Print Sets and Special Publications
CMH Pub 70-102-1
GPO S/N: 008-029-00433-0

History of Operations Research in the United States Army, 1942-1962 is the first of three planned volumes, each to cover a different time span, that will eventually be integrated into a single formal volume. Operations research (OR) emerged during World War II as an important means of assisting civilian and military leaders in making scientifically sound improvements in the design and performance of weapons and equipment. OR techniques were soon extended to address questions of tactics and strategy during the war and, after the war, to matters of high-level political and economic policy. Until now, the story of why and how the U.S. Army used OR has remained relatively obscure. This comprehensive history offers important insights into the natural tension between military leaders and civilian scientists, the establishment and growth of Army OR organizations, the use of OR techniques, and the many contributions that OR managers and analysts have made to the growth and improvement of the Army since 1942. The upcoming two volumes will take the story up to modern times. This account should be of interest not only to the Army's analysis community, but also to civilian leaders and military commanders and staff officers at all levels.

Print Sets and Special Publications
CMH Pub 70-105-1
GPO S/N: 008-029-00449-6

This second of three volumes on the history of operations research identifies, describes, and evaluates the ideas, people, organizations, and events that influenced the development of ORSA in the Army from the inauguration of President Kennedy in 1961 to the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Vietnam in 1973.

Print Sets and Special Publications
CMH Pub 70-110-1
GPO S/N: 008-029-00473-9

The period from 1973 to 1995 was one of the most challenging in the history of the United States Army. In an era of rapidly changing technology, sudden shifts in the threats facing the United States, and the need (particularly toward the end of the period) to operate on "short rations," Army leaders faced a number of complex and difficult decisions. Their ability to efficiently sort out the alternatives and find an effective solution was due in no small part to the support provided by Army operations research/systems analysis managers and analysts. This, the third and final volume of the history of operations research/systems analysis in the Army from 1942 to1995, covers the momentous events of the last quarter of the twentieth century and attempts to tell the story of when, where, and how the members of the Army analytical community supported Army decision makers and how the Army analytical community itself grew and evolved between 1973 and 1995.