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

LOST BUT NOT FORGOTTEN

THE SEARCH FOR THE MISSING OF THE HÜRTGEN FOREST

BY IAN MICHAEL SPURGEON

STUDIES IN THE EXERCISE OF POWER

SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE AND THE VIETNAM WAR, 1961–1973

BY JOHN M. CARLAND

ARMY HISTORY

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Front cover: A U.S. Army soldier helps a buddy up a slope during the Battle of the Hürtgen Forest. (*National Archives*)

Back cover: A farmhouse on the main route in Hürtgen served as HQ, 121st Infantry, 8th Infantry Division. They nicknamed it the "Hürtgen Hotel.". (*U.S. Army*)

EDITOR'S JOURNAL

In the Summer 2021 issue of *Army History*, we are pleased to offer two engaging articles, an excellent selection of book reviews, a look at some of the Army's recruiting poster artwork, and a visit to an Army museum in a tropical locale.

The first article, by Ian Spurgeon, details the search for the missing soldiers from the Battle of the Hürtgen Forest. The effort to locate and identify remains from this battle continues to this day nearly eighty years later. The difficult terrain, postwar forest fires, logging, and time make recovery an arduous process. However, the operation continues and remains of the fallen are still being identified and returned to their families.

The second article, by John Carland, profiles three secretaries of defense, Robert S. McNamara, Clark M. Clifford, and Melvin R. Laird, and examines how each exercised power and implemented policy and strategy during the Vietnam War. The author highlights the secretaries' relationship with the presidents they served, studies their various successes and failures, and focuses on their very different approaches to the conduct of the war.

When this issue of *Army History* is published, it will be the fourth released while its staff has been teleworking during the COVID-19 pandemic. As vaccines become readily available to the workforce, we are hopeful this will allow us to return to the office more often, in a hybrid fashion, in the coming months. Over the past year, we have learned to publish this magazine just as efficiently as if we were all still in the office together. This is due to the dedication and commitment of the small *Army History* staff, but it is also a triumph of the technology that many of us take for granted every day. Working for the Department of Defense (DoD) has afforded us the opportunity to utilize the Microsoft Teams business communication software. Many were skeptical of this new DoD-mandated program, but they were soon converted. Teams, which offers features such as video, audio, and text chat, files sharing, and calendar management, helped replace the many face-to-face interactions that normally took place in the office. Editors could now transfer drafts of articles instantaneously, authors could review maps and return them to the cartographer in no time at all, and the team could supply graphics to the visual information specialists much faster than it would take to transfer them physically. We have learned to operate in an entirely new environment and, in many cases, we increased our efficiencies and further refined our processes. In fact, many of those working in our division have reported that they have been more productive while teleworking over the past year than in any previous year.

The next year undoubtedly will bring challenges, as we will have to learn a new hybrid style of working and start to return to the office. However, I do not foresee this interfering in any way with our commitment to bringing you more excellent issues of *Army History*.

BRYAN J. HOCKENSMITH
MANAGING EDITOR

AH SUMMER 2021 ARMY HISTORY

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THE CHIEF'S CORNER

CHARLES R. BOWERY JR.

HISTORY AND THE POWER OF PLACE

Devotees of *Army History*, yours truly among them, always get a thrill from settling down to read a new issue of the magazine, or indeed any historical work. Part of that pleasure stems from the ability to transport oneself away from the here and now into another time. But we also know that much of the fulfilment we derive from studying history comes from the opportunity to visit and interact with places we study or read and write about. A historian friend of mine, who is a retired career employee of the National Park Service, refers to this dynamic as "the power of place."

In my years of doing history, both for the Army and in my personal pursuits, I have had numerous chances to experience the power of place. As a junior officer assigned to an aviation unit in South Korea in 1999, I organized and led a unit staff ride to the 1951 battlefield of Chip'yong-ni, and stood in the remnants of American and French fighting positions, imagining what it was like to endure a bayonet assault. When I returned from Korea, I took my father on a trip to Antietam and Gettysburg, and experienced the power of place with him, the first of many visits to those hallowed grounds. In 2018, the year of the U.S. Army's World War I Centennial commemorations, I walked the American battlefields in France with French and American civilians and soldiers in a life-changing series of encounters with Army history. I had read about all of those places and events, and still do today, but nothing can replace the visceral, haptic sensations of matching the images in your mind with reality. Such is the power of place.

Over the past year, my physical location in the Washington, D.C., region has allowed me to experience the power of place in a socially distanced way, exploring battlefields and historic sites on my own. This has been a welcome change from the need to remain at home and separated from friends and colleagues, but these visits are also a further reminder that our National Army Museum, as well as most of our local Army museums, have been closed for an extended period. We hope to reopen our facilities in the coming months, but in the meantime, the Center of Military History continues to offer a variety of virtual museum experiences. As I write this, we are conducting our inaugural Civil War Week of programming in a completely virtual format, but we anticipate that next year's event will be in-person and will include battlefield and historic site experiences. You can see all of the museum's virtual offerings at www.thenmusa.org.

So here's wishing all of our readers continued good health, and here's to the power of place to educate, inspire, and preserve!

NEWSNOTES

CLAYTON D. LAURIE (1954–2021)

Although Dr. Clay Laurie achieved prominence in the intelligence history community, we remember fondly his days at the U.S. Army Center of Military History (CMH). A native of Cedar Falls, Iowa, he earned his bachelor's in history at the University of Northern Iowa in 1977 and then taught American history and government in the Council Bluffs school system. In 1982, he received his master's degree in history from the University of Nebraska Omaha. He moved to Washington, D.C., to attend American University and received his Ph.D. in 1990.

Before then, in 1986, he was a rising scholar among a wave of young historians at CMH. He wrote two commemorative pamphlets on the Army in Italy in World War II, and coauthored *The Role of Federal Military Forces in Domestic Disorders, 1877–1945* and *Industrialists in Olive Drab: The Emergency Operation of Private Industrial Facilities During World War II*. His published dissertation, *The Propaganda Warriors: America's Crusade Against Nazi Germany* (University Press of Kansas, 1996), met with scholarly acclaim. As an adjunct at the University of Maryland, Baltimore County, he taught popular classes on warfare, World War I, World War II, the Vietnam War, and American intelligence.

In 2000, Clay became the deputy chief historian at the National Reconnaissance Office and later served as chief historian. From there, he moved to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and in 2007, he became deputy historian with the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. There, he wrote volume 2 of *The Negroponte Years, 2005–2007.* He returned to the CIA history staff in 2008 and stayed until he retired in 2019. His sudden and premature passing in February 2021 was a great loss.

For all who worked with him, Clay was a friend and an inspiration. Although much of his work was classified and did not achieve wider notice, his reputation as a scholar was undeniable. His enthusiasm for history was

CLAYTON D. LAURIE

evident, whether with a colleague enjoying a drink and a laugh or with rapt students in one of his well-attended classes. An Eagle Scout, Clay served as a Cub Scout Master, Den Leader, and Boy Scout Leader. In retirement, he looked forward to indulging his interests in militaria, travel, camping, sailing, gardening, and cooking. Unfortunately, he departed this world too soon, and will be sorely missed. He is survived by his wife, Sarah Jane, and his two sons, Ian and Tyler.

CONNECTING WITH THE NATIONAL ARMY MUSEUM

Even though it is now open, the National Museum of the United States Army is still offering a variety of virtual programs for anyone interested in military and historic tourism. Book Talks with military historians, Battle Briefs, and Field Trips, along with seminars and videos such as Curator's Corner, provide lively discussions and compelling insights on important events and remarkable stories.

Designed to appeal to a broad array of audiences and interests, the virtual programs are free and require advance registration. For the full calendar of events, see: https://www.thenmusa.org/events.

Please visit the museum's website, www.theNMUSA.org, and the museum's social media channels, @USArmyMuseum, for the most current information.



LOST BUT NOT FORGOTTEN

THE SEARCH FOR THE MISSING OF THE HÜRTGEN FOREST

BY IAN MICHAEL SPURGEON

Composite Image: U.S. Army troops move through wooded terrain during the Battle of the Hürtgen Forest. (*National Archives*)

The Battle of the Hürtgen Forest—a lengthy series of fierce clashes along the German-Belgian border—was among the U.S. Army's longest and bloodiest campaigns of the Second World War. It took elements of at least nine infantry divisions and two armored divisions five months, from mid-September 1944 to early February 1945, to fully expel enemy forces from the roughly seventy square miles of German forest southeast of Aachen, near the Belgium border. American casualties numbered in the tens of thousands. For many veterans of the fighting, there was no greater hell on earth than the Hürtgen Forest.

The Hürtgen Forest also proved to be a nightmare for graves registration activities. The heavily wooded and uneven terrain, poor weather, stagnant front lines, and enormous number of dead taxed the understaffed recovery teams. If the teams did not recover a fallen soldier immediately, there was a good chance his remains would be lost within the tangled mess of artillery-shattered vegetation, mud, and snow. Despite the great efforts the American Graves Registration Command (AGRC)

took to recover the dead in the late 1940s, the War Department eventually declared more than 250 soldiers missing in the Hürtgen Forest as nonrecoverable.

Over the following decades, people discovered several more remains, either accidentally or through the efforts of the occasional American search team. However, in 2015, the Department of Defense's office for finding and identifying missing American service members assigned a historian to all cases of unresolved American casualties in the Hürtgen Forest. At the time, there were still 200 individuals missing from combat in that area. That number is only a tiny portion of the more than 72,000 Americans still missing from World War II. However, when compared to the density of unresolved losses to square mile, the Hürtgen Forest surpasses the much more famous Battle of the Bulge, Operation Market-Garden, and the Normandy invasion.

This article is about the recovery of fallen Americans in the Hürtgen Forest. It will briefly review past graves registration activities to reveal why government investigators did not recover or identify those missing. Next, it will describe the U.S. government's current multidisciplinary efforts—involving historical research, geospatial technology, archaeological fieldwork, and anthropological analysis—to find and identify the missing and finally return them to their families.

The Battle

World War II veteran and Army historian Charles B. MacDonald called the Hürtgen Forest a "seemingly impenetrable mass, a vast, undulating, blackish-green ocean stretching as far as the eye can see."[1] Despite this imposing terrain, American forces had to clear out German defenders there before they could safely approach and cross the Roer River. Furthermore, American military planners wished to capture two major river dams southeast of the forest before German forces used them to release a massive volume of water and flood the Roer valley.

The first American units to test German defenses in the Hürtgen were elements of the 9th Infantry Division in late September 1944. German soldiers contested nearly every American step through the forest. However, the Germans had placed their greatest defenses at the towns and roads within the eastern half. As a result, after several days of slow but steady progress across nearly five miles of densely forested ground, the 9th Infantry Division came to a hard stop along the north-south road running through the village of Germeter in late October. Only a few more miles to the southeast lay Schmidt, a key crossroads town and the division's objective. Yet, the troops of the 9th Infantry Division could not make it. Efforts by the 39th Infantry to push through Germeter to the town of Vossenack failed in the face of heavy German resistance and artillery, as well as roving German patrols. On the 9th Infantry Division's right flank, the 60th Infantry encountered a series of concrete pillboxes guarding a road juncture in a forest section known as the Raffelsbrand. For a week, the 60th Infantry troops struggled in vain to eliminate the enemy defenders. By late October, the 9th Infantry Division had suffered 4,500 casualties; German forces lost roughly the same number.[2]

In late October, the 28th Infantry Division arrived to relieve the 9th Infantry Division and renew the attack. The 110th Infantry took over the Raffelsbrand sector along the right flank, the 109th Infantry moved into position on the left, and the 112th Infantry held the middle with the ambitious plan to capture the towns of Vossenack, Kommerscheidt, and Schmidt. On 2 November 1944, the division launched its main attack. The result was an extended salient into enemy territory that proved costly to hold. The 110th Infantry on the right continued the war of attrition against Germans dug in at Raffelsbrand. Apart from eliminating some pillboxes, the regiment made no appreciable gains for the week it fought there. The 109th Infantry, on the left, advanced several hundred yards north toward the town of Hürtgen and stopped in a horseshoe formation within a wooded plateau. According to 1st Lt. Charles E. Potter, one of the few surviving officers from the regiment's 1st Battalion, the woods were so thick "that it was impossible to see more than thirty yards in any one direction."[3] Incessant German artillery and counterattacks bombarded the regiment for another week. Incoming shells frequently burst in the trees above, raining shrapnel and shards of wood onto the soldiers below. Broken branches further littered the already crowded forest floor, Lieutenant Potter remarked, "making it more difficult to move or to see any distance from the positions."[4] The 112th Infantry



A soldier helps an ammunition carrier through the mud during the Battle of Hürtgen Forest.
(*National Archives*)

at the middle of the division line secured Vossenack quickly, and eventually rushed troops into Kommerscheidt and then Schmidt. However, German infantry and armor attacks eventually recaptured the latter two towns, and deadly, pinpointed artillery strikes on the American foxholes along the open fields on Vossenack ridge broke the line there and prompted a chaotic retreat on 6 November.

By the middle of the month, it was clear to those on the front lines that there would be no quick route through the Hürtgen. Over the next several weeks, elements of the 1st, 4th, 8th, 9th, 78th, 83d, and 104th Infantry Divisions, supported by various armor units, methodically advanced through and along the northern portion of the forest, sweeping it clear of enemy forces. By mid-December 1944, approximately 90 percent of the Hürtgen was in American hands. Still, German defenders, with their backs against the Roer River, continued to hold key defensive locations along the central and southeastern edges of the forest until February 1945, when American units launched a full offensive to cross the Roer and eliminate all remaining resistance on the western bank.

Graves Registration Goes In

Although casualty estimates for the Hürtgen Forest campaign vary according to sources, the U.S. Army Center of Military History's study of the fighting there concluded that more than 24,000 Americans reportedly were killed, wounded, or missing in the Hürtgen. Another 9,000 were pulled off the line because of illness, nonbattle injuries, and combat fatigue.[5] Frontline infantry sometimes carried the remains of the fallen away from the front lines. However, as Sgt. Donald R. Burgett, an airborne infantry veteran of the European Theater later wrote, the frontline soldiers usually left the dead in place. "It was the job of the graves registration team to take care of our dead whenever they could get to them," he explained. "It wasn't that we were heartless. Many of these men were like our own brothers, but we had a war to fight and win."[6]

Graves registration personnel accompanied U.S. forces and handled the retrieval, documentation, transfer, and burial of remains in cemeteries they established behind the American lines. Generally, these teams recovered the fallen quickly when American forces advanced rapidly. However, when the line in the Hürtgen remained stagnant, incoming fire frequently prevented anyone from retrieving the dead. Surviving soldiers often did their best to recover casualties during tactical retreats, but the military situation and terrain complicated efforts to collect the wounded, let alone the dead. As Capt. Benson C. Parrish explained in a casualty report after a firefight near Vossenack on 23 November 1944, it "was extremely black and to find a man in woods unless he answered a call was impossible."[7]

Even when soldiers knew where a fallen comrade was, graves registration teams could not always reach him. After an artillery shell killed an enlisted soldier from the 121st Infantry in his foxhole in the woods north of Brandenberg, a sergeant contacted a graves registration officer and tried to lead him to the remains. As the pair walked across the battlefield, they encountered an enemy minefield. Unable to navigate safely through the area to reach the body, the two men eventually abandoned the effort. That soldier is still missing.[8]

Despite such difficult and unforgiving conditions, graves registration officers managed to recover the remains of hundreds of Americans killed during the campaign and sent them to the military cemeteries at Henri-Chapelle in Belgium and Margraten in the Netherlands within a few days of death.[9] Considering the limited number of safe and passable roads at that time, the quick processing and burial of these soldiers at cemeteries more than thirty miles west attests to the graves registration teams' efficiency and ingenuity among the worst conditions in wartime Europe.

Remains recovered soon after death generally arrived at the cemetery with identification, either in the form of their dog tags or other material evidence.[10] In some cases, members of the deceased's unit gave statements to identify a particular soldier. For instance, during the early morning hours of 30 December 1944, the first platoon of Company A, 295th Engineer Combat Battalion, received instructions to place landmines near the front line at Winden, Germany, on the eastern edge of the Hürtgen Forest, along the Roer River. The engineers trucked into a small clearing at the town, unloaded their stockpile of mines, and waited for a guide to direct them to the necessary location. As the soldiers stood shivering in the predawn winter cold, a single German mortar shell fired from across the river arched high overhead and landed directly on the pile of mines. The unit's narrative history grimly reported that, "when the mines exploded they made the loudest, most horrifying noise we had ever heard. The silence that followed was deathly."[11] The explosion killed at least sixteen members of the platoon instantly. Such a catastrophic event mangled many of the bodies and complicated recovery.

Graves registration teams recovered and processed the sixteen fallen soldiers inconsistently. For an undetermined reason, they sent some to Henri-Chapelle and others to Margraten within a couple of weeks.[12] They did not formally process some of the remains until March 1945. Several of the deceased arrived at the cemetery with some form of identification, but others' Individual Deceased Personnel Files included signed statements by surviving members of the company attesting to the identity of the remains.[13] Despite the tragic circumstances of loss and haphazard graves registration processing of the individuals killed during this incident, all but one of those sixteen soldiers have been identified.

By the time U.S. forces secured the last section of the forest and the front line had advanced eastward across the Roer River in February 1945, hundreds of bodies—American and German—still lay across the battlefield, due to the conditions described. Wartime graves registration teams did not remain behind to search the still-dangerous landscape thoroughly. The unrecovered fallen remained in place. Passing rear echelon troops found some that lay close to roads or towns by accident, and German civilians returning to their shattered communities found others months later.[14] Recoveries made in 1945 were not part of any systematic search, but random chance finds reported to American forces during the massive cleanup and stabilization period following the battle.

Army medics tend to a wounded comrade in the Hürtgen Forest.
(*National Archives*)

The American Graves Registration Command

In 1946, a year after the war ended, the War Department tasked the AGRC, part of the U.S. Army Quartermaster Corps, to conduct the formal investigations, recoveries, and identification efforts for American remains in Europe. This mission involved disinterring remains from the temporary American cemeteries for processing, as well as recovering thousands of remains scattered across Europe at plane crash sites, battlefields, and isolated graves. The AGRC began the first recovery missions in the Hürtgen that summer. The 6890th Quartermaster Graves Registration Company was among the primary recovery units for this area in 1946 and it sent remains to the cemetery at Neuville, Belgium. However, personnel from the 610th Quartermaster Graves Registration Company conducted at least one mission near Germeter, Germany, in November 1946, and transferred twenty-three sets of remains to the American military cemetery at Saint-Avold, France.[15] Documentation within the recovery files do not indicate that these teams coordinated their work at all. The recovery teams operated independently. As a result—when considering wartime and postwar recoveries—remains recovered in the Hürtgen were scattered among four different cemeteries for processing and disposition.

Based upon the AGRC recovery reports, demining teams initially found most of the remains recovered during this period by clearing land mines from the

An American graves registration technician reviews and records personal effects from a U.S. casualty in Europe in 1946.
(*National Archives*)

woods and fields in the central part of the Hürtgen Forest. The demining personnel, primarily German nationals, handled the remains differently. Sometimes they left them in place and notified American officials, who arrived days later to recover the fallen. Other times, the demining teams gathered the remains themselves and handed them over to American graves registrations personnel later. In those latter instances, when they found multiple sets of remains close together, they frequently had commingled bones and material evidence by the time AGRC medical technicians received them. For instance, S. Sgt. Henry C. Kloepfer of the 610th Quartermaster Graves Registration Company reported that the twenty-three sets of remains recovered by his unit and sent to Saint-Avold in November 1946 originally had been found by "German demining Company #179 Duren." A rough sketch map and additional reports within the files with those remains suggest that the AGRC personnel conducted the actual field recoveries after the company notified them. However, processing reports by medical technicians at Saint-Avold revealed several discrepancies. In one instance, a set of remains labeled as a single unidentified individual (IF-1128) by Staff Sergeant Kloepfer's recovery team turned out to contain bones from two individuals.

The commingling of skeletal remains during AGRC recovery operations in Europe was not unusual. Graves registrations personnel frequently mixed small bones, such as ribs, phalanges, or vertebrae, during the excavation of mass graves or in the process of gathering bones of multiple people killed close to each other. Recovery teams generally did their best to segregate the remains into single individuals. Despite those efforts, recent Defense POW/MIA [Prisoner of War/Missing in Action] Accounting Agency (DPAA) laboratory analysis of seventy-three sets of remains originally processed by the AGRC in Europe found that twenty-two (or 30 percent) had some degree of undocumented commingling.[16] In the IF-1128 case, the box of remains contained obvious parts of two individuals, including three femurs, two pelvises, and two skulls. The fact that Staff Sergeant Kloepfer's team designated those remains as a single individual suggests that the AGRC personnel received the collection of bones in a box or a bag from the German demining team and transferred them to the cemetery without even a cursory examination.[17]

However the investigation teams received the remains, standard procedure involved recording the recovery details on AGRC Form 10, entitled "Report of Investigation Area Search." The form included entries for the recovered soldier's name (if known), military organization, rank, service number, town name and coordinates, names of other individuals found nearby, estimated date of death, nature of burial (if one occurred), and cemetery records. The form included sections for airplane crashes and tank losses as well. The AGRC required investigators to record the name of local residents with information about the case, and to provide a brief narrative of the circumstances of recovery.[18]

Investigators assigned X-number designation (X indicating unknown) to remains that had no identification. As a result, the documentation for unidentified remains have become known as the "X-files." During the 1946 recoveries, AGRC teams frequently took short cuts in documentation. If they found remains without identification, investigators typically drafted a rough sketch map of the recovery location. None of the 1946 AGRC sketch maps reviewed for this article had been drawn to scale, and generally, they exhibited only an approximate representation of an area. Still, those were the best-documented cases. Those same 1946 AGRC teams did not submit area sketch maps for remains found with dog tags or other means of identification, presumably because they believed such clues were unnecessary in those cases. By 1947, the AGRC sketch maps for Hürtgen recoveries improved remarkably. Several files for unidentified remains recovered between the towns of Germeter and Hürtgen, for instance, include sketch maps with geographical markers, including forest paths and firebreaks, detailed enough for current DPAA investigators to reference alongside modern maps.

An American graves registration photograph of a land mine warning sign in the Hürtgen Forest in 1951.
(*U.S. Army*)

The AGRC recovery teams shipped the remains to a processing cemetery by truck.[19] Technicians at the Saint-Avold and Neuville cemeteries conducted more thorough examinations of remains to confirm or recommend identifications. The AGRC's standard operating procedures called for a team of four personnel to examine each set of remains. These specialists carried the Army's professional rating of embalmers; however, the AGRC manual noted that this title was misleading, and that a more appropriate designation for these technicians would be "Identification Analysts." The AGRC expected these individuals to have a "thorough knowledge of anatomy" and be able to properly reconstruct a skeleton, and recognize and record any physiological abnormalities of the remains.[20] The technicians estimated the individual's height, weight, and age (if possible) and completed a skeletal chart indicating which bones were missing or damaged. Dental technicians did not use or create X-rays; instead, they completed tooth charts on paper, marking which teeth were present, contained fillings, had been previously extracted, or were posthumously missing. Technicians also examined whatever material evidence investigators included with the remains for clues to identification. They specifically looked for names or numbers written on clothing, paper documents, and personal effects. Following this analysis, which technicians generally completed in one day, they wrapped the remains in a mattress cover and buried them at the cemetery to await later reprocessing or permanent burial at a different location.

The AGRC expected technicians to conduct this process for all remains. The

EVACUATION NUMBER IF-[redacted]

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION
AREA SEARCH

ATTN: REG. DIV. AG.R.C.
FOR USE IN
CASUALTY CLEARANCE

AGRC Form 10 (Revised)
1 January 1946

26 MAY 1947
Date

NAME Unknown X - [redacted] RANK Unknown ASN Unknown
ORGANIZATION Unknown A.G.F.
MEANS OF IDENTIFICATION none

(All statements above this line will be completed, upon final) processing, by the clerical staff at the unit processing point.)

SECTION A — GENERAL (To be completed by investigators in all cases)

1. Was positive identity acquired for the deceased through the surface investigation? If so, state the following information:
   a. NAME RANK ASN
   b. ORGANIZATION
2. Was partial identification established? NO If so, state the facts as to whom you believe the deceased to be:
   a. NAME UNKNOWN RANK UNKNOWN ASN UNKNOWN
   b. ORGANIZATION UNKNOWN
3. NAMES OF OTHER DECEASED BURIED IN IMMEDIATE VICINITY FOUR (4) UNKNOWN U.S. SOLDIERS
   (Use reverse side for listing of crew members from MARC)
   a. Date of above burials NOT BURIED Common Graves?
5. Name and Type of Cemetery NOT BURIED
   (Military or Civilian)
6. Map Coordinates of the Cemetery
   a. Town Country
7. Give exact location in cemetery of the remains.
   a. Section Row Grave
   b. Is Sketch attached?
8. If remains are not located in a cemetery, give exact location.
   a. Town HURTGEN Coordinates WF-0336
   b. Is Sketch attached? YES
   c. Is area mined? NO
9. How is the grave marked? NOT BURIED
10. If grave is marked with cross, give exact markings thereon
    a. From what source was this information obtained?
    (Identification tags, personal effects)
    1. By whom
11. Where are the cemetery records? NOT BURIED
    (Town Hall, cemetery, burgermeister's office)

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Example of an AGRC Form 10
(*U.S. Army*)

command eventually identified virtually all of the remains that had been recovered during the battle and buried temporarily in American cemeteries. By 1950, only four sets of the hundreds of remains recovered from the Hürtgen Forest during the battle were still unidentified.[21]

Postwar Identification

The AGRC's more difficult task was identifying the hundreds of sets of remains brought in after the war. These remains consisted of only bones and remnants of material evidence. At this stage, technicians could not positively identify most of the remains without dog tags or other obvious means of identification such as wallets, driver's licenses, or other labeled personal effects. Technicians tried to use dental charts to identify the unknowns, but few of the resolved cases examined for this article were identified solely through this method. Instead, tooth chart comparison generally helped confirm a presumed identification. The dental charts and other physical characteristics among most of the missing in the Hürtgen Forest were usually too similar to make solid identifications in most cases. In fact, the danger of using these techniques alone is seen in the temporary misidentification of remains recovered near the town of Hürtgen as Sgt. Carl R. Johnson of the 28th Infantry, based upon dental chart comparison, similar estimated height, hair color, and general area of loss.[22] The AGRC only discovered the mistake after a German demining team discovered Sergeant Johnson's actual remains with his dog tags two miles away in 1952. A simultaneous comparison of the two sets of remains showed both to be similar, but that the later recovery was indeed the real Sergeant Johnson. The AGRC declared the remains previously identified as Sergeant Johnson unidentifiable and buried them as an unknown soldier.[23]

On 20 October 1950, the AGRC initiated a six-week general search and investigation of the Hürtgen Forest. Except for a few individual cases spurred by specific family or congressional requests, this was the Army's final proactive recovery effort in the forest. For six weeks, the team interviewed public officials and local residents for information about American remains or isolated burials. They examined foxholes, trenches, bunkers, and any other battlefield feature they could find for signs of remains. Even at this late date, however, the team found some areas of the forest still unsafe to search because of unexploded ordnance and landmines. The team also reported that it learned "that the forest area is literally infested with wild bears and carnivorous animals that will devour or dissect and scatter a human remains (*sic*)." (The reference to "bears" may have been a typographical error, meant to say "boars.") These details, they explained, limited their success. Overall, the team completed its search and found only a few sets of remains. The investigation leader, Cpl. Hellmuth Willner, recommended declaring any unresolved casualties in the forest to be nonrecoverable.[24]

On 8 December 1950, a board of three officers met at the 7887th Graves Registration Detachment's headquarters in Liege, Belgium, and, after reviewing the AGRC's search and recovery efforts, formally recommended that 162 unaccounted-for individuals lost in the Hürtgen Forest be declared nonrecoverable.[25] Seven days later, on 15 December 1950, a second board of officers met at the Liege detachment and formally recommended an additional 121 missing individuals—some from combat in the forest, others from the areas nearby—be declared nonrecoverable.[26] The War Department approved these cases individually over the coming weeks, marking the formal end of the Army's proactive search for the missing of the Hürtgen Forest. Additionally, by this date, all remains recovered from the forest that could not be identi-



An AGRC skeletal chart showing the condition of a set of unidentified remains found in the Hürtgen Forest in 1947.
(*U.S. Army*)

fied had been declared "unidentifiable" and buried as unknown soldiers.

Modern Recovery Efforts

Over the next few decades, accidental discoveries by German residents or work crews in the Hürtgen recovered some remains. It was not until the early 2000s that the Department of Defense began actively searching for missing soldiers there. Investigators from the Joint POW/MIA Accounting Command (JPAC), an organization dedicated to recovering the dead from World War II, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War, conducted a few limited investigations for single individuals in the Hürtgen, as well as a broad information-gathering visit that was part of a larger mission in western Germany. Around 2014, some JPAC researchers began compiling comprehensive information about the campaign and its losses. Their work established an overall list of 200 unresolved casualties within the region, and sparked the U.S. Army's Casualty and Mortuary Affairs office to gather DNA reference samples from the families of those missing soldiers. Still, this effort regarding the Hürtgen Forest was essentially a side project for those historians and analysts, as JPAC primarily tasked them to work on unrelated cases and areas.

In 2015, the Department of Defense reorganized various parts of the POW/MIA accounting community, combining JPAC, the Defense POW/Missing Personnel Office (DPMO), and the Life Science Equipment Laboratory into DPAA. This new organization placed the responsibility for all cases of missing individuals in Europe within the hands of its Europe-Mediterranean Directorate in Washington, D.C. That directorate established four multidisciplinary teams (consisting of historians, analysts, archaeologists, and logistical planners), each with a geographical responsibility—one centered on cases in France, Belgium, and the Netherlands; another focused on Germany, Poland, Austria, the Baltic states, and Russia; and a third that handled Italy,

An American graves registration recovery team inspecting former fighting positions in the Hürtgen Forest in 1950.
(*U.S. Army*)

North Africa, and the Mediterranean area. The fourth is responsible for water loss cases in the Europe-Mediterranean area. These teams are not large. Each consists of three to four historians, one archaeologist, and one planner. Those small groups handle all aspects of case development, from researching and writing the historical background information for families or other parts of the agency, to investigating the sites and interviewing witnesses, to setting up and assisting site excavations, in their respective areas. For the terrestrial teams, that covers roughly 2,500 missing Americans each. The water loss team is responsible for more than 20,000 cases. The creation of these multidisciplinary teams allowed historians within DPAA to become subject matter experts on cases within their assigned area of responsibility. Such expertise is vital for case resolution, especially in areas of overlapping unit action and numerous unresolved ground losses, such as in the Hürtgen Forest.

The director of the Europe-Mediterranean Directorate chose the Hürtgen Forest as a high-priority area because of the large cluster of losses there and the potential for several recoveries and identifications through coordinated research and fieldwork. Furthermore, because of previous work by JPAC researchers, the multidisciplinary team handling cases in Germany had a solid foundation of data. As a result, the Hürtgen Forest became the Europe-Mediterranean Directorate's first dedicated ground campaign research project.



G. R. & E. DIV.
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF QUARTE...STER
HQ. COM. ZONE, ETOUSA

TOOTH CHART

29 April 1947 (Date)

Unknown X-[redacted] (Last Name) (First) (Initial) | Unknown (Rank) | unknown (Serial No.)

Unknown (First) | ACF (Organization)

Hurtgen Forest, District #21 D (Place of Death) Germany | BTB; Small arms fire or Shrapnel (Date of Death) | Est. November 1944 (Cause of Death)

Right Left

8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

Side views

TOP VIEWS

UPER

LOWER

Side Views

16 15 14 13 12 11 10 9 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16

See remarks

This dental chart is very important and should be filled in with great care. There are 32 teeth to be accounted for, as shown by the numbers on the chart. Beginning at the middle line in both upper and lower jaws, the teeth are arranged symmetrically on either side and classed as incisors (cutting teeth), cuspids or canines (tearing teeth), bicuspids (chewing teeth), and molars (principal chewing teeth). An examination should be made and findings charted to cover the following basic conditions : Lost teeth, crowned teeth, bridge work, fillings, caries (cavities of decay), dentures (plates), and any deformity of jaws found. See reverse side for illustrations.

Signature of Officer or other person who prepared Tooth chart

ERNEST C. GADDY, CWO. U.S.A., C.I.P.

Verified by G. R. S. Officer

GRAVES REGISTRATION FORM NR. 1-A

Example of an AGRC tooth chart made from a set of unknown remains recovered in the Hürtgen Forest in 1947.
(*U.S. Army*)

The Hürtgen Project

The Hürtgen Project has three main objectives. First, research and write a historical summary for every American soldier missing from combat in the Hürtgen Forest. Second, recommend disinterment for every set of unknown remains that has a greater than 50 percent chance of identification. Third, conduct field investigations and execute recoveries when applicable.

The first objective is the foundation of the Hürtgen Project. The DPAA historian determines the last known location of each missing American through researching and analyzing unit records, combat histories, and the personnel files. Army casualty reports of the missing soldiers frequently listed the closest town, or the location of a command post, as the place of loss. That reference is often several hundred meters, or even a few kilometers, from the actual place of death. Battle reports and combat interviews housed at the National Archives and Records Administration can provide additional context through narratives of battalion-level, and even company-level, action. The DPAA historian uses these sources along with the circumstances and date of loss to reconstruct a unit's movement and determine the most likely place a soldier, or group of soldiers, was lost. This objective also helps fulfill the larger DPAA requirement of having a case file for every missing American, and provides a historical narrative for family or third-party inquiries. Finally, the historian then records the geographical coordinates of each soldier's last known location and enters it into a DPAA database. Then the historian imports the data into geospatial software to provide a comprehensive, visual image of the unresolved losses of the Hürtgen Forest.

Historians at DPAA have marked the last known locations of all of the 200 missing soldiers at the Hürtgen Forest. These data, when projected onto modern satellite imagery, show that although soldiers are missing across many parts of the forest, there are notable clusters of unresolved losses. These cluster locations correlate to areas in which American forces engaged in prolonged fighting in stationary positions,

Investigators climb the northern slope of the Kall River gorge, near Vossenack, Germany, in 2016.
(*DPAA*)

particularly in the center of the forest, near the town of Vossenack, where the 9th, 4th, and 28th Infantry Divisions fought in October and November 1944. Those divisions had the highest number of missing soldiers from the Hürtgen Campaign—nineteen soldiers were missing from the 9th Infantry Division, thirty-six were missing from the 4th Infantry Division, and fifty-nine soldiers were still unaccounted for from the 28th Infantry Division.[27] Combined, the missing from those three divisions made up 57 percent of the total number of unresolved losses for the Hürtgen Forest.

Once the DPAA historian studies all of the unresolved losses of a particular area of the Hürtgen Forest, he or she then reviews the X-files for remains recovered in that area. Around 2011, historians and analysts at DPMO, using the AGRC recovery data in the X-files, began recording the approximate geographical coordinates of the recovery locations of remains found in northern Europe. By 2016, the database contained geographical information for approximately 2,500 unknown remains, or roughly 95 percent of the X-files of northern Europe. This effort revealed the presence of more than 170 sets of unknown remains recovered within the Hürtgen Forest, or its immediate vicinity. Historians also imported this data into geospatial software to create a visual image of X-file recovery locations. Not surprisingly, many of the unknown remains

Pin flags mark locations of interest identified by a metal detector sweep during a DPAA recovery mission in the Hürtgen Forest area in 2018.
(*DPAA*)


Düren
Stolberg (Rhineland)
Kreuzau
Hürtgen
Nideggen
Germeter
Vossenack
Kommerscheidt
Schmidt
GERMANY
BELGIUM
Simmerath
LOST BUT NOT FORGOTTEN IN HÜRTGEN FOREST
GERMANY
2021
Missing Soldier's Last Known Location
Recovery Location of Unidentified Remains
0
6
Miles

Members of a DPAA recovery team screen excavated soil for artifacts and remains in the Hürtgen Forest in 2018.
(*DPAA*)

had been recovered from the cluster areas of unresolved casualties.

After determining which sets of unidentified remains have sufficient historical information and biological data for identification efforts, DPAA historians use the research and analysis from the existing case summaries to reconstruct the battle history of the area and establish a list of missing soldiers who might be associated with the remains. This work does not usually generate a one-to-one match. In other words, DPAA historians rarely conclude that an unidentified body must be one particular soldier. Instead, given gaps in the historical record, occasional errors in the AGRC paperwork or processing, and the general fog of war, the historian's research primarily produces a list of all potential matches. In more remote parts of the forest, these lists may include less than five individuals. In the areas where many soldiers are missing, the list of candidates can be twenty or more.

Significantly, the Department of Defense released a policy in 2015 allowing the disinterment of unknown remains if there is a greater than 50 percent chance of identification. DPAA investigators determine this on a case-by-case basis. For each case, DPAA researchers and scientific experts analyze the relevant X-file and personnel files, including the historical, dental, and physical details of soldiers who went missing in the area, to determine the chances of identification. If they agree that the likelihood of success is greater than 50 percent, their recommendations go through a Department of Defense approval process. If approved, the DPAA disinters the remains—usually from an American Battle Monuments Commission military cemetery—and sends them to the DPAA lab for full anthropological analysis and, hopefully, identification. Between January 2016 and January 2021, DPAA historians recommended the disinterment of 114 sets of unidentified remains previously recovered by the AGRC in the 1940s and 1950s. The approval and exhumation process can be lengthy. As of the summer of 2021, the DPAA has disinterred approximately sixty of those remains and sent them to DPAA's laboratory for scientific testing. From these, anthropologists have identified thirty-two soldiers. The DPAA anticipates more identifications in the coming years.

By comparing the total number of individuals missing from a particular area of the forest with the number of X-file remains recovered from that area, the DPAA historian can then determine which areas or which cases may require fieldwork. For instance, researchers recovered more unknown remains from the woods southeast of the town of Hürtgen than there are missing American soldiers from combat there. This is likely because some of the unknowns consist only of partial remains left over from incomplete recoveries of identified soldiers, or are the remains of German soldiers. By contrast, researchers recovered only eleven sets of unidentified remains from the Kommerscheidt and Schmidt areas, where twenty-six soldiers of the 112th Infantry still are missing. For those areas in which there is a high probability of remains still present in the field, multidisciplinary analysis comes into use.

In 2016, DPAA contracted with the archaeological firm SEARCH, Inc. to conduct a four-week field mission at the communities of Vossenack, Kommerscheidt, and Schmidt. Using ground-penetrating radar, magnetometry, metal detecting, geospatial analysis, and simple excavation, their goal was to find the remains of unresolved soldiers from the 112th Infantry, lost in November 1944. Although the archaeologists located several fighting positions and many artifacts from the battle, they did not recover human remains. They conducted this work in areas with the highest densities of unresolved losses and locations where there were very few recoveries of unknown



Discolored soil indicating the presence of a former foxhole in the Hürtgen Forest in 2018.
(*DPAA*)

A DPAA recovery team screen showing a variety of artifacts recovered from foxholes in the Hürtgen Forest in 2018.
(*DPAA*)

A memorial for Pfc. Paul Peternell, Company C, 1st Battalion, 121st Infantry, 8th Infantry Division, killed on 9 December 1944 on Hill 400 near Bergstein, Germany, in the Hürtgen Forest. His remains were found in 1981.
(*DPAA*)

remains. Their effort highlighted the difficulty of proactive field searches for ground casualties.

This situation often introduces another element to the fieldwork—DPAA partnering with third-party individuals and groups who have expertise in the region. One of the most important for the Hürtgen Project is a developing partnership with Prof. Dr. Christoph A. Rass of the University of Osnabrück in Germany. For the past few years, he has led a team of historians, archaeologists, geographers, and other specialists in studying American fighting positions at Vossenack. Although his effort is an academic study, it incorporates fieldwork and excavations in an area of unresolved American losses. His group's skills, interests, and location blend very well with DPAA's objectives. Through the partnership, DPAA and Rass share information and coordinate their work to complement each other's interests. Similar partnership efforts are also developing with individual or small nonprofit groups in Germany and the Netherlands. These efforts are still in the early stages, but they are key steps to better utilizing a great interest and set of capabilities outside of the Department of Defense.

The Hürtgen Project Continues

The initial objective of the Hürtgen Project—to write a case narrative for each missing individual—is nearly complete. The second objective, to disinter as many unknown remains as possible, will likely take another five years, with laboratory analysis lasting longer. Not all of the 170 unidentified remains from the Hürtgen Forest will be, or can be, identified. Some are in poor condition, only fragmentary or burned by forest fires that broke out in 1946 and 1947. Others are likely additional portions of resolved individuals, and some are likely the remains of Germans. Nonetheless, DPAA historians hope disinterment efforts eventually will identify two-thirds of the missing of the Hürtgen Forest. The final objective, the fieldwork options, will continue for the near future. In the meantime, though, DPAA analysts will use the lessons learned from this undertaking for other campaign projects.

Dr. Ian Michael Spurgeon is a military historian with the Defense POW/MIA Accounting Agency (DPAA) in Washington, D.C. Since 2010, he has conducted investigations for the Department of Defense for missing Americans at World War II aircraft crash sites and battlefields in Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Japan (Okinawa), and Poland. Currently, he specializes in resolving cases of American soldiers lost during ground combat in Germany and in particular those missing from the Hürtgen Forest campaign. Dr. Spurgeon received a bachelor's and a master's in history from Kansas State University in 1998 and 2000, respectively, and a Ph.D. in history from the University of Southern Mississippi in 2007. Before coming to DPAA, he worked on Capitol Hill as a staff member to a U.S. senator from 2000 to 2003 and was a U.S. Air Force historian for the 18th Wing at Kadena Air Base, Okinawa, Japan, from 2009 to 2010.

PVT. SHIRLEY E. BAILEY

Medic with Company G, 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry, 4th Infantry Division. Enemy machine-gun fire killed him while he provided aid to a wounded American soldier. His remains were not recovered after the battle, but a German civilian found and buried them after the war. The AGRC exhumed the isolated grave in 1946 but could not identify the remains, and subsequently interred them as an unknown soldier (X–4734 Neuville) in the Ardennes American Cemetery in Belgium.

Identified by DPAA in 2017.



PVT. KENNETH D. FARRIS

Company B, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry, 4th Infantry Division, reported missing in action (MIA) as of 28 November 1944 near Grosshau, Germany. Recovered by the AGRC in 1946 and buried as an unknown soldier (X–2762 Neuville) in the Epinal American Cemetery in France.

Identified by DPAA in 2018.



TECH. SGT. ROBERT J. FITZGERRELL

Company I, 3d Battalion, 311th Infantry, 78th Infantry Division. Killed by a land mine on 30 January 1945 during an attack at Huppenbroich, Germany. The AGRC recovered his remains from a shallow grave in 1947 and buried them as an unknown soldier (X–6998 Neuville) in the Ardennes American Cemetery.

Identified by DPAA in 2018.

PVT. FLOYD A. FULMER

Company A, 1st Battalion, 110th Infantry, 28th Infantry Division, reported MIA as of 14 November 1944 in the Raffelsbrand sector of the Hürtgen Forest. Recovered by the AGRC in 1947 and buried as an unknown soldier (X–5460 Neuville) in the Ardennes American Cemetery.

Identified by DPAA in 2019.

PFC. DEWEY W. HARRIS

Company C, 1st Battalion, 110th Infantry, 28th Infantry Division, reported.MIA as of 14 November 1944 near Simonskall, Germany. Recovered by the AGRC in 1946 and buried as an unknown soldier (X–2702 Neuville) in the Ardennes American Cemetery.

Identified by DPAA in 2019.

PVT. JAMES I. TRICK

3d Battalion, 109th Infantry, 28th Infantry Division, killed in action on 4 November 1944 near Germeter, Germany. Recovered by the AGRC in 1947 and buried as an unknown soldier (X–6207 Neuville) in the Ardennes American Cemetery.

Identified by DPAA in 2019.

S. SGT. RAYMOND C. BLANTON

Company C, 1st Battalion, 60th Infantry, 9th Infantry Division. He was killed on 10 October 1944 during fierce fighting in the Raffelsbrand sector of the Hürtgen Forest.

Identified by DPAA in 2020

(Full details of his identification have not been released publicly as of April 2021.)

PFC. OLIVER JEFFERS

Company L, 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry, 4th Infantry Division, reported killed in action on 10 November 1944 near Germeter, Germany. Recovered by the AGRC in 1946 and buried as an unknown soldier (X–2735 Neuville) in the Ardennes American Cemetery.

Identified by DPAA in 2020.

PFC. OSCAR E. SAPPINGTON

Company C, 1st Battalion, 309th Infantry, 78th Infantry Division, killed during an attack on 10 January 1945 near the Raffelsbrand sector of the Hürtgen Forest. Recovered by the AGRC in 1947 and buried as an unknown soldier (X–5396 Neuville) in the Ardennes American Cemetery.

Identified by DPAA in 2020.

PVT. LYLE W. REAB

Company F, 2d Battalion, 112th Infantry, 28th Infantry Division. He was killed in his foxhole during intense German artillery bombardment on American positions at Vossenack, Germany, in early November 1944. The AGRC recovered his remains from the foxhole in 1948 and buried them as an unknown soldier (X–7388 Neuville) in the Ardennes American Cemetery.

Identified by DPAA in 2021.

NOTES

1. Charles B. MacDonald, *The Siegfried Line Campaign*, United States Army in World War II (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2011), 323.

2. MacDonald, *The Siegfried Line Campaign*, 340.

3. Combat Interv, Lt. Charles E. Potter, 1st Bn, 109th Inf, 9 Dec 1944, 2, Box 19036, Entry 427A, Record Group (RG) 407, National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), Washington, D.C.

4. Combat Interv, Potter, 9 Dec 1944, 2.

5. Charles B. MacDonald, *The Battle of the Huertgen Forest* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1963), 196. MacDonald's casualty numbers cover losses sustained between September and mid-December 1944.

6. Donald R. Burgett, *Seven Roads to Hell: A Screaming Eagle at Bastogne* (Novato, CA: Presido Press, 1999), 73.

7. Capt. Benson C. Parrish, "Missing Report," 17 Dec 1944, Individual Deceased Personnel File (IDPF) for Duane Whitman, Pfc., 14007887, RG 92, Rcds of the Ofc of Quartermaster Gen, National Personnel Records Center (NPRC), St. Louis, MO.

8. "Missing Report," 24 Mar 1945, IDPF for Emmet W. Schwartz, Pvt., 35837608, RG 92, NPRC, St. Louis, MO.

9. For instance, S Sgt. Ralph Cooper, 20301979, of Company D, 1st Battalion, 109th Infantry, was killed in action on 4 November 1944 and buried at Henri-Chapelle #1 cemetery on 6 November. "Report of Burial," 6 Nov 1944, IDPF for Ralph Cooper, S Sgt., 20301979, RG 92, NPRC, St. Louis, MO.

10. For a typical example of a rapid recovery and graves registration processing with identification information, see the "Report of Burial" for 1st Sgt. Manuel S. Baker, of Company H, 109th Infantry. He was killed on 6 November 1944 near Germeter, Germany, and arrived at Henri-Chapelle #1 cemetery with his identification tags and pay book. "Report of Burial," 9 Nov 1944, IDPF for 1st Sgt. Baker, 6825839, RG 92, NPRC, St. Louis, MO.

11."Rhineland Campaign," 295th Engr Combat Bn History excerpt, 21 Sep 1945, 10, http://lct376.org/us295th/Rhineland.pdf.

12. "Report of Burial: Unknown X-70," 2 Jan 1945, IDPF for Jermouth A. Brown, Pvt., 31286701; "Report of Burial: Coulter, Jabez A.," 14 Feb 1945, IDPF for Jabez A. Coulter, Pvt., 33439867; both RG 92, NPRC, St. Louis, MO.

13. Ninth United States Army Graves Registration Service Identification Form, 24 Mar 1945, IDPF for Axel M. Ahlberg, Pfc., 31286705, RG 92, NPRC, St. Louis, MO.

14. For example, see "Report of Burial," 11 Jun 1945, Unknown X-1043 Margraten file, RG 92, NPRC, St. Louis, MO.

15. "Report of Investigation Area Search," 13 Nov 1946, Unknown X-8117 St. Avold file, RG 92, NPRC, St. Louis, MO.

16. Katie Skorpinski and Ian Spurgeon, "Comparison of Historical and Present-Day Skeletal Analyses of Unidentified Remains Recovered from Europe during World War II" (poster presented at the 70th Annual Mtg of the American Academy of Forensic Sciences, 19–24 Feb 2018).

17. "Report of Investigation Area Search: IF-1128," 14 November 1946, Unknown X-8118 and X-8122 St. Avold files, RG 92, NPRC, St. Louis, MO.

18. For a typical example of this form regarding a Hürtgen Forest casualty, see "Report of Investigation Area Search," 18 May 1946, IDPF for Charles A. Demmler Jr., Pvt., 35071241, RG 92, NPRC, St. Louis, MO.

19. "Operation of the Central Identification Point, European Theater," 30 Nov 1946, 2, Folder "293 Graves Regis-Europe (Central I.D. Point)," Box 378, Entry 1894-A, RG 92, NARA.

20. Ibid., 3.

21. The four sets of remains recovered during or immediately after the battle that were still unidentified by 1950 were X-82 Margraten, X-90 Margraten, X-381 Henri-Chapelle, and X-400 Henri-Chapelle. The DPAA has since identified the X-90 Margraten remains.

22. Ltr, Capt. J. F. Vogl to Mrs. William Green, 1 Mar 1950, IDPF for Carl R. Johnson, Sgt., 36215980, RG 92, NPRC, St. Louis, MO.

23. Rpt of Board of Officers, 23 Jul 1956, Unknown X-2707 Neuville file, RG 92, NPRC, St. Louis, MO.

24. Cpl. Hellmuth Willner, "Narrative of Investigation," 20 Nov 1950, IDPF for Leo W. Kaiser, Pfc., 28567342, RG 92, NPRC, St. Louis, MO.

25. "Proceedings of Board of Review appointed in accordance with letter AGAO-S 293.9 (27 Mar 47) D-M, War Dept, TAGO [The Adjutant General's Office], 9 Apr 1947," 8 Dec 1950, IDPF for Pfc. Kaiser, RG 92, NPRC, St. Louis, MO.

26. "Proceedings of Board of Review appointed in accordance with letter AGAO-S 293.9 (27 Mar 47) D-M, War Dept, TAGO, 9 Apr 1947," 15 Dec 1950, IDPF for Leo J. Husak, S Sgt., 38432713, RG 92, NPRC, St. Louis, MO.

27. "Huertgen Losses with Locations" Database, DPAA, Historians files. These numbers are accurate as of January 2020.

COMING SOON FROM

CMH



MUSEUM FEATURE

U.S. Army Museum of Hawaii

By Nevin G. Field

The Army established the U.S. Army Museum of Hawaii at Fort DeRussy, located in the heart of world famous Waikīkī, in 1976. It resides in Battery Randolph, a former coastal artillery fortification that mounted two 14-inch disappearing rifled guns. Constructed in 1911, Battery Randolph, along with the smaller adjoining Battery Dudley, was a potent defense against an enemy naval attack on the south shore of O'ahu. It also provided powerful overwatch of the territory's strategic deepwater port at Pearl Harbor. When the Army emplaced the guns at the battery, they were the largest guns in the entire Pacific—from California to the Philippines.

The museum preserves, honors, interprets, communicates, and presents the history of the Army in the Pacific and centers its exhibits and educational programs on Hawaii's contributions to our nation's defense and its Army heritage. In support of this mission, the museum collects and displays artifacts, photographs, and ephemera with provenance to pre-European Hawaiian warfare, Hawaii-based coastal artillery defenses, and materials related to Army bases in Hawaii. The museum also collects and displays artifacts relevant to Army engagements in the Pacific Theater of Operations, Hawaii-based Army units and their missions, and exceptional citizens of Hawaii who have served honorably in the United States Army.

Although the museum's storyline and exhibits currently cover a broad history of events, dating from pre-European Hawaiian warfare through the Vietnam conflict, the museum's collection also includes artifacts dating from the post-Vietnam era to the present day. Key exhibits include Hawaiian warfare and weaponry; coastal artillery in Hawaii; Hawaii's critical role in World War II, Korea, and Vietnam; the "Go For Broke" Nisei soldiers of the 442d Regimental Combat Team; and a Gallery of Heroes, which honors all citizens of Hawaii who earned the nation's two highest awards for valor. The museum also houses almost 3,000 artifacts, a photo archive of more than 20,000 images, and other archival materials that visitors may access by appointment to assist with historical inquiries and research.

Now in its forty-fifth year of operation, the museum proudly hosts an average of more than 95,000 visitors annually (pre-COVID-19), many of whom often mistake the historically significant building's original purpose. So much so that we display the words, "This building was not a jail!" on one of the very first text panels as you enter the museum's gallery spaces. This oft-repeated mistake is understandable given the museum's bunker-like interior and original heavy steel doors and barred-window openings that run the length of the museum's main corridor. Fortunately, the battery's robust construction gave it the upper hand when the Army attempted to demolish it in 1969. While the adjoining Battery Dudley came down without much of a fight, Battery Randolph refused to submit to the wrecking ball, giving way instead to what would become one of the Army's flagship museums.

Nevin G. Field is the director of the U.S. Army Museum of Hawaii.



AH-1S Cobra helicopter displayed on the Diamond Head gun deck.

The Hawaiian Gallery features replica weapons used by Hawaiian warriors before and after European contact.

The Gallery of Heroes honors soldiers from Hawaii that were awarded the Medal of Honor during World War II, Vietnam, and Korea.

The Hawaii on Defense Gallery recounts actions and precautions that were taken in Hawaii after the attack on Pearl Harbor.

The Hawaii on Offense Gallery displays two cases of weapons that were used by the United States and the Japanese during World War II.

The Shell Room Gallery shows how the room was utilized when the building was an active battery.



The Cavalry Room Gallery features different branches of the Army and explains their roles on Oahu.

The 100th Infantry Battalion and 442d Regimental Combat Team Gallery highlights Nisei soldiers and their service in the European Theater during World War II.

The "Blackouts and Bomb Shelters" display in the Hawaii on Defense Gallery.

U.S. Army Art Spotlight

Jes W. Schlaikjer's World War II Posters

By Sarah G. Forgey

During World War II, the Army engaged in both the war itself and in an effort to gain and retain the support of the American people. The War Department's Bureau of Public Relations contributed to this effort by commissioning official posters to captivate the public, raise support for the war effort, and increase pro-American sentiment at home. The Army Art Collection includes original artworks for many World War II posters, including works by Jes Wilhelm Schlaikjer (American, 1897–1982).

Schlaikjer served in the Army Signal Corps in World War I, becoming chief receiving operator of the Lafayette radio station near Paris. In 1919, he was one of several American soldiers who attended the École Nationale des Beaux-Arts in Lyon, France. Upon returning home, Schlaikjer studied at the Art Institute of Chicago for three years and later with the Ashcan school artist Robert Henri and the illustrator Harvey T. Dunn. Like Dunn, Schlaikjer began his professional career as a magazine illustrator, with his work appearing in *McCall's*, *American Legion Magazine*, *Collier's*, and other contemporary periodicals.

In May 1942, the Bureau of Public Relations selected Schlaikjer as an official artist to create patriotic posters intended to inspire Americans to support the war effort. The artist completed a series of branch recruiting posters, including the Army Infantry, Signal Corps, Women's Army Corps, Navy, Marine Corps, and other subjects. He also produced a series of posters for the American Red Cross and informational posters in support of V-Mail.

Schlaikjer's poster artworks are dramatic portrayals of soldiers in action performing heroic deeds. His models were soldiers, selected for their looks and posed in dramatic scenes. In one poster, Schlaikjer depicts a three-soldier infantry machine-gun crew engaged in battle while explosions erupt in the background. In his Medical Department poster, titled *Service Above Self*, the artist again set his subjects on a battlefield, with a medic administering aid to a wounded soldier held in his arms in a pietà-like pose, referencing the artistic tradition of the Virgin Mary cradling the crucified Christ. The Women's Army Corps poster, titled *Mine Eyes Have Seen the Glory*, references the "Battle Hymn of the Republic", forging a link between the female soldier portrayed and a lineage of military service dating back to the Civil War. As in many of Schlaikjer's war posters, dramatic light highlights the subject as the background references dramatic events.

Schlaikjer's World War II original poster paintings are among the greatest treasures in the Army Art Collection and Army Museums throughout the United States proudly display several of them. The Military Police branch poster, titled *Of the Troops and For the Troops*, is currently on display at the Military Police Corps Regimental Museum at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. The Signal Corps branch poster art, titled *Where Skill and Courage Count*, is on view at the Signal Corps Museum at Fort Gordon, Georgia. The Engineer painting, titled *We Clear the Way*, is on display in the Pentagon. The Women's Army Museum at Fort Lee, Virginia, frequently displays the Woman's Army Corps painting. The Army's Museum Support Center at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, preserves several other examples of Schlaikjer's World War II poster artworks.

Sarah G. Forgey is the chief art curator of the Army Museum Enterprise.


He's Sure to get
V...–MAIL
SCHLAIKJER 1943
Safest Overseas Mail
U.S. ARMY POSTAL SERVICE


Of the troops
and for the troops
MP
© WAR DEPARTMENT, BUREAU OF PUBLIC RELATIONS
SCHLAIKJER 1942
THE CORPS OF
MILITARY POLICE
UNITED STATES ARMY


"Where SKILL
and COURAGE Count"
© WAR DEPARTMENT BUREAU OF PUBLIC RELATIONS
SCHLAIKJER 1942
SIGNAL CORPS
UNITED STATES ARMY


SERVICE ABOVE SELF
MEDICAL DEPARTMENT
UNITED STATES ARMY


MINE EYES HAVE SEEN THE GLORY
SCHLAIKJER
© WAR DEPARTMENT, U. S. A.
WAC
WOMEN'S ARMY CORPS
ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES

STUDIES IN THE EXERCISE OF POWER

Secretaries of Defense and the Vietnam War, 1961–1973

By John M. Carland

How did each secretary of defense during the Vietnam War years exercise power with regard to the formation and implementation of policy and strategy for that war? What did each secretary bring to the table in background, experience, and leadership? What was each secretary's central objective in relation to the war? How did each achieve it? Did he achieve it? Did his achievement matter? Moreover, if he failed, how did he explain that failure?

To answer these questions, this article presents three case studies, one for each secretary of defense from 1961 to 1973: Robert S. McNamara (21 January 1961–29 February 1968), Clark M. Clifford (1 March 1968–20 January 1969), and Melvin R. Laird (22 January 1969–29 January 1973). The McNamara case study focuses on his application of game theory as a strategy to win the war. Clifford's case study concentrates on how he transitioned from a supporter of the war to one determined to stop a post–Tet Offensive troop buildup and, more ambitiously, to end America's participation in the war. Laird's case study centers on his attempt to use Vietnamization and the defense budget to disengage the United States from the conflict.

McNamara: Game Theory Fails to Win the War

Born in 1916 and raised in San Francisco, California, with a business executive father and a homemaker mother, Robert McNamara graduated from the University of California, Berkeley, in 1937 with a degree in economics and minored in math

and philosophy. He then earned a master of business administration from Harvard University in 1939 and began teaching there after graduation. During World War II, he entered the U.S. Army Air Forces in 1943 as a statistical control officer. After three years, he departed the military as a lieutenant colonel. He next joined Ford Motor Company, where he rose quickly in the executive suite, and in 1960 he became the company's first president who was not a member of the Ford family.[1]

Appointed secretary of defense by President John F. Kennedy in January 1961, McNamara came to government reputed to be a man who knew how to make a large organization perform efficiently. He loved information and he loved numbers. According to the former chief historian of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Alfred Goldberg, McNamara "was a vacuum and sucked everything in that he could get hold of."[2] According to McNamara himself, he believed that the "things you can count, you ought to count."[3] Within a short time in office, McNamara had mastered the Pentagon's processes, tamed its independent parts, and made them all work (or seem to work) in tandem to defend the United States and assert American national interests.[4]

Later described as "a leading proponent and chief architect" of the Vietnam War, McNamara enjoyed a close relationship with both presidents he served. "Between Kennedy and McNamara," a Defense Department study observed, "the chemistry was practically ideal. More than just 'business associates,' they socialized together and consulted regularly on all manner of issues, not just defense or national security."[5] Out of this relationship with Kennedy came a good deal of McNamara's great influence on national security policy.

The McNamara–Lyndon B. Johnson relationship, also professionally and personally close, allowed McNamara to continue to influence the formation and implementation of the president's Vietnam War policy. According to Defense Department historian Joel C. Christenson, Johnson "drew comfort and confidence from McNamara's presence." Furthermore, "the secretary's management acumen and strength relative to his cabinet peers lent an air of authority to his advice that Johnson, who distrusted the professional military, found reassuring."[6] However, McNamara's influence began to fade during late 1966 and faded further by late 1967 when he shied away from Johnson's war policy. In a 1 November 1967 memorandum to the president, for example, he argued in robust terms that the United States should cap American troop strength in Vietnam (though he used the neutral word "stabilize"), stop bombing North Vietnam, and more seriously seek negotiations with Hanoi.[7] As a result, Johnson lost faith in McNamara and became more suspicious of his advice, and considered removing the secretary of defense from his post. Finally, in November 1967, Johnson announced that McNamara would leave the Defense Department to become president of the World Bank.[8]

Early on in McNamara's tour of duty as defense secretary, non–Vietnam War crises and conundrums took center stage: the ongoing Laotian Civil War, the attempted invasion of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs early in 1961, the Berlin Crisis and the construction of the Berlin Wall later that same year, and the Cuban Missile Crisis late in 1962. Vietnam, although a concern—as evidenced by the high-level missions to the Republic of Vietnam (or South Vietnam) and the increase in the number of military advisers there—was not much more than that. However, in 1963–1964, Vietnam became a major problem. America's ally, South Vietnam, was in danger of falling to communist insurgents, the Viet Cong, themselves controlled by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (or North Vietnam). Kennedy's successor, Lyndon B. Johnson, decided this would not happen on his watch. As secretary of defense, McNamara's task was to achieve that policy goal and therefore assure the survival of an independent, noncommunist South Vietnam. McNamara devised two strategies—sequentially, not concurrently—to meet the challenge posed by Johnson. He based his first strategy on limited war theory. His second strategy emerged when the first failed. The second, however, also failed.

As championed by scholars such as Robert E. Osgood and Thomas C. Schelling, limited war theory appealed naturally to the rationalists—the so-called hard-nosed realists—in the Kennedy-Johnson administrations, and thus to no one more than Secretary of Defense McNamara.[9] Limited war theory postulated that war was primarily about communicating credible threats of force to an enemy and, via the enemy's perception of these threats as potentially damaging, bargaining one's way

Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara works at his desk in the Pentagon.
(*Department of Defense*)

to success. Thus, conflict was more about diplomacy and negotiating than it was about force. And if it was about diplomacy and bargaining, civilians should be managing limited war. Indeed, the military need not participate at the policy level. In this concept, the military became supporting rather than central actors in the theater of war. Limited war theory allowed force to be applied, but dictated that it be only the minimal amount—a sharp punch, not a massive blow—necessary to inflict pain sufficient to make a point. If the initial application of force did not communicate enough pain to change enemy behavior, then leaders could escalate force incrementally. In this process, the application of decisive force became unnecessary, perhaps even harmful. After all, if leaders applied decisive force at the outset, they would not be able to use incremental escalation as a future bargaining tool.

McNamara and his colleagues—mainly John T. McNaughton, assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs; Alain C. Enthoven, assistant secretary of defense for systems analysis; and McGeorge Bundy, national security adviser—transformed limited war theory into policy in 1964 and 1965. An apt description of the policy in practice would be coercive diplomacy, and the phrases most often used in discussing and applying it were graduated response and graduated pressure.

The United States' graduated response in Vietnam took many forms, but the approach was especially apparent in the air war against North Vietnam. As the war heated up in 1964 and South Vietnam's fortunes plummeted, President Johnson and his key advisers developed plans to stave off a communist victory. Most of that planning revolved around persuading North Vietnam, seen as the center of gravity of the communists, to cease its support for the Viet Cong insurgency. Because a ground invasion of North Vietnam was not on the table, air power would be the means to influence the North militarily. The debate within the American government was whether to apply air power massively in one fell swoop or to apply it selectively and over time in minimal doses only. Applying minimum force at first would allow the United States to signal that it could escalate its actions if the level of force initially used failed to generate the desired peaceful settlement.

The causal connection between theory and practice for Johnson's advisers is abundantly clear. As early as 27 May 1964,

McGeorge Bundy (*left*) talks with President Lyndon B. Johnson in the Oval Office.
(*National Archives*)

Henry Cabot Lodge, U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam (*center*), meets with General Maxwell D. Taylor (*left*), chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Secretary McNamara (*right*) at the Pentagon.
(*National Archives*)

Bundy told the president: "An integrated political-military plan for graduated action against North Vietnam is being prepared under John McNaughton at Defense. The theory of this plan is that we should strike to hurt but not to destroy, and strike for the purpose of changing the North Vietnamese decision on intervention in the south."[10] At a Senate hearing on 17 February 1966, General Maxwell D. Taylor, who served both Kennedy and Johnson on Vietnam War policy matters in both military and diplomatic roles, spelled out how graduated pressure would work on North Vietnam. "The decision to use our airpower," he told the Foreign Relations Committee,

> was to provide a sobering reminder to the leaders in Hanoi that progressively they must pay a mounting price for the continuation of their support of the Vietcong insurgency. In spite of their defiant statements of determination to endure these attacks forever, I for one know from experience that no one derives any enjoyment from receiving incoming shells and bombs day after day and I have no doubt that the warning message is getting through to the

leadership of Hanoi. In a very real sense, *the objective of our air campaign is to change the will of the enemy leadership*.[11]

The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) resisted this approach and proposed a massive application of air power against the North. At the same time, Secretary of Defense McNamara and his advisers advocated for selective application of force, seeing the bombing as a cease-and-desist message to Hanoi rather than the more aggressive action the JCS desired. When U.S. forces began their bombing campaign in February 1965—at first on a tit-for-tat basis as Operation Flaming Dart and then in March on an ongoing basis as Operation Rolling Thunder—the bombing policy, sometimes called strategic persuasion, followed limited war theory.[12]

What did the bombing accomplish? Though American Air Force and Navy jets escalated their strikes on targets from early 1965 through late 1968, the effort was in vain.[13] The incremental bombing had no discernible impact on the behavior and policy of the North Vietnamese leaders regarding their unwavering determination to prevail in the South. In short, as Edward J. Drea succinctly put it in his official history of McNamara and Clifford as secretaries of defense: "McNamara's theories of limited war and escalation failed in Vietnam."[14] The JCS had argued against the graduated response policy because a systematic increase in the level of violence allowed the North Vietnamese to acclimate to that level and then to the next level. A massive force applied at the beginning, they believed, would have a much greater impact—perhaps sufficient to bring the North to the negotiating table or at least to consider withdrawing its support of the Southern insurgency. This argument gained no traction with McNamara and his civilian advisers.

The failure of the graduated pressure air war strategy revealed not only its theoretical emptiness but also its lack of practical relevance unless both sides agreed that a conflict was a limited war. To Washington it was a limited war, to Hanoi an unlimited one, a total war. Illustrative of Washington's naiveté on this topic was Johnson's mid-1965 statement: "Once the Communists know . . . that a violent solution is impossible, then a peaceful solution is inevitable."[15] But the communist leaders in Hanoi disregarded this message and so did not sue for peace. As

Secretary McNamara briefs the press on the situation in Vietnam, 26 April 1965.
(*National Archives*)

one analyst put it: "The key decisions of U.S. policymakers in 1965 were made in apparent ignorance of both the will and capability of the adversary."[16] With graduated response having failed, McNamara was without a policy or strategy and was clueless as to how to win the war or, as he increasingly favored, to withdraw from it. One might add that the failure also made a mockery of his famous dictum about handling the Cuban Missile Crisis—that "there is no longer such a thing as strategy; there is only crisis management"—because he was without a strategy and his crisis management approach had let him down.[17]

McNamara could have turned to his statutory military advisers, the JCS, but he did not. Since 1964, the JCS had prepared numerous plans to apply massive American force to the war in both North Vietnam (air war) and South Vietnam (ground war). However, McNamara was only willing to use the JCS at most for saber rattling. Typical of his view of the JCS was his comment on their role in the Cuban Missile Crisis: "The job we gave them to do. . . was to convey a

Secretary of State Dean Rusk (*left*), President Johnson (*center*), and Secretary McNamara discuss the situation in South Vietnam, 21 July 1965.
(*Library of Congress*)



Secretary McNamara briefs the press on the extent of the Ho Chi Minh Trail, 29 June 1966.
(*Library of Congress*)

political message without incurring unnecessary risks of military escalation."[18] In the final analysis, he marginalized the JCS and refused to allow them to provide strategic direction while having nothing himself to offer once graduated response had failed. His contempt for the JCS showed in a mid-1980s interview in which he said: "It never bothered me that I overruled the majority of the Chiefs, or even occasionally the unanimous recommendation of the Chiefs." McNamara and his advisers distrusted the Chiefs from the start, believing that "the generals and admirals [on the Joint Chiefs of Staff] were out of touch with the military and political realities of the nuclear age," viewing them as unsophisticated dinosaurs, and thus, unable to grasp the complex and nuanced needs of modern warfare.[19] He called the JCS a "miserable organization" and the Chiefs themselves individuals whose, "thought processes were circumscribed by the biases of their service positions and responsibilities."[20]

By default, therefore, he left the war to the course established in 1965 under theater commander General William C. Westmoreland. The strictures of that course allowed American ground forces to operate only within the confines of South Vietnam. Consequently, Westmoreland could not go on the strategic offensive and had to remain on the strategic defensive. The war of attrition and escalation thus drifted into stalemate and a protracted conflict.

George C. Herring's damning understatement regarding McNamara's running of the war is his term's epitaph: "In many ways a superb Secretary of Defense, he was not an effective minister of war."[21]

Clifford Stops the Buildup But Not the War

While McNamara despaired about the war's winnability and increasingly favored withdrawal, President Johnson remained determined to achieve success, however defined. Therefore, Johnson looked for a new defense secretary who would support his Vietnam policy, one who was more of a true believer. He found him in old friend Clark Clifford, arguably the most influential lawyer-lobbyist and problem solver in Washington, and a Democrat to boot. A 7 November 1967 memorandum contained proof of his hawkishness. In it, Clifford attacked and rejected McNamara's recommendations to Johnson to "stabilize" the number of American troops in South Vietnam—that is, to not send more—and to stop bombing North Vietnam. He concluded in the memorandum that "the future of our children and grandchildren require that it [the war] be ended by accomplishing our purpose, i.e., the thwarting of the aggression by North Vietnam, aided by China and Russia."[22]

Raised in St. Louis, Missouri, son of a railroad executive and a professional storyteller, Clifford attended Washington University in St. Louis and graduated in 1928 with a law degree. He then became a successful attorney in the city. Years later, in 1944, after having joined the Navy in 1943, Clifford moved to Washington and became a naval aide to President Harry S. Truman. He departed the Navy in 1946 but stayed with Truman as special counsel. In that capacity, he was enormously influential in drawing up the National Security Act of 1947 and the 1949 amendments to it. Clifford left the White House in 1950 to enter private practice in Washington. From that time on, he excelled as a behind-the-scenes fixer and adviser to presidents and Democratic leaders. In public life, President Kennedy appointed him to the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board where he served until 1968. During that time, he initially had been leery of American involvement in Vietnam. However, he also argued that if the United

Secretary McNamara poses at his Pentagon desk with Clark M. Clifford (*right*), who will succeed him as Secretary of Defense, 7 February 1968.
(*National Archives*)

States was to intervene it should do so with great force.[23]

Sworn in as secretary of defense on 1 March 1968, as the Tet Offensive wound down, Clifford came to the Pentagon tasked by the president to find ways to invigorate and support a more robust military policy in Vietnam. What Johnson did not know, however, was that though Clifford wanted the United States to prevail in Vietnam, he too had begun to doubt the possibility of American success.

Shortly before he was sworn in, he became chair of a presidentially directed task force composed of senior government civilians, mostly from the Department of Defense, the Department of State, and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), plus the chairman of the JCS, Army General Earle G. Wheeler. The mission of the task force was to seek better ways to implement the president's Vietnam policy, particularly to recommend a response to General Westmoreland's request of 27 February for a little over 205,000 additional American troops.[24] This group, called the Clifford Group, met in his first week on the job. They read and discussed staff-produced papers and policy recommendations. The papers bearing on policy recommendations, authored mostly by senior staff members originally appointed by McNamara, were pessimistic in tone and substance. Consequently, the new task force, already dubious about the chance for success in Vietnam, became even more so after seeing the papers. In short, the staff papers became, as the Pentagon Papers later put it, "the dominant voice in the consideration of alternatives."[25]

The task force experience, more than anything else, persuaded Clifford that the United States had to reverse course in Vietnam. What brought him to this point were the depressing answers he received to a series of questions put to the JCS.[26] "I questioned the military," Clifford later wrote, "politely but firmly asking them to justify the 205,000 troop request. . . . It went something like this:

- 'Will 205,000 more men do the job?' They could give no assurance that they would.
- 'If 205,000 might not be sufficient, how many more troops might be needed—and when?' There was no way of knowing.
- 'Can the enemy respond with a buildup of his own?' He could.
- 'Can bombing stop the war?' No. Bombing was inflicting heavy personnel and materiel losses, but by itself it would not stop the war.
- 'Will stepping up the bombing decrease American casualties?' Very little, if at all. Our casualties are a result of the intensity of the ground fighting in the South.
- 'How long must we keep on sending our men and carrying the main burden of combat?' We do not know when, if ever, the South Vietnamese will be ready to carry the main burden of the war. [27]

The answers, he observed, "disturbed me greatly." Furthermore, he continued, "The military [i.e., the JCS] was utterly unable to provide an acceptable rationale for the troop increase. Moreover, when I asked for a presentation of their plan for attaining victory, I was told that there was no plan for victory in the historic American sense," mainly because of political limitations set by President Johnson on military action in Indochina.[28] This left the JCS, therefore, with an uninspired and uninspiring default option. The best, and perhaps only, way to win was to continue the war of attrition in the South and the limited bombing of the North, hoping to reach the point where the enemy "could not afford the attrition we were inflicting on him."[29] As Clifford later observed, "I was appalled: nothing had prepared me for the weakness of the military's case."[30] As a result, he changed his view and concluded, though only to himself for the moment, that the United States should withdraw from the unwinnable Vietnam War. "In short," as official historian Drea observed, "after less than a week in office, Clifford reversed his position on Vietnam."[31]



Secretary Clifford
(*Lyndon Baines Johnson Library and Museum*)

On 4 March, Clifford reported his group's findings to the president. Even though he had concluded that the war was unwinnable, he simply was not willing to advise the president that the United States should withdraw from Vietnam. Rather, he wanted to prepare the ground for such thinking and have the president himself come to the appropriate conclusion. To that end, he stated in the meeting: "This new request brings the President to a watershed. . . . We are not sure that a conventional military victory, as commonly defined, can be achieved. . . . We seem to have gotten caught in a sinkhole. We put in more, they match it. . . . I see more and more casualties on the U.S. side, and no end in sight."[32] Having made these dramatic points, Clifford presented the more prosaic recommendations of the Clifford Group. Instead of sending the entire 205,000 troops requested, President Johnson should send only 20,000—all that could be sent immediately—and hold off the decision about the larger troop request pending a full and complete review of policy and strategy for Vietnam.[33]

Stage-managed by Clifford, the "full review of policy" took place on 25–26 March 1968. Senior members of the Johnson administration and a number of elder statesmen of the Cold War era—former Secretary of State Dean G. Acheson, former National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy, General Omar N. Bradley, and General Maxwell D. Taylor—attended briefings and discussed policy options. Formally named the "Senior Advisory Group," they have gone down in history as "the Wise Men." On the afternoon of the 26th, they planned to meet with Johnson to inform him of their conclusions.[34]

Before meeting the president, the Wise Men read and discussed papers prepared by the JCS, CIA, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense, among others, many of which painted a bleak picture of the war. They also received briefings from Army Maj. Gen. William E. DePuy, senior CIA functionary George A. Carver Jr., and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Philip C. Habib. After Habib's briefing, Clifford asked if the United States could win in Vietnam, to which Habib answered "no." Habib was possibly the first senior official to say such a thing. Clifford then asked what the United States should do.

His stunning answer was, "Stop the bombing and negotiate." [35]

On the afternoon of the 26th, the Wise Men met the president. Clifford's adroit framing and presentation of the issues from 1 March onward paid off handsomely. Things had changed. "Oh, you could just feel it," he later said, "you could just sense it, it was just a great big swing all around . . . and a substantial shift in the meeting . . . was that we should not continue to pour blood and treasure into Viet Nam but that we should give the most careful consideration to seeing if we couldn't find some way to negotiate ourselves out of Viet Nam." [36]

On the question of the troop request, the original reason for their review, the Wise Men recommended against Westmoreland's request, saying, "There should not be a substantial escalation, nor an extension of the conflict." More generally, and more importantly, the senior member of the group, Acheson, powerfully and simply declared, "We can no longer do the job we set out to do in the time we have left, and we must begin to take steps to disengage."[37] President Johnson was visibly shaken and furious. He wanted to know who had poisoned the well, refusing to believe that those who had strongly supported his war policy in late 1967 could so quickly change their views.[38] However, the message of the Wise Men sunk in over the next few days as Johnson absorbed, accepted, and embraced the message.

Manifest evidence of the president's change of heart and policy, and Clifford's influence on them, came in the draft of the president's next major speech on Vietnam, scheduled for 31 March. Clifford essentially controlled the drafting process for this speech.[39] It was about peace, not war. In the speech, Johnson announced that he had ordered a halt to the bombing over North Vietnam except for the area immediately abutting South Vietnam. He pledged increased and renewed efforts to negotiate with Hanoi and he promised to supply and train the South Vietnamese military to take over more of the warfighting. He also delivered a bombshell: he said he would not run for reelection. Except for the last item, which came as a surprise to almost everyone, the others mirrored Clifford's goals. The troop request, which jump-started the momentous month of March, would not be answered formally, would not be granted, and would be quietly put on the back burner.

In retrospect, the month was Clifford's moment in the sun. The rest of his tour of duty, in which he attempted to push forward a withdrawal from Vietnam, made little progress. His sensible explanation was that "to reach a conclusion and to implement it are not the same, especially when one does not have the ultimate power of decision."[40] This failure takes nothing away from Clifford. Risking, and in fact damaging, his long friendship with President Johnson, he worked skillfully to not only reject the troop request but to ensure that the troop buildup was over. In doing so, he created the circumstances in which senior members of the American foreign and defense policy establishments could and would conclude that American policies had failed, that the United States could not succeed in Vietnam, and that withdrawal had to begin. Clifford further argued that although the United States had to engage in serious negotiation with the North Vietnamese, it also had an obligation to support the South Vietnamese military and government in resisting the Hanoi-directed campaign to take over the nation. In a sense, he laid the groundwork for Melvin Laird's later Vietnamization policy. Clifford later assessed his work in these words: "I believe the contribution I made to reversing our policy in that wretched conflict in Vietnam is very likely the most gratifying experience I have had."[41]

Clifford was respectful and courteous in his dealings with the JCS, and was never openly contemptuous of them as McNamara had been. Nonetheless, his first encounter with the Chiefs in March 1968 convinced him that the JCS had not the slightest idea how to win the war or get out of it. As a result, he would not permit the JCS any substantial role in his policy process.

Secretary Clifford and Secretary Rusk (*right*) meet with President Johnson in the Oval Office.
(*National Archives*)

Laird: Vietnamization Justifies American Disengagement

Born in 1922 in Omaha, Nebraska, Melvin R. Laird grew up in Marshfield, Wisconsin (population 7,400 in 1920). He came from a family of politicians and leaders. His father was a member of the Wisconsin state senate and his mother was active in Republican politics. One of his grandfathers was a lieutenant governor of Wisconsin and a great-grandfather was a member of the Wisconsin state assembly. He attended university in nearby Minnesota at Carleton College. Joining the Navy in 1942, he served on a destroyer and survived a Japanese kamikaze attack that killed nine nearby sailors. Leaving the Navy in 1946, he entered politics as a candidate for his recently deceased father's state senate seat. This prodigy of politics won and at age 23, he became the youngest member of the state senate. He served there until 1952 when he won election to the U.S. House of Representatives. There he stayed until 1968 and in the process developed a special interest and expertise in defense and national security affairs.[42] In the early years of Johnson's Vietnam War, Laird was a hawkish critic, accusing Johnson and McNamara of incrementalism and concerned more with sending messages to the enemy than winning the war. He



Secretary Clifford at a news conference at the Pentagon, 15 August 1968
(*National Archives*)

believed that if the United States was not in the war to win, it should not be in that war at all.[43]

In these years, he mastered many of the chamber's intricate and byzantine political maneuvers to achieve his legislative goals. His signature phrase became, "See what I mean?" National Security Advisor Henry A. Kissinger later remarked it was a signal that "there was no possible way of penetrating his meaning" except that he was advancing his agenda.[44] With his political expertise married to massive self-assurance and a no-regrets personality, Laird easily endured political heat without losing sleep. He was comfortable in his skin.

Laird was a reluctant secretary of defense. After the 1968 election, he recommended to new president Richard M. Nixon that he appoint Senator Henry M. "Scoop" Jackson, a Democrat from Washington State, as defense secretary. When Jackson turned down the offer, Nixon pressed Laird to become secretary because, according to the official account of his tenure as secretary, Laird was known for his "political shrewdness, strong character, and expertise on defense appropriations." Laird, however, desired to remain in Congress and so made his acceptance contingent on what he hoped would be a condition unacceptable to Nixon. That is, Laird "insisted on authority to make civilian and military appointments."[45] To his surprise, Nixon accepted this condition and Laird became secretary of defense. Laird's reputation for cunning in his political dealings combined with his penchant for autonomy would come back to haunt Nixon.[46] At the moment, Nixon viewed these qualities as effective ones for dealing with Congress and running the Pentagon.

By the time he took up the reins of office in January 1969, Laird had concluded, as Clifford had before him, that the war in Vietnam could not be won without wreaking havoc on America's social fabric, political community, and fragile economy. It did not matter if the ends the United States sought in Vietnam were commendable, the means necessary to achieve them now seemed grotesquely disproportionate to those ends. Therefore, he decided in the first week as secretary of defense that his principal priority would be "to wind down American involvement in Vietnam, because public support was at the breaking point."[47] Winding down meant withdrawing American troops. Withdrawing American troops had to be done in what President Nixon considered an honorable way—one that allowed the South Vietnamese ally to survive the Viet Cong insurgency and the campaign against it from North Vietnam. Such a "peace with honor plan," but without any specificity, had been a key element in Richard Nixon's campaign for president in 1968.

As it turned out, Nixon had no plan and was in search of one. That void provided Laird with the critical and necessary opportunity to develop his own plan, persuade Nixon to buy into it, and initiate it in early 1969. Laird always claimed he acted with Nixon's blessings and in Nixon's interests. The former is definitely true and there is some truth to the latter. Even Nixon's deputy national security adviser, Alexander M. Haig—no admirer of Laird—reluctantly confirmed it in a 1996 interview. He stated that Laird "came in convinced that he had to save Nixon from himself and get us out of that war one way or another as quickly as possible."[48]

What was Laird's plan? It had the virtue of simplicity, but its execution would prove complex. Laird's plan to withdraw American forces "honorably" was to make sure that the South Vietnamese military had the proper training, weaponry, and equipment so that it could take on its communist opponents. If the Americans could accomplish this, then logically American forces would become less and less necessary and more of them could be withdrawn. His plan came to be called Vietnamization. The name came into being 28 March 1969, at a National Security Council meeting. General Andrew J. Goodpaster, deputy commander of the American forces in South Vietnam, regarding the already-in-progress program to improve the South Vietnamese military, said, "we are, in fact, closer to de-Americanizing the war." Laird responded, "I agree, but not with your term de-Americanizing. What we need is a term [such as] Vietnamizing to put the emphasis on the right issue."[49]

Nixon accepted the political argument Laird made in favor of Vietnamization. To be sure, as protests in the country and loss of support in the Congress made clear, Nixon had little choice other than to go along. His preferred "peace with honor" settlement was a negotiated end to the war from a position of military strength. To that end, and concurrent with Vietnamization, he authorized

(*Left to right*) President Nixon, General Creighton W. Abrams, Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird, and General Earle G. Wheeler confer about the situation in Vietnam, 12 May 1969.
(*National Archives*)

Henry Kissinger to pursue this goal during peace negotiations in Paris.

As Vietnamization ramped up in mid-1969, it also became shorthand for troop withdrawal, or, as Laird put it, "a simultaneous diminution in the U.S. share of the total military effort."[50] By pressing the president hard, Laird gained approval for the first withdrawal increment of 25,000 to take place in mid-1969.[51] Following on this success, Laird pushed for and received approval for a second withdrawal increment of 40,500 troops from September to December 1969.

At that time, Kissinger felt that the withdrawal rate was going faster than the South Vietnamese military was improving. Because withdrawals would likely become popular in the United States, they would increasingly limit Nixon's flexibility in both supporting the war in Vietnam and using them as bargaining chips in Kissinger's talks in Paris. On 10 September, Kissinger expressed those views in terms that were quoted frequently: "Withdrawal of U.S. troops will become like salted peanuts to the American public: The more U.S. troops come home, the more will be demanded. This could eventually result, in effect, in demands for unilateral withdrawal—perhaps within a year."[52] As it turned out, Kissinger's analysis and prediction were spot-on. As 1969 turned into 1970, 1970 into 1971, and 1971 into 1972, the withdrawals inexorably continued. The original notion on which Laird had sold Vietnamization—that there would be a causal relationship between increased South Vietnamese operational capability and American force withdrawals—quickly was lost.

Laird had a second powerful reason for winding down the war: the budget. The defense budget also had to keep America's global Cold War commitments and maintain and improve the superiority of the American military—its size, quality, and weaponry.[53] Laird frequently made the point that American resources were finite, and he stressed that he had to make choices about the importance of some goals over others. Laird wrapped up almost all of these arguments in a single script. For example, in one of his many memoranda on this subject, he concluded that "to enhance the vital interests of our country (particularly in recognition of our worldwide military requirements), to stimulate increased self-defense effectiveness and self-reliance by the Government of RVN [South Vietnam], and to sustain the support of the American public for our stated objectives, plans should be drawn for the redeployment of 50–70 thousand U.S. troops from South Vietnam this year."[54] Similar memoranda over the next three years made comparable arguments. As Congress had to approve the defense budget, Laird set out policy positions that Nixon could accept and Congress could approve. In doing so, Laird skillfully manipulated the budget to achieve his policy ends.

To justify the continued withdrawals, Laird remained persistently positive about South Vietnamese military improvement, even in the face of abundant evidence to the contrary. Despite the South Vietnamese military's mediocre performance in Cambodia in 1970, catastrophically poor performance in Laos in 1971, and barely acceptable performance during North Vietnam's Easter Offensive in 1972, Laird continued to tout improvement. In early 1973, he reported that: "Vietnamization . . . today is virtually completed. As a consequence of the success of the military aspects of Vietnamization, the South Vietnamese people today, in my view, are fully capable of providing for their own in-country security against the North Vietnamese."[55] To this day, it is difficult to decide whether he was an optimist or a realist, inflating the accomplishments of the South Vietnamese military to justify his goal of getting American troops out of Vietnam and winding down America's participation in the war.

At the end of his tour of duty in January 1973, Laird had accomplished a great deal. Even with modest or indifferent support from the White House, he had prevailed on his early 1969 goal. His accomplishment came at a personal cost. Initially on friendly terms with Nixon, "the relationship became," as Laird's military assistant put it, "increasingly contentious with each succeeding month and [getting things done] became a little more difficult as a result."[56] Kissinger and Haig did much to make Laird's name toxic in the Nixon White House, and both men (as well as Nixon himself) had numerous outbursts regarding Laird's alleged bad behavior. In one instance in early 1972—the result of the White House not getting Vietnam bombing information in a timely manner—Nixon said of Laird: "He's a procurement officer. That's what he is and not another goddamn thing."[57] Haig later concluded that, "Mel was the consummate politician. He didn't give a damn about substance. There were few principles in him except what worked politically. That's why he was a good politician but a lousy secretary of defense."[58] This remark and others reflected White House frustration at not being able to control Laird.

With one notable exception, the JCS continued under Laird as they had under McNamara and Clifford. The Chiefs provided plans for operations when the secretary of defense requested them, but they were not involved in and apparently did not ask to be involved in higher matters of policy formation and implementation. One significant exception was Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, chief of naval operations until mid-1970, and after that, chairman of the JCS until mid-1974. Moorer was far from being a wholehearted member of Laird's team. Indeed, he was an ardent advocate of the use of force against American enemies in Vietnam and thus was more in tune with Nixon and Kissinger than with Laird.

Shortly after Laird's arrival at the Pentagon, Moorer explored with Kissinger and Haig how to get around Laird's directive that all communication to the White House go through the him, his deputy, or his military assistant. In conversation with Kissinger on 24 January 1969, and Haig on 1 February 1969, the three agreed that Moorer should have direct, sub-rosa access to the White House via Kissinger and Haig on an as-needed basis. In the second conversation, Moorer said directly, "my first loyalty is to the President and the orders he gives me

Secretary Laird with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Thomas H. Moorer
(*National Archives*)

are obeyed immediately"—and then added, "regardless of Laird." President Nixon approved this arrangement and it remained in effect until Laird left office.[59] Throughout these years, the White House used Moorer to prevent Laird from pigeonholing orders. When, for example, the president gave Laird an order for a military operation or something of comparable importance, Nixon or Kissinger would then tell Haig to "go and tell Tom Moorer what we ordered."[60] Laird realized he had a problem in Moorer but never solved it.[61] Laird's military assistant later said that Admiral Moorer "was very difficult. . . . We never knew where he was or what he was doing. He was a tough one to keep track of."[62]

Admiral Moorer is the exception that proves the rule: the JCS as a corporate body were not players in the Vietnam War policy game. Their political masters found their judgment and proposals questionable or irrelevant or both.

Secretary Laird meets with the Joint Chiefs of Staff in his Pentagon office. (*Left to right*) Admiral Moorer, chairman; General Abrams, chief of staff, U.S. Army; Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt Jr., chief of naval operations; General Robert E. Cushman Jr., commandant, U.S. Marine Corps; and General John D. Ryan, chief of staff, U.S. Air Force.
(*National Archives*)

The Secretaries and Their Power: An Assessment

Robert McNamara, given great authority over the Vietnam War by President Johnson, allowed its conduct, especially the air war against North Vietnam, to be guided by limited war theory. The colossal error that McNamara and graduated response theorists made in running the war on this basis was failing to realize that limited war theory could not work in practice unless both sides agree that the war is limited. Washington did, but Hanoi always made it clear the conflict was a war to the end and that its forces would, in John F. Kennedy's words, "pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship" to achieve victory. McNamara simply could not believe this approach. When he finally did, he had no other solution except to soldier on, despite his own growing doubts as to the war's winnability and morality.[63]

Clark Clifford's term as secretary of defense is startling. President Johnson appointed him to shore up the war and to support his policy. After a week in the job, Clifford's view took a 180-degree turn—determining instead that the war was unwinnable. Therefore, he concluded, the United States could not and should not send any more of its soldiers to fight and die in such a war. Consequently, he organized a series of events in which significant and powerful members of the national security community—Acheson, Bradley, Bundy, and others—who until recently had supported the war now turned against it. The practical result was to persuade President Johnson to turn down the request for the deployment of more than 200,000 additional soldiers to South Vietnam. The more comprehensive result was that his actions stopped the American buildup there. Clifford spent the rest of his almost eleven months as defense secretary attempting to persuade the president and his advisers to begin pulling out troops and to deescalate the U.S. involvement in the war. Though he failed, he is important to the history of the higher conduct of the war for what he accomplished as well as for what he attempted.

Melvin Laird, to a degree, was a successful version of Clifford. Unlike Clifford, he did not have to be converted to the idea of withdrawing American troops and winding down the war. He came into office already dedicated to that proposition. Within weeks of his swearing-in, he began developing a plan to achieve his goal. Within months, it was firmly in place. His Vietnamization program argued that training and equipping the South Vietnamese to take over the war would allow American forces to be withdrawn. The first troops carefully withdrew in the second half of 1969; after that, it was as if Laird had turned on a spigot to allow them to flow out of Southeast Asia. His Department of Defense always certified that the South Vietnamese troops were improving so more Americans could depart but this was a specious argument. By the end of 1972, however, and despite some shaky moments in both Saigon and Washington, over a half a million American troops had been withdrawn from Vietnam and only 27,000 remained. That small number departed South Vietnam by the end of March 1973.[64] Although far from being singularly responsible for America's withdrawal from the war, he deserves a good deal of the credit. A war cannot be fought without troops.

This article is not about judging the rightness or wrongness of America's action in the Vietnam War but about how those in authority—specifically, the secretaries of defense—used their power during the war. It is clear that great power resides inherently in the position of secretary of defense. It is also clear that these three secretaries were confident, capable individuals who were willing to use the power of their office aggressively to achieve stated, and sometimes unstated, policy aims and objectives.

Descriptions by the Chinese military commander, strategist, and philosopher Sun Tzu, across twenty-five centuries, vividly sum up these men and their use of power. For McNamara: "If ignorant both of your enemy and of yourself, you are certain in every battle to be in peril." For Clifford: "When you are ignorant of the enemy, but

know yourself, your chances of winning or losing are equal." And, finally, for Laird: "Know the enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles you will never be in peril."[65]

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NOTES

1. This material is from "Robert S. McNamara," Office of the Secretary of Defense, Historical Office (OSD/HO), n.d., https://history.defense.gov/Multimedia/Biographies/Article-View/Article/571271/robert-s-mcnamara/, accessed 1 Nov 2019.

2. Interv, Alfred Goldberg and Maurice Matloff with Richard M. Helms, 16 Jul 1991, OSD/HO, 20, https://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/oral_history/OH_Trans_HelmsRichard%207-16-1991.pdf?ver=2015-07-01-080224-420.

3. Robert S. McNamara with Brian VanDeMark, *In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam* (New York: Times Books, 1995), 238.

4. For McNamara's early years as head of the Pentagon, see Lawrence S. Kaplan, Ronald D. Landa, and Edward J. Drea, *The McNamara Ascendancy, 1961–1965* (Washington, DC: OSD/HO, 2006).

5. *The Ascendancy of the Secretary of Defense: Robert S. McNamara, 1961–1963*, Cold War Foreign Policy Series: Special Study 4 (Washington, DC: OSD/HO, 2013), 6.

6. Joel C. Christenson, *Expanding the Secretary's Role in Foreign Affairs: Robert McNamara and Clark Clifford, 1963–1968*, Cold War Foreign Policy Series: Special Study 5 (Washington, DC: OSD/HO, 2014), ix.

7. See his 1 Nov 1967, "Draft Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Johnson," in *Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1964–1968*, vol. V, *Vietnam, 1967*, ed. Kent Sieg (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2002), document (doc) 375, 948, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v05/d375, accessed 17 Nov 2019. See also McNamara, *In Retrospect*, 306.

8. In his memoir, McNamara disingenuously wrote: "I do not know to this day [1995] whether I quit or I was fired. Maybe it was both." McNamara, *In Retrospect*, 311.

9. See Robert E. Osgood, *Limited War; the Challenge to American Strategy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957) and Thomas C. Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960). Although Presidents Kennedy and Johnson differed in style and substance on various policy matters, key senior officials at the reins of Vietnam War policy, among them John T. McNaughton, Alain C. Enthoven, and McGeorge Bundy, all mentioned in the next paragraph, plus McNamara, were one on making limited war theory the foundation of American strategy.

10. *FRUS, 1964–1968*, vol. I, *Vietnam, 1964*, ed. Edward C. Keefer and Charles S. Sampson (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1992), doc. 167, 350, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v01/d167. An additional link here is personal: McNaughton had gone to work at the Defense Department when his Harvard colleague, limited war theorist Thomas Schelling, turned down the job but recommended McNaughton for it. When McNaughton accepted the job, Schelling advised him on how to conduct a limited war.

11. Statement of Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor (U.S. Army-Retired), 17 Feb 1966, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Hearings on S. 2793 to Amend Further the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 89th Cong., 2nd Sess. Part 1, 437. Emphasis added. Taylor served first as Kennedy's military representative in the White House, then as chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff under both Kennedy and Johnson, and finally as Johnson's ambassador to South Vietnam.

12. "By late 1966," the official JCS history notes, "Secretary McNamara and his civilian assistants were locked in contention with the Joint Chiefs of Staff over the direction of ROLLING THUNDER. From the start of the campaign, the Joint Chiefs had urged rapid escalation of the bombing offensive, with strikes on all of North Vietnam's principal military and industrial targets as well as its major seaport, Haiphong. At the advice of McNamara and other civilian officials, however, President Johnson chose to expand the program slowly. Initially, he kept the most important targets off limits to air attack. Influenced by 'limited war' theory, which viewed military force primarily as a diplomatic bargaining tool." See Graham A. Cosmas, *The Joint Chiefs of Staff and The War in Vietnam 1960–1968, Part 3* (Washington, DC: Office of Joint History, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2009), 3–4.

13. According to Earl H. Tilford, the target list for U.S. bombing of North Vietnam in Rolling Thunder contained 94 targets in 1964 and had more than 400 by late 1967. As to what was bombed, Tilford wrote that the targets "included ammunition depots and storage areas; highways and railroads; bridges and marshaling yards; warehouses; petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL) storage facilities; airfields; army barracks; and power generating plants. North Vietnam possessed three major factories—the Thai Nguyen Steel Works, and ammunition plant, and a cement factory—and all were eventually destroyed." Earl H. Tilford Jr., "Rolling Thunder, Operation," in *The Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War: A Political, Social and Military History*, ed. Spencer C. Tucker (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 358.

14. Edward J. Drea, *McNamara, Clifford, and the Burdens of Vietnam, 1965–1969* (Washington, DC: OSD/HO, 2011), 534.

15. Lyndon B. Johnson, "July 28, 1965: Press Conference," Miller Center for Public Affairs, University of Virginia, https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-speeches/july-28-1965-press-conference.

16. Joseph R. Cerami, "Presidential Decision-making and Vietnam: Lessons for Strategists," *Parameters* 26, no. 4 (Winter 1996), https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol26/iss4/2/.

17. Quoted in George C. Herring, *LBJ and Vietnam: A Different Kind of War* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1994), 39.

18. Interv, Alfred Goldberg, Lawrence Kaplan, and Maurice Matloff with Robert S. McNamara, 24 Jul 1986, OSD/HO, 8, https://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/oral_history/OH_Trans_McNamaraRobert7-24-1986.pdf?ver=2014-05-28-121319-510. During the Cuban Missile Crisis, a senior admiral assumed that the Navy would use force, if necessary, to stop an approaching Soviet vessel if it did not respond to American signals. McNamara said no, explaining, "We're trying to convey a political message, we're not trying to start a war." Ibid., 6.

19. Graham A. Cosmas, *The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the War in Vietnam, 1960–1968, Part 2,* (Washington, DC: Office of Joint History Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2012), 2.

20. Interv, Alfred Goldberg and Maurice Matloff with Robert S. McNamara, 3 Apr 1986, OSD/HO,

18, https://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/oral_history/OH_Trans_McNamaraRobert4-3-1986.pdf?ver=2014-05-28-121606-850.

21. Herring, *LBJ and Vietnam*, 38 .

22. Memo, Chair of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (Clifford), in Sieg, *FRUS, 1964–1968*, V:994, doc. 388, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v05/d388. It is ironic that Clifford here is critical of McNamara's recommendations to stop the troop buildup in the South and the bombing of the North—recommendations that he fully embraced and urged on the president four months later. It is worth quoting more of Clifford's highly charged prose in this memorandum: "Is this [McNamara's recommendations]," he wrote, "evidence of our zeal and courage to stay the course? Of course not! It would be interpreted to be exactly what it is. A resigned and discouraged effort to find a way out of a conflict for which we had lost our will and dedication." This statement neatly encapsulates his own views by March 1968.

23. Biographical material comes from "Clark M. Clifford," OSD/HO, n.d., https://history.defense.gov/Multimedia/Biographies/Article-View/Article/571292/clark-m-clifford/, accessed 1 Nov 2019. In his memoir, Clifford explains his dovishness on the war (pre-1965), his later hawkishness (1965–1967), and his conversion to American withdrawal from the war (early 1968). See chapters 24–26 in Clark M. Clifford, with Richard Holbrooke, *Counsel to the President: A Memoir* (New York: Random House, 1991).

24. It is more accurate to call this the Wheeler-Westmoreland request, as Wheeler put it together after a quick trip to South Vietnam to confer with Westmoreland about troop requirements in the wake of the Tet Offensive. Wheeler then combined information taken from a 9 February Westmoreland message and additional information from talks with Westmoreland to present the request to President Johnson for 205,179 additional troops for Vietnam. See Memorandum from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) to President Johnson, 27 February 1968 in *FRUS, 1964–1968*, vol. VI, *Vietnam, January–August 1968*, ed. Kent Sieg (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2002), doc. 90. Westmoreland's 9 February message to Wheeler is Document 61 in this volume.

25. *The Pentagon Papers*, vol. IV, Gravel Edition, ed. Mike Gravel (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), 550.

26. The following paragraphs about Clifford's questions and the Chiefs' answers come from Clifford, *A Memoir*, 493–94.

27. Although he called them "the military" in his memoir, he said in an interview that, "by the military I'm referring to the whole Joint Chiefs." Transcript, Clark M. Clifford Oral History Interview III, 14 Jul 1969, by Paige Mulhollan, Internet copy, Lyndon Baines Johnson Presidential Library, Austin, TX, http://www.lbjlibrary.net/assets/documents/archives/oral_histories/clifford_c/cliffor3.pdf.

28. There were three limitations: (1) the president forbade an invasion of North Vietnam because he feared a Chinese armed intervention in response; (2) the president refused to allow the mining of North Vietnam's principal port, Haiphong Harbor, guaranteeing that the Soviet Union would continue to resupply North Vietnam through that port; and (3) the president refused to allow the military to operate in Laos or Cambodia, thus ensuring a sanctuary for the enemy. See Clark M. Clifford, "A Viet-Nam Reappraisal: The Personal History of One Man's View and How It Evolved," *Foreign Affairs* 47, no. 4 (Jul 1969): 611.

29. Ibid.

30. Clifford, *A Memoir*, 494. To be sure, and no doubt without intending to, Clifford here criticized the limited war policy McNamara forced on the Chiefs.

31. Drea, *McNamara, Clifford, and the Burdens of Vietnam*, 186.

32. Clifford, *A Memoir*, 495.

33. Ibid.

34. For the story of the Wise Men and the "full review of policy," see Clifford, *A Memoir*, 511–19.

35. Ibid, 513–14.

36. Clifford, transcript, 14 Jul 1979, 3.

37. Quoted in Clifford, *A Memoir*, 516.

38. Ibid., 518. Lt. Gen. Phillip B. Davidson Jr., who was Military Assistant Command, Vietnam, chief intelligence officer, 1967–1969, believed that it was none other than Clifford who had poisoned the well. In his history of the war, Davidson stated starkly, "Clifford's use of the Wise Men to serve his dovish ends was a consummate stroke by a master of intrigue and it—more than anything else—convinced the President that he had to revise his policies on Vietnam. In a slightly blasphemous vein, what happened was that Johnson had fired a doubting Thomas (McNamara) only to replace him with a Judas." Phillip B. Davidson, *Vietnam at War: The History, 1946–1975* (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1988), 525.

39. Historian Larry Berman notes, "between the final meeting of the 'wise men' and President Johnson's March 31 speech, Clifford took control of the speech-drafting process. He informed [Secretary of State Dean] Rusk and [National Security Advisor Walt. W.] Rostow that the country could not accept a war speech; the president as candidate and as Commander in Chief needed a peace speech." And that is what happened. See Larry Berman, *Lyndon Johnson's War: The Road to Stalemate in Vietnam* (New York: Norton, 1989), 199–200.

40. Clifford, "A Viet-Nam Reappraisal," 613.

41. Quoted from Marilyn Berger, "Clark Clifford, a Major Adviser To Four Presidents, Is Dead at 91," *New York Times*, 11 Oct 1998, https://www.nytimes.com/1998/10/11/us/clark-clifford-a-major-adviser-to-four-presidents-is-dead-at-91.html.

42. Richard A. Hunt, *Melvin Laird and the Foundation of the Post-Vietnam Military, 1969–1973* (Washington, DC: Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2015), 6–7.

43. Dale Van Atta, *With Honor: Melvin Laird in War, Peace, and Politics* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2008), 96. For examples of Laird's hawkishness before 1969 see 61, 99–100, and 107.

44. Henry Kissinger, *White House Years* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979), 32.

45. Hunt, *Melvin Laird*, 5–6; quoted words.

46. An example of his "deviousness": after Nixon had approved but not yet announced the Vietnamization program with Laird in charge in late March 1969, Laird leaked stories about the coming withdrawals. His purpose was to lock the policy in place despite Nixon's desire to choose the time and place of publicly proclaiming the policy. Nixon was not happy with the leaks and Laird, to muddy the waters, suggested that Kissinger might have leaked the information. David L. Prentice, "Ending America's Vietnam War: Vietnamization's Domestic Origins and International Ramifications, 1968–1970 (PhD diss., Ohio University, 2013), 330–31. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=ohiou1384512056.

47. Interv, Maurice Matloff and Alfred Goldberg with Melvin R. Laird, 18 Aug 1986, OSD/HO, 8–9, https://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/oral_history/OH_Trans_LairdMelvin%209-2-1986.pdf?ver=2015-06-30-110159-040. It seems unlikely that Laird shared this view with Nixon and Kissinger before accepting the post.

48. Interv, Ronald Landa and Alfred Goldberg with Alexander M. Haig, 14 Feb 1996, OSD/HO, 14.

49. *FRUS, 1969–1976*, vol. VI, *Vietnam, January 1969–July 1970*, ed. Edward C. Keefer and Carolyn Yee (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2006), doc. 49, 170, https://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1969-76v06/pdf/frus1969-76v06.pdf.

50. Ibid., doc. 38, 116.

51. Graham A. Cosmas, *MACV: The Joint Command in the Years of Withdrawal, 1968–1973*, United States Army in Vietnam (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2006), 178.

52. Keefer and Yee, *FRUS, 1969–1976*, VI:372, doc. 117. Almost a year later, Kissinger made it even clearer to Nixon about the downside of this kind of withdrawal: "In my view, our biggest bargaining chip . . . is our ability to regulate the timing of the drawdown of our forces. We face the danger of losing this chip. Thus, whether the potential military risk materializes or not, you should be aware that fiscal constraints and, more importantly, manpower decisions made outside the framework of the NSC system threaten to deprive us of desirable flexibility in the critical months ahead." See *FRUS, 1969–1976,* vol. VII, *Vietnam, July 1970–January 1972*, ed. David Goldman and Erin Mahan (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2010), Document 29, 59, https://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1969-76v07/pdf/frus1969-76v07.pdf.

53. In large measure, this is the central argument of the official history of Laird as secretary of defense and is made clear in the title, *Melvin Laird and the Foundation of the Post-Vietnam Military.* For full citation, see note 40.

54. Keefer and Yee, *FRUS, 1969–1976*, VI:119, doc. 38.

55. Interv, Matloff and Goldberg with Laird, 19.

56. Interv, Roger Trask and Alfred Goldberg with Robert E. Pursley, 6 Nov 1997, OSD/HO, 31.

57. *FRUS, 1969–1976*, vol. VIII, *Vietnam, January–October 1972*, ed. John M. Carland (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2010), Document 52, 176, https://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1969-76v08/pdf/frus1969-76v08.pdf.

58. Interv, Landa and Goldberg with Haig, 14.

59. Quotations are from Carland, *FRUS, 1969–1976*, VIII:81, doc. 16. A good example of this system in action occurred on 4 May 1972. Nixon had just decided to order the mining of Haiphong Harbor in North Vietnam and he and Kissinger wanted the decision implemented within days. To that end, Kissinger called Moorer to the White House. At the meeting, Nixon said, "Admiral, what I am going to say to you now is in total confidence of the relationship with the Commander in Chief and the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff. Nothing is to go to the Secretary. . . . Is that clear?" Ibid., 429. It was clear. Nixon ordered Moorer to put in train plans Moorer and his staff had prepared as early as the mid-1960s. Nixon told Laird of the operation only at the last minute.

60. Interv, Landa and Goldberg with Haig, 15.

61. Laird's biographer described, "a contentious relationship between Laird and Moorer that ranged from simple cat-and-mouse games to outright spying by Moorer as each tried to stay one step ahead of the other." See Van Atta, *With Honor*, 270.

62. Interv, Trask and Goldberg with Pursley, 24.

63. *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy: Containing the Public Messages, Messages, and Statements of the President, January 20 to December 31, 1961* (Washington DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1962), 1.

64. Cosmas, *MACV: The Joint Command*, 178.

65. All three quotations from Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, trans. Samuel B. Griffith, with a forward by B. H. Liddell Hart (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), 84.

BOOKREVIEWS



BEYOND DUTY: THE REASONS SOME SOLDIERS COMMIT ATROCITIES

BY WALTER S. ZAPOTOCZNY JR.
Fonthill, 2017
Pp. 288. $34.95

REVIEW BY CRAIG LESLIE MANTLE

Beyond Duty is not an easy book to read. The accounts of rape, murder, and torture are enough to make one lose faith in humanity. Yet for all of its difficulty, Walter Zapotoczny offers an intriguing argument for why groups of soldiers commit atrocities during wartime. He contends that five specific episodes—the Japanese Army at Nanking (1937), the German *Einsatzgruppen* in eastern Europe (1941–1943), the Red Army in Germany (1945), the Americans at My Lai in Vietnam (1968), and the Americans at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq (2003)—can be explained through a combination of five unique factors. His book endeavors to uncover why soldiers acted as they did, for as he astutely observes, "Historians, in large part, have described in great detail the actions of these groups, but they have not adequately dealt with the factors that contributed to those actions" (5). In his estimation, a combination of factors can explain each of these tragic events: the indoctrination of the perpetrators; the economic and political conditions then prevailing in their home country; the characterization of the target population as subhuman; the tactical circumstances on the ground; and, finally, the living conditions of the culprit-soldiers.

Although a seemingly logical approach, Zapotoczny comes up short. Most problematic is his reluctance to discuss his own model. After a promising introduction that nicely whets the appetite, he immediately begins his discussion of the first historical case study without exploring the finer details of the intellectual framework around which his argument revolves. He fails to explain why he selected these five explanatory factors in the first place and why we can safely ignore other possible contributing issues. Because he avoids this necessary discussion, he essentially asks readers to take him at his word and to trust that *his* factors above all others are the ones that actually explain some of history's most egregious episodes. The book, therefore, lacks an articulated and defensible theory—what should in fact be its centerpiece. Rather than endeavoring to show how soldiers "progressed through the stages of 'violentization' outlined by criminologist Lonnie H. Athens", something to which he devotes his penultimate chapter, Zapotoczny might have been better off developing his own theoretical framework at the outset and arguing it continually.(6)

Unfortunately, in a similar manner, he does not clearly explain why he selected these five examples, for surely, and sadly, atrocities in the twentieth century occurred on more than these five occasions. The French experience in Algeria in the 1950s and 1960s where torture was commonplace and had far-reaching strategic implications, or the Canadian experience in Somalia in the early 1990s where a torture-murder, among other events, eventually led to unprecedented institutional reform, might also have fit the bill.

Also troubling is the near-total lack of synthesis. Each chapter provides introductory context and then moves to a discussion of the five explanatory factors, but there is no conclusion that ties the individual discussion elements together into an integrated and cohesive whole. Each chapter, therefore, ends somewhat abruptly, as if the author has incontestably proven all points. In many instances, discussions of individual explanatory factors are either weak or not clearly related back to the case under consideration. In other words, Zapotoczny leaves readers to make causal inferences for themselves rather than explain such relationships. How can the model he posits explore an atrocity when he does not reflect the explanatory factors back on the atrocity or even to group/individual motivation/behavior? Intelligent readers do not need to be spoon-fed, but he does need to point them in the right direction. To be fair, on some occasions he is apparently successful in linking his explanatory factors to a historical event—the connection seems logical enough—but in the absence of a strong theoretical framework, how can a reader be sure that he has indeed uncovered a cause-and-effect relationship?

His discussion also leaves unanswered why so many soldiers did not, and do not, commit atrocities. Not all Americans in Vietnam or Iraq (and to this could be added Afghanistan) committed reprehensible acts. Yet it is quite possible that they likewise were subjected to many of the same conditioning forces that Zapotoczny argues encourage atrocities in the first place. Some comments along these lines would have been useful. Is acceptable behavior on the battlefield simply the absence of some or all of these factors or is it another explanation altogether? Why do some people transition between Athens's various stages of "violentization"

and others do not?(132) What role does the inculcation of a strong military ethos play in discouraging barbarism? [1] Does an educated soldiery translate into an obedient soldiery? What is the relationship between professional military behavior and strong societal norms, whether influenced by religion or not, of "right" and "wrong"? It is unfortunate that he offers nothing in this vein.

If *Beyond Duty* is difficult to read emotionally, it is also difficult to read physically, for mistakes litter the text and interrupt the flow of the narrative. In the span of only two pages, 74–75 for example, several mistakes appear: the same geographical feature is frequently misspelled; "colonial general" is substituted for the German and Russian rank of colonel general; and sentences occur like "On the left flank of the Western Front of the Soviet 4th Army was in no position to offer and effective defense." Although the odd typographical error is perhaps excusable, the frequency and extent of errors in this book simply are not.

Zapotoczny is prone to offer excerpts from various documents that extend over multiple pages, either as part of the narrative text or as back matter. Indeed, his four appendices are equivalent in length to his five historical case studies, give or take. It might have been better to devote the space used by the former to a more forceful conclusion (two pages) and policy recommendations (one-half page). In the opinion of this reviewer, both of these warranted greater discussion given the gravity of the topic and his suggestion that he has now filled the gap left by other historians who have ignored motivation when examining these tragic events.

Overall, *Beyond Duty: The Reasons Some Soldiers Commit Atrocities* is disappointing. Although the atrocities are explored in sufficient detail for a work such as this, the reasons for their occurrence are not owing to the absence of a clearly defined theoretical approach that serves as a unifying force. Walter Zapotoczny may very well be correct that these five factors do indeed explain descent into the abyss, but his argument as published is unconvincing.

NOTE

1. In the case of Canada, see Department of National Defence, *Duty with Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada 2009*, https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/corporate/reports-publications/duty-with-honour-2009.html.

Dr. Craig Leslie Mantle is an occasional instructor on the Joint Command and Staff Programme at Canadian Forces College in Toronto and for the Department of History at the Royal Military College of Canada in Kingston, both in Ontario. He is also a Fellow of the Royal Historical Society



ON TACTICS: A THEORY OF VICTORY IN BATTLE

BY B. A. FRIEDMAN
Naval Institute Press, 2017
Pp. xiv, 242. $30.95

REVIEW BY DOMINIC J. CARACCILO

On War, Carl von Clausewitz's seminal work on the psychological and political aspects of war, now has a companion.

On Tactics: A Theory of Victory in Battle by B. A. Friedman focuses on the conduct of military engagements and battles while acknowledging Clausewitz's greater strategic and operational frameworks. Friedman's work binds the strategic and political principles found in *On War* with theories he associates as a malleable construct of tactics to achieve a means to a strategic end. Curiously enough, this is the first real attempt to explain, or more appropriately, codify, a theory that explicitly focuses on tactics and their principles of war.

As the book begins, Friedman immediately rebukes the age-old belief that tactics, in general, are too technical "to catch the theorist's eye" (1). He claims that there has never been a true tactical theorist, a belief that drove him to unveil that tacticians are less about science and more about art; that one should turn the science behind the production into art. To support this claim, Friedman expertly weaves what he defines as the tactician's trinity of sources—doctrine, personal experience, and the experiences of others—to "elude codification" (2). This premise is the centric theme of the book, as the author offers "theory" as the mortar to bind together his trio of sources.

If tactics make up strategy and tactics are chosen or modified based on strategy, there is an integral need, therefore, for a theory that addresses both elements. It is commonly thought that tactics is too "amorphous a study" due to a lack of accepted theory. Friedman challenges this void with this book (4).

Friedman, an experienced Marine, tethered the vernacular various military sages used in their notable works to his own thesis. References to Clausewitz, Antoine-Henri Jomini, J. F. C. Fuller, Ferdinand Foch, Sun Tzu, and B. H. Liddell Hart, for instance, provide credibility and credence to the concepts he introduces. He then fully explains how the science and art of conflict find their way into the full spectrum of theories.

Like *On War*, this book requires careful study to digest Friedman's scholarly presentation. Throughout his work, he makes worthy proclamations that only result in frustration if one is expecting a scientific mechanical application of the Clausewitzian Principles of War. Friedman accurately conveys that, over time, principles were added to the original list that focused on defeating the enemy in battle. These "add-ons," which were important to the strategist but less so to the tactician, resulted in "too little amplifying information." They failed to capture the art/science duality of war as a means to understand tactical tenets that ultimately provide a guide to victory on the battlefield (8).

A notable strength with Friedman's *On Tactics* is that, although he introduces new ideas, he smartly compartmentalizes and aligns these ideas with concepts commonly understood by military novices and lay readers. They are certainly familiar to those with a working knowledge of construction to most military strategists. Thus, chapters on The Culminating Point of Victory, Command and Control, Environment and Geography, and appendices on the Center of Gravity and the Opera-

tional Level of War, will resonate with the reader as he or she grasps Friedman's ideas from a tactical point of view. Putting his theories and ideas in context makes his work effective in a contrast-and-compare manner.

Proposed as a hip-pocket manual of sorts, *On Tactics*, although not an easily digestible practitioner's guide as intended, is more than a company-grade handbook for tacticians. Readers need to study the book in its entirety to gain the optimal value of it. It is not a reference book where tacticians can quickly frame battlefield courses of action. Rather, its study will provide a theoretical framework of tactics in the context of battle, just as Carl von Clausewitz devised a general theory of war from political and strategic aspects.

At the end of this work, the author circles back to the lead chapter focusing on how tactics and strategy linked together. Providing his insights on what he defines as "Crossing the Bridge," Friedman purposefully brings the reader back to his premise in a "tell them what you are going to tell them, tell them, and then tell them what you told them" manner. This Aristotelian "triptych," archetypally used in effective presentation forums, works well in Friedman's arrangement of chapters. It provides *On Tactics* with a much-anticipated crescendo of ideas at the end and leaves the reader in complete understanding that, "Just as war, and thus strategy, are subordinate to policy, tactics are in turn the servant to strategy" (139).

Friedman finishes his work with six appendices that provide the reader a more in-depth consideration of how key concepts, ranging from the Clausewitzian point of culmination to the infusion of training and education, support his theories. The Appendix titled "Operational Level of War" aids in the connection of tactics and strategy. Perhaps the next step is to define the full spectrum of war—from tactics to operations to strategy to form this pedagogical connection. *On War*, then *On Tactics*, logically lead to a volume on how operational level fits into the equation.

Friedman does not focus the work on tactics alone, but also clearly states the necessary supporting role that tactics play within operations and strategy toward achieving policy aims.

It is insightful, well written, and an immediately accessible resource. I wish I had it as a young officer. I look forward to sharing it with others.

Dr. Dominic J. Caraccilo has had over thirty-five years of experience in leadership roles with the U.S. Army and multibillion-dollar enterprises. In his final tour as an Army officer as brigadier general, he served as the acting senior mission commander of Fort Campbell and deputy commander of the 101st Airborne Division. He has had corporate roles with Amazon, Facebook, Parsons Corporation, and Microsoft. He has also been a small business owner. He holds a doctorate in business administration, a master's in arts, a master's in science, and a master's in engineering. He has written eight books and many articles and book reviews for commercial and professional journals.



THE MEDAL OF HONOR: THE EVOLUTION OF AMERICA'S HIGHEST MILITARY DECORATION

By Dwight S. Mears

University Press of Kansas, 2018
Pp. vii, 312. $34.95

REVIEW BY GARY SOLIS

The Medal of Honor is the subject of many books. This one is different. It relates the legislative background of the medal. Although that simplistic description may initially sound dull, this text is anything but. It is well written and engaging, relating the legalities of the medal, as well as brief specifics of many recipients' valorous deeds. It details the medal's surprisingly quirky and contentious history, political misuse, and administrative injustices. The Medal of Honor has had a long and decidedly uneven path to today's universal respect as America's foremost award for combat heroism.

Few realize that federal law, not the armed services, has shaped the Medal of Honor from its inception—with the varied interpretations and abuses too often found in legislation. At its inception in 1861 as a Civil War medal available only to Navy enlisted sailors, it was the U.S. military's sole award for battlefield valor. In 1862, legislation established a separate Medal of Honor for Army enlisted soldiers. A continuing problem was that the legislation for both medals failed to specify any criteria for granting it. Civil War commanders awarded the medal at their discretion, which they often abused, as author Mears illustrates.

Major Mears, a retired Army helicopter pilot, holds a law degree and a Ph.D., which serve both him and the reader in interpreting the legislative, military, and political intricacies that have long surrounded the medal. In the initial absence of federal legislation, neither Navy nor Army regulations precluded the medal's award to civilians for "other soldier-like qualities" disassociated from battlefield heroism (20). Medals of Honor for civilian ship pilots? For William F. "Buffalo Bill" Cody, for his service as an Army scout out West? For an entire 864-soldier infantry regiment, for extending their enlistments? Such awards of the medal exemplified its early lack of standards. The authorizing legislation did require that recipients be soldiers. Beyond that (commonly disregarded) prerequisite, senior commanding officers were free to apply, without review, any criteria they considered appropriate. The author makes clear his disapproving view of such violations of the minimal requirements, not to mention the spirit, of the medal's authorizing legislation.

In 1863, federal law finally allowed Army officers, as well as enlisted personnel, to receive the Army Medal of Honor. The Navy allowed officers the medal only in 1915. Not until 1895 and 1897 did the War Department publish explicit standards for award of the Army's Medal of Honor that introduced combat and gallantry requirements. Legislation to that effect, however, did not follow until 1904. The Navy Medal of Honor, also available to the Marines, remained untethered to such requirements. Marine Maj. Smedley

D. Butler returned his Medal of Honor for his actions at Veracruz in 1914, believing, he wrote, that he had merely executed his duty. (The Navy gave the medal back to Butler with pointed advice to wear it proudly.) The Air Force received statutory authority for its separate Medal of Honor in 1956.

Through his laudable research into the medal's evolution, Mears explains the legislative steps, and their foundations, drawing the reader into the odd and interesting distinctions between the Army and Navy medals, as well as the armed forces' efforts to raise the medal's significance. He also provides the political and social contexts that eventually did elevate the Medals of Honor of all service branches to the high distinction of heroism they enjoy today.

Immediately after World War I, legislation authorized new American valor medals, aligning the United States with many European nations' graduated military award systems. In 1918, legislation unambiguously tied the Army's Medal of Honor to combat heroism. Until 1945, the Navy continued to resist the Army's stricter statutory criteria and continued granting the medal to civilians, as well as awarding it for heroic noncombat acts. Meanwhile, legislation established the various armed services' Distinguished Service Crosses, Distinguished Service Medals, and the Navy Cross, as were the Silver Star, Bronze Star, and the modern Purple Heart. Not until 1963 did Congress largely standardize legislation for the Navy, Army, and Air Force Medals of Honor that finally precluded their award for noncombat actions, no matter how heroic.

The author notes that the Army awarded several World War II Army medals, in violation of the legislative mandate requiring discrete heroic acts beyond the call of duty, to senior officers who excelled in their assigned duties—Generals Douglas MacArthur and Jimmy H. Doolittle, for example. Maj. Richard I. Bong, America's top flying ace, and Marine Gregory "Pappy" Boyington, received the medals for doing what fighter pilots were supposed to do. Readers may protest that those officers were surely heroes, their combat zone deeds extremely impressive and requiring of heroic effort. Although true, their actions, the author points out, were their duties, brilliantly done, but not rising to the authorizing legislation's requirement for discrete voluntary acts that exceeded their duty. Mears also notes the Vietnam conflict's plethora of questionable Bronze and Silver Star awards. He also fully discusses the contentious recent case of Marine Sgt. Rafael Peralta's nonaward of the medal, and that of Army Capt. William D. Swenson, whose 2013 Medal of Honor paperwork shamefully was "lost" for four years after he spoke out against limitations on the Army's rules of engagement in Afghanistan.

Throughout the book, the author briefly describes combat acts that clearly do meet the medal's high standards. Audie L. Murphy, Hector A. Cafferata Jr., Randy D. Shughart, Gary I. Gordon, Salvatore A. Giunta, Michael P. Murphy, and scores of others make brief appearances, tacitly emphasizing the medals' legislative requirement for voluntary acts at the risk of death that exceed one's duty. He also describes and explains reviews of past secondary awards that the military has upgraded to Medals of Honor. Were recent new Medals of Honor merited, or were they politically inspired? Mears makes clear that all fully earned their medals.

Finally, the author deals with exceptions to the legislative requirements for award of the medal: legislative relief, administrative relief, administrative restorations, and judicial relief. Mears relates fascinating accounts of how Congress sometimes lawfully finessed the medal's legislative requirements through "bills of relief," such as Charles A. Lindbergh's 1927 medal and Billy L. Mitchell's 1946 medal. The book also examines administrative remedies exercised by each armed service's sometimes inept and mismanaged Board of Correction of Military Records. Judicial relief has been rare, although Mears recounts a few well-merited exceptions, including the 2018 case of World War II Army Lt. Garlin M. Conner.

The deep and exacting research Major Mears has conducted cannot be overstated. There surely is no legislative aspect of the Medal of Honor that his book does not explore and document. He supports virtually every statement regarding the medal with a footnote to the authority. This is a work of scholarship that will be a lasting reference. The book, 211 pages, plus another 95 of three appendices (including summaries of all Medal of Honor–related legislation), is not for every reader; sections of the early history chapters can be slow going. But nothing is filler. Every chapter is necessary to a full appreciation of the medal and its history. If you are interested in a Medal of Honor book deeper than a series of citations, you will enjoy this outstanding text.

GARY SOLIS holds a juris doctorate from the University of California at Davis, a master of laws degree from George Washington Law School, and a Ph.D. from the London School of Economics and Political Science. He is a retired Marine and a retired West Point professor of law.



PATTON'S WAY: A RADICAL THEORY OF WAR

BY JAMES KELLY MORNINGSTAR
Naval Institute Press, 2017
Pp. xiv, 378. $35

REVIEW BY PAUL H. WHITMORE

"Patton has been misunderstood. His success was a result not of bravado but of a well-thought-out and highly developed way of war, one at variance with the accepted doctrine and often practiced in the face of interference by more conventional commanders. This book is an attempt to correct the record" (ix).

With these words, James Kelly Morningstar engages in a well-written, deeply researched, and unique assessment of controversial General George S. Patton and his personal philosophy of war—one at significant odds with official doctrine taught in Army schools through the world wars and into the Cold War era. Morningstar, a twenty-year Army veteran with extensive experience across a wide range of assignments, is currently an adjunct professor of military history at Georgetown University and has held numerous positions as an

armor officer across multiple assignments, including the National Training Center. His assessment finds Patton to be a unique visionary commander among his World War II peers—unlike the dangerous, radical, and egocentric leader that certain events, such as the slapping incidents, imply.

Rather than creating another Patton biography that likely would have been merely another volume in the historiography, Morningstar instead evaluates Patton's methods of, and approaches to, war. He approaches Patton's legacy in two ways. First, he addresses the general's warfighting philosophy, which he clearly demonstrates was at odds with the reigning doctrine of the day; second, he takes that philosophy and historical treatment and compares it to changes in Army doctrine from the end of the war. Morningstar calculates that Patton's philosophy, as demonstrated during the European campaign, became extensively codified in Army doctrine, although it would take nearly half a century for it to become a reality.

Morningstar opens his work by addressing Patton's reputation and legacy created in the postwar years and after his death in December 1945. Given his philosophy of war and personal manner, people often have described Patton as "indiscreet," "an actor," and an eccentric and boorish officer, given to "conflicts of personality," and prone to "buffoonery" (2). Though Morningstar acknowledges many of Patton's idiosyncrasies—many even admitted to by Patton himself—he rejects the consensus view of Patton as a renegade. He instead casts him as a misunderstood and unorthodox commander butting up against traditionalism and doctrines born out of a lack of understanding of maneuver warfare in the new age of armor. Patton preferred infantry in support of armor capabilities, but most of his contemporaries believed all Army capabilities should support infantry engaging in direct assaults. This difference caused consternation for Patton during the European campaign and frustration for his superiors orchestrating the movements of several nations.

In several chapters, the author posits that Patton developed a "new calculus of war" (5) by fusing integrated intelligence systems (across multiple capabilities and units); flexible command and control (in today's joint doctrine, Mission Command); integrated, combined arms operations (primarily focused on the effects of armor); and the ability of the forces to shock the enemy through surprise maneuvers. Using this approach, Morningstar assesses Patton as a commander driven by a deep understanding of history—indeed, Patton was among the most scholarly officers in the Army of the day, possessing a "profound knowledge of strategy, tactics, and military and political techniques" (2).

Always a student of history, Patton likely gained insights of movement and maneuver through listening to stories from Civil War veterans such as noted Confederate partisan John S. Mosby, known for lighting raids, shock attacks, and the ability to elude enemy forces. In addition to his own experience in World War I as one of America's experts in armored warfare, it is easy to see how the totality of his formal and informal education served to develop new methodologies for engaging forces. These experiences caused Patton to embrace the idea of coup d'oeil, where a commander's ability to take in a clear view of an entire situation at a glance allows for almost an innate, seemingly autonomous reaction to events rather than an assessment over periods of time, discussion, and thought.

Successive chapters alternate between Patton's formative years during and after World War I, leading to an analysis of his actions in North Africa, Sicily, and Europe during World War II. Morningstar uses the four lenses of intelligence, maneuver, shock, and combined arms to assess Patton's waging of war in the European campaign in a case study of the ten months after Operation Overlord. In this case study, Morningstar reviews Patton's foundational concepts and planning strategy after the Army selected him as Third Army commander and then again after Patton entered Europe and embarked on his military campaign. His innate ability to assess the situation on the fly put him at odds with the traditional thinkers.

The author ends his work with a look at the legacy of Patton after the end of World War II, focusing primarily on the Army's inability or unwillingness to implement Patton's methodology for nearly fifty years, renewing its focus and doctrine on supporting infantry maneuvers rather than combined arms. It was not until a few years before Operation Desert Storm that the Army formally implemented and codified Patton's strategic outlook and tactical concepts in Army doctrine. Morningstar paints Patton not as an undisciplined maverick, but rather a misunderstood genius whose way of war set him truly apart and above his peers—and one whose operational legacy has only been realized in the past thirty years.

For the reader, Morningstar clearly demonstrates Patton's impact on the Army's doctrinal mindset and provides a far better understanding of Patton, his lifelong pursuit of knowledge, and his ability to mold that experience and knowledge into a successful military campaign. Finally, this work should instill in each reader the desire and importance of formal professional development as a catalyst for personal improvement. *Patton's Way* is a thought-provoking, insightful, must-read for future leaders—if for nothing other than the understanding that challenging the conventional wisdom of the day is a beneficial and often necessary reality of leadership and command.

Lt. Col. Paul H. Whitmore, a U.S. Space Force officer, is an assistant professor and course director at Joint Forces Staff College in Norfolk, Virginia. A twenty-six-year veteran, he holds degrees from the Virginia Military Institute and the University of North Dakota.



DEAR DELIA: THE CIVIL WAR LETTERS OF CAPTAIN HENRY F. YOUNG, SEVENTH WISCONSIN INFANTRY

Edited by Michael J. Larson and John David Smith
University of Wisconsin Press, 2019
Pp. xiii, 287. $29.95

REVIEW BY CLAIRE S. SAMUELSON

There is a plethora of published material related to the Civil War; in fact, one could argue there is an overabundance. A few

shine, a few flounder, and every once in a while a true gem appears. *Dear Delia: The Civil War Letters of Captain Henry F. Young, Seventh Wisconsin Infantry, 1861–1864* is one of those gems. The background narrative of the letters themselves is worthy of more attention, as the correspondence was discovered at the Wisconsin Historical Society, a fact which is only discussed on the book's cover. Young's letters not only illustrate the realities of being a soldier, far from his family, during a tumultuous time in our history, but they also present the rare perspective of a Wisconsinite.

The editors, Michael J. Larson and John David Smith, have created a blank stage for Young's letters to provide a soliloquy. Thanks to their superior editorial efforts, the reader is able to comprehend, chuckle, and shudder along with Young and his family. Specifically, Larson and Smith "retained Young's original spelling and capitalization and have refrained from inserting the intrusive [*sic*] to identify his misspellings" (xi). In addition to that welcome freedom, Larson and Smith have offered ample notes at the conclusion of each letter. Those notes clarify people (fellow soldiers, neighbors, and store owners from back home, casually referred to by Young), places, battles, and troop movements, but they do not overwhelm Young's voice. For instance, Larson and Smith "resisted annotating uniformly well-known persons, place, or events (such as the Battle of Gettysburg) that, in their opinion, require no further explanation" (xi). The notes fill the gap so often left by oral histories and letter collections.

The correspondence are comprehensive of Young's experience; they are not all addressed to his wife, Delia. Incorporated in the 155 letters home are several addressed to his father-in-law, Jared Warner. The communications between the men adds business and political dimensions to the thirty-seven-year-old soldier's life, whose journey the reader shares.

Patriotic and ready to serve in the Union Army, a member of the famed Iron Brigade, Young soon found himself in hurry-up-and-wait mode as he finished training at Camp Randall, Wisconsin, and then traveled to Washington, D.C. Pleased to be surrounded by others from home but weary of the constant rearrangements—almost seven months of camping on Capitol Hill, Chain Bridge, Arlington Heights, and then Camp Arlington without any real movement—Young's frustration is palpable. On 6 October 1861, a month after arriving in the Washington, D.C., area, Young writes from Arlington Heights, "I don't like it at all. I do not like the country East half as well as the west" (13). He also shares some of the petty infighting while camping in the area and the general mood of the men.

Almost a year later, Young's involvement in the war became real during the Second Bull Run Campaign (Second Manassas Campaign). Near the end of September 1862, Young composed a lengthy letter home to his father about his experiences, which encompassed several days. His contribution began late at night when his corps was told to "build a bridge across the river about one mile above the Railroad bridge" (99). Amid heavy artillery fire from both sides of the Rappahannock River, they managed to complete the task. The same men were then "roused at daylight to go and destroy the Railroad bridge" (100). The brigade crossed the bridge, and under heavy fire Young and his companions set it alight. The fighting continued, and Young's rendition of it reflects the chaos and loss. Young's experience during the skirmishing left him worn out and he admitted to his father "it is one incident in my life I would like to forever forget" (104).

As the war continued, Young remained prolific. He captures his participation in the 1863 Second Battle of Fredericksburg beautifully. He depicts the frequent crossings of the Rappahannock River, the attacking Rebs, and the "terrible rain storms which this southern climate alone can produce" (161).

By 1864, Young had served for three years, fought in several battles, and watched numerous men muster out. He was tired, but remained steadfast and dedicated to the cause of the Union, writing to Delia, "I feel as though I would not be doing right to leave now when my services are most needed" (259). Unfortunately for Young and his family, sad news lay on the horizon, in mid-November he received a letter from Delia that their daughter Laura had died of diphtheria. Less than a month later, the Union Army discharged Capt. Henry F. Young and he returned to his Wisconsin mill to mourn and rebuild his life.

This book will appeal to Civil War experts, those who dabble in the social and political ramifications of war, and those who are searching for a single voice among the noise. Larson and Smith's gentle editing style do justice to Henry F. Young and his legacy.

CLAIRE S. SAMUELSON serves as the chief, Northeast and OCONUS Region, Army Museum Enterprise, supervising fifty-six museum employees and coordinating long-term strategic plans for eighteen regional museum facilities. With a master's degree in military history, she began her civil service career in 2001 as a student temporary employee at the Training and Doctrine Command Military History and Heritage Office, Fort Monroe, Virginia, and moved to a permanent position in June 2003 as an archivist. From 2006 until 2018, Samuelson served in myriad positions throughout the Army Museum Enterprise: Collections Manager and Director, Casemate Museum, Fort Monroe, Virginia; Army Artifact Representative Officer, Base Realignment and Closure Transition Team; Director, Ordnance Training and Heritage Center, Fort Lee, Virginia; and Director, Transportation Museum, Fort Eustis, Virginia.



AN UNLADYLIKE PROFESSION: AMERICAN WOMEN WAR CORRESPONDENTS IN WORLD WAR I

BY CHRIS DUBBS
University of Nebraska Press, 2020
Pp. xviii, 336. $34.95

REVIEW BY SHANNON GRANVILLE

In his book *American Journalists in the Great War: Rewriting the Rules of Reporting* (University of Nebraska Press, 2017), military historian Chris Dubbs examined the ways in which American war correspondents forged new paths in their approach to covering the First World War. However, he noted that the scope of his book overlooked the vital contributions of the women who

also reported on the war. Female war correspondents braved bullets and shells at the front lines; wrote and filed their copy in between grueling shifts as nurses or volunteer aid workers; and witnessed disease, starvation, and genocide to convey to their readers the stories of civilians affected by the war. At the same time, they had to contend with restrictive gender norms that frequently barred them from being treated as equals to their male counterparts, in spite of the similar dangers and hardships they faced. These women's stories, Dubbs felt, deserved to be placed back into the broader history of the Great War—and in *An Unladylike Profession*, he has given them their well-deserved spotlight.

More than a few of the American women war correspondents in Dubbs's book may be familiar to modern readers. The muckraking journalist Nellie Bly, known for her investigative and often daredevil reporting at the turn of the twentieth century, became one of the first women to report from the war's eastern front with dispatches from Serbia and Austria-Hungary in 1914. The novelist Edith Wharton, who had been living in France when the war began, wrote articles for *Scribner's* and the *Saturday Evening Post* to assist with charitable fundraising efforts, calling on Americans to send aid to the suffering French people. Yet many of the more than thirty other women featured in *An Unladylike Profession* are not well known today, for all that they were groundbreaking reporters in their own time. Some worked alongside their spouses in reporting teams: their ranks included the photojournalist Helen Johns Kirtland, who covered the fighting in Italy as well as the Versailles Peace Conference with her husband Lucian Swift Kirtland; and the socialist writer Louise Bryant, who accompanied her husband John Reed to Russia during the explosive days of the 1917 revolution. Others fought to be a part of the war on their own terms. Perhaps the most notable example of this latter group was Peggy Hull, a veteran newspaper reporter who covered the U.S. Army's campaigns from Mexico to France to Russia. Hull's tenacity and determination to be in the thick of the action, wherever it was, enabled her to cultivate friendships with high-ranking officers such as American Expeditionary Forces commander General John J. Pershing and Army chief of staff General Peyton C. Marsh. With Marsh's support, Hull became the first woman officially credentialed as a war correspondent by the U.S. Army in October 1918, and accompanied U.S. forces halfway around the world to report on the Allied intervention in Siberia.

Many of the women war correspondents had to resort to unconventional tactics to get anywhere close to the soldiers and civilians they sought to write about. Most fought uphill battles to cajole reluctant newspaper editors and unyielding government officials into allowing them to travel to England, France, Germany, or Russia in the first place. In some cases, they framed their work from a specifically gendered position, claiming that only a woman's perspective on the needs of homeless war orphans or destitute widows would touch the hearts of female readers and encourage them to raise funds for war charity campaigns. At other times, when denied access through official channels, they broke the rules and operated by stealth, whether by stowing away on cross-Channel ships (Mary Roberts Rinehart) or joining trainloads of refugees (Corra Harris) to get to their intended destinations. Dubbs provides a wealth of similar stories, showing the countless ways in which American women journalists used any means at their disposal to find the war stories they believed needed to be told.

One poignant aspect of *An Unladylike Profession* is the extent to which many American women war correspondents struggled to balance their duty to report faithfully to their readers with their own revulsion at the grim reality of war. In some cases, they felt conflicted by their roles as noncombatant spectators to the fighting, which explained why some were drawn to serve as nurses or aid workers in addition to their work as reporters. When given an opportunity to witness the Gallipoli campaign, Eleanor Franklin Egan—whose work as a war correspondent dated back to the 1905 Russo-Japanese War and the first Russian Revolution—declined the offer. As she put it, "If I could do anything to help anyone—but what's the use. Nobody out of mere curiosity should go near a fearful thing like that" (182). However, only a few years after she refused to cover the carnage at Gallipoli, Egan begged her *Saturday Evening Post* readers to bear with her as she wrote about the moment when a starving Armenian man, a victim of the Turkish genocide, died before her eyes among a crowd of other famished survivors. The mostly male editors back in America's newsrooms expected their women reporters to provide the lighter "human interest" stories from the conflict, yet the unprecedented bloodbath of the world war was by no means restricted to the battlefield.

Historians and casual readers alike will find much to enjoy in Dubbs's expansive, engaging narrative. He follows faithfully in his subjects' footsteps, taking the reader beyond the well-traveled Western Front to the less-explored war zones of eastern Europe and the faltering Ottoman and Russian empires. Crucially, he also centers American women war correspondents within the major social and political dynamics of their day, both domestic and international. The women profiled in *An Unladylike Profession* had been shaped by progressive reform movements of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, from suffrage to socialism. For many, the war exposed tensions between their beliefs and the demands of their chosen profession. Could an outspoken peace activist like Inez Milholland Boissevain provide an objective perspective on the fighting in Italy, when her acidic commentary on the Italian soldiers who allowed themselves to be "massacred like dumb sheep" was so violently at odds with the patriotic rhetoric of the day?(173) Could a committed suffragist like Rheta Childe Dorr put an uplifting spin on her account of the Russian Women's Battalion of Death—an all-female volunteer combat unit who marched into battle, hoping to inspire and shame war-weary male soldiers into continuing to fight for the czar? In both published columns and in private letters and journals, many of the women confessed that they found it difficult to remain optimistic about the future in the face of the relentless misery of the present.

The American women war correspondents of World War I blazed a trail for future generations of journalists, men and women alike, by helping to reshape the concept of wartime reporting in modern conflicts. By bringing together so many of these women in a single volume, *An Unladylike Profession* frames them not as isolated individuals or well-meaning amateurs, but as a small but vocal cohort of dedicated professionals who challenged society's expectations for what any reporter—male or female—could accomplish.

SHANNON GRANVILLE is the senior editor in the Historical Products Division of the U.S. Army Center of Military History. Previously, she was editor and deputy publications director with the Woodrow Wilson Center Press, where her responsibilities included editing manuscripts for the Cold War International History

Project series copublished with Stanford University Press. She has a master's degree in international history from the London School of Economics and a bachelor's in history from the College of William and Mary. Her research interests include Cold War nuclear history, postwar British and Japanese politics, and political satire in popular culture.



OPERATION DON'S MAIN ATTACK: THE SOVIET SOUTHERN FRONT'S ADVANCE ON ROSTOV, JANUARY–FEBRUARY 1943

BY DAVID M. GLANTZ
University Press of Kansas, 2018
Pp. xxi, 930. $39.95

REVIEW BY MARK KLOBAS

In November 1942, the Red Army launched Operation Uranus, their famous counterattack against the Axis forces assaulting Stalingrad. Many regard this offensive, which successfully encircled four German and Romanian armies and over a quarter of a million soldiers, as being the turning point on the Eastern Front in World War II. It has received due attention in numerous works as a result. Yet Operation Uranus was just one of a series of offensives launched by Soviet forces at that time. They reflected Joseph Stalin's belief that the best way to achieve victory was by pressuring all fronts simultaneously in a search for the Germans' weakest point. Despite being a part of Soviet strategy at a critical point in the war, these operations have received considerably less attention than the Stalingrad counteroffensive. David Glantz is one of the few who has written about them. He wrote and published an account of Operation Mars, the calamitous campaign in the Rhzev salient, two decades ago. This book, which draws upon a wealth of documents declassified over the past thirty years to chronicle the Red Army's campaign in the south, is the first volume of a new series (a second volume, *Operation Don's Left Wing: The Trans Caucasus Front's Pursuit of the First Panzer Army, November 1942–February 1943*, was published in 2019) that brings this previously overshadowed operation into focus.

Glantz begins by summarizing the Soviet offensives conducted by the Southern Front at the end of 1942. The Red Army centered this effort on Operation Little Saturn, the offensive launched in December 1942 against Germany's *Armeeabteilung Hollidt* (part of their *Army Group Don*) and the Italian *Eighth Army*, which carved a salient into Axis lines south of Stalingrad. Seeking to maintain the pressure upon the Axis and build upon their success, the Stavka (Soviet High Command) conceived Operation Don, an ambitious plan to destroy an entire German army group. Though crafted in accordance with Soviet doctrines of operational maneuver and deep operations, it failed to take into account the reality of their situation by employing units already debilitated by weeks of combat. With other forces simultaneously committed in fronts elsewhere, they found combat replacements by cannibalizing support and rear-service units. This swelled the numbers of "bayonets" available, but exacerbated an even greater problem. The limited logistical capabilities and the demands of the Stalingrad campaign to the north restricted the supplies necessary to sustain the pace of the planned operation.

These problems soon became evident once the operation commenced. Although the initial thrust drove *LVII Panzer Corps* back and seized key crossing points over the Don and lower Manych rivers, mechanical troubles disabled over half of the tanks of the 3d Guards Tank Corps, and lack of fuel reduced the mobility of the 3d Guards Mechanized Corps. Moreover, the Stavka underestimated the Germans' ability to reinforce their beleaguered units, which soon slowed the pace of the advance. This gave the Germans the time needed to extricate the *First Panzer Army* from the Caucasus region and prevent the collapse of operations on their entire southern front. In an effort to prevent this, Stalin and the Stavka pressured the front commanders to capture the city of Rostov-on-Don, despite the growing deterioration of their forces after a month of sustained combat. The combination of Soviet weariness and a skillful defense by the Germans ensured the *First Panzer Army*'s successful withdrawal by the end of January. Determined to make up for this setback, Stalin pressed his generals to follow up their capture of Rostov, from which the *Fourth Panzer Army* withdrew on 13–14 February 1943, with a renewed offensive. A new thrust toward the Mius River proved a repeat of earlier operations. Impressive early gains, subsequently limited by inadequate logistical support and effective German response, left the campaign to peter out by the end of the month as merely a diversionary effort.

Glantz details all of this in a text that quotes liberally from contemporary reports, unit histories, and memoirs. He recounts events to such an extent that his book doubles as a collection of translated documents from the campaign. This adds to its value as a resource for anyone studying the operation in detail, albeit at the cost of a narrative that is readable and easy to follow. The maps provided do not help Glantz's effort in this respect. Although most are from the campaign itself, and make it possible for readers to review the maps the participants themselves utilized, the need to shrink them for reproduction combined with the mass of place names on them makes them difficult to read without careful study and even magnification. Here, University Press of Kansas would have better served Glantz if they produced a new set of maps for the book appropriately sized for the sake of clarity. This is a minor complaint, though, when set against the scale of Glantz's overall achievement. Combined with his previous book on Operation Mars and his more recent four-volume opus on the Battle of Stalingrad (cowritten with Jonathan M. House), he has provided English-language readers with the most comprehensive examination available of Soviet offensive campaigns in the fall and winter of 1942–1943. It is a monumental scholarly achievement; one not likely to be duplicated soon. There is still so much work to do in chronicling the epic campaigns on the Eastern Front that decided the course of World War II.

Mark Klobas teaches history at Scottsdale Community College in Scottsdale, Arizona. A graduate of Texas A&M University, he is a podcaster with the

New Books Network and is currently at work on a biography of the twentieth-century British newspaper editor James Louis Garvin.



RAMPAGE: MACARTHUR, YAMASHITA, AND THE BATTLE OF MANILA

By James M. Scott
W.W. Norton, 2018
Pp. 635. $32.95

REVIEW BY CHARLES R. BOWERY JR.

In the American popular imagination, World War II on land occurred in two distinct spheres. In North Africa, Italy, and Western Europe, the U.S. Army battled the Germans to ultimate victory. In the Pacific, the U.S. Marine Corps prevailed over the Empire of Japan. Both constructs are incomplete, ignoring as they do the contributions of the Allied nations. For America, the latter conception is also deeply flawed because it ignores the immense scale of the Army's Pacific war, which existed side by side with the Marines from Pearl Harbor in December 1941 to the surrender of Japan in 1945.

James M. Scott's *Rampage* goes some distance toward correcting the national misconception that the Army's World War II was fought in Europe. In his detailed retelling of General Douglas MacArthur's campaign to retake the Philippine island of Luzon and the national capital, Manila, and the battles fought to liberate the islands in 1944–1945, Scott also restores the voice of the Filipino people, who suffered greatly through the long years of Japanese occupation and the fight to retake their land. An accomplished narrative historian with a number of highly regarded books to his credit, Scott structures *Rampage* around the stories of the American and Japanese commanders, who offer compelling stories of their own.

Readers of *Army History* likely know a good deal about Douglas MacArthur. Although Scott correctly notes MacArthur's intense focus on his reputation and career and his constant use of the press to burnish his reputation, this is definitely a sympathetic portrayal of the man and his family. The book also does a good job of reconstructing the life and times of General Tomoyuki Yamashita, the "Tiger of Malaya," who was the author of the British surrender of Singapore in 1942 and the supreme Japanese commander in the Philippines.

As an American colony since the Spanish-American War, the Philippines was an outpost of Western commerce and lifestyle on the eve of World War II. Tens of thousands of American and European merchants, teachers, and family members lived and worked there. MacArthur served there several times in different capacities, including command of the Army's Philippine Department and, on the eve of Pearl Harbor, as the commander in chief of the Philippine armed forces. Shortly before the Japanese captured the islands and the American and Filipino defensive forces, President Franklin Roosevelt called MacArthur back to Australia, as Roosevelt was fearful of the propaganda victory Japan would gain with the general's capture. MacArthur took command of Allied forces in the Southwest Pacific, and plotted his return to Manila.

Another interesting dimension of *Rampage* is the story of the more than four thousand civilian internees held in Manila by the Japanese army. They occupied two locations in the city, the University of Santo Tomas and Bilibid Prison, from early 1942 until their liberation by American forces in early February 1945. The men, women, and children in these internment camps endured harsh conditions, malnutrition, and disease until their repatriation, and their efforts to fashion a life out of their surroundings make for an interesting subtext in this military history.

The battle for Manila began with American landings at Lingayen Gulf, northwest of the city, on 9 January 1945. The U.S. Sixth Army, spearheaded by the 1st Cavalry Division, would land and fight its way south to Manila, while elements of the American Eighth Army would attack from the southwest, around Manila Bay and into the city. Yamashita's forces in southern Luzon, including a force of naval infantry and marines in Manila itself, prepared their defenses. On 3 February, MacArthur launched a small force of the 1st Cavalry Division on a fifty-mile raid into Manila to capture the internment camps; these soldiers were the first into Manila late on 5 February, and by 7 February, had secured both camps and all of the surviving internees.

This success led MacArthur, ever on the lookout for a media opportunity, to declare the battle for Manila over on 9 February. In reality, the worst was only beginning. Admiral Sanji Iwabuchi, the Japanese commander in Manila, ignored Yamashita's orders to evacuate the city, instead fortifying key sections of it and destroying much of the rest with fire and explosives. For a week or more as he defended Manila, Iwabuchi allowed his sailors and marines to carry out systematic executions and rapes among the civilian population of Manila, an orgy of violence that makes for difficult reading, even after seventy-five years. American forces entered a ruined city in which the Japanese had fortified every building and intersection for urban combat. The twenty-nine-day battle for Manila killed or wounded 6,500 Americans and 16,600 Japanese, virtually the entirety of Iwabuchi's force. An estimated 100,000 Filipino men, women, and children died either from shellfire or Japanese atrocities.

The final act of this story took place in a Manila courtroom in December 1945. On 2 September, as the formal Japanese surrender took place in Tokyo Bay, Yamashita and his staff came down from the mountains of northern Luzon to surrender to American forces. After he formally surrendered his army—in a ceremony that included Lt. Gen. Jonathan M. Wainwright, who had surrendered Corregidor in 1942, and General Arthur E. Percival, the British commander at Singapore—the Allies imprisoned Yamashita to await his fate. MacArthur directed the formation of a military commission to try Yamashita, and assigned the general a defense team of Army judge advocates. The court-martial lasted for thirty-two days, and the prosecution team, consisting of American line officers who were prewar attorneys, laid out an exhaustive litany of testimony as to the atrocities that occurred in Manila during

the battle. Although there was no question that the atrocities occurred, the prosecution was unable to tie Yamashita conclusively to the orders for Japanese units to carry out the rapes and killings. Nevertheless, given the scale of the atrocity and the international optics of it, the outcome seemed preordained; the commission, composed of U.S. Army generals, only one of whom was a military judge, convicted Yamashita on 7 December, four years to the day after Pearl Harbor, and sentenced him to death. He was hanged on 23 February 1946.

Rampage is a compellingly written, fast-paced narrative that tells the story of the Battle of Manila from multiple viewpoints. Readers looking for detailed tactical and operational analysis of the battle will need to go elsewhere, but those seeking an interesting story of World War II in all of its dimensions will enjoy this book. In many respects, the soldiers of the U.S. Army units of the Pacific Theater recede into the background of this book. The characters of MacArthur and Yamashita, and the tragedy that befalls the Filipino people, dominate its narrative.

Charles R. Bowery Jr., a retired Army colonel, is the executive director of the U.S. Army Center of Military History. He is a former military history instructor at the U.S. Military Academy, West Point, and a graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. He served as an Apache helicopter pilot in Iraq, and commanded an attack helicopter battalion in Afghanistan. He is the coeditor of the Army War College's *Guide to the Richmond-Petersburg Campaign* (University Press of Kansas, 2014).

CAREER PROGRAM 61 AND A NEW TEAM MEMBER

Jon T. Hoffman

In a previous issue, I previewed the major changes in the Army's career program setup. That initiative continues to march forward and experience some growing pains along the way. The Army Civilian Career Management Activity (ACCMA) is up and running, though it is still developing processes to manage all of its missions and tasks. Michael W. DeYoung, formerly the Career Program (CP) 61 (Army Historians, Museum Personnel, and Archivists) program manager, is now the director of Operations and Plans in the new organization, which is located at Fort Belvoir, Virginia. His directorate is responsible for Recruitment and Outreach; Talent Acquisition; Talent Development; Talent Assessment and Analysis; Supervisor Training; and Operations and Programming. He is also dual-hatted as the deputy director of ACCMA, so we have a friend in high places. CP 61 is grouped with Career Programs 31 (Education Services) and 32 (Training, Capabilities, and Doctrine Warfighting Developers) under the Education and Information Sciences Career Field (CF EDIS). The functional chief for CF EDIS is David G. Paschal, the assistant deputy chief of staff G–3/5/7 at Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). As the U.S. Army Center of Military History (CMH) is also a TRADOC element, that alignment works well. Mr. Paschal is supported in his career field role by a small cell headed by James H. Breeding. CMH's executive director, Mr. Charles R. Bowery, serves in a new role as the functional adviser for CP 61, providing input on the program to Mr. Paschal.

The ongoing budget crunch from the COVID-19 pandemic continues to affect funding for career programs. CP 61 received a miniscule budget for training and career development this year. The Army recently cut $12 million from the centrally funded apprentice program, resulting in a freeze on all hiring actions that were not yet complete. That affected the two museum apprentices we had selected but not yet brought on board, as well as an archivist apprentice hiring action still in the works for the Tank-automotive and Armaments Command headquarters. ACCMA is trying to restore the apprentice part of its budget, and hopefully, we will be able to bring them on later this year. There is no indication yet what the budget for CP 61 or for the apprentice program will be in fiscal year (FY) 22, but it appears likely funding will be limited again compared to what was available before FY 21.

On a much more positive note, CF EDIS has promoted Dr. Nicole B. Morant to be the dedicated program manager for CP 61 to replace Mr. DeYoung. She has been working at TRADOC the past two years as the program manager for CP 32. One of her areas of emphasis was managing the training and development budget, so she has considerable expertise in programming, planning, and executing funding. She also oversaw CP 32's functional and leader development programs and thus brings a great deal of knowledge about developmental assignments, degree programs, mentorship, and continuous learning. Although she is dedicated to support of CP 61, she will remain a part of Mr. Breeding's cell at Fort Eustis, Virginia. Given our experience with remote work during the pandemic, we do not envision any issues arising from that physical separation. Being part of a team allows the members to help each other whenever someone is on leave or extremely busy. Camille B. Romail continues to provide contractor support to CP 61 and remains located at Fort McNair, D.C.

Prior to Dr. Morant's time at TRADOC, she spent seven years in the educational services field with the Army National Guard. She has a bachelor's degree in management from Delaware State University, a master's degree in human performance from the University of New Orleans, and a doctorate in education from Teachers College, Columbia University. The emphasis of her doctorate was adult learning and leadership, and she did her dissertation on the subject of military personnel transitioning into the civilian workforce. She has been an active participant in the work groups that helped develop and guide the creation of ACCMA, so she is intimately familiar with the new organization. She also is well-versed in the Army People Strategy and other high-level policies governing the civilian career programs. Her education, skills, and experience made her a perfect fit to manage CP 61 and we welcome her aboard the CP 61 team.



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