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NMUSA Feature

U.S. Army Art Spotlight

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JAMES C. MCCONVILLE
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

Official:

KATHLEEN S. MILLER
Administrative Assistant
to the Secretary of the Army

PAUL E. FUNK II
General, United States Army
Training and Doctrine Command
Chief of Military History
Charles R. Bowery Jr.
Managing Editor
Bryan J. Hockensmith
Editors
Deborah A. Stultz
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Book Review Editor
C. Sarah Castle
Cartographer
Matthew T. Boan
Layout and Design
Michael R. Gill

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In the Spring 2020 issue of Army History, we are excited to offer two engaging articles, an interesting look at an Army artist, an update on microartifact installation at the National Museum of the United States Army (NMUSA), a quality selection of book reviews, and comments from our executive director and chief historian.

In the first article, Center of Military History (CMH) historian J. Travis Moger examines Operation VIGILANT WARRIOR, the U.S. military’s response to the 1994 movement of Iraqi Republican Guard divisions to the Kuwaiti border. The threat of an Iraqi incursion set off alarm bells in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the United States. What easily could have been the opening phase of a second Gulf War turned into little more than Iraqi saber-rattling. Moger deftly describes this little-known operation and gleans numerous lessons from the short-order mobilization and deployment of U.S. and allied troops.

The second article, by Grant T. Harward, looks at the World War I demobilization of the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) through the eyes of a private first class. From a collection of letters archived at the U.S. Army Medical Department Center of History and Heritage, Harward details the challenges faced by the AEF as it demobilized after the Armistice. Under public pressure to get the troops home as quickly as possible, while still maintaining an occupation force, demobilization presented the AEF with a myriad of problems. From logistical nightmares to transportation quagmires, complications mounted every day. This article presents First World War demobilization from a truly unique perspective.

This issue’s NMUSA feature showcases the installation of microartifacts into the museum’s exhibit cases and highlights the talents of dedicated museum staffers who handle these priceless pieces of American history.

The Art Spotlight for this issue looks at the artwork of U.S. Army artist Janet Fitzgerald. Her drawings and paintings are among the few in the Army Art Collection to depict women serving between World War II and Operation DESERT STORM.

Opening and closing this issue we hear from the CMH executive director and the chief historian as they discuss a framework for actionable history and keeping Department of the Army Historical Summaries current, respectively.

As always, I look for your constructive comments about this publication and ask readers to submit their articles and request books to review.

Bryan J. Hockensmith
Managing Editor
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In early December, the Center of Military History (CMH) and the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Military History and Heritage Office conducted an off-site meeting to continue the iterative process of designing the U.S. Army History and Heritage Framework. We kicked off this journey at the Conference of Army Historians last summer, when Maj. Gen. Bradley T. Gericke’s thoughts on “actionable history” for official historical offices inspired us all. As we continue to work our way into TRADOC business processes, the time is now to think innovatively about the way Army historians, museum professionals, and archivists deliver historical content to the force. The History and Heritage Framework will be our guiding construct to do that.

The framework will give us a road map for the ways in which we will collaborate across the Army Historical Program to deliver actionable history to five audiences:

- The American public, with a focus on young citizens with a propensity to join the Army, and also their influencers. We will tell the Army’s story to the nation and reinforce the Army’s position with Congress. In this way, we will support the number one TRADOC priority—the accomplishment of the Army’s recruiting mission—and the enhancement of civil-military relations.
- Newly inducted personnel in their initial training or in precommissioning training, both officer and enlisted. Historical content for this population will reinforce commonly agreed upon themes and ideas, will ground their service in our nation’s concepts of voluntary service and civilian control of the military, and will prepare them intellectually in the profession of arms. This content will educate and inspire our newest service members.
- Personnel attending Professional Military Education or mid- and senior-level Army training. Historical content for this audience will foster continued intellectual development of operational and strategic leaders—building critical thinking skills and developing informed, nuanced perspectives of changes in the Army.
- Army Senior Leaders, both military and civilian. They need historical content to develop and improve themselves professionally, to inform current and future staff processes and decision-making, and to develop viable command historical programs across the force.
- The operating force, in order to make historical content a component of ongoing unit training and professional development. This historical content should reinforce branch, mission occupation specialties, and unit heritage as a way of supporting unit cohesion and esprit de corps.

I want to emphasize that this framework approach is not just about the CMH workforce—it is about maximizing the capabilities and effectiveness of the entire Army Historical Program and taking advantage of the incredible skills and depth of expertise across our community. I hope to encourage collaboration through a series of era-based Communities of Interest, and to leverage other digital-age methods of collaboration. Watch this space, as well as our Web site, https://history.army.mil, and our social media pages for more on the Army History and Heritage Framework.
Coming Soon

In the coming months, the Chief of Staff of the Army and the U.S. Army Center of Military History will release *Modern War in an Ancient Land: The United States Army in Afghanistan 2001–2014*, a two-volume history of the U.S. Army’s involvement in Afghanistan. These volumes, prepared by the Operation Enduring Freedom Study Group, present an operational-level narrative of how the U.S. Army formed, trained, deployed, and employed its forces in Afghanistan from October 2001 to December 2014. To write this history, the study group embarked on an extensive research program, including oral history interviews with dozens of key military and civilian leaders. These volumes contain a total of fifty maps, a wide range of campaign photography and artwork, and volume-specific indexes. They will be issued as CMH Pub 59-1-1 and will be available for purchase by the general public from the U.S. Government Publishing Office.

**Dr. Dennis E. Showalter (1942–2019)**

The acclaimed military historian Dennis E. Showalter passed away on the evening of 30–31 December after a battle with esophageal cancer. The author of numerous books, articles, and reviews, he was also the recipient of the Pritzker Military Museum and Library Literature Award for Lifetime Achievement in Military Writing. He is survived by his wife, Clara Anne McKenna, and two children, Clara Kathleen and John Showalter.

Distinguished scholar Dr. Michael S. Neiberg, of the U.S. Army War College, writes,

Dennis was a longtime professor at Colorado College and a visiting professor at many military schools including the Air Force Academy, the United States Military Academy at West Point, and the Marine Corps University. Despite never having had Ph.D. students of his own, Dennis was a mentor, a teacher, and an inspiration to an entire generation of historians. He appears in hundreds of acknowledgments and dedications, and was the subject of a Festschrift (a collection of writings published in honor of a scholar) and also a special issue of the journal *War in History*. He was a president of the Society for Military History, a founding member of the International Society for First World War Studies, and the winner of numerous awards and prizes.

Above all, though, Dennis was a true gentleman who saw the potential in every student and scholar with whom he ever worked. As his daughter, Clara Kathleen, stated, the lesson of Dennis’ career and his life is ‘Be kind. Period. Lift up, don’t punch down. Assume the best and if you don’t get it, challenge people to get there. That’s how you make the world better.’

We have lost a true titan and a good friend.
A composite image of a convoy from Company A, 2d Battalion, 69th Armor, 24th Infantry Division, carrying materiel needed to support Operation VIGILANT WARRIOR.
On 6 October 1994, U.S. intelligence analysts discovered clear evidence that Iraq was deploying two elite Republican Guard armored divisions to the Kuwaiti border. The presence of ground combat troops so close to Kuwait set off a panic in Kuwait City where memories of the Iraqi invasion and subsequent six-month occupation in 1990–1991 were still fresh and terrifying. General J. H. Binford Peay III, Commander in Chief, U.S. Central Command (CINCCENT), headquartered in Tampa, Florida, also saw the buildup of forces as a serious threat. Even as he rapidly mobilized U.S. forces to meet the Iraqi threat, Peay discussed with his deputy, Marine Corps Lt. Gen. Richard I. Neal, the possibility of evacuating the small, lightly defended U.S. base, Camp Doha, located approximately twenty-four kilometers west of Kuwait City.

The problem was time. Was there time to evacuate the approximately 500 Army personnel and 1,200 civilians on the post when the Iraqi army was only a few hours away? What about all the Abrams tanks, Bradley fighting vehicles, and howitzers stored at Camp Doha? If the Iraqis crossed the border, should the equipment be abandoned, moved, or destroyed? How long could the Kuwaiti military with its four brigades hold off Iraq’s two armored divisions? And perhaps the most important question on General Peay’s mind: Was there time to rush enough forces into theater to stop the Iraqi Republican Guard from overrunning Kuwait as they had in August 1990?

The Gulf War

The exciting events during the first two weeks of October 1994 were indicative of the recurring challenges of containing Iraq in the years after the Persian Gulf War (1990–1991). On 2 August 1990, three armored divisions of the Iraqi Army’s Republican Guard rumbled across the Kuwaiti border and quickly overran the emirate’s small, unsuspecting military. By seizing Kuwait, Iraq controlled a fifth of the world’s oil reserves and punished Kuwait for refusing to cancel debts Iraq incurred during the Iran–Iraq War (1980–1988).

The response from the rest of the world was swift. Four days after Iraq swallowed its neighbor whole, the United Nations (UN) Security Council imposed a comprehensive trade embargo on Iraq, including weapons and other military equipment but excluding medical supplies and food. The United States and a multinational coalition deployed military forces, under UN mandate, to defend Saudi Arabia, a critical ally and major oil producer in the region. They fought a lightning war to expel Iraq after a brutal six-month occupation. It took just six weeks of air war and a hundred hours of ground combat to push the Iraqi Army—the fourth-largest army in the world—out of Kuwait. Defeated and badly mauled but not destroyed, the Iraqi Army withdrew.

The outcomes of the Gulf War were mixed. At the end of the conflict, the UN-brokered cease-fire agreement required, among other things, that Iraq give up its chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons programs and stockpiles. To enforce this requirement, the UN left the economic sanctions in place, including an arms embargo, and set up an inspections regimen to monitor and verify compliance. The UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) was responsible for overseeing the identification and destruction of Iraq’s biological and chemical weapons, as well as its long-range missiles. The UN assigned Iraq’s suspected nuclear weapons program to the International Atomic Energy Agency. Despite these conditions, the Gulf War neither removed Iraqi president Saddam Hussein from power nor eliminated his ability to threaten neighboring countries and vital U.S. interests in the region, especially the free flow of oil.

After the Conflict

Regime survival by whatever means necessary remained the top priority of Saddam’s Ba’athist government in Baghdad.
In the immediate aftermath of the Gulf War, this goal required a ruthless repression of uprisings by Iraq’s Kurdish minority in the north and by the Shi’ites in the south. Although the international community initially turned its back on the Shi’ites, who had ties to Iran, it mobilized to help the Kurds. To prevent Iraqi aircraft from continuing these attacks, the United States created a no-fly zone above the 36th parallel and, as part of a larger humanitarian mission, inserted ground troops to push the Iraqi army below a defensible line. The following year, President George H. W. Bush announced Operation Southern Watch to enforce a new southern no-fly zone below the 32nd parallel (Map 1). U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) created Joint Task Force Southwest Asia (JTF–SWA) in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, to run the operation, and Headquarters, Ninth U.S. Air Force executed its mission through the 4404th Composite Wing. France and the United Kingdom joined the United States in patrolling duties. These exclusion zones provided a literal form of top cover to Saddam’s domestic adversaries. Iraq practiced partial and measured compliance with weapons inspections punctuated by demands and refusals. Saddam’s desire to maintain the capacity and expertise to restart his weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs kept him from fully complying with the UN inspections.

After four years of hardship in Iraq, Saddam Hussein was determined to end sanctions. The Iraqi president never acknowledged the legality of the sanctions, and even initially rejected a UN “oil for food” arrangement, which would have allowed Iraq to use some oil revenue to import food, medicine, and other essentials. By 1994, Iraq’s economy was in shambles. Prices for consumer goods had skyrocketed and per capita income had fallen drastically, making it difficult for most Iraqis to purchase anything but the bare essentials. On 23 September, citing shortages caused by sanctions, the Iraqi government halved daily food rations for the nation’s 18 million people. In just one day, food prices doubled. Medical equipment and drugs were also scarce, causing a crisis in the nation’s health-care system.

In seeking the termination of sanctions, Saddam’s main concern was not the survival of his people but the survival of his regime. If the domestic conditions deteriorated further, Saddam feared that it would cause more political unrest. An unsuccessful coup in July 1993 and repeated assassination attempts against Saddam underscored the precariousness of his position. Lifting the arms embargo would allow Saddam to equip, arm, and modernize Iraq’s military—a critical tool for maintaining internal order and repressing potential dissent. Saddam spent much of 1994 embarked on a so-called “charm offensive” to undermine UN sanctions, using measured cooperation with weapons inspectors and appeals to the international community on behalf of the innocent victims of the sanctions. Taking advantage of a loophole in the UN resolutions, Iraq also negotiated contracts for arms deals and infrastructure projects in anticipation of the lifting of sanctions. Saddam’s public relations efforts seemed to be paying off.

**IRAQ AND THE UN**

The Iraqi leader had reason to be optimistic about the possible lifting of sanctions. Three permanent members of the UN Security Council—France, Russia, and China—all wanted to end the sanctions. All three countries had a history of selling arms to Iraq and stood to gain lucrative contracts for rebuilding the country. Iraq had accumulated large debts to both France ($6 billion) and Russia ($5 billion) during the Iran–Iraq War. An end to the oil embargo would give Baghdad the funds to buy arms and pay its debts. The United States and the United Kingdom, however, adamantly opposed the lifting of sanctions until Iraq complied with all UN resolutions, including the complete dismantling of its WMD program.

In September 1994, as the United States was deploying 20,000 troops to
restore Haiti’s democratically elected government and remove the military junta that had governed the country since 1991, Saddam increased his antisanctions rhetoric ahead of the next UNSCOM report to the UN Security Council, due on 10 October. Although UNSCOM Chairman C. Rolf Ekéus doubted Iraq had come clean about its biological weapons program, he was satisfied that UNSCOM had largely achieved its goals in identifying and dismantling Iraq’s chemical weapons and missile programs. In light of this progress, the commission shifted its focus to ongoing monitoring. U.S. intelligence officials, however, had even greater concerns about Iraq’s WMD capabilities and intentions. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director R. James Woolsey Jr. announced that Iraq had hidden some weapons programs, was building underground facilities to resume these programs, and harbored ambitions of seizing Kuwait again. On 25 September, an Iraqi government official stated that Baghdad would reconsider its cooperation with weapons inspectors if the UN did not ease or lift sanctions. In this tense environment, Ekéus visited Iraq during the first week of October to discuss ongoing monitoring of suspected WMD sites.

SUSPICIONS

On 4 October, while Ekéus was in Baghdad, a British GR-1 Tornado, flying a Southern Watch reconnaissance mission, photographed an Iraqi transport on the highway between Qalat Salih and Al Basrah. An initial photographic analysis in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, concluded that it was heading north and carrying an older T55 tank. When intelligence analysts in Riyadh took another look, they determined that the vehicle was actually carrying a modern T72 tank and heading south. This was the first solid indication of Iraqi troop movement. Over the next two days, U.S. intelligence analysts scoured the available imagery to determine which Iraqi units were moving and to where. They determined that two Republican Guard divisions—the Hammurabi and Al-Nida—were moving south to the Iraqi III Corps area near Al Basrah. On 6 October, CENTCOM received a “national warning message” about the Iraqi deployments (Map 2). Alongside the three regular army divisions permanently stationed in the south, the arrival of two Republican Guard formations would give Saddam five heavy divisions within striking distance of Kuwait. The Iraqi positions, including a forward command post at Az Zubayr, resembled those established just before the 1990 invasion of Kuwait.

The same day CENTCOM learned of the Iraqi Republican Guard deployments, Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz demanded that UNSCOM set a date for lifting sanctions and made a veiled threat about Iraq looking for other means to defend itself. This kind of saber-rattling was nothing new. Saddam had made similar threats in March 1994. However, the combination of threats and troop movements set off alarms in Washington that would soon reverberate at CENTCOM headquarters in Tampa. On the same day Aziz issued his warning, General Peay, who had assumed command in August that year, received a briefing about unusual troop movements in southern Iraq. Lead elements were fifty kilometers from the border, and at the current rate of movement four Republican Guard brigades could be on the Kuwaiti border by 10 October. This was the date scheduled for the next sixty-day review of Iraq’s compliance with UN resolutions and Saddam’s deadline for a commitment from the UN Security Council on the lifting of sanctions.

At the time, the U.S.-led coalition had insufficient aircraft to deter an Iraqi ground assault, much less launch a counterattack. A substantial number of U.S. and British
Royal Air Force (RAF) assets in the region enforced the no-fly zone below the 32nd parallel, but these aircraft were not equipped to stop advancing armored divisions.\(^7\) In the first week of October, JTF–SWA had only eighteen F–16C Falcons and six British GR–1 Tornados to counter the Iraqi divisions moving south.\(^8\) Moreover, no forward air controllers, liaison officers, and other personnel were in theater to conduct extensive close air support operations. The Kuwaiti air force had twenty-four new F–18s, but it was unclear how combat ready the fighters and their crews were.

The United States and Kuwait had only minimal ground forces in the region. Kuwait fielded four understrength brigades—two armored, one mechanized infantry, and one motorized cavalry—plus a unit with a single anti-armor helicopter.\(^9\) CENTCOM also had limited forces in the country. The Area Support Group–Kuwait (ASG–K), the Army’s only permanent command in the emirate, consisted of about 180 Army personnel, a detachment of approximately 300 soldiers from the 513th Military Intelligence (MI) Brigade, and some 1,200 contract civilians.\(^10\) The command’s primary responsibility was to maintain the Army War Reserve–5 (AWR–5) stored at Camp Doha and used by the battalions that deployed for Intrinsic Action, a recurring Kuwaiti-American live-fire training exercise. The next Intrinsic Action rotation was scheduled to begin mid-October, so the designated units from the 1st Infantry Division were still at their home station, Fort Riley, Kansas.\(^11\) As it happened, the only U.S. combat troops in Kuwait at the time were sixty-five Special Forces soldiers from Company C, 2d Battalion, 5th Special Forces Group, 1st Special Forces, who had arrived on 3 October for an Iris Gold training exercise with the Kuwaiti military. Not only were there too few troops, but pre-positioned stocks were also short. AWR–5 was supposed to outfit a brigade; however, not all of the allocated equipment had arrived from recently inactivated VII Corps units in Europe.\(^12\) The limited personnel and materiel meant that coalition ground forces would not have been sufficient to halt the advancing Iraqi Republican Guard divisions without significant reinforcements.\(^13\)

The maritime assets in theater, however, were more extensive. Although the Navy...
had no carrier in the Persian Gulf, five major combat ships armed with Tomahawk cruise missiles were present. The USS Tripoli Amphibious Ready Group was also in the Gulf. Its landing force, the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit, had approximately 2,000 marines ashore in the United Arab Emirates conducting exercises. A Marine expeditionary unit is an air-ground task force built around a Marine Corps infantry battalion.

On Friday, 7 October, the Hammurabi Division’s 15th Mechanized Brigade and 17th Armored Brigade were at Shaibah Air Base, a former RAF facility approximately twenty-eight kilometers from the border, near the town of Az Zubayr. The Al-Nida Division’s 43d Mechanized Brigade was embarking on rail cars in Mosul. At the current rate of movement, CENTCOM estimated that the Republican Guard would have six brigades—two full divisions—in the south by 13 October.25

**Urgent Situation**

Given the limited number of friendly combat-ready forces in theater, the priority for General Peay was to send as many coalition forces to Kuwait as quickly as possible. He telephoned his subordinate commanders to stress the urgency of the situation. “SECDEF [secretary of defense] feels it’s serious,” he told Lt. Gen. Steven L. Arnold, the commander of the Third U.S. Army/U.S. Army Central (ARCENT) at Fort McPherson, Georgia. Peay informed Arnold that Maj. Gen. Everett H. Pratt Jr. (U.S. Air Force), commander of JTF–SWA in Riyadh, would run operations in theater until the arrival of the deputy CINCCENT, General Neal. Peay ordered Arnold to send a senior commander from Third Army to Kuwait. Arnold chose his deputy, Maj. Gen. James B. Taylor. The CENTCOM commander stressed the importance of moving heavy ground forces to the Gulf quickly to “stop this guy.”26

After speaking with Peay, Arnold wondered aloud to his staff whether General Taylor would be able to defend against a possible Iraqi attack with the limited resources available. “Will General Taylor stand and fight or go south?” he asked.27 Peay’s question was one of tactics, not courage, and it highlighted the precariousness of the situation. The same day, Peay stood up his Crisis Action Team. He also requested the immediate deployment of Air Force and Navy assets to the Gulf: KC–130 tankers, U–2 and RC–135 reconnaissance aircraft, and the USS George Washington aircraft carrier battle group. At the evening update with his staff, Peay again raised the possibility of evacuating Camp Doha: “At some point do we want to retrograde [AWR–5] equipment south? We have a 3–5 day vulnerable window.”28

The Kuwaitis also took the threat seriously. On 7 October, Peay learned that Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker had relayed a request from the Government of Kuwait for ground troops, a Patriot missile battery, and a statement of U.S. intentions. To meet the immediate threat, Peay requested from Washington the deployment of three mechanized companies and three armored companies—a “3×3 Battalion Task Force.”29 That evening, the Kuwaiti Land Forces headquarters deployed all four of its brigades into defensive positions in the desert northwest of Kuwait City.

However, leaders at Camp Doha did not sense the same urgency felt in Washington, Tampa, or the rest of Kuwait. Seeing Kuwaitis stocking up on groceries and queuing up at gas stations, the ASG–K commander, Col. Robert L. Smalser, went ahead with a planned 8 October picnic for his troops, which Ambassador Crocker also attended. Later, Smalser recalled that he did not believe the Iraqi Army had the ability to attack successfully, because, as he saw it, they had neither the necessary command and control capability nor sufficient support in place.30 This assessment, which contradicted CENTCOM’s, was based on limited intelligence, because the 513th MI detachment did not have access to CENTCOM’s satellite imagery until 1995.31

Nevertheless, on the day of the picnic, U.S. Special Forces soldiers embedded with their coalition partners in the desert north of Kuwait City, preparing for an imminent Iraqi offensive.

Kuwait was not alone in its mobilization of forces. President William J. “Bill” Clinton ordered “the USS George Washington Carrier Battle Group, cruise missile ships, a Marine expeditionary brigade, and an Army mechanized task force” to the Persian Gulf.32 Speaking to reporters as he left the White House, the president said, “I want to make it clear one more time, it would be a grave error for Iraq to repeat the mistakes of the past or to misjudge either American will or American power.”33

**Deployment**

Once the president issued a deployment order, lead units moved quickly in response to CENTCOM’s request for forces. Two
Patriot missile batteries of the 2d Battalion, 43d Air Defense Artillery, arrived in Saudi Arabia on 8 October: one in Riyadh, the other in Dhahran. The plan was for them to drive pre-positioned equipment to Kuwait.35 The same day, the Army ordered elements of the 7th Transportation Group to Kuwait and Saudi Arabia for split operations. The Third Army forward headquarters left Georgia on 8 October. When Taylor flew to Kuwait to establish Joint Task Force–Kuwait (JTF–K), Arnold did not have a written mission to give his deputy, which Third Army planners were still developing. In the interim he issued verbal orders based on discussions with General Peay. In addition to setting up JTF–K, Taylor was to assess the Kuwaiti defenses and take command of U.S. ground forces.36 Upon arrival on Sunday, 9 October, Taylor and his staff converted a warehouse at Camp Doha into a command post, working around the clock for the next forty-eight hours. Lacking time to deploy Third Army’s “Lucky Tac” mobile command post, Taylor improvised.37 While the Army flew its forces to Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, Navy ships sailed toward the Persian Gulf. In addition to the USS George Washington carrier battle group, which was already steaming from the Adriatic toward the Red Sea, the Navy, on 9 October, also deployed five ships carrying AWR–3 from Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean to the Port of Dammam, Saudi Arabia.

As units headed to the Middle East during the first weekend of the crisis, Arnold’s staff worked in coordination with CENTCOM planners to craft a mission statement, which General Peay approved on Monday, 10 October. “Third Army would deploy forces to theater, deter an Iraqi attack, defend Kuwait if necessary to protect critical coalition assets, and be prepared to counterattack and conduct offensive operations.”38 This statement reflected the ambiguity surrounding Saddam’s intentions. Was the deployment of Republican Guard troops to the Kuwaiti border simply a show of force to intimidate his opponents? Was he planning to conduct cross-border operations? Or would he order his troops to repeat their August 1990 invasion of Kuwait? The absence of human intelligence from inside Iraq forced the intelligence community to rely on Saddam’s past behavior. On that basis, analysts generally assumed hostile intent.39 U.S. military planners had the same mindset as they began developing a contingency plan and Time Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD), which controlled the deployment of units.

As the planners refined the TPFDD, Iraq’s forces continued to move south. By 9 October all three brigades of the Hammurabi Division were already in southern Iraq. Two brigades—the 15th Mechanized and 17th Armored—were at Shaibah and the 8th Armored Brigade was a little further south, just fifteen kilometers from the Kuwait border. All three brigades of the Al-Nida Division were heading south by rail from their bases in northern Iraq and lead elements were already in Shaibah. An armored battalion from a third Republican Guard division was moving from Qalat Salih north of Al Basrah to near Shaibah. CENTCOM analysts determined that both the Hammurabi Division and the Al-Nida Division would be amassed near the border by 13 October, enabling Iraq to launch a five-division attack with Republican Guard and regular army divisions already in the area.40 However, some signs indicated that the troop movements were a show of force and not preparation for an attack.

Maj. Gen. Joseph E. DeFrancisco’s 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized) worked around the clock to deploy its units to meet the threat. DeFrancisco ordered 2d Battalion, 7th Infantry (Mechanized), 1st Brigade, the primary component of Task Force (TF) 2–7 Infantry, to deploy first. This was a logical choice because the battalion had just completed an INTRINSIC ACTION exercise. Therefore, they had recent experience with AWR–5, the terrain, and working with the Kuwaiti military. After receiving an unofficial warning order on 7 October and official notification at 1900 the following day, two TF 2–7 companies—one armor and one mechanized—plus a battalion headquarters element were ready to fly out by noon on 9 October. They landed in Kuwait on the evening of 10 October (Table 1). After drawing their equipment and ammunition at Camp Doha, the two companies were in their tactical assembly area within forty-eight hours. Lead elements of their sister battalion—3d Battalion, 69th Armor, 1st Brigade, the center of TF 3–69 Armor—were in Kuwait on 11 October. The rest of the two battalions continued to arrive over the next few days. The deployment of troops did not always go as planned. S. Sgt. Andrew Conrad, who was on the TF 2–7 advance party, flew out of Savannah, Georgia, on 10 October but did not arrive in Kuwait until 14 October because his C–5 aircraft “kept breaking down.”41 Many such hiccups occurred during the rapid deployment phase.

As the first American war fighting units were in the air on their way to Kuwait, the United States and its allies approved more deployments. On 10 October, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) General John M. D. Shalikashvili issued an execution order for Operation Vigilant Warrior.

Joseph E. DeFrancisco, shown here as a brigadier general

![Joseph E. DeFrancisco, shown here as a brigadier general](image)

### Table 1 – U.S. Army Battalion Deployments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Division and Brigade</th>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Arrived in Theater</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>24th Infantry Division</strong></td>
<td>2–7 Infantry</td>
<td>10–11 October 1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Brigade</td>
<td>3–69 Armor</td>
<td>11–15 October 1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>24th Infantry Division</strong></td>
<td>2–69 Armor</td>
<td>15–17 October 1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Brigade</td>
<td>1–18 Infantry</td>
<td>22 October–5 November 1994</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
General Peay subsequently requested 374 more fixed-wing aircraft. To prepare for a possible full-scale Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, Peay also requested three full Army divisions—the 1st Infantry Division, the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized), and the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault)—and the III Corps headquarters to provide command and control. CJCS alerted these units, which began making preparations to deploy. The United Kingdom also announced it was sending 4,000 Royal Marines and an additional six Tornados. The British also promised two ships: the frigate HMS Cornwall and the destroyer HMS Cardiff. France committed the frigate Georges Leygues.

Just as the coalition began taking shape, the Iraqis changed course. After the first 300 soldiers from TF 2–7 arrived in Kuwait, Iraqi Ambassador to the United Nations, Nizar Hamdoon, announced that Iraqi troops were “already on the move” to a site north of Al Basrah. Iraqi Foreign Minister Mohammed Saeed al-Sahhaf added that the troops would redeploy to “other locations in the rear” to complete military exercises. President Clinton addressed the nation from the White House Oval Office at 2000. After outlining the progress in ongoing operations in Haiti, the president discussed military deployments to the Persian Gulf: “Today I have ordered the additional deployment of 350 Air Force aircraft to the region.” He added, “Iraq announced today that it will pull back its troops from the Kuwait border. But we’re interested in facts, not promises, in deeds, not words. And we have not yet seen evidence that Iraq’s troops are in fact pulling back. We’ll be watching very closely to see if they do so.”

Reconnaissance imagery of 10 October showed no signs that the Iraqi Republican Guard divisions were moving north. In fact, a British Tornado photographed more than 100 Iraqi T72 tanks near the demilitarized zone. Peay told his subordinate commanders to disregard news reports of
Iraq pulling back. Arnold said that he was not going to take the bait and told his staff to ignore what they heard in American news reports. The generals had good reason to be skeptical, based not only on intelligence reports but also on historical precedents. Iraq had perfected the art of deception during the Iran–Iraq War. After the Iraqis invaded Kuwait in 1990, they made false withdrawal announcements, which they used to buy time to reposition their forces. When the ground war began in February 1991, the Iraqis had announced their plans to remove their forces from Kuwait; however, the coalition forces saw no signs of withdrawal.

Consequently, the United States and the United Kingdom continued to send forces to the Gulf. Even when western intelligence agencies observed Iraqi Republican Guard units moving north again, senior American military officers suspected it might be a feint. On 13 October, General Peay went on the Today Show and stated: “The crisis is not past. . . . We have diffused the crisis but we will have to watch the situation closely.”

Peay’s suspicions seemed warranted when the Al-Nida Division halted its northward movement at Al Nasiriyah on the Euphrates River about 200 kilometers northwest of Al Basrah. This raised the possibility that the withdrawal was a deception intended to stop the movement of coalition forces to the region. However, the Defense Intelligence Agency concluded that the Al-Nida Division’s halt at Al Nasiriyah was likely due to transportation problems. Both Peay and Shalikashvili still thought it prudent to send a second brigade.

A debate ensued over whether to deploy 3d Brigade, 24th Infantry Division, to Saudi Arabia as planned. Peay wanted these forces in theater to reinforce the ones already there. But Army leaders were concerned that with the Iraqi threat appearing to diminish, deploying another brigade would be too expensive. Consequently, eight planeloads of 7th Transportation personnel bound for Dhahran turned around midflight over the Atlantic Ocean. However, General Shalikashvili was concerned about sending a premature message that the crisis was over. In order to underscore the American commitment to regional security and reduce the likelihood that Saddam would reverse his withdrawal decision, the chairman told Peay to deploy a second heavy brigade. This order required the eight rerouted aircraft to turn around again in order to proceed to their original destination and prepare for the arrival of 3d Brigade. The continuous shifts in deployments attested to the general uncertainty about Saddam’s intentions and objectives.

While CENTCOM continued to send military forces into theater, diplomats worked to prevent a repeat of Saddam’s “October Surprise.” Technically, Iraq had not violated existing UN resolutions by moving divisions to the Kuwait border. In light of this, U.S. diplomats sought a new restriction on such troop movements. As U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Madeleine K. Albright, explained, “What we’re looking at are ways to try to make sure that they stay well, well behind their borders.” As a result of these efforts, the UN Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 949 on 15 October, demanding that “Iraq immediately complete the withdrawal of all military units recently deployed to southern Iraq to their original positions.” Iraq quickly acceded to the Security Council’s demand. The UN also ordered Iraq not to “take any other action to enhance its military capacity in southern Iraq.” To enforce this order, the United States and its allies created a ground exclusion zone south of the 32nd parallel—a “no-drive zone” as a corollary to the no-fly zone.

A Shift in Focus

In the second week of the crisis, the operational focus shifted as the threat of an Iraqi attack subsided. By 15 October, one week after Clinton gave the deployment order, the first two battalions comprising a 3×3 task force were in Kuwait. By 17 October, they had drawn their equipment and ammunition at Camp Doha and were in the desert northwest of the capital ready to support the Kuwaiti army. However, this was still a thin screen against the available Iraqi forces in southern Iraq (approximately 50,000 regular army troops in Al Basrah and the Republican Guard division at Al Nasiriyah) should they attack. That possibility seemed remote after the Al-Nida Division started moving north again on 18 October. The president canceled the deployment of 18,000 marines from I Marine Expeditionary Force, plus 156,000 other personnel who had been put on alert. The crisis appeared to be over.

Although still officially a contingency operation, Vigilant Warrior evolved into a training exercise and deployments slowed accordingly. On 17 October, TF 2–69 Armor—centered on 2d Battalion, 69th Armor, 3d Brigade—assembled in Dammam, Saudi Arabia. The unit billeted for several days in a hangar at Lucky Base, the ARCENT facility about thirty kilometers from the port, waiting to get their equipment from AWR–3 before moving north to Kuwait. By the time the first two Military Sealift Command (MSC) roll-on/roll-off ships—MV Cape Horn and MV Cape Decision—were ready to offload cargo on 22 October, the crisis with Iraq had passed. Also on this day, elements of 1st Battalion, 18th Infantry, 3d Brigade—the core of TF 1–18—began to trickle into Dammam, in time for its Alpha and Bravo companies to join TF 2–69 on the trip north a few days later. The soldiers found the tanks aboard ship in excellent condition. However, there were problems. None of the batteries worked because they had not been properly maintained and were not checked before offloading. Every vehicle had to be jump-started in order to move down the ramp and onto the pier, slowing the operation. Eventually, the U.S. Army Materiel Command (AMC) cargo specialists, working with 6th Transportation Battalion and 3d Brigade soldiers, finished unloading the tanks, trucks, and other equipment. Soldiers then moved everything to an assembly area to prepare for convoy operations.

The United States encountered myriad difficulties throughout the training exercise, not just at the port. The movement from Dammam, Saudi Arabia, to the tactical assembly area in northern Kuwait took place over three days from 26 to 28 October. Owing to a lack of drivers and equipment, the 6th Transportation Battalion, commanded by Lt. Col. Kathleen M. Gainey, augmented their capacity with Saudi army and contracted drivers and vehicles. Inferior foreign equipment combined with language and culture
An M1A1 Abrams tank crosses a berm in the desert during maneuvers outside the Tactical Assembly Area Liberty.

A convoy carries materiel needed to support Operation VIGILANT WARRIOR. The convoy is from Company A, 2d Battalion, 69th Armor, 24th Infantry Division, Fort Benning, Georgia.

An M1A1 Abrams tank crosses a berm in the desert during maneuvers outside the Tactical Assembly Area Liberty.

Soldiers from the 24th Infantry Division clean and inventory equipment at the Tactical Assembly Area Liberty during Operation VIGILANT WARRIOR.

Crew members of an armored personnel carrier set up a communications antenna outside their vehicle in the desert of Kuwait. The troops were establishing a checkpoint in the desert to guide other vehicles as they deployed throughout Kuwait.
barriers caused numerous problems. Few Arabic interpreters were available which made it difficult to communicate with Saudi drivers. The Saudi soldiers refused to eat the U.S. military’s ready-to-eat meals and said they would bring and cook their own food. The 6th Transportation Battalion’s after action report (AAR) relates what happened next: “The Saudis did bring food with them but not the kind of food we expected. They traveled with live goats and propane stoves and expected to have time to slaughter and cook their meal when we stopped.” Once the convoys got under way, Saudi drivers did not maintain convoy integrity and kept speeding and passing each other. Consequently, more tires blew out and more vehicles broke down than the Americans expected. When the convoy stopped for rest and refueling stops, the Saudis did not get back in their vehicles when it was time for the convoy to proceed. Loud arguments between the drivers and their superiors ensued. “The Saudis were not used to working the length of time we expected them to,” the AAR explained. The situation improved once the convoys crossed the border, where Kuwaiti police escorts slowed the pace and kept Saudi drivers in line with orders barked over their loudspeakers. Despite the problems, the coalition partners and their equipment enabled the 7th Transportation Group to move a total of 376 pieces of equipment to Kuwait in three days.

Once 3d Brigade units arrived in their tactical assembly area north of Kuwait City, they joined the 1st Brigade, 24th Infantry Division, for live-fire exercises: practicing counterattacking along an axis to an attack-by-fire position. When they had completed their training, the armored task force withdrew to Saudi Arabia to a facility near the Port of Dammam. After cleaning their equipment, 3d Brigade soldiers turned it in. With input from the 24th Infantry Division, AMC personnel created a new load plan for maximum efficiency and put the equipment back on the MSC ships for transport back to Diego Garcia.

During Vigilant Warrior, the U.S. Navy did more than just provide sealift for Army equipment; it enforced UN sanctions against Iraq by interdicting smugglers. On 22 October, a Navy warship in the Persian Gulf stopped the Honduran–flagged oil tanker *Al Mahrousa*. After boarding it, Navy and Coast Guard personnel found that the vessel’s paperwork was not in order. The ship’s Egyptian captain admitted to loading 3,162 tons of diesel fuel in Iraq, then sailing into international waters in violation of the four-year-old oil embargo. His contractor told him to sail to Sirri, an Iranian island off the coast of Dubai, to await instructions on where to deliver his contraband cargo. The Navy turned over the *Al Mahrousa* to the Kuwaitis for further investigation. This incident was the first time a tanker was caught in the act of violating UN sanctions against Iraq, showing the difficulty of enforcing the oil embargo. This incident also strengthened the U.S. and British argument against lifting UN sanctions, as Iraq was caught violating those same sanctions.

**SIGNIFICANT OUTCOMES**

Operation Vigilant Warrior, which officially ended 22 December 1994, yielded several important outcomes. From a strategic perspective, the United States and its allies deterred Iraqi aggression with an agile and determined U.S.-led military force. This was accomplished without firing a shot or sustaining a single casualty due to enemy action. One military analyst called the operation “the first prominent example of effective conventional deterrence by the U.S. in the post–Cold War era.” Of course, this conclusion assumes that Saddam intended to attack Kuwait. U.S. Secretary of Defense William J. Perry believed as much. Regardless, diplomatic efforts during the crisis led to a UN-mandated ground exclusion zone, which curtailed the Iraqi military’s freedom of movement and made future deterrence easier.

Other strategic victories proved a net gain for Kuwait and its allies against Iraq and its supporters. Saddam withdrew his threat to cease cooperating with UN inspectors and said he would work to comply fully with UN resolutions. Moreover, Iraq recognized the sovereignty of Kuwait, which Saddam formerly claimed as Iraq’s 19th province, and acknowledged the new frontier which ceded a corner of Umm Qasr, Iraq’s only deepwater port, and a disputed portion of the Rumaylah oil field. This gesture on Saddam’s part cleared a major U.S. and British objection to the lifting of sanctions. “By making this offer under duress,” one journal article opined, “Saddam saved face with his people, the majority of whom are prepared to recognize Kuwait but not the new border.”

This Iraqi concession was the product of intense behind-the-scenes Russian diplomacy. On 13 October, Russian foreign minister Andrei V. Kozyrev made a deal with Baghdad in which Iraq would agree to recognize Kuwait’s sovereignty and the UN-designated border in exchange for renewed Russian efforts to end the sanctions within seven months. Privately, Russian analysts believed Saddam had snatched defeat from the jaws of victory, making an “unforgivable” mistake by provoking a confrontation just before the Security Council was to discuss Iraq’s compliance with UNSCOM efforts. This provocation assured that sanctions would remain in effect for the foreseeable future.

For the U.S. military, and the Army in particular, the rapid deployment of troops was the great achievement of the operation. General Gordon R. Sullivan, U.S. Army Chief of Staff, explained, The most recent crisis in Kuwait gave us the opportunity to demonstrate a new standard in rapid deployment. We alerted two Patriot batteries at Fort Polk, Louisiana, and they were in the air the next day. We alerted the 24th Infantry Division on a Friday; on Monday, planes began carrying the main body of the brigade to Kuwait. Within 10 days of the initial notification, the 1st Brigade combat team was in Kuwait and had drawn all of its pre-positioned equipment. Deploying a heavy brigade with this speed is a remarkable feat that we could not have accomplished five years ago—and which no other nation can do today.

Although the Army put tens of thousands of soldiers on alert to deploy, the total number of Army troops in theater supporting Operation Vigilant Warrior peaked at 6,987 on 27 October 1994. This was a sizable force considering it had been transported across seven time zones in just four weeks.

From a joint perspective, the deployment was even more impressive. Once
assembled, U.S. forces in the Gulf included the CENTCOM forward headquarters, the ARCENT forward headquarters, two heavy brigade task forces, a Marine expeditionary unit, a carrier battle group, two Air Force squadrons, and significant support forces. Total U.S. forces in theater reached their highest number of 28,952 on the last day of October. General Peay boasted that “this impressive display of power projection achieved in days what had taken weeks during Desert Shield.” However, privately he knew that things could have gone differently. In a meeting with General Shalikashvili on 16 October, Peay admitted that there was a vulnerable window from 7–10 October. Had Saddam attacked during that period, there would have been little the United States could have done to stop him.

A lack of proper planning and a shortage of equipment and supplies exacerbated the time and distance problem Peay alluded to. The 24th Infantry Division’s AAR observed, “There was no ground tactical plan for contingency operations in Kuwait.” It elaborated that, “The U.S. Army has been conducting training in Kuwait for almost four years. Yet, when 24ID [24th Infantry Division] arrived in theater there was no tactical plan for the units to fall in on.” The report further noted the absence or deficiency of critical materiel in the war reserves—everything from multiple-launch rocket systems to engineering equipment to counterbattery radars to tactical maps to field sanitation kits. In an interview, General DeFrancisco also complained about “an almost tragic shortage of trucks.” The lack of equipment and supplies indicated that CENTCOM had not adequately prepared for a potential war in Kuwait, a problem that predated Peay’s tenure. In fact, before advanced parties arrived to inspect the stockpiles, no one tasked with drawing the equipment knew what was in them as no up-to-date inventories existed. General Peay used the lessons learned during Operation Vigilant Warrior to produce a new CENTCOM theater strategy and updated war plan for Iraq (Operation Plan 1002–94). In most cases, soldiers found workarounds to problems. Because of a lack of engineering equipment in AWR-5, a single company of engineers conducted split operations in support of two battalion task forces. A shortage of radios with encryption necessitated communicating tactical information “in the clear”—a cumbersome affair due to security precautions. S. Sgt. Grant R. Rosen of Company C, 3d Battalion, 69th Armor, explained how radio operators reported grid coordinates in code, using the words “camel turds” as the key in which each letter stands for a number from 0 to 9. Fortunately, the hastily assembled and minimally equipped force was not put to the test.

Some critics, including the French defense minister François G. M. Léotard, accused President Clinton of playing politics with the military ahead of the November midterm congressional elections. However, no evidence suggests that Clinton’s resolve in the face of Iraqi aggression was a ploy to gain more votes for members of his Democratic party. Senate minority leader Robert J. Dole, a Republican, supported the president’s decision to send troops to the Middle East, even though Dole had opposed U.S. intervention in Haiti the month before. In any case, Republicans won majorities in both houses of Congress, flipping the leadership of both chambers. Others, including some in the intelligence community, claimed that the United States overreacted. Early in the crisis, General Peay told his staff that he “would rather take the heat for overreacting than be responsible for getting a lot of kids killed because we weren’t prepared.” At any rate, assessing the validity of the charge that Operation Vigilant Warrior was an overreaction would require knowing...
what was in Saddam’s mind, which no one did at the time. Years later, after being captured by American soldiers, Saddam told his CIA interrogator that the 1994 troop movements were just exercises meant to keep the United States and Kuwait guessing about his intentions. Although the threat seemed real, Saddam’s “October Surprise” Convention had been a misguided show of force intended to bully the UN Security Council into ending or easing sanctions and to distract from Iraq’s deteriorating domestic situation. Even though Saddam did not achieve sanctions relief and had to make concessions after withdrawing his troops from the border, he continued to test the resolve of the United States. But never again did Iraq use ground troops to threaten its neighbors.

**Dr. J. Travis Moger** is a historian at the U.S. Army Center of Military History and a retired Navy Reserve officer. He holds a Ph.D. in history from the University of California, Santa Barbara, and is currently preparing a monograph titled, *After the Storm: U.S. Army Operations in the Persian Gulf, 1991–2001.*

### Author’s Note
The recent declassification of three important primary source documents—two from the U.S. Central Command and one from Third Army/ARCENT—made publication of this article possible.

### Notes
10. Sancton, “No Longer Fenced In.”
21. Ibid., ch. 1, p. 15.
22. Ibid., ch. 1, p. 9.
23. The fact that the Kuwaiti government requested U.S. ground troops to reinforce their brigades suggests that they doubted their own military had the capability to defend the country against the threat.
28. Ibid., p. 8.
29. Ibid., p. 5.
31. Ibid., ch. 1, p. 27.
34. Ibid., p. 1725.
37. Ibid., ch. 2, p. 5, n. 4.
38. Ibid., ch. 1, p. 20.
42. Peay, “XO’s Notes,” p. 4.
55. Ibid.
57. AAR, 6th Transportation Bn (Truck), 10 Jan 1995, n.p., OVW Coll, CMH.
58. Interv, Maj Michael W. Byrne with Capt Donald V. Phillips, Co A, 2‒69 Armor, 3d Bde, 24th Inf Div, 9 Nov 1994 (CMH Catalog No. VWIT–A‒007B), OVW Coll, CMH.
59. AAR, 6th Transportation Bn (Truck), 10 Jan 1995, n.p., OVW Coll, CMH.
61. Ibid.
65. Speaking on 22 August 1995, Perry said, “There have been some unusual deployments of Iraqi military forces—nothing that leads us to believe that any invasion is underway or planned—in particular, nothing like we saw in October of 1994 which we believed was clearly indicative an invasion was planned” (emphasis added). Public Statements of William J. Perry Secretary of Defense, 1995, vol. 4 (Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, n.d.), p. 2676.
68. Ibid.
76. Interv, Maj Michael W. Byrne with Maj Gen Joseph E. DeFrancisco, 9 Nov 1994, p. 32, (CMH Catalog No. VWIT–A–010), OVW Coll, CMH.
78. Interv, Maj Michael W. Byrne with Co C, 3d Bn, 69th Armor, 28 Nov 1994, (CMH Catalog No. VWIT–A–0282b), OVW Coll, CMH.
80. Peay, ”XO’s Notes,” p. 11.
The outfitting of the National Museum of the United States Army (NMUSA) reached another milestone with the installation of the first microartifacts into designated exhibit cases. This phase of the project signals that construction work inside NMUSA has progressed enough that conditions are suitable for final phases of exhibit work. Museum professionals have begun placing our smaller historic artifacts.

The museum’s curators and other specialists work closely together and comprise a unique team. According to Paul Morando, the NMUSA’s exhibits chief, more than 1,300 microartifacts will be installed over the next several months. Preparation for this stage of work took place over several years. Each artifact was assessed and conserved according to its individual needs. Next, exhibit specialists crafted custom mounts for each artifact that are specifically designed based on an artifact’s measurements. Conservation statements about the artifacts informed the curators about the optimal way to display them while also protecting them.

The museum’s macroartifacts were installed into the museum first. Cranes and other large equipment placed some of them in August 2017—even before builders constructed the exterior walls of the museum. The smaller artifacts are now finding their place in exhibit cases along with exhibition graphics and descriptive placards. Morando states that “we are carefully examining the placement of graphics, photos, and labels while maintaining the integrity of the artifact and considering the aesthetics for the visitor’s experience.”

The museum is sharing more than 240 years of Army history through soldiers and their stories. One of the first microartifacts to be installed was 1st Lt. Edward N. Whittier’s uniform that he wore during the Battle of Gettysburg. Whittier was later awarded the Medal of Honor for his actions at the Battle of Fisher’s Hill. While Whittier’s uniform is interesting in its own right, when placed with other exhibit elements, the uniform tells a story that connects a visitor with Lieutenant Whittier and that moment in time. “We’re telling the Army’s story through soldier stories,” said Morando. “From the moment the visitor enters the Museum through the last exhibit, a personal perspective is intertwined in every historic story.”

As the museum prepares to open, Morando says it is exciting to see the evolution of the museum galleries. “Every day, more artifacts are in their cases, and it’s gratifying to see a building transform into a museum—and a place where the Army’s history will reside.”

The National Museum of the United States Army will open on 4 June 2020. For more information please visit www.theNMUSA.org

Images: Team members at the museum work together to carefully install artifacts and graphics into their exhibit cases with coordinated and delicate precision.
While battle scenes and images of daily soldier life during wars and conflicts are usually the focus in the Army Art Collection, there are also important works in the collection that have been produced by soldier-artists during peacetime. Throughout the 1960s, the Combat Art Program focused on recording the Vietnam War, selecting nine teams of artists that produced over 3,000 artworks. In 1970, the Army expanded the program to include documentation of Army activities beyond Vietnam. Spc5. Janet Fitzgerald became a member of Army Artist Team XVIII in 1979. Her assignment was to document women in the Army and in Corps of Engineers activities in various locations on the U.S. East Coast. Her drawings and paintings of Army women are among the few pieces in the collection portraying women between World War II and Operation Desert Storm.

Fitzgerald does not portray her subjects in gendered roles. A series of drawings documenting female soldiers in training at Fort Jackson covers situations and emotions experienced by any new recruit during training, regardless of gender. The artist emphasizes achievement and personal drive in *Pushing for Soldierhood* by depicting an exhausted soldier with a look of intense concentration on her face. In another work, Fitzgerald documents a universal moment for every new recruit: the dread of being “singled out” by the drill sergeant. A drawing titled *Heat Run* shows a recruit suffering through her run in the summer heat while another highlights controversy with the title *A Bit More Than a Conflict of Personalities*.

Other artworks from Fitzgerald’s assignment similarly portray the female soldiers of 1979 as tough and able contributors to the Army. Her subjects are women with muscled physiques who are competently engaged in their tasks. In several cases, the viewer might not even recognize that the subject is female without the title. These proficient soldiers represent the potential of any soldier, almost as if they anticipated the creation of the “Be All You Can Be” Army recruiting slogan.

Janet Fitzgerald’s 1979 artworks are part of the Army Art Collection and are preserved at the Museum Support Center at Fort Belvoir, Virginia. Two pieces from Fitzgerald’s series will appear in *The Art of Soldiering*, the inaugural art exhibit at the National Museum of the United States Army, which opens 4 June 2020.

Sarah G. Forgey is the chief art curator of the Army Museum Enterprise.
Female Mechanic, watercolor on paper, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, 1979

Heat Run, conte crayon on paper, Fort Jackson, South Carolina, 1979

Introspection, colored pencil on paper, 1979

A Bit More Than a Conflict of Personalities, conte crayon on paper, Fort Jackson, South Carolina, 1979

Pushing for Soldierhood, conte crayon on paper, Fort Jackson, South Carolina, 1979

Female Parachute Rigger and Jumper, watercolor on paper, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, 1979

Singled Out, Ft. Jackson, conte crayon on paper, Fort Jackson, South Carolina, 1979
"Get the Boys Home—Toot Sweet."

A Private's-Eye View of World War I Demobilization

By Grant T. Harward
The papers here are printing headlines ‘get the boys home—
toot sweet’ but there is nothing
definate as to going home yet. All the
talk is of being sent to Russia,” Pfc.
Alonzo E. Reed Jr. wrote his mother on
2 February 1919. Lonnie (as family and
friends called him) used “toot sweet,”
the anglicized French phrase tout de
suite meaning “right now,” popularized
by doughboys in France. His letter
illustrates the conundrum facing the U.S.
Army on the Western Front following the
Armistice. The American Expeditionary
Forces (AEF) needed to be ready to fight
if peace negotiations collapsed and also
to support an ongoing Allied intervention
in the civil war in Russia, but they also
had to demobilize rapidly because the
American public expected soldiers to
return from overseas “toot sweet.”

Lonnie served with a railroad regiment
in France that helped transport most of
the AEF to ports for home. His collection
of letters, stored at the archives of the U.S.
Army Medical Department (AMEDD)
Center of History and Heritage, provides
a unique private’s-eye view of the AEF’s
demobilization a century ago. This article
covers Lonnie’s military service between
May 1918 and November 1919 and uses
his correspondence to highlight various
aspects of Army demobilization.

Lonnie, like many American youths,
was anxious to demonstrate his honor and
manliness by becoming a soldier after the
United States declared war on 6 April 1917.2
By then, World War I was in its fourth year.
Although armies fought across the globe,
the most important theater was in Europe
and specifically in France on the Western
Front, where the British and French armies
were locked in deadly combat with the
German army. A vast network of trenches
protected soldiers from deadly firepower,
leaving the Western Front deadlocked, but
attritional battles steadily wore down the
opposing forces. The United States entered
the war just as the Eastern Front was
collapsing because of revolution and civil
war in Russia, thus prompting Germany
to rush to defeat Britain and France on the
Western Front before the United States
could come to their aid. With no time to
waste and little margin for error, Congress
bucked American tradition and passed
the Selective Service Act on 18 May 1917,
placing its faith in an Army of conscripts
rather than volunteers.3 Even so, the Army
still accepted volunteers under certain
conditions for most of the conflict.

Lonnie Reed was one of these volunteers.
He was born on 30 August 1899 to Alonzo
E. and Mary E. Reed in Colorado Springs,
Colorado. His parents had moved from
Indiana to Colorado to mine gold, but after
strikes and floods they returned home.
Consequently, Lonnie grew up in Monon,
a town 90 miles northwest of Indianapolis,
with his older sister Lucy and younger
brothers Charles, John, and Myron. He
graduated from high school soon after the
United States entered World War I, but
had to wait until he turned 18 to volunteer.
The Selective Service targeted men 21 to
31 years old and accepted volunteers until
15 December 1917. Even then, anyone
not registered for the draft could still
volunteer. An initial surge of volunteers was
followed by a steady stream until 8 August
1918 when all volunteer enlistments were
suspended.4 Lonnie had suffered a bout of
polio as a boy that left his legs weak, but
he remained determined to serve. On 4
May 1918, Lonnie excitedly scribbled on a
postcard from Indianapolis, “Rejected for
Navy. But accepted for Army.” He wrote
his sister, “Well one of my chief ambitions
has been realized, the wearing of a uniform.
The Navy did not desire my presence in
their midsts, so like the fox + sour grapes
a changed my mind about wanting in +
joined the Army . . . I enlisted in Indplis as
an ambulance driver in the Medical Dept
as that was the only place I could be used in
any truly active capacity in France.”

Taking a train to St. Louis, Missouri, Lonnie
reported to Jefferson Barracks where “we were
worked thru the ‘mill’ the name given the
examining bldg” for six hours that “was as
hard a days work I have ever known.” The
Army nearly rejected him. “The Dr’s at J.B.
had quite a consultation concerning my feet
and my card was marked passed for limited
service, because I talked him out of turning
me down entirely. As for limited service one Dr said I could never go to France, the Dr’s here say I will.” Lonnie’s medical company was supposed to be attached to pioneer engineers, troops tasked with constructing trenches, causing him to excitedly claim “the fatalities in this work are greater than any branch of the service,” as he expected to serve near the front.7 After five days, he returned to Indianapolis, reporting to Fort Benjamin Harrison to begin training. He proudly instructed his parents, “P.S. Now you can fly your service flag.” Meanwhile, British and French armies, reinforced by the few U.S. formations already in France, confronted a massive German spring offensive.

The Army rushed to transport troops overseas during the crisis, and training suffered. The AMEDD grew from 9,000 to 350,000 men creating shortages in personnel, especially doctors and surgeons, because training new ones from scratch took years.7 The Selective Service plucked physicians from civilian practice to be hurriedly trained as medical officers.10 In contrast, most medical enlisted men had little or no prior civilian medical experience. Although Lonnie was to be a “chauffeur” and not a “sanitation man” (then a common term for a medic), the Army required him to have some basic medical training. Ambulance companies officially had a four-week training program consisting of over two hours of drill each morning followed by classroom instruction every afternoon in auto mechanics, nursing, bandaging, first aid, or messages, signals, and general orders.11 Lonnie informed his brother Charles that his first week was “more the life of a school boy than a soldier.”12 Not all his training was so scholastic, however. A nearby field had been transformed into trenches mimicking those on the Western Front, complete with dressing stations and shelters for stretcher bearers. “The barb wire entanglements could be electricly charged to prevent their being cut and believe me any one who could be electricly charged to prevent their bearers. “The barb wire entanglements consists of sterilizing instruments after use on each victim.”15 Finally, on 29 June, Lonnie departed with the 61st Engineers.

“I am happy to know that I am able to be one of the fellows on this train, and I don’t believe that there is one, who is here for a more patriotic stand point,” he opined, “I guess that this is shooting men there pretty fast as I have not been in the Army quite two months.”16 Concurrently, German attacks continued to batter the Allied line in France, but the crisis at the front had already passed even as American soldiers arrived in growing numbers.

Nearly 85 percent of doughboys left for France through ports in or around New York.17 Soldiers traveled in high spirits. Lonnie reported, “The time was passed in Singing and yelling chiefly. About 1130 we were in Cleveland, but I was so sleepy that I nearly put my head out the window and gave one yell and went back to sleep.”14 After fifty-five hours, he disembarked and rode a crowded ferry to Camp Upton passing battleships, the Statue of Liberty, Brooklyn Navy Yards, the interned German passenger liner Vaterland, and the Brooklyn Bridge along the way. On 8 July, after fewer than six days, the 61st Engineers left the port, and not a moment too soon for Lonnie, because, as was true of most embarkation camps, “This is a poor camp and full of vermin.”15 Up to the last minute, he worried about being turned back as unfit for duty. “We have not taken the final examination yet, but I am beginning to feel confident that I will pass as it will now have to be done in such a hurry that they may miss my feet and I have nothing else to fear for.” His imminent departure prompted him to reflect, When we leave the States I realize that we are launching upon the greatest enterprise of our life and must be eqiuped physically, mentally and morally, to survive, all ready I have seen and known of many of the unpleasant incidents of Army life which spell the ruination of a man’s life and I think that I am better prepared for this trip now than I have ever been in my short life, and god helping me will come back a bigger, cleaner stronger boy than the one that you know, or else die that way in a good cause.19

The only record of Lonnie’s voyage was a postcard provided to every soldier when they boarded with the message “The vessel on which I sailed has arrived safely overseas.”20 A peak of 311,359 soldiers embarked overseas in July with a total of 1,600,000 Americans arriving in France between April and November 1918.21

A great number were service troops needed to sustain combat troops in battle. On 10 August, Lonnie disembarked with the 61st Engineers at Brest and they quickly were assigned to Rennes under Base Section No. 5. Initially, the AEF naively had believed the French would supply its forces, but France lacked personnel and rolling stock to supply the Americans, and French railroads were battered. Therefore, the AEF created a service force with the mission “to relieve the combatant field forces from every consideration except that of defeating the enemy.”22 First known as the Lines of Communication, on 9 March 1918,
the AEF reorganized this service force and renamed it the Services of Supply (SOS). The SOS was responsible for the Quartermaster Corps, Medical Department, Engineer Department, Ordnance Department, Signal Corps, Air Service, General Purchasing Board, Gas Service, Construction Department, Transportation Department, Motor Transportation Department, and the Light Railways and Highways Department. By the Armistice, the SOS had 546,596 soldiers and, with the 173,008 troops in supply trains, headquarters, and hospitals with large combat units, comprised nearly 37 percent of the AEF. The SOS divided France into three zones: the advanced section on the front, the intermediate section, and seven base sections (six in France and one in Britain) on the coast. Base sections unloaded and transported the supplies to the intermediate section where they were sorted and sent to the advanced section to be distributed on the front. Base Section No. 5 was the primary point of disembarkation for men and materiel because Brest, which could handle 30,000 troops and 6,000 tons of supplies a day, was the only deepwater port available to the AEF. Rennes was its center of rail operations with a locomotive terminal and repair shops enabling Base Section No. 5 to transport 125,000 troops and 25,000 tons of supplies every month. Lonnie initially drove ambulances for an infirmary in Rennes until 26 September when he was transferred to Laval, a town several hours closer to Paris.

The Allies had launched a massive counteroffensive in August—including an AEF attack at St. Mihiel followed by another at Meuse-Argonne—that steadily drove the German army back along the whole front. On 3 October, Lonnie wrote his mother, “The papers give promising news each morning and some of the fellows are talking about packing up and starting back to avoid the rush.” Indeed, the War Department ordered a secret study on demobilization around this time.

Lonnie’s life in Laval was idyllic. The 61st Engineers maintained a small station in town where railway crews rested and ate. He spent most of his time preparing food for the railway engineers because his small medical detachment, which did not even have an ambulance, had little to do otherwise. Lonnie wrote his uncle, “Your letter sounds like you were writing to some heroic soldier, as for me I am an aristocratic ‘yank’ spending the fall and winter abroad living in a hotel too, fine eats, feather bed, two kinds of water, clean + dirty and congenial company. There are only a few soldiers here (american) but there are a great many Russians . . . As for the war you know a whole lot more about it then I do, I have never heard a rifle shot yet, and it don’t look like I would either.”

Lonnie was fortunate never to experience frontline combat in the trenches.

The reason Laval boasted a large Russian population was complicated. After suffering horrendous casualties in 1914 and 1915, France desperately turned to Russia, believing it had near limitless personnel reserves. It offered French war materiel in exchange for Russian men. Russia had also taken heavy losses, yet was in dire need of arms, so it struck a deal with France. Eventually, Russia sent 43,000 soldiers organized in four brigades to fight for the French: two brigades on the Western Front formed the Russian Expeditionary Force (REF), another traveled to the Salonika Front in Greece, and one more arrived in France but never fought. The REF entered combat in July 1916 and performed satisfactorily, although there were troubling signs of indiscipline and poor morale. News of the Russian Revolution in March 1917 made the situation much worse. After a failed French spring offensive, the REF was pulled off the front in April 1917. However, a brigade rebelled in August 1917 because it had not yet been repatriated to Russia and occupied a town, which resulted in a standoff. Ultimately, reliable Russian soldiers, backed by French troops, disarmed the revolutionary Russian soldiers after a brief battle in September 1917. The Bolshevik revolution in Russia in November 1917, which triggered a civil war, further delayed the REF’s repatriation. Until they could return home, the French gave the Russians a choice to fight, work, or be imprisoned. A few joined the Russian Legion to keep fighting and most agreed to work, but a sizable minority refused either option and were held in internment camps in North Africa. Laval became headquarters for Russian work units laboring across France and a depot for the Russian Legion fighting on the front. Consequently, Russian soldiers were a familiar sight for Lonnie.

The Transportation Department kept railway crews busy by feeding men and materiel into the meat grinder of the Meuse-Argonne, which was fast becoming the largest and bloodiest battle in Army history. The SOS estimated that by the Armistice, the AEF required over fifty-one...
pounds of supplies for each man every day. The War Department dumped supplies into French ports, but according to the SOS chief of staff, the "real neck of the bottle" was shifting supplies from ports to the front. The Transportation Department, soon reorganized into the Transportation Corps, worked under the French State Railway.

The Transportation Corps often clashed with the French State Railway because the French preferred short runs by small trains, and French station masters could sidetrack shipments or keep empty train cars on a whim, but the Americans wanted to make long runs with large trains. Only when more powerful locomotives and additional railcars arrived from the United States could the Transportation Corps realize these plans. Engineers laid 1,002 miles of track, operated 1,667 locomotives, and assembled 19,697 railcars and other rolling stock with parts shipped from the United States before the Armistice. Lonnie watched troop trains pass through Laval. On 18 October he wrote, "I wouldn't trade shoes with anyone just now, but everyone cannot be stationed in Laval and yet they are crazy to get across, 'poor fellows.' I would like to serve my time at the 'front' and their go home, but that does not appear to be my destiny, so I'm content." Lonnie ate well, bought American newspapers, mingled with locals, and volunteered for the local French Red Cross. Although sharing in the same cultural conceit as most doughboys, he developed a relatively enlightened view of France. After an argument with a French interpreter about whether the United States or France was the better country, he wrote, "[A]s far as I'm concerned, this is the Frenchman's country and they are welcome to it, but we need not tear it down because everything here is not as we are accustomed to; nor because they were not strong enough to handle the present situation."

Lonnie felt life had become somewhat monotonous in Laval, but new activity would begin after relentless Allied attacks forced German leaders to agree to a truce.

War-weary France met the Armistice on 11 November with delirious celebrations. Lonnie reported, "The natives here surely are sociable since the eleventh and that date has been celebrated in a manner most appropriate." When official word of the Armistice arrived in Laval after dinner, "In a half hour all the bells were ringing and flags began to appear from every house and building along the street. The crowds started moving in a sort of parade, and the
The deadly illness emerged in Europe. Neutral Spain’s uncensored press first reported the illness, hence its nickname. The AMEDD had anticipated a resurgence of the influenza over the winter and had taken extra precautions, but the flu’s second wave beginning between September and October was far deadlier. It overwhelmed military authorities as one million soldiers, over a quarter of the Army, became ill. The Spanish flu also sickened millions of civilians. Troopships packed with doughboys acted as veritable plague ships, arriving in France with scores dead and hundreds sick. Although 75 percent of those exposed could fight off the disease, the rest became very ill. Few actually died from influenza. Instead, secondary infections, most often pneumonia, usually killed the afflicted. The AMEDD recorded 46,992 soldiers died from the Spanish flu or its complications by the Armistice—only 3,500 fewer deaths than in battle. All combatant armies suffered similarly. Many hundreds of thousands of civilians also succumbed to the Spanish flu in the United States and Europe, not to mention more victims across the rest of the globe. Fortunately, Lonnie’s sister Lucy recovered.

While the AMEDD fought the Spanish flu, the War Department hurried to plan for demobilization. Of 4,178,172 mobilized soldiers, 2,810,296, or 67 percent, were draftees known as “emergency men” who had to be sent home immediately. Most of the rest were volunteers (fewer than 300,000 soldiers were prewar regulars or national guardsmen), but even volunteers expected to be discharged as soon as possible. Moreover, families at home demanded the soldiers’ rapid return. The War Department considered four criteria for demobilization: length of service, occupation, locality, and unit. The first three options would have separated soldiers as individuals, which would have required experienced personnel, extensive paperwork, and time. Additionally, most soldiers had been overseas less than six months. Holding men arbitrarily based on occupation was likely to cause tensions, and local draft boards lacked uniformity. Finally, separating soldiers individually would hollow out divisions that needed to remain militarily effective just in case the Armistice collapsed and fighting resumed in Germany. Thus, the War Department decided to demobilize by unit because it was simple, discharged a broad cross section of men, and kept combat divisions intact. Regular Army divisions, which had many draftees, would be the last to demobilize. On November 16, the War Department announced its decision to the public and started to demobilize 1,500,000 men in the United States and 2,000,000 men in France in the following order: casuals (unassigned soldiers); surplus or special service troops; troops in England; Air Service personnel; troops in Italy; combat divisions; and finally, SOS troops. Releasing soldiers in the United States (who usually were near home already) was simple, but coordinating AEF soldiers’ return across the ocean was much more difficult. France no longer gave priority to troop trains and the British stopped providing troopships.

Brest became the main port of embarkation as Base Section No. 5 threw its railroad operations into reverse. Soon trains passed through Laval going the opposite direction. On 24 November, Lonnie reported that, “The wounded soldiers are on their way home now, and the idea that they are on their way back to America is better than medicine, and makes them forget their aches and pains. Some of the fellows are in pretty bad condition but they all smile and joke with us, when we’re at the depot.” He often had the chance to listen to the Russian band in Laval. “I am always meeting someone who speaks English. Yesterday I met a Russian who speaks six different languages. I didn’t suppose that one of those big overgrown creatures could be so intelligent.” Not all doughboys kept going west. On 11 December, Lonnie complained, “This town
is ruined now, and there are going to be thousands of soldiers stationed here, the first train of several is to arrive here to-day, and then goodbye old Laval; but then I supposed I shouldn’t feel selfish and try to feel bad over spilt milk.” His medical company in Rennes finally received an ambulance “now that the war is over and the ‘flu’ well in control, so I am not going to leave here on my own efforts to try and drive it, and anyway its only a ford.” The new arrivals did not impress Lonnie. “Well, they are in now and everybody in Laval knows it too. I hate to criticize any bunch of US soldiers that have been thru the mill at the front, and have acquitted themselves so well, when I have never even heard a gun crack; but such an uncivilized lot of troops I never saw. Our little town is ‘ruin’ . . . The French tho’t that if we were a sample of american soldiers, why, bring on a whole division, we were often asked when the soldiers would be here, now they ask ‘when will they go?’”

Such attitudes were not limited to Laval. Franco-American relations cooled after the Armistice as resentment grew on both sides. The French saw Americans as troublesome and Americans perceived the French as ungrateful. Nevertheless, when President Woodrow Wilson’s train passed through Laval on the way to the Paris Peace Conference, he received an enthusiastic welcome. On 27 December, Lonnie wrote, “My first Christmas away from home, but it was far better than some had, I know.” After Christmas dinner with his mates, he had an “engagement with a little friend” and attended a concert by the Russian band. “The leader of the band, before the war, was the first violinist with the Moscow opera orchestra, so you know the band is worth hearing.” The Army also provided a present. “On the 10th of Jan we are entitled to a service stripe for six months service, but it seems like six years sometimes. Of late however time has been on wings.”

Although time flew, Lonnie remained rooted in place.

Railway crews were vital to demobilization, so the 61st Engineers would be among the last to leave France, and Lonnie would stay to support their mission. On 7 January, after driving back from Rennes where he had seen a minstrel show and attended a boxing match on New Year’s Eve, he broke the news to his mother, “The best I have to tell, is that the present outlook for the near future, is very promising not for a homecoming but for existence in France . . . An outfit operating on a [railway]y cannot be relieved every so often like an outfit at the front, for it takes time to get crews accustomed to a road and everything working smoothly. And now there is as much or more traffic then there ever has been; with troops and material coming back from the front.” The Transportation Corps reorganized rail operations along the same lines as in the United States and the 61st Engineers’ three companies were assigned to the 16th Grand Division. Laval became even more crowded. Lonnie complained, “My worst troubles at present is that a couple of American officers are trying to crowd in and get a house where they have no business.” The spike in the number of troops meant military police (MP) appeared in the town for the first time. “This town is now so full of M.P.s that they make life a misery for some . . . One M.P.
came inside and tried to make one fellow put his coat on. Oh the place is ‘getting good.’”

Unsurprisingly, discipline began to slip during demobilization, especially as soldiers had plenty of free time. The AEF focused on training after the Armistice, but faced resistance from doughboys. The French had asked for American help to begin rebuilding regions devastated by war, but AEF commander General John J. Pershing argued this would delay demobilization. He said inadequately prepared troops should use the time to train in case fighting resumed. And the American public would not tolerate soldiers being used as laborers.

On 30 January, Pershing arrived in Laval on his special train. “The automobiles were unloaded and the A.E.F. commander went out to review some of his fighting forces which are soon to be returning home. The French put out a great display of flags but there were few who saw ‘Jack’ as he was on a purely business trip. The 61st has the honor of furnishing the engine crew which pulled him from here to Rennes and that is worth mentioning,” Lonnie wrote.

Soldiers resented the training, especially combat veterans who felt they had little to learn. There were limits to how much soldiers could train, so the AEF began organizing sports, vocational training, education, and liberal leave to keep troops occupied until they boarded trains for a port.

Meanwhile, a third wave of influenza struck North America and Europe between December 1918 and April 1919, peaking in February when Lonnie himself got sick. On 7 February, he wrote two letters—one telling his mother he “had a severe cold,” and another informing his sister “I am recovering from an attack of the gripe and have not been out side until the last day or so.” On 25 February he reported, “The ‘flu’ is raging here as bad or worse than ever before, but since I have just recovered I do not feel in any danger myself. Two of our family [we are billeted with] are sick now and I have to do some extra work.” This outbreak seemed particularly cruel as it killed many soldiers who had survived terrible battles. The news of these deaths in France added to growing public outcry in the United States about the perceived slowness of demobilization.

In the same letter, Lonnie recorded that a handful of railway engineers had volunteered for six months’ service in Russia. The Allies had chosen to intervene in the Russian Civil War to guard stocks of Allied war materiel and rescue the Czechoslovak Legion, a force consisting of captured Austro-Hungarian troops recruited to fight for the Allies, who became stranded in Russia. In August 1918, the first of 9,000 soldiers who had been stationed in the Philippines landed in Far East Russia at Vladivostok and seized part of the Trans-Siberian Railway in an attempt to reach the Czechoslovak Legion from the east. In September 1918, another 5,000 AEF soldiers in North Russia disembarked in Archangelsk and joined Allied and White Russian forces trying to link up with the Czechoslovak Legion from the west. The morale of the AEF in North Russia deteriorated during the winter. Some troops nearly mutinied. The AEF never did connect with the Czech Legion before leaving North Russia in August 1919. The AEF in Siberia remained to evacuate the Czech Legion and supply the White Russians until April 1920. As such, the AEF needed railroad engineers to operate the Trans-Siberian Railway. The 61st Engineers was a likely unit from which to recruit, as Lonnie boasted, “[S]ince the armistice was signed we have hauled 40,000 more troops to port of embarkation then all the other regiments in France put together, besides train after train load of freight. We have the best record of any outfit; and all the single engine crews are to be transferred to the army in Russia.” In actuality, only eight engineers left the 61st Engineers for Russia.
Lonnie now received a request to return to Rennes but was reluctant to leave Laval. He had grown comfortable where he was and had a local girlfriend. He had befriended a widowed Belgian Red Cross nurse and become close with her 18-year-old daughter Odette, who was a stenographer for a French colonel. He wrote his sister, "She is a good girl in every sense of the word which makes her an exception here. She is pretty and a girl who would not be shaded, even in the States." He claimed he had no desire to marry her "by choice or otherwise," although he admitted he had been angry when "Madame" had earlier informed him marriage was out of the question. Lonnie was also now the acting mess sergeant, although three recommendations for his promotion were ignored because the medical detachment already had enough noncommissioned officers. As he waited to find out if the request would become an order to return to Rennes, he began fantasizing about traveling elsewhere. On 2 March he wrote his mother "No I have not taken my furlough yet and will not while the flu is raging. Later I am planning a trip to Paris and all other principal cities of France and then go to Italy. I had tho't of going to England but since I cannot go on into Scotland will go to Italy instead." Although uninterested in going to Russia, he informed his sister, "P.S. I am considering going to Turkey for six months, keep it quiet tho." The Army had begun looking for volunteers for six months service in the former Ottoman Empire because of ongoing negotiations in Paris. Allied peacemakers debated what to do with territories previously ruled by now defunct empires. Rather than annexation or colonialization, they agreed upon mandates. A mandate was a territory considered unready for self-rule that would be administered by an Allied power in trusteeship until they...
deemed it ready for independence. There was talk of creating a U.S. mandate in Armenia. A military fact-finding mission was dispatched in August 1919, but it came to nothing. Lonnie’s plans to travel to other countries never bore fruit either.

Instead, seen off by the railway detachment in Laval, and after receiving a photo from Odette, Lonnie went “home to roost” in Rennes on 24 March. On the same day, the War Department issued a bulletin again outlining its demobilization plan and asking for patience from the public as anger over alleged Army incompetence had reached a fever pitch. Lonnie quickly settled into his new surroundings in Rennes. “Well since writing last I have a new job, am now working in the Infirmary offices, making out all reports etc. If I was a better typest it would be easy but it takes time for me. It is good work tho’ for I have a chance to use and renew my own dead brains.”

Rennes was much larger than Laval with many more Americans and had a large Young Men’s Christian Association (YMCA) building.

The AEF had decided at the war’s start it would not try to operate canteens and stores to sell refreshments, sundries, cigarettes, and other items to soldiers. Instead, the Quartermaster Department signed a contract with the YMCA to set up a system of hotels, restaurants, officer and enlisted clubs, and leave centers. The YMCA operated facilities in France like a business, charging soldiers a minimal fee for services, but at the same time it solicited donations from the public in the United States on behalf of soldiers. Many soldiers grew to hate the “Damn Y,” accusing it of price gouging, selling donated goods, evangelizing too much, and most gallingly to combat veterans, deceiving the public at home through a publicity campaign—including posed photographs—that claimed YMCA workers risked their lives providing charity at the front when the YMCA’s activities were in fact restricted to rear areas.

Other welfare organizations like the Knights of Columbus, Jewish Welfare Board, and the Salvation Army were much smaller, but passed out their goods for free. In addition, their workers often were close to the front. Combat troops cherished these groups. By the Armistice, the YMCA had 4,444 workers with the AEF compared to Knights of Columbus’ 1,019, Jewish Welfare Board’s 129, and the Salvation Army’s 134; only the American Red Cross exceeded the YMCA with 5,601 personnel, but not all were assigned to the AEF. The YMCA’s mission became even more important after the fighting was over and expanded to 6,430 workers by April 1919.

In his letters, Lonnie, a soldier with the SOS far to the rear, did not curse the “Damn Y,” like troops with the combat arms, but praised the “Y” for its efforts. Despite all the hustle and bustle of the YMCA in Rennes, Lonnie felt isolated away from his comrades and friends in Laval. “I surely do get lonesome in this town, as I have no place to go and nothing in particular to do when off work,” he wrote on 1 April. With the coming of spring, the Army threw demobilization into high gear, requiring long hours from railway crews. As a result, bottlenecks quickly developed. On 10 April, the 42d Division began passing through Rennes, “Everything is delayed and way behind schedule, wait-wait-wait is all they know.” Lonnie reported railway crews worked 13–30 hours without rest and with little food for $33 a month when they could be earning $150–$200 at home. This caused anger and even protests. “On some of the engines, they have written ‘The $1.10-line’ or ‘Mush and Bacon Route.’ Our fellow in Le Mans got a heavy sentence, for writing this on his engine, ‘We’ve paid out debt to old Lafayette, who th’ hell, we working for now?’” The Army’s precipitous demobilization still did not seem quick enough for many soldiers.

On 19 April, Lonnie finally had some news about the 61st Engineers’ departure. “Word has been received concerning our schedual of work here where we have five more divisions to haul but then we will have to wait our turn on the shipping list.” Periodically, a French airplane doing stunts over his camp would lift his spirits. “I have seen numerous planes since being in France but the novelty hasn’t worn off of watching them.” He and a few others began attending a class taught by a medical officer at an AEF school established in Rennes. “Our classes include a little study of medicine and physiology, but then they are an absolute farce as no one takes any interest.” On his own, Lonnie
practiced algebra “to remove some of the rust off the wheels of the attic, but the wheels were almost past being moved. It took me a half day to extract the cube root of a little number. A person in the army on most of the work, never uses his mind, if he does + acts on it, it usually brings him to grief.”

He hoped to arrive home in time to begin at Purdue University in the fall. Others had a similar desire, and 10,000 veterans received permission to attend universities in France and Britain. The AEF University in Beaune had enrolled over 13,000 students by May 1919, but nearly all left before finishing a term. Fighting boredom in Rennes, Lonnie jumped at a chance to visit Paris.

Paris drew doughboys like moths to a flame, even though they had to obtain leave and pay their own way. Between January and March 1919, 118,920 soldiers visited the City of Light, and many more followed in subsequent months while awaiting their turn to train to ports for home, including Lonnie. On May 11, he wrote his mother, “It isn’t often I come to Paris, that I can write letters on Mother’s day, but this is one exception.” The YMCA had six different trips designed to cover the greatest number of points of interest over three days. These trips are by train, truck, subway and a little walking. Unless a person is acquainted with the city he would be foolish to not go under the instructions of the ‘Y’—for they are competent guides and explain it all.”

Although impressed by the beauty of Paris, Lonnie saw it as old and backward compared to the modern cities at home. “When it comes to comparison between Paris + any of our large cities, it is out of the question, American cities are devoted to commerce + Paris to art, each has the other only as a side issue. All ready I have seen and heard more than I can possibly remember. Every foot of ground has a book full of history. One fully modern piece of improvement is the subway here, it is wonderful, fare 3¢ + a cavalry minute.” He visited the Latin Quarter, Versailles, the Louvre, and the Paris Opera House. He took two YMCA tours by truck or boat before hiring a taxi to drive him around the city, including a stop to see Odette’s family home. "Believe me a person don’t get any rest, when he undertakes to see this place in three days.”

Like all soldiers who visited, Lonnie received a flyer with guidelines about proper dress and behavior plus a card with instructions on where to find a prophylactic station on one side and a map to the central one across from the Opera House on the reverse side. Venereal disease (VD) was common but kept under control in the AEF. Beginning in July.
1917, the AEF’s anti-VD campaign focused on education and punishment. Soldiers were lectured on sexually transmitted disease and instructed that it was their patriotic duty to avoid getting VD. Additionally, instead of adopting officially sanctioned brothels like the French, the AEF erected fences around camps and put “houses of tolerance” out of bounds. The YMCA established leave centers in isolated resort towns in the countryside, and Paris was even off limits for soldiers on leave during the war. Soldiers were subjected to semimonthly inspections and if found with VD had to forfeit pay. The Army relied heavily on prophylaxis during the war, but following the Armistice, the fear of being interned in a venereal segregation camp instead of going home discouraged many men from sowing their wild oats. Lonnie held other soldiers who contracted VD in contempt.

He found Rennes a hive of activity upon his return on 15 May. “Word has been received here that this organization will stay here to help transport the army of occupation to Brest. That means 600 trains of troops alone besides the equipment if we get home by Christmas we will be lucky; altho’ preparation are being made to handle ten train trains per day or a total of about eighteen, war times never were like this, and we can handle the troops over this road alone, faster than all their Transports put to gether can haul away.” Embarkation camps outside ports were soon overcrowded with soldiers waiting for ships. To make up for lost British troopships, the Navy added more berths, galleys, and washrooms to its vessels, converted cargo ships into troopships, used surrendered German ocean liners, and even pressed warships into service as troopships.

After finishing paperwork for the day, Lonnie went on walks in the countryside, purloined an ambulance for joyrides once a week working, and boxed. Boxing was the most popular sport in the AEF. A mania for boxing had developed among soldiers because officers believed it encouraged aggressiveness and enlisted men saw it as epitomizing masculinity. Lonnie begged his family to send him proper boxing gloves after he accidently broke a comrade’s nose during practice, stating: “I hated the accident very much.” Lonnie’s sense of isolation in Rennes had dissipated as he made new friends with whom he went on long walks, eventually visiting at least eleven towns in the surrounding countryside. On 21 May he wrote, “As far as hardships and the horrors of war—I don’t know anymore about that then I ever did my life during this ten months so far has been a big vacation. No work much practically my own boss when compared to fellows in other organizations. I have certainly have had + am having some mighty good times over here.” He spent a week working in the dispensary for a sergeant who was on leave. Lonnie seemed reconciled to the fact he was not leaving France soon. “The only thing that remains to do is wait and occupy the time best as possible.” Nevertheless, the declining quality of the 61st Engineers bothered him. “There has been so many changes transfers etc in the personal of this organization that only about half the original men remain. Other men who have been Court Martialed and sentenced to labor battalions are assigned to this outfit.” Lonnie began feeling that remaining in France was a form of punishment.

Lonnie’s angst grew as the Army continually delayed the 61st Engineers’ departure. He was not alone. Most enlisted men directed their anger about being stuck in France not at the officers, who were in the same boat, but at Frenchmen, whom they believed were cheats out to rob the Americans after having saved France. Many doughboys believed rumors that France had charged the United States rent for American soldiers to use French trenches during the fighting. The French had their own negative opinions of the Americans and sometimes tensions exploded. On 4 June, after American soldiers accused by French police of shooting a civilian were not punished, a “big free for all fight” broke out in Rennes.

“I don’t know how many ‘frogs’ were injured but we have five men in quarters to-day as a result, one man has a bad cut with a knife another has his chin bones all beaten up where they had kicked him. The french don’t fight with their hands but use their feet like savages, the other fellows are just ‘banged up’ in general. Every american can lick five of them so I figures there must be over a couple dozen of natives layed up with various injuries.”

Concurrently, a strike in Paris was slowing the 7th Division’s arrival in Rennes on its way to Brest. France’s 1914 Union sacrée, or “Sacred Union,” declaring solidarity regardless of class, religion, politics, or gender, had started fracturing under wartime pressures. French solidarity dissipated after the Armistice, and strikes became increas-ingly common in 1919, further hampering American demobilization.

On 13 June, the AEF’s spirits lowered once again when Stars and Stripes, a popular newspaper for soldiers, printed its final issue. “[T]he fellows feel like they were being deserted by their best friends, am sending a copy under second cover. It states that only one fourth of the A.E.F. is left at June 10th but it forgot to state anything definite concerning, about a dozen homesick lads here which form the enlisted personnel of the Med. Detch. Rennes.” Insult was added to injury as it had been announced some engineers were leaving, reducing the 61st Engineers’ companies to skeletons, but the medical detachment would remain. Lonnie claimed, “Rennes will be nothing less then a venereal camp.”
what I have seen here I think the fellow who came over here and goes back as good as he comes, is more entitled to a D.S.C. [Distinguished Service Cross] then some of those at the front.”

Perhaps his bad mood explains why he got in a fight. “The trouble by a lad saying that a frog’s a frog, their all alike. This led on and on to a couple of raps on the chin. My fist is a little sore but I won the argument anyway. I sure was mad. I would have stepped in his face if he said another word,” he smugly wrote his sister.

Less happily, he calculated the 61st Engineers had at least sixty more days of work. On 20 June, he reported finally putting his driving skills to good use transporting ambulances from Rennes to Camp de Coëtquidan to be shipped back to the United States, but otherwise, “The general attitude of the personnel of the camp [in Rennes] is, ‘I don’t give a dam’ and many of them are sure living up to it. This sure is some Army.”

A week later there was a riot in camp. “This certainly is a sick bunch around here to-day and last night they nearly tore the barracks down.

Shoes, mess kits, scoop shovels, cases of Jam + corned ‘willie’ [beef], ball bats and stove pips filled the air for over a half hour. One fellow got knocked over by stopping a can of corned ‘willie’ on his head. The Guard house is so full that the men sleep in shifts of eight hours and work sixteen.”

Lonnie was more accepting of his lot as he had occasion to drive the roads, ride the trains, and visit Odette and “Mamma” (as he now fondly called her mother) in Laval, but he too ached to go home to his real sister and mother. The French tried to force the Americans to divert troop trains from the main railway line to Brest to make room for passenger trains, but, as Lonnie testily wrote on 30 June, “The Americans won’t listen to them because of the loss of time + extra work it will mean. The French never said haul the troops that way a year ago, they certainly seem to have short memories.”

The same day, the AEF school in Rennes, composed of 130 students and faculty, packed up and left. A peak of 314,167 men landed in the United States in June, and a total of 2.7 million soldiers had already been discharged.

After combatants signed the Treaty of Versailles on 28 June, the AEF started sending home the Army of Occupation. Over 250,000 soldiers had stayed with the Third Army occupying the Coblenz bridgehead on the Rhine River in Germany ready to attack with other Allied armies if the peace negotiations collapsed. After celebrating 4 July with ice cream, lemonade, and waffles with “Y girls” visiting from St. Malo, Lonnie wrote, “Well you are all mistaken about me getting home this summer—It is true most all will be home by July 30 and for a while we had some hopes, but the 1st train of the Army of Occupation...
went thru’ this morning. Seven divisions of them to haul. The best we can expect now is during the first half of September.” The Army of Occupation quickly shrunk to 16,000 soldiers. Meanwhile, Lonnie worked during the day doing paperwork or driving ambulances, went on walks each evening, and often saw shows or films at the YMCA at night. On average, the 61st Engineers moved three troop trains a day through Rennes, and because he knew 105 troop trains were scheduled, he finally had an end in sight. A complication was the unknown number of freight trains that also had to be transported, Lonnie reported, “There is train after train load of salvage equipment being hauled over the road. What even can be sold here is disposed of in that way, but there is a great amount to be carried back to the States.” On 11 July, Lonnie wrote that the New York Herald reported in a recent issue that all troops should return from France by November, but he still hoped to get home sooner.

In the meantime, Rennes suddenly had more than enough to do because “the entertainment side of Army life is now coming to the front as all the troops are nearly gone.” A dance was held weekly with YMCA girls from St. Malo, with a new group each week to ensure no inappropriate relationships blossomed. Lonnie noticed, “Since we started hauling the A of O [Army of Occupation] I notice a great change in our meals, at least for the present we are being fed much better than at any time I been at Rennes.” He also received another six-month service stripe for overseas duty, one of few doughboys who did. Life was good. On 28 July, Lonnie reported he had “a glorious week.” It began with “a big fete” between American and French athletes centering on a boxing match. “I drove the Ambulance up + had bandages, litters etc but didn’t have to use anything + sat best seat in the house.” He followed this with the usual YMCA dance. Finally, Lonnie won a coin toss for a spot with a group of soldiers going to tour battlefields across France. “Only two of us medics were allowed to go as the train could not accommodate all who wanted to go.” The nine-day excursion was a welcome adventure.

Lonnie finally saw something of the front. The soldiers took a train stopping in Le Mans for a day before continuing to Paris. After pausing in Paris they went on to spend a whole day at Belleau Wood where the AEF had halted a German attack in June 1918. Then the group headed to Reims. “[T]he city is one mass of ruins. The cathedral is not beyond repairs if there is any archetects in the world who are willing to spend the time in doing the work. It may take a hundred yrs and will cost between 20 + 30 million dollars.” They also visited a French fort that had been captured by the Germans and toured the German lines, guided by a German prisoner of war, marveling at the underground shelters. The next stop was Verdun. There the French and German armies had slaughtered each other between February and December 1916. They toured the French forts and trenches. Then the group traveled to “the great American battlefront” of St. Mihiel, walking the ground where the AEF won its first independent victory in September 1918. A tour of a German fort followed. News that the 3d and 5th Divisions were departing reached the tour group causing it to turn back instead of continuing into
Germany. Finally, on the way back, “We visited the great store houses + Gievers which also has the largest R[ailwa]y yards in the world + other points of interest of S.O.S.” When they arrived in Rennes, they discovered the major Lonnie worked with had been ordered home, so they quickly wrapped up accounts and transferred military property before parting ways. Once so proud of wearing a uniform, Lonnie now looked forward to shedding it for good. On 12 August, he claimed, “I have realized ever since I joined the Army, that by nature I was never intended for a soldier anyway.”

Soon after, it was his turn to join the troops traveling westward to Brest. The 61st Engineers decamped from Rennes on 24 August, but although the need for railway crews had lessened, the demand for medical personnel at embarkation ports had grown. Most of Lonnie’s medical detachment was sent to Camp Pontanézen, the main embarkation camp, but he and three others were sent to Camp de la Rampe in Brest itself. “The camp overlooks the docks + we see all the ships leave, it sure is tough. The worst of it is there is no telling when we’ll get out now perhaps not for some time.” On 1 September, General Pershing and his staff, along with their wives, boarded the USS Leviathan bound for the United States, and the AEF was disbanded. Lonnie saved a copy of the ship’s manifest with Pershing’s name as a souvenir.

The remaining Army forces were organized into American Forces in France (AFF) and American Forces in Germany (AFG). The embarkation camps in France were depressing places notorious for being muddy and filthy. Additionally, strict discipline and repeated equipment and medical inspections frustrated soldiers. If one soldier had lice, the whole unit would be held back for delousing. Anyone caught with VD was transferred to a venereal segregation camp. Troops returning home complained of being treated like cattle in disease-ridden camps, prompting a visit by the secretary of war to head off a congressional investigation. Seemingly arbitrary decisions of who stayed or left did not help morale as troops bounced between camps.

On 9 September, Lonnie recorded that he had been transferred to Camp Gambette because the French were reclaiming control of Camp de la Rampe. “I have been talking my head off trying to get sent home, on account of school, and can convince everyone except those who can send me . . . If we have to say in Brest ‘til the last it will be in Feb. Don’t that sound cheerful.” Over the next few weeks, his group of medics was transferred to four different camps, “nothing but casuals just getting kicked from pillar to post,” until he and another man were assigned to the dock dispensary verifying officers’ medical records before embarkation. The rest were sent to Camp Pontanézen, or a nearby venereal segregation camp. “I am always more fortunate then some anyway. I can at least be thankful Im not out at that camp . . . Now that I have been held so long + have cooled down a little I can almost be happy in my present surrounding. Congenial work, + practically no restrictions when off duty.”

On 27 September, he estimated 20,000 to 30,000 men still awaited transport, 5,000 more under guard for being absent without
leave, and 3,500 “Venereals.” Troopships left weekly, steadily reducing the U.S. population in Brest. “As fast as soldiers are relieved here, then places are being filled with French civilians, girls + women mostly because they are the best workers,” Lonnie reported. He had given up hope in arriving back in the United States in time for school, but still hoped to be home for the holidays.

Lonnie could not wait to leave France, but he also was concerned about conditions in the United States that he read about in papers and heard about from re-enlisted Americans arriving in Brest. After the Armistice, Congress had required the Army to discharge all soldiers enlisted after the United States went to war, regardless of any desire to remain, but on 28 February 1919, Congress altered this policy and allowed troops to volunteer to stay with the AFF or AFG and men discharged in the United States to re-enlist. On 7 October, Lonnie informed his sister that all the medics would finally be returning that month and soldiers interned in the venereal segregation camp were being sent home as quickly as possible, “[A]fter they are gone it will not be a disgrace to be held over here, as it is now.” He was shocked by the high prices of goods in the United States. “There are many American Civilians here who returned because of no work in the States, the stories they tell of our land of liberty are not very complementary. The after effects of this war will be worse than the war itself on a great many people, no doubt the country will be flooded with idle people for some time.” The situation in France was not good either, and fights between workers and marine guards in Brest broke out at night, often resulting in dead and wounded. French workers went on strike the next week resulting in a curfew and other restrictions as workers and police battled in the streets. On 16 October, Lonnie wrote, “The restrictions were raised here to-day since the strikers have gone back to work. The strikes have been causing riots, breaking windows looting etc. One soldier + two officers were killed during the past week and I don’t know how many frogs. No one has been allowed out of Quarters after 6:30 PM. Even the MPs were called in. We carried rifles when we went to the ‘Y’ for our meals. It was necessary to keep two men on nights in order to seal up + bandage the victims.” This would be Lonnie’s last letter from France.

He was transferred to Camp Pontanézen on October 22 and soon boarded a ship for America. Only 8,000 soldiers remained with the AFF to finish transferring records and shipping materiel to the United States and turn over depots to the French. Most of these troops would board ships by December. Finally, on 8 January 1920, the last soldiers left, and the AFF was disbanded. Approximately 1,000,000 soldiers, or about half the AEF, had embarked at Brest before Base Section No. 5 closed. The Army’s demobilization was finished, although a token occupation force of 6,000 men remained with the AFG until 27 January 1923.

Lonnie’s wartime experience encapsulates that of many men, whether service or combat troops, who were rushed through training, hurried to France, and then were just as quickly sent back to the United States. Many Americans expected a return to “normalcy” after the interruption of World War I.

Lonnie arrived home in Indiana in time for Christmas 1919. He found a job as an assistant cashier at Farmers & Traders...
State Bank. Later, after attending a special course in agriculture at Purdue University, he became an employee of the Chicago Produce Commission Association. He soon married Maude Evelyn Minch, born 28 October 1896, and together they had a daughter who was their only child. Lonnie later moved his family to Mission, Texas, to cultivate grapefruit. After this enterprise failed, he became a bookkeeper. Lonnie was a captain in the Texas State Guard in 1943 during World War II. Later, he and his wife moved to Albuquerque, New Mexico, where Lonnie continued a career as a bookkeeper. He remained an avid outdoorsman throughout his life. Maude died on 9 November 1984. Lonnie passed away on 6 November 1992 in Lubbock, Texas.

The Army successfully balanced the need for combat-ready forces in Europe in case the Armistice broke down and the demand of families and congress to send soldiers home “toot sweet.” Although many soldiers and thus, their families and congressmen, complained about the supposedly indifferent, inefficient, and slow process of demobilization, the Army’s decision to demobilize by units was remarkably fair, efficient, and fast. In fact, demobilization was too fast and too complete in the Army’s opinion, especially as Germany still needed to be occupied and Russia remained in chaos. The Army wanted a much larger peacetime force of 500,000 soldiers. Congress traditionally disliked the idea of a large standing army and did not want to bear the costs of supporting one. It also doubted enough volunteers could be recruited to maintain one, so it favored only a slightly enlarged force of 225,000 soldiers. The American public concurred.

The Army’s recruiting campaign beginning in March 1920 failed, fulfilling less than a third of its goal, and by June it only had 177,974 men. The National Defense Act of 1920, passed on 4 June, rejected the idea of universal military training, enhanced the National Guard and Reserve, and set a goal for an all-volunteer force of 280,000 soldiers. The Army never came close to recruiting that many men during the interwar years. The United States had already withdrawn all its soldiers from Russia by this point and within a few years brought home troops from Germany, further lessening the need for men to fulfill America’s commitments abroad. The Army’s demobilization after World War I continued America’s venerable tradition of reverting to a small frontier constabulary after having mobilized a large army for a major war.

**Dr. Grant T. Harward** graduated with a Ph.D. in history from Texas A&M University in 2018 where he focused on modern European war and society. He is an alumnus of the Fulbright U.S. Student Program and is working on a book about the Romanian Army and the Holocaust. For the last two years, he has worked for the U.S. Army—first as a graduate research assistant at the U.S. Army Center of Military History and currently as a historian at the U.S. Army Medical Department Center of History and Heritage.

**EDITOR’S NOTE**

The quotes from Private Reed’s letters are reproduced as they were written, with original spelling, punctuation, and capitalization.

**NOTES**

1. Ltr, Pvt Alonzo E. Reed Jr. (Lonnie) to Mary E. Reed (Mother), 2 Feb 1919, Box 1, Folder 2, Pvt Alonzo E. Reed Jr Collection, AMEDD Center of History and Heritage, Archival Repository, Joint Base San Antonio–Fort–Sam Houston, Texas. (Hereinafter, AMEDD CHH Archives).
5. Ltr, Lonnie to Alonzo E. Reed (Father), 4 May 1918, Box 1, Folder 5, AMEDD CHH Archives.
6. Ltr, Lonnie to Lucy Reed (Sister), 16 May 1918, Box 1, Folder 6, AMEDD CHH Archives.
7. Ltr, Lonnie to Mother, 15 May 1918, Box 1, Folder 2, AMEDD CHH Archives.
8. Ltr, Lonnie to Father, 8 May 1918, Box 1, Folder 5, AMEDD CHH Archives.
10. Ibid., p. 25.
12. Ltr, Lonnie to Charles F. Reed (Brother), 17 May 1918, Box 2, Folder 1, AMEDD CHH Archives.
13. Ltr, Lonnie to Mother, 18 May 1918, Box 1, Folder 2, AMEDD CHH Archives.
14. Ltr, Lonnie to Sister, 24 May 1918, Box 1, Folder 6, AMEDD CHH Archives.
15. Ltr, Lonnie to Mother, 8 Jun 1918, Box 1, Folder 2, AMEDD CHH Archives.
16. Ltr, Lonnie to Mother, 30 Jun 1918, Box 1, Folder 2, AMEDD CHH Archives.
18. Ltr, Lonnie to Mother, 2 Jul 1918, Box 1, Folder 2, AMEDD CHH Archives.
19. Ltr, Lonnie to Mother, 8 Jul 1918, Box 1, Folder 2, AMEDD CHH Archives.
21. Ibid., p. 44.
23. Ibid., p. 129.
25. Ibid., p. 44.
27. Ltr, Lonnie to Mother, 3 Oct 1918, Box 1, Folder 2, AMEDD CHH Archives.
29. Ltr, Lonnie to E. L. Smith (Uncle), 9 Oct 1918, Box 2, Folder 3, AMEDD CHH Archives.
32. Ibid., pp. 258–59.
American Amphibious Warfare: The Roots of Tradition to 1865
By Gary J. Ohls
Naval Institute Press, 2017
Pp. xxiv, 274. $39.95

Review by Nathan A. Marzoli

When students of American military history think of amphibious warfare, they most likely picture iconic images of Marines bogged down in the black volcanic sands of Iwo Jima, or the soldiers of the 1st Infantry Division wading ashore at Omaha Beach under the brutal fire of German machine guns. In his new book, American Amphibious Warfare: The Roots of Tradition to 1865, published as part of the New Perspectives on Maritime History and Nautical Archaeology Series, Gary Ohls argues that contrary to being revolutionary in nature, the widespread use of amphibious warfare by the United States during World War II in both Europe and the Pacific was instead the culmination of nearly 200 years of American military tradition and practices.

Ohls, a thirty-six year veteran of the U.S. Marine Corps and recently retired professor of Joint Maritime Operations at the Naval Postgraduate School, believes “the art of amphibious warfare has deep roots in early American military and naval tradition,” which was then “raised to an especially high level of proficiency” during the twentieth century (p. xiii). Therefore, a study of early American amphibious operations (defined as “a military operation launched from the sea by an amphibious force, embarked in ships of craft with the primary purpose of introducing a landing force ashore to accomplish an assigned mission”) fills a gap in the historiography of naval and military warfare, and also demonstrates how these early operations contributed to the nation’s “rich amphibious tradition” (p. 1). But Ohls also clarifies that early American amphibious operations were not necessarily like those of World War II; in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, it was actually preferable to land unopposed and maneuver into an advantageous position against the enemy force. In other words, amphibious operations were not always assault landings, such as on D-Day.

American Amphibious Warfare is structured into seven chapters that are individual case studies: the New York Campaign of 1776; from New York to the end of the Revolutionary War, with an emphasis on Yorktown; the Barbary Wars; the War of 1812; the Mexican-American War, with a focus on the conquest of California and Winfield Scott’s landing at Veracruz; and the Union assaults on Fort Fisher in December 1864 and January 1865. In addition to these seven core chapters, Ohls includes a brief introduction that focuses on amphibious operations by British and colonial American forces during King George’s War and the French and Indian War.

Within each chapter, Ohls provides historical context for the main case study. This may include other relevant amphibious operations or land and naval battles. For example, Ohls believes that to fully understand the New York Campaign of 1776, it is important to first reference the operations at Bunker Hill and Boston earlier that year; or for the reader to comprehend the actions of the Barbary Wars from 1801 to 1815, one must first learn about the Quasi War with France. Although this context is welcome and helps the narrative flow between the separate case studies, readers might occasionally find themselves forgetting they were studying an amphibious operation in the first place.

Ohls also uses current military concepts in his analysis of each operation. Although not formalized into doctrine until recently, he argues that many of these concepts were factors in the earliest American amphibious operations and are therefore useful in conducting any study. For example, the modern terms “joint” (used to label an operation that involves more than one service of a single nation) and “combined” (describes an operation that involves the services of multiple nations) can be used to describe the 1781 Battle of Yorktown because it involved both U.S. Army and Navy units, as well as French forces. Ohls also analyzes these historical operations using a set of principles called the “characteristics of amphibious warfare,” which exist in current Department of Defense doctrine. The author believes these four characteristics—integration between the Navy and landing force, rapid buildup of combat power from the sea to shore, task-organized forces capable of a range of missions, and unity of effort and operational coherence—“are useful in evaluating the effectiveness of amphibious operations, and they help to explain success or failure” (p. 2). Ohls occasionally uses other modern military concepts to analyze these historical operations, but he always defines them in context so as not to confuse the layman reader.

Overall, American Amphibious Warfare is an important addition to the historiography of the American way of war. It is a readable and compact book that is manageable for the general public (in part due to Ohls’ clear explanations of doctrinal terms), but also thought-provoking for the more studious military historian or theorist. Its flaws are few—mostly in the form of a few small typos and maps that, frustratingly, are too broad in scope—but these issues can be overlooked when one considers the great contributions this book brings to the table.
Amphibious Warfare reminds us that the successful assault landings of World War II were not a contemporary concept, but rather the culmination of two centuries of a strong amphibious military tradition. Perhaps this affirms the answer to America’s next military dilemma is actually in our past.


Choosing War: Presidential Decisions in the Maine, Lusitania, and Panay Incidents

By Douglas Carl Peifer

Oxford University Press, 2016

Pp. x, 331. $34.95

Review by Nikki Dean

“Remember the Maine.” “Remember the Lusitania.” These poster slogans are forever tied to the ships and the wars that shaped American history. In relation to the world events that followed, the attacks on the U.S. battleship Maine and the British civilian ocean liner, HMS Lusitania, have become irrevocably coupled to the conflicts that trailed in their wake. There are natural comparisons to be made between the Maine, the Lusitania, and modern-day incidents that result in diplomatic sanctions, military escalation, or other types of national retaliation. The desire to seek continuities across the spectrum of conflicts is common for policymakers and historians, professional and amateur alike. In examining three case studies of naval events and their associated conflicts, Douglas Carl Peifer’s Choosing War: Presidential Decisions in the Maine, Lusitania, and Panay Incidents provides an effective platform for examining “how Congress, the press, and public opinion set parameters to presidential freedom of action,” (p. 4) and how each presidential administration balanced the acceptable boundaries between effective response and public demand in the wake of naval incidents. Peifer’s analysis of the attacks on the USS Maine in 1898, HMS Lusitania in 1915, and the USS Panay in 1937 provides context to each diplomatic and military option weighed before, during, and after the attack. Unlike a deeper dissection of a single event, Peifer examines three events, including their presidential administrations, against each other in an effort to show the range of responses and probable outcomes within the context of their historical era.

In detailing the Maine, Lusitania, and Panay events, Choosing War builds each case study on a common architecture of examining the incident, the geopolitical context, the immediate national reactions, the executive decisions, and the aftermath, to include the postevent consequences and postconflict reflections. Each “Incident” subchapter provides a well-written and engaging blow-by-blow account, describing the experiences of the men and women directly involved at the moment bullets, bombs, metal, and flesh collided. The “Context” subchapters widen the lens of examination, providing the history of the events and political intersections that placed each ship in the crosshairs of historical infamy. Here, Peifer details both the societal influences as well as the national and international political undercurrents preceding the conflicts associated with each incident: the Spanish-American War and the Maine, the First World War and the Lusitania, and the Second World War and the Panay. This allows the reader to consider the diplomatic influences, political intrigues, and presidential frustrations through Peifer’s well-documented source material. It provides a greater examination that moves the reader beyond shallow correlations of timelines and events, and introduces nuanced context for the diplomatic choices and social demands that shaped the decisions of each presidential administration. Choosing War’s subchapters on the immediate reactions and administrative decisions are well researched, detailing the turmoil in advancing presidential agendas while balancing national interests in the wake of a tragedy at sea involving American lives. Peifer describes the evolution of social and political perceptions and the impact on each subsequent decision, closing each chapter with a discussion of the aftermath, an examination of the consequences of the choices made, and a reflection on how the collective narrative of the event changed after conflict resolution. The chapter architecture of the case studies provides consistency for the reader, enabling both enjoyment of the narrative and an effective transition into Peifer’s argument against categorizing naval incidents that are “superficially similar, in that they involved sunken ships, dead Americans, and urgent calls to ‘do something’” (p. 234).

Peifer eschews typology, the quantitative attempt to bin events together by phenomenon or end state, and effectively encourages the reader to approach history with a “mindset that values the particular, the interplay between foreign and domestic affairs, and the role of chance, friction, and uncertainty” (p. 234). Quantity may have a quality all its own, scratching an itch to hastily analyze in a sound-bite world, but it is problematic in Peifer’s eyes. It fails to examine the full range of incidents, which may or may not be derived from the coercive use of military power. Peifer makes his case clear at the end of his chapter on “Anticipating the Unexpected,” “[o]ne gains a much better sense of types and range of incidents when one studies several incidents in depth, analyzing causes, possible responses, and outcomes within their historical context” (p. 242). When lumping incidents by their
proximity to a war, we ignore the relevance of tightly coupled and connected events, chance, and even ambiguity, especially for political and military decision makers. This conclusion is emphasized by Peifer’s selection of the Japanese strike on the USS Panay, which—if historical categorization is to be believed—should have resulted in America’s entrance into war with Japan in 1937, rather than following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor five years later.

The true value of Choosing War is Peifer’s closing chapter on “Valuing the Particular.” In it, he remarks that “[h]istory can be used to help policymakers and the reading public understand contemporary challenges and issues,” (p. 245) thereby acquiring strategic depth, a sense of linkages between political and diplomatic institutions, and an understanding of the range of strategic options, along with a model for their potential impacts. Crucially, Peifer argues that history gives policymakers and the public a “sense of [the] bureaucratic intelligence” (p. 247) necessary to understand how policy is influenced and crafted from events and negotiations that originate long before a seemingly tangential incident trips a nation into conflict. Choosing War: Presidential Decisions in the Maine, Lusitania, and Panay Incidents is both an effective examination on three historical events and a timely argument for greater historical literacy, all couched in a genuinely engaging read. It will appeal to historians, policymakers, military members, and those seeking the history behind the sinking of ships and the shouting of slogans.

Lt. Col. Nikki Dean is an active duty Army officer, a graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College and the School of Advanced Military Studies, and currently assigned to the 166th Aviation Brigade. Her previous writing and research focuses on the impacts of art and artifact looting in war and illicit artifact trafficking from conflict zones.

The General Who Wore Six Stars: The Inside Story of John C. H. Lee
By Hank H. Cox
Potomac Books, 2018
Pp. xix, 248. $32.95

Review by Timothy M. Gilhool

Logistics officers have never had a sterling reputation in the chronicles of military history. Alexander the Great reputedly said on the subject, “My logisticians are a humorless lot . . . they know if my campaign fails, they are the first ones I will slay.” One of the most vilified in recent military history is U.S. Army Lt. Gen. (Retired) John C. H. Lee, who served as the senior logisticians under General Dwight D. Eisenhower in the European Theater of Operations (ETO) from 1942 to 1945. Both during the course of the war, and afterward in numerous histories and biographies, Lee was assailed for his personal quirks and professional judgement. A deeply religious man, his detractors claimed his initials “JCH” stood for “Jesus Christ Himself.” Despite being maligned by generals such as Omar Bradley and Bedell Smith, as well as criticized by historians from Geoffrey Perrett to Stephen Ambrose, he does have at least one defender. In his book, The General Who Wore Six Stars: The Inside Story of John C. H. Lee, retired journalist and former Washington Post book reviewer Hank H. Cox makes the case that this important American military leader was not really all that bad.

Drawing primarily on contemporaneous memoirs and a range of secondary sources, Cox tells the story of Lee’s early life and military career. The most important source for his narrative is Lee’s unpublished memoirs, currently held at the U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Together, these works enable Cox to give additional context to Lee’s career as well as to some of his most controversial actions and decisions. Born in Junction City, Kansas, in August 1887, Lee grew up in and around a military community. He earned an alternate appointment to the United States Military Academy, where he distinguished himself academically, and graduated 12th out of a class of 109 cadets (p. 11). Unfortunately, Cox covers Lee’s West Point years in less than a page. As a member of the class of 1909, his fellow cadets included Henry “Hap” Arnold (1907) and George Patton (1909). A deeper examination of his time there might have illuminated Lee’s subsequent professional interactions.

Lee’s performance at West Point enabled him to secure a commission in the Corps of Engineers. His military career postgraduation was exceptional, mixing stateside assignments with postings to Guam and the Philippines. Along the way, Lee cultivated relationships with several senior officers, including Generals Leonard Wood, Douglas MacArthur, and George Marshall. These relationships served him well over the years, availing Lee opportunities and rapid advancement. During World War I, less than eight years after graduation, he was the division G–3 for the 89th Division, earning a Distinguished Service Medal for his valor and accomplishments in France (p. 22). Lee went on to serve in multiple high level positions in the interwar period, including the Vicksburg Engineer District and as assistant commandant of the Army Industrial College (now the Eisenhower School of National Security and Resources Strategy). By 1940, Lee was one of the most accomplished officers of his generation. Selected for brigadier general, he was appointed first to command the Port of San Francisco, then in 1941 to command the 2d Infantry Division following an inspection tour on behalf of General Marshall. By early 1942, he was selected for his second star, and soon afterwards got a call to report to Washington, D.C. Lee’s destiny in World War II would not be to lead a division in combat, but instead to command what would become the largest Allied formation of war.
Promoted to lieutenant general shortly after assuming his duties, Lee had the habit of wearing the three stars of his rank on both the front and rear of his M1 helmet, hence the book’s title. In his role as the commanding general of the ETO’s Supply of Services command, Lee and his organization were responsible for planning, coordinating, and executing logistics operations in support of American forces, both in England and in support of the campaigns in North Africa, Italy, and Western Europe. This command would be renamed the Communications Zone (COMZ) after the invasion of Normandy, moving from southern England to the continent in the weeks following. Cox devotes the majority of his work (fifteen of twenty-two chapters) to covering Lee’s performance in this position, as well as the logistics challenges faced by the Allies throughout the subsequent campaigns. This includes some of the more controversial aspects of his tenure, to include procuring a personal locomotive for inspections of supply depots across Great Britain and later France; for his wholesale movement of the COMZ organization into the hotel of Paris after liberation without the permission of General Eisenhower; and for his struggles to meet the summer 1944 supply challenges faced by the U.S. Army after breakout and pursuit of the German armies after Operation COBRA.

Lee’s prickly personality and professional demeanor exacerbated all of these issues. A strict disciplinarian and stickler for military protocol, coupled with an almost zealot-like personal faith, Lee was, in the words of one officer, “no one you’d want to go fishing with for [a] week” (p. 7). His relationship with then General Omar Bradley, the commander initially of the First U.S. Army and later the 12th Army Group, was abysmal. Bradley was the primary “customer” for the logistics support that Lee provided, and Cox illustrates their poor relationship through the majority of the book. These professional tensions, coupled with the challenges, confusion, and chaos of large scale combat operations, have colored Lee’s reputation to this day. Despite that, Cox does a respectable job of defending Lee’s legacy and highlighting his significant contributions to not only victory in the ETO, but over the course of a long and distinguished career. However, while he attempts to provide background, context, and mitigating circumstances to many of Lee’s more controversial decisions, in almost every instance, it comes back down to his particular personality. *The General Who Wore Six Stars: The Inside Story of John C. H. Lee* succeeds in showing the subject to be a man of character, principal, and genuine importance to American military history. As to the argument that Lee has truly been treated unfairly by authors and historians, that question remains unanswered. Thanks to this author, though, we do have more to consider.

**Lt. Col. Timothy M. Gilhool** is a retired Army officer and a command historian at the U.S. Army Combined Arms Support Command, Fort Lee, Virginia. He received a bachelor’s degree in history from the University of Michigan, a master’s degree in history from the University of Richmond, and a Master of Military Arts and Sciences from the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College School of Advanced Military Studies. He served twenty-three years as a Logistics Corps officer, to include battalion command in both U.S. Training and Doctrine Command and the 82d Airborne Division.

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**The Queen’s American Rangers**

By Donald J. Gara

Westholme Publishing, 2015  
Pp. x, 405. $29.95

**Review by John R. Maass**

Unit histories of early American conflicts, particularly at the regimental level, are common in the field of Civil War publishing, even back to the years immediately after the hostilities ended. This was not the case in the study of the War of the American Revolution, where official records are more scarce, letters and diaries hard to come by, and where literacy rates among the soldiers were comparatively lower. Recently, however, this trend changed as publishers issue more histories of regiments serving in the Revolutionary struggle. This volume by Donald Gara is a welcome contribution to the literature, and an addition to Westholme Publishing’s growing list of Revolutionary War titles.

Gara’s subject is a Loyalist unit called the Queen’s Rangers, raised in America early in the war among those who opposed independence, and led by British officers—the most notable of which was the young Lt. Col. John Graves Simcoe. It included a mixed legion of dragoons, grenadiers, and light infantry. Originally formed by Lt. Col. Robert Rogers in the French and Indian War (1754–1763), it recruited in the northern colonies. The regiment fought in most of the Revolution’s major campaigns and engagements, including the battles around New York City in 1776, Brandywine, Germantown, Monmouth Courthouse, the Siege of Charleston, and Lord Cornwallis’ 1781 invasion of Virginia that culminated in the British surrender at Yorktown. These troops participated in numerous small engagements as well, such as Connecticut Farms, Springfield, Richmond, Petersburg, and Spencer’s Ordinary. In addition, early in the war several of the rangers and Colonel Rogers captured American spy Nathan Hale on Long Island. With such an active service record, Gara is able not only to tell the story of much of the war, but also to provide significant context for the unit’s activities from 1776 to 1781.

Gara enhances his narrative with the inclusion of six period maps and nine newly created maps, the latter a rarity in today’s publishing world. Moreover, Gara has consulted a wide number of sources, including diaries, orderly books, correspondence of key commanders, and memoirs (including Simcoe’s own journal).

Much of Gara’s narrative of the Rangers’ history focuses on their service in the South beginning in 1780. This includes a detailed account of the unit’s actions in Virginia, first under turncoat Benedict Arnold, then Lord Cornwallis. During these operations the green-coated Queen’s Rangers’ mounted troopers and infantry burned tobacco, destroyed military
supplies, and routed militia forces along the James, Appomattox, and Pamunkey Rivers of central Virginia as the British sought to destroy the American logistical network in the southern theater of the war. After helping to defeat Virginia troops at the small battle of Petersburg in April 1781, Simcoe’s men (especially his cavalry) were involved constantly with intelligence and reconnaissance missions, and performed valuable service as Cornwallis moved west toward Charlottesville and other local depots. In a memorable incident, Simcoe and his dragoons attacked an important American supply cache located on the James River at Point of Fork, which Baron Friedrich von Steuben of the Continental Army commanded. Through a ruse to make his forces look larger, Simcoe forced von Steuben to abandon much of his stores and artillery, which the Queen’s Rangers destroyed.

Although Gara makes a number of minor mistakes with place names, dates, and locations, his narrative is overall detailed and fast-paced. His account of Simcoe’s command at the June 1781 skirmish at Spencer’s Ordinary (six miles west of Williamsburg) is particularly good, especially considering the difficulty in finding sources for it. However, this account also highlights the book’s overall and consistent weakness—Gara only provides readers with a factual account of events from beginning to end, albeit a generally well-written one. He provides no introduction to his study, gives no interpretive remarks at the end of his chapters, and in the end provides no conclusion or discussion of the regiment’s active service in the years of Revolutionary struggle. This would have been an especially welcome addition to this tale in that the Queen’s Rangers were Americans battling Americans in what for them must have been a civil war. Unfortunately, Gara gives no such interpretive conclusion, but rather ends abruptly with the regiment’s final activities in South Carolina until 1782.

Dr. John R. Maass is a historian at the National Museum of the U.S. Army. He received a bachelor’s degree in history from Washington and Lee University and a Ph.D. in early U.S. history from Ohio State University. He is the author of Defending a New Nation, 1783–1811, the first pamphlet in the Center of Military History’s Campaigns of the War of 1812 series (Washington, D.C., 2013), and the books The Road to Yorktown: Jefferson, Lafayette and the British Invasion of Virginia (Charleston, S.C., 2015), George Washington’s Virginia (Charleston, S.C., 2017), and The Battle of Guilford Courthouse: A Most Desperate Engagement. (Charleston, S.C., 2020).

The Ghost Dance movement was a spiritual one in which Native Americans hoped to return to the traditional lifestyle of nomadic hunters they maintained before being forced onto reservations in the years following the Civil War. The author explains the events leading up to the crisis of 1890, particularly those that occurred on the Pine Ridge reservation in South Dakota, and asserts that the federal government overreacted to some degree. Many Sioux, having grown accustomed to—though not content with—reservation life, refused to participate in the movement. Army leaders, particularly veteran Indian fighter Maj. Gen. Nelson A. Miles, sought to avoid an outbreak of hostilities, recognizing the real problem was the government’s failure to honor treaty obligations. Unfortunately, the deployment of the largest military force to take the field since the Civil War—intended initially to prevent conflict with a display of overwhelming force—exacerbated tensions, as did sensational newsmen. When Indian police, themselves Sioux, killed the aged Sitting Bull in a scuffle resulting from his attempted arrest, the editor of the Aberdeen Saturday Pioneer wrote, “Whites, by law of conquest, by justice of civilization, are masters of the American continent, and the best safety of the frontier settlers will be secured by the total annihilation of the few remaining Indians” (p. 188). The man who wrote that was L. Frank Baum, later famous as the author of The Wonderful Wizard of Oz (Chicago, 1900).

Greene explains troop movements, logistical requirements, and the difficulty of coordinating operations in the bleak, wintry South Dakota landscape, including the celebrated Badlands, in fine detail. The activities of Sioux who chose to flee the reservation, many seeking refuge in a natural defensive position called the “Stronghold,” also are discussed thoroughly, as are the bureaucratic maneuvers by military leaders, Indian reservation officials, state governments, and the administration of President Benjamin Harrison. The author also describes factionalism within the Sioux Nation itself, along with the role of clergymen attempting to mediate for peaceful resolution of the crisis.

The clash at Wounded Knee Creek on 29 December 1890 resulted from the surrender of approximately 370 Sioux, led by the aged and ill Big Foot, to soldiers of the U.S. 7th Cavalry led by Col. James W. Forsyth, a veteran of the Civil War and...
Indian Wars. An attempt to disarm the Indians proved difficult, as they voluntarily turned in only a token collection of old and damaged weapons. A search of the Sioux encampment likewise proved problematic, and when the cavalry required warriors to pass through a cordon of soldiers who would search them, some of the Native Americans drew concealed weapons and opened fire. While the Army had greater numbers, the Sioux had better weapons (Winchester repeater rifles), and this forced the soldiers to draw pistols as their single shot Springfield rifles were inadequate for the close quarter brawl that ensued. Some of the warriors broke through the line of troops, making for their encampment or the shelter of a nearby ravine. At this point, officers lost control of their men, who literally began to fire at anything that moved. As the fighting escalated, a battery of Hotchkiss guns opened up with devastating results for the Sioux.

Some Sioux escaped the slaughter, either by getting far enough away to avoid pursuit, or by feigning death as soldiers made their way through the killing ground. Soldiers took wounded survivors to a hospital set up in an Episcopal chapel. Thirty soldiers and at least 200 Sioux were killed or died of wounds, and General Miles blamed Forsyth for the disaster. Although nineteen participants received the Medal of Honor for what the Army called a “battle,” Miles was highly critical of the affair, and in fact continued to support Sioux claims for justice until his death in 1925. Skirmishing continued after Wounded Knee, including a subsequent engagement (the “Mission Fight” of 30 December 1890) between the 7th Cavalry and the Sioux, in which the “Buffalo Soldiers” of the 9th Cavalry arrived to extricate their comrades from a tenuous position. Miles considered this to be another example of Forsyth’s incompetence, and the colonel was suspended temporarily from his command, though he managed to retire as a brigadier general in 1902.

In conclusion, American Carnage is an excellent book on a complex and controversial subject. Thoroughly researched and incisively written, it is as balanced as any work on the Wounded Knee tragedy can possibly be. Students of military, Native American, and Western history will find it well worth reading, and both academic and military professionals will likely consider it to be a valuable addition to their personal libraries. It is highly recommended.

Dr. Frank L. Kalesnik earned his bachelor’s degree in history at the Virginia Military Institute (VMI) and his master’s degree and doctorate in American history at Florida State University. He taught at VMI and the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy and was a command historian for both the Air Force and Marine Corps. He also served twenty-two years as an officer in the Marine Corps Reserve. He is currently the command historian for U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Special Operations Command, at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina.

Last Stand on Bataan: The Defense of the Philippines, December 1941–May 1942
By Christopher L. Kolakowski
McFarland & Company, Inc., 2017
Pp. ix, 207. $35

Review by James A. Villanueva

On 9 April 1942, Maj. Gen. Edward P. King surrendered the combined Filipino American “Luzon Force” to Imperial Japanese forces on the Bataan Peninsula in the Philippines. Less than a month after that capitulation, the largest in U.S. history, Lt. Gen. Jonathan M. Wainwright surrendered the remaining Allied forces in the Philippines from his headquarters on the island of Corregidor. The campaign preceding these events, the five-month-long defense of the Philippines, is the subject of Christopher J. Kolakowski’s Last Stand on Bataan: The Defense of the Philippines, December 1941–May 1942.

Primarily writing from an American perspective, Kolakowski begins his narrative by discussing the situation in the Philippines on 6 December 1941, the eve of American involvement in World War II. He then discusses the broad goals of the Japanese, American, and Filipino governments at the war’s outset. With Japan bent on a war of conquest, many, including Filipino President Manuel Quezon, and the head trainer for the nascent Filipino Armed Forces, former U.S. Army Chief of Staff Douglas MacArthur, worked to prepare the Philippines for defense. Kolakowski acknowledges the inadequacies of many of these preparations, especially the lack of training or cohesion among hastily raised Filipino units, and the failure to stockpile food on the Bataan Peninsula to withstand a protracted siege.

In the following chapters, Kolakowski discusses initial Japanese attacks in the Philippines, the subsequent landings by Japanese forces, the Allies’ retreat to Bataan, and the losing struggle of the Filipinos and Americans on Bataan against both hunger and Japanese firepower. Kolakowski ultimately assesses the retreat to Bataan as “an impressive achievement” (p. 70), given no major American or Filipino units were lost. He also discusses the political crisis surrounding Filipino President Manuel Quezon’s feelings of abandonment by the United States and his desire to negotiate with the Japanese in February 1942. A message from President Franklin D. Roosevelt pledging American troops to fight to the last to defend the Philippines, and to eventually liberate the Philippines with troops being gathered elsewhere, convinced Quezon to change his mind and remain allied with the United States.

The final three chapters of Last Stand on Bataan deal with MacArthur’s evacuation from the Philippines, the surrender of forces on Bataan to the Japanese, and the final surrender of American and Filipino forces in the Philippines. In his epilogue, Kolakowski gives an assessment of the Japanese and Allied forces, concluding that American and Filipino forces delayed the Japanese timetable for conquest despite ultimately losing the campaign. Kolakowski views the battle as a “personal
and professional disaster” (p. 180) for MacArthur, although the Philippine scouts and Philippine division performed very well, and rapidly procured Filipino units improved markedly in fighting quality despite a poor performance early on. The Japanese performance, in contrast, “was not stellar” (p. 182), hamstrung by poor intelligence and, later on, lack of experienced troops. Kolakowski acknowledges that “individual Japanese units fought with skill and aggression” (p. 182), and General Masaharu Homma’s leadership during the fighting in April was greatly responsible for Japanese victory.

Although in large part synthesizing his narrative from Louis Morton’s official U.S. Army history, The Fall of the Philippines (Washington, D.C., 1953), Kolakowski draws on a variety of sources, including interviews with campaign participants and personal papers from the MacArthur Memorial Archives (MMA) in Norfolk, Virginia. Significantly, he also gives some Japanese perspectives on the campaign by referencing captured and translated documents housed at the MMA, quoting Japanese commanders and pilots several times. Although Kolakowski’s use of such sources is worthy of praise, more perspectives of this type would certainly be welcome, especially from lower-ranking Japanese soldiers who took on the tough defenses on Bataan. Additionally, Kolakowski’s description of the destruction of the Far East Air Force would have benefitted greatly from William H. Bartsch’s December 8, 1941: MacArthur’s Pearl Harbor (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2003).

Last Stand on Bataan uses maps from Morton’s The Fall of the Philippines along with some maps from the MMA, and they are generally useful in clarifying Kolakowski’s descriptions of the fighting. The author’s use of photos, especially those from the MMA, is commendable, and they certainly add to his narrative by putting faces to many prominent individuals like Maj. Gen. Edward P. King. Also, appendixes providing the U.S. Army Forces in the Far East Order of Battle and a list of participants and their fates after the fall of the Philippines are helpful.

Ultimately, Kolakowski does not overturn existing historiography, but clarifies it with his use of additional sources from the MMA. Discussing the controversy surrounding the destruction of the Far East Air Force at the beginning of the campaign, Kolakowski notes the difficulty of resolving whether MacArthur, his chief of staff Maj. Gen. Richard K. Sutherland, or Far East Air Force commander Maj. Gen. Lewis H. Brereton were responsible for the inaction of the thirty-five B–17 bombers on 8 December 1941. According to Kolakowski, placing blame hinges on whether one believes the overbearing Sutherland forced Brereton to wait for specific authorization from MacArthur for an airstrike on Japanese-held Formosa, or Brereton had not fully planned such a strike. Kolakowski does acknowledge it is possible MacArthur would not have ordered the strike anyway given the high risk to what would have been unescorted B–17s. Examining leadership, Kolakowski is far from blindly praising MacArthur, noting in his conclusion that, “a dispassionate review of MacArthur’s record as commander . . . shows mixed results” (p. 180). However, the author could have criticized MacArthur more vigorously for failing to ensure adequate supplies, especially food, were stockpiled on Bataan prior to the Japanese invasion.

While not groundbreaking, Kolakowski’s book is a fairly short yet lively read. Historians looking for a concise summary of the campaign would find it useful, as would a general audience interested in the defense of the Philippines. The book also demonstrates the consequences of a lack of preparedness for war, something military professionals would find important. Overall, in a workmanlike account, Kolakowski succeeds in telling the story of the desperate, and ultimately futile, fight to defend the Philippines at the outbreak of World War II.

Maj. James A. Villanueva is a U.S. Army infantry officer who holds a Ph.D. in history from Ohio State University. His dissertation focused on the American and Filipino guerrillas who resisted the Japanese occupation of the Philippines during World War II. Having previously taught military history at the U.S. Military Academy, West Point, he is currently serving as a future operations planner with the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault).

Maxwell Taylor’s Cold War: From Berlin to Vietnam
By Ingo Trauschweizer
University Press of Kentucky, 2019
Pp. viii, 299. $45

Review by Eric B. Setzekorn

In the past 150 years, American military leaders have successfully leveraged battlefield success to achieve political power, with Theodore Roosevelt, Dwight D. Eisenhower, and Ulysses S. Grant all winning office because of their military victories. The opposite path, generals using political support to achieve high military rank, is less common and much less respected in the American military tradition. General Maxwell D. Taylor, who rose to become chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff because of his connections with senior members of the Kennedy administration, is a textbook case for the corrosive effects of political calculations impacting military judgement. Thomas Ricks, in his 2012 work, The Generals: American Military Command from World War II to Today, wrote that Taylor “made a habit of saying not what he knew to be true but instead what he thought should be said.” In his 1997 work, Dereliction of Duty: Johnson, McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies That Led to Vietnam, H. R. McMaster wrote of Taylor, “When he found it expedient to do so, he misled the JCS [Joint Chiefs of Staff], the press and the NSC [National Security Council],” leaving a toxic legacy of “distrust and deceit” between the JCS and the president. Ingo Trauschweizer’s new work, Maxwell Taylor’s Cold War: From
Berlin to Vietnam, is not a rebuttal to these accusations, but seeks to integrate Taylor’s post–World War II career into the Cold War military strategy of the United States, which to some extent rationalizes Taylor’s self-serving behavior and flawed decisions.

Tauschweizer has a dual objective in studying Maxwell Taylor. First, he clarifies historical understandings of Taylor’s thinking and policies on critical issues such as counterinsurgency, nuclear weapons, and limited war during the tense 1950s and 1960s. By illustrating Taylor’s apparently sincere strategic beliefs, which brought him into conflict with Eisenhower, Tauschweizer undercuts the notion that Taylor was a sycophant to whomever was in power. His second objective uses Taylor’s Cold War postings to explore the national security establishment, which was coalescing into a large, enduring bureaucracy when Taylor’s power and influence were at their height. Taylor’s post–World War II career included center-stage postings: superintendent of West Point, West Berlin in 1949, Korea in 1953, the Pentagon under Eisenhower, and the White House during the Kennedy administration. Tauschweizer concludes that Taylor’s increasing clout was indicative of the militarization of U.S. policy as the Cold War deepened, and his failures are reflective of the continued difficulties of integrating a large military into the larger U.S. government strategy.

The discussion of Maxwell Taylor’s experiences with the burgeoning bureaucracy of the Cold War national security state is the most intriguing and valuable contribution of the book. The creation of the Department of Defense, National Security Council, and large peacetime military forces presented military and civilian leaders with significant management problems in aligning organizational missions with budgets and policy guidance. Taylor was never comfortable with the large administrative burden that bureaucratic structures imposed on senior leaders. Instead, Taylor repeatedly attempted to use coordination committees and interagency groups to align policies with dismal results. At West Point, Taylor used the academic board to push for curriculum changes. As Kennedy’s military advisor he formed a “special group” to focus a response to counterinsurgency, and as ambassador to South Vietnam he formed a “Mission Council” to bring together military and civilian efforts. In each case, Taylor’s approach was not to change the internal structure of organizations but to attempt to steer them, and the result was temporary and superficial changes with little enduring impact. Many of Taylor’s failures can also be attributed to his personality, which even his friends referred to as cold and isolated.

The heart of the book lies in Taylor’s role in the escalation of the American military presence in Vietnam. Roughly half of the 211 pages of text focus on Taylor’s involvement in counterinsurgency and his belief in air strikes against North Vietnam to coerce a settlement. Taylor’s assessment of the situation in South Vietnam was analogous to the Berlin crisis earlier in his career. As commander of Allied troops in Berlin from 1949 to 1951, Taylor used military forces to signal American resolve to the Soviets and learned the value of robust deterrence. As commander of the Eighth Army in Korea during the final months of the conflict, Taylor saw the Chinese use attacks on U.N. forces to influence the ongoing peace talks at Panmunjom. In both of these cases, Taylor drew the conclusion that U.S. credibility was vital, and local allies must be supported by U.S. prestige, influence, and, if needed, firepower. As chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from 1962 to 1964, and ambassador to South Vietnam from 1964 to 1965, Taylor’s early Cold War experiences gave him a false analogy to the situation in mid-1960s Vietnam, resulting in a jumbled strategic response.

Unfortunately, the short length of the work means the author omits a more detailed exploration of Taylor’s character. For example, by picking up Taylor’s life in 1945, Tauschweizer excludes his formative years in the Army of the 1920s and 1930s. He does not discuss the thirteen years from 1927 to 1940 when Taylor was either a teacher, student, or military attaché, all duties that separated him from troops and perhaps shaped his “loner” identity within the military. The author covers Taylor’s intriguing one-year sojourn in Mexico City as an executive for an electric company from 1959 to 1960 in one sentence. The introduction is also very brief, only four pages, and the conclusion is less than five pages in length, leaving readers with an abrupt feeling to the work that diminishes the strong narrative developed in the core chapters.

Overall, Maxwell Taylor’s Cold War is solid but unfulfilling. It is also a narrowly focused book, and readers unfamiliar with the Cold War or the intricacies of post–World War II military policy will want to read a background work by John Lewis Gaddis or Brian Linn’s recent Elvis’s Army for context. Tauschweizer has, to some extent, rehabilitated Taylor’s character by showing Taylor deeply believed in his suggested policies and was not driven purely by political scheming. However, Taylor’s policies themselves, poorly conceived and woefully implemented, demonstrate the dangers of political generals taking control of military affairs. Overly responsive to political supporters outside the Pentagon and theories percolating from his own enigmatic mind, Taylor’s ad hoc approach to Cold War strategy had a profoundly negative impact on the Army and the United States during the Cold War.

Dr. Eric B. Setzekorn is a historian with the U.S. Army Center of Military History and an adjunct professor at George Washington University. He is the author of The Rise and Fall of an Officer Corps: The Republic of China Army, 1942–1955 (Norman, Okla., 2018)

How We Won & Lost the War in Afghanistan: Two Years in the Pashtun Homeland
By Douglas Grindle
Potomac Books, 2017
Pp. xxii, 250. $29.95

Review by Davis M. Abt
A soldier’s war experience is unique— influenced by location, duty description, and mental outlook. For those who served in the West’s most recent intervention
in Afghanistan, it is no different. In How We Won and Lost the War in Afghanistan, Douglas Grindle describes his own journey as a U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) district field program officer tasked to facilitate reconstruction projects in rural areas of Kandahar Province. His recollections, accumulated from 2011 to 2013 in Dand and Maiwand Districts, provide numerous insights that resonate with those familiar with the problems facing Afghanistan.

Much of the book centers on Grindle’s experience in Dand District, directly south of the provincial capital of Kandahar City. The book also discusses U.S. Army Lt. Col. Brian Payne’s 1st Battalion, 5th Infantry Regiment’s redeployment to neighboring turbulent Panjwai District, in which Grindle and others strove to improve the economic and political situation of the district. The book excels at describing the attitudes and motivations of the district-level Afghan officials who worked with Grindle’s team. It paints a vivid picture of flesh and blood human beings with individual goals and concerns. Chief among the officials is the district’s subgovernor, the young and capable Hamdullah Nazak. Grindle spends a large of amount of time mentoring Nazak on the intricacies of project funding and implementation. unfortunately, less than half of the money spent by USAID reached Afghan projects, and some of the aid had onerous preconditions placed on it by governments or organizations, degrading its usefulness. Additionally, bureaucratic complexity hindered construction efforts. In one illustration, money was available to construct new schools, but no money existed to maintain them. Furthermore, the low wages and irregular pay of district officials often prevented them from purchasing fuel to visit outlying villages and made them more susceptible to graft.

USAID enacted a number of projects in Dand and they provided significant positive impacts to locals. For example, they installed an inexpensive well-pump refurbishing program in many villages and it greatly improved quality of life for residents. The author masterfully illustrates the paucity of information on the efficacy of aid programs. It is far easier to track items issued and funds supplied than measure more abstract concepts such as local people’s trust in their government. It is much less difficult to talk of the millions of Afghan children now attending school than to gauge if the students actually learn anything. This only adds to the ambiguity of tallying metrics of victory in a counterinsurgency.

Despite improvement in Dand, the author lamented progress as temporary. The failure to supply the Afghan government with the capabilities needed to reach a permanent settlement ultimately undermined hard fought for gains, prompting Grindle to succinctly write, “So we won. And then we lost” (p. 185). In short, while engagement at lower governmental levels was critical to success, without effective support from the national government, the success was unsustainable once foreign assistance ceased.

The final part of the book centers on the author’s experience in the more volatile Maiwand District. Despite spending as much time in Maiwand as in Dand, Grindle devotes less than a fifth of the book to his experiences there. Nevertheless, his insights provide an illuminating contrast to the relative stability of Dand. Tellingly, Grindle stated that in Maiwand, the cradle of the Taliban, the “security situation failed to reach escape velocity” (p. 208). Significantly, Maiwand’s District Governor Salih Mohammad experienced a much worse relationship with coalition enablers and local elders than Nazak experienced in Dand. This prevented officials from visiting swaths of the district and hampered locals from contacting officials in the district center.

Given the title of the book, one might have expected a more comprehensive overview of the eighteen–year conflict. However, the details in this intimate account readily lend themselves to larger assessments on the nation’s longest war. The author wisely refused to entertain notions regarding alleged flaws in the Afghan character, and excluding a smattering of historical quotes at chapter headings, downplays the well-trodden “graveyard of empires” narrative. This makes Grindle’s clear-eyed and thoughtful work highly useful for anyone trying to formulate their own response to the book’s titular proposal.

Capt. Davis M. “Greg” Abt is a military intelligence officer and currently serves as a battalion executive officer in the 188th Infantry Brigade. He has been in the Army nine years and deployed to Zharay District, Afghanistan, from 2012 to 2013 as a member of a Security Force Assistance Team. He holds a bachelor’s degree in history from Georgia State University.
In previous footnotes, I have described the Center of Military History’s (CMH’s) book process and our attempts to produce official history volumes in a more efficient manner. In a similar fashion, we have tested and implemented new procedures to fix a long-standing problem with the timeliness of the annual Department of the Army Historical Summary (DAHSUM).

The DAHSUM dates back to 1969, when CMH began publishing it as a successor of sorts to the annual reports of the Secretary of War (initiated in 1822) and to the subsequent contribution of the secretary of the Army included in the secretary of defense periodic reports. Congress canceled the latter requirement in 1972, with the last published report covering fiscal year 1968. The secretary of defense began issuing a new report in 1973, but it no longer featured separate sections from the service secretaries. CMH stepped into the breach with the DAHSUM and has published it ever since.

DAHSUMs serve as a snapshot of the key programs and activities of the Army and emphasize the perspectives and actions of the Army secretariat and Army staff. Essentially, it is the command history report of the Army and Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), and serves as a valuable reference tool. Its importance has only grown due to the uneven quality of Army records management, as it ensures that key information about HQDA activities is preserved for the historical record.

In a remarkable feat, CMH published the first three DAHSUMs covering 1969 through 1971 at the same time in 1973. The 1972 edition came out in 1974, but the 1973 report did not appear until 1977. That marked what would become a worsening trend, with reports coming out later and later after the year being covered. For a time, beginning with the 1976 report, a group of historians completed the DAHSUMs within two or three years, but then the process reverted to one or occasionally two historians compiling the annual report. The average time to completion of the 1980s volumes was seven and a half years. The following decade, it was just under seven years. For the first decade of the twenty-first century, it was eight and a half years, and that was achieved only by taking a number of historians away from their primary tasks in 2010 so they could each tackle a volume. The 2000 through 2003 DAHSUMs appeared in 2011 and the remainder of the decade’s volumes in 2013 and 2015. The process, such as it was, more or less collapsed after that spasm of effort, and the years 2011 through 2015 have not yet been completed.

The lagging production was not the fault of the authors or compilers, but largely the lack of an efficient process. Beginning with the 1983 report, CMH assigned a different historian to the task each year. While this gave more historians the opportunity to gain credit for authoring a publication, it ensured there was no continuity and no chance for a historian to develop subject matter expertise. CMH has adopted a new approach now and has assigned each of the historians in the HQDA Studies and Support Division to compile the portion of the DAHSUM that corresponds to the Headquarters staff sections they routinely support. With a team rather than an individual working on the project, an initial draft is completed in months. More importantly, the same historians are responsible for the same portions of the next report, so that they come to the task with a full understanding of what transpired in their subject area the previous year. They can thus pick up right where they left off and hit the ground running. CMH still faces a hurdle in publishing the DAHSUM, as it must get through the logjam of open publication clearance in the Office of the Chief of Public Affairs, but completing each draft in less than a year will keep the reports current. This system also provides the Headquarters staff sections with a draft report covering the previous year at the time we request their input for the next DAHSUM, which eases their burden.

With continued emphasis on the new process, we expect to have each DAHSUM ready for public affairs review one year after the end of the fiscal year covered by the report. This ensures that the DAHSUM will remain an important and timely source of institutional knowledge to support Army leaders and staff offices. Now we just face the task of completing the gaps in the record for fiscal years 2011 through 2015.