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## The U.S. Army Military Observers with the Japanese Army during the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905)

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*This paper initially derives from Dr. Greenwood's doctoral dissertation, "The American Military Observers of the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905)," (Kansas State University, 1971), as well as from significant subsequent research. The original paper came complete with ninety-one footnotes, which are not reproduced here. Interested readers may contact the Editor for a copy of the notes.*

For over a century, armies have studied themselves and their performance in peace and war just as much as they have probed their actual or potential enemies. Sophisticated "lessons learned" systems have evolved to analyze performance and correct deficiencies. Mimicking the 19th century Prussian General Staff model, official military history programs were also created to provide the historical basis for organizational and doctrinal change.

During Operations JUST CAUSE and DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM, U.S. Army historians collected the documentation needed for later histories and analytical studies. Working beside them were teams from the Army's Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) collecting data to support more immediate changes. While the historians' involvement is of more recent origin, learning lessons from its own operations, as well as from foreign wars, is not new to the U.S. Army. Indeed, the Army has been about this business in a systematic manner since the Crimean War (1853-56), usually using officers detailed as military attachés or observers as the principal "lesson learners." One of the U.S. Army's most significant and least known experiences in learning lessons was in the Russo-Japanese War (February 1904-September 1905).

### The Observers and American Interest

The outbreak of the war in February 1904 triggered intense international diplomatic, military, and naval

interest that attracted more foreign military observers than any previous war. Partly an outgrowth of the attaché system of the 19th century, military observers were the product of the rapid advance of military technology coupled with the lack of extended general wars. The observer's task was really quite simple—to observe military maneuvers, campaigns, or wars and to extract tactical, strategic, doctrinal, and technical lessons for the use of his own army. The Russo-Japanese War was the most closely, extensively, and professionally observed war of the pre-1914 era because it was the largest conflict between 1871 and 1914 to test the various theories that had been debated for years in military circles.

From the outset, the United States had very significant diplomatic and strategic interests in the clash between Russia and Japan. American commercial and diplomatic interests in the Far East had grown throughout the nineteenth century, but the acquisition in 1898 of the Philippine Islands and Guam from Spain, and the advocacy of the "Open Door Policy," had made the U.S. a trans-Pacific power. Now, with strategic and military interests in East Asia and the western Pacific, the U.S. Army was vitally interested in the military lessons of the war between Russia and Japan. Only hours after learning of Admiral Togo Heihachiro's attack on the Russian Fleet at Port Arthur, the War Department asked the Department of State to secure permission for it to dispatch military observers to accompany the Russian and Japanese forces.

The U.S. Army of 1903-04 was small, but many of its officers had a remarkable degree of professionalism, intellectual vitality, and knowledge of modern military science, in view of their lack of higher military education and the circumstances of their service in a largely frontier army. Within the Army, this was also a period of ferment and change as it digested the reforms of Secretary of War Elihu Root, including the

creation of the General Staff in February 1903, and the numerous lessons of the recent Spanish-American War (1898). The Army's receptiveness to learn from the Manchurian war could not have been more auspicious.

By April 1904 thirty-four foreign officers had gathered in Tokyo to accompany the Japanese field armies—ten from Great Britain, five from Germany, four each from France and the U.S., two each from Spain, Austria-Hungary, and Switzerland, and one each from Italy, Turkey, Sweden, Chile, and Argentina. Second only to the British team with the Japanese, which eventually numbered seventeen officers, during the war the U.S. military dispatched twelve official observers—three Navy and nine Army: Col. Enoch H. Crowder, Capt. Peyton C. March, Maj. Joseph E. Kuhn, Capt. John F. Morrison, Capt. Charles Lynch, Maj. Gen. Arthur MacArthur, Capt. Parker W. West, Capt. John J. Pershing, and Lt. Col. Edward J. McClelland. (See Appendix I for the U.S. Army observers, the time they served in Japan and Manchuria, and the Japanese field armies to which they were assigned; Appendix II has brief biographical sketches of these officers).

Only Enoch Crowder, Joseph Kuhn, Peyton March, John Morrison, and Charles Lynch were present in Manchuria during the period of active combat opera-

tions. They either personally saw or were present with the Japanese armies during the major battles of Liaoyang, the Shaho, Sandepu (Heikoutai), and Mukden, but only witnessed small parts of the siege of Port Arthur. Arthur MacArthur, Parker West, John Pershing, and Edward McClelland arrived after Mukden in March 1905 and were present only during the period of stalemate through September 1905.

### Observations and Lessons

The five volumes of the Reports of Military Observers attached to the Armies in Manchuria during the Russo-Japanese War published by the War Department in 1906 and 1907 as well as the observers' articles in military journals, lectures, private notes, and correspondence clearly reflect what they thought were the principal lessons of the war. Space limitations prohibit even a cursory review of their numerous observations and recommendations, so this article will focus only on their comments regarding the infantry, artillery, and combined arms warfare, followed by some general conclusions about the influence of these and other observations on the U.S. Army and about the effect of this experience on the observers themselves.

As in previous wars, the armies in Manchuria were composed mostly of infantrymen who bore the brunt of



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the fighting and whose role generally remained consistent with past experiences. In his report, Capt. William V. Judson, who served as an Army observer with the Russian Armies from April 1904 until his capture at Mukden in March 1905, remarked that "nothing in the Russo-Japanese War demonstrated that, in field battles, the infantry had lost its supreme importance."

The Russian adoption early on of a largely defensive strategy meant that the Japanese infantry, with only rare exceptions, attacked the Russians in their prepared defensive positions. Thus the American observers with the Japanese often saw the infantry in the attack while those with the Russians witnessed the infantry on the defensive. Based on experiences in the Boer War, some European military thinkers held that infantry could not attack and take a defended position in the face of modern small-arms and artillery fire. Other theorists, usually of the French offensive school but also some British and Germans, contended that nothing could stop the offensive when undertaken by well-trained and highly motivated troops. To these prominent tactical questions of the day, Manchuria provided some interesting, yet contradictory and perplexing, answers.


After examining the Russian positions at the battle of Nanshan (26 May 1904), Joseph Kuhn noted that "according to the text-books it should be impossible to carry such a position by frontal attack and yet this was accomplished by the Japanese." He did not mention that this success cost General Oku Yasukata's Second Army over 4,500 casualties and was only won due to the incompetency of Russian leadership and, as John Pershing astutely noted, its poor handling of available reserves. John Morrison, who later became the most influential Army tactician and educator of the pre-World War I era, questioned Oku's tactical conduct of the battle after studying reports of the Nanshan fighting. Rather than repeatedly attacking along the entire Russian front, Morrison thought that the Japanese should have concentrated on one point, broken through, and rolled up the Russian lines—the result would have been a quick, cheap victory.

Their studies of the war's early battles and personal observations of the heavy fighting at Liaoyang (26 August-3 September 1904) and on the Shaho (4-17 October 1904) convinced Morrison and Kuhn that frontal infantry assaults against entrenched defenders were indeed feasible and usually successful. Supported by artillery that covered the assault and beat down the enemy artillery, the Japanese infantry fre-

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quently carried such attacks to success. However, both Morrison and Kuhn added qualifying conditions. Morrison believed that brave and thoroughly trained soldiers had to make such attacks because half-trained soldiers could not succeed except at an unthinkable cost. Kuhn also stressed the need for adequate artillery support and good leadership, as did Morrison and later McClelland. Yet he added that "no doubt the successes of the Japanese . . . must be attributed, in part at least, to the poor shooting of the Russians."

In a letter of 16 September 1904 from recently occupied Liaoyang to Maj. Gen. Charles Boardman, Adjutant General of Wisconsin National Guard, Morrison wrote:

There is one of the fallacies thoroughly exploded for one thing, and that is "Infantry can not assault and carry a strongly entrenched (*sic*) hill by frontal attack." They can for I have seen it done, but it was costly. The right kind of infantry can carry anything if you have enough of it. It is cheaper to do it some other way than by frontal attack if possible but frontal attacks can win. This position was very strongly entrenched but was carried. It wasn't the Arty [artillery] that does the killing it is the little steel jacketed rifle bullet.

From the Russian side of the lines, both Judson and Capt. Carl Reichmann, who served as an observer from April to November 1904 and who had been an observer with the Boer forces in South Africa, saw things quite differently than Kuhn and Morrison. They had an intimate view of the growing power that modern weapons gave to entrenched defenders. Judson did not think frontal assault could take strongly held entrenched positions. Reichmann attributed the great difficulty of frontal attacks to the power of shrapnel fire. Judson and Reichmann had many times seen the Russians, often markedly inferior in numbers and artillery, repulse repeated Japanese attacks.

At Kandalishan, Reichmann saw six successive defensive lines, each strengthened with every trick of the engineer's art from mines to wire entanglements, built before his departure in late November 1904. He noted that this position withstood fourteen Japanese attacks during the Mukden fighting and was never breached. Lt. Col. Walter Schuyler, the senior American observer with the Russians from April to November 1904, noted that the second line of the Liaoyang defenses was not taken until the Russian rear guard abandoned it. In listing what he considered to be the predominant features of the war, Col. Valery Havard,

a special medical observer with the Russians who was captured along with Judson in March 1905, sided with Judson, Reichmann, and Schuyler. Havard saw "the great difficulty and impossibility of successful frontal attacks on account of the number and strength of entrenchments...." as one of the war's most significant features.

Two factors had really made Japanese frontal attacks successful—the attackers' aggressiveness and willingness to absorb staggering casualties to take a position combined with the repeated use of enveloping movements to outflank the Russian defenses, which often panicked inept Russian commanders into hasty withdrawals. Few observers saw that this critical interaction in Japanese military operations essentially led to prolonged stalemates rather than victorious conclusions. The threatening encircling movement on the flank only forced the enemy's withdrawal to a new fortified defensive line where the frontal struggle would resume anew.

Contrary to what Kuhn and Morrison had seen, but in line with what the observers with the Russian side had observed so clearly, the Russians more often than not repelled numerous Japanese attacks until forced out by an endangered flank or a premature decision to retire. And yet, enough successful assaults were made to substantiate Kuhn, Morrison, and McClelland, and anyone else who claimed that frontal assaults worked against entrenched positions. So again, the lessons were confused and contradictory—the observers with the Russians watched defensive tactics and disclaimed the success of frontal attacks while those with the Japanese saw the very opposite. As with all such observations, much depended on where, when, and what the observers personally witnessed versus information they gleaned from other observers or received from detailed Japanese briefings. Such ambiguous "lessons" were difficult for any army to digest and accept as the basis for major doctrinal changes.

The entire question of frontal infantry attacks against defenders armed with modern weapons raised another tactical problem, that of assault formations. An extremely wide extension of the British infantry firing line had become normal practice in South Africa due to the heavy losses their traditional close-packed infantry formations took from Boer rifle and artillery fire. A repetition of similar extended order tactics in Manchuria would have proven quite significant.

McClelland, Havard, and Maj. Montgomery M. Macomb, who was with the Russian Armies from April 1904 through December 1905 noticed that as the war

progressed the formations of the Japanese infantry became looser and more extended. Kuhn, March, and Morrison again saw things differently. Kuhn contended that "the great dispersion which was threatened by the Boer War found no application in Japanese tactics." Morrison seconded this when he wrote that "the tactics of the Japanese infantry in attack offers nothing startlingly new. There is a decided reaction from the great extension advocated by some and used in South Africa." In a lecture to the General Staff after his return from Manchuria, March said that he "did not observe any tendency on the part of the Japanese to abandon their close formation." Thus, depending on their vantage points, the observers' opinions once again clashed on an important and controversial tactical point.

In contrast to the Japanese infantry, the Russian soldiers spent most of their time entrenched and on the defensive. Whenever the Russians attacked, such as at the Shaho and Sandepu, the units were usually poorly handled and sluggish, although the Russian infantrymen were very stubborn and brave fighters. Reichmann saw the Russian infantry in the attack more than the other observers. He concluded that their tactics were not at all satisfactory and that the Army had "nothing to learn from this war for our regular infantry."

A unique feature of the fighting in Manchuria was the frequency of night actions. Kuhn noted that the Japanese use of night attacks and maneuvers "was to be expected from the destructiveness of modern fire-arms...." Havard, March, and Reichmann concurred with this opinion and saw this development as one of the most significant of the war. March noted that, "The argument of the open school that the killing effect of modern magazine rifles and rapid fire guns make great dispersion necessary had been answered by the Japanese, and by the Russians too, by the night attack." The Japanese used the cover of darkness to bring up and deploy troops close to the Russian lines and thus to escape the losses that would have resulted from similar movements during daylight hours.

While other observers also agreed on the importance of night attacks, Kuhn concluded that "it seems quite certain that night attacks and maneuvers will receive a wide application in future wars, and troops should be carefully trained for this work in time of peace." Most of the observers agreed on this point at least.

The Russo-Japanese War also featured very extensive use of infantry entrenchments, about which much has already been mentioned. This development

was an outgrowth of the search for protection from both artillery and infantry fire and was seen as early as the American Civil War. Russian defensive work inspired Reichmann to comment that "it may be truthfully said of both sides that the soldiers dug when they did not march or fight." Even on the Japanese side, Morrison saw that "once in the presence of an enemy the entrenching tool seemed next in importance to the rifle and ammunition. The rule of both sides seemed to be always to cover their positions with entrenchments as soon as taken up, even when held only for a short time." March told the General Staff upon his return that "...cover is one of the most striking things about the whole war as viewed from the Japanese side. They never go anywhere without entrenching immediately...the army is always digging. And it is the same thing on the Russian side—always the spade."

Both the Russian and Japanese infantry made great use of entrenching tools. In this respect, the observers noted that the U.S. Army was very laggardly in adopting an appropriate entrenching tool for the infantry. McClelland said the entrenching tool had to be selected carefully because "experience tells us that our troops are prone to disencumber themselves on the march of articles not essential to personal safety or of immediate use." He did not doubt that "the pick and spade will play an important role on the battlefield of the future, and it is well that we have finally decided to add them to the soldier's equipment."

From his Manchurian observations, Judson clearly saw that the improvements in field fortifications would force infantry tactics to change. In a prophetic description of the trench warfare to come, he wrote: "The properly fortified line then becomes practically continuous.... These short trenches are not in a continuous line parallel to the front, but occupy what may be called a defensive belt, of a width between 200 or 300 yards and half a mile, depending upon the ground and importance of the sector.... With three or four thousand men to the mile of front, including all reserves, a fortified line of the belt type is invulnerable to frontal attack...."

On the Manchurian battlefields, the artillery of both sides, though not of the latest quick-firing designs, played a larger role in the final decision of battle than ever before. Japanese artillery was frequently massed on Russian defenses to obtain an intensity of fire hitherto unknown in modern warfare. Artillery fire on opposing batteries, as well as on the defenders, covered infantry attacks. The defending infantry was more and more forced to entrench for protection both from artillery and infantry fire, while defending artillery exacted

very heavy losses among the ranks of the attackers. All in all, artillery had come to assume a place in battle second only to that of the infantry, and some observers even questioned whether it was not now the major key to success in modern battle.

The Americans saw little to learn technically in Manchuria, aside from the new importance of high explosive shells and the need for heavier caliber artillery and shells to destroy field fortifications. However, they reversed their stands when it came to tactical employment of artillery. They saw as one of the primary lessons of the war the growing necessity for indirect rather than direct artillery fire. The range of opposing artillery and infantry weapons led to serious losses if and when batteries deployed in the open to use direct fire.

The impact of artillery fire on infantry tactics was much more difficult to assess because the observers' experiences varied greatly and thus their conclusions were often contradictory. Morrison saw little change in infantry tactics as a result of improved artillery. Yet Reichmann noted that the ever more deadly fire had driven the infantry not only to entrench but also to the use of night attacks to escape artillery and rifle fire. In the future McClelland saw increasingly heavy infantry losses from artillery, but he also stressed that artillery support would facilitate an infantry assault.

March emphasized the growing importance of combined arms of the battlefield. "The Japanese artillery and infantry work together splendidly," he noted, "...the artillery keeps up its fire during the infantry advance, sometimes even until the infantry walks into the burst of their shrapnel." From talks with Japanese officers and other observers, Pershing came away with conflicting views. On the one hand, he agreed with March that artillery could help the attacking force by suppressing enemy fire until it reached the enemy's lines. But he also cautioned

the preparation of the infantry by artillery is not as easy as is usually believed. All their efforts to destroy the enemy's artillery and trenches is of little avail, it seems to be very difficult....

Obviously, general agreement on the exact effect of artillery fire on infantry, either in the open or entrenched or while attacking or defending, was difficult to reach. Reconciling the conflicting observations was almost impossible, because what one observer reported, another one contradicted. As with Pershing above, the observers sometimes even contradicted

themselves. By carefully selecting examples from the different observers' experiences and reports, any number of tactical conclusions could be reached on the subject of the interaction of artillery and infantry on the modern battlefield. The new importance of artillery on the battlefield was clear and so was the fact that infantry and artillery had to train together as a combined arms team in peacetime to be effective in wartime.

Reichmann returned from Manchuria "strongly impressed with the importance of mobility" for the infantry and the entire army. "Mobility of an army is the greatest increment of strength in the hands of its leader," he observed, "and even if the Japanese had been inferior in infantry armament as they were in their type of field gun, their mobility would have given them victory nevertheless. Mobility, when opposed to heaviness, is a terrible power. Those of our officers who were with the Japanese saw the power exerted; I saw its irresistible effects on the helpless Russian masses." Judson carried Reichmann's stress on mobility one step farther when he noted that "with regard to infantry, the lesson, as I see it, is, beyond all other things, to make it more mobile." He concluded that in the future "the troops who can move most quickly, with the least loss of vitality, will be able to win with considerable odds against them."

One of the new weapons that eventually came to play a prominent role in the Russo-Japanese War was the machine gun. Neither side, however, possessed the guns in any number before the winter of 1904-05, and the War Department General Staff only asked the observers for special reports on the organization, equipment, and use of machine guns in April 1905. Thus, Peyton March and John Morrison with the Japanese and Walter Schuyler and Carl Reichmann with the Russians saw little of them in action, so they could report little. Later observers commented more extensively on the new weapons, but only Maj. Montgomery Macomb, who had spent almost the entire war with the Russians, filed a special report of any significance on the use of machine guns. Macomb was then one of the best qualified officers in the Army to observe and comment on machine guns. Just prior to going to Manchuria, he had prepared a special report in December 1903 on the Army's recent tactical experiments with machine guns that later helped to resolve the Army's continuing debate on their tactical organization and placement in the infantry rather than artillery.

In his detailed account of the organization and employment of machine guns, Macomb noted that they

## Request for Research Assistance

*Army History* has received a request from Prof. Alex Danchev of Keele University in England. He is working on a biography of Basil Liddell Hart (1895-1970) and would like to communicate with anyone having information that might be germane to his study. Interested parties should write to Prof. Alex Danchev, Department of International Relations, Keele University, Keele, Staffordshire, ST5 5BG, England, United Kingdom.

A.G. Fisch

"played a useful but not great part in the war." They were limited to 2,000 yards range and were helpless against artillery. Addressing a point then in dispute, he equated the machine gun's fire to that of 50 infantrymen, not the 100 some experts claimed. He also pointed out that it took 12 infantrymen to handle the gun to get the added firepower, so the net increase was equal to 38 infantrymen. Machine guns were to be used in pairs, not singly, and their most valuable quality was that they supplied "a means of suddenly and unexpectedly increasing the volume of fire without overcrowding the firing line, thus extending the scope and flexibility of the fire actions."

Macomb concluded that the gun's "greatest physical and moral effect is produced when it is employed suddenly against massed troops...or in enfilading lines of any kinds. It is, in general, impossible to foresee when and where such opportunities will arise. Hence, the best organization is that which distributes the machine guns among the fighting units so as to take instant advantage of an opportunity without making a good target for the enemy...." He advocated holding the machine guns in reserve until the critical moment rather than keeping them in the firing line because they would provide the commander with the ability to fight with "redoubled confidence" when he knows he has easy means to increase his firepower by "a company or more." Military experts already appreciated the effect of machine guns as a defensive weapon, but Macomb also thought it was equally valuable on the offensive "to an active moving force which knows how to use it."

From his observations of Japanese operations, McClelland confirmed Macomb's view of the growing use of machine guns in offensive operations. The Japanese frequently employed machine guns to provide effective covering fire for assaulting infantry.

"Their rapid fire frequently silenced the fire of the Russian infantry," he wrote, "and caused the latter to crouch down in their trenches." Pershing, in a short special report on Japanese machine guns, concluded that they had also increased the difficulty of the offensive, especially in open country.

Kuhn saw machine guns in action used both in the field operations and during the siege of Port Arthur, and he reported that they had clearly demonstrated their effectiveness. "It seems certain that this weapon will play an important part in the future," Kuhn concluded, "and the equipment and tactics of machine guns should receive serious and prompt consideration in our Army." Macomb's observations with the Russians seconded this recommendation, while General MacArthur called for "a careful and exhaustive investigation by the General Staff, as to the best type of gun, the organization of tactical units, and their distribution to commands."

John Pershing did not see Japanese machine guns used in action, but he did see training exercises with the 2d Division and talk extensively with Japanese officers who had used them in combat as well as other foreign observers who had been with the Japanese armies during combat. In his overall draft report, which was never formally filed with the War Department General Staff, Pershing provided a short account of the guns and their use. While the Japanese used them in both offensive and defensive operations, Pershing noted that a Japanese captain of a machine gun battery said the guns increased the troops' morale and could be used in defensive positions "without disadvantage..." if terrain permitted. Pershing also remarked, however, that "The Japanese are averse to going against machine gun fire at anything like fair range. At 1,700 to 1,800 meters the fire from machine guns is not different from

the fire of infantry. Machine guns can work with infantry and keep very close to it working behind it."

The American observers returned with no conclusive answer to the current debate within the U.S. Army over the proper organization and use of the machine gun. Macomb and McClelland certainly concluded that it was an infantry weapon with definite offensive and defensive applications. Others, such as MacArthur and Kuhn, clearly realized the machine gun's growing importance on the battlefield but could not recommend its exact organization and tactics.

As far as other new and potentially revolutionary changes in warfare, Kuhn remarked that while in Manchuria he had seen no "serious modification" in the application of the rules and principles for conducting warfare. He wrote further that "if there is one factor more than any other which has impressed itself on my mind it is that the war was conducted by both sides along strictly orthodox lines." Because the Russo-Japanese War was the first great modern war since 1877-78, Kuhn had expected to see some startling and original methods and tactics. Yet he had seen nothing but that which was "strictly orthodox."

Morrison reflected Kuhn's sentiments and those of most of the other observers when he wrote that "the Japanese in their army have shown us little that is not in the books, little that can be truly called original." The organization and tactics of the Japanese infantry, cavalry, and artillery were closely patterned on the current German or French lines, but with certain alterations to fit Japanese proclivities and equipment. Morrison concluded that "their tactics can be found in books open to us all." He found the reason for Japanese successes had "but one answer—system and training." Kuhn also remarked that most of what he had seen savored "strongly of the text-book."

The highly observant Judson also saw little development of novelties in the conflict. "What counted most," he wrote toward the end of his report, "were not newfangled devices and surprising methods, but the preliminary training of troops, the right tactical use of all arms, and the proper administration of the great military business of supply and transportation." With such conclusions in mind and the contradictory evidence presented by the observers in their *Reports*, it is understandable that Kuhn strongly cautioned his readers against completely accepting what he had witnessed and described as the final word on the war's lessons. "In the absence of more detailed information," he wrote, "any general deductions as to the lessons of the Russo-Japanese War must necessarily be viewed

with considerable caution."

## Conclusions

For many reasons, the lessons and recommendations that the American observers reported went largely unheeded. Even though many specific things that the observers mentioned were subsequently either introduced or implemented, often no obvious connection can be made to their recommendations. On the other hand, some recommendations had distinct impacts. Sometimes this was because the recommendations tipped ongoing debates in favor of a particular course of action, such as with the adoption of the sword bayonet as a standard infantry weapon or of a new entrenching tool.

At other times, the personal influence of an observer was clearly discernible as a deciding factor. One case of direct influence was that of Peyton March. Assigned to the Artillery Reorganization Board, March incorporated many ideas from his Manchurian experience into the Artillery Reorganization Act of 1907. The separation of field and coast artillery and the reorganization of artillery into regiments was partly due to March's experience in Manchuria. However, years of debate and discussion of the effect of technological change on artillery equipment, organization, and doctrine had also conditioned the artillerymen to the need for change and to these suggestions. Many artillerymen saw the Russo-Japanese War as critical proof of the need for additional change in directions they were already moving or seriously discussing. Few other such obvious instances can be singled out.

Alfred Vagts has argued that the lessons and recommendations carried home by the observers from most countries could not percolate up through the chain of command. While his contention was only partly true in most cases, it was most assuredly not true for the U.S. Army. With a small and closely-knit officers corps of only 3,709 officers in 1906, the observers knew and were known by most of the important officers of the General Staff, the various bureaus and departments, their own branches, and the War Department.

In addition, the American observers all spent some time on the General Staff upon their return from the Far East. Many of them gave lectures to the General Staff, at the Army War College, at various officers' associations, and to the public; and they wrote numerous articles for professional military journals. They also spoke at length about their experiences with the Chief of Staff, with the Secretary of War, and with President

Roosevelt upon their return to Washington. The observations and opinions of the American observers most likely percolated fairly well through Washington's military circles, the General Staff, and the Army.

In the years following the Russo-Japanese War, debates over organization, tactics, doctrine, and equipment filled American military journals, lecture halls, and classrooms. Numerous articles and translations were published on all aspects of the war in Manchuria and its impact on American military doctrine. New books on the war were avidly reviewed and recommended. Students at the Army War College, and the School of the Line and Staff College at Leavenworth studied the war's campaigns in detail, and some officers even visited the battlefields to study the operations on the original terrain.

Because their observations provided the most cogent new information available on key tactical and technological issues, the works of the American observers were heavily read and used within the U.S. Army. The observer's *Reports* and articles were studied and used freely to support all sides of the various ideas then under debate, from the role and importance of machine guns to medical service, field fortifications, cavalry, the bayonet, and training. Where possible, the branches and schools incorporated relevant information into their manuals. The Engineer Field Manual of 1912 explicitly states that "much valuable information, especially as to railroads and field fortifications, was obtained from the reports of military observers with the Japanese and Russian armies...." While the observers' recommendations resulted in few concrete changes, their works certainly shaped much of the discussion of military organization and doctrine through 1916.

Actually, one of the most prominent pressures against the acceptance of the observers' recommendations came from the man most intimately interested in the Russo-Japanese War and the observers' experiences therein. President Theodore Roosevelt wrote to Chief of Staff Adna R. Chaffee on 3 July 1905 expressing his concerns about accepting the apparent lessons of the victorious Japanese Army:

I think we must be careful about following in anything like servile fashion the Japanese merely because the Japanese have won. Doubtless you remember how, after the Franco-German war, it became the fashion to copy all the bad points as well as the good ones of the German Army organizations, so that in our own army they actually introduced the preposterous spiked helmets for the army; as foolish a kind of

headgear for modern warfare as could be invented. We should be on the lookout now not to commit a similar kind of fault as regards the Japanese. Not all of the things they have done have been wise, and some of the wise things they have done are not wise for us.

Thus, while Roosevelt was clearly in favor of learning from the Russian and Japanese experiences, he desired only those things that were pertinent and useful. With such an influential voice on record against the immediate adoption of anything from either side, the General Staff's acceptance of even the most practical recommendations was naturally bound to be slow and overly cautious. Neither Roosevelt nor the U.S. Army can be faulted for these skeptical attitudes. In many instances, the observers concluded there was nothing to learn from either side—that what they had seen was routine, commonly known, unoriginal, orthodox, or textbook. Many of the recommendations were not applicable to the U.S. Army because they were so uniquely Russian or Japanese or so peculiar to the conditions found in Manchuria. Other observations and recommendations, such as those already discussed, were often contradictory and the lessons ambiguous. For every lesson one observer drew, another could be quoted with an opposite conclusion. For every argument, there was an equally valid counter-argument. Doctrine, tactics, organization, and equipment could not be changed overnight based on such ambiguous and often contradictory observations from foreign battlefields.

Not only President Roosevelt, but influential American military thinkers also advised against uncritically accepting the supposed lessons of recent wars. In his publications and lectures on infantry tactics at Leavenworth and throughout the Army in the years after the Russo-Japanese War, Morrison cautioned his students:

The experience of others, their failures as well as their successes, should furnish us with valuable guides in our work. Thus, a careful study of recent wars must be a very great aid in the study of tactics...however, tactics, in each instance, is influenced by conditions and circumstances, and caution must therefore be used in accepting too unqualifiedly the methods employed in any one campaign, no matter how successful they may have been.... Every war has had conditions peculiar to itself and, where formations were appropriate only to these conditions, they must not be applied where such conditions do not exist.

In addition to being of dubious validity for the Army, many of the observations were also simply ruled irrelevant to its present or future roles and missions. Most of the principal American military thinkers or leaders envisioned no continental European war or similar commitment that would have justified adopting the level of military preparedness required to implement many of the recommendations. Even had the reverse been true, the Congress would probably not have provided either the legislation or funds for the development of a large, reserve, cadre-type army and a huge stockpile of weapons and ammunition to arm and equip it. In the years immediately after the war, financial restrictions imposed by Congress, the lack of high-level political interest, the natural conservatism of the military, and a perceived irrelevance to the Army and national security combined to blunt any significant adoption of the observers' recommendations.

While the recommendations derived from the Russo-Japanese War were of relatively little immediate benefit to the U.S. Army in doctrine, organization, or equipment, the service of these officers in Manchuria constituted an important career experience. Duty as an observer in the Far East was not the determining factor for future promotion and a successful military career. A number of the American attachés were later to hold important positions in the Army, but most of them were already considered exceptional officers and that is why they were selected for such critical duty in the first place. Pershing, March, Morrison, Crowder, Kuhn, and Judson all played significant roles in World War I. March and Pershing were successive Army Chiefs of Staff from 1918 to 1924. Yet it would be most difficult to assess the exact impact that service as a military observer in Manchuria might have had upon these officers' careers. So closely witnessing history's greatest war to that time must have left deep and lasting impressions on the more astute observers—as obviously happened with Peyton March, John Pershing, and John Morrison.

In a series of lectures on his role as the Army's wartime Chief of Staff to the Army War College during the 1930s, March frequently returned to the importance of his tour with the Japanese armies in Manchuria. In April 1933, he said:

There I began a careful and practical study of the operations of a General Staff...it was soon apparent to me that our General Staff was not either organized along modern lines at that time, nor did anyone who had the power to reorganize it have the knowledge

necessary to effect such a reorganization.... I found myself regarded, upon my return from Japan, as a firebrand, because of my outspoken opposition to many things which then existed; but I was not successful in forcing any reorganization of the General Staff at that time.... The conception of a true General Staff, which I acquired in my observations of a General Staff in operation in the field in Manchuria formed the basis of the orders which I issued on the organization of our own General Staff when I became Chief of Staff of the Army.

As with March, John Pershing subsequently acknowledged the value of his duty as an observer in Manchuria. Pershing told Frederick Palmer, his friend and colleague whom he had first met in Manchuria, that his Manchurian experiences had been "Invaluable!" Although he had missed the major battles, Pershing had seen for the first time large modern armies in a wartime setting with all the problems of command, logistics, training, manpower, and so on played out on the battlefield. He would carry those impressions with him to France and beyond. Frank Vandiver, in his biography of Pershing, concludes of his experience in Manchuria: "He had gone to Manchuria an accomplished small-unit leader, a master of light tactics; he came out skilled in the management of mass."

In Morrison's case, his experience in Manchuria was the primary reason that the Army Chief of Staff, Maj. Gen. J. Franklin Bell, selected him to go to Leavenworth as an instructor in tactics in 1906. During his next six years at Leavenworth, Morrison personally shaped the development of the Army's Leavenworth schools, the content of the basic Field Service Regulations, and the tactical thinking of a generation of Army leaders who became his disciples, including General George C. Marshall, the Army's Chief of Staff during World War II.

The exact value of their Manchurian experiences on later career and actions of Pershing, March, Morrison, and the other observers defies accurate appraisal. Detail as an observer with either army in Manchuria provided valuable personal and professional experience for the American officers. Such a unique career experience had to affect each officer's perceptions of his own army, its doctrine, organization, tactics, and equipment, and also his future role therein. For those observers with the Japanese, it was also a rare opportunity to watch closely as a vastly different, complex, nonwestern culture and society organized, planned, and conducted war. The observers came away with a

great admiration for the spirit and discipline of Japanese soldiers, the skills of their officers, and the preparedness of the nation, but also with great fears about the future course of Japanese-American relations and growing Japanese hostility toward Americans.

In their lack of impact on their own army, the American officers differed little from the other foreign observers who had been with them in the Far East. Like the U.S. War Department, but for different reasons, the European armies considered the Manchurian experiences either as confirmation of their existing doctrines or, if they refuted their preconceived views, as irrelevant to any future war. Those things that were not ruled as inappropriate could conveniently and correctly be explained away as ambiguous. This made any realistic evaluation of the Manchurian fighting difficult, if not impossible. No modern army could risk major doctrinal or organizational changes on slim and ambiguous evidence that often contradicted its own basic institutional beliefs and established organization and doctrine.

Searching for answers to the slaughter of the trenches during the First World War, many military writers and historians fixed on the Russo-Japanese War as an unheeded warning signal of what was to come ten years later. Without doubt, that earlier war provided many lessons that were relearned at great and tragic human and national cost from 1914 to 1918. However, the tactical lessons of the Russo-Japanese conflict were certainly more obvious after 1918 than they were before 1914. Between 1905 and 1914 they had not penetrated enough "military minds," staff colleges, or field service regulations, except possibly to a limited extent in Germany, to shake the dogmatic

foundations of prevailing beliefs and doctrines. The war in Manchuria generated nearly ten years of intense but inconclusive debate about its exact military meaning, but few lessons were ever really learned. "Prior to the present European War," Judson said in a 1916 speech, "there does not seem to have been a very thorough appreciation of the lessons of the Manchurian War in some European armies or I might say in our own."

Learning the correct lessons of recent wars and then implementing appropriate changes are no less critical challenges to today's military leaders than they were for their predecessors after 1905. The ambiguities of the observations and lessons from recent operations such as JUST CAUSE and DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM probably differs little from those of the war in Manchuria. What must be different is the ability to discern the important trends from the unimportant and to avoid the blinders of bias so that the necessary corrections can be made in doctrine, organization, tactics, and so on. Understanding the consequences of failing to learn important lessons in the past should make military leaders more receptive to accepting the process of analysis and change in the present and future. Studying the role and impact of the U.S. Army's observers with the Japanese Army in 1904-05 is more than just an interesting historical exercise, it is indeed a valid lesson learned.

*Dr. John T. Greenwood is Director of Field and International Programs at the Center and Chief, Field Programs and Historical Services Division.*

## Appendix I

### U.S. Army Observers With the Imperial Japanese Army During the Russo-Japanese War, March 1904-September 1905

#### Official Observers

##### Initial Group

Col. Enoch H. Crowder, Senior Observer, Cavalry and General Staff, March 1904-April 1905, 1st Army  
Capt. Peyton C. March, Artillery and General Staff, March-November 1904, 1st Army  
Maj. Joseph E. Kuhn, Engineers, March 1904-September 1905, 2nd Army, 3d Army, and Port Arthur  
Capt. John F. Morrison, Infantry, March-November 1904, 2d Army

#### Special Medical Observer

Capt. Charles Lynch, Medical Department, December 1904-September 1905, 2d Army

### **Special Observer**

Maj. Gen. Arthur MacArthur, March-September 1905, 2d Army

Capt. Parker W. West (Aide), Cavalry, March-September 1905, 2d Army

### **Replacement Observers**

Lt. Col. Edward J. McClelland, Cavalry, May-September 1905, 1st Army

Capt. John J. Pershing (Military Attaché, Tokyo), Cavalry and General Staff, March-September 1905, 1st Army

### **Unofficial Observer**

Lt. Granville R. Fortescue, Infantry, March-December 1904, 3d Army (Port Arthur)

## **Appendix II**

### **Brief Biographical Sketches of U.S. Army Observers**

**Col. Enoch H. Crowder** (U.S. Military Academy, 1881), the senior observer from March 1904 to April 1905, was commissioned in the Cavalry in 1881 and transferred to Judge Advocate General's Department in 1891. He became the Chief, First Section, First Division, General Staff, upon its creation in 1903. He was chosen as senior observer with the Japanese Army in February 1904 and arrived in Tokyo with Capt. Peyton C. March in late March. He was detailed to General Kuroki Tametomo's 1st Army in northern Korea in May and remained with it through the battles of Liaoyang (26 August-3 September 1904), the Shaho (4-17 October 1904), and Mukden (23 February-10 March 1905). Crowder was recalled in April 1905 due to sickness. He was later Judge Advocate General of the U.S. Army from 1911 to 1923, and also served as Provost Marshal General in 1917 and executive of the Selective Service for the duration of World War I (1917-19). He retired as a major general and then served as ambassador to Cuba from 1923 to 1927.

**Capt. Peyton C. March** (U.S. Military Academy, 1888), an artilleryman, served with artillery units during the Spanish-American War and Philippine Insurrection and was selected as a member of the initial General Staff in 1903. He was detailed to the Japanese Army in February 1904 and arrived with Crowder in March and accompanied him with the 1st Army until recalled in November 1904 due to the death of his wife. He was later Chief of Artillery, American Expeditionary Forces (AEF), in France from September 1917 to February 1918 when he returned to Washington to become Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, from 1918 to 1921. He retired as a lieutenant general and was later promoted to the rank of full general by Congress in 1930.

**Maj. Joseph E. Kuhn** (U.S. Military Academy, 1885), Corps of Engineers, held a number of military engineering and civil works positions prior to his selection as an observer while serving with the 3d Battalion of Engineers in Philippines. He arrived in Tokyo with Morrison in March 1904 and remained there until assigned to General Oku Yasukata's 2d Army in Manchuria in July. Kuhn was with the Army through Liaoyang and the Shaho and was recalled in November, only to have his recall canceled when March was suddenly called home. He was then assigned to General Nogi Maresuke's 3d Army at Port Arthur in time for the final days of the siege and remained there to survey the Russian landward and coastal defenses. He rejoined Nogi's army during the Mukden fighting and remained with it until the end of the war in September 1905—thus serving longer with Japanese forces than any other American observer. He later served as special observer in Berlin during World War I (1914-16), president of the Army War College and chief of the War Plans Division (1916-17), and as commander of the 79th Infantry Division in France (1918-19). He retired as a major general in 1925.

**Capt. John F. Morrison** (U.S. Military Academy, 1881), Infantry, served in Spanish-American War and Philippine Insurrection before his selection as an observer. He and Kuhn arrived in Tokyo in March 1904 and remained in Japan until July when they were assigned to General Oku Yasukata's 2d Army. They remained with

the 2d Army through the battles of Liaoyang and the Shaho, after which they were recalled to permit the dispatch of Maj. Charles Lynch as a special medical observer. Subsequently, Morrison revised the entire curriculum at the Army's School of the Line and Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, while serving there from 1906 to 1912, beginning as instructor and ending as the Commandant. During these years Morrison gained the reputation as the Army's master tactician and educator and also exercised a major influence on the revision of the basic *Field Service Regulations* of 1914. He later served with the AEF in France in late 1917 and as director of training for the Army (1917-18) before taking command of the 8th Infantry Division and the Western Department (1918-19). He was commander of the IV Corps Area (1919-21) before retiring as a major general.

**Capt. Charles Lynch** (Syracuse University, M.D., 1891), Medical Department, saw duty as a surgeon in the Philippine Insurrection. He was selected as a special medical observer with Japanese Army in October 1904 and arrived in Japan in December, but did not reach his assignment with 2d Army until February 1905. He witnessed the fighting for Mukden and then remained with the Japanese in Manchuria until September. He later held a number of important Medical Department positions and edited the *History of the Medical Department of the U.S. Army in the World War* prepared by the Surgeon General's Office.

**Maj. Gen. Arthur MacArthur** had a long and distinguished career dating back to the Civil War. He played a leading role in Spanish-American War in the Philippines and the ensuing Philippine Insurrection. He made a special request to observe the Japanese armies in Manchuria in December 1904 and departed for Japan with his aide, Capt. Parker W. West, and Captain Pershing in February 1905. They arrived in Japan during closing days of Mukden fighting and reached the front in late March. MacArthur was assigned to 2d Army and Pershing to 1st Army where each remained until war ended in September 1905. MacArthur subsequently toured the Far East and India with his son, Lt. Douglas MacArthur, from November 1904 to August 1906. He retired in 1909.

**Capt. John J. Pershing** (U.S. Military Academy, 1886), cavalry, gained fame from his exploits during the Cuban campaign of 1898 and later for his actions in the Moro provinces of Mindanao in the Philippines. He was selected for the first General Staff in 1903 and assigned as military attaché in Tokyo in January 1905 with collateral duty as an observer. In Manchuria, he served with General Oku Yasukata's 2d Army. He remained in Tokyo until September 1906 when he was promoted to brigadier general and then transferred to Mindanao where he remained until 1913. He commanded operations along Mexican border (1914-16) and the Punitive Expedition (1916-17) before his selection to command the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF)(1917-19) in France. After the war, he commanded the American Armies in Germany (1919-20) before succeeding March as Chief of Staff in 1921. He retired as General of the Armies in 1924.

**Lt. Col. Edward J. McClernand** (U.S. Military Academy, 1870), Cavalry, had served for years on the frontier. During the Spanish-American War, he served in the Santiago de Cuba campaign and then commanded the 44th U.S. Volunteers in the Philippine Insurrection. He was assigned to replace Crowder as senior observer with the Japanese Army in March 1905, arrived in Manchuria in May, and was detailed to 1st Army where he spent the remainder of the war. He retired as a brigadier general in 1912 and was recalled to active duty during World War I.

### Suggestions for Further Reading

This article, and Dr. Greenwood's unpublished dissertation from which it derives, draws upon items in the following document collections: National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), Record Group (RG) 165, General Staff, Military Information Division, Document File 1882, and War Department Historical Files, Intelligence Corps, Case 128; RG 59,

Department of State Records, Secretary of State to Griscom, U.S. Legation, Japan, roll 108; RG 94, Adjutant General's Office, Secretary of State to Secretary of War, M-698, roll 780; Pershing Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress (LC), see unpublished personal memoir of General John J. Pershing, "Report of Captain Pershing as Military Observer with the

Japanese Army in the Russo-Japanese War," and "Report on Machine Guns;" March Papers, Manuscript Division, LC, Capt. Peyton C. March's Lectures to the Army War College and the Officers at the U.S. Military Academy, "Observations on the Russo-Japanese War," Peyton March, Lecture Before the Army War College, 20 April 1933, March Papers, U.S. Military Academy; Maj. Gen. Charles Boardman Papers, State Historical Society of Wisconsin, box 2; and Judson papers, Newberry Library, Chicago, IL, Special Collections, William V. Judson, "Engineer Duties in Field Warfare." See also two doctoral dissertations from Duke University, David A. Armstrong, "The Endless Experiment: The United States Army and the Machine Gun, 1861-1961," 1976; and Vardell E. Nesmith, Jr., "The Quiet Paradigm: The Evolution of the Field Artillery Doctrine of the United States Army, 1861-1905," 1977.

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Falls, *A Hundred Years of War, 1850-1950* (New York: Collier Books, 1962); Edward M. Coffman, *The Hilt of the Sword: The Career of Peyton C. March* (Madison, WI: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1966); Boyd L. Dastrup, *King of Battle: A Branch History of the U.S. Army's Field Artillery* (Fort Monroe, VA: U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1992); U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, *Engineer Field Manual, Professional Papers, no. 29* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1912); Elting R. Morison, ed., *The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1951-54), vol. 4; Frederick Palmer, *John T. Pershing, General of the Armies: A Biography* (Harrisburg, PA: The Military Service Publishing Company, 1948); Frank E. Vandiver, *Black Jack: The Life and Times of John J. Pershing* (College Station, TX: Texas A&M Press, 1977), vol. 1; Douglas Porch, "The French Army and the Spirit of the Offensive, 1900-1914," in *War and Society: A Yearbook of Military History* (New York: Holmes & Meier Publishers, Inc., 1975); Tim Travers, *The Killing Ground: The British Army, the Western Front, and the Emergence of Modern Warfare, 1900-1918* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1987); Shelford Bidwell and Dominick Graham, *Fire-Power: British Army Weapons and Theories of War, 1904-1945* (Boston: George Allen & Unwin, 1985); and Maj. J.M. Home, *The Russo-Japanese War: Reports from British Officers Attached to the Japanese and Russian Forces in the Field* (London: HMSO, 1908), vol. 3.

For the activities of the Army War College and the Leavenworth, Kansas, schools, drawing on the Russo-Japanese War, see Lt. Col. George P. Ahern, *A Chronicle of the Army War College, 1899-1919* (Washington, D.C.: The Army War College, 1919); Timothy K. Nenninger, *The Leavenworth Schools and the Old Army: Education, Professionalism, and the Officer Corps of the United States Army, 1881-1918* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1978); and John F. Morrison *Seventy Problems: Infantry Tactics, Battalion, Brigade and Division* (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Cavalry Association, 1914).

The reports of the various military observers attached to the armies in Manchuria during the war are preserved in five volumes of the U.S. War Department, General Staff, Office of the Chief of Staff, Second (Military Information) Division, *Reports* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1906-1907).

A survey of the prominent professional journals of the period, such as the *Journal of the United States Infantry Association*, *Journal of the* (Cont'd. on p. 16)

## The Chief's Corner

John W. (Jack) Mountcastle

A very happy new year to each of you! The holiday season just past provides each of us with an opportunity to count our blessings and to renew those personal contacts that are so very important. I truly hope that you will stay in touch with your friends and associates here at the Center of Military History (CMH) during the holiday season and through the coming New Year. Incidentally, we are determined to make it easier for you to reach us. Improved e-mail service and a home page on the World-Wide Web will help us to keep our links with the history community strong.

Although you can find me in the Washington area on most duty days, I've been working hard to visit those places where the Army is *making* history around the world. Since the previous edition of *Army History* was published, I've been to North Carolina, Alabama, Kansas, and to Western Europe twice.

I joined General Jim Lindsay (USA, Ret.) and the Airborne and Special Operations Museum Foundation for a most worthwhile two-day conference at Ft. Bragg in September. This session was designed to provide a detailed report to the Foundation's members on fundraising and design progress on their new museum. My visit at Ft. Bragg gave me the opportunity to visit the Special Warfare Museum with the Army Special Operations Command historian, Dr. Dick Stewart and the museum's curator, Ms. Roxanne Merritt. If you've never visited this fine museum at Ft. Bragg, you need to do so the next time you are in that part of the country. While at the conference, I provided General Lindsay with a copy of the memorandum I was sending to the Ft. Bragg commander, Lt. Gen. Henry H. Shelton, that recognizes the Airborne and Special Warfare Museum Foundation as an officially recognized project aimed at developing a new museum. I urge those of you who have an interest in supporting this great effort to contact the Foundation at (910) 483-3003. The FAX number there is (910) 433-2594. They are nearing their goal in fundraising, but they need our support to meet the final objective.

Later in September, I had the opportunity to participate in the ribbon-cutting ceremony for our new storage facility for artifacts at Anniston Army Depot. One of the greatest benefits of my trip to Alabama was the chance it gave me to meet some of the finest employees in the Army—Lyn Couvillion and his team

at the CMH Clearance House. This small group of five professionals receives, catalogs, conserves, and (frequently) reissues the regimental colors, guidons, and unit equipment that fill the facility to overflowing. The impending arrival of all of the material from two great Army divisions that are standing down (2d Armored and 24th Infantry) will stretch the capacity of this brand new warehouse. I may have inadvertently hit upon a very good reason to preclude any further Army strength reductions—there's just no room for us to store any more stuff!!

I flew out to Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas in October with our Chief of Staff, General Dennis J. Reimer. I went for the specific purpose of sitting in on his address to the officers attending the School for Command Preparation, which is administered by the Command and General Staff College. Command selectees for battalions, brigades, and installations attend, and the class includes Reserve Component as well as Active Component officers. I also wanted to monitor his discussions with the students' spouses, who were attending the Command Team Seminar at Ft. Leavenworth. The Seminar is a one week course that provides commanders' spouses with in-depth discussions of the Army Family Action Plan, community leadership challenges, interpersonal relations, and how to deal with family stress and trauma in the unit.

The fruits of the Army's efforts in the School for Command Preparation over the past ten years were clearly evident at Ft. Bragg eighteen months ago when paratroopers were the victims of a crash of two USAF aircraft at Pope Air Force Base. The 82d Airborne Division and the surrounding community truly pulled together in meeting and surmounting this disaster. Ever mindful that soldiering is inherently dangerous work, we at the Center are working hard to complete a short, readable history of the Army's response to the Pope AFB disaster. We hope that when, once again, bad things happen to good people (as they surely will) commanders, chaplains, doctors, and senior NCOs throughout the Army will have our monograph to turn to for a review of the actions taken by the Ft. Bragg community.

Early in November I spent five days in Germany. I went to Europe for the specific purpose of assessing our current capacity to capture the history of the actions

of U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR), a forward-deployed major command. With the help of USAREUR Historian Bruce Siemon and the V Corps Historian Charles Kirkpatrick, I was able to talk with the USAREUR DCSLOG and Assistant DCSOPS and the V Corps deputy G3 while at Campbell Barracks in Heidelberg. A stop in Wuerzburg afforded me the opportunity to discuss the reflagging of the 3d Infantry Division with Maj. Gen. Monty C. Meigs and his staff. I was there at the same time 3d Infantry Division Museum Curator Gabrielle Torony was playing host to museum curators Terry van Meter (Ft. Riley) and Roger Durham (Ft. Stewart) who were there as part of a "Tiger Team" formed around Les Jensen and Terry Dougherty from the Center's Museum Division. All of them had traveled to Wuerzburg to hold the second in a series of planning sessions aimed at ensuring the efficient and effective transfer of 1st Infantry Division items to Wuerzburg and 3d Infantry Division items to Ft. Stewart. Leaving Wuerzburg, I drove to the locus of all training activity in Europe, Grafenwoehr Training Area.

The Commander of 7th Army Training Command, Brig. Gen. George H. Harmeyer, ensured that, while I was at Grafenwoehr, I got in to talk with Lt. Gen. John N. Abrams, the V Corps commander; and with Maj. Gen. Bill L. Nash, commanding general of 1st Armored Division. My specific purpose in talking with these commanders was to assess their need for outside help in capturing the history of their efforts in carrying out Exercise MOUNTAIN SHIELD, in preparation for peace support operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Both the corps and division headquarters were busy with command post exercises (CPXs) and situational training exercises which addressed likely missions, should

the U.S. commit a division plus additional supporting units to the NATO effort to maintain a peace accord in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Each of these commanders asked for a three-man Military History Detachment.

My visit to Grafenwoehr on Saturday was followed by a full day at the Army's Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC) at Hohenfels Training Area. There, soldiers from V Corps units were engaged in some of the most demanding and realistic training that I have seen in twenty-eight years of service. Dealing with highly trained and motivated soldiers of the CMTC's OPFOR (Opposing Force), troops playing the role of refugees, and German *Bundeswehr* soldiers assisting in the training, the U.S. troops tackled the difficult and complex missions inherent in this sort of sensitive and unsettled environment. We should all be tremendously proud of the work our troops and their leaders are doing. I am determined to record the history of this effort.

I'll conclude my travel for this season by visiting both the Artillery School and Ordnance Center in December to meet with museum curators and talk with young officers and NCOs about their appreciation of the importance of history to their profession.

We appreciate your interest in Army's history program and hope that you will continue to stay in close touch with all of us here at the Center. Please don't forget that we are a support agency for historians in the field and their commanders. We want to work for you. Let me conclude this Chief's Corner as I started it, by thanking you for all you've done to support the Army's history program during the past year and to send you and yours my very best wishes for all good things in the new year!

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*United States Cavalry Association, Journal of the Military Service Institution of the United States, Journal of the United States Artillery, and Professional Memoirs* (the Corps of Engineers), reveals extensive coverage of the Russo-Japanese War, with articles by the observers, translations, professional notes, and articles drawing on the war for examples. See especially Maj. Joseph E. Kuhn, "From Port Arthur to Mukden with Nogi," *Journal of the United States Infantry Association* 2, no.4; Maj. Montgomery Macomb, "Notes on the Russian Infantry Soldier,"

*Journal of the United States Infantry Association* 2, no. 4; Capt. Carl Reichmann, "Chances in War," *Journal of the United States Infantry Association* 3, no. 1; Keith Neilson, "'That Dangerous and Difficult Enterprise': British Military Thinking and the Russo-Japanese War," *War & Society* 9, no. 2 (October 1991); "Infantry Tactics," *Journal of the United States Artillery* 36, no. 1 (July-August 1911); and 2d Lt. Henry J. Reilly, "Port Arthur," *Journal of the United States Cavalry Association* 17, no. 63 (January 1907).

## A Forgotten American Military Strategist The Vision and Enigma of Homer Lea

Richard F. Riccardelli

Warfare, either ancient or modern, has never been nor will ever be mechanical. There is no such possibility as the combat of instruments. It is the soldier that brings about victory or defeat. The knowledge of commanders and the involuntary comprehension and obedience to order is what determines the issue of battles. Homer Lea, *Valor of Ignorance*, p. 43.

On the morning of 12 December 1941, five days after their attack on the American fleet at Pearl Harbor, Japanese forces began their invasion of the Philippines. The exact invasion sites, as well as the Japanese strategic plan, were outlined by Homer Lea in his book *Valor of Ignorance* (1909). He predicted the Filipino capital, Manila, would fall in three weeks or less; the Japanese Army took it in twenty-six days.

Who was Homer Lea and what were his theories? Why has he been forgotten? If he were alive today, how would he illustrate a strategic vision and identify flashpoints of strategic interest to the United States?

Homer Lea, standing just over five feet tall and weighing about one hundred pounds, was both a colorful and a pitiful character. He was a lieutenant general in the Chinese Imperial Army. Before World War I, he also became an adviser to Lord Roberts, chief of the British General Staff, as well as Kaiser Wilhelm and *Generalmajor* Hans von Seeckt. The king of Italy personally annotated a copy of *Valor of Ignorance* for his chief of staff. A copy of Lea's book was seen on Vladimir Lenin's desk in Zurich, Switzerland, in 1916. Lenin stated that "this book will someday be studied by thousands of people." Lea's book was on the curriculums of the German, Russian, and Japanese military academies.

His supporters in the United States included Elihu Root, former Secretary of War, then chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee; former Army Chief of Staff, Lt. Gen. Adna R. Chaffee; Maj. Gen. Harrison Gray Otis, and Maj. Gen. J.P. Story. While his admirers saw Lea as a visionary who ultimately would predict the nature and areas of conflict in the twentieth century, his enemies described him as anti-Semitic, with a fascistic insistence on racial purity.

### Who Was Homer Lea?

The grandson of a Civil War, Confederate physician (Dr. Pleasant John Graves Lea), Lea was born 17 November 1876 in Denver, Colorado. Because of a physical defect called scoliosis, which causes a hunchback condition, as well as weak eyesight aggravated by smallpox, Lea's ambitions for military service and a complete academic education never were realized.

His family moved to California, where Lea excelled in Latin, French, history, and mathematics, and where he learned Chinese from the family cook. After attending Occidental College and Stanford University (1897-1899), he left school because of poor health. Yet, he earned a reputation as a brilliant student of the military campaigns of Alexander, Hannibal, Caesar, Napoleon, and numerous American Civil War generals. His fellow students enjoyed Lea's ability to confound "his professors with his intimate knowledge of the campaigns of Napoleon and Hannibal." But Dr. David Starr, a renowned pacifist and then president of Stanford, recalled Lea as "a vulgar, loud-mouthed, excessively warlike youth."

After leaving Stanford, he joined a secret Chinese movement that was a branch of the White Lotus Society, a source of Chinese revolutionaries over hundreds of years. The goal of the society was the overthrow of the Empress Dowager and the Manchu court of China.

Accounts of Lea's participation and role in the revolution in China are fragmentary and in some cases, contradictory. What can be said about Lea's role is that in the summer of 1899, he left for China with at least \$60,000 to participate in the overthrow of the Manchu dynasty, and that he was commissioned a lieutenant general in the Chinese Imperial Army.

He met Dr. Sun Yat-sen, the future president of the Chinese Republic and leader of the *Kuomintang* (Nationalist Party), either in Japan or Hong Kong. Sun selected him as his military adviser and, later, as his chief of staff. Perhaps it was Sun's western medical education and his political ideas, borrowed from western democracies, that drew him to select Homer Lea as a trusted confidant.

In May 1900, when then Maj. Gen. Adna R.

Chaffee led a multinational expedition to end the uprising known as the Boxer Rebellion, which was aimed at driving the "foreign devils" out of China. Chaffee met Lea in Beijing and was supportive of his plans to democratize China.

After Lea's return to California, he continued fund-raising efforts for the Chinese reform movement. In 1904 he established the Western Military Academy, using former U.S. Army personnel as trainers. The Academy was expanded to cover twenty cities nationwide, to include Chicago, New York, Boston, Denver, Seattle, Phoenix, and a number of cities in California. A contingent of fifty Academy members marched in the 1905 Tournament of Roses parade.

While secretly sending Academy graduates to China in anticipation of the uprising against the Manchu regime, Lea encountered trouble at home. Legal problems emerged in California, Minnesota, and New York, because of accusations that he was illegally training soldiers on American soil for use in a foreign war. He was investigated by the U.S. Secret Service, but the various charges could not be proven, and both the charges and the investigation were dropped.

On one particular trip to the eastern part of the United States, Homer Lea sought financial and political assistance from several sources, including the Military Academy at West Point, New York; the Colt arms manufacturing company in Hartford, Connecticut; and even the White House in Washington. However, these efforts by the Chinese reform movement to secure support from politicians and manufacturers in the east met with failure.

According to his sister, Ermal Lea Green, in a letter to the *Saturday Evening Post* in May 1942, Lea had an interview with President Theodore Roosevelt at the White House to seek support for his Chinese revolutionary cause. The fruits of his travels are unknown, but apparently he was unsuccessful in raising any substantial sums of money or measurable political support from national figures.

Lea's first book, published in 1908, was a novel, *The Vermillion Pencil*. The plot concerned the destruction of Chinese society by Christian missionaries. This theme echoed a principle of the Chinese reform movement: to seek a China without foreign influence within its borders. Concurrent with this novel, he wrote a play, "The Crimson Spider," which remained unproduced.

His second book, *The Valor of Ignorance*, published in 1909, would become more popular in the United States during World War II, although it was

written in spring 1907 at the conclusion of the Russo-Japanese War. Dedicated to Elihu Root, it was a strategic-military thesis, which sold 18,000 copies in the United States before going out of print in 1922. In that year, Japan began to build up those Pacific islands which had been acquired from Germany after World War I.

In Japan itself, *The Valor of Ignorance* was published under the title, *The War Between Japan and America*, and was reprinted at least twenty-four times, selling over 84,000 copies in the first three months after publication.

*The Valor of Ignorance* was studied by General Douglas MacArthur, and was quoted by Col. (later Maj. Gen.) Charles Willoughby, MacArthur's intelligence officer during World War II and Korea, as the roadmap for Japanese hegemony in Asia and the Pacific. In an interview in 1942 for an article, "Ever Hear of Homer Lea?" Colonel Willoughby further observes that

Homer Lea was neither a mystic nor a prophet. He was a scientist. He studied the science of war, the fundamental laws of which are as immutable as those of any other science.... He also sought to analyze the causes of war and to diagnose the symptoms of an approaching conflict. And having proved, at least to his own satisfaction, that great causes for war existed between the United States and Japan...he proceeded to set forth the tactical course that war would take.

Shortly after *Valor* was published, Lea sent a copy to General Chaffee for his critique. Chaffee, along with the former chief of artillery, General Story, immediately came to see Lea. Chaffee noted that he had not been able to sleep since reading the book.

Pacifist groups denounced *Valor* as fascist and totalitarian. At the same time, *Literary Digest* called it a daring and startling book for every American to ponder.

In Europe, Field Marshal Lord Roberts, British Chief of the General Staff, said he could not rest until he had finished the book. While in Germany, Kaiser Wilhelm II sent a personal invitation to Lea to attend German military maneuvers, which Lea subsequently did, attired in the dress uniform of a general in the Chinese reform movement army. Lea observed the maneuvers and met with senior German Army officials.

By 1911, Lea, along with Sun Yat-Sen, had gone

to Europe to meet with political and military leaders in Great Britain and Germany, to raise funds for the Chinese reform movement, to see German doctors for eyesight problems, and to seek European support (or, at least, nonintervention) in the overthrow of the Manchu dynasty. Whether at meetings in London or war games in Germany, Lea would appear in his full dress Chinese general's uniform.

In October 1911, the child emperor of the Manchu dynasty, Pui Li (as portrayed in the movie *The Last Emperor*), was unseated in a surprise uprising. Sun and Lea returned to China. During this turbulent year, Lea found time to publish *The Day of the Saxon*. This book emphasizes Anglo-Saxon superiority and the perceived threat posed by Slavic powers. Lea warned the Germans against an attack on Russia. He saw that such a future war would lead to the defeat of Germany. The book sold 7,000 copies in English and went out of print the same year that Adolph Hitler came to power. In December 1911, Lea started his third book on geopolitics and military strategy, "The Swarming of the Slavs," but it was never finished, and today there are no copies extant.

In 1911, Sun Yat-sen was elected president of the Chinese Republic and presided briefly before stepping aside as various warlords maneuvered for position. In 1917, Sun established himself as the leader of the *Kuomintang* in southern China.

While in China, Lea suffered a stroke and returned to California, where he fell into a coma and died 1 November 1912, two weeks before his thirty-sixth birthday.

On 10 April 1969, the ashes of Homer Lea and his wife, Ethel, were brought to Taipei, Taiwan. They were interred on 20 April during a ceremony attended by the premier and vice premier of the Republic of China (Taiwan), and the president of the Taiwanese legislature, Yuan Sun Fo, Dr. Sun Yat-sen's only son. The government of the United States gave no official recognition to this event. Given President Richard Nixon's historic trip to mainland China only three years later, perhaps this official indifference is not surprising.

### Homer Lea's Strategic Vision

Success in military operations depends primarily upon the excess of rapidity that one army has over another in reaching a theatre [*sic*] of war and moving therein. As the theatre of war increases in distance from the main bases of the combatants and extends in

area, armies become more dependent upon the rapidity and capacity of means of transportation. As an army is limited or retarded in gaining strategic positions in a theatre of war, its worth is decreased accordingly. Homer Lea, *Valor of Ignorance*.

Homer Lea is an enigmatic figure, lost in the shadows cast by the geopolitical and military strategists of his time, including Frederick Ratzel (1844-1894) and Rudolf Kjellen (1864-1922), who created the term *geopolitik*. Meanwhile, Sir Halford Mackinder (1861-1947), a British geographer and theorist of the Eurasian heartland, received considerable notoriety for his work in 1904, *The Scope and Methods of Geography and the Geographical Pivot of History*.

Karl Haushofer (1869-1946) transposed some of Lea's thoughts into German geopolitical thinking affecting Hitler's National Socialist movement. In 1909, Haushofer traveled to the Far East for service study with the Imperial Japanese Army. He learned Japanese, increased his knowledge of the region, and taught at the Japanese staff college. Perhaps Haushofer's two years of service study drew him to Homer Lea's works; perhaps these affected Haushofer's theories on *Autarky*, the ideal of national economic self-containment; *Lebensraum*, the right of a nation to expand to provide room for its population; or *Panregions*, the claims/manifest destiny of a nation to conquer and annex territory.

During this same period in the United States, Alfred T. Mahan (1840-1914) rose to international prominence through his work on naval strategy, *The Interest of America in Sea Power, Present and Future* (1898). Mahan, like Lea, drew on historical analogies to support his principle points. There are strong similarities between Mahan's six elements of seapower and Lea's treatise, which cites landpower as the ultimate source of victory. While some writers believe Lea's theories contradict Mahan's principles, in reality they complement Mahan.

Homer Lea believed that war was inevitable. Wars result from territorial aggression and economic expansion, caused by population growth and the needs of survival, including geographic access to transportation and resources. He describes this inevitable expansion as follows:

The loot of town and tavern has given way to the universal thievery of natural resources that modern civilization has made necessary for the progression of man and the supremacy of his political institutions. In those old days it was the orderless strife of individuals;

now it is the predetermined struggle of nations. In those times when the world was opulent and the greed of man was the small greed of his single self, mankind marauded rather than warred. Now it is the struggle of nations in the last looting of Nature; increasing each year in intensity, not alone by the added increment of population, but by the development of material science and the growing hungers of insatiable civilization.... Homer Lea. *The Day of the Saxon*.

In the determination of "nation-states," Lea notes that "one of the principal causes responsible for much that is erroneous in our ideas of national existence is due to the indifference with which we form our conceptions of the forces that control the formation, progress, and dissolution of states."

In an ominous warning in *Saxon*, he noted that "the wealth and population of the United States excites no fear in Japan, nor does the vastness of the British Empire cast any foreboding shadow across those routes of march over which Germanic armies exact, in due time, to make their way."

Lea viewed states located between great powers as the battlegrounds of future wars. "Whenever a physically inferior state is placed between two greater powers so that it is included within their sphere of political and military progression, its independence is never more than tentative and its political survival brief." In this category he cited Poland, the Philippines, the Balkans, Persia [Iran], Afghanistan, and Korea.

When considering economic power, Lea notes that "instead of adding power to a nation, it simply increases the responsibility of its rulers and necessitates a greater diligence for defense...."

Like Mackinder, he saw Great Britain, Germany, and Russia as major players in the future—but he also included China and Japan. Lea foresaw Japan as the "industrially controlling factor in Asia." He foretold of German and Russian expansion into Poland; and he saw Persia's ultimate goal as control of the Persian Gulf. He prophesied the end of the British Empire "east of Suez" with the loss of India.

While he regarded Russia and Japan as geopolitically natural allies, he observed friction between China and Russia. As Lea noted, "The expansion of China is antagonistic to Russia more than to any other nation."

Concerning war, Lea warned that

in the future, it can be considered as an established principle that nations will more and more make war

without previous notification, since modern facilities increase their ability to take their opponents by surprise and to strike the first blow as nearly as possible to their main base.

Lea recognized the profound impact that logistics and transportation had on power projection and as the fulcrum for national military power. In his historical analogies, Lea highlighted the grave impact this had in the Spanish-American War and on the war in Europe. In particular, he focused on the relation between the transportation difficulties and power projection problems the United States faced in transporting troops to the Philippines during the war with Spain.

Because of technology, Lea foresaw that future wars would erupt quickly and extend over great distances with far more destructive results than in the past. Along with the revolution that technology has on warfare, Lea focused on the critical impact internal political and economic changes have on the strategic policies of nations.

Lea believed that economic interdependence between nations would not reduce conflict, but rather, precipitate it. He noted that

opulence, instead of being a foundation of national strength, is liable to be the most potent factor in its destruction.... National opulence is a source of danger instead of power, for...trade, ducats, and mortgages are regarded as far greater assets and sources of power than armies and navies.

There are parallels between Lea and Mahan in this philosophy, with Mahan citing a like rationale for the fall of the Roman Empire.

During World War II, much of the Japanese Army was in China and Southeast Asia. Perhaps the Japanese should have dedicated more of their army to the Pacific campaign, for according to Lea, "should Japan, to extend her sovereignty on the Asian continent, neglect to first gain control of the Pacific, then the duration of her national greatness will draw to an end."

### Lea Forgotten and his Vision of the Future

The amalgamation of small states into great political entities is the reason for the diminution in number and frequency of wars, a lessening of international conflict that has nothing to do with the so-called increasing morality of man. Homer Lea, *Valor of*

Homer Lea observed that "in the past it was the individual who was the predominant factor; today, nation; tomorrow, races." His detractors identified Lea with authoritarian figures who used ethnic and cultural differences to project their power. Some of his undemocratic philosophies, no doubt, are one reason for his obscurity today. Yet, he lived in an era when the Chinese Exclusion Act had a profound impact on his Asian activities. He recognized that the United States focused on a Europe-first strategy.

Lea had other shortcomings as well. In two articles in *Harpers Weekly* in August 1910, he dismissed the importance and influence that the airplane would have on future war. According to Lea, perhaps its only significance would be in the field of reconnaissance. He also was against using the "citizen soldier" to fight in any national conflict less than total war. The roots of Lea's aversion to the use of the reserves are unclear, but he notes of the "civilian volunteer" soldier:

The soul of the soldier can only be developed by discipline, by honor and martial deeds. It cannot be constructed to order or dressed up with false shoulders in twenty-four days by uniforming [*sic*] a civilian volunteer or by commissioning and spurring him with purchased valor....

Homer Lea also criticized those who advocated disarmament. He saw armament of a democratic society as relieving the great mass of society from the responsibility of being on a perpetual war footing. Regarding totalitarian societies like Germany and Japan, he wrote in 1909:

Should Germany on the one hand and Japan on the other continue to adhere rigorously to these laws [of national existence], resisting the deteriorating influence of industrialism, feminism, and political quackery, they will, in due time, by the erosive action of these elements on other nations, divide the world between them.

Lea's short life, Pacific focus, lack of academic credentials and his emphasis on a strong defensive posture, were out of step with his contemporary strategists. Still, Lea emerges as a remarkable geopolitical and military strategic thinker, with uncanny insight into future flashpoints. Homer Lea is overlooked by

historians and academicians today, yet his analytical approach to warfare and subsequent forecasts on conflict in the twentieth century were astonishingly accurate.

Today, there is a renaissance in geopolitical analysis in works published by Zbigniew Brzezinski, Henry Kissinger, and others. With the breakup of the former Soviet Union, cultural, ethnic, and regional power clashes have increased in number and intensity. One recent article notes that the source of conflicts today are neither ideological nor economic, but rather, cultural, thus corresponding to Homer Lea's observations. Robert Kaplan's book, *Balkan Ghosts*, and his recent article on "The Coming Anarchy," cite the historical genesis for ethnic conflict. Kaplan cites how scarcity, crime, overpopulation, tribalism, and disease are all contributory to conflict.

Homer Lea's theories of using convergence and intersection of lines emanating from centers of power to forecast future wars show extraordinary applicability to warfare and campaigns in the twentieth century. Lea's principles and mathematical paradigms at the strategic level of conflict show a striking similarity to military strategist Antoine Jomini's standardized military methods in his treatise, the *Summary of the Art of War*, at the operational level of warfare. Indeed, Jomini has great impact on Mahan's view of seapower and on Lea's view of landpower.

In a recent (1993) book, *War and Anti-War in the Twenty-First Century*, futurists Alvin and Heidi Toffler assert that the geopolitical assumptions of the turn of the century, as characterized by Halford Mackinder, are obsolete, with the role of space dominating the future battlefield. For his part, Lea noted that "modern means of transportation and communication, while shrinking in a practical sense the size of the world, have to a corresponding degree increased the area [and possibilities] of modern and future warfare." That area is one where technology is only a tool—a means toward victory; the geopolitical and military reasons for war are much the same as during the turn of the century. Ethnic warfare, overpopulation, and nation-state aspirations of regional hegemony are sources of conflict as we enter the twenty-first century and step back to the future.

*Col. Richard F. Riccardelli is Director of Plans, Programs, and Budget, U.S. Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence. Prior to that assignment, he was G-2 for*

the 82d Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. A graduate of the U.S. Army War College and the Army Command and General Staff College, Colonel Riccardelli holds B.A. from Seton Hall University and a M.S. degree from Ohio University.

### Suggestions for Further Reading

Interested readers should begin with Homer Lea's own books, of course: *The Valor of Ignorance*, and *The Day of the Saxon*, both published by Harper and Brothers (1942). In addition, the Charles Boothe, Joshua B. Powers, David Starr Jordan, Bertram Wolfe, Stanley Hornbeck, and Howard P. Jones collections at the Hoover Institute on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford, California, contain valuable material on Lea. See also the following books: Key Ray Chong, *Americans and Chinese Reform and Revolution, 1898-1922*:

*The Role of Private Citizens in Diplomacy* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1984); Richard O'Connor, *Pacific Destiny* (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, and Company, 1969); Robert D. Kaplan, *Balkan Ghosts: A Journey Through History* (New York, NY: St. Martin's Press, 1993); and Alvin and Heidi Toffler, *War and Anti-War: Survival at the Dawn of the 21st Century* (New York, NY: Little, Brown and Company, 1993). A number of articles in periodicals also shed light on Lea, particularly Clare Boothe "Ever Hear of Homer Lea?," *The Saturday Evening Post* (14 Mar 42); Valeriu Marcu, "American Prophet of Total War," *The American Mercury* (April 42); "General Homer Lea," *The Literary Digest* (16 Nov 12); Raymond Hardie, "Homer," *Stanford* (June 90); Thomas Fleming, "Homer Lea and the Decline of the West," *American Heritage* (May/June 88); John Clark Kimball, "Homer Lea—Interloper on History," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings* 98 (April 72); Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?," *Foreign Affairs* (Summer 93); and "The Coming Anarchy," *Atlantic Monthly* (February 94).

### Editor's Journal

The winter holidays, the blizzards of '96, and a combination of illness and jury duty on the part of the managing editor--these have all conspired to delay this issue by about three weeks. I want to extend to our readers belated but nonetheless sincere wishes for 1996. We know it will be an interesting, challenging time for Army history.

This issue, we also are pleased to feature John Greenwood's excellent article on U.S. Army observers during the Russo-Japanese War, and Col. Richard Riccardelli's look at the enigmatic strategist, Homer Lea. As with each new year, we offer an index of the articles in *Army History* during 1995.

As we move confidently into a new year, I thank you for the kind words and letters of support we receive, and I hope that many of you will continue to share quality historical material on the Army with your fellow readers.

On a personal note, I want to thank Ms. Sherry Dowdy, of the Center's Graphics Branch, for her help with *Army History*. Although—for the most part—I work alone on *Army History*, I would not be able to prepare the publication for the Government Printing Office without the help of the Center's editors and Sherry, who manipulates the edited version so that I can lay out each issue in camera-ready copy. Her help is very much appreciated.

Arnold G. Fisch, Jr.

## The 1996 Conference of Army Historians

Judith A. Bellafaire

*Dr. Judith Bellafaire of the Center's Field and International Branch is the conference coordinator for the forthcoming Conference of Army Historians.*

The 1996 Conference of Army Historians will be held 17-19 June in Crystal City, Virginia. The theme is "The Early Years of the Cold War, 1945-1958." The conference will have both a joint and an international focus. Panel sessions are being planned to cover a wide variety of perspectives, including those of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff; the U.S. Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marines; the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers, Europe, and NATO. In addition, military historians from Germany, France, Great Britain, Canada, the Netherlands, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Romania, the Slovak Republic, South America, Japan, and Korea will present papers.

There will be at least one important workshop on the impact of the recent declassification order on researching and writing the military history of the Cold War. Participants will include representatives from the Center's new Declassification Branch, and historians from the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command.

The Air Force History Office will sponsor a panel entitled "Forging the Sword: Preparing Strategic Air Power for The Cold War," chaired by Roger G. Miller, which will include presentations by Edward Mark on "Early American Planning: The Strategic Offensive on the Soviet Union," Richard Davis on "The Organizational Basis of the USAF Air Staff," Walton Moody on "The Specified Command: SAC in the United Command Structure," and Dr. Rebecca Cameron on "Positioned To Fight: Worldwide Basing."

A panel assembled by the Joint History Office entitled "Aspects of the Early Development of the Joint System," and chaired by Dr. David Armstrong will include papers by Mr. William Epley of the Center of Military History, Dr. Jack Schulimson of the Marine Corps Historical Center, and Dr. Walter Poole of the Joint History Office.

The Naval Historical Center will sponsor a panel entitled "Navies and the NATO Alliance," with papers by Captain Peter N. Swartz USN (Ret.) on "U.S.-

French Naval Relations From World War II to the Suez Crisis," and Sean Maloney on "Royal Canadian Navy-U.S. Navy Cooperation in the Defense of North America." Center historians will also contribute to other panels. Dr. Edward J. Marolda will present a paper on "The U.S. Navy and 'The Loss of China,'" Dr. Gary Weir will discuss "Listening To The Enemy: SOFAR, Eleuthera, and the Early Years of Acoustic Ocean Surveillance, 1946-1960," and Dr. Jeffrey Barlow will address "The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the New Look."

Historians from the Office of the Secretary of Defense and from the United States Military Academy will also sponsor panels.

Dr. James Walker of the U.S. Army Strategic Defense Command will chair a panel on "The U.S. Army and ABM Development." Other U.S. Army MACOMs sponsoring panels include the Information Systems Command, the Training and Doctrine Command, and Forces Command. Historians from U.S. Army South, U.S. Army Europe, the Army Materiel Command, and the Center of Military History will also be presenting papers.

International presenters will include Dr. Erwin Schmidl of the Austrian Army on "The United States and United Kingdom Plans for the Blockade of Vienna," and his colleague, Dr. Wolfgang Etschmann, on "The Austrian Army During the Early Years of the Cold War," Maj. Winfried Heineman (*Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt*) on "The West and Yugoslavia," Mr. Ray Ojserkis of the United Kingdom on "The Beginning of the Cold War Arms Race: A Survey of International Arms Policy, 1950-1951," Dr. Isabel Warner of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office on "The British Foreign Office and the Hungarian Revolution of 1956," Dr. Klaus R. Bohme of the Swedish War College on "Swedish Security Policy and the Rearmament of the Two German States," and Dr. Constantin Botoran on "Romania and the Beginning of the Cold War Era."

Military historians of the Cold War interested in participating in the 1996 Conference of Army Historians should contact Dr. Bellafaire at 202-761-5368. Individuals who have attended past conferences should receive a registration packet in the mail by April.

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## Superstitions and Attaining the Commander's Objectives

Stuart E. Wahlers

Today, when most military planners incorporate psychological operations into their plans, they usually request and receive the traditional PSYOP (psychological operations) mediums (loudspeakers, leaflets, and AM/FM radio) bearing the standard fare of inevitability or divisive themes and symbols to accomplish their respective objectives. Rarely do they venture beyond these boundaries to accomplish the psychological and military objective. Consequently, military PSYOP planners have grown comfortable with those boundaries as well, allowing psychological opportunities to slip through their grasp. One of those neglected areas is superstitious beliefs.

Before embarking upon any PSYOP campaign, the psychological operations planners usually have researched thoroughly their target audience's religious and superstitious beliefs; yet, rarely do they actively incorporate these potential vulnerabilities into a plan, despite numerous successful historical precedents for so doing.

Throughout history, adept military and civilian planners have utilized superstitions successfully to influence the behavior, actions, and attitudes of target audiences at every level of conflict. When properly planned and accurately incorporated into the supported commander's plans, addressing those audiences' superstitious vulnerabilities can effectively accomplish a myriad of military, economic, or political objectives at the tactical through strategic levels of operations.

A superstition is yet another tool in the psychological operations inventory. Its use in attaining the commander's objectives must be weighed against numerous strategic, operational, and tactical factors; otherwise, it can negatively affect objectives, both tactical and strategic.

During the war against the Huks in the Philippines, a tactical operations team proved that properly planned PSYOP campaigns (using balanced themes and persuasive messages), based upon a thorough understanding of the local populace's beliefs/superstitions, and disseminated by the proper medium (in this instance, rumor) could help defeat an enemy without firing a shot.

Prior to the PSYOP team's arrival, Philippine government forces repeatedly had failed to defeat a Huk guerrilla unit located on a hill adjacent to a Philippine village. The PSYOP team, familiar with the Huk culture, conducted a target analysis of their adversaries. Their intelligence specialists concluded that the villagers were providing the guerrillas with supplies, that they were susceptible to rumors, and that they were superstitious; specifically, they believed blood-sucking *Asuangs* (vampires) frequented the surrounding hills.

Based upon that information, the PSYOP team circulated a rumor amongst the villagers, stating that the hill in question was one of the *Asuangs'* sacred hills. After allowing sufficient time for the rumor to circulate throughout the village and among the guerrillas, the PSYOP team prepared an ambush site adjacent to one of the guerrilla resupply routes into the village. One evening, after allowing a Huk patrol to travel through the ambush site, they silently snatched the last Huk in the patrol. After ripping his throat open and draining him of his blood (simulating a vampire's attack), his body was dumped back on the trail.

Later, the Huks found their comrade's corpse—drained of blood—the obvious victim of the *Asuang*. The deliberately planted rumor, the Huks' belief in the *Asuang*, and the visual reinforcement presented by the body, provided sufficient reason for them to vacate the *Asuangs'* sacred hill without firing a shot. (1)

Superstitions are not restricted to tactical scenarios or to primitive target audiences. During World War II, the British Political Warfare Executive (PWE) produced an astrological magazine call *Der Zenit*, which successfully targeted superstitious German submarine crews operating from French ports.

During the early years of the war, German U-boat crews were not targeted by the PWE, because they were enjoying tremendous successes against Allied shipping. Psychological appeals rarely are effective against an adversary who is winning a war. Despite their dazzling initial victories, the Germans' euphoria was soon dissipated.

During 1942-1943, the German Navy began to

experience numerous defeats at sea. As Britain's Royal Navy perfected its sonar skills, and the Germans' radio codes were broken, conditions changed significantly for the U-boat crews. Utilizing their recent discoveries to their fullest, the British inflicted a heavy and deadly toll on the German submarine force. As fewer and fewer boats returned from their missions, the Germany Navy was forced to keep its dwindling submarine fleet at sea longer.

Prolonged sea duty adversely affected the surviving crews' morale. Submariners, their nerves frayed by close encounters with Royal Navy units, began to lose faith in their own situation, giving them a feeling of impending doom. News from home and abroad concerning Allied victories and Axis defeats further demoralized the sailors. Finally, certain elements of the indigenous French population were demonstrating their animosity toward the German occupiers through various acts of passive and active resistance.

These conditions evoked numerous suppressed psychological vulnerabilities in the German seamen, making them susceptible to a variety of British themes, symbols, and persuasive messages. The PWE discovered that, like many sailors throughout the world, German submariners were highly superstitious and vulnerable to astrological predictions. The PWE embarked on a campaign designed to feed on their fears and superstitions.

The British PWE decided to utilize two primary media, radio and print. The German submariners would be targeted while they were in port for rest, relaxation, and refitting. In conjunction with the regular radio programs, the PWE settled upon the idea of producing an astrological magazine, entitled *Der Zenit*, to reinforce specific themes and persuasive messages stressed on the radio programs.

Utilizing current tactical and operational intelligence, *Der Zenit's* editors would, in German, predict events (some mundane and others disastrous) for various U-boat crews. Their predictions had a demoralizing effect on the tired and superstitious crews. In order to pass muster, the magazine was printed in the same style and with the same type of ink and paper utilized by German printers. It had an attractive cover and contained similar advertisements. The content of the magazine was based on accurate intelligence, and it contained credible-sounding astrological information. The magazine was distributed in places frequented by German U-boat crews, without exposing the distributors to the deadly German counterintelligence units.

*Der Zenit* proved to be both credible and ex-

tremely successful. Many German U-boat crews believed its contents and its source to be German. It gained so much popularity with the crews that Admiral Karl Dönitz (commander of the German Navy) assigned staff personnel to analyze its contents and to track its astrological advice.

One particular issue asked the reader to consider the U-235's unfortunate journey. The U-boat had a good horoscope when it was launched. Unfortunately, its commander, *Kapitan-leutnant* H. Pelkner, did not. The U-235 was sunk four days after it was launched. Clearly, *Kapitan-leutnant* Pelkner's "bad sign" had doomed the submarine and its crew to a watery grave. *Der Zenit* utilized an assortment of astrological signs and symbols to demonstrate the relevance of its predictions.

Eventually, *Der Zenit* gained sufficient notoriety to warrant examination by the principal German intelligence agencies. German astrology experts were asked to verify the magazine's validity, and they subsequently declared this creation of the British Political Warfare Executive to be authentic and accurate. (2)

Ultimately, *Der Zenit's* predictions directly influenced the operational and strategic levels of the war by silently filtering through the sea's cold depths and the steel hulls of the deadly U-boats to foster a persistent feeling of dread to the tired, demoralized, and hunted crews.

A clever psychological operations planner's use of superstitions need not be restricted to the tactical or operational level. When it is feasible, the planner should seek to apply it at every level of warfare, including the strategic level.

Many knowledgeable people believe it is preposterous that today's modern, intelligent man or woman will fall prey to such nonsense; yet, despite their education and access to information, many do succumb. Given the right conditions (fear, unemployment, hunger, etc.) almost all target audiences will react to the proper stimuli, sometimes with amazing results.

During the mid-1980s, when the majority of U.S. citizens were experiencing the benefits of a relatively healthy economy, very few of America's newspapers, television programs, or radio stations, advertised psychic or astrological services. During those relatively secure economic times, most people considered such services to be amusing diversions; yet, during the past few years, those same "diversions" have been advertised daily, sometimes hourly, utilizing the most popular media available, to influence the attitudes and

behavior of millions of educated and informed Americans.

The current state of the economy, the constant news of massive job reductions, rising medical costs, crime statistics, and a myriad of other depressing conditions are exposing many suppressed psychological vulnerabilities within many Americans. Many people falling within this economic and educational demographic group are vulnerable psychologically to the instant relief and gratification offered on television and radio by psychics and astrologers. Based upon the sheer volume of advertisements, a large and vulnerable target audience exists, willing to pay complete strangers their hard-earned money for a few moments of psychological solace. (3)

This is not exclusively an American middle-class phenomenon. Middle- and upper-class target audiences throughout the world are proving themselves—given the right conditions—just as susceptible to astrology and superstition. (4)

Certain national leaders, despite their education and experience, purposely practice a religious duality, i.e., many are practicing Christians, Moslems, etcetera; yet, they openly and simultaneously practice various superstitious beliefs or consult astrologers to maintain acceptable and readily identifiable ties with their tribes and countrymen.

During the war in Vietnam, Special Forces teams, operating in isolation among indigenous tribes for months at a time in various regions throughout Southeast Asia, quickly discovered the direct correlation between knowing the superstitious and animist beliefs of their hosts and gaining rapport and maintaining their trust.

Throughout Central and South America, representatives of the Roman Catholic Church have had to cope with the religious duality of the populace. It is not unusual to find people attending church and, simultaneously, paying adoration to slightly adulterated versions of the saints—with the acquiescence of the local priests. Many of these saints represent a mixture of Catholic and Indian values—Maya, Inca, or Aztec, depending upon the individual's location.

Today, despite their belief in science and facts, educated people of power and wealth consult a variety of psychic mediums to predict future events or to ward off potentially unpleasant situations. Famous and powerful world leaders have consulted witches and astrologers to divine future events or to gain advantage over their competitors. Panama's former dictator, Manuel Noriega, during the height of his power, was an

ardent necromancer. (5) President Jaime Paz Zamora of Bolivia; Prime Minister Chatichai Chophnaven of Thailand; and Dimitra Liana, wife of Greek Premier Andreas Papandreu, also are among those in high places who have relied on a variety of muses for assistance and advice. (6) Nancy Reagan, wife of former President Ronald Reagan, also regularly consulted astrologers. President Reagan's chief of staff, Donald T. Regan, has described Mrs. Reagan's obsession with astrological advice and the impact it had on daily events:

Virtually every major move and decision the Reagans made during my time as White House chief of staff was cleared in advance with a woman in San Francisco, who drew up horoscopes to make certain that the planets were in a favorable alignment for the enterprise.... As I discovered in my turn, there was no choice but to humor the First Lady in this matter.... Few in the White House ever suspected that Mrs. Reagan was even part of the problem—much less that an astrologer in San Francisco was approving the details of the presidential schedule. (7)

Because so many days were identified as very dangerous for the president or even as forbidden regarding outside activity, Regan describes his attempts to accommodate the First Lady's fears of the unknown, while tempering her astrologer's input into President Reagan's busy schedule. (8)

Donald Regan's statements appear to be corroborated by Nancy Reagan in her book, *My Turn*. Mrs. Reagan explains the conditions of her life that made her psychologically susceptible and vulnerable to the readings and predictions of her astrologer:

Another reason I was open to astrology was that I have spent most of my life in the company of show-business people, where superstitions and other non-scientific beliefs are widespread and commonly accepted.... I don't think actors and performers literally believed these things, but you went along with them as a way of hedging your bets. When someone consulted an astrologer, nobody thought much about it.... I have been criticized...for turning to astrology, but after awhile I reached a point where I didn't care. I was doing everything I could think of to protect my husband.... Astrology helped me cope—and nobody has ever shown that it caused any harm...to the country. (9)

Mrs. Reagan's reliance on astrology stemmed from

earlier learned behavior. Subsequent traumatic, significant, and frightening experiences and events in her life, e.g., her husband's medical conditions, a nearly successful assassination attempt on his life, the stress of presidential campaigning, her mother's death, and the stress of being the First Lady reinforced this reliance.

Perhaps it is worth noting the potential power Mrs. Reagan's astrologer, Joan Quigley, had over the White House for eight years. Certainly she was aware of the president's schedule, presumably months in advance. Could an astute adversary, in attempting to influence the president's attitudes, opinions, or behavior, have arranged to manipulate the astrologer's sources, thereby influencing the president's decisions or agenda? Yet another scenario might have presented the White House's reliance on astrology through the media (certainly, it did become public) in such a way as to make the administration appear unstable to the voters.

Interestingly enough, Mrs. Reagan's interest in astrology did become an object of interest to the former German Democratic Republic's State Security Service. Recently, German intelligence discovered a ninety-page dossier, compiled in the former East Germany in the 1980s, concerning President Reagan and his family's lives and personal habits. The report reveals the East Germans were particularly interested

in the Reagans' vulnerability to astrology. (10)

Some may argue that the lifestyles of relatively few national leaders, celebrities, or other figures do not warrant operational- or strategic-level consideration; yet, the decisions of just a handful of important people may affect the lives of millions. The reality is that, historically, target audiences who are quite susceptible to superstitious beliefs and behavior have been found anywhere. It therefore is incumbent upon the commander, his staff, the PSYOP planner, and his soldiers, to be cognizant of those beliefs and to record experiences to ensure future successes with the people in question.

Understanding a target audience's beliefs should be an integral component of the commander's overall mission strategy. History underscores the instances where PSYOP utilizing these beliefs have proved successful and decisive to the success of the commander's mission.

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# D-Day at Normandy Revisited

Thomas D. Morgan

The question of landing in face of an enemy is the most complicated and difficult in war.  
-Sir Ian Hamilton, *Gallipoli Diary*, 1920 (1)

*The parades have ended, the fly-overs have passed, and most of the frantic activity that surrounded the fiftieth anniversary of World War II has ceased. But many of the D-day veterans remain, as do the monuments and battle sites. Herewith, Thomas Morgan helps Army History take a last look at the Normandy invasion beaches, and offers a suggested tour for anyone wishing to revisit.*

## Echoes of Normandy

During the United States' fiftieth anniversary commemoration of World War II, the 1944 Allied landings in France at Normandy took on renewed meaning. At the Quebec Conference in 1943, the Allied leaders made the final decision to make a large-scale invasion against the continent of Europe in the spring of 1944. D-day, 6 June 1944, was the culmination of Operation OVERLORD, the largest amphibious landing in history.

Fifty years have passed since the Allied landings. Veterans who visit peaceful Normandy beaches still hear echoes of history's "longest day." Although the landscape was devastated by the fighting, the Normandy countryside has recovered from the fierce battles that raged there in June and July of 1944. The tranquility the visitor now encounters makes it difficult to image the scene in the early hours of 6 June when more than 5,000 ships carrying 156,000 troops appeared out of the early morning channel mist to start the bloody battles that were to liberate France. The Normandy beaches are filled now with local fishermen, tourists, returning veterans, and laughing children whose parents enjoy weather that is usually more bracing than warm.

June 1944 was the climactic month that set the stage for the final victory in World War II in Europe. Ever since Adolph Hitler invaded Russia in 1941, Joseph Stalin had relentlessly pressed Franklin D. Roosevelt and Winston Churchill for a second front in Europe. Finally, on 6 June 1944, a day author Cornelius Ryan called "The Longest Day," about 5,000 ships, smaller landing craft, and thousands of planes and gliders brought the equivalent of over nine divisions of

troops to the sandy soil of Normandy in the largest armada in history. (2)

## Crusade in Europe

Understandably, there was great anticipation and excitement in the Allied camps in England. Just four years before, the British had been forced to withdraw their forces from the continent of Europe at Dunkirk in the aftermath of Hitler's two-week *Blitzkrieg* offensive in the west. The successful D-day landings fulfilled the promise to Stalin of a second front in Europe and launched the Allied "crusade in Europe." (3) With the Anglo-American forces pressing in from the west and the Russians from the east, Hitler's forces were trapped between two fronts, and Nazi Germany's final defeat was certain.

Although the peaceful Normandy landscape was devastated fifty years ago, the countryside has recovered from the fierce battles that raged there in June-July 1944. Normandy is once again renowned for its green pastures and superb cathedrals. Instead of washed up ships, dead bodies, destroyed tanks, and the other wreckage of war, the invasion beaches are now filled with fishermen, tourists, pensive veterans, and laughing children whose parents let them run on the now safe, beautiful beaches.

## Anglo-American Beaches

The invasion beaches were given code names: UTAH and OMAHA for the American objectives, and GOLD, JUNO, and SWORD for the British-Canadian beaches. Those sites have seen many famous visitors, before and after General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, launched his famous crusade in Europe across these beaches. Field Marshal Erwin Rommel personally supervised the construction of beach defenses during visits in early 1944. Indeed, he inspected the UTAH Beach sector less than a month before D-day. While inspecting the Atlantic Wall, Rommel said: "the first twenty-four hours of the invasion will be decisive...for the Allies...as well as for Germany, it will be the longest day." (4) Winston Churchill, King George VI, and Charles de Gaulle all made their first reentry into liberated France across JUNO Beach, near the resort town of Courseulles-sur-Mer. Subsequently, President Ronald Reagan would make several emotional

speeches to returning veterans on the fortieth anniversary of D-day in 1984, and President Bill Clinton followed suit on the fiftieth anniversary.

But, perhaps the most important visitors are the veterans from all the Allied and Axis forces that participated on D-day. They are American, British, Canadian, French, Belgian, Dutch, Danish, Norwegian, German, Polish, Lithuanian, Latvian, Estonian, and Russian, returning to visit fallen comrades' graves, visit the museums, and look at the remaining bunkers of Hitler's fabled Atlantic Wall.

## OVERLORD

The code name for the D-day invasion was OVERLORD (NEPTUNE was the name of the naval assault phase that supported OVERLORD). (5) The Germans knew that the Allies were coming, but they did not know exactly where or when. Most of the better German units reinforced that part of the coast of France known as the Pas de Calais, only twenty miles across the English Channel.

To reinforce the Normandy sector, the Germans had brought in two new divisions (the 352d and 91st) and a parachute regiment of inexperienced teenagers. The presence of the 91st Air Landing Division behind UTAH Beach caused General Matthew B. Ridgeway to alter the DZ (Drop Zone) locations of his 82d Airborne Division. However, there was no avoiding elements of the 352d Infantry Division, which had recently moved into the OMAHA Beach sector. (6) Assault elements of the U.S. 1st and 29th Infantry Divisions had no choice but to storm "Bloody OMAHA," as it came to be called, in the face of these fresh German reinforcements. The resulting American casualties were so heavy that the Germans thought they had won that day.

The German fire from the bluffs overlooking OMAHA was heavy. Many landing craft were hit and sunk in the rough waters. During the morning hours, the issue was in doubt. Lt. Gen. Omar N. Bradley, who was in charge of the American beaches, contemplated a withdrawal to concentrate his efforts on the more lightly defended UTAH Beach to the west. Yet, in spite of heavy casualties, the Americans finally managed to move off the beaches and take the bluffs beyond. By nightfall, they had pushed a mile inland. The other landings in the British and Canadian sectors went more smoothly. By 7 June, Bayeux had been liberated by the British and the battle for Caen and the Cotentin Peninsula had begun.

## Heroes

Time heals the scars of combat for the adversaries

of the battle for the Normandy beaches. There were many heroes on both sides. Brig. Gen. Theodore Roosevelt Jr., a World War I veteran pushing sixty years of age, won the Medal of Honor for his actions on UTAH Beach. (7) A German defender on UTAH Beach, 24-year old Lt. Arthur Jahnke, fought valiantly until knocked unconscious and half-buried in sand by a 14-inch shell from the battleship U.S.S. *Nevada* (refloated following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor). For both of these brave men the war was nearly over. Roosevelt died of a heart attack a few weeks later and Jahnke, badly wounded, was captured and evacuated to England on one of the ships that had brought his captors to Normandy. (8)

Commandant Phillippe Kieffer returned to his native land leading French commando troops. Although wounded almost immediately upon landing at Riva Bella, Kieffer led his men in hand-to-hand fighting that liberated Riva Bella and Ouistreham. (9)

Three companies of Lt. Col. James E. Rudder's 2d Ranger Battalion assaulted the sheer cliffs of Pointe du Hoc and held onto a small perimeter for nearly three days without relief. Of the original 225 Rangers who landed on Pointe du Hoc, less than 90 were able to bear arms at the end of D+2. Rudder, twice wounded and refusing to be evacuated, was still with his men when help arrived. (10)

German General Erich Marcks, a one-legged veteran of the Russian Front whose 84th Corps defended the Normandy sector, also was with his men in the front lines a few days later when he was killed by Allied bombers. (11) Another German general officer, Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, the "Desert Fox" of North Africa fame, tried to lead from the front. A master of mobile warfare, Rommel failed to convince Hitler to release the *Panzer* divisions in the west to his control in time to stop the invasion. Locked in a battle of stationary warfare and siege, Rommel conducted a spirited defense. On 17 July, the day before the great Allied offensive at Caen that started the breakout from the landing zones, Rommel was severely injured when his staff car was strafed by British Spitfires. It was a day of misfortune for the German Army in Normandy, for Rommel was medically evacuated and never returned to active command. (12)

## Liberation

On the eve of D-day, 176,000 Allied soldiers and marines waited on ships and at airfields to begin their mission: an assault along a fifty-mile stretch of the Normandy coast between Caen and Cherbourg. The first twenty-four hours were critical to the liberation of

France. On D-day, 156,200 troops landed, with the rest following on D+1. (13) For the French civilians of Normandy, the painful burden of daily life under Nazi occupation was about to end.

Today, the D-day landings are remembered in heroic, chivalric terms. In spite of recriminations by the Canadians against the *12th SS Panzer Division* following D-day, the Allies conceded that according to the curious morality of the battlefield, the Germans had behaved reasonably during the fighting in Normandy. (14) There were many days and weeks of hard fighting ahead in the hedgerow (*bocage* in French) country of Normandy to secure the hard-won landing beaches. The capture of Cherbourg, the breakout at St. Lo, the battle of the Falaise Gap, the liberation of Paris, and the advance to the Rhine all lay ahead; but, the liberation of Western Europe had begun.

Before V-E Day in May 1945, there still would be Allied setbacks. The failed airborne assault at Arnhem ("The Bridge Too Far") and the Battle of the Bulge in the Ardennes showed that the Germans could still strike back with surprising strength. But, the final outcome of the war in Europe could never again be in doubt—for the Allies had landed at Normandy!

### Normandy Remembers D-day

The Normans have the reputation of being among the friendliest of Frenchmen. Accustomed to frequent visitors, they offer tourists a warm hospitality. Normandy does not forget those who fought on her soil. All the major landing beaches are protected and have museums, monuments, and markers to record the events of the most famous military operation in history. Visitors can see the beaches relatively untouched since 1944, except where the debris of war intentionally has not been cleaned up, such as the remains of the artificial Mulberry harbor at Arromanches. The German guns are silent along the fabled Atlantic Wall, which was more propaganda myth than reality. Tourists, veterans, and their families can see the gigantic invasion site that was the key to the liberation of Europe. It is well worth seeing because there will never be another operation like OVERLORD again.

As 6 June 1994 approached, the entire region of Normandy experienced a massive tourist invasion and an international media blitz. Normandy's cities and towns fixed things up for the fiftieth anniversary. Street lights were added, roads widened, signs repainted, museums enlarged, and in some places new museums were built.

One of the newest museums is Le Memorial in Caen. Well marked and easily found on the north

traffic ring of Caen, it is a multimedia museum, dedicated in 1986, that uses high-tech audio-visuals to convey lessons in war and peace. Funded by the Battle of Normandy Foundation, this museum is a must for anyone starting a tour of the Normandy landing beaches.

Commemorating World War II is almost a way of life in many Norman towns. Sainte-Mere Eglise, which claims the honor of being the first town liberated by the Allies (a distinction shared or challenged by several other towns, depending upon which Allied force—either British or American—liberated them) has welcomed veterans from the 82d and 101st Airborne Divisions for many years. It was the setting for several memorable scenes from the film, *The Longest Day*.

Benouville, just north of Caen, is to the "Paras" of the British 6th Parachute Division what Sainte-Mere-Eglise is to the American airborne. It was here that the Gondree Cafe was used as an aid station and made popular when Monsieur Gondree dug up a large supply of champagne from his garden to celebrate the arrival of his airborne liberators. The capture of the bridge over the Caen Canal next to the cafe by Maj. John Howard's glider-borne force was also a high point in *The Longest Day*.

Wherever one goes in Normandy, the war is never very far away. Plaques, cemeteries, memorials, and old fortifications dot the countryside and dominate the villages. The D-day landings were not accomplished without terrible sacrifice on the part of the Norman inhabitants. Caen was 80 percent destroyed by Allied bombers as Field Marshal Montgomery duelled with Rommel's *Panzers* for control of the city and a breakout from the D-day beachhead.

Returning veterans have noticed changes in Normandy. Like themselves, the French population has aged, and the hedgerows are disappearing to make room for larger farms. Modern buildings and towns have grown out of the rubble of war. The Normans, however, still have not embraced fully the postwar, industrial revolution. Blessed with fertile soil and a proximity to Parisian markets, the region has been a major supplier of milk, butter, cheese, beef, and seafood. The magnificent chateaux, manor houses, and churches of Normandy are reminders of the region's agricultural wealth from past days of glory. The local planners for the fiftieth anniversary of D-day appreciate the significance of the tourist trade, and value is returned for dollars and francs spent. Normandy still has much more to give than money can buy.

### Normandy Revisited

Visitors who want to retrace the landing beaches

and battle areas need to plan their visit in advance so that they can see and appreciate what happened on *les plages du débarquement*, as the French call them. Although the OVERLORD invasion plan was basically simple, its execution by General Dwight D. Eisenhower and General Sir Bernard Law Montgomery was the most complex in the history of warfare. Another reason for making preparations is that the five principal landing beaches stretch for over fifty miles along a crescent of coastline from the mouth of the Orne River near Caen, called the Bay of the Seine, to midway up the Cotentin Peninsula in the direction of Cherbourg. The actual driving distance is about 350 kilometers (over 200 miles), because of the many twists and turns along the narrow, picturesque coastal roads. At least two days should be devoted to touring the landing beaches; one day for the American and one day for the British-Canadian beaches.

Although almost all the villages along the coast have camp grounds and a few hotels, the better hotels are located in Caen and Bayeux, with Bayeux the more centrally located.

### **Suggested Tour**

A recommended tour starts at Bayeux with a visit to the Museum of *La Bataille de Normandie*. From there, drive to Arranches. On the bluff to the east of Arranches is a vantage point from which, on a clear day, the British beaches may be seen to the east and the American beaches to the west. After that, descend into Arranches and visit the excellent museum devoted to the artificial Mulberry harbor and the overall events of D-day. From Arranches, drive west along the coast road to Longues-sur-Mer. Turn right at the *Batteries de Longues* sign and drive toward the ocean bluffs. The well-preserved Longues Battery was one of the principal Atlantic Wall coast artillery batteries and was used as a set for the film, *The Longest Day*.

### **OMAHA Beach**

From Longues, it is but a few miles west to the American Cemetery and Memorial at Colleville-St. Laurent. From the orientation table on the bluffs at the edge of the cemetery, one looks down onto the 1st Infantry Division sector of OMAHA Beach. It was called "Bloody OMAHA" because some of the heaviest fighting on D-day took place in this sector, as "Big Red One" soldiers fought their way up from the beaches in the face of fierce resistance from the newly-arrived German *352d Division*. There is a path to the beach and along the bluffs to monuments and other viewpoints.

A tour of the cemetery is in order. Look for the

side-by-side graves of Brig. Gen. Theodore Roosevelt, Jr. (distinguished by a Gold Star and gold lettering for Medal of Honor recipients on his cross) and his brother, Lt. Quentin Roosevelt, about halfway down on the edge by the ocean.

After the cemetery, drive back to the coast road and go two kilometers to St. Laurent. Turn right at the sign and go down to the Les Moulins-Vierville part of OMAHA Beach. This was the 29th Infantry Division's sector. Further down at the west end near Point de la Percee is where the 5th Ranger Battalion ("Rangers Lead the Way!") landed.

### **Pointe Du Hoc**

To the west of OMAHA Beach is Pointe du Hoc. On D-day, the 2d Ranger Battalion had the mission of scaling the 100-foot cliffs and destroying six 155-mm. guns emplaced there. The guns are gone, but the broken gun casements and cratered landscape attest to the D-day aerial bombing and naval gunfire that preceded the Rangers. Just three miles west of Pointe du Hoc, on the beach at Grandcamp, is a new Ranger museum.

### **UTAH Beach**

Going westward through Isigny and Carentan (liberated by the 101st Airborne Division), UTAH Beach is found easily by following the markers on N13 after Carentan and before Ste. Come du Mont. Driving down to La Madeleine through Vierville and Ste. Marie du Mont, the drop zones of the 101st Airborne Division are on either side of the D913. The museum at La Madeleine is housed in the old German bunker. Lt. Arthur Jahnke's platoon held this position, and the bunker was the strong point. Field Marshal Erwin Rommel had visited the site in May and exhorted Jahnke to plant more mines and build more obstacles. All of that was to no avail, as Jahnke and his men were either killed or buried in sand and captured after the heavy aerial and naval bombardments.

Drive up UTAH Beach about three kilometers to Varreville. There, a French monument marks the spot where Brig. Gen. Jacques-Philippe LeClerc's 2d (French) Armored Division came ashore after D-day. This is where the 4th (U.S.) Infantry Division was supposed to have come ashore on D-day instead of at La Madeleine.

### **Ste. Mere-Eglise**

A drive up from UTAH via the Marcouf Battery to Ste. Mere-Eglise will put you in the middle of the 82d Airborne Division drop zones. Ste. Mere-Eglise was

taken by the 82d just after midnight on 6 June. The Airborne Museum there run by Mr. Phillippe Jutra, a retired Normandy veteran, and the 12th-century church, on whose steeple Pfc. John M. Steele's parachute caught on D-day, are the prime attractions. A coffee and *calvados* (the local apple brandy) at the Hotel John Steele will rejuvenate the tourist after a day of sightseeing.

Return to your hotel in Bayeux or Caen. That should be enough for one day. Sample the local gastronomic delights at any number of superb restaurants either in the city, out in the countryside, or down on the waterfront at Port-en-Bessin or Arromanches.

#### **British-Canadian Beaches: GOLD, JUNO, and Sword**

A day visiting the British-Canadian beaches and Caen will conclude your D-day tour. The bluffs that dominate OMAHA Beach flatten out east of Arromanches, and the coast is dotted with small vacation villages and an occasional gun casement or bunker to remind the visitor that this was a hotly contested area on 6 June 1944.

From Arromanches eastward, along the coast road, GOLD Beach is situated between Le Hamel and La Riviere. The 50th British Division landed here at 0725 on 6 June and liberated Bayeux the next day. A little farther on is JUNO Beach, between the Seules River and Ste. Aubin-sur-Mer. The 3d Canadian Division landed in this sector, making the deepest D-day penetration (six to seven miles) with the most casualties in the British sector.

The last British beach, SWORD Beach, runs from Lion-sur-Mer to Riva Bella. Here, the 3d British Infantry Division and Lord Lovat's Commando Brigade came ashore. Their objective was Caen and the bridges over the Orne Canal and River. Two of these bridges had been taken by Maj. John Howard with six gliders of troops just after midnight on D-day. A short drive down to Benouville will put you at the site of the most famous of the two bridges, the Pegasus Bridge, named in honor of the British airborne. The "Pegasus Cafe-Restaurant" overlooking the bridge site and owned by the Gondree family is as it was in June 1944. Members of the Gondree family still greet visitors at the bar. The Gondrees hid in the basement while Major Howard and his men fought to secure the bridge. There is an interesting museum dedicated to the 6th British Parachute Division right next to the cafe. Unfortunately, the original Pegasus Bridge is being replaced by a newer one. There is a chance that the old one will still be displayed on the site of this famous *coup de main* that was featured in the film, *The Longest Day*.

There are many other things to see if time permits. The Merville Battery, located northeast of Benouville is to the British Airborne what Pointe du Hoc is to the Rangers. It was taken in a daring night parachute and glider assault that resulted in many British casualties. A visit to the modern (dedicated in 1986) Le Memorial Museum in Caen is essential. Funded by the Battle of Normandy Foundation, it uses high-tech multimedia techniques to tell the story of D-day, and World War II in France. It offers an excellent bookstore and restaurant, so several hours should be devoted to it. It is well-marked and easily found on the *Boulevard Peripherique* (ring road) north of Caen. Paris is about two hours away on the Autoroute for those leaving Normandy for other destinations.

1995 was a year of ceremonies all over Normandy to mark the fiftieth anniversary of D-day. The principal American ceremonies were held 5 June (the Airborne Ceremony at Ste. Mere-Eglise featured a demonstration jump by members of the 82d and 101st Airborne Divisions) and 6 June (with the 2d Ranger Battalion reenactment of the assault on Pointe du Hoc, the French International Ceremony featuring nine heads of state on OMAHA Beach, and the U.S. National Ceremony at the OMAHA Beach Cemetery). President Bill Clinton spoke on 6 June 1994, much as President Ronald Reagan did in 1984.

It has been an inspiring sight seeing the veterans return to Normandy. Singly and in groups, they have made their pilgrimage to relive the experiences of their youth. In 1995, Normandy was crowded with veterans and tourists; and World War II veterans—especially D-day veterans—received priority for room at the ceremonies. Hotel accommodations were scarce. Now, however, anyone wishing to visit the D-day beaches can find accommodations more easily, or else stay in Rouen, Le Mans or other cities on the periphery of Normandy. For additional information, interested persons should write to the French Government Tourist Office, 610 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10020-2452.

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### Book Review

by Robert J.T. Joy

#### *Shangri-La for Wounded Soldiers: The Greenbriar as a World War II Army Hospital*

by Louis E. Keefer

COTU Publishing. 321 pp., \$19.95

In the summer of 1942, the Army Surgeon General was directed to plan for increased hospital construction in the United States. To save time, labor, and material, he was further directed to consider adapting apart-

ments, hotels, schools, dormitories, and civilian hospitals for general hospitals. Only 3 percent of the hundreds of buildings examined were suitable for conversion. By 1943, twenty-eight new hospitals were sited in former civilian buildings: thirteen in hotels, ten in state or local hospitals, four in schools, and one on an estate. By June 1945 there were 430,000 total beds; 153,000 of them in 56 general hospitals (See Clarence M. Smith, *The Medical Department: Hospitalization and Evacuation, Zone of the Interior* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army CMH, 1956).

Louis Keefer is a well-known scholar of Army

education (See "Birth and Death of the Army Specialized Training Program," *Army History* no. 33, Winter 1995). He has given us the history of Ashford General Hospital, converted from the antebellum "Greenbriar," an expensive and expansive resort for the very well-to-do in White Sulphur Springs, West Virginia. Owned by the Chesapeake and Ohio Railroad, the resort had a private airport and railroad siding, separate cottages, 650 rooms and 3 golf courses. Royalty, presidents, actors, and other celebrities enjoyed these and other amenities. From 17 December 1941 to 8 July 1942, the Department of State housed over 1,000 interned enemy diplomats at the Greenbriar. When they left, the government condemned the property and bought it for \$3.3 million and began converting it to a 2,025-bed hospital. Named for Col. Bailey K. Ashford, MC, USA, who discovered the American hookworm in Puerto Rico and developed methods to control the disease, the hospital specialized in general medicine, neurology, neurosurgery and vascular surgery. The commander, Col. Clyde M. Beck, was a Regular Army Medical Corps officer, clinically out-of-date, but an experienced administrator and commander. The senior clinical staff were all commissioned from civilian life, largely specialists from academic medical centers. The junior medical, nursing, dental, and enlisted staff rotated within the continental United States, and between the United States and overseas assignments.

The author has told his story in very much an Ernie Pyle or "Hometown News" style. It is exactly appropriate for this book. His first focus is properly on the patients, the first of whom arrived in November 1942. Some 24,000 patients were treated at Ashford. Some 800 medical department officers and 1,500 enlisted personnel served at Ashford over the years. The German prisoner of war (POW) camp three miles away

furnished 600 POWs for grounds keeping and manual labor.

In separate chapters, the experiences of the medical officers, nurses, enlisted personnel, civilian employees, and Red Cross workers are presented in brief vignettes, often with contemporary photographs. The impact of the hospital on the small town of White Sulphur Springs is documented the same way. One must stand in awe at the perseverance of the author in finding so many patients and staff so long after the war.

The last patient left in June 1946, and in September the C & O Railroad repurchased the hotel for about the original 1942 sales price. The town got the enlarged airport. Some \$12 million was spent refurbishing the Greenbriar, now once again a magnificent resort complex. The book is clearly a labor of love, and properly commemorates one of the distinguished conversion general hospitals. Keefer's work is a useful addition to our evolving understanding of the medical support of the Army in World War II.

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#### Forthcoming in *Army History*...

Dr. Susan Canedy's reflections on being the personal historian for General Frederick M. Franks, Jr., then Commanding General, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command.

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