OUR MAN IN BERLIN
THE SECRET LIFE OF WILLY BRANDT
BY THOMAS BOGHARDT

"WHY CAN’T A GIRL BE A SOLDIER?"
THE IMPORTANCE OF FEMALE MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS, 1875–1900
BY GARY A. MITCHELL
In the Winter 2022 issue of Army History, we are pleased to offer two engaging articles on very disparate topics, a great selection of book reviews, a look at some interesting Army art, and a visit to an Army museum at the foot of Cheyenne Mountain.

The first article, by Center of Military History (CMH) historian Thomas Boghardt, examines the covert life of Willy Brandt, the former West German chancellor and mayor of West Berlin. CMH recently published Boghardt’s book, Covert Legions: U.S. Army Intelligence in Germany, 1944–1949. An outgrowth of that book, this article tells the fascinating story of Brandt’s involvement with various intelligence services, including the U.S. Army’s Counter Intelligence Corps, during and after World War II and throughout the Cold War. His connection to these organizations ultimately would be his undoing and destroy his political career.

The second article, by Gary A. Mitchell, looks at the rise of female military organizations from 1875 to 1900. He argues that these groups, often referred to as “broom brigades,” paved the way for women’s enlistment during World War I, and that this necessary precursor helped the suffrage movement and led to the eventual ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment. Many antisufragist arguments prior to 1920 called notice to the fact that women could not perform military service. Without this crucial element, women were denied full citizenship and, thus, the right to vote. In response, female quasi-military organizations sprung up across the country. Uniformed, with brooms and fans at the ready, and sometimes employing mock rifles, these units drilled, marched, performed community services, published their own manuals, and attempted to show that military service was not just a man’s game.

The last two years have been ones of change and adaptation here at Army History. From teleworking to learning to operate in a COVID–19 environment, 2020 and 2021 have not been without their struggles. Although we succeeded in our endeavors to continue to publish engaging content on time and on target, there were still some challenges. The pandemic seems to have afforded folks the time they needed to write the articles they had been putting off. During the last eighteen months, we have received a record number of new article submissions—way more than we ever could publish. And, as it turns out, way more than I ever could hope to read in a timely manner. I review all of the submitted articles before passing along those deemed suitable for publication for further evaluation, and there is currently a large backlog of submissions. This has caused, in my opinion, an unacceptable delay in responding to authors with a decision. For this, I sincerely apologize. Due to this backlog and these delays, we have suspended the call for new article submissions for a few months. This will allow me to catch up on reading and responding to the current inventory of articles. My hope is that when we reopen for submissions I will be able to respond more promptly, a courtesy which your hard work and writing most certainly deserve.

BRYAN J. HOCKENSsmith
MANAGING EDITOR
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THE NATIONAL ARMY MUSEUM: THE FIRST YEAR OF THE ARMY’S FRONT PORCH

It’s hard to believe that the National Museum of the United States Army has been open for more than a year. It has been a year of challenge and growth, as we have successfully operated the museum in what is becoming an endemic COVID–19 environment, welcoming in-person visitors to a safe and educational setting in Northern Virginia. After conducting a grand opening on Veterans Day 2020, the pandemic forced us to close again to onsite visitors in early December. We reopened in June for the Army Birthday and have remained open over the summer and fall. In total, we have seen 60,000 visitors during the seven months the facility has been open. A timed ticketing system has allowed us to maintain social distancing within the building while remaining within Department of Defense and Commonwealth of Virginia guidelines for public spaces. This has truly been a team effort by Department of Army civilians, the Military District of Washington and the Fort Belvoir garrison, our colleagues in the Army Historical Foundation, and our robust contractor work force. The museum continues to receive praise and positive reviews by individual visitors, the news media, and the museum and tourist industries.

Onsite operations have not been our only way to reach the nation. The museum’s programs and education team has continued to develop and present innovative virtual programs throughout the year, reaching more than 5,000 visitors through seventy-three distinct virtual events. We have conducted two week-long virtual seminars, school-age field trips, gallery tours by our curatorial staff, battle briefs on Army battles and campaigns throughout history, and book talks with new and upcoming authors. The museum staff has also provided professional development for the Army’s museum professionals through “History and Hard Conversations,” a series that looks at complex and controversial topics in Army history through the lens of material culture and the latest scholarship.

In the years ahead, the National Army Museum will continue to be a living thing, changing and growing to embrace new conversations about Army history. We are actively planning to lead the Army’s commemoration of the 250th anniversary of the American Revolution and the nation’s founding, and work is underway to begin regular upgrades and exhibit changes across the museum. Event space reservations for private events are going strong, school groups are flowing in, and our volunteer program is an overwhelming success. There has never been a better time to experience your National Army Museum. I’ll see you around the facility!
NEW PUBLICATIONS

On 17 November 2021, the chief of staff of the Army and the U.S. Army Center of Military History (CMH) released *Modern War in an Ancient Land: The United States Army in Afghanistan 2001–2014*, a two-volume history of the U.S. Army’s involvement in Afghanistan. These volumes, prepared by the Operation ENDURING FREEDOM Study Group, present an operational-level narrative of how the U.S. Army formed, trained, deployed, and employed its forces in Afghanistan from October 2001 to December 2014. To write this history, the study group embarked on an extensive research program, conducting oral history interviews with dozens of key military and civilian leaders. These volumes contain a total of fifty maps, a wide range of campaign photography and artwork, and volume-specific indexes. They will be issued as CMH Pub 59–1–1 and will be available as a free download on the CMH website and for purchase by the general public from the U.S. Government Publishing Office.

CMH also recently published *Covert Legions: U.S. Army Intelligence in Germany, 1944–1949*, by Thomas Boghardt, as part of the U.S. Army in the Cold War series. *Covert Legions* tells the story of Army Intelligence in Germany from the time U.S. forces entered the country in September 1944 to the end of the military occupation five years later. It provides a comprehensive overview of the Army’s intelligence organizations, from the headquarters to the field agencies, and covers the many operations carried out by Army intelligence personnel in Germany during the final months of World War II and the early years of the Cold War. The book will be issued as CMH Pub 45–5 (cloth) and 45–5–1 (paper), and will be available as a free download from the CMH website as well as for purchase by the general public from the U.S. Government Publishing Office.

88TH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE SOCIETY FOR MILITARY HISTORY

The 88th Annual Meeting of the Society for Military History (SMH) will convene at the Omni Fort Worth Hotel in Fort Worth, Texas, 28 April–1 May 2022. Meeting information, including hotel room reservations, can be found on the SMH website, https://www.smh-hq.org/annualmeeting/index.html.

CONFERENCE OF ARMY HISTORIANS

The biennial Conference of Army Historians (CAH) will be held 18–22 July 2022 at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, after a yearlong delay due to COVID restrictions. This event is vital for the professional development of Army historians, providing them unique opportunities to research critical historical topics and prepare presentations and papers for review, all of which are core competency skills required by Functional Community 61.

The theme for the 2022 CAH is “9-11 at 20 Years.” This is an especially relevant theme as the conflicts precipitated by the events of 11 September 2001 are reaching their culmination, and the Army begins to refocus on large-scale combat operations against potential near peer adversaries. This theme and its key strategic issues provide the foundation for a detailed agenda that will be published in early 2022.

The conference is essential to the professional growth of Army historians, archivists, and museum professionals. All Army historians are expected to attend this conference, and their commands are encouraged to send other personnel engaged in historical activities as well.
Willy Brandt was born as Herbert Ernst Karl Frahm in the Baltic seaport of Lübeck in 1913. Raised by a single mother in a hardscrabble household, Frahm joined the Social Democratic Party of Germany (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands; SPD) at the age of 17. Like most socialists, he battled the rising tide of Nazism. When Adolf Hitler became chancellor in 1933, Frahm moved to Norway to organize the resistance from abroad. He learned Norwegian, assumed Norwegian citizenship, and adopted the pseudonym “Willy Brandt” to elude the prying eyes of Nazi intelligence. Meanwhile, the Nazis stripped him of his German citizenship. When Germany invaded Norway in 1940, Brandt fled to neutral Sweden where he got his first taste of the world of intelligence.

As Hitler rampaged through Europe, Brandt reached out to several Allied intelligence services, including the U.S. Office of Strategic Services (OSS). He provided the OSS with information on German exile activities in Scandinavia, and the office
connected him with the American envoy in Stockholm, Herschel V. Johnson. By spring 1944, Hitler’s defeat seemed inevitable, and Brandt sent Herschel an eight-page memorandum on the future of Germany. This document is remarkable for several reasons. For one, Brandt wrote it in flawless English, a testimony to his facility with languages and his ease in engaging with foreigners. He discussed the collapse of the Nazi regime and the forces vying to succeed it. Unsurprisingly, Brandt highlighted the significance of the labor movement, but one factor is conspicuous for its absence—the victorious Allies. The most remarkable aspect of this memorandum is perhaps that he sent it at all. That a refugee from Nazi Germany took the liberty to advise one of the principal Allies on the enemy’s future bespeaks Brandt’s self-confidence and his zeal to shape postwar Germany. That Johnson respected his views and forwarded them to Washington testifies to Brandt’s political talent. One OSS officer described Brandt as “one of the ablest in the entire lot [of German émigrés in Scandinavia] and [as] the one most likely to play some role [in Germany] after the war, in spite of his Norwegian nationality.”

On 8 May 1945, the Third Reich surrendered unconditionally to the Allies. The victors divided the defeated nation into four occupation zones—the United States, Great Britain, and France administered the three western zones while the Soviet Union held the one in the east. Likewise, the Allies split Berlin into four sectors. To coordinate their occupation policies, they set up an administrative body, the Allied Control Council, in the former German capital.

But the wartime alliance did not survive victory for long. While the United States and Great Britain favored capitalist, democratic societies across Western Europe, the Soviet Union established communist regimes in the Eastern European territories occupied by the Red Army. The strains within the postwar realignment reached a breaking point in 1948 when the Soviets imposed a blockade on the Western sectors of Berlin in an attempt to squeeze the Western Allies out of the city. The Americans and the British responded with an airlift that held the Soviets at bay and forged a tight bond between Berliners and their erstwhile conquerors. The blockade and the airlift turned occupied Berlin into the fulcrum of the Cold War.

To this divided and contested city, Brandt returned in early 1946. Attached to the Norwegian military mission with the rank of major, he was to keep the Oslo government informed about the reemergence of local politics, the establishment of communist rule in the East, and the increasingly fractious inter-Allied relationship. In 1947 alone, he sent nearly 400 dispatches. Within weeks of his arrival, Brandt resumed contact with the reconstituted SPD, headquartered in Hanover. Eventually, he reacquired German citizenship and rejoined the party. In January 1948, SPD chairman Kurt Schumacher appointed him as the party’s representative at the Allied Control Council in Berlin. Here, Brandt aligned himself with the kingmaker of the local SPD, Ernst Reuter. Like Brandt, Reuter had spent much of his time in exile, returning to Berlin in 1946. As skilled organizers, gifted orators, and natural leaders, Reuter and Brandt rapidly consolidated power in the Berlin SPD.

Brandt had long admired American democracy, the New Deal, and President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s commitment to

Title Page: East German soldiers observe the western side of the border, August 1961.
(National Archives)
defeating the Nazis. Likewise, he trusted Roosevelt’s successor, Harry S. Truman, for his steady leadership and his determination to contain communism. Brandt hailed Truman’s reelection in November 1948 as a *Lichtpunkt* (highlight) of the year. Truman, Brandt reckoned, would commit to a long-term U.S. presence in Berlin and defend German democracy against Soviet pressure. Brandt’s mentor, Ernst Reuter, shared his lieutenant’s pro-American sentiments. This stance put the Berlin-based Reuter and Brandt at odds with the SPD leadership in Hanover—including SPD chair Kurt Schumacher, who favored a neutral Germany that could navigate the Cold War between the two superpowers.

Brandt’s pro-Americanism drew the attention of Brewster H. Morris, a diplomat working for the Office of the Political Adviser to the American military governor in Berlin. In 1947, Morris introduced Brandt to a member of the Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC), the U.S. Army’s principal espionage and counterespionage agency. Berlin was quickly becoming a battleground between Western and Soviet intelligence agencies, and the CIC looked for sources. In Brandt, Army Intelligence liked what it saw. CIC Special Agent George D. Swerdlin, who vetted the young Social Democrat as a potential informant, described him as “an intelligent, energetic man, who may be considered a friend of the Western Powers.” He had “a hatred of communism typical of a true Socialist.”

Initially, the CIC handled Brandt as an informal contact. A note in his file described him as “motivated to furnish information to CIC as he believed CIC to be an agency actively engaged in the fight against Communism.” The Corps assigned Swerdlin to work with the new recruit. The Corps agent’s biography resembled Brandt’s. Born in Berlin in 1923, Swerdlin had left Germany with his family during the war, he served with the U.S. Army and participated in the D-Day landings in Normandy. Fluent in six languages, he joined the CIC at the end of the war and worked for the U.S. intelligence community for many years.

As an informal contact, Brandt reported few real secrets. His “loyalty to the SPD,” the CIC noted, “comes before that of any agency of an occupying power,” constituting the “main drawback” of working with him. Only “in specific cases” did Brandt aid the Corps “in preference to the SPD.”
That did not keep Brandt from sharing gossip about fellow party members. On one occasion, he talked about Carlo Schmid, a Social Democrat from southwest Germany. The Francophile Schmid, Brandt said, had “pacifist tendencies” and “strictly” followed the neutralist policy of SPD chairman Kurt Schumacher. Nonetheless, he “loves to criticize [Schumacher] behind his back.”

Unlike many other CIC informants, Brandt did not ask for regular payments. He received compensation for his contacts, usually in the form of cigarettes and other tradable goods, and reimbursements for expenses. On one occasion, the CIC issued him an airline ticket from Berlin to Frankfurt. Swerdlin noted that Brandt was “very fond of American whiskey, and accept[ed] an occasional present of a bottle given in a sociable manner.” An undated receipt documents his acceptance of five A-rations of bottled whiskey.

The Cold War transformed this gentleman’s arrangement into a professional intelligence relationship. In 1946, the German Communist Party (Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands) in the Soviet Zone forced the Social Democratic Party in the Soviet Zone into a merger, creating the Socialist Unity Party (Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands; SED). Communists held all the key positions in the new party, and many Social Democrats resented having been coopted into a party that was little more than a puppet for the Soviet authorities. With the assistance of the SPD leadership, the disgruntled Social Democrats in the Soviet Zone founded a secret organization, the so-called Ostbüro (Eastern Bureau), which provided the Western leadership with information on political developments in the East. West Berlin served as the logistical link between party headquarters in Hanover and its covert branch in the Soviet Zone.

In early 1948, the SPD sent Stephan Grzeskowiak—under the cover name of “Stephan G. Thomas”—to Berlin to supervise liaisons with the Ostbüro. He stayed at the house of Willy Brandt. Although the SPD leadership had warned Grzeskowiak to avoid involving the gregarious Brandt in the bureau’s affairs, the two men hit it off, and Grzeskowiak revealed his mission to his host. In due course, Brandt became a key player in the bureau’s Berlin branch. His house served as a clearing station for agents and couriers arriving from the Soviet Zone before proceeding to the Ostbüro’s main office in the city.

CIC Special Agent Theodor Hans praised the Ostbüro as “one of the most popular and efficient private and political intelligence and resistance organizations” in the Soviet Zone.

In January 1950, the CIC recruited Brandt as an “O-type” or “investigative informant”—that is, a source who provided information from records or agencies to which they had access. He received the designation O-35-VIII. On a reliability scale from A to F, the Corps assigned him the second-highest grade: B, or “usually reliable.”

Brandt reported prodigiously. Between 7 January 1949 and 3 November 1953, he met roughly 200 times with Swerdlin or his successor, CIC special agent Gustav Bard. These meetings took place in Brandt’s car, in his home near the Wannsee, or in a CIC safe house on Hagenstrasse. He provided details on SED internal matters, the communist youth organization Free German Youth (Freie Deutsche Jugend; FDJ), railroads, industrial plants, shipyards, various police units, population statistics, and telephone equipment for the Red Army. He also produced a list of the inmates of the notorious Bautzen jail in Saxony, where the Soviets held political prisoners. On one occasion, Brandt introduced Bard personally to a “possible source on [East German] govt and police.” The CIC shared some of the information obtained from Brandt with other American intelligence organizations, including the 7880th Military Intelligence Detachment and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). In turn, these agencies requested and paid for specific intelligence. In October 1951, for example, the CIA asked for a complete survey of machinery in the German Democratic Republic.

Initially, the Americans paid Brandt in goods, such as cigarettes, coffee, sugar, canned fish, and candy bars. As the postwar German economy stabilized, the Corps switched his payment to a monthly retainer of 250 deutsche marks (DM). He also received DM 50 to 100 per meeting, one extra payment of DM 500 and two of DM 1000.
1,000. Brandt used the money to cover his expenses and pay his Ostbüro sources.

Neither Brandt nor the members of the Ostbüro were intelligence professionals, and their lack of clandestine training cost their networks dearly. In late summer 1948, the bureau identified two prospective CIC sources, Walter Willfahrt and Alfred Lippschütz. Lippschütz worked for the Soviet Zone paramilitary police, and Willfahrt, head of Region VIII [the CIC in Berlin], namely O-35-VIII” and several others. O-35-VIII was, of course, Willy Brandt’s code name.

In another case, a key Ostbüro member and friend of Brandt’s fell into a trap laid by Soviet intelligence. Either with the help of a defector or through a mole, the Soviets identified Heinz Kühne as an organizer of the bureau’s courier network. In February 1949, Soviet agents lured him to a house near the Soviet sector under the pretense of an informant wanting to meet with him. Brandt lent Kühne his driver and car to get to the rendezvous. While waiting outside, Brandt’s driver suddenly heard screams, and then saw several shadowy figures disappear in the dark. The police, who arrived at the scene fifteen minutes later, found several empty vodka bottles, traces of blood, a syringe, and a sock and shoe belonging to Kühne. The Soviets had drugged and kidnapped a key Ostbüro agent.

In East Berlin, the captors tortured Kühne. Special Agent Theodor Hans, who served in the organization did not regain its former

Kühne’s brutal treatment yielded a rich intelligence harvest for the Soviets. In April 1949, the SED newspaper Neues Deutschland published an “open letter” from Kühne to the SPD leadership. Presumably, the Soviets had dictated the text to him. In it, the author alleged he had defected voluntarily, and he disclosed the names of numerous Ostbüro members, including Fritz Heine, Siggi Neumann, and Stephan Grzeskowiak. The letter also named Willy Brandt as a spy for the Norwegian military mission. The Soviets evidently had gained a thorough understanding of the bureau’s informant network because the names of Willfahrt, Lippschütz, and several more actual or suspected agents appeared in the text as well.

The letter identified another Ostbüro member, Ernst Moewes, as a CIC informant. In fact, the CIC had recruited Moewes in February 1948 and dropped him because of Kühne’s confession. The letter further identified a certain “Oberst [i.e., Colonel] Thomsen” of the CIC as Moewes’s handler. “Thomson” or “Thompson” was the alias of Special Agent Severin F. Wallach, who wisely had chosen to use a cover name in his dealings with informants. Kühne’s fate remains unknown, but his disclosures wreaked havoc with the Ostbüro. According to Special Agent Hans, “the loss of many good sources and contacts through [Kühne], and the drop in prestige were so damaging to the SPD ‘Ost-Büro’ that for many years the organization did not regain its former significance.”

Kühne’s kidnapping occurred on the eve of the establishment of the Federal Republic of Germany in September 1949. The Soviets converted their occupation zone into the German Democratic Republic, or GDR, one month later. Brandt promptly joined the West German parliament, the Bundestag, as a representative from Berlin. Henceforth, he split his time between Berlin and the West German capital in the Rhineland, Bonn. Although he continued to relay information from the Ostbüro, German politics demanded more and more of his time. As his reporting diminished, the CIC decided to release their informant. In September 1952,
the CIC dropped Brandt “without prejudice,” a term indicating severance owing to a lack of interest rather than a loss of trust. The two sides parted on friendly terms.31

That did not end Brandt’s involvement with American intelligence. His circle of friends included Hans Hirschfeld, another emigrant returnee and SPD member, who had served with the OSS during the war. Hirschfeld, in turn, introduced Brandt to Shepard Stone, a wartime intelligence officer then serving with the Office of the High Commissioner for Germany (HICOG), the top U.S. authority in Germany. On 27 July 1950, the three men met at the HICOG building in Frankfurt. By then, Brandt edited a struggling Berlin daily, the social democratic Berliner Stadtblatt, and Stone agreed to inject $200,000 to keep it afloat. Brandt repaid the courtesy with pro-American propaganda.32 In March 1951, he wrote in the Stadtblatt, “Without the United States there would be no free Berlin. Without the material support of the strongest factor of the democratic world the problems of this city won’t be solved in the future.”33

To strengthen the transatlantic ties, the U.S. State Department arranged for four Social Democrats, including Carlo Schmid and Willy Brandt, to visit the United States in March 1954. The group’s ambitious cross-country tour included stops in Washington, D.C., New Orleans, San Antonio, San Francisco, Chicago, Detroit, and New York. They met with Under Secretary of State Walter Bedell Smith, Vice President Richard M. Nixon, and the sister of CIA Director Allen W. Dulles and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, Eleanor L. Dulles, who handled the German desk at the State Department.

The red carpet treatment failed to impress the Francophile Schmid, who left the United States convinced that most Americans were ignorant. Brandt recognized that many Americans knew little about Germany—“Who is currently emperor in Germany?” someone had asked him—but he rejected European arrogance à la Schmid. “Do people at home know more about the United States?” he wondered. The visit affirmed Brandt’s belief in American vitality and democracy. Many years later, he looked back on this trip “as one of the most pleasant experiences of [my] political life.”34

From the perspective of U.S. intelligence, the trip may have succeeded as well. In the early 1950s, the CIA was ratcheting up operations across Western Europe, always on the lookout for potential sources. As Brandt prepared for his trip to the United States, the CIA asked their military colleagues if they would mind the agency making a recruitment pitch during Brandt’s visit. The CIC did. To protect the political career of their erstwhile informant, the Corps exhorted the CIA that “no efforts whatsoever will be made to approach SUBJECT by members of your organization.”35

According to former CIA officer Victor L. Marchetti, the agency ignored this wish. Marchetti served in a U.S. Army intelligence unit in Germany in the early 1950s and joined the CIA in 1955. Fourteen years later, he resigned, having “lost faith in [the agency] and its purpose.”36 In 1974, he and the journalist John D. Marks published the tell-all book The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence. Concerned about the revelations of state secrets, the CIA censored parts of the manuscript. Nonetheless, the redacted book makes a number of explosive statements. The authors discuss CIA covert action, a discipline that included “political advice and counsel, subsidies to an individual, and financial support and technical assistance...
to political parties.” Agency censors deleted thirty-six lines on this page. The remaining text describes one individual apparently discussed in the censored portions thus: “Years later, he was elected mayor of West Berlin. Through this period, [8½ lines deleted] He was a hard-working politician in Allied-occupied Berlin, and his goal of making the Social Democratic party a viable alternative to communism [15 lines deleted.]

The book had hardly come out when inquiring journalists sought to fill the gaps. In May 1974, Washington Post reporter Jack Anderson, “with the help of the [Post’s] own CIA sources,” outed the unnamed mayor as Willy Brandt. “Like many other world leaders,” Anderson wrote, Brandt “received money from the CIA when he was an aspiring young politician.”

Whatever the CIA invested in Brandt, he repaid the Americans in spades. During the 1950s, he endorsed West German rearmament and membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization—steps favored by the United States but resisted by the SPD leadership for fear of cementing the division of Germany. In 1959, he helped “Americans for Democratic Action” bring U.S. labor leader Walther P. Reuther, an outspoken anticommunist, to the city.

While mayor, Brandt served on the German executive committee of the Congress of Cultural Freedom to Berlin. Covertly sponsored by the CIA, the congress sought to mobilize cultural elites in Western Europe against the appeal of communism. “Brandt was financed by the Americans,” a British intelligence officer recalled, “and so was the Berlin cultural program. Brandt was perfectly at ease with this, it didn’t worry him in the least.” Under Brandt’s aegis, the congress turned West Berlin into an anticommunist beachhead in a sea of red.

Brandt pitched a propaganda scheme of his own to the Americans. At a luncheon with the diplomat John B. Holt, he suggested the United States establish a “black” radio station that “would broadcast on changing wave lengths and from different locations just over the zonal borders in West Germany while claiming that it was actually transmitting from within the East Zone.” He was probably thinking of the British-run black radio stations which pretended to be actual radio stations broadcasting from within continental Europe, during World War II. Under the direction of British intelligence, fake German military stations such as Soldatensender Calais broadcast disinformation and defeatist propaganda into Nazi Germany.

While the black radio scheme came to naught, Brandt worked effectively with an established American propaganda outlet in the city, Radio in the American Sector (Rundfunk im amerikanischen Sektor; RIAS). RIAS reached a large audience in Berlin and in East Germany owing to its clever mix of entertainment, news, and popular music. Its director, William F. Heimlich, had entered Berlin as the deputy chief of intelligence of the conquering American forces in July 1945. In 1948, the U.S. commandant of Berlin, Col. Frank L. Howley, appointed Heimlich director of RIAS with the mission of using the popular radio station to promote “active anticommunism.” Heimlich proved an apt choice. Equipped with a commercial radio broadcasting background and a can-do personality, he rapidly transformed RIAS into a powerful anticommunist propaganda platform. Lambasting the repressive policies in eastern Germany and stoking discontent among citizens behind the Iron Curtain, the radio became a thorn in the side of the GDR government.

At his opulent Berlin mansion, Heimlich often hosted local journalists and policymakers, including Willy Brandt. On one such visit, Brandt suggested to Heimlich that RIAS broadcast the names of known informers of the Soviet and East German secret police to pillory the communist regime. Brandt knew the names of many informers from his Ostbüro contacts. The idea appealed to Heimlich. During the 1950s, every Thursday night RIAS broadcast what became known as Spitzelsendungen (“snitch reports”), exposing Soviet informants in dramatic fashion. Following an ominous drum beat, a voice would call the citizens of a particular town or city to attention and identify a potential spy in their midst: “Achtung Schwerin, Achtung Schwerin. The name is August Blank, 31 such-and-such Strasse, third floor. He is a spy for the NKVD.
[Soviet secret police]. He is an informant. We repeat, Achtung Schwerin . . .”46 The enormously popular snitch reports highlighted an unsavory aspect of communist rule while raising the stakes for informants in the East: a hotel owner denounced by RIAS lost all of his guests, and an outing singer could not perform without being booted.47

RIAS returned the favor by endorsing Brandt in his campaign for mayor. The SPD dominated Berlin politics, and Brandt’s principal challenger, Franz Neumann, was a local SPD heavyweight. In alignment with the SPD leadership in the West, Neumann sought to distance the party from the United States and pursue a unified, neutral Germany. In its broadcasts, RIAS branded Neumann as yesterday’s man and an alter Kämpfer (old warrior)—a not-so-subtle allusion to the early Nazi Party members who had proudly referred to themselves by that name.48 Many Berliners considered support by RIAS equivalent to an endorsement by the U.S. government. With the station’s backing, Brandt handily won the contest and, in 1957, became mayor of West Berlin.

Brandt’s ties to the Americans, his opposition to the Soviets, and his growing popularity across West Germany put him in the crosshairs of Eastern intelligence and propaganda. In February 1950, Neues Deutschland sought to expose Brandt “as an agent of the American secret service . . . and collaborator of the Ostbüro.”49 Ironically, this allegation was true, but not having discovered Brandt’s links with the CIC, the East Germans could not back up the statement with facts. East German propaganda routinely painted West German politicians as American spies, and the frequency of these—usually dubious—claims shielded Brandt from further probing into his U.S. intelligence links.

Nevertheless, the East Germans persisted. In a more sinister campaign, the East German Ministry of State Security (Ministerium für Staatssicherheit; MfS) sought to tarnish Brandt as an informant of the Nazi secret police (Geheime Staatspolizei; Gestapo) during his wartime exile in Norway. “If we succeed in proving Brandt’s collaboration with the Gestapo,” noted an internal report of the ministry’s foreign intelligence department (Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung; HVA), “this would amount to Brandt’s political death warrant.”50 The HVA sent an informant to Oslo to dig up incriminating evidence in the Norwegian archives, but the covert researcher returned empty-handed. To obtain a “confession” of Brandt’s collaboration, in 1959 the MfS apprehended an acquaintance of Brandt’s, Georg Angerer. Like Brandt, Angerer had spent the war in Scandinavia and returned to Germany afterward, settling in Leipzig in the Soviet Zone. Despite several harsh interrogations at Stasi headquarters in East Berlin, Angerer failed to deliver the desired accusation. In 1965, at last, the MfS shelved the Gestapo dirt campaign.51

In the meantime, the HVA extended its operations to the West German capital. The city of Bonn lies by the Rhine River and dates back to Roman times. Until 1949, it had little to offer besides its university, the alma mater of Karl Marx and Friedrich Nietzsche. Bonn owed its improbable choice as seat of the federal government partly to Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, who lived nearby and did not want to move. Few relished the local weather. “A hothouse climate flourished in the basin between the hills,” a contemporary observer wrote, “the air stagnated over the river and its banks.”52 Small, provincial, and narrow-minded, Bonn appealed to few of the parliamentarians who arrived there in 1949.

Separated from their families and with little else to do, quite a few took local girl-friends. Brandt joined their ranks, linking up with an attractive journalist, Susanne Sievers, who was seven years his junior. Unfortunately for Brandt, Sievers was a double agent working for a West German intelligence trafficker and the MfS. When the East Germans discovered Sievers’s duplicity, they lured her to East Berlin, arrested her, and sentenced her to eight years of prison for espionage. When the HVA learned of her relationship with Brandt, it offered her an early release in exchange for her agreement to spy on her lover. Sievers refused to abuse Brandt’s trust “for such things.” Nonetheless, she agreed to spy for the HVA, which assigned her the cover name “Lydia.”53

In 1956, Sievers returned to Bonn. At the behest of HVA director Markus Wolf, she set up a salon where the movers and
shakers of the West German capital met for drinks and informal discussions. Regulars included Rainer Barzel, a key member of the Christian Democratic Union (Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands; CDU); Defense Minister Franz Josef Strauss of Bavaria’s conservative Christian Social Union (Christlich-Soziale Union; CSU); and, of course, Brandt. To Wolf’s delight, Sievers promptly relayed the gossip she picked up to the HVA in East Berlin.54

Sievers remained in love with Brandt, but he rejected her attempts to rekindle their affair. Hurt, she turned on her former lover. She struck up a relationship with Maj. Alfred Sagner, an archconservative officer of the West German army, who worked for Defense Minister Strauss and had many ties to right-wing circles. With the help of these circles and the HVA, Sievers exacted her revenge.

In 1961, Brandt ran for chancellor, a campaign that forged an unlikely alliance between West German conservatives and East German spies. A few years earlier, the HVA had helped one of their informants, Hans Frederik of the CSU, to set up a publishing house, the Humboldt Verlag, for the purpose of spreading black propaganda and disinformation. Through Sagner, Sievers met Frederik, who persuaded her to publish a book about her amorous encounters with Brandt. The book hit the shelves in 1961.55 Although Brandt had the book banned for the violation of personal rights, the revelations wrecked his campaign. He lost the election squarely to the conservative incumbent, Konrad Adenauer.56

For other reasons, too, the year 1961 proved a milestone in Brandt’s life. The GDR government had long been concerned about the flow of refugees from East Germany to West Germany. In 1952, the GDR had sealed the borders between the two countries but kept the route through Berlin open. A would-be refugee simply traveled to East Berlin, hopped on the metro, and got off at a stop in one of the Western sectors. In a typical week, more than 3,000 GDR citizens crossed the intrasectoral borders in this manner.57 Young, professional, and university-educated East Germans were particularly prone to leave the GDR, in light of its totalitarian politics and limited opportunities for advancement. In August 1961, the East German government put a stop to the brain drain by sealing off the Western sectors. The concrete border between the two parts of the city gained infamy as the Berlin Wall.

Brandt, at this time mayor of West Berlin, condemned the wall in stark language. Its construction, he said in a public speech,
“marked an act of inhumanity” and signified an illegal annexation of East Berlin by the East German regime. “That wall,” he demanded, “must come down.”

That did not happen for nearly three decades. Instead, the Wall cemented the Cold War order in Europe, stabilized the East German regime, and forced the Federal Republic of Germany to deal with the reality of two German states. Brandt recognized the necessity for adapting to the new situation earlier than many of his political rivals. As he prepared another run for chancellor, he considered practical ways in which the two countries could work together, a policy he coined Ostpolitik (Eastern policy).

In 1969, Brandt ousted the long-ruling conservatives by forging a coalition government between the SPD and the center-right liberal Free Democratic Party (Freie Demokratische Partei; FDP). Within weeks, he approached the East German government to implement Ostpolitik. In the ensuing negotiations, the West Germans pursued the diffusion of Cold War tensions, increased trade, and eased travel restrictions for GDR citizens. The GDR, which had been a pariah state in the West since its inception in 1949, sought diplomatic recognition and financial aid for its moribund economy. Because the two countries had no diplomatic relations, Brandt’s principal emissary, Egon Bahr, carried out the negotiations through a back channel with an MfS representative, Hermann von Berg.

The administration of President Richard Nixon saw Ostpolitik as a challenge to Western unity. Inside the U.S. intelligence community, it prompted concern and disappointment. E. Howard Hunt, a CIA officer best known for breaking into the Watergate hotel, vented his frustration in a roman à clef. Hunt’s novel, The Berlin Ending, features a fictional West German foreign minister moonlighting as a Soviet spy. The minister, a handsome man whose face “changed with smooth plasticity from sternness to ready smile,” had fled to Sweden in his “time of need” and had just received a nomination for the Nobel Peace Prize. Brandt, of course, had been awarded this prize in 1971, two years before the book came out. To dispel any doubt about the identity of the novel’s villain, Hunt sent a picture of Brandt with Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev to his editor with the scrawled comment: “Here’s the dirty dog with his master.”

In Bonn, Ostpolitik rocked Brandt’s coalition government. Many West Germans distrusted the GDR and feared that rapprochement with the East would destabilize the Western alliance. As the two governments finalized their talks, several FDP representatives signaled their opposition to the deal. Sensing an opportunity to
topple Brandt, CDU leader Rainer Barzel announced a vote of no confidence for April 1972 in the Bundestag. As the vote drew closer, defections mounted among the FDP, and the government faced defeat.

The East Germans pulled out all the stops to keep Brandt in office. In March 1972, von Berg and Bahr discussed the pending no-confidence vote. Von Berg, who worked for the “active measures” (covert action and disinformation) department of the MfS, raised the possibility of “financially influencing or buying certain [Bundestag] representatives.”63 The two men reached no formal agreement, but the East Germans forged ahead. The HVA paid DM 50,000 to Julius Steiner of the CDU and an unspecified sum to Leo Wagner of the CSU in exchange for their support. On 27 April, both deputies voted to keep the government in office, and Brandt’s coalition survived with the barest majority of one vote.64

The investment soon paid off for the East Germans. In December 1972, Bonn and East Berlin signed the Grundlagenvertrag (Basic Treaty), normalizing the intra-German relationship and paving the way for the diplomatic recognition of the GDR in the West. The following year, France and Great Britain recognized East Germany as a sovereign state, and in 1974, the United States followed suit.

Ironically, the very organization that supported Brandt also planted the seeds of his downfall. In the late 1950s, the HVA had inserted an agent named Günter Guillaume into West Germany. Posing as an East German refugee, Guillaume joined the SPD and gradually worked his way up. In 1970, he joined Brandt’s inner circle as the chancellor’s adviser on labor relations. In this position, he regularly reported on West German politics to his handlers in East Berlin.65

As a refugee from the communist East, Guillaume drew the attention of the West German security service (Bundesverfassungsschutz; BfV). By 1974, the BfV had collected enough evidence to pinpoint Guillaume as an East German mole in the chancellery and issued an arrest warrant. Guillaume did not deny the charges. “I am a citizen of the GDR and its officer,” he told the police who came to arrest him at his house on 24 April. “Respect that!”66

As chancellor, Brandt assumed responsibility for the government’s failure to detect an East German spy in its midst. Two weeks after Guillaume’s arrest, Brandt resigned. In East Berlin, Markus Wolf acknowledged the “irony of fate” of the affair: “For years, we forged plans and measures against Brandt, now, when we really did not want it and even feared it, this accident happens, we pull the trigger, provide the bullet.”67

Brandt’s resignation ended Ostpolitik. His successor, former defense minister Helmut Schmidt, realigned the Federal Republic with the United States. He excommunicated the Soviets for their invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, denounced the Red Army’s military buildup as a potential source of blackmail, and blamed Moscow for the “world’s darkened political horizon.”68 In the early 1980s, he paved the way for the deployment of nuclear-tipped Pershing 2 missiles on West German soil. The U.S.-Soviet arms race of the 1980s contributed to the decline of the Soviet Union and, ultimately, the fall of the Berlin Wall and the demise of the GDR.

* 

Willy Brandt led two lives, one in the spotlight of his public career, and another in the shadowy world of intelligence. In Brandt’s mind, the two did not contradict but complemented each other. “He used them [U.S. intelligence] and they used him,” recalled the wife of an American official.69 Yet his benign relationship with U.S. intelligence may have blinded Brandt to the predatory nature of a secret police organization like the MfS. In his dealings with the East Germans, Brandt acted like the sorcerer’s apprentice in Johann Wolfgang von Goethe’s poem—eager to wield the magic broom but unable to control its might. In the poem, the sorcerer returns just in time to save his apprentice. In real life, no deus ex machina came to the rescue of Willy Brandt. To paraphrase Goethe: the spirits he summoned, he could not get rid of them.

**Author’s Note**
I am grateful to Kendall E. Cosley, who conducted background research for this article.
NOTES


4. Msg, Herschel V. Johnson, Stockholm, to Sec State, 22 May 1944, sub: Future Developments in Germany and Possible Sources of Future German Leadership as Viewed by German-Norwegian Journalist; Memo, n.d., encl. to Msg, Johnson to Sec State, 22 May 1944, sub: Future Developments; both in File Unit: Decimal File 1940–44, Record Group (RG) 59: Records of the Department of State, National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD (hereinafter NACP).

5. Merseburger, Willy Brandt, 256.


40. Merseburger, Willy Brandt, 273.
45. Merseburger, Willy Brandt, 289.
49. “Es steht zur Diskussion: Ein gewisser Herr Brandt” [It is up for discussion: A certain Mr. Brandt] Neues Deutschland, 5 Feb 1950.
51. Münkèl, Kampagnen, 17.
53. Merseburger, Willy Brandt, 337.
55. Claire Mortensen [Susanne Sievers], . . . da war auch eine Mädchen [. . . there was also a girl] (Munich: Humboldt Verlag, 1961).
59. Münkèl, Kampagnen, 36, 50.
63. Münkèl, Kampagnen, 50–54.
65. Münkèl, Kampagnen, 64ff.
67. Wolf, Spionagechef im Kalten Krieg, 496.
69. Michel, Willy Brandts Amerikabild, 83.
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CMH
Soldiers and visitors to Fort Carson, Colorado, have been inspired by the heritage items and artifacts found at the "Mountain Post" museum for seven decades. The museum officially came into being after World War II, when returning units brought an abundance of captured enemy equipment, artifacts, and war trophies back to Camp Carson, along with surplus U.S. equipment and ordnance that had become outdated as tactics and technology led to new developments in vehicles and equipage during the war.

At first, all of this material was proudly displayed at various units’ headquarters buildings and regimental rooms across the post. With the massive postwar demobilizations, we were soon left with more artifacts than units to display them. It became clear that a proper place was needed to display and preserve this new influx of historic material. Interestingly, these same conditions had presented themselves after the Revolutionary War when an excess of captured cannons, arms, and munitions from the 1777 victory at Saratoga was brought to the fort at "West Point" and became a teaching collection at the garrison.

On 15 July 1957, General Orders 57 was posted, establishing, as of 18 June 1952, the "Fort Carson Army Museum." The newly founded museum marked the start of a new era for the professional display, storage, and research of military artifacts and material culture at Fort Carson. The early days of the museum were exciting. A tall, warehouse-type building was designated for museum use. The museum had inherited a diverse collection of artifacts and heritage material, from items associated with the Indian Wars and western expansion to World Wars I and II, and even an exhibit for the newly established U.S. space program!

The creation of an Army-level historical office in 1945 had led to a major revision of historical regulations, which changed the focus, scope, and responsibilities of historical activities and Army museums. As the Army’s historical office began to mature and codify regulations, new guidance was directed in Special Regulation 870–10–1, Historical Properties: Responsibilities, Use, and Disposition (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 18 Jun 1952). This regulation became the guideline and inspiration for Fort Carson’s museum and heritage programs at the post.

The 4th Infantry Division and Fort Carson Museum has grown and changed quite a bit since those first years. The museum has changed locations a few times over the decades, with each move bringing modernizations, updates, and new exhibits to the museum.

Today, the museum offers an immersive environment, starting with our main gallery, which tells the story of the founding of Camp Carson in 1942, during World War II, and many of the units that have served with distinction at the Mountain Post, such as the 10th Mountain Division, the 89th Infantry Division, and the Women’s Army Corps.

As visitors explore the museum’s five other galleries, they will discover many historic figures and irreplaceable artifacts. These include the silver Liscum Bowl, which was made out of sterling silver bullion captured from Chinese insurgents during China’s Boxer Rebellion and was presented to the 9th Infantry Regiment in 1902 as a symbol of China’s gratitude to the regiment and its commander, Col. Emerson H. Liscum, who had been killed in the rebellion. Visitors will also find the likeness of Brig. Gen. Theodore Roosevelt Jr., deputy commander of the 4th Infantry Division, directing combat operations from Utah Beach on D-Day. Winding through the museum, patrons are asked to envision how the Army Mule Corps—including Hambone, the legendary jumping mule—was replaced by technology ranging from trucks to Army helicopters in 1956. One of the most noteworthy artifacts is the cover of the spider hole (a camouflaged hiding position) used by Saddam Hussein as he attempted to evade capture in the middle of the dangerous Sunni Triangle in 2004. Accompanying this piece of history is the story of how the 4th Infantry Division was able to assist in the capture of the former Iraqi dictator.

The 4th Infantry Division and Fort Carson Museum maintains a tradition of preserving the history and culture of the U.S. Army in order to inspire and educate. The museum is open daily from 0900 to 1630; it is closed on Thanksgiving, Christmas, and New Year’s Day. Admission is free. The museum is located at 1205 Nelson Boulevard, Fort Carson, Colorado, 80923. The phone number is 719-524-0915.

Michael A. Cline is the acting director of the 4th Infantry Division and Fort Carson Museum.
Re-creation of a scene from the Hürtgen Forest Campaign, featuring a Jeep

Reenactment of the World War II tank desant tactic, featuring an M4 Sherman tank

A likeness of Brig. Gen. Theodore Roosevelt Jr., the 4th Infantry Division deputy commander, on Utah Beach on D-Day

Re-creation of a defensive position from the Aisne-Marne Campaign, featuring a water-cooled Vickers medium machine gun

A likeness of Saddam Hussein with the Styrofoam plug that concealed the entrance to the small underground room where the former dictator of Iraq was found
An original Chinese Communist–made bicycle captured on the Ho Chi Minh Trail by 4th Infantry Division soldiers

The blanket worn by Hambone, the famous jumping mule, among other artifacts
The Medal of Honor Wall shares the stories of twenty-one 4th Infantry Division soldiers, ranging from World War I’s Sgt. William Shemin to Task Force MOUNTAIN WARRIOR’s Capt. Florent A. Groberg.
The Army Art Collection recently received a donation of eighty-two sketches and watercolor paintings by Pfc. Arthur B. Singer, who served in the 603d Camouflage Engineer Battalion during World War II. Along with an archival collection of letters that the artist sent home during the war, Singer’s artworks represent a comprehensive historical view of the “Ghost Army’s” service in Europe through the eyes of an artist.

Singer was drafted in May 1942 and initially assigned to a combat unit. His commanding officer happened to see him painting in his spare time and recommended his transfer to the newly created 603d Camouflage Engineers, which was part of the 23rd Headquarters Special Troops. Known as the “Ghost Army,” the unit was responsible for deceiving the enemy via subterfuge, such as creating fake equipment and fake radio traffic. One of their most successful endeavors was Operation Brittany, designed to make the Germans believe that General George S. Patton Jr. was moving his army west when he was actually moving east. The 603d was the “art section” of the Ghost Army, composed of soldiers with art or visual design backgrounds. Many of the soldiers in the 603d had distinguished postwar art careers, including Bill Blass, Art Kane, Ellsworth Kelly, and Victor Dowd. Arthur Singer is best known as a wildlife artist, with many of his works in the collection of the Smithsonian Natural History Museum.

Like many of the other soldiers in the unit, Private Singer sketched and painted in his free time during the war. His subject matter included portraits of fellow soldiers, landscapes and villages visited during his service, and scenes of daily life. Another Ghost Army veteran later recalled that whenever they stopped at a place for more than a day or two, Singer could be found painting scenes of birds and wildlife on the walls of local buildings.

His artworks and the accompanying letters cover the Ghost Army’s Atlantic crossing; time spent at Walton Hall in England; arrival in Normandy just after D-Day; and operations in Normandy, Brittany, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. The eighty-two artworks in the collection are representative of the breadth of subject matter and geographic location of Singer’s wartime experience. His work shows a keen interest in the natural world, full of details of interesting trees, weather patterns, seasonal differences, the play of light, and nuanced observations about the interplay of manmade structures with the natural world. His representation of the war is very human-focused, with portraits and depictions of camps or living spaces much more common in his work than scenes of battle.

Pfc. Arthur Singer’s artworks are part of the Army Art Collection and are currently preserved at the Army’s Museum Support Center at Fort Belvoir, Virginia.

Sarah G. Forgey is the chief art curator of the Army Museum Enterprise.
Top: Waiting to Leave on Our First Job Near Ecrammeville, Normandy, by Pfc. Arthur B. Singer, ink and wash on paper, Normandy, July/August 1944


Opposite page: Pup Tents, by Pfc. Arthur B. Singer, watercolor on paper, Normandy, August 1944
Opposite page top: Drying Gear, by Pfc. Arthur B. Singer, watercolor on paper, 1944


Above: Jeeps at the Bivouac, by Pfc. Arthur B. Singer, ink and wash on paper, July 1944

Below: Luxembourg City Church (Luxembourg City Convent), by Pfc. Arthur B. Singer, mixed media on paper, Luxembourg, November 1944
Portrait of Bernard Greenberg, by Pfc. Arthur B. Singer, watercolor on paper, December 1944
An Impressive Stump, by Pfc. Arthur B. Singer, watercolor on paper, 1944
On 18 August 1920, the Nineteenth Amendment was ratified, giving women the right to vote. One key factor that contributed to the passage of this amendment was the enlistment of women for military service in World War I. By the start of the twentieth century, advocates of women’s suffrage had demolished many of the objections raised against expansion of the franchise. Of the objections that remained, one of the most difficult to address was the argument that full participation in the rights of citizenship included obligatory military service.

This objection had become a matter of case law early in the quest for voting rights. In 1871, Carrie H. Burnham filed a lawsuit in Pennsylvania because she had not been allowed to vote in local elections. She based her case upon the definition of a freeman. Pennsylvania law said that freemen were allowed to vote. Burnham argued that freeman was not a gender designation but a sum of obligations, responsibilities, and rights. She was a citizen, she was of legal age, she owned property, she paid taxes, she was subject to the laws, she was educated, and she had not forfeited her rights by any criminal behavior; therefore, she was a freeman and should be allowed to vote. The opposing attorney agreed to accept her premise that a freeman was not related to sex. However, he argued, Burnham had left out a fundamental obligation of a freeman—that of military service. “To vote, a freeman must be armed and equipped, or pay a militia tax (in lieu of service). When had women been armed or equipped? Such a thing was unheard of in our history.” Since Burnham could not perform such service, she could not qualify as a freeman, and therefore was not allowed to vote. The verdict went against her. The repercussions of this decision were immediate. Within four days, the Illinois legislature reconsidered a bill that would allow women to serve as notary publics. Antisuffrage lawmakers suddenly objected to the bill because they felt that its loose wording might be interpreted to allow women to perform military duty. Following the Pennsylvania case, the barrier against women’s military service had to be maintained in order to prevent the enfranchisement of women.

The Importance of Female Military Organizations, 1875–1900

By Gary A. Mitchell
This argument remained a critical part of the arsenal of the antisuffrage movement. More than thirty years later, an editorial in a 1907 Connecticut newspaper restated it succinctly: women wanted the right of the ballot box without the obligation of the cartridge box. The decision to allow women to enlist in the armed forces evinced this argument. When the female enlistment program was announced in 1917, it was greeted with curiosity, not hostility, and cautious optimism, not rejection. In the forty-six years since Burnham’s case, the United States had undergone an attitudinal shift—a shift that made room for the possibility of women as soldiers. The activities that led to this change provide an important context for the eventual success of the suffrage movement. How that change occurred is the subject of this study.

Except for a few instances of individual heroism, American history contains minimal mention of military women before World War I. This narrative of absence is at best uninformed and at worst patently false. In the decades between the Civil War (1861–1865) and the War with Spain of 1898 (commonly referred to as the Spanish-American War), the number of women engaging in activities of a distinctly military nature significantly increased. The astonishing aspect of this movement is not that it occurred, but that it has been largely forgotten. Women served with such frequency that the image of a woman in uniform established itself in the national consciousness and did much to prepare the United States for that day when the nation would send its daughters off to war.

The years following the Civil War witnessed societal changes that laid the groundwork for what would be known as the New Woman movement. By the 1890s, the New Woman ideology had found expression and definition in popular literature. Briefly stated, the New Woman philosophy proclaimed the importance of education, a profession, independence, physical activity, and equal rights for women. Given this mindset, women were more likely to engage in behaviors previously outside their culturally accepted scope, including those that long had been considered sacrosanct expressions of masculinity. One such activity, which attracted female involvement between 1875 and 1900, was engagement in military drill within the framework of a completely female military organization with its own uniforms, formal ranks, and arms. These female organizations, with their martial characteristics and attendant goals, do not seem to have existed before the Civil War. Women’s participation in military affairs generally was limited to that of service providers, including cooks, laundresses, sutlers, and medical caregivers—all activities that fit within the traditional roles allotted to women. A few women managed to perform military service disguised as men, but they were viewed as oddities. The number of women in military service (in traditionally female roles) began to swell during the Civil War, continuing a trend that began in the Revolutionary War. Importantly, the Civil War saw the establishment of the first “girl militia” organizations, initially as expressions of patriotic sentiment. Most were short-lived, but a few persisted throughout the war years, and even became swept up in military events. Examples of such persistent organizations were the Rhea County Spartans, a ladies cavalry company that acted as couriers and intelligence gatherers for Confederate guerrilla forces in Tennessee, and the Nancy Hart Rifles, who squared off against a U.S. cavalry regiment in 1865 and negotiated an agreement to prevent the burning of their town in Georgia. Once the war ended, such organizations ceased to exist. However, the idea of women as soldiers—particularly soldiers who were openly organized and in completely female units—did not die. It lay dormant waiting for fresh expression. When all-female military organizations did reappear, they expanded the public perception of women’s abilities to operate in nontraditional roles. The first postwar fruits of this new way of thinking were harvested by the land grant colleges. The 1862 Morrill Land Grant Act set aside federal land that, when sold, provided funds for states to found coeducational colleges—known as land grant colleges—focused on the practical arts of agriculture and engineering. The legislation required these new institutions to provide military education, which in turn would ensure that the nation had a body of trained personnel that could be called upon to fill the ranks of the junior officer corps in future conflicts. Because the wording of this provision did not specify gender, several land grant colleges decided that the requirement applied to both sexes. At these colleges, female students were required to take the same military training and courses as the male students. In several other cases, the land grant colleges did not initially include women in these activities, but the female students themselves approached the college and requested permission to take part in military training. Land grant colleges known to have established women’s units were Iowa Agricultural College (1878), the University of Nebraska (1879, then restarted in 1888 and again in 1896), the University of Missouri (1885), the University of Minnesota (1888), Utah Agricultural College (1892), Florida Agricultural College (1895), and the University of Wyoming (1902). These units experienced varying levels of success as measured by duration of existence, usually marked by declining interest within the student body as other opportunities opened to women on campus.

The Iowa Agricultural College (now Iowa State University) ladies’ unit was the most successful and was active for approximately twenty years. One of the founding members and the leader of the
The women’s units adopted a uniform that senior noncommissioned officers carried. The officers and latter at some institutions that dictated (Generally, it was the unavailability of the spears and replica rifles to actual firearms. with a variety of weapons ranging from夜里, the female units were equipped and events that featured the entire corps companies, and were included in parades considered more or less equal to the men’s Company Q (queens), or Company W Company G (girls), Company L (ladies), sometimes battalions), with female officers and noncommissioned officers. Sometimes these companies were assigned tongue-in-cheek identifications, such as Company G (girls), Company L (ladies), Company Q (queens), or Company W (women). Nevertheless, these units were considered more or less equal to the men’s companies, and were included in parades and events that featured the entire corps of cadets. The female units were equipped with a variety of weapons ranging from spears and replica rifles to actual firearms. (Generally, it was the unavailability of the latter at some institutions that dictated the use of substitutes.) The officers and senior noncommissioned officers carried swords just like their male counterparts. The women’s units adopted a uniform that differed from the men’s companies but often matched the men’s color scheme. The uniforms featured an ankle-length skirt, a waist-length coat or blouse with rows of horizontal braid or vertical rows of buttons, and a cap (usually a Civil War–style kepi or a pillbox hat). To justify the existence of such units, frequent reference was made to the benefits of physical activity and military drill, such as improvements in carriage and bearing. The habits of obedience and attention to detail were also noted, applicable to both men and women. When women’s military education eventually ended at these colleges, the classes often were replaced in the curriculum by physical education courses.

The Iowa Agricultural women’s battalion marched at the 1893 Chicago World’s Fair and performed spear drill for the visiting public. Reactions from spectators and the press varied from favorable to critical. Criticisms included derogatory comments on their personal appearance (e.g., “what big feet they have”) and questions about the morality and masculinity of women who engaged in men’s spheres of behavior. These reactions, in turn dismissive and defensive, typified the kinds of comments aimed at young women who chose to assume military garb and discipline. One local Minnesota newspaper savaged the women of Company Q, University of Minnesota, by declaring that it would be far better to teach them to dust, scrub, sew, build kitchen fires, and perform other domestic tasks. Female soldiers were a novel sight, and stories about such units were considered newsworthy. Usually, an article about a female military organization spawned additional articles that provided a journey through historical precedents, including the hoary myths of Amazons and the recent experience of the French in fighting the “woman warriors” of the West African kingdom of Dahomey. Once one paper published an article on such affairs, other newspapers often picked it up, and it might reach national scope over the course of several months. Thus, the fact that female military organizations were not merely possible but in some cases already existed became public knowledge and inspired the spread of such organizations—regardless of the tenor of the coverage. One benign example of this greater public awareness was the simple announcement, appearing in more than one hundred newspapers in 1887, that “Miss Anna Goebel is the captain of a female militia company in Savannah Ga. The privates number thirty-two and are well drilled.”

Magazine articles also helped spread the word, as exemplified by the story of the Poughkeepsie Girls Military Company. In 1889, Mrs. E. T. Dudley was dissatisfied with the posture and bearing of the young ladies of Poughkeepsie, New York. This complaint was common nationally, and newspapers typically mentioned the benefits of military exercises in correcting physical deficits such as stooped shoulders and shallow chests. Dudley’s inspiration for creating a women’s military unit came from an article in the January 1888 issue of St. Nicholas magazine. Lt. W. R. Hamilton, a regular Army officer, described his experience in 1881 with a female company that had formed during his tenure as Professor of Military Tactics at Indiana Asbury College (renamed DePauw University in 1884). The forty women who formed the company expressed their desire to do so both for physical improvement and to show the male cadets that they were their equals in every regard. Eight years later, the DePauw company had flourished and grown to one hundred members. Dudley determined that the solution to the problem in Poughkeepsie required the establishment of a girls’ military company. She easily recruited nearly fifty girls, aged 17 and younger. Their uniforms consisted of a blue skirt with a gold stripe at the bottom; a blouse with gold braid, buttons, and a wide
sailor collar; a necktie worn sailor-fashion; a white canvas belt with a decorative clasp; and broad-soled, low-heeled boots. Tight garments such as corsets were forbidden. Military caps featuring a wreath with the initials GMC (for Girls Military Company) completed the uniform. All recruits signed a pledge to attend all drills and obey all regulations and rules established for the organization. Both the uniform and the oath utilized by Dudley were taken directly from Hamilton’s account of the company at DePauw. Girls from the best elements of Poughkeepsie society participated in the Girls Military Company. The commander of the local National Guard company, whose daughter was a member of Dudley’s unit, agreed to train the girls in military drill using Upton’s Tactics, a well-regarded manual. The company met twice a month at the National Guard armory for instruction. Dudley did not want the company to be a source of public entertainment, so spectators were forbidden until the final drill of the year when tickets were sold to friends and family. (Funds from the sale of tickets were donated to charity.) Male cadets from the nearby Riverview Military Academy also watched in amazement at the excellence of the girls’ movements: “They marched splendidly, single file, by twos, by fours, by platoons, by company front, &c, and the audience applauded enthusiastically, especially a number of cadets from Riverview Military Academy. The company front in the march was excellently kept, and the wheeling was also very fine, as was also the double-quick. Each girl stood erect, square shouldered and moved forward in splendid time.”

The girls maneuvered with precision and without missteps, demonstrating complex military formations. Sketches in the newspaper indicated they drilled with rifles. In an interesting conjunction of teacher and pupil, Hamilton, who was stationed in New York City at the time of the final drill, attended the event as a guest. He expressed admiration for the excellence of the Poughkeepsie girls’ drill and the speed with which they had mastered the intricacies of the maneuvers.

For many of these female companies, the few remaining records of their existence come from newspaper articles, and even then these accounts have only the briefest of details. This scarcity of information contrasts sharply with the extensive records associated with men’s uniformed military organizations. Of the more than one hundred female military companies mentioned during the period of 1875 to 1900, at least half have little or no historical details beyond a single newspaper reference. Detailed research at the local level may uncover resources that shed more light on these little-known endeavors.

The comingling of education and military training spread to the broader educational arena—including other colleges, junior colleges, and the private and public school systems—during the period of 1880 to 1916. The extreme popularity of these
programs naturally contributed to the rise in female military organizations. Until the creation of the Reserve Officers’ Training Corps program, these organizations were not related to the state or federal military institutions, but were purely local in scope and purpose. To note several examples, Lasell Seminary of Massachusetts introduced military drill for its all-female student body in 1884 and maintained such exercises until after World War I. Lasell had several companies organized into a battalion, whose members wore uniforms and drilled with replica wooden rifles.

Cornell College (Iowa) allowed individual women to participate in military drill as early as 1873 and in 1889 formed a Ladies Battalion. Iowa Wesleyan College formed a female military company (Company B) in 1888 and drilled with rifles and bayonets. The women of St. Olaf College in Minnesota established a drill unit in 1890. Keuka College in New York organized both women’s and men’s military companies in 1894. Another example occurred at Omaha High School, where, in 1896, the female students established a uniformed company called Company Z as part of the school’s cadet battalion. Company Z was eliminated in 1899 when a new principal terminated the group immediately upon his arrival. To those who opposed such units, they presented a clear and dangerous precedent: as women demonstrated their competency, walls that had kept women out of the military were crumbling. As noted in a supportive 1895 article about three companies of female cadets at Eastern High School in Washington, D.C., one disapproving male student remarked, “If we shout for the prosperity and happiness of Companies X, Y, and Z, who can tell when girls will begin to apply for admittance into West Point and Annapolis?” The article responded “Truly enough, who can?”

The enthusiasm for military drill and display during this period became evident in other areas of society as well. Beginning in the 1880s, publishers released drill manuals for practically every kind of training. The manuals carried detailed instructions on various maneuvers, augmented with informative drawings. Included were drill instructions for such items as fans, axes, hoops, flags, scarves, and brooms, written primarily with women’s military training units in mind. Units that learned these maneuvers typically participated in charity fundraising exhibitions, which featured precision drill, although a few instances of participation in political rallies also were reported. “Broom brigades” first surfaced in 1881 and were especially popular. The broom was utilized in the same manner as a rifle, including firing drill. Groups ranging from grade school children to women in their forties participated. Churches seem to have been the first institutions to seize upon the fundraising aspect of this type of exhibition, but it quickly spread to other venues and purposes. Military-style uniforms were recommended for broom drill units, and Butterick, a maker of home
Typical broom drill manual

.Library of Congress.

sewing patterns, even published its own drill manual in order to advance sales of patterns linked to each style of drill.28

More than a thousand different broom brigade articles were published during this era, although this number, while significant, certainly undercounts the actual amount.29 Most broom brigades were established for a specific charitable or exhibition purpose and were ephemeral in nature, but their broad recurring existence made them a recognized part of the cultural landscape.

Broom brigades did not generate the degree of negative reaction that other women’s military drill units encountered. In the context of charity, female use of military trappings such as uniforms and ranks was acceptable, and the use of a domestic implement as a drill accessory was not viewed as threatening or out of place. However, these units more firmly established an association between women and distinctly military behavior, and thus advanced the idea of women as soldiers in an indirect manner. Some of the newspaper articles that described broom brigades drew a parallel between the women’s performance and their fitness for war.30 Following the military drill of a young ladies’ military group at the Jamestown (New York) High School commencement, a reporter stated: “The whole exercise was a prophesy that in ‘the good time coming’ the boy who goes to war will have no occasion to sing The Girl I Left Behind Me.”31

While broom brigades represented a subcategory of military drill, women conducted drill without the aid of such implements as well. Newspapers contain many hundreds of accounts of such public exhibitions (approximately matching the number of broom brigade articles).32 Drill exhibitions of this type continued to increase, and they had not reached their peak by the end of the nineteenth century. Whether drills were conducted for reasons of charity, entertainment, patriotism, physical health, or just because it was possible, the extent of this activity makes it seem like in many parts of the country it was impossible to escape the tramp of women’s feet as they maneuvered through complex military formations.

One organization, the Young Ladies Naval Guards, formed in Hoboken, New Jersey, in 1894, was one of the few that aligned themselves with the Navy. They patterned their drill after naval manuals and took part in several parades and ceremonies, playing a prominent role in the ceremonial opening of the Harlem Canal. The women were described as extremely patriotic and ready to die for the flag.33

Conspicuously limited in the historical record is evidence of African American participation in any of the already described military drill activities. The White press provided minimal coverage of day-to-day African American affairs, and the coverage it did provide served to reinforce established stereotypes. Only two detailed accounts of Black female drill activities surfaced during research for this article. The first involved teams of women from Jersey City and New York City competing in an 1889 judged drill contest. The women were dressed as serving staff and used silver trays as the accessories to their maneuvers.34 (The second detailed account is covered later in this article.) One brief mention of a Black broom drill unit received extended distribution in White newspapers only because it featured a murder and the expectation of a death sentence for the perpetrator.35 Online Black newspaper archives contain occasional references to broom drill, so this phenomenon was not limited to White women.36 One common aspect of the references to Black broom drill (with a parallel in White broom drill) is the church as the nursery of these organizations.

Men also established military drill organizations outside of the opportunities available in the state National Guard units. Unlike the women’s units, the men’s units were almost always political in nature, formed to march in parades and influence voters by whipping up enthusiasm for the party’s nominee. In several cases, these political drill organizations served as a pathway to more traditional military establishments. For example, the members of the Republican marching unit formed...
in Malone, New York, in 1876 enjoyed the comradeship and structure of a military organization so much that they applied for admission to the New York National Guard. They became the 27th Separate Company of Infantry.37

Some women’s groups also transformed from show or charity drill organizations to true military units. A “broom brigade” unit in Atlanta, Georgia, initially was formed to raise funds for a local hospital in 1897. A member of the Georgia National Guard trained the unit extensively for two months in preparation for the charity exhibition. The event was a success, and the women received high praise for the excellence of their drill. Encouraged, the members were determined to form a regular military company and selected the name Foster’s Light Infantry. They designed two uniforms (one blue and one white) and procured equipment, including cartridge belts and knapsacks. The women drilled with 6-pound Springfield rifles and elected a full slate of officers and noncommissioned officers. The unit attracted forty members and expressed confidence in growing quickly to at least sixty.

Unit leadership applied to Georgia for an official charter as a social and state military organization. In stories about the unit, carried in numerous papers and accompanied by drawings of the unit at drill, the male drill instructor, Lt. W. J. Foster, stated that he was “convinced that they [were] easier to drill in the long run than young men” because they were more serious about it, although they were apt to fuss with their hair and appearance when first learning drill.38 “Up the hands would go, in spite of all I could say or do, and they would be patting their hair and adjusting their caps whenever they had a moment’s leisure,” Foster recalled.39 After the unit performed at an exhibition drill for the entire 5th Georgia Volunteer Infantry regiment, “the officers . . . declared they had never seen such perfection in drill, and did not believe among all the Georgia militia a company could be found which would equal this.”40 Foster went even further, saying, “I don’t believe there is a company in the United States army that drills according to Upton’s Tactics as carefully as these girls.”41 Despite its skill and its application for formal military standing, this unit was never accorded official recognition by the state or federal governments.

The prospect of an official militia company made up of women was a frequent theme of newspaper articles reporting on female military organizations. Usually, the article was meant to sensationalize the topic rather than generate real discussion. For example, articles indicating that Colorado intended to legalize female militia units occupied the papers in 1897, despite the fact that Colorado had no such intention.42 Another interesting debate in the newspapers involved Companies K and H of the Girl Guards of Wyoming. Composed of girls aged 12 to 18, these two companies performed military drill as part of Wyoming’s push for admission to the union. The territory had granted women the right to vote in 1869, a situation at odds with most of the rest of the United States. However, it was not a given that the new state constitution would provide similar protections if Wyoming were admitted to the union. The Girl Guards represented a platform that supported the continuance of suffrage with statehood. Their companies’ exhibitions of precision drill using replica rifles were reported nationally. These stories often described the Girl Guards as formal organizations of the territorial militia, which they were not. The statehood celebration following Wyoming’s successful admission to the union in 1890 included the two Girl Guard companies in the festivities, but the Girl Guards disbanded shortly after the celebration. Suffrage had been included in the state constitution, but militia service in the new state was restricted to men.43

The concept of female military units began to spill over into popular culture, and
public reactions to the idea often took on a romanticized tone. Advertisements began to use images of women in military-style clothing or uniforms to sell products as diverse as cotton thread, corsets, parasols, tobacco, and calendars. Magazines featured articles about female soldiers. In 1904, the hugely popular *Ladies’ Home Journal* carried the first account of the Nancy Hart Rifles and their dramatic participation in the Civil War. Sheet music for popular songs about female soldiers and women in military garb—with titles such as “With Fire and Sword” (1901), “I Want to be a Soldier Lady” (1904), “She Fought by his Side” (1904), and “My Soldier Girl” (1910)—was published. The song “Why Can’t a Girl be a Soldier?” (1906) stated the case for female soldiers in two verses and proclaimed that “she’ll carry a gun, good as any mother’s son, and she’ll make a good soldier, too.” Even the broom brigades merited their own tune, “The Broom Brigade March,” which was published as early as 1883.

The imagery of female soldiering appeared not only in popular music, but also in the musical numbers of Broadway theater. Play reviews often noted the lines of dancing, singing, and drilling uniformed chorus girls. The “woman soldier” was a key element in the plot of the opera “Sergeant Kitty” (1904) and the musical “Mlle. Mischief” (1908). Capitalizing on the commercial aspect of the female soldier concept, a troop of uniformed English female performers called Kellar’s Zouaves toured the United States on the vaudeville circuit and with Pawnee Bill’s Wild West Show. The Zouaves presented high-speed, precision military drill combined with military actions such as scaling walls. These acts required the Zouaves to wear trousers, a daring departure from the typical garb of female military organizations. Acts like these were so frequently imitated that they became known on the vaudeville circuit as gun spinners.

Humor, usually a good barometer of popular sentiment, acknowledged the trend. Newspapers in 1910 and 1911 carried a joke that gradually spread nationwide:

It was war time. The intrepid general was rallying her wavering troops. “Women,” she cried, “will you give way to mannish tears?” A muffled murmur of indecision ran through the ranks. “Shall it be said that we are clothed in male armor?” shrieked the general. The murmur became a mumble. “Will you,” fiercely demanded the general, “show the white feather in a season when feathers are not worn?” The effect was electrical. “Never,” roared the soldiers. And forming into battle array, they once more hurled themselves upon the enemy.

The joke is instructive. It turns upon the stereotype of female obsession with fashion, and presents women in the thick of battle as an accepted context. As if to demonstrate that old jokes never die, this particular one popped up randomly in newspapers until the 1930s.

The unintended sum of these examples of female soldiers in popular culture was a public that was well-acquainted with the possibility of such a phenomenon becoming a reality. As the world crept closer to the disaster of World War I, the idea of American women performing in military roles was firmly established.

The potential for women acting in actual military roles had also been reinforced during the Spanish-American War. The rapid recruitment and assignment of
women to nursing duties reminded the public that women had always supported the Army’s operations in the field. The female military companies were prepared to take this one step further. A number of them advocated for service in combat or combat support roles. In the midst of the Spanish-American War, their willingness to volunteer and to give their lives for their country was noteworthy and, indeed, widely reported on.

One typical experience of this period involved a group of forty armed and uniformed women who were presented to the governor of Kansas by their drill instructor, Maj. Horatio N. Boyd, in July 1898. The major declared that, should they be given the opportunity to fight, they would be found “standing as firm as a rock.” Governor John W. Leedy responded with diplomatic finesse: “I do not know what to call you, ladies or soldiers, but I will say that I am greatly pleased at the patriotism you have shown by this tender of your services to your country and I promise you now that if the time ever comes when you will be required by the United States government, I shall take pleasure in presenting you to the commander-in-chief for active service.”

Newspaper reports mentioned women flocking to the colors: 1,500 women in Connecticut offered to enter the militia, and several hundred young women in Nebraska who could ride and shoot formed companies and asked to be mustered in. The report on the latter group, carried in papers across the country, concluded with the observation that “the Mothers of the Republic would be surprised to see these girls but would not be ashamed of them.”

War fever also served to open the door a crack for the formation of female military companies in the African American community. Two companies of Black women were formed in the Topeka, Kansas, area in October 1898. This was the first instance of a Black women’s company formed with a military purpose. They numbered one hundred women and called themselves the Leedy Guards. One article notes that many were the wives and girlfriends of members of the 23d Kansas Volunteer Infantry, an African American regiment serving in Cuba. The women had uniforms of gray with white trim, and John T. Veney, the organizer, commented on the excellence of their drill. When antisuffrage politicians tried to disrupt the organization, Veney noted that the women would not be deterred by their disenfranchisement: “The young ladies joined the cadets with a perfect understanding of what was expected of them and I am not afraid that our enemies will succeed in breaking up the organizations.” Women’s unofficial military service demonstrated their fitness to perform official military duty which would then qualify them for the vote. And in the case of the Leedy Guards, even without the vote, women would continue to demonstrate their fitness.

The challenges of the Spanish-American War strengthened the women’s military movement. Many women volunteered to serve in nontraditional roles, including in combat if required by the government. Refused the opportunity to serve in uniform, they turned to related civilian endeavors—encouraging recruiting,
raising funds for the families of soldiers, and participating in patriotic celebrations. New units were formed, and although no female units served in the war, their voluntarism elicited favorable notice and an increased appreciation for the proposition that women deserved consideration for formal military service. Women marched into the twentieth century more convinced than ever that they should be treated with equality in all spheres of endeavor, to include military service.

This new perspective was an evolution from the previous more limited American view of women’s service in the military, which had been restricted to individual “woman warrior” heroines who served in male disguise, or putative camp followers who were thrust into battle when their husbands’ units came under attack. The period of 1875 to 1900 cast a different light on women’s capacity to perform military duties. This expansion paved the way for the United States’ official acceptance of women as full-fledged members of the armed forces (at least in the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Marine Corps), entitled to pay, rank, benefits, and recognition equal to their male counterparts. On 17 March 1917, the first woman enlisted as a yeoman in the U.S. Navy. By the time the United States entered World War I, 2,000 women had enlisted in the armed services. Public reaction was accepting, attributable in large part to the groundwork laid by the first women’s military and drill units. Newspaper accounts expressed positive views or neutral statements of fact; not a single paper carried a negative account. America had decided that women had a new place in our military response to the war. Women had established a foothold in this most traditional of men’s activities, a foothold that continued to grow after 1917.

With women officially enlisted in the U.S. military, the last justification for barring equal voting rights to women (military service as a requirement of full citizenship) was nullified. This notion was captured by President Woodrow Wilson in his 30 September 1918 speech in favor of women’s suffrage:

We have made partners of the women in this war; shall we admit them only to a partnership of sacrifice and suffering and toil and not to a partnership of privilege and of right? This war could not have been fought, either by the other nations engaged or by America, if it had not been for the services of the women,—services rendered in every sphere,—not merely in the fields of effort in which we have been accustomed to see them work, but wherever men have worked and upon the very skirts and edges of the battle itself.

The acknowledged contributions of women to the war effort finally swung public opinion in favor of women’s suffrage. The activities of early female military and drill organizations thus played an unacknowledged but meaningful role in moving America one step closer to the desired goal of universal suffrage. Scholars of American military history should salute the efforts of these many pioneers, whose cumulative efforts formed the roots of U.S. women’s military service, and, in turn, led directly to the dramatic improvement of the rights of women.

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NOTES
2. “Female Suffrage.”


10. The Bomb: I.A.C. ‘94 (Nebraska, IA: Representative Print, 1894), 181.


Ida M. Dudley, who was married to Edgar T. Dudley, always appears in newspaper accounts as Mrs. E. T. Dudley.


18. “Our Girls’ Military Company”; “Maiden’s Drill”; “For the Fresh Air Funds.”


26. “Girl Cadets are These,” Washington Times (DC), 3 Mar 1895, 6.


29. Querying a database that contained only a subset of newspapers published during this era revealed more than a thousand different broom brigade articles. The number is almost certainly much higher, given the reliance on a single database.

30. “Notes from the Town,” Weekly Saratogian, 26 Apr 1883.


32. Search Page, Old Fulton New York Postcards, n.d., https://fultonhistory.com/Fulton.html (accessed 2 Jan 2020). Note: Comparative statistical surveys conducted on results of exact match “broom brigade” and “broom drill” search terms and sum of Boolean search results from the term “military drill” within fifteen words of “girls,” within fifteen words of “ladies,” and within fifteen words of “women.” False positives and duplicates were discarded in calculating final statistics.


36. Online Black newspaper archives are more difficult to search given their scattered sites, incompleteness, scarcity of period source material, and uneven search and access protocols. It is not possible at this time to make any comparative statement about the numbers or nature (organization, uniforms, etc.) of these groups. An opportunity exists for research into the question of Black female (and male) military drill and the impact of class, gender, and race on this movement.


39. Foster, “Pretty Girls Take to Soldiering.”

40. Foster, “Pretty Girls Take to Soldiering.”

41. Foster, “Pretty Girls Take to Soldiering.”

42. “Female Militia Company,” Topeka State Journal, 18 Apr 1897.


45. Interestingly, when Kellar’s Zouaves toured in England, they were billed as American women. Their first appearance had indeed been in the United States, so it is likely that the performers were American all along.


48. “Girls with Muskets.”


50. This is the earliest mention of the formation of a Black women’s military company encountered in the author’s research.


52. The author reviewed over one hundred newspaper accounts from 1917 dealing with the enlistment of women in the Navy and found not a single negative response. This is not to say there are not, somewhere, some opinion pieces that take the opposite view, but this author did not find any.

THE SCOURGE OF WAR: THE LIFE OF WILLIAM TECUMSEH SHERMAN

BY BRIAN HOLDEN REID
Oxford University Press, 2020
Pp. ix, 621. $34.95

REVIEW BY MITCHELL G. KLINGENBERG

The subtitle of this book, with its definite article, suggests not merely an account of William T. Sherman—one of the most chronicled soldiers in U.S. Army history—but the authoritative one. This is no modest aspiration; scholars such as Sir Basil Henry Liddell Hart, John Marszalek, Michael Fellman, Steven Woodworth, and James Lee McDonough (to name a few) have written compelling accounts of Sherman’s life. The general also has featured prominently in historiographical literatures concerning the character of total (versus “hard”) war and just war theory.

Woven throughout this study is the argument that Sherman was a man of ideas. On its face, this claim is not novel. John Marszalek in Sherman: A Soldier’s Passion for Order (1995) and Victor Davis Hanson in The Soul of Battle: From Ancient Times to the Present Day, How Three Great Librators Vanquished Tyranny (1999) have posited similar interpretations. But Holden Reid is careful to prove that while Sherman demonstrated scholarly proclivities, his intellect was not academic. Rather, Sherman’s mind animated his boundless physical energy—a niece once likened him to “an electric wire which threw off sparks in quick succession”—a quality that empowered his unrivaled capacity for action (212). Sherman’s intellect was therefore utilitarian; he believed that academic and professional literatures were useful insofar as they contributed to a knowledge of how to fight and win wars, though all knowledge needed to be paired with hard-won practical experience.

Holden Reid is the first biographer since Liddell Hart to see Sherman against the backdrop of nineteenth-century military thought and practice and to apply precise technical knowledge of war in his assessment of the soldier. The Scourge of War analyzes the complex interplay of thought and action in Sherman’s commands at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war. One benefit of this approach is that it affords readers an instructive case study in change over time. It also invites readers to see how Sherman understood—and sometimes failed to understand—war in its vast complexity and at successive stages of advancement throughout his career. Sherman was an unremarkable tactician at brigade and division, but later proved adept at comprehending the linkages of tactical actions in time, space, and purpose. He was a master logistician, having learned from 1863 to 1864 how to sustain a campaign over vast and difficult terrain. As commander of the Military Division of the Mississippi, Sherman grasped the war’s strategic dimensions in ways that few Federal commanders could. (Only Ulysses S. Grant was Sherman’s superior in this respect.)

A particular strength of this book is how it chronicles and contextualizes Sherman’s career as commanding general of the Army. Holden Reid builds on the scholarship of Russell F. Weigley, who perceives in Sherman a mind rivaled only by Winfield Scott. No other commanding general, Weigley argues, possessed Sherman’s intellectual powers. (The office of commanding general was replaced in 1903 by the Army chief of staff.) Like Weigley, Holden Reid underscores the instructional value of Sherman’s memoirs and their quality as a military text. The Memoirs of General W. T. Sherman were instrumental in nurturing professional thought within the Army, and Sherman did much to encourage the development of a uniquely American school of tactics (454).

Sherman was a man of the West. As commanding general, his role in sanctioning the use of force against Native American tribes helped conquer the continent and position the United States for global hegemony. Readers may take issue with Holden Reid’s view that this did not constitute genocide, but the author defends his position well (435). Sherman loved the West for its ethos and its topographical features, making frequent inspections of frontier posts to “imbibe” the serenity and “unfathomable beauties” of Western landscapes (491). Previous biographers have noted Sherman’s affinity for that ethos, but Holden Reid has done so with singular imagination, citing the spiritual essence of the West so beautifully rendered in the iconic literature of Willa Cather (491).

The author depicts Sherman as an architect of the literary counteroffensive against the Lost Cause—an interpretation of the war that claims Confederate General Robert E. Lee was a hero on par with the martyred Abraham Lincoln, among other things. This narrative, which found widespread acceptance in the postwar South and even permeated international interpretations of the conflict, received a thrashing from Sherman. In a response to the English General Garnet Wolseley (who had praised Lee in a prominent article) published in the North American Review,
Sherman wrote that Grant, not Lee, was the foremost soldier of the conflict. Lee, according to Sherman, fought in a narrow theater of operations and sought illusory decisive tactical actions while the strategic defense of the Confederacy crumbled. Sherman's assessment of Lee was blunt: "As an aggressive soldier Lee was not a success, and in war that is the true and proper test" (478). He believed the Virginian George Henry Thomas was a superior talent to Lee and built of better moral fiber. It was Thomas—not Lee—who "remained true to his oath and his duty, always, to the very last minute of his life" (478). Thus, Sherman anticipated the mounting power of the Lost Cause and dedicated some of his most pointed writings in retirement to smashing its foundations.

For all of its erudition and scope, and more than its decisive refutation of the false view that Sherman inaugurated total war in the American context, The Scourge of War never loses sight of Sherman's humanity. Indeed, its author has demonstrated why his subject remains one of the most compelling figures of the Civil War and Reconstruction eras. The story of Sherman's life is improbable, almost incredible, and yet relatable. A man of modest beginnings who struggled in life and contemplated suicide in moments of despair; a man whose Army career seemed ruined in the earliest phase of the Civil War, who grieved the death of his most beloved son, and yet persisted against long odds and triumphed; a man who helped transform the nation in the 1880s, resisted the lure of partisan politics, and outlived other Civil War luminaries—Sherman was uniquely fitted to historical moments in which his intellect and talents ultimately flourished. Though he shared certain cerebral and temperamental qualities with Grant, Sherman, in retrospect, has appeared more endearing and complicated than his close friend and commander in chief. Former president Rutherford B. Hayes regarded Sherman in 1891 as "the most interesting and original character in the world" (490). This is because, as Holden Reid concludes, Sherman "had the courage of his convictions," always spoke the truth, and possessed an unwavering confidence in "the destiny of the United States" (507).

Sherman believed "a more perfect peace" to be the only "legitimate object" of war. Practitioners of war should not assume, however, that the peace which Sherman and later generations of Americans fought to secure is final, nor neglect preparations for future, large-scale armed conflict. Now more than ever, officers in the U.S. Army would do well to remember this soldier who so fully grasped the "scourge"—the inherently violent nature—of war. Essential reading and an instant standard in the field, Holden Reid's The Life of William Tecumseh Sherman delivers on its subtitle and will profit students of military history for years to come.

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**CIVIL WAR PLACES: SEEING THE CONFLICT THROUGH THE EYES OF ITS LEADING HISTORIANS**

**EDITED BY GARY W. GALLAGHER AND J. MATTHEW GALLMAN, PHOTOGRAPHS BY WILL GALLAGHER**

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**REVIEW BY NATHAN MARZOLI**

"Few words," write renowned Civil War historians Gary Gallagher and J. Matthew Gallman, "are as deceptively simple and yet potentially complex as the word 'place'" (1). To military historians, this statement carries particular weight. Much of our scholarship requires an embrace of this concept of "place"; it is impossible to analyze the outcomes of battles and campaigns without understanding the landscapes over which they were fought. Especially in the case of the American Civil War—where historical site visitation remains an integral part of how we interpret the conflict—this discussion of "place" is paramount. Through a series of essays by prominent historians in the field, Civil War Places: Seeing the Conflict through the Eyes of Its Leading Historians aims to help us better understand the complex and multifaceted meanings of historical spaces.

The basic idea behind this book is straightforward. Gary Gallagher (the John L. Nau III Professor in the History of the American Civil War Emeritus at the University of Virginia) and J. Matthew Gallman (professor of history at the University of Florida) asked two dozen friends—all colleagues and also prominent historians of the Civil War era—to select a single location tied to the war and explain in an essay why they chose it. Sounds simple, right? But the outcome, reflecting the duality of the concept of "place" itself, is much more nuanced and complex.

Each historian answered the prompt differently. Some selected places that fit into their own personal narrative—somewhere they grew up near, for example—while others picked a location that struck a chord because of its beauty or the unique memories it evokes for them. These places included gravesites, cemeteries, and specific spots on battlefields. Several historians also wrote about structures specifically tied to Civil War memory, such as monuments, buildings, or memorials.

Although the essay subjects generally fall into the broad categories and locations described above, their variations also "speak to the many ways a group of gifted historians can address a simple assignment," Gallagher and Gallman write (2). Several of the authors chose to contextualize their essays in memories tied to their own childhood experiences, while others opted to explore how they currently navigate teaching the difficult meanings of "place" to their students. For many of the contributors, their essays also provided a welcome opportunity to gain fresh perspectives on sites that had long been integral to their own scholarship.

The written word is not the only element of this book that helps us better understand the concept of Civil War "place." Each essay is accompanied by a single black-and-white photograph of the author's subject taken by Will Gallagher, Gary's son. "In many ways," Will writes, "this was the project of a lifetime for me" (184). He had wanted to work with his
father on a project for many years, so
Will was naturally excited when Gary
called him with the initial idea for the
book. The results of this collaboration
were well worth the wait; Civil War Places
would feel incomplete without the younger
Gallagher’s incredible photography.
Each shot wonderfully accentuates the
author’s written words, and captures the
historian’s tone and message perfectly.
Will’s outstanding contributions convince
this reviewer that photography should be
a more fundamental part of academic
historical interpretation going forward.

This volume is a welcomed addition to
the crowded historiography of the
Civil War for two main reasons. At their
most basic level, these essays provide us
with valuable insight into the inspiration
behind the work of these prominent Civil
War historians. In his essay about Shiloh
Church, Stephen Berry deftly weaves a
description of the battlefield’s contempo-
rary tranquility with that of its April 1862
hellishness as a way in which to convey
his own struggles in writing about the
horrible violence the war unleashed. Other
historians contributed essays that identify
a certain place as the touchstone that led
them on the path to becoming a Civil War
historian. Carol Reardon, for example,
became enamored with the war largely
because of visits to the Soldiers and Sailors
Memorial Hall with her grandmother
following Pittsburgh Pirates games at old
Forbes Field. Caroline Janney explains
in her contribution how a particular
photograph of Burnside’s Bridge, taken
during a childhood visit to Antietam with
her grandparents, continues to shape her
memory and personal meaning of that
place. No matter the subject of the essay,
Civil War Places importantly reveals how
each historian maintains an intimate
connection to a Civil War “place” in their
professional and personal lives.

Civil War Places also encourages us
to develop and nurture a stronger
relationship with our historical spaces. All too
often, visitors view these places—at either
a conscious or subconscious level—as
frozen in time; they exist only as static,
modern interpretations of events that
occurred in the past. This collection of
essays demonstrates that this could not
be further from the truth. Because each
visitor carries different memories, expe-
riences, and biases, their own personal
meaning of a particular “place” can be
altered in subtle and unique ways. As
each individual interaction changes one’s
own thoughts, memories, and perceptions
about a site, the inherent meaning of the
place itself is permanently changed as
well. This is what makes the concept of
“place” so difficult to define. Its meaning
is never static, but rather is transforming
and evolving with each human interaction.

“Place” is defined by the people who visit it.

Civil War Places encourages us as
participants in the historical commu-
nity—whether academics or members
of the general public—to pause and to
think more critically about our perceived
connections with the sites we visit. By
doing so, we develop a stronger relation-
ship with our surroundings, our memo-
ries, and our history. This book shows
us that it is a wonderful thing to marvel in
both the seeming simplicity and the utter
complexities of “place.”

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CHASING MOSBY, KILLING
BOOTH: THE 16TH NEW YORK
VOLUNTEER CAVALRY

BY JAMES CARSON
McFarland & Company, 2017
Pp. vi, 255. $35

REVIEW BY RODERICK R. GAINER
Regimental histories have long played an
important part in Civil War scholarship.
As dedicated researchers continue to mine
the vast troves of primary documentation
from the period, these works, like the
regiments themselves, vary greatly in both
size and quality. In Chasing Mosby, Killing
Booth, James Carson, a retired Army and
Central Intelligence Agency officer, rescues
the 16th New York Volunteer Cavalry from
historical oblivion, and a compelling story
emerges from this first official history of
the often shadowy regiment.

Raised in the Plattsburgh area of New
York in 1863 from elements of three
partially completed regiments, the 16th
soon saw itself attached to the XXII Corps,
whose duties included staffing fortifica-
tions in Washington, D.C., patrolling,
and provost activities. Originally under
the command of Col. Henry Lazelle, the
regiment was led by Col. Nelson Bowman
Switzer until the end of the war. Both
officers were capable commanders who
had long and successful Army careers.

Carson explains that the regiment,
despite its fine colonels, had problems
from the start. First, the unit found it
difficult to keep soldiers: bounty jumping,
the practice of accepting money to enlist
and then deserting, had become a cottage industry by late 1863. Second, the regiment often deployed its troops in thankless static patrol duties, making them easy targets for enemy fire. Third, John Singleton Mosby and his famed 43d Ranger Battalion wreaked havoc in Northern Virginia, often hitting the 16th’s outposts and more often than not besting them. This left Maj. Gen. Henry Halleck to declare the regiment “cowed and useless” (149). Yet despite its poor reputation with senior leadership, the 16th often fought well, twice wounding Mosby himself. The regiment also learned from its mistakes: Colonel Lazelle instituted a system of mutually supporting stockades that severely restricted the 43d’s ability to penetrate Union lines.

Carson explains that the guerrilla war against Mosby proved especially bitter and savage. In many cases, neither side granted or received quarter. In early 1864, elements of the 16th captured William Ormsby, a trooper from the 2d Massachusetts Cavalry who had absconded to the enemy and joined Mosby’s rangers. The trooper soon found himself in front of a drumhead court-martial and, immediately afterward, a firing squad. Then, in October 1864, several of Mosby’s men managed to slip into Falls Church, Virginia, where they captured and summarily executed local abolitionist and Unionist Reverend John Read for being a “Yankee spy” (108–9).

The unusual officer corps of the 16th gives Carson great grist for discussion. Despite the proven competence of Lazelle and the officers of the regiment proved themselves able or honorable. The 16th’s Lt. Col. George Hollister found himself front of a court-martial for sexually assaulting Capt. A. Livingston Washburn and Lt. William Farrell, raping a woman, and drinking with an enlisted man. Hollister was found guilty and dismissed from the regiment, but after the war he appealed, offering letters of support from fellow officers and providing evidence suggesting that Washburn and Farrell were not reliable witnesses. Incredibly, Hollister was reinstated.

The most famous of the 16th’s unusual soldiers was Sgt. Boston Corbett. A religious fanatic, Corbett castrated himself with a pair of scissors after being tempted by prostitutes before the war. When the war broke out, he enlisted as an infantryman, but his eccentric behavior—including challenging senior leadership—led to a court-martial and eventual acquittal. In the summer of 1864, Corbett joined the 16th, serving in Company L. Like so many of his regimental companions, he ended up a prisoner of war, scooped up by Mosby’s rampaging rangers. After serving time at Andersonville Prison, Corbett was exchanged and rejoined his regiment. After the assassination of President Abraham Lincoln, Corbett and twenty-five other cavalrmen cornered John Wilkes Booth and fellow conspirator David Herold in a Virginia barn. During the ensuing standoff, Corbett shot and mortally wounded Booth, becoming a national hero. Carson does a good job illuminating the chase, but offers little new information here.

Chasing Mosby, Killing Booth is a fine modern regimental history. Carson narrates the often thankless service of a late-war regiment that participated in no famous battles or campaigns, but rather spent its time fighting irregulars and picketing. The story is nonetheless an important one, and Carson’s history provides a new piece in the kaleidoscopic puzzle of Civil War History.
and execution, is more lucid than most. He explains operations economically, not getting into such deep detail that the greater points he seeks to make become obscured in the smoke and mud of the trenches. Boff clarifies throughout the work that the Germans were not masters of the battlefield, though they often are seen as such in so much English-language literature. The Germans struggled as much as their opponents in adapting to the changing conditions of trench warfare. Their commanders argued and ignored directions, just as the British and French did. Furthermore, the Germans frequently saw things as being in more dire straits than their opponents imagined or were conversely as overly optimistic as historians often portray Haig, Rupprecht’s opponent.

Boff’s work represents the converse of the extensive works in English on the British commanders, the tactical and operational proficiency of the British Expeditionary Force, and the nature of the British command in the First World War. He gives his readers the first extensive look at a German commander, the German perspective on their own tactical and operational proficiency, and the nature of the German command in the First World War. This approach opens up more than merely the German army’s learning process and adaptation to the conditions on the Western Front. Using extensive scholarly literature on the French and British armies, Boff effectively compares the Allies’ efforts to learn and adapt to the German efforts. At the end of each of the first three parts, Boff takes the time to discuss what each army learned and how they adapted. This comparison of the British, French, and Germans separates Boff’s efforts from many other works on the First World War. However, the work, while comparative in these periodic chapters, also examines Crown Prince Rupprecht as a commander, the German army’s command structure, its ability and willingness to adapt to change, its tactical and operational ability, and finally, the effect of a long, grinding war on the morale of both senior leaders and the men in the trenches.

Haig’s Enemy is a major contribution to the historiography of the First World War. Scholars will be impressed with Boff’s new perspective on the Western front, while interested soldiers and laymen will find Boff’s writing approachable and engaging and his insights valuable as they reconsider their view of the First World War.

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European theater but on the enemy that had made the surprise attacks at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, and elsewhere in the Pacific—Japan. As Churchill confided at the time to his personal physician, “They may concentrate upon Japan and leave us to deal with Germany. They have already stopped the flow of supplies that we are getting” (14). These concerns about resources and overall Allied strategy convinced Churchill that meeting in person with his counterpart, U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, and the senior military leaders of both nations was critical to establishing a firm strategic foundation for waging a global war. On 22 December 1941, Churchill and his military leaders arrived in Washington, D.C., for a series of meetings that would set the course of the Allied war effort.

The ensuing Arcadia Conference, as the meetings that took place between 24 December 1941 and 14 January 1942 came to be known, is the subject of Brig. Gen. (Ret.) John F. Shortal’s Code Name Arcadia: The First Wartime Conference of Churchill and Roosevelt. With this comprehensive history of the conference, Shortal, the former head of the Joint History Office and author of a well-received biography of General Robert L. Eichelberger, has done important service for historians of U.S. and Allied strategy in World War II. His account of the conference, and the interplay of the fascinating personalities involved in it, brings to life the challenges faced by all parties in waging coalition warfare. Perhaps most important, Shortal demonstrates convincingly the strategic significance of the conference. In many accounts of the war, the Arcadia Conference is overshadowed by later conferences, but by placing the workings and thoughts of the participants in the context of the challenges they faced in December 1941 and January 1942, Shortal shows the importance of the conference’s achievements as well as the influence it had on the American military.

Shortal’s decision to present events day-by-day and meeting-by-meeting provokes valuable insight. He captures the nuances and contingent nature of the debates and decision making on both sides in meetings that, as he notes, were consistently “emotional and contentious” (167). The reader, immersed in the details, can fully grasp the chaos and stress of the period, understand the rationales for the positions and arguments debated in Washington, D.C., and see how these viewpoints were shaped by events unfolding around the world.

The story can be read as a riveting work of theater with a colorful cast of characters in roles both major and supporting. Churchill, of course, dominates the first act with his rhetoric, grandiosity, and belief that British preparation and experience—in addition to his own force of personality—would carry the day and convince the Americans, particularly President Roosevelt, to adopt a grand strategy in line with his own vision and goals. Churchill’s military leaders presented an established, unified front and, perhaps more important, a strong and competent staff capability. The American military leaders, suspicious of their British counterparts, lacked the show of competency, which at times disadvantaged—as well as embarrassed—them. Shortal fairly contrasts the performance of the two nations’ staff officers and military secretaries, often to the detriment of the Americans. He also shows how individual excellence among American planners such as Brig. Gens. Dwight D. Eisenhower and Leonard T. Gerow and Rear Adm. Richmond Kelly Turner complemented the strategic thinking and hard-headed reasoning of the senior Americans—particularly Commander in Chief of the United States Fleet, Admiral Ernest J. King and Army Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall, whom Churchill’s physician called “the key to the situation” (97). This mélange of personalities brought a global vision to the matters of supplying and waging a war around the world, and helped identify a way forward. Behind them all was President Roosevelt, always politely refusing to be boxed into unfavorable positions and willing, in the end, to exert the decision-making power that U.S. industrial and manpower resources brought to the negotiating table.

Shortal also shows how many of the positive outcomes of the Arcadia Conference became central to the prosecution of the war and paved the way for the successes of later wartime conferences. In addition to making significant decisions about future operations and the allocation of resources, the military chiefs established an organizational body—the Combined Chiefs of Staff—through which the Americans and British could plan and conduct combined strategic operations. On the American side, the need to support the combined chiefs led to the creation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a forum for the U.S. military services to—gasp!—talk with each other and coordinate at the national level. The military leaders also agreed to establish unified commands with a single commander for all the forces in a theater. First applied in Southeast Asia, the principle of unity of command would be employed throughout the remainder of the war. Most important, the participants affirmed that the “Germany First” concept would be paramount to the Anglo-American strategy. Considered together, the achievements of the Arcadia Conference were impressive given that it concluded less than six weeks after the United States had entered the war.

Shortal is a fair guide in a landscape filled with complicated issues and personalities that evoke strong reactions. He highlights historic moments and gives credit where it is due, regardless of the personality involved, such as the influence of British Minister of Supply Lord Beaverbrook on the U.S. approach to war materials production. His even-handed treatment is evident throughout this clearly written, cogently argued story. If, as Shortal phrases it, the former chief of the imperial general staff, Field Marshall John Dill, “interpreted for both sides” throughout the conference, then Shortal himself has achieved the same result on behalf of readers of this history (236).

The outcome is an engaging history of the early days of Allied strategic planning that reminds readers that the major issues at the start of wars are often quite different from those that, years later, hold the attention of both participants and historians.

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The Japanese retreated southward, closely pursued by Slim’s army, with Maj. Gen. David “Punch” Cowan’s 17th Indian Division leading the way. Meanwhile, Lt. Gen. Philip Christison’s XV Corps liberated the Arakan and then took Rangoon by sea and air assault, meeting Cowan’s troops north of the city as the monsoon broke in early May. After several battles with Japanese stragglers and die-hard resisters, the war in Burma ended with Japan’s surrender on 15 August 1945. The Burma battles in 1945 thus ended up as the last great victories of the British Empire.

This story is the focus of Callahan and Marston’s volume, the final one in a series about the British Indian Army of World War II. The authors first recapitulate some of their previous volume to set the stage. This is followed by a review of the lessons the army learned in 1944, and the resulting doctrinal, organizational, and equipment changes for 1945. Several chapters briskly examine the operations in the Arakan and central Burma, the push to Rangoon, and the final battles against Japanese holdouts. The authors conclude with an examination of the Fourteenth Army’s troops in the occupations of Japan, Indochina, the Dutch East Indies, and Malaya—forgotten episodes that saw these soldiers sucked into postcolonial conflicts on the eve of returning home.

The diligent reader will find many rewards throughout the book. The authors’ grasp of detail is solid, and well-chosen vignettes illuminate their points. The leadership and teamwork that makes the British successes possible shines through clearly.

That said, the book has limitations. First, awkward and inconsistent usage (for example: XIV Army for Slim’s force versus 12th Army for its British counterpart) is annoying and can be confusing to readers less familiar with the subject. Second, there are not enough maps for readers to follow all the action. The authors are also sometimes prone to sweeping statements, such as alleging a coverup of Slim’s embarrassing relief in May 1945. On occasion, the awkward construction of the book (e.g., some chapters have individual appendices) obscures the authors’ points. As a result, readers will need to sift the narrative in places to capture the key points.

Despite these limitations, Callahan and Marston have compiled a good survey of a complex and underappreciated subject. This book is recommended to anyone with an interest in the Indian Army, the Raj, Britain’s Far East operations in World War II, the dynamics of an army on campaign, or general military organization.

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2006 book *The Looming Tower,* the war was a “psychological turning point” for the region because it discredited pan-Arab nationalism and fostered the spread of Islamic fundamentalism.1 In the best and most comprehensive history of the war, *Six Days of War,* the Israeli historian Michel Oren emphasized its chaotic context, unpredictable momentum, and hopeful yet dangerous legacy;2 In the view of the political scientist Kenneth Pollack, the war’s overarchling significance lay in just one thing—it serves as an enduring indictment of Arab culture.

In *Armies of Sand: The Past, Present, and Future of Arab Military Effectiveness,* Israel’s victory over what appeared to be insurmountable odds drives Pollack’s central question: what is wrong with the Arab armies? While frequently invoking 1967, Pollack examines each of Israel’s wars with its Arab neighbors, from its struggle for independence in 1948 to the 2006 conflict with Hezbollah. He also ventures far beyond the region—to Angola, Argentina, Korea, Vietnam, and elsewhere—to consider how other militaries have measured up in the crucible of combat. The purpose of these examples is to reinforce how consistently incompetent Arab militaries have been relative to non-Arab forces.

Pollack organizes his work around four common criticisms of Arab armies. First, he dismantles the canard that “it’s all the Soviets’ fault.” During the Cold War, the Soviet Union tried to extend its influence among the region’s postcolonial regimes through military assistance and training. When Israel defeated Arab forces equipped with Soviet arms and doctrine, Arab leaders excused their failings by blaming the Soviets. Pollack argues, however, that Arab armies performed poorly whether they followed Soviet doctrine or not, and many did not. Moreover, North Korea and Cuba both built competent militaries while relying on Soviet assistance, and Cuba intervened effectively in African wars in the 1970s and the 1980s. The evidence, Pollack maintains, shows that the Soviet Union was not to blame for Arab failures.

Pollack gives limited credence to two other criticisms: politicization and underdevelopment. For Pollack, a politicized military takes one of three forms: a military dictatorship, a head of state turning the military into a tool of personal power, or a military that is reduced to a palace guard with no purpose beyond protecting the head of state. Any of these scenarios, focused as they are on internal security, cripple the military’s ability to defend the state from external threats. Underdevelopment is even more detrimental to military effectiveness, owing to the widespread illiteracy that results from an impoverished or nonexistent educational system. Illiteracy makes it almost impossible to train troops, build ready forces, or plan and execute operations. Egypt under Abdul Nassir and Syria under the Assads demonstrate the inherent frailties of a politicized military and underdevelopment. Pollack also finds, however, that neither politicization nor underdevelopment were fatal flaws for Chad in its wars with Libya, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army in Korea, or the South Vietnamese Army.

According to Pollack, the worst problems Arab armies have experienced in combat “derive from behavioral patterns associated with Arab culture” (343). He defines culture as learned, shared values and patterns of behavior (343). Strangely, Pollack does not see Islam or its many fissures as having particular resonance in contemporary Arabic culture. Instead, he points to pre-Islamic Arab tribalism and centuries of subjugation under Ottoman and Western rule, which “fostered passivity, resignation, deception [and] dissimulation” as powerful tendencies (368). Like the rising of the sun in the east, Pollack suggests, the results are inexorable: a deep-rooted cultural incompetence sure to break out under the pressure of combat.

Pollack recognizes exceptions to his argument, such as the performance of Jordan’s Arab Legion in the 1948 war with Israel and Syria’s commandos in 1982, again against Israel. Among nonstate actors, Hezbollah and Da’ish (the Islamic State) have fielded formidable forces. In each case, these were learning organizations committed to a cause, and they were willing and able to use the resources at hand to their best effect. However, these examples were short-lived or did not encompass the broader society, which underscores that they were the exceptions that proved the rule.

The strengths and weaknesses of Pollack’s work are clear. His analytical framework of politicization, underdevelopment, and culture offers a reasonable basis for assessing any military establishment. These serve as a template for considering foreign influences, domestic politics, and economics, and they have distinctive effects on small-unit tactical leadership, information management, intelligence, and logistical capabilities. *Armies of Sand* is a veritable textbook for novice analysts, and its wide-ranging historical examples will familiarize readers with conflicts they may never have studied, from Cuba’s intervention in Ethiopia (1978) to the Falklands War (1982).

Pollack’s work also has significant flaws. Unexplained references to Sparta, English longbowmen, Waterloo, the American Civil War, and German panzer divisions are distracting for even well-read military historians. *Armies of Sand* pulls together too many diverse examples and subjects them to too little fact-checking, and dubious reasoning reveals the limits of Pollack’s expertise. The question at the heart of this work—which is wrong with Arab armies?—is too narrow-minded; in fact, it is more of an assumption than a question. If Arab societies are incapable of building competent defense establishments, why have outside powers failed to subdue them? Perhaps there are bigger forces at play than the mere shortcomings of Arab culture or any particular Arab army.

*Armies of Sand* is an ambitious but sprawling attempt to make sense of a wide array of historical fragments. Pollack’s framework—his analysis of politicization, underdevelopment, and culture—is intriguing and it offers interesting insights. The problem is that when the animating question is so myopic, the entire edifice rests on a shaky foundation.

**Notes**


This important discussion resembled others with veterans at Texas A&M University. Interactions civilian students might have about the nature of military stories and the students, he and Eide began a conversation. Gibler served as a guest speaker in Eide’s class for first-year commander at Texas A&M University. With the war on terrorism reaching its second decade, a generation of veterans have unique stories that, for the most part, do not see the light of day. When they are told, it is within veterans’ groups, perhaps during a night of drinking, or within the confines of a therapy office in one of the VA clinics scattered across the United States. This book attempts to remedy this situation.

Added to the growing list of nonfiction books on military service in the twenty-first century is After Combat: True War Stories from Iraq and Afghanistan by Marian Eide and Michael Gibler. The authors come from different backgrounds. Marian Eide, an associate professor at Texas A&M University, focuses on twentieth-century English literature. She was raised in the foreign service and is a “committed pacifist” (xviii). Michael Gibler served as an infantry officer in the U.S. Army for twenty-eight years, participated in Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, and was the Army ROTC commander at Texas A&M University. When Gibler provided commentary as a guest speaker in Eide’s class for first-year students, he and Eide began a conversation about the nature of military stories and the interactions civilian students might have with veterans at Texas A&M University. This important discussion resembled others occurring among academics (civilians and veterans alike) on campuses across the United States where veteran populations have been growing. These conversations have resulted in books such as Eide and Gibler’s After Combat, which explores the microcosm of one university and its veteran community.

Eide and Gibler begin by explaining that “not long into the process [they] began to see the uniqueness and import of anonymity,” and indeed the identities of the contributors to After Combat remain elusive (xiii). Based on the authors’ locality, readers might assume that the narratives are from Texas A&M University students, faculty, staff, and alumni, but the text does not indicate where the stories came from. The authors provide some demographic information in the introduction, including the number of people used and a vague assessment of race demographics, but the book lacks concrete information or charts. Books of a similar nature, such as Christian G. Appy’s Working-Class War: American Combat Soldiers and Vietnam (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1993), include in-depth race, age, and gender demographic charts to fully explain where the researchers obtained their information. One of After Combat’s alarming numbers is that of the thirty participants, only five are women. This indicates a problem, though it is not clear whether the authors were not willing to reach out to the female veteran community, the female veteran population did not feel comfortable telling their stories to the authors, or the studied group did not contain a significant amount of female veterans. Regardless, the lack of gender-diverse voices in this book (and others) is telling both in the veteran community and in the publishing world when it comes to military history.

This book does not have author notes (either at the end of the book or as footnotes), which is unfortunate, as notes could have helped supply additional information for the novice reader and the researcher alike. Each chapter starts with a quote or story; whether these quotes are from the authors themselves or a combination of information from participants and authors is unclear. These opening quotes do help stabilize the chapter titles, but outside of this they could be excluded from the book altogether.

With the anonymous nature of the stories, there is no narrative thread connecting the chapters; nor is there one connecting stories within the chapters. The authors state that “each chapter [is] narrated collectively by veterans. The order within each chapter is not particularly chronological but rather associative” (xix–xx). However, this format is choppy, leading to confusion and a lack of flow in the overall narrative. The use of section breaks helps establish where each story begins and ends, but does not help build the “associative” structure the authors sought to create. The most distinct voices in each chapter are from the female veterans, who provide unique perspectives on their roles within the military. These viewpoints and the overall subject matter of each chapter help to build an understanding of the linear path most service members follow, from joining the military to postmilitary life.

After Combat is part of a larger project that includes a digital humanities collection. The online platform (http://www.aftercombat.tamu.edu) is not complete and lacks a lot of the information that is included in the book. It is possible that in the coming months and years, the digital portion of the project will be fleshed out; Texas A&M University has a large center for digital humanities and expression. A database containing MP3s of the interviews, summaries, and transcriptions would be helpful for future scholars’ research. At present, however, it is unclear what the website might become apart from a landing site for the book.

Overall, After Combat provides a good beginning for those wanting to understand veterans and gain some sort of background understanding of the military. It is a book probably best appreciated by other veterans; it could be a great reader to have in veteran centers at universities with large veteran populations. Those already working within the field of military history community are likely to find this book confusing and frustrating, especially if they want to use the book for their own research. For civilians, this would be a hard read because of the amount of jargon used by the veterans. The authors do include a basic glossary, but a larger glossary, further reading, and maps would help the military novice. The book could use a better timeline and organization. Perhaps the authors eventually will include a lot of this missing information on their digital platform.

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CMH’S DIVERSITY, INCLUSION, AND EQUITY TASKFORCE

By Zelpha N. Anderson and Anthony J. “AJ” Cade II

The U.S. Army Center of Military History (CMH), like many historical organizations, has been affected by a lack of diversity, equity, and inclusion for some time now. To correct this deficiency, CMH has started a taskforce geared toward addressing these issues within our organization, our products and services, and the hierarchy of CMH. Cochaired by Zelpha N. Anderson and Anthony J. “AJ” Cade II, the Diversity, Inclusion, and Equity Taskforce (DIET) is the latest initiative launched by CMH to demonstrate how serious the organization is about promoting equity both within its workforce and within the field of military history. By taking steps to make our own workforce more diverse, inclusive, and equitable, we can ensure that the work we do at CMH reflects the historical experiences of the entire U.S. Army—including those whose voices traditionally have not been heard.

The DIET is built on the back of an earlier diversity initiative at CMH. Between 2019 and 2021, Cade visited twenty-three historically Black colleges and universities as well as others with diverse populations to discuss the field of military history, how to get into graduate school, employment within CMH, and the employee pipeline that CMH created to recruit highly talented individuals for the federal government within the historical field. This outreach directly led to CMH hiring five undergraduate interns from several of the universities Cade visited, and those interns—through their own efforts—have garnered stellar reports and demonstrated the success of the program. CMH plans to hire more interns on a yearly basis to ensure we continue to attract motivated future historians toward equitable results for all within CMH. As part of this training, the board members of the program will watch a series of videos, gathered from various universities and other inclusion programs, which are meant to foster ideas of diversity and inclusion within their respective directorates. These videos will be on the CMH SharePoint website, available to all employees. Furthermore, the DIET will record a series of video messages regarding the importance of equity and inclusion. These videos will also be posted on the CMH website in the hopes that they will generate new ideas within the workforce. There will be multiple levels of training for nearly all members involved, and that will aid the organization in preparing for the next steps the DIET has planned for CMH. We understand it will take a few years to create effective change across all of CMH, and the DIET is prepared to do what is necessary to ensure the programs, services, and workforce of CMH are equitable for all involved.

As a new program within CMH, the DIET initiative has room to grow. A tasking order, TASKORD 055–21, was sent out to all CMH employees on 17 September 2021 requesting volunteers for the DIET. The taskforce, still under construction, already features some of the brightest minds within CMH. With twenty-one members, two chairs, and more room to grow, the taskforce represents nearly every directorate within CMH. These members will meet in January 2022 to discuss the future of diversity, inclusion, and equity at CMH. CMH employees who have ideas to share with the board are encouraged to contact their representative and make their voices heard. To find out who your representative is, or to volunteer for the board, contact the taskforce chairs, AJ Cade and Zelpha Anderson.

Like any good military organization, one of the first things the DIET program will do is train. The Center is currently exploring options to send Anderson and Cade for formal training in an effort to ensure that they will have the knowledge and the skills necessary to lead the DIET toward equitable results for all within CMH. As part of this training, the board members of the program will watch a series of videos, gathered from various universities and other inclusion programs, which are meant to foster ideas of diversity and inclusion within their respective directorates. These videos will be on the CMH SharePoint website, available to all employees. Furthermore, the DIET will record a series of video messages regarding the importance of equity and inclusion. These videos will also be posted on the CMH website in the hopes that they will generate new ideas within the workforce. There will be multiple levels of training for nearly all members involved, and that will aid the organization in preparing for the next steps the DIET has planned for CMH. We understand it will take a few years to create effective change across all of CMH, and the DIET is prepared to do what is necessary to ensure the programs, services, and workforce of CMH are equitable for all involved.

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Zelpha N. Anderson is a U.S. Army veteran, and she has served as the chief of visitor services for the National Museum of the United States Army since September 2017. Her educational background includes a bachelor’s degree in finance and legal studies, a master’s of business administration, and a master’s degree in management and leadership.

Anthony J. “AJ” Cade II is a retired U.S. marine, a PhD candidate at George Washington University, and a historian with the U.S. Army Center of Military History. He has two master’s degrees in American and military history, and his dissertation focuses on the Louisiana Native Guards and their effect on the American Civil War and Southern history.