

# ARMY HISTORY

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# ARMY HISTORY

The Professional Bulletin of Army History

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Issue Cover: Troop B, Ogallala [sic] Indian scouts at the Pine Ridge Agency in South Dakota, 1891. The troop's commander, 1st Lt. John J. Pershing, is on the far right. /Library of Congress

## EDITOR'S JOURNAL

In the Winter 2020 issue of *Army History* we are pleased to present an interesting article on Native Americans in the Army in the American West, a report on the Center of Military History's (CMH) and the Army's World War I commemorative activities, a look at the Wright Flyer exhibit at the National Museum of the United States Army (NMUSA), the presentation of a unique Army artifact, an excellent crop of book reviews, and words from the Center's executive director and chief historian.

This issue's article, by David McCormick, examines efforts to enlist Native Americans in the Regular Army in the 1890s. Many people are familiar with the Army's "Indian" Scouts of the late nineteenth century, but fewer know about the Army's attempt to establish and fill the ranks of regular infantry and cavalry units with Native Americans. The experiment was plagued from the beginning with numerous problems, many originating with the inherent racism that existed both within and outside of the Army. Though the program had many detractors, it did have its share of supporters from the heights of military and political leadership to the officers commanding these Indian units.

The second featured piece is a report on CMH's World War I commemorations. This after-action review includes thorough notes on the Army's activities in France celebrating the war's centennial, as well as remarks from the various Army field museums on their commemorative activities and exhibits. This piece delves into the many aspects of planning and executing a commemoration of this size, including governance and resourcing, outreach and education, unit commemorations, allied and international commemorations, strategic communications, and social media activity. It is hoped that the lessons learned from this commemoration, detailed in this report, will inform future Army and Department of Defense commemorative efforts.

This issue's artifact spotlight and NMUSA feature examine two pieces of important Army material culture. We also include eight book reviews covering topics from the Revolutionary War during the year 1779 and the siege of Atlanta during the Civil War to American tanks during the First World War and Darby's Rangers during World War II.

In his Chief's Corner, the Center's executive director discusses the CMH transition to the Army's Training and Doctrine Command as well as the recently concluded Conference of Army Historians. In addition, the chief historian uses his Footnote to elaborate on the future of workforce diversity within CMH and throughout the Army History Program.

As always, I welcome your submissions and constructive comments about this publication.

Bryan J. Hockensmith  
Managing Editor



WINTER 2020



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### EDUCATING AND REMEMBERING

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By CHARLES R. BOWERY JR.





# THE CHIEF'S CORNER

CHARLES R. BOWERY JR.

## LEVERAGING INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE

As you read this issue of *Army History*, the realignment of the U.S. Army Center of Military History (CMH) from the Headquarters, Department of the Army, to the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) will be complete. I am proud of the flexibility and innovation our work force has demonstrated in becoming the first Department of the Army-level organization to execute the intent of the Secretary of the Army to reshape headquarters operations while continuing to execute our missions. Our new colleagues across TRADOC have been nothing short of welcoming and professional in receiving the assignment of CMH, and we have begun a series of conversations about what our organization can bring to the entire force as a member of TRADOC.

I would like to encourage all Army historians to see our realignment as an opportunity as well. Two professional development events from this past summer illustrate the benefits of this realignment. At the Continuing Museum Training Course (CMTC), our biennial symposium for Army museum directors, and at the biennial Conference of Army Historians (CAH), we modified our usual agenda of top-down speakers, information briefings, and panels to instead consider some first-order questions facing our career program. The CMTC was focused on using the collective decades of expertise in our museum director cohort to develop approaches to our Army Museum Enterprise (AME) reform lines of effort:

- Right-sizing and properly positioning the AME work force
- Right-sizing the Army Artifact Collection
- Achieving greater effectiveness of AME programs across the force

Now that we have established our three regional AME headquarters, we can begin to develop the ideas initiated

at the CMTC into actionable AME reform along these lines of effort.

Similarly, at the CAH, we moved away from our traditional panel-driven approach to conduct a series of workshops built around the central theme in our keynote speaker's remarks. Maj. Gen. Bradley T. Gericke, the Army's chief strategist and holder of a doctorate in history from Vanderbilt, spoke to us about the ways he has encouraged the development of "actionable history" in the organizations he has led. By developing relevant and useful historical products for commanders and staffs, Army historians, archivists, and museum professionals can be enablers of critical thinking skills and organizational perspective. Strong historical programs also promote a sense of our Army's long heritage of service, enhancing morale and unit cohesion in our operating forces. The workshops at the conference discussed such topics as innovative twenty-first century classroom historical instruction, effective command and field historical programs, staff ride techniques and pedagogies, and relevant historical products and publications for the widest possible audience.


This period of realignment, transformation, and innovation has energized and inspired me, and I hope you are feeling these positive effects from your position within the Army Historical Program as well. My belief is that this transformation will take the already high quality of this magazine, and the rest of our historical products, to the next level of effectiveness for the Army and the American public.



# NEWSNOTES

## 87TH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE SOCIETY FOR MILITARY HISTORY

The 87th Annual Meeting of the Society for Military History (SMH) will convene at the Crystal Gateway Marriott in Arlington, Virginia on 30 April–3 May 2020. Hosted by the Army Historical Foundation (AHF), the conference has the theme of “Policy by Other Means.” Meeting information, including the call for papers, the SMH 2020 Panel Builder, and hotel room reservations, can be found on the SMH Web site at <http://www.smh-hq.org/smh2020/index.html>. Additional information is located on the AHF Web site at <https://armyhistory.org/smh2020>.




## NEW PUBLICATION FROM CMH

The Center of Military History (CMH) recently published the last pamphlet in its U.S. Army Campaigns of World War I series, *Occupation and Demobilization, 1918–1923*. When the guns finally fell silent at the end of the First World War, just under 2 million American soldiers were serving on the Western Front. Over the next month, 250,000 doughboys marched into Germany as part of an Allied occupation of the Rhineland. Tens of thousands more Americans remained in France and provided crucial logistical support. The American occupation would last until 1923, when the last soldiers withdrew and the Europeans continued the difficult process of restoring the continent to stability. American political, military, and



business leaders quickly turned their attention to dismantling the vast war machine built during 1917 and 1918. Returning soldiers to their civilian lives and shifting to a peacetime economy proved almost as difficult as mobilization, but without the unifying impulse the war provided. Just as the war produced unique challenges for the nation, so too did the process of demobilization. American armed forces underwent a massive reduction in force and returned to peace in a world fundamentally altered by war. This publication has been issued as CMH Pub 77–9 and will be available for purchase by the general public from the Government Publishing Office.



## OPENING OF THE NATIONAL MUSEUM OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY

The U.S. Army announced that the National Museum of the United States Army (NMUSA) will officially open to the public on 4 June 2020. The 185,000-square-foot museum is now under construction near Fort Belvoir, Virginia, just south of Washington, D.C. Admission to the museum will be free of charge, though tickets must be requested through an online reservation system for a specific date and time. A limited number of tickets will be available for each reservation slot to help ensure a quality experience for everyone. Due to the expected demand, visitors are being reminded to wait until they have received confirmation of their tickets before making travel plans. More details about the ticket reservation system are expected in early 2020. For further information visit the Army Historical Foundation’s Web site, <https://armyhistory.org/opening-day>.

## CORRECTION TO ARMY HISTORY NO. 113, FALL 2019

In the News Notes of issue 113, we mistakenly identified the pamphlet *The Russian Expeditions, 1917–1920* as CMH Pub 77–9. The correct publication number is CMH Pub 77–10.



# A NOVEL PROPOSITION

Indian Regulars in the U.S. Army in the 1890s

By **David McCormick**



Courtesy of Worthpoint Corp


Two unidentified Indian cavalry troopers



Indian noncommissioned officers from Troop L, 1st Cavalry, 1893


**I**t was in September 1894, while visiting Mount Vernon Barracks, Alabama, when Capt. Marion P. Maus caught sight of the Apache warrior Natchez among a number of other men from his tribe. Natchez had fought fiercely against Maus eight years earlier during the Sierra Madre campaign. Natchez, now in his U.S. Army uniform with its first sergeant stripes, impressed Maus with his skillful handling of the Indians of Company I, 12th Infantry.<sup>1</sup> What had brought about this transformation of former enemies, now united in a common effort? The end of hostilities between Indians and the U.S. Army came about in the early 1890s, but that was not necessarily a good thing for the Indians who had been partnered with the U.S. Army.

For more than twenty-five years, the Apache, Sioux, Kiowa, Cheyenne, and other tribes had been valuable assets to the U.S. Army, but the cessation of hostilities brought an end to military employment for most of these Indian scouts and police. A small number of Indians were retained to fill the ranks of scout companies in




Marion P. Maus, shown here as a major or lieutenant colonel

Arizona and on the Northern Plains, but many of the Indians, now unemployed, faced a sudden emptiness in their lives. As chance would have it, just as the Indians were released from service as scouts, the



The Apache warrior Natchez

Army faced lagging enlistments in its soldier ranks. In order to reverse the enlistment problem, the War Department ordered the recruitment of a maximum of 1,485 Indians to serve in the regular



California State University, San Bernardino

James McLaughlin

Army. This not only beefed up the Army ranks, but also took the sting out of Indian unemployment.<sup>2</sup>


Maj. William H. Powell first proposed the idea of enlisting Indians to serve as soldiers in the Army. In 1898, he wrote that there were “some noble qualities in the Indian character, as well as in that of the white man, and through the influence of a soldier’s life these qualities would naturally be developed,

and they themselves be made to feel that they were a part and parcel of the government.”<sup>3</sup> Powell felt strong enough in his convictions to pen three articles for *United Service*, a monthly periodical reporting on military affairs. In his first piece, “Soldier or Granger?,” he proposed that American Indians be recruited into the U.S. Army as regular soldiers, not as scouts—who essentially were Army contractors—as most officers viewed their limited role in the Army. He stressed that the Indians possessed a warlike disposition and were extremely partial to all of the trappings of war, wanting nothing to do with tilling the soil. He disputed the fact that they could be coaxed into farming, as they were acclimated to a wholly dissimilar manner of life. Powell suggested instead that the Army should “educate them to our ways by employing them in that which is the most acceptable to their instincts and tastes—that is, make soldiers of them.”<sup>4</sup> Powell added that “the physical endurance of the Indian was unequalled, with the ability to cover lengthy distances by foot.”<sup>5</sup> He also noted the demoralizing effect of keeping young warriors dependent on allotments that, to them, were nothing more than handouts. Powell felt that they would like to be in the fray, imitating their fierce ancestors. He noted that he was present at Fort Laramie in 1868, when Red Cloud of the Oglala Sioux, with three thousand of his clan, arrived to place his mark on the treaty that would end hostilities between the United States

and the Sioux. Powell recorded the scene he had witnessed twenty-one years earlier and recalled when the Sioux had approached the fort in formation. He exclaimed, “No troops could have moved with more regularity, or have been tactically better handled than these Indians. The sight was beautiful to look at, and reminded us of old war times.”<sup>6</sup>

Powell received such a favorable response to his first article that he wrote a second, “The Indian as a Soldier.” He proposed enlisting Indians as soldiers on a trial basis, noting that there were only two objections to his plan: the language barriers between the various tribes, and the Indians’ “barbarous customs which would have to be obliterated.”<sup>7</sup> Powell believed both could be addressed easily. The initial concern could be surmounted by enlisting the graduates of the Indian schools, who were fluent in English, as sergeants within the Indian units, where they could act as translators. Also, white officers could pick up the basics of sign language from them. As for the second objection, Powell believed that “contact with civilization in time removes . . . elements of barbarism.”<sup>8</sup> Powell’s third *United Service* article, “The Indian Problem,” echoed his previously published sentiments on enlisting Indians into the U.S. Army.<sup>9</sup>

Powell was not the lone voice in the wilderness; he drew strong declarations of support from those who lived and worked alongside the potential new recruits. James McLaughlin, an Office of Indian Affairs agent at the Standing Rock Sioux Reserva-



Left to right: General Crook (*Library of Congress*); Frank C. Armstrong (*Alabama Department of Archives and History*); Benjamin H. Grierson, shown here as a colonel (*Library of Congress*); John C. Kelton, shown here as a colonel (*Library of Congress*)

tion of the Dakotas, voiced his support, touting it “a grand thing for the Indians. They are warriors from their childhood, and would make the very best of soldiers.”<sup>10</sup> M. R. Wyman, agent at the Crow Reservation in Montana, weighed in, saying of the Crow warriors, “They are the finest kind of horsemen . . . and, in my opinion, would make the finest body of light cavalry in the country.”<sup>11</sup> Finally, Powell made the financial argument, citing the War Department’s own numbers. It had spent about \$2 million in quelling the Ghost Dance and Messiah Craze among the Sioux of South Dakota in 1890–1891.<sup>12</sup> Noted artist Frederic Remington also agreed with Powell, adding that military service could be the federal government’s best tool in aiding the Indians, to bridge the chasm between their culture and the white man’s world. The warrior culture was all they had known for generations—agriculture would not do.<sup>13</sup>

Powell argued that a senior officer such as Maj. Gen. George R. Crook backed his Indian soldier scheme. When Crook discussed his use of Indian scouts in the campaign against Apaches in Arizona, he stated, “During the entire campaign, from first to last, without any exception, every successful encounter with the hostiles was due exclusively to the exertions of Indian scouts.”<sup>14</sup> Powell must have misconstrued Crook’s approval of the Indians as scouts as meaning that he favored the idea of them as regular Army soldiers, because Crook wasted little time in voicing his opposition to Powell’s plan. On 24 February 1890, he wrote to Army Adjutant General Brig. Gen. John C. Kelton stating his case against the proposal. Crook believed Indians served well as scouts and reservation policemen, but being thrown into the world of the Army, with its rigid discipline and its units of soldiers fighting in unison, would be too much for their individuality to overcome. Crook felt fondness and sympathy for the Indians, and he did not want to see them fail in this endeavor, which might further demean them in the eyes of the white man. At least one other senior Army officer spoke out against Powell’s proposal. In his 1890 annual report, Brig. Gen. Benjamin H. Grierson signaled his agreement with General Crook’s assessment.<sup>15</sup>

However, there were advocates of recruiting Indians for the Army as regular soldiers. One was Frank C. Armstrong, an inspector for the Indian Service. He had enlisted 120 Cheyenne Dog soldiers as Army


scouts in 1885, when there was a threat of an outbreak of violence in Oklahoma. The Cheyenne warriors proved effective in foiling the action. Armstrong was convinced they would be successful as Indian soldiers. But Armstrong differed from Powell in a key way: he supported assimilating the Indians into white companies instead of keeping them set apart in individual units.<sup>16</sup>

Both Powell and Armstrong were looking for other senior officers who were willing to test the waters. Brig. Gen. John R. Brooke, commanding the Department of the Platte, perceived the endeavor as “an effectual means of civilization for a certain class of Indians that cannot it seems be reached in any other practical means.”<sup>17</sup> Brooke backed Powell’s recommendation of structuring the Indian soldiers into separate companies under the leadership of white officers, seasoned by the rigors of the frontier. He felt posting them far from their reservations was key to successful results. Secretary of War Redfield Proctor and Maj. Gen. John M. Schofield, the Army’s commanding general, saw merit in Powell’s stratagem, but still had reservations. They elected to assess how strong a commitment the Indians possessed to enlist in the Army in greater numbers. They determined that expanding the scout program might offer an insight. In the spring of 1890, the War Department issued orders for the enlistment of two 100-man scout companies. One of the companies, assigned

to Fort Keogh, Montana, was commanded by 1st Lt. Edward W. Casey, 22d Infantry. The unit, composed of Cheyenne from Montana, became Company A, Department of Dakota. Also known as “Casey’s Scouts,” this unit served during the 1890–1891 campaign in South Dakota. The second company enlisted Comanche and Kiowa warriors from the Southern Plains. This unit was under the command of 1st Lt. Homer W. Wheeler, 5th Cavalry, and assigned to Fort Reno, Indian Territory (Oklahoma).<sup>18</sup>


The success of Casey’s and Wheeler’s 200 scouts—combined with the 800 Sioux and Cheyenne scouts recruited to aid in the 1890–1891 campaign to quell the Messiah Craze—convinced Schofield and Proctor there was a place for Indians in the regular Army. Schofield saw this scheme as a win-win situation: “First, to diminish by that number the braves who might otherwise become enemies, and to increase to the same extent the number of United States troops.”<sup>19</sup> Schofield was savvy; the young warriors wanted rifles in their hands, not hoes. Schofield touted the young warriors as “natural soldiers.” The Indians had lined up to enlist as scouts, and their proficiency as such had been demonstrated time and again. But would they be as quick to enlist on a more permanent basis—three or more years instead of three months?<sup>20</sup>

Before going ahead, Schofield decided to query the officers commanding scout



The Washington Sketch Book Supplement

John R. Brooke, shown here as a major general




Library of Congress

Secretary Proctor

companies to see if there was interest among the Indian scouts in enlisting in the Army for a term of five years. The scouts balked at a commitment of that duration. One of those officers, Col. William R. Shafter, found that the Indians most objected to being infantrymen. They wanted no part of trudging along the ground. Second Lt. Guy H. Preston, commanding Company A, Sioux Scouts, at Pine Ridge, South Dakota, reported that both the Oglala Sioux and neighboring Brulé Sioux were “horse Indians and among them all I cannot find a man who is willing to leave the reservation as an infantry soldier . . . the idea of going afoot and carrying the heavy rifle is repugnant to them also.”<sup>21</sup> Preston also added another barrier to the program. These warrior horsemen valued their horses above all else and would not go marching off to battle without them. These results aside, Schofield was not disheartened and remained unwavering in his support. On 7 March 1891, he remarked that, “so novel a proposition as the enlistment for a term of years as regular soldiers, rather than as scouts for a short period, could not be expected to be at first acceptable to the Indians.”<sup>22</sup> Rather than giving up on the plan, Schofield was convinced the solution to the lack of enthusiasm was to restrict the Indians from enlisting as scouts, leaving joining as regular soldiers as the only option open to them. Proctor was in agreement. Two days later, on 9 March, General Kelton issued General Order

28 to execute the plan. This order was not for the 3,000 Indian enlistees initially asked for, above the Army’s 25,000-man cap, but only 2,000 enlistees within the 25,000-man force.<sup>23</sup> General Order 28 specified the need for eight troops of Indian cavalry as well as nineteen companies of Indian infantry, one attached to each regiment posted west of the Mississippi River, excluding Negro units. Each troop and company would enlist fifty-five Indians, and whenever possible, they would be posted near home. Also, the rule for being fluent in English was abandoned. Lastly, to have a better chance of enticing Indians into enlisting as regular soldiers, the number of Army scouts was cut back. The maximum number of scouts allowed for the entire Army had been set at 1000—it was now drastically cut to 150.<sup>24</sup>

General Brooke and Maj. Gen. Nelson A. Miles, commander of the Military Division of the Missouri, balked at this last stipulation. Brooke, commanding the Department of the Platte, called for an exception to this abrupt cutback in the number of scouts. He argued that the term his scouts signed up for during the Messiah Craze movement was still in effect. To them, being discharged earlier without cause would be considered a betrayal of their loyalty. It certainly would not endear them to the idea of joining the Army as soldiers. General Miles had even more reason to wish to be excluded from this requirement, which, he reported, would definitely weaken his operations. His Sioux, Crow, and Cheyenne scouts were serving as “secret police, and in such service, they are very valuable in discovering and securing arms.”<sup>25</sup> In both cases, the Indian scouts were allowed to complete their enlistments that



Library of Congress

General Schofield

would end by July. Miles concluded that to let them finish their terms of service might encourage them to reenlist—this time as regular Army.<sup>26</sup>

General Brooke opined that it might befit the Army to assign a number of prominent Indians at Pine Ridge as sergeants and corporals to the proposed Indian company he was establishing. Brooke trusted that these new noncommissioned Indian officers had the respect of fellow warriors who would follow them into the ranks. General Order 28 allowed department commanders to make these appointments if they wished to do so.<sup>27</sup>

In the spring of 1891, enlistment personnel, working for judiciously selected officers, initi-



U.S. Army

Lieutenant Wheeler



Library of Congress

A panoramic illustration of Fort Reno



William R. Shafter, shown here as a major general

ated recruitment on the reservations. Before thirty days had passed, Lt. Edward Dravo of the 6th Cavalry had recruited Sioux warriors from the Rosebud Reservation, South Dakota. They filled the ranks of Troop L, stationed at Fort Niobrara, Nebraska. Some of these enlistees had fought bravely against the U.S. Cavalry in previous conflicts. During the following six months, several more Indian units were established. Troop L, 1st Cavalry, at Fort Custer, Montana, was composed of Crow; Troop L, 2d Cavalry, at Fort Wingate, New Mexico, was mostly made up of Navajo; Company I, 8th Infantry, at Fort Washakie, Wyoming, consisted of several different tribes; Company I, 3d Infantry, was stationed at Fort Sully, South Dakota, and was recruited from the ranks of the Cheyenne River Sioux; Company I, 20th Infantry, stationed at Camp Poplar River, Montana, was made up of Assiniboine and Sioux warriors; Company I, 22d Infantry, was assigned to Fort Yates in North Dakota and would be filled with Sioux from the Standing Rock Reservation.<sup>28</sup>


Company I, 9th Infantry, posted at Fort Whipple, Arizona, was composed of Apaches from the San Carlos Reservation.<sup>29</sup> They soon demonstrated their skills to Lt. Charles W. Dodge Jr. After arriving at Fort Whipple, he led them on a fifty-mile trek and reported they were “as fine a set of young men as were ever recruited for the U.S. Army.” Dodge went on to say, “They showed total obedience to orders and a compelling desire to become

good soldiers.”<sup>30</sup> Company I, 10th Infantry, at Fort Apache, Arizona, also included Apaches. Company I, 12th Infantry, was formed at Mount Vernon Barracks, Alabama. This last unit was made up of Apache prisoners as well as warriors from the San Carlos Reservation, Arizona. From all reports, the first six months of this experiment appeared successful, which had everything to do with the immense efforts of the Army officers involved.<sup>31</sup>

Despite the recent killing of so many Sioux at Wounded Knee, the Army’s recruiting personnel successfully enlisted a significant number of Sioux warriors from their reservation in South Dakota. Of the eleven Indian units formed within the Departments of Dakota and the Platte, six were composed of Sioux Indians. But it was not an easy venture. Capt. Richard H. Pratt, superintendent of the Indian School at Carlisle, Pennsylvania—and an early supporter of Indian enlistments—visited the Pine Ridge Agency during the summer of 1891. He found that preliminary attempts to recruit the Army scouts there as regular soldiers for Company I, 2d Infantry, had been unsuccessful. He was not surprised because he knew why it failed. He reasoned that the recruiting efforts should wait until the “scouts are discharged and after their money is gone.” The commander of the 2d Infantry concurred, replying, “money and food are now more abundant with the Sioux Indians than for years; this fact retards enlistments.”<sup>32</sup>

One curious problem occurred at the Fort Hall Indian Agency in Idaho. When 1st Lt. William H. Johnston Jr. was attempting to enlist Bannock Indians to serve in Company I, 16th Infantry, he discovered that the war chief of the tribe bitterly opposed his efforts because of the directive that all recruits be vaccinated for smallpox. The chief mistakenly thought that his warriors were being branded so that they could be recognized if they later deserted. Johnston explained to the chief that all soldiers—black, Indian, and white—were to be inoculated to prevent smallpox and nothing more, but the chief would not be persuaded. Johnston relayed that he foresaw “no hope of obtaining a single recruit at Fort Hall.” This enlistment endeavor, once transferred to the Rosebud Reservation, was successful in filling the ranks.<sup>33</sup>

Another looming issue was the requirement of General Order 28 that no more than ten married Indians could be enlisted in each troop or company. The man in charge



Edward Dravo, shown here as a colonel

of recruiting for Troop L, 7th Cavalry, 1st Lt. Hugh L. Scott, a strong advocate for the Indian soldier experiment, spoke out against this limit on married Indians. He explained that it was characteristic of Indians to wed at a young age. As a result, there were very few unmarried Indians on the Kiowa reservation with whom to fill a cavalry troop. This was not an isolated incident—other recruiting officers made similar complaints. 1st Lt. John



General Miles

H. Kinzie, recruiting at Pine Ridge, gave an account of his dilemma in enlisting warriors for the 2d Infantry. He found very few Indians over eighteen years of age who were unmarried. Further, the married soldiers who were interested in enlisting did not want to leave their families behind, though, according to Kinzie, “even if they could take their families, they could not support them on their pay.”<sup>34</sup> As a result of all of these factors, Secretary Proctor permitted recruiters to waive the limit on married soldiers. However, Kinzie and Scott were directed by Proctor not to lessen their efforts in recruiting as many single Indians as possible. They were also instructed to notify the married Indians that they could claim “no special privileges because of their married status.”<sup>35</sup> While it was not the intent of the Army to move the Indians away from their reservations, the crucial objective of this experiment was to meld the Indian forces into a steadfast “military force of the United States,” which could be called on whenever and wherever they were needed.<sup>36</sup>

When Proctor released his annual report for 1891, it revealed that the first year of the Indian enlistment experiment was a “total success.”<sup>37</sup> Three troops of cavalry and four companies of infantry had been filled. Seven more had been filled in part. The secretary decided to visit some of the Indian units and appeared to be enthusiastic over the conditions he found. He commented:

When it is considered, that a short time ago many of these Indian soldiers were “blanket Indians,” that few of them had ever had on a suit of clothes, slept under a roof, ate at a table, used a knife and fork, wore shoes, or had their hair cut, the transformation is indeed remarkable. . . . It is not only an important step toward their civilization, self-support and control, but is the cheapest and best insurance against further Indian troubles.<sup>38</sup>

Not everyone saw the merit in the Indian soldier endeavor, however. Stories of Indians’ drunkenness were played up in the press. Maj. Theodore Shawan, assistant adjutant general, decided to look into the allegations at Fort Whipple. He found the basis of these reports—that the entire troop of Indians was drunk and on a rampage—was, in fact, only one intoxicated Indian soldier.<sup>39</sup> Nevertheless, an irate citizen assailed the War Department for placing weapons in the hands of savages.<sup>40</sup> There was also opposition within the Army. An



Richard H. Pratt, shown here as a lieutenant

anonymous officer voiced disapproval in an editorial printed in the 16 May 1891 issue of the *Army and Navy Journal*. In the piece, he ascribed the fall of ancient Greece, Carthage, and Rome to their dependence on “barbaric mercenaries.” He followed with the warning that “the utilization of Indian soldiers would undermine the moral



Hugh L. Scott, shown here as a brigadier general

fiber of America.”<sup>41</sup> Another soldier who took issue in the *Army and Navy Journal* opined, “The establishment of these Indian regiments is a dangerous innovation. Experience of other governments with mercenaries is not a happy one.”<sup>42</sup> Even Captain Pratt, having earlier recommended a program akin to this present one, was now decidedly an opponent of the experiment. When Pratt corresponded with the War Department in the summer of 1891, he conveyed his dissatisfaction and hoped that the secretary of war “would let his Indian enlistment scheme die.” Oddly, in spite of his disapproving view, Pratt still suggested a number of his Indian school graduates for noncommissioned officer posts.<sup>43</sup>

Proponents of the program had, from the start, anticipated hostility from the Department of Interior’s Office of Indian Affairs, but this was not the case. Secretary of the Interior John W. Noble’s annual report for the first year of the experiment was surprisingly supportive. Noble stated that “every possible encouragement and help” was accorded to the recruiting efforts on the reservations. He added, “Much good will result . . . no less to the Indians enlisted than to the peace and quiet of the settlements in the vicinity of the reservations, by enlisting the young men who would otherwise be idle, and possibly restless.”<sup>44</sup> In reporting on his recruiting trips to the various reservations, Capt. Robert Lee, who had the job of overseeing Indian recruitment for the Departments of the Dakota and the Platte, confirmed that the Indian agents were cooperative and helpful, at least in the early stages.<sup>45</sup>

Despite these varying accounts, General Schofield assessed the results of enlisting Indians as soldiers as “very satisfactory” in his September 1892 report, and he advocated for the experiment to be carried forward.<sup>46</sup> By the following month, a number of Indian units had progressed to the point that two of them were cherry-picked to be symbols of the Army at the 1893 Columbian Exposition dedication in Chicago. Indian soldiers were selected out of Troop L, 3d Cavalry, from Fort Meade, South Dakota, and Troop L, 6th Cavalry, of Fort Niobrara. The Indian troopers, all of whom were Sioux warriors, garnered significant attention from fairgoers and the press. It was not lost on the attendees that the Indian troopers had, up until a short while ago, been the adversary. As a *Chicago Tribune* headline stated, “Lots of People Visit the Indian Soldiers’ Camp.”<sup>47</sup> The paper took

special note of the fact that the 3d Cavalry troop included many followers of Big Foot, who had survived the carnage at Wounded Knee. Two Indians who had been shot and wounded at the hands of the U.S. Cavalry were now enlisted in the 3d Cavalry. The *Tribune* identified the warrior named Drops Two as one of them: “He claims that he killed two soldiers [at Wounded Knee] and immediately took this name.”<sup>48</sup>

According to the new secretary of war, Stephen B. Elkins, the Indian enlistment experiment was “essentially philanthropic and not military.”<sup>49</sup> During 1892, the scheme seemed likely to develop into a permanent program, and Elkins believed the endeavor must do so “without imposing a burden upon the limited resources set aside exclusively for the regular military establishment” and without adversely affecting “the efficiency of the Army.”<sup>50</sup> To ensure this measure, Elkins endorsed the passage of a new bill (S. 2083) that was introduced by now Senator Redfield Proctor. The bill sought congressional approval to enlist up to 3,000 Indians. The measure, advanced on 8 February 1892, stipulated that the Indian enrollments would be above and separate from the official enlisted force of the Army.<sup>51</sup> But the bill died on the vine, never making it out of committee to reach the floor for congressional debate.<sup>52</sup>


During 1893, chinks began to appear in the Indian soldier program as Indian satisfaction with Army life began to wane. Fewer men enlisted. Four Indian companies that had not attained their full complement of men were disbanded, and the Indians were discharged. One particularly disheartening episode concerned Company I, 22d Infantry, at Fort Yates, which was disbanded despite its ranks

being full. The Army had been planning on moving this company from the Standing Rock Reservation due to the unit’s supposed drunkenness and the fact that agent James McLaughlin deemed the men of the 22d a bad influence on other Indians of his agency. When the Company I soldiers balked at the proposed relocation, they were given the option of transferring to another company or being discharged. As a group, they decided on discharge, and on 30 April 1893, they were mustered out. Though Schofield remained by-and-large content with the results of the experiment, he admitted that the situation with the 22d had been “wholly unsuccessful.”<sup>53</sup>

These were not the only instances of Indian soldiers wanting out. Indian soldiers could secure their release from the Army following one or more years of service. A number of Sioux—Troops L of the 3d and 6th Cavalries—opted out of the army after their terms of service were complete. Company I, 21st Infantry, at Fort Sidney, Nebraska, however, was a case in the extreme. In the fall of 1893, the whole company appealed to be relieved of their military obligation. The reasons behind their request were explained thus: “When we were enlisted, we were told that ten men might be connected with the company and keep their families with them. But nineteen married men were enlisted. Part of us left our families at home and part have them with us, but we find neither way satisfactory. . . . We want to go back home where we can look after our families.” They had to wait until the following year to gain their discharges.<sup>54</sup>

With the number of disillusioned Indian soldiers mounting, dissatisfaction with the Indian soldier program also was rising

within the War Department. The adjutant general informed General Schofield that it was “becoming more and more apparent that many intricate and perplexing questions connected with the companies of Indian soldiers will be presented to the Department for action.”<sup>55</sup> He advised that the Indian troops and companies, should be “systematically examined,” in order to keep Schofield and the secretary of war “in possession of full and complete information concerning their condition.” But Schofield himself was not ready to throw in the towel on the trial. To him, the plan had proved successful to this point—two main aims had been attained. First, a number of young warriors “who were generally dissatisfied and liable at any time to become hostile” were kept busy rather than being dangerously idle. Second, the value of “the warlike tribes of Indians as part of the military strength of the United States” had not yet been appraised. Schofield believed it “too early to reach a final conclusion upon this question. Results vary from one extreme to the other. In some cases, the Indian troops have proved highly satisfactory. In others, less so.” Schofield conveyed one relatively unexpected and woeful observation: a number of Indian soldiers from warlike clans had ceded their “military character” and had become too “docile” due to interaction with the white man. Schofield concluded that the Indians “may be counted




Fort Whipple, c. 1893



Secretary Elkins

Library of Congress



Major McClure

as of no military consequence either for or against the United States.”<sup>56</sup>

Despite these negative reports, the Indian soldiers effectively accomplished numerous military assignments, participated successfully in combat training, and were commended for their progress. Several individual units were involved in and completed security assignments. One such detail was handled by Troop L of the 7th Cavalry in July 1894, when it served as the armed escort for Army paymaster Maj. Charles McClure. The unit was solely responsible for safely deliv-

ering the soldiers’ payroll from Fort Sill to Rush Springs, Indian Territory.<sup>57</sup> In another successful assignment, which took place in January 1892, eleven of “Casey’s Scouts” from Fort Keogh were ordered to capture the errant warrior Walks-in-the-Night. The Indian troopers returned to the fort with their man in tow to stand trial. In 1894, rioters from “Coxey’s Army”—a large group of unemployed workers who were protesting economic conditions in the U.S.—were sent in to take over the trains, but Troop L, 8th Cavalry, was sent to Forsyth, Montana, and derailed them. This incident was also unusual in that it was the only instance in which the U.S. Army deployed Indian troops against white Americans.<sup>58</sup>

With the election of S. Grover Cleveland as president, there was a changing of the guard at the War Department. In November 1893, Daniel S. Lamont of New York became the new secretary of war. Secretary Lamont was not as enthusiastic as Proctor or even Elkins had been about the idea of Indian soldiers in the Army. But he did note that there were several opinions on the matter, both for and against. The number of Indian soldiers remaining in the Army had dropped considerably, decreasing to 771 by 30 June 1893.<sup>59</sup> This level of attrition made a strong argument against enlarging the Indian force, but Lamont recognized that some arguments for continuing the program were valid. He stated, “The advisability of employing individual Indians as scouts. . . has never been called into question.”<sup>60</sup> But by the time Lamont submitted his annual report

for 1894, the writing was on the wall. The Indian units remaining numbered only six cavalry troops and four infantry companies—a total of 547 men. In July 1893, Lamont gave orders to muster out the three Indian units at Fort Wingate, Walla Walla, and Spokane.<sup>61</sup> An accounting of the demise of the experiment appeared in the 3 March 1894 issue of *Army and Navy Journal*, wherein it was stated there was “little doubt among officers of the Army. . . that the experiment of enlisting Indians for soldiers was a failure.” It was also believed that within just a few months, the troops and companies would be “skeletonized,” leading to the disappearance of the units within two years.<sup>62</sup>

There were several reasons for the decline in numbers in a program that had seemed to hold such promise less than three years earlier. The language barrier was still a major impediment. It was all well and good to lift the requirement of English fluency for enlistment—doing so certainly improved recruiting numbers—but not being able to understand what was being said to them probably left the Indians feeling embarrassed and inferior. The Indians seemed restless and unhappy with the regimens of military life. Homesickness was a strong motivation drawing them away from military life, and once the shine dulled on the novelty of military service, the Indians wanted out. By mid-1895, only one Indian unit remained.<sup>63</sup>

The unit left standing was now Capt. Hugh L. Scott’s Troop L, 7th Cavalry, which was



Fort Wingate, c. 1875



Poor Buffalo

posted at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, and composed chiefly of Kiowa and Comanche as well as a small number of Cheyenne and Arapaho. Scott was able to fill his troop due to his good rapport with the Kiowa chief, Poor Buffalo. Scott had served at Fort Meade and was among the Army's staunchest adherents of carrying out the Indian-soldier experiment. He believed in a healthy "give and take" with his men; he allowed them to leave their hair long, saying, "let it drag on the ground as far as I'm concerned." Yet despite Scott's willingness to accept their longer hair, the Indians eventually had to give in to Army regulations and cut their hair anyway.<sup>64</sup> Scott also sought and received special approval from Secretary Lamont to permit young enlistees to bring their wives with them. While this permission was granted, the wives were stopped short of going along with their husbands on campaigns.<sup>65</sup> These allowances contributed to the success of Scott's troop, but as he himself noted, Troop L was successful "only as long as he had stayed with it." He added that the officers of Indian units "could not be changed around as in white troops," suggesting that the stability of personnel in his unit was critical to its success. Scott remained with his 7th Cavalry troop for the duration of its existence, and that made all the difference. But Scott also understood that the success of his unit was atypical. "Since all the other troops were a disappointment," Scott explained, "the experiment of enlisting Indians was regarded as a failure." Scott's Troop L, 7th Cavalry, served until 31 May 1897, when its complement of fifty-three Indians was discharged.<sup>66</sup>

According to the Army's adjutant general, 1,071 men in total had served during the trial. In his words, the Indian enlistees "never reached a degree of substantial success as useful soldiers," notwithstanding the "strenuous and intelligent efforts" by recruiters and troop and company commanders.<sup>67</sup> Scott took issue with that statement, responding, "Innumerable obstacles were thrown in my way by unthinking officers." Though he never identified the officers or explained which obstacles he meant, Scott did add that "support in Washington was withheld by a change of the Secretary of War."<sup>68</sup>

By the time General Schofield mustered out of service in September 1895, the Indian-soldier experiment had waned to the point it was rated a failure. Secretary Proctor had initiated the program with a flourish, but his successors did little to support its continuation.



Library of Congress

Secretary Lamont

Although the experimental program of the 1890s ultimately failed, it at least set the stage for the future successes of Native Americans, who have served honorably and well in the United States' armed forces ever since. During World War I, when all Native Americans were required to register for the draft even though most of them were not yet viewed as full citizens, 6,500 Native men were drafted into military service, while

another 5,000 volunteered. The Onondaga and Oneida tribes went so far as to declare war on Germany, and many Native Americans volunteered for the most perilous missions. They paid a price for these daring efforts, losing about 5 percent of those who served compared to the 1 percent loss for U.S. troops overall.<sup>69</sup> Famously, the Navajo code talkers of World War II followed in the footsteps of the Choctaw warriors of World War I. Just as the Choctaw telephone squads had frustrated the efforts of the Germans in the Great War, so too did the Navajo and other tribes such as the Tlingit of southeast Alaska during the Second World War. These Army warriors were also proficient in hand-to-hand fighting and served well as snipers.<sup>70</sup> During the Korean War, Native Americans served in the upper echelons of the Army:

Major General Hal L. Muldrow Jr., a Choctaw, commanded the Division Artillery, 45th Infantry Division, from Dec. 10, 1951, to May 22, 1952. Colonel, and later Brigadier General, Otwa Autry of the Creek Nation commanded the 189th Field Artillery Battalion, 45th Infantry Division, until May 1952. The 189th delivered some of the heaviest artillery fire during the battles for Hills 191 (T-Bone Ridge) and 275 (Old Baldy) during the summer of 1952.<sup>71</sup>

As in these three previous wars, Native Americans were heavily entrenched during the Vietnam War, in which more than 42,000 Native Americans served admirably.<sup>72</sup>



Oklahoma Hall of Fame

General Muldrow

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### Editor's Note

The terms "Indian" and "Indians" have been used in this article in keeping with the vernacular of the period and the naming conventions of the day. The use of Native American at the end of the article is an acknowledgement that Indian and Indians are no longer acceptable nomenclature.



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# NMUSA FEATURE



## THE WRIGHT FLYER

The National Museum of the United States Army (NMUSA) exhibits team recently moved an exact reproduction of the 1908 Wright Model A Flyer from the National Air and Space Museum's Steven F. Udvar-Hazy Center to its new location in the NMUSA's *Army and Society* gallery. Positioned on a platform near the R-4B Sikorsky helicopter, the flyer symbolizes the Army's early recognition that manned flight would be valuable to the military.

In 1908, Orville Wright began a series of test flights at Fort Myer, Virginia, in a bid for an Army contract. The tests were a major success until September when tragedy struck and the flyer crashed. The passenger, 1st. Lt. Thomas E. Selfridge, died, becoming the first American soldier to lose his life in a flight accident. After the crash, the Wright brothers quickly made improvements and built a new flyer to continue their testing.

According to Paul Morando, exhibits chief at the NMUSA, "when the flight trials resumed at Fort Myer in 1909, the Wright brothers not only met, they exceeded the Army's challenge to develop an aircraft that could maintain a speed of forty miles per hour and remain airborne for one hour with one passenger on board." In turn, the Army purchased the 1909 flyer for \$30,000, making it the world's first military airplane.

Since the 1908 flyer was damaged beyond repair in the crash, no example of the Model A existed until 2008 when Ken Hyde and his team at the Wright Experience built an exact reproduction based on the Wright brothers' original materials and specifications. The flyer's frame is made of aluminized painted wood with metal cabling, and the wings are covered in cotton muslin. A unique, four-cylinder, 31-horsepower, water-cooled engine sits in the middle of the flyer, directly behind the pilot's seat.

While waiting for the NMUSA exhibit space to be ready, the flyer was on loan to the Smithsonian Institution and displayed at the

Udvar-Hazy Center. The three-day move required precise coordination and planning by a team of experts. "By disassembling the flyer at Udvar-Hazy and reassembling at the National Army Museum, I gained an even greater appreciation of what the Wright brothers were doing more than one hundred years ago," Morando remarked. It took a team of people, carefully balancing the forty-foot wingspan on dollies, and a forklift to load the flyer safely into a trailer with only two inches to spare on each side. "Very slowly, the truck backed up to the flyer and we maneuvered it in the tiniest movements, bit by bit, into the trailer," recalled Morando. "It looked as if the truck was swallowing up the flyer into its trailer."

Upon arrival at the NMUSA, the flyer was offloaded and installed in a newly constructed exhibit space that displays other Army innovations such as the FPN-40 Radar and the Liberty Truck. The *Army and Society* gallery focuses on the symbiotic relationship between the Army, its civilian government, and the people. This gallery will introduce visitors to military and civilian advancements which support geography, science, technology, engineering, and math learning activities.

The National Museum of the United States Army is scheduled to open on 4 June 2020.

### NOTE

Patrick R. Jennings, "The Big Four' Move In!" *Army History* 106 (Winter 2018): 32-37.



Image: Orville and Wilbur Wright's historic flight at Kitty Hawk, N.C., 17 December 1903



The teams from Udvar-Hazy and the NMUSA carefully maneuver the Wright Flyer reproduction into a trailer.



The Wright Flyer arrives at the NMUSA.



The Wright Flyer is reassembled in the NMUSA's Army and Society Gallery near the R-4B Sikorsky helicopter.



A member of the NMUSA exhibits team cleans and prepares the Wright Flyer for permanent installation.



The Wright Flyer on display in its permanent home in the NMUSA's Army and Society Gallery

# U.S. ARMY ARTIFACT SPOTLIGHT



## GUIDES TO THE WEST Enlisted Native American United States Scouts

By Dieter Stenger

As early as the Revolutionary War, Native Americans served alongside American militia and regular troops of the Continental Army. Since then, Native Americans have served with distinction in most major wars fought by the United States.

Following the American Civil War, the U.S. Army enlisted and hired Indian scouts and authorized the formation of Indian companies within regular infantry and cavalry regiments. During the Indian campaigns, scouts were recruited from each tribe's traditional enemies to serve as guides, trackers, and diplomats. In so doing, the Native Americans serving in the U.S. Army gained the confidence and respect of Army leaders.<sup>1</sup>

By 9 March 1891, General Order 28 incorporated Indian soldiers within Company I of infantry regiments (excluding the 24th and 25th) and Troop L of cavalry regiments (excluding the 9th and 10th). Each existing regiment of cavalry and infantry contained one Indian regiment, with the exception of the black regiments known as the Buffalo Soldiers. No more than fifty-five Indians were authorized for each company or troop. While the general order permitted roughly 1,500 Indians for Regular Army service, the actual number of recruits was about half that. In the end, homesickness, lack of education, and prevailing racism brought an end to the "experiment" of Indian companies. Only the Indian soldiers of Troop L, 7th Cavalry, in Fort Sill, Oklahoma, remained in service until 31 May 1897.<sup>2</sup>

Jason Betzinez, an Indian scout who served as a prisoner of war at Fort Sill from 1900 to 1914, was the head blacksmith for the Apache prisoners of war, whose ranks included his second cousin Geronimo, Naiche, Chichuahua, Loco, and other Apache warriors. A Warm Spring Apache, Betzinez also served on scout duty, in the fields, and on Apache cattle roundups on the military reservation. The detachment of prisoner-of-war scouts was disbanded in 1914 when the Apaches left Fort Sill. Jason Betzinez died in 1960 at age 100.

The depicted campaign hat, which was worn by Betzinez, now serves as a primary source of information for this particular moment in history. Its details—the three-inch wide brim, the original tan silk ribbon with bow, and the evidence of extensive use—provide context and connection to help us understand our past in ways that are real, visual, and tactile. This hat is professionally maintained at the Fort Sill Museum.

**Dieter Stenger** is a curator of arms and ordnance with the Army Museum Enterprise, Fort Belvoir, Virginia.

### NOTES

1. Trevor K. Plante, "Lead the Way: Researching U.S. Army Indian Scouts, 1866–1914," *Prologue Magazine* 41, no. 2 (Summer 2009), <https://www.archives.gov/publications/prologue/2009/summer/indian.html>; Richard W. Stewart, ed., *American Military History*, vol. 1, *The United States Army and the Forging of a Nation, 1775–1917*, Army Historical Series, 2d ed. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2009), p. 345. In 1866, the Army Reorganization Act authorized the Army "to enlist and employ in the Territories and Indian country a force of Indians not to exceed one thousand to act as scouts, who shall receive the pay and allowances of cavalry soldiers, and be discharged whenever the necessity for further employment is abated, at the discretion of the department commander." U.S. Congress, An Act to Increase and Fix the Military Peace Establishment of the United States, 39th Cong., 1st sess., 28 Jul 1866, ch. 299, p. 322.

2. Robert Lee, "Warriors in Ranks: American Indian Units in the Regular Army, 1891–1897," *South Dakota History* 21, no. 3 (Fall 1991): 273–74, 300–301; Plante, "Lead the Way."





Warm Springs Boys at Carlisle Indian School, Carlisle Barracks, Pa. Jason Betzinez is depicted standing in the center back row.

United States Scout Campaign Hat M1881, worn by Jason Betzinez, a Warm Spring Apache and U.S. Scout.



Geronimo at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, where he enlisted as an Indian Scout for three years on 11 June 1897. Geronimo was sixty-three years old at the time of his enlistment.



Apache Soldiers, Company I, 12th Infantry, 1892



National Archives

National Archives

# EDUCATING and REMEMBERING

THE UNITED STATES ARMY'S WORLD WAR I CENTENNIAL COMMEMORATION PROGRAM

BY CHARLES R. BOWERY JR.



1st Infantry Division color guard and soldiers at the rededication of the division memorial in Cantigny



French and American soldiers at Mort Homme, on the Verdun battlefield, before the Meuse-Argonne historic march

**H**istory and heritage programs are integral to the military, effectively building esprit de corps, critical thinking skills, and perspective in military personnel and organizations. When properly executed, these programs create a sense of organizational longevity and a connection to the past, resulting in more engaged individuals and more effective units. This is particularly evident during periods of commemoration, when these activities instill awareness and pride in past accomplishments. Honoring the past can also inspire further investigation, fostering critical thinking and an appreciation for perspectives that are beneficial to meeting future challenges. Thus, the study of one's organizational history contributes to unit morale and further develops the skills necessary to carry on those lessons of the past in service of the nation.

With these benefits in mind, from April 2017 to November 2018, the U.S. Army conducted a service-level commemoration effort honoring the World War I (WWI) centennial. Because the Army History Program's historians, museum professionals, and archivists designed and implemented the Army's program, it was unique among military service department commemorations in its scope, depth, and intellectual rigor. The program strove to educate the Army and the nation about the war and to communicate themes of

service and sacrifice to a variety of audiences. It included an extensive lineup of print and video products, Web site content, school curricula, museum exhibits, staff rides, and commemoration events. The program took place in Washington, D.C., at installations across the continental United States and overseas, and on the battlefields of Belgium and France.

The U.S. Army's World War I Centennial Commemoration Program provided historical content to Army personnel and American citizens through the creation of historical products, the planning and execution of commemoration events, and an active social media campaign. Army commands and units conducted fifty home-station commemoration events, many at the seventeen current installations established during the mobilization of 1917–1918. Army museums sponsored more than forty temporary WWI exhibitions in 2017 and 2018. Army commemorations in the 1918 area of operations included the participation of personnel from twenty-five of the seventy Field Army, Corps, and Division headquarters at more than 300 separate events throughout France and Belgium, providing more than 400 soldiers the opportunity to visit historic sites and develop a personal connection to the war. This effort included the essential collaboration of the American embassies in France and Belgium; the United States European Command; United

States Army, Europe; the American Battle Monuments Commission (ABMC), the U.S. and French World War I centennial commissions, and the government and army of the Republic of France.

At an overall cost of \$1.8 million, the U.S. Army accomplished all of the objectives of its WWI centennial commemoration program from August 2016 through November 2018, realizing a significant return on investment through the education of tens of thousands of Army personnel and American citizens in the process. The Army led all Department of Defense (DoD) WWI commemorations in scope, reach, and effectiveness, and supported DoD senior leader strategic goals to improve capability and reinforce global alliances. These accomplishments occurred through five lines of effort.

## **1** Planning, Governance, and Resourcing

European belligerent nations began to conduct commemorative activities in August 2014, the beginning of the centennial period. France and the United Kingdom formed national centennial commissions well before this time, and the United States followed suit in early 2014 with the U.S. National World War I Centennial Commission (WWICC). The WWICC conducted a kickoff event in Washington, D.C., in June 2014, bringing together a number of educa-

tion and heritage groups across the country with an interest in the centennial, and initiated a fundraising campaign to design and build a national World War I Memorial in the nation's capital. The U.S. Army Center of Military History (CMH) executive director served as an ex-officio member to the WWICC, and CMH's centennial commemoration program manager represented him at meetings and activities. The WWICC held over seventy-five meetings for all government and nongovernment organizations (private sector, educational, military), as well as the WWICC commissioners (presidential and congressional appointees). Additionally, CMH conducted meetings with representatives from French national and local governments, the French military, the United Kingdom commemoration committee, and the Australian embassies in Paris and in Washington, D.C.

In Europe, the 2016 commemorations of the Battle of Verdun and the Battle of the Somme were overwhelmingly successful. Millions of people from the combatant nations attended in person, and millions more watched the ceremonies on television and the internet. As these various efforts gained momentum in 2014–2016, it became apparent that current Army planning was insufficient to commemorate such an important historical era. From May to August 2016, CMH visualized and developed the outline of a commemoration plan. The program was designed to (1) remember the scope of the Army's participation in WWI; (2) revisit the immense changes that the war brought to both the Army and American society; (3) honor the four million men and women who served during the war and the 300,000 who were killed, wounded, or went missing; and (4) educate the force on its own history, lineage, and connection to the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) of 1917–1919. With the support of the Office of the Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army (OAA), CMH created a commemorations team composed of temporary employees, contractors, and existing CMH employees. OAA worked with the Army National Guard (ARNG) to detail a French-speaking officer to the team to serve as a liaison with French and Belgian authorities. Within CMH, employees with expertise in WWI supported the team in a variety of functions, including building a lineage unit database at regimental to field army levels, developing staff rides and educational products, and supervising the

publication of a commemorative pamphlet series. CMH employees including historians, editors, cartographers, public affairs officers, the digital historian, field programs personnel, and museum curators, as well as Army field historians, ARNG command historians, and contracted historians, were all critical to the full execution of this ambitious commemoration plan.

In the fall of 2016, Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), designated CMH as the office of primary responsibility for the WWI centennial. CMH then established an Army-level WWI commemoration committee composed of representatives from HQDA, U.S. Army Forces Command, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, ARNG, the Office of the Chief of Army Reserve/U.S. Army Reserve Command, U.S. Army, Europe, the Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), and the WWICC.

HQDA Executive Order (EXORD) 101–17, *U.S. Army Commemoration of the World War I Centennial*, was published 31 August 2017 and provided major Army headquarters, commands, agencies, staff elements, installations, and the ARNG and Army Reserve with guidance, governance, roles, responsibilities, and business rules for identifying, synchronizing, integrating, and coordinating key commemorative events and activities. It contained two annexes: public affairs guidance and the WWI lineage master list, which identified units in the current Army force structure that perpetuate the lineages of WWI units

## 2 Outreach and Education

The goal of this line of effort was to increase understanding of the U.S. Army's participation in WWI through a range of print, Web, social media, and video products applicable to multiple military and civilian audiences.

### *Print Publications*

Recognizing its ongoing workforce and fiscal restraints, CMH made the decision to rely, whenever possible, on reprints of existing CMH publications. Thus, over a three-year period, CMH produced twenty-seven new and reprinted historical publications as part of the Army WWI centennial program. The core of the centennial publication effort was the commemorative pamphlet series. Building upon best practices established during previous

commemorations, Dr. Brian F. Neumann, CMH's WWI subject matter expert, supervised a series of ten commemorative pamphlets written by a combination of CMH and external historians. The experts in CMH's Historical Products Division (HDP) revised and edited the pamphlets, developed new maps, and produced beautiful layouts with new photographs and artwork. A commemorative box set of the ten pamphlets is expected to be completed in early 2020.

In partnership with the Army Museum Enterprise (AME), and with AME Curator of Art Sarah Forgey serving as the supervising editor, HDP produced a two-volume box set of coffee table books: *The Great War: U.S. Army Art* and *The Great War: U.S. Army Artifacts*. AME curators nominated WWI objects from the Army's world-wide museum collections for inclusion in the artifact book, which featured new, high-resolution photographs. The art book was organized topically with short descriptive texts for each image.

In another significant effort, the team in HDP rebuilt *American Armies and Battlefields in Europe*, originally published in 1938 and last revised in 1992, for e-text format and a small print run of 750 copies. The resulting book won a 2019 Army Historical Foundation award for reprint histories. To supplement this reprint, CMH historians produced a range of print publications to support overseas commemorations, including participant administrative guides, battle books for units participating in staff rides, participant guides for the two historic marches, information sheets, and posters.

### *Web Resources*

In early 2017, Dr. Erik Villard, the CMH digital military historian, developed and launched a WWI centennial Web site. This public outreach and educational tool provided information about every phase of WWI and included pictures, maps, and videos. CMH used the WWI centennial Web site to promote the commemorative pamphlet series and to provide information on WWI outreach events and ceremonies via the events calendar. The Web site was designed to appeal to a wide audience, ranging from those with a general interest in WWI to experts and scholars in the field. To enhance the site, Villard produced approximately 2,000 PowerPoint slides, including 2,000 digitally enhanced images,



with curriculum-promoting partners such as the Department of Defense Education Activity, the WWICC, the Army Medical Department Museum, and the World War I Museum and Memorial. In March 2018, a representative from CMH attended the Conference for Medicine in World War I, an event with presentations from fifty contributors in the field of WWI medicine, to promote the CMH WWI lesson plans.

**Lesson 1: *Introduction to President Woodrow Wilson.*** Students analyze Wilson's two-term presidency by examining his social beliefs, political stances, and navigation in and out of conflict during WWI.

**Lesson 2: *Naval Warfare and the Lusitania.*** Students are introduced to the concept of European naval blockades and German submarine warfare as a cause of U.S. entry into WWI by examining the sinking of the RMS *Lusitania* in 1915.

**Lesson 3: *The Interception of the Zimmermann Telegram.*** Students examine the path of transmission, interception, and eventual broadcast of the Zimmermann Telegram and evaluate the historical

importance of its discovery and publication as it pertains to the shifting foreign policy perspective of the United States in early 1917.  
**Lesson 4: *Declaration of War.*** Students compare the various viewpoints on U.S. entry into WWI by examining the national debate, congressional contention, and the presidential address to Congress that prompted America to enter the war on the side of the Allies.

**Lesson 5: *The Nation at War.*** Students analyze the geopolitical landscape of Europe to understand how shifting European alliances drew America into military engagement on a foreign continent. Students also examine why the conflict, which was expected to be short and decisive, turned into a war of attrition influencing the U.S. economy, labor force, food, and consumer culture.

**Lesson 6: *Out of the Trenches to Peace after War.*** Students examine the toll of trench warfare on the soldiers of the Allied and Central Powers, analyze the worldwide cost of total war, and evaluate


America's plan for peace after the war.

**Lesson 7: *The Paris Peace Conference, Treaty of Versailles, and League of Nations.*** Students identify the international participants who attended the Paris Peace Conference, interpret the events that took place, and evaluate both the terms of the Treaty of Versailles and the peaceful aims of the formation of the League of Nations.

**Bonus Lesson: *World War I: Medicine and War.*** A collection of twenty-three presentations by noted historians, clinicians, and experts in the field of WWI medicine presented by the Army Medical Department Museum Foundation and the Society for the History of Navy Medicine with the support of the Army Medical Department Center of History and Heritage and the Society for Military History.

### 3 Unit and Installation Commemoration

The CMH Field Programs and Historical Services Directorate developed a database of current Army units with WWI lineage





French and American leaders at the Sissone French Army base, where American personnel were billeted for the 2018 commemorations

and campaign credit down to the regimental, battalion, and (in some cases) company level, as well as a roster of Army installations established for WWI mobilization. These lists were published with the Army EXORD.

Because the AEF lineage list was so large, CMH focused on division-level units and higher for participation in the centennial commemorations. Lineal descendants of WWI combatant units that did not trace to a higher command were also listed and contacted. Thus, former African American units that are now active in the ARNG were given the opportunity to participate. In all, CMH identified and contacted more than sixty units and installations in all three components of the Army, informing them about the Army WWI program, including all of the WWI National Guard divisions and WWI National Army divisions that are currently active in the ARNG and Army Reserve, even those configured as brigade combat teams, training, sustainment, or other functional headquarters. In the end, every World War I installation and lineage unit conducted some form of home-station commemoration during 2017 and 2018.

Many units in all three components of the U.S. Army still carry designations and wear sleeve insignia similar to the WWI units from which they descend. Beginning in early 2017, the Institute of Heraldry worked with insignia manufacturers to develop historically accurate reproductions of World War I shoulder patches that could be worn on the current Army combat uniform in commemoration of the centennial. The vendor produced examples of the 1st, 2d, 3d, and 4th Division patches, and CMH developed an implementation plan to offer current members of these

divisions the option to purchase the patches. However, senior Army leadership determined that the cost expenditure for fabrication and stocking of the patches was not feasible or acceptable within current priorities, and the optional nature of the program would create issues of good order and discipline at the unit level. As a result, this was the one portion of the larger WWI centennial program that was not executed.

Overall, the unit and installation commemorations program was successful because of persistent and effective communications. CMH coordinated with public affairs offices, unit historians, project officers, state political offices, and congressional staff and provided support through dozens of conference calls, video conferences, and WWI community discussions. Field Programs personnel handled sixty requests for historical support from units ranging from locating photographs and unit histories, arranging for certificates of recognition, providing speech-writer support, and publicizing events and activities. To respond to these requests, CMH staff visited the National Archives and the Library of Congress in addition to referencing CMH WWI resources.

Some unit and installation commemoration programs were particularly noteworthy for their level of leader development and education, social media, public engagements, headquarters historical displays, publications, centennial balls, host nation engagements, and community centennial events. Installations and units of note include:


1st Army, Rock Island Arsenal, Illinois  
 3d Army/U.S. Army Central, Shaw Air Force Base, South Carolina  
 U.S. Army Europe, Wiesbaden, Germany

I Corps, Joint Base Lewis-McCord, Washington  
 III Corps, Fort Hood, Texas  
 1st Infantry Division, Fort Riley, Kansas  
 2d Infantry Division, Camp Humphreys, Republic of Korea  
 3d Infantry Division, Fort Stewart, Georgia  
 4th Infantry Division, Fort Carson, Colorado  
 32d Infantry Brigade, Army National Guard (32d Division)  
 The Wisconsin ARNG, which also developed a multimedia project, “Dawn of the Red Arrow,” that featured a documentary film, primary source materials, and social media content.  
 37th Infantry Brigade, Army National Guard (37th Division)  
 42d Infantry Division, Army National Guard (42d Division), which also raised funds for a memorial on the Meuse-Argonne battlefield.  
 82d Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, North Carolina (82d Division)  
 101st Airborne Division, Fort Campbell, Kentucky (101st Division)

## Army Museum Enterprise

Throughout the centennial period, the AME fully embraced the commemoration of WWI. Through special exhibitions, programs, and events, the AME provided soldiers, families, and the American public opportunities not only to honor the service and sacrifice of those who fought, but also to appreciate the technological, organizational, and social impact that WWI had on the Army and the nation. More than 932,000 visitors attended over 40 WWI-specific





Soldiers of the Ohio Army National Guard visited the battlefields of the 37th (Buckeye) Division in the Meuse-Argonne, including this orphanage in the village of Montfaucon paid for by the state of Ohio after the war.

war. All artifacts in this exhibit came from the NIMSC collections. The exhibit was flanked by two macro artifacts: a French design, U.S.-built Renault tank and a 1916 White armored scout car. The joint NIMSC/Fort Benning WWI commemoration culminated in a service of remembrance, which was held on the museum's parade field on 11 November 2018. Representatives of seven nations that had participated in the war raised their flags as national anthems played. At the close of the traditional service and ceremony, an artillery barrage raged for five minutes, falling silent at 1100 on the 11th day of the 11th month, just as it did in 1918 to signal the end of the war. The participants laid wreaths in tribute to the 17 million who died in WWI.

*U.S. Army Basic Combat Training Museum, Fort Jackson, South Carolina*

The U.S. Army Basic Combat Training (BCT) Museum and the U.S. Army Training Center at Fort Jackson worked together to commemorate the centennials of both WWI and the establishment of the fort as a training cantonment in 1917. The museum distributed the books *Fort Jackson 1917–2017: VICTORY STARTS HERE!* and *The Birth of Camp Jackson* to a wide range of individual recipients as well as historic and heritage institutions, and helped to create a thirty-minute documentary about Fort Jackson's centennial, which aired on South Carolina educational television. To emphasize Fort Jackson's role in the evolution and development of the modern soldier, the BCT Museum presented four centennial lectures. A traveling exhibit of four 10'x10' banners displayed photographs, textual panels, and statistical graphics for Camp Jackson in 1917–1918, and represented the creation of Camp Jackson and the U.S. Army's initial military training in support of the Great War.

*Harbor Defense Museum, U.S. Army Garrison Fort Hamilton, Brooklyn, New York*

To commemorate the centennial of the United States' involvement in WWI, the Harbor Defense Museum created two exhibits to honor the service of American soldiers. "A Soldier's Journey during WWI" focused on First Class Gunner Angelo A. Rizzo, a member of the 59th Artillery, Coastal Artillery Corps. "U.S. Rifles of

over 100,000. Additionally, at the Fort Hood World War I Seminar, the museum director presented research on Fort Riley's involvement in the 1918 influenza pandemic, subsequently published in *On Point* magazine. The director also offered soldiers of the 1st Infantry Division battle analysis and historical perspective regarding the division's participation in the Battle of Cantigny and subsequent campaigns

*Lewis Army Museum, Fort Lewis, Washington*

The Lewis Army Museum occupies the historic WWI-era Red Shield Inn, which was built by the Salvation Army in 1917 to house the family members of troops who were training for overseas service. The museum possesses a great deal of historical material on the war and on the 91st Infantry Division, a major combat unit to mobilize, train, and deploy to combat in France. This material was utilized to plan and execute the museum's WWI centennial commemorations events, which encompassed both the

centennial of Camp Lewis (est. 1917) and the museum building itself.

*National Infantry Museum/Armor and Cavalry Training Support Facility Fort Benning, Georgia*

Fort Benning's WWI centennial commemoration efforts were focused on the National Infantry Museum and Soldier Center (NIMSC), as the Armor and Cavalry Training Support Facility is not open to the public. Because NIMSC already had an extensive WWI exhibit in its main gallery, the new exhibit focused on the emergence of the United States as a world power. Tracing the short history of the Army from its early constabulary-type force to the four-million-strong Army of the AEF, the exhibit portrayed the growth of the Army from its outdated equipment through its rapid development of weaponry and new battlefield capabilities, including aviation, armor, and chemical weapons. The new exhibit showed how the United States mobilized quickly to equip, train, house, and ship soldiers overseas to a modern

WWI” was created using rifles issued by the Army during WWI.

### *Transportation Museum, Fort Eustis, Virginia*

To commemorate the centennial of World War I, the U.S. Army Transportation Museum created an exhibit about the establishment of Fort Eustis during the war, held lectures, had related exhibits, and arranged for the Virginia state traveling exhibit to be on the museum’s grounds for two days. Five cases of exhibits in the World War I gallery and exit area were updated with new information panels. The main exhibit featured artifacts, photographs, documentary paperwork, and panels explaining the history of Fort Eustis from its creation in March 1918 to the present day.

### *Fort Lee Museums, Fort Lee, Virginia*

As part of the WWI commemoration efforts, the gallery exhibits of the U.S. Army Quartermaster Museum were upgraded to include new text panels, mounts, and cases to compliment a temporary exhibit detailing the Quartermaster Corps’ role in WWI. The new exhibit, “Battle Ready: The Quartermasters Mission in World War I,” explored each of the Quartermasters’ missions during the conflict. Students of various Quartermaster schools visited the exhibit as a history and

heritage program. In addition, the museum held a “Night at the Museum” program for children highlighting the current World War I exhibit.

The Ordnance Training and Heritage Center created a World War I commemoration exhibit called “It Was a War of Ordnance,” which was displayed in Hatcher Hall High Bay at the Ordnance School. All twenty-nine artifacts (including four macros) used in the teaching gallery were from the Ordnance Collection. Some of the artifacts related to specific soldiers or are ordnance prototypes. Macro artifacts included the first prototype American FT17 Tank, a 6-inch coast artillery gun, and the U.S. Skeleton Tank prototype.

### *U. S. Army Chemical Corps Museum, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri*

On 28 June 2018, the centennial of the establishment of the Chemical Corps, the U.S. Army Chemical Corps Museum unveiled an exhibit entitled “Over There & Back Home: Uniforms of the 1st Gas Regiment” to commemorate the first chemical soldiers and their service to the United States in World War I. The exhibit featured uniforms, photographs, and artifacts that had been donated by 1st Gas Regiment veterans in 1980. The engaging and educational exhibit highlighted these

men and their service in WWI, showing how their service affected them for the remainder of their lives. In total, eight uniforms of seven 1st Gas Regiment veterans were exhibited.

### *U.S. Army Museum of Hawaii, Fort DeRussy, Hawaii*

In observance of the WWI centennial, U.S. Army Museum of Hawaii created a small display featured in an existing rotating display case in the main lobby of the museum. The display consisted of one text panel and one Koa wood display case to convey the following themes: the worldwide impact of the international conflict, the toll of the United States’ involvement in the conflict, technological innovations and advancements in modern warfare, and the context and relevance of these things to Hawaii.

### *U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR), Wiesbaden, Germany*

The USAREUR curator installed a three-phase exhibit at the Keyes Building and in the USAREUR Mission Command Center foyer to commemorate the centennial of WWI. The first exhibit conveyed the theme of leadership and included a U.S. officer uniform, a German officer helmet, a German combat helmet, and two bayonets.



The 7th Mission Training Command, U.S. Army Europe, operated a command post at Sissone for the Meuse-Argonne commemorations.



U.S. Army soldiers from units historically aligned to V the Corps, AEF, examine maps in a village in the Meuse-Argonne.

Camp Doniphan, now part of Fort Sill  
 Camp Funston, now part of Fort Riley  
 Camp Gordon, now called Fort Gordon  
 Camp Jackson, now called Fort Jackson  
 Camp Lee, now called Fort Lee  
 Camp Lewis, now called Joint Base  
 Lewis-McChord  
 Camp Meade  
 Camp Shelby (Alabama), a National  
 Guard training base

### 1918

Camp Bragg, now called Fort Bragg  
 Camp Benning, now called Fort  
 Benning  
 Camp Eustis, now called Fort Eustis

### National Capital Region

HQDA conducted WWI centennial events in the national capital region. On 6 April 2017, HQDA held a WWI centennial commemoration opening ceremony in the Pentagon Auditorium. More than 400 attendees and several thousand Web viewers saw the program, which began with opening remarks from the Chief of Military History and included WWI music from the Army Chorus, a centennial video produced by the WWICC, and a keynote address by Chief of Staff of the Army General Mark A. Milley.

In May 2017, Lt. Gen. Gary Cheek, director of the Army Staff, hosted a reception at his quarters on Fort Myer for all allied nation military attaches assigned to HQDA. The theme of the reception was the U.S. entry into WWI. The Chief of Military History provided a brief overview of the attending nations' military participation in WWI, and the Army Chorus performed a selection of WWI-era music.

The national capital region's Army Birthday Week theme for 2017 was "Over There! A Celebration of the World War I Soldier." CMH displayed artifacts in the Pentagon center courtyard on 14 June, the Army Birthday, in both 2017 and 2018, and provided photographs and historical support for the development of the Army Birthday Ball script and sequence of events. The host, Lt. Gen. Joseph Anderson, Army G-3/5/7, dressed in a WWI uniform for the ball.

Finally, on 11 November 2017, Chief of Staff General Mark A. Milley represented the Army at the ceremonial ground-breaking of the new National World War I Memorial at Pershing Park in downtown Washington, D.C.

The second exhibit included an enlisted U.S. uniform and equipment, two German helmets, a German gas mask, and a U.S. bayonet. The third exhibit, "Occupation of the Rhineland," included an occupation uniform and equipment, German souvenir medals, a U.S. victory medal, and U.S. service chevrons. Additionally, this exhibit included a twelve-foot-high photo of the Rhine River and the bridge at Ehrenbreitstein (Koblenz), Ehrenbreitstein castle (U.S. Third Army Headquarters, the post-WWI U.S. Army of occupation), and a three-dimensional mock-up of the bridge with two soldiers in replica uniforms conducting a changing of the guard in front of the photo. All exhibits were supported by text and graphics. The curator also updated and reworked two additional WWI exhibits at the Mission Command Center, giving a total of six WWI and Rhineland Occupation-related exhibits during the centennial observance.

### *The Reed Museum/2d Regiment of Dragoons Heritage Center, Rose Barracks, Vilseck, Germany*

The Reed Museum constructed a temporary WWI exhibit to highlight the 2d U.S. Cavalry Regiment's role in various campaigns during the First World War. The exhibit utilized three vitrines which were divided into three fields of focus. Each vitrine possessed text for each artifact and descriptive text panels explaining the campaigns and mission set of the

2d Cavalry. Of particular interest was a spread of period trench weapons. Hosting the temporary WWI exhibit in the Traditions Room created several "we did it before and we can do it again" moments during current operations meetings.

## 4 Stateside Commemoration

CMH provided support to institutional commemorations at thirty posts, such as lectures, memorial ceremonies, public events, and military professional development activities. CMH provided publications and other historical materials, information support, and guest speakers. From April 2017 through November 2018, CMH added ninety-nine events to its WWI Web site events calendar for greater publicity.

Installations Established During WWI that are Active Today:

### 1917

Camp Beauregard (Louisiana), a National Guard training base  
 Camp Belvoir, now called Fort Belvoir  
 Camp Custer (Michigan), a National Guard training base  
 Camp Devens, an Army Reserve base now called Fort Devens  
 Camp Dix, now called Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst  
 Camp Dodge (Iowa), a National Guard training base

## 5 Overseas Commemoration

The U.S. Army's participation in WWI commemorations in Europe was truly the program's margin of excellence and the element that made this program exceptional. Through careful coordination with host nations, synchronized through the U.S. Embassy, U.S. European Command, and U.S. Army Europe, the U.S. Army participated in a series of commemoration activities in Europe from 14 July 2017 to 25 September 2018. Regular Army, National Guard, and Army Reserve units with WWI lineage were selected for participation in events including memorial dedications, staff rides, and historic marches to trace the AEF campaigns of the conflict.

The planning process for the overseas program began in August 2016 with the creation of a chronology of American involvement in the war, from the U.S. declaration of war in April 1917, through the arrival of the AEF in France beginning in June 1917, to the employment of the AEF in battle from April to November 1918. Battles and campaigns then were grouped chronologically and by location, which resulted in the development of four week-long events. Each event included three types of activity days. Education Days featured staff rides of campaigns and battles. Unit Days featured unit-specific ceremonies or other professional development events at the unit commander's discretion. Ceremony Days featured unit participation in ABMC or WWICC events.


Beginning in early 2017, the CMH planning team conducted a series of reconnaissance and coordination trips to France, Belgium, and Germany to prepare for the overseas program. The team, composed of two to seven personnel, traveled in total over 10,000 miles to survey battlefields, visit ABMC cemeteries, and identify WWI sites such as monuments, cemeteries, places of historic interest, and museums. These visits required coordination with the Defense Attaché office at the U.S. Embassy in Paris, the applicable French government officials, and a multitude of other entities.

### *Bastille Day 2017*

On 14 July 2017, in remembrance of the parade of the newly arrived First Expeditionary Division in Paris, France, on 4 July 1917, a detachment of the 1st Infantry Divi-



CMH and Army National Guard historians at Meurcy Farm, on the field of the Second Battle of the Marne





The mayor of Malancourt welcomes the Meuse-Argonne historic march to his village on the centennial of its liberation.

ABMC and WWICC ceremonies. Soldiers marched from the 167th Infantry memorial at Croix Rouge Farm to the Oise-Aisne Cemetery. Army historians stationed along the way recounted details of the American offensive and actions of American heroes such as Lt. Col. William Donovan and Sgt. Joyce Kilmer. The march culminated at the village of Sergy, near the Oise-Aisne Cemetery, where a French Army detachment and French and American veterans groups helped to honor the combat and sacrifice of Americans in WWI.

On education and unit days, soldiers from units descended from the 42d Division participated in staff rides to Sommepey, where the 42d Division helped stem the German offensive in Champagne in July 1918, and to the Argonne Forest, where the 42d Division took the Côte du Chatillon. There, soldiers helped to dedicate the Douglas MacArthur memorial plaque overlooking that battlefield. New England Guardsmen of the 26th Maneuver Enhancement Brigade (MEB) conducted staff rides covering actions in the Second Marne between Torcy, Belleau, Givry, Bouresches, and then Chemin des Dames at Froidmont, the scene of heavy combat for the 26th MEB's antecedent, the 26th Division. Soldiers of the 28th Infantry Division commemorated actions in the Meuse-Argonne. Army historians led a staff ride covering the advance from Varennes, where the 28th conducted a brief commemoration ceremony, to the Chêne Tondou. The staff ride culminated at the infamous Lost Battalion battlefield, where the 28th Division helped to relieve the beleaguered 1st Battalion, 308th Infantry Regiment, during the Meuse-Argonne

sion traveled to Paris, where they received the singular honor of leading the French national military parade that occurs each Bastille Day. For the parade, the American officer in charge of the detachment carried with him the identification tags of his grandfather, who had served in the AEF in France.

### *First American Actions*

From 23 to 29 May 2018, detachments of distinguished soldiers of the U.S. Army's 1st, 2d, and 3d Infantry Divisions traveled to France. Each of these commands trace their lineage to the like-numbered divisions that fought in the first AEF actions in France in 1918. Soldiers of the 1st Infantry Division commemorated battles fought at Cantigny and Château-Thierry, participated in the dedication of the 1st Infantry Division Monument at the Croix du Bayle, Cornay, and participated in staff rides analyzing the battles of Cantigny and Soissons. Soldiers from the 2d Infantry Division toured the French Army Museum. At Château-Thierry, the 3d Infantry Division soldiers learned about the "Rock of the Marne," their predecessors' combat on the banks and bluffs of the Marne River—actions that halted the last major German offensive on the Western Front. As this event occurred on Memorial Day, Army personnel participated in special centennial ceremonies at the Aisne-Marne and Meuse-Argonne American Cemeteries.

On 4 July 2018, the Illinois Army National Guard participated in a multinational ceremony and commemoration tour at Le Hamel with the Australian Army.

The 33d Infantry Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) is the lineal descendent of the 33d Division, elements of which liberated the town of Le Hamel in the Somme region in 1918. The Australians specifically invited the 33d IBCT to stand alongside them and the French at Le Hamel. The combined U.S.-Australian element also conducted a staff ride of the Le Hamel battlefield.

### *Second Battle of the Marne*

From 24 to 30 July 2018, National Guardsmen representing ten of the famed 42d (Rainbow) Division's twenty-six states took part in commemorations and training events dedicated to the centennial of the Second Battle of the Marne. The Rainbow Division historic march, commemorating the advance of the 42d Division to the Ourcq River, was a perfect complement to the subsequent



Army historians near Montfaucon preparing for the Meuse-Argonne historic march



U.S. Army personnel, the U.S. World War I Centennial Commission, and French and German representatives dedicate a Rainbow Division memorial at Croix Rouge Farm.

campaign. Participating Army units also took part in a ceremony with the French Army at the Oise-Aisne American Cemetery.

### *Road to Armistice*

From 3 to 9 August 2018, soldiers of the 27th Infantry Brigade Combat Team (New York ARNG), 30th Infantry Brigade Combat Team (North and South Carolina ARNG), and the 37th Infantry Brigade Combat Team (Ohio ARNG), as well as soldiers from the Army Reserve, participated in commemorative events and staff rides supported by Army historians in Northern France and Belgium. Starting in Ypres, Belgium, soldiers led staff rides, participated in the Last Post Ceremony at the Menin Gate, and conducted a memorial ceremony at the Flanders Field American Cemetery. Transitioning to France, the group conducted a memorial ceremony at the Somme American Cemetery, executed staff rides across northern France, and

had a barbecue dinner at a guest house on the Somme battlefield. The 37th Division also enjoyed a separate education day touring the Meuse-Argonne battlefield. The culminating event of the week was an incredible multinational remembrance ceremony in Amiens Cathedral.

### *Victory Over There*

During the week of 19–25 September 2018, Army National Guard and Army Reserve soldiers commemorated the St. Mihiel and Meuse-Argonne Offensives. Secretary of the Army Mark T. Esper laid a wreath at the St. Mihiel American Cemetery commemorating the service and sacrifice of American doughboys in the first independent AEF offensive of the war. In the Meuse-Argonne corridor, Army historians led staff rides of the I, III, and V Corps battle sectors enabling all units to view pieces of their WWI battlespace and, in many instances, explore the scenes

of heroic actions that resulted in Medal of Honor citations.

The Montfaucon march commemorated the actions of the 79th Division. Soldiers of that division's lineal descendent, the 79th Sustainment Command, joined by soldiers from other units, including the 77th Sustainment Command, the 7th Mission Support Command, the 80th Training Command, the 89th Sustainment Brigade, and the 35th Infantry Division, as well as over sixty French infantry soldiers, traced the opening phases of the Meuse-Argonne Offensive. They marched from Hill 304 to the Montfaucon Monument in a driving rain that was eerily reminiscent of the 1918 battlefield conditions. Again, Army historians stationed along the way educated the participants in key aspects of the battle. Approximately fifty French high school students joined the march before the midpoint and over 100 young children met the marchers at the end, in the rain,



Members of the Massachusetts ARNG participate in the Aisne historic march over the historical battlefields of their lineal ancestors in the 26th (Yankee) and 42d (Rainbow) Divisions.

waving American flags. A ceremony at the village of Montfaucon commemorated the sacrifice of French and American soldiers in the region. Soldiers of these same commands participated in staff rides to the Lost Battalion battlefield, the Sgt. Alvin York march, and commemorations at both the St. Mihiel and Meuse-Argonne American Cemeteries. The village of Nonsard specifically commemorated their liberators, the 1st Infantry Division, and dedicated a monument in their honor. Army historians conducted tours tracing the actions of the 35th, 80th, and 89th Divisions.

Finally, as a culmination to the week of commemorations, the ABMC coordinated the illumination of the graves in the Meuse-Argonne American Cemetery, which the Army contingent supported by placing candles on graves. The Army units' color guards participated in the memorial ceremony the following day, and a series of unit-focused events brought the overseas commemorations to a close.

## Overall Assessment

The U.S. Army delivered a comprehensive commemorations program grounded in training and education, with a wide variety of options for participation. From start to finish, the program engaged all three components of the U.S. Army, strengthened the significance of combat lineages, improved civil-military relations, and educated millions of Americans about the origins of the modern U.S. Army.

Most importantly, CMH spearheaded a groundbreaking program of overseas events on the historical terrain. More than 400 soldiers from all three components attended commemorations in France and Belgium. Of the forty-nine Field Armies, Corps, and Divisions in the AEF, thirty-eight remain in the current Army inventory, and, of those, thirty-six conducted unit-level WWI events during 2017–2018. These events combined formal training and education, reinforcement of unit history and heritage, immersion in ABMC cemeteries and memorials, and well-planned engagements with host-nation citizens and military personnel.

These deep engagements with host nations came to symbolize the highest purpose of the commemoration program. While traditional overseas commemorations have taken place in U.S. government-maintained facilities, with little interaction with the host nation, the U.S. Army's WWI program relied on host-nation lodging, transportation, facilities, and expertise. Certainly this interaction saved the Army money and produced better outcomes, but it also reaffirmed and strengthened ties with several of our European allies. CMH was able to engage with communities that have kept alive the memories of American service and sacrifice for a century, and, in recognition of these friendships, was able to create meaningful experiences for all involved.

The chief lesson the U.S. Army learned in conducting its WWI centennial program is the importance of a team approach to managing commemorations at the DoD level, and the value of a standing commem-

orations architecture across the Joint Force. The DoD and the service departments do not maintain commemorations offices, instead assigning responsibility for commemorations to their public affairs offices as significant anniversaries approach. This “just in time” and stovepiped approach to commemorations management leads to less meaningful experiences. While there is no doubt that public affairs and community engagement are critical aspects of managing commemorations, relying on the public affairs community solely, without input and collaboration from other stakeholders, leads to reduced effectiveness and impact. Service staffs, historical offices, and operating force commanders must be involved from the outset in order to account for the many equities at stake in proper commemorations. Early and forceful senior leader buy-in and support is the center of gravity to appropriate commemorations, and stakeholders must build and sustain this support. While permanent commemorations offices may not be fiscally feasible in the long term, a “matrix” approach that assigns commemorations responsibilities across stakeholders, and that is able to be activated as commemoration windows approach, can work in most situations. Assigning lead responsibilities to public affairs professionals is appropriate, as long as staffs and historical offices remain engaged in planning and execution. With the approach in five years' time of the 250th anniversary of the American Revolution, the time is now for the U.S. Army and the



Residents of Nonsard reenact the liberation of the village by the 1st Division in September 1918.

# PARTICIPANT COMMENTS

"We need to take time to reflect. We owe it to the five million Americans who wore the uniform of our nation. We owe it to the ninety-nine Divisions that were mobilized in World War I. We owe it to the almost 117,000 soldiers killed in action in the fields of Europe. We owe it to every one of them." —General Mark A. Milley, Army Chief of Staff

"To come here in person is just an awe-inspiring experience; to see what happened and learn the history first-hand . . . it is humbling, I wouldn't trade this experience for the world." —S. Sgt. Jeffrey Fellin, 1st Infantry Division

"I initially wondered how much value the lessons of World War I would have to my unit today. Once we got out here, I saw the immense value and how applicable and valuable the lessons learned are to today's Army." —Maj. Gen. Leopoldo Quintas, Commanding General, 3d Infantry Division

"I'm not gonna lie; it's going to make me a better soldier. I'm going to put a lot more effort into everything I do." —Pfc. Zachary Martin, 1st Infantry Division

"I'm honored to be a part of this. It really brings home the commitment the National Guard had to World War I." —General Joseph L. Lengyel, Chief National Guard Bureau

"We were able to go into the caves—and I'm a hands-on guy myself—so looking, touching, seeing, and putting things into perspective is my favorite thing that I've done here." —Sgt. Christopher Arnaudin, 251st Combat Engineers, Maine National Guard

"I think it makes a great impact. A lot of guys don't look back on the past and realize the role that their unit played, so it instills a lot of pride, and I think it's something everyone and every unit should do." —Spec. Torin Samples, 150th Cavalry Regiment, West Virginia National Guard

"This experience has made me open my eyes and want to learn more about history. I'll also share this with my family and tell them how much of an honor it was to be here." —Spec. Jessica Kelley, 972d Military Police Company, Maine National Guard

"The key thing is that we have to continue to stress the importance of history. You have to know the history in order to know how to go forward, and that would be the big thing for all my leaders." —Maj. Gen. Linda L. Singh, Adjutant General, Maryland National Guard

"I think it's important that we always try to maintain our legacy . . . it's something we need to remember to take pride in. Having the opportunity to come here and have this first-hand experience, we can go back and share that with our soldiers." —Maj. Gen. R. Van McCarty, Assistant Adjutant General, South Carolina National Guard

DoD to begin planning their efforts to recognize the critical role of our military forces in the founding of our nation.

In the final analysis, the U.S. Army's WWI centennial commemoration was unprecedented in scope and scale. Moreover, it was exceptional in its impact on the education, inspiration, readiness, and cultural awareness of both the force and civilians. Never before have so many Americans experienced battlefield staff rides in such breadth and depth and enjoyed interactive allied experiences with their French counterparts. The people of France have not forgotten America's contributions to their liberation in two world wars, and their enduring gratitude showed forth in every activity they hosted or participated in alongside American soldiers. This commemoration succeeded beyond all expectations in reinforcing this essential strategic partnership.

In summary, the U.S. Army successfully commemorated the WWI centennial through a program of initiatives and events both stateside and overseas. The Army WWI program reached a total of 1,896,906 soldiers, civilian personnel, and citizens. It built readiness through training, historical awareness, cultural literacy, and multinational interoperability, and it supported the priorities of the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the Army to capitalize on history and reinforce alliances and partnerships.

It was an honor and privilege for everyone at CMH to take part in the WWI centennial commemoration program. Participating in a commemoration of this scope challenged CMH to fulfill its mission of capturing, preserving, and writing the Army's historical record in such a way as to inspire people—both within the profes-

sional armed forces and without—to learn more about Army history. CMH looks forward to the next commemoration.


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**Charles R. Bowery Jr.**, a retired Army colonel, is the executive director of the U.S. Army Center of Military History. He is a former military history instructor at the U.S. Military Academy, West Point, and a graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. He served as an Apache helicopter pilot in Iraq and commanded an attack helicopter battalion in Afghanistan. He is the coeditor of *Guide to the Richmond-Petersburg Campaign* (Lawrence, Kans., 2014).

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# BOOKREVIEWS



## *Traumatic Defeat: POWs, MIAs, and National Mythmaking*

By Patrick Gallagher  
University Press of Kansas, 2018  
Pp. viii, 200. \$29.95

### Review by Dwight S. Mears

Patrick Gallagher presents a compelling study charting several examples of the “secret camp” myth, which posits that soldiers who are listed as prisoners of war (POWs) or missing in action (MIA) remain in illicit enemy captivity after the end of hostilities. Gallagher builds on several earlier works covering the POW/MIA myth, particularly in the context of the Vietnam War. His contribution is to present the myth in an international context rather than merely through an isolated case study. Specifically, he compares the example of German POW/MIAs in the USSR following World War II with the case of American POW/MIAs after the Vietnam War.

Gallagher’s German case study is rooted in the Eastern Front, where *Wehrmacht* forces died and capitulated in enormous numbers. Accounting for these losses was extraordinarily difficult due to the refusal of both Germany and the USSR to abide by

the 1929 Geneva Convention agreements relative to POWs, Germany’s suppression of POW reporting to its own population, and the *Wehrmacht*’s chaotic personnel reports while in headlong retreat. At war’s end, the secret camp myth was fueled by the USSR’s retention of large numbers of German POWs that were significantly underreported.

The German secret camp myth was exclusively West German throughout its existence, owing to organized activist groups and receptive political leadership. Gallagher explains that the myth was influenced by the population’s collective guilt over wartime atrocities, since secret camp allegations conveniently deflected blame by recasting German POWs as “victims of communist barbarity” rather than aggressors (pp. 8–9). In this way, the secret camp myth was a corollary to the “clean hands” myth that falsely alleged the *Wehrmacht* was relatively innocent of the crimes perpetrated by other arms of the state. The secret camp myth never arose in East Germany because the Soviet occupation officials and their successors viewed returning POWs with skepticism, as they believed the glorification of returnees would undercut the communist narrative.

The German secret camp myth was relatively short-lived due to the removal of a condition material to its creation: the USSR’s continued retention of German POWs. Stalin’s death in 1953 set the conditions for several German POW repatriations that culminated in 1956. This reconciliation effectively ended political intervention as well as popular activism on the POW/MIA issue and, Gallagher claims, convinced the West German population that its remaining missing personnel would never return alive.

Gallagher’s American case study is markedly dissimilar from its German counterpart due to a substantially smaller population of POW/MIAs that outlasted the war in captivity in Vietnam. The rise of the American secret camp myth was due in part to the covert locations where many aircrews were lost, as the Nixon administration falsi-

fied loss reports to conceal unlawful combat. This complicated recovery efforts and compromised families’ faith in government reports. President Richard M. Nixon himself also misled POW/MIA groups by inflating the numbers of alleged POWs, which gave concerned families unrealistic expectations about their eventual return. Even the term “POW/MIA” was an intentional conflation of separate casualty categories, meant to suggest that the missing were perhaps secretly captured and alive. Gallagher explains that MIA wives were particularly susceptible to the secret camp myth, as they were in a “psychological no-man’s-land . . . separated from their husbands and with no certainty of ever being reunited” (p. 72). Nixon callously exploited these de facto widows by coopting their movement to counter increasingly vocal antiwar activists.

President Nixon’s manipulation of POW/MIA groups culminated with Operation Homecoming, the repatriation of U.S. POWs at the end of America’s involvement in the war. Although the administration claimed the event secured “peace with honor,” to many activists it was a betrayal, because the 591 POWs released comprised less than half the number that the administration had suggested might be alive (p. 90). Gallagher argues that Operation Homecoming convinced some activists that the government’s account was a mere cover-up, and reinvigorated the secret camp myth. Gallagher convincingly dissects the increasingly hardened mentality of POW/MIA activists, whose beliefs were based on the unrealistic presumption that “the missing were alive until proven otherwise, rather than vice versa” (p. 118).

Gallagher argues that the 1980s were the “high-water mark” for the secret camp myth due to a shift of public opinion during the Iranian hostage crisis, political attention focused on the issue, and Hollywood’s appropriation of the secret camp myth in a distinct “subgenre of action films” (p. 129). This section is quite interesting given its explication of American cultural themes as well as for its coverage of individuals who

exploited the POW/MIA movement for their own gain. Gallagher says that the myth still persists today, although he acknowledges that it has declined and cannot “command congressional or presidential attention” as it once did (p. 146).


Gallagher’s approach ultimately shows its value by revealing the contrast between the two case studies. Both groups of captives bore superficial similarities: they were used to promote agendas over the legacy of the conflicts, and resulted in secret camp myths. However, German POWs notably dwarfed their American counterparts in terms of both numbers as well as time of postwar captivity. It is therefore surprising that the American secret camp myth proved more resilient, particularly since the secret retention of German POWs seemed much more plausible. Gallagher expertly argues that this difference was a product of the U.S. government’s failure to “satisfy its constituency” through its inability to convince activists that all living POW/MIAs had been repatriated (p. 154). This was a consequence of the Nixon administration’s manipulation of the movement, as well as the government’s corresponding loss of credibility—events that had no direct analogues in Germany.

*Traumatic Defeat* should be of great interest to those studying the repatriation of POW/MIAs and corresponding nationalist narratives of victory and defeat, both in the United States and elsewhere. Further work in this vein of research might probe the sudden demise of the German secret camp myth in greater detail and investigate whether the phenomenon occurred in other countries and conflicts. Another question to be explored is whether motivations other than secret camp activism contribute to popular support for the modern U.S. POW/MIA movement, especially given that the passage of time virtually guarantees that there are no living U.S. POWs in Vietnam. It is possible that the secret camp myth has effectively run its course, and symbols such as the POW/MIA flag can again represent the maxim that America not only honors the sacrifices of its warfighters who endure captivity in enemy hands but also makes reasonable and evidence-based efforts to secure their return.

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His dissertation convinced Congress to broaden eligibility for the Prisoner of War Medal in 2013. He is the author of *The Medal of Honor: The Evolution of America’s Highest Military Decoration* (Lawrence, Kans., 2018).



### ***Washington’s War, 1779***

By Benjamin Lee Huggins  
Westholme Publishing, 2018  
Pp. xv, 184. \$26

### **Review by Erik M. Davis**

Of all American icons, there are few analyzed and written about more than George Washington. As the leader of the Continental Army in the American Revolution, and afterwards the standard-setting first President of the United States, George Washington provides plenty of material for historians, journalists, and others to explore and interpret. Historians are hard-pressed to find new ground upon which to stake their historiographical claim in such an expansive body of knowledge, but that is exactly what Benjamin Lee Huggins sets out to do in *Washington’s War, 1779*.

Huggins argues that in all the scholarly work on Washington in the American Revolution, the year 1779 is either misinterpreted for its value or is otherwise ignored. Others call 1779 the “forgotten war” and refer to Washington’s inaction, indecision, sluggishness, hesitation, and uncertainty (pp. ix–x). Huggins declares that while 1779 was largely uneventful on the battlefield compared to other years,

it emerges as a crucial year of the war due to Washington’s transformation as a leader. Huggins seeks to demonstrate that a great deal of fighting occurred between 1778 and 1781, that Washington was indeed aggressive, and that he possessed an expert understanding of intelligence operations and their value. Overall, Huggins uses *Washington’s War* to claim that 1779 is a window into Washington’s generalship. 1779 was the year in which George Washington morphed from an army commander to a commander in chief; it was the year he transcended the tactical and operational levels of war and demonstrated his ability to lead successfully at the strategic level (p. x). Huggins supports his thesis by examining Washington’s planning abilities, diplomatic skills, and operational prowess.

A relatively short book of less than two hundred pages, *Washington’s War* packs enormous detail. The book is organized into four straightforward chapters, with the first setting the stage for 1779 by recounting the fighting of 1778. The second chapter is brimming with details of Washington’s involvement in manning and supplying his troops during 1779. Huggins claims this second chapter can be skipped, but in doing so the reader would miss a great deal of evidence supporting Huggins’ argument about Washington’s understanding of strategic sustainment. The third chapter examines the fighting that occurred during 1779 in the spring and summer. The fourth and final chapter describes how Washington planned for an attack on New York City as the center of gravity for any victory in the war.

To Huggins, Washington showed his planning ability and strategic understanding of warfare in 1779. He was well aware of the constraints placed upon the Continental Army by money, supply, and personnel shortages. Considering the totality of the situation, Washington recommended three courses of action to Congress for the 1779 fight. Ultimately, Congress approved Washington’s plan to concentrate defense in the Hudson Valley with a limited strike against the British-allied Iroquois in the west (p. 21). Huggins argues that the quality of Washington’s submission to Congress of three separate campaign plans for the year was the proof they needed to empower him with the authority of

commander in chief (p. 75). Washington was content with this plan because he knew it was a strategic requirement to hold and defend the Hudson Valley in order to keep the colonies united in the fight against Great Britain. Huggins contends that Washington, all of his planning ability aside, also realized that plans should remain flexible based upon enemy actions. In 1779, the British attempted to draw the Continental forces out of their defenses around West Point, New York, by raiding Virginia and savagely attacking Connecticut. Washington demonstrated his generalship by altering his plans due to his belief that inaction by the Continental Army would reduce its credibility with the American people (pp. 86, 89, 90–91).

Washington knew credibility was also crucial in diplomacy. Huggins uses Washington's actions in regard to the arrival of the French fleet to explain that Washington's primary goal was to keep the French fleet in American waters (p. 10). Huggins argues that Washington valued diplomacy so highly that he chastised his own officers when they challenged the honor of the French fleet commander. By doing so, Washington quelled the discontent among his men and restored good relations with the French commander (pp. 8–11). Washington also demonstrated his understanding of his allies' operational requirements and went to great lengths to ensure they were met. He dispatched ship pilots again and again to assist French captains with navigation in American waterways (pp. 6, 131). Ultimately, both Congress and the French valued Washington's diplomatic abilities. Indeed, Congress authorized Washington to coordinate operations directly with the French in the conduct of the war (pp. 3, 71).

The final examination of Washington by Huggins is an analysis of his ability to lead an army in the field. Huggins provides examples from 1779 that he claims demonstrate what he calls Washington's operational ability. These examples better describe Washington's strategic understanding of warfare and support Huggins' argument about Washington's generalship. Terminology aside, the author makes his point that Washington was extremely talented when it came to understanding how small elements fit into the overall goal of

winning the war. Huggins describes how Washington placed high value on holding West Point to keep the colonies connected and that he avoided all attempts by the British to draw him and his forces out for a battle (p. 15). Additionally, Washington understood that sea power, and thus the French fleet, were vital to any successful outcome of an attack on New York City (p. 16). Furthermore, Washington understood that New York City was the British center of gravity in North America and a victory there could end the war (pp. 16, 71). These points support Huggins' assertion that Washington was not overly cautious, as others have described him. Huggins instead argues that Washington understood his limits on manning and resources; he did not wish to waste them on campaigns that had little potential to win the war (p. 153).


Huggins based his thesis upon thorough research. Many of his key arguments are supported in the text by excerpts from correspondence between Washington and other leaders as well as those within Congress. At times, the excerpts extended beyond the point being made and were distracting from the overall work. However, this is evidence of Huggins' attention to detail and the value he places on primary source research. His research and sources are the quality expected of an author who intends to alter how history views George Washington and the year 1779.

Benjamin Lee Huggins' *Washington's War, 1779* is solidly researched and written and supports the author's thesis. Huggins' work allows him to make the statement that 1779 was not a year of inaction in the Revolutionary War and that, in fact, it was a transformative year for George Washington. With *Washington's War*, Huggins contributes significantly to an already exhaustive historiography. At a minimum, his research-supported contentions cannot be ignored and must now be addressed by any historian who disagrees with Huggins' view of 1779.

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***Fighting Means Killing: Civil War Soldiers and the Nature of Combat***

By Jonathan M. Steplyk  
University Press of Kansas, 2018  
Pp. x, 294. \$29.95

**Review by Nathan A. Marzoli**

“War means fighting, and fighting means killing,” Nathan Bedford Forrest once declared about the Civil War (p. 5). These are harsh words from the former Confederate cavalry commander. But perhaps students of the war need to be reminded of this important point—especially in places like Gettysburg, a town famously inundated with thousands of tourists and kitschy shops selling flags, toy guns, and other knickknacks. Americans killed each other, in Gettysburg and elsewhere, during the Civil War. After four years, 700,000 of them lay dead. In his new book, *Fighting Means Killing: Civil War Soldiers and the Nature of Combat*, historian Jonathan M. Steplyk does an excellent job reminding us of this by examining the attitudes of Union and Confederate soldiers toward, and their experiences of, killing other human beings.

Steplyk, an adjunct instructor at Texas Christian University and an adjunct lecturer at the University of Texas at Arlington, has written a book that offers a fresh perspective on a well-covered topic. His work is the continuation of a long line of Civil War soldier studies, pioneered by Bell I. Wiley in the 1940s and 1950s, and carried on in more recent memory by prominent historians such as Reid

Mitchell, James McPherson, Earl J. Hess, and Drew Gilpin Faust. In fact, writes Steplyk, “this project has undeniably benefitted from standing on the scholastic shoulders of these giants among Civil War historians” (p. 8). Although all of these historians have touched on some aspect of Civil War combat in their respective works, none has devoted a full-length monograph solely to the study of killing itself.

After examining substantial documentary evidence from both armies, Steplyk concluded that “the majority of Union and Confederate soldiers positively affirmed and accepted killing the enemy as part of their military duty and a necessity for their respective causes to prevail” (p. 7). This is not to say that all soldiers were prolific killers; Steplyk actually found that a significant minority “harbored doubts about or outright objected” to the act (p. 7). Yet even the most ambivalent combatants tended to fight just as purposefully and effectively as their more belligerent comrades. Steplyk also clarifies that “the nature of killing in the Civil War was not a simple dichotomy between killing and not killing” (p. 7). Most soldiers instead fell somewhere along the spectrum between the so-called prolific and reluctant killers.

Steplyk supports this argument in seven thematic chapters. Chapter 1 examines the antebellum cultural and societal factors that influenced soldiers’ attitudes on killing once they got into combat, while Chapter 2 examines the way soldiers experienced infantry firefights in battle. Chapter 3 goes a step further in examining killing in hand-to-hand combat, a relatively rare occurrence during the Civil War but nevertheless one of the most dramatic, challenging, and traumatizing aspects of a battle. While Chapter 4 examines the language Union and Confederate soldiers used to describe killing—and how their words may have conveyed their feelings toward it—Chapter 5 deals with the use of sharpshooters in both armies. Chapter 6 discusses what Steplyk calls “the extremes of killing” (p. 11). This covers the soldiers who refrained from inflicting violence, as well as examples of killing that transgressed the accepted rules of war. The final chapter might be the most difficult for modern readers to stomach, as Steplyk examines the impact of racial attitudes in Civil War combat, especially in brutal fights between whites and blacks.

As with most other studies of Civil War soldiers, *Fighting Means Killing* relies heavily on contemporary sources, including wartime diaries and letters. Steplyk also extensively uses postwar reminiscences and accounts, however. Some historians, especially James McPherson in *For Cause and Comrades*, have tried to avoid postwar sources due to the negative effects of hindsight and faulty memory. While Steplyk believes that a good historian has to take this into consideration, he explains that “to not include certain published accounts would have meant leaving out a great number of remarkable and incisive details regarding killing and other aspects of Civil War soldiering” (p. 11). He believes their inclusion strengthens the argument of the book; the fact that many veterans wrote “candidly and unashamedly” about killing during the war is evidence that many soldiers found the act acceptable (p. 11). Because many Civil War historians are now much more hesitant to use regimental histories and reminiscences as sources, Steplyk’s book presents an interesting counterargument of their value.

*Fighting Means Killing* is also intriguing because it challenges the idea that Civil War soldiers experienced combat in the same ways as Americans in other conflicts. After World War II, S. L. A. Marshall famously and boldly asserted that only 15 to 25 percent of American combat infantrymen actually fired their weapons in battle. Steplyk’s argument largely refutes S. L. A. Marshall’s assertion that “the average and normally healthy individual...still has such an inner and usually unrealized resistance toward killing a fellow man that he will not of his own volition take life if it is possible to turn away from the responsibility” (p. 8). *Fighting Means Killing* also questions the idea presented by Dave Grossman, a retired army officer, West Point psychology professor, and author of *On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society* (New York, 2009), that killing in battle is as great of a stressor on men as the fear of being killed. Steplyk instead contends that Union and Confederate soldiers “displayed greater willingness in their attitudes and behavior to kill in battle” than the twentieth-century soldiers of Grossman’s study (p. 8).

There are few flaws with Steplyk’s work. The major gripe is that the author left out any real discussion of killing done by soldiers other than infantrymen. This was a conscious deci-


sion; Steplyk tells us in the introduction that his focus would be on those who did the bulk of the fighting and killing, and infantrymen made up 75 to 80 percent of those who served in Civil War armies. However, a discussion of the unique brutality of artillery (close-range canister could literally obliterate men) and irregular guerrilla warfare, for example, would have added another welcomed dimension to the book.

Overall, *Fighting Means Killing* is a worthy heir to landmark books such as Earl Hess’ *The Union Soldier in Battle: Enduring the Ordeal of Combat* (Lawrence, Kans., 1997), James McPherson’s *For Cause and Comrades: Why Men Fought in the Civil War* (New York, 1997), and Reid Mitchell’s *Civil War Soldiers: Their Expectations and Their Experiences* (New York, 1988), to name a few. Besides adding to the historiography of Civil War soldiers, there is value in illuminating the darker sides of America’s bloodiest conflict. All too often, we get engrossed in the stories of glory, the seemingly larger-than-life characters, and the now-serene battlefields. Historians and the general public alike need reminding of the dirty truth about the Civil War. Americans brutally killed other Americans. Jonathan Steplyk’s *Fighting Means Killing* makes sure we do not forget this.

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***Fighting for Atlanta: Tactics, Terrain, and Trenches in the Civil War***

By Earl J. Hess

University of North Carolina Press, 2018

Pp. xvi, 391. \$45

**Review by Mark L. Bradley**

*Fighting for Atlanta: Tactics, Terrain, and Trenches in the Civil War* is the fourth book on the Atlanta Campaign by Earl J. Hess, and it is Hess' fourth study devoted to Civil War field fortifications, having been preceded by his trilogy on trench warfare in the Eastern Theater. This volume also serves as an operational history of the pivotal 1864 campaign that began in May at Rocky Face Ridge in north Georgia and closed five months later at Palmetto Station south of Atlanta. During its hundred-mile advance, Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman's 110,000-strong Union Army group encountered eighteen major lines of fieldworks constructed by the 63,000-man Confederate Army of Tennessee, under General Joseph E. Johnston and his successor, Lt. Gen. John Bell Hood. Hess praises Sherman's operational art as "a good blend of caution and maneuver mixed with an occasional willingness to try a limited attack on fortified positions," whereas Johnston's operational art was one-dimensional (p. 4). The Confederate commander preferred to remain on the defensive, choosing strong positions on which his men could dig formidable entrenchments, but he displayed a tendency to abandon his fortified lines

at the first sign of an enemy flanking maneuver, as he did at Cassville in mid-May.

By the time the contending forces faced off along the Kennesaw Mountain Line in mid-June, both sides had become adept at constructing field fortifications that reflected their mode of warfare. The defensive-minded Confederates constructed substantial and imposing works that dared the enemy to attack them, while the more aggressive Federals dug rudimentary fortifications that offered ample protection and served as bases for flanking maneuvers. On 27 June, Sherman launched a frontal assault against Johnston's formidable defenses because he wanted to "restore mobility to his bogged-down troops" (p. 112). The multipronged attack failed, and it cost the Federals 3,000 casualties—roughly one-fifth of the total assault force. Undaunted by this setback, Sherman resumed his flanking maneuvers and, on 2 July, pried Johnston out of his Kennesaw fortifications and pressed him back to the last natural obstacle before Atlanta—the Chattahoochee River.

As for the armies' engineer officers, Hess maintains that they "have never been given their due for the role they played in the campaign" (p. 307). He notes that Sherman's chief engineer, Capt. Orlando M. Poe, was "superb," but that the Union engineer organization was, to quote Poe, "altogether inadequate" (p. 13). The same shortage of qualified engineers also plagued the Confederates. While Johnston's chief engineer, Lt. Col. Stephen W. Presstman, proved capable, he was ultimately replaced by Maj. Gen. Martin L. Smith, whose arrival came too late in the campaign to make full use of his considerable talents.

Perhaps the most innovative of the Confederate engineers was Johnston's chief of artillery, Brig. Gen. Francis A. Shoup, the architect of the Chattahoochee River—or "Shoup"—Line. The most distinctive feature of the four-and-a-half-mile fortification was a series of thirty-six chevron-shaped redoubts dubbed "Shoupades" after their inventor. Spaced at intervals of roughly eighty yards, the Shoupades were designed to provide converging fields of fire. Shoup noted that the position was not a continuous earthwork, but rather a line of mutually supporting strongholds.

Although his novel design drew a good deal of criticism and even some ridicule, no less an authority than General Sherman pronounced the Shoup Line "one of the strongest pieces of field-fortification I ever saw" (p. 148). Many other Union soldiers shared their commander's opinion. Shoup designed the redoubts to be manned by small garrisons to enable the bulk of Johnston's army to attack Sherman's flanking force as it attempted to cross the Chattahoochee. Much to Shoup's disappointment, Johnston failed to exploit the advantages of the Shoup Line but instead retreated after Federal infantry and cavalry had crossed the river at several points.

Johnston's withdrawal to the outskirts of Atlanta marked the end of his tenure as commander of the Army of Tennessee. On the night of 17 July, while directing his chief engineer, Colonel Presstman, to begin constructing an outer line of fortifications north and east of town, Johnston received a telegram from Confederate President Jefferson F. Davis relieving him of command. Hess indicates that his replacement, John Bell Hood, "felt enormous pressure to strike" because of Davis' frustration with Johnston's caution and Hood's reputation for aggressiveness (p. 161).

The new Confederate commander launched three attacks on Union forces in the Battles of Peach Tree Creek (20 July), Atlanta (22 July), and Ezra Church (28 July). While the Confederates landed some telling blows, they suffered a total of 11,000 casualties, and the Federals repulsed them in each engagement. Such heavy losses induced Hood to abandon audacity and revert to the passive defense of his predecessor.

What followed resembled a siege, but it was a siege in name only, for Sherman sought to cut the railroads that supplied Hood's army because he lacked the means—and the patience—to invest Atlanta. As the Federal noose tightened, Hood attempted one more assault at Jonesboro on 31 August in a last-ditch attempt to save the Gate City. The attack was an unmitigated disaster: the Confederates suffered 2,200 casualties, while the Union defenders lost only 172. Noting that the Southern troops gave less than their best effort, Hess blamed physical exhaustion as well as low morale stemming from "a lack of trust in Hood's

judgment” dating back to the futile attacks of 20, 22, and 28 July (p. 254). He condemns Hood for blaming “everyone but himself for the loss of Atlanta,” which he calls “sordid in the extreme” (p. 286).

The conclusion would have benefited from a brief discussion of the Atlanta Campaign’s strategic significance, but the omission is understandable, given the book’s emphasis on operational concerns.


The appendix includes a comparison of Union and Confederate works. At the outset of the campaign, Federal fortifications tended to be stronger, but by the time the armies had reached the Kennesaw Line, the Southerners displayed more skill at fortifying their positions because they were most often the defenders. It is surprising that Sherman’s quartermasters had as much difficulty in supplying troops with entrenching tools as did their Confederate counterparts. Many companies in the two armies had to make do with just a few spades or shovels. Hess observes that shorthanded Confederate quartermasters purchased tools from local civilians. In critical situations, soldiers used whatever implements came to hand. During the Battle of Kennesaw Mountain, Union troops who were pinned down on Cheatham’s Hill “used bayonets, spoons, tin mess pans and their hands” to dig in until they began receiving entrenching tools under cover of darkness (p. 123).

Readers familiar with the Atlanta Campaign will find this book well worth their time, and for those who are new to the subject, it will serve as an excellent introduction.

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***Pershing's Tankers: Personal Accounts of the AEF Tank Corps in World War I***

Edited by Lawrence M. Kaplan  
University Press of Kentucky, 2018  
Pp. xi, 290. \$50

**Review by Scott A. Porter**

Lawrence M. Kaplan has compiled the largest collection of reports and personal accounts of the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) Tank Corps to date. *Pershing's Tankers: Personal Accounts of the AEF Tank Corps in World War I* contains more than 250 pages of skillfully mined tank corps senior leader commentaries, official tank corps personal-experience reports, unofficial personal accounts, and unofficial tank corps operational summaries. While many editors would have presented such a vast amount of information chronologically (making for a long, dry read), Kaplan, thankfully, does not. Instead, he masterfully organizes this huge volume into major, unifying categories. In doing so, Kaplan sets a new standard for editing and framing the experiences of World War I (WWI) tankers.

Kaplan wisely sets the stage in Chapter 1 by providing a short and highly informative historical summary of the U.S. Tank Corps. Starting in the fall of 1917, General John J. Pershing approved plans for the first overseas tank corps and assigned a cavalryman, Col. Samuel D. Rockenbach, as its first chief. With the establishment of the General Headquarters, Tank Corps, in France, Rockenbach built a tank center in

Langres and adopted the U.S. Army's first tank, the light French tank FT-17. Capt. George S. Patton Jr. was the first officer attached to the newly established Tank Corps, and from two light tank battalions he formed the 304th Tank Brigade. Eventually, the U.S. Tank Corps would include the 301st Heavy Tank Battalion equipped with the mammoth 38-ton Mark V Star from the British. These American-manned tanks from the French and the British would fight alongside doughboy infantrymen from 12 September 1918 until the war's end.

Surprisingly, only three U.S. tank battalions fought in combat in WWI, but those that did documented their experiences well. After the war, newly promoted Brigadier General Rockenbach recognized the potential of tank warfare, and he knew that lessons learned in WWI would be useful to future tankers. He sent a memorandum to his tank officers and men instructing them to write accounts of their experiences to augment the war's official records on tank operations. These supplemental records covered not only combat, but also organizing, training, equipping, and maintaining the tank force. On 29 August 1919, Rockenbach testified before Congressional Subcommittee No. 5 (Ordnance) on the history of the Tank Corps, from the original difficulties with production and logistics through the recommended designs to increase the tanks' capabilities.

Kaplan aptly places Rockenbach's testimony in Chapter 2, "Tank Corps Senior Leader Commentary," as it provides the necessary context for Chapter 3, "Official Tank Corps Personal-Experiences Reports." Contained in this chapter are forty-eight official accounts from the reports Rockenbach requested of his soldiers, including that of the quickly promoted Col. George S. Patton Jr., commander of the 304th Tank Brigade. Official accounts also came from the 302d Tank Center (including salvage and repair) and all three battalions that were engaged in combat, with the 301st being of particular note. Maj. Roger B. Harrison, commander of this heavy battalion, and nearly all of his junior officers provided over fifty pages of detailed accounts of every battle they had fought alongside various U.S. and British units.

The human dimension of tank warfare is captured in Chapter 4, "Unofficial

Personal Accounts.” Patton’s letters to his wife are included here, along with vivid personal stories from twenty other tankers, told in letters, local newspaper articles, and magazines. Unlike the official reports, these accounts give the harrowing details of what it was like being gassed, inhaling tank fumes, suffering wounds, experiencing artillery strikes near or on top of a tank, and destroying enemy emplacements and forces with machine guns or a six-pound cannon. There are tales of survival, sorrow, and bravery under the most adverse battlefield conditions of mud, blood, and bodies.


Approximately twenty useful photos and sketches are included along with tank corps organizational charts, detailed maps, plans for various offensives, and a chart of the U.S. tank program in progress just before the war ended.

A capable editor with an eye for telling the human story, Kaplan also corrects spelling, almost unreadable grammar mistakes, and errors in location names while still preserving the authentic tone of the men’s stories and descriptions. Thus, *Pershing’s Tankers: Personal Accounts of the AEF Tank Corps in World War I* is highly recommended for historians and nonhistorians alike. Lest we forget.

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***Russia in Flames: War, Revolution, Civil War, 1914–1921***

By Laura Engelstein  
Oxford University Press, 2018  
Pp. xxvii, 823. \$39.95

**Review by Grant T. Harward**

This impressive work of synthesis ranges across the vast expanses of imperial and revolutionary Russia and brings to life century-old events in such a way that they seem familiar to contemporary audiences. While the U.S. Army girds itself to be prepared for peer or near-peer conflicts, in the last several decades since the fall of communism in Eastern Europe, the Army often has been required to intervene in civil wars or fight insurgencies that included sectarian conflicts. It seems likely that in the future the Army will be called on again to fight such campaigns. Professor Laura Engelstein’s *Russia in Flames* will interest those who want to know more about the dynamics, the role of foreign intervention, and the reasons why one side gains the upper hand in civil war. Through her engaging prose, Engelstein brings clarity to an extremely complex period of Russian history that dramatically shaped the rest of the twentieth century.

Despite the seemingly equal components of the subtitle “War, Revolution, Civil War,” a good half of Engelstein’s book focuses on the Russian Civil War, and most of the rest of it is on the Russian Revolution. Only a small portion of the book is dedicated to Russian belligerency in the First World War. Indeed,

Engelstein presents the section on the Eastern Front not as a history but as an overview of three important themes: the increasing disarray of the Russian state, the mobilization of citizens to commit violence, and the official stigmatization of both external and internal threats. This section explains the total collapse of the Russian state in February 1917, due to the contradictions between autocracy and modernization, which undermined it. Engelstein focuses her narrative on political rather than military matters, however, the line between the two becomes increasingly blurred in civil wars when military victories are especially hollow without similar political successes.

Engelstein repeatedly argues that the Bolsheviks did not so much seize power but rather created it. Indeed, she believes the implosion of the Russian state left a vacuum of power in which revolutionary, and later counterrevolutionary, groups competed in state building. Whoever was able to raise, field, and supply an effective army would win the civil war. The Bolsheviks, benefiting from the Red Army built by the military parvenu Trotsky, proved most successful. Engelstein points out, however, that the Bolsheviks superiority at employing violence was only one of the reasons for their success. Nearly all revolutionary and counterrevolutionary groups used so-called Bolshevik methods during the Russian Civil War—forced requisitioning of grain, conscription, summary execution, secret police, and vilifying propaganda. “But the party, under Lenin’s astute leadership, was also good at brand-building, image-making, political theater, and parliamentary maneuvers. They were better than their rivals at leveraging institutions for their own use” (p. 198). The Bolsheviks did not succeed merely by terrorizing people into submission, but by mobilizing them for a cause, too.

Throughout her work, Engelstein also demonstrates the importance of symbols in mobilizing popular support, the most potent of which was “the Democracy,” and Lenin offered something mimicking democracy, even while he endeavored to stamp out true democracy.

The book drives forward chronologically, but the narrative is periodically interrupted by thematic or geographic chapters—increasingly so in the second half of the book as Engelstein switches between different regions during the

Russian Civil War. She makes great effort to show that the revolution and civil war were also imperial and international events. Imperial Russia had stretched from Eastern Europe to Far East Asia, and the breakdown of the Russian state resulted in nationalist state building in the former imperial periphery. This was successful in some places, such as Finland, Poland, and the Baltic lands, but unsuccessful in other places, such as Ukraine, Crimea, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. Engelstein shows how foreign powers became deeply involved in the revolution and especially the civil war. The Allies initially took a neutral stance during the revolution, while the Central Powers exploited developments. The peace treaty signed between the Bolsheviks and the Central Powers enraged most non-Bolshevik revolutionaries and even divided the Bolsheviks. Germany was particularly influential in the western borderlands that successfully broke away from Russia. The Allies, especially France and Japan, began interfering more once the civil war broke out, but accomplished little. The thematic chapters offer glimpses into how the political decisions at the top influenced peasant and worker politics at the bottom. The terrible persecution of Jews during these upheavals is also covered in detail. The scope of the book is breathtaking and, even more impressive, adeptly examines a vast array of territories, themes, peoples, classes, individuals, politics, and battles.

While not a traditional military history, *Russia in Flames* offers several truly fascinating chapters on the Russian Civil War. The description of the early days of the White movement (when it consisted of volunteers, mostly officers fighting as privates, and resembled a guerrilla movement more than an organized army) is engaging. The transformation of the Czech Legion from armed refugees to anti-Bolshevik shock troops is also fascinating and helps to explain one of the stranger aspects of the Russian Civil War. The narrative here is filled with charismatic warlords, such as the Cossack-style hetman in Ukraine and the Turkic-style ataman in Far East Asia, who raised undisciplined but effective forces for the Red and White armies while also pursuing their own aims. Ultimately, the White forces were defeated, not just because they operated on the periphery but because

they failed to build functioning states to mobilize resources and because they refused to gain popular support by promising some version of democracy.


Finally, Engelstein refutes the long-cherished claims of apologists who argue that Lenin's democratic revolution was later betrayed by Stalin's ruthless dictatorship. She emphasizes that Lenin had no time for "petite bourgeois" ideas like elections, trade unions, the rule of law, compromise, or the sanctity of life. Lenin himself was the engine of the Bolshevik coup that destroyed the fledgling democracy in October 1917. Lenin turned to terror well before the civil war, used the civil war to liquidate enemies, and adopted the position of "war communism," which resulted in a famine killing over five million people. "Leninism, in short, was an authoritarian version of socialism" (p. 627).

*Russia in Flames* is a chronicle of failures. The failure of the tsarist state to meet the demands of total war, of the notable and moderate socialists to solve the problems that caused the revolution, of foreign intervention to bend the revolution to various ends, and of the Whites to state build. It is also a history of success. The success of the Bolsheviks in creating a new form of state power under that "substituted the forced mobilization of popular participation for the formal institutions of political democracy" (p. 625). A success that came at the costs of millions of lives during the civil war and countless more in the decades to follow. Engelstein's arguments are persuasive, and her book is sure to become a standard work about the subject, if for no other reason than the sheer breadth of scope and depth of detail.

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***The Spearheaders: A Personal History of Darby's Rangers***

By James Altieri  
 Naval Institute Press, 2014  
 Pp. 318. \$24.95

**Review by Matt D. Montazzoli**

*The Spearheaders: A Personal History of Darby's Rangers* is James Altieri's account of his World War II service, rising from private to company commander, with the First Ranger Battalion. The Naval Institute Press has republished a paperback edition, acquainting a new generation of readers with the best primary source of information about early Ranger operations. Although an accessible and interesting read, *The Spearheaders* will probably remain in the province of dedicated military historians and those with a personal connection to the Rangers.

Towering over the book is William Orlando Darby, the tough, charismatic leader of the Ranger Force, "born to command other men in the dark of night."<sup>1</sup> Darby's selection to command the inaugural Ranger Battalion was largely happenstance: a West Pointer and an artilleryman, Darby was serving as a general's aide in Ireland, and his boss recommended him to then-Col. Lucian K. Truscott. Truscott selected Darby to form and command the new American commando-style unit, assessing him as "outstanding in appearance, possessed of a most attractive personality . . . keen, intelligent, full of enthusiasm."<sup>2</sup> Altieri tells us that he "looked the part of a man singled out by destiny to lead a group of men who required leadership of the highest

caliber,” with “a magnetic quality about him that defied description” (pp. 31–32). The commander set the pace for officers and men alike, constantly in the field and always up front on the grueling nighttime speed marches that became the unit’s signature. Trained by British commandos in Ireland and Scotland, the Rangers were forged with an emphasis on physical fitness, small unit tactics, and doing the basics extremely well. Altieri spends much of the book chronicling this initial training, a crucible that left the Rangers convinced that they would go into battle “surrounded by men who had proved themselves again and again through grueling tests of courage, endurance, and ability” (p. 120).

The reprint is laudable for the opportunity to bring Altieri’s tale to a new audience, but it is marred by editorial errors and printing mistakes, with sentences tapering off into nothing and entire sections missing from the paperback edition. The writing style is workmanlike, but the prose occasionally soars, especially when discussing the psychological discomfort that attended Altieri’s actual experience of combat. His reflection that “[i]t was one thing to conjure up pictures of Rangers as hard-hitting, bayonet-wielding commandos marauding in the black night, putting terror in the enemy’s hearts—but it was another thing physically to experience plunging a knife in another human’s stomach” would elicit nods of agreement from any combatant who has ever struggled to reconcile the mythology of violence with the reality of its practical application (p. 222).

Altieri’s story does not feel fresh or new. Thanks to a steady diet of World War II hagiography, in print and on screen, everything from the harsh training to the fanatical camaraderie and the off-duty hijinks feels familiar, almost stale. This is not the fault of Altieri, a man who at the time of original publication was one of the few World War II veterans to grapple honestly with his combat experiences, relating not only the tropes of training and camp tomfoolery, but earnestly recollecting the moments before going into action when the Rangers “were silent, thoughtful, each man wrapped deep in his own private hell, each man probing his inner soul for the strength and courage to prove equal to the battle ahead” (p. 200). It is largely a testament to the book’s status as a classic that it feels recycled; Altieri’s vivid account has morphed into conventional wisdom over the years. Every history book that references Darby’s Rangers rightfully

footnotes *The Spearheaders*, and for a reader with a genuine interest in the Second World War Rangers, there is no better primer on the exploits of this storied and star-crossed unit.

The fate of Darby’s Ranger Force also provides students of military art and history with a cautionary tale, in the form of the unit’s decline and eventual destruction along the Anzio beachhead. Altieri laments that as the Rangers expanded rapidly after their success in North Africa, “six weeks were all we had to whip the three new battalions into fighting shape for another invasion we knew we would again lead” (p. 245). Commonly accepted scholarship faults poor intelligence for the disaster at Cisterna, when a Ranger night attack blundered into an unexpected Panzer formation and was massacred so thoroughly that it caused Darby to weep, but “[e]ven before Cisterna, the lack of time to train replacements had diluted the quality of the battalions.”<sup>3</sup> The employment of the Rangers as conventional infantry against the teeth of the Winter Line had forfeited their unique advantage as lightly armed raiders and steadily bled the unit of experienced veterans. The Rangers at Cisterna fought bravely, but the failure of that attack and the effective destruction of the unit illustrate the truism that Special Operations Forces cannot be mass produced, and that the selection and training “process cannot be hastened without degrading ultimate capability.”<sup>4</sup>

The bloodline of the Army’s modern 75th Ranger Regiment is easy to trace back to Darby’s outfit. Among the regiment’s foundational documents is the Abrams Charter, a charge from the famous chief of staff to ensure that the regiment provides leaders and lessons for the larger Army. Altieri would approve, as it was his stated hope that “every unit in the Army will have a hard core of daring, spirited combat leaders, imbued with the same qualities of initiative and valor that Darby inspired in his original troopers. Thus the Ranger spirit will never die” (p. 318). *The Spearheaders* makes it clear that from Darby’s day to the present, the specially selected and well-trained members of the Rangers shared Altieri’s confidence that “being with the Rangers meant being with the greatest group of men ever to be assembled as a fighting unit” (p. 60).

## NOTES

1. Rick Atkinson, *An Army At Dawn: The War in North Africa, 1942-1943* (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 2002), p. 435.

2. Michael J. King, *William Orlando Darby: A Military Biography* (Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1981), p. 32.


3. David W. Hogan Jr., *U.S. Army Special Operations in World War II* (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 1992), p. 23.

4. See SOF Truths: Truth III, U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), <https://www.socom.mil/about/sof-truths>, 2016.

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### *Reconstructing a Shattered Egyptian Army: War Minister Gen. Mohamed Fawzi’s Memoirs, 1967–1971*

Edited by Youssef H. Aboul-Enein  
 Naval Institute Press, 2014  
 Pp. xx, 233. \$64.95

### Review by Christian H. Heller

The Middle East has witnessed numerous conflicts between Israel and its Arab neighbors over the last seven decades. The 1948 Arab-Israeli War was the first test of influence for a young United Nations. The 1956 Suez Crisis established new rules for how the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union would play out in the Middle East. Egyptian threats to restrict naval

shipping led Israel to launch preemptive air strikes in the 1967 Six-Day War, which nearly destroyed Egypt's entire air force. Israel subsequently occupied the Sinai Peninsula and Suez Canal until an Egyptian-led Arab coalition launched a surprise attack and, in a stunning military success, recaptured the lost territory in the 1973 Yom Kippur War.

In only a few short years, the Egyptian Armed Forces (EAF) transformed from a service in disarray to a combined arms force capable of significant offensive operations against Israel. In *Reconstructing a Shattered Egyptian Army: War Minister Gen. Mohamed Fawzi's Memoirs, 1967–1971*, Youssef H. Aboul-Enein, a U.S. Navy commander and National Defense University professor, explains how this revolution took place.

Though the book focuses on Mohamed Fawzi, who served as the Egyptian war minister from 1967 to 1971, numerous other characters from Egyptian history appear, including Gamal Abdel Nasser, Anwar Sadat, and Abdel-Hakim Amer. Aboul-Enein accurately claims that “Fawzi is to Egypt what George B. McClellan—who trained, equipped, and drilled soldiers, providing an army with which Ulysses S. Grant and Abraham Lincoln could challenge the Confederacy—was to the Union” (p. 3).

*Reconstructing a Shattered Egyptian Army* is divided logically into four major sections. Chapters 1–3 address the military's problems leading up to the 1967 war, while Chapters 4 and 5 address Egyptian decision making and the collapse of the armed forces. In these chapters, Abdel-Hakim Amer, the concurrently serving vice president, war minister, and chief of staff of the Egyptian Army, plays a main role, as Aboul-Enein discusses the three critical weaknesses that plagued the EAF in this period.

First, the military's focus was on domestic control and supporting the regime. The military had “assumed responsibility for civil security . . . and put ever more resources toward combatting internal threats and countercoups” (pp. 6–7). Its responsibilities also involved political indoctrination at universities, but military officers were more interested in “making the most of the opportunity to personally enrich themselves” than preparing their troops for war (p. 9).

Second, Egypt deployed forces to Yemen starting in 1962 to fight an insurgent campaign against Saudi- and Jordanian-backed royalists. Years of guerrilla fighting led to an institutional shift within the EAF away from conventional military

capabilities. Combined arms practices and joint operations training were abandoned. The campaign offered Egypt no strategic benefit and eventually involved fourteen divisions and seven Special Forces battalions, which imposed dire strains on the military's finances, logistics, and morale.

Third, as tensions increased prior to the 1967 conflict, EAF units suffered not only from shortages in personnel and equipment, but from poor planning and guidance as well. Cairo failed to issue cohesive objectives or orders to frontline forces and lacked an effective command and control structure to disseminate instructions from senior Egyptian leaders to tactical commanders. Senior officials like Amer began to improvise orders, changing plans for the 1967 conflict at least four times prior to initiation, which led to paralysis and confusion throughout the chain of command as combat unfolded. Chaos followed, and the army abandoned its posts to flee the Sinai. By Fawzi's assessment, Egypt lost 85 percent of its air force and army equipment in the war, including 100 percent of its heavy and light bombers, as well as 13,600 soldiers.

Chapters 6–10 focus on Fawzi's reforms of the military beginning in 1967, immediately following the devastating loss in the Sinai, and continuing through 1970. Fawzi set about developing a detailed plan for removing nonmilitary tasks from the War Minister's portfolio while simultaneously organizing a disarrayed and retreating army to secure the west side of the Suez Canal. His attention then turned to offloading, storing, and distributing the massive shipments of Soviet aid pouring into Egypt, which included 550 airlift sorties and 15 ocean freighters filled with weapons, ammunition, and equipment.

Externally, Egypt quickly began its three-year War of Attrition (1967–1970) to probe Israeli defenses and test new weapons, build the Egyptian military and prepare it for combat, and create complacency among the Israeli defenders in the Sinai. Domestically, Fawzi and Nasser agreed on three goals to guide the coming years of Egyptian reform: organizing the armed forces to form a defensive line against Israel; removing the “state within a state that plagued many Arab armies” from the EAF; and embracing a foreign policy which refused negotiation with Israel until the Sinai was returned to Egypt (pp. 67–68). Fawzi instituted policies during this time which seem second-nature to the modern American military professional: tying military goals to political policy goals,

establishing civilian control over military departments, debating military strategies between senior leaders for refinement, implementing training plans to meet future operational needs, organizing nationwide logistics routes to supply combat zones, and crafting clear and concise chains of command for military units to obey.

Finally, Chapters 11–16 explore the intricacies of various components of the armed forces during these reforms. Many details in these chapters are covered in other portions of the book, though Chapter 13, which focuses on Egypt's air defense branch (a separate and distinct fourth military service) and naval capabilities, is especially interesting. Using Soviet aid, Egypt established a complex defense-in-depth to neutralize the Israeli Air Force's superiority. Three new MiG squadrons, various types of anti-aircraft guns, advanced surface-to-air missiles, and overlapping radar grids provided the airborne protection the Egyptian military required to take the offensive in 1973.

Aboul-Enein's book has two weaknesses. The forewords included with each chapter, some of which are multiple pages, distract from the actual content and serve no apparent purpose other than to demonstrate the support Aboul-Enein's work has received from senior defense leaders. Additionally, while the book is detailed and unique in its examination of Egyptian military leaders within a small window of history, any casual reader who lacks a thorough understanding of the Arab-Israeli conflict, Egyptian-Israeli relations, or the Cold War's history within the Middle East may find it too specific to be of interest.

Despite its minor imperfections, *Reconstructing a Shattered Egyptian Army* fills a critical gap in Middle Eastern and military literature. A case study in effective staff work and civil-military relations, this book provides a rare glimpse into the almost hidden past of the once-premier Egyptian armed forces. *Reconstructing a Shattered Egyptian Army* should be a natural addition to the professional military education of career officers.

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# CHIEF HISTORIAN'S FOOTNOTE

**JON T. HOFFMAN**



## WORKFORCE DIVERSITY

A recent Career Program (CP) 61 presentation on demographics underscored the fact that our workforce has a high percentage of older white males, especially in the history field. In the coming years, as that cohort—including me—retires, we will be hiring a new generation of employees. As we do so, we will be seeking to diversify our workforce, even though we will, to a large extent, still be at the mercy of the pool of candidates coming out of the leading military history programs in the country. The makeup of that prime source of applicants is illustrated by our current graduate research assistants (GRAs), who have so far consisted of eleven white males and two white females. In discussing our gender imbalance and lack of racial diversity with the graduate programs that provide our GRAs, we learned that these programs also have been attempting to diversify their student populations, but with limited success. Additionally, when it comes to federal hiring, there is the caveat of preferential job placement for veterans, who are, at this time, still predominantly male. However, as one of the largest employers of military historians in the federal government, the U.S. Army Center of Military History (CMH) is in a unique position, along with CP 61, to influence the future of the field of military history. With this in mind, we are in the very early stages of a multifaceted and long-term effort to diversify our workforce.

Our first objective is to generate interest in the study of military history within a diverse pool of undergraduates. We have begun this effort by reaching out to the history departments of several historically black colleges and universities (HBCUs), offering to have a CMH historian come to their campuses to discuss the military history career field with interested students. The presentation includes information on what official military historians do, the value of military history to the Army, the graduate school experience, and employment opportunities in the field. The response from the schools has been positive, and these visits are already underway. While we are focused at the moment on HBCUs within easy reach of Washington, D.C., if student interest warrants continuation, we plan to expand our efforts to schools around the country, returning to them on a rotating basis every second or third year. The targeted schools will be those with substantial minority or female student popula-



tions. We may also coordinate with the veteran affairs offices at these schools, as student veterans come equipped with knowledge and experience regarding the military and may be very interested in military history, especially once they learn that such a career field exists. We may carry this initiative even further and explore the possibility of working directly with the Veterans Administration (VA) to reach out to veterans around the country, as the VA will have contact information for all those using the G.I. Bill and can undoubtedly sort them by academic major and other criteria.

Beyond simply generating interest, we are looking to establish summer internships at CMH for undergraduates, primarily between their junior and senior years. This will give students familiarity with the types of work official historians do, provide hands-on work experience, and the possibility for letters of recommendation to strengthen their graduate school applications, and would allow CMH to identify potential candidates for future employment. When students return to their schools, we hope they will spread the word about CMH and the career field of military history. We have not yet worked out the exact form of these internships, which could be Pathways interns, paid positions via contracts with schools (following the GRA format), or unpaid volunteer positions. If we can obtain the funding, we also want to expand the GRA program to one or more additional schools. Doing so would provide more avenues for former summer interns and others to get into graduate school and return to CMH to acquire advanced work experience, as well as the security clearance that comes with a GRA position. Former GRAs make excellent candidates for civil service positions and contract work.

As I noted earlier, we are only at the beginning of an effort that will last for years to come. We do not yet know what will be effective or what other initiatives we might explore to achieve our diversity goals. But we are committed to building and maintaining a highly qualified, diverse workforce that will carry the Army History Program through the twenty-first century and beyond. We would be glad to hear from anyone who has additional ideas in support of these efforts.



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