

ARMY HISTORY

Fall 2017

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
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The Professional Bulletin of Army History



ARMY HISTORY

The Professional Bulletin of Army History

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

MARK A. MILLEY
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

Official:

GERALD B. O'KEEFE
Administrative Assistant to the
Secretary of the Army

Chief of Military History
Charles R. Bowery Jr.


Managing Editor
Bryan J. Hockensmith

Editor
William R. Scherer

Layout and Design
Michael R. Gill

Cartographer
Ramón L. Pérez David

Consulting Historian
Mark Bradley



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Issue Cover: Army Pfc. Bruce Elkus, Photo Assignment Detachment #11, 3116th Signal Service Battalion, stands on Red Beach, Iwo Jima—with Mount Suribachi looming in the background—in March 1945. /Photo courtesy of Elkus' granddaughter Marianne Ingleby

EDITOR'S JOURNAL

In this Fall 2017 issue we offer articles from two seasoned *Army History* authors. The first, by Douglas Nash—who has previously published with us a number of times, most recently in the Summer 2012 issue (No. 84) with his article “Rommel’s Lost Battalions”—looks at a lesser-known aspect of Army history with an examination of the 147th Infantry Regiment that fought alongside U.S. Marines on Iwo Jima during World War II.

The second article, by Nathan Marzoli—whose work recently graced the pages of the Fall 2016 issue (No. 101) with his piece “‘Their Loss was Necessarily Severe’: The 12th New Hampshire at Chancellorsville”—again highlights the actions of New Hampshire regiments during the Civil War, this time on Morris Island, South Carolina, and the attacks on the Confederate Battery Wagner.

This issue’s Artifact Spotlight displays the earliest known example of a buckskin hunting frock worn by a U.S. Army soldier. This garment, part of the core historical collection at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, is an excellent example of early- to mid-nineteenth century clothing from the Army’s time on the Western frontier.

In his Chief’s Corner, Mr. Charles Bowery discusses the efforts under way to increase the Center of Military History’s relevance and value to the Army. In the Chief Historian’s Footnote, Mr. Jon Hoffman details the coming implementation of the Defense Performance Management and Appraisal Program, a new system that will be used to rate all Department of Defense employees.


This issue also offers an interesting crop of new book reviews on a myriad of topics.

As always, readers are invited to submit articles for consideration, request books to review from our list of available titles (<http://www.history.army.mil/armyhitory/books.html>), and send us their constructive comments about *Army History*.

Bryan J. Hockensmith
Managing Editor



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
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"WE ARE SEEING SOMETHING OF REAL WAR NOW"

THE 3D, 4TH, AND 7TH NEW HAMPSHIRE ON MORRIS ISLAND, JULY-SEPTEMBER 1863

BY NATHAN A. MARZOLI



THE CHIEF'S CORNER

CHARLES R. BOWERY JR.

ARMY HISTORY: INCREASING RELEVANCE AND VALUE

This past May, Center of Military History (CMH) leaders held an offsite gathering on the Wilderness and Spotsylvania battlefields from the American Civil War's 1864 Overland Campaign. Woven into our discussion of senior military leadership in stressful situations was a candid dialogue on where the Center, and our larger community of Army historians, is headed. This conversation continued recently at our biennial Conference of Army Historians, attended by over one hundred members of Career Program (CP) 61. I'm also pleased to report that our capabilities—but also the challenges facing our community—are gaining the attention of Army senior leaders.

This confluence of actions and visibility is giving CMH the ability to highlight efforts to increase the relevance and value of history to the entire Army. The end state of this effort is less of a defined milestone than a condition, that of an increased "historical-mindedness" throughout the entire force. Our model for this endeavor is the continuing development of the Army Museum Enterprise, which fosters a more unified corporate identity throughout our museums. Army official historians will benefit from the same approach. In short, it is incumbent upon all Army historians, whether in the training and education base, in command and unit history offices, or in military history detachments, to seek ways to sustain or increase our relevance and value to our commands. We can do this by continuing to educate Army leaders about who we are and what we do, collaborating to revise our doctrine

and policy to make them more reflective of the current environment and communicating shared messages and priorities. In my last Chief's Corner, I made the point that a historically minded force makes better choices in complex situations. Therefore, I would submit that our role as keepers of Army history is not just a good idea, but an absolute necessity in a world in which the role of our force is ever-evolving.

Over the coming year, we will have several exciting opportunities to do this. A collaborative approach to writing the official Army histories of Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM (the Tan Books) will involve all of CP 61. We will seek your help to continue revising Army Regulations 870-5, *Military History* (2007) and 870-20, *Army Museums, Historical Artifacts, and Art* (1999). The World War I Centennial offers a unique platform from which to refocus the entire force on history and heritage. Finally, the addition of an online and virtual component of the National Museum of the United States Army, what we are calling a "Museum Without Walls," will integrate history and material culture in innovative new ways.

More to come on all of these initiatives. Let's continue to Educate, Inspire, and Preserve!



NEWSNOTES

COMING SOON FROM CMH

In the coming months, the U.S. Army Center of Military History will publish the latest addition to its U.S. Army in the Cold War series. *The City Becomes a Symbol: The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Berlin, 1945–1949*, by William Stivers and Donald A. Carter, begins in July 1945 during the opening days of the occupation of Berlin by the Allied powers. The four nations negotiated on all aspects of postwar life in the city, including troop placements, headquarters locations, food distribution, and the question of which Berliners could serve in governing the city. During the initial years of the occupation, differences emerged over policies and goals that


led to the Soviets cutting off road and rail access to the city. With no other options, U.S. and British forces had to supply their sectors of the city by air. In addition to meeting the basic needs of the residents in their sectors, the Western allies worked to win the loyalties of the citizens and to convince political leaders to resist the spread of Soviet communism. These first four years of occupation set the stage for a decades-long face-off with the Soviets in Germany. This book is 329 pages and contains six maps, forty illustrations, and an index. It will be issued as CMH Pub 45–4 (cloth) and 45–4–1 (paper) and will also be available for purchase by the general public from the U.S. Government Publishing Office.

THE TENTH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON WORLD WAR II

The National WWII Museum in New Orleans, Louisiana, will host the Tenth International Conference on World War II from 16 to 18 November 2017. The conference is presented by the Pritzker Military Museum and Library and will feature a number of presentations and discussions from renowned historians and authors like Rick Atkinson, Robert Citino, Conrad Crane, Sir Richard Evans, Richard Overy, and others. For more information, or to register for the conference, visit www.ww2conference.com or call 504-528-1944 ext. 511.

ARMY HISTORY AUTHOR WINS WRITING AWARD

The Army Historical Foundation recently announced the recipients of its 2016 Distinguished Writing Awards. The winner in the Army Professional Journals category was the article “Armor Goes to War: The 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment and the Vietnam War, December 1965 to December 1966,” by John M. Carland, which appeared in the Spring 2016 issue of *Army History* (No. 99). Carland received a plaque and a monetary award at the Army Historical Foundation’s annual meeting on 15 June 2017.



ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Douglas E. Nash

Sr. enlisted in the U.S. Army in 1974 and graduated from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point in 1980. He retired as a colonel in 2006 after thirty-two years of service in a number of different armor, cavalry, and special operations assignments. He has master's degrees in international relations and military history. Nash is the author of several books, including *Hell's Gate: The Battle of the Cherkassy Pocket, January–February 1944* (Southbury, Conn., 2002) and *Victory Was Beyond Their Grasp: With the 272nd Volks-Grenadier Division from the Hürtgen Forest to the Heart of the Reich* (Bedford, Pa., 2008), which was nominated for the 2008 Pulitzer Prize for nonfiction. He is currently serving as the senior historian for the Marine Corps History Division.



The first Japanese soldier to emerge from an Iwo Jima cave in which, with twenty other Japanese, he had been hiding for several days, 5 April 1945.

ARMY BOOTS ON VOLCANIC SANDS



THE 147TH INFANTRY REGIMENT AT IWO JIMA

BY DOUGLAS E. NASH SR.

The Battle of Iwo Jima has occupied a position of prominence in U.S. Marine Corps history ever since the American flag was raised atop Mount Suribachi on 23 February 1945. This most celebrated of all Marine battles has done more than any other to cement the public perception of the Corps as the nation's premier fighting force, willing to pay any price or bear any burden to achieve its objectives. The loss of 24,053 marines and sailors at Iwo Jima, including 6,140 men killed in action, was the cost of this reputation, the "highest single-action losses in Marine Corps history."¹

Many legends arose from this most iconic of battles, as well as a few myths. One of the most persistent misconceptions is that this was an all-Marine Corps and Navy battle, fought without the aid of the U.S. Army or Army Air Forces. Recently uncovered records, as well as another look at Marine Corps

historical accounts published nearly fifty years ago, have come to prove that Iwo Jima was a joint operation from its inception, with the Army and Army Air Forces contributing significantly to the battle's outcome. In fact, the Army contributed an infantry regiment that joined the battle on 21 March 1945, fought the Japanese die-hard survivors until the end of July 1945, and even conducted a flag-raising ceremony of its own. This is the story of that regiment.

The 147th Infantry Regiment, a unit of the Ohio National Guard, was activated and inducted into federal service on 15 October 1940, more than a year before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Recruited mainly from the Cincinnati area, its members were an integral part of the state's 37th Infantry Division and the unit traced its roots back to the American Civil War, where it was originally known as the 6th Regiment, Ohio Volunteer Infan-

try. Redesignated the 147th Infantry Regiment on 25 October 1917, it was federalized and deployed to France as part of the 37th Division during World War I, where it fought as part of the American Expeditionary Forces under General John J. Pershing.² During World War II, the unit was shipped out to the south Pacific four months after Pearl Harbor and was assigned to defend the strategically important Fijian Islands beginning in April 1942.

The 147th Infantry, temporarily detached from its parent division which remained behind in Fiji, took part in the Battle of Guadalcanal, where its men experienced sustained jungle fighting from early November 1942 to early February 1943. An integral part of the "Composite Army-Marine (CAM) Division," the regiment played a prominent role in the final battles for the island, which ended in an Allied victory with Japan's evacuation of its surviving troops by 8 February 1943.³

After the island was declared secure on 9 February, the 147th was retained as the Allies' "mopping-up" force, staying behind as the island's garrison while the rest of the 37th Infantry Division (which never served on Guadalcanal) deployed elsewhere. Permanently relieved from assignment to its parent division on 31 July 1943, the 147th would thereafter operate separately as an independent regiment, where it was frequently attached to Marine Corps units or served under Navy command.

Usually the regiment's mission, similar to that of the Marine Corps' own base defense battalions, was to provide security in the wake of amphibious assaults and prepare to defend against Japanese counterlandings, a duty it performed at Emirau Island while attached to the 4th Marine Division from 11 April to 1 July 1944, where its men saw no combat except the constant battle against boredom and mosquitos. However, rather than allowing the regiment to grow stale while performing glorified garrison duty in the wake of the Marine Corps' seizure of the island, the regimental commander, Col. William B. Tuttle, insisted that it fill its daily calendar with training activities, ranging from refresher courses on individual skills such as rifle marksmanship and patrolling, all the way up to battalion-

level field exercises. The regiment routinely reviewed lessons learned from its experience on Guadalcanal and incorporated as many of these as possible into its standard operating procedures. It also conducted competitions between the various companies of the regiment and staged training events in which even cooks and clerks were given the opportunity to fire and become familiar with American and captured Japanese weapons.⁴


Based on this experience, the regiment also insisted that its platoons and companies, when going into battle, carry additional automatic weapons and flame throwers, which had proven their utility on Guadalcanal. These weapons, such as Browning Automatic Rifles and Thompson submachine guns, enabled the average rifle platoon of the 147th to field far more firepower than the standard Army rifle platoon of that time.⁵ These additional weapons and knowledge of how to more effectively employ them would serve the unit well at Iwo Jima. However, as 1944 neared its end, the outfit, occupying temporary quarters on the island of New Caledonia, had no idea as to where it would be deployed next and many of its men were anticipating the war's end, believing that they would all soon be going home.

These fantasies would be shattered shortly after the 1945 New Year's celebrations were concluded, when the regiment's new commander, Col. Robert F. Johnson, informed his men that "We're going right up into Tojo's front yard." Though the location of the next campaign was still a secret, he stressed the seriousness of their upcoming assignment, stating that "Every man must know this and every man must be prepared."⁶ Thereafter commenced an intensive training schedule for the unit, which had lost nearly half of its experienced personnel due to the troop rotation program. Courses in jungle warfare were set up on New Caledonia, firing ranges were built to hone marksmanship, and instruction in amphibious operations was given to officers and noncommissioned officers. By 24 February 1945 the force was ready. The Marines had landed on Iwo Jima the week before on 19 February, where they had experienced hard fighting and had already lost a significant number of men to the fanatical resistance of the Japanese defenders.

The 147th's advance party had already sailed with the invasion force, consisting of V Amphibious Corps with its three Marine divisions, at the beginning of the month; the regiment, with its three battalions, Cannon Company, Antitank Company, and headquarters troops, began loading onto four troop transports (codenamed Task Unit 11.1.2) on 24 February and sailed for the invasion force's staging base at Eniwetok on 4 March. After dropping anchor on 14 March, the regiment was told it would remain at Eniwetok until 31 March, when it would be called forward to begin its assignment as Iwo Jima's garrison troops, responsible for base defense as it had been at Guadalcanal, Emirau, and New Caledonia.⁷ Any relief the men felt upon hearing this did not last long; within hours after their arrival at Eniwetok, the regimental commander received a message from the commander of Task Force 53 (assault force), R. Adm. Harry W. Hill, leader of one of the task forces participating in the amphibious assault on Iwo Jima, stating "Request Task Unit 11.1.2 carrying 147th Inf. be



Troops from the 147th Infantry firing machine guns at a practice range on the island of New Caledonia, and familiarizing themselves with captured Japanese weapons, such as this 7.7-mm. Nambu Type 92 heavy machine gun, 24 November 1944



directed proceed [*sic*] Iwo Jima earliest practicable date.”⁸

The ships carrying the 2,952 men of the regiment weighed anchor and departed that same day, after only a few hours at Eniwetok. The troops learned while en route that the 147th Infantry had been attached to the 3d Marine Division. What had prompted the early departure, of course, was that the seizure of Iwo Jima had proven to be far tougher than anticipated. Japanese resistance was as stubborn as it was fierce. Losses in the Marine divisions taking part in the assault (3d, 4th, and 5th Divisions) had been astronomical; battalions had been reduced to companies, and companies to platoons, after only a few days of fighting. Consequently, there were far fewer marines available to finish securing the island; in fact, there were still thousands of Japanese defenders who refused to surrender, requiring more

ground troops than anticipated to drive them out of their underground fortifications and kill them. Before the island could be declared secure, these holdouts would have to be dealt with. Despite this unwelcome development, one of the island’s three airfields had already been placed into limited operation to handle crippled bombers returning from air raids on the Japanese mainland and seeking emergency landing strips, which was preferable to ditching in the ocean.

The ships bearing the 147th Infantry arrived off the coast of Iwo Jima at 1335 on 20 March 1945. Its members saw the battered peak of Mount Suribachi for the first time and heard the sounds of the ongoing battle. In the words of the regimental commander, “Everyone strained to see how he would physically fit into the regiment’s mission on the island.”⁹ The initial orders instructed



Naval History and Heritage Command

the regiment to defend the new base to be built at Iwo Jima by organizing positions at probable landing beaches, performing continuous observation of the whole coastline, and preparing inland and final defensive positions. These orders were changed that same afternoon instead to reflect that the 147th would now conduct a relief-in-place of elements of 3d Marine Division, then engaged in deadly mopping-up operations, and “assist Marine forces in clearing the island of remaining Japanese defenders and stragglers.”¹⁰ It would not, as originally believed, become a component of the Army Garrison Force, at least for the next two weeks.

To carry out its new assignment, the regiment began disembarking its transports at Purple Beach on the island’s southwest coast at dawn on 21 March and had occupied its assembly area in Target Area 183-Golf near Motoyama Airfield Number 2 by late that morning. Colonel Johnson and his staff had already met with Maj. Gen. Graves B. Erskine, the commander of the 3d Marine Division, at his command post earlier that day, where they received the details about the 147th’s new assignment.¹¹ The following day,

1st and 2d Battalions were informed that they would be attached to the 21st Marine Regiment and would relieve its 2d and 3d Battalions on 23 March. The 147th’s 3d Battalion would commence patrolling activities around the base of Mount Suribachi immediately.


Each of the regiment’s three battalions was assigned its own sector, with the island divided roughly into thirds: the 1st Battalion drew the east coast from Target Areas 236-Dog to 186-Able, stretching inland to form a triangle including Motoyama Airfield Number 3; 2d Battalion was assigned the northeast coast of the island from Target Areas 251-Fox to 236-Dog, reaching inland to the western edge of Airfield Number 3; and 3d Battalion was given the defense of the east and west beaches. On its first day of combat, patrols from the 1st Battalion killed twenty-three Japanese while being guided into their new area by marines familiar with the area. Japanese troops probed their defensive positions that evening, randomly tossing hand grenades that kept everyone awake in their foxholes.

Thus commenced what would be a grueling and dangerous assignment—the first time the regiment had been

face-to-face with the enemy since the Battle of Guadalcanal, two years before. The battalions would send out patrols, set up ambushes, and exploit abandoned tunnels and caves during the day; at night, they would spring ambushes upon Japanese troops who had left their underground warrens to search for food and water. It was a bloody business; the troops of the 147th Infantry employed highly effective “corkscrew and blowtorch” tactics, involving the liberal use of satchel charges and flamethrowers that marines and soldiers had developed at Peleliu the previous autumn, and which had been widely disseminated throughout the Pacific Theater. These methods forced the Japanese out of their fighting positions, where they would be killed out in the open by overwhelming automatic weapons fire or sealed within their caves. The soldiers would neutralize dozens of unsuspecting Japanese, who brazenly penetrated American defensive positions to steal food, weapons and, above all, water.

The regiment’s area of responsibility soon grew, when on 26 March it was assigned the sector being vacated by the hard-hit 5th Marine Division, which was being shipped out to be rebuilt for





V Phib Corps Landing Force
Annex Easy
To Operation Plan No 3-44 (Detachment)
(Preferred Plan)
23 Oct 1944

OPERATIONS MAP
 By Command of Major H. Schmidt
 W. W. Rogers
 Colonel USMC
 Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL
 E. A. Craig
 Colonel USMC
 AC of S, G-3


SPECIAL AIR AND GUNNERY TARGET MAP
 SCALE 1:10,000

- INSTRUCTIONS**
- BLUE** THE SPECIAL GRID SYSTEM IS SUPERIMPOSED ON THIS MAP IN PURPLE COLOR. THIS SYSTEM IS TO BE USED FOR PIN-POINT DESIGNATIONS.
 - PURPLE** THE ARBITRARY TARGET SQUARE SYSTEM IS SUPERIMPOSED ON THIS MAP IN BLUE WITH LETTERS TO BE USED FOR AREA DESIGNATIONS.
 - RED** THE NUMBERING OF THE 100-YARD TARGET AREAS AND LETTERS OF THE 200-YARD TARGET SQUARES HAS NO RELATION TO THE NUMBERING USED IN THE GRID SYSTEM.
- EXAMPLES FOLLOW**
- PIN-POINT DESIGNATION OF RIDGE IS BG 750-708
 KJ105 IS IN TARGET SQUARE 13E 4
- DEFENSIVE SYMBOL KEY**
- COASTAL DEFENSE GUN
 - DUAL MOUNT DUAL PURPOSE GUN
 - DUAL PURPOSE GUN POSITION (Shm)
 - SINGLE MOUNT HEAVY AA
 - AUTOMATIC AA
 - COVERED ARTILLERY EMPLACEMENT
 - RANGE FINDER
 - UNCOVERED INSTALLATION
 - RFI
 - RIFLE PIT OR FOX HOLE
 - MAST OR TOWER
 - UNDERGROUND ENTRANCE
 - AIR RAID SHELTER
 - ANTI-TANK GUN
 - WATER STORAGE
 - MACHINE GUN
 - BLOODHOUSE
 - FILLBOX
 - RADAR
 - SEARCHLIGHT
 - COMMAND POST
 - OBSERVATION TOWER
 - ANTI-TANK BARRIERS
 - RADIO STATION
 - RADIO TOWER
 - ANTI-BOT BARRIER
 - ARTILLERY EMPLACEMENT
 - ANTI-TANK TRENCH
 - EMPTY REVETMENT
 - AMMUNITION STORAGE

the impending invasion of Japan. It was also the same day that the island was officially declared to be “secure,” signifying the point in the operation when overall command of land forces was finally handed over to the U.S. Army Garrison Force, under Maj. Gen. James E. Chaney, who relieved Maj. Gen. Harry Schmidt of the V Amphibious Corps.¹² General Erskine of 3d Marine Division would continue to serve as the commander of ground combat forces until 4 April. With this development, the regiment now was in charge of the defense of nearly the entire island, including Mount Suribachi, except for the eastern portion of the island that remained under the control of the 9th Marine Regiment.

The 147th Infantry Regiment continued its operations, maintaining a rapid tempo designed to prevent the Japanese survivors from coalescing and carrying out large-scale attacks against the American units, which now primarily consisted of Marine units recovering from the battle, antiaircraft units, and construction battalions preparing the three airfields as permanent bases. The pace of operations continued through the end of the month and beyond; by 31 March the 147th Infantry had killed 387 Japanese troops and had captured seventeen. In turn, the regiment had lost eight men killed in action and fifty-three wounded.¹³ It was a sign that this “mopping up” would not be easy.

On 4 April, the 147th Infantry relieved the last Marine unit on the island, the 9th Marine Regiment, and from that point onward was solely responsible for finishing the clearing actions on Iwo Jima as well as acting as its defense force. To show appreciation for the regiment’s service while attached to his division, General Erskine, in his 11 April commendation letter, wrote “The 147th Infantry Regiment displayed in their debarkation, movement into positions and execution of assigned missions a fine spirit of cooperation and a commendable eagerness for combat” and was “an inspiration to all hands.”¹⁴ While the Marines were now freed to prepare for their next mission, that of the 147th was only just beginning.



General Chaney



Harry Schmidt, shown here as a lieutenant general, c. 1946



The makeshift open-air command post of Company F, 147th Infantry Regiment, on Iwo Jima, c. 1945

Placing the 147th Infantry into the line of battle on 23 March did have one adverse impact, though. During the early morning hours of 26 March, a number of Japanese survivors launched a final, desperate attack against the bivouac area of the Army’s

Garrison Force, located near Airfield Number 1 in Target Area 198-J, which was occupied at the time by a number of Army Air Forces fighter pilots of VII Fighter Command, a field hospital, Navy Seabees, and the Marines’ 5th Pioneer Battalion and 8th Field

Depot. More than 100 Americans were slain, and over 200 wounded, before a counterattack by the Seabees and Pioneers, reinforced by elements of the 28th Marine Regiment, then in the process of redeploying aboard their troopships, were able to systematically hunt down and kill the Japanese. A total of 223 bodies of the enemy were initially counted, with the total rising to 300 before it was all over.

Had the 147th Infantry not been engaged in the line of battle at the time, it may well have been available as the garrison security force, as was originally intended, and the impact of the Japanese attack might not have been as great. As it was, it was bad enough, and thereafter until the last Japanese defender was accounted for, security, especially in the encampments, was strictly maintained. Another result was that on 26 March, the 147th Infantry was directed by Headquarters, 3d Marine Division, to maintain a company-sized “general reserve” (reaction force) near the airfield at all times, should future incidents such as the 26 March attack occur.¹⁵

Until the end of June, when the final Japanese defender was dispatched, the 147th Infantry Regiment carried out its deadly task with monotonous regularity. Patrols and security sweeps occupied the day, and ambushes the night. As one day followed another, the number of Japanese killed or captured continued to mount; 963 killed in April alone, with another 664 captured. A platoon of Japanese-speaking Nisei was attached to the regiment, whose appeals in the defenders’ native language helped to make the “dishonorable” act of surrender more palatable. As time went by, more and more Japanese chose this way out, though fanatics continued to exercise their influence on isolated parties who chose to either fight to the death or commit suicide rather than capitulate. Many Japanese prisoners of war (POWs) decided to help their captors convince their countrymen to surrender rather than needlessly killing themselves.

The aforementioned corkscrew and blowtorch tactics continued unabated. Japanese refusing to leave their caves were sealed in by explosives or killed


when gasoline was pumped into their hideouts and ignited. In May, 252 were killed, with 186 choosing to live instead. By the end of June, the number of Japanese killed had fallen to seventeen, with only six surrendering. After that month, living Japanese were only occasionally spotted, though when captured most of them proved to be impressed Korean laborers. The regiment’s core strength was decreased on 30 June when its 1st Battalion was relieved from its duties and embarked aboard the attack transport USS *Rockwall*, which sailed to the island of Tinian, where the battalion would provide security for the top-secret B-29 bomber unit designated to drop two atomic bombs

on mainland Japan.¹⁶ Thus, reduced in size by a third, the regiment that remained on Iwo Jima was forced to do the same amount of patrolling with fewer men. A reassignment of eighteen company-grade officers took place on 29 May, further sapping the unit’s strength. Urgently needed on Okinawa, where the casualty rate of Army lieutenants and captains in that battle had been extremely high, these officers volunteered to depart for a tour of duty with the 96th Infantry Division, even though they could have remained on Iwo Jima.¹⁷

The now-understrength 147th Infantry worked slowly and methodically, taking no chances and using as much firepower as the situation



Troops from the 147th Infantry, using a prisoner as a translator, attempt to talk Japanese holdouts into surrendering peacefully.



USS *Rockwall*, c. 1945

demanded. After all, because the island had already been declared secure since 26 March, the soldiers had no rigid timetable to adhere to, unlike the marines, who had been forced to take enormous risks to secure their objectives according to schedule. To help address this shortage of frontline troops, the regiment's cannon and antitank companies were both employed in the line as infantry. Even with this augmentation, there still were not

enough troops to cover everything. Additionally, the regiment continued to suffer casualties, usually caused by Japanese mines, snipers, booby traps, and machine gun fire.

In one case, two noncommissioned officers were wounded on 30 March by a samurai sword when they attempted to capture the Japanese officer wielding it. Failing in this, they killed the man in hand-to-hand combat, though not before sustaining slash wounds to their

hands.¹⁸ Day after day, the gruesome death toll mounted, as well as the number of captures, such that by 30 June, the regiment had killed 1,602 Japanese holdouts and had captured 867 more, accounting for nearly 2,500 of the enemy. The number who died in sealed-up caves will never be known. In return, the 147th Infantry Regiment had suffered the loss of fifteen men killed in action and another 144 wounded, as well as dozens more to noncombat related injuries or sickness.

During this period, several incidents stand out as being noteworthy enough to deserve further examination. On 30 March one Japanese cave was located in the 1st Battalion's area and assaulted. After killing its two defenders with rifle fire, the soldiers were astonished to discover that the cave held two cows, a vegetable garden, chickens, medical supplies, and a stockpile of ammunition for a 75-mm. howitzer.¹⁹ Not all of the defenders were starving, either. Many Japanese, whether dead or captured, showed no signs of starvation or privation at all, and a number of them were found to be carrying American weapons, grenades, and even American-issued items such as ponchos, shelter halves, and leggings. The ability of the Japanese to infiltrate American positions at night was astonishing, but once they had left their concealed positions, they were fair game for the numerous ambushes set by the 147th Infantry each night.

Another significant event occurred on 11 April when an eleven-man patrol from Company A, led by its commander, Capt. James T. Kolb, took the largest number of prisoners at one time during the entire battle of Iwo Jima near Target Area 202-Fox, located on the eastern portion of the island. When the patrol spotted two Japanese soldiers emerging from a hole near its ambush position during the early morning hours, Kolb's men opened fire, killing one and seriously wounding the other. Despite his wounds, the Japanese soldier managed to crawl back into the hole, prompting Kolb to use his Nisei interpreter, Sgt. Ritsuevo Tanaka, to call to the Japanese thought to be still underground to



These five Japanese, part of twenty taken alive by a mop-up squad from the 147th Infantry, receive some American cigarettes.




On Iwo Jima an American interrogator, 2d Lt. Manny Goldberg (left), questions a Japanese prisoner with help from his Nisei translator, T. Sgt. Ben Hirano (third from right, seated), 25 March 1945.



Courtesy of Thomas McLeod, Museum of the Pacific

Captain Kolb, assisted by Sergeant Keogh, uses a flamethrower against dug-in Japanese troops on Iwo Jima, 20 April 1945.



U.S. Marine Corps

General Kuribayashi

come out and surrender or they would be sealed up alive with explosives. After a brief negotiation, Kolb learned that his patrol had stumbled upon the hospital of the 2d Mixed Brigade, located 100 feet underground. The Japanese, led by senior medical officer Maj. Masaru Inoaka, called for a vote of surrender; sixty-nine men voted “aye.” Three voted “nay” and immediately committed suicide, allowing the others to depart unharmed.

Over the next several hours, Kolb and his men assisted thirteen Japanese medical officers, one warrant officer, and fifty-nine medical enlisted men as they crawled through the cave’s two-foot-square exit. Several wounded men being treated in the hospital were also evacuated. In addition to bringing out all of their medical supplies, the hospital also presented the Americans with six flags and several samurai swords, which Kolb’s men kept. When asked by the interpreter why he had surrendered with all of his men, the Japanese hospital commander replied that he thought his situation was hopeless and that he trusted that the Americans would obey the “International Conventions of the Red Cross.”²⁰ So many were taken prisoner that trucks had to be requested to transport all of

the Japanese to the island’s prisoner-of-war facility.


Another incident, on 4 June, involved the location and identification of the headquarters cave reputedly used by the island’s commander, Lt. Gen. Tadamichi Kuribayashi. Although the 147th Infantry had already identified and exploited several other large underground complexes, this one, located on the island’s northeast

quadrant, was the largest of all. Discovered by a patrol from Company F, led by Lt. James I. Ahern, the cave was found to be still defended by the enemy, who refused calls to surrender. Calling forward a demolition team from the regiment’s Ammunition and Pioneer Platoon, led by Lt. Joseph “Pappy” Lenoir, the soldiers pumped in hundreds of gallons of gasoline and set it alight. The resulting fire ignited a quantity of ammunition stored



National Archives

Members of Company F, 147th Infantry, display captured Japanese flags found in the underground hospital, 11 April 1945.



Soldiers of the 147th Infantry engaging Japanese holdouts amid the rugged terrain on Iwo Jima

inside, killing or wounding many of the surviving occupants who had not committed suicide. Fifty-four survivors surrendered, though two killed themselves shortly afterward.²¹


An exploitation of the cave complex soon followed, revealing several stories that contained offices, ammunition and ration storage areas, sleeping quarters, and radio rooms, all linked by interconnecting tunnels so large that the Americans could walk upright through them. The commanding officer's quarters consisted of several smaller rooms, reinforced with concrete, and fitted with several escape hatches. A number of bodies were found inside, all of them showing signs of suicide. However, General Kuribayashi's remains were not found within, as it was believed that he had died or had committed suicide during a counterattack carried out several weeks before. Lieutenant Lenoir and his men made several detailed sketches of this cave complex as well as several others, mute testimony to the tunneling skills of the Japanese, who had moved nearly their entire force underground before the amphibious assault commenced on 19 February 1945. With their inspections complete, Lenoir, who had been an Oklahoma

oil field "wildcatter" in civilian life, had his men seal the caves shut with explosives to prevent them from being reoccupied by the enemy.²²

The last noteworthy event that involved the 147th Infantry Regiment was the U.S. Army's flag-raising ceremony during the Battle of Iwo Jima.

Unlike the better-known event that took place on Mount Suribachi on 23 February, the 147th's version did not occur on the island of Iwo Jima proper. The Army raised the American flag on the neighboring island of Minami, a scant thirty-five miles south-southeast of Iwo Jima. Considered part of the Volcano Islands group, with Iwo Jima forming the largest island, the approximately one-and-a-half-square-mile Minami, also known as South Iwo Jima, had to be searched and secured to ensure that no Japanese forces held it that might interfere with flight operations on the main island.

Consequently, the 147th Infantry was notified on 2 May by the U.S. Army garrison force headquarters that it was to conduct a reconnaissance of the island the following day. Adverse weather prevented Company C, which had been selected to carry out the mission, from departing Iwo Jima until 5 May. The units' soldiers conducted planning and rehearsals the day before, while Maj. Richard R. Morrison, the 1st Battalion operations officer, selected to lead the mission, carried out an aerial reconnaissance that afternoon. No enemy were spotted on the island, so plans were advanced that evening for the amphibious task



Medics from the 147th Infantry treat wounded Japanese survivors from the hospital cave on Iwo Jima, 11 April 1945.

force, which was to consist of 111 men from Company C, thirty-nine from Company B, five medical personnel, and an Army photographer, Pfc. Bruce Elkus, to depart White Beach 2 at 0233 on 5 May. At the last moment, Major Morrison's force was joined aboard Landing Craft, Infantry (LCI) 1094 by three "observers" from the Army Garrison Force headquarters.²³

Morrison's task force arrived at the island at 0630, and began circling its four-and-a-half-mile shoreline in search of possible landing beaches. No signs of life were detected, and the LCI lowered its ramp thirty feet from the northeastern shoreline. Striking rocks, the ship withdrew and launched its dinghy, which succeeded in landing a six-man shore party at 0916 to patrol the area in search of a better landing site. Spotting nothing of importance other than a wrecked Japanese airplane and large quantities of washed-up Marine Corps supplies, including crates of C-rations, the patrol was surprised when they flushed an enemy soldier out of his hiding place an hour later. The man, who proved to be a Korean survivor of the crew of a Japanese transport that had been sunk at least forty days earlier, spoke no English but could read and write it. Upon inter-



Japanese from the underground hospital are led to one of Iwo Jima's prisoner-of-war holding areas by troops from the 147th Infantry, 11 April 1945. They have been stripped of their clothing as a precaution against concealed weapons.

rogation, he indicated that he was the island's only inhabitant, and had been subsisting off of washed-up rations and rainwater.

After being told by radio that the island was clear, Major Morrison and four others, including the photogra-

pher, left the LCI aboard the ship's dinghy an hour later. The boat overturned in the surf, dumping its passengers forty or fifty feet from the shore, forcing them to swim the rest of the way. Despite this mishap, Elkus and all of his photographic equipment was retrieved and safely brought ashore. At noon, Morrison and his waterlogged party had reached the summit on the island's southeast tip and successfully raised the American flag.²⁴ Morrison, who had written a speech to mark the occasion, stated, "As an officer of the United States Army, and under authority invested in me by the Congress of the United States, I hereby do take possession of this island, Minami Iwo Jima, in the name of the United States of America." It is assumed that Private Elkus recorded the moment on film, but to date none of his photographs of the event have been discovered. It would have been interesting to see how this ceremony carried out by the 147th Infantry compared to or was influenced by the one conducted ten weeks earlier atop Mount Suribachi by the Marines. Certainly, everyone was aware by this point of the iconic image taken by Associated Press photographer Joe Rosenthal, which



Japanese troops taken prisoner at the underground hospital wait for trucks to carry them to one of Iwo Jima's prisoner-of-war compounds, 11 April 1945.



Courtesy of Thomas McLeod, Museum of the Pacific

Members of Company A, 147th Infantry, proudly display Japanese battle flags captured on Iwo Jima.



General Richardson

during the previous two months had been widely reproduced in a variety of news publications as well as in soldiers' magazines and newspapers such as *Yank* and *Stars and Stripes*.

Major Morrison and his landing party, along with their prisoner, then tried to return to the ship by rubber raft, since their dinghy had been smashed on rocks. Finally, after several attempts and another capsizing, the major and his men were safely back on board LCI 1094 by 1719. Private Elkus had once again been washed overboard when a wave hit the raft; whether he was able to save his camera and its precious film remains unknown. Finally, after having to sever its anchor cable after the ship's stern anchor became caught in the rocks near the shoreline, the LCI carrying the amphibious task force returned safely to Iwo Jima, arriving without incident at White Beach 2 at 2215. The sole prisoner was taken to the POW area, the only concrete result of the day's activities. There is no evidence that the Army's flag raising was ever publicized and no further mention of it in the regimental history is recorded. Another landing party was arranged to conduct a reconnaissance of Kita, a much smaller island a few miles north of Iwo Jima, on 30 May, but the group

returned without spotting the enemy or raising a flag.²⁵

As early as 20 April, there were few marines left on Iwo Jima, except for the 5,330 buried in the island's three division cemeteries. The rest had departed for various rest areas in the Pacific, where they would absorb replacements and prepare for the impending invasion of Japan, codenamed Operation DOWNFALL. The island was far from uninhabited, however. By that point, 31,000 soldiers, Navy Seabees, and Army Air Force ground crews had nearly filled the island to the limit.²⁶ Roads had been built, the three airfields reinforced and lengthened, and scores of new buildings and warehouses were constructed, as well as post exchanges, theaters, and recreation facilities. Within weeks, the island was completely transformed into a forward staging base for the assault on Japan. The 147th Infantry remained for several months as the Army Garrison Force's only ground combat outfit. Its primary mission of defending the island from attack remained unchanged, while it continued the elimination of any remaining Japanese. There were many other units that began to arrive on Iwo Jima at the end of March 1945 as well, rapidly

swelling the number of troops on the island.

Intended to serve as a ground combat force for the invasion of Japan, the 147th was given a reprieve when it learned of the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki by two atomic bombs dropped from B-29s operating from Tinian, still being guarded by the regiment's 1st Battalion. The 147th Infantry finally departed Iwo Jima on 8 September 1945 when it was assigned similar duties on the Island of Okinawa, declared secure by the end of June 1945 after a battle even bloodier than that of Iwo Jima. Two months of occupation duty on Okinawa followed, during which time the regiment continued killing or capturing Japanese holdouts. To its members' relief, the 147th Infantry was notified that it would be returning home to the United States at the end of November. Finally, after serving in the Pacific Theater for nearly four years, the last man of the regiment arrived home on 12 December 1945. By that point, only three men who had deployed with the original regiment from the United States in 1942 were still serving in its ranks.²⁷

By 25 December 1945 the regiment had been inactivated at Vancouver

Barracks, in Washington State, and was reassigned once again as an element of the 37th Infantry Division, Ohio National Guard. Its remaining members were demobilized and returned to their civilian occupations. For the most part, the regiment's achievements during the Battle of Iwo Jima went unrecognized by the U.S. Army, though the Marine Corps' official history of the battle briefly mentioned the 147th Infantry as participating in the mopping-up phase. No official histories mention that the regiment conducted its own flag-raising ceremony on Minami and, as noted previously, no photographs depicting the event are known to exist.

Though it served in obscurity in support of the Marine Corps for most of its existence during World War II, the 147th Infantry Regiment carried out its duties well and faithfully during its years spent in the Pacific. It had earned the right to display the battle honors bestowed for participation in the "Air Offensive, Japan 17 April 1942–2 September 1945," the U.S. Army's designation of the island-hopping campaign in the western Pacific that included operations on Iwo Jima. Perhaps the most concise description of the regiment's contribution to victory is best summed up by Lt. Gen. Robert C. Richardson, the commanding general of U.S. Army Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas who wrote,

[The] members of the 147th Infantry Regiment, whose mission was the destruction of the Japanese forces remaining on Iwo Jima after organized resistance had ended, displayed consistent courage and combat ingenuity in dealing with an enemy determined upon a course of fanatical resistance. Despite conditions of terrain and emplacement favorable to the Japanese, morale remained at a high level and few

casualties were sustained. . . . The military proficiency and devotion to duty constantly manifested by the regiment were in great measure responsible for the final security of a vital advance base.²⁸

No marine or soldier could hope for a more succinct summation of his contributions toward the final victory than that.



NOTES

1. Joseph H. Alexander, *World War II Commemorative Series, Closing In: Marines in the Seizure of Iwo Jima* (Washington, D.C.: Marine Corps Historical Center, 1994), p. 47.

2. Lineage and honors certificate, 147th Infantry Regiment (First Ohio) (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, U.S. Army Center of Military History).

3. John Miller Jr., "Guadalcanal, the First Offensive," in *U.S. Army in World War II: The War in the Pacific* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1949), p. 322.

4. Tom McLeod, *Always Ready: The History of the United States' 147th Infantry Regiment* (Texarkana, Tex: Privately Published by the Museum of the Pacific, 1996), p. 134.

5. While the regiment formally adhered to the U.S. Army's standard Table of Organization and Equipment, its squads were habitually reinforced by each company's heavy weapons platoon or the battalion weapons company, which provided these additional weapons, such as flamethrowers, in direct support—that is, their use was directed by the squad leader. This went against the usual Army doctrinal practice, which generally prescribed keeping these assets employed at the company or battalion level, where they would provide general support to squads and platoons. The tactical situation on Iwo Jima demanded otherwise and the success of this practice speaks for itself. This also does not rule out the then-common practice of us-

ing additional weapons—"battlefield pick-ups," found on the field—to supplement unit arsenals.

6. Quarterly Unit History Report, 147th Infantry Regiment, January–March 1945, p. 1.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 5.

8. *Ibid.*

9. *Ibid.*

10. Unit Monthly Combat Journal, 147th Infantry Regiment, 1–31 March 1945, p. 1.

11. *Ibid.*

12. Letter of Instruction, Headquarters, U.S. Army Garrison Force, Iwo Jima and Volcanic Islands, 26 March 1945.

13. Quarterly Unit History Report, p. 7.

14. Commander, 3d Marine Division, Commendation Letter, 11 April 1945.

15. Unit Monthly Combat Journal, entry for 26 March, 1640 hours, p. 7.

16. McLeod, *Always Ready*, p. 165.

17. Quarterly Unit History Report, April–June 1945, p. 3; McLeod, *Always Ready*, p. 159.

18. Quarterly Unit History Report, entry for 30 March 1945, 1300 hours, p. 12.

19. *Ibid.*, entry for 30 March 1945, 1757 hours, p. 13.

20. McLeod, *Always Ready*, p. 149; George W. Garand and Truman R. Strobbridge, *History of Marine Corps Operations in World War II, Vol. IV, Western Pacific Operations* (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, History and Museums Division, 1971), p. 711. The activity of the 147th Infantry at Iwo Jima was also mentioned in an earlier Marine Corps history of the battle, *Iwo Jima: Amphibious Epic* by Lt. Col. Whitman S. Barley, long out of print (1954), p. 193.

21. McLeod, *Always Ready*, p. 160.

22. *Ibid.*

23. After Action Report, Minami Expedition, Headquarters, 147th Infantry Regiment, Monthly Combat Journal, 5 May 1945, p. 1.

24. *Ibid.*, p. 2.

25. Headquarters, 147th Infantry Regiment, After Action Report, Reconnaissance to Kita Iwo Jima, Volcano Islands, 30 May 1945.

26. Garand and Strobbridge, *History of Marine Corps Operations in World War II*, p. 712.

27. McLeod, *Always Ready*, p. 169.

28. Commendation Letter, Commanding General, U.S. Army Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas, 15 August 1945.

U.S. ARMY ARTIFACT SPOTLIGHT

THE HUNTING FROCK

OF CAPT. ALEXANDER JOHNSTON, 5TH INFANTRY REGIMENT

BY DIETER STENGER

Alexander Johnston was born in Pennsylvania in 1806. At the age of fourteen he entered the U.S. Military Academy at West Point and graduated on 1 July 1824, with a brevet commission to second lieutenant in the 5th Infantry Regiment. He served on the northwestern frontier from 1825 to 1845, as a captain and commander of Fort Brady, Michigan, until his death after contracting “consumption.”¹

Throughout the 1820s, the Army continued to push westward while surveying the land and building roads and forts in places like Iowa, Nebraska, and Kansas—the fringe settlements on the western frontier at the time. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, established in 1827, was the first permanent fort west of the Missouri River and served as the main base for Army expeditions. In 1831, when settlers in western Illinois pushed Sac and Fox Indians onto the prairies west of the Mississippi River, a band of warriors under Chief Black Hawk conducted raids across the Mississippi, burning settlers’ homes. After a show of force by the Army, the Indians retired but returned the following spring, thus starting the Black Hawk War. Again the Army deployed, but this time with a force of Illinois militia including then-Capt. Abraham Lincoln. While the militia soon returned home after failing to force the Indians into a decisive engagement, Col. Henry Atkinson, with 500 Army regulars, volunteers, and a steamboat carrying a six-pound gun firing canister, routed the Indians in southern Wisconsin on 2 August 1832, at the confluence of the Bad Axe and Mississippi Rivers.²

Then-Lieutenant Johnston, who participated in Battle of the Bad Axe, wore the buckskin hunting frock pictured here during the Black Hawk War and other Western frontier campaigns. Known as the earliest one of this type, and the only one with provenance to a U.S. Army soldier, the garment is functional and durable. Constructed of what appears to be brain-tanned elk skin or buckskin, it has an open front without button closures, gussets under the arms, and a fringed cape and edging. The Johnston hunting frock is part of the U.S. Army’s historical collection and stored in the climate-controlled Museum Support Center at Fort Belvoir, Virginia.

Dieter Stenger serves at the Museum Support Center as the curator of firearms and edged weapons.



NOTES

1. George W. Cullum, *Biographical Register of the Officers and Graduates of the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, N.Y., from Its Establishment, March 16, 1802, to the Army Reorganization 1866–68, vol. I, 1802–1840* (New York, Nostrand: 1868), p. 264.

2. Richard W. Stewart, ed., *American Military History, vol. 1, The United States Army and the Forging of a Nation, 1775–1917*, 2d ed. (Washington, D.C.: 2005), pp. 166–68.

The hunting frock of Capt. Alexander Johnston, 5th Infantry Regiment



Background Image: A sketch titled *The Battle of Bad Axe* /Yale Law School



**ABOUT
THE
AUTHOR**


Nathan

A. Marzoli is a historian in the Force Structure and Unit History Division at the U.S. Army Center of Military History. A U.S. Air Force veteran, he completed a bachelor's degree in history and a master's degree in history and museum studies at the University of New Hampshire. Mr. Marzoli's primary research and writing interests focus on the Civil War—specifically the study of Union soldiers and their relationships with their home communities. He is the author of "Their Loss Was Necessarily Severe": The 12th New Hampshire at Chancellorsville," which appeared in the Fall 2016 issue of *Army History*.



Union soldiers at Battery Chatfield on Morris Island man a gun aimed at Fort Sumter, 1864

“WE ARE SEEING SOMETHING OF REAL WAR NOW”



THE 3D, 4TH, AND 7TH NEW HAMPSHIRE ON MORRIS ISLAND, JULY–SEPTEMBER 1863¹

BY NATHAN A. MARZOLI


In the sultry predawn darkness of 7 September 1863, Pvt. Lucien Smith, of the 4th Regiment, New Hampshire Volunteer Infantry, quietly shuffled up the trenches that crisscrossed the beaches of Morris Island in Charleston Harbor, South Carolina.² Smith, along with the rest of his unit, was getting into position to make a final charge on Battery Wagner, the Confederate fortification that had kept Union forces on the island laboring in siege warfare for the better part of two months. Only a few hours before the charge was to be made, however, welcome news came to the men of the 4th Regiment—a rebel deserter had reported that Wagner had been abandoned during the night. Leery of a Confederate trap, Smith and his fellow soldiers clambered up the battered sand parapets and carefully dropped themselves down into the fort. The deserter had been telling the truth; Wagner was indeed emptied of its living inhabitants. There was little joy to be found in the quick

victory, however, as Smith and others discovered that Wagner was a living hell. “I can give you no discription of the awful Smell,” Smith wrote in a letter home. “Hundred of rebels had been killed by our fire . . . many lay unbirried and our Shell had dug them up as fast they did burry eney. I could not live only by holding my breath . . . no one who has not smell[ed it] can have an Idea of it—I never shall forget the smell [*sic*].”²² The horrific scene, which ended the Union siege of Battery Wagner, perfectly encapsulated the weeks-long battle for gaining control of Morris Island.

Many Civil War enthusiasts are familiar with the failed Union attack on Battery Wagner on the evening of 18 July 1863, re-created in the 1989 film *Glory*. However, popular history has mostly forgotten that after this unsuccessful engagement, the Federal forces on Morris Island settled into nearly two months of siege warfare before finally capturing the fortification after Confederate forces abandoned

it in early September. The siege was characterized by agonizing heat, hard manual labor, and the constant threat of death from Confederate shells and sharpshooters.

Three of the eighteen infantry regiments furnished by the small state of New Hampshire during the Civil War played key roles in both the attacks on Battery Wagner and the ensuing siege: the 3d, 7th, and 4th Regiments, New Hampshire Volunteer Infantry. This article chronicles the experiences of these New Hampshire outfits as they labored and fought under the hot South Carolina sun in the summer of 1863. It is not meant to be an exhaustive study of the siege, but will instead focus on the exploits of these three regiments in order to help develop a more complete understanding of a major battle and theater of the war that historians have often neglected. This article will also provide a glimpse into true textbook siege operations, an event that was relatively rare during the Civil War.



THE PLAN FOR MORRIS ISLAND


Following Maj. Robert Anderson's surrender of Fort Sumter to Confederate forces in April 1861, Northern public opinion maintained a constant clamor for Charleston's capture. Union military leaders needed no special urging to launch an attack against the city. In addition to restoring the Union Army's honor, the capture of Charleston had tangible military benefits, because it could serve as a site to launch an invasion into the Southern heartland.³ Although the Navy pressed the War Department to send troops into Charleston as early as November 1861, it was not until the following summer that the Army finally took action. In an effort to flank the city, Maj. Gen. David Hunter, commander of the newly created Department of the South, landed troops at James Island on 2 June 1862. The operation failed, however, when the Union forces were repulsed by roughly 700 Confederate infantry and artillerymen near the village of Secessionville on 16 June, and Hunter withdrew from the island.⁴

The Army's interest in capturing Charleston waned for more than a year until the War Department replaced Hunter with Maj. Gen. Quincy A. Gillmore in June 1863. As a captain, Gillmore had successfully engineered the reduction and capture of Fort Pulaski, Georgia, fourteen months earlier. He believed that a coordinated land and naval effort, supported by recently arrived reinforcements, would enable him to finally take Charleston. On 4 July 1863, Gillmore met with Rear Adm. John A. Dahlgren, the commander of the South Atlantic Blockading Squadron, to outline his plan of attack. Union troops would march across undefended Folly Island and cross over Lighthouse Inlet in boats to Morris Island, a roughly four-mile-long barrier island that was anywhere from 25 to 1,000 yards wide and somewhat in the shape of a "long-legged boot, [with] the toe pointing towards Charleston."⁵ After landing, the Union forces would move up the beach and attack the two fortifications on the

northern end of the island, Batteries Wagner and Gregg. Once these were taken, heavy guns could be placed at the edge of the harbor to neutralize Fort Sumter and provide cover for the Navy ships to run the entrance into Charleston Harbor, thereby opening the city to capture.⁶

The Confederate defenses on Morris Island were formidable, and proved that the spit of sand and salt marsh would not be taken easily. On the island's southern tip, near the ruins of an old lighthouse and directly across the inlet from Folly Island, were eleven detached batteries connected by a line of rifle pits. Although these guns were unevenly distributed and not well connected, they were built into small hillocks and could give formidable opposition to any landing party on this part of the island (which is where Gillmore intended to attack). Nearly three miles north of Lighthouse Inlet was Battery Wagner, an irregular fortification facing south that stretched from Vincent's Creek, on the James Island side, to the Atlantic Ocean. An

earthwork strengthened with palmetto logs, the battery had a strong land front that was arranged for howitzers and infantrymen who could concentrate on anyone charging up the beach. In front of Wagner was a deep moat designed to fill with seawater at high tide, providing another obstacle. The




gorge wall, to the rear of the battery, was nothing more than an infantry trench, but an attack was not expected from that direction. Three-quarters of a mile north of Battery Wagner, on Cummings Point, was Battery Gregg. This work was not designed to fight off infantry attacks, but instead only to fire on vessels approaching south through the main ship channel into Charleston and was therefore lightly defended. In all, the Confederates had a force of 665 infantrymen, 330 artillerymen, and 26 cavalrymen to defend Morris Island.⁷


The three New Hampshire infantry regiments that joined the Union forces massing on Folly Island in June and early July 1863 for the invasion of Morris Island had followed somewhat similar paths to get there. All of them had been raised over the last six months of 1861 for a period of three years' service, and had spent most of their time up until that point along the Atlantic coast, either on guard duty in Florida or participating in operations in the Carolinas. Although the 7th New Hampshire had not yet been tested in combat, the 3d and 4th regiments had participated in numerous skirmishes and more pitched battles throughout 1862; the most notable action was at Secessionville in June, where the 3d New Hampshire lost 104 men killed and wounded. Nevertheless, all three regiments were well accustomed to the trials and tribulations of army life when they came together amidst the sand hills, pine and palmetto trees, and sparkling white sand beaches on Folly Island.⁸

"THE SCENE WAS VERY EXCITING": THE AMPHIBIOUS LANDING ON MORRIS ISLAND⁹


Gillmore's final plan for the attack on Morris Island, issued on 9 July 1863, was relatively straightforward. That evening, a force under the command of Brig. Gen. George C. Strong, which included the 3d New Hampshire, would march to the north side of Folly Island, where boats would ferry them across the inlet to strike Morris Island at daylight. Meanwhile, a diversionary force, under the command of Brig.



General Strong, c. 1862



General Terry, c. 1865





Union soldiers of the 9th Regiment Infantry, Maine Volunteers, camped on the beach on Morris Island, 1863

Gen. Alfred H. Terry, would sail up the Stono River and land on James Island with the goal of drawing any potential Confederate reinforcements away from Morris Island. Late in the afternoon, the 410 men and officers of the 3d New Hampshire received their orders to march to the embarkation point. Preparations were made for a difficult landing; each man was issued a piece of three-inch-wide cotton cloth to tie to their arms for easy recognition in low-light situations. It was not until almost midnight, however, that the soldiers boarded the boats that would ferry them over to Morris Island.¹⁰

Meanwhile, the 4th New Hampshire, as part of Terry's 3,800-strong diversionary force, boarded the steamers *Beaufort* and *Trade Wind* from the wharves on the opposite end of Folly Island around midafternoon, and headed up the Stono River toward James Island. The small fleet, which consisted of nine transports loaded with troops, two gunboats, one monitor, one mortar schooner, and two or three dispatch boats, came to anchor near sunset on the south end of James Island near the small village of Legareville. Federal gunboats shelled the woods on both James and Johns Islands to provide support for members of the 52d and 104th Regiments

Infantry, Pennsylvania Volunteers, who waded ashore and secured the causeways that connected Sol Legare Island to James Island. Gillmore had ordered Terry not to bring on any general action, however, so the rest of his force remained on the transports offshore. At daybreak the next morning, the men of the 4th New Hampshire still bobbed on their transports in the Stono River, as the "long looked for report of Cannon came plainly to [their] East," where the other two regiments from the Granite State had begun the assault against Morris Island.¹¹

Throughout the night, Strong's force had quietly made their way down the Folly River to Lighthouse Inlet, with nothing to break the sticky stillness of the night except for the dip of the oars into the water. By dawn, they had arrived within sight of Morris Island, and the launches were stopped and pulled up close to the bank of Folly Island. The troops were almost entirely hidden from sight by the tall marsh grass, yet they could clearly see the Confederate batteries and sentinels "walking their beats as though no enemy was near." Around 0500, the relative quiet was shattered as the Union batteries on Folly Island and the Federal gunboats and monitors positioned offshore opened fire.¹²

"It was warm next," recalled the 3d New Hampshire's 1st Lt. George Stearns, of Company C, in his diary, as the Confederate batteries returned fire, dropping some scattered shells around the boats. One solid shot struck a boat nearby Stearns, cutting it in two. Although the young officer's boat was also struck by a shell, fortunately, nobody was hurt.¹³

As the Union and Confederate batteries dueled, Strong's boats slowly worked their way amidst the splashing shells toward Morris Island. When the boats grounded, the men of the 3d New Hampshire leapt into water that was between one and four feet deep. Few paid attention to their soaked clothes as they raced ashore and quickly seized the first line of Confederate rifle pits. Their rapid progress was slowed at the second line, however, by a "murderous fire of musketry and bursting shell which stopped the progress of many." Cpl. Elisha M. Kempton, of Company B, was struck down by a piece of shell that tore through his hat and carried off a small piece of his scalp. Although stunned, Kempton did not realize that he had been wounded until blood began running down his face, blurring his vision, but he remained conscious enough

to bind the wound with his handkerchief.¹⁴ Despite the heavy fire, the 3d New Hampshire, cheered on by the sudden forward presence of their brigade commander General Strong, captured one of the rebel batteries and continued pushing up the beach until they were stopped cold by fire from Fort Sumter and Battery Wagner. Although short of the ultimate goal of conquering the entire island, Strong's men halted and took cover behind the area's numerous sand hills.¹⁵

By the time the 3d New Hampshire landed on the southern beach of Morris Island, reinforcements were already on the way. The men of the 7th New Hampshire, who had spent the night and early morning in support of the Union batteries on Folly Island, were soon loaded onto barges and ferried across Lighthouse Inlet, where they followed the first wave up the beach. They soon found evidence of the Confederates' hasty retreat. There was still "bread in the oven [and] rice in the kittle," as well as cooking utensils, clothing, muster rolls, and the personal baggage of the officers and men strewn around the beach.¹⁶ Around 1600, the men of the 7th joined the 3d New Hampshire in the front lines, where the two Granite State regiments remained, suffering from a lack of potable water, until sunset brought a small semblance of relief from the hot sun.¹⁷



"OUR LOSS WAS VERY SEVERE": THE ATTACKS ON WAGNER¹⁸

The landing at Morris Island had been executed almost flawlessly, but the island was still not completely in Union hands. Gillmore had failed to utilize the second wave of regiments, including the 7th New Hampshire, in quickly launching an assault on Battery Wagner while the Confederate defenders were still somewhat disorganized. Instead, he waited until early the next morning to renew the assault. With the 3d and 7th New Hampshire remaining in reserve, the 7th Connecticut, 76th Regiment Infantry, Pennsylvania Volunteers, and 9th Regiment Infantry,

Maine Volunteers, launched an uncoordinated attack that was bloodily repulsed, even though some soldiers had made it all the way to Wagner's exterior walls. As the survivors of the attack streamed back down the beach, they poured through the lines of the two New Hampshire regiments. General Strong met the men with tears in his eyes, as he cried "my fault" over and over.¹⁹ For Gillmore and his men, it was now obvious that taking Battery Wagner would prove much more difficult than expected.

That same morning, the 4th New Hampshire returned to Folly Island from their diversionary expedition to James Island. As they landed just before noon, some of the men encountered Confederate prisoners, many of them wounded, who had been captured during the initial assault on Morris Island the day before. These prisoners were mostly a "hard-looking set of men," and many remained brash in spite of their situation.²⁰ One of them, a "Big Dutchman," told Pvt. Samuel Wilkinson, of Company F, that "he would not Disgrace his Country So much as to light his Pipe with one of our Green Backs." Wilkinson apparently did not take too kindly to the prisoner's cockiness. "Luckey for him," the Union private quipped, "that he was well Guarded [sic]."²¹ The men of the 4th New Hampshire mostly remained on Folly Island for the next several days, occupied by picket duty, dress parades, and the occasional trip across the inlet to Morris Island to ferry guns and equipment to their comrades who remained at the front.²²

Despite the initial failed attack, Gillmore still believed that Wagner could be taken by a powerful infantry assault, which he scheduled for sunset on 17 July. The attack was to be made by three brigades under the overall command of Brig. Gen. Truman A. Seymour. General Strong's Brigade, which included the 3d New Hampshire, was to spearhead the assault on Wagner. The 7th New Hampshire was to be a part of the second wave, led by their brigade and former regimental commander, Col. Haldimand S. Putnam. Brig. Gen. Thomas G. Stevenson's Brigade was Seymour's third line and intended reserve.²³ To support the




infantry, powerful siege batteries were constructed on the island; these guns, combined with the federal gunboats positioned offshore, were to furiously shell Wagner for the entire day leading up to the scheduled attack. Heavy rain on the 17th, however, forced Gillmore to postpone the attack until after sunset on 18 July.

Although relieved from not having to make the scheduled attack, the inclement weather on the night of 17–18 July made life miserable for the New Hampshire soldiers who were on picket. The driving rain “wet [them] to the skin,” and one officer from the 3d New Hampshire remembered it as “the darkest night [he] ever saw,” as they could not see “a man before [them].”²⁴ Although the men were able to change out of their soaked clothes once off duty, few were able to get any sleep as the preparatory Federal bombardment of Battery Wagner began early the next morning and built in intensity throughout the day. The monitors and the ironclad frigate USS *New Ironsides* soon joined the siege batteries in the attack, and “poured a shower of shot and shell on [Wagner] that must have stove any common fort into atoms.”²⁵ Yet the New Hampshire soldiers would soon find out that the bombardment did not inflict as much damage on Wagner as they thought.

When the shelling concluded around sunset, an eerie silence fell over the island. In this calm before the storm, the assaulting regiments fell in and made their way up the beach until the dim outline of Battery Wagner could be made out, silhouetted against the darkening sky. Around 1945, the first three regiments of Strong’s Brigade, led by Col. Robert G. Shaw’s 54th Regiment Infantry, Massachusetts Volunteers, charged the Confederate position and were soon engaged in fierce combat on Wagner’s parapets. For some unknown reason, the final three regiments of the brigade, including the 3d New Hampshire, were held back and not committed to the attack until the first wave was already languishing on the battery’s walls.²⁶

Led forward by the 3d New Hampshire, the remaining three regiments of



Strong’s brigade finally moved forward in the darkness toward the flashing guns of Battery Wagner. As they neared the work, the men of the 3d were greeted by a “deadly fire of grape and canister,” as well as solid shot from Forts Johnson and Sumter. “The scene was truly exciting, the carnage terrible, [and] the fire deadly, hot and like hail,” remembered one soldier.²⁷ Although spurred on by their regimental commander Col. John H. Jackson, a veteran of the Mexican War, the 3d New Hampshire’s advance was soon halted by a chokepoint: the narrow approach of sand to Battery Wagner that was sandwiched between the ocean and a thick marsh was completely clogged by retreating troops of Strong’s first three regiments. Colonel Jackson sent Lt. Col. John Bedel forward to determine if an attack could be made across the marsh to the left, but Bedel was captured by the Confederates and did not return. Seeing no other option, Jackson reluctantly pushed his regiment through the defile. The heavy fire from Wagner tore huge holes in the packed ranks of the 3d New Hampshire, “cutting men down like grass”; Jackson himself was struck down by a shell fragment, and a now-dismounted General Strong took active control of the survivors of the regiment.²⁸

Strong spurred the 3d New Hampshire forward by commanding them to “take that Fort, & clear those Gentlemen out and sent up a tremendous shout when you get there [sic].”²⁹

However, the advance through the narrow defile had broken up the regiment and drastically reduced its striking power. Only three companies managed to cross the ditch in front of Wagner, where they attempted to rush over the battery’s walls near where the 54th Massachusetts had struck only a short time before. Their position soon became untenable, however, as Putnam’s Brigade failed to come up in support and Strong was forced to order the retreat of his troops. During the chaotic withdrawal, the men were subjected to a “heavy fire of grape and musketry,” and General Strong received a mortal wound from a grape shot in the thigh. “It was an awful sine [sic] in the night to see our poor fellows lying in the ground,” one young officer recalled as the men streamed their way back down the beach.³⁰

As the 3d New Hampshire and the rest of Strong’s men poured back along the narrow beach, Colonel Putnam’s brigade, with the 7th New Hampshire leading, finally began their advance toward Battery Wagner. Due to the narrowness of the beach and the unusually high tide, the left of the regiment had to contend with the marsh that was flooded with anywhere from one to nearly six feet of water. As soon as the guns from Wagner would flash, signaling a hail of grape and canister, the men in the left companies of the 7th New Hampshire were forced to fall down into the brackish water to avoid



Soldiers gathering on the beach to watch USS *New Ironsides* bombard fortifications, 1863

being hit. This caused many of the men to get “wet enough to be heavy,” as the grape shot threw violent splashes of water up into their faces. Capt. Nathan M. Ames, of Company H, was severely injured here as well when his boots got stuck in the thick mud and he was run over by his own advancing men.³¹

Although the advance was often interrupted by the men of Strong’s brigade streaming back through their lines, the 7th New Hampshire kept plodding toward Wagner despite enduring the same terrible fire that their comrades in the first wave had encountered only a short time before. The Confederate fire cut large swaths through the leading New Hampshire regiment. One soldier, in a letter home to his local newspaper, recalled that all the men around him were either wounded or killed; the three to his left were wounded and died before even reaching Wagner, the man in front of him was killed instantly, and the soldier directly to his rear had both of his feet blown off by a Confederate shell.³² Despite the chaos, Colonel Putnam urged his former regiment toward the flashing guns. Closing up as well as possible, the 7th New Hampshire waded across the large ditch in front of the Confederate work—which was some fifty feet wide and flooded with waist-deep sea water from the high tide—and then moved to the right, where they assaulted the seaward-facing salient of the Confederate work and clambered up the parapet wall. By that time, the attack was nearly two hours old.³³

By a flaw in its design, Wagner’s seaward (southeast) salient formed a

small protective work within the battery. The roof of the main bombproof, which bisected the base of the salient, was about six feet higher than the parapet. This small rise provided valuable protection for the Federal soldiers who had climbed Wagner’s walls, but also destroyed all momentum and organization of the attack.³⁴ Chaos reigned on the parapet wall, as up to 200 men from both brigades were clustered into a very small area. “All was wild uproar, with the groans and cries of the wounded,” remembered Lt. Henry G. Webber, “men calling for their officers, officers calling for their men, and many, in wild excitement, yelling with no apparent object but to add to the confusion.”³⁵ Colonel Putnam, delayed because his horse had been shot out from under him during the assault, suddenly appeared among the mass of men clustered on top of Wagner’s parapet. After trying in vain to organize a charge, Putnam crowded his men into a corner, where he endeavored to hold out until reinforcements from Stevenson’s brigade arrived. Shortly after announcing to Capt. August W. Rollins, of Company F, 7th New Hampshire, his determination to “hold out to the last,” a bullet struck Putnam in the head and exited out of the rear of his skull, killing him instantly.³⁶

Stevenson’s brigade never advanced, and for some reason remained further back in reserve. The survivors of Putnam’s advance soon found their position untenable and fled back across the beach and flooded marsh, where the ground was littered with dead and wounded Union soldiers. “On my way back,” one soldier remembered, “I saw hundreds of our good fellows laying

[sic] dead on the marsh who were so anxious to help take the fort but never reached it.”³⁷ By 0100 on 19 July, the battle was over. The only sounds across the battlefield were the groans and cries of the wounded, gently muted by the crash of the surf along the beach. The 7th New Hampshire had suffered the most severely, with 216 total casualties, and 41 men and officers killed or mortally wounded. The officer ranks bore a significant amount of the battle’s brunt in that regiment; of the eighteen officer casualties, twelve were either killed, mortally wounded, or captured. Despite enduring a similarly devastating fire in the first wave of attacks, the 3d New Hampshire had fortunately suffered comparatively few casualties. Only two were killed, with thirty-eight wounded and six captured during the night’s battle.³⁸

“WE ARE SEEING PRETTY HARD TIMES HERE NOW”: THE SIEGE OF WAGNER³⁹

The two disastrous infantry assaults on Battery Wagner convinced General Gillmore that the only reasonable option left for capturing Morris Island was a prolonged siege. The soldiers on the island generally agreed with their commander’s decision; it was the opinion in the 3d New Hampshire and probably other regiments that “it was only a waste of life to throw infantry against it [Wagner] in that way [an infantry assault],” and that “any Gen who would order [an assault] after what has taken place, ought to have a gardian [sic] placed over him. . . .”⁴⁰

Gillmore immediately devised a new plan to conquer the rest of the island. The infantrymen would no longer act as the key instrument of warfare; instead, the engineers and artillerymen would take control by organizing the construction of a series of defensive parallels (trenches), with each one pushing closer up the beach toward the Confederate position. These parallels would be connected by a series of zigzag trenches across the beach, which would prevent the Confederates from being able to fire directly down a defensive line. In addition, heavy Parrott rifles would be mounted to shell Sumter into submission, while other batteries for both guns and mortars would also be constructed to concentrate fire against Batteries Wagner and Gregg. The navy would also provide support with monitors and gunboats positioned just offshore.⁴¹

Beginning on 19 July, the 1st New York State Volunteer Engineer Corps, assisted by detachments of infantrymen, began preparations for opening the siege lines through the establishment of the first parallel (a trench line dug parallel to an enemy's work; the term referred to the line from which siege approaches were started toward the target).⁴² Although the work was relatively simple, it was dangerous to perform during daylight because of the threat of Confederate fire. Therefore, most of the work was done under the cover of darkness. The fatigue party formed a long line, with each man carrying a cylindrical wooden basket that measured three feet by two

feet in diameter, known as a gabion. These gabions were carried to a specific point and then placed upright in the sand. After clearing away roots in the ground with an axe, earth was then shoveled into the gabions. Once these were filled, additional dirt was thrown over the top of the gabions in order to form a natural slope with the ground. Once finished, the men received two more gabions and repeated the process across the beach.⁴³

As this siege work began, the men of the 3d and 7th New Hampshire realized that they would not be leaving Morris Island anytime soon. The regiments' tents, knapsacks, and company baggage were sent over to them from Folly Island, where they set up more permanent camps in the sand of Morris Island. In addition, small reinforcements arrived to assist in the siege operations. Among these was Col. Louis Bell's 4th New Hampshire, who moved their camp from Folly to Morris Island during the night of 20–21 July.⁴⁴


For the first few days following the failed assault on Wagner, the Granite State soldiers endured an unrelenting duty schedule. Every night for about a week, the 3d New Hampshire was forced to fall in on the beach and either serve on the picket line, or be detailed to work on the trenches and various batteries. "The boys have had a hard time of it since they have been here, either on picket or at work all night most every night," Pvt. Edward F. Hall wrote to his wife. "Our regt did not take off their equipments [*sic*]

for 5 nights and 4 days when they first came here. . . ."⁴⁵ The men of the 4th New Hampshire, meanwhile, worked all night on 24 July to construct a series of palisades in front of the first siege parallel in order to protect the working parties from a potential enemy charge down the beach. They started work close to midnight, and were almost immediately greeted by the Confederate defenders on the opposite side of the beach. "Just before we got to whare we were to do our work we were Saluted with a Volley of Rifle Bullets [*sic*]," Private Wilkinson remembered. Luckily, no one was hit in the initial volley, but the men of the 4th were forced to drop to the beach and lie still before retreating back to the picket line. They eventually were able to finish the work that night in relative peace, but the Confederates had further made it clear that the siege would not be easy.⁴⁶

The work schedule soon became more regulated, but nevertheless remained grueling. Every third night the men were detailed to go to the front lines to work on the trenches or to act as pickets, where they would remain for twenty-four hours before being relieved and sent back to camp for rest.⁴⁷ This work pattern quickly wore out the New Hampshire soldiers, who were not used to the rigors of siege warfare. Pvt. Caleb F. Dodge, of the 7th New Hampshire, complained to his sister that "we have to work hard I tell you, we only get an average of about twenty four hours rest out of seven[ty] two. . . ." "Our small force is being fast used up . . . a great



First parallel near Battery Wagner, 1863



Federal mortars aimed at Fort Sumter, c. 1863

many are getting sick from hard work [and] want of sleep,” Private Hall of the 3d New Hampshire wrote to his son. “We haven’t [*sic*] force enough to stand such severe service,” he continued, “our regt has only about 200 men for duty now . . . no one unless they can see it can imagine [*sic*] what an amount of hard work there is to do in a siege of this kind.”⁴⁸

The threat of enemy fire at almost anywhere on the island added to the stress and fatigue. The firing was almost always incessant, and continued both night and day. “We don’t [*sic*] get much sleep,” Private Dodge of the 7th remembered, “for the Rebels keep a throwing shells . . . you get almost a sleep and pop goes, one of Jeff’s mesingers [*sic*] as we call them, over your head.”⁴⁹ Although more annoying than deadly to soldiers such as Dodge who were resting in camp, the effect of the Confederate shells could be horrific to those on duty at the front. Large numbers of men generally were not killed at one time during the siege, but it was not unusual for at least one man per regiment to be killed each day, with sometimes two or three dozen wounded. These solitary deaths, however, were often gruesome. Private Smith of the 4th New Hampshire detailed to his sister about the death of Sgt. Darius A. Drake, of Company D; Drake, who had been home on recruitment service only several months

earlier, was killed by a piece of shell that “cut an awful gash in his thigh and Smashed the bone all to peices [*sic*.” On 27 August, Cpl. Thomas L. Gilpatrick, a soldier from the 4th New Hampshire who had recently been detailed as a sharpshooter, was sitting against a strong embankment when he was struck by a solid shot or unexploded shell probably fired from a battery on James Island. The shell tore off both of his legs so close to his torso that his friends were unable to secure effective tourniquets, and Gilpatrick died in a stretcher before he was even able to reach the hospital. Shells could also cause quicker deaths, albeit just as gory; it was not uncommon to see soldiers with their “head blown off” by Confederate shells.⁵⁰

For their own safety, the men learned to watch the course of the shells and calculate where and when they would land. While working at the front, each fatigue party would usually detail one man to hide behind sand bags and keep watch over the Confederate forts. When the soldier saw the ball of fire from the Confederate guns that signaled an incoming shell, he would call to the working men the name of the fort—Sumter or Moultrie, for example—from which the shell originated. The forts were far enough away that the men would usually have time to take cover in several of the bomb proofs that were


constructed in each siege parallel. Battery Wagner was much closer, however, and the men did not have as much time to react to the fire that emanated from its guns. The only way to avoid injury or death was to immediately drop to their stomachs in the sand, and let the grape and canister, “howling and screaming,” pass over their heads.⁵¹

The long hours of duty and constant threat of enemy fire were not the only factors that wore down the New Hampshire soldiers working in the trenches. Morris Island was a miserable place to live under the best of conditions; it was “nothing but a sand heap” with hardly a tree on it. “There are one or two Palmettoes, but no grass, all sand, & the rest of it swamp,” recalled Lieutenant Stearns of the 3d New Hampshire.⁵² The blowing sand, which some soldiers compared to the familiar winter snowdrifts of New Hampshire, was impossible to escape; some soldiers even apologized for sending letters home still covered in the dust.⁵³ For soldiers that were used to the much more temperate climate of the Granite State, the heat and humidity of the South Carolina summer was also difficult to endure. “I used to think we had warm days at home, but they are not to be compaired [*sic*] with this climate,” complained Lieutenant Stearns. Corporal Kempton, of the 3d, complained to his sister that their camp on Morris Island was “abounding in flies and hot as white sand and a tropical sun can make it. Yesterday the thermometer in the hospital indicated 108 degrees in the coolest place on the island.” There was no escape from the heat, even when off duty; one private complained as he wrote a letter to his wife that “the sweat runs down my face in streams . . . and my shirt is wet through.”⁵⁴

The poor water supply on Morris Island provided the men with no adequate relief from the intense heat. Soldiers would dig wells about three or four feet deep in the sand in order to access water, but much to their chagrin, the water would become brackish and covered with a thick green scum in only a few hours. “The

smell from these wells was sickening,” remembered a soldier from the 7th New Hampshire. At one point, a soldier from the 4th New Hampshire tried to mitigate the brackish water in one of these wells by digging deeper into the sand. To the man’s horror, he dug up a soldier’s leg with a boot still on it—apparently, the dead from a fight a few days before had been buried there. Many yearned for the “clear cool water” from one of New Hampshire’s numerous springs and wells. “If there is anything I would like it would be some of that good water in the well I would give anything for some,” Lieutenant Stearns wrote to his brother, “you do not know what it is to be deprived of good water. . . .” Private Hall of the 3d salivated at the thought of the “white gravel and pebbles at the bottom, and the water coming up in little bubbles.” He would have paid a “good price for a canteen full of it.”⁵⁵

Despite the terrible conditions and hard work, the New Hampshire soldiers remained confident and determined to capture Morris Island. “We are progressing slowly, but surely, with the seige [*sic*] of Charleston,” Pvt. Leander Harris of the 4th New Hampshire wrote home to his wife Emmy. “It is a harder job than most of us expected, but no one doubts but that we shall succeed in the end . . . our works, are being steadily carried forward in spite of all the enemy [*sic*] can do to prevent. Every one has perfect confidence in Gen. Gillmore, and his officers who direct the works.”⁵⁶



Library of Congress

“SUMTER IS ABOUT DONE TO, AND WE HOPE TO HAVE WAGNER AND GREGG SOON”⁵⁷

As July turned into August, the siege lines were steadily advanced up the beach toward Battery Wagner. The second parallel was established on 23 July, and the third on the night of 9 August, only several hundred yards from Wagner’s parapet. “We have to go within about three hundred yards of the rebels Fort,” Private Dodge of the 7th New Hampshire wrote home on 7 August. “You may think that it is fun to be so near to the rebels fortification but I dont see it in the lite [*sic*].”⁵⁸ On the evening of 10 August, the 1st New York Engineers, assisted by one hundred men from the 7th New Hampshire under

the command of 1st Lt. William C. Knowlton of Company D, began work on a battery in the marsh between James and Morris Islands (“it is in the last place I should have thought of building a battery,” remarked Private Hall of the 3d New Hampshire). General Gillmore planned on using this battery to lob incendiary shells into the city of Charleston itself. The work proved difficult, and the job was “disgustingly muddy and nasty,” when the men disembarked from the boats that had carried them to the remote marsh, they were immersed in waist-deep mud. The New Hampshire soldiers struggled all night to establish a solid foundation for the battery. Heavy pine logs were pulled in from the nearby channel of water, but each time they were rolled into position by



Library of Congress

Siege mortars in Battery Reynolds, 1863

ropes attached to either end, the logs almost immediately disappeared into the thick mud. It was only through continued exertion and the use of numerous sandbags and planks that the soldiers were able to finish the night's work. When the filthy, wet, and tired men made it back to the boats near morning, they found that their stacked muskets had sunk as far as the middle bands into the mud, and it was only with the "utmost exertion" that they could extricate them.

The battery, variously nicknamed the "Swamp Angel," or "Marsh Hen," was completed by 21 August, and Company H, 7th New Hampshire, was detailed for picket duty at the battery that night and witnessed its first firing. "How it made things shake!" First Lt. William F. Spaulding remembered. Only seconds after the firing, Spaulding and the rest of his company witnessed a "faint boom" and the light of the exploding shells over Charleston. The sound of fire bells could soon be heard drifting across the harbor, and the soldiers knew that the battery was doing its job. "Again and again the artillery loaded and fired that Parrott gun, we infantry stowing ourselves wherever we could find a place." Unfortunately for the New Hampshire soldiers who labored in its construction, the massive Union gun burst its barrel two days later, after firing only thirty-six shots at Charleston.⁵⁹


Beginning 17 August, the New Hampshire soldiers on Morris Island were treated to a viewing of the most intense Federal bombardment of Fort Sumter during the war. Many of the Union soldiers emptied out of their camps and crowded on top of the island's sand hills to witness the awesome work of the siege batteries



and naval vessels positioned offshore. "Evry Shot was fire Directly over us," Private Wilkinson of the 4th New Hampshire wrote in his diary. "Some of the Shells made Beautiful Music as they pased over us [*sic*]." The bombardment unrelentingly pulverized Sumter's brick walls for several days, and the New Hampshire soldiers watching on Morris Island were impressed by the destruction. After only two days, Wilkinson thought that the fort looked "very much like a Raw Potatoe after being Picked by the Chickens [*sic*]," and by the 22d, "a Brick yard in Distress." The next day, Lieutenant Stearns of the 3d New Hampshire thought that Sumter looked as if would soon collapse, even as the Federal rifled guns continued to get good shots on the fort and make the "Bricks Fly."⁶⁰

After effectively neutralizing the guns of Fort Sumter by 23 August, the federal engineers turned their full attention back to Battery Wagner. By this time, a new problem had manifested

itself for the Union sappers: Wagner's rifle pits were only 150 yards away from the newly established fourth parallel, which allowed the Confederates to fire directly into the Union trenches. Fatigue parties worked for several days to strengthen the fourth parallel by protecting it from the enfilading fire, and at the same time worked to advance the sap closer to Wagner. At dusk on 25 August, the 3d New Hampshire was placed in the forward trenches with orders to charge on and capture the Confederate rifle pits, but through some confusion, the order to attack never came. Instead, a "smart engagement" of small arms fire opened up in the darkness between the two lines that lasted about an hour. The attack was postponed until the next night, when the 24th Regiment Infantry, Massachusetts Volunteers, supported by the 3d New Hampshire in reserve, was ordered forward by the wave of a white handkerchief, held by an officer who was visibly mounted on the works. The





Library of Congress

Engineers using the full sap on Morris Island, 1863


two regiments carried out the assault “in good style,” and the pits were taken along with sixty-seven Confederate prisoners. The infantrymen, who had strapped shovels to their backs before conducting the assault, almost immediately began expanding the newly won rifle pits into a fifth defensive parallel.⁶¹

As fatigue parties pushed the siege lines forward from the fifth parallel, the engineers discovered that the fire from Wagner had become too severe to em-

ploy the traditional flying sap (gabions). Instead, the much slower, but safer, sap roller was used. This was a massive, sand-filled woven basket that was nine feet long and four feet in diameter. It was used much like a portable breastwork for the fatigue parties, and was moved forward using sap hooks and two strong levers that were twelve feet in length. Although it weighed about a ton, the sap roller was slowly pushed forward in the sand a few inches at a

time. Men taking cover behind it would quickly dig a shallow trench about four feet wide and two feet deep, using axes and short-handled shovels. Though much more time-consuming than the gabion method, the sap roller provided better protection for the men as they inched closer to Battery Wagner.⁶²

On Friday, 4 September, the siege lines were finally close enough to Wagner to convince Gillmore that he could once again launch an infantry assault against the work. For two days, heavy and rapid firing from the Union batteries and gunboats pounded Wagner with shot and shell in preparation of the attack. “Sand and timbers have been flying high,” remembered Pvt. Elias A. Bryant of the 4th New Hampshire. The heavy bombardment subdued all return fire from Wagner, and the engineers and infantrymen were able to quickly dig their way the last few yards virtually unopposed. By 6 September, the trenches were so close to Wagner that “one [could] jump at one step” from the Union positions into the battery’s deep seawater ditch, and the men knew that the climax of the battle was fast approaching. “Something up,” Private Wilkinson scribbled in his diary after standing in the hot afternoon sun for an



inspection and review of the brigade by General Gillmore. "All now tends to a decisive moment," wrote Capt. George F. Towle of the 4th New Hampshire. "A crisis is certainly near."⁶³

The 3d New Hampshire and the 97th Regiment Infantry, Pennsylvania Volunteers, were chosen to spearhead the final assault that was to kick off at 0900 on 7 September. These regiments were to be placed in the forward trenches, and when the signal was given, a group of one hundred men, led by Capt. James F. Randlett of the 3d New Hampshire, would rush forward and seize the seaward bastion and spike Wagner's guns. Once this foothold was established, the remaining men would charge over Wagner's walls and seize the rest of the battery. Behind these lead regiments was General Stevenson's Third Brigade, Terry's Division, reinforced by the 4th New Hampshire and the 9th Maine. The second wave was to double-quick up the beach, pass around the work, then form up and enter Wagner from the lightly defended rear. Col. William

W. H. Davis' brigade would come last and position themselves across Morris Island to block any potential Confederate reinforcements coming from Battery Gregg.⁶⁴

The night before the assault was to take place, Captain Randlett ordered all the officers of the 3d New Hampshire into his quarters to outline the plan of attack, as well as to provide them with the spikes to disable Wagner's guns. The rest of the men of the 3d and 4th New Hampshire were roused around midnight, and after getting some much-needed coffee, fell in and marched up the beach toward Wagner. Everyone seemed ready to finally take the Confederate stronghold, no matter the cost. "All the men felt in good spirits & had full confidence in what they were going to do," remembered one of the officers. Nevertheless, experience taught them it would probably be "an unpleasant job."⁶⁵

The men had been in the trenches for several hours, anxiously waiting for the order to advance, when a hopeful rumor quickly began spreading through the ranks: according to a Confederate deserter, Battery Wagner had been evacuated during the night. Captain



Battery Wagner after Union capture, 1863

Library of Congress

Randlett's assault force was still ordered forward, but expecting a Confederate trap, the men cautiously crept through the trenches right up to Wagner's sand walls. Once inside, they found the "Cursed Hole" dark and deserted, with the only living Confederates remaining being the badly wounded who had been left behind within the bombproofs. The rest of the attacking force soon followed Randlett's spearhead into Wagner, and many marveled at the defenses that they had thankfully avoided assaulting. "It was Set all around with a Sort of lance [*sic*]," wrote Private Wilkinson, "A Pole Planted Firmly in the Ground with a steel point. if we had Charged in the dark we would have found Serious trouble with them [*sic*]." To make matters worse, a variety of explosive devices, known as torpedoes, were embedded in Wagner's parapet.⁶⁶ The furious Union bombardment of the past forty-eight hours had also created what the men believed to be "the most horrible Sight dureing the whole Scape [*sic*]."⁶⁷ The Confederates had not been able to bury their dead during the shelling, and bodies lay scattered across the ground within the battery. Even more horrifying, occasional shells had struck the mass graveyard located behind Wagner, turning up "a Dozen half Decomposed Bodies at one time [*sic*]." The smell was so bad that most of the men had to hold their breath in order to keep from getting sick.⁶⁸ Most of the New Hampshire soldiers did not linger at Wagner, but moved quickly farther up the beach to Cummings Point to Battery Gregg, where they expected

the Confederate defenders to remain entrenched. To their surprise, only about one hundred Confederates remained there, waiting to be evacuated to the safety of James Island. Nearly two months after the initial landing, Morris Island was finally under complete Union control.

"THIS CAMPAIGN WILL MAKE OLD SOME OF US"⁶⁹

The shells that greeted the captors of Battery Gregg from the numerous other Confederate forts and batteries that remained around the harbor reminded them that despite Morris Island's capture, Charleston was still under enemy control. After conquering Morris Island and nearly obliterating Fort Sumter, General Gillmore felt that his role in the campaign was over, and left the final capture of Charleston up to the navy. However, unsatisfied because Sumter was never actually taken and only reduced in strength, the navy refused to run the batteries into Charleston Harbor. For all of the work and cost in materials and human lives, the federal campaign on Morris Island failed to achieve its ultimate goal: Charleston remained in Confederate hands and did not fall until Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman forced its surrender in February 1865.

Despite the campaign's technical failure, the Army learned from its experiences. On the beaches of Morris Island, the shovel and the axe became the weapon of choice over the rifle and cannon. Trench warfare, with all its



Fort Putnam, formerly Battery Gregg, c. 1865

horrifying aspects, emerged on the island as a viable method of conquering an opposing stronghold. Combat operations shifted to the cover of darkness to lessen the chance of fatigue parties and pickets being killed by sharpshooters and enemy batteries. Furthermore, the power of the Union's rifled artillery against Fort Sumter once more proved that masonry walls were obsolete and were no longer adequate for future fortifications; the amount of damage that Battery Wagner's sand parapets absorbed throughout the campaign demonstrated that earthworks were the protection of the future. This type of warfare displayed on Morris Island in the summer of 1863 was a preview to the trench warfare that emerged in the final year of the war, as well as the terrible world war to come in the early part of the twentieth century.⁷⁰

For the three New Hampshire regiments that had toiled and bled on Morris Island, the war was far from over. The men remained on the island in various fatigue and picket duties at Batteries Wagner and Gregg—renamed Forts Strong and Putnam in honor of the Union officers who had fallen during the 18 July assault—for the remainder of 1863. In April 1864, as a part of General Gillmore's X Corps, all three regiments were attached to Maj. Gen. Benjamin F. Butler's Army of the James, where they fought in numerous battles during the Bermuda Hundred campaign, at Cold Harbor (only the 4th New Hampshire), and around Petersburg. Despite their service period of three years coming

to end during this time, many of the men in all three regiments reenlisted. In January 1865, all three units once again participated in amphibious operations as a part of the second assault on Fort Fisher, North Carolina. During the attack, the 4th New Hampshire's commander, Colonel Bell, was mortally wounded. For the final spring of the conflict, the 3d, 4th, and 7th New Hampshire remained on duty in various capacities around Wilmington, North Carolina, before being mustered out in the summer of 1865. When they returned home to New Hampshire, fewer than one hundred men remained in each regiment who had left Concord during the latter half of 1861.⁷¹

As costly and important as the struggle for Morris Island was, it quickly slipped from the public's memory—Charleston largely became a backwater due to the Union failures there and also the furious campaigns that opened in the spring of 1864. Most people today are only familiar with Morris Island and Battery Wagner because of the 54th Massachusetts' famous charge during the night of 18 July, and not the siege warfare that ensued for the next one and a half months. Yet for the men of the 3d, 4th, and 7th Regiments, New Hampshire Volunteer Infantry, the hellish experiences on the sweltering beaches and tidal marshes around Charleston in the summer of 1863 always stuck out in their minds. To these men, the work that they did there was just as important, and difficult, as any work done by their fellow soldiers in the Army of the Potomac.

“Any day we are liable to be called into as great danger as any of the Va troops have ever seen,” a soldier in the 3d New Hampshire wrote to his wife only two days after the failed assault against Wagner, “and before we get into Charleston we had no doubt see as hard fighting and as much hard work in the same length of them as they ever did [*sic*].”⁷² Although the campaign was a technically a failure, these men had most certainly sacrificed enough for the ultimate goal of winning the war. Lieutenant Stearns perhaps summed up the feelings of his fellow soldiers perfectly when in a letter home to his cousin he wrote, “I think I could enjoy life in New Hampshire after being in S. Caroline two years [*sic*].”⁷³



NOTES

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2. Ltr, Lucien Smith, 7 September 1863, NHHS.
3. Stephen R. Wise, *Gate of Hell: Campaign for Charleston Harbor, 1863* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1994), p. 23.
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5. *Ibid.*, pp. 40–41; U.S. War Department, *The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies*, ser. 1, vol. 28 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1889), p. 14 (hereafter cited as *OR*); Lt. A. H. C. Jewett, “My Remembrance of Three Years’ Service,” in John Gould Hutchinson, *History of the Fourth Regiment, New Hampshire Volunteers* (Manchester, N.H.: J. B. Clarke, 1896), p. 17.
6. Moore, *Civil War on the Atlantic Coast*, pp. 40–41.
7. Wise, *Gate of Hell*, pp. 2, 15, 61.
8. Otis F. R. Waite, *New Hampshire in the Great Rebellion, Containing Histories of the Several New Hampshire Regiments, and Biographical Notices of Many of the Prominent Actors in the Civil War 1861–65* (Claremont, N.H.: Tracy, Chase & Company, 1870), pp. 169–357; Henry F. W. Little, *The Seventh Regiment New Hampshire Volunteers in the War of the Rebellion* (Concord, N.H.: Ira C. Evans, Printer, 1896), p. 102.

9. Daniel Eldredge, *The Third New Hampshire and All About It* (Boston: E. B. Stillings and Company, 1893), p. 302.
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11. Samuel Wilkinson Diary, 9–10 July 1863, Milne Special Collections, University of New Hampshire Library (UNHL), Durham, N.H.; George F. Towle Diary, 9–11 July 1863, NHHS; Elias A. Bryant, *The Diary of Elias A. Bryant of Francestown, N.H.: As Written By Him While in His More Than Three Years' Service in the U.S. Army in the Civil War* (Concord, N.H.: Rumford Press, N.D.), pp. 107–08; Wise, *Gate of Hell*, pp. 63–64.
12. Eldredge, *Third New Hampshire*, pp. 300–301.
13. George Stearns Diary, 10 July 1863, NHHS; Ltr, George Stearns to mother, 14 July 1863, NHHS; Eldredge, *Third New Hampshire*, p. 301.
14. Eldredge, *Third New Hampshire*, p. 302; Ltr, Elisha Kempton to father and mother, 11 July 1863, NHHS; Ltr, Elisha Kempton to sister, 20 July 1863, NHHS.
15. Ltr, George Stearns to mother, 14 July 1863, NHHS; Eldredge, *Third New Hampshire*, p. 302; Ltr, Elisha M. Kempton to father and mother, 11 July 1863, NHHS.
16. Little, *Seventh Regiment*, p. 109; Ltr, Upton Onville to sister, 12 July 1863, NHHS.
17. Little, *Seventh Regiment*, p. 110.
18. Eldredge, *Third New Hampshire*, p. 318.
19. Wise, *Gate of Hell*, pp. 76–78.
20. Bryant, *Diary*, p. 106.
21. Wilkinson Diary, 11 July 1863, UNHL.
22. Wilkinson Diary, 11–20 July, UNHL; Towle Diary, 11–20 July, NHHS.
23. Wise, *Gate of Hell*, pp. 101, 232–33.
24. *Ibid.*, p. 93; George Stearns Diary, 18 July 1863, NHHS.
25. Ltr, Edward Hall to wife, 20 July 1863, NHHS.
26. Eldredge, *Third New Hampshire*, p. 315; Wise, *Gate of Hell*, p. 107.
27. Eldredge, *Third New Hampshire*, p. 315.
28. *Ibid.*; Wise, *Gate of Hell*, p. 107.
29. Ltr, George Stearns to brother, 29 July 1863, NHHS.
30. Eldredge, *Third New Hampshire*, p. 318; George Stearns Diary, 18 July 1863, NHHS.
31. “Interesting Letter from a Member of the 7th New Hampshire,” *Manchester Dollar Weekly Mirror*, 26 September 1863; Little, *Seventh Regiment*, p. 121.
32. “Interesting Letter,” *Dollar Weekly Mirror*, 26 September 1863.
33. Little, *Seventh Regiment*, pp. 122–23.
34. Wise, *Gate of Hell*, p. 109.
35. Report of the Adjutant General of the State of New Hampshire, for the Year Ending 1 June 1866, vol. II (Concord, N.H.: George E. Jenks, State Printer, 1866) p. 617.
36. *Ibid.*, p. 618.
37. “Interesting Letter,” *Dollar Weekly Mirror*, 26 September 1863.
38. Wise, *Gate of Hell*, p. 233; Report of the Adjutant General of the State of New Hampshire, p. 619.
39. Bryant, *Diary*, p. 121.
40. Ltr, Edward Hall to wife, 20 July 1863, NHHS.
41. Wise, *Gate of Hell*, pp. 119–20; Little, *Seventh Regiment*, p. 131.
42. Earl Hess, *Field Armies and Fortifications in the Civil War: The Eastern Campaigns, 1861–1864* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2005), p. 337.
43. Wise, *Gate of Hell*, pp. 141–42.
44. Little, *Seventh Regiment*, p. 131; Wilkinson Diary, 20–21 July 1863, UNHL.
45. Stearns Diary, 20 July–1 August, NHHS; Ltr, Edward Hall to wife, 20 July 1863, NHHS.
46. Wilkinson Diary 24 July 1863, UNHL; Ltr, Lucien Smith to sister, 31 July 1863, NHHS.
47. Ltr, George Stearns to mother, 7 August 1863, NHHS.
48. Ltr, Caleb Dodge to sister, 7 August 1863, NHHS; Ltr, Edward Hall to son, 27 July 1863, NHHS.
49. Ltr, Caleb Dodge to sister, 7 August 1863, NHHS.
50. Ltr, Lucien Smith to sister, 6 September 1863, NHHS; Jewett, “My Remembrance,” p. 17; Bryant, *Diary*, pp. 113–16.
51. Bryant, *Diary*, p. 114; Ltr, George Stearns to mother, 7 August 1863, NHHS; Ltr, Caleb Dodge to sister, 7 August 1863, NHHS; Ltr, Upton Onville to sister, 4 September 1863, NHHS.
52. Ltr, George Stearns to cousin, 26 September 1863, NHHS.
53. “Interesting Letter,” *Dollar Weekly Mirror*, 26 September 1863.
54. Ltr, George Stearns to mother, 7 August 1863, NHHS; Ltr, Elisha Kempton to sister, 11 August 1863, NHHS; Ltr, Edward Hall, 11 August 1863, NHHS.
55. Little, *Seventh Regiment*, p. 132; Bryant, *Diary*, p. 112; Ltr, Edward Hall, 23 August 1863, NHHS.
56. Ltr, Leander Harris to wife Emmy, 31 August 1863, UNHL.
57. Ltr, Edward Hall to wife Susan, 28 August 1863, NHHS.
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59. Wise, *Gate of Hell*, pp. 148, 171–72; Little, *Seventh Regiment*, pp. 139–42; OR, ser. 1, vol. 28, p. 20; Ltr, Edward Hall, 11 August 1863, NHHS.
60. Towle Diary, 17 August 1863, NHHS; Wilkinson Diary, 17–22 August 1863, UNHL; Stearns Diary, 23 August 1863, NHHS.
61. Wise, *Gate of Hell*, pp. 173–75; Houghton Diary, 25 August 1863, NHHS; Stearns Diary, 26 August 1863, NHHS.
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
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BOOKREVIEWS



Review by Gary G. Shattuck

While various conflicts playing out on the world's warring stage frequently allow easy description of their individual characteristics, it is only by examining them as a whole that one appreciates how interrelated their aspects can be. The long story of military medicine is one of those wartime particulars that has been told from many perspectives over the centuries, but rarely attempted in a single volume. Fortunately, Richard A. Gabriel's *Between Flesh and Steel: A History of Military Medicine from the Middle Ages to the War in Afghanistan* accomplishes that goal admirably, looking beyond individual conflicts and revealing the consistent challenges they provided to wartime medical services.

Between Flesh and Steel covers virtually every aspect of battlefield medicine over the past five centuries in many theaters around the world. It is a wide-ranging story that closely examines the efforts of many of the major powers, drawing occasionally on the experiences of ancient states, while mainly covering land-based warfare with only passing reference to naval concerns.

Gabriel, a former U.S. Army officer, a professor of history at the Royal Military College of Canada, and the author of more than forty books, examines his subject as it unfolded by the century, devoting a chapter to each. While there are no images accompanying the text, many interesting tables list detailed statistics on such things as mortality rates, weapon lethality, the number and types of wounds, casualty rates, and a creative display of the dispersion of soldiers throughout conflicts in the ages of muscle, gunpowder, and technological innovation. A comprehensive thirteen-page bibliography completes the effort, identifying an eclectic range of sources that will enable a researcher to find even the most obscure of authorities.

In the introductory chapter describing the emergence of modern warfare, Gabriel provides an excellent overview of its evolution. The author discusses the introduction of gunpowder, the changing types of weaponry that affected the tactical distribution of soldiers on the battlefield, the wounds they suffered and their rough treatment, and the all-too-frequent deaths caused by infection and disease—all matters

already familiar to students of military conflicts. However, it is in the subsequent chapters that this story shines, providing much information to help the reader understand and appreciate the physical discomforts that injured troops experienced in obtaining care, regardless of the location or time of conflict.

The author frequently mentions the issue of the competency of the medical practitioner, whether he be a physician, surgeon, or barber-surgeon, and Gabriel fully describes the evolution of each role. Individual struggles for recognition in a developing medical bureaucracy constituted an important consideration in the efficacy of the overall care provided to injured soldiers. Similarly, with the overall changes taking place in the world's societies, governments were forced to refocus their attention from upper class, rank-purchasing individuals to providing for the common good—personified by the lowly foot soldier. As Gabriel explains, it was only in the nineteenth century that these competing interests were able to put aside their prejudices and work together to provide the most efficient medical care on the battlefield to date.

The tools used by wartime caregivers consistently evolved as soldiers' injuries changed with new and more destructive weaponry. Surgical instruments became more sophisticated as innovative practitioners adapted to new kinds of bodily damage, and medical professionals ultimately changed their approach to treating these wounds. The Napoleonic, Franco-Prussian, Crimean, and American Civil wars

of the nineteenth century, often called the “Age of Amputation” (p. 129), provided ample opportunities for physicians to adapt to various environments that required new procedures. Anesthesia, bacteriology, and antiseptic surgery are some of the most noteworthy contributions during this time, making doctors’ work more effective and increasing survival rates.

One consistent factor in all conflicts is the need for medical staff to have ready access to the wounded in spite of doctors’ physical separation from the battlefield. Advances in triage and mobility made it increasingly possible to lessen delays in treatment by locating field and rear-placed facilities closer to the actual point of conflict. Accordingly, the use of litters, ambulances, wagons, mechanized vehicles, helicopters, and airplanes all become important aspects of the story. Gabriel later describes the evolving practices of doctors in both their initial care and subsequent monitoring during the patients’ healing process. He also discusses wound management, infection, sanitation, and overall hygiene to enable the reader to appreciate the challenges of surviving this important postbattle phase of soldiers’ lives.

Between Flesh and Steel is also notable for relating some of the more obscure events that took place in the advancement of battlefield medicine. The author describes the development of plastic surgery, the recognition of psychiatric problems and their treatment, the invention of gas masks by medical personnel, the use of plaster of paris to immobilize broken bones, and the practice of identifying the wounded and their caregivers as noncombatants in case of capture by the enemy.

One of the most frustrating aspects of military medicine that Gabriel addresses is its inability to maintain a body of institutional knowledge that would aid in the transfer of hard-learned lessons of the past to medical teams of the future. Over the centuries, soldiers have repeatedly suffered because effective practices from past wars were not adequately documented, preventing their timely use in future

conflicts. The invention of the printing press helped to resolve some of this difficulty, but persistent divisions within the medical profession and an unwillingness to adopt past lessons only delayed their deserved recognition and implementation, much to the detriment of the wounded.


Gabriel concludes with the fact that survival from traumatic wounds requires rapid treatment to stem blood loss and inhibit the onset of shock. Because these factors will not wait for the arrival of trained medical personnel, modern-day soldiers are taught to quickly intervene. Tourniquets are now a part of all soldiers’ equipment and their use is attributed to the survival of some 2,000 individuals in the recent Iraq and Afghanistan wars (p. 257).

Between Flesh and Steel is not a part of the frequently read genre devoted to the military profession, but it certainly deserves to be. The proper care of survivors of violent battlefield clashes, including civilian victims, constitutes an uncomfortable aspect of life that many might choose to ignore. However, it is through those experiences that we are able to collectively increase the overall state of medical knowledge and effective care to allow for the survival of many who would otherwise perish.

Gary G. Shattuck, a former federal prosecutor, is a graduate of Vermont Law School and American Military University and holds degrees in anthropology, military history, and law. He has served in various legal capacities, including adviser to the governments in Kosovo and Iraq. He is the author of *Insurrection, Corruption & Murder in Early Vermont: Life on the Wild Northern Frontier* (Charleston, S.C., 2014), *Artful and Designing Men: The Trials of Job Shattuck and the Regulation of 1786–1787* (Mustang, Okla., 2013), and *Green Mountain Opium Eaters: A History of Early Addiction in Vermont* (Charleston, S.C., 2017).



Selling War: A Critical Look at the Military’s PR Machine



By Steven J. Alvarez
Potomac Books, 2016
Pp. xxi, 345. \$34.95

Review by Jeffrey T. Brierton

In *Selling War: A Critical Look at the Military’s PR Machine*, Steven J. Alvarez takes the reader on a very personal journey behind the scenes of the conflict in Iraq. He provides an up-close and personal account of how the military managed—or mismanaged—the information war there. Alvarez served as a military public affairs officer (PAO) in the U.S. Army Reserve from 2004 to 2005. It was his mission, and that of his PAO colleagues, to present the news of the war effort in the hope of convincing Iraqis, and Americans at home, that the combat war was over and that Americans were helping to restore peace in Iraq. *Selling War* is a unique personal history of the American presence in Iraq as seen through the eyes of a warrior journalist.

The early chapters of the book describe the author’s experiences in Washington and his subsequent arrival in Iraq. Like many of his colleagues, he believed he had something to offer the postcombat mission of securing the peace. The mission became more complicated when he was assigned to the command of General David Petraeus after the U.S. transfer of authority to the Iraqi government. After arriving in Iraq as a new PAO, Alvarez’s adjustment to the chain of command and their personalities offers valuable insight into the egos of his commanders. His description of his

relationship with Petraeus is direct and typical of the Alvarez narrative style: “We couldn’t be more different. He was active duty. I was a reservist. He was a field officer. I was company grade. He was a West Pointer. I had gotten commissioned late in my career. I had a master’s degree. He had a doctorate. He seemed worldly and refined. I was street smart and rough. He told me, I don’t need a PAO. I am my own PAO” (p. 72).

Alvarez offers his most compelling accounts of his experiences and relationships with Iraqi media representatives and the ensuing frustration with attempts to project a consistent message. This becomes apparent as he describes his efforts to showcase Iraqi military successes to local, U.S., and international media outlets. He grows increasingly disillusioned as the U.S. military command tries to project the appearance of success in Iraq in an effort to ensure continuing American political and public support, while at the same time, facing a chaotic Iraqi and Arab media. To further complicate his mission, the insurgents became much more adept in their own manipulation of the different aspects of the media: “The insurgents used informational jiu-jitsu to help their cause. Al-Jazeera’s coverage of collateral damage caused outrage in the Pan-Arab world. Ultimately, the ones who win the informational struggle are the insurgents, because more Iraqis and Arabs became supportive or tolerant of them” (p. 277).

In subsequent chapters, Alvarez provides a comprehensive treatment of several other aspects of the war effort and the management of information pertinent to the conflict. He discusses the relationship of the PAO office with Al-Jazeera and the coverage of the important battle for Fallujah. The last chapter provides a fascinating description of the relationships between the military effort, the office of the PAO, and the western media. Finally, in his powerful epilogue, Alvarez offers a sobering retrospective of his time in Iraq and subsequent events since his coming home. He seems to find some bittersweet comfort in the 2006 Iraq Study Group Report that, ironically, reflects his own frustration and disillusionment:

In addition, there is significant underreporting of the violence in Iraq. The standard for recording attacks acts as a filter to keep events out of reports and databases. A murder of an Iraqi is not necessarily counted as an attack. If we cannot determine the source of an attack, that attack does not make it into the database. A roadside bomb or a rocket or mortar attack that doesn’t hurt U.S. personnel doesn’t count. For example, on one day in July 2006, there were 93 attacks or significant acts of violence reported. Yet a careful review of the reports for that single day brought to light 1,100 acts of violence. Good policy is difficult to make when information is systematically collected in a way that minimizes its discrepancy with policy goals (p. 335).

Selling War should be on every war correspondent’s reading list. Alvarez reminds them again that the military leaders and the politicians directing them are not in the truth business; they are in the winning-the-war business. He also reminds those who cover the war, in and out of uniform, that they must face the stiff reality of having to deliver a “managed” message. What pours from his pages, at least to those old enough to remember, is that failure to understand whom we are fighting and why leads inevitably to an irreconcilable loss of both blood and treasure.

This reviewer’s only criticism of *Selling War* is that it can ramble a bit, particularly as Alvarez recounts the many anecdotal episodes of his tour of duty in Iraq. Experienced military personnel and war correspondents familiar with this experience might be more comfortable with this style, but it can challenge the less informed civilian reader to stay with the book to its powerful end. In his own words, he describes *Selling War* as part memoir, part catharsis, part after-action review, part white paper, and a firsthand account of his yearlong assignment as a PAO. This fragmented narrative structure tends to disrupt the flow of his compelling story.


That said, make no mistake: Alvarez has written a very important book, and military officers and journalism students would be wise to read and

study this work more than once. *Selling War* sheds important light on the bureaucracy of military public relations and the brutal truth about the effort of military PAOs to win the “hearts and minds” of Iraqis and Americans. It also serves as a reminder that we didn’t learn very much at all from previous conflicts, and that we can indeed count on truth to be the first casualty of war.

Dr. Jeffrey T. Brierton served for ten years in the U.S. Army Reserve as an armored cavalry scout in the 2d Battalion, 338th Regiment, 85th Division, in Waukegan, Illinois, with six of those years as a drill instructor. He separated from the service in 1993 as a staff sergeant. He holds a doctorate degree in American history from Loyola University.



Fatal Sunday: George Washington, the Monmouth Campaign, and the Politics of Battle



By Mark Edward Lender
and Garry Wheeler Stone
University of Oklahoma Press, 2016
Pp. xxi, 600. \$34.95

Review by John R. Maass

Readers interested in the military history of the War for American Independence have long awaited a modern study of the Battle of Monmouth Courthouse, the sprawling 1778 clash in northern New Jersey between George Washington’s Continental forces and the retreating British forces under Sir

Henry Clinton. *Fatal Sunday: George Washington, the Monmouth Campaign, and the Politics of Battle*, a detailed, 600-page description of the event, is a model narrative of a complex Revolutionary War engagement that will certainly be the definitive account of this campaign for years to come, and is augmented by eighteen valuable maps.

In their straightforward narrative, Mark Edward Lender and Garry Wheeler Stone provide an exhaustive story of the entire Monmouth campaign, which was the summer retreat of British forces from Philadelphia across New Jersey to reach their base at New York City. The authors provide several initial context chapters to describe the strategic situation in early 1778, the wintertime training of the Continental Army under Baron von Steuben at Valley Forge, Washington's difficulties in command and with Congress, and the two opposing armies. The American army was "a substantially improved fighting force" (p. 72), as the redcoats would soon appreciate.

Clinton left Philadelphia in June and marched his troops in excessive heat and over dusty roads to New York. Recognizing an opportunity to catch Clinton on the move with his better-trained Continentals, Washington set out to chase the enemy by quickly marching east. After long treks, the American commander finally got his men into position for a strike at the British column by the end the month near Freehold, New Jersey.

Perhaps the most colorful character in the Monmouth campaign was Maj. Gen. Charles Lee, Washington's second in command. Lee was a peculiar, eccentric man who seemed to resent Washington's exalted position above his own. The authors provide an excellent account of Lee's controversial actions as the leader of the Continental advance force trying to close with the enemy—the most famous incident of the battle. Lee got his men too far in front of the American main body, and soon realized that he faced not just the British rear guard, but instead the majority of their troops, whom Clinton had turned around to catch the American rebels off guard. While a number of previous accounts of the battle report that Lee lost control

of his force and had to retreat in panic, Lender and Stone show that Lee's retrograde west to a better position was a wise move; that his men were not panicked and made an orderly withdrawal; and that he was never ordered by Washington to make an attack on the enemy. Still, his orders regarding the retrograde were confusing and misunderstood by his lieutenants.

Nevertheless, when Washington approached Lee's confused retreating troops, he became angry and confronted Lee in warm language. The authors conclude that Lee acted prudently and that Washington should have kept the main body of his army in closer support. They also dispel the myth that Washington ordered Lee from the field and swore at him. Lee stayed with the army and provided valuable service the rest of the day, but was later court-martialed.


Washington quickly gained control over the situation and organized a defensive line in what the authors call "one of the general's finest hours" (p. 296). Heavy fighting continued on the American left and Washington's artillery made an attack against the main rebel line out of the question for the British commander. Lender and Stone take readers through the complex fighting and maneuvering of that scorching afternoon, and are clear to point out that once General Clinton saw that he faced all of Washington's army and local militia forces on his flank, he chose to end the battle and proceed with his primary objective: to get his men and wagons to New York safely. "Clinton made a relatively quick decision not to renew any infantry assault," the authors note, as "there was no point" (p. 331). Late in the afternoon, Washington ordered an attack on the retreating British units, but by dusk he was forced to call it off. "Around midnight, Clinton quietly broke camp, slipped into the night, and left the battlefield to Washington" (p. 349). The rebel leader decided not to pursue Clinton.

Lender and Stone have provided a remarkably lucid description of an unusually complex battle, and have done historians and readers of the Revolutionary War a great service with their clear account and superb accompanying maps.

Dr. John R. Maass is a historian at the U.S. Army Center of Military History. He received a bachelor's degree in history from Washington and Lee University and a Ph.D. in early U.S. history from the Ohio State University. He is the author of the first pamphlet in the Center of Military History's Campaigns of the War of 1812 series, titled *Defending a New Nation, 1783–1811* (Washington, D.C., 2013); *The Road to Yorktown: Jefferson, Lafayette and the British Invasion of Virginia* (Charleston, S.C., 2015); and *George Washington's Virginia* (Charleston, S.C., 2017).



Soldiers in the Army of Freedom: The 1st Kansas Colored, the Civil War's First African American Combat Unit



By Ian Michael Spurgeon
University of Oklahoma Press, 2014
Pp. xii, 442. \$29.95

Review by Evan C. Rothera

Ian Michael Spurgeon begins *Soldiers in the Army of Freedom: The 1st Kansas Colored, the Civil War's First African American Combat Unit* by correctly observing that few people know anything about the 1st Kansas Colored Infantry. Even among scholars, the author continues, the regiment usually merits only a footnote. His point is striking: the 1st Kansas Colored Infantry was the first black regiment raised in a northern state and the first to see combat during the American Civil War—at the Battle of Island Mound in Missouri on 28–29 October

1862. Why, therefore, has the regiment been forgotten? Spurgeon identifies two reasons: first, the 1st Kansas saw action in the Trans-Mississippi Theater, which has always received far less attention in the historiography than the Eastern and Western Theaters; second, the unit is overshadowed by the 54th Massachusetts Infantry, an African American regiment and the subject of the 1989 film *Glory*. The author's goal, therefore, is to "shed light on the relative anonymity of black soldiers from Kansas and to describe their contributions to Union victory in the Trans-Mississippi Theater of the Civil War" (p. 6). Spurgeon believes, quite properly, that the men of the 1st Kansas are long overdue for recognition especially because they "broke a key color barrier in American society" (p. 6).

As the author of a biography of U.S. Sen. James Henry Lane of Kansas, Spurgeon is quite familiar with the state. He begins with the violent Bleeding Kansas clashes and describes how the territory became a battleground between proslavery and antislavery forces, commenting that "most free-state settlers did not engage in a crusade to end slavery. They opposed proslavery rule in Kansas because it defied the antislavery majority" (p. 14). In other words, Kansas was hardly an egalitarian paradise, despite a substantial majority of free-staters. Most government officials, in the early days of the Civil War, did not see any need for black soldiers. Lane, one of the most fervent proponents of immediate action against the rebel states, did not advocate an emancipation policy at the beginning of the war but quickly grew extremely hostile to slavery. Lane soon argued for the use of black soldiers on pragmatic grounds: they could kill traitors and save the lives of white northerners by their service. Lane soon began to recruit black soldiers in Kansas because wartime migration created a reservoir of recruits, even in the face of an ambivalent response by the federal government. While many black men volunteered to join the regiment, not all able-bodied men wanted to serve and some recruiting officials utilized aggressive methods to fill the ranks. Forced enlistments did not bother Lane because he considered

black military service a "tool to protect Kansas and the Union, not a humanitarian measure" (p. 68).

The 1st Kansas Colored Infantry saw its first fighting at the Battle of Island Mound in October 1862, several months before the unit was mustered into federal service. The importance of this engagement, Spurgeon asserts, was not in its size—in fact, it was a small affair, particularly when compared to other battles like Shiloh or Antietam. The true significance of Island Mound was that it marked a notable milestone—the first time black soldiers saw combat during the Civil War. It did not hurt that the 1st Kansas fought bravely and won the battle. Despite accolades, little changed for the outfit until 1863 when President Abraham Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation opened the door for black soldiers. Senator Lane used the performance of the 1st Kansas at Island Mound to humiliate Democrats who claimed black soldiers would not fight. Thus, "by demonstrating its ability to defeat the enemy as capably as a white regiment, the First Kansas Colored Infantry helped shape policy in Washington, D.C." (p. 107). The regiment was mustered into federal service in 1863, although they soon encountered discriminatory policies: black men could be soldiers, but the government did not issue commissions to two black officers who helped build the regiment.

The unit was soon in the field, fighting both rebel guerrillas and soldiers. The Confederates did not take well to the presence of African American troops, and on at least one occasion executed the wounded and mutilated the bodies of dead soldiers. Before long, the 1st Kansas went to Indian Territory, present-day Oklahoma, and played a prominent role in the campaign as the "backbone of Major General Blunt's army" (p. 147). The regiment's relocation, Spurgeon comments, was both a blessing and a curse. While black soldiers, who had enlisted to fight, would indeed "see their share of combat as long as they remained a vital part of Union operations south of Kansas" (p. 158), events in the Trans-Mississippi were usually ignored in favor of the other theaters. Despite

the lack of attention, the 1st Kansas fought ferociously and played a key role in the resounding Union victory at Cabin Creek against Col. Stand Watie and a mixed rebel force of Texans and Indians. At the Battle of Honey Springs, the Kansas troops helped smash a much larger Confederate force, who, incidentally, had with them 500 pairs of iron shackles. The purpose of these shackles, the author notes, was not lost on the black soldiers. The men understood that they fought "not only for the Union and the freedom of slaves across North America, but also for their own freedom" (p. 173). Through their discipline and bravery, the men of the 1st Kansas commanded respect from their white comrades.

Spurgeon does not shy away from the unpleasant elements of the story of the all-black unit, specifically, their participation in the Camden Expedition, the Arkansas phase of the Red River Campaign. At the Battle of Poison Spring, rebels attacked the outnumbered Kansas troops. Although it took them a very long time to break the 1st Kansas lines, rebel soldiers later "partook in one of the Civil War's most notable atrocities" (p. 214) and mutilated wounded and dying black soldiers. This was not an isolated incident, the author cautions, nor was it the last time the 1st Kansas suffered from rebel barbarity. At Flat Rock Creek, one company from the regiment and a company from the 2d Kansas Cavalry were attacked and defeated by a much larger rebel force, who massacred many of the black troops.

By April 1865, Spurgeon observes, the 1st Kansas had not seen combat in months and their service primarily involved occupation duty. In a war where disease killed far more men than bullets, the unit was a notable exception to that trend as it "lost more men to bullets and shell fragments than to sickness" (p. 252). In his epilogue, the author traces, as best he can, the careers of the men of the 1st Kansas in the postbellum period. He also includes a comprehensive roster of the unit that runs for ninety-two pages.


In sum, this is an interesting and well-written analysis of a regiment that deserves much more attention and notice. Spurgeon offers a compelling

account of the determination and valor of the men of the 1st Kansas Colored Infantry as well as the impact they had on the Civil War and the United States more generally. This book will appeal to students and specialists as well as a popular audience.

Evan C. Rothera is a postdoctoral fellow in the History Department at the Pennsylvania State University. His dissertation analyzes civil wars and reconstructions in the United States, Mexico, and Argentina. He has published articles in the *Journal of Mississippi History* and the *Journal of Supreme Court History*, as well as numerous book reviews.



1941: Fighting the Shadow War, A Divided America in a World at War



By Marc Wortman
Atlantic Monthly Press, 2016
Pp. xi, 409. \$27

Review by Alan C. Cate

In recounting America’s “complex, contentious” path into World War II, Marc Wortman’s new book tells an old story well. Ranging widely from domestic politics to the diplomatic challenges of neutrality, *1941: Fighting the Shadow War, A Divided America in a World at War* covers the period from the mid-1930s until that “date which will live in infamy,” when the Japanese Navy wrecked America’s Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor and plunged the nation into global war. Wortman, who has penned two previous works on military history,

provides a kaleidoscopic series of short chapters that offer a gripping account of people and events that were front-page news more than seventy-five years ago, but have likely slipped from historical memory today. More significantly, *1941* appears well timed at a moment when, once again, millions of Americans, facing a tumultuous world, are drawn to an “America First” foreign policy.

Although the book does not attempt an argument, it does have a theme—namely, that what became the “Greatest Generation” was initially, in the author’s apt phrase, “the Most Conflicted Generation” (p. 3). While an overwhelming majority of Americans despised the dangerous powers on the march throughout the 1930s—the evil axis of Nazi Germany, Imperial Japan, and Fascist Italy—they were also resolute in their determination to stay out of overseas conflicts. This sentiment stretched as far back as the nation’s founding and the warnings of George Washington and Thomas Jefferson about “entangling alliances.” It also reflected the blessings of geography, which provided the United States with weak, benign neighbors north and south, and shielded it on the east and west with two broad oceans. Aversion to foreign quarrels had more recent roots in World War I. The United States belatedly entered that contest so that the world might be “made safe for democracy,” yet the international scene in the war’s aftermath made a mockery of that ringing phrase. Two very different economic experiences—absorption with prosperity in the Roaring 20s and the desperate focus on extricating the country from the Great Depression in the 1930s—further turned Americans inward.

Most depictions of the American run-up to war portray President Franklin D. Roosevelt (FDR) as a farsighted commander in chief who correctly grasped the necessity of opposing the Axis while remaining mindful that, as the leader of a democracy, he could not get too far ahead of his people. As the president himself plaintively noted to an intimate, “It’s a terrible thing to look over your shoulder when you are trying to lead—and find no one there” (p. 57). Wortman strays slightly from

this sympathetic rendering; while not exactly hostile to FDR, he does not hesitate—at times seeming to echo the charges of contemporary isolationists and anti-interventionists—to identify where the president played fast and loose with the truth, and maybe even the law. The author cites FDR’s own declaration that he was “willing to mislead and tell untruths” to oppose the dictators, while baldly asserting that Roosevelt employed “lies, deceit, and tricks to arouse the nation for war” (p. 313).

For instance, Wortman details how, starting in 1940, the president allowed a foreign intelligence service—Great Britain’s—to covertly operate on American soil to gather information and influence public opinion here to favor aid to Britain. FDR also authorized a wealthy, passionate amateur—the young Nelson Rockefeller—to construct what the author labels “America’s first homegrown foreign intelligence network” to counter Axis penetration of the Western Hemisphere through the use of both “white” propaganda and clandestine “black ops,” which included spreading bogus information in friendly Latin American capitals about Nazi intentions (p. 75). In pursuing a strategy he termed “aggressive nonbelligerence,” Roosevelt directed “neutral” American warships to shadow German vessels and communicate their whereabouts to the Royal Navy (p. 36). By September 1941, the U.S. Navy patrolled an expansive neutrality zone that “covered more than three-quarters of the entire Atlantic Ocean” and was embroiled in an undeclared shooting war with the German Navy (p. 285). Still, while Wortman repeatedly demonstrates how the president pushed the envelope on neutrality, it takes him only a sentence to dismiss the fringe canard that FDR had advance knowledge of the Pearl Harbor attack and allowed it to occur in order to achieve his goal of getting the nation into the war.

The strategic problems posed by Germany in Europe and by Japan in the Far East and Pacific were, in Roosevelt’s words, “so vast and so interrelated that any attempt even to state them compels one to think in terms of five continents and seven seas” (p. 197). Yet while engaged in diplomatic and military fencing with adversaries abroad, the

president also had to contend with very real domestic opposition to American involvement.

“Politics stops at the water’s edge” is a comforting adage that, historically, may be honored more in the breach than in observance. This certainly was the case regarding the question of whether the United States ought to aid Britain, as that embattled nation stood alone against the Nazis in 1940–1941. Wortman does an excellent job illustrating what we today might call the extreme polarization over this issue. FDR desperately wished for a bipartisan approach—recollecting how bitter partisan politics had torpedoed Woodrow Wilson’s cherished goal of American membership in the League of Nations two decades earlier—going so far as to name two interventionist Republicans to his cabinet in July 1940.

Nevertheless, in response to Roosevelt’s maneuvers such as negotiating a destroyers-for-bases deal with Britain, getting Congress to agree to an unprecedented peacetime draft, and implementing lend-lease assistance, his outraged opponents called him a dictator. An isolationist senator likened the president’s policies to a New Deal agricultural measure that paid farmers to eliminate excess crops, notoriously declaring that they would “plow under every fourth American boy” (p. 160). Wortman, in a book stocked with nicely descriptive individual portraits, is particularly good in painting a picture of FDR’s most formidable opponent, the aviation hero Charles Lindbergh. The “Lone Eagle”—racist, anti-Semitic, and at times perilously close to sounding pro-Nazi—became, despite an aversion to the press and publicity, “a dauntingly hard-nosed and effective fighter” as a spokesman for the isolationist America First Committee (p. 188).


In February 1941, ten months before Pearl Harbor, the powerful and pro-intervention media mogul Henry Luce proclaimed in his famed “The American Century” essay, “We are in the war. The irony is that Hitler knows it—and most Americans don’t” (p. 2). The day after Pearl Harbor, the nation’s staunchest and most influential isolationist newspaper, the *Chicago Tribune*, declared in a page-one editorial, “All that matters today is that we are in a war and we

must face that fact” (p. 335). Although much danger and many arguments lay ahead, the country was unified as never before, or arguably, since. The considerable virtue of Wortman’s sparkling narrative is that it vividly brings to life all the uncertainty and divisiveness that preceded this seminal moment.

Alan C. Cate is a retired Army colonel who taught history at the United States Military Academy at West Point. He earned his master’s in history from Stanford University. He currently teaches history at an independent preparatory school outside of Cleveland, Ohio.



MacArthur’s Korean War Generals



By Stephen R. Taaffe
University Press of Kansas, 2016
Pp. vii, 267. \$34.95

Review by William M. Donnelly

Thirty years ago, Clay Blair published *The Forgotten War: America in Korea, 1950–1953* (New York, 1987), which includes his critique of the U.S. Army’s performance during the first twelve months of the Korean War. Blair, a reporter who covered the Pentagon during the war, decades later set out to create a “battle narrative” of that year and to use that record as a tool with which to examine the Army’s field grade and general officer leadership. That examination, conducted more in the spirit of a crusading journalist than a historian, concluded that too many of these leaders failed the test of command in battle.

Stephen R. Taaffe, a historian at Stephen F. Austin State University, is the author of studies on General Douglas MacArthur’s campaign in New Guinea and General George C. Marshall’s management of senior Army commanders during World War II. Taaffe used the expertise developed from his research for those books to assess the service’s general officer corps in the first year of its next war because it “is impossible to accurately evaluate the army’s performance during the Korean War’s first decisive year without examining its combat leadership at the field army, corps, and division levels” (p. 204).

MacArthur’s Korean War Generals is not another narrative of 1950–1951. The battles of that year are instead concisely summarized for use in Taaffe’s evaluation of their officers. The book’s first chapter sets the stage with brief discussions about Korea from 1945 to 1950, MacArthur’s actions, and the “ramshackle” U.S. Army of June 1950. The next chapter is an analysis of the Eighth Army’s retreat to and defense of the Pusan perimeter. In the third chapter, Taaffe looks at “MacArthur’s Last Hurrah”—the Inchon landing and subsequent pursuit into North Korea. Chapter 4 covers the Chinese intervention and the retreat of United Nations forces back to South Korea. The last chapter takes the Eighth Army through its revitalization by then-Lt. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway, its return to the 38th parallel, and its defeat of the Chinese spring offensives. The book ends with Taaffe’s conclusions regarding the performance of the officers involved.

The author includes incisive character sketches of MacArthur and the twenty-one men who commanded at army, corps, and division levels, highlighting the ways that their training, education, experience, and personality shaped how they commanded. Their varied backgrounds and careers show that there were multiple paths to senior command. Taaffe pays close attention to the interactions between these men and the effects of those exchanges, most notably those generated by the poor relationship between MacArthur and Lt. Gen. Walton Walker, Eighth Army’s first commander during the war. There is little detail concerning the dealings

between division commanders and their field grade commanders, an important consideration in evaluating these general officers. Taaffe rightly points out that most of the men holding field grade and general officer commands in June 1950 had been selected for reasons other than their potential fitness for leading troops into battle. However, readers not familiar with the history of the Army between 1945 and 1950 would have benefited from a more extensive discussion on how these selections were shaped by the lessons the Army learned from mobilizing for World War II and its planning for World War III, the only contingency the service considered likely to occur.

Organizational records cannot answer the questions of how well a general commanded soldiers in combat and the reasons for that performance. Therefore, like Blair's book, Taaffe's work makes extensive and effective use of memoirs, oral histories, interviews, and material from collections of personal papers, including interviews Blair conducted for his book that are now at the Army's Heritage and Education Center at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Taaffe's bibliography shows his awareness of the extensive scholarly works on the Army in the Korean War that were produced in the years after Blair published his 1987 work. On occasion, however, these sources are not used to their best advantage in the text. Thomas Hanson's work is absent from the citations for the discussion of Eighth Army's condition in June 1950. On page 200, the author criticizes the method Ridgway used to purge the Eighth Army for creating a precedent that inhibited the removal of ineffective commanders in later wars. This criticism, presented without any supporting argument or citation, likely draws on the work of Thomas Ricks' *The Generals: American Military Command from World War II to Today* (New York, 2012), which is in the bibliography.

Overall, Taaffe agrees with Blair that Army general officer leadership—particularly during the war's first six months—too often ranged from inadequate to mediocre. The analysis supporting his conclusions, however, is more nuanced than Blair's and more cognizant both of the difficulties in

making such evaluations and the factors that must be taken into account. Taaffe concludes that despite his "brilliant victory" at Inchon, MacArthur "failed" in this war, making "one poor decision after another that contributed greatly to Eighth Army's woes" (p. 215). Ridgway is graded as the best of Eighth Army's commanders, while the many difficulties Walker faced are considered in the mixed verdict given him. Of the corps commanders, the controversial Lt. Gen. Edward M. Almond is ranked first, because for "all of Almond's undoubted flaws, he usually got the job done" (p. 217). His evaluations for the division commanders during the first six months of the war range from leaving "much to be desired" to becoming "increasingly effective" as they gained experience in combat (p. 219). The performance of division commanders appointed after the defeat in North Korea is appropriately caveated by noting the very different circumstances under which they operated compared to their predecessors.

As pointed out in the introduction, armies that move from peacetime to wartime have always had the problem that some leaders who are successful during the former are found to lack the attributes necessary for success during the latter. *MacArthur's Korean War Generals* is an insightful study of the U.S. Army's experience with that phenomena during the war's first year and is highly recommended.

Dr. William M. Donnelly is a historian at the U.S. Army Center of Military History. He is the author of *Under Army Orders: The Army National Guard during the Korean War* (College Station, Tex., 2001) and several articles on the U.S. Army during the Korean War.



The Thai Way of Counterinsurgency



By Jeff M. Moore
Muir Analytics, LLC, 2014
Pp. xxix, 446. \$18

Review by Nicholas J. Schlosser

The study of counterinsurgency warfare is dominated by a select number of analyses. These include C. E. Callwell's overview of small wars in the British Empire, T. E. Lawrence's memoirs of the Arab Revolt, the U.S. Marine Corps' *Small Wars Manual*, Mao Zedong's treatise on revolutionary warfare, Sir Robert Thompson's accounts of irregular war in Malaya and Vietnam, and the work of two veterans of France's war in Algeria, Roger Trinquier and David Galula.¹ Thanks to their substantial influence on the Army and Marine Corps' field manual FM 3-24 *Counterinsurgency*, the observations of Galula in particular have risen in prominence and have been often cited by admirers seeking a clearly written synthesis on the subject of irregular warfare.²

However, while the heavy reliance on Galula and other theorists such as Thompson has led to the emergence of a fairly concise, cohesive concept of counterinsurgency as a tactical and strategic paradigm, one is forced to contend with the question of how valid this model can be. Galula, for example, was the veteran of a counterinsurgency campaign that ultimately failed to achieve its objective of maintaining French control of Algeria. He was also never able to implement his principles on a wide scale.

Jeff M. Moore's *The Thai Way of Counterinsurgency*, a comprehensive and thorough analysis of the various counterinsurgency campaigns carried out by Thailand's military over the past fifty years, attempts to answer the model validity question. Arguing that the Thai government has effectively defeated multiple internal, irregular threats, Moore examines how well Thailand's counterinsurgents adhered to the general principles of theorists such as Galula and Thompson. The author concludes that the Thai have followed about three-fifths of the tenets laid out by these two counterinsurgency thinkers (p. 369). Regarding Galula, Moore writes, "While the Thai have not completed each of Galula's steps with 100 percent success, they have nevertheless applied them toward victory in two wars" (p. 365). These principles included winning the support of the population, enlisting the aid of an active, anti-insurgent minority, recognizing that the support of the people is conditional, and subsequently using the full resources of the entire government, both civil and military elements, to wage a comprehensive effort against the insurgency. Likewise, the author argues that the Thai also adhered closely to the counterinsurgency tenets identified by Thompson, which include pursuing clear political objectives, operating within legal structures, having an overall counterinsurgency plan, prioritizing defeating political subversion, and securing government controlled areas before moving onto guerrilla-held territory (p. 367). This overall approach was largely codified during the anti-communist campaign in 1980 in a plan designated 66/2523, which became the basis for future counterinsurgency efforts in Thailand (pp. 69-74).

Moore also addresses the precepts set forth by Thompson and Galula that the Thai government did not follow. First, whereas both men stipulated that counterinsurgency campaigns should be led by civilian authorities, in Thailand they were, for the most part, directed by

military leaders (p. 366). Indeed, in one of the instances where a civil authority was in command, namely, the tenure of Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, reversals against insurgent forces spurred the military to stage a coup and seize control of the government (p. 241). Other Thai innovations were the use of economics as a weapon, the granting of mass amnesty to insurgents in regions secured by military forces, and a heavy reliance on paramilitary rangers known as *Thahan Phran* and irregular infiltrators called Village Scouts. Moore argues that, taken together, these practices showed that the "Thai way of counterinsurgency" was based on using, "decisive strategy of politics leading the military and staunch coordination to drive forward their COIN [counterinsurgency] operations" (p. xxii). As a whole, these various principles and techniques have created a Thai way of counterinsurgency that is "clumsy and messy," "sleek and elegant," and ultimately "largely effective" (p. 372).

Moore draws primarily on two types of sources: interviews with individuals who participated in Thailand's counterinsurgency campaigns or had firsthand knowledge of those campaigns, and a wealth of secondary literature. In some cases, however, it is difficult to discern what some of the actual sources are. For example, in Chapter 4, the author cites "anonymous" sources fifty-five times and often provides little context or details in the text itself as to whether the source is an oral history, memorandum, briefing, or some other documentary source. By citing this way, the author prevents fellow scholars from evaluating his sources and assessing his thesis. Even more detailed endnotes could provide additional basic information. For example, the author frequently cites a "Chronology for Malay-Muslims in Thailand," located on the Web site of the University of Maryland's Minorities at Risk Project, a part of the Center for International Development and Conflict Management. However, the footnote simply states the source is "University of Mary-

land, 'Minorities at Risk,' <http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/chronology.asp?groupID=80002>." Such a sparse note forces the reader to visit the Web site itself to ascertain what this source exactly is. More details should have been included in the endnote itself, especially since the URL included in the text appears to be no longer valid.

As detailed as this study is, its arguments about Thailand's "way of counterinsurgency" prompt a number of questions. In light of the Thais' supposed success on the counterinsurgency battlefield, why has the country been repeatedly plagued by insurgent threats of one form or another over the course of the past fifty years? Since 1965, there have been only six years in which the Thai government was not fighting an insurgency of some kind. While Moore touches on many of the problems that have plagued Thailand's political culture, he largely overlooks them to stress the effectiveness of the Thai's approach to counterinsurgency. Yet, it could easily be argued that the persistent insurgent threat, coupled with the dominance of Thailand's military over its civilian government, attests to a general volatility in Thailand's politics.

The precarious nature of Thai politics coupled to the almost constant threat of insurgent activity thus brings into question just how successful Thailand's counterinsurgencies have been. By using Galula as one of his models for what effective counterinsurgency should look like, the author's analysis is also susceptible to the same problems that plagued FM 3-24. Galula's perspective was that of a small unit commander, and his assessment of counterinsurgency warfare is largely shaped by that frame of reference. By using the Algerian War veteran's treatise as a model of effective counterinsurgency, Moore focuses primarily on tactical and operational innovations and pays less attention to how the Thai managed the fundamental strategic, cultural, and social factors that often spark

and drive insurgencies.³ Thailand's several decades of experience against irregular threats may demonstrate that the kingdom can effectively put out brush fires, but the perennial threat of war attests to a national leadership that has had difficulty extinguishing the root cause of these conflagrations.

These concerns aside, scholars and analysts looking for a single, comprehensive overview of Thailand's counterinsurgency campaigns will be well served by this volume. It is highly detailed and provides valuable insights into Thailand's military culture and how it adapted and formulated a range of practices for confronting irregular threats over the past half-century. Its narrow focus means that its general conclusions about counterinsurgency theory are less convincing, however. Nevertheless, it is a welcome addition to the growing corpus of works analyzing the history and practice of irregular warfare.

NOTES

1. C. E. Callwell, *Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1996 [originally published London: H.M.S.O. 1906]); T. E. Lawrence, *Seven Pillars of Wisdom* (Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1926); Lawrence, "Guerrilla Warfare," *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 14th Ed., (1929); *Small Wars Manual: Fleet Marine Force Reference Publication 12-25* (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Navy, 1990 [originally published 1940]); Mao Zedong, *On Guerrilla Warfare* (New York: Praeger, 1961); Sir Robert Thompson, *Defeating Communist Insurgency: The Lessons of Malaya and Vietnam* (New York: Praeger, 1966); David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice* (New York: Praeger, 1964); Roger Trinquier, *Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency*, trans. Daniel Lee, intr. Bernard B. Fall (London: Pall Mall Press, 1964).

2. Field Manual 3-24/Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-33.5, *Counterinsurgency* (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2006).


3. For a critical analysis of Galula's influence on counterinsurgency doctrine, see Gian Gentile, "The Selective Use of History in the

Development of American Counterinsurgency Doctrine," *Army History* (Summer, 2009): 21-35, and Geoff Demarest, "Let's Take the French Experience in Algeria out of U.S. Counterinsurgency Doctrine," *Military Review* (July-August, 2010): 19-24.

Dr. Nicholas J. Schlosser is a historian at the U.S. Army Center of Military History where he specializes on the Iraq War. He holds a Ph.D. in history from the University of Maryland, College Park. His publications include *Cold War on the Airwaves: The Radio Propaganda War against East Germany* (Urbana, Ill., 2015); *U.S. Marines and Irregular Warfare, Training, and Education, 2000-2010* (Quantico, Va., 2015); *The Battle for Al-Qaim and the Campaign to Secure the Western Euphrates River Valley, September 2005-March 2006* (San Francisco, 2013); and *The Surge, 2007-2008* (Washington, D.C., 2017).



Social Science Goes to War: The Human Terrain System in Iraq and Afghanistan



Edited by Montgomery McFate and Janice H. Laurence
Oxford University Press, 2015
Pp. xi, 383. \$ 39.95

Review by Clark Capshaw

Social Science Goes to War: The Human Terrain System in Iraq and Afghanistan is a collection of essays related to the civilian-academic Human Terrain Teams (HTTs) deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan starting in 2007. It includes contri-

butions from the program founder, Montgomery McFate, team members in Iraq and Afghanistan, and a foreword by retired U.S. Army General David Petraeus.

The essays include information about the conception of the HTT program, its initial design and modifications, the controversies that accompanied its implementation, and personal stories of those who played integral roles on the teams. This collection is more cohesive than most books of its type, perhaps aided by a thorough and authoritative introduction by McFate and coeditor Janice H. Laurence, and a summary chapter written by Laurence.

It is worth noting that the book does not attempt to deny or sidestep the program's associated controversies, such as direct opposition by the American Association of Anthropologists, who maintained that the very existence of military teams employing anthropologists was a violation of its code of ethics. McFate notes that "For many anthropologists, [the Human Terrain System (HTS)] represented a potential violation of the prime directive of the discipline: do no harm to the people you study" (pp. 81-82). Likewise, errors of execution are addressed in a forthright way. McFate and Laurence noted that, "organizational factors [such as] staggered rotation, lack of control over hiring or firing, and inability to deploy teams with the actual brigades they would support down-range—contributed to the stress and aggravation of individuals who served on teams and influenced whether teams and individuals could perform optimally" (p. 23).

So, how did HTT participants reconcile their ethical obligation to "do no harm" with a military mission that often included a requirement to locate and kill the enemy, who often was hiding among the civilian and noncombatant population? Most of the participants in the program were motivated by a desire to do something positive and to try to reduce the level of violence and lives lost, whether by Americans, Iraqis, or

Afghanis. In the words of participant Brian Brereton,

I was [initially] worried about violating the central tenet of my discipline, “do no harm.” . . . Yet to me, doing nothing to mitigate the effects of potentially destructive military forces on a local population equally served to violate these relationships. Re-phrased, I felt “do no harm” should never be used as an excuse to “do no good.” . . . I felt it would be better to understand and attempt to shape the U.S. intervention in Afghanistan than ignore or feebly protest a decade-long effort (pp. 265–66).

Personal essays by program participants provide vivid descriptions of what it was like for formerly classroom bound academics to actively work in a war zone. They addressed such subjects as worries about personal safety and danger, acclimating to a military culture, wrestling with ethical issues, and adjusting to a team of academic cultural experts with backgrounds sometimes starkly different from their own. Also, team members voiced concern for their limited ability to connect with the subject culture, considering their preference for full cultural immersion,

The basic disconnect between what HTS was doing and what the critics thought we were doing was that, in the case of anthropologists, they assumed that we were actually doing ethnography—spending time among the Afghans, getting to know them and winning their trust. The reality was that we were doing a sort of drive-by “windshield ethnography,” hastily conducted under difficult, dangerous conditions and more akin to journalism than anthropology. It was disappointing, in light of my academic training, my prior experiences in Afghanistan, and my expectations. But given the circumstances, it was about the best that could be hoped for. Yet, while superficial by any standard of schol-

arship, our research was important because so little has been done in Afghanistan recently (p. 107).

Another common theme that emerged for many of the HTT participants was the conflict between the military culture and the academic culture,

First, the military tends to be highly collective in its work process orientation. . . . [In contrast] few academics are accustomed to team work. . . . Second, the preferred styles of communication of the military and the academy differ. . . . Third, the knowledge [academics and the military] take for granted is dissimilar. Most graduate students in the social sciences have read Foucault, Durkheim, and Said . . . most midgrade to senior military officers have read Clausewitz, Keegan, and Sun Tzu. . . . Fourth, academics and military personnel have different approaches to epistemology, or the nature and scope of knowledge. . . . [S]cholars see the world in the form of a series of interesting puzzles . . . [that] one seeks . . . out on one’s own and attempts to structure a research agenda to solve . . . [whereas] military practitioners . . . see the world in terms of problems to be solved (pp. 49–50).

These cultural divides were apparent in many of the personal essays, but were usually addressed and resolved in a professional manner. HTT participant Kathleen Reedy stated that,

When beginning work with a new unit, my first step was to clarify what I did and did not do, both in terms of research topics and actual data collection. Some of my directions included: I would not go into someone’s home unless for a pre-planned meeting; I would not talk to anyone who did not choose to speak to me of his or her own free will (and I was to be the judge of that); I was not an

intelligence gatherer; all of my information was unclassified; I would not record or hand over any names aside from known public officials; I would not ask about insurgents or supporters; and most importantly, my data was protected and while I would share my final analysis, the raw information was strictly my own (p. 182).

Another HTT participant, James Dorough-Lewis Jr., argues that this academic-military cultural divide is actually constructive. “Methodologically, social science that is worth the military’s investment should never mimic the military’s way of doing business since the military can do that itself without such an investment” (p. 193).

If the true test of a book’s success is whether it inspires the reader to want to learn more, then this work is a prodigious success. I plan to use this collection in a course on diversity and culture. These essays also inspired me to find a copy of the film *Human Terrain* (2010), which is equally informative, though less cohesive than these writings.

In summary, those who would understand the work of nation building following ground battles (likely to be the nature of most future U.S. conflict) should read this work, as should academics who would like to know more about the real-life process that accompanies a military occupation, regardless of how benign or well-intentioned that occupation might be.

Dr. Clark Capshaw received his doctorate in higher education leadership and policy from Vanderbilt University in 2007. He currently works as an operations research analyst at the Military Sealift Command in Norfolk, Virginia, and as an adjunct instructor for Central Michigan University.



CHIEF HISTORIAN'S FOOTNOTE

JON T. HOFFMAN

THE DEFENSE PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT AND APPRAISAL PROGRAM



The Center of Military History is undergoing its conversion to the Defense Performance Management and Appraisal Program (DPMAP), just like everyone else in the Army and the Department of Defense. Our GS-13s and above started their first cycle in the new system on 1 July, though we had until the end of August to actually finalize the performance plans. The Center's GS-9s through 12s will migrate in November, and any remaining employees in June 2018. Many civilians elsewhere in the Army have converted already or will do so in the near future.

Crafting performance elements and standards for evaluating the work of every civilian employee is not simple, given the requirements of the new system. We accomplished some of this effort months ago when the Center established a standard operating procedure (SOP) to govern the process of researching, writing, editing, and producing its official histories. The SOP included performance elements covering the work accomplished by the authors and by supervisors reviewing their draft manuscripts. As I write this footnote, managers outside the two book-writing divisions of Histories Directorate are busy working with their employees to establish similar elements and standards for tasks as diverse as preparing for, conducting, and editing an oral history interview; researching and developing the lineage and honors certificates for Army units; and processing newly acquired artifacts.

It was not until the latter part of July that guidance came down from the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs with required standard elements for generic supervisory tasks—management and leadership, hiring reform, and equal employment opportunity and diversity. With those in hand, we have been writing other elements to cover supervisory duties involving the specifics of each position, whether it be managing an artifact collection, editing an information paper or other product written by a subordinate, overseeing the work of archivists, or arranging for the printing of a volume.

While most personnel coming under DPMAP in the initial wave are supervisors or team leaders, by necessity we have been crafting the elements for more junior employees, so that all the components work together as

a whole. Thus, although only GS-13s and above will be under the DPMAP system by the time this issue of *Army History* is in print, the Center expects to have elements written for nearly all GS-12s and below, so the latter stages of implementation will be much easier.

Our goal throughout this effort has been to develop common elements that can be used for all employees performing similar work. The specific tasks or deadlines might change from one person to the next, but the standards to be met are the same for all. Thus, every book author has an identical writing element, with the only difference being the specific deadlines for the chapters to be completed during the course of the performance period. Undoubtedly most other organizations in the Army are establishing common elements and standards, as well. But many members of Career Program (CP) 61 are often the only historian, museum specialist, or archivist at their command, or perhaps one of two or three at most. They face a much more difficult challenge because their supervisors generally are not members of CP 61 and therefore may know little about the details of how historical, museum, or archival work is accomplished or what constitutes a valid standard for measuring performance. If you find yourself in that situation, the Center is only a phone call or e-mail away and can provide you with elements we have developed that should be adaptable to what you do. Your supervisor may even appreciate having a model to work from rather than starting from scratch. Even if your rating cycle is under way, DPMAP permits a supervisor and employee to change elements and standards if necessary.

The DPMAP system is not as radical a transformation as the National Security Personnel System (which I experienced firsthand during my prior period of service with the Center), but like any significant change, it will take time to see how it works out in practice. We will all be navigating it together and finding out what works well and how we might have to tweak performance elements and standards to better achieve the objectives of the system and accomplish our mission of providing the Army with the best possible historical support.



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