

ARMY HISTORY

THE PROFESSIONAL BULLETIN OF ARMY HISTORY

PB-20-91-3 (No. 19)

Washington, D.C.

Summer 1991

Military History and the Academic World

Ronald H. Spector

"And this I write that young men may learn, if they should meet with such trials as we met with there, and have not opportunity to cut off their enemies; yet they may, with such pretty pranks, preserve themselves from danger. For policy is needful in wars as well as strength." So wrote Lion Gardner in his 1638 *History of the Pequot Wars*, perhaps the earliest military history written in America.

The writing of military history thus has a long tradition in the United States, and some of the most distinguished American historians, from William H. Prescott to Henry Adams to Samuel Eliot Morison have turned their hand to it. Yet it has not been an academic tradition. If we accept Walter Millis' definition of a military historian as "a technically trained professional historian [who]...applies the interests and techniques of the general historian to the study of warfare," then it must be said that until the last three decades the academic historian of war hardly existed in the United States. (1)

From the emergence of modern historical research in America, around the late 1880s, till the end of the First World War, most of the serious writing on military history in the United States was the work of professional officers such as Alfred Thayer Mahan, author of the famous *Influence of Sea Power Upon History*, and Emory Upton, an Army officer who completed the manuscript of his pioneering work, *The Military Policy of the United States*, in 1881. In 1912 when the American Historical Association held a conference on military history in conjunction with its annual meeting, only two of the participants were professional historians. (2)

Far from stimulating American interest in military affairs, World War I led to a widespread reaction in the 1920s and '30s against all things military. During this

period historians whose specialties were in other areas nevertheless carried on a fair amount of research in military history. The *American Historical Review*, for example, carried fifteen articles or notes on military history between 1920 and 1930 and eighteen between 1930 and 1941, a respectable number in a journal in which so many fields are represented. About 6 percent of doctoral dissertations written in these two decades were also on military topics.

Yet few professional historians could or wished to concentrate primarily upon the history of war. Some of the most important work in the field was, in fact, done by persons without formal historical training, such as the journalist Walter Millis and the political scientist Harold Sprout. In 1926 at the University of Chicago, scholars from a number of disciplines, including history, cooperated in a massive study under the guidance of political scientist Quincy Wright on the causes of war. The Chicago project produced a large number of monographs, articles, and books culminating in Wright's own work, *A Study of War*. Although Wright's study contained much to interest the historian, it was in no sense history. (3) Wright himself had little use for military history, which he believed to be "less historical than technical in purpose and usually designed to assist the practitioners of the art." (4) Like many academics of the 1920s and 30s, Wright believed that war in general could be understood without detailed study of any particular war.

During the interwar period, officers-turned-historians continued to provide much of what little military history was written in the United States. Authors such as William A. Ganoe, John McAuley Paler, and Oliver L. Spaulding, all former Regular officers, contributed the first modern comprehensive institutional histories of the U.S. Army and of American military

policy, while Dudley Knox, an Annapolis graduate and veteran of Admiral Simms' World War I staff, did the same for the history of the U.S. Navy. (5) These authors not only sought "lessons" useful to future soldiers and strategists as had Lion Gardner, but also addressed themselves to the informed citizen as well.

World War II and the onset of the Cold War enormously increased scholarly interest in the study of war, but historians generally did not share in this revival of interest in matters military. After 1945 social scientists largely preempted the field of military studies, particularly recent national security policy. While study of civil-military relations, military administration, strategy, and arms control flourished in departments of political science and sociology, military history continued to languish. In 1954 after polling 815 colleges and universities, Dr. Richard C. Brown found thirty-seven schools offering courses in military history. (6) Even these few courses were largely products of the personal interest and effort of the professors involved, rather than a reflection of the desires of the history department. Few departments made an effort to replace positions in military history in the same way they would other areas such as ancient history or diplomatic history. Theodore Ropp, one of

the few academics in the 1960s teaching military history at the graduate level, observed in 1968 that at most universities, "graduate advisers warn their students that military history is not a recognized specialty and offers extremely limited opportunities for teaching and publication." (7) "Academically speaking," wrote John Higham in his authoritative 1965 survey of historical scholarship, "military history is still a side line." (8)

Even the military establishment, which from time to time had provided the military historian with a wider audience for his work, seemed to have lost interest in the study of history. The Army's Command and General Staff College "had almost no military history in its curriculum" by the late 1960s, and the Naval War College where Mahan had given his famous lectures offered little more. (9)

Writing in 1961, Walter Millis declared that serious study and research in military history had had its day and that "military history, as a specialty, has largely lost its function." The strategy and tactics of Napoleon, the Civil War, even the operations of the two World Wars, were hardly relevant to the nuclear age. (10) That Millis made such statements in an essay forming part of a pamphlet series designed to intro-



Contents

<i>Military History and the Academic World</i> by Ronald H. Spector.....	1
Editor's Journal.....	6
The Chief's Corner.....	9
<i>The Korean War: Forty Going on Fifty</i> by Duane Denfeld.....	10
<i>Research From the Battlefield: Military History Detachments</i>	
<i>in Wartime Korea</i> by Raymond A. Mentzer, Jr.....	13
World War II Chronology.....	20
Focus on the Field.....	22
The Archaic Archivist.....	25
Gettysburg Staff Ride Guide.....	27
<i>Training MHDs in a Desert Environment</i> by Dave Bristow.....	29
<i>Wargames: Training for War</i> by Thomas D. Morgan.....	32
Letters to the Editor.....	36
Book Reviews.....	38

duce new students and potential teachers of history to the various specialties in the field was especially devastating.

Yet less than three decades after the publication of Millis' essay the study of military history in colleges and universities could be observed to be experiencing unprecedented growth and showing signs of emergence as a recognized and fully developed subspecialty within the historical profession. By the end of the 1980s it had become one of the most popular undergraduate course offerings in the liberal arts and increasingly in demand as a graduate specialty.

This sudden growth in the popularity of military history on college campuses was both unexpected and unprecedented. Yet with the aid of hindsight it is possible to identify five factors that largely contributed to this development. They were, first, the expansion of college and university education in the United States during the 1950s, '60s, and '70s and the corresponding growth and diversification of the historical profession; and, second, the institutionalization of research and writing in military history within the federal government and a steady growth in the demand for military history among the general public, the military, and college undergraduates. Along with these developments came a revival of interest in military history within the mainstream elements of the American military profession which helped to fuel this demand. Contributing to this revival was the publication of a number of influential and popular books and monographs that brought the methods and discoveries of military history to a broad segment of the reading public.

Of these factors, the influence of the historical programs of the armed services beginning during World War II has been one of the strongest and most enduring. Most military professionals evinced no greater interest in military history after World War II than they had before. Indeed, the explosive development of technologically sophisticated devices of all types and the advent of nuclear weapons in the postwar era seemed to make military history appear of doubtful relevance. Yet the decision of the service departments to sponsor broad and comprehensive histories of World War II gave an impetus to the serious study of military history that was to continue for the next forty years. (11)

Distinguished academic historians like Kent Roberts Greenfield of Johns Hopkins University headed the Army's historical program, Samuel Eliot Morison of Harvard University produced the magisterial his-

Secretary of the Army
Michael P.W. Stone

Chief of Staff, U.S. Army
General Gordon R. Sullivan

Chief of Military History
Brig. Gen. Harold W. Nelson

Chief Historian
Jeffrey J. Clarke, Ph.D.

Managing Editor
Arnold G. Fisch, Jr., Ph.D.

Associate Editor
Edward N. Bedessem

Assistant Editors
Rae T. Panella
Billy A. Arthur
Sherry L. Dowdy

Army History (PB-20-91-3) is published by the Center of Military History for the professional development of Army historians. The reproduction of articles for educational purposes is encouraged. Correspondence should be addressed to Managing Editor, *Army History*, U.S. Army Center of Military History, Southeast Federal Center, Bldg. 159, 3d & M Sts. S.E., Washington, D.C. 20374-5088, telephone AV 335-2955 or commercial (202) 475-2905. Opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors, not the Department of Defense or its constituent elements. *Army History's* contents do not necessarily reflect the official Army position and do not supersede information in other official Army publications or Army Regulations. This bulletin is approved for official dissemination of material designed to keep individuals within the Army knowledgeable of developments within Army history for the purpose of enhancing their professional development. Use of funds for printing this publication was approved by the Department of the Army on 7 September 1983, in accordance with AR 310-1. Postage paid at Washington, D.C.

tory of *United States Naval Operations in World War II*, and Wesley Frank Craven of New York University with James Lea Cate of the University of Chicago edited the seven-volume *Army Air Forces in World War II*. That few of these men had any connection with military history before World War II was symptomatic of the state of military history in the academic world in 1945. Two decades later, however, historians like Harry Coles, K. Jack Bauer, Martin Blumenson, Louis Morton, and I. B. Holley, who had begun their careers as official historians, were teaching and directing research at a number of universities and colleges throughout the country.

Yet veterans of the service history programs provided only a minority of the students and teachers who were to spark the revival of military history. Of perhaps greater importance was the expansion of graduate study in history in the United States after 1945. Initially under the impetus of the GI Bill, American colleges and universities began a sustained expansion which ended only in the mid-1970s. Along with this expansion came an increased number of opportunities for graduate study and jobs for historians. In the first fifteen years after World War II the number of students receiving a doctorate each year increased 115 percent. The membership of the American Historical Association, which had hovered around 3,000 since 1909, rose to more than 9,000 by 1960. (12) The 1960s and early '70s saw even more extensive growth as normal schools and teachers' colleges were upgraded to college and university status and new masters and doctoral programs were introduced at established institutions.

With this expansion of the historical profession there was a natural tendency on the part of graduate students and younger scholars to branch out into new or neglected fields and specialties, and it was in the area of dissertation research and the publication of monographs by younger scholars that the new interest in military history first became apparent.

In 1969 Allan R. Millett, himself a member of the new generation of scholars trained in the 1960s, called attention to a surprising fact: a large and growing number of recent dissertations, perhaps 10 percent of all those completed in the previous twenty years, had been in the area of military history, and the proportion appeared to be growing. These dissertations were not confined to the study of operations, but ranged over a wide area of subjects. Many explored new or neglected areas of scholarship or reexamined old topics from a new perspective. The new areas included the role of minorities in the U.S. armed forces, the Army

and Reconstruction, the influence of war plans on foreign policy, the armed forces and disarmament, the role of the military in developing countries, and the social ideas of professional military men. (13)

As the new scholarship in military history gradually became more widely recognized, a parallel development began to emerge. By the end of the 1970s, college students were displaying a strong and growing interest in military history. The reasons for this growth in popularity on campus are hard to identify. There is some evidence that the beginning of this growth in interest began during the first half of the 1970s when the long agony of the Vietnam War made military history appear unfashionable if not immoral and the prestige of the military was at an all-time low.

Whatever the reason, the trend was undeniable. An examination of enrollments in military history courses at the University of Illinois from 1949 till 1979 reveals a steady growth in student interest during the late 1970s. (14) By 1978 the undergraduate military history course was drawing enrollments of over 100 students in a department where the majority of courses enrolled less than 15. Moreover, the course was attracting students who normally would not have enrolled in a history course. Over two-thirds of the students had majors outside the social sciences and humanities. Less than 10 percent were members of ROTC. (15)

Whether the pattern of enrollments at Illinois was precisely representative of those at other colleges and universities cannot be determined, but one thing is clear: on many campuses during the late 1970s military history was enjoying growing popularity among undergraduates, a popularity reflected in high enrollments. In a period when enrollments in history courses were generally flat or declining, this made military history a field of specialization that history departments could no longer ignore—although for a time they did their best.

By the mid-1980s the academic establishment had largely surrendered to the inevitable. As had earlier been the case with specialists in women's history, black history, and the new forms of social history, military historians were grudgingly admitted to the "establishment." Increasing numbers of sessions were devoted to military history at conventions and regional meetings. Military historians competed for office in the American Historical Association and sat on its committees. Yale University established an endowed chair in military history, and other leading graduate schools began to consider such appointments. Prizes

and awards were established and even the most determinedly academic and esoteric reviews and journals began to publish military history.

The growing student interest on campus was paralleled by a new demand on the part of the professional military, for during the late 1970s and early 1980s the armed services had rediscovered military history. The renaissance of military history among military professionals may be traced back to 1971 when the Army, responding to the concerns raised by Brig. Gen. Hal C. Pattison, the Chief of Military History, convened an "Ad Hoc Committee on the Army Need for the Study of Military History" chaired by the head of the West Point history department, Col. Thomas E. Griess.

Although the committee members recommended a large number of measures to encourage the study of military history by Army professionals, the immediate results of their work were modest. ROTC instructional cadres were required to include one officer with an advanced degree in history, and civilian faculty members were to be encouraged to teach military history to ROTC students. In addition, the Army's service schools and colleges were to establish elective courses and some introductory lectures in military history. (16) A beginning had been made. The movement for greater emphasis on military history in the Army, fueled in part by a growing reaction against the "managerialism" of the McNamara era and in part by the Army's traumatic experience in the waning years of the Vietnam War, continued to gain momentum. In 1972 visiting professorships in military history were established at West Point and the Army War College, with a third at the Command and General Staff College in 1974. (17) The Naval War College had had a chair in naval history, the Ernest J. King Professor, since the 1960s, and in 1974, under the auspices of college president Admiral Stansfield Turner, a "department of strategy" was established as part of a broad reorganization of the curriculum. The Naval War College's approach to strategy was eclectic and inductive, stressing the case study method, and the strategy department soon came to include many historians, among them distinguished specialists in military and naval history who served as members of the permanent staff or as visiting faculty.

At the end of the 1970s the services' interest in and support for military history continued to grow, spurred by critics in Congress and the media who charged that the services' neglect of military history reflected a lack of true professionalism. (18) In 1979 the Combat Studies Institute (CSI) was established at Fort Leaven-

worth. Originally organized to prepare historical materials to support military education, training, and doctrinal development, the Institute soon expanded into the teaching of military history at the Command and General Staff College, first on an elective basis and later as part of the basic core of courses required of all students. In the same year that CSI began operations, the Commander, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), General Donn A. Starry, introduced a comprehensive program to provide some sort of historical education or publication at all levels of the TRADOC educational system.

The Army's rediscovery of military history probably had its most direct impact on academia in the program established in 1980 to provide civilian history professors a compressed course in military history at the Military Academy to encourage them to teach in the ROTC program. By 1989 over 400 college professors from universities in forty-five states had attended a one-month workshop in military history at West Point as a preliminary step towards assuming full responsibility for teaching the required ROTC history course. (19)

As an autonomous and self-conscious group of military historians began to emerge in the 1970s, they surveyed the state of their specialty and were unhappy with what they saw. Writing at the end of the 1960s, Peter Paret observed that the character of most military history produced in the United States "is extremely conventional, descriptive history, centering on leading figures, campaigns, and climactic battles, often with a strong antiquarian bent," that "standards of technical knowledge were low," and the field as a whole was "marked by enormous methodological confusion or more accurately...indifference to problems of methodology, most writers being content to jog along in the old narrative ways." (20)

The traditional type of utilitarian history exemplified by the soldier-authors of earlier years seemed narrow, unproductive, and easily prone to bias or special pleading. Such history held little appeal to this new group of practitioners. Allan Millett issued an early declaration of independence in his 1969 article when he observed that "most of us have abandoned the military's definition of military history as lessons of command and strategy. Rather, we study the conduct of America's wars and development of its military institutions in the...milieu which shapes them. I would guess we hope such study will give us a fuller understanding of American history rather than make us strategists." (21)

The new breed of scholars was also dissatisfied with what they saw as the parochialism of their field. They pointed out that the work of military historians had little influence on the work of historians in other fields and that military historians themselves seemed to be largely unacquainted with the newer methods and approaches of the "new" social, political, intellectual, and urban history that was fast coming to occupy center stage in the academic community.

For many, although by no means all, new practitioners of the 1960s and '70s, the answer seemed to lie in

developing a "new" military history. The phrase "the new military history," that by the mid-1970s had come into common use, was defined by one of its leading exponents as "a full-fledged concern with the *rest* of military history"—the part usually omitted when campaigns, strategy, leaders, tactics, and weapons were discussed. (22) The new military history focused instead on subjects such as the institutional development of military organizations, recruitment, training, socialization of personnel, interservice relationships, combat motivation and performance, and civil-mili-

Editor's Journal

This issue of *Army History* focuses, at least in part, on Korea and the Army's ongoing efforts to commemorate the fortieth anniversary of the Korean War. Perhaps this is a good time to call attention to the Center's publications about that conflict. These include four titles in the U.S. Army in Korea series:

James F. Schnabel, *Policy and Direction: The First Year* (1972, 1988). CMH Pub 20-1.

Roy E. Appleman, *South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu* (1961, 1986). CMH Pub 20-2.

Billy C. Mossman, *Ebb and Flow* (1990). CMH Pub 20-4.

Walter G. Hermes, *Truce Tent and Fighting Front* (1966, 1988). CMH Pub 20-3.

Also available are three medical titles:

Albert E. Cowdrey, *The Medics' War* (1987, 1990). CMH Pub 20-5.

Arnold M. Meirowsky, M.D., ed., *Neurological Surgery of Trauma* (1965). CMH Pub 83-4.

Frank A. Reister, *Battle Casualties and Medical Statistics: U.S. Army Experiences in the Korean War* (1973, 1986). CMH Pub 82-5.

Finally, the Center has published a number of monographs treating special topics:

John G. Westover, *Combat Support in Korea* (Facsimile reprint, 1987). CMH Pub 22-1.

Russell A. Gugeler, *Combat Actions in Korea* (1970, 1987). CMH Pub 30-2.

Terrence J. Gough, *U.S. Army Mobilization and Logistics in the Korean War: A Research Ap-*

proach (1987). CMH Pub 70-19.

Robert K. Sawyer, *Military Advisors in Korea: KMAG in Peace and War* (1963, 1989). CMH Pub 30-3.

These include two primarily photographic publications, *Korea, 1950* (1952, 1989). CMH Pub 21-1, and John Miller, jr., Owen J. Carroll, and Margaret E. Tackley, *Korea, 1951-1953* (1956, 1989). CMH Pub 21-2.

Ebb and Flow and *The Medics' War* have been printed in paperback editions, proudly displaying a Korean War commemorative band across the front cover. Over the next several months the Center also intends to republish *Policy and Direction: the First Year*; *South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu*; and *Truce Tent and Fighting Front* as paperback commemorative editions.

All of these publications are (or will be) available to Army account holders from the Army Publications Distribution Center, 2800 Eastern Boulevard, Baltimore, MD 21220-2896. Titles are requested by using DA Form 4569 and by citing the relevant Center Publications number (CMH Pub). Other interested individuals can order Korea volumes and other Center publications by contacting the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402-9325. Call (202) 783-3238 to verify prices.

Arnold G. Fisch, Jr.

tary relations.

Over the next two decades practitioners of the new military history were to transform the genre from a chronicle of battles and leaders to a broad and sophisticated examination of the development of military institutions and practices, the place of the military in society, the relationship between economic development, foreign policy, and military power, and the social impact of war and military service. At the same time historians more inclined toward the traditional topics of strategy, leadership, and operations rewrote the histories of many wars to emphasize the impact of psychological, political, and technological factors. The "enormous methodological confusion" of the '60s had given way to a significant amount of fruitful methodological experiment and by the mid-1970s, military historians had become full partners in such interdisciplinary scholarly enterprises as the Inter-university Seminar on Armed Forces and Society and frequent contributors to its journal, *Armed Forces and Society*.

Until the late 1970s, however, no work in military history had captured the attention of a wide academic and general audience. Then, in 1976, John Keegan, a civilian professor at the Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst, published *The Face of Battle*, a collection of three short essays on Agincourt, Waterloo, and the Somme. *The Face of Battle* became an instant best-seller and received praise and attention far beyond the academic and military communities. Whether or not it was "the most brilliant evocation of military experience in our time," as C. P. Snow declared, it was certainly one of the most widely read military histories since Mahan's *Influence of Sea Power*. The genius of Keegan's work was to take the most traditional type of military history, the battle piece, and transform it, using questions and viewpoints of the new military history. The results were startling, and the book gave a new impetus both to further exploration of combat motivation and behavior in the new mode and to a renewed interest in operational history as a field that could still yield new and illuminating insights about the nature of war.

The success of *The Face of Battle* was symptomatic of another development as well. The "market" for military history, both among military professionals and the general public, was large and growing rapidly. Sales of books by historians such as Stephen Ambrose, Paul Kennedy, and Stephen W. Sears equaled or exceeded those of many writers of popular fiction. By the

late 1980s at least three popular mass-circulation magazines devoted entirely to military history were doing a flourishing business.

The combined effects of all these developments: increased enrollments; the new military history; and a growing audience of students, professionals, and the general public has been to change the place of military history in the academic world from an obscure and suspect field on the periphery of the academic community to a far more respectable specialty. Yet problems remain. Many observers of the field have pointed out that the work of military historians has failed to influence greatly the general field of history or to alter and amend the way in which history is interpreted. This too is changing. Certainly the work of scholars such as John F. Guilmartin and Geoffrey Parker have had an important influence in the field of early modern European history, while books and articles by Richard Buel, Richard Kohn, Charles Royster, and John Shy have profoundly influenced the way historians look at the relationship between military force, politics, and society in the colonial and early national period. (23) It nevertheless remains true that military history, new or traditional, however brilliant and provocative, has not had profound and far-reaching impact on American historiography produced by the new types of social, political, urban, and intellectual histories, specialties which presently dominate most history departments. Nor have many practitioners of the newer fields heeded the invitation of Richard Kohn to employ the new methodologies and data in exploring the broad social, political, and psychological dimensions of the history of service in the American military. (24)

Nevertheless, conditions have never been more favorable nor the work of younger scholars more promising. In 1970 Millett subtitled his essay on the state of military history "Over the Top." In a later paper he declared it to be "struggling through the wire." (25) If we adopt these metaphors for the 1990s we may say that while the battle has not yet been won, many important objectives have been captured and that a fully autonomous, fully professional body of military historians now commands the field.

Dr. Ronald H. Spector is professor of history and international affairs at the Elliot School of International Affairs, George Washington University. He is the author of Eagle Against the Sun: America's War with Japan.

Notes

1. Walter Millis, *Military History* (Washington: American Historical Association Service Center for Teachers, 1961), p. 2.
2. *Annual Report of the American Historical Association 1912* (Washington: American Historical Association, 1914), pp. 159-93.
3. Quincy Wright, *A Study of War*, 2 vols. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942).
4. Quincy Wright, *The Study of International Relations* (New York: Appleton Century, 1955), p. 149.
5. John McAuley Palmer, *America in Arms: The Experience of the United States With Military Organization* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1941); William A. Ganoc, *A History of the United States Army*, rev. ed. (New York: Appleton-Century, 1942); Oliver L. Spaulding, *The United States Army in Peace and War* (New York: G. P. Putnam, 1937); Dudley W. Knox, *A History of the United States Navy*, rev. ed. (New York: G. P. Putnam, 1943).
6. Richard C. Brown, *The Teaching of Military History in Colleges and Universities*, U.S. Air Force Historical Study no. 124 (Montgomery, Ala.: Air University, 1955).
7. Theodore Ropp, "Military History and the Social Sciences," *Military Affairs* 30, Spring 1966, p. 13.
8. John Higham, Leonard Krieger, and Felix Gilbert, *History: The Development of Historical Studies in the United States* (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1956), p. 49.
9. David Syrett, "The John F. Morrison Professor of Military History," *Military Review*, May 1983, p. 17.
10. Millis, *Military History*, p. 3.
11. Allan R. Millett, "The Study of American Military History in the United States," *Military Affairs*, April 1977, p. 58.
12. Higham, *History*, pp. 26-27.
13. Allan R. Millett, "American Military History: Over the Top" in Herbert J. Bass, ed., *The State of American History* (Chicago: Quadrangle, 1970).
14. John A. Lynn, "Military History in the Classroom: A Strategy for Enrollments," *Military Affairs*, December 1979, p. 202.
15. *Ibid.* The author observed a similar pattern among students in military history courses at the University of Maryland, Baltimore County, in the early 1980s.
16. Brooks E. Kleber, "The Army Looks at Its Need for Military History," *Military Affairs*, April 1973, pp. 47-48.
17. *Ibid.*, p. 48.
18. Cf. Jeffrey Record, "The Fortunes of War," *Harper's*, April 1978, pp. 19-23; Edward Luttwak, "A New Arms Race," *Commentary*, September 1980, pp. 27-34.
19. On the origins of the program, see Lt. Col. Kenneth E. Hamburger and Capt. Robert Mixon, "USMA Educates the Professors," *Army*, June 1984.
20. Peter Paret, "The History of War," *Daedalus* 100, Spring 1971, pp. 376-96.
21. Millett, "American Military History: Over the Top," p. 117.
22. Peter Karston, "The 'New' American Military History: A Map of the Territory Explored and Unexplored," *American Quarterly* 36, Fall 1984, p. 389.
23. John F. Guilmartin, *Gunpowder and Galleys* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1974); Geoffrey Parker, *The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road, 1567-1659* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972); Colin Martin and Geoffrey Parker, *The Spanish Armada* (New York: Norton, 1988); John Shy, *A People Numerous and Armed* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976); Charles Royster, *A Revolutionary People at War* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1979); Richard H. Kohn, *Eagle and Sword: The Beginnings of the Military Establishment in America* (New York: Free Press, 1975).
24. Richard H. Kohn, "The Social History of the American Soldier: A Review and Prospectus for Research," *American Historical Review* 86 (1981), no. 3, pp. 553-67.
25. Millett, "American Military History: Struggling Through the Wire," Paper delivered to the 1975 conference of the International Commission of Military History, Washington, D.C.

The Chief's Corner

Harold W. Nelson

This issue devotes some special attention to Korea and the U.S. Army's role in the Korean War. Both topics are important to today's Army historians. Our bilateral relations with our counterparts in the Army of the Republic of Korea (ROK) are strong and growing. Their government is building a world-class war memorial that will include a fine museum and archive as well as historical offices. U.S. Army historians are proud to play a small part by lending artifacts and facilitating the copying of documents.

The U.S. Army history effort in Korea is equally important. As headquarters are consolidated and missions change, the need to chronicle rapid change—a requirement familiar to many Army historians both in Europe and CONUS—is a growing challenge. At the same time, the demand for staff rides to Korean War battlefields is unrelenting. The opportunities to work with ROK Army units to conduct combined staff rides, preserve the battlefields, and improve documentation are limited only by available resources. There is no doubt that this is an exciting time to do command history in Korea.

The Center of Military History has not forgotten the Korean War. Publishing Billy Mossman's *Ebb and Flow* as a forty-year commemorative volume received grateful acknowledgment from many veterans. As Doctor Fisch's "Editor's Journal" notes, other commemorative editions of previously published volumes will follow. I am certain that these affordable paperback editions also will be well received.

Many are also awaiting Col. John Cash's study of the 24th Infantry Regiment. His draft seems to be progressing nicely, although he must resist the siren call of additional oral history sources if he is to stay on schedule. His book will be a unique study of a single regiment—no such work has ever before been attempted at the Center, and I doubt that it will ever be repeated. Official history in an organization as large as the U.S. Army is best written at the "macro-level." Tactical histories that develop narrative at the brigade or regimental level simply cannot be proliferated if the broader work of the Center is to be completed. His study is worthwhile, and it is sure to be commented upon by many interested readers.

As our project to broaden coverage of logistics history bears fruit, two new books that address Korea within the context of the logistics topic should be noted. Carter B. Magruder's *Recurring Logistic Problems As I Have Observed Them* is a fine memoir covering the period beginning in World War II, giving numerous up-to-date insights. Joseph M. Heiser, Jr.'s *A Soldier Supporting Soldiers* begins with lower-level treatments of World War II but carries the narrative into the Vietnam era.

Our emphasis on Korea should not overshadow other important work. World War II commemoration swings into high gear as many division and state associations observe their fifty-year anniversaries, and retrospectives on the 1941 maneuvers hold center stage as the final touches are completed on the Pearl Harbor commemorative activities. Lt. Gen. (Ret.) Claude M. Kicklighter has taken the lead for the Army (and the Department of Defense) in coordinating activities, and *Army History* will continue to publicize events and publications.

World War II activities inevitably will expand the Center's international contacts. Our traditional ties have been our European counterparts, but planning for World War II commemorations has already opened some interesting prospects in Latin America and North Africa. The potential in South Asia and around the Pacific rim is immense, and we hope to find ways to use conferences to answer the need while dealing effectively with the great distances that always pose such a challenge to sustaining programs in that part of the world. The origins of our military and academic traditions have given us a "Europe first" orientation in our work as well as in the war we commemorate, so we must all be aware of the bias as we plan future activities.

The past year has been tumultuous, and historians will need time to gain perspective and draw tentative conclusions. Within the Army we have had excellent support for our work. We shall continue to use this publication to communicate our efforts to people who are interested, and I am indebted to Doctor Fisch and the Production Services Division staff for keeping *Army History* on a steady course.

The Korean War: Forty Going on Fifty

Duane Denfeld

These are exciting times for military historians and for American society in general, as the nation observes the fiftieth anniversary of World War II. Coverage of the conflict is ubiquitous: many books have been released or will soon be in the bookstores; news weeklies have put out special issues; and there has been a surge in the number of conferences, television specials, new museum exhibits, veterans' reunions, and battlefield tours.

The summer of 1990 also marked the fortieth anniversary of the Korean War's onset. This anniversary also has generated interest and excitement. A number of histories recently have been published, and there is considerable media attention to the war and to commemorative events. The number of Korean War veterans and relatives visiting the Republic of Korea has been on the increase.

The 2d Infantry Division, stationed on the forward defense line in Korea, provides assistance to groups and individuals returning to the battlefields. In particular, the 2d Infantry Division Museum and Historical Center at Camp Casey, Korea, conducts background research to make visitors' time more meaningful. The museum staff is instituting a new program to cope with some special and unique problems that the Korean War veteran (unlike the veteran of World War II) experiences when returning to wartime places.

There are two major obstacles to making the connection between events during the Korean War and today. First, a large number of sites are inaccessible, and second, few sites retain any resemblance to their wartime appearance. Sites in North Korea cannot be visited, nor can one enter the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) to explore war relics there. At those sites that can be toured, reforestation, intensive farming, and urban development have so altered them that they hardly are recognizable to the veteran.

The World War II veteran has increased freedom of travel as barriers between the European countries come down. Nearly all the battlefields of Europe and the Pacific can be reached. Air travel and modern accommodations have eased travel to once-remote Pacific islands, although there has been a recent decline in tours to the Philippines, once the most popular Pacific destination, because of political unrest there.

In contrast, there is not yet freedom of travel to North Korea, where so many significant wartime sites

exist. In the north, along the Yalu River on the Manchurian border, there are fourteen known prisoner of war (POW) camps and cemeteries. These POW camp sites and adjacent burial grounds might hold the answers to questions about hundreds of American MIAs (missing in action). Some other areas in North Korea that veterans would like to see are the Changjin (Chosin) reservoir, the Chongchon River and Kunu-ri areas, and many hills in the north and on the northern side of the DMZ. There are also numerous battlefields in the southern portion of the DMZ and in restricted lands south of the zone. Some of the restricted parcels may be entered with advance approval.

The processing of requests to enter restricted areas south of the DMZ usually requires seven to ten days. Relatives of one Medal of Honor recipient were disappointed by this sad fact. They had come to Korea hoping to walk the area where his actions earned him the medal and cost his life. Upon their arrival at Camp Casey, his relatives inquired at the museum about the location of the battlefield. With the Medal of Honor citation and Korean War-vintage Army Map Series maps to go by, the site (Pachi-dong) was identified. Unfortunately, it was within a restricted area, and the visitors did not have enough time remaining in Korea to make a formal request for access. Personnel of the 2d Division, however, were able to conduct a special ceremony during their stay at a facility named in honor of the Medal of Honor recipient.

Without assistance, visitors can be frustrated trying to locate small villages and place names cited in Korean War accounts. Places such as Pachi-dong are not on tourist maps, since they are too small or have disappeared. Multiple place names confuse the visitor even more. For example, Changjin is better known to most as Chosin, its name on Japanese maps that were used at times during the war in Korea. The various names may be quite different—Chonggok is referred to as Chonggong-ni in some wartime descriptions, while Konjian-ni was also called Konjae.

The second major difficulty the visitor to Korea faces is making the connection between the landscape of the 1990s and the 1950s. European and Pacific war landscapes still have dominant features that serve as landmarks or specific identifiers. At Omaha and Utah beaches the German bunkers and casemates survive as do churches, farmhouses, and roads. These features



Korean laborers carry supplies to hill positions during the Korean War. Today these hills are covered by a dense forest.

allow one to become oriented and to find special locales. A mental image can therefore be created to link today with events over forty years ago. Similarly, some Pacific islands are little changed, allowing one easily to orient to the past. Marines and soldiers of the 1944 campaign to capture Peleliu in the Palu Islands will find the island nearly frozen in time. The Japanese pillboxes, bunkers, caves, airfield, and other structures are extant. Jungle growth, hot humid weather, and the rugged terrain are the only impediments to retracing one's steps.

Korea is a different story. Few places aside from the inaccessible DMZ retain any of the flotsam of war. The hills, once barren except for scattered scrub pines and grass, are now lush green forests. A spectacular reforestation program has completely changed the appearance of the hills that figured so prominently in the war. Veterans of hill battles in the Republic of Korea who come to see them express discomfort over being unable to find important sites or features. Battlefields on flat places have been plowed under to create rice paddies or farmland. Urban growth has transformed other battle areas. There are few opportunities to find one's foxhole position or to stand in the same spot again.

The magazine *After the Battle* uses the fact that the World War II sites are more intact to relate military

history through a series of "then and now" photographs of World War II battlefields. Readers may well be surprised at how close in appearance World War II photographs are to the present European and Pacific scenes. The Korean War, by contrast, offers few "then and now" comparisons. For example, when the *After the Battle* staff recounted the accidental death of Lt. Gen. George S. Patton, Jr., they were able to find the exact site of the accident, hospital room, and other places surrounding the event with few changes between World War II and today. An attempt in Korea to locate the accident scene where Lt. Gen. Walton Walker was killed was less successful. Both accidents took place near population centers, but urban expansion in Korea has been dramatically greater. The Walker accident site, some five miles south of Uijongbu, has gone from rural to urban, and exact terrain analysis and effective "then and now" comparison are simply not possible.

Uijongbu's experience is not unique. Korean cities are new, with few reminders of the past. Seoul, Taegon, Inchon, and other cities have undergone fantastic development. All are new cities with few buildings left from before the war. In Seoul the most identifiable surviving structures are the Capitol building, Seoul Station, and the city gates. Unlike European cities, there was no attempt to restore or replicate



Hall of Changdan, a city that has disappeared. Today the city remains are within the DMZ.

the old architecture during rebuilding.

The 2d Infantry Division Museum and Historical Center staff has developed a program to alleviate some of the problems in reaching and identifying Korean War sites. The program is designed to assist both veterans and active duty personnel in finding sites and in providing historical data about the sites to take with them. Active duty soldiers account for those making the greatest use of this service. Officers engaged in professional development studies or battle analyses account for many requests for assistance. Thus, both officers and enlisted personnel with an interest in Korean War history seek information from the museum. Local military newspapers also ask for help in preparing news items on hill battlefields and memorials spread across Korea.

A new set of files containing information on over 200 specific locations is being organized to serve those requesting information. Previously, the historical center files were delineated only by unit. Although the unit files will be retained, a second system is being compiled by hill number/name, place name, temporary cemetery, camp, and reserve area. These files will range from famous hills, such as "Porkchop," to lesser known hills and features. For example, a file on Hill 303 near Waegwan includes details on the capture and

murder of forty soldiers of the 1st Cavalry Division. There are separate files for multiple events at the same place, e.g., there is a file for the battle of Kapyong and another file that has details on the 2d Infantry camp near this city.

Each site file will include map coordinates, accessibility information including local transportation, property ownership data, and the name of someone to be contacted if it is a restricted area. The presence of memorials on the site will be indicated. Battle maps, unit reports, war diaries, photographs, and other references will also be included in the files. Excellent staff ride notebooks, prepared by the command historian, Thomas Ryan, are available for certain places and are rich sources of data. Additionally, a computer data base will be developed with key word identifiers so that rapid delineation of types of features can be made.

The staff believes that this new system will allow the historical center better to direct both veterans and active duty soldiers to the battlefields and sites associated with the Korean War.

Dr. Duane Denfeld is curator of the 2d Infantry Division Museum at Camp Casey, Korea, and division historian.

Research from the Battlefield Military History Detachments in Wartime Korea

Raymond A. Mentzer, Jr.

The United States Army emerged from World War II with a new, official, and vigorous historical program. The War Department had created a special historical office, originally known as the Historical Branch of the Military Intelligence Division. It was subsequently reorganized into the Office of the Chief of Military History (OCMH). (1) Through this office, the Army embarked upon an ambitious project to write and publish a multivolume history of the war. Military circles had long appreciated the value of operational history for training as well as for the development of doctrine, but until the 1940s no one recognized or suggested the value of an ongoing, established program. The official histories, the so-called "green books," eventually drew wide critical acclaim. (2) In addition, S.L.A. Marshall, a journalist by training who served in the Pacific and later became deputy theater historian in Europe, had developed a fresh and promising research technique, the after-action group interview. (3) Finally, the Army had, in conjunction with these various developments, established a field historical program with military history detachments (MHDs), whose chief purpose was to conduct interviews, gather historical materials on the battlefield, and write preliminary accounts of key actions.

In 1950 with the outbreak of hostilities in Korea, the time had come to return Army historians and historical organizations to the theater of operations and to bring to bear on a wide scale the research and data-gathering techniques developed just a few years earlier. Curiously, the attempt proved to be disappointing and frustrating. It simply did not work as planned and, in any event, was nowhere nearly as successful as the far more limited effort during World War II. Thus it is only natural to ask what happened to the field historical program in Korea. To begin with, how was it organized? What was its mission? What were its achievements, and what problems confronted it? Above all, why did it fail to measure up to expectations?

Hostilities erupted on 25 June 1950 when North Korean troops launched a full-scale invasion of the southern half of the peninsula. About nine months later, in February of the following year, Army historical detachments began to deploy from the United

States. By July, there were eight detachments, known generically as historical teams, assigned to Eighth Army Special Troops. The theater historian was Gordon Prange, at headquarters in Tokyo, but the Eighth Army staff historian, Col. Elbert Nelson, exercised operational control over the various detachments. After the Chinese entry into the war during the waning months of 1950, Colonel Nelson established his office first in Yokohama, Japan, and after 1952, in Korea. (4)

Historical detachments in Korea were of three types: A, B, and C teams. The A team had five persons. A lieutenant colonel commanded and was chief historian. An officer historian with the rank of major and a senior enlisted historical editor, a master sergeant, assisted him. Two other enlisted persons, a stenographer and a driver, completed the roster. The single A team in Korea, designated the 1st Military Historical Detachment, supervised the B and C teams. Three B teams—the 2d, 3d, and 7th MHDs—were assigned to the three corps of Eighth Army. (5) The officer historian was a major, who commanded two enlisted persons, the familiar stenographer and driver. Four C teams—the 4th, 5th, 6th, and 8th MHDs—supported the various divisions. Their organizations were similar to that of the B teams, except that their commanders held the rank of captain. The original intention was to create sufficient C teams to cover each of the six U.S. Army divisions in Korea, but this plan was never fully implemented. (6)

The mission of these "historical service organizations," as stated in *Table of Organization and Equipment No. 20-17*, was "to collect and furnish historical information of the command to which the detachment is assigned or attached." More specifically, the units were to observe the conduct of combat operations; interview commanders, staff members, and participants; obtain historical information "for subsequent use in Department of the Army History"; and provide "material for immediate use in preparing experimental data on battlefield tactics, techniques, and material." (7) Yet there was no apparent consensus on the priorities and practicalities of the various aspects of the mission.

Some officers saw themselves in the mold of

S.L.A. Marshall and attempted to provide immediate feedback for battlefield commanders. Marshall had become well known for his discoveries made in the course of covering the invasions of the Makin and Kwajalein Islands in late 1943 and early 1944. He asserted that his after-action group interviews revealed that only 25 percent of infantrymen fired their rifles in battle, and that cooperation between armor and infantry was sometimes less than ideal. (8)

Such successes, however controversial, motivated at least a few history detachment commanders in Korea. Maj. Robert H. Fechtman, serving with the 1st MHD from November 1951 to June 1952, clearly felt that one of the basic functions of historical detachments involved their capacity for discovering battlefield improvisations and expedients. Not only could the historical officer assist field commanders in resolving immediate problems—Fechtman cites an example of his own assistance in fine tuning night fire training in Korea during April 1952—but the information, once included in the combat interview narrative, could eventually be available for Army-wide distribution. Additional evidence of similar expectations can be readily found. The following year, in a covering letter to a historical manuscript examining the "Organization of the Korean Communication Zone," the project officer suggested that the "lessons learned would be of immense value" in guiding the operation of future field army logistics. (9) Fechtman and others evidently had in mind the sort of lessons learned that are now collected by the Center for Army Lessons Learned at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and distributed to the various Army schools. These were high standards, and such immediacy of payoff to field commanders was difficult to sustain. The other fundamental aspect of the detachment's mission in Korea was far more traditional. They were to gather the raw historical data to which historians working for OCMH could later turn in order to write an official postwar history of the conflict in Korea. The pertinent official military records were made available through appropriate Army channels or, in due course, deposited in the National Archives, there to be freely consulted.

OCMH wanted the detachments to complement and complete the normal operational materials. By March 1952 the Department of the Army viewed the MHDs' official mission as the collection of information to supplement and amplify the documentary account of events. OCMH was especially anxious that detachment members conduct interviews and gather observations and comments to support a projected

multivolume history. The office wanted accounts of small unit actions and reports focusing on lower ranking enlisted men and noncommissioned officers. Ideally, such material was to convey to ordinary servicemen the combat experience far more explicitly, far more vividly, than the usual dry military rhetoric. It would also help flesh out the official history, breathing the human experience into what might otherwise be a lifeless printed account. The result was a long series of narrative reports or, in official terminology, "monographs," which in the end were far more elaborate than the planners in Washington had likely envisaged.

The reports that the detachments regularly dispatched to the Office of the Chief of Military History were many, varied, and detailed. OCMH's Historical Manuscript Accessions Lists for the Korean conflict enumerate nearly one hundred and fifty separate type-script historical manuscripts prepared by the MHDs in Korea and forwarded to Washington. (10) A great many were concise accounts of small unit actions, complete with maps, orders, and photographs. Indeed, the detachments initially concentrated their efforts on small unit engagements and activities, reconstructing them in precise detail through interviews with participants and research in unit records. The results, to cite but a few examples, were studies of raiding patrols by several platoons of the 3d Infantry Division; the night defense of Hill 200 by 2d Battalion, 179th Infantry Regiment, 45th Division; and the withdrawal of Company C, 2d Engineer Combat Battalion, 2d Infantry Division from Wonju.

The eight separate detachments were, in the hope of improved command and control, consolidated in Seoul by December 1951. They continued to prepare accounts of small unit actions, but now undertook broader projects as well. The move allowed the detachments to pool their resources and, in the process, draft reports on major undertakings. The results included a four volume study of over one thousand pages on Operation LITTLE SWITCH—a major repatriation enterprise; a two-volume narrative report on Operation CLAM-UP, a deployment designed to capture Chinese soldiers; and a 522-page report on the fighting along the now famous Heartbreak Ridge during September and October 1951.

Still other projects dwelt on the technical aspects of warfare. There was, for instance, a report of nearly two hundred pages on graves registration, an even longer one on offshore procurement problems, and several studies of helicopter operations. There were descriptions of surgical hospitals as well as dental

services, the use of flame throwers and chemical smoke generators, the employment of radio equipment, the winterizing of water points, the repair of tidal locks, and the destruction and demolition of various installations as part of the withdrawal from North Korea. Finally, there were a few studies of a more general and overarching nature. They treated such matters as inter-Allied cooperation and coordination during combat operations, personnel and logistics problems, and the order of battle for both Eighth U.S. Army and the Republic of Korea forces. (11)

These were not inconsiderable accomplishments. The reports received by OCMH from the detachments in the field assisted measurably in the subsequent writing of the official history. The effort was concentrated, with a fairly small number of officer historians putting together the majority of the reports. Capt. Martin Blumenson wrote no less than twenty-three accounts and had a hand in preparing four others. Maj. Billy C. Mossman, serving with several different historical detachments, prepared at least eight historical manuscripts and collaborated on seven more. Captains John Mewha of the 8th Historical Detachment and Edward C. Williamson of the 4th each wrote thirteen accounts. Altogether, a close knot of seven officers produced 96 of the 149 historical manuscripts (almost 65 percent) compiled by the MHDs in Korea.

Much of this work was soon put to use. As early as 1954, following the cessation of hostilities, Capt. Russell A. Gugeler published a collection of small unit combat accounts. OCMH, for whom he had worked before the Korean conflict, sent Captain Gugeler and several other officers to Korea with an eye to several specific projects. (12) Operating independently of the MHDs, Gugeler conducted a series of interviews centering on small unit actions. His model was the after-action interview technique pioneered by S.L.A. Marshall. Of the nineteen accounts contained in Gugeler's volume, however, only nine—less than half—were based on individual or group interviews conducted by the author himself. The remaining ten were drawn entirely from the narrative reports prepared by various officers in the historical detachments.

OCMH also dispatched Capt. John G. Westover to Korea in the belief that the Army needed a record of combat support at the small unit level. Westover had been S.L.A. Marshall's assistant in Europe during World War II and was fully prepared for the task assigned him. (13) In Westover's opinion (which likely reflected OCMH's view) small unit accounts were "sometimes better than high-level histories," for

they inform inexperienced junior officers, provide examples for Army instructors, and refresh those leaders who have been away from combat. (14)

Although he functioned quite separately from the historical detachments, Westover too came to depend heavily on their work. His collection of interviews, entitled *Combat Support in Korea*, first appeared in 1955 and was, in some ways, a companion and follow-up to Gugeler's volume. It contained 141 interviews, treating a wide diversity of engineering, transportation, and logistical problems. He excerpted a few of the interviews from speeches, letters, and magazines. The majority were done by the author while in Korea or upon his return to the United States. Still, no fewer than eighteen of the published interviews came from reports sent to OCMH by military history detachments.

Later, as the patient, orderly publication of the official history of the Korean War got under way, the work of the various MHDs acquired additional significance. OCMH proposed a five-volume U.S. Army in the Korean War series. The project was modest compared with the ninety-six volumes originally envisaged for the Army's official history of World War II, yet the final volume was not completed until 1990. (15) The first volume in the series was Roy E. Appleman's *South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu*, published in 1961.

Appleman, a World War II veteran, was recalled to active duty and sent to Korea as another of the historians working for OCMH. (16) He arrived in July 1951 under orders from Maj. Gen. Orlando Ward, then Chief of Military History, "to study the terrain of the action and interview as many participants, of all ranks, as he could find." (17) OCMH had already outlined its plan for the Army's history of the Korean War, and Appleman, along with Gugeler, was to begin his research in the field. His lengthy subsequent study, solidly based on the official military records, details combat operations from June to November 1950. He supplemented official materials extensively with the interviews he and Gugeler conducted. Finally, he put to good use the numerous, detailed reports prepared by the historical detachments.

Subsequent volumes in the official history were no less beholden to the detachments. The most recent volume, entitled *Ebb and Flow*, is an account of combat operations from late 1950 to mid-1951. It relied extensively upon the MHDs' manuscript reports and their many battlefield interviews. The author, Billy Mossman, was a detachment commander in

Korea. Understandably, he has expressed a keen appreciation for their work. (18)

Other more specialized studies of the war found the results of the detachments' labor equally worthwhile. When Albert E. Cowdrey wrote *The Medics' War* in 1987, he too turned to the collection of manuscripts written by the historical units. At his disposal were reports on helicopter evacuation, the care of prisoners and refugees, medical processing in prisoner of war exchanges, and the operation of medical companies as well as surgical hospitals. (19) More recently (1989), the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers published the work of a Korean War historical team in its entirety—a narrative on bridge construction along the Imjin River. Written nearly forty years ago by Maj. William R. Farquhar, Jr., and Maj. Henry A. Jeffers, Jr., the account was complete with photographs, maps, and official documents, and required a minimum of editing. It was printed virtually unchanged and, according to Corps of Engineer officials, provides an "instructive example of imaginative engineering in the face of challenging wartime requirements." (20)

The value of the historical manuscripts produced by the MHDs in Korea has only increased as historians in and out of government now begin to rethink the meaning of those violent events along the far northern rim of the Pacific during the early 1950s. Still, the field historical program in Korea encountered difficulties and frustrations. In some instances they were the usual and recurring bureaucratic problems; at other times, they appear to have been fundamental and hence more perplexing.

Organizational complications plagued the detachments throughout the war. The 1st MHD was meant to provide administrative support and to coordinate the activities of the other seven detachments. Unfortunately, it was among the last to arrive in Korea. Even then, the 1st MHD could oversee the other units only by correspondence. They were scattered among the various corps and divisions in the field. The arrangement quickly proved cumbersome and impractical. Thus, in December 1951 Eighth U.S. Army centralized the detachments at headquarters in Seoul under the close supervision of the 1st MHD. About twelve months later, near the end of the war, the separate detachments were reorganized to form a single unit, the 8086th Army Unit, Military History Detachment, at Headquarters, Army Forces Far East (AFFE). (21) The unit was authorized ten field grade officers and nine sergeants who were organized into eight historical teams, each consisting of a historical officer and an

enlisted research assistant. The chief of the AFFE Military History Section exercised operational control. (22)

The consolidation of all eight history detachments, particularly the first reorganization in late 1951, had some obvious advantages. Given the limited number of historians, they could be dispatched to the field in more efficient and practical fashion. Also they could cooperate in the preparation and review of manuscripts. The substantial number of narrative accounts produced by the detachments is eloquent testimony to the benefits of concentrating assets. Decades later in Vietnam, the twenty-seven MHDs operated in a far more decentralized manner. They focused their energies on raw data collection—preserving records and conducting interviews—and accordingly prepared fewer narrative reports. Each approach has its advantages. Yet—to return to the Korean experience—other problems sometimes offset whatever improvements centralization and pooling had achieved.

A chronic personnel shortage went unresolved. By September 1952 four of eight detachments lacked commanders. In addition, the officer historian position in the 1st MHD was vacant. The only people remaining on duty were the chief historian and three officer historians commanding the 2d, 3d, and 6th MHDs. Thus effective officer-historian strength stood at less than half. (23) To make matters worse, in March 1952 the Department of the Army reorganized the detachments, reducing the number of enlisted persons by 50 percent. Each detachment lost its driver and was left with only a stenographer.

Pulling the Army historians in Korea out of the field, away from the corps and divisions, also meant that they were separated from the fighting. The historians' sense of the flow and immediacy of events inevitably was dulled. The absence of direct contact with the combat units impeded the ability of the detachments to conduct interviews. Projects focused less and less on activities that had only recently transpired, while the events were still fresh in the minds of the participants. There was greater lag time between the engagement and the interview of combatants. Progressively, studies were of actions that had taken place some time ago. In addition, far more staff studies and technical reports were developed. Withdrawal from the field refocused and in some cases diverted energies.

The move to headquarters also increased editorial control. By the spring of 1952 the review and approval procedures necessary before narrative reports could be

forwarded to OCMH had become astonishingly cumbersome. Not only did the numerous bureaucratic hurdles significantly lengthen (indeed double) the time required to complete a report, some historians also felt that effective, if unintentional, censorship emerged. No less than five other agencies had the opportunity to review and comment upon the manuscript, and each seemed determined to expunge whatever materials, in its view, cast an unfavorable light. In addition, the very format of the reports became more onerous. Naturally, reports had to be typed. Less understandable were the requirements that there could be no penciled corrections and that paragraphs had to end on a page, with each new page starting a new paragraph. (24) These demands were both banal and impeding.

These particular complications might have been resolved by precise written directives from OCMH, detailing requirements and instituting a methodology and procedure for the conduct of interviews and the submission of narrative reports. Representatives from the office did visit Korea and explain their needs and desires. Such oral, almost casual, expressions of OCMH's wishes were ineffective, however. Without explicit published guidelines the office's views lacked clarity, energy, and resolution. Ultimately, contact between OCMH and the detachments proved inadequate. (25) Was the office preoccupied with writing its volumes on World War II? (26) Did it, as a result, give the field historical teams in Korea a lower priority? Certainly General Ward, Chief of Military History, had an interest in writing a history of the Korean conflict. He ordered a number of his own historians to Korea, persons such as Appleman, Gugeler, and Westover, where they undertook primary research in the field. Did this action stem from an encompassing desire to give close attention to the basic principles of historical research and writing? Or did OCMH lack confidence in the historical detachments, preferring instead to rely on its own people?

The MHDs in Korea did, naturally enough, suffer some internal problems, though these were not always of their own making. Commanders and enlisted persons lodged the usual complaints about administrative tasks, namely, the difficulty that a two- or three-person detachment has in maintaining unit records and preparing the routine reports required of all military units. Such protests are not novel and are not likely to subside, given the essential bureaucratic nature of the modern Army. Some detachment commanders also criticized their equipment, or lack thereof. These

grievances were more justified. Several units, when first deployed from the United States to Korea, discovered that their organization equipment had been stolen upon arrival in Pusan. They had some difficulty replacing it. There were additional challenges. Units initially possessed what might be considered the minimum equipment: one camera and one portable typewriter—the slightly larger A team had two of each. The organizational changes of 1952, unfortunately, eliminated the camera, making it more problematic for the detachment to fulfill its mission. (27)

These equipment difficulties only aggravated a growing problem of inadequate staffing with untrained personnel. Several of the officer historians initially dispatched to Korea possessed a strong professional background. Martin Blumenson, for example, had served as a historical officer with the Third and Seventh Armies during World War II. Recalled to active duty in 1950, he commanded, in turn, the 3d and 4th MHDs. Later as a civilian historian for OCMH he wrote two volumes in the official Army series on World War II. Billy Mossman, who commanded several different detachments in Korea, was similarly qualified. He too went on to join OCMH after the war and wrote a volume for the U.S. Army in Korea series. As the war dragged on, however, the early resolve to provide qualified historians such as Blumenson and Mossman for the detachments broke down. The MHDs were constantly short-handed, and the officer-historian sometimes had only the most rudimentary qualifications and training for the position.

The supply of qualified reserve officers, which the Army originally had mobilized to command the historical detachments, was quickly exhausted. Thereafter officers were assigned helter-skelter through the normal personnel channels. OCMH tried to compensate in a limited way by giving detachment members a two-week orientation before their departure for Korea. (28) Such training could hardly be considered adequate, however.

If OCMH ultimately failed the detachments in terms of confidence, direction, and support, field commanders tended to view the MHDs with suspicion. Line units believed, often justifiably, that they had far more pressing and immediate tasks. Thus they sometimes resented the historian and his probing questions. He was just a nuisance. Some soldiers even suspected he was a prying member of the Public Affairs Office—or from the Inspector General. (29)

Higher placed, politically aware commanders may also have been worried about "information dissemina-

tion" amid the growing McCarthyism of the early 1950s. Army officers were, after all, among those tainted in the anti-Communist campaign led by the senator from Wisconsin. Moreover, this first of several wars against Communist regimes proved to be an ambivalent and uncertain affair. The battlefield was a stalemate, and victory ever elusive. Support at home was weak or wavering, and the average soldier often seemed demoralized and confused. The conduct of some Americans captured by the North Koreans and Chinese, for instance, would later shock both the Defense Department and the American public. In this climate field officers may have been understandably cautious about committing themselves to the historical record, even for something so concise as the after-action interview of a small unit engagement.

In the final analysis, if the performance of the MHDs in Korea appears lackluster, the reasons are many, and they can be found at several different echelons. The distance that at first separated the detachments from the Eighth Army Historian in Japan probably contributed to some early confusion, particularly since he had responsibility for operational control. Later, rigid centralization and overly tight direction by the AFHE Historical Section in Korea occasionally robbed the detachments of initiative and incentive. Staff and equipment problems only further demoralized the officer-historians. In addition, field commanders could be overly protective and cautious. Finally, the absence of continuing close cooperation

and mutual understanding between OCMH and the officer-historians made everyone's task more challenging. The Chief of Military History might have been more effective in terms of guidance for the detachments and more supportive in helping them resolve difficulties stemming from shortages of trained staff and suitable equipment.

Official, or to borrow a more recent term, public history is always a delicate and complex matter, particularly when situated within the framework of an armed conflict. There is, nonetheless, a well-recorded corpus of Korean War history, and the military history detachments operating in the field made a significant contribution to it. Their narrative reports and many interviews have been used extensively for the preparation of the official Army history of the war, as well as for smaller, more focused studies. If the MHDs' achievements have sometimes been underestimated or overlooked, undoubtedly the cause was bureaucratic indifference and human forgetfulness rather than a failure on the part of the detachments themselves.

Raymond A. Mentzer, Jr., professor of history at Montana State University, Bozeman, is a staff sergeant formerly with the 50th Military History Detachment. The author wishes to thank Maj. Christopher L. Manos for his careful critique of the article and SSgt. Michael R. Fischer for his generous research assistance.

Notes

1. The office was redesignated the U.S. Army Center of Military History in 1973.
2. There is no official narrative history of World War I. By 1948, however, the Army War College Historical Section published through the Government Printing Office a seventeen-volume edited collection of documents and orders entitled *The United States Army in the World War*. The model was *The War of the Rebellion*, the established documentary history of the Civil War. See John E. Jessup, Jr., and Robert W. Coakley, eds., *A Guide to the Study and Use of Military History* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1979), pp. 285-87.
3. See S.L.A. Marshall, *Island Victory* (Washington: Infantry Journal Press, 1944), pp. 201-13. On the

- subject of Marshall's contribution, see F.D.G. Williams, *SLAM: The Influence of S.L.A. Marshall on the United States Army* (Fort Monroe, Va.: U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1990).
4. Department of the Army (hereafter DA), U.S. Army Center of Military History (hereafter CMH), 8086th Army Unit, *Chronology of the Historical Detachments in Korea, October 1950 to January 1954*, pp. 2,5,8.
5. The I, IX, and X Corps.
6. DA, Table of Organization and Equipment (hereafter T/O & E), no. 20-17, "Historical Service Organization," 11 February 1949, with changes; T/O & E, No. 20-17A, "Military History Detachment," 8 March 1952.

7. DA, T/O & E, no. 20-17, "Historical Service Organization," 11 February 1949, with changes. The directives issued by General Headquarters, Far East Command, Military History Section "The Military Historian," 20 June 1951, echoed these views.
8. Marshall's findings have been the subject of an ongoing debate in military and historical circles.
9. DA, CMH, Maj. Robert H. Fechtman, "The Value of Historical Detachments," Student Monograph, The Infantry School, Fort Benning, Ga., 13 December 1952; 8086th Army Unit, *Chronology*, p. 37.
10. The manuscripts can be consulted at CMH in Washington, D.C.
11. DA, CMH, Historical Manuscript Accessions Lists (Selected Subjects), nos. 2, 2A, and 2B, Korean Conflict, 1 July 1953, 1 February 1955, 1 September 1957.
12. Gugeler, along with Roy E. Appleman, James M. Burns, and John Stevens, was coauthor of *Okinawa: The Last Battle* (Washington, D.C.: Historical Division, Department of the Army, 1948). After Korea Gugeler became a civilian historian for the U.S. European Command. See Hal C. Pattison, "Foreword to Revised Edition," in Russell A. Gugeler, *Combat Actions in Korea* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1970. First printed 1954), p. v.
13. Roger J. Spiller, "S.L.A. Marshall and the Ratio of Fire," *Journal of the Royal United Services Institute*, Winter 1988, p. 68.
14. John G. Westover, *Combat Support in Korea* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1987. Reprint of 1955 edition), p. v.
15. Kent R. Greenfield, *The Historian and the Army* (New Brunswick, N. J.: Rutgers University Press, 1954), pp. v, 3-4.
16. He was also one of the coauthors of *Okinawa: The Last Battle*.
17. Roy E. Appleman, *South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1961), p. xi.
18. Billy C. Mossman, *Ebb and Flow, November 1950-July 1951* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1990), pp. 507-08. See also Walter G. Hermes, *Truce Tent and Fighting Front* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1966).
19. Albert E. Cowdrey, *The Medics' War* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1987), p. 365.
20. See especially the Foreword and Editor's Preface to William J. Farquhar, Jr., and Henry A. Jeffers, Jr., *Bridging the Imjin: Construction of Libby and Teal Bridges during the Korean War (October 1952-July 1953)*, ed. Charles Hendricks (Fort Belvoir, Va.: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 1989), pp. iii-vi.
21. Billy C. Mossman suggests that the change arose in part from dissatisfaction with the Eighth Army command historian. Interview, Thomas Ryan with Billy C. Mossman, 30 March 1988.
22. "8086th Army Unit, Military History Detachment," *Stars and Stripes*, Pacific Edition, 27 January 1954; National Archives and Records Administration, Kansas City Records Center, BC 2998, Korean Communications Zone, Military History Section Monthly Report, 1-31, January 1953; DA, CMH, 8086th Army Unit, *Chronology*, pp. 1-17; Fechtman, "The Value of Historical Detachments;" Terrence J. Gough, "Military Historians and Lessons-Learned Activities in World War II, Korea, and Vietnam," 2 June 1980, Historical Manuscripts Accessions List, no. 2, Korean Conflict; Richard A. Hunt, "The Military History Detachment in the Field," in Jessup and Coakley, *Guide*, pp. 314-15.
23. The shortage of personnel did not improve in the months that followed. DA, CMH, Eighth U.S. Army Korea Military History Newsletter, no. 2, 30 September 1952; 8086th Army Unit, *Chronology*, p. 19.
24. DA, CMH, Fechtman, "The Value of Historical Detachments." Fechtman's complaints are echoed by Billy C. Mossman, interview, Thomas Ryan with Billy C. Mossman, 30 March 1988.
25. DA, CMH, Fechtman, "The Value of Historical Detachments."
26. A former chief historian, Stetson Conn, alludes to the possibility in *Historical Work in the United States Army, 1862-1954* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1980), pp. 184-87.
27. DA, CMH, 8086th Army Unit, *Chronology*, pp. 1, 4-6; T/O & E, no. 20-17, "Historical Service Organization," 11 February 1949, with changes; T/O & E, no. 20-17A, "Military History Detachment," 8 March 1952.
28. Hunt, "The Military History Detachment in the Field," in Jessup and Coakley, *Guide*, p. 314.
29. DA, CMH, Interview, SP4 D.C. Wagner with Billy C. Mossman, 1 June 1983.

World War II

1941

JULY-SEPTEMBER

1 Jul - 750,000 men who had turned twenty-one since 16 October 1940 register for the draft.

2 Jul - American pilots flying in the Royal Air Force shoot down three Messerschmitt fighters over Lille, France.

3 Jul - The German-controlled Danish government requests that the United States remove its consular personnel from Copenhagen.

7 Jul - U.S. Marines land in Iceland to help deter any German attempt to occupy the island. The action is fully supported by the Icelandic government.

11 Jul - One German and seventeen Italian ships are seized in various American ports under the Espionage Act of 1917.

14 Jul - A Gallup poll of British citizens indicates that 43 percent believe that Germany cannot be defeated without the help of the American armed forces, and 72 percent believe that the United States eventually will enter the war.

16 Jul - President Roosevelt bans U.S. trade with 1,800 Latin American firms and persons accused of collaborating with Axis countries. The German press denounces the move as "hemisphere imperialism."

- Sixteen Danish cargo ships are seized by the Maritime Commission.

- The Navy transport *West Point* sails from New York bound for Lisbon, with 464 Axis nationals aboard who have been ousted from the United States.

17 Jul - The second draft drawing begins.

- The Office of Production Management announces that the production of M1 Garand semiautomatic rifles, Browning automatic rifles, and Thompson submachine guns has surpassed 1,500 a day, an increase of 419 percent over the past 11 months.

19 Jul - The U.S. Navy is ordered to escort the shipping of any friendly nation to and from Iceland.

21 Jul - President Roosevelt asks Congress to extend the one-year service of draftees, reservists, and National Guardsmen, whose terms are scheduled to begin expiring in September.

- The War Department places orders for 2,200 more tanks.

- The first U.S. troops arrive at bases leased from the British in Guiana.

23 Jul - Vichy France agrees to allow Japan to establish military bases in French Indochina. Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles says that the Japanese do not need Indochinese bases for self-defense, and that the move clearly demonstrates that Japan is "determined to pursue an objective of expansion by force or threat of force."

24 Jul - The War Department announces plans to build a \$35,000,000 office building across the Potomac River from Washington, in Arlington County, Virginia. The five-sided building will provide office space for 30,000 employees.

25 Jul - President Roosevelt freezes all Japanese assets in the United States, worth an estimated \$138,000,000.

26 Jul - President Roosevelt orders all 150,000 members of the Philippine military forces into the U.S. Army and Navy. General Douglas MacArthur is placed in command of the ground troops.

- Japan freezes U.S. and British assets.

- The Senate Military Affairs Committee approves a resolution that would grant the President power to extend the service of draftees, reservists, and National Guardsmen beyond one year.

- Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles and Army Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall meet with Soviet Lt. Gen. Philip Golikov and Engineer General Alexander Repin in Washington to begin coordination of Soviet orders for American military equipment.

29 Jul - Japanese warplanes inflict minor damage to the U.S. gunboat USS *Tutuila* during a bombing raid on Chungking, China. On 31 July Japan apologizes for the mistake and offers to pay for the damage.

- The prohibition on the enlistment of convicted felons is lifted.

Chronology

1 Aug - President Roosevelt bans the export of aviation fuel to Japan.

6 Aug - The United States and Great Britain warn Japan against any aggression toward Thailand.

14 Aug - Washington and London announce that President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill met at sea on August 9 and 10. The two leaders designed the Atlantic Charter, an eight-point declaration of peace aims that stated that the United States and Great Britain seek no new territories, that no territorial changes should take place without the consent of the people involved, and that any lasting peace must include provisions for the right of self-determination, free trade, joint economic development, "freedom from fear and want," freedom of the seas, and abandonment of the use of force.

- The first of four U.S. tankers turned over to Russia for transporting supplies leaves Los Angeles bound for Vladivostok carrying 95,000 barrels of aviation fuel.

15 Aug - Roosevelt and Churchill send a message to Joseph Stalin advocating a conference to discuss how America and Britain can best aid Russia in defeating Germany.

18 Aug - President Roosevelt signs the bill extending the service of draftees, reservists, and National Guardsmen for eighteen additional months.

26 Aug - President Roosevelt announces that a U.S. Army mission will be sent to China to coordinate increased Lend-Lease support to that country.

1 Sep - In an international Labor Day broadcast, Roosevelt vows that Americans will "do everything in our power to crush Hitler and his Nazi forces."

4 Sep - The destroyer USS *Greer* is attacked by an unidentified submarine while on her way to deliver mail to Iceland. After evading torpedoes, the *Greer* fires depth charges to unknown effect.

- President Roosevelt extends Lend-Lease aid to Polish troops training in Canada.

5 Sep - President Roosevelt says that U.S. warships will destroy the submarine that attacked the USS

Greer if they find it.

- An American freighter, the *Steel Seafarer*, is sunk in the Red Sea by an aerial bomb dropped by an unidentified plane.

6 Sep - Berlin announces that, on 4 September, an American destroyer launched an unprovoked depth charge attack on a German U-boat about 200 miles southwest of Iceland, and that the U-boat fired its torpedoes in self-defense.

- The War Department awards contracts for the construction of 1,000 B-17 bombers.

11 Sep - As a result of the recent attacks on American ships Roosevelt orders the Navy to sink any Axis submarine or surface warship found "in waters which we deem necessary for our defense."

- The *Montana*, a U.S.-owned cargo ship under Panamanian registry, is torpedoed and sunk between Greenland and Iceland.

12 Sep - The German trawler *Buskoe*, operating as a weather monitoring and reporting station for the German military, is seized by the U.S. Coast Guard cutter *Northland* in Mackenzie Bay, Greenland.

15 Sep - The largest peacetime military maneuvers in U.S. history begin in Louisiana, with the 250,000-man Third Army invading against the 130,000-man Second Army.

17 Sep - For the first time U.S. Navy ships begin escorting convoys of merchant ships bound for Britain. The U.S. Navy escorts the convoys to Iceland where the Royal Navy takes over responsibility.

18 Sep - President Roosevelt asks Congress for an additional \$5,985,000,000 to continue the Lend-Lease program.

23 Sep - President Roosevelt advocates arming American merchant ships. This would involve changing or repealing the Neutrality Act. Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox urges repeal.

28 Sep - Members of the American and British delegations arrive in Moscow for the Tri-Power Economic Conference to discuss supplying the war effort.

Focus on the Field

**Historical Branch
United States Forces, Korea
Eighth United States Army
Thomas M. Ryan, Command Historian**

Korea, "Land of the Morning Calm," is a beautiful mountainous country with warm, friendly people. Forty-one years ago, on 25 June 1950, that calm was broken when the North Korean People's Army (NKPA) invaded the Republic of Korea (ROK) in an ill-fated attempt to unify the peninsula by force. Sixteen free nations joined forces to restore peace in Korea. Eighth United States Army (EUSA) fought under the United Nations banner in 1950-53, and its continued presence has provided peace and stability in northern Asia. One might say that EUSA has been in Korea for forty-one consecutive one-year tours. As a result of the one- and two-year "short tours" commanders have relied on the Historical Branch to provide continuity and to serve as the command's institutional memory. Consequently, the Historical Branch provides a unique perspective that is available from no other source.

For many years Army historians occupied ancillary positions on their MACOM (major command) staff—they were nice to have, but did not really contribute directly to the war-fighting mission. While this view may have been true in the past, military history at the MACOM level has changed, and this change is the direct result of the Army's military history education program. Following the Vietnam War, the Army placed increased emphasis on military history education. Senior U.S. Army officers now have an extensive background in history that began in their precommissioning school and periodically was reinforced at their basic and advanced schools, Command and General Staff College, and again in their respective senior service school. Many senior commanders coming to Korea are veterans—not of Vietnam, Grenada, Panama, or Kuwait—but veterans of Dr. Jay Luvaas and Brig. Gen. Hal Nelson's staff ride to the battle of Gettysburg or some other Civil War battle site. Most senior officers and many junior officers are well versed in history and how it can support their mission. The Army's emphasis on military history education has had a profound impact on MACOM history offices. Command historians are no longer on the outside looking in. Commanders arrive

in Korea ready to use and apply military history, and it is up to the MACOM command historian to develop and manage history programs that meet these needs. As a result, the historian is no longer "nice to have around," but rather a fully supportive and functioning member of the command group.

The U.S. Forces, Korea/Eighth U.S. Army (USFK/EUSA) history program is dynamic and proactive. Our mission statement includes the full range of traditional history functions: historical adviser to the commander in chief, historical support during contingencies and combat operations, archives and research collection, monographs, special studies, professional development, historical displays, annual historical reviews, historical research and reference support, and oral history. The Historical Branch is located in the USFK/EUSA headquarters under the Secretary, Combined Joint Staff, which reports to the EUSA chief of staff. The branch consists of a command historian, two assistant historians, and one enlisted military clerk-typist. My predecessors—John Bamhardt, Jim Finley, and, particularly, Herman Katz, were responsible for establishing the history function within the EUSA headquarters and developing a sound program upon which we have been able to build.

Like all headquarters staffs, the emphasis is on timely completion of staff actions. Proper staff work is necessary to establish credibility and is the basis of a successful program. The history office also maintains a high level of command awareness by attendance at staff meetings; preparation of articles on history and the history program in command information publications; talks to military, civic, and educational groups; and coverage on Armed Forces, Korea, TV Network. We have found that these intangibles, which are often time consuming, provide the foundation for command support of the history program.

USFK/EUSA has two military history detachments (MHDs) scheduled to deploy to Korea during contingency or combat operations. As we recently learned in Kuwait, the modern battlefield and AirLand Battle doctrine have dramatically altered how we fight. MHD doctrine is derived from our experiences in World War II, Korea, and Vietnam, and may not be adequate to meet current historical needs. In 1988 the 50th MHD deployed to Korea to participate in Exercise TEAM SPIRIT. The detachment examined how data processing technology has changed combat infor-

mation flow and the need to retain computer discs as part of the historical record. Future exercises will focus on the use of video to document significant activities in a tactical operations center.

Issues currently under study will have far-reaching impact on the peace and stability of the Korean peninsula. As stewards of the present as well as the past, we preserve the documents and records that future scholars will use to write the history of our times. Accordingly, we have expanded the command archives to include documentation of the decision-making process—as well as the final outcome.

With the increase in the number of documents, a manual information retrieval system is inadequate to handle the large volume of data. We are currently exploring computer programs to record, store, index, and retrieve documents in our collection. This process represents a substantial investment that we believe will greatly increase our ability to support the staff with accurate and complete information.

The staff ride is particularly applicable to Korea and is a major aspect of the command history program. Despite changes in doctrine and war-fighting technology, if war were to resume on the Korean peninsula, we would fight for the same key terrain, travel over the same transportation network, and cross the same streams in exactly the same places as our predecessors did in 1950-53. Because of Korea's geography, north-south travel is limited to a few well-defined corridors that have served as transportation and invasion routes for thousands of years.

Korea offers numerous opportunities to learn firsthand the lessons of the past. U.S. Army units are situated throughout the Republic of Korea, and there are Korean War battle sites located within a few miles of almost all installations. Thanks to Dr. Glenn Robertson's program at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, and Professor Luvaas and General Nelson's work at the War College, officers are now anxious to incorporate the staff ride into their unit's professional development program. The staff ride is a high-visibility exercise that is in high demand, also providing an excellent introduction to the history program.

Our staff ride program has grown to include over twenty-five rides encompassing over 1,500 American and Korean officers and enlisted men annually. In response to growing demand, the Historical Branch has prepared, printed, and distributed read-ahead packets for the battle of Chip'yong-ni, Task Force Smith, battle of the Imjin River (Gloucester Hill), Pusan

Perimeter-Naktong River bulge, and a soon-to-be printed packet on the Inchon invasion. Each read-ahead package contains primary and secondary source documents, select readings, and 1:50,000-scale contour maps of the area. Packets frequently run 400-500 pages or more with carefully selected readings to cover the full range of professional interests. The packets are distributed through the library system and are available at each post library throughout the peninsula.

The history office does not conduct battlefield tours, but we do provide professional support and assistance. A unit desiring to conduct a staff ride receives one or more read-ahead packets, a copy of Robertson's *The Staff Ride*, and a video tape on how to conduct a ride. The read-ahead and staff ride guide are retained in the unit library, while the tape is returned at the end of the ride. Also available on a loan basis are large briefing boards showing unit locations, order of battle, period photographs, terrain, and unit positions and movement at the time of the battle. These maps and photographs are used by successive units in the field, thus reducing unnecessary duplication. While we do not conduct staff rides, we do try to make it as easy as possible for the soldiers to focus on professional development during their tour in Korea.

Unique to the USFK/EUSA program is support in locating and recovering the remains of Korean War dead. Over 8,000 U.S. service personnel are still unaccounted for, with no body recovered. Our office still receives inquiries from relatives and friends of missing men. Although it has been almost thirty-eight years since the armistice was signed and the fighting ended, there are still lingering questions and uncertainties that may never be addressed.

Through official combat records and oral history interviews with veterans and local inhabitants, combined with the unique perspective provided by historical archeology, we have conducted three successful recoveries and a fourth is planned. Two have recovered the remains of North Korean soldiers who died attacking the Pusan Perimeter in the summer of 1950, and a third recovered the remains of Chinese soldiers who fought in the battle of Chip'yong-ni in February 1951. These recovery projects are in accordance with the provisions of the armistice agreement and support efforts toward a full accounting of missing American personnel.

These projects have also provided a unique opportunity to work with the Center of Military History's Museum Division. Many of the Chinese and North Korean People's Army military artifacts such as uni-

form buttons, belt buckles, and combat equipment are unmarked as to origin of manufacture. The Museum Division provided examples of documented Chinese and North Korean uniforms and equipment captured by U.S. units during the war. By comparing the documented museum samples with artifacts excavated in the field, we were able to establish positive identification.

The Historical Branch strives to develop and maintain close professional ties with the Republic of Korea Ministry of National Defense; the War History Compilation Committee; and the War Memorial Service, Korea. The War History Compilation Committee is the equivalent of our Center of Military History and has published in English a seven-volume *History of United Nations Forces in the Korean War* and numerous in-depth studies of ROK Army actions during the war (these are available only in Hangul). The committee is currently revising its United Nations war history series and is actively researching Korean military history from ancient times to the present. Most recently the committee translated Schnabel and Watson's *The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Volume III: The Korean War, Part I* and is working on translating *Part II* from English into Hangul.

The Republic of Korea Army had a rich combat history during the Korean War that is, unfortunately, poorly understood by English-language historians, scholars, and military personnel. In an effort to increase the availability of English-language scholarly studies on the ROK Army, we have translated two publications prepared by the War History Compilation

Committee. These two monographs, entitled *Battle History of the Korean War, Early Stage Battles at the 38th Parallel: Western Front* and *Battle History of the Korean War, Early Stage Battles at the 38th Parallel: Central and Eastern Front*, focus on ROK Army battles during the first week of the war before the entry of U.N. ground combat forces. These translations have been made available to the Center of Military History and are being reviewed for possible copublication.

The War Memorial Service has an active role in the new museum Korea is constructing to depict the military history of Korea from ancient times to the present. The museum will contain a large exhibit hall; outdoor exhibits of vehicles, armor, and aircraft; a research facility; and collections storage. When completed in 1992 this world-class facility will be the finest museum of its type in Asia. The USFK/EUSA Historical Branch is working with the museum staff to identify and acquire military items for their displays and reference collection.

The future of the history program appears bright. As the U.S. Army force structure in Korea evolves, the Historical Branch will continue to play an important role in documenting this process and in providing historical support to the staff. Plans are under consideration to consolidate the USFK/EUSA and ROK/US Combined Forces Command history programs. This step, if implemented, will provide a single history office to support the requirements of all commands in the Republic of Korea.

1991 MACOM Historians' Council Meeting

The 1991 MACOM Historians' Council Meeting was held 6-9 May at Fredericksburg, Virginia. Over forty command historians attended the meeting, which focused on the collection of historical documents relating to Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. The meeting was highlighted by the presentations of several Army historians detailed to Southwest Asia in the midst of the conflict. Participants emphasized the need for cooperation among Army commands to ensure that the history of the Army's actions in DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM will be available to historians writing now and in the future.

Operation JUST CAUSE and Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM Posters Available!!!

Just as we were going to press, we received word that the Army's new wall posters, designed with the help of the Center's Graphics Branch, are now available from the Government Printing Office. Order by title and GPO stock number (Operation JUST CAUSE GPO S/N 008-029-00222-1, \$5.00; Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM GPO S/N 008-029-00223-0, \$5.00) from:

Superintendent of Documents
Government Printing Office
Washington, D.C. 20402-9325

The Archaic Archivist

This issue of Army History inaugurates a new feature article, "The Archaic Archivist," to alert readers to archival holdings of the U.S. Army Military History Institute (MHI) at Carlisle Barracks, Pa. 17013-5008.

This feature will concentrate on archival holdings. Some issues of Army History focus on a particular theme, e.g., the Korean War, while others provide a forum to advertise the breadth and diversity of the MHI holdings, which range from the 1940s to the 1990s.

Subscribers to the former MHI newsletter, *Perspectives in Military History*, will recall that almost every issue announced recent acquisitions of manuscripts, publications, and photographs. The last *Perspectives* came out in January 1983, however; until "The Archaic Archivist," there has not been a periodic vehicle for informing researchers about important MHI acquisitions of archival source materials.

The Institute contains three branches that serve the public. The Historical Reference Branch makes available printed material from the MHI library: books, periodicals, military newspapers, manuals, and documents. The Special Collections Branch contains still and motion pictures (including photographs, slides, drawings, paintings, posters, and prints), sound recordings, and distinctive unit insignia and patches. Manuscript holdings, including completed oral history transcripts, personal papers, and retained copies of official papers, as well as the curricular archives of the U.S. Army War College, are the responsibility of the Archives Branch. Readers of "The Archaic Archivist" should keep in mind that any or all of the Institute's branches may possess material relevant to the themes featured in *Army History*.

The ensuing summary of Korean War holdings covers four categories of papers. Within each category, some are specified by name.

Many senior generals who served in Korea are represented in the archives. General Matthew B. Ridgway, Eighth Army commander and commander of the United Nations forces, has contributed wartime official and personal correspondence, daily logs, memoirs, and transcribed oral histories (twelve boxes on Korea). Similar material on that war fills twenty-five boxes within the papers of Lt. Gen. Edward M. Almond, chief of staff to Douglas MacArthur and later X Corps commander. General Almond's papers also

reflect how, as commandant of the U.S. Army War College (1951-52), he oriented the curriculum to the study of the Korean War.

General Ridgway's successors in army or theater command—Generals James Van Fleet, Maxwell Taylor, Mark Clark, and John E. Hull—each have a transcribed oral history memoir in the MHI archives. The 1951 diary of Lt. Gen. John B. Coulter, deputy Eighth Army commander; papers of Lt. Gen. William S. Lawton, Communications Zone commander; memoirs of Brig. Gen. Crawford Sams, chief of the Public Health Section, on his medical mission behind enemy lines; recollections and oral history transcripts of General Bruce Clarke, I Corps commander; and wartime papers and oral history transcripts of Lt. Gen. Arthur G. Trudeau, 7th Infantry Division commander, also represent useful sources available on the war. Another important collection is a box of letters that Maj. Gen. Frank Lowe, the White House's personal representative at the front, wrote back to President Harry Truman and Maj. Gen. Harry Vaughan during the period 1950-1951.

Additional high-level perspective on the war, this time from stateside, is found in the oral history transcripts of Secretary of the Army Frank Pace and Army Chief of Staff J. Lawton Collins. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Omar N. Bradley, is also represented through diaries, papers, and speeches.

Besides these senior officers, the MHI has the papers of junior officers (some of whom achieved high rank after the Korean War) and enlisted men. Among many such collections are the wartime papers and oral histories of future generals: Paul Freeman, colonel of the 23d Infantry Regiment; Harold K. Johnson, colonel of the 5th and 8th Cavalry Regiments; Herbert Powell, chief of staff of the 7th Infantry Division; and William Quinn, colonel of the 17th Infantry Regiment. Many commanders of the 27th and 31st Infantry Regiments took time from fighting in Korea to correspond with Joseph Longuevan, who had served with those outfits in Siberia during the Russian civil war. The oral history of Brig. Gen. Glenn Muggelberg and the papers of Col. Donald Siebert concern Allied partisan operations behind Communist lines. Also noteworthy are the diaries of Lt. Robert Howes of the 160th Field Artillery Battalion; the letters of Sgt. Irvin Bermester of the 89th Medium Tank Battalion; the letters and papers of Cpl. Richard Fleckenstein of the

51st Signal Battalion; and the diaries, letters, and memoirs of Sgt. Clemens Moss of the 570th Ordnance Company.

Sergeant Moss and many other enlisted men and junior officers have also contributed to the Institute's ongoing Korean War Survey. Similar to the highly successful surveys on the Spanish-American War, World War I, and World War II, this concerted approach to veterans seeks their wartime letters, diaries, photos, and unit newspapers and helps them to record their recollections through a twenty-page historical questionnaire. Over 150 veterans, primarily from the 23d Infantry Regiment, have already contributed to the survey. Thousands of additional donations are anticipated over upcoming years.

Survey contributors, stateside leaders, and officers and enlisted men in Korea all participated in the war in their own way. The fourth major element of the MHI archival holdings is the research collections of official and private historians who wrote on the Korean War. The Office of the Chief of Military History Collection contains a box of wartime and postwar interviews and four boxes of research notes gathered in preparation for writing the official series, the United States Army in the Korean War. Those notes were taken by Mr. Roy Appleman for his *South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu*. He has also donated a filing cabinet full of primary sources, including many unique first-person accounts, which he obtained in the

course of writing his own four books: *Disaster in Korea, East of Chosin, Escaping the Trap, and Ridgway Duels for Korea*. A comparable combination of copied wartime documents and unique personal reminiscences graces the collection of Clay and Joan Blair. Nineteen boxes of papers and twenty boxes of transcribed oral histories, which the Blairs conducted, pertain to *The Forgotten War: America in Korea*, while seven boxes touch upon the Korean War portion of *A General's Life*, concerning General Omar N. Bradley. Wartime interviews, including field notebooks, on the Korean War fill two boxes of S.L.A. Marshall's collection. An oral history interview of him on his career as a military historian is also available.

Through all these types of sources—historians' collections, surveys, papers from Korea, and papers from America—the Korean War is, indeed, well represented in the archives of the Military History Institute. Researchers are welcome to visit the MHI, which is open 0800-1630, Monday through Friday, except for federal holidays. Letters and phone calls may be addressed to the respective branches: Reference, 717-245-3611 (DSN 242-3611); Special Collections, 717-245-3434 (DSN 242-3434); and Archives, 717-245-3601 (DSN 242-3601). The MHI staff, including the archivists (archaic and otherwise), is always pleased to have researchers use the Institute's vast holdings.

New Army Signal Center Books

The command historian's office at the U.S. Army Signal Center and Fort Gordon—home of the Army Signal Corps—has available a number of new publications: *A Concise History of the U.S. Army Signal Corps*, *The Signal Corps and the U.S. Army Regimental System*, *Signal Corps Medal of Honor Recipients*, and *United States Army Signal Center and Ft. Gordon Historical Documents Collection Guide #1: Manuscripts*. Works in progress include a history of Fort Gordon in commemoration of the installation's 50th anniversary and a guide to the Signal Center's archival holdings. To request copies of any of these publications, call (404) 791-5212 or write: Command Historian, U.S. Army Signal Center and Fort Gordon, ATTN: ATZH-MH, Ft. Gordon, Ga. 30905-5000.

Gettysburg Staff Ride Guide

Ted Ballard

Much has been written about the Battle of Gettysburg, one of the greatest battles of the American Civil War. The most tangible historical link to those three days in July 1863, however, is the battlefield itself, parts of which look much the same today as they did at the time of the battle. For that reason, every year regardless of season, groups of Army officers and Department of Defense civilians tramp across the fields and hills of Gettysburg on organized staff rides.

The purpose of these rides is to further the professional development of Army leaders. These rides focus not only on what happened, but also on how and why events occurred as they did and on what these observations mean now. The emphasis on the "how and why" brings the staff ride analysis to bear on current understanding of the realities of war and airland battle doctrine. Thus, a properly conducted staff ride is a powerful teaching tool.

The following information is intended to assist individuals interested in designing and leading a Gettysburg staff ride.

One publication to assist in arranging the project is *The Staff Ride*, by William G. Robertson and published by the U.S. Army Center of Military History. This booklet provides guidance to organize a staff ride, lists various requirements associated with staff rides, and establishes flexible standards for a successful exercise. Copies are available from the U.S. Army Publications Center, 2800 Eastern Boulevard, Baltimore, Md. 21220-2896. The order number is CMH Pub 70-21.

Gettysburg staff rides invariably begin at the Gettysburg National Military Park Visitor Center. That office has brochures, maps, and other information which can be mailed to the staff ride leader, who should coordinate with the Visitor Center staff well before the day of the ride. The Visitor Center is located on Route 134, across from the National Cemetery, and includes a museum and a thirty-minute Electric Map presentation that shows—through the use of colored lights—landmarks, points of fighting, and troop movements during the battle. The Visitor Center and nearby Cyclorama Building are open seven days a week, 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., except Thanksgiving, Christmas, and New Years. The 750 square-foot Elec-

tric Map is shown from 8:15 a.m., every forty-five minutes. The last showing is at 4:25 p.m. Admission is \$2.00 per adult. Seating capacity is 525.

The Cyclorama Building, just south of the Visitor Center, also on Route 134, houses the Gettysburg Cyclorama, an 1884 painting of Pickett's charge by Paul Philippoteaux. The painting is 356 feet in circumference by 26 feet high and is displayed with a light and sound program highlighting points shown on the canvas. The Cyclorama is shown from 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., every half hour. Admission is \$2.00 per adult, and seating capacity is 150.

Additional information regarding the Gettysburg National Battlefield Park can be obtained by calling (717) 334-1124, or by writing to the Superintendent, Gettysburg National Military Park, Gettysburg, Pa. 17325.

Before actual field study at Gettysburg, the staff ride leader should become relatively familiar with the battle and principal personalities. A "dry run" to the battlefield is highly recommended to lay out the route, create a time schedule, and become familiar with actual sites of important events.

Gettysburg was an "encounter battle" because neither the Federal nor the Confederate leaders planned to meet in combat there. In fact, neither the Union Army of the Potomac nor the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia had any prior idea of the relative geography or terrain of the area. Gettysburg staff ride participants, however, can arrive better prepared. Modern topographical maps of the battlefield area (Fairfield and Gettysburg Quadrangles, both 1:24,000) are available for sale by the U.S. Geological Survey, Denver, Colo. 80225, or Reston, Va. 22092. The cost is \$2.00 per set.

Sources of information and publications about the battle of Gettysburg are legion. It would take more space than is available here to list them all, but what follows may be helpful to Gettysburg staff ride leaders. These should be available from commercial bookstores or, if out of print, through interlibrary loan:

Cleaves, Freeman. *Meade at Gettysburg*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1960.

Downey, Clifford. *Death of a Nation: The Story of Lee and His Men at Gettysburg*. New York: Knopf, 1958.

Eckenrode, Hamilton James. *James Longstreet, Lee's War Horse*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1936.

Esposito, Vincent J. *West Point Atlas of American Wars*. vol. 1, 1689-1900. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964. Maps 92-99.

Freeman, Douglas Southall. *R.E. Lee, A Biography*. New York: Scribner, 1934-35, 4 volumes.

_____. *Lee's Lieutenants: A Study in Command*, vol. 3 *Gettysburg to Appomattox*. New York: Scribner, 1942-44. Chapters 1-18.

Hollingsworth, Alan M. *The Third Day at Gettysburg: Pickett's Charge*. New York: Holt, 1959.

Longstreet, Helen D. *Lee and Longstreet at High Tide*. Privately published by the author. Gainesville, Georgia: 1904.

Luvaas, Jay and Nelson, Harold W., editors. *The U.S. Army War College Guide to the Battle of Gettysburg*. Carlisle, Pennsylvania: South Mountain Press, Inc., 1986.

Meade, George Gordon. *With Meade at Gettysburg*. Philadelphia: John C. Winston, 1930.

Montgomery, James. *The Shaping of a Battle: Gettysburg*. Philadelphia: Chilton, 1959.

Nichols, Edward Jay. *Toward Gettysburg: A Biography of General John F. Reynolds*. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press: 1958.

Nicholson, John P., editor. *Pennsylvania at Gettysburg*. Harrisburg, Pennsylvania: William Stanley Ray, 1904.

Norton, Oliver Wilcox. *The Attack and Defense of Little Round Top*. New York: Neale, 1913.

Stackpole, Edward James. *They Met at Gettysburg*. Harrisburg, Pennsylvania: Eagle Books, 1956.

Swanberg, W.A. *Stickles the Incredible*. New York: Scribner, 1956.

Taylor, Emerson Gifford. *Gouverneur Kemble Warren: The Life and Letter of an American Soldier*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1932.

Tucker, Glenn. *High Tide at Gettysburg: The Campaign in Pennsylvania*. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1958.

Walker, Francis Amasa. *General Hancock*. New York: Appleton, 1894.

_____. *Battles and Leaders of the Civil War*. Grant Lee edition, vol. 3, parts 1 and 2. New York: The Century Company, 1888.

_____. *War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies*, series 1, vol. 27, parts 2 and 3. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1889.

Additional advice and assistance on how to plan and conduct staff rides can be obtained from the following sources:

In the continental United States: Mr. Ted Ballard (DAMH-FI), U.S. Army Center of Military History, Southeast Federal Center, Bldg. #159, Washington, D.C. 20374-5088 (DSN 335-2905, commercial 202-475-2905).

Military History Director, Department of National Strategy, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pa. 17013-5000 (DSN 242-3207, commercial 717-245-3207).

Director, Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kans. 66027-6900 (DSN 552-2810/3831, commercial 913-938-2810).

Head, Department of History, U.S. Military Academy, West Point, N.Y. 10996 (DSN 688-2810, commercial 914-938-2810).

In Europe: Chief, Military History Office, ATTN: AEAGS-MH, Headquarters, U.S. Army, Europe, and Seventh Army, APO New York 09403 (DSN 370-8612/8127)

In Korea: Command Historian, ATTN: SJS-H, Headquarters, Eighth Army, APO San Francisco 96301-0100 (DSN 315-723-5213/5214).

Larry C. ("Ted") Ballard is a historian in the Center's Field and International Division, with a special interest in the Civil War. Because of the numerous phone calls and letters we receive each year asking for advice or support for staff rides, in future issues Mr. Ballard will discuss the more popular Civil War staff ride sites in the region around Washington, D.C.

Training MHDs in a Desert Environment

Dave Bristow

Departing from Fort Benning, Georgia, last September, the 44th Military History Detachment (MHD), stationed at Fort McPherson, Georgia, became the Army's first military history unit to deploy for Operation DESERT STORM. Just weeks earlier the members had undergone extensive desert training in the Mojave Desert of California with two National Guard MHDs. All three units subsequently collected records and recorded history in the Persian Gulf. This article looks at the Death Valley experience they shared before heading off to war.

Normally, military history detachments work alone. On 14 July 1990, however, three MHDs merged as one at Fort Irwin, California, to venture out into the sizzling heat of the Mojave Desert and to validate a new Army training and evaluation program (ARTEP). The ARTEP likely would change the way historical units do business in the field.

The historians, members of the Army's 44th Military History Detachment, Atlanta, Georgia, along with two National Guard units (the 116th Military History Detachment, Alexandria, Virginia, and the 132d Military History Detachment, Madison, Wisconsin), looked more like infantry foot soldiers than recorders of history, as they dug in with troops of the 48th Infantry Brigade, a National Guard unit from Macon, Georgia. The MHDs were attached to the Guard unit during a National Training Center rotation at Fort Irwin.

According to William E. Stacy, command historian of Forces Command, besides validating a new ARTEP, the historians were attached to the Guard to test their own individual soldiering skills in the desert as well. "We wanted to see if MHDs could operate effectively under very adverse conditions. All three units more than met the challenge."

Stacy went on to add, "We wanted to pool three MHDs together to see if they would be capable of supporting a corps-wide mission. This was not an unreasonable workload, given the number of MHDs in the inventory and the number of units they would have to support in a major war scenario."

The 132d Military History Detachment was organized and formed only a year ago. For it, the chance to live and work with veteran history units in the field was a priceless opportunity. Maj. Norman Johnson,

commander of the 132d MHD said, "We are the youngest history detachment in the Army today. And it was a big help having veterans around me, reassuring me that my focus on training was correct."

Having had a chance to test the deployment of his unit and their training for desert operations, Major Johnson went on to add, "We learned that the recording of history, even in a desert environment, takes place very fast—the same rate as battle. Recording has to be done quickly, every opportunity seized to capture the battle for history. You may not get another chance."


According to Johnson, historians in battle must record their interviews and collect documents in the field within seventy-two hours, before documents can be destroyed or people get killed. To record the history of soldiers in simulated combat, the historians drove Army jeeps to distant locations. The threat of becoming turned around or lost was always present.

During this rotation, M60 and M1 Abrams tanks and Bradley fighting vehicles were all used extensively to fight the "battles."

Sgt. Sherry L. Walker, 116th MHD, the only female historian with the three history units, was amazed at how good the morale was among the tank crews. Many of them were stranded on the desert floor, waiting for mechanics with repair parts. "I was really impressed with these guys," said Sergeant Walker. "They have a good outlook, even when their equipment fails. They even have names for each tank crew, names like the 'turret lizards.'" According to Walker, the tankers, members of the 24th Infantry (mechanized) Division, Fort Stewart, Georgia, were nothing short of terrific when interviewed for the record: "I got some awesome interviews."

During the validation of the ARTEP the history detachments conducted historical missions, practiced security, prepared for tactical operations, defended their perimeter, conducted tactical movements, and sustained operations.

Referring to the need to change his unit's position so that the enemy would not know where they were located, Specialist Craig T. Luther of the 132d MHD exclaimed, "It seemed like we had to pick up and move all our gear to different locations every time we turned around." Specialist Luther added, "We became mas-



Trucks carrying hundreds of pounds of ice are brought into the exercises for soldiers facing 110-plus degrees in the California desert.

Armored vehicles play a large role in the war games held at the National Training Center.



ters at taking down tents with camouflage netting and putting them up in a hurry. Nothing comes easy in the desert.”

Once the ARTEP was completed in the field, the historians returned to Fort Irwin. There they conducted post-combat interviews, developed photographs, and recovered combat logs, journals, and documents from maneuvers.

Later, attached to a combat armored unit somewhere near the Kuwaiti border, Specialist Luther recorded history from a homemade bunker. He was a long way from the Mojave Desert, but found himself in a desert environment not unlike “Death Valley.” All three MHDs served in the Persian Gulf war. Their taped interviews and collected documents will remain

a significant part of the military history of American soldiers at war.

SFC David T. Bristow is the noncommissioned officer in charge and public affairs supervisor of the 44th Military History Detachment. Sergeant Bristow is a Vietnam veteran, having served as a rifleman with the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile). He has served as a photojournalist for the 197th Infantry Brigade and as the public affairs NCO for the Third U.S. Army. His articles and photos have appeared in ArmyTimes and Soldiers magazine.

Photographs by Sgt. Ed Crowley.



National Guardsmen, Spec. Vaughn Larson (left) of the 132d Military History Detachment, and PFC John Freund, 116th Military History Detachment, proudly sit before a military history detachment rock they painted for a permanent display at the National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California. The boulder depicts the unit insignia of the 132d, 44th, and 116th MHDs.

Wargames: Training for War

Thomas D. Morgan

History of Wargames

Wargames for the military are a serious matter. The ancient Chinese military strategist Sun tzu (ca. 400-320 B.C.) is credited with developing the first wargame, which was called "Wei Hai" (encirclement). (1) Since then there have been many different wargames developed for the purpose of gaining insights into the dynamics of warfare. These wargames originally were played by kings and princes and were chess derivatives that only reflected the play of war. *Kriegsspiel* (wargame), which developed in eighteenth-century Germany, was one of the first formal wargames to receive widespread military acceptance as a training technique.

Modern wargaming started in 1811 when Baron von Reisswitz, a minor Prussian bureaucrat, developed a wargame using a sand table instead of a chess-like board of squares. It was later refined by his nephew, Lieutenant von Reisswitz, who introduced it to the Prussian court and general staff. (2) While watching a wargame designed by Lieutenant von Reisswitz in 1824, the chief of the Prussian General Staff, von Muffling, exclaimed, "It's not a game at all! It's training for war." (3) Wargaming was then institutionalized at the *Kriegsakademie* (war college) as two-sided, free-play wargames designed to train officers to make decisions and to take responsibility and initiative. (4) Von Reisswitz' *Kriegsspiel* system was used to wargame the successful German campaigns of 1866 and 1870.

The U.S. Navy was the innovator of modern American wargaming, which began in the late nineteenth century at the Naval War College. By World War II it was well institutionalized in the U.S. Navy. The Japanese also discovered the technique of wargaming and reportedly used some sort of wargame for every major campaign they fought in World War II. Unfortunately for the Japanese, they learned that one trifles with wargame validity at one's own risk. During a wargame before the battle of Midway, the Japanese chief umpire disallowed hits on Japanese carriers by the opposing force. (5) Thus, the Japanese validated their Midway campaign plan on faulty assumptions, and the record of the Japanese Navy's defeat by the American fleet is one of the great events in modern

military history.

Wargaming became of the one U.S. Navy's principal tools for educating its officers and for evaluating fleet combat capabilities. Between 1919 and 1941, the Naval War College played 136 wargames, of which 127 involved Blue (American) forces against the Orange (Japan). (6) After the war Fleet Admiral Chester Nimitz said that in the naval war with Japan nothing was a surprise to the U.S. Navy except the *kamikaze* tactics, which had not been envisioned. (7)

Korean Battles

Forty years ago hostilities started on the Korean peninsula, and U.S. armed forces have been stationed there on "Freedom's Frontier" ever since. On 25 June 1950 the North Korean People's Army (NKPA) invaded South Korea in force. Overwhelmed by thousands of North Korean troops supported by Russian-made T-34 tanks, the Republic of Korea (ROK) troops fell back, leaving the capital of Seoul and almost all of South Korea in Communist hands. The United States responded with troops, which eventually were joined by those of 15 other members of the United Nations (UN). These forces held on in the Pusan perimeter under Lt. Gen. Walton Walker's stand-or-die defense long enough for General Douglas MacArthur to stage a brilliant flanking movement at Inchon, which pushed the North Koreans out of the south and up to Korea's Yalu River boundary with Manchuria.

In October 1950 the sudden intervention of Chinese Communist forces in large numbers compelled the UN forces to make a retreat, and Seoul fell into Communist hands once again. UN troops regrouped under Lt. Gen. Matthew Ridgway's inspired leadership, retaking Seoul, but reaching a stalemate along the 38th parallel, where the conflict had begun.

The Korean War was one of repetitive attacks and repulses. It was not a war in which individual courage, or tactical and technical superiority held the key to victory. Rather, it proved to be a war of attrition, with the specter of international political considerations limiting and influencing campaign results.

On 27 July 1953 an armistice was signed, ending a conflict that lasted just over three years and one month. U.S. forces suffered over 136,000 casualties.

Enemy losses were estimated as 900,000 Chinese and 520,000 NKPA killed or wounded. (8) An uneasy truce descended upon a country once so little known to Westerners that it had been called the "Hermit Kingdom." The war left South Korea in a shambles, with its cities and towns destroyed and hundreds of thousands of its civilians killed or injured. Forty years later the country has been rebuilt as a pillar of democracy and progress in the Far East, but American forces are still there on guard.

Aftermath of the War

The 2d Infantry ("Indianhead") Division provides the bulk of the U.S. combat forces in South Korea. Nowhere else in the world do U.S. forces man such a hostile border as does the 2d Division along the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) that separates North from South Korea. It is, therefore, fitting that modern-day wargames in the style of Sun tzu, as improved by the Prussian General Staff, are actively being played out on the Korean peninsula with a scenario not too far removed from the bloody Korean War campaigns of 1951-53.

Glasnost (openness) and *perestroika* (restructuring) have reduced East-West tensions across Europe, but the Cold War is still alive and well along the DMZ in Korea. Name-calling and occasional firefights have kept tensions high on the Korean peninsula for 37 years since the signing of the armistice agreement in 1953. The 2d Infantry Division participated in many epic battles of the Korean War after its initial commitment along the Naktong River in the Pusan perimeter. The 2d Infantry was the first UN force to enter the North Korean capital of P'yongyang, and in General Ridgway's mind the gallant stand of the 23d Regimental Combat Team at Chip'yong-ni marked a turning point for the American forces in Korea. While armistice negotiations were ongoing in late 1951, the 2d Infantry Division participated in the "Battle of the Hills," which included bitter struggles for Bloody Ridge, Heartbreak Ridge, Old Baldy, Arrowhead Ridge, and Pork Chop and T-Bone Hills. (9) Since the war the bloody tree-cutting incident of 1976 at Panmunjom in the DMZ and the well-publicized North Korean tunnels under the DMZ have marked the uneasy, armed truce on the Korean peninsula.

The Soviet Union's crumbling orbit has had little effect on Kim Il-Sung's Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPKR). For over three decades the DPKR has conducted an ambitious buildup of its

military might. The NKPA today numbers about 784,000 men under arms—the fifth largest army in the world. NKPA doctrine, tactics, and equipment are based on Soviet models. By 1981 the DPKR was manufacturing a large part of its own military equipment from Soviet designs. The DPKR currently spends more money per capita on defense than any other nation except Israel. (10) The NKPA, therefore, presents a formidable threat to UN forces, principally the ROK Army and U.S. 2d Infantry Division.

The historical experiences of the Korean War and its aftermath are effective teachers. The history of conflict in Korea offers many examples of high-intensity combat flavored with guerrilla/unconventional warfare and political/ideological indoctrination used to motivate soldiers. For that reason, modern-day wargames are well suited to the situation on the Korean peninsula.

Wargames and For Real

Today large-scale training exercises cannot always be conducted in anticipated theaters of operations. There are political objections to the disruption of civil activity and the cost of large-scale exercises is great. For these reasons, wargames have recently enjoyed a revival of interest and even popularity within the American defense community. Wargames, using computer-assisted scenarios, offer a practical and affordable means to improve the training of higher-echelon commanders, their staffs, and their subordinate commanders and staff members. Battle simulations offer a unique opportunity to practice the use of certain tactics, techniques, weapons systems, and sensors in a nonobtrusive manner, using cost-effective computers and software. The objective of computer-assisted training is to hone the skills and decision-making ability of a commander and his staff members so that they can perform as if each were a combat-experienced veteran.

Wargames are best used when other approaches to military training are costly, risky, ethically controversial, or simply unavailable. Wargames are powerful and effective training devices because by placing real people in opposing force decision-making roles, wargames model human parameters and processes. The human thought processes found in wargames resemble those in actual history, in that motivation, cause and effect, and contingency "what ifs" are key elements. Wargame players must live with the consequences of their decisions just as real-world commanders must

live with theirs. Wargames usually feature dynamic, unpredictable courses of events that approximate real human affairs. The major challenge to wargamers is to represent accurately enemy behavior and the radical differences in political objectives and military style that exist in competing nations.

Wargamers vs. Historians

The real purpose of using wargaming models is not to emulate reality, but to serve as a device for stimulating innovative thought and, thereby, to educate and train players. Wargame models do not predict actual outcomes, but the lessons learned from a simulated war will be remembered long after a lecture or readings on the same subject are forgotten. Wargaming can yield military insights better than other analytical or educational processes short of large-scale troop exercises or real war.

Unlike the repeating of a historically factual scenario (although wargame scenarios are rooted in history), a wargame is a warfare simulation where the sequence of events is interactively affected by decisions made by players representing opposing sides, although the operation does not involve actual military forces. Wargames tend to be stochastic, i.e., the outcome of the decisions made by the players is dependent not only on the decisions themselves, but also on the roll of the dice (algorithmic random number draws in the computer). This is a realistic ingredient, since war results rarely repeat themselves any more than do dice.

Some historians argue that wargame models should not be allowed to influence important military decisions because the most commonly used models do not accurately reflect what has happened on real, past battlefields. Also, there is a fear among some that computers can encourage a Maginot Line train of thought if commanders give over to computers too many functions while denying commanders and staffs any real knowledge of the enemy.

This controversy can be better analyzed if one understands what wargames can and cannot do. Although wargames include sophisticated algorithms and attrition coefficients, they are inherently not predictive, which is the business of operations research. The Clausewitzian fog and friction of war—such things as courage, fear, morale, and blind chance—are not quantifiable. The role of the dice mirrors this situation, but the results of wargames give us valuable insights only if the rules of the game are consistent.

The arbitrary action of the Japanese chief umpire in the pre-Midway wargame previously mentioned is a good example of juggling the rules of the game and thereby predicting the wrong winner.

Winning a wargame is a chancy matter because of the stochastic nature of most computer wargames. However, winning can occur as a result of having had the practice of making decisions and seeing the potential outcomes after having made an in-depth study of the terrain and the enemy. This experience, when translated into actual military operations, allows the wargame practitioner to win in a real war. Wargames teach military leaders what they did not know and how to start thinking about it.

We should not expect simulations to reproduce battles in all of their historical detail. Computer models and wargaming can evaluate the relative merits of the decision-making process, while not being predictive of actual future combat. Students of history will have to tolerate some degree of abstraction in wargaming because of the computer calculus involved in complex computer simulations. Help from historians who understand simulation models is essential. The results from wargames cannot always be explained away as being "intuitively logical," but then, real warfare is not like that either. Models must be validated against history and other observations that can be made about current and future combat operations. A historical review of documents, systematic content analysis, and a historical/comparative analysis are all interpretive research procedures that can be used by historians for model validation.

Wargaming for the Future

Although the U.S.-Soviet superpower rivalry in Europe has lessened in intensity and cooperative ventures may even expand, the threat to the United States from other quarters is still formidable. With or without superpower involvement, conflicts in developing countries will be increasingly violent and will involve higher technology. There has been a steady increase in the availability of high-technology military platforms and weapons systems to the Third World. North Korea has achieved a level of military power that could credibly confront any conventional force the West might field. Both the Soviets and the industrialized nations of the West need the hard currencies provided by foreign military sales, so arms proliferation is likely to continue. In addition, impressive indigenous arms industries are emerging in the Third

World that are not constrained by arms reduction talks. Continued regional disputes will mean that more countries will be searching for advanced weapons in larger quantities. The types of military forces designed to be used in a technically sophisticated, modern threat environment, are increasingly the same types of forces required to fight in the Third World. As the risk of American involvement in armed conflict rises in areas where revolution, aggression, and civil strife continue unabated, the United States and its allies may at some future date look back at the Cold War with a certain degree of nostalgia.

Thus, the Korean peninsula remains an area where modern combat is an ever-present danger. The Korean Demilitarized Zone is a great misnomer; in fact, it is one of the world's most heavily fortified borders. Peace is precariously balanced along the DMZ, as it is in other areas of the world, because of a proliferation of armaments and unpredictable rulers. One of the ways U.S. forces maintain their combat readiness and professional edge in these situations is by using Computer Assisted Exercises (CAX) to wargame potential conflict. Computer simulations such as the Corps Battle Simulation (CBS), formerly called the Joint Exercise Support System (JESS), used by the Army's Battle Command Training Program in WarFighter exercises are used to train such units as the 2d Infantry Division to cope with the specter of another

full-blown Korean conflict. (12)

Conclusion

The U.S. Army is in a state of transition as defense policy and budget cuts make major changes in the Army's force structure and strategy for the 1990s. Wargaming can assist Army planners if it is responsive and credible. The Army's missions of forward deployment and forward defense, projection of force for contingency operations, reinforcing and sustaining properly balanced forces in a variety of regional scenarios—all lend themselves to wargaming. (13) Military history can play a major role in making wargame results valid. Wargames do not reproduce history, but by using available historical data, useful wargame scenarios and data bases can be developed which will lend credibility to the wargame outcome. In so doing, user confidence in CAX will be increased, and the Army will be well on the way toward a better trained fighting force in the 1990s.

Thomas D. Morgan, LTC, USA (Ret.), is a military operation simulations analyst for a private organization supporting the Army's Battle Command Training Program at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He holds an M.P.A. degree from the University of Missouri and an M.A. degree in history from Pacific Lutheran University.

Notes

1. Peter P. Perla, *The Art of Wargaming* (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1990), p. 15.
2. Ibid.
3. Thomas B. Allen, *War Games* (New York, N.Y.: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1987), p. 116.
4. Richard F. Timmons, "Lessons from the Past for NATO," *The Parameters of War: Military History From the Journal of the U.S. Army War College*, eds. Lloyd J. Matthews and Dale E. Brown (Washington/London: Pergamon-Brassey's International Defense Publishers, 1987), p. 275.
5. Thomas B. Allen, "A Scenario for Armageddon: The Grim Unrealities of War Games," *Sea Power* (July 1987), pp. 39-48.
6. Ibid.
7. Perla, *The Art of Wargaming*, p. 73.
8. *Operations in Korea* (West Point, N.Y.: USMAAG Printing Office, 1956), pp. 57-58.
9. *The Second United States Infantry Division in Korea: 1951-1953* (Tokyo: Toppan Printing Co., Ltd., undated), pp. 30-32.
10. CACDA, FC 100-2-9, *North Korean People's Army Operations* (Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: USACACDA, Dec 86), 3-1 to 3-3.
11. Timmons, "Lessons from the Past," p. 277.
12. See the Fall 1989 issue of *Army History* for a discussion of the Battle Command Training Program (BCTP) and WarFighter exercises. BCTP WarFighters are setting the standard for Computer Assisted Exercises (CAX). Other trainers look to BCTP for leadership.
13. "What's Happening in the Army?" *AUSA News Special Supplement* (August 1990), p. 3A.

New Southwest Asia Bibliography Available

Professor Patrick D. Reagan has published a 24-page bibliography of the recent war in Southwest Asia, *America and the War with Iraq, A Bibliography for Instructors*, which he was kind enough to send us at *Army History*. After examining this new publication, Dr. Frank Schubert (who is heading the Center's effort to capture DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM in book form) described it as follows:

This useful compilation contains citations to a wide variety of works, including some published as recently as early 1991. The citations are arranged in sections by category, starting with reference works, then dealing with regional history, the Iran-Iraq war, American foreign policy, and a number of other subjects and issues. Overall, Professor Reagan's choices appear sound. The annotations, where they exist, are very terse.

Anyone interested in this publication can write to D. C. Heath and Company, 125 Spring Street, Lexington, Massachusetts 02173.

Call for Papers (4-5 June 1992)

Siena College is sponsoring its seventh annual multidisciplinary conference on the 50th anniversary of World War II: World War II--A 50-Year Perspective. The focus for 1992 will be 1942, although papers dealing with broad issues of earlier years will be welcomed. Topics include: Fascism and Nazism; Midway; New Guinea; Guadalcanal; North Africa; the North Atlantic; literature; art; film; diplomatic, political, and military history; popular culture; and women's and Jewish studies dealing with the era. Asian, African, Latin American, and Near Eastern topics of relevance are solicited. Also, collaboration and collaborationist regimes; the events on the home front; and conscription and dissent will be significant subjects for study. Replies and inquiries to:

Prof. Thomas O. Kelly II
Department of History
Siena College

Loudonville, New York 12111

Deadline for submissions is 15 December 1991.

Letters to the Editor

Colonel Arnold Responds to the Review of *Buffalo Soldiers*

Editor:

Dr. Frank Schubert's review (*Army History* No. 17, Winter 1990/1991) of *Buffalo Soldiers: The 92nd Infantry Division and Reinforcements in World War II, 1942-1945* indicates that he would have preferred to have it written as a black history book rather than as a military history.

He has resorted to erroneous statements, nit-picking, and caustic comments to indicate his displeasure with the publication.

Dr. Schubert apparently attempted to address himself exclusively to the organic units of the 92nd Division, while, as the title indicates, the book addresses the reinforced division as a total force. At no time during its period of combat in Italy did the 92nd operate entirely by itself. At various times, units totaling approximately 34,600 fought as a part of the division. The maximum reinforcements, at any one time, totaled about 10,000. Thus, with an organic strength of 15,000, the assigned personnel constituted only 60% of the total force.

In presenting a review of the operations of the 92nd Division and its reinforcements, it was intended to emphasize its accomplishments rather than dwell on the negative aspects and look for excuses for its failures. Many individuals are proud of their service with the 92nd Division. To dwell on its various difficulties would serve only to detract from its accomplishments.

The connection between the history of the black units operating in the west in the 1800s was made by the War Department when it directed that the personnel of the 92nd Division would wear the buffalo shoulder patch. Former personnel of the 92nd Division continue to refer to themselves as Buffalo Soldiers.

Dr. Schubert has stated that, "as the only black combat division, it received a large number of lower categories of draftees, compared to other divisions." As indicated on page 7, there were three black combat divisions organized in World War II. The 92nd Division was the last one to be activated. The draftees received by the division were a cross section of the black manpower available at that time. The 92nd did, in fact, have a high percentage of lower categories of personnel, as undoubtedly did the other two black

combat divisions. A total of approximately 727 individuals who could not or would not execute right face, forward march in less than approximately five minutes, were culled out and placed in a special training unit.

As was true of almost all of the reserve divisions activated during World War II, there were relatively few Regular Army and/or West Point graduates assigned to the 92nd Division. The selection of white officers for duty with the division was careful, and continued over the approximate two years of its training period. Most of that time it had a 5 percent overage in officer strength. This permitted the opportunity to pick and choose among them. Also, when the 597th and 600th Field Artillery Battalions were converted to all black officers, selections were afforded among the white officers made surplus by that action. At the time of activation, Brig. Gen. William Colbern visited the commandant of the Field Artillery School at Ft. Sill, Oklahoma, and requested four of the best field grade officers from the staff and faculty of the school for assignment to the 92nd Division artillery. Contrary to Dr. Schubert's statement that, "white officers avoided service with the 92nd," none of these or any other white officers were afforded the opportunity to avoid service with the 92nd Division should they so desire.

The quality of the Regular Army officers of the division is indicated by the fact that Maj. Gen. Edward Almond subsequently was promoted to lieutenant general, served as chief of staff for General Douglas MacArthur, and commanded the X Corps in Korea. Brigadier General Colbern subsequently was promoted to major general and served as the commandant of the Field Artillery School. Col. William McCaffrey, chief of staff of the 92nd Division, subsequently was promoted to lieutenant general and served as the Inspector General of the Army. Lt. Col. Edward Rowney subsequently was promoted to lieutenant general and later appointed a United States ambassador.

With regard to black officers of the 92nd Division, it should be remembered that there was a general lack of black entrepreneurs and college graduates in the early 1940s from which to draw black leadership.

Except for the all-black 597th and 600th Field Artillery Battalions and the attached 366th Infantry Regiment, the black officers were primarily lieutenants and captains. As battle casualties took their toll of junior officers, good noncommissioned officers became mediocre lieutenants, leaving a void in the senior noncommissioned officer and junior officer area.

As in Operation DESERT STORM, where coalition forces on the right were employed to hold hostile forces on their front while others were employed to envelop from the left, Allied Armies Italy (15th Army Group) utilized the reinforced 92nd Division and IV (U.S.) Corps to hold hostile forces on the left flank while others were employed to envelop from the right. Although Dr. Schubert's views apparently are to the contrary, those present at the time believed that there was much happening on the front of the 92nd Division, particularly during the German offensive in the Serchio Valley in December 1944, the February 1945 offensive, and the spring offensive in April 1945.

The inadvertent typographical errors in substituting an s for an e in Senator Brooke's name and 1945 for 1942 in the caption of the picture of activation ceremonies, on page 210, are regrettable. The preceding page (209) states clearly that the division was activated on 15 October 1942.

Note 4, page 208 states that Senator Brooke was the first black senator from *Massachusetts*. Senators Revels and Bruce were from *Mississippi*.

The first name of the commanding general of the 148th (German) Grenadier Division was Otto. His last name was Fretter Pico, a double name. Listing his name in the index more than one way does not appear to be a significant breach of journalism and may assist as a cross reference.

Sincerely,

Thomas St. J. Arnold
Colonel, U.S. Army (Ret.)

Editor's Note: We offered Dr. Schubert an opportunity to respond to Colonel Arnold's letter, but he declined, stating that he will stand by his review.

Book Review
by Edward M. Coffman

GENERAL OF THE ARMY: George C. Marshall, Soldier and Statesman
by Ed Cray
Norton. 847 pp., \$35.00

Eisenhower, MacArthur, and Patton. These are the generals that Americans remember from World War II. Eisenhower, of course, served two terms as president while two movies made MacArthur and Patton more memorable. George C. Marshall's name, however, usually puzzles the average college student who might make the guess that he had something to do with the Marshall Plan. He did—but there is much more about General Marshall that should be remembered.

As chief of staff of the Army from 1939 through the end of World War II, he oversaw the mobilization, equipping, and training of the largest American army in history. His responsibility did not end once this tremendous force was committed to battle. As the leading American military strategist, he played a key role in shaping the course of the war.

With victory accomplished and demobilization well under way, President Truman assigned him the frustrating role of peacemaker between the Chinese Nationalists and Communists. He failed in that mission but, in all likelihood, no one could have been successful. Then, as secretary of state for the two critical years of 1947 and 1948, he bolstered the Free World's cause in the Cold War with actions that resulted in his being awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. Finally, in the early days of the Korean War, he took the office of secretary of defense and supervised a military buildup as well as set the terms for a defense policy that went far beyond the Korean peninsula. Here, indeed, was a great man.

Ed Cray, a journalist turned academic, spent fourteen years preparing this large book. While the result certainly does not replace Forrest C. Pogue's monumental, definitive biography that Viking Press brought out in four volumes between 1963 and 1987, it is a well-written, balanced, and effective full length coverage of the general's life.

Although his focus is naturally on the years from 1939 to 1951, Cray does not neglect the earlier years when his subject matured and worked his way to the top. After all, by the time Marshall became chief of staff in 1939, he was fifty-eight and had spent more

than thirty-seven years in the Army.

They were years in which he advanced with success from one assignment to another. In particular, he established a reputation while still a lieutenant as a student at Fort Leavenworth's School of the Line and Staff College. In the American Expeditionary Forces during World War I, he performed brilliantly as a staff officer and attracted the attention of General John J. Pershing, whose close adviser he became in the early postwar years. Throughout his service, but particularly when he was assistant commandant at the Infantry School at Fort Benning from 1927 to 1932, he kept a sharp eye on subordinates. His astute judgments of those who became known as "the Marshall Men"—Omar Bradley, J. Lawton Collins, and others—paid off when the ones he chose for high command turned in such exemplary performances in World War II.

The author gets across the character and personality of the man as well as details of his personal life to balance the description of his professional activities. Reserved, aloof, Marshall seemed to thrive in situations where there were no easy decisions. His willingness to make those hard decisions, his integrity, his demeanor, his command of relevant facts and the ability to present them tersely and effectively impressed Presidents Roosevelt and Truman as well as many others, including Winston Churchill. Then, in the great tasks which he faced, he demonstrated vision and the ability to continue to learn.

Cray works his way skillfully through the intricate issues of wartime strategy and explains the decisions hammered out by the American military chiefs and their Allied counterparts. In controversial matters—such as those strategic debates, the retention of segregation in the wartime Army, the Pearl Harbor disaster, the problems of China during the war and into the postwar period, and Marshall's relations with Douglas MacArthur—he presents the evidence and arrives at conclusions generally sympathetic to Marshall.

Scholars—indeed, any reader—deeply interested in the subject should turn to Pogue's magisterial work and *The Papers of George Catlett Marshall* (two volumes of which are in print) while anyone looking for an excellent brief—200 or so pages—biography should pick up Mark Stoler's *George C. Marshall: Soldier-Statesman of the American Century* that came out last year. Cray's book fills the need, then, of the reader who wants to read more about Marshall than Stoler offers, but less than is available in the Pogue biography. In any case, it is time well taken to gain knowledge not only of Marshall but also of the American

army throughout the first half of this century, World War II, and the first years of the Cold War.

Dr. Edward M. Coffman is professor of history at the University of Wisconsin at Madison. He has been a visiting professor at the Air Force Academy and the U.S. Military Academy, as well as Harold K. Johnson Visiting Professor at the Military History Institute and John W. Morrison Professor at the Army Command and General Staff College. Professor Coffman is the author, among other works, of The War to End All Wars and The Hilt of the Sword: Peyton C. March.

Reprinted with permission from the Washington Post, 22 July 1990. All rights reserved.

Book Review

by Frank N. Schubert

The Commanders

by Bob Woodward

Simon and Schuster. 398 pp., \$24.95

When this fast-paced engaging book first appeared in the spring of 1991, it caused something of a sensation. The *New York Times* reviewed it twice, once in its daily pages (6 May) and again in its book review section (26 May). The Washington papers also gave it prominent billing, the *Washington Post* publishing a review by Clay Blair in its "Book World" section of 5 May and the *Washington Times* printing an essay by Elliott Abrams on 20 May. Other coverage in news and feature sections showed a high level of interest.

Although much of the attention was due to the remarkable timing of the book's appearance just weeks after the end of combat operations in Southwest Asia, the subject itself was of intrinsic interest. The dust jacket promised insights into the process by which the Bush administration made its military decisions, and—putting questions of documentation aside for a moment—the text delivered. Here were insider accounts of how the administration decided to launch Operation JUST CAUSE in Panama and Operation DESERT SHIELD in Saudi Arabia and then implemented those decisions.

There were other reasons for the publicity, among them interest regarding who gave Woodward the bulk of the information he used. Most reviewers concluded that Admiral William Crowe and General Colin Powell provided the lion's share. The author claimed that he

conducted more than 400 interviews, but assessments of his principal sources must remain guesses, albeit apparently sound ones. However, he provided no documentation, either in the form of notes to the text or even a bibliography.

So we have to take his word for the soundness of his data and of his use of it. The latter may be the more significant of these two issues. General officers who talk to media celebrities are likely to get very careful preparation by their staffs beforehand. So the information that Woodward got was probably pretty good. But, in any case, an Army historian reviewing this book could not even comment on the accuracy of some of the information or the analysis. This is so even for cases where the source is clearly implied. For example, the plans for Operation JUST CAUSE remain classified. So even a knowledgeable reviewer with the proper clearances could not comment on the validity of the information or the analysis.

The author's handling of classified security information is especially noteworthy. Questions of accuracy aside, and they must remain aside, he treats this material in a very matter-of-fact and even offhand way. There is no note of triumph about acquiring top secret material, no boasting, or even emphasis. He just has it, uses it, and moves on. It is apparently a matter of course, well within his expectations and part of his normal mode of operation, to have access to classified material as well as to senior officials.

In addition to the sources of the book, the signs of disagreement between major administration figures provoked extensive commentary and came in some quarters to indicate dissension rather than at least a modicum of useful internal debate over proper courses of action. Then there is Woodward himself. He is something of a media star, whose earlier books have sparked interest and controversy. He has even been portrayed in his role as an investigative reporter in the Watergate affair by Robert Redford in the motion picture "All the President's Men."

While so many people have found this book, which is perched securely among the bestsellers on national lists, of interest for a variety of reasons, there remains the question of its utility for an Army historian. The lack of proper documentation seriously diminishes its value. The need to treat the classified material in the text with caution, neither confirming nor denying the accuracy of the information, still further detracts from its usefulness. The Army historian writing about JUST CAUSE or DESERT SHIELD, or interested in the policy-making process or command

relationships, may still want to read this book—the author writes well and has an interesting story—but is unlikely to find it helpful in his own research.

There is more at issue here for the Army historian than a tantalizing book that should be used only with great care. There is also the matter of access to information. Here is a case of general officers and politicians talking at length to a reporter cum media star about very recent operations, in some cases perhaps using the author to get their views into public print, in others maybe settling personal scores, or even just flattered to be of interest to such a national figure. Who knows? What we do know is that senior officials and their immediate subordinates do not always deign to talk to us. When they do, moreover, they are likely to impose restrictions on when or how we can use what they provide. So while Woodward does his 400 interviews and gets a book into print, we wait for commanders and senior staff officers to grant us interviews—that they frequently classify as "secret" or declare to be "close hold"—and allow us access to the records of their operations.

Of all the things Bob Woodward set out to do, surely he did not intend to underline the frustrations of being an Army historian. Yet that is one of the things his book does well. It does not appear to be very useful for our own work on recent operations, but it is a clear reminder of who has access to what.

Dr. Frank N. Schubert is Chief, Field Programs Activity, in the Center's Field and International Division. He is managing the production of the Center's history of the U.S. Army's role in DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM.

In the next issue of *Army History*...

Lt. Col. Charles McKenna's account of the "forgotten reform": instituting a system of field maneuvers in the U.S. Army in the years just before World War I.

The 1990 Military History Writing Contest prize-winning essay on the 6615th Ranger Infantry Regiment (Provisional) at Cisterna di Littoria, by Capt. Anthony J. Abati.

A look at the U.S. Army Air Defense Artillery Museum at Fort Bliss, Texas.

Ted Ballard's staff ride suggestions and bibliography for those planning a staff ride to Antietam.

Book review of Martin Van Creveld's *The Training of Officers*.

Book review of *Winged Sabers* by Lawrence H. Johnson III.

And much more....

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
THE CHIEF OF MILITARY HISTORY AND
THE CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20374-5088

OFFICIAL BUSINESS
PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE \$300

Bulk Rate
U. S. POSTAGE
PAID
Permit No. 1044
Orlando, Florida