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Center Symposium

"The Second Indochina War"

This November's symposium on the Second Indochina War, held at Airlie House near Warrenton, Virginia, is a new departure for the Center of Military History. Aware that its Vietnam book-publishing series is the largest project of its kind in the country, the Center has arranged to supplement the series by bringing together what is hoped will be the most significant assemblage to date of both private and public researchers of the war. The spirit animating the meeting is one of inquiry in which scholars can reexamine and reinterpret the major issues of the conflict. Specifically, participants consider how and why the United States became involved in Vietnam, how the United States and its allies fought the war, and the immediate effects of the war on the United States Army and on American foreign policy.

The question of how and why the United States got involved in Vietnam is one that still excites and divides scholars. Existing interpretations of the genesis of this involvement extend from the broadest to the most narrow, proposing causes that range from the more remote to the most proximate. In the first category, explanations see American involvement as the product of "real-politik" as expressed in the policy of containment, and as the inevitable result of the possession of immense power by the United States. More immediate causal theories emphasize the imperatives of domestic politics, the inherent tendency of decision makers to place excessive faith in the efficacy of power, America's misperception of Vietnam as another western nation, and her misunderstanding of the motives of the Vietnamese. All of these views and others, individually and in combination, figure into the presentations and discussions.

Widely divergent opinions also persist over the military strategy pursued in Vietnam. These, too, are explored. One major issue speaks to the general nature of the war, questioning whether it

was indeed the insurgency the United States assumed it was at the time, or whether North Vietnam planned a conventional war, using the southern guerrillas merely as a diversion. A further set of issues addresses the manner in which allied forces were employed. Some argue that allied military power was misused to signal our desires for negotiation, rather than as an instrument for defeating the enemy. Restrictions on the use of military power figure prominently in these arguments. Others, particularly among those who fought the war, point to an absence of clear political objectives that rendered futile the efforts to devise an effective strategy. Further, many questions remain concerning Vietnamization: the seriousness with which American decision makers viewed it, the possibility of its success, and the reasonableness of expecting the South Vietnamese to shoulder such a burden successfully. There even remains disagreement as to whether or not it actually did work. Finally, there is the overarching question of what went wrong (or, indeed, whether anything went wrong). One school of thought highlights the series of blunders purported to have spelled defeat for the anticom-



Airlie House, site of the Symposium.

munist forces. Another suggests that, on the contrary, the American decision-making system produced as it was supposed to. The symposium is designed to shine new light on these nagging but important issues.

A third set of questions looks at the immediate results of the war. One issue of interest to Army historians is the conflict's impact on the United States Army. Near the war's end and on into the seventies, the Army experienced an "identity crisis" which, in the view of some, greatly impaired its effectiveness. The degree to which this degradation resulted from Vietnam rather than from general societal developments remains a subject for inquiry. A further issue centers around the all-volunteer Army. The draft ended just as American participation in the war was winding down, and the resultant all-volunteer Army must be counted among the effects of Viet-

nam. The absence of conscription has had a pervasive impact on the Army and must be included in any post-mortem on the war.

Vietnam's effect on American foreign policy is also open for reinterpretation. To what degree did the Southeast Asian experience alter America's approach to the rest of the world? Did the United States abandon its policy of containment or did it only shelve it temporarily? Did America's tarnished image impair its ability in the seventies to project its power and achieve satisfactory negotiations in other areas?

There are many other war-related, post-war issues. Since many of these have yet to play themselves out, however, the symposium on the Second Indochina War confines itself to the immediate post-war period, and does not venture into issues tilted principally toward speculation about the future.

Editor's Journal

As this issue goes to press, the Center is preparing for its symposium on the Second Indochina War at Airlie House in Virginia. Our cover story provides details on that event, and our "Professional Reading" section gives a comprehensive summary of the Center's U.S. Army in Vietnam Series.

Although concentrated on what is one of the Center's principal writing efforts, this issue provides useful advice from a nineteenth-century colonel on the use of military history in planning and from a twentieth-century four-star general on producing articles for publication. In the "Perspective" section, the Center's Chief Historian provides some cogent insights on new approaches to the study and writing of military history. We are beginning to feature more items on the Army's field historical programs, including this time the views of a past director of combat developments on contributions historians can make to the Army's future.

The Army Historian is developing into more of a forum for the views of Army historians and others on how military history can best work for the Army. The Commentary and Exchange section is already bringing in some useful ideas. The publication will also provide space for announcing new Center publications and reprints as they appear.

The masthead of this issue will be the last to list Brig. Gen. Douglas Kinnard as Chief of Military History. Announcement of his departure is made in the Chief's Bulletin. *The Army Historian* was

General Kinnard's brainchild, and he presided over its growth throughout each of its issues. We will try to maintain the standards he set for us.

The ARMY HISTORIAN

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CHIEF'S BULLETIN

Douglas Kinnard

In the last Chief's Bulletin, I promised to discuss future directions we might take to meet the Army's historical needs. Since then we have initiated a systematic analysis of all aspects of the Center's publication program within the context of our future directions. It is all well and good to have able and dedicated historians and administrators at the Center planning to provide what it appears the Army will require in the years to come, but they cannot and should not operate in a vacuum isolated from equally able and dedicated people in the field. Under its basic governing regulation, AR 870-5, "Military History: Responsibilities, Policies, and Procedures," the Center compiles both a Long-Range Historical Plan, projecting publications over a ten-year period, and an annual administrative statement of Army historical activities. Although recipients of these two documents have always been invited to submit comments, few have expressed their ideas on the goals outlined in either report. Perhaps the professionals outside the Center have felt that their comments and suggestions would not receive serious treatment. If that perception has in the past had any basis in fact, the facts are now changed. Rather than continue to await such comments, I have chosen actively to search out views on the Center's activities and embark on what we have dubbed PROJECT INNOVATION. My guidance to those tasked has been very specific: Do not assume the current program inviolable, let the Center worry about impact upon personnel resources, and give serious consideration to every innovative idea proposed. Above all, listen. The professionals in the field, and not we, have their fingers closest to the pulses of their institutions and commands.

To date, we have dispatched representatives to teachers and program officers at three major history "cells" in the Army: the War College, the Command and General Staff College, and the Military Academy. We are also in the process of talking with many current and former visiting professors of military history at these institutions. Personal contacts and correspondence with center/school and command historians will follow. Response has been gratifying and substantive, confirming our judgment that we need to involve the field in our efforts to provide depth to the Center's new directions.

As we suspected, this open-ended approach opened a virtual Pandora's Box of innovation, for all aspects of the Center's activities are linked to our publications program. It follows that almost any new idea in almost any area invariably involves the publications plan. So far, the innovations those professionals we contacted suggested have fallen into four major categories: modification of our existing publications series; directions for our new Army Historian series of publications; the future of this publication, *The Army Historian*; and an enhanced Center role within the Army's military history community.

In general, those with whom we spoke in the field consider the World War II, Korean War, and Vietnam series to be our "bread and butter," what the Center has done so admirably in the past and what it must continue to do well in the future. They want us, however, to consider some additions to the various series, such as a concluding strategy volume for the Pacific Theatre in World War II, a Korean War logistics volume, and a history of Army aviation in Vietnam. They are also suggesting more volumes following the format of our enormously popular World War II *Command Decisions*, which they would have treat the subject in both war and peace.

The second of our field conversants' general areas of concentration, The Army Historian series of publications, is one the Center established to enhance military history education in the Army, primarily as an outlet for manuscripts from outside the Center worthy of publication. The aim of the series has been to reach the uniformed officer in mid-career level, the professional soldier generally outside the Army's school system. A Military Academy history instructor expressed the view that "officers are interested in history they think they can use." We should aim to provide this important segment of the officer corps with readable, usable history that not only creates historical mindedness for problem-solving, but a desire to read history for its own sake. The possibility of having established scholars write interpretative historical studies on such subjects as strategy, doctrine, training, and leadership was one frequently mentioned, as was the possibility of well-written studies on such common military experiences as combat and biographies of successful military leaders. We have already begun consideration of reprints of entire out-of-print military classics for the series. Comments from the field suggest that editing selective excerpts from the classics with inter-

pretative introductory essays might be a better approach for our target readership. Also proposed were selected and annotated bibliographies on American military history subjects and a revision to our *Guide to the Study and Use of Military History*, both aimed at the serving mid-career officer rather than at the graduate student.

I am delighted that so many in the field have expressed enthusiasm for this periodical, *The Army Historian*. The clear consensus thus far is that our future coverage should address the uniformed and civilian historians involved in the Army's historical programs. They see it as both a newsletter and a journal, providing information on current historical programs throughout the Army as well as a forum for opinion and discussion. Those we spoke with believe that presenting more of the periodical's practical, "how to" articles will be of benefit to all. Interest was also strong in future bibliographic articles on recent military history scholarship. In short, *The Army Historian* should serve as a "working journal" for all professionals involved in the Army's military history program.

The suggestions on an enhanced role for the Center within the Army's military history community touched upon a question for which we have yet to settle upon an answer satisfactory to all. There has been a spectacular growth in the number of both uniformed and civilian military history scholars over the past decade, and although I have sensed a need for cooperative coordination, I had not made a final decision on what role the Center should play. Responses from the field indicate that the Center should adopt a "mentor" role, one that does not proceed from inherited paternal rights, but rather from genuine personal concern. It is clear that there are differences between uniformed and civilian professional historians, but the suggestions we have heard also indicate a host of shared professional development concerns. Both groups go through similar career phases—entry, development, and contributive. The ideas advanced suggest steps the Center can take to assist in such areas as counseling on dissertation and postgraduate research, encouraging professional development meetings, publishing individual research projects, and establishing exchange programs between the Center and the field.

The range and originality of the ideas offered during our talks—and I have only mentioned a few—were truly remarkable. A great, largely untapped resource has been opened to us. It had really always been there; it awaited only an energetic search. Our initial efforts, together with

the enthusiasm and honest concern of our conversants, has already brought many significant suggestions that can substantially influence the Center's new directions.

We designed the first phase of PROJECT INNOVATION to solicit ideas from an important segment of the field on our own initiative. In the next step, currently underway, we are taking a hard look at the recommendations we have been given, comparing them to our current long-range and annual plans, weighing the suggestions against our assets. Working on the basis of this review, the next step will be to establish a standard procedure the field can employ to continue to contribute innovative ideas for the Center's future directions. While this process is working itself out, I hope that the field will not wait for us to call. We are establishing PROJECT INNOVATION as a continuing activity within our Research and Analysis Division, and I urge all interested professionals to advance their ideas to that division at the U.S. Army Center of Military History, ATTN: DAMH-RAA, 20 Massachusetts Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20314-0200.

On a personal note, I would like to pass on to the readers of *The Army Historian* an announcement I delivered to members of the Center of Military History on September 28, 1984:

At the conclusion of today's meeting of the Historical Advisory Committee, I read the following extracts from a letter of August 8, 1984, to the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army:

General John A. Wickham, Jr.
Chief of Staff, United States Army

Dear John,

The purpose of this letter is to provide advance notice of my decision to resign as Chief of Military History in mid-November shortly after our Vietnam Symposium. The major reason for my leaving this important and interesting position is to pursue a full-time writing career, beginning with the Maxwell Taylor book.

* * *

It has been a great privilege to return to the Army which I first joined at West Point on July 1, 1941, and to help give its history program 'new directions' and momentum. The support of the Secretary and yourself, as well as Max Thurman and Fred Mahaffey, has been superb. The dividends will accrue in the future to the institution to which we are all dedicated.

With Warm Regard,

Doug

Actions are currently underway to choose my successor. It is hoped that by the next issue of *The Army Historian* the new Chief of Military History will be writing this bulletin.

THE COMMANDER AND MILITARY HISTORY

The Army Historian and Combat Developments

James R. Paschall

Within the last few years, the Army has established and manned an austere but comprehensive military history organization. Particularly in the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), it has a great potential to serve the Army in achieving intelligent, thoughtful change. The most immediate way for the historian to influence the Army's future is to contribute to the combat developments process. Although this is currently in progress, here are a few tips that may be helpful to the historian and several suggestions that could aid him in the effort.

What the Combat Developer Does

The historian is of little use in the combat developments process unless he understands what the combat developer does. The combat developer has several functions: concepts and studies, organization and personnel systems, materiel and logistics, and finally, test and evaluation. In a very basic sense, concepts produce doctrine. Usually, the combat developer takes the basic Army concept, AirLand Battle, and writes the supporting concept for his own functional area: intelligence, artillery, communications, for example. Although he will not write the field manual for his particular functional area, that document must also produce the Tables of Organization and Equipment for the units that will accomplish the tasks derived from the concept. He must define the characteristics and performance parameters of future materiel that his organizations will employ. The combat developer also writes the test and evaluation standards that will accept or reject his new organizations and materiel systems. Finally, the combat developer is the fellow with the "blank piece of paper." Although he will receive a lot of guidance and criticism, and must jump through many bureaucratic hoops to secure approval, he is the initiator of change for most of the Army's battle functions.

History and the Combat Developer

By way of example, an examination of the use of military history within the last year at one

TRADOC center can illustrate the utility of a historian in the combat developments process. In the Summer of 1983, while I was the Special Warfare Center's Director of Combat Developments, we conducted a review of clandestine communications systems as part of a study that would point to future developments in communications. In the course of our examination, we found a small, concealable, lightweight radio that had been developed in 1943 and successfully used in 1944 and 1945. When we compared our current counterpart radio to the system of forty years ago, we found there had been considerable growth in weight and size. Launching into a sometimes acrimonious debate involving industry, the Materiel Development and Readiness Command, and the Department of the Army, we argued for a smaller, lighter set. Our argument was centered entirely upon the World War II piece of equipment. This small bit of history was convincing. We got the money and eight months later a working little gem that was one-third the weight of the current set.

At about the same time, we were tasked to recommend an optimum organization to perform a certain intelligence function. We again conducted a historical review and found that from 1942 until 1971 a number of different configurations had successfully performed the function. Team size ranged from two to thirty-six men. In this case, history failed to yield an optimum organization, but pointed in another direction. We concluded that there may be a best configuration to train with but our future doctrine had to stress the value of task organization.

Historical comparison was also useful in the conceptual field when we had to produce a concept for future command and control of Special Operations elements. Our task was to define an Army command and control arrangement for a function that is currently considered to be in the joint and unified command area. Realizing that command and control are often highly personalized, we decided to find out how two strong personalities had handled the problem in World War

II and Korea. We discovered that it was managed in two widely different ways by Mark Clark and Douglas MacArthur. We were again pointed to a flexible doctrine.

These are but three examples of how history has been useful to combat developers in the last year; there are many others. We at the Special Warfare Center had simply expanded our professional knowledge by using the experience of our predecessors. History had been used as a source of knowledge for solving military problems, what the 1977 version of AR 870-5, the Army's regulation governing the use of military history, had set as the primary Army objective for the discipline. Unfortunately, although the 1982 version of the regulation has much to say about education, art, artifacts, lineage, and honors, it says precious little about using military history in the combat developments process. Combat developers and historians are left largely to their own devices. Generally, this might have had a beneficial effect, were it not for all the other priorities imposed upon the TRADOC center and school historians, historians who in 1982 had not yet been hired.

Tips for the Historian

There are a few useful maxims for the Army historian involved in combat developments. The first is to stay out of the clutches of a director of combat developments. These people are busy, fast-moving, and practical folk who cannot afford to let the best be the enemy of the good. Their world is one of completion—protecting their functional area from those who would take people, equipment, and funds. They are constantly competing for higher priorities for their projects, battling with materiel developers and industry, and striving to produce for the soldiers they serve. The historian is far better off being of external assistance to the combat developer and not as a subordinate member of his team. It is not that the director of combat developments will distort history to support his projects, but it is probable that only a careful "selection" of examples will find their way to his briefing charts.

The second maxim is to work with the combat developer during his project; do not wait to criticize it when he presents it to the boss. You probably will lose. The combat developer is normally a well-informed officer who knows where the Army is moving. That is, after all, his job. He is usually a street fighter who has a list of ready answers for potential objections.

Know what the combat developer is working on, look up the historical record, and feed him copies of appropriate works of military history,

highlighting those sections that may be relevant experience. This is usually quick, inexpensive, and useful, particularly when his "blank piece of paper" is only partially filled in.

The final and most important maxim is simply to participate in any event. Historians often dread to stand up and be counted out of fear of professional criticism; they prefer to be the critic. In the combat developments world, the stakes are too high for this attitude. The history of our army is rich with triumphs and failures; it cannot afford to repeat the latter out of ignorance. The misuse of history is deplorable, but not to use it is all too often, and potentially, tragic.

Aid for the Historian

The Army historian needs help in contributing to the combat developments process. He badly needs comprehensive, functional indexes to the U.S. Army in World War II and the Korean War historical series. Unless he has previous insight in a particular area relevant to today's activities, he faces the task of plowing through about eighty volumes for the World War II series alone, each of which has an index burdened by place name, personality, battle, and unit references. Deleting these and compiling the remaining subject references into one or two volumes would put at the historian's fingertips the functional experience of the Army in at least two wars. It would then be possible quickly to find comprehensive references to such vital activities as ammunition storage, handling of prisoners of war, air reconnaissance, marksmanship, liaison, and a myriad of other functional areas. Such a large but simple project would at least triple the productive use of a fine historical record that is all too often ignored. Other steps to aid the historian in the combat developments area involve release from unnecessary annual writing assignments, exchange of information on projects throughout the Army, more coordination and centralization, and backup manpower, all areas which may require a change in regulations.

The Historian and the Future Army

The Army's military history system can make a positive contribution to the Army's future. The historian must understand the combat developments process and be able to deal effectively with the combat developer. But the historian needs help. Regulations should be revised and tools must be forged for his use.

Colonel Paschall is Director of the U.S. Army Military History Institute at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.

PERSPECTIVE

The "New Military History" and Army Historians

David F. Trask

The Army Historian continues here its series of guest contributions on the state of military history. Dr. Trask is Chief Historian, U.S. Army Center of Military History.

For some years practitioners of Army history have been hearing about the "new military history," a term that has been used to describe quite a number of distinct departures from tradition. Perhaps its best usage nowadays is to define the present state of the field, much removed from the situation a generation ago. In those days military history was largely the province of amateurs and buffs who lacked training. The few professionals were often "retreads" who came from other fields, usually from some facet of American domestic history, as was also the case in the realm of diplomatic history, an allied specialty. The old school, which produced many useful works, emphasized "battles and leaders"—the study of operations with an accent on what made for good leadership—an important but narrow branch of military history in the guise of political history. It was an approach often referred to pejoratively—and unfairly—as "drums and trumpets" history.

Expansion of the Field

More recently, military history has incorporated many aspects of social and economic history as well as new areas of political history, along with the associated intellectual history. Frequently turning to the social sciences for relevant concepts, methods, and data, military historians have delved into all manner of topics, such as the social history of enlisted personnel, military activities during peacetime, the organizational history of military groups, business relationships between the military establishment and private industry, and the activities of technical services. Perhaps the most advanced aspect of the new military history is the study of policy and strategy and the relationships between them, as against the operational theme characteristic of the battles-and-leaders approach.

This expansion of the field reflected a remarkable transformation in the national security situation during the twentieth century, particularly after 1939. The Age of Free Security between

1815 and 1914 obviated the need for large, well-trained, and expensive military services. For this reason the history of America's military heritage did not receive extensive attention during the years between 1880 and 1930, when the study of history became professionalized and retreated largely to colleges and universities. Thereafter, as military issues became more and more important, professional historians turned more and more frequently to investigations intended to illumine the background of novel developments that were not explicable through the study of operational history.

The recent efflorescence of military history means that the field now boasts of considerable amplitude and penetration; easily identifiable subfields have materialized in profusion. These subfields continue to attract significant numbers of graduate students who are able to pursue advanced degrees in military history, something largely unheard of prior to 1960. This growth in numbers is reflected not only in the journals of the armed services but in standard historical journals, which occasionally publish articles on military subjects. Each year fifteen to twenty doctoral candidates compete for two predoctoral fellowships sponsored by the Center of Military History.

Perils of Growth

All this growth has a dark side; recent interest in highly specialized inquiries has had a tendency to divert attention from the shape of the field as a whole. Professional historians are preternaturally drawn to inquiries that stress depth and rigor, the hallmarks of basic research in the modern era, as against the emphases of synthetic history—breadth of coverage and range of evidence. The new scholarship inevitably concentrates on a close analysis of primary sources rather than secondary authorities in order to achieve depth and rigor. This specialization, very desirable in itself, nevertheless might tend over time toward the inconsequential or the irrelevant unless a broader

conception of military history informs its manifestations. Specialties are by definition parts of the whole; they can become distorted if not treated as such. For example, modern scholars who specialize in the history of relationships between policy and strategy err if they fail to consider the operational outcomes of these prior activities. Much can be learned about the evolution of these relationships by looking into operations. Ordinarily the opposite error is easier to find, i.e., the failure of those in the battles-and-leaders school to consider the policy-strategy background to operations.

Elements of the New Military History

What follows is an attempt to comment in very general terms on the apparent shape of military history—the contours of the field that are likely to influence its devotees across the next decade and more. What generalizations summarize the parts that make up the whole of the new field as it has revealed itself during the 1960s and 1970s? This formulation is intended not to settle the question but to engage others in the discussion.

—The total process of national security affairs should constitute the central theme of modern military history. Such affairs are at the center of national activity during these troubled times. If historians take up this theme, it is possible to encompass all aspects of the new military history in their analysis; we are freed from the confining limits of conventional battles-and-leaders history.

—Given the organizing theme of national security affairs, the prime chronology for the overall study of military history should be the experience of given wars. Any war can be treated in terms of three phases—its *causes*, its *conduct*, and its *consequences*, a pattern familiar to anyone with knowledge of the field. The traditional approach suffered because it did not automatically require a study of what preceded and what followed the battles. One of the most important advantages of the modern approach is that the historian must grant full attention to periods of peace as well as martial interludes, studying interwar periods in two perspectives as either preliminaries to warfare or aftermaths.

—The prime topical considerations for the historian of national security affairs should be *policy*, *strategy*, and *operations*, all broadly construed. The term *policy* refers to larger *goals*, the objectives of the exercise of power, i.e., the political relations between nation states deemed most desirable from the home country's point of view. The term *strategy* refers to the comprehensive *plan*, the design for the use of national power

in its multiple forms. Besides military power, nations typically make use of political, economic, and even psychological forms of influence—such as alliances, export and import controls, and propaganda. The term *operations* refers to *actions*, the enterprises that fulfill the strategic design and therefore achieve national goals. Operations involve diverse organizations—the diplomatic corps, the armed forces, the intelligence services, information agencies, and economic ministries of various types, to name a few. A prime purpose of synthetic military history should be to trace the evolution of policy, strategy, and operations in their relations to each other across the arc of experience in given wars and in the overall military experience.

—Comprehensive military history must treat the evolution of all the individuals and groups that make up the national security community—enlisted personnel as well as officers, bureaucrats as well as politicians, staff as well as line, services of supply as well as combat arms. The list is interminably long, but historians who seek to develop military history so that it is competitive with other areas of history must accept the challenge. Those who want to treat the ventral as well as the dorsal aspects of the field in its political, economic, and social dimensions have no choice. History is neither useful nor entertaining without a proper parade of personalities.

—The field requires consideration of developments both within and outside the nation. The home front exerts enormous, often controlling influence on the conduct of national security affairs, whether in democratic or nondemocratic contexts. Moreover, the armed forces often embody the ideas and emotions of the whole people. To ignore the home front is to cripple historical comprehension of why things happened (causal analysis) as against what happened (descriptive analysis). In addition, military historians must concern themselves with external circumstances—the behavior of allies, enemies, and neutrals. After all, the subject matter of national security affairs is the adjustment of power relationships among nations by exerting some combination of the various forms of power to that end. Developments outside the nation, like those within, must be dealt with in order to understand causation.

—Military history in its broad form concerns all the armed services—land, sea, and air. All too often, for example, histories of the Civil War that concentrate on land operations, a perfectly legitimate emphasis in itself, ignore the contribution of naval forces to army operations.

—The new military history must give special stress to certain eternal questions of interest to its students, among which are the *technology of warfare*, in all its diverse manifestations, and the *geography of warfare*. Continuities or changes in these areas almost always exercise extraordinary influence on the national security process. Whether the nation is advantageously situated in terms of weapons and spatial location enters into practically every analysis of national security affairs. Whether other nations possess the technology needed to threaten the United States or whether geographic realities require a defensive or offensive orientation remain questions that are never far from any aspect of national security. Although other subjects might well be taken up, technology and geography are crucial to present-day concerns and are all too often given little or no attention in historical accounts.

—One substantive element of the greatest importance in understanding the overall military history of the United States is the distinction between the free security of the nineteenth century and the dangers of the twentieth century, mentioned above in another connection. After the nation confirmed its independence, a process that was completed about 1815, a hundred years of unprecedented freedom from external security concerns lay ahead. Compared to such matters as defining the nation's political system, expanding to continental limits, and developing the economy, very little attention had to be devoted to the question of national security. The armed forces, incredibly small and barely professional in many ways, dedicated themselves mostly to peacetime missions—the navy to protection of commerce and the army to policing the frontier. War was deemed unlikely and in any event not very dangerous. The only great American war during the nineteenth century was a civil conflict. The bilateral wars, all limited, were incidental to a search for coveted territories and hemisphere defense. Why was this the case? Free security derived from the absence of any serious threat to the nation emanating from the powerful nations of Eurasia. The generally stable international balance of power that persisted between 1815 and 1914 minimized the possibility of Eurasian projects aimed at the New World. By contrast, the breakdown of the Eurasian balance associated with the two World Wars of this century generated dangerous threats to American security. In response the United States developed a huge and highly professional military establishment that concentrated on wartime missions—de-

fense against potential aggressors and offensive operations within a general pattern of strategic defense against hegemonizing powers in Eurasia, notably Germany, Japan, and Russia.

—Finally, another substantive concern, one essential to an understanding of developments on the home front that influence national security affairs, is much more familiar to generalist students of American history than the geopolitical circumstances just discussed—the evolution of the United States from a small and powerless agricultural nation committed mostly to agrarian social patterns to a large and powerful industrial nation committed mostly to urban social patterns. Unlike most other specialists, students of the nation's military past have given far too little attention to the consequences of this elemental reality, perhaps a leading reason why the study of the home front does not loom sufficiently large in most analyses of national security affairs.

The Future of Military History

What precedes is a tall order indeed, but no one promised military historians a lesser burden. We deal with conditions, not theories. The generalizations above reflect the present diversity of the field—the scope of the concerns that influence most of the new military historians. The future of military history, whether in its official or private guise, depends on how well military historians during the 1980s and 1990s practice the new forms of the subject now plainly visible and awaiting exploitation.

Two final observations seem appropriate by way of conclusion. One is that the foregoing commentary should not be viewed as a plea for an emphasis on broader historical studies as against specialization. The premise of this commentary is that specialists must conduct their studies with a continual eye on the overall context. Broad studies and monographic subjects are complementary, not competitive. A second is that these thoughts ought to be of special interest to those involved in introductory courses in military history, notably ROTC instructors. Such courses serve as a broad introduction to further studies in depth.

If official historians and their academic coadjutors cultivate a broad conception of the field, it will help to counter manifestations of provincialism that in present circumstances might endanger effectiveness. Scholarly energies, which can be taken for granted within the community of Army historians, might not serve the nation un-

less bathed in the restorative waters of cosmopolitanism. For historians of national security affairs, the outcomes of specialized studies might turn out badly unless developed in a humane framework of sufficient breadth. Those inter-

ested in battles and leaders can surely retain their specialty, but like students who treat subfields, their prospects remain modest unless they give due consideration to the outlines of the broader field.

AT THE CENTER

DAHAC Meeting

On September 28, the Department of the Army Historical Advisory Committee (DAHAC) conducted in Washington its thirty-ninth annual meeting. Early in the meeting the Chief of Military History and his staff briefed the committee on the implementation of the Center's new directions, with presentations on the Center's future publication program, the Center's role in the command history program, its enhanced analysis function, plans for automation, and progress toward construction of the National Museum of the U.S. Army. After reviewing Center accomplishments during the last year and a half, the committee concluded that a great deal had been done to fulfill the directives of the Secretary of the Army's March 1983 letter of instruction to the Chief of Military History, and commended the Chief and the Center's staff on their efforts.

Army-Air Force Exchange

The Center and the Office of Air Force History are embarking upon a pilot program to exchange selected historians for special limited-term projects. The first exchange will involve one Air Force and one Army historian and will be of two months duration, probably January and February 1985. The Air Force historian will be providing expertise on the use of air support during ground operations for an Analysis Branch study on the Army's AirLand Battle doctrine. Aside from the obvious benefits in broadened perspective for each historical activity, the exchange will benefit the historians involved by giving them experience with a brother historical office.

Dissertation Year Fellowships

The Center is offering two "Dissertation Year Fellowships" for the 1985-1986 academic year. The purpose is to stimulate scholarly research and writing among qualified civilian graduate students preparing dissertations in American military history, especially U.S. Army history. Each fellowship awarded carries a \$5,000 stipend and access to the Center's facilities and technical expertise. Information and applications may be

obtained from college and university history departments or from the Chief Historian, U.S. Army Center of Military History, 20 Massachusetts Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20314-0200, telephone number (202) 272-0293.

Research Chair

Funding for the two-year research chair at the Center detailed in last issue's Chief's Bulletin is now in place. The Center has begun its search for qualified candidates by contacting all the major university and college history departments in the country. An official announcement and information on application procedures can be obtained by writing to B. D. Hardcastle, ZDA, U.S. Army Center of Military History, 20 Massachusetts Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20314-0200.

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PRACTICING THE HISTORIAN'S CRAFT

"The Best School"

In 1894, Col. Arthur L. Wagner, a protege of Emory Upton, published his Organization and Tactics, a volume representing the culmination of American military thought in the nineteenth century. The book went through several editions, and served as a basic instructional reading at Fort Leavenworth and the U.S. Infantry and Cavalry School until the appearance of the Field Service Regulation in 1905. What follows is an excerpt from the preface to Wagner's first edition. The views he expresses on the utility of military history to planning are still timely.

The best school for acquiring a knowledge of organization and tactics is that furnished by actual experience in war. If a nation were constantly engaged in hostilities, it could always find qualified military leaders among its many veterans, who, having passed through the test of camp, siege, and battle, and having served in all grades, under all circumstances, could readily derive from their own experience a guide by which to shape their action in any contingency that might arise. Fortunately for the happiness of the human race, schools of perpetual warfare do not exist; but, as war is an occurrence to which all nations are subject, as the duration of the longest conflict is but a brief period in the life of an actor therein, as the intervals of peace are so long that the participators in one war are, if living, generally only superannuated observers of the next, it follows that if an officer would prepare himself to be of service to his country, he must attentively consider the recorded experience of those who have learned war from the actual reality, and must accumulate by reading and reflection a fund of military knowledge based upon the experience of others. Any work on the art of war must, to be of value, be based primarily upon actual facts; and, to be worthy of attention, its theories must be logical deductions from experience gained on the field of battle.

In this work, the author has sought to give historical illustrations and examples as vouchers, so to speak, for the soundness of his premises or for the correctness of his assertions. Where changes in arms and equipments have brought into existence conditions as yet untried in war, he has endeavored to collect and to weigh carefully the opinions of the best military authorities of both hemispheres, and to adopt such views as seem to him to be the logical outcome of the

stated conditions. But, as every war has its surprises, and every conflict brings forth something as yet unforeseen, it must be admitted that any theory as to the tactics to be employed under the new conditions of war may possibly be demolished in the very next collision of armed forces. Only those tactical methods which are based on actual experience, and which may be used again under the same or very similar conditions, can be advocated with confidence.

If armies were always composed of men having the same physical and moral qualities, the same arms and equipments, the same animating impulses, and the same degree of discipline; and if then the operations were always conducted in the same theater, and the battles were always fought on the same terrain, rules might be confidently prescribed for the conduct of all military operations, and war would become almost an exact science. But the conditions vary in nearly every respect; no two battles are fought in the same way; and the most carefully matured plans have to be quickly altered to meet new and unforeseen circumstances. Human nature alone remains the same; all else is subject to many and great alterations. For this reason, the caution will often be found in the following pages, that the line of conduct to be adopted will depend upon the circumstances of the action and the nature of the terrain. No fear of criticism for this frequent repetition is entertained; the only anxiety in this regard is that the caution may not have been repeated often enough.

It may be asked then, What is the use of prescribing "normal formations," since everything is, after all, dependent upon the circumstances of each case? The answer is simple: They furnish a standard, in the main correct, from which an officer in action can vary according to the condi-

tions presented, and they do not leave him altogether without a guide. They furnish a basis upon which a commander may construct his own formations; and their value depends upon the indisputable fact that it is much more difficult to create a system in the turmoil of conflict than it is to alter and adapt to circumstances a system

already existing, and suited to many conditions, though far from being applicable to all.

Our best military lessons must be sought in the history of wars that were fought under conditions most similar to those likely to be encountered by us in the near future.

Writing for Publication

Bruce C. Clarke

When I recently talked to the Infantry School faculty and class at Fort Benning, Georgia, I asked how many had ever written anything for a military publication. The response was two out of six hundred. Why so few? I believe many lack confidence. They do not want to be turned down. They think no one would be interested. They have never been taught the mechanics of putting together an article.

Are the demands for producing a manuscript too great? How many of our schools teach anything on how to write or how to make a speech? Both are important to an officer training troops, making a report to a higher commander, or simply selling his ideas. The following hints on how to produce articles suitable for publication are adopted from a piece I did for *New Age Magazine*:

The writer contributes most who takes the least amount of reader's time. Keep it simple, direct, clear. Less is often more! Each of us has much to share through writing which is a most effective means to distribute our ideas to many. As the poet Byron wrote:

Words are things; and a small
drop of ink,
Falling, like dew, upon a
thought produces
That which makes thousands,
perhaps millions, think.

Despite the requirements for proper word usage, rules of grammar, proper spelling, and producing interesting sentence structure, writing is not difficult. By following some simple guidelines and taking the time to plan your composition carefully, you will not only cause others to think but will derive much personal satisfaction.

The process begins with an idea. As the idea is clarified in your mind, supporting material

should be gathered, arranged, and written in such a way that your thoughts will hold the attention of the readers, guiding them from your introduction to your conclusion.

The following eight steps lead to three qualities of worthwhile writing—unity, coherence, and emphasis:

First, select a subject. Choose something to write about, if you have a choice, something you have an urge to tell someone. If you are assigned a subject, learn all you can about it before you start.

Second, think of your reader. Select a person in your mind to whom you want to tell your story. As you write, address your thoughts to your reader in a way easily understood and followed.

Third, make a list of all facts. List the facts and points you want to cover, and select the key points you want to stress.

Fourth, make an outline. Arrange your points and facts into a list of topics in a chronological or other logical order that introduces your story, tells it, and ends it with a strong conclusion.

Fifth, prepare a draft. Write a paragraph about each topic. Read it through. Is it roughly what you want to say? Does it relate to the main idea? Do your thoughts flow smoothly?

Sixth, rewrite it! Check for spelling, sentence structure, grammar, punctuation, and capitalization. You may wish to do some rearranging the second time over.

Seventh, rewrite and refine your ideas. Repeat one or more times until you are satisfied and think your selected reader will benefit from it. Are you now enthusiastic about the piece?

And finally, submit it for publication and enjoy the fruits of your labor.

Retired General Clarke's last tour of active duty was as Commander in Chief, U.S. Army, Europe.

PROFESSIONAL READING

The U.S. Army in Vietnam Series

The position of the Center of Military History's U.S. Army in Vietnam Series as the country's most extensive research and writing project on Vietnam reflects the Army's preeminent role in the war. Not only did the Army bear the largest share of the combat in Vietnam, but Army leadership played an important role in determining United States policy and strategy in the conflict.

Even before the build-up of American forces early in 1965, Army historians were preparing unpublished historical studies on events in Vietnam. When planning for the Army's official history of the war began in 1966, few could have foreseen that the American combat role would last until 1973.

The Army's Vietnam histories were intended to do what official histories since World War II have done best: provide early, authoritative historical accounts before the comprehensive release of official documents to outside scholars. The U.S. Army in World War II series titles, the celebrated "green books," began appearing shortly after that war. Vietnam, however, was not World War II, and the problems of a different kind of war brought the problems of a different kind of history. Army historians found that documents were not as readily available to them as they had been to their predecessors after World War II. Victory excuses a thousand disasters, and General Eisenhower's liberal attitude on access to classified documentation opened almost the entire record to Army historians shortly after the global conflict. Nor, for obvious reasons, were the records of America's enemies and South Vietnamese allies available the way allied and enemy records were available after World War II. The war in Vietnam also lacked the conventional characteristics for which scholars in the World War II tradition were trained, having been a conflict without fixed fronts or set battles. Spotty record keeping reflected the patchwork quilt of the embattled countryside. Recognizing these difficulties that obstructed the production of fully developed histories immediately after the war, the Army first published a variety of specialized studies that preceded the principal official histories of the war.

The Center of Military History's U.S. Army in Vietnam Series is now well underway, with

significant resources and ever-increasing access to documents. One volume has been published and is already stimulating new research and reinterpretation. Five are scheduled for publication within the next two years, and the rest are slated to appear between then and 1991.

The following summary of the U.S. Army in Vietnam Series groups the volumes under topical headings and, where appropriate, treats the books chronologically according to periods covered. Publication dates do not necessarily follow the periodization. Following the summary is a chronology by year of the current publication schedule, to which the vagaries of editorial and printing schedules may bring future changes.

Advice and Support

Three separately authored *Advice and Support* volumes treat the Army's military advice and assistance efforts in Vietnam. The first of these, Ronald H. Spector's *The Early Years, 1941-1960*, has already been published. From an examination of the activities of the U.S. Army in Vietnam during World War II, *The Early Years* moves on to describe and evaluate advice and assistance to the French government during the immediate postwar years and the advisory program that developed after the Geneva Agreements of 1954. The scope of this study, like that of the volumes to follow on advice and support, ranges from high-level policy decisions to low-echelon advisory operations in the field, presented against a background of relevant military and political developments. Praised in reviews in such diverse journals as *Army Magazine*, *The New Republic*, *Parameters*, and *Choice*, *The Early Years* is an indication of the level of scholarship the series is expected to sustain.

The second chronologically of the *Advice and Support* volumes, Vincent H. Demma's *The Middle Years, 1960-1965*, covers the substantial increase in American support at the start of the Kennedy administration in early 1961, culminating in the decision for major commitment of American ground combat troops early in 1965. It also treats relevant events in Indochina outside Vietnam, particularly in Laos, during the same period.

Jeffrey J. Clarke's *The Final Years, 1965-1973* completes the *Advice and Support* volumes with

coverage of the U.S. Army's advisory and support roles in Vietnam from the introduction of major U.S. combat forces in 1965 to withdrawal in 1973. It concentrates on the role of the U.S. Army in the growth, training, and operations of the Republic of Vietnam armed forces, and analyzes the U.S. Army's contribution to Vietnamization.

Combat Operations

Four of the series' volumes deal specifically with U.S. Army combat operations in Vietnam. In each, although the emphasis is on U.S. Army units, sufficient attention is paid to operations of other ground and air forces to put the Army's ground operations in perspective. The first chronologically, Alexander S. Cochran's volume covering the period from March 1965 to September 1966, begins with the introduction of the U.S. combat troops and describes the build-up and "fire brigade" phases of the war to the fall of 1966 and the beginning of large-scale, sustained operations. Discussed are the strategy, tactics, weapons and equipment, command relationships, establishment of bases, and other operational matters during the build-up phase, aspects examined for different periods in each of the other volumes, as well.

George L. MacGarrigle's two volumes on the periods October 1966 to October 1967 and November 1967 to October 1968 begin where the first of the combat operations volumes leaves off. Continuing to a point when the scale of U.S. operations decreased and the decision was made to begin withdrawal of U.S. troops, the volumes cover both U.S. and enemy offensives, including the Tet offensive of 1968 and its aftermath. These volumes deal with the expansion of U.S. Army operations into the I Corps and IV Corps tactical zones and the increasing importance of South Vietnamese forces in strategy and operations.

Jeffrey Clarke's volume on the period from November 1968 to March 1973 examines the developments of a span of years marked by a gradual winding down of U.S. Army combat operations, culminating in the withdrawal of the last American combat units from Vietnam.

Pacification

Two volumes by Richard A. Hunt, *Pacification: Managing the Other War, 1960-1969* and *The Struggle for the Villages, 1969-1973*, cover the changing role of the U.S. Army in pacification as America began large-scale commitment and beyond. The books examine all major issues associated with pacification, including enemy military and political strategy and goals, the

structure of rural South Vietnam, the Phoenix Program, Regional and Popular Forces, and refugees. They describe the evolution of command and organizational arrangements through the establishment of the Office of Civil Operations and Civil Operations Revolutionary Development Support; the role of pacification in overall policy and strategy; pacification plans and operations at various echelons of commands; and the development of pacification doctrine, techniques, and programs.

Special Areas

Current plans call for seven volumes on various other important aspects of the Vietnam conflict, three of which are nearing publication. Lt. Col. John D. Bergen's *The Development of Army Communications in Southeast Asia* covers the U.S. Army's role in the build-up and operation of military communications in the region, stressing the importance of technological developments. It describes the expansion of Army communications and electronics in the Philippines, Taiwan, Okinawa, Japan, and Hawaii, and the impact of associated technology upon intelligence, logistics, and operations.

William M. Hammond is devoting two *Military and the Media* volumes to a particularly controversial topic, one tome covering the period from 1962 to 1968 and the other the period from 1968 to 1972. The volumes deal with the evolution and formation of military information policy for the Vietnam war, including the origins and growth of the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) information apparatus and its implementation of U.S. policy, and the role of the news media. The effect of the nature of the war and of its setting upon the Army's role in public information is an important topic of consideration, as is the Army's method of handling members of the news media and reporters' reactions. Particular attention is paid to the treatment of major, often controversial issues, such as the suitability of the M-16 rifle, the Tet offensive, and morale and discipline problems.

A volume by Lt. Col. Adrian G. Traas, *Engineer Operations in Southeast Asia*, covers U.S. Army Corps of Engineers activities in support of military operations in the region, paying particular attention to base development, lines of communication, and combat support. Joel D. Meyerson's *Logistics in the Vietnam Conflict* treats a crucial aspect of the American effort, consolidating material on Continental U.S. and theater-level logistical operations. A projected volume entitled *The War and the American*

Soldier deals with the effect of the conflict on the people who made up the U.S. Army.

Jeffrey Greenhut's *Medical Service Support in Southeast Asia* covers the administrative and logistical aspects of the U.S. Army Medical Department's role in the war, with emphasis on South Vietnam. While concentrating on the period of major American commitment, it also provides background coverage of the early years.

Capstone and Pictorial Supplement

Graham A. Cosmas' *MACV: The Joint Command* provides the capstone for the series. The volume concentrates on the Military Assistance Command's commander and his use of U.S. Army forces as the major component of his command to achieve goals specified by directives and policy from higher headquarters and the U.S. government. It describes U.S. objectives, policies, and strategy, and gives broad treatment to combat, advisory, logistical, pacification, and related operations. Primarily covering the period from 1965 to 1973, the volume provides background preceding major U.S. commitment in early 1965.

Joel Meyerson's *Photographic History: Images of a Lengthy War* provides a graphic supplement to the series. Covering with pictures and a brief narrative all aspects of American activity in Vietnam from 1945 to 1973, it depicts combat operations, base development, training, deployments, equipment and weapons, construction, aviation, the enemy, the environment, pacification, Vietnamization, and withdrawal operations.

Publication Schedule

As it stands now, then, the schedule of publication for the U.S. Army in Vietnam Series is as follows:

- 1985: *Photographic History: Images of a Lengthy War.*
The Development of Army Communications in Southeast Asia.
- 1986: *The Military and the Media, 1962-1968.*
Advice and Support: The Final Years, 1965-1973.
Pacification: Managing the Other War, 1960-1969.
- 1987: *Combat Operations, October 1966-October 1967.*
- 1989: *Medical Service Support in Southeast Asia*
Advice and Support: The Middle Years, 1960-1965.
- 1990: *Logistics in the Vietnam Conflict.*
MACV: The Joint Command.
Combat Operations, November 1968-March 1973.
The Military and the Media, 1968-1973.
- 1991: *Engineer Operations in Southeast Asia.*
Combat Operations, March 1965-September 1966.
Combat Operations, November 1967-October 1968.
Pacification: The Struggle for the Villages, 1969-1973.
The War and the American Soldier.

Announcement of the volumes' publication will be made in *The Army Historian* as they appear in print.

B.D.H.

COMMENTARY AND EXCHANGE

To the editors:

Colonel Stofft's comments on Army and Air Force Exchange Service bookstore operations (Professional Reading section, Summer 1984) piqued my interest. Basically, I couldn't agree with him more regarding the steps to ensure that our AAFES-operated bookstores support academic programs in Army schools. Fort Leavenworth is a prime example of the kind of results that can be achieved when our bookstore management works closely with post and Army school representatives. This same level of support can be provided to other posts or schools using Colonel Stofft's four-point program: determine what books are needed; ensure they are available in the library; request bookstores stock and display them; and encourage their purchase.

From where I sit in AAFES, Colonel Stofft's latter point is the most salient regarding our ability to respond to your demands. Our bookstores are not libraries; thus the products in them must sell. But if we

work closely together to complement academic programs with readily available reading support material in AAFES bookstores, our relationship should be long lasting and mutually beneficial.

BRIG. GEN. JOHN E. LONG
Deputy Commander
Army and Air Force Exchange System
Dallas, Texas

To the editors:

I noted the contrast, painted so vividly in issue no. 4, between the educational experiences in the Old Army and the frustrations of pushing military history in the New Army. Those historically conscious leaders of the Old Army had time for reflective reading; today's officers don't. Eisenhower's graduate studies under the eagle-eye of Fox Conner have been duly noted. Marshall also provides a case study of intellectual development in the pre-World War II army. Prodded by his own recognition of a lack of knowledge about the Philippine Insurrection, the "ashamed" Marshall, on

his second tour of the islands, collected all the War Department reports on the subject. Wading through these in his spare time in 1913, the future Chief of Staff studied guerrilla war, troop reactions, and officer decision making. He had the time—the time to study and to plan a staff ride of Luzon.

When did reflective reading in the army die? Probably with the mobilization of 1939–1941—under the direction of George C. Marshall. Although we can date the establishment of modern military institutions to the Root reorganization, the culture of the Old Army seemed to have survived until 1939. The bureaucratic army with its technocratic mentality evolved after 1940. Simultaneously, the historical consciousness of the officer corps declined. Do we go back to

quitting at noon? I hope these thoughts provoke some more discussion of these contrasts.

CLARENCE WUNDERLIN
George C. Marshall Research Foundation
Lexington, Virginia

Readers are invited to express their opinions on this publication and its featured articles, as well as to share their experiences and views on topics relating to the study, use, and teaching of military history. Correspondence should be addressed to the Editors, The Army Historian, U.S. Army Center of Military History, 20 Massachusetts Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20314-0200.

New Paperback Reprints

New Center of Military History reprints in paperback include two World War II volumes, *Command Decisions*, edited by Kent Roberts Greenfield (CMH PUB 70-7, GPO S/N 008-029-00071-7, \$18.00), and Earl F. Ziemke's *Stalingrad to Berlin: The German Defeat in the East* (CMH PUB 30-5, GPO S/N 008-029-00005-9, \$13.00); and one volume in the Special Studies series, James E. Hewes' *From Root to McNamara: Army Organization and Administration, 1900-1963* (CMH PUB 40-1, GPO S/N 008-000-00202-9, \$15.00). The maps for this printing of *Command Decisions* are detachable, to facilitate their use as teaching tools. Of particular interest are three first Center of Military History editions, in paperback, of titles in the American Forces in Action series. *Omaha Beachhead* (CMH PUB 100-11, GPO S/N 008-029-00128-4, \$8.50) and *St. Lo* (CMH PUB 100-13, GPO S/N 008-029-00127-6, \$8.50) are now available. *Utah Beach to Cherbourg* (CMH PUB 100-12, GPO S/N 008-029-00129-2, \$12.00) will be published in November 1984.

A special military distribution of *Omaha Beach* and *St. Lo* has been made. *Utah Beach to Cher-*



bourg will be handled in the same manner. No distribution has been made of the other paperbacks mentioned above, since these reprints constituted a replenishment action. The listed and other Center of Military History publications are available to military users from the Adjutant General Publications Center, 2800 Eastern Boulevard, Baltimore, MD 21220-2896, which requires a DA Form 4569. They are also available for purchase from the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402.

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