



THE PROFESSIONAL BULLETIN OF ARMY HISTORY

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"TONIGHT YOU ARE GOING TO FIND YOUR SOULS"

THE FLY-IN OF WINGATE'S CHINDITS, MARCH 1944

BY CHRISTOPHER L. KOLAKOWSKI

VICTORY OR DEFEAT?

TASK FORCE HAWK AND ARMY
AVIATION READINESS, 1991–1999

BY CHARLES R. BOWERY JR.

ARMY HISTORY

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Front cover: An American C-47 towing a glider en route to the landing zone at BROADWAY. (National Archives)

Back cover: (Left to right) Col. John Alison, an unknown British Chindit, and Maj. William H. Taylor on landing zone BROADWAY in Burma during Operation THURSDAY. (U.S. Army)

EDITOR'S JOURNAL

In this Fall 2021 issue of *Army History*, we are excited to present two outstanding articles, a top-notch crop of book reviews, a look at a World War II-era gun carriage, and a feature highlighting an Army museum in the Pacific Northwest.

The first article, by frequent *Army History* contributor Chris Kolakowski, examines Operation THURSDAY and the aerial invasion of Burma during the Second World War. Masterminded by eccentric British Maj. Gen. Orde C. Wingate, the operation airlifted thousands of soldiers and massive amounts of equipment from India to makeshift airfields carved out of the Burmese jungle behind enemy lines. Senior Allied leaders initially met Wingate's plan with serious criticism, as the only major Allied airborne operation up to that point had been the Allied air landings on Sicily in July 1943. The drawbacks of that operation left significant doubts in their minds that Wingate's plan could work in the much harsher terrain of Burma. It was a serious gamble, but one that Wingate was confident could work.

The second article is by the U.S. Army Center of Military History's executive director Charles Bowery. He looks at Task Force HAWK, the 1999 deployment of Apache attack helicopters during Operation ALLIED FORCE, the NATO air campaign to curtail Serbian ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. Hampered by numerous problems, the operation ended before the Apaches ever fired a shot. The article dissects the obstacles faced by the task force and details some of the corrective actions the Army made in the ensuing years.

At the time of this issue's publication, the staff of *Army History* has been teleworking primarily for about a year and a half. For those of you who read every issue, I hope you will agree that we have not missed a beat. Come September 2021, we will be returning to the office in a hybrid fashion. One of the benefits of returning to the office will be the resumption of the book review program, which we suspended in March 2020. I am excited to share with you that we will have a sizeable new selection of titles for reviewers to pick from, as publishers continued to send books for review throughout the pandemic.

I must acknowledge many of you for your kind notes and comments about the quality of *Army History* over the past year. We have worked very hard not to let the situation affect how we do things and your words of encouragement let us know that we are succeeding. There is much work to be done as we transition back into the office, and I expect it to be relatively seamless. We will continue to provide you with engaging content in the issues to come. Thank you all for your support.

BRYAN J. HOCKENSMITH
MANAGING EDITOR

CONTENTS

FEATURES

THE CHIEF'S CORNER.....	4
SEPTEMBER 11TH AT TWENTY: LOOKING BACK THROUGH OUR ARMY HISTORY	
NEWS NOTES	5
MUSEUM FEATURE.....	20
THE LEWIS ARMY MUSEUM: THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST'S PREMIER LAND WARFARE MUSEUM	
U.S. ARMY ARTIFACT SPOTLIGHT.....	24
THE LEGACY OF THE MUTUAL DEFENSE ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1949: A YUGOSLAV ARMY (WORLD WAR II U.S.)	
90-MM. GUN CARRIAGE M36B2 IN ACTION AS LATE AS 1999	
BOOK REVIEWS.....	42
LAND WARFARE SINCE 1860: A GLOBAL HISTORY OF BOOTS ON THE GROUND	
THE VETERANS CEMETERIES OF TEXAS	
THE INDISPENSABLES: THE DIVERSE SOLDIER-MARINERS WHO SHAPED THE COUNTRY, FORMED THE NAVY, AND ROWED WASHINGTON ACROSS THE DELAWARE	
MUSIC ALONG THE RAPIDAN: CIVIL WAR SOLDIERS, MUSIC, AND COMMUNITY DURING WINTER QUARTERS, VIRGINIA	
UNSUNG HERO OF GETTYSBURG: THE STORY OF UNION GENERAL DAVID MCMURTRIE GREGG	
AMERICAN WOMEN REPORT WORLD WAR I: AN ANTHOLOGY OF THEIR JOURNALISM	
BROTHERHOOD IN COMBAT: HOW AFRICAN AMERICANS FOUND EQUALITY IN KOREA AND VIETNAM	
TALIBAN SAFARI: ONE DAY IN THE SURKHAGAN VALLEY	
CHIEF HISTORIAN'S FOOTNOTE.....	51
WORKING IN THE COVID WORLD	

ARTICLES

06 ▶	"TONIGHT YOU ARE GOING TO FIND YOUR SOULS": THE FLY-IN OF WINGATE'S CHINDITS, MARCH 1944 BY CHRISTOPHER L. KOLAKOWSKI
26 ▶	VICTORY OR DEFEAT? TASK FORCE HAWK AND ARMY AVIATION READINESS, 1991–1999 BY CHARLES R. BOWERY JR.



THE CHIEF'S CORNER

CHARLES R. BOWERY JR.

SEPTEMBER 11TH AT TWENTY: LOOKING BACK THROUGH OUR ARMY HISTORY

This September marks twenty years since the terrorist attacks on the United States that changed our Army, our country, and the world in deep and lasting ways. On the morning of 11 September 2001, I was wrapping up my first class session as a military history instructor at West Point, when my officemate came into the classroom to tell me to turn on the television. The rest is a blur in my memory; from Trophy Point, we could see smoke rising from the World Trade Center. Late the following night, my wife and I stood on the Plain and watched the Corps of Cadets conduct a silent parade in remembrance of the victims of the attacks. Right then, we knew instinctively that we would both be involved in combat operations, and that the arc of our lives had changed permanently.

Fast forward three years. In early 2004, I was a student at the Command and General Staff College and had learned that I would be assigned as an operations officer in an attack helicopter battalion deployed in Iraq. My commander sent me an email urging me to get to the unit as quickly as possible, because the war would be over soon and he didn't want me to miss this professional opportunity. Seven Bowery family deployments and more than a decade later, the Army's post-11 September wars continued and Army operations in the region persist today.

Because of the Herculean efforts of the Army's historians, Military History Detachments, archivists, and museum profes-

sionals, the records and material culture of these conflicts are substantially complete. They are available to our force and the scholarly world for research, publication, force development, doctrine, public history, and education. The Center of Military History (CMH) and the Army University Press have published a number of oral history collections, both of 11 September and operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. CMH historians now are engaged in writing the Tan Books series, formally titled *The U.S. Army After 11 September 2001*. It is worth reiterating, however, that CMH historians continued to write the series, *The U.S. Army in World War II* (the Green Books), into the 1980s. The Tan Books will take time, patience, hard work, and senior leader commitment to bring them to publication in the coming years. At present, CMH authors are preparing manuscripts on such diverse topics as the war in Afghanistan after 2004, the 2007 troop surge in Iraq, and the battle with the Islamic State as part of Operation INHERENT RESOLVE. Based on all of this great work, I am proud to report that the Army continues to invest in its recent history and remains a learning organization. The service and sacrifice of so many soldiers and their families, myself and those I love among them, deserve no less.

AH

NEWSNOTES

NEW PUBLICATION FROM THE CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY

The Center of Military History (CMH) recently published *Between DESERT STORM and IRAQI FREEDOM: U.S. Army Operations in the Middle East, 1991–2001*, by J. Travis Moger. From 1991 to 2001, the U.S. Army deterred Iraqi aggression and maintained a high tempo of operations, despite a decade of downsizing and consolidation. Even as the Army's personnel numbers shrank to their lowest level since 1940, and the service reduced its number of active duty divisions from eighteen to ten, the potential for war in the Middle East persisted. The U.S. military was compelled to maintain a modest forward presence and developed the capability to deploy troops rapidly to the region. The Army rushed brigades to Kuwait repeatedly to serve as a deterrence force, although no fighting took place between American and Iraqi ground combat units in the interwar period.

By the end of the decade, Iraq retained the ability to threaten its neighbors with conventional arms, and concerns about its illicit weapons programs persisted. To

counter these twin dangers, the international community used a combination of economic sanctions and weapons inspections, while the United States and its allies applied military pressure. When the United States deposed Saddam Hussein in 2003, it was able to do so because of the new power projection capabilities that the Army had developed between DESERT STORM and IRAQI FREEDOM. This title has been published as CMH Pub 57-1-1. It is available electronically on the CMH website and the public may purchase print copies from the Government Publishing Office.

NEW RELEASE FROM AUSA

On July 12, the Association of the United States Army (AUSA) released the latest entry in their Medal of Honor graphic novel series, *Medal of Honor: Mitchell Red Cloud Jr.* Mitchell Red Cloud Jr. served as a Marine raider in World War II before joining the Army as an infantryman. During the Korean War, he detected and thwarted a Chinese assault despite being shot twice. Refusing assistance, Red Cloud propped himself against a tree to continue fighting until he was fatally wounded. His heroic actions prevented his company from being overrun. To read *Medal of Honor: Mitchell Red Cloud Jr.* online or download a free copy, please visit www.ausa.org/redcloud.

GRAHAM ATHAN COSMAS (1938–2021)

In March 2021, the U.S. Army Center of Military History (CMH) lost one of its most distinguished alumni, Graham Cosmas, a quiet professional who was one of the leading lights of military history. Graham was born in Weehawken, New Jersey, and grew up in Morristown. He graduated from Oberlin College, Ohio, and in 1969 he received his Ph.D. from the University of Wisconsin at Madison. By then, he had already begun his teaching career at the University of Texas at Austin. After a stint at the University of Guam, however, Graham was between jobs and briefly considered a career as a certified public accountant. For the everlasting




Graham A. Cosmas

benefit of the profession, Brig. Gen. Edwin H. Simmons offered Graham a position with the Marine Corps Historical Center in 1973. From there, Graham launched a brilliant career as an official historian. He joined CMH's Histories Division in 1979. From 1984 to 1985, he was the Harold K. Johnson Professor at the Army War College. He became deputy director of the Joint History Office in 2001 and stayed there until retiring in 2012.

While at CMH, Graham wrote the monumental two-volume history of Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, for the U.S. Army in Vietnam series and was co-author of *The Medical Department: Medical Service in the European Theater of Operations*, for the U.S. Army in World War II series. He put his accounting skills to work as treasurer of the Society for Military History, earning the Victor Gondos Award in 1999 for his service. He was also a trustee of the United States Commission on Military History and a devoted member of the Military Classics Seminar.

Although he leaves no immediate family, he will live on in the hearts and memories of those graced by his intelligence and goodwill for all.



"Tonight You Are Going to Find YOUR SOULS"

THE FLY-IN OF WINGATE'S CHINDITS, MARCH 1944

BY CHRISTOPHER L. KOLAKOWSKI

Visitors to Burma see lion statues occupying prominent places. They are often quite large and usually depicted crouching with tail up and teeth bare.¹ Known as *chinthe*, these lions flank temples and monasteries, and appear on the country's currency. They originate from the ancient poem the *Mahavamsa*, which describes the legendary origins of the Sinhalese people. In the poem, a lion "ravages the kingdom" out of grief. The Sinhalese King Vijaya's father kills the lion, only to discover that he is the lion's own son.² As symbols of great power and strength, chinthe have occupied a culturally important part of Burma and Southeast Asia ever since.

In March 1943 and March 1944, a new form of chinthe entered Burma, appearing on the insignia of British forces fighting to rid the country of Japanese invaders. In 1943, the British marched into the country, but in 1944, they did something never done before on such a scale: they flew.


The aerial invasion of Burma, codenamed Operation THURSDAY, ranks as one of World War II's great dramatic stories. It also was the largest airborne operation mounted to that point in history. In its success, many ground forces made important contributions to the

Allied victory in Burma while providing valuable experience for use in subsequent airborne operations elsewhere.

GENESIS OF THE OPERATION

Operation THURSDAY originated in the thinking of British Maj. Gen. Orde C. Wingate. He advocated inserting infantry into the enemy rear to create havoc and disruption, an approach he called "long-range penetration." He dubbed his chosen force the "Chindits," a corruption of chinthe. In 1943, the brigade-sized Chindits moved overland into Burma from Imphal in India and spent three months harassing Japanese rear areas before exfiltrating in scattered groups. The Chindit expedition provided a tonic of victory, but with a significant cost: the men left a third of their number behind as casualties, including a large number of wounded whom they could not evacuate.³

General Wingate was one of the great characters ever encountered by the American military. He achieved both infamy and fame fighting Arabs in Palestine in the late 1930s, and later led Anglo-Ethiopian forces into Addis Ababa against the Italians in 1941. He created the Chindits and directed their 1943 expedition into Burma, known as Operation



General Wingate

(Imperial War Museum)

LONGCLOTH. Wingate drove himself and his men hard with a single-minded determination to win that infused his Chindits with a very high esprit de corps. Wingate was also deeply eccentric in appearance and behavior. He often wore an old pith helmet and an alarm clock, would receive visitors naked, ate raw onions because of their supposed

A C-47 takes off, preparing to tow a glider to the landing zone at BROADWAY.
(National Archives)



Brigadier Fergusson

(Imperial War Museum)

curative properties, and ordered his officers to move at a run at all times. Brig. Bernard E. Fergusson, one of Wingate's closest lieutenants, described him as "a broad-shouldered, uncouth, almost simian officer who used to drift gloomily into the office for two or three days at a time, audibly dream dreams, and drift out again . . . [yet] he had the ear of the highest, [and] we paid more attention to his schemes. Soon we had fallen under the spell of his almost hypnotic talk."⁴

In August 1943, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill met Wingate on the latter's return to London, and took him to a strategy conference in Quebec to meet with other senior Allied leaders. There, Wingate recounted his experiences during LONGCLOTH, explaining how it validated his concepts and advocating for a larger force to do more for longer in the Japanese rear areas. He also wore his unwashed battle uniform in meetings, which contrasted with the polished dress uniforms of the senior leaders. Wingate's forceful words and



Colonels Cochran and Alison

(National Archives)

appearance made a deep impression. "You took one look at that face," recalled General Henry H. "Hap" Arnold, chief of the U.S. Army Air Forces, "like the face of a pale Indian chieftain, topping the uniform still smelling of jungle and sweat and war, and you thought: 'Hell, this man is serious.'"⁵

Wingate's proposals came at a time when the value of large airborne operations faced doubts. The two largest airborne operations to this point, the German invasion of Crete in May 1941 and the Allied air landings on Sicily in July 1943, had both been successes achieved at great cost. Deficiencies in execution had left troops scattered and had reduced the combat effectiveness of the divisions employed. By the time of the Quebec meetings, serious conversations about the future viability of airborne units were underway.⁶

The Allied leaders approved another, larger, Chindit expedition into Burma in 1944. Wingate's operation would support a multipronged campaign into Burma by U.S. Lt. Gen. Joseph W. Stilwell's Sino-American X Force (later Northern Combat Area Command [NCAC]) from the north, Chinese General Wei Li-huang's Y Force from the east, and British General William J. Slim's Fourteenth Army from the west.⁷

Hap Arnold left Quebec impressed with Wingate and determined to help him and the expedition. Wingate's presentation had dwelt on the fraught necessity of leaving the wounded behind for lack of transport. In Quebec, Arnold had offered up to three hundred light planes for the Chindits to use in their next expedition, but upon returning to Washington his thoughts grew beyond medical evacuation. He looked for a way

to use airpower to help the Chindits move and fight.⁸

Arnold sent for two of his best young officers, Lt. Cols. Philip G. Cochran and John R. Alison. The two were good friends, and greeted each other warmly upon arrival in Washington. Both had seen considerable fighting, Cochran in North Africa and Alison in Asia. Alison had been a member of the Flying Tigers, and Cochran was famous as the model for the maverick flying instructor Flip Corkin in the comic strip *Terry and the Pirates*. Both were smart and energetic, good leaders and proven fighters. Unable to choose between them, Arnold decided to make them co-commanders of this new force, officially designated as the 5318th Provisional Air Unit but informally named the 1st Air Commando. The two decided among themselves that the genial Cochran would be in charge, with the reserved Alison as second in command.⁹

Cochran went to England to meet with Wingate. The men's relationship was initially cool, but over a few days, Cochran began to understand Wingate's methods. Cochran realized the radio direction of Chindit columns was analogous to vectoring aircraft. "I saw it as an adaptation of air to jungle, and application of radio-controlled air-war tactics to a walking war in the trees and weeds," remembered Cochran. "I realized there was something very deep about him." Arnold told Cochran and Alison to "draw up a list of what you want," and the men created a miniature air force. The 1st Air Commando left for India with 30 P-51 Mustangs, 20 B-25 Mitchell bombers, 32 C-47 transports, 225 gliders, 100 L-1 and L-5 liaison aircraft, and 6 prototype

Sikorsky helicopters. Aviation engineers of the 900th Field Unit also joined the burgeoning Chindit support force.¹⁰

For his part, the Chindit commander assembled a staff in London, and left for India in mid-September. Brig. Derek Tulloch, an old friend, went along as Wingate's chief of staff. The Chindits also received a new name: Special Force. For official and deception purposes, they would call the Chindits the 3d Indian Division.¹¹

Special Force contained 6 brigades numbering 30,000 soldiers. One was Wingate's former command, the 77th Brigade under Brig. J. Michael Calvert. Brig. W. D. A. "Joe" Lentaigne's 111th Brigade, already training in long-range penetration, also joined Calvert. The veteran 70th British Division was broken up and reorganized into

the 14th, 16th, and 23d Brigades under Brigs. Thomas Brodie, Fergusson, and Lancelot Perowne, respectively. The 6th Brigade, composed of the Nigerian troops of Brig. A. H. Gillmore's 3d West African Brigade, joined in December. The American Galahad Force, later famous as Merrill's Marauders, also trained with Special Force.¹²

Wingate set out a purposeful eight-week conditioning program for his troops. Based on the experiences of LONGCLOTH, it emphasized "marching, watermanship, mules, air supply, jungle shooting; air support with live bombs; digging, column marching, column bivouac, patrols. R.E. [royal engineers] Signal exercises, [and] medical and veterinary tests," recalled Calvert. Wingate weeded out older soldiers and unfit personnel and replaced them with


volunteers from other units. In addition, each brigade rehearsed their part of their operation, including cooperation with the 1st Air Commando for glider landings, air supply, casualty evacuation, and air support. The air and ground units' trust in each other became apparent after a training accident in which two gliders crashed, killing ten Chindits. "Please be assured," said Lt. Col. D. C. Herring, the victims' commander, to the Air Commando leadership, "that we will go with your boys any place, any time, anywhere." The latter part of this statement became the 1st Air Commando motto.¹³

A key part of Wingate's plan was a system of fixed bases for his soldiers to use behind enemy lines. Called strongholds, these fortified centers would hold airstrips, supplies, and artillery. Floater units would operate



Brigadier Calvert

(British National Army Museum)



Brigadier Perowne

(National Archives)



nearby to ambush the Japanese and if possible draw them into the stronghold itself. "The Stronghold," instructed Wingate, "is an orbit around which columns of the brigade circulate. . . . The motto of the Stronghold is 'No Surrender.'"¹⁴

Much of Special Force's successful preparation was the result of Tulloch's hard work as chief of staff, for Wingate had come down with typhoid during the multistage flight from London. Wingate and his party had stopped in Tripoli, Libya, at dawn, when airport services were not yet open. A vexed and thirsty Wingate, recalled Tulloch, "impatiently threw some flowers out of a vase in the canteen and drank the water." Symptoms of typhoid began appearing soon after Wingate got to India, but Wingate, who believed most diseases were signs of mental weakness, pressed on. By early October, he was seriously ill and reluctantly went to the hospital. "Wingate was a difficult patient," recalled Tulloch. "He had little faith either in the desire or the ability of the hospital authorities to cure him." Tulloch arranged for the nurse who had tended to the Chindits in Imphal after LONGCLOTH to come. "As soon as Matron [Agnes] McGahey arrived, Wingate settled down and ceased to worry about his condition. He had complete faith in her and obeyed her instructions implicitly." Nonetheless, Wingate was in the hospital from 8 October to 10 November, and did not take full command of Special Force until 1 December.¹⁵

Over the next month, the Chindit plans coalesced under the codename Operation THURSDAY. Wingate and Tulloch visited General Stilwell on 3 January 1944, ten days after NCAC's forces started its North Burma campaign against Japanese Lt. Gen. Tanaka Shinichi's 18th "Chrysanthemum" Division. Wingate explained that he would use three brigades, the 77th, 111th, and 16th, in the area around Indaw, where they could cut Tanaka's supply line and hopefully disrupt other Japanese units in North Burma. The first two brigades would fly in, while Fergusson's 16th Brigade would march south from Shingbwiyang; Wingate hoped that Fergusson's men might be able to help Stilwell's advance as they passed by. After ninety days, the other three Special Force brigades, the 14th, 23d, and 3d West African, would fly in and relieve the first three, extending operations into and through the monsoon season. Wingate also formally released the Galahad Force to Stilwell. "The meeting ended in a most friendly atmosphere," recalled Tulloch,

"and Stilwell's previous suspicions appeared to have been replaced by respect."¹⁶

General Slim, whose Fourteenth Army exercised overall command of Special Force, formalized these plans in early February. He assigned Wingate three objectives: 1. To help the advance of combat troops (Ledo Sector) [NCAC] to the Myitkyina area by drawing off and disorganizing the enemy force opposing them and prevent the reinforcement of these forces. 2. To create a favorable situation for the Chinese [Y Force] advance westwards across the Salween. 3. To inflict the maximum confusion, damage, and loss on the enemy forces in Burma."¹⁷


The first part of Operation THURSDAY got underway when Fergusson's 16th Brigade started its march on 5 February. Wingate now turned to the delivery of Calvert's 77th and Lentaigne's 111th Brigades to the Indaw area via glider. Cochran's 1st Air Commando would handle air support and transport operations. Planners identified three landing zones in the jungle within forty miles of Indaw and the railroad that served as the Japanese 18th Division's supply line. The zones were codenamed BROADWAY, PICCADILLY, and CHOWRINGHEE; all were between 150 and 200 miles behind Japanese

lines. Each offered good access to Indaw and was large enough to house a C-47 airstrip. The Royal Air Force had used PICCADILLY for an improvised evacuation of sick Chindits via C-47 in April 1943 during Operation LONGCLOTH.¹⁸

Wingate planned the first fly-in to occur at 1800 on Sunday 5 March, to take advantage of a near-full moon. Calvert would lead his 77th Brigade and elements of the 111th Brigade from Lalaghat Airfield in northeast Bengal to BROADWAY and PICCADILLY. A few nights later, the balance of the 111th Brigade would fly from Imphal into CHOWRINGHEE. Once established, the Chindits would send columns against the railroad near Indaw, while a small detachment called Dahforce headed for the Kachin ethnic areas south of Myitkyina.¹⁹

5 MARCH: D-DAY AND CRISIS

By 5 March, Calvert and his men had assembled at Lalaghat. Arrayed around the field were the sixty-one gliders set to carry his troops, most double-towed behind C-47s of the 1st Air Commando. The field buzzed with activity around the flight line, as the Chindits and Air Commandos loaded, checked, and rechecked the planes





British troops at Lalaghat waiting to board their aircraft.

(National Archives)

and equipment. Wingate and Tulloch staffed Special Force's headquarters nearby. Cochran and Alison oversaw final preparations with their 1st Air Commando planes; Alison would handle part of the landing operations and go into PICCADILLY by glider. Slim was also present, as was Royal Air Force Air Marshal Sir John E. A. Baldwin of the 3d Tactical Air Force, U.S. Lt. Gen. George E. Stratemeyer of Eastern Air Command, and U.S. Brig. Gen. William D. Old of Air Transport Command.

Everyone felt the electric sense of impending adventure. "We were all so eager," recalled Calvert, "We could never again be keyed up to such a pitch morally, physically, or materially." Cochran put it to his pilots succinctly: "Nothing you've ever done, nothing you're ever going to do, counts now. Only the next few hours. Tonight you are going to find your souls."²⁰

To avoid tipping off the Japanese, Wingate had prohibited aerial flights near the three landing grounds. Capt. Charles Rushton of Cochran's staff suggested a last reconnaissance just to make sure there were no last-minute developments at the landing zones, and Cochran agreed. At 1100 on 5 March, Rushton boarded a B-25 piloted by Col. Robert "R. T." Smith, the 1st Air Commando's bomber commander. Two hours later, they flew over BROADWAY. "Everything looked normal," recalled Rushton. "We flew around it in a complete circle, and I made a dozen stills [i.e., photographs]. Then we headed for PICCADILLY to the south." What

Smith and Rushton saw there shocked them. "Hundreds of teak logs lay in rows across the open space," reported Rushton. "They had been placed since I photographed the clearing weeks before. Anything trying to land among them would have been smashed.... It seemed like a trap."²¹

Rushton and Smith realized the importance of this discovery—"a life-and-death warning," as Rushton termed it. Using the

radio was out of the question for security reasons, so they flew to Hailakandi Airfield in India, where Rushton's assistants quickly developed his film. Rushton made prints of varying sizes, including a 3-foot-by-3-foot blowup of PICCADILLY covered with logs. Unable to reach Cochran or Alison by phone, a frantic Rushton considered driving the twelve miles to Lalaghat. Instead, he sent some of the prints ahead via a fighter plane that was flying to Lalaghat and happened to land at Hailakandi by mistake. Rushton then found a small scout plane and followed. "If you've ever ridden in an L-1 and know how slow it is," Rushton recalled, "you'll understand how I felt flying those mere twelve miles, simply wanting to push the plane along." Upon landing and taxiing, Rushton jumped out and grabbed a jeep, speeding over to where Calvert's men prepared to embark. It was 1630, just ninety minutes before the operation was to begin.²²

Rushton found Cochran and Alison studying the photos delivered by the fighter pilot. Rushton handed over more and opened the big picture, telling Cochran, "They've caught on to us."

Cochran looked at what Rushton was showing him. "There on our landing strip were huge logs that had been drug across it that looked to us like obstructions that you would put down so that gliders, or nothing else, could land there, and, they,



Gliders at Lalaghat ready to be hooked up to C-47s.

(National Archives)


in fact, had guessed our purpose, that there was one place we weren't going to make it," Cochran recalled. "So then you had to deduce that here, lo and behold, was the other one, BROADWAY, which was clean and had no obstructions at all." In short, this information imperiled THURSDAY on the eve of takeoff.

The men found Wingate, and the other senior officers soon joined them in a huddle around the photos. Wingate demanded to know who had ordered the reconnaissance mission, and Cochran replied that he "had a hunch." Wingate smiled and returned to the photo.

Urgent questions followed. Was this an ambush? Nobody was sure, and there was no time to investigate. Postponement was not an option; they had to go that night or cancel. Could they change the plan that quickly? Calvert, Cochran, and the field commanders indicated they were in favor of going, and preferred to start with BROADWAY alone.²³

Wingate had stood slightly aside during the discussion, head bowed in thought as the huddled group reviewed the pictures and considered courses of action. With their recommendations, the time now came for a decision. Slim and Wingate stepped aside for a conference. In his postwar memoirs, General Slim recalled that Wingate now "became very moved," and the discussion became fraught. "The decision is yours," Slim recalled Wingate saying. "I knew it was," recalled Slim. "Not for the first time I felt the weight of decision crushing in on me with an almost physical pressure. . . . On my answer would depend not only the possibility of a disaster with wide implications on the whole Burma campaign and beyond, but the lives of these splendid men, tense and waiting around their aircraft. At that moment I would have given a great deal if Wingate or anybody else could have relieved me of the duty of decision. But that is a burden the commander himself must bear." "The operation will go on," Slim directed.²⁴

Slim's memory has been subject to review and criticism by other participants—especially the part about Wingate's mood. Calvert and Cochran credited Wingate with coolly making the decision to go, but may have mixed up the sequence and the nature of Wingate's direction. In reality, there were two sequential choices they had to make: to launch or abort Operation THURSDAY and, if they did go ahead with it, to determine a new landing plan for Calvert's troops.



An aerial reconnaissance photo of PICCADILLY. Note the logs that have been dragged out onto the landing zone.

(National Archives)



Wingate and party discussing the plans for Operation THURSDAY.

(National Archives)

Only the latter decision was Wingate's free choice; the former required Slim's concurrence. Slim and Wingate did confer alone, as Wingate related on 17 March and the official contemporary narrative of Special Force's 1944 operations confirms. Tulloch later recorded his impressions as Slim and Wingate stepped away to talk. "I admired Slim tremendously on that occasion," he recalled. "The final decision to go on with the operation rested squarely on his shoulders, and in the event of disaster he would carry a major share of the blame. Watching him closely at this moment of crisis, I gained the impression, which has always remained, that he had the utmost confidence both in Wingate and in the success of the operation." Slim's handling of the situation "earned the respect of all concerned," recalled Tulloch.²⁵

Wingate found that his superiors "were in full agreement . . . that the plan should proceed," and returned to the group to determine how to land his troops. Special Force's contingency plans called for CHOWRINGHEE as a backup landing field for either PICCADILLY or BROADWAY. Calvert pointed out that shifting the forces intended for PICCADILLY to CHOWRINGHEE would leave his brigade straddling the formidable Irrawaddy River, risking defeat in detail. "I am prepared to take all my brigade into BROADWAY alone," he said, "and take the consequences of a slower build-up as I don't want to split my brigade either side of the Irrawaddy." Wingate, with Slim listening, assented to Calvert's request. Everything would go into BROADWAY that night.²⁶

In the end, Wingate drove Slim's decision to go and Calvert propelled Wingate's plan to send all forces into BROADWAY alone. Slim or any of the air commanders could have vetoed these choices, but they did not do so. "Although some of the glider pilots and the leaders of our air part of this action would be there and would be in jeopardy, really, the people that were going to take it, and had to make the decision whether they were going in or not, were those ground people," explained Cochran later. "They were Wingate's people. If they decided they were going in, and they were going to battle for that landing strip, there was just no doubt."²⁷

THE NIGHTS ON BROADWAY AND CHOWRINGHEE

"So things began to move again," recalled Tulloch. Cochran jumped on the hood of a jeep in front of the pilots assigned to PICCADILLY. "Say fellers," he announced,



Wingate and Cochran brief the pilots and aircrews before Operation THURSDAY.

(National Archives)

"We've got a better place to go!" The men absorbed the changed information and scattered to their planes while Calvert's troops boarded. At 1812, just twelve minutes behind schedule, the first planes rumbled down the runway with their gliders in tow. They circled the field and then headed east.²⁸

In Imphal, Lentaigne and some of his staff were socializing with officers of the Indian 4th Gurkhas. They went outside to watch the first planes pass overhead. "We heard the distant, growing throb of the C-47s—a full, round sound, soft-edged and with a

slow pulse," recalled Maj. John Masters of the 11th Brigade staff. "We heard it many times before, but this night we first *heard* it, to know it from any sound, for ever. The black wings swept across the moon, and at the roots of the wings I saw the red glow of the motors. For a long time they passed, eastward. 77 Brigade was on its way."²⁹

Overhead, Calvert watched out the window of his glider as India turned into Burma. The moonlight made the terrain at first relatively easy to discern. The Chindwin River, marking the boundary between Allied



A typical U.S. Army glider

(National Archives)

and Japanese territory, shimmered below. Calvert noted it was his fourth crossing of the Chindwin, and his first by air. "Perhaps this was a better way to go back," he mused. Land and sky fused into a dull darkness, pierced only by the exhaust of the Dakota engines, which helped the glider pilots keep station behind and slightly below the tow plane.

After a few hours, they reached BROADWAY. The glider pilot cut the towline and Calvert recalled a "sudden tremendous silence" after the C-47 banked away. The glider swooped in and came down with a bounce and a crash, causing minor injuries to the occupants. Calvert dismounted and soon found Alison trying to mark the field with lights for the other landings, while other men set about moving gliders to the side.³⁰

Concern developed as the men soon discovered ruts in the land undetectable from the air. At this time, the first large wave of gliders appeared, each silently streaking in. "The first few landed safely, avoiding obstacles," noted Calvert, "but many of them became ditched and immovable." Soon wrecked gliders littered the clearing, with others causing severe confusion as they desperately tried to set down safely. One glider containing a bulldozer sailed through the field and crashed into the trees beyond, while other gliders holding engineers crashed short of the jungle. "The British were shocked," said Alison. "Our maneuvers had been so perfect, the timing had been

so good . . . it was [also] a hell of a shock to me." Part of the problem turned out to be overloaded gliders, as many Chindits had snuck extra food and ammunition aboard as insurance against mishap.³¹

The second wave was en route, but Calvert needed time and daylight to arrange the field to receive them. He had arranged two code words with Tulloch: "Pork Sausage" meant all was well at BROADWAY, whereas "Soya Link" meant trouble and to stop all flights. At 0230 on 6 March, Calvert radioed "Soya Link" to Special Force headquarters. This message produced gloom in Wingate but not in the other senior officers.³²

Calvert also felt despondent as he considered the night's events. Without a bulldozer to smooth out an airstrip or sufficient engineers to clear wreckage, BROADWAY was unusable for all but the lightest planes. He expressed to Alison and Rushton that everyone may need to walk back to India. "Let's wait until daylight," replied Alison, "and see how badly off we really are."³³

Daylight on the sixth revealed the results of the previous night. "Of the 61 gliders which took off," reported Special Force's staff, "46 reached hostile territory, 8 landed prematurely in friendly territory, and 7 were recalled. Of the 46 gliders that reached hostile territory, 35 safely discharged their loads at BROADWAY, 2 more crashed on the strip, and 9 were cut loose prematurely over hostile territory. No opposition was encountered at BROADWAY." Patrols to PICCADILLY

later discovered that the obstructions on the ground were not an enemy trap: Burmese loggers had placed the trees across the open space of the airfield to dry them out. The landings had caught the Japanese by surprise. Despite the last-minute excitement, Operation THURSDAY was off to a promising start.³⁴

About half of the occupants of the nine lost gliders made it back to India safely. Their landings had sowed confusion among Japanese forces massed near the Chindwin. One party from the 77th Brigade headquarters, using what one member described as "luck and a certain amount of tactical common sense," survived an eight-day trek through Japanese forces back to friendly lines in India.³⁵

At BROADWAY, Calvert and Alison surveyed the situation in the first rays of daylight. "Shortly we were startled to hear the sound of an engine from the region where I had seen the glider crashing into the jungle like a charging elephant," recalled Calvert. "Soon emerged . . . a bulldozer." Calvert and Alison accosted the operator, U.S. Army Lt. Donald Brackett of the 900th Field Unit. Brackett explained that his glider opened by raising the front cockpit to load cargo. The glider crashed between two trees, which tore off its wings and sent its fuselage skidding to a halt. The momentum carried the bulldozer forward, which opened the front and swung it up; the bulldozer slid out the front and then the cockpit slammed



Brigadier Lentaigne
(Imperial War Museum)



Troops sit around two crashed gliders waiting to start work at BROADWAY.
(National Archives)

closed again, leaving Brackett and the glider pilot stunned but miraculously unhurt. They recovered the bulldozer and got it going.³⁶

Alison asked Brackett how long he thought it might take to clear and grade a runway suitable for C-47s. "Well," came the reply, "I think we can do it by this afternoon." Brackett scraped together a jeep, some American enlisted engineers, and a company-strength labor detail from Calvert's brigade and set to work on what Alison called "a terrifying piece of labor." Calvert then transmitted "Pork Sausage" at 0630 and opened the field.³⁷

By 1000, they were sorting out BROADWAY and establishing reliable communications back to India. Calvert and Alison conferred over the radio with Wingate and Cochran, respectively. "When I found out they were not all killed," recalled Cochran later, "I was so relieved I was bawling, I was that upset. I had been physically knocked out by discouragement." He sent twelve light planes to evacuate wounded, with C-47s scheduled to start flying in that evening.³⁸

As dusk settled, a 4,800-foot runway was ready, complete with lights and a makeshift control tower set up in a wrecked glider. Not long after dark, the first C-47 came in, piloted by General Old. He successfully landed from south to north, opposite of instructions, without incident. Sixty-three more C-47s followed, all of which disgorged their cargo and flew back to India. General Wingate also arrived, posing for a beaming picture with Calvert, Alison, and other officers. Before Old's landing, "I was pacing about with anxiety and worrying Alison," wrote Calvert. "There were no accidents, no enemy air activity, no reports of enemy patrols." Confidence grew that everything would be all right. "LaGuardia has nothing on us," Cochran received from BROADWAY. "Can take over 100 [flights] a night."³⁹

CHOWRINGHEE opened the same night when the 111th Brigade began its fly-in. First, a small party arrived in a dozen gliders to secure the clearing. Then Brackett's bulldozer arrived by glider from BROADWAY and smoothed out an airstrip. Once the engineers completed their work on the night of 8 March, the balance of the brigade flew in via C-47s. The scale and precise efficiency of the airlift impressed Major Masters. "There were no gliders," he recalled. "One plane landed and one took off every three minutes. Each plane was allowed twenty-four minutes on the ground. Overhead our aircraft cruised like



Engineers work on the runway at BROADWAY.

(National Archives)



Troops work to prepare the runway at BROADWAY.

(National Archives)

shoals of winking, luminous fish and their multiple drone filled the air."⁴⁰

Over Operation THURSDAY's first week, relays of C-47s came in to BROADWAY and CHOWRINGHEE while light aircraft flew out casualties. "In a few days," remembered Calvert, "We had 12,000 men, 2,000 mules, masses of equipment, anti-aircraft and field guns all established behind the enemy lines."⁴¹

"Our first task is fulfilled," announced Wingate in an order of the day on 13 March.

We have inflicted a complete surprise on the enemy. All our Columns are inside the enemy's guts. The time has come to reap the fruit of the advantage we have gained.

The enemy will react with violence. We will oppose him with the resolve to conquer our territory of Northern Burma. Let us thank God for the great success He has vouchsafed us and we must press forward with our sword in the enemy's ribs to expel him from our territory. This is not the moment, when such an advantage has been gained, to count the cost. This is a moment to live in history. It is an enterprise in which every man who takes part may feel proud one day to say 'I WAS THERE.'⁴²

THE CHINDITS IN BURMA

The same week the Chindits flew in to Burma, Japanese Lt. Gen. Mutaguchi Renya's



Wingate and party the night they arrived at BROADWAY.

(National Archives)

Fifteenth Army launched an invasion of India by attacking toward Imphal and Kohima. Slim pulled his forces back toward the Imphal and its plain, offering battle. The fighting would last for the next three months before Mutaguchi ordered a retreat in early July.⁴³

Meanwhile, Wingate set the Chindits to work. Calvert's brigade moved south toward Indaw while the 111th Brigade fanned out north and east of CHOWRINGHEE, which closed down on 11 March. Slim now approached Wingate about using the Chindit reserves to assist at Imphal and Kohima; in response, Wingate flew in two of his reserve brigades, the 3d West African and the 14th, whereas Slim kept back the 23d Brigade and eventually it saw action at Kohima. Wingate set up two more strongholds: WHITE CITY near Mawlu, and ABERDEEN northwest of Indaw. These efforts cut the railroad and panicked the Japanese rear area troops, drawing reserves that Mutaguchi needed in India. However, efforts to take Indaw itself failed in the face of stiff Japanese resistance.⁴⁴

Just as Operation THURSDAY was poised to develop further, the Chindits lost their leader. On the evening of 24 March, while returning from a series of visits to his commanders, General Wingate's B-25 crashed in the hills west of Imphal; there were no survivors. At a stroke, all Chindit plans were uncertain. "Wingate's death," recalled Tulloch, "could not have come at a worse time." On 27 March, Slim appointed Lentaigne to take Wingate's place; Major Masters assumed command of the 111th Brigade.⁴⁵


The Chindits were not the only force in Burma at that moment facing a crisis. Tanaka

and his 18th Division opposite Stilwell's forces found their supply lines cut. They lived off accumulated stocks, which they had been doing since January as the buildup for Mutaguchi's India attack received all supply priority. Operation THURSDAY commenced just as supply and replacement shipments were about to resume to the 18th Division. "Tanaka's supply position," noted a later analysis, "was fundamentally compromised by the Chindit fighting along the railway to North Burma."⁴⁶

The American pilots supporting the Chindits also made military history. On 21 April 1944, a light plane carrying three casualties and a pilot went down fifteen

miles west of WHITE CITY. Planes could not get in to rescue them, so an overland rescue expedition started from WHITE CITY. "Send the egg-beater in," commanded Cochran from the 1st Air Commando headquarters. The Commandos' lone operational Sikorsky YR-4B helicopter flew to ABERDEEN in stages, arriving 25 April. The helicopter pilot, Lt. Carter Harman, learned that Chindits had secured an airstrip in a riverbed not far away from the stranded men. He flew to the streambed, landed and refueled, got his bearings, and took off immediately. Harman knew the Sikorsky would struggle to carry himself and one passenger, and that he would need to make four trips. On the 25th, he picked up two casualties before the engine overheated and needed a rest. The next day, he made two trips to pick up the final casualty and the pilot, taking off as troops (which turned out to be the rescue party) swarmed the landing zone. Harmon flew back to ABERDEEN, having accomplished the first battlefield helicopter rescue in military history.⁴⁷

For six weeks in March and April, the Chindits and Japanese battled around Indaw with neither side gaining complete advantage. However, with the monsoon coming, it was clear that Special Force had to make physical contact with Stilwell's NCAC forces. On 17 May, the Chindits came under Stilwell's command, and he directed them northward to Mogaung. With Fergusson's brigade flown out, the four remaining brigades moved north. Masters established the 111th Brigade



B-25s of the 1st Air Commando in flight over Burma

(National Archives)

in a stronghold called BLACKPOOL in a clearing near the railway some thirty miles southwest of Mogaung. Almost immediately, Japanese forces started attacking the position. Movement delays prevented other brigades from arriving as expected to be floater units. On 25 May, the 111th Brigade evacuated BLACKPOOL after an epic but ultimately futile struggle. Masters's men carried their wounded to Indawgyi Lake, where flying boats and light aircraft flew them to India. Three of the four Chindit Brigades stayed in this area to protect this lifeline.⁴⁸

Meanwhile, General Stilwell's forces, spearheaded by Galahad Force, advanced southward, capturing Myitkyina Airfield on 17 May. Two days later, NCAC's Chinese forces assailed the 18th Division's front and flank, touching off severe fighting. In early June, Tanaka retired to the southwest of Mogaung under Chinese pressure, with one Chinese regiment striking south for Mogaung itself.⁴⁹

Calvert's Chindits also approached Mogaung from the south. Although his 77th Brigade was down to 535 effectives from the 4,000 he had in March, Calvert reconnoitered the town in early June. It was raining an inch each day, and his men had to move through waist-deep water. Too weak to attack, he awaited the Chinese troops. Once the Chinese 114th Regiment arrived and took position south of Mogaung, Calvert sent his men forward. Mogaung fell after a sharp battle lasting from 23 to 26 June. Shortly thereafter, the exhausted Chindits flew back to India, ending their campaign.⁵⁰

CONCLUSION

Operation THURSDAY's value became the subject of later debate. Many British officers, including General Slim, believed the results were not worth the resources they had expended, and that the Chindits could have been used to better effect on the main battlefield. Maj. Gen. Stanley Woodburn Kirby, the British official historian who had been in India during the war, called Special Force "a military misfit; as a guerrilla force it was unnecessarily large and, as an air-transported force, it was too lightly armed and equipped" to carry out its missions. Their Japanese counterparts held quite different opinions. "The advance of the airborne forces [the Chindits]," commented a senior staff officer, "proved to be a devastating factor in cutting lines of communication. The difficulty of dealing with these airborne forces was ever a source of worry to all the headquarters staffs of the Japanese army." A postwar staff study was even more explicit: "The penetration of the airborne force into northern Burma . . . greatly affected Army operations and eventually led to the total abandonment of northern Burma."⁵¹

None of the subsequent controversies obscures the fact that the fly-in itself was one of the most dramatic episodes in the war against Japan and a tremendous Allied success. Previous major airborne operations—the Germans in Crete in 1941 and the Allies in Sicily in 1943—had turned into confused bloodbaths that caused some commanders on both sides to call into question the feasibility of large invasions via air. Proponents of airborne warfare found a strong case in Operation THURS-

DAY's success; indeed, General Dwight D. Eisenhower specifically requested personnel from the Air Commandos come to Europe to advise on planning the airborne aspects of Operation OVERLORD, the invasion of Normandy. Lessons from the THURSDAY fly-in also influenced execution of the airborne part of Operation DRAGOON in France later that year.⁵²

The story of Operation THURSDAY's fly-in offers perspectives on how a multinational force, well trained and trusting one another, can achieve success against significant obstacles. Wingate's concepts and preparations proved their merit over the first week of the air operation. Superb leadership and teamwork between the Chindits and the 1st Air Commando headed off disaster on 5 and 6 March and set up further successes. Their experiences can still teach, even seventy-seven years later.

Operation THURSDAY's legacy lives on in the units who are still on the rolls of the British Army, Indian Army, Pakistani Army, Nigerian Army, and the United States Army and Air Force. Memorials to the Chindits are found in London and elsewhere, including the battlefields of Burma. The Commonwealth War Graves Commission collected the Chindit dead after the war and interred them in Rangoon. Wingate is buried in Arlington National Cemetery, as are many American veterans of Operation THURSDAY and the China-Burma-India Theater more generally. "This is a moment to live in history," Wingate said eleven days before his death. It most certainly does.



The pilot and maintenance crew of the Sikorsky YR-4B helicopter that performed the battlefield medical evacuation.

(National Archives)

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The officers, including Brigadier Calvert (center), of the 1st Battalion, Lancashire Fusiliers, in India post-Operation THURSDAY.

(Imperial War Museum)

NOTES

1. In 1989, a military government renamed Burma to Myanmar. However, I have represented place names in this article as they were in 1944. I have rendered Japanese and Chinese names surname first.

2. Wilhelm Geiger, trans., *The Mahāvamsa or, The Great Chronicle of Ceylon* (London: Oxford University Press, 1934), chapter VI.

3. Excellent popular histories of the Burma operations in World War II are Louis Allen, *Burma: The Longest War* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984) and Frank McLynn, *The Burma Campaign: Disaster into Triumph 1942–45* (London: Vintage, 2011). For official accounts, see S. Woodburn Kirby, *The War Against Japan*, vols. I–V (London: Naval & Military Press, 2004); Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland, *Stilwell's Mission to China*, U.S. Army in World War II (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History [CMH], 1953); Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland, *Stilwell's Command Problems*, U.S. Army in World War II (Washington, DC: CMH, 1954); and Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland, *Time Runs Out in CBI*, U.S. Army in World War II (Washington, DC: CMH, 1958). See also McLynn, *The Burma Campaign*, 136–58; Derek Tulloch, *Wingate in Peace and War*, ed. Arthur Swinson (London: Macdonald and Co., 1972), 160–74.

4. Bernard Fergusson, *Beyond the Chindwin: An Account of Number Five Column of the Wingate Expedition into Burma 1943* (London: Pen and Sword 2009), 20. See also Tulloch, *Wingate*, found at various places; and McLynn, *The Burma*

Campaign, 69–71. For an alternate perspective on Wingate, see Kirby, *The War Against Japan*, 3:217–23. A suicide attempt in 1941 left Wingate's voice sounding slightly strained.

5. Tulloch, *Wingate*, 118–21; Arnold is quoted in Eric Larrabee, *Commander in Chief: Franklin Delano Roosevelt, His Lieutenants, and Their War* (New York: Harper & Row, 1987), 551.

6. For details on these conversations, see Albert N. Garland and Howard McGaw Smith, *Sicily and the Surrender of Italy*, U.S. Army in World War II (Washington DC: CMH, 1965), 423–25.

7. Tulloch, *Wingate*, 120–21; Christopher L. Kolakowski, “The Coming of Modern War: The Coalition War in North Burma, 1944,” *Army History* 107 (Spring 2018): 6–27.

8. Lowell Thomas, *Back to Mandalay* (New York: Greystone Press, 1951), 26–29.

9. Ibid., 29–56.

10. Ibid., 71–107.

11. Bisheshwar Prasad, ed., *The Reconquest of Burma*, vol. I: June 1942 to June 1944 (New Delhi: Government of India, 1958), 313–18. There was no 1st or 2d Indian Division in World War II.

12. This is drawn from an unsigned summary of operations of Special Force in the UK National Archives, WO 203-25, 1–3. Hereinafter cited as “Special Force.” The British stripped the divisional artillery and reconnaissance troops of their guns and vehicles and retrained them as infantry, retaining their former designations. See also Prasad, *Reconquest of Burma*, vol. I, 313–18.

13. Michael Calvert, *Prisoners of Hope* (London: Leo Cooper, 1971), 16–17; Thomas, *Back to Mandalay*, 155.

14. Wingate laid out the stronghold concept in “Special Force Commander’s Training Note No. 8.” It is quoted in full in Calvert, *Prisoners of Hope*, 282–88.

15. Tulloch, *Wingate*, 130–41.

16. Ibid., 160–61. See also Joseph W. Stilwell Diary, entry for 3 Jan 1944, in Hoover Institution Archives at Stanford University.

17. “Special Force,” 6.

18. Ibid.; Tulloch, *Wingate*, 194–96. The code-names chosen for the landing zones were the major commercial streets in New York, London, and Calcutta (Kolkata).

19. “Special Force,” 7–9.

20. Tulloch, *Wingate*, 197–98; Calvert, *Prisoners of Hope*, 23; Thomas, *Back to Mandalay*, 197.


21. Thomas, *Back to Mandalay*, 199–201.

22. Ibid., p. 201–2, quotes are verbatim from Russhon’s account of this day. See also Philip Cochran, oral history interview in the archives of the U.S. Air Force’s 1st Special Operations Wing (hereinafter cited as “Cochran Interview”), 240–43. Russhon later was technical adviser and Defense Department liaison to the first James Bond films, and he appeared on camera in *Thunderball* as an Air Force general. One of his duties included arranging the filming of *Goldfinger* at Fort Knox; in recognition, the filmmakers put his name on the post’s marquee, visible in the film.

23. This and preceding paragraphs are based upon William Slim, *Defeat Into Victory* (New

- York: Cooper Square 2000), 260–61; Tulloch, *Wingate*, 198–201; Calvert, *Prisoners of Hope*, 21–24; Thomas, *Back to Mandalay*, 202–6; “Special Force,” 9; Cochran Interview, 240–43.
24. Slim, *Defeat Into Victory*, 260–61; Tulloch, *Wingate*, 198–201; Calvert, *Prisoners of Hope*, 21–24; Thomas, *Back to Mandalay*, 202–6; “Special Force,” 9. John Masters endorsed Slim’s account, but he was not present at the meeting.
 25. Ibid. “Special Force” describes the sequence this way: “After a conference with GOC-in-C [General Officer Commander in Chief] 14th Army [Slim] and Comd 77 Ind Inf Bde [Calvert], GOC [General Officer Commanding] Special Force [Wingate] decided to use BROADWAY only.”
 26. Ibid.
 27. Cochran Interview, 243–45.
 28. Slim, 260–61; Tulloch, *Wingate*, 198–201; Calvert, *Prisoners of Hope*, 21–24; Thomas, *Back to Mandalay*, 202–6; “Special Force,” 9.
 29. John Masters, *The Road Past Mandalay* (London: Cassell, 2003), 171.
 30. Calvert, *Prisoners of Hope*, 24–28.
 31. Ibid.; Thomas, *Back to Mandalay*, 221–22.
 32. Calvert, *Prisoners of Hope*, 28–30; Tulloch, *Wingate*, 202–3. Pork sausage was a popular item in British rations, whereas the soya link version of the sausages was the most reviled.
 33. Thomas, *Back to Mandalay*, 225.
 34. “Special Force,” 9. Two gliders full of Gurkhas came down near Imphal and started a firefight with British troops under the mistaken impression they were in Burma.
 35. The report of this party is quoted in Calvert, *Prisoners of Hope*, 261–81.
 36. Thomas, *Back to Mandalay*, 225–31; Calvert, *Prisoners of Hope*, 30–33. Calvert calls him “Brocket.”
 37. Ibid.
 38. Ibid.
 39. Ibid.; “Special Force,” 9. Other wrecked gliders became mess halls and offices.
 40. “Special Force,” 9; Masters, *Road Past Mandalay*, 179–80.
 41. Calvert, *Prisoners of Hope*, 27–33. Tulloch, *Wingate*, 207–8, has statistics on glider operations on the night of 5–6 March.
 42. Quoted in Tulloch, *Wingate*, 208. Emphasis in original.
 43. See Christopher Kolakowski, “Is That the End or Do We Go On? The Battle of Kohima, 1944” *Army History*, 111 (Spring 2019): 6–19.
 44. Tulloch, *Wingate*, 209–34, 265; Yamaguchi Jiso, *Burma Operations Record: 15th Army Operations in Imphal Area and Withdrawal to Northern Burma* (Tokyo: U.S. Army Japan, 1952), 144–45. This is an official Japanese account, prepared under the aegis of the U.S. Army and based on records from the operations and recollections of the officers involved. Hereinafter cited as BOR. WHITE CITY earned its name because of the white parachutes that festooned the surrounding jungle.
 45. Tulloch, *Wingate*, 235–41, 265. Upon hearing the news over the radio, General Mutaguchi prayed for Wingate’s soul “of this man in whom I had found my match.” The nine people on board included Wingate, an aide, two British war correspondents, and five American aircrew. Individual bodies were unidentifiable in the crash and resulting fire. Because the majority of those lost were American, in 1950, the Army sent the commingled remains to Arlington National Cemetery and buried them in a common grave.
 46. Romanus and Sunderland, *Stilwell’s Command Problems*, 197.
 47. Robert F. Dorr, “The First Helicopter Rescue: Where the Special Operations Combat Rescue Mission Began,” *Defense Media Network*, 15 Jan 2015, <https://www.defensemedianetwork.com/stories/first-helicopter-rescue/>. The new National Museum of the U.S. Army features this mission in an exhibit.
 48. Kirby, *War Against Japan*, 279–96, 401–8; BOR, 144–45. American L–5 aircraft provided a majority of these flights for the duration of Chindit operations.
 49. Romanus and Sunderland, *Stilwell’s Command Problems*, 215–20.
 50. Kirby, *War Against Japan*, 408–9. See also Calvert, *Prisoners of Hope*, 175–221. Reports announced the capture of Mogaung as a Chinese victory. “Chinese reported taking Mogaung,” Calvert signaled in response. “My brigade now taking umbrage.”
 51. Kirby, *War Against Japan*, 220–23, 443–46; Calvert, *Prisoners of Hope*, 249; BOR, 149.
 52. Cochran Interview, 200. One item of special interest to Eisenhower’s headquarters was the question of single-towing or double-towing of gliders. Based partly on the experiences in Burma, Operation OVERLORD used single tows in Normandy.

NOT
AVAILABLE



MUSEUM FEATURE

THE LEWIS ARMY MUSEUM: THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST'S PREMIER LAND WARFARE MUSEUM



BY ERIK W. FLINT

Housed in a turn-of-the-twentieth-century hotel, the Lewis Army Museum is home to the Pacific Northwest's largest public, land-warfare historical collection. Its 6,000 artifacts, military vehicles, aircraft, and artillery pieces tell the history of the U.S. Army from the First World War to the present day. Its story began with the establishment of Camp Lewis in 1917 and continued through the post's hundred-year role as an Army force-generating and power-projection platform. Currently, the installation is home to the U.S. Army's I Corps, the 7th Infantry Division, and the largest contingent of Army special operations professionals in the American West and Indo-Pacific region.

For over fifty years, the museum's current home has been the Lewis Inn. Built in 1919, it served the Army community as transient housing until 1972, when the Army planned to demolish the three-story, Western stick-style structure. Instead of falling to the wrecking ball, however, the post commander at the time, Maj. Gen. William B. Fulton, elected to make the inn the home of the new Fort Lewis Military Museum.

Since its founding in the early 1970s, the museum's storyline has evolved to reflect the status and role of this unique Northwest Army post. In 2010, the Department of Defense merged Fort Lewis and the adjacent McChord Air Force Base into Joint Base Lewis-McChord. In 2016, the U.S. Army Center of Military History approved the museum's redesignation as the "Lewis Army Museum" to reflect its role as the Joint Base's U.S. Army-specific museum.

Today, the primary mission of the museum, its historical collection, and its professional staff is to train America's soldiers

to deploy, fight, and win. Unit morale and heritage tours, leader development programs, and premission training are some of the ways the museum prepares soldiers for operational employment. The museum's secondary and more public mission is to tell the story of the U.S. Army to the American people and to military and civilian visitors from all over the world. After an extensive renovation, the Lewis Army Museum reopened its doors with brand-new exhibits in time to celebrate the base's 2017 centennial.

The museum's Lewis Gallery tells the story of the Army in the Pacific Northwest and the evolution of Camp Lewis to Fort Lewis to today's Joint Base Lewis-McChord. A highlight of the gallery is a 9th Infantry Division (Motorized) Fast Attack Vehicle from the 1980s. The modified civilian dune buggy was used to test the motorized division concept that ultimately led to the Stryker Combat Vehicle and the Stryker Brigade Combat Teams of today. Additionally, the museum's Hall of Valor tells the combat history of the U.S. Army through the battles and campaigns of units that trained and deployed at the post.

The museum is open to the public Wednesday through Sunday, 1000 to 1700, and is available for soldier training and support twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week. Please check <https://lewisarmymuseum.com> for the most current operating status.



ERIK W. FLINT is the director of the Lewis Army Museum and, as a U.S. Army Reservist, also serves as the command historian for the I Corps, Joint Base Lewis-McChord's senior command organization.



Camp Lewis centennial celebration and museum grand reopening, August 2017



McChord's 2d Battalion, 1st Infantry, during a "Gear Faith" class at the museum



Battle of Attu exhibit, Hall of Valor



Curator Heidi K. Pierson with visiting Republic of Korea army officers



Vietnam veterans during the Lewis Army Museum's annual Living History Weekend event



A visiting soldier walks through the Global War on Terror exhibit.



DESERT STORM exhibit, Hall of Valor

U.S. ARMY ARTIFACT SPOTLIGHT

THE LEGACY OF THE MUTUAL DEFENSE ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1949

A YUGOSLAV ARMY (WORLD WAR II U.S.) 90-MM. GUN CARRIAGE M36B2 IN ACTION AS LATE AS 1999



BY DIETER STENGER

As tensions in Europe strained U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War era, the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 6 October 1949 leveraged the first U.S. military foreign aid designed to contain the spread of communism. Although most recipients of the aid were countries belonging to the newly formed North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and vulnerable to Soviet aggression, non-U.S. aligned countries, such as communist Yugoslavia, also received U.S. military equipment.¹ This aid came in 1953 while the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was under the leadership of Josip Broz Tito. Communist Yugoslavia charted a self-governing destiny that resulted in isolation from Moscow and its Soviet satellites. American assistance and exposure to western European countries, culture, and prosperity pushed along reforms in Yugoslavia that offered its citizens relaxed restrictions on

traveling, trading, and exercising their faith. Despite Yugoslavia's more liberal form of socialism, backlashes and severe oppression kept a tight control on the socialist state.²

Indeed, the isolated Yugoslav People's Army (Jugoslovenska Narodna Armija; JNA) obtained U.S. military aid that included, among other items, World War II-era 90-mm. gun carriage M36B2 tank destroyers. The JNA employed them in 1991 at the onset of the Yugoslav wars, in opposition to NATO peacekeepers, and during the withdrawal of the JNA from Bosnia, Slovenia, and Croatia.³ U.S. Army forces deployed to the region as part of the peacekeeping Kosovo Force and with Task Force HAWK. Over 100 artifacts in the Army Museum Enterprise (AME) system relate to this deployment.

On 19 June 2005, the U.S. Army 1st Armored Division Museum acquired a 1943 90-mm. Yugoslavian Army M36B2 gun carriage from the Kosovo region. The vehicle has eleven impact points

(10-mm. wide) on the left side of the gun mantle and a 20-mm. hole burned through the upper left side of the gun mantle. The chassis is a late production M10A1 without auxiliary armor bosses on the upper hull sides. The track suspension is from early World War II, with chevron T-48 rubber-track grouser pads that are worn down. The vehicle is fitted with a late-model traveling lock at the rear hull. The right side front fender has three piercings (10- to 15-mm. wide holes). The driving compartment is fitted with circa 1990s instrumentation and the vehicle retains the iconic Yugoslav-type front headlight boxes and overhead turret cover.

The AME categorizes the M36B2 tank destroyer as Organizational Heritage Materiel, and it joins a number of vehicles outside the U.S. First Army at Rock Island Arsenal, Illinois.



DIETER STENGER is the chief art curator of the Army Museum Enterprise.

1. Chester J. Pach Jr., *Arming the Free World: The Origins of the United States Military Assistance Program, 1945–1950* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1991), 326; Stephen Clissold, ed., *A Short History of Yugoslavia: From Early Times to 1966* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1966), 248–49. The M18 Hellcat was also provided as assistance; see David M. Phipps, “Yugoslavian Armor Fleet Is a Mix of New and (Some Very) Old,” *Armor: The Professional Development Bulletin of the Armor Branch*, CVIII, no. 3 (May–June 1999): 18.

2. Lorraine M. Lees, *Keeping Tito Afloat: The United States, Yugoslavia, and the Cold War, 1945–1960* (University Park: Penn State University Press, 1997), 233–34; Victor Sebestyen, *1946: The Making of the Modern World* (New York: Vintage Books, 2016), 148.

3. Marko Pantelic, “Cold War Yugoslavian Armor: 90mm GMC M36 ‘Jackson’ in Yugoslavian Service,” The Online Tank Museum, 21 June 2018, <https://tanks-encyclopedia.com/coldwar-yugoslavia-90mm-gmc-m36-jackson-in-yugoslavian-service/>.





VICTORY or DEFEAT?

Task Force HAWK and Army Aviation Readiness, 1991–1999

BY CHARLES R. BOWERY JR.

Operation ALLIED FORCE, a NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) air campaign to stop Serbian ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, ended on 20 June 1999. The next month, U.S. Army Brig. Gen. Richard A. "Dick" Cody put the Army's after-action review of its portion of the operation on the front pages of newspapers. Cody, a highly regarded Army aviator, had served as the deputy commander of Task Force (TF) HAWK, which had deployed to Albania to conduct cross-border attack helicopter operations against Serbian forces in Kosovo. In two months on the ground in Albania, TF HAWK prepared for combat operations but never fired a shot. Terrain,

an elusive enemy, and a period of decline in the Army's capabilities reduced the Apache unit's effectiveness. A joint and multinational command and control structure challenged the integration of multiservice assets and fed a growing perception that the Army force could not meet the tactical challenge. Two helicopters crashed during training, killing two of the four pilots and casting doubt on the unit's ability to accomplish the mission. In a scathing article on the front page of the *Washington Post*, defense correspondent Dana L. Priest judged that "the vaunted helicopters came to symbolize everything wrong with the Army as it enters the 21st century: its inability to

move quickly; its resistance to change; its obsession with casualties; its post-Cold War identity crisis."¹

Cody pulled no punches in candid testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee. In speaking to the Senate, Cody referred to an assessment that he had sent to Gen. Eric K. Shinseki, the incoming chief of staff of the Army. The memo, along with his public testimony, earned Cody a sharp rebuke from the Army's leadership, but the service's negative reaction did not make Cody's findings any less devastating. He stated that the Army had undertrained and improperly equipped the Apache crews of the 11th Aviation Group, which formed the nucleus of

A U.S. Army AH-64A Apache attack helicopter from Task Force HAWK comes in for a landing at Rinas Airport in Tirana, Albania, on 21 April 1999.
(National Archives)

TF HAWK, for the demanding missions they faced in the Balkans. The unit's peacetime training at its base in southern Germany did not prepare the crews to employ heavily loaded Apaches in nighttime missions in mountainous terrain while facing an enemy with surface-to-air missiles and antiaircraft artillery. In fact, the unit was so understaffed that the Army had to deploy twenty-two more experienced aviators from Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Yet in spite of these challenges, TF HAWK enjoyed some success in conducting a short-notice deployment that added specific important capabilities to the larger NATO air campaign.²

Why did the Army's attack aviation component, which had earned plaudits for its performance in Operation DESERT STORM eight years before, atrophy during the 1990s? The shortcomings of the 11th Aviation Group and TF HAWK represented the nation's benign neglect of its military capabilities in the post-DESERT STORM euphoria and expectations of the reduced defense spending popularly referred to as a "peace dividend."³ Yet the operation spurred significant doctrinal, equipment, and personnel innovation in Army aviation, and its successes foreshadowed capabilities the branch would develop more fully after 11 September 2001. TF HAWK was the subject of intense scrutiny and controversy, and its difficulties highlighted the resourcing and training challenges that Army aviation faced during the 1990s, as well as the growing complexities of conducting joint and combined military operations in the post-Cold War world. Interservice rivalry and parochial thinking often motivated sweeping pronouncements of the operation's failure and have obscured a clear understanding of both the operation's challenges and successes.

STRATEGIC SETTING AND THE DECISION TO EMPLOY TF HAWK

In the aftermath of the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, a polyglot construct of numerous smaller Balkan states and ethnic groups, also disintegrated as various nationalist movements asserted their autonomy. This turmoil led to armed conflicts in the region, with the 1992–1995 Bosnian War being the most notorious and deadly among them. Although the 1995 Dayton Accords put an end to the fighting in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the agreement did not silence other nationalist efforts to gain independence. Ethnic Albanians in

Kosovo, a small state bordering Albania, Macedonia, and Montenegro, undertook just such an effort. The Serbians considered Kosovo a region of theirs, and used military force to keep Kosovo within their orbit. In the ensuing conflict, both the Serbian army and the Albanian separatists of the self-declared Kosovo Liberation Army carried out armed reprisals and ethnic cleansing.⁴

A United States-brokered cease-fire in October 1998 held for only a few months before conditions deteriorated again, with growing numbers of Kosovar refugees streaming into camps in Albania and Macedonia. This was the situation that Army General Wesley K. Clark confronted serving in the dual roles of Commander, United States European Command (EUCOM) and Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, a NATO post. Within the EUCOM theater of operations, General Montgomery C. Meigs commanded U.S. Army forces in Europe, and Lt. Gen. John W. Hendrix commanded the Army's V Corps, the operational headquarters for Army tactical units stationed in Europe.⁵

On 24 March 1999, NATO initiated Operation ALLIED FORCE, a campaign of missile and air strikes against Serbian targets, including its security forces operating in Kosovo. As the tempo and size of the air campaign increased, incorporating both U.S. Navy and NATO coalition air


forces, atrocities by Serbian forces in Kosovo increased, as did refugee movements. However, the air campaign was successful overall. Coalition air forces avoided Serbian air defenses and lost only two aircraft to hostile fire (both pilots were rescued). In fact, as the campaign went on, coalition air forces ran out of targets to attack.⁶

Although NATO was efficient in attacking Serbian infrastructure and industrial



John W. Hendrix, shown here as a full general

(National Archives)



General Clark

(National Archives)



General Meigs

(dignitymemorial.com)

targets, it was much less effective against Serbian forces operating in Kosovo. The Serbs skillfully dispersed and concealed their armored vehicles and units throughout Kosovo, making them difficult to target, and they shielded their equipment and personnel with large numbers of air defense weapons, both antiaircraft artillery and shoulder-fired missiles. The aerial campaign's relative ineffectiveness against Serbian ground forces prevented **ALLIED FORCE** from stopping much of the violence against Kosovar Albanians. In his memoir, Clark expressed frustration that hinted at a disagreement between ground and air commanders about air operations against air forces. "Compared to the whole-hearted Air Force work against the strategic targets," he wrote, "there was an inertia in adjusting and innovating to attack the Serb military machine in Kosovo, an inertia magnified in several ways." Bad weather or threats from Serbian antiaircraft weapons "always seemed more troublesome when the object was to attack the ground forces than when it was to attack the strategic targets."⁷

In response to this tactical problem, Clark, acting in his capacity as the NATO theater commander and the officer responsible for Operation **ALLIED FORCE**, submitted a request to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 26 March 1999 for U.S. Army forces. He asked the Army to form a task force of

AH-64 attack helicopters and field artillery multiple-launch rocket systems (MLRS) assigned to U.S. Army, Europe (USAREUR). The task force would deploy to Macedonia to occupy an existing U.S. base, and conduct operations into Kosovo to deter or defeat Serbian ethnic cleansing.⁸

Clark's request was immediately controversial. It caused intense debate within the Department of Defense (DoD) about the roles of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the combatant commanders, and the military service departments in conducting joint and multinational operations. The DoD had left these issues largely unanswered since the passage of the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act, which mandated the structure of the United States Joint Force.

The idea for TF HAWK germinated before the beginning of Operation **ALLIED FORCE**, after a mid-March 1999 conversation between General Clark and General H. Hugh Shelton, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Later that month, General Clark observed a simulation exercise at Grafenwöhr, Germany, involving elements of the V Corps headquarters, the 1st Armored Division, and the 11th Aviation Group. The exercise focused on deep assault operations by attack helicopters and artillery, and took place a matter of days before the beginning of Operation **ALLIED FORCE**. On the eve of the start of the air campaign, Clark learned

from Lt. Gen. Edward W. Anderson, the chief of strategic plans on the Joint Staff, that Shelton was "very serious" about employing Apache helicopters as part of the NATO operation. For his part, Clark believed that successful employment of Apaches against Serbian forces in Kosovo would degrade Serbian President Slobodan Milošević's will to continue the campaign against the Kosovo Liberation Army.⁹

Upon receipt of Clark's request on 26 March, the Joint Staff circulated the request to the four service departments. All four recommended against the deployment. Army staff cited concerns that deploying TF HAWK would mean introducing U.S. ground forces to the operation, which ran counter to U.S. policy in the region. The Army and the Marine Corps both pointed out that Apaches would be vulnerable to ground fire and potential casualties, whereas the Air Force expressed concern about the burden on their airlift assets, which would be required to deploy the unit. The Army's lack of support for the request frustrated Clark, and he directed General Meigs to continue planning for the deployment.¹⁰

The next obstacle to the deployment of TF HAWK was the Macedonian government's refusal to host the task force. The original USAREUR plan called for TF HAWK to deploy to Camp Able Sentry on the Macedonia/Kosovo border, but Macedonia would



General Shelton
(National Archives)



General Anderson
(National Archives)




Slobodan Milošević
(Courtesy of Tanja Kragujević)

not permit NATO to conduct offensive operations from its soil. USAREUR planners scrambled to find an alternate site, and examined two locations in Albania: Rinas Airfield near the capital, Tirana, and Gjadër Airfield, in the northern part of the country. The Albanian government authorized TF HAWK to enter the country on 3 April, and the deputy V Corps commander led a team to Albania on 5 April to examine both sites. The team ruled out Gjadër because of its proximity to Yugoslav artillery in neighboring Montenegro. They thus selected Rinas, an airfield already used by NATO as a base for humanitarian operations. With time of the essence, USAREUR and V Corps deployed an advance party from V Corps and the 11th Aviation Group within a few hours. Concurrent with all of these actions, the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued a deployment order for TF HAWK on 4 April.¹¹

How did the U.S. military go from unanimous service disagreement with TF HAWK to a deployment order less than ten days later? On 1 April, Clark, along with General Hendrix and his deputy, Maj. Gen. David D. McKiernan, presented the case for TF HAWK to the secretary of defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff via secure video teleconference. Clark writes in his memoir that when he reviewed Hendrix's presentation, which focused heavily on the potential risks involved, "I could see the influence of the reluctant Army mind-set in Washington at work." Hendrix agreed to have his staff revise the initial brief, and the meeting took place. After Clark and Hendrix briefed the concept of the operation, relying heavily on current Army doctrine for the deep attack, the Joint Chiefs asked questions that reinforced their early nonconcurrence, focusing mainly on the potential for casualties and lost helicopters. Hendrix stated that the task force might suffer losses "up to 5 percent, but stressed there was no way of accurately estimating them." Tellingly, Army Chief of Staff General Dennis J. Reimer was not present for the brief, instead sending his vice chief, General Shinseki, who was weeks away from taking over from Reimer. Shinseki restated the Army's early reasons for disagreeing with the deployment. After the other service chiefs echoed their previous concerns, Clark reiterated his request, and the meeting ended. The next day, Shelton told Clark that they would probably approve the deployment. So it seems likely that the chairman, who had at least partly originated the idea, cast the deciding vote over the heads of the service chiefs. With this less than full-



David D. McKiernan, shown here as a full general
(National Archives)



General Shinseki
(National Archives)

throated approval, TF HAWK was underway. For the first time in its history, the Army would deploy an aviation-centric task force, apart from a corresponding ground force, to conduct deep operations.¹²

DEEP ATTACK: DOCTRINE AND EQUIPMENT

The 1993 edition of the Army's manual for operations, *Field Manual 100-5*, discusses the helicopter deep attack within the context of other types of offensive operations carried out by an army unit. The doctrinal battlefield framework describes *close operations*, conducted in immediate proximity to an enemy's front line; *deep operations*, conducted against an enemy's rear area or enemy forces that are out of contact with friendly forces; and *rear operations*, conducted in friendly rear areas behind the lines. Although not explicitly stated in this manual, in this period the Army oriented its doctrine toward describing operations in a linear scenario, in which friendly and enemy conventional forces fight one another on a defined battlefield.¹³

Army aviation doctrine of the late 1990s dealt extensively with deep operations. *Field Manual 1-111* covers the operations of aviation brigades and those devoted exclusively to attack helicopter operations. It establishes that the objective of a deep operation is to "delay, disrupt, or destroy enemy forces, facilities, and high-payoff systems," and that the targets of deep operations are "the freedom of action of the opposing commander and the coherence and tempo of his operations." Deep operations are not the sole province of helicopters, however. They may involve other aviation forces, artillery, and ground and naval forces.¹⁴

A helicopter deep attack is a deliberately planned, complex, and risky mission. Beginning in the 1990s, it received its own detailed appendix in the doctrinal manual for aviation brigades. The Army bases the mission on a twenty-four- to forty-eight-hour planning cycle, which includes an extensive intelligence analysis process known as Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB). This assessment, when melded into the Army's overall military decision-making process, produces a set of targets for a deep attack and allows the executing unit to plan in detail the actions of each individual aircrew and helicopter.¹⁵

An aviation unit's staff contains a deep operations coordination cell. It plans the deep attack by developing the IPB and analysis of the target into a conditions checklist that provides the final approval to launch the operation. This checklist verifies that supporting units are in place, that the target should be in the planned location for the attack, and that the mission

is coordinated and synchronized properly with other air operations in the area. The participating crews conduct a premission briefing as a part of the conditions checklist, rehearse the mission using maps or a scale model of the operations area, and maintain readiness to launch once the unit commander gives the order to proceed.

Although the Army built its model of a deep attack around the Apache, field artillery, fixed-wing aircraft, and utility helicopters also play important roles. Identification and suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD), whether through artillery and missile fire, air attack, or electronic jamming, are perhaps the most critical supporting tasks of a deep attack. In a highly orchestrated mission, the deep operations cell synchronizes various SEAD platforms through its command and control process and allows the attack force to reach its battle position. The UH-60 Black Hawk electronic warfare variants, called “Quickfix,” can provide frequency jamming against enemy fire control radars, as can Air Force and Navy planes. Command and control variants with a radio console in place of troop seating can give the operations center an on-scene commander in the target area. Basic utility Black Hawks can carry mechanics and recovery personnel in case enemy fire or maintenance failures force down the Apaches.

With prelaunch conditions set, the Apaches and their support aircraft depart the friendly base and fly along a predetermined route, crossing the enemy's front

line into their rear areas with the support of SEAD and electronic jamming. The attack force then moves to predetermined positions to engage and destroy a target: armor, infantry, or artillery forces, logistics units, or a headquarters. Doctrine requires flight crews to occupy the battle positions that the unit's staff planned to maximize concealment in the surrounding terrain. They achieve this either by creating a backdrop that minimizes the silhouetting of the helicopters against the sky, or by maneuvering low enough to the ground to remain out of direct vision of the target. The pilots orient the Apache's targeting system toward a preplanned grid reference, climb at a hover or in forward flight, and attempt to gain a visual reference on the target. At a predetermined time, or once the pilots identify and confirm the target, the attack helicopters open fire, assess battle damage, and record the engagements on a helicopter-mounted video recorder. If the attacking aircraft runs out of ammunition or if the attacking force sustains significant losses, the attack element returns to its base via a different precoordinated route, again under the coverage of SEAD. Black Hawks pick up crews of downed helicopters if necessary. The execution of a deep attack usually takes the flying unit out of further action for forty-eight to seventy-two hours for recovery, reconstitution, and maintenance.¹⁶

The centerpiece of the deep attack is the AH-64 Apache attack helicopter. Originally fielded by the U.S. Army in 1983 as one of the post-Vietnam “Big Five” weapons systems

around which the Army built its AirLand Battle doctrine, the A-model Apache was combat-proven in Panama and Saudi Arabia in the late 1980s and early 1990s. But even in the late 1990s, it provoked no small amount of controversy in defense circles. Built around a tandem seating, two-pilot arrangement, the Apache is similar in appearance to its predecessor, the Vietnam-era AH-1 Cobra, but the similarities are mostly skin-deep. The Army designed and built the dual-engine Apache for system redundancy and survivability in high-intensity fighting. It tested the drive train, transmission, electronics, and rotor systems against large-caliber ground weapons as the two pilots sat in crew stations surrounded by projectile-resistant shielding.

Three weapons systems in various configurations make the helicopter effective against a variety of targets. Its 30-mm. electric cannon fires a depleted-uranium projectile originally designed to defeat Warsaw Pact light armored vehicles and personnel. Weapons mounting points on the helicopter's short wings allow for folding-fin unguided rockets or laser-guided antitank missiles to be affixed. The Apache's front-seat pilot, labeled a copilot-gunner, is primarily responsible for operating the weapons using a forward looking, infrared (FLIR) targeting system with an active laser rangefinder and designator. The helicopters' weapons hard points also support an external auxiliary fuel tank, which would be required on TF HAWK deep attacks because of the long flying distances.

The Apache is capable of effective operations in day, night, and adverse weather conditions because the pilots fly with the aid of FLIR, which overlays the pilot's flight instrument information, such as an artificial horizon and altitude and airspeed readouts. Unlike helmet-mounted goggles, which gather and intensify ambient light to create night vision, the FLIR system sees an object's heat in contrast to the environment around it and produces an image in the night vision system. Thus, a pilot flying an Apache equipped with FLIR is less dependent on ambient moonlight or ground lights, and can operate in virtually any conditions. Excessively humid or wet conditions, however, can degrade FLIR performance. By the late 1990s, Army Apache crews regularly trained and flew with a combination of FLIR and night-vision goggles, but a safe balance of the two systems required more flying time and experience.¹⁷



UH-60 Black Hawk support helicopters arrive at Rinas Airport, Tirana, Albania, on 21 April 1999.

(National Archives)



A U.S. Army AH-64A Apache helicopter flies around Rinas so the pilots can become familiar with the terrain. A U.S. Army TOW missile launcher is seen partially behind small trees in the background.

(National Archives)

TF HAWK: PLANNING AND DEPLOYMENT

Within a few hours of receiving an execution order from the Joint Staff, a small advance party flew from bases in Germany to Rinas Airfield. The conditions the group encountered were daunting, and they would turn a complex but straightforward operation into a very difficult one. The physical conditions of Rinas Airfield, combined with ongoing NATO air operations there, made things difficult for TF HAWK right from the start. The airfield already served as the staging base for NATO humanitarian relief flights into Kosovo and Macedonia and had a U.S. Air Force major general serving as the de facto airfield commander. NATO air force personnel and units had already appropriated the one hard surface runway and the hangar areas for aircraft parking and personnel living quarters. This limited to two the maximum number of U.S. Air Force C-17 cargo aircraft on the ground at any one time. The limit, combined with the Air Force stance that it would allow cargo flights only during daylight hours, slowed the deployment of TF HAWK's artillery, ground vehicles, equipment, and nonaviation personnel. The occupation of the paved runway left no improved surfaces for TF HAWK to park aircraft or to erect command posts and living tents. A period of heavy rains had left all of the remaining acreage inside the airfield fence a sea of knee-deep mud. The TF HAWK staff established contracts to have gravel and plywood hauled

to the base for the construction of living quarters and aircraft parking areas, a process that took several days.¹⁸

While the advance party struggled to prepare an operating base at Rinas, the 11th Aviation Group and the 12th Aviation Brigade prepared for deployment at their bases in Germany. General Hendrix recognized that this would be a difficult mission for his aviation units, and called on a senior Army aviator with a reputation for innovative training, mission focus, and tactical success: General Cody. The newly promoted brigadier general served at Fort Hood, Texas,



General Cody

(National Archives)

as the assistant division commander for the 4th Infantry Division. At the time, the division was the Army's digital test unit, proofing a variety of concepts for digitized command, control, and communications systems. Hendrix contacted Cody while he was at the Bell Helicopter plant in Dallas inspecting a rotorcraft demonstrator, and had the general on a flight to Germany within twelve hours. Cody arrived in Germany, met with Hendrix at the V Corps headquarters, and essentially received a blank check to conduct a readiness inspection of the two brigades, determine their



A rear view of a C-17 Globemaster III as it offloads U.S. Army Task Force HAWK personnel at Rinas Airport. Note the condition of the airstrip.

(National Archives)

state of training and equipment, and offer recommendations to bring them to a state of readiness for the deployment.¹⁹

Cody's first stop was Illesheim Army Heliport, home of the 11th Aviation Group and its two, twenty-four-ship Apache squadrons: the 2d and 6th Squadrons, 6th Cavalry (abbreviated here as 2-6 and 6-6). What Cody found dismayed him. Although the regiment had capable senior officers and a number of seasoned senior warrant officers (some of whom had served with Cody in DESERT STORM), its state of combat readiness had declined through the 1990s as the Army struggled to reckon with the peace dividend expected by the William J. "Bill" Clinton administration. Adding to the problems facing Army units in Europe was the lack of a peer-competitor threat in the decade following the collapse of the Warsaw Pact. Aside from limited deployments to the Balkans for peacekeeping in the mid-1990s, USAREUR aviation units were, in Cody's words, "at the end of the supply chain" in every respect. In a conversation with President Clinton the previous year, Clark had noted specifically that the 144 Apache helicopters stationed in Germany had only 120 fully qualified crews to fly them.²⁰

Cody got down to business at Illesheim by reviewing the regiment's flight training and aerial gunnery records. He spoke to all of the unit's assembled pilots. He asked the eleven company commanders, six of whom commanded Apache companies, who among them were certified pilots in command. None raised their hands.

Next, he asked the aviators, a mix of commissioned and warrant officers in both line and staff positions, who was qualified fully to fly the Apache using night-vision goggles in addition to the Apache's FLIR vision system. None raised their hands. Finally, he asked how many of them had participated in a nighttime aerial gunnery exercise with more than two aircraft flying simultaneously. Again, none lifted their hands. Later, he asked a senior warrant officer, with whom he had served in the 101st Airborne Division, when the regiment had last conducted a nighttime aerial gunnery exercise or an exercise involving multiship formations. Not during his time in the unit was the officer's reply. Cody asked the warrant officer if the unit was ready for the mission. "Not ready at all," he stated.

Eight years had passed since Operation DESERT STORM. Resources—flying hours, spare parts, and aviators—were tight and peacetime flight restrictions in Germany prevented realistic training in the Apaches' mission. In this environment, the key training events on the regiment's calendar, and the only ones that involved employing the entire unit, were computer simulation exercises that focused on the deep attack mission, albeit with no peer threat left in Europe. The cumulative effect of this lack of mission focus and resources was an unprepared unit. Cody found the 12th Aviation Brigade in a better situation because the unit had been able to replicate its combat missions of general support, logistics movement, air assault, and medical evacuation in

a peacetime environment. Cody returned to corps headquarters in Heidelberg with this disconcerting report.²¹

The corps commander's reaction to this news was to assign Cody as the deputy commander of TF HAWK for aviation operations. His counterpart for ground operations was Col. Raymond T. Odierno, the commander of the V Corps artillery and future chief of staff of the Army. Cody had specific equipment requests for TF HAWK, such as night-vision goggles, improved aircraft radios, specific types of ammunition, and all-terrain vehicles for aircraft towing and supply movement in the operating base. Hendrix allowed Cody to coordinate directly with product managers and vendors for these items. Before he left Illesheim to return to Heidelberg, Cody directed the 11th Aviation Group staff and commanders to begin developing mission rehearsal exercises that the unit could execute upon arrival in Albania. All of this furious activity took place two weeks before the helicopters began their cross-country flights to Rinas.²²

General Hendrix went to Albania as the commander of TF HAWK, rather than delegating command to an officer of more appropriate rank, because the task force had increased in size and international visibility when its operating base changed from Macedonia to Albania. The original intention for TF HAWK was for it to be a lean, helicopter-and-MLRS-centric force that would operate from an established, protected NATO base. As originally designed, TF HAWK comprised 48 Apaches, 22 Black Hawk and Chinook support helicopters, a battalion of MLRS



Raymond T. Odierno, shown here as a brigadier general
(National Archives)



A wave of Apaches arrives at Rinas Airport on 25 April 1999.
(National Archives)

launchers, and 1,700 soldiers. The shift to Albania changed all of this. The proximity of Rinas Airfield to the border with Kosovo concerned NATO and USAREUR because of the possibility of a cross-border incursion by Serbian ground forces or a terrorist attack on the airfield. Additionally, the task force would need to establish a forward operating base at the Albania-Kosovo border in order to emplace the MLRS and shorter-range counterartillery radar systems, which would require additional ground security. What originally had been a company of infantry for local security of the aircraft became two battalions of airborne infantry, a battalion of mechanized infantry in Bradley fighting vehicles, and two batteries of shorter-range tube artillery. A detachment of logisticians and a combined staff from the V Corps and the 11th Aviation Group rounded out the ground contingent of the task force. The addition of these nonflying elements forced the V Corps to reduce the number of Apaches to twenty-four, a combination of 2-6 and 6-6. In spite of this reduction, TF HAWK grew in time to more than 5,000 personnel, triple the original estimate, placing a serious strain on the Air Force strategic lift.²³

The airlift of task force equipment began on 8 April, and on 14 April, the helicopters began their self-deployment flights from airfields in Germany. The helicopters made three refueling stops in Italy. At Cody's direction, they waited at the first, Camp Darby, a U.S. Army installation on Italy's west coast, for several days while heavy rains inundated Rinas. The Italian government delayed the flights for several more days while U.S. and Italian authorities negotiated the overflight. The aircraft began arriving at Rinas on 21 April, and all were present by the 26th. On 7 May, Hendrix reported to NATO that his force had achieved full operating capability.²⁴

The deployment timeline of TF HAWK became a point of criticism both during and after the operation. Overly optimistic predictions from the DoD fed a perception that the Army was slow and ponderous. At the formal announcement of the deployment on 4 April, Kenneth H. Bacon, the assistant secretary of defense for public affairs, answered a reporter's question about the task force's timeline with the statement that it would take the unit "maybe seven to ten days" to close completely on Rinas. A formal DoD press release the same day stated that the entire movement would take

up to ten days, creating an expectation that TF HAWK would arrive in mid-April—when in fact the airlift only began on 8 April, and the helicopters began their multiday flights on the 14th.²⁵

A DIFFICULT START

The integration of TF HAWK into Operation ALLIED FORCE began with the unit's command post, a combination of staff officers from USAREUR, U.S. Air Forces Europe, the V Corps, and the 11th Aviation Group. In Army doctrine, command and control of deep operations rested with the Deep Operations Coordination Cell. This cell of aviation, surface-to-surface and air defense fires, and intelligence planners and coordinators worked around the clock to synchronize with the NATO Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC), located in Vicenza, Italy. Inside the CAOC, a small team of U.S. Army personnel, the Battlefield Coordination Detachment, was responsible for integrating Army land operations (which included TF HAWK) into the larger air effort.²⁶

The Air Tasking Order (ATO), published daily by the CAOC, lists all air missions conducted in a twenty-four-hour cycle with their call signs, ordnance, and targets. It also includes a list of special instructions for aircrews operating in that theater. It was the mechanism by which TF HAWK executed missions as part of the air campaign, and it became a friction point in the task force's ability to reach full mission readiness. This operation represented the first instance in U.S. military history of Army rotary- and

fixed-wing aviation integration into an ATO-driven air operation without a corresponding ground force operation. This novel occurrence was one of the concerns raised by the service chiefs in the deliberations over TF HAWK's involvement.²⁷

Army aviation unit operations in DESERT STORM occurred within the tactical zones of their higher Army commands and took place below a clearly defined coordinating altitude, an airspace control measure designed to separate helicopters and airplanes operating over a battlefield. The Aviation Branch after-action review for DESERT STORM stated bluntly that "procedures for airspace control were inefficient." It pointed out that the Army had no method of procuring or disseminating computerized aircrew special instructions, which include actions in the event of a helicopter being shot down or forced down in enemy territory, because the Air Force used a proprietary system for them. The only Army units that had no problems in this area were "the ones that selectively ignored airspace requirements," and it was merely good fortune that no midair collisions or friendly fire incidents occurred.²⁸

Between 1991 and 1999, no operational scenarios forced the Air Force and the Army to develop better battlefield integration for deep attack operations, and so TF HAWK got off to a rough start in planning its operations. The situation at Rinas exacerbated this interservice friction. The U.S. Air Force had responsibility for the humanitarian flight operations at Rinas. It staffed the control tower and base operations for the airfield,



An interior view of the control tower at Rinas
(National Archives)

and all flights into and out of the base had to conform to Air Force and International Civil Aviation Organization standard procedures, including constant transmission of air traffic control transponder codes and “slot times” for departure and return. These procedures promoted the flight safety of a multinational military and civilian airspace scenario, but did not facilitate a wartime air campaign with a need for flexibility and operational security. In the eight weeks of operations from Rinas, however, the TF HAWK command post, the Air Force element at Rinas, and the CAOC were able to reach an effective state of integration through the hard work and professionalism of all parties.²⁹

REHEARSALS AND PREPARATION

As soon as the Apaches arrived at Rinas, Cody had the task force conduct a series of sixteen mission rehearsals. The rehearsals began with basic orientations to the airspace around Rinas, and increased in complexity to involve the other supporting elements of a deep attack: tactical missile artillery, unmanned aerial vehicles, and electronic warfare airplanes and helicopters. These flying rehearsals carried significant risk for the aircrews of TF HAWK, given their state of training and the difficult and unfamiliar terrain they would encounter. Rinas Airfield sat approximately 75 miles southwest of the border with Kosovo. The border area is a mountainous region, giving way to rolling, forested terrain inside Kosovo. Rain, fog, and high-tension wires all

would present difficulties during the flight.

During the preparation period, the rehearsals took aircrews up to, but not over, the border into Kosovo. At the same time, the TF HAWK planning staff and the deep operations cell conducted an intensive IPB to identify as precisely as possible the Serbian military targets inside Kosovo. This IPB and target development relied on signals intelligence from radio transmissions and radar operations, image intelligence from aircraft operating over Kosovo, human intelligence from refugee camps in the border areas, and visual reports and postmission debriefs from allied air forces conducting strikes across Kosovo. It was the job of the deep operations cell to connect these various intelligence sources into an integrated picture of Serbian forces. The task force commander used this intelligence to assign targets to the 11th Aviation Group’s Apache crews for deep attack execution.³⁰

When TF HAWK’s command team first informed General Cody of its mission and operational area and assessed the state of training and readiness of the Apache crews of the 11th Aviation Group, he had concerns. The early mission rehearsals validated them. On one of the first rehearsals that reached the Albania-Kosovo border, Cody, who was monitoring the rehearsal, watched an Apache crew execute a 180-degree turn and unknowingly fly directly beneath the others in the flight in the opposite direction. On the night of 26 April, less than a week after the first Apaches arrived at Rinas, a rehearsal flight suffered a crash that destroyed the

helicopter. Its crew consisted of a warrant officer serving as the pilot in command and a captain serving as the copilot-gunner and the overall air mission commander. They attempted to hover the helicopter at 70 feet above ground as they observed a simulated aircraft recovery operation. They allowed the helicopter to descend quickly, and they became disoriented and crashed. The crew escaped with minor injuries as the helicopter burned.³¹

The Army’s postaccident investigation showed that the flight experience of the two pilots was normal and reflective of the state of Army aviation in the late 1990s, but that some critical information was lacking during the flight. The warrant officer pilot graduated from flight training and the Apache qualification course in September 1996, and had logged just under 900 hours of time in the Apache, including 271 hours with the Apache’s night-vision system. The captain had been in the Army since 1991, but entered service as an infantry officer, and had only graduated from flight training in 1995. He had logged 600 hours in the Apache, of which 187 were with the night-vision system. He was the company commander, but was not a certified pilot in command. Both aviators were well regarded within the unit, yet their relative inexperience echoed the concerns raised to General Cody back in Illesheim. In the postaccident interviews, the captain noted that the aircraft’s external fuel tank contained a full 230 gallons, instead of the planned 170 gallons, a difference in weight at takeoff of over 300 pounds. This excess fuel weight would require significantly more power for the aircraft to hover at the high altitude of the mission. A condition called “settling with power” caused the unplanned descent and crash: a helicopter descends inside its own downwash because of a lack of either engine power applied or forward airspeed. Settling with power directly relates to aircrew awareness and interpretation of visual cues of the helicopter’s instruments. So in this instance, the accident was a case of aircrew error.³²

TF HAWK suffered its second accident eight days later. The aircraft was again part of a mission rehearsal. As the helicopters decelerated to occupy a battle position, others in the rehearsal saw one aircraft pitch up rapidly, roll to the right, nose over, and crash into the ground. The helicopter went up in flames, its onboard ammunition exploded, and the two pilots perished. The two pilots were both more senior chief



Two Apaches conduct maneuvers around Rinas.

(National Archives)



warrant officer 3s, and the pilot in command had logged over 1,800 flight hours, virtually all in the Apache. In this instance, the accident was a result of material failure. One of the unit's hydraulic servicing units contained water, which, when introduced into the helicopter, caused a hydraulic malfunction that froze the flight controls.³³

The two accidents cast a pall over the entire operation, and gave ammunition to U.S. officials and military leaders who had disagreed with the employment of the task force in the first place. The remainder of the mission rehearsals occurred without incident, and overall the 11th Aviation Group's aircrews made significant gains in their mission proficiency during their time in Albania. From General Cody down to junior pilots, the unit remained confident that if they had received the order to execute a deep attack mission, they would have been successful. In a later interview, Cody stated that he did not believe that the two accidents were a factor in the unit never receiving orders to conduct a deep attack into Kosovo, but rather were the result of the larger air operation continuing to wind down after late April.³⁴

Even amid the two accidents, life for the 11th Aviation Group developed into familiar routine. For each twenty-four-hour air

which the day's mission aircrews planned and rehearsed their deep attack for that night. Then they waited. The TF HAWK staff conducted a "go/no-go brief" based on set criteria of weather, target fidelity, SEAD, and electronic warfare availability. In the event of a "go" decision, the aircrews would prepare for takeoff. In the event of a "no-go" decision, the assigned crews would conduct, on many nights, a flying rehearsal of the mission, up to the point at which they were to cross the border into Serbia, after which they returned to base.³⁵

Along with the chilling effect of the two accidents, two concerns doomed any real possibility of launching deep attacks: concerns over potential collateral damage from SEAD and fears of the Apache's vulnerability to Serbian air defense weapons. The Army's MLRS, using the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS), was TF HAWK's primary suppression weapon for Serbian air defenses as the attack force maneuvered into Kosovo. The ATACMS is a satellite-guided missile, which provides high levels of accuracy, but only against stationary targets. For this reason, as Apache crews flew along the ingress route, they fully expected to defend themselves against Serbian air defenses using a combination of flight altitudes, evasive maneuvers, the helicopter's onboard jammers, and weapons. These

operations cycle, the deep operations cell would analyze potential target sets and settle on targets for planning by the Apache crews. The regimental plans officer conducted a daily aircrew briefing of the target set, after



U.S. airmen roll a wheelbarrow load of mud along a gravel walkway in front of tented living quarters at Rinas Airport.
(National Archives)

engagements might require the Apache's unguided rockets or cannon, increasing the possibility of collateral damage. Serbian forces were also adept at concealment in populated areas, creating the real possibility of civilian casualties. They fielded the SA-7 surface-to-air missile system, which tracks the infrared signature produced by aircraft. Although the SA-7 is dependent on a line of sight from the shooter to the target, and it would be difficult to acquire at night, Joint Force leaders were not willing to underwrite more coalition aircraft losses after Serbian forces shot down two aircraft during the early days of ALLIED FORCE.³⁶

Two elements of TF HAWK provided an unexpected addition to the overall

capabilities and success of Operation ALLIED FORCE, even though the Army originally designed them to augment the Apache deep attacks. By 1 May, TF HAWK had established a forward operating base on the Albania-Kosovo border to house the MLRS tactical operations center, a battery of missile launchers to reach deep into Kosovo, a platoon of 105-mm. howitzers, and several counterbattery radar systems to identify Serbian artillery and antiaircraft systems. A detachment of Hunter unmanned aerial vehicles deployed to Camp Able Sentry in Macedonia on 21 March to provide reconnaissance of Serbian forces in southern Kosovo. By 23 April, TF HUNTER was under the operational control

of TF HAWK, and the full-motion video it provided was a key element of the unit's mission planning. By mid-April, both of these Army elements provided intelligence to both the TF HAWK deep operations cell and the NATO air operations center. As the air campaign went on, TF HAWK's helicopter and fixed-wing electronic warfare platforms, the EH-60 Quickfix and the RC-12 Guardrail, also became increasingly important to air operations planning, targeting, and postmission damage assessment.³⁷

As May went on, however, it was apparent that the Army would not employ TF HAWK in Kosovo. On 18 May, President Clinton remarked in public that he did not believe the operation would use the Apaches because the target set in Kosovo had dried up. Serbian units, which had never appeared in large groups, increasingly were going to ground and dispersing as coalition aircraft struck them. The Army sent an assessment team to visit the unit at Rinas. They complimented the hard work the 11th Aviation Group had done to prepare for the mission, but they were not sanguine about its employment. On 20 May, *Inside the Pentagon* published an article that was sharply critical of TF HAWK, and in particular of General Hendrix. It cited unnamed Air Force and Army staff officers who contended that Hendrix initially had refused to allow Apache missions to appear on the ATO. The author of the article quoted an "Air Force wag" whose response to word of TF HAWK's operational readiness was, "We've got nukes that are operational too." To be absolutely clear as to the nature of the Air Force criticisms of the Army, the article featured a shadow box titled "USAF OFFICERS DEPICT APPROACH TO APACHE OPS AS POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS," citing material from an Air Force liaison officer assigned to TF HAWK at Rinas. As Clark noted in his memoir, "the mood in Washington had turned increasingly hostile to Task Force Hawk." On 25 May, Clark requested permission to employ the Apaches from the Albania side of the border, launching missiles against verified Serbian targets within range in Kosovo. General Shelton refused the request. Planning inside TF HAWK shifted to using the Apaches as a part of the coalition force that would enter Kosovo once a cease-fire was in place. When Operation ALLIED FORCE formally ended on 20 June 1999,



U.S. Army Task Force HAWK personnel at Rinas Airport load M-39 guided missile and launch assemblies.

(National Archives)



Army aviation mechanics prepare to perform maintenance on a servo mount of a T-700 engine of a Black Hawk helicopter, while deployed to Albania in support of Task Force HAWK.

(National Archives)

TF HAWK had successfully deployed, but never carried out its assigned mission in Kosovo.³⁸

INQUESTS, JUDGMENTS, AND CHANGE: THE AFTERMATH OF TF HAWK

A number of national security observers offered postmortem examinations of TF HAWK. Some were more rigorous than others and some reinforced political agendas and interservice rivalries. Inside the Army, and within the Aviation Branch in particular, TF HAWK spurred intense introspection and no small amount of doctrinal, technological, and personnel change. Several commentators, including the author of the *Inside the Pentagon* article, raised the issue of the “unconventional” nature of

the TF HAWK tactical plan, highlighting that it was unusual for an Army helicopter force to conduct operations without other ground force maneuver units. This lack of a higher level of ground force command, they contended, caused confusion over command relationships and tactical procedures, even though deep attack was a clearly defined task in Army aviation doctrine of the time and had been since the 1980s. This claim overlooks the fact that a deep attack, by its very nature, will take place away from the operating zone of a friendly ground force. TF NORMANDY, Cody’s Gulf War-opening mission in 1991, did so with great success. The friction points in this operation were the integration of Army and Air Force airspace control procedures, and the synchronization

of Army helicopters, artillery, and missile fires with coalition air forces.

Equally significant in Cody’s mind were the equipment challenges TF HAWK faced. As Cody discovered when he assessed the unit in Germany, the regiment did not possess a full complement of night-vision goggles for pilots, and their Apaches did not have high-frequency or satellite radios for long-distance communications with their base and reliable communications with coalition air forces. This communications shortfall made it virtually impossible to integrate the Apaches completely into the air campaign. The Apaches’ aircraft survivability equipment, the suite of jammers and countermeasures that would deter enemy air defenses, was growing obsolete by 1999. Across the branch, the Army chronically underfunded this program as Cold War threats disappeared. Finally, the Apaches’ external fuel tanks were meant for long-distance ferry transport flights, not for combat. They were extremely heavy and took away one of the four wing-mounted hard points that normally held a missile or rocket launcher. The sum total of these material deficiencies was a branch that had taken measurable steps backward in combat readiness since the successes of Operation DESERT STORM.³⁹

Army budget realities and “year of execution” business rules limited the service’s ability to react rapidly with immediate materiel and training reforms. However, Army aviation quickly identified the lessons learned from TF HAWK and began implementing solutions. The Aviation Center’s assessments largely mirrored General Cody’s. They addressed the human dimension, highlighting an overall lack of aviator flight experience and a growing number of accidents resulting from that lack of experience. They found answers in providing training through better funding of flight hours; more aggressive use of upgraded simulators; a new model for basic flight training; an increase in postings of more experienced senior warrant officers within flight companies; and an overall reshaping of the aviator’s career model to emphasize operational time and flight experience. In time, Army aviation leaders hoped that these changes would decrease accidents and increase aircrew proficiency.

The Aviation Center’s doctrine and force structure recommendations aimed to make aviation units more robust in their staff and planning capabilities, better able to conduct



A C-17 Globemaster III offloads U.S. Army Task Force HAWK equipment at Rinas Airport.

(National Archives)

extended round-the-clock planning and operations, and more able to integrate into a joint and multinational operating environment. The branch would take Cody's practice of developing mission rehearsal exercises and realistic training to replicate better the combat conditions in training events. TF HAWK was a significant driver of the development of the Aviation Training Exercise, a simulation-driven staff and aircrew training event executed at Fort Rucker, Alabama, for deploying units throughout the two decades after 11 September 2001.⁴⁰

General Cody's attack helicopter materiel recommendations, which had been a focus since his arrival in Germany to assess the 11th Aviation Group, found a solid form in the Aviation Center's plan of action.

With the impetus of TF HAWK, the Army would move forward in developing better airborne command and control capability, with continued fielding of high-frequency radios. The Army continued to develop full-spectrum night sight devices, integrating improved infrared sensors and better night-vision goggles. The report acknowledged that the Apache's first-generation FLIR night sight was inadequate, especially in areas with persistent rain or fog. A night sight that combined the two technologies (infrared and the intensification of ambient light) was the branch's number-one priority for the Apache helicopter. The second priority was a smaller and more crashworthy internal auxiliary fuel tank. The Army further developed an immediate funding request for improved

infrared and radar countermeasures for Army helicopters, and developed a tactical operations and electronic warfare career field for aviation warrant officers. Finally, the successes of TF HAWK led Army aviation to continue developing the concept of teaming between crewed helicopters and unmanned aerial vehicles, along with better downlinks to transmit full motion video to ground stations.⁴¹

In early 2001, the United States General Accounting Office (GAO) published a report to the House Armed Services Committee on the lessons the Army learned from TF HAWK. In an evenhanded assessment, the GAO broadly established that although TF HAWK was not a typical Army operation of the time, in which a ground force commander "owned" a sector of a front and carried out combined arms operations in two dimensions, its employment plan was consistent with Army and joint doctrine. Instead, the GAO focused on collective inexperience in joint operations. Neither the Air Force nor the Army had addressed the serious disconnects between the two services' air elements in the years since DESERT STORM. This lack of emphasis reinforced the procedural and cultural differences between the services. The difficulty of ATO integration was the effect of this shortcoming. The report noted that a total of nineteen Army and five joint doctrine publications were under revision because of TF HAWK. Between them, USAREUR and the Army Training and Doctrine Command, of which the Aviation Center is a subordinate, developed 146 recommendations for action, mostly in the areas of training and force development. Joint lessons learned focused on the interoperability of equipment and doctrine between the Army and the Air Force.⁴²

Back in Germany, the 11th Aviation Group conducted its own series of lessons-learned reviews and redoubled its efforts to train more realistically for deep attack missions. Command of the regiment changed hands soon after redeployment, with Col. Oliver R. Hunter giving way to Col. Rickey L. Rife. During the TF HAWK deployment, Rife served on the staff of General Meigs at USAREUR, and traveled with him to Rinas to observe the operation. Rife came away with a series of impressions of the unit and the operation that drove significant change in the regiment once he took command. Rife implemented a new system of standard operating procedures and increased the risk and complexity of the unit's training events.



Rickey L. Rife (right), shown here as a brigadier general, presents the Distinguished Service Cross to the family of a service member killed in action, c. 2007.

(Department of Defense)

Over the next two years, the 11th Aviation Group conducted a number of large-scale training exercises with other V Corps units in Poland and Hungary and rehearsed deep attack missions with live artillery support against opposing forces with Warsaw Pact equipment. On a personal level, the aviators and soldiers of the unit felt the sting of public perception, reinforced by Cody's testimony that they had failed in Albania. When their next turn came to go into battle, they relished the opportunity to redeem the unit's reputation.⁴³

Less than a year after the GAO issued its report, terrorists attacked the United States on 11 September 2001. The onset of wars in Afghanistan and Iraq accelerated many of TF Hawk's materiel recommendations, particularly with regard to the Apache helicopter. But the extreme demand for Army aviation support to ground forces in two different theaters of war tabled the doctrine, training, and personnel findings for a number of years, as the Army, the Aviation Branch, and unit leaders focused their attention on combat operations. The Army and the rest of the U.S. military moved onto a wartime footing, and the events in the Balkans two years before receded from the Army's collective memory, but not from the consciousness of the 11th Aviation Group as it alerted and deployed to the Middle East in early 2003.

The key doctrinal finding from TF Hawk, the lack of communications and interoperability between Army and Air Force units

in the same area, was a problem with a history stretching back to Operation DESERT STORM. Although the technological tools for interoperability—radios, navigation and air traffic control systems, and computerized command and control systems—were relatively easy to upgrade in the course of ongoing joint combat operations after 11 September, doctrinal, procedural, and cultural differences remained. It would require more than a decade of sustained operations in Afghanistan and Iraq to narrow the interoperability gaps between the services.

In spite of the headlong rush to proclaim a revolution in military affairs in the new century, the failures of TF HAWK, real and

perceived, had a substantial impact. The 11th Aviation Group's difficult experience in Albania highlighted the challenges of joint and multinational operations after the end of the Cold War, and presaged many of the challenges that U.S. Army aviation forces would face in Afghanistan and Iraq. Although the unit's aircrews never carried out a deep attack mission into Kosovo, they successfully conducted a short-notice deployment to a challenging theater of operations. Once there, General Cody and the members of TF HAWK designed and executed a rapid training and rehearsal program against a background of persistent shortcomings in unit readiness. They overcame two accidents to integrate Army aviation operations into a joint and combined air campaign, and employed intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets that materially assisted the larger NATO operation. In all of these ways, the TF HAWK deployment to Albania represented both success and failure, victory and defeat.



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An exterior view of the control tower at Rinas with two Black Hawk helicopters coming in to land.

(National Archives)

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31. Interv, Author with Cody, 4 Aug 2020; Accident Investigation Rpt no. r_19990426, U.S. Army Combat Readiness Center (CRC), Fort Rucker, AL, 15 Nov 1999.
32. Accident Investigation Rpt no. r_19990426. The copilot gunner noted in his interview that during the crew's performance checks before departure, the aircraft needed 93 percent applied power to hover at mission altitude. Proper crew coordination procedures would require the crew to cross-reference this number with a performance planning card, and to adjust flight procedures as necessary, to include limiting the types of maneuvers conducted on the mission.
33. Accident Investigation Rpt no. 19990505, CRC, Fort Rucker, AL, 9 May 2000.
34. Priest, "Risks and Restraint"; Interv, Author with Cody, 4 Aug 2020.
35. Interv, Author with Barker, 19 May 2020.
36. Nardulli et al., *Disjointed War*, 27–29.
37. Interv, Author with Barker, 19 May 2020; Nardulli et al., *Disjointed War*, 88–93.
38. Elaine M. Grossman, "Army Commander in Albania Resists Joint Control Over Apache Missions," *Inside the Pentagon*, 20 May 1999, 1, 7–9, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/43995423>; Clark, *Waging Modern War*, 319–21.
39. Interv, Author with Cody, 4 Aug 2020.
40. Army Aviation Warfighting Center, "Task Force Hawk: A Review of Issues and Recommendations" (unpublished rpt), Jan 2001, Historians files.
41. Ibid.
42. Rpt, "Kosovo Air Operations: Army Resolving Lessons Learned Regarding the Apache Helicopter," GAO-01-401 (Washington, DC: General Accounting Office, 2001), 6–10.
43. Interv, Author with Cody, 4 Aug 2020.

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ARMY HISTORY


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BOOK REVIEWS



LAND WARFARE SINCE 1860: A GLOBAL HISTORY OF BOOTS ON THE GROUND

BY JEREMY BLACK

Rowman & Littlefield, 2018

Pp. vii, 279. \$39

REVIEW BY JUSTIN M. MAGULA

In his book, *Land Warfare Since 1860: A Global History of Boots on the Ground*, Jeremy Black, a history professor at the University of Exeter, tackles the question of whether land war is obsolete. Like T. R. Fehrenbach, who wrote that, "you may fly over a land forever; you may bomb it, atomize it, pulverize it and wipe it clean of life—but if you desire to defend it, protect it, and keep it for civilization, you must do this on the ground, the way the Roman legions did, by putting your young men into the mud," Black argues that there is no substitute for controlling territory other than boots on the ground.¹ State and nonstate actors continue to rely on land warfare as an essential means to achieve their political goals. Even so, Black claims, when compared to air

and sea warfare, modern military thinkers often undervalue land warfare and subsume it into the broader analysis of conflict.

Black approaches his study of land warfare with a worldwide lens, focusing on well-known conflicts and lesser-studied ones such as the Chinese and Mexican revolutions, British efforts outside the Western Front in World War I, the Greco-Turkish War, and the strife over decolonization during the Cold War. Through his analysis, he determines that there is no single essential character of warfare. However, there are often distinct regional and national dimensions that military historians and practitioners often overlook. Instead, they focus mainly on major European wars during the twentieth century when drawing lessons from the past. Unlike those who believe "history can be neatly pigeonholed into discrete episodes that fit together linearly," Black finds problems with this method of categorizing and trying to make things fit into a system (3). The arrangement of this book reflects this viewpoint.

Land Warfare Since 1860, the capstone volume in Black's global warfare series, has eleven chapters. As in the other books in the series, Black approaches warfare from an international perspective and various levels of analysis, such as the different levels of war, the political dimensions of conflict, and socioeconomic contexts. He begins his narrative at the start of a decade that saw the American Civil War, the Wars of German Unification, the War of the Triple Alliance, and the continuation of the Taiping Rebellion. Next, he devotes chapters to the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century, each World War, the interwar years, the Cold War, the past three decades, and the future of land warfare. The examples in this book, even where Black provides only a short account

of a conflict, give the reader a full picture of the comprehensive nature of land warfare during this time.

Each chapter focuses on a specific period where Black scrutinizes the events and actions that shaped conflicts in both a local and general context. He looks at warfare between Western states, non-Western states and actors, and intrastate conflicts. Three of the best chapters focus on the First World War, the interwar years, and the Second World War. Black does a fantastic job showing how events outside the Western world played pivotal roles during their respective eras and how they subsequently related to future events. For instance, he argues that World War I was far more complex and global than the dominant images of trench warfare and strategic stalemate. Not only were the British fighting in Africa and the Middle East, but the Chinese also entered the Warlord Period, with conflicts that saw armies and casualties that at times were almost as large as those on the Western Front. Likewise, the interwar years saw staggering levels of civil conflict, particularly in Ireland, China, and Spain. Although these periods provided many key lessons, Western military planners commonly failed to use them throughout much of the Cold War and in recent conflicts.

One common thread that Black touches on throughout this book is the proclivity of scholars and military practitioners to draw the wrong lessons from the past—by either coming to preordained conclusions or by narrowly focusing on specific areas of conflict. They fail to consider the broader strategic, political, economic, and cultural aspects that lead to war and determine its conduct. Furthermore, despite repeated warnings throughout this period, many leaders fall victim to the false belief that they can conduct a short war and control it once it begins. However, Black does note that in

recent decades, military and government bureaucracies are doing serious analytical work to understand the past better in order to succeed now and in the future.


Most historians and military leaders recognize the importance of understanding the past. Black helps to clarify what history they should study. He states, “learning from the past for the benefit of the future is the key element of military education” (6). Militaries prepare for the future, and while understanding the past does not guarantee success, it does allow them to prepare for an uncertain future. For instance, military thinkers planning for operations against China in the Pacific should look at various military conflicts, and from the perspective of the participants, rather than just studying American operations in that region during World War II.

This book will give experts new insights and equip beginners with a solid foundation about land warfare. Black challenges readers to take a global and contextual approach when studying military history and avoid arriving at preordained conclusions. Doing so will make readers better at scrutinizing the past, understanding its lessons in the present, and using that knowledge when envisioning the future. As Black reminds the reader throughout the book, evaluating the past is rarely value-free. In an era of revived great-power competition, Black’s book is a timely addition that will be of interest to military historians and expedient for military leaders.

MAJ. JUSTIN M. MAGULA is an Army Strategist at the U.S. Army War College, where he focuses his teaching and research efforts in the field of strategic landpower. He holds a master’s degree in international public policy from Johns Hopkins University and a bachelor’s in international relations from West Point. He has four combat deployments to include service at the theater level.

NOTE

1. T. R. Fehrenbach, *This Kind of War: The Classic Korean War History* (Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, 2008), 290.



THE VETERANS CEMETERIES OF TEXAS

BY MICHAEL LEE LANNING

Texas A&M University Press, 2018

Pp. viii, 178. \$29.95

REVIEW BY ROBERTO FERNANDEZ III

In 1862, the U.S. Congress passed legislation authorizing President Abraham Lincoln to purchase land for “soldiers who shall have died in the service to their country” (2). A year later, on 19 November 1863, people gathered in Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, to hear Lincoln dedicate a portion of the Gettysburg Battlefield “as a final resting place for those who here gave their lives that that nation might live.”¹ Four years after the dedication of Gettysburg National Cemetery, San Antonio National Cemetery opened on a section of land donated by the City of San Antonio.

The Veterans Cemeteries of Texas by Michael Lee Lanning is a solid introduction to the history of Texas’s veterans cemeteries. Many authors have published books about cemeteries in the state of Texas, but this is the first to focus exclusively on veterans cemeteries. Lanning organizes the book with an introduction and two major sections. The first section of the book focuses on the National Veterans Administration Cemeteries in Texas. He divides this part into six chapters that focus on San Antonio National Cemetery, Fort Sam Houston National Cemetery, Kerrville National Cemetery, Fort Bliss National Cemetery, Houston National Cemetery, and Dallas-Fort Worth National Cemetery. The second

section of the book concentrates on Texas State Veterans Cemeteries. This part has four chapters that focus on Central Texas State Veterans Cemetery, Rio Grande Valley State Veterans Cemetery, Texas State Veterans Cemetery at Abilene, and Coastal Bend State Veterans Cemetery.

The book begins with a brief overview of the establishment of military cemeteries during the Civil War. Before the Civil War, fallen soldiers were buried on the battlefield or in church graveyards located near the battlefield. The number of dead during the Civil War required a more formal system for military burials. Over time, Congress expanded the cemetery system and it now includes 155 national cemeteries. Lanning then introduces readers to a brief history of the state of Texas and the military contributions of Texans from all lifestyles in the support of the state and nation during times of war.

The beginning of each chapter has an introduction that discusses the history of the cemetery and includes a map, allowing readers to orient themselves to a cemetery quickly. The chapters that focus on the national cemeteries include sections that examine notable groups, noteworthy burials, and Medal of Honor recipients. The chapters on state cemeteries, although shorter in length, are similar in organization but include only significant burials. Among the notable burials featured in the national cemeteries are Buffalo Soldiers from the 9th and 10th Cavalry and the 24th and 25th Infantry regiments; Negro League baseball players Dan Robert Bankhead, Willard Jessie Brown, and Reece Tatum; 140 German, Austrian, Italian, and Japanese prisoners of war from World War II; and Sergeants Major of the Army William O. Wooldridge and Leon L. Van Autreve. Readers can find the final resting place of Lt. Col. William W. S. Bliss, the namesake of Fort Bliss, in Fort Bliss National Cemetery.

To help readers visualize these cemeteries, the book includes 10 black-and-white maps and approximately 100 color photographs. The photographs feature a variety of interesting scenes and activities that take place in the cemeteries. For example, in one photograph, readers can see cemetery workers raising, resetting, and aligning headstones. Although the book’s colorful photography makes it more interesting, it also represents a missed opportunity as none of the photographs have captions. Even though the photos are a plus, readers would better

appreciate them if the author described or contextualized what the photographs show.


The seven appendices included are important for reference. Appendix A focuses on the eligibility requirements for burial in a national cemetery, whereas Appendix B contains information on the eligibility requirements for burial in a Texas State Veterans Cemetery. A full copy of Theodore O'Hara's poem "The Bivouac of the Dead," which can be seen on monuments located within the cemeteries, is included in Appendix C. Appendix D provides images and names of the emblems of belief for government headstones. Appendix E provides information on Premier Cemetery Service Corporation, which is the company contracted by the state of Texas with maintaining the four Texas State Veterans Cemeteries. The eligibility requirements for burial in a national cemetery and state cemetery are located in Appendixes F and G, respectively.

There is very little not to like about this book. It is a relatively quick read and it can serve as a guidebook for those interested in visiting any of these veterans cemeteries. The pages featuring the notable burials and Medal of Honor recipients are both interesting and inspiring. Historic preservationists might find the book of interest; although it offers no more than a basic introduction, the appendices may be of use in the future. Readers will enjoy the book's concise writing, great photography, and the stories about the veterans. This is a must-have guide for anyone interested in the history of Texas, and American military history.

ROBERTO FERNANDEZ III is a social studies teacher with the Broward County School Board and serves as an adjunct lecturer at Florida International University. He received his bachelor's degree in sociology/anthropology and his master's degree in African and African Diaspora studies with an emphasis in pedagogy of the African Diaspora from Florida International University. From 2000 to 2008, he served in the United States Army Reserve as a civil affairs specialist and did two tours of duty in the Horn of Africa.

NOTE

1. Abraham Lincoln, "The Gettysburg Address," Hay draft, 19 Nov 1863, Library of Congress, <https://www.loc.gov/exhibits/gettysburg-address/ext/trans-hay-draft.html> (accessed 21 Jul 2021).



THE INDISPENSABLES: THE DIVERSE SOLDIER-MARINERS WHO SHAPED THE COUNTRY, FORMED THE NAVY, AND ROWED WASHINGTON ACROSS THE DELAWARE

BY PATRICK K. O'DONNELL

Atlantic Monthly Press

Pp. vii, 415. \$28

REVIEW BY DAVID RETHERFORD

Patrick K. O'Donnell's book, *The Indispensables: The Diverse Soldier-Mariners Who Shaped the Country, Formed the Navy, and Rowed Washington Across the Delaware*, is written in a narrative style centered on the mariners, soldiers, and politicians of the Marblehead Regiment (14th Continental Regiment) during the American Revolutionary War. O'Donnell's masterful storytelling transports readers to the ice-filled Delaware River on 25 December 1776. The crossing of the Delaware into Trenton, New Jersey, was a tactically dangerous move that resulted in a much-needed victory and provided some strategic momentum for the war. O'Donnell has written a solid and articulate book about the soldiers who helped transport General George Washington across the Delaware River and about the battles that followed, marking the birth of American land power.

In general, the main themes of O'Donnell's book cover topics such as military affairs; the tactics of the American, British, and German armies; political and legal oppression; and taxation. The book connects readers with the American Revolution through processes,

ideas, and themes such as adaptability, resilience, and the establishment of the "American style of war" (348). In addition to the book's main themes, O'Donnell introduces concerns such as slavery and the race issues of the time. If you are looking for military action with step-by-step battlefield storytelling, this is your book.

O'Donnell's book is a lengthy read; however, his style establishes and creates character investment. *The Indispensables* is a book about the American soldiers and mariners of Marblehead, Massachusetts, who not only filled the ranks of the namesake regiment but also helped establish the U.S. Navy—a major step in the creation of a sovereign country (348). In his work, O'Donnell articulates the roles and influences the Marblehead mariners had on the establishment of American sea power and the legal aspects of American privateering. Here again, he connects readers to the humanitarian, political, and military toll of the American Revolutionary War. Readers may be surprised to learn that some of America's war chest came from privateering other country's ships to pay for gunpowder—and that General Washington briefly authorized and sanctioned these acts of privateering.

The Indispensables introduces readers to many different characters of the Marblehead Regiment and their roles and influences. Political and historical figures, such as the abolitionist and politician Elbridge T. Gerry, are constant presences. Military historical characters such as Col. John Glover, the commanding officer of the Marblehead Regiment, appear throughout the book. Furthermore, O'Donnell includes the common soldiers from military muster roll calls and diaries from that time to create a mosaic of the American, British, and German soldiers and civilians who took part in events.

O'Donnell's lengthy book complements his writing style and his story arc. He interweaves a narrative of the Marblehead Regiment with different subjects, such as the threat of smallpox and the vital need to secure gunpowder. One can easily draw comparisons to our present-day need for natural resources that affect national security, such as the supercomputer chip shortage the United States is experiencing. By articulating the challenges of the day, O'Donnell engages readers in Colonial America's dire need for gunpowder.


O'Donnell covers some interesting topics beyond the battlefield that readers may likely want to research further: the various forms of

economic hardship on the American colonies leading up to open warfare, such as the Stamp Act; the international business relationships of some of the Marblehead merchants; the logistics of securing gunpowder from the Spanish; and the Life Guards who were Washington's personal security detail. The book also discusses the role of British and American propaganda and journalism during conflict. On many levels, O'Donnell's book serves as a history of the American colonies' military infrastructure by delving into the various committees that provided logistics and vital supplies to the Continental Army.

Additional features of O'Donnell's book are the battlefield maps and pictures of the various historic personalities of the time. The maps help in understanding how battlefields looked and how battles unfolded. For example, the materials on the Battle of Bunker Hill on 17 June 1775 are well done and assist readers in understanding the battle's topography and why the Colonial Army took their stand on Breed's Hill (137). Although the Colonial Army had skirmished with the British before Bunker Hill, after it, there was no going back. The British ran the Americans off the field of battle but paid dearly in loss of life. One British soldier recorded the scene within the fortifications on Breed's Hill after victory was declared: "I cannot pretend to describe the Horror of the Scene within the Redoubt, when we enter'd it. Twas streaming with Blood and strew'd with dead and dying Men, the Soldiers stabbing some and dashing out the Brains of other[s] was a sight too dreadful for me to dwell any longer on" (142). From Bunker Hill to New York to the icy Delaware River and Trenton, O'Donnell keeps the hardship, struggles, and accomplishments of the Marblehead Regiment front and center.

The Indispensables informs readers of the vital role and the various influences on the Marblehead Regiment and its soldiers during Revolutionary War. O'Donnell's own words best sum up this well-crafted American history book: "America's history is a strange and foreign land filled with good and rife with bad and ugly movements but the achievements of the Marblehead Regiment serve as a shining example for future generations" (350).

DAVID RETHERFORD has an undergraduate degree from the University of Florida. He is currently working on a master's degree with a focus on American intelligence gathering during the First World War.



MUSIC ALONG THE RAPIDAN: CIVIL WAR SOLDIERS, MUSIC, AND COMMUNITY DURING WINTER QUARTERS, VIRGINIA

BY JAMES A. DAVIS

University of Nebraska Press, 2014

Pp. xiii, 346. \$45

REVIEW BY NATHAN A. MARZOLI

Music and melody, whether in the form of the latest infectious pop tune or the rumbling clickety-clack of a train as it carries commuters to work, are so prevalent in our everyday lives that most of us never stop to think about its significance. The same can be said about most historians of the Civil War. This is unfortunate, because for both soldiers and civilians who lived through the conflict, music was a critical part of their personal lives—whether popular parlor tunes or the mundane drum and bugle calls that accompanied the soldiers in both the U.S. and Confederate camps. James A. Davis, a professor of musicology at the School of Music at the State University of New York at Fredonia, has therefore entered unchartered (but not unwelcomed) waters with his study of music and community in Culpeper County, Virginia, during the winter of 1863 to 1864. Entitled *Music Along the Rappahannock: Civil War Soldiers, Music, and Community during Winter Quarters, Virginia*, Davis's study is an important addition to the historiography of the Civil War. Through the lens of music and community, it allows us to develop a more complete understanding of the people who lived through the nation's greatest bloodletting.

Music Along the Rappahannock examines the role of music in defining the social communities that emerged in the area during that winter, when the Army of Northern Virginia and the Army of the Potomac recuperated from the bloody campaigns of the previous year. Music was an essential part of soldiers' lives and their identities, and Davis explains how it became a means of controlling the chaos that surrounded them. Davis also demonstrates how the arrival of thousands of soldiers in the rural central Virginia Piedmont caused various communities to collide—the U.S. and Confederate soldier communities of enlisted soldiers and officers, as well as the shared communities (both physical and imagined) of the soldiers and civilians who lived in the area. He argues that communities used music to either reaffirm or contest these socially or ideologically defined groups. Two beliefs, Davis writes, predicate this argument: "that music was a particularly meaningful social process during the American Civil War and that the idea of community was central to Americans' worldview at the time" (2). Together, these ideas led Davis to two conclusions: "that appreciating Civil War music requires understanding the social environments in which music occurred, and that understanding these social environments involves recognizing how a cultural icon like music contributed to the formation and expression of social identities that came to the fore during the war" (2).


To show that music was inseparable from community for the civilians and soldiers living on both sides of the Rappahannock for those winter months, Davis has focused his book on the types of music that served communal functions (martial, traditional, religious, and formal dance music). He demonstrates how it "recalled past communities, created lived communities, and strengthened imagined communities" (21). The communities used music to either reaffirm or contest different groups in winter quarters. Military music inculcated a new professional and martial perspective on northern and southern citizen-soldiers. Traditional music spoke to the happy times before the war and the relatively safe world of the civilian. Religious music drew both soldiers and civilians into an "imagined" community that transcended other traditional communal boundaries. Formal dance music reminded soldiers of the social hierarchies that remained in place between officers and enlisted soldiers, despite their shared goals of winning the war.

For this reviewer, the most valuable aspect of Davis's book was the discussions of the soldiers' community. In one instance, for example, Davis explains how soldiers took the lyrics of a popular Stephen C. Foster song of the time, "Hard Times Come Again No More," and altered the lyrics to reflect a sarcastic commentary on their repetitious diet ("Hard crackers, hard crackers, come again no more! Many days have you lingered upon our stomachs sore, Oh, hard crackers, come again no more!"). Davis writes that in this case, the new lyrics "distanced the soldiers from their past communities by removing an established song from its functional environment and giving it a new and contextually dependent meaning" (61). The new version of the popular song therefore meant something to soldiers only—not civilians. Although Davis's study uses the lens of music, the idea of a wartime context altering the meaning of an experience that originally had been inherent to everyday life opens up many innovative possibilities for historians to look at the well-worn topic of the transformation from civilian to soldier.

Davis, although a musicologist, has written a work that transcends the boundaries of his field. This book would also be a valuable study for sociologists, social historians, and those who study the lives and motivations of U.S. and Confederate soldiers. *Music Along the Rapidan* is a very readable book that would be of interest to any student of the Civil War, despite its seemingly complex themes and ideas. The book's flaws are few. Its one weakness (albeit a necessary one in order to make the study manageable) is that it covers a relatively small geographical area and time period. Although *Music Along the Rapidan* is an excellent starting point, it would be interesting to see how music was involved in the lives of soldiers and civilians at other points during the war, and if the building of communities at any point differed from the winter quarters in Culpeper and Orange Counties from 1863 to 1864. Any future studies in this area, taken along with Davis's landmark work, would be key to developing a more complete understanding of the American experience during the Civil War.

NATHAN A. MARZOLI is a staff historian at the Air National Guard History Office, located on Joint-Base Andrews, Maryland. A U.S. Air Force veteran, he completed a bachelor's degree in history and a master's degree in history and museum studies at the University of New Hampshire. His primary research

and writing interests focus on the Civil War draft, specifically the relationships between civilians and Federal draft officials. He is the author of several articles in journals such as *Army History* and *Civil War History*, as well as numerous blog posts.



UNSUNG HERO OF GETTYSBURG: THE STORY OF UNION GENERAL DAVID MCMURTRIE GREGG

BY EDWARD G. LONGACRE

Potomac Books, 2021

Pp. xvii, 316. \$34.95

REVIEW BY ARNOLD D. BLUMBERG

Students of the American Civil War, especially those who study the history of the mounted branches of the U.S. and Confederate armies, are well familiar with the bigger-than-life "glory hunters" in the ranks of the Army of the Potomac and Army of Northern Virginia: J. E. B. Stuart and Thomas L. Rosser on the Rebel side, and Alfred Pleasonton, Hugh Judson Kilpatrick, and George A. Custer for the U.S. Army. Although these Civil War cavalry enthusiasts know the name David McMurtrie Gregg, his character, and, to a large extent, his accomplishments as a commander of horse soldiers, have been shrouded in mystery and largely ignored. Only one slim volume about Gregg, written in 1984, has ever been published.¹ Now, thanks to Edward G. Longacre, David Gregg has a biography that befits him and his valuable accomplishments as a soldier.

Longacre is a retired historian for the U.S. Department of Defense and the award-

winning author of numerous books on the American Civil War. The majority of his work deals with the mounted branches of the Army of the Potomac and the Army of Northern Virginia.

The author begins with Gregg's early life and how events shaped his character, which was marked by a reserved demeanor, aloofness, and a tendency to conceal his emotions, although he also could be genial and self-possessed. In short, he was a man of great modesty, who avoided the spotlight and shunned self-promotion. These traits, along with his calm under pressure, reliability, and admiration by peers and subordinates alike, would endear him to the men under his command. On the other hand, they would put off the superiors who controlled his promotions as well as his assignments.

Longacre goes on to narrate Gregg's military service, from his time as a cadet at West Point to his tours of duty in Texas, California, and the Pacific Northwest in the late 1850s. He then details Gregg's pre-Gettysburg career, including his outstanding command and tactical acumen in the cavalry service with the Army of the Potomac during the first two years of the national conflict.

The book's intended draw, as is evident by the title, is the part Gregg played at the Battle of Gettysburg. Longacre masterfully describes the general's actions and those of his troopers at East Cavalry Field on 3 July 1863. This, the heart of the work, clearly adds Gregg to the list of hero U.S. officers who gave the federal government its first significant battlefield victory in the eastern theater of the war. Due to Longacre's expert writing and research, Gregg now is recognized alongside other U.S. officers like Maj. Gen. George G. Meade, Brig. Gen. John Buford, Col. Joshua L. Chamberlain, and Maj. Gen. Winfield Scott Hancock, who not only stemmed the tide of Confederate victories but also ensured that it would be decisively reversed. After two more brutal years of conflict, the Union would be preserved.

Longacre next expertly tackles the post-Gettysburg career of Gregg: his fine work during Lt. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant's Overland Campaign of 1864, his activity at the Battle of the Wilderness, the major cavalry clashes at Todd Tavern and Haw's Shop, and large-scale mounted raids led by cavalry chief Maj. Gen. Philip H. Sheridan.

Gregg's many sterling martial accomplishments notwithstanding, Longacre

does not shirk from showing that his subject made mistakes. Gregg's performance at the Second Battle of Brandy Station (9 June 1863), the largest mounted action in North America, was, as the author explains, far from flawless. Gregg's failure to warn Meade in a timely fashion of General Robert E. Lee's turning movement at the start of the Bristow Station Campaign in October 1863 was a great embarrassment to Gregg and posed a grave threat to the Federal Army under Meade.


In January 1865, Gregg resigned his commission in the U.S. Army—something that seemed incredible to many veteran officers in the Army of the Potomac at the time. The author devotes the last chapter of the book to fathoming why Gregg did this. Because no documentary sources exist, and only vague statements from Gregg are extant, Longacre can only speculate as to the general's motivation for leaving the Army as the war was nearing its conclusion. His possible answers are plausible, reasonable, and varied based on the meager material available.

Composed by the foremost American Civil War cavalry historian writing today, and supported by operational and tactical battle maps, *Unsung Hero of Gettysburg: The Story of Union General David McMurtrie Gregg* is a must-read and highly recommended.

ARNOLD D. BLUMBERG is an attorney residing in Baltimore, Maryland. He holds a bachelor's degree in history from the University of Maryland and a juris doctorate from the University of Baltimore Law School. A past Visiting Scholar, and Fellow by Courtesy with Johns Hopkins University's history and classics departments, respectively, he is the author of *When Washington Burned: A Pictorial History of the War of 1812* (Case-mate Publications, 2012), and articles on Civil War cavalry in the *Encyclopedia of the American Civil War: A Political, Social, and Military History* (ABC-CLIO, 2000). He is also a regular contributor to numerous military history publications.

NOTE

1. Milton V. Burgess, *David Gregg: Pennsylvania Cavalryman* (State College, PA: Nittany Valley Offset Press, 1984).



AMERICAN WOMEN REPORT WORLD WAR I: AN ANTHOLOGY OF THEIR JOURNALISM

EDITED BY CHRIS DUBBS

University of North Texas Press, 2021

Pp. xviii, 310, \$29.95

REVIEW BY SHANNON GRANVILLE

Military historian Chris Dubbs has produced two recent books on World War I correspondents. His first book, *American Journalists in the Great War: Rewriting the Rules of Reporting* (University of Nebraska Press, 2017), looked at the history of American war correspondents in the First World War and the ways in which they broke ground in military journalism. His second book, *An Unladylike Profession: American Women War Correspondents in World War I* (University of Nebraska Press, 2020), focused specifically on the stories of the American women reporters of the war, who often had to resort to unconventional methods to secure their places as correspondents of the twentieth century's first truly global conflict.¹ In his third book, an edited collection of the war reporting from the women profiled in *An Unladylike Profession*, Dubbs uncovers their voices. The thirty-five pieces in *American Women Report World War I* span the breadth of the war, from the earliest days of the fighting to the postwar recovery, and showcase the American women war reporters' myriad contributions to their readers' understanding of the war and the peace.

Dubbs has assembled a wide range of pieces that vary in tone and perspective,

arranged in thematic chapters dedicated to particular aspects of the war. Some are first-person narratives, capturing the author's excitement over her proximity to the fighting or despair over the loss of life. Others take a more objective view, covering events as an observer providing an eyewitness account of a peace conference or a country in turmoil. Many of the women reporters' editors assigned them to produce "human interest" stories that would capture the attention of female readers. Thus, several selections focus on the needs of the wounded and the plight of refugees—often as means of promoting charitable fundraising efforts. Once the United States entered the war, the human-interest angle shifted, as readers at home grew anxious for news of family members overseas. In response, American women war reporters followed the doughboys as they streamed out of training camps and into the trenches, giving their audience a glimpse of the daily lives of their loved ones fighting half a world away.

Many of the pieces specifically contrast the experiences of men and women in wartime, with the authors commenting on the gender norms and expectations of the day. When Mary Roberts Rinehart visited the Belgian front lines in 1914, her willingness to expose herself to danger scandalized the officers who escorted her through the trenches: "For men such a risk was legitimate, necessary. In a woman it was foolhardy" (19). In a 1916 piece on the drastic decline in birth rates during the war, Mary Boyle O'Reilly evokes popular eugenicist views that European women will need to "save the race" by having more children—but, she adds deliberately, only if their governments provide them with the proper care and resources to do so, because "if the state needs children, the state must pay for them" (68). At times, the commentary is scathing, highly critical of both war and gender roles. Madeleine Zabriskie Doty, writing about the women nurses who cared for wounded French soldiers in 1915, expresses her outrage at the seemingly futile efforts to cope with the unending parade of injured and dying men: "Is the labor all to be lost? Faster than women can save, men go out and kill" (30). Yet there are also moments where some women reporters lament the loss of their own personal comforts during their travels, complaining about scanty food and high prices for service in the once-opulent hotels of war-torn France and Germany, or lack of hygienic living conditions in

the devastated Balkans. For women who had chosen of their own volition to place themselves in harm's way for the sake of their professions, the contrast between their sensitivity to suffering and insensitivity of their own privileges occasionally strikes a discordant note for a modern reader.

The only negative aspect of *American Women Report World War I* is the poor quality of the annotations. Rather than feeling like natural extensions of the text, the scattering of footnotes throughout the book are often disjointed and lacking in helpful information. In a reference to "Gallieni" in a 1916 article by Jessica Lozier Payne, for instance, the footnote merely describes him as "French general Joseph Gallieni," with no further context given to the reader (35). More than a few notes, particularly those that provide basic translations for non-English terms such as *blessés* (wounded soldiers) or *dvornik* (a doorkeeper or building caretaker), might have been better placed as glosses within brackets in the text. The choice of which individuals and historical elements to annotate also seems to have been made at random, with some more obscure items and events remaining unexplained. On the whole, the annotations would have benefited from greater detail and consistency—such as a standardized formatting for references to individuals, with dates of birth and death, when known—and more substantive attention to clarifying obscure details for those less familiar with the period. In an otherwise engaging collection of material, the problems with the notes detract from the flow of the reading.


That issue aside, *American Women Report World War I* is a much-needed anthology of work by women writers who helped blaze a trail for future war correspondents, both male and female. It is a useful complement to Dubbs's *An Unladylike Profession*, giving readers a direct connection to the many women who risked life and limb to report on a world at war—and not without misgivings at times. While receiving emergency medical care for shrapnel wounds she received during a supposedly "safe" tour of a battlefield, *New Republic* correspondent Elizabeth Shepley Sergeant privately mourned that she was "giving so much trouble" to the overworked medics in a place where "women are superfluous" (167). Yet as she and many others like her fought for their right to be more than unwanted outsiders in a man's world, their unique approaches

to the elements of journalism would shape the profession in the years to come.

SHANNON GRANVILLE is the senior editor in the Historical Products Division of the U.S. Army Center of Military History. Previously, she was editor and deputy publications director with the Woodrow Wilson Center Press, where her responsibilities included editing manuscripts for the Cold War International History Project series copublished with Stanford University Press. She has a master's degree in international history from the London School of Economics and a bachelor's in history from the College of William and Mary. Her research interests include Cold War nuclear history, postwar British and Japanese politics, and political satire in popular culture.

NOTE

1. For a review of *An Unladylike Profession*, see *Army History* 120 (Summer 2021), 50–51.



BROTHERHOOD IN COMBAT: HOW AFRICAN AMERICANS FOUND EQUALITY IN KOREA AND VIETNAM

BY JEREMY P. MAXWELL

University of Oklahoma Press, 2018
Pp. xv, 207. \$29.95

REVIEW BY FRANK A. BLAZICH JR.

Combat, arguably, is a great equalizer among its participants, where survival under the most adverse conditions strips away societal differences of class, race, ethnicity, or social status. In *Brotherhood in Combat: How African Americans Found Equality in Korea and Vietnam*, Jeremy P. Maxwell, an

assistant professor at the Command and General Staff College, examines how the combat experiences of African Americans in the Korean and Vietnam Wars proved invaluable to the integration of the Army and Marine Corps during the Cold War. He ably argues "that through a shared experience in combat, African Americans were able to change the preconceived beliefs of traditionally conservative high-ranking officials. In Korea, that realization translated into a greater push toward integration. In Vietnam, the experience of combat trumped the intense racial atmosphere of the time, bringing black and white soldiers and Marines closer together as a result" (158).

Maxwell structures his argument chronologically in a concise work of 207 pages. He lays out a succinct historiography in his introduction, followed by an examination of early African American military service from the Civil War through the end of World War II in his first chapter. Military service offered African Americans opportunities for personal advancement, a pathway to equality in society, and the full benefits of citizenship. Repeated demonstrations of honorable and valorous service failed to alter prejudices of military leaders, however. Whether the racist views of Lt. Gen. Edward M. Almond or the politically minded views of Generals George C. Marshall and Dwight D. Eisenhower, they considered the military an inappropriate venue for social change. The author then devotes a chapter to President Harry S. Truman's issuance of Executive Order 9981, directing the desegregation of the Armed Forces over a two-year implementation period. With segregation scheduled to end in the military on 1 July 1950, "Korea would be the arena within which integration would be tested and built upon" (50). Over the next three chapters, Maxwell places integration within the necessities of combat experiences in Korea. Integration within the Army from the onset of the conflict to mid-1951 bore hallmarks of familiar prejudiced leaders of World War II, but under the leadership of General Matthew B. Ridgway and Marine Maj. Gen. Oliver P. Smith, combat efficiency and logistical priority replaced segregation and racism.

In his next three chapters, Maxwell examines integration and racial equality during the Vietnam War. Even with the advances since Korea, African American soldiers and Marines entered combat in Southeast Asia, the civil rights movement continued and fought to address institutional discrimina-


tion and racism across the United States. The conflict saw a generational shift within the Black community. Young Black men still saw the military as a chance for social advancement while senior Black civil rights leaders asked, with regard to casualties, why so many young men had to die in Vietnam “to protect the freedoms of the South Vietnamese when they did not enjoy the same freedoms at home” (110). Maxwell clarifies that Blacks incurred a higher proportion of casualties in the first years of the war because a higher percentage of Black men volunteered for combat for pay and promotion incentives. After 1968, the percentage of Black volunteers declined as the number of Blacks drafted into the service increased. Although one could find racial tensions and conflict in rear support areas, this differed for combat personnel in Vietnam: “Race mattered little if men were dying; therefore racial harmony was required while in the field for units to survive” (128).

Readers of military history examining issues of diversity and the African American experience in war will find *Brotherhood in Combat* valuable. Maxwell’s analysis is direct and oriented on broad points of argument rather than analyzing specific aspects in depth. He admits his focus is on male soldiers and marines, does not cover the Air Force or Coast Guard and makes only passing mention to experiences in the Navy and National Guard. Although Maxwell narrows the focus to two services and two specific conflicts, the work’s greatest value is found in the incorporation of original voices via oral histories, notably the holdings of the Veterans History Project at the Library of Congress, to emphasize the importance of “trial by fire” in breaking down racial barriers and preconceptions.

Maxwell’s cogent and professional writing make *Brotherhood in Combat* an accessible resource for scholars unfamiliar with the topic. The book offers an impressive bibliography of primary and secondary sources, including collections from no less than fifteen archives. The endnotes are equally concise, however, and do not necessarily reflect the array of consulted materials. Readers will be disappointed to find no imagery or maps and only two tables of questionable value shoehorned into the text. Disconcertingly, distracting typos and factual errors absolutely riddle the book. The sheer number of both items, noted by other reviewers, is a shared failure between the author and the editorial staff at the University of Oklahoma Press,

as such egregious faults should have been corrected during revisions. These problems should not detract from the importance of Maxwell’s research. *Brotherhood in Combat* is a useful resource and solid read. This work serves as a springboard for further research into the subject of diversity in the American military and of the complex web of social, political, and military history in the twentieth century.

DR. FRANK A. BLAZICH JR. is a curator of modern military history at the Smithsonian Institution’s National Museum of American History. He holds a doctorate in modern American history from the Ohio State University and is an Air Force veteran. His most recent book is *An Honorable Place in American Air Power: Civil Air Patrol Coastal Patrol Operations, 1942–1943* (Air University Press, 2020).



TALIBAN SAFARI: ONE DAY IN THE SURKHAGAN VALLEY

BY PAUL DARLING

University Press of Kansas, 2019

Pp. xii, 168. \$27.95

REVIEW BY CRAIG LESLIE MANTLE

In *Taliban Safari: One Day in the Surkhagan Valley*, Lt. Col. (ret.) Paul Darling leads the reader through the triumphs and misfortunes of a one-day offensive mission in Afghanistan’s Surkhagan Valley on 7 June 2009. It was a mission intended to drive hiding Taliban into the open where Apache helicopters could destroy them with impunity. Beginning in the wee hours

of the morning and ending with a macabre evening press conference, the narrative relives the details of this day, some dramatic and life-altering, others more mundane and boring. In so doing, the book makes clear the realities of leading combined U.S. and Afghan National Police (ANP) forces in deliberate counterinsurgency operations, albeit on a relatively small scale.

This book started out as a much longer work, encompassing what Darling “considered witty and astute observations of the greater mission in Afghanistan” (xi). His editor and others encouraged him (unfortunately, in the humble opinion of this reviewer) to excise such extraneous material. Despite these deletions, commentary about U.S. engagement in Southwest Asia still infuses its pages and is exceptionally interesting where it occurs, adding both contextual depth and color to his highly personal one-day account. His remarks about the discord between the ANP and Afghan National Army, and the placement by the U.S. Department of State of junior and arguably ill-prepared civilian representatives in Zabul Province, are worthy of note and add an additional dimension to the discussion.

Throughout the book, Darling offers insightful comments on the peculiarities of the ANP. For instance, corruption, prizes (in the form of enemy motorcycles), retribution for past offenses, sympathies for or active support of the Taliban, and the treatment (abuse and summary execution) of prisoners are all mentioned to varying degrees. Although he does not draw explicit connections between these practices and their effect on security overall, it is not unreasonable to assume that a negative relationship existed: the more manifest these behaviors on the part of the ANP, the less likely a stable and secure Afghanistan. One cannot help but come to appreciate the complexities of the mission through the pages of this memoir, where, as he puts it, “Twenty-first century warfare meets biblical-era tribes and Civil War-era maxims” (54).

Taliban Safari is also a case study in what it means to be a soldier in a modern-day campaign. Through his writing, Darling exemplifies attributes of the professional officer. He is competent; his mission to destroy the resident Taliban was successful. He is an able leader and commander; even though he makes some mistakes, in his estimation, he uses them as learning opportunities. He is fit and well read (he frequently quotes

historical figures). He appreciates the larger security environment in which he operates, even if he sometimes questions his ability to influence it. And perhaps most important of all, he respects the rules of war and the Law of Armed Conflict. Darling's views on the proper treatment of prisoners and enemy wounded are vastly different from those of the ANP who tend not to observe the Geneva Conventions. Aspiring soldiers would do well to look beyond the mere surface details of the story and to study the author.

If there is a shortcoming to *Taliban Safari*, it is that Darling gives very little detail about himself. Readers must wait to learn that he is a major (80), that he is mentoring and advising the ANP (134), that his National Guard unit is from Alaska (148), and that he is a graduate of West Point (159), although a few of these facts can be inferred from earlier text.

Perhaps the lack of personal detail was intentional, a way to make his story more broad and universal, a tale of any soldier on any given day in Afghanistan, but the absence of such information makes his experiences somewhat difficult to situate within the larger picture of U.S. and coalition operations. A short biography of sorts at the beginning, or at least sufficient background, would have negated this criticism, minor and fussy as it is.

A relatively short book, *Taliban Safari* has much to offer the student of the war in Afghanistan. An intensely personal, introspective, and honest account, it succeeds in meeting its objective: to describe "what it was like" (xi). If its one-day focus is narrow in scope, some of the issues and questions it raises are much more expansive and worthy of deeper reflection. *Taliban Safari* is a valuable addition to

the literature for it forces readers to come face-to-face with combat and to appreciate the real-time thought processes of those who engage in it.

DR. CRAIG LESLIE MANTLE is an adjunct assistant professor at the Royal Military College of Canada and a fellow of the Royal Historical Society. He is the principal editor of *In Their Own Words: Canadian Stories of Valour and Bravery from Afghanistan, 2001–2007* (Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2013).



chief historian's FOOTNOTE



Jon T. Hoffman

WORKING IN THE COVID WORLD

As I write this, cases of the Delta variant of COVID-19 are on the rise, and we are waiting to see what impact that has on work routines and daily life. The historical side of the Center of Military History (CMH) has remained largely on remote work, but is scheduled to return to Fort McNair in early September. The National Archives also has reopened on a limited basis, allowing some of our authors and research assistants to catch up on overdue research. Whether we go forward or backward on the return to normalcy remains to be seen, but CMH will continue to cope with whatever comes.


One recent instance of dealing with the impact of the coronavirus was holding our first external review panel since the onset of the pandemic. The subject was Andrew J. Birtle's manuscript on the Vietnam advisory effort between 1961 and 1965. We have split it into two volumes because of its length. The panel reviewed the second half, covering 1964–1965. For the first time ever, the group met virtually, owing to the difficulty of travel, the social distancing and masking restrictions then in force, and a lack of funding to bring everyone to Washington, D.C. Although CMH has grown accustomed to conducting business meetings online, this gathering presented unusual challenges. The Department of Defense employs a version of Microsoft Teams for official business. It is accessible only from government-furnished computers using a Common Access Card. We thus could not use that system as most members of the panel hailed from academia. Conversely, those of us on the government side are not authorized to use commercial collaboration tools such as Zoom on our official computers. There also was no easy means for CMH to pay for a Zoom account, necessary due to the likely length of the meeting, so that we could participate using our home computers. Ultimately, one of the nongovernment panel members agreed to use their university Zoom account to host the meeting, and that worked. But it was not the ideal way to run a railroad.

Despite the pandemic, we had a typically strong group of reviewers. Robert K. Brigham is a history professor at Vassar College and his publications include *ARVN: Life and Death in the South Vietnamese Army* (University Press of Kansas, 2006). Gregory A. Daddis is a professor of history at San Diego State

University, a former Army officer, and the author of five books on the Vietnam War. Jacqueline L. Hazelton is a professor of political science at the Naval War College and currently on a one-year sabbatical with the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at the Harvard Kennedy School. She has written several studies on counterinsurgency and has a forthcoming book, *Bullets Not Ballots: Success in Counterinsurgency Warfare* (Cornell University Press, 2021). David M. Toczek, a retired Army officer with a master's degree in history, is currently a planner for U.S. Strategic Command. He also is the author of *The Battle of Ap Bac, Vietnam: They Did Everything but Learn from It* (Greenwood Press, 2001). Andrew A. Wiest is a professor of history and director of the Vietnam Studies Center at the University of Southern Mississippi and author of *Vietnam's Forgotten Army: Heroism and Betrayal in the ARVN* (New York University Press, 2008). We also planned to have Brig. Gen. Scott A. Jackson, head of the Army's Security Force Assistance Command, but because of a late change in his schedule, he was unable to participate.

The panel's assessment was very positive, as we expected it would be, but they also provided valuable input. In particular, they felt that the heavy reliance on American sources, particularly reports from U.S. Army advisers, overemphasized shortcomings in the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN), without an offsetting South Vietnamese perspective. To a great extent, Birtle was limited by the sources available, as no official South Vietnamese records survived the conflict, and most published works on ARVN focus on the period after the intervention of U.S. ground troops in 1965. Any South Vietnamese veterans who routinely interacted with American advisers before that time also would be far advanced in age at this point. In the revision phase, Birtle will do some additional creative searching to see if he can turn up anything relevant. At a minimum, the book now will emphasize the limitations of the sources. Based on the panel's feedback, revisions will be minimal and we expect to get the manuscript into the production phase in the next few months.

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