. (4) Charges of favoritism before and after the release of Marshall's Bastogne led to an investigation and decision that the War Department could no longer turn over manuscripts to the Infantry Journal to copyright and publish as they wished. Lt Col Clark to Kemper, 9 Aug 1945, HB 314.75.

31. Motter's progress and his difficulties can be followed in the Chief Historian's weekly progress reports, 1944-45, in HIS 319.1.

32. (1) HB 314.72, G-2 Survey, 1 Jan 1944 [updated]. (2) Dr. Wright, "Notes on Conversation with Col Kemper, . . . 6 November 1944," in Wright Papers.

33. (1) Memo, Exec G-2 for Ch, Dissemination Unit, G-2, 8 Dec 1943, in HRC 020, Hist. Prog. (2) Chief Historian's weekly progress reports, 1944-45. (3) Special Services discontinued its chronology work, relying after 1943 on the Historical Branch to feed the short history project described in the following paragraph; and it should also be noted that the chronologies kept by the Army's two historical agencies from the beginning of 1944 onward were so different in character and purpose that they did not really overlap.

34. (1) Memo For Record, Kemper, 19 Feb 1944, and other papers in HB 314.732, War in Outline. (2) Progress reports of Chief Historian, 1944-45. (3) Maj Lamson, "Notes on Editorial Work on World at War," 7 Oct 1944, in Taylor Papers.

35. (1) Chief Historian's weekly progress reports, Sep-Dec 1944. (2) Notes of Dr. Wright concerning draft manuscript, 16 Oct 1944, and notes of "Conv. with Kemper . . . 6 November 1944," both in Wright Papers.

36. (1) Memo for Record, Kemper, 2 Oct 1944, in HB

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314.73 GS. (2) "Memoranda of Conversation," Dr. Wright, 15 Feb 1944, in Wright Papers. (3) Dr. Wright, Memo for Record, 16 Mar 1944, in HRC 020 Hist Prog, Org, and Functions. (4) Dr. Wright's Note for Record, 16 Oct 1944, in HB 314.733 OSW. (5) Chief Historian's progress report, 14 Oct 1944.

37. (1) Chief Historian's progress report, 10 Mar 1945. (2) Ltr, Gen Marshall to Maj DeWeerd, 22 Aug 1945, Memo, Asst Sec GS for G-2, 10 Sep 1945, and other papers in HB 314.73 GS. (3) Memo, Exec OPD for Group Chiefs, 15 Sep 1945, and other papers in OPD 321.19 OPD.

38. (1) Ltr, Kemper to Col Taylor, 30 May 1944, in HB 314.75. (2) Memo, Gen Nelson for G-2, G-3, and CG's, ASF, AAF, and AGF, 12 Jun 1944, in HRC 020, Hist Prog, Org, and Functions. (3) Chief Historian's weekly progress reports, 1944-45. (4) Wiley, "Historical Program," pp. 70-71.

39. (1) "Memo Regarding John Hope Franklin, 22 Feb 1944," by Dr. Wright, undated attached Memo by Kemper, and Wright's Memo, "Treatment of the History of Negro Troops in World War II, 22 May 1944," all in Wright Papers. (2) Memo, Ch HB for G-2, 2 Oct 1945, in ASW 314.7. (3) Chief Historian's Progress Reports, 22 Sep, 10 Dec 1945.

40. (1) Col Clark, Note for Record, 27 Mar 1945, Ltr, ASW to Mr. Tyng, 22 Jun 1945, and other papers in HB 314.72, Development of Historical Program, World War II (Popular History). (2) Memo, Col Clark to Theater Historians, 10 Apr 1945, in Clark Personal File, 1945. (3) HB Office Memorandums of 4 and 28 Jun 1945, in Wright Papers.

41. In addition to references cited above: (1) Memo, ASW for CofS, 27 Nov 1945, in ASW 314.7. (2) Chief Historian's progress reports and Colonel Clark's diary, entries from July 1945 onward. (3) Ltrs, Col Clark to Cols C. Rodney Smith and Thomas D. Stamps, 26 Feb, 16 Apr, and 15 May 1945, in Clark Personal File, 1946. (4) Neither the draft chapters nor any reviews of them are to be found in CMH records.

42. "Notes by Colonel Clark," Aug 1948, p. 14, in CMH GRB. Referred to hereafter as Clark Report.

43. (1) Memo, USW for DCofS, 19 May 1945, and other papers in HIS 334, Committee for Interrogation of German Prisoners. (2) Chief Historian progress reports, and Clark diary, Jun-Sep 1945. (3) Clark Report, pp. 14-16. (4) Wiley, "Historical Program," pp. 83-86. (5) Maj Hechler, "The Enemy Side of the

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Hill," a detailed account of the Shuster Mission written in 1949, in HRC 314.71, Interrogation of Enemy Commanders.

44. (1) Memo, Col Clark for Historical Officers, 21 Apr 1945, and attached list, in HRC 314.72. (2) WD Circulars Nos. 64, 28 Feb, and 287, 20 Sep 1945.

45. (1) Ltr, President Truman to Director, Bureau of the Budget, 6 Jul 1945, cy in HB 313 (20 Feb 1943). (2) Ltr, AG to WD Directors and Chiefs, 11 Sep 1945, AG 314.7 (1 Sep 1945), is typical of the directives sent out. (3) Clark Report, p. 18.

46. (1) Memo, G-2 for CofS, 21 May 1945, and Summary Sheet and Incls, G-2 for DCofS, 10 Aug 1945, both in HB 320.2 Strength. (2) Clark diary, entries of 9, 11, and 25 Jul and 11 Aug 1945. (3) For more detailed (and somewhat conflicting) accounts of the manpower and organizational developments in 1945 see Clark Report, pp. 16-17, 24-28; Wiley, "Historical Program," Ch. V; and Louis Morton, "The Establishment of the Historical Division, WDSS: The Struggle for Survival," in CMH GRB.

47. (1) G-2 Summary Sheet and attachments, 10 Aug 1945, in HB 320.2 Strength. (2) Memo, ASW for DCofS (through WD Manpower Board), 18 Aug 1945, in ASW 314.7. (3) Pencil Notes of Col Kemper, 3 Jan 1945, and Memo, Col Douglas for Ch, HB, 19 Jul 1945, in Wiley Papers. (4) WD Cir 427, 1944, sec V, par 1.

48. (1) Agenda for Meeting of Advisory Committee, 20 Aug 1945, and Summary Sheet and attached memorandum of Advisory Committee, HB, G-2, 22 Aug 1945, both in HRC 334 OCMH Hist. Prog.--Adv. Committee. (2) Ltr, Dr. Baxter to Dr. Louis Morton, 8 Aug 1952, in HRC 314.72, Misc. (3) Memo, McCloy for Gen Marshall, 6 Sep 1945, and Ind., OCS to G-2, 11 Sep 1945, in ASW 314.7. (4) The author has found no evidence that the Advisory Committee met as a body between June 1943 and August 1945. General Spaulding attended the 21 August 1945 meeting, Dr. Herring being the only absentee.

49. (1) Morton, "Struggle for Survival," p. 10. (2) Clark diary, 10, 14-15, 24 Sep 1945. (3) Ltr, Baxter to Morton, 8 Aug 1945, cited above. (4) Memos, Gen Bissell for ASW, and ASW for Baxter, both dated 14 Sep 1945, in ASW 314.7.

50. (1) Memo, Col Benson, Ch, HS, AWC, for CofS, 12 Sep 1945, and other papers in T 3514/F-5 and F-3. (2) Clark diary, 17-19 Sep 1945. (3) Cy of Ltr, Gen Eisenhower to Col Benson, 12 Oct 1945, in HRC 020, Hist. Prog.



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51. (1) Clark diary, 19 Sep, 24 Oct 1945. (2) Chief Historian's progress report, 22 Sep 1945. (3) Memo, Advisory Committee, HB, G-2, to ASW, 24 Oct 1945, and exchanges between Offices of ASW and SW, in HRC 334 OCMH and ASW 314.7. (4) It appears that the Advisory Committee during its August-October 1945 activities acted as if it were an integral part of the Historical Branch, G-2. (5) On the branch's preference of status, Memo, Col Clark for Maj. Gen. Edwin F. Harding, 27 Oct 1945, in HB 314.72, Hist. Prog. General.

52. (1) Memo, Col Clark for Gen Harding, 27 Oct 1945, cited above. (2) Clark diary, 29-31 Oct 1945, and Chief Historian's progress report, 5 Nov 1945. (3) Memo, Col R. Ammi Cutter, Asst. Exec., ASW, for McCloy, 31 Oct 1945, and notations thereon, in ASW 314.7.

53. (1) Ltr, Dr. Baxter to Dr. Morton, 8 Aug 1952, cited above. (2) Clark diary, 5 Nov 1945, (3) Morton, "Struggle for Survival," p. 30. (4) Memo, ASW for SW, 7 Nov 1945, and Memos, SW for CofS, 9 Nov 1945, in ASW 314.7. (5) WD Special Orders 272, 14 Nov 1945. (6) Memo, DCofS for heads of WD agencies, 17 Nov 1945, WDCSA 314.8.

54. Memo, McCloy for Gen Eisenhower, 21 Nov 1945, in ASW 314.7.

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1. (1) Plan of 21 Feb 1944, and Memo, Wright for Kemper, 17 Mar 1944, in Wright files. (2) Charles B. MacDonald, "The Origin and Early Development of the Official History, The U.S. Army in World War II," MS in CMH completed in 1952, and Colonel Clark's comments on this study attached to the ribbon copy.

2. (1) Clark Report, pp. 21-23, and Colonel Clark's comments on the MacDonald manuscript cited above. (2) Dr. Wright's draft memo of 24 Jul 1945 on "WD Historical Program," in Wright files.

3. (1) Plan in Greenfield file, "The Official History of World War II," undated but context shows it must have been drafted in late August 1945. (2) MacDonald MS., pp. 21-23.

4. Clark diary, 7 Sep 1945. (2) Memo, Col Douglas for Ch, HB, 12 Oct 1945, in HIS 314.7 Official History. (3) Memo, Col Douglas for Ch, HB, 15 Oct 1945, and attached draft memo entitled "Future Historical Work of the War Department," in HIS 314.732

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Official History. (4) Drafts of Agenda for Advisory Committee Meeting, 19 and 23 Oct 1945, in HIS 334 OCMH Hist Mtg Rpts. (5) The account given here differs somewhat from Mr. MacDonald's in the work cited above.

5. (1) Clark Report, p. 23. (2) MacDonald MS., p. 30. (3) Kent Roberts Greenfield, The Historian and the Army (Rutgers University Press: New Brunswick, N.J., 1954), p. 8.

6. (1) Clark diary, entries of 22, 23, 30, 31 Oct, 5, 7 Nov 1945. (2) Memo, Chairman, WD Printing Board for ACofS G-2, 13 Nov 1945, in HIS 486.4 Official History, U.S. Army in W.W. II. (3) Draft plan, dated in pencil 24 Nov 1945, in HIS 314.7 Official History, U.S. Army in W.W.II. No explanation has been found for the three-week delay between the completion of this draft and its formal submission. (4) Memo, Gen Harding for AG, 1 Mar 1946, which credits Clark with developing "the detailed plan for the History of the Army in World War II." (5) At least two of the key files of papers dealing with the evolution of the official history plan could not be located in CMH or National Archives files in 1975, the time of writing.

7. Memo, Gen Harding for CofS, 14 Dec, and cover sheet, 18 Dec 1945, in WDCSA 314.7 (22 Jan 1946).

8. (1) Action papers attached to 14 Dec 1945 memo previously cited. (2) WD Circular 45, 12 Feb 1946, (3) Ltr, Gen Harding to Dr. Baxter, 19 Feb 1946, in HIS 314.72, Hist Program, General. This letter errs in stating that the Advisory Committee meeting had been held in November rather than October. (4) Pers Ltr, Col Clark to Col C. Rodney Smith, 26 Feb 1946, in Clark Personal File, 1946.

9. Memo, Deputy Director, Budget Bureau, for DCofS, 5 Feb 1946, attached as TAB C to the Memo of 14 Dec 1945.

10. (1) Memo, Col Benson for Gen Harding, 17 Dec 1945, in T 3514/F3-D. (2) Exchanges between Freeman and Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson, 23 Apr-1 May 1946, in SW File HD (Corres) (15 May 46-10 Apr 47), in National Archives.

11. (1) Clark diary, 15 Nov 1945. (2) Draft, dated 16 Nov 1945, of proposed organizational directive. (3) WD General Staff Circular 5-15, 7 Jan 1946.

12. (1) Clark Report, p. 37. (2) Clark diary, 10, 18 Apr 1946. (3) Army and Navy Register, 27 Apr 1946, p.

6. (4) Colonel Benson and others on the Historical Section staff were considerably senior to Colonels Clark and Kemper.

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13. (1) Cy of D/F, Ch HB for Ch, MIS, 15 Oct 1945, in HRC historical files. (2) Draft of Ltr, Dr. Wright to Gen Harding, about 1 Feb 1946, in Wright files.

14. (1) Clark Report, pp. 28-30. (2) Memos to and from Col Clark, 20 Nov and 21 Dec 1945, and Ltr, Clark to Col Rodney Smith, 26 Feb 1946, in Clark Personal File, 1946. (3) Ltr, Gen Harding to Dr. Baxter, 26 Feb 1946, in Wright files. (4) As an example of the differential in salaries in 1946, the author was lured from a college teaching position that had offered a basic salary of \$3,250 for the year following to a position with the Historical Division that paid \$5,900. As teaching salaries rose rapidly in the following decade the differential disappeared.

15. (1) Clark diary, 13, 14, 26, 28 Feb and 1, 15, 17 Apr 1946. (2) The only surviving records found on the Advisory Committee meeting on 13 Mar 1946 are Dr. Wright's copy of the agenda for it and a notation in his progress report of 18 March. (3) Dr. Greenfield's notes for and on his talk with Gen. Eisenhower on 15 Mar 1946, and exchanges between the Historical Division, Secretary Patterson, and Greenfield, 17 Mar-19 Apr 1946, all in Greenfield files. (4) In engaging Greenfield as Chief Historian, the Historical Division appears to have followed the procedure proposed by Colonel Clark rather than the provisions of Army Staff Circular 5-15.

16. Greenfield, The Historian and the Army, pp. 3-10.

17. (1) Clark diary, 26 Apr 1946, 17 Jan 1947, and other entries. (2) Chief Historian's appreciation of Malony's contribution in his progress report, 8 Sep 1948.

18. (1) CH Prog Rpts, Mar-May 1946. (2) Clark Report, p. 36, and Ltr, Col Clark to Col. Thomas D. Stamps, 27 May 1946, in Clark Personal File, 1946. (3) Clark diary, 2 Aug 1946.

19. (1) CH Prog. Rpt., 1 May 1947. (2) Clark Report, p. 58. (3) Clark diary, 22 January 1947, contains a good example of the consequences of a failure in communication.

20. (1) Clark diary, 6 Aug, 11 Dec 1946. (2) Ltr, Greenfield to Wright, 20 Jan 1947, and agenda of HAC meeting on 22-23 Apr 1947, in Greenfield papers. (3) CH Prog. Rpt., 1 May 1947.

21. (1) Clark Report, pp. 8-9, 34, 51-52. (2) Clark to Maj. Gen. Albert C. Smith, 19 Mar 1953. (3) Greenfield to Chief, HD, 19 Jul 1946, and copies of

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other related papers dated 20 Mar-19 Jul, in Greenfield file.

22. (1) WD Memorandum 345-105-1, 31 Jul 1946. (2) Clark diary, 2 Aug 1946. (3) Chief Historian's Report to Advisory Committee, 7 Nov 1946, pp. 7-13, in Greenfield papers.

23. (1) SM-7449, 22 Jan 1947, giving service historians access to JCS and CCS records. (2) Clark diary, 14 Oct 1946, 7 and 9 Jan 1947. (3) CH Prog. Rpts, 17 Jan 1947, 23 Jun 1948. (4) Ltr, Greenfield to Col Kemper, 8 Jul 1948, in Greenfield papers.

24. (1) Clark Report, pp. 52-54. (2) CH Report to Advisory Committee, 7 Nov 1946, pp. 13-15, and Prog. Rpt, 1 May 1947.

25. (1) CH Prog. Rpt., 15 Dec 1948. (2) AG Ltr, 16 Mar 1948, "Access to Historical Records of World War II," reproduced in HDSS Administrative Memo 21, 4 Mar 1949.

26. (1) Two undated outlines, ca. May 1946, apparently drafts of Dr. Winnacker and Colonel Kemper, in Greenfield file, USA in WW II--General. (2) Copies of European and Pacific planning papers in HRC Black Book II.

27. (1) CH Prog Rpts for various dates, 1945-47. (2) Clark diary, 26 Sep and 10 Oct 1946. (2) CH Report to Advisory Committee, 7 Nov 1946.

28. (1) Entries in CH Prog Rpts and in Clark diary, various dates, 1945-47. (2) On Pogue's project, Memo, Gen Harding for CofS, 8 Jul 1946, in Clark 1945 file.

29. (1) CH Prog. Rpts, 18 Feb 1946-16 Oct 1947. (2) Memo, AGF Hist Sec to Director, HD, WDSS, n.d. (April 1946), in HIS 314.7, Hist. Prog. AGF.

30. (1) Memos and attachments, Winnacker for Greenfield, 6 Nov 1946, and Greenfield for Chief, HD, 12 Nov 1946, in Greenfield papers. (2) CH Prog. Rpts, 1946-48.

31. (1) Seminar file in Greenfield papers. (2) Clark Report, p. 44. (3) Col. Allison R. Hartman, Memo for Record, 13 Feb 1950, "My Service with the Historical Division Since 1946," pp. 10-11, in HRC. (4) CH Prog. Rpts., 28 Jan, 1 Apr, 15 Jul 1947.

32. (1) Clark diary, numerous entries, 15 Apr 1946-16 Jan 1947. (2) Memo, Chief, HD, for Director, Organization and Training Div, 16 Aug 1946, in HD "Strength" folder. (3) Clark Report, p. 38.

33. Clark diary, entries of 16, 17, 21, and 27 Jan 1947.

34. (1) Basic papers in HRC 123, OCMH Hist Prog--W/D

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Hist Fund. Establishment (1947-50). (2) Clark Report, pp. 38-42. (Informative, but Clark misdates some of the June 1947 events.) (3) Papers in HD (Corres) (15 May 46-10 Apr 47) and in ASW 314.7, both in National Archives. (4) CH Prog. Rpt., especially 24 Jun 1947. (5) Memo, Dr. Greenfield to Historical Advisory Committee members, 12 Jun 1947, and other items in his papers.

35. (1) Basic papers, dated June-July 1947, in HRC 123, OCMH Hist Prog--W/D Fund. Establishment (1947-50). (2) Memo, Chief of Military History for Management Division, OCS, 22 Jul, and 1st, Ind., 24 Jul 1947, in CH "Personnel" Folder.

36. On the OPD transfer, (1) Papers dated 1945-48 in HRC 020 (1947), and (2) Pers Ltr, Dr. Greenfield to Prof. Charles Taylor, 17 Dec 1947, in Greenfield file.

37. On strengths, (1) GRB Catalogue Card, Information Compiled by Army Comptroller, 26 Mar 1956, and (2) Unnumbered HD Admin. Memo, 7 Apr 1949.

38. (1) On the Air Forces historical activity and the relation of the Army's historical office to it, HB 314.74 Army Air Forces (8 Jul 1942) and later Army history files. (2) On review of Volumes I and II of the Air Forces history, Chief Historian's Prog. Rpt, 15 May 1947 and 11 May 1948. (3) On Air Force sharing of the WDHF, Council Minutes (exchanges of 23 and 28 Jul 1947), in HRC.

39. An unsigned HD "Summary of Historical Activity in the ASF," 10 Jul 1946, in the Chief Historian's "Army Service Forces" folder, presents a good picture of the situation; and other papers in this folder describe 1946-47 Supply, Services and Procurement Division plans for a seven-volume ASF history.

40. In addition to a large number of documents in the Chief Historian's "Army Service Forces" folder cited in the preceding footnote, (1) Personal Ltr, Col Clark to Prof. Charles Taylor, 2 Aug 1947, in Clark Personal File, 1947, and (2) CH Prog. Rpts., especially entries of 16 Sep and 3 Nov 1947.

41. In addition to references already cited, papers in Chief Historian's "Personnel Project" and "U.S. Army in World War II--General" folders.

42. Figures drawn from the July 1947 survey.

43. (1) Various papers in "Army Service Forces" folder referred to in preceding footnotes, including a copy of General Malony's letter of 15 July 1948 to technical service chiefs. (2) Undated mimeographed list of QMC publications relating to World War II. (3)

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HD Admin Memo No 20, 22 Mar 1948.

44. On new projects, Chief Historian's progress reports of various dates and survey of the status of World War II projects as of August 1949.

45. (1) Analyses written in 1947 by Mark Watson and Ray Cline, and (2) Notes on Conferences held in March and June 1948 and August 1949, in Chief Historian's papers. (3) CH Prog. Rpt., 19 Mar 1948.

46. (1) Hartman Memo, 13 Feb 1950, pp. 6-7. (2) Aug 1949 Survey, p. 14.

47. (1) Clark diary, 5 Dec 1946. (2) Hartman Memo, 13 Feb 1950, pp. 4-5.

48. (1) CH Prog. Rpt., 4 Dec 1946, 28 Jan 1947, 13 Apr 1948. (2) Chief Historian Memo for All Authors and Editors, 3 Mar 1948, in CH papers. (3) Notes of S.C. on status of statistical work as of 1 Apr 1948, in HRC 314.72. (4) Hartman Memo, 13 Feb 1950, pp. 6-8, 12-13. (5) HD/OCMH Diary, 1950, entry of 3 Mar 1950.

49. (1) Memo, Dr. Cole for Dr. Greenfield, 22 Jul 1946, in HD (Corres) (15 May 46-10 Apr 47), National Archives. (2) Hartman Memo, 13 Feb 1950, pp. 3-4.

50. Various papers, dated 1947-48, in Chief Historian's folder "Editorial Problems."

51. (1) Various papers in Chief Historian's "Editorial Programs" folder cited in preceding footnote, including copies of 1948 and 1949 administrative memorandums describing the system. (2) Various entries in CH Prog. Rpts., 26 Mar 1947-1 Mar 1949.

52. This topic is a recurring one in the Chief Historian's progress reports, 1945-49; the calculation referred to is described in the report of 25 May 1948.

53. (1) Hartman Memo, 13 Feb 1950, pp. 8-10. (2) Memo, Dr. Winnacker for Col Clark, 15 Nov 1946, HIS 486.4 Official History, USA in World War II. (3) CH Prog. Rpts., various entries 1948-49, especially that of 12 Apr 1949. (4) JAGO opinion of 25 Jun 1948, copy in Greenfield papers.

54. (1) Data in HIS 486.4, Official History, USA in World War II. (2) Various items in Chief Historian's folder, "Sales and Distribution." (3) CH Prog. Rpt., 1 Sep 1949.

55. (1) Clark diary, 10 Dec 1946. (2) Various items in CH Prog. Rpts., 1946-48, and numerous other items in his papers.

56. Various papers in two Chief Historian's files on Advisory Committee meetings, 1946-57.

57. (1) CH Prog. Rpt., 11 Jan 1949. (2)

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Administrative Memo No. 80, 2 Aug 1949. (3) Aug 1949 Survey by the Acting Chief Historian and the Chief, Histories Division, on plans for and progress on The United States Army in World War II.

58. (1) CH Prog. Rpt, 19 Feb 1948. (2) Ltr, Dr. Greenfield to Prof. J. D. Bragg, Baylor University, 6 Nov 1948, in Greenfield papers.

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1. WD/DA Staff Circulars 5-15 of 6 December 1946 and 1 January 1948, and the division's organization chart of 1 July 1948, reflect the changes.

2. (1) Hartman Memo, 13 Feb 1950, p. 1. (2) CH Prog Rpt, 9 Sep 1948.

3. (1) SR 10-245-1, 13 Jun 1949 and 23 Apr 1951. (2) OCMH Diary (Exec Officer), 26 Apr, 16 Oct, 13 Nov 1949. (3) Exchanges between Executive and Chief Historian, 14-15 Nov 1949, in Chief Historian's "Organization" file. (4) Notes on address of Dr. Greenfield to Mobilization Unit, 26 Sep 1955, in Chief Historian's file.

4. Dr. Greenfield's letter to Dr. Baxter of 31 Aug 1948, in his alphabetical file, discusses both proposals in some detail.

5. HD Adm Memo No. 1, 3 Jan 1950, listing personnel, and a breakdown of strength as of 31 Jan 1950, in HIS 020 OCMH, provide the basis for the above statements.

6. CH Prog Rpts, 15 Apr 1947, 22 Jun and 27 Jul 1949, and personal recollections of the author (Acting Chief Historian at the time). Dr. Hugh M. Cole led the charge.

7. (1) HD Adm Memo No. 13, 18 Feb 1949. (2) CH Prog Rpt, 7 Jun 1949. (3) Various papers, dated 1946-50, in HRC 231, Est. of CS Register for Historians. (4) Memo, Frank H. Colley for Dr. Greenfield, 17 Jan 1951, in CH "Civil Service" file.

8. (1) Various papers in WW I and Personnel historical files, including Memo, Col Benson for Gen Harding, 24 Jan 1946, HD manning plan for World War I Branch, 15 Aug 1946, and Memo, Gen Malony for Mr. Woods, 16 Aug 1946, sub: Cut in Personnel. (2) Clark diary, 12 and 25 Sep 1946. (3) On declassification project, papers in T3514/F-6.

9. Various papers, dated 5 Nov 1945-31 Mar 1946, in T 333/F-1, T 3514/F-3, HB 314.71 World War I History, and HRC 314.72 OCMH Hist. Program.

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10. (1) Various papers in T 3336/F-7, T 5076, and HB 314.71 WW I History. (2) Memo, Mr. Thomas for CMH, 14 Sep 1951, in Chief Historian's "World War I History" folder. (3) Maj. Rocco M. Paone (Res.) "The World War I Historical Section, 1941-52," in HRC, provides a summary that should be used with some caution.

11. (1) On Thomas' narrative history, preserved for reference use in the Historical Reference Collection, see the Chief Historian's review files on this topic. (2) On the retirement of records, data in T 3514.

12. (1) WD Circulars 138, 14 May 1946, and 58, 1 Mar 1947, and WD Memos 345-102-2, 2 Aug 1946, and 345-105-5, 9 Dec 1948. (2) Ltr, Gen Malony to CG, OMGUS, 22 Sep 1948, copy in CH's "0" file, 1948.

13. (1) CH Prog Rpts, 19 Mar, 13 Apr, 1948, 15 Feb 1949. (2) Memo, Col Greenfield for Senior Army Instructor, ORC, MDW, 29 Sep 1948, in CH files.

14. (1) Clark Report, pp. 45ff. (2) Memo, Mr. Wice to Lt Patterson, 13 May 1947, in CH historical notes.

15. (1) CH Prog Rpts, 24 Sep 1946, 17 Mar and 27 Sep 1949. (2) Bimonthly and monthly progress reports of the Reference office, 1947-50. (3) Memos, Wice for Col James, 11 Mar 1952, and for Col Bennett, 24 Nov 1952, both in HRC, 319.1 Special.

16. (1) Clark Report, pp. 45-51. (2) Royce L. Thompson, "The Historian and Historical Records Centralization," address before seminar of HRS on 3 Dec 1948. (3) Memo, Gen Harding for OPD, DCofS, 4 Feb 1946, in Black Book III. (4) Memo, Wice to Patterson, 13 May 1947, HRC, 319.1 Special. (5) CH Progress Reports, 3 Sep 1947, 23 Jun, Nov-Dec 1948.

17. (1) Memo for Record, Gen Spaulding, 11 May 1942, in HRC 314.7 HS, AWC, Vol. 2. (2) Clark dairy, entry of 15 Jan 1947. (3) Study No. 9, by Lt. Col. R. A. Stamey, Jr., in HRC 319.1 OCMH Prog. (4) See above, Chapters 3 and 4.

18. (1) CH Prog Rpts, 1 May 1947, 8 Jul 1948. (2) AR 220-305, 18 Mar 1949, SR 220-345-1, 7 Feb 1950, and DA Circular 100, 26 Nov 1952, "Military History Indoctrination Plan." (3) Draft prepared for the Secretary of the Army's FY 1948 Annual Report, in OHB "Progress Report" file.

19. (1) Item (3) in preceding footnote. (2) Memo of Mr. Thomas, 30 Nov 1948, in HRC "Policy Book" folder. (3) Memo, Mr. Todd for Col James, 31 Mar 1950, in OHB Prog Rpt Files, (4) FM 21-13, Jun 1952. (5) The Army Lineage Book, Volume II: Infantry (Washington: GPO, 1953).



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20. Study No. 10, by Lt. Col. R. A. Stamey, Jr. in HRC 319.1 OCMH Prog., contains a good historical summary.

21. Study cited in preceding note. (2) Capt. Gordon W. Gilkey, "German War Art," in HRC 007 Art, German War. (3) HD Diary, Aug-Dec 1949, entries of 15 and 19 Aug. (4) Resume of Activities, OCMH, 1 Apr 1951 to 31 Mar 1952, p.4.

22. (1) On the Secretary's requests, Clark diary, entries of 30 Sep 1946 and 8 Jan 1947: (2) On the Chief of Staff's, General Malony's Memo for Record, 12 Nov 1947, and attached papers, in historical file.

23. (1) On Northwest Europe Dispatch, CH Prog Rpts, Dec 1945-June 1946, and Ltr, Col Clark to Col Stamps, 27 May 1946, in Clark Personal File, 1946. (2) On projected 1945-47 report, Clark diary, entries of 27 Sep and 14 Oct 1946; CH Prog Rpt, 8 Oct 1946, Memo, Sec GS for Ch HD and others, 1 Nov 1946, in WDCSA 319.1 and studies in folder "Biennial Report, C/S," in historical file.

24. (1) Military Affairs 13, no. 4 (1949), and 14, no. 3, (1950) contain articles describing the Institute's relationships to the Historical Division. (2) HD/OCMH Diary (Col Harris), entries of 23 Oct 1949, and 23 Feb and 22 Jun 1950.

25. (1) CH Prog Rpts, 31 Dec 1946, 16 Sep 1947. (2) USA in WW II Survey, Aug 1949. (3) OCMH Diary, 18 Apr 1950. (4) Draft describing duties of Applied Studies Division, 13 Sep 1950, in historical file.

26. (1) Study attached to Memo, Ch of O/B Branch for CMH, 24 Jan 1951, in HIS 314.7 Military Histories (1951) (National Archives). (2) Various papers in CMH 314.7 Order of Battle.

27. (1) USA in WW II Survey of Aug 1949. (2) Memo for Record, Acting Chief Historian, 18 Aug 1949, Memo, Chief Historian for CMH, 4 Sep 1956, and other memoranda and progress reports in Chief Historian's Chronology files.

28. AG ltr, 27 May 1948, AGAM-PM 314.7 (20 May 48).

29. (1) Adm Memos 28, 3 Aug, 1948, 32, 20 Aug, 1948, 74, 30 Nov 1948, and 69, 29 Jun 1949. (2) HRC Black Book, Vol. I, Agenda of meeting in Apr 1946. (3) Memo, Dr. Winnacker for Gen Malony and Dr. Greenfield, 6 Jul 1948, in historical file, and Memo of Mr. Thomas, 30 Nov 1948, in HRC "Policy Book" file. Memo Greenfield for Col Harris, 9 Jul 1948, sub: Planning of Post-WW II Prog of Div. (4) Notes of conference on demobilization history, 3 Aug 1948, in historical

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file. (5) CH Prog Rpt, 9 Sep 1948. (6) General Robinett, an active Republican, would not commit himself to remain with the Historical Division until after Truman's victory in 1948.

30. (1) Thomas' 30 Nov 1948 Memo, cited in preceding footnote. (2) Memo, CH for CMH, 22 Jul 1954, in historical files. (3) Adm Memo 79, 13 Dec 1948.

31. (1) Adm Memos 8, 2 Aug, and 84, 18 Jan 1949. (2) Memo, Ch, Applied Studies for CMH, 4 Feb 1949 and other papers in HRC 314.7 OCMH Hist Prog, Robinett Correspondence, 1948-50. (4) SR 10-245-1, 13 Jun 1949.

32. (1) See above Chapter 4. (2) Memo of Col Hale for Deputy Director et al, 6 Jun 1946, and other papers in Chief Historian's Review folder. (3) CH Prog. Rpt., 12 Aug 1947.

33. (1) Sec II, WD Circular 58, 1 Mar 1947, describes the review process in detail. (2) CH Prog Rpts, 9 Sep, 6 Oct 1948. (3) Gen Robinett's reports to Historical Advisory Committee, 9 Apr 1949 and 7 Apr 1950, and his Memo to Col Clark through CMH, 25 Apr 1949, all in HRC 314.7 Robinett Correspondence, 1948-50.

34. (1) Gen Robinett's 1949 and 1950 reports to HAC, cited in preceding footnote. (2) Memo, Col Harris for "The Executive Officer," 15 Dec 1950, in CMH 020 O/C Mil Hist (1948-51) (Battle Monuments). (3) Memo, Gen Robinett for CMH, 24 Sep 1951, in CMH 020 O/C Mil Hist (1948-51), in National Archives.

35. (1) On the Shuster Mission, Chapter 4 above. (2) CH Prog Rpts, 26 Nov 1946, 21 Jan, 27 April 1947.

36. (1) Drafts of chronological account of post-surrender enemy studies work in France and Germany, in HRC records, and of an address by Mr. Finke, June 1971, dealing with the same subject and also describing the several German manuscript series and their use by the Historical Division. (2) Notes of Dr. Bell I. Wiley on foreign studies work, including interview notes, collected in the mid-1950's. (3) Clark Report, p. 29. (4) Introduction to OCMH's Guide to the Japanese Monographs, 1945-60. (5) CH Prog Rpt, 11 May 1948.

37. (1) Wiley notes. That Mahin was a classmate and close friend of General Eisenhower's son John may have had more than a little to do with gaining the Chief of Staff's attention and thereby obtaining his strong support for the program. (2) CH Prog Rpt, 9 Sep 1948. (3) Various 1948 entries in Captain Mahin's office diary, in HRC. (4) Brief on the status of Historical

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Division work, 24 Nov 1948, in HIS 020 OCMH (9 Nov 1945). Adm Memo 77, 1 Dec 1948. (5) After the summer of 1948 the HD's Pacific Section carried on directly its research on the Japanese side of the war.

38. This process is described most clearly in Mr. Finke's previously cited address.

39. (1) Report, Gen Robinett to Advisory Committee, 9 Apr 1949, and Ltr, Gen Robinett to Col Clark, 25 Apr 1949, both in HRC 314.7 Robinett Correspondence, 1948-50. (2) Report of Gen Robinett to Advisory Committee, 7 Apr 1950, and his draft submission of 13 Sep 1950 for inclusion in OCMH's "Policy and Procedure Book." (3) Graph of Foreign Studies Branch publications, as of 1 Jun 1956. (4) Mr. Finke's June 1971 address.

40. Report of Gen Robinett to Historical Advisory Committee, 8 Apr 1950, and his draft submission to CMH, 13 Sep 1950, on Applied Studies, for inclusion in the OCMH Policy and Procedure Book then in preparation.

41. Special Studies Division Progress Report, 1 Jun 1956.

42. (1) Gen Robinett's report cited in preceding footnote. (2) CH Prog Rpt, 10 Mar 1950, Part IV. (3) Memo, Gen Ward for DCofS for Administration, 12 Jun 1950, in HRC 314.7 Robinett Correspondence 1948-50. (4) The two dissertations were not products of staff assignment to get a particular study; the authors were placed OCMH to allow them to research and write dissertations on subjects of their own choosing.

43. Exchange, Gen Robinett and Mr. Thomas, 3 and 13 Apr 1950, and Memos, Gen Robinett for CMH, 26 Apr and 5 Dec 1950. All in HRC 314.7 Robinett Correspondence, 1948-50.

44. (1) Memo, Gen Robinett for CMH, 24 Sep 1951, in CMH 020 O/C Mil Hist (1949-51), and revised SR 10-245-1, 3 Jun 1953. (2) Minutes, Closed Meeting, HAC, 12 Apr 1952, and memo, CH for CMH, 15 Apr 1952, in Greenfield papers.

45. This and the following two paragraphs have been based principally upon a summary lecture given by the author (then a deputy chief historian) in late 1953 and again in 1954.

46. (1) World War II Series Progress Chart, 1 Jan 1951. (2) Chief Historian's Summary of Activities, 1 Apr 1951-31 Mar 1952, Minutes of Closed Meeting of Advisory Committee, 12 Apr 1952, and OCMH Report to Advisory Committee, 3 Apr 1953, copies in Greenfield

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papers.

47. On the last item, data sheet on "Trade-mark of OCMH," prepared by Maj. William G. Bell, 4 Jun 1959.

48. On this and the final paragraph, see Dr. Greenfield's paper, "Some Reflections on the Situation and Outlook of the Office of the Chief of Military History," 18 Mar 1954, and his report on the White House visit in May 1954, both in Greenfield papers.

## Bibliography

The author has obtained most of the documentary information he needed to write this work from files and papers in Military History's own reference collection, and files of the Army's historical offices in or on loan from the National Archives. In the first category the most important source on happenings before World War II has been the so-called Thomas (T) file, actually the surviving official files of the World War I Historical Branch and Historical Section for the years 1918-1948. The excellent card index to this file suggests the destruction some years ago of other material that would have been useful. Second only to the Thomas file for the earlier period, and very useful for the whole work, have been the Historical Records Collection (HRC) files in Military History's Reference Branch. The Center of Military History (CMH) has also kept a sizeable collection of Chief Historian's desk and convenience files and other papers relating to the post-1945 period, and other similar though much smaller collections kept by Chief Historian Livy Wright, and Colonels Kemper, Taylor, and Clark, and working papers of historian Bell I. Wiley, all of which have been used extensively. Two volumes of an incomplete desk diary kept by Colonel Clark and on loan to the historical office were also of substantial value. Other CMH documentary sources used have included Reference's three "Black Books" and a "Policy Book," each containing copies of documents of historical value; Planning Branch papers; a front-office diary kept by the Executive in 1949-1951; and Organizational History Branch (OHB) files.

The principal documentary sources for information on the World War II effort are the official files of the Historical Branch (HB) of 1943-1945, and of its successors the Historical Division Special Staff and the Office of the Chief of Military History (HD or HDSS, OCMH) and CMH, files under the custodianship of the National Archives although many of them resting in Reference at

#### BIBLIOGRAPHY

the time of the author's research; others were loaned by the Archives for use in Reference. In the National Archives the author made use of other files as needed of the Army's War College (WCD) to March 1918, and of its War Plans Division (WPD), 1918-1921; of the more modern Chief of Staff's (WDCSA), Secretary of War's (SW), and Assistant Secretary of War's (ASW) offices; of the Operations Division (OPD); and of the 1918-1919 Historical Section, General Headquarters, American Expeditionary Forces (HS, GHQ, AEF) in France.

In Reference's library and files, supplemented in a few instances by the resources of the Army Library and National Archives Library, the author had access to a variety of other useful official and unofficial documents: items in the Secretary of War's Annual Reports; War Department General Orders, Special Orders, Bulletins, Memorandums, and Circulars; General Orders of the General Headquarters, American Expeditionary Forces; Army Regulations and Special Regulations; organization charts; Adjutant General Letters; Historical Branch, Historical Division, and Office of the Chief of Military History Administrative Memorandums; and Army biographical data sheets for general officers, and for some other military and civilian personnel.

Narrative accounts of the Army's historical work since the Civil War include the following unpublished items in Reference's manuscript collection of particular value to the author, listed alphabetically:

Clark, Col. Allen F., Jr. "Notes by Colonel Clark" (August 1948), usually referred as the Clark Report.

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