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This issue of Army History opens with an article by Professor Wayne E. Lee of the University of Louisville that compares the style of warfare employed by the Continental Army during the Revolutionary War against regular British forces and their British colonial supporters, on the one hand, with the way the Continental Army campaigned against the Iroquois Indian allies of the British. This examination is part of an ongoing historical analysis of the United States military's way of making war.

The issue then turns to more current history. Maj. W. Shane Story of the Center of Military History examines seven commercially published books issued in 2003 and 2004 that discuss the planning and execution of the invasion of Iraq.

While each of these books appeared quite promptly after the offensive that overthrew the regime of Saddam Hussein, some provide more depth than others in analyzing the issues that military action involved. This essay offers readers an overview of this literature. After Major Story's piece, the issue contains two essays by civilian Center historians examining official Army efforts to capture quickly the basic historical outlines of recent military campaigns. The first, by Richard W. Stewart, focuses on three accounts of the Gulf War, Afghan War, and Iraq War. The second, by Jeffrey J. Clarke, takes a longer view of official military historians' efforts to evaluate recent campaigns, observing an increasing demand in recent decades for speedier analysis, to which the Army's historians have responded. Sadly, the issue also includes a half-dozen obituaries of men who made significant contributions to the Army's historical efforts.

The issue concludes with nine reviews of individual books on military history from 1776 to the Afghan War. A policy question relating to book reviews arose in the aftermath of the publication during the previous issue of Army History. While this bulletin has on rare occasions reprinted permission reviews of books on military history that appeared first in other journals, it always acknowledged their earlier appearance. The Spring 2005 issue of Army History (No. 61) contained a review by Samuel Watson of the book by Alan Peskin, Wingfield Scott and the Profession of Arms (Kent, Ohio, 2003), that was very similar to, albeit somewhat more extensive than, the review Watson contributed to the January 2005 issue of the Journal of Military History. I learned of Watson's earlier review of this book only after the Spring issue was published and thus did not acknowledge the earlier piece there. I regret that omission. To avoid a recurrence, authors and reviewers are hereby informed that the policy of appearance, authors and reviewers are hereby informed that the policy of Army History is that all articles and reviews appearing in this bulletin will contain the initial presentation in print of the writer's analysis of the subject at hand, unless clear acknowledgment is made to the contrary.

Charles Hendricks, Managing Editor
In the fall and winter of 1777 to 1778 General George Washington and the main part of the Continental Army fought a profoundly conventional campaign against the British expeditionary force sent to Philadelphia. The period is traditionally seen as the start of the Continental Army’s transformation into a professional force modeled along European lines that fought in the traditional European style, with all the Enlightenment-era accouterments that such a statement entails.¹ In the summer of 1779 many of the very same regiments, with the same officers, and following Washington’s orders, marched into the Iroquois country of upstate New York and fought a very different kind of campaign—one marked not only by a different strategic use of violence, but also by a qualitatively different interpersonal style of violence.² Here were two “American ways of war” coexisting at the same time in the same Army, producing very different results.

The use of the phrase American way of war is of course deliberate. Russell Weigley’s landmark volume of that title argued that Americans since the Civil War have primarily relied upon war of annihilation—seeking to destroy the enemy as a military power. Prior to the Civil War, Weigley argued, the American military usually lacked the resources to undertake such an overwhelming strategic goal and thus developed techniques of limited war. Weigley highlighted two different strategies of limited war: Washington’s conventional war of attrition, designed to avoid decisive engagement and keep an “army in being,” and Maj. Gen. Nathanael Greene’s more innovative combination of guerrilla and conventional forces in a running war against the British in the south. In either case, Weigley saw limited resources dictating American strategic choices.³ There is much wisdom here but also some inevitable oversimplification. What I would like to do is to suggest an increase in the number of variables that should be considered and then use those multiple variables to compare the choices made in the two campaigns, Philadelphia 1777–78 and Iroquois 1779, to examine how the same Army arrived at two very different ways of war.
In addition to increasing the number of variables under consideration, as I will detail shortly, I would like to alter slightly the definition of a way of war. Instead of merely considering strategic choice (economic, technological, social-organizational), we can define a way of war by analyzing its overall level of “frugality,” in the determination of which strategic decisions are but one component. In other words, in what ways is violence in warfare restrained or unleashed, both inside and outside the deliberate, strategic decisions about its use? Note that frugality is a more inclusive term than merely destructive, and it also allows us to consider decisions within their own cultural norms. Deliberate decisions to destroy resources, for example, can accompany but do not require atrociously interpersonal violence, unless that too is chosen in an effort to terrorize a population. Furthermore, specific acts are more or less destructive depending upon the cultural context. For example, scalping was considered a norm by Native Americans, but a terrible violation by Europeans. Thus a European decision to scalp implies a clear escalation of violence. Indeed, when analyzing the differences in these two campaigns, looking at their relative destructiveness will not be enough; we must also qualitatively and contextually assess their frugality. Such an assessment requires considering the intersection of three different variables: what it was possible to do; what it was necessary to do; and what the participants believed they should do. For the remainder of this article I will abbreviate and capitalize these variables as Can, Must, and Should.

The usual historical explanation for an escalation of frugality has simply been that of necessity. Leaders have calculated what level of violence they needed to win. Laws of war, peace morality, and other such restraints were all willingly discarded when confronted with immutable “military necessity.” There is a great deal to be said for this argument, and it forms one leg of this model: What Must we do to win? But there are occasions when calculations of Necessity are a great restraint—at least within their cultural purview at the time. For example, “we Must win their hearts and minds to win,” or even “we Must not kill all the farmers whose produce feeds us.”

A somewhat more sophisticated approach to the level of frugality in war acknowledges economic, technological, or social-organizational restraints on violence in the overall capacity of a society to wage destructive war. Upper limits on the sizes of armies that can be deployed or the destructive potential of the weapons in use in war, and thus an army’s overall way of war, transmutes commanders’ choices or calculations of necessity or possibility. The frugality of war is also very much affected by the choices of local leaders and individual soldiers, and their choices are rooted in broader cultural predilections. But let us consider these issues in the light of the two campaigns of the Continental Army in 1777–78 and 1779.

The Continental Army and “Gentility”

As a whole, General Washington and the Continental leadership approached the waging of war in a typical eighteenth-century fashion. Washington, as the American commander in chief, was among the most powerful political figures in the world; therefore, in the light of the two campaigns of the Continental Army in 1777–78 and 1779.

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The third major leg of Washington’s strategy for the war was to fight it with a conventional army, conforming to eighteenth-century expectations. This element is placed last in the Must categories because it reflects a percep-
tion of necessity and partly an expres-
sion of Should. There is a significant overlap here. The seventeenth-century shift to drilled armies firing volley’s was a creation of necessity—a response to chang-
ing technology and the expansion of army size. But by the third quarter of the eighteenth century it had become accepted as the way an army "should look." Washington sought international respectability, and to achieve it he had to win, but the Army also had to "look right." As historian John Shy put it, "Washington and other native Ameri-
can leaders stressed a regular army, I suspect, because they felt a need to be seen as cultivated, honorable, respect-
able, and capable of leading other, more uncivilized savages in a howling wilderness." The victory at Saratoga was the key to gain-
ing the French alliance, but the French Army would not fight the war on its own. It needed a recognizable and re-
spectable American equivalent to fight alongside.

What was the effect of this preference for a conventional army on the level of violence? The eighteenth-century European army carried with it a host of structures that tended to limit violence in warfare. For example, the eighteenth-century discipline associated with preventing desertion—regulations keeping the soldiers in camp—helped prevent unauthorized "foraging" and plundering. Furthermore, the logistical requirements of a large army also limited the ability of the commandant to put pressure on the countryside. What was the impact of this kind of discipline on the behavior of soldiers and their commanders? The Continental Army’s discipline also shaped the landscape of violence in war, although, again, very much within the parameters set at higher levels, as strategic decisions to devastate would overwhelm the occasional outlier. Nevertheless, we must assess the way the values and morals of common soldiers and lower-
level leaders shaped their daily decisions about the use of violence in war.

We have already discussed the kind of Should at play in motivating Wash-
ington to create a conventional-style army. Other Shoulds sometimes evolved similarly as calculations of necessity, or predicated on assumptions of what oth-
er leaders would expect. Many examples may be found in the codes of war—the whole complex of quarter, paroles, and prisoner exchanges. These codes were at root created from notions of mutual self-interest, and the Continental Army’s observation of them derived in part from a calcu-
lation of necessity based on the need for international respectability. But the codes also represented a kind of Should at play in motivating Wash-
ington to create a conventional-style army.
ity as well. Private Martin remembered one incident during his own personal for-aging expedition of 1777, when he found himself among a flock of “geese, turkeys, ducks, and barn-door fowls.” He recalled that he could “have taken as many as I pleased, but I took up one only.” When Sgt. John McCasland, a Pennsylvania soldier in the Valley Forge encampment in 1778, was out in the countryside to “prevent the Hessians from plundering and destroying property,” he and his party sneaked up on a group of Hessians plun-dering a mansion house. Seeing a sentinel outside, the group settled on McCasland to shoot him. McCasland recalled, “I did not like to shoot a man down in cold blood. The company present knew I was a good markman [and thus would not believe a miss], and I concluded to break his thigh.” He did, and as they ran up to the Hessians, they proceeded. The Iroquois, with the presence of this army. It ended up being almost a purely Continental force. Very few mili-tia troops participated, which greatly sim-plifies the question of “laying blame” for atrocities—these were virtually all regular troops. The two columns converged south of the Finger Lakes, at the “door” to the center of Iroquois country, and then pro-ceeded to march together into the Sen-eca and Cayuga country around the lakes, burning crops and destroying villages as they proceeded. The Iroquois, with the assistance of a few British regulars and somewhat more Tory rangers, occasional-ly harassed the combined force and put up one serious roadblock, which was quickly overthrown, at the Delaware Indian vil-lage of Newtown, near the modern city of Elmira, New York. Between early August and the end of September 1779 Sullivan and Clinton destroyed thirty to forty Iroquois and allied towns, burned 160,000 bushels of corn, and girdled thousands of fruit trees. No significant groups of Iroquois were killed or captured—or even seen for that matter, other than at Newtown. Before rejoining Wash-inson’s army, Sullivan lost approximately forty men to Indians, accidents, and dis-ease. While extraordinarily destructive of property, the expedition did not destroy the Iroquois’ will to resist. Provisioned by the British at Fort Niagara, which Sul-li-van did not attack, the Indians vigorously resumed raiding the frontier in 1780, kill-ing or capturing over 300 Americans and destroying six forts and over 700 houses and barns.27

So what conclusions can be drawn by applying the Can/Must/Should model? To begin with Can, the level of possible destruction was immediately much high-er than it had been in the Philadelphia campaign (or in most other Continental operations) for two simple reasons. First, the enemy homeland and population was accessible. Second, the total population of the Iroquois relative even to the limited size of the Continental Army theori-cally put them at serious risk of destruc-tion. Washington’s sources suggested that there was a maximum of 2,050 men (Iro- dians, British, and Loyalists) who would oppose the campaign, defending a total Iroquois population I estimate at 6,400.28 To confront them, Washington initially proposed sending a full 6,000 men and eventually dispatched 4,000.29 Such a ra-tio of invading army to invaded popula-tion rarely occurred in European military history, and this situation alone created the potential for very high levels of de-struction, although it did not necessitate that outcome.

The most serious limitation in terms of possibility was the inability to surprise members of a society that had long fought
warfare based on surprise. Strategically the Iroquois had plenty of warning of the expedition, and tactically the Continentals repeatedly tried and failed to surprise populated villages. Just one example, Continental scouts reported a body of Indians and Tories in the Seneca village of Chewung, and Sullivan quickly planned a night attack with converging columns to cut off its escape. At dawn, in an oft-repeated scene, they found only an empty village.31 Continental Surgeon James Grant oft-repeatedly classified Indian attacks as “mere plunder and the wanton killing of men, women, and children,” a response to what they believed still occupied, and in all but one of them they failed completely.” This inability drastically limited the total possible human damage that the Continentals could do and shaped their perception of how to win.

The ability of the Continentals to wreak human and property damage was limited by the available time on target and the available force size. Strategic priorities limited the time available; the main opponent after all continued to be the British, and Washington could not afford to have so many troops deep in the interior for too long. Furthermore, the British might intervene or take advantage elsewhere once they realized just how much force Washington had committed to the campaign against the Iroquois.32 Finally, once the goal of the operation became one of destroying crops, the campaign begin in mid-June when the corn could be caught half grown, but Sullivan did not get under way until August.33

Other strategic and logistical considerations further limited the size of the force and the overall time available. Advancing so deeply beyond the European American frontier required Sullivan to drop off detachments along the route to secure his communications, and those were only so many troops that could be fed in such an environment.34 The expedition severely strained Continental logistics, and the Army ultimately had to live off the land for much of the march. In the end, logistical considerations were what cut short the campaign and sent Sullivan and his troops back to Pennsylvania.35 This logistical restraint would become less and less significant in the Indian campaigns of the future, and thus their destructive potential would rise.

What about Washington’s perception of necessity? Again, the policy goals of the campaign were to convince the white settlers that the Army would protect them (a goal that did not prescriptively demand high levels of violence) and to provide sufficient stability for those settlers to bring in their harvests for the use of the Army (again, a nominally low demand for violence here).36 The immediate practical means of meeting these needs was to find a way to stop the Iroquois raids. The question remains, how did Washing-
impracticable for them feed on air and drink the morning dew.”

The consequences of such a strategy on the level of violence should be obvious. The effects of the feed fight could be dire and would certainly be indiscriminate, but the approach also fit within certain European traditions of destructive war. When necessary the resources of the enemy could be seen as legitimate targets. But within these strategic parameters considerations of Should also contributed a very different quality to the violence of this campaign from that pursued around Philadelphia in 1777–78. In general the category of Should becomes much more complex in intercultural war because in those circumstances perceptions of ought to can often unleash violence rather than restrain it. In this campaign there were a number of Shoulds that increased the level of violence.

First was the desire for retaliation. The concept of retaliation was, in general, culturally accepted within American society: If an enemy act had exceeded certain bounds, then retaliation was equally authorized to exceed the bounds. In European notions of war the customary right of retaliation had been codified explicitly as the only means of enforcing the behavior expected between enemies. The legal theorist Emerick Vattel noted in 1758 that retaliation should be avoided, but a prince or general who “is dealing with an inhuman enemy who frequently commits atrocities such as [hanging prisoners without just cause] may refuse to spare the lives of certain prisoners whom he captures, and may treat them as his own men have been treated.” Vattel wished a “Law of Retaliation,” a phrase frequently used by eighteenth-century combatants. In their minds retaliation was not only a human urge but a quasi-legal right. This legalistic view of retaliation blended with the more generalized popular ideology of an individual’s right of self-redress—the right “to make oneself whole” in response to injury or affront. This expansive and quasi-legal vision of retaliation played a crucial role in the minds of individual soldiers. It made normally immoral acts into legitimate acts of war, clearing consciences and creating the freedom to be frightful. In the case of war against Indians retaliatory-style war was almost traditional by the middle of the eighteenth century, but there were also specific retaliatory issues in play. When the British and Tory attack on Wyoming was seen as a massacre, and the November 1778 attack at Cherry Valley, New York, actually was quite vicious. As a result, the whole Sullivan campaign was perceived by its participants in part as a campaign of retaliation. A chaplain accompanying Sullivan’s expedition, when he learned of the planned devastation of the Iroquois country, declared it “just & speedy retaliation for British & savage barbarity.”

Furthermore, a number of incidents or reminders on the march further cemented the urge to retaliate in this campaign. Contentional soldiers’ minds and defined the nature of the war they saw themselves fighting. When the army arrived at Wyoming, the site of the battle the year before, they were shown around the massacre site, where they witnessed unburied bodies and scalped skulls. Even more personal to the Army, a few days after the Newtown fight, a Continental patrol under the command of Lt. Thomas Boyd was caught, overwhelmed, and wiped out. This could be dramatic and would certainly hurt at all, but enough freedom of action existed and enough social authorization outside the military hierarchy remained to allow such an extreme act of cruelty. And note that while it may not have reflected the army’s overall willingness to inflict that kind of violence, this kind of act would be precisely what was most remembered by the Iroquois. Atrocity creates its own momentum.

The social authorization for violence against Indians rested on a well-established race prejudice, based in turn on a long history of conflict between Indian and European culture, all of which have been thoroughly explored by other historians. This set of cultural assumptions about Indians was a developed one, derived from a long history of conflict. Where the first English colonists were preconditioned to expect “good” and “bad” Indians, by the middle of the eighteenth century (at the latest), that dichotomy had for the majority of the American colonists been reduced to just “bad.” Thus, when New England publicist William Wood of “Hobart” could be generally polemical about the local Indians, his 1764 editor, Nathaniel Rogers, instead grumbled about “their immense sloth, their inability to consider abstract truth . . . and their perpetual wanderings” and commented that “The fierce manners of a native Indian can never be effaced.” The Indians, always a kind of other, one against whom extreme violence was justified. When British Maj. Gen. James Wolfe issued orders to his regulars to keep the middle-aged and the women and a young male cripple hidden in the bushes, too feeble to flee. Virtually every diarist recorded the incident, because she provided some good intelligence of the Iroquois’ and Butler’s intentions and because of her apparent incapacity to consider abstract truth. In the minds of the troops and led to acts of violence even when the leadership’s calculations of necessity or their notions of honor suggested mercy and restraint.

For one thing, the Continential soldiers reached the middle of the eighteenth century, white American society had come to “authorize” a level of wartime violence against Indians that it simply did not sanction against European enemies. This authorization pervaded the mentality of the troops and led to a cultural assumption that when the leadership’s calculations of necessity or their notions of honor suggested mercy and restraint.

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Henry Dearborn, painted from life by Charles Willson Peale, 1796–97. Having served as an officer in the New Hampshire line since April 1775, Dearborn was the lieutenant colonel of the New Hampshire Regiment in the campaign against the Iroquois.

The thought of destroying fruit trees also impressed the commanders. One of the few Continentals ever to admit to thinking of taking prisoners to use as hostages put forth the notion that the English had long used this strategy: “The Indians shall see, and believe, that there is malice enough in our hearts to destroy everything that contributes to their support.” Some of the officers however, who were sent out with parties to lay waste the Indian territory, would see apple or peach trees; so that they were left to blossom and bear fruit.

Hand and col. Durbin [Dearborn] do honor to their own characters, Gordon observed.

Although the Should in war Iroquois, typically pointed to a lack of restraint, as this last anecdote about fruit trees suggests, there were arenas or moments of choice in which individuals or leaders deliberately tried to contain the violence of the war. We have seen how some care was taken for abandoned elderly women. A surgeon on the expedition expressed guilt and remorse at the level of destruction: “I very heartily wish these rusticks may be spared; but we have no mercy to expect, if taken, as they will put us to death immediately, and will not even spare our Women and Children.”

Even the most prosaic destruction of fruit trees involved an escalation that the war’s protagonists perceived as exceptional and unnecessary. Europeans’ expectations of war included the possible necessity of devastating the countryside, but even in those circumstances they found the idea of destroying fruit trees to be egregious. The thought of destroying fruit trees also apparently disturbed some of the officers on the Sullivan expedition, who, as the Rev. William Gordon reported, “thought it a degradation of the army to be employed in destroying apple and peach trees, when the very Indians in their excursions spared them, and wished the general to retract his orders for it.” Sullivan refused, couched in the language that “The Indians shall understand that there is malice enough in our hearts to destroy everything that contributes to their support.” Some of the officers however, who were sent out with parties to lay waste the Indian territory, would see apple or peach trees; so that they were left to blossom and bear fruit.
“Discipline in the Morristown Winter Encampments,” New Jersey Historical Society Proceedings 90 (1962): 1–5. The Massachusetts Historical Society Proceedings (1960, ed. the Continentals) and the Continental articles of 1778 and 1779, which often omit William Winthrop, Military Laws and Precedents (1886; reprint, New York, 1979), pp. 947–953, 963–971. Trumbull, ed., Robinson, in the Kimberly article 1883, originally entitled Rowley, in the Kimberly article 1883, originally entitled Robinson, in the Kimberly article 1883, originally entitled Robinson, in the Kimberly article 1883, originally entitled Robinson, in the Kimberly article 1883, originally entitled Robinson, in the Kimberly article 1883, originally entitled Robinson, in the Kimberly article 1883, originally entitled Robinson, in the Kimberly article 1883, originally entitled Robinson, in the Kimberly article 1883, originally entitled Robinson, in the Kimberly article 1883, originally entitled Robinson, in the Kimberly article 1883, originally entitled Robinson, in the Kimberly article 1883, originally entitled Robinson, in the Kimberly article 1883, originally entitled Robinson, in the Kimberly article 1883, originally entitled Robinson, in the Kimberly article 1883, originally entitled Robinson, in the Kimberly article 1883, originally entitled Robinson, in the Kimberly article 1883, originally entitled Robinson, in the Kimberly article 1883, originally entitled Robinson, in the Kimberly article 1883, originally entitled Robinson, in the Kimberly article 1883, originally entitled Robinson, in the Kimberly article 1883, originally entitled Robinson, in the Kimberly article 1883, originally entitled Robinson, in the Kimberly article 1883, originally entitled Robinson, in the Kimberly article 1883, originally entitled Robinson, in the Kimberly article 1883, originally entitled Robinson, in the Kimberly article 1883, originally entitled Robinson, in the Kimberly article 1883, originally entitled Robinson, in the Kimberly article 1883, originally entitled Robinson, in the Kimberly article 1883, originally entitled Robinson, in the Kimberly article 1883, originally entitled Robinson, in the Kimberly article 1883, originally entitled Robinson, in the Kimberly article 1883, originally entitled Robinson, in the Kimberly article 1883, originally entitled Robinson, in the Kimberly article 1883, originally entitled Robinson, in the Kimberly article 1883, originally entitled Robinson, in the Kimberly article 1883, originally entitled Robinson, in the Kimberly article 1883, originally entitled Robinson, in the Kimberly article 1883, originally entitled Robinson, in the Kimberly article 1883, originally entitled Robinson, in the Kimberly article 1883, originally entitled Robinson, in the Kimberly article 1883, originally entitled Robinson, in the Kimberly article 1883, originally entitled Robinson, in the Kimberly article 1883, originally entitled Robinson, in the Kimberly article 1883, originally entitled Robinson, in the Kimberly article 1883, originally entitled Robinson, in the Kimberly article 1883, originally entitled Robinson, in the Kimberly article 1883, originally entitled Robinson, in the Kimberly article 1883, originally entitled Robinson, in the Kimberly article 1883, originally entitled Robinson, in the Kimberly article 1883, originally entitled Robinson, in the Kimberly article 1883, originally entitled Robinson, in the Kimberly article 1883, originally entitled it a discussion of the minor alterations to the text corresponding to endnotes 8–44 at the end of the article. No endnotes are missing.
The most contentious military debate surrounding the 2003 invasion of Iraq centered on the size of the forces required for the operation. The debate turned on the effects of changes in the U.S. armed forces, ranging from the fielding of new technologies to the reorganization of tactical units and higher headquarters. In planning for Iraq, traditional advocates of robust land power stressed that these changes enhanced the nation’s military superiority but did not alter the nature of war or the importance of ground troop strength. On the other side, “transformationalists” argued that advanced technologies had made small forces operating jointly with air power both decisive and efficient. This debate went public before the invasion of Iraq as traditionalists and transformationalists diverged sharply on the size of the force that should be employed.  

Privately, Secretary of State Colin Powell encouraged Army General Tommy Franks, the commander of U.S. Central Command, to insist on using overwhelming force. Franks dismissed Powell’s concerns, explaining to the National Security Council that “we are moving into a new strategic and operational paradigm” that justified a small invasion force. Although problems during the invasion brought the debate back into the headlines, with critics assailing the Pentagon for invading with too few troops, Baghdad’s swift fall appeared to vindicate the small-force strategy.
Appearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee in July 2003, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld hailed the way victory was won in Iraq as a triumph of transformation. Some analysts accepted Rumsfeld’s thesis and gushed about the Pentagon’s new small-force, high-tech strategy and its ability to produce fast, decisive results. Rumsfeld’s arguments likewise shaped one of the first books on the war, The Iraq War: A Military History, by emeritus Ohio State University history professor Williamson Murray and retired Maj. Gen. Robert H. Scales Jr. Murray and Scales describe a conflict that began with Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990. The dictator survived his 1991 defeat because of American “mistrust,” which the United States rectified in the brilliant campaign of spring 2003. Murray and Scales offer the public its first overview of the ground campaign in southern Iraq, the air war, the British campaign, and the capture of Baghdad. Finishing the book quickly, however, precluded significant research, and the content and depth of the final product resembled that of a two-hour CNN special. In lieu of an original thesis, Murray and Scales repeat the Pentagon’s emphasis on information technology, special operations capabilities, and enhanced training. According to the authors, the campaign foreshadowed a future of “smaller, leaner, more physically fit units that can deploy more quickly and fight independently.” (p. 243) Murray and Scales wrote late enough in 2003 to acknowledge that Iraq was not yet stable, but this did not raise questions for them about the campaign’s transformational success. Noting that they had not undertaken an academic effort, Scales and Murray admit they learned, with both good and bad results. He gives detailed explanations of many obscure technologies, weapon systems, and organizations engaged in the fight. On the other hand, Cordesman accepts claims of transformation-driven success uncritically, using Rumsfeld’s and Franks’s July 2003 statements to the Senate Armed Services Committee as half of his introduction. (pp. 1–6) In the summer of 2003, insurgent attacks worsened many of the strategic dilemmas confronting the United States in Iraq, pitting the desire to redeploy and reconstitute military units against the need to secure Iraq and pitting the wish to minimize the American troop commitment against a determination to shape Iraq’s future. These dilemmas prompted Cordesman to criticize policymakers’ best-case assumptions on post-invasion Iraq as he detailed the occupation’s myriad challenges. He contends that the military has traditionally failed to plan for conflict termination or nation-building despite having repeatedly confronted chaos among civil populations, a failing Cordesman attributes to having a “non-political” military with limited resources. (pp. 506–08) While capturing the hubris of victory that drove the transformation thesis, Cordesman repeats the military’s mistake of mentally separating combat from civil chaos. If, as Cordesman avers, the invasion and occupation periods represented separate problems, then occupation failures did not diminish the luster of the invasion’s successes. However, if occupation problems originated in the execution of the invasion, then Cordesman would have to reassess his endorsement of Rumsfeld’s view that “the speed and scale of the coalition victory speaks for itself.” (p. 139) Regarding the occupation period, Cordesman sees troop strength issues as incidental to the failure of strategic vision and planning, both by the administration and the military. He thus neglects the “small-force” mobilization and deployment issues and devotes only a few pages to the use of reserve forces.

As occupation problems and a burgeoning insurgency increasingly undermined the transformation thesis in 2004, Rick Atkinson’s In the Company of Soldiers offered a fresh perspective on the ground campaign in southern Iraq. Atkinson’s division-level view stresses the non-transformational effects of a micromanaged deployment process. A Pulitzer Prize–winning journalist and historian, Atkinson accompanied Maj. Gen. David Petraeus’s 101st Airborne Division command post for six weeks beginning in late February 2003. Petraeus’s war was an act of improvisation throughout. Long-delayed deployment orders forced the division to issue desert uniforms at the last minute and rushed its road, rail, and sea movements. The division hastened through final preparations in Kuwait but did not receive all of its equipment before the invasion began. Thus the 101st attacked without enough trucks to move its troops. Soldiers cursed the imbroglio that followed and blamed all the “callous” and “incompetent” higher headquarters they assumed were responsible for the deployment’s ridiculously poor coordination. (p. 236) Atkinson’s sober account accompanied growing concerns about American operations in Iraq, worries that two recently retired generals try to allay with insiders’ versions of the campaign. Rejecting criticism of the invasion in his memoir American Soldier, General Tommy Franks claimed that the invasion was both brilliant and transformational, but he sidesteps critical issues. Instead, he uses some 200 pages to describe what he learned while growing up not-quite-poor in west Texas, enjoying a bacchanal with mounted machine guns to guard an intersection in Mosul, Iraq, August 2003.

Using its helicopters and rationing its trucks, the 101st provided rear security along V Corps’s vulnerable lines of communication, seeing action in a number of cities before Baghdad fell. With the fall of the regime, the 101st occupied part of northern Iraq. Believing the first thirty days of the occupation would be crucial, a brief honeymoon in which to win the peace, Petraeus had the 101st launch an ambitious stabilization campaign. Atkinson’s book ends with the beginning of the occupation. While recognizing faults in the soldiers and leaders he encountered, Atkinson also admires them as both humane and fierce. Petraeus stands out as a commander and an intellect, both driven and thoughtfully cautious. On the other hand, Atkinson has no sympathy for the strategic planning or the conceptions of warfare that shaped the invasion, and the rhetoric of “non-political” military with limited resources. (pp. 506–08)
that the United States "needed a new policy" on Iraq but believed that more time and study were needed to determine options for either squeezing Saddam harder or backing off. (p. 200) Rather than a new policy, what came next was 9/11, operations in Afghanistan, and renewed planning for operations in Iraq. Franks dismissed the existing Iraq plan, which detailed all the "requirements for a major operation," as too conservative, unimaginative, and unsuited to the strategic situation. (p. 331) The plan was too big because it used 500,000 troops and took too long because it required six months for deployment. Moreover, the plan did not account for technological advances and deployment. Moreover, the plan did not account for technological advances and deployment. Furthermore, Saddam's regime collapsed before the deployment's mistakes seem less painful, almost forgettable. Within weeks, however, underequipped and undersupplied soldiers were struggling through unplanned missions in the desert sun. Unfortunately, Franks avoids the subject of deployments in American Soldier, a glaring omission that lessens the value of his account.

For Franks, the regime's collapse vindicated the planning. Against charges that he went to war without enough forces, he asserts that "today, our ground troops operate 'leaner and meaner,' that strength derives "from the mass of effective firepower, not simply the number of boots or tank tracks on the ground," and that talk could never "convince the strategic kidnappers that the force we'd be moving into Iraq was adequate to accomplish the mission." (pp. 475–77) Information operations—a euphemism for propaganda—fascinated Franks, but he did not recognize their limits. He claims to have slyly deceived Saddam Hussein with a ruse about a weapon site and cited unspecified warnings from Jordan's king and Egypt's president as proof that Iraq had chemical weapons. (pp. 418–19) Unwavering self-confidence likely made Franks a better commander in many ways, but it left him oblivious to the dangers of self-deception. If the physical evidence of Iraq's weapons programs was sparse, the dictator's back-channel warnings of chemical warfare—apparently an attempt to deter an attack—only emboldened Franks to invade because they "proved" Iraq had such weapons. Franks claims credit for successes, but abdicates responsibility for post-invasion chaos. He expressed little concern over reports of disorder in Basra after being assured that "it looks like looting, but it's actually revenge." (p. 520)

Franks's most important contribution to the transformation debate is the considerable attention he gives to other factors that shaped the campaign. He shows that the campaign began in 2001 and not from some automatic war making process, but rather from the difficult interactions of complex bureaucracies, marked by personal rivalries and strained relationships. Franks lauds the secretary of defense and himself but subjects other officials outside his control to unmerited, unsubstantiated criticism. For Franks, Wolfowitz's significant contribution of General Richard Myers, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was keeping a lid on the service chiefs while Rumsfeld and Franks carried on the business of war. Franks repeatedly belittles the service chiefs, describing them as "inflexible bean counters" and "Chihuahuas," and he reports exasperating them to Secretary Rumsfeld and Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz. (pp. 207, 275–78, 301, 383, 440) The coup de grâce came in a memo to Wolfowitz explaining that the chiefs "lacked a working background or understanding to be operationally useful." (p. 441) In marginalizing and then silencing the chiefs, however, Franks also made the Pentagon's support planning and execution more difficult. After Baghdad fell, Iraq's problems dwarfed Franks's expectations. Having fought two campaigns in three years and extended his command tour once, Franks had seen enough of military challenges and decided to retire rather than accept Rumsfeld's offer to serve as chief of staff of the Army. Franks, therefore, suddenly became a lame duck in the crucial early days of the occupation. He seems to have been a cipher on the all-important decision surrounding de-Baathification and disbanding the Iraqi Army, quietly leaving these matters to others much as he had earlier acquiesced on the deployment process. He did conclude that the key to security and civil reconstruction in Iraq was to get "an international bureaucracy moving—quickly." (p. 526) But he apparently did little to arrange for that or to push for any preferred course for the occupation. In American Soldier Franks prefers to blame others for failing to make decisions that he shrank from advocating, such as fence-mending through the United Nations to build a bigger coalition, committing unlimited American troops and treasure to Iraqi security, or limiting the commitment by rejecting such policies as de-Baathification, which primarily excluded Sunnis and thus fed insurgent resistance. Avoiding such choices brought the worst outcome in all three spheres: a limited coalition, a shortage of American resources to secure Iraq, and a sizable, armed, and angry group of Sunnis who were convinced the Americans had stolen the Sunnis' birthright. Regarding the occupation, Franks only regrets mistakes he attributes entirely to others—the ill-defined, all-purpose scapegoat known as the international community, the U.S. Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance, the George W. Bush administration, the Clinton administration, Congress, Rumsfeld, Powell, and, not least, the much-maligned service chiefs. (pp. 544–45) While he managed to grab the laurels before they withered, Franks passed up an opportunity to place the occupation on a more secure foundation.

In Inside CENTCOM: The Unvarnished Truth about the Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, retired Marine Lt. Gen. Michael DeLong confirms Franks's deeply held animosity toward the service chiefs. As Franks's deputy, DeLong tracked events from the attacks of 9/11 to the fall of Baghdad, and he reports that Franks's difficult, alienating, and distrustful attitudes shaped an adversarial relationship with the Pentagon. (pp. 8, 27–28, 86) Conflicts with the Joint Chiefs of Staff came to a head over the new Iraq war plan, and Central Command, with Rumsfeld's support, shot down all objections to the plan from the service chiefs. (pp. 86, 102) In DeLong's account, Central Command's strategies in Afghanistan and Iraq were brilliant and "both campaigns were an unqualified success." (p. 136) Others were responsible for those things that went wrong, beginning with the Iraqis themselves. DeLong bore the first responsibility for post-invasion disorder because he freed criminals just before the war. Iraq's soldiers and police fostered chaos by abandoning their posts, and Iraqi civilians destroyed their country with rampant looting. Unnamed American officials made things worse when they disbanded the Iraqi Army without naming a provisional government. (pp. 117–18) The provisional government excluded Sunnis and thus fed insurgent resistance. Avoiding such choices brought the worst outcome in all three spheres: a limited coalition, a shortage of American resources to secure Iraq, and a sizable, armed, and angry group of Sunnis who were convinced the Americans had stolen the Sunnis' birthright. Regarding the occupation, Franks only regrets mistakes he attributes entirely to others—the ill-defined, all-purpose scapegoat known as the international community, the U.S. Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance, the George W. Bush administration, the Clinton administration, Congress, Rumsfeld, Powell, and, not least, the much-maligned service chiefs. (pp. 544–45) While he managed to grab the laurels before they withered, Franks passed up an opportunity to place the occupation on a more secure foundation.

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as dating the 1988 chemical attacks on the Kurds as 1995, citing the alleged concrete bunker at Dora Farms that was never found, and referring to Third Army when the author means the 3d Infantry Division.

Journalist Bob Woodward’s Plan of Attack, published in the spring of 2004, deals in greater depth with the institutional bureaucracies behind the war. Woodward’s focus is not on the efficacies of force ratios but on the individuals, relationships, politics, and diplomacy that shaped the planning, with a particular focus on Secretary Rumsfeld’s personality and reputation. According to Woodward, Rumsfeld returned to the Pentagon in 2001 with thoughtful use-of-force guidelines that would weigh necessity, purpose, cost, political viability, and diplomatic options before committing American troops to combat. At the same time, Rumsfeld was deeply suspicious of the Pentagon and its ways, believing that civilian and military bureaucrats had stultified innovation in the Department of Defense and left it mentally stuck in the Cold War. The secretary handled criticism stoically, preferring to tear apart for months. Discarding of ponderous operation he had been

The gist of the plans “was to move a vast portion of the American military machine, and in some cases a portion of the U.S. transportation infrastructure and logistics capability” to troubled regions, whereupon the Army expected to fight big battles. (p. 33) Appalled, he berated long-serving officers, spoke of his predecessor’s job performance “with disdain,” and thought the institution had caused “fine, talented people” to waste their efforts through wrong-headed thinking. (pp. 33, 35) Rumsfeld wanted quick-strike contingency plans that would eliminate threats before they matured. Before solutions emerged, the 9/11 terrorist attacks signaled a national crisis, and Pentagon planning and execution accelerated into reaction and crisis management. Initially daunted at the need to rout Al Qaeda and Taliban forces from Afghanistan, planners’ first efforts called for a massive deployment and a slow, difficult conquest of the country. Rumsfeld was furious; military planners were proposing precisely the kind of ponderous operation he had been tearing apart for months. Discarding planners’ recommendations, Rumsfeld had Franks link together Special Forces and Central Intelligence Agency teams. These joined teams used air power, precision weapons, cash, and indigenous forces to defeat the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan. Triumphant there, Rumsfeld thought he had found the formula that would vindicate and sustain transformation, and Franks became Rumsfeld’s point man for the new strategy. (pp. 5–6, 37, 41)

Rumsfeld and Franks tossed out the existing plan for Iraq and spent a year negotiating the size and shape of an invasion force. Franks finished his new plan in November 2002 and submitted it to Rumsfeld with an accompanying schedule, asking him to begin mobilizing and deploying some 300,000 troops. Rumsfeld thought the plan called for too many troops. Worse, by virtually committing the armed forces to an invasion of Iraq—and signaling invasion to the entire world—the plan deprived the administration of the flexibility it needed to pursue diplomatic effect. Rejecting Franks’s schedule, Rumsfeld instead started dribbling out incremental and uncoordinated deployment orders. Lacking clear guidance, the services could not coordinate mobilizations and deployments, and confusion spread. Everyone focused on Rumsfeld’s day-to-day schedule and priorities. As Rumsfeld later explained to Woodward, some of the deployment decision-making “was criticized. The fact that it was a joint effort on the deployment process and disaggregated it to support diplomacy was never understood out there, and I didn’t want to say that’s what we were doing so we sat here and took the hit.” (p. 234)

There were, in fact, numerous factors over which Rumsfeld had little control. These included diplomacy, overthrow and training of the enemy, the logistics of coalition building, and domestic political concerns, all of which complicated the decisions on deployment scheduling. President George W. Bush and his administration had a delicate task of balancing military preparations and diplomatic pressure. These measures were mutually reinforcing, but any misstep risked undermining the effort to remove Saddam. Further, the leaders of America’s partners in the war on terrorism and Iraq’s neighbors had their own concerns and their own domestic constituencies to pacify, causing them to develop independent roles for their nations. These complexities forestalled the timely decision-making on which military efficiency depended. However, Rumsfeld exacerbated the problems, as his elusive style and refusal to explain anything to the military “what we were doing” left the Army leadership, at least, perplexed on the eve of war. Indeed, just days before the March 2003 ultimatum, the press carried stories that Rumsfeld nearly fired Army Secretary Thomas White for failing to rebuke the Army chief of staff, General Eric Shinseki, over the general’s estimates that occupying Iraq would require “hundreds of thousands” of troops. By Rumsfeld’s own account, the defense secretaries, he was “struggling,” but he also did not seem to appreciate the confusion and consequences of impromptu deployments. As a result, the invasion of Iraq was not based on any model of transformation. Instead, it was a series of ill-coordinated acts of improvisation that led—through skill, hard labor, soldiers’ sacrifices, and some luck—to the toppling of the Iraqi regime. Woodward demonstrates the many complexities of the war that loom much larger than transformation.

“Transformation” stood for a new-style military that exploited the latest technological advances to reduce the size and friction of war; it came to imply great results, quickly achieved, with controlled risks. Baghdad’s fall reinvigorated Rumsfeld’s vision, but the insurgency provoked a backlash against the invasion’s architects. Critics blamed the Pentagon for not sending enough troops and for failing to prepare for post-hostility operations. Jeffrey Record argues the case against the administration in Dark Victory: America’s Second War against Iraq, concluding that the invasion “was not only unnecessary but also damaging to long-term U.S. political interests in the world.” (pp. xiv, 142) He directs his unrelenting criticism against both Bush administrations. The first “erred egregiously” in 1991 when it announced a unilateral cease-fire; since Saddam had not been forced to ask for terms, he was able to avoid admitting defeat. (p. 7) Record disputes the development in the 1990s of a neoconservative agenda dedicated to “an ambitious, forward-looking foreign policy reliant on force to rid the world of tyranny and promote the spread of democracy.” (p. 18) President George W. Bush entered office as a moderate realist, but the attacks of 11 September 2001 converted him to the neoconservative viewpoint (pp. 26–27) and by early March 2003 “he linked the case for war with Iraq to the 9/11 attacks.” (p. 53) Although U.S. security interests were at stake in the region and regional change was needed, the costs and risks of the invasion of Iraq rendered the operation a dubious enterprise at best. (pp. 64–77) The coalition’s military campaign was not remarkable; its success “was never in doubt,” and Iraq’s military was “doomed to defeat.”

Secretary Rumsfeld outlines his defense plans at a Pentagon briefing, May 2001.

Secretary Rumsfeld speaks with General Franks from his Pentagon office.
Records, his conclusion again trumpeted transformation: “Air power plus small supporting ground forces plus local surrogates” could coerce or overwhelm regimes. He takes the opposite view in Dark Victory, however, blaming the Pentagon for its obsession with “the technologies of aerial precision” (p. 154). Record’s 2002 caveat that considerable ground forces would be required to conquer, occupy, or administer territory did little to discourage transformational analysis, which tended to minimize the contributions those responsibilities involved.23

The Record canon damns problems and extolls successes but collectively offers no insight for mitigating the former or enhancing the latter. Dark Victory’s bias derives more from frustration over Iraq and the rhetoric of transformation than from any substantive insight regarding strategic policy or military operations, for the record’s frustration is what produces his cynicism. In light of Record’s abrupt reversals, planners and policy-makers would be well advised to be skeptical about his latest critique.

Controversies surrounding the importance of transformation and troop strength will continue, if only for purposes of budgetary wrangling. As Record recognizes, the debate is a reflection of “an extension of the prewar argument within the Pentagon over the future size and structure of U.S. armed forces.” (p. 104) For historians and military analysts studying the war in Iraq, the debate overshadows many other difficult issues and can obscure our understanding of the origin, course, and outcome of the invasion. Woodward’s and Ackerman’s books have been invaluable because they demonstrate that the planning, preparation, and execution of the invasion were sufficiently flawed to undercut exaggerated claims that Operation Iraqi Freedom was a transformational campaign. However, placing two mechanized divisions in the planners and policy-makers ad

NOTES

10. Ibid., p. 12.
11. Ibid., p. 8.
12. Ibid., p. 20.
COMMENTARY

“Instant” History and History: A Hierarchy of Needs
By Richard W. Stewart

“History is not what happens; history is what historians say happened.”

Anonymous


As a practicing military historian, I am often engaged in pondering (and defending) how the profession of official military historiography fits into the wider historical profession and to what degree the official historian’s product is “real” history as opposed to “court” history. However, that is not what this short article is about. Others have dealt with this topic in the past, and only the ignorant or obtuse would somehow imagine that this article attempts to do so. And military history, while it has its peculiarities and problems, is a subset of history in general. In understanding the creation of military histories we can gain insight into the strengths and weaknesses of the various levels of historical product precisely because that can and should be produced after military operations.

Essentially the creation of military history is a very sloppy process with many, many chances to get it wrong in the rush to report, at best, less wrong in the long run. To understand how sloppy the process is should give all historians and readers of history a more critical eye for all historical products, especially the “instant” histories now so much in vogue. So much of the quality of the final historical product depends on the haphazard collection and preservation of the records of military operations. The fact that this collection and preservation has grown much more haphazard of late is a matter of much distress to all military historians. The U.S. Army records management program remains broken and no one seems to have the interest, resources, or enthusiasm to fix it. The increasingly problematic collection of documents makes contemporary history more challenging to write about than events further in the past. Many military historians would prefer to write about the Civil War, World War II, or even Vietnam than attempt to write with any measure of certainty on current military operations. The sources, despite the flood of electronic data, are simply not collected and preserved as thoroughly as in the past.

Restrained by this hit-or-miss collection process, writers about current operations must, of necessity, create layers of interpretation. The official historical products relating to these operations: the initial after-action report, a summary of what a unit reports that it just did; an initial chronicle of the events, including some measure of analysis; and finally the official history that an event or war—the senior generals—have retired and are no longer directly in the chain of command, where they no longer have access to the office computers. But their use of primary sources is so thorough and their understanding of the true context of contemporaneous events is so clear that seeking their general content and the time frame for

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I don’t know if it is any writer’s purpose to tell the story of the war, and even prouder of the renaissance of the Army in the recent period.” As such, Certain Victory, was prepared by a team of Army officers, headed in this case by a retired officer, Col. Gregory Fontenot, and the book was published within a year of the events covered. It is based heavily on oral history interviews and unit-after-action reports and seeks to “tell the Army story” with numerous highlighted sections on specific acts of sacrifice or heroism on the part of Army leaders and soldiers. It deals with some controversies—it does not hide the appallingly near-run nature of the logistics system nor the chaos caused to the plan by the Defense Department’s decision to scrap the time-phased force deployment list (TPFDL) and to turn to a politically driven request-for-forces process—but on the whole, like Certain Victory, it is essentially a good-news story. It wants to put the Army, its soldiers and leaders, in the best possible light. That is what it was written with that in mind. On a lesser note, it is also hard for a non-military person to read. It is shot through with acronyms, describes complex military movements that need more careful explanation, and has a few too many (one is too many) instances of repeating cute nicknames for some senior Army leaders. (Does anyone really care that a senior officer goes by the nickname of “Spider,” “Rock,” or “Binky”?) On Point is, in essence, just a more detailed and comprehensive after-action report, rather than a history. On a positive side, On Point is, again like Certain Victory, a very useful contemporary study of a recently completed military operation, and thus it serves a valuable purpose. It does not pretend to be official history. It is a solid attempt to impose some order on a complex operation and tell the story of how far the military infrastructure in Kuwait, and the generation of plans as the mission changed from defense to attack (Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm) constituted the final proof of success. There are some problems with the book, however. It is, like Certain Victory and On Point, determined to focus relentlessly on good-news stories and vignettes. The special forces operators want to talk about what a great job they are doing, and this book fills that purpose. This is fine, but the story after the war and the decade or so since then has had one of the most annoying and troubling aspects is the use throughout the book of pseudonyms for all personnel involved except the most public, such as the JSOTF-North commander, Col. John Multiholland; his deputy, Air Force Col. Michael Vess; and the special operations personnel involved with the JSOTF-South, Capt. Mark Phelan. The historian in me is troubled by this since what purports to be history where “the stories are true, only the names have been changed to protect the innocent” may work on TV with “Dawson’s Creek” but it worries me. This book would certainly not have been published in such a quick time frame and perhaps not at all. The historian cringes, but the civil servant understands and finally must accept the facts. There are other small problems with Weapon of Choice. I have to fault the lack of an index. This alone makes the work much less usable by anyone. Speed of production is important, but this is an unnecessary and unhelpful shortcut. It is even harder to understand the lack of an index in this day and age since so many automated programs now exist that could with ease generate a simple name list—or, in this case, a pseudonym list, perhaps matched with a unit—and a crude topic index. And how can we explain the indiscriminate use of black tape over the eyes of all special operations personnel in the photographs, even civil affairs soldiers, who are not really super-secret warriors, and even in those photos that have already been published, unmasked, by Special Warfare magazine? This is an annoying affectation that should have been stopped in its tracks early on. There are these mere quibbles, however, given the amount of detail the authors of Weapon of Choice have obtained from their unsupervised access to the members of a portion of the special operations community. The vignettes tell some great stories, and if the analysis is a little weak, it is apparent that the book has captured and preserved enough facts to enable analysts and historians to refine the interpretation at some future date. As the Introduction states, “This historical project is not intended to be the definitive study of the war in Afghanistan. It is a ‘snapshot’ of the war.” Indeed it is a very detailed snapshot that tells great stories and serves the special operations community. The book does not tell the Army well as an initial account. It is a valuable “mark on the wall” for all future historians of these stirring events.” As I have stated, I believe that all three of the studies reviewed above fall into the middle category of contemporary, “officially sponsored” studies or reports and that they serve the valuable purpose of being “place holders” for later, more definitive official histories. Their tendency toward good-news stories is understandable, but all readers need to be aware of this and not use these books uncritically. On the whole, however, even though they were products quickly, while public and Army interest was still focused on the events at hand, they tell the Army story in sufficient detail and with enough overall fidelity that they ought to be read, yet with the critical eye of the professional historian. It is only in the future that we may begin to judge what story is being the final word on their purpose. Their raison d’être is to serve as an interim product. And in each instance listed above, these books fulfill that purpose admirably. Speaking in the shadow of Thucydides, a chronicler of contemporary events, I can sympathize with the authors goal of all of these studies. Objectivity is hard to achieve when one is so close to or actually involved in the events one is writing about. However, we can learn from Thucydides, whose work has stood the test of time to become the epitome of the type of history toward which historians of contemporaneous events should aspire. Objectivity, however difficult to attain, must always be the goal of historians, and this is especially problematical when one tries to write about events so soon after they have occurred. I wrote about the Gulf War soon after it ended, and the inclination was to be over enthusiastic. Certainly historians must try to capture events and write about them as objectively as possible as they occur, leaving the more definitive version to future historians. The Army and the American public deserve no less.

Dr. Richard W. Stewart has served as chief of the Center’s History Division since 1998. He holds a doctorate in history from Yale University and has served as historian of the Army’s 1917-1919 Expeditionary Force and chief historian of the Army Special Operations Command. He was general editor of the two-volume American Military History (CMH, 2005).
The Care and Feeding of Contemporary History

By Jeffrey J. Clarke

Following the Second World War, the gradual rise of what some have called “instant history” has bedeviled decision-makers and analysts of current events—not to mention the historical profession itself. So compelling has been our thirst for understanding that we have tried to re-create key contemporary events almost as soon as they have occurred, mining them for their immediate significance and attempting to use them as a foundation for future action. In the rush for relevance, professional standards have often been discarded or ignored and causal relationships asserted with minimal factual evidence. Nowhere is this phenomenon more prevalent than in the realm of military history.

In the past, traditional military history focused on battles lost and won, both for their human drama and for their decisive influence on the outcomes of wars. As late as about 1850, the telling of such events has followed a well-marked trail. Initial accounts have almost always been journalistic in nature, based on limited or inclination employed either by government or private record. Some military professions have increasingly sought to use historical data to government actions that is vital to a healthy democratic process.

A final ingredient in this porridge has been the professionalization of the military itself. The American Civil War may have been the last struggle dominated by such “Great Men” as Grant, Lee, and Sherman, whose military genius subsequently replaced by the collective wisdom of the general staff. In truth, war had become too complex to be controlled by one man, be he a Frederick or a Napoleon, with the expansion of the battlefield, the creation of more and more entities, and the profusion of capabilities in terms of weapons and trained manpower, all necessitating a highly educated officer corps and soliderly. One result has been a new appreciation of the ability of history and its teaching tools, including staff rides and war games, to supplement practical experience, which in warfare tends to be both costly and intermittent, with military training and classroom instruction. To better train their officers, armies have demanded that their histories be accurate, balanced, and comprehensible, even suggesting a marriage, however rough,

In the past, traditional military history focused on battles lost and won, both for their human drama and for their decisive influence on the outcomes of wars. As late as about 1850, the telling of such events has followed a well-marked trail. Initial accounts have almost always been journalistic in nature, based on limited or inclination employed either by government or private record. Some military professions have increasingly sought to use historical data to government actions that is vital to a healthy democratic process.

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Army’s “heritage,” or the glorification of its positive historical experiences—no one in the Army speaks of America’s heritage of resistance to the draft—and troop morale, and even the morale of the nation-state at war. In sum, the study of history—the interpretation and context of things past—must still be guided by the warning “sweet emptiness.”

Government historians have often been afflicted by these trends. After World War II, the U.S. Army broke from its tradition of documentary history, producing the much-acclaimed "Green Book" narratives that avoided the institutional biases plaguing earlier efforts abroad. While these much-acclaimed “Green Book” narratives that avoided the institution’s political background and service support for the three-week endeavor. The extensive and costly stabilization campaigns that followed; and the Center of Military History; neither addressed the more comprehensive histories—which they were not—and that shortcomings, leading the New York Times (3 February 2004, page A1) to trumpet a purported early draft as an internal report exposing all manner of military deficiencies.

Both histories illustrate the risks of trying to issue historical products too quickly without adequate time for study and analysis. Yet even the Army’s Historical Advisory Committee, a group supported by academics as Gerhard Weinberg and Jon Samuda, has consistently encouraged service history offices to publish more contemporary history, if only to ensure the relevance and survival of their programs. One solution to the dilemma of instant history pursued by the Center of Military History has been the publication of shorter studies, campaign brochures providing a limited overview, chronology, and analysis of such ventures as the 1989 invasion of Panama (Operation Joint Cause), the Somalia intervention, and the Bosnian peacekeeping effort (Operations Joint Endeavor, Joint Guard, and Joint Force). For Somalia, that short history, coupled with the Center’s publication of a Somalia “source book,” combining a chronology with a list of available oral histories, and the decentralized version of the contemporary after-action report, a vision of Somalia, seems wholly adequate until a more definitive account can be written. Meanwhile, works like Black Hawk Down—both Mark Bowden’s 1999 book and the movie—do a good job of capturing some of the human flavor of the experience before it has dissipated. As more of the documentation has become available, the Army Historical Program’s Desert Storm coverage has continued with the publication of more specialized works like Janet A. McDonnell’s Supporting the Troops: The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers in the Persian Gulf War (Washington, D.C., 2002), and Gordon W. Rudd’s Humanitarian Intervention: Author of Task Force lips to Kuwait: U.S. Army, Europe, in the Gulf War (Washington, D.C., 1998), Stephen P. Gehring’s From the Flandes Gap to Kuwait: U.S. Army, Europe, in the Gulf War (Washington, D.C., 2002), and Gordon W. Rudd’s Humanitarian Intervention: Author of Task Force lips to Kuwait: U.S. Army, Europe, in the Gulf War (Washington, D.C., 1998), Stephen P. Gehring’s From the Flandes Gap to Kuwait: U.S. Army, Europe, in the Gulf War (Washington, D.C., 2002), and Gordon W. Rudd’s Humanitarian Intervention: Author of Task Force lips to Kuwait: U.S. Army, Europe, in the Gulf War (Washington, D.C., 1998), Stephen P. Gehring’s From the Flandes Gap to Kuwait: U.S. Army, Europe, in the Gulf War, and an objective analysis. Consequently, the tomes were published on unclassified sources, it provided a good overview of the experience but little detail on controversies such as the decision not to deploy National Guard combat brigades, the level of effectiveness of Patriot missiles, and the larger command and control questions at the theater level. However, criticism within the Army over the limited credit for the operation’s success given to certain high-ranking individuals nearly caused the entire project to be scrapped, and the manuscript was ultimately issued only in an unattractive format, received limited distribution, were heavily footnoted. The sources in fact are both its strength and its weakness, as they generally consist of either press releases or, in the author’s own words, “non-attributable sources.” Both text and citations rely heavily on pseudonyms—made up names—within the Army, giving the book’s quality. More disquieting overall was the fact that the book’s quality. More disquieting overall was the fact that

Dea Jefrey J. Clarke has been the chief historian of the Center of Military History since 1990. He is the author of Advice and Support: The Final Years, 1965-1973 (CMH, 1988), a volume in the series United States Army in Vietnam, and coauthor of Riverine to Rhino (CMH, 1993), a volume in the series United States Army in World War II. He received his doctorate from Duke University.

N O T E S

Center of Military History Issues New Publications

The Center of Military History has issued a new book about federal military responses to civil disorder in the past sixty years; a newly revised, two-volume edition of its Survey of American military history; and a collection of operational art in modern warfare; proceedings of the 2004 Dwight D. Eisenhower National Security Conference and a conference on U.S. defense acquisition since World War II; a booklet and several pamphlets; and a print version of the Army Reserve military history division’s three on the German Army, two on the French Army, and one on the origin of the concept. Three Center of Military History authors are represented, Brig. Gen. Harold W. Nelson, General Brown, and Colonel Krause. Bruce W. Menning, who teaches at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, contributed two essays, and two others were written by former staff members of the U.S. Army Foreign Military Studies Office at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. This book is CMH Pub 70–89–1. We expect that the Government Printing Office will soon offer it for sale. Those interested in purchasing it may look for updated information at http://bookstore.gpo.gov.

The proceedings compiled in Dwight D. Eisenhower National Security Conference, 2004, edited by James R. Craig, detail the presentations made by nineteen distinguished speakers at a conference held in Washington, D.C., in September 2004 that focused on alliances, nuclear deterrence, and 21st century security challenges. The speakers included retired General Montgomery C. Meigs; Harry C. Stonecipher, chief executive officer of The Boeing Company; Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz; General Peter Pace, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and former Congressman Lee H. Hamilton. This book is CMH Pub 79–95–1. Providing the Means of War: Historical Perspectives on Defense Acquisition, 1945–2000, edited by Shannon Brown, publishes the fifteen papers presented at a symposium held in Virginia on 10–12 September 2001 on American military procurement since World War II. The Center of Military History and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces collaborated in the book’s publication. Among the authors’ papers are essays by Albert Hayworth, William Collins, and Alphonse McNamara. The Center has published the first two pamphlets of eight ultimately projected in a series on the U.S. Army campaigns of the Mexican War. Both initial pamphlets were authored by historian Stephen A. Carneny; they are entitled Guns along the Rio Grande: Pueblo Alto and Rosada de la Palma and The DeserT Storm and Desert Shield, respectively. The others are written by former staff members of the U.S. Army Foreign Military Studies Office at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. This book is CMH Pub 70–89–1. We expect that the Government Printing Office will soon offer it for sale. Those interested in purchasing it may look for updated information at http://bookstore.gpo.gov.

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Center Artist Wins Fine Arts Competition

The painting Fallujah by Sfc. Elizabeth Golden, artist in residence at the Center of Military History, garnered first place honors in the 2004 fine arts competition held by the Defense Information School at Fort George G. Meade, Maryland.

Battle Issued in Paperback Edition

Basic Books has issued Battle: A History of Combat and Culture by John A. Lynn, in paperback edition at a list price of $16.95. This book was reviewed in the Spring 2005 issue of Army History (No. 61).

Upcoming Military History Conferences

The Council on America’s Military Past will hold its annual conference from 10 to 14 May 2006 at Chattanooga, Tennessee. The conference will highlight papers and site tours related to military activities in Tennessee and Georgia, including the removal of the Cherokee Indians and the Civil War combat in the area. Further information on the conference may be obtained by contacting the council’s executive director, retired Marine Corps Col. Herbert Hart, at camhart@idt.net. The council’s website is www.armypast.org.

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Retired Army Maj. Charles Edward Kirkpatrick, long an active member of the Army’s historical program, died in Franklin, Virginia, on October 1, 2005. He was 57.

Kirkpatrick was born in western North Carolina in December 1947. He earned a bachelor’s degree with honors in history from Wake Forest University in 1969 and a master’s degree in European history there the following year. He earned a doctorate in modern European history from Emory University in 1982.

Kirkpatrick was commissioned in the Army in 1969 and served in the United States and Europe as an air defense artillery officer, retiring as a major in 1991. While in uniform, he served as an assistant professor of history at the U.S. Military Academy, taught military history and tactics at the U.S. Army Air Defense Artillery School, and spent five years as a military historian at the U.S. Army Center of Military History, where he worked in the Center’s Analytical and Operational History Branches. He worked briefly at the Center of Military History during the Cold War, then three years at the U.S. Army War College, before serving as an assistant professor of history at the U.S. Military Academy from 1991 to 1995.

Kirkpatrick is the author of three books, An Unknown Future and a Doubtful Present: Sergeant Golden, written by R. Cody Phillips, this book provides brief descriptions of the holdings of 100 Army museums and other military artifact collections maintained by the Army. The guide states the location of each museum and its hours of operation. This book, which is CMH Pub 70–51, may be purchased from the Government Printing Office for $14 under stock number 008–029–00399–6. The Center has also issued a set of six color prints, each 16 by 20 inches in size, reproducing works of art by Sfc. Elize Golden depicting American soldiers in Desert Storm and Fallujah, Sergeant Golden is an artist assigned to the Center of Military History. The Government Printing Office is offering this set for sale for $12 under stock number 008–029–00418–6.

Each of the aforementioned publications may be obtained by Army publication account holders from the Directorate of Logistics—Washington, Media Distribution Division, ATTN: JDHQVSVPAS, 1655 Woodson Road, St. Louis, Missouri 63114–6128. Account holders may also place their orders at http://www.us.army.mil. The facility accepts customer service inquiries by phone at 314–592–0910 and by email at the customer service link at the aforementioned website.

Some of the recent publications of the Center not currently available for sale may be offered to the public later. The issuance of the CD ROM version of Correspondence Relating to the War with Spain (2d ed., CMH, 1993), under the title The United States Army and the War with Spain, was announced in the Spring 2005 issue of Army History (No. 61). The CD ROM contains the text of the memoranda, but can be now be purchased from the Government Printing Office for $21.19 under stock number 008–029–00428–3.

Review by Roger D. Cunningham

In 1993 James T. Controvich, an employee of the city of Springfield, Massachusetts, and a “sloppy collector of army unit histories” (1: 635), published the first edition of United States Army Unit and Organizational Histories. The subject of this review is an updated version of that book, now issued in a two-volume format because the compiler discovered that over two decades the number of entries had nearly doubled. Since these two volumes do not have to be purchased as a set, each one is considered separately. The first volume covers units from the Colonial era to World War I, and the second volume proceeds from 1917 to the present.

The first volume focuses primarily on the Civil War, and the compiler acknowledges that Charles E. Dornbusch’s Military Bibliography of the Civil War (3 vols., New York, 1961–72) served as one of the main sources for his entries. The volume’s first 100 pages list non-state unit/organizational histories according to their related branches—Artillery, Infantry, Signal Corps, etc.—with separate chapters for titles related to divisions, corps, armies, miscellaneous units, and geographic commands. The remaining five-ninths of the volume consists of a single lengthy chapter listing military and National Guard unit histories organized according to their respective state or territory, including the District of Columbia and the Philippines. With some exceptions, the last item in each entry is a code identifying one library where the book may be found.

The compiler readily admits that “a bibliography of this nature must be considered a work in progress” (1: 1), so there are some omissions. In the section of the artillery chapter listing histories of United States Colored Troops units during the Civil War, there is an entry for an article on the Independent Battery (Douglass’s Battery), U.S. Colored Light Artillery, that appeared in early 2001. In the Virginia section of the militia chapter, there is a listing for the 119th Virginia Volunteer Infantry of the Spanish–American War. There are also no entries for the Alabama, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, North Carolina, and Ohio sections for six other scholar journal articles on black Spanish–American War units by William B. Gateswood Jr. that appeared between 1971 and 1973. This suggests that the compiler did not thoroughly screen the many journals published by state historical societies.1

The second volume is organized in the same manner as the first, with additional chapters to cover newer branches, such as the Chemical, Military Intelligence, and Military Police Corps. Because state National Guard units have fought under federal designations since World War I, this volume’s National Guard chapter is much smaller, accounting for only about one-ninth of its length. Thus a journal article discussing the 1916 mobilization of the District of Columbia’s First Separate Battalion for service on the Mexican border is listed in the National Guard chapter in Volume 1, while histories of the 372nd Infantry, with which that National Guard organization served in two world wars, are listed in the infantry chapter in Volume 2. Entries concerning units with long histories, such as Joseph I. Lambert, 1st Indiana Volunteer Infantry of the Spanish–American War, or William H. Leckie is listed under XVIII Airborne Corps but does not appear under either the 13th, 17th, 82d, or 101st Airborne Divisions. Also neither volume seems to have any entries from post-2001 sources, so researchers hoping to find information on articles and books written during the past four years are advised to look elsewhere, as are researchers seeking works covering military issues that transcend a narrow unit focus.

Within these limitations, the 2003 edition of United States Army Unit and Organizational Histories provides a very useful two-volume bibliography and an excellent place for a military historian to begin locating both printed primary and secondary sources. Unfortunately, the volumes’ $270 total price tag will probably discourage all but very serious (or wealthy) researchers from adding the set to their personal libraries.

Retired Lt. Col. Roger D. Cunningham served as an infantry and military police officer in the United States and Korea and as a foreign area officer in Pakistan, Egypt, and Nepal. He was the U.S. defense attaché in Kathmandu in 1991–92. His article “Rearvent to His Trust: The Disappearing Centuries One Hundred Years with the Army Air Assault in the Winter–Spring 2004 issue of Army History (No. 60).
Field Artillery and Firepower by J. B. A. Bailey, Naval Institute Press, 2004, 633 pp., $49.95

Review by Boyd L. Dastrup

British Maj. Gen. Jonathan B. A. Bailey has established himself as a leading authority on the field of field artillery in war as the author of Field Artillery and Firepower, first published in its substantially expanded version in 2004. The Military Press of Oxford, England, brought Bailey’s treatise to light in 1989 as the first volume in its Combined Arms Library series. Bailey’s original book filled a gap in the literature on military history, which has concentrated for the most part on the combat contributions of the maneuver arms, the beneficiaries of artillery fire, rather than the field artillery itself. Bailey’s emphasis on the role of artillery is seen again in his second book, Field Artillery and Firepower, which was published in 2004.

In this volume, Bailey discusses how the field artillery has evolved from the early days of the Napoleonic Wars to the present day. He examines the role of artillery in both defensive and offensive operations and how it has been used throughout history to achieve different military objectives. Bailey emphasizes the importance of effective field artillery, particularly in massing fire from cannons positioned across the battlefield.

Bailey begins by discussing the development of field artillery during the early years of the Napoleonic Wars, when it was used primarily for direct fire support. He explains how, over time, the field artillery evolved into a combined arms weapon system, capable of providing massed fire in support of maneuver forces.

Bailey then turns to the role of field artillery in the American Civil War, where it played a crucial role in determining the outcome of battles. He discusses the use of field artillery by both Union and Confederate forces, as well as the innovations that were introduced during the war, such as the use of rifled guns and the development of effective smoke screens.

Bailey goes on to discuss the role of field artillery in the two World Wars, where it became an even more important weapon system. He explains how advances in technology, such as radar and computers, have allowed field artillery to become even more effective in recent decades.

Bailey concludes his book by discussing the future of field artillery, emphasizing the importance of continued research and development to ensure that field artillery remains a viable and effective weapon system in the twenty-first century. He calls for a renewed focus on field artillery education and training, as well as greater investment in research and development to ensure that field artillery remains relevant and effective in the years to come.

In conclusion, Field Artillery and Firepower is an excellent volume that provides a comprehensive overview of the development and role of field artillery throughout history. Bailey’s expertise and insights make this a valuable resource for students, scholars, and practitioners of military history and field artillery alike.
Fischer is one of America’s preeminent living historians and, working from a new manuscript stage. Enter their revels when taken by Washington’s men on the morning of 26 December. In fact, although badly surprised and outnumbered, they resisted vigorously for hours. Fischer’s commander, Johann Gottlieb Rall, was mortally wounded and they were overwhelmed.

More substantively, the book challenges alternative images many of us carry of Washington either as a “marble man,” distant and cold, or as an oft-beaten, amateur general whose only military contribution to independence was to rag his ragged army up. In Fischer’s rendering—and through the eyes and accounts of Washington’s contemporaries—we encounter an energetic, brave commander who demonstrated tremendous ability to inspire his men and learn from his mistakes. Indeed, this Washington displays in abundance all the requirements for successful combat leadership. He employs superior intelligence about the New Jersey terrain in a manner that resembles Stonewall Jackson’s campaign of battlefield against Union forces in the Shenandoah Valley. He builds consensus among subordinate generals. He employs his troops in accordance with their capabilities and to the best advantage of their unique strengths. And he leads from the front, positioning himself at the decisive point on the battlefield and repeatedly exposing himself to enemy fire.

And again during the campaign, Washington showed a penchant for bold maneuver. Following the Christmas night raid across the Delaware, he launched a second, larger surprise crossing four days later and occupied the high ground just south of Trenton. Here, along Assunpink Creek, the Americans fought a successful retreat back in England, where the war grew increasingly unpopolar. Beyond the psychological impact, the campaign inflicted heavy losses on British and Hessian forces, unbalanced the Loyalist position in New Jersey, and gave the patriot cause breathing space at a critical juncture. Throughout this tour de force, Fischer powerfully illustrates the importance of contingency, the historians’ term for expressing the idea that peoples’ beliefs and choices—not fate, not a decisive battle, not a single event—were what truly count in history. Deeply researched, creatively reconstructed, and gracefully written, Washington Crossing offers a model of the military historian’s craft.

Retired Col. Alan C. Cate teaches history at the University School in Shaker Heights, Ohio. Prior to his retirement from the Army in 2004, he was the director of the U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, and earlier in his career he was an assistant professor in the History Department of Catholic University of America. He holds a master’s degree in history from Stanford University.

The second part of the book focuses on France’s defense in Italy. The 1807 campaign, 1809 operations, and the 1813 final assault on Austerlitz are treated in detail. The comprehensive bibliography displays Schneid’s breadth of primary source research in French, Italian, and Austrian archives. The list of secondary sources, conveniently arranged by topic, provides another useful resource for the reader.

Schneid opens by setting the stage in a wonderful preface on the operations of the main armies of France and Austria and their leaders. He accomplishes this in brief enough fashion not to overwhelm the reader, yet fully enough to remove the need to interject these details later in the text. One theme he highlights in this portion is the disagreement between the French leaders and their Austrian counterparts. Another is the important role played by Charles and his brother, the Austrian Archduke Charles. As Schneid explains, Charles maintained that “a war at this time . . . would certainly result in disaster.” Colonial America was but a “distant and cold, or a ‘marble man,’ distant and cold, or as an oft-beaten, amateur general whose only military contribution to independence was to rag his ragged army up. In Fischer’s rendering—and through the eyes and accounts of Washington’s contemporaries—we encounter an energetic, brave commander who demonstrated tremendous ability to inspire his men and learn from his mistakes. Indeed, this Washington displays in abundance all the requirements for successful combat leadership. He employs superior intelligence about the New Jersey terrain in a manner that resembles Stonewall Jackson’s campaign of battlefield against Union forces in the Shenandoah Valley. He builds consensus among subordinate generals. He employs his troops in accordance with their capabilities and to the best advantage of their unique strengths. And he leads from the front, positioning himself at the decisive point on the battlefield and repeatedly exposing himself to enemy fire.

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Napoleonic Italian Campaigns: 1805–1815

By Frederick C. Schneid

Prager Publishers, 2002, 228 pp., $64.95

Review by Frederick H. Black Jr.

Historians have long documented the glories of Napoleon’s armies in northern Europe during the 1796–97 and 1800 campaigns. While those campaigns certainly propelled Napoleon to prominence, the wars in Italy did not end there. Conflict continued in this vital region throughout Napoleon’s rule. Napoleon’s absence from Italy after 1800, due to more significant activities in other regions, may in part explain the shortage of scholarship on the later battles, but it does not excuse this omission. Frederick Schneid aims to right this oversight in his book Napoleon’s Italian Campaigns: 1805– 1815. This second part of his major work, Soldiers of Napoleon’s Kingdom of Italy: Army, State, and Society, 1800–1815 (Boulder, 1995), covered roughly the same period, but, as its title implies, that book focused on the soldiers from the larger and better-known battles on the lesser-known engagements. For instance, the capture of 25,000 Austrians at Ulm in October 1805. He draws a similar connection between the Battle of Austerlitz and the operations in Italy following this caliber. In this manner, Carollard, a “marble man,” distant and cold, or a “marble man,” distant and cold, or as an oft-beaten, amateur general whose only military contribution to independence was to rag his ragged army up. In Fischer’s rendering—and through the eyes and accounts of Washington’s contemporaries—we encounter an energetic, brave commander who demonstrated tremendous ability to inspire his men and learn from his mistakes. Indeed, this Washington displays in abundance all the requirements for successful combat leadership. He employs superior intelligence about the New Jersey terrain in a manner that resembles Stonewall Jackson’s campaign of battlefield against Union forces in the Shenandoah Valley. He builds consensus among subordinate generals. He employs his troops in accordance with their capabilities and to the best advantage of their unique strengths. And he leads from the front, positioning himself at the decisive point on the battlefield and repeatedly exposing himself to enemy fire.

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army marched into Russia under Eugène’s command. Schneid describes the battle outside Moscow in late October 1812 as “the bloodiest and most costly in the history of the Armée d’Italie” (p. 104). After returning to Italy in 1813 with fewer than 3,000 troops, Eugène faced the daunting task of rebuilding his army; amazingly by July of that year his army numbered approximately 40,000 native Italians. Schneid points out that the large number of Italians in the Armée d’Italie had positive and negative consequences for both the army and Italy as a whole.

The author recognizes that Italy was a secondary theater of operations throughout the period from 1805 to 1815. Napoleon, initially concerned to station troops stationed there to discourage the Austrians from entering or reentering the ongoing conflict and make them pay at least some cost of maintaining an army on the border, Eugène reengaged the conflict in August 1813 with two corps that numbered about 47,000 men, substantially fewer than the 100,000 Austrians that were opposed to him. As a result, Schneid explains, Eugène chose to “sacrifice blood in order to maintain the integrity of Italy and the troops stationed there” (p. 119) to avoid the consequences of maintaining a large army of occupation. In this 2003 revised edition, Schneid’s latest efforts constitute less a major reworking than a modest retouching of a well-known text. Schneid’s latest efforts should be evaluated.

The new version manages to correct most of these earlier problems by drawing heavily on post-1967 scholarship, and, in some ways, a comparison of the original and revised editions reveals how much the historical profession has evolved with the times. Reflecting modern sensitivities, the subtitle replaces “Negro Cavalry” with “Black Cavalry,” while the term “Afro-Asian” is replaced by the term “African American.” The Ninth and Tenth Cavalry companies remain the key actors because the black infantry has been well covered elsewhere. The Leckies have also made sense of the political and social dynamics that produced the black military phenomenon in Cleveland, one of the few major industrial cities in the United States that had a significant black population. Schneid’s latest effort should be evaluated.

What clearly distinguishes the revised edition from the first are the last two chapters, starting with “The Final Years,” in which the Leckies describe the family life, education, and other aspects of the lives of retired black officers and privates and noncommissioned officers. Though incorporating this material throughout the other chapters might have been helpful, the new edition remains a welcome addition. An all-new twenty-page epilogue delivers a synopsis of black military history after the Indian Wars that extends from the Jim Crow era of the 1880s to the take of black-armed forces in 1948. The Leckies also provide a summation of buffalo soldiers’ depictions in films, memorials, and novels, not all of which they applaud. The Leckies argue that the epilogue’s importance is the Leckies’ acknowledgment of how historiographical trends on the buffalo soldiers have diverged from the official “Negro Cavalry” with “Black Cavalry,” while the term “Afro-Asian” is replaced by the term “African American.” The Ninth and Tenth Cavalry companies remain the key actors because the black infantry has been well covered elsewhere. The Leckies have also made sense of the political and social dynamics that produced the black military phenomenon in Cleveland, one of the few major industrial cities in the United States that had a significant black population. Schneid’s latest effort should be evaluated.

The Buffalo Soldiers: A Narrative of the Black Cavalry in the West by William L. Leckie, with Shirley A. Leckie
Review by James N. Leiker
Since his World War II service when he led African American troops in the Pacific theater, Bill Leckie has been researching and telling the history of the black military for so long that he essentially has become part of the story. In his book The Buffalo Soldiers, first released in 1967, documented the role of all-black cavalry regiments in the western Indian Wars and delivered a timely corrective to the popular notion that there was no presence of color in western conquest. In this 2003 revised edition, Bill—in collaboration with his wife, Shirley, a historian in her own right—attempts to update the original version by incorporating new research. Those who question the appropriateness of revising such an all-classic text of black military history will find the new quite familiar; most of the text, including the chapter headings, is identical. Updated footnotes show references to contemporary secondary works, including some written by the Leckies, and a detailed study of a specific theater of operations. In this 2003 revised edition, Schneid’s latest efforts constitute less a major reworking than a modest retouching of a well-known text. Schneid’s latest efforts should be evaluated.

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Visitors to a thriving city, volunteer for active military service during wartime, and contribute significantly to the social life of Cleveland.

While the Cleveland Grays is preserved today by the 112th Engineer Battalion, Ohio National Guard, the traditions of this originally independent voluntary militia company have been maintained by the prestigious Cleveland Grays civic organization. The civic organization, which Vourlojian once headed, has no military affiliation but provides a venue for Grays members to participate in the community and exhibits the superb ceremonial aspects of their military tradition. Members of this unit have represented a social and economic elite. Vourlojian has validated the author’s thesis that the civic organization’s ceremonial activities have contributed significantly to the picture of this unit and might have profited from more extensive use of primary sources and more historical analysis.

The threat to the U.S.-Mexican border posed by Mexican revolutionaries resurfaced in the protection of the Mexican border in 1916. Fifty months after returning from border service in March 1917, the 3d Ohio was ordered to Camp Sheridan, Alabama, and in September 1917 it was redesignated as the 148th Infantry. The latter organization remained for the end of an era and the beginning of the twenty-first century and how this impacted Cleveland and elsewhere in Ohio, in the attitude of the economic elite. Vourlojian does, however, make some important contributions to the picture of this unit and might have profited from more extensive use of primary sources and more historical analysis.

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Years of distinguished service. Like the author, he was born and raised in Illinois. He was commissioned in 1902, just as President Theodore Roosevelt declared an end to major combat overseas, against invaders of the Philippines. This placed him squarely in the generation of Walter Krueger, Douglas MacArthur, Lesley J. McNair, George C. Marshall, and Joseph W. Stilwell, each of whom represented the senior Army command or staff position in World War II. All had served as junior officers in the Philippines before World War I. In this period the U.S. Army struggled with guerrilla forces there in what we would today label “stability and support operations.”

Short excelled at every stage of his career and became instrumental in the transformation undertaken by the Army to incorporate the unprecedented firepower of the machine gun. After the First World War he progressed to receive promotion, taking his peers, including General Douglas MacArthur, to the 6th Infantry in 1933. After that, he rocketed to the top, first as assistant commandant of the Infantry School, then as brigade and division commander for the 7th Infantry Division. MacArthur commanded a corps during the 1940 Third Army maneuvers, Army Chief of Staff Marshall, who had known Short since 1906 and had served with him in France, selected him to command the Hawaiian Department, the Army’s largest overseas command.

The heart of Anderson’s book concerns Short’s actions as commander of that department between February and December 1941, as he built up the Hawaiian Air Force, trained his forces to defeat amphibious landings, and prepared Washington to come to the Hawaiian Department’s aid. MacArthur relied on himself on Bataan and in the Southwest Pacific. Had the Japanese invaded Hawaii, Short might similarly have proven to be a national hero. But he was relieved of command and forced to retire in disgrace at his permanent grade of major general, marked forever as being at least partially responsible for the disaster.

Hearings and review boards failed to give Short the vindication he sought during his lifetime. The sobering truth is that something went wrong everywhere, but the enemy still strikes a deadly blow. High command brings with it the risk of failure and recrimination. This fine book gives Short the recognition he so richly deserves. The performance of his duty.

Anderson examines Short’s cooperation with a series of investigations over the next five years, culminating in joint congressional hearings in 1945–46. Short was repeatedly called upon to justify his every action as commander, especially in the final days leading up to 7 December. Anderson tells the story better than any of the previous authors. Short testified with dignity, professionalism, and moral courage but consistently rejected any implication that he had been derelict in the performance of his duty.

After the war Short maintained a dignified silence until his death in 1949 at age 69. He was buried in Arlington National Cemetery. Decades later in 1998 a Department of Defense panel recommended that the secretary of defense take no further action to clear the records of Kimmel and Short or to restore their previous ranks, as requested by their families and supporters. The Naval Institute Press has recently published this panel’s report, along with useful commentaries by Col. Frank C. Gruenther, an Army lawyer, and Daniel Martinez, National Park Service historian at the USS Arizona Memorial, under the title Kimmel, Short, and Pearl Harbor: The Final Report of the Pearl Harbor Investigation Panel (Naval Institute Press, 2005). Although the publisher calls this the “final” report, the Pearl Harbor controversy will doubtless go on for as long as people debate the responsibilities of high command.

The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor
By Charles Lane Toomey
Hegle Press, 2004, 626 pp., $34.95

In August 1990, Lt. Gen. Gary Luck’s VIII Airborne Corps arrived in the Saudi Arabian desert to begin a desperate fight along Kuwait’s southern border. Iraqi troops were in position to continue their offensive south. Hardened in Iraq’s desperate war with Iran and the “pirates from the east” (as he equates the presence of military hardware, the Iraqi Army appeared to be an impressive foe, more than capable of brushing aside the weak Saudi Arabian Army. Standing between the IX Corps (equivalent to a French 6ème Division Légère Blindée (6th Light Armored Division) in its attack on Iraq) and the Arabian oilfields were the few battalions of airborne infantry that Luck had been able to assemble in the first few weeks of August. Fortunately, the author concludes, “The Eighth Airborne Division’s seizure of Forward Operating Base Cobra and its actions in Area of Operations Eagle along the Euphrates River on the second day of the war. Operation Eagle along the Euphrates River. Seven of his twenty-one chapters describe the maneuver of the command’s divisions and supporting units. While its opposition was light, compared to the combat experience of the VII Corps to its right, its attack was essential to protect the coalition’s left flank. Toomey adequately describes the corps’ assault and most of its important engagements. Of special note is his coverage of the French 6ème Division Légère Blindée (6th Light Armored Division) in its attack on Iraq. By contrast, the VIII Corps’ actions in the desert transportation net in the corps area. His description of the charge of the 4ème Régiment de Dragons (4th Dragon Regiment) against 100 Iraqi armored personnel carriers on September 8, 1990, is simply stirring. He goes into extensive detail to describe both the challenges and success of the largest helicopter-borne assault in American history and much of its importance in the desert transport system outweighs the corps’ exploitation of the Joanna mission or theลาย of the ever increasing number of American soldiers. The VIII Corps’ command was in position to continue to envelop and isolate the Iraqi forces in the Kuwaiti Theater, when General H. Norman Schwarzkopf Jr. put into effect the cease-fire ordered by President George H. W. Bush. Most senior VIII Corps officers believed that the cease-fire decision was ill-timed and that the Army should have continued one more day to pressure the Iraqis and forge a genuine surrender.

Dr. James C. McNaughton is the command historian of the U.S. European Command. He was the command historian of U.S. Army, Pacific, from 2001 to March 2005. He is a member of the author walks the reader from Exercise Storm: From Planning to Victory By Charles Lane Toomey

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XVIII Airborne Corps in Desert Storm: From Planning to Victory
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Review by Stephen Bouzique

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Toomey also presents the best account of tactical operations center (TOC) status for the Corps’s experience. His inside-the-TOC on the first C–141 airlift with the Corps’s XVIII Corps’s G–3 planning cell in Fort Leavenworth’s School of Advanced Army inspector general investigation and agrees was justified, resulting in a major vehicles. This incident, which the author the Victory Division had destroyed over its sector. By the end of the day the Hammurabi Division trying to escape (Mechanized) pounced on a brigade from combat action that took place after the date of the corps’s most controversial to date of the twentieth century.

My major complaint is that Toomey generally confines his discussion to activities below corps level and fails to examine fully the decision-making process at corps headquarters. I had hoped to learn more about General Lucks’s interaction with his peers, such asLt. Gen. Frederick Franks of VII Corps and the senior officers with Third Army and Central Command. While much of this material is covered in other sources, viewing it from the XVIII Corps’s perspective would have been instructive. That said, this is nevertheless a solid manuscript that is an essential addition to the library of any soldier or scholar interested in combat operations at the end of the twentieth century.

Not a Good Day to Die: The Untold Story of Operation Anaconda
By Sean Naylor
Berkley Books, 2005, 425 pp., $25.95

Review by Richard W. Stewart

Sean Naylor has written a very good and quite exciting book about events in Afghanistan in 1992. Special Air Service unit), several ad hoc headquarters or task forces (including the often overlooked Task Force Bowe—a joint interagency task force with an intelligence fusion mission), conventional forces of the 10th Mountain Division and 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), and various “other governmental agency” intelligence agents and analysts that planned and carried out Operation Anaconda. Naylor’s grasp of the facts and personalities is sure, on the whole, and he omits no major players. He has generally done his homework, and the author has mined all of the available secondary sources and a wide range of government documents. His impressive bibliography forms the baseline for any further scholarship on the XVIII Corps’s conduct of this campaign.

Organized into twenty-two chapters and seven appendices, Toomey’s book provides a detailed story of the corps’s activities. The author is generally blunt with his descriptions of events and does not hesitate to point out where matters did not progress as planned, such as with the use of long-range surveillance units to reconnoiter before the attack or the development of friction between rear staff officers and front-line soldiers. He is at his best in describing details, such as the mechanics of deployment and the process of establishing the initial defense.

Retired Army Maj. Stephen A. Bourque is an associate professor of history at the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He served in the 1st Infantry Division in the Persian Gulf War and in 1992 commanded the Army’s only Regular Army military history detachment. He wrote the chapter on Operation DESERT STORM in George Hofmann and Donn Starry, eds., Camp Colt to DESERT STORM: The History of U.S. Armored Forces (Lexington, Ky., 1999). He is the author of Izzywank! The VII Corps in the Persian Gulf/War, published by the Center of Military History in 2002.

An Iraqi T–72 tank destroyed in Operation DESERT STORM
at the time. Such an approach tends to detract from the detailed work that the author has done. In those sections of the book that eschew false drama, Naylor has written a truly exhilarating story that needs no false cadence to carry it. 

My second objection, related to the first, is that at times the author seems determined to find far too much conflict, dissent, and intensity among elements of the military. Naylor recognizes this intensity in great detail but fails to see the essential flexibility that brought victory, admittedly at a price, but victory nonetheless. I suggest that the conflicts among the planners and operators were more the result of professional soldiers and operators grappling with real problems and less the ego-driven posturing that Naylor seems so taken with. Personalities are important in war, and in the special operations community they are often critical. But one can overwrite the “clash of princes” scenario that dominates much of this book to the detriment of the rest of the story.

My third main problem is that the author indulges in so much detail on the nuances of the special operations that I find its perspective is not as broad as it could be. This gives very short shrift to much of the operation. He spends the first 368 pages tracing the development of the plan, the actions on Day 1, and the fight on Takur Ghar on the following two days. In the process he elaborates on the actions of special operations reconnaissance teams, providing some of the best and most detailed accounts of this aspect of the operation that I have seen. He then wraps up the next two weeks of the operation in a mere ten pages. Granted, the first three days of ANAConDA saw most of the ground combat, but the reader comes away from this account feeling that he or she has not, the Army you might want.

In the inevitable aftermath of the difficult first few days of the operation, there has been a certain measure of second-guessing and finger-pointing. There was certainly some dissension and tension. Some of the actors were right and others wrong, and each tried to convince the other of his position. The men fought in a state of “friction” as messy and “friction” exists. No plan was first contact with a resourceful and brave foe. Yet U.S. forces bounced back, reorganized, punneled the enemy, and drove him from the caves in which he was sheltering within two weeks.

Secondly, ANAConDA seemed to serve as many, certainly, but also as a tribute to U.S. planning flexibility and to the courage of the troops and their leaders who could make lemonade out of the lemons they were dealt. Naylor recognizes this intensity in great detail but fails to see the essential flexibility that brought victory, admittedly at a price, but victory nonetheless. I suggest that the conflicts among the planners and operators were more the result of professional soldiers and operators grappling with real problems and less the ego-driven posturing that Naylor seems so taken with. Personalities are important in war, and in the special operations community they are often critical. But one can overwrite the “clash of princes” scenario that dominates much of this book to the detriment of the rest of the story.

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In Memoriam, Martin Blumenson (1918–2005)

Martin Blumenson, a prolific historian of World War II who worked at the Office of the Chief of Military History both as an Army officer and a civilian, died on 15 April 2005 at the age of 86.

A native of New York City, Blumenson received a bachelor’s degree from Bucknell University and master’s degrees in history from Bucknell and Harvard. Commissioned in the Army during World War II, he served in Europe as a historical officer with Third and Seventh Armies. Recalled to active duty in 1950, he commanded a historical detachment in Korea and in 1952 was assigned to the Office of the Chief of Military History. He later served for a year as historian of a joint task force conducting atomic weapons tests in the Pacific.

Blumenson returned to OCMH as a civilian in 1957 and worked there until 1967. He authored two volumes in the official history of the U.S. Army in World War II, Breakout and Pursuit (OCMH, 1961), describing the fighting that liberated Paris and much of northern France, and Salerno to Cassino (OCMH, 1969), covering the first eight months of the Army’s combat on the Italian mainland. He assisted in the writing of a third volume in that series, Sicily and the Surrender of Italy (OCMH, 1965), by Albert Garland and Howard M. Smyth, condensing and revising the authors’ manuscript.

After leaving OCMH, Blumenson taught at several colleges. He held the Ernest J. King chair of maritime history at the U.S. Naval War College and the Harold Keith Johnson chair of military history at the U.S. Army War College. He also taught and served as a graduate adviser at George Washington University. He was a member of the Department of the Army’s Historical Advisory Committee from 1989 to 1993. The books Blumenson authored included Anzio: The Gamble That Failed (Philadelphia, 1963); Rommel’s Last Victory: The Battle of Kasserine Pass (London, 1967); Bloody River: The Real Tragedy of the Rapids (Boston, 1970); Eisenhour (New York, 1972); The Vidal Affair: Beginning of the French Resistance (Boston, 1977); Mark Clark (New York, 1984); The Battle of the Generals: The True Story of the Falaise Pocket, the Campaign That Should Have Won World War II (New York, 1993); and Heroes Never Die: Weapons and Warfare in World II (New York, 2001). He also compiled and edited The Patton Papers (2 vols., Boston, 1972–74); authored Patton, the Man behind the Legend, 1885–1945 (New York, 1985); and delivered a Harman memorial lecture on Patton at the U.S. Air Force Academy.

In 1995 Blumenson received the Society for Military History’s Samuel Eliot Morison Prize for his lifetime contributions to the field of military history.

In Memoriam, Charles V. P. von Luttichau (1917–2005)

Charles Victor Pennington von Luttichau, a historian who worked at the Center of Military History for 35 years, died on 27 May 2005. He was 87.

Von Luttichau was one of the founders of the U.S. Commission on Military History, and he remained active in the organization for decades. He served as a consultant to Time-Life Books on the production of The Soviet Juggernaut by Earl F. Zimmerman, which appeared in 1982. He also wrote for the Center a detailed, manuscript account of the 1941 German invasion of the Soviet Union, which the Center has been revising with an eye to its publication.
Iraq’s Kurds after that war, and the role of Army lawyers in military operations from the 1960s to the 1990s. The list also includes collections of essays on American defense acquisition since World War II and the evolution of thought over the last two centuries on what we now call operational art. The new direction from the Center that will likely reach the largest audience is the thoroughly revised and expanded two-volume survey American Military History, which provides readers with a thoughtful and comprehensive introduction to the topic. We expect it will be used at many American colleges.

Beyond these books, the Center has issued a stream of brief “cargo pocket” histories, some offering accounts of the Army’s recent campaigns. These have been particularly well received by our soldiers. The Center has broadened its publication efforts into other media as well. The Center of Military History website has expanded, incorporating an ever-larger sampling of our manuscripts and holdings, and it now attracts roughly seven million “hits” a month. The website has won a number of academic awards, each of which in turn has further increased its use. We have been putting our publications and collections onto compact discs as well, and each CD we have published thus far has elicited rave reviews. Army History, this very magazine that you are reading, has matured into a first-class periodical—without advertisements! These innovations have been reflected in the field. Several major command history offices have established websites and issued CDs. The Training and Doctrine Command’s Combat Studies Institute, having been totally reorganized and expanded, has once again initiated an aggressive publication program. I am proud of the manner in which we Army historians have sustained our long-established standards for major publications, while reaching out to our public with diverse products to fully satisfy our readers.

We have been working more closely in recent years with our international colleagues. We have sustained our long and healthy relationship with the International Commission of Military History and our robust bilateral ties to a number of international military history offices. Over the last six years the Partnership for Peace Military History Working Group, encompassing the military history organizations of the United States, Canada, and a wide array of Western and Eastern European nations, has developed a vibrant forum for intellectual exchange, particularly with respect to the Cold War. I hope this will serve as a model for multinational military history gatherings in other regions of the world. These international contacts, which the internet has made ever more convenient, have helped all involved with access to archives and the pursuit of historical research.

When I first arrived at the Center of Military History, the National Museum of the United States Army was nothing more than an idea. Now the National Museum Division of the Center has its own headquarters at Fort Belvoir, Virginia; an ever-growing staff under capable leadership; and the support of the Army’s leaders for the expenditure of over $100 million in appropriated funds. It has established vibrant outreach programs that have demonstrated its capacity to reach the American public while building goodwill around the world. The Army Historical Foundation, a private organization raising funds for the museum, has grown in size and capacity as well. We may all look forward to a wonderful opening event in June 2011. We also can take great pride in the successful, well-organized, and well-led affiliates of the museum, the Army Heritage and Education Center at Carlisle, Pennsylvania, and the Center of Military History’s Clearinghouse at Anniston, Alabama. The growing synergy among these three fine institutions—one primarily a museum, one primarily an archive, and one primarily a depot—cannot help but lift the Army Historical Program to an entirely new level.

While the Army museum system as a whole will benefit greatly from the emerging National Museum of the United States Army, it has also independently made great strides in centralizing inventory control and enhancing the quality of its many constituent museums. The museum system’s collegial certification teams and command supply discipline teams have exemplified the ideal of curators helping one another to achieve the highest possible standards. Over the past seven years we have integrated all of the U.S. Army’s museum artifacts into a single property book—the largest in the Department of Defense—and we are currently entering them all into a single data base. This has enormously improved accountability, protecting these valuable items from the vagaries of local moves or reorganizations. We have begun to centralize the oversight of museum funding as well, seeking to ensure that each museum gets the best possible support while enjoying economies of scale and full asset visibility.

I could not be more pleased with or proud of the time that I have had the honor to serve as chief of military history. I am indebted to each of you for all of your hard work and for the dedication you have displayed in preserving and promulgating the history and heritage of our soldiers. Seven years have gone by incredibly quickly. I leave with the fondest of memories.

Dr. John S. Brown retired from his position as chief of military history in October 2005.
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