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20 Devil Dogs in Olive Drab: The 2d Engineers at Belleau Wood
Army Historians Cover War in Iraq

The U.S. Army forces that conducted Operation IRAQI FREEDOM included a military history group at Headquarters, Combined Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC), at Camp Doha, Kuwait, and at least seven military history detachments. Col. Neil Rogers headed the CFLCC military history group. He was assisted by Lt. Col. Thomas Ryan and Maj. John Aarsen. All three are Army Reserve officers with skill identifier 5X (historian). The latter two men work for the Army Historical Program in their civilian capacities as well. Colonel Ryan is the historian of the 90th Reserve Command and Major Aarsen is director of the Airborne and Special Operations Museum in Fayetteville, North Carolina. Major Aarsen has been collecting wartime artifacts for the Army Museum System.

Col. Donald Warner, the deputy chief of military history, accompanied the 3d Infantry Division to Baghdad during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, and Dr. Robert Darius, chief historian of the Army Materiel Command (AMC), collected lessons learned and after action reports at the rear headquarters of the AMC Logistic Support Element in Kuwait. The military history detachments taped interviews with combat participants, took photographs, and collected campaign documents. Two members of the Army Museum System have been identified for mobilization to assist in the effort to collect military artifacts in Iraq. These men are David Hanselman, a museum specialist at the Army Transportation Museum, and Marc Sammis, a registrar at the Center of Military History. Sfc. Elzie Golden, an artist assigned to the Center of Military History, was also awaiting orders to deploy to Iraq.

Government Printing Office Sells Center’s Army in Somalia Pamphlet

The Government Printing Office has begun to sell the 28-page pamphlet by Richard W. Stewart entitled The United States Army in Somalia, 1992–1994, the publication of which was announced in the Winter 2003 issue of Army History. Dr. Stewart, who is chief of the Center’s Histories Division, served in Operation CONTINUE HOPE in Somalia. The pamphlet is available from the Government Printing Office under stock number 008–029–00381–3 for $2.50. Army publication account holders may obtain the pamphlet from the Army Publications Distribution Center–St. Louis. The Association of the United States Army has also issued the pamphlet in a commemorative edition.

News Notes continued on page 30
As you can imagine, the Center of Military History has been heavily involved with the preparations for and execution of Operation Iraqi Freedom, which is under way as I write, but we have tried hard to sustain our momentum with respect to other projects and responsibilities as well.

Bill Epley and his Field and International Branch are coordinating the deployment of military history detachments and individual uniformed historians to document the conflict. The 305th Military History Detachment, which had been stationed at CMH for the past eighteen months, received its deployment orders in early March. All told, thirteen military history detachments (MHDs) have been mobilized to cover the conflict, in addition to individual historical augmentees serving with the Combined Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) headquarters and a fourteenth MHD in Afghanistan. Given world events, the publication in February of the new edition of FM 1-20, Military History Operations, has proved very timely.

The members of the Force Structure and Unit History Branch are intensively engaged in tracking unit deployments to document campaign participation and possible entitlement to unit decorations. This is especially challenging in relation to the many Army Reserve and National Guard units that have been called to active duty. An official campaign name has not yet been determined, but the operations in Iraq will be part of the Global War on Terrorism, for which President Bush has already approved individual service medals. The embedding of journalists with various units in Iraq is putting the spotlight on the operations of the 3d Infantry Division and its elements, such as the 3d Squadron, 7th Cavalry. We have been receiving numerous inquiries for historical information from units about to deploy as well as from the media, and the pace is certain to increase.

The Histories Division has continued to provide information papers, briefings, and responses to inquiries to ensure that Army planners and decision makers at the highest levels have historical data and insights available for their deliberations. Many of these focus on issues relevant to Operation Iraqi Freedom, and some draw information from the MHDs in the theater and provide that information to forces that are about to deploy. The division has also prepared papers on such topics as the oversight responsibilities of the Army Secretariat; the impact of force reductions in U.S. Army, Europe; the actions of Army special forces in Afghanistan; the relevance of comparisons between Cambodia during the Vietnam War and Pakistan today as examples of "sanctuaries" from U.S. troops; precedents in DOD funding of foreign military forces; the history of the U.S. Army prison system; the turmoil among prisoners held at Koje-do during the Korean War; and British military operations in Mesopotamia in World War I.

Members of the Histories Division maintained support for the Army transformation process by conducting oral history interviews, attending relevant meetings, and providing comments on the Army White Paper on Transformation. The Oral History Activity conducted significant interviews with many of the major participants in the Army's quadrennial review process. In addition, the activity has begun the time-consuming task of conducting end-of-tour interviews in preparation for the retirement of the chief of staff of the Army this summer.

The Histories Division made major progress on several volumes on the history of the U.S. Army in Vietnam, especially the volumes on the engineers and on combat operations in 1968–73. In addition, forthcoming volumes tentatively entitled "MACV: The Joint Command" and "U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine, 1942–1976," which had been paneled, are undergoing final revisions.

The CMH website now highlights the bicentennial of the Lewis and Clark expedition. This new website feature provides a global forum to commemorate the Corps of

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"Our most intelligent men deserve a chance to prove their ability and serve their country in the artillery branch of the service."

Emmett J. Scott, March 1907
Black Artillerymen from the Civil War through World War I

By Roger D. Cunningham

When Congress reorganized the Regular Army after the Civil War, it created six segregated regiments comprising black enlisted men—two cavalry and four (later reduced to two) infantry. Although black soldiers had served competently in both heavy and light artillery units during the war, no black artillery regiment was included in the postwar Army. Over the next half century, a secretary of war, various senators and congressmen, some senior Army officers, and prominent African Americans sought to remedy this shortcoming without avail. Army leaders maintained that only Congress could add another black regiment to its rolls, and many officers considered the artillery branch too technical for African Americans to master. As race relations deteriorated at the start of the twentieth century, white Southerners displayed strong opposition to the idea of black artillerymen serving at their seacoast fortifications, although ironically, the only black artillery unit at this time was a militia battery in Savannah, Georgia. Black artillerymen thus did not reappear in the active force structure until World War I.

The Civil War

All but a few of the black volunteer units that served during the Civil War belonged to the United States Colored Troops. One hundred thirty-seven infantry regiments comprised the bulk of these black troops, but they also included 6 cavalry and 13 heavy (or foot) artillery regiments, along with 10 light artillery batteries. More than 25,000 black artillerymen, recruited primarily from freed slaves in Confederate or border states, served in the Union Army during the Civil War. The only black artillery regiment raised north of the Mason-Dixon Line was the 11th U.S. Colored Heavy Artillery, which began its service as the 14th Rhode Island Colored Heavy Artillery and served out the war in Louisiana.1

Federal military authorities armed and equipped the soldiers in these twelve-company heavy artillery regiments as infantrymen and ordinarily used them to man the larger caliber guns defending coastal and field fortifications located near cities and smaller population centers in Louisiana, Mississippi, Tennessee, Kentucky, and North Carolina. The 3d U.S. Colored Heavy Artillery spent most of the war at Fort Pickering, Tennessee, which was part of the defenses of Memphis, while the 8th U.S. Colored Heavy Artillery served on garrison duty at Paducah, Kentucky. The 10th U.S. Colored Heavy Artillery spent its entire service in New Orleans. Combat for the black heavy artillerymen was rare, but four companies from the 6th U.S. Colored Heavy Artillery were serving at Fort Pillow, Tennessee, in April 1864, when Confederate forces commanded by Maj. Gen. Nathan B. Forrest attacked. The ensuing “massacre” of almost two-thirds of the black soldiers, many of them after they had surrendered, was decried in the North, and “Remember Fort Pillow!” soon became a battle cry of the U.S. Colored Troops.2

In late 1863 black light (or field) artillery batteries were organized from freed slaves in Louisiana and Tennessee. The horse-drawn guns of light artillery batteries accompanied infantry and cavalry formations on their campaigns, and as a result of their excellent performance in the Mexican War, light artillery units had earned the prestige of an elite arm. According to the Instruction for Field Artillery (Philadelphia, 1863), its men were supposed to be “intelligent, active, muscular, well-developed, and not less than five feet seven inches high.” Each light artillery battery was authorized 3 officers and 141 enlisted men. The twenty to thirty cannoners and drivers who were assigned to each “piece” (gun), its limber, and two caissons (ammunition storage vehicles) constituted a platoon, led by a sergeant. Two platoons constituted a section, led by a lieutenant, and under ideal circumstances three sections—right, center, and left—formed the battery,
which also was equipped with a traveling forge and a wagon.3

In early 1864 nine batteries from around the South were designated as elements of the 2d Regiment, U.S. Colored Light Artillery, but, as they were never intended to serve together as a regiment, no regimental headquarters was organized for them. The three batteries that already existed in Louisiana were redesignated as Batteries C, D, and E, while the Memphis Light Battery (African Descent) became Battery F. Two more batteries in Tennessee (A and I) and one each in Arkansas (H), South Carolina (G), and Virginia (B) were also organized. The letter K should have been assigned to the tenth battery to be organized, but Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton designated it as an independent battery instead. The Independent Battery, U.S. Colored Light Artillery, began recruiting in Leavenworth, Kansas, in July 1864, and by order of Maj. Gen. Samuel R. Curtis, commander of the Department of Kansas, all three of its officers were African Americans. They were the only light artillery officers of their race commissioned during the war, and the battery was the only unit in the Union Army to have no white officers.4

The Independent Battery spent the rest of the summer recruiting in eastern Kansas, enlisting many runaway Missouri slaves. During the fall of 1864 Confederate Maj. Gen. Sterling Price led a 12,000-man mounted force into Missouri from Arkansas and then headed west toward Kansas City and Fort Leavenworth. To stop Price’s raid, General Curtis quickly organized the Army of the Border, and a two-gun section from the Independent Battery was ordered to the Kansas City area, where it was attached to the four-gun 9th Wisconsin Independent Battery, Light Artillery. Commanded by 2d Lt. Patrick H. Minor, this section of two ten-pounder Parrott guns helped to defeat Price in the Battles of the Big Blue and Westport on 22 and 23 October, and it joined the federal force that pursued his retreating army back toward Arkansas.5

The Independent Battery completed its recruitment in December and was then officially mustered into the Union Army. Under the command of Capt. H. Ford Douglas, the unit spent most of the remaining days of the war manning guns on the bleak knob of Fort Sully, a series of fortifications that had been constructed hastily on a hill on the western side of Fort Leavenworth to help defend the post from Price. After seven uneventful months of service, “Douglas’s Battery” was mustered out of federal service in July 1865. In spite of the fact that light artillery’s intended role was to accompany troops to the field, most of the other black light artillery batteries also spent the war performing garrison duty. Battery A, 2d U.S. Colored Light Artillery, however, fought in the Battle of Nashville in December 1864, and Battery B participated in the siege of Petersburg. Battery F fought in the Battle of Bric’s Cross Roads, Mississippi, in June 1864, and one of its sections had also been present at the Fort Pillow massacre.6

After the fighting ended in 1865, the soldiers in U.S. Colored Troops units were mustered out of federal service much more slowly than were those in white volunteer units, perhaps because the latter could vote, while the former were almost all disenfranchised. Only four of the heavy artillery regiments and seven of the light batteries mustered out by the end of the year. The 14th U.S. Colored Heavy Artillery, which had begun its service as the 1st North Carolina Colored Heavy Artillery, remained close to friends and families, manning Fort
Macon on the coast from June to December 1865, when it mustered out. The remaining black artillery units performed garrison duty across the South until they finally mustered out in 1866, or, in the case of the 10th U.S. Colored Heavy Artillery, in February 1867. Battery B, 2d U.S. Colored Light Artillery, served along the Mexican border in Texas from May 1865 until its muster-out in March 1866. That same month the New York Times reported that the “general conduct of the various bodies” of black troops in the South had been “in the main, exceedingly good.” It also noted that it was evident that “negroes . . . [could] do efficient work in all arms of the service.”

Meanwhile, the future of black artillerymen was being debated in Washington, where Senator Henry Wilson of Massachusetts, chairman of the Senate Committee on Military Affairs, was crafting legislation that would, upon its enactment in July 1866, add six black regiments to the Regular Army. Thanks to an early life of poverty and hard labor, Wilson sympathized with “the downtrodden and underprivileged” and had a long history of looking out for African Americans. In 1844, as a young Massachusetts legislator, he had tried to amend state militia laws to remove racial barriers. In December 1861 Wilson had introduced legislation to abolish slavery in the District of Columbia, and four months later it was signed into law. Along with his state’s abolitionist governor, John A. Andrew, he had urged the Lincoln administration to enlist black troops in the Union Army. He then fought to equalize the pay of black and white soldiers and persisted until this was accomplished in 1865.8

In addition to creating black cavalry and infantry regiments, the initial version of the “Wilson Bill” to increase the “military peace establishment” provided for organizing two new artillery regiments—one black and one white—but Lt. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant objected to this provision. Responding to Senator Wilson’s request that he look over the Army reorganization bill, Grant observed, “I am not in favor of black artillery regiments, because I regard our artillery in time of peace merely [sic] as an artillery school for time of war . . . and in time of peace I think the efficiency of the artillery as a school will be higher if composed solely of white troops.” Grant’s opinion carried a lot of weight, and the provision for black artillerymen was quickly dropped from the bill, but the fact that the white artillery regiment was deleted as well suggests that economy was also a factor in determining that outcome.9

Veterans of the U.S. Colored Troops initially comprised about half of the men that enlisted in the Army’s six new black regiments, with more than 500 of them receiving early discharges to accomplish that end. African Americans who had served as artillerymen during the war had no choice but to join the infantry or cavalry. Three of the 208 enlisted men who had served in Douglas’s Battery enlisted in the 10th Cavalry, which began to recruit at Fort Leavenworth in August 1866. At least 137 of Louisiana’s 10th U.S. Colored Heavy Artillery veterans enlisted in the Regular Army in the fall of 1866.10

The First Black Officer in the Civil War?

William D. Matthews (1827-1906), of Leavenworth, Kansas, was one of only three black light artillery officers to serve during the Civil War and appears to have been the first African American to function as an officer in that conflict. He raised a company in the First Kansas Colored Volunteer Infantry and commanded it as a captain from August 1862 to May 1863, but that service was not recognized by the federal government, as the regiment was organized before it sanctioned the use of black troops. In July 1864 Matthews was appointed as a first lieutenant to recruit for the Independent Battery, 2d Regiment, U.S. Colored Light Artillery. In October, while on a recruiting trip to Fort Scott, Kansas, Matthews was commended for organizing a local black militia force to assist in protecting the Union military complex from the Confederate army with which Maj. Gen. Sterling Price had invaded Kansas. After the Independent Battery was finally mustered into federal service in December, Matthews was its second-in-command until the unit mustered out at Fort Leavenworth in July 1865.

After the war “Captain” Matthews remained in Leavenworth and was able to secure a pension for disabilities related to a loud gun discharge at Fort Scott. He also sought congressional assistance in securing nine months of back pay as an officer in the First Kansas Colored, but at least eleven bills introduced between 1869 and 1902 failed to get that money for him.
tillery veteran. In 1881 Maj. Frank M. Welch was elected to command Connecticut's 5th Battalion (Colored). Welch had been a lieutenant in both the 54th Massachusetts Volunteer Infantry and the 14th U.S. Colored Heavy Artillery.11

During the Gilded Age the only black artillerymen in the United States were members of the Georgia militia, which was segregated into the all-white Georgia State Troops and the Georgia State Troops, Colored. The latter had an authorized strength of almost 2,100 officers and men. In 1878 the black citizens of Savannah organized the Georgia Artillery, and Capt. George McCarthy, a barber, was elected to command the battery. He was succeeded by John C. Simmons in 1881. When a lieutenant from Savannah's white Chatham Artillery inspected the unit in 1886, he found two officers and twenty-three enlisted men who had drilled or paraded fifty times over the previous year. The battery had two three-inch rifled cannons with limbers, and the men were individually armed with sabers. These arms were maintained in excellent condition, and the inspecting officer observed that “This is a fine body of colored troops, deserving much credit for the interest taken by them in military matters.”12

Like many militia units, black and white, the Georgia Artillery spent much of its time engaged in social activities—marching in parades (including President William McKinley's 1901 inaugural parade in Washington, D.C.), staging "entertainments," and sponsoring excursions to nearby attractions to raise the funds that the unit required to cover its expenses. The battery periodically fired its guns on special occasions, such as 1 January, Emancipation Day. In a May 1887 ceremony celebrating the adoption of the Fifteenth Amendment, a gunner was fatally wounded when he removed an unexploded cartridge from one of the guns and it blew his arm off. Three years later the state's Military Advisory Board recommended disbanding the unit, but Governor John B. Gordon, supported by prominent citizens of Savannah, disapproved the proposal. By 1891 the unit’s enlisted strength had grown to forty-six, but an armory fire that year destroyed all of the battery's equipment. Within a year, however, the citizen-soldiers had raised enough money to purchase two brass cannons from Philadelphia. Savannah's black newspaper, the Tribune, boasted, "Savannah should feel proud of the fact that it has the only colored artillery company in the United States."13

In 1897 the battery raised enough money to fund an August encampment at nearby Flowersville. Twenty-seven men mounted guard, drilled, and received military instruction during their eight-day camp—a first for Georgia's black militiamen. The Tribune commented, "The step taken by the command is an heroic one, and should put the state to shame for the penurious manner in which the colored troops have been treated."14

Although many of Georgia's black militiamen were eager to serve during

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**Average Annual Personnel Losses in Company-Size Line Units, 1 July 1879–30 June 1889**

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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>White Units</th>
<th>Black Units</th>
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<tr>
<td>Light Artillery</td>
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<tr>
<td>Battery (10)</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(96)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(230)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Company (50)</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cavalry Troop</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>(24)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Infantry Company</td>
<td>20</td>
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<tr>
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</tbody>
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**Source:** Army and Navy Journal 27 (21 Dec 1889): 328
the Spanish-American War, the governor refused to include them in his Volunteer Army troop quota. In May 1898 Captain Simmons learned about another opportunity for military service—a new force that Congress had authorized of 10,000 enlisted men “possessing immunity from diseases incident to tropical climates.” Believing correctly that some of these men would be African Americans, Simmons wrote President McKinley to request that one or more light artillery companies be included “among the immunes.” After pointing out that the Georgia Artillery had “the honor of being the only colored artillery company in the United States,” Simmons stated that “to maintain our identity and to perpetuate this branch of the service in the history of our race, we pray your favorable consideration.” The War Department did not accept Simmons’s proposal.  

In 1899 the state reduced its black militia units to one seven-company infantry battalion, also headquartered in Savannah, and the artillery battery. A year later the state’s adjutant general reported that the administration of the units was good, and “the[ir] drill is all that could be asked.” Nevertheless, he recommended disbanding the black units, because he failed to see where they “are or can be of any service to the State, from a military standpoint.” In 1904 the state’s inspector general expressed the same sentiments, noting that “the colored troops . . . could not be used to suppress riot where white men were engaged without aggravating the affair and it would be a doubtful experiment to use them on a mob composed of their own race.” The Georgia Artillery’s annual inspection did not go well; it was placed on probation, and in April 1904 it was finally disbanded, followed sixteen months later by the state’s remaining black infantry companies.

The Regular Army

Meanwhile, most of the Regular Army’s artillery was assigned to coast defense. Some field artillery was used in the Indian campaigns in the West, but infantry or cavalry details almost always manned the guns. In late 1884 only 11 of the Army’s 60 artillery batteries (5 regiments) were located west of the 100th meridian, and 10 of them were stationed at the coastal forts guarding San Francisco harbor and the mouth of the Columbia River. Thirty-one other batteries were stationed along the Atlantic and Gulf coastlines, including 10 guarding New York harbor; 5 at Fort Adams near Newport, Rhode Island; and 5 at the Artillery School at Fort Monroe, Virginia.

The records of the Army’s black cavalry and infantry regiments were excellent, but in 1877 the New York Times reported that their white officers felt the units were unjustly treated. Because the Army believed that black troops were better suited to service in hot climates, the black regiments had, their officers complained, been “exiled . . . at the most disagreeable and unhealthy posts in the United States,” and many of these officers supported opening all units to black enlistment to end this discrimination. That same year Senator Ambrose E. Burnside of Rhode Island, a Civil War major general, introduced a bill to remove color restrictions on enlistments, but it never became law. Although he preferred having white troops, Lt. Gen. William T. Sherman also supported integrating the Army. In his 1880 annual report he commented, “All men should be enlisted who are qualified, and assigned to regiments, regardless of color or previous condition. Such has been the law and usage in the Navy for years, and the Army would soon grow accustomed to it.”

In spite of the fact that the Army allowed black soldiers to serve outside the cavalry and infantry as post hospital stewards and ordnance, quartermaster, and commissary sergeants, it refused to accept either individual black artillerymen or black artillery units. There was, however, some high-level interest in the latter subject. In an annual report submitted to Congress in December 1889, Secretary of War Redfield Proctor noted that the Army’s commanding general wanted to raise two more artillery regiments and observed that “Whether one or both of these new regiments may not be of colored men is worthy of consideration.” Proctor pointed out that the record of the four black regiments “is excellent” and that the African Americans “are neat, orderly, and obedient, are seldom brought before courts-martial, and rarely desert.” This last characteristic was especially attractive in a year when roughly one out of every nine soldiers went “over the hill.” The secretary also noted that black soldiers “would seem to be especially well adapted for service at some of the sea-coast fortifications, and the discipline and instruction received would benefit them and be a public good.” President Benjamin Harrison specifically endorsed Proctor’s recommendation that the Army’s artillery force be increased in the State of the Union message he sent to Congress on 3 December.

Later that month Republican Senator Joseph R. Hawley of Connecticut, chairman of his body’s Committee on Military Affairs, introduced a bill to reorganize the artillery. Hawley had been an antebellum abolitionist; commanded a brigade that included a black infantry regiment at the Battle of Olustee, Florida, in February 1864; and received a brevet promotion to volunteer major general before mustering
out of the Union Army in 1866. In 1884 the Petersburg, Virginia, Tribune had noted that “the colored people . . . hail[d] few warmer friends.” Hawley’s bill proposed increasing the number of artillery regiments from five to seven and included a provision that “the president, in his discretion, may authorize the enlistment of such proportion of colored men for service in one or more of said seven regiments of artillery as the interests of the service may demand.”

In January 1890 Republican Congressman Byron M. Cutcheon of Michigan, a Civil War colonel and brevet brigadier general, introduced the identical bill in the House of Representatives. Cutcheon was chairman of his chamber’s Committee on Military Affairs, and his bill passed the House in April 1890. It was only approved in the Senate on 28 February 1891, however, after it had been amended to reorganize the Army’s infantry regiments, expand its engineer battalion into a regiment, and increase the Army’s authorized strength from 25,000 men to 30,000. These provisions drew vigorous rebuttals from some Democratic congressmen, who sought unsuccessfully to prevent the bill from going to a conference committee. During the debate on the amended bill, Cutcheon explained that the administration planned “not to exceed one regiment of colored troops to garrison the seacoast fortifications in the extreme South.”

When the conferees reported a compromise military reorganization bill that would expand the artillery to seven regiments, allow for the enlistment of colored artillerymen, and authorize the formation of infantry battalions within the existing infantry regiments, opponents in the House continued to attack its costs and its infantry reorganization provisions. On the last day of the lame-duck session the Senate approved the conference report but the House rejected it by a vote of 48–54. Most of the opposition to the amended bill concerned its provisions adding officers and men to the Army. The extent to which racial politics contributed to the bill’s ultimate failure will probably never be known.

Nine months later the issue of black artillerymen again surfaced on Capitol Hill. In December 1891 Senator Redfield Proctor of Vermont, who had resigned his position as secretary of war a month before, introduced an artillery reorganization bill with the same provision for black enlistment. In April 1892 the Senate passed a military reorganization bill containing these artillery provisions, but the House failed to approve it. Senator Charles Manderson of Nebraska introduced a similar bill in August 1893 that would allow the president to enlist African Americans in one or more artillery regiments, but this time it did not emerge from committee.

Senator Hawley introduced a new bill to expand the artillery to seven regiments in December 1897, but this bill made no mention of enlisting black artillerymen. Perhaps the bill’s supporters doubted that African Americans could provide the “highest class of skilled labor” they deemed necessary to effectively operate the new coast artillery guns installed during the 1890s. As the United States moved closer to war with Spain, the Senate approved the bill, 58–4, on 22 February 1898, and the House soon followed suit, after debating the bill under a procedure that prohibited any amendment. Black Congressman George H. White, a Republican from North Carolina, nevertheless won loud and prolonged applause when he “appealed to American patriots to remove all statutory barriers now prescribed” against African Americans and to allow one of the new units to be “colored.” Henry V. Plummer, former chaplain of the 9th Cavalry, made the same suggestion to President McKinley on 8 March, when the president signed the bill into law. Plummer “earnestly request[ed] that one of the regiments be recruited from the Negro race,” but the War Department reserved the new units for white artillerymen.

On 11 March S. G. Hubert of Palmyra, Virginia, offered another suggestion for black participation in the artillery. Hubert, who was a teacher in the “higher colored schools” of Fluvanna County, Virginia, proposed to Senator Hawley that black men native to “malarious localities [be] trained to man the cannon used in defence [sic] of same.” To accomplish this, he suggested establishing a training station at Newport News, Virginia, to train African Americans to “skillfully” handle ordnance for mortars and heavy cannons. On 14 March Senator Hawley passed Hubert’s suggestion to Brig. Gen. Daniel W. Flagler, the chief
of ordnance, but no action was taken on the matter.  

During the Spanish-American War, when Capt. Henry H. Wright of the 9th Cavalry was asked why there were no black artillerymen, he bluntly replied that if they were allowed to "enlist in the artillery our shooting would . . . resemble the . . . marksmanship of the Spaniards." All of the Army's black regiments served in Cuba, and, in spite of Captain Wright's concerns, some of their men functioned as artillerymen during the brief Santiago campaign. Sgt. Horace W. Bivins of the 10th Cavalry, a noted Army marksman, was put in charge of a battery of four Hotchkiss guns during the assault on San Juan Hill. Other 10th Cavalry troopers capably served as temporary gunners with Lt. John H. Parker's Gatling gun detachment.  

In 1899 the seven artillery regiments were each expanded from twelve to fourteen batteries, with two field artillery batteries per regiment. Two years later Congress expanded the Army again, and an 'Artillery Corps' of 30 field artillery batteries and 126 coast artillery companies replaced the 7 artillery regiments. Black citizens in Illinois and Kansas responded to the latter act by sending identically worded petitions to President McKinley saying "that the time has now arrived when the Afro-American [sic] should be admitted and represented as soldiers into all the branches of the Armies of the United States." The citizens "earnestly petition[ed]" the president to organize two black batteries—one light and one heavy—but the War Department restricted all of the fourteen new artillery batteries authorized in 1899 and fifty-six new artillery batteries and companies authorized in 1901 to whites.  

Three years later two departmental commanders—Brig. Gen. Thomas H. Barry, commander of the newly restored Department of the Gulf, and his immediate superior, Maj. Gen. Henry C. Corbin, commander of the Atlantic Division and the Department of the East—raised the question of black enlistment in the coast artillery. In his annual report Barry observed that white artillerymen rarely reenlisted for sea-coast posts, many of which were "undesirable by reason of prolonged and excessive heat, isolation, mosquitoes, and bad water." The general saw black enlistment as a solution to this problem:  

The enlistment of colored men for the artillery and their assignment to the companies serving at these stations [sea-coast posts] suggests itself. There would seem to be ample authority for their enlistment under the law. . . . These men would be content at the stations referred to, can be obtained in any number desired, and in time will master the requirements of the Coast Artillery Service, and there would be no difficulty at all times in maintaining the organizations at their authorized strength.  

General Corbin's annual report noted that the "great labor" of caring for sea-coast guns was "so severe" that men refused to reenlist in the artillery. He thus recommended "the transfer to the Artillery Corps of sufficient trained men from the colored cavalry and infantry." He argued that the black soldiers "would in a very short time make good artillerists" and that "they would very soon, by their aptitude and love of the service, commend themselves to the artillery officers," just as they had to the officers of cavalry and infantry.  

Two months after General Barry submitted his report to the War Department, Southern newspapers picked up the story and, as the Atlanta Journal reported, "a storm of opposition" arose. Norfolk's Virginian-Pilot argued that the Southern people would prefer their ports "to look out for themselves" rather than have black artillerymen. The Charleston News and Courier published part of Barry's report in a front page article headlined "Degrading the Artillery." The newspaper labeled the general's suggestion "very unfortunate and unwise" and said that it would "probably run all white men out of the artillery." An editorial stressed "how peculiarly offensive to the Southern people such a course of conduct" would be. Mayor Herman Myers of Savannah wrote his senators and his congressman to encourage them to protest Barry's recommendation. The mayor suggested that if black artillerymen were to be utilized, "the trial should be made at the posts along the coast of New Jersey, New York, Massachusetts or other Northern states."  

Mayor Myers' letter energized Congressman William G. Brantley of Brunswick, Georgia, to inform Secretary of War William Howard Taft that the citizens of Savannah were concerned about the possible impact of Barry's recommendation on the manning of Fort Screven on nearby Tybee Island. Brantley argued that it would be a mistake for the recommendation to be carried out, "and I write to join in the hope that you will make careful investigation and give most careful consideration to same before reaching a favorable conclusion with reference thereto." A month later Senator Augustus O. Bacon of Georgia wrote the assistant secretary of war to "file [his] objections to the proposed plan." Senator Bacon stressed that Tybee Island was a popular seaside resort, rather than an "unhealthy and disagreeable place," and stationing black

![General Barry](https://www.usma.edu/Media/PressRoom/NewsImages/1997/Barry.jpg)
troops there "would have a most unfortunate and injurious effect."31

A few days before Brantly wrote his letter, Lt. Gen. Adna R. Chaffee, the Army's chief of staff, asked the opinion of Brig. Gen. George B. Davis, the Army's judge advocate general, on the legality of enlisting "colored" men for service in coast artillery units at Southern posts, and the latter replied that the 1866 law that created the black cavalry and infantry regiments was "mandatory and restrictive." Davis wrote that only Congress could change the racial composition of coast artillery units. When the Army and Navy Journal reported on Davis's response, it commented that "it may be authoritatively stated that the War Department does not look with favor upon the recommendation of General Barry. It is not believed by the authorities that it would be feasible to station colored soldiers in the Southern States and the matter will doubtless be allowed to drop."32

Spokesmen for the black community, however, refused to let the issue die. In January 1907 Congress divided the Army's artillery into coast and field artillery branches and created six new field artillery batteries and forty-four new coast artillery companies. The following month Presley J. Holliday, a former 10th Cavalry sergeant major who had been recommended for the Medal of Honor for his bravery in the fighting at San Juan Hill, wrote Emmett J. Scott, the personal secretary of influential black educator Booker T. Washington, to suggest that he seek President Theodore Roosevelt's assistance in creating some black artillery units. Roosevelt had angered most African Americans by discharging "without honor" 167 members of the 25th Infantry for their possible involvement in an unsolved shooting incident at Brownsville, Texas, in 1906 in which one man was killed and two others were wounded. Although Washington had opposed the dismissal, he and Scott continued to support the president. Ordering the creation of black artillery units might help to restore the popularity of Roosevelt and his party with black voters.33

Scott wrote Roosevelt in March 1907, asking him to order that six field artillery batteries and at least eighteen coast artillery companies "be recruited with colored men." Scott presented five reasons to justify this "favor" for African Americans: their proven bravery in combat (including their use of four Hotchkiss guns during the War with Spain), their proven good marksmanship in the cavalry and infantry, their "sufficient intelligence," their low desertion rates, and finally that "our most intelligent men deserve a chance to prove their ability and serve their country in the artillery branch of the service the same as white soldiers of similar qualifications do." Scott also said:

I have been informed that the War Department in the past has been of the opinion that colored men with sufficient intelligence to make good artillerymen cannot be found. This was doubtless true in the '60s and in the period immediately following, but does not hold good now as a trial, I am sure, will show. Whenever given an opportunity, as at Las Guasimas [in Cuba] in 1898, they have acquitted themselves credibly.34

Scott closed his letter to President Roosevelt by noting that although the size of the Regular Army had increased significantly since the Civil War, there had been greater black representation in its ranks before the first six regiments were consolidated into four in 1869. He correctly pointed out that "the Negro people since the first six regiments were authorized, have received no favors at the hands of congress or the War Department."35

The president passed Scott's letter to the War Department and asked for a report from the General Staff. The Army's chief of staff, Maj. Gen. J. Franklin Bell, directed his office's Military Information Division to determine whether African Americans could qualify for artillery service and to recommend "what portion of the new artillery force should be composed of negroes" in the event a decision was made to include them. The division's chief, Lt. Col. Thaddeus W. Jones, a cavalryman who had served with black troops for nearly three decades in the West, in Cuba, and in the Philippines, prepared a response cautiously favoring the incorporation of African Americans into the artillery, a proposal that, he observed, had the support of all but one member of his division.36

Colonel Jones first responded to Scott's justifications, acknowledging the bravery and lower desertion rates of black troops but pointing out that there was no link between small arms and artillery marksmanship. He also argued that the capacities of black soldiers for clerical work and leadership had developed more slowly than had those of white soldiers. Citing census data indicating that a smaller percentage of black males than native white males born of native white parents were engaged in a number of categories of skilled labor, Jones wrote that unless a higher proportion of skilled black workers wanted to serve in the military "there would be difficulty in filling the more important positions in an artillery organization composed wholly of negroes." He determined that the 1900 census showed that 10.42 percent of the militia age male population was
black, so 18 of 170 coast artillery companies and 4 of 36 field artillery batteries would be a fair distribution of black artillery units. Jones recommended, however, that the Army organize no more than eighteen black coast artillery companies and six black field artillery batteries (preferably mountain), each with a “skeleton” of volunteer white artillerists to fill the more important positions demanding special aptitude and training. If black soldiers later demonstrated the ability to occupy those positions, they could advance to them as vacancies arose. If not, the assignment of blacks to the artillery should cease.37

Two General Staff officers submitted reports dissenting from the views expressed by Colonel Jones. Maj. Cornelis DeWitt Willcox, a career artilleryman who had entered the service from Georgia, took a much harsher view of Scott’s justifications. He maintained that bravery was “not of itself a reason” why black soldiers “should be selected for a particular kind of service,” and that artillery marksmanship required good teamwork rather than individual shooting skills. Willcox asserted that the “negro race” was “inferior to the white race in intelligence and mental ability,” a matter he claimed was “recognized by many negroes themselves.” Their lower desertion rate would not help the artillery, Willcox argued, if the soldiers remaining were “unintelligent and unfitted for their duties.” As far as Scott’s argument that black soldiers deserved the chance to prove their ability as artillerymen, Willcox simply said, “We fail to see the bearing of this argument.” After detailing the highly skilled nature of modern artillery range finding and the complexity of coast artillery mechanisms, Willcox judged that it was “fairly to be concluded” that African Americans were “not fitted for the modern technical artillery service, either field or coast.” He stressed that the “late disturbance at Brownsville” illustrated “what may be expected in the South if this plan of negro companies be insisted on.” Finally Willcox pointed out that the “Artillery Bill” had just recognized coast artillery as a branch, and the new branch had many unsolved problems before it. Enlisting black coast artillerymen now would divert part of “the energies of the coast defense from its proper function to a race question. To enlist negroes is deliberately to open a running sore that may never heal.”38

A second minority report came from Major “CJB,” evidently Maj. Charles J. Bailey of the Third Division, the war plans section, of the General Staff, who was a coast artillery officer. He similarly argued that “the average negro recruit is not fitted by nature, disposition or training to acquire technical knowledge” and “an organization composed entirely of negroes will not become efficient for many years, if ever.” Instead, Bailey recommended integration, or “sending the colored recruit to any [artillery] organization where a vacancy exists.” Only those who could qualify for the more technical higher positions would be promoted to them. This would parallel the practice of the Navy, which was appropriate because “The higher duties of enlisted men in the Coast Artillery are more analogous to those in the Navy than to any branch of the land service. The experience, therefore, of the Navy with the negro should be considered, rather than that of land forces, and no other comparison should be made.”39

Booker T. Washington also talked with Secretary of War Taft, who asked for his “opinion in regard to the advisability and wisdom of organizing a colored regiment of field artillery.” Washington wrote Taft in late May 1907 that, after consulting with several people he respected and considering the criticism the move might arouse, he had nevertheless decided to “recommend strongly that the regiment be organized.” Washington pointed out that in most states the “colored state militia had been abandoned” and this had discouraged African Americans. He also hoped to repair some of the post-Brownsville damage to the Republican Party: “The organization of this regiment will stop much of the senseless and useless criticism that is now in the air and will let the country see and feel that the President and the administration are in favor of doing the right thing by all races regardless of praise or blame.”40

Washington wrote Taft again in January 1908, because he had heard that the Army’s six new field artillery regiments, which had been organized
enlist in the service, while I understand white men are difficult to get.” The black educator suggested that this offered an adequate reason to justify organizing a black regiment “at the proper time.”

Secretary Taft replied to Washington nine days later. He said that he had seen President Roosevelt about the matter and “he seems favorably inclined toward the creation of a colored regiment of artillery” but prefers to first await the report of the Senate Investigating Committee on the Brownsville affair. Taft added that he had “always been in favor of having one of the regiments consist of colored men.” The secretary of war wanted to be the Republican presidential candidate in 1908, however, and he apparently feared the political backlash from creating a new black unit. As he explained to Washington, “I had just about decided to give the order to organize one of the new artillery regiments with colored men when the Brownsville affair suddenly took a political turn.” Taft thus decided to postpone his decision. He told Washington, “I had just about decided to give the order to organize one of the new artillery regiments with colored men when the Brownsville affair suddenly took a political turn.” Taft thus decided to postpone his decision.

In 1906 about one-fourth of the Army’s coast artillery companies were stationed in the South, from Fort Hunt, Virginia, to Jackson Barracks in New Orleans. Southern white politicians opposed the creation of black artillery units, anticipating that some of them would be stationed in the South.

in May and June 1907, were already filled and “consequently there seemed to be no chance for a colored regiment to be organized.” He pointed out, “Colored men as a rule are anxious to

**World War I**

Six months after the United States declared war on Germany in April 1917, the War Department announced that it had decided to organize a black division. The 92d Division had its own 167th Field Artillery Brigade, while a later black formation—the 93d Division (Provisional)—comprised only two infantry brigades or four regiments, three of which were formed from black National Guard units, without organic artillery or trains. The 92d Division’s 167th Field Artillery Brigade, initially commanded by Brig. Gen. John E. McMahon, a former president of the Field Artillery Board, was authorized just over 5,000 men. The brigade comprised three regiments—the 349th, 350th, and 351st Field Artillery regiments—and the 317th Trench Mortar Battery, with smaller medical, ordnance, and veterinary units. The 349th and 350th were each eventually armed with twenty-four 75-mm. guns, while the 351st had twenty-four 155-mm. howitzers, and the 317th had a dozen 6-inch trench mortars.

All three regiments were constituted on 24 October 1917 and organized by 2 November, the 349th and 350th at Camp Dix, New Jersey, and the 351st at Camp Meade, Maryland. Obtaining black officers posed an immediate problem. On 20 October Col. P. D. Lochridge, acting chief of the War College Division of the Office of the Chief of Staff, had sent a memo to the chief of staff, General Tasker H.
Bliss, reporting that it was "believed to be absolutely impracticable to make battery commanders . . . out of the available colored material." The material he was referring to was the mid-October output of 639 black company officers, including 106 captains, from a special four-month segregated officer training camp that the Army had established at Fort Des Moines, Iowa. The camp provided strictly infantry training. Colonel Lochridge recommended that all fifteen of the 167th Field Artillery Brigade's officers above the rank of captain and all thirty-seven of its captains be white, but that a heavy majority of its lieutenants (130 of 133) be black. The War Department, however, assigned African American lieutenants to the 349th and 350th and white lieutenants to the 351st.

Inspections conducted in January 1918 indicated that leadership was only one of several major problems facing the brigade and its units. At Camp Dix the 349th and 350th together had only one battery of 3-inch guns, while at Camp Meade the 351st had Enfield rifles but no artillery. The brigade had no fire control equipment except for one battery commander's telescope, and the 317th Trench Mortar Battery at Camp Dix comprised just one man—its captain. One inspector at Camp Dix reported that regimental commanders were "apparently not hopeful of ever making these efficient artillery regiments on account of the lack of education and intelligence of the colored personnel." The officer opined that it would "take at least a year to train these regiments so that they can be sent to the front." The commander of the 351st thought that he could produce an "efficient artillery regiment" if he was provided with at least "300 educated colored men . . . for non-commissioned officers, specialists, clerks, etc." His inspector noted that his men's discipline and military courtesy were good, but "A certain leaven of educated and intelligent negroes is a necessity if they are ever to be made efficient in the methods of modern warfare." The brigade's officers then conducted recruiting drives in black high schools and other institutions, obtaining relatively well-educated black soldiers from Pittsburgh, Baltimore, and other cities, and a group of students from Tuskegee Institute.

In April 1918 Col. Daniel W. Ketcham, acting director of the War Plans Division, informed the chief of staff that the brigade's commander, Col. William E. Cole, considered the state of training of the black lieutenants of the 349th and 350th to be unsatisfactory and had suggested that many of them were "not mentally capable of becoming efficient officers." Ketcham explained that they were the only officers who had been assigned to National Army field artillery regiments without previous artillery training and "without undergoing elimination on the ground of mental or other incapacity for artillery work." Colonel Cole recommended either not using the black officers or sending them through a training camp for field artillery officers, and Colonel Ketcham endorsed the second option.

By 1 May 1918 Secretary of War Newton Baker had directed that all of the black officers in the 349th and 350th be sent to the next divisional officers' training camp and required to "come up to the established standard for Field Artillery officers." Those officers who failed to meet that standard would go to infantry, labor, or stevedore units and be replaced in the 349th and 350th by white field artillery officers. At least a half-dozen black officers completed officer training at Fort Sill and served with the brigade in France until the Armistice.

The artillery brigade's problems mirrored those of the 92d Division as a whole. Because the War Department wanted to minimize potential conflicts between black soldiers and white Southerners, the division's units had been distributed among seven camps outside the South—from the divisional headquarters at Camp Funston at Fort Riley, Kansas, to Camp Upton in Suffolk County, New York. This reduced the division's useful training time during the winter and, as the only division to be so fragmented during its training, prevented it from developing a level of divisional cohesion and esprit equal to those of other divisions. As the 92d prepared to deploy overseas, it was, in the words of the
foremost recent historians of African American service in World War I, "reluctantly conceived, superficially trained and inexpertly led." 48

After the 167th Field Artillery Brigade arrived in France in June and July 1918, it continued to train in rear areas at Montmorillon and La Courtine. Thus it did not join the rest of the 92d Division in August and September 1918 in occupying a 25-kilometer-long sector of the French Seventh Army's defensive line north of St. Dié in the Vosges Mountains. Many of its officers were still poorly trained, and much of its equipment was missing. A month after arriving in France, the 351st Field Artillery, which had no black officers, still had not fired its 155-mm. French howitzers.49

The 92d Division moved in early October to a sector of the forward defensive line just east of the Moselle River near Pont-à-Mousson, south of Metz. Its artillery brigade joined it there on 20 October, but the division retained the assistance of one white artillery regiment until the Armistice. When the 167th Brigade moved into this sector, it was finally equipped with the tractors and motor vehicles that made it a completely motorized unit. The brigade then capably supported the 92d Division's attacks during the final two days of the war. Brig. Gen. Malvern Hill Barnum, a career cavalryman who led the division's 183d Brigade in these attacks, reported that the divisional artillery supported the infantry advances with rolling barrages that "were very well laid and proved effective. It also rendered valuable work in placing heavy concentration fire on enemy strong points and machine-gun nests. Its counter-battery work was excellent." The black artillerymen also received congratulations from General John J. Pershing, who told them, "You men acted like veterans, never failing to reach your objective, once orders had been given you. I wish to thank you for your work." 50

Since it had spent only a short time on the line, the 167th Field Artillery Brigade had very few casualties—only twenty men from the three regiments were wounded in action and none died from their wounds. The brigade joined the rest of the 92d Division in returning to the United States in February and March 1919, and its regiments were speedily demobilized at the posts where they had been organized.51

In spite of General Pershing's commendation, other senior Army leaders were critical of the black artillerymen. In March 1920 Col. Charles C. Ballou gave a mixed evaluation of the merits of the 92d Division and its black officers. Ballou had commanded the division as a major general and had earlier served as lieutenant colonel of the black 24th Infantry in Pershing's Punitive Expedition into Mexico and as commander of the black officers' training camp at Fort Des Moines. He stated that his divisional artillery "did very good work—though few colored officers ever qualified at the School of Fire, and efficient noncoms were hard to find." Ballou concluded, "Few negroes can qualify as artilleryists." 52

Conclusion

In evaluating the limited experience of America's black artillerymen from the Civil War through World War I, it is obvious that their greatest enemy was always racial prejudice. The Army's senior leaders generally preferred white soldiers and were satisfied to limit the participation of blacks to the branches Congress had opened to them in 1866. They maintained that only further legislation could authorize black artillery units, but fair-minded senators and congressmen, such as Joseph R. Hawley, Byron M. Cutcheon, Redfield Proctor, and George H. White, were unable to convince both houses of Congress to enact such laws. Cutcheon's bill to increase the artillery did come extremely close to authorizing black artillerymen during the closing hours of the 51st Congress. The Army and Navy Journal noted that those were "hours of great possibilities for the line of the Army," and it could have correctly added "and for increased black participation in the Army." 53

Influential Army officers argued that most African Americans were not smart enough to master the technical aspects of the artillery branch. Moreover, Southern communities were not amenable to the possibility of assigning black artillery units to nearby coastal forts and used congressional pressure to dissuade the Army from attempting such an experiment. This Southern attitude was expressed in a 1904 Savannah newspaper editorial, "There is nothing the government could do that would tend more to increase race friction than the garrisoning of Southern army posts with Negro soldiers." The accusations raised against black soldiers in Brownsville, Texas, in 1906 exacerbated the South's distaste for black troops, and neither President Roosevelt nor President Taft was willing to authorize black artillerymen to help make amends for the former's highly questionable decision to order
the mass discharge of soldiers from the 25th Infantry.

The experiment with black artillerymen in World War I was so poorly handled by the War Department that it probably caused many African Americans to wonder whether the Army was trying to ensure their failure. The black lieutenants initially assigned to the 167th Field Artillery Brigade were poorly trained, and many of the enlisted men did not have enough education to be able to function as artillerymen. Inspectors also noted, "In most artillery units, there was a total lack of artillery equipment. When any was provided, it was either negligible in quantity or of a type which was of little training value." Still, the men worked hard, and after further training in France, they provided effective fire support for the 92d Division during the closing weeks of the war. The 92d's commander, General Ballou, later reported that his artillery "did very good work."

Emmett Scott admitted to Theodore Roosevelt that in the period immediately after the Civil War there probably was a lack of "colored men with sufficient intelligence to make good artillerymen." Two generations after the war, in 1907, a fair trial of a black unit would have demonstrated that things had certainly changed. More than another generation had to pass, however, before the Regular Army finally included black artillery regiments—one field and two anti-aircraft—in its 1940 expansion. Dozens more black artillery units were raised before the end of World War II. In 1948 the Army finally followed the wise advice of General Sherman and Major "CJB" and began the process of integrating the "King of Battle."
NOTES

The author would like to thank Anthony Gero of Auburn, New York, and Budge Weidman, project manager of the Civil War Conservation Corps at the National Archives, for their superb assistance.


2. Dyer, Compendium, pp. 1630, 1718, 1721–22. The 9th U.S. Colored Heavy Artillery had four companies. For details on the Fort Pillow massacre, see Andrew D. R. Dobak and John H. Moncre, 11th U.S. Colored Heavy Artillery, and Frank M. Welch, 54th Massachusetts Volunteer Infantry, all in Record Group (hereafter RG) 94, Records of the Office of the Adjutant General, National Archives (hereafter NA).


5. Ibid., p. 49; Savannah Tribune, 7 Aug 1897.


13. Ltr, Hubert to Hawley, 11 Mar 1898 (quotations), and Ltr, Hawley to Flagler, 14 Mar 1898, both in Doc. file #72375, RG 94, NA.


15. Petition from Illinois Citizens, undated but received at the War Department on 23 Apr 1901, Doc. file #375206, and Petition from Kansas citizens, undated but received at the War Department on 21 May 1901, Doc. file #379437, both in RG 94, NA; Janice McKeyenney, "Field Artillery" (Unpubl. Ms., CMI, 2002), p. 171–76. Five of the twelve citizens who signed the document were from Wichita, three from Kansas City, and one from Topeka.


17. Rpt, Atlantic Division and Department of New England, 20 Sep 1904, printed in Ibid., 17: 136–37. Corbin had served for many years with black troops in both the 14th U.S. Colored Infantry and the 24th Infantry.
30. Atlanta Journal, 7 Oct 1904; Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 9 Oct 1904; Charleston News and Courier, 6-7 Oct 1904, Savannah Morning News, 7 Oct 1904. The Atlanta Journal later reported that Barry only wanted to station black artillerymen at isolated Florida posts.
31. Lt. Brantly to Secretary of War, 10 Oct 1904, and attached clipping from the Savannah Morning News, 6 Oct 1904, in Doc. file #932159, and Lt. Bacon to Assistant Secretary of War, 5 Nov 1904, Doc. file #942632, both in RG 94, NA. By 1906 three coast artillery companies, each authorized 10 enlisted men, were assigned to Fort Screven.
35. Ibid. On 30 June 1907 the total strength of the four black regiments was 2,925, having declined by more than 2,000 since the turn of the century. As a portion of total Army strength, the enlisted strength of its black regiments in 1869 was approximately 27 percent. It was 7.4 percent in 1900 and just under 5 percent in 1907. See Schubert, On the Trail, p. 509; Heitman, Historical Register of the Army, 2: 626; and for 1907, Russell F. Weigley, History of the United States Army (New York, 1967), p. 568.
36. Memo, Chief of Staff for Military Information Division, Office of the Chief of Staff, 6 Apr 1907, reproduced in MacGregor and Nalty, Blacks in the Armed Forces, 3: 336. After graduating from West Point in 1872, Jones served in the 10th Cavalry through the Santiago campaign of the Spanish-American War, commanded the black 10th U.S. Volunteer Infantry (July 1898–March 1899), and was lieutenant colonel of the black 48th U.S. Volunteer Infantry (September 1899–June 1901), a unit raised for the Philippine War. Jones's father, a Union Army veteran, represented western North Carolina in Congress in 1868–71.
37. Memo, Jones to Secretary, General Staff, 22 Apr 1907, reproduced in MacGregor and Nalty, Blacks in the Armed Forces, 3: 337–38, quotations, pp. 341, 342.
40. Lt. Washington to Taft, 28 May 1907, in Harlan and Smock, Booker T. Washington Papers, 9: 279–80, quotations, p. 280. The number of black militia companies fell from forty in 1903 to twenty-five in 1907, primarily due to the Militia Act of 1903, which made it more difficult for states to discriminate against their black units. Rather than comply with this legislation, several states simply opted to disband their black units.
41. Lt. Washington to Taft, 27 Jan 1908, in ibid., p. 448; the dates and places at which the regiments were organized are detailed in Janice E. McKenney, Field Artillery: Regular Army and Army Reserve, Army Lineage Series (Washington, D.C., 1985), pp. 7, 29, 39, 59, 68, 85.
44. James A. Suwicki, comp., Field Artillery Organizations of the U.S. Army, 2 vols. (Dumfries, Va., 1977–78), pp. 579, 582, 584. Memo, Lochead for Chief of Staff, 20 Oct 1917, and Memo, Brig Gen William J. Snow, Chief of Field Artillery, for the Chief of Staff, 16 May 1918, reproduced in MacGregor and Nalty, Blacks in the Armed Forces, 4: 117–19 and 130, respectively. Arthur E. Barbeau and Florette Henri, The Unknown Soldiers: Black American Troops in World War I (Philadelphia, 1974), p. 61, provide the number of black officers that graduated from Camp Des Moines. Lochead believed that there were only 624 graduates but agreed that these included 106 captains.
46. Memo, Ketcham for Chief of Staff, 20 Apr 1918, reproduced in MacGregor and Nalty, Blacks in the Armed Forces, 4: 127–28, quotations, p. 127. Units of the National Army (primarily comprised of draftees), the Regular Army, and the National Guard formed the U.S. Army in World War I.
47. Memo, Brig Gen William S. Graves for the Adjutant General, 1 May 1918 (quotation), and Memo, Maj Gen Pershing C. Marsh, Acting Chief of Staff, for the Adjutant General, 21 May 1918, reproduced in ibid., pp. 129 and 132, respectively; Charles H. Williams, Side­lights on Negro Soldiers (Boston, 1923), p. 173.
49. American Battle Monuments Commission, 92d Division, pp. 4, 27; Barbeau and Henri, The Unknown Soldiers, p. 140.
51. American Battle Monuments Commission, 92d Division, pp. 33, 34. Hearing racial problems between black soldiers and French civilians, the Army's senior leadership ensured that the 92d went home quickly.

National Guard Museum Opens in Washington, D.C.

On 17 March 2003 the National Guard Association of the United States opened the new National Guard Memorial Museum in the association's headquarters building at 1 Massachusetts Avenue, NW, Washington, D.C. The museum explores the history of the militia and National Guard in the United States from the first British American militia muster in 1636 to the response of the National Guard to the attacks of 11 September 2001. The museum is open from 1000 to 1600 hours, Monday through Friday.
Marines Clearing German Soldiers from Machine Gun Nests in Belleau Wood

“T
here was always good feelings between the Marines of the 2d Division and
the Regular Army units that formed it, but the Marines and the 2d Engineers — ‘Say,
if I ever got a drink, a 2d Engineer can have half of it! — Boy, they dig trenches and
mend roads all night, and they fight all day!’”

John Thomason
Devil Dogs in Olive Drab
The 2d Engineers at Belleau Wood

By William T. Anderson

In the Marine Corps' Hall of Heroes, there are few more revered than those stalwarts of the 4th Marine Brigade, 2d Division, American Expeditionary Forces (A.E.F.). The names of the young Marine officers who struggled in Belleau Wood read like a "Who's Who" of the great combat leaders of the Marines' amphibious campaigns in World War II. However, often lost in the Marine mythology are the significant sacrifices made by the soldiers of the U.S. Army who were attached to the 4th Marine Brigade in the hot, dusty days of June 1918. The purpose of this article is to highlight the important contributions of the 2d Division's engineers, the 2d Engineer Regiment, in this bloody contest in June 1918. With shovel and '03 Springfield, the 2d Engineers fought side-by-side with the "devil dogs" of the 4th Marine Brigade. As then-Marine Capt. John Thomason reported in his 1926 classic Fix Bayonets, "There was always good feelings between the Marines of the 2d Division and the Regular Army units that formed it, but the Marines and the 2d Engineers — 'Say, if I ever got a drink, a 2d Engineer can have half of it! — Boy, they dig trenches and mend roads all night, and they fight all day!'"

The Allies were not expecting the Germans to launch in the spring of 1918 an attack against the French on the Aisne front between Noyon and Reims, an area that had witnessed a devastatingly futile French attack the previous year. Nevertheless, on 27 May 1918 the German Army launched there the third phase of its spring offensive to defeat the Allies, and within four days the Germans were at the banks of the Marne River. Assailing over a thirty-mile front, they drove over the Chemin-des-Dames ridge and quickly exceeded their High Command's expectations. On the 29th they captured the important railroad town of Soissons and began to exploit their success, pressing ever closer to Paris. The result was the demoralization of the Allies and the creation of a third great bulge or salient in the Allied line in the shape of a triangle formed by Reims in the east, Château-Thierry in the south center, and Soissons to the north. Everything seemed to be moving in Germany's favor. Unfortunately for the Germans, however, the speed of the advance had outrun their logistics, and their exhausted troops were about to meet the Americans, including the 2d Engineers.

The 2d Engineer Regiment had been formed in July and August 1916 from the 2d Battalion of Engineers while most of the unit was participating in Brig. Gen. John Pershing's Punitive Expedition into Mexico. The unit remained in Mexico until February 1917, but after the United States declared war on Germany, the regiment began training in earnest for the difficult tasks associated with trench warfare. The first portion of the regiment's journey to France started at El Paso, Texas, on 22 August 1917, when it embarked by rail for Washington, D.C., under the command of Col. James F. McNedoe, a man who had ranked fourth in his class upon his graduation from the U.S. Military Academy in 1891. It was on the grounds of the American University in Washington that the regiment was outfitted for further duty in France.

The 2d Engineers sailed for Great Britain on 10 September 1917 and then proceeded to France. The regiment was initially employed building troop accommodations near Nancy in eastern France for the anticipated arrival of many thousands of American soldiers. During January and February it engaged in intensive infantry and engineer troop training with the 2d Division a few miles south of where it had been pursuing construction work. In March its
regimental headquarters and 2d Battalion moved into the defensive line with the 2d Division southeast of Verdun, while the 1st Battalion joined the 1st Division in a sector north of Toul not far away. The regiment was reunited in the 2d Division area in mid-May 1918. Prior to the German attack in the Aisne sector, the division headed toward the part of the line further north near Amiens, where the Germans had advanced against the British earlier in the spring.5 Many have told the story of the 2d Division reversing its course and traveling to Belleau Wood in the final days of May 1918. They described the long convoy of “camions” or trucks that snaked along the Paris-Metz highway from Meaux to Montereau-Lions, where many members of the division commenced their foot march to the front. Initially, it had been planned to hold the engineer regiment in division reserve at Montereau-Lions, but as events turned out, it did not stay there very long. Ordered to support the French units to the west of Château-Thierry, the 2d Division commander assigned the 1st Battalion of the 2d Engineers to the 3d Infantry Brigade, his Army infantry element that comprised the 9th and 23d Infantry Regiments, and the 2d Battalion, 2d Engineers, to the 4th Marine Brigade, consisting of the 5th and 6th Marine Regiments. The Marine brigade, which was led by Army Brig. Gen. James G. Harbord, was assigned the area running generally from Les Mares Farm on the left through Lucy-le-Bocage to Triangle Farm on the right. The two battalions were supposed to be used only to perform engineer duties in support of the infantry. The primary such duty was entrenching, which was often referred to as “consolidating positions.” This plan for the utilization of engineer assets was quickly revised, however, and both battalions eventually participated in combat alongside the Marines.6

During the evening of 1–2 June 1918, the two engineer battalions walked from Montereau-Lions to Paris Farm, some two miles southwest of Lucy-le-Bocage, where they drew their entrenching tools. The 1st Battalion—Companies A, B, and C—then deployed to the area near La Croisette Woods in support of the 9th Infantry. The 2d Battalion—Companies D, E, and F—moved between Lucy-le-Bocage and Triangle Farm in support of the 6th Marines. However, due to darkness and lack of maps, the 2d Battalion companies did not arrive as planned. Companies D and E reached the American forward line near Triangle Farm, but Company F was in front of Lucy-le-Bocage. In the vicinity of Triangle Farm, the platoons of Company D were assigned to companies in the 6th Marines and helped to repel the German attack of 2 June.7

When they could not prepare or consolidate defensive positions for the Leathernecks, the engineers from Company D served with them in the line. They received a prompt introduction to what it meant to support the Marine brigade on what had effectively become the front line due to the defeat of the French 43d Division that had been in front of the 6th Marines. Several engineer soldiers would be recognized later for their exemplary conduct in the fighting that day and the following night. Pvt. Jefferson Holt and Charles Raffington of the battalion’s medical detachment received Distinguished Service Crosses after they continually exposed themselves to severe enemy fire in order to bring aid to wounded engineers and marines. Although wounded and in great pain, 1st Sgt. Mack Byrd refused evacuation on 3 June and remained with the company commander during the battle. He was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross for his physical courage. As a result of this action and continued exemplary conduct, Byrd was later commissioned as a lieutenant.8

While the 6th Marines were defending the area around Triangle Farm, the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, took over responsibility for repelling German assaults on the brigade’s left flank. On 4 June 1918, this battalion stopped the final German attack of the offensive at Les Mares Farm, just northeast of the village of Marigny.9
As both sides rested on 5 June, the Allies decided to attack. General Joseph Dégoutte, the French XXI Corps commander, ordered a general advance to begin on 6 June with the ultimate objective of retaking Belleau Wood and the village of Bureches just to the east. This would prove to be by far the most catastrophic day yet encountered in Marine Corps history. At its conclusion, more marines had been killed or wounded than had become casualties in all of the Corps’ previous history.  

The 2d Engineer Regiment played a critical role in those bloody twenty-four hours. Unfortunately, the engineers shared both the glory and the sacrifice. Although the 2d Engineers’ 1st Battalion had initially been assigned to the 3d Infantry Brigade, on 6 June it would participate with the 6th Marines in the brutal fighting for the village of Bureches and the southern edge of Belleau Wood. Likewise, the Engineers’ 2d Battalion would be bruised and battered after providing needed reinforcements to the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, following its assault on Hill 142 north of the village of Champillon.

The first phase of the 4th Marine Brigade’s plan to take Belleau Wood began with the attack on Hill 142. This attack was intended to support a French advance farther west. However, when the commander of the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, Maj. Julius Turrill, received the order from the 5th Marine Regiment to attack at 0345 hours on 6 June, not all of his battalion, its supporting machine guns, and its intelligence assets had been properly assembled. Nevertheless, the marines stepped out of the woods and into the unknown smartly on time, with the 49th Company on the right and the 67th Company on the left. After going about fifty meters, they ran into murderous machine gun fire. Fighting “Indian style,” the survivors pushed their way into the woods and overcame the German machine gun positions. As they reached the objective near Vaillon Spring shortly before 0800, the situation became critical due to the number of casualties they had suffered and the fact that elements of the 49th Company had overrun the objective. Realizing the error, the company’s commander, Capt. George Hamilton, brought his marines back to Hill 142. Due to the deaths of the commander and first sergeant of the 67th, he quickly took charge of the remnants of both companies and organized a defensive line.

As the day progressed, the remainder of the battalion and more machine guns finally reached the area and moved forward rapidly. Mixed in
with these fresh Marine troops were two companies of Army engineers, Capt. Edwin Chisholm's Company D and Capt. John Costello's Company E, 2d Engineers. Placed in the line alongside the marines to help them dig in, the engineers joined in the repulse of many vigorous German counterattacks. It was here that the 2d Battalion, 2d Engineers, first exhibited the professionalism under fire that drew the admiration of the marines. The engineers established outposts and conducted patrols. In addition, they performed critical supply duties by repeatedly going to the rear and returning with water and ammunition, vital commodities that were in short supply on Hill 142.12

Later on 6 June, the 1st Battalion, 2d Engineers, contributed significantly to the efforts of the marines on the eastern flank of the 4th Brigade area between the villages of Lucy-le-Bocage and Bouresches. Following the costly success of the assault at Hill 142, the next phase of the operation to capture Belleau Wood began at 1700. The initial plan of the brigade directed a coordinated assault by the 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, hitting the center of Belleau Wood and the 3d Battalion, 6th Marines, striking its southern edge; both battalions would then seize the village of Bouresches and two hills just north of the village, aided by the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, and a company from the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines. The attack of the 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, across the wheat field just north of Lucy proved to be a disastrous frontal assault over open terrain. The uncoordinated attack of the 3d Battalion, 6th Marines, into the southern edge of Belleau Wood stalled as the defenders shifted their fires to meet the threat. However, the 2d Battalion, 6th Marines, which had been ordered to aid the attack on Bouresches from its position near Triangle Farm in an amendment to the initial plan, managed to seize Bouresches. Due to the heavy casualties, the 96th Company from the 2d Battalion, 6th Marines, was only barely able to scramble into the village led by 1st Lt. James Robertson on the left and future commandant of the Marine Corps, 2d Lt. Clifton Cates, the 4th Platoon commander, on the right.13

The desperate situation in the village and at the southern edge of the woods called for engineer support by Companies A and B, 2d Engineers, that evening. As directed, the two companies left the reserve areas south of Lucy-le-Bocage on the evening of 6 June. At Lucy they were ordered to advance down the road toward Bouresches to support the 2d and 3d Battalions, 6th Marines. However, when the head of the engineer column, with Company A in the lead, was about two kilometers from Bouresches, it was swept by artillery fire, and Company B received its first casualties. Despite the enemy shelling, which included both high explosives and gas, Company A reached Bouresches at 0200, 7 June, and its platoons sought shelter where they could find it. This was a critical concern as the German artillery fire was intense during 7 June.14

Company B, evidently following its orders, meanwhile filed off to the left of the road and entered Belleau Wood. The column found a ravine that ran along the southern edge of the woods and followed its course until about 0230, when it encountered and joined the 3d Battalion, 6th Marines. However, a man in the 3d Platoon, Company B, lost contact near the edge of Lucy with the man he was following, causing the rest of the 3d Platoon and the entire 4th Platoon to become separated. As the road ahead came under bombardment, these men took shelter in roadside trenches and remained isolated until a guide came from their company commander. Still unlucky, this group then stumbled past the trail into the woods and continued down the road to Bouresches. Having lost two men killed and seven wounded in the bombardment, the senior officer of this reinforced platoon placed his men under the command of the senior marine in the town, Capt. Randolph Zane, commander of the 79th Company, 2d Battalion, 6th Marines, which had by now reinforced the 96th Company.
there. Most of these Company B men rejoined their company in Belleau Wood the following night, although a sergeant and several men became lost again, this time amid the boulders and underbrush of the woods, and they were cut off behind German lines for three days.\footnote{\textsuperscript{16}}

After resting most of the day on 7 June, the platoons of Company A were employed to improve the defensive positions in Bousches. The 1st Platoon, under 1st Lt. Tucker Wyche, barricaded the street in the center of the position, while the 2d Platoon, commanded by 1st Lt. Allan Burton, built machine gun emplacements on the left flank. About twenty men from the 3d Platoon, with 2d Lt. George Woodle in the lead, improved positions on the right flank as 2d Lt. Walter Booth’s 4th Platoon constructed machine gun positions covering the center of the village.\footnote{\textsuperscript{17}}

At 0030 on 8 June the Germans began a very strong counterattack against Bousches, supported by heavy machine gun fire from the railroad embankment outside the village. Immediately, the engineers in Bousches dropped their tools and grabbed their ’03 Springfields. Every engineer in the village played a role in repelling the German attack. Any engineers in reserve, who were not actively working when the attack began, became part of the operational reserve under Captain Zane, who used them as reinforcements or on patrols. At the height of the battle there were 110 engineers either in the front line positions in Bousches or in Captain Zane’s operational reserve there. When the Germans withdrew, the engineers surprisingly had lost no more than seven men killed or wounded.\footnote{\textsuperscript{18}}

Company A continued to support the marines in Bousches for the next two days, as the town was continually shelled. It withdrew before dawn on 10 June, the day the 2d Battalion, 6th Marines, was relieved by the 3d Battalion, 5th Marines. As the engineers left, the marines congratulated them for their courage and coolness under fire during this struggle for Bousches. Maj. Thomas Holcomb, the commanding officer of the 2d Battalion, 6th Marines, and another future commandant of the Marine Corps, sent commendatory messages up the chain of command in recognition of the company’s notable contribution to the defense of the village. Singled out for recognition were soldiers like Pvt. (later Cpl.) Louis Goodrich, who was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross for successfully carrying the relief order from Lucy in daylight along the road to Bousches, which was under constant and accurate German machine gun and artillery fire.\footnote{\textsuperscript{19}}

In Belleau Wood, those from Company B who did not get lost prepared positions in support of the marines during 7 June as this portion of the woods was also subjected to German artillery, mortar, and machine gun fire. Early on 8 June, as the Germans began their counterattack on Bousches, they simultaneously attacked the 3d Battalion, 6th Marines, in the woods. Although the attacks were unsuccessful, Company B lost four men killed and three wounded. At 0430, the entire force was withdrawn to the ravine by which the engineers had entered the woods so that the division artillery could pulverize the enemy positions in front of them. At dawn the marines reentered the woods and attacked, supported by Company B’s 1st Platoon under 1st Lt. Lester Smith. The company’s 2d Platoon, under 2d Lt. James Gregory, assisted the attack by providing patrols protecting the marines’ flank. This renewed attack gained little ground before it was halted at 0600, and the remainder of the day was spent consolidating positions, requiring Company B to resume digging. At dark on 8 June Company B was withdrawn from Belleau Wood and marched to a bivouac area near Marigny.\footnote{\textsuperscript{20}}
Following his brigade’s failure to seize Belleau Wood on 6–8 June, General Harbord issued a new attack order on the evening of 9 June. It called for an attack by Maj. John Hughes’s 1st Battalion, 6th Marines, into the southern portion of the woods from the ravine to the south. Due to the damage sustained in the previous American attacks and from heavy artillery bombardment, German resistance in this area was no longer at the level of effectiveness that destroyed the 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, and stymied the 3d Battalion, 6th Marines. As a result, the 1st Battalion, 6th Marines, was able to penetrate and establish positions much deeper in the woods. Then on 10 June General Harbord ordered Lt. Col. Frederic Wise’s 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, to attack the northern end of Belleau Wood the following day at 0430. Taking advantage of the reduced state of the enemy, which nevertheless was still sufficiently strong to blanket the battalion’s approach with deadly fire, Wise’s marines fought their way into the woods. However, they were in the middle part of the woods, not the northern part. Due to the confusion of close combat in a densely wooded area, the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, became disoriented, and Colonel Wise erroneously reported on 11 June that he and his men had reached their objective at the northern edge of the woods.

As a result of this inaccurate report, Col. Wendell Neville, the commander of the 5th Marines, requested two companies of engineers to consolidate the positions at the brigade objective. Col. Preston Brown, the chief of staff of the 2d Division, quickly sent forward two engineer companies from the 2d Battalion to exploit this apparent success. The battalion's commander, Maj. William Snow, led them into action. Once the companies reached the woods, however, it was quickly apparent the location of the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, was not as reported. Company D was then directed to assist Colonel Wise’s battalion in the center of the woods, while Company F entrenched positions on the western edge of the woods. These engineers soon experienced the thrill of supporting marines in battle when the Germans mounted a counterattack during the evening. Company D engineers were intermingled with the marines at every point of the action. Some platoons actually took part in raids against the German positions. The 1st Platoon, commanded by 1st Lt. Lyman Chase, assaulted a German machine gun position. Going into action with forty-four men, Lieutenant Chase could only count twenty-six effectives when they left the woods. The heroism Cpl. Joseph Sanders displayed during this fighting, combined with his bravery on 13 June when he carried a wounded officer through intense fire to a dressing station, won him a Distinguished Service Cross.

At 1700 on 12 June, Company F was ordered to move north and rein-

Distinguished Service Cross citation for
Maj. William A. Snow

For extraordinary heroism in action in the Belleau Woods, France, 12–15 June 1918.

In order to consolidate the position of his brigade, Major Snow personally led one company of his battalion thru a heavy barrage. After passing thru the barrage he discovered that part of the company had become separated because of the violent fire. He returned thru the barrage and in so doing was wounded in the neck. After having his wound dressed at the aid station he refused to go to the rear, but went back and conducted the remainder of the men thru the barrage. Despite his wounds he remained on duty for sixteen hours until ordered to the rear.
force the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, on their front. However, this movement proved to be disastrous, as the company came under a mixed barrage of high explosives and gas that killed the company's commander, Capt. Jesse Lowen. Many members of the company were unable to find their way through the thick woods and underbrush in their gas masks. Only 50 engineers, now commanded by 1st Lt. Harold Barrons, out of the 180 that had commenced the deployment, reached the marines. Upon their arrival, the men were immediately placed in the line facing north. Some of these engineers then joined a group of marines in capturing or killing some thirty German soldiers occupying ditches along a nearby road. Major Snow, who had been leading the company, went back to search for the missing soldiers, and although wounded in the effort, ultimately managed to reunite the company. He too was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross.\(^{23}\)

Continuing their frontline support during repeated shelling, the engineers from both companies remained with the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, until relieved early on 14 June by a company of the 6th Marines. The combined force of marines and engineers had reached the limit of its physical endurance. As a result of its duty with the Marine brigade, Company D could only muster thirty men for duty on 16 June. It had lost 11 men killed or wounded; some 40 to 50 gassed; and 20 to 30 evacuated due to physical exhaustion.\(^{24}\)

Following the withdrawal of the Marine battalions from Belleau Wood during 15–19 June, the 2d Engineers’ contribution to Marine operations there ended. However, the battle continued unabated as the Army's 7th Infantry regiment relieved the exhausted marines. However, the 7th Infantry also failed to capture the woods and, beginning on 21 June, the 2d and 3d Battalions, 5th Marines, and the 3d Battalion, 6th Marines, reentered the line. Finally on 26 June 1918, General Harbord, the Marine brigade's commander, received the famous message, "BELLEAU WOODS NOW U.S. MARINE CORPS ENTIRELY."\(^{26}\)

During the struggle for Belleau Wood, the 2d Division called upon its engineers repeatedly to go forward as reinforcements either to support Marine attacks or to assist in the defense of positions already taken. The regimental history of the 2d Engineers states that, from the first attacks of the Marine brigade on 6 June until the division was relieved in July, all or part of the regiment was engaged in every offensive action. The members of the engineer regiment were very thankful for the infantry training they had received and put that training to effective use in close combat in the tangled undergrowth of Belleau Wood. They continued to serve valiantly for the remainder of the war. French military authorities, with the approval of the commander of the A.E.F., General John Pershing, awarded the 2d Engineers a Croix de Guerre for its contribution to the Aisne-Marne campaign beginning on 18 July. Unfortunately, by the end of the war the regiment also earned the distinction of accumulating the largest percentage of major casualties, 12.73 percent, of any engineer unit in the American Expeditionary Forces. Major casualties included those who were killed in action; died of wounds, disease, or accident; or were declared missing. These losses far exceeded the 2.65 percent average major casualty rate for engineer units during the war, and they even exceeded by just over 1 percent the average similar losses for infantry units. The high loss figure for the 2d Engineers was consistent, however, with its service in the 2d Division, the organization that suffered the largest number of major casualties of any organization in the A.E.F. During the period 1 June to 16 July 1918, when

During the period 1 June to 16 July 1918, when it was employed at Belleau Wood, the 2d Engineers suffered 452 casualties, losing 91 killed in action, 30 dying of wounds, and 331 wounded. With an assigned strength of 1,697, it had in this period endured a casualty rate of 26.7 percent!
it was employed at Belleau Wood, the 2d Engineers suffered 452 casualties, losing 91 killed in action, 30 dying of wounds, and 331 wounded. With an assigned strength of 1,697, it had in this period endured a casualty rate of 26.7 percent.

The significance of the engineers' contribution at Belleau Wood was not lost on General Harbord. On 22 July 1923, some six months after he retired from the Army as a major general, the former 4th Marine Brigade commander dedicated the Belleau Wood Memorial Park next to the American Military Cemetery in Belleau, France. The Belleau Wood Memorial Association, under the sponsorship of the Navy League of the United States, had purchased the park, comprising about one-third of the entire Belleau Wood, in May 1923. (The remainder is still privately owned.) In his remarks, General Harbord noted that the former hunting preserve had become in June 1918 the focal point of a desperate struggle. Purely by chance, the world's attention was fixed on this small tangle of woodland and giant boulders. Harbord stated that by the end of June 1918 the name Belleau Wood had been written on the tablet of history to chronicle the immortal fame of the men of the 4th Marine Brigade "and their comrades of the Second Engineers."

Although the advances of the increasingly exhausted German Army were in fact grinding to a halt by June 1918, most military historians affirm that the success of the U.S. 2d Division at Belleau Wood was a great stimulus to the Allied armies, which were themselves demoralized and close to exhaustion. As Cyril Falls stated in his classic account, *The Great War*, the "dash and daring" exhibited by the Americans in the capture of Belleau Wood was "comforting" in a month that witnessed continued German offensives elsewhere in France. Besides its strategic and operational consequences in blunting the German advance and restoring hope to the Allied cause, the fighting in the vicinity of Belleau Wood marked a noteworthy evolution in the development of the modern Marine Corps. The words and actions of marines at this place have become important parts of the Corps' history and tradition. All should remember, however, that the success of the 4th Marine Brigade at Belleau Wood was in every sense a joint accomplishment in light of the support the 2d Engineers gave to the Marine regiments there. Indeed, this effective relationship would continue to the very end of the war, when the 1st and 2d Battalions, 5th Marines, forced their way across the Meuse River on 10 November 1918. The marines made this crossing under artillery and machine gun fire on bridging improvised by the 2d Engineers.
After the battle for Belleau Wood, officers in the 2d Division began to debate the proper use of engineers. During that battle engineer personnel had often been used as infantry reinforcements. This was justified as a critical requirement under emergency circumstances. Most engineer officers concluded that their units should be armed with French Chauchat automatic rifles, and some urged the Army to give them machine guns as well. These proposals were rejected, however, because they would have reinforced the view that it was correct to employ engineer troops as infantrymen, as occurred at Belleau Wood. The 2d Division staff viewed engineers as specialized troops that should fight only if necessary, and it did not welcome the alacrity with which the supported infantry brigade and regimental commanders had employed the engineer assets as additional infantry in battle. The 2d Division thus adopted a new policy of avoiding assignment of engineers to infantry units. Henceforth, the engineers were retained under the direct control of the division commander and were only attached to an infantry unit to accomplish a specific task.

During the staff rides that I lead throughout the year at Belleau Wood, I always pause at the end to identify a small stone marker laid in 1919 just beyond the grounds of the American military cemetery. Although the engineer emblem it features is worn by time and weather and the marker itself needs restoration, it stands in silent tribute to the soldiers of the 2d Engineers who fought and died with the 4th Marine Brigade. They, too, earned the right to be called devil dogs.

The Author

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Notes

1. According to Marine Corps tradition, the Germans were so impressed with the aggressiveness of the 4th Brigade's attacks that they called the marines "devil dogs" after the large hunting dogs that victimized the German soldiers at the nearby Château Belleau.


6. Ibid., pp. 20-22.

7. Ibid., pp. 22-23.

8. Ibid., pp. 122, 130; Burton, History of the Second Engineers, p. 41. Byrd received a Croix de Guerre with Silver Star as a second lieutenant on 19 July 1918 for courageous conduct near Viazy.


15. This terrain feature on French maps is a drainage ditch named "Gobert." The marines referred to it as "Gob Gully." It became an important avenue of approach into Belleau Wood for men and supplies throughout the battle because it permitted unobserved access to the southern part of the woods from the vicinity of Lucy-le-Bocage. See Richard Suskind, Do You Want To Live Forever? (New York, 1964), p. 47.


Virginia Historical Journals Publish Articles by Army History Author


Army Issues Field Manual 1–20

The Army published Field Manual 1–20, Military History Operations, in February 2003. It provides basic Army doctrine on the roles, responsibilities, and relationships of Army component command historians, unit historical officers and historians, and members of military history detachments. The field manual describes how these individuals preserve and document the history of the Army and explains how the Army conducts military history operations during wartime. Individual chapters discuss the products of military history operations, the coverage of military operations other than war, and military history planning.

The Army Center of Military History, the manual’s proponent, and the command history office of U.S. Army Forces Command jointly developed the field manual. The Center’s Field and International Branch will welcome comments and recommendations regarding it. The Army Publications Distribution Center–St. Louis is distributing the field manual.

Air Force Issues New Air Power and Campaign Histories

The History Office of the Air Force’s Aeronautical Systems Center at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base has issued a hefty, 507-page, fully illustrated history of the development of U.S. military aircraft and associated weapons systems and technologies, as well as land-based Air Force missiles, during the century following the Wright brothers’ first flight. Entitled Splendid Vision, Unswerving Purpose: Developing Air Power for the United States Air Force during the First Century of Powered Flight, the book was published in 2002. It is available from the Government Printing Office under stock number 008-D7-(--)0779-7 for $69.

The Air Force History and Museums Program has published detailed histories of the initial years of the U.S. air war with North Vietnam and the 1991 Persian Gulf War air campaign against Iraq. The book by Jacob van Staaveren, Gradual Failure: The Air War over North Vietnam, 1965–1966, was written in the 1970s and only recently declassified. It was published in 2002 and may be purchased from the Government Printing Office for $42 under stock number 008-070-00781-9. The book by Richard C. Davis, On Target: Organizing and Executing the Strategic Air Campaign against Iraq, also published in 2002, may be ordered from the Government Printing Office for $45 under stock number 008-070-00780-1.

A corporal and captain of the 1st Battalion, Colored Infantry, Virginia Volunteers, circa 1887
Army Curator Receives Interagency Exemplary Service Award

Les Jensen, curator of arms at the West Point Museum, received an Exemplary Service Award from the Interagency Federal Collections Alliance on 3 December 2002 for his research on museum law involving trust responsibilities of federal museum collections. The interagency alliance brings together all federal agencies with museum collections. Jensen's research supported the alliance's request that the Office of Management and Budget pursue revisions to the definition of museum services contained in the Federal Activities Inventory Reform Act.

Naval Historical Center to Host Biennial Naval History Workshop

The Naval Historical Center will conduct a Naval History Workshop on 24-26 June 2003 at the Washington Navy Yard. The workshop will feature eleven panel sessions focusing on the theme “Preserving and Promoting Naval History.” Three staff members of the Army Center of Military History—Renée Klish, Stephen Lofgren, and James Speraw—will participate in the panels. All those who attend the workshop must register, but there is no charge except for those wishing to join the buffet luncheon on 24 June. Those interested may obtain the registration form and the workshop program by sending a message to Lt. Comdr. Wanda Pompey at wanda.pompey@navy.mil.

Naval War College Review Publishes Articles by Army History Author


Combat Studies Institute Schedules Conference

The Combat Studies Institute of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College will host a conference on “Armed Diplomacy: Two Centuries of American Campaigning.” Conference organizers plan to have a majority of papers address military operations that fell short of all-out conventional warfare. The conference will be held at the Frontier Conference Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, on 4-7 August 2003.

Society of the First Infantry Division Publishes Books by Maj. Gen. Albert H. Smith


In Memoriam: John B. Wilson and Dorrell Garrison

John B. Wilson, who worked as a historian at the Center of Military History from 1968 until his retirement in 1997, died on 12 January 2003 at the age of 68. Mr. Wilson spent his entire CMH career in the Center’s Organizational History Branch, now the Force Structure and Unit History Branch. He was the author of Maneuver and Firepower: The Evolution of Divisions and Separate Brigades (CMH, 1998) and the compiler of the lineage book Armies, Corps, Divisions, and Separate Brigades (CMH, 1987). In 1999 the Center reissued the latter book with updated lineages compiled by Mr. Wilson. He contributed articles on the Army in the first half of the twentieth century to Military Review and Parameters and authored an illustrated pamphlet on Campaign Streamers of the United States Army that was published in 1995 by the Association of the United States Army.

Dorrell Garrison, who had been curator at the John M. Browning Memorial Museum, now the Rock Island Arsenal Museum, died on 15 March 2003. Mr. Garrison began work at the Browning Museum in 1955 as assistant curator and retired as curator in 1984. A veteran of Navy service in the Korean War, Mr. Garrison contributed an article on the Army’s marksmanship program to The Gun Report.
Continued from page 3

Discovery, to educate the American public that this endeavor was a military expedition conducted by Army soldiers, and to reinforce Army values as demonstrated by the officers and soldiers of the expedition. The Website Activity continued moving toward its goal of making all of the volumes of the Center's Vietnam Studies series available online by posting Field Artillery, 1954–1973, and The Role of Military Intelligence, 1965–1967. During the past quarter traffic on the CMH website reached a new high, averaging over 540,000 visits per month.

The Website Activity is also working to expand the online “Army History Knowledge Community,” which resides on Army Knowledge Online (AKO). An electronic version of the newly published FM 1–20 was posted, as were additional issues of Army History, making these materials more easily available to the Army community at large. Work has also begun on establishing a “sub-community” within the Army History Knowledge Community for military history detachment activities. Once fully operational, this portal will serve as an online forum for the MHDs to post training materials and other resources and to share after-action reports and reports of lessons learned. CMH’s Digitization Program also continues to make progress. Contractors at CMH have finished scanning the Center’s collection of Department of the Army general orders, bulletins, and circulars. Website personnel are now performing quality control inspections, and the materials should be available to you digitally by late spring.

Members of Production Services were pleased to support Stephen A. Bourque’s book-signing for Jayhawk! The VII Corps in the Persian Gulf War at the VII Corps Desert Storm Veterans Association dinner at Fort Myer. This, in effect, marked the official release of the book. They also received the delivery of FM 1–20, the U.S. Army Historical Directory 2003, and eight CMH reprints. The reprints include the World War II commemorative brochure Normandy, which will support the May 2003 Normandy staff ride planned by U.S. Army Europe. Production Services sent to GPO for printing updated, expanded editions of The Sergeant Major of the Army and The Story of the Noncommissioned Officer Corps and will soon send there as well the new, expanded edition of Secretaries of War and Secretaries of the Army: Portraits and Biographical Sketches, the new-style Staff Ride Guide for the Battle of First Bull Run, and the compendium of papers presented at the 2002 Eisenhower Conference. Editorial and production work continues on a monograph on Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, a volume on the Corps of Engineers in Cold War Europe, the Signal Corps lineage volume, the second volume of essays On Operational Art, and the third and—at least for now—final volume on The Role of Federal Military Forces in Domestic Disorders.

The Museum Division continues to make great strides on the National Museum of the United States Army (NMUSA) project, having completed a field survey of British military museums, a detailed manpower study, and a site-selection survey of five specific potential sites at Fort Belvoir. The division is also actively involved in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, notably in providing guidance on policies and procedures governing artifact identification and recovery.

I know that all of you have been busy throughout the quarter as well and that many of you are also heavily involved in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. These have been trying times but also days marked by extraordinary contributions. Please keep up all you have been doing to sustain and promulgate the history and heritage of our fine soldiers.

Former Army Nurse Corps Chief Publishes Biography

By Debra R. Cox

My Rise to the Stars: How a Sharecropper’s Daughter Became an Army General presents a very human look at the life and times of its author, retired Brig. Gen. Clara Adams-Ender. She paints a candid and often inspiring picture of her life, describing the opportunities and challenges she faced head-on throughout her 33-year military career. A motivating and visionary leader, she was selected in 1987 to serve as the eighteenth chief of the Army Nurse Corps. She was the first person holding that position to be dual-hatted, serving also as chief of personnel for the Army Medical Department. Under her tenure as chief, the Nurse Corps successfully met the challenges of Operation DESERT STORM. In August 1991 she became the first chief of the Army Nurse Corps to remain on active duty as a general officer after holding that position. She served as the commander of Fort Belvoir, Virginia, and deputy commander of the Military District of Washington until her retirement in August 1993. These firsts are but a few from this rich study of an Army leader. The book was published in 2001 by CAPE Associates, Inc., 3088 Woods Cove Lane, Lake Ridge, Virginia.

Maj. Debra R. Cox was the Army Nurse Corps historian in 1999–2002. She is now head nurse of Ward 75 at Walter Reed Army Medical Center in Washington, D.C.
Book Reviews

Encyclopedia of American War Literature
Edited by Philip K. Jason and Mark A. Graves
Greenwood Press, 2001, 424 pp., $99.95

Review by Stephen C. McGeorge

Philip Jason and Mark Graves must be congratulated on assembling a reference book of considerable breadth that certainly fills a void in the scholarship on war literature. This work offers a collection of extremely well-written and insightful essays on American authors who have dealt with the wars our nation and our colonial forebears fought since the first arrival of European colonists in North America.

A broad introductory essay explores the major themes and the recurring clichés the editors discovered in the literature and touches on the scholarship on the subject, which they conclude is limited in scope and focuses on specific time-periods or particular genres. At the end of this essay the editors reveal their “dominant concern with imaginative responses (fiction, poetry, and drama).” This explains the dearth of essays on authors whose works are historical, biographical, autobiographical, or theoretical. Thus the Encyclopedia explicitly limits itself to examining the creative efforts inspired by, or written in response to, war.

The editors assembled a remarkable array of nearly eighty contributors, most of them either Ph.D. candidates or sitting professors. Nearly all are from university English departments. A mere six of the contributors are historians. Given the editorial focus of the encyclopedia, this is understandable, and it yields entries that reflect a marked bent toward literary criticism. A more interdisciplinary approach could have produced a richer work overall, and perhaps a wider perspective on the literature under examination.

The collection is particularly strong in its coverage of the literature of the Second World War and Vietnam and contains surprisingly many entries on authors writing on the early colonial period. While certainly intended primarily as a reference work, a cover-to-cover reading of the Encyclopedia will be eye-opening for many historians for its revelation of just how diverse the corpus of American war literature truly is.

Interspersed with essays on individual authors are topical entries on specific wars and types and categories of works. These include some genres one might find surprising, including Native American Ghost Dance Songs and Corridos, the Mexican American folk ballads of which many emerged from the Mexican War. The entries on Indian Captivity Narratives and Civil War Women’s Diaries are fascinating and informative examinations of these special categories of writing. The Spanish-American War essay offers a surprisingly broad view of the literature spawned by our “Splendid Little War.”

The Encyclopedia includes a “Selected Bibliography,” which is in fact an extensive listing of the published scholarship on American war literature, and this alone is a most useful resource for students interested in the subject. The general index combines entries by author and title. Though perhaps a minor criticism, I found this format bulky and awkward and would have been more comfortable with separate indexes for authors and their works.

As with any such collection, there are bound to be omissions. Given that Professor Jason, the senior editor, teaches English at the U.S. Naval Academy, it is quite surprising that Maj. John W. Thomason, Jr., the Marines’ most revered storyteller, is missing in action.

 Anchored as it admittedly is on creative artistic efforts, the Encyclopedia of American War Literature may perhaps be disappointing for historians looking for a comprehensive examination of American writing on war. But historians do need the occasional reminder that history is often about the story and that the stories that emerge from our military experience are no less meaningful for lack of factual verisimilitude, critical narrative based on evidence, and copious footnotes. Literary responses to war must be judged for their ability to inform our understanding of events in ways history cannot.

The rather hefty price tag of this work is, unfortunately, not atypical of historical dictionaries and encyclopedic works published by scholarly publishing houses. While few students will find this encyclopedia an essential addition to their personal bookshelf, none would want it to be missing from the reference section of the library they use most.

Stephen C. McGeorge retired as an Army major in 1996. His seventeen years in active service included assignments in Korea, Italy, and Turkey and as a military history instructor at the Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He was director of the Oregon Military Museum from 1997 to 2002. He is now the historian with the Office of the Deputy Commanding General for Transformation, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, at Fort Lewis, Washington, where he will be writing the history of the Stryker brigade combat teams.
Campfires of Freedom
The Camp Life of Black Soldiers
during the Civil War
By Keith P. Wilson
Kent State University Press, 2002,
336 pp., $39

Review by William A. Dobak

During the Civil War the United States government had to reconsider its long-standing policy of excluding black men from the Army. As Union forces moved south, they occupied sections of country that were home to tens of thousands of black people held in bondage. The former slaves flocked to Army camps, presenting a source of untapped manpower and potential disorder. At the same time, many free black men in the North clamored to join a fight which seemed more and more likely to bring about the end of slavery. As the war entered its third year, authorities in Washington decided on a massive recruiting campaign to enlist soldiers from the North and South in all-black regiments. Including artillery, cavalry, and infantry, these regiments were known as United States Colored Troops. They served for the rest of the war and the first year or two of Reconstruction in every theater from the Chesapeake to the Rio Grande. Since William Wells Brown's The Negro in the American Rebellion appeared in 1867, they have been commemorated and analyzed in scores of books.

Keith Wilson's Campfires of Freedom takes a different tack from Joseph Glatthaar's Forged in Battle (New York, 1990) and Noah Trudeau's Like Men of War (Boston, 1998). Glatthaar concentrates on relations between black enlisted men and their white officers, and Trudeau's book is a narrative of battles and sieges, but Wilson, a professor at Australia's Monash University, directs his attention to the U.S. Colored Troops' long stretches of time off the parade ground and the battlefield. In the camps of the Union Army, thousands of former slaves made the transition to freedom and, like the free blacks serving in U.S. Colored Troops regiments raised in the North, validated their citizenship through military service. The Army served as an agent of social and cultural change.

Although Army life was "an essentially liberating and empowering process," Wilson writes, it was "similar enough to the plantation to encourage cultural continuity and transfer, but different enough to stimulate cultural re-creation and change." (pp. xii-xiii) In other words, while soldiers were subject to stern, even harsh, discipline, their military service contained an element of dignity that slavery lacked, and the end result was to be freedom. The men brought their social and religious practices into the Army, and the oral traditions of a largely illiterate people helped them to make sense of their new surroundings.

The issue of illiteracy at once raises an important question. What sort of sources does Wilson base his study on? He relies largely on the official correspondence, private letters, and diaries of white officers; to a lesser extent on letters from enlisted U.S. Colored Troops published in the Anglo-African and the Christian Recorder, two black newspapers of the era; and finally on the much rarer unpublished letters and diaries of black soldiers. Besides the Library of Congress and the National Archives in Washington, D.C., and the U.S. Army Military History Institute at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, the repositories that house these collections are scattered across the country from the Massachusetts State Archives in Boston to the Henry E. Huntington Library in San Marino, California. The range of sources the author tapped is truly impressive, especially in view of his foreign residence. But the New England abolitionists' ability to crank out correspondence and then save it, and the fact that the Christian Recorder was a Philadelphia newspaper—eleven U.S. Colored Troops regiments were raised in or near that city—impair both an ideological and a geographical bias to these sources. The Philadelphians fought along the Atlantic seaboard from Virginia to Florida, and some of the New Englanders sailed as far as Louisiana to serve with Union forces there. Arkansas, Mississippi, and Tennessee will probably always be underrepresented in the black military history of the Civil War. Moreover, most of the officers quoted were well disposed toward black people, while the enlisted men, whatever their complaints about unfair treatment, were patriotic volunteers. Press gangs were not among their grievances, although thousands of men did serve in the U.S. Colored Troops under duress. It is too much to hope that historians will ever come across the letters and diary of a scoundrelly officer who abused his men, imprompted their wives, and absconded with their pay, although there are plenty of recorded observations, both official and private, of such conduct.

Campfires of Freedom treats the soldiers' entry into the Army and their reaction to a discipline that sometimes employed the same brutal punishments the men had undergone as slaves. It addresses the necessity for education and the role of regimental chaplains—only fourteen of whom, throughout the entire U.S. Colored Troops, were black—both as pedagogues and pastors, and the men's own religious practices, which often included hearing sermons and exhortations by lay preachers and sometimes approached riotous disorder, far beyond the bounds of good military order and discipline. Campfires of Freedom also describes the men's music and its function among a largely illiterate people, as well as the family life of black soldiers, many of whom regularized with ceremonies "under the flag" the unsanctioned marriages into which they had entered as slaves. Early in the war, one of the first activities undertaken in any Northern town or city that raised a company or regiment for the Union Army was to provide for the welfare of the volunteers' families. Black soldiers lacked such support, and the deficiency added to the woes of discriminatory pay and fatigue duty assignments.
Keith Wilson has been publishing articles about the U.S. Colored Troops in *Civil War History* and other journals for more than twenty years. *Campfires of Freedom* is the fruit of mature reflection. It discusses matters that are barely touched on in many other books and represents a valuable addition to the literature about black Americans' military service.

Dr. William A. Dobak is a historian in the Histories Division of CMH. He is the author of *Fort Riley and Its Neighbors: Military Money and Economic Growth, 1853-1895* (Norman, Okla., 1998) and coauthor with Thomas D. Phillips of *The Black Regulars, 1866-1898* (Norman, Okla., 2001).

The Last Battle of the Civil War
Palmetto Ranch
By Jeffrey Wm Hunt
University of Texas Press, 2002, 217 pp., cloth $60, paper $22.95

Review by Roger D. Cunningham

After Generals Robert E. Lee and Joseph E. Johnston surrendered their respective Confederate armies on 9 and 26 April 1865, the Union Army still faced the very real possibility of additional battles in the Confederacy’s vast Trans-Mississippi Department. General Edmund Kirby Smith’s forces remained alive and well in Arkansas, Louisiana, and Texas, and even after four long years of fighting, many of these feisty Southerners were not yet ready to lay down their arms. Although there had been little action in Texas throughout the Civil War, on 12–13 May 1865 the conflict’s last battle occurred near its southernmost tip—at Palmetto Ranch, on the north bank of the Rio Grande. Jeffrey Wm Hunt, chief curator of the Admiral Nimitz National Museum of the Pacific War in Fredericksburg, Texas, tells its story in this well written study.

The battle at Palmetto (or Palmito) Ranch involved only about nine hundred men in all and was little more than a two-day skirmish. The Union troops came from the 34th Indiana, the 62d U.S. Colored Infantry (USCI), and two dismounted cavalry companies that had been raised in Texas, while the Confederates came from three cavalry battalions and an artillery battery. The Union troops had sallied forth from the federal base at Brazos Santiago, on Brazos Island just north of the mouth of the Rio Grande, with no clear purpose. As the Yankees marched inland, they encountered mounted rebel troops near Palmetto Ranch. The two sides exchanged fire and maneuvered inconclusively. The next day, after further skirmishing and the arrival of more troops on both sides, the federal soldiers retreated to their island base, leaving the Southerners victorious. Only three soldiers were killed—two Union and one Confederate—but about a dozen men were wounded and the Confederates captured more than 100 members of the 34th Indiana, along with their regimental colors. The prisoners were soon paroled and the colors returned to the Hoosiers, but the latter’s undistinguished performance led to a July general court-martial for their commander, Lt. Col. Robert G. Morrison. The trial included a unique feature—testimony from Col. John S. “Rip” Ford, the Confederate commander at Palmetto Ranch, who had finally surrendered and been paroled only a few days before the trial began. Ford helped to convince the court that Morrison was not guilty of the charges leveled against him.

The fight at Palmetto Ranch never should have occurred. It accomplished nothing and is worth studying only because it was the Civil War’s last episode of ground combat. Hunt capably covers all aspects of its story, with two exceptions. While he discusses the postwar careers of several of the officers in an epilogue, he could have shed further light on what happened to the enlisted participants by examining their federal pension records. This would have been especially relevant to Texas history, because several of the black soldiers enlisted in one of the black regiments that the Regular Army organized after the war and eventually stationed in the Lone Star State. (Some of the white soldiers may also have enlisted in the Regular Army.) The author also fails to mention the interesting fact that members of the 62d USCI and the 65th USCI, both of which had been raised in Missouri, joined together after the war to raise enough money to found the Lincoln Institute in Jefferson City, the state capital. This small black college has grown into Lincoln University of Missouri, and it continues to fulfill the veterans’ admirable postwar goal of ensuring progress through education.

Race to the Front
The Materiel Foundations of Coalition Strategy in the Great War
By Kevin D. Stubbs
Praeger Publishers, 2002, 373 pp., $71.95

Review by Richard J. Shuster

The military and economic scope of the First World War was unprecedented. Never before had so many men and so much materiel been amassed for such an enormous and destructive undertaking. The ability of each nation to harness its resources for total war largely determined the course and outcome of this global conflict. In *Race to the Front*, Kevin Stubbs examines the importance of materiel foundations in contributing to victory in the First World War. He maintains that human resource mobilization, economic mobilization, and the effective use of transportation networks influenced the military strategies of the major belligerents and had a profound impact on the war’s outcome. Within this framework, Stubbs assesses the relative contribution that each nation
made to the war effort, arguing that the economic and military strength of the United States was the critical factor in the victory over Germany.

A colonel in the United States Air Force Reserve with a doctorate in military history from Texas A&M University, Stubbs bases Race to the Front on archival records of the American Expeditionary Forces (A.E.F.) and the War Department General and Special Staffs, official war histories, and a vast number of published materials on the war. In addition to analyzing the importance of the materiel foundations of the war, he confronts the conclusions of both European and American historians critical of A.E.F. operations. Throughout the book Stubbs emphasizes American economic and military contributions to the war effort, and he is especially supportive of General John J. Pershing, the commander of the A.E.F. On the other hand, he is deeply suspicious of the long-range war goals of the British and French.

In a war of attrition, especially on such a prodigious scale as the fighting on the Western Front, the coalition of military forces that can attain superiority in men and materiel has a distinct advantage. Stubbs traces each combatant’s ability to mobilize its population and industries for war and outlines the various forms of transportation each nation used to bring its troops, munitions, and equipment into battle. The strength of Race to the Front lies in the dozens of statistical tables that the author provides. Annual mobilization, casualties, industrial and agricultural production, and railroad inventories are just some of the subjects of the informative tables he includes in his study. Although the writing is somewhat choppy due to the inclusion of copious statistics in the narrative of the book, Stubbs points out the complex nature of a global war. He argues that a rapid mobilization of personnel, increased industrial production, and the creation of transportation networks to feed civilians and supply the front played as important a role as the military efforts on the field of battle. He supports his arguments with numerous statistics and briefly touches on the government policies needed to implement the dramatic changes to society at war.

The economic and military contribution of the United States to the Allied war effort is a consistent theme of Stubbs’s work. American troops would not participate in any significant fighting on the Western Front until the spring of 1918, but the industrial and commercial power of the United States had already made its mark on the war. Stubbs points out that the United States was the world’s largest producer of steel, coal, and pig iron by 1914 and that the Entente had access to these crucial resources throughout the war. The author argues that the American supply of food, fodder, munitions, and raw materials to Britain and France saved them from defeat long before the doughboys arrived in strength, but unfortunately he does not provide any statistics regarding American exports to the Allies prior to 1917. Stubbs does contend that by the end of 1916 Britain devoted 40 percent of its total war expenditures to purchasing American supplies and that shortly afterward 80 percent of Allied purchases of American goods were financed by American loans. Once the United States entered the war, the impact of American industrial capability was striking. For instance, Stubbs asserts that 50 percent of all shells fired on the Western Front in 1917–1918 had been manufactured with American gunpowder and steel. The A.E.F.’s participation then decisively tipped the scales in the Allies’ favor.

The final section of Race to the Front looks at the impact of American forces on the outcome of the war. Here, Stubbs praises General Pershing and the A.E.F. and attempts to refute recent assessments of the American military intervention, especially the views contained in David Trask’s The A.E.F. and Coalition Warmaking, 1917–1918 (Lawrence, Kansas, 1993). The author raises some provocative questions, but his analysis lacks the necessary depth of evidence. When he points out that American casualties were far lower than those of the British and French in the latter half of 1918, he does not examine potential causes. For instance, how did various factors, such as the quantity and quality of enemy troops that each nation faced, scale of operations, or days in actual combat, influence casualty rates for each army? Stubbs goes on to accuse General Ferdinand Foch of sending Pershing’s force into the difficult terrain of the Meuse-Argonne in the hope of curtailing postwar American prestige. Without acknowledging the four years of British and French military operations that slowly, if not always effectively, helped bleed the German Army dry on the Western Front, Stubbs concludes that in the six weeks before 11 November 1918 the Americans achieved “the very success that won the war.” (p. 265) These assertions contradict the conclusions of much recent scholarship, and they are not thoroughly grounded in the wide array of available American and European sources.

Victory in the First World War was achieved by a coalition of forces, in which the United States played a crucial economic, political, and military role. In the last decade a number of historians have evaluated the military effectiveness of the A.E.F. and assessed both the strengths and weaknesses of its operations. Stubbs offers a new perspective to this debate and adds to the overall historiography of the First World War. The major contribution of Race to the Front, however, is the author’s analysis of the materiel aspects that were critical in providing the resources necessary for conducting, and ultimately winning, the war.

Dr. Richard J. Shuster is a historian for Morgan, Angel & Associates, a public policy firm in Washington, D.C., that specializes in historical research. He received his Ph.D. in modern European history from George Washington University in 2000. He continues to teach courses in European and U.S. military history through the university as part of the Navy College Program for Afloat College Education.
The Challenge of Change
Military Institutions and New
Realities, 1918–1941
Edited by Harold R. Winton and
David R. Mets
University of Nebraska Press, 2000,
246 pp., cloth $55, paper $29.95

Review by Stephen J. Lofgren

Change is hard. There are so many things that have to be, well, changed. In his introduction to The Challenge of Change, editor Harold Winton proposes a Clausewitzian-style trinity of influences and considerations that inform, shape, and complicate the practical process of change for an army: environmental uncertainty, particularly strategic requirements and (changing) technology; political and social constraints; and institutional culture. The process of change, in short, is contingent. In fact, successful change (or reform) is so dependent upon a favorable alignment of multiple variables that Winton suggests that the key may be whether an army produces leaders or advocates for change with a “genius for adaptation.” (p. xv) The relatively few examples of armies successfully carrying out full-scale reform should not be surprising; genius is rare.

The case studies in this volume offer ample support for the primacy of Winton’s trinity. They examine how the European great powers—Great Britain, Germany, France, and Russia—and the United States each addressed the prospect and process of changing an army in the decades after World War I. Indeed, the dynamism and challenges—political, strategic, and technological—of the decades were precisely the factors that made momentous decisions about reform so fraught with peril. A weapon system chosen in one year, for example, could be obsolete five years hence. No one wished to make that misstep, although the Italians succeeded. Moreover, new technology might require new doctrine. New doctrine, even if all the concerned parties can agree on one, requires retraining soldiers and revisiting organizational routines. Then there were problems that were beyond an army’s control: the strategic ally of years past might suddenly withdraw. Out of the state of the nation’s economy might change suddenly for the worse. Readers will find that many issues resonate with concerns of today.

In his chapter on the British Army and mechanized warfare during the interwar period, Winton asks, why did the British Army not develop an effective doctrine for armored warfare? After all, the British Army invented the tank, and after World War I it possessed prominent advocates of armored warfare. His answer emphasizes the importance of leadership and the influence of outside actors. In the case of the British Army, an absence of inspired external leadership combined with very real economic and political problems, an unresolved strategic debate over whether to defend the empire or pursue the continental commitment, and internal Army factions to derail doctrinal advances relating to armor. Outside actors had only limited influence. Emphasizing that successful leaders must inspire and persuade, especially when dealing with army leaders antipathetic to outside influence, Winton rates Secretaries of State for War Alfred Duff Cooper and Leslie Hore-Belisha and writer Basil Liddell Hart largely as failures. Still, he suggests that in democracies successful military change depends at least partially on support from outside the services.

By contrast, James Corum examines an army that conducted wide-ranging reform and managed to avoid being “too badly wrong,” at least at the tactical and operational levels of war. Corum rightly reminds readers that the “rational and sensible direction” (p. 37) for reform of the German Army after the Great War would have been to adopt the victorious French system. Two key factors prevented a reflexive mimicking of the victor’s methods. The first was a leader, Col. Gen. Hans von Seeckt, who possessed that critical genius for adaptation. As commander in chief of the Army from 1920 to 1926, and unconstrained by any strategic requirements, von Seeckt articulated a vision of future war and convinced others to adopt it. Von Seeckt saw that the advent of mechanization gave mobility and maneuver an advantage over relatively static and defensive firepower. He also grasped that exploiting the promise of technology to enhance maneuver would require a professional army, more highly trained and educated than ever before, employing combined arms, mental agility, and effective doctrine.

To achieve this type of army, von Seeckt employed the second key factor that Corum identifies: an institutional culture that emphasized and prized objective historical study and honest self-assessment. By 1920 over 400 general staff officers, some of whom von Seeckt had fought to retain in place of experienced combat commanders during the brutal postwar officer reduction, were at work preparing studies of the past war. This was perhaps the greatest “lessons learned” study in history. At the same time, von Seeckt increased qualifying standards for both officers and noncommissioned soldiers, and the German Army began sending many officers to civilian schools to obtain advanced degrees. The “officer corps’ spirit of critical analysis” (p. 54) was central to the success of the German Army’s postwar reforms. It ensured that organizational ideas and doctrinal concepts would be tested and bluntly critiqued, with the weak destined to be exposed and discarded. These debates, which occurred in numerous military journals, both informed the Army and improved the ideas.

While the Germans did not do everything right—certainly their neglect of logistics and industrial planning stand out, and, after Hitler took the reins of power, speaking of their strategic planning rapidly became oxymoronic—the reasons for their incredible success in conceptualizing and implementing successful tactical and operational methods years ahead of their rivals bears examination today.
One wonders how much the encouragement of open debate coupled with rigorous analysis actually made it easier for the German Army to adopt new ideas and concepts. This widespread intellectual involvement in the future of the Army, with new ideas being tested and debated, gives the lie to the portrait of the interwar Army painted by General Heinz Guderian's memoirs, in which the lone reformer struggles against hide-bound conservatism.\(^2\) The essence of what became known as "Blitzkrieg" was the product of the thought of many, many people, and it took this widespread involvement to generate, in the words of the chapter title, a "comprehensive approach to change."

Of course, von Seeckt did not have to cope with the divisive and self-handicapping French political system or French strategic dilemmas, which at times could prove incapacitating.\(^3\) Eugenia Kiesling's superb chapter on the interwar French Army might have been titled "The Danger of Change." She presents a daunting catalog of the substantive impediments to change, which should be read and absorbed by armchair critics.

Most significant, Kiesling reminds readers that for the French in 1919 there seemed little reason to change. They had won the war. Their methods, doctrines, and equipment had proved successful. Their grand strategy had merged military resources with the efficient mobilization of national resources (to include allies) to outlast an opponent that spent itself in wasteful offensive efforts. As Kiesling states, the French military situation at the end of the war "was conducive to satisfaction, not change." (p. 4) French commanders did not want to pay in blood a second time to realign the lessons of the Great War. Theirs was "a reasoned belief that the known benefits of reinforcing the existing correct doctrine outweighed the dubious advantages offered by innovation." (p. 11)

The world was not static, however, and French fortunes and strategic position began to decline in the 1930s. Absent any leaders with genius, straitjacketed by social and political constraints, increasingly aware of the risks imposed by the Army reforms of 1927–1928 (which created a reserve-based Army manned by short-service conscripts), and abandoned by its allies, the French high command tightened its control over institutional culture. Kiesling expertly traces the problem of integrating tanks into the doctrine of methodical battle, nicely connecting internal French Army thinking with international and political realities. In doing so, she shows how studies and thinking that did not validate existing doctrine were discouraged and suppressed. Concerned by the fragility of their position, French military leaders sought above all to avoid making a mistake, such as undertaking doctrinal reform during a time when neither the necessary funding nor training time was available. The result was an institutional climate in which innovation could not flourish and a national climate that would not permit significant changes, although Kiesling rightly notes the speed with which the French adopted mechanization in 1936. As Kiesling has written elsewhere, "It was an army unready for war against the Wehrmacht in 1940, but it could not have been different and remained the army of the Third Republic."\(^4\)

Jacob Kipp's lengthy chapter on the Soviet Army deserves a review of its own. Kipp provides an example of an external political influence decisively determining the direction of change—one hesitates to call it "reform." In Joseph Stalin we see not a genius for adaptation, but the source of a reckless, amoral revolution from above that ultimately produced battlefield effectiveness, but only after creating tremendous inefficiency and exacting a heavy cost of life. Interwar Soviet developments, such as the articulation of "operational art," occurred in spite of, not because of, Stalin's rule, and the innovators did not survive the period. Kipp effectively dismantles historiographical interpretations that view battlefield success in World War II as evidence of successful change and reform.

In his chapter on the U.S. Army, David Johnson lays the blame for the Army's "unpreparedness" for World War II not on the usual scapegoats—a penurious Congress and an isolationist public—but instead on the third leg of Winton's trinity: institutional culture. The Army, as Johnson accurately notes, "had intellectual and institutional defects that exacerbated fiscal and manpower shortfalls." (p. 163)

Focusing on the development of armor and bombing doctrines, Johnson traces the Army's adolescent growing pains during its transition from a frontier constabulary to a modern army. Coming in the middle of this transition, World War I cemented the importance of manpower and mobilization as the Army's primary wartime requirements. With the exception of the Air Corps, which like today's NASDAQ enthusiasts believed technology would solve every problem, the Army kept its focus on manpower and always accorded manpower primacy in receiving funds. One reason the Army could not break this paradigm, Johnson emphasizes, was its parochial institutional culture, which did not tolerate dissent. When coupled with inefficient bureaucratic arrangements, the results were not conducive either for objectively analyzing the potential significance of technological change or for developing a viable course of organizational innovation.

While I agree with much of Johnson's argument, I question both whether the Army's interwar focus on manpower rather than weapons was as shortsighted as he implies and whether this critique is applicable to today's Army. After World War I, any American involvement in a major war would necessarily require mobilization and dramatic expansion: a capability to mobilize and produce filled divisions, therefore, was the Army's top priority and its most important weapon—the sine qua non of success in modern warfare. Given the constantly changing, constantly improving weapons technologies of the period—for example, the main battle tank—the choice of...
organized manpower as the top priority is understandable, defensible, and, I would warrant, correct. The real, somewhat ahistorical, complaint we have is that Army planners and developers did not correctly identify when World War II would start. Moreover, while there were great qualitative differences among various weapons systems and technologies, as the six-year test of battle that began in 1939 showed, the parties began from a state approximating technological parity. I am not sure that this is the case today with regard to either manpower or weapons.

The experiences of interwar armies in grappling with fundamental change are difficult to analyze objectively today because we know the whole story—we know what happened and when. It is important to remember that the actors in these case studies might have had priorities different than what today, we believe they should have had. With the possible exception of the Soviets, these chapters are filled with rational military actors. Sure, some are egotistical and convinced without factual basis that they are correct (as are some historians), but there are no irrational actors. Both the military leaders and the political leaders in these chapters act based on their individual understandings of the evidence in the way that they think is in the interest of their institutions and their nations. But people can be wrong. Perhaps the most valuable observation is the one made explicitly by Johnson and supported by the other authors: lack of money is not the greatest impediment to change. A lack of ideas or the means to assess and test ideas in an objective fashion is vastly more debilitating. That is because, as Dennis Showalter notes in his thoughtful concluding essay, “The crucial interwar questions . . . involved not the implementation of change but the details of change.” (p. 224) The arguments this volume makes about the importance of institutional culture in promoting a climate that can encourage and refine new ideas, as well as ensure that money is spent on the right things, should draw the attention of all professionals interested in the health of the Army.

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Notes


5. The importance of institutional culture as a determinant of successful change, particularly in comparison with funding, is a major theme of Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett, eds., Military Innovation in the Interwar Period (New York, 1996).

Stars in Khaki
Movie Actors in the Army and the Air Services
By James E. Wise, Jr., and Paul W. Wilderson III
Naval Institute Press, 2000, 241 pp., $26.95

Review by Roger D. Cunningham

Stars in Khaki completes a trilogy documenting the military careers of hundreds of motion picture and television actors who served in the armed forces from the Spanish-American War through the Vietnam War. The Naval Institute Press also published the previous volumes—Stars in Blue: Movie Actors in America's Sea Services (Annapolis, 1997) and Stars in the Corps: Movie Actors in the United States Marines (Annapolis, 1999)—although James E. Wise, Jr., wrote them with a different coauthor.

Stars in Khaki begins by discussing a group of fourteen actors who actually served in combat as soldiers and airmen, primarily in World War II. These include Academy Award recipients Art Carney, Clark Gable, and Jimmy Stewart. Stewart began his distinguished military career by joining the Army Air Corps in 1941. He flew twenty missions over Germany before leaving active duty as a colonel in 1945, but he then served in the Organized Reserves and later in the Air Force Reserve and retired as a brigadier general in 1968. The most decorated man in this first group and, for that matter, one of the most decorated American servicemen of all time, was Audie Murphy, who received the Medal of Honor for his extraordinary heroism as a young second lieutenant with the 15th Infantry regiment in France in 1945. After the war Murphy’s battlefield fame carried him to Hollywood, where he appeared in more than forty movies, including To Hell and Back (1955), which related his military exploits. The group also includes Jackie Coogan, who later played Uncle Fester in the popular 1960s television series The Addams Family. Coogan, who had been a child star during the silent film era, flew a Waco glider behind Japanese lines in Burma in support of Maj. Gen. Orde Wingate's “Chindits.” For a few years before the war Coogan had been married to Betty Grable, one of World War II’s most celebrated pinup girls.

The second part of the book discusses eleven actors who served as staff personnel, instructors, or entertainers during their time in uniform. These men include Academy Award winners Melvyn Douglas, Clint Eastwood, Charleton Heston, William Holden, and Burt Lancaster, along with Elvis Presley and Ronald Reagan. The future president had been an Army Reserve officer for four years when the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, but his poor eyesight and his acting experience
caused him to spend most of the war assigned to the Army Air Forces' 1st Motion Picture Unit at the Hal Roach Studios, popularly called Fort Roach, in Culver City, California. Reagan made training films as well as at least one feature film, *This Is the Army* (1943). The movie, in which Reagan starred, was based on Irving Berlin's morale-boosting Broadway musical of the same name. As a result of Berlin's insistence, the show's cast of black and white servicemen comprised the only integrated company in the Army. The film raised nearly $10 million for Army Emergency Relief.

*Stars in Khaki* also briefly summarizes the military service and films of over 100 "Others Who Served," including Alan Alda, Mel Brooks, George Gobel, James Earl Jones, George Kennedy, Karl Malden, Robert Mitchum, Clayton Moore, and George Reeves. Gobel, who later became a very popular television comedian, spent the war as a B-26 pilot and flight instructor in Oklahoma and was often heard to say, "Not one Japanese plane got past Tulsa." Moore, who served in Reagan's Army Air Forces film unit, later became *The Lone Ranger*, and Reeves became *Superman*—two icons of the golden age of television. Two other actors from this group—Tom Mix, the famous cowboy star of the 1920s and '30s, and Lewis Stone, who played Mickey Rooney's sage father in the popular "Andy Hardy" films of the 1930s and '40s—had served in uniform during the Spanish–American War.

A short appendix also lists prominent movie stars who were unable to serve, primarily because of age or health concerns. They include James Cagney, who was too old; John Garfield, who had a heart murmur; Dean Martin, who had a hernia; and Frank Sinatra, who had a punctured eardrum.

*Stars in Khaki* contains much interesting information and is nicely illustrated, but the authors may be faulted in two areas. First, perhaps because neither of them served in the Army (Wise retired from the Navy as a captain after serving as a naval aviator), they make several errors in discussing unit hierarchies. Tony Bennett, for example, was assigned to the "Seventh Army, G Company, 255th Infantry Regiment, 63d Division," (p. 5) and Presley was "transferred to Company C, a scout platoon, where he was assigned to drive." (pp. 163–64) Second, in their brief summaries of "Others Who Served," the authors fail to note that several of the veterans they discuss won Academy Awards. These omissions include ex-Cpl. Red Buttons, who won best supporting actor honors for *Sayonara* (1957); ex-Sgt. Broderick Crawford, who was named best actor for *All the King's Men* (1949); former Signal Corpsman Robert Duvall, who won his best actor award for *Tender Mercies* (1983); and Burl Ives, who won his Oscar as the best supporting actor for *The Big Country* (1958). Nevertheless, for those who are interested in the nexus of military history and the performing arts, *Stars in Khaki* is well worth a read.

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**Patton's Bulldog**

The Life and Service of General Walton H. Walker

By Wilson A. Heefner

White Mane Publishing Company, 2001, 348 pp., $29.95

Review by Stephen A. Bourque

History has not been kind to those who labor in the shadow of popular and flamboyant commanders. Biographies are plentiful describing the exploits of Pershing, Eisenhower, Montgomery, Patton, and MacArthur. Far more difficult to find are accurate studies on important commanders such as Hunter Liggett, Joe Collins, Miles Dempsey, and John Hodge. Walton H. Walker, the subject of this book, is a member of that much-ignored fraternity. Although he was one of the few American officers ever to command both a corps and an army in combat, historians have all but ignored him, and he did not even merit an entry in *The Harper Encyclopedia of Military Biography* (New York, 1992). His problem, of course, is that he served under two of America's most dramatic leaders, George Patton and Douglas MacArthur.

Wilson A. Heefner aims to bring Walker's distinguished military record to light. Heefner's own connections to the Army have been extensive. The author served as a private in Walker's Eighth Army in Korea and later as an infantry and medical officer, before retiring as a colonel after forty-one years of active and reserve service. Dr. Heefner also pursued a career as a physician. Even without an introduction to set the stage of this narrative, it is obvious throughout that the author identifies with Walker and wants to ensure his former commander gets the historical credit he deserves. In twenty-seven short chapters, Heefner leads the reader from Walker's birth in Texas, through West Point, to command of a machine gun battalion in World War I, leadership of XX Corps in World War II, and command of the Eighth Army in Korea, where he died in a vehicle collision in December 1950. The author's epilogue is an adoring testimony to the gallantry of this fine officer. Heefner uses a wide array of sources in constructing his narrative, including records maintained at the National Archives, MacArthur Archives, Army War College, Eisenhower Library, and other archives. In addition, he has mined most of the secondary sources that relate to Walker's career.

While the author succeeds in presenting a chronicle of the general's military service, he fails to help us understand Walker the commander. For example, although Walker received two silver stars for his performance as a battalion commander in the 5th Division during the Saint-Mihiel and
Meuse-Argonne offensives of World War I, we learn little about his personal experience in that war, how he obtained his battalion command, or what he did to earn his silver stars. We learn almost nothing about Walker’s character, leadership traits, or what he gained from his experience. In his sole chapter on the Great War, Heefner does not provide a single name of a subordinate soldier, sergeant, or officer. Without such detail, this reader was at a loss to understand what qualified Walker for his promotion to lieutenant colonel at the end of the war.

Having just finished writing a book on corps command, this reviewer was looking forward to observing how Walker led the XX Corps in the European campaign. However, after reading Heefner’s five chapters describing where the corps went and in what battles it fought, I had barely expanded my understanding of the events beyond what I had learned from the Center of Military History’s “Green Books” and Russell Weigley’s Eisenhower’s Lieutenants. The questions are many: How was the corps organized (the details are quite sketchy)? What was Walker’s relationship with his chief of staff, Brig. Gen. William A. Collier, whom Heefner mentions only in passing? Who were Walker’s principal staff subordinates (the author names only one other staff officer, who died on a reconnaissance)? How did Walker organize his headquarters? How did he gain and relinquish control of the divisions that constantly flowed through the corps’ command structure? How did he, at crucial moments, motivate division commanders and influence the battle with the other units he had available? Answering these questions and others like them is essential to understanding Walker as a corps commander. Russell Weigley’s history of the European Theater provides us more information about Walker’s staff than does Dr. Heefner’s biography. Discussing the battle at Metz, for example, Weigley notes, “The actions at Driant and Maizières-les-Metz had not distracted XX Corps headquarters enough to keep Walker’s staff from compiling a plan so detailed that its maps showed every building in the city that was known to be occupied by the enemy.”

This is the kind of detail and insight into the operations of this large tactical unit that one should expect to find in a biography devoted to the commander of a single corps.

Dr. Heefner devotes fourteen of his twenty-seven chapters to Walker’s role as leader of the Eighth Army from 1948 to 1950. Leading an army, like corps command, requires the development of a cohesive staff team. Patton’s Bulldog provides few details of how Walker organized the army and its command structure. While we find out who the principal staff officers were, we learn almost nothing of how they operated together. Only when the author describes the debate over the intelligence that preceded the Chinese offensive in November 1950 do we get any insight into what was happening inside the army’s headquarters. Even with the additional detail provided by this section, this reader still came away unable to understand Walker the commander. How did he make his decisions? How did he influence the campaign, other than by simply giving orders to his corps commanders? This reader looked in vain for information that might convey a sense of how Walker imparted his personality to his organization and how he differed from any other commander.

This book, therefore, is essentially what its title says it is, a chronicle of Walker’s “life and service.” It summarizes Walker’s career and begins to fill a void in our understanding of this great combat leader. We now have, in one place, a narrative of his career and references to sources for further research. However, we do not yet know very much about his command style or why he was so successful. We do not have an explanation of how Walker imparted his command philosophy to his subordinate staff and unit officers. We really do not know why he was “Patton’s Bulldog.”

Stephen A. Bourque teaches history at California State University, Northridge. A retired Army major, he served in the 1st Infantry Division in the Persian Gulf War and in 1992 commanded the Army’s only Regular Army military history detachment. He authored the chapter on Operation DESERT STORM in George Hofmann and Donn Starry, eds., Camp Colt to Desert Storm: The History of U.S. Armored Forces (Lexington, Ky., 1999). In 2002 the Center of Military History published his book, Jayhawk! The VII Corps in the Persian Gulf War.

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**Guts & Glory**

*The Making of the American Military Image in Film*

By Lawrence H. Suid

Revised and expanded edition, University Press of Kentucky, 2002, 748 pp., paper, $29.95

Review by David W. Hogan, Jr.

In 1978, at the height of American society’s post-Vietnam reaction against things military, Addison-Wesley published Lawrence H. Suid’s book *Guts & Glory: Great American War Movies*. Based in part on Suid’s dissertation, this book was a truly pathbreaking work in a field that has since seen an explosion of interest among military, film, and cultural historians. Twenty-four years after *Guts & Glory* first appeared, Suid has produced a new edition of his classic history, one well worth the price for those interested in the relationship between Hollywood and the military establishment or, more generally, between warfare and American culture. The core of his original book remains, but he has extensively expanded it, filling out his story on the origins of the American war film at the start of the twentieth century and continuing his history of the genre...
since the late 1970s. In the process, he has more than doubled the length of the account, tough sledding for those seeking a quick and concise analysis but a feast for connoisseurs of the subject.

Given the huge number of war films produced by the American entertainment industry, Suid’s magnum opus undoubtedly would have been even longer had he not closely defined his subject. As the subtitle shows, this book is really the story of how Hollywood, with or without the cooperation of the defense establishment, has formulated its image of the American military. Identifying himself as a military historian, Suid distances himself from such staples of film history as studies of producers, actors, screenwriters, and cinematic technology. He focuses on war films, “peacetime military stories,” and Vietnam home-front movies, defining war films as movies “in which men appear in battle or in situations in which actual combat influences their actions.” (p. xii) Thus, although he discusses MASH and Catch-22, he does not view them as true war films. At the same time, he leaves out movies on pre-World War I subjects, except where their production required military assistance, and films that do not portray the American military, thus excluding such classics as All Quiet on the Western Front. For some reason, although he mentions Rambo in a number of places, he never analyzes that significant film in detail. With the notable exception of Brecker Morant, he mostly leaves out foreign war films, along with most made-for-television movies and miniseries. Idiosyncratic though his distinctions may seem at times, they at least keep his project within manageable proportions, but, as a result, one cannot call this the definitive history of American war films as most scholars understand the term.

Even if not definitive, Guts & Glory reads like a definitive study. The number of movies covered, as listed in an extremely useful appendix, is overwhelming. Within an overall chronological framework, the book follows a topical approach, alternating between a focus on the different services and on the distinctive World War II and Vietnam genres. The discussion has an encyclopedic quality, as the reader encounters film after film, each with a brief summary of the plot and a discussion of the cooperation or noncooperation between producers and defense agencies, together at times with a succinct evaluation of the film, its use of dramatic license, and the support provided by the military. The author bases his account on a truly prodigious number of interviews, research into Department of Defense records, important correspondence in numerous repositories, and some newspaper articles. He draws heavily on materials he has collected during a career that has also produced the noteworthy book Sailing on the Silver Screen: Hollywood and the U.S. Navy (Annapolis, 1996), not to mention countless articles and media appearances. Given the depth of most of his research, it seems a bit odd that he does not mention in his footnotes or fascinating note on sources many key secondary works, such as those authored or edited by Michael E. Birdwell, Clayton R. Koppes and Gregory D. Black, and Peter C. Rollins.

Suid is at his best describing the on-again, off-again relations between Hollywood and the defense establishment. Through the 1950s those relations were generally close. Victory in World War II and the emergence of the Cold War created as tight a bond between the services and society as had existed in the course of American history. War films usually needed technical military assistance to achieve some degree of realism; in addition, many Hollywood producers, screenwriters, and actors were themselves veterans. Consequently, in the years after World War II, the film industry was relatively sensitive to the Defense Department’s concerns. But the honeymoon between the two institutions came to an end even before the Vietnam War tarnished the military image in the United States. The military’s declining inventory of World War II equipment combined with new filmmaking technology lessened Hollywood’s dependence on the services for technical assistance. Over time, veterans left the movie industry and were replaced by individuals with no military service and little understanding of military culture. Anxious to influence portrayals of the military as much as possible, public affairs personnel in the Department of Defense showed more willingness to negotiate with the producers and, as a result, earn criticism from Suid for not standing their ground on accuracy. Suid’s description of the controversy over Defense Department historian Dr. Alfred H. Goldberg’s evaluation of Day One shows the problems that face the official historian who reviews film scripts. Throughout his balanced discussion, Suid evinces a sure grasp of the dynamics and imperatives guiding both sides in the military-Hollywood relationship.

The author encounters more problems as he deals with the admittedly complex issue of dramatic license. On the one hand, he states that, first and last, movies exist to make money, and that, given the resulting constraints, filmmakers cannot be expected to be sticklers for accuracy, a point that eluded author Cornelius Ryan during the filming of The Longest Day. On the other hand, he contends that movies do influence their audiences to some extent, and that a filmmaker’s willingness to play loose with the facts “may well contribute to people’s apparent lack of concern with truth.” (p.xiii) So, to what standard shall we hold the film industry? Shall we write off movies as hopelessly unable to achieve even a minimal level of accuracy, given the imperatives of drama and business? Or does dramatic license enable filmmakers to achieve a valuable, deeper “truth” than is possible through a more documentary-
like approach to historical events—a truth that justifies the frequent current use of movies in classrooms? Although he often criticizes filmmakers for exceeding the bounds of dramatic license, Sud does not give a clear answer to these questions, settling instead on the aphorism, “Truth matters only to the extent that truth matters.” (p. 657) Perhaps it is too much to ask for a definite statement on this complicated subject, but seeking a tighter, more analytical conclusion might have helped the author to focus some of his arguments.

Suid's speculations on the influence of the Hollywood image on American public attitudes toward war and the military are intriguing if not conclusive. He notes the irony of filmmakers claiming that they make only antiwar movies while they continue to portray combat as a thrilling, yet maturing, experience for young men. Until the early 1960s, he contends, most movies showed only the glamorous side of combat: the excitement, adventure, and camaraderie. They fed the perception of the American armed services as an invincible force that could protect the United States from any threat and project American power to any corner of the world. They upheld America's self-image as a peace-loving nation that went to war only to defend itself or to promote democracy. This image, he contends, contributed to the ease with which President Lyndon B. Johnson and “the best and the brightest” who advised him took the United States into the Vietnam War. For a time in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the film industry backed away from martial subjects, as antiwar sentiment from the Vietnam conflict crested. But with the triumph of *Midway* in 1976 and a procession of successful Vietnam movies in the late 1970s, warfare returned to the American cinema with a vengeance. Seeing the later movies, such as *Saving Private Ryan*, largely as vehicles for violence, Suid suggests that this renewed production of war films may have reflected at least in part the film industry's need to portray violence on the screen and thereby attract audiences without criticism.

At times, Suid makes questionable assertions, particularly in giving the context for the events he describes. It is hard to follow his argument that the success of the Pearl Harbor attack rebutted isolationist claims that preparedness films were drawing the United States into war. In analyzing the War Department's instruction to the Office of War Information in the fall of 1943 to stop making Japanese-atrocity films, he probably overstates the anticipation of American policymakers that the alliance with the Soviet Union would dissolve during the postwar era. His context on the Vietnam War is a bit shaky at times, and he probably overestimates the increased empathy of Americans for the Vietnamese in the wake of 9/11. Many viewers would see the villain of the 1983 film *Wargames* as technology rather than the Air Force itself. Actual errors are few, particularly for a work of this length, although Suid refers to the “Office of Special Services” when he really means the “Office of Strategic Services” and to an Army Ranger battalion at a time when the Army did not have such units. His style is serviceable, although his phrasing is a bit redundant at times.

These few problems notwithstanding, Suid deserves much praise for his second edition. The strength of the book remains the sheer weight of documentation on the Hollywood-Defense Department relationship. It is hard to imagine anyone going far beyond Suid on this subject. If you like war movies, you will love the detail of this book. If you have a casual interest in the subject, you may not want to read the entire work, but you will want it on your shelf as a reference.

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