THE MEUSE-ARGONNE WAS NOT THE SOMME
THE AMERICAN COMBAT EXPERIENCE IN WORLD WAR I
BY GENE FAX

JOSHUA LAWRENCE CHAMBERLAIN AND THE INTERPERSONAL DYNAMICS OF LEADERSHIP
BY GEORGE R. GOETHALS
In the Summer 2022 issue of Army History, we are pleased to offer two new articles, a quality selection of book reviews, a look at some unique Army art, and the unveiling of a new exhibit at the National Infantry Museum.

The first article, by Gene Fax, evaluates the American World War I combat experience in the Meuse-Argonne with that of the British army during the Battle of the Somme. Fax argues that the mental image of “futile carnage” that dominated postwar depictions of the fighting came largely from British fiction, nonfiction, and theater. He also illustrates that the “endless futility” of the war’s early years usually did not hamper American Expeditionary Forces’ battlefield performance, even though the Americans often ignored or dismissed lessons and techniques offered by their British and French allies that had been learned the hard way.

The second article is a commentary from George Goethals. Goethals, a professor of leadership studies at the University of Richmond, provides of critique of Col. Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain and his actions at the Battle of Gettysburg as the commander of the 20th Maine Volunteer Infantry—actions that were ultimately crucial to Union victory. Most students of history know well Chamberlain’s exploits on Little Round Top, but some may not know about the episode with the “mutineers” from the 2d Maine shortly before the battle. Goethals studies Chamberlain’s interactions with the 2d Maine and their delegate, as depicted in the novel Killer Angels by Michael Shaara and later the movie Gettysburg. Through these fictional accounts, which Goethals points out are based on relevant histories, he suggests how Chamberlain may have established his authority and legitimacy effectively over the men of the 2d Maine.

Recently, there has been some internal reorganization here at the Center of Military History (CMH). Our Historical Products Division that produces Army History, among other things, has been renamed the Multimedia and Publications Division (MPD). MPD has been moved out from under the Histories Directorate and now reports directly to the CMH Headquarters and the deputy director. In addition, MPD also absorbed the CMH Strategic Initiatives Group, which includes the Center’s website and some of its social media content creation responsibilities. This move will allow MPD to serve better CMH as a whole, as well as customers within the Army Museum Enterprise, and the Army at large. It will not affect the publication of Army History in any way.

On a side note, Army History has not been immune from the supply chain issues affecting most of the country. Many printers are having difficulties securing paper in a timely manner and this has already led to some brief delays in printing and distributing the last couple of issues. Army History readers should know that we will make every effort to get our issues out to you on time and on target.
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AND THE INTERPERSONAL DYNAMICS OF LEADERSHIP
BY GEORGE R. GOETHALS
On 26 July 1948, President Harry S. Truman issued Executive Order (EO) 9981, banning segregation in the United States armed forces “without regard to race, color, religion, or national origin.” Less than two years later, the U.S. Army went to war in Korea and it took the first halting steps toward integration. Four years after that, the Army in Europe was desegregated completely, with African American soldiers serving in all military occupational specialties and units. The process of desegregating the Army in Europe remains one of the most remarkable, but largely forgotten, transformational moments in the Army’s long history.

However, it would be a mistake to celebrate 26 July 1948 as the end of systemic racism in the Army. That date was only “the end of the beginning,” to paraphrase Winston Churchill, of a decades-long process of redress and growth. The day after the issuance of the order, General Omar N. Bradley, only days into his tenure as Army chief of staff, told a media group that the Army was no place for social experiments and that the Army would desegregate only as the rest of the nation did so. General Dwight D. Eisenhower testified before Congress in support of the continuance of segregation in the Army. Service leaders reacted to EO 9981 with general ambivalence and in many cases with outright resistance and refusal to comply. By early 1950, there was so little movement on the order that Truman established a whole-of-government committee to analyze the services’ compliance with the order and to apply political pressure to force them to integrate. This attention to the issue, combined with the personnel needs of the Cold War, which had heated up in Korea, nudged the Army’s leadership in the direction of desegregation. Unit leaders took it from there. Over time, the entire Army came to realize that not only was segregation morally and constitutionally wrong, it was hugely harmful to military readiness. So from the top of the Army leadership to the grassroots of unit commanders, desegregation efforts converged on an Army that eventually met the intent of EO 9981.

Soldiers and citizens who study the Army’s desegregation efforts should celebrate the Army’s national leadership in the area of social justice and freedom, but they should also learn and understand the deep and insidious ways that institutional racism have continued to affect people of color up to the present day. In the era of the all-volunteer U.S. military, people of color, and women of color in particular, have been consistently underrepresented in the Army’s officer corps, as well as in a number of branches and specialties, amid a well-intentioned but harmful focus on so-called “color-blind” personnel policies. These policies fail to account for the social, cultural, and political factors that have often limited the opportunities for non-White soldiers. A belief that the Army has achieved a post-racial meritocracy ignores these factors. An honest study of the Army’s more recent history provides a vital corrective to this triumphalist narrative. The U.S. Army truly is one of the most diverse and inclusive institutions in our nation, but a warts-and-all understanding of the Army’s history can result in a deeper awareness that can inform current and future policy decisions. Only in this way can we continue to leverage the Army’s diversity as a marker of our strength and effectiveness.

NOTES
Army History Articles Win Multiple Awards

Articles published by Army History were honored recently with two awards. The first was a 2021 Army Historical Foundation Distinguished Writing Award in the Academic Journals category for “The Gulf War at 30,” by J. Travis Moger, which appeared in the Winter 2021 (No. 118) issue of Army History. This article commemorated the thirtieth anniversary of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Moger detailed the complexities of joint operations and coalition warfare while examining the lasting impact the Gulf War has had on the Army, the Middle East, and the world.

The second award, from the Society for History in the Federal Government, recognized the article “Lost but Not Forgotten: The Search for the Missing of the Hürtgen Forest,” by Ian Michael Spurgeon, which appeared in the Summer 2021 (No. 120) issue of Army History. This article outlined the process by which the Defense POW/MIA Accounting Agency analyzes, investigates, and accounts for fallen U.S. soldiers. It described how the agency applied this methodology to the recovery efforts in the Hürtgen Forest and how this project fits into the larger history of the agency. The article also makes use of and explains Graves Registration records and other underutilized primary sources.

New Publication from AUSA

The Association of the United States Army (AUSA) recently released its latest entry in the Medal of Honor graphic novel series: Medal of Honor: Tom Custer. Thomas W. Custer was the first soldier in U.S. history to earn two Medals of Honor. During the Civil War, he lied about his age to enlist in the infantry and then commissioned as a cavalry officer. The medals recognized his actions in two separate battles in April 1865 in which he captured Confederate flags and multiple prisoners. Years later, he was killed at the Battle of the Little Big Horn alongside his younger brother Boston and their older sibling, George Armstrong Custer. Information and links to all of the graphic novels are available on AUSA’s Medal of Honor series page at: https://www.ausa.org/medal-honor-graphic-novels.

Army History Email Account Problems and Backlog

Late last year, the Army migrated email domains and changed from “mail.mil” to “army.mil” addresses. During this migration, we lost access to the Army History email account (usarmy.mcnair.cmh.mbx.army-history@army.mil) and only recently regained access. If you emailed us in the last eight months or so and did not receive a reply, this is the reason. We are currently working through the large backlog of messages and will respond to them in the order in which we received them. We apologize for the delay and inconvenience and thank our readers for their patience.
By Gene Fax

The image of World War I in English-speaking countries is characterized by soldiers living in trenches, emerging occasionally to walk shoulder-to-shoulder into deadly artillery and machine-gun fire; long rows of troops making futile mass attacks that killed millions for no gains in territory; generals repeating failed tactics over and over, indifferent to immense casualties; and soldiers broken in body and spirit by unceasing, fruitless combat.1 This is a caricature. However, like all caricatures, it is based partly on truth. The British (and the French and, eventually, the Americans) did waste many lives in fruitless attacks.

American Reactions to the War

Futility was not, however, the war’s dominant impression among the American public for many years after the war ended. Films such as The Big Parade (1925), What Price Glory (1926), Wings (1927), and Hell’s Angels (1930) presented it as an arena for individual heroism and romance. Disillusion was there, in literary works by Ernest Hemingway, E. E. Cummings, F. Scott Fitzgerald, and others, but it sat in the shadow of more popular notions of valor and accomplishment.2 Works now seen as bitterly antiwar were not always perceived that way when they were published originally and they did not represent the attitude of many veterans.3 Even Erich Maria Remarque’s All Quiet on the Western Front (Little Brown, 1929), as antiwar a novel as one can imagine, was often seen as representing Europe’s war, not America’s.4 American attitudes reflected the nature of America’s war, which was different from that of the other combatants on the Western Front. Officially, the United States was in the war for nineteen months beginning on 6 April 1917. But the U.S. Army fought as an army for only nine weeks, from 12 September through 11 November 1918. A few divisions fought under British and French command before then, but the First U.S. Army was not formed as a unified, self-sufficient fighting force under American command until 10 August 1918 and did not go into action for another month. Once it did, it left the trenches and never looked back. Moreover, the United States suffered 50,000 combat deaths, as opposed to 1.6 million German, 1.4 million French, and 900,000 British and Commonwealth dead.5

How did the image of futile carnage come to dominate the American impression of the war? It came from the British, who produced the majority of fiction, nonfiction, and theater about the conflict. Robert Graves, Siegfried L. Sassoon, Virginia Woolf, and others, writing in the 1920s, were the first to pick up the themes of tragedy and disillusion. Not until the 1960s, however, did the mood
become one of nihilism and cynicism. *Oh, What a Lovely War!* (stage, 1963; film, 1969) and the *Blackadder* television series (1989) showcased the absurdity of the commanders and the deceptions they practiced on their soldiers. Histories like Martin Middlebrook’s *The First Day on the Somme* (Allen Lane, 1971) and Niall Ferguson’s *The Pity of War* (Basic Books, 1998) contrasted the war’s staggering casualties with the mindless optimism of the generals. Paul Fussell’s *The Great War and Modern Memory* (Oxford University Press, 1975; an American author analyzing British culture and literature) documented the efforts of propagandists and memorialists to transform horror into myth. To present-day citizens of Great Britain, and by extension the United States, they reduced the entire war to the 1916 experience of the British Army in Flanders, epitomized by the Battle of the Somme.

**World War I’s Early Years**

It is true that the war in the West from December 1914 to March 1918 comprised offensives—mostly British or French—that produced hundreds of thousands of casualties with little gain in territory or strategic advantage. But the static nature of the war in northeastern France was changing even as the U.S. Army reached the battlefield. Partly this was because of changes in Allied and German fighting methods. By early 1918, when only a few American divisions had arrived in France, the stalemate on the Western Front was about to come to an end. The Germans had developed new artillery, infantry, and air combat methods to create a new tactical concept. Before 1918, a typical attack would open with a bombardment of several days to a week, with the intention to destroy the enemy’s fortifications. This usually tipped off the enemy that something big was coming. In the new system, German field guns would fire intensely but briefly—a few hours only—on the enemy front lines to surprise the defenders and drive them into their dugouts and bunkers. Heavy artillery would pound strategic points such as crossroads, railroad lines, supply dumps, and telephone exchanges. As the infantry attacked, the guns would lay down a moving line of fire as close as fifty yards ahead of the soldiers in a rolling barrage to suppress the defenders. Infantry would advance in groups as small as platoons and squads, armed with a variety of weapons including light machine guns, grenades, trench mortars, and flamethrowers. They would probe for weak spots in the enemy line and penetrate through them to the rear areas, disrupting command and control, isolating defending units from each other, interdicting supplies and reinforcements, and leaving heavily defended fortifications for the supporting troops to mop up. Artillery spotters accompanied the infantry to call in the guns when the advancing troops hit an obstacle. Airplanes identified targets for the artillery and provided ground support to the attacking troops. The combination of infantry, artillery, air, and—in the case of the Allies—tanks has come to be called combined-arms warfare. A modern writer has defined this as "the basic idea that different combat arms and weapons systems must be used in concert to maximize the survival and combat effectiveness of the others. The strengths of one system must be used to compensate for the weaknesses of others."

Using these methods, in March of 1918,
the Germans sent seventy-one divisions crashing across the old Somme battlefield, destroying one British army, damaging another, and punching a hole in the Allied position 40 miles deep and 40 miles wide. A second attack further north threatened the English Channel ports and further weakened the British. In May, a third offensive pushed a salient 30 miles through the French lines all the way to the Marne River and was stopped partly by the timely arrival of two American divisions. The French government debated quitting Paris. Two more attacks against the French in June and July made minor gains, but eventually the exhausted Germans came to a halt. In July, two French armies reinforced by (at various times) nine American divisions, using similar methods, returned the favor, pushing many of the depleted German divisions back to their starting line. Then in August, the British, having recovered from the Spring Offensives and reorganized their army, staged an attack at Amiens based on combined-arms principles. They advanced 6 to 8 miles on the first day and, in a few days more, eliminated the German salient. The German Commander in Chief General Erich Ludendorff, called this “the black day of the German army.” Mobility, absent for three years, had returned to the battlefield.

The Americans Start to Fight
How did these startling developments affect the American Army as it arrived in France? At first, not much. The Americans, who by September of 1918 numbered almost 2 million in France, missed the three years of static, trench-bound combat—the part that British memory still considers to be “The War.” This was a good thing, because by the time most of the Americans got there, the war was becoming mobile. But General John J. Pershing, the American commander in chief, was unimpressed by machine guns, artillery, tanks, and even hand grenades. He considered these to be inessential and characteristic of the tactics that had gotten the Allies nothing but casualties. He disdained what he believed to be the characteristics of trench warfare—rolling barrages, phase lines, timed advances, limited objectives—and expressed his own concept of battle concisely: “Close adherence is urged to the central idea that the essential principles of war have not changed: that the rifle and the bayonet remain the supreme weapons of the infantry soldier and that the ultimate success of the Army depends upon their proper use in open warfare.”

Only this kind of attack, he maintained, could get the Germans out of their trenches so they could be defeated in the open field. Artillery, machine guns, and the rest were useful, but only in supporting roles. Pershing’s concept was reinforced by the Army’s Field Service Regulations of 1917, which prescribed flank attacks and vigorous pursuit. It hardly mentioned artillery, gave no useful instructions on attacking fortified positions, dismissed the machine gun as “a weapon of emergency,” and did not mention airplanes, which had been used since 1914. These were essentially the tactics used at the Battle of Gettysburg. They were also the tactics that the French army had used at the beginning of the war, yielding them 300,000 casualties in one month—which is what led them to dig trenches in the first place. Pershing allowed that trench methods would be useful occasionally but feared that too much training in such doctrine would dilute the basic aggressiveness and initiative of American soldiers. He therefore forbade French and British trainers from instructing American troops except in purely technical functions—how to operate machine guns and artillery, how to organize a staff—and expelled them entirely in July of 1918.

He thus cut his forces off from learning about the most recent developments on the Western Front. The Americans’ first combat actions recapitulated the French experience at the beginning of the war. In June 1918, the marines of the U.S. 2d Division attacked Belleau Wood in orderly rows with fixed bayonets. They were cut to pieces by German machine guns. If they were to learn at all, it would be on their own.

Although nine of its divisions saw combat in early 1918, while attached to the British and French, the First Army was created only three months before the end of the war and did not go into action until 12 September. Marshal Ferdinand Foch, the French commander in chief of Allied forces on the Western Front, intended a concentric, simultaneous attack on the German position: the Americans in the Lorraine would attack northward, between the Meuse River and the Argonne Forest, along with the French Fourth Army to its left; the French in Lorraine and Champagne would move northeasterly a day later; and the British in Picardy, Artois, and Flanders would strike eastward beginning a day after that. But Pershing persuaded Foch to allow him to conduct a preliminary mission to reduce the Saint-Mihiel salient, a bulge in the German line that threatened the eastern flank of the American position and interrupted lateral rail traffic and which the Germans had occupied since 1914. Eight American divisions—including six of the seven most experienced ones—and three French divisions took all their objectives in four days. But the victory was deceptive. The Germans were already in the process of abandoning the salient, so First Army fought mainly against rear guards, not well-entrenched and committed defenders. The action therefore gave an overly optimistic impression of the fighting capabilities of the U.S. formations. Many problems of tactics, logistics, and command arose that reappeared in the Meuse-Argonne Offensive. Perhaps most important, the commitment of so many trained, veteran divisions made them unavailable for Foch’s later, more important, operation.

Pershing’s plan for the Meuse-Argonne Offensive envisioned nine American divisions organized into three corps attacking abreast along a 20-mile front (see Map; six more divisions were in reserve). They were to go “over the top” at 0530 on 26 September and were expected to advance up to 13 miles by noon. Pershing knew of the need to use trench warfare methods to penetrate the German defenses before his troops could conduct a rapid advance. He therefore specified intermediate objectives at which the three corps would wait for each other before advancing further. He ordered a rolling barrage timed to advance at 100 meters every 4 minutes. He specified boundaries between which the corps were to operate. But all this was to be temporary—for a few hours at most.
Clearly such methods could not produce the planned 13-mile advance in half a day.

Pershing’s continuing commitment to open warfare in the face of a strongly fortified German defense was shown by his plan for the heavy guns of Army and corps artillery. They were to fire only “until an hour when the infantry was to reach its objective,” in the words of Col. Conrad H. Lanza, former chief of operations of First Army artillery. “After this hour had been reached, it was assumed that the infantry would not need further strong artillery support, as there should be no enemy resistance left except from possible isolated detachments which might have escaped our artillery fire. . . . To enable the infantry to advance more rapidly, all fire by corps and army artillery was stopped inside of a line many kilometers beyond where the infantry was located.” Only the divisional field artillery was to provide support as it moved its guns forward behind the infantry—assuming it could negotiate the muddy, shell-torn terrain that the attackers had traversed.

One can judge the realism of Pershing’s plan by comparing it to the 8 August 1918 assault on the Amiens salient in which the British Fourth Army advanced six to eight miles the first day. In that engagement, the Germans had not fortified their positions strongly. They had dug in wherever Ludendorff’s first offensive petered out. Their soldiers were hungry, having outrun their supplies (one of the reasons the offensive stalled was that the troops had paused to loot abandoned British food stocks). The British preregistered their guns on 95 percent of the German artillery positions using air reconnaissance and careful calibration of their weapons. They used their best assault troops, Australians and Canadians. They conducted extensive combined-arms training to teach the infantry, artillery, air, and armor how to operate in mutual support.

By contrast, in the Meuse-Argonne sector, the Germans had occupied their positions for four years and had honeycombed the hillsides with reinforced trenches, wire, interconnected concrete bunkers, machine gun nests with overlapping fields of fire, and zeroed-in cannons. These defenses were particularly strong in the Argonne Forest in the west of the sector and around Montfaucon, a hill in the center that gave a commanding view of the surrounding countryside. Having occupied the sector only days before the assault, the Americans had no opportunity to identify German artillery positions in advance; inexperienced observers coupled with fog and rain prevented them from identifying targets for counterbattery fire. Of the nine divisions in the American line, only one (the 4th) could be considered veteran and four (the 35th, 37th, 79th, and 91st) had seen no action at all. Most of the American divisions’ infantry regiments had never worked with artillery, the few available practice ranges in France being far from the infantry’s training grounds; none had ever worked with aircraft.
Most American soldiers had never seen tanks, much less trained with them. Tanks were allocated to two American corps for the assault but were given no particular orders other than “whenever practicable, to assist the advance” of the infantry. In comparison to the British at Amiens, Pershing’s preparations for an advance of 13 miles on the first day were primitive in the extreme. First Army’s offensive failed badly to meet Pershing’s expectations. On the first day, most divisions advanced four miles, and in front of Montfaucon, the 79th Division made only two. Not until 13 October, did the Army reach the line Pershing had specified for the first day’s advance. The ordeal of the 79th, one of the least trained and wholly inexperienced units in the assault, epitomizes the experience of the Army. It will be used as a case study in the development of the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) as a combat formation.

The 79th, a draft division, had been given the task of taking Montfaucon hill. In its sector, the rolling barrage quickly outran the soldiers, exposing them to withering machine gun and rifle fire. The troops bunched up in the fields and woods and failed to take cover. The few roads turned to mud and became jammed; food, ammunition, and reinforcements could not get forward nor could the wounded be evacuated. Army and corps artillery, forbidden from firing at targets short of the Army objective, failed to support the infantry after the initial bombardment. The division’s own guns got stuck in the mud, unable to follow the troops. The result was virtually no artillery support after the first day of the attack. Communications broke down so that commanders no longer knew where their soldiers were or which units were beside or behind them. One whole brigade, half of the division’s infantry strength, remained out of contact with division headquarters for almost 20 hours. Soldiers from different battalions and regiments got mixed together, making control almost impossible. Support units failed to mop up bypassed enemy positions, subjecting the front lines to fire from the rear. Most of the French tanks assigned to the 79th either never got their orders or failed to reach the battlefield on time. Soldiers did not accompany the tanks that did advance, exposing the latter to destruction or forcing them to retire. A German officer wrote an account of the assault of the 79th:

The enemy soldiers fall by rows, collapsing and sinking silently to the ground. New waves hurl themselves over the corpses of the fallen. They too meet the same fate. Then the attacking spirit of the enemy seems broken. The last remnants turn back towards the enemy in front of the bodies of their comrades.

Inflexible boundaries made it impossible for divisions to support one another. This problem became critical for the 79th, which by the afternoon of 26 September had become stuck in front of Montfaucon. The veteran 4th Division to its right had bypassed the hill and by that evening was in a position to encircle it from the rear, thus capturing the hill as well as the German division defending it and opening a large hole in the German line. Such a movement had been anticipated in somewhat confused terms in Pershing’s original order but had wholly disappeared from the corps and divisional orders. Officers in the 4th Division nevertheless saw their opportunity and asked III Corps staff for permission to send

37th Division engineers repairing a road near Montfaucon, 28 September 1918. (National Archives)
a brigade westward. Permission was granted. That night, a phone call from an unidentified officer at III Corps headquarters came in to the 4th Division commander canceling the movement—the 4th was to continue to plow straight ahead. Of several explanations since offered for this puzzling error, the most likely is that the overcautious chief of staff of III Corps feared losing control of 4th Division's troops by sending them into enemy territory and in front of the (virtually inactive) guns of the 79th.20

The 79th took Montfaucon on the morning of the second day and struggled forward until 30 September, when it was relieved. In all, it had gained 7 miles but had given back the last mile in the face of German counterattacks. It had suffered 609 officers and enlisted killed, 2,674 wounded, and 594 gassed, for a total of 3,877 casualties. 21

Along with the 79th, three other divisions were pulled out of the line and three veteran divisions were sent up to replace them. In five days, First Army had suffered roughly 24,000 casualties, about one-quarter of them killed.22 Nevertheless, the army continued to plod forward for another two weeks, making limited progress, incurring casualties, but gaining combat experience.

A Change in Tactics

By 11 October, Pershing realized that, at more than 1,000,000 soldiers covering 85 miles of front, the Army had grown beyond his ability to control it. The next day, he split his Army in two: First Army would continue to attack between the Meuse and the Argonne Forest and Second Army would operate east of the Meuse River. He appointed himself Army Group commander, taking himself out of direct management of the battle. As his own replacement, he appointed Maj. Gen. Hunter Liggett, his most experienced corps commander, to lead First Army and promoted him to lieutenant general.23 Liggett was an innovative tactician. As commander of I Corps, he had inserted a brigade of the 82d Division into the line to the right of the 77th Division, which had stalled in the Argonne Forest. He sent them on a daring attack westward behind the German lines, rescuing the surrounded "Lost Battalion" and allowing the 77th to advance rapidly northward. At Liggett’s insistence, on 19 October, Pershing stopped the offensive. Liggett used the period from 20 to 31 October to regroup, reorganize, and retrain. He particularly drew on the recommendations of Maj. Gen. Charles P. Summerall, an experienced artillerist then commanding V Corps.24 The changes in tactics that Liggett and his staff would make, plus what the soldiers in the trenches taught themselves, would transform the AEF into an efficient fighting organization.

On 8 October, the 79th Division took over a “quiet” sector on the old Saint-Mihiel battlefield to rest and refit. The sector was quiet only in the sense that neither side had planned an offensive action. Frequent shelling, including gas, and occasional German trench raids kept the soldiers on edge. But they were not idle. First Army sent groups of them off to be trained in the methods they should have studied in the first place. Upon their return, they were to train their comrades in what they had learned. Maj. Gen. Joseph E. Kuhn, the division commander, reorganized his brigades to give him better control on the battlefield. The troops developed fire discipline, no longer shooting at shadows and noises. Anticipating enemy shelling, the soldiers learned to spread out and dig in. They sent out nightly patrols and took prisoners. Support units—sanitary, ammunition, and supply trains—learned road discipline and how to set up distribution points behind the front. Gas mask discipline was enforced. With increasing expertise, confidence
and morale improved. The division soon demonstrated its increased competence by repelling several German nighttime raids, one of them by ambush, which inflicted heavy losses.  

The retraining of the 79th reflected the experience of the AEF as a whole. The Army and corps staff learned to make divisional boundaries flexible and to conduct oblique assaults, not just frontal. Army and corps staffs encouraged their artillery to support local attacks when good targeting information was available. Infantry commanders learned to coordinate their plans with the artillery to arrange fire support ahead of time. Artillery officers assigned observers to regions of the battlefield, not just within their own divisional sectors, so that fire from several artillery brigades could be concentrated on individual targets. Communications between infantry and artillery improved and hourly dispatches of carrier pigeons proved quite reliable.  

On 1 November, the 79th was put back into the line for a new assault. It was to capture another hill, this one east of the Meuse River, which the Germans were using to direct their heavy artillery against the right flank of Pershing’s stalled First Army. The fight was a bitter, three-day struggle and the division took losses, but not because they were unskilled. They had learned how to work with artillery observers to bring the guns to bear on the positions they were attacking. They displayed their newfound expertise on the night of 9 November. To shorten the division’s front, the left brigade was ordered to perform a flank march—that is, to move sideways to its right, falling in behind the right-hand brigade. A flank march is a difficult maneuver under any circumstances, but the 79th accomplished it at night, in a hurry, and under fire. The division kept moving forward and, when the Armistice took effect two days later, it found itself closer to Germany than any other unit in the American Army.  

By the end of the war, the 79th had transformed itself into a competent fighting organization. It never became as proficient as the British and French, or even as adroit as the regular U.S. divisions or some of the National Guard units. But to develop effective combat methods, the AEF—and the 79th along with it—had learned the basics of modern warfare in nine weeks, from 12 September to 11 November 1918, while its allies had taken almost four years. One can ask fairly how this difference came about.  

**Development of British Doctrine**  
No single answer appears in the records of the war, but a picture emerges from comparing the learning trajectories of the British and American armies. Students of the British army point out that it had, in fact, developed many of the elements of combined-arms warfare as early as 1916. These included the rolling barrage, small units attacking between enemy strongpoints, fire and maneuver, equipping attacking units with a variety of light weapons, and tanks and aircraft working with infantry. However, British leadership did not combine these elements into a well-defined system that could be duplicated with success. Certain imaginative officers of Third Army, commanded by General Sir Julian Byng, made a start at Cambrai in November 1917. His attack used tanks, infantry, air support, and artillery firing by map coordinates (rather than registering the guns using preliminary fire) to penetrate the Hindenburg Line by up to 4 miles. (Unprepared to follow up their success, the British forces were soon pushed back to their original
positions.) For the most part, however, the elements of what would become combined-arms tactics were used separately at different places and times. Before 1918, British commanders were incapable of integrating them into a comprehensive system that could be replicated.

The reasons for this arose from the social system of the British army itself. The branches of the army—infantry, cavalry, artillery, and indeed individual regiments and battalions—came from different military traditions to the extent that they regarded each other “as outsiders and sometimes almost as civilians.” The officer corps was anti-intellectual and antimodern, which led it to reject doctrine and theory as concepts. Instead, it believed that the fox-hunting, grouse-shooting upper classes would know instinctively how to lead soldiers in battle and that aggressive leadership would overcome any amount of firepower. A persistent conviction continued that cavalry was the decisive arm in combat, leading Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, the British commander in chief, to place General Hubert Gough, a cavalry soldier, in charge of both the Somme and Passchendaele battles. These tendencies fostered an antipathy to technology—machine guns, quick-firing artillery, tanks, airplanes—especially among cavalry officers. Infantry commanders continued their faith in the rifle and bayonet as the essential arms, assigning artillery and tanks to adjunct support roles rather than important forces in themselves. Commanders were unable generally to learn from their men’s battlefield experiences because of the strict segregation between officers, drawn from the upper and upper-middle classes and the land-owning gentry, and noncommissioned officers and enlisted soldiers, representing the lower-middle and working classes.

The officer who put the elements together for the British Army was not British. He was Lt. Gen. Sir John Monash, commander of the Australian Army Corps. To the British officer corps, Monash was four times an outsider: a colonial; an engineer rather than a professional soldier; an intellectual; and of German-Jewish ancestry. But as an outsider, his philosophy was that:

"The true role of infantry was not to expend itself upon heroic physical effort, not to wither away under merciless machine gun fire, not to impale itself on hostile bayonets, nor to tear itself to pieces in hostile entanglements . . . but on the contrary, to advance under the maximum possible protection of the maximum possible array of mechanical resources, in the form of guns, machine-guns, tanks, mortars, and aeroplanes."
Ordered to reduce a German salient in the vicinity of Hamel on the old Somme battlefield, Monash put his ideas into effect. He had his infantry train with tanks, to refine their mutual-support tactics and to engender trust—hitherto lacking—between the two branches. To maintain surprise, artillery were to avoid registration fire and were not to change position before the attack. The guns were to open with a four-minute preparatory bombardment (rather than the days- or weeklong cannonades used previously), then switch to a sophisticated firing schedule that included shrapnel, high explosive, smoke, and a rolling barrage. Troops in small detachments equipped with light machine guns and grenades would bypass strongpoints. Tanks were to reduce fortifications, which would then be taken from the rear by the infantry. Aircraft would support the ground assault by scouting for the tanks and by dropping ammunition to the advancing infantry by air. Actions beyond the initial advance—fire, movement—would be at the initiative of commanders of brigades and subsidiary units on the spot, rather than being prescribed rigidly by headquarters. The attack jumped off at 0310 on 4 July 1918. It achieved its objectives in 93 minutes. A month later, General Sir Henry S. Rawlinson, commander of the British Fourth Army, applied Monash’s principles to his attack at Amiens, advancing 8 miles the first day and 20 miles by the end of the operation 17 days later.

Summary
How, then, did it take the AEF only nine weeks to adopt similar methods? It was not because they learned from the British and French; Pershing expelled them from the American training camps in July 1918. Most likely, the speed with which the AEF acquired its skills was precisely because it was starting from scratch. The Americans had no entrenched officer class to perpetuate old military traditions. America’s historic aversion to a standing army meant that the small but tightly knit officer corps had little social or political influence. In fact, there were no military traditions to speak of. The most recent major war was by then more than 50 years in the past and had involved volunteer and draft regiments, not long-service regular units with proud histories. The army’s rapid expansion to, eventually, 4 million soldiers meant that the majority of officers and enlisted soldiers were in the same boat, having essentially no military experience. Officers and their troops often came from the same social stratum. The former were more likely to be college-educated and wealthier, but Ivy League graduates served in the ranks and soldiers from working-class families became officers. These structural features imparted a certain democracy to the organization. Rigidities of class were, if not unknown, at least uncommon. It is clear from memoirs and journals that privates frequently developed familiar relations with their officers, unlike the British Army, where class differences often rendered interactions between officers and enlisted soldiers as “mutual incomprehension, good-natured but absolute.” This allowed small-unit commanders to derive tactics from the immediate battlefield experience of their troops rather than from regimental tradition or notions of “proper” procedure directed from above.

Rapid improvement in the AEF was possible partly because the Americans had little to unlearn; partly because it possessed imaginative commanders such as Liggett and Summerall; and partly because its social structure allowed innovation from the bottom up. Endless futility was not part of its military experience. That is why the American public’s impression of despair and alienation among participants and veterans did not solidify until the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, when British literature and film portrayed the entire war as one long Battle of the Somme.
Gene Fax is the author of With Their Bare Hands: General Pershing, the 79th Division, and the Battle for Montfaucon, which was published by Osprey in February 2017 and appeared in paperback in June 2018. The book received the 2017 Master Corporal Jan Stanislaw Jakobczak Memorial Book Award by the U.S. Military History Group as the outstanding book on U.S. military history between 1898 and 1945. It was selected as a finalist for the Army Historical Foundation’s 2017 Distinguished Writing Awards and was named “One of the 5 Best Books on the Hundred Days Offensive” by History of War magazine. More of his writings can be found at genefaxauthor.com.

Notes

1. I have based this article in part on talks I gave to the Inter-Agency Seminar Group in December 2017 and to the American chapter of the Western Front Association in January 2021.

2. Not many famous American writers saw combat. William Faulkner, John dos Passos, E. E. Cummings, Ernest Hemingway, and F. Scott Fitzgerald were all in uniform but did not fight at the front. (Hemingway was wounded in Italy while serving as an ambulance driver.) The dramatic and nonfiction writings of Laurence Stallings, who lost a leg to wounds suffered at Belleau Wood, show the varying attitudes to the war of even a single “literary” writer. His semiautobiographical novel Plumes (Harcourt, Brace, 1924) showed a wounded veteran’s difficulty adapting to society and his resolve to spare his son the trauma. His Broadway hit What Price Glory (1924), cowritten with Maxwell Anderson, was a romantic comedy produced again in 1926 as a movie. The First World War (Simon and Schuster, 1933) was a collection of photographs to which Stallings attached ironic captions. His The Doughboys (Harper and Row, 1963) was a tribute to the American soldier that can only be called celebratory.


4. See, for example, George Currie, “All Quiet on the Western Front,” (book review), Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 2 Jun 1929), 94: “To us who went to France and came back again, particularly those like myself who got not even a scratch . . . the war was and still is a pretty good little war, after all. But to Erich Maria Remarque it was a ghastly war, leading to a ghastly explosion of a national delusion. There is, I think we may concede at this late date, a vast difference in the point of view.”


9. War Department, Field Service Regulations, United States Army, 1914: Corrected to April 15, 1917, Document No. 475 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1917), found at various places throughout the text. The artillery’s own service regulations, in three volumes, had one sentence on its combat role: “The reason for the existence of Field Artillery is its ability to assist the other arms, especially the Infantry, upon the field of battle.” See War Department, Provisional Drill and Service Regulation for Field Artillery (Horse and Light), 1916, Corrected to April 15, 1917, Document No. 538, 3 vols. (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1917), vol. 1, 17.


11. The American force included four regular divisions—1, 2, 4, and 5—and two National Guard divisions, 26 and 42.


13. Ibid. Pershing’s Field Order No. 20 of 20 September 1918 specified, “The advance will be pushed with great vigor. The American Army objective will be reached during the afternoon of D day.” 87. The map accompanying the order shows the American Army Objective as lying from a maximum of 13 miles ahead of the jump-off line in the V (center) Corps sector, or about 3 miles beyond Romagne-sous-Montfaucon, to roughly 4 miles in the I (left) Corps sector. The advance planned on the extreme right extended only to the Meuse River, which bounded the battlefield.


19. Field Orders No. 20 said of III Corps, “By promptly penetrating the hostile second position it will turn Montfaucon and the section of the hostile second position within the zone of action of the V Corps, thereby assisting the capture of the hostile second position west of Montfaucon,” Historical Division, U.S. Army in the World War, vol. 9, 84. But III Corps ordered the 4th Division to operate only in its own sector, John L. Hines, “Field Orders No. 54,” 24 Sep 1918, RG 120, Entry 1241, 4th Division Historical File, Box 16, 32.1, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

20. Gene Fax, With Their Bare Hands: General Pershing, the 79th Division, and the Battle for Montfaucon (Oxford: Osprey, 2017), 246. In another illustration of First Army’s self-defeating obsession with maintaining divisional boundaries, Capt. Harry S. Truman, commanding a battery in the 35th Division, saw German artillery pounding American infantry to his left. He
quickly redirected his guns, destroying one enemy battery and disabling two others. For this he was threatened with court-martial because the Germans were in the sector of an adjacent division. The threat was not made good. See Martin Gilbert, *The First World War: A Complete History* (New York: Henry Holt, 1994), 467.


28. The tactical development of the French army, the product of much different social and political systems than those of the English-speaking nations, is beyond the scope of this article.


34. Late in the war, some enlisted soldiers were promoted to junior officers’ ranks to make up for heavy losses. Their appointments were for the duration of the war only; they were termed “temporary gentlemen” and were never accepted as full members of the officer corps. After the war, they returned to their working-class jobs and social status. Laura Root, “‘Temporary Gentlemen’ on the Western Front: Class Consciousness and the British Army Officer, 1914–1918,” *Osprey Journal of Ideas and Inquiry*, vol. V, 2006, http://digitalcommons.unf.edu/ojj_volumes/72, accessed 16 March 2021.


38. British historians like to date the “Hundred Days” that ended the war from the opening of the Amiens campaign, ignoring the highly successful combined-arms attack by the French and Americans at Soissons three weeks earlier.


40. Contrast this with the ethos of the British officer class: “The division was an artificial creation of the war itself, often with a shifting population of battalions, whereas the regiment might be able to trace its battle honours back through the centuries. . . . For most officers, the regiment was also incarnated not merely in the base depot at which they had probably started their military lives, but very directly and specifically in the tightly knit ‘social club’ that was their battalion headquarters’ mess.” Griffith, *British Fighting Methods*, 6.

41. Officer candidates were given 90 days’ training in a variety of stateside camps. The results, although better than nothing, bore little relationship to the needs of the battlefield. See James W. Rainey, “The Training of the American Expeditionary Forces in World War I” (master’s thesis, Temple University, 1981), 121–23.

42. For example, at the beginning of the war, 1600 new officers were created by promoting enlisted soldiers, most of whom certainly were not college-educated. See Edward M. Coffman, *The War to End All Wars: The American Military Experience in World War I* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968), 55. Examples of graduates serving in the ranks are found throughout veterans’ memoirs and journals and in the service record books compiled by colleges and universities.

43. On a visit to the 77th Division in May 1918, Field Marshal Haig was offended to see that noncommissioned officers slept in the same tents as the privates; see John Toland, *No Man’s Land: 1918, the Last Year of the Great War* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1980), 244. There were nonetheless important social distinctions: Regulars v. National Guard v. draftees, native-born Americans v. immigrants, Protestants v. Catholics and Jews, and, most rigidly, Whites v. Blacks.


45. The 79th Division again furnishes an example. On the night of 23 October 1918, soldiers of Company I, 316th Infantry, reported that the wire had been cut in front of their position at Doncourt, in the Troyon sector. Suspecting an impending raid, the lieutenant in charge of the platoon sent a patrol forward to set up an ambush; he then withdrew the rest of the unit behind the town. The German attack fell upon a vacant position. The ambush patrol then hit the raiders in the flank with automatic rifle fire, killing four, wounding more, and sending the enemy back in disarray. Barber, *History of the Seventy-Ninth Division*, 195.
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By David S. Hanselman

The National Infantry Museum recently reopened its Global Presence Gallery. One of seven major galleries within the museum, it presents a chronological history of U.S. Infantry operations from 1989 to the present. The National Infantry Museum Foundation funded its one-and-a-half-year renovation through a Georgia state grant. Led by Army Museum curators Jefferson C. Reed and Christopher A. Goodrow and along with the design firm of HealyKohler, they transformed the entire gallery into a new visitor experience.

The gallery utilizes graphics, photographs, video, and artifacts to lead visitors through U.S. Army humanitarian and contingency operations in Central America, the Balkans, Somalia, Haiti, and the emotional and compelling story of 11 September 2001. This pivotal day in our nation’s history is the defining point of the Army’s entry into the Global War on Terrorism.

Visitors walk through a simulated Iraqi street and learn about a major part of the longest conflict in U.S. history. A display and video honors those soldiers who earned the Medal of Honor, our nation’s highest award for gallantry, during the Global War on Terrorism. Guests also learn about how a soldier’s equipment and capabilities on the battlefield changed during the conflict. Army operations in Afghanistan are portrayed in a large diorama of an infantry unit working up an Afghan mountain trail and in a combat outpost. The introduction of Female Engagement Teams, which would lead to the full inclusion of women in the ranks of the Infantry branch, are represented. So too are exhibits discussing the increasing need for advisory and assistance missions and the forming of Security Forces Assistance Brigades to fill that role.

An exhibit on the Army of tomorrow shows modern technologies that today’s infantry soldiers test and employ. Throughout the gallery, panels discuss the Army Values that are taught to every soldier. Personal stories and events highlight these values and they become tangible concepts to every visitor.

The mission of the National Infantry Museum is to train and educate our nation’s soldiers—to teach them about the infantry’s history and to instill a sense of pride and belonging to a long tradition of service. The museum also serves as a central location to educate the general public on the U.S. Army and the role it plays, not just in defending our nation, but in its response to national and global challenges. It defines what selfless service truly means.

The National Infantry Museum is free and open to the public Tuesday–Saturday, 9 a.m.–5 p.m. and Sunday 11 a.m.–5 p.m. It is located at 1775 Legacy Way, Columbus, GA 31903, near Fort Benning. The website is https://nationalinfantrymuseum.org.

David Hanselman is the Regional Director for the Southeast Region of the Army Museum Enterprise.

Figure in MOPP–4 (Mission Oriented Protective Posture level 4) gear at the entrance to the Gulf War 1990–1991 exhibit
Title page and here: Operation IRAQI FREEDOM is represented by artifacts depicting a typical Iraqi street and highlighted by a Humvee with a TOW (tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided) missile system.

Left: Exhibit representing weapons and equipment used during the Gulf War; Right: Cast figure of Sfc. Scott E. Cahill of the 75th Ranger Regiment, Ranger Reconnaissance Detachment, rigged for a combat skydive into Afghanistan in November 2001. This was the first military free fall insertion into a combat zone since the Vietnam War.
WORLD WAR II
SCENES OF FRENCH LIFE
BY LUDWIG BEMELMANS

By Sarah G. Forgey


Bemelmans (1898–1962) was born in Austria-Hungary and attended school in Germany until emigrating to America in 1914. He enlisted in the U.S. Army in 1917, but was not sent to Europe because of his German background. Bemelmans detailed his experiences in My War with the United States (Viking, 1938), based on his diaries from 1918 and 1919. After the war, he became a United States citizen, spent time working in hotels, and began a career as a cartoonist in the mid-1920s. By the mid-1930s, Bemelmans had married and had turned his creative efforts toward writing and illustrating children’s books. Madeline (Viking, 1939) was inspired by a 1938 trip to France with his wife and young daughter, though anecdotes from his own childhood also appear in the books.

Bemelmans’s drawings in the Army Art Collection date from World War II. Completed in ink and watercolor, the drawings are recognizable as Bemelmans’s with his sketchy and whimsical illustration style. However, they lack the brilliant colors used in Madeline and many of his other illustrations. The drawings portray scenes of everyday life in France with insights into the lifestyle and habits of the French people. Accompanying text informed soldiers about French culture, history, and what military personnel should expect of their interactions with French civilians. One of the first illustrations in the book, appearing on page two, is titled You will probably get a rousing welcome from the French and depicts a café scene with French citizens raising their arms, waving flags, and using binoculars, presumably when they see American soldiers. In great contrast to the jubilation shown in that piece, a somber scene on page seven portrays a French couple in their home, their backs turned to the window, where Nazi troops can be seen marching down the street. The significance of this moment is highlighted by the title, The Fall of Paris Shook the World. Many of the other illustrations are lighter in content, including one that appears on page forty-four that depicts a well-dressed French couple and appears with the caption, “Don’t think that peasant means hick in France.”

Bemelmans is not credited for his illustrations in the publication and the drawings are unsigned, which was typical for official War Department publications during the Second World War. As such, these illustrations are virtually unknown within his body of work. The eleven drawings are preserved at the U.S. Army’s Museum Support Center at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, and are available to support exhibits in both Army and civilian museums.

Sarah G. Forgey is the chief art curator for the Army Museum Enterprise.

All art shown is by Ludwig Bemelmans, ink and watercolor on paper, 1944.
Top: French Provincial Town; Bottom Left: Monsieur Le Maire; Bottom Right: A Chateau
Top: You Will Probably Get a Rousing Welcome From the French; Bottom Left: Queuing For Vegetables; Bottom Right: French Prostitute
Top Left: Monsieur Le Cure; Top Right: Paris Street Scene; Bottom: The French Have a Remarkable Capacity for Minding Their Own Business
Michael Shaara’s 1974 historical novel, *The Killer Angels* (Random House), received the Pulitzer Prize for fiction in 1975. It offers a compelling account of the three-day battle at Gettysburg during the American Civil War of 1861–1865. The book also served as the basis for Ronald F. Maxwell’s 1993 film, *Gettysburg*. Most of the story in both the novel and the film focuses on the top leadership of the Army of Northern Virginia, specifically the relationship between Confederate commander General Robert E. Lee and his trusted subordinate Lt. Gen. James Longstreet (Lee called him “my war horse”). In contrast, the film and novel tell the Union perspective through the eyes of a relatively low-ranking officer, Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain, colonel of the 20th Maine Regiment. Even though Shaara’s book is a work of fiction, its incisive depiction of leadership has been remarkably influential in shaping common understandings of both the battle at Gettysburg and of leadership. In particular, its account of Chamberlain’s decisive command of the 20th Maine on 2 July 1863, the second day of the battle, has had a marked impact on both lay and academic audiences’ understanding of good leadership and the Civil War itself.


In a chapter on Captain Ahab of the whaling ship *Pequod* in the novel *Moby-Dick*, Nicholas Warner argues that “literary works offer compelling depictions of the way that leadership can succeed or fail, [and] of the emotional relationship between leaders and followers.” That two prominent historians esteem Shaara’s novel and that his portrayal of Chamberlain has been used in U.S. military training, shows that such “compelling depictions” can be highly influential. They are, in effect, an author’s theories of leadership, and their novels can render a writer’s ideas in clear and dramatic fashion. One difference between *Moby-Dick* and *The Killer Angels* is that the latter offers accounts of events that actually happened. According to numerous historical accounts, Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain actually did take effective and decisive action on 2 July 1863 at Gettysburg. Still, we must remember that Michael Shaara’s descriptions of Chamberlain’s actions are works of fiction that may or may not reveal actual elements of his leadership.

In my view, one of Shaara’s chapters on the colonel, along with one of the most compelling scenes from the movie *Gettysburg*, portray nuances in the interaction of leaders and followers that scholars would do well to accord greater importance. These
nuances suggest elements of interpersonal exchange that communication scholars and psychologists have studied for decades but that have not had much impact on studies of leadership. I consider them here. Ironically, the interactions that these parts of the novel and film depict did not take place during the battle, but several weeks before. However, as we shall see, they were highly consequential for the events that unfolded during the actual fight.

The Historical Record: Chamberlain at Gettysburg and Before

At the start of the Civil War, Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain was a professor of modern languages at Bowdoin College in Maine. He was unsuccessful in getting leave from the college administration to join the Union Army, but he did get a sabbatical to study in Europe. Then, freed from Bowdoin, he joined the Army, at age 33, in the summer of 1862. He became colonel of the 20th Maine Regiment in May 1863, about six weeks before the battle at Gettysburg. Just when Chamberlain assumed command of the 20th, the enlistments of most members of another Maine regiment, the veteran 2d Maine, expired, and the Army sent those soldiers home. However, 120 soldiers had signed three-year letters of commitment. They were left behind when their comrades headed north. Initially, it was not clear what to do with these soldiers when their regiment disbanded. Forty of them mutinied and refused to fight and it became increasingly likely that the other eighty would join the rebellion. The soldiers were kept as prisoners and, for several days, they were deprived of rations. Finally, Army leaders decided that they should be sent under guard to the 20th Maine, the only other Maine regiment in the V Corps of the Union army. Chamberlain’s corps command told him that he could do what he wished with the troops and that he should “make them do duty or shoot them down the moment they refused.”

Chamberlain met with the soldiers, listened to their grievances, and sympathized with their complaints, but he made clear that they had to follow orders and join his regiment. Most of them did and fought at Gettysburg six weeks later. On the second day of that battle, the 20th Maine, with the help of the veterans from the 2d Maine, was able, as one historian noted, “to change the course of their country’s history.”

How did this happen? On that hot 2 July in a hastily organized deployment of the 3d Brigade of the V Corps of the Army of the Potomac, the 20th Maine, now strengthened by most of the 2d Maine soldiers, was positioned at the furthest end of the Union’s left flank, on a hill called Little Round Top. If that ground fell to an assault from several Alabama and Texas units, the entire left of the Union force could be “rolled up,” probably meaning decisive defeat at Gettysburg and, very likely, Confederate independence along with the perpetuation of slavery in the Americas. Union commanders ordered Chamberlain to hold the position “at all costs,” a euphemism for fighting to the last. The 20th and other units in the brigade held off several rebel assaults. When yet another attack got underway, the 20th Maine had lost a third of its troops, and those who remained were out of ammunition. James McPherson, writing that Chamberlain’s regiment was one of two that “achieved lasting fame” during the three-day battle, described the action as follows:

Chamberlain was in a tight spot . . . but cool and quick-witted—perhaps a legacy of dealing with fractious students—he ordered his men to fix bayonets on their empty rifles and charge. With a yell, these smoke-grimed Yanks lurched downhill against the surprised rebels. Exhausted by their uphill fighting . . . and shocked by the audacity of the bayonet assault, the Alabamians surrendered by scores to the jubilant boys from Maine. Little Round Top remained in Union hands. . . . The Union left . . . was secure.

Other accounts of the battle are largely in accord with McPherson’s treatment. They all suggest that Chamberlain’s leadership on Little Round Top was exemplary for its calm creativity in a desperate situation. However, his regimen most likely would not have won the day if Chamberlain had failed in his effort several weeks earlier to win over the men from the 2d Maine. Chamberlain’s correspondence with the governor of Maine suggests those efforts.

In a letter dated 25 May 1863, the colonel writes, “The transfer of the ‘three year men’ of the 2d Maine has been so clumsily done, that the men were allowed to grow quite mutinous—left unguarded for in their
old camp after the 2nd had gone for several days, & having time and provocation to work themselves up to such a pitch of mutiny” that they had been treated as prisoners “with severe penalties for disobedience. . . . You are aware, Governor, that promises were made to induce these men to enlist, which are now not kept.” Chamberlain expresses his sympathy for the soldiers’ situation and notes that “they cannot but feel that they are falsely dealt with in being retained & sent to duty in other Regts.” The colonel dwells on the matter of fairness: “I sincerely wish these men were fairly dealt with by those who made them their promises.” Nevertheless, he concludes he is stuck with them and must make them follow orders: “For us in the field there is no other way but to hold them to” the terms of their enlistment. Two days later he writes, “The men of the ‘2nd’ are quite unhappy; still feeling that great injustice has been done them in holding them to service longer. I have taken a liberal course with them, because they are nearly all good & true men, but I shall be obliged to carry a firm hand.” He tells the governor that the 2nd Mainers are expecting to hear from him and concludes, “I sympathize with the men, but while under my orders, they will be strictly held to obedience.”

The Fictional Account in Brief
Scholars know little more about “the liberal course” Chamberlain took with the soldiers or how he got most of them to obey his orders, such that they became an integral part of the force that prevailed, just barely, on Little Round Top on 2 July. However, we have a riveting fictional account of what happened in *The Killer Angels*. The film *Gettysburg* replicates, for the most part, Shaara’s rendition in the book. Chamberlain’s first meeting with the soldiers begins with an abusive captain leading the column of 2d Maine troops forward. He “had a loud voice and used obscene words.” A few soldiers collapsed as they reached the camp of the 20th. “A guard came forward and yelled and probed with a bayonet,” but even more soldiers simply slumped to the ground. “Chamberlain took it all in as he moved toward the captain.” He quickly dismisses the abusive officer: “You’re relieved, Captain.” As he approaches the soldiers, he tells the guards, so that the troops can hear him, “You men can leave now. We don’t need any guards.”

Then Chamberlain introduces himself: “My name is Chamberlain. I’m Colonel, Twentieth Maine.” After waiting a moment he asks, “When did you eat last?” At that point, more soldiers begin to pay attention. One says, “We’re hungry, Colonel.” Another adds, “They’re trying to break us by not feeding us. . . . We ain’t broke yet.” In response, Chamberlain explains, “They just told us you were coming a little while ago.” He then says, “You fellas eat up and then I’ll come over and hear what you have to say.” At first, no one moves, but then Chamberlain begins to walk away. At that point, the man who said, “They’re trying to break us” stands up and says, “Colonel, we got grievances. The men elected me to talk for ‘em.” Chamberlain replies, “Right. You come with me and talk. The rest of you fellas go eat.” He walks off, not waiting to see what the soldiers, or their delegate, do. The latter follows him, and Chamberlain turns and asks his name. The man does not give it up: “I don’t feel too kindly, Colonel.” Chamberlain nods. He invites the soldier into his tent, offers him coffee, which the soldier declines, and then listens for some time to the man’s numerous complaints about how he and his fellow soldiers have been abused. Again, Shaara writes, “Chamberlain nodded,” and again Chamberlain asks the other’s name. This time he replies, “Bucklin, Joseph Bucklin.” The two exchange pleasantries about where Bucklin is from (Bangor) and what he does (fisherman). Then Bucklin continues reciting his complaints until he has fully unloaded them. Chamberlain responds, “I get your point.” He then steps out of the tent to take a courier’s urgent message with instructions for the regiment to move out immediately. Returning to the tent, “he said cheerily to Bucklin, ‘We’re moving out. You better go hurry up your eating. Tell your men I’ll be over in a minute. I’ll think on what you said.’”

*The Twentieth Maine* by Dominic D’Andrea, depicting the charge down Little Round Top.  
(Courtesy of the National Guard Bureau)
After Bucklin moves away, both book and film capture a wonderful account of Chamberlain contemplating how he’ll deal with the men. His brother Thomas, a lieutenant in the regiment, challenges Chamberlain saying, “God, you can’t shoot them. You do that, you’ll never go back to Maine when the war’s over.” The colonel replies, “I know that.” After a second’s thought, he adds, “I wonder if they do.”

Then Chamberlain approaches the soldiers and tells them, “You fellas gather round.” He waits as they slowly and somewhat suspiciously assemble in the shade and then he begins speaking. Shaara writes that he speaks “softly so that they would have to be quiet to hear him.” Then the author describes the speech, touching on a wonderful combination of moral and pragmatic concerns, dealing with both personal and transcendent considerations. On the personal, pragmatic level, he says that he will not shoot them, but that somebody else might. Finally, he notes that “if you choose to come with us I’ll be personally grateful. Well. We have to move out.” In between, he talks about why men fight and why they had joined the regiment. Here he notes, “But we’re here for something new. I don’t . . . this hasn’t happened much in the history of the world. We’re an army going out to set other men free.” Of course when the actor Jeff Daniels gives “the speech” in the film, appropriate music and visuals accompany it, giving the scene even more emotional impact than the book can convey. Nevertheless, the text itself is quite moving.

After Chamberlain finishes speaking, he walks away. Shaara writes, “He turned, left the silence behind him.” Then his ranking officer asks how he should handle the soldiers. Chamberlain replies that he should wait to see what they have to say and march them under guard if necessary. A bit later, as the regiment moves out, Chamberlain asks his brother how many of the 2d Maine soldiers are joining: “Tom grinned hugely. ‘Would you believe it? All but six.’” Thus, the novel describes the triumphant resolution of a leadership crisis. From what we know, almost all of the 2d Mainers did in fact join the 20th for the crucial fight that took place on Little Round Top.

Interpersonal Dynamics in The Killer Angels and Gettysburg

Chamberlain’s overall challenge is to get the 2d soldiers to voluntarily join his unit and follow orders with the rest of the 20th Maine. We notice three overall parts of his effort. First, he works to establish his legitimate power and demonstrates to the troops of the 2d Maine his willingness to use it. Second, he attempts to gain enough referent power and legitimacy, or idiosyncrasy credit, to define a group identity that includes the soldiers of both regiments. He endeavors to erase as much as possible any categorization that defines the two regiments as different groups. He does this both by the way he behaves in front of the group and in how he interacts with Private Bucklin, the 2d Maine spokesman. Third, he tries to persuade the soldiers that their joint mission constitutes a moral quest. In doing so, he essentially acts in accord with James MacGregor Burns’s description of “transforming leadership.”

There is an aspect of Chamberlain’s interaction with the soldiers of the 2d Maine that is central to his effectiveness in all three of these activities. It is one seen in many other instances of leadership, but it is one that scholars have not explored sufficiently: the interpersonal dynamics that are crucial to leading and following. Chamberlain consistently controls interactions with Captain Brewer, the officer who brought the soldiers to the 20th Maine camp; with Private Bucklin; and with the group as a whole. In everyday terms, he does not let others push his buttons. He does not respond as they implicitly invite him to respond. Instead, he pushes their buttons and ensures that they respond as he wants them to. He does it subtly, at every turn in his interaction with those he is attempting to influence. Timothy Leary usefully illustrates the essential dynamic in his analysis of interpersonal behavior. People know Leary for his association with psychedelic drugs and his motto “Turn On, Tune In, Drop Out.” However, before becoming an
advocate for solving the world’s problems with psilocybin, Leary was an important and creative psychologist. His work on classifications of interpersonal behavior still is cited widely.

Based on hundreds of factor analyses of personal traits and social interaction, Leary noted that one could use two dimensions to classify interpersonal behaviors. One is a dominance v. submission dimension, and the other is a friendliness v. hostility dimension. That is, any interpersonal behavior varies in how much dominance or submissiveness it implies. A behavior is dominant, submissive, or somewhere in the middle. Similarly, every interpersonal behavior varies in how friendly or hostile it is, such that a behavior can be friendly, neither particularly friendly nor hostile, or hostile. Combining the two dimensions, Leary gets eight different kinds of interpersonal behavior. He arrays them around a pie chart so that the slice on the top is dominant, the slice to its right is friendly-dominant, the next slice friendly, then friendly-submissive, submissive, hostile-submissive, hostile, and finally, hostile-dominant. Behaviors can be sliced more narrowly than into eight wedges, but this representation is useful for understanding Chamberlain.

The most relevant part of Leary’s analysis of interpersonal behavior is the observation that each action invites or elicits a complementary response. In general, dominant behavior invites submissive behavior from the other, and vice versa. Similarly, friendly behavior invites friendly behavior back, and likewise for hostile behavior. So, for example, friendly-dominant behavior invites friendly-submissive behavior in return. Though it is beyond the scope of this article, it is worth noting that Leary suggests that interpersonal behaviors constitute “security operations,” that is, people behave in ways that are comfortable for them, and more importantly, also invite others to respond in ways that are comfortable for themselves. We prefer to behave in our “comfort zones” and nudge those we are interacting with to respond within those comfort zones. If being friendly and dominant is comfortable for us, having the other be friendly and submissive back is even more comfortable. We consistently see that Chamberlain does not complement other soldiers’ behavior when their own actions are hostile, hostile-dominant, or dominant. Rather, he unambiguously acts in ways that invite others to complement his behaviors, which, depending on the other person and the context, are hostile-dominant, dominant, or friendly-dominant.

Authors Watzlawick, Beavin, and Jackson outline another formulation relevant to this dynamic in the important book, *Pragmatics of Human Communication: A Study of Interactional Patterns, Pathologies and Paradoxes* (Norton, 1967). This analysis begins with the claim that every behavior is a communication and that each one communicates at two levels. At the explicit, verbal level, behaviors make suggestions, ask questions, or otherwise address tasks and goals. At the implicit, generally nonverbal level, behaviors communicate at the relationship level, that is, they offer a definition of the relationship, which another individual can accept, reject, or ignore. In many instances, the first individual’s behavior is “one-up,” by which they assert dominance or control in the moment. The other is invited to submit to or go along with the other’s behavioral definition of the relationship in that particular moment. A simple example might be one member of a couple suggesting, “Let’s go out to dinner tonight,” and the other replying, “Sure, that seems like a good idea.” In this example, the first person makes a one-up move and the other makes a complementary one-down response. This does not mean that the first person is dominant in the relationship. It simply means that the second person accepts the first individual’s communication conveying the belief that the relationship is one where he or she can make such a suggestion and have it accepted.

Not all one-up communications are accepted with a complementary one-down response. There are two other possibilities. The second person might reject the first person’s communication that the relationship is one in which such a one-up move is acceptable. In that case, their response may be symmetrical rather than complementary, meaning that they reject the first person’s initiative and make a one-up move themselves. In the example above, the second person might say, “No, let’s stay home and watch a movie.” In most cases, the exchange of symmetrical moves will end rather quickly in a complementary one-down response by one party or the other to avoid further conflict. So, the person who first suggested going out to dinner might say, “Okay, a movie sounds good.” However, there might be a cycle of rejection of one another’s communications, resulting in what Watzlawick, et al. refer to as “symmetrical escalation.” Such an exchange can become quite tetchy in very short order. Another possibility is that the second individual ignores or “disconfirms” the first, essentially communicating you don’t exist for me and we have no relationship, in a word, “get lost.” The overall implication of
this analysis is that one person can accept, reject, or ignore another’s definition of their relationship as embracing the opportunity to behave assertively.

We can see the dynamics described in both treatments play out by exploring in more detail how Chamberlain behaves when he sees Captain Brewer leading the column of troops and first interacts with him. Again, Chamberlain’s challenge is to establish his legitimate power and his willingness to assert it. He also would prefer to do it in a manner that begins to build referent power and legitimacy in the eyes of the 2d Maine soldiers. Remember the way Shaara describes Brewer: he “had a loud voice and used obscene words;” he “assembled the men in two ragged lines and called them to attention” and “began yelling.” In short, Brewer acts in a hostile-dominant manner with the men, though they do not completely submit. They do not fully complement his clear one-up definition of their relationship. Chamberlain takes all of that in. As Brewer approaches Chamberlain, Brewer adopts essentially the same hostile-dominant attitude: He “shook his head with contempt, glowering up at Chamberlain.” When Chamberlain is identified, he says, “You Chamberlain?” and “stared at him grimly, insolently.” He is clearly putting Chamberlain down.19

At that very moment, Chamberlain must assert his legitimate power and make it stick, as the soldiers are watching. He does not complement Brewer’s behavior by accepting his contemptuously disrespectful definition of their relationship. Rather, “Chamberlain did not answer him for a long moment, looking into the man’s eyes until the eyes suddenly blinked and dropped.” He then says “softly, ‘Colonel Chamberlain to you.’” Brewer slowly comes to attention and salutes, explains that he had orders to escort the soldiers, and that he “had to use the bayonet to get ’em moving.” Then acting dominant or one-up once again, he hands Chamberlain a sheaf of papers and says, “You got to sign for ’em, Colonel.” Again, Chamberlain does not do what the Captain tells him he has to do. He simply takes the papers, hands them back to his brother, and says, “Sign it, Tom.” (Or, “Sign it, lieutenant” in the movie.) Then, “To the captain he said, ‘You’re relieved, Captain.”’20

Brewer takes one more stab at being one-up, both in relation to the soldiers and to Chamberlain. “The captain nodded, pulling on his dirty gloves. ‘You’re authorized to use whatever force necessary, Colonel.’ He said that loudly, for effect. ‘If you have to shoot ’em, why, go right ahead. Won’t nobody say nothin’.‘” Chamberlain disconfirms or ignores, rather than rejects, the Captain’s move. Chamberlain softly but firmly repeats, “You’re relieved, Captain.” Then “he walked past the captain, closer to the men.” It is at this point he tells the guards that they can leave, that he will not be needing them. He stands in front of the men, ignoring the guards.”21

Until now in the story, Chamberlain has rejected or ignored Brewer’s rude assertiveness and dismissed, both in the military and relational sense, the guards. By his interpersonal manner, he has asserted his dominance and control. The soldiers are just beginning to pay attention and clearly note that Brewer and the guards are gone and that Chamberlain is in command. As they obviously do not like Brewer or the guards, he begins to build his referent power by implicitly siding with them. What is the significance of the foregoing for the understanding of leadership? One element is that the potential leader establishes status and authority in the relevant group by his demeanor and manner. At every moment, his interpersonal behavior must assert and embody his claim to prominence. Chamberlain first does so by staring down Captain Brewer: “Looking into the man’s eyes until the eyes suddenly blinked and dropped.”22 Subsequently, his demeanor in the rest of his interaction embodies his position of legitimate power and asserts his leadership role.

As a work of fiction, The Killer Angels illustrates the way an individual’s interpersonal manner controls a situation and establishes status. Another example is in Nicholas Warner’s discussion of how adeptly Herman Melville portrays Captain Ahab’s power in the classic novel Moby-Dick.23 Toward the end of the book, Starbuck, the first mate, has a chance to shoot Ahab in his sleep with a musket. He cannot bring himself to commit such a crime, even though he is certain that he and the entire crew will die if Ahab is not stopped. He considers imprisoning Ahab,
but he knows that he could not stand up to Ahab’s interpersonal power, even if the captain were in chains: “What! hope to wrest this old man’s power from his own living hands? Only a fool would try it. . . . I could not endure the sight.” Ahab has long since established a dominance through every detail of his commanding style.

Once having established through interpersonal behavior that he fully commands himself and those under his authority, Chamberlain faces the second of the two challenges to his leadership—Private Bucklin’s effort to define the situation and their respective roles in ways that question Chamberlain’s leadership and his effort to establish some kind of positive relationship with the soldiers. After dismissing Brewer and the guards, Chamberlain approaches them. He looks down and sees an unpromising situation. Among those who looked up, “there was hunger and exhaustion and occasional hatred.” He introduced himself by rank and waited another moment before asking, “When did you eat last?” At every step, he decides on the spot how to connect with the soldiers as potential followers. He pauses to create an uncomfortable silence and draw their attention. As noted earlier, one replies, “We’re hungry, Colonel.” Then another, described as “a scarred man, hatless, hair plastered thinly on the scalp like strands of black seaweed . . . a hard case” Chamberlain judges. “They’ve been trying to break us by not feeding us. We ain’t broke yet.”

Chamberlain considers and then tells them to go eat “and then I’ll come over and hear what you have to say.” He walks away, uncertain how the troops will respond. Shaara writes, “He did not know what he would do if they did not choose to move.” Especially in the film, we see Chamberlain thoughtfully making it up as he goes along, taking risks that seem necessary, all in the hope that the soldiers will complement his “one-up,” essentially friendly-dominant assertions and respond as he wants them to.

As he moves away, he hears a voice call, “Colonel!” It is the scarred man, the hard case. “Colonel, we got grievances. The men elected me to talk for ‘em.” The movie shows Chamberlain hesitate very briefly, again deciding how to keep control of the situation. He does not want to have discussions or negotiations with the scarred man in front of the rest of the soldiers. He replies, “Right. You come with me and talk. The rest of you fellas go eat.” He “beckons” to the man and walks toward his tent, hoping the other will follow. In the film, we see the scarred man hesitate, but then realize he has to follow Chamberlain if he wants to say his piece. He does, walking behind the colonel toward the tent. As noted earlier, Chamberlain attempts to seize control by asking the man his name and offering his hand. The other does not state his name, but his “hand seemed to come up against gravity, against his will. Automatic courtesy: Chamberlain was relying on it.” Thus, in a few seconds, Chamberlain risks three one-up moves: walking away, asking the man his name, and offering a handshake. Two behaviors succeed in drawing a complementary response, but the man does not offer his name. Rather, he says, “I don’t feel too kindly, Colonel.” Chamberlain merely nods to acknowledge the response.

In the tent, Chamberlain sits down and leaves the man standing. He offers him coffee, but that is declined. There is still only limited complementarity on the part of the scarred man. At that point, Chamberlain simply begins to listen as the soldier spews forth his group’s many grievances. Shaara describes the speaker in a way the film does not quite capture: The “man spoke calmly and coldly, looking straight into Chamberlain’s eyes. A good stubborn man. There was a bit of a lawyer about him . . . a coiled tension that was not quite captured: The “man spoke calmly and coldly, looking straight into Chamberlain’s eyes. A good stubborn man. There was a bit of a lawyer about him . . . a coiled tight set to the way he stood, balanced, ugly, slightly contemptuous, but watchful, trying to gauge Chamberlain’s strength.”

The colonel soberly listens and acknowledges that he is in fact taking in what the man says. Then the other makes a fascinating one-up move, attempting to put Chamberlain in his place, one-down. The response is a good example of what we see throughout the novel and film: Chamberlain controlling the interaction by not responding, either verbally or nonverbally, in the way the scarred man invites him to respond. The man says, “I’ve been in eleven different engagements, Colonel. How many you been in?” The book simply quotes Chamberlain’s response: “Not that many.” The film gives a more nuanced feel. The actor Jeff Daniels looks the other in the eye, considers the question, and replies “not that many” in a way that suggests he is not going to be nailed down by the man’s question. On the surface level, the viewer could interpret the answer to mean either more or less than eleven. On the relationship level, the answer conveys the message that Chamberlain will not be cornered and that he rejects the other’s one-up assertion.

The man continues elaborating his grievances and those of his fellows. Finally, he seems “embarrassed, realized he has gone too far.” It is as if he has worn himself out swinging his fists and Chamberlain has calmly slipped the punches. Then, “the man was relaxing slowly.” Chamberlain seizes the initiative: “What’s your name?” This time the man replies as invited to. He complements the colonel’s one-up, friendly-dominant question. “Bucklin. Joseph Bucklin.” Then, as mentioned earlier, Chamberlain asks where the man is from (“Bangor”) and what he does: “Farmer?” Bucklin replies, “Fisherman.” Chamberlain has succeeded both in not responding to Bucklin’s assertive moves and in getting Bucklin to respond to his. The nature of the relationship has changed rather dramatically.

At this point, a sergeant pokes his head into the tent and says, “Colonel, there’s a courier comin’.” Chamberlain nods but continues listening to Bucklin. He conveys that hearing Bucklin out is more important than responding right away to the messenger. He listens and says simply, “I get your point.” The sergeant then interrupts him again, conveying some urgency, and repeats that a courier is waiting. Chamberlain excuses himself to go take the message. In the film, he looks directly at Bucklin, says sympathetically, “Don’t go away,” and clasps him on both shoulders. After the courier tells him that the regiment is to move out immediately, he returns to the tent, tells Bucklin that they have to pack up and leave: “You better go hurry up your eating. Tell your men I’ll be over in a minute. I’ll think on what you said.” The movie shows him patting the man’s shoulder a second time.

It seems clear that Chamberlain has succeeded in disarming Bucklin’s hostility, at least for the moment, by conveying sympathy for his dilemma and establishing a benevolent authority. It is exactly what the real Chamberlain had expressed in his report to the governor. He obviously counts on Bucklin to convey his manner and the substance of their exchange to the soldiers who made him their spokesman.

Now it is time for the colonel to speak to the whole group. He walks purposefully toward the soldiers, trying to decide what to say. He relies on the advice of a trusted noncommissioned officer, a (fictional) Sergeant Kilrain: “Tell the truth.” As mentioned earlier, he tells the group to “gather round” in a manner that conveys that he expects them to do so. It is not a difficult request and they do as
After saying that they will be moving out immediately, he adds, “I’ve been told that they are limits, both of Chamberlain’s own and of higher authorities, on their options. Notably, he is vague about how those limits might be enforced. Another is a straightforward transactional appeal. Third, as mentioned earlier, is an attempt at what Burns has defined as “transforming leadership,” raising both leader and follower to higher levels of motivation and morality.

Outlining the choice and limits is particularly interesting. Even though Chamberlain had suggested to Tom that he might not let the group know that he would not shoot them, he immediately removes that threat, and then raises it again in a different form. After saying that they will be moving out immediately, he adds, “I’ve been told that if you don’t come I can shoot you. Well, you know I won’t do that.” However, he reinstates the threat of punishment. “Maybe somebody else will, but I won’t. So that’s that.” Later he tells them, “Whether you fight or not is up to you. Whether you come along, well, you’re coming.” He makes clear his benevolence but also his limits.

Chamberlain’s moves toward transactional leadership are fairly traditional, offering an exchange of services, tangible and intangible. He notes, “The whole Reb army is up the road a ways waiting for us and this is no time for an argument like this. I tell you this: We sure can use you.” Then the last thing he says before moving away is along similar lines: “I think if we lose this fight the war will be over. So if you choose to come with us I’ll be personally grateful.” The film adds a little more poignancy to these lines: “Gentlemen, I think if we lose this fight, we lose the war. So if you choose to join us, I’ll be personally very grateful.” What does Chamberlain offer in return? One is his promise to do what he can to see to your rifles for this fight you’ll have them back and nothing else will be said. If you won’t join us you’ll come along under guard. When this is over I’ll do what I can to see you get fair treatment.” And of course, he has already told them he won’t shoot them. Finally, he offers his personal gratitude, which may mean something if he has built up any legitimacy.

Finally, Chamberlain attempts to raise intangible moral issues. He discusses why they enlisted in the first place: “Many of us came . . . because it was the right thing to do . . . freedom is not just a word.” Then he addresses historically why armies fight: “for pay, or women, or some other kind of loot.” Then, Jeff Daniels in the film, backed by music, says with wonderful inspirational intonation: “But we’re here for something new. I don’t . . . this hasn’t happened much in the history of the world. We are an army going out to set other men free.” Finally, mixing the transactional and transforming, he adds, “It’s the idea that we all have value, you and me. . . . What we’re all fighting for, in the end, is each other.” In an amusing touch, Chamberlain pauses and says, “Didn’t mean to preach. Sorry.” Obviously, that is exactly what he meant to do.

In the end, all of this works. As they move out, Chamberlain asks his brother how many of the 2d Mainers are coming: “Tom grinned hugely. ‘Would you believe it? All but six.’” We see that some of the way Chamberlain leads is understood easily in terms of traditional leadership concepts, thereby reinforcing thinking about leadership in those terms. He enters into an exchange relationship, trying to do it in a way that engenders legitimacy in the soldiers’ eyes. He treats Bucklin especially, but also the group as a whole, with procedural justice. He accords Bucklin standing by treating him with dignity and politeness, thereby conveying that he respects Bucklin’s right to make his case. He promises to handle the soldiers’ concerns ethically and with an open mind. The book and film show him emphasizing fairness, just as the real Chamberlain does in his correspondence with the governor. Also, we see in his speech to the group an almost textbook example of transforming leadership, attempting to engage his followers in ways that will raise them to higher levels of motivation and morality.

The elements above are interesting enough in their own right, but the attention given to using the subtleties of interpersonal behavior to establish legitimate power and wise, benevolent authority are unusual. Being attuned to these matters of demeanor can enhance our appreciation of some of the less-studied elements of leadership.
the troops from the disbanded 2d Maine Regiment, The Killer Angels does not misrepresent his leadership. It offers an entirely plausible account of what he did to get almost all of the soldiers to join the 20th Maine and fight bravely at Gettysburg. However, the account is no more than plausible. The worry is that to the extent that the portrayal of Chamberlain’s leadership reflects conventional understandings of leadership, it reinforces them and partially blinds us to other understandings. For example, the speech scene we have discussed from the movie Gettysburg, like many other film scenes about leaders or leadership, reinforces the idea that eloquent oratory is the essence of leadership. Still, The Killer Angels novel, and the film based on it, usefully expand conventional, and therefore highly available, understandings of leadership. It illustrates the subtlety of interpersonal behavior that is crucially important to leadership but not often discussed in textbooks or scholarly accounts. Perhaps this commentary’s account of Chamberlain’s leadership will change the focus of scholarship usefully, at least to some degree.

Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain
After Gettysburg, Chamberlain fought bravely throughout the remainder of the Civil War. Wounded six times, he received an award for bravery four times. He was promoted to brigadier general of volunteers in 1864 and eventually promoted to brevet major general of volunteers. At Appomattox, General Ulysses S. Grant selected him to organize the formal surrender of Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia on 12 April 1865, three days after Lee surrendered to Grant. After the war, Maine’s citizens elected him governor four times, twice winning by record-breaking margins. He also served as president of Bowdoin College for twelve years. In 1893, thirty years after the battle at Gettysburg, he received the Medal of Honor. He died in 1914 at age eighty-three.

Author’s Note
The author thanks Brig. Gen. John W. Mountcastle (ret.) for his helpful suggestions regarding earlier drafts of this article.

Dr. George R. “Al” Goethals holds the E. Claiborne Robins Distinguished Professorship in Leadership Studies at the University of Richmond. Goethals’ recent books include Presidential Leadership and African Americans: “American Dilemma” from Slavery to the White House (Routledge, 2015), Realignment, Region and Race: Presidential Leadership and Social Identity (Emerald, 2018), and with Scott T. Allison, Romance of Heroism and Heroic Leadership (Emerald, 2019), and The Heroic Leadership Imperative (Emerald, 2020). He received the 2022 Lifetime Achievement Award from the International Leadership Association.

Notes
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid., 21–22.
11. Ibid., 26.
12. Ibid., 28–29.
13. Ibid., 31.
17. Ibid., 53.
20. Ibid., 21.
21. Ibid.
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24. Herman Melville, Moby-Dick or, the Whale (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1964), 651.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid., 23–23.
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29. Ibid.
30. Ibid., 24.
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32. Ibid., 28.
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COURAGE ABOVE ALL THINGS: GENERAL JOHN ELLIS WOOL AND THE U.S. MILITARY, 1812–1863

BY HARWOOD HINTON AND JERRY THOMPSON
University of Oklahoma Press, 2020
Pp. xviii, 523. $45

REVIEW BY ETHAN S. RAFUSE

The decades following the War of 1812 were ones of profound transformation for both the United States and its Army. After its second war with Great Britain, the country experienced an acceleration of economic, social, and political changes that ended the Early Republic and ushered in the Age of Jacksonian Democracy. Meanwhile, problematic performances by the republic’s land forces in the war with Britain served as a catalyst for the emergence of leaders who pushed far-reaching reforms of the U.S. Army and would shape its history and development for decades to come. One of these was John E. Wool. During over five decades in uniform, Wool played a conspicuous role in the nation’s wars with the armies of Great Britain, Mexico, and the Confederacy. He illustrated the variety of roles and missions the Army took on between 1812 and 1863 and experienced the officer corps’ development as a profession. Providing a thoroughly researched, richly detailed, and long-needed account of Wool’s life and career, as well as the forces that shaped them, Harwood Hinton and Jerry Thompson not only fill a significant gap in the literature on the history of the U.S. Army, but do so in magnificent fashion.

Born three years before the Philadelphia convention that produced the U.S. Constitution, Wool initially seemed destined to a life of local prominence in upstate New York, but not much more. However, his life took a dramatic turn as war clouds gathered in 1812. That year, despite the fact that his only military experience consisted of service in the local militia, Wool leveraged local political connections to secure a captain’s commission in the Regular Army—one of many instances where Hinton and Thompson show how Wool’s career illustrated the inextricable relationship between war, the Army, and politics. Wool then experienced the bitter fruits of suspicion of the Regular Army that colored the approach of Jeffersonian Republicans to the selection of military leaders, and the management of military affairs in general, when he was wounded in the October 1812 debacle at Queenston Heights.

After recovering from his wound, Wool saw further service in the New York theatre of war and found himself part of a group of officers, which included Winfield Scott and Alexander Macomb, who decided not to return to civilian life when the conflict ended. After surviving the postwar drawdown and reorganization, Wool spent several years as an inspector general, which proved beneficial to his career. Hinton and Thompson chronicle the evolution of the Army in the decades after the war and give readers an appreciation of the rich variety of experiences the Army had after 1815. They describe how Wool’s service as an inspector general gave him the opportunity to travel extensively and interact with a wide range of military and civil officials. Wool also played an important role in the effort after 1815 to instill greater accountability, discipline, and bureaucratic efficiency in the Army. It also made him a witness and at times key player in the Army’s efforts to secure and expand the nation’s frontiers and deal with the unsavory business of Indian removal.

The 1840s saw Wool’s time as an inspector general end with his selection to command the Eastern Division of the Army. His duties were once again in line with the Army’s constabulary role, as they included managing a tense situation along the border with British Canada. When war broke out with Mexico, Wool led a division across the Rio Grande to occupy Chihuahua and directed it on the battlefield of Buena Vista in February 1847. Controversy emerged between Wool and Zachary Taylor over their respective roles at the battle (the attention they received aroused interest in both as political candidates). Hinton and Thompson merit praise not only for providing a fine account of the battle, but for the skill and objectivity with which they sift through the evidence in their analysis of Wool’s performance.

Readers will find further testimony to the diversity of roles and missions Wool and the Army assumed during the nineteenth century in Hinton’s and Thompson’s fascinating account of the three years Wool spent commanding the Department of the Pacific. There, he had to deal with both vigilantism in California and conflict with Native Americans in Washington and Oregon. As was often the case in such situations, Wool and the Army often found White settlers and civilian leaders their greatest source of headaches. Students of the Civil War will likewise appreciate Hinton’s and Thompson’s treatment of Wool’s service in Virginia, Maryland, and New York, which provides fresh and useful insights into the Peninsula and Maryland Campaigns of 1862 and the New York Draft Riots—though readers will undoubtedly lament the lack of maps in this section of the book.

Fifty years ago, Sir Michael E. Howard famously declared that in order for the
Bullets & Bandages: The Aid Stations and Field Hospitals at Gettysburg

By James Gindlesperger
Blair Publishing, 2020
Pp. xx, 336. $29.95

Review by John R. Heckman

Scholarship on the Battle of Gettysburg has broadened from the traditional, tactical monographs to books that detail the human experience of the battle on a personal level. Military historians focus on the minutiae of battlefield movements and the lessons garnered from these actions, but it is also important to shed light on the post-battle trauma inflicted on the landscape, combatants, and the local population.

Bullets & Bandages: The Aid Stations and Field Hospitals at Gettysburg by James Gindlesperger is a fascinating guide to the medical aftershocks from the Battle of Gettysburg. Building on the legacy of the late Gregory A. Coco’s valuable books, A Vast Sea of Misery: A History and Guide to the Union and Confederate Field Hospitals at Gettysburg, July 1–November 20, 1863 (Savas Beatie, 2017), and A Strange and Blighted Land: Gettysburg: The Aftermath of a Battle (Savas Beatie, 2017), Gindlesperger produces a work that is one part narrative, one part field guide.

Gindlesperger immediately discusses how surgeons and nurses treated the wounded during the American Civil War. Throughout the first chapter, readers gain an understanding of the scope of the painful trauma suffered by those struck by musket balls or shrapnel. The author introduces the antebellum theories of medicine and treatment before diving into the medical organization of both the U.S. and Confederate armies.

The Letterman Plan, developed by Dr. Jonathan Letterman for the U.S. Army in the middle of 1862, revolutionized battlefield medical care. It takes a lead role in the reader’s understanding of aid stations and field hospitals at Gettysburg the following year. The first step in the plan was the development of aid stations near the lines of battle—a first stop on the path to treatment. Wounded men would make their way to this aid station on their own or comrades would carry them there. As Gindlesperger states, “The doctor there simply stabilized and dressed the wound, provided whiskey to prevent shock, or administered morphine for pain, if it was available” (3). If the soldier needed further assistance, an ambulance, provided by the Ambulance Corps, would get the men to a divisional hospital further behind the lines. Finally, if the soldier needed long-term care after treatment at the divisional hospital, they went to facilities in the nearest city to recuperate.

Along with the idea of triage, Letterman provided the groundwork necessary to save lives at Gettysburg and hundreds of other battlefields throughout the remaining years of the Civil War. One of Dr. Letterman’s initiatives that had a profound impact on the days after the battle concerned maintaining efficient medical staffs. “[Letterman] also assigned specific personnel the tasks of organizing food tents, various supplies, and administrative duties, and all medical personnel had particular assignments on the day of the battle,” the author writes (6). It underscores a tremendous logistical operation along with the infrastructure to treat thousands of grievously wounded soldiers. None of it would be possible without the tireless efforts of stretcher-bearers, ambulance drivers, surgeons, nurses, and many local citizens lending their hand in the hard work.

Gindlesperger also highlights the methods and locations of battlefield burials of those who were killed during the three-day struggle or died later from their wounds. The author describes the interment, disinterment, and reburials throughout the months and years after the battle in the first chapter of the book and gives the reader an understanding of the scale of the destruction.

The strength of this monograph comes from its ability to transport readers to where the struggle for survival took place during and after the Battle of Gettysburg. Acting as a guidebook, Bullets & Bandages takes readers on a geographic journey across various sectors of the battlefield and the town of Gettysburg. Along the way, Gindlesperger provides the address or GPS coordinates for each known aid station and hospital site (whether at a farm, church, or dwelling within town) for the reader. This makes a tour of the battlefield’s medical sites that much easier.

Readers come away with a greater understanding of how the battle flowed based on the locations of field hospitals throughout the Gettysburg area. For most of the sites in the book, Gindlesperger presents vignettes of the events that took place there. Highlighted within each story could be the names of some of the soldiers treated there and their regimental designation, surgeons who worked tirelessly at that location, and the civilians who did their best to treat the wounded and dying. One of the book’s many assets is the detail that the author puts forth in noting each doctor or surgeon in the context of each location.

Breaking free of the confines of the town of Gettysburg and Gettysburg National Military Park, the author pushes outward into the region to provide information concerning often-overlooked medical history from the campaign. Most of the roads leading away from Gettysburg also housed wounded and dying soldiers in the days after the battle. Gindlesperger takes readers on a journey into the hospital sites stretching from Hanover (where cavalry clashed on 30 June 1863), Hunterstown, Cashstown, Fairfield (where cavalry fought...
on 3 July 1863), and beyond. By doing this, he enlarges the scope of not only the campaign, but also the effects upon the landscape by two large armies in motion.

For those who are unfamiliar with Civil War era medical terminology, Appendix A provides some background for these terms and their uses at the time. As readers realize the human cost of the Gettysburg Campaign, they also learn monetary cost from the damage inflicted upon structures in the path of shot and shell. Appendix B details monetary equivalency between 1863 and 2020 to highlight the economic impact of the campaign upon the residents of the area. This is an excellent way for modern audiences to understand the costs of war and its effects on day-to-day life.

James Gindlesperger has provided those who are curious about the Battle of Gettysburg with a new and engaging guide to the medical history of the struggle during the summer of 1863. The book is easy to follow and directs readers to locations where they may experience the historical narrative in more personal ways. Bullets & Bandages is a must-have for all who are intrigued by the effects of battle upon soldiers and the populace.

**THE U.S. VOLUNTEERS IN THE SOUTHERN PHILIPPINES: COUNTERINSURGENCY, PACIFICATION, AND COLLABORATION, 1899–1901**

**BY JOHN SCOTT REID**

University Press of Kansas, 2020
Pp. xv, 302. $45

**REVIEW BY EDGAR F. RAINES JR.**

John Scott Reid, an associate professor of history at the University of Utah, has added an important study of counterinsurgency in the southern Philippines to the short shelf of books on the Philippine-American War. Reed earned a fellowship from the U.S. Army Center of Military History in the early 1990s and wrote an excellent dissertation that became the starting point for this book. I had hoped that he would publish his dissertation immediately, but he spent the following decades as an adjunct professor teaching three to four courses a semester and as a reserve Army officer with no time to revise the dissertation for publication. He also served a year on active duty in Iraq during the surge; his reflections on his own experiences have added depth to his analysis.

State volunteer regiments raised for the War with Spain, supplemented by a few Regular Army units, fought the first six months of the Philippine-American War. While most of the Regular Army recuperated from tropical diseases contracted during the Santiago Campaign, Congress created two-year volunteer regiments under federal control from inception: one cavalry and twenty-four infantry regiments. Each U.S. volunteer regiment received a handful of usually young Regular Army officers, supplemented by officers drawn from the state regiments. Enlisted ranks were filled also with those who had served in the War with Spain, many of whom had never seen combat. Reed has selected four of the infantry regiments for intensive study: the 26th, 29th, 40th, and 43d. They served on Samar, Leyte, Panay, and northern Mindanao. Three of these campaigns were unqualified successes. The Samar campaign failed, due to a combination of particularly rugged terrain, superb guerrilla leadership, and failures at the higher levels of the American command to allocate sufficient experienced troops to the task.

Organizing his study along functional rather than chronological lines, Reed travels from the general to the specific. His first chapter briefly outlines the course of the war and singles out the motivation of the opposing combatants. The Americans, everyone from the president to the most inexperienced recruits, shared a belief in a collection of ideas that historians have dubbed “Liberal Exceptionalism.” Americans believed that the United States had a working democracy, that democracy was the best kind of government for ordinary people, and that they shared an obligation to extend this kind of government to other people, by force of arms if necessary. The Filipinos included many ethnic groups and had no shared collective identity. A relatively small Filipino educated elite, large landowners, and members of the middle class had become Philippine nationalists during the late nineteenth century, not the masses. The rank and file of the Philippine forces were peasants who followed the lead of their patrons into the revolution. Over the long haul, those traditional patron-client relations would prove more fragile than the Liberal Exceptionalism that sanctioned the American war effort.

Reed then turns to raising and training of the four regiments and how lessons from the conflict with Spain affected their training. He provides a succinct yet comprehensive discussion of American tactical doctrine, the best available in the historical literature. A chapter on late-nineteenth century concepts of masculinity follows. Colonial soldiers needed to exhibit controlled aggression, courage under fire,
The Americans most feared a surprise mass attack. The author then considers the course of events in the different areas of operation. Of these, Samar was troop-starved, having only two battalions much of the time and never more than three. Ultimate success on the island came only after the U.S. volunteers mustered out of service. It required nine battalions of Regulars and one of Marines. Reed does not specifically address the question of whether Samar represented a straightforward economy-of-force decision by the higher command or whether events just happened that way, although he implies the latter. The Americans had no firepower advantage over the Filipinos. Both sides used bolt-action rifles, but the Americans had received marksmanship training; the Filipinos had not because of lack of ammunition. The Americans most feared a surprise mass attack. Even so, about two-thirds of the losses the regiments suffered were because of tropical diseases rather than combat.

Congress made no provision for the U.S. volunteer regiments to receive replacements. Experience showed that companies required a strength of at least sixty-five to protect their camp and mount long-range “hikes,” i.e., combat patrols into the bush to break up guerrilla camps. The Medical Department had learned much from the epidemics that swept the mobilization camps during the War with Spain and line officers had learned they had to pay attention and follow the advice of physicians. Despite everyone’s best efforts, the U.S. Volunteers lost soldiers at an unsustainable rate their first year; but during the second season of campaigning, having learned how better to adapt to the local environment, the casualty rate fell drastically. The regiments remained effective, but just barely. Victory in the counterinsurgency campaign came by a very narrow margin, much closer than historians have heretofore credited.

Although the military goal in a counterinsurgency is to reduce the insurgents and deny them the initiative, the political goal is to convince the bulk of the population to shift their allegiance from the guerrillas to an existing political order. To examine how the volunteers aided in this change in attitude, Reed focuses on the troops in garrison. Largely billeted in abandoned buildings once owned by the Spanish government or the Catholic Church, the troops led austere lives, but then they came from austere circumstances back home. In America, communal water pumps, outdoor privies, and maiming industrial accidents, with no social safety nets, defined everyday life for many citizens. Privates earned $15.00 a month, enough to buy a few cold beers at the canteen, add a bit of variety to the ration by purchasing food from local merchants, and still send a few dollars home. They were not earning enough to cause ruinous inflation. In fact, the small amount of money they spent may have brought a measure of prosperity to the regions where they served.

The relatively benign influence of the American garrisons depended on the enforcement of discipline—both internal and external. Internal discipline refers to the maintenance of proper obedience within the force and the willingness of soldiers to obey orders promptly that may place them in danger of death. External discipline pertains to the soldiers’ interaction with the host population (165). In both instances, company commanders maintained control of their troops through the use of summary courts, which were presided over by one officer, often the company commander. These courts could fine soldiers up to one month’s pay and imprison them up to one month. The penalties worked only if the troops received their salary on a regular basis. The Paymaster General’s Department accomplished this despite the soldiers being some seven thousand miles from San Francisco and over island roads that were muddy tracks at best. This administrative triumph was a key element in defeating the insurgency. No historian had realized this until Reed made the connection.

Professor Reed’s brilliant study, deftly organized and written in clear, easy-to-understand prose, devoid of jargon, deserves a wide readership.

**BLOOD, GUTS, AND GREASE: GEORGE S. PATTON IN WORLD WAR I**

**BY JON B. MIKOLASHEK**

University Press of Kentucky, 2019

Pp. x, 149. $30

**REVIEW BY DEAN A. NOWOWIEJSKI**

In his book, Blood, Guts, and Grease: George S. Patton in World War I, Jon B. Mikolashek focuses on a gap in the personal history of George S. Patton: the little-known years of Patton’s World War I experience. The histories of Patton’s experience in World War II are profuse, often repetitive, sometimes provocative, and frequently bordering on hero worship. That period is well covered. Mikolashek begins his story with the premise that the reader is familiar with these histories and then begins to explain the early foundations to Patton’s wartime leadership and rise to prominence. What he reveals is a George S. Patton who is ambitious, courageous, and opportunistic. Mikolashek is correct in his main premise that the World War II Patton would not have existed without the significant formative experiences of the World War I Patton.

Mikolashek is a professor at the Joint Advanced Warfighting School of the Joint Forces Staff College, National Defense University, in Norfolk, Virginia. When he wrote Blood, Guts, and Grease, he was a professor at the Army Command and General Staff College campus at Fort Belvoir. This new book forms a companion volume to his previous biography, General Mark Clark: Commander of the U.S. Fifth Army and

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Anne Wilson “Nita” Patton, George’s sister. War II. Pershing almost became engaged to Liberator of Rome (Casemate, 2013). They became the Tank School. From there, he would go on. Mikolashek reveals that his book on Patton grew out of a personal relationship with the noted Patton biographer Martin Blumenson, and that many of his views on Patton grew out of conversations and gimblets with the legendary historian. It helps to know that Martin Blumenson is in the shadows of Mikolashek’s conclusions. Mikolashek relied on Patton’s papers, both those published by Blumenson and those in the Patton collection of the Library of Congress, for substantial portions of this manuscript. The book grew out of Mikolashek’s close study of Patton’s correspondence and diary, and he successfully brings to life George Patton’s contemporary thought from 1917 to 1919. The chronology of Blood, Guts, and Grease starts with General John J. Pershing’s Punitive Expedition into Mexico and ends with Patton recovering from wounds received during the Meuse-Argonne Offensive and the debate of the Army Tank Corps’ future after World War I. The Punitive Expedition began an important relationship for Patton—that of a mentor-protégé relationship with Pershing. Mentor Pershing was a role model of organizational leadership for Patton and the relationship would endure into World War II. Pershing almost became engaged to Anne Wilson “Nita” Patton, George’s sister. John and Nita’s close relationship continued well after Patton and Pershing journeyed to France with the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF). Patton’s first role in the war was as a sort of headquarters commandant for the AEF, one he tolerated, but did not relish. His destiny shifted when he took advice from Col. LeRoy Eltinge and moved from AEF headquarters to create a school of light tanks in the Tank Service. This opportunistic move, made principally in search of promotion and command, would change Patton’s trajectory forever. Patton learned how to structure and lead an organization at the Tank School. From there, he would go on to command the first U.S. tank brigade and lead that organization in combat at Saint-Mihiel and the Meuse-Argonne. Mikolashek details his leadership and heroism in combat. Mikolashek reveals Patton’s thoughts, relationships, and actions throughout this part of the book. Patton missed his wife, Beatrice, dearly, fretted over her personal appearance as it might affect his reputation, and always relied on her personal wealth to be comfortable. He had a distant, but important relationship with Brig. Gen. Samuel D. Rockenbach, the commander of the Tank Corps, who also provided important mentorship and top cover to young Patton and helped him to grow as a leader. The relationship between the two grew to the point of mutual respect, but not friendship. The other relationship analyzed is that of Patton to his subordinates in the tank brigade. Without Joseph W. Viner and Sereno E. Brett, Patton could not have achieved the success with tanks that he did. Viner took charge of the Tank School so that Patton could command the tank brigade. Brett took command of the tank brigade when Patton was wounded. Divining the importance of Patton’s early relationships is a strength of Mikolashek’s book. Blood, Guts, and Grease explains well the importance of World War I to Patton’s professional development. It shows Patton’s beginnings as a military trainer and professional writer, too. Mikolashek dissects many of Patton’s early analytical papers—papers that showed promise for his ability to think conceptually about warfare and indicated the importance of intense professional study to Patton. As Roger H. Nye showed in The Patton Mind (Avery, 1993) George Patton became a careful student of war. Jon Mikolashek shows that this clearly began in World War I. So, too, did Patton’s raw professional ambition, moving from job to job in search of advancement and promotion, and his lack of self-control. Mikolashek links an incident in World War I in which Patton admitted to Beatrice the likely killing of one of his own men with a shovel in the heat of combat to the later slapping incidents that ruined Patton’s relationship with Pershing and almost removed him from World War II command (83). Mikolashek takes a magnifying glass to the incidents, relationships, and thoughts of George S. Patton in World War I to indicate clearly the patterns that marked his rise to fame in World War II.

DEAR MARY: LETTERS HOME FROM THE 10TH MOUNTAIN DIVISION, 1944–1945

BY SYDNEY M. WILLIAMS
Bauhan Publishing, 2019
Pp. 255. $24

REVIEW BY CHRIS JUERGENS
As the story goes, newsreel footage of Finnish Jäger (light infantry) on skis in the Winter War of 1939–1940 served as inspiration for the U.S. Army’s first forays into ski and mountain warfare. Charles M. “Minnie” Dole, founder and head of the National Ski Patrol, wrote General George C. Marshall of this gap in Army capability—and offered to help. For the first and only time in Army history, a civilian organization headed a military recruitment effort. Before too long, a core group of volunteers grew to thousands of skiers, cowboys, and other outdoors enthusiasts training at Camp Hale in Colorado’s Rocky Mountains to form what would become the 10th Mountain Division. The ambitious goal of preparing an entire division for mountain warfare led to numerous delays and a hesitation to utilize

Dr. Dean A. Nowowiejski a retired Army colonel, is a professor of history and the Ike Skelton Distinguished Chair for the Art of War at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC) in Kansas and directs the Art of War Scholars program. He has taught at both CGSC and in the
Dear Mary: Letters Home from the 10th Mountain Division, January 1945–July 1945 opens. The author’s father, Sydney Williams Jr., was drafted in the spring of 1944 and assigned to the 10th after their move to Camp Swift, Texas. The book is a collection of letters written between Williams and his wife Mary (as well as a few exchanges with other family members), showcasing wartime connections and disconnections, romance, apprehension, and the essential lifeline between the chaos of the front and the seeming normalcy of home. What emerges is a story that is both typical in the experiences shared by that generation of soldiers and unique in the view it offers of a late-war division in one of the conflict’s least-studied theaters.

The author does an admirable job of assembling the letters with interjections of context, particularly as the progress of the war often delayed mail and could result in batches of letters arriving all at once. Additionally, intense combat actions in Italy precluded writing for days at a time in the spring of 1945, leaving large gaps in the narrative with few details from Williams, the soldier, about the horrors he had endured.

Two important distinctions set Williams apart from many of his fellow ski troopers. As a latecomer to the division, he did not experience the mountain training at Camp Hale, nor his regiment’s role in the ill-fated invasion of Kiska in the Aleutians. The 33-year-old married father of three (later four) also did not match the average age and life experience of the young soldiers around him. When Williams received a rare pass to visit Florence during a lull in the spring offensive, he noted that his traveling companions amounted to little more than an impediment to his sightseeing (76). Though he shared a few other anecdotes of pastimes, most of Williams’ downtime was spent reading, writing, or thinking about letters home.

Perhaps most striking is Williams’ desire to stay connected to the day-to-day happenings stateside. No detail of life back home in New Hampshire was too small to warrant mention or comment, including the antics of the children, visits from neighbors, and the family’s many pets and farm animals. Despite their awareness that letters lacked privacy due to the ever-present censors—“This not being able to talk to you about what I please is terrible” (111)—the couple routinely expressed heartfelt tenderness for one another that underscores their painful separation.

Details from the front, on the other hand, were necessarily scant, both due to the constraints of this same censorship and a desire to keep letters light and focused on a happy return home. When Williams was wounded in an attack, he did give more detail in a letter to Mary, noting that “the shrapnel did cut my cheek just barely, but enough to bleed quite a bit, and killed a man nearby.” Even then, he found occasion to lighten the mood of the letter, noting that he looked “quite impressive” with dried blood on his face for several days before he had opportunity to wash himself (99). When the stresses of frontline service weighed on him heavily and led to general fatigue and weight loss, he joked that it must be his growing moustache that sapped his energy. “For the sake of science,” he claimed, he put off shaving to see if his condition would worsen or improve (108).

The war in Italy ended on 2 May 1945, about a week before VE Day. The soldiers of the 10th Mountain Division disarmed and processed POWs before going to northeastern Italy for a little-known blocking action. In this final set of letters from Europe, Williams and his family both betray the uncertainty they felt, even after the Allies achieved victory on the continent. The 10th Mountain Division was to be transferred to the Pacific to play a role in the anticipated invasion of Japan, with only a short reprieve at home. To the relief of the troops and their families, the war ended just as their transports arrived on the East Coast. After a well-deserved furlough, most traveled to Colorado in uniform one last time to be discharged formally from the Army at Camp Carson. Ultimately, 1,000 10th Mountain Division ski troopers died in action in Italy, with another 4,000 wounded in action. Among them were Olympic athletes, future titans of industry, a Medal of Honor awardee, and even a future senator and presidential candidate. This book will appeal most to readers already familiar with the story of the 10th Mountain Division’s training and deployment, despite the author’s contextual chapter openings. This book not only illuminates the human experience of that brutal service in Italy; it also highlights the ordeal of families at home anxiously awaiting letters and news bulletins from the front. Dear Mary is a humbling reminder of the extraordinary sacrifices made by ordinary people in trying times.
The military conflict to defend the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) from attacks by Communists units often has been depicted as two separate wars. The first pits U.S. or South Vietnamese regular army units against main force troops of the People’s Army of Vietnam, then called the North Vietnamese Army. They also battled against so-called Viet Cong units recruited in South Vietnam who ostensibly reported to the National Liberation Front but in reality, they were under the command of the People’s Army. The second war fought to secure the hamlets and villages against incursions by Communist troops and to provide economic prosperity to peasants so that they would support the Republic of Vietnam. This second process to secure the rural countryside was called pacification.

Yet in the panoply of Vietnam tomes, few books have attempted to analyze pacification, particularly for a specific area. In his well-researched volume on the allied effort to secure the coastal province of Phu Yen, the bulk of Robert Thompson’s book, *Clear, Hold, and Destroy*, is a detailed chronological overview of the period from 1965 until the end in 1975. Phu Yen and its more prominent neighbor province to the north, Binh Dinh, were the core rice growing centers for II Corps, the military region that stretched from the Central Highlands on the border with Laos across South Vietnam’s middle to the coastal plains. A chief pacification focus for allied units was to expand RVN influence by protecting the people and the critical rice harvest from Communist depravations. The author relates how in 1966–1967, constant U.S. Army, South Korean, and South Vietnamese operations sought to engage and destroy Communist forces comprised of one People’s Army main force regiment and several local force battalions. Despite these sweeps by allied units, they rarely found the elusive enemy.

The 1968 Tet Offensive saw major battles erupt. Communist units struck numerous villages and district seats and even penetrated into strongly defended Tuy Hoa, the provincial capital. Allied firepower inflicted heavy casualties on the Communist units and quickly drove them out. Although U.S. and ARVN troops had defeated the attackers, they had not destroyed them. This ongoing failure was the primary reason why Phu Yen was never totally secured. The mountainous terrain allowed the insurgents multiple hiding places. In addition, the People’s Army had an incredible ability to rebuild even badly mauled units at the end of a very long logistical chain. Along with a history of Communist influence in the coastal plains stretching back to the 1940s, the allies could not eradicate enemy political or military power.

Although Phu Yen was an important rice-growing center for II Corps, the province was always a backwater of the war. In mid-1969, both the People’s Army and the U.S. Army pulled their main combat formations out of the province for other, more important battlefields. From 1970 onward, while some civilian and military advisers remained to assist RVN district and provincial representatives, the war devolved into a clash between local forces. Unfortunately for the populace, RVN authorities failed to protect them against abductions, mines, and night forays by Communist forces for rice and other supplies. Unless they could eliminate the Communist forces, the RVN could never win.

How then to achieve security and hence become pacified? It was something that eluded policymakers and commanders, then and now. Thompson argues convincingly that the main force and pacification wars were separate phenomena but were intertwined inextricably. The author provides a thorough review of Washington and Saigon’s failure to agree upon a strategy that defined the issue and provided an answer to the Communist threat. Among the many solutions attempted was the French oil spot technique, in which forces secure one area and then protection spreads outward. Although sound in theory, unanswered questions remain: what programs should be instituted after the enemy is gone, and who will conduct those programs? The RVN response was to build an administrative structure behind the shield of U.S. firepower. They sent in Rural Development cadre, armed the local villagers under the People’s Self-Defense Force program, and added layers of elected and administrative officials to manage local affairs. Despite these efforts, U.S. advisers did not believe these programs worked effectively in the province.

Thompson, however, rightfully refuses to confl ate the conditions in Phu Yen with all of South Vietnam. Local conditions and the quality of RVN leadership usually determined the success or failure of pacification in every district and province—circumstances that often waxed and waned over time. The author also smartly does not attempt to blame corruption to explain American views of South Vietnamese inertia or incompetence. Although Phu Yen, like Binh Dinh, was rumored to be a notorious swamp of corruption (its rich rice fields in the rice-deficit II Corps often proved too lucrative for government workers to ignore), conniving local businesses fostered corruption as much as high government officials.

Even more important than the recounting of the battle for Phu Yen is Thompson’s thought-provoking description in his first chapter regarding how the Americans envisioned pacification in South Vietnam. These same questions, among the most critical for policymakers engaged in nation building, also haunted U.S. endeavors in Iraq and Afghanistan. How does one defeat a fanatical enemy that is able to elude destruction because of favorable terrain and working amid a portion of the population that tolerates their presence as much from self-preservation as sympathy? Thompson relates that although Washington and Saigon had differing concepts of pacification, control of the population, rather than winning their proverbial hearts and minds, lay at the core of their efforts. Within this goal lay two policies: destroy the Communist military and political formations and then build internally afterwards. However, failing to achieve the former usually meant the inability to realize the latter, which is precisely what occurred in Phu Yen.

Despite relying mainly on American records to detail pacification’s failure in one difficult province, Thompson provides scholars a unique opportunity to wrestle with not only the precise meaning of the term, but its implementation at the pointy end of the stick. For example, rather than just focusing on high stakes diplomacy or policymaking, historians should now understand other aspects, such as what level of violence is acceptable before an area is considered secure? Zero? By that measure, the crime rates in most U.S. cities would preclude pacification. Unfortunately, Thompson provides limited information about Vietnamese efforts, a consequence perhaps of publisher restrictions on word count and language barriers. Although only part of the picture, Thompson’s excellent work has provided a substantial lesson why the war in South Vietnam ultimately failed.

*George J. Field* is the author of four books on the Vietnam War, including *Black April: The Fall of South Vietnam, 1973–75* (En-
HEADHUNTER: 5-73 CAV AND THEIR FIGHT FOR IRAQ’S DIYALA RIVER VALLEY

BY PETER C. SVOBODA

Casemate Publishers, 2020
Pp. ix, 228. $34.95

REVIEW BY LAURENCE M. NELSON III

Military historians often struggle to depict the “face of battle.” Organizing multiple viewpoints into a single, coherent account can create a confusing and sometimes contradictory narrative. Peter Svoboda’s Headhunter: 5-73 CAV and Their Fight for Iraq’s Diyala River Valley grapples with this challenge as he recounts the operations of the 5th Squadron, 73d Cavalry Regiment, in the Iraq War from 2006 to 2007. Svoboda’s book is a chronological narrative covering the squadron’s deployment to Iraq through the eyes of paratroopers at various levels within the command structure. Although the book spends little time analyzing its subject’s strategic or operational context, the author provides a detailed and fascinating account of the patterns of daily life experienced by American combatants in Iraq.

The experiences of his father, a World War II veteran of the 82d Airborne Division, inspired Svoboda to chronicle the operations of that fabled U.S. airborne unit in Iraq. A tribute to his father, Headhunter tells the story of the paratroopers serving in the same division’s 5th Squadron, 73d Cavalry Regiment, as they worked to secure a large part of the Diyala River Valley at a critical point in the Iraq War. Svoboda relies almost exclusively on interviews with squadron members and their families to tell their stories. As a result, Headhunter gives an in-depth account of how the paratroopers waged war, including insights into their social lives. The author explores the friendships forged, their losses, and the courage to persist that influenced the lives of these soldiers.

The 5th Squadron (also known as “Headhunter,” after their squadron commander Lt. Col. Andrew P. Poppas’s call sign) faced numerous challenges. Before the squadron even deployed, they began to make history by serving as the first reconnaissance squadron in the 82d Airborne Division, meaning they had an even mix of cavalry scouts and infantry riflemen. The squadron provided reconnaissance assets for the division’s 3d Brigade Combat Team. The brigade’s modular force design enhanced deployment flexibility, establishing a pool of self-reliant units that division commanders could easily attach to larger, ad hoc formations as needed.

During its deployment, the squadron was responsible for securing much of Diyala Province, where Kurds, Sunni, and Shi’a competed for control. The coalition had paid little attention to the province since the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom three years before. Diyala consequently became a staging area for several anticoalition militant groups. The province is about the size of Connecticut and runs along Iraq’s border with Iran. Sectarian violence accelerated as a Sunni insurgent group, al-Qaeda in Iraq, began to establish itself in the region and Kurdish intermediaries funneled supplies through the area from Iran. The 5th Squadron lacked the combat power to secure the province completely, so they worked with Iraqi forces to try to secure the border, keep the insurgents at bay, and begin to address the sectarian issues. Having insufficient numbers to cover their entire area of operations required a focus on offensive efforts in identifiable zones of enemy concentration, one at a time.

Upon taking responsibility for the region in late 2006, the 5th Squadron, 73d Cavalry Regiment, began clearing out militant strongholds before the squadron could build up the local area. Colonel Poppas’s soldiers slowly began to reduce the influence of Sunni insurgent groups in the rural Southern and Eastern portions of the province. Svoboda centers most of his narrative on the operations in those rural communities, most notably Turki Bowl, Minotaur, Ithaca, and Pericles. Headhunter covers these operations from planning to execution. Svoboda explains how Maj. Bret G. Sylvia, the operations officer for the squadron, usually planned extensive preparatory psychological and reconnaissance efforts to prevent the enemy from escaping before the operations began. The squadron sent patrols to areas with insurgent concentrations to gather intelligence on enemy movements and place sensors on escape routes, which signaled insurgent movements to squadron leaders. Squadron members planted misleading evidence to confuse terrorists around the target area about the location of the impending attack. After completing these shaping operations, the squadron sprang multipronged aerial assaults to isolate and then destroy enemy strongholds. Attacks consisted of coordinated sweeps by the troops, who employed overwhelming firepower to break up enemy strongpoints. These vertical envelopments forced the enemy to stand and fight. Helicopters and truck convoys conducted detachments to predesignated points in the area to ensure the insurgents could not escape.

After these operations, troops began the complex task of clearing the area of weapons caches and strongholds. Throughout the clearing process, the paratroopers interacted with many civilians as they examined homes. The soldiers noted the hostility of some and the encouraging cooperation of others in their interviews with Svoboda. The paratroopers faced some dogged resistance from the insurgents using canals and trenches as cover. The terrorists prepared networks of IEDs that could trigger chaos among coalition forces as they scrambled to care for their wounded comrades. Svoboda’s prose describes the courage of medics as they triaged, treated, and evacuated the injured. When such setbacks occurred, the squadron would use directed airstrikes to clear enemy strongpoints in the canals, putting the insurgents on their heels.

Once the squadron cleared the target area, part of the squadron would stay to establish a patrol base to facilitate reconciliation and provide security for the population. Svoboda reveals how this phase of the conflict came with its share of danger. To live among the people while building “political
infrastructure and security,” the squadron established a patrol base with minimal “standoff” fortifications (151). On what one of the paratroopers describes as a “normal day,” two dump trucks drove over the vehicle barriers outside the base (153). When one came to rest near the front gate and the other stopped near living quarters, they exploded. Nine paratroopers lost their lives in the attack. Despite the constant violence the terrorists employed to undermine their mission, the squadron served with distinction to the end of their deployment.

Throughout this narrative, Headhunter reveals the 5th Squadron’s achievements and explores the personal struggles of its soldiers. Overall, Svoboda shows that the squadron proved their mettle and accomplished a great deal under adverse circumstances. One in four squadron members were killed or wounded during the deployment, and over 30 percent received awards for heroism. Svoboda’s work clearly illustrates how the 5th Squadron, 73d Calvary Regiment served with courage, determination, and devastating sacrifice. Despite reminding his readers of the squadron’s achievements, Svoboda does not obscure the less glamorous features of war these soldiers faced. Throughout Headhunter, Svoboda exposes the gritty realities of fighting in Iraq, including facing IEDs, fighting against a determined enemy, losing comrades, dealing with potentially hostile civilians, and handling combative prisoners.

Perhaps due to an abiding concern for telling the soldiers’ stories, Svoboda does not dwell too much on the institutional and strategic factors that directly influenced the squadron’s experience. First, the book does not scrutinize the impact that the 2007 surge had on the unit. Readers familiar with the Iraq War can find glimpses of how the coalition’s new emphasis on protecting the population influenced squadron leaders. That said, the author does not address how the build-up of forces during the surge affected the cavalry squadron. Svoboda also does not examine the impact on the squadron of the Army’s transition to a new modular force structure.

Additionally, the lack of institutional context led to a missed opportunity to explore the contrast between the traditional role of paratroopers and the experience of the 5th Squadron in Iraq. Headhunter begins with a description of the purpose of a paratrooper in a conventional conflict, which seems out of place without a thorough explanation as to how that training would serve the troopers under the very different conditions of an insurgency. Svoboda takes the time to discuss the unique role paratroopers typically hold in a conventional conflict but does not address how or if that matters in the unconventional conditions the squadron experiences in Iraq.

Svoboda also avoids engaging in the significant historiographical debates about the Iraq War, such as whether the surge campaign had a direct role in reducing violence in the country. However, the experiences of the paratroopers of the 5th Squadron can inform scholarly analysis of counterinsurgency, the war in Iraq, and the surge campaign. Headhunter underlines the efforts made by the squadron to “clear, hold, and build” in line with population-centric counterinsurgency doctrine. The struggles and comments of the paratroopers make the inherent limitations of adhering to that strategy with insufficient forces especially clear.

Additionally, historians may find broader contributions to military history as they examine the evidence of soldiers’ social rituals and combat experiences at the tactical level. Svoboda gives special attention to the mourning process as soldiers and families confronted the loss of comrades and loved ones. Svoboda takes care to include stories about the personalities and individual contributions of the fallen.

Svoboda devotes his seventh chapter to a description of the memorial for Capt. Rhett W. Schiller and 1st Lt. John R. Dennison. Svoboda describes how the squadron took the time to erect physical memorials and eulogize their friends between operations in Iraq. Within the chapter, Svoboda records how paratroopers and family members described how those lost affected their lives. As the author shares the personal details of their lives, the fallen become increasingly real to the reader and their effect on the social fabric of their community comes into focus.

Headhunter stands as an excellent resource for specialist historians and those curious about the personal experiences of soldiers at war. Although Svoboda could do more to explain the broader context of the Iraq War, his monograph tells the stories of the brave paratroopers with clarity and grit. Those looking to get insight into the lives of American soldiers as they served in Iraq will enjoy this compassionately written book.

LAURENCE M. NELSON III is a PhD candidate in United States history who specializes in U.S. military intervention in Latin America or the “Banana Wars.” He examines the actions of both Latin American and U.S. participants in those conflicts. By analyzing transnational documentation of an institutional and personal nature, he illuminates fundamental dynamics that contributed to military outcomes. He currently holds a fellowship with the Marine Corps Heritage Foundation.

21ST CENTURY POWER: STRATEGIC SUPERIORITY FOR THE MODERN ERA

EDITED BY BRENT D. ZIARNICK

Naval Institute Press, 2018

Pp. xii, 192. $21.95

REVIEW BY GARRETT A. CLOSE

The end of the Cold War led to many shifts in America’s global posture, among them the eventual disbanding of the Strategic Air Command (SAC). The opinions of experts who shaped America’s deterrence posture throughout those tense decades of U.S.–Soviet conflict have largely faded from public consciousness, seemingly irrelevant in an era free from talk of mutually assured destruction and nuclear annihilation. However, the world continues to change and events in the past few years make clear the importance of deterrence and escalation control throughout the world. In 2019, Russia unveiled a nuclear-powered cruise missile. In April 2022, Russia test launched their newly-developed intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), the Sarmat–2. Russia and
China have developed hypersonic glide vehicles as nuclear delivery systems. Iran’s Ayatollah Khamenei announced in August 2020 that Iran would expand its nuclear program. North Korea’s Kim Jong Un has publicly celebrated possessing nuclear warheads and long-range ICBMs; he said in July 2020 that such weapons would guarantee his country’s security.

It is precisely these types of developments that led Brent Ziarnick, an assistant professor of National Security Studies at the Air Command and Staff College, to edit 21st Century Power. The book compiles speeches, conversations, and writings from General Thomas S. Power, the third commander of SAC. It also includes useful commentary from Ziarnick, in an effort to help modern strategists approach nuclear warfighting in an era where it may once again be a reality. 21st Century Power provides a valuable historical account of how deterrence worked during the Cold War and makes a compelling case for why it is still relevant today. The book appeals to two audiences: students of history will appreciate it as an expertly compiled sampling of General Power’s speeches, writings, and conversations with government leaders. These provide a broad overview of SAC during Power’s time as its leader, the policies and procedures he implemented, and the underlying worldview that drove him. Students of strategy will appreciate it as a guide to shape and refine modern deterrence and escalation control policies.

The book is divided into five chapters. In the first, Ziarnick focusses on deterrence and strategic warfare. He explains how the deterrence philosophies espoused by important civilian strategists such as Thomas C. Schelling and Herman Kahn contrast with the practical outlook embraced by Power. Ziarnick then provides a 1957 Memorandum to SAC and multiple journal articles authored by Power, all corroborating the idea that Power viewed deterrence not as U.S. parity with an adversary, but instead as overwhelming U.S. advantage. Chapter 2 explores how Power incorporated ICBMs into SAC, arguing “no man did more to bring the ICBM from early development to mature operational status than Power himself” (43). Chapter 3 discusses Power’s unsuccessful attempt at persuading the Senate to oppose ratification of the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963. Ziarnick presents a slightly abridged version of Power’s testimony. He argues that it provides another perspective on Power’s beliefs on strategic nuclear warfare and serves as an example for modern readers of a senior officer taking “an opposing viewpoint from his political superiors and [communicating] it respectfully but honestly, even if his opinions are not particularly popular” (75). Chapter 4 presents a transcript of remarks Power made to civic leaders touring SAC in 1963 to make the case that Power was an “engaging and effective” speaker (128). Chapter 5 concludes by looking at the enduring role of strategic warfare, closing with Power’s last speech on active duty.

As a historical reference, the value of the book is clear. Ziarnick’s careful curation of speeches, memorandums, and conversations provides a platform for modern readers to connect with Power in his own words and in various situations. The broad variety of sources allows readers to get a comprehensive understanding of Power, from the way he wrote for journals, to what he briefed Congress, to the way he talked to the public. As one would expect, the way Power spoke diverged significantly based on his audience. In an article, for instance, he explained deterrence by saying that “the best way of maintaining peace is to take the profit out of war. In other words, we must convince the Soviets and their partners that the price they would have to pay for aggression against this country or its allies would be far higher than they would be willing or able to pay” (26). Power explains the same concept more colorfully when talking to a group visiting SAC: “We want to make sure that Mr. Khrushchev has a [strategic] planner, a good planner . . . [to] try to write a plan for the destruction of the United States and have him survive at the same time. We want him to do that. And then we’d like to have him turn every morning to Mr. Khrushchev and say to him, ‘Comrade, I’ve studied this very carefully and I recommend you don’t try it today.’ And if we can get him to do that every day, we will have accomplished our mission” (146).

The book also highlights the fact that if war had broken out in 1960, “over 90 percent of the explosive power available to [the U.S. and its] allies would have been carried in SAC bomb bays” (27). As a reader might expect in a tome written about a founding father of the Strategic Air Command, the focus is largely on policy and posture at the national level. There is very little here for students of the tactical or operational levels of war, but modern students of national strategy and deterrence will find value in the book. Power explains concepts such as escalation control, targeting, kill probabilities, and deterrence in a practical way. He occasionally goes into granular detail, outlining logistics, communications, and intelligence requirements that could very well pertain to present-day operations. The urgency with which Power speaks and the fact that he proved prescient in identifying challenges such as proliferation issues in which “nuclear weapons and missiles [become] available to small countries ruled by irresponsible men” (40) may help readers looking for an informed “devil’s advocate” to challenge modern beliefs and conventional wisdom.

21st Century Power represents a solid contribution to the field of deterrence. Readers who have professional interest in the topic, or historical curiosity about SAC, would be well served in picking up a copy. Although some sections—such as a technical discussion on issues with U.S. ICBMs in the 1960s—are no longer relevant to modern strategists, the principles that drive escalation and deterrence are as applicable today as they ever were.

**LT. COL. GARRETT A. CLOSE** received his master’s in strategic intelligence from the National Intelligence University. He recently served as an Army Fellow at the RAND Arroyo Center and is assigned currently to the Department of the Army Headquarters G–8 as a program integrator.
I have written before about the Book Process Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) and our goal of speeding up the production of our official histories, but it has been a while since I have provided an update on our current projects. Because of the SOP, the addition of new authors (some via contract), and circumstance, the Histories Directorate recently has completed an unusually large number of manuscripts in a short time. In fact, projects are now waiting for an available editor so they can begin production. It is a good problem to have!

The Vietnam series marches steadily forward. One of the oldest uncompleted projects was Mark Bradley’s logistics history covering 1965 through 1967. An external panel reviewed the manuscript in spring 2019 and provided excellent feedback on areas for improvement. The revision process included writing a prologue and conclusion, along with adding fresh research and rewriting some of the main text. That effort proved longer and more difficult than expected. However, Joel Meyerson, who had started the initial research and writing a couple decades earlier, and Bradley concluded it this spring and the manuscript is finally in the queue for editing and production. Mark Bradley has now retired, so it may be some time before we identify an author to research and write the logistics history of 1968–1973, but that is the lone remaining volume in the series that is not underway.

Andy Birtle’s manuscript on the Vietnam advisory effort from 1964 through the first half of 1965 underwent external panel review in July 2021. He completed all revisions in April of this year and the Multimedia and Publications Division (MPD) is performing final editing. It will come out in print next year. Birtle is currently revising his 1961–1963 manuscript, which will undergo external panel review later this year. Erik Villard, has recently completed Chapter 9 of his volume on combat operations 1968–1969. He has five more chapters to go and is on track to wrap up a full draft by the end of 2023. Contractor Kevin Boylan has finished seven of twenty chapters of the combat operations volume for 1970–1973, and is on schedule to produce the final chapter in summer 2024. With the exception of the second logistics volume, the series will be finished around 2025.

In our Cold War series, Thomas Boghardt’s book on Army intelligence in Germany 1945–1949 appeared in print earlier this year and he is working on the volume that takes the story through 1961. Don Carter’s manuscript on the institutional Army 1953–1963 underwent external panel review in November 2021. He completed revisions and the manuscript went to editing and production in May. Julie Prieto has written five of eight chapters of her account of the Army in Latin America 1945–1963 and should have it ready for panel in early 2024.

The Tan Book series continues to pick up steam. Nick Schlosser has completed eleven of sixteen chapters of his history of the Surge in Iraq 2007–2008. By this fall, we hope to have Mark Reardon under contract to revise his manuscript on the U.S. Army’s role in establishing and advising the Iraqi army, which had lain fallow following his retirement. Both volumes should be ready to go to external panel review in 2023. Mason Watson has completed the prospectus and begun research on the main volume on Operation Inherent Resolve in Iraq 2014–2018, the follow-up to his campaign monograph that appeared in print late last year. Retired Army Colonel Paul Cook, who recently earned his doctoral degree in military history, is now under contract to do a book on Army doctrine 2001–2017.

The Global War on Terrorism monograph series has made great strides. Mark Folse’s new account of Afghanistan 2001–2002 went to the editors this spring, and he is working on the prospectus for the main volume. Contractor John Mortimer is doing final revisions of Afghanistan 2009–2011, which will go soon to MPD. Kate Tietzen-Wisdom is in the final stages of her manuscript on Iraq 2009–2011. Travis Moger completed a draft of Iraq 2001–2003 before taking another job, but that project awaits a new author to wrap it up. Within the next year, we will have eight of the twelve monographs in print or close to it.

Several authors contributed to a new edition of Army History and Heritage. In a shift from tradition, the Center of Military History digitally published each chapter as we completed it, and the entire book will come out in hard copy in the near future.