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Conference of Army Historians
Scheduled for 13–15 July

The 2004 Conference of Army Historians will be held on 13–15 July at the Hilton Crystal City in Arlington, Virginia. The opening day of the conference will be devoted to workshops for Army historians. Conference participants will deliver papers and presentations relating to military professionalization during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries on the second and third days of the gathering. Conference attendees may also sign up for a staff ride to the First Bull Run battlefield to be held on 16 July. Center historians will lead the staff ride, which will depart from the Hilton Crystal City.

Individuals interested in attending the conference will find the registration form and the address to which it should be sent on the second page of the conference brochure, which is posted at http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/CAH2004/2004_CAH_Brochure.pdf. The conference program will be posted on the Center’s website once it has been completed. Conference registration fees are $15 per day, and the staff ride is $10. The registration form may also be used to sign up for the reception scheduled for 1800 hours on 13 July and the banquet to be held at the same hour on 15 July. The charges for those events are $15 and $35, respectively. Hotel reservations at the conference hotel may be made at 800–695–7551. Conference attendees should mention the Conference of Army Historians and group code CAH when making room reservations, as the hotel has set aside a number of rooms for them.

Peter Kindsvatter Garners Leopold Prize

The Organization of American Historians in March 2004 awarded its Richard W. Leopold prize to Dr. Peter Kindsvatter, historian of the U.S. Army Ordnance Center and School. The awardee received a certificate and $2,000. The prize honors Kindsvatter’s book, American Soldiers: Ground Combat in the World Wars, Korea, and Vietnam, which the University Press of Kansas published in 2003. The Richard W. Leopold prize is awarded biennially for the best book written by a historian connected with federal, state, or municipal government dealing with foreign policy, military affairs broadly construed, the historical activities of the federal government, or biography of an individual involved in one of these areas. Previous winners of the Leopold Prize include Dale Andrade and William Hammond of the Center of Military History.
We at the Center of Military History have remained busy since my last communication, trying like the rest of the Army to support the Global War on Terrorism and Army transformation at the same time. Referring to Army transformation first, I would point out the extent to which we are going digital to serve our customers better and to address their research requirements with ever more speed and precision. Digital initiatives dominating these past months included transforming our website and working on publishing another two CDs in our increasingly popular CD-ROM program.

Visitors to the Center’s website will notice a new look. The site recently underwent its first major redesign since its launch in March 1996, making it more streamlined and easier to navigate. Links to all of the website’s major sections can now fit onto a single screen. No materials were deleted during the redesign, but we regrouped them into more logical categories. On the new home page, links to historical information and materials appear on the left side of the screen, while those dealing with CMH and website business appear on the right. A new section, About CMH, serves as a central location for information pertaining to the internal operations of the Center and the Army Historical Program (AHP), including employment and fellowship opportunities, the CMH library catalog, and both the CMH and AHP strategic plans. Once completed, each of the site’s 15,000-plus pages will carry the date of its last modification and a search function bearing the image of Maj. Gen. Gouverneur Warren. During the ongoing conversion and review, we will continue to make all previously posted materials available, while adding new titles. As part of a project to post all twenty-six published Department of the Army Historical Summaries (DAHSUMs), thirteen years’ worth of DAHSUMs have now been made available online, and we plan to add the remaining years to the site by the end of September.

The Center issued a new CD-ROM publication in early 2004 and hopes to produce another before mid-year. The United States Army and World War II, Set 3, is a new three-disc publication that reproduces materials that provide an overview of the topic. The CD contains, from the Green Book series, Chronology, 1941–1945; the three pictorial volumes (The War against Japan, The War against Germany and Italy: Mediterranean and Adjacent Areas, and The War against Germany: Europe and Adjacent Areas); and United States Army in World War II: Reader’s Guide. The CD also includes forty commemorative campaign and topical pamphlets that CMH published during the fiftieth anniversary of the war. We will soon issue a single-disc CD reproducing Correspondence Relating to the War with Spain. The War Department first published this documentary history in 1902, and it has proved indispensable to historians studying our nation’s transition into a global power.

The Global War on Terrorism continues to demand our support in the form of timely information papers and briefings to assist the Army’s decision-making. Recent hot topics have included insurgency, counterinsurgency, large unit rotations, casualty rates, and denazification. One manuscript we published recently, the United States Forces, Somalia, After Action Report, has proved particularly useful in coping with the complexities of the present environment. The report had originally been completed in 1994 by a team at the Army War College headed by Lt. Gen. Thomas Montgomery, but it was not released at that time.

We have also taken great pains to provide support to and learn lessons from our deployed historians. A Military History Detachment (MHD) Commanders Conference held in November 2003 in Chattanooga, Tennessee, compiled after-action review comments from the MHDs that had by then participated in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. This was particularly important in refining the field-collection doctrine outlined in FM 1–20, Military History

continued on page 49
It is to be hoped that these cadets who . . . are soon to graduate and become officers of the army, will never again place themselves in any situation which may be discreditable to them or require the voice of authority to remind them of their duty as officers and gentlemen."

Secretary of War William W. Belknap, June 1871
On 8 July 1883 a new prisoner signed into the Kansas State Penitentiary at Lansing. Convict 2984 was a thirty-six-year-old man, who stood just over 5 feet, 10 inches, in height and had a light complexion, light hair, and light blue eyes. His occupation was listed as "soldier," and a later entry indicated that he had been an officer. Indeed, until five days earlier, James Robert Wasson had been a major in the United States Army. During the preceding two decades he had fought in the Civil War, graduated at the head of his West Point class, vacationed with the nation's First Family, and received a military decoration from Emperor Meiji of Japan. Who was this man and why was he about to begin an eighteen-month prison sentence? 

Army Blue to Cadet Gray

James R. Wasson was born in western Ohio in January 1847. In 1854 his family moved to the small town of Hartford, Iowa (near Des Moines), where his father, John C. S. Wasson, worked as a merchant and postmaster. John Wasson enlisted in the Union Army in 1862 and soon became the first lieutenant of Company B, 34th Iowa Volunteer Infantry. In February 1863, shortly before his regiment participated in the Vicksburg campaign, he resigned his commission because of ill health and returned home. In January 1864 seventeen-year-old James Wasson decided that it was time for him to fight as well, so he enlisted in his father's former company and campaigned with it and with Company C of the same regiment across the deep South from Matagorda Island, Texas, to Florida. In the spring of 1864 the 34th Iowa served in the Red River campaign in central Louisiana, and in August it participated in the operations that led to the capture of Forts Gaines and Morgan, Alabama, which guarded the entrance to Mobile Bay. After serving briefly in western Florida, the regiment participated in April 1865 in the siege of Fort Blakely, Alabama, whose fall resulted in Mobile's surrender. The 34th Iowa then returned to Texas, and Private Wasson mustered out of federal service in Houston in August 1865.
James Wasson’s performance as a soldier impressed his first company
commander, Capt. James A. Dunagan, enough to offer to recommend him
to take an examination for the United States Military Academy at West
Point, New York. With the war still in progress, Wasson declined his captain’s
offer, explaining that he would not lay down his musket until the rebellion
was over. He evidently liked what he had seen of military service, how-
ever, because after returning to Iowa he secured an academy appointment
from his congressman and entered West Point in 1867. Six other men
who eventually graduated with him had also served in the war, including
two who had already worn shoulder straps—George B. Davis, who had
been a second lieutenant in the 1st Massachusetts Volunteer Cavalry, and
John M. Webster, a 197th Ohio Volunteer Infantry subaltern who entered
the academy in 1866 but had been “turned back” to the class of 1871.3

Since its establishment in 1802, the military academy had developed
into one of the leading engineering and scientific schools in the United States.
As both soldiers and civilians, its more than 2,100 graduates had helped lay
the groundwork for the nation’s growth. During the Civil War, hundreds of
West Pointers served with distinction as officers in both the Union and Con-
federate Armies. Twenty-two of those who served with the Union eventually
received the Medal of Honor. Of the 977 graduates from the classes between
1833 and 1861 who were alive as the war began, almost two out of three
(638) wore blue during the rebellion. Their overall performance and their
domination of the U.S. Army’s high command convinced the academy’s
leaders that they had developed an effective institution.4

The war had caused West Point to abandon its short-lived five-year
academic program in 1861, when it graduated two classes and restored the
four-year program of studies that had been introduced by Bvt. Maj. Sylvanus
Thayer in 1817. A new curriculum went into effect in 1867, but mathematics
(which caused most academic failures), science, and engineering courses con-
tinued to dominate, accounting for 1,125 (63 percent) of the 1,775 points
used to determine a cadet’s order of merit. Stricter entrance requirements
applied to the classes entering West Point between 1866 and 1870 lowered
the overall academic failure rate to about 30 percent from almost 50 per-
cent during the war. Fully two-thirds of the 55 men who entered the acad-
emy with Wasson graduated, although four of them were turned back to the
next class.5

Wasson’s academic preparation when he entered the academy had been
only that which “a little Western district school” could provide, but when
he graduated in June 1871 he ranked first in his forty-one-man class’s order
of merit and was one of the four cadet captains commanding the companies
that comprised the cadet battalion. For mistreating two “plebes” (freshmen),
most of the first classmen (seniors) had lost all of their privileges and been
confined to campus from 10 January 1871 until Secretary of War William
W. Belknap finally released them from restriction in early June, just a week
before graduation. Despite this episode, the Army and Navy Journal printed
a report that called the class “one of the very best, as far as its study re-
cord was concerned, which ever graduated.” It described Wasson as “a very
fine-looking fellow physically, being tall, well proportioned, and as straight as an arrow.” One of Wasson’s good friends was Frederick D. Grant, son of President Ulysses S. Grant (Class of 1843) and one of eight members of the class of 1871 who needed five years to graduate. Wasson reportedly helped Fred with his studies, thus endearing himself to the Grant family. Along with two other classmates, he and Fred were commissioned in the 4th Cavalry, which was then fighting Indians in Texas. Twenty men from the Class of 1871 entered the cavalry, while twenty-one became infantry officers.6

James Wasson’s military career looked promising as he left his “rock-bound highland home” for the last time. Before proceeding to his first assignment, he spent the beginning of his graduation leave at the popular seaside resort of Long Branch, New Jersey, where he vacationed with Fred Grant and the other members of the First Family at their cottage. On 23 June President Grant wrote from Long Branch to Horace Capron, his commissioner of agriculture, recommending Wasson to him. Capron, who had commanded an Illinois cavalry regiment during the Civil War, had within the previous year met and traveled around the United States with Kuroda Kiyotaka, the Japanese general whose forces had crushed the last opposition to the new reform government of the young Japanese Emperor Meiji on the northern island of Hokkaido. With President Grant’s approval, Capron had contracted with the Japanese government to lead a team of experts to introduce modern agricultural and industrial practices to Hokkaido. Grant’s letter discussed Capron’s departure from Washington and the importance of the work he would be doing. He suggested to Capron that if he had not yet selected all of the assistants who would accompany him to Japan, he should consider Wasson. Although the recent graduate had an obligation to provide four more years of military service, the War Department had no shortage of Army officers and each year allowed some West Pointers to resign their commissions early. As proof of Wasson’s intellectual accomplishments, Grant pointed out that he had entered West Point “without any schooling after he was 16 . . . and graduated head of his class in almost every branch of studies, and very far ahead in the general average.” Grant’s strong endorsement, however, failed to convince Capron to employ Wasson on his four-man team.7

Japanese Interlude

President Grant nevertheless enabled Wasson to visit Japan by having the adjutant general give the new officer six months’ leave beyond his graduation leave, which would expire on 30 September; permission to draw four months’ advance pay; and orders to report to Maj. Gen. John M. Schofield, who commanded the Division of the Pacific from headquarters in San Francisco. Four other recent Military Academy graduates also asked the War Department for six to twelve months’ leave and permission “to go beyond the seas.” First Lt. Henry H. C. Dunwoody, an 1866 West Point graduate and a fellow Iowan, sought his seven-month leave to accompany the Capron commission and “avail himself of any opening in civil engineering that may offer.” Second Lt. James H. Jones, class of 1868, wanted to see Japan, China,
and India, and was willing to give up a year's pay to do it, while 2d Lts. Richard H. Poillon and William R. Hoag, both classmates of Wasson, wanted to see the world. On 1 August the five lieutenants, along with Capron and his commission, sailed on the monthly steamer to Japan, with Wasson bearing dispatches for Rear Adm. John Rodgers, who commanded the U.S. Navy's Asiatic Squadron from his flagship, the USS "Colorado."  

Charles E. De Long, the American minister to Japan, reported the safe arrival of Capron's party and the five lieutenants to Secretary of State Hamilton Fish in September. Dunwoody was apparently not alone in seeking foreign employment opportunities. Letters that Fish and other American officials had provided Wasson, Dunwoody, and some of their associates convinced De Long to ignore the clause in his diplomatic instructions that he should "recommend no citizen of the United States for any position under the government to which [he] was accredited." Instead the minister chose "to aid them somewhat." Wasson, it appears, managed to arrange for future employment.  

Wasson swore his second lieutenant's oath of office in late October before the American consul in Kanagawa, just south of Tokyo, and sailed back to the United States from nearby Yokohama the following month, bearing return dispatches from Rodgers to Secretary of the Navy George M. Robeson. Wasson wrote Secretary Belknap in December to apply for another leave of absence and to tender his resignation, effective 1 July 1872. By that date each of the four lieutenants who accompanied Wasson to Japan in 1871 had returned to military duties in the United States. Dunwoody would ultimately serve six years as the Army's assistant chief signal officer and retire as a brigadier general.  

Before his resignation took effect, Wasson returned to Japan, "strongly impressed with the picture given me of the progressive movement which was said to be going on in this country." He taught mathematics, surveying, and English for one year beginning in March 1872 at a school established by the Hokkaido Colonization Office (Kaitakushi) and then spent another year as surveyor-in-chief for that office. He also assisted Capron commission member A. G. Warfield in various civil engineering projects. Wasson was assisted in his surveying duties by Lt. Murray S. Day, an American naval officer on extended leave, and their services were greatly appreciated by General Kuroda, who was now the Kaitakushi's deputy director. In late 1873 Kuroda sent the two Americans gifts of crepe and silk. Hokkaido (also known as Yeso or Yezzo) was Japan's last undeveloped island, and more than three-fifths of the 78 foreigners employed there by the Kaitakushi between 1871 and 1882 were Americans. This has led one modern historian to speculate that the Japanese may have viewed Americans as best qualified for Hokkaido service owing to the United States's experience with frontier expansion and development.  

Virtually isolated until American Commodore Matthew C. Perry's 1853 visit, Japan under the young Emperor Meiji was eager to shun old-fashioned ways and catch up with the West. The Meiji government was employing hundreds of oyatoi gaihokujin ("hired foreigners"), who provided the necessary expertise for its modernization efforts. By 1874 there were some 500 well-paid oyatoi (slang for "hired hands") throughout the country, a heavy majority of whom were British or French. Americans comprised about 10 percent of the total. Many of the foreigners were prominent in their fields, and their combined salaries soon exceeded 2 percent of the government's budget. Japan also sought overseas training opportunities for its citizens. In 1868 it had asked the United States for permission to send up to six students to the 23-year-old Naval Academy, and Congress agreed to the request. Five years later Juunzo Matsumura became the first Japanese citizen to graduate from Annapolis. In 1872, however, the House of Representatives, apparently more fearful of sharing the lessons of land warfare, rejected a similar Japanese request to enroll up to six students at West Point.  

In April 1874 Wasson obtained an opportunity to use his military education when he was appointed as the Imperial Japanese Army's chief engineer. A month earlier Wasson had discussed transferring from the Kaitakushi to the Japanese Army with Charles W. LeGendre, an American advisor to the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. LeGendre was a French native who had led the 51st New York Volunteer Infantry in the American Civil War, received the status of a volunteer brevet brigadier general, and served as the American consul at Amoy (today's Xiamen), across the Taiwan Strait from Formosa (Taiwan). Wasson had told LeGendre that he would not accept a smaller salary than he was receiving from the Kaitakushi and that he should receive the rank of colonel. Wasson had spent his one year as a U.S. Army second lieutenant on leave, so to establish that it was not presumptuous of him to request that rank, he asserted that the governor of Iowa had offered him a militia colonelcy before he started working in Japan. He further claimed that he had subsequently been offered an opportunity to serve the khedive of Egypt as a colonel or lieutenant colonel of engineers but had preferred to remain in Japan. Wasson's appointment as the Japanese Army's chief engineer carried the rank he sought. Wasson later maintained that he consented to the transfer from the Kaitakushi to the Army "because [he] hoped that in the latter place [he] would be able to render more important service than in any other," but he also probably found the financial rewards attractive—$6,000 for one year of service as a colonel, paid in monthly increments, and an allowance of 1,000 yen.  

The Japanese Army was preparing to launch a punitive expedition against aborigines on the island of Formosa, much as the United States
had done seven years before, when the shipwrecked crew of the American bark *Rover* was murdered there (see sidebar). The Japanese, however, also contemplated colonizing part of the island once the area had been subdued. The Formosa Expedition of 1874, which represented Japan's first major military excursion since a disastrous foray against Korea in the late sixteenth century, involved more than 3,000 samurai from the southern island of Kyushu under the command of Lt. Gen. Saigo Tsugumichi. The operation was designed to punish Formosa's Botan tribesmen for murdering fifty-four shipwrecked fishermen from the Ryukyu Islands in December 1871. After Japan annexed the Ryukyus in 1873, Japan's military demanded the right to punish the Formosans.  

To assist their efforts, the Japanese engaged two American officers—Lt. Comdr. Douglas R. Cassel, who, during a year's leave from the Asiatic Squadron, was made a captain in the Japanese Navy; and Wasson, who "was engaged to superintend the construction of field works, should such become necessary at any time." Former Ohio Congressman John A. Bingham, the new American minister to Japan and a dedicated advocate of peace, strongly protested the Americans' involvement in the operation, as well as Japan's rental of a Pacific Mail Steamship Company vessel, the *New York*. Bingham successfully detained the ship, but Cassel and Wasson ignored the minister's protests and, after a minor delay, sailed on 27 April from Nagasaki on the *Nepaul* with an advance party of about 100 men. In a letter to LeGendre, Wasson wrote that he did not "recognize" Bingham's "right to interfere with me in this business."  

During the voyage to Formosa Wasson gave signals training to a select group of officers and men, and he found that he could transmit messages in Japanese as easily as in English. The *Nepaul* stopped in Amoy to secure an interpreter and small landing boats and finally reached Formosa's Liang Kiao Bay on 6 May. Cassel assumed charge of the advance party, and he and Wasson went ashore to select a campsite suitable for 3,000 men about a mile north of the village of Sialiao. The next day Wasson took a small party of Japanese ashore to mark out the camp and trace the boundaries of fortifications, which hired locals later constructed for them.  

On 10 May 400 more Japanese troops landed on the southwestern coast of Formosa, and five days later expedition leaders met with Chief Issa, the head of the island's sixteen southern tribes. Captain Cassel assured Issa that he should not regard the Japanese as enemies because his tribes had not been involved in murdering the Ryukyuan mariners. Cassel told him, however, that unless the Botans turned over the murderers and begged to be pardoned, the Japanese would "march into their country... to destroy their villages, lay their country waste and exterminate their people." Issa said that the Botans were not under his control and the Japanese could punish them as they wished.  

On 22 May General Saigo arrived with more troops. The Japanese then fought the Botans and their allies, the Kussikuts, in the Battle of Stone Door (*Shih-men*, also translated as Stone Gate). Sixteen of the aborigines were killed, and many more were wounded. The Japanese, who lost only six dead, were quite proud of their victory. Wasson observed that
“no troops could have behaved better or with greater gallantry.” A week and a half later, a 1,200-man force, equally divided among three columns, attacked Stone Door again. Two of the columns destroyed the Botan and Kussikut villages, and Wasson wrote that “all that remained of these dangerous tribes were panic-stricken fugitives, hiding in the mountains.” After the troops returned to their camp about 3 June, active operations ceased.

On 1 July a Chinese gunboat landed a messenger from J. J. Henderson, the new American consul at Amoy, carrying warning letters to both Cassel and Wasson that advised them not to participate in any hostile actions against the Chinese, who were contemplating military action to support their claim to Taiwan. Later that month malaria struck the Japanese troops on Formosa, and the disease would eventually kill more than 550 of them. Wasson left the island in mid-August, however, before the epidemic reached its peak, and he recovered relatively quickly. In October Minister Bingham demanded that Wasson not return to Formosa, expressing concern that to do so would violate American neutrality. Bingham’s concerns, however, were overcome by events as Japanese and Chinese negotiators in Peking, assisted by Thomas Wade, the British minister to China, managed to settle the Sino-Japanese dispute. The two Asian powers signed an agreement at the end of October under which the Chinese tacitly acknowledged Japanese suzerainty over the Ryukyu Islands and paid an indemnity, while the Japanese agreed to withdraw from Formosa, the punitive aspect of their mission accomplished. General

Avenging the Rover

Japan’s 1874 punitive expedition against the aborigines of Formosa had a precedent. The United States had launched a similar, though less successful, expedition seven years earlier.

In March 1867, after the crew of the American bark Rover was shipwrecked off the island’s southern coast, local inhabitants murdered them. On 7 June Rear Adm. Henry H. Bell, commanding the U.S. Asiatic Squadron, sailed from Shanghai, China, to Formosa with two warships, the Hartford and the Wyoming. His mission, in the words of Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles, was “to destroy, if possible, the lurking-places of the band of savages.” Five days later, the expedition reached the Formosan port of Takao, where it added several civilians, including an interpreter and the British consul.

On 13 June, after the two ships anchored off the southwestern coast of the island, Comdr. George E. Belknap, the Hartford’s skipper, led a 181-man landing party of sailors and marines ashore. “The savages, dressed in cloths and their bodies painted red,” Secretary Welles later reported, engaged the Americans as they marched several miles into a high range of hills, and

On 19 June the expedition returned to Shanghai. Commander Mackenzie’s older brother, Ranald (1840–89), also gained fame in the U.S. military. After graduating first in the West Point class of 1862, he served valiantly during the Civil War as an engineer and as commander of an artillery regiment, a brigade, and a cavalry division in the Army of the Potomac, earning a brevet promotion to major general of volunteers. General Ulysses S. Grant “regarded Mackenzie as the most promising young officer in the army.”

The War Department assigned James Wasson and Frederick Grant to the 4th Cavalry, commanded by Colonel Mackenzie, when they graduated from the Military Academy in 1871. Mackenzie and his regiment would gain a reputation for audacity and success in combat with Indians in the West.

Notes

2. Ibid., pp. 55–56. For more details on the punitive expedition, see Roger D. Cunningham, Avenging the Rover, Pull Together, no. 42 (Fall/Winter 2003–2004), pp. 4–6.
Saigo’s expedition returned to Japan in early December.19

Emperor Meiji personally thanked Wasson for his contributions to the Formosa expedition and later decorated him with the newly created Order of Merit (later renamed the Order of the Rising Sun). The government also offered monetary rewards to both Wasson and Cassel. Lieutenant Day had taken over the surveying position that Wasson had held on Hokkaido, so the latter was considering other employment options as the expiration of his one-year tour of duty with the Japanese Army approached. In February 1875 Wasson informed LeGendre that, to avoid having to purchase foreign armaments, Japan should build under his supervision a small “manufactory” for arms and ammunition, capable of producing 100 rifles per day. He told LeGendre, “If I could accomplish this work[,] I could leave Japan . . . in two or three years . . . with the feeling that I had done some lasting good to my employers.”20

It is not known what became of Wasson’s proposal, but in October he reentered academia, joining the faculty of the Imperial University of Tokyo as a civil engineering professor. He may have met with Bvt. Maj. Gen. Emory Upton during his summer visit to Japan to study the organization of its army. Upton had graduated from West Point in 1861, performed brilliantly in the Civil War, and subsequently become the Army’s premier tactician. In 1875 he was traveling around the world as the senior member of a three-officer delegation studying the armies of Asia and Europe for General William T. Sherman, the Army’s commanding general. Upton had returned to West Point as commandant of cadets and instructor of tactics during Wasson’s senior year, and, because the two men were acquainted, Upton would probably have sought Wasson’s observations on the progress of the Japanese Army’s modernization. Upton was certainly impressed with that progress, and he later remarked in his book The Armies of Asia and Europe, “The sudden transi-

Medal of the Japanese Order of the Rising Sun

tion of Japan from ancient to modern civilization, which will ever be the marvel of history, is nowhere more conspicuous than in the army.”21

Paymaster

In spite of his successful career in Japan, Wasson evidently missed the United States, as well as the profession of arms. As the nation celebrated its centennial, the yatoo reportedly called upon his friendship with Lt. Col. Fred Grant to enlist his aid in rejoining the Army as a paymaster. Fred’s family connections had certainly assisted his own military career. After taking a lengthy leave in Europe until November 1872, the president’s son, who had graduated thirty-seventh in his 41-man class, finally reported to the 4th Cavalry at Fort Griffin, Texas, in December of that year. No officer was supposed to be eligible for staff duty until he had served at least three years in a line regiment, but to please First Lady Julia Grant, Lt. Gen. Philip H. Sheridan, commander of the Division of the Missouri, selected her son in March 1873 to serve as his aide-de-camp. Grant’s temporary promotion to field rank came with the staff position, which he held until just before he left the Army in 1881. Officers enduring lengthy assignments at isolated Western posts resented the easier and more civilized life that staff officers enjoyed, but as one major frankly admitted, the line officer tended “to look to the staff as the highest object of his ambition . . . the only outlet whereby he can ever come in contact with his countrymen, relatives and friends.”22

In September 1876 President Grant appointed Wasson as an Army paymaster with the rank of major. Wasson would fill a vacancy caused by the recent death of Maj. Augustus H. Seward, son of former Secretary of State William H. Seward. When President Grant saw the notice of Major Seward’s death in the newspaper, he immediately instructed his new secretary of war, James D. Cameron, to appoint Wasson to “prevent pressure for applicants for the vacant place.” Grant had already earned a reputation for appointing friends to public office, and the unethical conduct of several appointees, including payoffs that led to the resignation and impeachment of Secretary of War Belknap, had embarrassed the president.23

Wasson, who had married Minister Bingham’s twenty-four-year-old daughter Marie in July, accepted his major’s commission in November 1876, while he was still in Japan. Bingham enclosed his son-in-law’s letter of acceptance with his own missive to President Grant expressing his “grateful thanks for the appointment.” The minister then wrote powerful Ohio Senator John Sherman, and five weeks later Sherman informed Bingham that the Senate had confirmed Wasson’s appointment. In January 1877 Eli T. Sheppard, a former American consul in China, informed Bingham, an old family friend, that, when he met with
the president, Grant told him that “he regarded Wasson as one of the most promising young men in the country.” The new major clearly had a number of very influential men looking out for his best interests.24

Wasson secured permission from the adjutant general, Brig. Gen. Edward D. Townsend, to remain at Tokyo University until the arrival of Winfield Scott Chaplin, his successor. Chaplin had graduated from West Point in 1870 and briefly remained there as an assistant instructor of artillery tactics. After serving for a year at Fort Adams, Rhode Island, he had resigned his commission a few months before Wasson did and then worked for two years as a professor of modern languages and instructor of military science at the Maine College of Agriculture and the Mechanic Arts, now the University of Maine. Chaplin would teach civil engineering in Tokyo for eight years.25

The Army’s Pay Department was part of the War Department staff. Commanded by Brig. Gen. Benjamin Alvord, it was a small but rank-heavy organization that tied the Medical Department for having the greatest number of authorized majors—fifty paymasters, who were charged with disbursing military pay. Promotions came at a glacial pace for the peacetime Army’s small corps of 2,151 officers, and Wasson’s appointment as one of only 242 majors in the Army put him far ahead of all but one of his West Point classmates. Of the thirty-five who were still on active duty, Wasson outranked everyone but Frederick Grant. The rest of his classmates were still subalterns, and only a dozen of them had become first lieutenants. Five of them would not enjoy their first promotion until the early 1880s. Of Wasson’s eighteen classmates who achieved field rank in the Army after he did, most had to wait until the late 1890s, and four did not pin on oak leaves until the next century.26

In February 1877 Paymaster General Alvord asked the adjutant general to place Wasson on temporary duty in his Washington, D.C., office. A few months later, after Wasson had turned down a posting to Oregon that would have made it much easier for him and his wife to visit her father in Japan, the new paymaster was assigned to the Department of Texas. Soldiers were generally paid every two to three months, but the long distances in the Lone Star State caused delays of up to six months. In 1871 one paymaster left San Antonio with his clerk, eighteen soldiers, and several wagons and teamsters and spent five weeks completing his lengthy pay circuit. Five years later, three paymasters operating out of San Antonio traveled circuits that ranged from 343 to 1,372 miles. In 1876 $1.2 million was disbursed to the 3,106 soldiers stationed in Texas, and the Army’s payroll in the state continued to average more than $1 million annually during the 1880s.27

Soldiers prior to 1879 received their meager pay in paper “greenbacks”
that the government would not redeem in specie, and sutlers and frontier merchants commonly discounted the paper bills in relation to gold or silver coins. The fact that the politically divided 44th Congress failed to approve a military appropriation before it adjourned in March 1877 left the Army without any pay for more than four months, causing even greater financial hardships. This period was especially difficult for officers and their dependents, who were not entitled to the free rations that soldiers received, and the Wassons were no exception.

In February 1878 the paymaster's uncle had the temerity to write President Rutherford B. Hayes that the officer was in "straightened circumstances" after his expensive move from Japan to the United States and wanted to secure a $1,000 loan to see him through. The uncle also wrote that Wasson was "a noble boy" and destined "to make his mark."

During his six years in the Department of Texas, Major Wasson was one of four or five paymasters who rotated among several stations. He was first posted to San Antonio, where his younger brother, George, became a paymaster's clerk. James and Marie's son, Robert Bingham Wasson, was born in San Antonio during the summer of 1877. In mid-1879 Major Wasson moved his base of operations to Fort Brown, an Army post located twenty miles up the Rio Grande from the Gulf of Mexico. Rather than accompany him to this outpost, where yellow fever was a real threat, Marie and their child journeyed to Japan to live with Minister Bingham, who was quickly charmed by his little grandson. Wasson seems to have amassed considerable debt while living in Texas. After Marie shared with her father her concerns about these debts, Bingham urged Wasson to sell his costly speculative real estate investments to eliminate his indebtedness. In 1880 the paymaster returned to San Antonio, and two years later he proceeded to Galveston, a bustling port on the Gulf of Mexico with over 22,000 residents. Marie and Robert, however, did not rejoin him.

Service in the Lone Star State had not diminished the major's interest in Japan, where he probably hoped once again to earn additional money as a yatai and thereby cure his indebtedness, as well as rejoin his wife and child. In December 1882 Wasson requested a leave of absence of up to two years so that he could accept a temporary appointment as an assistant to the chief of the survey department of the Japanese government. Secretary of War Robert T. Lincoln believed that such an assignment required Congressional consent. Therefore, just before the end of the year, during the lame duck session of the 47th Congress, Representative John A. Kasson, the Iowa legislator who had appointed Wasson to West Point, tried to assist him. Kasson, an internationalist who had recently spent several years as minister to Austria-Hungary, introduced a joint resolution to authorize Wasson's absence. When Pennsylvania Congressman Samuel J. Randall, a former speaker of the House, questioned this arrangement, Kasson explained that Wasson was "one of the officers who have won credit for our Government in what they have done to cement the friendship between the two governments and peoples by developing civilization in that country."

Indiana Congressman William S. Holman nevertheless objected to the consideration of Kasson's resolution outside the regular order of business, and it progressed no further.

To amuse himself while stationed in Galveston, Wasson liked to play poker, and by early 1883 several games had saddled him with a gambling debt of $5,500—more than twice his annual base pay of $2,500. The paymaster concocted a scheme to settle his gambling bill with government funds and then to cover his embezzlement by feigning a robbery while he was on a pay trip. In early May the press began to carry accounts of the crime. Wasson claimed that on 30 April, while sleeping on a train as he was traveling west from Fort Worth to Fort Davis in western Texas, a valise holding $24,000 was stolen from him near Sweetwater. Brig. Gen. Christopher C. Augur, commander of the Department of Texas, expressed his confidence that the robbers would be caught and the money secured.

Major Wasson's amazing story soon unraveled, however, and on 8 May "quite a sensation was created in San Antonio," when he confessed "that the whole transaction was a fraud to cover his short accounts with the Government." General Augur immediately notified both his immediate superior, General Sheridan, and the adjutant general, Brig. Gen. Richard C. Drum, of the paymaster's fraud. Wasson was placed under arrest at departmental headquarters in San Antonio, and an officer was dispatched to Galveston to retrieve the money that he had hidden there. After reminding its readers that Wasson "had entree to the highest social circles," the Galveston Daily News reported that "a great deal of sympathy is expressed for the unfortunate man, who has allowed a weakness to bring disgrace upon his fair name."

On 16 May the Department of Texas convened a general court-martial to try Major Wasson, but the trial did not begin until 28 May. The paymaster then requested a further delay until 6 June, so that witnesses could be secured to speak in his defense. On that date, he was charged with violating two Articles of War—the 60th (embezzlement) and 61st (conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman)—and section 5488 of the Revised Statutes of the United States (conversion of public money to personal use by a disbursing officer), all to the prejudice of good order and military discipline. Seemingly repentant for his crime, Wasson pleaded guilty to all charges and specifications, except for violating the 61st Article of War because the punishment for that transgression was dismissal from the service. Before the day ended, Captain Dunagan, Wasson's first company commander, and another former soldier who had served with Wasson in the 34th Iowa testified to his character.

The next day, several civilians spoke on Wasson's behalf. Dr. M. A. Dashiell,
a physician from his hometown, cited his “benevolent acts to his aged parents in their financial difficulty.” Durham W. Stevens, who had been the secretary at the American legation in Japan from 1873 to 1882, testified that “Major Wasson’s character and services were highly esteemed by all the Japanese officials and particularly the higher ones under whom he served.” General Augur also testified to the paymaster’s character.34

On 8 and 9 June several more officers testified on Wasson’s behalf, and after a weekend recess Bvt. Lt. Col. Charles M. Terrell, the department’s chief paymaster, said that he had “regarded him as a thoroughly high toned and honorable gentleman.” All of these accolades, the fact that his friends repaid the missing money during the trial, and Wasson’s own lengthy written statement could not dissuade the members of the court from finding him guilty of all charges and specifications. On 12 June, the twelfth anniversary of the paymaster’s graduation from West Point, they sentenced him to dismissal from the service of the United States and imposed a $2,000 fine. If he could not immediately pay the fine, he was to be imprisoned at hard labor until he did. The next day, however, one member of the court reportedly changed his mind, and a new vote increased Wasson’s sentence to dismissal and eighteen months’ imprisonment, with the punishment to be published in two newspapers in Galveston and nineteen in Iowa.35

On 14 June General Augur forwarded the case through his chain of command for the review of President Chester A. Arthur, with a recommendation from eight of the court’s eleven members that Wasson’s “excellent and honorable service” and “previous good character” entitled him to favorable consideration. In his legal review of the case, however, the judge advocate general, Brig. Gen. David G. Swaim, reported to Secretary of War Lincoln that he found the proceedings, findings, and sentence “fully justified by the law and the facts.” Unfortunately for Wasson, several recent cases of officer misconduct had generated a spate of bad publicity for the Army, and these incidents probably convinced Arthur that it would not be politically expedient for him to show leniency. Thus, on 26 June the president confirmed the harsher sentence. The secretary of war directed that the sentence take effect on 3 July 1883, and on that date Wasson ceased to be an officer. His confinement was to be served at the Kansas State Penitentiary at Lansing. The Galveston Daily News reported, “It was agreed that in view of the approaching presidential contest it would be imprudent for Mr. Arthur to exercise his pardoning power in Wasson’s favor in the face of his plea of guilty.”36

Major Wasson received the outcome that he deserved, and although he did have a large circle of friends and relatives who supported him, few in the fourth estate expended any kind words on his behalf. In a commentary entitled “Justice for the Army,” the Army and Navy Journal cited new allegations that Wasson had also overcharged the government for travel and fuel and misappropriated money allocated for clerical help. The journal concluded, “The prompt approval of the sentence of Major Wasson will give the Army an assurance, which it very much needs just now, that the interests of the Service are to take precedence of the interests and the sympathies of individuals.” The New York Times wrote: “Let the convicts step out and give place to better men. This is what the best interests of the military service demand. If these repeated warnings are not heeded, the morale of the army of the United States will vanish.” In his annual report, Brig. Gen. William B. Rochester, the Army’s paymaster general since 1882, described Wasson’s misuse of public funds, observed that it had resulted in his dismissal, and pointed out: “No system of accounting, however perfect, will prevent a corrupt official . . . from proving recreant to his trust.”37

**Convict 2984**

Wasson was not sentenced to serve his confinement at the military prison at Fort Leavenworth because it was too crowded. Established in the winter of 1874–75, the prison held 467 inmates at the end of June 1883, and General Drum reported that “increased accommodations must be provided for as fast as means can be obtained.” The military prison’s inmates, most of whom had been confined for desertion and theft, led a bleak existence, manufacturing boots and shoes, harnesses, brooms, chairs, and other articles for the Army, but Lansing’s convicts faced an even grimmer prospect—working in the prison’s coal mine.38

Built by convict labor, the Kansas State Penitentiary resembled a medi-
eval, red sandstone castle. It had two wings with a total of 688 cells, and within its ten-acre prison yard there were wagon, shoe, furniture, harness, and marble slab factories employing 350 convicts, whose labor was paid for by contract manufacturers. Just outside the prison's main wall was the coal mine, whose 732-foot shaft had just been completed the year before. The mine initially employed more than 100 convicts, but as economic factors caused the manufacturing firms to reduce their requirements for convict labor, additional prisoners were shifted to the mine. Three hundred convicts would be toiling underground by the end of the decade.39

Lansing was managed according to the Auburn system, named for the manner in which the New York state prison at Auburn was operated. Under this system convicts worked and dined together but returned to solitary cells at night. Behind a door made of half-inch iron-bar lattice, each cell was only four feet by seven feet by seven feet in size. Within the cell's confined space the authorities provided a bed that folded down from the wall; a chair; a small tin bucket; a washbasin, mirror, and towel; a broom; and a Bible. Prisoners wore black-and-white horizontally striped uniforms and were required to maintain absolute silence and march single file in lockstep.40

Lansing had been accepting federal felons since 1870, when Secretary of War Belknap approved Warden Henry Hopkins's request that military prisoners sentenced within the Department of the Missouri be confined in his institution. This was a profitable arrangement for the state, as the prisoners brought a per diem from the government and also furnished income-producing labor. By early 1884 there would be forty-seven military prisoners at Lansing, all but one of them enlisted men. The prisoners' sentences ranged from life for murder to only eight months for theft (the most common military offense); more than half of the sentences were four years or less.41

Wasson left San Antonio for Kansas on 6 July 1883, and two days later a large crowd was present when he arrived at the Leavenworth railroad station. The prisoner was still physically impressive, and a local newspaper described him as "a fine appearing man, straight as an Indian," who would be considered "an intelligent, refined and shrewd man by almost every casual observer." Wasson was accompanied by one officer, 2d Lt. George T. Bartlett of the 3d Artillery, and three "reliable" noncommissioned officers. One of the latter was handcuffed to the prisoner's right hand, which "seemed to annoy him very much."42

A military ambulance from Fort Leavenworth then transported the five men a few miles south to Lansing. In the penitentiary's reception hall the newly appointed warden, William C. Jones, met the group and extended a special welcome to Lieutenant Bartlett, a fellow Kansan whom he had once known. Warden Jones informed Wasson: "It is not often we have a West Point cadet in prison walls, and we will try and not be too hard with you. I presume [you] will be sorry to part with your moustache?" After the prisoner replied in a "slightly tremulous" voice that he would, Warden Jones informed him that he could keep it for at least one more day.43

Before the new prisoner was escorted away for his initial processing, correctional authorities allowed a reporter from the Leavenworth Times to interview him. When the reporter asked Wasson what he thought of his sentence, he replied that he was resigned to his fate. When asked whether his trial had been impartial, he replied that he had no reason to complain. Wasson indicated that since his troubles had begun, his fellow officers had treated him with uniform kindness and courtesy. He also reminded the reporter that all of the money he had taken had been returned.44

The Leavenworth Times left no doubt in its readers' minds where it stood regarding Wasson's crime. In an editorial entitled "Give Them Their Dues," the newspaper mentioned a group of Army officers, some unnamed, who had committed various transgressions but been allowed to resign in lieu of prosecution. The Times opined: "There is no desire to persecute these officers who have been guilty of wrong, but justice demands that they be punished without fear or favor." It concluded that most officers were moral, honest, and true to their country, "so why not kick out and into the penitentiary those who deserve hard labor and disgrace?"45

The New York Times reported that
Wasson had written the Army Relief Association, to which he belonged, requesting that benefits be paid to his wife, but that the organization refused to do this. Marie and their son Robert continued to live with Minister Bingham in Japan, and, although James and Marie apparently never divorced, they seem to have remained apart for the rest of their lives. Wasson was undoubtedly relieved by the fact that his West Point education enabled him to avoid working in the prison's coal mine, where seventeen of the military prisoners toiled. The warden determined that only Wasson and two other military prisoners had "good" educations, which earned them the lighter tasks of clerking, tailoring, and "general work." Wasson's duties ultimately expanded beyond mere clerking. The Army and Navy Register reported that "he did very valuable work in the engineering department during his confinement in surveying coal grounds and superintending the present system of water-works at the prison." Because Wasson caused no problems, two months were subtracted from his original sentence, and he was slated to be discharged on 3 November 1884.46

About midway through Wasson's incarceration the New York Times reported that his friends had been "extremely active" in seeking his pardon. This process actually began two days before Wasson's court-martial adjourned, when Minister Bingham petitioned former President Grant, "relying upon [his] generous nature and [his] uniform kindness" to use his "good offices" on Wasson's behalf. Grant forwarded the letter to President Arthur, who evidently ignored it. From the end of 1883 onward, scores of other concerned citizens wrote Arthur on Wasson's behalf. These included Iowa's governor, Buren R. Sherman, and former governor Cyrus C. Carpenter (1872-76); 5 judges of the Iowa supreme court; 140 members of the Iowa General Assembly; all 4 senators and 32 congressmen from Iowa and Ohio, along with the speaker of the House and both senators from Texas; 8 of the 11 officers who had sat on Wasson's court-martial; 3 members of the Kansas State Penitentiary's Board of Directors; and Warden Jones.47

In February 1884 Lt. Joseph M. Simms of the U.S. Revenue-Marine in Galveston wrote President Arthur on behalf of eighteen petitioners who believed that Wasson was "an honest man and gentleman at heart," and that his offense "was not premeditated or the act of a man steeped in crime." Simms asked that Wasson "be restored to his former position in society and the embrace of a fond wife and family." In April Iowa Congressman Lu­man H. Weller forwarded to Arthur a clemency request from Wasson's sister, Minnie, who "earnestly beg[ged] for help "in this great sorrow." Weller also alluded to a petition that Congressman Kasson had circulated and added, "I am of the opinion this is a case worthy of Executive clemency." After Wasson had been incarcerated for more than a year, a concerned Kasson wrote Secretary of War Lincoln to ask him to call the president's attention to the case.48

Finally, just before Wasson was scheduled to be released, President Arthur pardoned him. Arthur's reluctance to act on Wasson's behalf was characteristic of the caution with which he exercised his clemency powers. The president's rejection of "spoilsmanship" and support for civil service reform had angered enough members of his own party to deny him the Republican nomination for president in 1884. With no political capital to lose, he approved almost half of his clemency actions during his last year in office. On 1 November the president honored General Grant's request and the petitions he had received and pardoned Wasson. While the Army and Navy Register reported that this would enable the ex-paymaster's friends to try to secure his restoration to the service, it commented, "We fancy such efforts would be wasted."49

Citizen Soldier

With his full rights of citizenship restored, Wasson returned to Des Moines, where he attempted to start over and redeem himself. By the late 1880s he had worked as a general agent for the Provident Savings Life Assurance Society of New York and then become the general manager of the Iowa Feed, Water Heater and Purifier Company. His public acceptance was underscored in October 1886, when he was unanimously elected as the captain of the state capital's Company A (Governor's Guard), 3d Regiment, Iowa National Guard. The Iowa State Register reported that he was "eminently fitted to fill the position, both by ability and education, and will lead this flourishing organization to new victories." During the 1887 inspection of the 3d Regiment's eight companies, Wasson's unit received the highest score, and it was detailed to perform escort duty during the inaugural festivities of reelected Governor William Larrabee in January 1888. The company elected a new captain in February 1889, but whether this was due to discontent with Wasson's leadership or a decision on his part to step down is not known. Wasson failed to secure election as the Des Moines city engineer, and his political affiliation apparently jinxed his attempt to become the state adjutant general. His failure to obtain the contract to grade the state capitol grounds "seemed to make him despondent and he disappeared" from Iowa around 1890.50

In 1891 the New York Times reported that Wasson had returned to Japan and become "a prominent figure" in the Japanese Army, although he had to overcome charges that he was "implicated in a revolutionary movement," an allegation which, if proven, could have cost him his life. Three years later the Washington Post printed a report from a friend of Wasson stating that the former major, who was then residing in Sedalia, Missouri, had been asked to return to Japan to assist the country in its war with China, which the Japanese would win decisively in fighting on and around the Korean peninsula. There is no evidence, however, that Wasson did return. In 1898 the former officer, then
a civil engineer living in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, still seemed to retain a sense of military obligation, because as war with Spain loomed he sought an appointment in the volunteer force that would be raised to augment the small Regular Army. Wasson's attempt to serve failed, and in January 1899 he had the adjutant general return all of the correspondence related to his request. 51

In March 1899 Congress authorized the organization of a group of volunteer regiments to augment the state and Regular Army units fighting in the Philippines. In October, when Wasson was almost fifty-three, he wrote the Army's adjutant general, Brig. Gen. Henry C. Corbin, requesting permission to enlist in one of these new regiments. He wanted to serve in the 46th Infantry, U.S. Volunteers, perhaps because it was commanded by Col. Walter S. Schuyler, who had graduated from West Point one year before he had. An assistant adjutant general informed the commanding officer at Washington Barracks, D.C., (today's Fort McNair) that Wasson's enlistment in the 46th was authorized, "provided he fulfill all other requirements." After it was determined that Wasson was a bit nearsighted, he was initially rejected, but the adjutant general quickly authorized a waiver of his vision problem. 52

On 7 October Wasson enlisted in the 46th Infantry at Washington Barracks, an action that delighted both his wife and her father, John Bingham. Wasson was appointed a sergeant in Company M and later became the regiment's color sergeant. The 46th sailed from San Francisco on 14 November and dropped anchor in Manila Bay a month later. In January 1900 Wasson's regiment helped seize Cavite and Batangas Provinces south of Manila from Filipino insurrectionists. The following month, while serving in Cavite Province, Wasson was reduced to private for neglect of duty as the result of a special court-martial. In September, after a spring and summer in which his regiment endured occasional guerrilla attack, Wasson was again court-martialed for being drunk and absent from reveille. He was found guilty and sentenced to forfeiture of pay. His regiment left the Philippines in April 1901. 53

Among the passengers aboard the army transport ship that carried Wasson and his regiment home was Brig. Gen. Frederick Grant. Three years before, Grant had returned to uniform as colonel of the 14th New York Volunteer Infantry, and he had been quickly promoted to brigadier general. In the Philippines Grant had led the force that established American authority in Zambales and Bataan Provinces in December 1899, and he subsequently commanded a district that encompassed three provinces north and west of Manila. Perhaps the shared voyage enabled the general and Private Wasson to trade "war stories" or to reminisce about better days gone by. At the least it must have reminded Wasson how his career had diverged from that of his distinguished classmate and former friend. Wasson finally mustered out of federal service at the Presidio of San Francisco in May 1901, and an officer at that time noted that his service was "not honest and faithful. Object to reenlistment on grounds of general worthlessness." One newspaper later reported that he was mugged after he left the Presidio with his final pay. 54

Wasson soon demonstrated that he was still willing to travel to foreign lands to seek his fortune. In 1902
Wasson went to the remote mountain silver mining works of the Batopilas Mining Company in the state of Chihuahua, Mexico, where he worked as a civil and mining engineer. The manager of the company’s Mexican enterprises, former District of Columbia governor Alexander R. “Boss” Shepherd, had amassed a fortune of some $10 million over 23 years in Mexico, but Wasson lasted less than a year there. He returned to the insurance business in Chicago in 1903, and from 1904 to 1909 he worked for the Lennox Furnace Company of Marshalltown, Iowa.55

Wasson successfully applied for a disability pension in 1905, the same year that his son, Robert, wed Sara C. Browne in Baltimore. Marie Wasson, now living in Cadiz, Ohio, attended the July wedding unaccompanied. Japan’s ambassador, Kogoro Takahira, and the Russian ambassador, Baron Roman R. von Rosen, were both invited to the event. The former sent his regrets, perhaps to avoid unnecessary contact with the diplomat he would soon be facing at the Portsmouth, New Hampshire, peace conference that would end the Russo-Japanese War.56

From 1912 until 1920 Wasson served as an engineer for the National Soldiers Homes, moving around to branches in five states. In March 1917 he wrote President Woodrow Wilson from the home in Hampton, Virginia, to once again apply for a commission, this time in the military force that was being raised for the impending war with Germany. Given his tainted military record and the fact that he was seventy years old, Wasson’s request not surprisingly fell on deaf ears, but there was still something admirable about his final attempt to serve.57

Wasson also attempted to ensure his place in history. In April 1918 he donated his Order of the Rising Sun medal and the document conferring it to Iowa’s secretary of state. He wished “to deposit these articles in the museum connected with the State Library at the Capitol,” and even offered to pay for framing the document if it was to be placed on a wall. Three months later, the curator of the Historical Department of Iowa informed Wasson that he had all the items and proposed to add them to a case “devoted to a very interesting Chinese collection.” Like so many other Wasson plans, however, this one too went awry—the donated items are missing today.58

James Robert Wasson moved from Hampton to the Iowa Soldiers’ Home in Marshalltown in 1920. There his life came to an end on 17 February 1923, when he succumbed to pernicious anemia at the age of seventy-six. He was buried in the Hartford Cemetery, probably near his parents. Marie Wasson lived for another six years, before dying of pneumonia in Cranford, New Jersey, where she had gone to live with her son, Robert, and his wife. After pursuing a career as a mechanical engineer, Robert also died in Cranford in 1951.59

Obviously a very talented, supremely confident, and highly ambitious man who seemed to make friends easily, Wasson had clearly lacked the dedication and steadfastness that a successful military career demanded. His five years as a respected and well-paid yato in Japan had spoiled him for the Spartan lifestyle that Regular Army officers routinely endured—an existence of family separations, slow promotions, and mediocre pay (and for four months in 1877 no pay at all) that one frontier officer’s wife characterized as “glittering misery.”60 Wasson’s close friendship with the president’s son and his marriage to a powerful diplomat’s daughter also suggest that at heart he was an opportunist. His risky investments and his willingness to misappropriate public funds for his own use seem much more in tune with the ruthlessness that characterized the American business world during the Gilded Age than with the credo of selflessness and personal honor that distinguished the profession of arms.

There is no record of Wasson’s final thoughts, but surely as death approached the man who had shown so much promise in his youth must have greatly regretted the dishonorable actions that had ruined not only his military career, but his life. If only the “very fine-looking fellow” had followed Secretary Belknap’s wise advice when he released the Class of 1871 from arrest: “It is to be hoped that these cadets who ... are soon to graduate and become officers of the army, will never again place themselves in any situation which may be discreditable to them or require the voice of authority to remind them of their duty as officers and gentlemen.”61

Headline of article on Wasson's disgrace in the Topeka Capital, 10 June 1908

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Although James Wasson and one other member of the Class of 1871 were dismissed from the Army and six others resigned their commissions, Wasson's thirty-three remaining classmates either died on active duty or served in the Army until retirement. Nine of them became general officers—seven brigadier generals and two major generals. George S. Anderson, who became a brigadier general in 1911, served for six years beginning in 1891 as superintendent of Yellowstone National Park. George B. Davis, the author of several legal texts, headed the Military Academy's history department before becoming the Army's judge advocate general in 1901. He retired as a major general ten years later. Frederick D. Grant was promoted to major general in 1906 and died in active service in 1912. Eleven other members of the class also died on active duty, including two killed in combat. Second Lt. Reid T. Stewart died in a fight with Apache Indians in Arizona Territory in 1872, and Capt. James Fornance was mortally wounded leading his company in the assault on San Juan Hill in Cuba. Two other members of the class succumbed to yellow fever in Cuba after the Spanish-American War.

Ulysses G. White resigned as a second lieutenant in 1873 but in 1877 received a commission in the Navy as a civil engineer officer. He retired as a Navy captain in 1910. Frederick Schwatka became a noted explorer. In 1878 he led a team that found Inuit communities in Arctic Canada evidence of the ill-fated end of British explorer Sir John Franklin's 1845 expedition in search of a navigable Northwest Passage, and in the early 1880s he explored the Yukon River in Alaska. After resigning from the Army as a first lieutenant in 1885, Schwatka explored and studied parts of northern Mexico before dying in Portland, Oregon, in 1892. Thomas Mumford retired as a captain owing to a disability in 1891 but later became the Maryland National Guard's inspector general. The last surviving member of his class, he died at the age of 92 in 1941.
Notes

1. Entry on convict 2984, Convicts in the Kansas State Penitentiary, 1871–1894, Microfilm publication MS740, Kansas State Historical Society, Topeka.


3. Folder I, General Court-Martial of Paymaster James R. Watson, Case Q29901, RG 153, Records of the Office of the Judge Advocate General (Army), NA; Francis B. Heitman, Historical Register and Dictionary of the United States Army, 2 vols. (Washington, D.C., 1903), 1: 358, 1013. Davis later served as the Army’s judge advocate general. He retired as a major general in 1911.

4. James L. Morrison, Jr., The Best School in the World: West Point, the Pre–Civil War Years, 1833–1866 (Kent, Ohio, 1986), esp. pp. 133–34. Two former cadets who had not graduated and a number of the class of 1869 also later received Medals of Honor for Civil War heroism.

5. Ibid., pp. 147–48.

6. Army and Navy Journal 8 (24 June 1871): 717 (quotations); "West Point," New York Times, 11 Jan 1871; "West Point Cadets," New York Times, 6 Jun 1871; "West Point," New York Times, 13 Jan 1871; Official Army Register for January, 1872 (Washington, 1872), p. 49; Heitman, Historical Register, 1: 145. In an 1875 letter Watson claimed that, when he graduated, he was especially recommended to President Grant for a commission in the Ordnance Corps, which had last received a new graduate in 1868. See Wason to Charles LeGendre, 19 Feb 1875, LeGendre Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. Grant may have steered his son Fred and James Wason to the 4th Cavalry because of his great respect for its commander, Col. Randell Mackenzie.


8. Simon, Papers of Ulysses S. Grant, 22: 38; Telegram, Adjutant General (hereafter AG) to Secretary of War, 10 Jul 1871, file 2726 ACP 1879; Ltr, Jones to AG, 12 Jun 1871, file 2660 ACP 1871, Ltr, Poisson to AG, 11 Jul 1871, file 3020 ACP 1871, Ltr, Hoag to AG, 10 Jul 1871, file 3051 ACP 1871, all in RG 94, NA.


12. Edward R. Beauchamp, "Foreign Employees of the Meiji Period," Kodansha Encyclopedia of Japan, 9 vols. (New York, 1983), 2: 310–11; U.S. Statutes at Large, 15: 261; Congressional Globe 42 (42d Cong., 2d sess.): 3228–29; Email msg, James Cheevers, U.S. Naval Academy Museum, to author, 5 Sep 2003, copy in Army History files, CMH; Sixteen Japanese students eventually attended the Naval Academy, and seven of them graduated. West Point's first international graduate (from Guatemala) was in the Class of 1889. For an excellent discussion of the gakushūkai, see Hazel J. Jones, Life Machines: Hired Foreigners and Meiji Japan (Vancouver, Canada, 1980). Jones's figures for foreign employees are higher than Beauchamp's, but she argues that Americans were the third largest group and that their numbers peaked in 1874.

13. Ltrs, Wason to LeGendre, 11 Mar 1874; Suigo Yori-Mich to LeGendre, 1 Apr 1874; Wason to LeGendre, 27 Apr 1874; Wason to LeGendre, 19 Feb 1875 (quote), LeGendre Papers. In the 1870s Khedive Ismail governed Egypt as viceroy to the Ottoman sultan of Turkey. Wason's employment may have been suggested by an American soldier of fortune, Charles F. Stone (USMA 1845), who served as the Egyptian Army's chief of staff from 1870 to 1883.


15. Edward H. House, The Japanese Expedition to Formosa (Tokyo, 1875), p. 7 (first quote); James R. Wason, Unpublished expedition report, Tokyo, 1875, p. 2, LeGendre Papers; Ltr, Wason to LeGendre, 27 Apr 1874, LeGendre Papers. Author Edward House, a friend of LeGendre, actually accompanied the expedition. Douglas R. Cassel (USNA 1864) was, like Wason, a native of Ohio and a Civil War veteran, having been wounded in the 1864 Mobile Bay campaign. A director in the 1871 American punitive expedition to Korea, Cassel died in a Philadelphia suburb in June 1875 from the effects of the malaria he contracted on Formosa.


that Wasson in na/16 American residents."

Heitman, Historical Register, 1: 470; Paul Andrew Hutton, Phil Sheridan and His Army (Lincoln, 1985), p. 141; Robert M. Utley, Frontier Regulars: The United States Army and the Indian, 1866–1891 (New York, 1973), p. 32–33, quoting a letter of 2 April 1872 written by Maj. William R. Price of the 8th Cavalry. Years later the Army and Navy Journal 20 (12 May 1883): 931, reported that President Grant had named Wason as a paymaster at the behest of Lt. Col. Frederick Grant.

Lt. Grant to Cameron, 12 Sep 1876, in file 2871 ACP 1871; Heitman, Historical Register, 3: 296; Jean Edward Smith, Grant (New York, 2001), pp. 468, 471, 554–55, 593–95. Secretary of War Belknap, who during the Civil War commanded the 15th Iowa Volunteer Infantry in the Vicksburg campaign and led a division in Sherman’s march to the sea, had resigned in March 1876, after a House committee discovered that Belknap and his wife had over a half dozen years taken some $20,000 in payoffs made by the contractor awarded the military trading post at Fort Sill, Indian Territory. Although the House voted unanimously to impeach Belknap several hours after he resigned, the Senate, apparently on account of that resignation, failed by five votes to adopt the two-thirds majority required for conviction. See Smith, Grant, pp. 593–95; Ezra J. Warner, Generals in Blue: Lives of the Union Commanders (Baton Rouge, 1964), p. 29.

Erving E. Beauregard, Bingham of the Hills: Politician and Diplomat Extraordinary (New York, 1989), p. 156; Lt. Bingham to Grant, 13 Nov 1876; John Sherman to Bingham, 16 Dec 1876; Eli T. Sheppard to Bingham, 23 Jan 1877, Red 2 microfilm edition, John A. Bingham Papers, Ohio Historical Society, originally formed and, some currently, in the possession of Milton Ronsheim. Minister Bingham’s joy in his youngest daughter’s marriage was somewhat lessened by the sad news that in late June 1876 Lt. Col. George A. Custer, whom he had appointed to West Point from his southeastern Ohio district in 1857, had been killed with five companies of the 7th Cavalry at the Battle of the Little Bighorn.

Lt. Townsend to Wasson, 29 Dec 1876, file 2871 ACP 1871; Cullum, Biographical Register, 3: 143–44, Email msg, Ben Proud, Special Collections, Folger Library, University of Maine, to editor, Army History, 27 Jan 2004, copy in Army History files. Chaplin’s work in Tokyo seems to have been well regarded in American academic circles. He returned to the United States in 1885 to teach civil engineering at Harvard University and subsequently served for sixteen years as chancellor of Washington University in St. Louis. See Cullum, Biographical Register, 6: 145.

Lt. Alford to AG, 23 Feb 1877, and Ltr. Bingham to Hayes, 21 Nov 1879, both in file 2871 ACP 1871; Thomas T. Smith, The U.S. Army and the Texas Frontier Economy, 1845–1900 (College Station, 1999), pp. 125–27. In his letter to Hayes, Bingham requested that Wasson be transferred to California, so he could be closer to Japan. Alford’s endorsement to this request indicated that Wasson had turned down an earlier offer to be assigned in Oregon.


Wasson to Bingham, Historical Register, 3: 167; Official Register of the United States, Containing a List of Officers and Employees on the Thirtieth of June, 1879, 2 vols. (Washington, 1879), 1: 250, showing that George Wason was paid $100 per month; Ltrs. Marie Wason to John and Amanda Bingham, 4 Sep 1877, 4 Dec 1877, roll 2, and John Bingham to James Wason, 29 Oct 1879, 16 Feb 1880, roll 5, John A. Bingham Papers, Ohio Historical Society; Bingham to Grant, 11 Jun 1883, AG Doc. file 1746, Letters Received by the Office of the Adjutant General, roll 210, Microcopy M689, NA. Ltr. Bingham to Hayes, 21 Nov 1879, referred to Marie’s “failing health” as well as the danger that yellow fever posed for her and Robert. This suggests that the Wason’s initial separation was caused by health concerns rather than marital problems. Robert B. Wason’s obituary in the New York Times, 1 June 1951, reported that he was born at Fort Sam Houston, Texas, but that name was not adopted for the military post in San Antonio until 1890.

Lt. to AG, 6 Feb 1883, in file 2871 ACP 1871; Congressional Record 14 (47th Cong., 2d sess.): 663 (quote).

General Court-Martial Orders 30, Headquarters of the Army, 27 Jun 1883 (hereafter GCMO 30, 1883), a copy of which containing Wason’s initial report of the “robbery,” is in folder 3, Court-martial case Q3901, RG 153, NA; Army and Navy Journal 20 (5 May 1883): 910.

Army and Navy Journal 20 (13 Feb 1883): 931 (quotations in first sentence); Galveston Daily News, 10 May 1883; Teleg, Augustus to Sheridan, 8 May 1883, and Ltr. Augur to AG, 8 May 1883, AG Doc. file 1746, roll 210, Microcopy M689, NA. All documents on roll 210, Microcopy M689, NA, are related to the Wasson case. Wasson had hidden $18,500 in his office.

Folder 1, Court-martial case Q3901. 34. Ibid.

Ibid; Lt. War Dept Chief Clerk to the AG, 2 Jul 1883, AG Doc. file 1746. As an example, the Deseronto Gazette charged the Army $3 to publish its notice.

Folder 1, Court-martial case Q3901; GCMSO 30, 1883; Rpt, Swaim to Lincoln, 22 Jun 1883, AG Doc. file 1746; Galveston Daily News, 4 Jul 1883. General Swaim did object, however, to the charge citing section 3488, noting that the 60th Article of War was “sufficiently ample to embrace every species of embezzlement.” For details on two other cases of officer misconduct in 1883, see Oliver Knight, Life and Manners in the Frontier Army (Norman, Okla., 1978), pp. 73–74.


Ibid., p. 300; John N. Reynolds, The Twin Hells: A Thrilling Narrative of Life in the Kansas and Missouri Penitentiaries (Chicago, 1890) pp. 27–28. Reynolds spent sixteen months at Lansing three years after Wasson, and the author presumes that the conditions Reynolds described are the same as those Wason experienced.

Hougen, “The Impact of Politics, p. 303; Ltr. Henry Hopkins to Commanding Officer, Dept. of the Missouri and Kansas (sic), 31 Mar 1870, with an endorsement by the adjutant general stating that the secretary of war approved Lansing’s designation as a military prison in May, AG Doc. file M599 1870, roll 801, Microcopy M619, NA; Record of Military Prisoners Confined in the Kansas State Penitentiary, March 31, 1884,” folder 3, Court-martial case Q3901.

Major Wason,” Leavenworth Times, 10 Jul 1883; Special Order 76, Department of Texas, 5 Jul 1883, roll 210, Microcopy M689, NA; Cullum, Biographical Register, 3: 345. Bartlett would retire as a major general and survive to be the Military Academy’s oldest living graduate for over a year prior to his death in 1949.

Leavenworth Times, 10 Jul 1883.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Major Wason’s Audacity,” New York Times, 25 Aug 1883; “Report of Warden, Kansas State Penitentiary, of Military Prisoners in Confinement during the Quarter Ending March 31, 1884,” AG Doc. file 1612, roll 269, Microcopy M689, NA (initial quotes); Army and Navy Register, 8 Nov 1884; entry on convict 2984, Convicts in the Kansas State Penitentiary, 1871–1894. Kansas prisoners earned “good time” at the rate of three days per month during their first year, five days per month during their second year, and eight days per month after that. See undated memo, written prior to 26 October 1884, AG Doc. file 1746.

Major Wason Seeking Pardon,” New...
York Times, 12 Feb 1884; Ltr, Bingham to Grant, 11 Jun 1883, and List of Persons Recommending Pardon of James R. Wasson, Late Paymaster, U.S. Army, undated, both in AG Doc. file 1746.

48. Ltrs, Simms to Arthur, 3 Feb 1884; Minnie Wasson to Weller, 5 Apr 1884; Weller to Arthur, [Apr 1884], all in File J-504, Pardon Case Files, RG 204, Records of the Office of the Pardon Attorney, NA; Ltr, Kasson to Lincoln, 27 Jul 1884, AG Doc. file 1746. The U.S. Revenue-Marine became known as the Revenue-Cutter Service in the 1890s and in 1915 merged with the Life-Saving Service to form the Coast Guard.

49. Army and Navy Journal 22 (8 November 1884): 279, reporting that President Arthur granted the pardon “on the personal solicitation” of General Grant; Army and Navy Register, 8 Nov 1884. Arthur’s 337 emolument actions were the fewest issued by any president who served at least three years between 1861 and 1889. See the websites http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/pardons/report1.html and http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/images/ruck4a.gif.


52. Ltrs, Wasson to AG, 2 Oct 1899; Assistant AG to Commanding Officer, Washington Barracks, 2 and 5 Oct 1899, all in AG Doc. file 287449, RG 94, NA. Wasson’s classmate, George S. Anderson, commanded the 38th Infantry, U.S. Volunteer Service.


57. Cullum, Biographical Register, 6: 158; Ltr, Wasson to Wilson, 29 Mar 1917, in file 2871 ACP 1871.

58. Ltrs, Wasson to Secretary of State of Iowa, 23 Apr 1918; curator to Wasson, 22 Jul 1918, James R. Wasson Papers, Special Collections, State Historical Society of Iowa, Des Moines; Email message, Becki Plunkett, State Historical Society of Iowa, to author, 23 Dec 2003, copy in author’s files.

59. Cullum, Biographical Register, 6: 158; Email msg, Paula Kaiser, Iowa Veterans’ Home, to author, 17 Sep 2003; Biles to author, 28 Aug 2003, copies in Army History files, CMH; Cuditz, Republican, 23 Jan 1929; undated obituary clippings for Marie and Robert Wasson from the Cranford Chronicle, Cranford (N.J.) Historical Society. Robert’s obituaries in the Cranford Chronicle and the New York Times, 1 June 1951, stated that President McKinley appointed him to the Naval Academy, but the author has found no record that Robert actually enrolled there. According to John C. S. Wasson’s Civil War pension application file, he died in 1897 and his wife, James Wasson’s mother Julia, died in 1918. Robert Wasson’s wife, Sara, died in Cranford in 1967. See Email msg, Patty, Fairview Cemetery, Cranford, N.J., to author, 17 Feb 2004, copy in Army History files.


The Missouri Historical Society has organized and mounted *Lewis & Clark: The National Bicentennial Exhibition*. The exhibition focuses on the journey of Capt. Meriwether Lewis and William Clark and their Army “Corps of Discovery” from St. Louis to the mouth of the Columbia River and back during 1804 to 1806, and it compares the assumptions of the explorers with those of the Indian peoples residing along their route. The exhibit features artifacts, artwork, and documents entrusted to the Missouri Historical Society by descendants of Clark and Lewis, along with materials from other leading historical and scientific institutions. The exhibition will be on display at the Missouri History Museum until 6 September 2004, the Academy of Natural Sciences of Philadelphia from November 2004 to March 2005, the Denver Museum of Nature and Science from May to September 2005, the Oregon Historical Society in Portland from November 2005 to March 2006, and the Smithsonian Institution’s National Museum of Natural History in Washington, D.C., from May to September 2006.

The Washington State History Museum in Tacoma is featuring an exhibit, *Beyond Lewis & Clark: The Army Explores the West*, that illustrates Army-led explorations of the West during the first eight decades of the nineteenth century, beginning with the Lewis and Clark expedition. The exhibit will remain at the museum in Tacoma until the end of October 2004. It will be on display at the Kansas State Historical Society in Topeka from 10 December 2004 to 14 August 2005 and at the Missouri Historical Society in St. Louis from 8 October to 31 December 2005. The Center of Military History and the U.S. Army’s Frontier Army Museum contributed to this exhibit. The exhibit will be permanently installed at the Frontier Army Museum in April 2006.
“Given two books focused on events too recent to fully absorb, two books exploiting history for metaphor rather than analytic framework, and a book not really relying on history at all, have we lost anything because of the thinness of their historical grounding? I say yes.”

John S. Brown
Thoughts on the Future Force: A Review Essay

By John S. Brown

For the last several years the United States Army has attempted to transform itself into the force best suited for the twenty-first century while at the same time taking an active role in the Global War on Terrorism. In 1999 Army Chief of Staff General Eric K. Shinseki opined that our Cold War-vintage heavy divisions were too heavy to get anywhere fast enough and our light divisions too light to handle a lethal, capable adversary. Since then Army transformation efforts have pursued a strategically mobile, tactically agile, and incredibly lethal joint force, with the newly deployed Stryker brigades offering a glimpse of what is now possible. Operations in Afghanistan and Iraq and the intense media coverage they generated have understandably diverted attention from other topics, but useful discussion of defense transformation has continued nevertheless. In 2003 at least five writers brought out books on the subject: Col. Douglas A. Macgregor with *Transformation under Fire: Revolutionizing How America Fights* (Praeger Publishers, $34.95); Maj. Gen. (Retired) Robert H. Scales Jr. with *Yellow Smoke: The Future of Land Warfare for America’s Military* (Rowman and Littlefield, $24.95); Bruce Berkowitz with *The New Face of War: How War Will Be Fought in the 21st Century* (Free Press, $26); Norman Friedman with *Terrorism, Afghanistan, and America’s New Way of War* (Naval Institute Press, $33.95); and General (Retired) Wesley K. Clark with *Winning Modern Wars: Iraq, Terrorism, and the American Empire* (Public Affairs, $25). Let us briefly examine what each of these authors has said and how well, the extent to which a valid use of history reinforced their arguments, and the degree to which the Army seems mindful of their views in its pursuit of transformation.
Building upon his widely read *Breaking the Phalanx: A New Design for Landpower in the 21st Century* (Westport, Conn., 1997), Macgregor’s *Transformation under Fire* makes a readable and understandable case for specific reforms. Macgregor articulates his chosen six early on: reorganize the Army from its divisional structure into combat groups; adopt a rotational readiness posture; streamline Army command and control; make U.S. Joint Forces Command the executive agent for all matters pertaining to interoperability; create a new personnel system to support a reorganized, information-age army; and focus on sustained joint experimentation. In subsequent chapters he makes the case for and explains each of these, arguing that the time for change is now. Although mindful of the promise of further technological advance, Macgregor sees the Army’s ills as essentially organizational and argues that the technology necessary for a nimbler, more capable army is already available. He does not believe that the battlefield picture will ever be perfect, that the fog of war will be banished, or that the precision strike will obviate maneuver. He does believe that specialized, brigade-size combat groups organized either to maneuver, strike, conduct C4ISR, or sustain, serving in standing joint task forces with which they would train extensively, would radically improve efficiency and effectiveness beyond the level that the divisions of today can achieve. Emphasis should be upon effects and resources to achieve them should be tailored accordingly, with habitual organizational relationships taking a back seat to desired results. Macgregor’s text is a classic example of telling us what he is going to say, saying it, and telling us what he has said. It is well documented and supported by charts, diagrams, and a glossary.

Robert Scales’s *Yellow Smoke* concurs with much of Macgregor’s argument. Indeed, Scales wrote the foreword to *Transformation under Fire*, *Yellow Smoke* builds its case differently, however, and reaches some distinct conclusions. Scales draws widely on historical episodes from Korea, Vietnam, Kosovo, and Afghanistan to argue that over time Americans have evolved a firepower-centered style of war predicated on the notion that limited wars should be won at a limited cost in American lives. As head of the Army’s *Desert Storm* assessment team, leader of its Army After Next project, and commandant of the Army War College, Scales certainly has been in a position to observe the discussion, debate, simulations, and exercises that have shaped that evolution recently. In his text he takes us inside some of the analyses and war games in which he participated. After a broad discussion featuring historical assessment, operational analysis, and personal memoir, Scales pulls together a strong final chapter that posits and persuasively explains ten goals for the future: increase the speed of operational forces; project and maneuver land forces by brigades; maneuver by air at the operational and tactical levels; establish an “unblinking” eye over the battlefield; proliferate precision weaponry and distribute it downward; adopt an operational maneuver doctrine based on firepower dominance and area control; supplement manned with unmanned reconnaissance; maneuver with all arms at the lowest practical level; establish a “band of brothers” approach to selection, training, and readiness; and move beyond jointness to true interdependence of forces. A short book intended as an easy and interesting read, *Yellow Smoke* is thinly footnoted and lacks charts, diagrams, and maps.

Bruce Berkowitz’s *The New Face of War* takes a decidedly different tack. While Macgregor and Scales acknowledge the information revolution as one of several developments affecting the future of our Army, Berkowitz states unequivocally that the information revolution has fundamentally changed the nature of combat. To win wars today, he asserts, one must win the information war first. Despite his title, Berkowitz focuses on this imperative to the exclusion of all others. In a series of brief chapters heavily laced with engaging anecdotes he traces the evolution of information warfare through time. A persistent theme is the paradigm “deny, deceive, destroy, or exploit.” When you
have access to an adversary’s communications traffic, do you drown it out with signals of your own, send false signals on it, incinerate the source, or monitor it and act on this intelligence without his knowing that you are doing so? Berkowitz makes the case that information dominance has come to be decisive in everything from dogfights between fighter jets to the success or failure of terrorist attacks. Al Qaeda uses computers and the internet with a facility that would do credit to sophisticated armed forces. In the course of his discussion Berkowitz introduces and explains such contemporary terms as “zapping” (precision strike), “swarming” (nonhierarchical attack—like bees do), “network centric,” “platform centric,” and “just-in-time.” One of his most thoughtful and useful discussions concerns the prospect for an electronic Pearl Harbor. Far from painting a generalized Doomsday scenario, he concludes that such an attack would have to be tightly focused and synchronized with larger efforts to succeed. One could not destroy the United States over the internet, but one might deceive American intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets long enough to make a devastating strike on Taiwan a fait accompli. The New Face of War is adequately footnoted but does not contain charts, graphs, or maps.

Norman Friedman is a widely published strategist and naval historian who spent more than a decade as consultant to the secretary of the Navy. In Terrorism, Afghanistan, and America’s New Way of War he studies the September 11 attacks, the evolution and ideology of the Al Qaeda terrorist organization that perpetrated them, the regime that provided Al Qaeda a base in Afghanistan, the efforts of the United States to coalesce and support the forces that removed that regime, and the dramatic course of the Afghan campaign itself. Friedman then goes on to assess the implications of that campaign on the course of the Global War on Terrorism and on the nature of future warfare. In his view we are witness to an evolving tactical style that is well on the way to integrating information technology and precision-guided munitions into a network-centric system that will revolutionize the art of war. He does not particularly prescribe further developments along these lines but rather describes changes that in his view are already occurring. As a naval historian he is also able to make significant points about the role naval aviation played in so remote a country and the value added when Marines put their boots on the ground. Friedman acknowledges Operation Iraqi Freedom but does not devote much attention to it. When, in his final chapter, he recenters his discussion on terrorism and the means to combat it, he suggests that Operation Iraqi Freedom may have been more useful as a demonstration of American capability and will power than for any particular effects on Al Qaeda per se. In the end Friedman concludes that we can reduce terrorism beneath unacceptable levels of incidence and damage but never eliminate it entirely. Terrorism, Afghanistan, and America’s New Way of War is robustly documented with 56 pages of notes and a bibliography and is amply supported by maps and photographs.

Wesley Clark’s Winning Modern Wars provides a brief account of the origins and course of Operation Iraqi Freedom and then builds upon that base to propose a way ahead in the Global War on Terrorism and to comment upon the future of war in general. Written shortly before he decided to run for president, much in the book could be seen as politically motivated. One can also take the book at face value as an effort by a man with an impressive knowledge of the subject to share his wisdom on adapting the American military to the evolving challenges of the new century. Clark addresses the Army’s tactical and operational levels but does not have much new to say about transforming them. He seems to believe that transformation at those levels is on track and should be carried forward, especially with respect to the incorporation of information technologies, precision-guided munitions, and other technological advances. Unlike Macgregor and Scales he is dismissive of the notion of flattening command hierarchies, believing that each echelon demonstrated its unique and valuable contribution during the course of Operation Iraqi Freedom, in which American soldiers and units so outmatched their adversaries. Clark does argue that the campaign’s operational plans were flawed, criticizing especially
what he sees as the paucity of forces initially committed, insufficient attention paid to lines of communication, and unpreparedness for making a smooth transition to occupation. Clark’s strongest criticisms, however, are at the strategic level. He believes the United States should revert to a strategy that prioritizes inclusiveness with respect to allies and friends, uses and strengthens international institutions, and diminishes the role of the armed forces in nonmilitary functions. The things that must be done to transform America’s military are already underway, Clark believes, but even a transformed military cannot ultimately succeed in the absence of a viable strategy. Winning Modern Wars is brief, readable, and thinly documented. It has one map but no charts, tables, or photographs.

As historians, the readers of Army History have a more than casual interest in the extent to which these authors use history to reinforce their arguments. Both Friedman and Clark construct credible accounts of their chosen campaigns—Afghanistan and Iraq, respectively—before mining them for insights concerning the way ahead. The recency of the campaigns creates major challenges for them, of course, but both historical accounts are written as sensibly as time and space would allow. Scales and Macgregor range more widely through history in constructing their arguments but adopt a different methodology. Scales comments that he uses history for metaphor rather than analogy, and Macgregor employs much the same approach. Scales maintains a reasonable attention to chronology, but Macgregor jumps around through time to cherry-pick historical episodes that fit his lines of argument. This is an approach prone to drive historians crazy, leading as it can to incompatible comparisons, incomplete accounts, and curious interpretations. Berkowitz does not use history as we would recognize it, but he does sustain the liveliness of his narrative with one anecdote after another. Many of these are documented, all of them are entertaining, but some seem improbable.

Given two books focused on events too recent to fully absorb, two books exploiting history for metaphor rather than analytic framework, and a book not really relying on history at all, have we lost anything because of the thinness of their historical grounding? I say yes, and cite as examples insufficient attention paid to logistics, span of control, casualty replacement, and interoperability with allies.

All of these books are indexed, yet in none of the indexes do such terms as logistics, lines of communications, maintenance, supply, or combat service support appear. In fairness, most of the authors comment somewhere about logistical issues and Macgregor devotes several pages to an organization he labels the “early deploying support group,” but none of the authors persuade us they have thought through the sustainment of the ambitious operations they describe. Historically, logistics have dominated both operations and revolutions in military affairs, as the essays in The Dynamics of Military Revolution, 1300–2050 (New York, 2001), edited by MacGregor Knox and Williamson Murray, demonstrate. General Shinseki liked to point out that there will be no revolution in military affairs without a revolution in military logistics.

Some of our authors advocate eliminating an echelon or two in the command hierarchy, and all describe the huge supervisory and management responsibilities of each echelon that does exist. This surfaces a timeless topic, span of control. Macgregor goes to particular lengths to make the case that the current hierarchy is antiquated and argues that the Army’s resistance to change originates in the fact that only bureaucratic sycophants conditioned to defend the status quo become general officers within our system. Perhaps a careful reading of retired Col. Gregory Fontenot’s forthcoming book, On Point: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom, which the Combat Studies Institute at Fort Leavenworth will soon publish, may incline him to a more charitable view both of our generals and our hierarchy. It is hard to imagine how the capture of Baghdad and its environs on 4–9 April 2003 could have been achieved as successfully as it was had it not been for the unique yet complementary contributions of the headquarters commanded by Lt. Gens. David McKiernan (CFLCC) and William S. Wallace (V Corps), Maj. Gen. Buford Blount (3d Infantry Division), and Col. Da-
David G. Perkins (2d Brigade Combat Team, 3d Infantry Division). It is even more difficult to visualize the conduct of current operations in Iraq without brigades, divisions, or the corps, the last acting as a joint task force, with each fulfilling its separate and formidable role. Historical discussions such as John B. Wilson's Maneuver and Firepower: The Evolution of Divisions and Separate Brigades (CMH, 1997) provide valuable insight into why the U.S. Army has been organized as it has and how much that organization has been adapted over time. Information technology alone does not much ameliorate the human limitations that constrict effective spans of control. We should fully understand the purposes that have been served by each level of the hierarchy before we attempt to transform or abolish any of them.

In his 1970 doctoral dissertation "Towards a Science of War through Some Mathematical Concepts of Macrocombat" Col. Robert W. Samz made the point that attrition tends to dissipate qualitative differences between determined adversaries during prolonged hostilities. Our authors write in a manner that seems unmindful of casualties, as if our good fortune with respect to combat losses during our recent offensives will continue indefinitely. Macgregor and Scales advocate rotational systems that historically have proven themselves far more successful when casualties are few and combat episodic than when losses are heavy and combat is sustained. Retired Cmd. Sgt. Maj. and now-Dr. Robert S. Rush has done a persuasive job of illustrating the relative advantages of different replacement systems in Hell in Hertgen Forest: Ordeal and Triumph of an American Infantry Regiment (Lawrence, Kans., 2001) and subsequent studies for the Center of Military History. Casualties and the replacement of casualties have long been one of warfare's most central features. We would be wise to anticipate both when imagining future wars.

Clark makes participation within a coalition a central theme of his work and Friedman gives the role of allies due attention, but allies are largely invisible in the texts of Macgregor, Scales, and Berkowitz. Our nation has a long history of fighting within coalitions, and for three generations we have struggled for interoperability with our allies despite widely divergent technological capabilities. Within NATO interoperability in the face of American technological advance has become such an imperative that for the alliance's force planners it is almost a fetish. None of our authors comes to grips with the working mechanics of such issues at the
tactical level, although Friedman and Clark at least acknowledge them. Recent historical experience, with the exception of Operation IRAQ FREEDOM as it has thus far transpired, suggests that half or more of the troops tackling the typical future adversary will belong to allies. We would be wise to factor those allies into our thinking on the future force.

Whatever their limitations, the recent books by Macgregor, Scales, Berkowitz, Friedman, and Clark each provide a thoughtful analysis that greatly enriches the discussion of future warfare. Is the Army listening? In its internal discussions relating to defense transformation, in the chief of staff’s selected focus areas, and in such documents as the 2003 United States Army Transformation Roadmap; the 2004 Army Posture Statement; and The Army Plan, 2006–2023, it seems to be. Our authors’ major recommendations have by and large been taken into account somewhere during the course of the deliberative give and take. The Army’s most senior leaders may or may not have read each book, but intermediate-level players on their staffs clearly have. This is not to say that every recommendation will be honored—and given the conflicts among them they could not all be accepted—but it does seem that every recommendation will be heard. These are important books, and I strongly recommend them to all libraries serving soldiers and to anyone attempting to fathom the way ahead for our Army. I also encourage readers to reflect on the history of our nation’s employment of military force as they consider the proposals these books make for the Army’s future.

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**The Author**

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**Notes**

1. C4ISR is command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.
2. The chief of staff’s selected focus areas are posted at [http://www.army.mil/thewayahead/focus.html](http://www.army.mil/thewayahead/focus.html).

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**Exhibits Open on Army Medicine**

The Army Medical Department Museum at Fort Sam Houston, Texas, has opened an exhibit of fine art documenting U.S. Army medical activities during World War II. The exhibit features artwork selected from the more than 100 paintings produced by a dozen artists commissioned by Abbott Laboratories during the war to travel around the world recording the work of the Army Medical Department. Those paintings were published in a book by DeWitt Mackenzie, *Men without Guns* (Philadelphia, 1945). The exhibit also contains unit insignia, Bill Mauldin cartoons, and other artwork depicting Army medical activities during World War II. Entitled “Witness to War: Artists Look at Army Medicine in World War II,” the exhibit will be on display at least through 2004.

The National Museum of Health and Medicine has opened an exhibit entitled “Battlefield Surgery 101: From the Civil War to Vietnam.” The museum, an element of the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology, is located at Walter Reed Army Medical Center in Washington, D.C. The exhibit displays artifacts and more than 100 photographs that trace the evolution of the military operating room in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Despite its title, the exhibit also shows examples of some of the latest advances in military medicine, including new medical materials used by the U.S. Army in Afghanistan and Iraq in the twenty-first century. Drawn exclusively from the museum’s own collections, Battlefield Surgery 101 will be on display indefinitely.
Retired Brig. Gen. Thomas E. Griess died on 20 February 2004 at his residence in Arizona. He was 82. A Nebraska native, General Griess attended the U.S. Military Academy, graduating in January 1943. He served in the Philippine and Ryukyu Islands with engineer combat battalions during World War II and with engineer districts there after the war. He commanded an engineer construction battalion from 1960 to 1962 and served at Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe, from 1962 to 1963.

General Griess made his greatest contributions as an educator at the U.S. Military Academy. He taught in the Department of Military Art and Engineering from 1956 to 1959 and returned as a professor in that department in 1963. He introduced in 1967 a new instructional concept for the academy’s required course in the history of the military art, broadening its scope beyond operational history to consider also the political, social, and economic factors that have influenced military forces and outcomes. With his encouragement, the academy created in 1969 a separate Department of History, of which he became the first head, and expanded its course offerings in the discipline.

General Griess in 1971 chaired an ad hoc committee established by the secretary of the Army on the Army’s need for the study of military history. The Army would implement the committee’s recommendations to increase historical instruction in the Army’s branch schools and to use faculty with advanced degrees in history in Army military history instruction. The committee also urged the Center of Military History to issue a guide for the study and use of military history suitable for all officers. General Griess contributed a chapter to this guide, which appeared in 1979.

General Griess earned his doctorate in history in 1968 at Duke University, writing a dissertation on West Point professor and advocate of military professionalism Dennis Hart Mahan (1802–71). General Griess oversaw the publication by the Military Academy of a series of military history texts with broader scope than those previously used by the institution, addressing major wars from the ancient world to the Arab–Israeli conflict, all authored by Military Academy staff members. After his retirement from the Army in 1981, he served as series editor of revised versions of these texts, along with supporting atlases, which the Avery Publishing Group issued commercially. Square One Publishers reissued the texts and atlases on the Napoleonic Wars, American Civil War, and World Wars I and II in 2002 and 2003.

General Griess was widely revered as a teacher, mentor, and friend by those who knew him and worked with him. A generation of young officers matriculated into the Army Historical Program during his long tenure as professor and head of the Military Academy’s Department of History. Profoundly affected by General Griess’s vision of understanding the past to better shape the future, these officers have made striking contributions to the Army and the nation by providing thoughtful leadership in senior military positions, some at the four-star level, and by their teaching and wide-ranging historical publications, while working in academe. All of these younger men and women bore his indelible mark. General Griess is survived by his wife of 61 years, Elizabeth; his brother, Gerald; his daughter and son, Ann Adams and Thomas Griess, Jr.; and five grandchildren.

Photo Courtesy of the Department of History, U.S. Military Academy
Army Military History Detachments Continue Covering Operations in the Middle East

Three Army Reserve military history detachments are currently serving on active duty in Iraq and Afghanistan to chronicle ongoing operations in those countries. The 54th and 101st Military History Detachments, whose home stations are in Louisiana and Kansas, respectively, arrived in Baghdad in February 2004 for a twelve-month tour in Iraq. The 317th Military History Detachment from Georgia moved to Afghanistan in March 2004 for six months of service there. The members of each of these detachments are conducting interviews and collecting documents and artifacts for use by military historians and museums.

Army History Contributors Author New Books


Chief of Military History Co-Chairs Military History Seminar in Budapest


Army Institutes Issue Historical Studies

William G. Robertson and Lawrence A. Yates of the Combat Studies Institute at the Command and General Staff College have coedited Block by Block: The Challenges of Urban Operations (Command and General Staff College Press, 2003). The book comprises thirteen essays on urban warfare by officer and civilian scholars at Fort Leavenworth. Selected essays discuss combat in Stalingrad, Aachen, Manila, Hue, Beirut, Panama City, Sarajevo, and Kabul. The book is posted online at http://cgsc.leavenworth.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/content.asp#block. The Institute has a limited supply of printed copies. Academic and Army staff working on the subject may inquire of S.Sgt. Ernst Amelang about obtaining copies by email at amelange@leavenworth.army.mil or by phone at DSN 552-2044.


American Association of Museums Honors Army Museum Director

John T. (Tim) O’Gorman, director of the Army Quartermaster Museum at Fort Lee, Virginia, received an Excellence in Peer Review Service Award at the 2003 annual meeting of the American Association of Museums. Tim was among five individuals recognized for their contributions to the association’s museum assessment and accreditation programs. Tim is also a team leader of the Army museum system’s certification program.

University of Tennessee Press Issues Civil War Journal Edited by Army Museum Director

The University of Tennessee Press has issued A Confederate Yankee: The Journal of Edward William Drummond, a Confederate Soldier from Maine in its series Voices of the Civil War. Roger S. Durham, director of the Army Heritage Museum at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, edited Drummond’s journal. Drummond, who had moved to Savannah, Georgia, in 1859, became a prisoner of war after the capture of Fort Pulaski, where he had been serving as a commissary sergeant, but returned to Confederate service after his release in a prisoner-of-war exchange. He eventually reconciled with his Northern relatives.
In Memoriam

Russell F. Weigley, distinguished University Professor of History, Emeritus, at Temple University, died suddenly on 3 March 2004. He was 73.


Professor Weigley contributed directly to the Army Historical Program by serving on the Army's Historical Advisory Committee from 1976 to 1979, from 1987 to 1991, and from 2003 until his death. He was the only historian to serve as a member of the panel that selected the design for the National World War II Memorial in the nation's capital. He was also a visiting professor of history at the U.S. Army War College in 1973–74.

Blanche D. Coll, died on 8 March 2003 at the age of 86. Educated at Johns Hopkins University, she was a historian with the Army Corps of Engineers in 1948–60 and with the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare in 1964–77. She was coauthor with Jean E. Keith and Herbert H. Rosenthal of The Corps of Engineers: Troops and Equipment (1958) and contributed to the book by Lenore Fine and Jesse A. Remington, The Corps of Engineers: Construction in the United States (1972), both volumes in the series The United States Army in World War II. She also authored Perspectives in Public Welfare: A History (GPO, 1969).

Kenneth J. Deacon, Sr., a historian for three decades with the Army Corps of Engineers, died on 2 April 2004. He was 89. Deacon earned his doctorate in history at New York University in 1949, after serving as an enlisted man in Europe during World War II. He contributed to the preparation of the book by Karl C. Dod, The Corps of Engineers: The War against Japan (1966), a volume in the series The United States Army in World War II.

In no other field of human endeavor is the gap between theory and practice so stark as it is in war. In part, this is because war demands a balance of radically opposite traits from its practitioners. For instance, soldiers must combine impressive powers of reflection with a capacity for decisive action. They should be creative while adhering to and enforcing iron discipline. They need to possess a tolerance for ambiguity while operating in the largely deterministic domains of weapons technology, logistics, and administration. In short, soldiering demands mastery of war's art and science. Further exacerbating the divide between theory and practice, the majority of soldiers get relatively few opportunities to exercise their profession, as opposed to, say, doctors, who also deal with life and death, albeit in retail rather than wholesale fashion. In no other field are the penalties for failure so steep. While doctors may bury their mistakes, the World War I aphorism that "it takes 20,000 casualties to make a major general" provides one idea of the high stakes that engage military leaders.

Military Education: Past, Present, and Future examines how professional militaries in Europe and North America have attempted to bridge the gap between theory and practice. The volume consists of ten papers presented at a recent Royal Military College of Canada history symposium devoted to the topic of military education. Temporally, the offerings range from the eighteenth century to the present. They cover ground, naval, and air, as well as joint, institutions at levels from preservice military schools to the preparation of senior individuals for high command.

The editors aim "to highlight past failures and successes in the area of military education," although there are far more of the former in evidence here. (p. xi) Indeed, the principal theme appears to be why military education has generally been so inadequate across time and space. The contributors—scholars from the United States, United Kingdom, and Canada—collectively round up the usual suspects. One is the neglect—or worse, misuse—of history; in other words, military education is bad because the understanding of military history is bad. Another suggested reason is that military education has been overly focused on the technical aspects (science) at the expense of studying the timeless dimensions (art) of warfare. Finally, the authors note the continued tension and confusion among the indoctrination, training, and education of soldiers.

The overarching conclusion offered in these pages is that—paraphrasing Clemenceau—military education is too important to be left to the generals. The editors and several contributors insist that civilian educators, allied perhaps with a few uniformed mavericks or imaginative politicians, are essential to ensure that military professionals receive a first-rate intellectual upbringing. Perhaps not coincidentally, those who have studied military reform and innovation have reached similar conclusions about the importance of institutional "outsiders." A supporting argument made throughout this volume—unsurprisingly, from a historical conference, and one likely to resonate with the readers of this journal—is that history is an absolutely necessary, if not sufficient, ingredient in the cultivation of mature professional judgment.

The essays themselves are uniformly good. All are informative and to a greater or lesser degree stimulating and even provocative. John Hattendorf's keynote piece, "The Conundrum of Military Education in Historical Perspective," thoughtfully frames many of the major issues and introduces a number of paradoxes surrounding military education. He captures the most fundamental of these in a quotation he offers from an eighteenth-century source: "It is universally agreed upon, that no art or science is more difficult than that of war; yet . . . those who embrace this profession take little or no pains to study it." (p. 6)

Two complementary efforts by T. G. Otte and Dennis Showalter succeed Hattendorf's scene setting. Otte shies a light on Clausewitz's ideas regarding military education, a topic upon which, Otte says, surprisingly little has been written. Clausewitz, of course, dwelled extensively upon uniting theory and practice in discussing "ideal" and "real" war. Interestingly, this chapter suggests how the Prussian thinker and doer coupled his notions of military "genius" with his fervent belief in the need to develop soldiers' abilities to think critically. Otte's portrayal of
Clausewitz calls to mind what the American literary critic Lionel Trilling termed the "moral requirement to be intelligent," a sine qua non for soldiers. As Otte pointedly quotes from Clausewitz's *On War*, "Average intelligence may recognize the truth occasionally, and exceptional courage may now and then retrieve a blunder; but usually intellectual inadequacy will be shown up by indifferent achievement." (p. 23) Showalter's *tour d'horizon* of Prussian/German officer education from 1715 to 1945 provides a logical follow-on here. He nicely limns the complex interplay over two centuries of ideas about breeding, inspiration, and education, along with the increasing technical and bureaucratic complexity of war, in forming military leaders. And, contrary to the generally accepted view of some sort of Teutonic "genius for war," he has harsh things to say about how well the Germans succeeded. For instance, he writes, "The often praised 'mission concept' of fulfilling a superior's intentions rather than his orders favored innovation in implementation, as opposed to thinking 'outside the box.'" (p. 46, italics in original).

At times, the emphasis on intellectual acuity has been at odds with the perceived need to build character. Lori Bogle explicitly explores the ethical dimensions of officer education in her piece on Sylvanus Thayer and the nineteenth-century U.S. Military Academy, while this tension between sense and sensibility is a subcurrent in David French's study of officer formation in the British army between World Wars I and II. Bogle has both positive and negative things to say about the "Thayer System," which, in addition to emphasizing rote memorization and routine problem solving, made ethical behavior a primary object of officer education. While finding West Point's pedagogy well out of date by the nineteenth century's end, she admires its ethos of "duty, honor, country" for providing the American military with a vital ingredient of professionalization. French also offers a balanced judgment. He concedes that the insularity of the British Army's regimental system, with its emphasis on sociability and sports (see the 1960 British film *Tunes of Glory* for a wonderful evocation), contributed to the notion that the army was a calling for "the fool of the family." He adds a marvelous reminiscence from an officer regarding his interwar education, "I thought it was splendid, excellent... the only thing they didn't teach us much about was soldiering." (p. 123) Nevertheless, French credits the advanced thinking of a handful of interwar reformers for constructing a viable framework of professional military education in Britain.

Curriculum content and teaching methods are major themes in the remaining essays. Andrew Lambert, in surveying "The Royal Navy and Officer Education," offers a corollary to the Clemenceau reference above: "military education is too serious a business to be entrusted to any one academic discipline." (p. 99) Nevertheless, like the other contributors here, he clearly places history, shaped by professional scholars, as the first among equals for the oft-cited reason that it is the best possible substitute for the limited practical experience available to most warriors. Lambert also identifies another of the many dilemmas associated with military education: how does one stimulate incisive questioning in strictly hierarchical cultures that demand rigid discipline and obedience?

Mark Grandstaff's look at the evolution of the U.S. Air Force's Air War College and Thomas Keaney's assessment of how U.S. senior service colleges have implemented joint education each stress the importance of civilian influence to focus these institutions on warfighting. Regarding precisely what—or what not—to teach, Grandstaff notes that the first president of the Air War College promised students that they would never have to look at a map of Gettysburg during their stay! More prosaically, both these entries, along with Ronald Haycock on Canadian and Peter Foot on contemporary European approaches to military education, examine thorny questions of what and how to teach. All trace debates over whether educating senior leaders involves favoring academic, political, or military subjects. Within these realms, how much space does history merit? What about the social sciences—international relations, government, economics, and the rest? Should officers be prepared primarily to act as statesmen, perform as military strategists, or practice operational art? Probably the best we can conclude is that the answers will depend almost entirely upon specific times, places, and circumstances.

Regardless, it remains almost certainly true that under any set of conditions, as the nineteenth-century British general Sir William Butler put it, "The nation that insists on drawing a broad line of demarcation between the fighting man and thinking man is liable to find its fighting done by fools and its thinking done by cowards." For this reason then, military education will be successful when it produces officers who, borrowing from the French philosopher Henri Bergson, can act as men of thought and think as men of action.

Col. Alan Cate was the director of the U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, in 2003 and 2004. An infantry officer, he holds an M.A. in history from Stanford University and taught as an assistant professor in the History Department of the U.S. Military Academy. From 1997 to 1999 he commanded the 1st Battalion, 61st Infantry, at Fort Jackson, South Carolina.
Gerhard von Scharnhorst
Private und dienstliche Schriften. Band 1: Schüler, Lehrer, Kriegsteilnehmer (Kurhannover bis 1795)
Edited by Johannes Kunisch with assistance from Michael Sikora and Tilman Steive
Böhlau Verlag, 2002, 864 pp., €99

Review by Charles E. White

Gerhard von Scharnhorst: Private und dienstliche Schriften is a collection of the personal and official papers of one of the most enlightened soldiers of his time. This is the first of what will be three volumes, and it presents Scharnhorst's formative years as a cadet at the then-famous fortress academy of Wilhelmstein, as a military instructor in Hanover, and as a veteran of the War of the First Coalition against revolutionary France in 1792-95. It is a long-awaited collection of Scharnhorst's papers that will delight students of military affairs.

Gerhard Johann David von Scharnhorst (1755-1813) was born of humble origins in the village of Bordenau, near Hanover. He grew up tenant farming with his father, who had been a supply sergeant in the British-Hanoverian army during the War of Austrian Succession (1740-48). At seventeen, through his father's membership in the local Landschaft (an association of noble and free landowners), young Scharnhorst gained admittance to the military academy of Count Frederick Wilhelm Ernst zu Schaumburg-Lippe-Bückeburg (1724-77), one of the most distinguished soldiers then living in Germany. It was Count Wilhelm who introduced Scharnhorst to the profession of arms and, in particular, to the German concept of Bildung. A fruit of Germany's classical age, Bildung was the perfectibility of the individual's character and intellect through education and training. Literally, it means culture.

From 1773 to 1777 Count Wilhelm stimulated, guided, and cultivated Scharnhorst's character and intellect. How the count accomplished this can be gleaned from the documents in the first section of this book, appropriately entitled "Pupil at Wilhelmstein." Gathered from the Hanoverian archives at Bückeburg, these materials include Scharnhorst's academic record, his detailed description of the academy fortress, and six related letters. Perusing his program of studies reveals the striking breadth of Scharnhorst's Bildung, spanning theoretical and applied mathematics; world cultures, their geography, and religions; natural and physical science; civil and military engineering; languages (German, English, and French); astronomy; philosophy; economics; agriculture; shipbuilding and navigation; and gunnery. This broad education in the arts and sciences provided the intellectual basis that enabled Scharnhorst to become a successful military educator and would, thirty years later, exert a great influence on his reform program in Prussia.

Following the death of Count Wilhelm, Scharnhorst applied for admission to the Hanoverian army. He was accepted on 28 July 1778 and reported for duty as a Fähnrich (ensign) with the 8th Dragoon Regiment, the unit in which his father had served. Scharnhorst was fortunate that his commander, Generalleutnant Emmerich Otto August von Estorff (1722-96), was genuinely imbued with the pedagogic ideals of the German Enlightenment. He promptly recognized young Scharnhorst's teaching ability and posted him to the faculty of the regimental school at Nordheim. For the next fifteen years, Scharnhorst served as an instructor first at his regimental school and later at the artillery school in Hanover. While teaching, he also edited two professional journals and published three books. As he told his parents in February 1779, "I work so well using the superior methods of the late Count." (p. 42)

Section Two of this collection, entitled "Teacher at the Military Schools in Hanover," offers the reader a fascinating look into the development of a soldier-scholar. The three sub-sections contain personal and business letters, several historical studies of the Seven Years' War (1756-63), and thought-provoking essays on a number of contemporary military issues, notably "Standing Armies," "Changes in the Prussian Artillery," and "Some Thoughts on Fortifications." Another interesting memorandum Scharnhorst wrote in this period, "On the Utility and the Establishment of a Military School for Young Officers," later formed the conceptual basis of his reorganization of the Prussian military school system. By 1792 Scharnhorst had earned a reputation as an erudite and creative military writer.

When Hanover joined the First Coalition against France in March 1793, Scharnhorst left the classroom for field duty. Having demonstrated his competence as an educator and scholar, Scharnhorst now proved his ability under fire. Serving in several engagements in Flanders in autumn 1793 and spring 1794, he displayed exceptional combat leadership, earned a promotion to major, and transferred to the commanding general's staff.

Part Three contains the record of Scharnhorst's first experience under fire and is aptly entitled "The First Campaign (1793)." Most of the documents here are letters to his wife, Klara, and they provide a fascinating account of his activities from March through October 1793. The letters reveal that the savagery of war mortified Scharnhorst and that he was continually frustrated by the caste system in Hanover. "I am not made to be a soldier," he told Klara in May 1793. (p. 215) A month later he lamented, "We are being set back in favor of the aristocrats, and yet we fight for them." Continuing this theme, Scharnhorst wrote, "The silliest ass succeeds here almost as well as the most intelligent." (p. 218) He exclaimed in July: "God, what a life this is! Everything with the military is devastation!" (p. 244) Similar comments filled his correspondence throughout the campaign.

Significantly, his combat experience convinced Scharnhorst of the im-
iment of Bildung. “The man without Bildung,” he wrote referring to the plundering of villages in Flanders, “is surely a genuine beast, an inhuman animal. In general I have found that only well-educated people sought to alleviate the horrors of war, and that uneducated officers were just as bestial as the rank and file.” (p. 224) Reaching a conclusion that contrasted sharply with the contemporary view that all an army required to fight was the proper amount of training and drill, Scharnhorst recognized that disciplined intellect—achieved only through a sound, formal military education—is essential to the profession of arms.

Other documents in Part Three include a number of memoranda, after-action reports (with critical commentary from Scharnhorst), tactical lessons he believed should be implemented immediately, and an account entitled “A Hanoverian Officer Reports on the Engagements at Rexpoede, Wormhout, and Hondschoot.” Scharnhorst wrote this piece to counter what he perceived to be misrepresentations by the Hamburg Correspondent, but there is no evidence it was ever published.

Rounding out this section are several letters to the Hanover publishing house of Helwing. One concerns the publication of Scharnhorst’s recently completed edition of Frederick the Great’s Instructions to His Generals. Another requests that Helwing publish a third edition of his popular Militärisches Taschenbuch zum Gebrauch im Felde. Helwing did publish a third, as well as a fourth, edition of this handbook, which was one of the most widely used practical guides of its time. It would be published in an English translation in 1811 as the Military Field Pocket Book. What is remarkable about this book is the fact that it is a “how-to-fight” manual designed to assist officers on campaign. And yet a man without any field experience whatsoever wrote it. Scharnhorst penned the first three editions based solely on his historical study of war.

Scharnhorst secured his reputation as a warrior at the Flemish town of Menin in the spring of 1794. Acting as an assistant to Generalmajor Rudolf von Hammerstein, the garrison commander, Scharnhorst organized the town’s defense, despite a shortage of both men and materiel. By mid-April 20,000 French under General Jean Victor Moreau had the small garrison of 2,400 surrounded. The French tried several times to take Menin by storm but failed. They even offered Hammerstein terms of surrender under honorable conditions. He refused. Scharnhorst then convinced Hammerstein to save his command by breaking through the siege. During the night of 30 April the garrison broke out against overwhelming odds, with Scharnhorst commanding part of the troops. In his report to the Hanoverian commander, General der Kavallerie Johann Reichsgraf von Wallmoden, Hammerstein gave Scharnhorst credit for his tireless efforts to save the garrison.

Part Four is titled “Menin (1793/94)” and, much like the previous section, contains letters from Scharnhorst to his wife, some after-action reports and fact sheets, commentaries on the siege of Menin, Hammerstein’s report to Wallmoden, and interesting memoranda detailing the lessons Scharnhorst learned from the campaign. Two of the most impressive papers are “Some Observations on the Use of Artillery during the Campaign of 1793” and “The Advantages of an Enlargement of our General Staff.” The former suggested a reorganization and expansion of the Hanoverian artillery, while the latter recommended better organization to enhance military leadership and operational control in battle.

“On the Staff of Wallmoden (1794/95)” is the final section of documents in this volume. What the reader finds here are letters, fact sheets, and reports on various military topics; proposals for the establishment of a general staff; and several draft histories of the campaign. These memoranda cover a wide range of logistical, tactical, organizational, and educational matters. Most are conceptual papers that Scharnhorst would continually refine during his last years in Hanoverian service and that would later become the foundation of his reform efforts in Prussia. For those seeking to transform the United States Army in an age of dynamic change, these papers offer some valuable insights. Many of the social, political, and economic forces that led to the French Revolution and the twenty years of war that then ensued exist today. How one of the great soldiers of that era came to grips with these historical forces might just help those seeking to understand conflict in the twenty-first century.

Gerhard von Scharnhorst was a prolific writer who published much during his thirty-five years of military service. His papers, lectures, articles, and books deal almost exclusively with military affairs, particularly with the impact of the French Revolution on the art of war. They reflect his constant quest to understand the changing complexity of war. While many letters and some of the historical essays and memoranda in this collection have been published before, most of the material has not. Significantly, what appeared in other sources was often abbreviated or edited, as were many of the letters in Karl Linnebach’s edition of Scharnhorst’s Briefe (Munich, 1914), as well as the documents in the biographies by Georg Heinrich Kipple (3 vols., Leipzig, 1869–71) and Max Lehmann (2 vols., Leipzig, 1886–87).

Gerhard von Scharnhorst: Private und dienstliche Schriften is historical scholarship at its best. The editors have combed the archives of central Europe to compile this superb collection of documents. Included are two appendixes that provide information on the key people in Scharnhorst’s life and a glossary of specialized military and civilian terms used in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. A locality index and a register of the 471 documents in this collection, as well as the detailed annotations and explanatory notes, are simply invaluable to the researcher. This book is worthy of inclusion in any professional library or collection of meaningful historical works.
Dr. Charles E. White is the command historian of U.S. Army Forces Command. He graduated from the U.S. Military Academy in 1974 and received a doctorate in history from Duke University in 1986. He has served as the infantry branch historian at Fort Benning, Georgia; as the command historian of the 21st Theater Army Area Command in Germany; and as a historian at the Army Center of Military History. A retired lieutenant colonel in the Army Reserve, he is the author of The Enlightened Soldier: Scharnhorst and the Militärische Gesellschaft in Berlin, 1801–1805 (New York, 1989), the only book in English on Scharnhorst.

Brigadier General John D. Imboden
Confederate Commander in the Shenandoah
By Spencer C. Tucker
University of Kentucky Press, 2003, 372 pp., $32

Review by John W. Mountcastle

Spencer Tucker is the John Biggs Professor of Military History at the Virginia Military Institute. A prolific writer, he has authored or edited numerous books. Perhaps best known are his recurring examinations of the conflicts he encountered during the Civil War, especially his survey history entitled Vietnam and his history of the First World War. But he is also very well acquainted with the Civil War and has authored studies of Civil War military leaders and campaigns. His biographies of Union Admiral Andrew Foote and the Confederate Navy's Raphael Semmes were both well received.

Tucker's selection of Confederate Brig. Gen. John Daniel Imboden as the subject for a biography is certainly welcomed by those interested in the often neglected Confederate combat actions in the mountains of what is now West Virginia and along the western shoulder of the Shenandoah Valley. It was here that Imboden made his greatest contributions to the Confederate efforts to hold back Union incursions into the valley known as the "breadbasket of the Confederacy.

Imboden was an interesting person. He married five times and became the father and stepfather of nearly a dozen children. Born near Staunton, Virginia, in 1823, Imboden received his early education in country schools and attended Washington College in Lexington, Virginia. Practicing law in Staunton before the Civil War, he twice won election to the state legislature and came to support secession. Imboden later explained: "I favored secession as the only 'peace measure' Virginia could then adopt, our aim being to put the state in an independent position to negotiate between the United States and the seceded Gulf and Cotton States for a new Union, to be formed on a compromise of the slavery question by a convention to be held for that purpose." (p. 20)

Although he lacked any prewar military training, Imboden applied himself vigorously to the "school of the soldier" when Virginia rushed to organize troops to serve in the impending war. He helped to enlist and equip an artillery battery and commanded this unit as a captain during the capture of the Union arsenal at Harper's Ferry in April 1861 and in the Battle of First Bull Run (First Manassas) that July. He left the artillery in the spring of 1862 to raise a group of partisans for service in the western counties of Virginia, which included much of what would become West Virginia.

It was in this mountainous region that his 1st Virginia Partisan Rangers (later designated the 62d Virginia Mounted Infantry) and other units subsequently placed under his command made their major contributions. Imboden led several successful raids against Union forces in western Virginia during the winter of 1862–63 and was rewarded with authority to raise a full brigade and by promotion to brigadier general, a rank he held for the rest of the war. His participation in major battles in Virginia was limited, as his unit was frequently tasked with creating a diversion for federal units west of the Shenandoah Valley. He did take his mounted brigade into Pennsylvania during the later stages of Lee's 1863 invasion of that state and was charged with escorting the long Confederate wagon train carrying wounded soldiers back to Virginia. He performed most creditably in this mission, especially in fending off Union cavalry that attacked the rebel wagons as they waited to cross the rain-swollen Potomac River at Williamsport, Maryland.

Imboden's service during the last two years of the Civil War was not as rewarding for him as the early stages had been. In 1864 he frequently found himself at odds with the Confederate commander in the Shenandoah Valley, Lt. Gen. Jubal Early. A West Pointer and an infantryman, "Old Jube" Early was not impressed with cavalry in general, and he harbored a special antipathy for partisan or irregular units. The defeat of Early's Confederate forces in the valley during the autumn of 1864, combined with a serious shortage of horses, rendered Imboden's command nearly ineffective. At the same time, a breakdown in Imboden's health, stemming from a previous bout of typhoid fever, led him to request a reassignment until he could regain his former vigor. In January 1865 he reported to Brig. Gen. John H. Winder in South Carolina. Winder was at that time in charge of all Confederate prisoner of war camps east of the Mississippi River. He detailed Imboden to command all of the prisons west of the Savannah River, placing him in charge of facilities in Georgia, Alabama, and Mississippi. The infamous Confederate prison at Andersonville, Georgia, was among Imboden's responsibilities. To his credit, Imboden made an honest effort to improve the lot of the Union prisoners under his control and suffered no opprobrium after the Civil War.

Returning to Virginia after the surrender of the Confederate field armies, John Imboden applied himself energetically to business pursuits and the development of mineral resources in southwestern Virginia. During this
period of his life, he not only made and lost several fortunes but also wrote extensively about his wartime service. Unfortunately for Imboden, even before his death in 1895 veterans of the Army of Northern Virginia began to question his accounts of actions in the western reaches of Virginia and the role he had played in those engagements. Never one to hide his light under a bushel, Imboden often exaggerated the part he played in decision making and in executing orders.

Tucker's account of Imboden's life before, during, and after the Civil War has been generally well received. Stonewall Jackson's highly regarded biographer, Prof. James I. Robertson of the Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, has termed Tucker's book "a solid work on Imboden. No other biography will be necessary in the foreseeable future." Another authority on Jackson, Robert K. Krick, has been less complimentary, suggesting that Tucker should have done more work in primary sources and depended less on published accounts.

I found this to be both a serious study of a controversial figure and a very readable story of a nineteenth century American who not only rose from captain to general officer in the course of two years, but also achieved significant success as a businessman in the post-Civil War period, a time when some former Confederate officers were more inclined to spend their energies bemoaning the "Lost Cause."

I commend Spencer Tucker for giving us this straightforward, chronologically organized biography. His notes and the well-drawn maps support the text quite well. The index is equally useful and well organized. I believe that a student or researcher looking for more information on General Imboden, his units, or actions in the Shenandoah Valley would find the bibliography quite useful. Unlike many recent publications, it is not overpriced. I recommend this book to those who are looking for a better understanding of the bitter, no-holds-barred Civil War that was waged in the western reaches of Virginia.

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War and Ruin
William T. Sherman and the Savannah Campaign
By Anne J. Bailey
Scholarly Resources Inc., 2003, 139 pp., cloth $65, paper $19.95

Review by Thomas J. Goss

"When Sherman marched across Georgia, he did nothing new or innovative; he simply used the Northern army to bring war home to civilians in a way that Southerners east of the Mississippi had never experienced on such a grand scale." So begins Anne J. Bailey's new book War and Ruin: William T. Sherman and the Savannah Campaign, the tenth volume in the American Crisis Series from Scholarly Resources. Bailey, a professor of history at Georgia College and State University in Milledgeville, has put her experience from previous works on the Western Theater to good use in producing a readable and thoughtful examination of William T. Sherman's "March to the Sea" and its impact on both the towns in its path and on the outcome of the Civil War. Bailey concludes that Sherman's attempt to "make Georgia howl" succeeded in shortening the war, not with the wholesale murder and villainy he has been accused of sponsoring, but rather by bringing the devastating effects of war to a home front unprepared for the resulting trauma.

Focusing on a particular region during a single period of the war, War and Ruin concentrates on Sherman's march and its impact on a slice of Georgia, as well as the effect on the psychology of the Southern populace of having a Union army march apparently uncontested through the heart of the Confederacy. Beginning with a panoramic view of prewar Savannah, Bailey picks up the story of the city's wartime ordeal with the fall of Atlanta in 1864 and ends with the Union celebration of Christmas in occupied Savannah. The pages in between the strong argument that the contemporary stories of the fate of the towns in Sherman's path did far more damage to Southern morale than the actual deeds of Union soldiers.

One of the book's major themes is the nature of Sherman's intent toward Southern civilians in his army's path, an issue that Bailey ties to the question of the Civil War as a "total war." Painting the campaign as solely a result of Sherman's initiative and daring, Bailey builds a strong case for her view that the treatment of Southern civilians in central Georgia was exactly what the Union commander intended and that his soldiers were under the control of their officers with orders to "forage liberally." The result, according to Bailey, was a march filled with looting and destruction aimed at the heart and soul of the Confederate nation. Railroads, mills, stores, wagons, livestock, and barns were cleaned out and often put to the torch, as ordered by the Union commander, while soldiers generally followed prohibitions against looting and burning private homes of white Southerners. Sherman later admitted that some of his soldiers were "little loose in foraging, they did some things they ought not to have done, yet on the whole they have supplied the wants of the army with as little violence as could be expected." (p. 33) From these stories...
of the collision between the Union Army and towns in its path, the author concludes that Sherman planned to use wanton acts of destruction and the resulting psychological trauma to shake Southern morale to a greater degree than his army could accomplish with any number of battlefield victories. Adding to our understanding of this complex individual, Bailey also examines the differences in the behavior of Union soldiers toward white and black noncombatants and expands this discussion to consider Sherman's generally successful resistance to the formation and use of black units in his army.

The General Sherman that emerges is an innovative and brilliant military commander who could say, "War is hell" and mean it, yet also understand ruthlessness in war while choosing not to practice it. Bailey's Sherman never intended to treat Southern civilians as he would later handle Indian tribes in the West and never considered slaughter as a viable military tool during the Civil War. As a result, while describing the swath of ruin through Georgia that left nothing behind that could support the war, the author agrees with Professor Mark Grimsley's contention in The Hard Hand of War (New York, 1995) that there was very limited criminal behavior toward white Southerners and no overall plan for wanton destruction on the part of Union soldiers. Comparing the Union general's views and actions to those of other military commanders and to Clausewitizan theory on "total war," Bailey concludes by challenging many earlier works that claim Sherman was as ruthless in war against Confederate civilians as he later was against Native Americans. In Bailey's interpretation, Sherman emerges as deserving of his reputation for operational brilliance while undeserving of his postwar title as the father of an American way of war based on a drive for "total war."

This is a book with many strengths and few weaknesses. The major strength of the work, and its most interesting theme, is the linkage between large-scale military operations and Southern psychology during the critical months of Sherman's campaign from Atlanta to Savannah. Examining both current evidence and contemporary rumor of the "suffering and desolation" of Georgian cities and towns like Atlanta, Savannah, Milledgeville, and Griswoldville, the author provides to the reader a sense of the impact of the passing of Union armies through the heart of the Confederacy and of how the actual damage to the war effort was magnified by the impact on Southern morale. According to Bailey, it was this combination, not just the actions of Union soldiers, that tore the heart out of the Confederate home front and thus shortened the war. In Bailey's view, Sherman's march to the sea actually had a positive impact on the postwar South by helping it to avoid the damage another year of war would have caused. The book concludes with an assessment of whether the Civil War was a "total war" and the author's evaluation of Sherman's role in determining the severity directed on the Confederate home front.

These valuable additions to the field are only slightly offset by two problems that are becoming more and more common in works such as this: a shortage of maps that assist the narrative—the book only has one map, which is of the state of Georgia—and a price for the cloth edition that at $65 borders on the prohibitive. Fortunately, the publisher has offered the paperback for only $19.95. An interesting and thought-provoking assessment of the ends and means of a key campaign of the war as well as a solid narrative account of its impact on non-combatants in the path of marching armies, this book is a valuable addition to the crowded field of Civil War history.

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France, whose population numbered 10 million less. Moreover, the Austrians did not have enough small arms and artillery. The empire’s huge losses in the 1914 Russian offensive in Galicia had seriously weakened its forces, as did two bloody repulsed offensives in Serbia. Along with the prospect of taking coveted territories—the Trentino and Trieste in particular—these developments enticed Italy to enter the war against Austria-Hungary, its prewar ally. The Austrians, however, kept the advantage of high ground, holding the jagged mountains and forbidding plateaus that dominated the Isonzo valley. At first filled with optimism, the Italian forces in 1915 met repulse after repulse as they hammered at the gates of the Isonzo fortress.

In Schindler’s narrative, the Isonzo campaign becomes a contest between two steely generals. The imperious, imposing General Luigi Cadorna led the Italian side. The son of the general who had conquered the Vatican States in 1870, Cadorna had spent most of his military career as a staff officer, commanding few troops before 1914. “He had never heard a shot fired in anger” before World War I. (p. 14) A Croat of Serbian extraction who hailed from the Krajina, long a border region between the Austro-Hungarian and Turkish Empires, General Svetozar Boroevic von Bojna, commanded the Austrian forces. “He was physically unimposing, a small, almost petite man, but his appearance belied a stern character,” writes Schindler. (p. 46) Boroevic’s determination matched that of Cadorna, but the imperial general was the more imaginative.

Initially short of artillery and shells, the Italians began building up their munitions impressively. General Cadorna sought to bury the Austrians under the sheer weight of metal. Before each offensive he mounted ever greater artillery barrages, inflicting increasingly telling damage. The bombardments could not knock out all Austrian emplacements, however, and attacking Italian infantry (fanti) often crumpled under their opponents’ machine gun fire. As General Boroevic maintained his sometimes shaky defenses, he proved to be a master of improvisation and invention.

Largely stymied in 1915, Cadorna moved forward slowly but inexorably in 1916 and the first half of 1917. Coupled with the bravery of the fanti, their superior numbers allowed them to slowly push back the Dual Monarchy’s tenacious but limited defenses. In August 1916, for example, the Italians captured the key town of Gorizia, a goal that was once deemed unattainable. Their failure to capture the forbidding Austrian stronghold of Mount San Gabriele, however, left the Italians demoralized. Complacent after two years of offensives, the Italians proved unready for a German-led Austrian counterattack. Schindler deftly describes how the Central Powers’ Caporetto offensive caught the Italians napping: “There was no defense in depth, and there were no adequate reserves.” (p. 251).

Schindler downplays somewhat the Germans’ crucial role in the October 1917 Caporetto campaign. This approach is misleading. By late 1917 the Germans, specifically General Erich Ludendorff, controlled strategy on the Italian front. As B. H. Liddell Hart has pointed out, the Germans stepped in at this point to prevent an Austrian collapse. On 24 October the Central Powers opened their attack, spearheaded by six German divisions, on a previously quiet sector of the front. After deluging their foes with poison gas and high explosives, they launched a vigorous infantry assault. While some Italians resisted bravely, others fled. The Italian Second Army disintegrated. In S. L. A. Marshall’s blunt words, “the defenders panicked, backed away a hundred miles, and dissolved into a rabble.” The other two Italian armies were sorely pressed, but they retreated in good order.

Although the Central Powers seemed at first to be bound for Rome, they advanced only to the Piave River north of Venice. With British and French aid, the Italians halted further enemy assaults. King Victor Emmanuel promptly sacked General Cadorna and replaced him with the more able and approachable General Armando Diaz. The long years of Cadorna’s attrition strategy had given rise to sloppy defensive practices, primitive tactics, inadequate training, and complacency. Under General Diaz, the Italian Army would regain its fighting ardor.

Having strengthened their forces, the Italians, with British and French help, managed to turn back an Austrian assault in June 1918. Unaided by the Germans, the imperial Austrian troops then faltered and fell back. In this action, Schindler credits the Italians more than have other historians. Cyril Falls, for example, implied that the British drove the Austrians back and prevented an Italian rout. According to Schindler, the new Austrian assault collapsed under the improved morale and defenses of the fanti. This failed offensive sounded the death knell for Austria-Hungary.

Schindler gives less balanced coverage to the Italians’ final offensive of 24 October–4 November 1918, in which they recaptured the town of Vic­torio Veneto. After some initial fighting, the Allies swept all before them and drove the Austrians from the field in utter rout. The author focuses on the British contribution to this drive and largely ignores the Italians, except to say they bogged down at one point. In fact, although French and British forces contributed strongly, the Italians carried the heaviest load. The Austro-Hungarian Army surrendered on 4 November, and the empire that had raised it disintegrated.

The author, unfortunately, neither offers a comprehensive conclusion that would explain the meaning of all he has reported, nor does he compare and contrast the Isonzo campaign’s different phases. How successfully did the Austrians and Italians adapt to modern war? How decisive was their allies’ intervention in 1917–18? Schindler does not return to reflect on these questions. Instead he offers an extended travelogue of the Isonzo country in our
day, along with a postwar account of how the major figures fared. Though interesting and readable, this extended chapter does little to illuminate the book's major themes.

Schindler's pro-Austrian bias becomes troubling as the book progresses. For example, Schindler downplays both the Italians' operations in later campaigns and Germany's essential contribution to the Caporetto attack. Although the author repeatedly cites the bravery of Austrian soldiers, he mentions far fewer episodes of Italian heroism. He does, however, describe one striking incident near Mount San Gabriele in which the famed Italian conductor Arturo Toscanini put on a concert amid Austrian shellfire. Overall, however, Isonzo remains a welcome addition to World War I literature, as Schindler brings new light to a largely overlooked chapter of that massive conflict. Schindler's book has now also appeared in an Italian translation, Isonzo: Il massacro dimenticato.

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The British created the viceroy's commissioned officer ranks—jemadar, subedar, and subedar-major, along with risaldar and risaldar-major in cavalry and armored units—to bridge the significant cultural and language gaps between the predominantly British officers and the Indian Army's "other ranks" (enlisted personnel). With years of loyal service behind him, the viceroy's commissioned officer would rise within his regiment to become something of an older brother to young soldiers, serving in the words of South Asian scholar Stephen P. Cohen as a sort of "cultural transmission belt."

The three South Asian armies that ultimately emerged from the breakup of the British Indian Army—the armies of Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan—continue to use the same rank structure that they inherited in 1947, except that viceroy's commissioned officers are now called junior commissioned officers. Today, South Asian noncommissioned officers are much better educated than they were at Partition, so there is some disagreement among commissioned officers—many of whom are the sons of junior commissioned officers—as to whether this distinctive rank structure should be retained. Until the three armies are able to overcome their persistent shortages of officers, however, they will be obliged to rely on junior commissioned officers as platoon commanders. Abolishing junior commissioned officers could also hurt recruiting and retention, because many talented South Asian noncommissioned officers remain in military service hoping to retire as a greatly respected subedar-major.

To defend India, the "jewel in the crown" of their empire, the British created the Indian Army, a mix of British and Indian units that was led until the mid-twentieth century by British officers. Pradeep P. Barua, an associate professor of history at the University of Nebraska at Kearney, analyzes in Gentlemen of the Raj the gradual transition of the Indian Army's leadership from British to Indian officers.

During the nineteenth century the British were convinced that their own public schools produced the best officer material, and they commissioned only a few Indians with upper class backgrounds. At least a dozen gentlemen from the ruling families of India's
princely states were granted honorary commissions during the 1880s and 1890s, and a short-lived Imperial Cadet Corps was created in 1901, but the latter program’s graduates could only command Indian troops and were not employed in ordinary regimental service. Before World War I the highest military rank to which most Indians could reasonably aspire was that of viceroy’s commissioned officer, a rank analogous to the United States Army’s warrant officer (see sidebar). Each battalion’s ranking viceroy’s commissioned officer was the subedar-major, a seasoned veteran who was greatly respected within his unit but technically ranked below the youngest and least experienced British subaltern.

Indian units generally fought quite well in the colonial campaigns of the Victorian era, but if their British officers were killed in combat, poorly educated viceroy’s commissioned officers were sometimes unable to fill the resulting leadership void. This caused serious problems for the Indian expeditionary forces that served in France and the Middle East during World War I and convinced British military authorities that they should accelerate the process of commissioning full-fledged Indian officers, a process termed Indianization. In 1918 British military authorities opened a temporary cadet school in Daly College at Indore, and the Royal Military College, Sandhurst, in England, began accepting ten Indian cadets per year. Sandhurst commissioned its first Indian graduate two years later. The British initially designated eight Indian Army regiments to accept Indian officers, and they added more units later.

By 1931 Sandhurst had graduated 98 Indian subalterns, but Indians still constituted less than 4 percent of the Indian Army’s officers. Desiring a much larger annual intake of Indian officers, the British a year later created an Indian Military Academy at Dehra Dun in northern India. The first graduates of this “Indian Sandhurst” appeared in 1934, and 535 men had passed out of Dehra Dun by mid-1941. In 1933 K. M. Cariappa, a former Daly College cadet, became the first Indian officer to graduate from the Indian Army’s command and staff college at Quetta (now in Pakistan). During World War II a half-dozen Indian officers commanded battalions, and before the war ended K. S. Thimayya became the first Indian to command a brigade in the field. By September 1945 almost one-fifth of the Indian Army’s officers were Indian.

In 1947, when British India gained its independence, partitioned into Hindu-majority India and Muslim-majority Pakistan, native-born officers generally split along religious lines, with Sikhs and a few Muslims opting for India. These officers assumed most of the leadership positions within the newly formed armies of India and Pakistan. Pakistan’s Army was especially short-handed in its senior leadership, so British officers continued to fill selected command and staff positions into the 1950s. They also assisted the Indian Army, and General K. M. Cariappa did not become the Army’s first native-born commander until 1949.

Professor Barua’s well-researched book evolved from his doctoral dissertation, and it certainly treats the topic in detail. But it does contain several errors. The author incorrectly attaches the honorific “Sir” to the surnames of several individuals, instead of joining it to their first names. Perhaps his most glaring error, however, is adding an extra “o” to the name of Field Marshal Sir Philip Chetwode, an interwar commander-in-chief of the Indian Army whose name now graces the main building at the Indian Military Academy. Barua also fails to mention Sir Philip’s famous advice to the academy’s first cadets, which has become enshrined as that institution’s credo: “The safety, honour, and welfare of your country come first, always and every time. The honour, welfare, and comfort of the men you command come next. Your own case, comfort, and safety come last, always and every time.”

These mistakes and omissions as well as many typographical errors should have been corrected by the publisher, who is also guilty of attaching much too high a price to this thin volume. Nevertheless, for those readers who are seriously interested in the Indian Army, Gentlemen of the Raj presents a great deal of useful information on Indianization and explains why both India and Pakistan inherited soundly led armies at Partition. Sadly, those two nations promptly turned against one another, fought to a stalemate in Jammu and Kashmir, battled two more times in 1965 and 1971, and continue to confront each other in that contested region.
tary history, barely escaped into India. How the Indian Army absorbed the lessons of this shattering experience and rebuilt a force strong and capable enough to face the Japanese, and, not without continued struggles, eventually crush them decisively, is the focus of this excellent study.

*Phoenix from the Ashes* is not a history of the Burma campaign, of which there are already several fine published accounts. Rather it is an examination and analysis of the transformation of the Indian Army in the years following its initial defeat. The book focuses on training, tactical doctrine, recruitment and reinforcement, “Indianization” (increasing the number of Indians in the officer corps), and the induction of so-called non-martial races into the Army. The “martial race” theory—the belief that some Indian ethnic groups were more warlike than others—had led to the exclusion from the Army of many tribes or ethnic groupings in favor of those from the north. The bias favoring northerners existed in good measure because Punjabs, Sikhs, and Pathans, for example, tended to appear taller and stronger than peoples to the south, because they were fairer skinned and lived in rural rather than effete metropolitan areas, and for other equally questionable reasons. Eliminating this racial distinction, while difficult to do, eventually resulted in the gradual induction of “non-martial race” units from Assam, Bihar, Madras, and elsewhere. Not surprisingly, they did as well in battle as the supposedly more warlike groups.

The author, a senior lecturer in war studies at the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, bases his work on solid research in archival sources, unit and personal records, English-language Japanese materials, and a very large number of individual interviews with Indian and British veterans. The result is a unique and original study, with an impressive factual content of new information and analysis, well documented and clearly written.

To carry out his analysis, Marston describes how the implementation of Indian Army reforms affected the performance and character of ten selected infantry battalions and two cavalry regiments. These units are of various types and ethnic origins and include a Gurkha battalion and one of a non-martial race, but no British units. (Although British units constituted roughly one-third of an Indian infantry division, they were only peripheral to the reforms Marston discusses). Marston focuses on battalions and regiments rather than larger organizations because Burma’s topography dictated that most actions were fought at section, platoon, company, or squadron level. He demonstrates the diversity of background, experience, and development of these “Phoenix units,” as Marston denotes the units he selected, by examining their participation in each major operation of the war in Burma: the initial retreat to India, the abortive Indian Army counteroffensive into the Arakan (Burma’s west coastal area), the subsequent equally unsuccessful Japanese Arakan attack, the climactic Imphal/Kohima battle, and the Army’s concluding triumphal drive that drove the Japanese out of Burma.

While Marston pays brief, but respectful, homage to General William Slim, who initially commanded a corps and then the Army, as being “at the forefront of all changes undertaken,” (p. 4) as well as to other senior British commanders, his subject is “the Indian Army as a reform-minded organization.” (p. 5) By concentrating on a dozen selected units, he provides the reader with a broad but intimate perspective on the progress of change in the Indian Army and a convincing refutation of the view that it was too conservative a force to reform itself.

One of the first actions taken after the outbreak of war in 1939 to modernize the Indian Army was the withdrawal of the horses from the two Phoenix cavalry regiments, followed by their gradual mechanization. Other Phoenix units, either newly mobilized or already on duty, also slowly began to receive more modern equipment as well as a limited amount of training. Yet the strain imposed by
The Indian Army's defeat in Burma—and simultaneously in Malaya—in the opening months of the war in Southeast Asia led to some efforts to improve its tactical performance. But these steps were limited, uncoordinated, and without sufficient doctrinal guidance or upgrading of training methods. Thus when Slim launched an ill-conceived counteroffensive into the Arakan in the winter of 1942–43, the Indian Army, as exemplified by the Phoenix units, was once more sent reeling in defeat.

This sad experience led to the establishment of a centrally controlled training program that emphasized jungle warfare as well as basic training. Again using Phoenix units to illustrate his points, Marston describes the Army's focus on fire discipline, off-road maneuvering, and defense in depth, along with the great emphasis it placed on continuous patrolling as a key element of intelligence and both offensive and defensive operations. The use of tanks in the jungle, unsuccessful in the Arakan, was also stressed—the key being their employment in large numbers rather than in handfuls as they had been so futilely committed previously.

It was also during this period that the box formation was introduced. This term described a well-structured defensive perimeter established by a formation of any size from a platoon all the way up to a division, which was supplied by air. A series of these box formations would normally be established in sufficient proximity to one another for mutual support. Units so dug in would allow Japanese attacks to flow around them, to be countered by other friendly forces or hit on the flank by elements striking out from the box itself. It was a tactical formation originally introduced by the Germans and copied by the British in North Africa, where, for several reasons, it had only limited success. In Burma, however, it worked extremely well, surprising the Japanese, who referred to it as a "tortoise" or "bees' hive," reflecting its dual capability. It later became the basis for the so-called hammer and anvil tactic. Japanese forces attacking an Indian box would be struck by the hammer of other Indian elements sweeping down to crush the enemy against the anvil of the box.

Also enhancing Indian Army capabilities at this time—although not discussed by Marston—were important steps taken by General Slim to increase unit strength, raise morale, expand training and tactical innovation, construct a more efficient logistical system, and establish a first-rate health and medical program, including a key air evacuation scheme. By the end of 1943 the Indian Army was ready to start a new offensive in Burma.

The Japanese, however, noted the buildup of Slim's forces and anticipated an attack. To thwart this possibility, early in 1944 they opened their own new offensive to seize the Imphal-Kohima area, Slim's great base just across the Burmese border in India's Assam Province. Success in this effort, they hoped, would inspire a major revolt by Indian nationalists against their British rulers, which in turn could open the way for a further Japanese advance all the way to Delhi. Marston discounts the view that the Japanese hoped to push this
The Indian Army had proven that it could fight on equal or better terms with its enemy and demonstrated how much it had learned in the three years since its initial defeat. Marston describes in detail the continuing efforts to retrain and reorganize Indian forces even as these battles continued. Again using Phoenix units to illustrate his discussion, he shows how the Army made further changes even as it pursued the Japanese out of Burma. Especially important were the growing inclusion of non-martial races in its ranks and the continued “Indianization” of the officer corps. By the war’s end the Indian Army had been transformed into “a cohesive, modern professional army,” (p. 217) with “an important long-term political impact.” (p. 249) The post-war armies of India and Pakistan, with a nucleus of experienced officers and men, were able to enjoy a high level of public confidence that proved to be essential during the difficult transition from British rule to independence.

Phoenix from the Ashes is a first-rate piece of military history—not the ordinary kind, but a different and imaginative work of research, analysis, and exposition. It is the history of the self-education of an army through trial and error, not told anywhere else, and is thus a solid addition to the literature of World War II. Other armies in that global conflict may have gone through a similar process, but Marston’s account is unique in its thorough detail. How the Indian Army rose phoenix-like from the ashes of defeat is a remarkable story, and Marston tells it very well.

Dr. Stanley L. Falk was chief historian of the U.S. Air Force and deputy chief historian for Southeast Asia at the Center of Military History. He is the author of five books and numerous articles on World War II in Asia and the Pacific. His essay “Burma Memoirs and the Reality of War” appeared in the Winter 2003 issue of Army History (No. 57).
vehicle bumper insignia, wear and care of uniforms, and even the manner in which individual radio-telephone operators talk on the radio.

Gawne's book can be broken down into three sections, of which the first and third provide the bulk of the analytical scrutiny. The first three chapters describe the initial challenges of organizing the 23d at Pine Camp (present day Fort Drum), New York; determining and acquiring the appropriate equipment and personnel for it; and deploying it to Europe prepared for combat. The final two chapters discuss the fate of the 23d after the completion of fighting in 1945, when its primary task was to operate camps for those displaced by Nazi persecution, and the impact of the unit's wartime activities on postwar deception development, a topic that is unfortunately consigned to a minor postscript. The second section consists wholly of a sequential narration of the various tactical military operations in which the 23d participated, which began shortly after the Normandy landings. The 23d did not take part in the strategic deception work that coincided with those landings, and Gawne does not discuss those broader efforts. Taken as a whole, the middle 200 pages of the book illustrate the slow evolution of tactical deception tactics, techniques, and procedures and provide a good picture of how the 23d struggled to find the right balance of methods for achieving the desired effects on the enemy. Individually, however, each of these twenty-three interesting chapters does little more than explain what the operation under consideration involved and what the 23d sought to make the Germans believe.

This account, then, is the study of one specialty unit's development. What makes this evolution so intriguing, however, is that as the unit gains experience, its doctrine develops as well. Having no previous American program upon which to draw, the individuals responsible for the development of American tactical deception had to start from scratch. Borrowing from allies, as well as from the ongoing work of the other services in this sphere, the Army's deception pioneers diligently produced an initial tactical deception doctrine that focused on exploiting known German intelligence patterns and allowing those patterns to guide the selection of activities the deception unit would portray and the best methods for doing so. The reader sees a series of standard operating procedures emerge as the 23d conducted its missions throughout the European Theater, procedures that sought to standardize the methodology for setting up and using deceptive radio nets and the timing of unit replication. The author singles out a number of dedicated individuals who labored in obscurity during the war constructing the American tactical deception program, the most notable of whom was Col. Hilton Howell Railey. Initially Railey oversaw the development of the sonic deception program, but he went on to promote an all-encompassing deception program, becoming by the conclusion of hostilities the program's leading advocate.

Gawne does not try to expand his focus beyond American units in Europe, as he limits himself to the deception work of the 23d Headquarters Special Troops. This, however, leaves some avenues of research open and some questions unanswered. The deception efforts of other nations, other branches of the service, and other theaters of operation are not addressed, beyond the initial interaction with the originators of the 23d and their search for doctrine. Gawne thus largely neglects the well-known and robust Russian deception program and the U.S. Navy's nascent deception program in the Pacific. The prestigious actor Douglas Fairbanks Jr. played a key role in the development of the latter. Gawne acknowledges each of these cases but understandably devotes little attention to them. There are, however, some areas into which Gawne's study could well have delved further.

Most notably, throughout the book there is a conflation of the efforts of the 23d Headquarters Special Troops and U.S. Army tactical deception in general. The book gives the impression that the 23d represented the total American deception effort and that the lessons learned from its experiences were the only ones that impacted American doctrine in this sphere. There are scattered references in the book to the 3133d Signal Service Company (stationed at Pine Camp from June 1944 to February 1945 and subsequently sent to Italy) and to the continued work of Colonel Railey at Pine Camp after the departure of the 23d Headquarters Special Troops, but these are all presented simply as offshoots or by-products of the 23d. While the 23d may have remained at the center of American deception-doctrine development, the unit's relationship with other individuals and units working in this sphere is never made clear. Gawne may also be faulted for providing only a select bibliography that lists a relatively small number of works. A review of his endnotes shows that he cited many sources other than those listed in that bibliography. Considering the large number of tangential research possibilities that this work suggests, a more complete listing of the archives, interviews, and other sources would have been useful for future scholars.

Gawne succeeds in producing an admirable work on Army tactical deception in World War II. Although the reader will find that Gawne's book spawns as many unanswered questions as those the author can answer, the light Gawne shines on the activities of the 23d Headquarters Special Troops during World War II both heightens our understanding of that conflict and opens up possibilities for further research, despite the challenges that are present. Ghosts of the ETO succeeds despite the secrecy involved in the activities of its subjects.
Korean War Order of Battle
United States, United Nations, and Communist Ground, Naval, and Air Forces, 1950–1953
By Gordon L. Rottman
Praeger Publishers, 2002, 229 pp., $95

Review by Richard A. Mobley

One of the challenges in researching the Korean War is to identify the participating military elements from various nations and to understand their subordination. Gordon Rottman has eased this initial research task by writing Korean War Order of Battle. This easily used reference book provides thumbnail sketches of the participating U.S. units of all services, but its scope is far more ambitious. Rottman devotes over a third of the book to the military elements of other nations engaged under the United Nations’ auspices and to the Communist forces that fought in Korea. His book thus provides an excellent starting point for studying key engagements of the war from a multinational, joint-service perspective.

The author initially places units in context, providing the most detail on divisions, corps, and field armies. In the U.S. section, he starts by discussing key headquarters units and then works his way down to corps and divisions. Rottman reduces redundancy by describing the capabilities and organization of a generic U.S. Army infantry division before addressing the divisions individually. He then provides a short paragraph describing how and when each division moved to Korea and lists its key subordinate organizations, including specific infantry regiments, artillery battalions, and attached units. He also identifies division commanders and provides figures on the casualties sustained by each U.S. division. Rottman continues with short sections on non-divisional units from other U.S. Army branches, including aviation, military intelligence, and engineers. Here, however, he usually provides only a brief introduction and then simply lists the names of the units that fall under a given category.

Other U.S. services receive an equivalent depth of treatment. The major Marine headquarters, divisions, and the air wing each receive about a paragraph, followed in each case by a list of component organizations of battalion-size or larger. Navy coverage focuses on the commander of Seventh Fleet and the key naval task force commanders. Below the task force level, the author merely lists participating units, including all naval aviation squadrons. The discussion of U.S. Air Force elements is complicated because of the many participating wings and the large number of airbases in Korea and Japan from which they flew. After discussing Air Force involvement in the war generally, the author provides a wing-by-wing listing of participants. The citations are necessarily brief, usually just the wing’s designation, a sentence or two about when it fought in Korea, and then a listing of subordinate squadrons.

Rottman discusses the contributions of each of the UN combatants. He devotes an entire chapter to British Commonwealth units but only a page or two to each of the other UN participants. Once again the discussion includes just a paragraph characterizing the military involvement of the country followed by the names of its units and the dates they fought in the war.

The two chapters on the participation of the military forces of North Korea and the People’s Republic of China cover new ground. Research on Communist armies is difficult because the English language source material is often limited to “incomplete and often contradictory information” contained in contemporary intelligence documents. (p. xi) Rottman explains that the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) used elaborate deception measures, including the “constant withdrawal and recommitment of units and reattachment of divisions between armies and field armies between group armies,” which makes it extremely hard to provide an accurate order of battle even at the division level. (p. 180) The analysis of the PLA order of battle was further complicated because American intelligence “was based largely on information obtained by prisoners of war and captured documents.” (p. 180)

In light of the special challenge of analyzing the Communist order of battle, Rottman offers corps- and division-level summaries of these units. Unfortunately, however, he is unable to equal the level of detail he provides on the U.S. forces. Rottman devotes only a few sentences to the average North Korean division and provides even less information on the PLA divisions. Although the author discusses the general organization of the People’s Liberation Army, he lists only the designations of the participating Chinese Communist divisions. He also offers a few pages discussing Communist air and naval forces.

Rottman includes a short bibliography and six appendixes listing weapons and aircraft types, air bases, casualties, and campaigns. The book is modestly illustrated, with sketches of many ground unit insignia. Overall, Rottman’s Korean War Order of Battle will be a very useful addition to any Korean War researcher’s library.

Commander Richard A. Mobley, U.S. Navy, Retired, was a career naval intelligence officer who served as chief of indications and warning at U.S. Forces, Korea, in the late 1990s. He has a master’s degree in history from Georgetown University and has published several articles about North Korea. His article “North Korea: How Did It Prepare for the 1950 Attack?” appeared in the Spring 2000 issue of Army History (No. 49). The Naval Institute Press published his book, Flash Point North Korea: The Pueblo and EC-121 Crises, in 2003.
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Operations. The Center continues to receive for processing and accession documents, interviews, and other materials collected by MHDs in Iraq. To date, about sixty boxes of materials from Operation IRAQI FREEDOM have arrived at CMH. These will undoubtedly prove invaluable for history yet to be written. We have tried hard to help other agencies that should be published in the spring and will present fine accession documents, interviews, and other materials CMH. These will undoubtedly prove invaluable for history operations. The Center continues that are pulling together lessons learned and expedient materials from Operation Panama for the Army oral history program at the Center and in the Chief of Staff of the Army retirement program. We have also been working hard to refine and simplify the Army oral history database, which should become the standard for the Army oral history program at the Center and in the field.

We recently published several pamphlets: General Shinseki’s The Army Family: A White Paper, Ted Ballard’s new Battle of First Bull Run Staff Ride Guide, and two campaign-style brochures, Operation JUST CAUSE: The Incursion into Panama by R. Cody Phillips and The United States Army in Afghanistan: Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, October 2001–March 2002 by Richard W. Stewart. We also made major progress on several volumes on the history of the U.S. Army in Vietnam, especially the volumes on engineer operations in Southeast Asia and combat operations in the years 1968–1973. In addition, completed drafts of a first volume of two on the history of MACV, the joint command, and a second volume on U.S. Army counterinsurgency and contingency operations doctrine moved to the Center’s Office of Production Services for editing and production.

The final manuscript of a new two-volume edition of American Military History was approaching completion by the end of the quarter. We expect to publish the first volume of the new edition by June and the second volume within six months after that. These volumes promise to provide a valuable new introduction to the history of the Army, with colorful maps, a new page layout, and numerous “insets” of historical highlights and artifacts. We will also publish in the near future an updated and redesigned edition of Secretaries of War and Secretaries of the Army.

The National Museum of the United States Army (NMUSA) took a major step forward in September 2003. General Keane, concluding his tour as the Army’s vice chief of staff, hosted a spectacular NMUSA activation ceremony at Fort Belvoir, Virginia. This event established a permanent NMUSA planning staff that will operate at Fort Belvoir. This is the seed from which the ultimate museum will grow. Establishing this planning group will impact the staff of the Center’s Museum Division. Jeb Bennett, who had headed that division, assumed charge of the NMUSA planning organization, and he has begun to assemble its personnel. Terry Van Meter has become acting director of Army museums at Fort McNair, and he now supervises the field programs and daily operations of the Museum Division. With growth comes change.

The commemoration of the Lewis and Clark Expedition also continued in high gear, with numerous conferences, articles, and presentations to the American public on this key episode in the nation’s history. The departure of Charles White, one of the key players in the Center’s commemorative cell, was our loss and FORSCOM’s gain. We are proud Chuck was selected to be the Forces Command historian, and we know he will do a great job in this critical position.

Please keep up all the great work that you do to preserve and make available the history and heritage of our soldiers. We at the Center of Military History are always honored to be associated with so many distinguished colleagues around the United States and the world.

The Black Regulars Wins Utley Book Award

The Western History Association has conferred its first annual Robert M. Utley Book Award for frontier and western military history on The Black Regulars, 1866–1898 (Norman, Okla., 2001), co-authored by William A. Dobak, a historian at the Center of Military History, and Thomas D. Phillips. The book tells the story of the black men who served in racially segregated regiments, mostly in the American West, during the last third of the nineteenth century. It draws the words of enlisted men from court-martial testimony, pension applications, and letters they wrote to black newspapers while serving in the Army. Dobak is also the author of Fort Riley and Its Neighbors: Military Money and Economic Growth, 1853–1895 (Norman, Okla., 1998).
Center of Military History Issues New Publications

The Center of Military History has issued four new pamphlets, a reprint of a book first issued by the Field Artillery Center and School, and a third CD ROM set on the United States Army in World War II.

The Battle of First Bull Run Staff Ride Guide by Ted Ballard is the second in the Center’s new series of guides to battlefields in the national capital area. Containing a dozen situation maps and sixteen illustrations, this 83-page publication contains a narrative of the battle, a detailed chronology, an order of battle, and biographical sketches, along with short discussions of casualties, organization, tactics, small arms, artillery, logistics, and selected battlefield stops. The pamphlet is CMH Pub 35–2–1. It may be purchased from the Government Printing Office for $9.00 under stock number 008–029–00389–9.

The United States Army in Afghanistan: Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, October 2001–March 2002, recounts the first six months of U.S. Army operations in a campaign that toppled the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and deprived Al Qaeda of a hospitable base. Authored by Richard W. Stewart, this 46-page campaign-style pamphlet includes a half-dozen maps and an equal number of photographs. It describes not only the seizure of major Afghan population centers by friendly Afghan forces aided by American ground troops and air support but also subsequent operations in the Tora Bora Mountains south of Jalalabad and in Paktia Province in eastern Afghanistan. The pamphlet is CMH Pub 70–83–1. The Government Printing Office is offering it for sale for $5.50 under stock number 008–029–00388–1.

Operation JUST CAUSE: The Incursion into Panama by R. Cody Phillips is a new account of the December 1989 American military action that removed General Manuel Noriega from control of the government of the Republic of Panama and led to his capture and arrest. The pamphlet describes both the preparations for and the accomplishment of the lightning assaults that played so important a role in the operation’s success. Published in the format of the Center’s World War II and Korean War campaign pamphlets, it includes multicolor maps and color photographs. It is CMH Pub No. 70–85–1.

The Army Family: A White Paper by General Eric K. Shinseki provides a report by a recent Army chief of staff on matters affecting Army families since the issuance of an earlier white paper on this subject by his predecessor General John A. Wickham Jr. in 1983. The new white paper, which is 60 pages long and illustrated with color photographs, also charts the status in June 2003 of the more than 100 recommendations in the Army Family Action Plan. This white paper is CMH Pub 70–84–1.


The United States Army and World War II, Set 3: An Overview, is a three-disc CD ROM set that reproduces in digital form the Chronology, 1941–1945; Reader’s Guide; and three pictorial volumes in the Center’s Green Books series, along with forty campaign and topical pamphlets the Center prepared for the fiftieth anniversary of the war. The quality of the photos in this digital publication was enhanced by drawing on original photo prints instead of simply scanning the previously published photos. This set is CMH EM 0223. The Government Printing Office is offering it for sale for $24 under stock number 008–029–00387–2.

While only the staff ride guide, the Afghanistan operation pamphlet, and the CD ROM set have been made available for public sale, all six new publications are available to Army publication account holders from the U.S. Army Publishing Agency Distribution Operations Facility; ATTN: JDHQSV-PAS, St. Louis; 1655 Woodson Road; St. Louis, Missouri 63114–6128. Account holders may also place their orders at http://www.usapa.army.mil. The facility accepts customer service inquiries by phone at 314–592–0910 and by email at CustomerService@usapadofarmy.mil.

Center of Military History Awards Dissertation Fellowships

The Center of Military History will award fellowships for the 2004–2005 academic year to three graduate students preparing dissertations on the history of land warfare. Robert Blackstone of the University of Kansas will receive a fellowship for work on “Defining Duty: The Fighting Soldier and the Ideology of War, 1941–1945”; Judkin Browning of the University of Georgia will receive one for “Wearing the Mask of Nationality Lightly: The Myriad Effects of Union Military Occupation during the Civil War”; and Christopher Lew of the University of Pennsylvania will garner a third for “Becoming God(s): CCP Strategy and Policy during the War of Liberation (1945–1949).” Each of the fellows will receive a stipend of $9,000 and access to Center facilities and expertise.
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