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The Bicentennial at the Center

Ricardo Padron and Morris J. MacGregor

As regular readers of the *Army Historian* are aware, Secretary of the Army John O. Marsh, Jr., is an ardent apostle of the idea that knowledge of our past can enrich our understanding of the present and arm us, as a people and a nation, for future challenges. He is particularly eager to use national celebrations to focus attention on our history and this generation's ongoing role in preserving the blessings of liberty. As a very junior congressman, Jack Marsh introduced a bill providing for federal sponsorship of the celebration of the bicentennial of the Declaration of Independence. As a new secretary of the Army in 1981, he convened his top leadership to discuss celebration of the bicentennial of Yorktown as a means of highlighting the idea that the Revolutionary Army formed a national bridge between the Declaration of Independence and the new nation that was to follow.

Given the secretary's commitment to celebrating our history, it is not surprising to find him at the heart of planning for the bicentennial of the Constitution, which is to occur on 17 September 1987. Under his direction the Army has been designated executive agent to plan and conduct the Department of Defense's bicentennial activities. He made clear the aim of these activities: the role of the military to "Provide for the Common Defense," a heightened awareness and deeper understanding of the Constitution, the freedoms it guarantees, and the civic responsibilities necessary to its preservation and vitality. In effect, the secretary threw down a challenge to Army leadership. He wants every soldier reminded of these two-century-old principles and to be made aware of how the issues surrounding the questions of personal freedom and more perfect union were resolved by our Founding Fathers, how they have endured the test of time, and how the Army

played a role in the process while remaining steadfastly subordinate to civilian authority.

Mr. Marsh has sparked an intensive effort in the Army Staff and major commands to plan for a fitting celebration of the 1987 anniversary, and nowhere has that activity been more intense than in the Center of Military History. Its participation actually began back in late 1984 when Mr. Marsh asked it to formulate a bicentennial project that would highlight the relationship between the Army and the signers. Because colonial law placed a legal obligation to serve in the militia on most male citizens, virtually every member of the Convention belonged to the military at some point in his life. The Center took the position that military service should be construed more narrowly if it was to have significance. We believed that only those men who had taken the field during the Revolution should be considered. A thorough investigation identified 23 men (22 delegates plus William Jackson, the Convention's secretary, whose signature on the Constitution attested to the document's authenticity) from among the 40 signers who met this more rigorous military requirement. Eleven had served in the Continental Army; the rest had been mobilized as militiamen or state troops. This turned out to be our first "discovery" — that our current concept of a "Total Army" really had old roots, and that many of the Founding Fathers were citizen-soldiers. The continentals included Washington (whose official rank was "General and Commander in Chief"), 1 major general, 1 colonel, 2 lieutenant colonels, 2 majors, 2 captains, 1 chaplain, and 1 paymaster. The militiamen included 3 brigadier generals, 2 colonels, 1 major, 2 captains, 1 lieutenant, 2 staff officers, and 1 volunteer without rank. In all, a broad cross-section of the military leadership of the Revolution.

These 23 signatories provided leadership for

the emerging nation from the start of the Revolutionary movement during the French and Indian War through the first quarter of the nineteenth century. Washington and John Dickinson, for example, already enjoyed national reputations as statesmen before Lexington and Concord; Rufus King, among the younger signers, would continue in public service until 1825. All 23 men had distinguished careers as public servants at the national level. The majority were legislators: 19 served in the Continental Congress, 11 in the U.S. Senate, and 7 in the House of Representatives. One served in the federal judiciary as a district court judge, and a number of others served in the executive branch. Washington, of course, became the first President. Alexander Hamilton was his Secretary of the Treasury and James McHenry later became Secretary of War. The group also produced 4 ambassadors, 1 territorial and 7 state governors. Jackson went on to become personal secretary to the President, in effect the nation's first civil servant, while Washington, Hamilton, and Charles Cotesworth Pinckney returned to active military duty as general officers during the Quasi-War with France (1798-1800).

The deeper we probed the careers of these men, the stronger our conviction became that their military experience did indeed form a bridge between the Declaration of Independence in 1776 and the realization of union and liberty enshrined in the Constitution in 1787 and the federal period that followed. A common thread ran through their twenty-three stories. Where conventional wisdom has it that service in the Continental Army was the key to a veteran's nationalist sentiments, we found that *where* they served during the war, in particular their service in higher headquarters or in interstate operations, and not *how* they served, whether as regulars or militiamen, determined their support for a strong national government. Out of their special wartime service these twenty-three men came to understand that only under a strong Constitutional authority could the political, economic, and social promises of the Revolution be realized and the blessings of freedom, in particular the subordination of military authority to the civilian representatives of the people, be assured.

The results of this research are being pub-

lished in the form of twenty-three biographical brochures widely circulated throughout the Army and elsewhere. We are in the process of combining them into a richly illustrated volume that, with appropriate supporting documents, introductory survey, and bibliography, will be published this summer as part of our answer to the secretary's challenge.

The Center has other bicentennial responsibilities. As planning goes into high gear around the Army, our historians find themselves assuming new and broad reference functions, answering requests for bicentennial information, some complex, some trivial, all requiring the development of new expertise and large commitment of resources. In recent

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months we have, for example, prepared biographies of the seventeen non-military signers to insure the historical accuracy of the Army Public Affairs Office's bicentennial efforts. We have researched and written about the Annapolis Convention, the forerunner of the Constitutional Convention whose bicentennial was celebrated in August 1986. We have produced a major bicentennial exhibit for the Pentagon and provided support and guidance for the celebrations in the Army museum system. We have also found time to track down the origins of the American soil placed on Lafayette's grave (it was from Bunker Hill and collected by the Marquis himself in 1825) and identified the Army's first recruiting office (it was in Cambridge, Massachusetts, in 1775). We have even advised the Recruiting Command on naming recruiting offices after the twenty-three soldier-signers. More significantly, we are providing historical advice to TRADOC as it launches its ambitious bicentennial celebration in the Army school system. The Center has also helped organize a lecture series that is bringing to Washington a group of nationally recognized authorities to speak on various aspects of the early national experience. We plan to publish these lectures

as a further contribution to the bicentennial.

During our research and thinking about the Founding Fathers and the extraordinary events of 200 years ago, some interesting changes took place. Those of us who worked on the project found that our sense of gratitude to our forebears deepened and our appreciation grew of just how effectively the Founding Fathers had defined and preserved so many fundamental American values. The effect, one of those wondrous — if occasional — rewards of the study of history, was a general uplifting, a reinforcement of idealism and devotion. If professional historians can be so stirred by studying the soldier-statesmen of the Constitution, the secretary's hope for instilling similar sentiments in our soldiers seems eminently possible. This goal, however, will only be achieved if the entire Army historical community — professionals as well as historians-by-avocation — works to support the bicentennial. We know you will.

Ricardo Padron is a junior fellow at the Center of Military History who has written on various aspects of the bicentennial; Morris MacGregor is joint author of the Center's bicentennial brochures.

The ROTC Workshop in Military History: An Update

John F. Shortal and Richard E. Haith

In Thomas J. Adriance's article (*TAH* 10, Winter 1986) "Civilian Historians in the Army ROTC Classroom: A View From the Trenches," he addressed a number of concerns facing the civilian historian tasked to teach military history to ROTC cadets. This article was very perceptive and interesting. However, its assessment of the ROTC Workshop in Military History was based on outdated information. As a result of feedback from dedicated participants including Dr. Adriance, this program has been dynamic and changed considerably since he attended more than five years ago.

The ROTC Workshop in Military History is a one-month session (reduced from six weeks) conducted annually by the Department of History at the United States Military Academy for approximately forty civilian professors. It is part of an army-wide program to produce officers of the highest caliber through under-

graduate education. The broad objective of the U.S. Army's military history program, of which the study of military history by ROTC cadets is a part, is to develop an officer corps that possesses a sense of historical mindedness. This quality might be defined as a sensitivity to the values, both intellectual and functional, of the study of military history.

More narrowly, the objectives of the annual programs at West Point are for the professors to attain:

- A better appreciation of the value of historical methodology in analyzing military operations;
- A better understanding of the nature of war, the evolution of warfare, military theory, and the military as a profession;
- A better understanding of the meaning of the Principals of War and the Threads of

See **Workshop**, p. 17

I Corps Battle Analysis Conferences: A Case History of Development

Joe D. Huddleston

You dang well better have a full-time professional historian working hand in glove with your planning staff and your operational staff.

— General Joseph T. Palastra, Jr.

In late July 1985, General Joseph T. Palastra, Jr., then I Corps Commander, initiated a first in the Army Historical Program — a series of corps-level battle analysis conferences. The purpose of the program was to increase corps staff members' historical mindedness and improve their combat proficiency.

General Palastra envisioned each conference as consisting of two phases. The first phase was to be a detailed study of a past battle, and the second phase was a war gaming of the first phase using current corps equipment, weapons, doctrine, and technology. Participants were to be the corps command group and principal general and special staff officers, a total of some twenty individuals. The plan called for a conference every four months, held at a location outside corps headquarters and especially away from telephones.

These day-long conferences would examine battles at the operational level of warfare. The agenda would include an introductory summary of the subject, presented by the corps historian, followed by a presentation by each principal staff officer, who would describe operations from his special point of view.



LTG Palastra opens the Korean Battle Analysis Conference.

General Palastra directed that the subject for the initial conference should be a Korean War campaign. This selection added a note of realism to the project as Korea is currently assigned to I Corps for contingency planning.

A planning cell, consisting of two staff officers (one from G-3 Plans, the other from Operations Branch), was established in July, with the mission of arranging the first conference. The corps historian joined the cell when he returned from TDY in August. Events began to move quickly now. The Inchon invasion and recapture of Seoul was selected as the subject for the first conference, and the date was set for 5 December 1985. Once the program was on track, it was to become the sole responsibility of the historian.

As planning progressed, the following goals for participants were established:

- To develop an understanding of the enduring principles and theories of modern combat at the operational level.
- To develop an understanding of the impact of battlefield conditions on modern warfare.
- To develop an understanding of the application of past, current, and emerging weapons systems, equipment, branch functions, force structure, and doctrine on the art of war.
- To develop a better understanding of the human element in combat and its implications in operational planning and execution.

◦ To develop an understanding of the climate, terrain, and types of actions in which I Corps would likely be involved in in the future.

Early in the planning, one of the staff officers made a seven-day trip to Washington, DC, to gather research material from the National Archives and the Center of Military History. In September, General Palastra approved a letter of instruction for the Inchon

Conference and the subjects for the following two conferences: I Corps in Northern Luzon, January-August 1945, and the WWII Aleutians Campaign. Shortly thereafter, to plan as far in advance as possible, the corps historian traveled to the East Coast for twelve days to research the two new topics. He conducted research at the National Archives, Modern Military Branch, and Suitland Field Branch, Center of Military History, and Library of Congress in Washington and the Military History Institute and the Army War College at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.

As the 5 December Inchon Conference neared, the historian turned to the myriad of administrative details necessary to the success of the conference. Such tasks may come under the heading of dirty jobs that somebody has to do, but their importance to the success of such a conference cannot be overemphasized — so the historian did them.

He sorted source material and reproduced it, compiling individually tailored read-ahead packages for each participant. Everyone received selected basic readings, plus each principal staff officer received specific material appropriate to his staff proponenty, such as replacement data for the G-1, communications data for his signal officer, and so on. Some presenters obtained additional material from their branch schools. A retired major general, who as a lieutenant colonel had been on General MacArthur's Inchon planning staff, and a Marine Corps representative were invited to participate.

The Fort Lewis Officers Club was selected as the site for the first conference. Fort Lewis Training Aids Support Center (TASC) constructed a three dimensional terrain board of the area of operations and installed audio and visual equipment to record conference proceedings. Since the final two hours of the conference in which participants war-gamed the invasion with current I Corps technology was classified, the area had to be approved by the Director of Security and guarded on the day of the conference. The Fort Lewis Museum provided a large display of Korean War photographs and Army equipment and weapons of the period. Last, but not least, the Officers Club catered lunch for the participants and provided refreshments during breaks. The conference site was ready by the afternoon of 3 December, and the presenters rehearsed the next day.

General Palastra opened the Inchon Conference at 0830 hours, 5 December 1986. He was followed by the historian, the principal staff officers, the Marine Corps representative, the Air Force liaison officer, and the guest expert who had participated in the invasion. Overall, the conference was a success. The participants achieved all of the preconference goals. Many stated that, for the first time, they understood why military history should be used in planning operations. At the same time the conference planners learned lessons. The formality of a tight time schedule of presentations and the hot lights necessary for the videotaping stifled informal interchanges among the participants. In addition, the curiosity of what actually happened in 1950 led participants to eagerly pick the expert's brain instead of thoroughly analyzing the battle themselves.

The corps commander directed that the conference format be changed for the Luzon Conference to include only two formal presentations. The first, by the historian, would cover a summary of the campaign. The G-2 would present a detailed intelligence briefing, mainly from the Japanese point of view. The other presenters would speak informally from their seats. The historian would act as a facilitator, using his knowledge of the operation to stimulate discussion. The intimidation of audio and videotaping was removed, and the use of frontal overhead projectors added to the desired air of informality.

The conference site was changed to an unused area of the Fort Lewis Museum. There, elevated seating platforms were installed. TASC constructed a terrain board and installed dual projection screens. A videotape machine with two monitors was added so that the historian could show World War II films during his presentation. Again, the historian provided read-ahead packages for each participant.

The guest expert for the Luzon Conference was Brig. Gen. Teddy G. Allen, Chief of the Joint Military Assistance Group in the Philippines. He volunteered to present a classified country briefing and a discussion of the military aspects of the evacuation of President Ferdinand Marcos. Obviously, such a presentation would provide valuable background information on the area of the operations.

As the conference date approached, General Allen received orders which prevented him from attending the conference; however, he

could speak a week earlier. Thus, the historian found himself in charge of two functions. General Allen gave his presentation on 6 May 1985, nine days before the second conference. Although this seemed unfortunate at the time, it worked well in that this background information was in the minds of the participants early enough for them to use it in their own preparations, and there would be no diversions during battle analysis discussions on conference day. Also, the technique of having General Allen speak in advance of the conference meant a larger audience for him and a wider dissemination of his message — another lesson learned.

The time schedule for the 15 May Luzon Conference was the same as for the first one. Monday and Tuesday were set-up days. Wednesday was set aside for rehearsals, and the conference was held on Thursday. Barbara Bower, director of the Fort Lewis Museum, set up extensive displays of World War II-vintage Japanese weapons and equipment. Under the strict rules governing museum artifacts and the watchful eyes of the museum



Luzon Conference participant inspects WWII Japanese rifles. White gloves protect the artifacts from damage.

staff, conference participants were allowed to handle the items during breaks and lunch. This added realism to the proceedings and enabled the participants to better understand the conditions of jungle warfare in 1945.

The Luzon Conference went precisely as planned. There was generous and relaxed interchange among the participants. The historian acted as a facilitator in the discussions, using his knowledge and research capability to clear up questions involving command and control, terrain, and forces involved in the Luzon campaign.

In the discussion phase of the conference, the participants replayed the 1945 campaign as an AirLand battle, using current doctrine and technology. This led to further comparisons mainly concerning changes in doctrine over the past forty years versus the enduring principles in the art of war. By the end of the day, all participants understood clearly the use and value of military history in operational planning.

For the field historian, the conferences are a mixed blessing. They are extra work, but the payoff is well worth the effort expended. The historian becomes a more-valued, better-understood member of the team that is the unit staff. That staff becomes conscious of what history, and the historian, can do for them. And all acquire a deeper sense of historical-mindedness in the process.

In summation, the first I Corps Battle Analysis Conferences proved the validity of General Palastra's concept concerning the contemporary use of military history: "You dang well better have a full-time professional historian working hand in glove with your planning staff and your operational staff."

Mr. Huddleston is the Command Historian, I Corps, Fort Lewis, Washington.

Military History in an Active Duty Unit

Kevin Conley Ruffner

When I arrived in West Germany in 1983 to serve with the 2d battalion, 3d Field Artillery, I was afforded a unique — if largely self-imposed — challenge. Although initially assigned as a fire direction officer, I requested

that I also be given the extra duty of battalion historian. Most extra duties are those tasks that need attention but rarely receive it except just before inspection. Taking care of the battalion's historical records was one such

task. Although various battalion officers had added to the files over the years, little else had been accomplished.

After making a hasty estimate of the situation, I decided that my first priority should be to consolidate the many photographs, letters, and documents scattered throughout the unit sections. Some items lay forgotten in the S-1/PAC files, while others were in the battalion commander's office or in that of the S-3. In most cases, I had no difficulty in obtaining them; they cluttered up the files and were regarded — by many — as unnecessary paperwork.

Some of what turned up proved quite valuable. For example, a search produced the entire battalion's monthly, quarterly, and semiannual Historical Reports file from 1958 to 1971, providing fascinating and useful details on the unit's strength, training, and other areas. Another interesting find was a scrapbook covering the years 1944 to 1964. It contained material on two of the battalion's ancestor units, the 54th Armored Field Artillery Battalion and the 2d Howitzer Battalion, 3d Artillery, and included 54th AFA World War II after-action reports. The scrapbook maintained coverage of the organization until 1964.

A final example of what was lying around was a 1976 letter from an elderly German emigrant who had served at the 2d Battalion's *Schloss Kaserne* in Butzbach in 1906. This gentleman, upon his return to Germany from the United States, visited the battalion and donated several items from his Imperial Army service to our collection. Among these items was a description of the *Kaserne* in the early twentieth century, a photograph of him in uniform, a menu from the officers mess, and other small items.

The 2d Battalion, 3d Field Artillery, is one of the oldest active duty units in the Army. The Combat Arms Regimental System (CARS) traces the battalion's lineage to 1812. Like most military units, the battalion has had a tumultuous life with consolidations, inactivations, and redesignations, a circumstance which makes its history difficult to trace. However, this problem has been largely overcome through the efforts of the unit's regimental colonel and World War II battalion commander, Maj. Gen. George Ruhlen, USA (Ret.), who has spent countless hours researching the regiment's history. I reestab-

lished contact with General Ruhlen after a lapse of several years and enriched the battalion's historical collections with copies of his personal photographs, after-action reports, and research material.

Immediately after World War II, General Ruhlen privately published a one-volume unit history entitled *The Third Field Artillery in World War Two*. When he donated his copy of this book to the 2d Battalion in the 1970s, there were no other copies of the book available. As this work is a cornerstone of the unit's history, I had it reprinted at no cost and distributed to the batteries in the battalion. Additional copies were given to nearby Army libraries.

Contact with former members is an important part of researching a unit's history, as indicated by the information from General Ruhlen. Another example occurred when I saw a letter to the editor of the *Stars and Stripes* requesting a copy of the 3d Field Artillery Regiment's distinctive unit insignia. I sent the writer the regimental crest and discovered him to be Francis Gueths, a retired Army sergeant who had enlisted in the 2d Battalion, 3d Field Artillery Regiment, in 1936. Mr. Gueths remained with the battalion for three years and now lives in Augsburg, Germany. At my request, he agreed to put his 3d Field Artillery memories onto paper. Several weeks later, I received thirteen handwritten pages describing his basic training and service with the then horse-drawn unit. Mr. Gueths' reminiscences filled in some gaps in the unit's past. I sent copies of the Gueth papers to the Organizational Branch, Center of Military History, which had expressed an interest in my findings during an earlier research visit there.

Another example of the importance of public contact in researching military history occurred in March 1985 when I attended World War II's fortieth anniversary ceremonies at Medernach, Luxembourg, and Remagen Bridge, Germany. At both of these ceremonies, I established contacts with veterans of the 3d Armored Field Artillery Battalion who were there to dedicate memorials. Among them were General Ruhlen, a former WWII battalion sergeant-major, a former headquarters battery commander, and a former forward observer who had served throughout the Battle of the Bulge.

More often than not, extra duties like

military historian are performed during off-duty hours. I was lucky, however, to serve under two battalion commanders who shared my enthusiasm for the pursuit of Clio. Both allowed me to present classes on the battalion's history during officer professional development training. I also wrote and distributed to battalion soldiers a short pamphlet on the history of the unit. A knowledge of the unit's history enables the soldiers to better prepare for promotion boards as well as increase the esprit de corps of the organization.

My final project as battalion historian, before leaving active duty to return to gradu-

ate school, was to begin writing, editing, copyrighting, and publishing. I hope that my experiences at the grass-roots level — the battalion — and the writing of this unit history may encourage other junior officers to actively pursue their interests in military history.

Military history can come alive in any battalion or similar size unit through research, time, and persistence. The time has come to awaken military history in Active Army units.

The author has returned to graduate school at the College of William and Mary where he is pursuing an advanced degree in history and writing the history of 2d Battalion, 3d Field Artillery.

CMH's Communist Counterpart: The Institute of Military History of the USSR

Paul H. Vivian

The Institute of Military History of the USSR Ministry of Defense, abbreviated as IVI, is the Russian counterpart to our Department of the Army, Center of Military History (CMH). Established in 1966 as a scientific research organization, IVI is housed in a functional but uninspiring government building in the Lenin Hills District of the Russian capital, not far from Moscow State University. The Institute has scientific and subsidiary subdivisions, a military history library, a learned council, and a scientific council for coordination of research into the field of military history. Its functions may seem almost to parallel those of CMH, but there is one clearly defined difference — IVI has the additional mission of furthering Soviet propaganda through historical means.

Since the Institute is celebrating its twentieth anniversary this year, it seems a fitting time to examine its goals and most importantly its accomplishments.

Lieutenant General Pavel Andreyevich Zhilin has headed the Institute of Military History since its beginning until his death in early February of this year. At its founding, the organization was given three missions that, no doubt, strike most western historians as gross distortions of historical purpose, but in the context of a Marxist-Leninist society,

are quite sensible and ethical. First, the Institute was charged with raising the theoretical level of the study of military history. Next, it was to increase the quality of military-patriotic education among the workers, and thirdly, it was to sharpen the struggle against "bourgeois falsifiers of the military historical past."

As befitting a Soviet institution with such a broad charter, IVI's chain of command is convoluted. Officially, it is subordinate to both the Ministry of Defense and the Main Political Administration. The Administration, however, is not subordinate to the Ministry of Defense, as its name implies, but rather to the Central Committee of the Communist Party. Furthermore, the "scientific-methodological leadership" of the Institute is carried out by the history section of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR.

In 1968, the Institute took on the additional responsibility, albeit vaguely defined, of coordinating all military historical studies that are carried out in Soviet scientific research institutes, higher educational institutions, and social organizations. This task is handled by the Institute's Scientific Council for Coordination of Studies in Military History. Besides members of the Institute, this council is made up of representatives from the Ministry of De-

fense, the USSR Academy of Sciences and Academies of the Soviet Republics, history faculties from the military academies and universities, and central publishing houses. The council supervises the work of 460 scientific institutions and organizations. Since 1966, it has examined and approved the theme of more than 1,900 historical works. Moreover, the Institute reportedly has supervised more than 570 military memoirs, military historical works, and historical-artistic works, as well as approved 300 dissertations.

The Institute for Military History is much better known to both the Soviet public and historians for its publishing activity. The eight-volume *Soviet Military Encyclopedia* and the twelve-volume *History of the Second World War — 1939–1945* are the Institute's most prominent achievements. Because of the quality of the articles and the prominence of the contributors, the *Soviet Military Encyclopedia* has attracted much attention from western military analysts. Ostensibly edited by Marshal of the Soviet Union, Nikolay Vasil'zevich Ogarkov, who recently was relieved from his post as chief of the General Staff, the actual compilation and editing was done by the Institute's staff.

While the *Encyclopedia* is the Institute's most appreciated work in the West, the Institute itself is most proud of its *History of the Second World War*. It coordinated the contributions of the Central Committee's Institute of Marxism-Leninism and the Academy of Sciences' Institutes of World History and History of the USSR. More importantly from the Institute's view, the series was the primary vehicle by which the Soviet Union presented to the world, and especially the West, the Marxist-Leninist perception of World War II. The Soviets have felt for some time that western scholars have largely ignored the Soviet Union's vital contribution to the defeat of Nazi Germany. *History* puts forth, in an articulate, logical, and forceful manner, the argument that Soviet operations on the Eastern Front were decisive to the defeat of Hitler's armies — and unappreciated by the Western Allies. The text has been translated into at least five languages, but alas not English, and published abroad.

Working with historians from Hungary, Bulgaria, Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Cuba, and Mongolia, the Institute has prepared and published *The Second World*

War: A Short History. This history, while continuing to stress the decisive nature of Soviet contributions to WWII, emphasizes the efforts of the East European people's armies formed at the end of the war and the impact of local partisan forces in achieving "liberation." Besides the *Short History*, the Institute, working in conjunction with Warsaw Pact historians, has produced a series of books on the evils of NATO and the unbreakable bond among the Warsaw Pact allies.

Beginning in the early 1970s, the Institute published twelve studies on problems in the resistance movement in Europe during World War II. While the military significance of the partisan movement is widely questioned among western scholars, for the Soviets its value in achieving victory is an ideological necessity. Furthermore, the resistance histories provide justification for contemporary ideological concerns. First, the series offers sterling examples of what persistence and courage can achieve, themes constantly emphasized in Soviet propaganda. Secondly, the partisan movements, properly interpreted, provide a veneer of legitimacy for many of the East European regimes whose leaders originally came out of the communist-led factions of the underground. Finally, the series provides a vehicle for the Soviets to claim that without the moral and logistical support of the Soviet Union, the valiant liberation movement would have been doomed.

In an effort to fulfill its mission to raise the level of military-patriotic consciousness, the Institute published a two-volume set, *Heroes of the Soviet Union*. The books provide biographical information on all recipients of the title "Hero of the Soviet Union," the country's highest military accolade. Also, the Institute has published a widely popular encyclopedia, *The Great Patriotic War*.

Currently, IVI is working on a series of studies that apply lessons learned from World War II to contemporary military operations. Among the studies underway are: "Generalization on the Experience of the Preparation and Conduct of Frontal Attacks During the Great Patriotic War," "Surprise in Attack Operations of the Great Patriotic War," and "The Development of Weapons and Military Technology: A Short Historical Overview." For centuries, scholars and military men have searched for immutable principles of warfare based on studies of past conflicts. While

Soviets raised in the Marxist-Leninist tradition have no doubt of the reliability of such a positivist approach, western scholars for the most part remain skeptical. One cannot but wonder whether Soviet experiences in Afghanistan will validate the findings of these forthcoming studies.

The Soviets, who seem to have an addiction to productivity statistics, reported that since 1966 the Institute of Military History has prepared and published 210 scientific works (for a total of 154,000 pages) and sold 11,750,000 volumes. Forty-eight of its works have been translated into foreign languages. Further, it has produced 37 doctorates and 126 candidates of military-historical science. Even more astonishing, its staff has delivered 6,200 lectures to the public on military history. No doubt the senior military and party leadership in the Soviet Union is well pleased with the Institute.

In the two decades since its founding, the

Institute of Military History has become the focal point for military history in the Soviet Union. Not only does it coordinate all military historical research in the country, but it also produces the most important military reference series, such as the *History of the Second World War* and the *Soviet Military Encyclopedia*. It is a major source for inspirational-patriotic propaganda, and finally, it produces historical studies intended to sharpen the ideological foundation of Soviet policies. Because of its influential and ubiquitous role in Soviet military history — and by extension, the propaganda process — the Institute of Military History has become an institution that the western military specialist and military historian can ill afford to ignore.

Paul H. Vivian is the Commander, C Company, 1st Bn (Mecz), 120th Inf of the 30th Ind Bde, North Carolina National Guard.

Stetson Conn Remembered

Stetson Conn, Chief Historian of the Army 1958-1971, died in November 1986 in Charlottesville, Virginia. Dr. Conn was a major architect of the Army's monumental history of World War II, the "Green Books." He retired in May 1971 after twenty-five years of federal service.

Stetson Conn was born in Lakewood, Ohio, in 1908. He earned a bachelor of arts in economics in 1933 and a master of arts in American history in 1934. He received his doctorate from Yale in 1938 after which he spent eight years teaching at Amherst College in Massachusetts.

After the war, Dr. Conn accepted a position as a senior editor at the then Office of the Chief of Military History in 1946. He rapidly rose to a leadership position, assuming the post of chief historian of the Army in 1958, a position he held until retirement. During his tenure as chief historian, the Army published volumes on the Korean War, a history of Army logistics, a history of the German defeat in the East, and a textbook on American military history for use in universi-

ties. Two of the World War II histories carry Dr. Conn's name as co-author. He was also author of *Gibraltar in British Diplomacy in the Eighteenth Century*, a volume in the Yale historical series.

In retirement at Waynesboro, Virginia, Stetson Conn continued historical research and writing, compiling a bibliography of Woodrow Wilson's papers, publishing a history of the Church of the Epiphany (Episcopal) of Washington, DC, and a history of St. John's Church in Waynesboro. After his move to Florida he wrote a history of All Saints Church, Winter Park.

Stetson Conn's first wife, Mary Alice Conn, died in May 1971. He is survived by his wife Benny H. Conn, his daughters Judith C. Lokerson of New Carrollton, Maryland, and Margaret C. Annis of Cadillac, Michigan, his stepdaughter Margaret C. Aunon of West Lafayette, Indiana, a sister Miriam H. Moodhe of Sarasota, Florida, a brother George T. Conn of Carmel, California, and ten grandchildren. He is buried at Rock Creek Cemetery in Washington, DC.

Issues and Answers From the Chief of Military History

William A. Stofft

Why study military history?

BG Stofft: All armies have a legitimate interest in the study of the military history. The discipline is an indispensable part of a qualified soldier's intellectual growth and development. A military leader without at least a basic understanding of the evolution of the profession of arms cannot be certified as fully professional.

Not only is the history of the American Army inexorably intertwined with that of the Republic, it occupies a prominent position in the world view of military history. Both add importance to our Army's past and need to be studied and understood by military leaders.

Fundamental to the Army's knowledge of military history is the first principle that the study and use of military history expands during peacetime and directly assists in the preparation of our Army for battle. This assertion takes the premise that as peace progresses, as our deterrent remains successful, the gap between battle experience and training gets larger. One of the best ways to help reduce this gap is by the systematic and progressive study of war. Once battle begins, there is no time to pause and reflect on the study of war.

How is the historical program in the Army organized?

There are Army historians in every major command of our Army. There is also a strong contingent spread throughout the Training and Doctrine Command, where we train and educate virtually all of our officers and noncommissioned officers in the theories and practice of war. At West Point, the Army War College, and the Command and General Staff College, there are splendid departments and teams of military historians. The actual policy guidance and support to the Army staff are provided by the U.S. Army Center of Military History in Washington, DC.

The job of the historian is not limited to facts and figures. What is the job of the field historian? Is he not a staff officer also?



Brigadier General Stofft

Exactly. You've touched on the key issue for a commander in the use of the command's historian. The commander must first determine the duties for the historian in that command. The historian should work directly for the commander or the chief of staff so he or she has access to the major issues, options, decisions, and events. Thereby, the historian can measure effectively the priorities and needs of that command as well as keep its record.

The first priority of an Army historian is professional competence. The second priority is access. With these, the historian can be a true partner in the decision-making process and not merely the "chronicler of events." Essential to the process are mutual trust and respect between commander and historian.

Commanders come and go but historians are usually there for awhile. Does the historian help provide continuity to the command?

Absolutely. The purpose of the historian is to go beyond merely transcribing the record. The historian must provide immediate service to the command. We are not studying and writing history for the sake of history. We are serving "public historians," and the organization we serve is the U.S. Army — today and tomorrow. So while the Army historian's product is military history, it must be of both

immediate and long-term use to the command. The focus must be on issues of importance to our Army.

The historian is often the intellectual continuity of that command as well. If well trained and used, he helps provide focus to the commander on the issues that have evolved in that command over time; both what has happened and why.

If the Army's use of military history expands in peace, what role does the Army historian have during war?

We make a transition to war just as the rest of the Army does and in all three components. A number of military history detachments are organized in the Reserve Components for service with Army divisions, corps, and armies. These small three-soldier detachments are led by an officer and capstoned to an Army unit. They accompany that unit into battle. They collect and preserve documentation, conduct on-site battle analysis and interviews (including photos and audiovisual records), and then write reports to be used by the command, the Army Staff, the material commands, and the training base. This is done not only in the U.S. Army but in other armies as well. It has been done since World War II and was continued in Korea, Vietnam, and Grenada.

Many of our civilian historian positions are designated "key or emergency essential." These historians also deploy with their units and provide support during battle. More of our positions will join this group over the next year.

How long do you have to wait to come up with an "historical perspective?"

History almost always gets better with time. More sources become available. Time provides perspective on the events studied and their interrelationship with wider events. So history is like a fine wine and does get better with age. The aim, as a great military historian has remarked, is to provide study "in breadth, in depth and in context."

What the Army historical community must do is collect all the records it possibly can acquire to give us the most comprehensive coverage. Then we provide the initial assessment for relatively short-term use by our Army and the government.

At some convenient point, we should pull together a theme (history of technology, for

example, or the history of a weapons system, etc.) and write the first comprehensive "official" history. This would include analysis, synthesis, and evaluation. It would judge the performance of our Army against rigorous standards of professional scholarship and the equally high standards of military art and science.

Is there a magic date after which you can begin the process?

The time lapse varies for each event or historical theme. With some, we can begin immediately because the timeframe was short and we had a comprehensive collection process. Others, because the time of the project or event was lengthy (take a major weapon system or long war, for example), take much longer to begin.

One could say that, as soon as we have a relatively comprehensive body of sources, and some detachment from the emotion of the subject, we can begin the process of historical study.

How much background should a military leader have in military history?

A life's worth. We don't want military leaders to study history to the exclusion of everything else. First — before anything else — comes tactical and technical proficiency, the foundation of military professionalism. Beyond that, what we want in our military leaders is a reasonable degree of "historical mindedness." What that means is that when they think about their profession or a specific aspect of it, they habitually ask themselves these questions: "Has our Army or any other ever been faced with this situation before? What was done? How? Why? Through what process or by what means? How can the results of those experiences assist us today?" And so on.

Wars are first won or lost intellectually. By that I mean knowing or not knowing what to do and how to do it. This profession, like others, has a profound body of theory and practice. We demand its study so that it is known and understood by our leaders.

That's why it is important to study military history. These lessons from the past can be used today to help us understand the serious and complex nature of our profession and the profound responsibility inherent in leading soldiers.

Oral History Resources for the Study of the U.S. Army in Vietnam

Charles R. Shrader

The following article is adapted from a presentation delivered at The Citadel Conference on War and Diplomacy in April 1986.

American's ten-year struggle in Vietnam has been called "The First Television War." It could just as well be called "The First Oral History War." New voice recording technology made possible — to a degree scarcely even imagined in earlier conflicts — extensive *verbatim* interviews on the scene with participants at all levels. For the first time hundreds of eyewitness accounts were recorded, accounts detailing the events and feelings soldiers experienced at every level from the infantry squad to the high command. The oral testimony, both official and unofficial, on the U.S. Army in the Vietnam War is substantial both in volume and in scope, and for the most part it has yet to be properly collected, cataloged, indexed, and used.

In the 1950s the development of the portable tape recorder brought the recorded oral interview into its own as a recognized historical technique in the Army as well as in the academic community, and oral history as we know it today began to evolve as a separate field. The effect of the portable tape recorder was similar in both milieus: it increased the historian's ability to gather the story from followers as well as leaders and thus precipitated a further democratization of the historical process. The oral history technique also facilitated the efforts of historians to delve into the *why* as well as the *who, what, when, where, and how*. The ultimate result has often been a much more thorough and balanced view of history.

Space does not permit me to detail here the full range of oral history materials available for the study of the war in Vietnam. I will therefore restrict my remarks to only those oral history materials dealing with the Army's participation in the Vietnam War which were produced by official agencies. These materials generally fall into two categories: those produced in the field between 1965 and 1975 and those collected since the end of the war. Interviews produced under official Army aus-

pices by no means represent all the oral history evidence for the history of the Army in Vietnam. An enormous amount of oral history work has been done since the war, particularly among lower-ranking enlisted veterans, by institutional programs such as those conducted in Veterans' Administration hospitals, by various university oral history programs, and by such independent authors as Al Santoli (*Everything We Had*), Mark Baker (*'Nam*), and Wallace Terry (*Bloods*). Even exclusive of such rich sources, the significant body of oral history evidence official Army programs produced remains to be described — and it has barely been touched by historians writing on Vietnam.

The Army has long made use of oral history, even before the concept as we understand it evolved. Veterans of the Revolution testified to pension commissioners about their exploits. So did Civil War veterans, many of whom were also interviewed to obtain information about specific events. Survivors of the Little Big Horn (those with the relative good fortune to be with Reno or Benteen) were grilled extensively about what happened on that late-June day in 1876, and participants in both the Spanish-American War and World War I were called upon to add their views to the official documentary record.

Army historians played a leading role in the development of oral history as a separate historical specialty. They first began to do so during World War II, when military historians were dispatched to the various theaters to preserve and supplement the documentary record of the war. Quasi-official military history teams equipped with jeeps and typewriters were used for the first time in North Africa in 1942, and oral interviews were a primary means by which they accomplished their mission. In the fall of 1943 one of the most famous of all military oral historians, then Lt. Col. S. L. A. Marshall, went to the Pacific to cover the island campaigns of the

7th Infantry Division. The method he perfected there — based on his training as a journalist — was to reconstruct events as vividly and completely as possible through the extensive interviewing of groups of participants during or immediately after the battle. His methods were later adopted and adapted by historical officers in all theaters. One of those historians was Forrest Pogue, then a sergeant and now recognized as one of the pioneers in the oral history field. The oral history activity of Army historians during World War II proved its worth when used, along with the documents, to compile the famous “Green Books,” the Army’s official history of the conflict.

Army historians also made substantial use of oral history techniques to record the events of the Korean War from 1950 to 1953, benefiting greatly from their World War II colleagues’ experimental efforts. Eight military history detachments served in Korea and all made some use of oral history methods to record important Army activities, both large and small. As in World War II, the focus was on small unit actions, and once more S. L. A. Marshall was a leader in using the oral interview to provide the participants’ view of the war.

The war in Vietnam from 1965 to 1975 saw a significant increase in the Army’s overall historical effort, especially in the use of oral history methods to record not only the combat events of the war but information on almost every aspect of American war-making at every level. Vietnam was an oral and aural event to a degree never before experienced. The lack of identifiable front lines and the very nature of the military operations conducted placed a premium on oral evidence — often gathered after the fact — as the primary means of reconstructing events. The ambush, the helicopter-borne assault, the long-range reconnaissance patrol, and the perimeter defense of the isolated camp or fire base were characteristically small unit actions. The limited size and fast pace of combat operations often meant that they were incompletely documented, if at all, in the normal way. Many, if not most, Army combat operations in Vietnam were conducted without the customary “Leavenworth school solution” plan with all its annexes. Orders were issued orally and often in fragmentary form, and much of the administration of the war was conducted

telephonically or by electrically transmitted message, forms of communication which tend to leave only ephemeral traces. Fortunately for the historian, the mechanics as well as the techniques of oral history were well developed by the mid-1960s.

In Vietnam, the military history detachments’ TOEs provided for bulky reel-to-reel machines that required power sources and were virtually useless in the field. (One detachment made good use of the recorder allotted it to prop open its hooch door.) Most detachment historians purchased their own battery-powered cassette recorders, truly portable instruments highly suitable for field use, and were prepared to use them effectively to prepare the record of events. They produced hundreds of oral history interviews, many of which have still not been adequately cataloged, indexed, and cross-referenced, and most of which have consequently not been used by historians, official or otherwise.

The first military history detachment was deployed to Vietnam in September 1965. Originally only six detachments were planned, but eventually twenty-six of the small, two-man (some grew in-country) units were attached to units in the field in Vietnam. In addition to compiling “after-action reports” and “operations reports-lessons learned,” these detachments were charged with gathering raw historical material for later analysis. Conducting oral history interviews was a recognized part of the detachments’ duties, and most of them made extensive use of the oral history method. The tapes, sometimes accompanied by maps, documents, and other written material, were forwarded by the historians in the field to the Center of Military History in Washington for later use by more sedentary historians compiling the official history of the Army’s participation in the war. Most of this material reached its destination and is now available for its intended use, but it seems probable that some of it has already been lost, or at least has strayed. The volume of material and the procedures were such that some loss was inevitable, but more than enough remains to make Vietnam the “oral history war” *par excellence*.

Army historians working on the projected nineteen volumes of the official Army history of the war have available at the Center of Military History a significant collection of oral history materials. The collection consists

of 375 interview transcripts without tapes but with supporting documents of various kinds. Included in this first group is a series of combat interviews conducted in 1966 and 1967 by the master himself, S. L. A. Marshall. To these must be added another 1,656 tapes representing 1,108 interviews, of which only 193 have been transcribed in full. Some 200 of this group are also accompanied by supporting documents, and only nine are classified and therefore unavailable to private researchers. In addition to the field interviews, individual historians working on the official history of the war at the Center of Military History have conducted a number of relatively brief interviews with major participants in the war to flesh out certain specific aspects of the events. Unlike the field interviews, which deal for the most part with tactical and logistical matters, this last group includes discussion of higher level policy issues.

In general, the field interviews preserved at the Center of Military History cover the period from 1966 through 1970. All regions of Vietnam and all types of Army combat, combat support, and combat service support units are represented. The majority of the interviews deal with small unit combat actions, but logistical and administrative activities are also discussed in some detail. Although much of the content is purely "military" in nature (i.e., the plain description of events without much personal flavor), the field interviews still constitute a rich source for the historian interested in the tactical and logistical conduct of the war. Most of the interviewees were officers, including some general officers, but a substantial number were enlisted men who participated in the events described. The twenty-six military history detachments conducted most of the interviews, but a few were conducted by unit commanders, staff officers, and unit historians.

Each interview now at the Center has at least a summary card identifying the date, place, and type of event described, the unit involved, the interviewee, and in some cases the interviewer. A four-volume catalog and index for the first 375 interviews is in preparation, and a similar work is planned for the remaining 1,108 interviews. Although this major collection of Vietnam oral history material is being used by Army historians in the preparation of the official Army history of

the war, it otherwise remains virtually untapped, as does most of the official Army oral history on the war.

While most of the oral history work Army historians in the field did during the war has subsequently been preserved for use at the Center in Washington, the focal point of postwar oral history activity in the Army has been at the U.S. Army Military History Institute at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. The Institute is the Army's repository for unofficial historical materials of all types. Since 1971 it has conducted, in conjunction with the U.S. Army War College, a very productive Senior Officer Oral History Program. Started at the behest of the Chief of Staff of the Army, the program uses Army War College students to conduct life history interviews with retired senior officers. Soon after it began, the program expanded its scope to include topical projects as well as biographies. Although not aimed exclusively at the Vietnam era, the oral history projects of the Military History Institute constitute the major source of postwar Army oral history material.

The mainstays of the Senior Officer Oral History Program are the comprehensive interviews with retired Army generals. Almost all of the senior leaders of the Army during the Vietnam period have been interviewed as part of this program. The collection includes, for example, a transcript of more than 600 pages from interviews with General William C. Westmoreland, the MACV commander and later Army Chief of Staff. Unfortunately for the program, General Creighton Abrams, who succeeded General Westmoreland both as MACV commander and Army Chief of Staff, died before he could be interviewed. The collection does, however, include fifty-seven interviews with General Abrams' friends and associates. Other senior Army leaders interviewed include Generals Maxwell D. Taylor, Harold K. Johnson, Bruce Palmer, Jr., Paul D. Harkins, Walter T. Kerwin, Jonathan O. Seaman, John L. Throckmorton, and William R. Peers. In addition, many of the Vietnam-era division commanders in the field are represented, including Generals DePuy, Ewell, Hay, Kinnard, and Zais, to name a few. To the detailed information on tactical and logistical matters collected during the war is thus added the perspective of higher level policy and strategy, as well as what has come to be

called the "operational level" viewpoint on the conduct of the war in Vietnam.

In addition to the many senior officer interviews available, the topical projects undertaken by the Military History Institute are also very valuable resources for the study of the war. A project on the "History of U.S. Army Aviation," conducted in 1977-78, consists of nine interviews totaling over 800 pages of transcript, most of which is important for understanding the Army's use of helicopters in Vietnam. In a 1982 project entitled "The Last Days of Viet Nam," five individuals who participated in the final, precipitous withdrawal from Saigon in 1975 were interviewed. Four Army participants in the 1968 battle of Hue were interviewed in 1985, and many of the other topically oriented projects contain useful information on Army activities in Vietnam.

Perhaps the most valuable of the Military History Institute's oral history holdings are the 299 interviews of the "Company Command in Viet Nam" project. This unique project was started in 1981 with the aim of providing both a record of events at a different level — that of the company commander — and as a means of providing today's junior officers with some feeling for what the experience of commanding troops in combat is all about. Each of the 299 interviews was one to two hours in length and was conducted in accordance with a set format designed to cover most, if not all, of the types of activities in which Vietnam company commanders were involved. The interviewees were Army War College students who had served as company commanders or Special Forces A Detachment commanders in Vietnam between 1965 and 1975. All types of units — from infantry companies to transportation truck companies — are represented and all regions of Vietnam — from the Delta to the DMZ — are covered. The project was terminated in 1985 when the number of Army War College students with Vietnam company command experience petered out. The result of this effort is a unique and extremely valuable historical record which permits a comparative analysis of company level activities in Vietnam at various times and places. The first transcripts from the project are only now being completed and disseminated throughout the Army for use in the training of junior officers.

In 1983 the company command interviews were supplemented by eleven interviews, using essentially the same format and totaling 555 pages of transcript, with former battalion commanders who were then on the staff and faculty of the Army War College. In 1982 an effort had been made to conduct a similar program at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College focusing on officers who had served as platoon leaders in Vietnam. More than forty interviews resulted, each of which presents yet another unique perspective on the Army's Vietnam experience.

In addition to its own very useful products, the Military History Institute has also become the repository for a miscellaneous collection of oral history materials pertaining to Vietnam but not produced by the Institute. What appear to be "missing" military history detachment interviews conducted after 1970 are now at Carlisle Barracks. The 250 tapes, none of which has been transcribed, cover events from 1965 to 1974, in particular the Tet Offensive of 1968 and the Cambodian Incur-sion of 1970. The contents of these tapes are similar to those of the ones held by the Center of Military History and include interviews dealing with small unit combat operations, the deployment of units to Vietnam, and the advisory effort. Many of the interviews were conducted with NCOs. In addition, this miscellaneous collection contains eighteen interviews on various subjects conducted by Maj. John Cash of the MACV Historical Branch in late 1971 and early 1972.

As with the field interviews collected at the Center of Military History, the postwar interviews conducted by the Military History Institute as part of the Senior Officer Oral History Program have yet to be adequately indexed or used, although they are at least well-cataloged. An updated handlist of all the interviews in the senior officer program is published annually and a good internal control list of the "Company Command in Viet Nam" interviews also exists. Many of the senior officer projects are at least partially indexed, as are some of the company command interviews. A comprehensive catalog and index to all of the Institute's oral history holdings is much needed.

Together, the two collections form a rich — but as yet unexploited — mine of historical data for the study of the war in Vietnam at

all levels, from national policymaking to the actions of an ambush patrol in the field. While some attempt to use these materials for officer education and compilation of the official Army history of the war has begun, there remains much to be done, both officially and privately, to turn this excellent raw material into history.

A significant amount of official oral history material on the Vietnam War probably exists outside the two major centers. The work done at the Command and General Staff College with platoon leaders is an example. There are indications that a considerable number of oral history interviews with officers and NCOs recently returned from Vietnam were conducted at Army service schools during the war. To date, no accurate accounting has been made of such interviews. In 1982 and 1983 the Military History Institute attempted to identify the location and nature of such oral history materials preparatory to collecting them at Carlisle Barracks. The inquiries were unproductive and it must be assumed that whatever stray oral history materials on the Vietnam War exist are apt to remain outside the known, and therefore usable, collections for some time to come. Nevertheless, later this year the Center of Military History will once again attempt to corral some of the strays so that these very valuable materials can be put to use.

The Army's official oral history of the Vietnam War shares the strengths and weaknesses of the oral history technique in general, and has some unique strengths and weaknesses of its own. While the volume of material is great and the scope and level wide-ranging, not every important topic is addressed and often the perspective is restricted by the interviewee's limited insight into the full nature of the events to which he was witness. Not everyone who should have been interviewed was, and many interviews produced little of lasting significance. Even such a well-planned, systematic undertaking as the "Company Command in Viet Nam" project has limitations which are not immediately apparent to the potential user. The interviewees for that project had all been carefully winnowed by the Army's system of advancement. At the time they were interviewed they were all students at the Army War College and were presumably destined for high positions of leadership. They were,

almost without exception, some of the most successful company commanders in Vietnam; the project produced no interviews with the unsuccessful ones. The postwar interviews conducted with senior officers and those destined to be senior officers exhibit some lack of candor. A guarded attitude may have been adopted out of a desire to avoid controversy or to protect the reputations of others. Although this is a common phenomenon in all "elite" interviewing, it is compounded in the case of Vietnam by the ambivalent attitudes toward the war throughout American society and by the nature of the war itself. What is truly amazing is that so many of the available interviews are in fact as candid and complete as they are.

The first part of the task has been accomplished; the more difficult — and in some ways more important — part remains to be done. Army historians have collected an impressive amount of oral history data on the war in Vietnam. These data must now be cataloged and indexed so as to be usable by historians, both official and private. Only then can the raw data be analyzed and fashioned into a real history of the Army's participation in the war. Perhaps ten or twenty years from now we can read an article entitled "How Oral History Was Used to Write the History of the War in Vietnam." I hope so.

Lieutenant Colonel Shrader is Chief of the Historical Services Division, U.S. Army Center of Military History, Washington, DC.

Workshop, From p. 3

Continuity (the pedagogical method used by the USMA's Department of History, which manages the study of military history by stressing the evolutionary impact on war of certain "threads" common to the military art);

- An understanding of the historical evolution of the U.S. Army, the U.S. Army Reserve, and the National Guard, and the place and functions of those institutions in American society;

- The impact of European warfare on the development of the American style of warfare; and

- An increased interest in further study of military history.

The primary learning experiences of the workshop are seminars, a guest lecture program, and a Civil War battlefield staff ride. Daily seminars are held in groups of fifteen visiting professors for three hours in the morning. The seminars consist of an introductory lecture and discussion by either a Department of History faculty member or a visiting professor, followed by open discussion of the subject. The seminar discussions cover bibliography, historiography, and important questions of the war or period being discussed.

In the afternoon the entire group attends a lecture by a distinguished military historian. These guest speakers are invited from across the nation. The 1986 workshop had among its guest speakers General William C. Westmoreland, Brooks E. Kleber and David F. Trask (Center of Military History), Russell F. Weigley (Temple University), Edward M. Coffman (University of Wisconsin), Ira Gruber (Rice University), Richard H. Kohn (Chief of Air Force History), Dean Allard (Acting Chief of Navy History), and Col. Louis D. F. Frasche (Combat Studies Institute).

The Civil War battlefield staff ride is a unique experience of the workshop. For four days the group traveled to the U.S. Army Ordnance Museum, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Antietam and Gettysburg battlefields, and the Military History Institute at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, to walk and experience the battlefields and museums. The staff ride gives perspective on these famous battles unattainable in any other medium. This year Jay Luvaas of the Army War College led the trip and it was a particularly popular feature of the workshop.

The value of the 1986 program may best be understood from some of the participants' comments:

I cannot imagine that anyone learned more from this experience than I did. . . . This will pay off and have application in all the U.S. history courses I teach. . . . A tremendous experience for me.

This workshop is a tremendous asset to those of us who teach military history. It provides a vast amount of information and resources which will greatly enhance one's ability to effectively prepare and teach a course in military history. It is a valuable experience. I believe all my goals for this workshop were met.

The workshop has given me many new ideas to introduce in my courses. I feel that I will be more organized in presenting the subject. . . . I achieved all my expectations and more!

Again, it is important to reiterate that the ROTC Workshop in Military History is intended for civilian history professors and not army officers. It is designed to be an interchange of ideas among participants whose areas of concentration vary widely. The beneficiaries of this program include not only the attendees at the workshop, but also the faculty at West Point, and most importantly the ROTC cadets themselves.

Anyone with questions concerning attendance should have his professor of military science contact its ROTC headquarters.

Majors Shortal and Haith are assistant professors in the Department of History, United States Military Academy.

PROFESSIONAL EVENTS

DAHAC Meeting

On 9-10 October, the Department of the Army Historical Advisory Committee (DAHAC), under the chairmanship of Professor Charles Roland, University of Kentucky, conducted its forty-first annual meeting in Washington. The chief of military history and his staff briefed the committee on the status of the Center's new directions, with

separate presentations on the field programs, historical services, automation, and the National Museum of the Army. The committee conducted an extensive review of the Center's historical activities for the previous year. After the meeting, the committee prepared and submitted an extensive report to the secretary of the Army.

Historical Workshop

In March 1986, Dr. Alexander S. Cochran, Jr., presided over the 1986 Joint Historical Workshop — “On Historical Coverage of Joint Operations: Past, Present, and Future” — at the Washington Navy Yard. The one-day workshop was attended by official historians from over ten military and governmental agencies. Among the seminars presented, two were chaired by members of the Analysis Branch — Maj. Bruce Pirnie on “Joint Operations Between the Wars” and Maj. Lawrence Greenberg on “The 1965 Dominican Republic Intervention.”

Reorganization at Center

In August 1986, the Center consolidated the Reference Branch and the Staff Support Branch as the Staff Support Branch, Research and Analysis Division. Combining its quick and mid-level reference functions and mid-term study efforts into one branch enables the Center to provide thorough and timely support to the Army Staff and the MACOMS. On 25 August, Dr. Edward J. Drea reported for duty at the Center as Chief, Staff Support Branch. Dr. Drea had previously served as Assistant Director for Historical Services, U.S. Army Military Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA.

Constitutional Lecture Series

Three of a series of six lectures on the Constitution have been held at the National War College at Fort McNair, Washington, DC. Sponsored by the secretary of the Army and the chief of military history, the first lecture (October) was delivered by Professor R. Don Higginbotham of the University of North Carolina. Professor Higginbotham discussed George Washington's contribution to American Constitutionalism.

In December Professor Robert Rutland, professor of history at the University of Virginia, delivered the second lecture on “James Madison: First and Foremost of the Founding Fathers.”

Professor Jack P. Greene, Andrew W. Mellon Professor in Humanities at Johns Hopkins University, presented the third lecture in March on “America and the Creation of the Revolutionary World of the Late Eighteenth Century.”

Army Historians Conference

The Center held the Seventh Biennial Army Historians Conference at the Crystal City Marriott, Arlington, Virginia, 23–26 February. “Expanding Our Vision” was the theme of the 1987 conference, which despite a near-record snowfall in Washington for that time of year (15 inches), had an estimated 202 attendees.

Secretary of the Army John O. Marsh, Jr., gave the opening address which emphasized the value of history in the Army. The agenda included presentations by Brigadier General Stofft, who spoke on the “State and Future of Military History Within the Army” and Dr. David Trask, Chief Historian, who provided his views on the “State and Future of Military History as a Discipline.” Professor Mac Coffman, Visiting Professor of Military History at the U.S. Army Military History Institute, was the banquet speaker, sharing reflections and reminiscences of a career in military history.

Working sessions consisted of panels of experts to brief the attendees on the most important historical issues of the day. The first panel was chaired by Maj. Rick Eiserman, Combat Studies Institute. Entitled “Historians and High Tech,” it consisted of the following presentations: “Interactive Video Discs,” Capt. Gregory Emmons, Training Support Center, Fort Eustis, VA; “Digital Optical Discs,” Mr. Felix Krayeski, Library of Congress; “Army Forum” communications network, Lt. Col. Ed Feige, Office of the Army Chief of Staff; and “The History Net,” Lt. Col. David Campbell, Center of Military History.

Brigadier General Stofft chaired the panel “Fields of Battle: The Staff Ride and the Historian.” Presentations were: “What the Staff Ride Can Depict,” Col. Hal Nelson, U.S. Army War College; “How to Conduct a Staff Ride,” Dr. Glenn Robertson, Combat Studies Institute; and “Staff Rides and Audience Analysis,” Lt. Col. Joe Whitehorne, Office of the Inspector General.

Four panel sessions were held on 25 February. Colonel Rod Paschall, Military History Institute, was chairman of the panel, “Readiness, Military History at War,” which consisted of the following presentations: “Center of Military History's Role in Readiness,” Lt. Col. Robert Frank, Center of Military History; “USAREUR, A Case Study,” Mr.

Bruce Siemon, Headquarters U.S. Army Europe; "Processing the Product," Col. Kent Harrison, Center for Army Lessons Learned, Fort Leavenworth.

Dr. Forrest Pogue chaired the panel "Military History Detachments: Clio in the Trenches." It consisted of Mr. Ken Hechler and Dr. Hugh Cole who discussed military history detachment operations in World War II; Professor Martin Blumenson covered Korea, Dr. Jeffery Clarke discussed Vietnam, and Maj. Edgar Kleckley spoke on current operations.

In the afternoon Col. Louis D. F. Frasche was chairman for the panel entitled "Opportunity Meets Necessity, Less Resources, More Imagination" and spoke on "Teaching Beyond the Classroom." Other presentations were "Being a Branch Historian," Dr. James Williams, U.S. Army Chemical School; "Contracts," Dr. John Greenwood, Corps of Engineers; "Meeting a Command's Needs: Special Studies," Mr. William Stacy, USAREUR; and "Filling a Void," Dr. Sandy Cochran, Center of Military History. During the conference there were concurrent meetings of military history detachment personnel.

Publications

Cochran, Alexander S., Jr. "The Impact of Vietnam on Military Planning, 1972-1982," in Harry R. Borowski, *Military Planning in the Twentieth Century* (Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, 1986). Historical Analysis Series: Pirnie, Bruce R. *Operation URGENT FURY*. July 1986.
Raines, Edgar F., Jr., and Campbell, David R. *The Army and the Joint Chiefs of*

Staff: Evolution of Army Ideas on the Command, Control, and Coordination of the U.S. Armed Forces, 1942-1985. August 1986.

Research and Analysis Division Special Studies: Greenberg, Lawrence M. *The Hukbalahap Insurrection: A Case Study of a Successful Anti-Insurgency Operation in the Philippines, 1946-1955*. September 1986.

In stock at the Army AG Publications Center in Baltimore are *Field Artillery*, CMH Pub 60-11-1 and *The Army and the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Evolution of Army Ideas on the Command, Control, and Coordination of the U.S. Armed Forces, 1942-1985*, CMH Pub 93-3. *Field Artillery* is also available for public sale through the Government Printing Office, GPO Stock Number 008-00136-5.

The Center is in the process of reprinting the pamphlets in its German Studies series. Previously available only through the Army AG Publications Center in Baltimore, they are now being reprinted as historical studies with new cover designs and will be available for public sale from the Government Printing Office. Four of these studies are now in stock at the Government Printing Office: *Combat in Russian Forests and Swamps* (CMH Pub 104-2), GPO Stock Number 008-029-00143-8; *Military Improvisations During the Russian Campaign* (CMH Pub 104-1), GPO Stock Number 008-029-00142-0; *Night Combat* (CMH Pub 104-3), GPO Stock Number 008-029-00146-2; and *Terrain Factors in the Russian Campaign* (CMH Pub 104-5), GPO Stock Number 008-029-00144-6. Military account holders may requisition these studies, by using the CMH pub number, from the AG Publications Center in Baltimore.

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